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**An Analysis of State Building: The Role of Professional Somali Diasporas in Post Conflict Reconstruction.**

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**ABSTRACT**

This thesis assessed the role of skilled diasporas and their perceived contributions to rebuilding their homeland. The potential human contribution in post conflict setting as observed by the study shows that sending state and its development partners mobilisation efforts, with greater emphasis on achieving sustainable post-war development objectives have intensified over the past 5 years. The current optimism, which could serve as a grist to post war development, shows the significance of diaspora in homeland development. This is evident from the increasing number of international development organisations that have mainstreamed the mobilisation strategies into their wider development agenda, most notably IOM-Somalia. Some of these organisations acknowledge the broader role skilled Somali diasporas play in facilitating positive development in their home country. Building upon the theoretical underpinning (chapter 2) & the conceptual framework (chapter 3) that guided the research, the study employed different qualitative research methods to fully understand the impact and the context in which diaspora’s contributions are utilised to aid post-conflict reconstruction.

Somalia is in many ways an obvious choice to determine the role of diaspora in development in empirical depth. Combining transnationalism with the various aspects of the dynamics of return mobilities, this thesis argues that the typology of returns reinforces the notion that reverberates through many research papers on reverse migration and their subsequent contribution to homeland development. It however furthers the concept of reverse migration which is primarily aimed at engaging diasporas for development purposes by developing the contours of diaspora/mobility/engagement beyond the present scholarly inquiry by addressing the emergence of social media as a valuable tool for advancing human mobility, connections, interactions, and relationship with the sending state. In addition to the new emerging phenomena, the author took little explored path to examine the multi layered and multi fluid diaspora linkages (beyond home-host geographical borders) to different contexts of engagement driven by shared ‘identity,’ ‘culture’ and long-distance ‘nationalism.’ The study also notes the significance of brain circulation informed by transnationalism as a necessary condition for enabling the continuous flow of knowledge, skills, and information, adding a new thematic area by widening Somali diaspora discussions beyond remittances.

The thesis identifies and discusses key government policies and factors that facilitate the mobilisation process. This includes exploring the strategic behaviour of sending states’ adoption of conducive policies towards its diaspora, (Gamlen, 2006). The various perspectives of human capital mobility within the migratory and development processes provided a more complete framework to analyse crucial factors that determine the intensity and level of state-diaspora relations in Somalia, with emphasis on *institutionalising* government led diaspora engagements. In post-conflict terms, Somalia is a paradigmatic case since diasporas play a vital role in the cognitive reconstruction of the country. Overall, the paper acknowledges the valuable role of Somalia diasporas in homeland development and the state’s adoption of concrete measures to ensure the flow of skilled diasporas through building constructive relationships with its ‘people’ abroad, anchored in transnationalism. Finally, in a note of conclusion, empirical findings from the study show that interconnectedness and mobility of people beyond sending & host states’ territorial borders aimed at enhancing the pace of skilled diaspora mobilisation are fundamentally important in increasing reverse migration, with Somalia becoming an active theatre for the display of diaspora led development. However, despite their valuable contributions, there are multitude of challenges faced by the diasporas, for example, security, weak institutional capacity, financial constraints, and local resentment.

**DEDICATION**

To the memory of my late nephew Hashim Mohamud who passed away suddenly in his sleep (Minneapolis). There is such an unreplaceable void in my life since you departed. The recollections of playing *hide* and *seek* with you at the tender age of 2 (Schiphol Airport-Holland) will forever remain engraved in my heart. I MISS YOU AND LOVE YOU SO MUCH.

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**ACRONYMS**

World Bank World Bank

IOM International Organisation for Migration

AFDB Africa Development Bank

DFID Department for International Development

SSA Sub-Saharan Africa

UKAID United Kingdom Aid Agency

USAID United States Aid Agency

GITZ Gessellschaft fur Internationale Zusammarbeit

TIKA Turkish Cooperation & Coordination Agency

MOF Ministry of Finance

MOD Ministry of Defence

OPM Office of the Prime Minister

CBO Community Based Organisation

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

INGOs International Non-Governmental Organisation

QUEST-MIDA Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support Migration for

Development Africa

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

ESMP Environmental & Social Management Plan

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

LCDs Least Developed Countries

DLO Diaspora Liaison Office

FAO Food & Agriculture Organisation

IMF International Monetary Fund

UNSOM United Nations Somalia Mission

FGS Federal Government of Somalia

FMS Federal Member States

PCR Post Conflict Reconstruction

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

# **CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE**

**1.1 Introduction**

The role of diaspora in development is not a new phenomenon & their contribution as new `agents in the development arena is considered critical to developing their homeland, especially in post-conflict reconstruction (Rembold, 2013). A wealth of research investigating their intervention, shows increased interest from scholars, policymakers, and international development agencies with governments on both sides of the migration cycle recognising their valuable input as co-development partners (De Haas, 2010; Faist, 2008; Glick-Schiller, 2009). This is is observed, among others, by the intensity of diaspora mobilisation efforts mounted by sending states, inter-governmental agencies & multi-stakeholder strategies at a global level to enhance reverse/ circular migration (Horst et al., 2010). Equally important, non-governmental (NGOs) and donor/development organisations' attempts to increase diaspora contributions have emerged with considerable interest, possibly necessitated by the paradigm shift, from 'aid' to 'diaspora driven' development (Boyle and Kitchin, 2013). The existence of failures within conventional disciplines in providing a holistic picture of diaspora’s contributions to homeland development beyond remittances makes it imperative for sending states, scholars, researchers, and policymakers to further explore the unique potential of diaspora’s’ human, capital, and technological know-how, especially the effectiveness of /knowledge transfers as an analytical tool to gauge their impact on homeland development. (Brinkerhoff, 2008; Sinatti and Horst, 2014). It is, therefore, not surprising that the impact of diasporas’ contributions continuous to gain greater recognition, bringing a new dimension to understanding migration, mobility, and development discourse, beyond the often-cited remittances (Page and Mercer, 2018).

Over the past decade, the number of countries courting its diasporas has intensified, with many formulating strategies aimed at encouraging the return of skilled migrants (Koinova 2018:19). Empirical evidence from China, India, Mexico, and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), shows that the critical role of the diasporas plays as non-state actors with inordinate amount of attention, with many viewing diasporas a potent force for development (Poros, 2011; Tigau et al., 2017). Menkhaus (2012) acknowledges the value of creating an effective system of diaspora outreach, citing the importance of diasporas as viable non-state actors in homeland-oriented development. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) & its UK counterpart (DfID) have all embarked on developing innovative ways to facilitate diaspora mobilisation and engagement (Carment & Calleja, 2018’ Ratney, 2018). These organisations and other critical stakeholders, for example, the World Bank (WB) have teamed up with the Somali government in providing grants and technical assistance (Omar, 2020). These grants are intended to establish and operationalise diaspora affairs/recruitment efforts as well as creating an effective system capable of exploiting the substantial financial/economic and technical resources of the diasporas (Walton-Roberts & Crush, 2019; Omar, 2020; Zeleza, 2019).

The fluid nature of mobility informed by transnationalism in the contemporary era indicates that many countries recognise the essential role that diasporas play, from activism, philanthropy, remittances, and, more importantly, enhancing institutional capacity (Brinkerhoff, 2012). The rapidly growing influence of globally connected diaspora’s role in development could also be seen a plausible alternative to conventional development, especially in post conflict setting (Hammond, 2018). In defining the essential characteristics of diaspora contributions to homeland development, Omar (2020) acknowledges their role as vital partners, especially in post conflict reconstruction. Kent (2006) affirms this notion, admitting the potential contributions of diasporas and their transnational networks to developing home countries. Abdille (2011) recognises Somali diasporas immense influence over the economy, politics, and culture, further concluding the existence of `diaspora domination’. Others most notably, Kengni (2013); Hammond, (2012) & Waris (2018), observed the importance of tapping into the human, capital, cultural and economic potential of the diasporas in homeland development, noting their importance in Somalia. A significant signpost of their perceived contribution has been the remittance flow, which has outpaced development assistance in the past 20 years (Hammond, 2012). As non-state actors who straddle national boundaries, their role in post-conflict reconstruction demonstrates their continued commitment to the rebuilding process and attachment to their country of origin which is emerging from a decades-old civil war that has principally destroyed government institutions and infrastructure. A similar report published by the World Bank acknowledges that Somalia is faced with specific internal problems, including limited administrative capacity, weak government institutions, and a shortage of skilled workforce (WB, 2018).

1.1.2 Research Background

The UK's department for international development (DFiD) calls for increased funding in Somalia to improve human and economic development (DFiD, 2018). Kleist (2012) together with a growing field of researchers stemming from diaspora and development reinforce the notion that many countries emerging from civil wars are confronted with the challenges of development, with diasporas contribution seen as a diversification by the international community’s engagement in post war reconstruction. Within this framework of scholarly literature on diaspora as agents for development, Somalia, is well suited in unearthing the intricacies of diaspora’s engagement in homeland development. There thus, appears a consensus from a range of disciplines and perspectives on the vital role of diasporas in development, especially in countries emerging from civil wars (Laakso & Hautaniemi, 2014). Since establishing Somalia’s transitional government in 2010, donors have injected substantial amounts of financial and technical aid into rebuilding government institutions (Menkhaus, 2012). A significant share of this assistance is primarily aimed at improving public service delivery (Waris, 2018). To address the deficit of skilled workers, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the African Development Bank (AFDB) are among the contenders together with other international aid and financial institutions in establishing programs to recruit skilled Somalis in the diaspora. (IOM, 2012; World Bank, 2012).

To understand the premise in which Somali professionals are engaged, we explore the context in which they find themselves as 'agents’ for development. Most technocratic classes, including doctors, nurses, water engineers, and sector experts, fled the country and resettled in the US, UK, Canada, and the EU after war erupted in early 1991 (Brinckerhoff, 2009). According to the World Bank, more than 80% of professional elites have fled the country within the first five years, creating a gap in service provision (WB, 2012). As a result, Somalia's mortality and morbidity rates are ranked amongst the highest globally due to the limited access to service provision (placed fourth in global water and health rankings (AlSharmani, 2016). However, despite the long absence from their homeland, Somali diasporas are considered to have played an essential role in maintaining & sustaining linkage, most notably through remittances & family visits (Hammond, 2012).

Beyond the often-cited remittance flows, Somalis in the diaspora and their transnational networks are also seen as a direct source of advantage to their country of origin through facilitating skill transfer in rebuilding critical government institutions (IOM, 2012). Many studies on the Somali diaspora and transnational networks have offered critical insight into our understanding of socio-economic and political activism (Laakso & Hautaniemi, 2014). However, there is considerably less work done on the role of professional diaspora intervention in enhancing institutional capacity in the public sector. The emphasis has obscured the critical engagement of the professional Somali diaspora and transnational networks in post-conflict reconstruction (PRC) (UNSOM, 2018).

Being a relatively under-studied area that merits greater attention, especially the role of diaspora professionals in the rebuilding process, the study aims to address and expand our knowledge and understanding on diasporas/mobility/engagement/transnationalism etc. Informed by Jabareen's conceptual framework (2013), the study seeks to contribute to our understanding of the role of skilled diaspora and transnational networks in PCR. In particular, the study aims to contribute to the increasing body of knowledge and literature on the role of skilled Somali professionals' intervention in development, especially in mainstreaming diasporas contributions to homeland development within the broader context of post-conflict reconstruction (political, economic, social, and governance).

1.1.3 Research Context

The deliberate destruction of government infrastructure and institutions is enduring in conflict zones (McCandless, 2016; McCandless, 2017). Archived substantiation from the impact of the civil war shows that the entire public sector collapsed during the first phase of war in 1991, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities, particularly among women, children, and marginalized groups (UNDP, 2014). remittancethe country for their safety, with the majority resettling in the UK, US, EU, and neighbouring countries (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Kapteijns, 2013). Due to the "fragile" governance structure, many alternative strategies for service providers have emerged following the exodus of skilled workforce (Menkhaus, 2008). Currently, the country's public service provisions are primarily operated by international non-governmental organisations (Elmi & Barise, 2016). However, with the assistance of international partners, the post-transitional government plans to transfer service delivery from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to state institutions. In Mogadishu, some of these services, for example, education, health, and water services, are currently managed by the local municipal council (GIZ, 2018).

Rebuilding key government institutions in a post-conflict setting is a high priority for donors and international aid agencies (WB, 2010). Donors and development agencies are increasingly concerned with poor service delivery and as a result, have increased aid to remedy the situation (Abdille, 2012). By one estimate, the federal government's (FMS) budget for these two institutions increased by 35% in 2017 (WB, 2018). Equally important, the Somali government is keen on engaging its diaspora, viewing them as an essential component of the rebuilding process (Menkhaus, 2012). Additionally, donors such as the World Bank have also increased funding for the public sector to create robust government institutions. Notwithstanding the challenges, the Somali diaspora and their transnational networks in the UK and US have played a critical role in the economy, politics, humanitarian assistance, and participation in recovery and reconstruction efforts (Kengni, 2013; Hammond, 2013; Menkhaus, 2010; Mourad, 2022; Waris, 2018). Besides foreign aid, Somalia is one of the largest receivers of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa, with around $2 billion received in 2017 alone (WB, 2018).

Despite the well-documented role of the Somali diaspora's engagement as noted by Menkhaus (2013), one key area that has received relatively little attention from scholars and policymakers is the role of skilled Somali diaspora and transnational networks in rebuilding key government institutions. McCandless (2017) emphasizes the need for a collective approach to responding to the needs in PCR, especially critical government institutions. The shift towards diaspora-led development agenda, manifested in the transformations & reconceptualizing of state-diaspora relationship, calls for the need to adopt a more robust policy/strategies vis-à-vis skilled diaspora engagement (Koinova, 2018). 

1.1.4 Preliminary Literature Review

### 1.1.4.1 Definition of 'Diaspora.'

The term 'Diaspora,' which was first coined to describe the dispersal of Jews from their homeland, has evolved throughout the years (Ages, 1973; Taylor, 2001; Lustig & Ian, 2008; Cohen & Gerald, 2002). Singh (2006) holds the view that the term 'diaspora’ which originated from an ancient Greek word meaning to *'scatter about*,' can only be referred to Jewish migrants. The author argues that since the term was exclusively intended to describe the relationship of Jews with their ancestral heritage, the classical definition of 'diaspora' is different from today's migrant communities based on the diverse patterns and characteristics. These attributes highlight the activities of a modern 'diaspora.' Yet, since the early 1990s, the terminology was used to define Armenians and later religious minorities (Toyin & Danielle, 2015; Shane, 2012).

Gupta & Ferguson (1992) maintain that the classical term could only be referred to the Jewish community despite changes in current global discord necessitated by improvements in travel and communication technologies. In contrast, others argue that since the term was exclusively intended to describe the relationship of Jewish migrants with their ancestral heritage, the classical definition of 'diaspora' is different from today's migrant communities based on the diverse patterns and characteristics which highlight the activities of a modern 'diaspora,' hence the need to redefine the term (Butler, 2001; Grossman, 2019). It is worth noting that the implications of what constitutes a 'diaspora' have always been contested in the broad discipline of social sciences, even in where claims of attachment to the homeland are not forcefully articulated (Brubaker, 2005).

Furthermore, many diaspora scholars are of the view that the term ‘diaspora’ merits closer attention to broaden the scope of the terminology beyond the classical definition (Brubaker, 2017). In this regard, Braziel & Mannur (2003), Carment & Bercuson (2008), Safran (1997), and other theoretically oriented anthropologists well versed in diaspora and migration studies have made significant contributions in refining the term 'diaspora' concept beyond its original/traditional narrow scope (Dusenbery, 2016). Also, in expanding the terminology due to changing diaspora configurations, added that the idea of a community permanently or semi-permanently residing outside their homeland gives an impetus to a range of disciplines with a renewed interest (Brubaker, 2017).

While many acknowledge that previous studies on migration have provided an insightful understanding of the dynamics of diaspora and its formations, the deepening contradictions and unresolved discrepancies among scholars and policymakers, call for a cautious approach to define 'who' is and 'who is not a diaspora (Edwards, 2021).In line with this argument, the criterion for determining current diasporas leaves little place for accommodating 'others'-further delineating diasporic communities based on the divergent relationships to homeland (Butler, 2001).

Influenced by postmodernist readings on examining Somalia diasporas formation, mobility, identity, and experiences in both place of origin and country of residence in a rapidly changing & interconnected environment, Kleist’s (2008) observation on their unique position as co-development partners is well suited within the perimeters of the thesis’s overall objectives. The study aims to explore this further and if necessary, amalgamate the different perspectives that shape the conceptual dichotomy of 'diaspora'. In this regard, Sheffer's (1986; 2003) three criteria provides a descriptive and analytical change of 'diaspora' in the contemporary era. However, despite the differences in interpretations, the terminology has been used to define African, Indian, Chinese, and Mexican migrants. Finally, pointing out the critical importance of transnationalism in understanding 'diaspora,' Vertovec's (2004), crucial contribution in expanding the conceptual and disciplinary space of the term ‘diaspora’ by adding a new element (transnationalism) to broaden the contours of the terminology has gained public acceptance from scholars of different disciplines. Based on this inevitable change and the emergence of new insights on migration, diaspora, maintaining cultural and social ties across nation-state borders and mobility, Cohen's (2008) account offers greater clarity and a conceivable fertile ground for exploring Somali diaspora without excluding the classical term which primarily focuses on 'displacement' and return to 'ancestral homeland' as a theoretical lens.

In conformity with Cohen's proposition, Safran's (1997), profound analytical research on the term serves as a theoretical frame to define Somali 'diasporas' since they 'satisfy' certain essential conditions i.e., forceful removal, communities transcending national barriers and finally establishing sustained and emotional linkage to home country. In this regard, reinforced by classical definition of 'diaspora', the idea of forced displacement and maintaining psychological, emotional, and economic connection through new patterns of transnational migration, is aligned with the generally accepted definition of classifying Somalis as contemporary 'diasporas (Brinkerhoff, 2012). In empirical terms, the specification of the Somali diaspora in the study is based on having a shared identity in ethnic and historical traditions. The study will focus on original Somali (e) migrants and the return of subsequent generations. One of the key reasons for selecting this group is that they have a bearing on reverse migration (Baser & Swain, 2010). It is also worth noting that evidence from existing empirical studies shows that large-scale return flows mainly consist of Somali migrants displaced after the civil war in the early 1990s (Mezzetti & Guglielmo, 2010).

1.1.5 The Migration- Development Nexus: Role of Diaspora & Transnational Networks

The term "*transnationalism" can best be described as a "process by which migrants build multiple social, economic, and cultural relations across geographic and political boundaries*." (Munro, 2016). Lampert, 2009; Rembold, 2013; Hammond et al., 2011). Recent empirically driven studies on contemporary migrants, for example, Somalis, demonstrate that these groups maintain links beyond their host and home countries (Hammond, 2013; Waris, 2018). Since the 1990s, transnationalism has attracted increased interest from academics, creating a collaborative approach across different disciplines (Portes, 2010; Portes et al., 2015).

Diaspora groups have broad networks and are highly connected at a transnational level by modern technology (Kok & Rogers, 2016). Transnational networks created by diasporas are constructed around social, cultural, technical, and political linkages with the primary aim of maintaining linkages beyond home and host countries (Vertovec, 2009; Vertovec, 2010). A review of academic literature on transnational networks' roles in local development processes established that they, perhaps by default, assume key actors and substitutes for traditional political, economic, and development systems (Vertovec, 2010). These network systems serve two inter-reliant primary functions: "successful incorporation of network members into the host country" and "development of the network members' homeland" (Riddle et al., 2010). This is manifested in the movement of skilled workers, transnational network’s critical role in PCR, especially in fragile states and states in political transition (King & Levitt, 2014). Brinkerhoff (2006) argues that their impact on the reconstruction of government institutions in Somalia is essential in providing the government with much-needed legitimacy and authority. Previous studies have established that the contributions of the diaspora and transnational networks in the country's political and economic spheres have had a significant impact on the recovery process (Abdi, 2012; Harper, 2012; Hopkins, 2006).

A typical example is the often-cited remittance flows, which continues to play a critical role in sustaining livelihoods, enhancing economic growth, and improving living standards (Hammond, 2010; Hammond, 2013; Lindley, 2007; Lindley, 2010). According to Granovetter (1973; 1982), Transnational migration is mediated by kinship and social networks, for example, family members and friends. Groups that have settled in an area may potentially offer newly arrived migrants similar background information on housing, employment, and education (Grannovetter, 1973). Passing information from one acquaintance to another eventually reaches more dense clusters, creating a solid tie beyond their boundaries. In principle, Grannovetter (1973) suggests that individuals with similar cultures/background s are more likely to socialize and form strong relationships with others from the same group. This could potentially provide a valuable analytical lens in examining the interconnectivity of Somali migrants beyond host-home borders as well as providing theoretical insights into the emergence of Somali transnational networks.

Somalis in the diaspora are emotionally/instrumentally attached to their homeland, with many remitting monies to their relatives, families, and friends (Lindley, 2007; 2010). According to the International Monetary Foundation (IMF), Somalis abroad remit around $2 billion annually, with forecasts expected to grow in the coming years due to favourable economic and investment conditions (IMF, 2017). The economic contribution has been instrumental in accelerating economic and political growth in post-conflict settings (Hammond, 2011). Given the remittances' scale, magnitude & trend, and its impact on the country, their financial contributions have attracted much attention in research and policy with a considerable dominance in migration studies (Menkhaus, 2008).

### 1.1.5.1 Transnationalism & Brain Circulation

Transnationalism and brain circulation in some countries, for example, China, India, and Armenia have contributed to their homeland's socio-economic and technological development (Chand, 2012). These states view their skilled diaspora workforce as strong networks capable of facilitating the flow of knowledge and assets (Kapur, 2010). The phenomenon has also benefited other countries, most notably Somalia, Ghana, and the Philippines (Furman et al., 2010). Recognising the role played by Somali transnationals in socio-economic and political development, the UN, the federal government, and leading financial institutions have established development programs through skill and asset transfers and investment (UNSOM, 2018; Waris, 2018). According to the IOM, the QUEST-MIDA program links the skilled diaspora workforce to the needs in their home country (IOM, 2012). The program was developed to "*provide durable solutions to the state by using the country's diaspora as the primary instrument"* (IOM 2012:2).

Additionally, as part of its strategic plan in PCR, the World Bank has initiated programs by recruiting professional Somali transnationals (WB, 2017). The institution is particularly interested in shifting the development paradigm from conventional state aid programs towards skilled diaspora-led development initiatives (WB, 2018). Increasingly, the younger generation has been less engaged in socio-economic and political development. According to Hammond (2011), the second generation is more concerned with transferring knowledge and skills. Since 2011, Turkey's aid agency TIKA has been actively rehabilitating public sector institutions, offering training to hundreds of employees in different sectors (TIKA, 2017). The organisation employs many skilled Somali diaspora professionals and relies on their expertise in knowledge transfer (UNSOM, 2018). The transfer of skills & knowledge as a way of strengthening institutional capacity seems to be a very vital tool of analysis for this research.

### 1.1.5.2 Post Conflict Reconstruction

Post-conflict means that strife and violence have ceased, however, the transitory period could also increase political uncertainties & vulnerabilities to external/internal impacts could further re-ignite civil war (Hopkins, 2006; McCandless & Donais, 2015). Fragile states are significantly susceptible to internal and external shocks, whereas, in failed states, failure is defined as a condition of state collapse & as a result, the state can no longer offer basic functions (Bender, 2011; Woodward, 2017). In practice, many fragile states, if not most, are faced with the risk of renewed violence due to the fragility of their situation, for example, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Bender, 2011). The term "post-conflict reconstruction" itself became exceedingly popular in the 1990s, describing the role of donor countries in state-building and establishing political stability in the aftermath of a civil war (Kok & Roger, 2016; Lindley, 2010; Menkhaus, 2012). While the history of the concept long precedes the term, it was the international community's role in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past ten years that brought the terminology to the fore (Lindley, 2010; Lewis, 2011; McCandless, 2017; Menkhaus, 2010; Moller, 2009; Van Brabant, 2010).

### 1.1.5.3 Institutionalising State-Transnational Engagement

Countries emerging from the civil war are determined to initiate a productive dialogue with their diaspora abroad to foster peace and development (Menkhaus, 2010; McCandless & Donais, 2018; Waris, 2018; Waldinger,2015). In Somalia, the government is keen on tapping the resources of its diaspora to rebuild the war-torn country (WB, 2018). For that purpose, the Federal Government of Somalia (FMS) has established programs to encourage the return of skilled workforce back to the country, for example, setting up a Diaspora Liaison Office in the capital, Mogadishu (DLO) (UNSOM, 2018). Studies from growing literature of government policies towards diaspora engagement identify two conceptual approaches. The first approach investigates the strategic behaviour of nation-states (Bakewell, 2008; De Haas, 2006; De Haas, 2010; Hunter et al., 2010).

The first concept states that to gain from its skilled diasporic community's material and knowledge resources, sending states generally adopt a proactive approach, for example, establishing diaspora offices in host countries (Gamlen, 2012). Such efforts, aimed at maximising diasporas’ potentials, are designed in a way that allows the state to extend their reach beyond home-host territorial borders (Bakewell, 2008; De Haas, 2006; De Haas, 2010). The second concept emphasizes the government's approach towards its diaspora as `overseas citizens.’ This concept is mainly based on the government's view of their diaspora as a 'missing' portion of the state; hence their return is seen as mutually beneficial to both entities (De Haas, 2010). The second approach focuses on the notion that transnational communities have a moral obligation to contribute to their country of origin (De Haas, 2006; De Haas, 2010; Jeffery & Murison, 2011). Both concepts are well aligned with overall objectives of this study, and this could potentially offer a possible analytical framework to explore professional Somali diaspora’s role in homeland development.

Focusing on the positive contributions and diasporas impact on homeland development, success or failure is also tied to the sending state and skilled migrants' establishing robust links (King & Christou, 2010). Usually, due to the potential resources of the diasporas, sending states have developed diaspora strategies aimed at encouraging migrants' active participation in homeland development, and this could partially explain the expectations associated with their perceived contributions (Chand, 2012; Vertovec, 2009). The strength of the relationship between the diaspora and the government is one of the main determinants of diaspora mobilisation (Gamlen, 2014). In yet a further extension, few sending states have raised the stakes by creating a vibrant diaspora lobby group in host land as 'representatives' or 'reputational 'ambassadors' (Farooqi, 2009). This relationship is not always symmetrical; depending on the interaction's political, economic, and social conditions, one becomes more commanding than the other (Adamson, 2012).

### 1.1.5.4 Building Government Institutions & Infrastructure

Strengthening government institutions is critical to states emerging from conflicts (Englebert & Dennis, 2008; Fukuyama, 2004; Fukuyama, 2006). The protracted civil war in Somalia has severely destroyed basic infrastructure and disrupted the delivery of core services, with donor organisations calling for an urgent response to address the institutional deficit (Hammond, 2012; Hassan et al, 2019; Menkhaus, 2009). Rebuilding critical functions of the state, such as schools, hospitals, and water services, is not a new phenomenon in international development (Carothers & Marina, 2004). After WWII, the Marshall Plan was used to reconstruct government infrastructure to consolidate peace in Europe (Ellison & Huntley, (1991). Due to a renewed important level of international support for PCR since the 1990s, the UN's focus on rebuilding key government institutions in Kosovo, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone demonstrates its importance to policymakers and the donor community (Marshall, 2008).

key issues that have emerged considering the scope of the literature review include:

* Researchers and policymakers are becoming more interested in diaspora and development.
* There is a need to engage skilled Somali professionals in rebuilding key government institutions.
* Literature is scarce on the role of skilled Somali transnationals in the reconstruction of key government institutions; most studies are based on remittances as a way of gauging diasporas' contributions.
* Major development agencies and the Somali government's role in promoting the return migration of skilled diaspora workers have received less research and data collection attention.

1.2 Research Problem

Due to the decades-old civil war, Somalia has massive skilled workforce shortages (Waris, 2018). This was exacerbated by the mass exodus of elite professionals from the country during the early phase of the war in 1991. As a result, their absence has created a sub-standard and poorly staffed personnel, ineffective services, and chronic underdevelopment in almost every sphere of service provision (Kleist, 2008; Menkhaus, 2012). In confronting the structural weaknesses inherent in the post-conflict context, the idea of engaging skilled diaspora professionals has gained greater acceptance as an alternative to the traditional approach to aid-driven development in PCR (Galipo, 2018; Hammond, 2011; Kok & Rogers, 2017).

# 1.3 Research Aims & Objectives

1. To critically analyse the mobilisation of skilled Somali Diaspora professionals' intervention in rebuilding critical government institutions.

Questions:

How do the contextual and structural determinants of mobilizing skilled Somali diaspora professionals and their transnational networks impact the reconstruction of government institutions? Moreover, what bearing does it have on rebuilding key government institutions?

How do the different approaches to knowledge transfer and the factors that influence or hinder knowledge transfer and sharing impact institutional capacity-building practices?

1. To critically examine the role of the government/donors' policies in the return of Professional Somali diasporas & what lessons can be drawn from the process, including recruitment & retainment?

Questions:

How do government/federal state members', INGO's, and donors' policies affect and influence the recruitment of skilled Somali diasporas? Moreover, what practical policy recommendations can be formulated to address the gap in the public sector and the acute shortage of a skilled workforce?

1.3.1 Research Contribution

The role of the Somali diaspora is still being nurtured through economic and political participation, primarily focusing on remittances hence, creating a gap in research (Bradbury, 2008; Lindley, 2007; Lindley, 2010; Lewis, 1995; Lewis, 2003; Menkhaus, 2012). In much of the migration literature in Somalia, continues to be shaped by the economic contributions of the diaspora. Since little attention has been devoted to the study of professional diaspora and transnational networks in PCR, this study aims to address the imbalance created by previous studies that mainly focused on remittances as a way of gauging diasporas' contributions to homeland development. This serves as a good example to enumerate the points above.

# **1.4 Thesis structure**

**Chapter 1**. This chapter discusses the rationale and context in which skilled diaspora’s mobilisation could potentially be a potent force for development, with a special focus on institutional building in post-conflict reconstruction. Additionally, the chapter presented a discussion on the significance of skilled circular migration informed by transnationalism as a valuable tool for knowledge transfer. A well-formulated research aims & objectives are also defined to objectively enrich existing theories on diaspora-development knowledge.

**Chapter 2**. This chapter analyses the features of contemporary diaspora and their subsequent role in development by delving deeper into the historical/current role of Somali diasporas in development. It also discusses additional aspects of Somali diaspora formations, relations with sending state, and their role as ‘agents for development’. Given the theoretical differences inherent in diaspora/development studies, the chapter acknowledges the importance of re-defining ‘diasporas’ beyond its current classification & conceptual boundaries by including transnational diasporas’ valuable role as a ‘conduit’ for knowledge transfer. Finally, the chapter discusses sending the state's role in enhancing relationships with its ‘constituents’ abroad through coordinated strategies, citing the classical examples of India and the Chinese government’s policy changes in forging deeper relations with their diasporas.

**Chapter 3** This chapter discusses the conceptual framework developed for the thesis and its significance in explaining the role of skilled diasporas on homeland development. To examine the effects of diaspora contributions, I have adapted jabareen’s framework as a guide to gauge diaspora’s role in development, with emphasis on sustaining linkage, mobilisation, engagement, development & homeland policies extending reach across its borders. The diverse definition of 'diaspora' may not have necessarily provided the best theoretical assessment as a line of inquiry, however, other important features such as changing social dimensions, globalization, belonging/identity, and spatial & mobility offered guidance in critically analysing the impact of diaspora contributions to homeland development.

**Chapter 4**. This chapter discusses the research design & methodology utilised in the thesis to answer the research questions/problem statement stipulated in chapter 1. Due to the complex nature of diaspora mobilisation for development, the thesis relied on multiple qualitative research methods to gather data (semi-structured interviews, focus groups, document review, and historical accounts). The chapter also discussed the appropriateness of selecting a suitable paradigm, the methods, fundamentals as well as positionality and ethics issues associated with ‘researching home’.

**Chapter 5**. Informed by the conceptual discussions, this chapter examines the often-complex process of skilled Somali diaspora mobilisation and their subsequent impact on post-conflict reconstruction in a thematically arranged chronology. The sectors covered by the government, INGOs, and development agencies' engagement/recruitment activities in mobilising the diaspora are not solely aimed at economic development but more importantly encompass other social, cultural, artistic, and political aspects. The chapter also discussed new government policies/strategies vis-à-vis its implications on the diaspora’s role in homeland development.

**Chapter 6**. In analysing diaspora identity and its implications on empowering institutions capability, this chapter examines the role of nationalism, identity, and the Federal government’s systematic policy initiatives towards diaspora mobilisation, key strategies adopted for that endeavour, and the complexities that characterise their relationship. The study reveals substantial and visible changes since 2015, with the sending state recognising the need to develop effective diaspora engagement policies at both ends of the migration cycle.

**Chapter 7**. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of knowledge transfer and its impact on developing robust institutional capacity. It also explores migration, diaspora, and links to the homeland by arguing that the benefits of returning migrants are much wider than broadly imagined, with knowledge and social networks providing a new promising dimension to future emigration and migration studies. The focus here is on the two core building blocks of diaspora; homeland and development, and how elements of skills, knowledge, expertise and social connections are applied as a conduit for growth.

**Chapter 8**. The empirical findings discussed in chapter 5, 6, and 7 are summarised with each capturing diasporas’ mobility and their subsequent contributions to homeland development informed by changing diaspora migratory dynamics with various facets of diaspora configurations recognised as an important element in diaspora/migration studies. This chapter also highlights the main themes that have emerged from the data collection and link them to the research objectives in chapter 1.

**Chapter 9**. The final chapter summarises the contributions of the study, linking it to existing diaspora/development knowledge by broadening the scope and magnitude of diasporas’ contributions to homeland development. More importantly, this chapter discusses the main contributions of the thesis to academic and policy discourses, theoretical/pragmatic contributions. Finally, the study presents a proposal for further research.

# **CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW & THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK**

**2.1 Introduction**

This chapter reviews the role of skilled diasporas and their 'perceived' contribution to rebuilding their homeland. In addition to the potential human contribution in a post-conflict setting with the sequence of attempts by home government and its development partners mobilisation efforts with greater emphasis on achieving sustainable post-war development objectives (Koinova, 2019; Omar, 2020). Equally important, combining transnationalism with the various aspects of the dynamics of return mobilities, this chapter argues that the typology of returns reinforces the notion that echoes through many research literatures on the discourse of diaspora reverse migration and their subsequent contribution to their country of origin (Gamlen, 2018). It, however, furthers this concept by developing the contours of a novel approach beyond the present scholarly inquiry by addressing the emergence of transnational groups in advancing new patterns of human mobility and engagement. In highlighting this novel approach to describing the emerging phenomena, the author will take a little-explored path to examine the multi-layered and multi-fluid diaspora linkages to different engagement contexts. Finally, the study explored the possibilities of skill transfer as a means of rebuilding governance capacity in post-conflict societies, citing Armenian and Bosnian diasporas' role in post conflict reconstruction as an example.

To reflect the central issues in the research questions, the study is divided into four segments, with a significant overlap within the sections. The categorisation has also enabled the author to divide the literature into several salient themes. Section 2.1 highlights a brief history of Somalia’s civil war, formation of Somalia diasporas and the dynamics of diasporas/transnational networks relation and their contribution to post-conflict reconstruction and development. Section 2.2 discusses the diverse types of mobilisation strategies and their subsequent rationale for adoption as well as addressing the role of governments at both ends of the migration cycle and how host/home governments & international development partners' engagement policies foster these relationships, which is instrumental in developing a road map for diaspora mobilisation. Section 2.3 highlights state failure, collapse, and reconstruction, focusing on the need to engage non-state actors as co-development partners. Section 2.6 outlines the importance of diasporas' skill transfer as a catalyst for development, focusing on the diverse ways in which their knowledge, skills, values, and resources are utilized in enriching and improving local talent. Section 2.7 reinforces the importance of knowledge transfer in post conflict reconstruction, including exploring different knowledge transfer modalities aimed at maximising diasporas contribution. Section 2.8 explores existing theoretical frameworks for studying diaspora and development. Section 2.9 discusses epistemology and the idea of research paradigms. The concluding section provides a summary of the discussions.

# **2.2 The Dynamics of Contemporary Diaspora: Consolidating Post Conflict Development** **2.2.1 Global Somali Diaspora: History, Formation, and Identity**

The decades old civil war in Somalia which has ravaged most parts of the country caused immense suffering to people, property, businesses, and social structure (Ahmed, 1995; Menkhaus, 2006; Moller, 2009). Cornwell (2004) admits that events in the first phase of the civil war unleashed a torrent of egregious and systemic violations of human rights. Initially, the armed opposition started as a weak coalition of different clan rebel groups with the aim of overthrowing the socialist regime of the late dictator *Siyad Barre*; an Italian trained army colonel who ruled the country with an iron fist (Barakat & Waldman, 2013). The extreme viciousness that characterised the conflict was the fierce fighting for the control of Mogadishu; causing millions to flee as a result (Cornwall, 2014). Part A will provide a brief snapshot of Somalia’s civil war between 1991 to early two thousand and the pattern of migration that followed. The second part will focus on the patterns of mobility and the complexities associated with voluntary and involuntary mass migration movement. Categorising migration patterns into two groupings will serve better to understand the unparalleled complexities of Somalia’s mass migration movement. Finally, the last part will provide an in-depth analysis of Somali transnationalism.

### **2.2.2 Understanding Somalia’s Mobility Through Migration Lens: From Civil War to Transnationalism**

Lewis (1995) points out that prior to the civil war, Somalia was one of the first countries in Sub Sahara Africa to gain independence from the UK and Italy in 1960. It also become the first country in Africa to hold a free, fair, and credible multi-party elections in the 1960s (Elmi & Barise, 2006). Mogadishu, which served as an economic and political hub was dubbed as the ‘*pearl of the Indian Ocean’* attracting tourists mainly from Europe and the Middle East (Ahmed, 1995). With an Italian and Arabic influence, the city’s unique architectural buildings were regarded as one of the most advanced cities in Africa gleaming with white beaches, bright painted *Italianate* villas and green trees- a far cry of from its current status as the most dangerous city in the world and Somalia’s graveyard of grand and beautiful buildings.

During the initial period of *Siyad Barre’s* regime, the government made gains in eradicating clannism, building roads, and improving education for girls (Menkhaus, 2010). Moreover, the author asserts that the regime established different projects aimed at improving living conditions for herders and farmers. (Ahmed, 1995) claims that *Barre’*s regime was successful in portraying the country as a constitutionally social state even though, during the last 10 years before his overthrow, the regime cultivated a patrimonial state that revolved around clan identity. However, despite the progress made during the first decade of the revolution, *Barre’s* regime gradually turned into a repressive government, accused of masterminding clan cleansing, and devouring national and public resources for personal use especially among *Barre’s* henchmen and close associates, who at the time assumed the sole responsibility of protecting the revolution (Lewis 2011; Lyons & Samatar, 1995).

Soon after toppling *Barre’s* autocratic and patrimonial regime from power, the largely ragtag armed rebels returned to the capital Mogadishu (Lewis, 2003). Consisting of four groups; *United Somali Congress*, *Somali Patriotic Movement*, *Somali Salvation Democratic Front* and *Somali National Movement* which later retreated back to the northern part of the country (Somaliland) return to the capital marked the beginning of inter clan fighting that lasted for almost a decade (Menkhaus, 2008). Without articulating a clear exit strategy, Barre and his council of ministers consisting of senior generals, retreated to his native Gedo region, his last clan stronghold. The feudal struggles and civil discord that followed led to a wave of large-scale migration, looting and extreme brutal violence in major cities- beyond Mogadishu (Cornwell, 2004). The concept of territoriality in urban warfare is extremely important since it links geography and control- this is clearly evident from the rebels attempt to affect influence and control in all the major cities and towns surrounding Mogadishu (Menkhaus, 2012).

The ouster of *Barre* ushered an era of destruction, havoc, prolonged period of violent anarchy and total collapse of state institutions (Moller, 2009). The author implies that four months of fighting in mid-1991 between *AIdeed* and *Mahdi’ s* faction killed an estimated 25, 000 and displaced 1.5 million people in Mogadishu alone. Within a brief period of time, the ousting of Somalia’s long-standing military regime mutated from an uprising against a dictatorial government to civil war through state collapse, clan factionalism and *warlordism* (Harper, 2012; Rembold, 2013). According to Lewis (1995; 2011) the rebel’s mode of operation in the initial period of the war illustrates several important paradoxes. First, the rivalry between different clan rebels that took part in the ouster of the late dictator was evident from their lack of cooperation during the initial ouster and aftermath of Barre. *Aideed’s* faction were relentlessly seeking to destroy government infrastructures and private businesses owned by members of *Barre’s* clan and close associates while at the same time undermining other members of the ‘coalition’ partners, for example, using economic siege to coerce rivals into submission. Secondly, and perhaps most important, the author further observes that *Aideed* had superior weapons and controlled large territories in south and middle Somalia including areas that have relatively remained unscathed during the early period of the civil war- transforming the war from an urban warfare into symbols of wider territorial control.

Consequently, one of the key developments of the civil was that *Aideed’s* influence expanded immensely, capturing large territories as far as *Galkayo* in Puntland region (Lewis, 2003). It is worth noting that his faction was also largely accused of being responsible for the atrocities committed against innocent civilians. A good example is the capture of the Southwest regional capital *Baidoa* which was dubbed as the ‘*city of death;’* creating a monumental level of human destruction- forcing the US, UK, and the international community to intervene militarily (Menkhaus, 2008). Nevertheless, many reports including those conducted by the UN and Human Rights groups indicate that all the rebel movements including Somaliland’s *SNM* operating practices comprised of extraction, banditry, exploitation and forced migration (Cornwell, 2004). Over the next 2 decades, the war in Somalia will take many twists and turns creating untold suffering, further leading to mass migration of skilled workforce (Rembold, 2013).

### **2.2.3 Mass Exodus of Migrants**

Reports of *Barre’s* ouster brought transitory jubilation to the residents of Mogadishu and beyond (Moller, 2009). The intense fear of an attack by remnants of *Barre’s* regime was diminishing faster as the entire army disintegrated along clan lines. Efforts by *Mahdi’*s faction to integrate ex-military personnel failed and the process was marred by further conflict often reflecting clan divisions (Van Brabant, 2010). *Barre* and close family members fled to neighbouring Kenya where he stayed for few months before travelling to Nigeria where he later died in exile. Lewis (1995) claims that the return of the weak ‘coalition’ rebels to the capital city without a clear and concise political strategy was certainly a recipe for chaos, anarchy, and destruction- a harbinger of what would become a devastating decades old civil war.

Since the outbreak of the civil war in early 1991, civilians from all the major clans have been the victim of widespread and systemic violation of human rights abuses (Lewis, 1995; World Bank, 2013; WSP, 2001). As discussed earlier, during the first months of the civil war, a coalition of rebels lay siege to the city for many months as efforts to re-establish national government comprising of different factions foundered on the ambitions of the two leading rebel leaders (Lewis, 1993). This led to the indiscriminate shelling of residential areas of Mogadishu. Close to a million-people fled to neighbouring towns while others took the seas and travelled as far as Yemen and Kenya. Moreover, fearing retaliation, government employees left the city in mass exodus further crippling the weak government (Elmi & Barise, 2006).

### **2.2.4 Patterns of Displacement**

The single largest mass migration from the capital was witnessed after the fall of the capital city, Mogadishu (Amnesty, 2013; Clarke & Herbst, 1996). According to Lewis (2003), the main rebel group United Somali Congress better known by USC which was dominated by the *Hawiye* clan embarked on a ‘cleansing’ spree aimed at forcefully evicting members of Barre’s *Darood* clan who were accused of economically and politically benefiting from the previous regime. It is worth noting that two of the major rebel groups Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and Somali Social Defence Forces (SSDF) that took part in the ouster and overthrow of the late dictator also belonged to the Darood clan (Lewis, 2011; Cornwell, 2004). Both groups will later retreat to their respective sub clan strongholds in Puntland & Jubbaland.

According to reports by the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (2012), by early 1992, simmering tensions among the contending rebel groups and fierce fighting for the control of the city’s ports and government assets including parliament, Villa del Somalia (presidential residence), triggered an unprecedented movement of people from Mogadishu- the largest mass migration ever experienced in the country affecting at least a million people (Lewis, 1995). Since then, clan dynamics changed drastically as non-Hawiye residents moved to regions that were perceived to be their clan strongholds and neighbouring countries (Elmi & Barise, 2006). It is worth recalling that land conflicts in Mogadishu due to the pacification in the early 1990’s and the right to restitution after a long absence still remains a controversial and contentious debate in contemporary Somali politics-threatening to obstruct the post-war recovery (Menkhaus, 2012).

In towns and villages surrounding Mogadishu, the collapse of the government put a strain on resources and service provision; people fleeing the war were more often displaced on multiple occasion by the warring factions thus leading to increased migration to neighbouring countries in search of durable solutions (WB, 2011). Moreover, the movement of people in towns and villages surrounding the capital led to low intensity conflicts between the locals and the fleeing migrants-adding significant pressure to inter-clan relations. By 1995, Somali refugee numbers in Kenya peaked at 200, 000 people (WB, 2005).

### **2.2.5 Forced Migration**

Tensions surrounding migratory flows through Somalia is quite common. Between 2006 and 2010, the emergence of *Shabab* terror group forcefully uprooted millions from the middle and Southwest regions (Rembold, 2013). Fearing forced conscription, many migrants mainly adult male used different and often longer and dangerous routes to avoid areas controlled by the group. In some cases, migrants walked for months to reach neighbouring countries especially during the 2011 famine which uprooted millions from their homes (UNDSS, 2013). United Nations and aid organisations were refused to deliver food and medicine to regions under the control of the group affected by the drought. Forced migration has become a globally salient issue and Somalia has seen a substantial increase in recent years (BBC, 2013).

Arguably one of the key scholarly contributions on Somalia’s forced migration is Menkhaus’s (2010) article entitled *The Role of Violence in Stateless Somalia*. The research study was especially important not least because it reflected on the agony and anguish faced by migrants when forcefully evicted from their dwellings, but it also shed light on the fact that the terror group’s attitude towards migrants was not clan driven or based on political affiliation but rather an extremist ideology. The author further argues that the forced migration pattern in Somalia is often large scale and unpredictable migration flows. Such analysis is essential, especially where tensions between the different clans played a key role in the early phase of the civil war.

### **2.3 Somali Diaspora: The Making of Modern Transnationals**

In Somalia, internal migration within the country has been a customary practice due to the country’s nomadic culture (Lindley, 2010). However, after the civil war, many have settled in different countries with an estimated 1.2 million Somalis scattered around the world, the majority living in the US, UK, and Canada (Hammond, 2013; Hammond et al, 2011; Sporton et al, 2009). The Somali diaspora are overly attached to their homeland with many sending money back to their relatives, families, and friends. According to the International Monetary Foundation, in 2016, annual Somali remittances stands at $2 billion, and this is expected to grow in the coming years due to favourable economic and investment conditions (IMF, 2017).

Somalis who were recruited as sailors are considered among the first wave of migrants to the UK (Hopkins, 2006). Resettling in Cardiff, Liverpool and Bristol, the migrants who consisted of semi-skilled and skilled migrants were later followed by a mass exodus of Somali refugees and asylum seekers since the collapse of Siyad Barre’s regime in 1991 (Kleist, 2008). Empirical research on Somali diaspora indicate that the community is actively involved in transnationalism mobilising around a common diasporic identity in a triadic relationship.

In examining the Somali diaspora activities, Kok & Rogers (2016), recognises that the community is actively involved in political engagement that is “Structured around a particular identity category such as national, ethnic religious or sectarian identity” (kok & Rogers, 2016:26). Furthermore, the finding of the study indicates that technological advancement such as the internet has immensely contributed to the increased communication among Somali transnationals. For example, the creation of community-based organisation with worldwide reach connecting Somali diasporic communities in different countries was cited as a prime example of the impact of globalisation on transnationalism (Kok & Rogers, 2016).

In seeking to understand the ongoing dialogue between host, home and diaspora societies, Kok & Rogers (2016), established that diasporic communities play a crucial role in social integration as well as contributing to meaningful community development in host country despite the complexity and variation of geographical orientation. Nevertheless, the Somali communities in the US and the UK have long established relationship aimed at sustaining development in their home countries; hence creating an intimate social community across extended physical distances and boundaries (Hammond, 2013). Consequently, technological advancement has also immensely contributed to increased communication among Somali transnationals (Kok & Roger, 2016). The author acknowledges that cheap international communication and inexpensive telephone calls have enabled the community to stay in touch with family members. Moreover, the internet has also been instrumental in transnational activities. Through various internet-based platforms, the Somali diaspora are able to regroup, share views and organise activities.

Most Somalis in the UK and the US have family members living elsewhere and as such they have used the concept of transnational networks to resist several types of marginalisation in host countries (Demie et al, 2007; Lindley, 2007). According to Ahponen et al “Somalis do not have the same level of power and choice as others when using their citizenship to gain certain rights, they also face socio-economic marginalisation, negative stereotyping, and other types of insecurities. The fact that they develop a new transnational understanding of citizenship may be considered as a response to this marginalisation” (Ahponen et al, 2016:119). Somali transnationalism is hardly devoid of clan and tribal connotations (Hammond et al, 2013). After all, the country is deeply traditional, and affiliation, loyalty to the different clans plays a major role politically, socially, culturally and even economically. According to Lindley (2013), “Throughout Somalia’s history, clanship and traditional social practices have proved to be highly malleable resource for political and social mobilisation” (Lindley, 2013: 28). Despite sharing the same culture, norms, religion and common bonds of nationhood, small cluster transnational groups among the Somalia diaspora were established primarily for driving their own clan ‘agenda;’ depicting a deeply divided diaspora and this has in some way hindered the pace of transnational activities (Bradbury, 2008; Kleist, 2008).

# **2.3.1 Revisiting ‘Diaspora’ & Transnationalism**

Led by the interdisciplinary field of transnational studies, research on diaspora engagement in their countries of origin has exponentially expanded in the last decade, with much of the literature suffering from conceptual confusion and fractionalization (Delano & Gamlen, 2014; Gamlen, 2019; Ragazzi, 2009; Singh & Priyanka , 2018). However, a critical review of existing literature uncovers some alarming developments. First, developing an agreed definition of what constitutes a ‘diaspora.’ Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the vast majority of previous studies focus on diaspora economic/financial contributions (Ekanem, 2019; Brinkerhoff, 2012; Koinova, 2016). The study will demonstrate the fluidity of diaspora identities and how diasporas connect in more material ways to what is perceived as ‘ancestral home’ and the complicating relationship between state-diaspora and explore ways in which sending states facilitate the flow of diaspora capital and technological know-how.

In exploring the domain of these complex and often conflicting interpretations, a paper published by Clifford (1994), entitled ‘Diaspora’ argues that the long-established definition of the terminology ought to be augmented to suit contemporary migrants. In the years that followed, in shedding light on the conceptual puzzle of what constitutes a ‘diaspora,’ other scholars recognised the need to refine the term ‘diaspora’ and enrich its meaning through analysing the different contexts of migration vis-à-vis the changing dynamics of mobility (Braziel & Mannur 2003; Carment & Bercuson, 2008; Safran,1997; Palmer, 2018). About the archetype of the Jewish diaspora, the cultural distinctness of the Jews has not always been compatible with diverse contemporary migration, and this has, to some extent, weakened the classical definition of ‘diaspora’ (Cohen, 2008; Tololyan 1996; Walters, 1993). Beyond the similarities of external physical forms, Clifford’s article infers that since current ‘diasporas,’ for example, the Somalis, Indians, and Chinese maintain links to more than ‘host’ and ‘home’ countries, it is pertinent to redefine the term ‘diaspora.’ The table below shows types of diasporas and examples (2.1).

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Types of Diasporas** | **Examples** |
| **Refugee/Victim** | Jews, Africans, Armenians |
| **Imperial/Colonial** | Ancient Greeks, Russians, Germans |
| **Workforce/Service** | Indians, Italians, Turks |
| **Cultural/Post Modern** | Caribbean, Chinese |

## 

Table 2.1: Types of Diasporas. Cohen (1997).

Due to the multi-polarisation of migration and inter-polarity of relations, the new social formations of what constitutes a 'diaspora' in modern times has undergone dramatic changes in the past few decades. (Brighton, 2009; Ember & Skoggard, 2005; Wilcock, 2018). Since the 1970s, the term has experienced veritable inflation of claims and interpretations with regards to determining whether the terminology can be used to describe non-Jewish migrants, since the characteristic to the causes of migration and initial dispersal might be differently experienced, for example, Jewish diasporas envisage a return to their ancestral homeland at some point in their life to fulfil a religious duty (Cohen, 1997). In contrast, other migrants do not consider returning 'home' a sacred journey (Kenny, 2013; Safran, 2005; Sheffer, 2005).

With the terminological problem becoming a regular feature in diaspora studies, this raises the normative question of whether the term 'diaspora' is no longer a conceptual but rather an empirical question (Adamson, 2019; Tabar, 2020). From a theoretical viewpoint, a cluster of scholars are of the view that current diaspora formations are different from preceding immigrants since they do not conceptually echo/reflect a static community (Bosswick & Husband, 2005). Cohen (1997) furthers this by demonstrating that the various dynamics that shape the contours of 'diaspora,' for example, forced migration, conflicts, economic reasons, suggests that there is a need to reconsider the term in light of emerging studies of migrants and diaspora populations as well as considering the historical contextualisation and effects of transnational ties and processes (King & Christou, 2011; Vertovec, 2003:4). Against this background, Sternberg (2009) notes that even though the contemporary outlook of current migrants is different from previous groups due to the scope, intensity, & novelty of modern diasporas and their distinctiveness, features of past immigration play a critical role in defining modern diaspora formations. In essence, Sternberg's assertion reinforces other studies that accentuate the macro socio-historic transformations of past migrants' influence on current diaspora/migration identities (Ben-Rafael & Sternberg, 2009; Dufoix, 2016).

