# The Ecumenism of the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī of Pakistan

## Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Masters by Research

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I confirm that the work submitted is my own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

<u>Abstract</u>

Religious Sectarianism between Muslims has manifested itself in various ways within Pakistan, from polemical infighting and excommunication and at times there has been sectarian militancy which has received global attention, particularly from the 1980s onwards, where Pakistan had witnessed chapters of serious incidents of sectarian violence claiming the lives of many. Polemical infighting between Muslims in Pakistan has a longstanding history linked to the diverse makeup of Muslims in South Asia.

Some Islamists especially the Jama'āt-i-Islāmi have been considered to be post-sectarian. The loss of Muslim political power through the abolition of the Caliphate and the effect of colonialism had caused Muslims, especially those from the revivalist trend to emphasise the need for greater unity between Muslims. The Jama'āt-i-Islāmi's founder, Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi was a fierce critic of Sectarianism between Muslims, a position that was also held by fellow Islamists such as Hassan Al Banna.

This thesis explores the history of sectarianism in Pakistan and explores the relationship between the Jama'āt-i-Islāmi and other sects in Pakistan and how far the Jama'āt-i-Islami has been able to cross sectarian boundaries. In a broader sense, this study examines the relationships between Islamists and ecumenism as well as sectarianism and attempts to pacify sectarianism.

List of abbreviations

JUI      Jamiat Ulema-iIslam

TLP      Tehrīk-i-Labaik Pakistan

MMA Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal

SSP      Sipah-i-Sahāba Pakistan

TNFJ *Tehrīk-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jaa'faraiyah*

JIH Jamāʿat-i-Islāmī Hind

Contents

<u>Introduction</u>

<u>Background</u>

Throughout Islamic history, many '*sects'* have emerged, additionally, various schisms between these sects and, various legal and theological positionings/schools have formed. A doctrine of the Muslim *Umma* developing into 73 sects exists within Islam based on a Hadith:  "The Jews split into seventy-one sects, one of which will be in Paradise and seventy in Hell. The Christians split into seventy-two sects, seventy-one of which will be in Hell and one in Paradise. I swear by the One Whose Hand is the soul of Muhammad, my nation will split into seventy-three sects, one of which will be in Paradise and seventy-two in Hell." It was said: "O Messenger of Allah, who are they?" He said: "The main body."[1] Followers of various sects have weaponised this Hadith claiming to be the "saved sect."

Political events in early Islamic history had given space to the emergence of new sects and the formation of various theological schools. These political events have also influenced modern theology.

Sectarianism has manifested in Pakistan throughout its history in various forms, with episodes of intense sectarian violence seen in Pakistan's history. Polemics exist between Sunnis and Shiis and between individual Sunni sub-Sects[2]. Pan-Islamists and Islamist groups have often been considered groups that advocate against sectarianism in favour of greater Islamic unity.

Islam plays a central role in Pakistan's political system; several references are made to the Quran in Pakistan's constitution.  The centring of Islam within Pakistan's political culture could be attributed to the fact that the founding of the state of Pakistan was based on Muslim identity. Within Pakistan, multiple political parties use Islam to inform their policies, albeit to varying degrees, as well as using Islam to inform their ideology. In Pakistan, there is a high degree of religious diversity within Islam. Pakistan is home to a majority Muslim population with several sects that people are affiliated to. At

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[1] Ibn Majah 3992
[2] The term "Denomination" could be used to understand the meaning of a "subsect".

times, there has been a level of significant violence fuelled by sectarianism between sects, which has, at times, defined Pakistani politics.

Pakistan's ex-prime minister, Imran Khan, who was ousted from his role as prime minister of Pakistan in 2022, often spoke of establishing *Riyāsat-i-Medina* (The state of Medina) within Pakistan as a term to describe his political vision. Although Imran Khan's *Pakistan Tehrīk-i-Insaf* (Movement for Justice Party, Pakistan) (PTI) may not fall into the category of an *Islamist* political party, The PTI has entered into coalitions with Islamist parties, including the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī. The use of Islamic imagery highlights Islam's central role in Pakistan's political culture.

Following the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, which led to the loss of Muslim political power, sections of Muslims had concerned themselves with reviving political power. Unity between Muslims was perceived to be a necessary pre-requisite to achieving political autonomy.

The Jamā'at-i-Islāmī (Jamā'at) is the largest of all the religious political parties in Pakistan. The Jamā'at is often described as an Islamist political party. Whilst this assertion is not necessarily untrue, it must be noted that Islamism, like Islam in South Asia, is diverse with various readings of what constitutes Islamic politics and how to achieve their political ambitions. The Jamā'at describe themselves as the "party of *Iqāmat-i-dīn*", [3] (Literally translated to establishing the faith), the ideology of the Jamā'at represents a belief held by many Islamists that, establishing an Islamic polity to be a necessary form of devotional worship. The Jamā'at is not the sole representative of Islamists in Pakistan. Various outfits of Islamists exist within Pakistan, each with its own remits and ideological leanings. The diversity of Islamic sects in Pakistan is also reflected in multiple Islamist outlets in Pakistan; some sects in Pakistan have their own political parties.

The founding of the Jamā'at predated the creation of Pakistan. In the Pre-Pakistan context, the Jamā'at had been one of the key organisations of Muslim political organisations alongside the *Jamiat Ulema-e-Islām* Hind, a clerical party that had grown out of the Deoband movement. One of the factors that had led to the formation of the Jamā'at was the discontent with the secular nature of the leading Muslim League party. The Jamā'at is unique among its competing religious parties as it claims not to be connected to any individual sect, as is the case with the Jamat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, which represents clerics of the Deobandi sect and the *Tehrīk-e-Jāfirya* (The Jafari movement), which represents the Shia sub-sect of the Jafari Shias. The ideology of the Jamat is rooted in the

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[3] *Dastur Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan*

literature and ideology of its founder and the most influential figure in the party, Syed Abul Ala Mawdūdī.

Significance of the study

At the time of writing, much of the international reporting on Pakistani current affairs has been focused on sectarianism and sectarian violence against Pakistan's religious minorities,[1] such as Pakistan's Christian and Hindu communities, yet Intra-Islamic sectarianism is another major form of sectarianism in Pakistan that does not receive the same attention as interfaith violence receives. This study aims to explore the field of intra-Islamic Sectarian relations. The Issue of Islamic sectarianism in Pakistan is gaining further attention. The further polarisation of sects in Pakistan and the emergence of recent waves of religious politics in Pakistan, such as blasphemy activism, gives weight to the need to study Islamic sectarianism. Or in a broader sense, heresiology.

In recent history, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), one of the most vital state bodies in Pakistan that advises the Pakistani parliament on whether Pakistani state laws are compatible with Islamic law, has also come to acknowledge that (Islamic) sectarianism is on the rise in Pakistan and published an extensive survey on the dominant sects in Pakistan titled "*Pakistan Kay Dīni Masalik*" (The Islamic sects of Pakistan). The CII, in their motivations for the publication of this book, have argued that Sectarianism in Pakistan had risen in the 1980s and in the 1990s, the issue of sectarianism turned violent and extreme. According to their reports, among the reasons for the increase in sect-based discrimination (*Maslak-Prasti)* and contempt for other sects (*Maslaki Munāfarāt)* are a lack of understanding (*'Adm-Waqfiyat*) and lack of knowledge. [4]

Ecumenism, a term that has been traditionally used to describe the promotion of unity among Christian sects and churches, has parallels in the Islamic context and in this study, the term is used to describe ideas and the process of uniting Muslim sects or rapprochement between Muslim sects.

When speaking of Ecumenism in an Islamic context, I cover two main areas of research: political sectarianism, including sectarian violence/militancy, and the theological rapprochement of differences between Islamic sects.

[1] See Adeel Hussain, *Revenge Politics and Blasphemy in Pakistan* (C Hurst & Co Publishers: 2022)

[4] Akbar, Saqib *Pakistan Kay Deeni Masalik* (Al-Basirsah, 2010)  pp.3

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[4] Akbar, Saqib *Pakistan Kay Deeni Masalik* (Al-Basirsah, 2010)  pp.3

In this study, I explore the concept of Islamic sectarianism as a theological concept. Besides this, I explore the political history of sectarianism in Pakistan as well as exploring the extent to which the Jamā'at, if at all, has been able to pacify some of the sectarian divisions in Pakistan.

## Purpose of the study

The Jamā'at-i-Islāmī is credited as being a non-sectarian party, while Islamists have been credited with advocating for greater Islamic unity. This study aims to understand to what extent this assertion is true. Furthermore, the study seeks to understand what factors contribute to the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī being considered a non-sectarian party and to what extent the Jamā'at's non-sectarian outlook has been reflected in the wider Pakistani society or in different political parties in Pakistan. In addition to this, the study aims to be a historical survey of the political project of the Jamā'at within the context of sectarianism in Pakistan and to evaluate what effect sectarianism has had on the Jamā'at's achievement of its political aims.

As the history of sectarianism is a history that spans decades and contains various nuances based on the localisation of Islam around the world, I have attempted to localise the study of Islamic sectarianism in the Pakistani context. This is of importance as much research has gone into the study of Shii-Sunni Ecumenism outside of Pakistan; however, such research is less frequent in the Pakistani context. [5]

## Structure and chapter outline

As this study is not purely a historical survey of sectarian tensions and violence in Pakistan, this study is structured around themes rather than a chronology of events relating to sectarianism in Pakistan's history.

Chapter one attends to understanding the various different sects in Pakistan, some of the polemics between sects as well as understanding the history of sectarian violence between sects.

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[5] Sohaib Ali and Fatima Waqi Sajjad, 'Pacifying Sunni-Shiite relations. *In Radicalisation in Pakistan, a critical perspective*. (Routleddge:2002) Pp. 80

Chapter two studies the language surrounding the Jamā'at in order to understand whether the Jamā'at should be positioned as a sect or orientation in of itself or whether it can be understood to be a political movement.

Chapter Three discusses approaches to ecumenism from Muslims, especially the approaches promoted or applied by Islamists and pan-Islamists.

Chapter Four examines the methods of promoting ecumenism used by the Jamā'at.

Chapter five analyses challenge the Jamā'at faces in implementing its political aims as well as understanding the implications of such challenges on the Jamā'at's promotion of ecumenism.

Methodology

This study aims to include a theological and historical survey of the polemics that exist between the main sects in Pakistan. A hermeneutics-based approach is used to study some of these polemics and their development. It seeks to contextualise how these polemics have informed political sectarianism in Pakistan. As this study deals with sectarian violence and the Pakistani state response, terrorism studies also is a perspective that features in this study; however, its use is limited to understanding organisations that have been proscribed as terrorist organisations by Pakistan.

Main research questions:

- To what extent has ecumenism been a continual part of the political project of the Jamā'at?
- What have been the challenges to the Jamā'at concerning polemical sectarianism?
- To what extent has the Jamā'at been successful in promoting ecumenism?
- What approaches have the Jamā'at used in its promotion of ecumenism?

Additional questions:

- What approaches to rapprochement between sects have been taken within Pakistan, and the wider Islamicate world outside of the activities of the Jamā'at?
- To what extent have activities of the Jamā'at been emulated by other religious parties?
- To what extent have theological polemics played in the spread of sectarian violence in Pakistan?
- To what extent has Pan-Islamic unity been a recurring theme among Islamists?

Literature review

This section aims to explore the existing literature relating to the topics of sectarianism, intra-Islamic polemics and Ecumenism in addition to the literature discussing the relationship between sectarianism and Pakistani politics. The majority of the literature is in English however many Urdu texts have been consulted, especially texts that discuss the Jamā'at . Some Arabic texts that discuss Islamism have also been discussed.

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As ecumenism in Islam is a relatively recent phenomenon, the literature surrounding this topic is limited or in its infancy. However, various texts exist that study polemics between sects and the formation of sectarian identities. A reoccurring theme that is communicated in these texts of that sectarian identities began to form in a period in early Islamic history shortly following the death of the prophet Muhammad. When speaking of polemics in the South Asian context, many texts have discussed how these polemics had emerged in the days of the British Raj. A key shortfall in the literature is that a lot of literature discusses sectarian violence and militancy. However, limited texts discuss any reproachment projects or methodology for reproachment.

One such text is Barbara Metcalf's book, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, deals with the history and emergence of the Deobandi movement and some of the polemics between the Deobandi movement and the other sects, especially the Barelvis the text also helps to understand the features of the sects that make them distinguishable from each other and that polemics are not the only feature that categorizes texts as sects also share many features on common such as criticisms of some beliefs and practises of tradional Sufis which are commonly held by the Deobandis and ahl-i Hadith.

In addition to this, William Montgomery Watts Book: Islamic Philosophy and Theology is crucial in the general study of the emergence of sectarian trends as well as in understanding the formation of theological positions. Watt has thoroughly investigated the emergence of theological groupings, sects and schism through hermeneutics and historical analyses. Watts study has been critical in forming some of the arguments expressed in this thesis.

Islam in Pakistan by Muhammad Qasim Zaman is a comprehensive text that examines the history of Islam in Pakistan as well as addressing key facets of Islam and its practice in South Asia, as well as discussing the decline of modernist trends in Pakistan.

The literature on the dynamics of sectarianism in Pakistan highlights the 1980s as a critical point in the development of sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in the country. Literature on this topic also recognises that, in the pre-1980s period, Sectarian divides and episodes of sectarian violence between Pakistan's Sunni and Shia populations had also existed; however, they were isolated incidents and much less frequent.

*Pakistan kay Dīni* Masālik is an extended survey of the dominant sects in Pakistan commissioned by Pakistan's CII. The sects that are mentioned in the book are the Sunni sects:

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Barelvi, Deobandi and Ahl-I Hadith, as well as two Shia sects: Ithna Ashari (Twelver Shias) and Ismailis. The text covers the history, central theological beliefs, and ideologies of each sect. This study has not examined any individual sub-sect of the Shia. Instead, the study examines the relationships between Sunni and Shias in Pakistan.

Nasr's book, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, is one of the most comprehensive texts on the Jamā'at, its history, its relationship with various governments of Pakistan and its ideology as an Islamic revivalist party. In addition to this, Roy Jackson's book Mawlana Mawdūdī and Political Islam details the background of Mawlana Mawdūdī's development of ideas relating to Islamic revivalism and wider questions regarding Islamic political philosophy. Jackson's book also compares Mawdūdī's beliefs to other theological trends that lifetime, such as the Salafi movement. Furthermore, this book

partially serves as a biography of Mawdūdī's life. Much of the literature on the Jamā'at understands that the ideology of Mawdūdī is central to the Jamā'at's ideology. Another text that explores Mawdūdī's political philosophy is A system of life, Mawdūdī and the Ideologisation of Islam, which discusses Mawdūdī's portrayal of Islam as a Nizam-e-Hayat or complete system of life.

Literature on the Jamā'at, when compared to other Islamic movements, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, has been limited. Alternatively: On the other hand, the literature about the Jamā'at significantly dominates texts about other Islamist parties in Pakistan. The JUI has also been widely discussed in the literature. Both the Jamā'at and the JUI have historically been and remain two of the most prominent Islamist political parties. Other Islamist political parties have not had the same level of popular support or political power that the Jamā'at and JUI have traditionally enjoyed. The TLP is another party that is beginning to receive attention because of recent political events.

Literature surrounding specific ecumenical projects of the Jamā'at, such as the MMA or the Jamā'ats involvement in the *Milli Yakjehtī Council,* are extremely limited, which could indicate the extent to which such projects have been successful or mounted any influence.

Much of the literature that discusses the concept of sectarianism and paths to rapprochement in Islam speaks of the Shia/Sunni divide.[2] When speaking of sectarianism in the Pakistani context, sectarianism extends beyond Sunni and Shia sectarianism. Much focus needs to go towards the Deobandi/Barelvi divide, as this is another significant schism. In addition to this, as the politics of *Namūs-e-Risālat* (protection of the honour of the last messenger) and Gustakhi-e-Rusul (blaspheming against the Prophet) are a more recent phenomenon, literature on the TLP and Barelvi extremism is limited. This is likely to be the case, as the phenomena of "Blasphemy politics" and blasphemy activism in Pakistan is very much a recent phenomenon. That has taken hold in recent years. Some literature that discusses blasphemy politics in relation to non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan is available, such as Revenge, Politics and Blasphemy in Pakistan. As the phenomenon of the TLP is very recent and has limited literature, web sources such as news articles and YouTube videos have been cited as the study of this trend is crucial to this essay.

A number of primary sources were consulted to gauge an understanding of the Jamā'ats

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[2] See Akbar, Saqib *Pakistan Kay Deeni Masalik* (Al-Basirsah, 2010) , or Metcalf, B.d  *Islamic revival in British India* (Princeton University Press: 2018)

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ideology and history. The use of primary sources in this study were essential as many secondary sources do not address some of the features of the JI, many texts have been limited to studies of their political activities. Studies of the theological ideas of key figures connect to the Jamat such as the Amirs that followed Mawdudi or other significant figures.

The Primary sources that dominated the texts consulted in this study

were written by the Jamat's founder, Syed Abul Ala Mawdūdī. Among the primary sources on the Jamat are the *Dastur* (constitution) of the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī. In addition to the works of Abul Ala Mawdūdī, works of other key figures of the Jamā'at include Farīza-i-Iqāmat-i-dīn (The obligation of establishing the religion) by Sadruddin Islahi. This text is part of the required curriculum for membership of the Jamā'at.

**Chapter one: Islamic identities in Pakistan and sectarianism**

With a wide range of Islamic identities existing in Pakistan and sectarian militancy being a critical factor in Pakistan's recent political history, an analysis of the origins, history and development of sectarian violence and polemics that exist between the Islamic sects found in Pakistan will help inform an understanding of attempts at pacifying sectarianism as well as how these polemics affect the Jamā'at. This chapter briefly explores the background and history of Pakistan's various Islamic identities and sectarianism, its development, and the theoretical concepts behind Islamic Sectarianism. This chapter will also explore the polemics that exist between the various *Masālik* of Pakistan and survey the political dynamics of the sects.

1.1  The Islamic sects of Pakistan

Pakistan is home to great religious diversity within Islam, the term *Maslak* (Sect/orientation) *pl. Masālik* is one term that can be used to describe affiliations to Islamic denominations. The term *Firqā* is also used to describe sects/denominations, with *Firqābandi* Or *Firqawāriyat* often being used in Urdu literature when referring to sectarianism. In Pakistan, the following Sunni sects exist: *Barelvi, Deobandi and Ahl-i Hadith.*

The diversity of Muslims in Pakistan is not limited to the country itself; it extends across the entire South Asia region. However, it should not be assumed that differences between Islamic sects and affiliation to Maslaks will, by default, result in sectarianism, especially sectarian militancy. During different periods of Pakistan's political history, sectarianism has manifested at different levels, and overall sectarian violence has been limited to the actions of a small number of fringe elements in Pakistan. The scale of some sectarian incidents in terms of those affected and causality rates has been significant, nonetheless.

Arguably, the schism between Sunni and Shii Muslims is the most notable sectarian division in Islam; Pakistan is home to both schisms with a clear Sunni majority. However, it should be noted that the Shii minority of Pakistan is nevertheless a minority with a significant power base and the largest Shii minority outside of Iran. The distribution of sects in Pakistan is categorised by Murphy as follows: Sunnis, 75-80%, and Shiis 15-20%. The Sunni sub-sects

of Barelvis are 50% of the population, and Deobandis are 20% of Pakistan's population. [6] In addition to this, The *Ahl-i-Hadith* group also have a following in Pakistan and could be considered the third largest group of Sunnis in Pakistan; however, they are smaller in number than the Shii population of Pakistan. The *Ahl-i Hadith* have noteworthy influence in Pakistan.

Much research has gone into the nature of religious diversity within Islam in Pakistan. Several factors contribute to the level of diversity of religious sects found within Islam in Pakistan. The sub-groupings of Sunnism mentioned above (Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-I Hadith) emerged during the days of the British Raj.[7]

One factor behind the religiously diverse markup of Pakistan is the inaction of the Pakistani State to enforce a state version of Islam. In the Moroccan context, the state has enforced its state Islam as Sunni, Maliki Ashari, and Sufi.[8] Turkey could be taken as another example of a state that has attempted to nationalise or bureaucratise Islam through the *Diyanet* (Directorate of religious affairs) body in Turkey. However, it is vital to understand the Pakistani context differs significantly from the Moroccan and Turkish contexts. Countries that have attempted to regulate or nationalise Islam are nation-states however, Pakistan does not share the same framework  as Pakistan could be considered to be a religious state as opposed to an ethno-nationalist state.

