

Constructing Democratic Citizenship in a Religious-Diverse Political Community

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Abstract

How are we to live together under conditions of deep diversity, especially religious diversity? This is the question pursued in this dissertation. In examining the literature on political belonging under conditions of deep religious diversity a paradox can sometimes be found. On the one hand, it is claimed that a thicker version of democratic citizenship is necessary to bridge across difference and make life-together possible. On the other hand, realizing a thicker version of democratic citizenship seems to conflict with the pursuit of equal citizenship. In this dissertation, I intend to engage this paradox. To this purpose, I critically examine three distinct normative approaches to the question of citizenship in diverse societies: John Rawls's political liberal approach, David Miller's national republican approach, and Ceclie Laborde's critical republican approach. I will be arguing that, out of the three, Laborde's critical republicanism provides the best framework for addressing the challenge, still her politics of non-domination falls short of realizing equal democratic citizenship. Building on Laborde, I take domination to be the key normative issue raised in attempts to democratically engage deep diversity, but I argue that Laborde misidentifies the nature of the problem by misconceiving what is at stake in religious identity. The realization of democratic citizenship in a religious-diverse political community – I contend – requires a politics of recognition and a bridging model of social solidarity to be constructed through a politics of the everyday creating flexible communities that are open and inclusive.

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.

Introduction

With the increasing concerns arising from the expanding religious diversity accompanying large-scale immigration in Western liberal democracies, the question how we are to live together under conditions of religious diversity has once again emerged as a significant issue both in theory and practice. In recent decades, two groups of issues related to religious groups have sparked ongoing debates. The first group of issues pertains to religious education, encompassing controversies ranging from whether religious curricula should be integrated into public schools to the question of whether faith schools should receive state funding. The second group of issues revolves around the presence of religious symbols in public spaces. Prominent examples include cases involving the wearing of Islamic veils in public, such as the French ban on hijabs in public schools, and disputes concerning the construction of religious structures, as demonstrated by the Swiss ban on Islamic minarets (Green, 2010; Miller, 2016a).

Within these debates, a prevailing viewpoint among the majority is a call for religious minorities to demonstrate their respect and allegiance to the democratic community by integrating into mainstream society, even at the expense of compromising their religious commitments. This demand is accompanied by a worry that religious accommodation in those cases can jeopardize liberal democracy in the long run by undermining democratic citizenship necessary for stable democratic politics. For instance, in the debates surrounding religious education, some opponents express their concerns that religious education, such as Islamic education, may promote indoctrination, discourage critical thinking, and fail to prepare students for democratic life. Others worry that faith schools foster segregation, undermining mutual understanding among young people. (MacMullen, 2016; Saada and Gross, 2017; Grace, 2012) In the debates over religious symbols, some critics argue that symbols like Muslim veils or Islamic minarets express a rejection of liberal democratic values or a refusal to integrate into a democratic community. Others fear that the presence of these symbols alters the visual landscape of public space, eroding the social

connections among citizens. (Scott, 2007; Laborde, 2008) While these views can be subject to questioning, they nevertheless raise valid concerns. They highlight the fact that, in the face of religious diversity, a sustainable democratic community requires democratic citizens who act in ways that uphold democratic politics.

However, this demand has faced criticism for undermining the equal standing of religious minorities and contradicting fundamental liberal democratic values. Critics argue that those worries and opposition to religious accommodation often stem from discrimination and stigmatization directed at religious minorities. Notably, many of the controversies surrounding this issue pertain to the Muslim community, reflecting growing hostility and public anxiety towards Muslims and Islam in Western liberal democracies. In response to this widespread discrimination and public anxiety, there is an emerging group of assertive religious minorities, especially those of politically active youth, advocating not only for greater religious accommodation but also for positive recognition of their religious identity. This advocacy is echoed by a belief held by some theorists that ensuring equal citizenship for religious minorities necessitates the positive and public recognition of their religious identities. (Galeotti, 1993; Modood, 2013b; Modood, 2019)

These newly emerging controversies underscore a paradox faced by contemporary normative political theorists: while it is claimed that a thicker form of democratic citizenship is necessary to bridge across differences and make life-together possible, realizing such democratic citizenship appears to conflict with the ideal of equal citizenship. This paradox highlights the need for a thorough exploration of the role of democratic citizenship in sustaining the life-together, particularly in the context of religious diversity. In this dissertation, I intend to engage this paradox by addressing the following question: **to make life-together sustainable under conditions of religious diversity, how thick should democratic citizenship be, and in which sense can this form of democratic citizenship be attained without compromising our pursuit of equal citizenship?**

I. The limits of prior research

1. From the question of political order to the question of citizenship

The history of religious wars in Western Europe following the Reformation has demonstrated the potential for religious diversity to fracture a political community. The endeavour to sustain a democratic political community in the face of the challenges posed by religious diversity is never a new pursuit but an ongoing project for liberal democracies. However, for quite a long time, this project has been predominantly framed within the context of establishing a just political order, rather than focusing on the question of democratic citizenship. Along this trajectory, the most influential answer is articulated through the lens of the standard liberal approach, also known as the privatization approach. (Barry, 2001; Weithman, 1997) This approach addresses the issue from two perspectives. Firstly, it advocates for the secularization of politics, which entails a separation between the state and religion. Secondly, in addition to secularism, this approach asserts that religious persons should be safeguarded by basic rights, including the right to religious freedom, ensuring equal protection for religious practices and beliefs. Consequently, religion, in this approach, is considered a private affair and has no role in the realm of political life. The underlying principle of this privatization approach is political secularism. According to Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor's (2011) interpretation, this principle contains two fundamental sub-principles—that is, the liberal understanding of the principle of equal respect as a principle of state neutrality and the principle of free conscience. Following this principle, the standard liberal approach holds that a democratic political community manages the challenges posed by religious diversity by establishing a religiously neutral political order that equally respects both religious and non-religious individuals.

However, the newly emerged controversies over religious issues described above have exposed the limitations of the standard liberal approach. On the one hand, the concerns arising from these controversies go beyond the scope of the standard liberal approach. The fact that the advocacy of religious education and public presence of

religious symbols aims not at dismantling the separation between state and religion does not ease the worry of its opponents. By emphasizing the importance of cultivating democratic citizens, opposition to the expansion of religious accommodation suggests that a democratic political community cannot be sustained solely through a religious-neutral political order. On the other hand, lacking the sensitivity towards the oppressions faced or potentially faced by religious minorities, the standard liberal approach also falls short in addressing the demands put forth by proponents of religious accommodation as well. In some radical critics' view, the standard liberal approach runs the risk of alienating religious minorities from liberal democracy and this limitation roots in its problematically narrow interpretation of equal citizenship. Critics argue that equal standing of religious minorities cannot be ensured solely by a neutral political order. (Galeotti, 1993; Modood, 2013; Modood, 2019)

Those limitations are inherent in the way that the standard liberal approach frame the challenge posed by religious diversity. To reframe the challenge by focusing on the question of democratic citizenship is not only practically important for political theorists to properly address the newly emerged controversies in real politics, but also theoretically important as the limitations stem, in part, from the narrow understanding of democratic citizenship indicated in the standard liberal approach. Will Kymlicka (1994; 2000), in his work, refers to this narrow conception as "citizenship-as-legal-status". In this conception, the equal citizenship is interpreted as a person's equal legal status manifested through a set of equal legal rights and legal duties corresponding to those rights-that is, duties not to infringe upon the others' equal legal rights. However, this limited understanding of citizenship encounters difficulties. Since this liberal conception of citizenship assumes a pre-political agreement on principles of justice which define the set of legal rights and duties, it fails to address the challenges arising from deep diversity, where these very principles themselves are subject to controversy.(Miller, 2000)

Considering these challenges, alternative conceptions of democratic citizenship have been developed. Liberal theorists, who emphasize the necessity of an agreement on justice for a democratic political community, tend to expand the ethical dimension of

citizenship. The core idea is that democracy, characterized by the political order formulated on principles of justice, requires democratic citizens who bear certain responsibilities, virtues or characteristics. Other theorists aligned with republicanism and communitarianism argues that a democratic political community cannot be sustained by or solely by an agreement on justice but requires a thicker bond among citizens. And this view leads to a thicker interpretation of the ethical dimension of democratic citizenship. In Kymlicka's term, while some theorists propose a concept of "citizenship-as-activities", asserting that a stable democratic political community requires active and responsible participation, others propose a concept of "citizenship-as-identity", positing that democratic citizenship is also an identity expressing a person's membership of the democratic political community. The fundamental idea is that a stable democratic political community requires a more substantial common foundation. However, these alternative interpretations of democratic citizenship encounter another challenge. Since religious identity itself implies a set of ethical commitments or membership of a particular religious community, a question arises as to whether a thicker interpretation of democratic citizenship can be reconciled with the religious identity of religious citizens. If a conflict arises, it becomes crucial to determine whether the ethical implications of democratic citizenship would infringe upon the equal status of religious citizens.

Thus, while the standard liberal understanding of democratic citizenship proves too narrow to address the challenge posed by deep diversity, an alternative, thicker interpretation of democratic citizenship also confronts other challenges posed by religious diversity. Reframing the challenge by shifting the focus from the question of a just political order to the question of citizenship, the primary task is to explore how to construct democratic citizenship in a way that is thick enough to sustain a democratic political community while simultaneously ensuring the equal standing of religious minorities.

2. Religious diversity and its challenges

In exploring the proper conception of democratic citizenship in the face of the challenge posed by religious diversity, another question pertains to the proper understanding of religious diversity and its associated challenges. Specifically, it is important to investigate how religious diversity challenges a democratic political community and the role religion plays in this dynamic. Does the challenge stem from religion itself or from the diversity of religions? Two main perspectives need to be considered initially. The first perspective, advocated by secularists, tends to emphasize the negative aspects of religion, portraying it as a unique threat to the stability of liberal democracy, thus requiring special scrutiny. They depict religion as inherently absolutist, intolerant, conservative and anti-feminine. (Parekh, 2006, p. 330) According to this viewpoint, religion possesses unique characteristics that pose significant challenges, even potential harm, to democracy. Consequently, secularists argue for stringent restrictions on the public presence of religions. However, this perspective has faced criticism for its perceived bias and discriminatory nature.

Some theorists, who uphold a religious-friendly perspective, criticize secularists for overlooking the positive aspects and contributions of religion. They argue that religion is pivotal in nurturing social capital, a key element for sustaining a stable liberal democracy. (Weithman, 1997) Nonetheless, recognizing religion's potential value to liberal democracy does not negate the fact that religion, under certain circumstances, can present challenges. Thus, the question of whether and when religion or religious diversity poses challenges remains unanswered. In addition, there is skepticism about whether religion uniquely challenges democracy to warrant the excessive attention that secularists advocate. Critics question whether the labelling of religion as a unique threat is biased, particularly against certain religions. However, if religion or religious diversity is not uniquely problematic, then the inquiry into its challenges to liberal democracy may seem theoretically marginal or normatively wrong from the outset. On one hand, if religion or religious diversity poses no distinctive challenges, it may be argued that directing political theory research towards it is unwarranted. Perhaps focusing on broader issues such as the challenges associated with diversity or

difference in general could be more productive. On the other hand, it may also be normative wrong as privileging religion in theory may perpetuate existing biases and potentially reinforce them.

However, the reservations outlined above may stem from flawed assumptions. Firstly, dismissing the significance of the question as theoretically trivial poses methodological challenges, as it divorces political theory from the practical realities of the contemporary world and overlooks the sociological conditions crucial for upholding liberal democracy. This tendency towards isolation is particularly prominent in liberal political philosophy, where the focus centers on just political structures and principles. Shifting the focus from the question of the ideal political order towards the one of citizenship highlights the importance of how citizens perceive and comprehend political issues in their daily lives. Understanding citizens' perspectives is vital because these perceptions can shape their engagement and responses within the political sphere. In the real-world political discourse, people frequently, either intentionally or unintentionally, label the most contentious and heated issues as "religious", "religion-related" or "religious-people-regarded". Therefore, it is important for political theorists to not only take these labels seriously but also to address potential misunderstandings by offering a robust framework for understanding religion, religious diversity and its challenges.

Secondly, the concepts of religion and religious diversity are contested. While theorists view religious diversity as just an example of diversity in general and interpret the challenge it presents as an issue associated with difference, there is a concern that this philosophical generalization of religious diversity might suffer from, in Cecile Laborde's(2017) term, the problem of ethnicization. On one hand, philosophical generalization has the potential to interpret a concept by attributing it an essential property. A complicated and contested concept is improperly reduced to a certain aspect of it while other aspects of the concept that may also important are overlooked. On the other hand, theorists may also overlook the fact that philosophical generalization cannot be abstracted from the theorists' experience and consequently may reflect the majority's understanding of religious diversity while exclude the minority's. Cecile Laborde in her discussion regards this ethnicization as an important

source of real-life domination against religious people. Thus, considering the complexity of the concepts of religion and religious diversity, it is necessary to bring it back to the focus of political theory research rather than merely take it as one case of diversity in general.

II. Three approaches and structure design

To explore the question of the proper conception of democratic citizenship in the face of the challenges posed by religious diversity, this dissertation will engage three important approaches in normative political theory, including John Rawls's political liberal approach, David Miller's national republican approach and Cecile Laborde's critical republican approach. The reason to discuss three specific approaches lies in two aspects.

Firstly, these three approaches represent three typical schools of theory in interpreting religious diversity and its associated challenges. These three approaches are distinctive among all the other theories in terms of their, more or less, religious-friendly perspectives. When these three theories engage the challenges presented by religious diversity, they intend to show more respect for religious people. In this sense, these theories can help clarify the common misunderstandings prevailing in the contemporary world. John Rawls's theory, following the classic liberal interpretation of religion, is primarily concerned with religion as a faith. However, unlike liberal secularists, such as Robert Audi, who advocates the principle of restraint that particularly targets religious faith and aims to exclude it from public discourses, Rawls does not consider religious faith inherently a threat. According to Rawls's theory, due to the burden of judgment, reasonable pluralism is a basic fact of any liberal democracy. By interpreting religious diversity as a form of reasonable doctrinal pluralism, Rawls consider religious diversity as neither a threat nor uniquely challenging but only as a basic fact as all the other forms of doctrinal pluralism that liberal democracy should properly address.

David Miller's approach represents the culturalist interpretation of religious diversity.

Culturalists criticize that the ideal of political neutrality advocated by liberal neutralists is illusory and argue that conceptions of justice and political structure are culturally embedded other than culturally neutral. Particularly, they are grounded in the majority's culture.(Kymlicka, 1996) Unlike some liberal culturalists, such as Will Kymlicka, who consider religion as an exception to their theories, Miller's approach interprets religious diversity as a form of cultural diversity. In his view, as a form of culture, not all kinds of religion can be completely privatized, but rather the majority's religious culture, as a component of public culture, can be essential for maintaining the stability of liberal democracy. Miller's approach is worthy of discussion not merely because it represents one understanding of religion prevailing in the real-world public discourse, but also because of his nationalist defence for the dominant role of the majority's religious culture that arrests heated disputes.

The third school of theory in understanding the concept of religious diversity is multiculturalism, or put it precisely, Euro-multiculturalism in Laegaard's(2014) term or British multiculturalism in Modood's(2019) term. Striving for justice for minority groups, multiculturalists perceive religious diversity as a demographic fact that brings about exclusion and domination. Their discussion primarily engages religion as an identity that marks the difference and foreignness of a minority group which results in exclusion and domination. Among this school of theories, I choose to discuss Cecile Laborde's approach for two reasons. Firstly, Laborde's interpretation of religion includes the multiculturalist conception of religious diversity and perceives religious identity as an identity resulting from the majority's ethnicization of the minority and therefore is a marker of domination. In this sense, Laborde's interpretation is similar to Modood's interpretation. Secondly, Laborde's approach is worthy of a more thorough discussion because her approach does not merely engage religion as an identity, but more importantly, proposes a significant conceptual framework that helps us comprehensively understand religion and its related issues.

Thus, these three approaches are chosen to be discussed in this dissertation not only because they represent three typical ways of understanding religious diversity and its challenges, but also because they are distinctive among all the other theories upholding similar interpretations. In addition and more importantly, all these three

approaches particularly engage the question of citizenship and offer us three distinctive conceptions of democratic citizenship.

Among these three approaches, Rawls's political liberal approach proposes the thinnest conception of democratic citizenship. Unlike the standard liberal approach which considers the challenge presented by religious diversity as a challenge towards merely a just political structure, Rawls's political liberalism emphasizes that the question of citizenship is also significant as achieving a consensus on conceptions of justice necessitates an ideal of democratic citizenship, which in his theory, is defined by an ideal of public reason. Compared to the other theories in the school of public reason liberalism, for instance, Robert Audi's theory, Rawls's approach offers a conception of democratic citizenship that is more inclusive to religious citizens. By proposing the ideal of overlapping consensus and "the proviso", Rawls attempts to show that his ideal of public reason neither compromises the integrity of religious citizens nor excludes religious reasons entirely from the public political sphere. In this sense, among the theories in public reason liberalism, Rawls's political liberal approach is most promising to reconcile the ideal of democratic citizenship and the ideal of equal citizenship.

On the contrary, David Miller's national republican approach proposes the thickest conception of democratic citizenship among all the three. His conception is thicker in two aspects. In the first aspect, while Rawls's political liberal approach indicates that a stable democratic political community necessitates democratic citizens who follow the ideal of public reason when they engage in public political deliberations, Miller argues that a stable democratic community requires a thicker republican citizenship which entails not only responsible but also active participation. Unlike Rawls, Miller's approach concerns not merely the proper ideal of democratic citizenship but also the social conditions necessary for realizing the ideal. Miller argues that a shared national identity is an important source for realizing his republican ideal of democratic citizenship. Compared to other nationalist approaches that advocate nationalist conceptions of citizenship, Miller's national republican approach is more promising. Although Miller's approach, by emphasizing that a shared national culture is essential for maintaining a shared national identity, appears exclusive to immigrant minorities,

however, he attempts to alleviate this exclusiveness and secure the equal citizenship of the minorities. On one hand, Miller's approach, unlike radical nationalism, does not intend to defend that national identity is intrinsically valuable but merely indicates it is an important source for realizing republican citizenship. On the other hand, his theory attempts to reconcile the conflict between national republican citizenship and equal citizenship by defining national culture as a fluid public culture that can be transformed through ongoing public deliberations.

Compared to the thinner conception of democratic citizenship proposed by Rawls and the thicker conception proposed by Miller, Cecile Laborde's critical republican approach holds a middle position in the spectrum of conceptions of democratic citizenship. Similar to Miller, Laborde also argues that a stable democratic political community necessitates a thicker republican ideal of democratic citizenship that contains a requirement of a civic bond among citizens. In this sense, Laborde's conception is also thicker than Rawls's. However, by introducing critical perspectives into her republican theory, Laborde's position is more moderate than Miller's. Firstly, Laborde's theory of civic patriotism which indicates that republican citizenship requires a thinner form of civic bond than the national bond advocated by Miller. Secondly, while Laborde does not negate the value of the existing national bond, she proposes a critical strategy of de-ethnicization as a practical tool for alleviating the domination perpetuated in existing national culture.

To summarize, Rawls's political liberal approach, Miller's national republican approach and Laborde's critical republican approach offer not merely three typical as well as significant interpretations of religious diversity and its challenges but also three distinctive conceptions of democratic citizenship that, among all the others, are the most promising in addressing the challenges presented by religious diversity. Three chapters in this dissertation will, in turn, provide a thorough and deep exploration of each approach. Discussions in these chapters will demonstrate how these approaches address the challenges posed by religious diversity and reconcile the paradox between the ideal of democratic citizenship and the ideal of equal citizenship. The demonstrations will be followed by sharp critical examinations of these three approaches. Through the critical examinations, I will finally show that Laborde's

approach is more promising than the other two. On the one hand, Laborde's approach proposes an attractive conceptual framework for understanding religion and relevant issues. And her approach provides the most persuasive interpretation of religious diversity and its challenge. On the other hand, Laborde's critical republican conception of democratic citizenship, though more attractive than the other two approaches, suffers from several problems. Through a delicate analysis of these problems, this dissertation intends to point out a possible way for critical republicans out of those problems.

Chapter 1 Religious citizens and public reason

I. Rawls's political liberal approach: an explanation

1. Three fundamental ideas: Rawls's startpoints

John Rawls in his theory of political liberalism provides an influential approach to the question how a political community can accommodate the deep religious diversity in a just way. Before providing a detailed explanation of Rawls's approach, it is necessary to firstly provide the whole picture of his project of political liberalism itself. According to Rawls's clarification, his project of political liberalism was proposed to revise and supplement his prior work on theory of justice as fairness. In his prior book *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls, 1999, p. 71), Rawls provided a particular liberal conception of justice as fairness. He later realized that the conception of justice he proposed was partly grounded on a particular liberal conception of the good which was not suitable for a democratic society with deep diversity. And his theory of political liberalism intends to revise the ground of his conception of justice and address a more fundamental question—that is, the question of stability. That is, in the context of deep diversity, how can a political society of which the basic structure is formulated around a conception of justice can be stable for the right reason—that is, be stable without appealing to a *modus vivendi*?

Rawls's way to construct the answer to this question is the one he names as “reflective equilibrium”. In other words, he firstly reflects on the core ideas embedded in a democratic society and comes up with a theory of political liberalism that provides an answer that fits most in this democratic society. In Rawls's theory, he takes the constitutional democracy—especially the U.S. constitutional democracy—as a model and bases his theory of political liberalism on this form of political society. Thus, the fundamental ideas that Rawls grasps as the character of a democratic society are the start points of his construction of the answer. In this sense, the answer is located within a democratic society—especially a constitutional democracy, rather than other forms of

political society. According to Rawls's work, we can find three fundamental ideas in his theory featuring a democratic society.

The first fundamental idea is a political society as a fair system of cooperation. In this idea, a political society is in nature a social cooperation. In other word, people's life-together is not ordered by an external authority but guided by "publicly recognized rules and procedures that those cooperating accept and regard as properly regulating their conduct". (Rawls, 2005, p. 16) And those rules and procedures are fair in terms that they are formulated around a conception of justice.

The second fundamental idea is a conception of person as a free and equal citizen. In other words, each person in a political society is taken as free and equal. Rawls provides a particular interpretation of the idea of free and equal person. According to his view, a person is free in term of having two moral powers and the powers of reason. Put it precisely, each person has a capacity for a sense of justice-that is, a capacity to understand, apply and act from a public conception of justice, a capacity for a conception of good-that is, a capacity to form and change his/her own conception of good, and a capacity to think about, make judgments and inferences on the conception of justice and conception of the good. And each person is equal not in terms that they have equal degree of those powers but in terms that they all have the minimum degree to be a cooperative person in the political society. This conception of person, as a fundamental idea of democratic society is better not to understood as a sociological description of actual people in a democracy but as a conception according to which the fair terms of cooperation-namely, the conception of justice-should be formulated. In other words, the social cooperation should be structured in a way that persons in the cooperation is taken as free and equal.

In addition to these two ideas, there is a third fundamental idea, according to Rawls's

work. that characterize a democratic society. It is the idea of political relationship among citizens in a democratic society. This idea is demonstrated by Rawls in his later discussion of the idea of overlapping consensus and the idea of public reason. We can see that Rawls takes the idea of political relationship as an assumption which support the core ideas of his own theory. In this sense, it is also a fundamental idea that Rawls's theory relies on. And this idea of political relationship further defines the first two ideas. According to this idea, the cooperative relationship between free and equal citizens has two features. The first feature is that it is a political relationship within the basic structure of a democratic society. It defines the scope of the social cooperation in the first idea. And it is also set a limit to the scope of the application of Rawls's conception of justice. And this first feature of political relationship is closely related to the second feature-that is, free and equal citizens, as a collective body, exercise the ultimate political power. As Rawls states, the political power is always coercive and is "ultimately the power of the public". (Rawls, 2005, p. 136) In other words, the social cooperation of a democratic political society manifests in the collective exercise of the ultimate political power. To summarize, a democratic society is a fair social cooperation among free and equal citizens in terms of their collective exercise of the ultimate political power. In this term, when Rawls says that citizens are equal in terms that each one has minimum degree of three power to participate in the cooperation, he means that they have the minimum degree to collective exercise the ultimate political power.

Those start points of Rawls's political liberal approach-that is, the concern focusing on a conception of justice and the characterizing the democratic society with three fundamental ideas-leads him to a particular kind of diversity. Diversity challenges the democratic society in terms that it poses difficulties to formulate a conception of justice which takes each person as a free and equal citizen. However, on the one hand, Rawls does not take all kinds of diversity as normatively important. On the other hand, taking the difficulties in formulating a conception of justice as his focus, Rawls also emphasizes that the ambition of his project of political liberalism is limited and does not intend to deal with all kinds of diversity with normative significance. Thus, after the search of the fundamental ideas of a democratic society, the next question

addressed by Rawls is: what kind of diversity pose the most difficult challenge to a democratic society characterized by three fundamental ideas? Based on the three fundamental ideas, Rawls proposes an idea of reasonable pluralism which is an inevitable fact embedded in the fundamental ideas of a democratic society. And in his view, it is the kind of diversity that, from a political liberal perspective, a democratic society has to and should accommodate with. In the following section, I will firstly give a detailed explanation of Rawls's idea of reasonable pluralism and what role that religion and religious diversity play in this form of pluralism.

2. The idea of reasonable pluralism

Based on the three fundamental ideas of a democratic society, Rawls points out that there are two inevitable facts of a democratic society or the public culture of democracy. (2005, p. 36) The first is the fact of reasonable pluralism and the second is the fact of oppression. In short, the idea is that a democratic society or the public culture of democracy inevitably contains a pluralism of opposing and irreconcilable but reasonable comprehensive doctrines, namely, comprehensive conceptions of the good, and an agreement on a comprehensive doctrine can never be maintained unless through the oppressive use of state power. According to his view, a democratic society should not aim to eliminate but to accommodate the reasonable pluralism. And Rawls's theory of political liberalism provides a way for a political community to accommodate the reasonable pluralism. According to Rawls's statements, we can have the answer to the first question-that is, the kind of diversity that Rawls's approach-at least, at the beginning-intends to accommodate is reasonable pluralism. And there are several points needed to be further explained regarding Rawls's idea of reasonable pluralism.

2.1 Doctrinal pluralism and Rawls's definition of the reasonable

Firstly, the kind of diversity that bothers Rawls is the doctrinal pluralism, namely the pluralism of comprehensive conceptions of the good. According to his view, a

comprehensive conception of the good can include “the conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character” (2005, p. 13). It includes what is taken as the ends to pursue in life or the final ends of human beings. It can also include other virtues that are taken as valuable, such as loyalties or attachments. And those conceptions of values or ends can be connected or based on understandings of human nature or human conditions.(2005, pp. 19-20) A doctrine can be fully or partly comprehensive and it depends on whether those ideas of values are organized into an articulated belief system. In Rawls’s idea, a comprehensive doctrine can be a religious, philosophical or moral conception of the good. Thus, the doctrinal pluralism that Rawls’s approach targets at is a diversity of ideas and beliefs on what is valuable or morally good.

Secondly, Rawls does not take all forms of doctrinal pluralism but only reasonable pluralism as the kind of diversity worthy of accommodation. According to Rawls’s statements, reasonable pluralism can be understood in two aspects. The first aspect is that it is the fact that not all reasonable persons affirm the same comprehensive doctrine and instead they can affirm different and even opposing comprehensive doctrines. In other words, the fact of reasonable pluralism cannot be eliminated by accusing of the person who affirm different conceptions of the good as being unreasonable. When it comes to Rawls’s definition of a reasonable person, confusions emerge due to Rawls’s different explanations. In some places, Rawls seems to define the reasonableness in a moralized term. Let’s call it **the moralized definition of a reasonable person**.

As he summarizes his definition of a reasonable person in a footnote,

“I give the reasonable a more restricted sense and associate it, first, with the willingness to propose and honor fair terms of cooperation, and second, with the

willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences”.
(2005, p. 49)

According to Rawls's this statement, the idea of reasonableness of persons is based on the idea of reciprocity. In other words, a reasonable person in Rawls's definition is a person following the idea of reciprocity. Thus, a reasonable person is not a narrowly self-interest person nor a purely altruistic person. In this sense, a reasonable person does not need to be purely impartial if he/she realizes that others will not do likewise.

However, in another place, Rawls seems to add an epistemic element into his definition of a reasonable person. Let's call it **a compound definition of a reasonable person.**

As he re-elaborates the idea of a reasonable person in the discussion of reasonable disagreement,

“Let's say that reasonable disagreement is disagreement between reasonable persons: that is, between persons who have realized their two moral powers to a degree sufficient to be free and equal citizens in a constitutional regime, and who have an enduring desire to honor fair terms of cooperation and to be fully cooperating members of society. Given their moral powers, they share a common human reason, similar powers of thought and judgment: they can draw inferences, weigh evidence, and balance competing considerations.” (2005, p. 55)

From this compound definition, we can see that Rawls connects his idea of reasonable persons with the idea of free and equal citizens which he proposes as one of the

fundamental ideas of a democratic society in the previous part of his book. According to this idea, citizens are free and equal in terms that they equally have two moral powers-including “a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good”-and powers of the reason-that is, the capacity of “judgment, thought and inference”. (2005, p. 19)

The question which definition is more proper and coherent is important for two reasons. Firstly, it is important when we attempt to use this definition to identify “the unreasonable persons” in Rawls’s theory. Different understandings of the scope of the unreasonable might lead to different judgments on the degree of exclusiveness of Rawls’s approach. And it will further our judgment on the question concerned in this dissertation-that is, the question whether Rawls’s approach provide a proper way to accommodate religious diversity. Secondly, it is important because it will make a difference on its relation to the other aspect of Rawls’s idea of reasonable pluralism, namely the idea of a reasonable doctrine. However, since the task of this part is to demonstrate Rawls’s approach as it is. Thus, I will leave the detailed discussion of the proper interpretation in the later part of this chapter. I shall firstly turn to the second aspect of reasonable pluralism.

The second aspect of reasonable pluralism is that the opposing and irreconcilable doctrines are reasonable. Here, according to Rawls’s theory, a doctrine is reasonable not merely because it is affirmed by reasonable persons but also its content is reasonable. In Rawls’s definition, a reasonable doctrine has three features. Firstly, it is an exercise of theoretical reason. That is to say, the ideas of values covered by the doctrine are relatively consistent and coherent and “express an intelligible view of the world”. Secondly, it is an exercise of practical reason. It means that a reasonable doctrine contains the ranking, priority of and balance between the different values it contains when there is a conflict. Thirdly, a reasonable doctrine “normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine” and therefore it is relatively stable

as well as capable of evolving. (2005, p. 49) When it comes to Rawls's definition of a reasonable doctrine, there can be three possible doubts. The first doubt is that his usage of the term "intelligible" is inconsistent. While he claims that a reasonable doctrine expresses intelligible view of the world here, in his previous statements he claims that "what is obvious to some persons and accepted as a basic idea is unintelligible to others" (2005, p. 49) His previous claim seems to suggest that there is no shareable criterion to tell whether a view is intelligible or not. Apart from this inconsistency, Rawls's definition also seems to provide criteria to exclude many conceptions or viewpoints out of the pool though he emphasizes that this account is "deliberately loose". A third doubt lies in Rawls's different interpretations between a reasonable person and a reasonable doctrine. While Rawls "assumes" that the doctrines affirmed by reasonable persons will be reasonable in terms of their content, it is not clear why this assumption is tenable since Rawls's interpretation of a person's reasonableness is normative. Jeremy Waldron(2004) in his paper raises a similar criticism. I will also leave the detailed discussion of those criticism in the later part of this chapter. Here, an initial interpretation is that the definition of a reasonable doctrine is not provided as criteria to tell reasonable doctrines from unreasonable ones. Instead, this definition is proposed to support Rawls's distinction between reasonable pluralism from the pluralism as such. In other words, the key point is to show that the opposing doctrines are not results of conflicting interests or cognitive errors. And this interpretation will lead us to the third point involved in Rawls's idea of reasonable pluralism.

2.2 Reasonable disagreement and the fact of oppression

In Rawls's view, reasonable pluralism refers to not merely a diversity of different views and conceptions, but also disagreements among reasonable persons. According to Rawls's view, there are two important features of this reasonable disagreement. The first feature is that reasonable disagreement is not a result of individuals' conflicting interest nor a result of logical errors nor a result of limited standpoints. Instead, it is a result of the exercise of free human reason that is characterized by the burdens of

judgment. In this sense, reasonable pluralism, in Rawls's view, is distinguished from "the pluralism as such". (2005, pp. 35-7) According to Rawls's view, the source of reasonable disagreement lies in two aspects. On the one hand, a reasonable and rational person has to make three kinds of judgments, including judgments on the balance of different values that one commits to and their application to real-life case, judgments on other people's opposing claims and judgments on the choice between one's own and others' claims which Rawls thinks that reasonable persons incline to appraise their own ideas. The complexity of judgments that reasonable persons have to make and their inclinations to favor one's own claims cause disagreement. On the other hand, our uses of reasons-both theoretical and practical reason-are also subjected to burdens which lead reasonable people to make different judgments. Rawls lists six burdens that reasonable persons would have when they make judgments, including, for instance, the complexity of relevant evidence, vagueness of concepts that open to different interpretations, different balances between different values and individuals' different experiences which shape different assessments. (2005, pp. 56-7). The complexity of judgments and the burdens of judgments together lead to reasonable disagreement on comprehensive doctrines.

The second feature of reasonable disagreement is that the disagreement does not suggest skepticism. (2005, pp. 62-3). Put it precisely, Rawls's idea of the burdens of judgment does not presume a metaphysical proposition. In Rawls's view, the burdens of judgment neither suggest a metaphysical view on the limit of human reason nor suggest a skeptic position on the question whether there is a moral truth. In this sense, while a reasonable person accepts the burdens of judgments and realizes that a reasonable disagreement on comprehensive doctrines is not possible, he/she does not need to be skeptical or uncertain about the doctrines that he/she commits to, and he/she can still believe in the truth of his/her own doctrine. However, here the question is: why should a reasonable person who believes in the truth of his/her doctrine accept the fact of reasonable pluralism? In other words, why should not this person to strive for the agreement on the comprehensive doctrine? The answer to this question lies in the fact of oppression proposed by Rawls. In other words, due to the

burdens of judgment, an agreement on comprehensive doctrine cannot be achieved or maintained unless through oppression. It means that a reasonable person accepts the fact of reasonable pluralism because he/she refuses to use oppressive power to force an agreement though he/she is certain about the truth of his/her own beliefs. In Rawls's view, a reasonable person who accepts the burdens of judgment would know that every other person can reasonably insist in the truth of his/her own beliefs. And this person will realize when he/she attempts to impose his/her claim on others, the others could equally impose theirs on himself/herself. Thus, in Rawls's view, a reasonable person would admit that it is unreasonable to force an agreement through oppression. (2005, p. 61).

To summarize, a reasonable pluralism is a pluralism of reasonable comprehensive doctrines affirmed by reasonable persons. And only this kind of pluralism is an inevitable fact of a democratic society and the one that political liberalism intends to accommodate. In this sense, according to Rawls's theory, unreasonable doctrines are not worthy of accommodation. However, his attitude is less clear when it comes to the question how a democratic society should deal with unreasonable doctrines. In some places, it seems that Rawls does not suggest that unreasonable doctrines should be excluded. He states that "in their case the problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice of society" (2005, p. 13). However, in other places, Rawls seems to suggest that oppression upon unreasonable doctrines is allowed. As he states, "reasonable persons will think it unreasonable to use political power, should they possess it, to repress comprehensive views that are not unreasonable, though different from their own" (2005, p. 13). A proper explanation of this "inconsistency" might be found in the following statement that Rawls writes in a footnote:

"That there are doctrines that reject one or more democratic freedoms as itself a permanent fact of life, or seem so. This gives us the practical task of containing them—like war and disease—so that they do not overturn political justice." (2005, p. 13)

Defining the containment of unreasonable doctrines as a practical task, Rawls seems to suggest that it is reasonable and justified to repress the unreasonable doctrines. However, just like disease and war, unreasonable doctrines are hard to be completely eliminated from a democratic society, there are practical reasons for a democratic society to contain them.

Although Rawls's construction of his political liberalism begins with the fact of reasonable pluralism, however, he later realizes that the reasonable disagreement does not merely exist in terms of the comprehensive doctrines but also exist in terms of liberal political conceptions of justice. I will further explain this point when I demonstrate Rawls's political liberal approach itself and I will show that this expansion from reasonable pluralism to the pluralism of liberal political conceptions of justice makes the idea of public reason the most important in Rawls's approach. Here, I will firstly turn to the second question-that is, how Rawls understands religious diversity and its challenges and what kind of implications that the idea of reasonable pluralism on the question of accommodating religious diversity.

3. The challenge from religion and religious diversity

From the explanations above, we can see that Rawls's political approach aims to accommodate reasonable pluralism, namely the pluralism of reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good, including religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. Thus, in this approach, religion is not singled out and taken as one kind of comprehensive doctrines. However, Rawls's later explanation of the intention of his project in the two introductions of the expanded edition of *Political Liberalism* does show that he is mostly concerned with the challenges brought by religious diversity. And his idea of reasonable pluralism also discloses how Rawls understands and

approaches the issue of religion.

3.1 Challenges from religion and religious diversity

In the introduction of the expanded edition, Rawls takes his project of political liberalism historically originated in the project of religious toleration in and after the Reformation. While the latter project, situated in a context of religious clashes and religious civil war, aimed to find a basis of religious toleration that makes a society between people with different faiths possible (2005, p. xxiv), the project of political liberalism, as Rawls states, aims at the following question: “how is a just and free society possible under conditions of deep doctrinal conflict with no prospect of resolution?” (2005, p. xxviii) From Rawls’s clarification of his project, we can see that his deep worry is toward the possibility of deep doctrinal conflict and the religious war after the Reformation is taken as a historical tragedy from which Rawls thinks we should learn the lesson and which a democratic society should strive to avoid.

From this clarification, we can see how Rawls understands the challenge brought by religion and religious diversity. According to Rawls’s view, to him the doctrinal conflict is the most bothering though might not the only challenge that religious diversity has brought to modern society. According to Rawls’s understanding, the tragedy of the religious civil war in history was rooted in the combat between religious doctrines that were uncompromisable and intended to acquire the dominated status through suppressing the other. In other words, Rawls interprets the religious clashes as a doctrinal conflict. Rawls in his discussion distinguishes the modern religion from the ancient religion. In his view, the ancient religion, which he mainly refers to the religion in ancient Greece, is a civic religion constituted by “public social practices”, “civic festivals” and “public celebration”. The ancient religion is not doctrinal in terms that it does not contain a system of beliefs on values and the good. By contrast, the modern religion is doctrinal religion. Rawls firstly takes the Medieval Christianity as the paradigm of the modern religion. In his view, the Medieval Christianity is different from

the civic religion in terms that it is authoritative, salvationist and expansionist. (2005, p. xxiii) Then Rawls states that, as the religions split in the Reformation, the society was shifted from being dominated by one authoritarian religion to the one containing a plurality of religions. In his view, though the diverse religions split from the original were somewhat different but their core was the same-that is, they are doctrinal and intolerant. To summarize, in Rawls's understanding, the modern religion is a comprehensive doctrine containing a system of beliefs on the highest good and the way to the highest good.

Based on this understanding of modern religion and religious clashes, Rawls claims that the most pressing issue faced by the moderns is how to tackle the doctrinal conflict. In other words, the question is no longer about the conception of highest good that was the problem faced by the ancients, but about the conception of justice that can provide a way out of the conflict and make a life-together possible. When Rawls takes his theory of political liberalism as a project tackling the problem of the moderns, he distinguishes his approach from the Enlightenment tradition of liberalism. According to Rawls's discussion, the Enlightenment liberalism attempts to tackle the religious conflict through replacing the religious doctrine with a liberal secular philosophy and provides a conception of justice based on this liberal secular doctrine. Although Rawls does not explicitly criticize the Enlightenment tradition, his discussion does implicitly suggest that the Enlightenment liberal approach that bases the conception of justice on a liberal secular doctrine cannot sustain the right kind of stability of a democratic society¹. The problem lies in the fact that a liberal secular doctrine is also a comprehensive doctrine. As Rawls states,

¹ Rawls implicitly expresses this doubt through his self-reflection on his theory of justice as fairness. He self-criticizes that when he previously constructed this theory of justice he ignored that the conception he proposed was also a comprehensive doctrine which could not provide the right kind of stability.

“...the question should be more sharply put this way: How is it possible for those affirming a religious doctrine that is based on religious authority, for example, the Church or the Bible, also to hold a reasonable political conception that supports a just democratic regime? The point is that not all reasonable comprehensive doctrines are liberal comprehensive doctrines: so the question is whether they can still be compatible for the right reasons with a liberal political conception.” (2005, p. xxxvii)

From the statements above, we can see the worries that Rawls bears. Constructing a conception of justice from a liberal comprehensive doctrine, according to Rawls's theory, fails to treat religious doctrine in fair terms. If this comprehensive conception of justice can provide a kind of stability, the stability could only be achieved through sacrificing religious people—in Rawls's term, the citizens of faith. In other words, it could only be achieved through excluding, compromising² or suppressing the citizens of faith. For Rawls, this stability is not the right kind of stability for a democratic society. In his view, the right kind of stability, in this case, relies on citizens of faith being “wholehearted members of a democratic society”. In other words, the conception of justice should be constructed in a way that citizens of faith are able to affirm without compromising the religious doctrines that they are committed to.

3.2 Citizens of faith and religious doctrines

Apart from Rawls's interpreting religious diversity as a doctrinal diversity, Rawls's understanding of the challenges from religions and religious diversity to existing liberal project is based on another two assumptions. The first assumption is Rawls's idea of religious persons as citizens of faith. In other words, in Rawls's view, to treat religious persons in fair terms is to treat their religious doctrines in fair terms. Although it seems

² Here, based on Rawls's view, “compromising” citizens of faith means that those citizens were forced to go along with a society organized along the liberal comprehensive conception of justice out of their balance of political and social forces. Rawls, J. (2005) *Political liberalism*. Expanded ed. edn. New York: Columbia University Press.

that Rawls, by taking religious persons as citizens of faith, does not intend to provide an accurate and full account of the term “religious persons”, he does take it as the most important or fundamental difficulties lie in the question about the fair treatment of religious doctrines. The second assumption is that in Rawls’s view citizens of faith can also be reasonable persons and the religious comprehensive doctrines that they are committed, though might not be liberal, can also be reasonable doctrines. Thus, there are three important points in Rawls’s understanding of religious doctrines.

Firstly, a religious comprehensive doctrine can be nonliberal. For example, as Rawls states, a religious doctrine might be based on religious authority such as the Church or the Bible. In this sense, this doctrine might reject that individual is the final authority of one’s beliefs. In this sense, it might contradict with Kantian ideas of autonomy or Mill’s idea of individuality or directly reject those liberal values as the highest good. In other words, a religious doctrine can be nonliberal in terms that it contradicts with or reject a liberal comprehensive doctrine. In this sense, Rawls’s approach is distinguished from a liberal secular approach not mere in terms that it does not intend to provide a comprehensive conception of the good but also in terms that he does not think religious doctrines should be treated differently from other doctrines.

Secondly, in Rawls’s theory, a religious, nonliberal doctrine can also be a reasonable doctrine. Being nonliberal is not equated to being unreasonable. Thus, reasonable religious doctrines should not be excluded and should treat in fair terms with other liberal comprehensive doctrines. Here, another point needed to be addressed. That is, Rawls states that a religious doctrine can contain transcendent elements. And the transcendent elements do not make a doctrine unreasonable. Thus, according to this view, one should not accuse a doctrine of being unreasonable merely because it involves an idea of “the other world” that one cannot understand or accept. From Rawls’s definition of reasonable, we can see that he does not understand this term in a metaphysical way. Hence, we can further infer that Rawls does not take the public

intelligibility as a criterion for a reasonable doctrine. In this sense, we can partly answer a doubt I have mentioned in previous section. That is, the statement of “an intelligible view of the world” should not be understood as a requirement of public intelligibility. A better explanation is that the view is intelligible from the perspective of its believers.

Thirdly, a reasonable religious doctrine can be uncompromisable due to its transcendent elements. Here, Rawls does not further explain the relation between transcendent elements of a doctrine and its incapability of compromise. Rawls firstly connects these two ideas when he explains the religious clashes in the Reformation. He states,

“But resting on the conflicting authorities of Church or Bible, there was no resolution between them, as their competing transcendent elements do not admit of compromise.”
(2005, pp. xxxviii-xxxix)

There are two possible interpretations on the incapability of compromise. The first interpretation is that transcendent elements are not compromisable because they are not arguable. In other words, the conclusion of a religious doctrine’s incapability of compromise is grounded in the nature of the beliefs contained in a religious doctrine. If Rawls’s idea is understood in this sense, then it seems that this conclusion is based on a thorough research on religious conviction and Rawls should explain a bit more about it to support his claim. However, in my view, this interpretation is inconsistent with Rawls’s idea of the burdens of judgment. Put it precisely, a claim that a religious doctrine containing transcendent elements is uncompromisable itself is a judgment of the doctrine. Due to the burdens of judgment, it seems impossible to have an agreement on this judgment. It seems that Rawls’s theory, including his idea of reasonable pluralism and the burdens of judgment, does not encourage a person to do research on a comprehensive doctrine that he/she does not believe in and make a

political judgment based on the result of this research. Because, as he suggests, when we make judgment on others' claims we incline to favor our own claims. Following this idea, it seems that as a political theorist, Rawls would not make a judgment that a religious doctrine containing transcendent elements is, in nature, uncompromisable. And this inconsistency of the first interpretation will lead us turn to the second possible interpretation. Another possible interpretation is that Rawls does not try to conclude that religious doctrine in nature is uncompromisable. Instead, what he does is to describe his findings based on his observation of religious clashes in history. In other words, in the religious clashes in the Reformation, part of the conflict between different religious doctrines was focused on the controversy on the beliefs about the transcendent elements and their believers were not willing to compromise their beliefs. Thus, due to the lessons from history, a conception of justice should not be constructed in a way that relies on the willingness of compromise from religious doctrines. In this sense, we can infer that in Rawls's view it is not a religion person's fault that he/she is not willing to compromise his/her comprehensive beliefs as long as he/she is reasonable. And it is the responsibility of political theorists or public officers to provide a political conception of justice that can be affirmed by citizens of faith without compromising their comprehensive beliefs.