These typologies and the differences in interpretation used as a basis for defining 'diaspora' reflects a deeper divergence of opinion between Anglo-Saxon theorists and other researchers, most notably European scholars (Bostwick & Husband; Cohen, 2008). From an Anglo-Saxon point of observation, the term 'diaspora' has evolved since its inception with increased theorization in a globalized context, whereas others have restricted its usage (Kenny, 2013; Wu, 2016). In contributing to the highly contested debate, Safran (1991) provides a more descriptive and detailed definition of 'diaspora' based on multi-criteria. Some of the characteristics cited by the author in defining modern diaspora include dispersal from the country of origin, retaining collective memory of a distant homeland, regarding ancestral home as true and ideal home (Albury & Schluter, 2021; Freiling, 2019; Safran, 1991; Wu, 2016).

For reasons of terminological purity, this study aims to distinguish the two; diaspora and transnational/transnationalism, for explanatory and normative purposes to serve as a useful lens in addressing the migration-development nexus in a post-conflict setting. Equally important and in congruence with Cohen's proposition, Vertovec's (199; 2004; 2009) profound analytical research on the term serves as a theoretical frame to define Somali' diasporas' since they 'satisfy' certain essential conditions, i.e., forceful removal, communities are transcending national barriers and finally establishing sustained and emotional linkage to home country. Reinforced by the classical definition of 'diaspora,' the idea of forced displacement and maintaining psychological, emotional, and economic connection through new transnational migration patterns conforms with the generally accepted definition of classifying Somalis as contemporary 'diasporas. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the rather long and confusing history, both authors offer a pragmatic approach to understanding the 'Somali' diaspora concept by distinguishing the vast disparities in the phenomena the term is applied in contemporary times. The importance of skilled diaspora as a source of immense potential financial & human resources is recognised. The study aims to analyse the series of mobilisation & engagement measures designed to stimulate the return of professional diasporas & their subsequent contributions to homeland development.

# **2.4 Theorising Somalia State-Diaspora Relations**

The diaspora-development nexus has received increased interest from researchers and policymakers across the globe, with human geography and its interests in the spatial organisation of migration offering an excellent academic avenue for redefining the parameters of state-diaspora relation (Mavroudi & Nigel, 2016; Mujica, 2016). Grounded in 'new liberal governmentality' approach, state-diaspora relation, which is partly driven by persuasive argument, scholarly endeavors, and the rise of diasporas as co-development partners in recent years, can be attributed to three main features; conducive policies developed by both host and home governments, diaspora themselves and international organisations increased attempt in recruiting skilled diasporas (Kleist, 2008; Koinova, 2016; Mangala, 2017). In the context of state collapse, outlining a global approach to attract skilled Somali diaspora professionals, donor governments & multilateral development agencies acknowledge the vital contribution of the diaspora with calls for stronger involvement becoming more vocal in recent years (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Orjuela, 2018).

Evaluating the theoretical and policy linkages, Carment & Calleja's (2017), *'Diasporas & Fragile States* *Beyond Remittances'* article seeks to refine the complex and multifaceted relationship between the diaspora and their interventions in developing their homeland. The authors' argument is based on the notion that diasporic communities' role in their home countries can potentially contribute to the reduction in fragility, especially in countries that are emerging from decades-old civil war, noting the exemplary role of the diasporas in Ukraine and Somalia (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Carment & Calleja, 2017). Equally important, Koinova (2016), a key contributor to the existing literature on migration, makes a similar allusion, reaffirming previous findings on state-diaspora relations, noting the significance of Bosnian diasporas to post conflict reconstruction.

In an attempt to move away from the simplistic definition of 'diaspora' in migration-development paradigms, scholars have redrawn the patterns of participation and diaspora engagements to maintain durable and sustained linkages to Somalia (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Kleist, 2008). Three major theories have emerged: utilitarian, governance, and identity-based (Agunius & Newland, 2012). The three theories specify how relations with countries of origin provide ideational and practical alternatives to the status quo; replacing donor agencies and multinational development organisations in the reconstruction process (Koinova, 2016; Omar, 2020). In practical terms, proactive efforts by host states engage members of the diasporic communities as potential resources for material, financial and human capital to rebuild war-torn countries through circular migration (Betts & Jones, 2016; Tsourapas, 2015). This argumentation underpins the importance of the diaspora's economic contribution by providing insight into transnational diasporas' spatial dimensions and social dynamics in the rebuilding process (Agunius & Newland, 2012; Rainer & Faist , 2010).

Phillips (2013), inquiry on the role of home governments active facilitation of the return of its diaspora advances this notion by juxtaposing the impact of their contribution to state-building- viewed by some observers as a valuable asset in bringing technical and professional skills, legal procedures and markets, foreign business practices among others. Empirical evidence derived from other studies acknowledges the diaspora's potential resource and material contribution, especially to countries emerging from civil war, for example, Somalia, Armenia, and South Sudan (Betts & Jones, 2016; Brinkerhoff, 2012; Mangala, 2017; Peter, 2019). Pearlman's (2018) findings on Iraq and Lebanon corroborate Phillip's discovery on how home states capitalize on these opportunities. Delano & Gamlen (2014) view this approach as an innovative and robust advancement in reconstructing government institutions, enhancing their legitimacy, and achieving security and post-conflict development goals with diasporas’ contributions as the main enabler. Equally important, Brinkerhoff's (2008) comparative analysis on diaspora-state relationships contributes to a more nuanced understanding of several aspects of the interaction and their subsequent participation in development, noting their valuable contributions as key to reviving the public sector ravaged by wars. This notion of ‘diasporas’ as agents for development in a borderless world, is also viewed by many as an alternative to traditional aid-led development (Sorensen, 2012).

In the past years, the change in basic assumptions from 'development aid' to 'diaspora for development' is fast becoming an important level of analysis for scholars and policymakers (Ahmed & Martinez, 2013; Chami & Hakura, 2009). Taking these arguments at its cue, the studies on state-diaspora relations, to some extent, acknowledge that the concept is also driven by the renewed resurgence of optimism, recognising diasporas as a potent force for development (Mekonnen, 2017; Niebuhr, 2010; Vammen & Bronden, 2012). In mitigating economic woes, establishing good governance, and rebuilding fragile states, diasporic communities are lured into investing in their home countries (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Hammond, 2011; Ratha, 2003). The optimistic view, widespread among Sub-Saharan Africans, could potentially be a strategic recruitment tool by home states to capture the diaspora's innovative and scientific technologies and liberal ideals (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Hammond, 2011; Wise & Covarrubius, 2009). In essence, home governments exploit the situation for their own economic, political, social, and development gains (Sorensen, 2012).

The second theory focuses on 'governance.' This concept entails a variety of approaches adopted by state governments (Gamlen, 2014; Koinova, 2016). Research-informed by this theory argues that home states seek to exploit their diasporas through bilateral treaties to enhance and develop the relationship into a meaningful and sustainable long-term plan (Dean, 2010; Gamlen et al., 2017). Explaining the theoretical proposition of 'governance theory,' Ragazzi, (2009) identifies the relationship as one-sided, with home states benefiting immeasurably by classifying their diaspora as an integral part of their internal affairs. Others are of the view that sending states influence and take advantage of their diasporas by applying a variety of 'techniques and forms of incentives' to lure skilled and potential diasporas in a set of processes which ultimately benefits the home state more than the diaspora (Fick, 2006; Laguere, 2017). Uncovering these various mechanisms and processes, Foucault (1991) provides a clear, insightful understanding of how home states influence and gain from their diasporas; in one example, the author notes how homeland governments outsource state functions in host countries in a bid to foster the relationship. Some of these services include allowing the diaspora to serve as reputational intermediaries, facilitating close political and trade alignment between host and home governments, soliciting for aid, and encouraging inward investment, among others (Burgess, 2018; Delano & Gamlen, 2014). Home states actively exploit these emotional attachments, literally banking on the diaspora's desire and longing for a distant homeland (Mohamoud, 2006).

In explaining the 'governance theory, Gamlen et al. (2017) acknowledge a growing trend of state adoption of diaspora engagement initiatives in collaboration with donor agencies and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs). Much of this is focused on recruiting skilled Somalia diasporas in developmental projects. Among the leading organisation cited by Brinkenhoff (2012) include the World Bank (WB) and International Organisation for Migration (IOM). According to the IOM, the QUEST-MIDA program, which has largely succeeded by linking skilled diaspora workforce to the needs in their home country, continues to attract skilled transnationals to their ancestral homelands (Matsas, 2008; Horst & SInatti, 2014; Okechukwu, 2011). Additionally, as part of its strategic plan in post-conflict reconstruction, the World Bank has initiated programs through the recruitment of professionals from the diaspora (WB, 2006:2010:2017). The institution is particularly interested in shifting the development paradigm from conventional state aid programs towards skilled diaspora-led development initiatives. All these initiatives give state governments an upper hand to control their diaspora abroad. To some extent, some have extended domestic realms beyond national borders by establishing institutions in host countries devoted to emigrants and their descendants in their diaspora (Cochrane, 2007; Raghuram, 2009).

The third and final theory focuses on home states cultivating and maintaining relationship with their diaspora through shared identity (Gamlen, 2018, Koinova, 2016). A symbolic connection in this regard is driven by the social and cultural link between home states and their diasporic communities abroad (Brubaker, 2008). The discussion on the identity theory mirrors around sending state's aptitude to coalesce its diaspora under its 'authority' driven by ethno-nationalistic agenda (Koinova, 2018). Going beyond current state boundaries, sending states capitalises on the diasporic communities' renewed interest in their original homeland based on a shared common narrative (Ben-Rafael & Sternberg, 2009; Jain, 2010). In addition to creating a sense of 'cultural belonging,' home states play a very critical role in constructing, reconstructing, and sustaining diaspora identities abroad (Kunz, 2012). A good example is an attempt by Turkey, Somalia, Armenia, and Bosnia to use identity to engage with its diaspora (Koinova, 2019). In enhancing this relationship, India, Somalia & others use the commemoration of important national holidays to invoke nostalgic memories of 'distant home' (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Valenta & ramet, 2016). Furthermore, intertwined with sentiments of moral obligation to serve their home countries, dozens of states have classified their diasporas as 'overseas citizens' (Haegel & Peretz, 2005).

In line with this, the Somali government is keen on tapping the resources of its diaspora to rebuild the war-torn country (Horst & SInatti, 2014; WB, 2018). For that purpose, the Federal Government has established programs to encourage the return of skilled workforce back to the country, for example, setting up Diaspora Liaison Office in the capital, Mogadishu (DLO) (UNSOM, 2018).

**2.4.1 The Domestic Abroad: Remittances**

Previous studies underscore the importance of the diaspora in developing their home countries (Patterson, 2006). Much of the focus in the past decade has been diasporas economic contribution through remittances; with both host and home countries recognising its importance in eradicating poverty and improving living conditions (Adams & Page, 2005; Basu & Bang, 2013; Okechukwu, 2011). As a result, sending and receiving countries have embarked on implementing policies to boost and increase flows of financial resources (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2013; Rahman, 2010). According to the World Bank’s (2018), Global Economic Prospects, remittances to Sub Sahara Africa continue to grow exponentially, reaching a record level of $48 billion (WB, 2019). Prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, the World Bank is developing a new mechanism of increasing remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa to enhance sustainable development goals (WB, 2018) Below table shows remittances flow in Sub Sahara Africa (Fig.2.2).

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

Fig2.2: Remittances Flow in Sub Sahara Africa. Source: Brookings Institute, (2020).

An integral part of this program focuses on ensuring fewer barriers to remittance flows to home countries (Jawaid & Raza, 2016; Zuniga, 2011). In collaboration with other international development organisations, the WB is keen on improving the economic gains through diaspora remittances and investment with the establishment of free movement of financial resources from host to home countries, while at the same time reducing the risks of money laundering (WB, 2019). In some cases, inadequate financial legislation has led to the exploiting financial resources by host countries- with calls for the international community to address the fundamental failings in remittance flow (Newland & Tanaka, 2010; Nielsen & Riddle, 2009; Sahoo & Pattanaik, 2014).

Several host countries with significant migrant populations have experienced an increase in formal remittance networks in the past decade with increased competition, expansion of banking networks, and facilitating the participation of microfinance institutions in remittance services (Menkhaus, 2012; Riddle et al., 2008). Studies on Somali diaspora remittances have established that the monies sent to relatives provide insurance against adverse shocks through the diversification of household income (Birnkenhoff, 2012). Additionally, the study highlighted the impact of remittances on education, social well-being, and health at the micro-level (Gayle et al., 2013; Kshetri et al., 2015; Lin & Tao, 2012; Minto-Coy, 2011; Plaza & Ratha, 2011). Despite its importance, the exact extent of remittances is likely to be underestimated since most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Far East Asia have deficient & ineffective ability to collect adequate remittance data (WB, 2018).

**2.4.2 Post Conflict Reconstruction, Recovery and Development**

Recognising the need to rebuild effective governance in a post-conflict setting, the author examined the various actors beyond the sending state and its development partners, with much of the focus on the role of non-state actors (skilled diaspora) and their perceived contribution to the rebuilding process.

**2.4.4 A Global Perspective-Diaspora in Post Conflict Reconstruction**

In a ground-breaking policy document linking development to post-conflict reconstruction, the former secretary-general of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented a paper to the United Nation’s General Assembly entitled ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping’ in 1992 (Robinson & Hehir, 2009; Paris, 2010). In it, the term post-conflict was first introduced to improve social progress, human rights, and maintaining international peace (Freitas, 2012; Lederach & Appleby, 2010; Lyons, 2004). Creating an effective mechanism in post-conflict recovery was one of the key features of the newly adopted resolution was to ensure that the United Nations acts swiftly and collectively to protect populations against genocide, war crimes, and other crimes against humanity, and most importantly, to ensure that the government institutions are rebuilt through integrating post-conflict recovery into broader development agenda with much of the focus on fragile or vulnerable states (McGinty & Williams, 2009; Mohamoud, 2006; Smith & Stares, 2007). Given the magnitude of the task, members of the security council, in a rare show of unity, unanimously agreed on the principles and values of the document with a substantial number of financial resources set for fragile and vulnerable countries (Coning & Stamnes, 2016) (See Fig2.3).




Fig 2.3: Crisis States Category. Source: Grono, (2010).

This new emerging concept became an integral part of humanitarian intervention in the years that followed, eclipsing traditional aid functions (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). The focus later shifted from humanitarian relief to post-conflict recovery and development, with establishing and nurturing key government institutions attaining precedence in the newly established UN department tasked with overseeing post-conflict development, reconstruction, and recovery (Collinson, 2003; Paris, 2004). In an extraordinary meeting of the UN reconstruction contributors, the world’s richest countries concluded that since most countries emerging from prolonged and painful civil wars have limited resources, it is imperative to consider rebuilding key infrastructures, making it the central focus of the reconstructive process (Coning & Stamnes, 2016).

The forms of intervention at the initial stages of post-conflict reconstruction and development put more emphasis on ensuring that failed and fragile states with dysfunctional institutions are provided with international support to enhance service delivery; with education, health, policing, and water securing the continued flow of international aid (Mac Ginty, 2014: Lederach & Appleby, 2010; Iversson, 2020; Radin, 2020). A comprehensive post-conflict study in Sub-Saharan Africa recognises the significance of restoring service delivery as a means of improving living conditions for its population (Mohamoud, 2006; Roth, 2015). In determining the impact of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in the region, a collaborative study by the World Bank and the UNDP concluded that the process could foster the effective use of aid (Curtis & Dzinesa, 2012). This line of thinking does not only improve people’s lives, but it also represents countries emerging from the civil war with an important instrument for enhancing state legitimacy and authority (Lyons, 2006; Mac Grinty & Williams, 2009).

Neethling and Hudson. (2013) advance a parallel argument with regards to state-building in Sub-Saharan Africa. Presenting a detailed, structured, and logical explanation to the West’s ‘legitimized interventional practices to rebuild failed and fragile states stems from its concern and preoccupation with terrorism. Remarkably, previous research on the matter suggests that terror groups are aggressively exploiting failed states and other areas of lawlessness, for example, Iraq, Libya, and Somalia, as a breeding ground and primary base for their operation (Schmidt, 2103). Equally crucial to these assumptions is the emergence of pirates off the Somali coast, often linked to weak governance and ineffective institutions (Schroeder, 2017). Depicting various broad approaches to understanding the link, other variables on weaker institutions, especially policing and ineffective border control, have contributed to the correlation between state failure and terrorism (Jacob, 2017). For these reasons, failed and fragile states continue to receive a surge of attention from governments, think tanks, academics, and intergovernmental agencies, with long-term recovery, stability, and reconstruction gaining more eminence (Philpott, 2016). As such, rebuilding effective government institutions in these states is viewed by donor countries as a way of fostering security and stability in the wider region through reshaping the political structures in favor of Western interests (Turner & Kuhn, 2016). The figure below illustrates the ways of terror manifestation. (Fig 2.4)

Diagram

Description automatically generated

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Fig2.4. Terror Links. Source: Jacobs (2018).

Post-cold-war global politics has also contributed to redefining the West's attitude and perception towards rebuilding failed states (Jacob, 2017:2018). Marching from the fringe to the very center of Western capitals London and Washington, fragile and failed states' security concerns have become the bridge that connects security, development, and democracy (Englehart, 2017; Kilcullen, 2016). This argument's claims and variations, which are deeply rooted in the Western-backed neoliberal peacebuilding and reconstruction agenda, are viewed as serving two unique and hybrid traditional forms of intervention; preventive and reconstructive simultaneously. It is also seen as an effective way of consolidating sustainable peace globally and minimizing terrorism and other crimes (Jacob, 2017). Tuning the definition of failed and fragile states from Western viewpoint into theory, the few published studies failed to provide a comprehensive and broader picture that links failed states to breeding grounds or attempt to classify failed states' agent provocateurs’-capable of creating chaos, anarchy, and disruption to international peace (Bellamy, 2013,). Only a handful of researchers have attempted to address this relationship, linking failed states to all sorts of human sufferings, terrorism, and drug crime (Woodward, 2017). The dilemma under scrutiny here is the belief that almost all failed states are potential breeding grounds for terror groups. (Fig2.5) shows the world’s most fragile states.




Fig2.5. World’s Most Fragile States. Source: Statista (2019).

Even though the term 'post-conflict reconstruction' itself became popular in the 1990's-, the international community's role in Iraq and Afghanistan has brought the terminology to the fore (Curtis & Dzinesa, 2012; Lederach & Appleby, 2010). Post-conflict means that war and violence have stopped. however, the transitory period could also increase political uncertainties, potentially increasing the risks of relapsing back to civil war (Langer et al, 2016). In respect of that, fragile states are significantly susceptible to internal and external shocks, many, if not most, are faced with the risks of renewed violence due to the situation's fragility coupled with weak government institutions (Bender, 2011). As a result, intervening nations have determined efforts to rebuild key government institutions to restore stability and governance (Hopkins, 2006; McCandless & Donais, 2015).

Finally, it is obvious to comprehend how and why the topic of state failure, rebuilding, and the role of diaspora in development has gained more prominence and high-profile attention in recent years from both scholarly and policymaking communities. Afterall, beyond the murky outlook of state collapse lies the dilapidated hopes of abandoned structures/institutions noticeable in many countries emerging from decades-old civil war, and beyond this lies the wider crisis of rebuilding a modern democratic state. For these reasons, state failure poses many challenges to the international community, from poverty, humanitarian, diseases to refugee flows. In the absence of effective government institutions, fragile states continue to be viewed as a concern by wealthy nations, emphasizing the need to rebuild effective government institutions.

**2.4.5 New Partners in Post Conflict Development- A Review of Existing Studies on Somali Diaspora**

In practical terms, the study's specification of the Somali Diaspora is based on having a shared identity in ethnic & historical traditions. The study will focus on original Somali (e) migrants and the return of subsequent generations. One of the key reasons for selecting this group is that they have a bearing on reverse migration (Baser & Swain, 2010). Existing empirical studies show that large-scale return flows mainly consist of Somali migrants displaced after the civil war in the early 1990s (Mezzetti & Guglielmo, 2010). This can be attributed to the fact that they still maintain material ties to their country. Several diaspora and development literature view diasporas’ role as strengthening government institutions which is critical to states emerging from conflicts (Englebert & Dennis, 2008; Fukuyama, 2004; Fukuyama, 2006).

Rebuilding critical functions of the state, such as schools, hospitals, and water services, is not a new phenomenon in international development (Carothers & Marina, 2004). Due to a renewed high level of international support for PCR since the 1990s, the UN's focus on rebuilding key government institutions in Kosovo, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone demonstrates its importance to policymakers and the donor community (Marshall, 2008). Ideally, donor countries view the reconstruction of government institutions as a core focus in PCR programs (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Kaplan, 2008). The ultimate aim of rebuilding these critical institutions is to ensure that they have the capacity to provide basic services to their constituents. Empirical evidence from a rich multi-disciplinary literature acknowledges the vital role of effective and robust institutions in 'bringing back state institutions’ (Benthuysen, 2015; Gisselquist, 2014; Marquette & Beswick, 2011).

Strengthening government institutions is critical to states emerging from conflicts and without relevant institutions, recovery may not be broad-based (Englebert & Dennis, 2008; Fukuyama, 2004; Fukuyama, 2006). The protracted civil war in Somalia has severely destroyed basic infrastructure and disrupted the delivery of core services, calling for an urgent response to address the institutional deficit (Hammond, 2012; Menkhaus, 2009). In defining the importance of rebuilding robust government institutions, Young & Goldman (2015), are of the view that effective institutions are central to achieving sustainable post conflict recovery, it is therefore not surprising that PCR and recovery programmes have intensified in recent years. The immediate aftermath of conflict in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo created a renewed high level of international support for peacebuilding with much of the focus on rebuilding key government institutions, this demonstrates its importance in the broader PCR strategies (Marshall, 2008).

Few scholars have conceptualised ‘*conflict*’ as ‘*development in reverse,’* recognising the valuable role returning migrants play in homeland development & acknowledging sending states’ relentless attempts in courting its diasporas. Such vigorous efforts by the government to reincorporate its lost ‘citizens’ under its authority & the international community, mainly major development donors (Gamlen, 2014). Increasingly recognising the need to provide financial assistance to countries emerging from civil wars to foster stability, Menkhaus (2009) demonstrates the visible impact of their contributions in rebuilding public insitutions. This is an indication of optimising engagements and maximising returns beyond home-host geographical borders (Ghani & Lockhart, 2009; Woodward, 2017). In particular, the focus on rebuilding vulnerable and fragile countries, for example, Somalia and South Sudan, reflects the growing engagement by the UN and the international community (Brinkerhoff, 2012). From Iraq in mid-2000 to Mozambique in the 1990s, the UN and international development partners countries have contributed more than $200 billion in the past 2 decades to transforming fragile and failed countries into functioning states (Omar, 2020).

# 2.5 State Failure, Collapse & Reconstruction -Somalia

Intentional ruination of government infrastructure and institutions is enduring in conflict zones (McCandless, 2016; McCandless, 2017). Documented evidence suggests that the entire public sector in Somalia collapsed during the first phase of the civil war in 1991, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities, particularly among women, children, and marginalized groups (Menkhaus, 2007; Omar, 2020). Within the same period, most of the technocratic class, including doctors, nurses, and water engineers, fled to the UK, US, EU, and neighboring countries (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Carothers & Marina, 2004; Kapteijns, 2013). While many acknowledge that the protracted civil war in Somalia has severely destroyed basic infrastructure and disrupted the delivery of core services, calls to address the institutional deficit was a gradual process (Hammond, 2012; Menkhaus, 2009). However, during the past years, the intensity of rebuilding critical functions of the state, such as schools, hospitals, and water services, attained a high priority in government’s reconstruction agenda (Omar, 2020).

Due to the 'fragile' governance structure, a plethora of alternative service provision strategies has emerged (Menkhaus, 2008). Until recently, the country's water, education and health provision were operated by international non-governmental organisations (Elmi & Barise, 2016). However, with assistance from international partners, the post-transitional government plans to transfer service delivery from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to state institutions has intensified with the engagement of diasporas as co-development partners (Brinkerhoff, 2018; Waris, 2018). In Mogadishu, the local municipal council currently manages water & health services, hence increasing the government’s authority (GIZ, 2018). This is a recognition of strengthening government institutions as critical feature to states emerging from conflicts & weak states (Englebert & Dennis, 2008; Fukuyama, 2004; Fukuyama, 2006).

In addressing the deficit of skilled workers, the IOM is working in "Collaboration with national government and other stakeholders on programs that promote effective management of health worker migration, health systems capacity building in source countries and skill/knowledge transfer from the diaspora" (IOM, 2012: 1). Additionally, through its Environmental & Social Management Plan (ESMP), the African Development Bank aims to improve access to adequate and clean water, which currently stands at 32%, with the assistance of skilled diaspora professionals in establishing viable government institutions (ADB, 2016).  Notwithstanding the challenges, the Somali Diaspora & their transnational networks in the UK/US have played a critical role in rebuilding the economy, politics, humanitarian assistance, and recovery and reconstruction efforts (Kengni, 2013; Hammond, 2013; Menkhaus, 2010; Waris, 2018). Besides foreign aid, Somalia is one of the largest receivers of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa, with around $2 billion received in 2017 alone (WB, 2018). Accounting for the single largest source of foreign exchange, some invest their money in social infrastructure, services, and income. Additional study in Somalia shows that remittances are also used to provide weapons and material support to terror and clan wars (Daniels, 2012).

However, despite the well-documented role of the Somali Diaspora's engagement noted by Menkhaus (2013), one key area that has remained unnoticed by researchers and policymakers is the role of skilled Somali Diaspora & transnational networks in rebuilding key government institutions. McCandless (2017) emphasize the need for a collective approach to responding to the needs of PCR, especially critical government institutions with the assistance of skilled external actors, especially at a time when the government is increasingly emphasizing the need for policy reforms vis-à-vis skilled diaspora engagement (Kaplan, 2010; Osman, 2017). In addressing the deficit of skilled workers, the IOM is working in "Collaboration with national government and other stakeholders on programs that promote effective management of health worker migration, health systems capacity building in source countries and skill/knowledge transfer from the diaspora" (IOM, 2012: 1). Several studies show empirical evidence on how partnering agencies have gone to great lengths; the African Development Bank, through its Environmental & Social Management Plan (ESMP), aims to improve access to adequate and clean water, which currently stands at 32% with the assistance of skilled diaspora professionals in establishing viable government institutions and a regular berth for growth (ADB, 2016).

The presupposition that gaining stability and rebuilding key government institutions reduces risks of war relapse and lowers the likelihood of fragility resonates well with policymakers and practitioners (government & non-government)-especially those that are concerned with alleviating human suffering in a post-conflict setting since state failure is directly linked to increased and widespread humanitarian suffering and instability (Kaplan, 2010; Mac Ginty, 2014; Paris, 2014). On account of this analysis, there is a growing concern among donor agencies & international development partners on the importance of rebuilding effective government institutions, hence the need to engage a robust and effective external intervention in the rebuilding process.

2.5.1 Why the Diaspora/Transnational Network Groups?

Beyond the often-cited remittances flows, Somalis in the Diaspora and their transnational networks are also seen as a direct source of advantage to their country of origin through facilitating skill transfer in rebuilding critical government institutions (IOM, 2012). Whereas many studies on Somali Diaspora & transnational networks have offered important insight to our understanding of socio-economic and political activism, there is considerably less work done on the role of professional diaspora intervention in water, education, defence, aviation & health sectors. The role of diasporas in development is not a new phenomenon, and their intervention is considered critical to post-crisis recovery (Rembold, 2013). A wealth of research investigating the intervention of the Somali Diaspora and their transnational networks recognises their immense influence over the country's economy, politics, and culture (Kengni, 2013; Hammond, 2012; Waris, 2018). A major signpost of their perceived contribution has been the remittance flows which have outpaced development assistance in the past 20 years (Hammond, 2012). As actors who straddle national boundaries, their role in post-conflict reconstruction demonstrates their continued commitment to the rebuilding process and attachment to their country of origin, especially when it is emerging from the decades-old civil war that has largely destroyed government institutions and infrastructure.

A similar report published by the World Bank acknowledges that Somalia is faced with specific internal problems and the absence of state structures has severely led to limited administration, weak government institutions, and a shortage of skilled workforce (IOM, 2012). UK's department for international development (DFID) calls for increased funding for health projects in Somalia to improve human & economic development (DFID, 2018). Kleist (2012) acknowledges that the lack of infrastructure means the vast majority of the population is entire without access to health and water services, hence the need to engage a skilled diaspora workforce in the rebuilding process. Since establishing a transitional government in 2010, donors have injected large amounts of financial and technical aid in rebuilding government institutions (Menkhaus, 2012). A significant share of this assistance has been spent improving health water service delivery (Waris, 2018). In addressing the deficit of skilled workers, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the African Development Bank (AFDB) are among the leading international aid and financial institutions that have established programs aimed at recruiting skilled Somalis in the Diaspora as effective partners for implementing development policies and programs (IOM, 2012' World Bank, 2012).

Diaspora groups have broad networks and are highly connected at a transnational level by modern technology (Kok & Rogers, 2016). In that regard, these networks created by diasporas are generally constructed around social, cultural, technical, and political spheres to maintain linkages beyond home & host countries (Vertovec, 2009; Vertovec, 2010). A review of academic literature on transnational networks' role in the institutional building create stable & fruitful relationship with sending states, potentially substituting traditional aid and development systems (Vertovec, 2010). These findings illuminate the importance of the Diaspora and their transnational networks in harnessing their expertise, especially concerning institutional building. These network systems serve two inter-reliant primary functions; 'successful incorporation of network members into the host country' and 'development of the network members' for 'homeland' development (Riddle et al., 2010).

Transnational networks play a critical role in PCR, especially in the context of fragile states and states in political transition (King & Levitt, 2014). Birkenhoff (2006) argues that their impact on the reconstruction of government institutions in Somalia is essential in providing the government with much-needed legitimacy and authority. Previous studies acknowledge that the contribution of the diasporas & transnational networks in the country's political and economic spheres has had a major impact on the recovery process (Abdi, 2012; Harper, 2012; Hopkins, 2006). A typical example is the often-cited remittance flows which continue to play a key role in sustaining livelihoods, enhancing economic growth, and improving living standards (Hammond, 2010; Hammond, 2013; Lindley, 2007; Lindley, 2010). Somalis in the Diaspora are very attached to their homeland, with many sending money back to their relatives, families, and friends (Lindley, 2007; 2010). According to the International Monetary Foundation (IMF), Somalis abroad send around $2 billion annually, which is expected to grow in the coming years due to favourable economic and investment conditions (Beileh, 2020). The economic contribution has been instrumental in accelerating economic and political growth in post-conflict settings (Hammond, 2011). Given the remittances' scale, trend, and impact on the country's recovery, it has attracted much attention in research and policy (Menkhaus, 2008).

2.5.2 Rebuilding Government Institutions? Who Benefits?

While there is much debate on the role of external actors (INGOs/UN/Donors) in rebuilding effective and robust institutions, little is known about the role of skilled Diaspora as genuine and legitimate stakeholders in state-building (Curtis & Dzinesa, 2012). The obscurity has considerable implications for labeling their contribution as a mere 'participant' in a hierarchical donor-recipient relation. Many scholars consider rebuilding key government institutions as an important pillar in post-conflict reconstruction (Krasnigi & Williams, 2019). For Paris (2010), and Mac Ginty (2014), the true description of state-building in a post-conflict setting is the (re)construction of legitimate, effective government institutions. For Ottoway & Ottoway (2019), rebuilding effective institutions as part of a large-scale, comprehensive mission to rebuild post-war societies provides services and discharge functions more proficiently based on the Weberian state concept. The perceived relationship between good governance, stability, and service delivery is critical for maintaining and sustaining effective administration and attaining political stability (Neething & Hudson, 2013; Woodward, 2017). Past studies on countries emerging from conflict, for example, Bosnia and Kosovo, recognise that building legitimate, effective, and robust government institutions could potentially reduce root causes of fragility and conflict (Curtis & Dzinesa, 2012; Lederach & Appleby, 2010; Valenta & Ramet, 2016). These studies examined the impact of 'effective government structures' on the local population. The results show that there has been an increased improvement in the quality-of-service delivery, thus reducing fragility risks and improving service coverage in rural areas. Additionally, public trust in government institutions has increased significantly, and re-establishing capable state functions has improved as a result (Radin, 2020).

A joint WB & UNDP report in post-war Angola shows a similar trend (UNDP, 2012). Since rebuilding key government institutions, the country's post-conflict recovery and reconstruction programs have enabled it to re-strengthen and re-establish good governance, achieving enhanced and decentralized service delivery and attaining economic growth & political stability (Tvedten, 2018). This indicates that post-conflict reconstruction appears to be generally more effective if implemented correctly (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Paris, 2014. Other reports indicate that maximising the potential success of state-building in countries emerging from civil war contributes to establishing effective service delivery and accountability mechanism (Curtis & Dzinesa, 2012; Englehart, 2017; Neethling & Hudson, 2013; Robinson & Hehir, 2009; Woodward, 2017).

The underlining principles of rebuilding key government institutions are associated with immense benefits to all the stakeholders involved (Curtis & Dzinesa, 2012). Among the most prominent cited rationale for rebuilding is to help maximize long term benefits such as establishing a stronger state, effective legislation, enhanced capacity, gaining legitimacy, attaining political stability, enhanced service delivery, reasserting sovereignty, and re-establishing law and order, among others (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Kaplan,2010; Paris, 2014). In an attempt to shed light on the matter, scholars and policymakers acknowledge that a functioning state is a necessary condition for eradicating poverty and delivering basic services to a traumatized society (Checko & Gebre, 2013 Mac Ginty, 2014; Neethling & Hudson, 2013; Page & Mercer, 2010;).

The theoretical assumptions for analysing effective restructuring and rebuilding effective institutions in post-conflict are intimately associated with service delivery (Paris, 2014; Woodward, 2017). Mac Ginty (2014) & Radin (2020), are of the view that the type of service, institutional capacity, and coverage reflect the state's capability in restoring legitimacy within the context of PCR and development (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019). Considering the importance of achieving sustainable, long-lasting state-building, stabilization, and recovery, it will be erroneous to 'assume' the same beneficiaries since all the stakeholders benefit from establishing strong and effective governance from the external actors, especially donor countries, INGOs to members of the Diaspora coordinated and cohesive role in the rebuilding process.

2.5.3 Diaspora Challenges in Rebuilding Government Institutions

### 2.4.3.1 Lack of Autonomy

States emerging from civil wars have little or no influence on how the reconstruction is planned, developed, or initiated (Koinova, 2018). In Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leonne, political and reconstruction decisions are predetermined by the West, and as such, members of the Diaspora and sending states have limited influence (Mac Ginty 2014). Similarly, bureaucratic structures in sending states could potentially derail Diaspora's proposed institutional restructuring changes. Equally important, influencing domestic response to foreign reforms could jeopardize the restructuring and reconstruction (Mac Ginty, 2014).

### 2.5.3.2 Local Dynamics

Most members of the Diaspora are not conversant with the local political and social dynamics on the ground. Having spent the last 2 or 3 decades abroad, it is extremely difficult to have a deep understanding of the society they claim to 'belong' to (Robinson & Hehir, 2009). Additionally, according to Paris & Sisk (2009), failure to develop local knowledge in East Timor, Bosnia, and later Iraq failed to achieve greater success in reconstructing key government institutions (Radin, 2020).

### 2.5.3.3 Detailed Preparation

Lack of a clear approach from the federal government and international aid organisations could derail the reconstruction process, hence limiting the role of skilled diaspora and transnational networks intervention (Abdi, 2012). Additionally, because of institutional deficit, "One of the most important characteristics of post-conflict institutional arrangements is that they tend to be transitional in nature: for a variety of reasons, state institutions are not ready to take on the full range of functions and outputs which they will fulfill in the longer term, or a specific transitional institutional configuration is necessary to address the political legacy of conflict." (WB, 2016:4).

### 2.5.3.4 Terror Threats

The resurgence of the Al-Shabab terror group could also possibly disrupt the reconstruction efforts (Menkhaus, 2012). The country's political & stability dynamics are unpredictable despite the government's success in regaining large swathes of land from the group (Daniels, 2012). This could prove difficult to manage in the long term, especially in areas that have experienced frequent attacks, for example, Merca, a strategic coastal town that has changed hands a few times (BBC, 2017).

### 2.5.3.5 Lack of Funding

Withdrawing international funding could potentially limit the work of skilled Diaspora and transnational networks in the rebuilding process since these countries lack financial resources to undertake developments of such a magnitude (Richmond, 2010). Finally, 'skill transfers' models used by diaspora groups may not necessarily be an appropriate choice to transfer skills & knowledge to local staff (Paris & Sisk, 2009). A skilled diaspora workforce tends to bring knowledge transfer models from host countries that can potentially create barriers to their effective implementation due to Western bureaucracies and social and cultural dynamics (Kaplan, 2010). Figure (2.6) poor states per GDP 1960-2016.




Fig2.6. Poorest States Ranking. Source: Brookings (2019).

### 2.5.3.6 Positive/Negative Contribution

Numerous studies on diaspora's role in their country of origin acknowledge their positive contribution to their country of origin (Vertovec, 2009). A study by Meyer & Brown (1999) focuses on educated 'intellectual or 'scientific' diaspora. Moreover, the studies recognised that skilled diaspora has contributed to rebuilding key state institutions in a post-conflict setting, for example, Bosnian's contribution in rebuilding state institutions (Gellman, 2010). Its diaspora plays a crucial role in strategic decision-making processes in Mexico's case. One key area that has benefited from diaspora engagement is intellectual interaction and knowledge transfer (W.B., 2017). The Somali government's 2016-2020 Diaspora Action Plan calls for strengthening institutional capacities through the engagement of its diaspora. Beyond remittances, Somali diaspora groups are also positively involved in philanthropy, political, intellectual, and lobbying (Waris, 2018).

In a rejoinder, (Newland & Patrick, 2004; Vertovec, 2004; 2005) highlights the negative contribution of diaspora groups in their country of origin. Vertovec (2009) acknowledges that some diaspora groups such as Somalis, Eritreans, Sri Lankans, Kosovans, and Sudanese engagement in their home countries have indirectly created political uncertainties, prolonging the recovery process. These studies indicate that their intervention of diaspora is viewed as *'nation wrecking'* rather than *'nation-building*,' that could potentially derail the reconstruction process (Vertovec, 2009). Other studies on Somali diasporas show a similar trend, with evidence from previous studies demonstrating their critical role in the build up to the civil war in 1991. A good example is the Somali National Movement (SNM), a secessionist rebel group in Somaliland that enjoyed financial, political, and moral support from its diaspora in the Middle East is a key example. Somalis in the diaspora tend to portray a unified front, yet, behind the nationalist façade, clan nepotism in some transnational groups plays a crucial role (Abdi, 2012). Somali transnationalism is hardly devoid of clan and tribal connotations (Hammond et al., 2013). After all, the country is deeply traditional, and clannism plays a major role politically, socially, culturally, and to some extent economically (Lewis, 2004). According to Lindley (2013), "Throughout Somalia's history, clannism and traditional social practices have proved to be a highly malleable resource for political and social mobilisation" (Lindley, 2013: 28). Moreover, despite sharing the same culture, norms, religion, and common bonds of nationhood, small cluster transnational groups among the Somalia diaspora were established primarily to drive clan 'agenda'; depicting a deeply divided diaspora, and this could possibly hinder the pace of transnational activities & post-conflict recovery (Bradbury, 2008; Kleist, 2008; Williams, 2020).

## 2.6 Transnationalism & Post-War Development

2.6.1 Introduction

Empirical evidence from previous studies shows transnationalism engagement in development is no longer a theoretical domain of sociologists and anthropologists but rather a dominant approach in migration and development studies (Baubok & Faist, 2010; Koinova, 2018). Evaluating its role from a multi-disciplinary perspective remains a highly under-theorized concept despite its extensive applicability and theoretical utility in migration and development studies (Gamlen, 2012; Lee, 2018). Identifying the concept as a 'missing link' in developing fragile and vulnerable states, other scholars acknowledge the salient role of transnationalism, labeling it an essential aspect of state-diaspora relations (Portes et al., 2008; Smith, 2005). Patterson (2006), Brinkerhoff (2009), Sahoo & Shome (2020), and many others acknowledge the increased intensity & the effect of the rapidly changing globalized world, stressing the importance of transnationalism in modern migration studies. Exploring the role of place, place, identity, and shared culture, Appadurai (2003) Schiller et al (1995( provide an essential contribution to understanding the concept of 'de-territorialized nation state' based on sending state's constructive engagement of its 'people' abroad, alluding to the contribution of Mexican transnational migrant's intervention in rebuilding Michoacan state, denoting the interwoven relationship as a single community spread across various places.

Portes's (2002;2004) studies on transnationalism reveal valuable insight into the importance of transnational networks in countries of origin. The study emphasizes socioeconomic, technological development, rebuilding effective institutions, brain circulation, and peacebuilding. A significant advance in our understanding of the rapidly shifting post-war paradigm is fuelled by transnational activism. Kostovicova & Dzelilovic (2008) provide a detailed and comprehensive reflection of the strategic importance of these groups in Bosnia and other Balkan states. Using the role of transnational networks as a prism for examining PCR, the author will present a comparative analysis of transnationalism and the pivotal role it plays in state-building and recovery. The author will also note the contribution of Iraqi Shia transnationalism in post-war state-building.

Finally, the study establishes contrasting views on transnationalism, limiting the use of the term in theoretical terms. However, since migration/diaspora historians have long associated human mobility with the liberty of movement and, until recently, enhanced technological/logistical advancement, one area that is seldomly discussed, and often cast on the periphery, is the diverse and uneven ways people experience transnationalism (Gamlen, 2019). To attain a more nuanced understanding of individual/group feelings, this thesis aims to provide a potential avenue for future studies exploring individual differences/experiences within changing global migration dynamics-extending the parameters of transnational migrants.

## 2.7 Exploring the Complexity of Global Transnationalism: Structures & Theories

Globally, the rise of transnationalism has been documented with various studies acknowledging its importance in understanding contemporary diaspora and migration patterns (Portes 2001; Gamlen, 2014). Two critical theoretical perspectives serve as a lens to explore how transnational communities construct and nurture multi-stranded social relations, often across multiple geographical borders (Faist, 2010). First, transnational structures and formations offer a basis for understanding how these structures in multiple locations, fuelled by enhanced connectivity and increased human mobility, are defined by the fluid identity of contemporary transmigrants (Baubock & Faist, 2010). Secondly, the new configurations of transnationalism are crucially important in understanding the transnational bonding of non-institutional actors based on the 'transnationalism from below' concept-a people-driven formal & informal cross-border activities (Portes, 2001:2002). Expanding the boundaries of transnationalism, Portes (2001) provides a detailed analytical framework of the different types of transnationalism:

1. Nation-states conduct transnationalism.
2. Formal institutions in a single country conduct transnationalism.
3. Transnationalism is conducted by formal institutions that transcend multiple nation-states.
4. Non-institutional actors conduct transnationalism. (below)

The scope of Porte's (2001) work focusing on the structure and processes in which transnationalism is conducted is corroborated by most migration studies, showing consistency and commonality across multi-disciplinary fields. One practical significance of transnationalism from below involves non-actors maintaining sustained links over different geographical borders. Appadurai (2003) points out the role of a 'globalized village' and migrant globalized of 'togetherness,' grounded in everyday practices of ordinary people. Anderson (2001) reaffirms changing dynamics in contemporary migrants where multiple identities become embedded in transnational formations. Central to this notion, transnational hybrid identities facilitate the connections between transnational diasporas, home, and host states, such that they consider betwixt between several geographical locations.

However, not all diasporas/migrants are transnational; Portes's (2001) ground-breaking research on the plural identity & sustaining social links beyond host-home borders acknowledges that changes in today's migrant societies severely limit the use of the word to cover specific segments of migrants. Wading into the broader meaning/theories of transnationalism, Baubock & Faist (2010) provide a valuable insight into the current debate on 'who' is and 'who is not transnational, citing the various flows and counter flows that connect multiple localities-encompassing hosts & home societies. Building on preceding theories on transnational migrants, the duo's shift in analytical focus within the domain of migration places Somalis as active transnationals-illustrating their importance in modern diaspora/migration studies.

2.7.1 Inclusion of Transnational Networks in Mainstream Development and State Building

Central to the new discourse in migration and development, the engagement of transnational network groups as partners in post-conflict reconstruction is yet to attain prominence in migration literature, especially in Somalia (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Manuel, 2017). The few published studies on skilled diaspora's role in Sub Sahara Africa acknowledge that the group constitutes valuable & potential human resources for reconstruction, and their presence is viewed by many as a positive reversal of 'brain drain' (Mangala, 2017; Horst, 2007; Orjuela, 2018). In recognising their critical importance in embracing transnational migrant organisations, host and home states coupled with the emergence of a coherent global agenda on stabilization, donor countries have established robust structures at a multilateral level to engage the transnational organisations in reconstruction programs (Gamlen, 2014; Portes & Radford, 2007).

In line with this argument, Gamlen (2019) acknowledges the critical contribution of the diaspora and transnational networks. The author further admits that their engagement in rebuilding and reshaping post-conflict states has necessitated the development of a broad range of mechanisms and establishing an institutional framework to optimize their engagement. As a result, the new migratory pattern of 'transnational in development' becomes meaningful in addressing the skilled deficit in countries emerging from civil wars (Neethling & Hudson, 2013; Radin, 2020). Based on these emerging facts, there has been an increased interest in current global state policies shifting the paradigm from 'development aid' to 'exploiting diaspora resources' with much of the focus on sending states role in 'tapping' technical, financial, material, and knowledge of its diaspora, including transnational networks that transcend borders (Adebayo, 2011).

IOM and other multilateral organisations have played a pivotal role in catalyzing this change (Hagmann, 2016; Omar, 2020). Since the focus of development has shifted to engaging the diaspora, securing access to influential transnational networks to foster state-building in home countries has redefined the basis for the diaspora engagement with the emergence of new strategies and mechanisms to bolster state legitimacy, authority, and enhanced service delivery as a core priority (Agunius &N Newland, 2012; Faist, 2010; Paris, 2015). Other multilateral organisations working in rebuilding conflict zones have teamed up with host governments to establish cross-border ties to recruit members of the diaspora and transnational networks (Brinkerhoff, 2012, Horst., 2012). Going beyond remittances, these organisations mobilize the competencies, skills, and technical know-how of formal and informal diaspora networks and link their talents to needs in countries of origin (Plaza & Ratha, 2011; Kuznetsov, 2006; Wessendorf, 2007).

The UN has recently recognised the discourse in which the conditions of transnational migrants create enormous opportunities for both development organisations and home countries (Ukpkodu, 2020). Presenting a wide-ranging framework of understanding this relationship, Kapur (2013) acknowledges that highly skilled and effective transnational diaspora networks are beneficial for the long-term acceleration of socio-economic and political development. Williams (2018) advances this notion by exposing the dramatic change in sending states' view of the engaging transnational networks with many approving initiatives to enhance close collaboration. This new interaction framework is distinctly different from the 'state-diaspora' relationship. It allows sending states to develop & facilitate a coherent recruitment strategy to recruit many skilled members in the diaspora and channel their expertise and resources (Meyer, 2001; Portes, 2009).

As part of a growing array of theories that deal with migration and development, one might argue that transnationalism & post-conflict recovery, as a concept, is critically important due to the cultural-linguistic functions of the diaspora-giving them a unique advantage in transacting transnational activities (Christou & Mavroudi, 2016). In this regard, government apparatuses within home state governments collaborate with transnational networks to develop an enhanced relationship and coalesce its diaspora around cross-border cooperation (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Davies, 2012). This is usually conducted using a broad range of activities to engage a cohesive transnational community, with the sending states relying on the expertise, skills, connection, and influence of diaspora communities abroad. This is primarily aimed to advance the sending states’ national interests based on a common state-centric national identity (Dahinden, 2017; Hugo, 2006; Mohan, 2008; Gamlen, 2013).

To maintain affectionate relationships with family members in different countries, diasporic communities adopt transnational characteristics that transcend borders beyond home and host states (Horst, 2018; Rainer & Faist, 2010; Portes, 2009). With many migrants from the same family scattered around the globe, not only does communication change traditional migration patterns, but more importantly, the interaction between people and the exchange of information creates a new forms of society. (Portes & Radford, 2007). Waldinger (2013) argues that the ability to connect and communicate through horizontal linkages often leads to creating a broader network (Mugge, 2013). This gesture could reignite renewed feelings for ‘*serving*’ home countries and provide sending states with the opportunity to recruit skilled diaspora professionals from a large pool of interconnected skilled workforce (Czaika & Parsons, 2017; Hooper & Sumption, 2016).

Ukpokudu (2020) points out that exploring the development contributions of highly-skilled, educated, and networked diaspora members bears strategic importance to Africa's economic and political recovery. Not only does the continued existence of a group beyond a border that maintains cultural identity critical for advancing sending states' development agenda, but more importantly, as a vital reservoir of knowledge (Horst, 2018; Koinova, 2018; Plazza & Ratha, 2011). Others, for example, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have long promoted the return of foreign-educated students to partake in development projects in response to addressing acute skilled labor (Silbereisen et al., 2016). Viewing migration & diaspora networks as an essential partner, transnational networks have become a dominant paradigm informing the international community's approach to development (Adamson, 2005). This line of reasoning is further corroborated by Phillip's (2013) claim that the decline of development aid and the rise of the diaspora has created a seismic shift with donor's view of development projects.

For Bosnia and others in Sub-Saharan Africa, transnational groups are an essential tool for development, with emphasis on capacity (Mangala, 2017; Valenta & Ramet, 2012). Equally important, sending states to acknowledge the critical role played by these groups and diaspora recruitment strategies is faster becoming an important field of public policy (Gamlen, 2014). Representing a more nuanced response to issues of skill transfer since diaspora organisations generally represent a wealth of information, skills, financial resources, with empirical findings from previous studies showing that diaspora/transnational networks can be critical for post-conflict governance reconstruction (Brinkerhoff, 2012 Paris, 2010). Given the multitude of diasporic networks in the US/UK and other parts of Europe, less developed countries (LDC) are more likely to benefit from these organisations' collective action in response to rebuilding effective government institutions (MacGinty & Richmond, 2013).

On capitalizing on the untapped human resources, transnational organisations are viewed as a leverage tool for developing post-war governance (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Portes, 2009; Rainer & Faist, 2010). Many studies suggest that diaspora and transnational networks in the Balkans are the primary and most reliable sources of external contributors to homeland development (Koinova, 2018; Mangala, 2017; Valenta & Ramet, 2012). Due to their ability to coordinate global networks, these groups are regarded as a valuable stakeholders credited with achieving effective governance, enhanced service delivery, and sustaining long-term stability (Adamson, 2013; Brinkerhoff, 2011; Gamlen et al., 2013). Gerharz (2014) maintains that the return of talented, skilled & highly educated members of the diaspora can potentially integrate western and local models of development in PCR. Finally, governments at both ends of the migration cycle recognise the importance and the value of skilled diaspora professional's spontaneous engagement with their home countries and, as such, in collaboration with donor and multilateral organisations, attempts to engage the diaspora in rebuilding key government institutions in post-conflict becomes a priority (Adebayo, 2011; Horst & Nur, 2016).

## **2.8 Diaspora Skills & Knowledge Transfer in Post Conflict Reconstruction**

**2.8.1 Introduction**

Knowledge and skills transfer in the contemporary era has gradually become an important feature of diaspora/migration debate (Brinkerhoff, 2008). In exploring general concepts and theoretical aspects, most literature on skills/knowledge transfers tend to stick to a common narrative structure, that ‘brain gain’ provides a critical link between diasporas and homeland development (Newland & Plaza, 2013). In a globally connected diasporas, knowledge & skills transfer is not a new concept, with most scholars viewing it as a major contributor to homeland development (Brinkerhoff, 2008, Plaza & Ratha, 2011). Amidst the renewed interest in recent years, the growing depth & range of contemporary literature on China & India’s highly skilled professional diasporas contribution reflects its importance in sustaining accelerated economic growth (Kitching et al, 2009; Riddle, 2008). Theoretically, brain circulation informed by transnationalism & its contributions in enhancing socio economic and technological development of homeland development is no longer viewed as holders of human capital, but rather as enablers of knowledge transfer (Chikanda et al, 2016). These states view their skilled diaspora workforce as vital networks capable of facilitating the flow of knowledge and assets (Lee, 2019).

The phenomenon has also benefited emerging economies, with newly emerging markets determined to adopt measures to increase the flow of knowledge across borders (Newland & Plaza, 2013). Newland & Patrick (2004), offer a broad synthetic overview of ‘brain circulation’ & tapping into the potential knowledge gained overseas informed by transnational networks with home countries seeking to strengthen the return of skilled diasporas. However, in Sub Saharan Africa, except for Ghana, ‘brain gain’ concept has been slow with adaptive capacity depending on home government’s engagement/interaction with its diaspora.

