

The Transformation of Journalism in Taiwan and its Democratic Functions

I-Chun Lin

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds School of Media and Communication
December 2023

I confirm that the work submitted is my own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

Acknowledgement

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to everyone who has participated in the successful completion of this doctoral dissertation. Your support and encouragement have been indispensable, and this work would not have been achievable without your contributions.

My deepest thanks are reserved for my supervisors, Professor Christopher Anderson, and Professor Julie Firmstone, whose invaluable guidance, patience, and mentorship have been a constant source of support throughout this research journey.

Last, but certainly not least, I am profoundly grateful to my family for their unwavering love. Their support and understanding give me the courage and strength to pursue my dream and overcome challenging tasks.

This thesis is dedicated to my beloved country, Taiwan, and its cherished democracy.

Abstract

This research focuses on the transformation of journalism in Taiwan, a post-authoritarian society, with a specific focus on its democratic function. While previous research concentrated on the early stages of change after the authoritarian regime collapsed, democratisation has been a continuous process. Taiwan is a pertinent case providing empirical evidence of the role journalism plays in a new democracy's move from transitional to consolidating stages.

This research explores the dynamic changes in print journalism, including a consideration of the assumed Asian trait in journalism - Confucian culture - and the impact of social media in Taiwan's hybrid media system. The study addresses a wide range of concerns related to these dynamics, aiming to shed light on the evolution of print journalism after democratisation. A multi-method approach is used, which includes analysing data from semi-structured interviews with twenty-three journalists and analysing political news from Taiwan's four national newspapers in 2008 and 2020 as well as their corresponding Facebook pages. By taking a longitudinal approach that considers the changing landscape of journalism over time, across print and social media platforms, and through different generations of journalists, this thesis provides a nuanced and holistic understanding of the transformation of journalism in Taiwan.

Challenging the notion that Confucian culture directly applies to Taiwan's journalistic landscape, the research proposes alternative interpretations emerging within Taiwan's distinctive partisan media system, such as the concept of social harmony. Unlike Western concepts, Taiwan's partisanship assumes a unique meaning, with dominant ideologies of unification and independence rather than the usual dimensions of left and right political ideologies. In the post-democratic era, a hybrid form of journalism emerges, and the partisan media system evolves. Print newspapers strive to exert political influence and fulfil democratic roles; while their online counterparts, particularly Facebook pages, mainly serve informational and entertainment functions, unable to replace the significance of print editions. This study not only emphasises the ongoing transformation of print journalism in serving democracy but also reveals the impending crisis of print journalism's democratic function.

Table of Contents

<i>Acknowledgement</i>	<i>iii</i>
<i>Abstract</i>	<i>iv</i>
<i>Table of Contents</i>	<i>v</i>
<i>List of Tables</i>	<i>vii</i>
<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>ix</i>
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	<i>x</i>
<i>Chapter 1 Introduction</i>	<i>1</i>
1.1 The Aim of this Research	1
1.2 Structure of the Thesis	2
<i>Chapter 2 Background</i>	7
2.1 Introduction	7
2.2 The Historical Background of Democratisation in Taiwan	8
2.3 Journalism and Democracy in Taiwan	17
2.4 Normative theory – looking for the standards for journalism	23
<i>Chapter 3 Literature Review and Research Questions</i>	29
3.1 Introduction	29
3.2 The Democratic Functions of Journalism	29
3.3 Journalistic Roles	40
3.4 Journalistic Autonomy	54
<i>Chapter 4 Research Design and Methods</i>	61
4.1 Introduction	61
4.2 Selection of Newspapers	63
4.3 Semi-Structured Interview	68
4.4 Content Analysis	76
4.5 Limitations of Research Design	91
4.6 Ethics	92
<i>Chapter 5 Democratic values in news content</i>	94
5.1 Introduction	94
5.2 The Quantity of Political News: How Much Is Enough?	94
5.3 The News Quality in Political News: What is pivotal for consolidating democracy?	97
5.4 Summary	113
<i>Chapter 6 Journalistic role performance in news content</i>	115
6.1 Introduction	115
6.2 Journalistic Role Performance in 2008 and 2020	115
6.3 Interventionist: The newspapers reserve their interventionist role after democratic transition.	119

6.4 Power distance	125
6.5 Market and Public Orientation.....	136
6.6 Summary	147
Chapter 7 The Shift to Digital: Political News on Social Media	148
7.1 Introduction	148
7.2 Comparing Journalistic Role Performance Across Platforms.....	149
7.3 Comparing Democratic Value in News Content	167
7.4 Summary	179
Chapter 8 The Transformation of Role Perception.....	181
8.1 Introduction	181
8.2 The Transformation of Journalistic Culture	181
8.3 The Transformation of Journalists' Role Perceptions.....	190
8.4 The Perceived Difficulties in Practising the Role Perception.....	201
8.5 Perceived Influential Factors	204
8.6 Summary	212
Chapter 9 Conclusion and Discussion	214
9.1 Introduction	214
9.2 Key Findings in the News Quality.....	214
9.3 Key Findings in the Role Performance.....	221
9.4 Key Findings in Role Perceptions: Moving from the old paradigm to the new face	226
9.5 Discussion: The changing role of print journalism after democratic transition	230
9.6 Limitations and Suggestions.....	238
Bibliography.....	240
Appendix 1: Semi-structured Interview Questionnaire.....	254
Appendix 2: Codebook.....	258
Appendix 3: Information Sheet.....	268
Appendix 4: Participant Consent Form	270
Appendix 5: Democratic values in news content.....	271
Appendix 6: Role performance.....	275

List of Tables

TABLE 4. 1: RESEARCH QUESTIONS, OBJECTIVES, AND METHODOLOGIES	62
TABLE 4. 2: INFORMATION ABOUT THE FOUR NATIONAL NEWSPAPERS.....	64
TABLE 4. 3: THE NUMBER OF FACEBOOK FOLLOWERS ON NEWS MEDIA'S FACEBOOK PAGES	67
TABLE 4. 4: JOURNALISTS INTERVIEWED FROM EACH NEWSPAPER SHOWN BY MEDIA AND JOURNALIST' GENERATIONS.....	70
TABLE 4. 5: SAMPLES OF POLITICAL NEWS FROM THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS AND THEIR FACEBOOK PAGE	80
TABLE 5. 1: THE AMOUNT AND PERCENTAGE OF POLITICAL NEWS IN 2008 AND 2020.....	95
TABLE 5. 2: THE AMOUNT AND PERCENTAGE OF SOURCE CITED IN THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020 CATEGORISED IN TWO GROUPS	98
TABLE 5. 3: THE AMOUNT AND PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE OF SOURCE IN THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020	100
TABLE 5. 4: THE AMOUNT AND PERCENTAGE OF SOURCE DIVERSITY AMONG THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020	101
TABLE 5. 5: THE AMOUNT AND PERCENTAGE OF TRANSPARENT SOURCE IN NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020	105
TABLE 5. 6: THE GAP BETWEEN TWO POLES OF THE TONE TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT	108
TABLE 5. 7: TONES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT IN THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020.....	109
TABLE 5. 8: THE PERCENTAGES OF MAJOR NEWS SOURCES IN POLITICAL NEWS	111
FIGURE 6. 1 THE AVERAGE SCORE OF FIVE ROLE PERFORMANCES OVER TIME	116
FIGURE 6. 2 PERCENTAGE OF THE OBJECT TOWARD WHOM INTERVENTIONIST WATCHDOG CLAIMS MADE IN EACH PAPER	130
FIGURE 6. 3 PERCENTAGE OF THE OBJECT TOWARD WHOM DETACHED WATCHDOG CLAIMS MADE IN EACH PAPER	132
FIGURE 6. 4 PRESENCE OF INDICATORS OF THE INTERVENTIONIST ROLE SPLIT BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020	138
FIGURE 6. 5 PRESENCE OF INDICATORS OF THE CIVIC ROLE IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF NEWS STORIES SPLIT BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020	144
FIGURE 6. 6 PRESENCE OF INDICATORS OF THE CIVIC EDUCATOR SPLIT BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020	144
FIGURE 6. 7 PRESENCE OF CIVIC AGENT INDICATORS SPLIT BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020.....	145
TABLE 7. 1: THE AVERAGE SCORES OF THE FIVE JOURNALISTIC ROLE PERFORMANCES BY EACH NEWSPAPER IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK	151
TABLE 7. 2 : THE AVERAGE SCORES OF THE INTERVENTIONIST ROLE IN TWO ASPECTS IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK PAGES	154
TABLE 7. 3: THE AVERAGE SCORES OF THE WATCHDOG ROLE IN TWO ASPECTS IN PRINT AND ON FACEBOOK.....	157
TABLE 7. 4: THE AVERAGE SCORES OF THE WATCHDOG ROLE PERFORMED BY EACH NEWSPAPER IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK	158
TABLE 7. 5: THE AVERAGE SCORES OF THE INFOTAINMENT ROLE PERFORMED BY EACH NEWSPAPER IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK	162
TABLE 7. 6: TWO GROUPS OF AUTHORS IN THE POLITICAL NEWS ON EACH NEWSPAPER'S FACEBOOK PAGES	163
TABLE 7. 7: THE ROLE PERFORMANCE OF THE TWO GROUPS OF AUTHORS ON NEWSPAPER'S FACEBOOK PAGES...	164
TABLE 7. 8: THE AVERAGE SCORES OF THE CIVIC ROLE IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK	165
TABLE 7. 9: TWO ASPECTS OF THE CIVIC ROLE PERFORMED BY NEWSPAPERS IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK	166
TABLE 7. 10: THE QUANTITY OF POLITICAL NEWS IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK	168
TABLE 7. 11: THE AMOUNT AND PERCENTAGE OF SOURCE DIVERSITY IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK CATEGORISED IN TWO GROUPS	170
TABLE 7. 12: THE AMOUNT AND PERCENTAGE OF SOURCE CITED IN THE NEWSPAPERS OVER TIME AND ACROSS PLATFORMS CATEGORISED IN TWO GROUPS.....	171
TABLE 7. 13: THE PERCENTAGE OF SOURCE CITED IN THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS ACROSS PLATFORMS.....	172
TABLE 7. 14: SOCIAL MEDIA CITATIONS IN NEWSPAPERS: LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS BY AMOUNT AND PERCENTAGE ACROSS PLATFORMS	173

TABLE 7. 15: THE AMOUNT AND PERCENTAGE OF SOURCE TRANSPARENCY IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK CATEGORISED INTO TWO GROUPS.....	175
TABLE 7. 16: THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF TRANSPARENT SOURCES IN EACH NEWSPAPER IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK CATEGORISED INTO TWO GROUPS	176
TABLE 7. 17: THE GAP BETWEEN TWO POLES OF THE TONE TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK	177
TABLE 7. 18: TONES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT IN THREE SECTIONS OF NEWS ARTICLES IN PRINT AND IN NEWS ON FACEBOOK.....	178
FIGURE 8. 1 THE DEGREE TO WHICH SENIOR AND JUNIOR JOURNALISTS FEEL THE DESCRIPTION IS TRUE IN FOUR INDICATORS.....	183

List of Figures

FIGURE 6. 1 THE AVERAGE SCORE OF FIVE ROLE PERFORMANCES OVER TIME	116
FIGURE 6. 2 PERCENTAGE OF THE OBJECT TOWARD WHOM INTERVENTIONIST WATCHDOG CLAIMS MADE IN EACH PAPER	130
FIGURE 6. 3 PERCENTAGE OF THE OBJECT TOWARD WHOM DETACHED WATCHDOG CLAIMS MADE IN EACH PAPER	132
FIGURE 6. 4 PRESENCE OF INDICATORS OF THE INTERVENTIONIST ROLE SPLIT BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020	138
FIGURE 6. 5 PRESENCE OF INDICATORS OF THE CIVIC ROLE IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF NEWS STORIES SPLIT BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020	144
FIGURE 6. 6 PRESENCE OF INDICATORS OF THE CIVIC EDUCATOR SPLIT BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020	144
FIGURE 6. 7 PRESENCE OF CIVIC AGENT INDICATORS SPLIT BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN 2008 AND 2020.....	145
FIGURE 7. 1 FIVE JOURNALISTIC ROLE PERFORMANCES PERFORMED BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN PRINT AND ON THEIR FACEBOOK PAGES	150
FIGURE 7. 2 FIVE JOURNALISTIC ROLE PERFORMANCES PERFORMED BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN PRINT.....	152
FIGURE 7. 3 FIVE JOURNALISTIC ROLE PERFORMANCES PERFORMED BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS ON THEIR FACEBOOK PAGES	153
FIGURE 7. 4 THE OBJECTS OF THE WATCHDOG ROLE PERFORMED BY THE FOUR NEWSPAPERS IN PRINT AND ON THEIR FACEBOOK PAGES	160
FIGURE 7. 5 THE AVERAGE SCORE OF TWO DIMENSIONS IN THE CIVIL ROLE IN PRINT AND ON THEIR FACEBOOK PAGES	167
FIGURE 8. 1 THE DEGREE TO WHICH SENIOR AND JUNIOR JOURNALISTS FEEL THE DESCRIPTION IS TRUE IN FOUR INDICATORS.....	183

List of Abbreviations

CCP	Chinese Community Party
DPP	Democratic Progress Party
FB	Facebook
KPI	Key Performance Index
KMT	Kuomintang
KOL	Key opinion leaders
ROC	Republic of China
PFP	People First Party
PBS	Public Broadcasting System
PRC	People's Republic of China
PTS	Public Television Service
PTT	PTT Bulletin Board System
TSU	Taiwan Solidarity Union
UDN	United Daily News
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nation
U.S.	United States

Chapter 1 Introduction

In August 2022, former U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei coincided with China's launch of joint military exercises around Taiwan, increasing cross-strait tensions. Several months prior, Russia had invaded its neighbouring democratic country, Ukraine. These international conflicts highlight the importance of continuously defending freedom and democracy. Whilst investigation of the democratic function of journalism in Taiwan was already of great importance, these recent developments heighten the potential contribution of political journalism to democratic discourse. Democracy may not always be the best form of government, but its tenuous existence in Taiwan stands in contrast to the authoritarian tendencies of its much larger neighbour, China. When confronting the challenge of consolidating democracy, its pivotal role in journalism cannot be overstated.

1.1 The Aim of this Research

The central research inquiry of this thesis is how the democratic functions of journalism have been transformed following democratisation. The dramatic change brought by democratisation impacts society, including the media system, particularly press freedom. How journalism in Taiwan transformed during the shift from an authoritarian to a democratic regime has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. Empirical analyses that demonstrate changes in journalistic values and practices in transitional democracies primarily focus on the early years of the transition from 1991 to 2008. As Voltmer (2012) indicates, the emphasis is on the process of change that media systems undergo during democratisation rather than the outcome they ultimately achieve. In Taiwan, little is known about how journalism transformed after the watershed in 2008. A common assumption for so-called third-wave democracies¹ is that after adopting the normative norms from U.S. print journalism, post-authoritarian media systems would naturally become independent from the government and function as the fourth estate in society (Hallin and Mancini, 2012). However, literature has contested this notion of a universal and unidirectional implementation of a global model of journalism in all emerging democracies (McCargo, 2012; Voltmer, 2012). It is essential to bear in mind that the democratic role of the

¹ According to Huntington (1991), the third wave pertains to a global phenomenon of democratisation that took place during the late twentieth century. This wave was characterised by the simultaneous collapse of authoritarian regimes and the establishment of democratic governments in numerous countries across diverse regions, including Taiwan.

press should be consistently scrutinised even after significant political reforms have been achieved, as dysfunction in democratic journalism may still occur post-democratisation.

This thesis argues that journalism and democracy are interdependent in Taiwan's democratic transition. The quality of journalism is critical in shaping and sustaining a democratic society. When analysing the journalistic culture in Taiwan, Confucian journalism is inevitably discussed. Confucian culture has been constantly referenced as a distinctive trait in East Asian journalism by scholars (Yin, 2008; Voltmer, 2013; Lee, 2019; Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Mellado, 2021b; Wu, 2022) but has seldom been distinguished by divergent political contexts in terms of Taiwan and China. Examining whether Confucian culture remains a valid presumption in Taiwan's journalism after democratisation, and identifying which values persist and which are retired, is a crucial aim for this thesis. This leads to a discussion of developing professionalism amongst specific journalistic cultures after democratisation. Previous research examining professional roles in transitional democracies has frequently underscored the persistent tension between normative values, professional standards, and actual reporting practices (Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Mellado et al., 2020). As a former political journalist who experienced Taiwan's democratic transition first-hand, I have witnessed the struggles of establishing professionalism. This research aims to reveal the tension between normative roles and their practices as well as the causality behind the gap. Furthermore, the media system after democratisation has been significantly reconfigured by technology which also has transformed journalism across the world. Considering this, online news is included to broaden the scope of this research, encompassing not only the print edition but also online platforms, with a particular emphasis on their democratic functions.

1.2 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of nine chapters, as outlined below. Following on from this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 sets the scene by explaining Taiwan's social background and the history of its democratisation. It begins with the argument that the historical relationship with China is the cause of discrepant national identities today. Next, the changes in the media environment, the progress of media reforms, and the challenges of establishing professionalism are noted. After this, I demonstrate the thread between journalism and democracy and how both concepts are inevitably linked within Taiwan's evolving Confucian journalistic culture. This chapter concludes by examining normative theory in Taiwanese and Western contexts and indicating the theoretical approaches used in this research.

Chapter 3 reviews the literature relating to the democratic function of journalism. The chapter contains two sections. It begins with a historical discussion of the democratic functions of journalism, the criteria of democratic values in various social contexts, along with a review of research related to political knowledge. Next, the second dimension of journalism regarding journalistic role perceptions and role performance is examined. I have conducted a thorough review of significant literature on journalists' role perception, spanning from Cohen's seminal study (1963) to the recent worldwide survey conducted by Hanitzsch et al. (2019). Additionally, I explore how the enactment of role perceptions is reflected in news content through role performance. Mellado et al.'s (2020) research on journalistic role performance (JRP) serves as a critical point of reference in this study. Furthermore, I extensively discuss literature which investigates journalistic roles in Taiwan with quantitative and qualitative approaches. Throughout the review, I identify gaps and limitations in the existing literature, which leads to my main research questions at the end of each section.

Chapter 4 outlines the research design and strategy employed to study journalism and its political news output across different platforms and time periods. This dual-method approach combines quantitative and qualitative methodologies to investigate news content and to conduct interviews with journalists. The quantitative method, content analysis, involves the creation of a coding frame and ranking system to assess journalistic role performance and democratic values in news content. Inspired by Mellado's (2021a) work, a coding frame tailored to Taiwanese journalism is established to evaluate the enactment of role perceptions in news content. Additionally, indicators are developed to measure three democratic values criteria: diversity, transparency, and partisan bias. The research design includes a longitudinal analysis comparing two time points and a comparison of political news across two platforms, newspapers, and their Facebook pages. The qualitative method, through in-depth interviews, comprises a total of twenty-three interviews with journalists from the four newspapers. Semi-structured questions are designed to gauge three dimensions of journalistic role perceptions, the significance and challenges associated with practising these roles, and the perceived influential factors affecting their implementation. Furthermore, four indicators of Confucian culture are devised to explore the Asian traits of role perceptions. This chapter offers comprehensive technical insights into various aspects, including sampling methods, data collection procedures, pilot studies conducted, assessments of inter-coder reliability, and limitations of the research design.

The empirical chapters, Chapters 5 to 8, present a threefold comparative analysis of the research findings. Chapters 5 to 7 draw upon content analysis data to comparatively analyse political news from two angles – longitudinally across time and across platforms. Chapter 8 compares data gathered from in-depth interviews with journalists drawn from across senior and junior generations. Each of these chapters incorporates reflections from the interviews with journalists to explain and contextualise the findings from the content analysis.

Chapter 5 focuses on comparing the democratic values in news published by the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020. The chapter comprehensively analyses the changes in political news quantity and quality, which is measured through an evaluation of source diversity, source transparency, and partisan bias, and compared over time. Moreover, the chapter examines the differences in news quality between the four newspapers and their evolution in the post-democratic era. By analysing the quantity and quality of news content, this chapter has identified an unpleasant trend: a reduction in the volume of political news and a slight decline in news quality after the democratic transition.

In Chapter 6, the temporal comparison of news content concentrates on investigating the roles performed in political news across the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020. The chapter comprehensively analyses five journalistic role performances performed in news articles: interventionist, watchdog, collaborator, infotainment, and civic role, as well as how the performance of these roles changes over time. Furthermore, the similarities and differences in the journalistic roles performed by each newspaper are explored. This chapter reveals the enactment of journalistic roles, presenting a relatively stable overall picture in 2008 and 2020, apart from the infotainment role. Among the four newspapers, there is a predominant emphasis on the interventionist role, followed by the watchdog role after the transitional period and relatively less concentration on performing the civic role and least of all in enactment of the collaborator. The most surprising finding is the decline in serving the infotainment role across the four newspapers, including the popular publication *Apple Daily*.

Chapter 7 focuses especially on the changes brought about by the shift from print to digital publishing by comparing political news across both platforms. The chapter explicitly examines democratic values and journalistic role performance in political news published on the four newspapers' Facebook pages, comparing them with their print counterparts in 2020, as demonstrated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. This chapter also analyses reflections on the social media platform from journalists' interviews, providing a better understanding of the variance between the platforms. Moreover, additional findings on the differences in role performance in

news content between online journalists and print journalists are presented. Overall, political news shared on newspapers' Facebook pages exhibits lower levels of news quality. Moreover, the practice of the democratic function, particularly in the watchdog role, is less prominent. Interestingly, this chapter indicates a rational explanation for the observed reduction of the infotainment role in the four print newspapers whilst the market is shrinking. It is revealed that the newspapers have strategically shifted the practice of the infotainment role to their Facebook pages. This shift is driven by the fact that infotainment news aligns well with the click-driven journalism model prevalent in the online sphere. By doing so, newspapers aim to generate online profits and compensate for the financial deficits faced by their organisations in the print sector.

Chapter 8 undertakes a comparative analysis of the role perceptions of senior and junior political journalists. Indicators specifically developed to investigate Confucian journalistic culture are used to explore the unique context of transformations in Taiwanese journalism. The chapter explores how Taiwanese journalists perceive their role in three dimensions including interventionism, power-distance and market-orientation and their generational variation. The result shows that significant variances between senior and junior generations lie in the traits of Confucian culture as well as the interventionist role. The ranking of how journalists perceive the importance of each journalistic role and the difficulty of practising each role is discussed in-depth. The chapter concludes with the importance of influential factors which journalists perceived in practising their roles. This chapter discovers that the role perception of Taiwanese journalists is contingent and dynamic, influenced by various contextual factors such as the news genre, the favour of the ruling party, and the platform on which they serve.

The thesis concludes with Chapter 9, reflecting on the content analysis results and journalists' interviews overall. First, the key findings from the three comparative analyses – longitudinal, across platforms, and across generations of journalists - are interpreted and discussed. Subsequently, the discussion focuses on the changing role of print journalism after democratic transition from three aspects: market-structure, partisanship, and professionalism. Next, I reveal the crisis of print journalism's democratic functions. Based on the research findings, the compelling conclusion drawn in this chapter is that the democratic function of journalism in Taiwan is undergoing a transformation, resulting in a hybrid journalism in the print and online platforms. U.S. professionalism in terms of the normative norm in newspapers are transformed to fit Taiwan's partisan context. I then conclude that following the democratic transition, the media market underwent a significant transformation, leading to click-driven news in online

platforms alongside an intensified display of partisan bias. These changes have had a constraining effect on journalistic autonomy and led to a compromised level of independence for journalists and to being detrimental for democracy. Finally, the limitations of the thesis are discussed, and suggestions for future studies are provided.

Chapter 2 Background

2.1 Introduction

Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), is located in the Western Pacific Ocean, and is separated from the south-eastern coast of China (PRC) by the Taiwanese Strait. As an immigrant society with blended cultures, including Chinese, Japanese, Taiwanese, and aboriginal cultures, Taiwan has peacefully transitioned from an authoritarian regime to a democratic country. Since the first democratic election in 1996, free and fair presidential elections have been held every four years, and in 2000 and 2008 two successful parties alternated: in 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took office, breaking the Chinese Nationalist Party's (Kuomintang [KMT]) one-party rule. Until 2008, when the KMT returned to power, according to Huntington's (1991) 'two-times turnover' theory, the country entered a period of consolidation. This peaceful power shift continued in 2016 when the DPP returned to power and successfully won the election in 2020. As the 2024 presidential election approaches, Taiwan has instilled confidence in the peaceful transition of power, a hallmark of its consolidating democracy. Since democratisation, the government's legitimacy reaffirmed through electoral success, has been fortified by a democratically crafted legal system. This has facilitated the pursuit of policies to foster a range of reforms and enhance the democratic framework, serving as the bedrock for Taiwan's democracy.

After democratisation, the threat of China, diverse national identities, factional politics entangled with plutocracy, and the KMT party-state system are considered latent risks for a democratic retreat in Taiwan. Particularly, China's influence could be critical to democratic consolidation. When the pro-unification KMT returned to power in 2008, the government launched a series of cross-strait negotiations and signed agreements with China to boost the economy. However, this led to the DPP criticising the country's over-dependence on China, thus arousing public doubts and distrust toward the KMT. When economic integration, with the political purpose of reunifying Taiwan, was declared by the Chinese government, the Taiwanese gradually became aware of the risk of economic cooperation. In 2016, when President Tsai Ing-Wen (DPP) took office, China unilaterally ceased official interaction with Taiwan's government. Since 2020, during DPP's second term, relations have become extremely strained, resulting in Taiwan becoming a conflict hot spot due to continuous military exercises launched by China in the Taiwan Strait. Although Tsai's government asserted their cross-strait

policy is to maintain the status quo without provocation, China is argued to be continually suppressing Taiwan, notably when Taiwan received support from democratic allies.

Against this backdrop, investigating the democratic function of journalism in Taiwan has become of great importance, with recent developments heightening the potential contribution of political journalism to democratic discourse. As Voltmer (2013) notes, the transformation of post-authoritarian journalism is embedded in political, economic, and cultural environment changes. My research adopts a de-Westernised approach to investigate how journalism and democratic functions transform in an Asian new democracy where Western studies conventionally believe that a so-called "Confucian culture" pervasively influences journalism.

This thesis delves into the perceptions of journalistic roles in Taiwan within the broader Asian context, often characterised by values such as obedience to authority, the maintenance of social harmony, and contributions to the state's development. Prior research has frequently linked these values to Confucian influence (Yin, 2008; Voltmer, 2013; Lee, 2019; Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Mellado, 2021; Wu, 2022). However, it is crucial to acknowledge the diverse political and economic circumstances across Asian countries, which can render generalisations problematic, especially when considering Taiwan (refer to Chapter 8). This study specifically concentrates on Confucian culture in Taiwan and formulates four statements to gauge its impact on journalistic roles. I challenge broad assumptions and underscore the significance of context-specific research, highlighting Taiwan as a unique case in examining journalism with Confucian culture.

The de-Westernisation approach avoids assuming that democracy is a prerequisite for journalism and considers that in authoritarian and transitional democracies, journalism may be practised either as a propaganda tool or with a high degree of self-censorship (Zelizer, 2013). In this chapter, I demonstrate how journalism and democracy are inevitably linked in Taiwan's context. In the following sections, I start with the historical background, along with the changes in politics and media environment, followed by the relationship between journalism and democracy, and conclude with the theoretical background of de-Westernising research in a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017).

2.2 The Historical Background of Democratisation in Taiwan

Like every post-authoritarian country, preventing democracy from retreating is a vital prerequisite for Taiwan. Notably, China's expanding influence has overshadowed Taiwan's democracy; its claim of Taiwan as one province of China and the perception of Taiwanese

identity as inherently Chinese has fuelled this. The complicated relationship between Taiwan and China is deeply interwoven into the political and media system. To establish the reasons for this entanglement, the historical context and the evolution of its society should be elaborated upon.

2.2.1 The Relationship Between Taiwan and China

Taiwan's complex history is rooted in its transition between various governance entities. Originally part of Qing China, Taiwan came under Japanese rule in 1895 after the Treaty of Shimonoseki. After World War II, it was returned to the Republic of China (ROC.), established by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang [KMT]) following the overthrow of the Qing monarchy in 1945 (Tsai, 2007). During this time, mainland China experienced a civil war between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1949, the ROC lost the civil war and retreated to Taiwan, using it as a base for continued resistance against the CCP in mainland China. This marked the beginning of Taiwan's thirty-eight-year authoritarian rule under the KMT from 1949 to 1987, setting the stage for today's complex cross-strait relationship. In 1949, the CCP established the People's Republic of China (PRC), which replaced the ROC as the representative of China in the United Nations in 1971. Consequently, the PRC claims Taiwan as part of its territory, considering it as "occupied" by the KMT. From the perspective of the ruling KMT in the ROC., their territory and sovereignty still encompass mainland China despite their administrative control being limited to Taiwan. This historical context underpins the intricate dynamics of the Taiwan-China relationship.

The cross-strait relationship was deeply embedded in specific international politics during the Cold War (1947-1991). The U.S., in its fight against the spread of Communism, supported the ROC by endorsing its legitimacy and providing military and financial assistance (Masahiro, 2014). However, as the U.S. moved toward normalising diplomatic relations with the PRC, the ROC lost its official representative status at the UN in 1971 (Lee, 1993; Masahiro, 2014). Subsequently, tensions in the cross-strait relationship remained high due to the "one China principle" asserted by the PRC. China has consistently used both military threats and economic incentives to influence Taiwan. While military threats aim to discourage Taiwan's pursuit of independence, economic incentives seek to gain support for reunification with China. However, the ultimate objective remains the same: achieving the ambition of unifying Taiwan. With Xi Jinping's call for the great revival of the Chinese nation after the 20th Communist Party

Congress in 2022, his third-term agenda undoubtedly includes the goal of Taiwan's reunification as part of his Chinese Dream.

2.2.2 The Conflict and Discrepancy of Political Ideologies

Apart from the external influences from China, an internal risk to democratic consolidation in Taiwan is the issue of discrepant national identities, which is also closely tied to China. The complicated history of relations with China has given rise to two distinct political ideologies in Taiwan, unlike the traditional left-right ideological spectrum in Western societies – unification and independence (Hsiao and Cheng, 2014). Hence, the ideologies of Taiwan's political parties are defined by their expectations for future relations with China, both of which extend to attitudes toward China. These divergent ideologies are closely associated with national identity, specifically whether individuals identify as Taiwanese or Chinese. This differential is not a free choice, which is not the same as left or right in the Western social context. The issue of national identity in Taiwan is influenced by various factors, including internal elements such as ethnicity, determined by family origins, and external factors such as the ruling parties' ideologies imparted through education. Whether individuals identify as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both has been addressed through longitudinal surveys conducted by academic institution, National Chengchi University (NCCU) since 1992. These surveys aim to capture the evolving dynamics of both ethnic and national identity. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the development of these dual national identities, it is imperative to delve into the origins of their associated ethnic identities and examine how they intersect with the political landscape and affiliations.

2.2.2.1 Ethnic Identities- Mainlanders vs Native Taiwanese

The two ethnic-based groups in Taiwan can be divided into the following historically defined categories: the period before and after the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Historically, Taiwan is a migratory society composed of aboriginal groups that had lived on the island since the 10th century, and those of Han ethnicity, mostly from ancient China, who arrived in the 18th century. Also, the people of Taiwan experienced fifty years of Japanese colonisation (1895-1945), during which time aboriginal and Hans had inter-mixed and became known as "native Taiwanese". When the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, they brought with them 1.3 million refugees from various Chinese provinces, and these became known as "mainlanders" (Tsai, 2007:9). As a minority group (15%), the KMT regime started to govern the majority of

native Taiwanese (85%). The barriers between the two groups, such as different languages (Japanese as the official language for fifty years in Taiwan), became latent factors leading to pervasive conflict. Moreover, the KMT government's unequal treatment of and discrimination toward native Taiwanese caused a sharp cleavage between the two ethnic groups. When the KMT began governing Taiwan in 1945, a combination of factors including governmental corruption, inferior administration, severe economic inflation, and impartial policies toward mainlanders and native Taiwanese sparked significant discontent. This discontent heightened tension between the two groups, culminating in the anti-government uprising on February 28, 1947, known as the 228 Incident². The aftermath of the 228 Incident saw a period of extensive suppression and killings of intellectuals and ordinary people, mostly native Taiwanese, known as the White Terror Period (Wu and Cheng, 2011). In response, the KMT imposed martial law to consolidate its power as a one-party state and suppress any dissenting voices.

During its authoritarian regime, the KMT, representing mainlanders, held exclusive control over political power and social resources (Wu, 2002). To ensure the privileged status of mainlanders, the KMT implemented policies granting them higher-level positions in political, educational, and cultural institutions (Masahiro, 2014). Noticeably, newspapers run by mainlanders, such as United Daily News and China Times, known as the "Big Two", enjoyed preferential treatment, including economic subsidies and government subscriptions. During the pre-1947 period, Taiwanese newspapers and journalists faced severe censorship, leading to a wave of closures of locally run newspapers (Lu, 2012). Additionally, Taiwanese journalists were often labelled as anti-government or aligned to communists, resulting in the departure of many Taiwanese intellectuals from such publications.

Chinese cultural imperialism, intertwined with Confucianism promoted by the party-state regime, played a significant role during the martial law period (1949-1978). While, during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the CCP in mainland China was critiquing and dismantling traditional Chinese culture, the KMT government in Taiwan launched the Chinese Cultural Renaissance movement to emphasise the orthodoxy of Chinese culture, which was preserved by the ROC. Thus, the KMT imposed Confucianism as the core of Chinese culture through the mandatory school curriculum, making it Taiwan's sole official culture. This approach resulted in the suppression of local cultures and native languages, by associating Confucianism with

² The KMT sent troops from mainland China to suppress the opposition voices. Two years later, the KMT was defeated by the CCP and retreated to Taiwan.

Chinese identity, authoritarianism, and KMT's Chinese cultural imperialism, which was a view opposed by many Taiwanese democratic activists (Fetzer and Soper, 2013).

Due to government interventionism, mainlanders dominated the journalistic field, particularly broadcasters. Consequently, by 1996, the proportion of journalists from ethnic groups was one native Taiwanese among ten mainlanders. Although ethnic identity does not necessarily dictate political stance, the composition of journalists at the managerial level often mirrored each newspaper's political stance. For instance, in 2000, *China Times* and *UDN*, where mainlanders, occupied the higher positions (65.6% and 82%, respectively), while the Taiwanese newspaper *Liberty Times* had only 25% of mainlanders as managers (Lu, 2012).

2.2.2.2 National identities- being Taiwanese or Chinese

After democratisation, the tension between ethnic groups gradually transformed into divergent national identities. Taiwanese scholars noted that, after democratisation, the conflict of national identities, regarding whether people see themselves as Taiwanese or Chinese, emerged as a vital political issue (Wu, 2002; Wu, 2005; Tsai, 2007; Wang, 2008). Wu (2002) indicated that mainlanders and native Taiwanese, the two main ethnic groups, seemed to have been fully integrated into society over the fifty years since 1949. However, importantly, this integration did not include the political field. The new imagination of Taiwanese identity emerged in the society where native Taiwanese remain the majority, but this may have been seen to be a threat to replace the old Chinese identity. Thus, the rise of a new identity has caused political distrust toward mainlanders among the Taiwanese. Their distrust stems from concerns regarding KMT and its supporters who associate the ethnic identity with China, while the Chinese government asserts that the recognition of Chinese identity is equivalent to acknowledging that the Taiwanese belong to the singular country known as the PRC.