To summarize, in Rawls's view, the question how to construct such a conception of justice is the biggest challenge that religions and religious diversity have brought to a democratic society. Based on this understanding of the challenges from religious diversity, Rawls's approach intends to accommodate religious diversity through providing such a conception of justice which he names as a liberal political conception of justice that is distinguished from a conception of justice based on a liberal comprehensive doctrine provided by Kantian and utilitarian liberalism. From Rawls's idea of reasonable pluralism and his understanding of the challenges from religious diversity, we can see that Rawls intends to show greater toleration to religious doctrines and citizens of faith. When he interprets religious persons as citizens of faith, it seems that, to Rawls, respect for religious persons requires one to respect the faith of religious persons-that is, to respect religious doctrines. When we find religious

persons who are not cooperative, we should firstly reflect on the fairness of the terms of our cooperative scheme before we categorize them as unreasonable. Thus, this respect of religious citizens and of religious doctrines, in Rawls's approach, is manifested in two ideas-that is, the idea of political conception of justice as the fair term of cooperation and the idea of public reason as an ideal of democratic citizenship. In the following sections, I will explain Rawls's approach to accommodating religious diversity through explaining these two ideas. And these two ideas can show us a picture of Rawls's ideal of a just and inclusive political community in the contest of deep religious diversity. Through the demonstration of these ideas, we can also see that in Rawls's view deep religious diversity does not merely pose challenges to a democratic society but also provides an opportunity.

4. Three ideas in Rawls's solution

From the discussion above, we can see there are two important points in Rawls's theory. The first is that, as a liberal political theorist, Rawls takes the conception of justice as the core of a democratic society. Understanding democratic society as a fair social cooperation among free and equal citizens, the conception of justice defines the fair terms of the cooperation and therefore defines the way how people in the democratic political society get along with each other. The second point is that the challenge from the reasonable pluralism is a challenge to the conception of justice. It is internal to a democratic society. That is, it is the internal conflict between the two fundamental ideas of a democratic society. Put it precisely, the implication of the second fundamental idea-that is, the fact of reasonable pluralism, can challenge the first fundamental idea, namely, the fair terms of cooperation as a conception of justice. In this sense, the challenge from the reasonable pluralism is not merely a practical but most importantly is a theoretical problem for political theorists who commit to defend a liberal democracy. This theoretical problem in the real-world context manifests in the difficulties and controversies brought by religion and religious diversity.

In order to reconcile the challenges from reasonable pluralism, especially the difficulties posed by religious pluralism, Rawls's approach takes three steps. In the first step, he attempts to provide a way out of the dilemma through proposing an idea of political conception of justice which is freestanding and therefore independently of comprehensive doctrines. In this sense, each reasonable citizen is respected as free and equal since each a freestanding political conception shows equal respect to all reasonable comprehensive doctrines-either religious or not. In the second step, Rawls further considers the problem of stability. The fact that the basic structure of a democratic society is regulated by a freestanding political conception itself does not guarantee the compliance from all reasonable persons-especially citizens of faith. To address this question of stability, Rawls provides a second idea in his approach, namely the idea of an overlapping consensus. Under an overlapping consensus, reasonable citizens are willing to live together under the basic structure not only because it is regulated by the political conception of justice which is presented as freestanding but also because it is public justified by political values that endorsed by all reasonable comprehensive doctrines³. However, considering the fact that a democratic society is not merely characterized by reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines but also characterized by the pluralism of reasonable political conceptions of justice, Rawls adds a third element to a democratic political community-that is, the ideal of public reason and democratic citizenship. In other words, since reasonable persons might affirm different political conceptions of justice, a democratic society will not be stable for the right reasons unless there is a political public discussion conducted under the ideal of public reason among reasonable citizens. In the following part of this section, I will provide further explanations on these three ideas in Rawls's approach.

³ Here, I take a slightly different explanation of the idea of overlapping consensus from Rawls's original statement. Rawls's original statement *Ibid.* which states that "all reasonable comprehensive doctrines in society endorse some member of a family of reasonable conceptions" can be confusing. Combining his reply to Habermas, I add the idea of public justification into the explanation. I will further clarify this point in the following section.

4.1 The political conception of justice

As I have already shown, in Rawls's theory, citizens in a democratic society are taken as free and equal in terms of their moral and reason power which will lead to the fact of reasonable pluralism. In other words, reasonable citizens in a democratic society will attach to different reasonable comprehensive conceptions of good. And this disagreement on the comprehensive conception of the good, as a result of burdens of judgments, is reasonable and cannot be eliminated unless through the using of oppressive power. This fact of reasonable pluralism poses a difficulty to the construction of a conception of justice. It suggests that the traditional way of constructing the conception of justice in liberalism is oppressive in sense that it appeals to a comprehensive doctrine. In order to address this problem, Rawls claims that a political liberal theorist would attempt to construct a liberal political conception of justice which is freestanding in terms that it does not depend on any comprehensive conceptions of good. In his view, a political conception of justice should be constructed out of the basic political values of a democratic society-namely, the fundamental ideas of the public culture of democracy and should not be derived from or grounded on or a comprehensive philosophy of persons, human conditions or morality. While a political conception of justice is not derived from a comprehensive doctrine, it is further distinguished from a comprehensive conception of good from two aspects.

Firstly, although a political conception of justice is a moral conception and concerns what is morally right, it is not comprehensive in terms that its subject is political. In other words, it is a conception of political justice which merely concerns the basic structure. In Rawls's theory, he defines the basic structure as the main political, social and economic institutions of a society. (Rawls, 2005, p. 11) In a constitutional democratic regime that Rawls focuses on, a conception of political justice covers the constitutional essentials and other matters of basic justice. (Rawls, 2005, p. xlviii) While Rawls in his theory of justice as fairness provides a relatively clearer clarification

of the basic structure, in his theory of political liberalism he does not provide such a clear boundary. An explanation here is that this loose definition of basic structure leaves a room for possibilities of different understandings in different reasonable political conceptions of justice. And Rawls theory of justice as fairness is merely one political conception that he takes as the most proper one. Although Rawls does not provide a definite boundary of the basic structure, his distinction between the political and the comprehensive is clear in two senses. According to Rawls's idea, a political justice does not provide a conception of human good which covers all spheres of life and can be compatible with those comprehensive conceptions. And a political conception does not suggest that a political justice is morally superior to other human goods. In this sense, a political conception of justice avoids the disagreements on comprehensive doctrines. Furthermore, according to Rawls's idea, the limit of the subject of a political conception of justice does not fit in the traditional distinction between public and private in liberalism. In Rawls's discussion on the questions related to family, he emphasizes that family which has been regarded as a private realm by some liberals is also taken as a basic structure of a democratic society and therefore is concerned by the political conception of justice. In other words, a political conception justice can involve certain restrictions on family as a main social institution without providing an idea of good regarding the internal life of a family.⁴ (Rawls, 2005, p. 466)

Secondly, while a political conception of justice is distinguished from the comprehensive doctrine in terms of its subject, it is distinguished from a conception of justice that is derived from or depends on a comprehensive conception of the good. In this sense, a political conception of justice is freestanding. A noteworthy point here is that this claim does not suggest that a political conception is culturally neutral. While

⁴ In this dissertation, my question is not on how a democratic state should operate and therefore not on the scope of state interference. However, the distinction between Rawls's idea of the political and traditional definition of the public is also important for the question discussed in this dissertation because it has important implications on the idea of democratic citizenship and the idea of political community. I will further clarify this point latter.

Rawls claims that a political conception is not derived from a comprehensive doctrine, he also emphasizes that the way to have a political conception is to reflect on the political values embedded in the public culture of a democratic society. As Rawls states, the public culture of a democratic society defines the content of political conception of justice. As I have already shown, Rawls's whole project of political liberalism itself is crafted from his understandings of the fundamental ideas of a democratic society. Here, Rawls distinguishes a public culture-or more precisely, the public political culture-from the background culture. And this distinction is closely related to his idea of basic structure as the primary subject. According to his definition, a public culture "comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge". (Rawls, 2005, pp. 13-4) By contrast, a background culture is a culture of civil society. As he states, this culture is "the culture of the social, not of the political. It is the culture of daily life, of its many associations: churches and universities, learned and scientific societies, and clubs and teams, to mention a few". (Rawls, 2005, p. 14)

As I have already shown, in Rawls's view, a core feature of a democratic society is that people's common life-namely, the social cooperation in Rawls's term- are regulated by a conception of justice and the task of liberal political philosophy is to search for a proper conception of justice. According to Rawls's theory, in face of the fact of reasonable pluralism, a proper conception of justice should be a freestanding, political conception. Thus, political philosophers should aim at providing such a freestanding political conception which is independent of comprehensive doctrines. Rawls's idea of the original position and the veil of ignorance is a device to provide such a freestanding political conception and justice as fairness, as a result of such a device, is the most proper political conception in Rawls's mind. The social cooperation among people is fair when the basic structure of a society is formulated around the political conception of justice. In this case, each comprehensive doctrine is respected since the political conception of justice neither favor one particular doctrine nor make any judgment on those doctrines. And in this sense, each person is respected as free and equal.

4.2 The overlapping consensus

According to Rawls's ideal of democratic society, in order to accommodate the reasonable pluralism, the basic structure should be grounded on the political conception of justice which is freestanding in terms of being independent of comprehensive doctrines. Rawls does not stop here, and he further claims that a democratic society can be stable for the right reason only if there is an overlapping consensus on the political conception of justice. In other words, in an ideal form of democratic society, people are willing to live with each other not out of their compromises or external forces but out of their wholehearted affirmation of the political conception of justice that regulates the social cooperation. With regard to the idea of overlapping consensus, Rawls in his work provides slightly different explanations which might lead to different interpretations.

In his lecture on the idea of overlapping consensus, Rawls describes it as the second stage of his project. In this clarification, he suggests that the idea of political conception of justice is proposed to solve the theoretical dilemma posed by reasonable pluralism and the idea of overlapping consensus is proposed to explain in which sense a democratic society grounded in a political conception of justice can be stable for the right reason. (2005, pp. 133-4) In this early demonstration, Rawls takes the social unity of a democratic society as a consensus on the political conception of justice. In this idea, the object of the consensus is the political conception and it is an overlapping consensus because reasonable citizens affirm the political conception from within their own comprehensive doctrines. As Rawls states,

"All those who affirm the political conception start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it provides." (2005, p. 147)

And he provides a model case for an overlapping consensus. In this model case, a political conception is affirmed on the basis of a religious and a comprehensive liberal and a pluralist doctrine. Based on these statements, some theorists, such as Jeremy Waldron(2004, p. 95), think that in Rawls's idea of an overlapping consensus, a political conception is affirmed by different persons on different moral grounds. Interpreting Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus in this way, it seems that the idea of overlapping consensus exercises a different way of reasoning from the idea of a freestanding political conception. In forming a freestanding political conception, one should not proceed from one's comprehensive doctrine, while in an overlapping consensus, one affirms a political conception from one's comprehensive doctrine. In this sense, this interpretation leads to a particular view towards the role of the third idea-namely, the idea of public reason that I will address later-in Rawls's project. For example, Charles Larmore(2003, p. 378) seems to endorse this interpretation and takes public reason as a value respected in the first stage of Rawls's theory.

This interpretation of Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus evokes some questions. The first question is that this interpretation is inconsistent with the distinction between full justification and public justification that Rawls makes in his later reply to Habermas's doubts. In this reply, Rawls further clarifies the point of the idea of overlapping consensus. In his view, a democratic society can be stable for the right reason only when the political conception grounding its basic structure is public justified. And as he states, "only when there is a reasonable overlapping consensus can political society's political conception of justice be publicly-though never finally-justified". (2005, pp. 133-4) Here, Rawls distinguishes the public justification from the full justification of a political conception. According to this distinction, as Rawls states, in the case of a full justification, "the citizen accepts a political conception and fills out its justification by embedding it in some way into the citizen's comprehensive doctrine", while in the case of a public justification "all the reasonable members of political society carry out a justification of the shared political conception, by embedding it in

their several reasonable comprehensive views". (2005, pp. 133-4) Put it in another way, in the case of a full justification, a person endorses a political conception because this political conception is justified by his/her own comprehensive doctrine. In other words, his/her comprehensive doctrine itself affirms the political conception. According to Rawls's view, in this full justification a person only needs to consider his/her own comprehensive doctrines and not need to consider whether it is endorsable by other citizens. In other words, a political conception can be fully justified though not acceptable to others. By contrast, in a public justification, a person takes others' reasonable comprehensive doctrines into account. In Rawls's view, this mutual accountability does not require a person to look into others' comprehensive doctrines but merely requires a person to recognize the fact of reasonable pluralism. In this sense, while a fully justification can be carried by all individuals, public justification is a type of justification for reasonable citizens. And it is also a result of the exercise of public reason.

Based on this distinction, we can see that in Rawls's view a political conception on which there is an overlapping consensus is publicly justified though might not be fully justified. And according to his definition of full justification, we can imagine a case in which there is a political conception that can be fully justified by all citizens within their comprehensive doctrines. However, Rawls does not take it a case of the overlapping consensus and does not think the stability of a democratic society for the right reasons requires consensus in this term. Thus, it is not accurate to interpret the idea of overlapping consensus as simply a consensus on the political conception among different comprehensive doctrines. Here, I object to Gerald Gaus's interpretation of Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus. In his interpretation, when a political conception is publicly justified, it is "seen by all as fully justified".(2014, p. 247) In Gaus's interpretation, he takes the term full justification simply as a justification viewed from the individualized perspective. He ignores the important difference between a full justification and a public justification in Rawls's discussion. That is, as I have already pointed out, a public justification is a kind of justification in which others' reasonable comprehensive doctrines are taken into account while a full justification

does not bear such mutual accountability. Thus, a public justification should not be interpreted as simply an aggregation of full justifications from all individuals.

To have a better understanding of Rawls's idea of the overlapping consensus, it is necessary to look at why Rawls adds the idea of overlapping consensus into his theory. As I have already pointed out, Rawls takes the idea of overlapping consensus the key to the question of stability. What worries Rawls here is related to his concerns to citizens of faith that I have demonstrated previously. As I have shown, Rawls believes that a democratic society is characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism. According to his view, to respect persons as free and equal citizens is to respect the comprehensive doctrines that he/she commits to. Thus, the whole idea behind the idea of political conception of justice is that for people to live together in the form of a fair cooperation we need a shared basis to settle fundamental questions. However, this attempt encounters two difficulties. The first difficulty is that in which sense the freestanding political conception of justice can be accepted by citizens who deeply commit to their doctrines—for example, the citizens of faith. On the one hand, Rawls distinguishes his idea of reasonable pluralism from a position of skepticism or agnosticism. On the other hand, Rawls takes the right kind of stability root in reasonable persons' wholehearted affirmation. The idea of overlapping consensus is introduced to reconcile this tension. This idea, on the one hand, explains why citizens of faith can accept a political conception of justice which is presented as freestanding as a shared basis to settle the fundamental issues. On the other hand, it also shows that this acceptance does not require citizens to give up the truth that they commit to. The tension is reconciled since the political conception itself is supported by the comprehensive doctrine and therefore is a part of the truth within one's beliefs. In Rawls's description of the process to form an overlapping consensus, he states as following:

“Since we seek an agreed basis of public justification in matters of justice, and since no

political agreement on those disputed questions can be reasonably be expected, we turn instead to the fundamental ideas we seem to share through the public political culture. From these ideas we try to work out a political conception of justice congruent with our considered convictions on due reflection. Once this is done, citizens may within their comprehensive doctrines regard the political conception of justice as true, or as reasonable, whatever their views allow.” (2005, pp. 150-1)

Thus, the overlapping consensus in Rawls’s theory happens among reasonable persons who hold different comprehensive doctrines but all value the ideal of public reason. In this sense, while a comprehensive doctrine that a person commits to might fully justify a political conception which is unacceptable to others within their comprehensive doctrines, in the case of an overlapping consensus, by valuing the public reason, the person will still affirm the publicly justified political conception which is either supported by or compatible with his/her comprehensive doctrine. In this understanding, an overlapping consensus does not simply refer to citizens’ affirmation on the basis of different comprehensive moral grounds. Instead, it is a consensus among reasonable persons who value public reason. However, a question here is: if it is the question of stability that the idea of an overlapping consensus intends to reply to, why does not Rawls favor the case of the consensus on a political conception in terms of multiply full justifications? Rawls’s answer here is not merely pragmatic. Rather, he does suggest a moral response to the question. That is, this kind of consensus is not the one that a democratic society should aim at because it does not embody the right kind of democratic relationship among citizens. In Rawls’s view, a democratic society is also characterized by a democratic citizenship which public reason is valued as an ideal.

4.3 The idea of public reason

In Rawls’s approach to accommodate the reasonable pluralism, the idea of public reason plays a key role in his theory. In Rawls’s view, public reason is a characteristic of

democratic people. As I have already pointed out, in Rawls's idea of a democratic society, a third fundamental point is that a democratic society is characterized by a particular kind of political relationship in which equal and free citizens together exercise the ultimate political power. The idea of public reason is embedded in this kind of political relationship. In other words, a democratic citizen who respect each other as free and equal in terms of the recognition of each other as a part of the collective body will exercise the public reason when it comes to the questions about constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. As Rawls states, a public reason is public in three ways:

“as the reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the good of the public and matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and content if public, being given by the ideals and principles, expressed by society's conception of political justice, and conducted open to view on that basis.” (2005, p. 213)

In Rawls's ideal of a well-ordered society which can accommodate to the challenges from deep diversity, the idea of public reason plays a key role in two ways. In the previous section, I have pointed out one way that his idea of overlapping consensus is correlated to the idea of public reason. Only when citizens value the public reason can an overlapping consensus in terms of a consensus on a publicly justified political conception secure the stability of a democratic society in face of the fact of reasonable pluralism. Under the ideal of public reason, democratic citizens are willing to affirm a political conception that is merely publicly justified rather than to pursue a political conception that is fully justified in their own comprehensive doctrines.

There is a second way that the idea of public reason plays a key role in Rawls's approach. Although the initial startpoint of Rawls's project of political liberalism is the challenges of reasonable pluralism, he later realizes that a democratic society is characterized not

only by the pluralism of reasonable comprehensive doctrines but also by the pluralism of reasonable political conceptions. Thus, in Rawls's view, the object of the overlapping consensus required by the stability is not a political conception of justice but a family of reasonable political conceptions. And in a well-ordered society the basic structure is regulated by one of the family of reasonable political conceptions. (2005, p. 164) However, even if a democratic society meets these two requirements, the stability still cannot be secured. In Rawls's theory, he adds a third condition. As he states, the social unity of a democratic society also requires that there is a public political discussion on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice that conforms the ideal of public reason. (2005, pp. xlvii, 391) According to this idea, we can see that disagreements still exist when the basic structure is regulated by a political conception of justice which is one of the family of political conceptions where there is an overlapping consensus. Disagreements can appear in two ways.

Firstly, even when there is an overlapping consensus on a family of political conceptions and any one among them is acceptable to all reasonable citizens, there might be disagreements on which political conception of justice is the most proper one⁵. Secondly, even when there is an overlapping consensus on a particular political conception of justice, there can still be disputes around the question how to interpret and apply this political conception to particular cases and which policy is the most proper to take under this conception.⁶ The disagreements around these two forms of questions are not less intensive than the disputes around comprehensive doctrines. However, according to Rawls's theory, these kinds of disputes would not tear a society apart if those questions are subjected to a political public discussion in honor of the

⁵ In Rawls's discussion, he emphasizes that public reason is not fixed and specified by any one political conception of justice but a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice. And those political conceptions are subjected to debate. Rawls, J. (2005) *Political liberalism*. Expanded ed. edn. New York: Columbia University Press.

⁶ Rawls describes this kind of disagreement when he claims that public reason does not settle questions in advance. He states that "reasonable political conceptions of justice do not always lead to the same conclusion, nor do citizens holding the same conception always agree on particular issues". Ibid.

idea of public reason. In Rawls's view, hopefully the political public discussion can lead reasonable citizens to a consensus. Even when a consensus cannot be achieved and a majoritarian vote has to be introduced, in Rawls's view, citizens are mutually respected in this process if each individual's vote honors the idea of public reason. And in this sense, the final decision made by vote is still acceptable to and will not be resisted with force by reasonable citizens (2005, pp. liv-lv, 241) In this sense, the difference between the dispute around comprehensive doctrines and dispute around the political conception of justice lies in the following fact: while following the ideal of public reason the disputes around the political conception of justice can be settled in a way that every citizen is equally respected, the disputes around comprehensive doctrines can never be settled without disrespecting some reasonable citizens.

From discussions above, I have pointed out that the idea of public reason plays a vital role in Rawls's ideal of the well-ordered democratic society and how it correlates to the other two ideas. Now I will turn to the idea of public reason itself. Rawls's definition of public reason that I have shown above suggests the nature, subject and the content of public reason. In nature, public reason is the reason of the public—namely, the reason of free and equal citizens. In this term, the idea of public reason implies a limit that manifests in two aspects. On the one hand, it implies the limit on the justification of the exercise of political power that Rawls calls it the principle of liberal legitimacy. In Rawls's theory, since political power in a democratic society is ultimately the power of the public, the principle of liberal legitimacy suggests that

“our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational”. (2005, p. 217)

In Rawls's theory, the limit of public reason, partly manifesting in the principle of liberal legitimacy, provides a common justificatory basis which can guide public political discussions when there are reasonable disagreements. And this principle leads us to the second aspect of the limit of public reason. In Rawls's theory, in a democratic society where citizens endorse this principle of liberal legitimacy, they bear a moral duty which Rawls names as "the duty of civility". In Rawls's theory, the duty of civility contains three specific moral duties that I summarize below:

The duty of civility: a moral duty followed by reasonable citizens in a democratic ideal. It is specified by three moral duties:

- 1) *A moral duty to "act from and follow the idea of public reason";*

- 2) *A moral duty to "explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental political positions in terms of the political conception of justice they regard as the most reasonable";*

- 3) *A moral duty to be willing to listen to others and to accept reasonable accommodations and alterations. (2005, pp. 217, 253, 444)*

In case of the two kinds of reasonable disagreements that I have elaborated above—that is, the reasonable disagreement on the proper political conception of justice itself and on the application of the political conception of justice, Rawls in his discussion adds that:

“...public reason does not ask us to accept the very same principles of justice, but rather to conduct our fundamental discussions in terms of what we regard as a political conception. We should sincerely think that our view of the matter is based on political values everyone can reasonably be expected to endorse.” (2005, p. 241)

In this sense, in Rawls’s theory, the duty of civility entails a duty of sincerity. According to Rawls’s further explanations, we can see that the duty of sincerity entails two important points. Firstly, as I have pointed out previously, even if reasonable citizens share a set of political values, when it comes to particular cases, they might disagree in the question which political value is relevant and how to rank different political values. The duty of sincerity does not merely require citizens to believe that their views are based on political values that are reasonably endorsable but also requires that they believe their views are based on a reasonable combinations and balance of different political values.

Secondly, Rawls emphasizes that the belief that the true ground of political values are nonpolitical values and comprehensive beliefs does not violate the duty of sincerity. Here, we can distinguish following three cases.

Case 1: John supports a law or policy by appealing to a political value which he sincerely believes that is endorsable to all reasonables. However, the true reason for his support is nonpublic and is grounded in his comprehensive beliefs.

Case 2: Amy supports a law or policy and sincerely believes that her support is based on a political value endorsable for all reasonables. The reason that she grounds her support on this political value is that this political value is confirmed by her comprehensive beliefs.

Case 3: Betty supports a law or policy and sincerely believes that her support is based on a political value endorsable for all reasonables. And the reason that she grounds her support on this political value because she believes that this political value is endorsable for all reasonables. But at the meantime, for herself her believe in this political value is grounded in her comprehensive beliefs.

According to Rawls's theory, among all three cases above, it is clear that the Case 1 is a violation to the duty of sincerity. In the Case 1, John does not honor the idea of public reason and merely uses the public reason as a tool of justification for his support or a tool of persuasion. He fails to act from the idea of public reason. Compared to Case 1, it is more controversial whether Case 2 is also a violation to the duty of civility. I will leave the detailed discussion on the difference between Case 2 and Case 3 in the next part. Here, I just give a simpler explanation. The difference between Case 2 and Case 3 is similar to the difference between full justification and public justification that I have discussed in the previous section. As I have pointed out, a key difference between full justification and public justification is that in the reasoning of public justification, others' perspectives are taken into account. Case 2 is a violation to the duty of civility because in Amy's reasoning on whether to support the law or the policy, in fact she reasons from her comprehensive beliefs and her comprehensive beliefs happen to support a political value that is endorsable to all reasonables. In her reasoning, Amy does not necessarily take others' beliefs into account.

From Rawls's explanation of the sincerity requirement, we can have two other implications. The first implication is that even in an ideal of public reason where all citizens comply to the duty of civility, it is possible that political public discussions do not lead citizens to a consensus. Although the duty of civility requires citizens to listen to others' reasons and accommodate their views, they can still insist on their views as long as they have taken others' reasons into account and sincerely believe their views

is based on political values that are reasonably endorsable. Since the ideal of public reason comes from an ideal of democratic relationship, therefore we can have the second implication. That is, in an ideal of public reason citizens do not merely themselves honor the duty of civility but also believe that others comply to the duty of civility as well. In other words, they believe in other citizens' sincerity in the political public discourse. This implication is important when we turn to the role of nonpublic reason in Rawls's theory. I will further explain this point in the next section.

Before turning to Rawls's discussion on the role of nonpublic reasons, another important point needs to be firstly clarified. That is, in Rawls's theory, he defines a scope that the limit of public reason applies.

First, the limit of public reason only applies to fundamental political questions including constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice. According to Rawls's ideas, constitutional essentials refer to two kinds of questions. The first kind of questions are those concerns "fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government and the political process". The second kind of questions concerns "equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect". (Rawls, 2005, p.227) Questions of basic justice concerns the basic structure of society in which the questions of basic economic and social justice and other issues uncovered by a constitution will be included. (Rawls, 2005, xlviii) However, Rawls does not provide a comprehensive argument for this limit of application. According to his explanation, it seems that Rawls does not have a clear idea whether public reason will apply to other political issues. He narrows down his discussion within this scope and thinks that those fundamental issues are the most important ones to be considered. (Rawls, 2005, p.215)

Second, the idea of public reason applies only to the discussions in public political

forum. According to Rawls's view, public political forum includes three discourses; that is, "the discourse of judges in their decisions", "the discourse of government officials", and "the discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers". (Rawls, 2005, p.443) In Rawls's typical examples of the public political forum, he does not include the discourse of ordinary citizens. However, later he extends the duty of civility to ordinary citizens. In his discussion, the discourse of ordinary citizens is not the typical case because in modern representative democracy, ordinary citizens do not directly deliberate on and decide the particular law or policies. However, Rawls claims that in the deal of public reason ordinary citizens are to "think of they were legislators" and to "fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason by doing what they can to hold government officials to do it". In contemporary democracies where ordinary citizens can directly participate in policy-making-for example, through a referendum, we can infer the limit of public reason can apply to the discourse of ordinary citizens in these cases.

Fundamentally, Rawls's limit of the scope is based on his distinguishing the public political forum from nonpolitical forums. That is to say, the limit of public reason does not apply to either personal deliberations and reflections or discussions in nonpolitical forums such as discussions within a family or associations. This distinction is further based on Rawls's distinction between public political culture and the background culture which I have elaborated in previous section. Rawls's idea of public reason does not apply to the background culture. In his view, the discussion in civil society is protected by the freedom of speech and therefore citizens are free to use any reasons they want. In addition, the idea of public does not apply to not only the background culture but also another kind of culture, namely the nonpolitical public culture. In Rawls's view, nonpolitical public culture contains the culture of all kinds of media and Rawls says that it "mediates between public political culture and the background culture". ⁷(Rawls, 2005, p. 443) However, Rawls's rationale behind his limit of the

⁷ Lewin gives an interpretation of this point. As Rawls himself implies, Lewin thinks, the nonpolitical public culture

application of public reason is less clear than he thought and this unclarity makes his theory subject to criticism. I will turn to this problem in the next part of this chapter.

4.4 A shift in Rawls's approach

From the discussions above, we can see that the challenges that religious diversity has posed to a democratic society, in Rawls's theory, is a challenge that the fact of reasonable pluralism has posed to the conception of justice. Rawls's understanding of the question includes two important ideas. The first idea, as I have already pointed out, is that a democratic society is understood as a social cooperation among free and equal citizens of which the terms are formulated around a conception of justice. Secondly, religious diversity in Rawls's theory is neither something problematic and therefore should be eliminated nor something worthy of pursuing. It is understood as a form of reasonable pluralism which is a theoretically inevitable fact of a democratic society. And the challenges that it brings is an internal, theoretical challenge that a democratic society has to accommodate. With this challenge in mind, Rawls's project moves from providing a substantive theory of justice to finding a way to construct a conception of justice that can accommodate the challenge from reasonable pluralism. In his theory of political liberalism, he provides such a way to construct a conception of justice through proposing the idea of the freestanding, political conception of justice and the idea of the overlapping consensus. The idea of public reason comes into the picture as two further questions emerge. The first question is why the freestanding, political conception of justice can be an object of an overlapping consensus—that is, can be endorsable by all reasonable citizens who commit to different comprehensive doctrines. The second question concerns the fact that democratic society is characterized not only by the fact of the pluralism of reasonable

is similar to Habermas's informal public spheres. Thus, it takes a mediating role as which the following three stages express: firstly, this culture of media is "sensitive to problems and concerns raised by civil society's many associations"; then, it "distills these into publicly accessible considerations"; finally, it communicates these considerations to the public political forum. Mandle, J. and Reidy, D. A. (2014) *The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon*. Cambridge University Press.

comprehensive doctrines but also the pluralism of reasonable political conceptions of justice. The idea of public reason provides an answer to both questions. From the idea of the political conception of justice to the idea of public reason, we can see a shift within Rawls's political liberal approach. For a democratic society to accommodate the challenge from religious diversity, the key shifts from a basic structure that is formulated around a political conception of justice to a public political sphere characterized by deliberations under the idea of public reason and a democratic citizenship characterized by the duty of civility.

To summarize, people can stably live together in a democratic society when they affirm a conception of justice that regulates the basic structure of the society. The expanding and deepening religious diversity has brought the following question to the democratic society: facing with the fact of inevitable but reasonable disagreement on the comprehensive conceptions of the good, how can a conception of justice be wholeheartedly affirmed by reasonable citizens of faith? In Rawls's theory, the fact of reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines leads us to construct the basic structure around a political conception of justice which, on the one hand, is independent of all comprehensive doctrines, and on the other hand, is public justified to all reasonable citizens who commit to different comprehensive doctrines. However, this solution is insufficient when we notice that a democratic society is not only characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism but also the pluralism of political conceptions of justice. In other words, in a democratic society, there is also an inevitable but reasonable disagreement on both the content of the political conception of justice which should regulate the basic structure and the application of the political conception to specific cases. In this condition, the solution lies in not the construction of the basic structure but the construction of a public sphere where controversial issues concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice will be subjected to a public political discussion that is guided by the idea of public reason. And this ideal of public sphere is accompanied with an ideal of democratic citizenship characterized by the duty of civility.

According to Rawls's theory, his project of political liberalism does not merely provide a way to tackle the challenge brought by religious diversity but also provide a way to tackle it in a fair way. Thus, the desirableness of his approach partly depends on how inclusive that his approach is to religious people-namely, citizens of faith, in his term. From his theory, we can see that the democratic society pictured by Rawls can be inclusive to citizens of faith in two terms. On the one hand, faiths of reasonable citizens-i.e., comprehensive religious doctrines-are equal and politically respected since the basic structure is regulated by a political conception of justice that does not presuppose the truth of any kind of comprehensive doctrine. On the other hand, reasonable citizens of faith are equally included in public political discussions. This equal inclusion manifests in several aspects. Firstly, since the pluralism of comprehensive doctrines is acknowledged as an inevitable fact and religious doctrine is taken as just one of them but nothing special, reasonable citizens of faith are taken as equal and fully capable participants in the public political forum. Secondly, the reasoning and viewpoints of citizens of faith are equally respected and considered in the forum as long as they comply to the duty of civility. A public political discussion guided by the idea of public reason refrain from subjecting anyone's faith to others' judgments. In this term, citizens of faith can securely participate in the discussion and make difference in the decision-making without compromising the religious truth that they believe in or commit to.

II. Is Rawls's approach religions-hostile?

In the previous part, I have provided a detailed explanation of Rawls's approach. As I have demonstrated, the challenge brought by religious diversity, in Rawls's theory, is accommodated in a democratic society through the construction of a political public discussion and the democratic citizenship around the idea of public reason. In this sense, whether Rawls's approach is desirable depends partly on whether his idea of

public reason is desirable. However, Rawls's idea of public reason, though influential, has arrested a large amount of criticism in literature⁸. All those criticisms target at the principle of restraint which is taken as an explicit principle contained in Rawls's idea of the limit of public reason. In this principle, nonpublic reasons are restrained in political public discussion. When it comes to the question whether Rawls's approach provides a satisfying way to accommodate the challenge of religious diversity, a widely and persistently discussed question is whether Rawls's approach is-either intentionally or unintentionally-hostile to religions. Critics who take themselves as religious inclusivists hold that Rawls's approach is hostile to religions and religious people.

This religions-hostility can be problematic in at least two ways. Firstly, this religions-hostility is problematic because it involves mistreatment to religions and religious people. And in this sense, Rawls's approach will fail to treat every reasonable citizen with equal respect. Secondly, this religions-hostility is problematic because it makes Rawls's approach self-defeating. As I have shown in the previous part, Rawls's approach attempts to construct a just society that religious people or citizens of faith in his word can wholeheartedly accept. Thus, if it is proved that Rawls's approach is religions-hostile, then it would not be convincing that religious people can wholeheartedly accept his idea and in this sense Rawls would fail his own goal. A comprehensive summary of this group of criticism can be found in Patrick Neal's(2016) work. In Neal's summarization, this group of criticism includes four specific objections-that is, the incompleteness objection, the fairness objection, the integrity objection, and the denial of truth objection.⁹ In this part, I will examine these four objections in

⁸ I will not, in this dissertation, engage all kinds of criticism against Rawls's idea of public reason but only discuss several important criticisms related to the question that this dissertation has addressed. A comparably comprehensive review of the criticism against Rawls's idea of public reason can be found in Ronald Den Otter's BookDen Otter, R. C. (2009) 'Judicial review in an age of moral pluralism [electronic resource] / Ronald C. Den Otter'..

⁹ Other relatively comprehensive summaries in literature can be found in Kevin Vallier'sVallier, K. (2014) *Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation*. Taylor & Francis. and Den Otter'sDen Otter, R. C. (2009) 'Judicial review in an age of moral pluralism [electronic resource] / Ronald C. Den Otter'. book. Vallier in his book follows Neal's summarization but adds another objection-namely, the divisiveness objection-into the group of religious objections. However, it would be better to take the divisiveness objection as a doubt casting on the moral

turn and discuss the existing and potential replies to these objections. Through this examination, I will show in which sense these objections are challenging and point out one of the core difficulties of Rawls's approach.

A preliminary point needed to be addressed here is that in my discussion the denial of truth objection will not be discussed as an independent objection but one specific argument in the integrity objection.¹⁰ In Rawls's theory, the political public discussion of which the aim is to deal with the disagreements on the contents and the application of the political conception of justice. In other words, the aim is to figure out the fair terms of social cooperation among reasonable citizens rather than to disclose or practice the truths. In Rawls's view, there is no conflict between following the idea of public reason and holding on the truth that one believes in. Thus, the denial of truth objection cannot sustain unless it can show why in a political public discussion the expression and insistence in the truth claims that one is committed to are morally important. There are two possible explanations. In the first explanation, a comprehensive doctrine that one commits to might pose him/her an obligation to express rather than keep silent on the truths. In this explanation, the moral impropriety of the denial of truth will finally rest on the claim of integrity. Since Neal in his discussion holds this explanation, I will interpret this objection as a specific argument of the integrity objection. There is another possible explanation of the moral impropriety of the denial of truth-or, in a more appropriate term, the bracketing of truth. In this explanation, bracketing the truth claims in political public discussion violates the value of equal respect for persons. According to this explanation, the problem lies not in the religions-hostility of Rawls's approach but lies in Rawls's

foundation of Rawls's approach rather than a religions-hostility objection. Thus, I will discuss this objection in the next part. Den Otter's discussion targets not particularly at Rawls's approach but at the whole branch of public reason liberalism.

¹⁰ Kevin Vallier, K. (2014) *Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation*. Taylor & Francis. in his discussion holds a similar view. In his view, the denial of truth objection cannot be separated from the integrity objection because its normative force is entirely derived from the latter. However, Vallier ignores another possible explanation of the normative force of the denial of truth objection.

inference from the equal respect for persons to the idea of public reason. Thus, this discussion will be left to the third part of this chapter. Hence, it would be better not to take the denial of truth objection as an independent objection whichever explanation that one might hold.

1. The fairness objection

In literature, there are at least three ways in which Rawls's approach has been criticized as being unfair. Nicholas Wolterstorff in his work provides two versions of this objection. In his first version of the fairness objection, he criticizes that Rawls's approach is unfair because the limit of public reason unequally burdens religious people. In Wolterstorff's view, religious convictions of the good are not viewed by religious persons as an option that they can choose to do or not. On the contrary, "it is their conviction that they ought to strive for wholeness, integrity, integration, in their lives" and "their religion is not, for them, about something other than their social and political existence; it is also about their social and political existence". (1997, p. 105) I will call this version of the fairness objection as "the unequal burden objection".

1.1 The inequality of burdens and its explanations

The unequal burden objection is closely related to the second type of objection, namely the integrity objection which I will discuss in the next section. As Vallier (2014, p. 71) mentions in his comment, derives its normative force from the integrity objection. That is to say, the validity of this objection depends on the truth of presumptions that religious convictions are authoritative to religious persons and constitute a part of personal integrity. If critics distinguish this version of fairness objection from the integrity objection, then they have to claim that the mistreatment

reveals by this objection lies in the fact that the integrity burden is unequal. There are two possible interpretations of the inequality of the integrity burden. In the first interpretation, the burden is unequal in the sense that persons who commit to nonreligious doctrines do not equally take their convictions as part of their integrity. The problem with this claim is salient since we can find many cases which show that people are willing to sacrifice themselves-their time, money or even their lives-for values and beliefs that are not religious. In history, for example, we can see how Socrates refused to escape from the prison and gave up the last opportunity to live for his belief in the moral duty to obey the law. In the second interpretation, the inequality of the integrity burden lies in the fact that religious doctrines, compared to nonreligious doctrines, are more possible to be incompatible with public reason. In this sense, nonreligious persons are more easily to find public reasons that are compatible with their nonreligious convictions or disguise their nonreligious comprehensive reasons as public reason and therefore do not bear burden to deviate from their integrity. Interpreting the unfair burden objection in this way, then the critics have to explain what makes a religious doctrine more possibly incompatible with public reason. Then, this objection will further rely on the other two versions of the fairness objection. In the other two versions of fairness objection, critics point out that religious reasons or doctrines are distinguished from nonreligious ones by certain features which make them a more salient prey for the limit of public reason. In this sense, the other two versions of the fairness objection, in fact, explain why religious persons might bear heavier burden than nonreligious persons.

The second version is also proposed by Wolterstorff and it argues that the inequity lies in the unequal consequence that Rawls's approach will lead to in practice. In Wolterstorff's view, in practice, it is much easier to recognize a religious reason than to recognize nonpublic reasons grounded in nonreligious comprehensive doctrines such as utilitarianism or nationalism. (1997, p. 105) According to this criticism, a religious reason is more recognizable due to its reference to sacred beings or sacred texts such as God, Jesus Christ, Quran or Bible. However, Wolterstorff does not provide a further clarification about the moral impropriety of this unequal consequence. A

most appropriate explanation will be that the recognizableness of a religious reason make it more difficult to be disguised as a public reason. In other words, since secular reason grounded in secular comprehensive doctrines are less recognizable, there is a greater opportunity for secular persons to disguise their secular reasons as public reasons. And in this sense, they bear no integrity burden. By contrast, religious persons cannot equally disguise their religious reasons as public reasons and therefore bear heavier burdens than secular persons. Explaining Wolterstorff's second inequity objection in this way, we can see that this second version works as a backup to the unequal burden objection.

The third version of the fairness objection can be found in Patrick Neal's (2016, p. 165) discussion. In this third version, Rawls's limit of public reason imposes stricter restraint on religious comprehensive doctrines than the nonreligious ones because of the "extensive narrative content" of the former. Thus, "it is the religious citizens and not secular ones who will have the most genuinely difficult time with the restrictive elements of public reason" and in this sense Rawls's approach is unfair to religious persons. In Neal's idea, the "extensive narrative content" refers to the way that a religious doctrine presents its beliefs. Put it precisely, the beliefs and claims in a religious doctrine are usually presented through the storytelling and those stories are normatively authoritative to its believers. By contrast, most of the modern nonreligious comprehensive doctrines, such as utilitarianism and Kantianism that Rawls take as typical examples, are viewed by those who commit to them as being constituted by rational accounts of morality. In this objection, Rawls's idea of public reason is more hostile to religious comprehensive doctrines because it favors rational argumentation over the storytelling. Thus, the narrative features of a religious doctrine make it less compatible with public reason than a nonreligious comprehensive doctrine. Thus, religious persons will find it more difficult to fit in a political public discussion regulated by the idea of public reason since they will bear heavier integrity burden to meet the requirement of Rawls's duty of civility. In this sense, we can see that Neal's fairness objection can be as well viewed as a supplement to the unequal burden objection.

1.2 Possible replies and problems with the fairness objection

With regard to this criticism, Rawls seems not to be bothered by the unequal consequences that his approach might lead to. In his view, his limit of public reason applies to all reasonable comprehensive doctrines and does not distinguish religious ones from nonreligious or secular ones. Theoretically, secular persons also bear the burden to restrain from appealing to secular comprehensive doctrines though in practice this burden might be less heavy. According to Rawls's idea, unequal consequences should not be equated to unfair treatment. Critics such as Wolterstorff and Neal do not agree with Rawls. According to their criticism, they seem to claim that a fair treatment should be sensitive to the different burdens or difficulties that religious persons might bear in practice. Thus, to treat religions and religious person in the fair way, one should take a closer look at the special features of religious doctrines and be sensitive to the differences caused by those features.

However, there are several problems with this criticism. The first problem lies in their description of religious reasons. Even though a religious doctrine might contain divine commands of which the authority is derived from a sacred being or a sacred text and might be narrated in a storytelling way, it does not mean that a religious reason or religious argument is necessarily presented in such way. If we follow Rawls's understanding of a religious reason, a religious reason is not defined by its content. According to Rawls's definition, a religious reason is used to refer to the reasoning in terms of a religious comprehensive doctrine.¹¹ Thus, it does not necessarily contain the reference to any divine existence and is not bound to be presented in a storytelling

¹¹ From Rawls's definition of a secular reason, we can infer this interpretation of a religious reason. Rawls, J. (2005) *Political liberalism*. Expanded ed. edn. New York: Columbia University Press.

way. In Robert Audi's (1993, pp. 679-682) work, he provides a distinction between a substantive religious argument and an epistemically religious argument. According to this distinction, the reason expressively referring to the God or Bible in Wolterstorff's view is such a substantive religious argument. By contrast, an epistemically religious argument is an argument of which the premise and the way it warrants its conclusion rely on religious beliefs. And religious argument of this type can have no substantive religious content. He takes the genetic argument for the personhood of zygote as an example. This genetic argument states that "all the normal human genetic information is present in the zygote and will normally result in a clear case of a person at the end of a natural process (pregnancy), the zygote itself is a person". (1993, p. 681) By the statement of the argument itself, we can see that it contains no religious story or religious reference. The genetic argument is a religious argument if it is rested on a presupposition that "God ensouls members of the human species at conception". However, it is not necessarily for a religious person to back up this genetic argument by declaring its religious presupposition in a political public debate. And in practice, religious persons might have strong, prudential reasons to avoid substantive religious content as they argue if they know that their interlocutors are not believers.

Critics might argue that even if a religious argument can be presented without containing obvious religious content, it is still true that a religious person would bear heavier burden to translate the divine command in his/her religious doctrine into an argument containing no such substantive content. However, this response is not convincing because whether a person find it difficult or burdened to do such a translation depends not on the fact that he/she is a citizen of faith or not but depends on his/her rational capability that is shaped by other factors such as his/her education. Thus, persons who commit to other nonreligious comprehensive doctrines might also bear similar burdens and the weight of the burdens also depends on their rational capabilities. For example, a religious command, as Neal suggests, might take the form as a religious story, such as the story of Good Samaritan. This story should be to be translated into an argument that is accessible to the nonreligious citizens-such as the argument that "everyone has a moral duty to aid fellows in need". Even if a religious

person bears this burden, a nonreligious person can bear similar burdens. A person who commits to a secular, philosophical doctrine such as Kantianism or Humeanism also bears the burden to translate the complex philosophical theories into an argument accessible to people who have no knowledge of those theories. And this burden is not necessarily lighter. In the second form of translation,

Furthermore, whether a religious doctrine is less compatible with public reason or not depends on how much the political value of the democratic society is influenced by religions. Here, an important point in Rawls's approach is that when he defines a public reason, he does not mean that the reason has to be epistemically acceptable to all. Rather, public reason in his theory refers to the reasoning from the political values embedded in the public political culture of the democratic society and those political values are regarded as acceptable to all reasonable citizens in such a society. When it comes to a real-world democratic society, it is possible that its public political culture is deeply influenced by religions. Through history, it is possible that it has absorbed certain religious values and turn those values into political values. Thus, according to Rawls's theory, the compatibility between a comprehensive doctrine and public reason does not depend on whether it is religious or not.

There is another possible reply from critics. According to this reply, even if the statement of a religious argument might not contain substantive religious content and therefore no more recognizable, it is still possible that religious persons, due to their religious identity would bear heavier burden to prove that the reasons that they provide is public rather than religious. Since a religious argument can be stated without containing substantive religious content, then in the political public discussion, the arguments provided by a religious person might be more easily to be suspected as reasoning from a religious doctrine rather than from the political values. In this term, a religious person bears more burdens to convince the others that his/her arguments are not religious. And in practice, religious persons' arguments are more easily to be

overlooked due to their identities as religious believers. And in a society where pro-life advocates in the debate of abortion who regard embryos as human beings are believed to be religious believers, for example, a possible result led by Rawls's idea of public reason is that voices of those pro-life advocates will at first be ignored because the others believe that their arguments are grounded in their religious convictions. This reply might at first seem to be convincing. However, it is still doubtful whether it can really threaten Rawls's approach.

