

# **THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL POLICY**

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This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy.

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August 2000

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## **Acknowledgements**

Whilst my name occupies the cover of this thesis, it is important to note that its production has been the result of an enormous amount of effort by a few special individuals. It is to these individuals that this acknowledgement is directed.

In starting, I would like to thank all members of staff at Sheffield University's Department of Town and Regional Planning. In particular, I would like to thank Professor John Henneberry for his time, patience and guidance in preparing this thesis. I would also like to thank the Kirkpatrick family for their support and encouragement. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to Douglas Kirkpatrick. Whilst he has not been able to witness the completion of this thesis, I know that he would have been proud of me.

It gives me a great deal of pleasure in thanking my parents, Peter and Chermine Groves. Whilst I owe an enormous debt to all those individuals mentioned in this acknowledge, the encouragement and support provided by my dear mother and father has been invaluable. They have instilled in me a sense of pride and determination. They are, in effect, responsible for placing me in a position where I could even contemplate undertaking a PhD. It is true to say that my successes as a student reflects their enormous success as parents. I consider myself to be privileged in this regard.

Last but by no means least, I would like to thank my partner and son. Andrea has provided a constant source of physical and emotional support. Through me, she has experienced the difficult process of completing a PhD. Consequently, it is with a great deal of pride that I am now able to declare that: "we have done it". As for my son Isaac, this PhD is dedicated to him. He serves as a constant source inspiration for me and my only hope is that I can be as good a parent to him as my mother and farther and Andrea's parents have been to us.

## Summary

Over the past twenty years the arts and culture have become a popular vehicle through which local economic development can be pursued. Whilst this relatively new local economic development tool has generated much interest amongst academics, many have been content to simply provide descriptive accounts of its development. Where theoretical frameworks for analysis have been applied, they have failed to adequately examine and assess those local factors which have contributed to the development of these strategies.

Interestingly, the evolution of arts policy as a vehicle through which to pursue economic development, has been mirrored by proliferation in coalitions as preferred vehicles through which governing decisions, at the local level are effected. Current debates surrounding the New Urban Politics have focused on the degree to which current modes of governance reflect: widened representation; increased community empowerment; and increased local autonomy. By employing regime theory as a framework for analysis, this thesis will examine how those local political factors in two cities have influenced the development of cultural strategy. Such an exercise will enable a comment to be made on the degree to which cultural strategies reflect more co - operative forms of decision making, increased access to new forms of expertise and community empowerment.

## INTRODUCTION

The origins of cultural policy as an economic development tool are to be found in those activities of the Greater London Council (GLC) during the 1980s. Whilst cultural policies' use as an economic development tool has originated out of local politico - economic projects, its ascendancy as a vehicle through which local economic development can be pursued has been reflected in both the current Labour central government's and the previous Conservative administration's attempts to harness and develop its potential.

New Labour's attempts to use and develop the arts and cultural industries reflects a number of changes in central government's attitude towards the arts and culture. New Labour's interest in the arts and cultural industries not only recognises these sectors' economic potential, but as Greenlaugh (1998) notes, it also reflects part of New Labour's wider political project:

“ The political project of New Labour, which sought to embrace popular aspiration as well as traditional responsibilities, brought with it a marked shift in governmental thinking about culture.” (Greenlaugh, 1998:84)

This marked shift in central government's approach to the arts and culture has not only involved an acceptance that the distinction between high and low forms of arts is a false one, but also reflects an attempt to generate wider political support (Greenlaugh, 1998). Whilst the Conservatives sought to develop the arts and culture through the Department of National Heritage, the New Labour Central Government has replaced this Department with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. This new Department's title at once reflects those issues discussed above (namely central government's embracing of a wider definition of that which constitutes culture) and an alternative

strategic approach which not only builds upon the past (i.e., heritage) but also reflects future aspirations. Those industrial sectors with the potential for economic growth (e.g. media, publishing, design) have become a focal point for further development precisely because central government believes that they represent growth sectors both in terms of employment and future export.

Recognition of the importance of these industrial sectors has been reflected in the creation of the Creative Industries Task Force in 1997. Chaired by Chris Smith, MP (Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport) and consisting of prominent individuals from the arts and cultural industries, this Task Force has been charged with the responsibility of identifying and maximising the economic potential of the creative industries. (Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 1999). As indicated below, whilst this Task Force recognises the economic importance of these industrial sectors, it also embraces heterogeneity in terms of the arts and culture and those individuals which are able to benefit from these industries:

“ The performing arts and creative industries in this country are a thriving economic force, attracting talented young people from across the social spectrum. My Department has set up the creative industries task force and the Music Industries Forum, which are looking at ways of promoting creativity so that young people - whatever their background - can contribute to the continued growth of those important sectors.” (Smith, C. 1998)

This theme of access to arts and opportunity for all is a recurrent concern expressed in New Labour's reference to the arts and cultural industries:

“It is important that opportunities in the performing arts and arts and even in broadcasting are available to everyone and that what ought to count is talent and not whom one happens to know, what one's name is or what social background one is from.” (Smith, C, 1998)



The creation of the Department for the Culture, Media and Sport and the Creative Industries Task Force represents just two of those changes which New Labour have made since coming to power. The National Lottery represents another example of where New Labour has sought to develop its populist agenda (White, 1999:79). Introduced in 1994 by the Conservative central government, legislation dictated that five good causes should benefit from its proceeds<sup>1</sup> (White, 1999:79). On coming to power, the New Labour administration published a White Paper entitled 'The Peoples Lottery' (1997). This document outlined plans to reform the National Lottery. Part of these reforms included plans to establish the National Endowment Fund for Science, Technology and The Arts (NESTA)<sup>2</sup>. As a consequence of the way in which National Lottery Funds are distributed it has acted as a catalyst for the development of local partnerships designed to draw down funding (see White, 1999)<sup>3</sup>. In fact increasingly the National Lottery is being employed by many local partnerships as a means of funding local economic development strategies (Griffiths, 1998; planning, 1997).

Whilst many accounts of the use of cultural policy as a vehicle for local economic development have reflected opportunistic behaviour on the part of local partnerships and local authorities, local strategies based upon or incorporating the arts and culture have developed over the past seventeen years. Infact, given central government's announcement, in 1997, of its intention to make the arts and culture a statutory responsibility of local authorities, it would be reasonable to assume that local cultural strategies will become a widespread phenomena.

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<sup>1</sup> These five 'Good Causes' were: the arts, sports, heritage, charities and Millennium projects. 28% of revenues from the sale of Lottery tickets were to be distributed equally amongst these 'Good Causes'.

<sup>2</sup> Two points are worthy of note here. Firstly, NESTA represents just one of those changes which were proposed in 'The People's Lottery' and has been singled out here because it directly to the current discussion of the arts and culture. Secondly, NESTA was created following the 1998 National Lottery Act. Thirdly, NESTA was designed to support talented individuals in the fields of science and the arts through a combination of financial and non - financial support.

Bassett (1993:1773) has identified these strategies as being an important and interesting aspect of policy innovation. He stresses that their evolution is linked to changes in public policy, local politics and local power structures (Bassett, 1993:1784). More specifically, in recent times, cultural strategies have come to reflect those collaborative approaches to policy development and implementation which currently characterise much of urban policy. These strategies also reflect an emphasis in local economic development on focusing upon the particular strengths, rather than the weaknesses, of a locality. In addition, cultural strategies represent a relatively new vehicle through which local economic development can be advanced.

Given local and central government's current interest in cultural strategies (as vehicles for economic development) and those partnerships which it appears to be giving rise to, now is an appropriate time to examine its development at the local level. Such an examination of these strategies presents an opportunity to more clearly understand how local politics shapes local economic development initiatives and to test for the presence of those features said to be associated with the new urban politics.

In chapter one a brief review of British urban policy will be undertaken and its main characteristics from the 1960s to the present day will be discussed. These characteristics will then be compared against those of cultural policies. This chapter will highlight the degree of symmetry which exists between mainstream urban policy development and cultural policy development. Having illustrated that cultural policy and mainstream urban policy have developed along similar trajectories, chapter two will chart in more detail those politico - economic factors which have given rise to urban entrepreneurialism. Next will follow a discussion of those more promising theoretical frameworks which have been employed to analyse the political dynamics of this mode of urban governance. This chapter will conclude with the development of a theoretical framework which will be employed in order to examine cultural strategy development. Chapters one and two will therefore set the scene for chapter three which will

outline the methodology which will be employed in order to address those research questions identified in chapter two. This chapter will then conclude with the selection of two case study in which strategy development will be examined.

Having selected two sites for investigation, chapter four will examine and compare the political and economic histories of these two cases whilst chapters five and six will examine and discuss cultural strategy development and those actors' relationships around which it has been developed. Following a comparative analysis (chapter seven) of those research findings highlighted in chapters four to seven, chapter eight will conclude with a discussion of how local political factors have influenced cultural strategy development and what this indicates for the presence of a new urban politics.

# **CHAPER ONE: URBAN POLICY AND CULTURAL POLICY**

## **1. Introduction**

In order to illustrate how cultural policy development mirrors that of mainstream urban policy it is first necessary to characterise urban policy development and state restructuring. Such an exercise not only highlights the way in which cultural policies have become part of mainstream urban policy but also serves to contextualise their development. What follows therefore, is a brief examination of urban policy evolution and state restructuring within the United Kingdom from the 1960s onwards. This exercise will draw attention to the manner in which central government's political responses to changing global forces have contributed to the shift towards entrepreneurial modes of governance (Oatley, 1998a). Following this, the development of cultural policies' use as a vehicle for economic development will be examined and those similarities between this policy area and wider urban policy will be highlighted and discussed.

## **2. Urban Policy**

This section will examine urban policy development and state restructuring from the 1960s onwards. Urban policy has undergone extensive changes since the 1960s, therefore its examination below has been divided into four sections in order to identify those main features which have been associated with its development. These four sections are: urban policy between 1960 and 1979; privatisation and the pursuit of 'enterprise culture', the influence of American approach to urban development; and the introduction of the 'challenge model.

### **2.1. Urban Policy 1960s - 1979**

The 1960s were marked by attempts to more clearly identify those causes of urban deprivation; and by experimentation as a means of identifying the most appropriate way of addressing this deprivation. In this context, the 1960s and early 70s were characterised by a search for appropriate forms of urban policy

(see Lawless, 1986:37-50). The 1970s, however, marked the point at which those causes underlying urban decay were more clearly linked to the decline in manufacturing industries and resulting high levels of unemployment. The 1978 Inner Areas Act represented just one response to these newly identified causes of urban decay<sup>1</sup>. This act has been singled out for particular attention here because it provides an example of central government clearly identifying local government as having a central role to play within urban regeneration. That is, local government was to be the primary vehicle through which urban and economic decline was to be addressed whilst the private sector was expected, where necessary, to play a supporting role (Lawless, 1991).

## **2.2. Privatism and the Pursuit of 'Enterprise Culture'**

The election of a Conservative government in 1979 marked a shift away from previous approaches to urban policy. Whilst urban policy has typically been characterised by centralisation and fragmentation (Stewart, 1994), prior to 1979 it was, none the less, built upon a tripartite consensus at the national level<sup>2</sup>. The *Thatcher* administration, however, (re)articulated the urban problem, identifying both economic and political factors as being central to urban and economic decline. Decline was said to have occurred as a result of the withdrawal of private sector interests from cities. Here local authorities (many of which were still Labour controlled) were identified as creating an environment which was not conducive to private sector investment (Parkinson, 1988; Parkinson and Evans, 1990; Edwards and Deakin, 1992). Associated with this newly identified cause of urban and economic decline was a discourse which identified a culture of dependence upon the welfare state (Edwards and Deakin, 1992).

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<sup>1</sup> Those local authorities located in declining areas were empowered through the 1978 Inner Urban Areas Act to support industrial renewal through a variety of measures. Here it is important to note that those powers provided to local authorities varied according to the level of status conferred upon the area by central government.

<sup>2</sup> This tripartite consensus existed between central government, organised labour and business.

To address those factors which were identified as having caused the decline of the inner cities, central government initiated a number of developments. Firstly, the tripartite arrangements which had existed at the national level since the end of the second world war were dismantled. Secondly, the private sector was encouraged to adopt a more proactive role within urban regeneration. Thirdly, a new value system which advocated that the individual become less dependent upon the welfare state and pursue an active philosophy of self - help was promoted (Edwards and Deakin, 1992; Boddy and Fudge, 1984:3-4).

As a means of pursuing the development of this 'enterprise culture', local partnerships replaced the national level tripartite arrangements. These local partnerships were established between central government and local business interests<sup>3</sup> through the medium of Quasi Autonomous Non - Governmental Organisations (Quangos) such as Urban Development Corporations<sup>4</sup> (Peck, 1995). At the time of their creation these new institutions were responsible for implementing clearly defined tasks within clearly defined geographical areas. In addition, they were under no legal obligation to co - operate with local authorities and were funded by central government<sup>5</sup>. In relation to UDCs two points are worthy of particular note here. Firstly, UDCs' ability to by - pass local government reflected central government's departure from past approaches to urban policy in which local government was empowered to perform a central role within urban regeneration. Secondly, UDCs' remit of physically improving their areas represented another departure from past approaches to urban policy. This emphasis on physical development was

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<sup>3</sup> Here it is important to emphasise that this partnership between central government and the private sector did not include business representatives. Instead 'non-representational' business interests were incorporated into partnership. See Peck (1995) for a fuller discussion.

<sup>4</sup> The first Urban Development Corporations were established under the 1980 Local Government Land and Planning Act and were charged with the physical regeneration of their areas. These corporations were pump - primed by central government. That is, public money was provided as an impetus to lever private sector capital.

<sup>5</sup> In the case of UDCs it is important to note that while these organisations received funding from central government it was expected that this funding would have a 'pump - priming' effect and attract private sector investment in the physical development of their areas.

based upon an attempt to increase market confidence and in doing so attract businesses. Bypassing local government and focusing upon physical renewal was to become a common feature throughout the 1980s under the *Thatcher* administration (See Lansley et al 1989).

In addition to more fully including local private sector interests in urban regeneration through the development of quangos, local private sector interests were also empowered to vet local authority action. An example of this can be seen in local chambers of commerce involvement in the appraisal of local authority applications for Urban Programme Funding (Lawless, 1991; Peck, 1995). These developments have been described by various commentators (Barnekov et al, 1989; Edwards and Deakin, 1992) as 'privatisation of urban policy'. These changes in urban policy and the introduction of new institutions reflected the *Thatcher* administration's political priorities in which the private sector was identified as being best placed to create community prosperity. Here emphasis on welfare policies were replaced by an emphasis on wealth creation. The distribution of this wealth, it was assumed, would occur through 'trickle - down'<sup>6</sup> processes. Commentators such as Edwards and Deakin(1992) have suggested that central government sought to allow the private sector to lead urban regeneration. Peck (1995), however, has pointed out that new institutions such as UDCs were dependent upon public funding (from central government). Peck (1995), therefore, asserts that these new institutions should be regarded as instruments of central government rather than independent agents.

In addition to those developments noted above, the private sector also developed business led initiatives. Such initiatives included Business in the Community, Phoenix, British Urban Development Association and CBI Task Forces<sup>7</sup>. Increased private sector interest in urban regeneration has been

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<sup>6</sup> The term 'trickle - down' describes a process through which the benefits of local economic development, through spin - off effects, filter down to the wider community.

<sup>7</sup> Created in 1982 Business in the Community has a largely corporate membership and has been central in establishing enterprise agencies and trusts. Phoenix was created in 1986 and consists of construction interests. CBI Task Forces were created in 1987. The British Urban Development Association was established in 1988 and consisted of property development companies.

attributed to three factors. Firstly, central government's calls for 'captains of industry' to contribute to policy and an appeal for the restoration of Victorian ideals, in which the private sector plays a proactive role in the development of cities, is thought to have increased business participation in regeneration. Secondly, the private sector's voluntary participation in urban regeneration has also been attributed to their desire to assist a central government which was viewed as being sympathetic towards business interests in general (Peck, 1995). Thirdly, the property boom of the 1980s increased property developers' opportunities for profit generation. These opportunities are thought to have provided a strong motivating factor for business involvement in urban regeneration (Barnekov et al, 1989; Harding, 1990; Lawless, 1991).

This restructuring of both urban policy and the institutional terrain through which these policies were to be advanced necessarily included a reorganisation of local government. Such changes involved: a reduction in local authorities' block grants; the introduction of rate capping; the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering for local authorities' services; the removal of local authorities' ability to raise taxes locally<sup>8</sup>; and the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) and the Metropolitan County Council's (Jacobs, 1992). When combined with the introduction of new institutions, local chambers of commerce vetting procedures and the mobilisation of organised business interests, these developments had the effect of reducing local government's influence (Stewart, 1994).

### **2.3. The Influence of American Approaches to Urban Development**

American approaches to urban policy and development have long influenced British urban policy. For example central government's experimentation in social policy during the 1960s was, at that time, influenced by developments in the United States (Lawless, 1986:38-39; Lawless, 1991; Parkinson et al, 1988; Harding, 1990; Barnekov et al, 1989). Within the United States the private

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<sup>8</sup> Local property rates were replaced with the Community Charge (this was eventually replaced with the Council Tax) and a nationally unified business rate was set by central government.



sector has a long history of active participation in urban development. Commentators such as Harding (1990), Parkinson et al (1988) and Barnekov et al (1989) have identified the rationale behind this involvement as having influenced central government's moves towards incorporating local private sector interests in the governance of British cities.

#### **2.4 The Introduction of the Challenge Model**

The City Challenge initiative was created in 1991 in response to criticisms of Thatcherite urban policies (Oatley and Lambert, 1998). Based upon a competitive bidding process in which funding was allocated on the basis of the quality of bids submitted, the introduction of the City Challenge initiative represented a fundamental change in urban policy funding. At the time of its introduction central government argued that this new funding process would encourage local level collaboration between stakeholders; encourage innovative approaches to the problem of urban decline; create value for money; and develop greater sensitivity to local needs (Oatley and Lambert, 1998; Oatley, 1998b). This initiative also identified local government as a lead partner in the bidding process and explicitly identified the need for community sector involvement (Oatley and Lambert, 1998).

Following the introduction of City Challenge, a range of other competitive bidding processes for resource allocation were introduced. These included: City Pride (1993), the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) (1994) and the National Lottery Regeneration Fund (1994). Central government suggested that the introduction of the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) would create a new localism in which public - private - community partnerships would be more responsive to locally specific problems. In examining SRB, Stewart (1994) has asserted that SRB has created a new localism which can be labelled as managerial, corporate and competitive. Stewart (1994:142-143), however, clearly states that this new localism represents:

“...the decentralisation of administration as opposed to the devolution of power and local influence.” (Stewart, 1994: 142 - 143)

SRB and other challenge models are based upon contractual agreements between central government, local bodies and local delivery agents<sup>9</sup>. In addition, such competitive initiatives represent a continuation of central government's drive to involve private sector interests in defining and addressing economic decline (Oatley, 1998c). In this respect Oatley (1998c) states that the challenge fund model should be regarded as a continuation of growing centralisation and private sector involvement in urban regeneration.

### **3. Cultural Policy**

Having briefly outlined urban policy's evolution during the past twenty years it is now necessary to chart cultural policy's development. Undertaking such an exercise draws attention to the manner in which cultural policy and wider urban policy have been influenced by similar pressures and sought to address similar problems in a similar fashion. What follows is a brief discussion of the changing rationales behind the creation of cultural policies and the ways in which policy emphasis and implementation has altered.

#### **3.1. Arts and Cultural Policy; 1946 - 1970s**

It was not until the Second World War that the state significantly intervened in support of the arts and culture. This intervention was expressed through the creation of the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) which was established in order to raise the morale of war time Britain. Following the conclusion of the Second World War the Arts Council for Great Britain (ACGB) was created. Its remit was to raise the standard of the arts and culture whilst at the same time increasing access to them (Bennett, 1995:202)

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<sup>9</sup> Those agencies bidding for these funds do so within the parameters or guidelines specified by central government. If awarded funds these agencies are obligated to achieve those targets and outputs specified in original bids.

Arguments put forward for state support for the arts and culture have always revolved about four broad themes. Firstly, the arts<sup>10</sup> were said to hold the potential to civilise the masses. Such arguments were based upon the assumption that the masses were largely uneducated and as such prone to acts of unsociable behaviour. The arts, it was argued, had the ability to enlighten and educate and, in doing so, to contribute to social order (Bennett, 1995:207; Bennett, 1997: 70).

Secondly, the arts were regarded as a symbol of national identity and prestige and as such should be supported by the state (Bennett, 1995:204; Bennett, 1997:71):

*"A history of 'great men' and 'great artists' works as a ... narrative [of nationality] only if it manages to articulate (elaborate and annex) a wider National - Popular narrative. The Nation - State succeeded only in so far as it managed to identify itself with this National popular ... this National - Popular tradition was seen to be enshrined above all in the products of 'High Culture'." (O'Connor and Wynne, 1991; cf. Volkerling, 1997)<sup>11</sup>.*

Thirdly, arguments about the economic importance of the arts have existed since 1816. Then arguments centred on the need to support the arts due to their potential to act as a source of inspiration for British manufacturers (Bennett, 1997: 71). Finally, there has long existed a view that the market could not be relied upon to generate those forms of art which were conducive to a civilising role or the advancement of national prestige. As such, state intervention was seen to act as a corrective to those inadequacies of the market (Bennett, 1995:210-211).

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<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that in this context the term 'arts' denotes high forms of art and culture (e.g., fine art) as opposed to popular art and cultural forms. High art is so named because it is said to reflect the values of the upper classes.

<sup>11</sup> Similarly, in reference to cities use of cultural policies Griffiths (1993:43) notes how during the Victorian era cultural policies were typically employed as a means of generating a respectable image for those cities which had generated wealth through industry.

Whilst these arguments have always existed, the degree to which they have acted as driving forces behind state support for the arts has varied with time. The creation of the ACGB was primarily based upon three of these arguments: the potential of the arts to civilise; their role as a symbol of national identity and prestige; and a rejection of market forces as a suitable vehicle through which the arts and culture could be developed (Bennett, 1995).

Whilst the ACGB was established two years prior to the creation of the welfare state there still exists strong similarities between the two. The welfare state represented a commitment to improving social conditions for the general population (Stoker and Mossberger, 1995:212). The welfare state can be understood to be a means of intervening in the economy and wider society in order to sustain and manage mass consumption which in turn supported mass production (Stoker and Mossberger, 1995:212; Painter, 1995:279). Those activities which were not conducive to mass production or profit maximisation and for which there existed little motivation for market provision were supplied by the state. Examples of where this occurred can be seen in the areas of education and health care provision. The creation of the ACGB not only represented an attempt to widen access to the 'arts' and in doing so improve social conditions but it also represented a means of addressing the inadequacies of market forces as a means of supporting and developing the arts. Support for the 'arts' therefore also represented an area which was not conducive to profit maximisation. As such it had to be supported but this support was provided at 'arms length' so reflecting its importance relative to areas such as health and education (Bennett, 1995: 212). From the preceding commentary a certain symmetry between the creation of the ACGB and the welfare state.

Support for the arts and culture via the ACGB only represents one form of state intervention. Local authorities also had (and still have) an important role to play in supporting the arts and culture. Local authorities were empowered by the 1948 Local Government Act to provide support for the arts through the use of a

six pence levy on rates. The rationale behind such a development reflected the welfare state's primary objectives of universal access and improved social conditions.

Although it is possible to identify similarities between the ACGB and the welfare state, it would be misleading to view the ACGB as an integral part of the welfare state. Created at arms - length from Central government, the ACGB reflected a laissez - faire approach to cultural development and this laissez - faire approach was largely absent from other areas of state intervention (Bennett, 1995: 204). In addition, whilst the ACGB was concerned with widening access to art and culture, which reflected the welfare state's principle of access for all, it was concerned with a narrow range of activities. This reflected the fact that, at the time of its inception, that which was deemed to be culture and art by the ACGB was narrowly defined in terms of 'high art' and 'high culture'.

In relation to local authorities' role in the provision of cultural and artistic activity, Evans (1997) notes how they were empowered to support this sector through enabling legislation as opposed to being legally required to do so. Such a means of intervention within the cultural sector reflected central government's attempt to seek a balance between the two pressures noted above (i.e., the arts/culture's perceived role as a civilising agent and laissez - faire approaches towards cultural provision) (Evans, 1997).

The ACGB's narrow definition of art and culture and its contempt for popular cultural and artistic forms, was reflected in those organisations which it would fund. Funding was concentrated on traditional, high - culture forms. This approach went largely unchallenged until the 1970s during which time social movements<sup>12</sup>, many of which were located in the inner cities, challenged the ACGB's monocultural and elitist approach to arts support. Such challenges resulted in calls for a form of 'cultural democracy' which recognised the validity

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<sup>12</sup> This term denotes such groups as environmentalists, youth movements, ethnic minority groups, feminist groups and gay and lesbian groups.

of both community and ethnic minority art and cultural forms (Bianchini, 1990, 1993, 1996; Volkerling, 1997). These calls for 'cultural democracy' were underlined by local authorities' attempts to use cultural and arts activities as a means of stimulating social cohesion<sup>13</sup> through support for community and ethnic based activities (Mulgan & Warpole, 1986; Bianchini, 1993:). In response to these pressures the ACGB initiated tentative steps towards providing financial assistance for community and ethnic arts<sup>14</sup>. The arts' intended role within urban policy during the 1960s and 1970s was, therefore, largely concerned with aiding social cohesion, 'civilising' and educating urban populations.

The 1970s also marks an important point within the history of cultural policy development and use because it represents the point at which the distinctions between high and low forms of art and culture were challenged. As a consequence of these challenges, the 1970s bore witness to the politicisation of cultural policy (Bianchini, 1993, 1996). Other important contextual forces implicated in the rise of cultural policy as an economic development tool include deindustrialisation, the resulting increased inter - city competition for inward investment and the rise in importance of city centres as the focal points of this competition. Associated with these developments has been a move towards city centres as sites of consumption rather than production and the way in which this transition has been employed as a marketing tool (Lovatt and O'Connor, 1995: 127-129). These developments were to have significant implications for cultural policies' development during the proceeding decades.

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<sup>13</sup> Note that local authorities were further empowered to support the arts and culture through the 1972 Local Government Act (Section 145). Again this provides local authorities with discretionary as opposed to statutory powers.

<sup>14</sup> The Arts Council's moves towards funding community and ethnic minority based arts groups in 1975 should not be regarded as a change in philosophy or an embracing of popular forms of art and culture. Those reasons given for this recent development in policy were based upon the assertion that community and ethnic minority arts could provide a vehicle through which greater appreciation for high art and culture could be generated (See Kelly, 1984)

### **3.2. The 1980s; Reorganisation of Arts and Cultural Funding**

As noted above, the 1980s marked a turning point in terms of urban policy rationale and modes of implementation. With regards to the latter, in response to deindustrialisation and its associated effects and in line with its political project, central government emphasised: the need for value for money amongst those institutions in receipt of public funds; an increased role for the private sector within public policy; and an increased sensitivity to the market. At this point it is important to note that each of these factors are linked to one another. That is to say, a central part of central government's philosophy towards public policy held that value for money could, in part, be achieved through the inclusion of private sector interests. It was believed that the inclusion of private sector interests in urban policy would also create a greater degree of sensitivity to market pressures. As a consequence of these developments and in line with central government's approach towards the management of cities and their constituents, the 1980s bore witness to a shift in the emphasis of urban policy. The emphasis of urban policy shifted away from social towards economic priorities. Associated with this shift was a reorientation in funding language away from subsidy and towards investment. Within the realm of cultural policy, such pressures were reflected in the restructuring of arts funding within the UK. Much of this restructuring occurred within the ACGB and the Regional Arts Associations (RAA).

RAAs developed as a consequence of the closure of ACGBs regional offices during the 1950s. By the mid 1970s RAAs had developed into structures which were dominated by local authorities in terms of their organisation and policy agendas. Although these RAAs were primarily funded by the ACGB, local authorities also provided funding via voluntary subscriptions.

As a consequence of being dominated by local authority representation, political factors filtered into RAAs' activities. This was observable in those activities which the RAAs supported. As well as providing support for professional building based, high art activities (e.g., theatres) the RAAs also

supported community and ethnic based arts activity (Evans and Taylor, 1994; Beck, 1989). As a result there existed a noticeable incoherence between RAAs activities and those of the ACGB<sup>15</sup>. At a time when the ACGB's budget was shrinking, the RAAs provision of financial support for community based arts activity was regarded by many professional arts groups and the ACGB as being a waste of valuable resources. Local authorities on the other hand' regarded support for such activities as being important both in terms of developing social cohesion and supporting social movements. The restructuring of the arts funding structure represented both a response to these criticisms and central government's drive towards greater cost effectiveness in public spending (Beck, 1989).

As a corrective to local authority dominance of RAAs and the resulting policy incoherence between the RAAs and the ACGB, the Wilding Report (1989) proposed a restructuring of the arts policy network. The RAAs were to provide the main focal point of this restructuring. This restructuring involved replacing RAAs with Regional Arts Boards (RABs); reducing local authority representation to one third; the incorporation of prominent individuals from the arts sector and the business community onto RAB boards; devolving powers from the ACGB to the RABs; and including RAB representatives on the ACGB's council. (cf Wilding Report 1989; Beck, 1989; Evans and Taylor, 1994; Kawashima, 1997).

Whilst such developments have led to a greater degree of coherence within the cultural policy network (i.e., between the ACGB's and RABs funding priorities), this coherence has been achieved through increased centralisation of policy and a reduction in local authorities' influence within RABs. Centralisation of policy has been increased through the inclusion of RAB representation onto the

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<sup>15</sup> Whilst the ACGB commenced funding community arts during the mid 70s, the overwhelming majority of its funds were dispensed amongst traditional professional arts groups not community and ethnic based arts activities. This is where the incoherence between the ACGB and RAAs lay.



ACGB council<sup>16</sup> so as to facilitate the development of a national rather than diverse and fragmented regional policy perspective. This has in turn resulted in RABs becoming more accountable to central government (Kawashima, 1997; Evans and Taylor, 1994; Beck, 1989). In addition, restructuring has afforded private sector interests increased access to the policy making process. Yet again the similarities between those factors affecting cultural policy development and wider urban policy are evident. In response to these developments Kawashima (1997) suggests that local authorities may move from a position of regarding RABs as their own 'property' and thus worthy of extended support towards a more adversarial stance.

Central government's response to economic decline have been accompanied by changes in the ways in which local authorities have used cultural policy. As noted above, the 1970s clearly marked the point at which cultural policies, a previously uncontentious and largely ignored policy domain, became politicised. Lovatt and O'Connor (1995). Factors which set the wider context for the politicisation of cultural policies (i.e., globalisation, economic decline, economic and industrial restructuring) have already been discussed. Consequently, what is now required is an examination of those agents who effectively contributed to the politicisation of this policy area.

As noted above, central elements of the Thatcher administration's policies during the 1980s included reductions in public spending and the inclusion of private sector interests in public policy. Such developments were regarded as being a means of moving away from welfare dependency. The arts and culture and the ways in which they were funded was regarded as being symptomatic of this welfare dependency (Bassett, 1993;1776). As a response to reductions in funding provided by central government, the ACGB published 'A Great British Success Story' in 1985. Here the ACGB argued that investment (as opposed to

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<sup>16</sup> It is important to note that under the recommendations of the Wilding report local authority representatives are disqualified from becoming RAB chairs and are therefore not eligible to sit on the Arts Council's council (See Evans and Taylor (1994) and Beck (1989) for a fuller discussion).

grants) in the arts provided value for money on the grounds that employment was created and as a result of increased income tax and national insurance contributions. In addition, 'A Great British Success Story' argued that the arts could contribute to the regeneration of inner cities through attracting tourists and job creation (cf Arts Council, 1985; Bianchini 1990; Bennett, 1995).

Following the release of 'A Great British Success Story' the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) published 'The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain' in 1988. This report concurred with 'A Great British Success Story' and concluded that an economic case could be made for 'investment' in the arts<sup>17</sup>. Here the Myerscough Report (as it is better known) claimed that the arts accounted for 25% of the total tourist earnings and 25% (£10 billion worth) of all goods and services bought by British and non British buyers (PSI, 1988). As Bassett (1993;1776) notes that, these developments had the effect of heightening issues surrounding the arts and culture at the local level.

### **3.3. The Influence of Local Political Factors**

The potential for using cultural policies/strategies as a vehicle for local economic development was recognised by a number of larger urban authorities such as the GLC, and Sheffield , Liverpool , Glasgow, Bristol and Leeds City Council's . These local authorities were to become the main vehicles for cultural policy/strategy development during the 1980s and 1990s.

Bianchini (1990:218) describes the activities of the GLC between 1979 and 1986 as being the most important influence on local authorities' use of cultural policies. The GLC was effectively the first British local authority to use culture as a vehicle for local economic development, political mobilisation and opposition to central government.

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<sup>17</sup> It is important to note that this report has since been discredited. See Hansen (1995) and Pick (1989) for further details.

The GLC's cultural policies were formulated through its Arts and Recreation Committee (ARC) and its Industrial and Economic Committee (IEC). Both ARC and IEC made no distinction between high and low forms of art and culture. ARC focused on social integration and cohesion through funding community and ethnic minority arts and devolving powers to grassroots groups. IEC was less concerned with social integration. Instead IEC was more concerned with employment creation. Having identified the cultural industries as a potential growth sector within the city's economy, the IEC sought to create employment through the development of a cultural industries strategy which was to be part of a wider industrial strategy for London (Bianchini, 1990). Here the cultural industries were defined as:

*“Those institutions in our society which employ the characteristic modes of production and organisation of industrial corporations to produce and disseminate symbols in the form of cultural goods and services, generally, though not exclusively, as commodities. That is to say newspapers, periodicals and book publishing companies, record companies, music publishers, commercial sports organisations etc.”* (cf Garnham 1983,. Lim, 1993:2)

It was argued that previously the public sector had tended to fund those activities which were not commercially viable and left the market to supply those activities for which there was demand. As a corrective to this the GLC, through its IEC, Economic Planning Group (EPG) and the Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB), argued that in order to play a role in economic development, the public sector would have to intervene through rather than against the market (cf Garnham, 1983;. Bianchini, 1990; 220). Between 1983 and 1986 (when it was abolished) the GLC supported cultural industries through the provision of loans, equity and business advice for commercially viable enterprises <sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> See Bianchini (1987, 1990) for a fuller discussion.

The GLC's activities (as seen through those activities of ARC, IEC, EPG and GLEB) represented an explicit means of political mobilisation as well as resistance to the Conservative central government. ARC's funding of community and ethnic arts represented more than just a rejection of the distinction between high and low forms of art and culture. It also sought to increase marginalised groups' access to arts and culture and in doing so generate political support for a local authority which actively opposed the central government of the day<sup>19</sup>.

Those activities of IEC, EPG and GLEB within the cultural industries represented an alternative local economic development approach to that advanced by the Conservative government. As noted above, central government's approach to local economic development was based upon partnership between themselves and private sector interests (bypassing local authorities). The GLC's cultural strategy, however, advanced a model of development in which the local government represented the main architect and mode of implementation. In this context the GLC's cultural strategy represented not only a 'New Left' alternative in which cultural policy development was linked to municipal socialism, but also a form of resistance to Thatcherism.

In relation to the aim of this thesis two issues are worth emphasising here. Firstly, the GLC effectively facilitated community empowerment through the development of an arts and cultural strategy. A central part of this process involved enabling the self-expression and development of groups previously marginalised as a consequence of the ACGB's funding priorities. Secondly, there is no mention of the GLC operating in partnership with private sector agencies in the development of these strategies and policies. Instead the main site of co-operation appears to have been between the GLC and community groups.

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<sup>19</sup> It is also important to note that ARC's funding of community and ethnic groups also represented a critique of ACGB funding which was regarded as being elitist and contemptuous of community, ethnic and popular culture.

Whilst the GLC's cultural strategy had limited impact upon London's economy it nonetheless highlighted the economic importance of the arts and culture and how these activities could be appropriated as vehicles for economic development. The GLC's activities along with the Myerscough Report were to become powerful catalysts for other local authorities to intervene in the cultural sectors in order to stimulate economic development as well as cultural democracy.

Sheffield was one of those cities which was influenced by the activities of the GLC and the publication of the Myerscough Report. In an attempt to address the city's rising levels of unemployment the city council's Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) initiated a cultural industries strategy. This strategy was characterised by the development of a cultural industries quarter which included infrastructure such as an Audio Visual Enterprise Centre (AVEC), an independent cinema, a recording studio (Red Tape Studios), a photographic gallery and film production unit. The city's cultural industries strategy attempted to compliment the development of cultural infrastructure with employment and training initiatives (Bianchini, 1990). As was the case with the GLC's cultural industries strategy, Sheffield's strategy was initiated and implemented by the City Council (not via partnership with the private sector or central government). Such developments occurred during a time when Sheffield City Council's resistance to the Conservative Central government had earned it the title of 'The Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire'.

Sheffield's cultural industries strategy, like that of the GLC, was borne out of left wing inspired political resistance to central government. This resistance revolved around continuing to act as the lead agency in the economic and social development of the city in the face of central government inspired developments designed to emasculate local government. These activities included: reductions in public spending; the active recruitment of local private interests within the economic and social development of urban areas; and the

active by - passing of local authorities by central government empowered agents able to play an active and central role in the economic development of their areas. As a response to these developments Sheffield's cultural strategy was firmly associated with municipal socialism (Seyd, 1990; Bianchini, 1990; 229).

Sheffield City Council's use of the cultural industries as a local economic development tool was initially seen as a means of continuing to act as the central agent in the development of the city despite measures designed to emasculate left wing local authorities intent on maintaining high levels of social provision<sup>20</sup>. Despite these origins, Sheffield City Council has been forced to modify its role. More recently the City Council, in partnership with the local private sector, has attempted to exchange the labels, 'The Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire' and 'The Steel City' with 'The Twenty Four Hour City'. The advent of increased inter city competition for limited investment has increased the need to portray an environment which is conducive to inward investment. This has meant that those past images associated with militancy and an anti business culture have become undesirable. The development of Sheffield's cultural strategy since the mid 80s reflects the City Council's shift away from an emphasis on social provision and the management of its community towards activities of an entrepreneurial nature in which the local private sector is an active partner (Seyd, 1990).

Liverpool provides another example of the way in which the adoption and nature of cultural policies have been influenced by local political factors. In Liverpool local political factors initially conspired to ensure that cultural policies were omitted from the political agenda (Bianchini, 1993; 156).

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<sup>20</sup> Reductions in grant allocation to local government and reducing local government's ability to raise taxes locally through rate capping had a coercive effect on many local authorities forcing them to abandon their emphasis on social provision.

Prior to 1987, cultural policy did not occupy a position on the policy agenda. Parkinson and Bianchini (1993; 155-157) identify the City Council's militant political leadership as being the primary reason for the absence of a local economic development oriented cultural policy. This militant leadership was primarily concerned with developing opposition to central government's policies of reducing public spending and forcing local authorities to subordinate social priorities in favour of economic considerations. The City Council was more concerned with maintaining (and expanding) the provision of welfare services than in developing an economic policy (See Meegan, 1989,1990). As a consequence of this emphasis on welfare provision, much of the City Council's efforts were focused upon the city's periphery where electoral support was located, not on the city centre (Parkinson & Bianchini, 1993).

It was not until the Militant Tendency was expelled from the Labour party in 1986 and removed from office by the House of Lords in 1987, that the City Council began to pursue economic development activities. Two key occurrences have been identified as having directed the City Council's attention towards the use of culture and the arts as an economic development tool. Firstly, during the mid to late 1980s whilst the City Council had been pursuing welfare policies and opposition to central government the Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) had been developing the docks. The docks were developed as a tourist destination by creating visitor attractions<sup>21</sup>. MDC's success in renovating this area and attracting visitors effectively alerted the new Labour administration to the potential of the arts and culture as a local economic development tool (Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993;160). Secondly, the abolition of the Merseyside County Council in 1986 resulted in many of its arts and cultural personnel being absorbed into the City Council. Merseyside County Council had been greatly influenced by those activities of the GLC and therefore had an understanding of how the arts and culture could be employed (Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993; 161-162). Liverpool's resulting cultural strategy attempted to strike a balance between economic development and social

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<sup>21</sup> See Chapter four for fuller discussion.

integration. The city's strategy document identified the need to develop tourism, the cultural industries and community involvement (Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993; 162-163).

Unlike the GLC, Liverpool City Council sought to work with MDC and other private sector interests in an attempt to develop a strategic approach to the arts and culture development. In addition, recognising that its resources were limited the City Council also sought to enlist the support of funding agencies such as the ACGB, Merseyside Arts, the Department of Employment, the European Community and MDC (Bianchini and Parkinson 1993; 164-165).