The various Islamic *Maslaks* have representation through political parties. Recently, the Tehrīk-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) has emerged as a popular political party representing the Barelvis. Before the TLP, the Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan had been a leading political party representing the Barelvis. One of the most significant political contenders is the Deobandi Jamat-e-Ulema-I Islam (JUI). The JUI existed before the creation of Pakistan and opposed its creation. The Jamat-e-Ulema-e-Islam continues to exist in its original form in India and Bangladesh as Jamat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and as Jamat-e-Ulema-e-Islam Pakistan in Pakistan, The JUI in Pakistan had split into separate factions.

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[6] Murphy Eamon, *Islam and Sectarian violence in Pakistan: The Terror Within,* (Routledge: 2019) p.13.

[7] See Zaman, Mohammad Qasim*, Islam in Pakistan* (Princeton University Press:2020)

[8] See Wainsoctt, Ann Marie, Bureaucratising *Islam* (Cambridge University Press:2017)

<u>1.2 Sunni and Shia sectarianism</u>

One of the most notable forms of sectarianism that exists within Pakistan is found in the Sunni/Shii divide. The schism between Sunnis and Shiis is arguably the longest schism in the history of Islam and is not unique to Pakistan. This crisis of sectarianism between both sects has, at times, grown beyond infighting and has resulted in violence and militancy.

The origins of the Sunni/Shii divide go right back to the early history of Islam with the death of Muhammad. The Muslims faced a succession issue over who should lead the Muslims following their prophet's death. Two groups had emerged: those in favour of Muhammad's father-in-law, Abu Bakr al-Siddique to be the ruler of the Muslims and those who believed that Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, Ali Ibn Abi Talib, should be in the position of leadership. In this phase, two camps existed: the pro-Ali camp and the pro-Abu Bakr camp.[9] However, the Sunni/Shii split did not fully emerge until later developments in early Islamic history. The events following the assassination of Uthman Ibn Affan, the third caliph, played a crucial role in the formation of both sects.

Two of the most prominent groups that are renowned for the displays of violence that can emerge between the two sects are the Deobandi outfit *Sipah-e-Sahaba (*guardians of the Sahaba) and the Shia group *Sipah-e-Muhammad* (The Guardians of Muhammad),. Zaman has argued that the primary goals of the Sipah-e-Sahaba could be defined as follows: the proscribing of Muharram marches, making the state religion of Pakistan Sunni Islam, and the declaration of Shii as non-Muslims.[10]

As well as the goals of the *Sipah-e-Sahāba* listed above, the Sipah-e-Sāhaba has engaged in acts of veneration of the companions of Muhammad. The issue of the veneration of the prophet's companions is a feature of the Sunni/Shii polemic. As the name "guardians of the prophet's companions" suggests, the organisation has concerned itself with the veneration of the prophet's companions. This can also be seen in their flag: a five-pointed star. The centre of the star contains the name Muhammad, the messenger of Allah, followed by the names of the four rightly guided caliphs on four points of the star. In addition to the names of the rightly guided caliphs, one point on the star contains the name of Mu'awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty and a companion of the prophet. The centring and

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[9] See Madelung, Wilfred: *The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate* (Cambridge University Press: 2008)

[10] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Sectarianism in Pakistan (Princeton University Press: 2020) pp.701

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veneration of Mu'awiyah in the SSP is of great significance. According to the general Sunni perspective, the four "rightly guided caliphs" who followed Muhammad are Abu Bakr, Umar Ibn al Khattab, Uthman Ibn A'ffan, and Ali ibn Ali Talib. The term *Char Yar (*Four friends) is a term that is used to display reverence for these four figures in Pakistan. A Sunni position also places the 8th Umayyad Caliph and descendent of 'Umar Ibn Khattab, 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al Aziz or Umar the second as the fifth rightly guided caliph. It is interesting to note that the SSP has revered Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan above Umar Ibn Abdal Aziz, considering that this alternative Sunni viewpoint has given the caliph 'Umar Ibn Abd Al-Aziz a rank above Mu'awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan as the 5th rightly guided caliph. It could be argued that the SSP's admiration of Mu'awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan is based on the Shii criticism of Mu'awiyah and the polemic that accuses the Shii of blaspheming against the prophet's companions.

The issue of the Sahaba vs. the *Ahlul Bayt* is a polemic found in the Sunni/Shii divide. As we will discuss in Chapter Four, undertones of this polemic have also been used against the Jamā'at, with accusations of blaspheming against the companions being levelled against the Jama'āt. Furthermore, these same groups have not been receptive to the ideas of the Jamā'at as they are seen to sympathise with Shia tendencies because of their readings of early Islamic history. Groups such as the SSP accuse Shiis of blaspheming against the companions of the Prophet. The issue of blaspheming against or cursing the companions is one of the most significant polemics in the Shia/Sunni divide, and this issue is not unique to Pakistan; across the Muslim world, this is a crucial point of contention that has led to some people using *Takfir* (The act of excommunicating people from Islam) against those who curse companions of the prophet Muhammad.

The Sipah-e-Muhammad (SPM) group is a Shiite group that has also been at the forefront of sectarian violence in Pakistan. It could be argued that the SPM had arisen in response to the violence that was faced by the Shiis of Pakistan at the hands of the SPP. The SPM had links with the TNFJ and was led by a district president of TJP Jhang, Ghulam Rida Naqvi.[11] This demonstrates the link between the SPM and some of the senior leadership of the Shiis in Pakistan.

One key event in the history of Shii and Sunni Sectarianism in the pre-1979 period was the anti-Shii riots of 1963. The riots had occurred in Lahore and had occurred in the month of

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[11] Kamran, T., 2009. Contextualizing Sectarian militancy in Pakistan: a case study of Jhang. Journal of Islamic Studies, 20(1), pp. 55-85. pp.74

Muharram, a significant month in the Islamic calendar which holds particular importance to the Shia as it is the month in which the battle of *Karbala* had occurred in which Imam Hussein, the grandson of the prophet Muhammad and the third Shii Imam had been martyred at the hands of the Umayyad army. Yazid was the son of Mu'awiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan and the Umayyad Caliph at the time.

The riots had taken the lives of 4 people, and 80 people were injured during the riots. In response to the riots, the governance of what was then West Pakistan had undertaken an enquiry in which they had suggested that Shia literature should be censored. Any pieces within the literature that may be opposed by the Sunni majority should be removed.[12] At this time, it could be argued that the Pakistani state response had taken a Sunni centric reaction to the riots, the enquiry of the Pakistani government was in many ways discriminatory to the Shiite victims.

The Islamic Revolution of Iran of 1979 was a crucial point in the mobilisation of Shia politics. The event was a cause for confidence among Pakistani Shiites. One result of this confidence was the increased assertiveness and confidence among the Shite leadership in protecting their rights.[13] Some Sunni groups had perceived the Islamic Revolution of Iran to be a threat to Sunnism in Pakistan as it could be a force for the strengthening of Shiite Identities. To this end, some anti-Shiite groups had taken an anti-Khomeini approach in their politics.

Whilst many Sunni identities in Pakistan had a hostile and distrustful view of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Jama'āt initially had an opposing view and were supportive of the Islamic Revolution. The Jama'āt had faced criticism for their support of the Iranian revolution. An example of this is when the SSP had described Khomeini and Mawdūdī as "brothers" in a pamphlet that they had published.[14] The Pamphlet contained various criticisms of Mawdūdī and Khomeini and accused the two of them of engaging in polemics against the prophet's companions. [15]

The study of the Islamic revolution in Iran is crucial to understanding the many factors that can lead to an increase in sectarian violence. The Iranian revolution shows how external factors such as foreign policy or international events can heavily influence sectarianism.

In addition to the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Islamisation policies of General Zia Ul Haq served as a point of mobilisation of Pakistan's Shii population against the government for

[12] Murphy, Eamon *Islam and Sectarian violence in Pakistan*, (Routledge: 2018)  pp. 76,77

[13] Sohaib Ali, Fatima Waqi Sajjad 'Pacifying Sunni Shite relations in Pakistan, Radicalisation in Pakistan, pp.79

[14] FUCHS, S. W., 2022. A Direct Flight to Revolution: Maududi, Divine Sovereignty, and the 1979-Moment in Iran. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* Volume 32, pp. 333-354. pp.351

[15] FUCHS, S. W., 2022. A Direct Flight to Revolution: Maududi, Divine Sovereignty, and the 1979-Moment in Iran. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* Volume 32, pp. 333-354. pp.351

what they had considered to be the implementation of Sunni laws regarding zakat and its forced implementation upon the Shiite population. The *Tehrīk-I-Nifaz I Fiqh-e-Jaa'faraiyah (The movement for the implementation of Ja'afiriyyah jurisprudence) (TNFJ)* was at the forefront of making demands that led to the exemption of the Zakāt laws upon Pakistan's Shiite population. [16] This campaign by the TNFJ is of crucial importance when attempting to make an understanding of the "Islamisation" projects of some of the Islamist" political parties of Pakistan, including the Jama'āt. With the diverse nature of Muslims in Pakistan, it should come as no surprise if those affiliated to any sect feel any law favours one sect over another, as was the case of the TNFJ campaign. Another critical factor of the TNFJ was that it had financial support from the government of Tehran.[17]

The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi) group is another group that is renowned for its acts of violence against Shias. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is a splinter group of the SSP named after one of the SSP's founders, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. The assassination of Jhangvi was one of the most significant events in the history of Sectarianism and terrorism in Pakistan. Jhangvi's assassination had served as a catalyst which lead to a flare up in sectarian militancy as well intensifying Sunni/Shii sectarianism. Following Jhangvi's assassination, chants such as *Kafir, Kafir Shia Kafir* (Infidels, infidels. The Shia are infidels,") were raised in Jhang.[18]

Intense Polemics exist between Sunnis and Shiis in Pakistan however, these polemics alone cannot be blamed for sectarian militancy or violence. Polemics (especially polemics between Sunnis and Shiis) have existed throughout the history of the two sects including before the creation of Pakistan. Several factors can be attributed to the growth of sectarian militancy in Pakistan. Jhang, one of the historical hotspots of sectarian violence, was home to several distinguishing factors that had resulted in intense militancy.

A critical factor in the spread of sectarian violence was the interplay between economic conditions and the *Biradari* (kinship) system. Tahir Kamran has detailed how much attention has been paid to factors such as madrasahs and the Iranian revolution have been attributed to the rise in sectarian violence, yet in the case of the Jhang district, complex relations between *Biradari* groupings have also contributed to a rise in sectarianism.

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[16] Muhammad Qasim Zaman: sectarianism in Pakistan pp. 693

[17] Kamran, T., 2009. Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan: a case study of Jhang. Journal of Islamic Studies, 20(1), pp. 55-85. pp.71

[18] Kamran, T., 2009. Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan: a case study of Jhang. Journal of Islamic

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Studies, 20(1), pp. 55-85pp.57

In the Jhang district, several groupings of *Biradari* clans exist, two of which who yield the most power are the *Syeds* and *Sials*. Both of these clans are *Shiite.*[19]

The Jhang district itself is made up mostly of Sunnis. The Sial *Biradari* holds the most political clout, yet a rivalry between the Sials and Sayyids has been attributed to a growth in sectarianism. Kamran has described how this has come into play as follows:

> *Syed-Sial factional rivalries have contributed to sectarianism. In Jhang, the politics of sectarian differentiation first emerged during the 1951 Punjab election. Ironically, the two families, Shah Jiwana and Rajoa—close relatives yet political adversaries—in order to undermine each other politically lent unswerving support to non-Syed and Sunni candidates. Abid Hussain successfully lured the pir of Sial Sharif into throwing in his lot with Mawlana Muhammad Zakir (Dhakir) who pulled off a victory against Rajoa candidate Sardar Ghulam Muhammad Shah from the Chiniot constituency. Similarly, Rajoa Syeds went all out in support of Mawlana Ghulam Husayn against Mubarak 'All Shah, a candidate of the Shah Jiwana group from Jhang constituency. Despite Shi'a-Sunni differences being considerably whipped up in the run-up to the electoral contest, Mubarak 'All nevertheless secured a comfortable victory.23 Sectarianism was thus used as a ploy by Shi'a Syed families as part of their factional rivalries. The power politics articulated in intra clan divergence was transformed into inter-clan rivalry in the span of two decades. Hence the Syed in-fight gave way to a Sial-Syed contest for power. As we shall see below, biradari rivalries intersected with sectarianism not just in electoral contests but in outbreaks of violence.[20]*

The study of the case of sectarian militancy in Jhang and the several factors that had contributed to a rise in militancy is of critical importance to this study, firstly the case of Jhang demonstrates that Sectarian violence is not a crisis that should always be considered to be endemic in Pakistan because in various instances sectarian violence has been a regionalised problem. Secondly, sectarianism in Pakistan is extremely complex, with several variables contributing to its growth, the link between Biradari, economic divides, and foreign influences demonstrates how addressing polemics alone is not sufficient to tackle sectarian

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[19] Kamran, T., 2009. Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan: a case study of Jhang. Journal of Islamic Studies, 20(1), pp. 55-85

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[20] Kamran, T., 2009. Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan: a case study of Jhang. Journal of Islamic Studies, 20(1), pp. 55-85 pp.65

violence. Moreover, in Jhang, some Shias had exploited anti-Shia narratives for the personal gains of their Biradari even if it would result in dire consequences for the local Shia population. The fact that some Shias were willing and able to stir up sectarian tensions against their own sect demonstrates that sectarian violence is not always based purely on sectarianism and polemics, rather it can intersect with other factors and when the case of Jhang is considered it has intersected with Biradari politics.

1.3 The Barelvi/ Deobandi Divide

Whilst much attention has been brought towards the dynamics of sectarianism between Sunnis and Shiis in Pakistan, it is also essential to understand that sectarianism and the emerging polarisation of identities of Islamic sects is not limited to Sunni and Shia groupings, rather it extends to intra-Sunni Islam.[21] intra-Sunni polemics are not limited to the Pakistani context, intra-Sunni polemics exist across the Muslim world however Pakistan is home to a few sects that are not represented outside of South Asia.

Pakistan is also home to another critical sectarian schism, the Deobandi/Barelvi divide. Both groups share numerous features in common. First, both groups are Sunni, additionally, both follow the *Hanafi* school of law and follow the *Ashari* or *Maturidi* creeds. However, Despite the commonalities shared between the groups, these groups also share differences. A schism exists between the two sects and could be considered the most prominent Islamic divide in Pakistan. Another factor that gives relevance to the Barelvi/Deobandi divide is the fact that these two groupings are not commonly found outside of South Asia; however, they do exist in diaspora communities outside of South Asia.

The schism between the Barelvi and Deobandi movements has its beginnings in the early history of both movements. In 1903, "The sword of the two holy sanctuaries" (*Hussam al-Haramain)* was published by Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi, the founder of the Barelvi movement. In this work, Ahmed Raza Khan had excommunicated senior figures of the Deoband movement from Islam. Qasim Nanotvi had been accused of denying the finality of the prophet, on the basis that he had argued that if God had willed, he would be able to create an infinite number of prophets. Ahmed Raza Khan had also accused other senior Deobandi

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[21] Iqtidar, Humeira. *Secularising Islamists* (University of Chicago Press:2014) pp.102

figures of arguing that Satan could have a higher rank than the prophet Muhammad, this is due to their denial that the Prophet held knowledge of the unseen realm, so in practise an assumption could be made that in certain situations, Satan could have more knowledge. The accused are: Rashid Ahmed and Ashraf Ali Thanvi.[22] The attacks laid upon the Deobandi figures by Ahmed Raza Khan related to their lack of veneration of the prophet Muhammad, a factor that as we will explore further in this study is central to the Barelvis.

Love and veneration of the Prophet Muhammad is a crucial feature of the Barelvi Maslak. Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi had charged Deobandi scholars with an accusation of displaying a lack of veneration for the prophet in his polemics against Deobandi scholars.

Beyond the writing of Hussam al Haramain, a deep schism has existed between the Barelvis and Deobandis. The same groups contest critical points of creed or Aqidah and jurisprudence. A key point of reference that separates the two groups is the jurisprudential issue of the celebration of the *Mawlid/Milad un-nabi* or the Prophets' birthday. Some Deobandis do not engage in the celebration of the *Mawlid.* The logic behind this, as argued by the opponents of the Mawlid, is that the celebration of the Mawlid has no precedence in the Qur'an and Sunnah, two of the sources of Islamic law and therefore its practice constitutes a *Bidah* or innovation.

The Barelvi and Deobandi divide is of crucial importance when studying Islamic ecumenism in the Pakistani context. This is because both groups are most prevalent in South Asia especially Pakistan. Both The Barelvi and Deobandi Maslaks exist within South Asian diaspora communities, such as the Pakistani community in Britain.

Whilst the Barelvi and Deobandi divide has not seen the same level of violence as the Sunni-Shia divide, episodes of Pakistan's history, particularly in recent history we have witnessed acts of sectarian violence carried out in relation to the divides that exist between the two groups. One key event in Pakistan's history of sectarian violence was the Nishtar Park bombings in Karachi 2006. The event that was supposed to commemorate the Milād was marred by the bombings. The event was organised by the Barelvi *Ahle Sunnat wal Jamat* group. 49 people lost their lives in the bombings. Among the victims were prominent Barelvi leaders from various Barelvi groups including *Jamat Ahle Sunnat* and the Sunni Tehrīk.[23]

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[22] Metcalf, B.d. *Hussain Ahmed Madani*. (Oneworld Publications: 2008) Pp. 66
[23] https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/12/world/asia/50-killed-in-bombing-at-a-sunni-prayer-service-in-karachi.html  Accessed:  28/7/2023

Recently, we have seen further politicisation of Barelvi's in Pakistan. In particular with the recent rise of the Tehrīk-e-Labaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLP). The TLP was headed by Khadim Hussain Rizvi, most of its work of the TLP is around protecting the blasphemy laws of Pakistan. The TLP is a relatively new *Maslaki* party when compared to other parties such as the JUI. Before the emergence of the TLP, the *Jamat-e-Ulema Pakistan* had been the leading political party representing the Barelvis.

The TLP is the political wing of the *Tehrīk-e Labaik Ya Rasul Allah,* a movement founded by Khadim Rizvi. Emerging from the Tehrīk-e –Rehai Mumtaz Qadri (The movement demanding the freedom of Mumtaz Qadri), the Tehrīk-I-Labaik Ya Rasul Allah came into existence. Mumtaz Qadri was a bodyguard who was acquitted of murdering Salaman Taseer, a senior politician from the Pakistan People's Party.

A turning point in the mobilisation of Barelvi politics was marked by the execution of Mumtaz Qadri. Salman Taseer had advocated in support of Asia Bibi, A Pakistani Christian woman who had been accused of Blaspheming against the prophet Muhammad. Bibi had been sentenced to death by hanging because of the accusations laid against her. Taseer had visited Asia Bibi multiple times In prison and had advocated against the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan which he had described to be a "black law".[24] Salman Taseer had been widely condemned, particularly by the Barelvi population of Pakistan.[25] The *Jamat-e-Ahle Sunnat Pakistan (JASP)* had issued a statement saying: "No Muslim should attend the funeral or even try to pray for Salmaan Taseer or even express any kind of regret or sympathy over the incident."[26] Maulana Shabir of the JUP had argued that Salman Taseer was *Wajubul Qatl* (Obligated to be murdered). Maulana Shabir argued further: "He had called the divine law of God, a black law and tried to protect a condemned blasphemer,"[27]

The Jamā'at did not show full support for the Statement of JASP however Farid Paracha, a significant figure in the Jamā'at had also been critical of Salman Taseer arguing that: "I believe that this call for changing the [28]law was being done at the behest of the US and other

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[24] https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-assertion-of-barelvi-extremism#:~:text=Known%20for%20their%20orthodox%20piety,%E2%80%9CTalibanization%E2%80%9D%20of%20Pakistani%20society. Accessed on: 13/8/2023

[25] Murphy, *Islam and Sectarian violence in Pakistan* (Routledge: 2018)

[26] https://tribune.com.pk/story/99313/hardline-stance-religious-bloc-condones-murder/ Accessed on 13th August 2023

[27] "https://tribune.com.pk/story/99313/hardline-stance-religious-bloc-condones-murder/ Accessed on 13th August 2023

[28] https://theprint.in/go-to-pakistan/jamaat-e-islami-has-a-sikh-candidate-pakistanis-say-its-like-vhp-named-a-muslim/776965/ accesses 28th august

western powers."[29] Whilst the Jamā'at may not have endorsed the statement of the JASP and had not taken the same hardline stance against Salman Taseer as the Barelvi leadership had. The Jamā'at had still defended the blasphemy laws of Pakistan and had used their discourse on anti-Americanism and anti-Western Imperialism as a point of defence of the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan. Whilst the Jamā'at had joined the mainstream religious parties in defending the blasphemy laws in Pakistan, the Jamā'at had recently stood out from the mainstream religious political parties which have been accused of taking an anti-minority stance by fielding a Sikh candidate: Hardeet Singh in local elections in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

Mumtaz Qadri, a member of the Barelvi *Dawat-e-Islami* group had been hanged for his murder of Salman Taseer which he had described to be his "religious duty".[30] Qadri following his execution had been revered by large sections of Pakistan's Barelvi population. Khadim Hussain Rizvi led a funeral procession for Qadri that was well attended by over 100,000 people. Generally, the Pakistani scholarship had either supported Qadri or had adopted a policy of silence over the issue.[31]

The TLP had emerged as a solid and influential movement in Pakistan. Electorally, the performance of the TLP had been incredibly impressive gaining over 2.2 million votes in the 2018 general election making the TLP Pakistan's fifth largest political party.[32] The growth and the success of the TLP in Pakistani politics is of crucial importance for this study, firstly, it demonstrates the potential power of the religious political parties in Pakistan, in addition to this, the Jamā'at which had traditionally been seen as the most influential Islamist political party has new competition Furthermore the TLP had broken an electoral trend where previously Islamist political parties had a very limited electoral base, on the other hand the TLP were able to emerge as a major political party.