As I have already shown in the previous part, while Rawls's idea of public reason targets at comprehensive doctrines, it does not target at persons who commit to any comprehensive doctrines. In other words, in Rawls's ideal of democratic society, every reasonable person, no matter whether he/she is a citizen of faith, is viewed as free and equal in terms of the capacities to engage in a political public discussion. In other words, every reasonable person is viewed as being capable of following the idea of public reason. That is to say, a person, as long as following the principle of reciprocity, would not be discriminated or suspected in the political public discussion merely because of he/she identity as a religious believer. As I have pointed out, a key disagreement between Rawls's and critics who hold the fairness objections lies in their different understanding of a fair treatment. In critic's view, a fair treatment should be a difference-sensitive treatment. By contrast, Rawls in his theory avoids singling out religions and avoids attributing to a religious doctrine any distinguishable features. Here, a dilemma faced by those critics is that when they emphasize that the distinctive features of religious doctrine make religious persons bear heavier burden to follow the idea of public reason, they might deepen the stereotype of and suspicions towards religious persons. Since religious persons are described as bearing much heavier burden, people might be more easily inclined to suspect that religious persons would not follow the idea of public reason and restrain themselves in political public discussion.

From the discussion above, I have shown that the several versions of the fairness objection proposed by critics can be understood as the unequal burden objection and different explanation of the inequality of burdens. And I have pointed out a problem why this objection cannot pose a real threat to Rawls's approach. Besides, there is another problem with this objection which has been pointed out by Kevin Vallier (2014, p. 72) in his discussion. As I have pointed out, the fairness objection cannot be an independent objection unless it takes the inequality of the burdens as the key. However, it is core of this objection, then it seems to suggest that a solution can be an equalization of the burdens. In this sense, an counterintuitive result would appear—that is, theoretically, critics should agree to level up the integrity burden of nonreligious persons by implementing more obstacles for them. If critics deny that they hold this view, then they have to declare that the problem lies not in the inequality of burden but in the burden itself. Put it precisely, they have to claim that Rawls's approach is hostile to religious persons because it imposes integrity burden that is itself problematic. In this term, the unequal burden objection will be no longer distinguished from the integrity objection. Thus, in the following section, I will turn to the integrity objection which is more challenging to Rawls's approach.

2. The integrity objection

As I have shown above, in Wolterstorff's unequal burden objection, he proposes an important claim which states that religious convictions constitute a religious person's wholeness and integrity. And religion constitutes a religious person's social and political existence. The limit of public reason requires a religious person to restrain from appealing to his/her religious conviction and therefore harm his/her integrity. When we interpret this statement into the integrity objection, the key problem lies not in the inequality of burdens but in the moral impropriety of the burden itself. In other words, it is morally improper or undesirable to harm a person's integrity. A similar objection can also be found in Michael Perry's work. In his criticism towards liberal

approach to religion, he states that

“one’s basic moral/religious conviction are (partly) self-constitutive and there are therefore a principal ground-indeed, the principal ground-of political deliberation and choice. To “bracket” such convictions is therefore to bracket-to annihilate-essential aspects of one’s very self”.(Perry, 1990, pp. 181-2)

In Vallier’s book, he provides a detailed explanation of the conception of integrity by introducing Bernard Williams’s identity conception. According to his idea, integrity refers to “fidelity to those projects and principles that are constitutive to one’s core identity”. In this term, the key to understand the concept of integrity is to figure out what “fidelity” means when it comes to the self-constitutive projects and principles. And the key to the question whether Rawls’s approach harms integrity is to figure out whether his idea of public reason contradicts the idea of fidelity. Based on the existing research, we can find out two interpretations. In the first interpretation, the fidelity to one’s self-constitutive beliefs requires a person to publicly affirm those beliefs. In this sense, Rawls’s idea of public reason is objected because this idea requires a denial of the truth that one believes in. In the second interpretation, which can be found in Vallier’s discussion, fidelity refers to the accordance between one’s beliefs and one’s action. In other words, integrity requires a person to act on his/her self-constitutive beliefs. In this term, Rawls’s idea of public reason harms integrity because it refrains a person from acting on his/her self-constitutive beliefs. In the following sections, I will further explain these two forms of integrity objection and examine whether it poses a real threat to Rawls’s approach. Finally, I will propose a third interpretation of the integrity objection. In this interpretation, the key problem lies in the inconsistencies within Rawls’s theory.

2.1 Integrity and the expression of truth claims

With regard to this criticism, Rawls might argue that his idea of public reason does not harm one's integrity. Firstly, by emphasizing the importance of freedom of conscience, Rawls claims that following the idea of public reason does not require a person to defer the truth that he/she commits to. In the previous part, I have pointed out that Rawls distinguishes public justification from the final justification. For him, a proposal that is publicly justified might not be finally justified for an individual. In other words, when a person reasons from a comprehensive doctrine that he/she commits to, he/she might take another proposal as moral desirable. Thus, Rawls makes the following distinction in his theory:

(i) Claiming the truth/desirable of a belief

(ii) Claiming the reasonableness/acceptableness of a belief

If this distinction can work as a reply to the integrity objection, then Rawls has to claim that a person's integrity is harmed only if he/she is required to betray the truth of the beliefs that constitute his/her core identity. The political public discussion regulated by the idea of public reason in Rawls's theory avoids discussing the truthfulness of a belief but merely focuses on the public justifiability of a belief. In this sense, Rawls might think that by avoiding subjecting one's comprehensive beliefs to public debate, his idea of public reason and political public sphere does not harm a person's integrity but protect one's integrity from being harmed by the others' judgments.

This reply does not satisfy the critics. Patrick Neal(2016) in his discussion points out that this reply is based on a particular understanding of the betrayal of one's beliefs which might be controversial. According to Rawls's idea, it seems that only lying and explicitly denial count as a betrayal of one's beliefs. In Neal's view, a requirement for a person to restrain from appealing to one's comprehensive beliefs is indeed a requirement for a person to keep silence to the beliefs that he/she holds as true.

However, Neal argues that it is possible that, in some religions, “silence” itself is regarded as a betrayal and is morally problematic.(Neal, 2016, p. 171) In other words, some religious persons might bear a religious obligation to speak out the truth in the political public discussion. For those persons, following the idea of public reason will do harm to their integrity.

However, a possible reply from Rawls is that his idea of public reason does not hold an exclusive view toward nonpublic reasons. In the earlier writing, Rawls claims that his idea of public reason holds an inclusive view towards nonpublic reasons such as religious reasons. In this inclusive view, citizens are allowed to “present what they regard as the basis of political values rooted in their comprehensive doctrine, provided they do this in ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason itself”.(2005, p. 247) In his later writing, he proposes a wide view of political public culture and further relaxes the situation where comprehensive doctrines can be introduced. In Rawls’s idea which he calls as “the proviso”, Rawls claims that the limit of public reason does not restrict the expression of comprehensive doctrines. As he states,

“reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons-and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines-are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support.” (2005, p. 262)

According to this inclusive view, Rawls’s limit of public reason does not require religious person to keep silence on their religious beliefs. By introducing “the proviso”, on the one hand, Rawls’s idea on the one hand allows religious persons to present the religious convictions in the political public discussion. On the other hand, since the religious convictions introduced in the political public discussion are not presented as

a justification, they will not be the subject of public debate and still avoid being judged and criticized by the others.

However, it is still doubtful that Rawls's wide view of political public culture can provide a satisfying answer to Neal's question since the intention behind the expression of truth claims in Rawls's theory is different. In Rawls's theory, religious comprehensive doctrines are allowed to be introduced in two forms of discourses including declaration-i.e., the form of discourse in Rawls's proviso, and conjecture. Conjecture in Rawls's theory refers to the reasoning from other person's comprehensive doctrines. (2005, p. 465) Although through declaration and conjecture, religious comprehensive doctrines are allowed to be presented in a political public discussion, it does not mean that they can work as a valid justification for one's proposal. In Rawls's theory, those two discourses are allowed when it can help to promote the ideal of public reason. Since the fundamental principle grounded the idea of public reason is the principle of reciprocity, the realization of the ideal of public reason requires a degree of mutual trust. In other words, in a political public sphere, each one trusts in the other's sincere allegiance to political values and each other will discuss, vote and advocate sincerely from political values. And this sincere allegiance can be believed in when each one can recognize that those political values are also affirmed by one's comprehensive doctrines. That is to say, the declaration of one's religious comprehensive doctrines works not as an expression of what is believed as true by the person but as a proof that one's allegiance is sincere. If for some possible religions keep silence on religious truth is regarded as a betrayal of religious beliefs, it is also doubtful that declaration of one's religious doctrine with the aim to prove one's sincerity can count as a fidelity to one's religion.

2.2 Integrity and belief-action accordance

However, even if Rawls's theory can cope with Neal's criticism about the betrayal of truth claims, this is not necessarily a convincing reply to the integrity objection. The concept of integrity, as I have pointed out, can be interpreted in a second way. Vallier provides the second interpretation of integrity. He states that,

"Integrated persons are united by the fact that reasons issuing from their projects and principles possess great normative force and thereby generate strong claims to noninterference." (Vallier, 2014, p. 58)

In this interpretation, integrity refers to the accord between one's beliefs and actions. In other words, those beliefs that constitute one's identity have great normative force and an integrated person will act according to those beliefs. According to this interpretation, Rawls's idea of public reason harms one's integrity by refraining a person from acting according to his/her important convictions. This integrity harm does not merely cause psychological harm to a person but might also annihilate the morality itself.

According to Vallier's identity conception of integrity that I have described, integrity refers to the accord between beliefs and actions. In other words, an integrated person does not merely express his/her core beliefs but also act on his/her core beliefs. And this belief-action accord also suggests that an integrated citizen will advocate and vote on his/her core beliefs. In this sense, there is a conflict between the idea of public reason and a person's integrity.

Rawls's theory seems to avoid this criticism through his idea of overlapping consensus and through his distinction between political public culture and background culture. Firstly, in Rawls's idea of democratic society, there is a congruence between political

values and conceptions of the good. While the idea of public reason suggests that proposals presented in a political public discussion should be justified by political values that are acceptable to all reasonable citizens in a democratic society, those political values might be further backed up by religious or nonreligious comprehensive doctrines. In other words, a person's religious comprehensive doctrines can also support or at least compatible with the political value that he/she offers to justify a proposal. In this sense, there is a belief-action accordance and acting on the idea of public reason does not harm one's integrity.

However, this reply is not satisfying. There is a difference between saying that one's act is not in conflict with his/her belief and saying that one acts on his/her beliefs. One acts on his/her beliefs if the practical reasoning supporting his/her acts is based on his/her beliefs. Imagine that there is a controversial issue I that is subjected to the political public discussion, both Andrew and Amy support a proposal P. Suppose that both Amy's and Andrew's support for P is in congruence with their religious doctrines, however, the reasoning behind their support is different:

Andrew's reasoning: *Andrew reasons from his religious doctrine and finds that his religious convictions support P. Since he knows that religious reason will not be persuasive to the others, he provides a public justification for P that is grounded in political values.*

Amy's reasoning: *Amy reasons from political values that are acceptable to all reasonable citizens in her society and through a balancing between different political values she concludes that P is the most appropriate proposal on the issue. At the meantime, she knows that P is not in conflict with or can be also supported by her religious beliefs.*

While it is clear that Andrew acts on his religious convictions, it is less clear that Amy acts on her religious convictions as well. It is possible that Amy's religious beliefs influence her reasoning in two stages. Firstly, her religious beliefs might make a difference in her seek for relevant political values. It is possible that what she regards as political values that are relevant in this case is influenced by her religion. Secondly, her religious beliefs might influence her judgment on the moral weights of conflicting political values. Under those influences, there is a great opportunity that the conclusion that Amy achieves through her reasoning will be compatible with her religious convictions. However, it is still doubtful if we say Amy also acts on her religious beliefs. Patrick Neal in his interpretation of citizen of faith(2000), or "integralist believers"(2016) illustrates this difference. According to Neal's idea, religious doctrines are viewed as ultimately authoritative to citizens of faith. When a person acts on his/her religious beliefs, it means that the authority that determines his/her acts is his/her religion. In this term, while Andrew's reasoning takes religion as an authority of his act and therefore he acts on his religious beliefs, Amy's support for P is not necessarily an act from her beliefs.

A question here is that whether Rawls's idea of public reason allows Andrew's reasoning. In the previous part, I have discussed Rawls's distinction between a final justification and a public justification. And from this distinction, we can infer that Rawls will not think Andrew's reasoning follows the idea of public reason. As I have pointed out, a key feature in a public justification is that it is a justification that takes the others' considerations into account. By contrast, a final justification is simply a justification reasoning from one's own beliefs without any consideration about the others. In Rawls's theory, the moral basis for the idea of public reason is a respect for person as free and equal citizens in the political public sphere. Following this idea, the spirit of public reason is to recognize that one's own comprehensive doctrines might not be agreed by the others, and one should not force his/her doctrines on the others. Thus, when a person follows the idea of public reason, the public justification that he/she provides does not work as a tool of persuasion but is regarded as a justification that shows the respect for equal citizenship. That is to say, the core of Rawls's idea of public

reason is not merely a particular type of argument but a particular type of reasoning. In this understanding of Rawls's idea, we can see that Andrew's reasoning does not meet the idea of public reason.

Although Andrew's reasoning does not meet Rawls's ideal of public reason, one might still argue that Rawls's approach does not harm one's integrity. Following Neal's further clarification of the integration objection, the problem is whether Rawls's idea of public reason requires a person to set aside the ultimate authoritativeness of his/her religious doctrines in the political public sphere. If it does, then Rawls's approach can do harm to religious persons' integrity. From Rawls's own discussion, we can see that Rawls would not endorse this view since his idea of an overlapping consensus is proposed to solve the problem of wholehearted allegiance from citizens of faith. As I have discussed in the previous part, Rawls's overlapping consensus only happens among reasonable citizens who already value the ideal of public reason. And the comprehensive doctrines that those citizens endorse are reasonable in terms that they themselves value the principle of reciprocity and affirm the idea of public reason. Neal in his later paper attempts to defend Rawls's approach against the integrity objection through providing a similar explanation. In Neal's defense, he distinguishes "direct subordination" from "indirect subordination". According to Neal's distinction, direct subordination suggests that the obligations derived from one's comprehensive doctrines are subordinated to the terms of political order. In short, in direct subordination, duty of civility which requires to follow the idea of public reason is given priority over religious obligations. By contrast, indirect subordination suggests that religious persons affirm "the terms of order, and the consequent demands of public reason, in full light of her religious duties and understandings" and "it is the consequence of her own conscientious decision to impose the subordination upon herself as a civic actor".(2015, p. 139) According to indirect subordination, although in a political public discussion on a particular issue, a religious citizen, under the duty of civility, might be required to subordinate his/her religious convictions to political values, however, the duty of civility or the idea of public reason itself is affirmed by his/her own religious doctrines. In this case, the ultimate authority of this religious

person's subordination is still his/her religion. One's subordination in a particular case does not count as a violation of the authority of one's religious doctrines. In this sense, Rawls's idea of public reason will not do harm to religious persons' integrity.

Turn back to the example of Andrew's and Amy's reasoning. While Amy's reasoning is a form of reasoning approved by the idea of public reason, Amy's reasoning does not necessarily suggest a rejection of the ultimate authoritativeness of her religion since her religion might approve the idea of public reason itself. In this case, the ultimate authority of her support of P is still her religion. By contrast, if Andrew thinks that his religion does not approve the idea of public reason and he should reason directly from his religious convictions, then, following Rawls's theory, Andrew will be regarded as an unreasonable person who will be excluded from the public political sphere. And if there is a religious command which explicitly rejects the idea of public reason, then this religious doctrine will also be regarded as an unreasonable doctrine that does not need to be accommodated in Rawls's theory. In Rawls's approach, since unreasonable persons do not show equal respect for other persons, that ignoring or excluding those persons from political public sphere does not violate the respect for equal citizenship. Put it precisely, even if the idea of public reason might do harm to those unreasonable persons' integrity, there is nothing morally wrong with it.

There are several possible doubts with this reply. Firstly, the indirect subordination happens only when it is true that religious comprehensive doctrines would affirm the idea of public reason. In Rawls's theory, he takes it as a premise of his discussion. By restraining his approach to reasonable persons and reasonable comprehensive doctrines, the concept of reasonableness, as I have already shown, already excludes those religious doctrines that would not affirm the idea of public reason. For Rawls, those religious doctrines are unreasonable. According to his idea, in a democratic society, when a reasonable religious person finds that his/her religious beliefs might conflict with the idea of public reason, he/she should reform or reinterpret his/her

religious doctrines and accommodate it with the idea of public reason. In this sense, it seems that religious doctrines are no longer ultimately authoritative. The threshold of “reasonableness” itself seems to give the idea of public reason a priority.

However, this problem is exaggerated. The logic of this criticism can be summarized as following propositions:

(i) An integrated person will act on beliefs that constitute one’s core identity;

(ii) A religious doctrine constitutes a religious person’s identity integrity when it is the ultimate authority of one’s action.

(iii) If a person intends to reinterpret his religious doctrine and accommodate it to other beliefs, then the religious doctrine is no longer authoritative to this person.

Firstly, proposition(iii) is untenable. To claim a religious doctrine is an ultimate authority of one’s action does not necessarily mean that this doctrine cannot be subjected to interpretations. For example, when a religious doctrine guides its believers’ actions in real-life cases, its application itself needed to be interpreted. Interpretation itself does not conflict with its authoritativeness. For some religions, the question is not about whether the doctrine can be interpreted or not but about who is entitled to interpret its doctrine and how this interpretation should take place.

Secondly, the critics might reject Rawls’s conclusion that the integrity of an

unreasonable person is invaluable or less valuable. Rawls's conclusion is premised on a balance between the value of equal respect for persons and the value of personal integrity. A possible and more convincing argument is that the value of personal integrity is derived from the value of equal respect for persons. The integrity of a person morally matters only if the person morally matters. Without the equal respect for persons, the discussion about the moral significance of a person's integrity will be meaningless. Thus, if religious convictions are important because they constitute a person's integrity, then a premise of the moral significance of those religious convictions is that they do not conflict with the basic respect for person. If we suppose that the basic respect for person does suggest the idea of public reason, then the religious doctrine that constitutes one's integrity is worthy of moral attention only if the doctrine itself affirms the idea of public reason. Otherwise, the integrity objection will lose its basis. Understanding Rawls's conclusion in this way, we can see that the validity of his conclusion is based on two further propositions. The first proposition is that equal respect for persons necessarily requires Rawls's idea of public reason. Rawls's conclusion is not tenable if this logical inference does not sustain. The second proposition is that an unreasonable person who does not show equal respect for persons is not worthy of equal respect. In other words, the value of equal respect for persons necessarily requires a principle of reciprocity. Only if the principle of reciprocity is a necessity can the exclusion of unreasonable persons be morally justified. These two propositions concern the fundamental moral basis of Rawls's approach. I will leave the discussion of this question to the next part of this chapter.

2.3 Integrity and the split of identity

In sections above, I have discussed two versions of the integrity objection. In the first version, integrity requires the fidelity to one's beliefs in truth and for some religions, the fidelity requires to express rather than keep silent in political public discussion. In the second version, integrity refers to the belief-action accordance which means that

a person acts on his/her beliefs. In some theorists' discussion, they describe the integrity objection as "the split-identity objection".(Yates, 2007; Miller, 2000) In this description, Rawls's approach harms integrity in terms that his idea contains an expectation that a person splits his/her moral identity into two-that is, the private identity constituted by comprehensive beliefs and the citizen identity constituted by political conception of justice. And in political public sphere, a person should give priority to his/her citizen identity. In this criticism, there are two relevant questions. The first question concerns whether the priority of citizen identity in political public sphere can be morally justified. This question will be addressed in the next part of this chapter. Here, when it comes to the integrity objection, the question turns to whether the split of identity itself is problematic. Critics seem to suggest that the integrity is harmed when a person is required to split his/her moral identity. However, it is not clear why such a split is bound to be problematic.

This "split-identity objection" assumes that self-constitutive beliefs of a person are themselves coherent and integrity refers to fidelity to those beliefs. However, in reality, a person can have multiple self-constitutive beliefs and those beliefs sometimes might not always be coherent. Those multiple self-constitutive beliefs are associated to different roles that a person occupies in a society. For example, Betty might be a parent of a child and at the same time is a teacher in a school. Her role as a parent and her role as a teacher might be both constitutive to Betty's understanding of herself. However, the principles or beliefs tied to the role as a parent might not, by themselves be consistent with those tied to the role as a teacher. An integrated person is a person who is able to reconcile those conflicting commitments and know what he/she should do when there is such a conflict. In this sense, integrity refers to a consistency between different role identities that constitute one's understanding of himself/herself.

Understand integrity in this way, to harm one's integrity is to destroy this consistency. When it comes to Rawls's approach, the problem lies not in the fact that his theory

splits a person's identity but in the fact that his theory might construct a citizen identity in a way that destroys the self-consistency of a person. This problem becomes salient when we have a closer look at Rawls's idea of citizen identity that is implied by his duty of civility. As I have shown, in Rawls's idea of duty of civility, he claims that a reasonable citizen should follow the idea of public reason and refrain from grounding his/her claims or actions on nonpublic reason. Since his limit of public reason targets at actions and discussions in public political sphere, the duty of civility also takes effect merely in this sphere. And the problem lies in Rawls's definition of public political sphere. In the previous part, I have explained that the scope of the limit of public reason is restricted in two ways. Firstly, it is restricted to questions of constitutional essentials and basic justice. Secondly it is restricted to discussions in public political forum that is distinguished from nonpolitical forum. While Rawls seems to be reluctant whether to extend the limit to other questions regarding the basic structure, he is certain that the limit does not apply to personal deliberations in private sphere and discussions or actions taken place in civic society. From Rawls's statements, his distinction is made in light of different occasions and the limit of public reason takes effects in occasions that are part of or can directly influence the formal decision-making. In this sense, the duty of civility also takes effect merely in those occasions.

If it is the case, then the split of identity can be problematic. Take the discussion on the issue of the legal permissibility of abortion as an example. The discussion can take place or the personal position can be made in three occasions. Firstly, it can take place in the private realm such as within a family. Family members can discuss whether abortion should be legally permitted and give their position on this question. Secondly, the discussion can take place in a religious organization or in a university. Since the idea of public reason does not target at the private realm and civic society, then a reasonable person can argue from his/her religious conviction and support the anti-abortion position. And it is possible that members of a particular church, religious organization or religious university agrees on an anti-abortion position. Thirdly, the discussion can also take place in the political public sphere such as in the parliament, citizens' meetings, or in the campaigns. And it is the occasion that the limit of public

reason targets at because only in those occasions, the discussion and actions can directly influence the formal decision-making.

Let's imagine a case of John's split positions on the anti-abortion policy. In the discussion within his family or church, John reasons from her religious convictions and concludes that abortion should not be legal permitted. When John is going to vote for an anti-abortion policy, he realizes that, as a reasonable citizen, he should ground his position on a public reason. However, since he cannot find a coherent and persuasive public justification for his anti-abortion position, he thinks that he should not advocate or vote for the anti-abortion policy. In other words, John has following two conflicting beliefs associated to his different identities:

(i) As a person believes in God, I believe that abortion should be legally prohibited.

(ii) As a citizen, I should not vote for a law that prohibits abortion.

Following Rawls's idea, we will get to such a weird situation where a person can coherently hold these two beliefs at the same time. The claim that abortion should not be legally permissible itself suggests that there should be a law prohibiting abortion. It is inconsistent to hold this claim but reject to vote for it. It is hard to see who an integrated person can reconcile this conflict. And the most possible result of this weird situation is the retreat from the citizen identity. In other words, when John finds that it is impossible to hold these two beliefs at the same time, probably he will choose to not participate in political life anymore.

This problem roots in the inconsistency within Rawls's idea of public reason. It seems that sometimes Rawls takes a participant's stance. From this standpoint, the idea of public reason, as a principle of liberal legitimacy, guides our deliberations on the question concerning the legitimate law. If it is the case, then the idea of public reason should apply to all kinds of deliberations concerning the questions of constitutional essentials and issues of basic justice. If we accept that a legitimate law should be publicly justified, then we should apply this principle in our discussion no matter whether it takes place within a family, a religious organization or a formal citizen meeting. In other words, the limit of application to public political forum is inconsistent with the idea of public reason as a principle accepted by all reasonable citizens. However, in other times, it seems that Rawls takes an observer's stance. From this standpoint, the question is not about the ethics of citizenship-that is, what a citizen should do in a democratic society, but about the justice of political structure. Understanding in this way, then the idea of public reason is used to judge the legitimacy of law and political structure rather than to restrain citizens' deliberations or actions. A great number of theorists understand Rawls's idea of public reason in the second way. Critics, such as Kevin Vallier, argues that a principle of public justification itself does not contain a principle of restraint on public deliberations. Defenders, such as Robert Audi, attempts to reconstruct the theory of public reason liberalism through providing an alternative understanding of the principle of restraint. The detailed discussion of their debate is derived from the unclarity existed in Rawls's idea of public reason. And this unclarity further roots in the unclarity of the moral basis of Rawls's approach. This question will be addressed in the next part.

For now, let's turn back to the integrity objection. A way to reconcile the inconsistency is to negate the restriction of the scope of public reason. In other words, the limit of public reason applies to all deliberations and discussions about the legitimate law. When it comes to the issue of abortion, the limit of public reason applies to all discussions about the legal permissibility of abortion and all advocations of the relevant law and policy. By contrast, nonpublic reason can be used in deliberations and discussions concerning the morality of abortion. That is to say, in the discussions taken

place within family, university or organizations, religious persons are free to appeal to religious convictions in expressing their positions towards the question whether abortion is moral or immoral on their religious convictions. Revising Rawls's idea of public reason in this way, the obvious inconsistency can be solved. However, there is another question left unanswered.

Conclusion

Regarding the limitation of the standard liberal approach, liberal theorists have sought to develop a thicker conception of democratic citizenship to tackle the challenge posed by religious diversity. One influential alternative approach is called "the public reason liberalism". Several key ideas are shared in this public reason liberal approach. Firstly, these liberal theorists view democracy as a political order shaped by a consensus on principles of justice. They perceive religious diversity as a diversity of different beliefs, and the challenge posed by religious diversity is seen as a challenge to reaching an agreement on the conception of justice. Those liberals attempt to find a way to produce the agreement on the conception of justice. This attempt leads to a second idea: in the face of the deep diversity, the just way to reach an agreement on justice is through democratic deliberation, where citizens exchange reasons and arguments. Taking democratic deliberation as the core of democracy, a third shared idea in this liberal approach is that religious diversity can cause difficulties and hinder such democratic deliberations. Consequently, to maintain a stable democracy, there should be a principle of restraint on the reasons or the form of reasoning used in the democratic deliberation. Accordingly, a democratic citizen should refrain from employing certain types of reasons or reasoning when participating in democratic deliberations. In this approach, two distinctive theories emerge. The first theory, proposed by Robert Audi (2000; 1997), interprets the principle of restraint as a restraint on religious reasons and arguments. In other words, only secular reasons are considered valid for democratic deliberations. According to this interpretation,

democratic citizenship is understood as secular citizenship, implying that religious individuals should detach themselves from their religious identity and act as secular citizens when participating in the democratic deliberations. However, this theory has faced criticism its failure to treat religious persons justly. On the one hand, it fails to treat religious persons fairly by imposing unfair burdens on them. On the other hand, it places unreasonable burdens on religious persons as it undermines their integrity. (Wolterstorff, 1997) Thus, this liberal interpretation of democratic citizenship as secular citizenship fails to ensure the equal citizenship of religious persons.

There is a second theory in the public reason liberal approach that appears more promising than Audi's secular liberal approach, known as the political liberal approach put forward by John Rawls. In the first chapter, I will demonstrate that Rawls's approach offers a better answer to the question compared to Audi's approach. On the one hand, Rawls's theory begins with a more respectful view towards religion. Firstly, by proposing the idea of reasonable pluralism, Rawls points out that the challenge posed by religious diversity is not inherently unique. The disagreement on justice arises from the burden of judgment, rather than religion itself. In other words, what challenges democracy is the pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, which encompass both secular and religious comprehensive doctrines. Accordingly, in Rawls's theory, the principle of restraint is interpreted as a restraint on nonpublic reason, which refers to reasoning based on comprehensive doctrines in general rather than specifically targeting religious reasoning. Secondly, following this idea, Rawls does not perceive religion per se as a potential threat. Instead, the threat arises from unreasonableness—that is, the rejection of the idea of public reason. In this sense, as Rawls himself claims, his theory does not treat religious persons unfairly, as it treats both religious and nonreligious doctrines equally. On the other hand, Rawls's theory is more sensitive to the integrity of religious persons. It offers two ways to address the integrity objection. Firstly, based on his idea of overlapping consensus, Rawls suggests that a reasonable religious doctrine would embrace the idea of public reason. In other words, compliance with the idea of public reason does not compromise the integrity of a reasonable religious person since his/her religious doctrine itself permits

adherence to the idea of public reason. Secondly, by proposing the idea of “the proviso”, Rawls’s theory allows for the presentation of religious reasons in the public political deliberations, as long as they function not as public justifications, but as evidence of the sincerity of the person’s proposals. In this sense, Rawls’s idea of democratic deliberation does not invisibilize religions by excluding them out from the public political sphere entirely. Thirdly, by distinguishing the political public culture from the background culture, Rawls confines the duty of civility, namely the duty to follow the idea of public reason, to the deliberations in the public political realm. Thus, religious reasons are permissible in private deliberations or public deliberations in the civic society. In this sense, Rawls’s theory can also respond to another criticism raised by religious-friendly theorists, namely that public reason liberal approach disregards the positive value of religion in promoting democratic citizenship.

After demonstrating the attractiveness of Rawls’s political liberal approach, the subsequent parts of the first chapter will attempt to show that although Rawls’s theory appears more promising than Audi’s secular liberal approach, it still encounters difficulties that hinder it from providing a satisfying answer to my question. There are three main problems with Rawls’s approach.

The first problem is that Rawls’s idea of democratic citizenship is exclusive to religious minorities and fails to guarantee the equal citizenship for religious minorities. This problem manifests in two aspects. Firstly, Rawls addresses the integrity objection by claiming that a reasonable religious doctrine would embrace the idea of public reason. However, since he interprets public reason as reasoning based on shared political values embedded in the public culture of the democratic society, his definition of a reasonable doctrine tends to favour religions that originate in a democratic culture and excludes religions that do not. Secondly, since Rawls claims that only reasonable religious doctrines should be accommodated, his theory opens the door to debates on the reasonableness of particular religious doctrine. This discussion may subject a

religious doctrine to external criticism and judgment, potentially leading to discrimination and stigmatization in real-world contexts.

The second problem is that Rawls's theory fails to address Parekh's version of the integrity objection. Rawls's distinction between background culture and political public culture may result in religious persons being encouraged to hold divisive perspectives on the same issue in their private/civic life and in their public political life. This distinction gives rise to a paradox: if a religious person, due to different forms of reasoning, holds different positions on the same issue, it becomes difficult for others to believe that his/her arguments proposed in the political public realm are sincere. Conversely, if a religious person holds the same position on an issue but provided different arguments in different realms, then it becomes hard for others to believe that the person sincerely reasons from the shared political values in public deliberations rather than using an acceptable argument to disguise his/her religious intentions.

This problem further reveals the third problem with Rawls's theory. That is, his theory ignores the social conditions necessary for a sustainable democratic political community. Firstly, compliance with the idea of public reason itself requires a degree of mutual trust. On the one hand, secular persons trust that religious persons, when providing public justifications, sincerely reason from the shared political values rather than from his/her religious doctrines. On the other hand, religious persons also trust that secular persons do not reason from their secular comprehensive doctrines. Secondly, since the compliance with the idea of public reason places heavy burdens on religious persons, a question arises as to why they would be willing to adhere to the idea of public reason rather than withdrawing from the political public realm. In other words, there is a lack of motivation that makes Rawls's idea of democratic citizenship achievable.

Chapter 2 Religious diversity and national identity

Introduction

The discussion of Rawls's approach in the first chapter shows that his theory, on the one hand, assumes a closed democratic community and fails to address the issue of equal citizenship for incoming religious minorities. On the other hand, his conception of democratic citizenship overlooks the social conditions necessary for realizing this democratic citizenship. These problems lead us to the second approach, namely David Miller's national republican approach. In Miller's approach, he interprets the challenge posed by religious diversity not merely as a challenge to achieving agreement on justice but also as a challenge to maintaining a shared national identity necessary for sustaining a democratic political community. With a focus on this challenge, Miller directs his attention towards the post-immigration religious diversity. Unlike Rawls's perspective, Miller conceptualizes the post-immigration religious diversity not as a form of doctrinal pluralism, but rather as a manifestation of cultural diversity—specifically, a diversity of private cultures brought by “strangers”. This type of diversity is perceived as a challenge because the associated private cultures are viewed as potentially threatening to the existing national identity that upholds the political community.

This perception of the challenge posed by religious diversity is based on Miller's national republican ideal of democratic political community. In this chapter, I will attempt to assess Miller's approach by examining whether his theory can reconcile the tension between fostering national republican conception of citizenship and ensuring equal citizenship for religious minorities. Before this examination, I will firstly show the key ideas in Miller's approach and how his approach addresses the challenge posed by religious diversity.

I. Miller's national republican approach to religious diversity

1. Miller's national republican theory

In Miller's national republican theory of a democratic political community, there are three important claims.

***Claim 1:** A stable democratic political community requires citizens' common identification with the political community.*

***Claim 2:** The common identification should be able to motivate political participation and to create social solidarity-that is, a social bond among citizens.*

***Claim 3:** In the real world, nationhood is the de facto source of such a common identification. In other words, the common identification requires by a democratic political community in many cases presents as a shared national identity.*

Claim 1 and Claim 2 are based on Miller's understanding of a democratic political community. In his view, a stable and successful democratic politics requires republican citizenship and a degree of interpersonal trust.(Miller and Ali, 2014)

1.1 Miller's idea of republican citizenship

In Miller's(2000, pp. 83-84) theory, he puts forth a republican conception of democratic citizenship. According to his view, successful democratic politics requires

active political participation. This means that participatory citizens who feel a sense of responsibility and motivation to engage in both formal and informal political sphere are crucial. Miller's emphasis on active participation stems from his republican understanding of a democratic political community. According to his view, a democratic political community is a self-determining political community where citizens collectively determine the future direction of their society through political debate and decision-making. (Miller, 2000, p. 53; 2016b, p. 154) Thus, active participation is important because it is only through substantial engagement that political decisions can truly reflect the self-determination of citizens. There are two important points in Miller's idea. Firstly, although he emphasizes the importance of political participation for democratic politics, he does not adopt the classic republican view that considers political participation as the ultimate good of human life. As he states,

"What is required is something weaker: that it should be part of each person's good to be engaged at some level in political debate, so that the laws and policies of the state do not appear to him or her simply as alien impositions but as the outcome of a reasonable agreement to which he or she has been party." (2000, p. 58)

Secondly, although Miller emphasizes the significance of politically active citizens in maintaining a stable democratic political community, he does not consider political participation as an obligatory requirement imposed on citizens. This stance is evident in Miller's (2000, pp. 58-59) reply to a common critique of republican citizenship. This criticism suggests that since a republican conception of democratic political community regards political participation as crucial, it excludes religious persons or groups who abstain from political participation. In addressing this critique, Miller explains that the refusal to engage in political life does not undermine the equal citizenship of those persons. However, as they voluntarily choose to withdraw themselves from political life, they lack a solid ground for raising complaint or

rejecting democratic decisions.

Moreover, according to Miller, successful democratic politics requires not only active political participation but also responsible participation. In his view, a republican citizen is driven by a sense of commitment to advancing the common good through political participation. However, Miller's understanding of the common good differs from the classic republican perspectives. Unlike the notion that the common good is predetermined and fixed prior to political processes, Miller argues that it emerges as a result of democratic politics. In other words, this commitment does not imply that the input of a political process must align with a predetermined common good; rather, it suggests that the output should reflect a common good. Thus, Miller(2000, pp. 55-56) claims that his conception of republican citizenship does not impose a strict requirement of impartiality and therefore can avoid Iris Marion Young's criticism. In Young's(1989) criticism, republican citizenship entails a requirement of impartiality, demanding citizens to reason from a universal standpoint and detach themselves from their personal interests, experience and differences in public deliberations. In response to this criticism, Miller clarifies that his republican conception of citizenship does not entail such a requirement of impartiality. When Miller claims that republican citizens are committed to promoting the common good, this commitment does not require a citizen to disregarding their own interests.

In Miller's conception, in public deliberation, a republican citizen's commitment to the common good is manifested through four key aspects. Firstly, a republican citizen demonstrates a willingness to actively defend the rights and interests of others.(Miller, 2000, p. 83) This means that a republican citizen is not indifferent to the suffering of others and engage in politics not solely for the sake of his/her own or his/her group's interest, but also to protect the interests of others. Secondly, when advocating for his/her own preferences or interests, a republican citizen takes into account the opposing interests of others and considers the potential costs that

his/her demands may impose on them. In other words, he/she strives to balance his/her interests with the potential burdens that others or society as a whole might experience. (Miller, 2000, p. 55) Thirdly, a republican citizen listens to and considers the reasons and arguments put forth by others. He/she engage in a genuine exchange where he/she confront his/her own reasons with those of others. Lastly, a republican citizen seeks agreement with others and collectively establishes procedures to find practical solutions when the agreement is difficult to reach. In this process, a republican citizen avoids extreme views, demonstrates a willingness to moderate his/her claims, and is open to compromise when necessary to achieve a solution. In case where moral premises are at odds, a republican citizen recognizes and respects the “the depth and sincerity” of others’ commitments, striving to find practical solutions that do not undermine or offend these commitments. (Miller, 2000, pp. 151-155)

1.2 Social bond and interpersonal trust

Based on the previous discussion, it becomes evident that, in Miller’s republican ideal, the establishment of a stable and successful democratic politics requires participative and responsible citizens. Miller emphasizes that this form of republican citizenship is demanding, as it is can only be achieved through the existence of a social bond and interpersonal trust among citizens.

Miller’s concept of republican responsibilities extends beyond an individual’s legal and moral obligations. These responsibilities encompass more than just negative obligations, which are limited to non-interference. Instead, they include positive responsibilities to defend or assist others. In other words, a republican citizen is not solely morally obliged to refrain from violating others’ basic rights, as typically argued by standard liberals. He/she is also responsible for aiding those who suffer from injustice or hardships, even if the citizen himself/herself does not play a part in their sufferings. Unlike a liberal citizen who may remain indifferent to other’s experiences

of injustice as long as they are not personally affected, an indifferent citizen would not be considered as a republican citizen in Miller's theory. Following this idea, Miller's idea of political participation is more demanding than the liberal idea. A republican citizen actively engages in a formal or informal political process not merely because the decision impacts directly his/her own interests, but also because the decision is closely tied to the well-being of others. A republican citizen defends others' interests through political participation not merely due to his/her commitment to principles of justice, but also out of a sense of attachment to his/her fellow citizens. Thus, the republican responsibilities are so strong that they have their ground in a social bond between citizens, extending beyond a mere agreement on norms of justice.

The demandingness of republican responsibilities can be further understood through their potential implications for citizens. Firstly, a republican citizen, who considers and may even defend the interests of others, might sacrifice his/her personal interests when he/she finds that the cost borne by others outweighs the interests he/she would get. Secondly, according to Miller's idea, republican citizens strive to reach agreements with their fellow deliberators in democratic deliberations. However, in cases where reaching consensus proves unattainable, such as when there are disagreements in fundamental moral premises like in the abortion debate, republican citizens demonstrate their willingness to seek practical solutions (Miller, 2000, pp. 150-151). In this process, a republican citizen might need to moderate or compromise their claims even when he/she is in the majority. Thirdly, while active participation is a crucial aspect of republican citizenship, it comes with its own demands. Participating in the political process can consume a citizen's personal time and may even have financial costs. Additionally, engaging in democratic deliberations requires citizens to engage in argumentation, confront differing viewpoints, and listen to others' demands and perspectives of which they may disapprove. The confrontation and argumentation are not always enjoyable. Moreover, a citizen may ultimately need to sacrifice his/her own interests. Overall, the demandingness of republican responsibilities becomes evident through the potential personal

sacrifices, compromises, and challenges that citizens must face when striving to fulfill their roles as active and responsible participants in democratic politics.

In addition, republican citizenship is demanding because it entails not merely responsibilities but also motivations. A republican citizen is also motivated to fulfill these responsibilities. And this motivation stems not only from the fear of punishment, social sanctions or moral criticism but, more importantly, from a genuine willingness to undertake these responsibilities regardless of associated costs. In Miller's view, this type of motivation cannot be solely derived from a rational commitment to specific ethical or moral principles; it also requires a sentimental attachment between citizens. In other words, the formation of a republican ideal of democratic political community relies on fostering a shared sense of identification and emotional connection among citizens. This sentimental bond serves as the foundation for citizens' motivation to fulfill their responsibilities.

The third aspect of the demandingness of republican citizenship, as articulated by Miller, revolves around the necessity of mutual assurance among citizens. Specifically, a republican citizen's willingness and motivation to actively participate, defend others' interests, and accept potential sacrifices or compromises rely on the reciprocal understanding that fellow citizens will also act in a responsible manner. According to Miller's idea, it is unreasonable to expect a person to fulfill the republican responsibilities if others fail to do the same. Thus, the foundation of republican citizenship rests upon a generalized trust in the sense of responsibility exhibited by fellow citizens. This underscores the significance of fostering a common identification among citizens, as it is through this common bond that interpersonal trust can be established, enabling the functioning of republican citizenship.

According to the demandingness of republican citizenship demonstrated above, the

republican ideal of democratic political community requires a social bond among citizens. This social bond is characterized by sentimental attachment and interpersonal trust. In Miller's view, a shared national identity fulfills this function and serves as the de facto source of social solidarity necessary for the democratic political community.

1.3 National identity as a de facto source

According to Miller's (1995, pp. 22-27) theory, a national identity is an identity shared by members of a national community. Miller defines a national community based on five key features. Firstly, a national community is inherently an ethical community where members share a sense of belonging together and mutual ethical commitments. As such, a national identity is an ethical identity containing ethical commitments and obligations. Secondly, a national community is a historical community characterized by historical continuity. Members of a national community share a common history and feel a sense of responsibility not merely towards their contemporaries but also towards their forebears. Thirdly, a national community is a community capable of making collective decisions and acting collectively. Thus, a person with a national identity feels a responsibility towards the collective actions taken in the name of his/her national community. He/she may experience sentiments of pride or shame in response to the collective actions or decisions. Fourthly, a national community is bound by a homeland or the idea of a homeland. A national identity not only connects people to one another but also to a specific territory. Finally, a national community is marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture. Consequently, a national identity is also a cultural identity associated with a common public culture. Miller emphasizes that while a particular national identity may sociologically stem from a pre-existing ethnic identity, the concept of nationality is not defined by shared ethnicity. Thus, a national identity can be shared among people with diverse ethnic backgrounds.

In Miller's theory, those features of national identity illustrates why the establishment of a social bond among people is possible in the context of a modern democratic political community. As Miller(2000, pp. 32, 84-87) states, throughout history, the republican model of political community was only achievable in small city-states where direct, face-to face communication was feasible. In contrast, the modern democratic political community is characterized by anonymity, making it impractical for all citizens to engage in direct personal interactions. Thus, the social bond cannot be built upon kinship or actual interactions among citizens. National identity emerges as an alternative source for fostering the social bond essential for republican citizenship. Two arguments supporting the functional value of national identity can be found in Miller's work.

The first argument is based on Miller's general claim that identity can serve as a source of social solidarity. According to Miller's(2017) theory, a group of people shares an identity when specific characteristics or attributes distinguish them from others, forging a collective sense of "we". Miller points out that this function of a shared identity is underpinned by a psychological claim that suggests, "we are disposed to sympathize with, help, trust, and take responsibility for those that we perceive to be like ourselves"(2017, p. 73). By fostering a sense of likeness, a shared identity binds persons who may not have direct interactions. In other words, when citizens in a political community share a national identity, they do not perceive themselves as randomly assembled in a particular place but rather feel a sense of connection based on commonality. This establishes the groundwork for social solidarity, wherein citizens possess both a sense of obligation and motivation to care for and defend one other within a political community.

The second argument highlights the distinctive qualities of national identity that facilitate the establishment of social solidarity within a political community. One key aspect is that national identity binds individuals within a political community through

their belief in sharing a common public culture and a common history. Unlike identities based on biological facts, such as race or gender, national identity is not based on objective attributes but rather on the belief in sharing specific characteristics. In essence, it is the shared sense of belonging together that binds individuals in a national community. As Miller states, “nations are not aggregates of people distinguished by their physical or cultural traits, but communities whose very existence depends upon mutual recognition”.(1995, p. 23) Building upon Benedict Anderson’s idea of imagining community, Miller illustrates another feature of national identity. That is, the belief in belonging together involved in national identity is fostered through collective acts of imagination manifested in cultural expressions. Cultural artefacts like films, songs, books as well as cultural symbols such as flag and ceremony, collectively contribute to this collective imagination. (1995, p. 32) Thus, national identity is socially constructed and possesses a fluid nature, allowing for transformation over time. This flexibility, attributed to the imaginary component of national identity, enables the connection of citizens in a political community, even in the presence of racial or ethnic diversity.

1.4 Inclusiveness of a national republican community

Based on the demonstration above, it becomes clear that Miller’s national republican theory of democratic political community differs from Rawls’s theory in two aspects. Firstly, for a stable and successful democratic politics, Miller argues that it requires not citizens who are reasonable according to Rawls’s political liberal conception of citizenship, which emphasizes adherence to the ideal of public reason, but rather republican citizens who actively engage in political life and demonstrate a commitment to promoting the common good through their participation. These contrasting views on democratic citizenship also imply disparities in their respective understandings of a democratic political community. In Miller’s theory, faced with deep diversity, a stable democratic political community is sustained not by an agreement on justice, as Rawls’s terms it-an overlapping consensus on the political conception of justice-but rather by citizens’ shared identification, which fosters a social bond and interpersonal trust. In

other words, people are willing to live together politically with the others who possess divergent interests, perspectives and lifestyles due to their sense of belonging together and ethical commitment to promoting the common good.