Another point of difference between the GLC and Liverpool City Council which highlights further the importance of local political factors in shaping the nature of cultural policy, was the degree to which the local community was empowered. Whilst Liverpool City Council sought to give marginalised groups, such as the black community, access to resources and assistance, the degree to which this involved devolving power is questionable. For example an investigation into the cultural life of Toxteth indicated that the black community still experienced:

*"...the dual disability of unstable funding and the struggle for cultural/artistic recognition in its own right."* (Dixon, 1991:6; Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993:170)

This difference between the GLC's and Liverpool's degree of community empowerment may reflect the degree to which each cultural strategy was driven by grassroots/social movements. In the case of the GLC the cultural strategy was developed at the height of the local authority's resistance to Thatcherism. In the case of Liverpool, however, cultural strategy entered the local political arena at the point at which the City Council was moving closer towards political moderation. This shift towards political moderation is also illustrated in the council's attempts to engage in more co-operative arrangements with private sector organisations.



Local political factors also appear to have had a role to play in Glasgow's use of the arts and culture as an economic development tool. Glasgow's use of the arts and culture as an instrument for place marketing has commonly been identified in its designation as the '1990 European City of Culture' (Booth and Boyle, 1993; Boyle and Hughes, 1994). This festival, however, represented an extension of the city's previous efforts to portray an image of a post - industrial city attractive to visitors and investment. These efforts began with the 'Glasgow's Miles Better' campaign which was launched by the City Council in 1983 (Boyle, 1990: 121-122). Whilst Glasgow District Council submitted the bid for the 1990 City of Culture it also received support from the Scottish Arts Council and Glasgow Action (a coalition of prominent business interests within the city). In their examination of Glasgow<sup>22</sup>, Boyle and Hughes (1993:44) note that there was consensus as to the type of bid which should be submitted. The bid submitted identified the objectives of the 1990 celebrations as:

- to continue those marketing initiatives already developed within the city for the city;
- to market the city's artistic activities;
- to build upon the co-operative and organisational experience which had been developed within the city;
- to increase awareness and participation in the city's cultural life.

(Booth and Boyle, 1993: 33, cf. Glasgow District Council, 1987: 2-3)

The programme of events arranged for the year long celebrations were therefore geared primarily towards place marketing. As part of these proceedings Glasgow District Council established a Festivals office. The Festivals office's role was to encourage the local community to develop and implement ideas which could be used during the celebrations (Boyle and Hughes, 1994: 462-463).

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<sup>22</sup> This refers to Glasgow's successful bid for and hosting of the 1990 European Community's title of 'European City of Culture'.

A group of prominent artists and managers, known as the 'Worker's City', labelled Glasgow District Council's attempts at community empowerment as being tokenistic. In addition, this group criticised the organisation of the 1990 celebrations for its emphasis on place marketing rather than celebrating the city's 'real' history which was entrenched in workerist struggle. (Boyle and Hughes, 1994: 464-467).

In his summation of Glasgow's approach to place marketing via the arts and culture Boyle (1990: 126-130) states that consensus and Glasgow District Council support for privatisation were an essential requirement for civic survival. In addition, Boyle goes on to suggest that the local Labour party's hegemony assisted in the development of a relationship between local government and the city's private sector. Here the private sector came to accept that the local Labour party was an intrinsic part of the city's political profile. Consequently, in order to pursue economic development it was necessary for the private sector to work with local government. These concluding remarks clearly identify a collaborative approach between local government and non - governmental actors as being at the centre of Glasgow's approach to place marketing.

Bristol provides another example of a city which has moved towards the development of a cultural strategy geared towards local economic development. As in the case of Glasgow, Bristol is attempting to develop its strategy via partnership. In Bristol's case, however, this partnership is more encompassing involving the private sector, and arts and community groups<sup>23</sup>. Bassett (1993:1784) attributes the development of a cultural strategy for Bristol to the (re)emergence of a self - conscious business elite and the building of bridges between this elite and local government. Bassett's (1993) efforts, however, have been limited by the fact that at the time of his investigations a cultural strategy did not exist. Bassett's (1993) investigation best serves as a means of understanding how Bristol moved towards the use of the arts and

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<sup>23</sup> See chapter five for a fuller discussion.

culture as an economic development tool. Partly as a consequence of the timing of his investigation, Bassett's analysis is not extended to the way in which those groups responsible for strategy formation interact. Consequently, whilst he is able to identify this business elite's role in catalysing the development of a strategic approach to the arts and culture he is unable to comment on how strategy orientation is shaped.

Using Bristol as a case study, Griffiths (1995) examines why cultural strategy geared towards local economic development acts as a stimulus for local partnership formation and how strategic dilemmas (see below) are addressed. In his conclusions Griffiths (1995:262) identifies two factors which influence cultural strategies' ability to stimulate partnership formation. Firstly, Griffiths asserts that partnership working is common within the arts and cultural sector and that those funding pressures experienced by arts organisations have driven them towards greater co-operation. Secondly, he asserts that the notion of a cultural strategy is in some way linked to notions of choice and pluralism and that these values are also found amongst partnership members. This sharing of such values acts as an ideological binding point. With regards to those factors shaping the orientation of the cultural strategy created (which in this case emphasises place marketing via flagship developments) Griffiths (1995:26) makes reference to the 'logic of partnership'. Here Griffiths suggests that partnership is being employed as a means of extracting finance from the private sector in order to redevelop under - used city centre sites. In addition, Griffiths (1995) also concludes that the Bristol partnership has adopted a strategy of least resistance<sup>24</sup>.

Whilst Griffiths makes references to the 'logic of partnership' and policies of least resistance, he fails to explain (in depth) the nature of partnership arrangements between the actors involved in the strategy making process.

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<sup>24</sup> This term denotes the development of a strategy which reflects the need to accommodate all parties involved in the strategy making process. The result is a strategy which yields to the lowest common denominator.

Consequently, it becomes difficult to explain how and why partnership is maintained. Like Bassett (1993), Griffiths' investigation was hampered by the fact that a cultural strategy did not exist at the time of this research.

In his examination of the use of the arts and culture as an economic development/place marketing tool in Leeds, Strange (1996:33; 1996b:54) characterises the city's approach as one of pragmatism and opportunism. Strange (1996a:35) identifies institutional competition between the City Council and the Leeds Initiative (a partnership of private sector organisations) as being a primary reason for the absence of a cultural strategy. Competition between these two groups revolved around the issue of who should lead on the development of a cultural strategy. In addition, Strange (1996) also identifies the City Council's political rigidity as being another obstacle to the development of a cultural strategy (at the time of writing his paper). As a consequence of these two factors, Strange (1996a:36) identified a top - down approach to the arts and economic development/place marketing in which the City Council plays the leading role. As a consequence of this top - down and opportunistic approach Strange asserts that whilst the City Council claims to facilitate community access to the arts and culture, community empowerment is not being advanced. Strange asserts (1996b:53) that if a cultural strategy is to be developed, a partnership approach will be necessary. Strange (1996) also asserts that such a partnership will probably result in policies of least resistance. Such a comment presupposes that those interest groups participating in strategy development will have equal access to/influence on this process.

Strange's (1996a; 1996b) examination of Leeds provides another example of how local political factors have influenced whether or not a city adopts a cultural strategy. In addition, Strange is the only commentator in this field to explicitly attempt to identify what a pragmatic and opportunistic approach to arts and cultural use has meant for community empowerment.

### **3.4. A Typology of Cultural Policy Uses as Economic Development/Urban Regeneration Tools**

The preceding section usefully highlights the ways in which cultural strategies can be employed to promote local economic development and how the absence/presence of partnership are associated with different forms of strategy. What follows is a closer examination and characterisation of the ways in which cultural strategies have been employed as vehicles for local economic development.

Bianchini (1990:221-223) identifies three cultural policy models<sup>25</sup>. These models are:

- place marketing/civic boosterism
- cultural industries
- civic identity/social cohesion (civilising)

In relation to cultural policy and its association with economic development and urban regeneration the USA has once again been a source of inspiration for city governors (Bianchini, 1990:221). This can be seen in the ways in which cultural strategies have been used as instruments for place marketing/civic boosterism. Here the arts and culture have been employed in mixed use development schemes as a means of increasing property and rental values. Whitt (1987) for example, in an examination of arts led development in US cities, notes how such developments typically focus on mixed use developments<sup>26</sup>. In a British context such models have been applied to Liverpool's Albert Docks (see Madsen, 1992; Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993) and Glasgow (see Booth and Boyle, 1993 and Boyle, 1990), however in these two examples (re)creating image served as a (if not the) central objective.

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<sup>25</sup> It is important to note that these models are ideal types and as such they help to shed light on the ways in which cultural policies/strategies can be employed in order to assist economic development.

<sup>26</sup> Of particular relevance to this thesis is Whitt (1987:30) comment that these mixed use developments typically involve a central role for the private sector and that arts coalitions often act as vehicles for improving public - private relationships.

It is important to note that present forms of place marketing differ from those approaches which were so popular during the 1970s. In fact those forms of promotional activity which were popular during the 1970s have been characterised as methods of 'selling the city'. At that time activity focused upon providing loans, premises and serviced sites as a means of 'selling the city' to potential inward investors. During this period promotional material was also used in an attempt to attract tourists. This approach largely revolved around an attempt to sell those attributes of a particular location to potential customers. This was done without necessarily identifying customer needs. Place - marketing, in contrast, is more concerned with identifying and supplying consumer needs (Fretter, 1993).

Increasingly a central part of place marketing involves attempting to develop less quantifiable factors or resources such as 'image'. So here a city's resources or attributes are marketed in an attempt to selectively (re)construct image. That is to say, image is (re)created via those resources appropriated as a vehicle for city marketing (Ashworth and Voogd, 1990). In this context Paddison (1993) characterises place marketing as a form of social marketing in which a central aim is the reorientation of attitudes and hence behaviour. Cultural amenities and activities are increasingly being employed as vehicles through which to (re)construct images and alter perceptions about places (For examples see Booth and Boyle, 1993; Madsen, 1992). Typically the city centre has acted as the main focus of attention.

It is important to note that whilst cultural activities have come to occupy a prominent position within place marketing that its role is still a supportive one. For example, in their investigation of place - promotion in the East Midlands German and Worthington (1998) discovered that policy makers regarded qualitative considerations as being less important than quantifiable factors. Here qualitative considerations relate to the quality of life and a pleasant environment whilst quantitative factors relates to physical infrastructure and labour supply. Similarly, in his investigation of Liverpool, Madsen (1992) notes

that in relation to stimulating inward investment, cultural provision has been unable to displace the importance of a skilled labour supply. Despite this he notes that Liverpool has had more success in attracting tourists than inward investors (Madsen, 1992).

The cultural industries model is clearly reflected in those activities of the GLC between 1983 and 1986, as discussed above. Consequently, what follows now is a brief characterisation of this particular model. This model attempts to generate wealth through the production and dissemination of cultural artefacts. Commonly, a wide definition of art and culture is employed in cultural industries strategies. The appeal of such strategies is to be found in the increasingly semiotic nature of cultural artefacts and the fact that the cultural industries represents a growth sector. Typically there is no geographical focus for such strategies. As the example of the GLC illustrates, in a British context these strategies developed out of left wing local authorities responses to economic decline and restructuring. Other examples of where these strategies have been employed include Sheffield (see Bianchini, 1990).

The 'civic identity' model's role is largely a supportive one in that it is concerned with image (re)development and as such is closely associated with the place marketing or civic boosterism models. The main aim of this model is to encourage the use of the city as a natural site for a wide range of activities ranging from shopping to entertainment (Bianchini, 1990:223). Commonly using the city centre as the primary focal point, an attempt is made to (re)create a sense of civic identity by encouraging and providing a wide range of activities for a wide range of people. That which binds these diverse groups together is a common sense of city ownership or belonging which is created through wide access to city centres and their activities (Bianchini & Parkinson, 1993). A common feature of this model is the development of policies associated with street cleaning, lighting and policing. Such policies are designed to facilitate and encourage increased access to the city centre. Also associated with this model is the 'Night - Time Economy' and the need for city governors to

appreciate the importance of developing redundant time and space through policies which encourage the development of the '24 hour city (Montgomery, 1995; Bianchini, 1995; Lovatt and O'Connor, 1995; Trickett, 1994).

As a means of achieving this sense of civic identity some commentators (Bianchini, 1993; Montgomery, 1990) have made calls for 'cultural planning'. In this context the term 'cultural' is explicitly defined in anthropological terms. Those advocates of a cultural planning approach call for cultural considerations in all aspects of city planning ranging from building design to street lighting. It is argued that such an holistic approach will result in the city becoming a safer and more pleasant place to live and work and as such produce positive impacts in terms of economic and social development.

In attempting to use cultural activities as an aide to local economic development/urban regeneration Bianchini (1993) has identified policy dilemmas which policy makers will have to resolve. These dilemmas are related to those cultural policy/strategy models noted above in the previous section. These dilemmas have been classified under three headings:

- spatial
- economic
- funding.

The second spatial dilemma relates to the potential of cultural policies to exacerbate or simply relocate spatial inequalities through the effects of gentrification. For example, in her investigation of New York's SoHo district Zukin (1988) notes how the resident artists' community unwittingly conferred upon this once decaying area a fashionable status. This fashionable status resulted in increased property and rental values which in turn displaced the original artist community.

Economic dilemmas refer to the need to decide on whether cultural policies should be production or consumption orientated. Production orientated



strategies refer to cultural industries strategies whilst consumption orientated strategies refer to those strategies which are geared towards tourism and retail. Here Bianchini (1993:203) highlights a number of problems associated with consumption orientated strategies. Firstly, he notes that consumption orientated strategies are commonly dependent upon factors which are ultimately beyond the control of city governors such as increased travelling expense. Secondly, those jobs created by consumption orientated strategies have been criticised for being poorly paid and frequently part time.

Bianchini (1993:203) notes that often a choice will have to be made about the degree to which resources should be directed towards permanent activities (e.g., museums) or ephemeral activities and events. Bianchini (1993:204) notes that in times of financial hardship that city governors are more likely to reduce budgets directed towards marginalised groups rather than building based arts organisations such as theatres.

### **3.5. Summary**

Those examples of cultural strategies discussed above usefully highlight the importance of the influence of local political factors on the development of cultural strategies. Also highlighted is the shift towards more co - operative arrangements in the pursuit of these cultural strategies. The literature on cultural strategies/policies, however, has failed to adequately examine the mechanisms through which these co - operative arrangements are pursued and realised. Consequently, it is difficult to comment on how (or even whether) consensus is achieved. By not explaining how consensus is achieved, it is difficult to comment on how and why collaborative relationships between local actors shape the cultural strategy adopted. The manner in which conflict is resolved and negotiation occurs provides a means of understanding how local political factors influence those cultural strategies adopted. What is needed, therefore, is a framework for analysis which is capable of examining conflict mediation and negotiation and linking these developments to a resulting cultural strategy. Also required is a framework which is capable of identifying those

resources required for strategy development, how they are used by partnership members and how this shapes the resulting strategy.

Those examples of cultural policy's use as a local economic development tool discussed above also highlight the presence of these dilemmas. What has been omitted from most examinations of cultural policy and strategy development (with the exception of Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Griffiths, 1995) are the way(s) in which these dilemmas have been addressed. An examination of the way(s) in which these policy dilemmas are resolved offers the potential to reveal how local political factors influence the form of strategy adopted. The manner in which these dilemmas are resolved also allows a comment to be made on the nature of those institutional relationships which contribute to the development of cultural strategy.

## **CHAPTER TWO: URBAN ENTREPRENEURIALISM, COALITIONS AND REGIME THEORY**

### **1. Introduction**

This chapter will locate cultural strategy geared towards local economic development within a shift towards entrepreneurial modes of governance. A brief review of those theoretical frameworks which can be employed in order to analyse urban politics will then be discussed. Following this discussion, those research questions to be addressed in this thesis and the conceptual framework through which is to be achieved will be discussed.

### **2. Urban Entrepreneurialism**

During the past twenty years there has been a reorientation in the way in which cities are governed. Harvey (1989) has depicted this shift as a movement away from managerialism towards entrepreneurialism. Managerialist modes of governance<sup>1</sup> are characterised by an emphasis on welfare and service delivery. In contrast, entrepreneurialism is predicated upon attempting to increase the competitiveness of cities and businesses therein. Within this context cities are competing for increasingly mobile international capital and a place within an emerging global hierarchy of cities. The term 'entrepreneurial' is applied to this mode of governance because those mechanisms through which increased competitiveness is sought are often speculative in nature. In characterising urban entrepreneurialism Harvey (1989) notes the importance of identifying who is being entrepreneurial. Here local governments have increasingly sought to increase the competitiveness of their cities through a variety of speculative measures which will be discussed elsewhere in this chapter.

Increased capital mobility has resulted in a reduction in central government's ability to influence the locational decisions of multinational companies. Consequently, the local state has replaced the national state as the preferred

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<sup>1</sup> Here the term governance is used to describe the designing and implementation of governing decisions by a combination of formal government structures and non - elected agencies.

site for negotiation - that is, increasingly negotiation around inward investment occurs between city governors and potential inward investors. Whilst the local state has increasingly become the primary site for negotiation and preparation for inward investment, central government has still had a central role to play in influencing urban governance (see Chapter One). Developments such as state restructuring, privatisation of urban policy and the introduction of competitive funding structures have all had the effect of promoting a shift towards civic entrepreneurialism (see chapter one). Also associated with this mode of governance is an emphasis on 'place' as opposed to 'territory'. In other words, policies geared towards the attraction of inward investment have, in the main, tended to focus upon particular sites within formal governments' territory. (Harvey, 1989).

In discussing the rise of urban entrepreneurialism Harvey (1989) develops a typology. Here Harvey identifies four options available to governors seeking to pursue entrepreneurial strategies. The first of these models is production orientated and here a competitive advantage is sought through the production of goods and services for export.

The second model is consumption orientated. Here a competitive advantage is sought through both attempting to increase consumption within a locality and presenting the locality in a way which is attractive to potential inward investors. Part of this process involves attempting to enhance localities' desirability as a place to live and work (e.g. cultural policies as place marketing/(re)imaging tools).

The third model is characterised by a quest for control and command functions such as financial headquarters. The final model seeks to acquire a competitive advantage by competing for central government's redistribution of surpluses. Here Harvey (1989) makes specific reference to military and defence contracts.

## **2.1 How Cultural Strategies Reflect Urban Entrepreneurialism**

By comparing the preceding section on urban entrepreneurialism with chapter one (which in part discusses the evolution of cultural policies and strategies), it is possible to identify how cultural strategies are reminiscent of urban entrepreneurialism. Firstly, cultural strategies are increasingly concerned with local economic development and regeneration. Secondly, this local economic development/regeneration is characterised by competition - that is, competition between cities for inward investment and for a place within a global hierarchy of cities. Thirdly, cultural strategy development is, in the main, entrepreneurial because it is increasingly speculative in nature. Fourthly, partnerships involving governmental and non - governmental actors represent the vehicle through which cultural strategies are being advanced.

Harvey's (1989) typology of urban entrepreneurialism also usefully highlights those similarities between cultural strategies (and policies) and wider urban entrepreneurialism. Compare, for example, Harvey's (1989a) typology and Bianchini's (1993) typology of cultural strategies<sup>2</sup>. Bianchini's cultural industries strategy, in which a competitive advantage is sought through the production of cultural artefacts, can be included in Harvey's production oriented model. Similarly, Bianchini's place marketing and civic identity models can be included in Harvey's consumption oriented model. Finally, whilst Bianchini fails to make reference to the National Lottery Funds<sup>3</sup> and European Regional Development Funds (ERDF), these could also be included in Harvey's model of central government's redistribution of. General theories of urban policy/governance might therefore be expected to offer a framework for examining the development of cultural strategies.

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<sup>2</sup> See chapter one for a for an outline of cultural policy models.

<sup>3</sup> Proceeds from the National Lottery have become a major source of funding for local economic development since its launch in 1994. (see Griffiths, 1998; Planning 1997, White, 1999)

## 2.2 Coalitions and Urban Entrepreneurialism

Whilst the term governance should not be automatically assumed to mean collaboration or partnership, this has come to occupy a central position within urban entrepreneurialism. Harvey (1989) for example notes that:

“. . . the new entrepreneurialism has, as its centrepiece, the notion of public - private partnership.” (Harvey, 1989:7)

Within a British context this growth in collaboration between governmental and non - governmental agencies at the local level can be attributed to those developments outlined in Chapter One. In drawing attention to the proliferation in collaborative efforts between governmental and non - governmental interests and the role which they play within current modes of urban governance one is presented with problems of definition. Within the context of urban governance there is no widely accepted definition of the term 'partnership'<sup>4</sup>. Commentators such as Lawless (1991) and Mackintosh (1992) differentiate between partnership types. Lawless (1991) for example, differentiates between those partnerships which are formal and those which are informal<sup>5</sup>, whilst Mackintosh differentiates between partnerships on the basis of their life span. Here a distinction is made between partnerships which are concerned with one - off projects and those which are more long term in nature.

The proliferation of coalitions as preferred vehicles through which governing decisions are effected is part of, what Cox and Mair (1988) and Cox (1995), have termed '*a New Urban Politics*' (NUP). Here Cox and Mair (1988) assert that urban politics is now largely concerned with the politics of local economic development. Local economic development has now taken on centre stage in urban politics because of economic and political changes occurring at the

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<sup>4</sup> Mackintosh (1992); Bailey (1994); Lowndes, (1997) all use differing definitions of the term 'Partnership' as it applies to regenerative strategies.

<sup>5</sup> Here formal partnerships are those which are a legal requirement whilst informal partnerships are formed voluntarily (see Lawless 1991 for a more complete discussion).

national and international level. In particular, the increased mobility of capital has resulted in intense competition between cities for limited inward investment. A central part of this NUP is the uneven relationship between capital and cities (or communities). The constitutive elements of these cities (or communities) will, according to Cox (1988), collaborate in an attempt to compete with other cities (or communities) through the development of local economic development strategies designed to attract inward investment. Different interests within these cities, however, will be affected (to varying degrees) by the resulting local economic development strategies. Their participation in these development strategies occurs as a result of them being locally dependent upon their city. Cox and Mair (1988: 307) define local dependence as:

“dependence of various actors - capitalist firms, politicians, people, on the reproduction of certain social relations within a particular territory” (Cox and Mair, 1988:307)

As a consequence of these local dependencies and the differing degrees of burden/advantages gained through the pursuit of a given local economic development policy or strategy, conflict about those strategies which should be pursued will develop. At this point it is important to note that conflict not only occurs about redistributive consequence. Examining developments around Glasgow ‘European City of Culture’, Boyle and Hughes (1994) note how conflict can develop around those symbolic consequences of local economic development strategies. In an attempt to reduce this conflict prevailing coalitions will develop an ideology which stresses community. Coalitions thus urge the city’s constituents to rally around the need to compete against other cities on the basis of this community driven ideology and argue that the city, as a whole, will benefit from the resulting strategy (in terms of prosperity). Here similarities with Harvey’s (1989) assertions about the move towards entrepreneurialism are evident.

### **3. The Main Debates Surrounding the NUP in the UK**

Those debates surrounding local partnerships, urban politics and governance have crystallised primarily around six issues. These six issues are concerned with whether current modes of urban governance are resulting in:

- increased community empowerment;
- a widening in forms of representation;
- increasing access to new forms of expertise in addressing urban issues;
- increasing co-operative forms of strategic decision making;
- stable coalition forms; and
- an increase in local autonomy and pro-activity.

Firstly, many commentators have attempted to identify whether or not current partnership approaches to governance are actually resulting in increased community empowerment and a new localism. Examining the bidding processes in City Challenge and SRB, commentators such as Malpass (1994) and Ward (1997) suggest that current urban policy funding mechanisms are not resulting in significantly enhanced community empowerment. With reference to SRB, Ward (1997) notes that community involvement occurs because it is a requirement which has been specified by central government. In addition, Ward (1997) concludes that if community involvement does occur then it is at the level of strategy implementation as opposed to strategy development. Such a view is consistent with Lovering's (1995:113) viewpoint which draws attention to the 'politically constructed nature of local reality'<sup>6</sup>. Other commentators examining these new local partnerships have concluded that they simply reflect responses to new funding structures and are therefore merely marriages of convenience (Bailey et al 1992; DeGroot, 1992; Hastings, 1996).

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<sup>6</sup> This 'politically constructed nature of local reality' refers to local institutional relationships being the result of central government's neoliberal policies. See Lovering (1995) for a more complete discussion.



In his analysis of the City Challenge bidding process in Bristol, Malpass (1994) concludes that the policy process may include the involvement of more actors whilst at the same time not significantly altering power relations between these actors. More recently Raco (1998), in his examination of Cardiff and Sheffield, has adopted a more pessimistic view. Here Raco concludes that rather than promoting inclusive forms of governance, the new institutional relations may actually be exacerbating traditional divisions between those actors involved in governance.

Secondly, Stewart (1996) in an examination of partnerships in Bristol identifies the presence of an elite group of decision makers which he refers to as a 'new magistracy'. Thirdly, whilst funding regimes such as the SRB, National Lottery and ERDF have necessitated multi - sector co - operation, questions have been raised over whether or not such partnerships will prove to be enduring. Certainly, Ward (1997) expresses doubts over whether or not coalitions created about SRB will remain intact after funding has been exhausted.

Fourthly, collaborative approaches to urban regeneration and local economic development are, in theory, supposed to provide the public sector with access to new forms of expertise. The degree to which this is the case, however, has been questioned by a number of commentators. Quilley (1999), for example, in his analysis of governance in Manchester concurs with Bassett (1996) and concludes that:

“. . . the positive impacts of this new urban politics in terms of co-operation, the empowerment of local communities, widening the basis of representation and tapping additional sources of expertise are frequently overstated.” (Quilley, 1999: 203).

Finally, those four issues discussed above collectively contribute to debates over the levels of local autonomy associated with this new localism. Whilst Stewart (1998) and Lovering (1995) regard current local action as effectively

being directed by wider national and international processes, other commentators ( Imrie et al, 1995; Valler, 1996, Digaetano, 1997) view local social relations as having a role to play in guiding local economic development policies. Also associated with the NUP and New Localism have been criticisms over the degree to which it blurs lines of accountability (Keating, 1991).

#### **4. Analysing Urban Politics and Policies**

There are a number of perspectives from which urban politics can be analysed. These theoretical perspectives include: growth coalition theory, network analysis and regime theory.

Described as a model of interest group intermediation (Rhodes and Marsh (1992:1), policy network analysis essentially developed out of criticisms of both pluralist and corporatist models of interest group intermediation which, according to Rhodes and Marsh (1992:1), did not provide a realistic interpretation of the relationship between government and interest groups. Whilst neither pluralist nor corporatist approaches recognised the presence of unequal access to government policy making, policy network analysis does. In this approach, policy making represents a complex process which is divided into different policy areas. 'Policy network' is the generic term employed to describe a group of organisations engaged in 'resource dependent relationships' organised around government and capable of influencing policy outcome (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992:13; Grant, 1995:35). Within these policy domains civil servants represent the key policy makers. These policy networks can exist in a variety of forms ranging from policy communities at one extreme to issue networks at the other<sup>7</sup>. The form of the policy network is defined by its membership and the distribution of resources amongst members (Grant, 1995; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992).

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<sup>7</sup> Policy communities are policy networks consisting of a highly stable relationships between a restricted number of members. Issue networks on the other hand are characterised by a large membership of interest groups, instability and limited interdependence. For a detailed discussion see Marsh & Rhodes 1992.

Whilst policy network analysis provides a useful means of mapping those interconnections between actors, its usefulness in explaining and understanding how and why certain interests are more successful than others in shaping policy, is limited. In addition this form of analysis, by the admission of Marsh and Rhodes (1992)<sup>8</sup>, does not provide an explanation of policy change. Given the nature of those research questions to be addressed in this thesis, change represents a fundamental issue. That is, the need to identify and understand changing relationships between those actors involved in the development of cultural strategies. Consequently, while policy network analysis might be a useful tool for describing the relationship between local actors, it would require augmenting with a theory which able to deal with change.

Developed by Logan and Molotch (1987), growth coalition theory asserts that local economic development is driven by coalitions consisting of place dependent interests, typically rentiers, property owners, local government, local media and universities. The core of the coalition, which typically consists of rentiers, uses local government as a means of creating a favourable business climate. That is, local government is captured and used by the private sector in order to increase land and property values, and compete against other cities for mobile capital.

As a consequence of increased similarities between the USA and the UK in terms of local economic development strategies and how these have been pursued<sup>9</sup> some UK researchers have attempted to employ the growth coalition approach (e.g., Lloyd and Newlands, 1988; 1990; Harding, 1991). The usefulness of growth coalition theory when placed in a British context, however, is problematic. Firstly, the theory is constructed upon ethnocentric assumptions

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<sup>8</sup>Marsh and Rhodes are amongst the chief architects of policy network analysis.

<sup>9</sup> This convergence in local economic development trends between the USA and UK include: increased competition between cities for inward investment, an increase in the pursuit of place marketing strategy, the increase in public private partnerships as a means of advancing local economic development.

which are not applicable to the UK. These concern the capture of local government by private sector interests. Whilst this may be possible in the USA where the private sector has long had an active role to play in local politics and local government autonomy exists, the same is not true of the UK<sup>10</sup> (Harding, 1991:300).

Growth coalition theory has also been criticised for implying that local agents alone can initiate and direct change. Here non - local and structural factors are largely ignored (Cox and Mair, 1989:140; Harding, 1991:301). Given the obvious influence, in the UK, of central government on local action such an oversight weakens growth coalition theory's application in a British setting.

Finally, growth coalition theory has also been criticised for insufficient explanation as to why members of a coalition have an interest in the local economy (Cox and Mair, 1989). Here Cox and Mair (1988) assert that those land and property owners and firms which are significantly dependent upon the success of the local economy will have an interest in creating or becoming part of a coalition concerned with promoting local economic growth. In this context rentiers are not seen as being the only central members of a coalition. Membership is shaped by those interests which are rendered dependant upon locally specific social relations necessary for their economic growth and prosperity. The local state too is seen as being a central element of the growth coalition because of its dependence on the local tax base. Harding (1994), however, asserts that in the UK rentiers have been far less important members of such coalitions in comparison to their American counterparts. Also British banks have tended to be centrally controlled thus reducing the importance of local dependence. Similarly, utilities in the UK have traditionally also had a national rather than local perspective thus reducing the importance of local dependence. Given local dependence's limited applicability to the development of cultural strategies in a British setting, what is required is a framework for

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<sup>10</sup> Here Harding (1991) points to the poorly organised nature of business in a British context. See Harding (1991) for a more detailed discussion.

analysis employing other explanations of participation in emerging coalitions. Such a framework is offered by regime theory<sup>11</sup>.

#### **4.1 Regime Theory**

Regime theory has been described as a theory which links the community power structure and political economy paradigms (1996:428)<sup>12</sup>. It offers an alternative means of analysing urban politics (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993). In contrast to more structuralist based approaches to understanding urban development, regime theory attempts to avoid economic determinism. Instead regime theory assumes that cities have the ability to influence their own development by mediating extra - local forces.

Central to regime theory is the issue of power and how that power is exercised locally in order to shape governance. Stone (1989) rejects the pluralist - elitist conception of power as an instrument of social control and instead develops the use of power through his social production model. Here power is exercised in order to produce specific outcomes, not to dominate and control.

Reflecting this social production model, regime theory is constructed upon the assertion that power (and those resources from which this power stems) is dispersed in such a way that no one group is able to exercise total control over all interest groups within a city. Regime theory therefore, views society as being complex and fragmented. Given this complexity, regime theory provides a framework for understanding how governing decisions are made.

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<sup>11</sup> Logan et al (1997:607) assert that growth coalition theory and regime theory share more similarities than differences. Here the author points to both frameworks' concern with growth and tensions between private and non - private sector interests.

<sup>12</sup> The pluralist community power paradigm versus elite theories was concerned with the question of who governed. Pluralists asserted that power was dispersed amongst a variety of interest groups each with equal access to decision making whilst elite theorist asserted that power was dispersed amongst elites (see Dahl 1961, Hunter 1953). The political economy approach, however, attempts to explain how urban structures and processes are shaped by the division of labour between the state and economy.

Regime theory asserts that in order to increase their capacity to act (i.e., to govern) governmental actors are forced to enter into alliances with non-governmental actors. Whilst power is said to be dispersed, certain interests will, by virtue of those resources which they control, be viewed as being particularly attractive coalition partners. Here business interests are viewed as being particularly attractive coalition partners because they control those resources which are viewed as being vital for societal well-being. By virtue of their ability to control investment decisions, the business sector occupies a privileged position. Business, however, is not only structurally privileged but is also instrumentally privileged - in that business interests are also able to organise their resources in such a manner so as to advance their ability to influence public policy. As a consequence of this ability to intentionally and non-intentionally influence public policy, business is said to be a source of systemic power (Stone, 1989). Despite this, the power which stems from electoral support still has an important role to play in influencing governing decisions (as Stone's analysis of Atlanta highlights).

Stone (1989) labels those coalitions created between governmental and non-governmental actors as regimes. These regimes are defined as being stable but informal arrangements between governmental and non-governmental actors with access to institutional resources and created in order to govern (Stone, 1989). As noted above, non-governmental actors typically consist of business interests. Non-business interests can also play a part in regime politics. These non-business interests can consist of community groups, organised labour and professional/technical groups. Given the influence of local factors in shaping regime formation scholars have identified a number of differing regime types (See Elkin, 1987, Turner, 1992; Stone, 1989).

Regime theory therefore offers a means of understanding how economic and social forces are mediated by local collective action. Stated another way, regime theory offers a framework for understanding 'how urban actors go about responding to the world as they experience it.' (Stone, 1998:250). As such

regime theory provides a model for understanding and explaining policy choice and development.

#### **4.1.1. Difficulties in Applying Regime Analysis Within A British Context**

Despite regime theory's usefulness as an investigative framework for the analysis of urban politics, there are a number of problems associated with its application both within and outside the USA (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; Harding, 1994; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Ward, 1996; Kantor et al, 1997; Sites, 1997; Imbroscio, 1998a and 1998b; John and Cole, 1998; Quilley and Ward, 1999). In attempting to develop a cross - national comparative framework through which to apply regime theory Stoker and Mossberger (1994) note that the theory needs to be:

“cleansed’ of ethnocentric assumptions based on its North American origins” (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994:196).

As noted above, Stone (1989) constructed regime theory based on those power relations which exist within American cities. Power relations within British cities, however, have traditionally differed from those found in the USA. Firstly, business interests within the USA have traditionally played an active role in the political process in terms of sponsoring city Mayoral campaigns and influencing public policy. In the UK however, local business interests have traditionally been poorly organised. Also, partly as a consequence of greater centralisation of business activity, businesses have typically not played a significant role within local politics (Keating, 1993:375; Harding, 1994:365-367). Whilst business participation in local politics has increased since 1979, this participation has been at the prompting of central government (See Peck, 1995).

Secondly, local government within the UK is subject to greater control by central government than is the case in the USA. Until relatively recently, local government had primarily been concerned with the delivery of services and

welfare rather than local economic development. Local government's reorientation towards local economic development is, in part, a reflection of the degree to which their activities have been rearticulated from the centre (see Chapter One).

In relation to raising business taxes in the UK, local government simply acts as collection agent directed by central government. It is central government who ultimately redistributes these taxes (Jacobs 1992:131-132). This rules against Stone's (1989) assumption that local government will be dependent upon local taxes and that this dependence will predispose public officials to accommodate business interests. British local government's dependence (relative to their American counterparts) upon businesses within their territories is also reduced by the presence of greater fiscal equalisation within the UK (Harding, 1994). Collectively these factors have the effect of creating power relations within British cities which differ from those existing in American cities. These national differences, therefore, make wholesale transference of regime analysis into a British context highly problematic.

Thirdly, Stoker and Mossberger (1994:198) state that, as well as considering the influence of private and public sector actors, it is important to recognise and consider the role of professional or technical personnel in shaping regime action. In relation to these professional or technical personnel, Stoker and Mossberger (1994:198) note that 'knowledge' becomes a resource. If, therefore, knowledge becomes a resource and this resource is held by professional or technical personnel then they too potentially influence coalition action.

As well as being biased towards those ethnocentric peculiarities of the USA, the framework advanced by Stone (1989) has also been charged with being both localist and empiricist (Cox, 1991; Ward, 1996; Quilley and Ward, 1999). Ward (1996) points out that regimes may only appear to be locally driven because that is the way in which they have been analysed. As a consequence he calls



for a mode of analysis which is linked to macro - level theory (Ward, 1996; Quilley and Ward, 1999). Such a linkage, it is argued, would allow a consideration of how those power relations within the British city have come into being. Similarly, Sites (1997:538) and Kantor et al (1997) criticises Stone's (1989) regime theory for its over - emphasis on local political factors in explaining local governance. In addition, Ward (1996) also asserts that non - local actors should be considered in relation to regime formation and actions.

Ward (1996: 430) has argued that there exists a strong possibility that central government activity may be driving regime formation within the UK (Ward, 1996). Here Ward points to the introduction of the competitive allocation of funds, heightened competition for inward investment and the introduction of neoliberal institutions as having forced a move towards coalition formation at the local level. Similarly, Ward (1997) in his examination of the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) process in Leeds, DiGaetano (1997) in his examination of Bristol's coalitions and Stewart (1996) in his examination of Bristol, note that British regimes (if indeed such partnerships do exist according to Stone's definition) are subject to a greater degree of influence by central government and wider initiatives (such as European Community initiatives) than is the case in the USA. Here Ward (1997) notes how community and voluntary group participation in the SRB process was a requirement specified by central government guidelines. In the case of DiGaetano's (1997) examination of Bristol he notes how the combination of state restructuring and economic decline conspired to force the city council into alliance with the private sector. Similarly, Stewart (1996) notes how central government's actions in diluting local government powers, reducing funding and introducing a plethora of non - elected agencies (i.e., Training and Enterprise Councils and UDCs) and individuals has had a definite role to play in regime formation.

Despite these criticisms and debates as to whether or not regimes are emerging in the UK, many commentators have employed regime theory as a means of understanding the changing nature of British urban politics

(DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a; 1993b; Valler, 1996; Stewart, 1996; Ward, 1997; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1997, Strange, 1997; Houghton and While, 1998; John and Cole, 1998; Dowing et al, 1999). The appeal of regime theory as a means of analysing British urban politics can be attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, trends in the nature, development and implementation of local economic development strategies have been seen as indicating a convergence between the USA and UK<sup>13</sup>. Wood (1996:1281) provides a useful outline of these characteristics pointing to:

- increased competition between areas;
- an increase in boosterist strategies in the UK; and
- the introduction of Enterprise Zones and Urban Development Corporations to the UK;
- the emergence of coalitions/partnerships as a means of advancing local economic development within the UK.

Secondly, given the rise in the number of coalitions concerned with governance, regime theory usefully extends analysis beyond the machinery of formal government. Thirdly, because coalition formation and action is seen to be contingent rather than a structurally determined process, regime theory offers a framework for understanding how local political factors shape local action.

#### **4.1.2. Addressing Regime theory's Weaknesses**

Various attempts have been made to compensate for those deficiencies identified in regime theory (DiGaetano, 1993; 1997; Stoker and Mossberger; 1994; Ward, 1996; Sites, 1997; Lauria et al 1997; Kantor et al, 1997; John and Cole, 1998; Quilley and Ward, 1999). In relation to this research, a combination of those approaches developed by Stoker and Mossberger (1994) and DiGaetano (1997) is favoured. In their paper entitled 'Urban regime theory in comparative perspective' Stoker and Mossberger (1994) set out a conceptual framework for conducting cross - national comparative research of urban

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<sup>13</sup> Ward (1996) has argued that this convergence has been over stated (See Ward, 1996).

regimes. Whilst this conceptual framework uses Stone's (1989) regime theory as its point of embarkation, Stoker and Mossberger (1994) attempt to cleanse regime theory of those ethnocentric assumptions upon which it has been based, so facilitating its application outside the USA. In addition, Stoker and Mossberger's approach recognises that regimes operate in a wider political and economic environment (i.e., beyond the local). More specifically, Stoker and Mossberger's framework recognises that regimes' capacity to act will be influenced by their access to non - local resources and that these non - local resources will influence regime action.

“ A crucial dimension of regime formation is the way local elites are able to manage their relationship with higher levels of government and the wider political environment” (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994:199).

Taking on board these considerations the authors develop a typology in which regimes are classified according to their goals. These goals are identified as being the maintenance of the status quo, project realisation and recreating image. These goals are, in turn, linked to four broad processes associated with regime formation. These four broad processes are:

1. mechanisms for mobilising participation in regimes;
2. the nature and process of developing a common sense of purpose within regimes;
3. the quality of coalitions established within regimes and congruence of interests amongst regime partners; and
4. strategies used by regimes in dealings with the wider local and non - local political environment.” (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994:200)

With regards to those factors which motivate participation in regimes, Stoker and Mossberger identify the pursuit of tangible results, local dependency<sup>14</sup> and

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<sup>14</sup> See chapter two for a definition.

expressive politics<sup>15</sup>. Similarly, the authors identify three possible means by which a common sense of purpose can be created between regime partners. These are: selective incentives (as put forward in Stone's 1989 regime theory), tradition and social cohesion<sup>16</sup> and the strategic use of symbols<sup>17</sup>.