Since 2008, the general trend shows that the number with Taiwanese identity has not only risen but has surpassed that of Chinese identity (Wu, 2005; NCCU, 2022). According to the longitudinal survey of National Chengchi University (NCCH), the changes in Taiwanese and Chinese identities had two turning points corresponding to the landmarks of democratisation in Taiwan. Before democratisation, in Taiwan, individuals who identified themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese comprised the highest percentage at 46.4%, followed by those who identified solely as Chinese at 45.5%, and those who identified solely as Taiwanese at 17.6%. Approximately 10.5% did not respond. In 1995, however, a pivotal moment occurred as, for the first time, those who identified themselves as Taiwanese (25.0%) surpassed those who

declared a Chinese identity (20.7%). The majority of individuals identified themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese (47%), while 7.3% did not respond.

The inauguration of a more openly hostile period, during which China conducted a series of missile tests near Taiwan³, further consolidated Taiwanese identity. The gap continued to widen until the second turning point in 2008 when the KMT was elected to power, thus proving the second-party alternation. In 2008, Taiwanese identity emerged as the predominant identity, surpassing those who identified themselves with both Taiwanese and Chinese identities. The margin was significant, with 48.4% embracing a Taiwanese identity, compared to 43.1% identifying with both. The percentage of individuals identifying solely as Chinese dropped to 4.5%, while 4.0% did not respond. However, after 2008, with the KMT back in power, its China-centric economic policies increased its dependency on China, arousing greater public concern. In 2013 the KMT government signed the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade and Services with China, which the Legislative Yuan blocked. This dispute, which was related to the treaty's content and the ratification process, also caused a public protest leading to the Sunflower student movement in 2014; the Legislative Yuan was occupied, effectively delaying the Treaty's ratification for nearly a month. Consequently, due to the social upheaval and the concern about the country leaning toward China, the KMT lost the 2016 presidential election, meaning the treaty was never ratified.

Meanwhile, after 2008, the number of people declaring Taiwanese identity continued to grow, increasing from 48.4% in 2008 to 62.3% in 2021, while people declaring both Taiwanese and Chinese identities fell from 43.1% to 31.7% and Chinese-only identities fell to only 2.8%. These changes in perceived national identities, up to the 2008 turning point, when Taiwan consolidated democracy, seemed to closely reflect this progress, when those perceiving themselves to be Taiwanese had become dominant. However, the relationship between national identities and the future of the country, in terms of unification versus independence, was equally based on more pragmatic grounds. According to the NCCH survey, "maintain the status quo and decide the issue at a later date" seemed the dominant view (35.8% in 2008, falling to 28.4% in 2021). This view was followed by "maintain the status quo indefinitely" (21.5% in 2008, rising to 27.3% in 2021). The third-placed view was to "maintain the status quo but move toward independence" (16% in 2008, rising to 25.1% in 2021). These results indicate that

³ In 1995, an unofficial visit by President Lee, who delivered a speech at Cornell University, resulted in the Chinese government deeming it to threaten its one-China prim. Additionally, Taiwan stated that it was going to hold its first direct presidential election, which also proved to be unacceptable to China.

national identities cannot be directly equated with either pro-unification or pro-independence sentiments. The growth of Taiwanese identity, not directly translating into increased support for independence, can be attributed to the military threat posed by China (Hsueh, 2016).

2.2.2.3 National identities and political parties

The relationship between national identity and political ideology is important to understand political partisanship in Taiwan. Wu (2005) suggests that the different national identities are the only boundary of the political parties in Taiwan. Discussing the historical background of divergent national identities should link back to the development of political parties. The democratisation of Taiwan could not neglect the contribution of democratic activists known as Dang Wai⁴ activists (outside the KMT party). A year after martial law was lifted, Dang Wai activists organised the major opposition party, as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). DPP champions Taiwanese nationalism, which emphasises Taiwanese identity and has the goal of Taiwan's independence. Their party platform states that Taiwan is an independent and sovereign country whose sovereignty does not include mainland China. By contrast, the KMT represents Chinese nationalism, which emphasises Chinese identity and whose goal is unity with China. According to the KMT's platform, it should establish the ROC as a liberal, democratic, and unified country. Consequently, when KMT and DPP ruled the government, their distinct national identities could be implemented in their policies. For instance, the DPP government started a de-Sinicization policy in 2007 to rename state-owned enterprises, such as changing the name of the country from ROC to Taiwan. When KMT returned to power in 2008, the government immediately restored it. There are also minor political parties, such as the People First Party (PFP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which took extreme political stances on unification and independence; however, they usually secure only a relatively few seats in the Legislative Yuan. After 2008, Taiwan gradually formed a two-party system due to the reformation of the voting system as a single-district two-vote (mixed member system). This becomes obvious in the seven Presidential elections in which the candidates of two major parties, KMT and DPP, have ruled the country in turn.

2.2.3 The Media Environment

⁴ Lee (1993) indicated that due to martial law prohibiting the formation of new political parties, Dang Wai refers to individuals who opted to remain informally unaffiliated (to avoid persecution) and distance themselves from the Kuomintang (KMT).

Along with the democratisation process, the media environment has also been reshaped by governmental reforms. According to Sullivan et al. (2018), the first wave occurred after the end of martial law in 1987 and extended until 2000. During this period, the KMT government deregulated the media market as part of its constitutional reforms. While deregulation may facilitate democratisation, it also has other long-term effects on the media system. Lin (2008) noted that the KMT government had already created a monopolised structure in newspapers, dominated by the "Big Two", *UDN*, and *China Times*, before deregulation. By doing this, KMT cemented the speech market in which the newspapers with political allegiance could dominate after democratisation. The result was that small-scale newspapers struggled to survive in a market where the "Big Two" newspapers with the political affiliation toward the KMT dominated. This undermined external pluralism, leading to a lack of diverse voices in the media (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). For instance, due to fierce market competition, the *Independence Evening Post* was proud of its independence and played a vital role in the democratisation shutdown in the 2000s. It was also the first newspaper to draft an editorial statute to fight for editorial autonomy, although its owner refused to sign it (Lu, 2012).

The second wave of media reform occurred between 2000 and 2008, during the transitional period when DPP took office, replacing KMT. DPP introduced significant policies to protect media from political influence, including regulating media ownership in 2003 to prevent political parties, the state, and the military from directly owning media. This aimed to break the clientelism between the press and KMT, inherited from the authoritarian regime. In 2006, the public broadcasting system (PBS) was established to provide public broadcasting services, and the National Communications Commission (NCC) was created to manage commercial broadcasters. However, media reforms focused mainly on the broadcasting system, and print media continued to be driven by market forces. This market-driven approach was demonstrated by the introduction of *Apple Daily*, a popular newspaper transplanted from Hong Kong in 2003, which introduced sensationalism and paparazzi culture into Taiwan. The paper's colourful and visually attractive design, combined with its market-driven content provided by paparazzi, attracted readers, and *Apple Daily* became Taiwan's best-selling newspaper in 2008 (Ho, 2007). The paper's popularity was due to its distinct market-driven style which differed from other major newspapers traditionally dominated by specific political ideologies (Lin, 2009). *Apple Daily* was sold mainly by retail, while other newspapers relied on subscriptions.

Since 2008, the ascendancy of online platforms has emerged as a notable force shaping the media landscape in Taiwan. In recent years, Taiwanese readers have shown a gradual shift from print to online news consumption. According to a survey by the Reuters Institute in 2022, over 85% of Taiwanese now read news through online platforms, with social media being the dominant source, accounting for around 58% of readership (Lin, 2022). In contrast, traditional media, particularly print, has experienced a significant decline, dropping from 41% in 2008 to 16% in 2020. The decline in print readership has had a profound impact on advertising revenue, posing a threat to the survival of newspapers. The advertising market had grown since the beginning of democratisation, but the print share has sharply decreased, from NT 110 billion (U.S.\$37 billion) in 1996 to just NT 11 billion (U.S.\$0.36 billion) in 2020 (Lin, 2022).

As a result, many newspapers have undergone massive layoffs, resulting in a workforce shortage, especially in the reporting of local and international news. The remaining journalists face increased workloads and new demands, such as producing real-time news. To cope with the changing media landscape, newspaper companies have adopted convergence strategies across platforms to reduce production costs and amplify their political influence. Lin's (2015) interviews with journalists from four major newspapers revealed that journalists were then required to serve multiple platforms, producing online news, videos, and print news coverage.

Given that traditional media distribute their content online to boost profits, digital advertising revenue is primarily taken by news aggregators, particularly social media platforms. LINE (an instant communication platform) and Facebook (Meta), the two major social media companies, obtain more than 70% of their advertising revenues from news content provided free by publishers. In response, therefore, major publishers and academia have urged the government to learn from Australia's approach by pressing for financial compensation from these platforms; thus, holding them accountable for their impact on the media landscape (Lin, 2022).

2.2.4 The Influence of China on Taiwanese Media

Amidst the substantial decline in advertising revenue and readership, concerns have been raised about the media potentially compromising their professional integrity by accepting financial subsidies from China. According to Hallin and Mancini's (2004) theory, professionalism is contrary to instrumentalization. When the media becomes an instrument for political parties, economic organisations, or social groups in their bid to influence politics, it deviates from the profession and undermines autonomy. For instance, requirements by advertisers might conflict

with editorial autonomy to align with their profession. Accordingly, the increasing economic dependency on China contributes to the political influence after 2008. China utilises its economic force to exert political influence on the media in Taiwan (Huang, 2017; Sullivan et al., 2018; He, 2019). Huang (2017) indicates that part of the Taiwanese media has begun to self-censor to accommodate Beijing's policies and has produced biased news favouring China. China promotes its political ideology by coercing Taiwan's media capitalists into collaboration, achieved through financial incentives like advertising support, increased circulation, and market access, proven successful (Sullivan et al., 2018), along with purchasing embedded advertisements (Chang, 2011). An excellent example of economic interests from China with influence on news content is the news related to Chinese purchasing groups. After 2009, the purchasing groups frequently visited Taiwan with agreements to buy agricultural products sponsored by local governments in China. Chang (2011) finds that the newspapers *Want Want China Times* and *United Daily News* accepted embedded advertising in news content whilst the other two newspapers (*Apple Daily* and *Liberty Times*) did not.

The public discontent regarding the influence of China in the media industry accelerated after 2008 and resulted in the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement in 2012. The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement originated in a dispute over acquisitions by the *Want Want China Times Media Group*. Taiwanese businessman Tsai Eng-meng owned the newspaper *China Times*, and two broadcasters, Chung T'ien Television (CTi) and China Television Company (CTC), attempted to purchase another cable system with 23% of subscribers in Taiwan (Sullivan et al., 2018). Civil society, including university students and media scholars, participated in protesting the monopoly of the *Want Want China Times Media Group*. Against this backdrop, the acquisition application was refused. Therefore, given the latent influence of China in this enterprise, when the DPP returned to power in 2016, it started to draft a bill to prevent media monopoly, including restrictions on the ownership of multiple media forms, and requiring legal agreements to protect editorial autonomy.

2.3 Journalism and Democracy in Taiwan

In a new democracy, the relationship between politics and journalism is of essential importance. In this section, I discuss both Western and non-Western perspectives on how journalism can relate to democracy before exploring the specific relationship between Confucian culture and journalism in Taiwan.

2.3.1 Journalism and Democracy

Concerning the link between journalism and democracy, since the 1920s, Western scholars have debated the well-known disagreements emerging from the "Dewey and Lippmann debate" (Schudson, 2011; Champlin and Knoedler, 2006). The debate is historically embedded in the development of journalism in the U.S., where the relationship between democracy and journalism is related to the degree to which citizens should be involved in journalism, and who is eligible to participate. Due to the complications of modern society, Lippmann argued that it is impossible to practise direct democracy in which citizens participate and make decisions through their understanding of public affairs. Hence, society needs experts to make such complicated issues such as the economy understandable to ordinary citizens for them to make decisions. In such a way, citizens would be well informed about merely the vital issues related to those decisions.

Lippmann considered that thriving democracy depends on trained experts in government and journalism, forming an elite democracy (McQuail, 2010). His view was that the press, as an elite group, should evaluate policies and inform the public of the conclusions made by government experts. Dewey, as an advocate of civil democracy, emphasised that democracy needed all citizens to participate in the decision-making process and that the government and the press should be responsible for engaging the public in such discussions and making their own decisions. Consequently, the press should explain and analyse public issues by educating citizens to participate (Champlin and Knoedler, 2006; Schudson, 2011; Anderson, 2017). Although Lippmann and Dewey held different views about journalism's function, they recognised a close relationship between journalism and democracy. The argument about journalism and democracy has continued for an extended period, from the "Dewey and Lippmann debate" to the "Schudson and Carey debate" (Anderson, 2017). In the latter debate, Carey argues that journalism and democracy are names for the same thing. His most famous quotation is that "Journalism as a practice is unthinkable except in the context of democracy; in fact, journalism is usually understood as another name for democracy (Carey, 1997: 332)". For Carey, democracy is an intrinsic value of journalism and journalist; without democracy, journalism is merely a business, and journalists are just propagandists or entertainers (Carey, 2007). However, Schudson (2013) argues that if journalism can be defined as "the practice of periodically producing and publicly disseminating information and commentary about contemporary affairs of general public interest and importance (ibid:11-12)", it has long existed outside democracies, such as journalism in China.

2.3.2 De-Westernising Normative Press Theory: Confucianism and Democracy

From a de-Westernised perspective, some scholars argue that journalism could be critical for democracy, but democracy might not be central to journalism (Josephi, 2013; Zelizer, 2013; Hanitzsch, 2007). Zelizer (2013) criticises the notion that democracy became the centre of journalism from the First World War when the U.S. began to export democracy, which is generally assumed to be the best political regime to be adopted by other parts of the world. However, democracy is not a prerequisite for journalism; for instance, in authoritarian and transitional democracies, journalism may be practised either as a propaganda tool or with a high degree of self-censorship. Consequently, beyond the West, democracy has little relationship to journalism. Moreover, Josephi (2013) argues that the vital factor is not the political form, such as democracy matters for journalism, but journalistic autonomy and freedom of speech given to journalists and media. In Western matured democracies, journalism is independent of state intervention. Nevertheless, journalistic independence has been impacted by private commercial companies. The commercial forces may not be less threatening for autonomy than the state's intervention in other non-Western countries. Furthermore, in non-democracies, such as China, some journalists may strive for autonomy via journalistic practice to provide the news they think citizens should know, which also deserves to be considered journalism.

Extensive prior research conducted within non-Western contexts has illuminated the intricate nature of the relationship between democracy and journalism, revealing it to be far from straightforward, but rather complex and nuanced, deeply embedded within the social fabric. George (2013) emphasises the democratic core of journalism, even amidst different political regimes such as non-democratic and discrepancies between official doctrines and societal values. In China, where the press is often viewed as an instrument of propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party, investigative journalism continues to navigate the delicate balance between governmental oversight and the public's right to information, particularly concerning issues such as local government corruption (Bandurski and Hala, 2010; Tong, 2011). In other words, the watchdog role, frequently underscored as a cornerstone of democratic journalism in liberal democracies, has also been noted to operate in non-Western and non-democratic systems. In these settings, certain journalists acknowledge and adhere to this function, often at considerable personal risk when challenging authorities, although their approaches may differ from those of Western journalism practices (Bandurski and Hala, 2010; Tong, 2011; George, 2013).

In the case at issue here, journalism in Taiwan is not automatically related to democracy. The transition process for journalism is to consider that it is responsible for serving democracy; however, this must also be discussed in a cultural context. Confucian culture is widely accepted as a predominant component that distinguishes East Asian from Western societies, and this includes journalism. Whether the relationship between Confucian culture and democracy is potentially contradictory has for a long time attracted the interest of scholars (Gold, 1997; Tein, 1997; Spina et al., 2011; Fetzer and Soper, 2013). For instance, Fetzer and Soper (2013) conducted a study to compare four Asian countries with Confucian cultures, including both authoritarian and democratic regimes and concluded that Confucianism has neither a positive, nor a negative, effect on democratisation. The research showed that people in authoritarian countries, such as China and Singapore, had little interest in democratic values. However, in democratic Taiwan and South Korea, people adhering to Confucian culture had neither positive, nor negative, interest in democracy.

The debate between Confucianism and democracy has lasted for decades. This traditional political philosophy developed in ancient China was challenged by Western liberalism in the late twentieth century (C.C. Lee, 2004). Huntington (1991) implies that Confucian culture might influence democratisation, especially in China. He has not indicated that Confucian culture is a permanent obstacle for a regime to transform from an authoritarian regime to a democracy as every culture has compatible characteristics with democracy (Lee, 2006). However, the characteristics of Confucianism, such as obedience to authority and emphasis on collectivism, are considered to impede the development of democracy (Tein, 1997). Moreover, scholars point out that the complexity of the doctrines in Confucianism leads to divergent interpretations depending on which dimension is selectively emphasised (Spina et al., 2011). In other words, illiberal elements, such as social harmony and collectivism, and liberal elements, such as political accountability and tolerance of dissent, both exist in Confucianism in a sense that could advance or hinder the democratic process (ibid).

Since Confucianism is a multifaceted philosophy with illiberal and liberal elements, its relationship with democracy may be unavoidably open to interpretation. For this reason, Confucian culture should not be understood as the common trait of East Asian journalistic culture since it needs to be analysed within a particular local context. Lee (2004) indicates that Confucianism has localised within each East Asian society and its historical background. When the Confucian culture has been referred to as characteristic of East Asian journalistic culture, it implies that journalists' role perception tends to share common traits such as obeying

authority and maintaining social harmony (Yin, 2008; Voltmer, 2013). This assumption generalises that East Asian journalist as a whole perceive their role in society could be shaped by the Confucian culture in the given country. However, the relevance of Confucian culture in Taiwan may not necessarily be identical to its role elsewhere in East Asia. For instance, Confucianism can be observed in the development of the ideology of the *Three Principles of the People* found by the father of the nation, the founder of KMT, Sun Yat-Sen. He recognised the inherent moral values and political philosophy of Confucianism and viewed it as an effective force to consolidate Chinese nationalism. In the authoritarian period, the KMT government adopted Confucianism as a state ideology to legitimise its authority and exercise social control. This ideological influence extended to journalism in terms of shaping journalistic culture.

2.3.3 Journalistic Culture in Taiwan

Historical context: Confucian culture in journalism

Taiwan is fertile soil to explore the transformation of Confucianism in the journalistic field since Taiwan has transformed from an authoritarian, one-party dominant regime to a new democracy. Taiwanese scholars suggest that Confucian culture integrated into journalism developed in the specific historical context in mainland China. From 1912 to 1949, the Republic of China (ROC) still has the sovereignty of current mainland China and Taiwan. Confucian culture as a vital element of Chinese tradition proposed that intellectuals should involve in political debate and devote themselves to the country. The best way is to publish newspapers or become a journalist (Lee, 2019). The intellectuals of ROC in mainland China express their political views and patriotism through newspapers and periodicals known as the phase of Confucian literati-run newspapers, which also introduced western journalistic professionalism and western philosophies such as liberalism. For instance, the newspaper *Ta Kung Pao* found in 1902 is considered as the practice of Confucian journalism in ROC ruled mainland China before 1949 (ibid). During this period, the journalistic ethos was characterised by a spontaneous dedication to serving the country and prioritizing the public interest over profit, which was the primary purpose of running newspapers. These values are regarded as traditional core in Confucian journalistic culture within this research.

The ROC's newspaper industry characterised as Confucian journalism emerged in mainland China after overthrowing the Qing dynasty government. This version of Confucian journalism is adopted by journalists themselves, but the version of Taiwan's Confucian journalism manifests a unique complexion, having been substantially influenced by the authoritarian governance of the Kuomintang (KMT) party. After 1949, the KMT retreated to Taiwan and built up an authoritarian government. Since then, Confucian culture has been imposed by the state as an officially dominant ideology, through compulsory education in terms of curriculum design (Hung, 2015). This aims to remove the influence from more than half a century of Japanese rule and to enhance Chinese cultural identity (Huang, 2013). In journalistic field, Confucian journalism has been transformed as an instrument to justify their endorsement on the mainlanders' newspapers by claiming their founder as so-called Confucian literati. The KMT government imposed the press ban to suppress the local and Taiwanese papers while selectively offer political and economic profits for '*China Times*' and '*UDN*', two private newspapers found by mainlanders, to exchange their royalty, which formed a "Patron-Client relationship" (Lee, 1993; Lin, 2004; Lu, 2010). Against this backdrop, the founders asserted their roles as Confucian literati by publishing newspapers to save the country, while facilitating the KMT to claim inheritance of the orthodoxy of Chinese Confucian journalism."

Chiu (2014) indicates that Taiwan has hybrid journalistic culture, including "Confucian tradition" and "Taiwanese tradition". The former deemed as in favour of authoritarian regimes. The latter is believed as closer to liberal professionalism. Taiwanese tradition emerged because Taiwanese intellectuals introduced Western liberalism against Japan's colonisation. In this historical context, although Confucian and Taiwanese traditions may have divergent characteristics, the two traditions both imply that journalism has the responsibility to save the country and ethnicity. It related to the nationalism in which the definition of country and ethnicity might differ for Confucian and Taiwanese tradition (ibid:121). The former represents that Chinese journalism against imperialism before 1949 and Communist after 1949 might self-limited its autonomy to assist the propaganda. The latter was Taiwanese against the Japanese colonialism in the journalistic field, in which journalists criticise the colonists and the powerholders to save the country. However, because of the crucial suppression by the authoritarian KMT party, Taiwanese tradition was almost extinct after 228 massacres in 1947.

The foundational principles of Confucian journalism, which predated the Kuomintang (KMT) retreat to Taiwan, underwent a significant transformation and reinterpretation under the authoritarian regime. This transformation was orchestrated to serve the regime's objectives of

societal control while also favouring media outlets that aligned with its ideological stance. KMT emphasised Confucian journalistic culture in Taiwan during the authoritarian period with an aim to consolidate its legitimacy. At the same time, Western journalistic professionalism was introduced in the 1950s, emphasising values such as neutrality and objectivity. The core value of the U.S. professionalism, such as autonomy, was modified to fit the authoritarian regime, emphasising journalists' assistance to the country rather than their independence from external influences (Su, 2018). This exemplifies the state's intervention in journalism, where the imposition of Confucian culture served to mold Western professionalism to align with an authoritarian context. However, after democratization, the journalistic culture has gradually diverged from the confines of imposed Confucian culture. Considering the gradual nature of the transformation in journalistic culture, this research will delve into the enduring elements of the state-imposed Confucian culture, even as journalists and news organizations have moved beyond that era.

2.4 Normative theory – looking for the standards for journalism.

Normative theories are crucial in setting journalistic standards, especially during transitional periods. The classic normative theory, *Four Theories of The Press* (Siebert et al., 1956), defines four typical state-press relationships based on different political systems. However, it is criticised as oversimplified (Christians et al., 2009; McQuail, 2010) and difficult to apply to non-Western countries like Taiwan (Lee, 1975). Lee's (1975) *Three Principles of the People theory Model* in journalism offers a specific normative model for Taiwan based on Sun Yat-Sen's Three Principles of the People philosophy. Sun Yat-Sen's philosophy integrated Confucianism with the concepts derived from U.S. constitutional liberalism such as '*The nation should be of the people, by the people, and for the people*'. Lee's three *Principles of the People theory* in journalism emphasises the role of journalism in supporting the country's development but lacks empirical studies and is limited to the authoritarian context. After democratisation, Taiwanese scholars have mainly focused on locating Taiwan's media system within Western normative theories rather than developing a new paradigm by which to establish their own evaluative criteria for understanding what counts as "good journalism."

2.4.1 The Western Theoretic Approach- the Media System Theory

Hallin and Mancini's three media systems (2004) use the following four dimensions: (i) the structure of media markets, (ii) political parallelism, (iii) journalistic professionalism, and (iv) the state's role, to provide a typology of different types of media systems and their

characteristics. The three categories of media systems are, (i) the Liberal Model, (ii) the Democratic Corporatist Model, and (iii) the Polarised Pluralist Model. The liberal model is characterized by a professional and commercialised press, which is relatively independent and seeks to provide objective and balanced coverage of public affairs. The democratic corporatist model features a close relationship between the media, the government, and interest groups, with the media playing a role in the consensus-building process. The polarised pluralist model, meanwhile, is characterised by a highly partisan press that reflects and reinforces deep social and political divisions in society.

Hallin and Mancini's three media systems theory faces challenges of a lack of perspective outside the Western perspective. Most criticism focuses on their research objectives and the assumption of homogeneity among media systems. Also, some scholars challenge them because the Western-based theory may be difficult to apply to non-Western countries, and the assumption that all media systems may converge to the liberal model neglects the influence of the countries (McCargo, 2012; Voltmer, 2012; McQuail, 2010; Norris, 2009; Yin, 2008). Both Voltmer and McCargo argue that those Asian countries that have different political regimes and cultures cannot be categorised in the Polarised Pluralist Model, which Hallin and Mancini (2004) describe as the most suitable one for Asian countries. In this model, the system has relatively weak commercial media, lower professionalism, higher state intervention, and high political parallelism. In 2012, Hallin and Mancini published another book, which went beyond the Western model by looking at the media systems outside the West, such as transitional democracies and non-democracies. In this, they categorised Taiwan as a transitional democracy. Also in 2012, Voltmer described Taiwan as a one-party predominance transitional democracy as it had been ruled by the same party since becoming a transitional democracy. During a transitional period, the role of media, she states, is to improve the development of a country and assist its government. However, as described earlier, after the second party alternation in 2008, Taiwan's democracy entered a more consolidated period. The characteristics of the four dimensions of the media system in transitional democracies – a state-media-controlled partisanship, shaped by personal alliances and clientelism, with a journalistic profession influenced by a Confucian culture – may have been transformed over time.

The Western democratic function of media may serve as a reference for news democracy, but its applicability needs to be discussed in terms of each country's social context and democratic process (Christians et al., 2009). Therefore, specific media functions may require greater emphasis. McCargo (2014) investigated journalism in Thailand and suggested that new

democracies in Asia bypassed the phase of forming a political and media system by transitioning from an authoritarian to a hybrid form of governance within hybrid media structures. Furthermore, Voltmer (2014) studied transitional democracies and found that media can accelerate the breakdown of authority by advocating social changes. In transitional democracies, the media's role is involved in conflicts, transforming from an instrument of autocratic power to an independent voice in political debates (Voltmer, 2006:2).

2.4.2 The hybrid media system in Taiwan

Scholars hold differing opinions about Taiwan's normative journalistic status (Voltmer, 2008; Yin, 2008; Lee, 2009; Chen, 2011; McCargo, 2012). However, there remains a scarcity of studies examining the media system in Taiwan. Only one specific thesis has thus far explored the repositioning of Taiwan within the broader context of media systems: Taiwanese scholar Chen (2011) argues that Taiwan could not be categorised in the Polarised Pluralist Model by comparing the media systems in Taiwan and Italy. She argues that the media system in Taiwan does not belong to any of the three models proposed by Hallin and Mancini. The change in the political regime has separated media from the political institution in the sense that the media is independent of the state. However, the political discourse is dominated by two extreme political ideologies – unification and independence. The transition from partisan to neutral media is expected in the Taiwan media system when Chen (2011) concluded that the media system, after democratisation, which was located between the Polarised Pluralism Model and the Liberal Model, may be destined to lean further toward the liberal model in the future. This research is worth mentioning since Taiwan's theoretical position of the media system is rarely discussed. However, it is still constrained by the frame of Western media system models and places less emphasis on cultural influences.

During this present phase of democratic consolidation, there is a pressing need for empirical research to comprehensively understand the transformation of journalism. Such research will be crucial to gain insights into the evolving role of the media and its impact on democracy. Voltmer's (2012) take on media in transitional democracies emphasised the transformation process rather than the result of how media systems are shaped after democratisation. This avoids the challenge of using the media system to define journalism, which leads to the constrained answer of the connection with the political regime (Joseph, 2013). Voltmer's theory provides a valuable theoretic framework for my research, which will be to examine the dynamic transformation in the media system on the assumption that "media have a role to play in the consolidation of emerging democracies" (ibid:6).

Overall, both Hallin and Mancini's normative theories and Voltmer's theories, provide a useful framework for analysing the performance of journalism in different contexts by assessing its adherence to democratic principles; particularly because democratisation has reshaped the political and economic structure of the journalistic field. In this sense, the old paradigm is retired, but new normative standards, which are more appropriate to the Taiwanese context, have not yet been established.

2.4.3 Journalistic Professionalism in Taiwan

When the media and political systems changed rapidly during democratisation from 1996 to 2008, professionalism was expected to be the backbone of journalism. To discuss the journalistic profession in Taiwan, we need to trace back to the history before U.S. professionalism in print was transplanted. Before democratisation, in the party-national regime, the first journalism school at National Chengchi University (NCCU) was founded by KMT party to assist KMT government with propaganda rather than advocating democratisation. Journalism training was shaped within a clientelist structure dominated by the KMT, encompassing the media industry and journalism schools. Consequently, limited research exists on journalism and democracy during the authoritarian era. When adopting U.S. professionalism in print in ethical codes, it had to adapt to the political context and journalistic culture.

During the authoritarian period, newspapers adhered to "Chinese journalists' creeds" (Ma, 1942), which emphasised the journalistic responsibility of promoting government policies and refraining from reporting news that could hinder national development. It contains the transplanted concepts of U.S. professionalism in print that news coverage should be accurate, and commentary needs to be neutral and impartial. These principles were then applied to the print and the broadcasting industry in 1974 by the National Press Council when media was controlled by the government, known as *"The Code of Ethics for ROC Press"*, *"The Code of Ethics for ROC Radio Broadcasting"* and *"The Code of Ethics for ROC Television"* (Lee, 1974). Media might be fined by the National Press Council when violating these principles under the press law. For newspapers, the ethical codes indicate that the freedom of newspapers is to serve democracy, protect people's rights, and improve the public interest. According to *"The Code of Ethics for ROC press"*, when reporting news, the norm is to be accurate, objective, impartial, and avoid opinion. For commentaries, the norm is to be impartial while speaking for their interest on behalf of the public and never commenting on private life without relevance to the public interest.

The ethical codes had been the product of negotiation by the academic and media sectors to justify the legitimacy of journalism since the relationship between media and the government is clientelism (Liu, 2007). Hence, the U.S.'s objective norms were adopted but adjusted, to meet both authoritarian and anti-communist aims. Due to the foregoing changes, however, the National Press Council moved swiftly from a government institution to a non-government organisation, and at the time it was not given the necessary tools to force the press to abide by the ethical code.

In 1992, "*The Code of Ethics for ROC press*" preserved most of the original mandates, which included abiding by objective and impartial norms, but merely relied on each newspaper to self-regulate. Furthermore, in 1996, the Association of Taiwan Journalists established a new version of the journalists' ethical code, by emphasising their autonomy and independence, and their determination to avoid the influence of political and economic interventions. However, for news reporting, neutral and objective norms are no longer listed among the ethical codes, since more stress is placed on the public interest, accuracy, and avoiding a sensational reporting style. The reforms launched by the Association of Taiwan Journalists is deemed to have been a failure due to the lack of journalistic participation and being unable to compel media companies to respond to the issue (Liu, 2007).

In summary, Taiwan adopted the fundamental values of neutrality and objectivity from the United States, applying them uniformly across all news media forms, irrespective of their partisanship. A significant gap between ideal and practical journalism might impede the advancement of professionalism in Taiwan. Since the democratisation, professionalism in Taiwan has received little attention or theoretical development. Su (2012), a Taiwanese scholar, acknowledged the watchdog role and objective journalism as the profession's foundation, but she also highlighted that Taiwanese professionalism has evolved to create a hybrid system by drawing from the American professionalism approach and adapting it to meet local circumstances. Su's (2012) response to this blended approach is limited, as she refrains from fully elaborating on the topic and suggests that implementing Western professionalism in Taiwan may not be entirely applicable.

2.4.4 The Democratic Function of Taiwan's Journalism

During the democratisation process, not all members of the press acted as political supporters of reform. Party-owned and state-owned newspapers often served as the mouthpiece of the ruling party, KMT, while major newspapers, such as "Big Two", *UDN* and *China Times*,

tended to align with the government. As my earlier discussions suggest, journalism and democracy are not naturally bound; however, they are woven into the development of democratisation. Thus, the extant literature exploring the democratic functions of journalism mostly concentrates on the early stages of that transition.

After democratisation, Taiwanese scholars started to investigate the democratic contribution of the press in the process and reflected on its role under the authoritarian regime. Both Lin (2008) and Lee (2009) applied a historical approach to their studies and indicated that *Dang Wai* magazine, which was a non-party affiliated magazine reporting on issues and people outside KMT party circles, had emerged during the country's transition, and played a vital role in advocating liberal and democratic values. It also provided an important platform for independent thinkers, intellectuals, and activists to freely express their views, critique the government, and contribute to public discourse. This was particularly significant because the authoritarian government strictly censored such discussions by imposing a press ban.

UDN, was a conservative pro-KMT newspaper, whereas *China Times* was more tolerant of disseminating liberal values (Lee, 1995). Lu (2012) focused on the first Taiwanese evening newspaper, the *Independence Evening Post*, which was non-partisan, by investigating its political function during the democratisation process. He conducted in-depth interviews on the grounds that it was the first Taiwanese newspaper to advocate newsroom autonomy by championing editorial autonomy. Lu used qualitative historical research, a method of study that has received limited academic attention. Voltmer (2012) highlights the importance of studying Taiwan's journalism transformation following the authoritarian regime collapse. She concluded that a media system would take at least 15 to 20 years (a generation) to establish a long-term transformation. Therefore, a longitudinal, comparative study of journalism should be necessary after any democratic transition.

In conclusion, the transformation of journalism in Taiwan after democratic consolidation remains under-researched, leading to a limited understanding of its evolution in the political, economic, and technological landscape. To address this gap, I am committed to conducting a thorough investigation into the changes and challenges encountered by Taiwanese journalism.

Chapter 3 Literature Review and Research Questions

3.1 Introduction

This chapter comprises two sections: previous scholarship related to news quality and to journalistic roles. Reviewing and reflecting on previous research, and given the gaps in the scholarship to date, I deduce two main research questions with sub-questions at the end of two sections. In the first section, the literature on the democratic functions of journalism, the criteria of democratic value in various social contexts, and political knowledge as a democratic function are presented. I indicate that the criteria of democratic value in the news content after the democratic transition are rarely discussed.

In the second section, I delve into the other dimensions of journalism in terms of journalistic roles from two aspects: role perception and role performance. Given that the journalistic role is closely connected with journalistic culture, I reviewed Western studies and found that they tend to generalise Asian journalism by homogenous characteristics within their journalistic roles. I argue, instead, that journalistic roles are embedded in a specific social context and historical period, particularly in a new democracy like Taiwan. I also discuss the role perceptions which may not fully translate into news content, so the gap between ideal and practice is formulated. Lastly, journalistic autonomy is the fundamental cause of the gap, so the literature on the influential factors of journalistic autonomy is discussed.

Over the years, the perceptions of Taiwanese journalists regarding their role have been investigated through large-scale surveys based on Western theoretical frameworks. However, these surveys tend to frame the questions according to Western expectations of journalistic roles, which may not necessarily align with the interpretations in Taiwan. Moreover, there is a dearth of qualitative research examining how journalists' perceptions of their roles evolve within the broader cultural context, and how these perceptions are influenced by different platforms in the era of social media. This research intends to bridge this gap by exploring the transformation of journalists' role perception within the context of Confucian culture assumed as the main characteristic of East Asian countries. It also seeks to address the need highlighted by previous studies to reassess the extent to which individual journalists can shape news content.

