The Irish Front: The Easter Rising and the First World War

Henry Theakston

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Abstract

This thesis argues that the 1916 Easter Rising was a battle of the First World War. The Rising has long been seen in scholarship and popular opinion as a separate conflict from the war, though recent historians have drawn connections between the two. This thesis fills a historical gap by building a complex picture of how to understand the Rising as part of the war from a range of sources and viewpoints. Its key findings cover three main areas of the Rising. Firstly, this thesis demonstrates that the Rising was planned as an intervention into the war, then, secondly, establishes that contemporary participants and observers recognised it as a battle of the war, and, thirdly, determines the notable extent to which the Rising has been commemorated as a battle of the war. Recognising that the Rising opened an Irish Front in the war is a timely contribution to perspectives on the Rising, of the war and of Ireland's place in international contexts, following the recent centenaries and re-appraisals of Ireland's involvement in the war.

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Introduction

On Monday 24 April 1916, 21 months into the First World War, Patrick Pearse proclaimed the establishment of an Irish Republic outside the Dublin General Post Office (GPO). Meanwhile, groups of armed Irish rebels seized buildings across Dublin. Thus began the Easter Rising, a week-long conflict in Ireland between armed Irish republicans fighting for an independent Ireland, and police and the British Army fighting to suppress the rebellion. Over the 18 months before the Rising began, Irish republican Roger Casement had been in Germany to secure military assistance.¹ During the Rising itself, nationalist Dublin resident James Stephens recorded rumours of German military assistance for the rebels, and that news and rumours of the ongoing Rising were intermixed with news and rumours of events across the war.² After dying in the Rising, Harold Charles Daffen of the British Army was named on the First World War memorial of Exeter College, Oxford. Next to his name is inscribed 'Ireland 1916', representing the Rising as a battle of the war.³ Taking these elements across the Rising's planning, fighting and commemorations suggests the range of ways in which to consider it a theatre of the First World War.

The scholarship on the Rising, largely Irish, has significantly evolved its understanding of the relationship between the war and the Rising. Early histories, such as that by republican historian P.S. O'Hegarty in 1952, often described the Rising as 'a National uprising' in an insular and exclusively Irish narrative, a part of Ireland's long history, largely treating the war in a cursory manner and as an essentially separate conflict.⁴ From the 1960s, some scholarship began to meaningfully link the histories of the Rising and the war. For example, John de Courcy Ireland in 1966 and F.X. Martin in 1967 separately argued that the war and the promised German military

<https://www.iwm.org.uk/memorials/name/630740> [accessed 16 December 2022].

¹ One Bold Deed Of Open Treason: The Berlin Diary Of Roger Casement 1914-1916, ed. by Angus Mitchell (Sallins: Merrion Press, 2016), p.22; Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook (Dublin: Irish Times, 1917), pp.7, 130.

 ² James Stephens, *The Insurrection In Dublin* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), pp.30-1, 38-9, 82-3.
 ³ 'Daffen, Harold Charles', *Imperial War Museum War Memorials Register (IWMWMR)*

⁴ P.S. O'Hegarty, *A History Of Ireland Under The Union, 1801 To 1922* (London: Methuen, 1952), p.703; Heather Jones, 'Romantic Ireland's Dead And Gone? How Centenary Publications Are Reshaping Ireland's Divided Understanding Of Its Decade Of War And Revolution, 1912–1923', *First World War Studies*, 9.3 (2018) 344-361 (p.352).

assistance were of central importance to the Rising's conception, providing encouragement to the Rising's planners and being the decisive factors that drove them to rebellion. However, despite linking the Rising to the war, neither considered the question of whether the Rising was a part of the war and still understood the Rising as an essentially separate conflict.⁵

Scholarship on Ireland's First World War experience has developed considerably since the late twentieth century and largely overcome the war's marginalisation in Irish popular consciousness. Yet, this scholarship has often advanced along separate tracks from that on the Rising, with a substantial focus on Irish recruitment to the British Army, the experiences of individual soldiers or of regiments, and the war's effect on Irish politics, social engagement, cultural responses, gender and commemoration.⁶ Recent scholarship since the early 2000s has been increasingly likely to relate the Rising to the war, or even to indicate that the Rising should be seen as a part of the war.⁷ As prominent Irish First World War historians, Keith Jeffery and John Horne have done much to bring the Rising into narratives of Ireland's war experience. For example, in 2015 Jeffery described Dublin as 'a First World War battlefield' as the war provided the moment for the Rising and the example of violent conflict for the Irish republicans to follow.⁸ While Horne has related the wider Irish Revolution of the 1910s and early 1920s to a 'greater war' lasting 1912-23, arguing that the 1916 Rising was inextricably linked with the patterns of violence that the war unleashed.⁹ Horne also co-edited a significant 2013 collection explicitly emphasising the centrality of the war to the Irish Revolution, including the Rising. This volume took a broad scope on the Irish experience and memory of war and revolution, demonstrating the need for greater popular recognition of the

⁵ De Courcy Ireland, John, The Sea And The Easter Rising (Dublin: Maritime Institute of Ireland, 1966); Martin, F.X., '1916 – Myth, Fact And Mysteries', in Studia Hibernica, 7.1 (1967), 7-126 (pp.25-6, 58, 117).

⁶ Timothy Bowman, *The Irish Regiments In The Great War: Discipline And Morale* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Patrick Callan, 'Recruiting For The British Army In Ireland During The First World War', in *The Irish Sword*, 17.66 (1987) 42-56; Gregory, and Senia Pašeta, ed., *Ireland And The Great War: 'A War To Unite Us All?'* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); John Horne, ed., *Our War: Ireland And The Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008); Niamh Gallagher, *Ireland And The Great War: A Social And Political History* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020).

⁷ Jones, 'Romantic Ireland's Dead And Gone?', p.352.

⁸ Keith Jeffery, 1916: A Global History (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp.7-8, 73, 103-4.

⁹ John Horne, 'Ireland And The "Greater War", in *Atlas Of The Irish Revolution*, ed. by John Crowley, Donal Ó Drisceoil and Mike Murphy (Cork: Cork University Press, 2017), pp.204-12 (pp.205, 209).

multi-faceted relationship between the Rising and the war, though without addressing at length the matter of how and why the Rising was a battle of the war.¹⁰

Historians of Irish nationalism and the Irish revolution increasingly accept that the Rising was part of the war. For instance, John Gibney has argued that 'the Great War came to Dublin' in 1916, as the Irish rebels hoped for, while the British Government feared, a military alliance between an independent Ireland and Germany.¹¹ However, he has not fully explored this conceptualisation of the Rising to its fullest extent. Others, such as Fearghal McGarry, John Borgonovo and Jérôme aan de Wiel have considered in more detail the question of whether the Rising was part of the war. Aan de Wiel, for instance, firmly places the Rising within the broader European context of the war. He contends that Ireland, and specifically the Rising, held strategic significance in German perspectives due to its geographical position and potential as a base for naval operations, and also presented Germany with an opportunity to undermine the United Kingdom (UK) by diverting military resources away from the war's other fronts.¹² Borgonovo has also argued that the Rising was part of the war's broader context and that the war provided a catalyst for republican radicalisation and militant activities in Ireland. He describes the war, the Rising and the wider Irish Revolution as deeply intertwined and directly affecting each other.¹³

McGarry has explored in detail the interconnectedness and mutual influence between the Rising and the war. He firmly situates the experience of the Rising within the war's broader dynamics, with the war providing a catalyst and a backdrop for the Rising, shaping its development and the motivations and actions of its participants. His work has increasingly considered whether the Rising was part of the war. In 2013, McGarry situated the Rising as part of the experience of the

¹⁰ John Horne and Edward Madigan, ed., *Towards Commemoration: Ireland In War And Revolution 1912-1923* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2013).

¹¹ John Gibney, 'Ireland: Easter Rising Or Great War?', *History Today (HT)* <<u>https://www.historytoday.com/ireland-easter-rising-or-great-war</u>> [accessed 8 February 2023].

¹² Jérôme aan de Wiel, *The Irish Factor, 1899-1919: Ireland's Strategic And Diplomatic Importance For Foreign Powers* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2011), p.xviii.

¹³ John Borgonovo, *The Dynamics Of War And Revolution: Cork City, 1916-1918* (Cork: Cork University Press, 2013), pp.3, 234;

war, not simply parallel to it. Similarly in 2017, he argued that the Rising was, like other battles of the war, not a standalone event but 'a product of the First World War that provided its opportunity and rationale'.¹⁴

Nevertheless, some significant scholarship on the Rising is yet to engage with the question of how and why the Rising should be understood as a part of the war. For example, while juxtaposing the war's and the Rising's simultaneous effects on Dublin, and exploring the experiences of certain individuals in both conflicts, Richard Grayson has still essentially depicted the conflicts as technically separate albeit concurrent.¹⁵ Likewise, Charles Townshend, John Dorney, and Michael T. Foy and Brian Barton all demonstrate that the Rising's development depended on the precondition of the war as Irish republicans sought to capitalise on the opportunity it presented, and fears of an Irish alliance with Germany influenced the British reaction to the Rising. However, they do not enter the discussion on whether the Rising was part of the war.¹⁶ Briona Nic Dhiarmada's recent account of the Rising provides a generally traditional nationalist view not dissimilar to P.S. O'Hegarty's, with connections between the war and the Rising given very cursory treatment in a narrative largely focused on how the Rising fit into Ireland's national story.¹⁷

British scholarship on the war has generally not integrated the Rising into histories of the war.

A.J.P. Taylor loosely connected the Rising with the war, describing the war as an opportunity for

rebellion with Germany supporting the rebel plans.¹⁸ John Turner's history of the war mentions the

¹⁴ Fearghal McGarry, '1916 And Irish Republicanism: Between Myth And History', in *Towards Commemoration*, ed. by Horne and Madigan, pp.46-53 (p.52); Fearghal McGarry, 'The Easter Rising', in *Atlas Of The Irish Revolution*, ed. by Crowley, Ó Drisceoil and Murphy, pp.240-257 (p.243); Emmanuel Destenay, 'Future Directions In Rural History: Ireland, The First World War And The Search For Historical Evidence', *Rural History*, 34.1 (2023) 137–146 (p.141); Edward Madigan, "A Seamless Robe Of Irish Experience': The First World War, The Irish Revolution And Centenary Commemoration', *History Ireland*, 22.4 (2014) 14-17 (p.14).

¹⁵ Grayson, Richard, *Dublin's Great Wars: The First World War, The Easter Rising And The Irish Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

¹⁶ Charles Townshend, *Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion* (London: Penguin, 2006); Michael T. Foy and Brian Barton, *The Easter Rising* (Stroud: The History Press, 2011); John Dorney, *Peace After The Final Battle: The Story Of The Irish Revolution, 1912-1924* (Dublin: New Island, 2020), p.61; Heather Jones, 'Commemorating The Rising: History, Democracy And Violence in Ireland', *Juncture*, 22.4 (2016) 257-263 (p.263).

¹⁷ Nic Dhiarmada, Bríona, The 1916 Irish Rebellion (Cork: Cork University Press, 2016), p.10.

¹⁸ A.J.P. Taylor, *The First World War: An Illustrated History* (New York: Perigee, 1980), pp.111, 147.

Rising in its introduction as one of the British Government's several military and political failures in 1916, but the Rising is not mentioned in the rest of the book, including its chronology of the war.¹⁹ Similarly, Peter Hart's and Hew Strachan's recent histories of the war do not mention the Rising, and Stephen Badsey has overlooked the Rising to portray imprecisely defined British territory as uncontested throughout the war.²⁰

Demonstrating that the Rising was a part of the First World War necessitates re-conceptualising the war. Some authors, most prominently Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, have recently argued that the war should be understood fundamentally as an imperial war, defined by major imperial powers fighting to realise imperialistic ambitions, with much of the fighting occurring in imperial colonies around the globe.²¹ Likewise, David Olusoga argues that the war is best understood as deeply influenced by European imperial ambitions and structures. He has described the war as a product of the expansion of European powers and colonial empires around the world roughly from the mid-nineteenth century, and fought by imperial powers for imperial gain and using imperial resources.²² Crucially, these authors have not addressed Ireland or the Rising in conceptualising the war as fundamentally imperialistic in nature.

Other scholars argue that the ideal of national self-determination for small and unrecognised nations was a defining feature of the war. Erez Manela has demonstrated that the war had a significant anticolonial dimension due to the prominence of ideas surrounding the equality of nations and the right to self-determination during the war's closing stages and aftermath. These ideas developed through the war and reflected a shift towards recognising the rights of colonised peoples to self-determination and contributed to the erosion of imperial power

¹⁹ John Turner, 'Introduction', in *Britain And The First World War,* ed. by John Turner (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp.1-21 (p.7).

²⁰ Peter Hart, *The Great War: A Combat History Of The First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Hew Strachan, ed., *The Oxford Illustrated History Of The First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Stephen Badsey, 'Great Britain', *1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia Of The First World War* (*1914-1918-online)* <<u>https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-</u> <u>online.net/article/great_britain</u>> [accessed 07 December 2022].

²¹ Robert Gerwarth, and Erez Manela, 'The Great War As A Global War: Imperial Conflict And The Refiguration Of World Order, 1911–1923', *Diplomatic History* 38.4 (2014), 786–800 (pp.787-8).

²² David Olusoga, *The World's War: Forgotten Soldiers of Empire* (London: Head of Zeus, 2014), pp.15-24.

structures.²³ Likewise, John Horne argues that while the war was essentially imperial in origin, it revealed the potency of nationalism and raised the issue of the political entitlements of those who fought and the legitimacy of the states they defended, making the war the possible arena for an unrecognised national group to assert its independence. Horne also relates Ireland to the war's broader themes of decolonisation and national self-determination, arguing that the war provided the platform for Irish nationalists to assert their independence from the UK.²⁴ Other scholars since the mid-2000s have also portrayed the Rising as reflecting the war's themes of national self-determination. Priscilla Metscher has contextualised the Rising within the war's 'general issue of the rights of nations to self-determination', while Enrico Dal Lago, Róisín Healy and Gearóid Barry have described the Rising as the first major anticolonial revolt in Europe, triggered by the war. They compare Ireland and the Rising with other unrecognised nations and groups within empires during the war, indicating that the Rising was representative of other national struggles in the war and an entry point to assessing the war.²⁵

This thesis demonstrates the ways in which and the extent to which the Rising was, and is best understood as, a part of the First World War, through its planning, the events of the Rising itself, and its legacy and associated commemorations. The war was an enormous, multi-faceted conflict, so this thesis establishes how the Rising – itself multi-faceted – conformed to the war in numerous ways. There are objective, material and strategic reasons which compel situating the Rising in histories of the war, as the Rising was an armed conflict amidst the worldwide conflict, both involving the German and British Governments, and the Rising's leaders wanted to participate in the UK's overall defeat. These reasons mattered to contemporaries of the Rising, but

²³ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination And The International Origins Of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.5, 22.

²⁴ John Horne, 'James Connolly And The Great Divide: Ireland, Europe And The First World War', in *Saothar,* 31 (2006) 75-83 (p.77); John Horne, 'Introduction', in *A Companion To World War I*, ed. by John Horne (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp.xvii-xxiii.

²⁵ Priscilla Metscher, 'James Connolly, The Easter Rising And The First World War: A Contextual Study', in *The Impact Of The 1916 Rising: Among The Nations*, ed. by Ruán O'Donnell (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2008), pp.141-60 (pp.145-6, 149); Enrico Dal Lago, Róisín Healy and Gearóid Barry, 'Globalising The Easter Rising: 1916 And The Challenge To Empires', in *1916 In Global Context: An Anti-Imperial Moment*, ed. by Enrico Dal Lago, Róisín Healy, pp.3-17 (p.6).

contemporaries also understood the Rising as a part of the war in a more subjective and intellectual sense. Numerous contemporaries commented on whether the Rising combatants were legal belligerents in the war and described the Rising as the action of a small nation fighting for its independence, like others in the war. Furthermore, this thesis examines the different and evolving goals and agendas of the historical actors and groups under discussion across the different stages of the Rising, considering how they understood the relationship between the Rising and the war.

This thesis builds on and connects the distinct historiographical traditions of the war and the Rising to create a new history of the Rising as a part of the war. Challenging the prevailing popular interpretation that the Rising was only an element of Ireland's independence struggle with coincidental connections with the war, this thesis recognises the Rising as simultaneously a part of Irish history, and of a broader national, imperial, and European history of the war without drawing an arbitrary binary distinction between them. Although this thesis explores how and why different individuals and groups at different times cast the Rising as either solely a part of the war or of an Irish nationalist history, its central objective is to demonstrate that the relationship between the war and the Rising was not merely a matter of temporal co-existence, or of coincidence or context, but the Rising was fundamentally a part of the war.

Demonstrating that the Rising was indeed the Irish Front of the First World War challenges Irish nationalist histories in which the Rising has overshadowed the war or stood as a detached conflict and goes further than arguing that the war was just an opportunity or pre-condition for the Rising. This thesis also benefits from but advances beyond the yet underdeveloped discussion in the scholarship that the Rising and the war should be viewed together. While these discussions indicate a new understanding of how the Rising related to the war, this thesis makes a valuable contribution in establishing the ways in which the Rising was planned, experienced and commemorated as part of the war. Recent scholarship on the question of whether the Rising was part of the war has not sufficiently engaged with this topic across these three large areas, nor

satisfactorily rooted its conclusions in the detailed source analysis that underpins this thesis.

As this thesis establishes that the Rising was a component of the war, it demonstrates the shortcomings in British histories of the war that have given the Rising a small and uneven place. By expanding the war's boundaries to demonstrate that it was fought in Ireland, thereby recognising that UK territory was actively contested in the war, this thesis challenges histories that minimise the importance to British history of Irish events and that treat Irish and British history as entirely separate entities. Moreover, by demonstrating that a part of the war was fought in Ireland with republican rebels as involved in the war as Irishmen in the British Army, this thesis adds an entirely new element to histories of Ireland's war and of Irish war commemorations.

This thesis utilises and builds on the scholarship that the war was an imperial conflict and the scholarship arguing that national self-determination was a defining feature of the war. It brings important nuance to possibly reconcile these opposing points, arguing that the Rising shows the war as both imperial and anticolonial simultaneously, depending on the different goals and agendas of the historical actors. The war consisted of numerous fronts and overlapping conflicts between a diverse range of combatants, with multiple armies and forces making alliances and fighting enemies for numerous reasons, and the Rising fit into these larger patterns. While the Rising played into the imperial conflict between Germany and the UK, the rebels also believed that by rebelling they were joining the war as a small nation. This latter point goes further than the scholarship on this theme to demonstrate that emulating and entering the war as a small nation were powerful driving motivators behind the Rising's planning and undertaking. Thus, characterising the Rising and the war largely depended on the participants' point of view and contemporaries viewed both through a wide variety of lenses. In broader terms, at a macro level, the major combatants were imperial and fought for imperial reasons, but the idea that the war was fought for small nations had real contemporary power and could motivate actions at a micro level. This thesis is positioned between the major elements of the larger discussion on the war's nature,

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demonstrating that contemporaries recognised the war's imperial and anticolonial dynamics interacting with and complementing each other in the Rising; a victory for Imperial Germany over the British Empire would have benefited Ireland's national ambitions, and Ireland winning its independence from the British Empire – or at least pulling British troops from other theatres – would have aided the growth of Germany's Empire.

This thesis synthesises a wide variety of sources from the century following the Rising, encompassing archival materials, war memorials, recordings and transcripts of oral history and television interviews, memoirs, military awards, reportage, and histories, covering private and public, state and individual sources. The authors and creators include Irish, British, American and German figures, leading figures in the republican movement, 'rank and file' republican rebels, soldiers, Dublin residents, and journalists and historians from nationalist and unionist backgrounds. The Bureau of Military History (BMH) witness statements, collected in Ireland between 1947 and 1957, provide a large portion of nationalist and republican accounts of the Rising. Although British Army soldiers in Dublin vastly outnumbered the rebels by the Rising's end, the majority of those never left a written account, thus republican participants and supporters produced most of the accounts of and responses to the Rising. However, the available British perspectives and the range of other views considered here mitigate against a partial and narrow history.

The temporal span of sources is significant for understanding how perspectives on the Rising's relationship with the war have changed over time. Examining how and why contemporaries framed the events around them, through sources produced between 1914 and 1916, as close to the Rising as possible, and how they acted according to what they understood, is crucial to properly appraising the Rising. Later accounts produced over the decades following the Rising lend nuance and enlightening perspectives not always available to earlier sources, but also track changes to views on the Rising's relationship with the war.

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That later accounts are often more self-consciously structured to present a particular narrative of the Rising than contemporary views and, in the case of Irish republican accounts, often confirm the prevalent Irish view of an insular struggle disconnected from the war should not invalidate them. Rather, analysing them in their political context and using them to reflect evolving perspectives on the relationship between the Rising and the war asserts their historical value. This approach will allow diverse, sometimes conflicting, viewpoints from different times and with different agendas to complement or challenge each other directly on particular points, creating a richly textured and complex analysis of how different actors and groups understood the relationship between the Rising.