Given Africa’s preoccupation with exploring its rich natural resources, the slow flow of knowledge limits the potential of creativity & innovative abilities of technological knowhow (Chikanda & Crush, 2018). The relatively minimal impact of skills transfer in the continent can partially be attributed to opposition/resistance forces living in exile, for example, Ethiopia & Eritrea’s diasporas advocacy groups targeting homeland institutions/government, states minimal input in leveraging their expatriates’ talents as well as diaspora outreach policies which varies widely from country to country (Teye et al, 2017). A tentative conclusion is that to fully understand its impact including sending state’s schemes to lure skilled emigration, its pertinent to explore the phenomenon from a multiplayer angle driven by global race for talent, especially home country’s role in formulating strategies, building approaches aimed at extracting knowledge and skills gained in the West (Singh & Koiri, 2018).

**2.8.2 Reinforcing Contributions of Diasporas Brain Gain**

Unrelenting interest on the part of social science researchers exploring the role of the diasporas in development, especially socio-economic, cultural, political, and more broadly the impact of remittances has had a profound impact on our understanding of the flow and mobility of migrants and their subsequent impact on developing home countries (Brinkerhoff, 2008; Chikanda & Crush, 2018). A remarkably strong field that has attracted social researchers is the role played by Indians, Koreans and Chinese diasporas in home state’s economic development-a feature that continues to underline their importance as newly emerging bases for diaspora dynamism (Lee, 2019; Park, 2019). However, beside the socio-economic, political, and cultural contributions, renewed interests in recent years have emerged, focusing on migrant’s real and substantial resources, including knowledge and skills transfer (Sahoo, 2021).

To highlight the concerns of Least Developed Countries (LCDs), previous studies on migration, diaspora, and movement of people of goods/services, portrayed brain drain as a loss for emerging countries markets, with critics holding a firm conviction that the distributive effect of skilled emigration has primarily undermined socio-economic development in LCDs, hence the need to restructure international migration flows- limiting the extent of damage to their economies (Teye, et al, 2017). According to a recent WB report, there are 281 million international migrants currently living outside their country of origin (WB, 2020). Additionally, a UN report published in 1974 provided an insight on the magnitude of the loss, expressing major concern at the rapidly increasing rates of skilled mobility to developed countries, fearing the impact of a global knowledge/wealth divide (Titei, 2020). Scholarly interests stemming as far back as the 1960s and later numerous conferences/debates tasked with mitigating risks associated with the loss of skilled workforce were established, especially with regards to addressing the exodus of scientific immigrants from developing countries (West, 2010).

Subsequent studies on the flow of human capital have ignited a new public policy discussion with several attempts made to formulate a comprehensive policy towards addressing the determinants of brain drain (Newland & Patrick, 2004). However, despite the negative impact of skilled human resources on sending states, the drivers of international mobility continued to flourish for many reasons. First, globally integrated markets continue to provide skilled migrants with an effortless way of seeking economic opportunities abroad (Humphries et al, 2013). Secondly, the rise of the internationalist model backed by the notion that highly skilled migrants are placed in areas where their skills can be utilised better, thus increasing the flow of mobilisation to developed countries (Humphries et al, 2013; Lee & Kim, 2010). Finally, strong diasporic networks have also immensely contributed to increased international migration coupled with the emergence of international markets linking potential skilled migrants to multinational corporations (Chand, 2019; IOM, 2017).

**2.8.3 Beyond Remittances: A global Overview of Skilled Somali Diasporas**

Recognising the role played by Somali transnationals in socio-economic and political development, the UN, the federal government, and leading financial institutions have established development programmes through skill & assets transfer, investment etc (Brinkerhoff, 2008). According to the IOM, the QUEST-MIDA program which has succeeded by linking skilled diaspora workforce to the needs in their home country, continues to attract skilled transnationals to the country (IOM, 2018). Additionally, the World Bank as part of its strategic plan in post conflict reconstruction, has initiated programmes through the recruitment of professional Somali transnationals (WB, 2017). The institution is particularly interested in shifting the development paradigm away from the conventional state aid programmes towards skilled diaspora led development initiatives (WB, 2018).

Countries emerging from civil war are striving to initiate a constructive dialogue with their diasporas abroad to foster peace and development (Chand, 2019). The importance of Somali returnees in knowledge transfer and exchange in Somalia is considered a potent force for development (Galipo, 2018). The UN office in Somalia in collaboration with other multilateral institutions are aware that the diaspora’s critical role in the rebuilding process goes beyond remittances-making it an integral part of the post conflict reconstruction (Omar, 2020). These actors recognise the contribution of Somali diasporas to inter-sectoral aspects of the peace building process hence the need to develop and strengthen the role of diaspora in other key areas, for example, health, water, and education (Arrey & Rosa, 2021). Highlighting the multiple actions undertaken by diasporas, the agency has launched a campaign to lure skilled and professional Somali diasporas (Galipo, 2018). The increased intensity of tapping diasporas human resources to rebuild the war-torn country validates the importance of knowledge transfer in the rebuilding process (Omar, 2020).

Because of this, the Federal Government has established programmes aimed at encouraging the return of skilled workforce back to the country, for example, establishing the Diaspora Liaison Office (DLO) (Galipo, 2018). Increasingly, the younger generation of Somalis have been less engaged in socio-economic and political development in their ancestral country, & according to Hammond (2011), the second generation are more concerned with the transfer of knowledge and skills. This could explain the rekindled interest from researchers on reverse migration, illustrating the importance of this group to the study since skilled diaspora are the more mobile and in high demand group of migrants in underdeveloped countries (Galipo, 2018). Finally, I consider the role of skilled original Somali diasporas particularly fertile for this study due to the gap in research. As a result, the approach of addressing intellectual deficit in the public sector through a skilled diaspora workforce seems to be a very vital tool of analysis in this research.

**2.8.4 Institutionalising Skills/Knowledge Transfer-Modalities for Maximising Diasporas Contributions**

Undoubtedly, diasporas have emerged as one of the robust contributors of homeland development with India, China, Mexico, Israel & Somalia, and others well positioned to benefit from the migrant’s human and financial resources, with leading world organisations, for example, the UN, the World Bank (WB) recognising the importance of migrants in 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (WB, 2018). The Chinese diasporas, often referred to as the pioneers of brain circulation, have been actively involved in developing their homeland since the liberalisation of the Chinese economy in early 1980s. Dubbed as ‘astronauts’ by the Chinese media, the growing mobility of human talent shuttling between different geographical locations have immensely contributed to stimulating foreign direct investment (FDI),  promoting trade, transferring technology knowhow and improving access to foreign capital and markets (Lee & Kim, 2010; Park, 2019).

Until recently, most studies on skills and knowledge transfer were preoccupied with the concepts of ‘brain drain’ & ‘brain gain’ with academic researchers exhibiting keen interest on its impact on sending states, thus making it one of the most intensively explored sub-field in migration studies (Crush & Chikanda, 2018). Constructed to address the economic & social influence on human/capital resources, the debate on brain drain ignited a fierce debate in a multi-disciplinary field expanding the discursive scope beyond the realms of migration/migratory and knowledge transfer studies (Williams, 2018). Kitching et al (2009); Newland & Plaza (2013); Chand (2019), other prominent scholars acknowledge the inclusion of ‘brain circulation’ necessitated by the changing dynamics in contemporary patterns of migration, highlighting its importance in mainstream migration debate. Radwan & Sakr (2018) affirms the inclusion of ‘brain circulation’ to untangle traditional views on diasporas contributions driven by remittances, noting the significance of human mobility across international boundaries. Studies from growing literature of government policies towards diaspora engagement, identifies two theoretical approaches. The first approach investigates the strategic behaviour of nation states (Docquier & Lodigiani, 2010).

This concept approbates the notion that to capture material resources from its skilled diasporic workforce, states ought to establish diaspora institutions with the aim of benefiting politically, economically and as well as from transnational networks connections in host countries, since most of these networks extend their relationship beyond territorial borders (Gamlen, 2018). The second approach emphasises on constitutive identities of the states with particular focus on the government’s view of their diaspora as a ‘missing’ portion of its constituency; hence their return is seen as a symbolic reunification (Chikanda & Crush, 2016); Siar, 2013). The focus here is on the belief that transnational communities that are emotionally attached to their homeland have a sense of duty to contribute to its development (Plaza & Ratha, 2011). Both theories are well aligned with the research objectives, however, I will focus on the government’s efforts on institutionalising diaspora recruitment practices with the aim of encouraging the return of skilled Somali transnationals (Gamlen, 2018; Fromm et al, 2020; Tejada, 2016; Williams, 2018).

**2.8.5 Diaspora as a Vessel for Knowledge Transfer in SSA: Ghana & The Year of Return**

Notwithstanding the contributions of diasporas to Africa’s socio-economic development, one area that has been neglected by the growing body of research on African diasporas, is the role they play in developing home countries through skills and knowledge transfers (Setrana et al, 2021). Numerous studies on Africa’s diaspora show that African migrants remittances to their home countries has grown steadily over the past 10 years, reaching $44 billion in 2020-constituting a key resource flow that exceeds development assistance with major development agencies acknowledging the significance of emittances in developing home states (WB, 2021). However, knowledge and skills transfer constitute a major cause for improving socio-economic development with empirical evidence suggesting that India & Chinese diasporas have provided a vital human resource in developing their home countries (Amagoh & Rahman, 2016; Tchawe, 2019).

Ghana is one of Africa’s leading countries with a sizable diaspora population living outside the country, with some estimates putting the figures between 3-4 million. An initiative aimed at encouraging the return of Africa’s diaspora to coincide with the 400th anniversary of slaves landing in the US was established by the government in 2019 (DA, 2019). Ghana was a key transit point in the slavery trade and the government is keen on utilising its position to lure all diasporas who could trace their ancestry to the country-underlying the importance of identity as an essential element of homeland and belonging (Engmann, 2018). Besides the cultural impact of the visitors, attracting 500k extra tourists the same year, it has also provided a much-needed positive reputational boost, injecting $1.9 billion revenue to the economy (BBC, 2021).

Plagued by its long history and association with the slave trade, Ghana’s state institutions have made gradual strides since independence with empirical evidence implying the existence of rampant corruption & ill-governance as a source of public sector decay (Teye et al, 2017). As a result, the government has mounted a campaign to reform the public sector and strengthen service delivery, with comprehensive policy changes and structural administration changes aimed at creating an enabling environment for diaspora mobilisation (DA, 2019). A key component in these reforms is the role of Ghanaian transnational migrants through knowledge transfer and circulation-a departure from previous engagements that was solely centred around remittances as a source of socio-economic development (Ayakwah et al, 2020). The success of the state’s strategies, albeit from a preliminary perspective, intensified the quest for diasporic human resources, forcing the government to adopt more institutionally coordinated policies aimed at encouraging the return of its ‘assets’ abroad (DA, 2019). These include offering incentives, citizenship rights to the diasporas & ‘special consideration’ from the government (Schramm, 2020; Setrana et al, 2021).

The strategic use of skilled diaspora in developing and enhancing institutional capacity concentrates on sectors that can have immense impact locally. Inarguably, diaspora's impact is felt most strongly in the domain of health and education (Essia, 2017; Gajurel & Sharma, 2019). These two sectors are deemed critical in reviving public service delivery along with reducing the government’s burden on health & education budget (Diakpieng, 2020). In mitigating the impact of ‘brain drain,’ a substantial number of medical professionals are actively involved in offering training, mentoring, and providing outreach health programmes focused on developing practical health solutions to the neediest sectors of the population that are often neglected by state institutions (Teye et al, 2017). Equally important, they are also involved in collective in-kind remittances through donation of medical equipment & supplies, support international health organisations with terrain/logistical support as well as offering medical fellowship anchored in transnational practices (Diakpieng, 2020).

Even though most of these initiatives are built on a ‘shared objectives/collective action’ inherent in diaspora’s collective obligation towards homeland development, clearly captured by Indian and Armenian diaspora’s active role in socio-economic/political development, individual inputs have also made diminutive contributions in restructuring the public sector (Sahoo & Shome, 2020). While some view their contributions to compensate for ‘brain drain,’ others have firm belief in restructuring the ailing health and education sectors as a means to alleviate poverty and reduce health & education gap-with the aim of gradually eroding the rich/poor divide in public service delivery (Darkwa, 2018). In reflecting the importance of Ghanian diaspora’s impact on other segments of the economy, the education sector has benefitted from knowledge circulation & transfer. Remarkably, Diakpieng (2020), undertakes this task offering an in-depth and broad perspective on the role of skilled migration in rebuilding strong and robust institutions-consolidating previous findings on tapping human and capital resources of the diaspora.

Teye et al (2021), Setrana et al (2021), acknowledge the rise of professional diaspora associations' connections to homeland institutions, citing the strategic importance of maintaining strong links with the diaspora. A critical review of these organisations shows that they lack a centralised platform that could potentially coordinate & unify their activities, reaffirming the structural differences in major global diaspora organisations vis-à-vis homeland development with each vying to be the sole ‘representative’ of their respective government (Chand, 2019). Despite the collective determination and optimistic resolve to restructure public institutions in Ghana, empirical evidence suggests that it has made minimal impact on reorganising public sector service delivery (Diakpieng, 2020). Notwithstanding the marginal impact, their contributions have made valuable gains especially in education & health sectors (Setrana et al, 2021). The failures can be attributed to many factors among them, weak absorption capacity, inconsistent and uncoordinated collaboration & government’s inability to comprehend the critical importance of diaspora contributions (Teye et al, 2021). Ghana’s position in a globalised society shaped by the legacy of the slave trade, puts it in a better position to redefine and institutionalise the vague relationship it holds with diasporas of African descent. Undoubtedly, this could potentially attract a highly mobile skilled population unrestrained by the notion of spatial boundary and territorial sovereignty.

# **2.9** **Diaspora & Institutional Development: Existing Theoretical Framework**

The convergence of diaspora and development in literature has gained immense coverage in recent years, moving from the periphery to the mainstream (Gamlen, 2014). The coverage is primarily driven by increased academic interest, scale and scope of migratory patterns, transnationalism, circular human mobility & the recognition of diaspora as a potent force for homeland development (Bazer & Ozturk, 2020; Koinova 2017;18). Additionally, construed as self-less devotees & dedicated to homeland growth, diaspora networks anchored in transnationalism practices play a vital role in empowering public institutions in sending states. World Bank (WB), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and other vital stakeholders develop a robust roadmap for their engagement (Gamlen, 2016; Vertovec 2012; Zapata-Barrero, 2021). Chronicling the impact of diasporas' involvement on domestic institutions, the significant shift from aid/donor development to a more robust diaspora-centred development reflects the importance of their contribution in the contemporary era (Gamlen & Cummings, 2019; Gamlen, 2019).

A central theme that has emerged from the decades-old diaspora studies is the continued efforts of sending states to lure skilled and semi-skilled professionals back to the country (Hoffmann, 2018). Diasporas play a vital role in homeland development as non-state actors, with many emerging markets, including India, China, and Sub Sahara Africa. Viewing diasporas as valuable 'assets' that could play a prominent role in their home countries (Cruz, 2019; Gamlen, 2019; Kilby, 2021)—elaborating on theoretical issues, especially regarding diasporas as valuable non-state actors and their subsequent role in development. A crucial element that merits further investigation given its absence from contemporary discourse on migration and development is the state & nature in which diasporas find themselves as '*agents*' for development.

A substantial literature on migration and development reflecting the importance of skilled reverse migration to sending states gave rise to an emerging new phenomenon (Skeldon, 2012; Grossman, 2010; Zweig et al., 2008). They are increasingly extending beyond remittances which exceeded development aid in SSA, changing the development landscape that was traditionally dominated by development aid (Carment & Cajella, 2018e). Today's skilled migrations are captured differently from previous studies, which depicted them as *'human loss'* or more apty, *'brain drain*,' often focusing on the negative impacts it brings to sending states (Brooks & Walters, 2021). In sharp contrast to the idea of *'brain drain'* that has dominated migration/development in the 1960s & 1970s, diasporas are gaining serious interest from development/policymakers in a rapidly developing, globalized world (Darkwa, 2018; Dumaz, 2020). Ironically, departing from the historical perspective, the real significance of skilled migration to developing countries addressing other aspects of their contributions is progressively gaining mainstream acceptance in migration/politics/development studies (Kaplan,1997; Meyer, 2001; Sahay, 2009).

Phrases such as *'skilled circular migration*,' *'development partners,*' *'return of qualified nationals,*' & *'mobility partnership'* gradually replaced conventional terms (Constant, 2020). Significantly important, the optimism surrounding the return of skilled migrants as 'development partners' has evolved over the years, with many channelling their intellectual, knowledge resources & networking connections more than ever before (Grossman, 2010; Qin, 2015). They are no longer considered mere financial contributors (remittances) but as an empowering mass & a transformative force capable of developing various aspects of their homeland economies in multiple ways (Khan, 2020). In recognition of this, the change of 'tone' offers a valuable lesson for the study since it is no longer conceptually constrained by the traditional typology of the term.

Narrating some of the vital role diasporas play, Bob-Miller (2009) corroborates these findings, acknowledging that diasporas can potentially act as a catalyst for development. The intensity of the diaspora's involvement and reasons for their engagement can vary depending on the nature of their relationship to their homeland. While many studies focusing on diaspora's outward migration and motives for their mobility have been covered in previous studies, there is scant empirical literature related to their return intentions (Ezebuilo, 2019). Despite these shortcomings, looking at some of the emerging issues in diaspora studies, the few available scholarly articles show considerable diversity in diasporic returns. Many believe that commitment to serve their homeland are entirely driven by a 'nationalistic wish' as observed by Portes (2009) & Vertovec (2007).

Others consider their engagement as a way of 'repaying' for the 'brain loss' resulting from their absence, thus making long-distance nationalism, homeland belonging, and identity more central to the re-conceptualizing diaspora as a process (Sahay, 2009). Besides the patriotic reasons and desire to give back, diaspora entrepreneurs exploit opportunities at home with substantial investment. This is done by utilizing expertise, business skills/knowledge gained overseas & applying it in the home country (Riddle, 2019). Scholarly inquiry on diaspora entrepreneurs as an attractive resource for home development in Bosnia, India, and China shows that they remit acquired human capital, directly impacting the sending state's human and financial capital. This is achieved by offering home produce an alternative route to gaining access to international markets (Chand, 2012; Ye, 2014).

This is a useful conceptual approach that the study seeks to address, with particular focus on the formation of diasporas as a potent force for development at an international level & whether their role undermines state sovereignty (Baser, 2016; Sheffer, 2013). Also, the crucial absence of empirically driven evidence due to a gap in literature constitutes a puzzle or a substantive research problem for scholars and, more importantly, policymakers and international development agencies with serious theoretical/empirical questions; how do diasporas benefit from such engagement, and at what cost? Analytical evidence from previous shows the engagement of skilled diasporas as both necessary and advantageous, irrefutably recognising their role as enablers of homeland development (Safra, 2004; Newland et al., 2010). In line with this notion and building a case supporting a more diaspora engagement through multi strategies, the study seeks to address the philosophical shift from donor to diaspora-centred development, drawing on the most relevant dynamics in today's migratory patterns.

Following the outcome of the international conference on *'Diaspora & Development'* in 2018, many African countries acknowledge the fact that development goes beyond remittances, hence the need to formulate robust engagement mechanisms (Galipo, 2018). In practice, many recognise the emergence of new dimensions and opportunities in forging a closer relationship with their 'people' abroad, with Faist et al. (2014) & other prominent scholars attributing sending state's attitudinal changes towards achieving reverse flow of skilled migration to uneven development fuelled by neoliberal globalization and capitalism. Tapping resources with emphasis on pursuing policies to deepen the relationship becomes imperative (See Fig2.7).




Fig 2.7. Diaspora Impact on Sending States: Source: Boyle & Kitchin (2018).

Nonetheless, despite diasporas occupying a more central ground in matters of post-conflict development, their immense contributions towards poverty alleviation, institutional capacity building, economic growth are paradoxically covered by these same organisations in a sub-optimal way, often underestimating their immense contributions (Zack-Williams & Oduku, 2017). Such a perspective fails to acknowledge the scope of their contributions and its impact on institutional capacity building in reviving derelict state service functions. Nevertheless, in recent years, leading development & donor organisations have shown keen interest in incorporating diasporas involvement in Sustainable Development Goals (SGSs 2030), with many countries adopting a myriad of routes, including developing innovative diaspora mobilisation strategy schemes aimed at tapping into the financial, technical, and human resources of their diasporas (Mattheis et al., 2020; Patel et al., 2021).

## **2.9.1 Diaspora, Mobility & Migration: Paradigm of Inquiry**


One of the most important developments in contemporary social science research is adopting effective structural research processes to interpret data (Crook & Draft, 2005). Often referred to as the basic set of beliefs that guide and define the actions of social researchers, the term 'paradigm' first coined by Kuhn (1970) aims to make sense of global complexities and challenges (Walter, 2010). Other scholars, most notably Killion & Fisher (2018), acknowledge the existence of contradictory and contentious issues with the multiple research paradigms, making it difficult for social science researchers to comprehend, with each discipline adopting their paradigm. However, despite the daunting challenges regarding the practicalities of adopting a particular paradigm, Dezin & Lincoln (2011) underpin the significance & the criticality of selecting the right paradigm from the beginning to the final design and outcomes of the research. Abott (2004); Cresswell (2013); Cresswell & Clark (2011) recognise the importance of 'research paradigms' as a conceptual and practical tool to solve research problems, stressing its importance in data collection, analysis methods, and interpretation processes adopted for those endeavours.

Despite the commonalities between scholars of different disciplines on the importance of a 'paradigm' in framing the researcher's view of examining/probing a particular question, there are underlying issues that are connected, and if not carefully handled, could potentially lead to confusion (Lincoln, 2010). A key example is how essential ontology features are linked to epistemology, methodology & axiology, with all anchored in opposite ends of the research paradigm (Plessis & Majam, 2010). While it is imperative to choose the most appropriate/suitable approach, it is equally important to distinguish between a single or multiple constructed realities to consider (Clark, 2011). This is especially when designing socially constructed diaspora studies since most diaspora/development studies focus on the economic correlation of migrants and sending states (Lincoln, 2010). As a result, the raging debate on adopting a suitable point of view appropriate to address questions has become increasingly complex, and researchers are required to remain cautious about the competing array of philosophical and theoretical perspectives (Bunniss & Kelly, 2010).

The same applies to migration flows since diaspora and mobility are fluid due to the constantly changing migratory patterns & dynamics (Gamlen, 2018). Post Kuhn scholars insist on the importance of understanding research paradigms as temporal & characteristically dynamic. Furthermore, its very existence could be tied to societal changes, with many becoming obscured and outdated over the years while others are rendered less necessary in contemporary social science studies (Killion & Fisher, 2018). Despite all the criticisms, claims, and counterclaims on the role, impact, & importance of research paradigms in objectively answering research questions two unavoidable arguments have emerged. First, the concurrent and competing research paradigms in social science, which continue to dominate modern research & their influence in generating valid, authentic answers, have solicited mixed reactions (Walker, 2010). Secondly, since paradigms are considered inescapable, how could one avoid loyalty to a single paradigm and whether declaring allegiance to it offers a greater chance of unearthing the complex relationship that defines diaspora, mobility & their subsequent contributions to homeland development? These questions raise severe theoretical issues in social science and other disciplines, given the existence of deep-seated antagonism between proponents of different paradigms (Smith, 2018).

The central argument is that considering the complex and often complicated triad relationship (diaspora-homeland-host land), understanding human phenomena, behaviours, actions, and occurrences, it is crucial to adopt a paradigm that will enable the researcher to interpret the actions and experiences of the individual, including social interactions. These are paradigmatic and valuable questions that could potentially contribute our understanding of diaspora and migration dynamics given the fact that Somali diaspora's experiences in homeland development vary because of their social, political position within the society (Brinkerhoff, 2012). Providing clarity on the application and suitability of paradigms, Heacock & Hollander (2010) work on research methods and methodology offers a greater understanding of the importance of paradigm selection & the impact of paradigm applications on research techniques, methodology & methods. The authors’ acknowledgment that the type of paradigm chosen for a particular study will determine the outcome of the results, including the credibility and meaningfulness in the data, is a universally accepted notion. This is an important consideration given the magnitude of intra-paradigm rivalry role in informing and guiding research inquiry (Crook & Garratt, 2005). A key assumption underlying the notion of ‘suitability’ and ‘choice’ of a paradigm is thus, tied to generating valuable data which could eventually enable the researcher to understand & provide a more comprehensive picture of diaspora’s role in development (Plessis & Majam, 2010).

Among the widely used approaches in social science is Neuman's (2003) categorization of philosophical approaches in social research. Positivist, interpretive and critical social science, later amended by Lather (1992) to include an additional layer, provides readers/researchers with a clear picture of different paradigms and how they overlap in definitions and explanations. With each guided by its own set of values, principles, and unique characteristics, their adoption depends on the research nature and context. The researcher's position on the above assumptions is central in selecting the right paradigm, and this is used as a guide to collect accurate reliable data. This study finds the philosophy of interpretivism well aligned with the research questions, objectives, and inquiry. In addition, it also considers the position of critical theorists very appealing since it focuses on social actions necessitated by structural framing of diaspora migratory patterns anchored in transnationalism. The below illustrates differences in research philosophy. (Fig 2.8)

Fig 2.8. Research Philosophical Approaches. Source: Neuman, (2003)

**2.9.2 Epistemology & Ontology of a Paradigm**

As Cooksey & McDonald (2011) once described, epistemology refers to what counts as knowledge within the world. In other words, the main characteristic of epistemology is concerned with the very base of knowledge & finding the truth centred on '*how we come to know something*, '*ways of acquiring it*,' and eventually '*communicating the findings'* to other human beings. Schwandt (2007) goes further in adding a different layer to existing typology; '*how do we know the truth,'* '*what counts as knowledge* and the relationship between the '*knower and would-be known.'* Understanding the epistemological element of one's paradigm is crucial since the primary focus is focussed on knowledge, nature, forms, and ways of acquiring knowledge (Reiter, 2013). In contrast, ontology is concerned with making assumptions whether the knowledge gained makes sense or is natural, assisting the researcher in conceptualizing the form and *nature of reality*. The focus here is on the nature of *existence* and *reality* and whether this is a *social construction* or assumption in one's *mind* (Hayes, 1992).

Given the lack of communal ground, researchers may ignore the differences & the fundamental philosophical issues surrounding nature, perspectives, standpoints, and incommensurability of paradigms (Patel, 2012). Many studies on African diasporas tend to use the epistemology approach as a critical analysis paradigm despite theoretical and methodological differences (Chambers et al., 2018). These studies, primarily focused on remittances, failing to consider the ambiguity surrounding the definition (diaspora) (Faist, 2010). As contemporary diasporas are more actively involved in rebuilding home countries; changing the discourse of diasporas from the dominant views as 'oppressed minorities' to a more proactive professional capable of reversing 'brain drain' into 'brain circulation, will potentially push the findings into something new and unique (Small, 2018).

## **Conclusion**

Existing typologies on state-diaspora relationships often fail to capture the exact dynamics and empirical variation of state-diaspora connection (Baser, 2015; Safran, 1991). While many contemporary studies have made a significant contribution to expanding our knowledge & understanding of the relationship, there is a clear need to develop a wider approach covering different aspects that shape the state-diaspora relationship (Wu, 2016). This includes examining other factors such as the cross-border links, migratory status (spatial & temporal phases), skills, and socio-economic status, among others, to determine the exact impact and nature of their perceived contribution (Newland, 2012; Kleist, 2008). This new line of inquiry could potentially contribute to comparative research in the multi-disciplinary field by identifying the mechanism that links the structural variables, moving beyond single case studies that have dominated much of contemporary literature on state-diaspora relations. Moving beyond remittances, the international community view on the role of the diaspora in fragile states presents a different dimension to existing diaspora-state research studies (Adams, 2005; Ahmed & Martinez, 2013).

Such mainstreaming could add new thematic areas to current scholarly inquiry, widening the discussion beyond remittances, a dominant view on previous Somali studies. In seeking to address failed states and fixing key government institutions, it is worth noting that there is also a need to analyse diaspora's role in the reconstruction process through the transnational lens (Guarzino, 2017). The extant literature on 'transnationals or transnationalism' should reflect contemporary diaspora populations and changing migration dynamics and patterns vis-à-vis their role in the reconstruction process (Vertovec, 2002:2009).

Literature shows that Somalia diasporas’ plays a critical role in homeland development and the contribution to the rebuilding process has gained momentum, with many host governments encouraging the return of skilled diasporas to their country of origin (Menkhaus, 2012). Adopting a new pragmatic approach, states emerging from the war in collaboration with donor agencies have developed an 'enabler engagement programmes' to position diasporic communities in the programs the reconstruction process; signaling a fundamental departure from the aid for development approach (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Paris, 2004; Radin, 2020). In this context, diasporas are systematically placed in key government positions to oversee major institutional reconstruction and post-war rehabilitation efforts (Kaplan, 2010).

Rebuilding key government institutions in Somalia is a high priority for major development and international aid agencies (Mohamoud, 2005; Osman, 2017). Anchoring on positive contributions, rebuilding the health and water sectors have become a key component of donor-funded efforts in improving service delivery and reducing poverty and diseases (Brinkerhoff, 2009:2012; Kleist, 2012). By one estimate, the Somali federal government budget in these two institutions increased by 35% in 2017 (WB, 2019). Also, recent trends reveal the Somali government is keen to engage its diaspora, often viewing them as an essential component of the rebuilding process (Menkhaus, 2012; Tellander & Horst, 2019). Additionally, donors such as the World Bank have also increased funding in health, education, water & other key sectors to create robust government institutions. Finally, in a note of conclusion, the role of diasporas in rebuilding home states offers substantial scrutiny for researchers & renewed surge of interest from interdisciplinary academics to delve deeper into this complex and often triadic relationship between diasporas, home, and host states. Building on this recognition, Ghani & Lockart's (2007) study offers a glimpse of the role of external actors with much of the focus on diasporas & their transnational networks in post-conflict reconstruction.

Knowledge transfer among the diaspora communities is not a new concept with empirical evidence from India China and the Philippines, acknowledging the role of skilled and professional diaspora contribution in sustaining & accelerating economic growth (Chikanda & Crush, 2016; Darkwa, 2018). In Somalia, donors are increasingly recognising the need to encourage skilled diaspora professionals to return to their ancestral homes which is emerging from decades old civil war to foster stability (Elmi & Barise, 2016; Hammond, 2012; Brinkerhoff, 2012). In particular, the focus on rebuilding weak and fragile countries, for example, Somalia and South Sudan reflects the growing engagement by the UN and the international community in recruiting skilled diasporic workforce in the rebuilding process (McCandless, 2016; McCandless, 2017; Omar, 2020). The distinctive patterns of non-government actors ‘usurping’ government’s functions/responsibilities in service delivery is inevitably common in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in states with weaker government institutions-bringing a series of challenges with regards to sovereignty (Chand, 2019).

In contrast, Somalia diaspora networks, notwithstanding the inevitable clan affiliations, are anchored to the national state-hence allowing the sending state to maintain its functions as the sole ‘custodian’ of its people abroad (Omar, 2020). Other prominent scholars particularly Galipo (2018) underscore the importance of knowledge networks noting the position of diaspora based Somali professional’s role in facilitating the flow of brain circulation between homeland and foreign institutions through enhancing institutional capacity. Triandafyllidou (2018), acknowledges the impact of globalisation on African diaspora’s mobility trends, alluding to the significant reconfiguration of spatial boundaries. By briefly examining the symbolic and material ways in which Ghanian, Indians and Chinese diasporas contribute to developing home countries, trends and implications informed by technological advancement and deep sense of ‘belonging’ seems to be integrated into transnationalism driven global migration (Chand, 2018; Siar, 2013.

Previous studies on transnational Somali diasporas provide a detailed and analytical framework for understanding the concept and its impact on sending states. The myriad of case studies covered in this section is a testament to the phenomenon's importance to current migration/diaspora studies. Portes, Vertovec, and others provide a historical and comparative perspective, adding a new dimension to global migration studies, citing the importance of globalization, technological advancement, and hybridized identity. The authors demonstrate a well-theorized analysis of transnationalism, adding a beneficial new layer of conceptualizing the importance of forging sustained links beyond home-host borders. However, a few areas remain insufficiently addressed by previous studies. These include exploring personal feelings/experiences towards transnationalism. Equally important, even though these studies merit considerable admiration, by providing a valuable agenda for uncovering context-specific variables that shape transnational migration, the plethora of metaphors employed, for example, transnationalism migration circuit; transnational social field; global transnationalism; transnationalism from above/below; transnational bonding, could unintentionally confuse the readers with the multiple overlapping and conflicting analysis.

Nevertheless, the bulk of comparative and historical migration studies call for an interdisciplinary approach to define transnationalism from below, reinforcing previous studies on the need to view global interconnectedness through constantly changing social formations- with technological advancement as the principal conduit for sustained relationship (Smith, 2017). In this regard, Waldinger's studies on transnationalism adds a new variable to current studies on patterns of linkage beyond host/home state borders, alluding to the importance of identity, belonging, & cross-border activities to enhanced communication channels. In essence, this approach views virtual & physical mobilities as implicitly and often explicitly linked to technological advancement.

# **3 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS**

**3.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides an overview of diaspora theoretical and conceptual frameworks, with emphases on sustaining linkage, mobilisation, engagement, development & homeland policies to extend reach across its borders. The diverse definition of 'diaspora' may not have necessarily provided the best theoretical assessment as a line of inquiry, however, other key features such as changing social dimensions, interconnectedness beyond home-host geographical borders, belonging/identity, and spatial & mobility offered guidance in critically analysing the impact of diaspora contributions to homeland development. The first part summarised the theoretical approaches to diaspora studies, focusing on the diaspora-state relationship & subsequent role in development based on the commonly adopted diaspora engagement policy practices. The findings demonstrate that diaspora and development 'mantra' is a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon, becoming a staple of discussion within development & migration discourse (Halilovic et al., 2018; Vertovec, 2012;2014; Faist, 2010).

Scholars from diverse disciplines and policymakers are increasingly acknowledging the importance of diaspora contribution to homeland development. Faist (2010), points out on the need to engage diasporas in development with sending states using various instrumental reasons for courting their 'constituents abroad' with a supportive environment, and structural policy changes. This chapter compared and explored several theoretical and conceptual frameworks with regards to diaspora and their subsequent contributions in developing homeland. A central theme that has emerged throughout the literature/policy discussions is the ascending importance of diasporas studies to homeland development with many citing their engagements as an essential component for enhancing economic growth, service delivery and improving institutional capacity (Boyle & Ho, 2017; Shah, 2019; Gamlen 2016).

The underlying set of relations that defines state-diaspora, centred on the home country's efforts in institutionalizing diaspora engagement, including homeland initiatives towards bringing its diasporas into state domain to fulfil its agendas, reveals a global trend in harnessing diaspora-state relationship (Dickerson & Ozden 2018; Gamlen 2018). The second part addresses the impact of transnational mobilisation, strategies, composition & the conditions in which skill/knowledge transfer can be instrumental for homeland development. Diverse scholars from multi-disciplinary fields acknowledge the critical role they play, indicating the importance of diasporas as non-state actors, mirroring the success of India and China (Ho & Wei, 2018; Parija, 2021). However, some members of the diaspora have positively contributed to the development of their home country in many ways. Their engagement, especially in Africa and least developed countries (LDCs), has not gained the mainstream coverage it merits (Chand, 2019; Ogen 2017; Singh & Koiri, 2018).

Sizeable research on Africa's diaspora contributions to foster homeland development focuses solely on remittances (Hammond, 2013). Even though remittances provide a lifeline to the poor in Africa, diasporas engagement and subsequent contribution have not been utilized compared to China and India. For example, enabling better access to foreign capital markets, increasing trade links, and acting as brokers between local and western firms (Page & Mercer, 2019; Brinkerhoff, 2012). Additionally, from the view that diasporas are obliged to contribute, development calls for new theories that better match the realities of today's migrants, often linked beyond home and host borders (Caldwell, 2020).

# **3.1.2 Conceptual Advancement of Skilled Migration: Transnationalism Oriented Post-Conflict Development**

To identify conceptual gaps, broader theoretical accounts, and challenges faced by sending states in their bid to lure skilled diaspora back to their country of origin, the study recognises structural, conceptual challenges, and governance dilemmas. The wide-ranging empirical & theoretical literature shows this depends on the sending state's engagement efforts and diasporas perception/experiences (Gamlen, 2019). Although the term 'diaspora' has become diluted and often politicized, transnationalism as a new concept is yet to find relevance in global discussions (Cohen & Fischer, 2019). Re-evaluating the term '*diaspora*' and *migrants*' efforts & activities towards homeland development, it is worth discussing the two-fold complementary migration elements, diaspora anchored in transnationalism (Koinova, 2019). In this regard, an additional feature of diaspora mobility which the study seeks to address is the inclusion of transnational networks in circular knowledge transfer.

The two concepts are interlinked and critical in understanding current and future migration studies (Retis, 2019). Thus, each phenomenon's differences, similarities, and characteristics ought to be defined according to the changing dynamics of contemporary migration/diaspora mobilities (Blunt, 2007). Concurrent with this notion, engagement campaigns have intensified locally and globally. Many countries have embarked on developing robust recruitment strategies promoting the return of skilled/semi-skilled migrants (Henn & Bathelt, 2017). In respect of this, the need to repatriate valuable human capital through cross-border circular migration to develop sending states' failing public institutions becomes a viable alternative to donor-funded development projects (Bahar, 2020; Sinatti, 2019).

Transnationalism as a theory and an observable phenomenon offers an excellent opportunity to understand ways of harnessing diasporas' skills/knowledge transfer in post-conflict settings (Welde, 2020). Since diasporas are connected to diverse places simultaneously, enabling the transfer of knowledge/skills with migrant networks acting as a conduit for circulating new knowledge and training. Taking advantage of their potential position could shed light on the impact of their contribution in sustaining and developing the home country's institutional/delivery capacity (Toivanen & Baser, 2020). Transnational networks link sending states with global regions through networking, investments, and direct skills/knowledge transfer (Pande, 2017). This is one area that the study seeks to explore in more detail to ascertain its impact on post-conflict development, given the shortage of skilled workforce.

A major development in Africa is recognising the role of diasporas in development in a transnational context, especially in countries with weak & dysfunctional public institutions (Chand, 2019; Williams, 2018). Typically, the crafting of a diaspora as a potent for development raises critical issues in contemporary studies since the role of skilled migrants, the real or imagined potential, is yet to gain considerable attention from scholars and policymakers in SSA. Given that the terms 'diaspora' & 'transnationalism' maintain mutually constructive & reinforcing relations, it is imperative to note the contributions towards enhancing institutional capacity building from a cross-border perspective, even though the potential to play a productive role in re-establishing good governance and service delivery is often underreported in Africa (Nkwede et al., 2020). This could explain the disparity in literature, which mainly focuses on remittances as a source for development.

Considering the wealth divide between the wealthy and LDCs, human mobility, and its contribution to homeland development, especially in a post-conflict setting, diasporas contributions are seen as a potential leverage tool for development. Brinkerhoff (2012); Faist (2012) and other prominent scholars recognise the role & implications circular migration in advancing human/institutional development. Somalia presents a good case since it is recovering from the decades-old civil war that has ravaged most parts. Highlighting the impact of the civil war on service delivery, numerous attempts to encourage the return of skilled and semi-skilled diasporas have intensified (Tellender & Horst, 2019). In the wake of these developments, I argue that a closer examination is needed to explore the purposely designed initiatives deeply rooted in the perceptions that diasporas are inarguably tied to the development of their homelands. In other words, migrants are viewed as sedentary by nature.

# **3.1.3 Institutional Capacity Building**

Newland & Agunius (2007) assertions that migrants who have successfully settled in host countries have the appropriate skill capacity to contribute to the development of their home country resonates well with the research objectives of this study. Migrants in the west acquire & accumulate valuable experiences in the host land, potentially transforming service delivery and institutional capacity building in their homeland (Teferra, 2021). There seems to be a growing consensus among scholars and policymakers on the significance of their contributions towards rebuilding robust service delivery, especially in post-conflict settings, albeit with the limited literature (Mueller, 2020). The bulk of countries in Sub Sahara Africa lag behind the west in terms of institutional and public sector service delivery, with many adopting a robust & coherent strategy to encourage the flow of human capital/knowledge as a way of addressing skilled labour shortage (Chikanda & Crush, 2018).

Mobility schemes with structural cooperation from donor organisations in Somalia, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Iraq have intensified over the years (Koinova 2015). In collaboration with homeland governments, these organisations perceive diasporas as legitimate and valuable contributors to homeland development (Carment & Calleja, 2018). A change in the fundamental structure of donor/aid development to a more diaspora engagement validates findings from previous studies, which firmly puts homeland development at the hands of its diaspora (Brinkerhoff, 2011). At the heart of these discussions is to enhance the circular flow of skilled mobility and create uneven development (Kleist, 2018). Despite the evidence on the impact of skilled migration in developing their country of origin, the focus of their contribution has often been on selective economic skills or expertise, leaving other sectors uncovered, for example, restructuring public institutions.

Moving beyond diaspora fuelled socio-economic growth, the ability of the state to deliver services to the public is hinged on the engagement of external actors. It therefore becomes imperative that institutional capacity and legitimacy are enhanced with the inclusion of non-state actors as crucial stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction (Koinova, 2018). There are promising examples in Bosnia and Somalia, with empirical evidence providing essential insights into their role in rebuilding (Lewis et al., 2018). The term 'post conflict' itself, if translated loosely, covers a range of situations in different contexts, from state-building, peacekeeping, reconciliation to reconstruction. However, the focus here is on state fragility, or in other words, the inability of the state to provide essential services to its citizens, hence, justifying the involvement of non-state actors in the rebuilding process (Krasniqi & Williams, 2019). Since institutional capacity development is a crucial dimension of state-building, the nature of challenges faced by the state institution's functional ability is enormous (Baker, 2018; Brinkerhoff016). As a result, the international community, especially donor/development agencies, urges skilled diasporas to contribute to homeland development in a more pervasive and robust role (Coning,2018; Koinova, 2017;18).

Additionally, empirical evidence shows that sending states' use of long-distance' nationalism' to pursue state-building agendas has enhanced economic growth, improved political participation, and exploited diaspora's links to host land through lobbying. In this regard, the multi-dimensionality of 'diaspora' as a tool for development capable of utilizing their multiple 'affiliations' beyond home-host states becomes imperative (Brinkerhoff, 2017). Finally, diasporas increasing significance in homeland engagement has intensified in recent years, with many efforts being made to court their knowledge/human resources (Page & Mercer, 2018). The existence of an almost unanimous acknowledgment of diasporas' historical role in development & policymakers mainstreaming their contributions in national development agendas within the broader context of homeland development calls for a serious re-evaluation of current diaspora engagement policies beyond the often-cited remittances.

**3.1.3.1 Diaspora Institutions & Governance**

A comparative and historical analysis of previous studies shows that India and Chinese diasporas play an essential role in enhancing economic growth (Gamlen & Cummings 2019; Walton-Roberts et al., 2019). They have considered the pioneers of diaspora for development 'mantra.' Most empirical studies acknowledge their significant contributions vis-à-vis achieving sustainable economic growth through foreign direct investment (FDI) and acting as economic brokers between host and homeland (Boeri et al., 2012; Tejada, 2012). The Chinese state's liberalization of the market was also crucial in tapping their 'people abroad' through various incentives, including setting up special economic zones (EEZs), extending voting rights, dual citizenship & implementing a conducive environment as part of a broader strategy of diaspora engagement (Kilby, 2012; Kuznetzov, 2013). Equally critical, India's domestic deregulation policies in the 1980s were decisive in appealing to its constituencies abroad. Such policies aimed at increasing reverse migration that primarily targeted India's professionals' underlines the interconnectedness as a catalyst for forging a sustained relationship is constantly circular mobility (Hercog & Van de Laar, 2017; King & Raghuram, 2013).

Conceptually & empirically, the attitudinal change towards their diasporas reinforces findings in previous migration studies, which acknowledge sending states' strategies in courting and tapping potential diaspora contributions (Meyer, 2015). Also importantly, Bailey & Moulder (2017) and others observe that policy changes and diaspora mobilisation are interactive and intertwined, acknowledging that homeland government's efforts in policy changes could potentially have a profound impact on diasporas reverse migration. Ragazzi (2014) argues that more than half of the world's countries are actively harnessing diaspora contributions by implementing various policies. In this context, favourable policies constitute a primary mobilisation/recruitment strategy, and its impact could potentially amplify or lessen diasporas' reverse migration. The broad literature on the index of immigrant policies (IMEX) shows significant structural variations depending on the nature of the relationship and the country's development (Babcock & Faist, 2010), (Chen et al., 2014)' (Ho et al., 2015); provide theoretical insights into sending state policies and the divergent approaches used to exploit diasporas' human, financial and technological resources. The nature of the policy shapes the type of relationship the state wants to build. In most cases, some of these robust policies are usually developed and managed by specific administrative units designed to spearhead the process, often setting up realistic and occasionally over-ambitious goals for diaspora engagement under top government officials (Sheffer 2018; Gamlen, 2019). It is worth noting that some countries, most notably Belize and Panama, are the few countries that are currently not engaged in developing favourable diaspora return policies.

Gamlen's (2008) article on developing policies focuses on the need to recognise the existence of 'diaspora' as a missing link of the sending state's constituents. This is an essential step towards establishing a sustainable relationship, and its success is hinged on developing suitable policies to attract globally dispersed diaspora communities. This theory, also commonly referred to as Gamlen's diaspora mechanisms, focuses on sending states strategies on harnessing diaspora-state relations through robust & effective campaigns. This includes sending a state's proactive policies to engage with its diaspora outside the nation-state. The author's assertion that the inclusion of diasporas into its domestic agenda permits the rebranding of a new relationship with immigrants, albeit in a foreign land. For example, setting up offices in host land to attract diasporas has become a regular feature in migration & mobility, further changing the frontiers of the diaspora-state relationship (Gamlen 2019; Gamlen & Cummings, 2019).

Diaspora state relationship is not a new phenomenon, with evidence showing the existence of such a bond dating back to the mid-19th century between the Mexican government and its diasporas (McIntyre and Gamlen, 2019; Rivera, 2019). Ever since, several theories have emerged, providing clarity on the rise of these institutions. Explaining the rise of government institutions of various kinds dedicated to migrants and their descendants. A key essential element that has dominated most research is the use of single-case studies (Graham, 2020; Welde, 2020). Gamlen (2019) and other prominent scholars guide the emergence and importance of diaspora institutions to sending states and the need to develop robust, effective, and proactive institutions capable of luring diasporas back to their country of origin. Even though I could not find a single dominant explanation, the most cited theories are the conventional tapping, embracing, and governing perspectives which focus on governing cross-border flows of people (Craven, 2018; Ragazzi, 2017).

To highlight the importance of the governance perspective in modern-day diaspora engagement, Gamlen (2008:14:19) stipulates the need to adopt a decentralised global governance where sending states, host and diasporas are involved in a negotiation to develop & institutionalise a more suitable engagement approach in an international setting shows the interdependence and interconnections of states beyond home-host borders. Equally significant, the governance theory enables powerful international institutions, such as the World Bank and development agencies, to advocate for the return of skilled and semi-skilled diasporas (Carment & Calleja, 2018; Koinova, 2018). This is a clear indication of organisational uniformity in the contemporary era, with different institutions collaborating with sending and host states to formalize the recruitment of diasporas for homeland development (Gamlen, 2019). In this context, sending states institutions become actively involved in luring their 'constituencies' abroad through various schemes, albeit in a foreign land.

Nevertheless, Gamlen's concept may raise serious theoretical issues; for example, replicating the coding system used to determine the suitability of policy changes seems to be overgeneralized, primarily descriptive, with much of the focus on the national level gains (Baubock, 2009). Additionally, there is minimal consideration on diaspora's interests, perception of policy changes, and designing schemes to facilitate the mobility process without diasporas’ input (Lafleur, 2011). More importantly, the author acknowledges the development of divergent policy formulation driven by the varying scope and nature to suit the sending state's needs (Collyers, 2014b). In this case, state monopolisation could subjectively make diaspora lesser partners. Furthermore, Gamlen's argument to differentiate state (institutions) from the government (geographical territory) could be viewed as too ambiguous (Mylonas, 2013).

The literature review highlights critical gaps in the current discourse on migration with the final theory presenting diasporas as dynamic actors capable of improving homeland development (Chikanda & Crush, 2018; Rai, 2020). However, despite their importance on development, I hold the view that most findings on contemporary theoretical literature focuses solely on national-level interest, with little or minimal considerations of diasporas' ‘*privileged positions’* as non-state contributors. In line with that, I have proposed a conceptual framework that allows for a deeper theorisation of sending state-diaspora relationships with greater attention on tapping diaspora resources and their political influence on reshaping sending state’s perception (policy changes). While migration policies are critical for enabling circular mobility, institutional interventions anchored in structural settings (policies) are required to motivate the flow of people (Teye et al., 2017). Finally, the author’s claims that the sending state's authority in such a scenario is confined to government institutions as agencies rather than the state itself (central government) to avoid the delicate challenges of posing a threat to the sovereignty of host countries (Collyers, 2014; Fitzgerald, 2006). From an analytical and political perspective, Gamlen's contentions could well be viewed as interfering in other country's domestic/internal affairs since the majority of the diasporas are also citizens in their respective host countries.

# **3.1.4 Conceptual Framework**

**Post Conflict Context**

* Fragile state condition **.** Sub-standard & poorly staffed
* Corroded institutions . Health & Water prof shortage
* Resource scarcity . Persistent Poverty
* Corruption .Ineffective service delivery

**Actors Involved**

. Transnational Networks

. Skilled diaspora

**Policies**

-Diaspora-Gov't relationship

-Institutional capacity

-Matching PCR goals to diaspora resources

**Post Conflict Intervention**

Potential Consequences

**Organisational Restructuring**

-Improved Administrative

-Increased donor funding

-Reduced Corruption

-Efficient & Equitable Provision of Services

**Human Resource Development**

-Skill Dev’t

-Job creation

-Increased productivity

. Institutional Growth

-Developing Potentialities

**Institutional Capacity**

. Improved service Provision

. Increased coverage

. Empowering civic society

-Enhanced Governance/Capacity

**Potential long-term changes in context**

**-**Increased social divisions

-Clan hostility

-Power imbalance

-Renewed conflicts

-Local resentment

-Conflict relapse

-Inequality

-Unfair competition

-Nepotism

- Corruption

- Restoring basic administrative capacity and a functioning service

- Strengthening public financial management and policymaking

- Support to political governance, building leadership

-Developing conflict and governance crisis-response capacities

capacities of key state decision-makers and executives, parliamentary performance, and civil society participation

equality

-Improved health & water services

Positive

Negative

Time

**Fig 3.1 Conceptual Framework (COLOURED BLUE): Adapted from Jabareen (2013)**

This thesis aims to investigate the concept of institutional building in post-conflict reconstruction based on a critical evaluation of the role of the skilled Somali diaspora in homeland development. To better understand their perceived contribution (positive/negative), the study will adapt Jabareen's (2008) conceptual framework (coloured blue) to demonstrate the linkages of diaspora interventions and their consequences on post-war reconstruction (both long and short-term impact). The enhanced framework, which includes the authors additional components provide a clear structural overview of the research study and serves as a contemporary analytical entry into the multifaceted and often complex diaspora-host-homeland triad relationship. These additional parts were intentionally placed in relationship to each other with the aim of guiding the research in an integrated way. Equally, important, the new components added to Jabareen’s framework were designed in a series of sequences and logical proposition in relation to skilled diasporas contribution to developing homeland institutions. In line with this argument, Maxwell (2013), holds the view that ‘*conceptual framework for your research is something that is constructed, not found. It incorporates pieces are borrowed from elsewhere, but the structure, the overall coherence, is something that you build, not something that exits ready-made*’ (p.41).

## **3.1.5 Diaspora & Nation Building: A Complex Interplay**

During the decades-old civil war, the institution and human resource damage has had a devastating impact on service delivery (Menkhaus, 2014). Practically, the conflict has weakened the state's ability to provide essential and fundamental service delivery to the masses (Nenova,2004). In addition to the tragic destruction of critical infrastructures, the exodus of educated elites fleeing for safety strained the country’s public service delivery. Specific targeting of professionals became the norm with many settling in the west, most notably the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and Sweden (Oakley, 1995). The absence of a central government created a perfect storm for international non-governmental organisations to fill the 'structural vacuum' with many 'assuming' the role of the 'state' in service delivery through the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid (Ahmed et al, 2020).

However, since 2012, Somalia has made a remarkable recovery, emerging from the abyss with a functioning government courtesy of the international community-albeit with a weak institutional capacity (Brinkerhoff, 2012). Part of this extraordinary journey is the role of the diasporas in the reconstruction process, with donor agencies keen on enhancing their engagement vis-à-vis homeland development, with the broadening scope of diaspora interventions may provide essential clues to the paradigm shift from aid to diaspora-led development initiatives (Koinova, 2018). An interdisciplinary review of PCR frameworks shows a lack of a comprehensive theory of post-conflict reconstruction. The adapted framework is instrumental in this study since it defines the research problem, establishes theoretical coherence, and assists in organizing the research design and implementation (Jabareen, 2018). It specifies the domain of diaspora contribution in PCR as defined through cognitive research and investigates their short- and long-term impact. Using Jabareen's framework will significantly affect institution building in the post-crisis context by critically analysing their role in PCR (Jabareen, 2013). Additionally, and most importantly, the adapted framework establishes the theoretical coherence of the research problem, hence providing the basis for theorizing and generating new knowledge.