Whilst the Asia Bibi case and other cases of blasphemy activism have been considered to be mobilisations against Pakistan's religious minorities, recent events have shown that blasphemy activism could also claim Muslim victims. A Muslim woman in Lahore adorning a dress decorated with Arabic writing had faced a mob of men accusing her of committing

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[29] https://tribune.com.pk/story/99313/hardline-stance-religious-bloc-condones-murder/ accessed on the 13th of August 2023

[30] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35684452 accessed on 13th August 2023

[31] Adeel Hussain, *Revenge Politics and Blasphemy in Pakistan* (C Hurst & Co Publishers: 2022). 156

[32] Adeel Hussain, *Revenge Politics and Blasphemy in Pakistan*. (C Hurst & Co Publishers: 2022 Pp. 159

blasphemy as they had assumed that the Arabic text was a text from the Qur'an. Such cases of mob brutality have caught international attention when non-Muslim have fallen victim of such crimes, with a high-profile case of Priyantha Kumara, a Sri Lankan Buddhist worker in a garment factory being mob-lynched in the factory that he had been working at in late 2021 following accusations of blasphemy for removing a poster with religious content.

Another key organisation that had acquired prominence among the Barelvis of Pakistan is the Sunni Tehrīk, formed in 1990. Some objectives of the Sunni Tehrīk could be summarised as follows: defence against the growing militant nature of the rival sects to the Barelvi namely the Deobandis and the Ahl-I Hadith, besides this another aim is to increase Barelvi representation in the government. One of the most significant objectives of the Sunni Tehrīk is the reclaiming of Mosques that had fallen into the administration of the Deobandis.[33] It could be argued that organisations such as the Sunni Tehrīk are reactionary or defensive organisations against the Deobandis who the Barelvis accuse of persecuting them.

### 1.4  The *Ahl-i Hadith* movement.

The third major grouping of Sunnis in Pakistan is the Ahl-I Hadith Maslak.

Multiple factors have distinguished the Ahl-I Hadith Maslak from the Barelvi and Deobandi *Masālik*. However, despite the differences that exist between the Ahl-I Hadith and the Deobandis. The Deobandis have some sympathies and commonalities with the *Ahl-I* Hadith, mainly because of some of the Sufi practises that both groups have condemned. It is important to note that the Deobandis have not condemned Sufism as the Ahl-I Hadith have, instead they have condemned some of its practises.

The *Ahl-i Hadith* movement had shown a sense of opposition to institutional forms of Sufism whilst the Barelvis and the Deobandis had promoted them. Arguably, the *Ahle-Hadith* movement was the most distinct of the three Sunni sects that had emerged in British India.

Metcalf has highlighted how the method of prayer of the followers if the *Ahl-I Hadith* movement had distinguished the Ahl-I Hadith movement from the Barelvi and Deobandi maslak, both being Hanafi. Features of the Ahl-I Hadith methodology include the recitation

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[33] Murphy, Islam and Sectarian violence in Pakistan (Routledge: 2018)  pp.148

of *Ameen* out loud and the raising of the hands before entering the bowing position of the prayer. (*Raf Al Yadayn)*[34] These differences in the methodology of worship are examples of how the Ahl-I Hadith had adopted a position of being anti-Taqlīd (Imitation)

The grouping of those in Indian society who began to deny the authority of the Islamic schools of law in favour of following the Hadith came to be known as the *Ahl-I Hadtih.*[35] A divide had started to grow between the Hanafis and the Ahl-I Hadith groupings so much so that the British had got involved in reconciliation matters between the two groupings.[36] Essentially, the Ahl-I Hadith are non-conformists and often call themselves *Ghair Muqalid* (Those who do not engage in Taqlīd). , whilst the Hanafi Deobandis and Barelvis accept the authority of the schools of law.

A major polemic in Islam is the Salafi-Sufi polemic. Today, the terms Salafi and ahl-I Hadith are used interchangeably. This can be attributed to the fact that the Ahl-I Hadith movement has undergone a transformation from a movement that was less receptive of imitation of the schools of law to a sect following the Atharite creed. This polemic can be seen in the Ahl-i Hadith's criticisms of certain Sufi practises. Hanafis, which is the school of law that is followed by the majority of Pakistan's population (As both Barelvis and Deobandis are two movements of the Hanafi school) tend to be followers of Ashari or Māturidi creed.

One critical factor that characterises Sufi criticisms of Salafism today is the criticism of the anti-taqlīd or anti conformist approach of the Ahl-I Hadith.

Some of the Sufi practises that the Ahl-i Hadith Maslak have condemned include the celebration of the Mawlid and seeking intercession through saints (Tawassul). Other practises of Sufi Islam that have been condemned by Salafi/Ahl-I Hadith include the practise of *Qawali* (devotional music) that is commonly performed at *Darbars* in Pakistan.

Roy Jackson has attempted to position some of the similarities/sympathies between the Ahl-I Hadith and Mawdūdī and the Jamā'at. Jackson has argued that the Ahl-I hadith hold the belief that the following the Qur'an, the authentic Hadith should be considered the only other ultimate authority in Islam. Any source other than the Qur'an and the Hadith is not

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[34] Metcalf, B.d *Islamic revival in British India* (Princeton University Press: 2018) pp.275
[35] Metcalf*, B.d. Islamic revival in British India*, (Princeton University Press: 2018) pp. 277
[36] Metcalf, b.d. *Islamic Revival in British India* (Princeton University Press: 2018) pp. 285

authoritative in the same way; other sources are debatable and could be critiqued.[37] Whilst Mawdūdī may have had beliefs similar to those of the early Salafi movement, it is essential to note that these similarities are not sufficient to place Mawdūdī in the *Ahl-i Hadith* camp. At times, the views of Mawdūdī had opposed opinions that are held by the *Ahl-i-Hadith* movement such as when Mawdūdī advocated for the permissibility for celebrating the *Mawlid,* a position that has been denounced by the Ahl-i Hadith movement.

The interplay between the terminology of *Ahl-i-Hadith and Salafi* could indicate why parallels between the Mawdūdī and the *Ahl-i Hadith* movement have been drawn. The term Salafi has also been used to describe a 20th century modernist trend. Key figures in the early Salafi movement had been concerned with revivalism and Muslim autonomy, just as Mawdūdī had been.

<u>1.5 Political organisation of Islamic sects in Pakistan</u>

The various *Maslaks* of Pakistan of Pakistan are represented in the political landscape through political parties. Various terminologies are used to describe Muslims who centre Islam in their political ideologies and in their politics. Terms such as "Islamist", "Fundamentalist" and "extremist" are commonly used to describe the use of Islam in politics. The application of these terms can be highly problematic as they can be used to exceptionalise Muslims who centre faith in their politics. Often, critics of Muslims who use faith to inform their politics may not load the same criticisms to other faith communities who assimilate faith into their politics including Christian groups and political parties in the Global North.

Furthermore the term Islamist is also incredibly problematic, as we will explore further, as the application of Islam in politics is not monolithic and is heavily nuanced. In addition to this, defining the boundaries of what is considered to be "Secular" and what is considered to be "Islamist" can become difficult as all political parties have an Islamic element to them. The term "Islamist", when used in this essay is used to describe Muslims who have priortised political engagement either as a form of worship or as a religious obligation.

John Chakko highlights the link between the various Islamic political parties and Islamic Maslaks; Chakko argues that the Islamic political parties in Pakistan represent the various Maslaks of Pakistan, Chakko has named these parties the *Maslaki parties* [38]

Maslaki parties in Pakistan at times do not always share the same political objectives and motivations, for example, the TNFJ had come into existence to protect the interests of the Jafiri community. On the other hand, various factors have led to the emergence of the various Maslaki parties, for example, the most recent contender to enter the political field as a *Maslaki* party, the TLP, had emerged as a response to blasphemy laws in Pakistan.

Islam plays an essential role in all political parties in Pakistan, including the secularist parties such as the Pakistan's Peoples Party. Despite the people's party being considered a secularising force that had reversed some of the previous religious laws that had existed in Pakistan. The role of Islam in electoral politics could be linked to the centring of Islam in the Pakistan movement.

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[37] Jackson, Roy *Mawlana Mawdūdī & Political Islam* (Routledge:2010)  pp.97

[38] Johann Chakko, 'Religious Parties, The Politics of Denominational Diversity in an Islamic Republic', in *Pakistan's Political Parties,* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2020) pp. 105-125 (p.107).

As we have gathered from our readings, Pakistan's Maslaks have been concerned with issues regarding domination in social and religious influence. This is made evident through the formation of organisations such as the Sunni Tehrīk. In Addition to this, the study of sectarianism cannot be detached from the broader political events that have shaped not only the history of Pakistan but also the wider Islamicate world. This can be demonstrated through the effect the Iranian Revolution had on the dynamics of sectarianism in Pakistan.

Haroon K. Ullah has provided a classification of the political spectrum of political parties in Pakistan which he has described as the Sharia-Secular spectrum. The first of these types of parties believes that the governance of the state should be based on the *Sharia,* whilst the latter believes that Islam should not have a place in governance. K. Ullah also argues that both categories of parties often move between the Sharia-Secular spectrum.[39]

When Islamic political parties are considered, three dominant categories exist: The Maslaki parties and the "Muslim democratic" parties such as the Pakistan Muslim League. Nasr argues that Muslim Democratic parties are different to Islamist parties in the sense that they do not agree with the Islamists that Islam calls for the establishment of an Islamic state governed purely by the Sharia rather, they make reference to Islam in order to broaden their vote bases.[40] Examples of *Maslaki* parties include the JUI, TJP, and the JUP. Some Maslaki parties also could be considered to be Islamist parties, as many of them are concerned with using democracy as a tool to establish Sharia based laws.

As we have discussed, the *Maslaks* of Pakistan have been concerned with competing influence that they hold against each other in the public and political sphere. Political organisation through the electoral process has been one way the Maslaks have attempted to protect their interests. As we have previously discussed, sectarianism in Pakistan, has often been expressed through the religious political parties and the religious political parties have responded to both local and international political events to preserve the best interests of their respective Maslaks, such as the development of the *Tehrīk-e-Jāfirayyah* responses to Zia Ul-Haq's Islamisation process and Sunni responses to the Iranian Revolution.

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[39] Ullah, Haroon. K *Vying for Allah's vote*. (Georgetown University Press: 2013) Pp. 9

[40] See Nasr, V., 2005. The rise of Muslim Democracy. *Journal of Democracy,* Volume 16, pp. 13-27.

Besides the TNFJ, there were other avenues available for Shias to voice their dissatisfaction with the Zia regime. Many Shias chose to support Zia's political opponent, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan's Peoples Party.

### 1.6 The Madrasahs

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In addition to political parties, another significant institution that the *Maslaks* use is their network of Madrasahs (Islamic seminaries).

The expansion of Madrasah networks in Pakistan has sometimes been linked to violence in Pakistan, including sectarian violence. In the days of Zia Ul Haq, the Madrassah network had significantly expanded, and the Deobandi Madrassahs in particular, had continued to grow. The Madrassah Network continues to grow in the present times. Many factors exist for the increase in the number of Madrassahs, including the inability of the Pakistani state to provide education for its citizens.[41]

The following umbrella boards of Madrassas exist in Pakistan:

Deobandi: *Wiqaf ul-Madāris arabai*

Ahl-i Hadith: *Wiqāf ul-Madāris al-salafīyah*

Barelvi: *Tanzīm ul-Madāris arabai*

Shia: *Wifāq-Ul-Madāris* (Shia)

Jama'āt-i-Islāmi: Ribāt Ul-madāris al Islāmiya

In Pakistan's history, there have been examples of times where the Madrassahs were arguably used as an instrument to promote sectarian violence. An example of this is an episode of sectarian militancy that occurred in the Kurram Valley in 1996, deep grievances had existed between Sunnis and Shias, at times on socio-economic grounds however, the traditional Ulema had been exchanged with those who had emerged from madrassahs which had polarised sectarianism.[42]

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[41] Zaman, Muhammad Qasim *Islam in Pakistan* (Princeton University Press: 2020) pp. 125

[42] Nasr, S. V. R., 2000. The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the

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Ulama in Society and Politics. *Modern Asian Studies,* Volume 34, pp. 139-180. pp. 151

The rise of the Madrassah network particularly Deobandi Madrassahs is closely linked to the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union. During this time the number of Madrassah's had rapidly expanded, and these Madrassas became breeding grounds for *Mujahidin* fighters in Afghanistan.

Another factor that had led to the rise in Madrassahs in Pakistan was the Iranian revolution. The Iranian revolution had strengthened Shia identities in Pakistan and rival Sunni Maslaks, especially the Deobandis had perceived this new Shia confidence to be a threat. Notably, the Iranian revolution was not only a threat to Sunnis within Pakistan, but other regional actors also felt threatened. Saudi Arabia had attempted to counter this new threat by strengthening Sunni identities, Madrassahs from the *Ahl-i Hadith* Maslak. The Zia-ul-Haq regime at the time was also threatened by the Iranian revolution. Zia's attempts at enforcing Zakat laws in Pakistan were thwarted by a strong mobilisation of Shias who demanded to be exempt from this rule. Zia Ul-Haq had attempted to enforce his legitimacy by funding Sunni Madrassahs especially Deobandi Madrassahs.[43]

The Jama'āt had formally established their network of Madrassahs much later than from when the umbrella boards of the other Madrassahs had been formed. Initially the Jama'āt had not been involved in the running of Madrassahs however the rise of the Deobandi Madrassah following Zia Ul-Haq's funding campaigns had meant that the JI were beginning to lose out on governmental posts that they had traditionally held as these were now being filled by people connected to the Deobandi Madrassahs and the JI's rivals the JUI had also been strengthened. The JI's establishment of a Madrassah network had helped them to proselytise their ideology as well as maintaining their governmental influence that was beginning to fade at the hands of the Deobandis, many of them affiliated to Deobandi Madrassahs and the JUI.

The study of the *Madrassah* network in Pakistan holds significant importance in this study, firstly, it highlights aspects of the relationships between the *Maslaks* and the Pakistani state and politics. One significant example of this is through the institutionalisation of the Madrassahs as a response to Ayub Khan's educational reforms. Secondly the growth of Madrassahs shows one way in sectarian identities had become more hardline. As seen in Saudi foreign funding of Madrassahs As seen in Saudi foreign funding of Madrassahs to

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[43] Ali, Riaz 'Global jihad, Sectarianism and the Madrassahs in Pakistan' *RSIS Working Paper no.85* pp. 16 (2005)

strengthen Sunnism as well as the growth of Deobandi madrassahs under the rule of Zia Ul-Haq.

## 1.7 Conclusion

Polemics exist between all the sects that exist within Pakistan. This should not come as a surprise as polemics and 'infighting; is an issue that exists in Sunnism in general. It must be noted that sectarian violence has existed in many Muslim countries, with Iraq being one of the most notable cases of a state that has witnessed militancy and, therefore, the crisis of sectarianism is not unique or limited to Pakistan. In Pakistan's own case, sectarian violence has taken hold in certain episodes of Pakistan's history. Furthermore, it would not be fair to blame polemics and theology alone for sectarian militancy, Sectarian had arisen in times of political instability, and sectarian militancy could be considered to be a facet of a general rise in militancy in Pakistan. General wealth and social divisions have also been exploited to promote sectarian tensions and beliefs.

The deadliest sectarian schism among Muslims in Pakistan has been the Sunni-Shia schism, which has cost the lives of many across the Muslim world. Several factors, both internal and external, have contributed to sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan. Saudi Arabia and Iran's fight for dominance in the Muslim world has been one factor that has informed both contemporary polemics and sectarian militancy.

The Barelvi/Deobandi schism is another important polemic to be examined when studying polemics in Pakistan. Whilst it has not claimed as many lives as the Sunni/Shia divide, it has remained an intense schism with fewer attempts at rapprochement. Besides this, in modern times, it has been centered on the polarisation of both sects.

Whilst many polemics have been laid against the Jamā'at, the Jamā'at have been criticised for their inclusive nature, which is accepting of all sects including the Shias, in such times the Jamā'at could face a dilemma when it comes to their political project as they would like to receive support from all the mainstream Maslaks in order to fulfil their political project. The Jamā'at can either abandon their ecumenical message to appease sectarian groups (and potentially broaden their support base) or continue to promote ecumenism. The Jamā'at have not been victims of sectarian violence themselves, furthermore they have not laid any polemics against other sects.

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## Chapter two: Positioning the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī as a Sect or movement?

In the previous chapter, I had attempted to produce a survey of the main Maslaks of Pakistan, as well as attempting to form an understanding of some of the polemics and sectarian relationships between the Maslaks. This chapter aims to explore the theology of the Jamā'at and understanding if the Jamā'at could be considered to be a *Maslak*. Much of this study has been dedicated to understanding the ideology of the Jamā'at, which is crucial for this study as it helps us understand its objectives and purpose. At the most basic level, the Jamā'at is considered a political party. However, the diverse nature of Islamist political parties in Pakistan and the connection between the Maslaki identities and political parties, as well as voting trends, gives more context to why a further examination of the Jamā'at's identity is required. This section aims to examine some terminologies that have been used to describe the Jamā'at and what implications it has on sectarianism in Pakistan.

### 2.1 The Jamā'at as a political party/movement

As we have discussed, two types of Islamist parties exist within Pakistan: the confessionalist parties and the *Maslaki parties*. The Jamā'at does not consider itself to be a *Maslak* in of itself. However, the Jamā'at has not typically been labelled as a "confessionalism party" nor as a "Muslim democrat party". Chakko has described the Jamat with his terminology of being a Maslaki party (implying that the Jamā'at is a Maslak) and has argued that the Jamā'at is the most political among all the Maslaks of Pakistan. However, The Jamat does not consider itself to be a sect; instead, it sees itself as a body representing the Islamic movement (*Tehrīk-e-Islāmī*). The Jamā'at' s work and ideology focuses on Iqāmat-e-Din. (Establishing the religion). An alternative argument to Chakko's view has been provided by Murphy, who argues that theoretically, the Jamā'at is non-sectarian and not a religious party in the sense that the Ulema did not form it as is the case with other religious parties in Pakistan. Murphy describes the Jamā'at as a revolutionary party since it believes in engaging in Pakistan's political process to achieve its political project.[44]

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[44] Murphy, Eamon Islam and Sectarian violence in Pakistan (Routledge: 2018) pp.87

According to Nasr, the Jamat, at the time of its founding, was intended to be a "holy community." However, the Jamat faced an eventual shift in focus towards its political activities.[45] The foundational belief of the Jamat, as per its constitution, is simply the Islamic declaration of faith. [46] Beyond this, Theology and creed are not discussed in detail in the Jamā'at's constitution, however, the Jamā'at has a very specific positioning on certain theological matters which will be discussed below.

<u>2.2  The Jamā'at as a sect.</u>

Whilst the Jamat does not consider itself to be a sect, it has features that can be found in both *Maslaks* and social movements. The Jamā'at has taken certain Islamic debates, which at times has been a point of controversy for the Jamat. For example, the Jamā'at engages in the veneration of its founder, Mawdūdī. Veneration of the founders of Maslaks is a theme that is found in some of Pakistan's Maslaks; for example, the Barelvis engage in veneration of its founder, Ahmed Raza Khan. In numerous biographies of Mawdūdī, Mawdūdī is discussed to have had *Karām*āt (Divine gifts) and is discussed in a manner similar to the way in which Sufi saints have been discussed which the Jamā'at had found to be a resourceful manner of establishing Mawdūdī as a religious authority. [47]

 In terms of *Fiqh,* Mawdūdī was a Hanafi.[48] Among the Sunnis of Pakistan, the overwhelming majority follow the Hanafi fiqh. Whilst Mawdūdī himself was a Hanafi, it should not be assumed that his affiliation to the Hanafi Fiqh would result in the Jamā'at, and Mawdūdī would gain acceptance from the Hanafi majority of Pakistan. As we have seen in the case of the Barelvis and Deobandis, intense polemics exist between the two groups, and high levels of violence have also occurred between these two groups despite them both being Hanafi in Fiqh.