What all the sources analysed here reveal, explicitly and implicitly, about the various ways in which the Rising was a component of the war has been generally overlooked in the wider scholarship. Other histories of the Rising have also neglected numerous sources utilised here that provide valuable insights into the many ways in which contemporaries saw the Rising as a new front in the war. The range, diversity and content of the sources analysed here underscores that the contemporary understanding of the Rising as a part of the war was more widespread than later historians have heretofore established.

The progression of this thesis takes a broadly chronological approach to the Rising and encompasses its overall experience, from its planning, to the fighting, to its legacy and commemorative traditions. Chapter 1 of this thesis uncovers how the Rising was imagined and planned, demonstrating that the planners intended it to be materially a part of the war against the UK and logically align with the propaganda that the war was fought for small nations. Those not involved in the planning, such as civilians, 'rank-and-file' members of the nationalist Irish Volunteers paramilitary and the socialist Irish Citizen Army (ICA), and figures in the British Government and Army, also perceived that the Rising was intended to be the republicans' entry into the war as a small nation and on Germany's side.

Chapter 2 examines the events of the week of fighting, not only in Dublin but in other theatres of the war and shows that a diverse range of contemporaries understood the Rising as another part of the war and intimately connected it with the war's progress. The various ways in which participants in and observers of the Rising believed that it had opened a new front of the war in Ireland were central features to how it was contemporaneously understood, recognised and experienced.

Chapter 3 demonstrates the extent to which the Rising has been recognised as a part of the war in Britain and Ireland, uncovering the notable traditions of equating the service of British Army soldiers in the Rising with service in the war and subsuming the Rising into war commemorations and awards. This chapter on commemoration and legacy is a particularly timely contribution to perspectives on the Rising and the war, following the recent centenaries of both and increased attention given to commemoration. This concluding chapter reveals the widespread recognition that the Rising was a part of the war but also questions why there has not been more commemoration of the Rising as a battle of the war, particularly in Ireland.

By demonstrating that these stages of the Rising each show that it was fundamentally a part of the war and by advancing beyond the scholarship that has not adequately explored this fact, this thesis strengthens the appreciation that contemporaries recognised the Rising as an active front of the war and that such beliefs are essential to properly understanding the Rising.

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Introduction

In his 1966 memoir of the Rising, Irish republican Seán MacEntee drew a direct line from the war's outbreak to the Rising and strikingly framed the Rising as a part of that war. He wrote that on 28 June 1914, 'Austria has moved to avenge Sarajevo and Europe was racing into war, a war of which a minor part was to be fought in Ireland some twenty-one months later', with the Rising in April 1916.²⁶ However, MacEntee did not expand upon this suggestive conceptualisation of the Rising as a battle of the war. This chapter analyses this period between the war's outbreak in August 1914 and the Rising's beginning to demonstrate that the war triggered, motivated, and inspired the planning of the Rising, and to argue that those planning the Rising consciously intended it to be their entry into the war.

The scholarship on the Rising's plans has rarely claimed that the Rising was planned to be a battle of the war and then also conceptualised the resultant Rising as a part of the war. While Max Caulfield and Dorothy Macardle claimed in the 1960s and 1970s that the Rising's leaders wanted to enter the war against the UK and claim belligerent status in the war, most subsequent scholarship on the plans has considered elements of them in isolation or without using the plans to then argue that the Rising was a part of the war.²⁷ Parts of recent scholarship have linked the Rising's plans with the war, with Filip Nerad showing how Roger Casement attempted to unify Irish and German interests and Frank Callanan describing Casement's ambition for the Rising to open 'a further western front' on the UK's flank.²⁸ Similarly, Jérôme aan de Wiel, and Michael T. Foy and Brian Barton have recently argued that the scale of German military intervention that the separatists

²⁶ Seán MacEntee, *Episode at Easter* (Dublin: Gill, 1966), p.28.

²⁷ Max Caulfield, *The Easter Rebellion* (Boulder: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1995), p.18; Dorothy Macardle, 'James Connolly And Patrick Pearse', in *The Shaping Of Modern Ireland*, ed. by Conor Cruise O'Brien (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1970), pp.185-95 (pp.192-3).

²⁸ Filip Nerad, 'The Gallant Allies? German-Irish Military Cooperation Before And During World War I', *Prague Papers on the History of International Relations* (2008), 209-237 (p.211); Frank Callanan, 'Between Treason And Blood-Sacrifice: The Trials Of Roger Casement', in *Roger Casement In Irish And World History*, ed. by Mary E. Daly (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2005), pp.121-37 (p.134).

requested reflected the republican ambition to align with Germany in war.²⁹ Garrett Fitzgerald in 1966 and Fearghal McGarry more recently both argued that widespread nationalist support for and participation in the British war effort played a decisive role in the Irish republican leaders' decision to rebel during the war. The war was therefore central to the Rising's planning as republican leaders feared that nationalists were becoming reconciled to the British state and resolved to violently assert Irish independence against any allegiance to the UK. ³⁰

Other elements of the Rising's planning have been well-established in the scholarship from the 1960s to today, including Casement's efforts to create an Irish Brigade of the German Army to support the Rising, and the extent to which German military aid figured in the plans.³¹ Additionally, scholarship since the 1960s has generally concurred that the Rising began in early 1916 as the war's progress appeared to present the best opportunity for the Rising to succeed and possibly threaten the UK's morale and war effort, suggesting that the Rising should not be seen as totally separate from the war.³² Related to this, the scholarship has established the pro-German sentiments of leading Rising planners such as Roger Casement and James Connolly.³³ However, Joost Augusteijn has described any wider nationalist and republican pro-German sentiment as a passive response to the war and an expression of latent Irish nationalist anti-Britishness, thus downplaying any causal link between war and Rising.³⁴ F.X. Martin and Nuala C. Johnson have

²⁹ Foy and Barton, pp.25-7; aan de Wiel, p.188.

 ³⁰ Garrett Fitzgerald, 'The Significance Of 1916', in *Studies*, 55.217 (Spring, 1966), 29-37 (pp.29-31); McGarry, '1916 And Irish Republicanism', in *Towards Commemoration*, ed. by Horne and Madigan, pp.46-53 (p.51).
 ³¹ Andreas Roth, 'The German Soldier Is Not Tactful: Sir Roger Casement And The Irish Brigade In Germany During The First World War', in *The Irish Sword*, xix.78 (1995), 313-333 (pp.313-4); Emmanuel Destenay, 'The Impact Of Political Unrest In Ireland On Irish Soldiers In The British Army, 1914–18: A Re-Evaluation', *Irish Historical Studies*, 42.161 (2018) 50-63; Maureen Wall, 'The Background To The Rising: From 1914 Until The Issue Of The Countermanding Order On Easter Sunday, 1916', in *The Making Of 1916: Studies In The History Of The Rising*, ed. by Kevin B. Nowlan (Dublin: Stationary Office, 1969), pp.157-97 (pp.177, 182-3); Christine Strotmann, 'The Revolutionary Program of the German Empire: The Case of Ireland', in *Small Nations And Colonial Peripheries In World War I*, ed. by Gearóid Barry, Enrico Dal Lao and Róisín Healy (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp.19–36 (p.28).
 ³² J.J. Lee, *Ireland, 1912–1985: Politics And Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.25; Cyril Falls, 'Maxwell, 1916, And Britain At War', in *Leaders And Men Of The Easter Rising: Dublin 1916*, ed. by F.X. Martin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967) pp.203- 14 (p.212); Austen Morgan, *James Connolly: A Political Biography* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p.133.

 ³³ Reinhard R. Doerries, 'Die Mission Sir Roger Casements im Deutschen Reich 1914-1916. Dietrich Gerhard zum 80. Geburtstag' in *Historische Zeitschrift*, 222.3 (1976), 578-625 (p.586); Townshend, p.105; Morgan, p.199.
 ³⁴ Joost Augusteijn, 'Motivation: Why Did They Fight For Ireland? The Motivation Of Volunteers In The Revolution', in *The Irish Revolution, 1913-1923*, ed. by Joost Augusteijn (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.113.

compared the similar rhetoric surrounding the valour of war, and the duty and honour of dying for one's country evident in sources from the war and the Rising, placing the latter within a wider European context.³⁵

The scholarship covering how the major powers in the war attempted to incite ethnic, national, religious and political rebellions within rival empires provides useful foundations and context for this chapter. Fritz Fischer's classic 1960s account shows how the German Foreign Office and General Staff attempted to incite and arm religious, nationalist and political revolutions within the Russian and British Empires to relieve the main fronts and undermine their rivals. However, Fischer only cursorily discussed German support for the Rising.³⁶ Although in 2003 Hew Strachan discussed the German strategy of targeting their rivals' colonies without mentioning Ireland or the Rising, implicitly treating both as outside the war's boundaries, more recent scholarship, such as Jérôme aan de Wiel's significant analysis of the German perspective on Ireland in the war, has further considered how the Rising's plans fit into Germany's war effort.³⁷

Using a range of Irish republican sources including contemporary communications and articles in republican publications, plus later accounts and memoirs, this chapter demonstrates that, from its inception, the Rising was conceived of as a new front of the war. From the war's beginning, republicans planning the Rising wanted to become practically involved in the war and to align the Rising with the prevailing propaganda that the war was being fought for small nations. Irish separatists expressed a desire to ally with Germany in the war, imagined themselves joining the war like other small nations fighting for independence, and timed their rebellion for when it appeared they could capitalise on, and crucially become belligerents in, the war.

³⁵ Nuala C. Johnson, *Ireland, The Great War And The Geography Of Remembrance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.146; Martin, p.118.

 ³⁶ Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims In The First World War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1967), pp.120-46.
 ³⁷ Hew Strachan, 'German Strategy In The First World War', in *Internationale Beziehungen im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert Festschrift Für Winfried Baumgart Zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. by Wolfgang Elz and Sönke Neitzel (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003), pp.127-44 (p.138); aan de Wiel, pp.165-8; Doerries, 'Die Mission Sir Roger Casements', pp.592-3, 600; Strotmann, 'The Revolutionary Program of the German Empire: The Case of Ireland', in *Small Nations And Colonial Peripheries*, ed. by Barry, Dal Lago and Healy, pp.19–36.

Additionally, this chapter builds a picture of the Rising's plans from sources including the National Library of Ireland (NLI) Roger Casement papers, and messages between Ireland, the United States and Germany, to argue that the plans were deliberately formulated to open a new front in the war. A wide range of republicans envisioned German military intervention in the Rising as the decisive factor and making the Rising a crucial element in the UK's defeat in the war. German viewpoints analysed in this chapter provide an extra dimension and demonstrate that figures in Germany perceived that the Rising could serve their war aims. Thus, this chapter complements aan de Wiel's work by comparing German, Irish republican and British perspectives on the Rising's plans, underscoring that a range of contemporaries with different goals and agendas understood in their own ways that the plans were meant to make the Rising a theatre of the war.

This chapter builds on previous scholarship that has connected the Rising's plans to the war but not connected, as this chapter does, the military plans for the Rising with the aspirations that it would represent Ireland's entry into the war as a small nation and on Germany's side, demonstrating that Republicans planned the Rising to be a new front in the war. Moreover, republican pro-German sentiment fed into a wish to ally with Germany in the war by rebelling. Pro-German sentiment among republicans represented not just reflexive Irish nationalist Anglophobia, but also widespread tactical and sincere Irish nationalist reasons for crafting a rebellion as part of an alliance with Germany in the war to defeat the UK and thereby win independence for Ireland.

Part 1: The Irish republican aspiration to join the war

Shortly after the war began, the Supreme Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) – a secretive revolutionary organisation dedicated to establishing an Irish Republic by force – agreed to rebel if Germany invaded Ireland, if the British Government attempted to impose conscription on Ireland, or if the war was coming to an end.³⁸ Although showing that the IRB viewed a rebellion as

³⁸ MacEntee, pp.37-8.

entirely contingent on and linked with the war, this general resolution gave no indication of any concerted plans to actively plan a rebellion that would a be a part of the wider war. Some Supreme Council members were indeed wary of becoming involved in the war by rebelling. Supreme Council member Bulmer Hobson was representative of this faction, later claiming that the wartime IRB's 'aim was to keep out of [the war], and to keep Ireland out, and to profit as far as we could from whatever turn it should take'.³⁹

Conversely, other Supreme Council members and republicans wanted to become involved in the war. On 9 September 1914, a meeting of republicans, including IRB members, resolved to actively organise an insurrection and, crucially, to contact Germany for military support. This meeting – whose attendants included Patrick Pearse, Éamonn Ceannt, Thomas J. Clarke, Seán Mac Diarmada, Joseph Plunkett, Thomas MacDonagh and James Connolly, who all later signed the 1916 Proclamation of the Republic – was essentially the antecedent to the IRB Military Council. Formed in May 1915 in secret from the rest of the Supreme Council and IRB, this Military Council planned what would become the Easter Rising.⁴⁰

For largely tactical reasons, leading figures planning the Rising advocated joining the war on Germany's side, believing that Irish independence directly depended on the UK's defeat. Roger Casement worked to secure German assistance for the IRB's plans and most explicitly advocated a German-Irish alliance. Writing in 1913, he had predicted war between the UK and Germany, imagined a 'joint German-Irish invasion of Ireland' and urged that 'every Irishman able to join that army of deliverance must get ready to-day'. He also argued that 'Ireland must be involved in any war that Great Britain undertakes [...] We must see to it that the day Germany strikes, Ireland shall be there', anticipating that Irish separatists should become active participants in the war

³⁹ An t-Óglác, June 1931, p.12.

⁴⁰ William O'Brien, and Desmond Ryan, ed., *Labour And Easter Week: A Selection From The Writings Of James Connolly* (Dublin: At the Sign of the Three Candles, 1949), p.3; 'Cathal O'Shannon Interview For 'The Survivors', 1965', *RTÉ* <<u>https://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1993-easter-1916/2017-survivors/609021-the-survivors-cathal-oshannon/</u>> [accessed 9 January 2023]; Annie Ryan, *Witnesses: Inside The Easter Rising* (Dublin: Liberties, 2005), p.19.

against the UK.⁴¹ Then, in a November 1914 letter to the Irish Volunteers president, Eoin MacNeill, Casement repeated his call for alliance with Germany, as 'every man at home must stand for Germany and Irish freedom', and for taking an active role in the war as 'We may win everything by this war if we are true to Germany'.⁴² John Devoy, the leader of *Clan na Gael*, the IRB's American counterpart, and instrumental in planning the Rising, also spoke in terms of an alliance with Germany. Early in the war, *Clan na Gael* resolved that Ireland's interests would be best served by 'taking sides with Germany against England in the war which has just broken out'. He also later recalled that the republican Irish leaders had 'sought an alliance with England's most powerful enemy', clearly contextualising the plans for a rebellion within an alliance with Germany.⁴³

In September 1914, John Redmond –nationalist Irish Party leader dedicated to achieving 'home rule' or devolved government for Ireland by constitutional means – called for the Irish Volunteers to enlist in the British Army and fight in the war. This intervention prompted a split in the organisation and most of the membership left to form the new National Volunteers under Redmond's leadership. Around 12,000 or 7 per cent of the total number of original Irish Volunteers remained under a revolutionary republican leadership infiltrated by the IRB and were the basis of the Military Council's plans for, and some would later participate in, the Rising.⁴⁴ In the build-up to the Rising, these Volunteers were organised, at least in part, around the idea of helping Germany to win the war for the sake of Irish freedom. IRB member and Irish Volunteers organiser Ernest Blythe recalled telling a Volunteer parade in Kerry early in the war that if German troops landed in Ireland in support of Irish independence 'we would flock to their standards' and he 'called on the All-Merciful God to crown the German eagles with victory'. He later recalled that he regularly 'spoke in the strongest terms in favour of a German-Irish alliance' while organising the Volunteers and insisted that 'all of us' in the Volunteers 'naturally' wanted the UK to lose the war and were

 ⁴¹ Roger Casement, *The Crime Against Ireland And How The War May Right It* (1915), pp.3, 6, 72, 84.
 ⁴² Documents Relative To The Sinn Fein Movement (London: HMSO, 1921), p.5.

 ⁴³ John Devoy, *Recollections Of An Irish Rebel* (New York: Chas. P. Young Co., 1929), pp.393, 481.
 ⁴⁴ Seamus Deane, Andrew Carpenter and Jonathan Williams, ed., *The Field Day Anthology Of Irish Writing. Volume II* (Derry: Field Day Publications, 1991), p.346; Patrick Maume, *The Long Gestation: Irish Nationalist Life, 1891-1918* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p.150; Grayson, p.25.

'strongly pro-German'.⁴⁵ A 7 November 1914 article in *The Irish Volunteer*, the organisation's official magazine, likewise promoted joining the war on Germany's side to the mass of Irish Volunteers. Making several references to German progress and the UK's difficulties in the war, the article asserted that 'Our only path to the glorious and happy Ireland of our aspiration lies through the downfall of the British Empire'. Calling on the Volunteers to 'be ready to play our part' in that downfall, this article speaks volumes about how the republican leadership in Ireland imagined themselves participating in the war on Germany's side and, like Blythe's recruiting speeches, laid the groundwork for the Rising as an intervention into the war.⁴⁶

Contemporary sources and later accounts demonstrate a wider popularity to the idea of allying with Germany in the war due to their coinciding interests. For example, IRB and Irish Volunteers member Desmond FitzGerald recalled that from 1914 most Volunteers presumed that a German invasion of Britain and Ireland would spark a rebellion and imagined the Volunteers 'making an alliance' with the Germans. FitzGerald also assisted Blythe's Volunteer organising activities and recalled that when Blythe made a speech hailing 'Germany as the only friend for whom Ireland had sought for so long [...] There was plenty of applause', suggesting that the assembled Volunteers endorsed joining Germany in the war for Irish nationalist reasons.⁴⁷ Several almost comic touches in accounts of the pre-Rising period indicate mainstream pro-German sentiment among those who would participate in the Rising. ICA member Frank Robbins remembered that on pre-Rising marches they would often sing a song titled 'The Germans are Winning the War Me Boys', composed by leading ICA figure Constance Markievicz.⁴⁸ Similarly, the June 1916 prison diary of Patrick J. Moloney – Irish Volunteers president and organiser in Tipperary – mentioned Volunteers singing 'Ireland Over All' to the tune of *Deutschland Über Alles*, with words written by Éamonn Ceannt, who was executed for signing the Proclamation and commanding rebels during

⁴⁵ Dublin, Bureau of Military History (BMH), WS 939 (Ernest Blythe) 1954; 'Ernest Blythe Interview For 'The Survivors', 1965', *RTÉ* <<u>https://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1993-easter-1916/2017-</u> <u>survivors/610313-the-survivors-earnn-de-blaghd/</u>> [accessed 6 January 2023].

⁴⁶ *The Irish Volunteer*, 7 November 1914 Vol. 1 No. 40, p.8.

⁴⁷ Desmond FitzGerald, *Memoirs Of Desmond FitzGerald, 1913-1916* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), pp.46, 49.

⁴⁸ BMH, WS 585, Frank Robbins, 1951.

the Rising.49

Numerous post-Rising republican accounts strove to depict the Rising as a purely Irish national event, with the war as a backdrop and the desire to ally with Germany to help them win the war downplayed. American author Charles Newton Wheeler's sympathetic 1919 history of the Rising amusingly explained that as Irish separatists calculated that Germany could help them remove British rule of Ireland, any mouse under a cat's paw would be 'pro-dog'.⁵⁰ Similarly, IRB member Seán MacEntee qualified that while those planning the Rising expected and celebrated German victories in the war as paving the way to Irish independence, they were not 'by any means "pro-German" simpliciter', but wanted simply to serve Ireland.⁵¹ Even with most of the pro-German sentiment that motivated the Rising appearing to be tactical rather than sympathetic towards Germany, these and other similar accounts still attest to the general pattern of thinking among those who planned the Rising that German victory in the war was to be desired and supported for Ireland's sake. Wanting to help Ireland primarily over Germany was not irreconcilable with still aiding German victory and did not preclude the convergence of aims between Irish separatists and Imperial Germany. Most of those who planned the Rising had specifically Irish nationalist reasons for wanting to stage a rebellion and thereby enter the war on Germany's side, and in so doing help Germany defeat the UK and gain independence for Ireland.

Beyond allying with Germany, leading figures planning the Rising were also inspired to understand their planned rebellion as a part of the war by the propaganda that it was being fought to defend the independence of small and/or unrecognised nations and which was deployed in Ireland for recruitment early in the war. In September 1914, both Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith and John Redmond spoke in Ireland of the war as being fought 'for the independent existence and the

⁴⁹ London, The National Archives (TNA), Home Office: Registered Papers, Supplementary, HO 144/1457/313643, Patrick J. Moloney Prison Diary, June 1916; Ben Novick, *Conceiving Revolution: Nationalist Propaganda During The First World War* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2001), pp.123-4.