The quality of regimes and the degree to which regime partners' goals are compatible are said to be associated with the composition of participants and their motivation for participating in a regime. Using the work of Saunders (1980:233-234 cf. Stoker and Mossberger 1994:) Stoker and Mossberger identify political communion<sup>18</sup>, political partnership<sup>19</sup> and competitive agreement<sup>20</sup> as being three ways in which the quality of coalitions and the compatibility of interests can be shaped.

With regards to a regime's relationship with its wider local and non - local environment, Stoker and Mossberger (1994) note the need for comparative analysis to be sensitive:

"... (1) differences in the actors and goals of a regime, which are partly determined by differences in the structure of capital and by 'political culture' or past patterns of relations between local actors; and (2) differences in local autonomy, including both opportunities and constraints for regime formation posed by local relationships with higher levels of government." (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994:207)

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<sup>15</sup> Here the term 'expressive politics' is used to describe symbolic politics, that is political action used in order to communicate a particular set of values.

<sup>16</sup> This stems from a strong sense of civic duty and community and affinity to a particular place.

<sup>17</sup> This is the development of a new or/and shared outlook by communicating that an issue is taken seriously.

<sup>18</sup> Political communion refers to a common outlook or/and approach amongst regime partners. This shared outlook means that regime partners are of the impression that they understand one another.

<sup>19</sup> Here regime partners share compatible desires, however, due to the potential for disagreement and thus conflict, a common sense of purpose has to be explicitly constructed through negotiation.

<sup>20</sup> Due to incompatibility of regime partners' desired objectives there may be competition to shape regime action.

Digaetano (1997) has also developed a conceptual framework for conducting cross - national comparative research of coalition formation and maintenance. As in the case of Stoker and Mossberger (1994), DiGaetano (1997) builds upon Stone's (1989) regime theory in order to develop his framework for analysis. Here DiGaetano also uses Stone's social model of production. DiGaetano's approach attempts to address two criticisms of Stone's regime theory. The first of these criticisms centres on Stone's assumption that the political relationship between governing elites will be characterised by co - operation. The second criticism focuses on Stone's failure to adequately consider governing realignments. This weakness in Stone's regime theory, according to DiGaetano, is the result of failing to consider the political - economy context in which coalitions are created.

As a corrective to these two inadequacies of Stone's approach, DiGaetano (1997) develops a concept known as 'modes of governance'. Such a concept recognises the possibility that the relationships between governing elites may not be characterised by co - operation. Here DiGaetano identifies three 'modes of governance' each characterised by the nature of power structures within the coalition, the types of power which are exercised and the model of decision making to which they give rise. These modes of governance can be typified by decision making which is characterised by conflict, contingent co - operation or long term co - operation (DiGaetano, 1997:848).

Secondly, DiGaetano (1997) attempts to consider how economic and wider political factors create a context in which coalitions and resulting strategies are created. Here DiGaetano (1997) asserts that economic restructuring and business cycles should be considered. With regards to wider political factors DiGaetano (1997) usefully identifies the need to consider intergovernmental structures and their influence on the scope of local political action. These intergovernmental structures are said to be either directive, enabling or competitive in nature. In this context, directive intergovernmental systems are said to dictate local state action whilst enabling intergovernmental systems

facilitate a greater degree of local autonomy. Finally, competitive intergovernmental systems force localities to compete for grants and other resources.

Both Stoker and Mossberger's (1994) and DiGaetano's (1997) frameworks provide useful tools for addressing the research questions posed in this thesis. Stoker and Mossberger's framework provides an approach to analysing (in detail) those political arrangements and processes around which regime formation occurs. In addition, Stoker and Mossberger's approach allows for a detailed and open consideration of those relationships within regimes. Their consideration, however, of non - local factors and in particular the influence of how these non - local factors shape governing realignments are lacking in comparison to DiGaetano's framework.

As noted above, Stoker and Mossberger highlight the need to consider a regime's relationship with the wider political and economic environment and to consider how higher forms of government<sup>21</sup> interact with regimes. However, the framework which they put forward does not adequately consider how higher forms of government directly or indirectly influence (through their legislative power) regime formation. As highlighted in Chapter One, cultural strategy development has been influenced by higher level government legislation. Possibly associated with this point, Stoker and Mossberger's framework also fails to consider the possibility that governing realignments influence on motivation for participation in a regime. In fact, Stoker and Mossberger fail to show how those characteristics upon which their typology is based are linked and therefore influence strategy outcome.

In comparison to Stoker and Mossberger, DiGaetano considers governing realignments and how these are linked to the broader political - economy environment. The example of Liverpool's strategic approach (see chapter one)

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<sup>21</sup> In Britain's case these higher forms of government would include Central Government and the European Community.

in which cultural policy is used as a vehicle for local economic development highlights the influence of governing realignments on strategy action (but fails to explain how these realignments are translated into policy through partner interaction). The consideration of governing realignments alerts the researcher to the possibility that these realignments may have an active role to play in shaping coalition strategy by altering power structures at the local level (as witnessed within the context of cultural strategies).

DiGaetano's consideration of governing realignments also provides a context in which regime decision making can be considered. Similarly, his classification of the nature of intergovernmental systems as being directive, enabling or competitive is also useful in drawing the researcher's attention to the different ways in which higher levels of government can restrict or facilitate local political action. Again, this provides a context in which coalition partners' relationships with one another and decision making can be considered.

## **5. Aims and Objectives of the Thesis**

As outlined in chapter one, the literature on cultural strategies geared towards local economic development is limited. The literature on cultural strategies, does however, suggest that local political factors and collaborative arrangements have an important role to play in strategy formation.

Where investigation has occurred into these strategies the mechanisms through which local political factors influence the resulting strategy have either been ignored or inadequately addressed. This has resulted in the production of largely descriptive accounts of what is implicitly treated as a static phenomenon. These accounts interpret strategy development as having occurred because there is an economic need for such development. Such approaches are worthy of criticism on two counts. Firstly, change is of fundamental importance, particularly to a researcher concerned with the role of politics in strategy development - that is, change with regards to those

relationships out of which strategy is developed and the impact of these relationships upon the nature of the resulting strategy.

Secondly, such an approach leads to assertions that, increasingly, cultural strategy development represents a depoliticised area of activity (Bianchini, 1997). One of those issues which this thesis aims to address is the view that cultural strategy development is depoliticised or that lines of division have not yet crystallised about this area because it is a recent phenomenon. As Cox (1995) highlights in his discussion of NUP and local dependency, those actors involved in the development of local economic development policies who are in some way dependent upon an area will be affected in different ways by different strategies. This, therefore, suggests that the policy making process (or in the case of this thesis, the cultural strategy development process) will be highly politicised and therefore subject to conflict over the best way to proceed.

Similarly, Bassett (1993) asserts that cultural strategies geared towards local economic development can be problematic because a cultural strategy is concerned with community development and expression. Local economic development, on the other hand, is concerned primarily with growth and wealth generation. Whilst cultural development can assist local economic development the opposite is not necessarily true. Consequently, there exists the potential for tensions to exist between those groups participating in the cultural strategy development process.

Other attempts to analyse cultural strategy development, such as those presented by Strange (1997) and Griffiths (1993) have been hampered by the fact that, previously, there has been little in the way of strategy to actually analyse.

In light of these criticisms and those gaps in knowledge noted above, a regime analysis of cultural strategy development serves three main purposes. Firstly, our understanding of cultural strategy development and how local political



factors influence strategy will be advanced. Secondly, an assessment of those characteristics associated with the new urban politics can be analysed. An examination of cultural strategy development represents a useful vehicle through which to analyse NUP precisely because it is a recent phenomenon and because those tensions potentially located within the notion of such strategies geared towards local economic development. Thirdly, the application of a regime framework to cultural strategy formation will provide another opportunity to test the usefulness of this conceptual framework in explaining coalition dynamics.

The following research issues will be used as a framework for substantive empirical investigation:

- which actors participate in the development of cultural strategy;
- how participation within those coalitions responsible for cultural strategy development is mobilised;
- whether a common sense purpose exists amongst coalition partners and how it is achieved;
- what the purpose of the regime is (as broadly defined by coalition partners, strategy statements and strategy implementation) and;
- how the character and operation of a particular regime influences the character of cultural strategy which is formulated.

In order to explore these issues it will be necessary to understand the context in which coalitions evolve and cultural strategies are created. This will be achieved by considering, for two selected locations:

- the impact of restructuring;
- past and present political cultures and patterns of interaction;
- the structure of capital in each locality and;
- the intergovernmental system in which these coalitions and strategies have been created.

This framework does not explicitly link Stoker and Mossberger's (1994) and DiGaetano's (1997) frameworks to macro - level theory. By employing, however, a framework which includes a review and comparison of the political (local and local government - central government relations) and economic histories of case study sites, a greater understanding of those relationships responsible for strategy development is achieved. Those research questions to be addressed in this thesis are:

- how local political factors, as illustrated in coalition politics, influence cultural strategy creation; and
- the extent to which strategy development reflects the emergence of more co-operative forms of strategic decision making which increases access to new forms of expertise and increased community empowerment.

# **CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH ISSUES, METHODS AND METHODOLOGY**

## **1. Introduction**

This chapter is concerned with both describing and justifying those methods which will be employed in order to address those research questions outlined in the previous chapter. It will be argued that, given those research issues discussed in chapter two and the nature of that which is under investigation, that a case study approach based on intensive research will be of considerable value in terms of developing causal explanation.

## **2. Theoretical Issues**

In the previous chapter I have argued that recent analyses of local cultural policy have tended to be limited in terms of explaining change, and that this thesis will seek to respond to such explanatory weaknesses. Explanation involves:

“... describing both the observable and unobservable processes that link phenomena together. Explanation also involves describing and understanding people as conscious and social human beings, and their motives, experiences and subjective interpretations are all important components of causal processes.” (Bulmer, 1984:211 cf. Devine, 1995:140)

Clearly, though, explanation is not a straightforward process. As Sayer (1995) notes “difficulties arise from an interplay between the nature of the object of study, on one hand, and our aims, expectations and methods on the other.” (Sayer, 1995:232). Given the focus here on explaining how local politics influences cultural strategy formation, I seek to focus on how causal processes operating at different spatial scales impact on policy development in localities. This might be operationalised via Duncan and Goodwin’s threefold

categorisation of how space makes a difference to social processes. This categorisation includes contingent local variation<sup>1</sup> and causal local processes, where “locally specific relations...are socially generative.” (Duncan and Goodwin, 1998:58). The final category is that of “localities effects” where a combination of local contingencies, local causal processes and effects interact in order to create a locally specific structure within which “people monitor, learn and react to their context and so how they act would be partly shaped by their experience of this locally specific political culture.” (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988:60).

This concern for causal relations in the context of the interpretations and meanings held by actors involved in the development of cultural strategy requires an intensive research design. That is, a research design which examines a limited number of cases exhaustively in terms of politico - economic history, process and relations. Here emphasis is placed on examining qualitative rather than quantitative factors and in doing so the importance of context is not only recognised but is also actively incorporated into the explanatory process.

An intensive research design focuses upon those individuals who are ‘structurally’ or ‘causally’ linked to one another. This is in contrast to extensive research methods, which would either examine a limited number of properties associated with many cases or attempt to study a wide range of properties associated with a wide range of cases. In the first instance explanatory power would be limited because of the possibility of over - looking important characteristics which could help with the development of explanation. In the second case, large numbers of cases and a wide range of characteristics to be

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<sup>1</sup> Space only exists in relation to natural and social objects, without which there would be no spatial relation. The effects of spatial relations, however, can not be reduced to the causal powers of these objects. Rather, how these powers manifest themselves (if at all) is dependant on the relationship with other objects. Effects therefore, stem from the internal structures of social objects. Spatial relations are therefore contingent. Where this spatial contingency influences the manner in which social mechanisms operate locally, contingent local variation is said to be present.

examined would mean that it would be extremely difficult to identify which characteristics were associated with causality (Sayer, 1992:241). Extensive research designs are, therefore, less amenable to developing explanation and better placed to generalise and make predictions about a given population (Sayer, 1992:242).

This concern with generalisation in extensive research means that those individuals selected for investigation are selected on the basis of shared similarities rather than their links with one another (Sayer, 1992:244). In turn, a great deal of care is taken in the selection of a sample prior to the data collection process. In intensive research, on the other hand, the selection process need not take place prior to the data collection process (Sayer, 1992:244). Here, those individuals from whom information can be sought can be selected as the researcher's knowledge of the area under investigation increases (Sayer, 1992:244). Within the context of this thesis, this scope for exploratory research within an intensive research design is particularly important given the lack of information which exists with regards to coalitions in relation to cultural strategy development.

Those research methods typically associated with an intensive research design are semi - structured interviews, unstructured interviews and participant observation. Unlike extensive methods of standardised interviews and statistical analysis, qualitative research methods are not designed to minimise the level of direct contact which the researcher has with those whom s/he is studying. On the contrary, close contact is actually viewed as being an advantage associated with these methods. In the case of semi - structured and unstructured interviews for example, this close and sustained contact between researcher and interviewee allows the researcher to probe and where necessary ask the interviewee to clarify points of interest. Here the researcher is able to follow - up new issues. Similarly, the interviewee is not restricted in the type(s) of responses which s/he can give. Instead s/he is able to respond to questions in his/her own words and in doing so allows the researcher greater access to their

interpretation of events and the level of significance which they attach to these events (Sayer, 1992:245 - 6; Bryman 1999:37 - 8; Devine, 1995:137 - 8). These factors associated with semi - structured interviews (and qualitative methods in general) mean that, in contrast to quantitative research methods, they provide better instruments for addressing, not only questions of 'how' but also 'why'.

### **3. The justification for using detailed Case Studies**

The use of a single or limited number of case studies has often been criticised for their lack of representativeness and generalizability to a wider population. It is, however, important to note that on this point Devine (1995) notes:

“It is rarely the case that a sample of interviews are so unrepresentative, or the interpretations so misleading, that any generalisations would be wholly specious.” (Devine, 1995:145)

The objective of a case study (or a limited number of cases) is not to make generalisations about a wider population (Yin, 1984). Rather a limited number of cases which are investigated in detail are employed in order to demonstrate the operation of a theory which postulates causal relationships (Stake, 1994:237).

Yin (1994) argues that a case study presents itself as being an appropriate research strategy where:

“... a 'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control.” (Yin, 1994:9)

Those research questions being addressed within this thesis are directly concerned with understanding 'how and 'why'. In addition, cultural strategy formation and the relationship between those actors responsible for the development of these strategies represent a contemporary phenomena over which the researcher has no control.

As indicated in the preceding chapters, the relationships between cultural strategies, the actors responsible for developing these strategies and the context of strategy development and actor relations are poorly defined, both theoretically and empirically. Context will be of fundamental importance to the development of these strategies and actors' relationships with one another. If this is the case then a case study approach would allow an on going consideration of contextual factors, and in the case of comparative research, provide an indication of how these contexts influence actor interaction and the resulting strategy.

A case study approach also facilitates exploration, description and explanation of the phenomena under investigation. It also has a fundamental role to play in theory testing (Bryman, 1989:173). Due to the nature of the phenomena under investigation and the nature of the research questions, investigation must necessarily involve exploration and description. Such an approach will aid the development of explanation. For these reasons, a case study approach based on an intensive research design is considered to be an appropriate strategy for identifying causal relationships.

The research questions will be addressed through the use of comparative case studies. An in depth comparison of two cases serves three main purposes. Firstly, the risk of explanations developed through a case study approach being due to ethnocentrism is reduced. In particular, a comparative approach will allow the researcher to comment on the degree to which differing local political and economic histories, and local environments influence coalition membership and member's relationships with one another and thus the resulting strategy. Secondly, a comparison of two case studies provides an added test for the 'robustness and transferability of theory' (Mackie and Marsh, 1995:174 - 176). In this instance a comparative approach will allow the researcher to comment, with a greater degree of certainty, on the extent to which regime theory as put forward by Stone (1989), and Stoker and Mossberger (1994) and DiGaetano (1997) is able to explore and explain strategy development. Thirdly, a

comparative approach also enables a more robust conclusion to be reached with regards to the identification of spatial scale(s) of causality. Two cases which may or may not be representative of a wider population will therefore be selected for their usefulness in testing theory.

#### **4. Selection of Cases**

The recent nature of cultural strategies geared towards local economic development and the lack of published material on this phenomenon meant that it was necessary to conduct a telephone survey prior to selecting two cases for detailed investigation. At this point it is important to note that the aim of this survey was to guide the selection of two cases for further investigation. In order to select these cases it was necessary to identify those local authorities that had a cultural strategy or were in the process of developing one. The literature on cultural strategies indicates that they tend to be pursued by larger (typically urban based) local authorities. Consequently, the survey targeted those local authorities located in urban areas. A total of ninety - six local authorities were contacted<sup>2</sup>.

The survey was designed to provide an indication of:

- how wide spread cultural strategies were;
- those organisations other than local authorities that were involved in strategy development and implementation;
- those resources perceived to be controlled by local authorities and their partners involved in strategy development;
- those factors perceived to have led to the development of a cultural strategy;
- those objectives being pursued; and
- strategy type<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> See appendix 1 for survey details.

<sup>3</sup> See chapter one for a typology of cultural strategies.



Whilst the use of more than one case offers the potential for a more robust investigation, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of why each case has been selected. Given the concern with testing theory (or more specifically testing a theory which examines coalitions) it was necessary to select cases where cultural strategies were being created via coalitions. Whilst these similarities in those cases selected for further investigation represented a prerequisite, it was also important to select cases which were markedly different in terms of the type of locale for which a strategy was being created, the type of strategy being created, the geographical focus of the strategy (i.e., whether the strategy was geared towards the city centre only or the city as a whole) and whether long or short term objectives were being pursued. Other differences which were regarded as being important factors in the selection of cases were: those reasons for the adoption of a strategy; the perceived role of the local authority within the cultural sectors; and those resources being competed for.

Coalitions in Bristol and Liverpool were selected for further investigation. Prior to discussing why these two case study sites were selected for further investigation it is first necessary to provide a brief description of each site's survey results (see table 1). Both Liverpool and Bristol City Council (at the time of selection) were very close to completing the development of their respective strategies. It was felt that conducting case studies either very close to or just after strategy formation would provide a rich source of information and reduce problems of recall on the behalf of interviewees. In both cases, changes in City Council internal politics was identified as having influenced moves towards the development of strategy. In addition, both cases identified the entire city (not just the city centre) as providing the geographical focus of their cultural strategies. Also their strategies were directed towards local, national and international businesses and visitors.

Having identified these similarities between the two cases it is now necessary to examine their differences. First, whilst Bristol is the largest city in the south west, Liverpool is not the largest city in the north west. Second, whilst the

Liverpool case indicated that the geographical focus of the strategy would necessarily influence the type of strategy adopted, the Bristol respondent stated that this would not be the case. Third, the telephone survey results indicated that whilst Bristol was pursuing both long and short term objectives whilst Liverpool was only pursuing long term goals. Fourth, Bristol had a cultural strategy mission statement whilst Liverpool did not. Fifth, whilst Bristol City Council regarded itself as both creating demand and acting as an enabling agent within the cultural sectors, Liverpool City Council was only concerned with acting as an enabling agent. Finally, whilst both City Council's claimed to be engaged in cross - departmental co - operation in pursuit of a cultural strategy, only Bristol viewed this co - operation as being vital.

Whilst not part of the telephone survey, differences in Bristol's and Liverpool's political and economic histories represented another deciding factor in their selection for further analysis. Whilst both cities economic fortunes have been linked to the presence of a port, they have had markedly different political and economic histories (see chapter four).

Given those differences noted above, the investigation of two markedly different cases provides a more robust testing of the theory than the selection of two similar cases. Finally, there is another reason why Bristol and Liverpool were selected for analysis. Initial contacts made during the telephone survey were willing to participate in the research.

Table 1: Profile of case study sites.

	<b>Bristol</b>	<b>Liverpool</b>
<b>City's status</b>	Regional capital	–
<b>Competing for</b>	Inward investment/Central gov grants/lottery funds	Inward investment/lottery funds
<b>Level of competition</b>	Regional/National/International	Regional/National/international
<b>Strategy creation date</b>	Imminent at the time of survey	<sup>4</sup> Imminent at time of survey
<b>Strategy objectives</b>	Support production, consumption, inward investment & visitors	Support production, consumption, visitors
<b>Definition of cultural</b>	A way of life	A way of life
<b>Strategy due to</b>	Economic decline/Intercity competition/Other L.A success change in City Council politics	Economic decline/ Intercity competition/Other L.A success changes in City Council politic
<b>Geographical focus</b>	City wide	City wide
<b>Affect of geographical focus</b>	None	Yes: Partly led by local community, raising skills
<b>Target(s) of strategy</b>	All businesses/all residents (UK/international)	All businesses/all residents(UK/International)
<b>Type of objectives</b>	Long & Short term	Long term
<b>Mission statement</b>	Yes	No
<b>Resources necessary for strategy</b>	Cross agency support/ intellectual/democratic link	Cross agency support/ intellectual/democratic link
<b>Role of local authority</b>	Enabler/creating demand	Enabler
<b>Dept co-operation</b>	Yes (vital)	Yes
<b>Inter organisational co-operation</b>	Yes (vital)	Yes (vital)

#### 4. Conducting Case Studies

The case studies selected for investigation will seek to identify the membership, internal and external relations of cultural strategy coalitions which, hitherto, have been poorly documented. Following this phase of research, it will be possible to search for an explanation of these relationships and how they impact upon the resulting strategy. At this point it is important to note that whilst

<sup>4</sup> This makes reference to Liverpool's new cultural strategy.

a case study strategy necessarily involves a degree of exploration, this should not be taken to mean that an unstructured approach to investigation has been adopted. As discussed in chapter two, this investigation is informed by the literature on cultural strategies and urban politics and employs a combination of frameworks developed by Stoker and Mossberger (1994) and DiGaetano (1997).

As Yin (1994:91-92) notes, case studies can usefully rely upon more than one source of data and the use of these multiple sources of data can contribute to construct validity through a process of triangulation. In order, therefore, to enhance the accuracy of research findings, the following sources of data have been used in each case study:

- a survey of those cases to be examined prior to investigation;
- documentary evidence (such as newspaper articles, minutes, memos and official publications produced by each organisation involved in strategy development);
- archival evidence and;
- semi structured interviews with each actor involved in the strategy development process.

Prior to commencing interviews, a review of each case site's political and economic history was conducted. In addition, a critical review of the literature relating to the relationship between those actors identified in the questionnaire was also conducted<sup>5</sup>. This literature review and information acquired via questionnaires in association with the conceptual framework for comparison (see chapter two) provided an initial guide to those questions which were to be asked.

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<sup>5</sup> Here it is important to note that the literature on actors' relationships with each other was not taken to be a precise reflection of actual relations. Rather the literature was used as a means of guiding fieldwork.

Documentary evidence such as minutes from meetings, memos and publications were also obtained from each organisation involved in strategy development. Such information was collected immediately after interviews were conducted and, where possible, was used as a means of corroborating information provided from interviews. Where appropriate, documentation was also used as a means of guiding those questions to be asked during the second rounds of interviewing. Similarly, archival evidence was used as means of enhancing understanding of context.

Interviews were selected as a method of data collection because the case studies were concerned with an examination of organisations and their relationship with each other and the impact of these relationships on strategy development. Consequently, the initial stages of each case study was concerned with identifying and characterising the opinions of key individuals involved in strategy development. Semi - structured interviews, therefore, presented themselves to be the most appropriate means of identifying such opinions and allowing interviewees to respond to questions/issues on their own terms whilst allowing information to be collected in an ordered way. Here semi - structured interviews allowed specific issues to be discussed but also allowed the researcher, where necessary, to ask interviewees to elaborate on key points. In addition, the use of semi - structured interviews allowed for the identification of issues which had not previously been identified either in the preceding literature reviews or the telephone survey. Finally, whilst these interviews were used to gain access to opinions, they were also used to identify other sources of data (including other key person to be interviewed)<sup>6</sup>.

Prior to commencing each study a letter was sent out to the respondents of the telephone survey. These letters (see appendix 3) outlined the broad aims of the research and asked for permission to conduct interviews and collect

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<sup>6</sup> On this point it is important to note that more than one interviewee had to identify the same key person before they were selected for an interview and further investigation. That is, corroboration played a central role in the identification of key persons to be interviewed.

documentary evidence as part of a case study. A week after each letter was sent out the respondent was contacted by telephone in order to ascertain whether or not they were willing to participate in the case study. Once each respondent had agreed to participate in the case study, a date and time was arranged for conducting interviews.

Where interviewees indicated that they were willing to afford as much time as was necessary, interviews lasted longer than 60 minutes. In most instances, however, interviews were limited to 60 minutes. Limiting the duration of each interview was deemed to be necessary because interviewing key actors necessarily had to occur in two stages. The first round of interviews were, in part, exploratory.<sup>7</sup>

First round interviews were written up and analysed along with documentary evidence in order to identify gaps in information collected. A second round of interviews was then conducted with the same interviewees. The aim of these second round interviews was to fill in identified gaps in information from the first round of interviews.

## **5. Problems encountered with the Case Studies**

The case studies were conducted in Bristol and Liverpool (see Chapter 5 and 6). The Bristol case study took longer to complete than was expected. The reasons for this were twofold. First, the overwhelming majority of identified contacts agreed to be interviewed, however, in some cases these interviews were arranged some time after initial contact was made. Here contacts stated that their workload was such, that immediate interviews were not possible. Second, one key private actor proved to be extremely elusive. Contact was eventually made with this actor via another actor. Despite these difficulties the case studies provided a rich source of data from which the research questions could be addressed.

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<sup>7</sup> For a full interview guide and a list of interviewees see appendix 2.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

### **1. Introduction**

This chapter will review and compare the economic and political histories of Bristol and Liverpool. Such an exercise is designed to provide a context for the preceding case study chapters and in doing so assist in identifying those local factors which have contributed to the formation of those coalitions responsible for cultural strategy formation.

### **2. Bristol**

Between 1945 and 1970 Bristol's development was characterised by rapid economic and population growth. During this time the city's population increased with the bulk of its employment being located in the tobacco, food, printing, aircraft and packaging manufacturing industries (Boddy et al, 1986). It is, however, important to note that between 1961 and 1969 manufacturing employment decreased by 1% and the service industries became the city's fastest growing sector in terms of employment (Boddy et al, 1986). This economic and population growth has, in part, been attributed to the construction of the Severn Bridge, the M4 and the M5 (Boddy et al, 1986).

This period in the city's history was also characterised by local political consensus, with regards to the direction of its future development. That is, both local Labour and Conservative parties as well as local business interests were convinced that Bristol's future prosperity lay in the further development of manufacturing industries. This consensus was illustrated by the city's industrial and port development policies of the day (Boddy et al, 1986). Industrial policy was characterised by the provision of serviced industrial estates near to the city centre.

In 1964 the Port of Bristol Authority<sup>1</sup>, with the backing of the National Ports Committee, local Labour and Conservative parties, the Transport and General Workers Union and the Chamber of Commerce submitted development plans (estimated to cost £27 million) to the Ministry of Transport for the redevelopment of the city's port. This proposal was rejected by the Ministry of Transport and resulted in two more smaller proposals being submitted. On the third attempt the city's proposal was accepted, however this time the City Council proposed to cover the total cost of redevelopment. Reasons for the city's determined efforts to redevelopment its port were three fold. First, Bristol's past prosperity was strongly associated with its port. Second, given that the city's past wealth was strongly associated with its port, redevelopment was seen to represent a continuation of the city's entrepreneurial past<sup>2</sup>. Thirdly, the city regarded itself as competing with Cardiff, both in terms of acquiring central government funds for the redevelopment of its port and the perceived prestige that would follow from these developments (Boddy et al, 1986:174)

This example of the Bristol's pursuit of the central government funds for the redevelopment of its port has been discussed because it highlights two features of particular interest to this research project. Firstly, the campaign for a new dock was based, not only upon notions of economic development, but the campaign was also fuelled by the presence of a common ideological goal, namely to underline the city's past achievements in maritime history and its position as a major national port. In addition, this ideological goal was strongly linked to the two interrelated areas of entrepreneurial activity and inter - city competition. Second, the pursuit of the development of the city's port reflected the presence of an alliance of local interests (between politicians and the wider local business community) which existed until the 1970's. After this point

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<sup>1</sup> This was a City Council controlled organisation.

<sup>2</sup> Here the city sought to glorify its past despite the fact that much of history and wealth has been associated with the slave trade.



consensus between local politicians and business weakened and has only recently begun to return with the creation of local economic development policies linked to culture and the arts.

It is also important to note that during this period office development within the city centre soared new motorways were built in order to link the city to the national motorway system. Between 1964 and 1967 office development occurred at a rate of 250,000 square feet per annum (Boddy et al, 1986:174). This redevelopment, in part, reflected the fact that the service industries represented the fastest growing sector in the city (Boddy et al, 1986:174). As will be seen in the next section, office development within the city centre and the way in which this was managed by the City Council provided a focal point for conflict between the council and the private sector.

During the period between 1970 and 1979 the city pursued a variety of economic development initiatives which at best can be described as being unintegrated and at worse counter productive. Bristol actively attempted to market itself to a wider international business community and to encourage the (re)location of service sector institutions within its city centre. During this period the City Council also appealed to central government for financial assistance in order to address rising economic decline and social polarisation caused by the decline of the city's traditional manufacturing base (Boddy, 1986).

Prompted by the rapid growth in its manufacturing sector during the 1960s and the expectation that this growth would continue into the 1970s, the City Council took steps to improve Bristol's transport infrastructure. Here it was believed that improving the city's link to the national motorway system through the development of an outer circuit motorway system would enhance its ability to attract and retain investment. The period between 1971 and 1978 was, however, characterised by a 14.2% decrease in manufacturing employment

within the city. During this time, service sector employment increased by 14.3% (Boddy et al: 1986).

Associated with the increase in service sector employment was the City Council's development and planning policies. Fuelled by the growth in the city's services sector, speculative development within the city centre between 1971 and 1973 soared (Bassett, 1986:175). This combination of property development, transport infrastructure development and the decline in the city's manufacturing industries provided the catalyst for conflict (Punter, 1993:522). This decline in manufacturing industries and increase in city centre property development proved to be a source of conflict between Bristol City Council and The Bristol Trades Council. Here The Bristol Trades Council argued that the decline in the city's manufacturing industries was not receiving due attention city council and that instead the city council seemed to be more concerned with speculative property development. Similarly, a strongly middle class and conservationist group attacked city centre development and transport development, claiming that it was damaging the character of the city (Boddy et al, 1986:176, Punter, 1993:522). It was not until 1973, with a change in the city's administration (from Conservative to Labour control) that property development and the construction of the motorway system was finally suspended.

In response to continuing decline in the manufacturing industries and associated high levels of unemployment, the City Council's established an Economic Development Board (consisting of representatives from trade unions, local businesses, education institutions, Avon County Council and neighbouring district councils) and an Economic Development Subcommittee. The activities of the Economic Development Board and the Economic Development Subcommittee marked a turning point in Bristol's approach to economic development. Firstly, whilst the 1960s were characterised by facilitating the expansion of the city's manufacturing base through the provision of industrial

sites and improvements to transport infrastructure, the late 1970s was characterised by a culture of fear of further manufacturing decline. The Economic Development Board sought to safeguard against further decline by attempting to meet the needs of existing industry. Secondly, the strategy recognised that the city was over-reliant upon large manufacturing enterprises. In an attempt to remedy this situation, the city's new economic development strategy sought to provide active support for small business through the provision of serviced land and premises. Thirdly, whilst previously the city had sought to protect existing manufacturing jobs and attract national and international firms by marketing itself as a historically self sufficient and entrepreneurial location worthy of investment, the city now actively pursued Intermediate Area Status. Fourth, the city's economic development strategy sought to attract inward investment in the form of electronics, pharmaceuticals and plastics industries from Germany and the USA (Boddy et al, 1996:178).

The pursuit of Intermediate Area Status was not successful and presented a course of action which almost directly contradicted the image that the city had attempted to create for itself during the previous decade. That is, whilst attempting to attract investment by means of illustrating that Bristol was a suitable site for investment (because of its infrastructure and geographical location) and using the city's past history as an example of its self - reliant entrepreneurial character, the city also lobbied for Central Government assistance. The pursuit of this assistance was tantamount to an acknowledgement that the city was entering into a state of decline from which it was unable to remove itself without aid.

Another event which occurred during the 70s which contributed to the shaping of social relations within the city is worthy of attention here. In 1977 the new dock, for which Bristol had lobbied so hard, opened. The costs of its completion, (which the City Council's had to meet in order to be granted permission to redevelop the docks) were far in excess of those anticipated,

eventually amounting to £37 million. This over expenditure placed a strain upon the City Council's relationship with the local private sector (Boddy et al, 1986)

The 1980s were characterised by continuing efforts to protect existing industry, support local small businesses, assemble serviced land for potential incoming companies and attract multinational companies (from the USA). Other features associated with Bristol's approach to local economic development were the inclusion of commercial (as opposed to industrial) development and tourism in the city's arsenal of local economic policies. As will become evident in the brief commentary that follows, these developments occurred against a backdrop of financial crisis for the City Council, and conflict within the City Council and between the City Council and the local private sector.

As a continuation of 1970's policies designed to protect the remaining manufacturing base within the city, the council offered concessions on business rates as a means of retaining and attracting large firms. Despite these measures however, and in line with earlier trends, British Leyland announced the closure of its plant in 1983 (Boddy et al, 1986:183)

Continued support for small firms remained a strong feature of local economic development policies throughout the 1980s, however the means by which this support was articulated altered slightly. Advice previously dispensed to small firms by the City Council was now left to the private sector whilst the City Council primarily focused upon the provision of serviced buildings and land for small firms (Boddy et al, 1986)

Whilst there was a continuation of policies designed to protect existing manufacturing industries, the main element of the city's approach to local economic development was that of place marketing. Here the City Council, in association with the local chambers of commerce actively sought to attract high

- tech multinational companies from the USA and Germany. The means by which multinationals were lobbied was by offering rate concessions, land at reduced prices and expressing a commitment to carry out further infrastructural development around those sites of potential interest to incoming multinationals.

Whilst commercial development had largely been suspended during the 1970s, in part, as result of the high number of vacant premises which over-development of the city centre had caused, the 1980's witnessed its revival. Given Bristol's strategically advantageous location<sup>3</sup>, the decentralisation of financial services from London and the low numbers of vacant premises existing within the city centre, the City Council allowed this development to continue. It was not until 1984, in the face of rising numbers of vacant properties, that the City Council once again suspended planning applications within the city centre. This decision and the Planning Department's strict development control policies provided the catalyst for conflict between the City Council and the city's development interests who regarded the Planning Department's development control as being driven by an anti - market philosophy. This dispute culminated in Bristol property agents producing a report in 1985 entitled 'Planning Difficulties in Bristol' which criticised planning procedure. On this issue, Punter (1993:524) notes that the city's Conservatives were strangely silent, which he takes to be an indication of their agreement with the City Council's 's planning policy.

From 1984 onwards marketing and tourism were added to the city's arsenal of local economic development tools. Tourism was encouraged by promoting the city's historical heritage, architecture and surrounding countryside. The Bristol Marketing Board (BMB), created in 1984, played a central role in promoting the

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<sup>3</sup> Here the term 'strategically advantageous location' makes reference to: Bristol's close proximity to London, its lower rental and property values in relation to London; and the fact that the city was well serviced by motorway and rail.

city as a tourist destination site<sup>4</sup>. In particular, the BMB worked alongside the English Tourist Board to create England's first maritime museum. Other projects developed by the BMB included the Maritime Heritage Park, the National Lifeboat Museum and promotional activity around the 150th anniversary of the Great Western Railway. Reflecting the City Council's turbulent relationship with the private sector, the BMB was eventually disbanded in the mid 80s due to conflict between the two parties over financing.

Despite the expansion and intensification of local economic development, the City Council came under increasing attack from district Labour party officials<sup>5</sup>. This attack from within the local Labour party was initiated by a new left alternative which, according to Bassett (1996), reflected social changes within the city which were linked to the above changes in the local economy<sup>6</sup>. In 1983 this new left alternative made clear their preferred strategy for economic development within the city. Their preferences were expressed in the form of a report entitled "A Socialist Strategy For The Labour Party in Bristol". Inspired by the actions of socialist local authorities such as the Greater London Council (GLC) and Sheffield City Council who had actively pursued policies which were seen to be an alternative approach to the Thatcherite policies of the day, this document called for a radical approach to local economic development. Here it was argued that an Enterprise Board (developed along similar lines to that of the GLC's Greater London Enterprise Board) should develop a strategy which was more complimentary to the city's skills base. In particular, the strategy document argued that economic development should focus upon those most deprived wards within the city, offer more support for indigenous industries and

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<sup>4</sup> It is important to note that the BMB was a partnership which consisted of city council and local business representative.

<sup>5</sup> It is important to note that during this period the city council was labour controlled.

<sup>6</sup> As noted in the introductory element of this chapter, continuous decline in the city's manufacturing base throughout the 1970s and 1980s resulted in a decrease in male dominated trade unionised manufacturing and a concomitant increase in female employment. In addition, an increase in employment associated with high tech and service sector industries resulted in an increase in those numbers of white collar middle class professionals. (See Meegan 1986).

encourage co-operative and community development (Boddy et al, 1986:181). Stewart (1996:124) has cogently summed up this conflict within the city's Labour party as being concerned with whether to pursue local economic development policies which are more distributive in nature or whether to simply pursue those policies which are growth oriented.

The new left alternative still represented a minority within the local Labour party. Consequently they were unable to force through most of their recommendations (Bassett, 1996:543; Boddy et al, 1986:181). Despite this it is important to note that the measures put forward by this group represented a direct criticism of what they saw as an over-emphasis upon marketing, the pursuit of multinational businesses and a disregard for those skills which existed within the locally unemployed. In addition to this, it was argued that the number and quality of jobs created as a result of tourism were unsatisfactory - that is, these jobs were strongly associated with low wages, poor job satisfaction and instability. Whilst this new left alternative had limited success in developing their ideas they have been mentioned here because they highlight the disunity which existed in the local Labour party (Boddy et al, 1986:181; Stewart, 1996:124).

It is also important to note that the pursuit of those local economic development objectives outlined above took place against the backdrop of increasing City Council financial austerity and rising debt incurred by the failing docks (Boddy et al, 1986). By 1984 this debt amounted to £55 million and, following a consultant's report, the City Council was advised to accept its losses and sell the docks and surrounding land at a premium. In relation to this, two points are worthy of note here. Firstly, both the Labour controlled City Council and the Conservative opposition rejected the idea of selling off the docks. Secondly, in an attempt to save the docks the City Council sought Enterprise Zone Status (twice), Freeport status and Development Area status. In each case plans were rejected by central government (Boddy et al, 1986).

With regards to central government - local government relations, the 1980s were characterised by conflict. In December of 1987 the Secretary of State announced that a mini Urban Development Corporations (UDC) would be established in Bristol, to the east of its city centre (Punter, 1993:529; Oatley, 1993:137). The City Council condemned the imposition of a UDC which it regarded as being a direct attempt to undermine its democratic authority (Oatley, 1993:140; Punter, 1993:531). At this point it is imprint to note that the City Council was not alone in opposing the creation of a UDC within the city. The local Chamber of Commerce and the local branch of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) both objected to having a UDC established with the city. Whilst the City Council regarded the creation of a UDC as representing a deliberate attempt to undermine its position, the local Chamber of Commerce and Confederation of British Industry believed that it would force up development prices and in doing so drive small businesses out of the UDC's designated area (Punter, 1993:529; Oatley, 1993:144). Opposition to the imposition of UDC culminated in a petition in the House of Lords in 1988. Whilst the Select Committee upheld the case for the designation of UDC within Bristol, the size of the UDC site was reduced (Punter, 1993:533; Oatley, 1993:142).

During its existence the UDC's achievements were very modest in relation to what to what it had set out to achieve. Whilst Stewart (1996:126) notes that tensions existed between the BDC and the local private sector (most notably the BCCI), its mere existence further damaged those poor relations which had long existed between the City Council and local private sector. DiGaetano (1997:856) notes that throughout its entire existence the relationship between the UDC and the City Council was 'vitriolic'.

In summary, much of Bristol's history has been characterised by fragmentation in terms of local economic policy and by conflict between competing interests.