3.2 The Democratic Functions of Journalism

The role of the media and its relationship to democracy has been a long-term debate. Anderson (2021) indicates that the two paradigms of maximalist and minimalist stemmed from the historical context for analysing the connection between democracy and journalism. The maximalist is that when considering journalism is closely related to political life, it should advance democracy by encouraging public dialogues and enhancing public education, such as public journalism (Christians et al., 2009; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). The other strand is the minimalist, which tends to decouple or minimise the relationship between journalism and democracy (Schudson, 2008; Zelizer, 2013; Nielsen, 2017). From the maximalist perspective, James Carey (1993) indicates that communication is at the core of democratic society while emphasising the democratic power of the press. In this strand, journalism is expected to be a disseminator and be eligible to fulfil various functions to improve democracy (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). Gurevitch and Blumler (1990) propose that the media should be responsible for monitoring the social environment, agenda setting, scrutinising the government, motivating citizens to know and participate in public affairs, being a platform for politicians' advocacy, and defending its independence from external interventions. To conceptualise the expectations as specific journalistic roles, Christians et al. (2009) maximise the democratic power of journalism from the baseline of the monitor role toward three other roles, including facilitative, radical, and collaborative roles. In the 1990s, the maximalist paradigm became pervasive in journalism studies, including within the communitarian approach, which emphasises fostering the common good in terms of public journalism, and Habermas's (1989) public sphere approach, which focuses on facilitating conversations.

For the minimalist strand, Anderson (2021) explains that the challenge of the Western perspectives of normative theories arose after the Cold War. Schudson (2013) has proposed a minimalist argument of democratic function against both the communitarian and public sphere approach. In his book *Why Democracies Need an Unlovable Press* he adopted a more liberal normative frame to suggest six or seven functions of journalism frequently assumed to serve democratic societies, including information, investigation, analysis (interpretation), social empathy, public forum, and mobilisation (advocacy). The minimalist argument concentrates on the democratic function of information rather than fostering conversation or communities. Beyond this debate, the comparative perspective has introduced the de-Westernised approach to decoupling democracy and journalism. Zelizer (2013) suggests that in non-democratic countries, the normative norm could be consolidating their political regimes or building their

countries rather than advancing democracy. To go beyond the problematic presumption of the direct link between journalism and democracy, Anderson (2021) proposes that liberalism, not democracy, is superior to journalism. His new normative theory, journalism of fear, aims to minimise cruelty, the worst outcome under democratic governments. This theory expects journalists to reveal cruelty and side with the weaker party.

In non-western and non-democratic context, George (2013) indicates that the democratic core of journalism should be recognised across political regimes where the official doctrines and ideologies may not accurately reflect social values. Scholars must acknowledge journalists' endeavours to uphold the democratic principles inherent in the predominant paradigm of their profession, particularly in societies where such values face challenges and are not endorsed in official discourse. Hence, he suggests a definition of journalism that could apply across a spectrum of political landscapes where journalists engage in their work: "Journalism is the activity of reporting and commenting on current events, using observation, investigation, and enterprise, in order to form a public that is capable of collective self-government" (ibid:493). For instance, in China, the press is officially seen as the propaganda mouthpiece of the Communist Party, to such a degree that it plays a significant role in combating local government corruption. Furthermore, the investigative journalism in China which is walking the fine line between the government and the public to fulfil its democratic function in the society (Bandurski and Hala, 2010; Tong, 2011). Tong (2011) examined two newspapers in China, the *Southern Metropolis Daily* and the *Dahe Daily*, and asserted that investigative journalism in China facilitate social reform, benefiting both the governing authorities and the public. She suggests that Chinese investigative journalism differs from its Western counterpart as it is not inherently linked to democracy. Rather, it functions within a distinct philosophical framework deeply entrenched in China's historical and cultural backdrop, such as Confucianism, liberalism, and Communist Maoism. In comparison to the semi-democratic systems, Singapore's press doesn't actively combat corruption as its official institutions are robust. Singapore has a powerful and independent anti-corruption police force (George, 2013).

The World Journalism Study (Hanitzsch et al., 2019) suggests that the democratic principle of journalism, particularly the role of monitoring government, is more emphasised among journalists in countries with greater media freedom and democratic rights. However, this does not imply that the monitoring function is exclusive to democratic regimes. Interestingly, China ranks the importance of the monitoring role at a level similar to Italy, indicating its significance even in non-democratic contexts. Therefore, delving into the intricate relationship between

democracy and journalists necessitates a nuanced approach that extends beyond the confines of liberal democracies. It is imperative to acknowledge that the democratic core of journalism transcends geographical boundaries and manifests itself in diverse forms, even outside the conventional structures of official media within non-liberal democratic societies.

3.2.1 A New Democratic Function of Journalism? Participatory via Social Media

Chapter 2 explores the often-overlooked democratic function of journalism prior to democratisation. Following the transition to democracy, Taiwanese scholars began investigating the contribution of journalism to democratisation, primarily through qualitative research methods like case studies. Subsequently, media studies on specific areas such as market-driven journalism or political bias in reporting election news are usually deduced to the possible impact on democracy. However, a systemic and in-depth examination of the democratic functions of journalism after democratisation remains minimal.

Recently, the democratic function of journalism has regained academic attention due to the impact of social media on the business model of legacy media. Lin's (2022) report on the influence of digital platforms on Taiwanese newspapers concludes that the consequences could be detrimental to journalism and democracy. The report shows that newspapers' websites rely highly on traffic directed from platforms, such as Google and Facebook (Meta): over fifty percent for the latter, and major online news providers face a 90% decrease in print edition advertisements, resulting in difficulty in sustaining news quality. Furthermore, the shrinkage of the market results in decreasing the amount of local and international journalists in newspapers which leads to a lack of diversity in the speech market. The monopoly of digital platforms has severely impacted newspapers, causing them to lose advertising profits and readership. Due to a constrained workforce, insufficient financial backing, and an unsustainable business model, newspapers may face challenges in effectively delivering high-quality news.

Lin's (2022) research shed light on the detrimental effects of traditional newspapers relying on web traffic driven by social media, highlighting concerns for news quality and democracy. She raises further questions about the degree to which Taiwanese journalism has become more democratic inside itself rather than how social media contributes to democracy. In my research, the participatory function of print journalism focuses on how citizens' voices within social media are adopted as news sources. In the quantitative survey of role perception, Liu, and Lo

(2017) found that journalists ranked encouraging citizens' participation as the third most crucial role in the era of digital media. This result implies that journalists consider that citizens are not passive receivers but positive participants. In Taiwan, news sources from social media are pervasively adopted in broadcasts and newspapers. Regarding broadcasts, by applying content analysis, Liu (2013) investigates the strategy that news channels use news sources from social media and other digital platforms. The result shows that commercial broadcasts are more likely to adopt social media news sources than public broadcasts. Moreover, 60% of the news sources adopted from social media are anonymous and attributed to netizens. The sensational elements of content within social media are more likely to be quoted in the news on television. A similar result is found in print media. Yang (2013) conducted content and discourse analysis in news from two newspapers, *UDN* and *Apple Daily*. She finds that over 80% of citations from internet users are anonymous. Over 50% of internet users' quotations did not cite the source, 11.4 % from Bulletin Board System (BBS), and only 2% from social media. The newspapers generalise the citations from netizens' opinions to represent public opinion. The emotional discourse of netizens can emphasise specific opinions which means that newspapers may cite netizens' opinions to support their own position and stance. Other studies focusing on the newspapers' online news discovered that newspapers applied social media as a marketing tool to maintain traffic levels for advertising revenue instead of enriching content or sourcing news stories to improve the public sphere (Lin, 2014; Xiao and Wang, 2018). Lin (2014) conducted a survey involving five media outlets in both China and Taiwan, employing qualitative research methods. The study revealed that Chinese media utilised a narrower range of social media platforms and had a lower number of professional editors in comparison to Western media. Even though media outlets in Taiwan demonstrated a greater inclination to embrace social media when compared to their Chinese counterparts, a commonality persisted in both regions. Social media was primarily regarded as a marketing tool in both Taiwan and China, with little direct connection to enhancing content quality or sourcing news stories.

Xiao and Wang (2018) highlighted the concerns surrounding the use of social media within the Taiwanese media landscape, particularly in relation to the Facebook news feed algorithm. Their study involved interviews with eight social media editors from both traditional newspapers and digital-only media outlets. The research revealed that the visibility of news content provided by these media outlets was largely determined by the Facebook algorithm. In this context, news media found themselves in a position where they had to balance the interests of their audience, as calculated by the Facebook algorithm, in order to maintain the necessary

levels of traffic for advertising revenue. As a result, news outlets that relied on Facebook as a promotional platform often found themselves making trade-offs between their social responsibility and their pursuit of commercial profits.

3.2.2 When the Print Moves Online: Investigating News Content Across Platforms

From 2008, there was a gradual shift in Taiwanese news consumption behaviour, with an increasing number of people turning to online platforms, especially through social media. In fact, by 2022, social media had emerged as the most used digital media source for news (Newman et al., 2022). As online news consumption increased, newspapers began offering instant news online rather than just replicating their print editions to their news website. Therefore, Hallin and Mancini (2017) call for further research on the impact of online media outlets on media systems, particularly regarding the influence of print media. In the Western context, Humprecht et al. (2022) explore the impact of online media outlets, revealing diverse outcomes, potentially either converging with or reinforcing national distinctions. Within free-market media systems, online news content might tend to become more market-oriented, emphasising soft news, sensational elements, and opinion-based content to attract traffic. This is exemplified by the Liberal Model, as seen in the United States. Conversely, in media systems aligned with the Polarised Pluralist Model, such as France, online news may prioritise deliberation and include non-journalistic voices (Benson et al., 2012; Humprecht et al., 2022). In response to Hallin and Mancini's (2017) call to research the impact of online media outlets on the media system, in this thesis, I am interested in investigating the variance of democratic functions, such as participatory, between print and social media platforms.

The development of communication technology has challenged the traditional form of news media since the first newspapers went online twenty years ago (Anderson, 2015). In the last decade, social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google have transformed online journalism once again as "the platform era" unfolds (Anderson, 2019:231). Anderson's (2013) critical work, an ethnographic study of Philadelphia media institutions, provides a close chronicle of how local newspapers adapted to the online environment. It shows that online platforms impact the print industry dramatically, from journalistic practices and the institutional work model of traditional journalism to the news ecosystem. It demonstrates how local print failed to adapt to the digital media environment, which could be an alarm for Taiwan's newspapers which still struggle to rebuild their business model in the social media

era. Moreover, the trend of citizens' voices diffusing from bloggers to alternative online platforms has become more pervasive in the journalistic routine via social media.

Given the unequal economic and technological relationship between journalism and social media platforms, the economic and professional preference of social media may reshape news value. Anderson (2019) notes that online journalism provides another media choice for advertisers and audiences but also causes global monopoly by large technology companies. Social media leads to an acceleration of market-oriented news by algorithm, which implies that the influence of readers' interests on news selection might differ from traditional values (Anderson, 2011; Napoli, 2015; Xiao and Wang, 2018; Su, 2018). Napoli (2015) explains that while legacy news organisations utilise algorithmic rules to choose what news is published on social media, the public interest may not be as important as the audience's interest.

In Taiwan, existing research on newspapers that moved online was mostly conducted before social media integration. After the social media era, large-scale online news research is mainly focused on digital content on various platforms—with little comparative study regarding print and online news simultaneously. Chang and Chen (2003) investigated news in *China Times* and found that printed papers and websites tended to share similar news content. They concluded that the e-newspaper (newspaper's online version) had been around for several years but still failed to develop its advantage. In other words, before social media was integrated into news media, print newspapers made little effort to provide various content on their websites. When social media became the main channel for news media to disseminate their news content, the strategies for newspapers to run their Facebook pages changed.

Liu (2020) conducted content analysis to examine the news content provided by newspapers, television, and digital native media on their websites and social media platforms including Facebook pages and Line News. Regarding the official websites, the results showed that only newspaper websites published more hard news (52.3%) than soft news (42.3%), while the other two media types had more than 60% soft news. Regarding their Facebook pages, all three media types featured more soft news than hard news, although the newspaper's Facebook page still posted a greater amount of hard news than the other two. This highlights newspapers as significant contributors of hard news in the online sphere. Furthermore, the proportion of interactive and emotionally charged headlines on the Facebook pages of these media types was notably higher than informative headlines, in contrast to what was observed on their websites. Liu (2020) also interviewed social media editors and found that they tended to post less politically sensitive news to prevent disputes, given that Taiwanese social media users often

hold strong political opinions. With the shift toward softer and less politicised content on social media, journalism on these platforms appears to be moving in a more market-oriented and less politically charged direction. This shift might impede citizens' access to political information and diminish their motivation to engage in public affairs, potentially undermining the state of democracy.

To build on Liu's study (2020), we understand that newspapers tend to feature more soft news and attention-grabbing headlines on their Facebook pages compared to their official websites. Yet, the quality of hard news in both print and online formats remains unexplored. Additionally, journalism is expected to fulfil various social roles, particularly as hard news plays a significant role in democracy. However, there is a gap in comparative research, with a limited focus on hard news. Beyond market orientation, other democratic functions, such as government scrutiny or advocacy of political agendas, have rarely been examined.

3.2.3 Democratic Value in News Content

Democratic value is to evaluate how news content advances democracy in the given context, in terms of news quality. Cushion (2012) explains that democratic value means "the values citizens need from the news in a healthy democracy (ibid: 50)". However, there is no standard answer because news quality is ingrained within specific social and political contexts. Bachmann et al. (2021) indicate that the interpretation of news quality inevitably interacts with the people in society, which leads to news quality as "a dynamic contingent and contested construct (ibid:23)." News quality is difficult to define and operationalise since it depends on a built-in competing idea with what is the ideal society (Bachmann et al., 2021). It is normatively connected with the political regime, such as the type of democracy (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Curran, 2011; Donsbach, 2012; Voltmer, 2006).

In the American context, the "Full News standard" and the "Burglar Alarm standard" are introduced (Zaller, 2003: 112). The Full News standard indicates the predominant standard, developing from partisan news to neutral, factor-centred news along with American journalism history. The presumption is to provide sufficient political information and non-partisan news content, making citizen-informed voters. By contrast, the Burglar Alarm standard considers that most citizens might not be so interested in politics. Media should only provide minimal information for uninterested citizens who could be exposed to main political issues. The news could be dramatic and entertaining and contain conflict elements to attract the public's attention when the issue is urgent. Zaller (2003) argues that the Burglar Alarm standard is more suitable

for mainstream news since the criteria of news quality should be realistic and necessary for citizens to make voting decisions. However, Bennett (2003) argues that Zaller's two standard have existed in current news practice. Particularly the Burglar Alarm new has fuelled by sensationalism in current market-driven news. Zaller's model fails to account for false alarms, as well as situations where a public issue exists but fails to trigger any alarm. Moreover, he suggests allowing the interaction between two Standards. That said, the Full News standard should be viewed as an unattainable ideal and reframe it as more aligned with hard news: reporting on events and public decisions impacting citizens' life. When journalists apply it to filter events, it helps reduce the likelihood of exaggerated alarms. Given that the type of democracy may have divergent standards for news quality, Strömbäck (2005) argues that news quality should be discussed in specific models of democracy. Zaller's (2003) two standards seem to originate from procedural democracy emphasising free and fair elections. The high news quality in procedural democracy may become low in deliberative democracies due to deliberative democracy amongst which normative demands embrace mobilising citizens and participation (Strömbäck, 2005).

In conclusion, news quality should reflect the ideal democracy that society is pursuing. The type of democracy in Taiwan is closer to procedure democracy rather than deliberative democracy (see Chapter 2). The normative norm, i.e. neutral and factor-centred news in journalism is profound. As a result, the sufficient political information and non-partisan news content is considered to encourage as citizen-informed voters. While democracy in Taiwan is still developing and consolidating, the standards of news quality need to be continually revised and improved.

3.2.4 Political Knowledge

Political news underpins democratic functions, such as information, investigation, advocacy, and forum, since being politically informed is core to making political decisions. Specifically, political news presumably contributes to democracy (Voltmer, 2012; Humprrecht et al., 2022) since it usually contains intensive information about the debate of policies, important political agendas, and government endeavours. As Aalber et al.'s (2010) note, "democracy functions best when its citizens are politically informed (ibid:256)", which legitimises democratic elections when citizens can make well-informed decisions. Therefore, the discussion on the democratic functions of media typically focused on political news (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990; Norris, 2009; de Vreese et al., 2017).

Research indicates that access to high-quality political news is crucial for a healthy democracy as it empowers citizens with political knowledge (Van Aelst et al., 2017; Aalberg et al., 2010; Cushion, 2012; Voltmer, 2006; Carpini and Keeter, 1993). Political knowledge could influence citizens' attitudes toward political issues, motivate them to participate in public affairs and abide by democratic rules (Galston, 2001). It is particularly critical for transitional democracies such as Taiwan to consolidate democratic institutions and develop civil societies (Voltmer, 2013). Political knowledge refers to the public's cognition of political, factual information preserved in their long-term memory (Carpini and Keeter, 1993). The assumption is that when the media provides sufficient and relevant political information, citizens could be more likely to understand public and current affairs, which may help them make informed decisions (ibid). While scholars are devoted to measuring the level of citizens' political knowledge by asking about their political, factual information, the way they access political information, in terms of news media, could be a vital influential factor. In particular, political news is the main source that contains most political procedures, current affairs, and public affairs, which are the major aspects of measuring political knowledge (Carpini and Keeter, 1993). Curran et al. (2009) investigate different media systems in Western countries, including Denmark, Finland, the UK, and the U.S., and find that the visibility of news is a strong reference to the participant's knowledge. Moreover, the media system with strong public media service provides more public affairs and international news than the market-dominated model. They are concerned that commercialisation, in terms of deregulation of the broadcasting system, could cause a drop in political information, widening the political knowledge gap among citizens.

The fact that commercialisation accelerates the emergence of multiple media platforms may impact the flow of political information. Hallin and Mancini (2004) indicate that empirical studies about the relationship between news flow and commercialisation are still without a firm conclusion. Aalberg et al. (2010) conducted a comparative survey between Liberal and Democratic Corporatist Media Systems. They found that commercialisation could be the most critical factor influencing news flow on television. In the most commercialised liberal media system, such as the U.S., the quantity of news and current affairs is the lowest on commercial TV channels. In the Democratic Corporatist media system, European countries with strong public broadcasting services provided more news and current affairs. Van Aelst et al. (2017) indicate that a higher-choice media environment poses a challenge to democracy. This challenge manifests in a decrease in the availability of political information, a decline in news

quality, and a reduction in diversity. Furthermore, this media landscape tends to become more polarised and fragmented, leading to a concentration of media ownership. Consequently, there is a risk of worsening political knowledge inequality.

Although which type of media can improve political knowledge the most is arguable, newspapers tend to be considered relatively crucial over a long period in the Western contexts. Previous studies suggest that using newspapers as the main news source may advance political knowledge more than TV watchers since the TV audience use it as an entertainment instrument (Berkowitz and Pritchard 1989; Robinson and Davis, 1990; Weaver and Drew, 1993). Regarding the increasing number of news platforms, recent research indicates that social media may hamper citizens from increasing their political knowledge (Lee, 2020; van Erkel and Van Aelst, 2021). The study suggests that people relying on social media to feed them news become less motivated to seek other information to learn about politics. However, little influence is found in those who consume news mainly via traditional media with the complementary channel of social media (Lee, 2020). A more negative result could be found in the study of people integrating social media as part of news sources which can harm the learning of daily politics. The vast volume of information on social media can result in information overload, impeding the assimilation of political knowledge (van Erkel and Van Aelst, 2021).

Unlike societies where the visibility of political news relies on public media, Taiwan's media landscape is predominantly shaped by commercial entities. Public media outlets frequently lag behind in viewership ratings with small scale of audience (Lin, 2023). Despite of this, newspapers remain a trusted source of political information for citizens, even surpassing television in terms of the level of trust they command (ibid). This trust in newspapers underscores their enduring significance in the dissemination of political news in the post-democratization era. The quantity of news provided by trustworthy media holds significance for a new democracy. Additionally, the rise of social media has transformed the media landscape, emerging as the preferred platform for news consumption among Taiwanese (Newman et al., 2022). Notably, newspapers play a pivotal role in social media, with substantial followers on their Facebook pages and a major contribution to news content. Thus, in this media system, the quantity of political news coverage becomes a crucial factor in measuring the democratic value of journalism. Moreover, in the Taiwanese context, there has been limited focus on how newspapers use social media to bolster their democratic role. In my research, I developed a set of criteria to assess the quality of news content in both print and on their Facebook pages. These are investigated through the first research question of how the

democratic value in traditional newspapers changes over time and across platforms after democratisation. Four sub-research questions are developed to investigate the quantitative and qualitative changes of news content.

RQ1: What are the democratic values of news content in Taiwanese newspapers, and how have they changed from 2008 to 2020?

- 1.1: What is the quantity of political news in newspapers from 2008 to 2020? How has it changed over time?
- 1.2: What is the quantity of political news in print and their Facebook pages? How has it changed across platforms?
- 1.3: What is the quality of political news in newspapers from 2008 to 2020? How has it changed over time?
- 1.4: What is the quality of political news in print and on their Facebook pages? How has it changed across platforms?

3.3 Journalistic Roles

The term "journalistic role" pertains to the diverse responsibilities and functions expected of journalists in their professional capacity. This concept is intricately connected to the professional norms and standards of the journalism field, which can differ based on cultural, political, and economic factors.

After democratisation, the media system of Taiwan changed dramatically, and the media seem independent of the state. Journalistic roles in this research are analysed from two aspects, i.e. journalistic role perception and role performance. First, journalistic roles are discussed in the political context to emphasise their political functions in the democratic process (Hanitzsch and Vos, 2018). Second, role performance refers to "the manifestation of professional roles in both news decisions and news outcomes that reach the public (Mellado et al., 2020:55)." Investigating journalistic role performance is a new approach to understanding how normative journalistic roles translate into news content (Mellado, 2015; Mellado et al., 2017; Hallin and Mellado, 2018; Mellado et al., 2020). The differences between role performance and role perception are reflected in the news content (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Patterson and Donsbach 1996; Van Dalen et al., 2012; Firmstone, 2023). When analysing influences on news production, journalistic role perceptions is one of the key factors (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). Furthermore, as Voltmer shows, (2012), journalism in new democracies has been struggling to

adapt in different ways, depending on local context. Accordingly, in the second section of this chapter, I will discuss the journalists' role perception, followed by their role performance.

3.3.1 Role Perception in a Global Context

In previous studies, investigating role perception by asking how journalists perceived their role in society can be traced back to Cohen's (1963) seminal study. Two typologies of American journalists, neutral and participant roles, are classified. To advance the studies about American journalists' role perceptions, Weaver and Wilhoit (1986) developed Cohen's two role types into four categories: the disseminator, the adversary, the interpreter, and the populist mobilizer.

The questionnaire created by Weaver and Wilhoit (1986) has been widely adopted to investigate journalistic roles in different countries. Weaver and his colleagues conducted longitudinal research on the journalistic role worldwide. In their *Global Journalist* (1998) and *The Global Journalist in the 21st Century* (2012), journalists in various countries are surveyed about their working conditions, perceived autonomy, and the perception of journalistic roles. In 2012 they investigated 29,000 journalists from 31 countries, including Taiwan, and the disseminator, the analyst, and the watchdog role are perceived as the three most valuable journalistic roles worldwide. The way they measure the perception of journalistic roles is to ask journalists to rate the importance of eleven indicators, such as "reporting the news accurately" (ibid:110). Most journalists agree with the importance of reporting news quickly, and fewer agreed about the importance of providing entertainment. Taiwanese scholars have collaborated within this project so that the Taiwanese journalists' role perception is discussed in the later section.

After the Cold War, de-Westernised studies called for academic attention toward non-Western societies. Hanitzsch (2007) indicates that in the studies of journalism's institutional roles explored by the questionnaire of Weaver and Willnat (1986) American journalists usually neglect that the questionnaire and even the possible answers have been shaped by the normative expectation of the western professional model. To go beyond Western perspectives of role perception, Hanitzsch suggests three dimensions for the deconstruction of journalistic roles (Hanitzsch, 2007; Hanitzsch, 2011) which "avoid the Western-centric dichotomy or oversimplification" (Zeng, 2018: 1401) with the American-styled liberal journalism tradition in various societies. Hanitzsch (2007) provides a theoretical approach to conceptualise the journalistic culture among which journalists would perceive their journalistic roles with three

measurable dimensions of journalistic roles: (i) interventionism, (ii) power distance, and (iii) market orientation. Each dimension has a positive and a negative pole for journalists to evaluate their attitude. This frame provides broader perspectives to introduce the major aspects of journalistic roles.

The interventionism dimension "reflects the extent to which journalists pursue a particular mission and promote certain values" (Hanitzsch, 2007:372). Its positive and negative poles echo Cohen's (1963) classic typologies- neutral and participant roles. The most interventional pole means that journalists are involved deeply and attempt to motivate readers. Journalists are uninvolved and detached on the negative pole and regulate themselves with objectivity, impartiality, and neutrality. Second, the power distance dimension refers to "journalists' position toward the loci of power in society" (Hanitzsch, 2007:373). In the positive pole of power distance, journalists tend to collaborate with the government or the ruling party. On the other hand, journalists who distance themselves from power tend to consider themselves watchdogs (Gans, 1979) to monitor the government. Third, the market orientation dimension "reflects the primary social focus that guides news production" (Hanitzsch, 2007:374). In the positive pole, readers become consumers and the logic of the market is superior to the public interest. In the negative pole, readers are taken as citizens while journalists provide them with the information they need for political participation. Based on three dimensions, there are four journalistic roles identified by Hanitzsch's (2011) survey of 1,800 journalists from eighteen countries. The research finds that journalists in the West tend to embrace a detached watchdog view with a high level of power distance and a low level of interventionism. By contrast, in developing, transitional and authoritarian countries, opportunist facilitators with a low level of power distance and a high level of interventionism are the prevalent culture.

Hanitzsch et al.'s (2019) *"Worlds of Journalism: Journalistic Cultures Around the Globe,"* has provided a comprehensive framework for understanding role perceptions, utilising specific indicators, and considering various influential factors, to measure the diverse journalistic cultures worldwide. In the following paragraphs, I introduce critical concepts and findings highly related to this research. Hanitzsch et al. (2019) refine the previous categories and suggest four cognitive roles, which refer to the "journalist's professional aspiration and ambition" (ibid:202): the interventionist role, the monitorial role, the collaborative role, and the accommodative role. These four role orientations stem from three dimensions. The monitorial and collaborative roles are situated in the power distance dimension. The interventionist role relates to the dimension of interventionism. The accommodative role is rooted in the dimension

of market orientation. In general, the strongest role supported by worldwide journalists is the monitorial role. The interventionist role is strong in developing countries where society is transforming. The collaborative role is strong when the level of democracy is low. Finally, the accommodative role, which emphasises attracting readers and entertaining elements, is pervasive in developed countries, particularly in the Liberal Model. However, all the general pictures have exceptions. For instance, journalists in Russia tend to embrace accommodative roles and are less interested in the collaborative role since journalists attempt to avoid political conflicts.

Hanitzsch et al. 's (2019) research shows that journalists in Asia, excluding Taiwan, and African countries, tend to support being an educator more than most Western countries. Journalists in Asian countries tend to express their interventionist role as a "change agent" (ibid:200), which is understood as a participant to advocate a specific idea or social values. In this research, Asian countries include Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, China, Bhutan, Thailand, and Indonesia. They found that in non-western countries, such as the countries in southern Asia, the collaborate role is ranked higher, and the monitorial role ranked lower due to lack of press freedom. The western countries showed the opposite pattern. This result reflects a weakness of this research: those Asian countries across diverse political systems situated in the spectrum of democracy from one pole to the other pole, such as authoritarian China, transitional democracy as Thailand and matured democracy like Japan. With Asian countries, aside from the geographic location, any generalisation of this region as one group may risk oversimplifying their political, cultural, and religious differences among which journalistic cultures are cultivated and evolved. To address the limitations of large-scale quantitative surveys used by Hanitzsch to gauge journalistic role perception and culture, Blumler (2020) recommends that qualitative interviews with journalists about their role perceptions could be a valuable addition to future research.

3.3.2 Journalistic Role in Taiwan within the Confucian Culture

Research on journalists' role perception in Taiwan can be categorised into two main approaches. One approach aligns with Western theoretical frameworks and utilises large-scale quantitative surveys. The other approach takes a qualitative and cultural perspective, involving in-depth interviews with journalists from various generations. Regarding quantitative research in Western theoretical assumptions, Taiwanese scholars offer a picture of journalists' role perceptions with the large-scale survey in 1994, 2004, and 2014 (Lo, 1998; Lo, 2012; Liu and

Lo, 2017). Over the course of twenty years, the ranking of journalistic roles has exhibited a consistent pattern, with the "information disseminator" role being the most prominent, followed by "monitorial," "interpretative," "entertainment," and "adversary" roles. This ranking has remained stable.

During the initial research phase, which coincided with the early stages of democratisation, Lo (1998) conducted a study in alignment with the research by Weaver and Wihoit (1986) on Taiwanese journalists. It is worth noting that in 1994, Taiwan was still under one-party rule, and not until 1996 that the first direct presidential election by citizens was held. Lo's (1998) research from 1994 revealed that Taiwanese journalists placed the highest value on the information dissemination function of the media. This was reflected in the importance assigned to roles such as "reporting the news accurately", "getting information to the public quickly" and "avoiding stories with unverified content," which were considered the top three roles. The next most important roles were those related to interpretation and investigation, encompassing tasks like "providing analysis of complex problems", "discussing national policy", and "investigating government claims". Third in importance was the role of providing entertainment, with indicators such as "concentrate on the widest audience" and "provide entertainment". The role of being an adversary to government and business was considered the least important.

Over a decade, Taiwan underwent three presidential elections, and another national survey of journalists took place in 2004 (Lo, 2012). During this period, market-driven journalism faced substantial criticism, particularly with the entry of the popular *Apple Daily* in 2003. The findings revealed that journalists assigned similar levels of importance to various media functions. The most significant role remained that of an information disseminator, with "reporting the news accurately" retaining its top priority, and "avoiding stories with unverified content" surpassing "delivering information to the public promptly" as the second most critical function. The order of importance for other journalistic roles remained consistent: interpretative and investigative functions were second, followed by entertaining functions and the adversary role.

As the media landscape underwent rapid changes due to advancements in communication technology, online media was included in another national survey of journalists in 2014 (Liu and Lo, 2017). Taiwanese journalists consistently ranked the role of information provider as the most important, as seen in both 2004 and 2014. The ranking of other media functions followed the same order: interpretive and investigative roles, followed by entertaining

functions and the adversary role. Notably, a new function, citizens' participation, was introduced, and it ranked below interpretive and investigative functions.

The use of Western typologies to analyse journalistic roles often overlooks the impact of political regimes and cultural contexts in various countries. This may be because major Western nations, being mature democracies, have seen little change in the role of journalists over a short timeframe. Furthermore, quantitative surveys, especially those employing American-style questionnaires with predefined options based on Western concepts of journalism's functions, may not capture subtle differences, and lack the depth provided by the social and cultural context in which the journalistic role operates. Research by Liu and Lo (2017) indicates that journalists in print and online media place a higher value on the adversary role compared to their counterparts in broadcast media. However, there is limited evidence available to discern subtle variations in role perceptions, such as those related to specific beats or differing newspaper affiliations. The lack of further exploration into how beats and specific newspapers influence these perceptions makes it challenging to explain why the perception of journalists' roles has remained stable for over three decades despite significant political changes accompanying Taiwan's transition to democracy.

The other thread of studying role perception in Taiwan is from the qualitative approach. Lin (2006), Huang (2013), and Liu (2022) investigated journalists' role after democratisation, adding more cultural context to the journalistic role. Confucian culture is frequently considered an influential factor in journalists' role perception (Huang, 2013). Lin (2006) interviewed journalists in print and broadcasters of different generations and found that the traditional generation, journalists born before 1949, emphasised the responsibility of intellectuals to save the country, which is a traditional value of Confucian culture as opposed to Western professional values. Their journalistic career was mostly concentrated during the period of authoritarianism, so journalistic autonomy, the core of Western professionalism, is not prioritised. Following the democratisation process, journalism in Taiwan was liberated from suppression and censorship. However, commercialisation trapped Taiwanese journalists under pressure from the market forces perpetuated by political power which continued to impact journalistic autonomy. Economic and political interventions have hindered journalists and the practice of journalism from adhering to the normative principles of neutrality and detachment in news content. In the transitional period, there is a perceived decline in journalistic autonomy as the government indirectly influences news content by utilising its advertising budget to penalise or reward media outlets that oppose its position.

After the transitional period, Huang (2013) conducted interviews with political journalists from various generational backgrounds. He discovered that journalists who began their careers during the authoritarian period often placed greater emphasis on Confucian culture, such as social harmony and order, in contrast to their counterparts who entered journalism after democratisation. Moreover, since the fiercely competing media environment and relatively democratic regime, Huang (2013) and Lin (2006) both find that political journalists belonging to the new generation, generally indicating those starting their career after 2000, tend to perceive themselves as labourers instead of Confucian intellectuals with social responsibility to advocate social changes. When comparing the influence of cultural factors and political regimes, studies suggest that the political regime may have a more pronounced impact. Zhu et al. (1997) conducted a comparative analysis of journalists' role perceptions in China, Taiwan, and the United States using two variables: political regime (democratic and communist countries) and cultural background (Confucian culture and Western culture). Their findings indicate that journalists in politically similar regimes, such as democratic countries (Taiwan and the U.S.), may exhibit more similar characteristics in their role perceptions than those from a similar cultural background, namely Confucian culture, in Taiwan and China. However, a notable limitation of this research is the assumption that Taiwan and China share the same Confucian cultural background. This assumption overlooks the fact that Confucian culture, as an ancient philosophy developed over thousands of years, has undergone localisation and integration with various religious, social, and cultural contexts in East Asian countries. Therefore, considering Confucian culture as a universal trait in East Asian journalism is problematic, and the interpretation of Confucian culture is unique to each specific region (C.C. Lee, 2004).

In the most recent research on journalistic role perceptions conducted by Liu (2022), a mixed methodology was adopted. She interviewed sixty journalists from newspapers, broadcasters, and digital media, comparing differences between three generations: the senior generation (1988-1999), the millennial generation (2000 to 2009), and the junior generation (after 2010). The results revealed that the senior generation emphasises their profession by resisting external pressures to protect their editorial autonomy and upholds the ideals of serving democracy and advocating social change. This study did not specifically address the influence of Confucian culture, which in previous studies underpins the sense of responsibility among intellectuals toward their nation. Furthermore, the millennial generation strives to adhere to professional norms as the fourth estate, scrutinising power. They encounter challenges in a highly

commercialised and partisanship in the media system. Due to the overcrowded media market and declining profits, journalists face lower salaries and job insecurity. During the transitional period, journalists are influenced by the partisanship in news media when attempting to uphold their professionalism. For journalists who began their careers after 2010, the major challenge is juggling multiple tasks in a digital media environment. This leads to unhealthy competition in delivering instant news across various media types, as website traffic becomes a crucial reference for attracting digital advertisements. As news media increasingly emphasise the speed and quantity of instant news, young journalists are increasingly pessimistic about the future of journalism. In Liu's (2022) research, less attention is given to the cultural factors influencing journalists' interpretation of their professional roles. The focus primarily lies on the influence of the political and media environment on journalists' perceptions, encompassing their concerns and struggles with job satisfaction and the deterioration of the profession, without specific identification of which roles are undermined and how.