The revivalist and politically centred nature of the Jamat has also received much criticism from Muslim thinkers, particularly traditionalists. Humaira Iqtidar has argued that because Islamists such as the Jama'at-ud-dawa and the Jamā'at have a politicised reading of Islam, they break away from the traditional Muslims who have a focus on pietism.[49] Iqtidar has

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[45] Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza, The *Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan*. (Cambridge University Press 1994). Pp.28

[46] *Dastoor Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan* (Lahore:1947)

[47] Mawdūdī and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (OUP:1996) pp. 138

[48] Mawdūdī. Daee Wahdat-e-Ummat pp. 14

[49] Iqtidar, Humeira , *Secularising Islamists*  (University of Chicago Press: 2014) pp.110

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highlighted scholars such as Mufti Taqi Usmani of the Deobandi tradition to be traditionalists. However, Iqtidar has not specified who "traditionalist" Muslims are. The distinction between the "traditionalists" and "Islamists" according to Iqtidar, is further developed with the argument that Islamists have "politicised Islam Instead of Islamising Politics."[50] The argument that the Jamā'at has politicised Islam has also been stated by Nasr.[51]

One factor that the Jamā'at has used to argue that they themselves do not make up a Maslak is the fact that it has representations from various sects. However, a nexus of thought based on the Jamā'ats' ideology had emerged. One aspect of the Jamā'at that distinguishes it from both other Islamic movements and other *Maslaks* within Pakistan is the centring of its ideology of Iqāmat-e-Din. According to the Jamā'at, Iqāmat-e-Din is regarded as the purpose of life for Muslims. The term *Shahadat-e-Haq* (Witnesses onto mankind) is another term that the Jamā'at has used to explain the purpose of the Muslim Ummah. The term *Iqāmat-e-Din* takes a reference to verse 13 of Surah Shura:

*He has ordained for you of religion what He enjoined upon Noah and that which We have revealed to you, [O Muḥammad], and what We enjoined upon Abraham and Moses and Jesus - to establish the religion and not be divided therein. Difficult for those who associate others with Allāh is that to which you invite them. Allāh chooses for Himself whom He wills and guides to Himself whoever turns back [to Him].[52]*

Sadruddin Islahi has argued that three terms are used to describe the purpose of the Muslims, which can be used interchangeably: *Shahadat-e-Haq* (Witnesses onto mankind), *Amr bil Ma'aroof wa Nahi Ala al Munkar* (Enjoining what is right and forbidding that which is evil) and *Iqāmat-e-Din.[53]* The term Iqāmat-i-din is most commonly used to describe the Jamā'ats project. It is fundamentally rooted in Mawdūdī's conception of *Ibadah (*Worship) which argues that the greater purpose of prayer is the establishment of God's law.

Mawdūdī had prioritised the concept of *Iqāmat-e-dīn* as an immediate priority, however he did not shun devotional practises.

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[50] Humera Iqtidar *Secularising Islamists* (University of Chicago Press: 2014) pp.111
[51] The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr. (OUP:1996) pp. 220
[52] Quran: 42:13
[53] Islahi, Sadraldeen Fareeza Iqamat e Din (Markazi Maktabai:n.d.), pp.10

Discourses on divine governance exist in circles outside of the Jamā'at, however, the centring of Iqāmat-e-Din is unique to Islamic movement organisations. The Jamā'at, Muslim Brotherhood and some other Islamist organisations are distinguished from other Muslims in the sense that they believe that beyond acts of worship such as prayer, fasting and almsgiving, Muslims must also concern themselves with politics. This is an aspect that Mawdūdī had emphasised. Mawdūdī believed that the five pillars of Islam train one for the actual act of worship which he had argued to be Iqāmat-e-din.[54] Mawdūdī believed that politics and religion are inseparable from each other. The belief that *Iqāmat-e-Din* is an obligation and a fundamental tenant of Islam has been a defining factor that distinguishes the Jamā'at from other Maslaks, this positioning is unique to the Jamā'at.

The beliefs of Islamists such as the Jamā'at and Muslim Brotherhood regarding worship, i.e. through the belief that establishing Islams political system and *Iqāmat-e-dīn,* can be taken as one example of how these two groups have an orientation that differs from traditional Sunni beliefs.

2.3  Theological positioning of the Jamā'at

Although the Jamā'at may have adopted an inclusive approach to jurisprudence insofar as their member base is composed of members from various Maslaks. The theology of the Jamā'at has parallels with some beliefs of the early *Khariji* movement. The Jamā'at cannot be classed to be directly part of the Kharijtte movement as the Kharijtte's (as they had existed in its original form) no longer exist. Outside of the Sunnis and Shias, the Kharijtte camp could be considered to be the third most significant grouping of Muslims. Like the Sunnis and Shias, The Kharijites have their routes in early Islamic history in the formative period of Islamic theological schisms, in particular in the period of the third caliph Uthman ibn Affan. Edward Mortimer has described the Kharijites as:

> "…Uncompromising egalitarians, arguing that all men are equal in the sight of God, and equally accountable to him, and therefore rejecting any notion of privilege whether for the family of Muhammad, For the Meccan tribe of Quraish from which he sprang, or for the Arabs in general. The only criterian for virtue was of faith."[3]

The Kharijitte movement had originally fallen into the *Alid* (Pro Ali) camp, however, eventually the Kharijittes had rebelled against Ali following the success of Ali in the battle of

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[3] Mortimer, Edward. *Faith and Power, The Politics of Islam* (Vintage books:1982)

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Siffin against Muawiyyah. The Kharijittes had opposed Ali's arbitration with Muawiyyah, and eventually, a Kharijitte had assassinated Ali. Despite their rebellion against Ali, the Kharijites continued to be opposed to the Umayyad rule.

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[54] See Mawdudi, Syed Abul Ala *Khutabat* (Manshurat: n.d.)

The Kharijite's had a position of *La Hukm Ila li-llah (*No governance other than God's governance.) and any judgement can only fall in line with the judgement of God.[55] Mawdūdī and the Jamā'at's call for *Iqāmat-e-din.* Is one way their ideology parallels the concept of *Hakimiyah* that had been the call of the Kharijites as the position of *Iqāmat-e-Din* emphasises that God's law alone is the only law that can be implemented in society and state.

As a concept, *Hākimiyat (*Sovereignty) has been essential in Mawdūdī's discourse regarding Islamic statehood. Mawdūdī believed that the right to absolute sovereignty belongs to God alone. Mawdūdī had defined *Hākimiyat* as "supreme power and ultimate power" *(iqtidār-i-'Ala aur Iqtidār-i-mutlaq)* moreover, Hākimiyat as a term refers to ultimate rule that everyone must abide by as this condition has been produced by the lawgiver (Allah) himself.[56] Discourses on *Hākimiyah* developed an essential role in the framing of Islamist ideology, as it formed the basis of their belief that Islamic law must be implemented in the state. Mawdūdī has justified his views on *Hakimayat* through his Tafsir of verse 40 of Surah Yusuf, where *In-al Humk ila lillah* is translated as all authority to govern rests only with Allah.

Another way in which Mawdūdīs ideology parallels aspects of the Kharijite movement is through adopting an Umayyad-sceptic rhetoric. Both the Shiites and the Kharijittes had been critical of the Umayyads; the Umayyads stand accused of oppressing the Ahlul Bayt.

The Shiites and Kharijittes differ in their views regarding the nature of Abu Bakr and Umar, as the Shiites believe that the right to the leadership of Muslims belonged to Ali, some Shias accuse Abu Bakr of usurping his right to rule. However, the Kharijites view Abu Bakr and Umar to be upright individuals, here the Kharijittes differ to the Sunnis as the Sunnis believe that all four of the Caliphs are rightly guided, however, the Kharijitte's were critical of both Ali in the post-reconciliation era with Mu'awiyah as well as Uthman, however; they engage in veneration of Abu Bakr and Umar Ibn Khattab. The term Shaykhan (The two Shaykhs) has been used as a term of veneration for Abu Bakr and Umar by the Kharijittes (though this term is not used exclusively by the Kharijittes as some Sunnis may also use the term).

Critique of the Umayyad dynasty can become problematic for Sunnis as some senior ranking members of the Umayyad dynasty were among the companions and Sunnis hold a position of

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[55] Watt, William Montgomery, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (Edinburgh University Press: 1987) pp. 8

[56] Mawdudi, Syed Abul Ala *Islami Riyasat,* (Islamic Publications: n.d.)  pp.228

believing that the companions are upright, and Sunnis are committed to reverence of the companions. The implications of Mawdūdīs reading of events surrounding the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty will be discussed in detail in further detail in chapter five.

In relation to a longstanding debate in Islamic theology on orthodoxy vs orthopraxy, the discourse on the belief held by Islamists regarding the implementation of law and Islam's political system as a form of worship is noteworthy. The two positions address what constitutes being a Muslim, the former position shows that belief in the tenants in Islam alone is sufficient for one to be considered being a Muslim whilst the latter takes the position that both belief and practise of the faith are required for one to be a Muslim.

On one side of the spectrum, the *Murji'ites* held the position that God alone held the right to judge the actions of a Muslim, and one must not engage in acts of *Takfīr* (excommunication). This position fundamentally opposed the *Kharijite* position that committing a major sin takes one out of the fold of Islam.

Mawdūdī had argued that it is possible for one to be born into a Muslim household, however this in of itself is not sufficient for one to be a Muslim as Islam is not a "birthright" to be a Muslim; one must show commitment to following Islam otherwise they are renouncing themselves from being a Muslim.[57] For Mawdūdī, commitment to *Iqāmat-e-Din* is exactly the required essence of true Islam. Mawdūdī has not engaged in outright *Takfīr* of Muslims that do not subscribe to the Jamā'at's ideology of *Iqāmat-e-dīn.*

2.4 Conclusion

The formation of the Jamā'at was intended to be a 'holy community' rather than a sect. No *Maslak* was "formed" or "created"; *Maslaks* had emerged as a process rather than as an event. The Jamā'ats founding can be traced back to the latter part of the Indian independence movement and was established in response to the secular nature of the Muslim League. To date, the Jamā'at has not produced a good deal of Ulemā. This could be credited to the shift of the Jamā'at from its existence as a "holy community" to further emphasis on political activities. In the early days of the Jamā'at, they had more emphasis on intellectual production, and a good deal of Ulema had formed the ranks of leadership of the Jamā'at.

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[57] Mawdudi *Let us be Muslims* (The Islamic Foundation: 1985) pp.48

The Jamā'at was not formed to be a sect and the Jamā'at would fiercely resist being labelled as a sect. However, the party does follow a particular theological orientation as far as its ideology is concerned. *Iqāmat-i-Dīn* is a concept that is rarely discussed or endorsed outside of organisations affiliated with Islamic Movements, furthermore *Iqāmat-i-Dīn* is a concept that has not been universally accepted by all Muslims as some believe that establishing political tenants of Islam is not an obligation (*Fard*). It is true that the Jamā'at have taken specific theological positionings. These positions are positions that already exist within Sunni Islam, or at least take inspiration from existing Sunni positions (such as the debate on orthodoxy vs orthopraxy). Furthermore, the Jamā'at remains a Sunni movement; they uphold the doctrine of the upright nature of the four rightly guided caliphs and believe in caliphate to be the only legitimate from of governance, whilst Mawdūdī has been critical of some companions, critique of some companions has been performed by Sunni scholars as varying views on the upright nature of the companions exist. However, the Jamā'at at times deviates from the mainstream Sunni orthodoxy and the Jamā'at share some Neo-Kharijitte tendencies.

## Chapter three: Ecumenism in an Islamic context.

This chapter explores ecumenism, and the approaches Muslims have used towards promoting ecumenism as well as the application of Ecumenism in a Muslim context, with a focus on how have Muslims responded to the polemics that exist in Pakistan.

Parallels exist between sects, and some sects agree on various issues, as is the case with the Deobandis and Barelvis, who share beliefs on matters of Aqidah and Fiqh and both sects are Sunni and accepting of Sufism. Despite these fundamental similarities and agreements, both groupings are considered to be different sects which engage in strong criticism of each other.

### 3.1 Applying Ecumenism in an Islamic context

In the previous chapter, we explored some of the polemics that exist between Muslims in Pakistan. This section aims to explore attempts at applying Ecumenism an Islamic context with a focus on placating sectarianism in Pakistan.

Ecumenism is a term that is used to describe the act or belief of bringing together Christian Churches and or bringing together greater unity between Christian Denominations.[58]

*Wasitiya* or minimalism, is one concept that has Parallels with Christian Ecumenism.[59] Minimalism is described by Tajul Islam as: "Minimalism is a growing social construction of scholastic traditionalists through which the warring factions are attempting to salvage the historical continuity with 'orthodoxy' and placate Sunni infighting. " [60]

### 3.2 Ecumenism in Islamic movement thought.

Islamists, in particular the Jamāʾat and the Muslim Brotherhood, have been credited for their promotion of intra-Islamic unity, the Islamists often promote unity between Muslims to promote their political goals.

Mawdūdī had envisioned the Jamāʾat to be a party that had been formed with the aim to "break down sectarian prejudices" and would be a party where Muslims from any maslak would be able to continue their affiliation to any Maslak whilst holding membership of the

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[58]See Gros , J., McManus, E. & Riggs, A, *Introduction to Ecumenism* (Paulist Press:1938)
[59] Tajul Islam pp.65
[60] Tajul Islam pp.3

Jamāʾat, and Muslims with various Maslaki affiliations would work together to establish the Islamic system of life. Furthermore, Shia's are equally eligible to be a member of the Jamat if they agree with the aims and constitution of the Jamat. [61] Here, it could be argued that Mawdūdī has been promoting ecumenism within the party as membership is open to anyone who agrees with the Jamāʾats objectives and ideology and people from any sect are able to join as members. Moreover, Mawdūdī had not called for the abolishment of sects; rather, he had called for collaboration between the sects.

Islamist thought, particularly "Islamic movement" thought, has often centered the concept of Ummah in its ideology. Islamism has roots in Pan-Islamism; however, these concepts are different from each other. Pan-Islamism had taken hold in the 20th century, particularly following the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate. The differences between Islamism and pan-Islamism are characterised by Salman Sayyed in the following manner:

> *Pan-Islamism emerges in the reign of Abdul Hamid II as a political discourse that aims to unify all Muslims (including those under European colonial control) beneath the banner of the of the Ottoman Khalif. The roots of Islamism lie in the aftermath of the abolition of the Khalifah in 1924. It emerges as a political discourse that seeks to negotiate the political arrangement necessary for a Muslim society in the absence of a canonical answer that was provided by the figure of the Khalif. While both pan-Islamism and Islamism have some common features, it is important not to exaggerate these and to remain aware of the differences between the two discourses. Pan-Islamism is characterised by a colonial context and the desire to unify the Muslim world around the figure of the Khalifah. Islamism's condition of possibility is 'postcoloniality' and the ambition to re-Islamicise Muslim societies.* [62]

If the above characterisation of the two categories (Islamist and pan-Islamist) is to be applied solely, then it could be argued that the Jamāʾat falls into the category of an Islamist party as the Jamāʾat has concerned itself with Islamising Pakistan. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that Islamists have continued to promote pan-Islamic ideals of a unified Ummah under a single caliphate. Groups such as *Hizb ut-tahrīr* (The Party of Liberation). Reject the

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[61] Mawdudi, Syed Abul Ala, *Makatib* volume 2 (Islamic Publications) pp. 246
[62] See Salman, Sayyid 'Ancestor worship and the irony of the 'Islamic Republic' of Pakistan' *Contemporary South Asia 11. (2002)  pp 57-75.*

idea of attempting to Islamisice countries as reject the premise of a nation-state in its entirety. Instead, the HT promotes the idea of the re-establishment of the Caliphate as the only legitimate form of governance in Islam. Pan-Islamism as an ideology has not died following the collapse of the Ottoman empire. Ideologies can adapt and transform. The collapse of the Ottoman empire has left a vacuum, an absence of the caliphate which numerous groups such as the HT seek to re-establish.

The commitment to Ummatic unity has continued in Islamist circles. Whereas the founding of the Jamā'at occurred in the post-khilāfat movement period, the Jamā'at's founding remains grounded in a critique of nationalism and taking a position that favours a commitment to greater unity within the Ummah. The JUI, which had existed at the same time the Jamā'at was established, was committed to pan-Indian unity and Indian nationalism. Mawdūdī, although sceptical of the Pakistan movement, had commitment to both issues of Muslim autonomy as well as establishing orthopraxy. This is demonstrated in Mawdūdī's concerns over the fate of the Muslim minorities in what would become India if Pakistan was to be created.

The position of the Jamā'at on Indian independence was not identical to that of the JUI as the JUI had absolute commitment to Indian Nationalism, whereas Mawdūdī had continued to critique nationalism despite being critical of the Pakistan movement initially. Mawdūdī's critiques of the Pakistan movement had been based more on a position of concern for Muslim autonomy as opposed to a critique of Muslim/Islamic nationalism. Mawdūdī also had concerns over whether the All-India Muslim League is fit to implement Islamic law in a newly formed state.

One of the most significant figures of the pan-Islamist ideology was Jamaladin Al-Afghani. The emergence of nation-states in the 19th and 20th centuries had led to the re-imagination of nation-building. Furthermore, the abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate had led to an absence of a unified Muslim polity. These conditions led to the centring of the Ummah in the search for a Muslim polity.

Jamaladin Al-Afghani had been an advocate for the re-establishment of the Caliphate as a vehicle for the manifestation of the Muslim Ummah in its political sense. In addition to this, Afghani had advocated for engaging in national liberation struggles against colonialists in sections of the Muslim world that were under western colonialism.

Calls for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire had existed in the form of a social movement in British-occupied India. The Khilafat Movement was a movement of Muslim subjects of British India who had advocated for the preservation of the Ottoman Caliphate. The movement existed until 1924, with the eventual abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate.

Although the Ottoman empire had not ruled the territories of South Asia, the leadership of the Khilafat movement had still advocated for its preservation. One factor behind this was fear of the effects that the abolition of the caliphate could have on Muslims in British India.

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the caliphate, Muslims in South Asia had concerned themselves with the protection of their rights in a future polity that was to emerge. [63]

Sultan Abdul Hamid II had himself attempted to reconcile differences/animosity between the Shia and Sunni sects, particularly those living in Baghdad and Basra of Iraq. The Ottoman empire was a Sunni force. Multiple factors determined the caliph's motivation for attempting to reconcile the Sunnis and Shiites of the Ottoman Empire (in other words, the motivations for Abdul Hamid II ecumenism). One such factor was due to a potential threat to the unity of the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Abdulhamid II reign occurred during a time where the Ottoman Empire was facing a decline. These conditions had compelled Abdul Hamid II to consider how he could preserve the crumbling empire. Furthermore, the Shia of Iraq had been considered to be a force potentially disloyal to the Caliph.

Moreover, the Ottoman Empire has still perceived a threat from Shia Iran. Iraq was home to the most sacred of the Shiite shrines: Kazmiyan, Najaf, Samara and Karbala, which came to be known as the Atabat. The Atabat had become home to the Shiite *Usuli* school in the 18th century and the Atabat had continued to hold their central role in the 19th century hosting the *Mujtahids* who had used the Atabat to study or teach.[64]

Upon perceiving a potential threat from the Shia of Iraq, Sultan Abdul Hamid II had consulted with many to consider how to deal with the Shia threat. A critical opportunity for the rapprochement between Sunnis and Shia in Iraq had arisen when the *Ulema* of the Atabat

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[63] Çetinsaya, G., 2005. The Caliph and Mujtahids: Ottoman Policy towards the Shiite Community of Iraq in the Late Nineteenth Century. *Middle Eastern Studies,* Volume 41, pp. 561-574.
[64] Çetinsaya, G., 2005. The Caliph and Mujtahids: Ottoman Policy towards the Shiite Community of Iraq in the Late Nineteenth Century. *Middle Eastern Studies,* Volume 41, pp. 561-574. Pp. 561

had demonstrated that they were able to influence Iran's politics. In the late 19th century, the Iranian Shah had given a concession to a British company for the export of Iranian tobacco. This move was met with criticism and protest from the Ulema of Iran. One of the early leaders of these protests was Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, the Ulema of the Atabat had a significant influence in these protests. Eventually, because of such protests, the Shah had been compelled to overturn the export concession. Seeing the split between the Usuli Ulema and the Shah, Sultan Abdulhamid II had taken this opportunity for a rapprochement between Sunni and Shias, the Sultan had reached out to Jamaluddin Al-Afghani to help achieve this rapprochement.[65]

Sultan Abdulhamid II attempts towards rapprochement between Sunnis and Shias had been reactive in the sense that the Sultan had perceived a threat to his empire and had therefore understood the need for rapprochement between Sunnis and Shiites.