⁵⁰ Charles Newton Wheeler, *The Irish Republic* (Chicago: Cahill-Igoe Company, 1919), p.78.

⁵¹ MacEntee, p.38.

free development of the smaller nationalities', and 'for the defence of the sacred rights and liberties of small nations'.⁵² Irish author and nephew of John Redmond but sympathetic to the Rising, L.G. Redmond-Howard, and Michael Collins, who had fought in the Rising and was then prominent in the 1919-21 Irish War for Independence, both highlighted how the Rising aligned with the war through this propaganda. They separately wrote that those planning the Rising were driven to fight for their national sovereignty to reject, in Redmond-Howard's words, 'England's claim to be the champion of small nationalities' while denying Irish freedom. For Collins, this propaganda had given the Irish rebels the rationale 'to call the attention of the world to the denial of our claim', with the Rising representing Ireland's claim to be one of 'the nations that were emerging as a result of the new doctrines being preached' and had fought in the war to claim their national freedom.⁵³

Those planning the Rising also invoked such propaganda when urging Ireland to join the war as a small nation fighting for its independence. In a September 1914 open letter, Roger Casement wrote, 'If this be a war for the "small nationalities" as the planners term it, then let it begin, for one small nationality, at home', essentially advocating bringing the war to Ireland through an Irish rebellion.⁵⁴ Robert Monteith, who had assisted Casement's attempts to secure German aid, similarly adapted the idea of the war for small nations, arguing that Casement 'was putting to the test England's declaration that she was in the fight for small nationalities', as the Rising represented 'a small nation challenging the lightnings of Empire', like others in the war.⁵⁵ In a December 1915 article, Military Council member Patrick Pearse enthused that small nations were asserting and renewing themselves in the war, with people and governments across Europe fighting for the 'soil of a nation' and their 'fatherland', suggesting that Irish nationalists should emulate them and participate in the war. He effectively challenged Irish separatists to involve

⁵² The War, Its Causes And Its Message: Speeches Delivered By The Prime Minister, August-October 1914 (London: Methuen & Co., 1914), pp.30-1; Deane, Carpenter and Williams, II, p.345.

⁵³ L.G. Redmond-Howard, *Six Days Of The Irish Republic: A Narrative And Critical Account Of The Latest Phase Of Irish Politics* (London: Maunsel, 1916), pp. iii, 78; Michael Collins, *The Path To Freedom* (Dublin: The Talbot Press, 1922), pp.68-70.

⁵⁴ Roger McHugh, 'Casement And German Help', in *Leaders And Men*, ed. by Martin, pp.177-87 (p.179).

⁵⁵ Robert Monteith, *Casement's Last Adventure* (Chicago: 1932), pp.96, 100.

themselves in the war to secure Irish independence by asking, 'What if the war sets Poland and Ireland free? If the war does these things, will not the war have been worthwhile?'. At a time when the Rising was at an advanced stage of planning, he also hinted that the war spreading to Ireland was an imminent possibility: 'When war comes to Ireland, she must welcome it as she would the Angel of God', speaking volumes about how Pearse perceived the coming rebellion as expanding the war to encompass Ireland.⁵⁶

John Devoy later doubted that the idea of a larger anticolonial war inspired the Rising, again reflecting the trend of republicans back-projecting onto the Rising the notion that it was separate from the war. He claimed that 'the I.R.B. needed no such incentive' to rebel as the example set by small nations fighting in the war as the tradition of Irish rebellions was sufficient to spur the separatists.⁵⁷ However, the contemporary expressions of inspiration from the war clearly demonstrate that an Irish rebellion was imagined as part of the wider war. As John Horne has noted, the war was often incorporated into the projects even of those rejecting it.⁵⁸

In March 1916, Patrick Pearse channelled the war's practical and propagandistic inspiration for the Rising in an article arguing that the most advantageous moment to become active participants in the war by rebelling had arrived. Indeed, he held that Irish separatists were literally already 'at war with England', but an imminent rebellion was necessary to be 'the deciding factor in this war' as 'Defeat in Ireland means more for the enemy than any defeat she may sustain in Flanders'. In practical terms, victory for the Rising and the UK's subsequent defeat in the war seemed possible to Pearse as the war had weakened British naval and land forces so much that, with a supposedly imminent 'German offensive', they could not respond to the Rising. In propagandistic terms, he associated the upcoming Rising with the ongoing war. He dismissed any possible horror at his claim that 'war justifies the removal of our enemies in the most expeditious manner' by pointing to

⁵⁶ Collected Works Of Pádraic H. Pearse: Political Writings And Speeches (Dublin: Phoenix, 1916), p.216-7.

⁵⁷ Devoy, p.480.

⁵⁸ Horne, 'James Connolly And The Great Divide', p.82.

the Western Front's carnage. While those fighting in the war claimed 'just and noble' motives, he maintained that the desire for Irish national freedom was even 'more legitimate and more sacred' in the war's prevailing terms, thereby hinting that the Rising would align with the war.⁵⁹

That the war's progress made likely the Rising's success was a live discussion and recurred in numerous post-Rising accounts, emphasising that the war was integral to the Rising's planning and revealing the ambition that the Rising would be integral to the war. Seán MacEntee recalled Military Council member Seán Mac Diarmada lecturing Volunteers in March 1916 and obliquely hinting at the necessity for rebellion, as 'German armies had shown themselves to be invincible; England and France were being bled to death'. From this lecture, MacEntee reasoned that the leaders were planning a rebellion during the war, or 'the Germans assuredly would not raise the question of Ireland at the Peace Conference', implying that a rebellion would fall within the war's scope.⁶⁰ Similarly, Frank Robbins remembered ICA leader James Connolly, on the day before the Rising began, notifying the ICA of an upcoming secret session of the British Parliament that he believed would consider peace with Germany. Connolly declared that the ICA 'would stand to arms as soldiers of the Irish Republic' until Ireland was granted representation at the post- war peace negotiations, preparing the ground for the Rising to be Ireland's claim to belligerent status in the war.⁶¹ Desmond Ryan, an IRB member and participant in the Rising familiar with leading figures such as Pearse, confirmed that the Military Council hoped that the Rising would allow Ireland to be 'backed at the Peace Conference as a belligerent by Germany'.⁶² The Military Council, then, timed the Rising to when they believed that the UK was militarily stretched and the rebels could claim belligerent status in the war.

Around late 1915 and early 1916, the Central Powers did hold the military edge over the UK and its

⁵⁹ Patrick Pearse, 'The Work Before Us', *An Cartlann* <<u>https://cartlann.org/authors/padraig-pearse/the-work-before-us/</u>> [accessed 22 December 2022]; Francis P. Jones, *History Of The Sinn Fein Movement And The Irish Rebellion* (New York: P.J. Kennedy & Sons, 1917), pp.153-5.

⁶⁰ MacEntee, p.62.

⁶¹ Frank Robbins, *Under The Starry Plough: Recollections Of The Irish Citizen Army* (Dublin: The Academy Press, 1977), p.80.

⁶² Desmond Ryan, *The Rising: The Complete Story Of Easter Week* (Dublin: Golden Eagle Books, 1949), p.41.

allies. The British and French armies had made little progress against Germany on the Western Front, British deployment to the Balkans from October 1915 would engage over 180,000 British troops at its height, around late 1915 and early 1916 a British force had been encircled at Kut-el-Amara, and allied troops had evacuated from Gallipoli in January 1916 after around 200,000 British Empire casualties.⁶³ Perhaps with hindsight over the Rising's military failure, John Devoy claimed that the Military Council's decision to rebel when they did surprised *Clan na Gael* 'as we had no expectation that it would be taken until the war situation became more favourable', though without elaborating on the conditions he believed would have enabled the Rising's success.⁶⁴ He was right that the Military Council's rhetoric about the opportunity the war presented in early 1916 was overambitious. The UK was struggling in the war, but only the Royal Navy's defeat in the North Sea would have allowed sufficient German aid to reach Ireland and have prevented the British Army sending enough troops to quell the Rising. However, it is still significant that those planning the Rising recognised that its outcome was tied to the war and determined that its timing should align it with the war, just as they aligned their cause with the war's propaganda, both underscoring that the Rising was intended to be a battle of the war.

Part 2: The plans to open a new front in the war

Roger Casement arrived in Berlin on 31 October 1914 and spent the next 18 months until the Rising attempting to secure German aid for the Irish separatists and put the German-Irish alliance he envisioned into practice.⁶⁵ To secure assistance, Casement repeatedly framed an Irish rebellion as central to the war and the war as central to a rebellion. In one August 1914 letter to Kaiser Wilhelm II, Casement declared that 'Thousands of Irishmen are prepared to do their part to aid the German cause, for they recognize that it is their own'.⁶⁶ John Devoy, who assisted Casement's

⁶³ Holger Afflerbach, 'The Strategy Of The Central Powers, 1914-1917', in *Oxford Illustrated History Of The First World War* ed. by Strachan, pp.28-38 (p.34); David French, 'The Strategy Of The Entente Powers, 1914-1917', in Ibid., pp.52-65 (pp.57-8); Ulrich Trumpener, 'Turkey's War', in Ibid., pp.80-91 (p.88); Hart, p.195; Michael Provence, '1916 In The Middle East And The Global War For Empire', in *1916 In Global Context*, ed. by Dal Lago, Healy and Barry, pp.93-102 (p.93).

⁶⁴ Devoy, p.458.

⁶⁵ Berlin Diary Of Roger Casement, p.22.

⁶⁶ Devoy, pp.405-6.

efforts to secure German support, also framed plans for an Irish rebellion as a key element of Germany's war effort. After the outbreak of war, when *Clan na Gael* representatives approached the German ambassador in the United States to request German support, they emphasised that it was in Germany's interest to have an Irish rising divert British troops from the Western Front. Devoy later wrote that any military help for the Rising 'would be considered by the German Government as an integral part of its warfare against the British Empire, and in furtherance of the policy to smash England's control of the seas', underlining his recognition that the Rising could be intrinsic to the war.⁶⁷

A significant strand of Casement's work was to create an Irish Brigade attached to the German Army, manned by Irish prisoners of war from the British Army whom the German Government had separated from other British Empire prisoners and given preferential treatment.⁶⁸ On 28 December 1914, Casement agreed a treaty with the German Government to organise the Brigade, revealing Casement's intent to emphasise that the Brigade's and the German Military's actions should only serve Ireland, but also underscoring the Brigade's potential dependence and the Rising on German assistance. The treaty stated that 'under no circumstances shall [the Brigade] be employed or directed to any German end'. It also pledged Germany to send the Brigade to Ireland following a German naval victory, with 'efficient military support and with an ample supply of arms and ammunition' and 'a supporting body of German officers and men' to aid an Irish rebellion and support an independent Irish government.⁶⁹

Despite the efforts to emphasise that the Brigade would only serve Ireland and distance it from the German war effort, and that only 56 men joined and were never sent to Ireland, the Brigade was often portrayed as an asset to Germany's war effort. Underlining his vision of the Brigade and an Irish rebellion as essential elements of the wider war, in December 1915 Casement claimed to the

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp.403, 420.

⁶⁸ Destenay, 'Impact Of Political Unrest', pp.55-6.

⁶⁹ Dublin, University College Dublin Archives (UCDA), Boehm/Casement Papers, P127/2, Casement Agreement With German Foreign Office, 28 December 1914.

German Government that the Brigade's members had 'volunteered to take part in the war against England'.⁷⁰ Additionally, in a February 1916 letter requesting better treatment for the Brigade to Rudolf Nadolny – who directed covert German support for anti-government groups within rival empires – Robert Monteith claimed that the German Government 'has benefitted enormously' from the Brigade, as 'Owing to their example and the activity of the Irish people an army of at least 100 000 British troops is held at home' [sic].⁷¹

Although Monteith exaggerated the Brigade's effect, figures within Germany agreed that it at least held propaganda value for their war effort and supporting it reflected wider German strategies. For instance, according to a September 1914 despatch from the German Embassy in Washington D.C. to the Berlin Foreign Office advocating forming an 'Irish Legion' within the German Army, Germany was 'most likely to find friends here [the United States] if we give freedom to oppressed peoples, such as the Poles, the Finns and the Irish', and winning American support would have been hugely beneficial to the German war effort.⁷² Monteith also alluded to the Brigade's and the Rising's place in Germany's war effort when recalling that on his October 1915 arrival at the Brigade's German headquarters he encountered Muslim prisoners of the British and French Armies whom the German Military 'equipped and armed to return and fight on the side of their own countrymen' against Germany's enemies. Such an encounter was not just representative of German war strategies, as Monteith pointedly argued that France and Russia also practised what Casement attempted by enlisting volunteers from their enemies' lands.⁷³ These sources reflect the fact that rebellions by non-state combatants, backed by major powers, were integral components of the war. For instance, when militant Boers staged a rebellion against the South African government during 1914-15, their plans involved liaising with German forces and releasing German prisoners, and the German Military established a Vrij Korp Boer brigade in their territories

⁷⁰ Dublin, National Library of Ireland (NLI), Roger Casement Papers, MS13,085/2/2, Casement Memorandum To German Government, 9 December 1915.

⁷¹ NLI, MS13,085/1iii/7, Monteith To Nadolny, 5 February 1916.

⁷² Documents Relative, p.3.

⁷³ Monteith, pp.67, 78.

near South Africa.⁷⁴ While the Irish Brigade was ultimately a failure, it demands attention for revealing how a strand of the Rising's plans was intimately connected with the German war effort.

Landing German arms and troops in Ireland in support of an insurrection was the other major strand of the Rising's plans that reveals the ambition to open a new front in the war. In November 1914, Casement secured a declaration from the German Government in support of Irish national aspirations, which also suggested that German troops might land in Ireland.⁷⁵ However, he had trouble securing a definite agreement from the German Government to send arms and troops. Geraldine Dillon, sister of Military Council member and Proclamation signatory Joseph Plunkett, later explained that the Military Council sent Plunkett to Germany in 1915 as they had been concerned with Casement's lack of progress. She believed that Casement asking for a German invasion force to land in Ireland 'had completely disregarded German interests' and disregarded that Germany 'must derive some military advantage' from the Rising, indicating that the Military Council wanted to align the Rising with Germany's war effort.⁷⁶ However, Casement had consistently emphasised the potential military advantage to Germany of supporting an Irish rebellion and the Military Council's proposals were as essentially unrealistic as Casement's.

Around May and June 1915, Plunkett submitted two documents to the German General Staff requesting a German naval invasion of the West of Ireland with 12,000 soldiers, bringing 40,000 rifles for the Irish Volunteers, whom the Germans would then lead to relieve those who had begun the Rising in Dublin.⁷⁷ The German General Staff and Foreign Office rejected the full extent of Plunkett's proposals, but the aspiration of some German troops landing in Ireland with arms for the Volunteers remained the basis of the Military Council's plans. In February 1916 the Military Council confirmed their plans for a rebellion around Easter 1916 to the German Foreign Office and

⁷⁴ T.R.H. Davenport, 'The South African Rebellion, 1914', *The English Historical Review*, 78.306 (1963) 73-94 (pp.80, 84).

 ⁷⁵ Reinhard R. Doerries, ed., *Prelude To The Easter Rising* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp.60-1.
 ⁷⁶ BMH, WS 358, Geraldine Dillon, 1950.

⁷⁷ NLI, MS13,085/5/2, Volunteer Plan Of Action, May/June 1915; NLI, MS13,085/5/3, Coastal Survey, May/June 1915; Fearghal McGarry, *The Rising: Ireland, Easter 1916*, Centenary edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp.105-6; Foy and Barton, p.26.

again requested '25 to 50 thousand rifles with a proportionate number of machine guns and field artillery and a few superior officers' to be sent to Ireland 'escorted by submarines' and 'simultaneous with a demonstration in the Nord [sic] Sea'.⁷⁸ Again, in an April 1916 message to the German Foreign Office and General Staff the Military Council requested a 'large shipment of arms', emphasising that 'German officers absolutely necessary for volunteer forces' and a 'German submarine necessary for Dublin harbour'.⁷⁹

These repeated requests underline that those planning the Rising understood the war's centrality to the Rising and wanted to make the Rising central to the war. The May/June 1915 requests were explicitly formulated to show that supporting an Irish rebellion could serve German interests in the war by making an ally of independent Ireland. For example, Plunkett wrote that if German forces took Lough Swilly naval base, it 'would entirely alter the British naval strategy and provide an Atlantic base for the German Fleet', while Kerry's Blasket Islands and Galway's inlets and harbours would make good submarine bases.⁸⁰ Additionally, the February 1916 request claimed that if Germany supported it, the Rising could occupy 500,000 British troops in Ireland.⁸¹ Alongside the April 1916 request, George Noble Plunkett, Joseph Plunkett's father, asked Casement to emphasise to the German Government that 'the presence of German officers, and of a German submarine' were especially essential as direct German involvement in the Rising would bear significant 'advantages to Germany and to Ireland'.⁸² Or, as another April 1916 message to the German Foreign Office from Daniel F. Colohan of *Clan na Gael* succinctly declared, 'success of revolution can decide war'.⁸³

Contemporary observers from opposing political backgrounds correctly recognised that the hopedfor German aid had connected the Rising to the war. Irish-American nationalist writer Francis P.

⁷⁸ Doerries, *Prelude*, pp.181-4.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.206.

⁸⁰ NLI, MS13,085/5/2, Volunteer Plan Of Action, May/June 1915; NLI, MS13,085/5/3, Coastal Survey, May/June 1915. ⁸¹ Doerries, *Prelude*, pp.181-4.

⁸² Ibid., p.208.

⁸³ Ibid., p.218.

Jones extolled how the Rising had been planned as an 'Irish-Germanic alliance' which would have opened a new front with German submarines based in and around Ireland, and which 'would almost certainly have proved a crowning disaster for England in the war'.⁸⁴ Commenting on the planned country-wide risings supported by German troops and arms, unionist commentators Warre B. Wells and N. Marlowe deduced that the Rising was supposed to have led to a mass diversion of British land and naval forces to Ireland, allowing Germany to possibly attack the British coast. Therefore, the Rising had undoubtedly been planned as 'an integral incident in the great war'.⁸⁵

Karl Spindler, captain of the *Aud*, the ship tasked with carrying arms to Ireland, recalled a general belief within the German Government that the Rising 'would shorten the war by several months' as the British Army would have to move troops to Ireland.⁸⁶ However, most sources suggest that German strategists valued the propaganda rather than material benefits of arming the rebels. For example, in a June 1915 memorandum to the German General Staff, Captain Hans W. Boehm proposed that arms should be sent to Ireland but that the amount did not matter. He emphasised the propaganda value of supporting the Rising by claiming that 'We absolutely need the Irish, namely in America, where they are powerful', indicating that a token arms shipment to Ireland could sway American support away from Britain and towards Germany, which could be decisive in the war.⁸⁷ Likewise, in March 1916 Rudolf Nadolny, Casement's main contact in the German Government, revealed to Casement that German arms would be sent to Ireland only to cause a 'military diversion' and win Irish-American support for Germany.⁸⁸ Even while somewhat dubious of its immediate practical military prospects, this German belief that a rebellion with even tokenistic German support leading to British repression in Ireland could prevent America allying with Britain

⁸⁴ Jones, *History Of The Sinn Fein Movement*, pp.219-22

⁸⁵ Warre B. Wells, and N. Marlowe, *A History Of The Irish Rebellion Of 1916* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1917), pp.14, 132-4; Alvin Jackson, 'Mrs Foster And The Rebels: Irish Unionist Approaches To The Easter Rising, 1916–2016', in *Irish Historical Studies*, 42.161 (2018), 143-160 (p.145).

⁸⁶ Karl Spindler, *Gun Running For Casement In The Easter Rebellion, 1916* (London: W. Collins, 1921), pp.10-1. ⁸⁷ Doerries, *Prelude*, p.131.

⁸⁸ Roger Casement and Angus Mitchell, 'Diary Of Roger Casement, 1914-16. Part I: My Journey To The German Headquarters At Charleville, And Part II: A Last Page Of My Diary', *Field Day Review*, 8 (2012), 22-83 (pp.54, 63, 66).

in the war underlines that senior German military figures perceived the Rising as integral to the war's development and naturally complementing their war effort.