In Miller's view, the republican conception of democratic political community and citizenship is more inclusive in accommodating deep diversity compared to Rawls's theory. Firstly, Miller's approach does not reduce diversity to differences in conceptions of justice or conceptions of the good. When Rawls defines the challenge posed by religious diversity as the one posed by reasonable pluralism, his theory targets at a specific type of conflict arising from religious diversity. I will delve into this point further in the next section where I explore Miller's understanding of religious diversity. Furthermore, Miller himself points out a second advantage of his republican approach. In his view, if we consider differences in conceptions as a central issue for democratic politics and political community, a republican conception of citizenship proves even more inclusive by avoiding the strict separation between the good and justice. Firstly, there are no restrictions placed on the subject of democratic deliberations. This means that democratic deliberations encompass not only norms of justice but also the common good of the political community. In this sense, citizens participating in democratic deliberations are not constrained but rather encouraged to subject not only their competing demands related to basic rights or principles of justice to discussions, but also their perspectives on the common good and aspirations for the future of society. Secondly, there are no predetermined restraints on the type of reasoning or arguments deemed acceptable for democratic deliberations. This carries two implications. Firstly, citizens are not required to separate their conceptions of justice from their conceptions of the good. Moreover, they are not required to prioritize public reason over their deeply held convictions.

However, even though the republican theory presents a more favorable approach to diversity when compared to Rawls's theory, Miller still needs to address the question

of inclusivity. If national identity serves as the de facto source of republican citizenship, Miller needs to show that a democratic political community bound by national identity does not compromise the basic value of equal citizenship and remains inclusive. In response to this concern, Miller's answer consists of two aspects. Firstly, while Miller acknowledges that agreement on justice alone is insufficient for a stable democratic politics, he does not undermine the significance of justice. According to his view, the idea of republican citizenship not merely requires responsible citizenship but also equal citizenship. In other words, republican citizens are individuals who possess equal rights and obligations. However, in Miller's view, while Rawls argues for a pre-political justification of equal rights, his approach emphasizes that their justifications should be generated through democratic deliberations. In other words, the key difference between Rawls and Miller does not revolve around whether they consider agreement on justice as essential, but rather lies in the way through which an agreement on justice can be achieved.

Secondly, in Miller's national republican theory, national identity, serving as the source of republican citizenship, is inherently fluid. As discussed earlier, a national community is essentially an imagined community, and national identity is a socially constructed identity. As its core, it represents a shared belief in belonging together, shaped by cultural artefacts. This imaginative aspect allows for room for change and transformation. Thus, even though a national identity is characterized by a common public culture, as a matter of belief, the specific components of this public culture are not fixed and may change over time as people's beliefs about their national identity shift. This flexibility feature of national identity renders the national republican model of democratic political community inclusive from two aspects. Firstly, the concrete components comprising the national culture are disputable and are subject to democratic deliberations in case of controversy. Secondly, since national identity is socially constructed, national culture itself can gradually undergo transformation as specific cultural issues are addressed through democratic deliberations. Thus, through participation in democratic deliberations, citizens have the opportunity to discuss and reshape the content of their national identity.

2. Religious diversity and Miller's idea of equal citizenship

In the previous chapter, I have shown that by taking an agreement on the conception of justice as the core of a stable democratic political community, religious diversity in Rawls's theory is interpreted as a doctrinal pluralism. Based on this interpretation, Rawls further interprets the religious persons as citizens of faith and the respect for their equal citizenship refers to the respect for the religious doctrines that they adhere to. Under this basic understanding, Rawls and his liberal critics share a similar understanding of religious identity. In their discussions, religious identity is interpreted as a distinctive moral identity that embodies in the direct normative force of religious doctrines on the person's moral reasoning. By contrast, religious diversity in Miller's discussion is beyond the liberal idea of doctrinal pluralism.

Miller's discussion on the issues and challenges brought by religious diversity is based on his understanding of religious commitments. According to his idea, a religious commitment can be understood in at least two ways. Firstly, a religious commitment can be a faith commitment which is derived from a person's commitment to a religious doctrine. In other words, the commitment stems from "the belief that some authoritative body of doctrine requires it".(2016a, p. 8) When a religious commitment in question is a faith commitment, it is different from a commitment derived from a personal lifestyle or a cultural custom. In the case of a faith commitment, when a person feels committed to act in a certain way, he/she is compelled to do it by his/her faith rather than by the pressure from his/her fellow-believers or from his/her religious community. When the competing religious commitments presents as competing faith commitments, then religious diversity of this kind is the doctrinal pluralism as Rawls states. When a religious demand derived from a person's faith commitment, then it belongs to the question of the right of religious freedom. According to Miller's view, whether a religious demand can be

justified by the right of religious freedom depends on whether it is essential to a religious faith. In Miller's theory, the right of religious freedom is a basic human right that is universal and context-free. In other words, it is a basic right that every human being should be granted. And it is also a trump right which has the priority over other rights-such as legal rights or citizenship rights-and values in the democratic deliberations. Due to this strict interpretation. Miller holds a minimalist interpretation of human right. In this interpretation, an interest is a human right only if it is a human need that is universally necessary for a human being to lead a minimally decent or adequate life.(2012; 2002) Based on this strict interpretation of religious freedom, Miller claims that while the demand of mosque can be justified by the right of religious freedom, the demand of Islamic minarets cannot. It is because the former is essential to Muslims' exercising their faith and rituals while the latter is not essential. When it comes to the cases of Muslims veils and the state-fund faith schools, whether the demand can be justified by the right of religious freedom should also pass the strict test. In this case, the discussion on the demand of permitting wearing hijab in public schools can be more controversial than the others. In this case, while proponents might claim that the Islamic faith requires women to wear hijab in public space, the opponents might claim that wearing hijab is more about a cultural thing rather than a faith thing since whether it is necessary is itself controversial within the Islamic society.

Due to a restrictive understanding of religious commitments, Rawls suggests that to respect religious persons is to respect their religious doctrines. However, according to Miller's view, religious commitments might not always faith commitments but also can be cultural commitments. As Miller states, "a culture exists when a group of people share a distinctive conception about how life ought to be lived, and embody that conception in shared practices that they engage in"(2013, p. 99). According to this definition, a culture contains but is more than a comprehensive conception of good. An important feature of a culture is that the conception of good is shared by a group of people and embody in a set of rituals, symbols and mutual expectations that have been developed among this group of people. Religious commitments can

be cultural commitments when the commitments are associated to a person's membership to a religious community. The religious community is not merely bound by shared religious convictions but also by a shared religious culture that manifests in their shared practices, rituals and symbols. In this case, even though those cultural practices or symbols might not be essential to their faith but might be important components of their sense of belonging together. For a person who identifies with the religious community, violating the commitments might be viewed as a betrayal of one's community. In Miller's (2013, p. 103). discussion, he takes a Sikh's commitment to wear turban as an example. In the case, a Sikh wants to send his son to a school that bans the wearing of turbans and therefore demands of abolishing the no-turban policy in public schools. If the only criterion that can be appealed to is the right of religious freedom that protects religious person's faith, then the discussion on this case will turn to a discussion on the question whether the wearing of turbans is a requirement of a religious doctrine. However, in Miller's view, even if the wearing of turbans is not regarded as a faith commitment and therefore fall beyond the protection of religious freedom, it does not mean that the Sikh's demand cannot be justified. In Miller's view, the wearing of turbans can be a cultural commitment that stem from the person's membership to the Sikh community. As Miller states, "if you grow up in a cultural community and identify with it, then violating one of the community's norms in a way that will effectively exclude you from further participation in the life of that community imposes unreasonable costs" (2013, p. 104).

In Miller's theory, justice does not merely contain the principle of human rights but also contains a principle of equal opportunity which protect each person's equal opportunity to realize his/her aims and ambitions without bearing unreasonable cost. Following this idea, this idea of equal opportunity would require an equal treatment of different private cultures. In this idea, religious diversity is not merely interpreted as a doctrinal pluralism but also interpreted as a diversity of private cultures. In this sense, religious diversity also suggests a diversity of religious communities and contains a diversity of group belongingness. Religious identity is

not merely understood as a personal moral identity but also as a group cultural identity. Thus, to equally respect religious persons, in Miller's theory, does not merely require the equal respect for religious faith but also require the equal respect for religious cultures. Following this understanding, the religious demand in the Islamic minarets case and the Muslim veil cases can have different normative grounds. While opponents might reject the Muslims' demand of permitting minarets by arguing that the minarets are not essential for Muslims to practice their faith, proponents can argue that the prohibition fails to treat Islamic culture equally since the Christian towers are permitted. In the French hijab case, while the proponents of the hijab ban might argue that the law treats different religious cultures equally because not merely Muslim hijab but also Jewish yarmulkes and Christian crosses are also banned, the opponents might argue that the law is discriminative because it was proposed to target at Muslims rather than the other religious groups.

According to Miller's theory, in face of religious diversity, the respect for equal citizenship of religious persons contains two requirements. The first requirement is the respect for basic human rights-such as the right of religious freedom-of religious individuals. In Miller's view, the human rights are universal and they are trump rights that should be given priority to other rights and values in democratic deliberations. Thus, even if Miller's idea of democratic politics allows and encourages citizens to pursue or promote their aspirations and common good through political participation, those demands should not infringe on the basic human rights. The second requirement is the respect for equal opportunity and this requirement manifests in not merely an equal opportunity to pursue individual preferences and good but also an equal treatment on diverse private cultures. This requirement of equal treatment, in Miller's view, is a citizenship right that should be protected in a democratic political community. And according to Miller's understanding of citizenship rights, the requirement of equal opportunity and equal treatment also serves as a trump when there is a conflict between this requirement and other values or good.(2002, p. 182)

However, in Miller's theory, there is an important restriction on this citizenship right. That is, the requirement of equal treatment only targets as diverse private cultures that are compatible with the existing public culture of the political community. In other words, while equal citizenship requires an equal treatment among different private cultures, it does not suggest a right of equal treatment between a private culture and the public culture shared in the political community. There are three important points in this idea. Firstly, when a religious culture is a private culture of a democratic political community, the respect for religious people's equal citizenship requires a trump right of equal treatment between this religious culture and other private cultures. Secondly, if the religious culture is in conflict with the public culture of the political community, the respect for equal citizenship does not contain a trump right of equal treatment between this private culture and the public culture. Thirdly, in the case of such a conflict, while religious people can demand of an accommodation of their religious culture, this demand should be balanced with the good of the public culture. That is to say, the majority of the political community might take the public culture as an important common good. In this case the demand of accommodation from the religious minority will not be given priority and should be weighed up against the good of the public culture. Thus, in the case of the conflict between private culture and public culture, while the respect for equal citizenship does not require a trump right of equal treatment, it requires the equal standing in the democratic deliberations. In other words, all groups should have equal access to the democratic deliberations and have equal claim to be listened to.

A fundamental premise in Miller's theory is the distinction between private and public culture. According to Miller's (1995, p. 26; 2016b, p. 67) view, a public culture of a political community refers to "a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together" that includes political principles, social norms and cultural ideals and it embodies in cultural practices shared by members of the political community and is expressed through cultural artefacts and symbols. By

contrast, a private culture in Miller's theory is understood as a culture shared by a sub-state group or community.¹² In Miller's view, a common public culture can co-exist with a diversity of private cultures. Thus, a political community which there is a common public culture is not necessarily a cultural homogenous community since it can contain diverse private cultures. However, in some cases, a demand stem from a private culture can be in conflict with the public culture. And the emphasis on the good of public culture is related to the importance of a common identification for a democratic political community. As I have shown, in Miller's theory, a common identification that creates a social bond and an interpersonal trust is essential for holding a democratic political community, since it enables the republican citizenship which is required by a stable and successful democratic politics. A common public culture is important for a democratic political community when it is an essential element of a national identity which functions as a source of the required common identification in a political community. Put it shortly, the importance of a common public culture lies in the importance of a shared national identity for a democratic political community. In this context, the distinction between private culture and public culture contains two implications. On the one hand, it suggests that a democratic political community bound by a shared national identity can be culturally diverse since a shared national culture can co-exist with diverse private cultures. On the other hand, the potential challenge that a private culture might pose on a shared national culture is an issue that should be concerned with since it might challenge the fundamental basis of a stable democratic political community. Thus, according to Miller's idea, if equal citizenship requires a right of equal treatment between private culture and public culture, it will defeat the very foundation of a democratic political

^t A point needed to be addressed here. In Miller's own statements that he makes in the book published in 2016, he defines the private culture as "a person's beliefs about what is valuable in her own life" Miller, D. M. (2016b) *Strangers in Our Midst*. Harvard University Press.. However, this definition seems to be inconsistent with his own definition of "culture". As I have pointed out, Miller defines a culture as a set of conceptions shared by a group of people. In this definition, a culture is more than beliefs and conceptions held by an individual. In Miller's discussion, when he talks about the private culture, he mainly discusses the minority culture rather than a single person's conceptions. Thus, here, I re-state Miller's definition of private culture as a culture shared by a sub-state group or community.

community.

In Miller's theory, the paradigm case of the kind of religious diversity that might pose a challenge to the democratic political community is the religious diversity brought by religious immigrants. And this type of religious diversity is named as "the post-immigration religious diversity" by Tariq Modood(2019, p. 1). And it is viewed as a particular challenge faced by Western Europe and therefore is also named by some as a form of "Euro-multiculturalism".(Laegaard, 2014). In the next section, I will further explain the feature of the post-immigration religious diversity and Miller's approach to accommodate this type of religious diversity.

3. Religious immigrants and space of accommodation

The post-immigration religious diversity is a type of diversity faced by a traditionally nation state after a large scale of religious immigration. The distinctiveness of the post-immigration religious diversity and the challenge it brings about lie in the special feature of the religious culture it contains. The key feature is not merely that the religious culture in question contains elements that are incompatible with the dominant public culture of the political community but is also that the religious culture is not a private culture historically contained within the national culture of the political community. In other words, the religious culture is not only viewed as a different culture but also the "strangers' culture". In other words, the religious culture is a culture shared by religious people who are viewed as newcomers or strangers by the majority of the political community. In this sense, according to Miller's theory, the post-immigration religious diversity is distinguished from the indigenous religious diversity. The religious community, as newcomers, neither aspire nor eligible to become a self-governing political community. In short, the religious group in question is not a minority national group ordained in the land of the political community. In this case, a post-immigration religious diversity produces a question of accommodation when the elements of the religious culture are

incompatible with the dominant culture. By contrast, the indigenous religious diversity related to rivalry national groups is a different case. In the indigenous religious diversity, the diverse religious communities are national communities that are historically inhabited in the land of the political community. And in Miller's theory, they can be qualified to claim for political self-determination. This difference leads to a second difference. That is, the question brought by the post-immigration religious diversity is a question of accommodation. The religious immigrants want the dominant public culture to accommodate or recognize their religious culture by adjusting itself. By contrast, the question brought by indigenous religious diversity associated to rivalry national groups is a question of political self-determination. That is, the question is whether and how much self-determination that a political community can grant to the national group, And in Miller's view, the problem caused by rivalry national groups can be solved through granting them national secession or redraw the state borders.(2000, pp. 89, 128-129) The difficulty involved this case is practical rather than theoretical. Thus, by focusing on the post-immigration religious diversity, the challenges that Miller is mainly concerned with is not about the conflict between rivalry ethno-religious national groups, such as the conflict between the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland.

Thus, in Miller's view, while the post-immigration religious diversity cannot be interpreted as doctrinal pluralism in Rawls's term, it can neither interpreted simply as cultural diversity. As a descriptive fact of a democratic political community, the post-immigration religious diversity does not merely refer to a diversity of private cultures but also refer to a diversity of "strangers' culture". While a diversity of private culture is itself compatible and therefore can co-exist with a shared national culture of the political community, the diversity of "strangers' culture" is viewed as a challenge to the national culture of the political community. The challenge becomes real when religious immigrants' demands are taken as potentially destructive to the shared national identity by the majority of a political community. As I have shown in the previous section, in Miller's idea of equal citizenship, while the equal status of citizens requires an equal treatment among different private cultures, the

precondition of this citizenship right of equal treatment is that the private cultures are compatible with the common public culture. When there is a conflict, the claim for the equal treatment should be weighed up against the claim for protecting or promoting the shared national culture. In other words, the protection and the promotion of the shared national culture should be viewed as a valid reason in the democratic deliberations.

Take the controversial cases as examples. In the case of state-funded faith schools, in a political community where the secularity of public education is viewed as an essential element of their public culture, opponents can object to faith schools by arguing that faith schools would threaten the public culture of the political community by violating the secularity of public education. And it is a claim that should be taken into account in democratic deliberation. Similarly, when it comes to the issue of religious symbols, the questions related do also not merely include the one on whether religious freedom contains a freedom to build minarets or freedom to wear Muslim veils, but also include the one about whether those religious symbols harm an important cultural good. For example, opponents can ground their objection on the claim that minarets are expressions of Islamism, or Muslim veils are expression of Islamic gender discrimination and therefore are harmful for liberal values that are essential to their public culture. They might also ground their objection on the concerns that the large scale of presence of those religious symbols will be harmful to the national culture which is regarded as a common good of a political community.

Following Miller's idea of republican citizenship, responsible citizens who commits to the promotion of the common good should feel committed to concern and defend others' interests. When it comes to the competition between the demand from religious immigrants and the demand from the national majority, the ideal of republican citizenship poses certain responsibility on both sides(2016b, p. 149). On the side of religious immigrants, religious immigrants should act as responsible

citizens in three ways. Firstly, when responsible religious immigrants propose a demand of accommodation, they would understand and recognize the importance of the public culture of the political community. They would consider whether their demand might destroy the public culture—for instance, the shared national culture—of the political community. Secondly, in democratic deliberations, religious immigrants should take majority's claim of protecting and promoting the public culture as a valid claim that has considerable weight. Thirdly, religious immigrants should accept that it is permissible to grant the national culture symbolic precedence over their private cultures.

On the side of the national majority, in Miller's theory, responsible citizens should also act in following ways. Firstly, they should respect the equal citizenship of religious immigrants by respecting their basic human rights and equal opportunities. In other words, the political community should adjust their national culture to accommodate the private cultures of the religious immigrants when the accommodation is required by the respect for basic human rights and equal treatment. Secondly, while the majority can aspire or expect for culturally integrating religious immigrants, they should not require the religious immigrants to embrace the national culture. Responsible majority should also understand the significance of the private cultures for religious immigrants and attempt to adjust the national culture to encourage the cultural integration. Thirdly, when there is a conflict between their demand and demand of accommodation from the religious immigrants, responsible majority should, on the one hand, subject their demand to democratic deliberations and weigh their own demands up against the demand from religious immigrants. They should not merely listen to but also take into account the minority's voices. Fourthly, they should welcome the voices from the religious immigrants in the discussion on the content of the national culture of a political community. In other words, religious immigrants can express their disagreement on certain elements of the national culture and national majority should welcome those voices and taken them seriously in the deliberations.

In Miller's approach to the accommodation of the post-immigration religious diversity, there are some extra points needed to be clarified. The first point is that when Miller states the responsibilities of religious immigrants, we can find another line of argument for the normative basis of the requirement of the respect for national culture. Put it precisely, the normative force of requirement of national respect is not merely based on one's commitment to the promotion of the common good, but also based on the respect for the right of national self-determination. In Miller's(2008) view, a nation state is a culturally self-determining political community. When there is a conflict between religious immigrants' demands of cultural accommodation and majority's demand of promoting or protecting their national culture, religious immigrants should respect the latter demand because they should respect the host national community's right of cultural self-determination. Take the French hijab case for an example. The Muslims' demand for permitting wearing hijab in public schools might challenge the existing principle of cultural secularity established in the French society. The respect for a national community's right of cultural self-determination would require the Muslims who are newcomers in the French society to respect the existing law and principles in the host community.

Secondly, while Miller takes a shared national identity as functional valuable for democratic politics, it does not lead to a requirement of national integration but merely a requirement of national respect. In other words, while religious immigrants are required to respect the national culture by understanding and recognizing the significance of the national culture for the political community, they are not required to culturally integrate into the national culture by endorsing the national culture. By endorsing Joseph Carens's distinction between requirement, expectation and aspiration, Miller claims that while cultural integration can be set as an aspiration or expectation from the political community to the immigration minorities, it should not be set as a requirement. According to Carens's distinction, while requirements

are conditions that can be politically enforced, expectations and aspirations have weaker normative force. In his definition, expectations manifest as social norms and violation will lead to informal social sanctions such as social disapprovals or criticism. Aspirations are “hopes about the way immigrants will behave that are not enforceable even informally” (2016b, pp. 134-135). By defining the cultural integration as an aspiration or an expectation from the majority of the political community, Miller claims that it should not be set as a political goal.

Thirdly, in Miller’s work, he discusses the issue of the national culture that bear religious elements in particular. According to his discussion, there are at least two conditions when a national culture has religious elements. The first condition is that a national culture has religious elements when there was an established religion in its national history. The second condition is that there is a symbolic establishment of religion in the political community. In those conditions, religious symbols might be presented in public space such as the display of crucifix in public schools and the public holidays, ceremonies or symbols might be influenced by a particular religion. In this case, the conflict between the private culture of religious immigrants and the public culture shared by the national majority might appear more intensive than in the other cases. Miller’s viewpoints toward the conflict in this case are the same. On the one hand, Miller thinks that the protection and promotion of the national culture that bearing those religious elements do not infringe on equal citizenship of religious immigrants as long as their basic human rights, equal opportunities and equal access to deliberations are protected. Furthermore, those religious elements can be subjected to public deliberations and religious immigrants should have equal access to express their critical views towards those religious elements of the national culture. And responsible majority, as I have already pointed out, should be willing to transform their national culture through public deliberations. On the other hand, even if the religious elements are taken as important part of the national culture after public deliberations, the requirement of national respect is not oppressive to religious minorities. The requirement does not require religious immigrants to endorse or substantively affirm those religious elements embedded in the national

culture. Rather, it merely requires them to realize that those religious elements are taken by the majority of the political community as significant parts of their national culture.

4. A summary

According to the discussion above, we can see that the challenge of the post-immigration religious diversity that Miller focuses on manifests in the following paradox: on the one hand, as immigration minorities, those religious groups aspire for equal acceptance and recognition from the majority of the political community. On the other hand, however, the type of recognition that they demand of might threaten the common identification that binds up the democratic political community. In Miller's discussion, he specifies this threat as a threat to the national identity of the political community. In other words, religious diversity can challenge a democratic political community when the demands for recognition from the diverse religious groups of communities pose a threat to the national culture that is the basis for the national identity that binds up the democratic political community. In this term, religious diversity, when defined as a descriptive fact of a democratic political community, itself does not pose a threat. However, the difficulty that religious diversity might bring to the democratic political community is associated with the politics of recognition which claims for positive recognition of religious differences in the strong sense.

A fundamental claim made by Miller in his approach is the functional value of a shared national identity for a democratic political community. Miller's theory suggests that religious diversity does not merely challenge the democratic political community by making it difficult to achieve an agreement on justice-as what Rawls is concerned with in his approach, but also challenge the democratic political community by threatening the social bond and interpersonal trust that are sustained by a shared national culture. However, while Miller is concerned with the potential

threat brought by religious diversity and attempts to defend the value of national identity, he does not think the defense of national identity would violate the basic value of democracy. He attempts to reconcile the tension between a shared national identity and equal status of religious minorities through providing a minimalist interpretation of equal citizenship. In this interpretation, Miller proposes a minimalist interpretation of equal citizenship which includes a minimalist interpretation of both the right of religious freedom and the principle of equal treatment. Following this interpretation, the protection and promotion of a shared national culture does not violate religious minorities' equal citizenship if minorities' right of religious freedom is protected and there is an equal treatment between different private religious cultures. And this conclusion is further based on Miller's interpretation of religious demands. According to Miller's discussion, religious demands are interpreted as demands either from individuals' faith commitments or from individuals' cultural commitments. While the former is protected by the right of religious freedom, the latter is protected by the principle of equal opportunity. According to his view, cultural commitments are normatively important because they are related to individuals' equal opportunity to pursue and realize their aims and ambitions. In the rest part of this chapter, I will examine Miller's claims in turn. Firstly, I will discuss Miller's defense of national identity by examining his claim on the inclusiveness of national identity and his claim on the functional value of national identity. Then, in the third part, I will focus the problems with Miller's understanding of religious demands. I will point out that his understanding is too narrow to provide a comprehensive understanding of the injustice that religious minorities have suffered from. And this narrow interpretation makes his minimalist interpretation of equal citizenship less convincing.

II. The problem of exclusion and three arguments

1. The problem of exclusion: two objections

In Miller's national republican theory, an important claim is that national identity can function as a de facto source of republican citizenship which is essential for stable and successful democratic politics. Then, there are two prerequisites for a national identity to be functional valuable in this sense. The first prerequisite is that the national identity should be sufficiently inclusive to all citizens of a political community. The second prerequisite is that a shared national identity itself is compatible with basic democratic value such as equal respect for persons who are minorities of the political community. However, in critics' views, national identity is exclusive and fails both prerequisites. There are two kinds of objections in this criticism.

The first objection is the objection of group partisanship. National identity is a group identity that is based on a distinction between "us" and "them". According to Miller's concept, a shared national identity contains a belief of belonging together among a group of people who have a shared history, are connected to a particular territory and are marked off from other communities by a distinct public culture. In this sense, a sense of belonging together is accompanied with a form of "othering" towards people who do not share the history and public culture and who are newcomers of the territory. When national identity is understood as an ethical identity which contains special ethical obligations towards and particular sentimental attachment with one's fellows, then the special obligations and sentimental attachment only extend to the person who are one of "us". In critics' view, when it comes to a political community, this exclusiveness is morally problematic in two ways.

Firstly, as Bernard Yack(2012, p. 213) and Bhikhu Parekh(1999, p. 317) mention in their discussions, the exclusiveness of national identity is criticized that it would induce a kind of moral blindness or moral indifference. Put it precisely, people who take their

shared national identity seriously would intend to give the well-beings of their national group a priority over the well-being of newcomers and might even ignore the newcomers' sufferings in the pursuit of their well-beings. Secondly, national identity does not merely contain a potential of moral blindness to outsiders but also contain a potential of hostility to outsiders and newcomers. According to the social identity theory, the sense of belonging to a group is usually associated with the other two elements. The first element is the positive group differentiation. In other words, the sense of belonging to a group contains a sense of positive and differentiated evaluation of the group. The positive differentiation leads to the second element of social group identity. That is, when a person feels belonging to a group, he/she would intend to protect the group status. These two elements can produce the intergroup bias.(Huddy and Del Ponte, 2020) When a national identity is marked by a distinct public culture, people who take their national identity seriously will have greater possibility to see outsiders or newcomers and the different culture brought by them as potential threats to their nation.(Parekh, 1999, pp. 317-318) Thus, the fact that a common national culture is conceptually compatible with the diversity of private cultures does not mean that there is no hostility towards incoming diversity.

Another problem with the group partisanship is that its ground is problematic when it comes to the concept of national identity. Jacob Levy(2017, p. 110) in his paper points out this problem. According to Miller's view, a national community is an imagining community and national identity is socially constructed. It means that the ground of group partisanship contained in the national identity is artificial. In other words, what people believe to be the facts that unite them together and what divide them from outsiders are artificial. In this social construction, as Levy suggests, there is a tendency to exaggerate "both internal commonality and external differences". And this exaggeration might lead to a distortion of people's understanding of themselves and their understanding of the others. This problematic ground of group partisanship leads us to the second objection against the exclusiveness of national identity. And this objection targets at the problem with the concept of identity itself and is called "the problem of essentialism".

According to Alan Patten's(2011, p. 736) definition, essentialism "consists in the identification of kinds in the natural or social world through the singling out of some relevant property (or set of such properties) that are possessed by all and only the individuals who belong to that kind". In the concept of national identity, a group of people is categorized by the possession of certain characteristics-such as an ethnicity or cultural traits. Understanding Miller's theory as a form of cultural nationalism, critics objects that the cultural concept of national identity suffers from the problem of cultural essentialism because his concept attributes certain cultural characteristics to individuals of a national group. As Margaret Moore(2020, p. 189) states in her discussion,

"If we assume that a characteristic is essential to being a member of a group, then this seems to extend the problematic logic of attributing that characteristic to everyone who is a member, which might exclude people from the group who (justifiably) see themselves as part of it, or attribute a characteristic to them that they do not share or would reject."

In Moore's statement, a cultural concept of national identity will tend to culturally homogenize individuals of the group. When it comes to Miller's national republican theory, the problem of essentialism is still challenging though he emphasizes that a shared national culture can co-exist with the diversity of private cultures. Through distinguishing public from private culture, Miller might provide a way out of the problem of homogenization, however, his theory might still suffer from the problem of oppressiveness. In other words, if a national identity is defined by a common public culture, this national identity will inevitably be oppressive to indigenous minorities who do not share the public culture. Put it precisely, those minorities might suffer from a moral pressure to assimilate into the public culture and disagreement with the public culture might be criticized as a disloyalty towards the nation.

With regard to those problems of exclusion, there are three arguments can be found in Miller's discussion that might provide possible replies to those objections. Firstly, Miller distinguishes his national republican theory from a normative nationalism. In this sense, Miller might reply to the first objection of group partisanship by arguing that the normative force of the national identity argument supported by his theory is restricted and therefore will avoid the problem of group partisanship. I will call it "the argument of restricted normativity". With regard to the objection of essentialism, Miller in his theory proposes a family resemblance account of national identity which, in his view, can avoid the problem of essentialism. The third argument can be found in Miller's theory is the argument of fluidity which I have demonstrated in the previous part. In this argument, Miller claims that national identity is fluid and national culture can be transformed across time. And this argument of fluidity is supported by Miller's claim on national majority's responsibility of cultural adjustment. In the following sections, I will examine these three arguments from Miller in turn and attempt to show that neither of these arguments can provide tenable replies to the problem of exclusion.

2. The argument of restricted normativity

The first argument that can be found is that although Miller takes national identity functionally valuable for democratic political community, he does not give the good of national identity a pre-political priority. According to Miller's statements, the functional value of national identity only suggests that an argument grounded in the value of national identity should be taken as a valid argument in democratic deliberations. In other words, religious immigrants should take this kind of reason into account when they make a claim, and their reasons should be weighed up against the good of national identity. Thus, even though majority can ground their arguments on the value of national identity, it does not mean that their claim can escape from the debate and deliberations. In this case, if religious immigrants can show that their

demands are rest on a more important value, then it is possible that their demands can still outweigh the majority's demands. Take the case of the demand of state-fund faith schools as an example. While majority can reject this demand by arguing that state-fund faith schools destroy their national culture in which the secularity of education is an important principle, religious minorities in turn can argue for the merits of faith schools to the large society. For example, they might argue that faith schools do not merely benefit religious believers whose academic flourishing will be promoted through religious education, but also benefit the whole society by helping cultivate democratic citizenship among children who are religious believers.¹³ In other words, while a shared national identity is functionally valuable for democratic politics, it is not the only thing that matters for democratic politics. In the case of faith schools, Miller's approach will facilitate a balance between different goods and a calculation between different costs. For example, the cost that establishment of state-fund faith schools will make through threatening the secular national culture will be balanced with the benefits that faith schools will contribute to democratic politics and to the political community as a whole.

However, this argument of restricted normativity is untenable when it comes to the cases concerning religious immigrants. As I have pointed out in the previous part, when Miller proposes the responsibilities of religious immigrants, he seems to provide a second line of argument. That is, religious immigrants should respect the national culture of the political community because they should respect the hosting political community's right of cultural self-determination. In other words, since the established national culture of the political community is a manifestation of citizens' cultural self-determination, religious immigrants, as newcomers of the nation, should respect the established national culture. Although the respect for the right of national majority's

¹³ In Ian MacMullen's book, he discusses such an argument for the religious schools. In this argument, proponents argue that religious schools can have more sources to cultivate democratic citizenship and therefore can contribute to civic education.

cultural self-determination does not mean that the demands derived from the established national culture are free from democratic deliberation, the reason grounded in the respect for the right of self-determination bears a much heavier weight than the reason grounded in the functional good of national identity. When national culture and its elements are regarded as the manifestation of the collective right of self-determination, it means that it can only be outweighed by other rights. In this sense, religious immigrants cannot defend their claims simply by referring to the merits of their claims but have to point out the claims are related to their rights, such as human rights or citizenship rights. According to his minimalist interpretation of human rights and citizenship rights, while Miller holds that national group has a right of cultural self-determination, his theory does not support a cultural right of minority groups. Thus, minority groups including religious immigrants only have restricted protection when their demands are in conflict with national majority's demands.

Take the faith school case as an example. If the secularity of education is taken as a manifestation of national majority's right of self-determination, then religious immigrants cannot support their demand of state-fund faith schools by claiming that religious education is beneficial but have to show that faith schools are essential to their basic human rights-such as right of religious freedom or right of education, or to their citizenship right-such as their equal democratic standing or equal opportunity. Due to Miller's minimalist interpretation of human rights and citizenship rights, it is possible that a great number of religious demands would fall beyond the protection of rights.

On the other hand, if cultural elements that constitute a national culture is taken as a manifestation of collective right, then it implies that religious immigrants will bear the burden of proof. In other words, when they demand of accommodation that includes positive support from the state or the changes or abolishment of existing rules or

norms, they bear the burden to prove either that the accommodation is essential part of their rights or that the accommodation would not destroy the national culture of the political community. Thus, combined with the second line of argument, i.e., the argument of right of cultural self-determination, the normative force of the national identity argument is not restricted as Miller states.

With regard to this problem, Miller can provide two replies. Firstly, Miller might claim that although national identity argument grounded in the right of cultural self-determination has a stronger normative weight, whether this argument can justify the majority's demand is debatable since the content of national identity itself is open to contestation. This reply is related to Miller's second argument against the exclusiveness of national identity. That is, the contestableness of national identity makes his theory avoid both the negative consequences of group partisanship and the problem of essentialism. The second reply that Miller might claim is that immigration minorities might not always be "newcomers" but can also integrate into the national community. Thus, they can defend their religious or cultural demands through showing that they are also members of the national community and therefore also own the right of cultural self-determination. This reply is related to the third argument proposed by Miller-namely, the argument of the fluidity of national identity. I will discuss these two replies in turn.

3. Family resemblance account and space for contestation

The second argument that Miller raises to object the problems of exclusion is based on Miller's interpretation of the concept of national identity. According to his interpretation, the content of national identity does not set in stone and is open to contestation. This interpretation has two implications. The first implication is that the national identity argument that is based on either the functional value of national identity or the right of cultural self-determination-does not provide unconditional protection of every element of the national culture. Thus, it is debatable whether

majority's demand of protecting or promoting a certain cultural element can be justified by the national identity argument itself. The second implication is that this interpretation of the concept of national identity can avoid the problem of essentialism. Since it does not reduce a national identity to several particular cultural traits, it is not oppressive to indigenous minorities.

3.1 The family resemblance account

In Miller's interpretation, he takes a common public culture which is usually referred to as "national character" as an element of a nation which mark off the national community from the other communities. However, Miller does not reduce the common public culture-namely, the national culture-to particular cultural traits that can define the membership of the national community. Following Wittgenstein's idea, Miller(1995, p. 27) states,

"Instead of believing that for any given nation there is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to that nation, we should think in terms of Wittgenstein's metaphor of a thread whose strength 'does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres'."

This interpretation is named as "the family resemblance account of national identity" by Margaret Moore. In Moore's understanding, this family resemblance account from Miller suggests that "for a group to share a 'public culture', it is not necessary that all of the members should subscribe to any one value or possess any particular cultural trait; it requires some degree (as yet unspecified) of shared values or beliefs, so that the members of the group all could be said to share a resemblance to one another, while not having any particular feature in common ".(2020, p. 193)

From Miller's discussion, we can see that his concept of national identity has several

features. The first feature is that national identity is composed by multiple components and no single component define the national identity. (Miller, 2020, pp. 33-34) Thus, when people are bound by a shared national culture, they are not bound by a particular element that is contained in a national culture. This feature has two implications. The first implication is that a person who does not display a certain culture trait or does not endorse a certain tradition or norm can still be a member of a national community. The second implication is that national identity would not disappear with the change of a particular element-such as a particular national tradition or norm. Although it is possible that people who are deeply attached with the element would feel frustrated, the frustration itself does not necessarily mean that the person will no longer feel attached to the national community.

The second feature is that members of a national group do not need to display or endorse all the elements in equal measure. (Miller, 1995, p. 26) This feature manifests in two aspects. On the one hand, different persons might feel attached to and identify himself/herself with the nation by different elements contained in a national culture. And regardless of their attachment to different elements, they can still recognize that all those different elements are part of their national culture and share a sense of belonging together. On the other hand, different persons might feel attached to a single element in different degrees. Take the Christianity cultural landscape as an example. Some people make view it as an important feature of their nation and express their national culture and history. And therefore, they feel deeply attached to it and this landscape make them feel at home. Nevertheless, it is possible that some other people feel less attached to this landscape.

The third feature is that the content of national identity can be unarticulated. (Miller, 1995, p. 27) In Miller's view, it is a common case that people feel hard to explicitly articulate what their national identity consists in or feel hard to assure whether a particular cultural element is essential to their national culture. And this

inarticulateness of the national identity leaves a room for different interpretations and contestation. That is to say, citizens can hold different interpretations of their national culture and give different elements different weights. When it comes to the particular element-such as the norm of the secularity of education/public space or the Christianity of public space-that leads to conflict between religious immigrants and national majority, whether the element is part of or is an essential part of the national culture is a debatable question open to contestation. And the national identity argument itself does not necessarily provide a pre-political justification for this element.

Through this family resemblance account, Miller's concept of national identity seems to avoid the problem of essentialism and is not oppressive to indigenous minorities. Following his theory, on the one hand, minorities are not forced to endorse or display every element that majority hold essential to national culture. And without displaying or endorsing a particular element would not expose them to the criticism of disloyalty. On the other hand, minorities can also contest on the content of a national identity with the majority.

3.2 The Individuation problem

Although the family resemblance account seems to provide a way out of the criticism of exclusion, however, it is still subject to several problems which make it less attractive as Miller supposes. The first problem is raised by Margaret Moore and is named as the individuation problem. According to Moore's(2020) view, the problem of individuation implies a paradox faced by Miller's family resemblance account. While Miller intends to free his concept of national identity from the problem of essentialism through multiplying and abstracting the constituents of national identity, however, his concept suffers from a problem to explain the way in which a culture is distinct and differentiated from the others. Put it in another way, since a national community is marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture, then a theory of

national identity has to explain in which sense a public culture is distinguished from the other cultures. This individuation is important in two aspects. Firstly, as Moore states, it is important for accounting for the cultural changes and culture loss. In other words, the concept of cultural change or cultural transformation or cultural loss is meaningful only if there are some threshold criteria for us to tell the existence of a culture. In other words, when we think there is some elements essential for a culture, then we can explain that a culture changes or disappears when the essential elements change or disappear. However, if Miller refuses that there is any element essential to a national culture, then he cannot explain the fact of the change of national culture or the crisis of national culture. Secondly, this individuation is important not only because of the need for conceptualizing cultural changes and loss, but also because of the need for the criterion of national membership. In other words, we need a threshold criterion to tell whether a person belongs to a national group. In other words, if Miller interprets a national group as a cultural group and takes cultural integration as a permissible aspiration or expectation, he has to explain how much cultural elements that a person needs to share in order to be a member of a national group.

With regard to this criticism, a possible reply from Miller is that he does not define a national identity by the sharing of a national culture. As I have already pointed out, in Miller's theory, the core of a national identity is a belief of belonging together rather than the fact of sharing a certain characteristic. And a shared national culture functions as a mark of a national community which make it distinguishable from the other communities. In other words, the membership of a national community is defined not by cultural characteristics but by mutual recognition. Following this idea, a person is a member of a national community as long as he/she is widely recognized by the others as a member regardless of the fact that he/she might not share every culture element as the others. In this sense, national identity is more a subjective concept in the sense that it depends on the beliefs of people within the group and is not an objective concept that can be defined by a set of objective features.

However, this reply does not provide a persuasive answer to the criticism. Following Miller's idea, whether a person is a member of a national community depends on the fact whether he/she is widely recognized as a member. However, the question left unanswered is that in which sense a person is recognized by the others as a fellow member. When it comes to the immigration minority, the question is that in which sense that an immigrant can be regarded by the others as being integrated and become a fellow national. When Miller interprets the national integration as a cultural integration, it seems that he still takes the sharing of the public culture as a criterion that people define their fellow nationals. Thus, as long as Miller takes the sharing of a culture as an important element of a national identity, then the paradox cannot be avoided and is difficult to dissolve.

A better way out of the paradox is to provide an alternative interpretation of national community and national identity. Bernard Yack(2012) in his work provides such an alternative account. Following Ernest Renan's idea, Yack defines a national community as a cultural heritage community rather than a cultural community. As Yack states,

"It is the affirmation of a shared inheritance of cultural artifacts, such as language, relics, symbols, stories of origin, memories of traumatic experiences, and so on, that links the members of nations to past and future generations." (2012, p. 69)

According to his view, in the concept of national identity, the source of the sentimental attachment and sense of belonging together is the affirmation of the shared cultural inheritance rather than the shared cultural practices, beliefs or expressions. Since cultural heritages are created through history, thus the sharing of history and past become a more important element for the national membership. In this sense, Yack's concept seems to be more exclusive than Miller's. According to his concept, a person who endorses the same cultural practices or beliefs might still be regarded as an

outsider if he/she does not share the cultural heritage. However, this sense of exclusiveness is not necessarily morally problematic. There are several advantages with this interpretation.

Firstly, while cultural heritages are produced across history, newcomers can be included into the national community by participating in creating the history—that is, by participating in creating new cultural heritages. This interpretation provides a better explanation for the national recognition since in the real-world context, simply sharing a cultural practice does not make a person being recognized by others as their fellow national. Secondly, the sharing of a cultural heritage is a value-free fact and cannot ground a moral criticism. In other words, there is nothing morally wrong with the fact that a newcomer does not share the cultural heritage of the hosting political community. Thus, this interpretation might be able to facilitate a more tolerant attitude towards newcomers and outsiders. Thirdly, sharing a cultural heritage does not require a positive evaluation of particular cultural practices or cultural beliefs. In other words, a person who can share the cultural heritage might merely affirm that the cultural artefacts express the past of his/her community and shapes the current community. In this sense, this concept is more inclusive to indigenous minorities who might hold critical view towards the cultural artefacts. Furthermore, this interpretation is more consistent with a critical self-reflection on one's national past and on the prevailed cultural practices and beliefs of the community. In other words, compared to Miller's cultural interpretation, this interpretation provides a better way to restrain the dark side of national identity. I will come back to this point in the final part of this chapter.

3.3 The problem of exclusionary contestation

In addition to the problem of individuation, there is another problem that is concerned with the limit of Miller's family resemblance account. That is, while his account might be able to rescue indigenous minorities from potential exclusion, it fails to tackle with

the exclusion faced by immigration minorities. Put it precisely, even though the content of national identity is open to contestation, the contestation itself can be exclusive to immigration minorities.

Miller claims that his interpretation of the concept of national identity can support the contestation on the exclusive elements of national culture and therefore leaves a room for potential cultural changes and transformation. However, even if the constituent of national identity is unarticulated and open to deliberations, the question is that his theory would make it difficult for newcomers to engage in this deliberation in a meaningful way. Miller attempts to avoid this problem through his idea of equal citizenship. In his view, citizenship right of minorities and newcomers contains the right to have equal standing in democratic deliberations. And the equal standing requires that minorities and newcomers have equal access to the democratic deliberations and their voices should be equal listened to and equally considered. However, it is hard to see that Miller's theory can truly provide a support for the equal standing of newcomers when it comes to the deliberations on the content of national culture. This problem lies in the distinction between us and them-that is, the distinction between fellows and strangers-embedded in Miller's national republican theory. It seems that Miller does not take this distinction normatively wrong and suggests that it is a fact of a national political community. According to his theory, this distinction cannot be eradicated unless "strangers" are culturally integrated and recognized as fellow nationals by the majority. However, if this kind of categorization is not regarded as normatively problematic in the sense that responsible citizens should avoid, then it is hard to see how newcomers can have equal discursive power in the deliberations on the content of national culture. If immigrants are regarded as strangers, it is hard to see that strangers' interpretations of "our" national culture can be persuasive in any sense. Majority might and is probably claim that they hold the power to interpret their national culture and immigrants, as newcomers, do not possess the equal power to interpret their national culture. It seems that only when immigrants are viewed as a part of "us" will the majority seriously consider their interpretations of the national culture. In this sense, even if the content of national

culture is open to contestation, it is the majority who leads and controls the deliberations on the content. When Miller's theory does not take the distinction between fellows and strangers as something problematic, his theory lacks sources to genuinely include immigrants into the deliberations on national culture.

4. The argument of fluidity and majority's responsibility

4.1 The paradox of fluidity

The third argument can be found in Miller's theory against the criticism of exclusion is Miller's claim on the fluidity of national identity. According to Miller's theory, since national identity is social constructed, its content can be reshaped across time. Thus, national culture itself is subject to cultural change and transformation. In Miller's view, this cultural transformation happens when cultural issues have been disputed and contested. In Miller's idea, the ideal way for the transformation of national culture is the process of democratic deliberation. Through a democratic deliberation between majority and minority group and through an exchange of their arguments, majority will further understand minority group's claim. And through a competition between different arguments, majority has to pay attention to minority's argument. If their arguments are strong, they will influence the final decision. It seems that in the process of deliberation, the possibility for a change of national culture lies in two aspects. Firstly, majority will get further understanding of minority's culture and it is possible for them to absorb some ideas from minority group. And in this sense, the common public culture of the community may be reshaped by this absorption. Secondly, the common public culture will be transformed if there are sufficient decisions on cultural issues that expresses majority's need.

However, Miller seems to be over-optimistic towards deliberation's effect on the

transformation of national culture. As I have shown in the last section, the contestation itself can be exclusionary. While Miller's theory does not provide a way to alleviate the exclusiveness, his theory might even strengthen the existing exclusion. Democratic deliberation in different context may lead to different result. In a state where there is a strong sense of national identity and a strong national tradition, it seems that Miller's idea will frustrate the transformation. I have already pointed out that Miller's nationalist justification will hinder an adequate and sincere conversation between majority and minority. Furthermore, if nationalist reason is truly a sound and strong reason, then it seems that, in a nation with strong tradition, majority can easily overturn minority's claim by insisting on the value of their national tradition.

In this case, it seems that the transformation of national culture in those communities will take place only if one of the following two conditions is met. Firstly, majority people in the political community become more open-minded when their traditions are challenged. They show more concern to minority's aspiration for cultural presentation in public space and are willing to make a concession though the cost is to change some part of their national tradition or to narrow the space of presentation of their national culture. In this case, it seems that emphasizing the significance of one's own national culture will lead to opposite direction to this situation.

Secondly, the changes may begin to take place when the minority group is expanded. Take Muslim group as an example. Both the increasing number of native believers and an increasing number of immigrants will expand Muslim minority group. In other words, when the difference between members of majority and those of minority group is reduced, the force from the minority will be strengthened and therefore imposes a larger pressure on majority group. And in this case, majority might make a concession. In addition, the growing force might not only come from the increasing numbers of affiliate members but from the degree of the minority's activeness in public space. However, in both conditions, before the changes taking place, the

division and conflict between majority and minority will be amplified.