### 3.3 Iqbal's ecumenism

One advocate for ecumenism on a political level was Allama Iqbal, one of the most influential Muslim thinkers of the 20th century. Iqbal's *Magnum opus* Urdu poetic works: *Shikwa* (The complaint), and *Jawāb-e-Shikwa* (The response to the complaint) discuss the rise and fall of the Muslim Ummah, the poems promote Islamic revivalism and discuss the downfall of the Muslim Ummah.

In Iqbal's *Shikwa,* Iqbal laments over the state of the Ummah writing:

> *Other nations exist as well, among them are the sinful,*
>
> *The humble exist among them as do those drunken in their pride,*
>
> *The lazy, apathetic and smart exist among them,*
>
> *Several have become repugnant to your name,*
>
> *Your mercy is bestowed upon the fortunes of others,*
>
> *Whilst lightning strikes on the helpless Muslims![66]*

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[65] Çetinsaya, G., 2005. The Caliph and Mujtahids: Ottoman Policy towards the Shiite Community of Iraq in the Late Nineteenth Century. *Middle Eastern Studies,* Volume 41, pp. 561-574.

[66i] *Iqbal, Muhammad Shikwa, Jawab-i-Shikwa in kuliyat-i-Iqbal.* Translation is my own)

Among the reasons for the decline of the Muslim Ummah which Iqbal has examined, is the lack of unity among Muslims, which becomes a leitmotif across his poetry:

*The benefit and loss of this nation is one,*

*There is one messenger, one religion and faith is one,*

*One is your Kaaba, one is your lord, and the Qur'an is one*

*Would it be such a big deal had the Muslims been one?*

*Plagued with sectarianism and plagued with casteism,*

*Are these the ways to renewal in the world?*

Iqbal had also criticised Muslims for prioritising other identities in before their Islamic identities:

*You refer to yourselves as Sayyids, Mirzas and Afghanis,*

*You are everything, tell us are you Muslims?*

Iqbal also promoted pan-Islamist themes within his poetry:

*A Muslim I am, for the leadership of the Harem,*

*From the banks of the Nile to the deserts of Kashagar.[67]*

Iqbal had praised Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab of the Wahhabi movement:

"*The Great Puritan reformer, Mohammad Ibn-I-Abdul Wahab, who was born in 1700, studied in Medina, travelled in Persia, and finally succeeded in spreading the fire of his restless soul throughout the whole world of Islam. He was similar in spirit to Ghazali's disciple, Mohammad Ibn-I-Tumart-the Berber puritan reformer of Islam who appeared amidst the decay of Muslim Spain and gave her a fresh inspiration. We are, however not concerned with the political career of this movement, which was terminated by the armies of Mohammad Ali Pasha. The essential thing to note is the spirit of freedom*

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[67] Iqbal, Muhammad,  Kuliyat-i-Iqbal (Al Faisal Publishers: n.d.)
Translation is my own

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*manifested in it: though inwardly this movement, too, is conservative in its own fashion. While it rises in revolt against the finality of schools, and vigorously asserts the right of private judgement, its vision of the past is wholly uncritical, and in matters of law it mainly falls back on traditions of the Prophet."*[68]

Iqbal had also showed his admiration for Ahmed Raza Khan, the founder of the Barelvi movement. Iqbal's admiration of both Ibn Abdal-Wahab and Ahmad Raza Khan is significant as intensely strong polemics exist between the Barelvi and Wahabbi movements. The Wahabbi movement is one movement that Raza Khan had written polemics against in his *Husam al-Haramayn.* [69]

It is true that all Maslaks have venerated Iqbal in some form despite Iqbal's praise of Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahab, the Barelvis continue to celebrate Iqbal, the Barelvis could also be considered to be the largest support base for Iqbal. One reason for Iqbal's constant veneration across the spectrum of Maslaks could be attributed to the fact that Allama Iqbal is a national icon of Pakistan. The Jamā'at have also shown their admiration for Iqbal. One section of a couplet of Iqbal: *A Muslim I am for the Harem's leadership. (Aik Hu Muslim Haram ki Pāsbāni ke liye)* features on one of the Logos used by the Jamā'at.

Whilst Iqbal had not been affiliated to Islamic movement organisations as a member, Iqbal had numerous sympathies with Islamists. Iqbal and Mawdūdī shared various commonalities, in their political philosophy. Both Iqbal and Mawdūdī were concerned with the decline of the Ummah and Islamic civilisation, this concern was shared amongst many Muslim thinkers in the 20th century Islamic world. Iqbal and Mawdūdī shared a belief regarding Muslim nationhood wherein they both argued that Islam is the core defining factor of Muslim nationhood. They had made this argument clear in their criticism of Hussain Ahmed Madnis argument for power sharing between Muslims and Hindus. Mawdūdī had criticised Madni for his lack of attention to threat of Hindu Dominance following the end of British colonial rule.[70]

The concept of Ummah is central to the idea of Iqāmat-i-Din, the core ideology of the Jamā'at.[71] Iqāmat-i-Din, as described in the constitution of the Jamā'at, is described as "The establishment

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[68] Iqbal, Muhammad, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Kitab Bavan: n.d) pp. 152-153
[69] See Khan, Ahmed Raza, *Husam al-Haramayn*
[70] Zaman, M. Q., 2002. Nation, Nationalism, and the "ʿUlamāʾ": Hadīth In religio-political debates in twentieth century India. Oriente Moderno, Volume 21, pp. 93-113.
[71] Dastur, Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan

of divine, government or the Islamic system of life" (*Hakūmat-e-Ilahiya ya Islami nizam-e-zindagi ka qayam)*[72]

Sadruddin Islahi had begun his discussion on the necessity of Iqāmat-e-Din (establishing the religion) with the importance of the Ummah and has argued that the Muslim Ummah holds a "Privileged Status" (*Imtīāzi Haysiat*).[73] Islahi has argued the verse 110 of Surah Imran: "Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency; and ye believe in Allah. And if the People of the Scripture had believed it had been better for them. Some of them are believers; but most of them are evil-livers."[74] Implies that the Muslim Ummah should be considered to be a "party" and this party is the best party in humanity with no party or idea/ ideology being able to compete with its ranking as the best nation. Islahi's pairing of discussions on Iqāmat-e-Din with the concept of the Ummah shows that the two concepts, Ummah and Iqāmat-e-Din, are portrayed as inseparable from each other.

Furthermore, Islahi's idea and reading of the concept of the Ummah politicises and gives an ideology of the Ummah. Islahi's reading of the Ummah is not simply a grouping of people who share a belief system rather, as we have read, Islahi has read the Ummah through a political lens by using terms such as "party" and "ideology" in his description of the Ummah.

Mawdūdī's has argued that this verse declares that the role of the "guidance and leadership" (Imamat-o-rahnumai), has been assigned to the Muslims after being revoked from the Jews as Muslims had been enlightened with the qualities of enjoying right and forbidding Evil which are the very qualities necessary for the leadership of society. As we had explored in chapter one, the terms *Iqāmat-e-Din* and *Amr bil Maruf wa Nahi Ala al-Munkar* are two terms that can be used interchangeably to discuss the concept of establishing Islam.

Muslims have often quoted verse 103 of Surah Aal-Imran as a verse on the discussion on unity within Islam. The verse reads: "And hold fast, all of you together, to the cable of Allah, and do not separate. And remember Allah's favour unto you: How ye were enemies and He made friendship between your hearts so that ye became as brothers by His grace; and (how)

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[72] Dastoor Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan (Lahore) pp. 4
[73] Islahi, Sadruldin, *Fareeza-e-Iqamat-e-Din* (Markazi Maktaba:n.d.) pp.8
[74] Quran 3:110

ye were upon the brink of an abyss of fire, and He did save you from it. Thus Allah maketh clear His revelations unto you, that haply ye may be guided."[75]

Mawdūdī, in his commentary on this verse, has argued that this verse proves the necessity of Iqāmat-e-Din. According to Mawdūdī, the "rope" refers to the Din, this expression of a rope is used to express that the Din is what unites the believers as a party, and the Din is also what establishes the faithful's relationship with Allah. Mawdūdī, has also argued in his exegesis of this verse [76] that the foundational purpose of life is to establish the din. Ultimately, by shifting one's attention away from the central purpose of life, one will end up in the position of previous nations that had been disgraced by sectarianism.[11] This concept has been further developed by Mawdūdī in his argument that jurisprudential differences are considered to be the religion itself, henceforth new "Ummah's" are formed on the basis of these trivial jurisprudential differences which make the true purpose of life, i.e. Iqāmat-e-Din impossible.[77]

The idea that sectarianism makes the conditions for Iqāmat-e-Din impossible should theoretically mean that the Jamā'at would actively work to reduce sectarian tensions within Pakistan and promote ecumenism as a precondition in order to fulfil its political project.

Mawdūdī, like Islahi has centred Ummah in his discussions on Din, Mawdūdī's discussion on the necessity of focusing on Iqāmat-e-Din suggests that Mawdūdī argued that by centring the project of Iqāmat-e-Din, Muslims will be able to avoid sectarianism.

The discussion of Ummah and din in the Jamā'ats ideology of *Iqāmat-e-din* Demonstrates the ideological ecumenism of the Jamat, and more importantly, how they envision the breakdown of sectarianism could be achieved within the Muslim Ummah; however, discussions on Iqāmat-e-Din are rarely found outside of the Jamā'at and other *Maslaki* parties have not considered Iqāmat-e-Din to be part of their political project.

Mawdūdī has attempted to contextualise the emergence of Islamic sects in his work *Khilafat-o-Malookiat* has attempted to contextualise the process of the emergence of Islamic sects as an effect of what he has described as the absence of the system of the Rightly guided Caliphate. Mawdūdī has given the background to the formation of four groups: the Kharijites,

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[75] Quran 3:103

[76] See Mawudui, Syed Abul Ala *Tafheem Ul-Qur'an* (Idara Tarjuman Al Quran:n.d.)

[77] Mawdudi, Syed Abul Ala *Rasail o Masail* (Islamic Publications: n.d.) pp. 863

the Shiites, the Murjiiites, and the Mutazilites. According to Mawdūdī, the system of *Malookiat* (kingdom) that had emerged immediately following the end of the period of the *Rashidun* Caliphate and the beginning of the *Umayyad* caliphate lacked a system of finding solutions to or bridging the ideological differences that had emerged as a result of the loss of the Caliphate.[78] Mawdūdī's discussion on the emergence of sects in Islam in this context is significant because it relates to what is arguably the central thought in Jamat ideology: the need for a Muslim polity. Furthermore, Mawdūdī has clearly seen the emergence of sects as a negative issue. Much of Mawdūdī's political project is discussed in his Khilafat-o-Malookiat. As a return to an ideal Muslim polity is part of the Jamā'ats political project, Mawdūdīs arguments could indicate how he would see the issue of sectarianism resolved, as Mawdūdī believed a single shared cause (Iqāmat-e-Din) would be sufficient to unite Muslims. However, Muslims outside of the Jamā'at, and Islamists who share Mawdūdī's ideology, have not been unified behind the concept of *Iqāmat-e-Din* and many have refuted the Jamā'at's belief that *Iqāmat-e-Din* is an obligation.

On another occasion, Mawdūdī has discussed the birth of new sects in much more detail. Mawdūdī had argued that the Muslim rulers had fallen into ignorance in the period immediately succeeding the death of the Caliph Umar ibn Abdal Aziz. Furthermore, the Abbasid caliphs had lost their understanding of Islamic sciences and arts. As a result of this, Muslims were led down the path of conformity to the Sharia in a manner that did not recognise evolving trends. In addition to this, the Ulema had indulged themselves in trivial debates in Islamic matters, these debates had eventually been given patronage, and new sects had begun to emerge.[79] Mawdūdī further argued that these trivial debates that had exited in the Muslim world and which had been sponsored by the rulers who had seen the debates as a form of entertainment. Mawdūdī likened these debates to" scissors which had cut into pieces their religious unity."[80] Mawdūdī's discussion here demonstrates how he had seen the emergence of sects as a negative phenomenon in the Muslim world and as a sub-product of" ignorance".

Although Mawdūdī had been critical of the emergence of sects, Mawdūdī has exercised caution in refraining from criticising any individual sect. In addition to this, the framework of the Jamā'at which Mawdūdī has envisioned is a party that allows people from any Maslak to

[78] Mawdūdī Syed Abul Ala, *Khilafat-o-Malookiat,* (Lahore: Idara Tarjumanul Quran, 1966) pp.209

[79] Mawdudi, Syed Abul Ala, *A short history of the revivalist movement in Islam*, pp. 51 (Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers: 2009)

[80] Mawdudi, Syed Abul Ala *A short history of the revivalist movement in Islam(Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers:* 61

join if they do not have any prejudices towards any member of any Maslak. Mawdūdī, however, did fear that separate groups could emerge in the Jamā'at representing various Maslaks, should such a scenario occur, then in the eyes of Mawdūdī, the purpose of launching the party would fail.[81] To the credit of Mawdūdī, no parallel groups representing any Maslak have emerged in the Jamat.

Discussion on the origins of Islamic Sects with roots in political references is not a concept that is unique to Mawdūdī. A similar idea is held by William Montgomery Watt, who has argued that "all theological and philosophical ideas have a political or social reference".[82]

Although Mawdūdī did not discuss the emergence of the Deobandis, Ahle-Hadith and Barelvi movements, his readings of the transition from Caliphate to kingdom are of crucial significance. This is because many of the debates between these three sub-groupings take reference to key events such as the battles between Ali and Mu'awiyah and the battle of Karbala, in their debates. More importantly, Mawdūdī's readings on these events had been a point of criticism for him, especially from the Deobandis and the Ahl-i Hadith Maslaks.

From the above readings, it is clear that the Jamat has held the concept of the Ummah central to its ideology on Iqāmat-e-din and has continually linked the concepts of Ummah and Iqāmat-e-Din together. The above readings indicate how the Jamā'at could use their project of Iqāmat-I-din as an ideology to build towards Islamic unity.

From our readings, we have discovered that in the mind of various jurists, the Ummah should not simply be considered to be a community of Muslims, rather, it cannot be separated from discussions on the *Khalifa.* Discussions on Ummah in Islam is what contributes to the Pan-Islamist nature of the Jamā'at and other Islamic movement groupings.

The Jamā'at is not the only organisation which represents Islamic movement thought. In the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood is considered to be the counterpart to the Jamā'at. In addition to this, A nexus of Islamist thinkers, namely: Mawdūdī, Syed Qutb, Abul Hassan Ali Hasani Nadvi, and Hassan Al Banna. Yusuf Al Qardawi, who served as the intellectual head of the Muslim Brotherhood, was known for his work around *Taqrīb al-Madhahib.* (Rapprochement between sects)

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[81] Mawdūdī, Daee wahdat e ummat pp. 95 (n.d)

[82] Watt, William Montgommery. *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, An Extended Survey (Edinburugh University Press 1987), pp.1

Understanding the approaches that the Muslim Brotherhood have taken towards promoting ecumenism helps understand the ideology of ecumenism that the Jamā'at has worked to promote. Despite being organisations that are independent of one another, Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamā'at hold a common ideology and political project: The establishment of an Islamic polity. Polka, when commenting on the ecumenism of Yusuf al-Qardawi, argues that pan-Islamist ideas have always been found within the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hassan Al Banna had believed that the realisation of Muslim unity would occur when the Ummah is restored to the glory it had once enjoyed. [83] Pan-Islamism has also shaped the views of Mawdūdī. Banna's conception of when Muslim unity will be achieved shares similarities with Mawdūdī's ideas on the realisation of Muslim unity through working for the establishment of the Din as they both believed that Islamic unity could be achieved through political methods.

Qardawi's *Tayar al-wasaitiya* is a movement which argues that it is a fusion of *Salafiya and Tajdid.[84] (*A position that favours renewal/revivalism).

Qardawi has set out the following principles to refute those who excommunicate Shias from Islam Polka has described these principles as follows:

Shi'ites believe that the Qur'an is the word of Allah. The Qur'an printed in Iran is the same as the one printed in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. There is no Shi'ite consensus regarding the portions omitted.

> • *Shi'ites do acknowledge the Sunna as a second source of law, only they derive the Sunna from their own traditions. This is a far cry from heresy; at the very worst it constitutes unwarranted innovation (bid'a).*
>
> • *Vilification of the Companions of the Prophet is grounded in Shi'ite exegesis (ta'wil) and cannot therefore be deemed heresy.*
>
> • *Regarding the alleged infallibility of the Shi'ite Imams, al-Qaradawi upholds this as a mistake, but not a blatant heresy (kufr bawah). In Sunni eyes, the pro nunciations of the Imams are regarded either as prophetic traditions or as opinions hatched of ijtihad. It follows that Shi'i fiqh differs*

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[83] Polka, S., 2013. Taqrib al-Madhahib-Qaradawi's Declaration of Principles Regarding Sunni-Shi'i Ecumenism. *Middle Eastern Studies* , 49(3), pp. 414-429 pp. 416-417

[84] Polka, S., 2013. Taqrib al-Madhahib-Qaradawi's Declaration of Principles Regarding Sunni-Shi'i Ecumenism. *Middle Eastern Studies ,* 49(3), pp. 414-429pp.415

*no more from Sunni fiqh than the four Sunni legal schools differ from one*
*another.*

*• Just as the Shi'ites pray to the Imams for deliverance, so the Sunnis pray*
*to saints, awliya', some of whom are from the family of the Prophet, like al*
*Husayn, grandson of Muhammad, and Zaynab, His daughter. Nor are*
*Sunnis strangers to prostrating themselves on the graves of saints. The only*
*difference is that whereas Sunni religious scholars condemn the practice as*
*a bastardly innovation in faith, Shi'i clerics do not.*[85]

Qardawi had demonstrated that he is not only willing to accommodate Shias, he has also attempted to rebuttal arguments that are used against Shias and arguments that are used to excommunicate Shias from Islam.

One difference between Qardawi and Al-Banna, compared to Mawlana Mawdūdī, is that Al-Bana and Qardawi have set out a more detailed framework for achieving Muslim unity for example, Qardawi had directly addressed controversial polemics against Shias that had been used to excommunicate Shias. Qardawi has attempted to reconcile/refute such polemics. In contrast, Mawdūdī and the Jamā'at have not engaged in the same detailed work the Muslim Brotherhood had in finding solutions to promote ecumenism. It could be argued that, to a certain extent, the Jamā'at and Mawdūdī have condemned sectarianism and called for greater Muslim unity. This unity would ultimately be achieved through united action for *Iqāmat-e-Dīn.*

In addition to the development of a framework for Sunni/Shia unity as laid out by Qardawi, Hassan Al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood had also worked for a framework of Pan-Sunni or Intra Sunni unity to work to rectify some of the differences that exist within the Sunnis. Hassan Al Banna may have focused on the tensions that exist within Sunni Islam as Shias were not many in Egypt at the time of his activism. Hassan Al-Banna's framework for pan-Sunni unity was based on his twenty principles for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Another demonstration of Shia/Islamic movement unity can be seen following the Islamic revolution in Iran. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamā'at, alongside other Islamic movement organisations such as the Salvation Party of Turkey, had visited Iran almost

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[85] Polka, S., 2013. Taqrib al-Madhahib-Qaradawi's Declaration of Principles Regarding Sunni-Shi'i

Ecumenism. *Middle Eastern Studies ,* 49(3), pp. 414-429 pp. -421

immediately after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in a trip organised by the international organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood. [86] This trip had been particularly inspirational for the *Amīr* of the Jamā'at at the time, Mian Tufail Muhammad. The Islamic movement organisations had expressed their inspiration and admiration for the Islamic revolution in Iran.

The Jamā'at's support for the Islamic Revolution in Iran demonstrates how the Jamā'at had managed to transcend sectarian boundaries and support what they had perceived to be a joint political project. However, as we had seen with the SSP's attacks on Mawdūdī and the Jamā'at, had been a cause for criticism for the Jamā'at from other sects, mainly the Deobandis. In one sense, the Jamā'at's cross-sectarian support for the Iranian Revolution is a demonstration of how the Jamā'at have promoted Ecumenism, however within Pakistan itself has been a challenge for the Jamā'at as existing sectarian divides have hindered the Jamā'at from receiving support from sections of the mainstream Sunni sects, namely the Deobandis. Abul Hasan Nadvi, a senior Indian scholar who was once associated with Mawdūdīs Jamā'at as well as influencing Islamist thinkers such as Yusuf al Qardawi, wrote a preface to Manzur Numanis book: *Irani lnqilāb: Imam Khumayni awr Shi'iyyat.* This text became a critical influence on anti-Shia Deobandi Militant organisations.[87]

The concept of divine sovereignty (*Hākimīyah*) is a concept that is not only central to the Jamā'at and Mawdūdī, but it is a concept that is discussed and holds importance amongst various Islamists.