Cultural factors are crucial for comprehending the journalistic role in this context, but they can be challenging to quantify and measure. In previous qualitative research (Lin, 2006; Huang 2013), the cultural factor is mentioned ambiguously as the presumption without explicitly referring to it. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the same concept can vary, even within similar political regimes. Voltmer and Wasserman (2014) conducted a qualitative study that examined six new democracies, including Taiwan. Their research involved in-depth interviews with journalists, revealing differing interpretations of democracy and press freedom. From a social constructivist perspective, they contend that the meanings of these two concepts are highly contingent since the interpretations of even the same word may vary based on the historical background and the cultural context. Notably, in the context of press freedom in Asia, important findings suggest that journalists in Korea and Taiwan may express concerns about media becoming excessively unrestricted, and the vigorous watchdog role could potentially undermine social harmony, a primary value in Asian culture. These nuanced variations are rooted in geographical politics and historical contexts. Interestingly, six new democracies from post-communist, one-party dominant, and post-colonialism all perceive that press freedom should come along with responsibility. Journalists in most new democracies express their responsibility not only to "enlighten the citizens" but also to "set the direction of our nation's future and propose a national vision" (Voltmer and Wasserman, 2014: 189). It is worth noting that Polish journalists, particularly from the older generation, express a strong sense of responsibility to promote democracy. This stems from their active participation in political

activities against the former communist regime, highlighting that the responsibility to contribute to nation-building may not be exclusive to Confucian culture but can also be found in other new democracies in the West. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of how Confucian culture, such as social harmony, is perceived and evaluated by journalists is needed. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that the various facets of Confucian culture can be interpreted differently in various East Asian countries. However, there is limited exploration of how Confucian culture is integrated into journalistic role perceptions within the Taiwanese context and how it has evolved after democratisation.

To summarise, Taiwanese journalists' perceptions of their role have been examined every decade following the country's democratisation through large-scale Western theoretical-based surveys. The Western expectation of journalistic roles frames the enclosed questionnaires, but the same concepts can be interpreted differently in Taiwan. Additionally, there has been a lack of qualitative research considering how journalists' roles are perceived in the broader cultural context over time, as well as little understanding of how journalists perceive their roles on different platforms in the social media era. This research seeks to address this gap by exploring journalists' role perception transformation within a Confucian cultural context.

3.3.3 Journalistic role performance

In the recent decade, the gap between journalists' perception and role performance has aroused academic attention since journalists' role perception may not fully translate into their actions (Tandoc et al., 2012; Mellado and Van Dalen, 2014; Mellado, 2021b). Mellado and her colleagues propose a novel approach to investigate how normative journalistic roles translate into news content in terms of journalistic role performance studies. These empirical studies analyse specific journalists' perceptions, role performance, and the gap between two dimensions (Mellado, 2015; Mellado et al., 2017; Hallin and Mellado, 2018; Mellado et al., 2020). The definition of journalistic role performance is "the manifestation of professional roles in both news decisions and news outcome that reaches the public (Mellado et al., 2020:55)". Mellado's research framework on role performance is closely linked to Hanitzsch's three dimensions of role perceptions (Mellado et al., 2020). This framework encompasses three aspects: (i) "the presence of the journalistic voice in news content," which corresponds to Hanitzsch's interventionism dimension, (ii) "the relationship between journalism and those in power," reflecting Hanitzsch's power distance dimension, and (iii) "the way journalism approaches the audience" (ibid:55), which relates to Hanitzsch's market-oriented dimension.

Then, Mellado categorised three dimensions into six journalistic role performances. The interventionist is related to the journalistic voice; the watchdog and the loyal facilitator are to locate the relationship with power holders; the service, civic, and infotainment roles are the audience approach. Applying this research frame, Mellado and her colleagues investigate the six journalistic role performances and the gap between role perception and performance (Mellado, 2021a). This first wave of the Journalistic Role Performance (JRP) has collected over 30,000 print news articles and surveyed hundreds of journalists from eighteen countries across Europe, North America, Latin America, and Asia but not including Taiwan. The political systems among these sampled countries cross democratic, transitional, and non-democratic regimes. The second wave of the JRP project conducts a comparative analysis of role performance across 365 news media outlets in 37 countries, including Taiwan. The second wave of research broadens its focus beyond newspapers to encompass news outlets across four major media platforms i.e. newspapers, television, radio, and online, and explores a diverse range of news topics rather than solely concentrating on national political coverage (Mellado et al., 2024).

I. Interventionist dimension

Mellado and her colleagues (2021a) conducted an empirical study that applied five indicators to measure the role performance of interventionists in news content, including "journalist's opinion," "interpretation", "call for action", "use of evaluative adjectives", and "use of the first person (ibid:88)". The results show that the role performance of the interventionist has significant differences across countries and cannot find a clear division among regions or political regimes (Stępińska et al.,2021). Non-democratic countries performed the highest level of interventionist role, following advanced democracies, and, surprisingly, the transitional democracies ranked the least. The finding is against the presumption that in transitional democracies or developing countries, the media assume advocacy of social changes as a political actor (Vltmer, 2006; Blumler, 2018; Hanitzsch et al., 2019). The research also finds that popular newspapers generally perform significantly stronger intervention than elite newspapers, and among the news topics, journalists express their voices mostly on political topics (Stępińska et al.,2021).

In the dimension of interventionism, Mellado's (2021a) research, to a certain degree, supports that interpretative journalism is pervasive in the U.S. since the result shows the U.S. ranks highest in interventionist role performance. Interpretative journalism is generalised in Western European countries with a higher content-related level but a lower level of the styled

interventionist. In early studies, American journalistic culture represents a neutral and fact-centred disseminator, while European tradition is closer to an interpretive and opinion-oriented role. Interpretive journalism became more pervasive after 1960 (Fink and Schudson, 2014; Esser and Umbricht, 2014). Fink and Schudson (2014) indicate that U.S. journalism is gradually transforming from neutral to more aggressive and interpretative in news stories. Journalists are more likely to analyse news in the context by themselves rather than providing fact-centred straight news, which normally relies on the government or politicians' sources for explanation. Interpretive journalism emphasises "why" among the traditional elements in news articles while less focus on "what, where, when, and who" (Salgado et al., 2017:52). This may be attributed to the complexity of news topics in contemporary society, the heightened levels of journalistic professionalism and independence, or the growing inclination toward scepticism and investigative reporting (Fink and Schudson, 2014). The transformation also reflected the long-term study of U.S. journalists' role perception, in which an apparent decline in the disseminator role accompanies a rise in the interpretive role (Weaver, 2015).

Interpretive journalism is developed in the U.S. and popularised across Western media systems. Western journalists gradually transform their role from neutral and fact-centred bystanders to interpreters who attempt to analyse and evaluate political issues in their own words (Esser and Umbricht, 2014). Esser and Umbricht (2014) applied Høyer and Pöttker's (2005) concept of news paradigm to analyse political news in terms of the "hard news paradigm". The hard news paradigm originated from U.S. journalism to pursue objectivity and a fact centred approach. Their research finds that the hard news paradigm in different media systems develops in two ways and the difference decreases over time. The first direction is the U.S. style of hard news as "information mixed with interpretation," and the second direction is the European style as "information mixed with opinion and commentaries" (Esser and Umbricht, 2014:240). For both styles, the hard news approach shows a similar trend of contextualising their news stories by increasing analysis and interpretation. Salgado et al. (2017) indicate that in sixteen countries across three media systems, interpretive journalism is found in newspapers more frequently than on TV and the least in online news, particularly for political news. According to Salgado et al.'s (2017) research, interpretive journalism is highly related to news types. In their research, the editorials, columns, and commentary articles contain 94% interpretive elements, and news stories, including reportages, portraits, and regular news, have 29% interpretive elements. They remind us that generalising the concept of interpretive journalism across diverse media systems can be problematic, as the journalistic culture can vary significantly in different national contexts.

II. Power-distance dimension

Previous literature shows that scrutinising the government and holding powerful people to account is popular in the survey of journalists' role perceptions across political regimes (Weaver and Willnat, 2012; Hanitzsch et al., 2019). In some new democracies, the extremely strong watchdog role is demonstrated as the honeymoon period at the beginning of democracy (Mellado and Van Dalen, 2017). Mellado and Van Dalen (2017) investigated Chilean newspapers during 22 years of democratic transition. They indicated that the strength of the watchdog role increased after Chile returned to democracy in the so-called honeymoon period and decreased afterwards. The result challenges the homogenisation theory which presumes that democratisation automatically leads journalism to satisfy the watchdog or civic role because of press freedom (Lauk, 2009). Hallin and Mancini (2004) suggest that transitional democracies in the Western context may converge to the Liberal Model in which a watchdog or adversary role is widely accepted. However, Chile's case has demonstrated that the watchdog and civic role are not unidirectionally and automatically developed during the democratic transition. The journalistic role performance could be more dynamic, and the changes are embedded in specific national contexts such as historical backgrounds and cultural characteristics. As for Taiwan's hybrid media system, Taiwanese journalists tend to prioritise the watchdog role over the adversary role, influenced by Confucian culture (Liu and Lo, 2017), which may also affect their news content, challenging the presumption that media systems tend to converge toward the liberal model.

III. Market-oriented and public-oriented dimension

In market-oriented and public-oriented dimensions, two major role orientations can be distinguished based on the conceptualisation of the audience as consumers or citizens (Hanitzsch, 2007; Humanes and Roses, 2021). Firstly, market orientation involves viewing the audience as consumers, and it is closely associated with commercialization, resulting in market-driven journalism (McManus, 1994). In this approach, media provides the audience with what they desire rather than what they might need, often prioritising the delivery of the most engaging content. This approach has led to a long-standing debate surrounding the balance between catering to the market and serving the public interest. Given the dual nature of media as both a political institution and an economic enterprise, the tension between commercialisation and democratic functions may intensify through market-driven journalism (Voltmer, 2013; McChesney, 2015). Second, the public orientation, taking the audience as citizens, is correlated with normative theories, such as public journalism, the public's trust

model, public sphere theory, and social responsibility (Christian et al., 2009; Schudson 1999; Siebert et al., 1956). In normative theories, the media is expected to provide sufficient information for citizens to make decisions and advocate for citizens to participate in public discussion or public affairs with the presumption that the audience is seeking meaningful information to make political decisions. Hallin and Mancini (2004) point out that public orientation is one significant pillar of professionalism. Journalists need to claim their profession which differs from other occupations on account of lacking "esoteric knowledge" (ibid:35). The journalistic profession historically adopts the concept of public trust, depending on which they strategically justify their position to serve the public interest in society. Accordingly, public orientation is considered the core value of professionalism.

Mellado's research (2021a) classify three approaches used by media to conceptualise their audience: the service approach, the infotainment approach, and the civic approach. The first two approaches fall under market orientation, while the civic approach aligns with public orientation. The service approach emphasises the news content that the readers can use, such as tips for everyday life, and the infotainment approach indicates that news articles use emotional, sensational, or personalised elements to attract readers' attention. The civic approach advocates and educates citizens by adopting citizens' reactions to political issues and providing relevant background information. There are three main findings. First, the research notes that three audience approaches could occur concurrently and overlap. The civic and entertainment role performances are found in the U.S. news stories while the civic and the service role are practised in Mexico and Malaysia (Humanes and Roses, 2021). Second, the result shows that print applies the civic approach as an educator more pervasively in advanced and transitional democracies instead of in non-democracies. Moreover, print performs the civic approach as an advocate to reflect citizens' voices much more strongly in transitional democracies. Third, the infotainment role performance is higher in popular papers than in elite papers, and the service role performance is less performed in news content from national desk sections. They conclude that the civic, service, and infotainment role performances are not mutually exclusive.

3.3.4 Role performance online and offline?

Mellado(2021b) indicates that previous studies commonly examined the enactment of journalists' roles based on one single platform, such as print press. They consider this as a

weakness due to the lack of the perspective that journalists' practice and journalistic culture can vary across platforms. Their research aims to evaluate three influential factors, i.e. the media affordance, the organisational factor, the thematic beats, that may affect journalistic role performance across platforms. The news content in the two major newspapers and the two online news media in Chile are analysed by quantitative method and find three factors are significantly correlated with the different role performance on two platforms. Moreover, the story-level, thematic beats, is the most significant cause, followed by the organisations, quality, or popular media, then the media structure shaped by media technology, i.e. media affordance.

Their research found that in Chile print media embraced a higher loyal-facilitator, civic and infotainment role while online media performed a higher disseminator and watchdog role. These results contradict previous studies (Benson et al., 2012) that suggested online news may contain more infotainment and soft news than print media. Mellado (2021b) have suggested that Chilean newspapers, which belong to large conglomerates closely tied to political parallelism, perform less as watchdogs compared to more independent online media.

Mellado et al. (2023a) based on the second wave of JRP project, analysing 148,474 stories from 365 media outlets across 37 countries. It examines how journalistic roles differ between online newsrooms and other media platforms like television, radio, and print. The results highlight notable differences in role performance across platforms, with platform choice notably impacting roles related to service and infotainment, while roles focused on public service show more consistency across platforms. Moreover, online news outlets demonstrated less frequent engagement with roles such as watchdog, loyal facilitator, interventionist, and civic roles. The trend of presenting information more entertainingly and offering a greater amount of service-related content in online news can be interpreted as a response by online media to the information-rich and competitive environment. In this environment, online media outlets are compelled to vie for user attention, thus shaping their content accordingly. In this study, Taiwan is included but is not specifically singled out for analysis. However, upon examining the statistics presented in the figures, I found that in Taiwan online news outlets exhibit a higher level of engagement with the interventionist, civic, and loyal facilitator roles. Nonetheless, due to the absence of additional information, the overall portrayal of role performance across platforms in Taiwan remains incomplete.

Due to their relatively small-scale and limited sources, online media tend to prioritise serving instant information as disseminators rather than investing in in-depth reports. In contrast, print media, with less immediacy pressure, include more journalist voices in the interventionist role.

Nevertheless, fierce competition in the media market drives print media to offer more infotainment news to increase readership. A limitation of this study is its focus on various news media, both online and offline, rather than examining the same media producing two sets of news outputs; this may inadvertently overlook the influence of editorial decisions shaped by the brand as a whole and its distinct market positioning in deciding the use of sources. Additionally, the impact of specific news beats on role performance across different platforms is an under-explored area, warranting further investigation into the nuanced variations in role performance within various thematic beats. To address this research gap, my study centres on political news produced by the same print media across both their print and online platforms (RQ2.3).

In summary, the research by Hanitzsch and Mellado aims to develop indicators for measuring role perception and performance in global journalism, surpassing traditional Western typologies and normative roles. They have created indicators that offer both advantages and limitations. On the positive side, their work advances our understanding of journalistic practices within each role and allows for comparative analysis of role perception and performance across different countries (Mellado et al., 2020). However, the downside is that a universal set of indicators may overlook the influence of local contexts and how journalists interpret these roles in diverse societies. It may not fully capture the nuanced variations in journalistic role performance across various news topics, and other factors can also impact role performance. Notably, their research does not consider news content on social media as a part of the broader news production by the same news organisations, which could significantly influence their overall role performance.

3.4 Journalistic Autonomy

Previous research suggests various factors constrain journalists' editorial autonomy, leading to the gap between role perception and performance (Mellado and Van Dalen 2014; Tandoc, Hellmueller, and Vos 2013), particularly political, economic, and organisational factors. Focusing on journalistic roles, Mellado and van Dalen (2017) find that changes in the political and economic environment are vital to the gap between role perceptions and role performance in Chile across time. Afterwards, in the more large-scale survey across countries, Mellado (2021a) investigated the link between role performance as well as role perception and pointed out three levels of influential factors on journalistic role performance: a news-story (journalistic routine), an organisational and a societal approach. They conclude that the societal factor, the

political and economic environment, has a significant influence on the performance of the political role, such as the watchdog role, the loyal-facilitator role, and the civic role. Moreover, at the organisational level, the infotainment role is more pervasive in popular newspapers than in elite newspapers. At the level of news routine, the watchdog role is more frequently found in political news in the U.S. but in Spain, the watchdog role is often performed in police and crime news.

In their second wave of JRP research, Mellado et al. (2024) further examines the influence of two crucial system-level variables, i.e. liberal democracy, and market orientation, on journalistic role performance. The findings affirm that liberal democracy correlates with the performance of watchdog role and public-service oriented roles. Specifically, when focusing solely on political news, the impact of liberal democracy on the watchdog and loyal-facilitator roles is more pronounced, with a positive association observed in the former and a negative association in the latter. Moreover, the study indicates that a positive relationship between market orientation and the watchdog role, suggesting that in certain contexts, market orientation may foster an environment conducive to critical journalism. Additionally, the study delves deeper into politically authoritarian yet market-oriented regimes, revealing a notable emphasis on the loyal-facilitator role within journalism. This underscores the intertwined relationship between corporate and political powers, highlighting how they often collaborate to shape media dynamics within such contexts.

Furthermore, in the second wave of JRP research the relationship between various beats and journalistic role performance is explored. Mellado et al. (2023b) analyse how various journalistic roles—such as interventionist, watchdog, loyal-facilitator, service, infotainment, and civic role—unfold across eleven thematic news categories. The findings reveal significant differences, with nearly all news categories exhibiting distinct micro-cultures to some degree. For instance, elements of interventionism are prominently associated with soft news categories, while court and political news lean towards emphasizing the watchdog role. Moreover, the service role aligns more closely with economic and lifestyle news, whereas the infotainment role is prevalent in celebrity and sports coverage. When looking into the hard news and soft news, the research found that interventionism, infotainment, and loyalism are closely linked to soft news, while watchdog, service, and loyal roles are more common in hard news. However, comparatively, soft news tends to be more stable than hard news, which is more susceptible to media logic and political influences. In the study, they also investigate three factors influencing

journalistic role performance across different news beats. Firstly, ownership plays a crucial role, with television and public service ownership of media strongly supporting democratic functions, especially in hard news. Secondly, platforms have an impact, as online platforms tend to promote more interventionism and infotainment in soft news, while profit-driven motives of corporations increase infotainment across news categories. Lastly, political freedom levels affect role performance, with political liberties bolstering watchdog and civic functions in hard news, while diminishing loyalism and infotainment, which are more common in soft news.

Unlike Mellado's approach of analysing news content as role performance, Hanitzsch et al. (2010) focus on journalists' role perception and propose six dimensions of perceived influential factors on journalism by interviewing journalists, including political, economic, organisational, procedural, professional influence, and reference groups. Among these factors, political and economic factors are relatively substantial when comparing journalists' perceptions in eighteen countries (Hanitzsch and Mellado, 2011). For non-Western and developing countries, political and economic factors are perceived as having the most significant influence whereas, for Western and developed countries, both are perceived as the least important (ibid). A similar finding in Hanitzsch et al.'s (2019) survey of world journalism shows that journalists in Asian countries tend to perceive stronger political and economic influences than Western countries.

It is difficult to distinguish precisely which factor influences journalistic work more since the influential factors are usually entangled with each other. New technology and commercialization, for instance, often influence journalism hand in hand. Hallin and Mancini (2004) indicate that commercialisation and new technology accelerate the homogenous trend in media systems worldwide and form a global culture of journalism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). In Hanitzsch et al.'s (2019) world journalism project, they surveyed journalists' perceptions of the influential forces in the transformation of journalism. The result shows that the increasing influence of commercialisation and technology on journalism is pervasive in various media systems. In a media system where the newspaper market has not experienced a decline, journalists tend to be more positive about news work and perceive less pressure from technology and commercialisation. Furthermore, Mellado (2021a) indicate that the business principle is superior to the journalistic and technological principles in news organisations. Therefore, in the first version of Shoemaker and Reese's (1996) hierarchy influence model, including the individual, routine practice, organisational, social institutional, and ideology, they attempt to argue that the influence may follow the hierarchical order exerted on news

products. In the second version (Shoemaker and Reese, 2013) they transform to emphasise the intersection of influential factors and claim that no one influential factor is superior to others. The empirical research on the journalists' perceived influence supports the tangled relationship of influential factors. Hanitzsch et al. (2019) investigated different media systems regarding how journalists perceived influence on their daily work by interviewing them. They recognised that the influence of political and economic factors is internalised into the organisational factor or journalistic routines since both factors are operated in a less direct and more intangible way to journalistic daily work. Therefore, the result shows that the organisational factor is the most important influence on journalists' work across countries. Moreover, journalists may perceive the external political and economic stress less directly since organisations integrated into editorial management may mediate and negotiate the external influence. Hence, aside from the main dimensions of the media system, the organisational factor is a critical factor when exploring the transformation of journalists' role perception.

One of the significant influences on the journalistic profession is new technology when the print media operated two types of journalism, online and offline. Audience metrics could determine journalists' autonomy (Anderson, 2011; Nelson and Tandoc, 2019; Bunce 2019; Petre, 2021). Anderson (2010) first proposes that the metrics may influence journalistic autonomy when the number of readers becomes pronounced in the news selection process. Anderson (2011) and Petre (2021) find that metrics influence journalistic autonomy by disempowering journalists as workers and replacing their professional judgement with audience analytics. When journalists perceive analytics as a threat to the autonomy of their editorial judgments, they are likely to resent and strategically resist using the data in the course of editorial work (Bunce, 2019). Prior research demonstrates that metrics related to tension can significantly stress frontline journalists and editors (Petre, 2021).

Different newsrooms within the media landscape may not uniformly employ metrics for selecting news topics or assessing journalists' performance. In her analysis, Petre (2021) emphasises the need to investigate specific newsrooms to understand the impact of metrics. She explores the use of Chartbeat, a metrics tool, in various news media organisations. For instance, *The New York Times* limits journalist access to metrics and controls their interpretation, emphasising the importance of avoiding the influence of metrics on editorial decisions based solely on popular appeal, rather than newsworthiness. This approach is viewed as a means of preserving journalist independence. *The New York Times*, known for providing opinions to its readers, primarily uses metrics for reference to gauge audience reactions, rather

than as a strict criterion for selecting news topics. Petre (2021) concludes that the issue within the digital media industry is not solely about the metrics applied in newsrooms; instead, it is a symptom reflecting the ongoing economic pressures in the media industry.

The relationship between technology and commercialisation is tightened since new technology advances the efficiency of measuring the number of audiences and in journalism "audience size and revenue go hand in hand (Nelson and Tandoc, 2019: 1962)." Moreover, the metrics only apply to soft news to balance making profit and public interest. Nelson and Tandoc (2019) indicate that hard news tends not to follow the click-based standard to provide what readers want, but soft news without exception should be based on metrics. The reason is that soft news makes a profit to maintain the democratic function of hard news, such as informing citizens of public affairs and serving the watchdog role. They state that journalists have been aware of the two mutually exclusive goals for them to achieve. One is to increase audience exposure (i.e., attracting the largest number of clicks), and the other is to serve the public interest (i.e., making some sort of community impact).

3.4.1 In the Taiwanese Context- Perceived Autonomy and Influential Factors.

In Taiwan, during the transitional period, journalistic autonomy experienced a high peak in 2004 but apparently decreased after a decade in 2014. After lifting the press ban, the vital value of professionalism, namely journalistic autonomy, gradually increased over time. Drawing from longitudinal research, there was an increase in autonomy from 1994 to 2004, but it subsequently decreased to a level lower than that of 1994 after 2004 (Lo, 1998; Lo, 2012; Liu and Lo, 2017). Comparing journalists' autonomy in various media, radio journalists generally have the highest level of autonomy, with print journalists in the middle and broadcaster journalists ranked the least autonomous.

Liu (2022) conducted in-depth interviews with 41 journalists and attempted to explore the major influential factors in each decade. In 1994, aside from the three state-owned broadcasters, which were not yet independent from the government, direct political intervention no longer existed. Political influence has transformed in a nuanced way, but journalists claim they have more autonomy to stand by their professional news judgment, even if their opinion is not aligned with the newspapers' political ideology. During this period, the strong media market, such as the high readership of newspapers (70%), can be a vital factor for news media to resist political intervention so that organisations can give more space for journalists. In 2004, the

media environment was fully free from state intervention since the laws forbade the state and political parties from owning media. Three influential factors influence journalists' autonomy. First, the allocation of the advertising budget of the government, known as the embedded advertisement, becomes an instrument to influence news content. Journalists may be asked to report news which is paid by the government. In other words, the government became an important advertiser for news media. Second, the apparent partisan bias in news media has been formulated as Blue media in line with pro-unification political parties such as KMT, or Green media favouring pro-independence parties such as DPP. The news media tend to frame news strongly according to their political ideology. Third, the strong control from the editorial room of broadcasters. The broadcaster journalists could only follow the commands to report the topic decided by editorial desks. In 2014, during the era of social media, a significant factor contributing to the decline in journalists' autonomy was the rise of instant news, which entails reporting news events and updates as they happen, typically in real-time. Journalists faced immense pressure to provide continuous online news coverage, often under the directives of editorial desks, which left them with limited time and freedom to autonomously select news topics. This phenomenon aligns with existing literature highlighting the impact of commercialisation and technological factors on journalistic practices (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Mellado, 2021a). Hanitzsch et al. (2019) further suggest that in media systems where the newspaper market remains robust, there is a reduced likelihood of a decline in journalists' autonomy, owing to the integration of technology and commercialisation.

Previous research largely supports Liu's (2022) findings pertaining to the influential factors on the journalistic profession. Wu and Lin (2013) interviewed twenty journalists and managers in both print and broadcasting to explore the threats to the journalistic profession. The results show that the embedded advertisement of government, polarised partisanship in the political system, and the influence of owners' ideology assimilated into editorial control undermined journalistic autonomy after democratisation. Earlier research also indicates that commercial force and political influence have gone hand in hand since the transitional period. Lin (2006) interviewed journalists in print and broadcasting and indicated that commercialisation put journalists under the pressure of the market forces perpetuated by political power. The government, for instance, indirectly influences news content by using its advertising budget to punish the media functioning against its position.

In summary, after democratisation, the strength of the media market at the beginning released media from the authoritarian government control. During the transitional period, the

problem of a highly commercial media environment emerged as latent threats of state intervention and partisanship gradually foregrounded. Furthermore, social media worsened the fierce competition between digital platforms run by news media. As Hanitzsch et al. (2017) suggest, political and economic influence is vital for transitional democracies and organisational factors which mediated external forces are also critical for exploring the influence on autonomy. Accordingly, the influential factors on the journalistic role in my research, aside from three dimensions of the media system, i.e., state intervention, market force, partisanship, new technology, and the organisational factor, are also included.

To conclude the discussion, previous work provides the rationales for my research to investigate the transformation of journalists' role perceptions and performance. My research underscores the importance of interpreting changes in journalism within the unique social context of a given region, considering factors such as journalistic culture and the stage of democracy. Consequently, I aim to examine shifts in role perception and role performance in the Taiwanese context, where Confucian culture is presumed to have a notable influence. This investigation will be carried out longitudinally, allowing for a comparative analysis at two distinct time points and across media platforms. As a result, the second primary research question, along with its associated sub-questions, is formulated as follows:

RQ2: What are the journalistic roles in Taiwanese newspapers, and how have they changed from 2008 to 2020?

- 2.1 How are journalists' role perceptions integrated with Confucian culture? How has this relationship changed from 2008 to 2020?
- 2.2 What are the journalistic role performances in newspapers since from 2008 to 2020? How have they changed over time?
- 2.3 What are the journalistic role performances in print and their Facebook pages? How have they changed across platforms?
- 2.4 What factors do journalists perceive cause a gap between journalistic role perception and role performance? Why and how do these factors cause a gap?

Chapter 4 Research Design and Methods

4.1 Introduction

This research adopts a mixed-methods approach to investigate the transformation of journalistic roles and the democratic value of news content. It is distinguished from multi-methods, which contain more than one approach in a parallel way without dialogue. Bazeley (2018:4) defines the mixed method as "involves multiple sources of data and/or multiple approaches to analyses of those data, in which integration of data and analyses occurs before drawing final conclusions about the topic of the investigation." The mixed method emphasises triangulation, one of which is methodological triangulation, with more than one method to study the same phenomenon (Denzin, 1978; Denzin, 2006). Cross-checking the result by qualitative data with quantitative data or vice versa helps gain a better understanding of the studied phenomena. Accordingly, this research applies qualitative and quantitative approaches, i.e., in-depth interviews and content analysis, to investigate the role of journalism in Taiwan. The content analysis will describe the characteristics and forms of news content, while a combination of interviews can make further inferences about what the content analysis claims (Berelson, 1952). There are two stages. The first stage is the qualitative approach by which I interviewed political journalists to discover their role perceptions and changes. The second stage is content analysis to investigate the practice of the journalistic role and the democratic value in news content. The result of the first stage helps develop the coding frame of the content analysis as the sequential triangulation by which one method can guide the design of the second method (Bazeley, 2018).

Table 4.1 demonstrates how I undertook two methods to explore research questions with the specific objective. For the first main research question (RQ1), content analysis is the major method in examining news quality over time and across platforms, including four sub-questions (RQ1.1- RQ1.4). To investigate the second main research question, two research methods were both applied. The content analysis was mainly used to examine the role performance in news content since 2008(RQ 2.2) and in both print and social media (RQ 2.3). The in-depth interview explores role perceptions and journalistic culture (RQ 2.1). The last sub-question (RQ 2.4) compares the result of role perception and role performance conducted by two methods. I then attempt to explain the influential factors of the possible gap between the two through journalists' testimonies from in-depth interviews.

Table 4. 1: Research questions, objectives, and methodologies

RQ1: What are the democratic values of news content in Taiwanese newspapers and how have they changed from 2008 to 2020?		
Sub questions	objectives	methods
1.1: What is the quantity of political news in newspapers from 2008 to 2020? How has it changed over time? (Chapter 5)	To explore and compare the amount of political news in the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020.	Content analysis of political news in the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020 and on newspapers' Facebook pages in 2020 and 2021. I also use testimony from journalists' interviews to support and explain the findings from the content analysis.
1.2: What is the quantity of political news in print and their Facebook pages? How has it changed across platforms? (Chapter 7)	To explore and compare the amount of political news in the four newspapers in 2020 and on their Facebook pages in 2020 and 2021.	
1.3: What is the quality of political news in newspapers from 2008 to 2020 ? How has it changed over time? (Chapter 5)	To explore and compare the quality of political news in the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020.	
1.4: What is the quality of political news in print and on their Facebook pages? How has it changed across platforms? (Chapter 7)	To explore and compare the quality of political news in the four newspapers and their Facebook pages.	
RQ2: What are the journalistic roles in Taiwanese newspapers, and how have they changed from 2008 to 2020?		
Sub questions	objectives	methodologies
2.1 What are journalists' role perceptions integrated with Confucian culture? How has this relationship changed from 2008 to 2020? (Chapter 8)	To examine the Confucian culture embedded in role perceptions. To compare the difference in role perceptions between senior and junior generations.	In-depth semi-structured interviews with political journalists.
2.2 What are the journalistic role performances in newspapers from 2008 to 2020? How have they changed over time? (Chapter 6)	To examine the journalistic role performance in the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020.	Content analysis of political news in the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020. Journalists' interviews are used to support the findings in content analysis.
2.3 What are the journalistic role performances in print and their Facebook pages? How have they changed across platforms? (Chapter 7)	To examine the journalistic role performance in the four newspapers and their Facebook pages.	Content analysis of news content in the four newspapers across platforms. Journalists' interviews are used to support the findings in content analysis.
2.4 What factors that journalists perceive cause a gap between journalistic role perception and role performance? Why and how do these factors cause a gap? (Chapter 8)	To explore the influential factors in journalistic work which cause the gap between role perception and performance.	In-depth semi-structured interviews with political journalists. Content analysis of news content in the four newspapers over time and across platforms

4.2 Selection of Newspapers

Despite television being a popular media platform in Taiwan with a multitude of news channels, there is a relatively high similarity in the news content, much of which originates from newspapers. According to Wu and Lin's (2013) research, TV journalists they interviewed indicated that TV channels often lack the willingness to explore in-depth reports and instead tend to replicate topics from daily newspapers, which is seen as the most budget-friendly approach. Therefore, the news content in print is relatively significant in terms of setting political agenda and shaping the public opinions. Furthermore, newspapers in Taiwan are highly related and contribute to democracy during the democratisation (Su, 2002; Lin, 2004; Peng, 2007). Therefore, my research concentrates on political news coverage in newspapers in Taiwan, as there is a positive correlation between accessing hard news from newspapers and citizens' political knowledge and voting behaviours. Those who prioritize hard news over soft news exhibit a deeper understanding of democratic values and possess higher political knowledge (Peng, 2007).

This research sampled four major national newspapers in Taiwan, i.e., *United Daily News (UDN)*, *China Times*, *Liberty Times*, and *Apple Daily*. Four major players after democratisation mainly dominated the newspaper market. The selection of these four newspapers is not solely based on their popularity, but also on their significant influence as political actors during Taiwan's transition to democracy. Representing divergent political ideologies, three Taiwanese newspapers *UDN*, *China Times* and *Liberty Times* play pivotal roles in shaping the political landscape. Among them, *Apple Daily* stands out as the leading popular paper, exerting considerable market-driven influence on print media in Taiwan. Despite lacking traditional affiliations, *Apple Daily* was once seen as capable of impartially fulfilling a watchdog role.

Table 4. 2: Information about the four national newspapers

Newspaper	Apple Daily ⁵	China Times	Liberty Times	UDN
Type	Popular newspaper	Quality newspaper	Popular newspaper	Quality newspaper
The founder's ideology	Anti-Communist (Hong Konger)	Pro-unification with China (Mainlander)	Pro-Taiwan (Native Taiwanese)	Pro-unification with China (Mainlander)
Political stance	Ambiguous	Pro- KMT (Pan-Blue coalition)	Pro- DPP (Pan-Green coalition)	Pro- KMT (Pan-Blue coalition)
Readership	2008:16.3% 2020: 6.0%	2008: 7.1% 2020: 2.6%	2008:16.0% 2020: 9.6%	2008:8.5% 2020:3.3%
Circulation	2008:512,084 2020:96,471	N/A	2008: 696,630 2015: 580,123 2016-2020: N/A	N/A

Note 1: Media Agency Association, 2009 and 2021, the Audit Bureau of Circulations, and the official website of *Apple Daily*.

Note 2: Pan-Blue Coalition: the political position is close to KMT party. Pan-Green Coalition: political position is close to DPP party.

Table 4.2 shows the main characteristics of four major newspapers. Regarding readership, it is based on the Nielsen survey in which the readership is defined as the past seven days that newspapers have been read by the readers. The four newspapers have been the most read newspapers for nearly twenty years since democratisation, regardless of the decline of the whole readership of newspapers from 43.9% in 2008 to 18.9% in 2020 (Media Agency Association, 2009; Media Agency Association, 2021). In 2008, the highest readership was 16.3% for *Apple Daily*, and the lowest among the four was *China Times*, with 7.1%. Other newspapers only gained less than 1% (Media Agency Association, 2009). In 2020, the readership of the four still surpassed the others. The highest readership is 9.6% for *Liberty Times*, and the lowest among the four is *China Times* with 2.6% (Media Agency Association, 2021). The circulation of newspapers is often used to justify the selection of newspapers in content analysis. However, the data of circulation is not transparent in Taiwan. *Liberty Times* and *Apple Daily* revealed their circulation through the Audit Bureau of Circulations or on their website. In 2008, *Liberty Times* sold around 696,630, and *Apple Daily* sold 512,084 on average per day (as the reference that the population of Taiwan is about 23 million). The latest updated circulation for *Liberty Times* was around 580,123 in 2015, and *Apple Daily* was updated in 2020 with 96,471. On the other hand, *UDN* and *China Times*, which dominated the newspaper

⁵ . The printed edition was published from 2/5/2003 until 18/5/2021. Its news website stopped service on 31/08/2022.

market as the "Big Two" from the authoritarian era, have never revealed their circulations publicly.