Those difficulties in the transformation of national culture in certain context reveal a paradox in Miller's theory. On the one hand, Miller thinks that his concept of national identity shows that a national community is not so exclusive as its opponents hold because national culture can be transformed, and minority can contribute to this transformation through participating in the public deliberations on issues concerning the national culture or tradition. However, on the other hand, his nationalist argument which holds that for the value of national identity provides majority group a sound reason to sustain their national tradition by granting it precedence or restricting the changes of the tradition. In this sense, his nationalist justification itself is a barrier for the transformation of national culture. And this paradox will make Miller's claim appear to be hypocritical.

4.2 A partial interpretation of "exclusiveness"

With regard the paradox of fluidity of national identity, a possible reply from Miller is that his theory provides a more substantive support for cultural changes especially when the disputed element of national culture is exclusive. In Miller's theory, he does not merely emphasize the responsibilities of newcomers, but also emphasizes the responsibilities of the national majority. As I have pointed out, in his view, national majority who aspires for the integration of religious immigrants should also understand the importance of the private culture for religious immigrants and should be willing to adapt their national culture to accommodate the religious immigrants. Thus, national majority should also listen to religious immigrants' voices and take their important interests into considerations. And they should also be willing to sacrifice themselves to accommodate the immigration minorities. According to the idea of the majority's responsibility, although national identity argument can provide justification for majority's claim, it is restricted by their responsibility towards the newcomers.

However, it is still hard to see how Miller's idea of majority's responsibility can truly support cultural adjustment and transformation. There are two problems here. The first problem is that the responsibility is too weak to support an active cultural adjustment. While Miller claims that national majority has the responsibility to adjust the exclusive elements of their national culture which might hinder the integration, he does neither provide a criterion for the exclusiveness of an element nor specifies who can be the adjudicator of the exclusiveness of the element. From Miller's own discussion, it seems that Miller holds a rather loose interpretation of the exclusiveness of the element. In his discussion of religious symbols such as the crucifixes displayed in Italian school classrooms, Miller objects to Martha Nussbaum's claim that religious symbols in this type convey a message of marginalization or subordination of other religious groups. In Miller's interpretation, crucifixes are understood as part of Italian cultural heritage and does not convey an exclusionary message as Nussbaum suggests(2016b, p. 170). A similar view is held towards other religious symbols such as the Christian steeples. In Miller's discussion on Swiss minaret case, the construction of minarets cannot be justified by the principle of equal treatment between minarets and Christian steeples. According to his view, Christian steeples are also Swiss cultural heritages and do not convey a message of subordinated status of Muslims. Following this idea, it seems that religious elements of a national culture which are viewed as exclusive by newcomers or religious minorities can be interpreted as a cultural heritage and therefore are not exclusive. It seems that Miller holds a contextual interpretation of exclusiveness However, when he interprets the context, Miller interpret it from the majority's perspective rather than from the immigration minority's perspective. Thus, his interpretation of exclusiveness is bound to favor the national majority. This interpretation would not encourage the majority's self-reflective attitudes but would even hinder majority's critical examination of their own national culture. In this sense, Miller's partial interpretation does not support his idea of majority's responsibility of cultural adjustment. A second feature in Miller's understanding is that Miller seems to take a culturalized religious symbol as nonexclusive.

With regard to this problem, a way for Miller's theory to cope with this problem is to distinguish majority's obligation from majority's responsibility. This distinction is based on a distinction between permissible exclusion and impermissible exclusion. Permissible exclusion refers to exclusion that is not normatively wrong. In the cases of the religious symbols, while those religious symbols are experienced by religious minorities as exclusive, this kind of exclusion is permissible as long as minorities' right of equal citizenship is protected. In other words, protecting and promoting certain religious elements of a national culture can be justified by national identity argument and therefore is permissible. In this condition, majority is not morally obliged to refrain from promoting those elements. However, this claim is compatible with the claim that majority in this case still bear responsibilities to actively adjust the exclusive elements of their national culture in a way that can accommodate the private cultures of religious immigrants. In other words, even though the exclusive elements are permissible, they do cause obstacles for religious immigrants to integrate into the national culture of the political community. Majority who aspire for cultural integration would have interest in adjusting their national culture. However, this interpretation still suffers from another two problems.

4.3 Ungrounded responsibility

The first problem is that it is hard to see who one's aspiration can ground a responsibility. While majority might expect or aspire for cultural integration, they might think that the responsibility of integration lies in the immigrants' side. When Miller claims that both national majority and immigrants bear responsibilities to each other, he does not clearly state how the responsibilities are distributed. If cultural integration is an expectation or aspiration in a political community, the question is that whether it is the immigration minority's responsibility to integrate into the dominant culture or the majority's responsibility to adjust their own national culture to accommodate minorities. Put it precisely, when there are exclusive elements involved in a national culture, it is a question whether national majority should firstly eliminate the exclusive elements to make it easier for religious immigrants to integrate, or

religious immigrants should firstly eschew their private culture in order to show respect to the dominant culture. Miller's emphasis on the importance of national identity and right of cultural self-determination, along with his minimalist interpretation of equal citizenship, seems to suggest that it is the religious immigrants who bear heavier burden to integrate into the national culture of a political community.

A possible reply from Miller might be that majority's responsibility is grounded in his idea of republican citizenship. That is, responsible citizens who commit to promote the common good would take others' interests seriously. In this sense, responsible majority would also take immigrants' interests seriously. However, this reply is not tenable. If national identity is the de facto source of a republican citizenship, then it is hard to see that majority would take newcomers who they viewed as strangers as the subject of their republican responsibilities. According to Miller's theory, the social bond and interpersonal trust are grounded in a shared national identity. In other words, people who share a same national identity would feel attached to their co-nationals in the way that they would be willing to consider their co-nationals' interests and willing to sacrifice themselves for their co-nationals. If the source of the social solidarity is a shared national identity, then the bond only exists among co-nationals. In this sense, while responsible national majority would respect the equal citizenship of religious immigrants, they might not feel socially bounded to religious immigrants who are viewed as strangers to their community. Put it shortly, when Miller takes national identity as the de facto source of social solidarity, he has to appeal to alternative sources to prove that national majority in his political community would be responsible to newcomers in the way as Miller describes. Thus, it is the second problem with Miller's idea of majority's responsibility of cultural adjustment. That is, his national republican theory cannot provide a motivational ground for majority's responsibilities.

To summarize, Miller's national republican theory can neither provide a normative

ground nor a motivational ground for his idea of majority's responsibility of cultural adjustment. In order to ground this kind of responsibility, there are three strategies can be taken. The first strategy is to disclose the undesirableness of permissible exclusions. In other words, while some exclusive elements are permissible in terms that they do not infringe on religious immigrants' right of equal citizenship, they still involve something morally wrong that majority should be responsible to adjust them. The second strategy is to provide a criterion of inclusive national identity and restricts the application of national identity argument to inclusive national identity. Cecile Laborde(2008), Sune Laegaard(2017) and Patti Tamara Lenard(2020) endorses this strategy. Through providing an interpretation of exclusiveness or a criterion of an inclusive national identity that is more sensitive to minorities, their theories provide a more convincing normative ground for majority's responsibility of cultural adjustment. In addition, the third strategy is to provide another source of social solidarity which can provide a motivational ground for majority's responsibility towards immigration minorities. In other words, while national identity provides a social bond within a national group, there is another kind of bond that can be built between national majority and immigration minorities.

III. Miller's culturalization of religion and its problems

1. Two aspects of Miller's culturalization of religion

In the previous part, I have discussed the criticism towards the exclusiveness of national identity argument and three of Miller's arguments that might provide replies to those criticism. I have shown that neither of those arguments can provide a persuasive reply. The previous discussion is focused on the problem of exclusion with Miller's theory in a more general aspect. However, Miller's national republican theory, as an approach to cope with the challenge of religious diversity, can be exclusive to religious groups not merely because the concept of national identity is exclusive, but also because Miller's understanding of religion is problematic. There is a culturalization of religion in Miller's understanding. By saying that Miller culturalizes the religion, I do

not mean that he defines religion as a form of culture. Instead, it means that Miller interprets the challenge brought by religious diversity as a cultural challenge. In this sense, the religious diversity that he is concerned with is interpreted as a diversity of private cultures. And the disputed religious issues reflect conflicts between different cultures. Put it precisely, the culturalization of religion in Miller's theory manifests in following two aspects.

Firstly, as I have mentioned, when Miller discusses the religious demands, he categorizes religious commitments into two groups-that is, faith commitments and cultural commitments. According to his strict interpretation of human right of religious freedom, faith commitments are commitments derived from religious doctrines. According to Miller's(2016a) discussion on the necessity of minarets to practicing the Islamic faith, he endorses a relatively objective interpretation of religious faith. In other words, whether a commitment is a faith commitment depends not on the individual's subjective conviction but depends on the "authoritative body of doctrine" that is demonstrated through the religious texts or by the interpretations from religious leaders. And commitments that are not directly derived from religious doctrines are regarded as cultural commitments though the individual might take it as his/her religious faith. In Miller's theory, religious demands as cultural commitments are protected not because of the value of freedom of conscience but because of the value of individual's equal opportunity to realize his/her aims and ambitions. Whether one's equal opportunity is infringed depends on whether one would bear unreasonable cost to pursue his/her aims or ambitions. Thus, while the infringement on one's religious conscience is morally wrong, the infringement on one's cultural commitments is not necessarily morally wrong. The moral judgment of the latter is subject to the balance between the competing costs. Through distinguishing the cultural dimension of religious commitments from faith dimension, Miller's theory leaves more room for restraining individuals' religious commitments without implying any value judgment on a religious faith.

Secondly, the culturalization of religion in Miller's theory does not merely manifest in his interpretation of religious commitments, but also manifest in his justification of religious establishment. According to his view, religious establishment is justified when two conditions are met. Firstly, the establishment does not infringe the idea of equal citizenship-that is, it does not violate religious minorities' human rights and citizenship rights. Secondly, the established religion itself is a public good and is a part of the national culture or national tradition.(Miller, 2019) The culturalization of religion here manifests in two aspects. In the first aspect, the establishment of an official religion does not necessarily suggest a metaphysical affirmation of the truth of a religious doctrine. Instead, it might merely a continuation of a cultural tradition in which a religious organization is taken as a public institution. In other words, it can be an affirmation of the importance of a national tradition for a political community. Secondly, the culturalization also manifests in Miller's interpretation of religious symbols. Apart from Miller's discussion on a privileged status of a religious organization, he also discusses a second type of religious establishment, namely the symbolic establishment which a religious symbol or a set of religious symbols are given privileges over the other religious symbols. The paradigm cases include the Crucifix displayed in public school classrooms in Italy and the Christmas as a public holiday in many Western countries. In Miller's discussion, all these religious symbols are interpreted as cultural symbols which convey no doctrinal meanings but merely cultural meanings. In other words, they are regarded as cultural markers of the national identity of a political community.

However, both of these two forms of culturalization are problematic. In this part, I will focus on the second form of culturalization. That is, when Miller intends to justify the religious establishment through the national identity argument, he ignores that this culturalization might act as a legitimate cloak for the bias and prejudice among majority towards religious minorities. And this culturalization might intensify rather than alleviate the conflict between majority and minorities. This critical discussion of the culturalization of the majority's religion further reveals the problem with Miller's culturalization of religious commitments. That is, the culturalization of religion in this

aspect discloses his narrow understanding of religious identity. In the last part of this chapter, I will examine his interpretations by exploring the ignored dimension of religious identity.

2. The oppressive disarticulation of religiosity

From the discussion above, I have shown that Miller claims that majority's demand of a privileged status of a religion can be justified by the national identity argument. In this justification, what they claim for a privileged status is not a religion as a faith or doctrine, but a religion as a culture. Through this culturalization of religion, Miller's national identity argument provides a justification for weak or symbolic religious establishment. The first problem is that this culturalization involves a process of disarticulation of religiosity of religious objects including religious symbols, religious organizations and religious identity. Put it precisely, in this process of disarticulation of religiosity, a religious symbol loses its religious meaning and is interpreted as a cultural symbol. Evidence of this process of disarticulation can be seen in Susanna Mancini's(2009) paper. In Mancini's paper, she provides a detailed explorations of several controversial cases about the presence of religious symbols in public space including the Italian and Bavarian crucifix cases, the French veil case and the British jilbab case.

According to Mancini's discussion, an example of this culturalization is manifested in the interpretation of crucifix from the Bavarian Supreme Court. In this interpretation, the crucifix displayed in public school classrooms is not an expression of a religious conviction of confession but is "an essential object of the general Christian-occidental tradition and common property of the Christian-occidental cultural circle".(Mancini, 2009, p. 2633) This kind of disarticulation of religiosity is also manifested in Miller's discussion of the church establishment. In Miller's view, an established church that is granted a privilege status is not viewed as a religious organization but viewed as a public institution serving the public interests. In other words, the privileges are not

granted to a church as an organization of a particular religion but to a church as a public institution whose role as a public-service-provider is established in a national tradition. Thus, the church establishment in this sense is not an establishment of a religion as a faith or doctrine and therefore does not infringe on the political secularity. Accompanied with culturalizing the meaning or function of religious symbols and religious organizations, there is also a culturalization of religious identity. That is to say, a religious identity, i.e., the Christian identity, is not interpreted as an identity defined by the Christian faith or doctrine, but as a national identity defined by a shared national culture. In other words, the Christian identity embodies a belonging to a nation rather than a commitment to a faith.

In this disarticulation of religiosity, a religious symbol, institution and identity is secularized. A problem here is that it might infringe on the religious autonomy of a religious community. In other words, in this culturalization of religion, the religious believers are deprived of their power to determine the meaning of religious symbols, organizations and identities. Mancini in her discussion points out this problem by referring to the disagreement from Catholic communities against the culturalized interpretation of crucifix. In those Catholic believers' view, crucifix is, in its nature, a religious symbol of "salvation for all believers who recognize in it the manifestation of divine love" and it cannot be reduced to a mere cultural symbol of European civilization. (Mancini, 2009, p. 2635) In the Catholic and Protestant Churches' pronouncement of resistance against the Swiss minaret prohibition, we can also see an implicit resistance against the culturalization of religious symbols. In this pronouncement, both Islamic minarets and Christian bell towers are defined as signs of "the public presence of a religion".(Mazzoleni, 2016, p. 55) In other words, Christian believers do not interpret the Christian bell towers as simply a cultural heritage of the Swiss nation but as symbols that convey religious values. According to their view, the public presence of the Christian symbols represents the compatibility between Christian values and democratic values in Switzerland. Furthermore, the culturalization of a religious identity has also been resisted by religious believers. It is evident in the Catholic Church's resistance against the culturalized and secularized

interpretation of Christian identity. In Olivier Roy's(2016) paper, he points out that while the Catholic Church affirms the Christian nature of European countries, they reject to interpret the Christian identity as a secularized cultural identity. As Roy states,

“The Catholic Church is explicit on this point: Europe is Christian, but by letting a secular culture become dominant, it has betrayed its Christian nature.....The key point for the Catholic Church is thus that a Christian identity without a Christian faith does not make sense, that identity is a consequence of faith; of course, there could be a kind of ‘secularization’ of Christian values, but a culture that relies on values antagonistic to Christian values is not a Christian identity, but is ‘apostasy’.”(2016, p. 194)

With regard to this criticism, a possible reply is that while this criticism targets at the rationale of state courts' decisions or the ideologies of radical parties, Miller's theory is not subject to this criticism. In Miller's theory, the national identity argument can provide a justification for the protection of the appearance of some religious symbols or the privileged status of a particular religious institutions. His theory aims to articulate the fundamental rationale of the justification rather than provide an interpretation of the religious symbols or religious institutions. In other words, while the privileges are justified by the cultural role of the religious symbols or institutions, Miller does not reduce religion to a component of a national culture. As I have mentioned at the beginning of this part, When Miller interprets religious diversity as a diversity of private cultures, this interpretation is derived from his understanding of the most challenging question brought by religious diversity. Take the Christian bell towers as an example. While Christian believers might demand of protecting bell towers out of their aim of protecting the presence of Christian faith in public space, it is consistent with the approval of their demand grounded in the cultural significance of bell towers. In other words, the justification grounded in the cultural significance of religious symbols provides a reason for religious minorities to accept this demand rather than provides a guidance for Christian believers to understand their own

religious symbols.

However, this reply discloses a problem with Miller's approach. That is, when Miller provides a normative defense of the national identity argument, he ignores the context and effect of the discourse in the real-world politics and therefore is insensitive to the difficulties that religious groups suffer from in the reality. Here, the culturalization of religious issues makes Miller's theory insensitive to the negative effects of the national identity discourse on the conservative branches within the majority's religion. For example, the culturalized interpretation of Christian religious symbols and Christian identity is a manifestation of the traditional approach of the secularization and privatization of religion. In this view, religious elements are allowed to have public presence only when they are cultural. While this view is more acceptable to Protestant branches of Christianity, it is hard to accept for conservative Christians such as Catholics and Evangelical Christians. And it is part of the reason why the political initiative grounded in the national identity discourse and aiming to restrain religious immigrants has been criticized and resisted not merely by religious immigrants but also by indigenous religious communities. Their objection partly presents their resistance to the privatization of religion and the secularization of public sphere. Thus, when challenges of religious diversity are understood simply as cultural challenges brought by immigration, Miller's approach ignores the internal complexity of religious issues.

3. The culturalized "us" and politicized "others"

In addition to the neglect of internal discrimination within majority's religion embedded in the national identity narrative, there is a second problem related to Miller's neglect of real-world context of the national identity narrative. That is, the de-contextualization makes Miller's theory insensitive to the discrimination and xenophobia towards the religious minorities cloaked by the national identity argument in the real-world politics. In other words, the culturalization of religion embedded in

the national identity narrative in real-world context is biased and it reflects a discriminatory understanding towards majority's religion and immigration minority's religion. This bias manifests in two aspects.

In the first aspect, in the national identity narrative, the culturalization of majority's religion expresses a more positive understanding of majority's religion. In Mancini's discussion, she points out another argument raised by the Italian courts in their justification of the display of crucifix in public school classroom. That is, the crucifix not only expresses the affinity between "the essential core of Christianity" and "the essential core of the Italian Constitution", but also "reminding schoolchildren of the transcendent foundation of such principles, which shape the secular character of the State". (Mancini, 2009, p. 2639) In other words, in addition to the secularization of majority's religion, there is another rationale contained in the national identity narrative. That is, as an important component of national culture, Christianity performs not merely as a cultural heritage of Western countries but also as the origin of Western liberal democratic values. As Mancini states, the justification implies a positive evaluation of majority's religion in terms that "Christianity, unlike other denominations, is naturally inclusive and contains the ideas of tolerance and freedom, which constitute the basis of a secular state".(Mancini, 2009, p. 2641)

However, this positive understanding of Christianity exaggerates the affinity between majority's religion and democratic values and selectively ignores the conflict between them. For example, the positive understanding of Christianity ignores the disputed cases around the right of abortion and the legitimacy of homosexual marriages which exemplifies the conflict between Christian faith and liberal values. As Roy points out, in Pop Benedict's understanding of Christian identity, Christian identity "is not just cultural, but is linked to respect of Catholic norms and values, especially those concerning 'life' and 'the family'" and the respect for those values embodies in the rejection of "abortion, gay marriage, euthanasia, medically assisted procreation and

so on".(Roy, 2016, p. 194) Thus, when crucifix or bell towers are interpreted as religious symbols that express Christian-originated democratic values, this positive understanding selectively ignores the conflicting part of Christian values.

This selective ignorance of the incoherent aspects of majority's religion does not emerge naturally but is proposed when it is compared to the immigration minorities' religions. Then, it leads us to the second aspect of the biased culturalization. That is, the positive evaluation of majority's religion is accompanied with a negative image of minority's religion. While the national identity narrative exaggerates the affinity between Christianity and democratic values, minority's religion-Islam, in particular-is shaped as incompatible with liberal democracy. In other words, the rationale is not that "Christianity, per se, is the origin of and therefore is compatible with Western democratic values" but is that "Christianity overlaps with democratic values while the other religions-especially Islam-do not".

The biased understanding of minority's religion manifests in two aspects. In the first aspect, minority's religious symbols are selectively interpreted as an expression of religious values that contradict with democratic values. For example, in the French veil case, the Muslim veils are interpreted as a manifestation of oppression of women. This interpretation assumes that Muslim women are bound to be lack of autonomy because of her religious faith. In other words, in this interpretation, it is the religion rather than men who oppresses women. In Mancini's(2009) discussion on French veils case, she points out this irony. In a case, a Moroccan woman who married to a French citizen was refused French nationality because of her wearing of burqa in public space. In the decision, it is argued that the woman's wearing of burqa is a practice of religion that violates the principle of gender equality. In other words, it shows that the woman refuses to embrace the French republican values. However, while there is criticism against the women's wearing of burqa, there is lack of concerns towards the husband's compliance with the French republican values. In Mancini's discussion, she provides

another case which also shows that how the interpretation of minority's religion is discriminatory. In her discussion on British jilbab case, Mancini mentions that the school's prohibition of wearing jilbab is supported by the House of Lords and the rationale behind the support is the claim that wearing jilbab reflects the religious pressure on children from their family and religious community. The prohibition is regarded as a protection of children from those pressures. However, this judgment of jilbab is discriminatory and reflects a double standard in Mancini's view. As she states,

"No judge has ever ruled that it is illegitimate for a Catholic family to impose on its children to attend Sunday Mass, even if they would prefer to spend the day differently. When it comes to Islam, however, judges and legislators seems to feel a greater necessity to protect children's rights.....Islamic symbols are automatically associated with negative values and conceptions and considered as potential threats to the rights of the others."(Mancini, 2009, p. 2652)

The selectively negative interpretation of Islamic symbols and practices reflects a trend of painting Islam as a religion that is necessarily intolerant oppressive, anti-democratic and more generally speaking, anti-Western. This biased negative understanding of Islam partly lies in the suspicions in Western world towards Islamic culture. Since Islamic culture is viewed as originated in authoritarian countries where there is lack of separation between religion and politics, then Islamic culture is understood as illiberal, anti-democratic and destructive to political secularity. Thus, Islamic culture is not merely viewed as foreign culture or strangers' culture but also hostile culture. And Muslims who are sincerely committed to Islamic practices or norms are suspected as persons who refuse to integrate into the democratic community and resist the liberal democratic values regardless of the efforts that they have made in integrating into the political community.

In the second aspect, the biased understanding of minority's religion also manifests in the politicization of minority's religion. The politicization of religion refers to the perception of a religion as a radical political ideology which necessarily contains a political goal of imposing religious values and traditions on the other people of the society. While the appearance of the majority's religion in the public space is understood as a cultural tradition, the appearance of minority's religion is understood as an expression of a political goal. This politicization is evident in the Swiss minaret case. According to Todd Green's(2010) discussion on the Swiss minaret ban, the view that minarets are political symbols which convey a message of Islamist domination prevails among Swiss public, anti-minarets campaigners as well as the initiative committee. While local residents described adhan as a political tool to impose Islam on non-Muslims, the initiative committee also holds that minarets are symbols of political power that express the domination of Sharia Law. On the contrary, however, Church bells are depicted as cultural symbols that express Western Christian cultural heritages.

Thus, in the public discussions on the issues regarding conflicting demand from majority and religious minorities, the national identity narratives do not merely contain a normative justification for protecting a national culture but also contain biased and discriminatory understandings toward the majority's and minority's religion. In the real-world context, the national identity narratives have close connection with the radical political parties-i.e., the far-right parties which are anti-immigration and hostile to religious immigrants especially the Muslim immigrants.(Marzouki and McDonnell, 2016; Roy, 2016; Joppke, 2018) When they defend the presence of majority's religion in public space, the majority's religious objects are not merely interpreted as cultural symbols that express Christian cultural heritage but also viewed as symbols that differentiate "us" who are democratic citizens from "the others" who are potential enemies of democratic community. As Mancini(2009, p. 2664) suggests, the imposition of majority symbols in public sphere is structured "as a reaction against Islam cast as 'the other'". In other words, the national identity narratives are used to build "a sharp antagonism between Islam and

the West”.

From the discussions above, we can see that while Miller’s approach defends the national identity argument, his theory ignores the dark sides behind the revival of national identity narratives in the public discussions around religious issues. In other words, in public discussion, the usage of national identity argument is associated with a prior prejudice and bias towards religious others. However, as I have shown in the previous part, Miller’s national republican approach, in fact, favors the majority over the minority. According to his theory, in terms of integration, it is the immigration minority who bears greater responsibility to win the recognition from the majority rather than the majority who bear responsibility to accommodate the private cultures of religious immigrants. It is hard to see how a theory that favors the biased majority can provide a way to combat the dark sides of the national identity narratives in the real-world politics.

With regard to this criticism, Miller might argue that his theory, actually, is constructed out of a realistic understanding of the real-world context. According to his theory, a common national identity is the de facto source of the social solidarity and interpersonal trust; and the national identity is defined by mutual recognition. Thus, the most efficient way to eliminate the suspicion, fear and hostility towards the religious immigrants-Muslim groups in particular is to facilitate the majority to recognize the religious immigrants as their fellow nationals rather than foreign strangers. Following this view, the most efficient and realistic way to reduce the bias and prejudice is to let the immigration minorities to show their efforts in integrating into the democratic community and show their loyalty to the political community. Only in this way can the radical political parties lose their ground of anti-immigration and the ground of anti-Islam. However, even though this concern is reasonable, it can only support a prudential reason but not a persuasive normative reason for religious immigrants to bear greater responsibility. If the existing bias and prejudice contained

in the national identity narratives are morally problematic, then the prior task of a political theory is to facilitate a critical reflection on the national identity narratives rather than to provide them a normative defense.

Finally, there is another more fundamental problem with Miller's culturalization of religion-that is, the problem with Miller's interpretation of the challenge of religious diversity as a cultural challenge. As I have demonstrated in the first part of this chapter, Miller's approach is focused on the post-immigration religious diversity which he interprets as a kind of cultural diversity. This interpretation has two implications. Firstly, the challenge is understood as the question how a democratic community that is bound by a shared national culture can sustain in face of the challenge of incoming cultural diversity. And how much space a democratic community can accommodate religious diversity is understood as how much space it can accommodate strange private cultures. Secondly, the majority's mistrust and prejudice towards the religious immigrants are understood as being derived from their mistrust and suspicion towards the private cultures which they are unfamiliar with and view as foreign and threatening.

However, this culturalization of religion loses an important and distinctive feature with religious diversity. That is, when the post-immigration religious diversity becomes a worry for some people, their worries do not merely lie in their concerns toward foreign culture but also in their concerns of the religious revival which they regard as a consequence of immigration. Religious revival refers to the crease of "the public visibility of religion in terms of religious dress and practice, the construction of new temples, the density of religious organizations, and religious mass media".(Altinordu, 2010, p. 522) This religious revival is regarded as a threat to the political secularity which is viewed as a fundamental principle of democratic community. When the religion with a growing public visibility is a religion of immigrant groups, this concern becomes even more salient. This worry can be seen in the national identity narrative in the public discussion. In this narrative, the public presence of majority's religion-i.e.,

Christianity-is not viewed as a threat. It is not merely because the religious objects are viewed as cultural objects, but also because Christianity which is originated and has co-existed in the Western democracies is regarded as, in Green's term, a religion "that understands its place in Western liberal democracies".(Green, 2010, p. 636) By contrast, as I have already mentioned, the immigrated religion-such as Islam-which is taken to be originated in non-liberal countries without a separation between religion and politics becomes a major concern. The background worry toward religious revivals explains the division between radical political parties and religious communities in the public discussions on accommodating minority's religion. As Roy(2016) shows, the Christian communities including both Protestant and Catholic communities keep distance from radical political parties though those parties announce that their initiatives are grounded on the protection of Christian identity. In Swiss minaret case and French Muslims veils case, Christian communities hold a supportive attitude towards Muslims' demands. In their views, the wearing of Islamic veils and minarets are expressions of religious belief and therefore should be respected. The Christian communities keep distance from radical political parties and hold opposite positions to their initiatives not only because of the anti-immigration and xenophobia associated with radical political parties but also because of the insistence of strict secularization and the hostility to religions in general embedded in the radical political ideologies.

Thus, if Miller takes the post-immigration religious diversity as the main concern of his approach, his interpretation of this form of religious diversity as a cultural diversity makes him fail to pay enough attention to the challenge to the secularity of democratic community that the post-immigration religious diversity is thought to bring about.

IV. Equal citizenship and the ignored dimension of religious identity

1. The problem with the deprivation of defining power

In the previous part, I have argued that in the real-world public discussion, the national

identity narratives are associated with a discriminatory interpretation of majority's and minority's religion. In addition to a biased interpretation of minority's religion, there is another problem. That is, it seems that the interpretations of minority's religious practices and objects-including the interpretation of what religious value they express and what kind of message they intend to send-are determined by the majority rather than the religious minorities. In the previous section, I have pointed out that the culturalization of majority's religion that contains a process of disarticulation of religiosity deprive the majority's religious communities of the power to define their own religious objects and religious identity. Similarly, here, the religious minorities are also deprived of the power to define and interpret their own religions. In Cecile Laborde's(2022) criticism against Miller's position on Swiss minaret case, she holds a similar view. As she states, the Swiss minaret ban was established in the background context where "Muslims in Switzerland had no control over how their religion was portrayed"(2022, p. 142).

With regard to this problem, Miller might argue that his theory does not deprive of the religious minorities' power since his theory insists that it is a question subject to public deliberation and should be decided through democratic deliberation. Thus, while majority can base their opposition on a negative understanding of minority's religious practices and objects, religious minorities can also defend the presence of their religion by providing a positive interpretation. However, this reply does not solve the problem since in Miller's theory he clearly states that when disagreement persists and no consensus is arrived, the final decision should be made through voting. In other words, it is the majority who will make the final determination though their opinions can be changed by the religious minorities through public deliberations.

There is another reply here. That is, in those controversies, majority's perception of the minority's religion matters and should be taken seriously. In other words, when religious minorities interpret their religious symbols and practices in a more positive

way, majority can still oppose to it if they believe that those practices and symbols convey negative and destructive meanings. However, why should majority's perceptions matter more than religious minorities' definitions? There are two possible arguments.

The first argument is that majority's perceptions matter because the wrongness lies in the fact that minority religious practices or objects might harm the majority by offending their sensibilities. This argument can be seen in the French veil case and the British jilbab case. For example, as Mancini(2009, p. 2651) points out, one argument of the British school which prohibit jilbab is that majority students and teachers would feel insecure and uncomfortable "in presence of clothes that are generally associated with fundamentalism". Similar argument also appeared in the Swiss minaret case. The opponents of minarets claim that minarets would change the Christian landscape and harms the majority in the sense that they would no longer feel at home in the presence of the changed landscape.

However, with regard to this argument, there are two problems. Firstly, the argument assumes that people's psychological feelings morally matter. In other words, psychological harm is morally problematic and the act offend one's psychological feelings is morally wrong. However, even if this assumption is tenable, it is doubtful that a psychological harm that is derived from a misperception also morally problematic. This argument is even more doubtful if the misperception is caused by a widespread bias or discrimination. Secondly, this argument suggests an unequal treatment between majority and minority. While in those cases, opponents claim that majority's sensibilities are morally matter and should not be offended, they do not think the minority's sensibilities have the same moral weight. For example, in the crucifix case, proponents of the crucifix claim that the display of crucifix does not convey a message of exclusion or a message of the unequal status of religious minorities and secular persons regardless of the fact that the display of crucifix might

make them feel being excluded. Thus, if psychological feeling morally matters and offense in this form constitutes a harm that is morally problematic, it is doubtful why only majority's feelings matter.

Miller's approach replies to this criticism through two arguments. As I have already shown, the first argument is that what Miller takes morally problematic here is not the psychological harm but the value of national identity. There are two interpretations here. The first interpretation is that majority's psychological feelings matter when they are associated with their identification with the nation. For example, the presence of Islamic clothes or veils and the presence of minarets in the public space might make them unable to feel at home in this piece of land and weaken their identification with the nation. However, as I have already discussed in the previous part, the national identity argument itself cannot defend majority's psychological feelings since it is unclear that people will truly be unable to identify with the nation simply because the presence of unfamiliar religious objects though it might cause temporary negative feelings. The second interpretation is that what relevant here is not majority's feelings but the fact that a shared national culture is the basis of a shared national identity. In the previous part, I have already examined this argument and pointed out that this argument is untenable. In short, it is doubtful to think that the presence of minority's religion will destroy the national culture unless there is something essential to the national culture-such as the secularity of public space-that the presence will do harm to. However, once we think there is an essential principle or feature of a national culture, then the national identity characterized by the national culture will be subject to the criticism of essentialism.

2. Two replies and the problems with Miller's idea of equal citizenship

From the discussion above, the other problem with the national identity narrative in the public discussion is that religious minorities are deprived of the power to defining the meaning of their own religious practices and religious objects which are presented

in the public realm. There is a lack of persuasive justification for this deprivation and the national identity argument itself cannot provide a tenable justification. However, there is a second reply provided in Miller's approach. That is, according to Miller's theory, he might claim that this deprivation does not infringe on the equal citizenship of religious minorities. On the one hand, since Miller holds a minimalist interpretation of human right of religious freedom, he might claim that the power to define the public meaning of religious practices and objects is not essential for a person to exercise his/her religious faith. This claim seems to have the following implication. That is, as long as the law protect their right to exercise their religious practices that are essential to their faith, their religious freedom is not violated even though the majority might hold misperception and biases to some of their practices or some of their religious symbols.

On the other hand, since Miller also holds a narrow interpretation of citizenship right, he might also claim that the deprivation does not violate the equal standing of religious minorities in the democratic community as long as the law equally treats different minorities and the public meaning of their religious practices and objects are subject to public deliberation which they have equal access to. And this argument also has another implication. That is, it seems that in Miller's view, the way to change the misperceptions and biases existed among majority of the political community is through public deliberations. With regard to this point, there are two possible explanations. Firstly, Miller might think a fair public deliberation is not only an efficient to correct misperceptions but also the proper way to find it. A person will not know his/her perception is based on a misunderstanding and is biased unless he/she confronts his/her views with the others' views. Secondly, as what I have already pointed out, Miller might think that the misperceptions will not disappear by external moral criticism, but by the person's internal recognition of his/her misunderstandings. And this internal recognition can be achieved only through public deliberations.

However, neither of these replies are persuasive. Firstly, even though a misperception per se can be corrected through public deliberations, the prior biases and prejudice will hinder a fair public deliberation. In Miller's theory, a fair public deliberation is the one that each citizen has equal access and each person's voice will be equally listened to and considered regardless of his/her differences. However, it is hard to see how a sincere conversation can happen between majority and minority if there is a widespread bias and prejudice towards religious minorities. According to Miller's own view, a successful democratic deliberation requires a degree of social solidarity and interpersonal trust. As he suggests, only when there is such a social bond can citizens be willing to take the others' interests into considerations and to sacrifice their own interests in order to achieve an agreement. Following his own theory, we can see that a sincere conversation can happen only if there is a minimal degree of mutual trust between majority and minority. If majority have a deep fear of and suspicions towards religious minorities, it is hard to see how they will be willing to have a sincere conversation and deliberate together with religious minorities. Although this minimal degree of trust does not suggest that there are no misperceptions or biases among majority, it does suggest that majority should recognize that their perceptions of the minorities and their religions might be misunderstandings and even might be a result of bias, prejudice or stigmatization and they should be willing to correct their misperceptions regardless of their negative psychological feelings.

In this sense, Miller's national republican approach is self-defeating. On the one hand, while Miller takes a shared national identity as a source of the common identification that is essential for successful democratic politics, national identity cannot build a minimal degree of mutual trust between majority and immigration minorities. If the conflict between majority and religious minorities should be solved through democratic deliberation, there should be an alternative source of the minimal trust that enables the sincere and fair public deliberation between majority and minority. On the other hand, the national identity argument itself will hinder the sincere public deliberations. As I have pointed out in the previous part, the normative force of the national identity argument in Miller's theory is much stronger than he explicitly

suggests. It is an exclusive argument since a wide range of arguments can be rejected by claiming that “it is a significant part of our national culture”. It can provide a protective shield for a wide range of proposals that insist on sustaining the status quo. It seems that the only way to break through is to argue from within the national identity argument. In this sense, the national identity argument can become another conversation-stopper. When it comes to religious immigrants, the national identity argument would make it difficult for minority to adequately participate in the deliberation and influence the final decision.

The second possible reply is also untenable. Although the correction of misperceptions and elimination of biases and stigmatization cannot be realized simply through external moral force, they can neither be realized simply through public deliberation in Miller’s sense. A precondition here is that the majority can acknowledge both that their misperceptions can be a form of bias or prejudice and that this bias or prejudice is seriously morally wrong and they should correct it. Thus, it preconditions an idea of the wrongful bias or prejudice which can guide majority to recognize in which sense their perceptions of the religious minorities constitute wrongful biases. However, in Miller’s approach, his minimalist interpretation of equal citizenship seems to transfer the responsibility from the citizens to the state. In other words, it is the state’s responsibility to guarantee the equal legal status of religious immigrants rather than the majority citizens’ responsibilities to equally respect religious immigrants. Thus, his approach might in a sense indulge the biased majority’s ignorance of the religious minorities’ sufferings.

3. Religious identity and the ignored dimension

The limit of Miller’s minimalist interpretation of equal citizenship discloses another problem with his approach—that is, the problem with Miller’s understanding of religious demand and religious identity. And this problem lies in the first aspect of his culturalization of religion that I have demonstrated in the previous part. As I have

shown, according to Miller's theory, religious demands are interpreted as two forms of demands—that is, the demands derived from faith commitments and the demands derived from cultural commitments. As cultural commitments, religious demands embody religious persons' interest in the obedience to the norms and ways of life that are defined by their cultural communities. In Miller's theory, cultural commitments are important interests that should be respected because they are closely related to individuals' pursuit of their aims and ambitions. The violation of those cultural commitments might cause individuals unreasonable and unbearable cost in their pursuit of their aims and ambitions. However, this interpretation of religious demands ignores another important form of religious demands. Laborde's(2022) criticism can help us see the ignored dimension in Miller's understanding.

In Laborde's view, a fundamental problem with Miller's approach is that he ignores that a religion might not be "a first-person interest" but "an assigned identity" constructed by the third-party's perspectives. According to her view, a person or a group's assigned identity "may diverge from their first-person beliefs or culture, in the sense that it is principally a matter of how others classify and relate to them".(Laborde, 2022, p. 140) In this identity assignation, religious minorities are portrayed in a negative way. In other words, the assigned identity that is negatively portrayed reflects the misrecognition among the majority people towards the religious minorities. Understanding religion in this way, some religious demands might not demands derived from faith or cultural commitments which embody minority's significant conscious or cultural interests, but demands derived from their interests in fighting against the identity assignation. In other words, those religious demands are raised to object to the misrecognition of religious minorities in the political community. In Laborde's view, this is a basic interest of non-domination. According to this view, the equal standing of citizens is interpreted as a status of non-domination and misrecognition constitutes a violation of equal citizenship.

Laborde's interpretation of religious identity as assigned can provide a better understanding of the religious demands in Swiss minaret case and French veils case. As Laborde points out, in both cases, the demand of building minarets and the demand of wearing of Islamic veils such as niqab originally "have low-salience within the targeted minority". In other words, only a small number of Muslims in the Swiss or French Muslim community have those demands. Following Miller's minimalist interpretation of equal citizenship, those demands can be easily overridden because of this low salience. However, Laborde points out that the prohibitions towards those low-salience demands have earned high-salience support from the other Muslims who do not originally have the need to build minarets or wear niqab. The reason lies in the problematic rationale justifying the prohibitions. That is, the prohibitions embody the majority's misrecognition of Muslims in the sense that they associate Islam with gender oppression, political domination and violence and portray Muslims as people who are conservative, non-liberal and incapable of successful integration.

Based on Laborde's view, we can see that Miller's interpretations have two problems. The first problem is that he ignores that a religious identity is not merely a moral identity internally defined by a person's religious faith or a cultural identity internally defined by a person's cultural affiliation, but can be an assigned identity externally defined by the biased third party. The ignored dimension of religious identity leads to the problem with Miller's interpretation of religious demands. That is to say, religious demands might not necessarily be derived from a person's faith or cultural commitments, but can also be derived from minority group's interest in their identity perception. With regard to this interest in identity perception, there are two understandings. Laborde's theory proposes the first understanding. In her view, religious minority's interest in identity perception is understood in a negative way. In other words, it is an interest in non-domination and in refusing the misrecognition in political community. However, there is a second understanding proposed by other theorists such as Tariq Modood(2013, 2019). In those theorists' view, this interest contains more positive aspects. In other words, it is not merely a negative interest in refusing misrecognition but also a positive interest in regaining the power to define

their religious identity and in the positive expression of their identity through the public presence of their religion.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that in Miller's approach, the challenge posed by religious diversity is interpreted as a cultural challenge manifested in the conflict between religious minority's demand of accommodation and the majority's demand of protecting or promoting the public culture of the political community. By emphasizing the significance of a culture-based national identity for a stable democratic political community, Miller's national republican ideal of democratic citizenship imposes a responsibility of integration on immigrated religious minorities. It means that religious immigrants should respect the public culture and acknowledge its importance. This respect implies three specific responsibilities in democratic deliberations. Firstly, religious immigrants should take into account national identity arguments proposed by the majority. Secondly, they should be willing to compromise their demands of religious accommodation in order to show respect to the public culture of the political community. Thirdly, they should accept the decision determined through democratic deliberations even though the decision favors the majority's demand.

In the discussion, I have pointed out that Miller's national republican position has been doubted whether it mistreats religious minorities. This issue become salient when the public culture of the political community contains religious elements. And the most difficult issue emerges in the case of religious establishment where a particular religion is granted privileges-either material or symbolic. Miller approaches this difficulty in three ways. Firstly, Miller tends to culturalize the majority's religion. In his view, a national culture which contains religious elements is also inclusive to religious minorities since those religious elements convey cultural meanings rather than religious convictions. Thus, the responsibility to respect this kind of national culture does not compromise minorities' religious commitments. Secondly, by emphasizing

the imaginative nature and inarticulateness of national identity, Miller claims that national identity is open to contestation and transformation. Thirdly, by proposing a minimal interpretation of equal citizenship, Miller claims that a demand of promoting a national culture which contains religious elements or traditions does not infringe on equal citizenship of religious minorities when their basic human rights, equal opportunities and equal access to democratic deliberations are guaranteed.

However, I have shown that none of these arguments is tenable. There are two major problems with Miller's approach. Firstly, if the inclusiveness of Miller's national republican citizenship lies in the fact of that national identity is open to transformation, then it becomes important that transformation is plausible and can be conducted in a just way. This form of transformation preconditions a self-reflective and self-critical attitude of the majority. In other words, the majority should be able to question themselves whether their public culture is problematically exclusive. Thus, to facilitate a cultural transformation, a criterion to tell the exclusiveness of a culture is needed. However, Miller's theory lacks such a criterion and his idea of equal citizenship is not capable of doing this job since this idea is insensitive to cultural dimension of exclusion.

Secondly, Miller's culturalization of religion is problematic. In this chapter, I have analyzed two aspects of the culturalization of religion in Miller's approach. On the one hand, when Miller culturalizes the majority's religion in his defense of the national tradition of religious establishment, he overlooks the real-world contexts of such a national identity discourse. In the real-world context, the culturalization of religion embedded in the national identity discourse is often accompanied by a biased understanding of minority's religion and can also be oppressive to conservative branches of the majority religion by depriving off their power to define their own religious identity. On the other hand, when Miller interprets minority's demand of religious accommodation as a demand of cultural accommodation, Miller neglects another form of injustice experienced by religious minorities, namely the

stigmatization and discrimination produced by the majority's negative portrayal of their religious identity. These problems lead us to the third approach proposed by Cecile Laborde, namely her critical republican approach.

Chapter 3 Religion, Domination, and republican solidarity

Introduction

In the previous chapters, I have examined approaches of Rawls and Miller. Rawls perceives religious diversity as a manifestation of doctrinal pluralism and views its challenge as the one to attaining agreement on justice. Based on this understanding, Rawls's theory suggests that sustaining a stable democratic political community requires democratic citizens who follows the ideal of public reason. To reconcile the tension between the duty of civility and citizens' religious commitments, Rawls puts forth the idea of overlapping consensus. However, as I pointed out in the first chapter, Rawls's approach fails to address the cultural dimension of religion, thereby overlooking the tension surrounding immigrated religious minorities. Furthermore, his approach lacks sensitivity to the social condition, thereby falling short of providing the necessary resources to actualize his ideal of democratic citizenship.

Miller's approach, in a sense, avoids these issues. Firstly, by acknowledging the significance of social bond and interpersonal trust in sustaining a stable democratic political community, Miller's approach places greater emphasis on identifying the source of this social solidarity. In his national republican conception of democratic citizenship, Miller asserts that a shared national identity serves as a source for fostering social bond and interpersonal trust. Secondly, by asserting that religious demands can stem from cultural rather than faith commitments, Miller's approach takes the cultural challenge posed by religious diversity seriously. He attempts to reconcile the tension between upholding national republican citizenship and ensuring the equal citizenship of religious minorities by demonstrating the inclusiveness of the former while proposing a minimalist interpretation of the latter. However, as I

demonstrated in the second chapter, Miller's approach fails to address the question either. On the one hand, the absence of a criterion for identifying wrongful exclusion, which is crucial for facilitating the transformation of the existing national identity, undermines Miller's argument for the inclusiveness of national republican citizenship. On the other hand, the insensitivity to public discourse in real-world contexts leaves his approach ill-equipped to tackle the domination experienced by religious immigrants.

Regarding these issues, Cecile Laborde's critical republican approach offers a more promising solution compared to the approaches of Rawls and Miller. Through the discussion in the previous chapters, it becomes evident that both Rawls's and Miller's approach are not sociologically sound. In contrast, through incorporating ideas from critical social theories, Laborde aims to develop a normative political theory that is sociologically solid. Laborde's approach encompasses three major claims. Firstly, by endorsing a disaggregated account of religion, Laborde presents a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges posed by religious diversity. According to Laborde's interpretation, religious diversity can be understood in three distinct ways. Firstly, it can be interpreted as a diversity of different forms of reasoning, whereby religion presents an epistemic challenge to democratic deliberations when it manifests as inaccessible reasons. Secondly, religious diversity can be interpreted as a diversity of conceptions of the good, whereby religion presents a substantive challenge to political secularism when it manifests as comprehensive ethics. Finally, religious diversity can also be interpreted as a diversity of identities, whereby religion presents a challenge to democratic relationship when it manifests as a socially divisive identity.