Fuchs, when highlighting his arguments for the Jamā'at's support for the Iranian Revolution, argues:

> *"In other words, leaders of the JI were not fooled, as has been argued about the general Sunni reception, by the Revolution's supposedly ecumenical façade. Yet, what rendered Iran ultimately attractive to members of the JI was their judgement that the Iranians had drawn the right conclusion from hakimiyya, which was nothing less than an "essential function of God". Iran put into place an Islamic government (hukumat-i Islami). The revolutionaries*

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[86] FUCHS, S. W., 2022. A Direct Flight to Revolution: Maududi, Divine Sovereignty, and the 1979-Moment in Iran. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* Volume 32, pp. 333-354. pp.334

[87] Kamran, T., 2009. CONTEXTUALIZING SECTARIAN MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN: A CASE STUDY OF JHANG. *Journal of Islamic Studies,* 20(1), pp. 55-85. pp. 72

> *under Khomeini's leadership thus fulfilled Maududi's second requirement, namely, to give structure to the "universal viceregency of God", the Caliphate of man."[88]*

Fuchs's analysis helps to understand how a joint belief in divine supremacy had been a cause for the Jamā'at's support for the Iranian Revolution. Muhammad Qasim Zaman has credited Mawdūdī and Sayyid Qutb for polarising discussions on divine sovereignty into wider circles, additionally, Mawdūdī's concept of *Haakimiya* had been able to "cross sectarian boundaries".[89] Zaman, Like Fuchs, argues that references to Mawdūdī's concept of divine sovereignty are found in the ideology featured in Iran's Islamic Revolution. In this sense, it could be argued that the Jamā'at had been receptive to the Iranian Revolution based on shared theological concepts. Sayyid Qutb had advocated for the concept of divine sovereignty and had conceptualised his ideas on divine sovereignty as follows:

> *"From the viewpoint of the limited understanding of man, it does not seem as though this would be the easiest way to reach the hearts of the Arabs. They knew their language well and knew the meaning of 'Ilah' (God) and they also knew the meaning of 'la ilah il Allah' (there is ni deity except God). They also knew that 'Uluhiya' means 'sovereignty', and they also realised that ascribing sovereignty only to God would mean that the authority would be taken away from the priests, the leaders of tribes, the wealthy and the rulers, and would revert to God. It meant that only God's authority would prevail in the heart and conscience, in matters pertaining to religious observances and in the affairs of life such as business, the distribution of wealth and the dispensation of justice – in short, in the souls and bodies of men. They knew very well that the proclamation, "There is no diety except 'Allah', was a challenge to that worldly authority which had usurped the greatest attribute of God, namely, sovereignty.[90]*

The Muslim Brotherhood have found themselves allying with Shias on many occasions including Iranian allied factions such as Hezbullah. The Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has fiercely opposed Assad's government and has even condemned other Muslim

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[88] FUCHS, S. W., 2022. A Direct Flight to Revolution: Maududi, Divine Sovereignty, and the 1979-Moment in Iran. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* Volume 32, pp. 333-354. pp. 337

[89] Zaman Muhammad Qasim Islam in Pakistan, (Princeton University Press: 2020) pp.162

[90] Qutb, Syed *Milestones* pp.24-25 (Islamic Publication House: 2005)

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Brotherhood branches for allying with Iran here it must be noted that the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is an opposition movement the same way its counterparts in the Arab world serve as opposition movements. The key difference is that the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is in opposition to a Shia government that is allied with Iran whereas the other branches of the Muslim Brotherhood are in opposition to secular Sunni governments with many of them perceiving Iran to be a threat.[91]

The JI have constantly held events marking Al-Quds day, initiated by Ayotallah Khomeini. Such activities in Pakistan are also held by the TJP and the Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimin a Shia party in Pakistan that advocates for Muslim unity.

### 3.4  Opportunities for rapprochement

One of the most significant ecumenical works to emerge from South Asia was the *Tasfiya Ma Bayn Sunni o Shia* (The settlement between the Sunni and Shia) written by Mehr Ali Shah, a Hanafi Sunni scholar of the Chistiya Sufi order. In Mehr Ali's work, he delves into the divergence between Shia and Sunni Muslims and proposes methods to bridge the gap between both sects. Mehr Ali Shah had written that his work responds to a trend within some Sunnis that advocates for malice against the Ahlul Bayt and adopting to an Umayyad centric approach to history, a position that Mehr Ali had rejected as being a tenant of the *Ahlul Sunna Wal Jammah positioning.Mehr Ali provided a critique of Nāsibiya, which is a term that refers to hatred for the Ahlul-Bayt.*

Mehr Ali Shah had adopted a hermeneutics-based approach to reconciliation between Sunnis and Shias. Deobandis and the Ahl-i Hadith have rooted their polemics against Shias in their intense veneration of the prophet's companions. Although both the Deobandis and the Barelvis are based in the Sufi Tradition, the Deobandis have laid some of the fiercest polemics against the Shias. The Ahl-i Hadith criticise many Sufi practises and beliefs and can criticise Sufis for sympathising with Shias. Nasr highlights the connections between Sufis and Shias as both groupings share commonalities in both doctrines and practices. Both Shias and Sufis are united in their veneration of Ali ibn Abi Talib, Shias and some Sunnis accept the Hadith of the city of knowledge, where the Prophet has been reported to have said: "I am the city of knowledge and Ali is its gate". Here Nasr argues that the idea that Ali is a spiritual

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[91] Helfont Samual, The Muslim Brotherhood and the Emerging 'Shia Crescent', Orbis, Volume 53, Issue 2, 2009, pp 284-299

authority appeals to the Sufis, in the sense he is a 'spiritual viceregent' or *Khilafa ruhaniyah*.[92] The authenticity of this Hadith is defended by Mehr Ali Shah and Mehr Ali also uses this Hadith as a tool of reverence for the Ahlul Bayt.[93]

Despite commonalities between Sufis and Shias and the link between Sufi *Tariqas* and Ali as a spiritual authority, the Deobandis have laid some of the fiercest polemics against the Shias. Mainly on the basis that the Deobandis accuse the Shias of blaspheming against the prophets' companions. It could be argued that the Deobandis have favoured the doctrine of the upright nature of companions over empathy/reverence of the Ahlul-Bayt whereas the Barelvis have favoured veneration of the Ahlul-Bayt. Some Hanafis also permit the act of cursing Yazid, whereas others have adopted a more quietist approach to Yazid.

Mehr Ali's works were published before the foundation of the Jamā'at, yet Mehr Ali's views on the issue of Sunni and Shia Sectarianism have Parralels with Mawdūdī's ideas. Both Mawdūdī and Mehr Ali are rooted in the Chisti order of Sufism. In chapter two, we had discussed Mawdūdī's views on the battle of Siffin, and how such views shared commonalities with the views of the Kharijitte movement. Mehr Ali's reasoning for publishing his *Tasfiya*. Highlight how Umayyad-sceptic views are not unique to Mawdūdī and such beliefs have also been held by some Sunni traditionalists.

3.5  Conclusion

Islamic Ecumenism has at times been reactive to the events and scenarios occurring in the Muslim world, recently ecumenism has been discussed as a response to recent sectarian violence and trends. In the 20th century, with the loss of much of the political power in the Islamicate, especially as a result of the abolishment of the Caliphate, pan-Islamism and modernist trends sought to promote Islamic unity in response to the loss of political power. Unity has been promoted as a pre-requisite for revivalism in Islam.

Revival or re-establishment of the caliphate has been an aim of many Islamists. The Caliphate serves as a symbol of Islamic unity. Islamic ecumenism should be appealing to

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[92] Shi'Ism and Sufism: Their Relationship in Essence and in History, Nasr pp.231

[93] Shah, Mehr Ali*, Tasfiya Ma Bayn Sunni wa Shia*, Chapter 7 Hadith Madinatul Ilm pp. 63 (Golra:n.d.)

those advocating for Pan-Islamism and calls for an Islamic polity, especially by establishing a caliphate.

One major way in which the ecumenism of the Islamists, especially the Jamā'at, differs from the ecumenism of the traditionalists is that traditionalists have focused on forming/maintaining an inclusive orthodoxy, whereas Islamists have promoted ecumenism and Islamic unity has become a leitmotif in Islamist circles as a means of promoting their political project.

**Chapter four, Tackling sectarianism.**

Previously, we discussed the ideological and theological views of the Jamā'at towards ecumenism as well as Muslim approaches to tackling sectarianism. This chapter explores the Jamā'at's attempts to materialise their ideas on sectarianism and the extent to which the Jamā'at has succeeded in breaking down sectarian divisions.

During the founding stages of the Jamat, the Jamā'at contained a level of diversity as far as affiliation to Maslaks had been concerned. An example of this could be seen in the founding session of the Jamā'at, when Muhammad Manzur Nu'mani, a leading Deobandi figure, had expressed interest in being the leader of the Jamat.[94] This is significant as it demonstrates that Mawdūdī was willing to include various sects in the Jamat during its founding. Numani had eventually defected from the Jamat, not based on theological differences but on the character of Mawdūdī.[95] In 1941, the number of Ulema who had joined the Jamat began to increase with representation from Nadwi, Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith Ulema.[96] The diverse range of Maslaks represented in the Jamat gives weight to the argument that the Jamā'at in its inception had adopted an inclusive approach to membership. Had the Jamat not been receptive to ecumenism, or had it not been post-sectarian as it claims to be, it would not have allowed members of various Maslaks to join, and hold ranks within the party. The initial diversity of Maslaks involved in the Jamat had been in line with Mawdūdī's vision of Muslims from various Maslaks working for the purpose of *Iqāmat-e-dīn.*

In its primary days, the dominance of Deobandi scholars in the Jamat had been a limitation for the Jamā'at in its promotion of ecumenism. The number of Barelvis in the ranks of the Jamat had been limited. The limited ranks of the Barelvis within the Jamā'at is a significant limitation as the Barelvis are by far largest grouping of Muslims in Pakistan. In addition to this, the large number of Deobandis who filed in the ranks of both its membership and its leadership had resulted in the party being treated with suspicion by the Shia and Barelvis of Pakistan.[97]

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[94] Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan*.(California University Press:1994) Pp. 22

[95] Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan*. (California University Press:1994) Pp.26

[96] Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan*. .(California

University Press:1994)  Pp.23
[97] Murphy, Eamon Islam and Sectarian violence in Pakistan (Routledge: 2018)  pp.87

It should not be assumed that the early dominance of Deobandi scholars in the Jamā'at makes the Jamā'at a party that represents the Deobandi Maslak; The Jamā'at also had representation from the other Maslaks. In addition to this, many Deobandi Scholars such as Hussain Ahmed Madani[98] had been at the forefront of those critical of the Jamā'at and Mawdūdī, one of the main reasons for this is the views of Mawdūdī on the historiography of the quest for the Caliphate and the history of the formative period in Islamic sectarianism i.e. the wars between Ali and Muawiyya and Mawdūdī's criticism of Uthman Ibn Affan.

The MMA

Electorally, the Jamā'at had traditionally allied itself with political coalitions as a result of its limited voter base which severely limited its chances of electoral success. One of the most significant coalitions that the Jamā'at had played a part in was the *Muttehida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA).

The *Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal* (United Council of Action) was a coalition of *Maslaki* parties and more importantly, it could be considered to be a display of unity between Islamist political parties in Pakistan. This is because it had represented each of the sects of Pakistan. The MMA was composed of the following political parties: *Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, (Barelvi) Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, (Deobandi) Jamā'at-i-Islāmī (Islamic movement), Tehrīk-i-Jaafiriya Pakistan (Shia), Jamiat Ahle Hadith (Salafi).[99]* In the backdrop to the War on terror, the main Islamist parties of Pakistan were able to form a political alliance despite some of the parties in the coalition were sceptical of each other. Its first president spearheaded the proposal for the alliance was Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani of the JUP.

Sunni groups dominated the MMA. However, the coalition also included the *Tehrīk-e-Jafiryyah,* the most prominent group representing the Shias of Pakistan on a political level. This demonstrates the willingness of Sunni political parties to include Shias in their political work, in addition to this, as per our previous readings, some Sunni groups had been particularly suspicious of the Tehrīk-e-Jafiryah Pakistan. Considering the previous animosity shown towards the TJP, the inclusion of the TJP in an Islamist coalition should not be

[98] *Hussain Ahmed Madani, The Jihad for Islam and Indias Freedom* (Oneworld Publications 2008)
[99] Muhammad Imran Pasha, Ayaz Muhammad, Religious Political Parties in Political Enclave of Pakistan (A Case Study of MMA 2002-2008), *Pakistan Journal of Islamic Research,* 20 (2019)

considered to be insignificant and indicates a change in direction from sectarian suspicions to open collaboration in the political sphere.

The MMA was a significant breakthrough for Pakistan's Islamist political parties. Beyond a political alliance, the MMA was a platform for theological unity between Pakistan's various sects. Each political party collaborated to develop the central aim of the majority of the groupings: The establishment of the Sharia. In addition to this, this was an occasion where the religious political parties in Pakistan were able to show their electoral strength, which they had previously struggled to attain.

Several factors led to the success of the MMA. One factor that led to the success of the MMA was the opposition to the war on terror and policies of the US. Iqtidar highlights how the diverse grouping of *Maslaks* which had previously been critically opposed to each other were led with no choice other than to collaborate with each other as they had done with the MMA.[100]

Inspite of the relative success of the MMA, the alliance had eventually collapsed. Several factors had led to its collapse. Although unity had been displayed by the Islamist parties, the MMA was unable to survive in the long term.

One of the most critical attempted actions of the MMA was the *Hasba* bill. In the post-Zia Ul Haq era, the MMA had attempted to pass the *Hasba* bill. With an attempt at Islamising through law. The dynamics of the MMA's attempt at Islamisation were much different to the Islamisation attempts that occurred during Zia Ul Haq; Zia's reforms were seen as reforms that had favoured Sunni (mainly Deobandi) positions whereas the hasba bill was presented on a united front with representation from all *Maslaks.* The Hasba bill was a critical opportunity for the Jamā'at to attempt to reform Pakistani state law in the post Zia-era however despite a united Islamic front and a degree of Islamic unity (a factor that the Jamā'at believe is critical to implementing divine law), The MMA had failed to lay out several reforms to Islamise Pakistan.

The MMA was revived in the lead up to the 2018 General Election in Pakistan; however, it collapsed following the exit of the Jamā'at from the coalition. The revived MMA of 2018 was significantly weaker, firstly the JUI-S was not present in the alliance. The JUI—S had chosen

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[100] Iqtidar, Humeira *Secularising Islamists* University of Chicago Press: 2014) pp. 102

to ally with Imran Khan's PTI party.[101]  Secondly, the alliance performed significantly less well in the General elections. It should be noted that the exit of the Jamat from the MMA of 2002 was not because of an unwillingness to work with Pakistan's other religious political parties or based on sectarian lines. Rather, political differences that had existed between the Jamā'at and the JUI-F had been more of a contributing factor for the Jamā'at's exit from the coalition.

In the 2018 context, the MMA faced two new contesters of religious parties, the Allah-o-Akbar Tehrīk and the Tehrīk-e-Labaik Pakistan. Siddiqa has argued that TLP had enjoyed a relationship with the army to break away the vote bank of the PMLN's Barelvi voters. [102] The fact that the TLP was able to break away a section of the PMLN vote bank highlights the power of the *Maslaki* vote bank. In the 2024 Pakistani General election, no such electoral alliance as the MMA had existed and *Maslaki* parties had fought the elections on their own platforms.

Another reason for the decline of the MMA was the existing sectarian divides within Pakistani society. This holds significance, as it questions the extent to which the MMA was successful in alleviating sectarian divides within Pakistan. Of course, for representatives of Maslaki parties to join under one platform cannot be considered insignificant, however that suspicion of opposing *Maslaks* had exited demonstrates the MMA had not been entirely successful in pacifying sectarian relationships.

Overall, the MMA of 2002 could have a significant moment towards theological rapprochement and finding solutions for political violence between Muslim sects because it was the first time that representatives of each of the major Maslaks of Pakistan was represented in a single united coalition. However, in the long term, the MMA was unable to survive and was not replicated in subsequent general elections which demonstrates its limitations.

It could be argued that the MMA had used a minimalist approach towards ecumenism. The Uniting of the major parties representing the Maslaks of Pakistan was a huge achievement and one factor that allowed for its achievement was a minimalist approach towards policy making. As an Islamist coalition, the MMA had representation from all of the Maslak in

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[101] https://tribune.com.pk/story/1563033/pti-jui-s-mull-electoral-alliance-2018-polls accessed 7 august 2023
[102] Ayesha Siddiqa, in Pakistan's Political Parties, (Georgetown University Press: 2020) pp.231

Pakistan. The MMA was careful not to repeat some of the previous mistakes made by those who had attempted to implement Islamic law. The MMA had provided a platform for all Maslaki parties to collaborate for their joint project.

The Shite grievances of 1979 against the government's zakat policy is a key point of reference here, The MMA had agreed upon a manifesto and political project and had avoided any grievances based on polemical sectarianism. The attempts at Islamisation or the introduction of Islamic laws into Pakistani state law of the MMA were different to the Islamisation project of Zia ul Haq as in principle, the MMA's project was ecumenical and had functioned in a way that would not Favour any individual Maslak in Pakistan.

Outside of the MMA, religious parties in Pakistan have been able to collaborate on their shared purpose. As a political party, the Jamat has entered into coalitions and political alliances with a range of political parties, including non-maslaki parties. In the 1993 General elections, the *Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (*Islamic Democratic Alliance) was formed.

Traditionally, the social base and voter base of the Jamā'at have been limited, In the early history of the Jamā'at, the Jamā'at was able to attract some members of the Ahl-i-Hadith *Maslak.*[103] The limited vote bank and membership base of the Jamā'at can be attributed to several reasons. Initially, the Jamā'at was elitist in its membership structure.

Although the MMA was ultimately a short-lived project, a new party with a stated objective of promoting Islamic unity, the *Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM)* (The Council for Muslim Unity) had emerged. The MWM differs to the MMA in the sense that it is an individual political party as opposed to a coalition of political parties, most importantly the party is a *Shia* political party, which seeks to create unity between Shias and Sunnis. The MWM has held successful alliances with Barelvis in Pakistan mainly from the Sunni Ittehad Council and occasionally support from the Pakistan Awami Tehrik.

As Shias are a minority who have faced persecution, it is understandable that some Shias are more concerned with promoting Islamic unity.

As we have previously discussed, electoral performance and activity are not the only objectives of the Jamā'at and the *Maslaki* parties of Pakistan. In addition to political/electoral alliances, the Jamā'at has attempted to bring about intra-Islamic unity through non-electoral

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[103] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan. (California University Press 1994) Pp.83

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initiatives. An example of this is their leading involvement in the *Milli Yakjehti Council* (Council of Religious Harmony). The MYC was established in 1995. The MYC could be considered to be a forum for the existence of contact between representatives from the opposing Maslaks. However, since its inception, it has had a limited agenda with infrequent opportunities for contact between representatives.[104]

Alliances such as the *Islami Jamhūri Itehād* and the MMA demonstrate the Jamā'at is willing to work with other Islamic Movements in Pakistan, even if it does consider itself to be the vanguard party of political Islam or the Islamic revolution.

Paighām-e-Pakistan

A key breakthrough in Pakistan's recent political history in relation to sectarianism is the *Paigham-e-Pakistan* (Message of Pakistan) project. The *Paigham-e-Pakistan* is a policy document that had been put together by the Islamic Research Institute. The purpose of the document is outlined as follows:

> *"This unanimously agreed document titled "Paigham-e-Pakistan," prepared in accordance with the injunctions of the Holy Qur'ān, the sunnah of the Prophet and the Constitution of Pakistan, reflects the collective thinking of the State of Pakistan. The Message identifies the problems faced by the State of Pakistan and provides basis to devise a strategy to achieve the goals of Objectives Resolution.[105]*

References to the Qur'an and Sunnah in the Paighām-e-Pakistan document may be particularly appealing to the Jamā'at as it seeks to "Islamise" Pakistan.