Those who were uninvolved in the planning and were hostile to the Rising, and ignorant of German ambivalence towards the Rising, often portrayed Germans as the driving force behind the plans, thereby imagining it as indivisible from the wider war. Essentially the first response to the Rising from an official source, a 24 April 1916 Proclamation by Ivor Churchill, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, described it as 'instigated and designed by the foreign enemies of our King and Country' i.e. Germany.⁸⁹ Then John Redmond, who opposed the Rising as a threat to political gains made the Irish Party, gave a similarly partial response in the Rising's aftermath, declaring that 'Germany plotted it, Germany organised it, Germany paid for it' and that it represented 'a German invasion of Ireland, as brutal, as selfish, as cynical as Germany's invasion of Belgium'.⁹⁰ Likewise, in a May 1916 memorandum to the British Cabinet, Sir John Maxwell, the British Army in Ireland's Commander-in-Chief, asserted his certainty that Germany had 'fomented the Sinn Feiners [sic] Citizen Army with vague promises and propaganda to rebellion'.⁹¹

As Matthew E. Plowman was right to recently note, Germany did not put the idea of rebellion into Irish minds – the first contact and request for German aid for the Rising came from *Clan na Gael* members approaching the German Ambassador to the United States in August 1914.⁹² Although the above claims were mistaken, exaggerated, and removed Irish republican agency from the Rising's planning, they require attention for the fact that they were widely shared and illuminate how the Rising was perceived to fit into the war. Moreover, though the repeated requests for German aid prove that the Rising was driven by Irish figures, they also prove that the plans relied heavily on the promise of German aid and materially pulled the Rising into the war.

⁸⁹ TNA, CO 904/23, Baron Wimborne Proclamation, 24 April 1916.

⁹⁰ The Voice Of Ireland; Being An Interview With John Redmond, M.P. And Some Messages From Representative Irishmen Regarding The Sinn Fein Rebellion (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1916), pp.4-5.

⁹¹ TNA, WO 32/9574, Maxwell Memorandum To Cabinet, 13 May 1916.

⁹² Matthew E. Plowman, 'Irish Republicans And The Indo-German Conspiracy Of World War I', *New Hibernia Review*, 7.3 (2003) 80-105 (p.87); Spindler, p.10; Ryan, pp.24-5; Foy and Barton, p.24.

In his address to the Court Martial after the Rising, Pearse, while repudiating that he aimed to help Germany, acknowledged that 'I asked and accepted German aid in the shape of arms and an expeditionary force'.⁹³ Additionally, Irish Volunteers officer Donal O'Hannigan recalled that, shortly before the Rising, Pearse had told him that 'there was a good supply of arms and ammunition coming from Germany including artillery pieces and that the Germans were also sending troops to our aid', again indicating that Pearse held substantial German intervention as integral to the plan and reflecting his idea that the Rising would be a new front in the war.⁹⁴

Since the war's outbreak, James Connolly had been planning to lead an ICA rising but had been uninvolved in the Military Council's plans to rise until, as IRB member Liam Ó Bríain explained, in January 1916 they 'arrested' Connolly 'to prevent him precipitating things and to convince him they meant business as much as he did, by revealing to him their dealings with Germany'.⁹⁵ Connolly subsequently became a Military Council member and the ICA participated in the Rising with the Volunteers, suggesting that Connolly and the Military Council placed great importance on German intervention and on making the Rising a part of the war. ICA member Frank Robbins described Connolly, on the Tuesday before the Rising, telling some ICA men about the plan to rebel and 'that a ship-load of arms, including some machine guns, with officers and men to operate them would be coming from Germany'.⁹⁶

Seán Mac Diarmada also planned to rise on the assumption of German troops and arms being in Ireland. IRB members Piaras Beaslai and Ernest Blythe plus former IRB president Denis McCullough each recalled Mac Diarmada separately telling them that German arms and officers would land at various parts of Ireland including Dublin, demonstrating that German military aid was

⁹³ Piaras Machlochlainn, *Last Words: Letters And Statements Of The Leaders Executed After The Rising At Easter* 1916 (Dublin: Stationary Office, 1990), p.28.

⁹⁴ BMH, WS 161, Donal O'Hannigan, 1948.

⁹⁵ BMH, WS 6, Liam Ó Bríain, 1947.

⁹⁶ Robbins, p.77.

central to Mac Diarmada's conception of the Rising. Blythe and McCullough later claimed not to have believed him and indeed doubted whether Mac Diarmada had believed himself, but the range of evidence including the Military Council requests to Germany and recollections about individual leading figures strongly suggests that they planned the Rising as part of the war.⁹⁷

Conclusion

The Easter Rising was planned as the means for Irish separatists to enter the war on Germany's side. German military assistance held a complex and nuanced place in the Rising's plans, as how the plans were formulated, explained and framed at the highest level of planning in Ireland and Germany to show how Germany could help the Rising but also how the Rising could help Germany win the war. While the scholarship generally overlooks whether the Rising was planned to be the Irish separatists' entry into the war, this chapter has shown that the republicans had specifically Irish nationalist reasons to ally with Germany in the war, and that they held German support for the Rising and republican support for the German war effort as mutually supporting principles. The republicans did not plan a rebellion that was disconnected from the war, but explicitly planned the Rising to help Germany win the war and have Germany help achieve Irish freedom through the war, while also being inspired to have Ireland participate in a larger anticolonial war. These ambitions were not restricted to leading figures in the republican movement but were also shared and recognised by participants and contemporary commentators. Although the different goals and agendas of the Irish republicans and German military figures involved in the planning led to different outlooks on the Rising's ultimate goal and relationship to the war, these perspectives all still recognised the Rising as naturally a part of the war.

While it was wishful thinking that the war really had created the ideal conditions for a successful insurrection, or that the Rising as it was planned could really determine the war's outcome, it is crucial to view the plans as they were understood at the time. To assess how much of the plan

⁹⁷ An t-Óglác, December 1931, pp.4-5; BMH, WS 939, Ernest Blythe, 1954; BMH, WS 915, Denis McCullough, 1953.

was a practical reality is to somewhat miss the point. The plan's importance lies in demonstrating that a range of separatists wanted it to open the Irish Front of the war. This consideration is particularly true for the Irish Brigade, which was never sent to Ireland but matters historically because it was a key element of the plans, formed the background to the Rising and reflected that republicans and Germans imagined the Rising as a part of the wider war. Moreover, the ideas surrounding the Brigade aligned it and the Rising with those surrounding other non- state combatants and revolutionaries supported by imperial powers throughout the war.

This chapter fits within the larger discussion on the war's essential nature with a nuanced demonstration that the Rising's plans took inspiration from the idea that the war was fought for small nations while also fitting into the British-German imperial struggle. Both themes being united in the Rising's plans reveals that they could be mutually supportive and that the Rising could be legitimately envisioned as an element within a war that was simultaneously an imperial and anticolonial conflict. Likewise, this chapter adds another layer to understanding the Rising's timing, arguing that it not only signalled the intent to contribute to German victory in the war but also reflected the republican belief that they could become formal belligerents in the war, thus revealing the intention to make the Rising a theatre of the war. Moreover, this chapter has connected elements of the plans previously discussed in the scholarship to signal a wider argument that the resultant Rising was fundamentally a part of the war. In doing so, it has advanced beyond the scholarship that has not fully appreciated the extent to which the Rising's leaders wanted Ireland and the Rising to be integral to the war.

Introduction

At the Easter Rising's beginning on Monday 24 April 1916, Patrick Pearse declared in the Proclamation of the Republic that the Irish rebels were supported 'by gallant allies in Europe',⁹⁸ Three days prior, on 21 April, the *Aud*, a ship carrying arms from Germany for the Irish rebels, was intercepted and sunk off the coast of southwest Ireland.⁹⁹ On the same day that the Rising began in Dublin, a German Zeppelin attacked East Anglia.¹⁰⁰ Contemporaries framed these and other events of that week from Monday 24 to Sunday 30 April, in Ireland and beyond, as crucial parts of the ongoing war. Considerations of the war profoundly shaped reactions to the Rising and during the Rising it was widely seen as another theatre of the war, not simply a parallel or coincidental conflict.

Recent scholarship covering the events of the Rising has sometimes explained or rationalised them by reference to the war. Fearghal McGarry and Brian Barton explain how the war informed the British Army's approach during the week and in the aftermath, while Clair Wills contends that the ongoing war allowed those undertaking the Rising to believe that their actions were militarily rational. However, Wills still depicts the Rising and war as discrete if related conflicts, claiming that 'the rebellion mirrored the war it opposed'.¹⁰¹

Much of the scholarship on the events of the Rising maintains this framing that the war and the Rising were technically separate conflicts and rarely mention events in other theatres of the war. Some notable exceptions, including Richard S. Grayson and Keith Jeffery, cover global responses to the Rising or juxtapose the Rising and other theatres.¹⁰² The scholarship since the 1960s has

⁹⁸ Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, p.1.

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp.7, 130.

 ¹⁰⁰ Thomas Hennessey, *Dividing Ireland: World War I And Partition* (London: Routledge, 1998), p.127.
 ¹⁰¹ Fearghal McGarry, '1916 And Irish Republicanism', in *Towards Commemoration*, ed. by Horne and Madigan, pp.46-53 (p.52); Brian Barton, *From Behind A Closed Door: Secret Court Martial Records Of The 1916* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2002), p.36, 49-50; Clair Wills, *Dublin 1916: The Siege Of The GPO* (London: Profile, 2009), pp.11, 193.

¹⁰² Grayson, p.123; Jeffery, *1916*; Dal Lago, Healy and Barry, ed., *1916 In Global Context*; Foy and Barton, p.287.

referenced rumours of German aid for the rebels and of the UK's defeat in the war, which were widely shared during the Rising, and reports that British Army soldiers arriving in Dublin initially believed that they were in France or Belgium, though usually as a curious aside or insight into individual responses to the Rising.¹⁰³ Likewise since the 1960s, scholars have recognised the relevance of German naval actions in the North Sea during the Rising to the Rising and their place in the German war effort.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, F.S.L. Lyons in 1989 and Jeffery in 2000 have separately mentioned that the Rising's leaders aspired to formal beligerent status but have hazily contextualised this idea in the war and without arguing that such an aspiration made the Rising a part of the war.¹⁰⁵ Jeffery is also representative of recent scholarship that draws comparisons between the destruction wrought on Dublin and on the Western Front, mentioning newspaper reports comparing Dublin to Ypres, though again without fully developing and exploring how and why contemporaries regarded the Rising as a battle of the war.¹⁰⁶

Contemporary accounts of the Rising and its aftermath make clear that during the Rising a wide range of participants and observers, including rebels, British soldiers and civilians, understood it as another front of the war. Contemporaries related the Rising to the war by constantly discussing rumours of German support for the rebels, the war's progress, what that meant for the Rising and what the Rising meant for the ongoing war. Rumours and news of the wider war, central to the Rising experience, encapsulated a prevailing view among rebels, civilians, the press, and the British Army and Government that the Rising could simultaneously benefit from and contribute to the war against the UK, making it fundamentally a part of the war. Contemporaries framed the events of the Rising as if they were directly participating in or viewing the war itself. While the

¹⁰³ McGarry, *The Rising*, pp.155-6, 168; Foy and Barton, pp.216-7; Cliff Housley, *The Sherwood Foresters In The Easter Rising, Dublin 1916* (Nottingham: Miliquest Publications, 2014), p.28; Charles Duff, *Six Days To Shake An Empire* (London: J.M. Dent, 1966), p.140; Wills, p.68; R.F. Foster, *Vivid Faces: The Revolutionary Generation In Ireland, 1890-1923* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), p.225; aan de Wiel, p.213; Townshend, p.202. ¹⁰⁴ Caulfield, p.125; aan de Wiel, pp.189, 203, 212; de Courcy Ireland, pp.36-7, 41.

¹⁰⁵ F.S.L. Lyons, 'The Rising And After', in *A New History Of Ireland, Vol. VI: Ireland Under The Union, II 1870-1921*, ed. by W.E. Vaughan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.207-23 (214); Keith Jeffery, *Ireland And The Great War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.49.

¹⁰⁶ Jeffery, 1916, pp.73-4; John Gibney, 'Ireland: Easter Rising Or Great War', HT <<u>https://www.historytoday.com/ireland-easter-rising-or-great-war</u>> [accessed 8 February 2023].

republican rebels claimed the status of legal belligerents in the war, the British soldiers viewed the Rising as one part of their service in the war against Germany, and a wide range of civilian onlookers regarded the Rising as a literal manifestation of the war taking place in Dublin.




Fig. 1 Rebel garrisons in Dublin, 1916, Source: University College Cork.¹⁰⁷

Part 1: Understanding the Rising as another theatre of the war

Early on Friday 21 April, the *Aud*, which was supposed to land arms in Kerry to be distributed to Irish Volunteers across the country, was intercepted by British ships and scuttled itself in Queenstown harbour. Flying two German naval ensigns from the mast alerted the British authorities and the public to the fact that nationalist separatists had planned a nationwide rebellion with German aid.¹⁰⁸ Despite the *Aud*'s failure being widely reported and known, recurrent rumours that Germany would directly intervene in the Rising, and the manner in which they were recorded, demonstrate that contemporaries so widely understood the Rising to be self-evidently part of the

 ¹⁰⁷ 'Rebel Garrisons in 1916' University College Cork <<u>https://www.ucc.ie/en/theirishrevolution/collections/the-story-of-1916/chapter-4-the-uprising-itself/map-of-the-rebel-garrisons-in-1916/</u>> [accessed 1 October 2023].
 ¹⁰⁸ Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, pp.7, 130; Townshend, p.149; Foy and Barton, p.72; McGarry, *The Rising*, p.118.

war that it was logical to expect Germany to support and exploit it to aid their war against the UK.

From the Rising's beginning on Monday 24 April, its leaders widely promoted German intervention and framed the Rising as a new front in the war, as in the Proclamation's claim that the Irish rebels were supported 'by gallant allies in Europe'.¹⁰⁹ They also encouraged their followers with more detailed allusions to German aid, contributing to the sense that the Rising was a theatre of the war. Desmond FitzGerald recalled that, when in conversation with Patrick Pearse about the prospect of German help on Monday 24 April, Pearse had told him that 'smoke had been seen in [Dublin] bay and that [he] honestly believed that there were submarines there'.¹¹⁰ That same day, Thomas MacDonagh, a Proclamation signatory commanding rebels in Jacob's Factory, also told his garrison that German submarines were in the Irish Sea preventing British reinforcements.¹¹¹ James Connolly also contributed to the general sense that the rebels would be supported and relieved by German forces. A statement left by an anonymous Irish Volunteer present in the GPO records that when the British Army began heavy cannonading of rebel positions on Wednesday 26 April, Connolly declared it a sign of British panic as 'there are probably some forces coming up to help us'.¹¹² More explicitly, Irish Volunteer Liam Archer recalled 'an official statement' from the republican leadership circulating that Wednesday notifying the rebels that 'two German warships' had arrived in Dublin Bay'.¹¹³ Then on Friday 28 April, as rebel positions in Dublin were surrounded and bombarded, Connolly distributed an order of the day claiming 'that our Allies in Germany and kinsmen in America are straining every nerve to hasten matters on our behalf'.¹¹⁴ It is possible that, as the Rising failed, its leading figures had lost faith in German intervention and simply hoped to encourage their followers, but this suggestion does not preclude that they had requested the German aid they repeatedly mentioned during the Rising. Significantly, the rebels largely adopted defensive positions around Dublin during the Rising suggesting that they had

¹⁰⁹ Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, p.1.

¹¹⁰ FitzGerald, p.134.

¹¹¹ BMH, WS 312, Seasamh de Brun, 1949.

¹¹² NLI, MS49,810/6/4, Anonymous Volunteer Statement, c.1916.

¹¹³ BMH, WS 819, Liam Archer, 1953.

¹¹⁴ Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, p.50.

intended to withstand the British Military before a larger force relieved them. Even though the full plans for the internal rising are unknown, this strategy reflected the previously discussed plans and requests submitted to Germany.

Most accounts by rebel forces mentioning the rumours of German intervention indicate that the rebels likewise saw the Rising as a component of the wider war. A representative Tuesday 25 April letter to his family from Irish Volunteer Éamonn Duggan declared, 'I believe the Germans are in Kerry' and that the men around him were excited about the Rising's progress and potential.¹¹⁵ Liam Archer remembered that everyone in his garrison by the Four Courts was 'enthused' on Wednesday 26 April at the prospect of German warships in Dublin Bay, though one of his comrades 'quickly deflated' him 'by opining they were British vessels'.¹¹⁶ Similarly, an anonymous account of the fighting around west Dublin described hearing 'splendid news' on Thursday 27 April that '15000 German troops [had] landed in Ireland and country contingents [were] marching on Dublin', reflecting that the Rising had been planned with German military support to allow Volunteers across Ireland to relieve the Dublin rebels.¹¹⁷ ICA sniper Margaret Skinnider recalled hearing British artillery during the Rising, assuming that 'the Germans [were] attacking the British on the water' and reported a rumour that 'German submarines would come into the fight if they learned there was a chance of our winning'.¹¹⁸ Skinnider's recollection overlooked that the Rising, without such German aid in the first place, would have struggled to threaten the British Military to the point where German submarines could have overridden the Royal Navy to freely operate in Dublin Bay. However, it registers that there was a widespread belief in German intervention in Ireland as the Rising had opened a new front in the war. Even towards the Rising's end when rebel outposts including most of the republican leadership were surrendering, Irish Volunteer Patrick Ward and ICA leading figure Constance Markievicz recalled that they and their comrades still believed that German forces had landed in Ireland, and were therefore shocked by the order to

¹¹⁵ NLI, MS49,835/2/1, Éamonn Duggan To His Family, 25 April 1916.

¹¹⁶ BMH, WS 819, Liam Archer, 1953.

¹¹⁷ NLI, MS21,282, Account Of The Fighting At The Magazine Fort, Phoenix Park And At Marrowbone Lane, 1916. ¹¹⁸ Margaret Skinnider, *Doing My Bit For Ireland* (New York: The Century Co., 1917), p.154.

surrender.119

Dublin citizens repeated numerous rumours of German intervention in Ireland, as detailed by Dublin-born poet and nationalist James Stephens. He recorded the widespread belief that German troops had landed in Ireland or that Volunteers expected them to arrive soon, again imagining the ongoing Rising as theatre of the war. For example, on Tuesday 25 April Stephens noted widespread reports that German submarines had landed arms and thousands of troops on the Irish coast.¹²⁰ Blackrock resident G.F.H. Heenan also recorded his certainty that the German Military was behind the Rising and that the rebels expected German troops to arrive in Dublin. Even on Saturday 29 April – the day the Rising's leaders surrendered – his diary recorded rumours 'that the Germans are trying to land troops in Ireland', believing, like some rebels, that the Rising was a battle of the war throughout its duration.¹²¹ Similarly, Killiney resident Robert N. Tweedy wrote to his mother after the Rising reasoning that the rebels had been following a credible defensive strategy, believing that German assistance would help them to occupy Ireland and hold it from British attacks. Moreover, he claimed that the rebels themselves 'were convinced [...] that they were taking part in a great German push by sea and by land', accurately reflecting the prevailing view among the rebels about German aid and recognising the Rising as a front in the war.¹²²

There is scepticism about possible German intervention in some nationalist accounts, but Irish Volunteers officer Sean Prendergast hinted that rebels might have at least begun the Rising sincerely believing in such rumours. Prendergast held that 'the entry of a German force in Ireland at that time would have been welcomed by the Volunteers' and been decisive to the Rising's outcome. However, when no German help materialised, he and his comrades realised that they

¹¹⁹ BMH, WS 1140, Patrick Ward, 1955; TNA, CO 904/23, Constance Markievicz At Newcastle West Meeting, 15 September 1917.

¹²⁰ Stephens, pp.30-1, 38-9.

¹²¹ London, Imperial War Museum (IWM), Private Papers of G. F. H. Heenan, 67/196/1, Heenan Diaries.

¹²² Dublin, Trinity College Manuscripts & Archives (TCDMA), IE TCD MS 7533/3, Robert N. Tweedy To His mother, 7 May 1916.

were 'fighting our big fight alone'.¹²³ Likewise, although James Stephens correctly reasoned that the rebels' defensive positions in Dublin meant that they had 'expected and had arranged' for German troops to land in Ireland, he also recorded how Dublin citizens' belief in German intervention gradually faded; by Saturday 29 April, 'nobody believed' the rumours that German troops had been captured alongside Irish rebels. After the Rising, Stephens even dismissed the notion that rebels had expected or desired the intervention of German troops in the Rising. He concluded that 'German intrigue and German money counted for so little in the insurrection as to be negligible', reflecting, as with Prendergast above, the subsequent nationalist and republican conception that it had been a solely Irish rising, separate from the war.¹²⁴ In an objective sense, Stephens was right as no German troops or arms reached Dublin, therefore Germany did not physically intrude on events. However, Stephens underestimated how the Rising's undertaking itself depended on and to a large extent was sustained by the subjective belief that German help was imminent, as numerous contemporary and later sources attest.