Despite this fragmentation and competition there have been times when co-operation has occurred between local political parties and between the City Council and private sector interests. DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993:75) note that this co-operation has tended to occur around specific projects. Whilst this statement is partly true, it fails to acknowledge a history of development characterised by many attempts to act in partnership. As indicated above, such attempts date back as far as the 1960s.

### **2.1. Bristol's Local Economic Development Networks Today**

Bristol's current network of LED actors primarily consists of the City Council, Western Training and Enterprise Council, Bristol Chamber of Commerce Initiative and the Western Development Partnership. The City Council has already been discussed, consequently what follows is a brief examination of remaining key local economic development players.

The Bristol Chambers of Commerce and Initiative group represents the amalgamation of two organisations, the Bristol Initiative and the Chamber of Commerce. The Bristol Initiative is itself a partnership consisting of over 120 large firms including British Aerospace, financial companies, privatised utilities, local property developers and the Merchant Adventurers (this is a very exclusive organisation which for centuries has figured prominently in the city's social and economic history). Created in 1991 TBI was just one of many Business Leadership Teams created nationally in response to the CBI's Initiative Beyond Charity report of 1988. This report explicitly suggested that local government, in isolation, is unable to provide the leadership required to address economic decline. In addition, the CBI states that centrally imposed measures designed to address economic decline are doomed to failure unless local level support is first enlisted.

“It is simply unrealistic to expect local politicians to be able to fulfil [the] leadership role alone... If local politicians cannot normally be expected to provide the visionary leadership required, neither can central government ministers nor their departmental officials. Any worthwhile initiatives will have to be local. Solutions imposed from the centre without the support and involvement of the local community are unlikely to succeed” (CBI, 1988; c.f. Peck, 1995).

TBI was created in order to provide such a leadership function for the private sector and to participate in guiding economic activities in association with the City Council. Here the creation of TBI was:

“... a response to the perceived inadequacies of the Chambers of Commerce which, although the fourth - largest in the country, was mainly seen as representing small business in the city and as being incapable of providing an alternative source of leadership or vision.” (Bassett, 1996:544)

In 1993 the TBI merged with the Chambers of Commerce to create Bristol Chambers Commerce and Initiative (BCCI). This merger has not meant that the TBI has ceased to exist, rather it still exists but in the form of a ‘Presidents Group’ which actively engages in economic development and promotional activity on behalf of the city as a whole whilst the BCCI acts as a supportive framework a unified voice for the city’s business community (Stewart, 1996:125).

Created in 1993 Western Development Partnership (WDP), of which the BCCI is a part consists of private companies, employers’ organisations, West Tec and local councils throughout the city region. Its primary function is to co-ordinate and initiate long term economic development activities designed to secure E.C funding and selected inward investment (e.g., high - tech industries) from

overseas. Here it is important that the function of the BCCI and WDP are not taken to be the same. Whilst the BCCI functions on almost exclusively a city level, WDP has focused its attention on a wider geographical area, operating at a sub regional and occasionally regional level in the pursuit of inward investment and funding. Collectively these four actors have created 16 partnerships throughout the city, each designed to perform specific tasks. Here it is important to note that the cultural strategy partnership between the City Council, BCCI and SWA represented the first of these partnerships.

### **3. Liverpool**

The local historical and political context in which cultural strategies have emerged in the city has been divided into two parts. The first part briefly outlines those factors which have conspired to ensure that prior to 1987 local cultural policies (geared towards local economic development) were effectively ignored by the City Council until . The second part charts the gradual movement by a new council administration towards an emphasis on local economic development, partnership working and a strategic approach to cultural development geared towards economic development.

From 1945 to 1970 Liverpool's economic development was characterised by economic growth as manufacturing industries moved to the city fringes. Those manufacturing firms locating on the edge of the city were a combination of those relocating from the city centre and those who had relocated to the city in order to take advantage of regional aid. These firms typically consisted of chemical, pharmaceutical, electronic and car manufacturers and were in the main national or multinational companies (Meegan, 1989:199 - 200). This growth in manufacturing employment was accompanied by relative stability in

the city's port<sup>7</sup> which had for a long time provided a major source of casual employment for thousands.

It was not until the 1970s, with the onset of global recession sparked by the 1973 oil crisis and Britain's entry into the Common Market, that Liverpool's fortunes began to take a turn for the worse. Membership of the Common Market greatly reduced the amount of North American traffic which the port handled. Reduced North American trade combined with technological changes in transport containerisation and a slump in British ship building, led to job losses in port and port related activities (Parkinson, 1990:245). During the same period, many of the national and multinational companies which had moved to the city's fringe during those years immediately after the war closed or reduced their operations response to the recession (Meegan, 1989:207). Manufacturing and port related industries were not the only sectors to be adversely affected by recession. Meegan (1989:210) notes that the decline in port and manufacturing employment resulted in a decrease in spending power within the city which in turn resulted in a decline in the city's retail sector. As a consequence of these developments Liverpool during the 1970s and for much of the 1980's descended into a downward spiral of economic decline. As consequence of these factors the public sector became the major employer within the city. (Parkinson, 1990:246).

Sectarian local politics (with Protestants voting conservative and the Catholics voting Labour) during the 1960s had resulted in Conservative domination of the City Council. The 1970s, however, were characterised by a hung council in which the Liberals were backed by the Conservatives. The presence of this coalition administration meant that there existed no clear political leadership and as a result no clearly articulated long term economic strategy. Instead

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<sup>7</sup> Whilst the 1950s and much of 60s the port had remained relatively stable, it is important to note that its decline had commenced in the 1920s with the onset of world recession.

policies of the day reflected the city's political instability and were characterised by an emphasis on social issues designed to generate wide spread electoral support (Meegan, 1990:93; Parkinson, 1990). Given the relocation of large sections of the population from the city centre to the city's periphery during the 1950s and 1960s, an emphasis on housing issues meant that the city centre was neglected.

In 1983 a Labour council was elected to power. At this time the city's Labour Party was dominated by a strong workerist element commonly referred to as the 'Militant Tendency'. This group was committed to securing/protecting public sector jobs, prioritising the development of municipal housing and expanding public services. It was labelled anti-business by remaining business interests in the city (Parkinson, 1990:248).

The ascendancy of the Liverpool's Militant controlled City Council was the consequence of a number of factors. Firstly, housing relocation programmes had altered voting patterns which had previously been divided along Protestant/catholic lines (Meegan, 1990:93). Secondly, the exodus of both businesses and the middle classes since the 1970s had left a population characterised by high levels of unemployment (Meegan, 1990:93). Thirdly, the majority of the work force which remained in the city were either unskilled or semi - skilled and it was these groups which dominated the local unions (Meegan, 1990:93). Finally, when a Conservative central government came to power in 1979 they were firmly committed to reducing public spending (local government spending in particular) (Meegan, 1990:94). Given that employment within the city was now dominated by the public sector, these centrally imposed cuts in public spending would undoubtedly have led to job losses (Parkinson, 1990). The election of a Labour City Council, therefore, not only signalled the beginning of conflict between the City Council and remaining local private sector interests but also the beginning of a well publicised conflict between themselves and central government.

In 1987 the bitter conflict which had ensued between the City Council and central government came to an end with the Labour National Executive expelling the 'Militant Tendency' and the House of Lords disqualifying forty - seven Labour councillors from office (Parkinson & Bianchini, 1993:159). This year is significant because it marked the emergence of a new local Labour Party which took tentative steps to remove the impasse which had existed between the City Council and the private sector. In contrast to the Labour administration of old, the new Labour administration recognised the potential importance of the city centre in terms of generating employment through leisure and retail and other consumer orientated activities. Whilst it was acknowledged that the City Council was operating in an environment of financial austerity and as such was limited in how it could act, it did have control over planning issues which meant that it could play a part in the development of the city centre (Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993:160).

Moves to place the city centre, consumption oriented and place marketing strategies on the political agenda represented a recognition that the last administration's approach to development was not feasible. In addition, the City Council was sending a message to both central government and the private sector that the days of militancy and confrontation were over.

Parkinson and Bianchini (1993:160 - 161) identify two factors which influenced the City Council's interest in the leisure and cultural industries as vehicles for economic development. Firstly, the City Council's interest in cultural policy stemmed from the Merseyside Development Corporation's (MDC) relative success in converting Liverpool's Albert Docks into a visitor attraction (Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993: 160). Created in 1981, the MDC had been charged with the development of 850 acres of derelict docklands site. Pursuing a tourism led development strategy, the MDC had altered the negative image of

its area through the hosting of cultural events and the renovation of the docks. This renovation included developing a maritime museum, Granada television studios, offices, shops and accommodation for the Tate Gallery. Whilst the former Militant City Council had left the MDC board on its coming into office, the new Labour administration rejoined it. (Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993:160, Parkinson and Evans, 1990:71).

Secondly a Policy Studies Institute report entitled 'The Economic Importance of the Arts on Merseyside' was published in 1986. This report claimed that the arts directly employed over 3000 people within the city and had other indirect income and employment generating effects.

It is important to note that whilst the City Council's new found interest in the arts and cultural industries attempted to address economic concerns, it proposed to do so, in part, through social means including the improvement of access and participation, training and environmental improvements (Liverpool City Council, Interview, November 1998).

It is also important to consider the City Council's approach alongside the ideology of the Conservative central government of the day. Central government's ideology stressed the importance of the private sector in not just participating in urban policy but effectively leading it. This was combined with an approach that stressed the need for local authorities to prove that they were worthy of funding from central government. In order to do this, economic rather than social objectives had to be pursued. Eventually the benefits of these economic strategies would 'trickle down' to the wider community and in doing so address social problems. The City Council's new approach attempted to partially accommodate this ideology without wholly accepting it (for example to secure Urban Programme funding (Parkinson, 1990:253). It is clear that the City Council did not completely yield to notions of 'trickle - down'. Instead the

strategy recognised the primacy of economic development which is pursued through the harnessing and development of local resources. As indicated above, these local resources were, in part, identified as being local the population. Here emphasis on cultural training and education and the retraining of 'local talent' whilst facilitating access refers to these local resources (Liverpool City Council, interview, November 1998).

The City Council's moves towards working in partnership was further underlined in 1988 with the creation of the Merseyside Integrated Development Operation (MIDO). Established in order to facilitate the institutional co - ordination necessary for the pursuit of EU structural funds, MIDO consisted of representatives from the Chambers of Commerce, regional government offices, voluntary organisations and Merseyside's five local authorities. In 1989 Merseyside was awarded Objective Two status and with it 230 million ECU. (Boland, 1996:109).

Following the end of Objective Two funding in 1993, Merseyside was designated as an Objective One region. Regions so designated were required to prepare a Single Programming Document (SPD) which covers the funding period (in this case from 1994 to 1999). This document is supposed to be a plan or strategy which identifies those economic and social disparities existing within the region and indicates how these disparities are to be reduced. Once drafted the SPD is forwarded to the European Community and then agreed through a process of negotiation (Meegan, 1996:64). Merseyside's resulting SPD presented its vision for the region as being:

".....to establish Merseyside as a prosperous European City Region with a diverse economic base which provides access to employment for all sections within the local community, which develops people, their skills, talents and well - being, and emphasises its role as a Gateway between Europe and the rest of



the world, establishes it as a region for learning, arts and cultural excellence and innovation, and establishes it as a Region of environmental excellence that supports a high quality of life.” (Merseyside 2000, p25)

This vision was to be achieved by pursuing seven objectives These objectives were:

- investing in industry;
- investing in people;
- enhancing technology;
- pathways for integration;
- Merseyside’s role as a major gateway between European and the rest of the world;
- developing the cultural industries/media/tourism; and
- ensuring a high quality of life through sustainable development.

(Merseyside 2000, p 25)

These objectives were in turn to be pursued by focusing on five ‘drivers for change’. These five drivers for change were:

- “the key corporate sector enterprises in the region, including many world class companies;
- the home - grown small business sector, including a significant number of dynamic enterprises;
- the knowledge - based industries and advanced technologies, including environmental technologies;
- the cultural, media and leisure industries, in which Merseyside has particular strength; and
- the people of Merseyside.” (Merseyside 2000, p26)

The programme is implemented, monitored and evaluated by the Monitoring Committee whose structure includes Regional Government Offices, TECS, the five local authorities, MDC, the Chamber of Commerce, voluntary groups and the private sector. Here it is important to note that Meegan (1996:73) questions the notion of partnership upon which the Monitoring Committee was based, pointing out that the regional government office was effectively able to dominate the programme's activities.

Attention has been drawn to Merseyside's Objective One status for two reasons. Firstly because it illustrates the proliferation of organisations now playing an active role in the development of the city. TECs, Government Office, Liverpool City Council, MDC and the Chambers of Commerce are just a few of those organisations involved in the city's development. Secondly, a partnership approach represents a prerequisite to drawing down ERDF and ESF moneys. Throughout the 1990's this central requirement underpinning Objective One status has resulted in a proliferation of partnerships in a city once characterised by public private tensions and conflict with central government.

#### **4. Liverpool and Bristol Compared**

Having outlined the historical context in which both Bristol and Liverpool moved towards the use of cultural strategy as a vehicle for economic development, it is now necessary to compare and contrast these histories. Such a comparison provides a starting point from which to understand the context in which a strategic approach to culture's use as an economic development tool can be understood. That is, those similarities and differences in economic and political contexts will enable the researcher to more clearly identify those local and non-local factors which have impacted upon strategy development. The first part of this comparison will examine economic histories; the second part will examine local political responses to economic change; and the final part will focus on local - central relations.

Between 1945 and 1973 both cities' development was characterised by economic growth, although in Liverpool's case this was partly assisted through central government regional policy (Meegan, 1989:200).

The economic and political history of each city has been inescapably linked to the fortunes of their respective ports. In both cases recession in the 1970s resulted in a dramatic decline in port related activities which in turn resulted in rising unemployment. Whilst Bristol's economy was diversified, in that it was characterised by manufacturing and service industries, Liverpool's economy was much less diversified. The combination of contraction in port and manufacturing industries (characterised by the high number of national and multinational companies with little or no real stake in the economy) meant that the effects of change in world trade and recession were more strongly felt in Liverpool than in Bristol.

In contrast to Bristol and much of the UK, the services sector in Liverpool actually contracted during the 1970s and in doing so further accentuated the city's economic decline. Whilst in the 1980s Bristol had earned the title 'Sunbelt City' because of its buoyant economy, Liverpool had become the fastest declining metropolitan area in the country (OPCS, 1988 c.f. Meegan, 1990).

A comparison of local responses to economic restructuring provides two pieces of information relevant to this research project. Firstly, responses to restructuring and economic decline provide an illustration of each locality's historical-political character. Secondly, through understanding these local level responses to restructuring the researcher is better placed to understand how, if at all, past local politics have influenced present political orientation and action.

In comparison to Liverpool, Bristol's capacity to react to economic change has not been as impaired by partisan conflict during the 60s and 70s. This is not to suggest that conflict has not occurred but simply that it has not prevented the city from reacting to change. Much of the 60s and 70s were characterised by cross - party and sector co - operation in the pursuit of local economic development. Associated with this point, is Bristol's ability (unlike Liverpool), as early as 1964, to form partnerships between differing political parties and the private sector in the pursuit of economic development. This ability to act co - operatively has meant that the city has been able to respond to economic change. The opposite, however, was true of Liverpool where a decade of having no ruling majority and bitter partisan conflict had meant that the city was unable to respond to restructuring and recession to mitigate its affects.

Whilst during the 1980s both city's were run by Labour administrations the character of these administrations was very different. Liverpool for example was led by a Militant administration between 1983 and 1987. In contrast, Bristol's more traditional Labour administration was less concerned with forwarding an ideological project actively to oppose a central government hostile to left wing local authorities. Instead Bristol's Labour administrations were more concerned with advancing local economic development by any means necessary. This is not to say that an alternative, and in many ways more ideological element did not exist within Bristol's Labour party. There was such a faction but its ability to capture office and direct affairs were limited in a city which had always maintained a large middle class constituency, in part due to a diversified economy characterised by a sizeable service sector and high - tech industries. As has been indicated above, the effects of over fifteen years of economic decline in Liverpool had reduced such a middle class constituency and paved the way for militancy.

In both cities local - central relations during the 1980s were characterised by conflict. Although there exists similarities between these conflicts in terms of

their initiating factors, the ways in which they manifested themselves differed significantly. In addition, the manner in which these conflicts were resolved and their affect upon each City Council's subsequent approach to governance also significantly differs.

In both Bristol and Liverpool local - central government conflict originated from local government opposition to central government policy. In Bristol this opposition centred on the imposition of a UDC. LCC's conflict with central government centred on reductions in funding for City Council services. Such reductions threatened to thwart Liverpool City Council's attempts to generate employment through an expansion of the public sector.

It is important to note the differences in the two cities' modes of resistance. In Bristol, opposition to central government initially took the form of attempting to lobby central government directly. When this failed, the proper legal channels were used to oppose central government. Bristol's opposition to central government was concerned with attempting to maintain local autonomy. On this point it is also important to note that Bristol City Council actually had the backing of a considerable part of the city's private sector. In contrast to Bristol, Liverpool's opposition to central government was based on an attempt to advance an alternative political ideology and agenda through a process of direct conflict.

Having highlighted these differences and similarities in local history, the researcher is now better placed to more fully understand the context in which those local relationships through which strategy development has emerged. This will in turn assist in explaining how local politics in each case study site has influenced cultural strategy development.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: CULTURAL STRATEGY IN BRISTOL**

### **1. Introduction**

This chapter will concern itself with an examination of the coalition responsible for the development of Bristol's cultural strategy. This examination will be developed through the conceptual framework set out in chapter two. Specifically, this will involve: the identification of actors; an examination of how these actors were mobilised; their motives for participation in the development of strategy; and how a common sense of purpose was achieved amongst coalition members. Having developed these issues attention will then focus on how coalition members interact with one another and the type of cultural strategy created.

### **2. The mobilisation of Participants**

Bristol's moves towards the development of a cultural strategy orientated towards economic development commenced with the effects of the 1980s recession and the end of the cold war. A decrease in employment within the city's financial (4%) and aerospace sectors (23%) highlighted just how fragile these industries were and the degree to which the city's economy had become dependent upon a narrow range of industries (Bassett, 1993, 1996). Whilst highlighting the fragility of the city's economy, the recession of the 80s also led to a feeling within the city that Bristol was entering a decline.

Those reasons put forward for Bristol's perceived decline centred on the way in which the city had been managed. That is, there was a view that years of conflict between the private sector and the City Council had resulted in the city failing to compete as effectively for inward investment.

Economic decline and the debate which it initiated within the city led to the TBI approaching the City Council with a proposal of working in partnership. Here

the TBI proposed that collaboratively the City Council and private sector should combine their resources in order to raise the profile of the city in pursuit of economic growth. Cultural strategy was placed at the centre of this collaborative approach and provided a focal point about which further collaborative action in other areas could be pursued. So ultimately the TBI was responsible for initiating the development of a cultural strategy as a means of pursuing economic development. At this point it is important to note that the movement towards partnership occurred through a series of tentative steps.

From a very early stage in its introduction as a possible economic development tool it was intended that cultural policy should be used as a means of aiding place marketing, the attraction of inward investment (via attracting businesses and competing for Lottery money) and tourism. Whilst the TBI initiated the idea of pursuing the development of a cultural strategy geared towards economic development, three other factors played a significant role in shaping consensus as to the potential economic importance of the arts and culture. First, cities such as Glasgow had illustrated how cultural activities could be employed as a means of enhancing the image of a city and in doing so enhance its place marketing potential. Second, the 1986 P.S.I and 1989 Myerscough reports (both of which used Bristol as a case study site) had done much to promote the economic importance of the arts within the city. Third, on the basis of these two factors and at the prompting of the TBI, a consultancy (Boyden Southwood) was employed jointly by the City Council, TBI and South West Arts Board (SWA) to prepare a draft cultural strategy for the city.

The consultants not only created a draft cultural strategy but also presented an argument for its development. Such an argument presented examples of other cities, nationally and internationally, who had achieved relative economic success through the pursuit of cultural strategies. In addition, the report presented findings suggesting that the private cultural sector was responsible for an annual turn over of £26 million annually whilst those publicly grant aided organisations turned over £8.9 million annually. Such findings when combined

with the findings of the Myerscough and PSI report and Glasgow's relative success effectively convinced all parties concerned of the economic potential which lay in the development of a cultural strategy.

The Boyden Southwood report led to the creation of the Bristol Cultural Development Partnership (BCDP) in 1993. This partnership included Bristol City Council, BCCI, SWA and a community arts group known as Action for Community Arts Network (ACAN). Its remit was simply to raise the profile of the city through the development of the arts and culture. At the time of interviewing, the BCDP had initiated or participated in the development of a number of projects. These projects included a one - week stage and street festival, 'The Legible City Initiative' (a project focusing on developing and highlighting the quality of the city centre.) and the Brief Encounters Film Festival (this is an international film festival focusing on animation). Other projects include, 'The City Centre Then and Now'. This was a project designed to highlight the city centre's historical development. The most publicised of these projects was the Harbourside Centre, a £300000 project which includes the Centre for Performing Arts (CPA) and a wildlife and science centre<sup>1</sup>.

Whilst the Boyden Southwood report provided initial ideas as to how the cultural sector could be employed as a vehicle for place - marketing, the partnerships ideas for implementation were limited. At the time:

" They didn't have a clue." (BCDP Executive Officer, June 1997)

### **3. Motivation for Participation in Cultural Strategy**

Prior to discussing how a common sense of purpose was achieved amongst the four partners it is first necessary to advance our understanding of how partners were mobilised. In order to do this it is necessary to consider why each member chose to participate in a partnership concerned with cultural policy and local economic development. BCC's motivation for participation in partnership is

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<sup>1</sup> For a more comprehensive list of those projects worked on by BCDP see appendix. 3



clear. BCC's depressed financial situation and their limited experience and knowledge of how to employ culture and the arts meant that a partnership approach was regarded as essential. In this context partnership was primarily concerned with enhancing BCC's capacity to act.

South West Arts is one of ten Regional Arts Boards in England and its geographical focus is centred around Dorset, Devon, Cornwall, Somerset and Gloucestershire. Whilst Regional Arts Boards are strongly associated with the dispensing of grants their remit also includes working in partnership with other organisations in order to ensure the delivery and support of the arts and culture in its widest sense. Whilst SWA's motivation for participating in partnership ultimately reflects this organisation's wish to enhance its capacity to shape and strengthen cultural support within the city, more symbolic ends are also served. First, enhanced capacity to act, as facilitated through participation in BCDP, moves SWA closer to establishing its effectiveness in supporting the arts and cultural industries regionally. Here the executive officer summarises the situation by stating:

*"Bristol is the biggest city in the South West. If SWA were unable to address Bristol then they wouldn't be able to tackle anywhere so they wanted to make sure that Bristol was a leading arts city."* (Executive Officer of BCDP, June 1997)

Second, prior to the creation of the BCDP SWA had widely been criticised by Bristol's arts community for not being located in what is the largest city in the South West. There existed a sentiment that the SWA had little interest in the city. By becoming a member of BCDP SWA moved some way towards countering the claims that they had shown little interest in Bristol. In this sense SWA participation in BCDP and the assistance given to the City Council symbolises the Arts Board's commitment to the city.

Action for Community Arts Network (ACAN) is a community organisation consisting of over 250 local artists. Its role is to provide information and technical support for its members as well as providing a forum through which its members can express their needs. ACAN is funded by Bristol City Council, South Gloucestershire, North Somerset and Bath City Council. In the case of Bristol City Council and South Gloucestershire District Council the organisation is revenue funded. That is, ACAN receives funding on the basis of it performing certain pre - stated tasks. The organisation is monitored by these local authorities on a biannual basis. Deviation away from these pre - stated functions may result in ACAN's funding being withdrawn. ACAN also receives revenue funding from SWA and is able to generate capital through membership fees. Other than to ensure that any benefits to be gained from cultural strategy are reflected at the community level this organisation does not appear to have any strategic goals in relation to the partnership.

Given that the BCDP has always been concerned with place marketing and that this approach is largely at odds with ACAN's more community orientated approach to the arts and culture, it is believed that this organisation's participation is linked to its funding. As a result of ACAN being funded by BCC and SWA failure to participate in BCDP would undoubtedly have an effect on their future funding. ACAN's participation within the BCDP is, in part, a reflection of its need to safeguard its position by being at the centre of the Bristol's cultural strategy making network. In addition, whilst ACAN has little alternative than to participate in BCDP such participation also affords an elevated status for an organisation which prior to BCDP formation occupied a position of relative obscurity.

The BCCI's motivation for participating in the development of a cultural strategy is similar to that of the City Council. That is, to raise the profile of the city nationally and internationally by raising the profile of the arts and culture. At this point however, it is important to consider the rationale for the creation of the TBI, which was to fulfil a leadership function for the city's private sector and to

use this leadership function to play a greater role in urban governance. So whilst the City Council is employing a cultural strategy as a means of addressing those economic ills present within Bristol and (re)establishing its ability to act (i.e., govern within its locality), the BCCI appears to be employing a cultural strategy as a means of indirectly safeguarding its members' business interests i.e., increasing their profits.

In addition to this, given that a cultural strategy was the first policy area in which partnership was created, the BCCI's successful participation in such a partnership has enabled the BCCI to establish other partnerships with the City Council. These other partnerships are concerned with everything from local economic development to the provision of social housing and have therefore enabled the BCCI to establish its presence as a major actor in urban governance. To this end the private sector's participation not only serves a practical economic role but also a symbolic and political one. In articulating reasons for the BCCI's participation in a cultural strategy the BCCI's representative is very careful to do so in very general terms.

#### **4. How a Common Sense of Purpose was Achieved**

In order to chart how a common sense of purpose is achieved it is necessary to explore the relationships between the members of the BCDP.

##### **4.1. The relationship between BCCI and the City Council**

Whilst reasons for BCCI's participation have been loosely identified by the City Council, amongst SWA and ACAN representatives there still exists a degree of confusion as to why it is that the private sector is taking such an active role in the development of a cultural strategy. For example when City Council representatives were asked what they thought the BCCI's motivations were for being so actively involved in cultural strategy development three groups of responses were given. The first suggested that the BCCI genuinely feels that it has a sense of responsibility for the economic and social development of the city.

The second suggests that the BCCI in some way gains prestige from working with and alongside the City Council. It is important to note that none of the respondents were able to explain why this sense of prestige was so important to the BCCI that it was willing to spend in excess of £20, 000 each year in order to attain it. The third suggests that raising the city's profile via cultural provision was ultimately good for business from the BCCI's viewpoint. Interestingly all those City Council representatives interviewed expressed their belief that the BCCI was acting largely in an altruistic manner. Similarly, no interviewees interpreted BCCI participation as a means of them [BCCI] establishing a role for themselves in urban governance. Instead City Council representatives saw the BCCI less as occupying a governing role and more as assisting the City Council in the pursuit of their own objectives. Despite this inability to identify concrete reasons for BCCI participation each City Council representative was eager to stress how amicable the working relationship between themselves and the BCCI was.

In the same way that the City Council representatives were unable to identify concrete reasons behind BCCI's participation neither was the SWA representative. The major point of difference between the City Council's and the SWA's representatives response was that SWA's representative was not hesitant in airing his open distrust of the BCCI. This distrust stemmed from the fact that the BCCI had never explicitly stated the reasons for its involvement in cultural strategy development.

"The slight difficulty is the role of the private sector in terms of what drives the BCCI in funding partnership. This is a very interesting question. What do they get out of it? I know what we get out of it. I can see very clearly what the City Council gets out of it in terms of prestige and profile and the private sector probably gets a bit of that and benefits from increased numbers of visitors, but I've never really talked to them about that." (SWA Director of Regional Services, June, 1997)

The degree to which each partner attempts to convey an image of mutual trust and co-operation within the BCDP may provide an indication not only of the partnership's stability but also of the level of commitment of each partner. Both BCCI and the City Council's conveyance of an image of partnership based upon trust and co-operation indicates that these two organisations value and wish to protect the BCDP. Similarly, SWA's willingness to air its distrust of the BCCI may indicate its lack of commitment to the partnership relative to the City Council and BCCI. Alternatively the BCCI and City Council's conveyance of unity and purpose may reflect the state of relations between these two bodies. That is, cultural strategy may reflect a focal point about which improved relations between the City Council and private sector has occurred which is reflected in responses to the above question. Similarly, both the City Council and BCCI's responses may represent a wish to protect either the relationship or partnership so far constructed. When considered in this way, SWA's willingness to openly question BCCI's motives may reflect this organisation's [SWA] lack of local dependence upon the city. That is, whilst the City Council and BCCI's focus of concern is with the economic and social well-being of the city SWA's remit is geographically wider but functionally narrower.

Given the level of distrust shown towards the private sector in the past by the City Council, the BCCI have attempted to gain the confidence of the Council. This task has been addressed incrementally since the BCCI's inception to the present time. This process of building trust has occurred in a number of ways. First, it was the TBI's chairman, John Savage, who approached the City Council and called for a partnership approach towards addressing the city's economic problems. At this point it is important to remember that the BCDP was the first partnership between the City Council and the BCCI to be created in the city. This strengthens the suggestion that BCCI's involvement in a cultural strategy reflects this policy areas suitability in acting as a focal point for conflict mediation between the City Council and the private sector.

Second, from an early stage in John Savage's contact with the City Council he made it be known that he considered himself to be both a Christian and a Socialist. This revelation had the effect of reducing senior City Councillors' suspicions of both Mr Savage and the TBI. In fact following these initial points of contact the City Council was willing to work with the TBI on a one - off project. This project was concerned with the organisation of a festival designed to commemorate the 500th anniversary of John Cabot's sailing to Newfoundland. Having worked on this project and observing that the TBI were willing to fill any resource gaps within the partnership the relationship between the two bodies gradually improved.

More recently the BCCI has expressed this commitment to working in partnership alongside the City Council in the development of a cultural strategy by coming to their [the City Council's] financial aide. That is, prior to the creation of the BCDP, SWA made it clear that their levels of funding for the partnership would decrease over a five year period<sup>2</sup>. SWA's anxiety over the lack of strategic direction, until recently, exhibited by the BCDP meant that they had not deviated from this plan. The effects of these reductions upon the effective functioning of the BCDP have been exacerbated by the fact that the City Council has been and still is struggling financially. This has meant that they have also had to reduce their levels of financial support for the BCDP. Rather than allowing the BCDP to slip into decline the BCCI came to the aide of the partnership by not only delivering its usual levels of funding but also contributing more in order to account for the reduction in City Council spending. In doing so the BCCI has not only kept the BCDP afloat but has also underlined its commitment to working in partnership.

Due to the fact that the cultural strategy is being developed via a partnership in which the private sector invests more (financially) than the City Council, at a first glance it would appear that the City Council is being financially subsidised to undertake a task which many arts/cultural organisations feel they should

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<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that the BCDP's initial life span was set at five years.

naturally do as part of their role. The City Council however, is the democratically elected representative of the city and therefore is empowered to act on behalf of the city. This is a key resource which BCCI clearly recognises, as can be seen from those quotes below:

“... they [BCCI] do tread quite carefully, they are quite sensitive. They don't come in on hind leg and say we can do it, get out of our way City Council. We were able to get on and it didn't feel like we were being pushed out. It wasn't done like that but it could have been and I'm sure it was in other places.”  
(Councillor Pat Roberts, Bristol City Council, June, 1997)

“ One of the interesting things is that the private sector through the BCCI and also ourselves never try to supplant the role of the local authority...Out of the three organisations that set up the partnership [BCDP], it's the local authority that dictates the direction of the partnership but this is the case because that's how the partnership wants it to be.” (Executive Officer of BCDP, June 1997)

“We are very aware of the importance of local government in that they are the elected representatives but we can bring business alongside to add to that extra resource. In a way I think they feel comfortable with having that relationship.” (Nicola Rylance, BCCI, August 1997)

Similarly, the BCCI's ability to participate in urban governance rests largely upon its access to financial resources and its representation of the city's business community. As stated previously the BCCI is keen to participate in urban governance for those reasons listed above. If then one considers these three factors (i.e., democratic legitimacy, financial resources and representation) as being resources controlled separately by the two parties then it becomes possible to identify a symbiotic relationship. That is, in light of those centrally determined financial restraints imposed upon the City Council, acquiring access to the BCCI's financial resources further empowers it to govern. Similarly, the BCCI is able to participate in urban governance by

establishing a link with those democratically elected representatives of the city. So here a relationship based upon reciprocity had been developed about a cultural strategy in which there exists a common over-arching aim, namely to raise the profile of the city via the arts and culturally related activities.

#### **4.2. The relationship between SWA and BCCI**

Prior to 1991 SWA had a Business Development Director based in Bristol whose job it was to foster links with the private sector in order generate capital to fund a SWA operated project called Business In The Arts. As a result of reductions in expenditure this office was forced to close in 1991. Now the SWA's contact with the business community in Bristol is largely limited to the BCDP.

Given the lack of prior contact between the BCCI and SWA, the SWA representative still maintains that within the parameters of the BCDP that the BCCI and themselves have a good working relationship. Here the SWA representative attributes this good working relationship to the fact that both SWA and BCCI possess the sort of rigorous business planning that they would each expect their respective partners in any venture to have. According to the SWA representative, the presence of a rigorous business plan is vital in the development of any shared strategic goal. In this context a sound business plan constitutes a clear understanding of why it is that each participant is a member of a partnership, what each member's role within that partnership is and how the pursuit of this goal is to occur.

Despite the SWA representative maintaining that there exists a healthy working relationship between themselves and the BCCI, he was still unable to clearly identify BCCI's motivation for participating so actively in the BCDP. This inability means that whilst SWA may claim to have a good working relationship with BCCI they are none the less extremely sceptical of the BCCI as a partner. This scepticism has been heightened by BCCI's gesture in meeting the City



Council's funding obligations. So whilst SWA recognises BCCI's commitment to the partnership they are unable to explain this commitment.

In the same way that the relationship between BCCI and the City Council can be described as being symbiotic so can the relationship between SWA and BCCI. The significant point of difference between the two relationships is that both SWA and BCCI have a much clearer understanding of those resources being exchanged. As stated previously, SWA is the organisation within the BCDP with the greatest expertise in working closely with cultural organisations and arts projects. A strategic approach towards cultural development as it relates to economic returns was a previously unexplored area for all parties concerned with the exception of SWA. In this context SWA's expertise in cultural planning geared towards economic returns represents an important resource necessary for the development of a cultural strategy. Regardless of whether the BCDP existed, SWA would still have to pursue its predetermined objectives, namely to elevate the profile of the arts regionally.

So whilst SWA brings its expertise in dealing with cultural organisations to this two way partnership (i.e., between SWA and BCCI), the BCCI contributes capital. In doing so the BCCI is assisting SWA in the pursuit of its own objectives. So once again a reciprocal exchange of individually controlled resources can be identified.

#### **4.3. The relationship between SWA and the City Council**

As far as the SWA representative is concerned SWA's relationship with the City Council is an extremely good one.

"I think our links with the City Council are extremely good and that operates at all different levels." (Chris Humpheries, Director of Regional Services, SWA, June 1997)

As is the case with the relationship between the City Council and BCCI, the relationship between the City Council and SWA has taken time to construct. Although there is no history of hostility between the council and SWA there still existed a degree of apprehension as to whether or not it would be possible for the two organisations to work together. This apprehension largely stemmed from the fact that prior to the creation of the BCDP these two organisations had little contact with one another.

The unifying factor between the City Council and SWA was the fact that, prior to the creation of the BCDP, SWA had funded most of the cultural organisations that the City Council had traditionally supported. So there was and still is a degree of overlap in terms of their activities. In addition to this, prior to the development of the partnership SWA didn't simply fund these organisations at arms length. Instead SWA was concerned that the funding of these organisations would result in an improvement in the quality of services provided, which is part of its remit. Consequently, SWA's funding of arts organisations involves monitoring progress and where necessary offering advice and relevant information. So the overall aim of SWA's contact with its clients in the city was to ensure the presence of well run and supported cultural organisations. It was the realisation that both organisations were working towards the same goal but failing to co-ordinate their activities that facilitated their mutual co-operation. At this point it is necessary to make a note of SWA's motivations for wanting to work with the City Council in partnership. In doing so those resources held by the City Council which are necessary for the pursuit of SWA's objectives can be identified.

*"...our mission statement is to raise the standard of the arts in the South West and make it [the arts] available to the widest possible audience. That is our mission statement and we do it by partnership, partly because we have to because we haven't got enough money to do it on our own. Secondly, because local authorities actually spend more on the arts in England collectively than the Regional Arts Boards and Arts Council. So local authorities are very important*

*players in the arts. They have got a lot of money and a lot of time and effort and they have that local democratic link that we as a regional body don't have.”(Chris Humpheries, Director of Regional Services, SWA, August 1997)*

In the above quote the Director of Regional Services for SWA identifies a desire on SWA's part to co-ordinate spending on the arts in Bristol with that of the City Council in an attempt to more effectively pursue their own objectives. In addition the City Council's role as the democratic representative of the city is also identified as being a resource necessary for the pursuit of SWA's own objectives.

Once the BCDP was created the City Council was quick to realise that SWA would allow it access to their expertise in the cultural field. For example, the Director of Regional Services co- managed the City Council's arts policy and also spent a great deal of time in helping council officers develop their own arts and funding strategy. As is the case with the relationship between SWA and BCCI and the relationship between BCCI and the City Council, SWA and the City Council also share or exchange their individually controlled resources. In this case SWA lends the City Council its expertise in dealing with arts/cultural organisations whilst the City Council provides SWA with the democratic link which assists it in the pursuit of its own objectives.

Representatives from both the City Council and SWA freely admit that the forum provided by the BCDP has led to the realisation that there was a degree of overlap between the two organisations' overall objectives. It was this realisation that in turn led to both organisations working together, both within and beyond the parameters of the BCDP. For example Councillor Roberts sits on the board of SWA whilst the SWA Director of Regional Services now sits on the City Council's arts panel so allowing each to observe activity within the other's organisation as well as exerting a greater degree of influence over that organisation's activities. In the case of the relationship between SWA and the City Council reciprocity extends to the partial sharing of board members.

“As far as SWA is concerned I think the BCDP was responsible for a much better relationship with them [SWA], because before that they were a funding body that we didn’t have very much connections with. They just gave money to the same places as we gave money to and we didn’t have people on their board. It was only when I got a place on their board that we got much closer together and that came about via the BCDP. I was adamant that I wanted to be on the board of SWA which I am. Now we work on a lot of things. So it was a gradual evolving process and we found that neither of us had two heads. So it simply developed from there.” (Councillor Pat Roberts, Bristol City Council, June 1997)

Whilst SWA assisted the City Council in the development of its own arts plan and funding strategy it is important to note that this may not simply a gesture of good will or mutual co-operation. Rather ulterior motives may lie at the heart of SWA’s actions. Since the BCDP’s inception SWA has been concerned that the City Council has lacked a clear strategy for the arts and culture. That is, whilst the City Council’s general aim has been to elevate the profile of the city’s arts and cultural institutions, the council has lacked a plan for how this was to be achieved. According to SWA the lack of clarity exhibited by the City Council in terms of what it was trying to achieve and how, has meant that until recently, the partnership has been unable to function strategically. Instead the BCDP has operated in a largely opportunistic manner. The lack of strategic direction exhibited by the BCDP has meant that SWA, until recently, has been unable to pursue its objectives in a clearly structured way.

“When it [the BCDP] first started it was unequal from the policy strategy point of view on the basis that SWA entered the partnership with a regional plan for the arts if you like and certainly a sense of what the key issues facing us in Bristol were. The City Council entered the partnership with a similar sense of anticipation but the City Council did not have its own plan for the arts and culture which it could bring to the partnership..... So right from the beginning the

partnership was not based on equals in terms of each of the partners knowing clearly why they were there.” (Chris Humpheries, SWA, June 1997)

In this context SWA's assistance in developing the council's own arts and funding strategy has provided a means of ensuring that the council had in place its own strategic framework. The presence of such a strategic framework, it was felt, would guide the actions of the council. Since the creation of the council's cultural strategy the City Council has begun to operate strategically and this strategic perspective has been fed into the BCDP so ensuring that the council now functions effectively within the partnership. That is, shaping the actions of the partnership rather than simply endorsing BCDP actions as suggested by the BCDP's executive officer.

By attaching such great importance to the need for the City Council to take more of an informed role in shaping the BCDP's activities. SWA's actions further underlines that which the actions of the BCCI suggests. Namely that great importance is attached to the partnership being able to claim access to democratic representation.