The new inclusion to Jabareen’s framework consisting of *organisational restructuring*, *institutional capacity*, *actors involved*, *policies* and *potential consequences*, and *human resource development* provided a set of common premises as basis for discussion. These new additions are implicitly linked to the outcomes (favourable/adverse) representing the reality of diaspora contribution in PCR. Moreover, the three layers were developed to articulate the research themes and questions underpinning the study's methodology. The enhanced framework provides a precise analysis of skilled Somali professionals' intervention in the reconstruction process. This research aims to fill that gap by presenting an enhanced conceptual framework leading to a broader understanding and analysis of PCR intervention, focusing on institutional capacity building. The enhanced framework is characterized by fragile state conditions, thus making it a suitable choice for this study. This analytical standpoint opens the path to theorizing the complex and often complicated state-diaspora relationship, especially at a time when Somalia is emerging from a decades-old civil war. Also importantly, it will increase our understanding of diasporas' contribution in development context in with rebuilding critical government infrastructure is linked to the intervention of skilled Somali diaspora sits well the framework, hence comprehensively providing a critical analytical method.

Other frameworks fail to understand the complex dynamics of Somalia's post-conflict reconstruction. Rather than incorporating a new framework, the enhanced Jabareen (2008) framework recognises the country's war dynamics and the direct, formal/informal contributions in improving institutional capacity, human resources & organisational restructuring. Moreover, the framework ensures that institutional building in a post-conflict setting requires carefully tailored interventions tied to the needs on the ground. It is also seen as an integral part of peacebuilding efforts designed to attain enhanced institutional capacity, organisational restructuring, among others. A key feature of Somalia's post-war recovery is hinged on the government's ability to attract its ‘assets abroad,’ with an eye towards exploiting their financial, human, and technical know-how. Afterall, since the state is faced by structural/institutional weaknesses, for example, inability to perform essential governance functions, providing adequate/basic services, establishing a well-functioning institution could be strengthened by non-state actors.

The framework identifies two main significant actors in the reconstruction process, skilled Somali diasporas, and their transnational networks. The enhanced framework acknowledges that reconstruction demands prompt outside intervention to stabilise the conflict, rebuild key government institutions & infrastructures, and enhance service delivery, thus providing a holistic approach of existing PCR intervention. Additionally, since institutional capacity building is a central mandate of donor organisations/INGOs development agenda, a concerted effort by the international community to include skilled diaspora professionals is well aligned to the overall objectives of the study. To acknowledge their role in these profound transformations, the World Bank (WB) and other key stakeholders are encouraging the central government through diverse initiatives to promote and enhance the potential contributions of the diasporas. The conceptualization analysis is based on three pillars of post-conflict reconstruction. Each pillar has a specific role and theoretical function, but it is the concept of the fragile state that creates its core features, providing the desired legitimacy for external intervention. Without this concept, making a case for intervention becomes much more challenging to examine it comprehensively.

Except for Jabareen’s framework (2013), the bulk of conceptual frameworks often used in post conflict studies are concerned with the impact of economic and political structures in the reconstruction process (Bender, 2011). To analyse the diasporas concepts beyond these spheres, relationship with the sending state and their perceived contributions, the adoption Jabareen’s enhanced framework allowed the author to analytically investigate these links through the development of a narrative of interlinked perceptions, for example, the role of the sending state policies on return mobility. Equally important, whereas much previous research in post conflict reconstruction tend to primarily ignore the negative consequences of the intervention, Jabareen’s holistic approach provides a clear guidance of analysing the impact of diasporas in the rebuilding process. Focusing on the negative aspects, the theoretical soundness of Jabareen’s framework enabled the author to link theory and research, making the findings more meaningful in an ongoing post conflict context.

Pointing out the adverse consequences of state building, Jabareen posits that due the fragile nature of the state, external actors assert and maintain immense control of the rebuilding process. This includes, but not limited to, members of the international community, donors, and diasporas (Jabareen, 2013). Based on seven premises, Jabareen views post conflict reconstruction as an inclusive process that transcends ‘peacebuilding’ or ‘nation building’ (Sakalasuriya, 2018). The first concept captures the current condition of the state and its inability to provide tangible service delivery, acknowledging the weakness of the state. The second concept focuses on external intervention viewing it as a necessary mechanism to ‘bring back’ the state functions. This includes providing external financial and technical assistance. The third concept provides detailed sequence of establishing law and order, hence enabling the state to fully extend its authority over the country. The fourth concept is the reduction of conflict through reconstruction. This is particularly an important aspect of post war reconstruction since stability is a necessary condition for embarking in the transition to peace. The fifth concept is the liberalisation of the state with emphasis on its importance of the donors. The sixth concept focuses on using multi actors to achieve the desired reconstruction goals, encouraging greater participation from diasporas and locals (Jabareen, 2013).

**RATIONALE**

Notwithstanding the severity of wartime damage to government institutions, Jabareen’s concept acknowledges that post conflict reconstruction as a paramount process following a period of instability continues to change with the new global order and its applicability to Somalia’s context, focuses on the role of external actors in creating a functioning state despite the unique and daunting challenges (Jabareen, 2013). The author recognises that the failures in Iraq and other post conflict regions, necessitated the need to develop a grand strategy with grand narratives using interrelated and important concepts to theorise post conflict reconstruction. This is even more notable especially at a time when the UN reckons that countries in post conflict transition have 50% chance of reverting to war (Castillo, 2017). Increasingly, though, as attention focuses on capitalising on the previous failures, Jabareen’s framework relevance to the study is based on overcoming the complexities of rebuilding the state into a viable, robust, and functioning state. Somalia has struggled for many years to achieve some sort of ‘statehood’ and Jabareen’s framework could potentially provide lessons for practitioners and policy makers in establishing robust mechanism for recruiting diasporas with the aim of reversing decades old institutional decay.

The utilisation of Jabareen’s framework was also crucially important by acting as a guidance throughout the research process especially in countries still experiencing instability (Sakalasuirya et al, 2016). Due to the continuity of the war, to examine the relationship between the concepts studied, Jabareen’s framework was vital in building arguments that connects research questions to key theories in post conflict reconstruction with focus on diaspora constructs beyond host and home borders, factors related to mobilisation and their presumed relationship. The adopted framework offers new insights in the face of ongoing conflicts. In line with this, Maxwell (2013), defines the importance of selecting an appropriate framework for your study, further arguing that a suitable conceptual framework incorporates pieces that are borrowed from elsewhere, but with structures built by the author. Since previous research on post conflict reconstruction shows examples of failed interventions, for example, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, Jabareen’s enhanced framework, Jabareen’s framework has potential significance of contributing to the ongoing discourse on diaspora and development.

Moreover, the enhanced conceptual framework consists of concepts like other post-conflict reconstructions, however with different emphases. The unique position of the framework allowed the author to justify the findings of the research both substantively and methodologically, a stance echoed by Maxwell’s (2013) view of conceptual framework as an essential element in research studies through the connection of key theories and theoretical perspectives that affect people’s lives broadly. Equally important, the adapted framework provides a reference for formulating the research questions, demonstrating the enormous potential of unearthing diasporas implicit and explicit contributions. It also acts as a base of guidance and direction to the research design vis-à-vis role of diaspora in development. The research themes and questions are drawn into the conceptual framework, which clearly shows that they are linked to the research processes and theoretical bases in PCR context.

This makes the research questions more explicit, hence making data analysis less complicated. For these reasons, Jabareen's concept provides a broader understanding of the role of skilled Somali diasporas & transnational networks in PCR. The framework addresses PCR and its consequences in countries still experiencing conflict & hostilities (Sakalasuriya et al., 2016). However, a significant weakness with Jabareen's framework is that it concentrates on an integrated approach that includes addressing politics, economy, social and institutional (Mac Ginty, 2013). To avoid this, the study will focus on intervention and potential long-term outcomes using three key elements of PCR pillars: organisational restructuring, institutional capacity & human resource development. The three categories of consequences are recognised for analysis. Both the horizontal and the vertical relationships are equally important, which will impact the post-conflict context and long-term outcomes.

# **Conclusion**

An important correlation between diasporas, development and sending state’s favourable policies in luring skilled reverse migration, calls for the need to address the conceptual and substantive discussions on contemporary diasporas focuses on remittances as a way of developing homeland. Even though remittances are a key factor in homeland development, other elements of diasporas’ contributions in Africa, for example, knowledge transfer informed by brain circulation are yet to gain foothold in migration and development discourse. The main objective of this study is to articulate and enhance scholarly contribution beyond remittances, through a conceptual framework that encompasses and coherently explains the connections, affiliations, and engagement of the diasporas beyond home and host land borders. In examining the gap between the rich and developing countries, the flow of migrants is considered a significant contributor to undermining prospects for economic development.

Many scholars, including Gamlen (2013), Mohan (2010); Pellerin & Mullings (2013), argue that neoliberal development policies have created uneven development globally with irreversible loss due to the extraction of wealth & talent, forcing poorer countries into a state of stagnation and aid dependency. In reemphasising the need to redress these shortages, Faist (2010), Brinkerhoff (2012), Gamlen (2018) and other prominent scholars make a compelling argument for the need to engage non-state actors in development with particular focus on professional diasporas- point to the fact that diasporas are potent force for homeland development. To address the chronic shortage in Somalia's public institutions, the study aims to address the impact of talent migration given their social position and education level, especially at a time when global talent competition has intensified. By critically examining current conceptual frameworks, the absence of a holistic approach to gauge diasporas’ connectivity & contributions vis-à-vis homeland’s efforts in enhancing their relationship calls for the need to adopt a more robust framework capable of addressing the shortcomings. Central to these discussions is the role of transnationally linked diasporas connections to homeland development and how sending state’s policies could potentially serve as a theoretical tool for analysing their contributions.

Theoretically, existing literature on Africa’s diasporas is exceptionally elusive and does not necessarily reflect the formative influence of their contributions beyond remittances. To rectify the imbalance, Jabareen’s framework considers the significant importance of transnational mobility to homeland development. Additionally, the role of the framework is to analyse the role of non-governmental organisations in encouraging the return of skilled diasporas to an institutional building. Finally, since theoretical and empirical evidence from previous literature shows that contemporary diasporas are not exclusively connected to a single country, the study aims to explicitly challenge the often-assumed notion that depicts diasporas mobility as an exchange between host & home states (Gamlen, 2018). Given the relevancy of the framework to Somalia’ recovery, coupled with an attempt to clarify the relationship among the elements identified above, the author partially incorporated parts of Jabareen’s framework (coloured blue) to his own. These generic principles suitably apply to Somalia’s context and has the significance potential for practice and policy as well as contributing to the ongoing discourse on diaspora and development.

# **CHAPTER 4: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

**4.1 Introduction**

Building upon the theoretical underpinning (chapter 2) & conceptual framework (chapter 3) that guided the research study, this chapter aims to cover the methodological approaches adopted for those purposes. The decisions on the philosophical stance & method of inquiry related to the gaps and contentious issues in current understandings of diaspora's contributions are aligned with the pragmatic worldview of research. Asserting its importance using conductive reasoning to fully understand the impact and context of diaspora contributions to enhance institutional capacity and strengthening governance, this chapter recognises the importance of multi-sited research design in analysing various contending positions and arguments (Amelina, 2010). Additionally, the use of qualitative method was critical in addressing the link between Somali diasporas and connections to homeland as well as addressing some related conceptual concerns. It also offered an adequate terrain for analysing their connections & subsequent contributions beyond home-host borders, informed by transnationalism. A central consideration in the study was selecting an appropriate research method that could answer the research questions. Semi structured interviews and focus groups played a vital role in unearthing information that could have been difficult to retrieve. Allowed the participants’ in-depth engagement with the difference segments of return mobility, government’s policies and the impact of knowledge/skills transfer on post conflict development.

In addressing some of the ongoing debate on patterns of mobility, diaspora, migration, and development, I am of the view that the methods employed, and the interpretation design are congruent with the pragmatic worldview approach, and this is reflected on its importance in the Somalia context. The well-established insights on how diaspora-state relations are formed and harnessed were critically important in understanding & uncovering practical problems associated with diaspora & development as well as addressing the parallel between sending state's endeavours in enhancing diaspora relationship & the perception of diasporas as a 'vital' agents of homeland development informed by transnational connections.

The researcher is aware of the limitations and merits of the qualitative research in contemporary migration studies, however, its suitability in addressing complex and often multifaceted diaspora relations to homeland, qualitative inquiry becomes particularly well suited to analyse their engagement, mobilisation, and subsequent contributions to homeland development. Equally significant, considering the multi-layered connections to different spatial/geographical places simultaneously and the emergence of transnationalism in recent years as a tool for gauging diaspora mobility, the use of qualitative approach has enabled the researcher to gather rich insight & in-depth data, for example, analysing connections beyond home and host borders and how these transnational links are tied to homeland through shared identity, belonging, culture and obligations to serve the ‘motherland’ (koinova, 2018:19; Vertovec, 2012).

A more detailed account of the importance of the pragmatism approach and how it fits within social science research on diaspora & development anchored in transnationalism is also covered in **chapter 2**. Moreover, recent inclusion in migratory studies is also discussed using epistemological reflection, an essential feature in analysing data. Prior to conclusion, the study will present the rationale and significance of the approaches taken in designing, implementing, and analysing data, including tools & techniques used in data collection and the challenges associated with the pragmatism approach. The challenging pathways to reach the endpoint in collecting data will also be discussed to provide meaningful insights and contributions to theory and practice. The study will address the limitations highlighted and the various possible approaches adopted to bridge the 'shortcomings.’

**4.2 Methodology: Main Criteria for Analysis**

Sending states are constantly looking into ways of establishing a robust relationship with their ‘people abroad.’ Key objectives of this thesis are to analyse efforts developed by the Somali Federal Government and their international development partners to exploit the opportunities that arise from their citizens moving overseas. Equally important, the study also focuses on the effectiveness of knowledge transfer as a vessel of rebuilding key government institutions. This pertains to specific social context, for example, the linkage between the diasporas in transnationalism and the role of the government in enacting favourable policies. Developing greater understanding of issues related to mobility and their relevance in rebuilding their country of origin reflects the importance of the research in acquiring accurate answers.

Since migration is often considered as a complex phenomenon with multi-dimensional factors, the analysis focused on five main components. Firstly, the author examined research methods in previous migration studies and their suitability in answering the research’s objectives. To accurately capture the participants role in the rebuilding process, the study focused on semi structured interviews, document analysis, focus groups and to a lesser extent observations. Secondly, the research examined the participants role in state building, with focus on return mobility and the Federal government’s efforts in developing conducive policies. The frequency of return mobility was critically important in analysing their ‘perceived’ contribution and this helped the author categorise the participants into two groups: *long*- and short-term return mobility. Understanding the dynamics and flexibility of return mobility, intensive flow of people, knowledge has contributed to understanding their role and impact to the rebuilding process, a central element of the research’s objective.

Thirdly, participants were made identifiable through the process transnationalism and their linkages to the federal government beyond host-home geographical borders. The consequences of the diaspora’s global movement were vital in unearthing key information and its significance to the impact of increased levels of spatial interactions. Inherently multi-disciplinary, transnationalism played a key role in answering the study’s primary objectives, especially the formations of migrants as ‘*de facto state representatives*. Data collected from the semi-structured interviews constituted a principal element of understanding diaspora’s role vis-à-vis homeland development. Viewing transnationalism as a dynamic social process, information collected from the participants indicates the importance of functional linkages in relation to connectivity of people with shared ‘culture,’ ideas and information across spatially extended networks. Additionally, considering Somalis as traditional nomads, the movement, and connections of people beyond home-host borders reinforced findings in previous migration studies view of reverse migration as not only contemporary but more importantly a historic phenomenon.

Fourthly, a key catalyst of analysing the impact of diaspora’s contribution is the flow of information, knowledge and skills and the government’s willingness to receive, use and value the knowledge with the aim of strengthening institutional capacity building. In this respect, the author underlined the importance of retrieving knowledge, skills, and other resources through temporary or circular flows of human resources and its relevance on development, adding essential insight into the study’s objectives. Finally, the role of government was crucial in analysing the impact of policies on return mobility. Since existing literature by migration researchers on the role of homeland government’s efforts in luring its diaspora is one of the under-theorised areas of inquiry, the role of sending state’s policies on reverse migration was important in understanding the sending state’s role beyond its territorial confines (Waldinger & Green, 2016). Establishing a robust relationship with its ‘people abroad’ though favourable policies broadened the concept of mobility anchored in activities that transcend national borders with emphasis on the intensification of movement and its impact on homeland development.

**4.3 Inductive vs. Deductive**

Empirical research on previous studies on diaspora, migration, and transnational links shows that they are primarily explored through qualitative research (Fischer, 2021). However, the word 'diaspora' itself has ignited debate due to the diverse definitions offered by scholars of different disciplines, further complicating our understanding on the conceptualization of migration (Fasit, 2010). To demystify the complexity surrounding the term ‘diaspora’ it is essential to include contemporary attributes of diasporas and the changing dynamics of migration patterns to fully understand the importance of cross-border diaspora formations on homeland development. Such reflections are crucial in offering conceptual clarity to migration, diaspora and development studies given the existence of competing interdisciplinary approach to migration studies.

The study recognises the problematic nature of diverse labels that have been used to describe the term ‘diasporas’ beyond the traditional spheres (*Jewish/Greek Migrants*) the need to expand our understanding beyond one aspect of diaspora engagement in homeland development (remittances) and this should not be construed as a challenge but rather as a way of deconstructing the term as a conceptual tool for development (Vertovec, 2009). Equally significant, producing relevant empirical material in migration/diaspora studies could stretch conventional paradigms' limits and the use of qualitative research was critical since it is considered as holistic rather than reductionist way of unearthing new knowledge (Dhesi, 2010).

More often, complex research ideas evolve from a specific problem or a phenomenon that arouses one's curiosity (Killion & Fisher, 2018). Additionally, since mobility flow are extremely difficult to measure & map, especially in Sub Sahara Africa due to logistical and structural challenges, the inductive approach provides the opportunity of thinking about diaspora and development in a unique way (Teye et al, 2017). As discussed earlier, the intense rivalry and scholarly debates on what constitutes a 'diaspora' is a fascinating trajectory to undertake/explore, given the theoretical inter-disciplinary differences. The research used this as a starting point to address contextual issues relevant to the study and in line with changing diaspora formations and enhanced mobility.

Irrespective of the differences in terminology, the inductive approach, which begins with detailed observation and then moves to generalized ideas, was crucial for the study in determining theoretical suggestions vs. relevant facts. The study intends to approach this conceptual divide inductively since it is considered a useful way of rethinking migration, diaspora, and development without the constraints of competing & divergent interdisciplinary positions. Finally, in a note of conclusion, it is not uncommon to discover things along the way, and as a fact, one of the key reasons for choosing the qualitative approach is that it is exciting and intense at the same time and can help yield rich data (Heacock & Hollander, 2011).

**4.4 The Research Process: Ethics & Limitations**

The researcher is aware of the ethical and research limitations and as such, conducting an interview in such an environment (fragile) is not only challenging but it could also be daunting. Even though the participants entirely consisted of diasporas, however, exposure to homeland may have brought back memories of highly polarized clan rivalry/divisions, etc which could potentially evoke memories of the civil war in the early 1990s. Depicted as the darkest moment in the country’s history, the war killed, maimed, and uprooted millions from their homes, the participants included.

I incorporated ethical research strategies throughout the study, for example, avoiding discussions about the civil war except for exploring institutional decay because of the war/absence of a strong government. Also, since the country is emerging from a long-protracted war, there has been few instances where diasporas working for the government have become targets for Al Shabab terror group. The deaths of two prominent diasporas in 2019, London raised, Somali-British Mogadishu Mayor & a notable Somali Canadian broadcaster and youtuber who was actively involved in recruiting the diasporas through an online platform with million viewers, required the anonymity of the participants and confidentiality of the data collected at the highest level.

## **4.5 Diaspora & Development: Rationale & Design**

The main objective of this study is to generate meaningful knowledge that could be applied as a foundation for understanding diasporas' contributions beyond remittances. Since no paradigm, philosophy, or research theory has a universal claim to authoritative knowledge, the study intends to take a social epistemology approach to explore human experiences (diasporas). Logically, all the different paradigms can equally be valid or appropriate depending on the research inquiry. Nonetheless, in pointing the norms that structure our understanding of diasporas' role in homeland development, the study chose to work within the African diasporas epistemological framework to address the imbalance in previous studies.

Also, notwithstanding the existence of substantial differences & significant variations in definitions, the study finds the emergence of valuable transnational epistemology in the development of knowledge in line with the emerging concept of de-territorialized borders, with the hope of expanding the temporal and spatial parameters of the term. In addition, the state of multiple belonging informed by cross border linkage, shifting the lenses from the conventional linear diaspora mobility patterns to a more interconnectedness beyond home-host borders was crucial in unearthing diverse aspects of diaspora contributions. For these reasons, the use of epistemology was deemed critical in serving as a framework to guide the researcher through the inquiry in understanding the role of diaspora in development and institutional structures (policies) impact on circulatory migration. A good example is the policy changes and the interrelatedness of diaspora-homeland relations beyond the imagined normality, beyond the traditionally tilted literature that solely focuses on remittances as a way of fostering/enhancing the relationship.

**4.5.1 Essential Methodological Tools for Diaspora Studies**

Early research on migration, circulation, and practices are deeply rooted in the 'homeland' concept, with much of the focus on socio-economic contributions (Bartram, 2018). Concerned with a small number of paradigmatic cases, Brubaker (2005) affirms that the changing dynamics of diasporas and migration patterns have necessitated the expansion and scope of research methodologies. The new development has enabled researchers to evaluate diaspora experiences through a transnationalism lens (Koinova, 2018). Delano & Gamlen (2014) maintain that migration research's critical implications show that the boundaries of inquiry will continue to expand even further, making a solid case for interdisciplinary collaboration in future studies.

Moreover, Faist (2010) acknowledges that the complexities and challenges of critical concepts in migration research paved the way & enabled the inclusion of much broader methods and methodologies to address the shortcomings in previous studies. Other scholars, most notably Bartram (2018); Hoerder (2018), discussions on the merits of empirical research on migrant formation and mobility, state the importance of understanding diasporas' contemporary social life in an increasingly interlinked globalized society with greater emphasis on improved technology in maintaining social and symbolic relations beyond home-host borders. Even with these new findings, some view changing diaspora transformations as primarily focused on identity/cultural structures-a crucial function for studying migration, hence acknowledging the role of 'shared culture' & idealized return to the homeland as a base for choosing a suitable research strategy (Barglowski et al., 2015).

Among the most prominent research studies on migration, diaspora and development are Marcus's (1995) approach to untangling the complexities of diasporic life, provides a resourceful way of researching diasporas through qualitative techniques. The author's seminal article "*Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi Sited Ethnography"* proposes a qualitative research strategy reflected on cross-border spatiality. The findings are crucial as transnational mobility was new at the time (Desi, 2010). In view of this, distinct dimension to diaspora research informed by cross-border mobility enhances our understanding of the processes, societal connections, and the significance of connecting various people and places at each stage (Marcus, 1995).

The model takes note of the importance of the contemporary social life of a 'transnational diaspora' to address methodological challenges inherent in previous studies. Since the study of diasporas is deemed too complex and multifaceted, this research finds Marcus's concept appealing in many ways:

1. The ground-breaking theory on researching migrant movements informed by cross-border mobility provides a base for understanding transnationalism manifestations & practices.
2. Given that each stage is considered a separate process, it enabled the researcher to reconstruct meanings and patterns emerging from diasporic societies' social practices. This includes exploring unchartered territories, including how diaspora maintains sustained transnational links through digital/technological advancement.
3. Failure to include women diasporas in previous studies- this study departs from conventional research in which methodological reasoning is anchored on male experiences.

In further exploring the impact of transnationalism and cross-border linkages, Amelina (2012); Schiller & Caglar (2016) call for an interdisciplinary approach to investigate the formation of diasporic communities and the impact of 'culture' in these formations. Mazzucato (2009), to mitigate challenges in previous diaspora studies, proposes the use of simultaneous research beyond home/host borders and argues that the best way to research migrants' transnational link can best be done through 'matched sample methodology.' Her focus on Ghanian migrants in the Netherlands and their subsequent contributions to transforming critical government institutions in the homeland provides practical guidance for this study. Equally important, the authors' suggestions that African diasporas are a potential resource that could be potentially exploited for continental growth & development aligns well with the aims and objectives of this research study (Mazzucato, 2009).

The possibility of making valuable contributions to the knowledge thus becomes hinged on selecting a suitable paradigm. It is, therefore, imperative to create an environment where the diasporas' experiences, views, and ideas are valued, respected, and cherished (Chambers et al., 2018). Empirical evidence from previous studies shows that valuing an individual's contribution & the selection of a suitable paradigm could yield rich data, which can be taken as a true representative of the diaspora's contribution towards homeland development (Small, 2018). To achieve that, the study is built around three fundamental concepts as a general framework:

1. Duration spent overseas. (Cultural Linkages/Identity).
2. Education level (Experiences, Skills, Expertise).
3. Duration spent in homeland (Reverse migration/Contribution).

As outlined in the preceding sections, while acknowledging the importance of current events, themes, dynamics, and migratory changing patterns, it is vital to highlight the impact of transnationalism as a resourceful way to address homeland development (Vertovec, 2012).

## **4.6 Positionality: Ethical Dilemmas Researching ‘Home'.**

In addition to the dilemmas associated with researching' home', Somalia has recently emerged from decades-old civil war that has ravaged most parts of the country. Therefore, it is not surprising that the ethical and emotional dilemmas both the researcher and the researched go through in search of seeking knowledge are daunting. As a Somali raised in the UK, I have kept a sustained emotional/social linkage to my ancestral home through family/work ties. Before my Ph.D. journey, I have travelled back 'home' on several occasions for work, leisure, and visiting extended family members. Although Somalia has made a remarkable recovery over the past years, my request to travel was rejected by the ethics review board solely based on the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) travel advice. Ironically, the Department for International Development (DfID), which falls under the docket of FCO, in collaboration with other government agencies were actively involved in recruiting skilled Somali professionals in the rebuilding process at the time of my request.

I cannot generalize the research context in which my initial plans were changed to navigate FCO's disapproval. However, finding a solution was imperative and as such I had to re-strategies and make few adjustments to the study. The change of plan(s) made it feasible to conduct the interviews/focus groups in different countries, in Turkey & the UK with few in Kenya, & Germany. I fervently hope that my experience will provide lessons to other researchers pursuing similar projects since there is an absolute scarcity of published materials covering failed/fragile and conflict zones. The few published tend to primarily focus on security, underestimating the nature of problems/constraints associated with researching a 'fragile homeland'. I will highlight a few of the challenges that I encountered in changing 'the venue' and how the research design was influenced by the inevitable changes to the previous proposal. Finally, I will address the risks that can emerge from 'researching home' and how individuals with dual nationality can grapple with the multiple facets of identity & belonging.

An international conference convened at the *University College of London* in 2007 under the auspices of *the Institute of Jewish Studies* explored the significance of 'homeland' to migrants and the multifaceted connections between diasporas and homeland (UCL, 2007). One of the key findings from the conference was the importance of 'homeland,' real or imagined, to migrants and the benefits associated with sustaining and fostering long-term relationships. In addition, the conference explored two essential dimensions of diaspora-homeland relations, the impact of rich, deep connections necessitated by migrant's experiences of 'homeland/the nature of identity/belonging reflected by the diasporas' attachment to their country of origin and the impact of shared cultural heritage in harnessing circular mobility (UCL, 2007).

Saito's (2021) view on researching homeland acknowledges the emotions, the excitement it evokes, affirming the context in which researchers find themselves in 'researching home' could be overwhelmed by unintended emotional events. Other scholars contributing to the dilemma’s researchers face cited the selection of research topics/questions, type of paradigm, and relevant methodological approaches as significant factors that could complicate the process. Therefore, attachment to the homeland through cultural, political, or economic ties is a significant obstacle in avoiding research bias. The study has explored existing theoretical and typological frameworks in analysing and understanding the general tendencies in which diaspora's connections to homeland provide them with collective identity/cultural commonality aspirations.

Researching' homeland' in this context meant researching my country of origin that I fled from during the peak of the civil war in 1991. Even though I was barely a teen at the time, my deep connections were based on shared culture, traditions, language, and nationality. These shared similarities were central to my research since they provided an essential avenue for gathering information that could have otherwise been impossible. Bhandari (2016) recognises the importance of shared historical origins & commonality, identifying 'cultural insiders' as a vital component in gaining trust, hence increasing the eagerness of the participants to respond. I must confess that the idea of a shared commonality was crucial in establishing rapport with the participants, with many believing that they have shared experiences and viewpoints with the researcher.

As Elias & Lemish observed (2011), researching home is not always as simple as it may look, and at times, researchers are forced to depart from their 'role' or, even worse, relinquish some of their authority to the respondents. In such a scenario, the dilemma of researching homes becomes not only complicated, but more importantly, it could potentially render the findings too generic. I have encountered a few occasions where the respondents used words such as '*you know about it*, or '*you must have heard this* *before.’* As such, I grappled with the difficulties of being a 'Somali,' 'Diaspora,' and 'Researcher' concurrently. However, my conduct throughout the study informed my ethical positionality, mandated that I uphold ethics & procedural consciousness throughout the entire process. Considering the impact of research bias, I exhibited total restraint not to be drawn into the conversation as an 'insider,' expressing curiosity to discover more intimate insights into their experiences, views, and opinions with words such as ‘*tell me more about it’,* ‘*this is very interesting’ & ‘I would love to hear your perspective*’.

Yet, in few instances where the respondents remained silent or tongue-tied, I drew upon my own experience as a 'diaspora' and a 'Somali' to stimulate the conversation, thus assuming the role of an 'insider,' albeit briefly. Laying claim to the various facets of my identity, especially regarding the interchanging roles of 'insider-outsider depending on the context, nature of the interview, was extremely helpful in navigating such situations. Additionally, subscribing to Holstein & Gubrium (1995) positionality, I have also crafted the subject of the interviews to show appreciation for their contribution to rebuilding their homeland. The author’s claim that personal appreciation helps rebuild confidence resonated well with the study. More importantly, it creates a deeper and more complete understanding of the research context, eliciting an extensive and authentic version of the interviewee's responses. The need for reflexivity was also vital since it provided new dimensions to the diasporas' contribution to post-conflict reconstruction (Hew & Cheung, 2008).

Though the research was conducted in English in its entirety due to the participants' hybrid identity, interjecting with a few words of Somali was crucially important. It enhanced the pace of the conversation, making the 'researched' feel more open and comfortable to discuss sensitive matters that could potentially be difficult to be obtained even by a 'knowledgeable outsider.' That being the case, the two main aspects of 'homeland' and 'cultural identity’ were both crucial in giving a 'voice' to the country, which is often portrayed negatively by Western media. Many scholars of African descent confess that international media coverage of the continent as narrow & laden with negative stereotypes. Franklin's (2013) findings on the *Daily Telegraph* & *The Guardian's* portrayal of Africa as "homogenous failed block, savages, otherness, human rights abusers" fuels the negative perception & Afro-pessimism in UK's leading media houses. To correct this negative preconception in popular Western media & given the fact that mainstream international coverage's/portrayal shapes local audiences (host-land) perceive Africa, many of the respondents felt comfortable being interviewed with someone who shares the same identity/culture/hybridity.

**4.7 Research Contribution**

The role of Somali diaspora contribution continues to be nurtured through economic and political participation-especially through remittances; attaining the focus of attention in terms of data collection & research; thus, a gap in research exists (Bradbury, 2008; Lindley, 2007; Lindley; 2010; Lewis, 1995; Lewis, 2003; Menkhaus, 2012). Since little attention has been devoted to the study of professional diaspora and transnational networks in PCR, particularly the role of the skilled workforce, this study aims to address the imbalance created by previous studies. Informed by the conceptual framework developed by *Jabareen*, the study seeks to contribute to our understanding of the role of skilled diaspora and transnational networks in PCR. In particular, the study aims to contribute to the increasing body of knowledge and literature about the role of skilled Somali diasporas intervention in PCR with much of the focus on strengthening governance & enhancing institutional capacity.

## **4.8 Research Methods & Design**

This part aims to outline the research design, methods, and strategy used to obtain data. The approach that was undertaken in selecting the appropriate research design and method that suits the study is shaped and guided by the conceptual framework and findings in the literature review. This study seeks to critically explore the role of professional diasporas in the rebuilding process & the impact of policy changes on reverse migration.

**4.8.1 Research Approaches**

The qualitative approach has become the standard for data generation in diaspora/migration and development studies. Qualitative data collection can best be described as "*a form of social inquiry that tends to adopt a flexible and data-driven research design, to use relatively unstructured data, to emphasize the essential role of subjectivity in the research process*" (Hammersley, 2013:12). In qualitative, researchers are more concerned with capturing relevant aspects of the subject of inquiry. The object to be studied ought to guide the researcher through the course of knowledge-seeking, and this was broadly relevant in exploring the role of skilled Somali diaspora's contributions to the rebuilding process. Additionally, using a qualitative approach was crucial in determining aspects of the same phenomena using documentary data, for example, the UN, donor/development agencies and INGOs since they occupied a critical position in service delivery during the heightened period of the civil war.

The researcher is aware of the limitations and merits of the qualitative research in contemporary migration, however, its suitability in addressing complex and often multifaceted diaspora relations to homeland, qualitative inquiry is well suited to analyses their engagement, mobilisation, and subsequent contributions to development. Equally significant, considering the multi-layered connections to different spatial/geographical places simultaneously and the emergence of transnationalism in recent years as a tool for gauging diaspora mobility, the use of qualitative research has enabled the researcher to gather rich insight & in-depth data, for example, analysing connections beyond home and host borders and how these transnational links are tied to homeland through shared identity, belonging, culture and obligations to serve the ‘motherland’. This will be discussed later in detail. There are clearly other approaches that could have been used to collect data, however, given the ‘fragility’ of the state & changing my initial plans at the final hour to navigate FCOs advise on ‘travel’ to Somalia, I find qualitative inquiry as exceptionally well suited in seeking validity & accurate accounting of diasporas’ contribution to homeland & how their contributions could be embedded into broader network of transnational/development activities since it allows researcher to refine research questions.

This was taken to understand the impact of their contributions since it provides a much deeper understanding on the ways in which sending states harness diasporas’ potential, maintain cultural linkages as well as the extent to which developing favourable government policies could potentially enhance circulatory migration (Amelina & Faist, 2012). Also, since mobility is shaped by different and divergent influences, including crucial factors shaping diaspora engagements, a distinct feature of qualitative methods is the ability to appropriately address and investigate this relationship more closely (Fischer, 2021). Moreover, it also enabled the researcher to explore the nature and impact of diasporas' transnational linkage and social formations. The use of qualitative approach in previous studies on transnationalism, albeit the concept being a new phenomenon, was useful in providing valuable information from a theoretical perspective.

As such, utilizing qualitative methods as a line of inquiry was critical in generalizing the theoretical understanding of transnational networks, formations and connections propelled by ‘shared culture’ or ‘shared identity.’ Unlike quantitative method, qualitative research does not necessarily imply reference to a larger population but rather allows the researcher to delve into deeper description of the studied phenomenon (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). In this regard, describing accurate experiences of the diaspora connections informed by transnationalism was crucially important in unearthing the complex and dynamic process of transnational network’s vertical/horizontal linkages and its impact on homeland development.

Since the ‘*raging*’ scholarly debate on what constitutes a diaspora is at a crossroads, I tend to approach this conceptual divide, by utilizing qualitative method as a way of providing valuable insights, increasing our understanding on the way we ordinarily conceptualise diasporas’ contributions to homeland and its impact on strengthening governance, legitimacy and enhancing service delivery in post conflict setting. Theorists dating back to the early 1950’s discussions on the rubric of return migration were less helpful in understanding diaspora’s circulatory patterns due to the competing and often complicated interdisciplinary narratives, and as such, the ‘contending typologies’ surrounding global patterns of mobility could not provide a general framework as a starting point (Barglowski et al, 2015). In contemplation of this, it is imperative to deliver a more theoretical, generalisable account of diasporas’ contributions towards homeland development through two important principles of migration/diaspora studies; ‘skilled return’ and ‘development’ and how these two prominent features could be explored beyond the often-cited remittances, without deviating from the norms of accepted theories. Hence, the need to analyse diaspora social networks informed by transnationalism and their subsequent contributions from a qualitative perspective.

Also, qualitative research has particular importance in migration studies & understanding the participants perceptions/views towards homeland development, which formed the basis of this research were more relevance in addressing the changing & multiple dynamics of diaspora mobility (Amelina, 2010). As a result, refining research questions during and after data collection, the diverse qualitative research techniques allowed for conceptual modifications with higher validity. Equally important, drawing upon empirical findings on previous studies on migration/development and the relationship between research design, theory, and practice, using qualitative as a way of inquiry provided a valuable understanding of diaspora-homeland development. Additionally, since diaspora studies are social processes, qualitative relative strength in addressing key issues and challenges, for example, defining approaches, research questions and developing conceptual and theoretical frameworks were central in providing insightful information in a concise and a comprehensive manner.

**4.8.2 Limitations of the Research**

* Travel- Due to travel advise from the FCO, the research was limited to diasporas working in Somalia but visiting Turkey/UK/Kenya. Travelling to Somalia may have potentially enhanced the outcome of the research in terms of data collection/observation/participants selection.
* Information-The study relied on voluntary disclosed information and since members of the diaspora working in different capacities have become victims of terror related attacks in the past, useful information may have been withheld for fear of reprisals.
* Interpretation-The data was interpreted by a single person, there is a possibility that other people’s interpretations may increase the research’s scope/validity.

**4.8.3 Documents & Historical Data (OBJ 1&2)**

The study relied on documents data from the UN, the federal government, and international NGOs for analysis. These data provide rich information on the role of skilled Somali diaspora contribution to PCR. The newly formed Diaspora Liaison Office also holds helpful information for the research. Additionally, data from the WHO's office in Mogadishu, UNICEF, UNSOM, and ministries of health, education, defence & water will provide invaluable information on the impact of diaspora-led development initiatives on PCR. The study will also use joint government & UN committee reports on the progress achieved in the reconstruction process. The Federal Government is planning to establish an agency that will provide quarterly reports on different sectors of the society, for example, defence, education, water & health coverage. The new agency aims to provide information based on distinct categories; diaspora-led, NGO, and government-led. Qualitative records are an essential source of information of historical data, and this could significantly complement primary data by connecting events in the past to the present (Bryman, 2012; Berg, 2007). Document data on mortality & morbidity rates, public service coverage can provide helpful information about the role of diaspora-led PCR. There is a possibility of incorporating interviews and data collected from documents by conducting detective-like fashion by tracing information to source. The study aims to interview fifteen key informants.

**4.8.4 Key Informants Interviews (OBJ 1,2,3)**

Acknowledging the limited scope of primary data available, obtaining information from critical informants is a well-suited strategy to the study because of its inexpensiveness and ability to collect reliable data from information-rich respondents (Denise, 2014). The WHO argues that in some domains, especially Health-related research, using a fundamental informant approach may enable the researcher to obtain more valid and less biased responses than the general population owing to their expertise in the field (Filippo, 2003). In this study, participants will be selected specifically based on their expertise. For example, collecting data from the head of an advocacy group on the role of the skilled diaspora workforce in governance participation will provide information that could otherwise be impossible to obtain from other sources. Likewise, since the project aims to explore the role of the skilled Somali diaspora professionals in PCR, interviewing head/project leaders that fit this category will help obtain valuable information. Also, key informants, for example, the current secretary of health, a diaspora who previously worked in PCR projects prior to becoming a member of the cabinet, can potentially provide an overall view of PCR and plans regarding diaspora engagement.

**4.8.5 Interviews with Professional Somali Diaspora (OBJ 1,2,3)**

Since the research focuses on understanding the role of the skilled Somali diaspora in PCR, the study aims to conduct semi-structured interviews with participants that fit the category-health, education, defence, development & water diaspora professionals. Also, the research aims to explore the role of the skilled Somali diaspora in the reconstruction process, semi-structured interviews, questions that can be adapted to suit individual requirements. Allowing a certain degree of flexibility will ensure that a wide range of issues regarding their role and impact can be discussed, for example, how they perform their tasks (Hesse-Biber, 2015). Overall, forty participants participated in the semi-structured interviews— from different sectors. The use of non-probability purposive sampling in qualitative inquiry has gained widespread acceptance in recent years due to its ability to select information-rich cases related to the phenomenon (Maxwell, 2016). The research will use purposive sampling because of the enormous ability to recruit the right participants for the study and reduce risks associated with generalisability (Greene, 2015). Additionally, using a purposive sampling unit for the study is extremely important simply because it enables the researcher to observe or interview specialists in a particular field, for instance, key ministerial officials- once establishing important variables before sampling begins.

**4.8.6 Sampling**

The use of purposive non-probability sampling in the study was necessitated by the lack of accurate data on the number of diasporas currently engaged in different fields of the reconstruction process. In selecting diasporas that are well informed with appropriate knowledge and experience, non-probability sampling enabled the researcher to select and identify information-rich potential participants (Greene, 2015). The selection process was based on the qualities the participants possess, their knowledge and experience in developing their home country and duration spent in homeland. In essence, in order to achieve the research objectives, it is imperative to obtain comprehensive understanding of the sampling process and as such, purposive sampling was deemed to have a considerable relevance in enhancing the research’s validity.

**4.8.7 Analysis**

The interviews will be analysed using thematic analysis (Andrews et al., 2012), which involves transcribing and reducing data from the interview into different themes. The transcripts and audio recordings will be imported into the NVivo. The final phase of the analysis involves identifying significant broader patterns of meaning (potential themes). Thematic analysis is theoretically flexible; thus, it provides a rich interpretation of the study, both inductive and deductive (Andrews et al., 2012; Smith et al, 2011).

**4.9 Focus Groups (OBJ 1&2)**

The use of focus group discussion is significant to the research study because of the valuable benefits associated with the discussion dynamics (Bryman, 2012). Using a purposively selected sampling, the group interaction will enable the researcher to obtain valuable information on the role of diaspora in PCR. By providing a more natural environment compared to the semi-structured interview, the concept can also be used as an observation in obtaining rich data. Using several carefully designed predetermined open-ended questions on the role of the skilled Somali diaspora workforce in the reconstruction process, building on views expressed by others will produce a range of ideas, experiences, and opinions that will be useful for the study (Creswell, 2015).

Six focus groups were conducted in neighbouring Kenya (3), Turkey (2) and the UK (1). The study is mindful of gender inclusion, and as such, female participants will be grouped separately. The difference in opinions, views highlighted in the focus group will provide an insight into the role of diaspora-led development initiatives and their impact on PCR. Since focus group discussion tends to be a socially oriented research methodology with a primary interest in interaction, efforts on the collective rebuilding process will provide a realistic account of the role of the skilled diaspora workforce in PCR (Bryman, 2012). Using constant comparison analysis, data will be chunked into smaller units, each given a different code (Creswell, 2009). The units are later grouped into categories, and themes are developed to express the contents of each of the groups. This type of analysis is vital for the study because of the multiple focus groups. It is worth noting that each focus group will be analysed separately. Thus, researchers could use the multiple groups to assess whether there are similarities in themes between the diverse groups. Doing so would assist the researcher in reaching data saturation and theoretical saturation.

**4.9.1.0 Autoethnography (OBJ3)**

Autoethnography has become a powerful data collection tool in social science (Chang, 2010). In order to investigate the role of diaspora engagement in their home country, the researcher integrated previous experience in data collection. There are several benefits associated with autoethnography in this research; it provided a holistic and intimate perspective on the 'familiar' data, thus enhancing cultural understanding of policies attracting Somali diaspora to serve in their country of origin. Also, it allowed the researcher an easy access to the source of information (Chang, 2010).

### **4.9.1.1 Secondary Data Analysis**

Analysing secondary data is an established practice within social science research, and as such, it provides rich data (Andrews et al., 2012). It is also a cost-effective, convenient, and credible method for generating knowledge from existing data. Secondary data in this study is used to re-examine the primary study question for corroboration. It will also provide a large amount of information that would otherwise be unavailable in primary data sets (Creswell, 2009).

**4.9.2 Complementary Analysis**

The use of secondary data qualitative analysis is an established and well-documented methodology. The study will use secondary data (documents) to re-examine the primary research questions with the purpose of corroboration (Steinmann, 2011). Based on this information, the study will use a complimentary analysis method. This entails using existing data as cross-validation, which can be used to verify the results of the principal analysis (Steinmann, 2011).

**4.9.3 Assessing the data**

Assessing secondary data will be based on the quality of the dataset available and whether the primary dataset can provide answers to the questions of the secondary research (Andrews et al., 2012). Therefore, it is essential to ensure that the assessment should increase the potential of collecting data that provides 'appropriate depth' and 'pertinent detail.' This means collecting a sufficient and reasonable amount of information (Steinmann, 2011).

**4.9.4 Recordings & Transcriptions**

Informed consent will be sought from the participants prior to the interviews. The participants must be briefed on the primary purpose of the interview (Creswell, 2009). The researcher will ensure that participants are aware of the research purpose, reasons for recording, the duration of the recording, and information on who has to access the recordings. Interview data can either be recorded by handwritten notes or audiotaping. This study aims to use Dictaphone to record the interviews. The chief merit of using such devices in the study is that it provides a complete and accurate record of the entire interview (Creswell, 2009).

## **Conclusion**

Undoubtedly, selecting the right paradigm was critical to this study as it determined the philosophical framing of the research from the beginning to the end. The study acknowledges the parameters of the research paradigm in previous studies on migration, diaspora, and development and, in particular, its contribution to the philosophical worldview concept, which has fundamentally influenced the way data was collected, analysed, understood, and interpreted. Indeed, logically related steps & the analytical procedures employed in previous studies provided a consistent base for the design and implementation and, more importantly, guided the researcher towards using appropriate approaches of inquiry. More importantly, a key strength of previous studies is that it enabled the researcher to distinguish the different activities and stages of research through adopting good plans and procedures of inquiry, allowing grounds for a rebuttal.

This was crucially important in the study since most of the examined studies on diaspora, development elements that are often interlinked& overlapped, tend to have reached theoretical saturation, hence the need to revisit previous claims to increase coherence and legitimacy. The research also used personal construct theory as a guide since the author was familiar with the research setting's geographical, political, and structures. Having served and worked in Somalia in different capacities, I believe my status (diaspora, Somalia, hybrid identity) helped create a conducive environment and a base for constructing research instruments, i.e., interview questions. However, despite the commonalities, it was vital to include adaptive self-distancing to minimize risks associated with getting drawn into the interview as an 'inside. In order to sufficiently answer the research objectives, the study conducted 6 focus groups with male and female participants equally represented. The aim of the mixed gender focus groups was to gather as much relevant information on the government’s policies and diaspora’s role in the rebuilding process and their differing perspectives on the rebuilding process.

The set-up of the focus groups was designed in a way that will elicit broad responses from the participants. Additionally, it was also vital for collecting information from the diasporas’ different perspectives and experiences. Furthermore, semi structured interviews were critical in analysing formations of transnational networks and their role in skill development and institutional capacity building. The information gathered from the semi structured interviews provided information about their ‘lived in’ experiences as diasporas working in Somalia. The data from the focus groups validated much of the information collected in the semi structured interviews. The study conducted focus groups in Kenya and Turkey followed by the semi structured interviews in a span of one and half years. This was intentionally devised to probe divergent views from the focus group on the reconstruction process further.

## **Chapter 5: Mobilisation Strategies**

**5.1 Introduction**

This chapter examined the often-complex process of skilled Somali diaspora mobilisation and their subsequent impact on post-conflict reconstruction in a thematically arranged chronology (See Fig. 4.1). The sectors covered by the government, INGOs, and development agencies' engagement/recruitment activities in mobilizing the diaspora are not solely aimed at economic development but, most importantly, encompass other social, cultural, artistic, and political aspects. While the general historical context of diaspora mobilisation is well documented exclusively within the parameters of their contribution to home countries, a constantly changing global migration patterns beyond the remit of the old classical analysis of home-host states relationship calls for the need to reassess their engagement through a multi-disciplinary approach A great diversity of programs dealing with different aspects of diaspora issues are acknowledged, but only a few are comprehensively covered in this study.

A drawback in contemporary studies on Somali diaspora is the failure to incorporate changes in transnationalism return mobility to address linkages between homeland and diaspora networks and their effectiveness in the mobilisation process. To further examine the interest that drives the government's new policies and its implication on the diaspora-development nexus, focus on the diaspora-state relationship & whether diaspora groups' response to the state's call for assistance is reactive. Their contributions are merely linked to the government's call for action. I embark on extending the scholarly debate/dialogue on theorizing identity, cultural belonging, and nationalism paradigm in a global-transnational context. More importantly, the study will also, inconsequent chapters, cover ways in which 'identity' and 'culture' have been previously conceptualized in various disciplines and how this is reflected in contemporary migration mobility.

Diagram

Description automatically generated

Fig 5.1 Home State Integrated Approach. Source: Author, (2021).

**5.2 Building Trust**

Part of the government's effort in the mobilisation process is to build sustainable trust with its diasporic community abroad. There is a long history of the connection between Somali diasporas and home country After the publication of the Brahimi report (2000) on post-conflict reconstruction, the UN, World Bank, and other world-leading institutions in Somalia have increased their efforts and commitment to reconstruction and peacebuilding process through better coordination of various actors involved in the rebuilding process; especially the diaspora (Hammond, 2012; Hammond, 2013; Menkhaus, 2012) Also, gaining increased interests are charitable organisations and international non-governmental organisations strategic drive to promote skilled diaspora workforce return to their home of origin As a result, in 2018, aid organisations in collaboration with the Federal government in Somalia established coherent strategies for diaspora engagement in peacebuilding activities (UNSOM, 2018).

The federal government has invested substantially in nurturing exceptional and mutually beneficial relationship with its diaspora by incorporating emigration policies into its developmental agenda.

The finding uncovers a process that is multifaceted, complex, and multidimensional characterised by discontinuous sub-spaces, hence the need to develop sustainable and mutually beneficial partnership strategies and policies Since 2017, the federal government, structured itself around a roadmap aimed at creating a direct link between diaspora groups/transnationals and the government which is anchored in the circulation of people, goods, and information The government's goal is to strengthen and reinforce existing relationships while at the same time targeting skilled members of the diaspora to channel their knowledge and expertise to their country of origin Considering the prominence of this relationship for the rebuilding process, an excerpt from the interview reflects the importance of attaining at least two of the three principal conditions necessary for the initiative to succeed:

**Saney**: *The government has made remarkable achievements in luring the diaspora back to the country. For instance, during the recent flooding, the draught in early 2011 that displaced millions and killed hundreds of thousands, diaspora's financial & technical contributions have had a significant and tangible impact on the ground. Notably, the government has embarked on increasing trust and ensuring that financial assistance from the diaspora is not embezzled. Secondly, the government is keen on improving this relationship through conducive policy initiatives* (**Saney A.** Istanbul, Turkey**).**

**5.2.1 Reinforcing Contribution of Skilled Somali Diaspora**

The responses obtained from the interviews suggest that the diaspora-development nexus is an integral part of the government's post-conflict inner government structure. The current government is keen on ensuring that the process builds on the previous success of diaspora engagement in countries such as India and China (Goud & Mukherjee, 2015; Tejada & Bolay, 2010) In his opening speech at the recently concluded United Nations General Assembly meeting in 2019, Somalia's president stressed the need to engage more vigorously with its diaspora to drive the government's reconstruction and development agenda, citing Albania as an example.

**Yahya**: *Part of the government strategy is to appeal directly to the diasporas through regular visits, holding face-to-face consultation with members of the diaspora, and appealing to their emotional attachment to their homeland* (**Yahya, Y** London, UK).

In Addition to the president's positive gestures & diaspora-homeland rapprochement, the Prime Minister's Office is particularly interested in mobilizing at least 10 thousand skilled Somali diasporas back to their country of origin annually until the end of 2025; a notion backed by the World Bank and IMF At the local level, the PMs office appears to be the critical feature for channelling and enhancing diaspora contributions Such approaches are critical in ensuring that developmental projects are completed within a short time of period To achieve its ambitions, the government has included direct forms of support (financial) specifically targeting diaspora who are returning for the second or third time. The diaspora groups adopted a different strategy of linking and working with other Somali Diaspora Groups in the EU, USA, Canada, and Australia. Through a network consisting of distinct groups in different countries, the groups could create a network capable of mobilizing skilled Somali diaspora in different countries. Focusing on information sharing and communication channels as a critical component of their policy, the groups could share job applications and new funding opportunities, among others.

**I:** *On the issue of working with the government in engaging/recruiting the diaspora, how different are the (transnational networks) strategies from the government and other stakeholders, for example, IOM's Quest Mida?*

**Adam**: *Our strategies align with the governments,’ but we are independent of their recruitment agenda (embassies). They support us morally and through our vast network of diaspora groups in different countries*.

**I:** *And how is that different from the government's agenda on recruitment? It seems that the organisations you are talking about could be viewed as employment agencies and the government as the employer.*

**Adam**: *Not really. The federal government does not have a presence in most countries, let alone all significant cities in the West. The EU/Belgium embassy is overstretched, they can only rely on skilled, and diaspora entrepreneurs from Belgium Ours are different. We have established and linked organisations in significant Europe, US/Canada together, and places where the government does not have a presence, like Holland. We have a Somali grassroots organisation willing to act as a go-between.*

**I:** *How do you link these organisations together?*

**Adam**: *During the 2017 London Somali Summit, many Somali organisations from various parts of the world met and discussed sharing information on rebuilding, filling gaps in skills, and having a shared information centre to post job adverts. Then a year later, the Ankara Summit allowed us to go global and link most organisations to a single database which was later transferred to the Deputy Prime Minister's Office* (**Adam, O**. London, UK).