News and rumours of German actions against England's east coast during the Rising contributed to the sense that it was one part of a coordinated German-Irish alliance in the war. These North Sea actions were relatively minor – Zeppelin raids over East Anglia, Essex and Kent on Monday 24 and Tuesday 25 April, and a naval raid on Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth that Tuesday – but can unambiguously be described as aggressive German actions against the UK in the war.¹²⁵ They related to the Rising as John Devoy had requested a North Sea 'demonstration' by the German Navy to assist the Rising by distracting British attention and resources away from Ireland.¹²⁶ *Aud* captain Karl Spindler also confirmed in his memoir that a 'simultaneous naval demonstration on the east coast of England' had been planned to distract British attention, creating a 'favourable opportunity for the landing of arms', meaning that if the North Sea raids were

¹²³ BMH, WS 755, Sean Prendergast, 1952.

¹²⁴ Stephens, pp.91, 107-9, 115.

¹²⁵ Hennessey, p.127.

¹²⁶ Doerries, *Prelude*, pp.181-4.

incidents in the war, then the Rising they supported was also a part of that war.¹²⁷

The idea that the Rising and these naval actions were part of, in then-Prime Minister Asquith's words, the 'most recent German campaign' in the war was current in the British Government.¹²⁸ On 2 May 1916, the Cabinet considered the testimony of an American in Dublin during the Rising who claimed to have spoken to numerous rebels who all were 'counting upon a German invasion of the east coast, which would draw away the British troops and make the rising possible'. No minutes of the following discussion survive, but then-Home Secretary Herbert Samuel presenting this testimony as 'of interest to my colleagues' reflects the Government's readiness to connect the Rising to the German war effort through the North Sea raids.¹²⁹

The British press and official histories of the Rising shared this view, as with the *The Times'* Wednesday 26 April edition explicitly connecting the Rising, the North Sea actions and wider war in the headline, 'REBEL IRISH RISING. NAVAL BATTLE OFF LOWESTOFT. A ZEPPELIN RAID. FURTHER FIGHTING IN EGYPT' [sic]. To emphasise that all were part of the same conflict, the sub-heading reminded readers that they were in the '2nd Year: 267th Day' of the war and the article described the Rising and North Sea actions as 'all apparently parts of a concerted German plan'.¹³⁰ *The Times History of the War* likewise folded the Rising into a wide offensive against the UK, significantly juxtaposing the facts that the 'uprising of the Sinn Fein group [sic] in Dublin began on Easter Monday; a hurried attack from the sea was made on Yarmouth and Lowestoft on the Tuesday morning; and an offensive was actively pushed on the Western Front'.¹³¹ As the Rising had been preceded by an attempt to land German arms, the official British war history underlined that the Royal Navy believed that 'the Germans intended to support the insurgents with a demonstration against our east coast', drawing British attention away from Ireland, and the actual

¹²⁷ Spindler, p.11.

¹²⁸ Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, p.41.

¹²⁹ TNA, CAB/37/147/7, 'Germany And The Sinn Feiners', 2 May 1916.

¹³⁰ *The Times*, 26 April 1916, p.6.

¹³¹ The Times History Of the War. Vol. 8 (London: The Times, 1916), p.191.

raids simply confirmed this fear.¹³²

Fewer first-hand civilian accounts of the Rising discussed the North Sea actions, though when mentioned they tied the Rising into the war. Most notably, Irish scholar and future President of Ireland Douglas Hyde attempted to explain the Rising by reference to the naval actions after hearing distorted rumours about them from police detectives and British Army soldiers. Apparently, the Royal Navy were supposed to have sunk 14 German transports carrying troops across the North Sea. Hyde noted that the soldiers and detectives believed that the Rising was meant to distract the British Army and allow the German troops to land, flipping the notion that the naval raids had been to distract attention from Dublin. However, Hyde concluded that this information made the Rising 'more dangerous and far more sane in its conception than appeared at first sight', intimating a direct connection between the Rising and the war's progress.¹³³

Very few accounts from rebel sources explicitly mentioned the North Sea actions. For one, Irish Volunteers captain Frank Henderson, like Hyde, suggested that the naval actions mattered more to the troops in Dublin, recalling that some soldiers after his surrender 'shouted to us that our friends the Germans had been heavily defeated in several battles, and that many of their ships had been sunk'.¹³⁴ The diary of 2nd Lieutenant Harry Douglas of the Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment, 'Sherwood Foresters', also suggests a general awareness of the North Sea raids. Douglas claimed that while raiding Constance Markievicz's house he found letters containing information about the 'East coast raid, the air raid, and also the West of Ireland raid, all of which were to take place in conjunction with the Irish rising'. Although not elaborating on the content of these letters, it is important that Douglas painted the Rising as integral to a wider German offensive in the war.¹³⁵

¹³² Sir Julian S. Corbett, *History Of The Great War Based On Official Documents: Naval Operations. Volume III* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1923), pp.300-2.

¹³³ TCDMA, IE TCD MS 10343/7, Douglas Hyde's Diary Of Easter Week, 1916.

¹³⁴ BMH, WS 249, Frank Henderson, 1949.

¹³⁵ Harry Douglas, 'The 1916 Diary of 2nd Lieutenant Harry Douglas (Sherwood Foresters)', *The Irish Sword*, 25.99

Desmond Ryan recollected an anecdote that Piaras Beaslai had told him suggesting that leading figures in the Rising knew of the German naval actions and believed that they were directly relevant to the Rising. Beaslai had been imprisoned with Thomas MacDonagh after MacDonagh's court martial and he had apparently 'chatted gaily' about the fact that German troops had landed in England and that the UK was facing imminent defeat in the war, leading Beaslai to conclude that 'MacDonagh had heard some rumour of the German bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft on Easter Tuesday'.¹³⁶ Thus, rumours and news of the naval raids contributed to the general belief among a wide range of those involved in and observing the Rising that it was part of a new campaign in the war in alliance with Germany.

Those undertaking the Rising who explicitly referenced events in farther-flung theatres, positioned the Rising as fundamental to the war and playing into the UK's overall defeat. For example, some policemen who had been captured by rebels later reported that a commandant at Jacob's Factory explained the Rising by reference to the war. This commandant – possibly MacDonagh who was in command there – told them, '(1) that France had withdrawn from the war, (2) that England was seeking a separate peace, (3) that the coast of Ireland was surrounded by German submarines, (4) that 30,000 Germans had landed in Kerry and a similar number of Irish-Americans in Wexford'. In this way, the Rising and the war were completely intertwined; if (1) and (2) were true, then (3) and (4) could occur, thus rationalising the rebels' actions.¹³⁷ Significantly, this recollection echoes a MacDonagh despatch from Sunday 30 April – before he heard news of the surrender – declaring, 'Good news of international situation. England is down and out', unmistakably asserting that the UK had lost or was losing the war and that the Rising's prospects were intimately tied to that fact.¹³⁸

^{(2006), 85-93 (}p.86).

¹³⁶ BMH, WS 724, Desmond Ryan, 1952.

¹³⁷ John F. Boyle, *The Irish Rebellion of 1916: A Brief History Of The Revolt And Its Suppression* (London: Constable and Company, 1916), pp.83-4.

¹³⁸ Dublin, Trinity College Early Printed Books (TCDEPB), Gall.TT.15.33, The Record Of The Irish Rebellion Of 1916,

During the Rising, it was widely reported in Britain and Ireland that a British force of 13,000 men at Kut-el-Amara had surrendered to the Ottoman Army after suffering 30,000 dead and wounded.¹³⁹ In many primary accounts, the Mesopotamian theatre and the Rising were framed as concurrent events of the same war. For example, the British conservative *Daily Sketch* newspaper and Irish nationalist *Freeman's Journal* in May 1916 carried articles about the Rising on the same pages as news of the Kut-el-Amara surrender and of German attacks on the British lines in Europe.¹⁴⁰ Many accounts mentioning Kut-el-Amara and other theatres of the war show spectators to the Rising reacting simultaneously and similarly to news and rumours of the war and the Rising. For instance, in Douglas Hyde's Wednesday 3 May diary entry, he noted that he was finally able to get some newspapers to 'see how things went in other parts of the city, and that General Townshend has surrendered with 9000 men [sic] to the Turks at Kut'.¹⁴¹ Likewise, James Stephens noted that on Saturday 29 April 1916, just as rumours spread of the republican surrender, 'the rumour of the fall of Verdun was persistent. Later on it was denied, as was denied the companion rumour of the relief of Kut', indicating a general sense that all the events of the Rising and the wider war were connected in the same singular experience for many contemporaries.¹⁴² As Keith Jeffery has described the Rising and the war more generally, the way in which rumours about the Rising and the war were interspersed reflected that the former was folded into the latter making a 'seamless' robe' of Irish experience.¹⁴³

Part 2: Fighting in and witnessing the war in Dublin

From the Rising's beginning, its leaders explicitly promoted the desire for the embryonic Republic to gain recognition as a belligerent in the war. Irish Volunteer James Coughlan remembered that Proclamation signatory Éamonn Ceannt effectively began the Rising on Monday 24 April by

^{1916.}

¹³⁹ Provence, '1916 In The Middle East', in *1916 In Global Context*, ed. by Dal Lago, Healy and Barry, pp.93-102 (p.93).

¹⁴⁰ The Daily Sketch, 1 May 1916, p.10; Freeman's Journal, 5 May 1916, p.5 [mis-printed as p.3].

¹⁴¹ TCDMA, IE TCD MS 10343/7, Douglas Hyde's Diary Of Easter Week, 1916.

¹⁴² Stephens, pp.82-3.

¹⁴³ Jeffery, Ireland And The Great War, p.i.

addressing his garrison with news that the UK was seeking peace with Germany. With this in mind, Ceannt attributed 'terrific importance to the military alliance with Germany' which was helping 'to gain for Ireland the status of belligerent nation taking part in the World War, and thus [...] entitle Ireland to representation at the forthcoming peace conference'. Significantly, Coughlan described this desire for belligerent status in the war as 'the immediate political objective of the Rising', unambiguously casting the Rising as the republicans' entry into the war.¹⁴⁴ Likewise, Patrick Pearse declared in a speech to the GPO garrison that those undertaking the Rising were 'legally entitled to the status of belligerents' and to representation at a post-war peace conference, again asserting that the Rising was within the war's scope.¹⁴⁵

Even towards the Rising's end on Saturday 29 April, the Provisional Government of the Republic – i.e. the Military Council members and Proclamation signatories who were present, including Pearse, Connolly and Mac Diarmada – agreed among themselves to negotiate with the British Military as the Rising had 'been sufficient to gain recognition of Ireland's national claim at an international peace conference', as if they were legal belligerents in the war.¹⁴⁶ Reportedly, Thomas MacDonagh refused to accept the news of the surrender on Sunday 30 April as he believed that a peace conference was imminent and that Ireland would win the right to participate as a belligerent if they continued the insurrection.¹⁴⁷

Numerous rebel accounts suggest that the rebels embraced and espoused the claim to belligerent status in the war, as Dick Humphreys recorded that the GPO garrison endorsed Pearse's address mentioning that they were formal belligerents with a 'deafening outburst of cheering'.¹⁴⁸ Similarly, a Friday 28 April letter from Irish Volunteer Charles Saurin to his mother stated that, 'According to international law Ireland is now a Republic, so I expect it won't be too long till we get some help

¹⁴⁴ 'James Coughlan Interview For 'Portraits 1916', 1966', *RTÉ* <<u>https://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1993-easter-1916/portraits-1916/767284-portraits-1916-james-coughlan/</u>> [accessed 10 January 2023].

¹⁴⁵ Ryan, pp.149-50; NLI, MS18,829, Dick Humphreys Account Of Easter Week, May 1916; Joe Good, *Inside The GPO 1916: A First-Hand Account* (Dublin: The O'Brien Press, 2015), p.81.

 ¹⁴⁶ Séamas Ó Buachalla, ed., *The Letters Of P.H. Pearse* (Gerrards Cross: Colin Smythe, 1980), p.373
 ¹⁴⁷ BMH. WS 200. Father Alovsius, 1949.

¹⁴⁸ NLI, MS18,829, Dick Humphreys Account Of Easter Week, May 1916.

from Germany and may be [sic] America', suggesting that German intervention was connected to the putative Republic's status as a belligerent in the war.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, Margaret Skinnider held that by using artillery against rebel positions, the British Army had 'made us a "belligerent" in the world's eyes and gave us the excuse we could so well use – an appeal to the world court as a "small nation," for a place at the coming peace conference', channelling the idea that the Rising represented Ireland's participation in the war for small nations.¹⁵⁰ Perhaps with hindsight about the actual failure to gain formal belligerent status, Irish Volunteer Joe Good's memoir pessimistically noted that on hearing Pearse's speech he 'wasn't too hopeful of' gaining peace conference representation, but positive affirmations among his comrades that they should be recognised as formally entering the war outnumber his recollection.¹⁵¹

Moreover, some rebels acted as if they were formal belligerents in the war from the Rising's beginning. For instance, Donal O'Hannigan and IRB and Irish Volunteers member George A. Lyons separately recalled arresting British Army and police officers on Monday 24 April, telling them 'that a Republic had been proclaimed and that a state of war now existed', and to 'Consider yourselves prisoners of war', signifying that the rebels believed that they had joined the ongoing war. Lyons also aligned the Rising with the idea that the war was fought for small nations, recording that after arresting the officers, a priest asked him if he was 'going to start war here', to which he replied, 'Every man is fighting for his own country now, father, and we are going to fight for ours'.¹⁵²

Although some within the British Army at least recognised that the rebels aspired to be formal belligerents in the war, Irish Volunteer Joseph O'Byrne remembered the general despondency on surrendering to soldiers who 'would not acknowledge us as combatants in war', highlighting a division between the rebels who saw themselves as legally participating in the war as a separate

¹⁴⁹ NLI, MS15,000/7/2, Charles Saurin To His Mother, 28 April 1916; BMH, WS 288, Charles Saurin, 1949. ¹⁵⁰ Skinnider, p.155.

¹⁵¹ Good. p.81.

¹⁵² BMH, WS 161, Donal O'Hannigan, 1948; An t-Óglác, 10 April 1926 Vol. I.V. No. 13, pp.5-6.

nation and the British Army denying this status.¹⁵³ A priest who had been ministering to rebels in Dublin witnessed the Army's general attitude towards the rebels' status when he requested an interview with the Colonel of some nearby British troops. The Colonel replied that they 'were all rebels and outlaws and that we would get none of the amenities of war'.¹⁵⁴ In a post-Rising press interview defending his troops from accusations of murder, Sir John Maxwell, the British Army in Ireland's Commander-in-Chief, prominently declared that the Army did not see the rebels as legal belligerents protected by the rules of war, emphasising that the 'rebels wore no uniform', so his soldiers could justifiably have thought that anyone near them was a rebel.¹⁵⁵ The 1907 Hague Regulations' definition of belligerent status stipulated that the 'laws, rights, and duties of war' could apply to militia and volunteers wearing a uniform or some unifying symbol distinguishing them from civilians. The Irish Volunteers and the ICA had their own uniforms, but many individuals serving in the Rising did not wear all or any part of it. Moreover, the Hague Conventions applied to the forces of recognised states which alone could legally wage war, so as the rebels represented a nonrecognised government and were separate from the British Army, the 1907 Regulations could not apply to them.¹⁵⁶ Thus, the British Army did not afford the rebels the status of legal belligerents representing a separate nation and British Army orders from Wednesday 26 April were to shoot suspected rebels who were armed and not surrendering.¹⁵⁷

While the rebel self-definition as legal belligerents in the war is significant for demonstrating their belief that they had joined the war, the British Army's view that they were not legal belligerents is more realistic. However, this fact did not preclude the Army from still viewing the rebels as effectively joining in the war by virtue of fighting against the British Empire on the promise of German aid. The war involved a wide variety of non-state combatants who were participants in the

¹⁵³ BMH, WS 160, Joseph O'Byrne, 1948; TCDMA, IE TCD MS 2074, Elsie Mahaffy's Account Of The Easter Rising, 1916-1917; Boyle, p.264.

¹⁵⁴ BMH, WS 920, Father Augustine, 1949 [emphasis original].

¹⁵⁵ Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, p.23.

¹⁵⁶ Toni Pfanner, 'Military Uniforms And The Law Of War' in *International Review Of The Red Cross*, 86.853 (2004), 93-130 (pp.108-10).

¹⁵⁷ Barton, pp.12-3; Nottingham, Museum of the Mercian Regiment WFR Collection (MMR), 1998- 2718, A Diary of the Rebellion in Ireland, Easter 1916.

war as they took arms and actively fought in the war, irrespective of their legal status, including the Boer rebels of 1914-15, the Arab rebels of 1916-18, the numerous ethnic, political and religious groups the German Government armed, and the Irish republicans of 1916.

Several accounts by and about British Army soldiers reveal that many believed that the Rising was part of the wider war. Sources from outside the Army provide the most insight into this notion, such as Dublin resident John Clarke who met some soldiers on Sunday 30 April who said that they thought 'they were coming to fight the Germans; as they were hurried from London under sealed orders, they knew nothing of the Volunteers'.¹⁵⁸ After his arrest on Friday 28 April, Irish Volunteers officer J.W. Brennan-Whitmore encountered some soldiers who were convinced that there were Germans among the rebels and continually asked, 'Where are the German snipers?', again demonstrating that a wide range of contemporaries believed that the Rising was so self-evidently part of the war that Germans would naturally be in Dublin.¹⁵⁹

For other soldiers, even knowing that they were fighting Irish insurgents, they still saw the Rising as part of the war by seeing their adversaries as allied to or representing Germany. A nurse in service during the Rising recalled meeting a cavalry Sergeant who reflected that the only thing that made the loss of his comrades bearable 'was the certainty they were fighting Germany as truly as if they were in France. In his opinion, the Rebellion was Germany's last trump card, and would prove the turning-point of the war'. This idea also influenced the British Army's orders, as Dublin resident and later IRA-man Ernie O'Malley recorded in his memoir. A friend serving with the Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the Rising had told O'Malley of orders from his officers: 'Every man you see in green uniform [i.e. every rebel], regard him as a German soldier, as an invader, and shoot him down'.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ NLI, MS10,485, John Clarke Diary, 1916.

¹⁵⁹ J.W. Brennan-Whitmore, *Dublin Burning: The Easter Rising From Behind The Barricades* (Dublin: Gill Books, 2013), pp.87-8, 90.

¹⁶⁰ Roger McHugh, ed., *Dublin, 1916* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1966), pp.119-20,136.

Written by officers who served in the Rising, the official war history of the 2/7th Battalion, Sherwood Foresters, again depicted the rebels as representing Germany in the war. The account described Colonel Cecil Fane – who might have been one of the officers who helped to write the history – advancing into enemy fire, spurred by the conviction 'that though not fighting Germans he was fighting Germany'. This history also claimed that the Sherwood Foresters who served in Dublin 'played a great part in rendering abortive the alliance between Germany and the rebel section of Ireland'.¹⁶¹ Like republican claims to legal belligerent status, soldiers' convictions that the Rising would be a decisive event in the war or that they were directly fighting Germany were somewhat misplaced and overstated. It was true that the republicans had sought to ally with and aid Germany in the war, but the Irish-German alliance was more effective in Irish and British imaginations than in reality. Still, it is significant that British Army soldiers understood that in suppressing the Rising they were participating in the war, and that their rivals were participating in the war by fighting the British Army in alliance with Germany.

Many soldiers' accounts of their service in the Rising conformed to the notion that they were serving in the war itself, not a separate Irish conflict. Firstly, many men in the 59th Division who were sent from England sincerely believed that they were going to the Western Front. In early 1916, the Division had heard various 'rumours of our embarkation for service overseas', so, as numerous regimental and individual accounts concurred, the Division's mobilisation orders on Monday 24 April appeared to mean that 'something critical had happened on the Western Front' requiring their service.¹⁶² Such an expectation would have seemed especially cromulent on the night they entrained for Ireland via Liverpool, when they also had to mount an armed guard during a Zeppelin raid over nearby London, linking their actions, the Rising and the German raids from

¹⁶¹ "The Robin Hoods", 1/7th, 2/7th & 3/7th Battns, Sherwood Foresters, 1914-1918 (Nottingham: J. H. Bell, 1921), pp.284, 295.