The Paigham-e-Pakistan document is ecumenical in so far as it has been produced in consultation with "Ulema from "Pakistani Ulama of all schools of thought." [106] Furthermore, the document itself has a section titled: *"Sectarianism and Trends of Declaring Someone Infidel".* This section principally deals with two key areas of concern: sectarianism and *Takfir*

[104] Ali, Sohaib and Waqi Sajjad, Fatima *Pacifying Sunni Shia relations. In Radicalisation in Pakistan*, Routledge 2022) pp.96

[105] . Ahmad Munir, Muhammad Hussain Mamoon, Paigham-e-Pakistan (The Message of Pakistan) [II]: National Narrative Counter to Violence, Extremism, and Terrorism in an Islamic Perspective. *Islamic Studies* (2019) 127-148  pp. 129

[106] Ahmad Munir, Muhammad Hussain Mamoon, Paigham-e-Pakistan (The Message of Pakistan) [II]: National Narrative Counter to Violence, Extremism, and Terrorism in an Islamic Perspective. *Islamic Studies* (2019) 127-148 pp. 129

(excommunication). The crisis of Sectarianism is acknowledged as a challenge for the Pakistani state, the challenge is outlined as:

> "*Surge in sectarianism is another challenge for Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Although the Constitution of Pakistan allows people to follow their own juristic school but this privilege should not be used to spread sectarianism. Juristic schools are symbols of diversity in Islamic jurisprudence but when such differences become unchangeable and inflexible beliefs then they cause deep divides in the society. Consequently, every sect consider themselves the only righteous sect, which leads to anarchy in a harmonious Muslim society.*"[107]

Whilst accepting that Sectarianism is a challenge within Pakistan, the *Paighām-e-Pakistan* document has given limited ideas on what the Pakistani state considers to be the causes of sectarianism within Pakistan as well as how the state should work to pacify sectarianism. Whilst the document does state, "the state should use its powers to eliminate these elements and maintain social harmony and juristic diversity". [108] The document has not stated what precisely these powers entail and how these powers could be applied. Nevertheless, the significance of the *Paighām-e-Pakistan* message cannot be understated. The fact that representatives from all Maslaks have agreed on the condemnation of sectarianism and supported the Pakistani states message and vision for Pakistan represents a significant beginning of a joint understanding on sectarianism. The document has made reference to three Qur'anic injunctions that condemn sectarianism: 6:159, 30:31-32, and 3:105. In its minimalist approach, the document has done well in respecting the sensitivities of the differing Maslaks.

The *Paighām-e-Pakistan* document has also been concerned with combating terrorism within Pakistan. Some of the groups that have been examined in this study, such as the *Sipah-e-Sahaba* and its more radical offshoot, the *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,* have been the perpetrators of some of the most significant acts of terrorism on Pakistani soil.

The motivations that the Pakistani state holds for producing the *Paighām-e-Pakistan* document differs greatly to the JI's motivations for promoting ecumenism. Terrorism, including sectarian terrorism, had a major devastating effect on Pakistan, claiming the lives of many and destabilising the country. The Pakistani state had concerned itself with finding solutions to tackle sectarian violence as part of its broader efforts to tackle terrorism and violence in

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Pakistan, whereas the JI promotes ecumenism mainly as part of a theological project. The motivations of the Pakistani state in promoting ecumenism could be seen to be similar to the motivations of the Government of Jordan when producing the Amman message.

Jamā'at-i-Islāmī Hind

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107 Ahmad Munir, Muhammad Hussain Mamoon, Paigham-e-Pakistan (The Message of Pakistan) [II]: National Narrative Counter to Violence, Extremism, and Terrorism in an Islamic Perspective. *Islamic Studies* (2019) 127-148  pp. 144-145.

108 Ahmad Munir, Muhammad Hussain Mamoon, Paigham-e-Pakistan (The Message of Pakistan) [II]: National Narrative Counter to Violence, Extremism, and Terrorism in an Islamic Perspective. *Islamic Studies* (2019) 127-148  pp. 145

The Jamā'at-i-Islāmī Hind (JIH) is the Indian chapter of the Jamā'at. Following the creation of the two separate states of India and Pakistan, two sovereign entities of the Jamā'at were established. The Jamat-i-Islami Hind and the Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan. The JIH subscribes to the same ideology of the Jamā'at and believes *Iqāmat-i-dīn* is the organisation's objective. However, the JIH operates more as a social-political movement than as a political party (as is the case with the Jamā'at) as it does not engage in electoral activities.

The JIH also operates in a different context to the Jamā'at, whilst the Jamā'at in Pakistan exists in a context where the state has an overwhelming majority Muslim population and Islam is engrained into state institutions, the Jamā'ats Indian chapter exists in a state where Muslims are a minority albeit with a significant population, this has resulted in both chapters of the Jamā'at taking fundamentally different, and at times opposing approaches to their methodology and campaign work whilst both chapters continue to claim to call towards the same ideology. The JIH advocates for a form of secularism that they describe as:

> *"One of the meanings of secularism is that the state will not be partial to the followers of a particular religion but will treat all equally and everyone shall have equal opportunities. It is a fact that the people of this world do not agree on a single religion or ideology and hence religious freedom is the only appropriate and workable approach.*
>
> *The extreme position of secularism, adopted in some western countries is to exclude God and religion from the collective affairs of life and permit man to form a system of life for himself in the light of his intellect, desires and experience. Reducing religion to just a private matter is unwanted audacity. The position of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind is that this concept is not only antithetical to Islam but also would be quite oppressive for people of India, the vast majority of who believe in spiritual and religious values, to prohibit them from following the guidance offered by religion and impose irreligiousness on them instead."[109]*

The Jamā'at, would never advocate for secularism as they would view it as incompatible with Islamic law, additionally, Mawdūdī was sceptical of the All-India Muslim League as they were secularists. As Muslims are a minority in India, the JIH have chosen to focus on

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[109] https://jamaateislamihind.org/eng/secularism-democracy-and-fascism/ Acessed 4th April 2024

promoting pluralism and inter-faith harmony. The JIH have not advocated for a form of secularism that inhibits or limits the practise of religion in the public sphere rather, they call for a form of secularism that does not favour one religion over another. This could be seen as a pragmatic approach to *Iqāmat-i-Din.* Islamists have often existed in Muslim majority communities where there is more scope for them to engage in activism where they can seek to influence the state to implement what they perceive to be Islamic laws, Whereas Islamists who exist in societies where they are minorities, they may be forced to re-evaluate their priorities, this is especially the case when they are persecuted minorities. In history, there have been examples of where Muslims had ruled over non-Muslim majority populations which was the case in India before the British Raj, however India today is a secular nation-state which brings various challenges for Islamists who wish to implement Sharia law in the state.

The JIH has undertaken various activities that promote intra-Muslim unity and interfaith unity in India. The motivations for the promotion of ecumenism and undertaking actions intended to reduce sectarian tensions between Muslims in India could be due to the fact that Indian Muslims are a persecuted minority. Promoting Ecumenism has not always been among the immediate priorities of the Jamā'at, Pakistan, the fact that the Jamā'at have not been a persecuted minority may be a contributing factor to this. Today, the MWM seems to be the Maslaki party which has set promotion of ecumenism as their first priority.

Although the JIH does not contest in Indian elections as a political party, the *All-India Majlis-i-Ittehādul Muslimīn,* (All India council for the unity of Muslims) is a political party that focuses its political work around advocating for Muslim rights. The party which was founded before the end of the British Raj has an ecumenical name which the party has kept, highlighting a link between ecumenism and advocacy for greater rights for Muslims.

Conclusion

In Pakistan, various opportunities to tackle sectarian violence and sectarianism in general have arisen. Particularly in recent history, as a result of the mass scale of terrorism and violence Pakistan has witnessed. The MMA was one of the most significant breakthroughs for unity between Islamist parties. However, the Jamā'at had parted ways with the MMA shortly after the 2018 general elections and was not revived in the 2024 general elections.

One reason for the success of the MMA was anti-western and anti-American sentiments as a result of opposition to the War on Terror. Similar sentiments had existed in the 2024 general elections because of Israel's war with Hamas and some *Maslaki* parties had centred some of their political activities around this assault however it had not served as a catalyst for Islamic unity and Maslaki parties enjoyed limited success in the elections. One of the reasons behind this is that many voters who had expressed anti-American sentiments may have voted for independent candidates backed by Imran Khan's PTI party.

In terms of electoral alliances, the Jamā'at had entered alliances with Islamic political parties; however, they had not always initiated them. Electoral alliances alone cannot be used to "measure unity", additionally whilst electoral alliances may be significant displays of unity, it is hard to prove if they are effective in addressing sectarianism, the most solid actions against sectarianism have emerged from state intervention. Furthermore, intra-Islamic unity has not always been a rallying call for the Jamā'at during general elections. The Jamā'at has used anti-corruption messaging, anti-Americanism, and pro-democracy messaging in their electoral campaigns.

The Paigham-e-Pakistan document played a significant role in placating some of the sectarian tensions that had existed in Pakistan, as well as promoting a united narrative against terrorism. State intervention against terrorism was a necessity because of extreme levels of violence that Pakistan had witnessed as a state.

Chapter Five: Challenges to the Jamā'at

This chapter aims to explore the challenges that the Jamā'at has faced in its promotion of ecumenism and explore some of the polemics that have been developed over time that are laid against the Jamā'at.

As we had discussed earlier, the Jamā'at has faced challenges in terms of receiving acceptance of its ideology. Today, the Jamā'at continues to face significant challenges in being accepted within religious circles as polemics have been developed against the Jamā'at. Furthermore, a rift is emerging between the Jamā'at who are at times accused of politicising Islam.

5.1  Competing ideologies on Islamisation

The Jamā'at's shift towards further emphasis on politics from being an Islamic movement had brought a significant challenge to the Jamā'at. With the diverse nature of Islamic revivalism and Islamism in Pakistan, it should be no surprise that the Jamā'at had begun to face challenges, particularly in the political sense. Dr Israr Ahmed, a once longstanding member of the Jamā'at, eventually parted ways with the Jamā'at and formed a new organisation, the Tanzeem-i-Islami (The Islamic organisation). The aims and objectives of the Tanzeem-I-Islami are not too different from those of the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī . Both organisations believe in the Islamic Revolution or Islamic movement. On their website, Tanzeem-I-Islami states their beliefs:

> "*It is not enough to practice Islam in one's individual life but that the teachings of the Qur'an and those of the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) must also be implemented in their totality in the social, cultural, juristic, political, and the economic spheres of life.*"[110]

This belief essentially is a shared belief with the Jamā'at that the *Dīn* must be established in every sphere of life. (*Iqāmat-I-dīn*). However, the split from the Jamā'at is based on a jurisprudential issue of the permissibility of participating in the electoral process. This issue is not unique to the Tanzeem-e-Islami. Other Islamist groups, such as Hizb-Ut-Tahrir, have also challenged other Islamist organisations over their participation in the electoral process which they deem to be incompatible with Islam. This split shows a limitation for the Jamā'at

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[110] https://tanzeem.org/organization/background/ accessed on 8/10/2023

in terms of the universality of their methodology. In addition to this, the Jamā'at's political activities today are centred around reforming the nation state of Pakistan in order to implement Islamic laws therein. The Hizb-ut-tahrir would reject the idea of reforming a nation state as they believe nation states go against the Caliphate which they believe to be the only legitimate form of rule in law in line with Islamic law.

## 5.2 Polemics against the Jamā'at

The mainstream Muslim scholarship has not always accepted the Jamā'at and Mawdūdī who had faced fierce criticism especially from Deobandi scholars. One factor for the Jamā'at falling victim to such fierce criticism is due to the the doctrine of veneration of the companions that is upheld in Sunni Islam particularly among the Deobandi movement. The two fitnahs (civil wars between the Muslims) and particularly the battle of Siffin are used as a reference point for the main point of separation of the Sunni, Shiites and the Kharijitte Muslims. Tajul Islam has argued that Sunnism had developed a "companianist narrative" that argues that all companions are "upright individuals".[111] Therefore, criticisms of companions would be considered to be problematic for many Sunnis. Debates regarding the upright nature of the prophets companions had intensified in the period of the battle of Siffin as some companions had engaged in wars against the *Ahlul Bayt* and in turn had been accused of oppressing the Ahlul Bayt.

Mawdūdī has provided an alternative argument to the Sunni belief that all companions are upright by arguing that the Qur'an and the Sunnah are to be considered the criterion to judge any action by, therefore should any companion do any action that contradicts this criterion they should be held accountable in line with this criterion.[112]

Mawdūdī himself had not engaged in cursing the companions; however, he had been critical of some of the companions, namely Uthman Ibn Affan, who had been accused of nepotism by giving governmental roles to members of his own family or members of his (Umayyad) clan and Mu'awiyyah ibn Abi Sufyan. Despite the fact that Mawdūdī has not cursed any of the companions, he had received much criticism for his discourse on the companions, especially from traditionalist Barelvis and Deobandis. It should be noted that the Jamā'at, itself has been critical of the act of cursing the Sahaba. In January 2023, the Jamā'at had

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[111] Tajul Islam pp. 242
[112] Tajul Islam pp. 242

pushed through a bill in parliament that had toughened the sentences for cursing, the wives Prophet, the Prophet's Companions, the four rightly guided caliphs and the *Ahlul Bayt*.[113] The Jamā'at expressed that the act of cursing companions breeds sectarianism.

As discussed earlier in this essay, veneration of the prophets' companions has been a key factor in the identity of many Sunni Muslim groupings as well as a component of Sunni theology, the case of the Sipah-e-Sahaba is an example of how a narrative of companion veneration has been used as a polemic. The Sipah-e-sahaba had mounted some of their same criticism of Khomeini to Mawdūdī, as both figures stand accused of violating the honour of the prophet's companions.

These events of the battle of Siffin and the birth of the Umayyad dynasty hold key significance in forming Mawdūdī's ideology on the Caliphate as well as serving as a critical point in the formation of early sectarian identities. The battle of Siffin occurred following the assassination of Uthman Ibn Affan, Ali Ibn Abi Talib becomes the Caliph. however, he is accused of not avenging the killers of Uthamn Ibn Affan. Mu'awiyyah Ibn Abi Sufyan, re-appointed by Uthman Ibn Affan as the governor of Syria, had been one of those who had revolted against Ali.

Mawdūdī's critique of Mu'awiyah is not a unique trend and Sunnis have varying views on Mu'awiyah with some arguing that Mu'awiiyah was a just and upright companion and also consider him to be from the scribes of the prophet Muhammad who were tasked with writing down revelation, while others have accused him of being a rebel.

Some Sunnis have perceived the battle of Siffin to be down to a difference in Ijtihād. (critical reasoning) Whereas the Shias and Kharijittes had perceived it to be a revolt against Ali. The subsequent peace treaty or reconciliation between Muawiyah and Ibn Abi Sufyan and Ali ibn Abi Talib to excuse Muawiyah's differences with Ali. The Sunnis who promote the narrative that all companions are upright would face a dilemma if they were to criticise Muawiyah for the same reasons the Kharijitte's and Shias had done as they would oppose the doctrine that all companions were upright.

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113 https://tribune.com.pk/story/2396381/na-toughens-law-against-insult-to-pious-people Accessed on 18th August 2023

For Mawdūdī, the period of the Rashidun Caliphate was not only a period of caliphs being guided by God, a position held within Sunni Islam with a title of "Al Khilfa Al Rashida" (Rightly guided) being given to them, rather this period was also the exemplary Caliphate, ("Khilfat-e-Murshida"). [114] Mawdūdī had described the governance that had followed the Umayyad Caliph Umar ibn Abd Al Aziz as that which had fallen into ignorance. [115]

The emergence of the TLP in Pakistan has presented a new challenge to the Jamā'at. Despite being a more recent Islamist political party, it has quickly grown to become one of the largest and most influential political parties in Pakistan Traditionally the Jamā'at had been renowned for its influence in Pakistani politics. Khadim Hussain Rizvi, the TLP's founder had been critical of the Jamā'at and its founder Mawdūdī. Rizvi had criticised Mawdūdīs accusations of the nepotism of the third Caliph, Uthman Ibn Affan in *Khilafat-o-Malookiat.* Rizvi had cited multiple Hadith that had venerated Uthman in particular for his generosity in his rebuttal of Mawdūdī.[116] Rizvi's criticism of Mawdūdī could be seen as a new development in the challenges faced by the Jamā'at. The criticism of Mawdūdī's critique of some of the prophet's companions is a not a recent phenomenon however, it should be understood that the criticism of Mawdūdī's book *Khilafat o Malūkiat* and his critique of companions had traditionally come from Deobandi Scholars as opposed to Barelvi scholars.

The TLP differs from the Jamā'at in the sense that it has placed less emphasis on "Islamising" Pakistan or working to implement the Sharia through law. The TLP have been more focused on activism around *Namūs-I-Risālat.* More popular support has been gained by the TLP than what the Jamā'at has achieved.

Despite Mawdūdī's criticism of Mu'awiya, Mawdūdī has catered to the sensitivities of some Sunnis by using the term May Allah be pleased with him, following his mention. However, as far as some scholars are concerned, Mawdūdī has still disrespected Muawiyah.

In the early days of the Jamā'at, much of the leadership had formed the leadership ranks and membership with notable members, including Dr Israr Ahmed, Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz, and Amin Ehsan Islahi. All of the Ulema listed above had eventually parted ways with the

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[114] Mawdudi, Syed Abul Ala *Khilafat-o-malookiat* (Idara Tarjuman Al Quran:n.d.)

[115] A history of the Islamic revivalist movement.(Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers: n.d.) pp.51

[116] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yubneagHaqI Accessed 2[0th August 2023]

Jamā'at. The departure of Dr Israr Ahmed was based on a jurisprudential issue of the permissibility of participation in elections. Amin Ehsan Islahi had left because of differences in opinion on administrative issues of the Jamat.

Ghulam Ahmed Pervez, a modernist scholar who adopted a Qur'ān centric approach, is arguably one of the most notable former members of the Jamā'at to leave the party. Pervez had become a scholar with significant influence after leaving the Jamā'at, especially through the founding of his organisation *Tulu-e-Islām* (Revival of Islam). Differences between his thought and Mawdūdī's ideology had appeared more apparent. When Pervez's ideas on Hadith became more prominent, the relationship between Mawdūdī and Pervez grew bitter.[117] Beyond the differences between Pervez and Mawdūdī, Pervez had also attempted to use his influence to limit or restrict the activities and funding of the Jamā'at.[118]

Parvez and Mawdūdī, had both agreed that the term *Din,* should not be considered to be synonymous with religion, yet both figures had fundamental differences in their interpretation of *Din.* Parvez argues:

*"Deen* offers broad principles which give guidance to man in the adventure of life and which enable him to attain the goal of self-realisation and social welfare".[119] This interpretation of *Din,* differs from Mawdūdī who had argued that the dīn, should be interpreted as a system of life. Social welfare had a central place in Parvez's interpretation of the dīn.

5.3  Madkhalism, Quitism and Islamism

Another crucial challenge to Islamic revivalist thought is the emergence of Madkhalism. Madkhalism is a quietest form of Salafism i.e a doctrine that advocates for an approach that calls to refrain from criticising Muslim rulers even if they are unjust. This doctrine is a modern expression of a "quietist positioning within Sunnism". A conformist doctrine had emerged in Sunnism as a response to the levels of violence that had emerged from the hands of the Kharijte's.[120]

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[117] God's Kingdom on Earth? Politics of Islam in Pakistan, 1947-1969 pp. 1244
[118] God's Kingdom on Earth? Politics of Islam in Pakistan, 1947-1969 pp.1251
[119] Parvez, Ghulam Ahmed Islam a challenge to religion pp.66 (Tolu-e-Islam Trust:1968)
[120] Rahman, Fazlur Islam (University of Chicago Press: 1979) pp.169

The Qur'anic verse: "O you who have believed, obey Allāh and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you". [121] has often been cited as a reference to a doctrine of conformity and quietism and to refrain from criticising rulers. Mawdudi himself argues this verse sets the foundations for a constitution of the Islamic state, yet Mawdudi believes that obedience to "those invested in authority" is conditional; the people must only obey that which is good (*Mā'rūf*) and obedience in matters of evil is not obligated. Mawdudi has also referenced Hadiths that speak on obedience to rulers. According to Mawdudi, if a Muslim ruler does not concern himself with establishing prayers then it becomes permissible to overthrow that government.[122]

The Jamā'at and Muslim Brotherhood had also been criticised for opposing a traditional Sunni belief of exercising patience with oppressive rulers and refraining from criticising them. The Jamā'at and Muslim Brotherhood have continually advocated for revolution to remove tyrannical rulers. This has particularly been the case since the Arab Spring.[123] The Jamā'at had expressed support for the Egyptian revolution in the Arab spring, with delegations from the Jamā'at visiting Egypt and networking with leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood.[124]

It could be argued that the threat of *Madkhalism* is more of a threat to Islamists in the Arab world (Muslim Brotherhood) as opposed to the Jamā'at. The *Ahl-i* Hadith movement does not enjoin dominance in Pakistan and remains one of the smallest sects. Furthermore, it is not reasonable to say that all members of the Ahl-i Hadith movement are from the *Madkhali* trend as Madkhalism is one single trend within Salafism and not Salafi as a whole. However, political quietism exists in the South Asian context and an accusation of politicising Islam has been charged against the Jamā'at.