#### **4.4. The relationship between ACAN and the City Council**

ACAN's relationship with the City Council like that of BCCI and SWA has developed over time. Both within and external to the boundaries of the BCDP, ACAN's relationship with the council is characterised by an exchange of resources. ACAN is funded by the council because this organisation's activities aides the council in the pursuit of its own cultural strategy. That is, ACAN not only represents the collective interests of the arts community in the city but also provides training, information and an advocacy function for its membership. So ACAN's activities provides a means of practical support for the very organisations that the council is supposedly enabling in support of its own cultural strategy (NB: not the BCDP's cultural strategy). In this equation ACAN's representation of the arts community, access to community arts information and practical arts related training are resources useful for cultural strategy

development. Similarly the City Council's funding of ACAN is also a resource. The main point of difference between ACAN's relationship with the council and other relationships within the BCDP is that ACAN's relationship with the council is best described as one between subordinate and superior. This is the case because whilst ACAN can be said to be in possession of important resources, these resources are not ultimately vital for the development of either the council's or BCDP's cultural strategy. On the other hand although ACAN is not solely funded by the council, the council funding is vital for the functioning of this organisation on the level seen at the time of interviewing.

#### **4.5. The relationship between ACAN and SWA**

Both ACAN and SWA realise that their roles within the city compliment one another rather than being in direct competition with one another. Whilst SWA is concerned with the promotion of the arts and culture and audience development on a regional level, ACAN is more concerned with community development within the city. As stated earlier Bristol is the largest city in the South West and as such represents a major priority for SWA. ACAN's activities (in an indirect way) act as a means of promoting the arts and culture within communities and therefore within the city as a whole. Similarly, by promoting the arts within communities ACAN is participating (albeit indirectly) in audience and artist development and in doing so assists SWA in the pursuit of its objectives. In recognition of the complimentary position that ACAN occupies in relation to their own, in 1996 SWA funded ACAN's employment of an information officer to collect and distribute information relating to arts development and training. SWA is so convinced of ACAN's importance as a art organisation able to compliment its own activities that it is eager to see ACAN develop into a regional organisation. In this case ACAN's ability to address community arts development and its database on artists within the city is viewed by SWA as a resource needed to pursue its goals in a more effective manner. Similarly SWA's funding of ACAN is necessary to achieve its own objectives.

Once again this relationship cannot be described as being a partnership in the true sense of the word. Instead it reflects a relationship between subordinate and superior. Despite this, ACAN's relationship is less one sided than that which exists between the City Council and ACAN. This is reflected by the fact that SWA not only provides revenue funding for ACAN but has also been willing to expand on this funding (i.e., funding the employment of an Information Officer for ACAN).

#### **4.6. The relationship between ACAN and BCCI**

ACAN's involvement with the BCCI is limited solely to the BCDP and the Voluntary Sector Standing Conference on Regeneration (VOSCAR). Outside the confines of these two established city based partnerships ACAN has no other contact with the BCCI, although ACAN is keen to establish a closer relationship with the BCCI on the same level as that which exists with SWA and the City Council. Whilst ACAN's eagerness to establish closer links with the BCCI could be interpreted as a wish to gain access to the BCCI's major resource (namely finance) the BCCI's lack of interest in establishing such links indicates that (at the time of interviewing) ACAN is not in possession of any resources needed by the BCCI in order pursue its objectives.

From the preceding review of those relationships on which the BCDP is based it is clear that the City Council is the lead organisation due to its democratic status. By publicly presenting the City Council as the lead organisation within the partnership all members of the BCDP are able to make a deliberate political statement. The City Council for example is able to publicly illustrate its ability to act in an attempt to combat the economic decline of the city despite the fact that it has and still is operating under conditions of financial austerity. Similarly, BCCI is able to address those problems afflicting its membership whilst being seen to be working and enlisting the support of the City Council.

SWA on the other hand is able to address those criticisms which were levelled against them during the early 1990s (that they were not showing enough

interest in the city's arts community). Whilst making this public statement SWA is also able to raise the profile of the arts in the city through the BCDP's pursuit of high profile flagship developments. This is achieved whilst simultaneously avoiding being accused, as the City Council is, of supporting these developments at the expense of established and community art forms. SWA achieves this by being a member of BCDP, supporting the viewpoint that the City Council should be the lead organisation within BCDP and ensuring that its funding of the partnership does not result in an abdication of its responsibilities towards established arts organisations in the city<sup>3</sup>. So each partners' adherence to this norm upon which partnership is partially based (namely that the City Council should be the lead organisation), not only assists in ensuring the continued existence of the BCDP but also acts as a means of allowing each partner to justify their actions and protect their own political agendas.

Adherence to this norm also reflects those political agendas of each partner and the past history of this locality. As described earlier, the 80s were characterised by conflict between (the then) traditional Labour City Council and central government and the private sector<sup>4</sup>. The end product of this conflict was that the City Council developed a distrust of the private sector. Development interest's public criticisms of the council's development policies, the imposition of a UDC and TEC as well as decreases in the local authority's budget have all combined to undermine the council's ability to govern. Together with the social affects associated with the economic shock from the recession of the late 80s, all these factors have had a role to play in influencing the structure and relationships upon which the BCDP is based.

"The City Council had a tendency not to work with partners in Bristol. In Bristol all you had was the Bristol Development Corporation, which was a disaster.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference to established arts organisations makes direct reference to those larger arts organisations which SWA and the City Council have traditionally funded.

<sup>4</sup> On this point it is important to note that this conflict was punctuated by consistent attempts by the private sector and City Council to co - operate on issues concerned with local economic development.



The City Council in fact went to appeal against the Development Corporation because of the land they were given and they went right the way to the House of Lords. The Bristol Development Corporation failed. ...The relationship between the BDC and the City Council was very bad. ...The Council now works much more pragmatically and pro - actively with the private sector. You really can't get much done in Bristol now if you don't involve both these sectors." (Executive Officer of BCDP, June 1997)

In the above quote the head of the BCDP explicitly identifies the city's past experiences as influencing the structure and relationships present within the BCDP. As the above commentary suggests, these past conflicts lay at the heart of the City Council's position as lead organisation despite the fact that it is neither the initiator, the major financial contributor nor the most knowledge- rich member of the BCDP. Similarly the BCCI's commitment to funding the BCDP despite the City Council's lack of strategic direction and financial contributions reflects the BCCI's recognition of a response to past hostilities within the city. So here the BCCI's commitment to partnership can in part be interpreted as an attempt to foster long term fruitful relationships with the City Council in the pursuit of economic development objectives.

In contrast to the BCCI, SWA's tendency to make no secret of its distrust of the BCCI and its criticisms of the City Council highlights this organisation's dependence upon the city and those institutional relations within. That is, SWA formerly played no part in the city's past conflicts between private and public sectors. In addition SWA is concerned with the entire region as opposed to simply the city. These two factors allow this organisation to pursue a mode of operation within the partnership which, in relation to BCCI and the City Council, panders less to the legacy of past conflicts and local political agendas.

#### **4.7. Politics of Exclusion**

An examination of whether and how certain actors are excluded from the decision making process provides an indication of those political forces predominantly shaping the BCDP's actions from within. The results of this investigation suggest that community members of the board are marginalised from the decision making process. This exclusion of ACAN from the decision making process is linked to those resources held by ACAN, the place marketing role of BCDP and its representatives' experience of working with high profile, well resourced organisations and the absence of clear strategic objective. SWA's Director of Regional Services has identified the exclusion of ACAN from decision making on the board:

“They [ACAN] are marginalised completely which is usually the case in these situations because you have the professionals on the board,( i.e., the business people and the City Council) who are driving their own political agendas.” (SWA Director of Regional Services, August 1997)

Here the SWA representative points to the ACAN representatives' inexperience in working alongside high profile organisations such as the City Council, SWA and BCCI. ACAN's ability to directly influence action is also linked to the fact that, unlike the BCCI, SWA and to a lesser extent the City Council, they do not have a clear strategic goal to work towards. Because they are all pursuing their own strategic goals the other partners are able, to varying degrees, to manipulate the direction of the partnership in the pursuit of these goals. This pursuit of individual organisations' goals is heightened by the fact that at the time of interviewing the BCDP lacked a clearly define strategy.

“You have a strange mismatch of people all on the board and driven by their own agendas and it comes back to the fact that if there isn't a central agenda or strategy on the board it can be turned around and moved and shifted by personalities on the board...It is primarily the key business members on the

board who are articulate, competent and relaxed in that situation who can make the best of it.” (SWA Director of Regional Services, August 1997)

Similarly it has already been established that ACAN holds resources which are of secondary importance in terms of being necessary to achieve the BCDP’s general strategic goal (i.e. to raise the profile of the city by raising the profile of the arts/culture). These secondary resources translate into weak political or bargaining power which is reflected in the organisation’s inability to guide the actions of the BCDP.

Combined with their inexperience of working with such resource rich, therefore politically powerful organisations, and the fact that there is no clearly defined central agenda it is possible to envisage how ACAN is excluded from active participation. This lack of influence shown by ACAN is acknowledged, albeit indirectly, by the City Council, BCCI and ACAN itself. For example when asked about the membership of the BCDP both the City Council and BCCI only make reference to themselves and SWA. There was no mention of ACAN at all. During the course of the interviews conducted with both the City Council and BCCI it was up to the interviewer to make reference to ACAN. This indicates that representatives from both the City Council and BCCI did not view ACAN as representing an active player within the partnership. Similarly when the chief executive of ACAN was asked about the role of ACAN on the BCDP board the reply was:

“I think it’s a big problem. ...I think there is a problem. I think that Bristol is wanting a national and international reputation and the BCDP was initially mainly looking at doing that by big events rather than developing the grass roots initiatives.” (ACAN Chief Executive, August 1997)

The ACAN representative’s statement makes it quite clear that there is a problem in terms of community representation within the BCDP and this problem can only be attributed to the decisions taken at board meetings. This

raises issues of access and equity within such a cultural strategy. Whilst the City Council, BCCI and the BCDP's Chief executive are quick to state that the BCDP is concerned with equity and access there is to date very little evidence to suggest that this is the case. Furthermore, if access to decision making is restricted for community representatives on the board then how does this translate into issues of access and equity within the resulting cultural strategy.

“They come along but don't say anything. It's not their fault, again it goes back to this notion of boards generally. To what extent people invited to join a particular board or committee are given a full and proper induction as to why they should be on the board, what's the function of the board and what is their function. In my own view there isn't access and equity on the board and the reasons for this is that there isn't a strong induction, a process by which all are brought up to the level where they can all go it with each other. By not doing that that reinforces the exclusivity of the board..... Without being too cynical, at the moment I think that's the situation that the board quite likes because they can conduct business in a way that suits them without having to worry about what all those other artists think.” (SWA Director of Regional Services, August 1997)

Analysis of ACAN's inability to influence the partnership's actions and its sources of funding suggest that ACAN's membership on the BCDP board is less to do with sharing the ideas of the other partners and more to do with material incentives to be gained through its membership. The BCCI and SWA's adherence to the rule of not supplanting the City Council's authority has already been identified as being a norm present within the partnership which assists in its continued survival. This norm is one which exists between all constituent elements of the BCDP. ACAN's inability to affect the direction of the partnership and its reluctance to attempt to do so reflects another norm.

ACAN's adherence to this norm and its membership of the BCDP is believed to be strongly associated with the material incentive to be gained by doing so.

This material incentive is funding from both the council and SWA. So if ACAN has little or no direct input into decisions made by the BCDP then why were they invited to be members? Given the evidence so far it would be reasonable to suggest that ACAN's mere presence on the BCDP acts as a justification of the partnership's activities. That is, if there is community representation on the board, albeit largely symbolic, then the council and BCCI are able to justify the actions of the BCDP as being beneficial for the city as a whole. So the presence of community representation serves as a buffer to criticisms of ignoring community needs in favour of the private sector's (local and non - local) needs.

#### **4.8. The Role of BCDP's Executive Officer**

Until 1997 the executive officer has managed to have a major impact on the direction taken by the BCDP and his ability to do so has been linked to five factors. First, the executive officer was fully aware that it is the City Council which largely dictated the direction of the partnership. That is, the council is the organisation with the greatest ability to veto decisions taken by the BCDP board. Second, the executive officer was also aware of why this was the case.

Third, the executive officer has also identified the relationship between the council and BCCI as being the closest in the partnership relative to other members. Fourth, relative to members of the board, with the exception of SWA, the executive officer's knowledge of cities' past and present cultural strategies and those grants and funds available for culturally oriented activities is such that he is able to state authoritatively what the BCDP's activities should involve. Finally, the absence of a coherent strategic plan to guide those actions of the partnership has meant that, until recently, the executive officer has been able largely to guide its activities.

Given that the City Council represents the most influential member of the BCDP and that neither the council, BCCI nor ACAN are as *aufait* with cultural strategies as the executive officer, he has been able to authoritatively suggest

courses of action. Two incidents in particular have been largely responsible for shaping the executive officer's relationship with the board and in doing so has underlined his ability to strongly influence and at times dictate BCDP actions.

The first incident surrounds the development of a film festival of national significance for the city. In 1994, shortly after the executive officer was appointed, the director of Aardman Animations (a Bristol based television and cinematic company) was informed by the directors of the Brief Encounters Film Festival that they wished to move the festival from Cardiff and back to Bristol. In order to do so however, it was made clear that Bristol would have to bid for the festival which would involve raising £30000. Realising that the City Council was undergoing a period of financial austerity the director of Aardman Animations approached the executive officer of the BCDP in order to seek financial assistance. As a result of the city having been invited to bid for the festival the executive officer was confident of success. Believing that such a festival would act as a suitable vehicle for marketing the city as well as generating increased capital through increased numbers of visitors the executive officer convinced the partnership to donate £60000. At a late stage in the bidding process however, the organisers raised the amount of funds required in order to host the festival. Unable to raise extra capital Bristol withdrew from the bidding process. So three months after having been employed by the BCDP the executive officer was faced with the embarrassing situation of having raised £60000 (of which 50% was retainable in the event of failure). Following the failed bid the director of Aardman Animations suggested that as a damage limitation exercise Bristol should use the remaining £30000 to set up a film festival in direct competition to the Brief Encounters film festival which remained in Cardiff. This is exactly what happened and in its first year the festival was so successful that it was decided to run it as an annual event. In fact the film festival has proven to be so successful that now its total budget has increased to £80000 through contributions from SWA, South West Media Development Agency, the British Film Institute and private sponsors.

In a similar fashion the executive officer put forward the idea of Bristol making a bid for Millennium Project Funds which would result in the development of a wildlife and science centre<sup>5</sup>.

“They didn’t know about the Millennium project. It was only when we [executive officer and his assistant] arrived that we put forward the view of bidding for it and that was the tester. ....No one believed that we would have a Millennium project. We put forward the view, in fact my own board was not that keen on it at first, but we pushed and pushed because we knew it could be delivered and it was.”(Executive Officer of BCDP, August 1997)

The successful development of these two projects despite board members’ initial wishes not to proceed, effectively secured the executive officer’s status as being the primary initiator and director of BCDP activities. Board members are all in agreement as to the central role which the executive offers plays, stating:

“He has done a lot to initiate things like the Millennium bid, the Harbourside development, the Year of Photography bid and Imagination and so on and that wouldn’t have happened without Andrew quite frankly.” (Nicola Rylance, BCCI, August 1997)

“He’s [the executive officer] obviously got his finger on the pulse so he comes to board meetings with plans for us to discuss which we can change or a number of issues which we can then prioritise. So he does take an active approach and interestingly I don’t think we’ve ever taken a vote, there’s always been consensus.” (Cllr Pat Roberts, BCDP board member, August 1997)

“He [the executive officer] brings a lot of things to our attention.” (Cllr Clare Warren, BCDP board member, August 1997)

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<sup>5</sup> On this issue it is interesting to note that all Board Members acknowledged that it was the BDCP executive who suggest this course of action. In addition to this both BCCI and the City Council were not aware of the Millennium Fund’s existence despite the fact that Regional Arts Boards play a central role in the appraisal of such applications.

Prior to 1997 all the members of the partnership, with the exception of SWA had been content with this situation and as indicated in the above quote had become almost reliant upon the executive officer's leading role.

Possibly associated with the five factors already cited as influencing the executive officer's level of control over the BCDP board is the location of the BCDP's office. At the time of interviewing the executive officer was located within the City Council building. With the exception of SWA all partners were agreed that this was the best option due to the savings that could be made<sup>6</sup> SWA's objections to having the executive officer located within the City Council were based upon a belief that this would compromise the executive officer's neutrality. That is, the location of the BCDP offices would result in the executive officer having greater contact with City Council representatives on the BCDP boards and vice versa. It was feared by SWA that this greater contact between the BCDP's executive officer and the City Council would increase the possibility of the executive officer considering himself an employee primarily of the council rather than the partnership. This, it was felt, would lead to the possibility that the executive officer would base his decisions on those outcomes in the best interests of the council rather than the partnership as a whole.

Even where the executive officer's preferred course of action are in direct conflict with those preferences of SWA (i.e., one of his employers) the executive officer has still been able dictate the outcome. This ability to argue against the wishes of one of his employers in favour of his own preference is only made possible by two factors. First, SWA may be a key partner but this organisation's position within the partnership is below that of both the City Council and BCCI. Second, because the executive officer is employed by the partnership as a whole he is regarded by the council and BCCI as being a neutral element or rather instrument of the partnership. SWA's interests on the

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<sup>6</sup> By allowing the City Council to provide the BCDP with office space no alternative premises had to be rented.



other hand, are not firmly focused upon the city. As such SWA potentially represents a partner with its own agenda which may or may not ultimately serve the best interests of the city. Until recently these two factors have effectively combined to ensure that the executive officer has been able to dictate the actions of partnership.

Prior to 1996 BCDP had no strategic plan to guide its actions. Instead the partnership operated in a largely opportunistic manner, (as the examples of the Brief Encounters Film Festival and the Millennium project indicate). Whilst SWA had long wanted the BCDP to operate within the parameters of a well defined strategic plan the executive officer did not.

“Often Andrew’s (the executive officer) desire to do something and the board’s unspoken policies often come together quite well. There has been particular instances where that has caused problems whereby the board may have a certain view and Andrew has a different view but I still believe that it comes down to the fact that the board has not got a clear sense of what it’s about.”  
(SWA Director of Regional Services, August 1997)

“ ... a strategic plan can assist and guide development but there is also a very real danger that it becomes a straight jacket and reduces your ability to act..”  
(BCDP, Executive Officer, August 1997)

Despite the fact that the executive officer’s opinion as to the need for a strategic plan clashed with that of SWA, the executive officer was still able to pursue a path largely characterised by opportunism. Here the executive officer was of the opinion that a strategic plan would be too restrictive in that possible opportunities arising in the future would be forsaken as a result of adherence to a strategic plan. The ability of the executive officer to convince the board (with the exception of SWA) to follow a largely opportunistic path as well as being related to those factors mentioned above, was also related to the City Council entering partnership without its own cultural strategy. Similarly BCCI’s failure to

articulate their own strategy has increased the executive officer's level of control. Since 1997 the executive officer's ability to direct the activities of the BCDP have been greatly reduced, although not completely eliminated. This reduced ability to direct those activities of the partnership are the result of the City Council launching its own cultural strategy.

## **5. The City Council's Arts Strategy**

Examining the City Council's own cultural strategy will indicate the degree to which this has been influenced by the BCDP. In this regard, the combination of BCDP's and the council's activities should be viewed as reflecting Bristol's strategic approach to the use of cultural activities as an economic development tool. What follows therefore, is an examination of Bristol City Council's cultural strategy.

The City Council views raising the profile of the arts/culture within the city as a means of raising the profile of the city both nationally and internationally. In doing so it is believed that the city will be able to more effectively respond to national and international economic, social and political changes. The belief here is that Bristol is competing with other cities both nationally and internationally. Competition on a national level is centred on visitors (both from overseas and other British cities), central government and National Lottery funding. Increased visitors to the city, it is believed, will result in greater use of the city's services which will in turn generate employment in the services sector. Similarly, central government and Lottery funding has been identified as being a possible source of capital from which the city's physical and cultural infrastructure can be improved. These physical and cultural infrastructures, it is believed, will then assist in adding to the city's marketability to not only visitors but also businesses wishing to (re)locate within the south west (Bristol Arts Strategy, 1997; Bristol Arts Strategy Action Plan, 1997; Bristol City Centre Strategy, 1996;). Considering the city's financial position (i.e., one of financial austerity) the pursuit of external sources of funding represents a top priority (Boyden Southwood Associates, 1992).

Competition on an international level revolves largely about the pursuit of E.C funding and inward investment. The City Council has assumed that Britain will continue to be a member of the E.C and that if this is the case that the region rather than the nation state will continue to be the main geographical unit focused upon by the E.C. By concentrating on underlining Bristol's claims to being a regional capital through the provision of cultural infrastructure which reflects this status, it is thought that the city will be best placed to capitalise on any future E.C funding directed towards regional capitals. Similarly the claim to being a regional capital is further enhanced by strengthening links with other E.C cities through twinning arrangements. It is thought that further development of twinning arrangements will symbolically underline the city's commitment to its development into a European regional capital. It is also thought that regional capital status and cultural facilities reflecting this status will assist in Bristol's competitive advantage over other E.C cities for inward investment via company reallocations/set - ups. In addition regional capital status is thought to equate to increased numbers of visitors to the city in the long term.

In their strategy document (Bristol Arts Strategy) the City Council identifies three key factors as affecting the form of their own cultural strategy: reductions in public expenditure, the impact of the National Lottery and changes in the practice and consumption of the arts. With regards to the reductions in public expenditure the City Council's cultural strategy document states:

"The development of this strategy is taking place at a time of rigorous Government constraint on public expenditure. The arts strategy therefore seeks to achieve influence and financial leverage so that the city can develop its role in supporting the arts without the prospect of significant additional funding to support new policy initiatives; it therefore places great emphasis on the development of partnerships and collaborations."(Bristol Arts Strategy, 1997:4)

From this quote it is clear that reductions in the City Council's budget have effectively forced the City Council into partnership in order to acquire access to capital therefore enabling their continued and significant participation in the arts. By considering this statement along side the proposed structure of the City Council's own cultural strategy and statements provided by interviewees it is possible to make a number of assertions. Firstly, the council's participation in the BCDP directly and primarily reflects its restrictive financial position. Secondly the council's own cultural strategy acts as a supportive mechanism for the activities of the BCDP. Thirdly the council's cultural strategy attempts to fill in those gaps not addressed by the BCDP.

"...The Lottery represents a major opportunity to attract significant investment for the city, where other sources of external funding, such as some of the major European Unions programmes, have not been available. However, the availability of substantial sums for capital projects raises some difficult challenges such as providing the local partnership funding which is required as 'match' for lottery awards. A strategy for the arts will ensure that smaller organisations, who may need more advice and support, are able to benefit. With a clear sense of strategic direction it should be possible to secure support from the Lottery for new areas of provision. " (Bristol Arts Strategy, 1997:4)

The above quote in provides another indication as to why it is that the City Council is involved in partnership. That is, to acquire access to capital. In the case of National Lottery funding the City Council's membership of the BCDP not only provides direct access to private capital but also serves as a vehicle through which the City Council can pursue external sources of funding. In this context the above quote also provides another explanation for the focus of the council's strategy on funding the BCDP, integrating those activities of the BCDP into the council's strategy as well as continuing to be a member of the partnership.

“This strategy acknowledges that the way in which people relate to the arts is changing, due partly to social and economic changes and also to changes in culture, many of which are driven by technology. These proposals therefore recognises the growing importance of the media and broadcasting sectors, the emerging potential of the Internet and other multi-media to create new methods of working in or accessing the arts.” (Bristol Arts Strategy, 1997:4)

Here the City Council simply makes clear its commitment to and reasons for defining the arts/culture in its broadest sense.

### **5.1. City Council's Funding Strategy**

The primary thrust of the City Council's cultural strategy lies in its funding of the arts and culture. Therefore funding arrangements will be examined prior to discussing those policy areas which define the cultural strategy. A reorientation in the City Council's funding of the arts and culture has occurred. This reflects a combination of its newly acquired strategic approach to the arts/culture and consecutive reductions in the arts budget. As discussed above, the arts strategy has been developed during a period of prolonged central government constraint on public expenditure, which was reflected in the arts budget for 1996/97 (£606,000). Given these financial constraints and a growing concern with the potential of the arts/culture to act as an economic development tool the council was left with no alternative but to reassess both its funding priorities and processes.

Previously the arts/culture had been funded via a competitive application process and had been based upon socio-political rather than strategic objectives<sup>7</sup>. Given this new found strategic approach and decreases in the arts budget, funding has been reoriented towards those organisations whose

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<sup>7</sup> It is important to note that a reorientation towards strategic objectives does not mean that socio - - political considerations no longer exist but rather that the main concern of funding mechanisms and priorities has been to pursue strategic, i.e., long term economic objectives.

activities are believed to best reflect the council's own priority objectives. These priority objectives have been identified as being:

- “- To develop the quality and range of arts provision in Bristol.
- To encourage greater involvement in the arts from all sections of Bristol's diverse communities.
- To enhance Bristol's status as a cultural centre of the West of England and a major European city.
- To integrate the arts in delivery of all aspects of the city's corporate agenda.
- To increase partnership between the City Council and the arts, voluntary, private and public sectors.
- To achieve optimum value for money from the City Council's investment in the arts.”

(Bristol Arts Strategy Action Plan, 1997:1-21)

By focusing on the above priority objectives through funding arrangements the City Council is of the opinion that they will achieve value for money and maximum impact in terms of maintaining and increasing the quality of arts provision in the city.

The arts and culture are now funded in two main ways. The first is revenue funding of which there are two types, three year and annual revenue funding. Those key arts providers who are most appropriately placed to deliver the above mentioned service priority objectives have been selected by the City Council for revenue funding<sup>8</sup> (Bristol Leisure Services Committee, 1996: Appendix 1.2).

In order to be eligible for three year revenue funding, as well as meeting the above criteria, organisations must also have an education policy and programme which is monitored, an equal opportunities implementation programme and a three year development/business plan. Similarly, annual

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<sup>8</sup> See appendix 4 for selection criteria.

revenue funded organisations must have an income/expenditure budget and proposed programme of those services provided by the organisation. In both the cases of three year and annual revenue funding, funding is based on service levels agreements rather than organisations competitively applying for funds.

The second form of funding provided by the City Council is that of Strategic Seed funding. Strategic Seed funding is funding which is provided for initiatives which will promote innovation in arts practice. Here emphasis has been placed on those initiatives which are developed through partnership.

This restructured funding regime has meant that the City Council now revenue funds twenty one arts/cultural organisations, financially supports six organisations and is involved in direct provision through two organisations. Within this restructured funding regime out of an annual budget of £606,000, £242,000 goes to one organisation (Bristol Old Vic Theatre). In addition to this, as a senior Labour Councillor and Board member of the BCDP admitted, two thirds of the City Council's arts budget is spent strategically whilst only a third is contributed towards community based arts which have city wide, regional and national significance.

“We probably do lean more to the strategic ones because at one stage we used to fund peoples little tin pot carnivals in places like Lockly .....We pooled all that money because we said that everywhere can't have it, the only one we kept was the St. Pauls Carnival because we believe that has national implications. If that becomes very localised then we will take that money off them too.....So I would say that its probably a third community based and two thirds strategic.”  
(Cllr Roberts, Bristol City Council, August 1997)

Having examined the City Council's funding strategy it is now possible to look at how this funding strategy fits into the overall cultural strategy. Each of the

above priority objectives is divided into policy units with each unit having a series of tasks and desired outcomes attached.

Given the fact that the City Council's cultural strategy is a comprehensive one consisting of six aims, 21 policy units and 21 partners it is neither practical nor appropriate to discuss all aspects of the strategy. Instead attention will be focused upon those policy units involving the participation of the BCDP. This approach has been adopted because as indicated from the preceding commentary it was the BCDP members who were largely responsible for alerting the City Council to possibility and potential of a cultural strategy. As such the BCDP must be seen as being a central player in the development of a cultural strategy for the city as a whole both directly through its own activities and indirectly through its ability to influence the actions of the City Council.

Of the 21 policy units making up the City Council's arts strategy, BCDP participation has been identified in six. These six policy units are:

- To secure the long term future of a dynamic and innovative arts sector.
  - Encourage initiatives to secure major new arts provision.
  - Increase the availability of appropriate premises and open spaces for arts use.
  - Stimulate increased arts attendance and participation by all sections of the community.
  - Retain arts initiatives of regional and national importance within the city.
  - Raise the profile of the arts.
  - Recognise the economic value of the arts to the city.
  - Consolidate existing partnerships and develop new relationships or alliances.”
- (Bristol Arts Strategy, 1997:8-9)

Those policy units from which BCDP participation is excluded all related to education and community activities involving issues of access and equity. Examination of key tasks within these policy units reveals that in all cases BCDP's role corresponds to local economic development functions. These local



economic development functions can be categorised as training, information/advice, marketing and leveraging funding for arts/culturally related activities. So with only a few exceptions BCDP participation corresponds to all the strategy's economic development initiatives.

## **6. Summary**

The above discussion of Bristol's cultural strategy has focused not only upon the City Council's own cultural strategy but also upon the activities of the BCDP. Such an approach reveals the interconnectedness of both bodies' activities and in doing so reflects the true nature and meaning of the city's cultural strategy. In this instance the city's cultural strategy is not limited to the activities of the City Council's arts/cultural strategy or the activities of the BCDP which preceded it. Instead analysis of both the local authority and BCDP has highlighted how the activities of both these bodies constitute a cultural strategy. Here the City Council's cultural strategy has been constructed about those past and present activities of the BCDP. That is, given that the BCDP has largely been concerned with flagship developments, the City Council's own cultural strategy has centred upon facilitating the further development of these activities through a reorientation in funding mechanisms and priorities.

Also the partnership has to date exhibited little concern for issues of access and equity. The City Council has justified participating in a partnership which largely disregards issues of access and equity by stating that they [the City Council] provide access and equity in the arts/cultural activities through their own cultural strategy. In adopting such a stance for the partnership's lack of concern for such issues the City Council indicates that the activities of the BCDP and their own arts strategy collectively constitutes a cultural strategy for the city in which roles are shared between these two bodies. Despite the local authority's claim that their activities deal with issues of access and equity, the results of this investigation reveal that the funding and arts strategy sacrifices access and equity in pursuit of economic objectives.

Similarly the BCDP's present and future activities have been constructed directly about the City Council's arts strategy. The creation of the council's own cultural strategy has meant that it now has a clearer conception of what it is that it wishes to achieve and how. This in turn has meant that the council is now able to more fully exercise a leadership function within the partnership and argue for specific courses of action. In doing so the council has reduced the executive officers' degree of control over the partnership which has in turn meant that the BCDP now operates in less of an opportunistic way. Increasingly the BCDP is less concerned with the creation of further flagship developments and more orientated towards developing the existing high profile projects, marketing and the provision of advice and information.

In all cases where a policy unit's task(s) has been identified as being marketing, information and advice provision, the BCDP has been cited as being the main partner through which this is to be achieved. This underlines the BCDP's pivotal role in the City Council's arts strategy. So without the existence of the BCDP the City Council's arts strategy would be very limited. By the admission of the City Council had it not been for BCDP, flagship projects such as the CPA, Millennium project and Brief Encounters would not exist. In addition the council's ability to pursue marketing and arts information and advice would also have been greatly reduced.

In the case of the CPA, Millennium and Brief Encounters it was the BCDP's executive officer who initiated these projects and the partnership provided the initial finance not the City Council. Similarly those relationships between the council, SWA and the private sector which were created and cemented within the boundaries of the BCDP have facilitated an environment of co-operation between these three groups. It is this environment of co-operation which has led to a joint effort in terms of offering arts advice, information and marketing in a structured way. So the private sector's initiation of partnership and that partnership's past activities have effectively shaped local authority action. Here

this action has not only been shaped in terms of creating a cultural strategy but also in terms of the structure and focus of that cultural strategy.

Given the City Council's degree of influence over BCDP activities, the location of BCDP offices and the BCDP's central role within the local authority's cultural strategy it is easy to view the BCDP as an arm of the City Council. Although the City Council and other BCDP members would argue that this is not the case and that those activities of the BCDP and the council reflect a wish to avoid duplication, the results of this investigation indicate an additional explanation. The City Council's arts strategy indicates a conscious departure from this body's previous role within the arts and cultural life of the city. Rather than attempting to provide services directly and act independently the City Council has, as one major arts provider put it:

"Its [the BCDP] a very curious anomaly.... In effect it's [the BCDP] a way of the City Council abdicating its responsibility for the arts. That's a very cynical way of looking at it, but much of what the BCDP does could be done by the City Council. But I suppose having said that its better it not being done at all."  
(Bristol Old Vic Manager, September 1997)

Now the City Council is more concerned with guiding and enabling arts/cultural activities on a strategic level. As part of this new role some of the responsibilities for arts/cultural development have been delegated to the BCDP.

"As an arts provider and purchaser of arts activity, Bristol City Council has considerable influence on the well - being and future development of the city's arts. As a result, the City Council has a key role to play in enabling the arts to realise their full potential in Bristol. Yet it is not possible or desirable for the City Council to do everything. Priorities have to be set, whilst identifying how the local authority can work in partnership with arts organisations and artists, the voluntary sector, the private sector and others such as South West Arts, West Country Tourist Board or West Tec to name but a few. The strategy also takes

account of the potential within alliances such as the Bristol Cultural Development Partnership,..." (Bristol Arts Strategy, Leisure Services, Bristol City Council)

This guiding, enabling and delegating function reflects not only the City Council's financial constraints but also extra - locally inspired factors (i.e., the drive towards local public private partnerships as seen through SRB, City Challenge and the National Lottery where partnership is set as a prerequisite for participation) and the mediation of past conflicts about a cultural strategy.

Interestingly during the course of this case study each interviewee was asked to define the term 'cultural' as it related to a cultural strategy. In almost all cases a different and often vague definition was provided. Despite these differences in the definition of the term 'cultural', particularly amongst members of the BCDP, cultural strategy has still acted as a focal point about which previous conflicts have been mediated.

In many respects the activities of the main actors have not significantly altered despite a reorientation towards local economic development via cultural strategy. As was the case in the 60's and 70's with the redevelopment of the city's port, cultural enterprise still focuses upon the city centre and provides a focal point for public - private sector alliances in which civic boosterism and industrial development are the order of the day. Similarly, as was the case during the 60's, 70's and 80's, the City Council is still concerned with site provision, information and advice for small and medium sized businesses. In the context of the cultural strategy these businesses are cultural industries. Also, as was the case during the 1980's with regards to development within the city, the council is still attempting to extract social benefit from large scale development. In the context of a cultural strategy this involves allowing smaller, non - centrally based arts providers access to the large, prestigious CPA. Also included in this is talk of offering reduced rates of payments for elderly and unemployed visitors (although it is difficult to see how this is possible given the

council's financial position and a need to complete development.). An important point of difference between the council's concern with extracting wider social benefits from flagship developments and past attitudes towards development is that more recent developments have not been subject to having social benefits attached.

What has altered is the explicit linking of local economic development to the arts and culture and the redefinition of the term culture which now goes beyond the narrow confines of the arts to encompass publishing, film, media, photography and music. In fact as indicated above it is this wide definition which has facilitated the development of partnership and the resulting cultural strategy.

## **CHAPTER SIX: CULTURAL STRATEGY IN LIVERPOOL**

### **1. Introduction**

Chapter four outlined how cultural activities, as an economic development tool came to prominence within Liverpool during the 1980s. It has therefore set the context for this chapter. Which will concern itself with an examination of the main agencies responsible for Liverpool's strategic approach to the arts and culture. More specifically, this chapter will identify how this strategic approach has been developed. This will be achieved by examining a number of issues<sup>1</sup>. First, those main agencies responsible for developing the arts and culture will be identified. Second, attention will be drawn to how these agencies have been mobilised. Third, each agent's motive for participation in a strategic approach to the arts and culture will be considered. Fourth, the nature of these agents' interaction with one another and those factors influencing this interaction will be considered. This chapter will then conclude by drawing these issues together in order to comment on how, if at all, local political factors influence the strategic approach developed. In addition, such an examination of those actors involved in the strategy development process will allow a comment to be made on community interests involvement in the process of economic development (as reflected through cultural strategy development).

### **2. The Actors**

This section is concerned with the identification and characterisation of those actors participating in the development of Liverpool's cultural strategy.

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<sup>1</sup> See chapter two for a discussion of why these issues have been selected for examination.

## **2.1. Liverpool City Council**

There are two departments which have an active role to play in the arts and cultural sectors. These are, The Economic Development and European Affairs Department and Leisure Services Department. The Economic Development Department's involvement in the arts and cultural industries can be traced back to 1987 when the City Council emerged from its well publicised period of political turbulence<sup>2</sup>. The development of the arts and cultural industries sectors were seen to have the potential to fulfil a number of functions. These can be classified under the headings of: image, inward investment, production and social exclusion.

As a consequence of decades of political conflict (local and local - central) and economic decline it was felt that the city's image had suffered in that it was considered, in the minds of many, to be a site of a poorly skilled, militant workforce and an environment which was not conducive to inward investment or tourism. Here the arts and cultural industries were identified as having the potential to remove this negative image and project one which was associated with creativity, dynamism and rebirth. Through the production of such an image it was believed that the city would be better placed to compete for both inward investment and visitors.

Given Liverpool's long-standing dependence on a limited range of national and multi - national companies and the devastating effects which the withdrawal of many such companies had caused during the 70s, the cultural industries held the potential for the development of indigenous businesses. Such businesses would not only diversify the local economy but also, it was believed, be more rooted in the local area.

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<sup>2</sup> See chapter four for a more complete discussion.

One of the effects of years of economic decline was the presence of a large segment of the population who was unemployed and which had never been employed. It was believed that the arts and culture had the ability to reach these socially excluded groups and in doing so contribute to their reintegration into the social and economic fabric of the city.

Having identified the arts and cultural industries as having the potential to address to these issues, the Economic Development Department explored ways of aiding its development. Their ability to do so, however, was greatly affected by their limited understanding of the arts and cultural sectors. It was therefore decided to fund a number of enabling agencies which were run on a day to day basis by individuals with knowledge of specific cultural sectors. Most of those organisations funded by the City Council are revenue funded, that is they are funded on the understanding that they must perform certain tasks and meet target outputs. Although at the time of interviewing, MMDA was not revenue funded by the City Council, on the basis of interviews conducted with MMDA and the Economic Development Department it was expected that in the near future they would receive revenue funding. In addition to revenue support for enabling agencies the City Council has at times provided one - off grants. These one - off grants can be divided into two strands. The first grant type is employed as a means of supporting community economic development within the city. The second grant type is that which was provided to MMDA which is deemed as being necessary for an established business scheme. The criteria employed in order to identify those organisations to be funded (whether under revenue funding or one of the above mentioned grants) and the levels of funding to be allocated are largely economic. So funding is provided on the basis of :

- whether jobs and economic activity are going to be generated locally;
- the number of jobs which are going to be generated locally;



- the cost per job in grant terms;
- the amount of leverage that will be generated as a result of funding;
- the viability of the business proposition (i.e., is it going to be sustainable?);and
- whether the funding will result in the displacement of an existing business or scheme.

In terms of funding directed towards community economic development, as well as considering the above criteria the following qualitative or socially orientated criteria are also considered:

- equal opportunities considerations;
- the extent to which the activities of the organisation will meet community needs; and
- are there additional benefits outside of employment considerations?

Those enabling agencies supported by the City Council are all external to the council and non - profit making. One such agency was the Liverpool Film Office (LFO). Identifying the city as being a popular location for film crews, the Economic Development Department established the Liverpool Film Office in 1989. Employing only two members of staff, the Liverpool Film Office (LFO) was charged with promoting the city as a location for film and television production. The impetus for its development came from those problems encountered during the filming of '*A Letter To Brechnev*' in 1982. The production team working on this film found that they encountered an enormous amount of 'red tape' when seeking to film in or around public buildings. It was these difficulties in gaining access to public buildings, combined with the economic and city marketing effects which the film generated which eventually prompted the City Council to initiate the development of a FLO. Initially funded

by both the council and Mersey Television, the Liverpool Film Office was the first of its kind in the UK. The FLO is expected to participate in raising the profile of the city and in doing so accrue direct economic benefits.

As a consequence of the City Council's financial inability to pursue the development of the cultural sector by themselves they have also sought to enter into collaborative funding arrangements with other organisations. One such organisation is North West Arts Board (NWAB). Recognising that the main funder of the arts in the city, other than themselves, was *NWAB*, the City Council sought to work with them in partnership. Whilst financial necessity played a strong motivating factor in the pursuit of collaborative arrangements, it is important to recognise that the council perceived there to be other benefits attached to such a course of action.

“It wouldn't be fair to say that the reason to do that was just to do with money, although that was the prime motivating factor. It was also to do with recognising that there was an enormous variety and diversity of activity going on and that the local authority was a player in helping to support and develop that activity. Also NWAB was a key player. So it was partly recognition of the need for better co-ordination between the two bodies. The third element, although a subsidiary, was probably to do with credibility and the fact that if you are coming together in that sense you are actually generating greater credibility for what you are trying to do.” (Head of Economic Development; LCC, August 1998)

Another collaborative venture involves establishing the Liverpool Design Initiative (LDI). Prior to Merseyside Arts Association (MAA) and North West Arts Association merging to create NWAB, M.A.A attempted to ensure that funds were 'ring - fenced' for Liverpool. That is, MAA tried to ensure that Greater Manchester, Lancashire and the High Peak of Derbyshire did not absorb virtually all of the new RAB's funds. These moves to 'ring - fence' money for the

city coincided with the City Council's idea of creating an initiative which could provide technical and professional assistance to aspiring designers.