The importance of transnational networks in the rebuilding process contextualizes the extent to which these organisations assume 'state role' in the absence of the government due to the scope of their activities as typified in the discussions below:

**I:** *How important is the role of Somali diaspora networks to the government in engaging with the diaspora?*

**Amina**: *We are actively involved in assisting the government to address issues of skill shortages, reconstruction, lobbying, seeking funds for rebuilding, labour needs, among other critical issues to speed up the recovery. Initially, we started linking diverse groups virtually, then had the opportunity to bring those in the same country together than the same continent. The government is weak and cannot engage with the diaspora in all places; they are struggling to pay state workers regularly, and setting up new consular services, diaspora recruitment centres, or embassies is not their priority now what* *else can they do with the meagre budget pay soldiers in the front line or set up new offices in different cities, we are better acquainted with diasporas skills, expertise, and knowledge. I am glad we can provide such services, and it has worked well so far* (**Amina, C.** Istanbul, Turkey)

**5.2.2 Diaspora- Gov't Taskforce**

The Somali government established a formal government institution to monitor and evaluate existing diaspora engagement policies to restore faith and increase diaspora engagement. A key task force consisting of diaspora members and key government officials was established in 2018. The primary duty of the joint committee is to provide a broad but flexible policy framework capable of scaling up diaspora engagement in the country. The committee, which the Prime Minister's office directly supervises, is currently partnering with external agencies in host countries to facilitate diaspora engagement and recruitment initiatives further. In exploring the significance and value of its diaspora, the Federal Government has embarked on strategizing short-term reverse migration. This proposition is available to skill and semi-skilled Somalia diasporas throughout the year. The duration offered by the government varies from 6 months to 2 years depending on the government's development needs a considerable number of respondents considered this as a stepping-stone to prolong their stay. Through a historical review, the Somali government's response to reverse migration policies and strategies has evolved in line with the political, economic, and social changes at the domestics, but also, most importantly transnational level as well.

**Warfa**: *The government's initiatives in targeting the diaspora have diversified with increased intensity in the past five years. Senior members of the cabinet, critical heads of critical government agencies, the president, Prime Minister are all from the diaspora. Initially, the government developed a roadmap of engagement based on short duration/stay, but many opted to stay longer to improve stability. Practically, this is a diaspora 'owned' government* (**Warfa,** Nairobi, Kenya).

The government's role in recruiting skilled workforce from the diaspora also stems from the fact that they were seen as positive reputational agents in host countries. In 2016, Professional Somalis in the UK lobbied against Barclay's intention of closing money transfer accounts commonly known as Hawala in Somali. A section of diaspora of groups are also politically active in host countries, thus providing the Somali government with access to the proper channels, in essence, they act as a bridge between host and home countries, especially in countries where Somalia has no diplomatic presence. As a result, the government has exploited these links and made diaspora management an essential aspect of government policy.

**5.2.3 Diaspora Mobilisation**

There are no exact figures on the number of the skilled Somali diaspora in the country, although unpublished government figures are estimated to be around 70-90 thousand at any given time. In Addition, the department in charge of diaspora mobilisation, which consists of inter-government ministries, could only account for skilled diaspora in the public sector, which is estimated to be around 12 thousand; However, according to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), there are between 10 to 15 thousand skilled Somali diasporas currently engaged in different aspects of the rebuilding process This includes those engaged in the private sector, particularly in the construction sector. The study focuses on crucial stakeholder mobilisation strategies to better understand diaspora mobilisation. This includes the Federal Government of Somalia, International Development Agencies, and transnational networks. The study will also explore the different mobilisation practices and their effectiveness & relation to the recruitment process. Lastly, the study will highlight the gaps between the state INGOs and donor agencies and explore the crucial dimensions of diaspora mobilisation strategies adopted by the different stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction.

**5.2.4 Mobilisation Strategies**

Below is an example of the sending state’s outreach strategies targeted at maximising the potential of skilled reverse migration (Fig 4.2).

Diagram

Description automatically generated

Fig.5.2 Diaspora Mobilisation. Source : Author, (2021)

**5.2.5 Social Media Recruitment Strategy**

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has long called upon its diaspora to contribute to the reconstruction process with a well-thought-out strategy actively. The study reveals that the government's 'seductive' gesture towards its diaspora has a specific mechanism that empowers government embassies and ministries to reach out to its diasporic community in different countries, with much of the endeavours centred on 'extracting' maximum material, human and financial resources From an 'instrumental perspective,' the FGS through its own volition chooses 'who' and 'which' diasporic organisations to reconnect with as its central mobilisation strategy Recognising its diaspora as an asset, the state is forced to respond opportunistically In this regard, the state-diaspora nexus relationship and the nature of their engagement are constantly reconstituted to suit its immediate needs. A key informant highlighted this in the discussion whose duty was to bring scattered transnational networks under a coherent discourse in line with the FGS's reconstruction agenda:

**Ali**: *The government is aware of diaspora's financial, material, and political strengths and uses it to address and mitigate problems at home To give you an example, when we were faced with severe famine and drought in 2011, the worst of its kind in years, the transitional government's efforts were geared towards diasporic organisation to spearhead the government's fundraising efforts Senior government officials visited different cities in Europe and North America, and our goal was very clear, we need money as a matter of urgency to save lives but most importantly, the transitional government's engagement with the diaspora at the time was purely to raise much needed funds from the diaspora which was very successfully The government led by the PM pursued a highly determined strategy at the time, and once sufficient money was raised, it modified its strategy to encourage health & humanitarian professionals to help with the problems of internally displaced people, which the government could not cope with* (**Ali, M.** Istanbul, Turkey**).**

Similar thoughts were also expressed by the FGS's head of the UK's diaspora mobilisation strategy group.

‘*The country's challenges are immense and multifaceted. We have humanitarian, reconstruction, training needs, social-economic development, political stability, clan, and tribal challenges. The government has established a mechanism of addressing the most pressing issues it faces at a time, we do not have the financial/technical and human resources to tackle* *all these issues concurrently, together with the office of deputy PM (Mahdi Khadar), we devised ways of engaging the diaspora according to the immediate needs at home and so far, it seems to have worked UNDP effectively, and other organisations recognise our strategy and have since adopted a similar strategy, solve one problem at a time* (**Fardosa, A**. London, UK).

The government is actively involved in mobilizing skilled diaspora through social media. Its current policy towards recruitment involves using different social media platforms to encourage and recruit skilled workforce back to the country, For instance, the use of Twitter & Facebook to showcase positive stories from diaspora currently working in different aspects of the rebuilding process Excerpts from the interview with a senior with a critical informant established that the government's new measures are intended to help organise its diasporas abroad and enhance their long-term contributions.

Also, the fast-changing recruitment landscape in the country necessitated the need for an alternative recruitment strategy. Since the country has achieved relative stability in recent years, especially in Mogadishu and surrounding towns, numerous projects were initiated by the government to rebuild key government institutions.

The conventional way of mobilizing and recruiting skilled Somalis was no longer appropriate to recruit large numbers of applicants, hence the need to focus on social media as a recruitment tool. The new strategy, which covers all aspects of the recruitment process, helped the government make timely and informed decisions using the information available on its numerous social platforms. Several IT specialists were flown to the country to spearhead social media to mobilize the diaspora. According to excerpts from the interview, a London based IT consultant admits that the use of social media in recruitment was driven by the fact that the world was moving away from *analog* to *digital*. In the interview, the respondent indicated that a group of young IT specialists was flown to Mogadishu on a 6-month rotational basis. Overall, the government acknowledges that there has been an uptake in the recruitment of skilled Somalis from the diaspora. This is corroborated by an IT specialist response pointing out that the new recruitment strategy has actively accelerated the recruitment process.

**I:** *You have mentioned moving away from conventional recruitment practices to social media. How has social media and other broader sets of social technology and techniques changed the government's approach to recruitment? How is this effective*?

**Warsame**: *Somalia is one of the few countries in Africa that has used different social media platforms to its advantage. We actively engage with the diaspora through Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other platforms. We relay information on the transformational changes and encourage others to come and contribute to the reconstruction.*

……. *The Western media is preoccupied with showing the negative side of Somalia, often focusing on destruction, chaos, anarchy BBC always has a 20-year-old photo of ruined Somalia on its web page or TV screen whenever Somalia is covered in their news This will scare away young, potential members of the diaspora to return home and help us with state-building Ours is to show positivity on social media and attract skilled people to return We use the slogan 'dad walba dadkiisa dhisaa' (Every country is built by its own people) slogan to convey our message We have millions of followers on different platforms, and we use it to our advantage for recruitment We have specialised IT team that stays for 6 months or more on a rotational basis, their aim is to maximise the use of social media, show the positive side of the reconstruction and strides made so far, where we came from as a country and where we currently are Most importantly, we showcase members of the diaspora achievements, and this allows us to attract more conveniently* (**Warsame, M,** London, UK).

The argument for using social media in mobilizing its diaspora is grounded in two main points. First, passages from the interview with a member of the diaspora acknowledge that social campaigns are easier to reach a wider audience globally due to increased interconnectivity. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, social media has multiple implications for increasing the government's outreach efforts in mobilizing at a short period- and in extent, recruiting emigrants with the right skills and qualifications. The platform also allows the government to monitor the mobilisation process in 'real-time and adjust their policies/campaigns accordingly. One of the consequences of expanding the government's communication channel is the changing dynamics of diaspora mobilisation and engagement strategy. Findings from the interview with two key informants admit that the government's change of strategy is well suited to reflect the changing dynamics in the contemporary recruitment environment.

Both interviewees admitted that numerous social media channels under the name *Nabad iyo Nolol* loosely translated as 'peace & life' were established with the sole aim of recruiting and reaching a larger diaspora audience Furthermore, monthly live streaming on different social media platforms to engage with potential skilled diaspora emigrants is broadcasted focusing on strategic and priority sectors set out by the government The live streaming is intended to present Somalia and its government in the most favourable light. -It is worth noting that the government occasionally uses these platforms to discredit critics and opposition members. This notion is partially acknowledged by Yusuf, a senior federal government member.

**I**: *Some may view the government's robust social media approach to silence critics abroad and focus solely on the positive side of diaspora contribution?*

*Yussuf: There is nothing wrong with that, there are few people in the diaspora who have requested the government to recognise them as social media 'ambassadors It is all financially, and greed driven, give us money, and we will tell the diaspora the excellent work you are doing We have passed that stage now, we can do it ourselves, we have the capacity I remember when we first came to Somalia, most of us had to survive on meagre financial resources, the government was unable to look after us, we left our well-paid jobs, families*, *friends, children But that is 15 years ago, things are different now, most members of the diaspora are well paid and looked after, we do not need someone who is from the comfort of his bedroom in the West to ask us for money We can do it ourselves and focus on the positive reconstruction and contribution of the diaspora Very soon, hopefully in a year or two, the stadium which is undergoing refurbishment will be opened and most credit goes to skilled diaspora who sacrificed their lives for their country, not those that make noise from afar* (**Yussuf, Y.** Nairobi, Kenya**).**

The new communication strategy allows the government to reach a larger audience using different languages, for example, English, Swedish, and Dutch. Several members from the diaspora were recruited to spearhead the government's efforts in the mobilisation process. Through the provision of immediate access to images and sound on reconstruction and development, Somalis in the diaspora are exposed to daily events, further reinforcing revived emotions and attachment to homeland, with many respondents openly acknowledging experiencing emotional and cultural connection In Addition to broadcasting images of a 'distant' homeland, the strategy enables the state to penetrate deeper into diaspora enclaves The use of social media in mobilisation confirms the emergence of a new strategy in the recruitment and mobilisation of Somali diasporas.

An orchestrated effort by the government led to creating an integrated communication strategy in engaging with its diaspora. The establishment of Somali National Television (SNTV) on satellite and YouTube has helped strengthen links between home and host lands-conveying relevant information. Additionally, with the financial assistance from Norway, the Federal Government created a 'one-stop shop' online access, which enables potential returnees to seek advice, information, and assistance. The digital platform aims to connect with the diaspora and link individuals/groups and the government. The Chair of UK-based 'Diaspora Engage' (R37) acknowledges that the digitalization of diaspora mobilisation & engagement has proved to be a successful recruitment tool and empowering the Diaspora Liaison Office to provide quick and efficient service delivery.

**Rageh**: *SNTV broadcasting directly to the diaspora was a meaningful change. There is no doubt about the impact it has on recruitment and engaging with the diaspora The minister of information and the director-general of the ministry, both members of the diaspora, knew the importance and value of media and the need to broadcast through satellite to a larger diaspora audience It has enabled our diasporic community in the US, Britain, Canada, and other places to remain in direct contact with their home through television Then a few years later, we decided to set up broadcasting offices in London and Minnesota, our audience grew by tenfold.*

………*We were able to give them a different narrative from the typical western news outlets and show them the impact of the war on infrastructure, social wellbeing, and the importance of rebuilding the country. This is indeed a meaningful change, and through the establishment of SNTV, we were quickly able to raise funds for different projects, appeal directly to skilled and diaspora entrepreneurs, and inform the diaspora of the terror group Al- Shabab atrocities. Last year, SNTV introduced programs and integrated TV with social media platforms, inviting different professionals to discuss their work, contribution, and reconstruction needs. It made it easier for FGS to recruit, solicit money and engage the diaspora d*irectly (**Rageh, E.** Nairobi, Kenya**)**.

Findings from the interviews highlight the importance of innovative technologies, particularly the internet, which has enormously strengthened and enhanced collaboration between different Somali diaspora groups globally. The study also revealed that the communication strategy of these networks uses non-conventional methods of mobilizing skilled Somali diasporas, for example, re-circulating job opportunities in different countries. Given this context, the transnational networks have a competitive age compared to the Federal government's mobilisation approach. It is corroborated by a critical informant working for the government confessing that 'Somali Diaspora Groups are a valuable source of recruitment and mobilisation tool for the government.

**Warfa**: *Diaspora organisations and individuals have many advantages regarding recruitment. They can appeal directly to friends, family members and encourage them to return to Somalia. Before becoming a cabinet secretary, I have travelled to Somalia on numerous occasions for work and visiting family members. Upon returning to the US after a short visit, I encouraged two of my cousins to travel with me; the Directorate of civil aviation currently employs one. The other has invested heavily in the catering industry* (**Warfa,** Nairobi, Kenya).

Since these transnational networks are bound by shared values that transcend geographical boundaries, they demonstrate a horizontal exchange of ideas and information all the parties involved contribute and gain. The findings also show that these groups took upon themselves to develop a structural network and create a formal structure with representatives from different countries in developing a coherent and robust networking system:

**Jawahir**: *Globalisation and enhanced communication invention have simplified contacting other diaspora organisations worldwide. In the absence of a strong government, we have managed to create a virtual meeting place for these organisations, bringing us closer to the extent that you will not notice that we live in various parts of the globe* (**Jawahir.** Leicester, UK).

Also, the concept of nationalism to many of the respondents signifies a conspicuous example of identity mobilisation through transnationalism. The study found that using diasporic identity as a tool to mobilize, the government's efforts in appealing to its diaspora beyond geographical boundaries have enabled the diaspora to be a resource for socio-political and economic success. The study underlined the importance of recent political developments in their home country, which has reignited a renewed sense of nationalism. Many respondents justified the need to connect with other diasporas beyond geographical boundaries.

**5.2.6 Incentives**

Another salient fact concerns the government's financial incentive to emigrants returning to their country of origin to partake in the reconstruction process. Since Somalia is emerging from decades-old civil war, there are shortages of skilled and trained professionals in almost all sectors. Rebuilding key government institutions and providing adequate services is a perennial problem all countries face in a post-conflict setting. A handful of the respondents indicated that financial incentive was instrumental in deciding to relocate. Notwithstanding the government’s constrained financial capability, it aims to foster the permanent return of its diaspora is to devise an incentive package that is appropriate to the local situation with limited concessions. Several mixed incentives approaches are currently used to lure diasporas back to the country. One of the most critical elements of the incentives is to provide a 'decent' salary to extend their stay and further attract a strong pool of talent. Empirical findings from the study provide ample evidence on the perceived inequity between the locals and the diasporas, with many acknowledging that they are paid far more than their 'Somali' counterparts. Most respondents indicated that salaries (based on host states' market rates) are well-matched with their current positions, including those employed by international organisations such as UNDP, WFP, IOM, and the World Bank.

In Addition to the reasonable salaries paid to the 'expats,' most of the respondents are employed in senior managerial/policy framework positions due to their qualifications and skills acquired in host countries. To this effect, a rights-based approach to employment forms the basis for their engagement and subsequent contribution to homeland development, as claimed by one of the respondents:

**Hanad**: *Almost all the qualified Somali diasporas are assigned critical managerial and administrative duties, from the office of the Prime Minister to the president, senior officials almost half of the cabinet, slightly over half of all the DGs (Director General), key ministries, finance, defence, development, aviation are all occupied by members of the diaspora They bring their knowledge, skills, and professional background like the current Minister of Transportation & Aviation (Abdullahi Omaar) from Canada, for the first time since 1991, Somalia's airspace is under the control of the FGS, ICAO previously managed it from a rented office in Nairobi, Kenya I can give you many examples of exemplary diaspora members' contributions and the ministries, other government agencies key positions they hold, and how they were able to manage it successfully.*

*It is not only confined to FGS; look at member states and the number of diasporas in crucial positions, take Puntland for example, almost all the key ministries are diaspora dominated, look at the civil society groups throughout the country, look at all the major reconstruction projects, from the airport to the expansion of Mogadishu port, all these projects are diaspora led* (**Hanad, Y.** London, UK).

It is clear from the findings that the mixed incentives approach was crucial to the emigrant's decision regarding filling positions deemed 'critical resources' for post-conflict development.

**I**: *If not for the senior positions or the well-paid jobs, would you still be in Somalia now?*

**Hand**: (Laughs), *Well, well, when you leave your family abroad, and you were the breadwinner, they still rely on you financially. Then you got family members that relied on your remittances, and they still need financial assistance. Honestly, although we have done some magnificent work, it will be complicated to be underpaid, yet they expect you to stay. I know some who have done it during the transitional period. However, it is not sustainable in the long term, even IOM and UNDP diaspora recruitment programs pay the diaspora handsomely* (**Hanad, Y.** London, UK**)**

**Abdul**: *The pay allows me to help my family back in Birmingham (UK) and those that are here. I brought three family members from the village and enrolled them at school. I am responsible for their education, health, and upkeep the good pay allows me to help my country recover and take care of my immediate and extended family members. My work experience, skills, and education reflect my salary* (**Abdul, M**. London, UK)

**5.2.7 Socio-Cultural Connection**

### **5.2.7.1 Remittances**

Using emotional ties to their country of origin, the Somali government's approach towards its diaspora using a social-cultural connection to their homeland has been steadily growing. The government's main agenda is to lure more skilled people back to participate in reconstruction. Most of the respondents indicated that they had maintained links with family members back home, sending money, investing in businesses, and educating family members since the collapse of the government in the early 1990s. Remittances played a crucial role in maintaining and sustaining a strong bond between the diasporas and their home country (Somalia). The study also established that not all facets of socio-cultural connections to the homeland are symmetrical, women were more likely to have sustained links to their country of origin than their male counterparts 80% of women respondents claimed to have financially contributed to their immediate/distant family members regularly When probed further, a male respondent indicated that money remittances and other social and philanthropic contributions within the Somali community are mainly macro managed by females in the household. Changing tack slightly, I further asked whether remittances mainly drove connection to the homeland. The earlier question was augmented to ascertain the gender imbalance of socio-cultural connection to their homeland and examine the relationship between the diaspora and their homelands beyond remittances. The response elicited mixed reactions from both male and female respondents. Unlike the previous questions, which demonstrated that women overwhelmingly bear the burden of remitting money to their loved ones, keeping regular contact was shared among all genders. The majority of the respondents indicated that they maintain frequent contacts through telephone/social media.

### **5.2.7.2 Mobilising Through Philanthropy**

In crafting the research questions, the most challenging probe was defining the term 'philanthropy' instead of remittances. Even though both serve the same purposes; alleviating poverty, providing financial assistance, and improving livelihood for family members and friends, philanthropic resources tend to benefit the general society. Findings from the interview established that drawing on their personal and professional network, ¾ of the respondents have engaged in charitable contributions within the last five years. In Addition to leading in remittances, female respondents were more likely to contribute to charitable causes in their home country than their male counterparts. This can be attributed to women being more likely to be emotionally attached to their country of origin through remittances. The study also established that Somali woman mainly manage fundraising in host countries, hence the overwhelming support for philanthropic causes:

**Omar**: *Remittances & charitable causes usually fall under domestic obligations in Somali society, and women generally manage this. Also, we must remember that women are more emotionally driven when assisting family members, which could potentially explain the gender gap in remittances, philanthropical causes* (**Omar, S.** Istanbul, Turkey).

However, another factor in the calculus of philanthropic giving is that the act is deeply rooted in Somali culture and religious principles of Zakat (income-based financial contribution) and Sadaqah (voluntary contributions given in Ramadan). Most members of the Somali diaspora embrace the principle of helping the needy as a duty. The majority of the respondents indicated that they must pay a certain percentage of their wealth to the needy. As such, the issue of giving money to charities is viewed as fulfilling a religious obligation. However, despite the religious compulsion in helping the poor, a wide gender gap has emerged. Women are more likely to contribute to the rebuilding process through generous contributions. With the passage of time, transnationalism and globalization reinforced philanthropic contributions either individually or through a network of community organisations abroad. The bulk of female respondents claimed to have raised funds for organisations located in the US, Canada. As far as Australia is tasked with rebuilding critical government institutions, Respondents cited numerous and sometimes overlapping reasons for their involvement in the rebuilding process. However, one key issue remained unchanged; mobilizing the diaspora through charitable causes, the government continues to nurture this stable source of external finance to help deliver critical milestones in the recovery process.

**I**: *You have mentioned the scale and effectiveness of organizing and participating in other charitable causes organized by diaspora members. What are the strategic drivers of diaspora involvement in philanthropic activities*?

**Anab**: *Drawing from my personal experience, networks are the most effective tool in organising and raising funds for charitable causes we usually organise events through social media and Somali owned TVs around the world What we do is simple, do fundraising in London for example, and replicate the success in other cities, we also relied on foot soldiers, young graduates that have either returned from Somalia or are willing to travel soon. They can easily relate the work we are doing and that makes a lot of difference, this is an excellent example of this networking is the establishment of Walal Afuri (Donate to needy during Ramadan) and the unique fundraising strategies we adopted with no overhead costs and the federal government on its part requested money transfer agencies to waive commission (fee) which they did without hesitation The FGS advised us to publish donations based on cities around the world daily and this somehow created competition on which city donates the most Almost all my friends are family members still contribute to the cause since it was started in 2015 or 16* (**Anab, C.** Istanbul, Turkey).

**Amina**: *With the blessing of the FGS and state members, we have worked collaboratively on issues that require urgent financial needs. A good example is when a new town/city is liberated, the FGS requests us to raise funds for either the hospital, schools, or boreholes according to the needs on the ground, and we respond according to their immediate needs* (**Amina, K.** London, UK).

Findings deduced from the data show a parallel trend with Somali student organisations in raising funds for government-initiated projects. Every year, students from different universities around the globe host Somali cultural events to raise funds for charitable causes. Additionally, Somali student organisations have also contributed to mobilizing the return of the final year and postgraduate students to their country of origin on a short-term basis, especially during the summer holidays. Perhaps the most noticeable feature of student-led diaspora mobilisation is the London-based Worldwide Somali Students Association (WSSA) & British Somali Medical Association (BSMA). These organisations are critical in assisting the federal government and the government and international development partners with a much-needed skilled workforce in different fields.

These findings further cement the argument that the government and international aid agencies recognise the importance & the potential contribution of diaspora philanthropic giving. The study observed that a dozen diaspora groups are currently engaged in rebuilding key government institutions in the country, most notably the Somali Theatre set to be completed early next year. Many respondents acknowledged having made modest contributions to specific government-initiated reconstruction projects. In a bid to galvanize diaspora philanthropic contributions and facilitate diaspora donations, a dual-strategic approach targeted at 'individuals' and diaspora organisations with extensive philanthropic networks serves as the primary source for developing health, water, and education sectors. Pictures shown below are illustration of diaspora’s financial contributions. (Fig 4.3)

In amplifying the full range of diaspora contributions towards charitable causes, the federal government has embarked on ways of strategizing & developing sustained and continuous financial assistance to fund the crucial projects Key government officials acknowledged that through the engagement of short-term poverty alleviation and long-term reconstruction and development agenda, the government views charitable contribution as a means of mobilizing its diaspora even though the study established that diaspora's charitable contribution alone may have little effect on alleviating poverty and improving social wellbeing Shift in expanding revenue through philanthropic is not only confined to the government, but civil society groups in Somalia often rely on contributions from the members of the diaspora to enhance service delivery.

**Somali Theatre: Before and After.**


 

Fig 5.3 Somali Theatre. Source: Sonna, 2020.

While concurring with the above statement, a key informant acknowledged that mobilizing through charitable giving helped rebuild and restore key government institutions The study also established that through generous patronage of Somali Women groups in the UK, the government was able to rebuild 13 maternity wards in rural Somalia since 2015 Given the extended history of women engagement in charitable causes, the government is keen on tapping their financial contribution to improve social projects throughout the country.

**Yusuf**: *The government has a limited financial capacity and relies heavily on contributions from diaspora groups. In 2011 or 2012, I remember Somali women groups in Leicester raised funds for the first batch of used ambulances. Although the local trust donated the ambulances, the money was spent on transportation and maintenance of the four used ambulances. We decided to keep the UK number plates to remember where they came from when we truly needed help (laughs)* (**Yusuf, Y**. Nairobi, Kenya)

Unlike remittances which is documented, little is known about the exact figures of diaspora's charitable contributions Data derived from the findings appears to show that a diverse range of Somali diaspora organisations/individuals have participated with varying intensity, regularity, and frequency Moreover, expanding their contribution beyond geographical boundaries, several groups have established an endowment fund aimed at helping children orphaned by the decades-old civil war In selected instances, few respondents admitted that their philanthropic contribution was mainly influenced by clan loyalty, even though they were unable to justify the motives behind their contribution The impact of cultural/religious values on patterns of social giving is well documented in this report, yet the study failed to capture the gender disparity despite religious obligation requiring Muslims; both male & female to contribute certain amount of their financial income to charitable causes There may be other possible explanations that may warrant further research.

**5.2.8 Responding to Disasters: Revitalized Nationalism**

Following the famine in 2011, which killed more than 250k people and displaced close to a million from their homes, half of the respondents claimed that the suffering revived a 'sense' of belonging. A key informant who coordinated relief distribution in Middle Shabelle acknowledged that the rebirth of Somali nationalism globally highlights the importance of the diaspora's role in the rebuilding process. Viewing the disaster as a critical test to their identity, a substantial number of respondents acknowledged having participated in raising funds, creating awareness, lobbying host governments, advocating for increased intervention, and coordinating relief efforts with international aid organisations.

**Abdullahi**: *I remember that day vividly as if it were yesterday. I was watching BBC news, and all sudden, they had an extended coverage of Somalia's famine. I was aware of it through members of my family I spoke to weeks earlier. However, the magnitude and the destruction to lives, especially in Baidoa, were surreal. I was grateful to God that I live in the West, but what about those who were less fortunate and were left-back. I have a moral obligation, I made a few phone calls, followed by organizing meetings, then came the fundraising, and finally I was in Mogadishu within a spate of 6 weeks* (**Abdullahi, A**. Istanbul, Turkey).

The study established that calls to engage the diaspora in humanitarian response stems not only from the Somali government but also, and perhaps, most importantly, host government (UK/US/Sweden), INGOs and development, and other local disaster response organisations. The response rate is unexpectedly low among the respondents who indicated that apart from 'moral obligation,' they felt pressured and persuaded by external actors to respond, shifting the humanitarian context into a new paradigm. In recognising their unique contributions. In these few instances, respondents confirmed that they travelled to areas with increasingly complex clan conflicts to distribute aid and diffuse inter-clan rivalry.

Interestingly, the study found that disaster response increased collaboration between different Somali organisations globally, increasing the scope and influence of transnationalism networking. To ensure a collective focus on the disaster, a key informant asserted that he provided aid agencies with real-time needs on the ground. The overall response to this question was unexpectedly high among the respondents vis-à-vis renewed sense of nationalism. In some cases, diaspora groups use the organisation's funds to undertake projects crucial to the reconstruction process without financial support for the donor community. Finally, in galvanizing a collective response, many respondents cited the disaster as a 'wake-up call to serve their homeland in time of need.

### **5.2.8.1 Financial Link**

To encourage investments from its diaspora, the government is keen on expanding the mutually beneficial relationship to cover more expansive reconstruction areas in the private sector. The key to achieving this milestone is to provide diaspora entrepreneurs with lucrative contracts to rebuild schools, hospitals, and roads. This new initiative is seen as a 'win-win' for the diaspora and the Federal Government. In contrast, the government views it to encourage the return of its diaspora, facilitate economic growth, navigate informal trade barriers, and improve social conditions. On the other hand, transnational entrepreneurs cement their strong presence in the economic sector, increase their wealth and expand their businesses.

**Okiyale**: *Diasporas have long been the economic backbone of Somalia. I could say with absolute certainty that 90% of all new businesses in major cities are either wholly owned by the diasporas or hold the significant majority of the shares (***Okiyale, A.** Leicester, UK**)**

To illustrate this relationship, the government has set up a tax-free mechanism to enable diasporas to register and set up businesses to promote the development of their home country. Extensive evidence documents the role of the Somali diaspora as direct investors (FDI) in small to medium businesses. Two common attributes have emerged from the findings on diaspora mobilisation, strengthening the position that diasporas receive preferential treatment in jobs/promotion/business registration:

* That diaspora members/investors receive special treatment, preference from the government.
* That diaspora contributors/investors are driven by patriotic sentiments (Moral obligation to contribute to the ongoing reconstruction process).

On a closer inspection of their engagement/mobilisation strategy, the government's persistent and growing connection with its diaspora has paid off to some extent with the IMF's last report on Somalia's economic recovery reiterated the need to engage with the diaspora, 'thanking' the authorities for their strong commitment, program implementation and capacity to strengthen & mobilize diaspora entrepreneurs, despite the challenging environment” (Beileh, 2020).

**5.3 INGOs/Donor Organisation Mobilisation Strategy**

The final part of the findings on diaspora mobilisation is mainly devoted to the strategies and processes adopted by development organisations & INGOs. Compared to the government's mobilisation strategy, the study observed that they often incorporate similar strategies with minimal variations. Most of these groups presented here work closely with the government. Some are independent organisations working to transform their home country through lobbying and providing substantive input to the government's reconstruction agenda. Donor countries are increasingly recognising diaspora groups' vital contribution to Somalia. As such, international donor agencies have voiced their support for diaspora groups with transnational links and an enhanced role in reconstruction and development.

In Addition to the similarities, donor organisations/INGOs employ a different strategy to supplement existing mobilisation methods covering areas/regions beyond host and home countries. Also known as transnational mobilisation, the focus of the study is based on identifying the ways, processes, and factors that determine the conditions under which they endure and impact the mobilisation process. These questions helped shape the core research interests in line with Vertovec's (2004) pioneering work in transnationalism. Deepening the discussion beyond Vertovec's diaspora formations and linkage, the study focuses on the strategies and practices that are instrumental in mobilizing the diaspora beyond current home-host geographical borders.

4 different INGOs/ donor organisations were interviewed in 8 months Notwithstanding the policies introduced for enhancing return migration, these organisations are actively involved in mobilising skilled Somali professionals to return to their country of origin, with new technological advancement providing an opportunity to target highly skilled professionals The findings established that several international organisations embraced a diverse array of mobilisation strategies and practices, which has been successful compared to the government limited role mainly attributed to financial constraints Explaining this variation requires understanding the strategies and tactics adopted by these organisations vis-a-vis the government In Addition to the interviews, 2 local NGOs/community based organisations (CBOs-HIRDA & Horn Relief) were also interviewed to explore their role in the recruitment process and how this is integrated to the FGS's broader national reconstruction strategy These groups, with an expanding outreach connectivity in rural and hard-to-reach areas, play an active, coordinated & essential role in facilitating diaspora mobility.

**Guleid**: *These groups use diverse ways to interact and share information. I have worked for an NGO that works closely with these organisations in recruiting skilled people from the diaspora. Overall, these initiatives have been phenomenally successful since most Somalis trust us. We encouraged them to utilize the education and experiences gained in the West to develop their homeland* (**Guleid, W.** Nairobi, Kenya).

**5.4 Impact of Mobilisation on Institutional Building**

Data from the interviews shows that the number of returnees has significantly increased, even though the numbers provided by the participants is contested. Some estimate that diasporas currently living, working, and visiting Somalia to be around 300 to 500 thousand, with others pushing the figures slightly over half a million. According to a reliable source, the UK’s government acknowledges the importance of British Somalis in the rebuilding process, estimating their numbers to be around five thousand (DfID, 2019). In examining more closely, the data shows that the number of diasporas returning to their ancestral home will continue to increase in the near future given the emotional attachment to homeland development, coupled with enhanced mobilisation strategies.

The expansive degree of movement is therefore connected to the effectiveness of the mobilisation strategies and vice versa, informed by transnationalism-mobilising beyond home-host territorial boundaries. To aid the government in the rebuilding process, international development partners were instrumental in providing much needed financial assistance. Major international conferences were held in Washington, Istanbul, and London over the past 10 years. Underpinning the importance of rebuilding key government institutions, donors at the London 2017 conference contributed more than two billion dollars (gov.uk, 2018). Findings from the study shows that the country is on path to stabilisation and growth, thus making diasporas’ engagement a top priority.

To derive conceptual clarity, the process of engagement is dependent on the federal government and its international development partners ability to devise and articulate policies that successfully aligns with the diasporas ‘belonging, shared culture and interest.’ Even though most participants show willingness to develop their homeland, it is difficult to gauge their emotion in the absence of the federal government’s robust mobilisation strategies. Nevertheless, the potential gain from the diasporas is key to reviving institutional capacity as illustrated above and as such, the government’s mobilisation approaches yield direct assistance to the rebuilding process. Finally, the federal government’s proactive endeavours are central to luring more people to the rebuilding process given the diasporas unique advantages as dual nationals.

**5.5 Challenges and Barriers in Mobilising Somalia Diaspora**

Despite the government's efforts in mobilizing its diasporas to partake in the reconstruction process, some difficulties have hampered or derailed the mobilisation process. Below are some of the critical hindrances noted by the respondents:

**Corruption**

Corruption appears to be endemic in virtually all forms of government strategy, from mobilisation, recruitment, and retainment. In some cases, government officials downplay rampant corruption as merely "perversion of legal rules by misinterpretation." Somalia is among the most corrupt country globally, with the international acknowledging the loss of millions of dollars meant for the reconstruction. The destructive relation between corruption and poor service delivery is noticeable from the public sector. According to data from the focus groups, the corruption endemic has become ‘*institutionalised*’ to the extent of becoming pervasive. Other participants acknowledge that the government has failed to curb corruption due to weak legislations & unethical leadership. Additional information shows that the practice exacerbates existing challenges of post conflict reconstruction.

**Security**

Additionally, security is also a significant concern for the members of the returning diasporas. Even though the government has made an enormous improvement in the security sector, Al Shabab (AS) remains a threat. Additionally, members of the opposition are also using clan incitement to discredit the current government, potentially destabilizing the whole country. Majority of the respondents cited security as their major concern before relocating while others credited improved security as a major determinant for increased inward mobility. Al Shabab still possess threat to the government and a vast number of respondents are of the view that higher degree of instability affects the prospects of post conflict reconstruction. Additionally, data shows that inter clan rivalry is still visibly active in many parts of the country, especially in rural/nomadic areas.

**Duration**

Due to the complexity and range of technical, legal, regulatory, and institutional requirements, securing a placement could take months or even a year. In exploring its implications in post conflict recovery, many of the respondents confirmed that lack of a robust legislations on the part of the federal government and bureaucracy in donor and development partners affects swift mobilisation of skilled workers. Some of the respondents acknowledge that the delay in recruitment hinders recruitment process. A key informant cited structural bureaucracy in EU funded projects as a major obstacle to recruiting skilled diasporas. Others have highlighted poor government institutional capacity as a hindrance to recruitment/development.

**Diaspora Rivalry**

Competition among diaspora groups and clan loyalty/party affiliation is also partially mentioned as contributing factors to slow down the government's rapid mobilisation process. The rivalry and jostling for power and attention is likely to have profound implications on the recovery process. It is worth noting that this is based on data from minority members, others tend to disagree. Diverse Interest- The study established that transnational networks' interests differ depending on their structural/administrative formation. In contrast, some of these networks were exclusively created to lobby, engage the diaspora, and link the government and its diaspora. Others had a personal stake (political/economic/social). When probed further, the study established that clan loyalty and political affiliation played a role in determining the formations of the networks. intergroup rivalry, infighting, seeking the government's attention, legal representation poses a strategic threat to the government's reconstruction and development agenda. During the president's recent visit to the UK, different transnational networks petitioned both host & home governments to recognise them as the bona fide representative of the Somali community in the diaspora.

**Financial Constraint/Weak Institutions**

Financial Constraint-Most of the transnational networks relies either on host/home country governments, international donors, and members of the community for funding. As a result, some cannot continue providing essential services to the government's reconstruction and development agenda. Funding is also crucial for transnational networking groups since it will facilitate or impede the mobilisation process. Poor government institutions in Somalia hinder the relationship between the government and transnational network groups. A major obstacle cited by a UK-based transnational network group senior member asserted that the government's response/engagement was incoherent, weak, and disorganized. However, the respondent also admits that substantial improvements have been made over two years. (legal & institutional frameworks). The Federal government's failure to identify the right interlocutors among the different diaspora groups is also cited as an obstacle to effective mobilisation.

**Local Resentment**

Diaspora workers in the public sector are often seen as a source of inequality (job distribution). A substantial number of respondents indicated that the local population views them with scepticism and suspicion, with some experiencing verbal abuse from their local co-workers, using the derogatory word *Dayuuspora*. Respondent thirty-one stated that diaspora members have occasionally experienced blatant hostility making them feel unwelcome despite the socio-cultural solid connection to their homeland. Other accusations include stealing 'their' jobs, inflation, being out of touch with reality, possessing dual nationality & having escaped the worst period of the country’s history (civil war). Other aspects of resent is covered in chapter 7.

## **Conclusion**

From the data review, vital findings regarding state-diaspora engagement strategies have emerged. Despite the challenges, different dynamics of diaspora mobilisation, engagement, and recruitment, play a crucial role in delivering the government's reconstruction and development agenda. Significant evidence from the study shows that they continue to play a vital role in ensuring that skilled members of the diaspora are enticed to go back to their country of origin to partake in the reconstruction and development programs, especially at a time of relative stability in major urban centres including Mogadishu and surrounding towns. Additionally, donor organisations/INGOs were also instrumental in linking skilled members of the diaspora and the government.

Diasporas play an increasingly prominent role in rebuilding countries of origin to defy security risks. Somali diaspora engagement has attracted increased interest from researchers and policymakers as a link between the West and home country. The World Bank estimates that remittances to Somalia which currently stands at $2 billion, continue to rise as the country's security stabilizes. For decades, Somalis in the diaspora have played a critical role in three fundamental areas: economic, political, and social contribution. This research study adds the flow of expertise, a new thematic area to current scholarly studies, widening the discussion beyond remittances, political participation, and economic development. A detailed explanation will be provided in the next chapter.

Stretching beyond aid, INGOs and donor organisations often recognise the importance of skilled diasporas in the rebuilding process. The objective of these organisations is to ensure that the continued flow of skilled emigration and realigning their development agenda to diaspora's mobilisation & recruitment. Few development-oriented organisations, including the World Bank & IOM, have adopted policies that favour skilled Somalis especially with regards to staffing field operations (WB, 2017). Finally, in a note of conclusion, this chapter provided conceptual and analytical discussion on return mobility, including exploring areas that have relatively remained off- the radar for most of extant research examining diaspora engagement structures These includes exploring the role of philanthropic causes acting as instrumental motivation for diaspora engagement This is critically important because existing literature focusing on diaspora-development nexus, has to a more significant extent failed to capture this critical sub-field as a source for tapping the input and intellectual resources of the diasporas.

## **Chapter 6: Contextualising Diasporic Identity: Implications of Government Policies on Reverse Migration.**

**6.1 Introduction**

Analysing the role of nationalism, identity, and the Federal government's systematic policy initiatives towards diaspora mobilisation, key strategies adopted for that endeavor, and the complexities that characterize their relationship, the study reveals substantial and visible changes since 2015. Recognising the need to develop effective diaspora engagement, government policies at both ends of the migration cycle are aware of the critical contribution of the diaspora to rebuilding home states. In particular, the focus of this chapter is to examine the extent to which home state policies/practices and the external consequences of state behavior continue to reshape patterns of diaspora mobility. Given that Somali diasporas have become essential component of the reconstruction process with strong emphasis on rootedness & belonging, the study will also, to a lesser extent, explore the scope of the host state's role in creating conducive policies and structures for diaspora returnees to obtain a complete understanding of the interdependencies that exist between host/INGOs and host/home states.

Due to security/logistics reasons, all the participants are geographically confined to Mogadishu and its environs. This concentration gives unique rise to new formation of ‘diaspora dominated enclaves’ in Mogadishu. Additionally, since Mogadishu serves as the capital and commercial hub, all the government institutions are noticeably based in the capital for security/financial reasons. According to report on urban development published by the World Bank, Mogadishu is ranked among the top five fastest growing cities globally (WB, 2019). Of equal importance, the city’s pace of transition from clan ruled enclave to a modern/urban, improved infrastructure highlights its importance to the diasporas. Finally, an increasingly observed feature of Mogadishu’s rise is also linked to its connections to the world, with Turkish, Qatar and Ethiopian airlines plying the route, further increasing inward mobility (Amour, 2020).

Horst, Brinkerhoff, and others provide an enlightening analysis of the Somali diaspora, outlining their contribution to homeland development. However, little is known about the receptiveness of the diaspora to government mobilisation strategies and policy changes. By exploring this link, I argue that the series of policy initiatives intended to forge closer ties with its diaspora, which are diverse, are reinforced through transnational flows and practices. As a central feature of this chapter, the study will focus on three key areas to explore the government's strategies for reducing bureaucratic burden, simplifying diaspora mobility, and their profound effect on reverse migration:

1. Development Role-Policies and Initiatives aimed at increasing/enhancing diaspora philanthropic contribution.
2. Nationalism & Identity Role- Policies on Diaspora Recruitment centered on shared cultural identity issue & long-distance nationalism.
3. Partnership Role- Policies that amplify the positive impact of human capital on Post-war reconstruction in collaboration with locally owned Somali NGOs in host countries.

**6.2 Development Role**

In Somalia, previous diaspora mobilisation activities have been uncoordinated, disorganized, and often chaotic and incoherent. Many returnees were faced with difficulties navigating the institutional framework and instability, especially during the transitional period (2005–2012). The current Federal Government is aware of the importance of harnessing diaspora contribution in rebuilding by developing a robust and sustainable mobilisation strategy. As such, it has fairly designed goals and policies on diaspora recruitment. Additionally, the government is aware that the recruitment and mobilisation process requires sustained attention, and certain fundamental elements are incorporated into the diaspora engagement strategies.

The study established that the current government, which has a substantial number of diasporas in key government institutions, including the President and the Prime Minister, and over half of the cabinet, has introduced numerous policies geared towards creating a conducive environment for diaspora mobilisation and their subsequent engagement, for example, developing a roadmap for engaging the diaspora in development and passing favourable legislation. Many of these members are educated in the WestWest, bringing vast experience and knowledge gained in host countries. Migrants returning to their country of origin in positions of responsibility is not a new phenomenon. Returning elites, for example, Indonesia's "Berkeley Mafias" and Chile's "Chicago Boys," were instrumental in reshaping the two countries' political and economic spheres.

Some of the policies mounted by the federal government to recognise the value of its diaspora have yielded positive results, setting the stage for a new synergic partnership.

Among the many initiatives to improve relations with their diaspora, one considers the larger diasporas a source of national fabric in foreign countries, hence the need to galvanize their financial and technical wealth to develop post-conflict reconstruction efforts. This includes the establishment of a "Diaspora Liaison Office" in Mogadishu charged with overseeing the return of skilled and semi-skilled Somali diaspora back to the country in order to transform the old pattern of "brain drain" into "brain gain" and facilitating the return of migrants through policy changes. Putting the government's efforts into context, a senior member discloses that institutional and policy changes were instrumental in creating a favourable environment and the right atmosphere for the returnees in a mutually beneficial engagement:

I: How do changes in government in policies or strategies contribute to diaspora engagement? Moreover, how effective were these changes to the overall diaspora mobilisation?

Hani: The changes were in place before we took over the central government; the previous regime knew the importance of diaspora and wanted to do something to institutionalize their contribution to getting maximum extract resources, be it financial, technical, or any other contribution. We expanded on that blueprint and came with a diverse policy change; some required to be enacted into laws, which meant we had to go through parliament, but most of it were changes that we could amend or change at the ministerial level. Nevertheless, overall, the numbers have been very promising since we initiated these changes, which is evident from the Turkish airline's weekly flight. It is always full of diasporas returning home. This is due to policy changes from the top tier of the government, establishing new strategies and appealing directly to members of the diaspora, and informing them of these changes. (Hani, A.)

Abdullahi: Previous governments were not as serious as this one. They failed to capture this critical tool for development for some unknown reasons. I remember how chaotic and disorganized diaspora mobilisation was at the time. What you see now are total overhaul and restructured diaspora engagement policies. (Abdullahi, S).

The multifarious engagement initiatives are reinforced by a key government adviser tasked with designing a comprehensive framework for reverse migration policies and implementing diaspora engagement processes in the formative years.

**Moalim**: The engagement of the diaspora was a lengthy process, and the government was aware of their potential in the rebuilding process, especially in providing guidance, leadership, engaging the international community, and training local staff. When the government started drafting the engagement and recruitment policies, I oversaw a small group at the Prime Minister's diaspora engagement team. Everyone, including myself and the PM as members of the diaspora, understood the importance and impact of the diaspora on rebuilding our country. We set up new fronts of engagement, established links with different organisations, encouraged voluntary diaspora return, and exposed the diaspora to untapped opportunities in Somalia's huge labor market. The various steps we undertook had a dramatic impact on attracting many members of the global Somali diaspora. One key element in the engagement process was re-establish a permanent relationship between the government and its diaspora.

………………. These reforms were necessary for the recruitment of the diaspora. However, in the early stages, we faced obstacles; financial, logistical, security/instability, trust issues, and features in the old system that prevented the recruitment on a larger scale. Setting up new structures, developing new policies was instrumental in attracting a large number from the diaspora, and these new changes had one purpose, to establish a long-lasting relationship with our diaspora and to show them (diasporas) that the government has a keen interest in cultivating ties with its diaspora. I believe our resolute determination contributed immensely to recruiting skilled and entrepreneurs compared to the previous governments who, to my knowledge, were either noncommitment or disinterested (Moalim, E.)

In light of these policy changes coupled with the concrete measures undertaken by the government, respondents often cited the government's development-oriented programs and schemes to encourage the return of skilled diasporas, especially the context-specific diaspora development approach, as a critical element of their engagement. For example, each year in London, the influential Somali Week is viewed as a strategic mobilisation mechanism within the framework of "rebuilding." Importantly, the government's multi-recruitment strategy outlines how diaspora mobilisation became a core part of the government's reconstruction agenda, resulting in a deeper relationship with senior members of the previous socialist government. Anecdotal evidence from the ground shows that the government's efforts are fostering deeper links through a varied spectrum of initiatives. Part of this formal cooperation was designed to precisely target former members of the defense and security agencies who left the country following the overthrow of the government in the early 1990s to provide mentoring, guidance, and assistance to the fledgling security sector.

Commensurate with these efforts, many retired generals heeded the government's call to return to the country. It is worth noting that the government's wider mobilisation strategy has always stretched beyond the skilled and semi-skilled Somali diaspora, encompassing activities that offer intermediary functions. The newly reactivated and strategically important relationship brought a much-needed and vast array of experience to the security sector. Providing a visible example of the government's efforts, a respondent sums up the impact of wider state efforts in forging closer ties with the diaspora:

………Many of the former military commanders and generals were recalled taking the lead in the war against Al-Shabab. There was a lack of morale and experience, and what the West did was transform ragtag and clan militias into soldiers and police officers. This was not going well for the government for many reasons. One of the key critical issues was where their 'loyalty' was. Will they take orders from the government, or will they still be sympathetic to their clan/rebel leaders? These were legitimate questions that needed addressing, and there was no way the government could cope with the infiltration of rebels camouflaged as government soldiers. Other obstacles seriously hampered the government's security reform. For example, it will take at least ten years of military experience to achieve a higher ranking similar to lieutenant general. That is when the idea of bringing back former generals materialized. It worked very well and helped the state liberate large swatches (Warsame, M).

In practice, creating a high-quality, capable defense force proved to be a futile process initially, mainly due to a massive depletion of human capital (1991 exodus) and the military's image in the eyes of the wider society. Other factors that have negatively contributed include working with the enemy, corruption, looting, extra-judicial killings, passivity, divided loyalty, and moral concerns. As part of the government policy designed to primarily reform the security sector and redefine its relationship with society, it calls for recalling and empowering diaspora members, especially those that served under the previous regime prior to the war, assigning them explicit tasks in rebuilding the armed forces. The federal government sought to capitalize on their expertise and knowledge, later shifting the state's defense strategy from a "passive" reliance on ex-warlords to actively engaging and recruiting ex-generals from the diaspora.

While the process of rebuilding the military in a post-conflict setting is not novel as illustrated by the past historical context (Germany & Japan), however, the West'sWest's failure in Iraq (purging senior members of Saddam's army) has reignited the importance of restructuring the post-war security sector with more experienced high-ranking personnel at the core of the debate. Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. Their contributions are critical in establishing a professional, formidable, and robust armed force from a seniority and expertise perspective. More importantly, their contributions are critical in restoring professionalism, competence, discipline, and efficiency. A senior member of the defense forces provides a candid overview of the diaspora-led defense forces strategy:

Abdullahi………… Well, without the help of the returning diaspora, including generals and other high-ranking officials, we would not have achieved any tangible results. Their experience was crucial in liberating the country. As a person who closely worked with many of these generals and as the former director-general of the defense ministry, the first female to head such an important docket, I admit that their contribution was key to defeating Al Shabab (J. Abdullahi).

**6.3 Long Distance Nationalism & Identity Role**

In exploring the multifaceted role in which the government formulates ways to reconstruct "nationalism" as a tool to encourage the return of its diaspora as co-development partners, the study reveals that social science researchers and other disciplines have largely failed to produce adequate theoretical models for understanding the dynamics, nature, and intensity of attachment to the homeland in Sub-Saharan Africa. Many of these studies focused on financial remittances to reflect the nature of attachment, which may have contributed to the poor or weak orientations in examining the connections between diasporas and homelands. Nonetheless, as diaspora involvement in home countries becomes the "new engine" for driving development agendas, with an emphasis on cross-border and unexpected transnational alliances and collisions, this study suggests that a deeper theorization beyond remittances is required to reflect modern diaspora, particularly in broadening the scope of inquiry to cover areas (transnationalism) previously ignored by a vast literature on "nationalism" and "diaspora" in Africa.

### **6.3.1 The Elusive Concept of Homeland**

'This country has no one, but its diaspora'- Somali President's speech: 2018.

The domineering tone of such statements chimes with the government's overall diaspora mobilisation, recruitment, and retention strategy. Taking a critical view of the government's approach, the principal modality of nationalism in the study is linked to its efforts to encourage the return of its diaspora by monopolizing the discourse of "belonging" in the identity/culture narrative. Perhaps the most vivid illustration is depicted by the responses of 3 participants, acknowledging that the government's call for a strong link between the state and its diaspora marked a definite shift from past policies (driven by both global and local contexts). Empirical findings from the study indicate that the government has made considerable efforts in creating a vibrant and sustainable engagement with the diaspora using "nationalism" and "moral obligation" as bait.

Diasporas themselves view their return and contribution as an impetus for post-conflict development, given the importance of kinship, homeland, biological and cultural belonging. Surprisingly, a cursory look at the current leaders in government and parliament shows clear domination by members of the diaspora. The trend is expected to increase as more diaspora members are lured back.

I: Has the number of diasporas increased or decreased concerning the government's multi-focus engagement strategy?

Omar: The idea of engaging the diaspora is not confined to the current government. This has always been the case with previous governments; their aim is simple. Members of the Somali diaspora are viewed as the 'saviors' of the country through economic development (remittances). The financial contribution of the diaspora during the darkest time in our history when warlords ruled with impunity, diaspora monies kept flowing. The financial commitment has not changed since, although human mobility has increased since this government took power in 2017.

I: Why has it changed since the new government took power? Could you provide a few examples of the changes you have mentioned?

Omar: First, to begin with, both the President and the Prime Minister and the majority of the cabinet are members of the diaspora. They are aware of the human, financial, and networking potential they bring back. In short, the fed government, which members of the diaspora lead, knows their experiences will profoundly affect the stabilization. So that partially answers their ambitions of exploring ways of engaging diaspora members using different platforms. Secondly, the government has made the engagement of the diaspora part of its core reconstruction strategy, mobilizing the diaspora's financial, material and human resources for rebuilding the country. Take a look at every department. The diaspora dominates almost all the key ministries, education, defense, development. Senior government members, including the PM, regularly travel to the UK/US and Scandinavian countries with a substantial Somali population with one goal; come home and help us rebuild. (Interview with Omar, H.)