The characteristics of the major newspapers, such as the type of paper, the ideology of the founder, and the political stance, are considered significant in analysing the journalistic role. First, the four major newspapers are conventionally categorised into quality and popular papers. *UDN* and *China Times* have claimed themselves as quality papers based on their founders being Confucian literati rather than businessmen. *Apple Daily* claims to be a market-driven newspaper, and *Liberty Times* is conventionally considered a popular paper. Aside from *Apple Daily*, the other three Taiwanese newspapers are more ambiguous in the boundary of popular and quality paper over time. Notably, when the ownership of *China Times* shifted to a business tycoon in 2008, it was presumed that Confucian literati who founded the quality paper had challenges. Taiwanese scholars recently suggested that there is no quality paper in Taiwan since the sensationalism introduced by *Apple Daily* had a significant impact on other newspapers, which led newspapers to become homogenous (Hsu and Lo, 2019). Jimmy Lai, a businessman, established *Apple Daily* in Taiwan with the aim of targeting the newspaper market, which lacked reader-driven content. According to Ho's (2007) case study, Lai criticised the three major Taiwanese papers, considering them too political and boring to read; claiming that they positioned themselves as quality papers but failed to meet readers' desires. Recognising the niche, *Apple Daily* positioned itself as a popular paper that caters to readers' wants rather than just their needs. Notably, Lai asserted that the paper had no political affiliation with either the pro-DPP or pro-KMT camps in traditional Taiwanese politics; its only political stance was against communism, which ultimately led to the downfall of Lai's media groups.

In 2021, Taiwan's *Apple Daily* issued an open letter to its readers, announcing its closure due to unbearable financial losses and the deteriorating situation in Hong Kong. Pro-China forces had blocked various advertising resources, and as a result, the print publication ceased on 18th of May. The focus shifted to developing the website. A year later, the ownership of the digital edition was transferred to another businessman, and Lai's *Apple Daily* in Taiwan ceased to function after 19 years of operation (2003-2022). The disappearance of the self-proclaimed popular paper from Taiwan's newspaper market indicates a return to a state where there is no clear boundary between popular and quality paper in Taiwan. It shows that the Western typology of quality and popular paper does not fully fit into the Taiwanese context.

Second characteristic is the ideology of the founders. As chapter 2 mentioned, *UDN* and *China Times* were founded by mainlanders whose political ideology leaned toward unification with China. On the other hand, the founder of *Liberty Times* was deemed to transform in favour of pro-independence after democratisation (Lin, 2008). The special case is *Apple Daily*, the founder of which is Hong Konger, Jimmy Lai. Instead of unification or independence, his political ideology is considered anti-Communist after he was accused of subverting the Chinese government by supporting the Umbrella Movement in 2014 (Wu and Lin, 2013).

Third characteristic is the political stance of the newspaper. The four newspapers as political actors represent different political alignments. The Big Two formed a patron-client relationship with KMT during the authoritarian period (Lee, 1993; Lin, 2008; Lu, 2012). After democratisation, their political alignment was still considered akin to KMT party. By contrast, *Liberty Times* is the newspaper that shifts its favourability from KMT to DPP after the democratisation (Lin, 2004; Lin, 2008). *Apple Daily* seems ambiguous and claims itself as a politically neutral newspaper with highly market-oriented characteristics (Ho, 2007; Wu and Lin, 2013). As noted in the previous chapter, Taiwanese broadcasters are legally required to adhere to a standard of neutrality, including impartiality in election news coverage. At the same time, newspapers rely on self-regulation through ethical codes. However, the professional norms that call for print media to uphold objective and neutral reporting are often not effectively practised (Wu and Lin, 2013). Consequently, newspapers in Taiwan are typically associated with either the pro-KMT or pro-DPP camps, which are commonly referred to as the Blue and Green camps, respectively.

Table 4. 3: The number of Facebook followers on news media's Facebook pages

Rank	News brand	The number of followers on Facebook page	The type of news organisation
1	EBC News	4.7million	News channel of television
2	Ettoday.net	4.5million	Digital- native media
3	Apple Daily (TW)	3.6million	Newspaper
4	TVBS NEWS	2.3million	News channel of television
5	SETN	2.1million	News channel of television
6	United Daily News	2 million	Newspaper
7	China Times	1.4 million	Newspaper
8	Liberty Times	1.1 million	Newspaper
9	The storm media	0.69million	Digital- native media
10	Now news	0.46million	Digital-native media

Source: The author recorded the number of followers by visiting the Facebook page of each news media on January 4, 2020.

After Facebook was introduced in Taiwan and became the major channel for readers to access news, news media including broadcasters, newspapers and digital natives became dedicated to publishing news content on their Facebook pages when readers changed their media use habits from visiting news websites to reading news on social media. Under the pressure of chasing click rates, Facebook plays a vital role in directing web traffic back to official news websites. In 2020, eight news media companies had more than 1 million followers in Taiwan, including legacy media and digital natives. Among eight Facebook pages run by news media, the four major newspapers are all included in the top 10, and the number of followers ranged from 1.1 million to 3.6 million. The other four Facebook pages are run by three Television news channels and one digital native, respectively, without any public media in the Top 8. It shows that Facebook pages are the main battleground for commercial media, particularly newspapers. Newspapers use Facebook pages as the major platform to increase their advertisement profits since traditional newspapers faced incredible shrinkage in advertising revenue. Other legacy media, such as television news channels, do not rely so heavily on online advertisements as their counterparts since advertising profits of news channels is only a small part of the income for television. Therefore, there are more than ten news channels in Taiwan, but only three news channels' Facebook pages have more than 1 million followers and are ranked in the top 8. Hence, newspapers' Facebook pages are a major platform for disseminating news content,

including replicating print editions and other news content such as instant news, live streams, and news videos (see Table 4.3).

4.3 Semi-Structured Interview

In the following paragraphs, I introduce the first methodology, the semi-structured interview, with the sampling strategy and the design of interview questions. Interviews provide insights into individual experiences and attitudes, especially for the transformation process in role perceptions. Among the different interview approaches, the semi-structured in-depth interview, which integrates the characteristics of the fully structured and unstructured interview, can maximise the benefits (Wengraf, 2001). The classic semi-structured in-depth interview, defined by Wengraf (2001), comprises "...partially prepared questions that are fully structured by the researcher/interviewer's concerns and initial theoretical framework (ibid: xxv)." Hence, the semi-structured interview can be structured to investigate specific research questions and leave space for interviewees to add advanced information to the topic (Galletta, 2013). In this research, I applied the semi-structured interview to investigate the transformation of journalists' role perceptions because "it creates openings for a narrative to unfold while also including questions informed by theory" (Galletta, 2013:2).

Based on Hanitzsch's theoretical frame of role perceptions, I designed the frame of the interview questions. Within the interview questions, I particularly integrated my specific interest regarding the characteristics of Confucian culture in journalistic role perceptions, as a significant de-westernised approach.

4.3.1 Sampling Interviewees

The main aim of conducting the in-depth interview is to explore role perception and its transformation. Based on previous studies, the generation, the type of media, and the beat can potentially influence how journalists perceive and enact their role in new democracies (Mellado and Van Dalen, 2014; Mellado and Van Dalen, 2017; Mellado, 2021b; Huang, 2013; Hanitzsch et al., 2019). In addition to this main aim, I am interested in how role perceptions have changed over time in two ways. First is the transformation of an individual's perception after journalists have been through the democratic transition. Second is the variance between young and senior generations during democratic consolidation. Hence, I sampled journalists on the political beat and divided them into two groups, senior and junior journalists. Interviewing senior journalists regarding the first aspect of transformation can reveal how they perceived the change in

journalistic roles over time. The benefit of interviewing senior journalists is that they have lived through the democratic transition, and they are ideally placed to identify how journalism has transformed.

The second aspect of transformation is to compare two generations and explore the similarities and differences across generations. I distinguished two groups by whether they experienced the democratic transition. Based on empirical studies, senior journalists participating in the democratisation process perform more actively in their political role and are more likely to perceive themselves as advocates (Huang, 2013; Mellado and Van Dalen, 2017). The transitional period in Taiwan ended in 2008 after the second-party alternation based on Huntington's (1991) two-turnover test. Accordingly, the senior group refers to those who became political journalists before 2008. The junior group started their careers after 2008 with working experience of fewer than five years, in terms of only working during democratic consolidation.

Snowball sampling is applied in this research to recruit interviewees. The definition of this approach is that "the researcher makes initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses them to establish contacts with others" (Clark, 2021:176). It is a common strategy when the probabilistic sampling of population members is either impossible or too expensive. Particularly for the specific interviewees, "in many such hard-to-reach populations, link-tracing sampling is an effective means of collecting data on population members" (Handcock and Gile, 2011:369). In Taiwan, political journalists in the four newspapers are a relatively small and politically sensitive group. Moreover, political ideology in Taiwan is a disputed issue that always causes political conflicts since it involves diverse national and ethnic identities. Political journalists tend not to reveal their political ideology to avoid the challenges to their profession, such as being impartial in reporting news that aligns with the ethical codes (see Chapter 2). If the researcher has not been one of them, they would not easily reveal themselves, particularly in involving the personal choice of career or the internal information of media organisations. By adopting snowball sampling, due to the experience of being a political journalist, I am considered as their peer in their trust circle, which is beneficial to gain more in-depth information. I used my personal network to contact the initial interviewees and asked them to recommend journalists who fit my criteria to participate in the research. I recognised that the weakness of snowball sampling might not represent all populations since it is a non-probabilistic convenience sample. This is of minimal

concern to this research since I have no intention of generalising the result to all journalists, but to investigate in depth the specific group with their personal experience and perceptions.

Table 4. 4: Journalists interviewed from each newspaper shown by media and journalist' generations.

Newspaper	Senior journalist (former journalist)	Junior journalist	Total
United Daily News	3 (1)	2	5
China Times	3 (2)	3	6
Apple Daily	5 (2)	2	7
Liberty Times	2 (1)	3	5
Total	13 (6)	10	23

Note: Six senior journalists with extensive experience originally worked for the newspaper. After 2008, five of them transitioned to digital media, while one chose to leave the journalistic career before my interview.

In Taiwan, political journalists are responsible for reporting news related to the administrative department, legislative institutions, and political parties. The four major newspapers I sampled are national newspapers with their newsrooms based in Taipei, having various divisions in local provinces. Within the newsroom, the political section focuses on reporting national political news rather than local political news and is traditionally considered superior to other sections like police and crime, cultural, and education. Aside from the local news section, the political section normally comprises the largest number of journalists among all beats, typically ranging from 16 to 22, depending on the newspaper's size (T.S. Lee, 2004). Political news is categorised into various political beats. For instance, in UDN, there are six categories, including political parties, governmental divisions, legislative institutions, foreign affairs, national defence, and cross-strait relationships.

As a result, twenty-three political journalists were interviewed, composed of thirteen senior journalists and ten junior journalists. Each interview took around two hours, and all the interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. Despite the challenges caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, I conducted all the interviews in person face-to-face between November 2020 and January 2021. Conducting the in-person interview is vital for this research because the questions are related to sensitive issues that journalists may have concerns about answering on a video or phone call. Face-to-Face interviews enhance the quality and richness of the discourse addressed by interviewees, which contains more self-revelations about the transformation of role perception, their internal conflicts and cognitive dissonances, and the social control in their newsrooms. It is worth noting that this research includes five political journalists who have

extended work experience on major newspapers but have shifted their careers to digital platforms belonging to other media companies. As Hanitzsch (2019) mentioned, the conflict between the cognitive role and their practice leads journalists to adjust their professional role perceptions or leave the profession due to cognitive dissonance. Including these cases enriches the findings of transforming role perceptions and helps to advance the understanding of what impedes journalists from translating their role perceptions into news content.

4.3.2 Question design

The goal of the interview was threefold, including the investigation of journalists' role perception, the perceived gap between role perception and role performance, and the influential factors transforming journalistic roles. Accordingly, the semi-structured interview questionnaire outlined four sections based on theories and literature, which included a mix of open and closed questions (see Appendix 1). The first section is about the perception of the journalistic role (Question 1-9). I started with a warm-up question that asked journalists for their general views of the changes in the journalistic functions after democratisation. It helped journalists feel relaxed and more willing to be open to the following questions. After that, I applied Hanitzsch's (2007, 2011) three dimensions of journalists' role perception, i.e., interventionism, power distance, and market-oriented, to design the interview questions. In the interview questions, I asked journalists to rank the importance of indicators belonging to the specific role and then elaborate on their ranking. The ranking of indicators is the starting point for developing the discussion with journalists and prompts journalists to think about their role concretely. Most of the time, journalists may not be conscious of these theoretical roles when doing their daily news work. In some cases, they were aware that their first thought maybe not genuinely reflect their views and then went back to revise the ranking. I accepted their revision and pushed it further by asking them to elaborate on why.

For the first dimension, interventionism, I designed a spectrum of interventionism with two poles of advocate and disseminator and then asked journalists to locate their position and elaborate on it (Question 2). Next, I listed Hanitzsch's (2011) three statements of the advocate role, which are "influence public opinion", "set the political agenda," and "advocate for social change." For the disseminator role, Hanitzsch only lists one indicator of "being an absolutely detached observer," which may not be sufficient. Hence, I increased this with two other indicators "be objective, impartial, and neutral" and "strictly separate the fact and opinion." (Question 3). The other two dimensions mainly follow the same pattern, which asks journalists

to rank the statements first and elaborate on their choice later. Regarding the second dimension, power distance (Question 4-5), the two statements of watchdog role include "act as the watchdog of the government" and "act as the watchdog of business elites"; the two statements of collaborator are "support official policies to bring about prosperity and development" and "convey a positive image of political and business leadership". For the third dimension (Question 6-7), the market-oriented role perception (Question 7), two statements of the populist role are "concentrate mainly on news that attracts the widest possible audience" and "provide the audience with the information that is most interesting". The two statements of public-oriented role perception (Question 7) are "provide citizens with the information they need to make the political decision" and "motivate people to participate in civic activity and political discussion" (Hanitzsch, 2011).

In the first section of questions about the perception of the journalistic role, given that the influence of Confucian culture is significant for exploring the role perceptions in Taiwan, this research developed four statements for journalists to evaluate and elaborate on. Interviewees were asked to rate the likelihood with a five-point scale of four statements implying Confucian culture (Question 8-9), which are (i) journalists should be responsible for the destiny of their country (ii) journalists have the responsibility to monitor the government but also need to maintain social harmony and stability (iii) journalists can scrutinise the government but only in the way that will not denigrate its legitimacy (vi) journalists have the responsibility to provide news based on social morality and ethics rather than only considering profit or readership. In the following paragraphs, I addressed how the Confucian culture is conceptualised as the statements related to the journalistic role.

I. The Indicators of Journalists' Role Perception

Journalistic role perceptions in the Asian context, with some salient characteristics, are pervasively underscored, such as obeying authority, maintaining social harmony, and assisting the development of the state (Tu, 1997; Yin, 2008; Huang, 2013; Wu, 2022). Asian journalistic culture is broadly mentioned in previous research using the term Asian values, which generally refers to social harmony, norm conformity, respect for authority, and collectivism. It was initially proposed by the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, to describe the post-authoritarian society. It is also broadly applied to mention the shared values among East Asian countries with the influence of Confucianism, including China, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea (Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Mellado, 2021; Wu, 2022). However, the diversity of political and economic circumstances in East Asian countries could not be

generalised by so-called Asian values and the influence of Confucian culture may not be unified, as it could be localised in specific countries. Moreover, investigating role perception in Western-designed questionnaires often misses out the cultural factor so that the result seems to be decontextualised. Taking Taiwan as an example, qualitative research about role perception and Confucian culture is frequently considered an influential factor (Huang, 2013). Hence, in this research, I focus more specifically on Confucian culture to develop four statements to measure its influence on journalistic roles.

This is not only because Western and Taiwanese scholars consider it a crucial aspect of journalistic culture, but also a significant factor in distinguishing Taiwan and China due to their differing political contexts: both rooted in the so-called "Confucian culture" from their histories, which can have varying effects on their journalism. As discussed in Chapter 2, Confucianism was embraced by the authoritarian KMT to legitimise its rule by instilling obedience to authority and suppressing dissent to maintain social harmony. China has also employed similar narratives and strategies since restoring the honour of Confucianism after its complete rejection during the Cultural Revolution. In contrast, Taiwan, having undergone democratisation, integrated Confucian culture into society without experiencing a Cultural Revolution like China. Confucian culture in Taiwan evolved alongside democratisation and often became a battleground for political ideologies, particularly concerning de-Sinicization (refer to Chapter 8). The extent to which Confucian culture persists in journalism, or whether it is only confined to individual levels, such as journalists' personal beliefs and family values, still requires further research. In this thesis, I argue against making broad assumptions about Confucian culture in East Asian countries historically ruled or influenced by ancient China and shaped by Confucianism. Additionally, the predominant interpretation of Confucian culture is often influenced by China when studying journalism in East Asian countries. Taiwan serves as a unique case and a reminder to the field of journalism studies that comparative research on Confucian culture should be more context specific.

II. Conceptualised Indicators of Confucian Culture in Journalists' Role Perception

Regarding my research method, I have developed four distinct indicators of Confucian culture to track its evolving trends across generations. Subsequently, I have designed a five-level measurement scale to aid journalists in assessing their perception of Confucian culture in journalism and elaborating on Confucian characteristics within Taiwan's journalism (see Section 4.3.2). This semi-structured in-depth interview can be the most suitable strategy for this research since it allows interviewees to explain "how" and "why" they perceive the

journalistic roles following the preliminary designed theoretical frame. Hanitzsch's role perception is analysed in three dimensions, allowing the cultural interpretation of each role.

First, the influence of Confucian culture on the dimension of interventionism may be demonstrated in the advocate role as "Journalists should be responsible for the destiny of their country." In the past, the intellectual's best career was working for the government and taking responsibility for the country's destiny. The Confucian culture encourages intellectuals to participate in politics, reflected in leaning toward the advocate role (Lin, 2004; Huang, 2013). While journalists perceive they are Confucian literati, the attempt to influence and intervene in politics could be spontaneous. Therefore, we come to the second dimension of power distance. Two elements of Confucian culture in role perception are "Journalists have the responsibility to monitor the government but also need to maintain the social harmony and stability "and "Journalists can scrutinise the government but only in a way that will not deteriorate its legitimacy." Confucianism is a philosophy of how to rule the state in the ancient monarchist regime, which emphasises the quality of the virtue of Ren. Ren means the ruler should be benevolent and kind toward their people, while ordinary people should take responsibility for their social roles and obey the reign of authority (Huang, 2013; Sun, 2016). Since the basic principles are based on the method of the ruling emperor, maintaining social harmony can be a core value to underpin the stability of the regime. Confucianism also suggests that intellectuals should respect authority and improve government management from internal channels in the regime instead of overthrowing it. Journalists are expected to be involved in politics to help the ruler rather than distance themselves from politics (Huang, 2013). Accordingly, criticising the authority should avoid threatening the regime's legitimacy. Third, for the market-oriented dimension, the influence of Confucian culture can reflect that the public interest overwhelms the financial benefit. The element is developed as "Journalists have the responsibility to provide news based on social morality and ethics rather than only considering the profit". Regarding economic activities, Confucian culture stresses the virtue of righteousness (Yi). Morality is more important than financial benefit or profit (Sun, 2016). For instance, the owners of *UDN* and *China Times*, both claimed themselves as Confucian intellectuals in charge of newspapers. It implies that their newspaper prioritises social morality in circulation. In other words, they may not offer sensational new stories to increase circulation or advertisements (Huang, 2013). By contrast, the market-oriented newspaper *Apple Daily*, a businessman's newspaper, is criticised for challenging social morality in Taiwan to pursue more profit (Luk, 2003; Ho, 2007; Su, 2018). The traditional media owners in Taiwan assume

a conservative moralist stand, which may distinguish them from *Apple Daily*, which recruited the paparazzi to dig out sensational news (Ho, 2007; Luk, 2003). Due to the challenge of measuring and assessing cultural factors, I have conceptualised four statements representing Confucian culture in journalism and designed ranking scales for journalists to evaluate them. This design helps interviewees reflect on their perceptions and elaborate on the impact of Confucianism in journalism. Interviewees are asked to assess the extent to which they believe each description is true, thereby reflecting the presence of Confucian culture in journalism. They are required to rate their response on a scale of one to five, from "almost never true" to "almost always true."

After the first section of questions related to diverse aspects of role perception, I started the second section of the interview questions (Question 10-16) with a ranking table measuring the priority and difficulties of practising journalistic roles. I listed six role perceptions with two questions for journalists to evaluate. First is the importance of six role perceptions, and the second is the degree to which journalists perceived the difficulty of practising each journalistic role (Question 10). After ranking the two questions, journalists were asked to elaborate on their reasons and how they perceived the limitation of their autonomy when some role perceptions are hard to practise in their journalistic work (Question 11). The third section of the interview questions regards influential factors which have caused changes in journalists' role perceptions (Questions 12-16). Based on the literature related to the possible influence on journalists' role perception, I considered five factors as vital for Taiwanese journalism, including economic, political, governmental, technological, and organisational factors. I asked journalists to rank the importance of each influential factor and explain their experience of each one that has ever influenced their journalistic work, which lead to the change in their role perceptions (Question 17). The fourth section of the interview questions is the personal background, including age, seniority, position in the current media, etc. (Question 18-23).

III. Pilot Interview

A pilot interview took place in late November 2020 with a small sample of potential interviewees, including four senior political journalists. Each interview took two to three hours to pre-test the questionnaire. After the pre-test, I modified the research question to be more succinct to reduce the interview time by eliminating the question which was hard to answer: to ask a senior journalist to compare the ranking of importance and difficulties in journalists' role perceptions before and after 2008. It was so hard for them to recall their experience at the exact time point of 2008, that the question was dismissed. Four journalists who participated in pilot

interviews are included in the research samples, benefitting the interview content with valuable information. The interview data was imported into NVivo to organise the responses to each question and the background data of the interviewed journalists. For the quantitative data, I manually calculated the scores that the journalists rated during the interviews. The analysis of these data is conducted in two phases. Firstly, the average score for each indicator is presented in charts or tables, providing an overall perspective, and facilitating the differentiation of results among specific categories, such as senior and junior generations, and journalists from different newspapers. Secondly, I examine the elaborations provided by journalists based on the evaluation results for each indicator. Cross-referencing the scores with the interview content to identify discrepancies or similarities, enabled a deeper understanding of their assessments.

4.4 Content Analysis

Following the research design, the second phase adopted the quantitative method, content analysis, to measure the democratic value and role performance in news content. This method has been applied since the 1920s when Lazarsfeld and Lasswell conducted the original framework. It is still pervasive in media studies (Luker, 2008). Content analysis is used to systematically investigate such elements as the frequency and category of the contents. Berelson (1952:18) notes that content analysis is "a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of the communication." This definition is modified by Krippendorff (2019:24) as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use." The requirement of being quantitative and objective is omitted while emphasising contextualising the content. From Krippendorff's perspective (2019:24), content analysis aims to "provide new insights, increase a researcher's understanding of particular phenomena, or inform practical actions." It is, therefore, especially useful for this research to explore the enactment of role perception in news content. Krippendorff (2019) emphasises interpreting the result of content analysis in the context, including reading between the lines. It is vital for this research to investigate the sensitive topic in terms of political news, which may need more understanding about the implication of what the wording implies. Accordingly, in this research, I quantify the specific characteristics of many texts and put the numbers into context by giving an example and interpreting the statistic result from the SPSS.

The content analysis is applied in media research in a broad range of texts, including "the narrative and form of films, TV programs and the editorial and advertising content of

newspapers and magazines" (Macnamara, 2005:1). The type of media content is even more diverse and complicated in the social media era. It causes conceptual challenges, such as the new types of text, i.e. short messages or emojis in the text (Krippendorff, 2019). In this research, I examine news content in newspapers and news posted on social media. The news content in newspapers has relatively clear boundaries and simple types, such as text and pictures. The content on social media is more diverse, with blended media types in one post. Therefore, in my research, I selected only news posts with a link to the official website. Rather than analysing the text posted on social media, I collected online news from the official website with text only. It can avoid encountering the challenge of the new type of text on social media. Furthermore, due to the limited scope of the research, I focused on the text of news articles; other content, such as pictures, comics, live streams, and videos, are not included.

4.4.1 Sampling news content

In this section, I introduced the definition of political news, the sampling frame, and the strategy. The sampling process and the data collection method in both newspapers and Facebook pages are then explained. Finally, I concluded with the sampling results, including the number of news items across time and platforms.

The definition of political news is news items related to national politics. It was operationalised as news items in which terms such as the central government, political parties, and politicians are mentioned in the national context. According to the constitution of Taiwan, the central government refers to the President, Five Yuens (Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Control Yuan, and Examination Yuan), and the ministries belong to Executive Yuan. In news media, political journalists oversee various departments in the government mentioned above. Therefore, political news within this definition reflects the role performance of political journalists. Moreover, the sampling frame in this research consists of two platforms, the period, and the specific unit of samples. Regarding the platforms and the period, the analysis included news content from four national newspapers (*Apple Daily*, *China Times*, *Liberty Times* and *UDN*) and their own main Facebook pages. The period that this research investigated is between 2008 and 2020. I examined the news content after Taiwan initiated the phase of democratic consolidation and explored the changes by comparing 2008 and 2020. It's worth noting that despite the fierce global impact of COVID-19 in 2020, Taiwan experienced relatively minimal effects, allowing daily life to remain largely normal.

Furthermore, the unit of analysis for this research was defined as a single news article, which should contain the headline and the body of the text. Furthermore, the type of news included in the sampling, such as brief, news article, feature, news analysis, and reportages covered by political journalists is relevant. External authors' comments are not included since this research is specifically interested in journalists' role performance in the daily news. Additionally, the editorial is a particular genre in newspapers in which journalists with superior positions in the newsroom normally write and present the political stance of the newspaper (Firmstone, 2019). However, in Taiwan, the member of the editorial writers may be experienced writers or commentators without holding experience as journalists. Due to the limited scope, I only focus on investigating the daily news as the output of frontline journalists and exploring the degree to which the political ideology of newspapers is perpetuated in daily news content.

Regarding the sampling strategy, I applied two different strategies in selecting news items in newspapers and on their Facebook pages. For the newspaper, five weekdays in one constructed week were sampled from the four newspapers in the second half year of 2008 and 2020, i.e., from July to December in 2008 and 2020 (see Table 4.5). Constructed week sampling has been widely adopted in analysing news content since it is more representative of the population with a cyclical variation (Riffe et al., 1993). It is sampled in a stratified random way to represent seven days of the week. It provides a more accurate representation of news content than continuous sampling. Particularly for political news in print, the coverage intensity of political news is assumed to be higher during the election period and lesser during weekends. de Vreese (2017:175) argues that the political news "between election democracy" is also vital for representative democracy. The political news functions may not cease, and the elections are not always held. In this research, I am specifically interested in the daily news at normal times. The sampling dates in the second half of 2008 and 2020 were chosen, coinciding with the periods when the two major parties, KMT and DPP, were in power, respectively. To collect news items from newspapers' Facebook pages, I employed a random sampling strategy due to the continuous nature of Facebook updates 24/7, which lacks the weekly pattern seen in their print counterparts. Manual sampling faced challenges as specific dates could not be easily searched backwards, making it nearly impossible to collect past news from a constructed week on Facebook. Therefore, I collected posts on the day after the chosen dates. To ensure a balanced representation of political news, I focused on the legislative sessions when members have the right to orally interpellate the President of the Executive Yuan and ministry heads. Consequently, I sampled five dates: two days outside the session and three days during the

session of the new Legislative Yuan term. This approach aims to create a more even and representative sample, avoiding an overemphasis on continuous dates.

The following paragraphs introduce the sampling process and the data collection methods. The major challenge in data collection for the print edition of newspapers lies in their limited digitalisation and database availability. *UDN* and *China Times*' original papers were accessed through a paid membership from their respective databases. *Liberty Times* and *Apple Daily* only offer free online keyword searching, making it difficult to find news on specific sampled dates. Fortunately, the National Central Library (NCL) has scanned and stored three newspapers (excluding *Apple Daily*) from 2000 to 2017, which are accessible on-site. Thus, the news content for *UDN*, *China Times*, and *Liberty Times* in 2008 was downloaded from NCL's database, while *Apple Daily* required manual searching from shelves. For the year 2020, data for all four newspapers had to be retrieved from shelves, as they were not yet scanned into the NCL database. The entire data collection process in NCL consumed approximately six hours daily, spanning seven days, resulting in a total of 42 hours to complete the task.

Regarding data collection from newspapers' Facebook pages, the researcher manually collected news items. Only posts containing news linked directly to the newspapers' websites were sampled, while videos, pictures, and reposts from other media or politicians' posts were excluded. The posts were collected the day after the chosen dates to ensure the final version of the news articles was sampled, avoiding multiple counts of the same news coverage links. Copying links and news content from the four newspapers for a sampled date required three to four hours. The data collection process for five dates on the four newspapers' Facebook pages took approximately 60 to 80 hours to complete.

During the sampling process, I read through all the news content in newspapers and noted the total amount of news on the sampled dates. Then I selected the political news based on the news related to major administrative institutions of government, which conventionally is the responsibility of journalists on the political beat. Based on the ROC constitution, the central government has five governing powers: Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Control Yuan. The political beat in newspapers typically covers news related to the highest powers, such as the President's office, Executive Yuan, and subordinated ministries like Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Mainland Affairs Council, as well as the Legislative Yuan. The Executive Yuan evaluates and submits important bills to the Legislature, including those related to statutory and budgetary matters, martial law, amnesty, declaration of war, peace

treaties, and other affairs. The Legislative Yuan, elected by the people, exercises legislative power on behalf of the state and can make decisions on statutory or budgetary bills, martial law, amnesties, declarations of war or peace, treaties, and other important state affairs. To follow this principle, I read through news items from the four major newspapers, excluding editorials, to sample news related to important political institutions on selected dates. The sample size of news items from newspapers is 662. It comprises 386 political news articles sampled from 3,482 news articles in 2008 and 276 political news articles sampled from 1,922 news articles in 2020. The sample size of new items from the four newspapers' Facebook pages is 260 political news articles from 2,327 posts. Table 4.5 shows sample dates and the number of news items across time and platforms.

Table 4. 5: Samples of political news from the four newspapers and their Facebook page

sample	The four newspapers	Facebook official pages
Date	<p>Five weekdays in a constructed week of the second half year in both 2008 and 2020</p> <p>2008 Jul 21st (Mon), Aug 26th (Tue), Sep17th (Wed), Oct 23rd (Thu), Nov 28th (Fri)</p> <p>2020 Aug 3rd (Mon), Sep 8th (Tue), Sep23rd (Wed), Oct 15th (Thu), Nov 27th (Fri)</p> <p>Total: 40 days (5 days for each newspaper in 2008 and 2020)</p>	<p>Five days with a purposive sampling in and out the session during the new term of Legislative Yuan</p> <p>In session : Sep 19th (Sun), Sep28th (Tue) in 2021 and Jan 12th (Wed) in 2022</p> <p>Out of session : Sep 16th (Thu) in 2021 and Jan 17th (Mon) in 2022</p> <p>Total: 20 days (5 days for each Facebook fan page)</p>
Sampling size	<p>2008 386 political news articles (From 3,482 news articles in total)</p> <p>Apple Daily: 64 China Times: 101 Liberty Times 124 UDN: 97</p> <p>2020 276 political news articles (From 1,922 news articles in total)</p> <p>Apple Daily: 51 China Times: 79 Liberty Times: 70 UDN: 76</p>	<p>2021/2022 260 political news articles (From 2,327 posts in total)</p> <p>Apple Daily: 49 China Times: 73 Liberty Times: 57 UDN: 81</p>

4.4.2 Design of coding variables

Before coding, I designed the coding frame to include five sections of coding variables (see Appendix 2 codebook). The first and second section in my codebook is related to basic and advanced information about news stories. The third and fourth section of coding variables are the parameters of democratic value in news content. The fifth section comprises the variables of role performance.

Section 1 and 2: Basic and advanced information

Section 1 includes two variables: the name of the newspapers, date of publication, author, and headline. Section 2 delves into advanced details regarding news stories (variables 3 to 7), including the journalist's name. It explores whether the author conducted in-depth interviews with individuals, specifying if they were included as interviewees and categorising them into generations (senior or young). Variable 7 refers to the news format for newspapers, in which I followed Mellado's (2021a) four categories: brief, article, feature or news analysis, and reportage⁶.

Section 3 and 4: The democratic value of news content

In sections 3 and 4, I designed coding variables to measure the news content, which allowed me to make inferences about the democratic value. Section 3 is related to news sources and section 4 details the indicators of partisan tones. Regarding the democratic value in political news, due to lacking relevant studies in Taiwan, I conceptualise three criteria for measuring news quality after the democratic transition as a pioneering approach contributing to journalism studies. Three indicators of news quality include source diversity, source transparency, and partisan bias in source and tone. Aside from partisan tones (section 4), my criteria for news quality are mainly based on analysing news sources (section 3). News sources can shape society from their perspectives and dominate the direction of the social agenda, which is deemed representative of the news quality. When journalists cite diverse, transparent news sources without partisan bias in their political news, citizens presumably receive a higher quality of news regarding democratic value in making well-informed decisions. Hence, I sought to conceptualise and

⁶ A news article is usually longer in length than a regular article. This type of news article includes reporting facts and in-depth analysis of recent events that have already been covered by the media and did not necessarily happen the day before the news article is published. Reportage usually includes several sources, as well as contextual information, which is considered part of the report (see Appendix 2).

develop three parameters to gauge the democratic value of news content in Taiwan: diversity, transparency, and partisan bias, and operationalised them in various indicators.

The democratic value of news content

I. Diversity

Why the diversity in political news is vital for a new democracy like Taiwan? During a long period under authoritarianism, alternative voices were censored and excluded from the marketplace. Since democratisation, a wide range of ideas and political stances are encouraged to be expressed via media. The diversity of the marketplace of ideas⁷ could underpin a well-functioning democracy when citizens can consume and choose them freely from various media (Napoli, 1999). As Voltmer (2006) mentioned, in new democracies, media play a critical role in providing diverse ideas to enlighten and enhance citizens' political knowledge. It needs to be recognised that different types of news sources may not be equal regarding diverse ideas or enhancing discovery of the truth (Voakes et al., 1996; Voltmer, 2006). Particularly for the high partisanship in the media system, the media tend to be the political actor to advocate their voice, so it may be questionable for them to serve purely as a forum to exchange diverse voices (Voltmer, 2006). Nevertheless, it is safe to say that more diverse news sources may increase the possibility of diverse ideas or alternative voices (Mellado and Scherman, 2021).

To analyse the news sources in political news in Taiwan, I developed the coding variable of source type with a list of the news sources. Based on the Taiwanese political context, I include the sources from the government, KMT party, DPP party, minor parties, civil society, ordinary people, experts, and others. The frequency of each category appearing in news content was applied to gauge the diversity. First, regarding the governmental sources, due to the journalistic routine in the daily news, governmental sources may surpass other types of news sources (Tuchman, 1977; Page, 1996). Second, concerning the sources from political parties, compared to the one-party predominant period, after democratisation, there are more sources from various political parties that may enhance or least offer diverse political stances in news content. Previous studies show that the sources affiliated with the government are one of the prominent parts of news sources (Sigal, 1973; Brown et al., 1987; Bennett, 1990; Heim, 2021; Mellado and Scherman, 2021). Due to the information subsidies within the journalistic routine,

⁷ The concept of a marketplace of ideas comes from the liberal normative perspective, which represents that the course of politics could not be determined by one's say, and the truth will be clear via political debate (Mill, 1859).

journalists rely heavily on institutional sources (Gans, 1979). Information subsidy comprises a power bargain wherein institutional sources provide information in exchange for their visibility on media. At the same time, journalists could save time and money to satisfy their needs efficiently. Given that news sources may not be given equal power to set social agendas and express their opinion, increasing institutional sources may reinforce the power structure in shaping the public discourse. When media largely depend on the government source, it may limit the diversity of voices in public debate and the existing power structure of society is strengthened (Sigal, 1973; Gans, 1979; Schudson, 2013).