LDI was established in 1992 and a Director was employed to run the organisation. In its first year LDI operated on a budget of £29000. A total of £20000 was provided by MAA and the remainder was provided by the City Council. At the time of interviewing, LDI had an annual budget of £40300. Both the council and NWAB provided annual revenue support amounting to just over £20000 each.

LDI's present role is to promote design within Merseyside through the provision of free advice and information to designers and their potential clients. Through 'word of mouth' and advertising on the Internet, individuals/organisations wishing to commission a piece of work (whether it be designing posters or furniture) contact LDI. On the basis of what the commissioning body wants, LDI will then suggest a full list of Merseyside individuals and companies who would be able to undertake such projects. LDI is a non - profit making organisation employing only three full time and one part time members of staff. Despite its size LDI receives over two hundred enquiries a year from commissioning organisations/individuals..

Created in 1990, Business in the Arts North West (BIANW) represents another organisation which is jointly funded by Liverpool City Council and NWAB. Prior to 1991 Business in the Arts had a geographical remit which focused on Merseyside alone. When Merseyside Arts Association and the North West Arts Association merged in 1991, Business in the Art's geographical remit was extended to include the whole of the North West. It is important to note that Business in the Arts North West is part of a national network of such organisations. BIA's role is to help arts organisations develop their management skills and in doing so become more business like. This is

achieved in three ways. First, by way of a placement scheme, individual volunteers with specialist skills (e.g., finance or personnel) provide advice and guidance to an arts organisation. Second, BIA has what it refers to as a 'Board Bank'. Here potential candidates with experience of running businesses and who are interested in becoming board members of an arts organisation are matched to an appropriate organisation. Thirdly, via a 'Training Opportunities Initiative', free places on in-house training courses which are operated by businesses are accessed. Here BIA makes access to such courses available to business managers.

BIA is a very small organisation, consisting of only three permanent members of staff (a manager, full time administrator and a part time training/marketing manager) BIA. Despite its size, BIA has an annual budget of £70000. A total of £10000 and £44000 is provided by Liverpool City Council (local economic development) and NWAB respectively via revenue support. The remainder of this £70000 is provided by the North West Museum Service, fees provided corporate members, Lancashire County Council, the Association of Manchester Authorities and St. Helens District Council. At the time of interviewing it was apparent that the criteria employed by BIA in order to select those organisations which should and should not be supporting was largely dictated by their revenue funders.

"The primary market has to be clients of NWAB because obviously they are our biggest funder. In the museums sector because we get funding from the North West Museums Service, they [our clients] have to be registered museums. In terms of how flexible we are outside those two bands of people partly depends on where the individual or organisation is from. So for instance, in Liverpool because I get funding from the Economic Development Department I am much more flexible about helping a quasi-commercial organisation who is at the start-up stage..... I will work with people really on the basis of whether I think my volunteers would find them sufficiently attractive a prospect and whether they

would regard them sufficiently artistic.” (Manager; Business in the Arts North West, August 1998)

More recently (1997), Liverpool City Council has been instrumental in facilitating the development of The Merseyside Music Development Agency. Consisting of prominent individuals from the music industry and Liverpool universities, this initiative’s remit is to promote and facilitate training in the music industry for Merseyside residents. Initially the role of the agency was to act as an information and resource centre, provide music training for local people and attract investment for the music industry in Merseyside. In addition, MMDA is expected to provide business advice and generally co-ordinate and build the infrastructure necessary for the development of the city’s music industry. Despite these earlier intentions to act as a co-ordinating as well as facilitating organisation MMDA has had to adopt a narrow focus to its activities. This narrowing of its activities is directly related to its levels and sources of funding. In early discussions in 1997 the City Council had promised funding to the tune of £2 million. This was later reduced to £1 million because of the City Council’s lack of capital. Finally the City Council stated that they were of the opinion that MMDA would be unable to perform all those activities which they (MMDA) had previously suggested. In order to secure funding of some description MMDA was forced to reduce their proposed activities to the administration of a Business Development Fund and a Business Investment Fund.

“We [MMDA] see the aims and objectives of the agency as being broader than that, in the sense that there are things that the agency wants to do but hasn’t got enough money to do, like business support, information, setting policies and strategies for the city and developing festivals and things like that, like the other support agencies.” (Cathy Long; MMDA Board Member, September 1998)

At the time of interviewing MMDA was in receipt of £8000 from the NWAB and £17000 from Liverpool City Council. Unlike the other enabling agencies mentioned above, funding is not provided by way of revenue funding but is instead provided in the form of a one - off grant designed to act as start - up capital.

Liverpool City Council and NWAB have also created a joint fund known as The Arts and Cultural Industries Development Fund (ACID). ACID was created in 1995 in order to facilitate newly emerging individuals and micro-businesses in the creative industries sector to realise their economic potential and in doing so contribute to economic development within the city. ACID is funded by Liverpool City Council, the European Regional Development Fund and NWAB. In addition to providing direct financial support' Liverpool City Council also provides ACID with office space in its municipal buildings.

ACID's structure consists of a board of directors, a panel of advisors, one project manager and a part time project worker. It is important to note that the board of directors consists of prominent individuals from the arts and cultural world. Similarly the panel of advisors is made up of three directors from other city based enabling organisations such as LDI, BIA and MMDA.

Five funds are available through *ACID*. These include:

1. Test Marketing (up to £500)
2. Sample portfolio development (Up to £500)
3. Capital equipment (up to £2000)
4. First batch production (up to £2000)
5. Target marketing and publicity (up to £2000)

Liverpool City Council: Leisure Services Department (Arts and Cultural Unit) is another major actor in the arts.

“We don't fund business start - ups. We don't fund feasibility. They are not prime functions. Basically we are funding the delivery of wide ranging cultural provision. We're funding the arts. They [Economic Development & European Affairs] are funding the underpinning of art in terms of business development and the administration side.” (Phil Taylor; Arts Development Manager; Liverpool City Council, September 1998)

Prior to 1990 the Arts Unit, as it was then known, was part of the Libraries Department . The Assistant Director of Libraries was responsible for the Film Office, the Civic Theatre, the Arts Development Officer, Cultural Industries Officer and the Black Arts Team. In 1989 the post of Arts Development Manager was created along with three part - time posts. These three part - time posts were those of the Chinese, South East Asian subcontinent and African - Caribbean Arts officers posts. Including administrative support there existed thirteen posts dedicated to the development of arts and culture.

At the time of interviewing, the Arts and Cultural unit was part of the Leisure Services Department and consisted of seven officers. The Leisure Services department's total budget was approximately £1.2 million with the Arts and Cultural Unit accounting for £63,000. From this pool of £63, 000 the Arts and Cultural Unit funded 27 arts organisations.<sup>3</sup>. These 27 arts organisations were annually funded via revenue support. This method of supporting arts organisations is in stark contrast to those funding procedures which existed

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<sup>3</sup> It is important to note that at the time of interviewing, those organisations funded by Leisure Services had received a 7.5% increase in funding. This increase in funding has been attributed to increases in previous year's local authority funding due to inflation which were withheld as savings for times of financial hardship.

three years ago. Previously an 'Arts Initiative Fund' of £130000 existed<sup>4</sup>. Each arts organisation had to bid for money from this fund. The criteria employed to select those organisations to be funded was based upon community access opportunities, cultural diversity and geographical spread (i.e., how far reaching, in geographical terms, the organisation's activities were). On the basis of these criteria a points system was constructed. Here a maximum of 28 points could be attained.

The levels of funding afforded to this department has meant that it has been very limited in what it could attempt to do. By the admission of the Arts Development Manager, in many cases the funding provided by the Unit for arts and cultural activities is token. Over the past two years those organisations who have not provided education and training and those organisations where the quality of service delivery has fallen below a threshold level have had their funding reduced or stopped. The Arts and Cultural Unit's support for arts organisations is not limited to the provision of funding. Instead a holistic approach to support is adopted. The Arts Development Manager summarised this holistic approach as follows:

"It shouldn't mean that because we don't fund an organisation that we shouldn't work with them. As well as a direct financial input, that network approach is also important. We are ideally placed to put people in touch with the people that they need to be in touch with.....You're dealing with organisations that have got very small numbers of staff and spend enough time filling in European Funding paper work. We provide help with that. A number of us have been on management training courses with the Directorate of Social Change which will bring everybody up to the same standard in terms of fund raising.....If you haven't got that skill then how can you help somebody find money." (Phil Taylor; Arts Development Manager; L.C.C, September 1998)

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<sup>4</sup> Within two years this fund had been reduced from £130000 to £55000.



Through its funding of selected enabling agencies and groups, the Arts and Cultural Unit has an indirect enabling function. As the above quote makes clear, this enabling function is underpinned by a philosophy which attempts to adopt an holistic approach to its activities. Here this enabling role is extended beyond financial support to include advice and information. This role as a collector and disseminator of information is illustrated by the Arts and Cultural Unit's publication of an Arts & Cultural Directory for the city. This directory represents a proactive attempt to compile and disseminate information which will facilitate and encourage networking between arts organisations and freelance artists in the city. A combination of strategic funding, Arts Directory publication and attempts to help arts organisations acquire funding from external sources illustrates the Arts Unit reactive and proactive approach towards supporting Liverpool's arts community.

Unlike the Economic Development Department the Arts and Cultural Unit is primarily concerned with developing widespread arts/cultural provision and facilitating both directly and indirectly greater appreciation of the arts and culture. As such, issues of access, equity and the quality of arts/cultural provision are major guiding issues. Given the criteria employed for the selection of those organisations/groups to be funded (i.e., access opportunities, cultural diversity and geographical spread and quality), the Arts and Cultural Unit's activities clearly reflect the City Council's corporate priorities of 'quality and community development'. So whilst economic benefits may be indirectly accrued as a result of the Arts and Cultural Unit's core activities, the unit's primary functions are concerned with its promotion of quality of life and access to the arts and capacity building through the arts.

## **2.2. North West Arts Board (NWAB)**

Servicing Merseyside, Greater Manchester, Cheshire, Lancashire and High Peak Derbyshire, NWAB's remit is to support and develop the arts within the North West region. More specifically NWAB's purpose is to:

- encourage, develop and maintain arts to highest quality;
- encourage access to and participation within the arts;
- provide an advocacy role for the arts (i.e., communicate the social and economic benefits of investing in the arts);
- generate increased resources for the arts; and
- develop the arts, wherever possible through a partnership approach. (NWAB, 1998: 1- 5)

It is important to note that whilst the term 'art' has been used here, that NWAB supports a variety of arts and cultural activities, ranging from the performing arts to media and publishing organisations. It is also important to draw attention to NWAB's second broad aim as noted above which identifies the need to communicate the economic importance of the arts. In NWAB's 1996-1997 Review under the heading of 'Regeneration', it is noted that:

"With the growing recognition that the arts and leisure, cultural industries and cultural tourism will all become increasingly important as features of the changing regional economies, we can expect regional arts boards to have a central part to play in these developments over the coming years. We look forward to making a major contribution in this field...." (NWAB 1996 - 1997 Review: 28)

Given those broad aims noted above it is easy to understand why NWAB co - funds and co - ordinates its activities with that of Liverpool City Council. By

combining and co-ordinating its activities with those of the council, NWAB was in effect gaining assistance in the pursuit of their own central objectives.

Another key agency involved in the development of the arts and culture within Liverpool is the Centre for Arts Development Training (CADT). This agency differs slightly from those already mentioned above and this is why it has been highlighted at this point, as opposed to earlier. Created in 1984 the CADT provides vocational business training for individuals wishing to establish a business or operate as 'free-lancers' within the arts and creative industries sectors within Merseyside. CADT consists of five full-time members of staff and has a pool of 20 free - lance trainers. Funding for this training organisation is provided by the five Merseyside local authorities<sup>5</sup>, NWAB and European Social Funds and amounts to £200000 per annum. The only conditions placed upon CADT by the local authorities in return for funding is that their money is spent in their respective areas. NWAB provides revenue support because through its training courses CADT helps to create greater business awareness amongst arts organisations in the city<sup>6</sup>. As well as providing training CADT also provides a recruitment selection service for those arts organisations lacking experience in this area.

### **3. Mobilisation and Motives of Actors**

Those agencies noted above represent the key actors involved in the arts and cultural sectors in Liverpool. Having identified these actors it is now appropriate to identify how they have been mobilised into a coalition of interests concerned with developing a strategic approach to the arts and cultural development. Associated with the mobilisation of interests are their motives for participation in

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<sup>5</sup> It is important to note that Liverpool's arts and cultural unit rather than the Economic Development unit is responsible for contributing to the funding of CADT.

<sup>6</sup> Since the late 80s RAAs have systematically attempted to remove the dependency culture which has and still does characterise many arts organisations in the UK. In line with the conservative philosophy of the 80s RAAs have, in the main, replaced the language of subsidy with one of investment.

the coalition. In Liverpool's case these issues are best examined by examining a partnership known as 'Merseyside Arts, Culture and Media Enterprise' (ACME). Whilst as the name suggests, this coalition's geographical remit is wider than that of Liverpool, ACME is ultimately responsible for developing Liverpool's strategic approach to arts and cultural development. In addition ACME represents the only instance in which all the key actors involved in the arts and cultural sectors (in Liverpool) come together to form a partnership.

In order to understand how those interests within ACME were mobilised it is necessary to return to Merseyside's Objective One status. More specifically it is necessary to examine Merseyside's Single Programming Document. In this document entitled, 'Merseyside 2000', seven strategic objectives which were to be pursued via five 'drivers of change' (see chapter four for a list of these objectives and drivers of change). One of those drivers of change identified was the cultural, media and leisure industries. These industries were to be developed through five measures:

- the development and upgrading of physical infrastructure for investors;
- the provision of training geared towards sector needs;
- encourage and facilitate visitors and tourists to the region;
- improve the quality of services for visitors and tourists; and
- improve, develop and protect the historical and natural environment.

(Merseyside 2000; 121)

At this point it is important to note that Merseyside 2000 makes it clear that whilst individual objectives and 'drivers of change' have been identified, that these are not to be viewed as being mutually exclusive. Instead all objectives and 'drivers of change' are viewed as being mutually reinforcing and where possible will be co - ordinated and integrated.

It was in this context that ACME was created in September 1997 and officially launched in November of the same year. Initiated by Liverpool City Council's Economic Development and European Affairs Department, ACME represents a partnership between the five Merseyside local authorities (Sefton, St. Helens, Wirral, Knowsley and of course Liverpool City Council) and NWAB. ACME was funded through Objective One status European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) and received £2.97 million pounds initially for a two year period. Its broad remit was to facilitate the expansion of the cultural industries and develop the employment potential across Merseyside.

ACME pursues its objectives through three related initiatives. These initiatives are:

- community access and participation;
- production and market development funds; and
- mapping, monitoring and evaluation.

(ACME News, 1998:1)<sup>7</sup>

At the time of interviewing, the total amount of funding available for community access and participation was £500,000. This element of ACME's work focuses on those thirty - eight 'pathway areas'<sup>8</sup> within Merseyside. Here ACME aims to develop and deliver local projects designed to facilitate and support arts/cultural based urban regeneration<sup>9</sup> through the provision of advice and funding. (ACME News; Issue 2, 1998:1)

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<sup>7</sup> See Appendix 5 for ACME's funding criteria

<sup>8</sup> This term denotes those most deprived areas with Merseyside.

<sup>9</sup> This relates to physical and environmental regeneration, business development and employment generation.

Accounting for £1.65 million, the Production and Market Development Fund represents the largest of the three ACME initiatives. This fund is divided into two parts. The first part is geared towards R & D and market development. Here assistance is provided for local cultural producers wishing to identify, exploit and generate sales links in new markets. The second part of this programme focuses specifically upon production and offers assistance with the production of new cultural products. The overall aim of this programme is to generate sustainable employment through the export of locally produced cultural products and import substitution<sup>10</sup>.

Advocating the importance of the arts and cultural industries is a central part of ACMEs role. In order to do this ACME has sought to undertake a number of mapping, monitoring and evaluation exercises. These research activities have been divided into three key tasks:

- mapping training provision in the arts, culture and media sectors;
- mapping business support services; and
- monitoring and evaluating ACME's projects and activities.

The results from these exercises will then be used in a number of ways. First, the information acquired from these exercises will be used to communicate to potential funding and business advisory agencies the economic and social importance of the arts and cultural industries.

“It's [information dissemination] ensuring that if an arts or cultural business goes to a business link and says, look, we need help,' that that business link doesn't

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<sup>10</sup> This term is used to describe the replacing of products and services previously purchased in Merseyside but produced elsewhere with products which are both produced and purchased in Merseyside.

say, 'we can't help you', go to the regional arts board." (Director of ACME, October 1998)

Second, ACME's initial ERDF was due to end in 1999. Prior to 1999, therefore, it was essential that ACME achieved certain set targets in order to be eligible for further ERDF grants as well as justifying the further participation for each member local authority. Finally, it was hoped that those mapping, monitoring and evaluation exercises performed by ACME would help to highlight strengths and weaknesses in Merseyside's cultural infrastructure. Once these weaknesses had been identified they then could be addressed. So it was expected that this research conducted by ACME would inform the development of future strategies within the Merseyside.

NWAB's motivation for wanting to be part of ACME differs greatly from that of the five local authorities. NWAB's remit, as noted above, is to provide support for the arts and culture and the most appropriate way to achieve this is via partnership with local authorities. As NWAB's business plan notes:

"Local authorities are the principal funders of the arts in the North West....During 1997/1998, NWAB reviewed its systems for working effectively with local authorities - and intends to build on these in 1998/1999. Partnership is the key to sustainable development in the current economic climate." (NWAB Arts Board Business Plan, 1998:4)

There are a number of reasons for NWAB wishing to work in partnership with local authorities. First, as noted above local authorities represent the major funders of arts activity, not only in the region but also within Britain. As such NWAB is able to increase its effectiveness by, where possible, harnessing these sources of investment. Second, local authorities possess a fundamental resource which NWAB does not. As the chief executive of NWAB notes:

“They [local authorities] are the democratically elected base, they are accountable to the electorate and their citizens....It’s [the development of partnerships with local authorities] actually about talking to local authorities on a peer basis.” (Director of Resources; NWAB, September 1998)

As the above quote notes, local authorities are the democratically elected bodies whose remit it is to ensure the economic and social well-being of their areas. By the admission of the NWAB chief executive, access to such a resource is vital if NWAB is to play a strategic role in this sector. Here partnership with local authorities provides a greater degree of credibility to NWAB’s activities. This need for NWAB to gain credibility is highlighted by Councillor Cleary’s comments when she was asked what would happen if ACME were to disappear over night:

“...it would go back to the way it was with local authorities being forced to match fund and struggling to do so and with NWAB going back to their own remit and imposing rules on everyone, including local authorities, rather than working partnership.” (Liverpool Labour Councillor and ACME chair: Ann Cleary, August 1998)

Third, through participation in ACME, NWAB is able to draw down funding from the EU and play an active role in deciding how it is spent. Again the potential to strategically use external resources to work towards its own corporate aims has played a central role in NWAB’s participation in ACME.

There is a degree of overlap between NWAB’s and the local authorities’ reasons for wishing to work in partnership through ACME. For example Liverpool City Council is of the opinion that working in partnership with the



regional arts board adds credibility to what it is they are attempting to achieve. This need to construct credibility was of vital importance during the stage at which ACME was initially proposed. In order to understand why credibility is so important, it is necessary to refer to those principals on which Objective One ERDF and ESF are based. One of these guiding principals of ERDF is 'partnership'. It is also important to consider those criticisms directed at the City Council by the arts community. These criticisms surround the City Council's level of knowledge of the arts and cultural sectors and therefore their ability to act in a way which benefits that community.

Second, the prime motivating factor behind Liverpool City Council's moves to establish ACME was based upon the desire to continue to provide support for the arts and culture in the face of financial stringency. That is, ACME was viewed as fulfilling a role which the council was struggling to maintain. In this context the council first viewed ACME in terms of 'substitution' rather than 'additionality'.

"The temptation was there but ACME [the director and cultural sector representatives] stood firm. They made it clear that the role of ACME was not to subsidise arts organisations but instead to offer clear strategic assistance and in doing so encourage arts organisations to think on a business level and in doing so get rid of that dependency on subsidisation." (Cllr Ann Cleary; Liverpool City Councillor & ACME Board Member, August 1998)

"It's [ACME] not about subsidising what local authorities do. That's what they wanted in the beginning but we [the ACME executive] stood firm. If it was about doing the local authority's job for them then I wouldn't be involved with that." (Wesley Wilkey; CADT Director & ACME Cultural Sector Representative, August 1998)

“There is an expectation still and there certainly was an expectation of what ACME could do is, it could provide some of the diminishing resources that they [arts organisations] felt they needed to run their organisation.....There has been a reduction in some of those subsidies and when there is potential for a new resource people will look to that resource to replace what they are loosing. Our job is not to do that, our job is purely about additionality. It is purely about putting an additional resource into a company.” (Mark Collet; Director of ACME, August 1998)

Despite the local authorities’ attempts to use *ACME* as a substitute for their funding role, as the above quotes indicate, the director of ACME and cultural sector representatives on the ACME board argued that this should not be the case. Instead it was argued that *ACME* should provide an additional function which each member local authority could not provide.

Those cultural sector representatives who were part of ACME, initially became involve in the partnership for a variety of reasons. ACME presented an exciting opportunity to participate in a partnership which was well resourced and potentially led by artists and cultural professionals with a clear market oriented outlook. As will become apparent from the next section, many of those cultural sector representatives, who are also executives of enabling agencies, have been frustrated by two features associated with arts and cultural support within the city. First, enabling agencies, it was felt, were poorly resourced and this has been attributed to the fact that the City Council has been poorly resourced. Second, many cultural sector representatives have complained about the council’s reluctance to allow them to deal with the arts and cultural sector as they see fit. Similarly, ACME presented the opportunity of being able to re - educate both local authorities and arts organisations and in doing so create a

model of 'good practice'. Here it was felt that ACME would finally eradicate the subsidy culture which has for a long time been typical of the arts community. Cultural sector representatives were also keen to participate in ACME because it would allow them to ensure that the activities of the partnership would compliment that of their own organisations.

#### **4. Those Relationships between Actors**

Whilst ACME represents the main partnership through which a cultural strategy for Liverpool and Merseyside is being developed and therefore requires examination, there is a need to examine those relationships between relevant partners which extend beyond the boundaries of ACME. Such an exercise will help to further understand those relationships within ACME. In addition, this approach helps to ensure that analysis is focused upon those developments which influence Liverpool's strategic approach to the arts and culture.

##### **4.1. NWAB and Liverpool City Council**

The relationship between NWAB and the City Council is one of mutual dependence in which each organisation is fully aware of why the other is co-operating. NWAB is fully aware of the City Council's (Economic Development Department) wish to pursue economic development via the arts and cultural industries and that the nature of ERDF has meant that this has to be pursued via partnership. Similarly the City Council is aware of the fact that NWAB needs to work with local authorities in order to add credibility to their activities. Whilst each partner is mutually dependent upon the other and recognises this, ACME has created an environment in which greater understanding between the two organisation has been developed. These two organisations appear to be moving away from a situation where they are simply co-funders of arts organisations within Liverpool. Instead there are indications that their relationship is moving towards a situation where they are actually beginning to trust one another. For example, at the time of interviewing the City Council's

Arts and Cultural Unit was in the process of developing its cultural strategy for the city. Here the Arts and Cultural Unit manager made it very clear that he would, as part of the process of developing a strategy, work very closely with NWAB. This interaction would not simply take the form consulting NWAB and ensuring that there was a degree of co - ordination of activities, but would involve soliciting advice as to possible ways to proceed. Such a course of action recognises the fact that NWAB has for a long time adopted a strategic approach to the development of the arts and cultural industries in which value for money is of vital importance. Similarly, the NWAB executive officer expressed the expectation that NWAB would work very closely with the City Council on their development of a cultural strategy for the city. What is significant about this situation is the fact that there is a conscious effort, on both sides, to establish a relationship beyond the boundaries of ACME. This provides an indication that the relationship between NWAB and the City Council is moving away from that which could be characterised as a marriage of convenience.

#### **4.2. CADT and The City Council**

In examining the relationship between CADT and the City Council it is necessary to note that the interviewee (the director of CADT) is a former employee of the City Council's Arts & Cultural unit. As such his impressions of the City Council have been shaped not only by contact within the parameters of ACME and as representing an organisation funded by the City Council but also from previous working experience of the council.

CADT is funded by the Arts and Cultural Unit. It is funded because it is an enabling agency whose role is to develop commercial awareness in those arts/cultural organisations with whom it has contact. At the time of interviewing this funding was provided in the form of revenue support which necessitated attendance at meetings with the Arts and Cultural Unit and all those

organisations which they fund. The director of CADT argued that the manner in which these meetings are conducted and their very nature highlight's the Arts and Cultural Unit's inability to manage his organisation. Here it is argued that CADT's function should be regarded as being economic development orientated. As such CADT is not concerned with cultural provision in the same way that other organisations funded by the Arts and Cultural Unit are. Despite this marked difference between CADT's goals and many of the other organisations supported by the Arts and Cultural Unit, CADT believes that they are not managed by the unit in a suitably different manner. This has been attributed to an inability, rather than reluctance, on the part of the unit to fully understand those issues associated with economic development and the arts/cultural industries. Drawing on his past experiences as a cultural development officer within the Arts and Cultural Unit CADT's director identifies two issues which must be dealt with if this situation is to be adequately corrected. First, it has been suggested that there needs to be clarification within the City Council as to which department funds which organisation and on what basis. According to CADT's director, because his organisation provides an economic development function it should necessarily be funded by a department best equipped to deal with such issues. This in turn means that CADT should be funded by the Economic Development Department. Second, it is suggested that if the Arts and Cultural Unit are going to fund organisations like CADT that they should at least familiarise themselves with these organisations needs and the context in which they are operating.

As a direct result of those experiences noted above the director of CADT has very grave concerns about the development of a cultural strategy. The interviewee acknowledges that any cultural strategy created by the City Council will necessarily have to be clearly linked to economic development. According to the interviewee, at a time when many cultural organisations are struggling for investment, the only way to justify this investment is by promoting their potential as drivers of economic change. As a result of the interviewee's contact with the

City Council through ACME he is aware that the Arts and Cultural Unit are likely to lead on the development of such a strategy. Given the view that the Arts and Cultural Unit is ill equipped, both in financial terms and the competencies of its personnel (i.e., the inability of these personnel to adequately deal with issues of economic and business development), CADT is very sceptical of the City Council's ability to implement a coherent strategy.

CADT also takes issue with the fact that the City Council is not fully funding all of those activities which they demand of CADT. That is, there is a concern that the City Council uses CADT on an ad hoc basis as a trouble shooting and information device. Here CADT is regularly called upon to provide additional business advice to ailing arts organisations and where necessary provide information. Whilst the director of CADT views this as a worthwhile endeavour he is nonetheless concerned that this detracts from those activities for which his organisation is funded. This provides another clear indication of the Arts and Cultural Unit's inability to either deal with those business concerns which affect many arts organisations or their ability to act as an up to date source of information for arts organisations. In particular this inability to act as an up to date source of information indicates that the Arts and Cultural Unit is not as in tune with the sector and its needs as it might be. Not only does this provide an indication of the extent to which the unit is guiding the development of the arts within Liverpool but it also adds to those concerns surrounding the unit's ability to implement a cultural strategy.

As well as expressing concerns about the ability of the Arts and Cultural Unit to lead on the development of a cultural strategy the director of CADT has also expressed concerns about what he sees as being the inevitable nature of any cultural strategy which is devised. Once again this view has been formulated as a result of his contact with City Council representatives working in ACME. Here it is important to note that City Council representatives include both Economic Development and Arts Unit officers. Here the interviewee is concerned about

the City Council's wish to attach/link the cultural (multimedia, performing arts, publishing, photography etc.) to the restaurant and bar trade. The interviewee believes that including these activities in a cultural strategy will ultimately divert money away from what he terms the 'real cultural industries'. For these reasons the director of CADT is opposed to any cultural strategy which facilitates greater City Council intervention. The interviewee regards greater intervention in this sector as potentially damaging those networks and activities which have been created in spite of limited City Council intervention.

"The danger in attaching leisure to booze and food is that the real thing that is coming out of Liverpool, i.e., multimedia, poetry, design, music and film, will suffer. Where will the money go? It will go to booze and food not the real cultural industries. But the thing about it is that this has always happened in Liverpool. In the absence of public support people have just gone on and done things. The question which is frequently asked is how much better will it get with intervention."(Wesley Wilkey; CADT Director, August 1998)

Interestingly, whilst CADT has very strong views about the City Council and, the Arts and Cultural Unit in particular, the Arts and Cultural Unit simply views CADT as another organisation which they fund. The Arts and Cultural Unit manager is, however, conscious of the fact that CADT is funded for what is essentially an economic development function and that they [The Arts and Cultural Unit] are not directly concerned with local economic development. The situation, as it stands in relation to CADT, has been described as stemming from historical arrangements in that Leisure Services have always funded CADT and that is why they continue to do so.

So the relationship between CADT and the City Council's Arts and Cultural Unit is very difficult to characterise. It could not be described as being a relationship involving a superior and subordinate despite the fact that CADT is funded by

the City Council. Similarly, this relationship could not be characterised as being based upon mutual trust because it is obvious that CADT holds the Arts and Cultural Unit in very low regard. For CADT, the relationship is based upon mutual co-operation, that is CADT is funded to do a specific job but outside of this boundary there is little attempt on the part of CADT to form a relationship which goes beyond funder and funded.

#### **4.3. BIA: NW and The City Council**

As is the case with CADT, when examining the relationship between the City Council and BIA it is necessary to consider this relationship in relation to the BIA's contact with the City Council as a central funder and a joint member of ACME. As such it is important to examine BIA's relationship with the Arts and Cultural Unit as well as the Economic Development Department.

From those interviews conducted with the director of BIA it is clear that BIA feels more comfortable being funded by the Economic Development Department rather than the Arts and Cultural Unit. There are three reasons for this attitude. Firstly, BIA regards itself as being an economic development agency rather than a cultural development agency. As such the Economic Development Department is viewed as being best placed to act as a point of contact. Here the Economic Development Department is viewed as being better funded and possessing members of staff who are aware of those issues affecting economic development enabling agencies. Secondly, the Arts Unit is viewed as being under funded and this under funding is translated into low levels of funding which are made available to those organisations which it supports. Thirdly, the director of *BIA* states:

“I think there is an issue about the quality of the local authority officers working within the arts unit. Not Phil (Manager of Arts Unit), but some of the people he is working with are poor.” (Viv Tyler; Director of BIA, August 1998)



Whilst Leisure Services, of which the Arts and Cultural Unit is a part, is regarded as being 'arts friendly', this potentially positive factor is neutralised by the perceived quality of the members of staff chosen to work alongside enabling agencies. In an attempt to illustrate her point the director points out that the Arts Unit's inability to function outside a remit which focuses on cultural access is highlighted by the fact that the City Council funds ACID. Here the interviewee is of the opinion that ACID ultimately performs a function which the Arts Unit should be able to perform and that its funding of ACID is a reflection of the unit's inability to strategically fund arts business start - ups.

"Liverpool City Council puts money into ACID and that is, to be perfectly honest, a way of shifting responsibility away from their own officers because it is an idea that they found difficult to deal with." (Viv Tyler; BIA director, August 1998)

In fact the BIA's view of the Arts Unit's capabilities with regards to supporting the development of the arts is such that it is expected that they [BIA] will be asked for a direct input into the creation of a cultural strategy.

"My guess is that the City Council will be desperate to have external input into the development of a strategy." (Viv Tyler; BIA Director, August 1998)

This view is adopted by the director because she is of the opinion that the Arts Unit, despite its involvement in ACME still lacks the local knowledge and expertise necessary to confidently create a cultural strategy which will compliment rather than disrupt those networks which have already been created. Whilst it is acknowledged that the City Council recognises the potential socio - economic importance of the arts and cultural industries, it is believed that the City Council is no closer to understanding how this sector should be

resourced and what type of infrastructure needs to be built. For these reasons the director of the BIA is explicit in stating that she would not welcome the creation of a cultural strategy by the City Council.

The director of BIA is correct in assuming that the Arts and Cultural Unit will want to work closely with them [BIA] in the development of a cultural strategy. Again the Arts and Cultural Unit's manager identified the need to gain input into the strategy from this organisation. The Arts Unit's manager's motivation for this appears to stem from a wish not to disrupt current activity within the sector. Again this relationship appears to be characterised by distrust on the part of the BIA and a desire for access to expertise on the part of the Arts and Cultural Unit.

#### **4.4. LDI and The City Council**

As is the case with CADT and BIA, LDI's contact with the City Council is not simply limited to its funding arrangements with the Economic Development Department. Via LDI's involvement in ACID and ACME as advisors, this company has considerable contact with both the Arts and Economic Development Units. In exploring LDI's and the City Council's relationship with one another, both formal and informal, it is evident that LDI possesses a low opinion of the City Council's approach towards supporting cultural activity and their ability to create a useful cultural strategy. This attitude towards the City Council has been developed through years of contact with various council departments and officers in differing environments. The director of LDI is of the opinion that as an under funded organisation which is attempting to fund support for the arts/culture that the City Council is ill equipped to make either a positive or negative impact upon the arts/culture.

"If you've got a really incompetent, demoralised and under funded local authority like we've got then you really don't want them in charge of your life if

you can possibly help it..... Around here they [the City Council] will never have enough money for it [an arts strategy] to be particularly damaging.” (Francis Downee; LDI Director, September 1998)

Similarly, as is the case with many other enabling organisations within the city, the director of LDI questions the ability of the council to develop a cultural strategy given the quality of its officers. In particular, LDI is very disparaging of the Arts Unit, its management and officers. By the mere fact that the Arts Unit would be responsible for leading the development of a cultural strategy LDI views this as lending little political and therefore economic weight and therefore seriousness to the support of the arts and culture within the city.

“At the moment the Arts Committee is at the bottom rung of the committee membership and you get people whose ambition it is to be in charge of sewage and things like that and they start off in the arts because it is the only thing that they can get into. So what you get at a political level is people that aren't interested in art. Then you've got officers who are lower down the grade of the hierarchy who aren't valued and haven't got money, reporting to the uninterested and unintelligent and this combination is not good” (Francis Downee; LDI Director, September 1998)

LDI believes that because they are financially supported by the Economic Development Department rather than the Arts Unit that they are politically and economically more secure in the long term. As indicated by the above statement, the Economic Development Department carries more political weight than the Arts Unit and therefore those organisations supported by them believe that they are regarded in a more serious light than those supported by the Arts Unit. Similarly the Arts Unit's budget is smaller than that of the Economic Development Department's and it is felt that this is reflected in the levels of financial support offered.

“We have always side stepped the Arts Unit which has been an absolute blessing because it means that the officers that you deal with don’t pretend that they have an understanding of what you do. All they want is the outputs that you have discussed and agreed. Over a period of time, generally speaking, these officers have started to get their heads around it and they like it and they get enthused but they aren’t starting off in a position where they think they understand and that they can advise you on what you do. That makes life a hell of a lot easier.” (Francis Downee; Director; LDI, September 1998)

Finally, the director of LDI states that due to the fact that the Economic Development Department does not ‘pretend’ that they fully understand what design is and therefore does not interfere with creative aspects of the company, that this has resulted in the development of a good relationship. Rather the Economic Development Department continues to fund LDI because it is regarded as providing exceptionally good value for money, in that every £1 spent on LDI £10 is created within the city. LDI believes that if they were supported by the Arts Unit that they would attempt to interfere with the creative and ethical direction adopted by the company. Rather than having to operate within the boundaries of a cultural strategy which impinges upon their freedom to dictate the creative direction of the company LDI has gone on record as stating that they would relocate to another city. LDI is so opposed to the local authority exercising greater ‘control’ over the arts and culture in terms of directing creativity because it felt that they [local authorities] are large bureaucratic organisations and that such organisations are not suited to the development or even long terms support of the arts.

Once again, the Arts and Cultural Unit wishes to consult with LDI and those reasons given for this wish to work with LDI cultural strategy is a wish not to damage what has already been created. Whilst the Arts and Cultural Unit is

keen to establish closer links with LDI, the above quotes make it very clear that this is not reciprocated. In this context LDI's involvement within the boundaries of ACME is one of necessity in that they are forced to work with the Arts and Cultural Unit.

The Economic Development Department has corroborated the LDI's director claim that they [Economic Development Department] does not interfere with the artistic and ethical direction adopted:

"We do not make any qualitative judgements about what is or is not good art. We are only concerned with ensuring that those organisations we fund fit the criteria for funding and hit their targets" (Head of Economic Development; Liverpool City Council, August 1998).

LDI's relationship with the LDI is, therefore, characterised by mutual co-operation and an exchange of resources. In exchange for funding LDI achieves its targets which can be translated into an impact on economic development. The relationship between LDI and the Economic Development Department is not deeper than this. It is a relationship which appears to work well precisely because each party is aware of the other's needs and wants. In effect, the boundaries of this relationship have been clearly identified and set by each partner.

#### **4.5. Merseyside Music Development Agency and City Council**

Whilst the Economic Development Department contributes a substantially greater amount of funding (£15000) than does the Arts and Cultural Unit (£2000) MMDA has much greater contact with the Arts Unit. This difference in degrees of contact between MMDA, Economic Development and the Arts Unit

has been attributed to each department's underlying role(s) and the competencies of their officers.

As identified by LDI, MMDA asserts that the Economic Development Department never attempts to interfere with or question their authoritative knowledge of their industry. MMDA is of the opinion that they are funded by the Economic Development Department solely on the basis of their economic outputs. In short, as far as the Economic Development Department is concerned they fund MMDA and other enabling agencies, not because of their role in cultural development but because of their economic development role within the city. This is a situation which MMDA is content with and which they acknowledge probably results in an amicable relationship. In contrast, MMDA's contact with the Arts Unit is premised on different objectives and a noticeably different calibre of officer which results in greater interference. As stated above, the Arts Unit's central aims are concerned with quality, diversity and access. It is the pursuit of these three objectives, by officers who are regarded by MMDA as not being 'in touch' with the industry or its informal networks, which creates tensions.

"We have new officers in the council that really want to get on board with music stuff and really see a potential but it does mean that it can all get a bit haphazard. You get new people coming in and they don't know who is who. We have tried to say, use MMDA', talk to the industry. Don't just come in and come up with plans." (Cathy Long; MMDA Co - ordinator, September 1998)

As indicated by the above quote from MMDA's co-ordinator, another cause of tension between the Arts Unit and MMDA is the fact that MMDA provides a leading role within the industry locally. The question of who initiates and drives change is of central importance to the relationship between organisations like MMDA, LDI and the Arts Unit. Whilst MMDA and LDI, by virtue of those

commercially orientated individuals who run these organisations, are at the centre of change, the Arts Unit views itself as having a 'right' to play a central role. This perceived right to play a central role is based upon the fact that they represent a democratically elected organisation whose function is to ensure the well-being of the city. As such there is a deep rooted belief within this unit that only they can be trusted to ensure access and diversity within the arts and cultural sector. This situation has resulted in what the MMDA representative refers to as an ad hoc approach by the Arts and Cultural Unit. In MMDA's opinion, this ad hoc approach disregards the existing infrastructure and activities and at times can be counter productive<sup>11</sup>. For this reason MMDA would welcome the development of a cultural strategy. MMDA expects that a cultural strategy would result in greater co-ordination between all enabling agencies and the City Council. Here MMDA is assuming that the Arts Unit's perceived lack of knowledge of their industry and an awareness of existing cultural infrastructure and how that infrastructure operates would necessitate consultation. At the time of interviewing, where co-ordination did exist between agencies within the local music industry, this co-ordination was attributed to the efforts of those industries, not the City Council.

#### **4.6. Economic Development Department and the Arts and Cultural Unit**

At the time of interviewing, both departments acknowledged that the degree of contact between themselves was minimal. Economic Development Department was adamant that they only funded those organisations which were economically viable. That is, the funding of organisations which are providing some sort of service which will assist in the long term generation of employment. The head of Economic Development went to great lengths in order to state that his department was funding enabling organisations because the cultural industries had been identified as being an area of possible future

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<sup>11</sup> It is important to note that at the time of interviewing where co-ordination existed between enabling agencies involved in the music industry that this network was due to the efforts of those agencies, not the arts unit.

economic growth. Also highlighted was the perception that this sector had always been an area which generated economic rewards. However, the absence of an infrastructure capable of supporting that growth and therefore holding onto these industries has meant that in the past the economic benefits to be gained from this sector have been lost to London. Due to the recent nature of these ideas and the limited budget which the Economic Development Department has, support for these industries through other agencies more in tune with their respective sectors is seen as a necessity.