### **6.3.2 Homeland, Nostalgia & Long-Distance Nationalism**

The lingering desire to return to their homeland elicited a mixed reaction. The majority of those interviewed have returned more than once to participate in the rebuilding process. The Somali diaspora's support for homeland projects contributes to the reconstruction process, having long influenced political, economic, cultural, and national transformation in their country of origin. Despite living in host countries for more than 30 years, many respondents indicated a willingness to return to their homeland. It is worth noting that a few respondents (4) viewed permanent accepting settlement in host countries as a "betrayal" of their homeland. This view is rejected by the majority of the respondents who showed strong feelings for possessing hybrid identities (retaining transplanted cultures)—a mix of host and home country attributes.

In addition to actualizing collective identity regarding returning "home," many interviewed indicated that they have a moral obligation to participate in the reconstruction process. A substantial number of the respondents revealed that they had witnessed "renewed" interest from Somalis in the diaspora since the Western-backed invasion of Ethiopia in 2006 and the maritime dispute with Kenya, with both countries, considered arch-rivals. R3 confessed that this has, in turn, fuelled a resurgence of Somali nationalism globally, with many sacrificing their family, security, and jobs, in support of creating a stronger and more stable Somalia. This applies particularly to the wave of political migrants returning home since 2010. This "moral" obligation and the desire to serve your country are reflected in the interview below.

I: What are the main reasons for deciding to relocate to Somalia?

Arab: Desire to help, assist and contribute to the overall well-being of my country. I left when I was 13, and my childhood memories are still with me. My brothers are both working with the government in different capacities. My uncle, who migrated to Canada late 1970's is back and planning to set up an ITC school for the poor. The WestWest ignored Somalia for far too long. When the ICU-referring to Islamic Courts Union retook the capital and vast lands from warlords, they started acting as if they cared, sending Ethiopian mercenaries. I have no option but to come and help; we cannot let the WestWest use Ethiopia to occupy us. This has been their intention since the times of Menelik. (Interview with Anab, S.).

There are various ways in which politicians have also contributed to engaging and reinforcing the mobilisation of the Somali diaspora through emotional "drumbeating." According to respondent 27, many leading figures in the government continue to visit countries where Somalis are numerically concentrated. These visits have two important connotations. First, politicians used the meetings to drive the government's agenda by appealing to Somalis' emotional and cultural connections to their country of origin. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, these visits are seen as a way of appealing to younger, educated, and skilled 2nd or 3rd generation members of its diaspora to connect them to the country of their "forefathers."

Findings from the study established that the bulk of the respondents lives in the WestWest with a "myth" of returning to their country of origin. Many claimed that they had a moral obligation to help in the rebuilding process based on the ideological principle of "to be of use to your own country." This argument is supported by the fact that, while acknowledging the importance of possessing Western influence/culture, a substantial number of the respondents view themselves as temporal settlers, ready to go back to their country of origin when the need arises, while at the same time retaining an emotional connection to host countries. Closer scrutiny, the study reveals that the traditional paradigm of permanent migrant settlement is no longer feasible, with frequent visits to home and host states becoming rather normative.

Maryam: I am confused about where I call home. I was raised in London, and I am a frequent traveler to Somalia for work, business & visiting relatives. I cannot choose between the two, both are connected to me in different ways, and I will rather keep it that way. (Maryam, Ahmed)

Abdulwahab: I consider myself a modern (Somali) nomad, traveling between Sweden and Somalia. I strongly believe both countries are very important in reshaping who I am. I have seen debates on second-generation Somali diaspora and loyalty issues. Many share the same feelings with me. (Abdulwahab, M.)

……. My view on having faith in both country's ancestral country (Somalia) and the country I was born in (UK) is rather complementary than contradictory. I have friends here (UK) and family ties to (Somalia), and there is nothing wrong with having loyalty, faith in both countries. (Suad, A)

In addition to using "nationalism" to attract skilled diaspora members, the government intentionally or unintentionally appoints diaspora members as heads of key government institutions. A quick look at the top director generals of eight government institutions shows clear domination by diaspora members. While visiting the US Somali embassy in 2018, flanked by senior members of his cabinet consisting almost entirely of diasporas, the President stressed the importance of the contributions of the diasporas in governance and, in particular, acknowledged their critical contribution in the rebuilding process, using "moral obligation" and "national solidarity" as justification to serve, becoming a common theme in his speeches. In this context of revitalized nationalism, it has increased circular migration and enhanced transnational exchanges to unprecedented levels. In essence, the profound impact of nationalism on reverse migration in the study offers a better understanding of the presumed cultural linkages and mobility.

This call is further corroborated by many of the interviewees, acknowledging the fact that their home government's ultimate objective is to ensure that their emigrants will remain incipient rather than permanent diasporas through maintaining close and regular contact. This idea connects diasporas to their homeland through a series of attempts, including endless satellite television broadcasts on post-conflict development. A wider objective of the government's efforts towards mobilisation is to align its reconstruction agenda with the diaspora's shared dreams of returning to their ethnic homeland. Distance, nationalism, and migration in a globalized context, particularly Somalia, are not new phenomena.

Interdisciplinary and largely comparative studies on previous migration patterns, for example, Amrith (2011); Dellios & Henrich (2020); Rainer et al. (2014); Weingrod & Levy (2006); Ziemer & Roberts (2013), shed light on the multifaceted role played by sending states. A particular trend under the rubric of reverse migration in the contemporary era is the emergence of transnationalism as a major contributor to increased circular migration. Inevitably, the study reveals that the impact of globalization on migration, long-distance relationships, digitalization, and comparably low cost of communication has also played a significant role in reviving "cultural" and "ethnic" belonging in Somalia's prevalent circular migration-two indispensable elements in a "nationalism" narrative.

In addition to the cultural events, the government regularly conducts seminars to promote the return of its valuable diasporas by creating a strong and long-term partnership with diasporic networks acting as recruitment agencies. The main reason for this is that the Federal Government uses these engagements as a platform to highlight the current contributions of the skilled Somali diaspora in the reconstruction process, which includes various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. Consistent with these findings, discussions in the scholarly literature, except for a few, provide a detailed explanation of the dynamics of the process and the theoretical implication of wide-ranging mechanisms of influence to facilitate inward mobility.

I: In what ways does the government address diaspora mobilisation except organizing events abroad?

Abdi: Do you mean the cultural events? Celebrating Independence Day?

I: That could be part of it, but other events like organizing fundraising development projects. How else does it encourage the return of skilled members from the diaspora?

Abdi: The government has worked with diaspora organisations, donors, and other multilateral organisations to appeal to the diaspora members' contribution to rebuilding the country. Nevertheless, the problem with that is that these organisations could only play a facilitative role in the issue of mobilisation. Since 2017, the government's principal focus has been policy and attitude changes towards diaspora mobilisation, which has been very effective and possibly the most critical way of engaging the diaspora. (Abdi, S.)

Abdelhamid: Security improvements and favourable policy changes were the two most effective ways of increasing the number of diasporas visiting for a short or long term. Members of the diaspora know very well that this government is keen on enhancing the good relationship that currently exists further through legislation changes to make it easier for the diaspora to invest, live and work in the country (Abdihamid, L).

Examining the extent to which government policies towards recruitment are applied and how these changes have been amplified under the banner of "nationalism" critically demonstrates how both approaches complement each other. There are also signs that the government uses clan and clan politics to drive its recruitment policy abroad. The key to achieving this is that the federal government works closely with organisations deemed "pro-government" or "neutral" in Somalia's politics. These organisations are tasked with promoting highly skilled professionals from developed countries, often citing the adverse impact of their contribution on rebuilding key government institutions and improving governance and service delivery. There is no doubt that clan politics plays a critical role in the recruitment process, even though almost all the respondents, except for a handful, would admit that clan/clan politics plays an active role in the recruitment process. Nevertheless, linking "nationalism" to recruitment has achieved its intended objective with a considerable degree of success.

It is no surprise that the government exploits "nationalism" and ethnonational sentiments to drive its recruitment agenda abroad. The relative importance of the two phenomena has been cited in numerous studies on diaspora and migration. Further enhancing our understanding of how nationalism and diaspora for development are linked, a great deal of interesting work on the issue is covered by Dahan & Sheffers (2001) and later by Dufoix (2008); Stone et al. (2020). These studies provide compelling evidence of the link between the two and how both phenomena influence each other in a new mobility pattern and circular migration.

**6.4 Partnership Role**

Functioning as head-hunters in the global race for talent, the federal government works with a few selected diaspora organisations with the intent of recruiting skilled members from a variety of disciplines. This phenomenon opens a new path to recruitment and substantially improves the government's ability to reach its recruitment target quickly. Even though this may seem similar to other efforts undertaken by INGOs and other multinational organisations' diaspora recruitment policies/drives, the federal government is keen on expanding these networks and their ability to enhance returnee-recruitment policies and achieve its goals in engaging professionals in the rebuilding process, with grassroots organisations acting as facilitators of "brain circulation."

The interviews captured the government's new policies and its attitude towards recruitment across the spectrum of engaging, recruiting, and retaining skilled professionals from the diaspora. In addition to the policy changes, the government uses long-distance nationalism to positively increase its influence in the diaspora, with the recruitment of skilled professionals and diasporic philanthropy seemingly becoming inexorable. The intensity of the government's long-distance nationalism varies depending on the targeted country. The UK and US dominate the government's dual recruitment efforts, partly due to their global political supremacy and many Somali migrants living in these two countries.

Osman: Empowered diaspora organisations, especially those in the US and the UK, can be a useful tool to spearhead the government's agenda. It is also important to act as the government's de facto emissaries abroad, negotiate with host governments, align our local and international policies with 'their' governments, and proactively represent and positively portray Somalia to the international community. Our relationship goes beyond recruitment and job offer. It is deep, long-lasting, and we have witnessed its impact on our foreign policy strategies. We may have weak institutions but strong and vibrant diaspora organisations representing us and the diaspora. The election of Ilhan (US Congress Representative) is a clear indication of when diaspora organisations from different clans/gender work together on achieving the same goals, objectives, and milestones, they succeed (Osman, A.)

………...We rely on our diaspora organisations to help us achieve our strategic goals through lobbying and campaign abroad. Our priority is to link the government's foreign agenda to theirs, make it look like theirs too, and show that we share the same country and culture. They are responsible for representing us in 'their' countries, especially in countries where we do not have embassies yet (M, Hassan).

Among the most notable successes of organized Somali diasporic groups in recent years is their relentless campaign against major banks' moves to halt the flow of remittances to Somalia in 2015. Academics, activists, and INGOs, including Oxfam, Save the Children UK, and Novib Netherlands, joined these groups in forming a larger international campaign base to force financial institutions to reverse their earlier decision. The movement later gained support from major western governments (US and UK), weighing in on the perceived repercussions on socio-economic development, especially the considerable threat to Somalia's lifeline, and assisted community groups, banks, and money transfer agencies to develop an effective regulatory framework and ensure an unhindered flow of remittances to Somalia.

Due to their persistent campaign and the subsequent success in overturning an earlier decision, the federal government found a receptive international environment in diasporic groups, rekindling their mutually beneficial relationship based on shared values, culture, and identity. The home state's new approach to reaching out to its transnational diaspora became apparent when the current government came to power in early 2017. In the years that followed, the intensification manifested itself through meetings, cultural events, philanthropic and humanitarian fundraising, and institutionalizing diaspora engagement, exerting a degree of control on the diasporic group.

Consistent with the government's broader diaspora engagement, it is no surprise that many of these organisations have become recruitment agencies for the state's reconstruction agenda, rekindling their previously tense or ambivalent relationships (clan affiliation) and eager to facilitate the engagement of the diaspora on a transnational level. Summarising a respondent's view of the government's cooperation with many diasporic organisations shows that the government was keen on re-establishing strong and long-lasting ties with diverse Somali organisations in different countries.

………The government knew the fundamental role of diaspora groups in almost every aspect and the need to re-establish the lost link between our government and the diaspora, to move away from the clan-owned organisation into something that can bring people together, unite us, strengthen our ability globally. It was like a niche market for the government to explore its potential. After a meeting with UNDP at the PM's office; just before the elections, we realized how important diaspora groups in different countries are in protecting our sovereignty, remittances, and of course, as lobby groups. It was solely the efforts of these groups that forced Barclays and Wells & Fargo banks to rethink stopping remittances to Somalia. I think that was the turning point, that we needed the diaspora having demonstrated unity and strength, and let us be very clear, these groups live in privileged countries, and their voices are more likely to be heard than our government (S, Sheikh).

……...The idea of bringing together different organisations in different countries under a Somali flag brought unity and showed the world that we could achieve a lot together. We showed the world strength, reliability, and resilience of our people. We became one people instead of each organisation representing a clan or political faction, which is an extension of the clan. Even though diaspora organisations show unity in protecting Somalia's interest began during the Ethiopian occupation (2006), the Bank's intention of closing Somali remittance accounts galvanized diverse activists into a cohesive diaspora force (Y. Yusuf).

Extending the government's spheres beyond its geographical borders ushered in a new era for diaspora engagement and recruitment, challenging INGOs and international aid/development organisations' hegemonic control of diaspora mobilisation (IOM/UNDP). However, it is worth noting that despite Somali diasporic groups' shows of unity and activism reflected in the analysis, it does not necessarily mean that they always speak with a "singular voice."

### **6.4.1 Joint Implementation**

Evidence from studies shows that diverse diaspora organisations tend to respond differently to the government's attempts to engage them. However, despite the varying responses, one area that has remained unchanged throughout the study is the "willingness" and "enthusiasm" and "keen" interest in working with the state on joint projects. A realistic assessment of three diaspora organisations shows a clear pattern: a sense of desperation regarding working with the government on joint projects. This disposition, which is built on the notion of "collective strategy" and is largely concentrated on rebuilding key government institutions, capacity building, and transfer of knowledge, required further scrutiny to exert the extent and impact of their relationship.

The notion that diaspora (individuals and organisations) have a duty to contribute to the well-being of their countries of origin is a key component of this dyad of diaspora-state relationship (Nielsen & Riddle, 2017). These studies acknowledge, in part, that both parties benefit greatly from the relationship; home states benefit from increased economic growth through investment and philanthropic contributions (Nigeria, Ghana, Armenia, and Somalia); rebuilding institutions (Somalia, Armenia, and Rwanda); and knowledge transfer (China and India). Whereas, for the diaspora, gaining access to power through influencing government policies and becoming an integral "part" of the state's decision-making organ (Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda) (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Newland & Plaza, 2013; Boyle & Kitchin, 2009).

Diriye: Part of the government's efforts in recruiting from the diaspora is engaging directly with diaspora groups in projects that can be executed by joining hands. Hirda, ATM, and others were invited to implement projects that the government believed could be well executed and implemented by these diaspora organisations. Their presence was also important for other reasons. Assuming responsibility in the project timeline, financial obligation, integrity was crucial to the donors. Since these organisations were familiar with the western way of project management and governance, it became easy to report back to the donors. (Diriye, D.)

…………Challenges and obstacles in managing international community finances during the transitional period were extremely important reasons why many multinational organisations, including the World Bank, opted to work with diaspora organisations. During that time, there was no accountability, transparency, and no wonder Somalia was ranked as the most corrupt country by Transparency International. Rightfully, we lost a substantial amount of money that could have transformed lives (Kurlibax, M.)

In addition to diaspora (development) organisations, the government has partnered with a wide spectrum of civil society organisations. The rapid growth of diaspora organisations and individuals relocating to Somalia has had a positive impact on "governance," "accountability," and implementing the "rule of law." Most importantly, it provided the state with a much-needed "reputation" and "stature" in global affairs. The head of an advisory body composed of diaspora civil society groups provides a candid overview of the role and extent of civil society groups in rebuilding the country:

Abdihakim: We cannot underestimate the multitude of challenges that lie before us. Remember, we lost everything during the war, the looting of public institutions. Slowly, we started rebuilding the judiciary, armed forces, and police from scratch. We have demonstrated that the country does not rely on NGOs for everything. We have the capacity and knowledge to deliver projects primarily delivered by NGOs. I do not think the government could have achieved all these without our contribution (Abdihakim, J.).

### **6.4.2 Challenges & Barriers**

Within the realm of diaspora for development, a wide range of contextual factors have slowed down diaspora's functional capability or reduced service delivery to the very minimum. Efforts to improve public accountability, transparency, and diaspora organisations/individuals have, to some extent, failed to integrate mechanisms of institutional performance-based accountability-despite possessing a hybrid identity (western education & work ethics). Equally important, the absence of the government's oversight role is also cited as a major example, especially when the government places the role of the diaspora in the institutional building as a core part of its reconstruction strategy. Resources for enhancing state accountability are frequently diverted to cover the defense budget, raising many substantive questions about the government's role and readiness to oversee and improve accountability and governance. Government officials claim to have made significant progress in this area while admitting that efforts to reengineer accountability and transparency in the public sector could take years to fully implement, due in part to the costs associated with designing the system and hiring and training competent staff, financial constraints, and urgent development priorities.

Nonetheless, a senior government official at the federal level affirms a need to develop a robust and effective legal and institutional framework to strengthen oversight, accountability, and combat corruption. Reflecting on the country's unique circumstances and challenges typically associated with post-conflict reconstruction (decades-old war), the official further admits that the failure of the parliament to fast-track legislation aimed at addressing a broad array of government policies has immeasurably hindered the government's efforts:

Jama: The government cannot implement accountability and good governance reforms without legislation. It is upon the current parliament to pass these legislations and ensure its fully functional. In response to your question, the blame primarily lies with parliament, not the executive. Until the pending bills are debated and passed by both houses, we are not able to carry out governance reforms with outdated laws. Even though the World Bank, IMF have expressed support for the government's efforts, given the vulnerability of government institutions (weak), only the parliament can ensure we achieve that milestone, finally becoming answerable to the public. (Jama, A.)

Warsame………Despite the shortcomings and parliament's failure, we have taken steps to ensure that no one is above the law, whether the diaspora or locals. So far, there are three senior members from the diaspora, including the former director-general at the Ministry of Health in jail. Importantly the government has also recovered some of the ill-gotten monies, and the plan is to deal firmly with corruption, impunity once parliament approves these legislations. (Warsame).

There are also serious charges against some of these organisations and individuals from the diaspora. Cases of corruption, clan nepotism, and failure to address violations against women in a male-dominated society are partly attributed to the fear of patriarchal backlash. In some areas (political participation, employment), systemic challenges hinder the democratic inclusion of women and other socially marginalized groups (IDPs, minorities). The study shows that gender oppression has deteriorated, further diminishing women's voice and power in both private and public spheres. It is also worth pointing out that women in contemporary Somalia face greater hostility from traditional/clan elders, with many traditional elders and their followers fearing that changing the status quo may fundamentally alter the cultural order that has existed for centuries.

Focusing on equitable representation in key government institutions, analysis from the study indicates that traditional constraints in tandem with the government's current gender-skewed policies have effectively excluded women from critical government positions, with only a single female among the top 10 Director Generals currently in office. It appears that this practice of gender marginalization has successfully relegated women's role in the reconstruction and recovery process to insignificance. Nonetheless, recent shifts in the government's attitude towards accommodating more women following a successful social media petition may potentially offer a glimpse of hope shortly.

In evaluating the subjective importance of these organisations and their contributions, evidence from the study shows that most have largely ignored or eliminated regressive/weak/ineffective/outdated (rape, marital) laws, which are deeply entrenched in gender discrimination and can potentially perpetuate discriminatory norms in various ways. While the previous section highlighted their importance to post-conflict recovery, one key area that shows a collective failure is holding the government accountable for implementing 30% gender quotas and inaccessible service delivery (minorities) despite the substantial financial assistance. Additionally, their presence has also, to some extent, inadvertently created new inequalities, favoring the diaspora in new job creation.

…...As long as clan elders (s)elect MPs, we will not be in a position to change the status quo. We may need increased international pressure to ensure the next general elections are free, fair, and democratic; that way, we can delegitimize the male-dominated political culture. The President has promised to hold a one person one vote, and I genuinely believe we are edging closer to that (Firdaus, A.).

Hani: It is true some of these organisations, for financial purposes, might say that they have established offices throughout the country. This is purely meant to hoodwink the donors and others on their services, and one of the reasons they exaggerate their presence is simple, to get tenders. They use locally owned weak NGOs, with little accountability, if any, in villages and rural areas. Surely, this will impact service delivery (Hani, A.)

While regulatory frameworks and mechanisms dealing with corruption in Somalia are ostensibly weak "due to the prolonged war," some of the interviewees cited security as the primary reason:

Warsame: Some of these organisations are truly afraid of venturing outside Mogadishu, Garowe, Hargeysa, and Kismayo for security reasons. Most of the country's rural areas are controlled by Al Shabab, and diasporas are their main target. I think, for security reasons, outsourcing their work to poorly managed local NGOs is their only option. However, instead of transferring their services to these weak NGOs, they could empower them first through training. (Warsame, M.)

Unpacking these questions, one wonders whether state policies and existing diaspora mechanisms for engagement can potentially be narrowed into three important and often interrelated categories: "tapping," "embracing," and "engagement." Existing studies on diaspora engagement in India, China, Iraq, Armenia, and Sub Sahara Africa show a clear pattern of a state's ambitions to tap its diaspora for its skills, knowledge, finance, and influence (Gamlen, 2018; Koinova, 2018:19). This realist perspective indicates that the home state's tapping into diaspora investment and philanthropic contributions fosters relationships through a "nationalism" lens.

Part 2

**6.5 INGOs/International Development Organisation Mobilisation Strategy**

In line with the global, transnational thinking on diaspora engagement, many international development agencies in Somalia have, in recent years, focused on ways of mobilizing skilled Somali diasporas to stimulate post-conflict development and reconstruction. Given the broader context and dynamics of diaspora mobilisation, the empirical findings of this study will focus on two important organisations that are actively involved in diaspora engagement: the International Organisation for Migration's (IOM) QUEST MIDA program and the Himilo Relief & Development Association (HIRDA). Both organisations are vigorously involved in mobilizing skilled Somalis to work on development projects back home, and the government and international development partners recognise their invaluable contribution.

### **6.5.1 HIRDA**

Hirda, a non-governmental organisation based in the Netherlands with offices in the UK, Finland, and Somalia, was long considered the first Somali-owned non-state organisation to effectively pioneer the recruitment and mobilisation of the diaspora for rebuilding and enhancing local talents. The organisation is currently part of a multilateral initiative to enhance government institutions through skills development and diaspora mobilisation. In particular, the European Union's development initiatives to channel much of their development budget through diaspora-owned organisations symbolize the role played by Hirda and others in facilitating and enhancing donors' long-term sustainable rebuilding agenda. Furthermore, the international development agencies' reliance on diaspora-owned relief organisations in Somalia stems from two important reasons: security (vulnerability) and weak government institutions (corruption) in their home states, hence the need to rely on diaspora-owned civil society and humanitarian organisations.

The empirical findings point towards a proactive Somali-led INGO's approach to tapping into the diaspora's knowledge and networks. According to a senior member of Hirda's UK office, the growth of the diaspora's meaningful role in Somalia's rebuilding process through the recruitment and mobilisation of a skilled workforce is viewed by many as a way of strengthening and consolidating peacebuilding efforts in Somalia and beyond. This automatically increases the theoretical importance of diaspora engagement to state-building even further. The study also shows that due to chronic state fragility and weaker government institutions, triangular cooperation with donor agencies and the home government has effectively enhanced their role as "agents for development" without a strong central government. Below is a brief excerpt from the interview:

I: What exactly is the role of Hirda in the recruitment/mobilizing of the diaspora for post-conflict development?

Guleed: Hirda is one of the most active Somali INGO based in Holland, the UK, and Finland, and our role in the reconstruction of Somalia is through the provision of much-needed advice on ways of strengthening peacebuilding efforts through mobilisation of the skilled diaspora to both home state government and international partners. We have worked with many international organisations, including UNDP, Oxfam Holland, and Novib. We have also worked closely with Somalia's federal and state governments and occasionally independently.

I: When you say independently, what does that mean? Could you clarify or, if possible, give a few examples where you have worked 'independently'? Also, from whom? The FGS, Donors?

Guleed: There are a few exceptions where we have worked independently from the federal government. To give you a few examples, we researched education development in the Gedo region. We came up with a solution without necessarily involving the federal government in various phases of the project implementation. Well, except cutting the ribbon at the end of the project cycle (laughs). We embarked on ways of soliciting funds to implement the project, and we were successful in bringing three multilateral development organisations on board to fund the project jointly. On the question of recruitment, you asked earlier; we have a two-tier system,

1. Through the federal government-initiated projects, we work closely with different ministries to fulfill their employment needs by recruiting and mobilizing skilled diaspora members. Concerning this, we have placed a skilled workforce from the diaspora in education, health, agriculture, civil servant services, defense, and planning & development ministries.
2. Through collaboration with our international development partners in Holland and other parts of Europe/globally, we place skilled diaspora professionals and match them with jobs back home. In this regard, we have worked effectively with IOM's Quest-Mida Programme, Novib, and Sweden's SIDA. Additionally, we secure funding from these organisations for development projects directly managed by Hirda and mobilize diaspora members to fill key critical positions. (Guleed, M.).

Because of their "unique" cultural/traditional closeness to the recipients, multilateral development agencies increasingly recognise the importance of Somalia-led INGOs in delivering critical services. In an interview with Hirda's former team member tasked with recruiting the diaspora, multilateral and bilateral organisations rely on the diaspora's leading INGOs to benefit from the diaspora's untapped human and financial resources for nation-building. Below is a brief extract from the interview:

Muna: Many international organisations view Hirda and other Somali-owned charitable organisations as a potential and functional avenue for recruiting skilled members of the diaspora and their ability to provide a constructive contribution to developing Somalia. They are aware that these places offer a better chance of finding well-educated Somali diasporas with their immense transnational networks and connections. I was recruited through Hirda and Benadir University and served in Somalia for two years as a molecular biologist. We have blogs, and our presence on social media is robust and very engaging. you can watch me on YouTube and other social media platforms encouraging others to come home and contribute to its development (Muna, H.).

Horn Relief, a Somali-owned Kenya-based charity, is actively involved in recruiting diaspora members for development purposes. UNDP, UNICEF, USAID, and other multilateral organisations rely on it to capitalize on its potential to recruit Somali-speaking professionals for development projects. Unlike Western-based Hirda, which is better informed on diaspora formations, soliciting funding, mobilisation strategies, and has vast experience in networking activities, Horn Relief acts as an "employment agency" for INGOs and donor organisations. The organisation has carved out a niche in the supply of skilled Somali diaspora to areas deemed unsafe for non-natives. It also plays an intermediary role between the FGS and donor agencies based in Nairobi, prior to the relocation of major agencies to Somalia in 2018.

### **6.5.2 IOM QUESTS-MIDA**

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) convened a "Diaspora Ministerial Conference" in 2013 for governments at both ends of the migration circle. Drawing on its long-standing experience on the subject, the organisation developed a new strategically designed mobilisation and recruitment mechanism for engagement to maximize the positive impact of the diaspora's contribution to emerging economies, including post-conflict reconstruction. Due to the successes achieved since its inception, the organisation is currently in talks with major financial lenders, including the Africa Development Bank, to drive its second skilled Somali recruitment drive. In addressing the deficit of skilled workers in Somalia, the IOM, jointly with UNDP, developed Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support (QUESTS) to facilitate the transfer of skills, knowledge, and experience. The organisation has successfully achieved its intended objectives through the recruitment of a large number of Somalia's from the diaspora and is currently working in:

"Collaboration with national government and other stakeholders on programs that promote effective management of health worker migration, health systems capacity building in source countries and skill/knowledge transfer from the diaspora" (IOM, 2012: 1).

Additionally, through its Environmental & Social Management Plan (ESMP), the African Development Bank aims to improve access to adequate and clean water, which currently stands at 32%, with the assistance of skilled diaspora professionals in establishing viable government institutions (ADB, 2016). The term "diaspora mobilisation" for development is used in different contexts depending on the nature of their engagement and migration (Gamlen, 2011). The first approach focuses on the trans-local activities of the diaspora in developing the socio-economic, cultural, and political spheres of their home country. Second, to broaden the scope of the mobilisation discourse, recent transnational engagement debates and policies have heightened interest in the role of international development organisations in encouraging skilled diaspora return. Also known as the top-down aided development approach, Gamlen argues that this notion links homeland development to the diaspora's human and financial resources. The third and final part of the mobilisation analysis concentrates on the policies of migrant-sending states towards their diaspora through the creation of favourable legislation, offering financial incentives for returnees, and job security. This creates a 3-way vertical level of engagement that interacts with each other to develop their countries of origin.

## **Conclusion**

The government has enacted favourable legislation and created a conducive environment to encourage the return of its diaspora. Some of the key elements of this legislation are mapping out and identifying the goals and capacities of the diaspora and linking their skills to developmental needs back home. These laws are also designed to facilitate the quick return of skilled diaspora with, for example, visa-free travel, investment opportunities, and the issuance of IDs and passports to the skilled diaspora to help tackle severe institutional capacity constraints. Two of these key elements were particularly salient in mobilizing the diaspora: issuing passports and treating investment as domestic capital. These advances have contributed to recruiting largely skilled and semi-skilled diaspora professionals. However, circumventing old policies and government bureaucracy proved costly in the beginning. Arguably, the decision on waiving visa fees was finally dropped, mainly because the airport was managed by a private Turkish company and, most importantly, because of the substantial financial income, which, in essence, was more vital for the government's recovery strategy.

Practically, efforts to redefine or restructure the role of clan elders in the upcoming elections (2021) seem a farfetched reality, and this could potentially derail women's agitation for equitable representation and, most importantly, diminish hopes for enhancing minorities' and internally displaced people's (IDPs) rights. Arguably, in this context, traditional elders' creation or maintaining of barriers will continue to impede post-conflict development, especially in matters about service delivery reforms and inclusion (minorities and IDPs). In the discourse of good governance, key donors, INGOs, and the diaspora's functional and structural roles within the government remain unclear. Measures to bring coherence to the multitude of overlapping activities could hold immense potential for future reconstruction efforts.

Finally, in a note of conclusion, these results illustrate the relevance of pursuing policies that empower the diaspora's role in mobilisation and their subsequent engagement in development. The analysis also underlined the vital role the diaspora's contribution plays in re-establishing governance, strengthening institutional capacity, and service delivery. However, much greater progress and a bold new path are needed to enable the diaspora to overcome constraints that limit their realization, especially with regards to enhancing women's participation in politics, protecting minorities' rights, strengthening social and civic societies, enabling transformative social protection for the needy, fostering clan dialogue and reconciliation, and finally, ensuring unhindered, equitable service delivery to all communities.

A vast literature on government and INGO's policy towards engaging the diaspora demonstrates its importance in reversing weak institutional and service delivery capacity. One could argue, and rightfully so, that state policies can be framed as an ideology for social action. From the standpoint of historical institutions, state policies tend to portray a positive contribution to reversing institutional decay in dysfunctional states. Nevertheless, the findings in this study are not meant to be descriptive, in the sense that "policy changes" alone can effectively be considered as an important determinant of transnational skilled diaspora engagement, contribution, and rebuilding of critical government institutions, but rather an informative and insightful feature in a field that has largely remained on the periphery.

## **Chapter 7: Rethinking Diasporas: Reverse Skilled Migration Flows**

**7.1 Introduction**

This chapter seeks to reframe the public debate on migration, Diaspora, and links to the homeland by arguing that the benefits of returning migrants are much wider than broadly imagined, with knowledge and social networks providing a new promising dimension to the future emigration and migration studies. The focus here is on the two core building blocks of Diaspora, homeland and development, and how elements of skills, knowledge, expertise and social connections are applied as a conduit for growth. The findings go beyond reinforcing existing scholarly theories on migration and knowledge transfer studies by adding a new layer of diaspora contribution that has the potential to modify the current diaspora-state paradigm by analysing an important venue through which skilled Somalia diaspora's role in "knowledge transfer" is used in socio-spatial connections to multiple locations.

7.1.2 State Fragility & Public Sector Failure: Staff Training, Design & Development

Without a doubt, three decades of war in Somalia have degenerated to a point where the vulnerable population is hardly protected from harmful products. Training, institutional capacity-building, and knowledge transfer have become dominant ethos in the country's recovery process. Findings from the study are hardly surprising given the extent of institutional decay. Public sector service providers saddled with the protection of the public are poorly trained, undisciplined, ill-equipped, corrupt, underpaid, and exhibit an extremely high level of political/clan interference in staff posting. These aside, most of the trainers (Diasporas) are overly devoted to the capacity building initiatives, with few citing languages/cultural barriers coupled with structural/financial constraints as a major obstacle to fulfilling their "obligation" as a conduit for knowledge transfer. The majority acknowledged that training/knowledge transfer constitutes a critical function of state-building. This position is corroborated by the majority of the population who view the Diasporas as distributors of knowledge/skill resources—a vital component for achieving sustainable post-conflict recovery.

A quick review of the various training available demonstrates the challenges that the Diasporas face, with terrorism, funding, gender inequality, and clan rivalry having the potential to derail the public institutional recovery. The impact of terrorism on institutional capacity building is particularly apt in examining the long-term gains in training and empowering local staff. Equally important, most of this training is concentrated on or limited to staff from the capital Mogadishu and a few major towns with relative stability, raising further questions about whether these structural transformations could be attainable to cover the entire country or whether this inequality could potentially lead to the creation of different layers of service provision. Furthermore, despite the efforts of Diasporas and INGOs, a small minority of the public appears to view public sector reforms with a jaundiced and cynical eye, frequently associating the process with financial malpractices. For obvious reasons, security, training, and institutional capacity-building practices are critical for improving living conditions for millions of people subjected to the failure of administrative apparatus due to decades of civil war. However, beyond the broad grant of post-conflict reconstruction, security remains a key issue, with many of the respondents acknowledging that training is often interrupted by a lack of security. These disruptions may have far more serious consequences for trainees from rural areas. For intrinsic reasons and on the instrumental grounds that robust service delivery is an essential element of post-conflict recovery, the findings from the study show a near-universal consensus that the Diaspora's role in strengthening state institutions is crucial for reversing decades-old state institution collapse.

7.2 Cultivation of the Somali Diaspora: From Remittances to Knowledge Transfer

The previous chapter(s)' discussions on the Federal Government's, IOM/UNDP return programs of highly skilled Somali Diasporas demonstrate the importance of international human capital mobility to post-conflict reconstruction. With Diasporas becoming the most important asset, the findings tally closely with various studies penned by scholars on the rapidly growing literature on Diasporas, remittances, and development. Addressing the conceptual challenges, the study focuses on the emergence of a new agenda promoting the return of skilled Diasporas with an emphasis on temporary relocation to serve the "motherland," which, to a lesser degree, has continued to draw interest from academics and policymakers, signaling a significant change in return emphasis in the 1990s.

In summarising the possible effects of skilled migration in Somalia, the former UN special representative to Somalia acknowledges a significant increase in foreign direct investment, remittances, and, most importantly, increased circulation of human capital in recent years. This sentiment is corroborated by a former British Ambassador to Somalia, admitting the importance of human capital as a major determinant of the country's arduous journey to recovery and encouraging the federal government to facilitate the return of skilled migrants. Occasionally, participants echoed the same remarks with highly charged emotions throughout the discussions. A clear pattern emerges based on similar observations: the federal government's coherent approach to diaspora engagement is strategically positioned to reap the potential development benefits through skill gains and knowledge transfer, with donors appealing to the federal government to strengthen the existing engagement structures.

These federal-level engagements aimed at fostering enhanced relationships focus mainly on socio-economic development (remittances), philanthropy, and most recently, knowledge and skills transfer in their bid to offset serious shortages of skilled labor. As discussed in previous chapters, the primary reasons for their engagement and motivation to serve are multi-layered and complex. However, one area that has remained the focal point for many, including donors, Diasporas, and the larger international community, is reversing instability, state collapse, and addressing the acute shortage of human capital at a time when a vicious cycle of terror attacks on government institutions continues to stifle institutional capacity in Somalia. Contextualizing skills and information transfer in contemporary Somalia, members of the Diaspora admit that knowledge and expertise accumulated overseas have immensely contributed to rebuilding governance structures while at the same time offsetting skilled losses experienced during the beginning of the civil war in the early 1990s.

Mohamud: Almost all the public institutions were suffering from years of war, neglect, underinvestment, poor working conditions, low & unpaid wages, low morale, and above all, rampant corruption. Hospitals, schools, dispensaries were either ill or underequipped; equipment was rusting; Radio Mogadishu, with all the archives of important files of recording since its inception, lay in tatters. The government has every right to rally its Diaspora to come home and contribute to the rebuilding process.

Ali: If not for the Diasporas & donors, these institutions would have collapsed. They have (literally) resuscitated the public sector from total ruin. It would help to question the conventional reasoning on institutional building, especially regarding reliance on INGOs and donors that were tried, tested, and failed to yield tangible results. On the contrary, our people aid recipients often wait for NGOs to deliver basic service delivery, like immunization.

Anab: The government using a combination of 'nationalism' and financial incentives saved public sector institutions from collapse; I consider it the best & bold strategy ever taken since our clamor for independence.

Suado: Most offices closed at 12. pm due to poor work ethics. What was needed was a collective behavioral change that we eventually managed to instill in the locals.

Deeq: The country is indebted to its Diaspora. From training the locals, exchanging information, offering our expertise, linking local institutions to international organisations, and helping key government institutions deliver services to newly liberated areas.

Anthropological and social science studies have long supported the impact of Diasporas on sending states concerning diaspora-state relations, which are chiefly viewed as a catalyst for growth. Given the unique position of Somalia's federal state (financial backing/access to diaspora networks) and the fact that their linkage is conceptually and empirically interactive, as demonstrated by the findings in the previous chapters, the government is keen on utilizing its diaspora knowledge networks as part of its core operational and governance structure. Central to the new discourse, the study captures a deeper analysis of how the state optimizes the 'global Somali Family' concept through a range of activities; workshops, training, consultations, information exchanges, and public forums/debates, among others. In recognising skilled Diasporas as key actors in development, a senior cabinet member provides a detailed appraisal of their role, extending their contribution beyond the realms of remittances:

Warfa: The profound impact of skilled Diaspora on rebuilding and enhancing capacity for government institutions shows their importance, and it is not a secret anymore that members of the Diaspora lead most government agencies. They provide training, mentoring, and vast experience gained in the West. It is a win-win for all. (Warfa, S.)

Yahya: Profound policy changes on engaging skilled Diasporas have yielded positive results. Now the international community wants to seize this opportunity to scale it up in other countries in the region. Take the Baxnaano project as an example (Social Safety Net for the Poor); it was designed, implemented, and managed by people with extensive & long experience working for the Department for Works & Pension (DWP)-the UK are familiar with how the benefits system works. They bring their knowledge, skills to develop institutions that have suffered immensely due to the prolonged war (Yahya, O).

7.2.1 Linguistic & Cultural Know-How

Besides contributing to their home country through remittances, skills/knowledge transfer, and philanthropic causes with a varied development effect, Somali Diasporas possess considerable ties to host states through living, working, and visiting extended family members, with many becoming instrumental in enhancing ties between host and home states. A key example of this growing relationship is the election of Ilhan Omar to the US Congress in 2017. A frequent visitor to Somalia, the congresswoman is actively improving diplomatic, cultural, and political ties between the two countries. Similarly, exploring Somalia's Diaspora in the UK, the study shows critical trends with important implications through lobbying and petitioning the host government, thus making the UK an important partner in Somalia's post-conflict recovery.

This is illustrated by the fact that the UK government, in collaboration with selected diaspora community organisations, hosted a major international conference twice in the past ten years, attracting senior delegates from 50 countries. The head of the Anti-Tribalist Movement, Matan, summarised the event in terms of participation and its importance to the host and home countries:

Matan: We were invited by the PM's Office to take part in the event, most of our members are born here in the UK, and only a handful speaks fluent Somali. The meeting was important in many ways. First, it brought the two friendly countries together, and our organisation and others that were invited view ourselves as both British and Somali. The population of Somalis in the UK is close to a million, and we have a long historical tie to the UK. We are the first migrants to settle in the UK, and having two cultures, two languages is always an added advantage. After the conference, the senior members of our movement traveled back to Somalia to train, exchange ideas and inform them of our desire to see a stable and prosperous Somalia. We regularly attended debates/discussions with different universities, exploring the best ways of engaging with the students and ensuring young people do not join Al Shabab (a terror group). We are currently engaged in mentoring young people and ensuring that they live in peace and maximize their potential in rebuilding the country.

………...I was at the meeting, and I remember talking to senior members of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) in English; members of the Somali president's entourage sat a few meters away; we regularly interacted in Somali, even though I could not speak fluent Somali. That shows the immense benefits of multilingual Somalis worldwide, from Norway to the wilderness of Alaska.

…………. I went to Somalia for the first time since 2002. I worked as project coordinator for Stability Fund, established at the London Conference, pooling financial resources into a single entity. Once on the ground, I was overwhelmed by the poor working conditions and realized that I could do more. As a trained midwife with vast experience, I volunteered to train midwives in Madina, Banadir, and Kalkaal Hospitals during the weekends (**Maryama**).

Other participants' evaluations depict a similar trend on the importance of multilingual skills and their impact on training and empowering the locals. The most visible manifestation of "skills and knowledge transfer" in the study is illustrated by Muna Handulle's experience. A trained molecular biologist from the Netherlands, Muna traveled to Somalia to reverse the impact of a serious and deficient educational system (medical school) and enhance skilled human capital in major hospitals. According to her, the low level of social and human development because of the prolonged war that has completely decimated key government institutions has exacerbated unequal disparities in service delivery with the dynamics of clan superiority inherently creating deeper social and spatial structures (highly uneven service delivery in marginalized regions/neighborhoods/minorities/untouchables/women). Plagued with multifaceted problems, it is hardly surprising that Somalia is ranked among the worst in terms of prosperity in almost all the Human Development Indices (HDI) categories.

In realizing the impact of gender-based violence, including rape, which at the time was rampant, coupled with a legal mechanism that was not responsive due to structural (customary law & clan elders' role) and administrative weaknesses (impact of war/institutional collapse/weak legislation), Muna, in collaboration with a Dutch University, trained a few selected medical practitioners on DNA testing, the first of its kind in Somalia. Equally important, overwhelmed by the increasing number of child rape victims in internally displaced camps, Muna embarked on creating awareness, networking with other Diasporas in facilitating the transfer of medical supplies, encouraging the government to develop proactive and preventative strategies in dealing with sexual violence and addressing the insidious problems of culturally based gender discriminatory attitudes, mirrored by the broad social divisions, citing the importance of safety and justice to the wider society, minorities included. It is worth noting, since the introduction of DNA testing, dozens of rapists have been reprimanded. In contrast, others have been executed for gang rape and violence in Mogadishu and Garowe since 2019.

Muna: Imagine going to a country where a simple blood test is sent to Nairobi (Kenya) or South Africa. That was the reality when I arrived, and most locals did not trust existing laboratories for simple reasons. The majority were owned by private hospitals/dispensaries/clinics that profiteered from making sure each blood or urine test positive for an ailment. That is how they could survive by milking the society dry, and since there was no legal/structural framework to hold them responsible, they could do whatever they wanted. That had to change and to achieve that, we needed to train the locals in state-owned hospitals first to increase their capacity, improve service delivery and ensure that the public trusted them.

………We encountered many obstacles from privately managed hospitals/clinics, which accounted for over 80% of Mogadishu hospitals/clinics. We have succeeded in bringing new and modern equipment to hospitals, training local practitioners, and the Turks after that. The rest is history! (Muna).

Participants frequently recognise the importance of their accumulated knowledge and human resource capacity to recover while generating positive effects through knowledge and skill transfers. Another key example of this emerging relationship is the role of three participants and their subsequent contribution to restructuring and overhauling public sector provision. Tasked with the enormous mission of reforming a "defunct" public service sector that has been largely neglected, underdeveloped, and ignored by a decades-old civil war, 2 of the respondents worked directly with the key ministries to develop policies that are compatible with today's UN development goals. In contrast, the third worked for an international donor organisation to develop an inclusive education system, giving priority to diverse learning needs in public schools (nomads and children with disabilities), address education inequality, especially with regards to children in internally displaced camps, and identify the determinants of the "education gap" between the rich and poor in Mogadishu and surrounding towns/villages.

Focusing on training teachers, health practitioners, and mid-level water experts on delivering adequate and quality services, a former member of the cabinet and a senior adviser to multiple donor organisations admits the role and impact of the Diaspora in the reconstruction process. These short training are structured to offer general preparation in service delivery with financial support from donor agencies, noting the impact of infrastructural and institutional decay operating at a critically reduced capacity. With increased inbound mobility and demand for quality service provision growing due to the relative stability achieved over the past five years, the former minister insists on the Diaspora's contribution in the training and mentoring programs, linking institutional reforms to attaining sustainable post-conflict recovery. Additionally, Somalia's burgeoning youth population (75% of whom are under 30 years old) calls for urgent measures to be undertaken to address the often overcrowded, poorly trained public sector employees and inadequate facilities, hence the contribution of the Diasporas in enabling the adequate provision of services in major cities.

Qassim: There are more than 3 million who are out of school due to many reasons, conflict, nomadic life, natural disasters. I have worked with teachers from the Diaspora to draw up plans, a framework for engagement, and reform the education sector. We have worked closely with UNICEF to enroll more than a million children in schools.

…... part of the challenges we have faced is that the government is more concerned with security and most of its budget goes to paying soldiers wages/salaries. Despite these obstacles, we have tried to enroll more children in schools than any other period, equip more hospitals and dispensaries throughout the country; we have also managed to implement a standardized examination system throughout the country, we have trained schoolteachers/nurses on appropriate teaching, learning methods and materials in every state.

7.3 Ending INGOs Dependence: Leveraging Diasporas Strengths & Opportunities

Catalyzing the role of the Diaspora in the rebuilding process, donor agencies, INGOs, and other development partners have embarked on improving and strengthening the transfer of public service provision under the auspices of the government. A fairly well-developed system by the Ministry of Planning, Investment & Economic Development offers a glimpse of how knowledge and experiences gained abroad are utilized in developing key critical government institutions with the view of improving service delivery and, most importantly, modernizing public sector and operational effectiveness—further enhancing the central and federal member state's primary role in service provision. Equally important, the government is keen on upgrading staff skills through training, knowledge transfer, and integrating this newly gained information and skills prior to the formal service provision transfer.

The transfer of public service provision is mainly done through a dense network of diaspora organisations, state organs, and donor agencies with links to foreign-based Somali and non-Somali organisations. In reviewing the importance of knowledge transfer in reshaping managerial structures, governance, and delivery effectiveness, one area that has attracted the study's knowledge absorption schemes is the reintroduction of standard regulation and quality control systems since 1991. The bulk of the public and those interviewed strongly believe that INGO's role in public service provision is against the tenets and sovereignty of the state, with few acknowledging that their role undermines the very "statehood" that they are supposed to build. Few of the participants view their services as an "instrument of exploitation" that needs to be stopped at all costs, citing the issues of accountability surrounding the vast amounts of money injected into these organisations. However, despite the negative connotations, services such as food, water, and medicine regulation are expected to be fully placed under the government before their term ends in 2022-viewed as a sign of the government's will to re-establish its authority.

Globally, food standard regulatory agencies are unique in facilitating and protecting the public from harmful medicines, foods, and drinks. Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalia's nefarious suppliers have led to the importation of outdated and often harmful medicines, food, and drinks due to the absence of an oversight body to execute regulatory responsibilities. However, reform measures initiated by the government with financial assistance from donor organisations to control the quality of imported goods led to the reintroduction of minimal elements of regulatory systems, albeit with a lack of a skilled workforce. These reforms are partially attributed to social changes, for example, increased income, improved stability, international trends, urbanization, and the influx of Diasporas relocating back to the country. A 4-member team selected from members of the Diaspora was established to reinforce effective regulatory capacity through staff training from different departments, providing a pathway to attaining product safety and quality. The aim of the training on quality assurance is designed to strengthen the public sector's ability to oversee and regulate food, drinks, and medical products.

Outlining the importance of skilled Diaspora in these endeavors, a senior official from the Ministry for Planning narrates the public's vulnerability and the critical contribution of "our people abroad" in developing an effective regulatory framework. Most of the respondents were initially hesitant, citing the government's efforts as overambitious, costly, implementation deficient, lacking workforce, and extensive given the financial constraints and structural barriers. However, through a parliamentary decree, the government-mandated several key ministries to form a task force spearheaded by senior members from the Diaspora. The mandate also noted the state's intent to involve other members of the Diaspora who were not physically present at the time. Embedded in measurable outcomes, the benefits are visible in many sectors. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is expected to transfer food, drinks, and water quality responsibilities to the central government and its devolved regional authorities. Below is an excerpt from the interviews outlining the importance of the return of skilled migrants under the rubric of development:

Osman: We have many skilled Somalis throughout the Western world; they are a potential asset to help the country recover from the war. Comparing current service delivery to the state of public institutions ten years ago, the severity of public decay was unbearable, and the government has to take back service provision from NGOs.

……...they have brought knowledge and talent which conforms to western standards. Exposure to western values, western education & the adoption of the latest technologies is applied to drive growth and improve service delivery; these are why the president refers to them as 'our potential.' (Osman)

Hand: The government relies on Somali professionals to rebuild their home country; if not them, then who? We have seen a large influx of Somalis returning to the country. They are crucial in society in ending decades of NGOs monopolized service delivery. (Hanad)

Abdulwahab: I traveled with Turkish Airlines before, and the entire airplane was filled with Diasporas except for a few Turkish engineers and diplomats. The rest were members from the Diaspora returning. They bring education, skills, and knowledge from abroad.…. Some came for a short visit/holiday, but most I spoke to relocated permanently. These people are crucial for ensuring that the government can run its affairs, including service delivery (Abdulwahab)

Warfa: Like gold reserves in foreign banks, Somali professionals are our asset. As a minister, I have first-hand experience working with them to reform the ministry, set up standards, and represent the government in meetings/seminars. The country is undergoing rapid transition, and the Diasporas have played a key role in the process (Warfa).

## **7.4 Converting Migration Drains into Gains: Structural Determinants of Knowledge Transfer**

While the absolute transfer of international resources in the form of human capital deemed critical to the rebuilding process is at an unprecedented level, the nature of the transfer parameters & its impact on institutional capacity building is highly dependent on the transfer facilitation modalities & strategies. There seems to be a schism between different scholars and disciplines on the impact of brain/gain on sending states, terming it as ‘*simply too optimistic*’ while others criticise some of the underlying assumptions (Siar, 2014; Sinatti & Horst, 2015). However, in order to bridge the divide, this thesis seeks to present a structural foundation for understanding the complex and often interrelated pillars & processes of knowledge transfer and its impact on strengthening institutional capacity. (Fig 7.1).

STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS- The study established that understanding the conditions in which diasporas contribute to the rebuilding process is highly dependent on structural determinants such as security, funding/grants, competency level, training methods and tools of transfer etc. These factors may potentially determine and have an impact on the entire process of human capital transfer despite sending state’s renewed hope of viewing diasporas as potential partners in development.

FORMULATING STRATEGIES- In addressing modalities through which human capital transfer becomes effective, the study shows that formulating strategies and embracing ‘bottom up’ approach is key to achieving the desired goals. This was primarily viewed as a way of maximising knowledge transfer impact on strengthening institutional capacity. Some of the key issues discussed prior to training/knowledge transfer are identifying institution’s needs, training gaps, and institutional capacity to deliver basic services to the public. During the assessment period, trainees and the institutional needs are examined within their current context.

TRAINING- Once the training needs are identified and funding/grants are established, knowledge transfer commences. The trainings/skills knowledge transfer are tailored to the institution’s needs. This could be training individual staff, restructuring entire organisations, strengthening institutional legal/policy framework etc. The design of the trainings is primarily built to address gaps in institutional weaknesses and gaps in competencies.

HUMAN CAPITAL TRANSFER OUTCOME- The study established that knowledge transfer is crucial to ensure positive outcomes. In particular training ill-equipped staff to develop their full potential play a critical role in enhancing institutional capacity through empowering organisation’s service delivery capability, human development and developing legal and policy frameworks for institutions to operate.

## Figure 7. 1 Knowledge Transfer Infrastructure & Processes. Source: Author, (2022).

### 7.4.2 Transnationalism & Skills Transfer

In examining the role of transnationalism and the myriad of cooperation, coordination, and effective engagement beyond home-host geographical borders, the study aims to explore two intertwined critical parts of transnationalism: cross-border activism and hybrid identity, and evaluate how these two important elements are viewed as a valuable source of knowledge and skills transfer. In this context, the study aims to probe further how the home state capitalizes on the efficient flow of knowledge and skills, new ideas, and, more importantly, how this is manifested in broadening the scope of the government's grand recovery strategy.

Nevertheless, current discussions on Diaspora, knowledge transfer, and transnationalism overlook these crucial connections. Through numerous studies on Diaspora, one may acknowledge the diverse discoveries in the descriptive studies. However, the absence of these two significant elements within the "diaspora & development" realm may potentially constitute the missing pieces of the puzzle and, more importantly, merit further scrutiny to ascertain their importance in temporal and spatial terms. Furthermore, it could also provide a coherent framework for future studies.