According to Laborde's interpretation, the first two challenges targets not at democratic citizenship but at the democratic legitimacy of state. In this sense, Laborde denies that the idea of public reason-either in an epistemic term or in a substantive term-carries any ethical implications for democratic citizens. Laborde's interpretation

of the third challenge offers a more persuasive understanding of the difficulties arising from the post-immigration religious diversity compared to Miller. According to Laborde's view, the conflict between the majority and immigrated religious minority should not be solely interpreted as a cultural conflict, but rather as a conflict stemming from problematic identity assignation, which she terms "ethnicization".

Why does religion-as-divisive-identity pose a challenge to a democratic political community, and how can this challenge be addressed? The answers to these questions are embedded within Laborde's critical republican theory of democratic citizenship. Laborde's approach is republican in the sense that she advocates for a republican understanding of a democratic political community and proposes a republican conception of democratic citizenship. Faced with the challenges posed by the diversity of identities, Laborde's theory suggests that a democratic political community requires a civic sphere- an inclusive sphere where individuals, regardless of their differences, are included as equal citizens. The idea of civic sphere offers a potential for individuals with different identities to interact and cooperate with one another. This republican ideal of a civic sphere implies a corresponding ideal of democratic citizenship. According to this republican ideal, democratic citizenship entails two dimensions. In its normative dimension, democratic citizenship is characterized by equal citizenship that is defined by an idea of non-domination. In this interpretation, equal citizenship goes beyond equal legal status and encompasses equal social status, manifested through intersubjective recognition. In its ethical dimension, democratic citizenship involves a civic bond among citizens. By proposing an idea of civic patriotism, democratic citizens in Laborde's republican ideal are civic patriots. According to Laborde's approach, in the face of the challenges posed by the diversity of identities, a democratic political community is sustained by constructing such a civic sphere and fostering the republican ideal of democratic citizenship.

Laborde's approach is critical in formulating the strategies to foster the civic sphere

and promote democratic citizenship. Drawing inspiration from critical social theories, Laborde's approach displays greater sensitivity to real-world contexts and offers more realistic strategies for realizing her republican ideals. These strategies are realistic and critical across three aspects. Firstly, by incorporating the intersubjective dimension into the concept of equal citizenship, Laborde endorses a more critical view on how minority religious identities are shaped through public discourse. Through this critical lens, Laborde claims that religious identity itself can become a source of domination, manifests in the form of ethnicization. Secondly, although Laborde advocates for an idea of civic patriotism, she also acknowledges that, in reality, social bonds often derive from a shared national identity. Rather than advocating for the complete dismantling of existing national identities, Laborde emphasizes the need to de-ethnicize these identities in order to foster a civic sphere. Her approach therefore exhibits a critical stance towards national identity, aiming to address and confront its exclusive elements rather than obscuring them. Thirdly, acknowledging that existing democratic political communities fall short of the ideal of non-domination, Laborde claim that her republican ideal of democratic citizenship does not impose burdens on ordinary citizens, especially those belonging to the minority groups. Instead, she argues that the responsibilities of de-ethnicization should be primarily placed on the state and the majority. In this sense, Laborde's approach avoids the potential conflict between the ethical and normative dimension of democratic citizenship.

In this chapter, my examination of Laborde's approach will be divided into three parts. In the first and the second part, I will provide a detailed demonstration of Laborde's approach. The first part will focus on her disaggregated account of religion, exploring how it helps us understand the challenges posed by religious diversity. The second part will offer a picture of Laborde's critical republican approach, exploring her critical republican interpretation of the normative and the ethical dimension of democratic citizenship. After exploring Laborde's critical republican approach, the second and third parts will provide a critical examination of her approach. The second part will discuss potential issues with Laborde's notion of equal citizenship as non-domination, while also considering possible replies that her theory can offer. This discussion

attempts to deal with the question of whether Laborde's idea of equal citizenship should reject or embrace an idea of identity recognition. Moving to the third part, I will examine two problems with Laborde's idea of civic solidarity. The first problem pertains to her idea that participation is the optimal way to foster civic solidarity and combat domination. The second problem concerns Laborde's restrictions on the application of the idea of public reason. Through this examination, I will show that participation, if can foster civic solidarity, requires a certain form of responsible citizenship. I will argue that Laborde's theory may face self-defeat unless extending the application of her idea of public reason.

I. Laborde's account of religion and its challenges

1. The disaggregative account of religion

In her book *Liberal's religion* (2017, p. 250), Laborde puts forth a distinctive analysis of the notion of religion. While her analysis primarily focuses on the question of how a liberal state should regulate religion, it helps explain the critical republican approach she advocates in her earlier work and offers valuable framework for us to discuss the research question addressed in this dissertation.

Laborde's interpretation of religion exhibits three distinct features. Firstly, her theory of religion is interpretive rather than descriptive. In Laborde's view, due to the contested nature of the concept of religion, it is neither feasible nor desirable for political theorists to provide a definition of religion. Instead, she suggests adopting an interpretive approach that seeks to explore the ethically salient values associated with religion. In other words, instead of asking the question of what religion is, political theorists should focus on the question of what the underlying values are. This interpretive stance underscores the second feature of Laborde's account, which is its disaggregative nature. Recognizing the plurality of underlying values connected to religion, Laborde suggests that a proper account of religion should consider its

multidimensional aspects. Thus, she disaggregates religion into different dimensions, with each dimension representing a specific value associated with religion and giving rise to specific normative questions pertaining to religion.

Based on the interpretive and disaggregative account of religion, Laborde endorses a liberal egalitarian position. According to Laborde's idea, if religion is understood through exploring the different values associated with it, then it becomes evident that religion itself is not normatively special. Even if religion, as a sociological phenomenon, may be unique, it is not ethically or politically special. In this term, Laborde argues that her disaggregative account "allows us to treat religious and nonreligious individuals and groups on the same terms, as expressions of ethical and social pluralism".(2017, p. 3) This liberal egalitarian perspective implies an important viewpoint in understanding the challenges posed by religious diversity. Since religion itself is not normatively special, it is misguided to consider the challenges arising from religious diversity as inherently special. In other words, these challenges do not exclusively stem from religion or religious diversity. Following this view, religion itself does not inherently pose a difficulty or threat to democratic political communities. Instead, it becomes a difficulty only when it is associated with disvalues that are considered as problematic. The view that religion itself constitutes a challenge fails to demonstrate equal respect for religious persons. In this sense, both Rawls's and Miller's approaches avoid this issue as they do not single out the question of religion and religious diversity in their theories. While Rawls interprets the challenge posed by religious diversity as a manifestation of the broader challenge posed by the pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, Miller interprets this challenge as a manifestation of the challenge arising from cultural diversity. However, according to Laborde's account, a problem with their approaches is that they focus solely on one dimension of religion, thus failing to provide a more comprehensive understanding. In the rest of this section, through a comparison with Rawls and Miller, I will demonstrate how Laborde interprets religion and explore its implications for understanding the challenges posed by religious diversity.

1.1 Religion as a reason

Laborde disaggregates religion into three dimensions: religion as a reason, religion as a conception of ethics and religion as an identity. In the first dimension, religion becomes problematic when it manifests as an inaccessible reason that cannot be understood and assessed according to common evaluative standards. Laborde emphasizes the importance of accessibility as a constraint on inputs of democratic deliberations. In other words, proposals put forth in democratic deliberations should be justified by accessible reasons. In her view, grounding political proposals on inaccessible reasons is epistemically wrong as it fails to respect citizens as democratic reasoners. The wrong lies in the inaccessibility of reasons rather than the religiosity of reasons, though Laborde considers religious reasons based on the authority of a divine existence or divine text as the paradigmatic example of inaccessible reasons.

Although Laborde regards her idea of accessible reason as a version of public reason, there are fundamental differences between her notion and Rawls's. While Laborde puts forth the idea of accessible reason as a constraint on the inputs of democratic deliberations, she claims that this constraint applies to state officials rather than ordinary citizens, thus not burdening ordinary religious citizens. (2017, p. 124) Laborde asserts that there should be no restrictions on the reasoning of ordinary citizens in public debate, and they should enjoy complete freedom of expression.¹⁴ As Laborde states, state officials are subject to such constraint "because they have representative obligations-they speak in the name of all-and because state acts are particularly coercive, public officials are under an obligation of restraint when they publicly justify

¹⁴ Laborde holds a strong position on the freedom of expression. According to her earlier work, Laborde claims that ordinary citizens' expressions in the public debate should neither be epistemically restrained nor be substantively restrained. In other words, Laborde does not take an offensive expression as improper in public deliberations. Laborde, C. (2008a) *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy*. Oxford. This strong stance is closely related to her emphasis on civic participation and her disvaluing of any form of invisibilization. I will further clarify this point in the second section of this part.

their actions and policies". (2017, p. 125)

From this statement, it becomes clear that Laborde and Rawls have divergent understandings of democratic citizenship. Rawls views democratic citizens as ultimate exercisers of the political power and contends that their reasoning should be restrained by a thick idea of public reason, as they should not force unshareable reasons on others. In contrast, Laborde takes a more realistic view of the role of democratic citizens in democratic decision-making. Her view seems to align more closely with Philip Pettit's idea that democratic citizens are contesters rather than direct decision-makers. In other words, in democratic politics, political decisions should be subject to public debates and contested by ordinary citizens. Thus, it is crucial that the justifications underpinning these decisions can be understood and assessed by citizens. Following this idea, legitimate decisions should be justified by accessible reasons rather than shareable reasons. This difference in their understandings of the role of citizens in democratic politics also implies a difference in their understandings of democratic relationship among citizens. Rawls suggests that the democratic relationship among citizens is a political relationship that partly manifests through the way they engage in the democratic deliberations. Specifically, in a democratic relationship, citizens show respect for one another as equal co-exercisers through adhering to the thick ideal of public reason in public deliberations. In contrast, since Laborde does not perceive ordinary citizens' participation in public deliberations as a mean of exercising political power, the way they reason or argue in public deliberations reflects the vertical relationship between citizens and the state rather than the horizontal relationship among citizens.

Based on the demonstrations above, it becomes evident religious diversity, in the first dimension of the notion of religion, manifests as a diversity in the forms of reasons. More precisely, the challenge arises from the existence of diverse evaluative standards that can impede public contestations of democratic decisions. In other words, as

democratic politics necessitate public contestations on democratic decisions, the adherence to the common evaluative standards becomes crucial to enable public contestations. However, in Laborde's framework, where ordinary citizens are not direct decision-makers, this principle of restraint does not impose a burden on ordinary religious citizens.

1.2 Religion as comprehensive ethics

Additionally, another important difference between Laborde's idea of public reason and Rawls's emerges, which is evident in Laborde's exploration of the second dimension of religion. In this dimension, religion manifests as a conception of ethics, and the challenge arises when it takes the form of comprehensive ethics. The issue becomes salient when a state forces comprehensive ethics on its citizens. While Laborde shares a similar interpretation of religion with Rawls in this dimension, there are crucial differences in their understandings of the underlying issue of comprehensive ethics and their proposed approach to addressing this challenge.

Firstly, in Laborde's theory, the enforcement of comprehensive ethics manifests not only in the justifications of democratic decisions but also in the subject of political policies. This means that the problem lies not only in the justifications based on comprehensive conceptions of the good but also in policies that restrict integrity-related liberties, namely the liberties that are essential for citizens "to formulate and live by their own ethical commitments and projects". (2017, pp. 146-147) Thus, the wrong associated with religion as comprehensive ethics pertains to the legitimacy of democratic decisions and targets at the outputs rather than the inputs of democratic deliberations. This distinguishes it from the wrong associated with religion as inaccessible reasons.

In contrast, Rawls's idea suggests that the legitimacy of the outputs requires a principle

of restraint on the inputs. Although Laborde might agree that the constraint on the outputs also implies a constraint on the inputs¹⁵, however, the fundamental concerns underlying the constraint on inaccessible reasons and the constraints on comprehensive ethics are different. While restraining the reasons presented in democratic deliberations is grounded in the value of respecting citizens as democratic reasoners, restraining the outputs of democratic deliberations is grounded in the value of respecting citizens as self-determining agents with ethical independence to decide their ways of lives. By highlighting these distinct underlying values, Laborde's idea not only exposes the limitations of Rawls's idea of public reason but also helps clarify the difference between Rawls's idea and the ideas of other public reason liberals.

Secondly, since the wrong involved in the second dimension of religion also targets state actions, it does not imply any obligation or responsibility for ordinary citizens. Nevertheless, Laborde's discussion does imply an interpretation of the ideal of democratic citizenship. In her ideal, democratic citizens are not only democratic reasoners but also self-determining agents. There are several features of Laborde's idea of self-determining agents. Firstly, democratic citizenship in this idea implies the legal and political status of citizens, serving as a requirement on the state rather than an ideal for ordinary citizens to pursue. Specifically, this ideal demands that the democratic state respects citizens as self-determining agents. Secondly, this ideal involves a negative requirement rather than a positive one. In other words, respecting democratic citizens as self-determining agents means the state should refrain from limiting the citizens' integrity-related liberties, rather than actively promoting citizens' self-determining capacities. As Laborde states,

¹⁵ Here, it is worthy of notice that Laborde does not explicitly assert that the substantive wrong of political justification implies a constraint on the reasoning in democratic deliberations. However, even if she does agree with this implication, her possible interpretation of this principle of restraint would be different from Rawls's. Laborde endorses a negative rather than positive approach. In other words, unlike Rawls, she does not endorse a version of political conception of justice as a requirement of justification, but rather merely claims that the state should refrain from justifying its policies on comprehensive ethics.

“Ethical independence implies that I must not be forced to live according to some conception of comprehensive ethics (but it does not imply that I must live according to my own salient or determinate conception of ethics).” (2017, p. 146)

Additionally, the third feature of Laborde’s ideal is embodied in her interpretation of personal integrity. In her view, personal integrity extends beyond the accordance between one’s actions and conscientious commitments. It also encompasses the accordance between one’s actions and membership commitments. According to Laborde’s statements, conscientious commitments, which derive from one’s conceptions of the good, are distinguished from membership commitments, which define one’s sense of identity or belonging to a community. (2017, pp. 66-67, 148) By defining personal integrity in this way, Laborde points out an important limitation of the standard liberal understanding of religion. In the standard liberal approach, religion is seen as a matter of conscience. As discussed in the first chapter, when liberal critics question whether the public reason approach to religion adequately addresses the integrity problem, their primary concern lies in whether it allows religious person to act in accordance with their faith.

However, Laborde criticizes this understanding of religion, arguing that it fails to address what she refers to as “the non-Protestant critique”. According to this critique, the liberal understanding of religion endorses a “modern Protestant reading” that reduces religion to a matter of conscience and exhibits bias against non-Protestant religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and other forms of Christianity, which place greater emphasis on lifestyle practices and community affiliation. Laborde contends that this limited understanding of religion overlooks the importance of certain religious practices for the integrity of religious persons. In her view, there are religious practices that convey ethical salient value of integrity, which are not strictly derived from religious doctrines. Laborde takes the wearing of Islamic veils as an

example. (Laborde, 2017, p. 22) She argues that although veiling may not be an explicit faith requirement (as it is controversial within Islamic community whether Islamic doctrine does require veiling), it still holds importance for the integrity of religious persons. Veiling can be seen as an expression of their dedication to maintaining religious lifestyles in response to the existing secularization or their faithfulness to the relationships of their communities. (Laborde, 2017, p. 67)

According to this interpretation, the challenge posed by religion reflects the broader challenge posed by comprehensive ethics. In other words, the issue lies in the state's enforcement of comprehensive ethics, which undermines personal integrity. When it comes to religious comprehensive ethics, this problem manifests in two ways. Firstly, there is a threat associated with the politicization of religion, wherein attempts are made to facilitate the state's endorsement of a religious doctrine and enforce religious comprehensive ethics upon citizens of the political community. However, it is important to note that this threat is not exclusive to religion, as the enforcement of nonreligious or secular comprehensive ethics can also threaten the democratic political community.

Secondly, the challenge can also arise from the diverse commitments held by citizens, which define their personal integrity. With the increase diversity of religions in democratic political community, the understanding of integrity should also adapt to encompass the multiple ways in which citizens define their own integrity. While the first challenge primarily addresses the legitimacy of the state actions, the latter challenge pertains to the understanding of the normative dimension of democratic citizenship, which is the main question addressed in this dissertation. Laborde's interpretation of religion, by expanding upon the standard liberal interpretation, offers a more convincing interpretation of personal integrity.

1.3 Religion as an identity

In Laborde's exploration of the third dimension of religion, it is portrayed as an identity and the issue arises when religious identity is associated with social vulnerability and domination. More precisely, when a religious identity serves as a mark of social vulnerability and domination, the state's symbolic endorsement and promotion of this identity is considered substantively wrong as it disrespects the equal citizenship of religious persons. Laborde's interpretation encompasses two important points which distinguishes her ideas from Miller's.

Firstly, in Laborde's view, religion may present not as "a first-person belief" that serves as the source of a person's ethical commitments, but rather "a third-person identity" that represents "an externally defined category of social classification". (Laborde, 2017, pp. 89, 137) In contrast, as discussed in the previous chapter, Miller's approach interprets religious identity as a first-person identity and overlooks the fact that religious identity can also be externally constructed. While Miller acknowledges the cultural dimension of religion by expanding religious commitments to include cultural commitments, his interpretation of equal opportunity mainly concerns the question of whether the existing social structure imposes unreasonable burdens or costs on religious persons in pursuing their aims and ambitions. It appears that the underlying value that concerns him in formulating his idea of equal opportunity, a constituent of his idea of equal citizenship, remains the value of integrity, though his interpretation of integrity recognizes that individuals may define themselves by their affiliation with or membership in a religious cultural community. In this sense, based on Laborde's framework, the different interpretations of religion held by Rawls and Miller can be seen as stemming, in part, from their distinct understandings of integrity.

By emphasizing this third dimension of religion as an assigned identity, Laborde's approach offers a more comprehensive understanding of the normative dimension of democratic citizenship. Specifically, democratic citizenship of religious persons,

particularly religious minorities, can be undermined not only by impinging upon their personal integrity but also by external identity assignation. In Laborde's earlier work, she refers to the form of domination arising from external identity assignation as "ethnicization". According to her definition, ethnicization refers to a process whereby "citizens are reduced to their presumed identity, culture or religion, and consequently stigmatized as immigrants, Arab, or Muslim".(Laborde, 2008, p. 17) Thus, Laborde claims that religious identity in this sense share similarities with racial identity, which is paradigmatic example of an external constructed identity. And the form of domination experienced by religious minorities in this case also bears resemblance to racism.

In Laborde's idea, the notion of religion as a socially vulnerable identity not only illustrates that minority religious identity can be externally defined and becomes a source of domination, but also reveals the problems with the symbolic endorsement of the majority's religious identity. Firstly, the symbolic endorsement of the majority's religious identity is problematic as it "can reliably be predicted to increase the social salience of religious identity". Religious identity can serve as a marker of both the majority/minority groups and dominant/dominated groups. The symbolic endorsement may contribute to reinforcing the boundaries between the majority and the minority, as well as between the dominant and the dominated. In this sense, it may lead to the exclusion of minority religious groups by facilitating the process of "Othering" these groups. In this sense, Laborde opposes Miller's culturalization of the majority's religion. As discussed previously, Miller defends the symbolic endorsement by interpreting the majority's religious identity as a cultural identity. However, Laborde argues that the culturalization does not make a religious identity less divisive or exclusive, as both religious and cultural identity can be constructed in a way that marks the inferiority of the minority and the superiority of the majority.

The second problem with symbolic endorsement pertains to the interpretation of

religious symbols. In the debate, a central disagreement revolves around whether religious symbols convey a message of a socially divisive and vulnerable identity. Laborde argues that the crux of this matter lies in their social meanings, rather than the intention behind displaying these symbols or individuals' subjective feelings or perceptions. (Laborde, 2017, p. 140) To determine the social meanings of religious symbols, Laborde follows Martha Nussbaum in endorsing Justice O'Connor's "reasonable observer's test". According to this test, whether a specific religious symbol expresses a message of domination and exclusion depends on whether it can reasonably be constructed as sending such a message. (Laborde, 2017; Nussbaum, 2007) As Nussbaum asserts, the construction of meaning for religious symbols is context-dependent. Based on their interpretations, the context includes the public discourse surrounding the interpretation of religious symbols and the locations where these symbols are displayed. In the previous chapter, when I discuss the problems with Miller's culturalization of religion, I provided examples that illustrated how public discourse around religious symbols could convey a message of exclusion and domination. Laborde argues that the location where religious symbols display also matters. As she suggests, "a cross displayed in a public square or cemetery does not have the same expressive power as a cross in a school, parliament, or courtroom". (Laborde, 2017, p. 138)

Based on this interpretation of religion put forth by Laborde, religious diversity is perceived as the diversity of identities. Challenges arise when this diversity leads to a confrontation between the majority and the minority. This confrontation poses two significant challenges to the democratic political community. Firstly, through negative identity assignation (whereby the majority portrays and shapes the minority identity in a negative way), the confrontation contains an asymmetry power relationship between the majority and the minority. On the one hand, this negative identity assignation contributes to the subordinated socio-economic status of the minority. On the other hand, this negative identity assignation deprives the minority of discursive control over their own identity. In this sense, religious diversity poses a challenge to the ideal of non-domination, which Laborde views as a fundamental value of a

democratic political community. Secondly, the confrontation divides citizens into the group of “us” and the group of “them”. By a negative portrayal of the minority, minority groups are socially excluded from the political community, viewed as “others” or “outsiders”. This understanding of the challenges arising from the third dimension of religion aligns with Laborde’s critical republican understanding of democratic political community and democratic citizenship. In the next section, I will explore her critical republican perspectives.

2. The post-immigration religious diversity and its challenge

Through the exploration of Laborde’s disaggregative account of religion, it becomes salient that religious diversity can challenge a democratic political community in three ways. Firstly, religious diversity can manifest as a diversity of evaluative standards, which implies that certain religious reasons may not be accessible to others. When political decisions are justified by these reasons, their inaccessibility hinders public contestations, disrespecting citizens’ status as democratic reasoners. Secondly, religious diversity can manifest as a diversity of conceptions of ethics. When political decisions are justified by or seek to promote a specific comprehensive ethics, the enforcement of such decisions would impose this ethics on citizens, undermining their personal integrity. According to Laborde’s view, these two challenges target the formal justification and the subject of political policies. In response to these challenges, she proposes an idea of minimal secularism, which places constraints on both the justification and the subject of political policies. By interpreting democratic citizens as contesters rather than direct decision-makers, Laborde argues that the principle of restraint should only apply to state officials and not burden ordinary citizens. In this sense, her ideas diverge from those of Rawls’s.

However, given that Laborde’s book *Liberalism’s religion* primarily centers around the state, her discussions therein do not fully encompass her ideas on democratic citizenship. Her earlier work shows that she holds a much thicker conception of the

democratic political community and democratic citizenship. Her exploration of the third challenge posed by religious diversity provides some hints on this thicker conception. Since religion can also manifest as an identity, religious diversity can also manifest as a diversity of identities, which may engender a confrontation between the majority and the minority. While Laborde's discussion in *Liberalism's religion* focuses on the question how a liberal state can tackle this challenge, her earlier work discusses a broader question of how a democratic political community can address this challenge.

Laborde's approach to this question is grounded in her distinctive understanding of the challenge. Notably, her understanding differs from Miller's, particularly regarding the issues arising from the post-immigration religious diversity. While both of them view this kind of religious diversity as a diversity of identities, Laborde disagrees with the idea that the issue arises from the conflict between cultural identities. As illustrated in the previous chapter, Miller perceives the post-immigration religious diversity as a form of cultural diversity, thus framing the challenge as a cultural one. From this perspective, the confrontation between the majority and the immigrated religious minority is interpreted as a clash between the majority cultural group, who aspires for cultural integration and the minority cultural group who demands cultural accommodation. In contrast, Laborde suggests that the confrontation stems from an asymmetrical power relationship between the majority and the minority. In this unequal relationship, the majority dominates and excludes the minority by the identity assignation. Thus, the key question associated with the post-immigration religious diversity is not how a mainstream cultural community tackles the cultural challenge posed by immigrated religious minorities, but rather how a democratic political community tackles the majority's domination over the religious minorities. According to Laborde's view, the idea that "religious immigrants pose a cultural challenge" itself may result from the ethnicization of the religious minorities.

Moreover, Laborde's approach is based on her objection to the politics of recognition advocated by radical multiculturalists. According to Laborde's exploration, radical multiculturalists attribute the confrontation arising from religious diversity, particularly the post-immigration religious diversity, to the asymmetrical power relationship resulting from the misrecognition of minority religious identity. They endorse the politics of recognition as the proper way to deal with the challenge and advocate for multiculturalist policies that grant public recognition to group differences. According to Laborde's view, the politics of recognition lacks clarity regarding the underlying value or principle. Specifically, it is unclear whether this approach is based on the value of co-existence between different groups, the value of pluralism itself, or the value of equal citizenship. (Laborde, 2008, p. 231) If the politics of recognition is grounded in a specific ideal of equal citizenship, viewing the establishment of multicultural citizenship as the most proper way to realize this ideal, then this approach is still problematic for two reasons.

Firstly, by focusing on the promotion of identity differences, this approach overlooks the socio-economic inequalities experienced by minority groups. Conversely, as Laborde criticizes, the politics of recognition not only fall short of addressing those inequalities but also may facilitate or aggravate the socio-economic exclusion of the minorities. Secondly, Laborde criticizes that this approach is self-defeating. Laborde illustrates this problem through her criticism of Iris Marion Young's approach. According to her criticism, while Young's approach aims to foster a heterogeneous public, it falls short of establishing "the public". As Laborde states:

"The politics of recognition rely on the presence of a civil sphere where citizens recognize one another as worthy of equal respect and display attitudes of mutual trust and good will towards one another." (Laborde, 2008, p. 232)

Based on her understanding of the challenge as a problem of domination and her criticism of the politics of recognition, Laborde puts forth her own approach to addressing this problem. Which is grounded in a critical republican ideal of democratic political community. According to her view, faced with the problem of domination stemming from religious diversity, particularly the post-immigration religious diversity, a democratic political community can be sustained by fostering a civic sphere. In the next section, I will demonstrate Laborde's republican ideal of civic sphere and her interpretation of democratic citizenship.

II. Laborde's critical republican approach

In Laborde's approach, faced with the challenge posed by religious diversity, a democratic political community is sustained by fostering a civic sphere, also called by her as "a robust public sphere", where "all resident individuals regardless of their particular origins and identities, can be included as equal citizens". (Laborde, 2008, pp. 232-233) According to Laborde's view, there are two major features of her ideal of civic sphere.

Firstly, Laborde's ideal of civic sphere refers to a robust public sphere which meets the ideal of non-domination. Laborde's understanding of "a robust public sphere" can be found in the following statements:

"Citizens of different cultural, social and religious allegiance should be allowed and encouraged to 'dwell together' in genuinely public space—from political forums to mixed neighbourhoods and common secular schools—learn to argue and disagree together, and continuously reinvent their imagined (fictitious yet potent) sense of collective identity." (Laborde, 2008, p. 255)

From the statements above, a robust public sphere can be summarized as following:

A Robust Public Sphere (RPS): *a robust public sphere is a sphere where citizens interact with one another through having conversations and deliberations. Through these intersubjective interactions, social norms and cultural codes are formed and collective identity is generated.*

When Laborde proposes the ideal of civic sphere, the core concern is about the asymmetrical power relationship and the domination among citizens. Thus, a robust public sphere is understood as a sphere where this kind of relationship is formed and developed. It has two implications. On the one hand, her notion of a robust public sphere extends beyond Rawls's idea of public political sphere and includes Rawls's civic society. Consequently, the discourse formed in the robust public sphere does not only include the discourse of state officials and political candidates and their campaign managers which Rawls is mainly concerned with, but also and more importantly include the discourse of medias and ordinary citizens.

The second feature of this ideal of civic sphere is that it encompasses a republican ideal of democratic citizenship. Laborde's interpretation of democratic citizenship includes both normative and ethical dimensions. As Laborde states,

"Citizenship, on the republican account, refers to both a legal status and a psychological, intersubjective disposition: citizens feel themselves to be equal, to be sharing in the same fate, they do not think that other citizens are radical 'Others', people with ways of life, cultures, that they want nothing to do with." (Laborde, 2008, p. 236)

From Laborde's statement of citizenship above, it is evident that her interpretation of democratic citizenship includes both normative and ethical dimensions. In the following sections, I will demonstrate Laborde's interpretations of these two dimensions in turn.

1. Equal citizenship as non-domination

Firstly, Laborde's conception of equal citizenship is not only a matter of legal standing but also a matter of mutual recognition. Although Laborde's statement seems to suggest that equal citizenship contains subjective feeling of equality, however, it is improper to understand her idea in this way. Through her interpretation of the ideal of non-domination, we can see that she does not interpret the equal citizenship as simply a subjective feeling. When she takes intersubjective disposition as a significant component of her ideal of equal citizenship, this intersubjective disposition is considered a result of social structures. In other words, due to the existing social norms, institutions and cultural codes, citizens feel that themselves are not recognized as equals in the democratic community. Laborde views equal citizenship as not only equal standing in legal and political relationships, but also equal standing in social relationships among citizens. Thus, it concerns not only how a state and its policies treat its citizens but also how citizens perceive and treat one another.

This understanding of the ideal of equal citizenship is based on Laborde's interpretation of the concept of domination and her ideal of non-domination. Laborde's idea is significantly inspired by Philip Pettit's theory of freedom as non-domination. Following Pettit's idea, to be an equal and free citizen is to be free from domination.¹⁶ However, there are some crucial differences between Pettit's and

¹⁶ Taking the idea of non-domination as an account of citizenship rather than merely an account of freedom, Laborde provides a more general ideal of non-domination. In her ideal, she links the value of freedom with the value of equality and provides a relational egalitarian understanding of non-domination. Garrau, M. and Laborde, C. 2015. *Relational Equality, Non-Domination, and Vulnerability*. New York. As Laborde states, critical republicans

Laborde's interpretation of domination. While Pettit endorses an agential conception of domination, Laborde absorbs Iris Marion Young's idea and endorses a structural conception of domination.

As Laborde states,

"On a broad level, and following Iris Marion Young, domination refers to 'institutional conditions which inhibit or prevent people from participating in decisions and processes that determine their actions and the conditions of their actions. Persons live within structures of domination if other persons or groups can determine without reciprocation the conditions of their actions'." (Laborde, 2008, p. 152)

From Laborde's work, we can find that there are two important features of her interpretation of domination. Firstly, Laborde's idea of domination is less subjectivist than Pettit's idea. In Pettit's theory, domination, in many cases, exists only when there is a common awareness - or common knowledge, in Pettit's words - of this kind of domination. In Pettit's account, the common awareness of the domination generally involves "the awareness of control on the part of the powerful, the awareness of vulnerability on the part of the powerless, and the mutual awareness of this consciousness on each side". (Pettit, 1997) In this sense, Laborde states that Pettit defines domination as a feeling of vulnerability and powerlessness. Although Pettit mentions that there is an exceptional case - that is, backroom manipulation—, it seems that Pettit does not think this backroom manipulation is usual and does not take it

are also social egalitarians who concerns the quality of relationship among citizens and how inequalities affect the equal status of citizens. Laborde, C. (2008) *Critical republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy*. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. When Pettit gives his account of domination, the question that he has in mind is the one concerning the political freedom that individuals should have in a republican. Although he claims that his theory will also foster the value of equality, the value of equality is not the start point of his idea.

seriously enough in his account of domination. On the contrary, in Laborde's view, a domination without being aware of is a significant form of domination in current world.¹⁷ She gives the case of submissive women. In this case, women are brought up and educated in the belief that an ideal character of woman is to be a submissive housewife. If this form of domination is taken seriously, domination can not only be intentional but also be systematic.

In Laborde's idea, domination entails two forms. Firstly, a person or a group of people is dominated if they are deprived of the ability to form their own perspective. Secondly, in the case that they possess the ability, they may still be dominated if they are prevented from using it. The former of domination indicates the second feature of Laborde's account of domination. By contrast to Pettit's agent-centered account of domination, domination in Laborde's view is defined not only as a problematic, interpersonal relationship but also a problematic structural relationship. A structural relationship refers to a relationship that is based on a structural imbalance of power. (Garrau and Laborde, 2015) In this form of domination, social beliefs or norms and customary practices which are not legally or coercively imposed play significant roles in forming and fostering the domination. Thus, to eliminate the domination requires to get rid of the dominating social norms, beliefs or customary practices.

This structural account of domination is based on an ideal of minimum autonomy. It is the third feature of Laborde's theory of non-domination. In her view, domination is bad because it involves "a denial of a person's capacity for minimum autonomy". And a good life, by contrast to French laïcistes, is not a life of full autonomy and self-determination but a life with a capacity for minimum autonomy. Laborde uses Pettit's

¹⁷ In Laborde's critique, she pays attention to the domination that is not aware of by the victims. However, this case can expand to the case that the powerful also does not aware of the kind of control they have on the powerless.

idea of discursive control to define minimum autonomy. As Laborde states,

“What matters is that individuals have minimum discursive control or ‘voice’-that they can contest the power that is exercised over them.....To be non-dominated is to be recognized as having a voice of one’s own. To use a recent formulation of Pettit’s domination infringes on our freedom understood as ‘discursive control’: ‘to enjoy discursive control is to be proof against being silenced, or ignored, or refused a hearing, or denied the final say in one’s own responses. It is, on the contrary, to be given recognition as a discursive subject with a voice and an ear of one’s own.’ More precisely, republican citizens have discursive control when they are entitled and capable of contesting (or at least asking for a justification of) the power that is exercised over them. We can say that someone is a ‘discursive subject’ when he or she is considered worthy of being given justifying reasons for others’ actions or injunctions towards them.” (Laborde, 2008, p. 155)

From those statements, we can see that the minimum discursive control includes a minimum capacity and a minimum form of recognition. Firstly, the person or the group should have minimum capacity to form their own perspectives or to have their own voice. They have the capacities to question and challenge the problematic status quo. According to this idea, a good life in Laborde’s critical republicanism does not require individuals to either develop further capabilities or fully exercise those minimum capabilities. In this sense, Laborde’s idea of minimum autonomy is compatible with the beliefs or ways of life that does not cherish the value of full autonomy. Secondly, the person or the group is entitled to be recognized as a discursive subject. In Pettit’s idea, discourse is not merely a conversation but a process of reason exchanging. (Pettit, 2001) Thus, to be recognized as a discursive subject is to be recognized as an agent who has one’s own voice and is capable of reason-giving and reason-taking and is worthy of being given justifications.

Recognition as a discursive subject has two implications. Firstly, the person or the group is entitled to take part in a discourse. Put it precisely, a person or a group is not silenced or prevented, either by legal norms or social norms, from engaging in a discourse with others. Secondly, there is uptake: that is, the discourse, the person or the group's voice should not be ignored but taken seriously. Pettit's idea of discourse-friendly relationship can provide an explanation for this implication. In Pettit's idea, a discourse-friendly relationship is a relationship that does not "obstruct or jeopardize or restrict discursive influence between the parties and do not raise the costs of achieving it". (Pettit, 2001) Discursive influence in Pettit's theory refers to the decision-making influence that reasoners can have on each other in a discourse. In other words, in a discourse a reasoner can have an influence on the other in terms of changing one's beliefs or dispositions and finally influence the final result of the discussion. In Pettit's idea, this influence can be achieved in different ways, such as by providing strong reasons or by using an attractive style or personal charm. But it does not include the kind of influence that will undermine the discourse-friendly relationship itself. In a discourse-friendly relationship, one may have greater discursive influence than the other, but everyone is capable of exercising discursive influence without paying costs.

Despite their affinity, we can find that there are significant differences between Laborde's idea of "minimum discursive control" and Pettit's idea of "freedom as discursive control". Firstly, although Laborde emphasizes that minimum discursive control involves being recognized as a discursive subject, she does not explicitly give a threshold of rationality for republican citizens. She claims that the person should at least be capable of asking for justifications. This is different from Pettit's idea of discursive control. In Pettit's theory of freedom as discursive control, he claims that a person is free so far as she/he has ratiocinative and relational capacity. (Pettit, 2001) According to his idea, to be free does not only imply that a person is recognized as a discursive subject but also that she/he has the capacities that are necessary to exercise discursive control. This difference is due to different roles that the idea of discursive control plays in their theory. In Pettit's theory, freedom as discursive control is a more general and broader idea than freedom as non-domination. The idea of discursive

control is endorsed to interpret the freedom in philosophical terms, while the idea of non-domination provides an interpretation of republican, political liberty. In other words, for a republican state, what should be promoted is non-domination, not discursive autonomy. By contrast, Laborde provides a minimum version of discursive control and uses it to further explain her ideal of non-domination. In other words, Laborde does not aim to discuss the meaning of philosophical freedom or autonomy but the autonomy that should be treated as a goal for a republican state.

Along with her structural conception of domination, equal citizenship in Laborde's theory can be summarized as following:

The ideal of equal citizenship as non-domination requires that individuals are recognized, through structural institutions, social norms and customary practices, as free and equal citizens in the sense that they are recognized as discursive subjects who have the minimum discursive control.

2. Republican solidarity and civic patriotism

2.1 Republican solidarity and democratic citizenship

Laborde's conception of democratic citizenship also contains an ethical dimension. According to Laborde's demonstration, the ideal of civic sphere also contains a civic bond among citizens. In other words, citizens are equally included and feel that their fates are bound together in the civic sphere. As Laborde points out, a civic sphere is a realm where citizens dwell together and reinvent their collective identity. Laborde names this civic bond as republican solidarity or "inter-ethnic solidarity" which is built upon civic patriotism.

Laborde offers three arguments to support her idea of republican solidarity. The first argument can be seen in her statement cited at the beginning of this part. As the citation shows, Laborde argues that the ideal of equal citizenship contains an intersubjective disposition, wherein individuals feel a sense of sharing a common fate and being connected with other citizens. In other words, the intersubjective disposition of perceiving oneself as an equal citizen includes a sense of being embraced by other citizens as their fellows. When one feels connected with other citizens, he/she can also trust and expect that other citizens also recognize one as a fellow whose interests are connected to theirs to some extent. This connection between equal citizenship and equal inclusion is evident in Laborde's exploration of the problem of domination. As I have pointed out, Laborde claims that ethnicization is a form of domination prevails in contemporary democratic political community with the post-immigration religious diversity. For example, in the hijab case, Muslim women who insist in the wearing of Muslim veils are portrayed by the majority as immigrants who refuse to integrate into their political community. And in this term, they are viewed by the majority as "others" or "outsiders". This case shows that ethnicization is closely related to whether a person is included as fellow members of the political community. On the one hand, the majority's ethnicization is related to their disbelief of the religious person's willingness of becoming one of them. On the other hand, this ethnicization directly leads to the exclusion of the religious person in terms that he/she is not recognized by the majority as one of their fellows. And this exclusion further contributes to the socio-economic inequalities that the person would experience. This close connection between domination and communal inclusion implies that the ideal of equal citizenship encompasses equal inclusion to the solidaristic bond of a political community.

The second argument put forth by Laborde claims that the republican conception of democratic citizenship contains a demanding form of responsible citizenship. As Laborde states, republican citizenship requires that "people willingly share in practices of social cooperation (such as wealth distribution), be able to make compromises for the sake of the common good and be ready to defend the institutions of their common

liberty". (Laborde, 2008, p. 232) From this statement, it seems that Laborde holds a similar idea of republican citizenship as Miller. Like Miller, Laborde claims that the demandingness of republican citizenship requires a civic bond to motivate citizens to fulfill their citizen responsibilities.

Additionally, a third argument can be found in another paper where Laborde proposes and defends her idea of civic patriotism. Following Habermas's idea, Laborde argues that the legitimacy as well as the effectivity of democratic politics require the citizens to be able to adopt "the 'we-perspective' of active self-determination" in a democratic political community. (Laborde, 2002, p. 601) From Laborde's discussion, this "we-perspective" entails two aspects. Firstly, democratic citizens should be able to continuously identify with political institutions in the sense that they feel these institutions are "somehow theirs". In Laborde's view, only with this kind of bond between citizens and political institutions can a democracy avoid the problem of "democratic malaise" which does not only undermine the legitimacy of a democracy but also paralyzes it. According to Laborde, this democratic malaise is characterized by "cynicism towards democratic rule, reluctance to share the burden of social justice, resentment towards aloof and acculturated elites, decline of civic dispositions, alienation vis-à-vis an increasing 'privatized' public sphere". (Laborde, 2002, p. 601) Secondly, in Laborde's discussion, she also points out that democratic citizens do not merely feel identified with the political institutions but also have a feeling of shame or pride for the actions of their co-citizens. Laborde (2002, p. 602) takes the shame that British citizens felt for the racially-motivated bomb attack happened in London. This feeling of shame shows that democratic citizens do not merely feel connected with their fellow citizens in terms of the connection between their interests, but also in terms of a sense of shared responsibility. More precisely, they also, to some extent, feel responsible for the wrong-doings of their fellow citizens. In Laborde's view, this feeling of shame or pride is an important motivation for political mobilization in a democratic political community.

According to Laborde's discussion, we can infer that republican solidarity that sustains a democratic political community contains three forms of bond. Firstly, it contains a social bond among citizens, characterized by the sense of belonging together and sharing the common fate. Secondly, it contains a civic bond among citizens, characterized by the commitments to promote the common good and the sense of shared responsibility. Thirdly, it contains a political bond between citizens and political institutions, characterized by the sense of ownership towards those institutions. In Laborde's view, the proper form of this republican solidarity is civic patriotism. In the following section, I will explore Laborde's idea of civic patriotism itself.

2.2 Two problematic forms of republican solidarity

Laborde supports her idea of civic patriotism as the proper form of republican solidarity by objecting post-nationalism, represented by Habermas's constitutional patriotism, and Miller's cultural nationalism. Her criticism of constitutional patriotism focuses on what she terms "neutralist constitutional patriotism", which claims that patriotic commitments are directed to universalist political principles, ideals and procedures outlined in the constitution. There are two objections can be found in Laborde's discussions. The first objection is that neutralist constitutional patriotism cannot be the proper form of republican solidarity, as the shared commitment to principles alone cannot generate the three bonds required to motivate democratic citizenship and sustain a democratic political community. More precisely, on the one hand, a commitment to universal principles cannot support the social and civic bond among citizens, as it falls short of grounding the "we-perspective" essential for these bonds. On the other hand, it also fails to support the political bond, as it falls short of grounding the sense of ownership that a citizen has towards a particular polity. The second objection focuses on the failure of constitutional patriotism in addressing the problems associated with illiberal forms of cultural nationalism. Specifically, it falls short in addressing the cultural-based forms of communal exclusion and may overlook such forms domination. Thus, Laborde claims that this "cultural-blind principled patriotism" is insufficient to foster republican solidarity. In addition to these two

objections, Laborde offers a third argument in her work on critical republicanism.

In Laborde's view, these problems lie in a problematic dichotomization between nationality and a cultural-neutral political identity. In this dichotomization, since nationality is understood as necessarily exclusive, a political identity which is inclusive to diversity needs to be abstracted from specific cultures and traditions. However, Laborde argues that it is a misunderstanding. As she points out, even Habermas himself suggests that constitutional patriotism is not entirely abstracted from national legacies, but rather adopting a scrutinizing attitude towards the specific tradition and culture which forms a person's identity. Thus, what is problematic lies not in national identity itself, but rather which layers that a national identity resides in. In other words, as Laborde states, "national legacies are not irrelevant to the legitimate mode of present patriotic identification".(Laborde, 2008, p. 248) In this sense, while Laborde's idea of civic patriotism suggests that citizenship is a political identity associated with patriotic identification with political culture, this political identity is not isolated from national legacies of a specific political community, as political culture itself is a part of national legacies of a political community.

Although Laborde's civic patriotism does not abstract patriotic identification from national legacies, her theory does neither agree that this identification should be grounded in existing national identity of a political community. In this sense, Laborde distinguishes her theory from Miller's republican form of cultural nationalism, which grounds patriotic identification on common public culture which is much thicker than Laborde's idea of political culture. Laborde points out that cultural nationalism is theoretically doubtful, as national fellow-feeling, sustaining by a thick national culture, does not necessary supports solidaristic attachment. In her view, republican solidarity cannot be equated with national solidarity. (Laborde, 2002, p. 605) In addition to this theoretical problem, in her critical examination of French official republicanism, which endorse cultural nationalist theory and claim that French citizens should show loyalty

to the French political community through integrating into the French common culture, Laborde also criticizes its lack of sensitivity to the reality of existing political communities. She points out that this insensitivity leads to two problems.

Firstly, in Laborde's view, cultural nationalists tend to propose an idealized national culture as a common public culture which is itself ethnicity-blind though historically it might have an ethnicity source. Laborde argues that it is doubtful that this ideal form of national culture can offer guidelines to address the ethnicization in the real-world political communities. My discussion in the previous chapter supports this criticism proposed by Laborde. As I have shown, being insensitive to real-life nationalist discourse, cultural nationalists' advocacy for national identity may reinforce the existing bias and hostility towards minority groups. Laborde terms this problem "the invisibilization of ethnicization". As she criticizes,

"National republican ideology, because it repudiates all references to the social relevance of ethnicity, it is conceptually incapable of accounting for the structural connection between economic disadvantage and ethnic discrimination."

The second problem is that the lack of sensitivity to the reality hinders national republicans noticing the complexity of the real-world cases. Laborde proposes this criticism in her analysis on two forms of Islamization in France. While French national republicans criticize Islamization as a resistance against integrating into the French political community, Laborde asserts that this understanding of Islamization improperly simplifies the reality in two aspects.

On the one hand, it overlooks that some Muslims' disaffiliation from the political community and demand of religious accommodation are responses to the fact that

they are priorly excluded from the mainstream society. In other words, as Laborde argues, this defiant Islamization is a response to the failure of the cultural nationalist mode of integration. Laborde terms this form of Islamization as the “Islam of the excluded”. This form of Islamization illustrates a group of Muslims who are excluded from the mainstream society find their sense of belonging and restore their sense of self-esteem in the Islamic community.(Laborde, 2008, pp. 224-225) From Laborde’s exploration, she finds that this group of Muslims may not act as active protesters who advocate for the public endorsement of Islam identity. Laborde illustrates this point by showing evidence from an interview with Muslims in France. This interview shows that a Muslim man who does not wear djellabab in public space not because he integrates into the French secular national culture. Instead, this man takes himself as a guest of this country and does not want to shock his neighbours. In other words, the reality shows that some Muslims may well respect the national culture of the political community but simultaneously do not see themselves belonging to the political community. This lack of sense of belonging manifests not in their advocacy for public endorsement of their Islamic identity but rather in their lack of interests in participation unless the interests of their own Islamic community are involved.