¹⁶² E.U. Bradbridge, *59th Division 1915-1918* (Chesterfield: Wilfred Edmunds Ltd., 1928), pp.6, 9; *The War History Of The Sixth Battalion, The South Staffordshire Regiment* (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1924), p.144; IWM, 01/49/1, Captain A.A. Dickson Account of the Easter Rising; 'William Barnacle Interview For 'Ireland A Television History', 1979', *RTÉ* <<u>https://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1993-easter-1916/recollections-of-british-soldiers/780208-ireland-a-television-history-william-barnacle/</u>> [accessed 9 January 2023]; BMH, WS 807, Father Patrick J. Doyle, 1952.

the North Sea.163

Moreover, dividing the Zeppelin raid overshadowing the 59th Division's departure, and the recruitment and training of the troops who suppressed the Rising, from their service in the Rising and claiming that Dublin was beyond the war's boundaries is unconvincing and illogical. It would mean that their war service ended when the train departed after the Zeppelin raid, or when they reached Liverpool or Ireland, and then resumed when they returned to England or were sent to the Front. Such a compartmentalisation was not apparent to the soldiers who believed that they were fighting Germans or German allies and who conceptualised the Rising within their war service. Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur N. Lee served in Dublin and other theatres of the war, and devoted a chapter to the Rising in his war diaries with no suggestion that he viewed the Rising as a distinct conflict.¹⁶⁴ Likewise, in a 1971 interview a Mr F. Lingwood who had served with the Lincolnshire Regiment in Dublin concurred with the interviewer's suggestion that the Rising was his 'first interesting war work' after joining up to fight in the war.¹⁶⁵ British Army scout Orson Lucas recalled that the soldiers could only send field postcards home as if they were 'on active service in France'.¹⁶⁶ Even without some soldiers believing that they were bound for or even at the Western Front before learning the truth, the balance of evidence shows that a wide range of soldiers understood that the Rising was another component of the war.

The Rising saw the weapons of the First World War deployed in Dublin – rifles, grenades, machine guns, artillery, barbed wire and armoured cars – and whole streets were reduced to rubble. Many Dublin residents went further than news reporting that used the war as a point of reference or comparison, to depict the Rising as if the war had literally reached Ireland.¹⁶⁷ For example, south

¹⁶⁴ IWM, 66/12/1, Colonel A.N. Lee World War I Diary.

https://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1993-easter-1916/recollections-of-british-soldiers/766673-ireland-a-television-history-orson-lucas/> [accessed 9 January 2023].

¹⁶⁷ *Freeman's Journal*, 5 May 1916, p.6.

¹⁶³ War History Of The Sixth Battalion, p.143; "The Robin Hoods", p.281.

 ¹⁶⁵ Leeds, University Of Leeds Special Collections (ULSC), Liddle Collection, LIDDLE/WW1/DF/GA/IRE/15, Transcript Of Interview With Mr F. Lingwood, 1971.
 ¹⁶⁶ 'Orson Lucas Interview For 'Ireland A Television History', 1979', *RTÉ*

Dublin resident Alfred Fannin wrote to his brother on Wednesday 26 April declaring that 'We used to think we were clear of the war here in Ireland but we have certainly got it close enough now'.¹⁶⁸ Similarly, Father Patrick J. Doyle described seeing buildings destroyed by intense artillery fire as his 'first experience of the War'.¹⁶⁹ Likewise, Henry Hanna described 'the terrible effect of shell-fire' in the bombardment of Boland's Mill on Thursday 27 April and sombrely concluded that 'War had been brought to our doors'.¹⁷⁰ Echoing Hanna, Robert F. Tweedy wrote to his mother following the Rising to explain that, with the Rising, 'the reality of war has been brought to our doors'.¹⁷¹

The metaphor unionist commentators Wells and Marlowe used to demonstrate that the 'curse of war had come upon Ireland, and the citizens of Dublin [...] know only too well what war meant' is worth considering for conforming with their overall view that the Rising was fundamentally a part of the war and for reflecting the above comments. They explained that many now bullet-scarred walls in Dublin bore recruiting posters for the British Army and they focussed on one that read, 'The Curse of War – What it means – Keep it from Ireland's Fields and Towns'. Drawing attention to this shredded poster neatly encapsulated how the Rising had indeed brought the war directly to Ireland, while Dublin citizens heard machine-guns and artillery, and saw dead bodies and burned-out buildings, all horrors 'which war brings in its train'.¹⁷²

Accounts by those who fought in the Rising did not describe the violence and destruction of the Rising as if they represented the war physically coming to Ireland, but this fact does not mean that combatants did not see the Rising as a part of the war. Rather, it suggests that the violence and destruction that non-combatants saw as bringing the war to Dublin were relatively unimportant aspects of how the combatants related their experiences to the war, compared with the rebel

¹⁷¹ TCDMA, IE TCD MS 7533/3, Robert N. Tweedy To His mother, 7 May 1916.

¹⁶⁸ Letters from Dublin, Easter 1916: Alfred Fannin's Diary Of The Rising, ed. by Adrian Warwick- Haller and Sally Warwick-Haller (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1995), pp.30-1.

¹⁶⁹ BMH, WS 807, Father Patrick J. Doyle, 1952.

¹⁷⁰ TCDMA, IE TCD MS 10066/192, Henry Hanna Narrative Of The Easter Rising, c.1916.

¹⁷² Wells and Marlowe, p.211; 'The Curse Of War - What It Means - Keep It From Ireland's Fields And Towns', *Hoover Institution Digital Collections* <<u>https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/32416</u>> [accessed 27 February 2023].

claims to belligerent status in the war and the soldiers' views of the rebels as German allies.

Conclusion

A wide range of participants and observers across the Rising construed it in numerous ways as a new theatre of the war. Even when contemporaries did not explicitly declare that the Rising was a battle of the war, it is significant that the events of the Rising were regularly framed in ways revealing the Rising was indivisible from the war. The fact of this general perception supports the larger claim that the Rising was part of the war because the belief that it was part of war had a direct bearing on the actions and reactions of contemporaries.

This claim is particularly relevant for the recurrent rumours of German help and of soldiers believing they were destined for the Western Front, which should not be treated as curious, ultimately irrelevant asides in histories of the Rising, but reveal that the Rising was widely seen as interwoven into the war. This argument has also challenged parts of the scholarship that maintain the image that the rebels believed that they were fighting alone in a solely Irish fight, confirming that the republican leaders and followers sincerely believed that Germany would fulfil the alliance in the war, thus embedding the Rising in the war. Such rumours of German support for the rebels underscored that contemporaries widely understood and took it for granted that the Rising was another part of the war, so it would be perfectly natural to expect direct German intervention that would serve their overall purpose of defeating the UK. In so arguing, this chapter has advanced beyond the scholarship that has not sufficiently appreciated how events in other theatres of the war, such as the Western Front and Mesopotamia, were related to the Rising as it was happening, and how contemporaries involved in and observing the Rising understood it as a theatre of the war alongside other theatres. Additionally, this chapter has evolved discussion of the German North Sea naval raids undertaken to support the Rising, clarifying that as they were actions of the war, then so was the Rising, fundamentally unifying histories of the war and the Rising.

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The republicans claiming and exhibiting the formal status of belligerents, plus the range of civilians who understood the Rising as the war represent additional significant and original contributions of this chapter. These points demonstrate the war's centrality as a motivation and reference point during the fighting. Although the republican insurgents did not actually become legal belligerents in the war on the same terms as the UK and Germany, demonstrating that the rebels during the Rising claimed the status of belligerents and framed their actions as if they were asserting and defending their small nation's sovereignty develops wider considerations on the war's nature and dynamics. Groups did not need to be legal belligerents to actively participate in the war, with the rebels participating in the war in the same way as other various non-state combatants. Additionally, the rebels aligning their actions with the notion of an anticolonial war highlights that national self-determination was a defining feature of the war for certain participants.

Chapter 3: Commemorating the Rising

Introduction

The sole memorial dedicated to the Easter Rising in Britain was unveiled in Liverpool in 2017, commemorating those Liverpudlians who fought on the republican side, not the British Army soldiers who suppressed the Rising, and does not in any way treat the Rising as part of the war.¹⁷³ To choose one of many Irish memorials to the war and to the Rising, the war memorial at Belvedere College, Dublin, tellingly distinguishes between the Rising and the war, with two separate lists for pupils killed in each.¹⁷⁴ These memorials exemplify the general British oversight of Rising commemoration and the prevailing Irish compartmentalisation of the Rising and the war into separate conflicts.

The ways in which Britain and Ireland have commemorated and recognised the Rising have largely been treated separately in the scholarship. Peter Cottrell's summary that memory of the Rising 'has survived in Ireland as an emotional experience rather than a piece of history, while in Britain these events have, almost deliberately, been forgotten', essentially stands alone as a direct comparison.¹⁷⁵ General trends regarding British commemoration have been occasionally mentioned in recent Irish scholarship. Fearghal McGarry and Paul O'Brien have separately noted that the dead British soldiers being 'silently incorporated' into war memorials represents British amnesia about the Rising.¹⁷⁶ James Moran and Fintan Cullen in 2018 focussed more on British commemoration, arguing that the Sherwood Foresters' Rising service was not formally marked or recognised, and was largely forgotten in Britain as the dead of the Western Front presented a

¹⁷³ 'Britain's First Ever 1916 Rising Memorial Is Unveiled', *The Irish Post* <<u>https://www.irishpost.com/news/britains-</u> <u>first-ever-1916-rising-memorial-unveiled-128439</u>> [accessed 26 March 2023]; 'Easter Rising 1916 Memorial Unveiled In Liverpool', *Liverpool's Easter Rising 1916 Centenary Events 2016*

<<u>https://liverpooleaster1916.org/2017/06/26/easter-rising-1916-memorial- unveiled-in-liverpool/</u>> [accessed 26 March 2023].

¹⁷⁴ 'War Memorial', *Irish War Memorials (IWM.IE)* <<u>http://www.irishwarmemorials.ie/Memorials-</u> <u>Detail?memold=5</u>> [accessed 10 August 2023].

¹⁷⁵ Peter Cottrell, Brendan O'Shea and Gerry White, *The War For Ireland: 1913-1923* (Oxford: Osprey, 2009), p.11. ¹⁷⁶ McGarry, *The Rising*, p.x; Paul O'Brien, *Blood On The Streets: 1916 & The Battle For Mount St. Bridge* (Mercier Press, Cork, 2008), pp.114-5.

more compelling national narrative than those who fought in Dublin.¹⁷⁷

The scholarship on Irish perspectives on and commemorations of the war and the Rising presents a richer seam. To explain why Irish nationalists increasingly viewed the Rising as separate from the war, in 1952 P.S. O'Hegarty argued that they soon understood that it had been a purely Irish fight for Irish freedom and only tangentially related to the war, largely when it became clear that there had been no Germans in Dublin.¹⁷⁸ Recent work has confirmed the shift in nationalist constructions of the Rising, arguing that post-Rising Irish nationalist public opinion rapidly swung from viewing the Rising as a German conspiracy to seeing the Rising as a fight for Irish freedom, overlooking the war context.¹⁷⁹ Important twenty-first century scholarship, particularly in the 2010s, has also covered the major forms of Rising commemoration in Ireland, identifying how nationalist and republican commemoration has incorporated the Rising into one long, unbroken Irish struggle against Britain. This scholarship has also explored how narratives of republican martyrdom overshadowed the Irish war dead, and how the war and war commemoration have been popularly seen in Ireland – particularly since the 1960s – as inherently British and unionist, diametrically opposed to Irishness, with no place in popular Irish nationalist traditions and perspectives on the Irish Revolution.¹⁸⁰

Recent scholarship on commemoration of Irish service in the British Army, notably from Keith Jeffery and in John Horne's notable 2013 co-edited collection, has developed considerably since

¹⁷⁷ James Moran and Fintan Cullen, 'The Sherwood Foresters Of 1916: Memories And Memorials', in *Irish Studies Review*, 26.4 (2018) 436-454 (p.441).

¹⁷⁸ O'Hegarty, p.709.

¹⁷⁹ Dorney, p.88; McGarry, *The Rising*, p.269.

¹⁸⁰ Johnson, p.155; Roisín Higgins, "The Irish Republic Was Proclaimed By Poster": The Politics Of Commemorating The Easter Rising', in *Remembering 1916*, ed. by Grayson and McGarry, pp.43-62 (p.59); Mark McCarthy, *Ireland's 1916 Rising: Explorations Of History-Making, Commemoration And Heritage In Modern* Times (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), p.212; Keith Jeffery, 'Echoes Of War', in *Our War*, ed. by Horne, pp.261-76 (p.273); Jonathan Cherry, Jonathan, 'Creating Commemorative Spaces In Independent Ireland: The Construction And Use Of Publicly Sited First World War Memorials, 1919–1970', in *First World War Studies*, 11.3 (2020) 213-239 (p.221); Edward Madigan, 'Centenary (Ireland)', *1914-1918-online* <<u>https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/centenary_ireland</u>> [accessed 07 December 2022].

F.X. Martin described Ireland's 'Great Oblivion' in popular memory regarding the scale of Irish involvement in the British Army, reflecting recent decades' greater popular awareness of this topic.¹⁸¹ Keith Jeffery has questioned the extent of Ireland's popular war amnesia, but also argued that the neglect and remoteness of Ireland's National War Memorial at Islandbridge, Dublin, was symbolic of the war's general marginalisation in Irish memory until the 1980s and 1990s.¹⁸² Jason R. Myers has distinguished between the Irish state's 'official' narrative, which has largely sealed the war into a separate, British history, and 'vernacular' memory representing local and volunteer institutions across Ireland that have continued to commemorate the war and maintain most Irish war memorials.¹⁸³ Jeffery, among others, has also explored the Irish state's attempts to reclaim the British Army's Irish soldiers, reconcile them with Ireland's national story and create a 'shared memory' of the war to overcome divisions between Irish nationalists and unionists.¹⁸⁴

However, David Fitzpatrick and Anne Dolan have argued that scholarship highlighting the complexities and contradictions of Ireland's experiences of the war and the Rising can directly challenge modern narratives of these events that promote reconciliation between nationalists and unionists, and between Ireland and the UK.¹⁸⁵ Similarly, Edward Madigan has tracked the evolution of approaches to commemoration of the war in Ireland, particularly during the recent 'Decade of Centenaries', arguing that attempts to use First World War memory to promote reconciliation have failed to overcome to deep-seated political divisions and ongoing difficulties surrounding 'Brexit'.¹⁸⁶ Additionally, Mark Quigley has identified the British Army's Irish soldiers commemorated at Islandbridge, including some killed during the Rising, as a possible challenge to

¹⁸¹ Martin, p.68.

¹⁸² Keith Jeffery, 'Irish Varieties Of Great War Commemoration', in *Towards Commemoration*, ed. by Horne and Madigan, pp.117-25 (p.117); Jeffery, *Ireland And The Great War*, p.135.

¹⁸³ Jason R. Myers, *The Great War And Memory In Irish Culture, 1918-2010* (Bethesda: Academica Press, 2017), pp.2, 4, 24-5, 110, 115-6, 118; Gallagher, pp.17, 179-81.

¹⁸⁴ Jeffery, 'Echoes Of War', in *Our War*, ed. by Horne, pp.261-76 (p.273).

¹⁸⁵ David Fitzpatrick, 'Historians And The Commemoration Of Irish Conflicts, 1912-23', in *Towards Commemoration*, ed. Horne and Madigan, pp.126-33 (pp.126, 132-3); Anne Dolan, 'Divisions And Divisions And Divisions: Who To Commemorate?', in Ibid., pp.145-53 (pp.146-8).

¹⁸⁶ Madigan, 'Introduction', in Ibid., pp.1-8 (pp.3-7); Madigan, 'Centenary (Ireland)', *1914-1918-online* <<u>https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/centenary_ireland</u>> [accessed 07 December 2022];

Irish identity that cannot be easily reconciled with prevailing national narratives in Ireland.¹⁸⁷

Online records of British and Irish war memorials – including stone memorials, plaques and rolls of honour – reveal the substantial British and Irish traditions of recognising British Army servicemen killed in the Rising as First World War dead, thereby treating the Rising as a battle of the war.¹⁸⁸ The notable extent to which service in the Rising was recognised as service in the war itself is further demonstrated by sources including records of military and pension awards, and the official records of war dead, Britain's *Soldiers Died In The Great War 1914-19* (hereafter *Soldiers Died*) and *Ireland's Memorial Records, 1914-1918* (hereafter *Memorial Records*).¹⁸⁹ This chapter paints a nuanced picture of British commemoration of the Rising, highlighting how aspects of previous chapters have influenced the significant but not total or unopposed extent to which soldiers from Britain who served in the Rising were commemorated and recognised as serving in the war. It also establishes that Ireland contains two opposing traditions of commemorating the Rising: one recognising the British Army's Irish servicemen killed in the Rising as war dead, the other Irish nationalist and republican tradition deliberately treating it as separate from the war, reflecting that subsequent republican conceptions of the Rising elevated it to be a standalone Irish conflict.

Directly comparing how Ireland has commemorated the British Army's Irish servicemen and the Irish republicans killed in the Rising in relation to the war is a significant contribution to the scholarship that has not properly addressed this topic. This chapter benefits from the scholarship exploring how nationalist Ireland has largely viewed the Rising as separate from the war and how the war has been, until recent decades, largely absent from nationalist popular memory and seen

¹⁸⁷ Mark Quigley, 'Reconsidering The Great War: Ireland And The First World War', *Modernist Cultures*, 13.3 (2018) 289-304 (p.296).

¹⁸⁸ *IWMWMR* <<u>https://www.iwm.org.uk/memorials</u>> [accessed 16 December 2022]; *IWM.IE*

<<u>http://www.irishwarmemorials.ie/</u>> [accessed 14 December 2022]; Eunan O'Halpin and Daithi Ó Corráin, *The Dead Of The Irish Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020); '1916 Remembrance Wall', *IWM.IE* <<u>http://www.irishwarmemorials.ie/Memorials-</u> <u>Detail?memoId=997</u>> [accessed 14 December 2022]; *Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook.*

¹⁸⁹ 'Ireland's Memorial Records 1914-18', *In Flanders Fields Museum (IFFM)*

<<u>https://imr.inflandersfields.be/index.html</u>> [accessed 19 December 2022]; 'Soldiers Died In The Great War 1914-1919', [1921] *Find My Past (FMP)* <<u>https://search.findmypast.co.uk/search-world-Records/soldiers-died-in-the-great-</u> <u>war-1914-</u> <u>1919</u>> [accessed 19 April 2023].

as a British event. However, rather than further exploring this specific terrain, this chapter focuses on understanding what Irish commemorations of and responses to the Rising, within the broader context that the scholarship has established, can reveal about the prevailing disconnect between the Rising and the war in Ireland. Significantly, this chapter also contributes a nuanced view to this larger debate by exploring the trend in post-Rising republican propaganda describing the Rising as part of the war. This chapter also contributes to the scholarship on Irish commemoration of service in the British Army, as the commemoration of Irish servicemen killed in the Rising has been consistently overlooked. It will also complement work on how Ireland views service in the war and has used the war to overcome divisions, demonstrating like John Horne's 2013 co-edited collection the difficulty of weaving complex history into commemorations by more fully exploring than previously attempted the implications of recognising the Rising as part of the war.

Part 1: British commemoration of the Rising

The names of 41 of the 75 British soldiers killed in the Rising can be confidently matched with names on British First World War memorials. The confident matches are based on minimum criterion of a matching surname plus first name or initials on the memorial, with the location of the memorial in the same area, town, city or region as the soldier's origin, as far as can be ascertained from official records. With the confident matches, no other soldiers killed in the war with the same name came from the same area or city. Memorials listing the soldier's regiment and/or date and location of death increased the reliability of this figure. The names of three British soldiers killed in the Rising were tentatively matched with names on British war memorials, as there were other soldiers with the same names from the same areas killed in the war and the memorials do not specify the regiment or date of death, nor are they always located particularly near where the men killed in the Rising were from. The remaining 31 British soldiers cannot be identified on British war memorials, meaning that a slim majority of British soldiers killed in the Rising were commemorated in Britian as having died in the war.

The memorials naming the 41 confident matches are all standard war memorials, with the war's dates or 'Great War' inscribed, and some invoking 'King and Country'. The memorials naming Harold Charles Daffen in Exeter College, Oxford, Clarence Osborne in St. Alban's Church, Brighton, and Montague Bernard Browne in South Collingham, Nottinghamshire, are the only memorials that specifically invoke the Rising. The place of death inscribed on the memorial for Daffen is 'Ireland 1916', for Osborne 'Dublin' and for Browne 'Dublin Rebellion', while other locations on the three memorials include the Somme, Tarsus and Palestine. ¹⁹⁰ Thus, these explicitly First World War memorials completely intertwine the Rising with the war.