Third, regarding news sources from civil society, members of the public as a source are perceived as a double-edged sword – both as a useful contributor and as a potential threat. Journalists evaluate the value of civil sources before citing them (Firmstone, 2023). When a civil source is hard to obtain, such as in a natural disaster, it becomes a valuable voice from the public for journalists who take it as information subsidy. On the other hand, when the public is without a significant position or holds less professional status, their professionalism may be at risk as a threat to maintaining the journalistic boundary (Carlson, 2017). For new democracies, the media as a forum to present the diversity of voices from society instead of the dominant voice from the government is essential (Veltmer, 2006). Civil society needs to be giving a voice to organised citizen groups, unaffiliated ordinary people, and experts. Nevertheless, media as a forum passively provides a platform for exchanging various voices. This could be disputed in partisan media systems since ordinary people's voice may be included passively to support existing discourse (Firmstone and Corner, 2017). In Taiwan, the first research paper analysing media sources was conducted by Cheng and Lo (1988). They investigated the evening news on three TV channels, which were the only news stations established by the KMT party and the state and found that 61.4% of the sources were from official institutions. Similar conclusions were drawn by Liu (1989), who found that government sources were more prevalent in daily news compared to other types of sources.

Building on these early studies, Taiwanese scholar Cheng (1991) pointed out that media sources could reveal who held power over media access rights. Those with more favourable backgrounds as news sources had a higher probability of influencing the media. The practice of skilfully utilising news sources to manipulate news stances became prevalent in the Taiwanese news industry. For example, Chen (1991) investigated protest news before and after the martial law period and found that using voices from third parties to support the government was a common way to manipulate public opinion during the authoritarian era. In protest news,

the voices of third parties, such as scholars or experts, were more prominent than those from the government or protest actors. However, after martial law lifted, the voices of protest actors gradually increased. Su (1995) conducted a content analysis of newspapers focusing on a specific political agenda. She demonstrated that the newspapers in Taiwan at that time prioritised selecting news sources based on their alignment with the political stance of the publication, rather than considering the intrinsic news value of the sources themselves.

Along with the development of digital media, using social media as a news source is common nowadays. Therefore, I designed the coding variable for measuring the news sources quoted from social media platforms (Facebook, Line, Twitter, and others) with the same list of source categories. The empirical study shows that the diversity of news sources may increase while social media integrates within journalistic routines. Gulyas (2013) found that social media could increase news sources. Moreover, McNair (2018) indicates that new technology improves the possibility for citizens to engage with news content, such as by becoming news sources themselves. Social media is a popular instrument for journalists to cite from ordinary people, which is considered convenient and low cost, particularly in popular papers (Broersma and Graham, 2013). On the other hand, some research may find the opposite because governmental sources are still dominant, even when journalists increasingly use sources from social media (Heim, 2021). Moreover, the way that a civil voice is given in the news is critical. Firmstone (2023) indicates that journalists using social media sourcing techniques prefer official sources and tend to apply ordinary people's post to account for the original discourse. It is similar to the vox pops, which are criticised for limiting the public's voice by labelling them in categories rather than allowing them a voice to contribute their expertise (Firmstone and Corner, 2017).

Similarly, in Taiwan, journalists agree that social media provide multiple news perspectives (Liu and Lo, 2017). Other studies discovered that newspapers applied it as a marketing tool to maintain traffic levels for advertising revenue instead of enriching content or sourcing news stories to improve the public sphere (Lin, 2013; Lin, 2015; Xiao and Wang, 2018). Although social media is integrated into the journalistic routine, it may not necessarily correspond with increasing source diversity. Accordingly, whether social media increase source diversity, particularly in which categories of news sources, could be another critical dimension to investigate.

II. Source Transparency

Why could transparency in political news be vital for a new democracy like Taiwan? The transparency of news sources is related to credibility and objectivity as critical criteria in the journalistic field (Tuchman, 1972; Karlsson, 2010). The normative importance of transparency lies in its ability to enhance democratic discourse by allowing citizens to track the origins of information and improve news reporting quality through greater source attribution. Literature indicates that news could shape how people perceive the external world instead of mirroring it (Lippmann, 1922; Gans, 1979; Lee and Koh, 2010). Accordingly, the better the source transparency is, the less opportunity for people to receive incorrect information. Particularly for political communication, the transparent source can manifest the objective credibility of the media when it attempts to be independent of the state and political parties. Previous research indicated that transparent news sources improve credibility since they can be traced and verify the authenticity of information (Rupar, 2006). Moreover, transparent news sources represent objectivity since journalists avoid presenting their opinions by citing the news sources (Mencher, 1991). Transparency in news sources is one of many criteria for neutrality, and lacking transparent sources implies deviating from normative norms. However, in a partisanship media system, the transparent source may be considered more of a defensive strategy, as Chadha and Koliska's (2015) note, for gaining trust among their audience rather than abiding by norms.

With the rise of the digital era, there is an expectation for increased transparency in news reporting. Karlsson (2010) examined the transparency of online news websites in the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden, focusing on discourse transparency and participatory transparency. Discourse transparency relates to how news websites present their content, including time stamps, visible changes in news stories, and provision of links. Participatory transparency, on the other hand, pertains to user engagement in the news production process, such as reader collaboration or contributions. However, the study found that despite frequent updates to news stories, and the inclusion of comment functions on news websites, traditional journalistic routines still prevail in online news. User participation remains limited, and there is minimal explanation of the process or reasoning behind news stories.

To gauge the level of transparency in Taiwan's context, my coding frame categorised source transparency into three levels: transparent, translucent, and opaque (Lee, 2017): (i) transparent sources: entire identities with names, titles, and affiliations (ii) translucent sources: partial identities (iii) opaque sources: no identities. According to the frequency of source appearance, the more transparent source represents a higher level of democratic value. In this research, I

group translucent and opaque sources as anonymous sources, representing the limited identity of news sources.

III. Partisan bias

Why partisan bias in political news is vital for a new democracy like Taiwan? To go beyond Hallin and Mancini's (2004) Western-based media system, scholars suggest that in the Asian context, the relationship between politics and media might be shaped by personal alliances and clientelism rather than by the left-right division in the Western context (McCargo, 2012; Voltmer, 2013). Voltmer (2013) indicates the cause of partisanship in transitional democracies is tightly correlated with diverse ethnic and national identities. This is especially true for Taiwan since the development of Taiwan's democracy is embedded in dual ideologies, i.e., Taiwan's independence versus unification with the mainland (Lee, 2009). The party polarisation in Taiwan started in 2000 and increased to the highest level in 2008, based on unification-independence ideologies (Hsiao and Cheng, 2014). As Voltmer (2012) mentioned, in non-Western countries, regional or ethnic identities are more important than left-right division in political parallelism. The contest between left and right is usually negotiable, which is related to relocating the economic source, such as the issue of redistribution of national wealth. However, different identities are hard to bargain with or negotiate to gain balance. The positive aspect of partisanship could motivate citizens to participate in public affairs. On the other hand, it may lead to political conflicts and polarisation, which could result in the risk of hatred or even civil war (Voltmer, 2012).

Partisanship in Taiwan is broadly and in-depth discussed in electoral studies, in which scholars delved into the polarised political parties and voters in the field of political science (Hsiao and Cheng, 2014; Hsiao, 2014; Wang, 2019; Yu, 2021). They imply that media could be the latent cause of intensified polarisation in voters and appeal for fairness and balanced reportage (Hsiao, 2014; Yu, 2021). However, political bias in media is relatively lacking in research in media studies. Studies of political bias conventionally investigated electoral reportages before 2008 (Lo et al., 1996; Lo and Huang, 2000; Lo et al., 2007; Dzwo and Lee, 2010). For instance, in the 2000 presidential election, Lo and Huang (2000) compared state-owned newspapers and private newspapers. They found that state-owned newspapers displayed a higher level of political bias than their private counterparts by giving more voice to the candidate from the ruling party, KMT. It is worth mentioning that in the presidential election in 2000, DPP candidates were still not favoured by any newspaper since political party polarisation had not been formulated. After the first party alternation in 2000, political parties

began to polarise in unification and independence ideologies, which is interrelated with the political stance of newspapers. In the 2004 presidential election, Lo et al. (2007) found that political bias in electoral news improved among the four newspapers. Only *Liberty Times* apparently favoured the ruling party, DPP's candidates, by giving more coverage, using more news sources, and showing favourability. The other three newspapers performed with less bias in electoral elections. Furthermore, structural bias in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections is found (Dzwo and Lee, 2010). Candidates from the ruling party receive more coverage due to news value for the current President participating in the election for the next term. After 2008, scholars shifted their focus from print to broadcasts about the political bias in the electoral news (Liu, 2009; Lo and Huang, 2010; Lin and Lo, 2010). It left a gap in whether the partisanship of newspapers continued to improve or deteriorate after 2008.

Partisan bias means that media demonstrates a reality that systematically skews to the party they prefer (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Groeling, 2013). The partisanship in the media system of Taiwan is considered a latent risk to democracy due to the two contrasting political ideologies: unification with China and independence, which is interrelated with divergent ethnic and national identities. This is dissimilar to the Western type of partisanship in terms of right-wing and left-wing. However, rare research explores how it operates and is reflected in news articles in daily news (see Chapter 3). I sought to design the coding variables to examine how Taiwan's style of partisan bias is perpetuated in news content. The coding result in 2008 and 2020 allows me to gauge whether partisanship become sharper between two political ideologies after democratisation. I operationalised the partisanship in terms of the partisan bias in selection and performance. The selection bias is examined in the news sources. The positive and negative tone measures the performance bias. The tone is coded in three dimensions of the news article: headline, others' tone, and journalist's tone. Given that the sampled news is not electoral news, the topic is not as clear as candidate-related news. It is vital to distinguish to whom the tone is expressed clearly. Accordingly, the coding variable "toward whom" with a list of major players could make inferences about partisanship, i.e., the government and two major parties with their politicians and the Chinese government. Since this is the comparison of two different years, the gap between the negative and positive tone toward the DPP government and the KMT government allows me to infer the trend of polarised partisanship over time.

Section 5: journalistic role performance

To measure the role performance reflected by role perception, I designed the coding variables based on Mellado's (2021a) coding frame with an adjustment to fit the Taiwanese context. The entire coding variables can be found in Appendix 2. According to Mellado's Journalistic Role Performance project (JRP, the first wave), journalistic role performance includes interventionist, watchdog role, loyal-facilitate role, populist role, civic role, and service roles with standardized sets of statements for each role. The JRP was conducted in two waves by Mellado and her colleagues in 2013-2018 and 2019-2023, in which the variable was designed to cover all the topics and applied worldwide, and Taiwan is included in the second wave (Mellado et al., 2017; Mellado et al., 2022). Based on the previous literature and the pilot study, I modified variables to focus on political news in the Taiwanese context. According to Mellado's first-wave survey, three role performances refer to two audience approaches. The infotainment and service roles both refer to treating the reader as a consumer, while the civic role considers the reader a citizen. I only adopted the infotainment and civic role since the service role, providing tips or personal advice in everyday life, is less likely to appear in the political news (Humanes and Roses, 2021). Additionally, the variable to evaluate market-orientation in news articles, such as morbidity, means that news content describes "acts of violence, crime, extreme poverty, or sex scenes/scandal in the news, or the subjects in concrete detail" (Mellado et al. 2017:275). Given that this variable in the populist role mostly appeared in crime news, it was dropped. Several indicators in the coding process which are not easy to distinguish because different political contexts in Taiwan were also excluded. For instance, two indicators of the loyal facilitator role, i.e., national triumphs and comparison to the rest of the world, were omitted.

I chose Hanitzsch's role perception theory in the interview but Mellado's role performance in content analysis because my research aims to explore the role perception within the Confucian culture and the degree to which it can translate into role performance. Hanitzsch's research does not develop relevant indicators to measure role performance since it is reflected in the journalistic culture and aims to compare world journalism. Hence, I turned to Mellado's role performance research. Mellado et al. (2020) proposed a role performance framework that draws from Hanitzsch's three dimensions of role perceptions. This framework includes three aspects: (i) the presence of the journalistic voice in news content, which aligns with Hanitzsch's interventionism dimension, (ii) the relationship between journalism and those in power, which reflects Hanitzsch's power distance dimension; and (iii) the way journalism approaches the audience, corresponding to Hanitzsch's market-oriented dimension (ibid: 55). These three

dimensions can be classified into six journalistic role performances: interventionist, watchdog, loyal facilitator, service, civic, and infotainment. Mellado's framework provides useful indicators for examining journalistic role performances in news content. Therefore, I adapted relevant indicators from Mellado's framework to suit the Taiwanese context in constructing my coding frame. Although Van and Mellado (2017) developed corresponding indicators for role conceptions that allow for large-scale quantitative research to measure the gap between role conception and role performance, my study prioritises cultural interpretation of role perception. Therefore, Hanitzsch's three dimensions of role perceptions serve as a more suitable basis. I selected relevant indicators from Mellado's role performance framework and incorporated additional indicators of journalistic culture identified through my literature review.

I briefly introduced three dimensions of role performance with the indicators developed in this research. The first dimension of interventionism was coded by the variables designed to measure the presence of the journalistic voice (Variable 14). Five indicators of the interventionist role are (i) the journalists' opinion, (ii) the interpretation, (iii) proposals or demands, (iv) the use of evaluative adjectives, and (v) the use of the first person (Mellado, 2015). The news with more presence of these indicators means a higher level of interventionist role. The second dimension is power distance. The variables were coded for the relationship between newspapers and the people in power. For the watchdog role (Variable 15), seven indicators are (i) information on judgment, (ii) questioning from journalists, (iii) questioning from others, (iv) criticism from journalists, (v) criticism from others, (vi) denouncement from journalists, (vii) denouncement from others. For the collaborator role (Variable 16), five indicators are adopted by Mellado's research and the two indicators I added to detect the voice aside from journalists. This is based on the journalists' interviews, in which they revealed that the collaborator role could be subtle by quoting others to support the government. Consequently, there are seven indicators to measure the collaborator's role performance: (i) defend or support policies from journalists, (ii) defend or support policies from others, (iii) defend, or support activities from journalists, (iv) defend or support from others, (v) positive image of the political elites, (vi) nation's progress or success, (vii) promotion of country's image. In the last dimension of market orientation, the infotainment and the civil role were analysed to measure the audience approach. The infotainment role is reflected by market-oriented role perception (Variable 17). The news concentrates on attracting the broadest possible audience and providing the most interesting information. There are four indicators: (i) personalization, (ii) private life, (iii) sensationalism (iv) emotion. The civic role as public orientation refers to news providing

citizens with the information they need and motivating citizens to participate in a civil activity (Variable 18). It includes seven indicators (i) background information, (ii) information of citizens' activities, (iii) educating on duties and rights, (iv) citizens' questions, (v) citizens' demands, (vi) citizens' reactions, and (vii) local impact (Hanitzsch, 2007; Hanitzsch, 2011; Mellado and Van Dalen, 2017).

Role perceptions are not mutually exclusive and static but dynamic and coexistent. Therefore, when the perceptions are enacted as news content, multiple role performances are simultaneously coded in one news article; and I coded the existence of elements related to each journalistic role by their presence in the news item. Furthermore, the scoring system includes the headline and the body of news articles separately. This is because the headlines traditionally present the highlights of news articles selected by editorial desks. Adding headlines as another scoring part can underline the specific journalistic role performance. For instance, previous research on Taiwanese media also points out that news headlines on social media tend to be more emotionally appealing (Liu, 2020). Furthermore, headlines can represent the editorial stance in news content which may differ from journalists' stance. I also applied it to examine the difference between journalists and editorial desks in the tone toward the government as one of the criteria for partisan bias (see Appendix 2).

The average score was accumulated by the number of indicators of each role, and each indicator was coded on a presence (1) absence (0) basis. The news article with more presence of these indicators means a higher level of given role performance. All news content was coded in SPSS software and generated various descriptive statistics for further analysis.

4.4.3 Pilot study/ inter-coder reliability

Reliability is vital for conducting content analysis as it may demonstrate the consistency between coders and represent the extent to which the research measurement can be reproduced (Neuendorf, 2017). To establish reliability, I invited the second coder trained with the codebook to conduct a pilot study with a sub-sample of news articles. The reliability of the subsample is suggested to be at least 10% of the full sample and should not be less than fifty (Allen, 2017). Therefore, I randomly selected eighty news articles (n=80) from my main corpus, including ten news articles from the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020. The test result was calculated in a percentage agreement, and the inter-coder reliability across variables ranged from 70% to 100%. A percentage agreement over 90% is always acceptable, greater than 80% is acceptable in most situations, and 70% may be acceptable in some studies (Neuendorf, 2017).

The most contentious part of the percentage agreement was the variables in section four which measured the level of tone. The headline had the lowest percentage of agreement with 70%, followed by journalists' tone with 72.5%, and then the tone from others with 80%. After analysing these variables, I found that the disagreement often showed at the level of a positive or negative tone (i.e. very positive or somehow positive) instead of the positive or negative tone. A statistical analysis related to partisan bias may not cause a significant discrepancy between positive and negative attitudes. Hence, I decided to preserve these indicators in the formal coding process.

Although the percentage agreement is criticised as too liberal in reliability, it is still widely applied in communication studies due to the ease of calculation and interpretation (Neuendorf, 2017; Lombard et al., 2012). Lombard et al. (2012) explain that percentage agreement can be taken as a diagnostic tool and still has meaning. They encourage researchers to include other indices rather than using percentage agreement exclusively to measure reliability. Therefore, I applied Krippendorff's alpha to examine inter-coder reliability after conducting the percentage agreement. According to Krippendorff (2013), alphas (α) above 0.8 indicate variables are reliable, and variables with reliabilities between 0.667 and 0.800 allow for tentative conclusions. The results of inter-coder reliability across variables in sections range from 0.673 to 0.877. This shows that the reliability was acceptable for drawing tentative conclusions.

4.5 Limitations of Research Design

Before delving into the results, it is crucial to acknowledge the research design's limitations. In the qualitative in-depth interviews, efforts were made to capture the evolving trend of journalists' role perceptions. However, it should be noted that journalists' careers may not have remained static over the twelve-year study period. Senior journalists may have changed their affiliations with different newspapers, potentially being influenced by diverse newsroom cultures, even though they were asked to provide responses based on their current media outlets. Despite these dynamic changes, senior journalists all possess over a decade of experience in the field, making their role perceptions valuable for investigation. Another limitation is that asking journalists about changes in their perceptions may be susceptible to retrospective assessment bias. Longitudinal or panel studies would be the ideal approach to examine differences, but such studies were not feasible within the scope of this thesis due to the inability

to turn back time. To compensate for this weakness, role performance in news content was traced back to 2008 and 2020, enabling a comparison of changes over time.

In the quantitative content analysis, there are three major limitations. First, it's crucial to acknowledge that the variables used to measure news quality may not comprehensively cover all aspects. While I conceptualised source diversity, transparency, and partisan bias as criteria for assessing news quality, they may not be sufficient to encompass all dimensions of democratic values in news coverage. The second limitation is the inability to directly compare news articles sampled on newspapers' Facebook pages with the print edition, as the two outputs were not sampled from different periods of time. Although individual dates cannot be compared in parallel, this study can still make general comparisons of news content between print and Facebook pages. The third limitation is that the gap between role perception and role performance is not "statistically measured." Instead, the gap is discussed more qualitatively using data from journalists' interviews. As qualitative research involves a relatively small scope of interviewees, the results cannot be generalised to all journalists. However, they provide valuable insights that offer more detailed understanding than quantitative methods and aim to identify the influential factors perceived by journalists. As Hallin and Mancini (2017) state, both quantitative and qualitative research are essential when investigating the influential factors in media systems, as translating the theoretical framework into operational variables in quantitative research may inevitably oversimplify the complexities of society. Lastly, the conclusions drawn in this study regarding the transformation of journalism are based on a snapshot of two points in time and focus solely on political news. Therefore, it may not cover all the dynamics and changes in journalism during democratic consolidation.

4.6 Ethics

I obtained ethical approval from the AHC Committee of University of Leeds in October 2020 for my field study interviews. Throughout the research process, I followed the university's guidelines for data safeguarding and ethical interview conduct. Participants were assured of voluntary participation and the option to withdraw within a reasonable period. An information sheet (Appendix 3) outlining the research purpose, design, and potential advantages and disadvantages was presented, and verbal consent was obtained along with signed consent forms (Appendix 4). Participants' anonymity was maintained by using a code sheet for identification, accessible only to me for the final thesis. All data, including voice recordings and interview transcripts, were securely stored in separate files on a password-protected virtual hard disk

provided by the University. Physical copies were locked in my study room due to restricted access to the research office during the pandemic. After transcription, original audio recordings were deleted from my mobile phone.

Chapter 5 Democratic values in news content

5.1 Introduction

To investigate the democratic function of journalism, I start by comparing the news content in print after democratisation in 2008 and 2020. The democratic value in news content, in my research, refers to the quality of news with characteristics to improve democracy. The yardstick of news quality is normatively connected with the types of democracy (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Curran, 2011; Donsbach, 2012). Considering the absence of universal standards for measuring news quality, I have developed three distinct criteria, as conceptualized in Chapter 4, to examine the transformation of print media in Taiwan after democratization, which encompass diversity, transparency, and partisan bias.

This chapter aims to answer the first research question: "*RQ1: What are the democratic values of news content in Taiwanese newspapers, and how have they changed from 2008 to 2020?*" I discuss two sub-questions related to the transformation over time in this chapter, which are: *1.1: What is the quantity of political news in newspapers since 2008? How has it changed over time?* and *1.3: What is the quality of political news in newspapers since 2008? How has it changed over time?*". The other two sub-questions (1.2 and 1.4), related to comparing news in print and on their Facebook pages, are answered in Chapter 7. In the following sections, I demonstrate the quantitative findings with the statistics from content analysis. Meanwhile, the testimonies from journalists' interviews are applied to support my arguments in the research findings.

5.2 The Quantity of Political News: How Much Is Enough?

The normative perspective for electoral democracy is that sufficient political news provides citizens with a better understanding to make political decisions (Sartori, 1987). In this research, I consider that political news is more relevant for gauging democratic value, largely because it could be more specifically related to advancing political knowledge. For a new democracy, political knowledge is vital in the consolidating phase as democratic institutions still need to be constructed, as does civil society (Voltmer, 2013). Hence, the quantity of political news within the media ecosystem holds significant importance. When attempting to measure the quantity of political news, determining an appropriate threshold poses a significant challenge. To address this issue, an advantageous aspect of my research methodology lies not only in measuring the absolute amount of political news, but also in assessing the proportion of

political news amongst all other topics. This approach serves to demonstrate the extent of political news representation effectively. Accordingly, in the following section, I scrutinise the quantity of political news featured in newspapers from a dual perspective, encompassing the aggregate volume and the corresponding proportion. The changes over time and the difference between the four newspapers are then discussed. Finally, I provide the rationales, based on journalists' testimonies, to explain the superiority of political news over other topics in the newspapers.

Table 5. 1: The amount and percentage of political news in 2008 and 2020

Newspapers	2008 newspapers (5 days)			2020 newspapers (5 days)		
	Political news	All news articles	Percentage	Political news	All news articles	Percentage
Apple Daily	64	778	8.23%	51	437	11.67%
Liberty Times	101	992	12.50%	70	559	12.52%
China Times	124	760	13.29%	79	507	15.58%
UDN	97	957	10.19%	76	419	18.14%
Total	386	3,482	11.26%	276	1,922	14.36%

Note: The sum of news articles only includes news articles journalists report. The editorials, columnists, letters to the editor, and supplements are excluded.

First, the amount of political news in the four newspapers decreased after the democratic transition. Previous studies suggest that the decreasing quantity of political news is of concern in a high-choice media environment (Van Aelst et al., 2017). The absolute amount of political information may increase in the media ecosystem, but the relative amount of political news may decline. Moreover, commercialisation could cause a drop in political information, which may decrease the political knowledge among citizens in Western countries (Curran et al., 2009; Aalberg et al., 2010; Van Aelst et al., 2017). In Taiwan, traditional media, i.e., newspapers and broadcasts, remained the major channels where the public consumed news at the beginning of democratisation before social media was introduced. Nowadays, Taiwanese read news mainly via online platforms, particularly social media, at around 58% during the past five years (Lin, 2022). Newspapers were major political news providers when the print market was booming after the press ban was lifted. After the democratic transition, my findings show that the amount of political news has decreased by nearly 30% from 386 to 276 articles based on five sampled days from the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020. In 2008, each newspaper, on average, had 20 political news articles a day, whereas in 2020, only 14 political news articles. The decrease

in providing political news echoes previous research (Curran et al., 2009; Aalberg et al., 2010; Van Aelst et al., 2017) that the fierce commercial competition results in decreased political information. Accordingly, the vital question is proposed: Does the decreasing amount of political information lessen the democratic function of journalism in terms of informing citizens and advancing political knowledge?

One may argue that citizens in Taiwan use social media as a major channel to access news instead of print. While it has been suggested that the decline in political information within newspapers might not have a substantial impact on individuals' political knowledge (Liu, 2018), it is worth noting that in the pre-social media era, political knowledge was closely associated with newspaper usage in comparison to other media sources (Lin, 2005). Hence, further research is warranted to thoroughly investigate the intricate dynamics between the evolving dissemination of political news and political knowledge, including all media types within the broader media ecosystem, - I do this in Chapter 7 by looking at news content on Facebook.

Second, the proportion of political news in the four newspapers increased slightly after the democratic transition. Here, political news refers to straight news and features which do not include editorials. Ideally, straight news only consists of news facts, while the features deliver journalists' analysis and opinions. The rising share of political news content signifies a heightened significance attached to information and viewpoints concerning government, political parties, and politicians. Newspapers consistently afford political news a prominent position, typically gracing the front page and the initial three inside pages. In the face of dwindling advertising revenue and declining readership, newspapers continue to allocate resources to maintain a portion of political news coverage. The enduring presence of political news prompts the question: What is the underlying significance that makes it indispensable? Are newspapers cognizant of their social responsibility to foster political knowledge?

I contend that the observed increase in the proportion of political news can be attributed to the amplified partisanship within the media system: the ambition of the newspapers or their owners' motivation to influence politics since three newspapers were founded by the KMT party member, aside from *Apple Daily*. After democratisation, facing fierce competition and the slump in advertisements⁸, the four newspapers implemented cost-cutting measures by reducing the number of published pages. These reductions primarily targeted soft news

⁸ In 1996, the total advertising market was NT 460 billion (US 15 billion), and the print shared NT 110 billion (US 37 billion). In 2020, when the total advertising market increased to NT 600 billion (US 20 billion), online media share 482 billion (US 16 billion) and the print only shared 11 billion (US 0.36 billion) (Lin, 2022).

categories, such as entertainment, travel, and lifestyle segments. Interestingly, they opted to maintain the allocation of pages for political news, a decision that extended even to the most market-oriented paper.

Through analysing the proportion of political information, a critical finding emerges, underscoring the shared importance accorded to political news in both popular and quality newspapers. This observation challenges the Western newspaper typology, which traditionally posits that popular newspapers assign less significance to political news than their quality counterparts (McManus, 1994). The increasing share of political news in the four newspapers, ranging from 0.02% to 7.95%, underscores the sustained prominence of political news coverage in the print media following the transition to democracy. Furthermore, while the popular newspaper *Apple Daily* lags in terms of the proportion of political news, the disparity between the third and fourth newspapers is minimal, with a 1.96% share in 2008 and 0.85% in 2020. In the Taiwanese context, *UDN*, *China Times*, and *Liberty Times* participated in transforming political regimes during democratisation. Even the most market-orientated paper, *Apple Daily*, is not as pure as a commercial paper like its owner claims and practises in their Hong Kong edition- *Apple Daily (HK)*. An interviewee in *Apple Daily* (Taiwan) said:

"Although Apple Daily (Taiwan) is a popular paper, which aims to serve the readers' interests, the political news is still a spirit for the Taiwanese edition. We have a specific section preserved for political news daily; it cannot be replaced by other news. However, it is not the case for Hong Kong Apple Daily, which has no specific page for political news."
(A01)

To a certain degree, the popular paper *Apple Daily* shows its ambition to influence politics, notably in its support for the Hong Kong Umbrella protests against Communist China. This signifies how the popular paper transplanted from Hong Kong has been reshaped in Taiwan's media system. In contrast to the situation with Hong Kong's *Apple Daily*, which faced forced closure and persecution of its editors by the Chinese government after the Umbrella protests, it becomes abundantly clear that the popular newspaper could only advocate for democracy in a media system with press freedom, exemplified by Taiwan.

5.3 The News Quality in Political News: What is pivotal for consolidating democracy?

After discussing the quantity of political news and its changes, in this section, I aim to answer the sub-research question 1.3: *What is the quality of political news in newspapers since 2008?*

How has it changed over time? News quality in a new democracy is not only related to the political regime but also the specific social context. In Taiwan, there exists a latent societal division in terms of national identities, with individuals identifying as Taiwanese or Chinese, which is, to some extent, rooted in ethnic identities. The political ideology of political parties and media aligns along this spectrum with two distinct sides. Given the internal tension arising from these national identities within society, I have conceptualised three essential criteria for assessing news quality in Taiwan: source diversity, source transparency, and partisan bias. These criteria serve as crucial indicators for upholding democracy in the country.

5.3.1 Source Diversity

Why should we care who gets to be a source? The importance lies in examining not only "who" has a voice but also "how" they are given a voice in the news. The key lies in recognising sources' influential role in shaping society's portrayal.

Table 5. 2: The amount and percentage of source cited in the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020 categorised in two groups

	Two groups	Count (%)		Main contributing category
		2008 Newspapers (N=386)	2020 Newspapers (N=276)	
Source diversity	Political institution (Including sources from the state, DPP, KMT, minor parties, and local government)	689 (73.69%)	592 (84.69%)	The opposition party- KMT source (+11.05%)
	Civil Society (Including sources from organised people, ordinary people, and experts)	190 (20.32%)	63 (9.01%)	Organised people (-6.12%)

Note: The percentages provided for the two categories do not add up to 100% as they do not account for other sources.

The first criterion is source diversity in political news. In new democracies, the media should serve as a platform for presenting a diverse range of voices from society rather than being dominated by official sources (Voltmer, 2006). There has been a longstanding criticism regarding the imbalance between the voices of official sources and civil society in news reporting. Due to the daily routines of journalism, official sources often receive greater prominence than other types of sources (Tuchman, 1977). Considering this, I propose that high-quality news in Taiwan's democratic context should strive to include a variety of voices from across society, particularly in political news, to foster mutual understanding and alleviate conflicts arising from differing national identities.

To facilitate a comparative analysis between reliance on political institutions and alternative societal voices, I categorized news sources cited in the four newspapers into two distinct groups, namely political institutions, and civil society, in accordance with the established coding framework. Beyond political institutions, a diverse range of civil society categories is considered. Due to the segmentation across beats, the representation of economic elites' voices in political news is limited, hence not classified separately. Predominantly, my research identifies experts, primarily from academia, alongside organized individuals like labour unions and NGOs, as the most frequently cited voices. Additionally, ordinary citizens' perspectives are also common. All of these voices are regarded as representatives of civil society. I demonstrate the result of citing two categories of news sources which may not be able to show changes in the diversity of sources over time, but they provide insight into the dependency of political intuition. First, the political institution includes the sources from central and local government and political parties. Second, civil society presents the voice of organised citizen groups, ordinary people, and experts (see Table 5.2). In 2008, political institutions accounted for 73.68% of all news sources cited, while civil society comprised 20.32%. Fast forward to 2020, the percentage of news sources cited from political institutions rose to 84.69%, while civil society sources decreased to 9.01%. The rise of citing opposition party KMT with 11.05% contributes to the increase in the proportion of political institutions. The significant drop of source from civil society lies in citing organised people (6.12%). This change is in opposition to the expectation that the voice from civil society may increase after democratisation as press freedom without political censorship and the rise of vibrant civil society prevails.

Table 5. 3: The amount and percentage of each type of source in the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020

categories	Type of source	2008 Newspapers (N=386)		2020 Newspapers (N=276)			
		Count and percentage	Sum	Count and percentage	Sum		
Political institutions	State	376	40.21%	689 (73.68%)	292	41.77%	592 (84.69%)
	DPP	199	21.28%		85	12.16%	
	KMT	96	10.27%		149	21.32%	
	Minor parties	6	0.64%		42	6.01%	
	Local government	12	1.28%		24	3.43%	
Civil society	Organised people	92	9.84%	190 (20.32%)	26	3.72%	63 (9.01%)
	Ordinary people	64	4.92%		19	2.72%	
	Expert	52	5.56%		18	2.58%	
Other	Other	56	5.99%	56 (5.99%)	44	6.29%	44 (6.29%)
Total				935 (100%)			699 (100%)

Note: The anonymous source was not included.

Table 5.3 demonstrates the details of each type of source presented in the newspapers over time. Regarding civil society, three types of civil voices, including civil society, ordinary people, and experts, decreased by approximately 2% to 6%. The most significant variance lies in the source of organised citizens, which drops 6.12%. Considering the representative function of media, when the press presents fewer voices from civil society, it is less likely to represent a broad spectrum of opinions.

Regarding political institutions, the proportion of news sources from this group is stable and correlates with shifts in the political system. Comparing 2008 and 2020, the sources from the government and the opposition party show a similar proportion of approximately 40% and 20%. Additionally, the source from the ruling party accounts for 10% during both KMT and DPP administrations in 2008 and 2020, respectively. This suggests that in the overall print news ecosystem, both the government and the opposition party are provided relatively equal opportunities to express their perspectives by citing news sources regardless of the political party in power. In 2008, there were two minor parties with a combined total of four seats out of 113 in the Legislative Yuan (constituting 3.5% of the total seats). By 2020, the number of

minor parties had increased to three, with a cumulative nine seats out of 113 (representing 8% of the total seats)⁹. It is reasonable to observe an increase in news sources stemming from minor parties, rising from 0.64% (N=6) to 6.01% (N=42). My research finding underscores that the representation of political institutions can accurately mirror the prevailing political landscape, particularly when minor parties secure more seats in the Legislative Yuan. In this aspect, the representation of voices in political institutions has been relatively stable and reflective of the political system since 2008. This shows the representative function may be shaped by the political system when journalistic routine relies heavily on institutional sources. If the news source reflects the existing power structure of society (Schudson, 2013), journalism primarily gives voice to people with power. The power dynamic between politicians and journalists can become more pronounced when newspapers accept "information subsidies" from political institutions (Gans, 1979). In this exchange, journalists receive pre-packaged information that saves them time and effort in return for providing free publicity (Gandy, 1982; Tunstall, 1971). In a new democracy, these consequences can be even more problematic, as new democracies are expected to be inclusive and represent diverse voices, especially those of ordinary citizens. Consequently, the opportunities for civic voices to participate and engage in public discourse become increasingly limited over time.

Table 5. 4: The amount and percentage of source diversity among the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020

2008 Newspaper (N=386)	Political institution	Civil society	Other	Total	2020 Newspaper (N=276)	Political institution	Civil society	Other	Total
Apple Daily (N=64)	164 60.29%	87 31.99%	21 7.72%	272 100%	Apple Daily (N=51)	119 78.29%	20 13.16%	13 8.55%	152 100%
Liberty Times (N=124)	242 78.57%	55 17.86%	11 3.57%	308 100%	Liberty Times (N=70)	142 88.20%	9 5.59%	10 6.21%	161 100%
China Times (N=101)	132 77.65%	22 12.94%	16 9.41%	170 100%	China Times (N=79)	151 85.31%	14 7.91%	12 6.78%	177 100%
UDN (N=97)	151 81.62%	26 14.05%	8 4.32%	185 100%	UDN (N=76)	180 86.12%	20 9.57%	9 4.31%	209 100%

⁹ In 2008, the proportional distribution of political party seats in the Taiwan Legislative Yuan was as follows: (1) The ruling party KMT secured 81 seats. (2) DPP: DPP held 27 seats (3) Other minor parties: People First Party had 1 seat, Non-Partisan Solidarity Union had 3 seats, and there was 1 independent legislator. In 2020, the proportional distribution of political party seats changed: (1) The ruling party DPP held 61 seats. (2) KMT held 38 seats as the main opposition party. (3) Other minor parties: Taiwan People's Party secured 5 seats, New Power Party had 3 seats, Taiwan Statebuilding Party held 1 seat, and there was 1 independent legislator. This accounted for a total of 113 seats.