The Arts and Cultural Unit on the other hand has traditionally approached the support of the arts and culture from the viewpoint of access, participation, cultural diversity, training and education. Here the Arts and Cultural Unit facilitates training through the selective funding of external agencies. These clear lines of demarcation between the two departments is said to offer an increased potential for local people within the city to gain employment in the cultural industries.

Despite the realisation by both departments of the multifaceted benefits to be gained from the arts and culture, there still exists little co-ordination between the two. This lack of dialogue is not attributed to the Arts Unit. During the course of the interviews it became clear that the Arts Unit had for a long time wished to have a closer working relationship with Economic Development Department. For example, the Arts Development Manager stated on a number of occasions that as part of the development of a cultural strategy for the city that the Arts Unit would seek to consult with and work alongside the Economic Development Department precisely because a strategy, in his opinion should be about the social as well as the economic. Ironically, when negotiating access for interviews, the head of Economic Development was reluctant to participate in the research on the grounds that cultural strategy is the responsibility of the Arts Unit. These statements further highlight the lack of co-ordination which exists within the City Council.



“Sometimes something will land on our desk because nobody has got either the time or the money to handle it. Not because we are the Arts Unit therefore should take the lead on arts issues.” (Phil Taylor; Arts & Cultural Development Manager, LCC, September 1998)

Where co-operation does occur between each department it is limited to the Economic Development Department occasionally asking for ‘background’ information on an arts/cultural organisation which is attempting to gain access to development funds. The Arts and Cultural Unit is only now beginning to attempt to employ the Economic Development Department’s expertise in recording financial and other information on those organisations which they fund. In light of the fact that ACME has presented the opportunity for these two departments to have greater contact with each other, there is little evidence of either sustained co - operation or new developments stemming from their increased contact via ACME.

Once again the Arts Unit’s contact is limited with this department. In fact where co - operation does occur, at present it occurs out of necessity, rather than a wish to ensure the development of a working relationship built upon mutual trust and the exchange of resources. It would appear that where co - operation does occur that the Arts and Cultural Unit’s participation is one of junior partner.

#### **4.7. Relationships between LDI, NWAB, BIA:NW, CADT and MMDA**

These relationships have been grouped together because results from interviews all indicate the same thing, namely that the level of interaction amongst these agencies’ directors is high. Not only do these individuals appear to interact well within the environment provided by ACME, but they also appear to interact very well outside the confines of ACME. Interestingly, there is no culture of competition amongst LDI, BIA:NW, CADT and MMDA. Each

organisation realises that they do not have to compete with the other. There is, however, a realisation that it might be more beneficial to co - operate (through ACME) in the pursuit of funding. For example at the time of interviewing, these organisations were considering the best ways through which ERDF monies could be drawn down during the next round of funding. The preferred mechanism through which this was to be achieved was through using ACME as a 'funnelling' point. That is, a co - ordinated bid would be submitted through ACME. ACME would then receive the necessary funding and this would then be distributed to the relevant enabling organisations by ACME. Again, this is a situation which each organisation appears to be very happy with. Each of the above organisations appear to be united by the need to not allow the City Council to create a cultural strategy for the city. As indicated above, the general fear is that if the City Council does create a cultural strategy for the city, then it will disturb what has already been built.

## **5. The Role of ACME's Director**

The Director of ACME is clear in stating that he regards ACMEs activities as building a bridge between local communities and the local authority and within local authorities themselves. Here the Director is of the opinion that ACME is providing local authorities with an alternative means of working. One example of an alternative way of working with the local community can be seen through ACME's Community Access and Participation Fund which is administered in Merseyside Partnership Areas. ACME actively encourages local community groups to develop ideas as to how they can develop cultural activities (with an emphasis on economic development) which are eligible for funding. In this way ACME pursues the building of local capacity within these areas through inclusion and empowerment. That is, participatory cultural activities are employed as vehicles for the inclusion of a local community within the economic development of an area. ACME acknowledges that this will not necessarily result in cultural jobs being created in the short term but it is argued that a local community's capacity to generate employment or business skills may be

increased and this is viewed as being positive. Once again the aim here is to generate a culture of self help rather than a reliance upon subsidy. Through ACME, the local authority is being directed away from practices of old, where they told local communities what needed to be done. At the time of interviewing, the director of ACME was of the opinion that those ways of working through the community access and participation fund were the sorts of practices which would filter back into the City Council's future cultural strategy.

The director also believes that because of the nature of ACME and the way in which it operates, the City Council's Arts and Cultural Unit is being provided with an alternative way of supporting arts organisations. Now rather than providing services themselves, the City Council resources arts organisations to enter local communities and deliver services at the local level.

Although acknowledging that ACME is slowly altering the way in which the City Council approaches the development of the cultural industries, the director of ACME is still of the opinion that ACME's influence will be limited. This limited influence has been attributed to the political culture which dominates local authorities. Here ACME's director states with a high degree of certainty that the only way to get local authorities to do what you want them to do is to state:

"...here's a pot of money, if you want it you must do this and do that." (Mark Collet; ACME Director, October 1998)

## **6. Summary**

The results from this case study indicate that Liverpool City Council by itself lacks the expertise and resources necessary to develop a cultural strategy for the city. Recognising this, the City Council has sought to enlist the assistance of a number of agencies and has taken advantage of Objective One ERDF

monies to create a partnership with those in possession of resources and levels of expertise necessary to develop a strategic approach.

Having engaged in a partnership approach it is clear that the City Council's forthcoming cultural strategy will, to some degree, be influenced by the activities of ACME. Since central government's call for all local authorities to create their own cultural strategies, Liverpool City Council (Arts and Cultural Unit) has deliberately delayed the release of its tender document. Here it is believed that the City Council is awaiting the completion of a mapping, research and monitoring exercise which had just been completed by ACME at the time of interviewing. Another example of how ACME's activities have influenced those practices of the City Council is evident in the increased credibility now attached to the Arts and Cultural Unit and their activities within the City Council.

Through its structure and the way in which it operates, ACME is gradually creating a model for good practice for the City Council to follow. Through its use of cultural sector representatives with an arts background and a knowledge of sound business skills ACME has illustrated the importance of linking economic concerns with those of cultural concerns. Such a link has only been made possible by employing the use of individuals with these transferable skills.

The Economic Development Department is concerned with those economic aspects of the cultural sector whilst the Arts and Cultural Unit is concerned primarily with the social and training aspects of the cultural sector. Whilst this is the case, both the Economic Development Department and Arts Units openly state that it is important to recognise that these two aspects are mutually reinforcing. It would be misleading to state that there is conscious co-ordination between the two departments around the support of cultural activities, however there is a degree of information exchange which did not exist prior to the formation of ACME. This limited dialogue between the two departments is, in

part, attributed to ACME's working practices and personnel who have demonstrated the importance of cross disciplinary working.

"I wouldn't say that it [the activities of Economic Development Department & the Arts and Cultural Unit] is co-ordinated at all. There is no line between economic development and social development. If someone came to us with a proposal we would consult with Leisure Services. We would look first at whether it is appropriate for us to fund or whether it was appropriate for Leisure Services to fund...If it [a proposal] fitted our criteria and we decided to appraise the thing and take it forward we would consult with Leisure Services on that particular project and find out whether they had any background experience with it and vice versa." (Head of Economic Development & European Affairs; L.C.C, August 1998)

As far as the manager of the Arts and Cultural Unit is concerned the degree of co-ordination between the two departments is expected to intensify with the creation of the city's official cultural strategy. For example the Arts and Cultural Unit manager states:

"We would expect to liaise with Economic Development on a number of issues particularly with regards to the monitoring of arts organisations and the recording of this information." (Arts and Cultural Unit Manager; LCC, September 1998)

This is a reflection of the Arts and Cultural Unit's new found desire to approach the development of the arts and culture through more business orientated measures whilst still maintaining a strong social dimension. Due to the fact that ACME is concerned with arts and economic development it appears that ACME has indirectly encouraged the Economic Development and Arts Units to increasingly engage with one another. The results of this case study suggest

that previous lack of contact was due to the fact that the Arts Unit was not afforded a lot of credibility by Economic Development. Through its working practices ACME has provided much needed credibility because it provides the cultural industries with increased legitimacy by illustrating how the arts can be employed as a socio-economic resource and identifying these resources locally. Whilst the City Council has, since 1987, recognised the economic and social importance of the arts and cultural industries to the city ACME has only recently demonstrated how these economic and social goals could be effectively pursued.

Despite those criticisms directed towards the City Council by all parties concerned with developing and implementing a strategic approach, it is important to note that it was ultimately the City Council which was responsible for initiating ACME. All parties involved in the strategy process have been involved in the sector for a considerable amount of time. The development of partnership does not reflect the sudden appearance of any new players. It is therefore, important to note that this extended period of contact (or non - contact as the case may be) has influenced actors opinions and views of the City Council.

Given that these actors have all been involved in the arts and cultural sectors for a considerable amount of time prior to the introduction of ERDF monies, those mechanisms and motives through which interested parties were mobilised has been directly related to the desire to attract extra funding in order to develop their respective sectors. In this regard, all parties' motives for participation in ACME reflects their desire to address the development of the arts and culture in a more strategic way. For all parties concerned (with the exception of the Liverpool City Council) those principals driving Objective One ERDF (i.e., additionality, transparency, partnership and programming) provided an added incentive for participation in ACME. These guiding principals ensured that the development of strategy could not be dictated solely by local

authorities. It also ensured that there would have to be a sustained and structured attempt (rather than piece meal due to decreases in local authority budgets) to develop the arts and culture.

As well as those factors already noted above, the City Council's initial motives for the development of ACME were linked to a wish to continue to subsidise a sector in the face of a dwindling budget. That is, the prime motivating factor for the City Council was based on substitution rather than additionality. Despite the inability to pursue such an approach, the City Council has still benefited from the development of ACME and its activities. Here the City Council has been able to gain access to resources and expertise necessary for the development of those arts and cultural sectors within the city. In addition, as a consequence of sustained interaction between ACME partners, the City Council at the time of interviewing was beginning to learn new processes of good practice which it could apply to its own activities.

Those relationships upon which ACME is based are best characterised as mutual dependence. Each partner requires the presence and input of the other. Objective One ERDF guidelines demand this. Despite this, there are still uneasy relationships in some quarters, such as those which exist between the enabling agencies and the City Council. Similarly, the relationship between NWAB and the City Council appears to be improving as a result of sustained contact through ACME. As well as being characterised by mutual dependence, the partnership between NWAB and the City Council is also moving towards one of trust.

Finally, what is noticeable about this case study is the absence of large scale, well organised private sector interests in the development of a cultural strategy. ACME's board structure has a place free for a private sector representative. Despite this, at the time of interviewing, this place had not been filled. Whilst

those ACME board members who were interviewed expressed a desire to have a private sector actor sitting on the board, it was clear that there was no urgency to find such a board member. It was, however, stated by number of interviewees that in the absence of ERDF monies that there would be a greater need for private sector membership and sponsorship. Whilst this was the case virtually all board members stated that private sector membership and sponsorship would be necessary if ACME were to continue to exist following the end of ERDF.

Where large scale private sector has been involved in the city's strategy, it has been limited primarily to the *Duke Street/Bold Street* partnership<sup>12</sup>. In fact it would be misleading to suggest that the Duke Street/Bold Street partnership has or will have input into the development of a forthcoming cultural strategy. Rather this partnership is playing a limited role in the city's cultural development. Here the City Council has firmly expressed a wish that the partnership facilitates cultural concerns when developing this area. These concerns revolve about the need for the Duke Street /Bold Street partnership to facilitate the development of affordable premises for local arts organisations so reducing the possibility of gentrification displacing arts/cultural activities. ACME members are very conscious of the fact that there were no private sector representatives (at the time of interviewing). Despite this, all interviewees indicated that private sector representation would be vital after the end of the EU funding period.

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<sup>12</sup> This partnership is concerned with the redevelopment of the Duke street/Bold street area. Here the cultural considerations such as affordable premises for artists represents a minor consideration on the partnership behalf.



## **CHAPTER SEVEN: COMPARING BRISTOL AND LIVERPOOL**

### **1. Introduction**

This chapter will compare those results obtained from the Bristol and Liverpool case studies. Specifically, this comparison will include the following issues: these participants involved in the strategy process; motives for participation in strategy formation; mobilisation of actors; those relationships between actors involved in the strategy process; how a common sense of purpose amongst actors was achieved; and the congruence of interest amongst participants. Following an examination of these issues, each city's cultural strategy will be compared in terms of its content and orientation.

### **2. The catalyst for Strategy formation**

There is a degree of overlap between those factors which have prompted moves towards the creation of a cultural strategy for the two cities. In both cases the need to combat continuing economic decline and the need to diversify a local economy which had become dependent upon a narrow range of activities acted as a catalyst for moves towards the development of a cultural strategy.

In Bristol's case the major catalyst for the development of a cultural strategy stemmed from a perceived need to compete more aggressively with other cities for inward investment. In Liverpool, on the other hand, those factors which prompted the development of a strategic approach to the arts and culture were far more numerous. The factors included the need to diversify the local economy, to compete for inward investment, to alter the city's image, and to engage excluded groups in the social and economic life of the city.

### **3. Participants in the strategy process.**

Each participant's agenda and their relationship with one another has been influenced by both local and extra - local factors. In order to identify and explain how these local and extra - local forces are mediated in the pursuit of a cultural strategy, it is necessary to examine those actors participating in the strategy process and their motives for becoming involved in strategy development.

In Bristol the City Council, BCCI, SWA and ACAN were responsible for the development and implementation of a cultural strategy for the city. Prior to providing a brief description of each participant's role it is necessary to broadly characterize each participant in terms of the interests they are supposedly representing. The BCCI represents local private sector interests, SWA represents a quasi - public sector organisation with a nationally defined regional remit for supporting the development of the arts and culture and ACAN is a voluntary organisation designed to represent the interests of the city's arts community. The City Council is a democratically elected and accountable public organisation endowed with the broad remit of promoting the social and economic well-being of its locality. Finally the executive officer of the BCDP is employed by the partnership, and therefore in theory, is supposed to act in the best interests of all members of the partnership.

Participants in Liverpool's strategic approach to the arts and culture include; NWAB, the LCC and ACME (which itself consists of various sectoral and community representatives and the five Merseyside local authorities). NWAB's remit is exactly the same as SWA. ACME, as an alliance of Merseyside interests, is charged with supporting the development of culturally related industries. Here the city's cultural sectors, the five Merseyside local authorities and community interests are all represented.

Important differences between the two cities' partnerships include the geographical scale at which partnership is set in each site, the type and form of technical/expert presence within each partnership and the type and form of

community representation. In Bristol's case the partnership's (BCDP) geographical remit is concerned only with the city. LCC, however, is part of a partnership whose geographical remit is regional.

There also exists marked differences in the form of art or cultural expertise present within each partnership. In Bristol, a technical/expert presence exists in the form of SWA and the BCDP's executive officer. In Liverpool, on the other hand, there is a far wider range of technical/expert representation. This technical/expert representation is provided by NWAB, the City Council's economic development and arts representatives and ACME's cultural sector representatives and technical advisors.

One obvious similarity between each case site resides in the fact that each partnership includes community/voluntary sector representation, local authority representation, Arts Board representation and a technical/expert presence. A closer examination, however, of these constituent elements reveals one difference. Community representation within each partnership differs in its form. ACME includes community representatives from those most economically deprived areas within Merseyside. These representatives are not representatives of community based artists but instead represent their entire communities. Within the BCDP, however, voluntary/community sector representation is limited to a representative of the city's artists. There is no broader community sector representation present within the development of Bristol's cultural strategy.

#### **4. Motivation and Mobilisation**

Having identified and compared those participants involved in each city's strategy process, it is now necessary to compare and contrast the way in which they have been mobilized to take part in strategy formation and their motives for participation. Such an exercise provides a backdrop against which those partnership relationships influencing strategy development can be understood.

In Bristol it was private sector interests who identified the need for the city to compete for inward investment and to develop a reputation as a European regional capital. It was private sector interests who first placed a cultural strategy on the local political agenda. It was private sector interests who approached the City Council in order to create a partnership able to develop a strategic approach and it was ultimately the private sector who mobilized those participants involved in the strategy process.

If a cultural strategy geared towards place marketing became successful, members of the BCCI had much to gain. Increased numbers of visitors would be expected to translate into increased trade and profits. Although increased profits serve as a motivating factor for BCCI participation, it is believed that other more symbolic ends were also served. The pursuit of a cultural strategy acted as a focal point around which relations between the private sector and BCC have been improved. As a result of these improved relations, other partnerships between BCC and BCCI were created. BCCI's involvement in BCDP appeared to act as a vehicle through which reconciliatory steps towards BCC could be taken. Consequently, that involvement symbolized a desire to work in partnership for the benefit of the city as a whole. Given the emphasis on place marketing, a cultural strategy relative to other LED policy, represented a relatively depoliticised area of concern and provides an ideal focal point about which other partnerships could be created. In this way the private sector, as represented by BCCI, has been able to play a role in the governing of the city.

Given that the BCDP focused upon place marketing and that this approach is largely at odds with ACAN's more community orientated approach to the arts, it is believed that this organization's participation is linked to its funding. As a result of ACAN being funded by BCC and SWA, failure to participate in BCDP would undoubtedly have an effect on their future funding. In addition, whilst ACAN has little alternative other than to participate in BCDP, such participation also affords an elevated status for an organisation which prior to BCDP formation occupied a position of relative obscurity.

As is the case in Bristol, Liverpool City Council's involvement in ACME represented a direct move towards enhancing its capacity to intervene in the development of the arts and cultural industries as a means of addressing economic decline. A necessary feature of this is accessing EC Structural Funds. The nature of ERDF necessitates a partnership approach and in Liverpool's case the development of ACME added credibility to the City Council's plans. Associated with this were the City Council's motives for wanting to draw down ERDF monies via the creation of a partnership. At the time the City Council put forward the idea of ACME, it was believed that this would allow them to continue to play a part in the development of the arts and cultural industries despite their reductions in budget. Unlike Bristol, it was the City Council which initiated the development of a cultural strategy in Liverpool. Similarly, it was the City Council which was responsible for the mobilization of those participants involved in the development of cultural strategy.

NWAB significantly increased its capacity to act in support of the arts and cultural industries by gaining access to EC structural funds by collaborating with LCC. As stated earlier, only publicly accountable organisations are eligible to make an application for ERDF/ESF money and this necessitated NWAB's collaboration with LCC. In addition, NWAB's involvement in this alliance was viewed by its representatives as further underlining their ability to tackle arts and cultural issues within their region and also to play a leading role in this area. So those factors motivating participation were both economic and symbolic in nature.

Cultural sector representation in ACME acted as a means of underlining the pivotal role which cultural sector bodies play in the implementation of strategy. By underlining this role, cultural representatives highlighted the importance of continuing funding for their organisations. Unlike Bristol, the cultural representatives working in ACME were motivated to participate by the prospect of being able to play a sustained and active role in the development of a

strategy which would not be plagued by fluctuations in budget or changes in local government politics. In addition, cultural representatives' participation in ACME also offered the possibility of being able to re - educate the City Council, as to the best way to approach the development of the arts and cultural industries as an economic development tool.

## **5. Relationship between Participants in the Strategy Process**

Given that these differing constellations of representation have been identified, it is now important to compare the relationships between participants in each case study. Through an examination of such relationships it will be possible to comment on which participant(s) were able to exercise the greatest degree of influence over strategy orientation and content and why this was the case. In addition, an examination of relationships within each city will contribute to evaluating the degree to which central frameworks and locally rooted factors are responsible for each case sites' respective strategy orientation and content. These relationships should not be viewed in isolation but should be considered in light of what is known about the manner in which participants have been mobilized and their motives for participation.

### **5.1. The relationship between each City Council and their corresponding Regional Arts Board**

In both cities prior to the development of partnership the council and RAB had very limited contact with one another. They had failed to co - ordinate their activities and had no uniformity of funding procedures or criteria. Also common to both cities was the presence of a council which, either through lack of representation on the RAB board or through lack of consultation, felt that their democratic legitimacy to govern was being undermined<sup>1</sup>. In Bristol and Liverpool it seems that the creation of a partnership or the need to create a partnership has resulted in the RAB's explicitly recognising the councils' right,

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<sup>1</sup> Regional Arts Associations were the forerunners to the RAB. Prior to 1991 when RAAs were abolished and replaced with RABs local authority representation on these boards was a prerequisite. See chapter one.

as earned through a democratic process, to play a leading role in supporting the arts/culture.

In both cases collaboration between the council and RAB reflects each organisation's need to enhance their capacity to act. For both RABs, the councils' democratic status combined with the opportunity to co - ordinate their funding and support activities with those of the council presented a means of enhancing their [RAB's] capacity to act. Similarly, both council's ability to co - ordinate their activities with those of the RABs represented a means of enhancing their capacity to intervene in the arts and cultural sectors for economic development purposes. Also, both councils and RABs view collaboration with one another as adding a greater degree of legitimacy to their activities. SWA and NWAB are both able to demonstrate their ability to support and develop the arts and culture regionally. Similarly, both councils perceive RAB participation as adding greater legitimacy to their pursuit of EC and National Lottery funds.

Both LCC and BCC, on the one hand, and SWA and NWAB, on the other, were very aware of the resources which they were exchanging as a result of their association. Through partnership, both councils were able to indirectly gain access to their RAB's capital and expertise in funding the arts and culture. In return the RABs were able to better legitimize their actions because of their association with democratically elected representatives. In addition, in the same way that each City Council increases its capacity to act through gaining partial and indirect access to their RABs funding powers, RABs also gain indirect and partial access to each City Council's funding power. In doing so they believe that they are advancing the pursuit of their own core objectives.

Whilst these similarities exist there are also marked differences. Firstly, differences exist in the way in which the city councils and RABs initiated a collaborative approach. In Liverpool it was the council which was responsible for approaching NWAB with a very clear idea of what it was that they wanted to

achieve and how. In Bristol, on the other hand, collaboration between the BCC and SWA was mediated by the initial partnership between BCC and BCCI. Bristol City Council's involvement with the RAB within an environment created by BCDP led to a co-ordination of activities between these two organisations.

In Liverpool it was the City Council's financially driven need to co-ordinate its activities with the RAB which led to a collaborative approach between the two organisations and later the development of ACME. Secondly, the manner in which resources are exchanged differs in each case site. The exchange of resources between BCC and SWA occurs both within and beyond the parameters of the BCDP. Particular reference can be made to manner in which SWA assisted BCC in creating their own cultural strategy. The exchange of resources between NWAB and LCC, however, appear to be limited to ACME. Thirdly, whilst both RABs have recognised the City Council's democratic status, in each site this has meant different things. In Bristol the SWA regarded the City Council as the natural leader (both in symbolic terms and in terms of any one organization's ability to veto or direct action) of partnership. In contrast, NWAB's recognition of the City Council's democratic status resulted simply in the acknowledgment of the City Council's right to play a leading role in the city's artistic and cultural development. This did not amount to a recognition of LCC's right to lead. Rather NWAB views LCC on a peer basis, not as the leader of arts/cultural development. In this relationship decisions between the two organisations, in NWAB opinion, should be made jointly with no one organization's wishes able to take precedence over the other. Despite this, because of EC funding regulations, an application for funding must be made by a publicly accountable organisation. This has meant that LCC has officially held the leadership function within the partnership.

As will be alluded to in this investigation, these three factors have important implications for each organisations' degree of access to the decision making process and the changing nature of governance. This potentially has implications for the nature of the strategy adopted.



## **5.2 The City Councils and Community Sector Representation**

In examining those relationships between the City Councils and community representation in each site one is quickly drawn to the politics of exclusion which exist in Bristol. In Bristol community representation is limited to ACAN which is largely dependent on funds provided by BCC and SWA. Given that it was BCC, BCCI and SWA who initially set the BCDP's aims and given ACAN's resources and expertise, there exists very limited scope for ACAN to shape strategy orientation or content. ACAN's ability to influence strategy orientation was largely restricted prior to their becoming involved in BCDP and it has not been extended since. In addition, the absence of wider community representation provides a clear reflection of the partnership's strategic approach. That is, the BCDP is primarily concerned with place marketing and flagship development, the benefits of which are expected to 'trickle - down' to the wider community. In contrast, the inclusion of community representatives from Liverpool's five pathway sites in ACME indicates a strategic approach which more fully incorporates the community into strategy development and implementation. Again this may be a reflection of the nature of EC funding which calls for an integrated approach to strategy. That is, the explicit linking of social with economic objectives which focuses on those geographical areas which are most economically deprived.

## **5.3. The City Councils and Cultural Specific Technical/Expert Representation**

Any comparative analysis of the Councils' relationships with technical/expert elements within each partnership is made particularly difficult due to the differing nature of these technical/expert elements. Technical/expert elements are present within the BCDP in the form of SWA representatives and the executive officer. In ACME this technical/expert element is to be found in the form of cultural sector representatives, NWAB and City Council representatives. A comment on the relationship between the councils and RABs has already been made, therefore attention will be directed towards the BCDP's executive

officer and ACMEs cultural sector representatives (who are all members of Liverpool's enabling agencies).

Whilst the executive officer of the BCDP is an employee of the partnership and as such is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the partnership's wishes rather than initiating ideas, he has played a significant part in shaping BCDP and therefore BCC action. As stated in chapter 5, until 1997 the executive officer effectively led the City Council, rather than the reverse. This situation was the result of a combination of factors. Firstly, the City Council's knowledge of cultural policy was limited in comparison to the other partners. Secondly, the executive officer's knowledge of cultural policies and those sources of funding which could be accessed exceeded that of all other partners, with the exception of SWA. Thirdly, the City Council had entered into partnership with three organisations, two of which it did not completely trust. The executive officer, in theory represented a neutral party and therefore a party whose advice could be accepted as being politically impartial.

In combination these three factors led to a situation where, until recently, the executive officer was able to direct the actions of the BCDP. The need for BCC to create its own cultural strategy and SWA's assistance in doing so has altered the balance of power between the SWA representatives and the executive officer in terms of directing those actions of the BCDP and BCC. SWA's assistance in developing BCC's own strategy has created a situation where there now exists a degree of trust between these two organisations. In addition, as a result of having had to create a strategy, BCC now has a clearer view of what it is that it wishes to achieve and how. This increased awareness has meant that BCC now exhibits less reliance of the executive officer's opinions. Instead, the executive officer is now being directed by the BCC and BCDP rather than vice versa.. This has, in part, resulted in the BCDP focusing on developing those flagships already present within the city, rather than trying to attract more.

In Liverpool, in contrast, the City Council had a pool of specialist staff with a grasp of cultural policies and how they could be employed in LED. This meant that technical expertise of the cultural sector representatives were less able to lead LCC in its strategic approach to the arts. This does not mean that cultural sector representatives have not played a role in guiding strategy development within LCC and ACME. The point which is being made here is, that the degree of that influence and guidance was more limited in Liverpool than in Bristol. Whilst enabling agencies have collaborated over LCC strategy, this role has not been in the strategy development process. In addition, the council's aims have largely coincided with those of the cultural sector representatives. In part, this complementarity in aims can be attributed to the fact that all cultural sector representatives within ACME are also funded independently by LCC as enabling agencies. Consequently preferred strategic courses of action favoured by the City Council are also those favoured by the cultural sector representatives. The difficulty, until 1994, was that the City Council could not adequately fund such an effort.

Whilst cultural sector representatives have played a role in the strategic approach adopted by LCC and ACME it is important to note that their involvement has been primarily as enabling agencies and information sources. Their participation and role within ACME is not as a partner but instead as devices through which to collect and disseminate information and provide advice. That is, within ACME they only provide a supportive function, not a decision making function.

The ability to provide an up to date account of those issues facing their respective cultural sectors and their expertise in addressing these issues represent vital resources in the development and implementation of a cultural strategy. In return for providing these resources the City Council, together with NWAB, provides funding for these representatives organisations.

Finally, unlike the BCDP, ACME is not concerned with strategic practices which emphasize the primacy of flagship developments or place marketing. Instead

ACME is concerned with business development initiatives. Given those resources held by cultural representatives and their experience and knowledge, complimentary factors exist between ACME's aims and cultural sector representatives ability to assist. In many respects ACME's activities represent a grander and more well organised and executed continuation of Liverpool City Council's arts and culture activities.

#### **5.4. The City Council and the Private Sector**

The BCDP's participation in the pursuit of a cultural strategy has led to the development of a closer relationship between the City Council and the local private sector as represented by BCCI. This much improved relationship is attributed to BCCI's perceived commitment to the pursuit of a cultural strategy through partnership. Here BCCI's initiation of partnership, their willingness to compensate for reductions in BCC's financial support for BCDP, the lending of BCCI staff in the implementation of specific projects and their explicit acknowledgment of the BCC's right to lead have all served to underline their commitment to partnership. Despite this commitment to strategy development through partnership, BCC is still cautious of the BCCI. In other words, this is not a relationship based upon mutual trust. Rather, it is based on an explicit exchange of resources. BCC provides the democratic authority which the private sector lacks and which is necessary for the development of a strategy whilst BCCI provides an extra source of capital and where necessary manpower. As is the case in the relationship between BCC and SWA both parties are fully aware of the resources controlled by each other and the resources which are exchanged.

There also exists a clear understanding of the rules and norms which govern this relationship. These relate to BCC's status as lead organisation, both symbolically and in terms of its ability to influence and veto action, within the partnership. It is an adherence to this rule/norm as well as a perceived commitment to a collaborative approach which has ultimately been responsible for a continuing association between these two parties.

In contrast to Bristol where the private sector occupies a central role in strategy creation, in Liverpool, the private sector is noticeably absent from participation in cultural strategy development for the city . There does, however, exist private sector participation in individual projects. For example the development of Duke Street/Bold Street is being led by a partnership between LCC, local private sector interests and local community groups. Here LCC has carefully circumscribed private sector action in terms of insisting that affordable space/premises is made available for artists and cultural entrepreneurs. This limiting of private sector involvement to specific projects coincides with the need to match ERDF money. Several interviewees within ACME have readily acknowledged that private sector participation is less important within ACME because there already exists the ability to raise capital for initiatives from the five local authorities and NWAB.

#### **6. Has A Common Sense of Purpose Been Achieved and If so how?**

In both case study sites there exists a strong sense of purpose amongst those partners involved in the strategy process. This sense of purpose, however, has been created differently and at different stages in the development of each partnership. In Bristol's case, prior to the development of the BCDP there existed a vague sense of purpose as to what a partnership would seek to achieve and how. Initially it was this vague sense of purpose which, in part, acted as a pull (and push) factor in bringing the partnership members together.

In Liverpool's case there existed a stronger sense of purpose during the early stages of ACME's formation. This stronger sense of purpose can be attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, LCC had for a long time (since 1987) wished to employ the arts and cultural industries as vehicles for economic change. Secondly, NWAB's working remit complimented those aims of LCC. In this sense a common sense of purpose in part reflected these two members own previously rehearsed activities within the cultural sector. Finally, the media and cultural industries were included in the SPD as a "driver for change". These

drivers for change concern themselves with economic and social goals. Specifically, 'driver 4' (cultural, media and leisure industries) aims to:

- Develop facilities for potential investors;
- improve the quality of cultural and media industries through industry specific skills training;
- attract visitors through festivals and other attractions, improving accommodation and the skills of workers within the tourist industry;
- protecting and improving the natural environment and historic buildings (Merseyside 2000, 1994:111-122)

At the time of interviewing, partnerships in each case study site had achieved a common sense of purpose. As indicated above, in each case site this common sense of purpose was achieved in different ways. BCDP's common sense of purpose was constructed by those actors participating in the strategy process. Here BCC's, SWA's and BCCI's individual agendas overlapped in such a way as to assist in the construction of a common sense of purpose. In addition, the adoption of a norm or rule which placed BCC as the partnership's natural lead organisation assisted the development of this common sense of purpose.

In Liverpool, however, this common sense of purpose quickly became apparent once it was decided to involve the development of the arts and cultural industries as 'drivers of change'. Here Structural Funds guidelines largely dictated how the arts and cultural industries should be employed. This was partly highlighted by the way in which LCC and NWAB's competition about which organisation should occupy the primary role as cultural development agency failed to create tensions sufficient enough to disrupt partnership. Here guidelines specifying the need for applications for Structural Fund money to be submitted by a publicly accountable organisation dictated that LCC should, at least in name, act as the lead organisation.

## **7. Congruence of Interests**

Partnerships in each case site exhibit relatively high congruence of interest. This explains, in part, how a common sense of purpose was achieved. In both cases the remit of RABs although not exactly matching that of councils were none the less complimentary. In the case of Bristol, BCC's marketing of the arts, and its support for cultural activities which have the ability to operate in a regional and national market coincided with SWA's remit to provide arts/cultural support and evaluate the profile of the arts and cultural activities regionally. Similarly, LCC's attempts to encourage, cultural industry and community arts development and to market the city's arts complimented NWAB's remit of supporting and widening cultural consumption in the region. As stated above BCCI's ultimate motivation for participation is to be found in its pursuit of economic rewards for its members. This interest in part compliments BCC's wish to use the arts and wider cultural activities as economic development tools by marketing the arts and thereby marketing the city. A moderate degree of complimentary even exists between BCCI's and SWA's motivations for pursuing a cultural strategy. BCCI wishes to see the profile of the city elevated through raising the profile of the arts and cultural activity and in doing so stimulate economic growth. This compliments SWA's remit of supporting arts/cultural development and increasing audiences for the arts and cultural activities.

Whilst relatively high congruence of interests have been identified in each case site, it is important to consider this alongside other characteristics of partnership in each site. Despite a high congruence of interests in each site the aims of each partnership has been constructed rather than assumed. In Bristol this high congruence has not been translated into either equal access to strategy decisions or an absence of conflict within BCDP. As stated above BCC possesses the greatest ability to directly influence strategy whilst ACAN's ability to shape strategy content is virtually negligible. Whilst access to the decision making process is uneven, all parties involved in BCDP recognized that this

would be the case prior to its creation. Despite this unequal access to decision making, all parties concerned were of the opinion that their respective organization's interests would be better served through inclusion in this partnership. For example SWA entered partnership assuming that BCC and BCCI would probably have the greatest ability to dictate strategy direction. Similarly, ACAN also knew that their input into strategy content and direction would be minimal in comparison to the other partners. In addition, until 1997 the relationship between SWA and the executive officer was characterised by a fierce struggle over the direction in which the partnership should move.

In ACME's case, the relationship between LCC and NWAB has been characterised by shared interests and shared (broadly) means by which goals are to be pursued. Similarly, whilst it would be misleading to state that LCC and NWAB have had equal access to decision making their appears to be noticeable difficulty in any one organization's ability to dictate either terms or the direction strategy. In this regard the partnerships pursuit and capture of ERDF money has had a part to play in maintaining partnership.

## **8. Strategy Content and Orientation**

An examination of the content of each strategy reveals at a first glance startling similarities. Both cities' strategic approach share the following characteristics. These characteristics are:

- a wide definition of the terms cultural and arts;
  - advocate the need to facilitate training;
  - advocate encouraging the development of 'local talent';
  - identify the provision of premises and open space for cultural activities as being important;
  - encourage greater use of local arts/cultural facilities;
  - attempt to support initiatives which show potential to capture regional, national and international markets;
  - attempt to raise the profile of the city by raising the profile of the arts/culture;
- and



- attempt to consolidate and develop new partnerships in the development of the arts and cultural industries.

Despite these similarities a closer examination of each city's strategic approach as set out in strategy documents and discussions with key actors reveals significant differences. These differences are to be found in strategy content. Here strategy content refers to those tasks which have been identified as being necessary in the pursuit of key aims. By considering these tasks it becomes possible to comment on the orientation of each strategy. That is, it becomes possible to comment on what each strategy is attempting to achieve and how.

Merseyside's (and therefore Liverpool's) moves to improve quality in the cultural and tourist industries as well as LCC's attempts to improve the survival rates of businesses in the arts and cultural industries closely resembles Bristol's attempts to secure the long term future of a dynamic and innovative arts sector. One of those tasks identified by both cities has being necessary in the pursuit of such a task is training. Whilst training for the arts/cultural sector is identified as a key task in each city's' strategy, the extent and manner in which this task is pursued differs significantly.

In Liverpool training within and for the arts and cultural industries represents a major part of the city's overall strategic approach to cultural, social and economic development. Here training is divided into 'training within the cultural sector' and 'training for the cultural sector'. That is, LCC through the use of enabling agencies and with the aide of ESF money provides training for cultural and arts organisations. Such training focuses on facilitating companies' abilities to effectively train their own members of staff and in doing so ensure that they are endowed with those skills required by the market. The rationale behind such a move is to make these organisations more business like and in doing so make them more competitive. Through such activities it is expected that the long term survival rates of such companies will be increased as well as the numbers of those people which they employ. 'Training for the cultural sector'

refers to LCC's attempts , with the aide of ESF money, to provide those skills and qualifications relevant to market needs. Whilst such training initiatives are to be found across the city as a whole Merseyside's SPD proposes to concentrate on those most economically deprived parts of the region (Pathway Areas). In doing so it is argued that such initiatives contribute to the removal of barriers to employment. Given the fact that the arts and cultural industries have been identified as a potential growth industry there exists greater scope for combating unemployment in these areas. From an economic development perspective one can identify how 'training within the cultural sector' and 'training for the cultural sector' compliment one another and in doing so underlines LCC's and ACME's carefully constructed approach towards economic development and reducing economic and social polarization within the city.

In contrast to Liverpool's carefully constructed approach towards training for and within the arts and cultural industries Bristol's (i.e., BCC and BCDP) approach towards training about the arts and culture is relatively vague. Neither BCC's strategy document nor its officer's or councilors make any reference to attempting to provide training initiatives which focus on those economically deprived parts of the city. In addition, although BCC is keen to eradicate the culture of subsidy dependency which plagues the arts community, no attempts are made to achieve this through training arts organisations to become more 'business like' in their approach. Instead arts organisations in receipt of BCC money are expected to meet new criteria unaided. This absence of a clearly articulated statement on training may reflect the recent nature of the city's interest in the arts and culture relative to Liverpool and as such may reflect BCC's and SWA's lack of experience or knowledge in this policy area. At this point it is important remember that Liverpool's use of the arts and culture as an economic development tool predates that of Bristol's by at least 4 years.

The initial catalyst for Bristol's adoption of a strategic approach to the arts and culture was provided by a perceived need to market the city. Following an examination of BCDP's activities and BCC's strategy document it is possible to

argue that place - marketing and those activities which support place - marketing provides the main focus of BCDP's and BCC's activities. At the time of interviewing most of BCDP's activities were concerned with the capture and development of high profile events or activities such as securing the Harbourside Centre, the Millennium project and festival, Imagination, the Brief Encounters Film Festival and the Bristol Marketing Campaign. This in itself is not sufficient to claim that, at the time of interviewing, the city's strategic approach to culture and the arts emphasized marketing. An examination, however, of who or what the City Council's arts unit funded at the time of interviewing also supports the argument that there is an emphasis on marketing. In the main those bodies which are funded are those which have the potential to reach a regional, national or international market. Whilst it has not been possible to trace exactly how all of the arts unit's budget is distributed it is possible to state that over half is used to fund such high profile initiatives such as the Bristol Old Vic, Watershed and BCDP. Combined, BCC's strategy document and an emphasis on funding high profile initiatives or partnerships which focus on high profile initiatives or marketing it is difficult not to come to the conclusion that particular emphasis is being placed on city - marketing activities.

In contrast, Liverpool appears to have achieved a greater degree of balance between marketing initiatives and other areas of strategy such as business development, access and training initiatives. In fact, as shall be discussed later in this section, where attempts to develop place marketing do exist they are invariably linked to other considerations such as training, the provision of premises and workspace for arts and cultural organisations, SMEs and microbusinesses as is the case in the Duke Street/Bold Street area.

One of those objectives pursued by Bristol's arts strategy is the generating of greater involvement in the arts from all sections of the city's diverse community. BCC's strategy proposes to achieve this goal by pursuing policies which stimulate arts attendance and participation, reflect the city's cultural diversity,

encourages life long learning, empowers communities through the arts and promotes the value of the arts as a social policy tool. Once again the policy tasks identified in strategy documents are extremely vague in their nature and as such fail to state exactly how these policies are to be implemented, why and where. Unlike Liverpool there is no explicit linking of these policies to those most economically deprived parts of the city.