While only a slight majority of the British soldiers killed in the Rising are named on war memorials, 72 of the 75 are recorded as war dead in one or both of the 1920s official records, *Soldiers Died* and *Memorial Records*. Of the 41 confident matches, 34 are named in only *Soldiers Died*, with seven named in that and in *Memorial Records*. Of the 34 British soldiers killed who cannot be confidently found on memorials, 30 appear only in *Soldiers Died*, one who can be tentatively identified on war memorials appears in both *Soldiers Died* and *Memorial Records*, while the remaining three are not named in either record as war dead.¹⁹¹

There are, then, some anomalies in whose deaths were commemorated and recorded as war deaths. For example, of the 20 Sherwood Foresters who died on Wednesday 26 April, only ten are commemorated on war memorials. Of those ten, one is named in both records and the remaining nine in *Soldiers Died*. The other ten, despite dying in the same action, are not named on war memorials but are all in *Soldiers Died* as war dead.¹⁹² However, soldiers not being named on war memorials or in the official records after their deaths is not unique to those killed in the Rising and

 ¹⁹⁰ 'Daffen, Harold Charles', *IWMWMR* <<u>https://www.iwm.org.uk/memorials/name/630740</u>> [accessed 16 December 2022]; 'Osborne, C.', *IWMWMR* <<u>https://www.iwm.org.uk/memorials/name/1504498</u>> [accessed 16 December 2022]; 'Browne, M B', *IWMWMR* <<u>https://www.iwm.org.uk/memorials/name/345506</u>> [accessed 16 December 2022]; 'South Collingham - St John the Baptist Church - Parishioners', *Nottinghamshire County Council* <<u>https://secure.nottinghamshire.gov.uk/RollOfHonour/WarMemorials/Details/148</u>> [accessed 1 August 2023].
 ¹⁹¹ 'Memorial Records', *IFFM* <<u>https://imr.inflandersfields.be/index.html</u>> [accessed 19 December 2022]; 'Soldiers Died', *FMP* <<u>https://search.findmypast.co.uk/search-world-Records/soldiers-died-in-the-great-war-1914-1919</u>> [accessed 19 April 2023]; O'Halpin and Ó Corráin, p.27.

might not suggest any unwillingness to view the Rising as part of the war. Rather, the omission of soldiers from memorials is more likely due to the war's scale and the difficulty in tracking all deaths. For example, 25 names were added to the University of Leeds war memorial in 2014 and one name added to the Headingley war memorial in 2017 having been missed when the memorials were first unveiled in 1951 and 1921 respectively.¹⁹³ It is perhaps unreasonable to expect the memorials and records to be comprehensive.

There are very few direct responses from the family members, friends or associates of the servicemen killed in the Rising revealing whether they agreed with or insisted upon the men being commemorated as war dead. However, the case of Percy Claude Perry, killed in the Rising and named on at least three Nottingham war memorials, suggests that individuals killed in the Rising could be explicitly treated as war dead. At his burial in Nottingham, the presiding minister portrayed Perry as a soldier who served and died in the war, who was 'one of the first to respond to his country's call' at the war's outbreak and 'gave all he had to give for Honour, Freedom, King, and Country'.¹⁹⁴ Additionally, on demobilisation at the war's end, every soldier of the 59th Division - which would include those who had served in Dublin and survived the war - received a letter thanking them for their service and for having 'played a man's part in this great War for freedom and fair play'. Although this letter did not mention the Rising and the official history of the 59th Division nowhere explicitly categorised Ireland as a theatre of the war, they both suggest that all the Division's service including in Ireland ultimately aided the British war effort.¹⁹⁵ Likewise, in an account of the 2/6th Battalion Sherwood Foresters' service in Dublin produced by Captain Gerald James Edmunds, who fought in the Rising, is a list of all the Battalion's officers and men who died throughout the war, including all casualties from Ireland and the Western Front together, with no

¹⁹³ 'Twenty-five Names Added To University's First World War Roll Of Honour', Legacies Of War (LOW) <https://legaciesofwar.leeds.ac.uk/news/twenty-five-names-added-to-universitys-first-world-war-roll-of-honour/> [accessed 31 May 2023]; 'New Name Added To Headingley War Memorial', LOW

<https://legaciesofwar.leeds.ac.uk/2017/04/13/new-name-added-to-headlingley-war-memorial/> [accessed 31 May 2023]; Catherine Switzer, 'The Irag Casualty, The Listed Monument And The Missing Child: The Multiple Roles Of War Memorials In The Contemporary United Kingdom', in Journal Of War And Culture Studies, 3.1 (2010), 83-97 (p.86). ¹⁹⁴ Nottingham Daily Express, 11 May 1916, p.4. ¹⁹⁵ Bradbridge, p.186.

distinction between either conflict.¹⁹⁶

However, the Rising's incorporation into the British understanding of the war was not total and the Rising was sometimes excluded from war commemoration. For instance, a memorial tablet for the 59th Division, erected in 1927 to honour their service in the war listed the battalions that served in Dublin, but did not list Dublin in the battle honours along with Ypres, Cambrai and Albert. At the Derby unveiling, Major-General A.E. Sandbach, who had commanded troops in the Rising, said that the memorial commemorated those who 'served overseas in France', overlooking the fighting in Ireland – and indeed that some of the sites listed were in Belgium –and perhaps by omission suggesting that the Rising was not a proper battle of the war.¹⁹⁷

Additionally, there was considerable political debate over the awards and honours for those who fought in Dublin, hinging on categorising service in the Rising as service in the war. For instance, in October 1916, Conservative MP Charles Yate lamented that the Government had not formally recognised or rewarded the soldiers who served in Dublin against rebels 'in alliance with Germany'.¹⁹⁸ Later in October, Ellis Hume- Williams, another Conservative MP, asked when those endorsed for promotion or recognition for deeds in the Rising would receive them. Henry Forster, Conservative Financial Secretary to the War Office, replied 'that the majority of the honours given so far have been given in connection with services rendered in France and in the other theatres of war.' When Hume-Williams then asked whether there was any difference between 'fighting the Germans in France' and 'putting down an outbreak of traitors in Ireland', Forster demurred 'that there is a difference', without elaboration, encapsulating the difficulties involved in recognising the Rising as part of the war.¹⁹⁹ In November 1916, Charles Yate again pushed for recognition for the soldiers, asking, 'Is there any distinction between fighting the allies of Germany abroad and

¹⁹⁶ Gerald James Edwards, *The Irish Rebellion. The 2/6th Sherwood Foresters' Part In The Defeat Of The Rebels In 1916. Their Early Training* (Chesterfield: Wilfred Edmunds, 1961) [no pagination].
¹⁹⁷ Bradbridge, p.137, [memorial reprinted opposite p.144]; *Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook*, p.43.
¹⁹⁸ 'HC Deb 18 October 1916 vol 86 c642', *Historic Hansard (HH) <<u>https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1916/oct/18/government-of-ireland</u>> [accessed 25 April 2023].
¹⁹⁹ 'HC Deb 31 October 1916 vol 86 c1517', <i>HH <<u>https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1916/oct/31/sherwood-foresters-dublin-rising*> [accessed 25 April 2023].
</u>

fighting the allies of Germany in Ireland?'. The Speaker of the House interjected to claim, 'That is a matter of argument', and there was no further debate, leaving the rationale unclear for not treating the Rising as the war.²⁰⁰

Comparing the Government's reticence to recognise Rising service as war service with its earlier response to the Rising indicates British struggles around how to categorise the Rising and perhaps Ireland itself. The central charge for all post-Rising court-martials was that the Rising had been undertaken 'with the intention, and for the purpose of assisting the enemy', and Roger Casement was charged separately with planning to aid Germany in 'open and public war [...] against our lord the King and his subjects'. Moreover, on 3 August 1916, the day of Casement's execution in London, the British Government released a statement declaring that Casement had agreed with the German Government that the Irish Brigade 'might be employed in Egypt against the British Crown', suggesting that the Government understood Casement's actions to raise a Brigade and the Rising itself were undertaken within a broader effort to defeat the UK in the war.²⁰¹

In January 1917, 20 individuals who had been active in Ireland during the Rising received awards 'for valuable services rendered in connection with the War'.²⁰² For example, Captain M.C. Martyn received the Military Cross and Colonel Cecil Fane received the Order of St. Michael and St. George for their actions in Dublin.²⁰³ However, Fane's award of the Order of St. Michael and St. George again suggests British difficulties about how to categorise Ireland as it is awarded for service in colonies and imperial territories, despite Ireland then being an integral part of the UK.²⁰⁴ Additionally, at least 39 soldiers who had been active in the Rising were mentioned in despatches

 ²⁰⁰ 'HC Deb 16 November 1916 vol 87 cc953-4', *HH* <<u>https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1916/nov/16/gallant-behaviour-of-troops</u>> [accessed 25 April 2023].
 ²⁰¹ Barton, p.36; *Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook*, pp.139-40, 150.

²⁰² Supplement To The London Gazette, 24 January 1917, pp.924-27; Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, p.98; Bradbridge, p.45.

²⁰³ Supplement To The London Gazette, 24 January 1917, pp.925, 927; Bradbridge, p.41; IWM, 66/12/1, Colonel A.N. Lee World War I Diary.

²⁰⁴ Peter Duckers, *British Orders And Decorations* (Princes Risborough: Shire, 2004), p.26.

for 'services rendered in connection with the war', including eight killed in the Rising, plus Major-General Sandbach, and Captain A.B. Leslie- Melville and Sergeant W.S. Jackson who were both wounded during the Rising.²⁰⁵ These 20 awards and 39 mentions in despatches, all publicised as 'in connection with the war', effectively represent the British Government's official recognition that service in the Rising was service in the war.

After more parliamentary debate about the level of compensation for soldiers wounded in the Rising and the families of those killed, in November 1916 the Government confirmed that the dependants of soldiers killed during the Rising would be entitled to the same allowances as dependants of soldiers killed on other fronts.²⁰⁶ First World War pension award files confirm that those wounded in the Rising received money from a programme designed to compensate those wounded in the war. The National Archives, London, hold a two per cent representative sample of First World War pension files and searching the names of the 367 wounded soldiers recorded after the Rising reveals the files of at least three, coincidentally all officers, who were wounded in the Rising were less likely to be awarded war disability pensions. All three surviving files reveal that the officers received awards for gunshot wounds obtained in Dublin and described as, 'Attributable to military service in the present war', 'attributable to, or aggravated by, service in the Great War', or attributed to, 'Military service' and 'active service against the Irish rebels in Dublin', framing Dublin as a battlefield of the war.²⁰⁸ Therefore, a wide range of evidence generates a nuanced picture of

²⁰⁶ 'HC Deb 31 May 1916 vol 82 cc2692-3', *HH* <<u>https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1916/may/31/compensation</u>> [accessed 24 April 2023]; 'HC Deb 21 November 1916 vol 87 c1201', *HH* <<u>https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1916/nov/21/killed-and-wounded-soldiers</u>> [accessed 25 April 2023].

²⁰⁵ Supplement To The London Gazette, 25 January 1917 pp.943-6; Supplement To The London Gazette, 30 March 1917, p.3107; Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, pp.43, 52-3, 98.

²⁰⁷ 'Ministry Of Pensions And Successors: Selected First World War Pensions Award Files', *TNA* <<u>https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11539</u>> [accessed 14 May 2023]; Jessica Meyer and Alexia Moncrieff, 'Family Not To Be Informed? The Ethical Use Of Historical Medical Documentation', in *Patient Voices In Britain, 1840-1948*, ed. by Anne Hanley and Jessica Meyer (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2021), pp.61-87 (p.65); *Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook*, p.52.

²⁰⁸ TNA, PIN 26/21457, Lieutenant William Hugh Curtis; TNA, PIN 26/22590, Lieutenant Harold Horner Thompson;

how Britain has incorporated the Rising into the legacy of the war. Often this incorporation was inconspicuous, ambivalent or resisted, but in the years following the Rising, Britain did largely recognise service in the Rising as service in the war.

Part 2: Irish commemoration of the Rising

Of the 49 Irish soldiers of the British Army and Irish Association of Volunteer Training Corps (IAVTC) home defence reservists who died in the Rising, 19 names can be confidently matched with names on First World War memorials across Ireland, with three tentative matches and the remaining 27 not yet identified on any war memorial. Of those 30 who cannot be confidently identified on Irish war memorials, one had an unknown origin and seven came from or had family connections in Britain but are not named on British war memorials. They are included in the Irish figures as they served in Irish regiments and might have had Irish ancestry – six of these eight are in *Memorial Records* as Irish war dead – but their exact background is unknown. Even discounting those eight, the Irish servicemen killed in the Rising were still less likely to be commemorated as war dead than the soldiers from Britain. These figures mean that 60 – or just under half – of the 124 soldiers and IAVTC reservists killed during the Rising, can be confidently identified on British and Irish war memorials.

The 19 confident matches appear on 30 memorials across Ireland, 23 of which are private or institutional memorials for churches, educational institutions or workplaces, while seven are public or town memorials. These memorials, then, are broadly representative of the tendency for private Irish war memorials, while the British war memorials discussed above are a mixture of public and private.²⁰⁹ Moreover, of the 23 private or institutional memorials, ten are in churches or cathedrals – one a Roman Catholic church and nine in Protestant sites – all in southern Ireland, reflecting, firstly, that most of the 49 Irish servicemen killed in the Rising were Protestant and, secondly, that those 25 Protestants were more likely to be commemorated as war dead. Twelve of these 25

TNA, PIN 26/2116, Lieutenant John Alexander Battersby. ²⁰⁹ Myers, pp.115-6, 8.

Protestant servicemen, 48 per cent, can be found on Irish war memorials, while seven of the 19 Roman Catholic servicemen killed in the Rising, 37 per cent, were likewise commemorated as war dead. The religious affiliation of the remaining five is unknown and none of them can be confidently identified on Irish war memorials. Political affiliation in this era did not always map onto religious identity, but Irish Protestants were largely unionist and Roman Catholics were largely nationalist, so it would be reasonable to infer from this sample that unionist families and communities were more willing to commemorate service in the war and to recognise the Rising as part of the war than were nationalist communities and families.

However, the Irish servicemen's origins in what would become divergent states – Northern Ireland being largely unionist and dedicated to commemorating the war, and Ireland keen to distance itself from Britain and officially marginalise the war – did not influence whether they were more likely to have been commemorated as war dead. Of the nine Irish soldiers killed in the Rising from what would become Northern Ireland, all but one of them Protestant and presumably unionist, only three – all Protestant – were named on war memorials, compared to half of the 32 'Southern Irish' servicemen killed in the Rising. Moreover, of the 30 individual war memorials naming the Irish soldiers, only five of them are in Northern Ireland and one of those is a public or town war memorial. Therefore, 'Northern Irish' soldiers killed during the Rising were less likely than their 'Southern' comrades to be commemorated as war dead.

Most of the Irish war memorials naming servicemen killed in the Rising are standard memorials, with the war's dates or 'Great War' inscribed on them. That the men listed died 'for their country' – without clarifying Ireland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or indeed for the British Empire – is inscribed on Dublin's Heuston Station war memorial naming Alfred Ernest Warmington, killed on the Rising's first day. Not only is this station named for Seán Heuston, executed for leading rebels in the Rising, but a memorial to Heuston is situated in the station around 10 feet away from the memorial naming Warmington. These two men who died on

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opposing sides of the Rising are thus commemorated in practically the same location, Warmington as having died in the war with Heuston's memorial not mentioning the war.²¹⁰

Irish soldiers John Brennan and Percival Havelock Acheson, both killed in the Rising, are named on the Kilkenny war memorial inscribed in Irish, 'Ar dheis Dè go raibh a n- anamacha', meaning, 'At the right hand of God were their souls'. This is a very recent public town memorial unveiled in 2018 and the Irish inscription symbolises a wider Irish effort to bring Irish soldiers who served with the British Army back into the national story. However, two soldiers named on this memorial died fighting against Irish rebels, many of whom wanted to revive the Irish language in an independent Irish state. Or, as Patrick Pearse put it, wanted an Ireland 'not free merely, but Gaelic as well; not Gaelic merely, but free as well'. Moreover, the *Visit Kilkenny* website states that the memorial honours 'those who fought for the rights of small nations like ours', while two of these men died fighting against Irish independence. This memorial, then, epitomises some of the complexity in commemorating the war and the Rising in Ireland.²¹¹

All the 15 Irish soldiers who can be confidently identified on war memorials are recorded in both *Soldiers Died* and *Memorial Records* as war dead. All the five IAVTC reservists killed in the Rising were named in *Memorial Records*, but, unlike the regular British Army, they were not named in *Soldiers Died*, despite four of them appearing on war memorials. Most of the other 29 Irish soldiers killed in the Rising were also listed in the official records, with 19 named in both *Memorial Records* and *Soldiers Died*. Two soldiers not commemorated in Ireland were named only in *Memorial Records* and *Soldiers Died*. Two soldiers not commemorated in Ireland were named only in *Memorial Records War Book of Remembrance* for service with the Canadian Infantry.²¹² One soldier not

²¹⁰ 'Heuston Station', *IWM.IE* <<u>http://www.irishwarmemorials.ie/Place-Detail?siteId=19</u>> [accessed 14 December 2022].

²¹¹ 'Kilkenny World War I Memorial', *IWM.IE* <<u>http://www.irishwarmemorials.ie/Memorials-</u><u>Detail?memold=1137</u>> [accessed 14 December 2022]; 'Honouring The Past', *Visit Kilkenny* <<u>https://visitkilkenny.ie/honouring-the-past/</u>> [accessed 18 April 2023]; *Pádraic H. Pearse*, p.135.

²¹² 'First World War Book Of Remembrance', Veterans Affairs Canada

<<u>https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/books/page?page=89&book=1&sort=page Asc</u>> [accessed 7 May 2023].

commemorated in Ireland was named only in *Soldiers Died* and two soldiers not commemorated in Ireland were also not named in either record.²¹³ These official records are important for revealing that almost all Irish servicemen killed in the Rising were listed as First World War dead. Combining this recognition with the fact that a notable proportion were also commemorated as war dead registers an underappreciated Irish understanding that the Rising was a battle of the war, though this commemorative tradition incorporating the Rising into the war is a marginal element of popular views in Ireland and is more uneven than in Britain.

In contrast to this Irish tradition of recognising the Rising as part of the war, nationalist and republican commemorations of the Rising have not treated it as part of the war. Notwithstanding, at least two nationalist commemorations of the Rising have marked the German link to the rebellion. In 1966, a ceremony in Kerry was dedicated to the attempt to import German arms to the Volunteers, with the Aud crew described by the County Kerry Council chairman as 'our friends' from Germany'. The national anthems of Ireland, the USA and West Germany were also played. possibly suggesting an alliance between those three countries, overlooking that in 1917 the USA had joined the war against Germany. Then in 2006 a group of divers placed a memorial plague on the undersea wreckage of the Aud to honour the attempt to land arms, with inscriptions in English, Irish and German. Reporting on these events did not suggest that they were commemorating the Rising as a part of the war. Rather, reporting from 1966 indicated that figures from the USA and Germany had simply aided the Rising, leaving the question hanging of why Germany might have wanted to support the rebels. Then the Irish Times contextualised the 2006 plaque by mentioning that the Aud came from Germany, while the Irish Independent wrote that the ship had 'set sail from the Baltic port of Lubeck [...] under the command of Karl Spindler', with no mention of Spindler's war service or of the war itself.²¹⁴

²¹³ 'Soldiers Died', *FMP* <<u>https://search.findmypast.co.uk/search-world-Records/soldiers-died-in-the-great-war-1914-1919</u>> [accessed 19 April 2023]; 'Memorial Records', *IFFM* <<u>https://imr.inflandersfields.be/index.html</u>> [accessed 19 December 2022].

²¹⁴ Irish Independent, 1 March 1966, p.6; *Kerryman*, 16 April 1966, p.11; Irish Times, 17 April 2006, p.12; Irish Independent, 17 April 2006, p.12.

Nationalist narratives of the Rising throughout the twentieth century generally treated it as a separate conflict from the war and help to explain the dearth of Irish republican commemorations incorporating the Rising into the war. As Fran Brearton has noted that the executed Rising leaders' last words and testaments 'dictate the terms of remembrance' for the Rising in Ireland, the leaders established the sense that Germany and the wider war were marginal to the Rising, which was purely a fight for Irish freedom.²¹⁵ Patrick Pearse, in his court-martial statement, emphasised that devotion to 'Irish freedom' alone had driven him since childhood.²¹⁶ Additionally, soon-to-be-executed ICA captain Michael Mallin and Irish Volunteers captain Edward Daly protested the charge 'of assisting Germany' at their court-martials and insisted that they had fought only for Ireland.²¹⁷ Then James Connolly's court-martial statement that the republican call to free Ireland was 'a nobler call in a holier cause than any call issued to [the Irish people] during this war' created a sense that the Rising was elevated above, thereby marginalising, the war.²¹⁸

Elsie Mahaffy, who as daughter of the Trinity College provost opposed the Rising and was hostile to Irish nationalism, nonetheless noticed that nationalist responses had side-lined the Rising's connection with the war and elevated its purely nationalist credentials as a fight for Irish freedom. She wrote in 1917 that while she often heard the Rising 'talked of as "An Incident of the Great War", she increasingly doubted the Rising's connections with the war. Since the Rising, she had 'waded through a mass of' republican literature on the Rising and found 'nowhere any suggestion of calling in German help'. Additionally, since no German officers or soldiers had been caught in Ireland, she believed it was wrong to treat the Rising as a part of the war.²¹⁹

This account reflects both the contemporary recognition that the Rising was part of the war and

²¹⁷ Barton, p.279; Machlochlainn, p.71.

²¹⁵ Fran Brearton, *The Great War In Irish Poetry: W.B. Yeats To Michael Longley* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.18.