Total	689 73.69%	190 20.32%	56 5.99%	935 100%	Total	592 84.69%	63 9.01%	44 6.29%	699 100%
-------	---------------	---------------	-------------	-------------	-------	---------------	-------------	-------------	-------------

I now examine the disparities in content among the four papers. The popular paper adopts more sources from civil society, but the gap is narrowed after democratisation. *Apple Daily* plays an important role in representing the civil voice, but this function gradually weakens. Table 5.4 shows that civil voice presented nearly 32% of *Apple Daily* in 2008, while it decreased to 13.16% in 2020. Although civil voice may most frequently appear in *Apple Daily*, the gap between *Apple Daily* and other newspapers has reduced. In the other three papers, the proportion of civil sources was around 20% or less in 2008 and nearly 10% or less in 2020. Since 2008, the four newspapers have similarly transformed toward relying more on the political, institutional voice and less on mediating the voice of civil society.

How the Public is Represented in Political News

According to my findings, it is evident that the representation of the public in terms of civil voices following the democratic transition, has consistently featured organised citizens, followed by ordinary individuals and political experts in political news. Notably, the presence of organised citizen sources has experienced a reduction, impacting both the quantity and the quality of diversity. As we can see, the source from organised citizens is cited most frequently in both 2008 and 2020 among all type of civil voices, despite a decrease from 9.65% to 3.72% (Table 5.3). Examining the news content, organised citizens were more diverse in 2008 than in 2020. They are presented mostly in news issues related to a dispute policy. For instance, the Secretary-general of the Taiwan Labour Front You-Lian Sun criticised the policy to solve unemployment. *"In Efforts to Expand Job Opportunities: Labour Groups Express Dissatisfaction with Impromptu Policy"* (28/11/2008, *Liberty Times*). Other types of organised citizens in news stories include politically affiliated associations, such as the Taiwan Friend's Association, which held a rally against KMT government for the policy leaning toward China. Moreover, the NGO organised by lawyers scrutinised the performance of legislators. The student representative of Strawberry Movement held a social movement against the visit of Chinese official Zhang Ming-qing. Other organisations related to human rights, social welfare, or religions could be found in news coverage. By contrast, in 2020 the types of organised citizens in political news are fewer and cited less frequently. In summary, the array of organised citizens was more varied in 2008 compared to 2020, which mirrors the political landscape of 2008 marked by heightened protests and political activities during the transition period.

The popular paper, *Apple Daily*, tends to cite more ordinary people with sensational elements but it weakens after democratisation (see Table 5.4). In 2008, *Apple Daily* cites most frequently from ordinary people with 11.40%, while other newspapers only cited less than 4%. In 2020, the frequency of citing ordinary people in *Apple Daily* drops to 5.92%, which is closer to other newspapers with less than 3%. It is worth investigating how ordinary people are presented in news coverage via *Apple Daily*. In 2008 when newspapers had not created their Facebook pages, *Apple Daily* cited ordinary people's participation in two types: direct interviews and posts from BBS or Blogs. The first type of ordinary people is interviewed for their opinion and reaction to a specific issue, as a witness of the scene or the participants. For instance, Chinese official Zhang Ming-qing visited Taiwan and provoked several protests. He reported being injured after an incident when the protesters surrounded and pushed him. *"Therapist Treating Zhang After Incident Describes Him as Humble, Lacking Bureaucratic Traits"* (23/10/2008, *Apple Daily*). Another case for conducting an interview is *"Worker Advocating Against Former President Cheng Faces Layoff by Employer"* (26/8/2008, *Apple Daily*). Two cases were reported as a single news story with pictures and details. The second type of ordinary people are cited from the internet. For instance, regarding the former President's corruption trial, a blogger's sarcastic comment or netizens' sensational comments are widely used to write up a whole news story. Another case is a comment related to a specific politician with a sensational metaphor, which alludes to his physical characteristic. The headline incorporates a citizen's remark regarding the "Shen Zhu Ka"(Divine Pig Card) (26/8/2008, *Apple Daily*) when the politician was nominated as the president of the transport card company. Those comments are chosen based on the emotional or sarcastic expression about political issues. Citing civil sources in this manner does not initiate a story, but instead injects a sensational element into news coverage (Broersma and Graham, 2013). Hence, the popular newspaper's amplification of ordinary voices can often be attributed to market-driven motivations. These voices from ordinary people are not necessarily meant to convey political arguments or champion particular issues; instead, they are employed to deliver sensational content designed to attract readers. This aligns with prior research findings, indicating that popular newspapers, especially those incorporating social media sources, tend to prioritise personalisation as a means of capturing readers' attention (Broersma and Graham, 2013).

In 2020 social media, a popular instrument to cite ordinary people, was considered convenient and low cost. However, newspapers, including the popular paper, *Apple Daily*, did not show an increasing frequency of citing ordinary people's sources. A similar trend emerges

from earlier research, which indicates that despite the growing use of social media as sources by journalists, governmental sources continue to dominate news reporting (Heim, 2021). Indeed, the newspapers applied social media just as the literature indicates as a marketing tool rather than an instrument to enrich the news sources (Lin, 2013; Lin, 2015; Xiao and Wang, 2018). Although journalists agree that social media has the potential to provide multiple news perspectives (Liu and Lo, 2017), it might not reflect on source diversity. As Firmstone (2023) states, using citizens' voices is a double-edged sword, which can be either an information subsidy or a potential threat to the journalistic profession. While social media have expanded the accessibility for citizens to engage with comments and for journalists to connect with potential sources compared to the past, the capacity for ordinary individuals to have their voices recognised remains limited.

5.3.2 Source transparency

The second criterion, source transparency in political news, is closely linked to normative expectations of credibility and objectivity (Tuchman, 1972; Karlsson, 2010). Transparent news sources allow for verification of the authenticity of information (Rupar, 2006), and enable journalists to avoid injecting their personal opinions into the reporting process, thus upholding the professional norms of neutrality and objectivity (Mencher, 1991).

Transparency of news sources could be extremely important for a new democracy when journalism establishes itself as part of a democratic institution. Except for specific cases, such as protecting news sources in an investigation report like the Watergate scandal, the transparent source is widely accepted as a norm to increase credibility and objectivity. In my coding frame, source transparency is categorised into three levels: transparent, translucent, and opaque (Lee, 2017). First, the transparent source is news sources when journalists clarify the attribution of citations with full identities by giving names, titles, and affiliations. Second, a translucent source indicates that source with partial identities. Last, opaque source means sources with little or no identities. In the following analysis, I classify both translucent and opaque sources as anonymous sources, as they share the common feature of being challenging to verify due to their limited identity disclosure.

Table 5. 5: The amount and percentage of transparent source in newspapers in 2008 and 2020

Newspaper (N=386)	2008			Newspaper (N=276)	2020		
	Transparent source	Anonymous source	Total		Transparent source	Anonymous source	Total
Apple Daily (N=64)	226 (78.20%)	63 (21.80%)	289 (100%)	Apple Daily (N=51)	122 (72.19%)	47 (27.81%)	169 (100%)
Liberty Times (N=124)	277 (87.11%)	41 (12.89%)	318 (100%)	Liberty Times (N=70)	148 (86.55%)	23 (13.45%)	171 (100%)
China Times (N=101)	147 (79.03%)	39 (20.97%)	186 (100%)	China Times (N=79)	165 (85.49%)	28 (14.51%)	193 (100%)
UDN (N=97)	147 (86.47%)	23 (13.53%)	170 (100%)	UDN (N=76)	187 (81.30%)	43 (18.70%)	190 (100%)
Total	797 (82.76%)	166 (17.24%)	963 (100%)	Total	622 (81.52%)	141 (18.48%)	763 (100%)

Note: In 2008, there were 28 opaque sources and 138 translucent sources, whereas in 2020, there were 64 opaque sources and 77 translucent sources.

The result indicates that after democratisation, newspapers cite news sources with a similar level of the transparent source. Table 5.5 shows that newspapers use 82.76% of transparent sources in 2008 and 81.52% in 2020. The popular newspaper, *Apple Daily*, exhibited the lowest level of transparency, recording 78.20% in 2008 and 72.19% in 2020. This suggests that popular newspapers may be perceived as less credible sources. The other three papers demonstrate a relatively high level of source transparency. For instance, *Liberty Times* cited transparent sources most frequently by 87.11% and 86.55% in 2008 and 2020. Furthermore, when investigating the specific newspapers, aside from *China Times*, three other newspapers used less transparent news sources in 2020. Both *Apple Daily* and *UDN* present less transparent sources across time by approximately 5%. Conversely, the transparent source in *China Times* slightly increases by around 6%. *Liberty Times* uses transparent sources at a similar level over time. Considering the modest shift in the citation of transparent sources, I suggest that newspapers, following the transition to democracy, maintain their commitment to professional standards to uphold their credibility. The result is in line with the study in another new democracy, South Korea, that newspapers tend to follow professional norms to use more transparent sources instead of anonymous sources in political news (Lee and Koh, 2010). This leads to the reflection that transparent sources are used as the defensive strategy employed to substantiate their credibility, a measure tied to a media system characterized by a relatively weakened public trust (Firmstone, 2023).

Furthermore, looking into the specific category of news sources, the popular paper and the other three newspapers perform in a divergent way. First, the popular paper uses more anonymous news sources than other newspapers, particularly ordinary people. Among all categories, ordinary people are the most frequently cited translucent source, 43.48% of all translucent sources cited in the newspaper, and it decreased to 30% in 2020. Second, other newspapers tend to cite translucent sources more from political institutions such as politicians and government officers (see Appendix 5, Table 3, and Table 4). This observation is consistent with my findings in source diversity, showing that popular newspapers often use more non-transparent sources from ordinary individuals.

In this research, I find that the way that newspapers present ordinary people's voices may tend to preserve the traditional routine of conducting direct interviews instead of citing an anonymous source from the internet, including the popular paper. It may be due to journalists' concern about the source from Facebook. They claim that it is hard to distinguish where the anonymous utterance comes from.

"Due to the anonymity of social media comments and articles, it is challenging to verify whether they are mobilised by a specific party to shape public opinion or if they represent genuine voices of real people." (A06)

After more than a decade, journalists who integrate social media into the journalistic routine have become aware of the risk behind the convenient and cost-saving way to use citizens' voices from social media. They expressed concerns about the potential manipulation of information on social media by netizen armies, which are typically operated by public relations companies hired and funded by political parties or politicians. These armies aim to shape public opinion in their favour or against their opponents. To avoid being instrumentalised, the newspapers unexpectedly illustrated the trend to remain in their traditional routine by conducting direct interviews with people rather than conveniently citing from social media. The existing research shows that journalists have been relatively sceptical about using news sources from the internet, as it requires caution in verifying them. Journalists are concerned that the vital values of the journalistic profession, accuracy, and credibility, may be at risk due to sources from the internet (Firmstone, 2023). This scepticism has not changed even with the integration of social media into journalists' routines. This implies that journalists remain the gatekeeper and consider citing ordinary people a potential risk to their journalistic boundary. For political news, ordinary people from the internet may not be considered as a valuable resource by the legacy media according to journalists' testimonies. It is remarkably easy to

access information without any added value as part of the news production process. However, this seems to be different for their online news, reflecting a distinct standard in journalistic professionalism (see Chapter 7).

Aside from *Apple Daily*, the other three newspapers demonstrated a trend to cite anonymous sources from political institutions. In 2008, three newspapers tend to cite translucent sources, mainly from the government, and then the political parties. In 2020, the government is still the most frequently cited anonymous source by *UDN* and *Liberty Times*. It may be due to their professional norms which makes them hesitate to cite anonymous sources, particularly ordinary people from social media (Broersma and Graham, 2013). Another reason could be closer to the political reality in Taiwan. The three newspapers focus more on revealing the inside story or wrongdoings related to opponent political parties and the government. The most common situation for citing politicians as anonymous or translucent sources is closed-door conferences or private meetings among political parties or governmental departments. For instance, when KMT government held a closed-door meeting with KMT legislators, anonymous sources are quoted as "*A KMT legislator reported that Premier Liu exhibited strong displeasure during the meeting with President Ma and KMT legislators.*" (17/09/2008, *Liberty Times*).

The risk of citing anonymous sources from politicians is that journalists may be instrumentalised to attack political opponents, particularly in the election news. This observation is also a characteristic of partisanship in media systems when the media act as a player instead of a bystander in the political field (Voltmer, 2012).

5.3.3 Partisan Bias

In investigating news source dynamics, it's vital to consider partisan bias as the third criterion in assessing news quality. The debate over partisan bias in political communication and journalism has endured over the years due to its complex measurement. Scholars have explored various methods for assessing partisan bias, examining it over time, such as during election periods, or on specific issues, like war or economic performance (Larcinese et al. 2011; Soroka, 2012). In this research, I am interested in partisan bias in the daily news of print as political news does not only function during the election period but "between election democracy" (de Vreese, 2017:175). In Taiwan, the election news has proven that partisan bias exists in the major newspapers. In the 1996, 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, newspapers were proved to be in favour of specific candidates according to their news content (Lo et al., 1996; Lo and

Huang, 2000; Lo et al., 2007). While partisanship within Taiwan's media system is acknowledged as a potential risk for exacerbating societal divisions stemming from diverse national identities, there has been limited research on how this partisanship operates and is reflected in daily news articles.

Three newspapers as political actors during the democratisation have accommodated themselves in the two-sides of the political spectrum, unification, and independence, along with the formulation of the two-party system. *Liberty Times* is conventionally believed to support Taiwan's independence which leans toward DPP party. By contrast, *UDN* and *China Times* are considered in favour of unification to stand on the side of KMT party in the transitional period. Taiwanese partisanship is rooted in such a political context. *Apple Daily*, transplanted from Hong Kong, seems to be ambiguous with its party affiliation. Partisanship in newspapers is conventionally discussed as a fact due to their historical connection with political parties (Lin, 2004; Huang, 2013).

The operationalisation of measuring partisanship is to investigate the positive or negative tone toward the government with KMT and DPP as the ruling party in 2008 and 2020. The variable of tone is coded into three parts of news articles, the headline, the journalist's voice, and quotes from others by the five-scale scoring system (-2=very negative, -1=negative, 0=neutral, 1=somewhat positive, 2=very positive). Aside from the tone toward the government in news articles, I coded the tone toward major political parties, DPP and KMT.

Partisanship reflected on the extreme tones toward the government.

Table 5. 6: The gap between two poles of the tone toward the government

	2008 Newspapers (N=386)	2020 Newspapers (N=276)	The most positive and negative tone
The gap of two poles in average score	0.73	0.84	2008 KMT as the ruling party The most positive: <i>China Times</i> (M= 0.54) The most negative: <i>Liberty Times</i> (M= -0.19) 2020 DPP as the ruling party The most positive: <i>Liberty Times</i> (M= 0.51) The most negative: <i>UDN</i> (M= -0.33)

*The range of average scores (M=-2 to 2)

In this section, I assess partisanship through two dimensions: the tone toward the government and the selection bias in sources. First, the result shows that the tone toward the government was slightly extreme after the democratic transition. Newspapers, as political actors, have clear political stances which can be translated into daily news, including straight news and features. When the ruling party alternated, their role was exchanged in terms of their

tone toward the government. It can be found in the three newspapers, aside from the popular paper *Apple Daily*. When looking into the gap between the most positive and the most negative tone among the three newspapers, the result shows that the gap between the two poles of tone mildly widens over time. Table 7.6 shows that in 2008, the most negative tone in *Liberty Times*, with an average score of -0.19, increased to -0.33 in 2020 with *UDN*. The most positive tone in *China Times*, with an average score of 0.54 in 2008, slightly decreases to 0.51 in 2020 with *Liberty Times*. The gap between the two poles increases from 0.73 to 0.84. This finding not only supports that the partisan watchdog role is prevalent in newspapers but also demonstrates an extreme trend of partisanship after the democratic transition.

Table 5. 7: Tones toward the government in the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020

2008 Newspapers (KMT in power)				
	Headline	Quote from others	Journalists' voice	Average
Apple Daily (N=21)	-0.57	-0.48	-0.33	-0.48
China Times(N=55)	-0.04	1.87	-0.22	0.54
Liberty Times (N=87)	-0.80	0.87	-0.64	-0.19
UDN(N=54)	0.11	0.39	0.22	0.24
2020 Newspapers (DPP in power)				
	Headline	Quote from others	Journalists' voice	Average
Apple Daily(N=25)	0.04	0	0	0.13
China Times(N=53)	-0.77	0.13	-0.30	-0.31
Liberty Times (N=40)	0.50	0.58	0.45	0.51
UDN(N=47)	-0.74	0.11	-0.34	-0.33

Note: The range of average scores (M=-2 to 2) based on the five-scale scoring system (-2=very negative, -1=negative, 0= neutral, 1= somewhat positive, 2=very positive).

Table 5.7 shows the average score of the tone presented in news articles by the four newspapers. In 2008, *Apple Daily* exhibited the most negative tone toward the government, likely attributed to its paparazzi-style journalism and market-driven approach. The newspaper emphasises the exposure of wrongdoings and a stance against injustice as part of its market-driven strategy. The other newspaper that held a negative tone toward the government is *Liberty Times* since, in 2008, KMT ruled the government. *UDN* and *China Times* averagely held a positive tone toward KMT government. The other three newspapers perform, based on their party affiliation, as a partisan watchdog. Particularly in *Liberty Times*, headlines and journalists' voices are very negative in 2008. In other words, the editorial voice in headlines and journalists' opinions are more critical to the government. In contrast, *UDN* shows a positive tone in all three parts of the news articles. I display the example of how newspapers express the positive tone and the negative tone toward the government in the news. Regarding the rising unemployment rate in 2008, *Liberty Times* uses a negative tone toward the government's policy

which aims to boost the economy. The headline contains a negative tone by quoting from others: "*In Efforts to Expand Job Opportunities: Labour Groups Express Dissatisfaction with Impromptu Policy*" (28/11/2008, *Liberty Times*). The feature also expresses journalists' opinions in a negative tone: "... *President Ma, please stop messing around when the government is fighting at the frontline.*" (28/11/2008, *Liberty Times*). On the other hand, *UDN* presented the same policy with the more positive headline "*Uncapped subsidies for an increasing job opportunity*" (28/11/ 2008, *UDN*).

In 2020 when DPP became the ruling party, *Liberty Times* turned to using the most positive tone toward DPP government in three parts of news articles, in headlines, citing from others and journalists' voices. On the other hand, *China Times* and *UDN* changed their tone from positive to negative toward the government, specifically in the headline and journalists' voices. Additionally, *Apple Daily* performs with a less obvious negative tone in 2020. An example can be found in the news related to the government triggering a water cut of irrigation water due to the shortage of rainfall. *UDN* presents the negative tone in journalists' opinion: "*The farmers were ambushed by news with mixed feelings.... When facing the shortage of water supply, agriculture was always sacrificed first.*" (15/10/2020, *UDN*). On the other hand, *Liberty Times* emphasised the cause of water shortage was the unprecedented extreme weather and focuses on the higher subsidy for farmers hit by the irrigation curb. (The example of the partisan watchdog in a news article, see Chapter 6)

With an overview of the print in 2008 and 2020, we can see that aside from *Apple Daily*, the three newspapers' average tone toward the government shifts from one side to the other side depending on which party is in power. In 2008 *UDN* presented more positive headlines toward the KMT government's policies or enactment, along with endorsements by quoting others such as experts, organised citizens and ordinary people, and journalists' voices. The same stories are presented in divergent ways in *Liberty Times* with more negative headlines and containing a more negative tone in journalists' voices. In 2020 when the DPP party came back to power, the three newspapers switched their tone toward the government to in line with their political affiliation.

Partisanship reflected on sourcing strategy.

Table 5. 8: The percentages of major news sources in political news

Count %	2008			2020		
	KMT government	Ruling party-KMT	Opposition party-DPP	DPP government	Ruling party-DPP	Opposition party-KMT
Apple Daily	79 29.04% (4)	56 20.59%	27 9.93%	60 36.47% (3)	22 14.47%	27 17.76%
China Times	91 53.53% (1)	23 13.53%	16 9.41%	71 40.11% (2)	15 8.47%	47 26.55%
Liberty Times	120 38.96% (3)	78 25.32%	31 10.06%	88 54.66% (1)	17 10.56%	28 17.39%
UDN	86 46.49% (2)	42 22.70%	22 11.89%	73 34.93% (4)	31 14.83%	47 22.49%
Total	376 40.21%	199 21.28%	96 10.27%	292 41.77%	85 12.16%	149 21.32%

*This table only displayed the result of major news sources. The statistics show all categories of news sources can refer to Appendix 5 Table 3-5.

Second, I explore the partisan bias in news sources, in which the newspapers with specific political alignment cite more governmental sources when their favoured party is in power. The finding reveals that the newspapers practise a partisan sourcing strategy by citing more governmental sources. Table 5.8 shows that, in 2008, KMT was in power so *China Times* and *UDN* show higher percentages of governmental sources with around 54% and 46%. By contrast, *Liberty Times* gives voice to the government with a percentage of 39%. In 2020, *Liberty Times* cites from the government increased to 54.66%, ranking the highest among the four newspapers due to DPP in power. By contrast, *China Times* and *UDN* decrease the frequency of citing governmental sources to around 40% and 35%. Citing more governmental sources does not necessarily equal reporting more positive news about the government. Nevertheless, when we combine selection and tone biases among these three newspapers, it suggests that politically aligned newspapers amplify government voices and adopt a positive tone when their endorsed party is in power.

The gap between the most and the least frequent citations of the governmental source among the three newspapers slightly increases by 5%. When the newspapers demonstrate more governmental sources, it could facilitate the government to clarify their policy or promote their political agenda. This can be seen as a strategy for the newspapers to support the specific political party which stands for a similar political ideology. When these newspapers play a watchdog role, they would offer the government more opportunity to reveal their policy under professional norms. A similar selected bias is found in the source from the opposition party in

2020 but not in 2008. In 2008, the selected bias in the opposition party is negligible with around 10% of DPP cited by each newspaper. However, in 2020 *UDN* and *China Times* cite more sources from the opposition party KMT, with around 23% and 27%, while *Liberty Times* only cites 17% from KMT. This is further supporting evidence for partisan bias, which is discussed less. The cause of the biased selection could be related to the partisan readers they served. Journalists may be able to choose whose voices are worth presenting in the first place. However, the ultimate news product is a collaborative output that normally needs to fit with the editorial line. In Taiwan's case, newspapers with political alignment are not only partisan in their tone toward the government but also filter the news sources in line with newspapers' political stands.

To support the finding that newspapers become more explicit partisanship, I quote journalists' testimony below. They explain the reason why partisanship became more sharply apparent between the two different political ideologies that the newspapers stand for. Senior journalists from different newspapers denote that they perceived the increasingly polarised trend among newspapers on the political spectrum with the two poles as unification with China and Taiwanese independence.

They indicate two reasons for the polarisation, the economic factor, and the owner's ideology. First, due to the shrinking print market, newspapers tend to present political ideology in line with their reader to secure their readership. Particularly, when the newspapers reduced the number of pages to save cost, there was only limited space left for news related to the opposite ideology. Second, when the political ideology and national identity that owners endorsed are less supported over time in the political realm, owners become more eager to champion their values by exerting pressure on the newsroom. This is of paramount importance in Taiwan, where two contrasting political ideologies, related to the national identities of Chinese and Taiwanese, as well as perspectives on Taiwan's future—whether it should reunify with China, maintain the status quo, or pursue independence—have made it an intensely contentious and pivotal issue since 2008.

"After democratisation, partisanship in newspapers polarised. First, they attempt to meet their readers' political inclination. Second, the owners' ideology influences the political context. For instance, UDN may seem to be more and more against DPP since they may find the possibility of unification with China declines rapidly. The political realm makes it more urgent to champion their political ideology." (A07)

"In recent years, the political affiliations have become more explicit. It is because newspapers reduce the amount of news in the printed edition to save on the cost of paper. The editorial desk will select news content that is closer to our ideology. In the past, more space to accommodate various voices and opinions. However, limited space is only

preserved for the voice in line with us, other voices, particular from the opposite political stance are easy to be squeezed out." (D04)

Journalists' testimonies show that owners' political ideology is the determinative factor in the newspapers. Previous studies found that political stance is normally presented in newspaper editorials. My findings shed light on how partisanship performs diversely in daily political news. I identify the tension between the ideal and the practice in Taiwan's print journalism. When the newspaper owners' ideology surpasses journalistic autonomy, journalists' profession as neutral and objective could be sacrificed. The in-depth analysis of how journalistic autonomy has been constrained by various influential factors including owner's ideology is discussed in Chapter 8.

5.4 Summary

This chapter presents the result of the first temporal comparison of news content. The first research question (RQ1) - *"What are the democratic values of news content in Taiwanese newspapers and how have they changed from 2008 to 2020?"* is answered. The first sub-question (RQ1.1) asks about the quantity of political news since 2008, to which I conclude that the volume of political news in print has slightly decreased since democratic transition. Interestingly, the proportion of political news has mildly increased as political news remains greatly valued by the newspapers. Given that their main goal as political actors has not been achieved - to build the nation, the newspapers champion political ideologies, reflecting unsolved national identities and inner tension in Taiwan.

The second sub-question (RQ1.3) asks about changes in news quantity over time in terms of representation, transparency, and partisan bias. I acknowledge that the utilisation of solely three variables to assess news quality entails limitations which may not comprehensively encapsulate all dimensions of quality in news reporting. However, due to time constraints and the scope of the research, I will only focus on three aspects of news quality in this study. First, regarding source diversity, I found that political news relies more on political institutions rather than giving voice to citizens, indicating a replication and reinforcement of power structures in society. Moreover, ordinary people are mostly presented in political news to amplify dramatic or sensational elements, with Vox pop and social media comments criticising their passive representation as political agents. Second, source transparency in political news remains at around 80% after democratisation, indicating that newspapers persist in their professional norms to maintain credibility by citing transparent news sources. Using anonymous sources

can jeopardise the media's professional and ethical standards. Journalists often hesitate to utilise online sources to present the public, given the lack of trust in netizens—particularly those employed by PR firms or funded by political parties to sway public opinion and shape political agendas. Lastly, I observed heightened partisanship between different political perspectives in 2020 compared to 2008. Notably, I found that the level of support or disapproval expressed by pro-KMT and pro-DPP newspapers, respectively, has significantly intensified from 2008 to 2020, corresponding to the ruling party they align with being in power during those years.

Chapter 6 Journalistic role performance in news content

6.1 Introduction

The question (RQ2) aims to explore the democratic function of journalism by investigating the practice of journalistic roles. After the political turmoil and the transition to democracy, Taiwan has entered a stage of more stable democracy since 2008 (Voltmer, 2008). Past research suggests that journalism in transitional democracies is anticipated to take on an interventionist stance by advocating for change and fulfilling a watchdog role in monitoring the government. It often adopts a loyal facilitator in efforts to enhance and develop the nation (Voltmer, 2004; Mellado et al., 2020; Hanitzsch et al., 2019). In Taiwan, newspapers have held a notable position as influential political players during times of transition. The mainlanders-owned newspapers like *UDN* and *China Times* have served as platforms for clientelism, closely associated with the long-ruling KMT party. Meanwhile, *Independence Evening Post*, a Taiwanese-owned newspaper, encouraged the process of democratisation (refer to Chapter 2). However, we still have limited knowledge about the extent to which the performance of these journalistic roles has evolved in print journalism following the democratisation process. Hence, this chapter aims to answer (RQ2) 2.2: *What are the journalistic role performances in newspapers from 2008 to 2020, and how have they changed over time?*

6.2 Journalistic Role Performance in 2008 and 2020

In this section, I first illustrate how journalistic role performance manifested in 2008 and 2020. I then discuss the difference between the two years and the four newspapers. As explained in Chapter 4, the five role performances are measured, i.e. interventionist, the watchdog, the collaborator, the infotainment, and the civic role. This chapter begins with an overview of the statistical findings, followed by concrete examples from political news and testimonies from journalists' interviews to support my arguments.

My research findings contain two types of statistical data for comparing the performance of various roles in political news. These data include average scores (mean values) representing the overall performance of each journalistic role and the percentage indicating the frequency of each indicator's appearance in news content. Since multiple role performances can be present in a single news article, the percentages reflect the occurrence of indicators accordingly. These indicators, whether present or absent, contribute to a scoring system that is used to calculate

average scores. In this study, meaningful differences are defined as changes exceeding 5% in percentage or greater than 0.1 in the average score within a range of 0 to 2. News articles are assessed in two parts: the headline and the body of the content. Each part can contribute a maximum average score of one, resulting in a total highest score of two for the entire article and a minimum score of zero.




Figure 6. 1 The average score of five role performances over time

Figure 6.1 shows the average score of the five role performances practised by the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020. In 2008 the successful second party alternation through the democratic election was a remarkable landmark showing that Taiwan has progressed from transitional democracy to more consolidated democracy. Against this backdrop, we can see in 2008 the newspapers generally demonstrated a strong interventionist role (M=0.39) followed by the watchdog role (M=0.24), the infotainment role (M=0.2). The civic role is relatively weak (M=0.13), and the collaborator role is the least practised (M=0.01) (see Figure 6.1). Several characteristics of journalistic role performance in transitional democracy are found in line with the expectations in Taiwan, such as the higher level of the interventionist and watchdog role displayed. However, the newspapers performed as collaborator at a negligible level at that time which contrasts with Hanitzsch's research that development journalism in transitional democracies tends to embrace the collaborator role to facilitate improving and building the country.

First, regarding the interventionism dimension, the strong interventionist role in 2008 aligns with the Western assumption that journalists incline to perform as strong interventionists, aiming to build the country and advocate social reforms (Votmer, 2014; Hanitzsch et al., 2019). This finding of the high level of interventionism, is in accordance with previous qualitative research that political journalists in Taiwan tend to perceive themselves as a political change agent during the transitional period (Huang, 2013). According to this thinking, in 2020, after the transitional period, we would expect the interventionist role to be less active since the main political change in the political regime is completed. Meanwhile, the code of ethics suggests that U.S. professionalism in terms of newspapers' normative norms has been adopted in Taiwan with the ethical code emphasis on being detached, neutral, and objective - see "*The Code of Ethics for ROC press*" (see Chapter 2). Particularly for straight news, the code states that journalists should avoid expressing their opinions. The code of ethics applied in Taiwan should lead news content to be less interventionist after the transitional period. However, the transformation is not in the way expected. The interventionist role was performed at the highest level among all roles in 2008 ($M=0.39$) and it stayed at almost the same level in 2020 ($M=0.40$). This discovery contradicts the findings of three decades long survey on Taiwanese journalists' role perceptions, revealing a general preference for the disseminator role over the advocate role 2014 (Lo, 1998; Lo, 2012; Liu and Lo, 2017).

Second, regarding the power-distance dimension, the watchdog role is the main characteristic of Hallin and Mancini's (2004) liberal media system as well as in developed countries. The extremely strong watchdog role can typically be observed in the early stages of new democracies, as suggested by Mellado and Van Dalen's (2017) Honeymoon Hypothesis, but it tends to weaken as journalism accommodates its relations with politics. In 2020, the role performance in the watchdog role ($M=0.22$) is slightly less than in 2008 ($M=0.24$), but this is not a meaningful change. Previous research suggests that the collaborator role is valued by Asian and developing countries (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Hanitzsch et al., 2019). As a new democracy in Asia, the collaborator role is believed to offset the Western presumption of strong watchdog journalism. In 2020, the collaborator role performance remains the least practised role, with an average score ($M=0.03$) like 2008($M= 0.01$) showing that so-called Asian traits in role performance are not supported in the Taiwanese context.

Finally, regarding the market-orientation dimension, after democratisation, newspapers face the challenge of digital media and the fiercely competing media market (Lee, 2001). The

market-driven journalism significantly impacted Taiwanese newspapers when the symbolic popular paper, *Apple Daily*, gained the most readership in 2008 (Chen, 2009). The higher level of the infotainment role is expected to be present in news content. In 2008, the infotainment role is ranked third among the five role performances ($M=0.2$) which are in line with the presumption. However, in 2020 the infotainment role drops to 0.13, marking the most notable shift among all role performances. This fall not only goes against the existing research about Taiwan but is the opposite of the result of my interviews. Most journalists perceive a shift to a market-oriented role, but this is not evident in the content (Chapter 8). As for the civic role, in a new democracy, empirical studies show that media positively influence the improvement of citizenship (Voltmer, 2004). The level of the civic role, which represents citizens' voices and provides information on civil activities, is assumed to increase. The results do not fully support this presumption as the civic role performance in 2008 ($M=0.13$) and 2020 ($M=0.15$) is similar, with a negligible increase.

Surprisingly, the result of the role performance analysis between 2008 and 2020 demonstrates few changes. The role performances of Taiwanese political news in the major newspapers after democratisation exhibits a consistent pattern, apart from the infotainment role. The change in the level of the infotainment role is more obvious than others by a decreasing average score of 0.07. The average scores of other role performances show slight differences, such as a rise in the interventionist role, the collaborator role, and the civic role with less than 0.02 and a drop in the watchdog role by 0.02. Nevertheless, whether the role performance is relatively stable, or the changes may be offset due to the difference among newspapers needs further investigation. In the upcoming sections, I will delve into a detailed discussion of each role performance, drawing from specific indicators (the indicators of each role in Appendix 6 Table 1).

To offer a more comprehensive understanding of the nuanced differences within these indicators, I dissect the three role performances – interventionist, watchdog, and civic roles – into two distinct facets, excluding the infotainment role. In the subsequent paragraphs, I delve into each role performance and elaborate on the significance of their subcomponents.

6.3 Interventionist: The newspapers reserve their interventionist role after democratic transition.

Table 6. 1: The average scores of the interventionist role in 2008 and 2020

	Two aspects	Mean value		Main contributing indicator
		2008 (N=386)	2020 (N=276)	
Interventionist	Content-driven (Including journalist's opinion, interpretation, and proposals/demands)	0.39	0.39	-Journalist's opinion (-5.8%) -Interpretation (+5.6%)
	Style-driven (Including adjectives, and first person)	0.39	0.42	First person (+3%)
	Total	0.39	0.4	

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

In my research, the interventionist role contains two aspects: content-driven intervention is reflected in three key indicators—journalists' opinions, interpretations, and demands. Style-driven intervention is characterised using adjectives and the inclusion of first-person language (Stępińska et al., 2021). The content-driven interventionism allows journalists to express their opinions freely within news articles, while the style-driven interventionism emphasises the use of specific wording. Table 6.1 demonstrates that the newspapers displayed a similar level of performance in both content-driven and style-driven aspects in 2008. It is worth noting that a slight increase in style-driven intervention occurred in 2020. This indicates that Taiwanese newspapers not only excel in expressing their opinions in content but also in their writing style. Previous research suggests that in countries with limited press freedom and journalistic autonomy, journalism tends to perform more strongly in the style-driven aspect than the content-driven aspect (Stępińska et al., 2021). The fact that Taiwan, with its higher level of press freedom and journalistic autonomy, exhibits a similarly high level of performance in both aspects could be seen as a reflection of these democratic values. Furthermore, the high interventionist role may be because, despite democratisation, there is still a major cleavage, in terms of unification and independence, in society that the newspapers attempt to intervene in.