While national republicans overlook the reality of disaffiliation among this group of “obedient” Muslims, on the other hand they also misunderstand the Muslim youth who actively advocate for public recognition of Islamic identity and strive to increase the public visibility of Islam. Laborde terms this form of Islamization as “Islam of the included”. In Laborde’s finding, these Muslim youth are well-integrated French who see themselves as members of the French political community. Their insistence in wearing Islamic symbols such as Islamic cloth or veils is a manifestation of not their disaffiliation but rather their integration. By advocating public recognition of Islamic identity and increase the visibility of Islamic symbols in public sphere, those Muslim youth aims to make the culture of their French society more representative. However, ironically, these Muslim youth are categorized as people who fail to integrate into the French society. The misunderstandings on both the “Islam of the excluded” and the “Islam of the included” illustrate that cultural nationalism misplaces the source of

republican solidarity and fails to realize the republican ideal of democratic citizenship.

However, Laborde suggests that the problem of cultural nationalism does not necessarily imply the entire dismissal of national identity. On the one hand, as I have pointed out, Laborde thinks the problem lies not in the concept of national identity itself, but rather in which layers of national identity that patriotic identification is directed to. In her view, while civic patriotism claims that democratic citizenship is a political identity rather than a cultural identity, unlike post-nationalism, this theory does not suggest that the political identity is completely isolated from national legacies. Instead, civic patriotism holds that patriotic identification should be directed to a thinner layer of national identity.

On the other hand, when it comes to the existing national identity in real-world political communities, Laborde does not completely deny its value. In other words, while Laborde claims that a shared national identity is not theoretically essential for republican solidarity, she acknowledges its potential as an “effective channel” for cultivating such solidarity. (Laborde, 2002, p. 605) Through Laborde’s discussion, it becomes clear that Laborde endorses a more realistic position and is sensitive to real-world contexts. In her view, a shared national identity does indeed establish the existing network of solidaristic bond in many of the real-world democratic political communities. It holds not only instrumental value in grounding republican solidarity to some extent, but also defines the boundaries of communal inclusion. In the real-world context, whether the majority recognizes newcomers as part of “us” depends on their recognition of these newcomers’ integration into the national community. In Laborde’s view, a more realistic strategy to address the problem of national exclusion involves fostering a reflective and critical attitude toward the existing national identity, rather than completely dismantling the existing national bonds.

2.3 Civic patriotism as a proper form

In Laborde's idea of civic patriotism, citizens are identified with the political culture of a political community which are embodied in "political institutions, practices, symbols, ideological and rhetorical traditions and so forth". (Laborde, 2002, p. 598) Following this idea, it is the political culture plays the identificatory role and citizenship is inherently a political identity. Laborde offers a distinctive interpretation of the concept of political culture. As she defines in following:

"Political culture can be defined as the loose and malleable framework which sustains our political conversation over time. It includes familiarity with collective institutions, political rituals and rhetoric, types of discourses, and accumulated habits and expectations stemming from previous conversations." (Laborde, 2002, p. 609)

In the later paragraph, Laborde(2002, p. 610) summarizes it as "a shared framework of political meaning". Then, Laborde's idea seems to suggest that the object of patriotic identification is to the shared framework of political meaning in a political community. And this shared framework is manifested through political institutions, practices, symbols, and traditions. Consequently, a question appears: what does it mean by saying that a citizen is patriotically identified with such a shared framework? According to Laborde's discussion, we can infer that a patriotic identification involves at least two dimensions. Firstly, it involves a sense of ownership. Specifically, citizens will feel that the shared framework of political meaning is theirs. This sense of ownership can be further interpreted through Laborde's views on the artificial character of political culture. Laborde states that political culture is created, transformed and altered through political activities and conversations. Based on this idea, we can infer that the sense of ownership can manifest in citizens' engagement in those activities and conversations. In other words, citizens feel the political culture is theirs when they affirm that the political culture is shaped and can be transformed through their engagement.

This sense of ownership leads to the second dimension of patriotic identification—that is, the commitment to sustain and value the political culture. One explanation of this commitment is that it is a result of the sense of ownership. In other words, citizens value the political culture and commit to sustain it because they feel it is their political culture. In addition to this explanation, there is a second explanation can be found in Laborde’s discussion. Laborde argues that “we value our country because we value the particular character of its public debate”. With regard to the character of political culture of democratic communities, Laborde further states that,

“The political culture of every democratic society bears the marks of the particular struggles of historically excluded group...seeking to appropriate the existing public sphere and make good its abstract democratic promise of emancipation and equality”.(2002, p. 610)

These statements offer the second explanation of patriotic commitment. That is, citizens of a democratic political community value their political culture and commit to sustain it not only because it is theirs, but also because it is inclusive and reflects the value of liberty and equality. In this sense, Laborde argues that civic patriotism does not subordinate universal values and ideals to particularistic attachment but the opposite.

The above explanations of two dimensions of patriotic identification have three implications. Firstly, in civic patriotism, sustaining a political culture is consistent with absorbing new groups and new claims, as the inclusiveness of minority groups itself is the reason for one’s valuing of a political culture. Additionally, when it comes to the sense of ownership, since it lies in one’s engagement in the process of shaping and altering the political culture, then absorbing new groups and new claims does not

undermine this sense of ownership as long as one is also included in the process of the transformation.

The second implication concerns the newcomers. A problem arising with new-coming groups: since they do not play a part in shaping the existing political culture of the host political community, they may not gain a sense of ownership immediately. In this case, Laborde argues that civic patriots only require the newcomers to “become familiar with the country’s political culture in such a way to become functioning citizens”. (2002, p. 608) According to this statement, civic patriotism suggests a form of civic incorporation which is thinner than cultural form of national integration advocated by Miller. This civic incorporation places responsibilities on both the majority and the new-coming minority. On the one hand, the majority should be willing to engage in the political conversations with the new-coming groups and willing to transform the political culture to absorb their claims. On the other hand, the minority should be willing to engage in the political conversation and willing to gain familiarity with the existing political culture to make their participation effective.

However, in real-world contexts, Laborde’s critical republican approach seems to transfer the minority’s responsibilities to the majority and the state, as the existing political communities are far from the ideal of non-domination and the ideal of civic patriotism. Specifically, the existing solidaristic bonds reside in the ethnicized and exclusive national identity rather than in the inclusive political culture. It frustrates the participation of immigrated minorities and even leads to their political retreat. Thus, according to Laborde, the primary responsibilities of civic incorporation should be placed on the state and the majority. In other words, they are responsible for fostering the participation of the immigrated minorities through the de-ethnicization of existing national identity and public sphere. In the subsequent section, I will discuss the critical strategies advocated by Laborde and their implications on the controversial cases arising with growing religious diversity.

3. The critical republican strategy

3.1 The idea of the principled strategy and the transferred responsibilities

In the previous parts, I have shown that in face of the problem of domination arising from religious diversity, particularly the post-immigration religious diversity, Laborde's approach claims that a democratic political community is sustained by fostering a critical republican ideal of civic sphere, where citizens are equally included in a democratic relationship characterized by the ideal of non-domination and republican solidarity. Thus, Laborde's ideal of civic sphere is rested on her critical republican ideal of democratic citizenship. In this ideal, its normative dimension suggests that democratic citizens are respected as equals in terms that their minimal discursive control is equally protected, its ethical dimension suggests that democratic citizens are patriotically identified with political culture of the democratic political community and bear responsibilities in fostering civic incorporation. In Laborde's approach, the tension between the normative dimension and the ethical dimension of democratic citizenship is reconciled from three aspects. In the previous part, I have explained the first two aspects. To summarize, in the first aspect, in Laborde's theory, the normative and ethical dimension is intertwined, as equal citizenship of religious minorities involves an equal inclusion into the solidaristic bonds of a democratic political community. In the second aspect, by defining political culture in a thinner way, civic incorporation is inclusive and does not impose heavy burdens on religious minorities, particularly religious immigrants. In addition to these two aspects, Laborde's approach also reconciles the tension from a third aspect, based on her distinction between substantive ideals and practical strategies.

Laborde's critical republican approach is characterized by its critical turn in normative political philosophy. Inspired by the critical social theories, Laborde holds a critical lens when she constructs her critical republican theory. This critical attitude manifests in

two aspects. Firstly, when she constructs substantive ideals, she starts from a close and deep discernment of social reality. This contextual sensitivity leads her to place emphasis not merely on ideal moral norms and institutional legal norms, but also cultural norms and social attitudes. Thus, the ideal of equal citizenship as non-domination is critical republican because its construction is based on the understanding of the asymmetrical power relationship among citizens in the real-world democratic societies. In this sense, these substantive ideals are critical republican ideals. Secondly, these substantive ideals are constructed not merely as blueprints of an ideal form of democratic society, as Rawls terms “the well-ordered society”, but rather as a guidance to lead the social and political reforms. Thus, Laborde places more emphasis on the strategies implied by the substantive ideals, which she terms “a principled strategy for reform”. (Laborde, 2008, p. 13)

Endorsing this critical stance on the strategies in actualizing the substantive ideals, Laborde argues that her critical republican ideal of democratic citizenship, though itself implies responsibilities of civic incorporation, does not necessarily place these responsibilities on the minorities. As she argues, when the institutions and social structures are corrupt, it is not legitimately to require citizens to be fully virtuous. More precisely, since the reality of existing public sphere of democratic societies is far from her critical republican ideal of civic sphere, it is the state and the majority who benefits from the existing institutions and social structures bear the responsibilities to rectify the existing domination and to foster civic incorporation rather than the minorities who are disadvantaged and excluded. Thus, when it comes to the asymmetrical power relationship between the majority and the immigrated religious minority-particular Muslims, Laborde argues that the existing institutions and structures have been historically shaped by the majority-namely, non-Muslims-in a way that Muslims are subordinated and excluded. In this condition, unlike Miller who emphasizes the minority’s responsibility to respect national culture and seek for integration, her critical republican ideal of democratic citizenship does not require these religious minorities to make effort to participate in the public sphere and to incorporate into the mainstream society, but rather require the state and the majority

to eliminate the domination and foster the fair incorporation by removing the institutional and structural obstacles to the minority's participation and incorporation.

3.2 Critical republican strategy as politics of non-domination

Following the idea of the principled strategy demonstrated above, Laborde terms her critical republican strategy "the politics of non-domination". According to Laborde, the goal of the politics of non-domination is "participatory parity", a term Laborde borrows from Nancy Fraser. According to Fraser's (2004, p. 32) explanation, participatory parity means that individuals and groups can participate "on a par with others in social interaction". Participation plays a crucial role in Laborde's approach. The analysis on civic patriotism in the previous section has shown that participation is crucial for individuals to patriotically identify with the political culture. In this sense, participation is essential for fostering republican solidarity. Additionally, Laborde also asserts that participation, in all levels of society, is the best way to combat domination from others, as it "has a transformative effect" on reducing ethnic partiality and essentialization of identity. (Laborde, 2008, pp. 237, 250) Thus, the politics of non-domination aims at removing the obstacles that people-especially the minorities-have faced or would face, which undermines their participatory parity. According to Laborde, the politics of non-domination contains three major principled strategies, namely the critical republican strategy of de-ethnicization and de-segregation.

It involves de-ethnicization in three forms. Firstly, critical republican strategy of de-ethnicization requires to jettison the usage of languages involving in existing discourse of national integration. In Laborde's view, critical republicans are sensitive to "the politics of naming" because the usage of language itself constitutes a part of the ethnicization of minority identities. As she states, "the junction on immigrants to become français is a perversely paradoxical request, as both terms are implicitly ethnicized". (Laborde, 2008, p. 249) Following Laborde's idea, we can infer critical republicans might also object to use the term such as "outsiders", "strangers",

“newcomers” to generally describe ethno-religious group such as Muslim groups, as the usage of these terms itself constitutes a way to ethnicize these groups. The “Islam of the included” has shown that those Muslim youth who are well-integrated and have grown up and been educated in France have been improperly categorized into the immigrants who are outsiders or newcomers refusing integration. The usage of those terms itself implicitly reflects the suspicions towards these minority groups and, to some extent, set the majority against these minority groups. However, while Laborde insists in the jettison of the usage of such language, she objects to the policy of language and speech restrictions advocated by multiculturalists. Specifically, she argues that this correction of the language should not be enforced by state policies, though the aim of it is to protect the vulnerable groups and individuals. Laborde suggests that such kind of restriction only applies to state official discourse. (Laborde, 2008, p. 250) Possible examples may include both the written language in official documents and the discourses of state officials, legislators, judges and so on. In this sense, it seems that this strategy applies only to what Rawls calls as the formal political forums.

Secondly, critical republican strategy involves a de-ethnicization of the existing narratives of the nation. As Laborde states, “the narratives of the nation must be told in a way which does not alienate or exclude minorities”. In this sense, this de-ethnicization involves two requirements. On the one hand, it requires the majority to adopt a self-scrutinizing and self-reflective attitude towards their “identity-forming tradition”. Specifically, the majority should be more sensitive to the way that the traditional national narratives alienate and marginalize the minority groups. It suggests that they should not only be honest to the dark history and dark moments of the nation but also place more emphasis on the part related to the minority groups. For example, Laborde argues that the French should tell a “more complete history of their colonial past”. On the other hand, instead of requiring or expecting the minorities to endorse the existing national story, it requires the majority to expand their national story through incorporating the memories of the minorities and immigrants into their national memory.

When it comes to the specific policies, the politics of non-domination does not imply a restriction on ordinary citizens' speech but imply a restriction on applying national identity arguments in public political forum. This point is evident in Laborde's criticism of the national identity arguments against the display of religious symbols. Take the Swiss ban on minarets and French ban on Muslim veils as examples. In Laborde's view, in both cases, national republicans who defend the ban ignore overlooks the way that the real-life national identity is historically defined. Laborde points out that after the end of the Cold war, the Western Europe identity was imagined in opposition to Islam. In other words, the real-life national identities of Western Europe countries, to a degree, all presumes the conflict between their national values and Muslim values, and portrayed Islam as "the alien religiosity". In other words, the narratives of national identity-either the Swiss identity or French identity-is based on an ethnicization of Muslim identity. I have discussed this problem in the second chapter. However, since Laborde claims that there should be no restriction on free speech, she argues that ordinary citizens should be allowed to freely criticize the religious ideas and practices, "even in a prejudiced, ignorant, and disrespectful manner"(2022, p. 146). Thus, Swiss citizens should be allowed to freely criticize the extremist Islamic domination that they believe to be associated with Islamic minarets. Similarly, French citizens should also be allowed to freely criticize the disvalues such as gender domination that they believe to be associated with Muslim veils. However, it is wrong for a state to ban the minarets or Muslim veiling, as Muslims lack discursive control over their own identity. As Laborde states, "it is the political disempowerment, coupled with the anti-Muslim rhetoric of campaigners, that excluded them from the imaginary community of Swiss citizenship". (2022, p. 146)

Thirdly, critical republican strategy also involves a de-ethnicization of public sphere. As demonstrated in the previous part, due to the different areas of the public sphere, the strategy of de-ethnicization implies different requirements in Laborde's approach. When it comes to the robust public sphere which I have explained in the previous

section, the strategy of de-ethnicization requires to normalize and increase the presence of minority religions in the robust public sphere. On the one hand, it requires to increase the public visibility of religious minority groups through “proactive policies of symbolic representation of religious pluralism” in the areas such as the media. (Laborde, 2008, p. 250) Unlike the similar policies based on the politics of recognition which places emphasis on the differences, these policies based on the politics of non-domination aim at de-stigmatizing “the public mode of appearance” of religious minorities. On the other hand, it requires normalizing the presence of minority religions in public sphere. For example, it requires the political community to accept the minority religious dress code such as Muslim veiling, as well as minority religious architect such as minarets. In Laborde’s view, the normalization of their presence, by dismissing the problematic presumption of the incompatibility between Muslim identity and national identity, between Islam and democracy, can contribute to the de-ethnicization of both Muslim identity and national identity.

Notably, in Laborde’s(2012) discussion on the Islamic religious dress code, she particularly addresses some critics’ differentiated attitudes towards the public presence of hijab from niqab (an Islamic veil covering the nose and mouth and usually combined with jilbab)¹⁸. In their views, the public presence of niqab is more controversial than hijab because it is explicitly associated with a radicalized and extremist interpretation of Islam that involves a severer gender domination. They support a restriction or a ban on the wearing of niqab in public space, as they perceive it expressing one’s endorsement of extremist religious doctrine and advocacy of gender domination. Laborde in her discussion put forth two arguments against this position. Firstly, Laborde argues that in terms of the issue of free choice, there is no

¹⁸ In Laborde’s discussion, she mainly focuses on the case of the French Burqa Law. Following Olivier Roy’s and other Islam experts’ research, Laborde, C. (2012) ‘State paternalism and Religious Dress code’, *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 10(2), pp. 398-410. points out that the French law conflates niqab with burqa. In experts’ findings, while burqa is a whole bodying covering imposed on female population in Afghanistan by Taliban, niqab is a “recent Salafi invention” imported to Europe. In other words, what is appearing in Western Europe is niqab rather than burqa.

significant difference between wearing hijab and wearing niqab. While opponents assert that it is more problematic to view the wearing of niqab as a genuinely free choice of women in light of the extremist doctrine expressed by niqab, Laborde argues that recent research shows that the wearing of niqab in Europe is voluntarily adopted by young women themselves. As these findings show, young women in Europe wear niqab as an expression of their Muslim identity. On the one hand, they use niqab as a marker of their Islamic identity characterized by deeper religiosity which distinguishes themselves from the other Muslims. On the other hand, they use it as “a stance of defiant rebelliousness against the perceived hostility, racism, and Islamophobia of the mainstream society”. An evidence of this expression of Muslim identity can be found in the finding that shows that many Muslim women in France began to wear a niqab after being banned to wear a hijab in state schools.(Laborde, 2012, p. 405) Secondly, when it comes to the extremist Islamic doctrine associated with niqab, Laborde argues that a legal restriction or ban is not a good way to eliminate the domination. In her view, legislation itself is not an effective tool to change people’s mind but rather may reinforce and accelerate the othering of Muslims and Islam in public opinion. In Laborde’s view, a better way is to subject the niqab and the extremist doctrine associated with it to the public deliberations.¹⁹

While Laborde suggests that the presence of minority religions in robust public sphere should be accepted and normalized, she also suggests that public sphere in the strict sense should be secular and expresses what she terms “non-dominating impartiality”. In this aspect, the de-ethnicization of public sphere implies the disestablishment of religion, either in material or symbolic form²⁰. In the previous exploration of Laborde’s

¹⁹ However, Laborde’s discussion on the case of niqab leads to a possible question: when Laborde claims that de-ethnicization involves the acceptance and normalization of the presence of minority religious symbols in public sphere, does she merely mean that the state should legally permit their presence, or does she mean that the form of acceptance is varied to the different religious doctrines expressed by religious symbols? I will address these questions in the rest part of this chapter.

²⁰ In another paper, Laborde, C. (2013) 'Political Liberalism and Religion: On Separation and Establishment: POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND RELIGION', *The journal of political philosophy*, 21(1), pp. 67-86. lists five typical examples of symbolic establishment of religion, which is also termed “modest establishment” as it

disaggregated account of religion, I have pointed out that she denies the legitimacy of state establishment of religion when religion manifests as a divisive identity marking the social vulnerability. In Laborde's view, when religion manifests as such an identity in a political community, both the material and the symbolic establishment of religion can be objectively constructed as expressing an official message of excluding religious minorities or nonreligious people out of the political community and consequently reinforce the bias and discrimination among the majority public opinion. Furthermore, when religion manifests as a divisive identity, it does not merely imply a division between majority religious identity and minority religious identity and the subsequent subordination of religious minority, but also imply a division between religious identity and nonreligious identity. Thus, Laborde objects to not only the establishment of a single religion but also the establishment of multiple religions. In the latter case, although a multi-religious establishment extends the privileges from a single religion to multiple religions and may avoid subordinate minority religions, it may subordinate nonreligious people such as atheist people. It is possible that in a political community establishing multiple religions, nonreligious people such as atheist people might be portrayed as people with no faith and who are unreliable and more easily to violate moral norms.

In Laborde's discussion of the specific strategies of this form of de-ethnicization, there are two important points. Firstly, while Laborde claims that critical republicans reject religious establishment, she does not claim that de-ethnicization necessarily deny all

does not involve an issue of distribution of public fund. The five examples include: "(i) The head of state is the head of the National Church (for example, England and Wales).

(ii) Non-mandatory schools prayers are organised daily in state schools.

(iii) Religious symbols such as crucifixes are exhibited in public spaces (for example, Quebec's National Assembly).

(iv) State funerals (such as of heads of state) are organised by the Catholic Church (for example, France).

(v) Officials swear an oath or Pledge of Allegiance affirming religious belief (for example, USA). "Laborde, C. (2013) 'Political Liberalism and Religion: On Separation and Establishment: POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND RELIGION', *The journal of political philosophy*, 21(1), pp. 67-86.

kinds of state support of religions. In her discussion, she claims that state can support religion in two conditions. The first condition is that such support is required by ensuring citizens' basic right of religious freedom. The second condition is that such support is required to rectify the undue disadvantages experienced by minority religions due to the historically establishment of the majority religion. The latter case shows that the critical republican principle of minimal secularism may also requires a supporting policy for minority religion in some conditions. However, unlike radical multiculturalists who advocate multi-religions endorsement, critical republicans do not consider this supporting policy is prima facie legitimate. Rather, the core idea is that the reality of democratic political community is far from the ideal of minimal secularism and consequently this supporting policy can be an effective strategy to rectify the existing inequality.

Secondly, by rejecting symbolic establishment as well, Laborde's critical republican approach objects to the display of religious symbols in strict public sphere. Following Laborde's discussion, the public display is problematic when two conditions are met. Firstly, the symbol being displayed is a symbol associated with a religious identity which, following the "objective observer's test", is considered as a marker of social division and social vulnerability. While crucifix may be agreed to be such a religious symbol, it is more controversial when it comes to festival symbols with religious historical background such as Christmas trees.²¹ Secondly, the display of the religious symbol, following the "objective observer's test", is considered conveying an exclusionary message. In this condition, as I have pointed out previously, Laborde emphasizes that location is important. In other words, the religious symbols are display in strict public sphere. In Laborde's(2013, p. 14)'s discussion, she takes the display of

²¹ The relevant case is the Pittsburgh case revolving around the holiday displays in the Allegheny County Courthouse. Martha NussbaumNussbaum, M. (2008) *Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality*. Basic Books. has provided a brief picture of the relevant discussion on this case.

crucifix in Quebec's National Assembly (which was removed in 2019) as a typical example. Following Laborde's "objective observer's test", it is not hard to consider the display of crucifix in this case conveying an exclusionary message, as National Assembly is a political space where government's central function is operated and should be representative to all citizens in a democratic political community. A similar case is the display of religious symbols in courtroom that is also such a political space where justice is exercised and defended. The display of religious symbols such as crucifixes may cast a doubt on the impartiality of the court.²²

The case that raises more controversies is the display of religious symbols in school classrooms, such as the Italian and the Bavarian case discussed in the previous chapter. Laborde claims that school is a public sphere similar to parliament and courtroom and different from robust public sphere such as public square or cemetery. However, when she makes this statement, Laborde does not explain where the similarity lies. There are two possible interpretations here. In the first interpretation, the problem lies in the fact that the schools are public or state schools. Since the schools are established and supported by the state, opening to all citizens in the political community, the display of the religious symbol in the classrooms of these schools implies the state's support of the religious symbol. In the second interpretation, the problem lies in the nature of school in general rather than the type of the school. In Laborde's (2008a, p. 92) discussion, she points out that school is not extension of family sphere but rather are public sphere in virtue of its role in creating democratic citizens—that is, cultivating democratic values among students. Based on this understanding, it can be inferred that the display of religious symbols in the school classroom may implicitly set a partial connection between democratic values and a specific religion. In the previous chapter, I have pointed out that in debate around the Italian and Bavarian case, one argument prevailed among court judges and advocates claims that democratic values are

originated in Christianity and crucifix in this sense conveys the democratic values. I have shown that this connection is based on a selectively positive interpretation of the majority's religion and may be used to reinforce the negative portrayal of the minority religions. To use Laborde's term, this partial connection is based on an ethnicization of both the majority and the minority religious identities. Thus, to de-ethnicize the public sphere will require to erect the display of religious symbols in the school classroom.

Following the second interpretation of schools as public sphere where the principle of democratic impartiality should be adhered to, another two questions needed to be addressed. The first question concerns whether it means that public school should free from all religious signs. The particular question concerned here is whether schools can restrict or ban the religious dress code, by arguing that certain religious dress code is incompatible with the value of education-for instance, the value of free thinking and learning. In regard to this question, Laborde's position is two-folded. In Laborde's(2012) discussion, she particularly addresses the issue of Islamic dress code and distinguishes the case of wearing hijab from wearing niqab. On the one hand, Laborde strongly objects the ban on wearing hijab in public schools. One of the arguments she proposes have already mentioned-that is, wearing hijab is not necessary a manifestation of gender domination but can be voluntary choices by young people to express their distinctive religious identity. When it comes to the school case, Laborde further argues that the proponents of the ban on religious dress code in public schools mistakenly assume the connection between the wearing of hijab and the resistance to free thinking and learning. Wearing hijab does not necessarily hinder the students' capability to learn the skills and the democratic values.

On the other hand, however, Laborde's position on the case of wearing niqab in public schools is weaker. As demonstrated above, niqab is different from hijab in virtue of its connection with the radical Islamism, i.e., Salafism. One argument can be proposed by the proponents of the ban argues that the wearing of niqab "is an obstacle to the

proper integration of schoolgirls into their learning environment”, as Salafism itself contains a requirement of social separation and segregation. In regard to this argument, Laborde provides two replies. The first reply suggests that the case concerning wearing niqab in the public schools is not a real-life case but hypothetical. Thus, it is doubtful that there is a real difficulty here. Laborde’s second reply is that the restriction or the ban should not be enforced by the state through establishing a law. Rather, Laborde claims that the decision should be made by schools through their internal regulations. In other words, she seems to suggest that schools are permitted to ban the wearing of niqab but the state should not establish such a ban. However, Laborde’s weaker position here is less persuasive. If wearing niqab is necessarily an expression of one’s strict affiliation to Salafism which requires social segregation, it is doubtful that this group of Muslims will choose to study in a public school. The choice in studying in a public school itself embodies a person’s willingness to be exposed to a mixed social environment. In this sense, even if one day there is such a real-life case, the emergence of such case itself undermines the strict connection between wearing niqab and adherence to social segregation. Even if Muslims who wear niqab might be residentially segregated, their choice to send their children to public schools itself shows one way to foster the social integration of these children. In this case, in order to promote the social integration, public schools should not ban the wearing of niqab.

The second question concerns the issue of religious education. Put it specifically, if the school, in virtue of its role in creating democratic citizens, is considered a public sphere that should adhere to principle of democratic impartiality, the question is whether religious schools should be permitted or supported by the state. Based on the distinction between the substantive ideal and the practical strategy, Laborde’s position on the issue of religious schools is two-folded. When it comes to the practical strategy applied in the real-world contexts, Laborde tends to claim that religious schools are permitted as long as they are restricted by the civic ideals. There are two important viewpoints here. Firstly, the permission of establishing and supporting religious schools is conditioned on the fact that the real-world democratic political community falls short of the ideal of non-domination. On the one hand, religious schools should

be permitted and supported when such privileges have been priorly granted to a specific religion or religions. For example, if a democratic state has already permitted and supported the establishment of Christian schools, critical republicans will claim that other religious schools such as Muslim schools should also be permitted and supported in the same way. On the other hand, religious schools should be permitted and supported if the existing public schools are exclusive to religious children- especially, the minority religious children. Thus, in face of the demand for permitting religious schools from religious people, critical republicans do not merely concern whether this need should be satisfied but also concern the existing domination in the existing public education system which may facilitate the need of separate religious schools. In Laborde's view, the more important mission for a democratic political community is to scrutinize the existing public education system and reform it in a way to make it less burdensome to religious children, especially the minority religious children. Thus, while public education insists on the secularism of education, it should not discourage religious beliefs or disparage religious groups. On the contrary, secular public education should expose children to different worldviews including both religious and nonreligious. In Laborde's view, public schools should be secular in terms of aiming at the secular goal, namely the creating of democratic citizens, rather than in terms of its hostility or opposition to religion. (Laborde, 2008, p. 93)

In short, religious schools are permitted and supported when it is considered a practical tool to rectify the existing domination in the educational system. In other words, the normative ground of this permission and support does not reside in prima facie right of religious education. As I have pointed out, in Laborde's view, education in a democratic political community is not a private affair which should be entirely subjected to personal choice, but rather a public affair in virtue of its role in creating democratic citizens. Its nature as a public affair implies a second significant point involved in Laborde's critical republican position. That is, although religious schools, in certain conditions, should be permitted and supported, the permission and support are subject to restrictions. Since education is a public rather than private affair, Laborde asserts that religious schools should also meet the civic goal of creating

democratic religious citizens. It suggests that the curriculum and policies of religious schools should be censored by the state. In other words, religious schools should be incorporated into the state education system.

Although in the real-world contexts, the politics of non-domination may support a permission of religious schools, Laborde argues in principle religious schools do not meet the critical republican ideal of republican solidarity. When Laborde asserts that participation in all levels of life, including political and social, as the best way to eliminate domination and foster republican solidarity, the underlying idea is that the actual encounter and interact with others and their diverse ways of life are the best way to eliminate ethnicization and build social bond. Thus, Laborde takes “dwelling together” as a significant element of critical republican ideal of democratic political community. Thus, in the ideal of civic sphere, the robust public sphere should be congregated and mixed. Schools in Laborde’s idea are not merely a strict public sphere in virtue of being associated with certain public good and undertaking certain civic functions, but also a robust public sphere in virtue of being a space where individuals and groups encounter and interact with one another, together building republican solidarity and forming collective identity. Thus, in critical republican ideal, separate religious education which segregate religious children from the others falls short of the critical republican ideal of civic sphere. As Laborde states,

“The ideal of republican solidarity can only be promoted through actual social mixing, within common state schools, between children of different social, cultural and religious origin.....It is difficult for students to learn to be tolerant and respectful of other people, traditions, and ways of life unless they are actually exposed to them: only common schools concretely embody reciprocity in their daily institutional life”.
(Laborde, 2008, p. 253)

From Laborde's discussion of religious education, it becomes clear that territorial segregation itself is an obstacle to citizens' participation and consequently the politics of non-domination requires a strategy of territorial de-segregation. According to Laborde, this territorial de-segregation does not merely apply to schools but also to the broad urban spaces. Thus, the idea is to foster the critical republican ideal of civic sphere through promoting social mixity of the robust public space.

III. Participation and republican solidarity

The previous part has shown that, by interpreting the challenge posed by religious diversity-especially the post-immigration religious diversity, as a problem of domination, Laborde's critical republican approach encompasses following four propositions:

*(i) **The democratic citizenship proposition:** a democratic political community is sustained by foster a critical republican ideal of civic sphere where democratic citizens are included as equals and bound together by civic form of patriotic identification.*

*(ii) **The participation proposition:** the realization of this ideal of democratic citizenship, it requires the broad and deep participation from all citizens of the political community, as participation is the best way to combat domination and foster the solidaristic bond.*

*(iii) **The critical reality proposition:** the reality of structural domination in democratic political community frustrates the minority's participation and facilitates the retreat from public life.*

(iv) The critical republican strategy proposition: the proper strategy should endorse the politics of non-domination which aims at removing the structural obstacles to participation through de-ethnicizing the political institution and formal political forum as well as de-segregating the robust public space.

From these propositions, it becomes clear that participation is a key element in Laborde's theory. The proposition (ii) shows that Laborde considers participation as the best mean to achieve the critical republican ideal of civic sphere. According to Laborde's ideas that I have explained in the previous parts, we can see that two different forms of participation play different roles in Laborde's approach. While Laborde's theory of civic patriotism views political participation as the source of patriotic identification, she also emphasizes that participation in the other level, i.e., social participation, is also essential to sustain a democratic political community as it is the best mean to eliminate existing ethnicization. To summarize, political participation and social participation together contribute to build republican solidarity and to foster the ideal of civic sphere. Thus, if we agree with Laborde in her understanding of the challenge as a problem of domination, the attractiveness of her approach to a degree depends on the persuasiveness of her positions on the role of participation in a democratic political community. In this part, I will attempt to examine her approach by a critical discussion of both her idea of political participation and her idea of social participation.

1. Political participation and republican solidarity

To understand the role of political participation in Laborde's approach, it is necessary to further clarify Laborde's position on the question of nationality and distinguish two possible interpretations of her theory. In the previous part, I have shown that Laborde objects to post-nationalism by arguing that patriotic identification cannot be entirely abstracted from national legacies. In her view, the problem with cultural nationalism lies not in national identity itself but rather in the type of national legacies that it rests

on. Laborde views the political culture as the object of patriotic identification. Based on these statements, two possible interpretations may emerge. In the first possible interpretation, Laborde's idea of civic patriotism is may be interpreted as a specific type of cultural nationalism. Following this interpretation, the only difference between Laborde and Miller lies in their divergent understanding of the common culture that binds citizens in a political community. More precisely, while Miller interprets the common culture as a thick version of common public culture, Laborde interprets it as a thin version of common political culture. In other words, in Laborde's idea of civic patriotism, it is the sharing of a common political culture that marks "us" from "others". If we endorse Miller's (Miller, 2017) classification of different theories explaining the source of solidarity, then in this interpretation Laborde's theory of civic patriotism can be understood as an identity theory that takes a form of commonality as the source of solidarity.

However, it is a misinterpretation, as Laborde herself explicitly argues that civic patriotism does not assume any substantive agreement among citizens. This misinterpretation of the source of republican solidarity in Laborde's theory can be based on a misunderstanding of her idea of patriotic identification. In the previous part, I have pointed out the two dimensions of patriotic identification in Laborde's theory—that is, the sense of ownership towards the political culture, and the commitment to value and sustain the political culture. If one interprets that this sense of ownership and commitment are derived from the person's agreement with specific principles, institutions or cultural ways of life embedded in the political culture, then one will incline to interpret Laborde's civic patriotism into a specific form of cultural nationalism or post-nationalism. However, since Laborde interprets political culture as a framework of political meaning which is formed through individuals' and groups' engagements in the political conversation, a person's patriotic identification with a political culture should not be understood as an agreement or endorsement of certain principles or cultural ways of life, but rather a sense of ownership towards the political culture. In this understanding, the second interpretation would be more proper.

In the second possible interpretation, instead of commonality, participation itself is perceived as a source of patriotic identification. Based on Laborde's interpretation of political culture, political culture is formed, shaped and transformed through citizens' participation in the political conversation. Thus, although political culture of a political community is embodied in its political institutions, practices and traditions, it is not fixed by them. Instead, political culture is a living culture. Following this idea, civic incorporation into the political culture manifests in individuals' participation in the political conversations rather than their endorsement of any specific set of principles, which is held by constitutional patriots suggests, or their endorsement of any thick ways of life, which is held by cultural nationalists. As Laborde states, "while requiring that all citizens be socialized into the same political culture, it (civic patriotism) does not take this culture as a fixed legacy but as a lived experience". (Laborde, 2002, p. 611)

Endorsing the second interpretation of Laborde's theory, it becomes clear that political participation plays an essential role in her approach. Put it precisely, political participation in her theory refers to the "participation in the political conversations". Another important point needed to be addressed here retains the question of the term "political conversations". In other words, the question is: what kind of political participation does Laborde take as a source of republican solidarity? In the first part of this chapter, when I discuss Laborde's disaggregated interpretation of religion, I have mentioned that Laborde does not take ordinary citizens as direct decision-makers in a democratic state and therefore should not be restrained by the principle of public reason. In my interpretation, Laborde's understanding of ordinary citizens is closer to Pettit's. That is to say, ordinary citizens are contesters of political decisions. They influence the decision-making and engage in shaping the political culture through participating in the public debate over the political decisions. Thus, based on Laborde's understanding, a more appropriate interpretation of political participation that Laborde takes as the source of republican solidarity is to include participation in both the formal and the informal forms of political conversations. In other words, the

political conversations refer to both formal and informal public discussions over political issues.

When it comes to the essential role of political participation plays in fostering republican solidarity, there is a second possible misunderstanding needed to be addressed. That is, it is improper to think that political participation is merely instrumentally valuable in Laborde's approach. According to Laborde's interpretation of non-domination and civic patriotism, it is salient that political participation is also constitutive to her notion of democratic citizenship. On the one hand, in the critical republican ideal, democratic citizenship is not merely understood as a structural status but also a political identity characterized by a patriotic identification with the political culture. According to Laborde, this patriotic identification is formed through one's political participation. On the other hand, considering civic patriotism as a proper form of republican solidarity, Laborde seems to suggest that not only political bond, but also civic and social bond are generated through political participation. In other words, political participation is perceived not merely an effective mean to foster republican solidarity but rather the very source of republican solidarity.

2. Objections against political participation as a source

However, if in a critical republican ideal of democratic political community, political participation plays an essential role, not merely in defining the critical republic ideal of democratic citizenship but also in realizing this ideal, then problems emerge.

Shlomi Segal(2005) in his paper, by exploring the empirical research on different types of political participation, objects to the view that political participation can foster solidarity. In his exploration, citizens are likely to learn from political participations democratic skills rather than solidaristic dispositions. Segal examines three types of political participation, including voting, political campaign and political deliberation.

Among these three types of political participation, empirical research shows that it is lack of evidence that voting and political campaign can build social solidarity among citizens. Even though voting can help foster political bond between voters and the state through increasing the responsiveness of government, it is unclear that voters show more solidaristic dispositions towards their fellow citizens. While participation in political campaign can help promote citizens' political knowledge and skills and can also help them understand the sophistication of political process, empirical evidence suggest that participation of this type does not necessarily promote social solidarity but rather probably facilitate selfishness by making participants focus on their own interests rather than on the common interests. Compared to voting and political campaign, Segal points out that empirical research shows that political deliberations are more inclined to facilitate solidaristic dispositions. However, he further emphasizes that it is wrong to exaggerate the effect of this form of political participation in generating the solidarity. Segall bases this conclusion on his examination of two specific form of political deliberations.

The first form of political deliberations in the real-world politics is citizens juries in which a small body of citizens, through collective deliberations, reach a decision on a specific issue of political policy which concerns not their own interests. According to his observation, through participating in this form of political deliberations, participants are better informed of the specific political issue, "develop a sense of attachment and ownership toward the policy or institutions in question" and generate greater empathy towards the group of people in question and greater sense of responsibility towards the issue in discussion. In short, through participating in citizens' juries, participants more easily become public-spirited and gain a sense of connection with both the political policy and the other citizens. However, the problem with this form of participation lies in two aspects. Firstly, its positive effects largely depend on whether its participants' decisions are actually endorsed and implemented by the government. If the decisions made through citizens' juries are not finally implemented, then this participation will lead to frustration and may harm the republican solidarity rather than cultivate it. Thus, if one cannot make sure that decisions made through

deliberations among a small-body of citizens are bound to be the best decisions, then it would be better not limit one's expectations towards its positive effects on cultivating republican solidarity. Secondly, citizens' juries is not a mode of political deliberations that is suitable for widespread application and is only a mode suitable for limited type of policies.

The second form of political deliberation examined by Segall is "empowered participatory governance" that is advocated by radical democrats. Unlike citizens' juries, in the empowered participatory governance, citizens, through deliberations, collectively make decisions on policies that are directly related to their own interests. This form of participation, compared to citizens' juries, is less costly and more plausible for widespread application. However, there are several problems with this form of political deliberations. Firstly, it is lack of evidence to prove the positive effect of this form of participation in cultivating solidaristic dispositions. Jane Mansbridge in her observation finds that participants who gain a sense of responsibility to other citizens through participating in this form of deliberations are mostly those who "have been in some way formally selected to be responsible or others" (2003, pp. 185-6). Thus, it remains unclear whether the possible transformative effect of this participation is simply produced by deliberations. Secondly, in Segall's view, since participants deliberate on issues related to their own interests, it is not clear that this form of participation is bound to facilitate participants' solidaristic dispositions which participants in citizens' juries are able to gain through deliberations. In contrast, it is possible that the political conversations of this form, by exposing the disagreements and interest-conflict among citizens, may harm social solidarity rather than promote it. Thirdly, since the issues discussed in this form of political deliberations are issues directly related to participants' interests, this form of participation is usually applied in the local level. Thus, it is doubtful that it can cultivate the republican solidarity of the state level.

Although Segall's criticism is focused on the more formal form of political participations, his discussion does suggest several problems with the idea of political participation as a source of republican solidarity. Firstly, it is doubtful that political participation necessarily builds on a republican solidarity. According to Segall's discussion, the transformative effect of political participation can sustain only when the participants can truly see the difference that their participation makes on the politics and believe their participation will be fruitful. In Laborde's view, citizens can develop a sense of ownership towards the political culture through participating in the political conversations. However, there is a missing link between the sense of ownership and the participation. That is, citizens who participate believe and trust that their participation can shape and transform the political culture. When it comes to a public debate on a particular issue of a political policy, whether citizens, through participating this public debate, can develop a sense of ownership and solidaristic dispositions towards the others to an extent depend on whether their opinions and deliberations can actually influence the decision-making and transform the social structures. Otherwise, it may lead to frustrations and finally lead to political disaffiliation. In the real-world politics, it seems that, compared to public debate, political campaign and formal form of political deliberations are more effective modes of participation in influencing the policymaking and fostering social changes.

Secondly, it is even more doubtful that political participation necessarily fosters horizontal bond among citizens. While Laborde claims that political participation can foster the "we-perspective", she does not explain the mechanism through which this "we-perspective" can be generated. The link in-between is not self-evident. When people participate in the political conversations with other citizens, the disagreement and conflicting interests among citizens, which they might not be aware of in their daily life, become salient. It is not rare in the daily life that political disagreements can break friendship. Two persons may become friends because of their common interest- for example, their common interest in playing football. They rarely discuss political issues. However, when they engage in a conversation on some divisive political issues, the awareness of their divided positions on those issues might destroy their friendship.

Thus, if exposure to political disagreement can break friendship, then there might be greater possibility to increase hostility among citizens who are strangers to each other. In this case, it is doubtful whether participation is bound to foster rather than break the social bond among citizens. Thus, the persuasiveness of Laborde's approach, in this sense, depends on whether a convincing explanation of the way political participation foster horizontal bond can be provided to support her claim.

In the next section, I will introduce two possible theories that can explain the way that political participation fosters a republican solidarity and examine whether these two theories can cope with these two problems disclosed above.

3. The associational theory and its problems

The first theory which can support the idea of political participation as a source of republican solidarity is called the associational theory of solidarity. According to this theory, individuals are connected with each other by their engagement in a common project or a joint political venture. This theory is based on an Arendtian understanding of a political community as a political association. According to Hayward's interpretation, a political association "brings together citizens who are different in their experiences, needs, and perspectives, by creating for them a social and a political world that is common to them"(2007, p. 193). And this theory is further supported by Robert Putnam's social capital theory which claims that people are more likely to have solidaristic dispositions towards those who they are associated with in a common project.(Miller, 2017) However, when we apply the associational theory of solidarity in explaining the idea of political participation as a source, political participation may play different roles in different understandings of this theory. There are three interpretations of this theory.

In the first interpretation, in a solidarity, people associate with each other through

sharing a common goal. In this sense, a political association is an enterprise aiming at a common goal. Iris Marion Young's(2000) interpretation of solidarity holds a similar view with this theory. According to her, people associate with one another politically through sharing a common goal in promoting justice. When we endorse this interpretation, then it seems that it is the sharing of the common goal that works as the source of republican solidarity rather than political participation, though participation can be instrumentally valuable in making participants aware of this common goal. Then, there is a problem with this interpretation when the common goal is interpreted as a shared value commitment. That is, the associational theory, under this interpretation, is better to be used to support the political group solidarity rather than Laborde's republican solidarity. Philip Pettit(1997) and Sally Scholz(Scholz, 2008) hold a similar theory in interpreting their idea of solidarity. In Pettit's theory, he takes the goal of freedom as non-domination as a partially common goal shared by every vulnerable group. And the sharing of this goal lead vulnerable people to associate with other vulnerable people. In Scholz's idea, political solidarity refers to a group of people who are united by a shared commitment to combating injustice and it manifests in people's engagement in the group movement. The key issue here is that "the common goal" manifests in different specific goals in different contexts. In real-life cases, these specific goals tend to unite specific group of people rather than citizens of a political community in general. Thus, rather than bridge the minority and the majority of a political community, this mode of solidarity tends to confront the dominated minority against the dominant majority.

In face of this problem, some theorists combine the first interpretation with a second interpretation of the associational theory. In the second interpretation, people associate with one another by their recognition of mutual interdependence. There are three interpretations of the interdependence among citizens and in each interpretation this interdependence further explains the way through which people share a common goal. The first interpretation can still be found in Iris Marion Young's theory. I have pointed out that in Young's idea of solidarity citizens associate with one another through sharing a common goal in promoting justice. According to her view,

citizens share such a common goal because of their interdependence. In Young's view, citizens are interdependent in two ways. Firstly, people who live together in the same region are affected by the same geographical and atmospheric environment. They need to "care about and co-operate with one another enough to respond to local circumstances and problems that potentially affect most of them" (2000, p. 222). Thus, they interdependent on one another's action and coordination in dealing with the common issues faced by them. Secondly, people who live together are involved in institutional networks wherein their activities and actions are mutually affected. These two forms of mutual interdependence make people who live in the same region share a common goal in promoting the justice of their local institutions. When these two forms of interdependence associate people together and works as a source of solidarity, this kind of solidarity is limited to the local or regional level and should not extend to the state level.

Based on Young's idea, political participation is instrumentally valuable for building the solidarity as people become aware of the fact of their interdependence and the fact that they actually have a common goal through participating in conversations over political issues. Furthermore, political participation can also make them aware of the need of acting together to promote their well-being. However, it is not clear why the interdependence is bound to be local and regional. It is not hard to see that people who live in the same state are interdependent and share a common fate through being involved in some state-level institutional networks. Iseult Honohan(2002) endorses a similar interpretation. In her theory, political community is interpreted as a common enterprise where people living within are interdependent in terms of "their mutual vulnerability in the practices of self-government". This fact of interdependence "creates common concerns and the possibility of jointly addressing them"(2002, p. 268).