²¹⁶ Ó Buachalla, p.379.

²¹⁸ UCDA, LA10/A/2, James Connolly Statement At Court-Martial Trial, 9 May 1916.

²¹⁹ TCDMA, IE TCD MS 2074, Elsie Mahaffy's Account Of The Easter Rising, 1916-1917.

the ways in which republicans and nationalists disconnected the Rising from the war, but in 1917 this latter process was not complete. Many republican Sinn Féin political meetings and election addresses, such as those by George Noble Plunkett following his February 1917 by-election victory, did explain the Rising as an essentially standalone event, fought solely for Ireland without reference to the war. Yet he, like others, at times aligned the Rising with the war's rhetoric of national self- determination, describing Ireland as 'one small nation' that 'struck out for itself' in the Rising, like others in the war. He also announced that he wanted Ireland to 'get due hearing at the great peace conference' following the war, suggesting that the Rising rebels had been belligerents in the war.²²⁰ At the October 1917 Sinn Féin Convention, party president Arthur Griffith likewise spoke of Ireland's entitlement to 'belligerent rights' at the post-war Peace Conference due to the Rising, and Constance Markievicz also claimed in October 1917 that 'Ireland was a belligerent, entitled to representation at the Peace Conference', and that 'we are at war', again channelling previously discussed themes.²²¹ However, these statements are outnumbered by those that clearly separate Ireland and the Rising from the war. Éamon de Valera, who had commanded rebels in the Rising, declaring at a political meeting in October 1917 that the 'present war is not our war: what we want is a war here in Ireland for our own freedom' is more representative of the bulk of republican political pronouncements and suggests how associating the Rising with a war for Irish freedom instead of with the First World War could overshadow the latter.²²²

Nationalist accounts of the Rising from the 1920s to 1950s often portrayed it as the beginning of a five-year nationalist struggle from 1916-21, incorporating the 1919-21 Irish War for Independence and severing the Rising from the First World War. Joseph V. Lawless' 1954 BMH statement is representative of many others and of 1920s articles from *An t-Óglác* – the Irish Army magazine – with repeated references suggesting the Rising's relationship with the war and with the German

 ²²⁰ TNA, CO 904/23, George Noble Plunkett Statements, 6 February 1917, 12 March 1917, 17 March 1917, 29 April 1917.
 ²²¹ TNA, CO 904/23, Sinn Fein Convention, October 1917; TNA, CO 904/23, Constance Markievicz Statement, 7

October 1917.

²²² TNA, CO 904/23, Éamon de Valera Statement, 5 October 1917.

war effort, but which never explicitly argued that the Rising had been a part of the war. Instead, Lawless titled his statement, 'Recollections of the Anglo-Irish War 1916-1921'.²²³ Importantly, this was a view shared by nationalist figures from both sides of the 1922-23 Irish Civil War divide. For example, from opposing sides in the Civil War, Kevin O'Higgins declared in 1927 that a 'revolution was begun in this country in Easter, 1916', while Frank Aiken declared in 1937 that the Rising 'marked the opening of a new era in our history'. Aiken also explicitly lamented that the Civil War divisions had 'dimmed the glory and splendour of the epoch-making events of Easter week', suggesting that celebrating the Rising as a standalone national event, not as part of the war, could be a unifying factor in Irish nationalism.²²⁴

Framing the Rising as the culmination of a long war against Britain, therefore belonging to something much larger than the First World War, was just as common in nationalist responses. Again, the framing set by the Rising's leaders helped dictate how the Rising would be later remembered. Patrick Pearse, even while planning the Rising as the Irish republicans' entry into the war, framed the rebellion he was planning as the culmination of an 800-year-long struggle against Britain. In a December 1915 article he wrote of Ireland's separatist tradition dating back to at least 1169 and declared that the demand for freedom 'has been made by every generation; that we of this generation receive it as a trust from our fathers; that we are bound by it'.²²⁵ Sinn Féin propagandist Aodh de Blácam was like other nationalists and republicans in replicating Pearse's framing even while providing several links between the Rising and the war. He began his account of the Rising with the 12th Century Anglo-Norman invasion of Ireland, when the 'English flag was raised in Dublin, and was to float there unchallenged until the year 1916'.²²⁶ Thus, the Rising embodied an ongoing Irish struggle, outweighing anything external like the First World War.

²²³ BMH, WS 1043, Joseph V. Lawless, 1954; An t-Óglác, 16 January 1926 Vol. IV No. 1.

²²⁴ 'DE Deb 29 March 1927 vol 19 no 5', *Oireachtas* <<u>https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1927-03-29/9/</u>></u> [accessed 7 May 2023]; UCDA, P104/1355, '1916 Before And After', 1937.

²²⁵ Pádraic H. Pearse, pp.228-32.

²²⁶ Aodh de Blácam, *What Sinn Fein Stands For* (Dublin: Mellifont Press Ltd., 1921), pp.28-36, 75, 82, 85; BMH, WS 1043, Joseph V. Lawless, 1954; Jones, *History Of The Sinn Fein Movement*, p.142.

At stake for the nationalists and republicans who consciously separated the Rising from the war in the decades following 1916 was more than the unity of post-Civil War Irish nationalism. Objections to the Rising being considered an offshoot of the war reveal an Irish nationalist and republican concern that the Rising would be suborned, diminished and made less glorious, and its significance to Ireland's struggle for national independence diluted, by being considered a relatively small part of the enormous First World War. In this light, nationalist and republican participants in and commentators on the Rising considered that the political and cultural legitimacy of the Rising, and of the political elite and independent state that germinated within it, were at stake and depended on the Rising being widely understood not as part of the war but as the culmination of centuries of national struggle, and as a solely Irish national rebellion that sparked a war for independence

Identifying a single point at which the Rising and the war became separated in Irish public consciousness is not straightforward. Almost immediately following the Rising, the nationalist and republican leadership and wider movement promoted the idea that the Rising had been separate from the war to the Irish population, through the statements of executed leaders and in Sinn Féin political pronouncements from 1917. Articles, memoirs and speeches by participants and republicans from the 1920s onwards sustained this division. By the 1960s, when the general Irish nationalist population came to regard war commemoration as distinctly British, the war and the Rising had been clearly separate in the Irish imagination for some time.²²⁷

The nationalist separation of the Rising from the war has implications for how Ireland commemorates the republican and British Army dead of the Rising in relation to each other. It also has a bearing on attempts to create, as President of Ireland Mary McAleese described the Island of Ireland Peace Park in Belgium, 'a sacred space of shared memory and shared commemoration' where war memory could transcend political differences between nationalist and unionists in

²²⁷ Madigan, 'Centenary (Ireland)', *1914-1918-online* <<u>https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/centenary_ireland</u>> [accessed 07 December 2022].

Copies of the *Memorial Records*, listing 55 servicemen killed in the Rising, are held at the Islandbridge National War Memorial, meaning that memorial effectively commemorates British Army service in the Rising as service in the war. In 1919 it was proposed that Islandbridge should commemorate the 'Irish Officers and men of His Majesty's Forces who fell in the Great War'.²²⁹ Officially opened in 1994, the memorial today does not mention 'His Majesty's Forces' and is dedicated to the '49,400 IRISH MEN WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES IN THE GREAT WAR 1914-18' [sic].²³⁰ The Island of Ireland Peace Park commemorating the Irish Divisions that fought in the war similarly limits references to the British Military and is self-consciously designed to unite nationalists and unionists in commemorating the war dead. An inscription near the park entrance obliquely alludes to common service in the British Military, commemorating 'the thousands of young men from all parts of Ireland who fought a common enemy', while another plaque explains that the tower in the park's centre commemorates 'all those from the Island of Ireland who fought and died in the First World War'.²³¹

As Islandbridge effectively classifies British Army service in the Rising as service in the war, it necessarily implies that the rebels were also fighting in the war. As both Islandbridge and the Peace Park have limited references to the British Military to be just for Irishmen killed in the war, they open the door to commemorating together in the same memorial the Irish servicemen and rebels who fought against each other as direct adversaries in the Rising. Moreover, while it is possible for Irish nationalists to commemorate Irish service in the British Military without endorsing the British Empire, commemorating the Rising in Ireland is to endorse the aims of nationalist

<u>http://www.irishwarmemorials.ie/Memorials-Detail?memold=91</u>> [accessed 9 May 2023].

 ²²⁸ Ronan McGreevy, *Wherever The Firing Line Extends* (Stroud: The History Press, 2017), pp.5, 271.
 ²²⁹ Dublin, Dublin City Library and Archive (DCLA), Royal Dublin Fusiliers Association Archive, RDFA/20/056, Summary History Of The Irish National War Memorial, c.1937.
 ²³⁰ Jeffery, *Ireland And The Great War*, p.135; 'National War Memorial', *IWM.IE*

²³¹ 'Island of Ireland Peace Park', *The Great War* <<u>http://www.greatwar.co.uk/ypres-salient/memorial-island-of-ireland-peace-park.htm</u>> [accessed 19 April 2023]; 'Island Of Ireland Peace Park', Military History <<u>https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Island_of_Ireland_Peace_Park?file=Irish_Peace_Park_dedication_plaque.jpg</u>> [accessed 10 May 2023].

political rebellion as Rising memory is much more partisan than war memory. Therefore, a general recognition in Ireland that the Rising was part of the war may alienate nationalists who identify with the Easter rebels from unionists who identity with the British state and Military, and vice versa, thus undoing efforts to create a shared memory of the war. During the recent 'Decade of Centenaries', unionist politicians notably refused to attend Rising commemorative events.²³² Commemorating the Rising as a battle of the war in which nationalists fought against the British Military, many of whom were Irish, may make Irish commemoration of the Irish servicemen in the British Military more complicated for nationalists and challenges any Irish back-projection onto the First World War that it was a neutral, unifying historical event for nationalists and unionists, and for Ireland and the UK.

Conclusion

There are traditions in Britain and Ireland of recognising and commemorating the Rising as a part of the war, and this chapter is a significant advance on histories of war and Rising commemoration that have not recognised or examined this notable crossover between war and Rising commemorations. Histories of the war and its commemoration in Britain and in Ireland that do not introduce the Rising, or histories of the Rising that marginalise its place within the war, are neglecting a notable theme in the Rising's legacy. Moreover, this chapter underscores that the Rising's legacy extends beyond Ireland, as the recognition of soldiers by the British Government and their communities is integral to the Rising's wider significance. Comparing British commemorations of the Rising with the divergent Irish commemorations of the Rising facilitates a new perspective on the Rising's legacy that transcends a narrow view.

There is little evidence of a calculated British strategy to marginalise and separate the Rising from the war, though many of the soldiers killed in the Rising were silently incorporated into British and Irish war commemoration, or were left out entirely, and then there was some governmental

²³² Madigan, 'Centenary (Ireland)', *1914-1918-online* <<u>https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/centenary_ireland</u>> [accessed 07 December 2022].

reticence about the recognition given to soldiers. However, the British Government largely incorporated the Rising into recognition and commemoration of the war, with some British war memorials explicitly referring to the Rising. Any gaps or oversight are most likely the result of prevailing British difficulties over how to conceptualise Ireland itself, or of the war dead's overwhelming scale from both Britain and Ireland leading to the relatively small number killed in the Rising being overlooked or marginalised.

While there is an incomplete tradition of commemorating the Rising in Britain, there are in practice two traditions in Ireland: the first is the partial and largely inconspicuous incorporation of the dead Irish servicemen into war memorials, in both 'official' and 'vernacular' commemorative traditions. While the second, republican tradition sustains the general republican view of the Rising that it was part of the early twentieth century Irish Revolution and/or a part of a centuries-long war against Britain, so not subordinated to and diminished by the larger First World War.

However, some post-Rising republicans did sustain the claim to belligerent status in the war, indicating that there was no neat dividing line between republicans seeing the Rising as part of the war and then as technically separate from it. Moreover, demonstrating that numerous Irish servicemen killed in the Rising were recognised and commemorated in Ireland as having died in the war challenges parts of the scholarship and wider popular nationalist view that the Rising was really a part of a centuries long war against Britain or only part of the early twentieth century Irish Revolution, essentially separate from the war.²³³ Reflexively treating the Rising as solely part of a long Irish struggle against Britain and removing it from its international context is problematic and neglects the Irish tradition of recognising the Rising as part of the war. However, recognising that the Rising was a part of the war and that Irish people fought on directly opposing sides of the war in Ireland's foundational rebellion complicates wider Irish commemorations of the war and the

²³³ William H. Kautt, *The Anglo-Irish War, 1916-1921: A People's War* (Westport: Praeger, 1999), p.3; Duff, pp.v, 6, 121-2; Nic Dhiarmada, p.10; Fearghal McGarry, "The Ireland Of The Far East?": The Wilsonian Moment In Korea And Ireland', in *The Irish Revolution: A Global History*, ed. by Patrick Mannion and Fearghal McGarry (New York: New York University Press, 2022), pp.61-92 (p.64).

Rising and challenges the idea that the First World War can be commemorated in Ireland in a neutral manner.

Conclusion

This thesis has traversed a wide range of contemporary and later sources, and incorporated diverse ways of understanding the Rising, to demonstrate that the Easter Rising was fundamentally a part of the First World War, not a separate conflict. Irish republicans set out to stage a rebellion on Germany's side in the war – just like other non-state combatants, such as the Arab rebels acting on the UK's side in the war – and the Rising played into the wider German-British axis of conflict in the war. Irish republicans tried to develop a German alliance and use the German war against the UK for their own ends of Irish independence. They also framed their pursuit of independence as aiding the German war effort, making the war integral to the Rising and the Rising a component of the war.

The range of viewpoints, from numerous sections of society and all sides in the conflict, and their enlightening perspectives have been previously overlooked or treated in isolation. Connecting and analysing these views, and examining how different goals and agendas affected how contemporaries understood the relationship between the Rising and the war, demonstrates that contemporaries participating in, viewing and responding to the Rising had a more integrated understanding of the Rising and the war than later historians have fully appreciated. While some recent scholarship has characterised the Rising as a part of the war, their explanations do not adequately explore the full range of evidence available and do not engage with the question in the larger areas that this thesis has covered. This thesis has advanced beyond the recent scholarship in demonstrating and delineating the ways in which and extent to which so many contemporaries, understood the Rising as a part of the war in the larger areas of the rebellion's planning, experience and commemoration. Building on and connecting the recent trends in the scholarship, the war's and the Rising's distinct historiographical traditions, and rooting the analysis in how contemporaries recognised the war's and the Rising's essential unity, this thesis demonstrates that histories of the war without the Rising, or of the Rising as an essentially separate conflict, are incomplete.

Demonstrating that the Rising opened the Irish Front of the war enriches Irish studies and First World War studies, establishing the profound connection between the international context and events in Ireland, and the centrality of Ireland to wider discourses on the war. The Rising was simultaneously developed within and affected Irish, imperial and European frameworks. The Rising reflected, epitomised and aligned with the war's sometimes clashing characteristics as an imperial and anticolonial conflict. Therefore, this thesis helps to reconcile the larger debate about the war's essential characteristics, showing that defining the war as being fought fundamentally for small nations or for imperial gains depended on the participant's or observer's viewpoint, and these aims could be complementary even amidst friction over priorities, as the Irish republicans' and German Military's divergent goals for the Rising highlighted.

Chapter 1 demonstrated that the republicans deliberately planned the Rising as opening a new front in the war against the UK, and that figures across Ireland, the USA, Germany and Britain perceived how the Rising could contribute to and benefit from the German war effort. Moreover, the propaganda that the war was fought for small nations, plus the desire to formally ally with Germany, inspired the republican ambition to participate in the war. This chapter also contextualised Ireland within the war's imperial dynamic and established comparisons with other colonial situations to demonstrate that the Rising's plans were formulated to make it a new front in the war and put the republican rebels-to-be in the same position as other non-state combatants in tactical alliance with imperial powers.

Chapter 2 established that during the Rising, a wide range of contemporaries saw it as a new theatre of the war, imagining that the wider war would impinge on the Rising and the Rising affect the rest of the war, with the Rising and other theatres as components of the same global conflict. Civilian observers recognised the Rising's violence and destruction as literally manifesting the war in Dublin, and that British Army soldiers and republican rebels imagined themselves as

participants in the war. That the rebels claimed the legal status of belligerents in the war, while legally dubious, is highly significant in highlighting that figures at all levels of the republican movement involved in the Rising perceived the rebellion as fundamentally a part of the war while they were fighting in it.

By quantifying the Rising's legacy through memorials, despatches, official records of war dead and awards, Chapter 3 revealed the substantial yet incomplete British and Irish traditions of commemorating and recognising the Rising as a battle of the war. This chapter gave substance and rigour to conclusions about the Rising's British and Irish legacies, and is highly relevant to studies of national identity, and public and private memory, especially following the war's and the Rising's recent centenaries. The British soldiers who served and died in the Rising were, on balance, recognised as having served in the war, reflecting the way in which soldiers themselves saw the Rising as part of their war service. However, Chapter 3 confirmed that Britain has rarely explicitly elevated the Rising to the level of a battle in the war. Rather, commemoration and recognition of the Rising has come from the other direction, with war memory swallowing Rising memory.

This chapter also demonstrated that Ireland also contains a notable number of war memorials naming Irish servicemen killed in the Rising. Yet this Irish commemorative tradition of framing the Rising as part of the war does not pertain for Irish nationalist and republican commemorations of the Rising, despite the previously discussed republican views on the Rising's plans and on belligerent status in the war. Subsequent Irish republican and nationalist conceptions of the Rising have elevated the Rising as a standalone conflict above the war, and commemorated the Rising solely within the context of Irish nationalist rebellions, reflecting the nationalist agenda to not subordinate Rising memory to the larger, complex war.

This is an important and timely thesis that develops a refined understanding of the Rising,

recognising that while it is valid to contextualise the Rising within the Irish Revolution following previous rebellions, it can and must also be simultaneously regarded as a part of the war. That leading figures in, and rank-and-file members of, the republican movement planned and imagined the Rising as part of the war with Ireland as a small nation on Germany's side, then during and after the Rising claimed that they were participants in the war is significant for popular Irish nationalist perspectives. Establishing these ideas challenges the traditional, widespread nationalist and republican view of the Rising that developed over subsequent decades that it had been a standalone rebellion, separate from the war.

However, this thesis has also developed a more complex understanding of the Rising than claiming it was simply a German plot. There were some notable contemporary viewpoints espousing this idea and they illuminate how contemporaries related the Rising to the war, but obscure that the Rising was an Irish rebellion. Therefore, this thesis does not sustain a binary view that the Rising can only be understood as being either part of the war or of Irish nationalist history, as different historic actors would emphasise one element over the other depending on their agenda. The war overlapped with and incorporated numerous other conflicts with deep roots. Just as the Arab Revolt was an Arabian rebellion with deep roots but was also part of the war, so too was the Rising an Irish rebellion with Irish antecedents but also part of the war. The Irish republicans planning and fighting in the Rising had specifically Irish nationalist reasons for wanting to associate their rebellion with, and become active participants in, the war. Uniting the Rising and the war does not disrupt, belittle or submerge either conflict to the other, nor dismiss as irrelevant the longer history of Irish rebellions. Irish nationalist history and histories of the war can be united in recognising the Rising as a battle of the war.

This thesis also enhances the scope of First World War studies in simple terms by expanding its boundaries to demonstrate that it was fought in Ireland, therefore fought in the UK as it was then. The UK war effort involved not just fighting its imperial rivals but also suppressing the

independence of a small nation, all on 'home territory'. Moreover, Irish men and women fought on both sides of the war, fighting and killing each other on the Irish Front. Chapter 3 especially raises how timely and complicated this contribution is to understanding Ireland's war, given the recent 'Decade of Centenaries' and reflections on what the war and the Rising meant, why they happened and their legacies. As Ireland contains traditions of recognising the British Army dead as war dead, it implicitly recognises the Rising as part of the war. The modern Irish state essentially claims descent from the republicans who planned and imagined the Rising as their entry into the war, potentially alienating unionists from shared war commemorations, and putting the Irish state's and Irish nationalists' sympathies on the other side of the war from Irish servicemen in the British Military, whom the Irish state now also re-claims for Ireland's National story, some of whom fought and died to suppress the Rising and are named at Ireland's National War Memorial. At a time when greater attention is paid to commemoration and memory in history, it might be too much to expect Ireland to formally recognise that the 1916 separatists fought in the war against other Irishmen, as contemporaries to the Rising understood it, and trouble any 'sacred space of shared memory' that the Rising and war may separately provide.²³⁴

This thesis has developed a new understanding of the Rising, reaffirming the widespread contemporary recognition that it was a part of the war and substantially advancing the scholarship that has approached but not adequately explored this fact. The Rising can still be contextualised and understood within the Irish Revolution and a history of Irish rebellions, but this thesis has demonstrated the imperative of recognising it as the Irish Front of the First World War.

²³⁴ McGreevy, p.5.

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