An objective highlighted in the strategy document but stated by BCC councilors and arts unit representatives is a wish to use the city center as a focal point for the expression of such cultural diversity. Interviews with BCC councillors and the head of Leisure Services reveals their intentions to use the Harbourside as a focal point about which all sections of the city's communities can meet and display their cultural and artistic character. Considering the projected high costs of completing the Harbourside Centre it is feared that it will divert funds away from other cultural facilities and activities across the city. When one considers the projected costs of completing the HC and its proposed use (i.e., as venue where a range of cultural performances and activities by community groups and professionals will take place) it is difficult to dismiss those charges leveled against the BCC by all sections of the arts community. In addition, in order for the HC to become economically sustainable it is necessary that a critical mass of users is achieved. By filtering community groups through the Harbourside Centre BCC moves closer to achieving this needed critical mass of users.

It could be argued that one of the means of empowering communities through arts and cultural activities is to provide or facilitate training within these communities. Whilst training is mentioned elsewhere in the strategy document it is not mentioned in that section concerned with community empowerment.

Liverpool's attempts to encourage greater involvement in the arts/culture yet again represents a far more structured approach. As in the case of Bristol, LCC and ACME use the language of community empowerment and capacity building. In Liverpool, however, there has been a clear identification of those

communities in which this empowerment should take place. In addition the Merseyside SPD and LCC is very clear as to how this empowerment is to be achieved. Through training and education initiatives which prioritise the young and the long term unemployed in these areas, it is expected that barriers to unemployment within the arts and cultural industries will be reduced. As part of this move towards empowering specific communities LCC and ACME actively encourage these communities to create initiatives which can be linked to local economic development. In this way ACME and LCC is attempting to create a culture of self help.

BCC's wish to promote the value of the arts in social policy areas reflects an acknowledgment of the potentially wide ranging influence and applicability of the arts and culture. Despite this recognition BCC is very vague as to how this is to be achieved and following interviews with city councillors and arts unit staff it is difficult to envisage how, given the arts unit's small budget and small numbers of staff with limited expertise, this will be achieved. In addition, BCC strategy documents do not identify those geographical areas on which these policies are supposed to focus. Once again LCC is very clear as to where such policies are to focus both geographically and in terms of specific cultural sectors and exactly how the arts/culture are to be employed in order to enhance social policy.

Bristol's moves towards enhancing the city's status as a cultural centre for the west of England and as a major European city, reveals the degree to which much of the strategy is concerned with creating infrastructure necessary for the development of the arts and culture about local economic development. In particular an examination of this aim along with its key tasks highlights an emphasis on those activities associated with place marketing. Out of twenty key tasks identified within the strategic aim (i.e., enhancing Bristol's status as a cultural centre for the region and as a European city) eight are directly geared towards marketing the city through an appropriation of the arts and culture.

Liverpool's strategic approach reflects the fact that much of the infrastructure necessary for the implementation of a cultural strategy is already in place. That is, there already exists sector specific umbrella organisations with which LCC consults and employs as enabling agencies and information sources. In addition LCC already publishes an annual arts directory listing those events and organisations present within the city. Also Liverpool's arts funding strategy has for a long time been geared towards funding enabling agencies and those organizations whose activities match the City Council's strategic aims, namely employing the arts and cultural industries as economic development tools. Bristol's arts unit on the other hand has only recently adopted this approach towards funding. Similarly, whilst enabling agencies such as SWMDA, 'Picture This' and ACAN focus on media, film and art exist, the breadth and degree of enabling agencies present in Liverpool did not exist.

Another point of difference which is evident, not only from strategy documents but also from interviews conducted with BCC's councillors and employees, is the degree to which consensus exists on the value of arts and culture in terms of generating economic benefits. It has long been accepted in Liverpool (since 1987) that the arts and culture potentially have a vital role to play in the economic as well as social development of the city. In Bristol, however, the BCC's arts unit and BCDP are still engaged in selling the importance of the arts to other City Council departments. These differences are reflected in the fact that LCC's Economic Development Department plays a central role in a strategic approach towards cultural development. The department is represented within ACME, funds key cultural enabling agencies and is expected to play a part in the development of a formally articulated strategy for the city. In Bristol, however, at the time of interviewing the Economic Development Department was only beginning to play a role in the city's strategic approach. In many respects BCDP's existence and the fact that it is the arts unit rather than economic development which funds [it] highlights this point of difference.

So whilst BCC is concerned with attempting to integrate the arts and cultural considerations into other City Council directorate's activities, LCC has already achieved a higher degree of integration. LCC's arts unit, economic development unit and education department already play a part in the city's strategic approach towards the arts and cultural activities.

BCC's strategy document also stresses the need to develop partnerships with other local authorities in the region. Such a move is deemed a necessary part of a National Lottery strategy. At the time of interviewing the only local authority with which BCC had formed ad hoc alliances with was Bath. In comparison LCC is already engaged in partnership with the five other Merseyside local authorities. Whilst it has already been mentioned that Liverpool's association with the other Merseyside local authorities is linked to the pursuit of Structural Funds which are allocated on a regional basis, the same is also true of some National Lottery funds. For example, BCC will be aware of moves being taken by the Arts Council to allocate capital funding based upon the inclusion of new priorities. One of this priorities is concerned with whether or not funding will contribute to national and regional strategies. Such a new priority will necessitate collaboration with neighbouring local authorities.

BCC's aim of achieving optimum value for money from investment in the arts yet again highlights moves towards set in place a staffing structure capable of leading on an arts strategy. As indicated elsewhere in this commentary such considerations are not necessary in Liverpool where there already exists an Arts and Cultural Unit and Economic Development Department endowed with suitably qualified staff capable of leading on a strategy.

Finally Liverpool's strategic approach appears to be far more holistic reflecting a greater degree of integration between LCC departments and ACME which reflect attempts to develop the arts and cultural industries as a means of addressing both social and economic issues. LCC explicitly identifies how and where each strategic task is integrated. For example having identified the arts

and cultural industries as a potential growth sector LCC and ACME have set about attempting to increase SME survival rates through the imparting of business skills. Similarly, audits of the city's cultural sectors have revealed those skills and qualifications lacking in the local workforce. In order to address these skills shortages and provide an adequately trained workforce for an expanding industrial sector LCC, via its enabling agencies, facilitates training for individuals and organisations. Some of these training and skills development initiatives focus on areas of highest deprivation within the city. Simultaneously ACME attempts to encourage the development of cultural initiatives in these areas. In doing so LCC and ACME contribute to empowering these local communities and removing barriers to employment in a growing industrial sector.

#### **9. Definition of the term 'Culture' employed**

In both cities a broad definition of the term 'culture' is employed. In doing so each local authority and partnership acknowledges changing patterns of cultural consumption and the need to not differentiate between high and low forms of art/culture. More importantly such a broad definition facilitates directing attention to cultural activities which represent national and regional growth areas (e.g., media).



## **CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS**

### **1. Introduction**

The previous chapter identified and characterised the following issues:

- which actors participate in the development of cultural strategy;
- how participation within those coalitions responsible for cultural strategy development is mobilised;
- whether a common sense purpose exists amongst coalition partners and how it is achieved;
- what the purpose of the coalition is (as broadly defined by coalition partners, strategy statements and strategy implementation) and;
- how the character and operation of a particular coalition influences the character of cultural strategy which is formulated.

It is now necessary to examine these research findings through the lens of regime theory. Such an exercise will usefully relate those agents involved in coalition formation to both the decision making process and the resulting strategy. This chapter will therefore, be divided into four parts. First, research findings will be summarised and those local causal factors lying at the heart of strategy formation will be discussed. Second, the degree to which non - local factors influence the adoption and form of cultural strategy in each city will be explored. Third, comments will be made as to how the identification of these factors have advanced understanding of cultural strategy formation. Finally, consideration will be given on the degree to which regime theory has been able to address the research's central questions.

## **2. Local causal factors laying behind the development of cultural strategy**

In Bristol, the mobilisation of actors and their motives for participation in strategy development were based upon a combination of local dependence, the pursuit of tangible results and that which Stoker & Mossberger (1994: 203) define as 'expressive politics'. The mobilisation of those actors involved in the development of Bristol's cultural strategy was initiated by the BCCI. It was the BCCI who developed the idea of creating a cultural strategy. The BCCI's motives for developing a cultural strategy were based upon a perceived need to create an image for the city which was conducive to the attraction of inward investment. Here inward investment was deemed to be necessary in order to safeguard those business interests which already existed within the city. The pursuit of such a strategy was, therefore, deemed to be in the best interests of BCCI members and in this regard business mobilisation and motives for participation in the development of a cultural strategy can be seen to be driven partly by local dependence.

As noted in chapter five, it would be a mistake to view local dependence as being the only motive for business sector participation. Whilst the majority of BCCI representatives are made up of small businesses belonging to the local Chambers of Commerce, the driving force behind BCCI was located in its executive group (TBI). The TBI's membership, in contrast to the remainder of BCCI, consists primarily of multi - location interests. Given that the driving force behind BCCI action consists of multi - location interests, it is improbable that local dependence has acted as the sole motivating factor in business participation in strategy development. There are also indications that those motives for business involvement in the pursuit of a cultural strategy were based upon civic duty. Here it is important to remember that the TBI was created in response to the 'Initiative Beyond Charity' report which called for businesses to adopt a more prominent role in governance.

These motives for business interest in the arts and culture directly influenced both the identification of those actors to be mobilised in pursuit of a cultural

strategy and the manner in which they were mobilised. The actors who were mobilised by the BCCI were determined by resources which were required in order to pursue the development of a cultural strategy. These resources were a source of democratic legitimacy and expertise in arts/culturally related issues. This then explains why the BCCI sought to mobilise the City Council, SWA and ACAN. The manner in which support and resources for the development of cultural strategy were mobilised, however, also reflects past conflicts, not only between the city council and central government but also between the City Council and private sector interests within the city. The nature of these conflicts had deepened the Labour City Council's distrust of the private sector. Given Bristol's economic position relative to other cities, the City Council was able to make little effort to work with the private sector in the pursuit of economic development<sup>1</sup>.

Recognising these issues, the BCCI approached the city council making clear their wish to pursue a collaborative approach to economic development. Here it is also important to note that the manner in which the BCCI approached the City Council also contributed to ensuring the beginning of collaborative approach to cultural strategy formation. Here the BCCI employed an approach which emphasised the idea of community and civic duty. Once again, 'expressive politics' can be seen to have had a role to play in the development of partnership.

Given this context, the pursuit of a cultural strategy not only represented a vehicle for economic development but also represented an area around which private sector - city council relations could be improved. Cultural strategy represented a relatively uncontentious area around which collaboration between the city council and private sector could be constructed.

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<sup>1</sup> This finding is reminiscent of Haughton and While's (1999: 2) assertion that those cities with more buoyant economies are less dependent upon intergovernmental structures and therefore are able to exhibit a greater degree of freedom in the way they pursue governance.

The City Council motives for agreeing to enter into partnership with the BCCI [providing the nature of partnership was to their liking] are concerned with its reduced ability to effectively lead in local economic development within the city. Given the 'ground rules' upon which BCDP was eventually established and the willingness of the private sector to adhere to these rules, the BCDP and a cultural strategy offered the City Council the opportunity to publicly (re)assert itself as the lead actor in governance. Initially the BCDP and the development of a cultural strategy presented one of the few areas in which the City Council believed it could act autonomously. Equally important was the need to be seen to be adopting a proactive approach to combating economic decline. In this regard the research findings are consistent with Quilley's (1999:188) findings in Manchester<sup>2</sup>.

SWA's motives for participation in the development of a cultural strategy, (despite its distrust of the BCCI), have been based upon its past relationships with the Bristol's arts community and the feeling that it had given little attention to the city. SWA's motives for participation were, therefore, partly based upon 'expressive politics'. Motives for participation, however, were also based upon local dependency and the pursuit of tangible results. SWA's dependence on Bristol stems from its regional remit and the fact that Bristol represented the largest city in the South West. The pursuit of tangible results can be seen in SWA's attempts to use the BCDP as an additional means of pursuing its own objectives (see chapter five)

Given these overlapping motives for participation and the widely held view that the city was slipping into decline, a vague common sense of purpose can be seen to have existed prior to the development of the BCDP. This sense of purpose was concerned with developing the arts and culture in such a way as to act as a place marketing tool. For the BCCI and Bristol City Council this

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<sup>2</sup> Here Quilley implies that Manchester City Council moved from municipal socialism towards an entrepreneurial mode of governance characterised by cultural and flagship development because it represented one of the few means by which they (the city council) could be seen to be both proactive and successful.

meant the pursuit of inward investment and prestige whilst for SWA this meant pursuing its own remit. Whilst this vague sense of purpose existed, it was the creation of the BCDP which enabled a more clearly defined common sense of purpose to be established.

The manner in which participants were mobilised, their motives for participation and past historical factors had a direct role to play in influencing the internal dynamics of the BCDP. These factors, in turn, impacted upon the BCDP's strategy. The primary rule upon which partnership was based concerned the role and status accorded to the City Council. Here the BCCI and SWA had to ensure that the city council's authority as the democratically elected representatives for the city was never supplanted. Such a rule was ultimately a prerequisite for both the creation and maintenance of partnership working. Adherence to this rule stems from fact that the City Council's distrust of the private sector was based upon the view that they (the private sector) had, in the past (e.g. BDC and property development interests), attempted to either by - pass the City Council or challenge its right to lead in governance. Similarly, SWA's (begrudging) adherence to this rule has been based upon the knowledge that the City Council's distrust of them was based upon the fact that they [SWA] represents an unknown quantity.

During the early stages of BCDP's existence, adherence to this rule effectively allowed the trajectory of the city's cultural strategy to be set with limited intra - partnership conflict or questioning what it would mean for issues of equity within the city's arts and general community. Here the BCDP's chief executive played an important role in that he was able to set a course of action characterised by an emphasis on flagship developments. This course was established despite the fact that it was actively opposed by one of his employers (i.e. SWA). The executive officer's ability to guide the BCDP's course of action during the early stages of its existence was directly related to the City Council's lack of knowledge of how cultural strategies could be applied and their distrust of SWA.

SWA's inability to offer prolonged resistance to such a course of action was linked to the need to adhere to the central rule upon which partnership was based. In addition, the BCCI, given its motives for involvement, was content to pursue a strategy which focused primarily upon flagship led place marketing. Initial success in bidding for National Lottery and Millennium funds in order to develop flagship projects effectively secured the executive officer's status as a reliable authority on the development of a strategic approach to the use of the arts and culture. It was not until the City Council, with the assistance of SWA, developed its own arts (cultural) strategy that it was able to exert a greater degree of control over the development of the city's strategic approach to the arts and culture.

It is, however, important to note that the development of the City Council's own arts/cultural strategy was not based upon a need to guide the actions of the BCDP. Rather the development of the City Council's arts strategy was motivated by 'expressive politics'. Here the City Council attempted to counter claims from the city's arts and cultural community that it had abdicated its responsibility for these sectors and instead allowed the BCDP to lead on the development of a strategy which was concerned with economic rather than cultural development. The development of the council's own arts strategy, therefore, represented a clear attempt to be seen to be filling those gaps left by BCDP's activities. In comparison to the BCDP, the City Council's arts strategy devoted greater attention to social issues such as enabling arts and community development. Whilst this was the case, however, it is important to note that the strategy was still (by the admission of city councillors) geared predominantly towards to the pursuit of economic objects. Given the City Council's need to appear to be leading on the development of a cultural strategy, the development of its own arts (cultural) strategy represented a necessity rather than optional extra.

In Liverpool it was the City Council who responsible for initiating a strategic approach to the development of the arts and cultural sectors. The way in which

this was done also reflected past central - local government and local government - private sector relations. In addition to this, the city's economic position influenced the way in which a partnership approach to strategy development was initiated.

Those reasons for initiating collaborative funding efforts with NWAB in 1987 have been based on both a new economic realism and symbolic grounds. In other words, the City Council's Economic Development Department accepted the reality that it would be unable to adequately address economic development through the arts and cultural sector by itself. In this regard the pursuit of tangible results represented a prime motivating factor. In addition, collaborative funding arrangements were seen to underline a break with the past and signal the City Council's wish to work in partnership with other local interests. As such, 'expressive politics' can also be seen to have been a motivating factor in the city council's initiation of a collaborative approach to arts/culture led economic development.

Whilst these motives influenced the City Council's pursuit of collaborative funding arrangements they also had a role to play in the development of ACME. The City Council's initiation of ACME, however, also reflected an attempt not to create additionality but instead to substitute activities - here the City Council saw ACME as a vehicle through which continued support for the arts and cultural sectors could be achieved at reduced costs to itself.

The City Council's wish to use ACME as a substitute for its own activities was not successful because of direct opposition from the region's enabling agencies and NWAB. No attempts were made on the behalf of these actors not to oppose the local authorities' wish to direct operations. In contrast to Bristol, the norm upon which ACME operated was based upon the need for the cultural advisors to direct operations. This was a norm which Liverpool City Council and the other member local authorities were unable and ultimately unwilling to circumvent. To do so would have been to risk the development of partnership.

Cultural advisor's dominance over the approach adopted by ACME is partly explained by NWAB's relationship with the City Council both within and beyond the boundaries of ACME. NWAB's past relationship with the City Council had been based upon an attempt to guide cultural development within the city irrespective of the City Council democratic status. In terms of working arrangements, the least that NWAB has been willing to accept is a relationship established on a peer basis. This type of relationship has been allowed to develop because of a number of factors. First, the City Council's past history of conflict with local private sector interests and central government had created an image which was not regarded as being conducive to inward investment. If this image was to be altered it was necessary that an image of collaborative working relationships based upon consensus were established. Despite obvious undercurrents of institutional competition between NWAB and the City Council, outwardly an image of peer based collaboration has been presented.

Second, (and associated with the first point), both the City Council and NAWB recognised that they have more to gain through a collaborative approach than through working in isolation. This is reflected in those resources which they do (and do not) control. The City Council is the city's democratically elected representative and as such is empowered to act in its best interests. NWAB on the other hand, has access to expertise within the cultural sector and also represents an additional source of funding. Each actor requires access to the other's resources if they are to advance their own position.

Third, gaining access to ERDF monies is dependent upon a partnership approach between stakeholders. Finally, the city's depressed economy has meant that the City Council has been forced to accept a situation where it is regarded as a key actor rather than the lead actor. Such a situation has resulted in the development of a partnership in which the City Council has been forced to endorse rather than direct ACME's strategic approach. In contrast to Bristol, therefore, partnership in Liverpool is based more upon an explicit



exchange of resources in order to maintain a marriage of convenience, than it is on the development of trust, loyalty and mutual understanding.

As was the case in the BCDP, ACME has provided an environment in which the City Council has been (re)educated in best practice with regards to the development of the arts and cultural strategies. At the time of interviewing these learning processes were just beginning to filter into the City Council and influence its funding and monitoring procedures. In addition, results from the Liverpool case study indicate that NWAB and enabling agencies within the region will have a direct and guiding role to play in the development of the City Council's new cultural strategy. It is expected that this cultural strategy will attempt to complement and continue those activities of the ACME. In this way the city's cultural strategy is set to continue to address both social and economic goals in a way which acknowledges that they are mutually reinforcing.

Whilst resources, both in terms of knowledge and funding have largely been provided through ACME, the City Council has for a long time pursued a strategy based upon a dual but largely uncoordinated approach geared towards social and economic development. ACME's activities have acted as a means of showing how this can approach can be improved.

### **3. The influence of non - local factors on cultural strategy development**

Ward (1997:1495 - 1496;1996:431) have argued that regimes may well be centrally prescribed and locally mediated phenomena. Whilst it was not the intention of this investigation to identify the presence of a regime, these comments are still relevant to the present discussion. Neither Bristol nor Liverpool's coalition could be described as a regime according to Stone's (1989) definition. However, Ward's (1997;1996) comments apply equally to coalitions like BCDP and ACME. The relevant question which needs to be addressed here is whether those partnerships through which each city's strategic approach has been developed represent a centrally prescribed

phenomena. Addressing such a question necessarily contributes to the discussion of how local political factors influence the type of cultural strategy produced in each city.

Results from this investigation indicate that ACME does represent a centrally prescribed approach to the development of strategy. Given those tensions which exist between all ACME's members, it is questionable whether it would have been established had it not been for the presence of EU funding. It was the prospect of accessing EU funds which prompted actors involved in the strategy process to co - operate with one another. Whilst EU funding has meant that a strategic approach involving the pursuit of economic and social objectives has been pursued, it is important to recognise that this funding has not completely dictated the nature of the strategy created. Here it is important to note a number of factors. First, as noted above, the City Council has for a long time (since 1987), attempted to pursue such an approach towards the development of the arts and culture. This approach, however, has been hampered by a lack of resources.

Second, it is important to note that it was the City Council which was largely responsible for including the arts, media and cultural industries as a 'driver for change' within the SPD. Third, in direct opposition to the City Council, it has been ACME's advisors who have heavily influenced ACME's operations. These factors collectively underline the influence of local political factors upon the city's strategic approach.

Whilst Bristol has accessed central sources of funding (e.g. National Lottery and Millennium funds) in the pursuit of its cultural strategy, it is important to note that unlike Liverpool, partnership in Bristol did not develop around the need to access non - local funding. Rather, partnership has developed around the need to resolve differences between the City Council and the local private sector in order to combine resources in an attempt to attract inward investment. It has only been as a result of the partnership that external sources of funding

such as National Lottery and Millennium funds have been identified and accessed. Whilst, therefore, it is possible to state that external sources of funding have influenced the nature of the city's cultural strategy, it is not possible to assert that partnership, in this context, has been centrally prescribed. To do so would be to seriously underplay the degree to which local politics have influenced strategy development and outcome.

DiGaetano (1997:849) notes that intergovernmental systems which are either competitive, enabling or directive effectively set the parameters for local government action. In his examination of regime formation in Bristol, DiGaetano (1997:861) goes on to assert that a competitive intergovernmental system effectively forced the City Council into partnership with the city's private sector. As noted above, whilst the notion that the competitive intergovernmental system has forced Bristol City Council into partnership has been rejected, it is still accepted that the intergovernmental system sets the parameters in which local action occurs (Haughton and While, 1999:1; Stoker, 1995:67; DiGaetano & Lawless, 1999:572; Keating, 1993:). Here a competitive intergovernmental system has presented constraints and opportunities for particular courses of action, it has not forced the City Council into partnership with the private sector. On the contrary, it has been the complex interaction between the effects of this competitive system, historical economic, political (local and local - central relations) and present local political factors which lie at the heart of cultural strategy formation. If competitive intergovernmental factors had forced the City Council into partnership then those local political relationships upon which strategy has been developed would have been very different.

#### **4. Advances in understanding cultural strategy development**

An examination and comparison of cultural strategy formation in Bristol and Liverpool has usefully contributed to understanding of this strategy area in a number of ways. First, in both cities cultural strategy is being designed in such a way so as to attempt to reduce welfare dependency (i.e., a shift away from subsidy and towards investment). This is clearly reflected in each city council's

emphasis on funding those organisations which potentially have an economic development or educational role to play within the cultural sector.

Second, given the relationships which existed between both city councils and their respective RABs, it would appear that Kawashima (1997) correct in suggesting that RAB reorganisation has resulted in an almost adversarial relationship between local authorities and RABs. The results from this investigation suggest that RABs and local authorities will have to move closer towards long term collaborative arrangements in the pursuit of cultural development. Whilst this is the case, however, those tensions which exist between these two groups indicate that the development of long term collaboration will have to be actively constructed around an explicit understanding of their respective roles and positions within such partnerships.

Third, commentators (Griffiths, 1995:262) have suggested that cultural strategies act as a focal point around which partnership can be constructed. Here Griffiths states that this is the case because cultural strategies' recent emergence as a local economic development tool has meant that "*lines of division have not yet crystallised.*" Indeed, Griffiths goes on to suggest that cultural strategies are conducive to partnership formation because of the presence of a shared ideology and set of values amongst its partners. The results of this investigation, however, suggest that cohesive factors within such partnerships are less concerned with shared ideology and more concerned with 'expressive politics', local dependency and the pursuit of tangible results.

Fourth, on the point of how strategic dilemmas (as to which type of cultural strategy should be pursued) are resolved, Griffiths (1995:263) notes that the BCDP's approach to some extent concerns itself with all three strategy models. Whilst this is the case it is clear that Bristol's strategy concentrates primarily on one approach (i.e., place marketing). All other approach are merely of secondary importance As noted above, as far as the BCDP was concerned strategic dilemmas did not exist, the strategy type was decided very quickly and

with little intra - partnership conflict or consideration of alternative approaches. With regards to Liverpool, strategic dilemmas did not exist because of the partners involved in the strategy process, the high degree of overlap in their motives for wishing to pursue the development of a strategy and because Objective One guidelines stipulated the need to link social and economic development.

Fifth, despite the presence of a weakened local authority in each city and intergovernmental systems which set those parameters in which local action can occur, local political and social relations have still played a central role in influencing the type of cultural strategy created. Cultural strategies have not, as suggested by Strange (1996:36) resulted in 'policies of least resistance' caused by a need to accommodate all parties involved in the strategy making process. Rather, cultural strategy in each city has reflected the complex interaction between local politics (past and present) and economic forces with wider economic and political forces.

Recognising these factors, it has been possible to assign meaning to each cultural strategy. In Bristol's case, cultural strategy reflects the local private sector's and City Council's attempts at reconciliation so as to present an external image conducive to inward investment and increase the effectiveness of urban governance. Cultural strategy also reflects the City Council's attempts to (re)assert its status as the leading actor in local economic development within the city. Liverpool's strategic approach to the arts and culture reflects the city council's cautious attempts to define a leading role for itself in local economic development whilst at the same time attempting to construct a positive image for itself and the city.

## **5. Cultural Strategy and New Urban Politics**

The findings from this research partly contradict those assertions made by authors (Quilley, 1999:203; Ward, 1997:1503; and Bassett 1996:5) who have suggested that:

“... the positive impacts of this new urban politics in terms of co - operation, the empowering of local communities, widening the basis of representation and tapping additional sources of expertise are frequently overstated.” (Quilley, 1999:203)

Both ACME and Liverpool City Council were very active in attempting to empower local communities through the arts and culture. This was deemed to be necessary in order to address issues of social exclusion and encourage a pro - active community based approach to local economic development. Whilst a central part of both ACME's and Liverpool City Council's approach focused on community empowerment it is important to note that community representatives' role in the decision making processes was minimal and largely limited to implementation. In Bristol, however, there was very little evidence of any serious attempt to address community empowerment through the arts. Similarly, community sector representative involvement in the strategy was non - existent<sup>3</sup>. Whilst it is tempting to attribute these differences to Liverpool's Objective One Status, both Liverpool City Council and NWAB attempted to facilitate community empowerment prior to Objective One status. This would suggest that the coalition consisted of actors who were ideologically committed to community development.

Results from the two case studies also indicate that there has been a widening of representation within this policy area. As the preceding commentary on community participation indicates, this representation has largely been limited to governing elites and technical advisors. In Liverpool, this widening of representation within the strategy process reflected an adherence to ERDF

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<sup>3</sup> Here it is important not to confuse community interests with those sectoral interests presented by ACAN.

guidelines, the need to access sources of expertise and create credibility for the City Council's actions. Similarly, those actors participating in Bristol's strategy reflected a need to gain access to the resources and expertise necessary for strategy development.

## **6. The usefulness of regime theory as a framework for analysis**

Given the research's findings, regime theory has proved to be a useful framework for investigating how local politics influence the development and nature of cultural strategy. Here regime theory allows sense to be made of those complex interactions between local historical, political and economic factors which influence the construction of partnership arrangements which in turn contributes to shaping strategy.

Given those changes which have occurred in the institutional landscape across the UK and the introduction of a competitive intergovernmental system, Stone's (1989) regime theory is poorly equipped to explore and identify those governing realignments which have fed into coalition formation and resulting strategy. This has been attributed to an inadequate consideration of the political economy (DiGaetano & Klemanski. 1993; Stoker, 1995; DiGaetano, 1997; Ward, 1997; Quilley & Ward, 1999).

Both DiGaetano's (1997) and Stoker and Mossberger (1994) advocate an approach to analysis which recognises the necessary influence of intergovernmental systems. It is, however, DiGaetano's (1997) approach which offers a greater degree of sensitivity to the influence of these intergovernmental systems in presenting opportunities and constraints and influencing intergovernmental realignments. In his examination of Bristol, DiGaetano (1997) highlights intra - city conflict as a result of changes in the local institutional landscape and the intergovernmental system. In explaining moves towards coalition formation, DiGaetano then identifies economic restructuring and changes in the intergovernmental system as having forced the City Council into coalition arrangements. Such an interpretation, however, presents the City

Council as being a passive recipient of wider forces and therefore simplifies proceedings. Here DiGaetano (1997) fails to adequately indicate how the effects of economic restructuring and changes in the intergovernmental system interact with local political factors (past and present). This results in a failure to illustrate how these wider forces are mediated through the dynamics of partnership working.

Regime theory also highlights the way in which a common sense of purpose amongst those partners involved in the strategy process is not sufficient by itself either to maintain partnership arrangements or to guide strategy development. Instead, preferences as to the type of strategy which should be pursued have to be explicitly constructed within the dynamic context of partnership. Whilst highlighting the participation of elites in the development of cultural strategy, a regime approach has also identified local government's position at the centre of partnership formation. Where private sector interests are involved in the strategy they occupy a secondary position. Associated with this, regime theory highlights the way in which the partnerships producing cultural strategies are hierarchical in nature. Whilst these hierarchies were influenced by the sources of funding being accessed, they are also very much influenced by local political factors. Again, the presence of this hierarchy influences the type of strategy developed.

As Ward (1996:429) notes, most regime approaches employed in order to examine urban politics focus primarily upon how coalitions behave once created. Such an emphasis largely ignores those conditions under which regimes (coalitions) have been created. Here Ward (1997) states that those factors shaping regimes (coalitions) and their actions appear to be locally based because current approaches examine coalitions from almost exclusively from a local perspective and largely ignore or at best caricatures causal factors operating at other spatial scales. In this respect Ward (Quilley & Ward, 1999) along with Lauria et al (1997) have sought to identify the abstract conditions necessary for regime (coalition) formation. It has been argued that such an



exercise will link coalition formation and activities to those forces operating at scales beyond the local. Whilst regime theory has proved to be particularly useful in understanding urban politics in a British setting, this represents its greatest weakness. Despite this, however, its application within the context of this research project has proved valuable in explaining how local politics influences cultural strategy formation and what this means in terms of those characteristics associated with new urban politics.

## **Appendix 1**

### **List of Targeted Survey Population**

#### **Unitary Authorities**

Bristol	Andrew Kelly
East Riding	
Kingston upon Hull	Steve Fleming
South Gloucestershire	
North Somerset	
Stokton on Tess	Mr. Leyton
City of York	Mr Bradman
N. E. Lincolnshire	Malcolm Griffith
Bath & Somerset	

#### **Metropolitan Councils**

Birmingham	
Leeds	Rob Whinett
Sheffield	
Bradford	Neema Smith
Liverpool	Peter Stowe
Manchester	Lynn Barbour
Kirklees	Sean Leonard
Wirral	John Entwistle
Wakefield	

Wigan

Dudley

Coventry

Sadwell

Jill Norman

Sefton

Jacqueline Evans

Northumberland

Doncaster

J. Chapman

Stockport

Newcastle

Walsall

Andrew Holiday

Bolton

Rotherham

Wolverhampton

Barnsley

Salford

Donna Hall

Oldham

Tameside

Lisa Hoyland

Trafford

C. Keogh

Rochdale

Solihull

Richard Honeyset

Gateshead

N. Tyneside

Calderdale

St. Helens

Bury David Flower

S. Tyneside Chris Clarke

Knowsley

## **London Boroughs**

Croydon

Barnet

Bromley

Ealing

Enfield

Wandsworth

Lambeth

Brent Cathay Walstead

Hillingdon

Lewisham

Havering

Redbridge

Southwark

Bexley

Newham

Waltham Forest David Francs

Greewich Treveor Dorling

Hounslow

Haringey

Harrow Bill Munroe

Hakney

Westminster

Camden

Sutton Richard Hobday

Merton Catherin Kerswell

Islington

Tower Hamlets David Richardson

Richmond Nigel Cutting

Hammersmith

Barking and Dagenham Alan Watts

Kensington Coleen Devereux

Kingston upon Thames Collin Boxham

Corporation

### **Districts**

Leicester Mike Candler

Nottingham Richard Best

Stoke on Trent Jenny Lintern

Plymouth P Burrows

Derby R Williams

Southampton Jeff Waters

Warrington Kevin Hoyle

Northampton D Dampton

Milton Keynes

Vennessa Gwyn

Portsmouth

R Harrison

Luton

Thamesdown

Basildon

Collett Forbes

Newforest

Southend

B. Cole

Wycombe

Peterborough

L. Thorbes

Chelmsford

## **Administering the Questionnaire**

Due to the nature of cultural strategy and its recent emergence as an instrument for local economic development, a wide variety of departments within any one local authority might be responsible for its development. Recognising this potential problem, the first stage of administering the survey involved identifying those departments and individuals responsible for cultural strategy development within each local authority. This was achieved by contacting each local authority by telephone and inquiring as to which department and individual was ultimately responsible for strategy development. The identified department and person was then contacted in order to ensure that this information was correct. Having identified the relevant individual, the researcher explained the aim of the questionnaire and research project and then asked the contact to participate in the survey. Having enlisted the participation of the relevant person, a suitable time for conducting the questionnaire was arranged.

A random group of ten local authorities was selected for a pilot questionnaire to be administered by telephone. From this pilot it was possible to identify those questions which were poorly worded and thus correct them. This process also allowed an estimation of the average time taken to complete the questionnaire. The length of the questionnaire was considered to be an important factor in ensuring that respondents did not lose interest and thus fail to respond to all questions. The final version of the questionnaire was then administered to the survey population.

## **Appendix 2**

### **Bristol Case Study List of Interviewees and Organisations**

Andrew Kelly, Executive Officer, Bristol Cultural Development Partnership.

Nicola Rylance, Chambers of Commerce and Initiative.

Mike Wilkinson, Director of Leisure and Arts, Bristol City Council.

Rachel Efemey, Arts Development Officer, Bristol City Council.

Pat Roberts, Senior City Councillor (Labour), Head of City Council Arts Panel, SWA board member, Bristol Old Vic board member, BCDP board member.

Clare Warren, Senior City Councillor (Labour), City Council Arts Panel, BCDP board member.

Chris Humpheries, Director of Regional Services, SWA.

Mark Cosgrove, Brief Encounters Film Festival, Member of Board of Directors.

Sarah-Jane Merridith, South West Media Development Agency.

Ian Seargent, Manager, Black Pyramid.

Rachel Drmmond - Hay, Board of Directors of Picture This & Arts in Communities Action Network.

Ian Seargent, Board of Directors, Arts in Communities Action Network.

Susan West, Acting Head, Arts in Communities Action Network.

David Sproxton, Director, Aardman Animation's.

Nick Rogers, General Manager, Bristol Old Vic.

Abigail Youngman, BBC Animation.

### **Liverpool Case Study List of Interviewees**

Phil Taylor (Liverpool City Council :Arts & Cultural Unit)

Wesley Wilkie (CADT)

Sue Harrison (North West Arts Board)

Ann Cleary (Labour Cllr: Liverpool City Council)

Peter Stowe (Liverpool City Council: Economic Development & European Affairs)

Francis Downee (LDI: Director)

Cathay Long (MMDA Co-ordinator)



Mark Collet (ACME:Director)

Viv Tyler (BIA North West)

Community representative (anonamised)

## **Interview Guide**

Introduction.

Discussion points:

1. Positions/job title of interviewee.
2. Length of time organisations has existed (Where relevant)
3. What is the nature of the organisation's business?
4. What is the annual budget?
5. How many numbers of staff are employed at the organisation?
6. What is the organistion's/individual's role within the cultural sector/strategy?
7. How is the organisation funded?
8. Does the organisation fund and other organisations or individuals?
9. Reasons for involvement in cultural sector/strategy?
- 10.How did the organisation/individual came to be involved in cultural sector/strategy
- 11.Length of time the organisation/interviewee has been involved
- 12.Membership of any partnerships (How long & why, nature of relationship with other partners?)
13. Probe the nature of contact and relationship with other cultural srtategy actors that have been interviewed?
- 14.Frequncy of contact with other cultural strategy actors?/what is the nature of this contact?
- 15.Wha form would the interviewee like to see the cultural strategy take and why?
- 16.Does the interviewee see there being and opportunities/benefits associated with the development of a strategy? (Why?)
- 17.Have there been any areas of disagreement between partners? (If yes about what and how long ago?)
- 18.Ask interviewee to identify key players in strategy.

19. Ask the interviewee to define the term 'culture' as it relates to a cultural strategy.

**End interview**

## **Appendix 3**

### **Cultural Projects Initiated or Developed by BCDP**

1. Bristol City Council's Five year arts plan
2. Harbourside Project (which includes the Centre for the Performing Arts)
3. The Legible City Project (a project designed to increase access to, awareness of and enhance the city centre environment)
4. Led on the development of a strategy for the creation of a Museum for Bristol.
5. Promotion of a two week open - air festival held within the city centre.
6. Led on the development and implementation of Wildscreen and Brief Encounters Film Festival.
7. Bid for a Millenium project involving the development of Wildscreen World and a Science Centre.
8. Participated in the improvement of signage within the city centre.

## **Appendix 4**

### **Bristol City Council's Revenue Funding Criteria**

**“Organisations must be non profit making organisations with legal company status, their own bank account and in receipt of funds from sources other than the city council.**

**Organisations must show how they will share resources so as to facilitate increased service/activity delivery.**

**Organisations must be able to demonstrate that they have a commitment to working collaboratively.**

**Organisations should have a clearly articulated artistic policy and their services should not be duplicated by other organisations funded by the City Council.**

**Organisations should be able to provide an indication of the number of individuals/organisations using their services.**

**The quality of services provided must be of a high quality as determined by users, organisations, peer organisations and performance indicators.**

**Organisations must have a board/management committee consisting of at least five members with regular meetings which City Council officers should be permitted to attend.**

**An equal opportunities policy must be in place.**

**Organisations must provide the City Council with quarterly, annual audited accounts and minutes of management meetings.”**

*(Bristol City Council Leisure Services, 1996:7 - 10)*

## **APPENDIX 5**

### **Criteria for ACME Funding**

Applicants applying to *ACME* for funding of any description must meet the following criteria:

- Applicant's business must be located in *Merseyside*.
- Only microbusiness or SMEs are eligible for assistance (i.e., firms employing 1 - 250 persons)
- If applying for *Production Funds* the product must be for export outside *Merseyside*.
- Products must meet UK and EC safety standards.
- Applicants must show a commitment to equal opportunities.

### **Selection Criteria for Community Access & Participation Fund**

Prior to making a decision as to whether to allocate funds potential applicants must provide:

- A business plan outlining:
- The product idea.
- Potential market and partners for the product.
- Potential sources of investment other than *ACME*.
- The potential for sustainability.
- Detail research and *Market Development Plan*

Such a plan must include costs, a timetable, details of professional advisors used and management plans and the project must cost a maximum of £10700 and a minimum £2500 is available from *ACME* for any one project.

### **Production & Marketing Development Funds**

As with the *Community Access & Participation* fund prior to making a decision as to whether or not to allocate funds to applicants the applicant must provide:

- -Three year business plan listing

- Full details of production project.
- Full details of potential markets and partners.
- Confirmed sources of investment other than *ACME*.
- Details of the production timetable, income expenditure estimates, personnel requirements.

In addition applicants must indicate the potential for achieving 80% investment from other sources. Here the fund offers a maximum of £250000 and a minimum of £2500 towards the cost of production.

### **MEASURES:**

Following an initial pilot period of six months which indicated that demand for assistance would be very high *ACME* devised a number of measures for ensuring that proposals are ranked on the basis of value for money. The ranking criteria are:

Those proposals showing the greatest potential for sustainable employment will be given priority.

Those proposals with the greatest potential for generating other investment will also be given priority.

Those proposals using the greatest levels of local sourcing, local labour, services and materials will be given priority over those that do not.

All products funded by *ACME* must illustrate excellence as well as a potential for commercial viability.

### **The Application Process:**

When a telephone enquiry is made either the director or the development officer questions the potential applicant in order to ascertain eligibility. Provided that the criteria for eligibility is met, a consultation meeting is then arranged with either the director or the development officer. As a result of this meeting the potential applicant will either be invited to make a formal written application or be advised to rework their initial idea. It is important to note that an invitation to make an application does not necessarily mean that an applicant will be

successful in gaining financial assistance. Where applications are rejected by *ACME* a written statement providing those reasons for rejection are provided. Following a successful application a contract is drawn up between *ACME* and the applicant in which the applicant agrees to meet performance targets set by himself/herself and *ACME*. The receipt of future payments from *ACME* is dependant upon the successful applicant meeting these pre - set targets as well as agreeing to co - operate with *ACME's* appointed research agencies in the development of their monitoring and evaluation project.

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