### 7.4.3 Transnational Networks as Intermediaries

Fuelled by increased mobility, education, and capital, transnational networks position the Somali diasporic community as the "bridge" connecting the two entities. The study shows the importance of trans-local societies as uniquely placed to bring different states together. In essence, they occupy a far larger vantage point diplomatically (informal ambassadors) through the facilitation of dialogue, trust-building, and aligning the host state's geopolitical strategies with their homeland, forging closer cultural and socio-economic ties. The diplomatisation of Diasporas and their transnational networks is relatively new, and this could perhaps explain its importance in developing and reshaping a home state's foreign policy objectives. Though strategically important to both countries and, more specifically to home states through intangible benefits, the research shows that Diaspora affiliation to multiple localities could also be viewed with skepticism and distrust by the local population.

This raises a few conceptual issues with regards to "divided loyalty," "dual-citizenship," and "diasporic identity/nationalism," Prodding this further to highlight the significance and complexity of split loyalty or, more precisely, expressing their affinity to their homeland, the study shows that Diasporas tend to overlook these issues, positioning themselves as "loyal" to both their home and host states, with few suggesting they are compelled to lean towards their ancestral home due to social pressures or governmental insistence. However, the intensity and propensity to identify with their home or host state has never been consistent with current patterns showing that it varies with time and place, for example, in meetings and seminars where Diasporas are more likely to modify their affiliation "represent" their homeland.

Mohamed: *The emphasis on loyalty, states, territorial issues is contentious, and I have seen many Diasporas who identify as both and are very proud of their dual nationality* (**British/Somali**).

**Ali**: *Loyalty should not be an issue at all, I am a proud Somali American, and my loyalty to both is indestructible. I have attended meetings where I represented Somalia, and on such occasions, you represent your homeland* (**American/Somali**).

**Sara**……. *That does not necessarily imply that I have abandoned my Britishness* (**Australian/Somal**).

**Sahan**: *I have been asked these questions before, and I do not think these matter at all on a personal level. I am British, Somali, and female. That is my identity, and therein lies my loyalty* (**Swedish/Somali**)

Naima……*How can you decide your allegiance between the place you were born and ancestral land? My roots are deeply embedded in both countries, and I will remain loyal to both* (Dutch/Somali).

Although fraught with many challenges, many view this new emerging role as informal ambassadors as an integral aspect of the reconstruction agenda. Presenting an extended rationalization, findings from the study show that both home and host states are actively engaged in institutionalizing this kind of relationship-compelling Diasporas to the role of reputational enhancer without formalized diplomatic credentials. Expanding the homeland's diplomatic reach, the evidence tends to validate this notion, demonstrating that they can wield the symbolic role of "ambassadorial" across a geographical range. These evaluations chime with the optimistic progress made thus far in accelerating the Diaspora's contribution towards strengthening government institutions.

7.5 Transnational Activism

Through their advocacy work, the transnational networking groups regularly hold annual conventions in different countries to promote the return of skilled Somali diaspora professionals. These events are typically held in countries with many Somali Diasporas. In 2015, the event was held twice in London, fortifying its role as a global hub for Somalia's Diaspora. According to an excerpt from the interviews, a substantial number of potential skilled and semi-skilled members of the Somali Diaspora have been mobilized during these events, even though exact figures were not available. However, their potential contribution to the recovery and reconstruction process should not be underestimated. With a wide range of formal and informal manifestations, these events have become an integral part of the home/host-diaspora relationship, providing an avenue for their subsequent engagement. This year's Somali Diaspora Forum, held in Istanbul in August 2021, attracted many transnational networks. It is not yet clear the exact number of professionals that were recruited to partake in the reconstruction process despite the significance of the event is adding an important dimension to home-host states development strategy:

Samira: I have worked with other groups across the globe in New Zealand and Australia. We exchange ideas and develop constructive ideas on how to develop our home country—bearing in mind the multitude of problems because of the city and its impact on service delivery and social and mental well-being. I work as a GP in the UK, and I had to cut my working hours to concentrate on this noble idea of organizing events, fundraising for charities, helping members of the British Somali Medics contribution to the development of Somalia (**Samira**).

……This year alone, I traveled to Minnesota, Ohio, and several cities in Australia. We are actively involved in bringing skilled members of the Diaspora together and look at opportunities back home and their potential contributions. I have traveled to Somalia and accessed health services, which are totally in need of restructuring in many respects. Although there has been improvement lately in rebuilding decayed infrastructure, poorly trained staff and understaffing is major problem. I volunteered in one of the major hospitals in Somalia, and I was not impressed at the level of service provision. Alongside our noble cause, IOM is also working tirelessly in bringing a skilled workforce back to the country. (Samira, H.)

Firdaus: I came to London at a very young age, trained as a medical practitioner, worked for the NHS. Somali week, a cultural event held every year, encouraged me to travel back home. My cousin, a pediatrician in the US, was also very instrumental in making the decision I made to travel back home. She was very encouraging, especially after the worst famine in 2011. She contributed to delivering tonnes of medical supplies together with the help of Som Care and Mayo Clinic, both based in the US, to Somalia. We would later meet in Istanbul, London, Mogadishu, and Hargeisa. Networking is critical in such circumstances; Som Care could ship all this vital equipment through networking, which surely opened doors for me and others. (Firdaus, O.).

### 7.5.1 Hybrid Identity

Another promising finding is that most transnational Diasporas possess exceptional traits adopted in their home and host countries. This unique characteristic trait, often multipolar, provides an asset to the government's mobilisation agenda. Since most are connected beyond their home and host countries, they possess a unique advantage capable of linking multiple localities simultaneously. Their distinctive nature enables effective and robust facilitation of diaspora mobilisation and knowledge transfer. The unique position of the diasporas’ as dual nationals means that they are capable of navigating and bridging diverse cultures. These attributes are particularly important in bringing international development partners and the sending state closer. Such efforts are not limited to linguistic alone, (ability to speak different languages) but more importantly in mitigating challenges associated with the traditional top-down development approach.

Given the diasporas’ hybrid identity, the ability to utilise skills/knowledge gained abroad in a local context is considered to yield positive results. A critical reflection of their contributions to the rebuilding process is evidently captured in this chapter as a creative force capable of contributing to the rebuilding process. Diasporas apply western cultures in businesses and skills aimed at enhancing institutional capacity. Recognising the diversity of the diasporas, there is a growing tendency by the federal government to send MPs, Ministers, and senior government officials as representatives in meeting host country’s ambassadors. An extract from the interview with a senior government cabinet secretary confirms the importance of hybrid identity in mobilizing and engaging the Diaspora in post-conflict development.

Sadik: After the civil war, my family fled to the US, where I lived and studied. In mid-2000, I established a public debate forum called Fagaaraha (Public), inviting key stakeholders, members of the society, senior intellectuals, academics, women & youth leaders in the Diaspora, and politicians from Somalia with the view of finding a durable and lasting solution to our problems collectively. Through the Fagaraaha, I met senior government members at the time, and the program became very popular with Q&A from the public at the end of the very debate. I was invited to come back by a friend working at the president's office in an adversory role at the time. I made my 'maiden' journey in 2014 (laughs), I landed in Mogadishu, and the rest is history. The beautiful thing about being a diaspora is that we have characteristics that others envy, our knowledge on how the Western system works, our professionalism, work experience, and the list goes on.

I: Could you provide a few examples of these characteristics you have mentioned and how it impacts the reconstruction process or interaction with the locals?

Sadik: Good example is that we are all Western-educated, speak the language of the donors very well and bring that education/qualification/experience back home. Secondly, most of us who have worked in project management know the importance of project cycle, evaluation, and monitoring its impact on locals. These are vital experiences for donors and our developmental partners, which we all know very well, speaking a language that resonates well with them. Then there is the language and culture; to the locals, we are simply Somalis, and it makes much difference for us to communicate with them in our language rather than a non-Somali. Not all are perfect in speaking the language, I have seen people who struggle to utter a word in Somali, but that shows how far they have come to help. (Sadik, W.).

Other participants expressed similar feelings, with few acknowledging that their overall sense of "belonging" and "identity" had become more difficult to bear. While cultural and ethnic features remained like those of the locals, their hybridity, especially about Western characteristic traits, made them feel "less" Somali. They were frequently regarded as people who had become too "westernized," had lost "their" culture, or, in the worst cases, were "traitors. "The following quote underlines some of the resentment towards hybrid identity:

Arale: Sometimes you feel unwelcome, and you can see that from their faces. Some do not hide the fact that they see you as 'less Somali' than themselves, and my spoken Somali did not help at all. The problem is that before we came over here, members of the Diaspora were very actively involved in remittances, sending money back, and all we did was once money was transferred, you make a quick call and inform the member of the family that you have remitted the money. Usually, this is a short call, and it takes a few minutes. Now diaspora contribution is different; we are contributing to the reconstruction. I have been told, 'why did you abandon your language, culture,' which is the kind of negativity that does not help us.

I: And how do you navigate such negativity?

Arale: See, I belong in both places. Whether they like it or not, that does not make me less Somali. I am trying my utmost best to master the language (Somali). In the meantime, I usually tell them to focus on the positivity of the Diaspora and their contribution to rebuilding the country. I am here to contribute to the country's well-being and answer your question. To overcome the cultural differences, I spend most of my spare time with fellow Diasporas. They have been very instrumental in shaping my view of the locals. I hope the locals will recognise that the myriad cultural, social, and other practices we bring to Somalia far outweigh their negativity. (Arale, K.)

Abdibasit upped the stakes further by explaining the full spectrum of diaspora experiences, demonstrating scant respect from the locals. The positive virtues of retaining diasporic identity, i.e., showing absolute tolerance, calmness, listening to critics, may potentially have considerably reduced the 'otherness' rift. At the same time, their unequivocal commitment to serving their homeland remains unchanged.

Abdibasit: Sometimes you have that feeling that you are a foreigner in your own country. You have that feeling that the locals do not see you as their compatriot or as a fellow Somali. When I returned to Somalia since we fled in 1991, I found my return home profoundly detached from the realities on the ground, and I truly missed home so much that I contemplated going back a few times.

I: Where would that 'home' that you missed so much be?

Abdibasit: Truth be told, home is and will always remain London, UK. However, I also have a sentimental attachment to Somalia, especially Mogadishu, where I have made my second home since 2013. Things are changing gradually; I am feeling accepted by the locals nowadays, they no longer question my identity, dual nationality, or Western values.

I: What do you think made them change their perception?

Abdibasit: I remained indifferent to their negative perception. That could be the answer, or perhaps they have accepted the reality that we are going nowhere, and this country is ours just like they see it as theirs too. We have no option but to co-exist side by side for our country's sake (Abdibasit, K).

Documenting the strong correlation that has existed for years between Somali Diasporas and attachment to their homeland, Abdi (2015); (Brinkerhoff, 2006:2008:2012); Galipo (2018); Lindley (2010) & Hors (2007), depict a clear pattern of engagement that continues to nourish the country's nascent socio-economic and political development. At the heart of their relationship lies the complex clan structure, family, cultural, and transnational experiences that define their association with multiple social spaces. In this regard, Somali Diasporas' return manifests in multiple and hybrid forms of belonging where home and host states become an integral part of that mobility. For instance, to get a better insight on return processes, a majority of the respondents acknowledge that remaining active at both ends of the migration circle contributes to the migrant's frequent movement, interaction and helps them maintain social ties to more than a single country, contrary to the common notion that depicts reverse migration as static.

Yahya: Since my relocation to Somalia 7 years ago, I have always returned to the UK. I have visited family members in Europe and attended a few seminars/meetings in the US. I consider myself attached to many places simultaneously due to work and family. (Yahya)

……. Sadiya: This is a new way of being mobile. Perhaps this will reshape migration and return processes to Somalia differently than what many might not have noticed previously. While in the UK, I regularly visit the University of Leicester and especially two important senior lecturers who supervised my Ph.D. 5 years ago. I frequently travel to Brussels to attend meetings on vocation training programs to empower the youth in Somalia. I visit my mother and siblings in Denmark. After that, I will return to Somalia. The process is continuous, and I view myself as a global citizen that transcends beyond the borders of Somalia and the UK. (Sadiya)

………Firdaws: This is the new reality on the ground, or maybe a new beginning to understand today's Somali diaspora mobility. This year alone, I traveled to New York to attend a two-week training program organized by the World Bank on creating a safety net for internally displaced people. I rescheduled my return ticket to travel via London, meet family and friends, visit Somali Students Association to update them on the work I have been doing. I traveled to Istanbul (Turkey) to attend the annual Somali Diaspora Network a week later. Once the global meeting ended, I traveled back to Somalia, which is the reality of many of our diaspora colleagues. (Firdaws).

### 7.5.2 Serving as Channels for Ideas

A significant majority of participants acknowledge the impact of human development as an essential element of achieving sustainable recovery, hence the accelerated flows of highly skilled Diasporas to Somalia. A review of the data shows that the absence of a robust institutional mechanism in government structures, especially in critical institutions like defense, education, water, and health, exposes the state to vulnerable external shocks (robust private sector, worker desertion, sabotage, clan manipulation, infiltration). This is not an inevitable or irreversible consequence but rather a manifestation of the effects of the decades-old civil war on government institutions. In addressing the persistent failures of the prevailing system, the intensity of the Diaspora's domination in the public sector, serving in an advisory role to key government ministries, may potentially contain indications or at least some acknowledgment of their significance to the rebuilding process.

Serving home states with information exchange, many Diasporas have engaged in sharing information with their counterparts in institutional & capacity building, organizing seminars, donating books/journals to various universities/libraries, social/charitable contributions, women empowerment, enhancing girl education, and creating business opportunities. A brief overview of the scope and impact of information sharing shows its importance in addressing sectoral skilled labor shortages at various levels, with health & education sectors as the main beneficiaries. Additionally, having a dominant presence in critical government institutions allows the Diasporas to facilitate the flow of donor funding for some of these activities.

A key example of mobilizing funds for social and charitable causes is the role played by the Diasporas in empowering local development agencies in disaster relief and development activities. Such development initiatives have intensified and diversified in recent years, with the Diasporas taking an active role in the absence of a strong central government. Highlighting the importance of Diaspora's tangible and intangible information sharing, many participants acknowledge the importance of skilled Somali Diaspora to their home country through a variety of channels, both formal & informal.

Abdillahi: I have worked with different ministries to build local workers' capacity. You cannot have an effect rebuilding strategy without empowering local talent, ensuring that they have the potential to serve the country (**Abdillahi**).

Yahya: Sharing information on best managerial practices is as important as rebuilding the army, navy, judiciary, and police forces. Changing the mindset of public sector employees through training, seminars and with that, we were able to transfer work ethics that we have learned overseas and apply it locally with some modifications that suit them.

Fardosa: Improving local talents through proactive engagement, facilitation of information sharing, ideas have particularly worked in the health sector with many nurses, doctors training locals on best practices, especially on new equipment.

Utilizing their socio-spatial linkage to multiple global connections, many acknowledge that they have directly or indirectly contributed to training locals in different capacities. These include donor or state-backed training programs and volunteer seminars/training organized either by local NGOs or diaspora-based organisations. Crucially important, another important initiative is the Diaspora's role in sending ambulances, medicine, and food to IDPs. Evidence from the data shows how interconnected these groups are in coordination and delivery. A key informant gives a brief description of how their efforts have intensified and diversified in recent years:

Saney: Leicester Somali community arranged to send ambulances to Somalia. They coordinated with their counterparts in Minnesota to send containers full of medicines and hospital equipment. All these are designed and implemented through collective actions. (Saney).

The results show a significant increase in the flow of trade, technology, and foreign direct investment (FDI). More importantly, information exchanges, with Diasporas serving as channels for ideas. A reflection of a deeper role in their relationship and Diasporas' impact on the reconstruction process than previously imagined, expanding their influence beyond the specter of remittances and socio-economic contribution. Emphasizing the importance of sharing ideas, the government actively courts and valorizes the Diaspora with policy changes and other initiatives. Giving a summary of this, a participant admits the state in its most inclusive form regards the Diaspora's contributions to rebuilding critical government institutions as crucial to its own "survival."

7.6 Critical Relationship: Acceptance or Cultural Divergence?

Legitimizing their contribution is necessary for the government to assert its influence/governance over education, water, and health systems that have largely remained disfranchised. Each region/sub-region produces health guidelines, teaching, learning, and examination materials. However, the intricacies of power struggles at the federal and state levels may also inhibit forms of obstacles in reforming education and other critical sectors, with some senior local officials viewing the Diaspora's contribution as an instrument of "exploitative domination." As a result, many Diasporas admit that they are frequently viewed with cynicism, with one participant openly admitting that their work ethics, which include being very particular "with fine details," creating "distinctive sets of reward policies," or following the "rulebook" as stipulated in the code of conduct, are viewed as a source of conflict with Somali tradition, such as taking time off to attend funerals without prior notice/authorization.

Inevitably, these issues raise questions of complex diaspora-local relationships, loyalty, and allegiance. A second implication is recognising the crucial importance of "culture" and its influence on day-to-day activities, including workplace practices. There are fundamentally profound views on culture and traditions between the Diasporas and locals, with the latter assuming unilateral "ownership" of Somali culture, restricting the Diaspora's understanding of the tradition to a minimal functional space. More often than not, words such as' too westernized, 'or brought to rediscover their "roots" and "tradition" are regularly used to describe the Diaspora's presence in Somalia. This prejudicial assessment is no longer a contentious issue to note. Many admit they use "Dayuuspora," a derogatory word often used to describe the Diasporas, which is becoming very common. The contextual significance of coexistence and harmonized relationships creates an ideal atmosphere to utilize their formal and informal networks, skills, experiences, and successes accrued in host states.

To summarize, while the local's alleged "ownership" of the tradition is deeply ingrained, it continues to adapt to the ever-changing global technological innovation. Youths are more likely to incorporate western influences, such as social media, exemplifying the existence of a symbiotic relationship. Such insights are critical in determining the local perspective on the Diaspora's allegiance to the home state, with persistent negativity and intolerable behavior becoming unproductive and harmful to the larger society while embracing features of western influences. Adam's statement typifies instances in which locals' admiration for "western culture" is at odds with their overall view of Diasporas as "too westernized," consciously integrating traditional norms with western values:

Adam: Their lives (locals) consist of significant elements of western influence, western culture, and preference for western education. They accuse us of being too westernized, yet they adore western values, clothing, movies, and new technological advancement. There are ideological differences between the two (Diasporas vs. locals). Contrary to what many may believe as a divergence from traditional and cultural values, most, if not all, Diasporas are contented to have a more balanced western-traditional way of life, or more accurately, acting as a bridge between the two cultures. (Adam)

Additionally, locals' negative perceptions will inevitably hinder the Diaspora's role in the reconstruction process in the long term. Amidst the widening social rift, there is widespread disapproval among the participants in becoming un-diasporic to appease the locals, which resonates well with most participants. Calls for mutual acceptance, inclusion, and demands to be treated equally are mirrored throughout the study. Despite the differences, most of those interviewed are extremely contented with using hyphenated names; Somali-British, Somali-Swedish, Somali Canadian, and Somali-American. They are further cementing their mixed loyalty to both host and home states.

Nevertheless, due to the historical lack of social science inquiry into divided loyalty, I argue with caution that home-host states devotedness should not be used as an absolute definer within the discourse of migration, allegiance, and mobility owing to contemporary Diaspora's spatial widening of social relations & affiliations. In contention, most of the respondents subscribe to the dominant transnationalism phenomena and spatial mobility that transcends host-home borders. For these reasons, this study, with maximum consideration to modern diaspora dimensions, adopts this conceptualization by the changing configurations of Diaspora's mobility influenced by the association to multiple localities, transnational entities, which is often multipolar and the constitutive elements of contemporary Diaspora's feelings, sympathy, loyalty to more than a single entity.

Still, the underlying patterns of Diasporas-local resentment predicably fuel the widening perception gaps with the negative generalization of Qurba Joog as' foreigners' and 'agents,' underscoring the far-reaching consequences of their relationship. These kinds of emotionally charged and irrational provocation may eventually aid anti-government actors (terror groups or clan militias) against the Diasporas, positioning them at the opposite end of the social cohesion spectrum. Equally significant, the "xenophobic" discourse could also potentially benefit from stereotyping of the Diasporas as "undercover" and "non-believers," a narrative used by different terror groups to justify targeting Diasporas working for the government. These risks are acutely evident in the rhetoric used by the Al Shabab terror group's objection to the Diaspora's role in rebuilding the government and, so far, a handful of Diasporas in seniority positions, including the former mayor of Mogadishu, have paid the ultimate price. Reflecting on these outcomes, many participants emphasized the importance of social cohesion and coexistence with locals as prerequisites for achieving long-term peace and development:

Amir: When the locals get frustrated with anything wrong with the system (governance), they usually blame the Diasporas. They do not view us as equal (Somalis) whenever a problem arises. Some locals share the same ideology with Al Shabab in opposing the Diaspora's contribution to many aspects of post-conflict.

………. Al Shabab thinks that host states sent the Diasporas to advance a neo-liberal/democratic governance against the religion. Some locals hold that view, too, that the Diasporas are' foreign agents' working for alien/external states to impose liberal views through soft power (reconstruction). However, such sentiments are not shared by the majority.

Deeq: I wonder why they use certain words associated with the terror group to describe the Diaspora's presence in Somalia. Sometimes I feel uncomfortable discussing matters with the locals. I have always disagreed with their work ethics, their overall overview of politics (clan-driven).

According to this argument, a sizable majority admits that their role(s) in reforming education, health, and other sectors is limited, owing to a lack of urgency, government commitment, loyalty and trust issues, and even financial constraints. Secondly, the implications for water, health, rural development, disaster management, and educational reforms are not encouraging since most of the statistics provided by the government containing an overview of important reforms and recommendations are mainly derived from data collected in Mogadishu and a few selected urban centers/towns, raising further concerns about inequality in accessing quality public services nationwide. Within this broader context, issues of availability, accessibility, and adequate service provision existentially become "mythical" for the majority in rural areas and areas under the control of the Al Shabab terror group. I will express my reservations shortly.

Finally, excluding women seems to be rampant, even though the study could only identify a few instances where women faced systemic cultural and institutional barriers—especially in leadership and training roles. However, most of the respondents tend to avoid this pivotal conversation rather than vaguely acknowledging the marginalization of women in a global context. However, despite women's enormous potential in the rebuilding process, exclusionary cultural tendencies have limited women's ability to assume their position in the public as stipulated in the constitution, especially since most suffer the double tragedy of cultural oppression and the burdens of war. Significantly, the bulk of research literature on gender in Sub-Sahara Africa and, to a large extent, emerging economies, gender is deemed a "marginalized" subfield in diaspora studies.

Although some efforts are now being made to accommodate women in public institutions, including honoring gender quotas in the bicameral parliament and public sector recruitment, cultural tendencies continue to question women's role in society, often casting pervasive doubt on their intellectual abilities. I hold the view that a dynamically evolving post-war society is required to appreciate women's contributions and stimulate a vibrant and robust line of discussion on women's role in the contemporary era. Evidence from the study shows migration to the West has afforded Somali women the opportunity to assert independence due to the absence of patriarchal structures. Within this framework, a few women from the Diaspora have established advocacy offices in different parts of the country with minimal assistance from the government to improve the position of women and, more importantly, to reverse unwarranted practices rooted in centuries-old traditions. After all, state institutions ought to protect women, especially those from minority clans, tackle traditional subjugation through dialogue, and reconsider the role of exploitative culture in modern Somalia.

However, amidst the consequential shift from *warlordism* to governance, Somalia’s re-emergence as a country shows diasporas are instrumental in reshaping the country’s politically and economically. The concentration of diasporas in key government institutions is indicative of their role in the rebuilding process. Additionally, the number of dual nationals currently serving as members of parliament (100+) provides an informative description of their contributions to development.

**7.7 Government Reforms**

Relentless efforts by the federal government to encourage the return of its diaspora is aimed at increasing the intensity and flow of inward mobility. In additional to favourable policies & regulatory reforms, the government has improved security in and around Mogadishu. Domestically, the government has simplified diasporas’ economic intervention by removing red tapes, embracing innovation, and providing valuable insights into the local market. The government has also increased public-private partnership by awarding tenders to diaspora businesses, further cementing their relationship. These reforms and incentives are vital in tapping into diasporas’ immense potential.

## Conclusion

Given the fractured state of the public sector due to the decades-old civil war, creating momentum for effective diaspora engagement is relevant for many reasons. A critical overview of previous chapters identified key issues that are relevant to current global migration trends, including sending states proactive policy changes, mobilisation strategies, philanthropic giving, increased hybridized identity, and the different facets of "nationalism" used by the federal government to lure Diasporas back to the country. According to a leading member of Somalia's Ministry for Labour, donors have strengthened the role of Diasporas in the rebuilding process, noting the contribution of IOM's Quest-Mida program. Equally significant, it is worth mentioning that these recruitments are usually conducted through transnational flows, reflecting their importance within diasporic, migration, and development contexts. Underlining this, two critical departures shape the thesis's approach.

First, I consider transnationalism an integral part of the study and an emerging global regime of Diaspora and development, despite the slow recognition from scholars who have yet to comprehend the rationality and significance of transnational networks in rebuilding home countries. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, empirical evidence shows that transnational networks could potentially be an important avenue through which diaspora engagement for homeland reconstruction could be harnessed. In recognition of their contributions to rebuilding their home country, the desire to "serve" in any capacity, including "skills and information" transfer, is echoed throughout the study. Many of the interviewees have traveled more than twice (temporarily) to partake in the rebuilding process despite the disparities in working conditions between their home and host states. While acknowledging the choices that underpin these journeys, for example, moral, ethical, cultural, and financial gains, the study reveals a deeper revelation, using a "connectionist approach" to facilitate skills circulation with Diasporas as principal conduits.

The actual or potential contributions of the Diaspora are acknowledged throughout the study, with evidence suggesting the top echelon of the government is almost entirely dominated by members of the Diaspora, including the presidency, the PM, and critical federal ministries. Considering the contexts in which the Diasporas have become overwhelmingly and disproportionately represented in key government institutions, most of the respondent's justification as an "essentially objective" may potentially be viewed to legitimize skewed recruitment of the public service sector. However, despite their assertion and explicit, systematic bias against hiring, the unintentional outcome could well be a recipe for a constant source of tension between locals and Diasporas.

Taking a holistic approach to understanding the impact of these training and the state's responsive measures to ensure an unhindered flow of knowledge and skills to local staff indicates the Diaspora's role as quite apt and relevant given the collapse of public institutions. Several attempts to legitimize the state's authority are noted, particularly regarding transferring public service provision from NGOs and others. A significant focus of criticism is the domination of local and international NGOs and donor agencies in service delivery. This gesture is viewed by many as a tool to weaken the government's legitimacy and overall authority. In contrast, others admit that the presence of NGOs impedes genuine reconstruction of the state.

Few conclusions can be drawn from this assessment. Despite the Diaspora's contributions and the government's attempts to improve the quality of health, education, defence, water, and other critical sectors, including the passage of the Right to Education Act, the failure to provide a holistic approach that covers the entire country, compels the majority of children in rural regions, nomads and internally displaced people (IDPs) to poor quality education, health, and inadequate public service provision (Brookings, 2014). Equally, the government's efforts in reforming these critical sectors in urban centers have yet to generate a "tsunami" effect. On the contrary, many urban dwellers prefer private education, water, and health provision to public-managed service providers. This could partially explain the widening disparity in education, health, and access to other public services where financial resources determine access to quality education, water, and health services.

## **Chapter 8: Key Findings**

**8.1 Introduction**

The empirical findings discussed in chapters 5, 6, and 7 are summarised, each capturing diasporas' mobility and their subsequent contributions to homeland development informed by changing migratory diaspora dynamics with various facets of diaspora configurations recognised as an essential element in diaspora/migration studies. The principal outcome of this research project is to shed light on the role of Somali diaspora professionals in the rebuilding process & its implications for future research studies. In a fundamental departure from the traditional/historical studies that primarily focus on remittances as a way of gauging diaspora engagement, the thesis aims to make significant contributions to existing knowledge beyond remittances by expanding the horizons of diaspora/mobility/engagement in the contemporary era.

This includes exploring new conceptual categories, different opportunities, strategies, and constraints of transnational networks efforts, emphasizing transnationalism and its dynamics in fostering diaspora mobilisation, a lesser explored research path. To address these shortcomings, the study will provide a critical understanding of the diaspora-state relationship and how transnationalism offers a unique position & robust analytical concept for understanding diaspora engagement beyond immediate borders. Given the paucity of transnationalism in contemporary diaspora-development studies, this chapter will provide a brief overview of the government's mobilisation strategy anchored in transnationalism, highlighting its role as an essential ingredient in engaging skilled diasporas for development. I begin with chapters 5 & 6 with empirical findings in both chapters on diaspora mobilisation, formulating policy changes, fostering/sustaining sending state-diaspora relationship showing that the process is more complex & multifaceted than initially theorized.

8.2 Developing a roadmap for engaging the diaspora

Chapter 5 of this thesis explored the engagement of the Somali diasporas incorporating transnationalism in return mobility. A central theme is discovering the different mobilisation strategies adopted by both the sending state and its international partners, most notably the World Bank, USAID, and International Organisation for Migration (IOM). These findings relate to the evidence on the literature in chapter 2 on mobilisations and engagement. However, new layers of diaspora mobilisation strategies are included to further our understanding in a multi-connected, globalized world with constantly changing migratory patterns. This consists of exploring the role of social media as a robust recruitment tool & the impact of transnational migrants as a source of human/financial capital.

Also, the conceptual categories, different opportunities, strategies, and constraints of diasporas/international networks efforts with specific emphasis on transnationalism and its dynamics in fostering diaspora mobilisation; a lesser-explored research path. To address these shortcomings, the findings provide a critical understanding of the diaspora-state relationship, but more probingly, how transnationalism offers a unique position & analytical concept for understanding diaspora engagement beyond immediate borders. Given the paucity of transnationalism in contemporary diaspora-development studies, the thesis will provide a brief overview of transnational network's mobilisation strategy; a more comprehensive analysis on the topic will be discussed in the previous chapter(s), highlighting its role as an essential ingredient in engaging skilled diasporas in development.

### 8.2.1 Mobilisation Strategies: Building Trust

Building trust with members of the Somali diasporas is an essential part of establishing sustained linkages, given the long history of emotional/social attachment to their homeland. The current government (in office since 2017) has demonstrated the effectiveness of diaspora engagement to address shortages of skilled workforce in crucial state institutions. It is worth noting that current leaders, including the President, the Prime Minister, and several cabinet ministers have dual nationality, having lived in the west following the fall of the socialist regime in early 1991. They are conversant with the importance of transferring skills/workforce/expertise/knowledge acquired in host nations. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that they clearly understood the importance of diaspora as a potent tool for development compared to their predecessor. This is relevant in many ways:

* The intensity of diaspora engagement has increased over the last four years, with many skilled diasporas expressing keen interest in contributing to the reconstruction process.
* Since current leaders like the President, PM, and senior cabinet members, are from the diaspora, they are considered the 'real faces' of return migration, giving an enormous boost to skilled reverse migration.
* Findings from the study show the government has invested substantially in creating a conducive environment for diasporas' return as part of the broader 'building trust' strategy.

The majority of the respondents acknowledge the importance of trust and fostering a sustainable relationship with the sending state. Central to this emerging relationship beyond remittances, the government has built concrete measures to ensure that the flow of diasporas (skilled/semi-skilled) is built on the notion of 'mutual benefits. This is evident from the number of visits by key cabinet members, senior government officials to the west, most notably the UK/US. These visits' intensifications are vital since they are tied to building a new relationship with the diaspora beyond the narrowed horizons of remittances and philanthropic contributions.

Current literature on diaspora for development that portrays their contributions as a potent force for development provides insightful knowledge, which is corroborated by the findings from the study, without delving deeper into who benefits most and at what cost. Although we may agree with the general perspective of scholarly discourses, approach, which relies on sending state's ability to exploit and benefit from the engagement, due to the fluid characteristics of diaspora formations, engagement & mobilisation, over-emphasizing on the state as the sole structural determinant in the relationship, a significant heuristic potential seems to be missing (diasporas standpoint) (Gamlen, 2018). Such alignments cannot be generalized or, at least, be presented as exemplars of best practices in engaging global diasporas. I believe that exploring diaspora-sending state gains from the diaspora's perspective may offer a purposeful role in future studies.

### 8.2.2 Mechanisms for Diaspora Mobilisation & Strategies

Findings from the study show that the government's approach to building a constructive relationship with its diaspora is noted as a 'critical' government strategy with the migrants playing multiple roles, for example, facilitating human/skills capital, enhancing cross-border engagement, and engaging in philanthropic/charitable causes. In an attempt to engage with the diaspora, the government uses different mechanisms to exploit the human/financial possessions of its 'constituents' abroad using diverse recruitment mechanisms. The term 'constituents' or 'our people' abroad is echoed throughout the study to signify the government's perception/view of the diasporas as its 'own,' albeit living in a foreign land.

The different strategies presented in the study show that the state adopts various levels of engagement, with some considered as 'more' important than the others. This is demonstrated by the government's level of commitment with senior members' participation as the main drivers covering multiple spaces/locations to cultivate a new relationship beyond remittances. Notwithstanding the historical relations with its diasporas built on remittances, the new strategies aimed at maximising the potential of skilled circulatory migration are aligned with Gamlen's governability approach, which legitimizes cross-border engagements. The figure below depicts sending state’s recruitment and mobilisation strategies. (Fig7.1).

Diagram

Description automatically generated

Fig.8.1: Diaspora Recruitment Strategies. Source: Author, (2021).

8.3 Revitalized Nationalism: Role of Shared Culture/Identity in Mobilisation

Developing countries are increasingly becoming aware of the importance of diasporas in homeland development, with many adopting structural/policy changes to lure the return of skilled diasporas (Tejada & Bolay, 2010). Empirical findings from the study show that 'belonging,' 'shared culture,' and other elements of 'collectivism' are elaborate strategies adopted by the government to promote the return of skilled migration. Equally important, it also provides the state with a reference point for 'collective belonging,' which could potentially explain the strategic framing of 'nationalism' employed to mobilize the diasporas. In this context, the state assumes the role of 'cultural guardian' to exploit diaspora's emotional attachment to the homeland to essentialize collective identity. In such a scenario, it becomes critically imperative for the government to exploit 'every available option' to mobilise the diaspora. This includes using 'fearmongering' tactics, for example, portraying neighboring countries, most notably Kenya/Ethiopia and others from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) except for Qatar as 'peace-spoilers’/’obstacle' to achieving sustainable stability.

Additionally, most of the participants believe that UAE/Saudi Arabia is waging a well-calibrated low-level proxy war against Turkey/Qatar on Somalia’s soil. However questionable this notion may be, such tactics resonate well with most respondents, further validating/legitimizing the sending state's claims. Though scant in its use in current & previous diaspora/migration studies, 'fearmongering' as a foreign policy tool to mobilize the diaspora may add a new layer to existing mobilisation strategies. This highlights the importance of revitalized nationalism linking shared culture, identity, and belonging beyond the state's national borders. The study acknowledges the centrality and supremacy of 'cultural belonging' and connections to their homeland as an essential instrumental tool in advancing the state's outreach strategies.

Similarly, the study recognises the intensity in which the government injects itself into transnational spaces, offering a solid background on the reconstruction of national identities beyond the state's authority/geographical borders. In essence, the underlying importance of 'symbolic borders' beyond home-host shows that the very concept of diaspora and belonging has undergone a remarkable transformation, linking long-distance nationalism to homeland development. These findings are corroborated by empirical analysis in previous studies that derive common patterns of nationalism-driven engagement, such as Turkish, Armenian, and Somali diasporas (Kleist, 2008; Koinova, 2018:19). Finally, the emergence of 'national communities' encompassing different spatial borders was deemed critical in understanding diasporas’ role in development, further adding a new thematic to existing literature.

### 8.3.1 social media/Satellite TV/Philanthropy

A recently established strategy is using social media to encourage the circulation and transfer of skills (Koinova, 2019). Considering the wide range of strategies adopted for their engagement, social media is among the most effective recruitment tools designed to foster a more incredible state-diaspora relationship and subsequent engagement. Findings from the study show a clear pattern of the government's approach to lure skilled diasporas, with social media viewed as a convenient way of conveying its message to the diasporas. The idea of using social media platforms stems from 'informing' diasporas on the gains achieved over the past few years through diverse channels tasked with communicating and disseminating information on the government's development agenda. It later morphed into recruitment & innovative tool for engagement, with many of the respondents acknowledging the robustness of social media in engaging with the diaspora. Focusing on the novelty of social media as a recruitment/mobilisation tool in the contemporary era, transnationally connected migrants are linked to their homeland through different contexts concurrently or following a logical order.

Brinkerhoff (2006), Koinova (2019) acknowledge the importance of social media as a salient factor in political engagements. Mariam (2016) recognises the link between social media and digital diasporas, citing its significance in mobilizing protests against the Ethiopian state. In this context, the use of online tools (social media) for reaching widely dispersed populations also opened opportunities for the state to connect diasporas to the homeland, perpetually changing the face of state-diaspora relations by providing virtually instantaneous access to potential contributors. It has also facilitated communication between and among the diasporas and sending states beyond host-homeland borders. (Godin 2018; karabegovic 2018; Koinova 2019) affirm its importance in a spatial context, alluding to the importance of social networks as a structural determinant of sustaining durable linkages across borders. Overall, the findings demonstrate that mobilisation strategies are changing with the new technological advancement. Hence the multi-dimensional process of diaspora mobilisation could potentially increase the flow of reverse migration, which has specific significance for the study.

Redefining the engagement of the diasporas, another mobilisation strategy that has enjoyed increased utilization is the role of philanthropy/charitable causes incorporation into mainstream development agenda. 'private giving' is embedded in the Somali culture/religion. This could partly explain the sending states' considerable interest in cultivating relationships with their constituencies abroad. Findings from the study show that Somali diasporas have contributed immensely to the reconstruction process, achieving a more significant impact during the 2011/12 famine. Others have donated generously towards the armed forces, rebuilding government institutions, including schools and hospitals. Most notably, the aftermath of the 2017 terror attack in Mogadishu that claimed the lives of more than 500 experienced a vast philanthropic resource flow (monetary), generating a 'tsunami' on social media and satellite television.

The societal benefits of diasporas charitable contributions are acknowledged in the study, with many of the respondents citing religion, identity/culture as a fundamental obligation to contribute towards good causes. Also significant, findings from the study acknowledge the importance of transnationalism and the collection/flow of financial resources across borders. This is a crucial feature in diaspora/migration development studies. Empirical evidence from previous studies shows that donor/development organisations' acceptance of charitable causes and their positive impact on economic growth/service delivery, with the World Bank valuing the role of philanthropic diasporas, accepting its importance in achieving more significant sustainable development. Newland et al. (2010) declare that the diaspora's role in charitable causes is gradually gaining acceptance. Nonetheless, current existing literature on the issue tends to neglect the broader context in which philanthropy is utilized in development. With global diasporas gaining more knowledge & finding financial success abroad, the likelihood that diasporas' role in philanthropic giving to sustain development in their countries of origin might intensify remains positively high (Horst et al, 2015).

8.4 Government Policies

Existing studies on diaspora engagement acknowledge the importance of developing robust and effective policies to attract the diasporas' financial/capital, knowledge, and human resources (Gamlen, 2018). The study established that the role of diaspora in the rebuilding process is conditioned by:

1. The development of robust engagement strategies/practices.
2. Effectiveness of Policy Changes on reverse migration.
3. Political Stability/security.
4. Availability of Funding.
5. Dynamics of Transnational Connections

Even though all the above-mentioned have merits in increasing/decreasing diaspora mobilisation, the study established that government policy changes/strategies have a more significant implication on diaspora engagement, especially in post-conflict interventions. To evaluate this, the researchers analysed the impact of policy changes on recruitment.

### 8.4.1 Implications of Policy Changes on Reverse Migration

Increasingly, INGOs and international development organisations in Somalia have embarked on luring diaspora intelligence and financial resources for domestic institutional capacity and infrastructure development. The findings from the study reveal distinct models used to engage with members of the Somali diaspora depending on the organisation's recruitment and mobilisation strategy, most notably developing robust engagement policies. These organisations offer a short-term, circular, or permanent return for diaspora members, providing job opportunities in different areas such as volunteerism, philanthropy, social innovation, or simply as development partners. The importance of policy/attitude changes towards the diasporas highlights the importance of the relatively new strategy acquired by the government, INGOs, and international development partners in mobilizing the diaspora's return for development.

While the diaspora mobilisation strategy remains essentially transnational, the policy approaches adopted by these organisations differ. HIRDA views the skilled Somali diaspora as one of the "sending state's" strategic and core assets that could contribute to the reconstruction process. It primarily engages with Somali community groups and individuals through grassroots community mobilisation, focusing on recent graduates. On the other hand, the QUEST-MIDA attitude focuses on a myriad of approaches for engagement. These include raising awareness through regular community conferences, providing a mechanism for diaspora return, offering financial incentives, job opportunities, free accommodation, medical cover, return tickets, linking diaspora skills with development needs, decent wages, and cultural orientation.

Given its importance to recruitment, IOM's Quest Mida plays a crucial role in providing information to a multitude of organisations on the complex array of insecurity in Somalia and the development of a policy framework on diaspora recruitment with the FGS. Based on accumulated experience in providing, the organisation has become one of the few organisations that have had a lasting impact on Somalia's post-war recovery, most notably for engaging diaspora members. In exploring various forms of diaspora engagement, QUEST-MIDA is perhaps the most successful international development organisation working on recruiting and mobilizing skilled Somali diasporas returning to their country of origin. 30% of the respondents acknowledged that they had approached the development agency or attended one of their annual seminars or conferences. Underlining several essential aspects of the diaspora-development nexus, the QUEST-MIDA program acknowledges the growing influence and importance of the Somali diaspora in the reconstruction process. The program has two critical features: recruiting competent/experienced candidates and matching qualifications with the needs on the ground. The program relies on an online recruitment tool where potential candidates upload their CVs and resumes improving the capacity of mobilizing a skilled workforce from a large pool of potential candidates.

8.5 Creating an Enabling Environment for Migrants Participation in Homeland Development

Creating an enabling environment for diasporas contributions is a critical feature in the study. The changes are centered on increasing the flow of return migration and exploiting the diasporas' financial/capital and knowledge resources. In critically examining the role of policy changes, the study established that these modifications are crucial in formulating a long-lasting relationship with the diasporas. Even though existing literature indicates that it is imperative that the two sides (state & diasporas) should practically derive value from the relationship, findings from the study show the sending state as the 'sole beneficiary' in such an engagement despite the skewed representation of the diasporas in critical government positions.

### 8.5.1 Developing Robust Policies for Engaging Somali Diaspora

To fulfill its obligation in engaging and mobilizing the diaspora, the government has developed a policy framework consisting of 3 vital important elements of engagement.

* Identifying Diaspora skills and linking them to development needs;
* Building a relationship with diaspora groups/individuals in host countries;
* Creating Gov't-Diaspora Taskforce.

### 8.5.2 Identifying Skills.

A general remark from the interviews is that the national governments’ attitude regarding identifying needs and linking them to the diasporic communities’ skills has gained momentum due to critical resources and knowledge gap & funding opportunities. Previously, during the transitional period between 2010-2014, the Somali government’s efforts were mainly concentrated on remittances and philanthropic contributions commonly known in Somali as Iska U Dhis (Build Your Country). The government’s efforts in encouraging the return of its diaspora are reflected in its policies and diaspora mobilisation framework established at the end of 2017. The figure illustrates steps undertaken by the government in mobilisation. (Fig.7.2).

Fig. 8.2: Mapping Needs. Source: Author, (2021).

Mapping needs, funding, and targeting diasporas for engagement are interlinked, and their dependency is hinged on the government's development of conducive policies.

### 8.5.3 Building Relationship

Accentuating on the fundamental basis for their engagement and subsequent contribution, the President toured a few countries (US/UK/EU) since 2017 to build grassroots support and rally the diaspora to return 'home' and contribute to the rebuilding process, significant stakeholders. In this 'newly found' diaspora engagement context, the gov't was keen on expanding the recruitment efforts into a more general diaspora outreach strategy. Existing studies provide invaluable information on state-sponsored diaspora engagement strategies in expanding diaspora's role in socio-economic development, building sustainable partnerships, and consolidating the diaspora's role in homeland development (Sahoo & Pattanaik, 2014).

### 8.5.4 Government Taskforce

The governments' broader rebuilding strategy incorporates diasporas mobilisation in the mainstream development agenda. The government has set up a task force to encourage skilled reverse migration to expand contacts with its diasporas. Consisting entirely of diasporas, the team is tasked with providing Somalis living abroad with important information on current development projects, conveying the government's agenda, and, more importantly, portraying the sending states' positive reconstruction achievements to a broader audience. The team has an active presence in social media and satellite television and has to some extent, sustained strong ties with the diasporas. Unlike their predecessors, the current government is keen on cultivating and nurturing this relationship, realizing its importance in homeland development. This can partially be attributed to the fact that almost the entire top echelon of the government hierarchy, including the President, PM, and critical ministries, are occupied by members from the diaspora.

Fostering such a relationship is centered on shared identity/culture and belonging. These are crucial elements in ensuring that despite the geographical differences, embracing 'national collectivism' towards homeland development and perhaps more importantly, diasporas as development partners explain the policy/strategies context and factors in which their mobilisation and facilitation are enhanced. Reflecting the level and degree of policy/strategy changes designed to maximize the potential of diaspora contributions, the study recognises their role in post-conflict reconstruction anchored in transnationalism. Gamlen (2018) provides a more useful summary of sending states' policy changes towards diaspora engagement, citing its importance as a valuable tool for diaspora mobilisation. Additionally, Koinova (2018) notes that diasporas retaining elements of their original culture are more likely to be engaged in developing their homeland. Central to the construction of 'identity,' 'spatial,' and 'homeland,' the study finds both narratives a valuable concept to gauge skilled Somali diaspora's contributions in post-conflict recovery.

8.6 Knowledge/Skills Transfer Through Diaspora Transnationalism

The intrinsic value in this sub-sector lies in exploring the impact of today's highly skilled Somali Diasporas in post-conflict reconstruction, highlighted by new configurations of transnational bonding with a focus on institutional capacity building and improved service delivery. The majority of the respondents interviewed acknowledge that they have acquired vital attributes that could potentially be deployed in developing and enhancing institutional capacity. The primary focus is on the impact of reverse knowledge transfer on the government's ability to deliver essential services.

The study established that skilled diaspora's contributions are instrumental in enhancing many sectors, most notably, in critical government ministries. To identify appropriateness, robustness, and transferability of skills/knowledge, the study acknowledges the importance of knowledge transfer in a post-conflict reconstruction context, especially in creating effective government institutions. It is important to emphasize that the knowledge transfer process is diverse with multiple stakeholders (Government/donors) involved in the practice, different structural characteristics, and functions. The impact and magnitude of the transfer are also dependent on the transfer mechanisms employed. The diagram below shows value of diasporas’ overseas experience. (Fig 7.3).

## Fig 8.3. Value of Overseas Experience. Source: Author, (2021).

The use of skilled Somalian Diasporas in the study is both timely and relevant for many reasons. First, Somalia is emerging from a decades-old civil war that has ravaged most parts of the country. The destruction of public infrastructure, institutions and a toll on human capital caused the total collapse of public service delivery. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, diasporas are disproportionately represented in the top echelon of the government, including the Presidency, the Prime Minister, and critical cabinet positions, including Foreign, Finance, Health, and Defence, with other sectors, also benefiting substantially from the return of highly skilled Diasporas. Nonetheless, given the immense contribution to developing the home country, I take the view that prudence should be exercised concerning "brain gain" and "skilled reverse migration," principally because the benefits to the Diasporas may not necessarily constitute "individual gain" due to the insecurity, huge pay disparities, and other social sacrifices (instability, poor infrastructure, inadequate service provision) as a direct result of the relocation (Home vs. Host).

### 8.6.1 Towards a Model for Transnationalism Knowledge Transfer

In collaboration with the government, INGOs and international development agencies serve as intermediaries, facilitating and hastening the mobilisation of skilled diaspora return. Many of these organisations have increasingly become proactive in the past ten years, emphasizing skilled professionals, developing measures to maximize the diaspora's potential in rebuilding their home state. Among the key international agencies providing a platform for their return and consequent contribution are IOM, the EU, UKAID, and USAID (Bachman & Schouten, 2018). It is worth noting that some of these organisations offer financial incentives to harness the potential returns of skilled migration. Evidence from the interviews shows that transnational networks are a central component of the government's mobilisation strategy. Globally, only a handful of national governments have established a coherent and robust strategy for engaging their diaspora. Somalia is ranked among the few strategically positioned to reap the potential development benefits of their "people abroad."

Drawing on empirical evidence from the study, using both bottom-up engagement policies initiated by the transnational networks or top-down engagement policies implemented by the federal government and international development agencies working in Somalia, the findings provide some grounds for optimism that diaspora engagement has succeeded in cementing their position in the reconstruction/recovery process. Below is a summary of the knowledge transfer approaches and their impact on enhancing institutional capacity.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| TRANSFER MECHANISM | FACILITATORS | FUNDING | IMPACT |
| Direct Training of Key Personnel:  Training Type: Conventional  Training/skills transfer usually conducted at state and federal level. | Diasporas/Government officials at state & federal level. | Government/Donors/INGOs  World Bank  Norwegian Council  TIKKA  SIDA  USAID  GTZ | -Strengthened  personnel capacity.  -Enhanced Service delivery  Improved Delivery Coverage.  -Consolidating government’s authority.  -Improved stability  -Broadening government’s outreach/authority. |
| Direct training Lower, Mid-Level Staff.  Training Type: Conventional  Trainings are usually conducted in collaboration with Federal Member States (FMS) with frequent travel outside Mogadishu | Diasporas &  Diaspora Organisations | Donor Agencies  WB  TIKKA  IMF  Norwegian Council  AFDB | -Improved Staff capacity.  -Improved Awareness  -Enhanced Service Delivery  -Government Legitimacy  -Exposure to modern/new knowledge |
| Virtual Training.  Public/Private Sectors.  Training Type:  Unconventional  Virtual trainings are usually conducted online and are limited to specific public sectors depending on their immediate responsive needs | Diasporas,  Transnational  Organisations &  Somali Owned INGOs | -Diaspora Organisations  -Transnational Networks  -Individual Contributions  -Community Contributions | -Exposure to new knowledge  -Increased connectivity  -Improved networking.  -Enhanced service delivery.  -Enhanced economic growth. |

**Table 8.4. Knowledge Transfer Strategies & Impact. Source: Author, (2021)**

KEY EXAMPLES

1. Ministry for Labour & Social Affairs

Project: BAXNAANO

The minister in charge of Labour & Social Affairs is a diaspora member (US). In collaboration with the World Bank, the ministry established Baxnaano (uplifting) project, a safety net for human capital. The project's team lead and the entire top echelon are also diasporas. The social security agency was established in 2018 to eradicate abject poverty. The World Bank has praised the project as a valuable contribution to eradicating poverty with initial plans to target the 2 million most vulnerable in society. The World Bank has approved $40 million in 2021 to strengthen the system's preparedness in poverty eradication with other donors, most notably, Qatar and Norway promising to fund the scaling up of the project to meet marginalized groups' short- and long-term needs (WB, 2012).

1. Ministry of Defence (MoD)

Project: Armed Forces Biometric Verification

Somali army verification is a multi-agency project bringing the defense, finance, and the prime minister's office together. It is worth noting that these ministries are occupied by members from the diaspora, including the prime ministerial position (UK/US and Sweden). The project itself is headed by IT specialists from the diaspora tasked with reforming the armed forces into a modern transparent system. The new biometric project improved the reliability/credibility of the armed forces, removing almost 10,000 ghost workers from the government's payroll. Before the project, the US government suspended military aid to the Somali national army in 2017, citing rampant corruption as the primary reason. However, due to the remarkable success of biometric verification, the US government has resumed direct funding in 2020. Due to its success, the government is keen on expanding biometric verification to cover other vital ministries, potentially increasing the flow of skilled reverse migration.

1. Ministry of Health/Education

Project: Improving Health Institutions

In collaboration with the government, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has initiated several projects to improve and enhance institutional capacity in the health and education sector. The IOM recruited potential skilled diasporas and later placed them in different towns/cities to improve institutional capacity and service delivery. The duration spent is usually dependent on the project, with many of the respondents acknowledging that members of the diasporas tend to stay beyond the project's stipulated duration. As part of the 2030 Development Agenda, IOM has intensified the mobilisation of Somali professionals targeting young/fresh graduates to contribute to the reconstruction process (IOM, 2020). A recent report commissioned by the government shows that diasporas engagement to reverse health and education systems that the decades-old civil war has severely weakened made a remarkable impact on improving service provision (IOM, 2020; Sonna, 2020).

8.7 **Diaspora Mobilisation & Development: Corroborating Results Obtained from Previous Studies**

This thesis provided a unique opportunity to compare findings across the different disciplines, often characterised with having divergent views on the wider debate of diasporas and development and draw a generally applicable and context specific implications for practice, policy and research to guide skilled diasporas in post conflict reconstruction. In examining the key variables, the study broadened the implications of diasporas in development by adding new layers, for example, the role of transnationalism as a way of gauging their impact on enhancing institutional capacity. This includes analysing approaches utilized by the sending state which are primarily designed to recruit Somali diasporic communities in various countries. In order to uncover the specific attributes of "*sending state’s policies*" and diasporas’ "*human capital transfer*", the study explored ways in which their contributions play a critical role enhancing institutional capacity.