When the associational theory is interpreted in either way above, it seems that

political participation is merely an instrument which make people aware of some facts that exist in prior of their participation. In this sense, whether political participation can truly generate solidarity depends on whether these facts do exist and how strong these facts are. Then, two problems emerge. Firstly, the fact of mutual interdependence between citizens is idealized and may not fit in the real-world political community which is faced with the problem of domination. In other words, the dependent relationship may be one-way rather than two-way relationship. While the minority is vulnerable in terms of their dependence on the majority, the majority might not be equally dependent on the minority. As I have shown in the previous part, Laborde claims that participation, through fostering the republican solidarity among citizens, works as the best mean to combat domination. However, if we endorse the interpretations above, then it seems that participation can generate solidarity only if there is no severe domination in the political community. In this sense, Laborde's approach argues in a circle.

In addition to those two interpretations of the associational theory, there is a third possible interpretation. In this interpretation, a political activity such as political deliberation or political conversation is interpreted as joint activity.(Sevinç, 2019) Through participating in the joint activity, participants are associated with one another. According to this view, a political activity is a joint activity in two aspects. Firstly, the outcome of a political activity is jointly determined. When it comes to a political conversation in Laborde's theory, it is a joint activity when the result of the conversation is jointly decided by participants. A joint decision is a decision that cannot be made by a single person or several persons, but rather made by all participants together. In other words, every participant plays an equal role in making the decision. This point further directs to the second aspect of a joint activity. That is, a joint activity is a cooperative activity wherein all participants aim to reach a decision. In terms of a political conversation, participants, through participating in the conversation, seek for an agreement or at least a fair compromise that everyone can accept. In this interpretation, political participation is not an instrumental source of solidarity but a non-instrumental source.

On the one hand, the political activity itself is a common project that participants share. Through participating in a political conversation, citizens are involved in a common project of which the goal is to reach an agreement or an acceptable compromise. In this interpretation, participants are associated with not a common goal that they share in prior to their participation, but a common goal produced by their participation. Participants depend on one another in reaching such a decision. Thus, the interdependence embodies not in pre-political circumstances but in the process of participation itself. Since the decision should be decided jointly and every participant should play an equal role, participants would take one another's opinions and argument seriously.

On the other hand, participants are also associated by a shared responsibility towards the outcome of a joint activity. Since the outcome of a joint activity is made jointly by all participants and every participant play an equal role in achieving such an outcome, they share equal responsibility towards the outcome. In participating in a political conversation, participants jointly make the decision and share the responsibility to the decision. This shared responsibility also foster the "we-perspective" that Laborde takes important in her theory of republican solidarity.

The attractiveness of this interpretation lies in the fact that solidarity in this sense does not require a pre-participation common goal or the pre-participation interdependence. Solidarity generated in this way can be more inclusive, especially to newcomers such as the newly immigrated groups. For these groups to be incorporated in the hosting political community and bound with the other citizens, they only need to participate in the joint political activities. However, there are several conditions to be met. Firstly, it requires that the political conversation has a clear goal to be reached-i.e., an agreement or an acceptable compromise-and participants feel committed to reach such a goal. The strength of the solidarity depends on the degree that participants feel

motivated to reach a decision and feel compulsory to continue the conversation even if there are intensive disagreements. In this sense, a formal, institutional form of political conversation has a greater possibility to generate the solidarity than the informal form of political conversation. In other words, the strength of this solidarity will depend on whether the decision made through political conversations among citizens will be implemented or actually affect the policymaking. Then, this theory of republican solidarity cannot avoid the problems disclosed by Segall which I have discussed above.

The second condition to be met is that in the political conversation, participants actually play equal roles in forming the final decision. That is to say, each participant's opinions and arguments should be equally discussed and considered. Thus, whether the solidarity can be generated through participation depends on whether participants have equal standing in the political conversation. According to my explanation of Laborde's idea of equal citizenship in the previous part, we can see that Laborde's equal citizenship contains not merely equal political and social standing but also equal inclusion into "us". While republican solidarity shows how this equal inclusion can be fostered, it relies on the realization of the first dimension of equal citizenship. According to Laborde's idea, it would require a politics of non-domination which manifest in the de-ethnicization of the existing institutions. Then, it leads us to another question which concerns whether the de-ethnicization in Laborde's sense is sufficient to ensure the participants' equal standing in the political conversation. I will turn to this question in the following parts.

IV. Religion identity and the problem of domination

In the previous part, I have explained that Laborde's approach to religious diversity depends on her interpretation of the challenges posed by religious diversity. According to her theory, the challenge posed by religious diversity, especially the post-immigration religious diversity, is interpreted as a problem of domination-that is, a

problem of asymmetrical power relationship between the majority and minority that is produced through identity assignation wherein the majority imposes an external classification on a religious minority group. Laborde terms this identity assignation as “ethnicization”. In Laborde’s approach, this problem of domination poses a challenge to a democratic political community by threatening its core idea of democratic citizenship whereby each citizen is equally respected as discursive subjects and equally included by one another as one of “us”. In Laborde’s view, to restore an ideal of civil sphere, citizens’ participation of all levels should be encouraged through implementing a politics of non-domination. In the last part, I have examined Laborde’s idea of participation, including both political participation and social contact, and have shown that citizens’ participation can foster solidarity and combat domination only if a degree of equal citizenship has been priorly secured. And this degree of equal citizenship requires more than the politics of non-domination in Laborde’s theory. In this part, I will further explore the problems with Laborde’s approach and point out that the insufficiency of the politics of non-domination roots in the problems with Laborde’s interpretation of the challenge posed by religious diversity and her interpretation of equal citizenship as non-domination. In the first part, I have shown that Laborde’s interpretation of the challenge is based on her disaggregated account of religion and particularly her interpretation of religious identity as an assigned identity. In the following sections, I will firstly discuss the problems with her interpretation of religious identity. And then I will turn to the problem with her understanding of the challenge posed by religious diversity. And these problems will further lead us to the more fundamental problem with her specific interpretation of equal citizenship as non-domination.

1. The problem with Laborde’s interpretation of religious identity

In the previous chapter, I have pointed out that an important problem with David Miller’s approach is that he interprets religious identity as a merely first-person identity and overlooks the fact that religious identity can also externally constructed. On the contrary, Laborde’s approach pays attention to this dimension of religious

identity and her approach is focused on the issue brought by the externally constructed religious identity. In her view, when a democratic political community is face with a problem of domination that manifests in an asymmetrical power relationship between the majority and the religious minority, then religious identity can be a marker of social vulnerability or a marker of domination. In this sense, she objects to the political recognition of religious identity. However, when Laborde derives her objection against identity recognition from her interpretation of religious identity as a third-person identity, her interpretation has two problems.

The first problem with Laborde's interpretation is similar to Miller's. By focusing on the fact that religious identity can be a third-person identity, Laborde claims that religious identity in this sense is similar to racial identity and embodies the ethnicization of religious group. In this term, Laborde ignores the difference between racial identity and religious identity, and ignores the fact that religious identity can be multi-dimensional.

Group identity does not only contain an objective dimension which is constituted to certain characteristics that mark a group of people off from others, but also contains a subjective dimension – that is, group identification or how group members live it. In a loose account, group identification refers to individuals' sense of belonging to a group on basis of certain characteristics.(Huddy, 2013) In a stricter account, group identification involves individuals' sense of commitment to certain practices shared by other members and the sense of linking ones' well-being to the group's flourishing. (Mason, 2000) When it comes to religious identity, this internal dimension is particularly important. In other words, a group identity denotes not only outsiders' perception but also denotes the insiders' self-understanding. When it comes to religious identity, it is true that some religious identities, such as Jewish identity or Catholic identity in Northern Ireland, is similar with ethnic identity in terms that individuals identify themselves in this way do not have commitments to certain beliefs,

practices or culture. (Modood, 2019) For other religious identities, it is not the case. Some religious groups-such as Roman Catholics-are strictly organized around a religious institute and religious identities involve not only objective membership to the institute but also a sense of belonging and commitment to the institute. Some religious identities are not generated by a sense of belonging to a certain organization and therefore might not by themselves involve a strong sense of belonging together. However, for those individuals who identify themselves with those identities, religious identities involve their sense of commitment to a set of religious beliefs, practices or traditions and are important for their self-understanding. And those religious identities form the basis for those individuals' social or political actions.

According to Laborde's statements, it seems that Laborde acknowledges the internal dimension of group identity but does not think its importance would require a form of political recognition, especially in a democratic political community suffering from the problem of domination. Recognition of religious identity refers to positively affirm a religious identity and this affirmation is embodied in the social structures and social relations. What will influence the social and political structures is the social classification of a religious identity. When there is an asymmetrical power relation between the majority and religious minorities, social structures and social relations are in fact shaped by the majority. And how a religious identity is defined and how a religious group is portrayed are hugely controlled by the majority others rather than the religious minority group itself. In these circumstances, in the process of reifying the idea of recognition of religious identity, what counts a religious identity and what it entails are defined by the majority. Since majority's perceptions of religious identity itself can be biased and inaccurate, to recognize the religious identity that is constructed by the majority will reinforce the domination. Thus, when discussing whether a politics of identity recognition is proper, what should be mainly concerned with is not the first-personal dimension of religious identity but its third-person dimension.

However, this reply is still problematic. Even when we acknowledge that in a political community with the problem of domination, the majority's perception controls the perception of the minority's religious identity, it is doubtful that the issue lies in the religious identity itself. On the contrary, it seems that the problem lies in the asymmetrical power relationship between the majority and the minority in portraying the religious identity. Thus, it is not identity recognition that is undesirable but the unequal discursive power that is undesirable. Following this idea, the key is to ensure that a religious minority group has the discursive power in controlling the social image of their own religious identity and has the discursive power to challenge the existing social portrayal of their religious identity. In this sense, proponents for the recognition of group identities would claim that the object of the recognition are the group identities defined by the members of the group. This process of self-definition is part and parcel of the empowerment of minorities with discursive control. In this is correct, then the ethnicization of group identities and the ideal of non-domination as discursive control would support a form of recognition of group identities rather than reject it outright. Furthermore, following this idea, recognition of group identities is not merely an instrument to eliminate ethnicization but is integral to the ideal of non-domination. Thus, Laborde's divided position on recognition as an ideal and recognition as a strategic principle would not be tenable.

When we take a close look at the way how a religious identity-either first personal or third personal identity-is socially formed, we can see another more fundamental problem with Laborde's interpretation. The social formation of a group identity should be understood not as purely first-personal self-identification nor purely third-personal identity assignation, but rather as an intersubjective process. According to Laborde, it seems that in the asymmetrical power relation minorities lack agency in forming their own group identities and their group identities are purely formed through a one-side construction. However, this view has been rightly challenged by authors like Tariq Modood. In Modood's view, the formation of group identities-either minorities or majority's-is always a two-side process. It is formed both from outside in and formed from inside out.(Modood, 2013; Modood, 2019) In other

words, there is an interaction between the majority and minority groups in forming a group identity. Modood agrees with Laborde that group identity can be formed from outside. He calls this process as “othering”. In Modood’s statements, “othering”, by definition, “sees a minority in terms of how a dominant group negatively and stereotypically imagines that minority as something ‘other’, as inferior or threatening, and to be excluded”. (Modood, 2019) Although the process of “othering” involves improper stereotyping and stigmatization, it “must have some basis”. In other words, ‘othering’ should be at least somewhat based on some objective features of the group that will be partly acknowledged by its members, “if it is to be at all effective, otherwise it will not be a prima facie plausible stereotype of group X”. (Modood, 2019) While Modood rejects the view that group identity is purely a product of outsiders’ imagined projections, he also rejects that minorities’ group identification can be purely independent of the outsiders’ perceptions.

As Modood states,

“Othering shapes the group subjectivity to some extent: it can have sociological weight, creating situations which one has to constantly negotiate and some of it will be internalized, becoming part of one’s biography, even a focus of group identity assertion, solidarities and mobilizations, which by an energetic engagement with othering can subtly influence group identity.” (Modood, 2019)

With regard to this criticism, Laborde still might agree with this interactionist account of the formation of group identity. However, her point seems to be that when there is an asymmetrical power relation between the majority and minority, the influence of minorities’ perceptions on majority’s definition of minorities’ identities is too weak to make any significant difference. Even if the definition of minorities’ identities rests on some genuine features of minority groups, the definition is also accompanied

with an evaluation of those features. Thus, the real problem of the group identity defined by outsiders is that this identity is associated with biased or stigmatized evaluation. The majority possesses not only the power to define minorities' identities but also the power to define whether those differences marking minorities off are abnormal, negative or backward. This problem with Laborde's interpretation of religious identity would lead us to the second problem with her approach. This problem concerns the following questions: in which sense is ethnicization morally problematic? In the following sections, through exploring the concept of ethnicization, I will examine Laborde's interpretation of the challenge posed by religious diversity.

2. The problem with Laborde's interpretation of the challenge

Laborde in her approach interprets the challenge posed by religious diversity as a problem of domination which manifests in the ethnicization of religious group. As I have pointed out previously, ethnicization in Laborde's theory refers to the process that citizens are reduced to an identity assigned by others and results in the stigmatization of citizens. There are several possible explanations of the problem of ethnicization.

In the first explanation, ethnicization is problematic because it contains a form of essentialism through which citizens and groups are mistakenly reduced to several core features. When it comes to religious group, the problem of essentialism contains a neglect of intragroup diversity. If we understand the moral impropriety of ethnicization as a problem of essentialism, then it seems that all forms of group categorization are bound to be problematic as it tends to categorize individuals or groups by attributing them some features or labels. In this sense, the moral impropriety does not lie in the fact whether the categorization is positive or negative. Put it another way, even if social categorization portrays a group in a positive way-for instance, associates the group with some positive or desirable attributes.

This interpretation of the moral impropriety of ethnicization is sociologically unsound. Categorization is sociologically inevitable as it is the way through which people in the real world get to know one other. Put it precisely, people get to know each other firstly through attributing certain features or characteristics toward the others, though it is true that an individual cannot and should not be defined by any of those features or characteristics. When it comes to strangers who live in the same political community, group categorization is a way that people get knowledge of and build connection with those people who they do not have direct contact with. Thus, it is not merely implausible but also undesirable to eliminate categorization. Social categorization is constitutive to the generalized trust that is essential to republican solidarity itself. As I have shown previously, social contact can be a source of republican solidarity when the contact facilitates at least three stages. Individuals can only contact with some other individuals but cannot with all citizens of the political community. Contact fosters the bond between one individual and all the others through a form of categorization. Only through this categorization, can a person's trust in and concern with another citizen be expanded to the group that this citizen belongs to.

The moral impropriety of ethnicization lies elsewhere. In the second interpretation, ethnicization, as a form of categorization, is problematic when it is forced on the other citizens and other citizens lack of discursive power to contest or change the categorization. Thus, the moral impropriety of ethnicization lies in the degree of its coerciveness. When the majority force an identity on the minority, they fail to respect individuals of the minority as equally discursive subjects. Here, another question emerges—that is, in which sense do citizens lack discursive power? Laborde's position in this question is twofold. On the one hand, Laborde claims that the equal status of citizens manifests in the interpersonal recognition. In other words, it is important for a citizen to be recognized by the others as an equal discursive subject. On the other hand, as I have explained, Laborde does not endorse Pettit's agential interpretation of domination but rather endorse a structural interpretation. In other words, for a citizen

to be an equal discursive subject, it is more important that his/her discursive power is protected through the social structures and institutions than this power is recognized by specific others. Based on this idea, Laborde's politics of non-domination aims merely at eliminating the established institutions which do not respect citizens, especially the minority, as equal discursive subjects. And she claims that hate speech should be allowed to be expressed in the public realm. However, this idea would frustrate her idea of participation as a mean to foster solidarity and combat domination. Since Laborde merely place the principle of restraints on the formal and official political deliberations among state officials, there are no restraints on the other forms of political conversations. In this case, it seems that Laborde's theory can allow the participants to express hate speech in political conversations. Then, it is hard to see how solidarity can be foster through participation in this case.

There is another problem with Laborde's understanding of the challenge that lies in her disaggregated account of religion. Through disaggregating religion into a doctrine, an identity and a comprehensive ethics, Laborde's approach seems to claim that the problem of domination only resides in the issue of religion as an assigned identity. However, this understanding ignores that misrecognition of religion, in some or many cases, can be associated with the misperception of religious doctrine and religious reason. Religion as an identity can be closely connected to religion as a doctrine and religion as a reason. Put it precisely, the way a religious group is ethnicized is probably related to people's prejudice towards the doctrine or the form of reasoning. In other words, misrecognition of a religious group may root in people's misperception of the religious doctrine and the religious reasoning. For example, some secularists and protestants portrayed Catholics group as more conservative and be less likely to be open-minded because they perceive Catholic doctrine as conservative branch of Christianity.

V. Discursive control and recognition

As I have shown, Laborde's position on the recognition of religious identity follows from her views on the recognition of particular identities more generally. I have examined why Laborde might think the recognition of particular identities to be problematic as a substantive ideal and found her reasons wanting. Now I turn to Laborde's claim that identity recognition is unnecessary for achieving a republican ideal of equal citizenship.

1. Schuppert's criticism and principle of non-alienation

Fabian Schuppert (Schuppert, 2015) raises a powerful objection to the republican idea of non-domination. In his view, republican non-domination is insufficient for securing the republican idea of social equality. His target is Pettit's account of non-domination, not Laborde's. However, his discussion reveals a missing link between Laborde's structural account of non-domination and her idea of minimum autonomy. And his discussion provides such a bridge. Before discussing Schuppert's idea, I will firstly provide a further clarification of Laborde's idea.

In the first part of this paper, I have shown that Laborde provides a relational egalitarian interpretation of the republican idea of non-domination. In this interpretation, she makes significant changes to Pettit's concept of non-domination. Firstly, she substitutes the agential conception of domination by the structural conception of domination. Secondly, she uses Pettit's idea of discursive control to further interpret the idea of non-domination. She claims that domination is problematic because it violates individuals' basic interest in minimum autonomy, i.e., minimum discursive control. In a paper co-written with Marie Garrau (Garrau and Laborde, 2015), she provides a further explanation to the changes she made to Pettit's idea of non-domination. In particular, she re-interprets Pettit's idea of non-domination by using the concept of vulnerability. In Laborde's view, the problem with Pettit's

agential conception is that it fails to grasp the problematic vulnerability produced by social structures. Domination undermines individuals' minimum autonomy because individuals are vulnerable and to be vulnerable "*is to be exposed to the power of some we depend on-physically, affectively, socially or economically.*" (Garrau and Laborde, 2015)

In their view, the ideal of non-domination does not aim to eliminate all forms of vulnerability. They distinguish fundamental vulnerability from problematic vulnerability. Fundamental vulnerability is an anthropological fact of human beings. Human beings, as relational beings, are more or less depend on each other and therefore fundamentally vulnerable to each other. Fundamental vulnerability is not bound to be problematic. Vulnerability is problematic and becomes the target of a republican state when it hinders "citizens' capacity to participate equally in social and political cooperation". (Garrau and Laborde, 2015)

Garrau and Laborde criticise Pettit for ignoring that this problematic vulnerability does not always come from the domination in Pettit's sense but from domination in a structural sense. They claim that Pettit ignores the "long term structural vulnerability", which undermines individuals' autonomy "through social processes that deny the relational and social conditions of agent's autonomy" (REFERENCE). However, they do explain how this denial embedded in social structures undermines the individuals' autonomy even when there is no external agential domination.

With regard to this problem, Schuppert's relational egalitarian account of autonomy can provide an answer. According to Schuppert's view, freedom or autonomy do not only concern interpersonal relationships but also the effect of such relationships on a person's relation to herself/himself. This relational egalitarian account of autonomy is based on his account of social equality. In his view, social equality does not only refer

to the quality of the relationship with others but also to the quality of relationship to oneself. While the former concerns status hierarchies and asymmetrical power relations, the latter concerns the feelings of inferiority and lack of self-respect. If we take problematic vulnerability as the one that hinders individuals' capacity for equal participation in the public sphere, this vulnerability can also be produced by self-alienation. Social structures produce long-term structural vulnerability by posing a negative effect on individuals' self-understanding and self-respect which foster the self-alienation. Based on this idea, Schuppert proposes a principle of non-alienation as a supplement for the republican idea of non-domination:

“Alienation from oneself means that an agent fails to see herself as a legitimate source of claims and reasons, that is, the agent does not realize her capacity for freedom because of a range of autonomy-undermining experiences of misrecognition, powerlessness, voicelessness and exclusion.” (Schuppert, 2015)

Although Garrau and Laborde do not explicitly include the relationship to oneself in their account of equal citizenship, they are concerned with this relationship and take it as relevant to their idea of non-domination. In their criticism on Pettit's agential conception of domination, they point out that Pettit's account cannot deal with the problem of stigmatization. In their view, stigmatization which associates negative images to individual identities, “threatens their sense of their own value and can lead them to isolate themselves from others” and therefore undermines the affective ground of personal autonomy. (Garrau and Laborde, 2015)

In this sense, Schuppert's ideal of non-alienation can be seen as a useful extension of Laborde's ideal of equal citizenship as non-domination . Following this idea, the ideal of non-domination as discursive control involves not only an adequate interpersonal relationship but also a proper relationship with oneself that provides the affective

foundation for ????. To eliminate the domination also require eliminating the social structures that produce the self-alienation. In this sense, the further interpretation of Laborde's idea of minimum capacity and minimum status recognition which constitute her account of the minimum discursive control should also consider the principle of non-alienation.

2. Self-esteem as an affective foundation for discursive control

Following Schuppert's idea, I want to claim that the idea of autonomy, even in Laborde's minimum sense, entails a proper relation to the self. Thus, the ideal of non-domination as minimum discursive control should also involve a principle of non-alienation. In Schuppert's discussion, he suggests that the idea of non-alienation lies (?) in the value of self-respect. From his explanation of alienation from oneself, we can infer that self-respect is to regard oneself as a legitimate source of claims and reasons. However, it seems that Laborde's idea of minimum discursive control would require a relation-to-self that implies more than the self-respect.

As I have shown in the first part, individuals' minimal discursive control is embodied in minimum capacities and the minimum recognition. The minimum capacities include at least two capacities. The first is the capacity to form one's own perspectives and the second is the capacity to question and challenge the problematic status quo. The second capacity will require the individual to have self-respect because only a person able to see herself/himself as a legitimate source of claims and reasons will be capable of raising questions and offer ingreasons. However, self-respect is not enough, because minimum discursive control seems to require a capacity which cannot be offered by self-respect alone. What Laborde seems to have in mind is something like Susan James's idea of self-esteem.²³ In James's theory, she defines self-esteem as "a stable

²³ In Laborde's explanation of minimum discursive control, she does not explicitly claim that it requires self-esteem. However, when she explains why social structures embodied in social norms and social beliefs play a central role in the idea of non-domination, she states that citizenship requires a self-esteem and from her notes we can see that her interpretation follows Susan James's idea. Laborde, C. c. (2008b) *Critical republicanism*

sense of one's own separate identity and a confidence that one is worthy to participate in political life". (Bock and James, 1992) According to James's discussion, the former refers to a sense of oneself as an individual that is separate from others. The sense of separate identity makes it possible for a person to tell which voice is her/his rather than other's. The latter refers to the confidence that one possesses the "ability to assess situations and speak one's mind about them" and her/his voice is worthy to be heard.

James's explanation of those two components is too blurred to grasp its meaning and a further interpretation is necessary. Here, I will firstly provide a more detailed analysis on the sense of separate identity. That seeing oneself as an individual separated from others presupposes the fact that a person is to a degree related to others. A person might feel strong attachment and concerns to others and connect her/his own well-beings with others'. This sense of connection and attachment makes a sense of separate identity meaningful. The sense of separate identity that is entailed in self-esteem does not require tht a person completely detaches herself/himself from her/his attachments but rather requires the person to be able to see she/he is also an independent individual with her/his own worth. Thus, only a problematic or improper sense of dependence will diminish the sense of separate identity. That is, a person feels strongly and improperly attached to others and feels herself/himself is an appendage to others. In this sense, a person instrumentalizes herself/himself as a tool to realize the well-beings of other people. For example, a woman regards herself as an appendage to her husband or thinks that her worth merely lies in her ability of reproduction.

Applying this interpretation to individuals of a group, we can have two levels of this

[*electronic resource*] : *the Hijab controversy and political philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

sense of independent self-worth. In the intragroup level, a person who is a member of a group feels a strong sense of attachment and belonging to the group and a strong sense of commitments to the set of beliefs or practices that characterizes the group identity. This person has self-esteem in terms of a sense of separate identity if she/he is able to regard herself/himself not only as a group member but also as an independent individual who has subjectivity and agency in the group. This sense of separate identity enables her/him to reflect on those practices and beliefs that constitute her/his group identity. In the intergroup level, a person has a sense of separate identity if she/he is able to have her/his own sense of group identification that is distinguished from the negative images that outsiders associate with her/his group identity.

While the sense of separate identity distinguishes the concept of self-esteem from the concept of self-respect and provides an affective foundation for the first aspect of minimum capacity, the second component proposed by Laborde seems to suggest a similar meaning to that of self-respect. In other words, that to have the confidence that one possesses the “ability to assess situations and speak one’s mind about them” and her/his voice is worthy to be heard seems to suggest that a person is able to see herself/himself as a legitimate source of claims and reasons. In this sense, it seems that the concept of self-esteem in Laborde’s theory contains concept of self-respect. Thus, the boundary of these two concepts is blurred. If we separate two concepts and claim that self-esteem only contains the sense of separate identity, it seems that self-esteem is too much thinner than we used to think of this word. It seems that to have self-esteem does not only refer to the self-worth in terms of separate identity, but also in terms of one’s belief in the worth of what she/he does or aspire to do.

Thus, we need a more comprehensive understanding of self-esteem and to distinguish it from self-respect. Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth provide a more comprehensive understanding of relation-to-self. They claim that there are three types of relation-to-

self, including self-respect, self-trust and self-esteem. In following sections, I will introduce these three types of relation-to-self and show how they might provide the affective foundation for minimum discursive control. Laborde's minimum status recognition is missing.

3. Three types of relation-to-self and the insufficiency of minimum status recognition

Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth (Anderson and Honneth, 2005) claim that there are three types of relation-to-self that are significant to personal autonomy—that is, self-respect, self-esteem and self-trust. And those three relations-to-self are closely related to each other and mutual dependent. Since their interpretation of self-respect is similar to Schuppert's²⁴, here I will focus on the other two instead.

3.1 Self-esteem and self-trust

As I have pointed out in the last section, following James's idea, Laborde seems to define the concept of self-esteem as a sense of separate identity. To have self-esteem means to have a sense of self-worth in terms of being an independent individual. However, this concept of self-esteem seems to ignore another aspect of self-worth. That is, self-worth involves a sense that what one does or one's aspirations are meaningful and significant and therefore worth pursuing. According to this interpretation, it seems that a lack of self-esteem in this sense appears as a tension between one's deep aspiration and one's failing to find meaning or worth in her/his aspiration.

When it comes to the issues concerning groups, this tension can also appear at two levels. At the intragroup level, a person may lack the self-esteem when there is a

²⁴ In their theory, a person has self-respect when she/he thinks of herself/himself as "a competent deliberator and legitimate co-author of decisions" and "as the legitimate source of reasons for acting". Anderson, J. H. and Honneth, A. 2005. *Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice*.

conflict between her/his group identification and her/his individual aspirations. For example, a devoted Christian who is also biologically homosexual might suffer from a lack of self-esteem. Her/his aspiration for love is defined as a sin by her/his beliefs. In this case, it is impossible for her/him to challenge or contest the existing interpretations of the Christian beliefs. In the intergroup level, the lack of self-esteem happens towards members of a group when the way of life to which the group is committed becomes a target of the majority's denigration and is marginalized.

In the intergroup level, there is a further question needing to be addressed. It might seem that the outsiders' denigration does not necessarily cause the group members' lack of self-esteem. A person can find the meaning and worth of her/his way of life within the group. Even if the outsiders' denigration causes frustration, anger or grievance, it does not necessarily cause the lack of self-esteem. However, this view is untenable. Firstly, a stable sense of self-esteem relies on the flourishing of the group. However, the flourishing of the group is closely tied to legal, political and social structures. Majority's denigration marginalizes the group and therefore hinders the flourishing of the group. Secondly, even if a person might find meaning within the group, as long as she/he has to have social interactions with outsiders, her/his confidence in the meaning is influenced by surroundings. In this condition, the only way for a group to maintain the self-esteem is to separate itself from the outside world.

In addition to self-respect and self-esteem, Anderson and Honneth claim that there is a third type of relation-to-self-that is, self-trust. In their interpretation, a person has self-trust when she/he trust her/his desires, feelings, impulses and emotions to be authentically their own. However, self-trust does not suggest that a person will not suspect her/his own desires. On the contrary, only when a person has such trust in her/his desires can she/he openly and sincerely reflects on those desires and control them. In Anderson and Honneth's view, self-trust is significant to one's full autonomy because "those who have lost this basic trust have lost the basis for leading their life

in accordance with their most basic convictions, since they can no longer trust their desires to be authentically their own". (Anderson and Honneth, 2005) However, in Laborde's ideal of non-domination, the basic interest that should be guaranteed is not individual's full autonomy but the minimum autonomy as discursive control. A question is whether self-trust is also crucial for minimum discursive control. Since discursive control refers to a capability to contest or challenge the problematic status quo and the ability to ask justifications, it seems that a person's realization of the problem with status quo is usually accompanied by her/his negative feelings about it, such as anger, sorrow, frustration and so on. If we agree that one's desires and feelings provide an affective motivation for one's practical reasoning, it seems that self-trust is indeed significant for discursive control.

We can think of following two examples of the lack of self-trust caused by two levels of group conflict:

Intergroup level: a Muslim woman feels ashamed and embarrassed when she is asked to take off her hijab. She wants to contest this request from others but does not trust her own feelings. The external evaluation that wearing hijab is backward influence her self-trust. She feels extremely frustrated but does not dare to contest.

Intragroup level: in a conservative Islamic state, a Muslim woman is attacked by Muslim men on the street because she is not accompanied by her husband or male relatives. She feels a deep grievance. But she does not dare to contest because she does not trust her own feelings. She might internalize the negative evaluation of this act and think it is her own problem to feel sad.

3.2 The insufficiency of minimum status recognition

Based on Anderson and Honneth's views, it can be found that there are three types of

relation-to-self that are crucial to the idea of minimum discursive control. And the principle of non-alienation requires to secure not only one's self-respect but also a minimum sense of self-esteem and self-trust that constitutes the affective basis for the minimum discursive control. Human beings are relational beings, and our sense of self is partly shaped by interaction with others. Thus, to secure those three types of relation-to-self requires a certain form of recognition from outsiders. While Laborde's idea of minimum status recognition-that is (?????), the recognition of citizen's status as a discursive subject-might be sufficient to secure the self-respect, it is doubtful that this status recognition is sufficient to secure the minimum self-esteem and self-trust.

To secure one's self-trust is to enable oneself to trust her/his own desires and feelings. When a person who identifies herself/himself with a group feels a strong sense of attachment and a sense of deep commitments to certain beliefs, practices or cultures, to have self-trust means to trust that this sense of commitments is real and authentically her/his own. It seems that to secure self-trust of a group requires at least a recognition of its members' subjectivity and agency in shaping and transforming their group identities. In other words, their feelings are not a product of group manipulation. Take the hijab for an example. In the case that a Muslim woman has a strong feeling of shameless or frustration once she is requested to take off her hijab, instead of claiming that their feelings are products of the internalization of intragroup domination, outsiders or the majority should give a prima facie recognition of the authenticity of their feelings and trust their agency in critically reflect on their feelings and commitments.

To secure one's self-esteem is to enable oneself to find self-worth through a sense of separate identity and a sense of meaningfulness of one's aspirations. When it comes to people belonging to a group, self-esteem refers to a person being able to find out her/his sense of commitment and attachment are meaningful and worthy of pursuing. Compared to self-respect and self-trust, it seems that self-esteem would require a

thicker form of recognition. However, it can be controversial whether it requires a positive affirmation of the value of one's group identity. There are several questions here.

Firstly, to secure the minimum sense of self-esteem that lies a foundation for discursive control, it is necessary to eliminate the problematic negative evaluation associated with a group identity. In other words, it only requires eliminating the stigmatization and denigration. However, a paradox here is that how it is possible to get rid of the negative and stigmatized images associated with a group identity without an attempt to find the worth and positive aspects of the group identity. It is doubtful that asking the majority to stop stigmatizing and denigrating the minorities' identities and prohibiting the majority to publicly make such evaluations on minorities can do the work. And the ethnicization embedded in social structures, social beliefs and social norms will not be eliminated if the majority continuing holds such negative perceptions. Thus, the ideal of non-domination itself seems to suggest a more positive recognition of minorities' identities.

A second question is that whether self-esteem necessarily requires a positive affirmation of the worth of group identities among the outsiders. As I have discussed in the last section, it seems that self-esteem only requires that the worth of a person's aspiration is recognized within her/his group. According to Anderson and Honneth's idea, self-esteem requires "a network of solidarity and shared values within which the particular worth of members of a community can be acknowledged". And the "network of solidarity" can be merely a group solidarity. In other words, in order to secure a person's self-esteem, it is required to have a freedom of association. For example, a devoted Christian who is also homosexual might find lack of self-esteem because his/her aspiration for love is defined as a sin according to his/her beliefs. However, this person might construct her/his self-esteem in the Christian group of which the members endorse a more flexible interpretation of Bible and hold that

homosexuality is compatible with their Christianity. With regard to this view, I have proposed several replies in the last section. Firstly, a stable sense of self-esteem relies on the flourishing of the group. In other words, it is not enough that there is a freedom of association. Self-esteem and principle of non-alienation also requires that the group is not marginalized by the majority. Secondly, individuals cannot live their whole life within their groups but have to have social interaction with outsiders. Thus, the majority's perception will keep influencing their self-image. In this condition, they can avoid this influence only through a separation and the exit from the social life. And it is incompatible with Laborde's ideal of inter-ethnic integration, and she will not regard it as a good phenomenon.

To summarized, if Laborde claims that the long-term structural vulnerability will undermine individuals' minimum discursive control. To secure the minimum self-esteem that is essential to discursive control will require a positive affirmation of the value of minorities' identities to a degree.

Conclusion

I. A summary of three approaches

In the previous chapters, I have examined the approaches of Rawls and Miller. Rawls perceives religious diversity as a manifestation of doctrinal pluralism and views its challenge as the one to attain agreement on justice. Based on this understanding, Rawls's theory suggests that sustaining a stable democratic political community requires democratic citizens who follow the ideal of public reason. To reconcile the tension between the duty of civility and citizens' religious commitments, Rawls puts forth the idea of overlapping consensus. However, as I pointed out in the first chapter, Rawls's approach fails to address the cultural dimension of religion, thereby overlooking the tension surrounding immigrant religious minorities. Furthermore, his approach lacks sensitivity to the social condition, thereby falling short of providing the necessary resources to actualize his ideal of democratic citizenship.

Miller's approach, in a sense, avoids these issues. Firstly, by acknowledging the significance of social bond and interpersonal trust in sustaining a stable democratic political community, Miller's approach places greater emphasis on identifying the source of this social solidarity. In his national republican conception of democratic citizenship, Miller asserts that a shared national identity serves as a source for fostering social bond and interpersonal trust. Secondly, by asserting that religious demands can stem from cultural rather than faith commitments, Miller's approach takes the cultural challenge posed by religious diversity seriously. He attempts to reconcile the tension between upholding national republican citizenship and ensuring the equal citizenship of religious minorities by demonstrating the inclusiveness of the former while proposing a minimalist interpretation of the latter. However, as I demonstrated in the second chapter, Miller's approach fails to address the question either. On the one hand, the absence of a criterion for identifying wrongful exclusion, which is crucial for facilitating the transformation of the existing national identity,

undermines Miller's argument for the inclusiveness of national republican citizenship. On the other hand, the insensitivity to public discourse in real-world contexts leaves his approach ill-equipped to tackle the domination experienced by religious immigrants.

Regarding these issues, Cecile Laborde's critical republican approach offers a more promising solution compared to the approaches of Rawls and Miller. Through the discussion in the previous chapters, it becomes evident that both Rawls's and Miller's approach are not sociologically sound. In contrast, through incorporating ideas from critical social theories, Laborde aims to develop a normative political theory that is sociologically solid. Laborde's approach encompasses three major claims. Firstly, by endorsing a disaggregated account of religion, Laborde presents a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges posed by religious diversity. According to Laborde's interpretation, religious diversity can be understood in three distinct ways. Firstly, it can be interpreted as a diversity of different forms of reasoning, whereby religion presents an epistemic challenge to democratic deliberations when it manifests as inaccessible reasons. Secondly, religious diversity can be interpreted as a diversity of conceptions of the good, whereby religion presents a substantive challenge to political secularism when it manifests as comprehensive ethics. Finally, religious diversity can also be interpreted as a diversity of identities, whereby religion presents a challenge to democratic relationship when it manifests as a socially divisive identity.

According to Laborde's interpretation, the first two challenges targets not at democratic citizenship but at the democratic legitimacy of state. In this sense, Laborde denies that the idea of public reason—either in an epistemic term or in a substantive term—carries any ethical implications for democratic citizens. Laborde's interpretation of the third challenge offers a more persuasive understanding of the difficulties arising from the post-immigration religious diversity compared to Miller. According to Laborde's view, the conflict between the majority and immigrated religious minority

should not be solely interpreted as a cultural conflict, but rather as a conflict stemming from problematic identity assignment, which she terms “ethnicization”.

Why does religion-as-divisive-identity pose a challenge to a democratic political community, and how can this challenge be addressed? The answers to these questions are embedded within Laborde’s critical republican theory of democratic citizenship. Laborde’s approach is republican in the sense that she advocates for a republican understanding of a democratic political community and proposes a republican conception of democratic citizenship. Faced with the challenges posed by the diversity of identities, Laborde’s theory suggests that a democratic political community requires a civic sphere- an inclusive sphere where individuals, regardless of their differences, are included as equal citizens. The idea of civic sphere offers a potential for individuals with different identities to interact and cooperate with one another. This republican ideal of a civic sphere implies a corresponding ideal of democratic citizenship. According to this republican ideal, democratic citizenship entails two dimensions. In its normative dimension, democratic citizenship is characterized by equal citizenship that is defined by an idea of non-domination. In this interpretation, equal citizenship goes beyond equal legal status and encompasses equal social status, manifested through intersubjective recognition. In its ethical dimension, democratic citizenship involves a civic bond among citizens. By proposing an idea of civic patriotism, democratic citizens in Laborde’s republican ideal are civic patriots. According to Laborde’s approach, in the face of the challenges posed by the diversity of identities, a democratic political community is sustained by constructing such a civic sphere and fostering the republican ideal of democratic citizenship.

Laborde’s approach is critical in formulating the strategies to foster the civic sphere and promote democratic citizenship. Drawing inspiration from critical social theories, Laborde’s approach displays greater sensitivity to real-world contexts and offers more realistic strategies for realizing her republican ideals. These strategies are realistic and

critical across three aspects. Firstly, by incorporating the intersubjective dimension into the concept of equal citizenship, Laborde endorses a more critical view on how minority religious identities are shaped through public discourse. Through this critical lens, Laborde claims that religious identity itself can become a source of domination, manifests in the form of ethnicization. Secondly, although Laborde advocates for an idea of civic patriotism, she also acknowledges that, in reality, social bonds often derive from a shared national identity. Rather than advocating for the complete dismantling of existing national identities, Laborde emphasizes the need to de-ethnicize these identities in order to foster a civic sphere. Her approach therefore exhibits a critical stance towards national identity, aiming to address and confront its exclusive elements rather than obscuring them. Thirdly, acknowledging that existing democratic political communities fall short of the ideal of non-domination, Laborde claim that her republican ideal of democratic citizenship does not impose burdens on ordinary citizens, especially those belonging to minority groups. Instead, she argues that the responsibilities of de-ethnicization should be primarily placed on the state and the majority. In this sense, Laborde's approach avoids the potential conflict between the ethical and normative dimensions of democratic citizenship.

While Laborde's approach provides a more promising answer to the question in comparison to Rawls's and Miller's approach, her theory is still faced with several important problems which would weaken the attractiveness of her approach. Laborde's critical republican approach cannot provide a satisfying answer to the question of a proper conception of democratic citizenship in the face of the challenges posed by religious diversity unless it can successfully address these problems. The critical engagement of these problems with Laborde's approach on the other hand provides us hints of the shape of a conception of democratic citizenship that is more promising in dealing with the challenges.

II. Democratic citizenship

Through the discussions in the dissertation, I have already shown that the sustaining of a stable democratic political community necessitates an ideal of democratic citizenship that involves both ethical and normative dimensions. Regarding the ethical dimension of democratic citizenship, the explorations of three approaches indicate that a proper conception of democratic citizenship should involve a certain form of solidarity among citizens. Compared to Miller's national solidarity, Laborde's ideal of republican solidarity is more inclusive. However, as I have demonstrated, Laborde in her discussions does not provide an adequate explanation of her conception of republican solidarity. While she considers participation as an important way to foster republican solidarity, she does not explain how participation can reach those important goals and therefore has no tool to respond to the objections. This problem indicates that critical republicans should pay more attention to the concept of solidarity itself and undertake a more delicate work on the mechanism through which solidarity is cultivated and maintained. It does not mean that political theorists should become social scientists, as in the current academic circle most of this kind of research are conducted by social scientists rather than political theorists. Instead, it only suggests that political theorists should be more sensitive to the social scientists' research on solidarity, since the latter can provide fruitful resources for political theory research.

In the last chapter, I have attempted to fill this blank by introducing two possible theories of solidarity. I have pointed out that participation may foster solidarity in two ways: firstly, through participating in political activities, citizens are associated with one another through involvement in a joint project. Secondly, through participation, citizens have contact with one another which helps to reduce prejudice and to build a civic friendship among citizens. However, I have also shown that it is not clear that participation and contact can successfully generate a state-level civic bond among all citizens in a political community. In other words, neither way succeeds in fostering the kind of republican solidarity that Laborde has in mind. To address this problem, critical republicans can choose to explore an alternative

mechanism. However, there is another way out of this problem which I consider more promising. That is, critical republicans can endorse an alternative conception of solidarity and give up the attempt to forge a strong sense of civic “we”.

Robert Putnam(2000) in his research proposes a distinction between bonding social capitals and bridging social capitals. According to Putnam’s distinction, bonding social capitals refers to the social network encompassing people within a homogeneous group and it tends to reinforce the group identities and be exclusive to outsiders. By contrast, bridging social capitals refers to network encompassing “people across diverse social cleavages”. (Putnam, 2000, p. 20) Inspiring by this distinction, solidarity can also be categorized into bonding solidarity and bridging solidarity. While bonding solidarity refers to the bond among a group of people which have a strong sense of belonging together grounded in a degree of commonality, bridging solidarity refers to the interpersonal and intergroup connections. If critical republicans define republican solidarity as a state-level bonding solidarity, then it seems that this kind of solidarity can only be based on a state-level commonality among citizens in the political community since participation fails to generate such a bond. Consequently, republican solidarity cannot avoid the exclusiveness against minorities who are considered by the majority as outsiders and foreigners. However, it is unclear that the ideal of republican democratic citizenship does require republican solidarity in such a strong sense. Instead, it is possible that a bridging solidarity can also do the work. While participation and contact fail to foster the state-level bonding solidarity, they can foster bridging solidarity instead.

According to critical republican theory, republican solidarity is required by the ideal of equal citizenship since equal citizenship contains a sense of being included and recognized as compatriots. There are two assumptions here. Firstly, republican solidarity in this sense is required only when there is already a strong sense of belonging together-that is, a strong sense of civic “we”. In other words, only when there is such a civic we, there is a need to be included and recognized by the others as a member. According to Laborde’s theory, this sense of civic “we” is essential for democratic legitimacy, as the key element of democracy is that democratic citizens have a sense of collective ownership towards the polity. However, Michaele

Ferguson(2012) in her work proposes an intersubjective interpretation of sharing a democratic community which suggests that sharing a democracy does not necessarily require a thick sense of civic “we”. According to the intersubjective interpretation, “people share when they have a first-person experience of themselves as inhabiting the world together with plural others.”(Ferguson, 2012) If endorsing this interpretation of sharing, then participation in political conversations, though might not be able to generate a state-level republican solidarity, can still foster a sense of sharing. In this sense, the sustaining of democratic political community requires a civic sphere where the political conversations in all levels can be conducted freely, adequately and continuously. And each citizen can find a way to engage in political conversations. Since a thick sense of civic “we” itself is unnecessary in the first place, then equal citizenship, as an ideal, requires merely to be included in political conversations.

In real-world context, equal inclusion in political conversations might be hindered by existing domination and ethnicization. Bridging solidarity is essential for eliminating the existing domination. It would require social contact, both everyday interpersonal contact and intergroup contact. Gordon Allport(1979) in his theory demonstrates how contact can help to alleviate intergroup prejudice. Based on his theory, prejudice can be alleviated through two stages. The first is the stage of de-categorization that happens through interpersonal contact. Through interpersonal contact, individuals in different groups get to know each other. It is possible that through a friendly interpersonal contact individuals may begin questioning the existing negative stigma that they attach to the other group. However, while this interpersonal contact may be able to make individuals question their understanding of the other group, it may not be able to change it. Even in a friendly and productive interpersonal contact, a person may find that the other person, who is a member of the group toward which he/she possesses negative evaluations, is a good citizen but still hold the negative evaluations towards the group. He/she might just view this person an exception of his/her group. Thus, the alleviation of intergroup prejudice cannot be realized merely through interpersonal contact. It also requires intergroup contact. Applying Allport’s theory into the case of bridging solidarity, similarly, bridging solidarity also requires two stages of social contact. In the first stage, interpersonal friendship between individual

members of different groups can be fostered through everyday interpersonal contact. This interpersonal friendship opens an opportunity for intergroup contact. Through intergroup contact, cross-group friendships can be built.

To summarize, the sustaining of a democratic political community in the face of the challenges posed by religious diversity necessitates an ideal of civic sphere. In this civic sphere, each citizen is equal included in ongoing political conversations and through this participation they together form a sense of sharing of the democratic political community. In addition, the civic sphere is also characterized by ongoing social contact-both interpersonal level and intergroup level. Through this social contact, bridging solidarity is forged among citizens and existing domination and ethnicization are alleviated or even eliminated. However, the ongoing participation and social contact are not possible when there is severe ethnicization and intergroup hostility. To avoid severe ethnicization and intergroup hostility, there are further requirements. Firstly, it would require a weak form of politics of recognition which acknowledges the worthy of an identity to its people and empowers the religious minorities to redefine their identities. Secondly, it would require citizens who engage in political conversations and social contact to conduct a basic level of friendliness and respect.

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