Maslaki parties in Pakistan have both worked with governments (such as the JUI-F entering government through coalitions) and against Pakistani governments in opposition. When the case of Pakistan is considered, a conformist doctrine has not emerged as is the case with the Arab world, Pakistan has not seen a revolution such as that what the Arab world has witnessed however, a polemic has been formed against the Jamā'at and Mawdūdī because of

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[121] Qur'an 4:49
[122] See Mawdudi, *Syed Abul Ala* Tafhim Ul-Qur'an (Idara Tarjumanul Quran:n.d.)
[123] Tajul Islam pp.381
[124] https://tribune.com.pk/story/194807/Jamā'at-muslim-brotherhood-partner-to-promote-islam accessed 14th feb 2024

their belief in the obligation of *Iqāmat-i-Din.* Two South Asian scholars, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi and Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, have lead charges against the Jamā'at and Mawdūdī.

Ghamidi has accused scholars of performing *Ta'wīl* (Allegorical interpretation) of two Qur'ānic verses and using the two verses as a base to argue for the obligation of *Iqāmat-e-Din* which he has described as "an addition (*Izāfa)* to the religious obligations."[125]

The first of the two verses: *"It is He who sent His Messenger with guidance and the religion of truth to manifest it over all religion, although those who associate others with Allāh dislike it."[126]* Is a verse that Islamists such as the Jamā'at and Muslim Brotherhood used to argue for the supremacy of Islam, and for the obligation of *Iqāmat-e-Din.* Ghamidi, on the other hand, has argued that the verse does not deal with Iqāmat-e-din, instead Ghamidi argues that verse speaks of the occurrence of Supremacy of Islam which is connected to the lives of the prophet, when a prophet performs their prophetic mission, Islam becomes dominant.

The second verse that Ghamidi has argued has been misinterpreted through Ta'wīl is 42:13 which is one of the foundational verses that the Jamā'at have used to argue that Iqāmat-i-Din is an obligation. Ghamidi has interpreted the term *Aqīmu,* Interpretation by Mawdūdī to refer to be an imperative meaning establish, to mean maintain the dīn or follow the dīn.[127] Ghamidi, once again accuses Mawdūdī of allegorical interpretation of the Qur'ān and argues that the term has multiple meanings in various contexts. As Ghamidi argues that Mawdūdī has used Ta'wīl and the verse should not be interpreted in the manner that Mawdūdī has interpreted it, the argument that this verse can be used to argue for Iqamat-i-din is made irrelevant.

Mawdudi has written an extensive *Tafsīr* of this verse where he details his argument on how the term *Aqīmu-al-din* should be interpreted.

Ghamidis exegesis is based on a *Tafsir al-Quran bil Qur'an* approach which is a methodology that advocates for using the Qur'an itself to interpret the Qur'an. In Ghamidi's critique of Mawdūdī, this approach sets the foundations for Ghamidis arguments as Ghamidi has compared the use of the term *Aqīmu* in various verses of the Qur'an. Mawdudi has also

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[125] Ghamidi, Javed Ahmed, *Burhan* (Al-Mawrid: n.d.) pp.169
[126] Quran 9:41
[127] Ghamidi, Javed Ahmed, *Burhan* (: Al-Mawrid: n.d.) pp.177

used the *Tafsir al-Quran bil Qur'an* methodology on a few occasions however Mawdudi's Tafsir is based on what he terms to be the "four key concepts of the Qur'an".[128] Mawdudi has also made reference to various Qur'anic verses that relate to his conception of the Sharia.

Maulana Wahiuddin Khan wrote extensive criticisms against Mawlana Mawdūdī as Khan, like Ghamidi rejected Mawdūdī's perspective of the dominance of the Din in the world Khan wrote:

> "*Accordingly, for him, to establish the dominance of the deen was tantamount to establishing its political domination. He saw this as the very purpose or goal that God wants his servants to strive to work for. Naturally, then, in his understanding of Islam, the rest of the deen came to be subordinated to politics. Politics assumed the central place through which every aspect of the deen could be understood and its importance ascertained. In this way, in his understanding of Islam, every aspect of it acquired a political hue. This naturally resulted in a major deviation.*"[129]

Khan accuses Maulana Mawdūdī of politicising the *Din,* and overemphasising the role of politics in the Din, in other words, Mawdūdīs concept of the Din is rooted in his political or politicised interpretation of the Din. it is clear from the writings of Mawdūdī that the ultimate form of worship in Islam and the prophetic mission was Iqāmat-e-Din and therefore Mawdūdī advocates for Muslims to perform the same mission.

Khan has also rejected Mawdūdī's interpretation of Quran 42:13, and has claimed that because of Mawdūdīs, politicised reading of the Din, his interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the verse calls for the establishment of divine governance, this interpretation has been fundamentally rejected my Khan who proposes that the term "Din" does not deal with the complete tenants of the religion, instead it deals with the core of the Dīn. In addition to this, the term Aqim-Al Din should be Interpreted as "keep the religion established" as opposed to considering the verse to be a commandment to "establish" the Din.[130]

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[128] See Mawdudi's introduction to his Tafsir which has also been published separately as *"Four Key Concepts of the Qur'an"*. (The Islamic Foundation:2006)

[129] Khan, Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, *The Political Interpretation of Islam* (Goodword Books: 2015) pp. 27

[130] *Khan, Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, The Political Interpretation of Islam (*Goodword Books:2015)  pp.44-45

Beyond criticism of Mawdūdīs interpretation and ideology of *Iqāmat-e-Din,* Maulana Waiduddin Khan has also advocated for a form of what could be described as "Quitest Islam". Although Khan had once been affiliated with the Jamā'at and had served as a member, his ideology on the central purpose of Islam is fundamentally different to that of the Jamā'at. The Jamā'at believes that the establishment of divine governance is the fundamental objective of Islam. Khan has fiercely opposed this position.

In addition to the opposing views as far ideology regarding the purpose of worship in Islam is concerned. Wahiduddin Khan has developed a narrative on conformity which he describes as "positive status quo-ism".

Khan promoted the belief that establishing the Sharia in a political sense is not a collective duty of all Muslims. Rather, this duty is limited to those who have the means to do so provided the sharia is established by peaceful methods alone. Khan has attempted to justify his argument by drawing parallels to the obligation of Hajj; Hajj is only obligated to those who have the means to perform the ritual, and those who are unable to do so are excused from the obligation. [131]

Both the Jamā'at and Wahiuddin Khan advocate for a form of Islamic activism, yet their approaches are different to each other as the Jamā'at have focussed their attentions on state reform, whilst Wahiduddin Khan advocates for propagation of Islam (Dawah work). Khan's activism is based on the principle of patience. Khan argued that through the Seerah, we learn that Muhammad himself did not destroy the idols in the Kabah despite his call for monotheism, rather he had accepted the present status quo and had used other methods mainly by propagating Islam. Furthermore, Khan argues that the Prophet had not placed any attention on countering the political attacks laid against him through protest or political activism, on the other hand, the prophet's primary focus had been on Dawah work and the prophet had made Hijrah as a means of allowing him to conduct his propagation mission.[132]

Some of the differences between the Jamā'at and the *Ulema* had begun to fade during the mass expansion of the madrasah network, the state had used the *Ulema* as well as Madrassahs as a tool for its Islamisation project. The Ulema had now been established as a new class who would lead government discussions on Islamisation, a role that had traditionally been held by

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[131] Khan, Mawlana Wahiduddin, *Islam Rediscovered* (CPS International:1999) pp. 217
[132K] Khan, Mawlana Wahiduddin *Islam Rediscovered* (CPS International:1999) pp. 109-110

revivalist Islamists such as the Jamā'at. At this time, the Jamā'at had begun to establish their own Madrassahs which were an instrumental part of acquiring government influence. At this time, as both factions had been operating on what was once opposing terrain, were now sharing one united goal and had begun to adopt discourses of one another in order to establish themselves as the authority on Islamisation.[133]

**<u>Conclusion</u>**

The narrative of "companionism" and the veneration of companions that occurs within Sunnism has been a polarising factor and polemics had been laid against Shiites where they are accused of cursing or blaspheming against the prophet's companions. Mawdūdī's discourse on the companions had lead to sections of Sunni scholarship (in particular, Deobandi scholarship, and in more recent times sections of Barelvi scholarship) have rejected Mawdūdī because of their intense veneration of companions.

South Asian Muslim scholarship has not in its entirety accepted the concept and interpretation of the Din as proposed by Mawdūdī, the concept of *Iqāmat-e-Din* is a fundamental concept to the party, although the Jamā'at membership has representation from members of various Maslaks, the membership is still made up of those who agree with the positioning of the Jamā'at and believe *Iqāmat-e-din* to be a tenant of Islam. Furthermore, some ex-affiliates of the Jamā'at, such as Wahiduddin Khan and Ghamidi, had parted ways with the Jamā'at due to their rejection of the Jamā'ats concept of worship. Theoretically, the Jamā'at is open to membership from people from any Maslak however as their interpretation of Islam sets the foundations for their activities and political project, one must be committed to *Iqāmat-i-dīn* in order to fully participate in the Jamā'at. The rejection of the Jamā'ats ideology by sections of mainstream Islamic scholarship has been a critical challenge for the Jamā'at as they promote Islamic unity as a means of achieving their political goals. In addition to this, a key challenge is presented to Mawdūdīs belief that by working towards a joint project of Iqāmat-e-Din, Muslims can avoid sectarianism, instead of working towards

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[133] Nasr, S. V. R., 2000. The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics. *Modern Asian Studies,* Volume 34, pp. 139-180.

pp. 149.

this goal, the Jamā'at are in a position where they have at times been forced to defend their position on considering *Iqāmat-e-Din* to be an obligation or even defending their prioritising of political activities.

The fallout from the Arab Spring had led to a revival of a narrative of conformity, the Muslim Brotherhood had faced intense criticism for their role in the Arab Spring and had been accused of bringing instability to the region. Although the Arab Spring had not affected Pakistan, certain sections of Pakistani scholarship had used the narrative of conformity against the Jamā'at, some of the conformity-based polemics used against the Jamā'at had predated the Arab spring, demonstrating how a narrative of conformity and quietism had existed before the Arab spring.

Whilst a narrative on conformity and quietism may be a re-emerging challenge for Sunni Islamists in the Arab world, it may not be as much of a critical issue for the JI. In Pakistan, Muslims from various Maslaks have voiced their opposition to the government on individual and organisational level such as the TNFJ campaigning against Zakāt laws and the TLP advocating against various Pakistani governments for suggested reforms of blasphemy laws or as the TLP have accused successive Pakistani governments of failing to uphold the Prophets honour. The Deobandi JUI have joint numerous campaigns against Pakistani governments. The *Maslak* that has engaged in the least amount of anti-state activism seems to be the Ahl-i Hadith Maslak.

**Conclusion.**

In this study, I have attempted to explore the dynamics of sectarianism in Pakistan as well as attempting to understand the polemics that exist between the dominant Maslaks of Pakistan. The existence of such strong intra-Islamic polemics displays why promoting ecumenism may be desirable for the Jamā'at. In Pakistan, *Maslaki* parties have support bases that rarely transcend the boundaries of the *Maslaks* that they are affiliated with.

It should be understood that polemics have been a point of reference for sectarian violence in Pakistan, this is made evident when outfits such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba have published literature which engages in theological polemics against the Shia however, these polemics alone should not be understood to be the sole contributing factor to sectarian militancy in Pakistan. The spread of militancy in Pakistan has various facets. The three reference points that have been attributed to a growth in sectarian militancy in Pakistan are: Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation programme, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the growth of militant Madrassas. On the other hand, promoters of sectarian beliefs have been able to exploit financial and at times *Birādari* based divides in Pakistani society, which demonstrates the complexities behind sectarian violence and why a multi-faceted approach to understanding sectarian violence is required.

With Sectarianism being a key challenge in Pakistan's political history, several attempts have occurred to reduce sectarian tensions within Pakistan. The Jamā'at itself has made some of these attempts and others' attempts from other bodies, including the Pakistani state. It is generally understood that the frequency of intra-Islamic sectarian violence in Pakistan has been reduced over the years, with a gradual decline from its peak in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, it could be argued that the *M*aslaks of Pakistan have become more polarised and new polemics are emerging or existing polemics are being developed. An example of this is the Barelvis adoption of rhetoric in defence of the Sahaba, which are being layed against the Shia, which the Deobandis had traditionally led. Such developments show that sectarianism continues to be a challenge in Pakistan even if sectarian violence may not be on the same level, it previously faced. Furthermore, the Barelvi adaptation of rhetoric of companion veneration has implications for the Jamā'at as they are facing the same polemic that has traditionally been levelled against them from some Deobandi scholars.

From its inception, the Jamā'at has attempted to be a pan-sectarian body representing the needs of the Muslims of India. The Jamā'at is ecumenical in so for as it rejects sectarianism, has welcomed members from various *Masalik* and Mawdūdī's writings were ecumenical in nature. In the context of Pakistan, it could be argued that the Jamā'at has attempted to keep its ecumenical pledge. Whilst the electoral performance of the Jamā'at has not always been successful, the times where the Jamā'at has performed well on an electoral basis, and in numerous cases such as the MMA of 2002, the Jamā'at's electoral success was due to collaboration between the religious political parties. In any case, electoral politics and results are not a feasible measure of if an organisation is pan-sectarian as many factors lead to

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electoral success, as this essay has discovered however the Jamā'at has shown strength in its ability to work with the various Maslaks of Pakistan. Arguably, the Jamā'at has historically held higher leverage of

political power when compared to the other Maslaki parties. However, the emergence of the TLP and their electoral success may impact the political influence that the Jamā'at has previously held. On the other hand, the Jamā'at does not have any experience as the governing party in Pakistan. Therefore, it is difficult to measure or envisage how they may attempt to pacify sectarianism in Pakistan. The lack of experience of political power is something that is shared between many Islamic movement parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

Political events have been opportunities for rapprochement between Muslim sects. The Jamā'at had capitalised on anti-imperialist and narratives calling for greater Muslim autonomy, such as the liberation of Palestine and Kashmir. One factor that had led to the success of the MMA of 2002 was the anti-American and anti-war on terror narratives that were prevalent in Pakistan. The solidarity with world Muslims, which has been an essential aspect of Jamā'at ideology as well as being a political project of the Jamā'at has allowed the Jamā'at to emphasise the need for rapprochement between Muslim sects.

Electoral performance is a difficult variable to measure the extent of the Jamā'ats cross-sectarian support; people tend not to vote based on sectarian lines alone, as we had found in our readings on the case of Jhang, one group of Shias were exploiting sectarian divisions against fellow Shias who were their political opponents.

When factors behind the rise of sectarian militancy in Pakistan are considered, it becomes clear that the Jamā'at has limited to no influence in certain areas to work to reduce sectarian violence, an example of this is through the Madrassahs. This study has attempted to highlight (inline with existing literature on this topic) how certain institutions (such as the Madrassah) bare responsibility for spreading sectarianism. The Jamā'at does not influence any network of Madrasahs in Pakistan other than the ones managed by the Jamā'at itself. Polemics and sectarian divides have long been part of the Islamic tradition. Furthermore, Sectarian violence and militancy has not always been a part of Pakistan's history.

Whilst it is true that episodes of sectarian violence in Pakistan had appeared, Sectarianism, as it is understood today, has its beginnings in in the 1980s. Whilst some significant attacks have occurred in recent history, the frequency of such violence has been reduced. The reduction of the frequency of sectarian violence could be credited to the Pakistani state crackdown on terrorism and violence in Pakistan and the banning of organisations such as the

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SSP, LJ and SPM. Nonetheless, it must be noted that fringe organisations and individuals still exist; the main contenders have been proscribed despite their attempts to reform and re-mobilise. Additionally, the Paigham-e-Pakistan message has also been credited for its work in tackling violence and extremism in Pakistan. The Pakistan Rah-e-Haq party, a political front for the SSP, had failed to win a single seat in the 2024 general elections, even from within areas considered to be their support base.

In most cases, the Jamā'at cannot reduce Pakistan's militancy. On the other hand, the Jamā'at can continue its work in promoting ecumenism in Pakistan. The fact that the Jamā'at has resisted compromise on its ecumenical outlook despite the pushback from other religious players such as the SSP demonstrates that ecumenism has continually informed the Jamā'at's activities and political project.

It is critical to understand that theoretically, promoting ecumenism and engaging in Ecumenical initiatives would inform the Jamā'at's activities as the Jamā'at promotes the idea that Muslim unity is a necessary condition for its political objective: *Iqāmat-i-din*. However, the ecumenism of the Jamā'at and Mawdūdī has been limited to condemning sectarianism and emphasising the importance of unity within the Muslim Ummah. Mawdūdī had argued on various occasions that Muslim unity could be achieved through joint action with the objective of establishing the Islamic faith. However, the Jamā'at has continued to struggle to build a broad support base within Pakistan. Theological reasons alone cannot be attributed to the Jamā'at's failure to create a broad-cross sectarian support base. The Jamā'at has been considered to be an elitist party with a largely middle-class support base. The Jamā'at also has a set curriculum that is a pre-requisite for membership, large sections of Pakistan's population are illiterate and therefore they are unable to attain membership.

As the Jamā'at is a party that grew out of the Islamist discourse that was prevalent in South Asia in the 20th century, it must be noted that Pan-Islamism was an essential aspect of this very discourse. If Pan-Islamism or Islamism truly advocate for pan-Muslim unity then they cannot be exclusionary of any Muslims. Pan-Islamist and Ummah-centric politics continue to survive within Pakistan today. This can be seen in the responses of Pakistan to global Islamophobia, such as through condemning depictions of the prophet Muhammad as a result of the discourse and activism around *Namūs-I-Risālat.* In addition, political campaigns such as those around Afia Siddiqui, and solidarity with Kashmir and Palestine, continue to be popular in Pakistan. Both the Jamā'at and the JUI are united in their anti-Washington

narrative. Anti-Americanism has been a rallying point for various political parties, whether they are on the Islamist or confessional end of the political spectrum in Pakistan. Evidence for the continued popularity of anti-Americanism in Pakistan is seen in the campaign against the disqualification of Pakistan's former prime Minister Imran Khan.

Presently, the protection of blasphemy laws and the honour of the Prophet *Namūs-I-Risālat* holds more significance. The electoral success of the TLP in 2018 is a vital example of the desire for the protection of blasphemy laws in Pakistan. Furthermore, it demonstrates a growth in the popularity of religious parties which had traditionally received fewer votes in the Punjab. In addition to this, it reflects the politicisation of Pakistan's largest sect, the Barelvis. This could be a challenge to the Jamā'at as although previously the Jamā'at had collaborated with the Barelvi JUP party for example, during the period of the MMA, the Jamā'at has not entered into any coalition with the TLP.

Whilst the Jamā'at see themselves as bastions of promoting Islamic unity, other Muslims have not always been receptive to their ideology and Mawdūdī has been criticised as they perceive some of his beliefs to be falling outside of traditional Sunni orthodoxy especially because of his belief that the Quran and Sunnah are the criterion of the truth that one's actions must be judged by. Furthermore, in times of extreme sectarianism, sections of Pakistani society have not been receptive to the Jamā'at as they have been more inclusive in accepting sects.

The Jamā'at faces several challenges in both its political activity and in its promotion of ecumenism in Pakistan. The Deobandis continue to be critical of the Jamā'at, and the Jamā'at has similarly received criticism from the Barelvis who make up the largest population as far as individual sects are concerned.

The Jamā'at have sought to promote intra-Islamic unity as a means to achieve their political aims. It could be argued that a different approach to promoting ecumenism has been used by the Jamā'at as they are an orthopraxical movement, whereas minimalism is more concerned with maintaining orthodoxy. In this study I have attempted to highlight a few instances where the beliefs of the Jamā'at could be considered to be opposing orthodox Sunni beliefs, one such belief is that one must challenge oppressive rulers which opposes an orthodox Sunni position of conformity.

Overall, several factors make the Jamā'at are a party that is anti-sectarian, its pan-Islamist origins and linking of Iqāmat-e-Din with discussions on Ummah and the ability to collaborate with other Maslaks are the dominant factors that make the Jamā'at a party that could be considered to be ecumenical. It is pertinent to note that the Jamā'at's promotion of ecumenism has not translated into a post-sectarian Pakistan. Sectarianism in Pakistan has continued to be a force in Pakistan's political landscape.

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