The investigation incorporated various mechanisms involved in such transmission to draw diasporas' strength, ideas, financial and material support to develop their homeland. Several vital revelations have emerged as a result of conceptualizing diaspora engagement in the broader context of mobilisation & post-conflict reconstruction. The findings show the implications of diaspora mobilisation beyond host-home boundaries and the various perspectives of human mobility has immense impact on post conflict reconstruction. One of the key discoveries is the fluid nature of diaspora mobility anchored in transnationalism. This new phenomenon has essential implications for homeland development as the primary source of skills/knowledge transfer, and harnessing diasporas’ contributions is seen critical in enhancing institutional capacity, further accentuating existing findings on diaspora and development. By comparing & contrasting results from previous literature on diaspora and their subsequent contribution to homeland development, the findings shows that it corroborates with the outcomes obtained in previous studies. (Fig. 8.5).

Key Study Findings Relevant Literature & policy Documents

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Integrated Multi- Strategy/Comprehensive Approach   1. Defining strategies/Formulating suitable approaches 2. Developing Action Plan/context/targeted audience 3. Assess govt Capacity/Funding 4. Implementation   STRATEGIES  Social Media✓✓  Diaspora organisations✓✓  Embassies/Consulates✓  Mobilising through Philanthropy✓✓  Revitalized Nationalism✓✓  Threats to Sovereignty (GCC/Ethiopia/Kenya) ✓  Practical Implications  -Maximised potential for diaspora engagement✓✓  -Increased exposure to homeland✓✓  -Enhanced diaspora-state relations✓  -Increased human/financial/technological resources✓✓  -Increased lobbying/activism✓  -Improved interconnectedness/cross border identity/belonging/space✓✓  -Enhanced legitimacy (homeland)  -Enhanced economic growth/institutional capacity✓  -Diasporas as key actors in mainstream development agenda✓✓  -Institutionalising diaspora engagement  -Second generation exposure to country of origin  -Increased return/circular migration✓  -Increased remittances✓✓  -Increased living costs✓  -Local vs Diaspora Resentment✓  -Skewed recruitment✓✓  -Lineage/clan/regional affiliation as opposed to central govt. ✓  Theoretical Implications  -Broadly conforms with findings from the literature on diaspora mobilisation, underlying interest on fostering state-diaspora relationship. Key findings aligned with constructivism theory which integrate transnational movements in mobilisation strategies, hence assuming the role of transnational brokers on behalf of the sending state. It also reinforces theoretical findings in which identity/belonging/culture in a transnationally driven reverse migration are constructed and mobilised.  -Individualism/self-mobilisation & collectivism approaches are central to understanding diasporas in the realm of development. It also allows for deeper understanding on how diasporas & transnational networks are connected, merge and interact beyond home-host borders.  Mobilisation  Collective imagining of homeland✓  Moral/ethical obligation to serve homeland in different capacities, links to different countries beyond host-homeland borders at the same time, diaspora positional objectivity towards engagement i.e., people with the same position more likely to make the same judgement/observation. Taking advantage of unique/hybrid identity which is observable through skewed recruitment of senior staff in key government institutions.  Mix of top-down and down-up approach to facilitate the flow of reverse migration, with overlapping/interdisciplinary theories on IR, Migration and Politics studies.  Infrastructure✓  Institutional factors such as strong/weak institutions impact on mobilisation, ability to foster long distance relationship based on shared culture, nationalism are important aspects of the mobilisation process. Also, establishing formal/informal forums to reach out to its population abroad is well aligned with Gamlen’s theory of governance.  Positionality✓  Increased deterritorialised borders/ dual nationality/identities/connections, social formations and locations have impact on diaspora mobilisation with varying degrees. Importance of physical state & psychological connection to more than a single country in harnessing diaspora-state relationship. Operating at transnational level, diaspora agents/organisations with strong links to the government are more likely to influence government policy/decisions. Equally important, the level of relationship is determined by the host country (US/UK) most favoured, (Germany/Holland) least favoured. Is the global dominance of English language the deciding factor? Or could the role of the Anglo Saxon in modern geopolitics be viewed as the main influencer?  Fluidity✓  Mobilisation processes are more active in some (host) regions creating inequalities among diasporas mobilisation process, for example, the government’s recruitment efforts have primarily targeted UK/US and Canada based diasporas. In essence, diasporas from these countries are more likely to be mobilised by the government with their transnational networks commanding high centrality/influence on sending state’s recruitment strategies. | Mobilisation Theories  -Role of identity, culture and belonging is pivotal for diaspora mobilisation. The study contends that long-distance nationalism and shared identity is constructed as a response to develop homeland.  -Gamlen’s Governability Theory focusing on sending state’s ability to foster relationship beyond the state’s borders designed to promote nation building corroborates the study’s findings on policy/strategy changes and its impact on enhancing skilled diaspora reverse migration.  Homeland Attachment  -Koinova’s affirmation that conflict generated diasporas (forceful removal from their homeland) are more likely to maintain emotional attachment to homeland is well aligned with the objectives of the study.  Transnationalism  -Expanding the parameters of state-diaspora relationship beyond sending state’s territorial jurisdiction provides analytical framework to gauge diasporas engagement and subsequent contributions to homeland development. In particular, the impact of transnational spatial arena on deepening the relationship sits well with the research’s objectives.  Skills/Knowledge Transfer  -Empirical findings from previous studies shows that the transfer of skills/knowledge is ideally a valuable tool in understanding the impact of knowledge transfer as the primary source of economic development (India/China).  -There is limited relevant literature on the role of knowledge transfer in post-conflict reconstruction. In seeking to address gap in knowledge, the study examined the impact, mechanisms & dynamics of facilitation knowledge transfer as a way of enhancing institutional capacity.  Policy Documents  -A critical review of policy documents on skilled Somali diasporas contributions to the rebuilding process, acknowledges migrants’ significant contributions towards homeland development. The World Bank, USAID, IMF, IOM, and other vital stakeholders view diasporas mobilisation in Somalia and their new role in post conflict reconstruction as a way of complementing donors’ development efforts. This is critically important juncture for current and future migration studies since it focuses on expanding our understanding/knowledge on migration/mobility and development beyond remittances. Additionally, the growing interest of non-state actors’ inclusion into mainstream development agenda, sits well with the research objectives, especially at a time when fierce debate on the effectiveness of development aid is raging among scholars and policymakers.  -An increased focus on recruiting skilled Somali diasporas is evidently symbolic for many reasons. First, Somalia is emerging decades old civil war that has ravaged key government institutions and infrastructure. A review of policy documents recognises the importance of engaging non-state actors in enhancing institutional capacity due to severe shortage of staff, poorly staffed, ill-trained personnel, weak legislations & ill-equipped staff. Utilising diasporas’ financial, capital & human resources thus, becomes imperative. Secondly, the inability of the government to provide basic service delivery demands the inclusion of the diasporas in reversing institutional decay in public sector service delivery.  -Attempts to recruit, mobilise, and engage skilled diasporas has intensified in the last 5 years mainly driven by increased popularity of diasporas’ engagement in enhancing and strengthening institutional/governance capability. The IOM, WB, and other critical stakeholders’ recognition of diasporas contributions as a potent force for development serves as an important feature to examine their contributions beyond the often-cited remittances.  -A closer review of the government’s efforts in luring the return of skilled diasporas through policy, structural & strategy changes demonstrate its efforts in diversifying its recruitment strategies adopted for that endeavour. Additionally, the intensity of high-level government official’s involvement in the process is a testimony of diasporas importance to the rebuilding process (Sonna, 2018:19:20, IMF, 2018:19, WB, 2014:17:18,). |

Table 8.5. Mobilisation/Engagement Implications: Validation of Findings from Previous Studies

8.8 Challenges

Notwithstanding the security/stability issues that diasporas face, other multifaceted challenges/barriers could potentially hinder their contributions in rebuilding key government institutions. These factors are interrelated, and efforts to promote diasporas' financial, capital, and technological know-how are hinged on adequately mitigating/addressing the challenges.

1. Security- Stability is key to maximising the potential contributions of the diasporas. The study acknowledges the impact of security on the mobilisation process, and as such, it is imperative to create a conducive/stable environment for diasporas' engagement. The killings of prominent members from the diaspora, including the late mayor of Mogadishu & a renowned Somali Canadian journalist, underpins the importance of stability to the diaspora's subsequent contributions to homeland development.
2. Institutional/Structural Capacity- Sending a state's weak institutions to capitalize on diaspora's potential human, capital, and technological resources is undoubtedly a significant challenge. Although the state has made remarkable efforts in courting the diasporas as relevant co-development partners, there is room for improvement to maximize their contributions. Equally significant, integrating diaspora's role in mainstream development agenda has been slow and gradual.
3. Information-Providing timely, accurate information on development needs & providing relevant guidance, improving diaspora's access to information on development are all critical in enhancing state-diaspora relations. Even though the government has made efforts to bridge the gap, there are overlapping and, at times, conflicting functions from different state ministries on the modalities of engaging the diasporas.
4. Funding- Financial resources are critical for engaging the diasporas in development. Due to the government's financial constraints (security budget prioritized over development), the entire process may negatively impact the diaspora's contribution to homeland development without the assistance of donors.

8.9 Unintended Consequences: Impact of Policy Changes & Gov't Strategies

Even though Somalia has made a remarkable recovery in recent years towards establishing effective governance, improving security, and enhancing service delivery, the situation remains fragile partly due to the diaspora's contribution. Some predict that it could relapse back to anarchy. One area that is congruent with the social reality on the ground is the seemingly tense relationship between the locals and the diasporas. This is instead a unique and different tension that is less often discussed and has remained off the radar for social science researchers to a more considerable extent. Concentrating on crucial vulnerable factors and determinants, the study will focus on three compounding areas: jobs, social interaction, and housing.

1. Jobs

Somalia is one of the few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that allows dual citizenship (interim constitution). As a result, diasporas are not required to apply for work permits. Nonetheless, the influx of diasporas has created a moral panic among the locals, with some widespread viewing migration as an imminent threat to their "jobs" and "livelihoods." While acknowledging their contribution to socio-economic and political development, many believe that diaspora members are favored in jobs and promotions. More importantly, they are accorded privileges that put the locals in a disadvantaged position, particularly in the public sector. In an interesting parallel, the diaspora's western education, work ethics, and comparative higher pay could offer a possible explanation for their dominant status in crucial government institutions.

Additionally, with the unemployment rate at 43% according to the World Bank's 2019 report, competition for jobs has soured to a higher level. Since the government's new policy approach to luring diasporas back to the country has successfully achieved its intended purposes, some candidly confess to having encountered open hostility. Similarly, reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on employment, a participant acknowledges that despite the diaspora's increased foreign direct investment (FDI), fierce competition for jobs in the public sector will most likely exacerbate an already tense situation. Nevertheless, relying on vital empirical indicators, the analysis established that the higher pay differential has fairly fostered feelings of superiority among some participants.

1. Social Interaction

Social and capacity constraints make diaspora individuals and their organisations less visible to the public, often distancing themselves from the wider society—a central position with fragmented chances of integrating with the locals, even though many (diasporas) admit upholding social ties with family members. Also, citing "local embeddedness" as a valuable integration mechanism, most of the respondents acknowledged that integrating with the locals is imperative for transitioning to a new environment. However, the study established that diaspora organisations and individuals are more likely to interact (make friends) and consciously establish networks with others from the diaspora when they live in areas with a higher proportion of diasporas, not least because of socializing with fellow diasporas, but also for improved social infrastructure and security reasons. To build a reasonably consistent analysis of the brewing social discontent, one cannot rule out the adverse effect of instability on the diaspora's social dynamics. Threats emanating from the Al Shabab terror group have decelerated the diaspora's efforts to embrace the local population to some extent. Unsurprisingly, the terror organisation has previously targeted diasporas in senior positions, including the assassination of the mayor (Yarisow) of Mogadishu & a prominent Somali Canadian journalist in 2019. A London-raised native, Yarisow returned with pragmatic aspirations and the hope of contributing to the rebuilding process and later paid the ultimate sacrifice. It is also worth noting that the late mayor was a crucial figure in the government's engagement efforts, often appearing on state-owned and private satellite television (TVs), and is credited with contributing immensely to the mobilisation and subsequent recruitment of many skilled Somalis from the UK. Inevitably, safety, security, diaspora's symbolic disassociation, and the resulting spatial distancing all play a role in this story.

1. Housing

Equally important, the "diasporanisation" of critical parts of Mogadishu, Garowe, and Bossaso has, to some extent, made specific neighborhoods cost-prohibitive for the locals. The increased flow of transnationally mobile and highly paid diasporas in major cities boosts local economies and provides legitimacy to the government. However, some locals view the newly emerging diaspora' elitism' with absolute cynicism, especially regarding rent and housing. Several diaspora-owned construction businesses have heavily invested in the sector due to an increased demand for higher-standard housing. However, many of these properties are sold back to the returning diasporas, partly due to affordability. In order to address the imbalance, the federal government, in collaboration with the Turkish authorities, has made considerable efforts to build new housing for the armed forces and internally displaced people, although much needs to be done to cover the wider public as well as address the growth of informal settlements in Mogadishu.

In addition to the increased cost of living and rising land values, a significant obstacle to reforming the housing sector is the broad and complex issue of "contested ownership." A few diaspora participants have in the past or are currently embroiled in ownership wrangles with the locals, with policymakers and government officials arguably terming it the most contested "land ownership" of its kind, with a backlog of cases pending in different courts and traditional arbitration jurisdictions working at total capacity. Besteman and Cassanelli's book "The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia" presents in-depth and interlocking narratives centered on land ownership and its impact on security. A similar pattern seems to have emerged with an increased magnitude of property ownership, value, and usage, pitting locals against the returnees (diaspora).

Furthermore, by presenting an overview of "land ownership," the Mogadishu Municipality, with funding from the EU and the World Bank (WB), has immensely contributed to encouraging the public to resolve their differences through the courts—a paradigm shift from its previous position that relied on the extensive use of traditional and customary channels to resolve land issues. The administration has also used part of the financial resources to hire new judges and build capacity for existing judiciary staff with diasporas as trainers. Although this applies to urban and peri-urban centers, regional variations call for developing an appropriate and decentralized mechanism to deal with the inter-communal skirmishes in rural and farming regions.

Elaborating on details of developing a framework for addressing land disputes outside the capital Mogadishu (minimal government presence), a key participant acknowledges the frustrations faced by many due to the absence of government structures and institutions. The respondent further admits that legal inconsistencies and parallel jurisdictions between traditional and legal channels have confused land tenure and ownership, citing the legality of traditional courts in a constitutionally governed society. Nevertheless, the land remains a significant obstacle to achieving sustainable and durable stability and reducing rifts between the locals and returnees (diasporas).

1. **Social Amenities**

The urbanisation of Mogadishu to a modern city has enhanced inward mobility. According to the World Bank (2019), the city is among the top five fastest growing globally. The growth has triggered the flow of diasporas to the country, with new housing, infrastructure and improved social amenities becoming critical determinants of the diasporas’ intensified return mobility. Additionally, there has been considerable progress on linking Mogadishu to surrounding farming towns by building modern tarmac roads.

1. **Financial System**

Enhanced financial systems and the federal government’s approval of Turkish and Egyptian banks to operate in the country facilitates swift transfer of finances between host and home states. Additionally, there has been a sharp increase in ownership of commercial banks by diaspora businesses. The accelerated growth in the financial sector and the diversification of financial institutions and markets enables the diaspora to gain access to mainstream financial systems. Additionally, mortgage brokers and lenders have intensified to cover large segments of the population. It is also worth noting more than 70% of Somalia’s population use mobile payment, making it the world’s largest cashless society.

Conclusion

The previous chapters clarified critical concepts of brain circulation, policy changes, mobilisation strategies, addressed ways and strategies adopted by the diasporas, the contextual and structural determinants of brain circulation, and how skills/knowledge transfers are utilized in enhancing good governance, strengthening institutional capacity, reinforcing the government's authority, and improving service delivery. Departing from the traditional literature on brain gain, the study added brain circulation informed by transnationalism as a necessary condition for enabling the continuous flow of knowledge, skills, and information.

For these reasons, and on account of its importance in contemporary migration studies, informed by the continued spatial connectivity to multiple spaces/places, enhanced technology, and labile global migratory flows, findings from the study reveal that transnationalism and the numerous diaspora affiliations and attachments to host and home countries as a critical feature of enhancing institutional capacity. It is not uncommon for countries undergoing post-conflict reconstruction to include external actors in their development agenda, especially regarding transferring new ideas/human capital. However, disregarding the simplistic notion of diasporas as non-state actors, this thesis expanded the horizon of analysing diaspora-state relations, emphasizing the need to recognise the state itself as the prominent architecture of the relationship.

Often viewed primarily from an economic angle (remittances), the changing dynamics of diaspora contributions beyond remittances were analysed with a particular focus on institutional capacity building. The migration of skilled diasporas is also essential for developing and enhancing institutional capacity. The sending state utilizes different engagement platforms/tools to maintain and reinforce relationships with its constituents abroad. The approaches are divergent, and the state's efforts to engage with a large pool of skilled diasporas are noted as a significant achievement of mobilizing the diasporas to fill the gap left by the exodus of professional elites in the early 1990s.

Due to poorly staffed personnel, especially in crucial government institutions. Nevertheless, many admit that the diaspora's potential has not been utilized appropriately due to structural/operational challenges, including security/funding. Others cited corruption and weak institutional capacity as the greatest obstacle to diaspora mobilisation. All too often, most studies focus on sending state's engagement with its diasporas abroad are primarily focused on the premise of homeland' gains', with little information on diasporas' advantages/ gains. As much as the study recognises diasporas mobilisation for post-conflict recovery as critical stakeholders or, in the case of Somalia, 'domination,' further inquiries are needed to ascertain diasporas actual 'gains' from such an engagement.

Finally, few scholars have made several recommendations in addressing the intellectual deficit in *diaspora* and *development* discourses, suggesting that the two should be explored as separate entities. Even though there is merit to this argument, theorizing it differently may potentially complicate the matter further given the long-standing conceptual and methodological differences that currently exist in diaspora/migration studies (Sahoo & Pattanaik, 2013). Nonetheless, considering the parlous state of knowledge surrounding the exact cost-benefits analysis to the individual (Diasporan), the "*diaspora and homeland development*" concept may theoretically merit considerable scholarly attention in future knowledge transfer/development studies. The study explored resentment towards the diaspora given their perceived rewards, power, salaries, extremely skewed appointments, and domination in the top brass. The findings show that diasporas are disproportionately represented in key government institutions, which may put them at greater risk with the locals in the future.

# **Chapter 9 Conclusion**

**9.1 Introduction**

Somalia is among the worst countries in Africa that suffer from the most significant gap of skilled personnel in key government institutions (Nenova, 2004). This can partially be attributed to the decades-old civil war that ravaged the entire country's public institutions & infrastructure, virtually rendering service delivery non-existent (Bincof, 2020; Menkhaus, 2018; Musse et al, 2019). Due to the government's limited capacity to deliver essential services, the need to engage diasporas as non-state actors became inevitable, especially when the state is faced with limited capabilities and profoundly inadequate human and capital resources (Mohamoud, 2006; Kleist, 2019; 2020; Omar, 2020). The UN office in Somalia, the World Bank, in collaboration with other multilateral institutions, are aware of the diaspora's critical role in the rebuilding process-recognising their input beyond remittances (Carment & Calleja, 2018; Galipo, 2018). These organisations recognise the contribution of Somali diasporas in various aspects of the state-building process, intensifying calls to foster and strengthen the role of diasporas in the reconstruction process (Omar, 2020).

9.2 An Overview of the Research Findings

This thesis explored the role of skilled Somali diasporas in post-conflict reconstruction, focusing on enhancing institutional capacity. The study expanded our knowledge and understanding of skilled diaspora mobilisation anchored in transnationalism through extensive use of interdisciplinary literature. The study expanded the horizon of current discourses on migration, more specifically on the role of transnational diasporas intervention in rebuilding critical government institutions ( Koinova 2018; Patterson, 2006; Plaza, 2013; Vertovec, 2008); mechanisms and strategies of skills/knowledge transfer in enhancing homeland development (Newland & Plaza, 2013; Chikanda & Crush, 2018; Sahoo, 2021; Singh & Koiri, 2018); government/donors policy changes and institutional adjustments to encourage the return of skilled migration (Brinkerhoff, 2006:8; Chand, 2019; Gamlen et al., 2015; Meyer, 2011; Kuznetsov, 2006; Omar, 2020; Williams, 2018).

A critical review of the multidisciplinary literature on diaspora and development reveals lack of a comprehensive framework for understanding related topics on diaspora and homeland development (Jabareen, 2009). As a result, the enhanced framework became a valuable tool in the process of consolidating key literature findings into a whole single unit, generating main points of argument for the thesis as well as guiding the author through the design of the research questions. More importantly, the adapted framework was also vital in providing a clear and concise understanding of the key concepts in sending state’s relationship with its diasporas, impact of policies on reverse migration, effects of knowledge transfer through circular mobility and homeland reconstruction. Finally, since conceptualisation of diaspora has been a source of conflict between different disciplines, the framework became a critical investigation instrument in exploring the positive role of direct diaspora participation in development efforts.

A multidimensional theoretical framework was adapted to gauge the impact of skilled diaspora intervention in enhancing institutional capacity and addressing mobilisation strategies and policy changes established for improving the flow of skilled reverse migration (Chapter 3). It also enabled the researcher to fully understand the phenomena, provide guidance for the research questions pertaining to diaspora’s role in post conflict reconstruction. Equally important, the conceptual framework enabled the researcher to independently assess the various aspects of diaspora mobilisation, their subsequent contribution to homeland development, and perhaps more importantly, their interplay. The enhanced conceptual framework adapted from Yosef Jabareen (2013), which has been widely applied in post conflict reconstruction is viewed by many as suitably fitted to empirically examine post war institutional recovery. Drawing from past experiences, the framework outlined key and important variables and essential relationship between the sending state and its diasporas and discovered the immense impact it has on migratory patterns of human resource mobility through knowledge and skills transfer. Based on this perspective, the adapted framework focused on the sending state’s ability to encourage the return of its diasporas and their subsequent role in rebuilding government institutions.

Findings from study shows that diasporas are a potent force for homeland development and their role as new agents has attracted considerable interest from policymakers, donors, and host/home governments. In order to maximise the great potential and benefits of diasporas contributions, the federal government is keen on optimizing the development impact of skilled diaspora, viewing their unique hybrid position critically important in post conflict development. In response to the increasingly prominent role of the diasporas in enhancing governance, institutional capacity and improved service provision, the government has developed robust favourable conditions aimed at intensifying reverse mobility, for example, improved security in the capital and surrounding towns.

The study highlighted the impact of policy changes beyond sending state’s territorial borders on homeland development, recognising the emergence of new dimensions of relationship and reinvigorated opportunities for cooperation. Furthermore, the study added new element to existing mobilisation strategies by expanding the scope of diaspora mobilisation practices. The use of *'fear-mongering’* as an engagement tool underpins its importance in '*exploiting*' diasporas' emotional attachment to their homeland. Empirical findings from the study established that appealing to the diasporas' sentimental ties has largely been productive, stimulating diasporas' desire to contribute to homeland development, firmly placing the sending state in a superior position.

In explaining the numerous factors that drive or shape sending state's policies towards its diaspora, Gamlen (2018); Williams (2018), and Koinova (2019) examined the importance of policy changes in maximising the human, capital, and financial resources of the diasporas, with much of the focus on why and when states engage their diasporas. Noting diaspora contributions as an essential catalyst in homeland development, the government has institutionalised their engagement, incorporating diasporas’ role into mainstream development agendas. This includes making diaspora engagement an integral part of the post-conflict reconstruction process (Carment & Calleja, 2018; Hammond, 2013; Kleist, 2008; McCandless, 2017). In line with this notion, the federal government has expanded its role in diaspora engagement since 2015 with increased intensity and improved strategic engagement policies beyond its geographical boundaries. This includes establishing consular services/agents in the west with significant Somali population aimed at engaging diasporas for mobilisation. These efforts have been significant in recruiting skilled workforce for development purposes using ‘heritage’ and ‘cultural’ links as a bait.

In addition to fostering cultural and social links through kinship, diaspora organisations, albeit, clustered, has been effective in bringing sending state and its diaspora closer at transnational level. These organisations often act as overseas agents/government representatives offering incentives to the diasporas to 'exploit' their wealth of knowledge and practical experiences gained in host countries through the transfer of specific work skills and technology. These organisations have increasingly become essential tool for the government’s mobilisation strategies, often seen as strategic assets that could potentially contribute to homeland development. The study discovered that international development partners and donors are keen on optimizing diasporas’ human resources in collaboration with transnational organisations, viewing their role as potential non-state contributors to homeland development. The different skills/knowledge transfer mechanisms demonstrate its importance on enhancing institutional capacity, expanding the sending state's authority/influence, and improving service delivery. The dominance of Somali professionals in critical government positions is a clear indication of the government's intent on institutionalizing & incorporating its ‘people abroad’ into mainstream governance.

Equally significant, strong assumptions lend support to the drivers & nature of diaspora mobilisation anchored in transnationalism, with a notable emphasis on nationalism, shared *culture* & *moral* obligation to serve their homeland. Enhanced mobilisation strategies play a vital role in increasing return mobility of Somali professionals, for example, the role of social media & philanthropic causes for those endeavours. The new strategies identify key target areas using integrated social media platforms to reach a larger audience. In exploring the contextual and structural conditions of social media engagement, promoting specific development projects seems to have significantly reshaped diasporic thinking of home state, hence intensifying the scope and magnitude of skilled reverse migration.

The study shows that philanthropy is an enduring feature of Somalis cultural fabric and its contribution to stimulate growth is widely recognised. Given the importance of diaspora and their transnational organisations in charitable giving practices, the state and its development partners have established different strategies targeted at maximising diaspora's human, capital, and financial resources. These initiatives are strategically crucial in crafting robust relationship with its `people abroad.’ Philanthropy has far reached implications and tends to cover wider populations. Evidence suggests that Somalis in the diaspora belief in mutual assistance and ethical assumption of collective responsibility resonates well with their contribution to the rebuilding process.

Considering that the Somali diasporas are robust, well-organized, and sympathetic to rebuilding their war-ravaged country by design rather than by default, the comparative content in the study shows considerable variations in practices, which points to some surprising discovery; the use of *'fear-mongering’* as a way of appealing to diasporas' emotional attachment to a homeland. This is a novice concept in migration/development/diaspora discourses that requires well-structured, proceduralist analysis to provide valuable insights on its effects in diaspora mobilisation. Nonetheless, findings from the study show that skilled diaspora mobilisation is shaped by the various flows and counter flows beyond host-home geographical borders and the simultaneous connections to more than one country. The study observed that critical findings from the inquiry are in line with previous empirical studies on diaspora and development, departing from the traditional literature on Somali connections to the homeland through remittances.

### 9.3 Skilled Diasporas Role in Enhancing Institutional Capacity

In line with the sending state’s relentless efforts in maximising reverse migration, coupled with the wishes of overseas Somalis sentimental attachment to their homeland has led to many exploring new avenues and sectors for mutual beneficial interaction, the study examined ways in which knowledge transfer plays a critical role in homeland development. The federal government efforts in rebuilding key government institutions and the United Nations Quest-Mida programme have been instrumental in ensuring the effective flow of knowledge. This has essential implications for homeland development as the primary source of skills/knowledge transfer, and harnessing their contributions is critical to enhancing institutional capacity, further accentuating existing findings on diaspora and development. Since the government lacks the capacity to deliver basic services, empowering locals through diaspora skills/knowledge transfer mechanisms becomes imperative, hence improving the state’s ability to recover from the decades old civil war.

The importance of skills and knowledge transfer has been highlighted in the literature (chapter 2&7), with a focus on facilitating the flow of knowledge and human resources to develop their homeland (Chikanda et al., 2016; Kitching et al., 2009; Riddle, 2009; Singh & Koiri, 2018). Findings from the study show that the government and its development partners are aware of its importance in enhancing institutional capacity. In consequence, the sending state, in collaboration with critical stakeholders, has formulated strategies to maximize the impact of diasporas through the transfer of tangible/intangible skills/knowledge. A review of the critical findings on knowledge transfer mechanisms posits that the potential of resource gains in improving institutional capacity, governance, expanding authority, and improving service delivery. In identifying key factors that affect the impact of knowledge transfer, the study identified the importance of transnationally linked global diasporas in knowledge transfer, connecting ill-trained public sector personnel to transnational networks. Finally, the expansion of geographical borders beyond host-home states, connections to multiple spatial locations simultaneously are also cited as relevant factors in understanding the role of skilled diasporas in enhancing critical government institutions.

Despite their immense contributions, diasporas are faced by myriad of challenges that could potentially derail their role in strengthening institutional capacity. Security is key to achieving desirable outcomes and since Al Shabab terror group still wields influence in Southern Somalia, diaspora’s role in legitimising the government’s control could be seen as a threat to the terror group’s reign. Additionally, the sending state’s weak institutions are unable to capitalise on diaspora’s human and technological resources. Funding from donors is also critical in ensuring that the necessary restructuring and overhaul of decades old institutional decay is unhindered by financial constraints, especially at a time when the government is prioritising security budget over development. Finally, in a note of conclusion, the study provided a detailed account of the unintended consequences of diasporas' disproportionate representation in key government positions, adding a new layer to existing discourses on migration, development, and diaspora.

**9.3.1 Achievements of the Research Aims & Objectives**

First, in practice, diverse studies on diasporas' role in homeland development acknowledge the impact of diasporas & their extended networks rooted in transnationalism, alluding to their ability to economically empower homeland ventures, increase investments, improve skills/knowledge transfer, develop robust state-diaspora relations, elevate service delivery as well as benefiting from diasporas hybrid identity (Gamlen, 2018; Koinova, 18:19; Vertovec, 2012). Within the field of reverse migration and post conflict reconstruction, the intensity of Somali diasporas physical return to their homeland is seen critical to the recovery process. This is also evident at policy level, with the sending state recognising the significant role diasporas play in post conflict recovery, terming it as a valuable human capital. Also, the Increased efforts by the international community and leading donor organizations in fostering and enhancing the return of skilled migration, for example, the IOM's QUEST-MIDA program, the role of non-state actors in homeland development seems to have gained relevance in Somalia’s context. Looking at the different strategies adopted for maximising the return of skilled diasporas, the findings acknowledge that the sending state’s outreach strategies aimed primarily at repatriating valuable human capital yields positive results.

Secondly, building on the assumption that diaspora mobilisation through "*nationalism*" and "*moral obligation*" to serve their homeland is an ongoing process, the study examined the impact of nationalism-driven development and its persistence over time. The question was later expanded to cover other aspects of mobilisation, such as duration of stay and whether this new "addition" could shed light and contribute to our understanding of how migrants sustain and contribute to long-distance state-kin relationships. Finally, the study explored the multidimensional network of diaspora nationalism's response to humanitarian disasters in their home country and how it reinforces collective identity mobilisation. The findings from the study established that the construction and imagining of identity, shared culture, and belonging are justifiable elements in courting the diasporas, and several studies corroborate this. Brinkerhoff (2009); Cohen, (2007); Kleist (2009) & Patterson (2006) acknowledge the role of shared identity, belonging, and culture in homeland development.

Thirdly, in a post-conflict setting, diaspora contributions towards rebuilding effective government institutions impact the country and society as a whole. Ozden & Schiff (2005) acknowledged four positive externalities associated with brain gain; spill over of productivity, increased public service provision, increased revenue for home countries, and finally, increased policy and institution influence. Additionally, the sending state also benefits from the network of groups created by the skilled diaspora workforce in host countries, often beyond host-home geographical borders (Constant & Zimmerman, 2015). The different skills/knowledge transfer mechanisms demonstrate its importance on enhancing institutional capacity, expanding the sending state's authority/influence, and improving service delivery. The domination of Somali professionals in crucial government positions indicates the government's intent on institutionalizing & incorporating migrants' contributions into the mainstream development agenda.

Research Objective 1:

This objective has been achieved through in-depth analysis of semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The fundamental discoveries are validated by previous studies, acknowledging the importance of fostering state-diaspora relationships through diverse policies/strategies. The approaches adopted for diaspora mobilisation are dependent on the strategies of the sending state and donor organisations. Also important, the different approaches adopted for those endeavours vary in intensity and magnitude, with some factors having proximate influences. For example, the role of philanthropy, shared 'culture,' 'identity' and 'belonging' illustrates its importance in enhancing skilled workers' reverse migration. The study also acknowledges the value of social media as a tool of engagement and its impact in reaching/targeting a broader population beyond host-home geographical borders. The study also explored knowledge/skills transfer and its impact on institutional capacity building. Data from the research shows that diasporas are actively engaged in enhancing service delivery through empowering the local community. Findings also indicate that knowledge transfer are critical given the dilapidated nature of the public sector.

Research Objective 2

The study acknowledges the government's efforts to develop concrete measures to ensure the flow of skilled diasporas by building constructive relationships with its 'people' abroad anchored in transnationalism. The policy/structural changes beyond territorial borders to encourage the return of skilled migrants are fundamentally crucial in increasing the intensity/pace of return migration, representing an essential transformation in contemporary state-diaspora relations. Additionally, high government officials' visits to the west constitute an essential aspect of sending the state's formal and informal state policy changes towards diaspora engagement. Establishing a dedicated government institution to increase inward migration is crucial in formulating a long-lasting relationship with the diasporas. Finally, the role of INGOs/donors/development agencies, especially IOM's efforts in encouraging the return of skilled Somali diasporas, is acknowledged as an essential feature of diaspora engagement. Empirical findings from the study show that there are important lessons that can be learned in theorizing state-diaspora relationships through a multidimensional approach, including favourable policies & structural changes to maximize the potential of reverse migration.

9.4 Suggestions for Further Research

Findings from the study acknowledge the contributions of diasporas in the rebuilding process, which is inherently a political process. However, the study also captured the overrepresentation of diasporas in crucial government positions including the OPM, the Presidency & key government institutions. Cognizant of the overwhelming dominance of diasporas in all spheres, problematising this practice could potentially shed light on the nature/dynamics and factors that contribute to diasporas’ dominance in critical government/public institutions. It is worth noting that the economic/social/cultural sectors are also predominantly diaspora-owned, with diaspora-based artists perceived as the preferred choice. However, the disproportionate recruitment of the diasporas in the top echelon of the government could potentially be viewed as *'state capture'*. Whereas previous studies perceive diaspora contributions to homeland development as beneficial to the sending state, I suggest that further research is required to ascertain the impact of diasporas' complete 'domination' of state apparatus at the expense of the local population.

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**APPENDIX 1 RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET**

PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Research Project Title: **An Analysis of State Building: The Role of Professional Somali Diasporas in Post Conflict Reconstruction.**

Name of Researcher: **Sakariya M. Haji**

Participants Project identification no:

**Please tick the box next to the statement or thumbprint where applicable to show consent**

I agree to allow my child/ward/pupil to participate in this research

I confirm that the information about the research project has been read by me or read to me, necessary questions have been asked and all the details about the research is clear and understood my me.

I am aware that my child/ward/pupil’s participation is voluntary, and I am at liberty to withdraw his/her participation at any time. I also understand that he/she is at liberty to decline answers to any question that he/she is not comfortable answering.

I give permission for access to my child/ward/pupil’s information and responses to the research team. I understand that his/her response will form part of data generation for the research and that the data will be used for research purpose, and other academic and non-academic purposes. I am also aware that his/her personal details will be treated with utmost confidence and that he will remain anonymous unless otherwise requested.

I give my consent to the utilisation of data collected from him/her in future projects.

Parents/authorised person’s name Date Signature/Thumb Print

Name of person taking the Date Signature

Lead Researcher Date Signature

Note: Forms must be signed and dated in the presence of the participants. All signed copies of the consent form will be kept in the site file, while a copy of the signed form will be kept by signee

PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Research Project Title: **An Analysis of State Building: The Role of Professional Somali Diasporas in Post Conflict Reconstruction.**

Name of Researcher: **Sakariya M. Haji**

Participants Project identification no:

**Please tick the box next to the statement or thumbprint where applicable to show consent**

I agree to be a participant in this research

I confirm that the information about the research project has been read by me or read to me, necessary questions have been asked and all the details about the research is clear and understood my me.

I am aware that my participation is voluntary, and I am at liberty to withdraw my participation at any time during the study. I also understand that I am at liberty to decline answers to any question that I am not comfortable answering.

I give permission for access to my information and responses to the research team. I understand that my response will form part of data generation for the research and that the data will be used for research purpose, and other academic and non-academic purposes. I am also aware that my personal details will be treated with utmost confidence and that I will remain anonymous unless I request otherwise.

I give my consent to the utilisation of data collected from me in future projects.

Participants name Date Signature/Thumb Print

Name of person taking the consent Date Signature

Lead Researcher Date Signature

Note: Forms must be signed and dated in the presence of the participants. All signed copies of the consent form will be kept in the site file, while a copy of the signed form will be kept by signee

**RESEARCH TITLE: An Analysis of State Building: The Role of Professional Somali Diasporas in Post Conflict Reconstruction.**

**Participant Information sheet**

Invitation

You are please invited to participate in the above titled research. Prior to your acceptance, it is important that you understand the purpose of the research, and what the research entails. There is need to clarify why you have been invited and other relevant details about your involvement in this research, should you decide to participate. Along with this information sheet, the information contained therein will be given verbally to give room for questions, for clarity, and to ensure a full understanding of the form content. You are welcome to keep a copy of this form and take your time in deciding on your participation. Thank you.

What is the reason for this research?

Due to the decades old civil war, Somalia has a massive shortage of skilled workforce (Waris, 2018). The mass exodus of skilled workforce from the country during the early phase of the war in 1991 has created a sub-standard and poorly staffed professionals, ineffective services, and chronic underdevelopment in both sectors. In confronting the problems characteristics of post conflict situations, the idea of engaging skilled diaspora professionals has gained greater acceptance as alternative to traditional approach to aid driven development in PCR. This research aims to understand the role of skilled diasporas in homeland development.

Why am I chosen to participate, and do I have to?

Your involvement is entirely voluntary and is being solicited because you have some experience with diaspora’s role in development. Your contribution in sharing this experience will contribute towards achieving the aim of this research and understanding the role of diasporas in the reconstruction process.

What is my role as a participant and what do I stand to gain?

You will be involved in an interview process that should not take more than an hour of your time. You may also be invited to participate in a discussion with other people who have similar experience, and this should not take more than forty-five (45) minutes of your time. Although there is no immediate benefit to participants, there will be feedback on information received from you, also the collective benefit of contributing to policy that will address this problem offers great compensation.

Who will be informed about my participation and what will happen to the information I give?

You are assured that your participation will be kept anonymous (except you decide otherwise) and information given will be kept confidential.

If I agree to participate and later change my mind what will happen?

Your participation is completely voluntary and entirely up to you to choose to stop at any time in the course of the research without any consequences to you. If you feel you are no longer interested at any level of participation, please feel free to withdraw your participation.

If I need to raise a complaint, who do I contact?

If there is a need for complaint feel free to contact the main researcher in person or via email: [shaji2@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:shaji2@sheffield.ac.uk) or the Research Supervisor, Dr Miguel Kanai, at [miguel.kanai@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:miguel.kanai@sheffield.ac.uk).

What is the source of funding for the research?

The research will be funded privately by the main researcher.

For what will the information shared be used?

The information generated (discussions or audio /video recordings) will be used for analysis and will be used where necessary for comparison. The information you share will form part of data and results from this research will be shared with other research participants, government and non- governmental organisations, academic and non-academic forum, at the local, national, and international levels.

Ethics approval for this research was received from the Ethics Committee of the Department of Geography, of the University of Sheffield.

Thanks for reading this information sheet and feel free to make contact if you need further clarifications.

**Main Contact**

Sakariya M Haji,

Department of Geography, University of Sheffield.

Courriel : [shaji2@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:shaji2@sheffield.ac.uk)

# **APPENDIX 2 : PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM**

Research Project Title: **An Analysis of State Building: The Role of Professional Somali Diasporas in Post Conflict Reconstruction.**

Name of Researcher: **Sakariya M Haji**

Participants Project identification no:

**Please tick the box next to the statement or thumbprint where applicable to show consent**

I agree to be a participant in this research

I confirm that the information about the research project has been read by me or read to me, necessary questions have been asked, and all the details about the research is clear and understood my me.

I am aware that my participation is voluntary, and I am at liberty to withdraw my participation at any time during the research. I also understand that I am at liberty to decline answers to any question that I am not comfortable answering.

I give permission for access to my information and responses to the research team. I understand that my response will form part of data generation for the research and that the data will be used for research purpose, and other academic and non-academic purposes. I am also aware that my personal details will be treated with utmost confidence and that I will remain anonymous unless I request otherwise.

I give my consent to the utilisation of data collected from me in future projects.

Participants name Date Signature/Thumb Print

Name of person taking the Date Signature

Lead Researcher Date Signature

Note: Forms must be signed and dated in the presence of the participants. All signed copies of the consent form will be kept in the site file, while signee will keep a copy of the signed form.

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **APPENDIX 3 DOCUMENTS COLLECTED AND THEIR SOURCES** | | | |
| Source of data | Justification for the source | Type(s) of document/data | Access to documents |
| Ministry of Planning & Development) | Agency responsible for all reconstruction projects in the entire country. This includes recruiting capable skilled diasporas for development purposes. | Policy documents on recruitment/development needs etc. | Key informant/interviews/policy documents. |
| Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs | The ministry is in charge of drafting labour laws and ensuring that data of current labours in the country are accounted for. However, due to weak structural/institutional weakness, there is no exact number of diasporas currently involved in the reconstruction. | Policy documents on labour laws, working environment, permits etc. | Key Informant/interviews/policy documents. |
| Somali Diaspora Association | Due to its importance in the mobilisation process, the agency provided in-depth and accurate information on diasporas role in development. Additionally, since the organisation holds annual diaspora forums in different cities (last held in Istanbul 2020), it provided immense information on diasporas’ role in development | News on diaspora forums, meetings, seminars, and recruitment efforts towards rebuilding homeland. | On-line data/Interview with key informant. |
| Diaspora Liaison Office | DLO which is under the PMs office is responsible for engaging diasporas for rebuilding. | Since the office is located in Mogadishu, I could only rely on information published by the government’s ministry of information. | Online access to important data. |
| BAXNAANO | A diaspora led project aimed at eradicating poverty. The organisation has a sizeable number of diasporas at the helm. | Government initiatives in luring skilled workforce | Snowballing, contacts with the help of diaspora forum. |
| Nabad iyo Nolal | A government run diaspora support group. Actively involved on online (social media) encouraging the return of skilled diasporas. | Presents the government’s intention towards recruiting members of the diaspora | Contact established at diaspora forum. |
| Somali Urban Investment & Planning Project | SUIPP project has a sizeable diaspora in top positions. Due to its role/influence in infrastructure development, the agency was critical in providing information on current projects that are led by members of the diasporas. | Documents related to infrastructure/institutional development | Snowballing |

**APPENDIX 4 PARTICIPANTS AND INTERVIEWEES[[1]](#footnote-1) IN THE RESEARCH**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Name and Institution of Key Informants | Position | Justification for Selection | Location | Date Interviewed |
| **S. W,**  Minister, Federal Republic of Somalia | Key member of the diaspora/Minister in charge of Labour & Social Affairs | A key member of the cabinet and a member of diaspora. He participates in recruiting skilled diasporas from the west, especially USA/Canada. His knowledge on diasporas role in the reconstruction was imperative for answering the research objectives. | Formal Interview in Nairobi, Kenya. A follow up was conducted in Turkey. | 20/10/2019  28/01/2021 |
| **Dr Y. O,**  Head SUIPP | Senior officer Benadir regional government and head of SUIPP | The Office is in charge of development projects across the country, but more specifically around the capital city and surrounding towns/villages. Discussions with senior members was critical in understanding the role of professional Somali diasporas in the rebuilding of key government institutions. | Formal interview within the head of the project in London | 23/12/2020  04/01/2021 |
| **F. A,**  Head BAXNAANO PROJECT | Top official | Tasked with reducing poverty, the agency has recruited senior members from the diaspora to drive the government’s socio-economic development. Information gained gave insight into the government’s approach, strategies in courting its diasporas. | Formal interview in Nairobi, Kenya follows up in Istanbul. | 08/12/2019  Nairobi  28/01/2021  Istanbul |
| **M.H,**  Office of the Prime Minister | Top official and Senior government officer, adviser to the PM | A key adviser to the Prime Minster and an experienced recruiter of diaspora professionals. He was tasked with recruiting competent diasporas for several positions. He provided in an invaluable information diasporas and the government’s efforts in enhancing relationship with its diasporas. | Formal interview in Nairobi. | 22/12/2018 |
| **W.M,**  IT expert with reputation of encouraging the return of IT specialists. | Top official | Tasked with recruiting IT specialists from the diasporas. Due to his closeness to the recruitment strategy, he has provided an insightful information on diasporas’ role in homeland development. | Formal interview at Leicester Resource Centre | 18/01/2020 |
| **J.D,**  Head of Global Somali Diasporas | Head-Global Diaspora | J. D works as the current head of Global Diaspora Group. With an experience in diaspora mobilisation, her insight and views on diaspora mobilisation were critical for the study. | Formal interview at her office in the UK. | 11/12/2018 |
| **Dr S, S.**  Lead-Vocational Training. HANO ACADEMY | Senior Trainer/Mentor | A diaspora currently living in Somalia as head of US Funded training and mentoring project. Other tasks include, training public sector employees, institutional capacity building and mentoring young IDPs. | Interviewed her in Leicester. | First interview  19/01/2020  Second interview  08/12/2020 |
| **O, O.**  Mogadishu Diaspora Office | Senior Official-OPM | Mr O is a senior member of the diaspora working at the OPM. His main duties include strategizing and enhancing diaspora return to the country. He has immense knowledge on diaspora recruitment, overseeing public sector recovery and enhancing state-diaspora relations. | Formal interview in London | 01/11/2019 |
| **Abdillahi**  Worked in Different Ministries/different capacity | Ministry of health, education, and Transportation/Aviation | A is conversant with the local dynamics associated with recruiting skilled diasporas. He has immense knowledge on the strategies and mobilisation efforts of the federal government. His deep knowledge on government’s strategy is unparalleled. He has also worked closely with the former PM on drafting diaspora engagement policies. | Formal interview conducted  Twice in London over a period of 6 months. | 1stinterview 16/07/2019  Second interview  24/02/2020.  Third interview was disrupted by Covid/lockdown |
| **Maryama**  OPM | Top official Office of the Prime Minister | One of the leading in diaspora voices within the government. As a senior member of the OPM, she travels frequently overseas attending meetings, seminars, and forum. She has accumulated immense knowledge on diaspora engagement and her insightful and valuable contributions were critical in understanding the sending state’s policy plans | Formal interview conducted in London and later in Turkey briefly. | First interview 29/01/2019  Second interview  24 Dec 2021 (brief interview) |
| **Saney**  Disaster & Risk Management | Senior officer, disaster & risk management Mogadishu | Tasked with organising diaspora knowledge transfer, equipment etc, Saney’s interview provided an in depth understanding of how diaspora’s human and capital resources are used beyond home-host borders. | Formal interview in the UK | 6/12/2019 |
| **Muna, H.**  Worked at different public hospitals | Senior biochemist | Trained in Holland, Muna is a senior biochemist with experience in training and building capacity for local institutions. She is credited with bringing modern hospital equipment to Somalia and her role as a conduit for knowledge transfer and mentor was important in understanding various aspects and mechanisms of the trainings. | Formal interview in the UK | 17/09/2019 |

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION UNDERTAKEN in Kenya/Turkey** | | |  |
|  | | |  |
| Name of Participants | Position/role | Justification for Discussion | Date of Focus Group |
| Cabdiqadir-M  Abdi-Fatah-M  Mariam-F  Warsan-F | Student  Community Leader  Ex civil servant  Community Leader/Women Org | To obtain data on diasporas role in development. The diversity of the group was crucial in the sense that it yielded more information with regards to diasporas’ role in development. Also important, since the entire group consisted of non-diasporas, it was critical to hear the views of the locals, albeit living in a foreign land (Turkey/Kenya). However, all the participants in the focus group are on a short/medium visit to these two countries. | 19/12/2020 |
|  | | |  |
|  | Position/role of Participant in Community | Justification for Discussion | Date Undertaken |
| Amin-M  Cumar-M  Amina-Ali-F  Sucaado-F  Asli-F  Munaa-F  Ali-D-M  Mukhtar-M  Ilkacase-M  Ruqiyo-F  Muna, S-F  Cirro-M  Ali-Sh- M  Fadumo-F  Canab-F  Ismahaan-F | Student  Migrant  student  Stay-at-home spouse  Student  Business  Civil servant  Community Leader  Media  Civil servant/business  Student  Ex civil servant  Business  Private sector/Banking  Unemployed  Private sector/travel | To obtain data on diasporas role in development. The selection of the focus groups which consisted entirely of local Somalis with no affiliation to the west was crucial in understanding their perspective vis-à-vis diasporas domination of government. The first focus group lives in Turkey which has a sizeable Somali population. Turkey was chosen for many reasons, first Turkey has weekly flights directly to Somalia and this connection has brought many Somalis to settle, study and work in Turkey. | 19/01/2020 |

**List of Interviewees accessed in the Second Stage of the research**

**M-Male F-Female**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Name (all Pseudonyms and Gender) | Role/Position | Age | Current Residency | Date interviewed |
| Qassim  (M) | Defence | 58 years | Resident-Mogadishu | 16/4/2018 |
| Maryama  (F) | Senior Official/INGO | 30  years | Circular Migration | 08/07/2020 |
| Kuribax  (M) | Diaspora Org | 53 | Circular Migration | 29/03/2019 |
| Yusuf, Y (M) | Senior Government Official. | 40 years | Current Resident in Mogadishu | 01/05/2019 |
| Osman (M) | Civil Servant | 47 | Circular Migration | 27/11/2019 |
| Abdelhamid(M) | UN/public sector | 59 years | Resident-Kismayo | 23/02/2020 |
| Maryam, A. (F) | Public Service | 27 years | Resident Mogadishu | 22/02/2020 |
| Arab  (M) | Private Sector | 32 years | Circular Migration | 29/03/2019 |
| Omar  (M) | Government Adviser | 29 years | Circular Migration | 12/08/18 |
| Abdulwahab  (M) | NGO | 35 years | Circular Migration | 24/03/2019 |
| Jawahir  (F) | Diaspora Lobby | 51 years | Resident -Mogadishu | 20/08/2019 |
| OKiyale  (M) | Government Contractor | 37 years | Resident-Mogadishu | 12/12/2020 |
| Dr Samira  (F) | Health Professional | 40 years | Circular Migration | 16/08/2019 |
| Dr Saidyo, S. (F) | Trainer/Facilitator | 43 years | Circular Migration | 17/08/2019 |
| Guleed  (M) | INGO-HIRDA | 51years | Resident-Mogadishu | 22/12/2020 |
| Moalim  (M) | Private Sector | 36 years | Circular Migration | 21/12/2019 |
| Mohamed (M) | Government Official/Senior adviser OPM | 27 years | Circular Migration | 09/12/2020 |
| Fardosa  (F) | Senior Government Official/worked in different minsitries. | 41 years | Circular Migration | 18/12/2020 |
| Deeqa  (F) | Private Sector | 23 years | Circular Migration | 03/08/2019 |
| Amina  (F) | Donor Organisation/Senior Official/Former adviser to key ministry | 33 | Resident-Mogadishu, relocated 8 years ago | 03/08/2019 |
| Hanad  (M) | Private Sector | 44 | Circular Migration | 16/04/2019 |
| Omar  (M) | Education | 35 | Circular Migration | 19/12/2020 |
| Warfa  (M) | Senior adviser-Ministry of Transport & Aviation | 40 | Resident-Mogadishu. Relocated more than 10 years ago | 03/08/2020 |
| Ali  (M) | Private Sector/Education | 41 | Circular Migration | 04/08/2020 |
| Mohamed, S  (M) | IT | 28 | Circular Migration | 20/01/2020 |
| Osman  (M) | Local NGO/Coomunity Organiser | 38 | Circular Migration | 15/04/2019 |
| Adam  (M) | INGO | 29 | Circular Migration | 22/02/2020 |
| Saney  (M) | Senior Government Official/Risk/Resilience/coordinating transfer of equipment to Somali institutions | 51 | Circular Migration | 20/12/2019 |
| Firdwas  (F) | World Bank/FMS/FGS/Project Coordinator | 34 | Circular Migration | 21/01/2020 |
| Abdillahi, A (M) | Trainer/Facilitator | 29 | Circular Migration | 05/08/2020 |
| Amir  (M) | Private Sector/Hospitality | 30 | Circular Migration | 15/08/2019 |
| Abdibasit  (M) | Former Government Official/INGO | 35 | Circular Migration | 06/07/2020 |
| Naima  (F) | Private sector | 28 | Circular Migration | 11/12/2020 |
| Sahan  (F) | Education | 49 | Circular Migration | 17/04/2019 |
| **Yahya**  **(M)** | Senior Government Official/Head of World Bank Projects | 44 | Resident-Mogadishu | 23/12/2020  04/01/2021 |
| **Fardosa, A**  **(F)** | Head of Baxnaano Project. Previously worked in the OPM | 39 | Resident-Mogadishu | 08/12/2019  Nairobi  28/01/2021  Istanbul |
| **Jihan**  **(F)** | Director General-Defence. First female DG in defence. | 42 | Resident-Mogadishu | 18/127/2020 |
| **Guleid**  **(M)** | Senior recruitment official/worked for several INGOs | 35 | Resident-Mogadishu | 19/01/2020 |
| **Warsame**  **(M)** | IT/Senior recruiter | 40 | Circular Migration | 18/01/2020 |

1. Key informants are made of diasporas who hold high positions in government [↑](#footnote-ref-1)