Table 6. 2: Presence of content-driven and style-driven indicators of the interventionist role for all newspapers

	Interventionist	2008 (N=386)	Rank	2020 (N=276)	Rank	Gap
Content-driven	Journalist's opinion	81 (21%)	3	42(15.2%)	3	-5.8%
	Interpretation	261(67.6%)	1	202(73.2%)	1	+5.6%
	Proposals /Demands	16 (4.1%)	4	9(3.3%)	5	-0.8%
Style-driven	Adjectives	222(57.5%)	2	164 (59.4%)	2	+1.9%
	First Person	15 (3.9%)	5	19 (6.9%)	4	+3%

Table 6.2 shows the frequency of each indicator appearing in news content with percentages. We can see political news provides much more interpretation but fewer opinions and slightly fewer proposals in their news content over time. Additionally, political news demonstrates a little more interventionist colour in their writing style. Among all indicators, "interpretation" has been the primary element of the interventionist role, accounting for 67.6% in 2008 and increasing to 73.2% in 2020. The "evaluative adjectives" ranked second with a frequency of nearly 60% in both years. This is followed by the "journalist's opinion" with 21% and 15.2% percentages in 2008 and 2020. The least frequent indicators are "first person" and "journalist propose or demand," with a small percentage (less than 7%). The two major indicators that contribute to an increase in interventionism are the use of interpretive content and the first-person writing style. In the content-driven aspect, the main expression of journalistic voice is to interpret while journalists give their opinions less often and seldom propose demands or suggestions. The change of a rise in "interpretation" (5.6%) and a drop in "journalist's opinion" (5.8%) highlight that interpretative journalism is emphasised more after the democratic transition.

Previous research suggests that journalism in transitional democracy and the Popular Polarised Model is expected to be an advocate for social change; political news may contain more journalists' opinions by taking sides and showing political stances toward specific issues (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). My research finds that after the democratic transition, journalism begins to stress explanations of the causes and meanings or consequences of certain political factors or agendas. Notably, the predominant factor, i.e. interpretation, sets journalism in Taiwan apart from the countries in Hallin and Mancini's Popular Polarised Model. In these countries, journalists tend to convey more "demands and proposals" in their news content (Stępińska et al., 2021).

The following examples aim to illustrate how the content-driven and style-driven interventionist role was enacted in political news coverage. First, the content-driven

interventionist is performed when the news is related to a referendum. The newspapers advocate their political stance in specific political agendas and attempt to influence public opinions. Secondly, style-driven interventionism comes into play when the nation is confronted with military threats. The increased use of terms like "we" or "our," which emphasise collective identity, results in the rise of the interventionist role.

Examples

1.The content-driven interventionist

The growing presence of interpretative elements in news, among the content-driven aspect, contributes to the rise in the interventionist role. In 2020, the controversy over lifting the ban on U.S. pork containing ractopamine took centre stage in Taiwan's politics. The opposition party, KMT, led a campaign against this move and sought to block it through a failed referendum. Nevertheless, the ban was lifted. Newspapers played a crucial role in interpreting the policy's impact, addressing concerns about public health and the U.S.-Taiwan trading relationship. This aligns with previous research on the media's role in covering referendums, like the UK press during the EU referendum (Levy et al., 2016), where the media played an intensified interventionist role. A particular feature in *China Times* criticised the government's approach to lifting the ban.

"...The government announced that U.S. pork plants would undergo inspections before allowing imports to address public concerns. However, due to the pandemic, travel to the U.S. may not be feasible at the moment, automatically causing delays in the import process. This situation could potentially benefit the government, as lifting the ban might appease the U.S. government, and the delay due to the pandemic could alleviate immediate consumer concerns. Nevertheless, the U.S. government should be mindful of the calculations by the Taiwan government, which might inadvertently strain the trade relationship between the two countries." (China Times, 27/11/2020)

2.The style-driven interventionist

The second aspect of increasing the interventionist role is in writing style. After President Tsai won her second term in 2020, Chinese military aircraft frequently intruded on Taiwan's air defence identification zone (ADIZ). News articles related to national defence used the first person, such as *"our air defence identification zone"* and *"our national military,"* to represent the country as a whole and contrast it with China's ambition to invade the island. Instead of "I" or "My", Taiwanese journalists expressed their intervention by using "Our" when national identity was emphasised. In particular, *Liberty Times*, which supports Taiwan's independence, shows the highest presence of the first person (10%). *Liberty Times* used first-person in the

headline to emphasise the interventionist role: "Avoiding China wiretapping attack Our European Embassy, Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau conducts detection (*Liberty Times*, 8/9/2020)". In contrast, *UDN*, the paper in favour of unification with China, toned down the antagonism with the lowest frequent presence of first-person (3.9%) (see Appendix 6, Table 3). To put it simply, as cross-strait conflicts escalated, pro-independence *Liberty Times* and anti-Communist party *Apple Daily* became more interventionist compared to the pro-unification *UDN* and *China Times*. This result echoes the previous study that the media could be more supportive of the nation during a crisis or conflict (Zelizer and Allan, 2011).

6.3.1 The interventionist role in news forms: setting the boundary of professionalism.

In the early 20th century, U.S. journalism championed the clear separation of commentary and news. This practice has since been adopted by Taiwanese newspapers. Before the introduction of U.S. journalism, intellectuals serving as journalists wrote news articles with their opinion and interpretations, aiming to educate the public. The distinction between fact and opinion became a fundamental principle in news writing during the process of democratisation, which was fostered through journalism education (Peng, 2008). To evaluate the degree to which journalists separate their opinion and news fact into two news forms, news articles are grouped into two categories: feature (reportage and feature, editorials are not included) and straight news (brief and general news articles).

Table 6. 3: Presence of indicators of the interventionist role in different types of news stories

Year	2008				2020			
	Straight news (Number=339) M=.32		Features (Number=47) M=.91		Straight news (Number=250) M=.35		Features (Number=26) M=.88	
	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number
Journalist opinion	12.4%	42	83.0%	39	8.0%	20	84.6%	22
Interpretation	63.4%	215	97.9%	46	71.2%	178	92.3%	24
Proposes/Demands	1.5%	5	23.4%	11	0.8%	2	26.9%	7
Adjectives	52.8%	179	91.5%	43	55.6%	139	96.2%	25
First Person	3.2%	11	8.5%	4	6.4%	16	11.5%	3

Table 6.3 presents the difference between features and straight news in relation to the indicators of the interventionist role. Based on average scores in both 2008 and 2020, feature articles in the newspapers consistently display a greater degree of interventionist characteristics compared to straight news. In 2008, straight news articles had an average interventionist score of 0.32, while feature articles exhibited a notably higher score of 0.91. Similarly, in 2020, the average interventionist score for straight news was 0.35, whereas feature articles recorded a score of 0.88.

Looking into the specific indicators, the content-driven aspect, "journalist's opinion" and "proposals or demands" decreased in straight news, over time by 4.4% and 0.7%, respectively. It shows that journalistic performance reduced in the use of strong opinion in straight news (from 12.4% to 8.0%) but increased in explaining the causes (from 63.4% to 71.2%). This finding is significant in how the interventionist role was enacted in Taiwan after democratisation. Reducing journalists' voices in straight news can be considered an improvement in journalistic professionalism. The data demonstrates that since 2008, strong opinions and demands of journalists have been more clearly delineated from straight news, aligning with *"The Code of Ethics for ROC press"*. In other words, in Taiwan, the gradual separation of facts and opinions across various news formats has reshaped journalistic culture, following the influence of U.S. journalism. Ensuring that personal opinions do not infiltrate straight news remains a fundamental principle, a point on which most journalists interviewed agree (see Chapter 8). Interestingly, the increase in the interpretation of straight news from 63.4% to 71.2% reflects the characteristic of contextual journalism (Fink and Schudson, 2014) that emerged in Taiwan. As mentioned, an increase in interpretation may be due to the complex issue of modern society's need for journalists not only to give the facts but to explain the cause and consequences (Barnhurst and Mutz, 1997). This result is indicative of the growing professionalism and independence within journalistic culture (Fink and Schudson, 2014). However, it is essential to delve deeper into the specifics of news content. Consequently, I will address other critical role performances, such as the watchdog role and the civic role, in subsequent sections.

Overall, my research finds a subtle change in the interventionist role performance after democratic transition. As the political news articles in traditional Confucian journalism are dominated by journalists' opinion and interpretations to enlighten people before democratisation, there is no clear boundary between news fact and opinions. After U.S. professionalism in print is introduced, the practise of dividing facts and opinions into different

news forms, known as the "hard news paradigm" (Esser and Umbricht, 2014; Høyer and Pöttker, 2005) to pursue objectivity and fact-centred coverage commences ¹⁰. The boundary between news forms to separate journalists' opinions from straight news has dominated the pattern of interventionist role practised.

6.3.2 The interventionist role is pervasive in particular newspaper

Table 6. 4: The average of indicators of the interventionist role in the four newspapers

Indicators of the model	Content-driven (Mean=0-2)		Style-driven (Mean=0-2)		Total	
	2008 Mean (Rank)	2020 Mean (Rank)	2008 Mean (Rank)	2020 Mean (Rank)	2008 Mean (Rank)	2020 Mean (Rank)
Apple Daily (N=64)	0.35 (3)	0.43 (2)	0.39 (2)	0.51 (1)	0.37(3)	0.46(1)
Liberty Times (N=124)	0.33 (4)	0.34 (4)	0.35 (3)	0.38 (3)	0.34(4)	0.36(3)
China Times (N=101)	0.50 (1)	0.44 (1)	0.47 (1)	0.46 (2)	0.49(1)	0.45(2)
UDN (N=97)	0.39 (2)	0.37 (3)	0.35 (3)	0.36 (4)	0.39(2)	0.36(3)

As aforementioned, the type of newspapers in Taiwan is hard to distinguish (see Chapter 3) aside from *Apple Daily*, which explicitly positions itself a popular paper. *UDN* and *China Times* conventionally are considered quality papers and *Liberty Times* is considered a popular paper (Lin, 2008). Some scholars recently suggested that there is no quality paper in Taiwan since newspapers are homogenised by *Apple Daily* with market-orientation journalism (Hsu and Lo, 2019). Nevertheless, my finding does not completely support Stępińska et al.'s (2020) research that popular papers tend to be more style-driven than quality papers. In 2008, the most interventionist paper regarding their writing style was *China Times* instead of *Apple Daily*. By 2020, *Apple Daily* had become the most interventionist paper in terms of writing style, with a rise from 0.39 to 0.51, surpassing *China Times*, which remained at a similar level of 0.46 and was ranked second. Because of the blurred distinction between quality and popular newspapers, the writing style can be more closely linked to organisational culture. This finding is exemplified by *China Times*. Apart from *Apple Daily*, *China Times* has consistently exhibited a relatively high and stable level of style-driven interventionism using evaluative adjectives

¹⁰ It includes "inverted pyramid writing, balanced reporting, emphasis on verifiable facts and attributed sources, a detached point of view, and the separation of the news and editorial functions of the news organisation. (Esser and Umbricht, 2014:230)".

since 2008. According to my interviewees, the organisational culture at *China Times* is renowned for a writing style that tends to blend opinions with facts in its news narratives. Several senior journalists who were interviewed shared similar views.

"Political journalists at China Times recognise that their news articles often mix opinions with facts. This reflects the newspaper's liberal leaning within KMT, contrasting with the more conservative UDN during the authoritarian era. The newspaper's ownership had adopted a more liberal approach in critiquing the government before its acquisition by Want Want Food Company." (D02)

6.4 Power distance

In the dimension of power distance, the watchdog and collaborator roles, positioned at opposite ends of the spectrum, are evaluated using seven respective indicators (see Appendix 6 Table 1). I find that the watchdog role is performed at a more substantial level, whereas the collaborator role exhibits the lowest performance post-democratisation. In the subsequent sections, I delve into the watchdog role's performance from two perspectives – detached and interventionist watchdog – plus a few occasions when the collaborator role is performed after democratisation.

6.4.1 Watchdog role: the second significant role performance

The watchdog role is normatively presumed to be a fundamental function of the media to hold the government accountable. In new democracies, exceptionally robust watchdog journalism might resemble a honeymoon phase during the early stages of democracy. Over time, journalists tend to lessen their criticism of the new government and maintain the status quo (Mellado and Van Dalen, 2017). My finding shows that the watchdog role has been constantly strong, ranked as the second most performed role in both surveyed years. There is minimal change over time, with the average score for the watchdog role being 0.24 in 2008 and 0.22 in 2020. To understand how newspapers with divergent political ideologies and party alignments function as watchdogs when the opposing party is in power, I examine two aspects of watchdog role that offer insights into how newspapers readjust after a democratic transition. The statistical findings are then put into the political context by providing examples to support the arguments.

Table 6. 5: The average scores of the watchdog role in 2008 and 2020

Two aspects of watchdog role	Mean value		Main contributing indicator
	2008 (N=386)	2020 (N=276)	
Interventionist Watchdog (Including questioning, criticism, and denouncement from journalists)	0.12	0.06	Journalists' question (-5 %)
Detached Watchdog (Including information on judgement, questioning, criticism, and denouncement from others)	0.33	0.35	Others' criticism (+4.2%)
Total	0.24	0.22	

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

According to Table 6.5, Taiwanese newspapers demonstrated a stronger detached watchdog performance than interventionist watchdog in 2008 (M = .33 and M = .12) and 2020 (M = .35 and M = .06). This finding is similar to the trend in 18 countries, not including Taiwan, where newspapers preferred to scrutinise the power via other sources instead of using the journalist's voice (Márquez-Ramírez et al., 2021). However, the study identified a significant disparity in Asian countries, particularly China and Hong Kong, where the interventionist watchdog role is completely absent in news content. In contrast, according to my finding, Taiwan presents a distinct scenario when it comes to performing the interventionist watchdog role post-democratisation. The process of democratisation, driven by newspapers, fosters an environment in which journalists can freely pose questions, criticise, and denounce the government, particularly during the transitional phase. After the transitional period, although the average score of the watchdog role remains at a similar level, I find a subtle change, with a weaker presence in the interventionist watchdog role and a slightly stronger presence in the detached watchdog role.

Table 6. 6 : The percentage and ranking of indicators of the watchdog role in 2008 and 2020

	Watchdog	2008 (N=386)	Rank	2020 (N=276)	Rank	difference
Interventionist Watchdog	Questioning: Journalists	40(10.4%)	2	15(5.4%)	2	-5%
	Criticism: Journalists	42(10.9%)	1	18(6.5%)	1	-4.4%
	Denouncement: Journalists	15(3.9%)	3	2(0.7%)	3	-3.2%
Detached Watchdog	Information on judgement	101(26.2%)	1	64 (23.2%)	2	-3%
	Questioning: Others	75(19.4%)	3	63(22.8%)	3	+3.4%
	Criticism: Others	93(24.1%)	2	78(28.3%)	1	+4.2%
	Denouncement: Others	52(13.5%)	4	43(15.6%)	4	+2.1%

As shown in Table 6.6, the percentage of frequency appearing in political news in each indicator of watchdog role shows that the contributing indicator of decreasing interventionist watchdog is journalists' voice in questioning, criticism, and denouncement with a drop of 5%, 4.4% and 3.2%. By contrast, the increase in the level of the detached watchdog is due to the rise of others' questions, criticism, and denouncement with 2.1 %, 3.4% and 4.2%. This suggests that the overall decline in the watchdog role post-transitional period is primarily driven by the reduced frequency of the three interventionist watchdog indicators, while the detached watchdog indicators experience a slight increase.

These findings are supported by my interviews with journalists. After the second party alternation in 2008, Taiwanese society was significantly impacted by political turmoil surrounding the former President Chen Shui-bian (DPP), who was accused of corruption during his second term in office. Following this, the KMT party returned to power, and there was a prevailing political atmosphere in which the public was eager to hold the government accountable. During the sampled period, the newspapers played a crucial role in revealing the prolonged political debate and judicial process surrounding Chen's corruption. They actively performed an interventionist watchdog role by criticising and questioning not only Chen but also his family members, who were involved in an alleged money laundering crime. Therefore, the newspapers performed more aggressively in intervening in the political debate. In my interviews, senior journalists suggested that the era of extreme advocacy journalism has gradually passed and that since democratisation, society no longer expects the press to use such interventionist methods to advocate change. In summary, the interventionist watchdog role of the newspapers tends to be more pronounced during periods of significant political scandal during democratic transition and weakens as the country progresses toward democratic consolidation.

Comparing the watchdog role in the content of the four newspapers

Given the connection of practising a watchdog role with holding the government of the day to account, I now investigate how the performance of this role is shaped by whether the party that a paper expresses its support for is the governing party or the opposition party. To accomplish this, I examine the watchdog role in two distinct timeframes, in 2008 with KMT as the ruling party, and in 2020 with DPP in power, respectively.

Table 6. 7: The mean value of two aspects of the watchdog role in coverage of the four newspapers

Newspaper	Interventionist watchdog			Detached watchdog			Total	
	2008 Mean (Rank)	2020 Mean (Rank)	Gap	2008 Mean (Rank)	2020 Mean (Rank)	Gap	2008 Mean (Rank)	2020 Mean (Rank)
Apple Daily (N=64 in 2008, N=51 in 2020)	0.06 (4)	0.06 (3)	0	0.48 (1)	0.33 (3)	-0.15	0.30 (1)	0.21 (3)
Liberty Times (N=124 in 2008, N=70 in 2020)	0.12 (2)	0.02 (4)	-0.1	0.32 (2)	0.24 (4)	-0.08	0.23 (3)	0.15 (4)
China Times (N=101 in 2008, N=79 in 2020)	0.16 (1)	0.08 (2)	-0.08	0.31 (3)	0.39 (2)	+0.08	0.25 (2)	0.26 (2)
UDN (N=97 in 2008, N=76 in 2020)	0.10 (3)	0.09 (1)	+0.01	0.26 (4)	0.41 (1)	+0.15	0.19 (4)	0.27 (1)

*The range of average scores (M=0-2) based on the frequency of the indicators appeared in news articles.

**The gap refers to the difference between the average score in 2008 and 2020.

Table 6.7 shows the mean value and ranking of the four newspapers in the two dimensions of a watchdog role in 2008 and 2020. When KMT returned to power in 2008, the four newspapers varied in their performance of the interventionist and the detached watchdog role. The pro-KMT papers, *UDN* and *China Times* showed a relatively low level of detached watchdog (M=0.31 and 0.26, respectively), while the pro-DPP paper *Liberty Times* and anti-Communist paper *Apple Daily* ranked first and second in detached watchdog (M= 0.48 and M=0.32, respectively). For the interventionist watchdog role, surprisingly the pro-KMT *China Times* scored the highest level (M = 0.16) and the pro-DPP *Liberty Times* ranked in second place (M= 0.12), followed by pro-KMT *UDN* and anti-communist *Apple Daily*. In 2020, when DPP was the ruling party, the pattern of how the four newspapers performed the watchdog roles significantly shifted. The two pro-KMT papers, *UDN* and *China Times* ranked first and second in both interventionist and detached watchdog, followed by the anti-Communist *Apple Daily* and pro-DPP *Liberty Times* which performed the least in both aspects of watchdog (M=0.02 and 0.24, respectively).

This finding offers evidence that the partisanship of Taiwanese newspapers significantly impacts their performance in both the interventionist and detached aspects of the watchdog role. Journalists' testimonies further corroborate this, indicating that their intensity in scrutinising

the government may vary based on which party in power (See Chapter 8). When taking an interventionist approach, the two pro-KMT newspapers were more likely to direct journalists' scrutinising voices toward the DPP government in 2020. Conversely, the pro-DPP *Liberty Times* exhibited the lowest level of interventionist watchdog performance, and its difference was notably significant, marked by the widest gap in average scores between different political parties (with a gap of 0.1 in the difference of means between 2008 and 2020). *Apple Daily* remains in the low level of interventionist watchdog over time.

We may wonder what explains the relatively high level of scrutiny that the pro-KMT *China Times* gave to the KMT government. In the next section, I examine the different actors that the paper scrutinised, which provides more convincing evidence for the argument that journalists were encouraged and allowed to express their opinions to scrutinise people in power.

The focus of the watchdog role

The watchdog role of the press serves as the fourth estate, holding those in power accountable (Mellado and Van, 2015; Hanitzsch et al., 2019). While the government is a primary target for media scrutiny in political news, it is not the sole actor that the press scrutinises in political news. The media's watchdog role extends to people in power across all political parties. In Taiwan's political system, the two major parties, KMT and DPP, alternate in power. The press scrutinised the major opposition party since it is considered as the potential ruling party. According to my coding framework, the focus of the watchdog role can be classified into three main groups: the government, the opposition party, and others (such as business elites or other political parties).

Table 6. 8: The objective of the watchdog role performed toward by the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020

Count %	2008 KMT in power			2020 DPP in power		
	KMT government	Opposition party-DPP	Other	DPP government	Opposition party-KMT	Other
Apple Daily	37 57.81%	27 42.19%	4 6.25%	17 33.33%	4 7.84%	6 11.76%
China Times	45 44.55%	28 27.72%	7 6.93%	43 54.43%	5 6.33%	6 7.59%
Liberty Times	107 86.29%	4 3.23%	1 0.81%	14 20%	10 14.29%	5 7.14%
UDN	32 31.68%	22 21.78%	3 2.97%	26 34.21%	11 14.47%	3 3.95%
Total	221 57.25%	81 20.98%	15 3.89%	100 36.23%	30 10.87%	20 7.25%

The results reveal that in both 2008 and 2020, the primary focus of the newspapers' scrutiny was the government, accounting for 57.25% and 36.23% respectively. The opposition party DPP received scrutiny of 20.98% in 2008, while the opposition party KMT received 10.87% in 2020. When examining the individual newspapers, it becomes evident that the practice of the watchdog role is closely tied to partisanship. For example, in 2008, when KMT was in power, *Liberty Times* exhibited the highest frequency of watchdog role practise toward KMT government (86.29%), followed by *Apple Daily* (57.81%). Pro-KMT papers *China Times* (44.5%) and *UDN* (31.68%) also engaged in watchdog role practices. However, when the other three newspapers scrutinised the opposition party DPP due to the former President Chen's scandal, *Liberty Times* appeared to tone down its scrutiny, practising the watchdog role toward DPP only a few times (3.23%). In 2020, with DPP in power, *China Times* and *UDN* focused on the government with 54.43% and 34.21% respectively, while *Apple Daily* exhibited 33.33% focus. *Liberty Times* allocated only 20% of its focus to the DPP government but 14.29% toward the opposition party KMT (see Table 6.8).




Figure 6. 2 Percentage of the object toward whom interventionist watchdog claims made in each paper

When looking into the two aspects of watchdog role, the same partisan pattern is found in both interventionist and detached dimensions. Figure 6.2 shows that the interventionist watchdog was significantly influenced by partisanship in both 2008 and 2020. In 2008 pro-DPP *Liberty Times* had the highest percentage of news articles scrutinising the government with journalistic voices (25.8%), which is nearly three times the rate of pro-KMT paper *UDN* (9.3%). However, in 2020 *Liberty Times* had a slump (from 25.8% to 4.3%) in performing an interventionist watchdog role toward the DPP government. At the same time, *UDN* scored the highest rate (18.4%) in scrutinising the government with journalists' voices which was almost three times the percentage when the KMT government was in power. Additionally, the interventionist watchdog role performed by newspapers toward the opposition party in 2008 was more than in 2020. It may be due to former President Chen's scandals, which were severely criticised in print, while *Liberty Times* shows a relatively low percentage (0.8%).

China Times is an interesting case since its political ideology is in line with KMT but still practised a relatively high level of interventionist role toward KMT government. In 2008, the frequency of journalists' doubt, criticism, and denouncement toward the KMT government is 21.8% in *China Times*, which is only slightly lower than the pro-DPP *Liberty Times* (25.8%). Moreover, *China Times* shows the highest percentage of scrutinising the opposition party DPP (9.9%) in their political news among all newspapers. This matches journalists' testimonies about the newsroom culture in *China Times* having a high level of liberal tradition. The newsroom was given such autonomy that they were able to scrutinise the ruling party KMT, despite this going against the political ideology of the owner. *China Times* may be interpreted as a symbolic paper in which professionalism, to a certain degree, could yield partisanship when it had been owned by the founder Yu Chi-Chun and his family. However, when its ownership transferred to *Want Want* food company after 2008, the newsroom autonomy was sacrificed over the owners' business interest in China.




Figure 6. 3 Percentage of the object toward whom detached watchdog claims made in each paper

Figure 6.3 illustrates that the journalistic performance of the detached watchdog, specifically in terms of scrutinising from external sources, aligns with the assumption that it can be distinguished by partisanship. In 2008, *Liberty Times* continued to exhibit the highest level of scrutiny toward the government by citing others, with the least frequency of scrutiny directed toward the opposition DPP party. However, in 2020, *Liberty Times* only had a 21.4% percentage of scrutinising the government from external sources, yet it demonstrated the highest proportion of revealing wrongdoings by the opposition party KMT (8.6%). In contrast, when the DPP was in power, *China Times* and *UDN* secured the first and second-highest percentages in the detached watchdog role with figures of 78.5% and 68.4%, respectively.

In summary, all newspapers, except for *Apple Daily*, exhibit a similar pattern in practising the watchdog role. When the DPP is in power, *Liberty Times*, a pro-DPP newspaper, tends to scrutinise the government less frequently and relies more on external voices to criticise the government rather than journalists' perspectives. Conversely, when KMT is in power, the pro-DPP newspaper tends to scrutinise the government more frequently, incorporating more journalists' opinions in political news coverage. This partisan watchdog pattern is also observed in the pro-KMT newspapers, *China Times* and *UDN*.

Example:

In the previous section, I examined how the newspapers performed in both aspects of the watchdog role. The findings suggest that the intensity of the watchdog role may vary based on the favoured political party in power. Two examples vividly depict this variation in the newspapers' watchdog roles in 2008 and 2020.

1. KMT as the ruling party in 2008

When KMT returned to power after several months, the unemployment rate skyrocketed to 4.27% in September, which hit the highest record in four years. The economic crisis was caused by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which seriously damaged the global economy and Taiwan's economy. The KMT government announced a series of policies to boost the economy and increase employment, such as subsidies for companies to offer job vacancies.

(1) The performance of pro-DPP partisanship at *Liberty Times*

The main news article of this issue was straight news with the headline "*Labour Groups Disapprove of Improvised Policy for Expanding Job Opportunities*". In the news context, the journalist quoted others' criticism which matched the indicators of a detached watchdog.

Detached watchdog in the news article:

"Honestly, the government claimed that uncapped subsidies for companies increase job vacancies simply because they attempted to embellish the numbers. During the economic recession, corporations released only a limited number of job vacancies, making it fortunate for some to avoid redundancy," criticised Sun You-Lian, the Secretary-General of the labour group Taiwan Labour Front. "(28/11/2008, Liberty Times)

Moreover, *Liberty Times* also published a feature that manifested a strong interventionist role with the journalists' criticism.

(2) The performance of Pro- KMT partisanship at *UDN*

The same news issue was covered and enacted in a weaker watchdog role by *UDN*. The main news presented a positive headline, "*Expanding Job Opportunities with Uncapped Subsidies*". The major news articles mainly used official sources without covering other reactions from third parties. Since there were no quotes from others to criticise or cast doubt toward the government, no detached watchdog indicators were coded.

However, a feature illustrated the interventionist watchdog with less strong phrasing than *Liberty Times*. Furthermore, *UDN* advised the president with the headline "*Exercise Prudence*,

Mr. President: Urgent Caution Advised Before Implementing New Policies." In the context of the feature, the journalist mildly criticised President Ma saying they should not hurry the government to reveal an immature policy, and the previous policies may require time to yield results.

"...The global economy slumps, which will undoubtedly impact Taiwan's economy. Moreover, no one expected the government to save the economy immediately or execute the magical policy with instant efficiency. Therefore, the government should stay calm instead of panicking society." (28/11/2008, UDN)

2. DPP as the ruling party in 2020

In the second half of 2020, due to insufficient rainfall in the summer, the reservoirs faced a dire water shortage. The government triggered a cut of irrigation water the following spring, along with the policy to compensate farmers for their loss.

(1) The performance of Pro-KMT partisanship at UDN

UDN published two straight news articles and one feature to criticise the government and the policy. It performed both detached watchdog roles with others' quotes and an interventionist watchdog role with journalists' opinions.

Interventionist watchdog in the feature:

"The Council of Agriculture's sudden decision to reduce irrigation water for 19,000 hectares of farmland in Taoyuan, Hsinchu, and Miaoli has left local farmers surprised and with mixed emotions. While Taiwan has traditionally taken pride in its agricultural heritage, it's often agriculture that bears the brunt of water shortages, prioritising industrial needs" (15/10/2020, UDN)

Detached watchdog in the news article:

"Former Taoyuan Irrigation Association leader Huang Jin-Chun expressed his criticism, stating, 'Based on my past experience, irrigation water shortages can be predicted three to six months in advance. By implementing a region-specific approach to reduce irrigation water earlier, we can prevent substantial farmer grievances and social disputes.'" (15/10/2020, UDN)

(2) The performance of pro-DPP partisanship at Liberty Times

Liberty Times published two straight news stories, one of which covered the background and decision-making process by the government with mainly official sources. The other focus is on the higher subsidy for farmers hit by irrigation curb with a farmer's reaction. *Liberty Times* emphasised in news articles that the cause of the water shortage was the unprecedented extreme weather and there was no feature to scrutinise the policy with journalists' voices.

Detached watchdog in the news article:

"For the first time in 56 years, no typhoons brought sufficient rainfall in Taiwan this summer, threatening the water supplies. A farmer in Miaoli said that 'when rice grains begin to appear next spring, plentiful irrigation is crucial. If the government curbs the irrigation water, the rice will be impossible to harvest, and all the efforts will be in vain. However, due to the shortage of rainfall, we can only follow the government's policy.'" (15/10/2020, Liberty Times)

6.4.2 Collaborator

At the opposite end of the 'power distance' dimension is the collaborator role. The collaborator role's performance in Taiwan is relatively insignificant, with a low mean value and an insignificant percentage of the presence of indicators. This echoes Mellado's (2021a) research which found that in some surveyed countries newspapers rarely play the role of a collaborator. The low level of collaborator role also proves that the press in Taiwan is no longer subject to the clientelism which was pervasive in the authoritarian regime. The average score of the collaborator role in Taiwan is 0.01 in 2008 and 0.03 in 2020, showing a negligible difference across time. Although I conceptualised two aspects of collaborator, active and passive supporter, the frequency of detecting these indicators in the sample was relatively low (The detail of statistics can be seen in Appendix 6 Table 8). The most pronounced change was the increase in the frequency of promoting the national image and national progress which went up by around 2% and did not occur at all in 2008. When looking back at the news articles, I found that the military threat from China was the main cause for increasing the collaborator role after democratisation. This suggests that the Asian traits in role performance, as identified in comparative studies involving China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines, where journalism is assumed to assist the government in maintaining social harmony and stability, are not supported in the Taiwanese context (Mellado, 2021a; Hanitzsch et al., 2019). Rather than social harmony, the collaborator role is practised more when the sovereignty of Taiwan faces threats.

Due to the small number of cases in the data, I present an analysis of a specific news issue to illustrate the subtle and contingent changes in the collaborator role after democratisation instead of examining the statistics. The issue arises when President Tsai visits a military base, offering valuable insights into the practice of the collaborator role by Taiwanese newspapers.

Example: How newspapers deal with the threats from China

Taiwan is a good example to show how the collaborator role in the press was awakened by the exterior threats toward national security. I indicate that when a democratic country faces military threats, particularly from an authoritarian regime, the press inevitably performs the collaborator role to secure its nation. In the second half of 2020, cross-strait tensions escalated after Chinese military jets invaded Taiwan's air defence zone for a record number of times. President Tsai Ing-wen, who also chairs the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), visited a military base in Penghu. To a certain degree, the four papers displayed the collaborator role. For instance, each newspaper promoted the country's image by revealing the show of military force. Moreover, they supported the government's activities to defend national air space by including others' quotes in their news articles. Three papers, apart from *UDN*, portrayed President Tsai in a positive light during her visit to the 'patriotic beverage shop' in Penghu. The shop, known for its support to the Navy, had recently faced an unexpected mission-related order cancellation by a local Navy base without complaints, which gained significant attention on Facebook. In response, President Tsai visited the shop, ordering 150 cups of tea for Navy personnel and expressing her gratitude.

"President Tsai shared a photo of beverages on her Facebook, highlighting the story of patriotic beverage shops as a way for people to show their support for soldiers. A spokesperson from the Presidential Office stated that President Tsai personally visited the beverage shop to convey her gratitude for their dedication." (23/9/2020, Apple Daily)

As aforementioned, when a democratic country faces an external threat to its democracy, newspapers are likely to perform a collaborator role to bolster the government's democratic regime, a phenomenon less common in established democracies. In new democracies, newspapers may assume this role for diverse reasons, as seen in Taiwan, which could be aimed at advancing national progress or consolidating democracy.

6.5 Market and Public Orientation

The third dimension of the journalistic role is market-oriented and public oriented, which are conceptualised in my coding frame as the infotainment role and civic role. As mentioned in section 6.1, a comparison between 2008 and 2020 shows a shift in role emphasis. In 2008, infotainment was more prevalent, while in 2020, the civic role gained prominence due to a significant decline in infotainment. In this section, I will provide a detailed analysis of these role performances and their post-democratisation evolution. The examples from news articles for each role are presented after content analysis data.

6.5.1 Infotainment role

Table 6. 9: The average scores of the infotainment role in 2008 and 2020

	Mean value		Main contributing indicator
	2008 (N=386)	2020 (N=276)	
Infotainment role (Including personalization, emotion, private life, sensationalism)	0.20	0.13	- Emotion (-8.1%) - Personalisation (-6.8%)

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

Following democratisation, media market liberalisation has resulted in commercial forces dominating the media landscape. Given these changes, I expect that a higher level of the infotainment role would be present in news content after the democratic transition, but the result is the opposite. In 2020 the average score of the infotainment role drops from 0.2 to 0.13, the most significant change among all role performances in the twelve-year period studied (see Table 6.9). The direction of this change also contradicts journalists' perceptions, with most of them perceiving more market-oriented processes over time (see Chapter 8). Hence, I now look at the nuances in this change by investigating alterations in the specific indicators of the infotainment role.

Trends in the enactment of the infotainment role

Table 6. 10: Percentage and ranking of infotainment role indicators

Infotainment role	2008 (N=386)	Rank	2020 (N=276)	Rank	difference
Personalisation	50(13.0%)	3	17(6.2%)	3	-6.8%
Emotion	92(23.8%)	1	44(15.9%)	2	-8.1%
Private life	18(4.7%)	4	6(2.2%)	4	-2.5%
Sensationalism	77(19.9%)	2	52(18.8%)	1	-1.1%

Table 6.10 shows that in 2008 and 2020, "emotion" and "sensationalism" are the two most frequently used elements in political news. The other two indicators, "personalisation" and "private life", are presented relatively less often. In 2008, "emotion" is the most predominant indicator (23.8%), followed by "sensationalism" (19.9%) and "personalisation" (13%), and the least frequent indicator is "private life" (4.7%). In 2020, the most frequent indicator is "sensationalism" (18.8%), followed by "emotion" (15.9%) and "personalisation" (6.2%). The least frequent indicator is also "private life" (2.2%). In other words, the infotainment role in

political news is more frequently performed in a way to describe an individual's feelings or highlight unusual incredible elements. Journalists describe an individual's personal background or physical characteristics less often in political news and seldom reveal details about an individual's personal life. Furthermore, the four indicators saw a decline from 2008 to 2020. The most significant contributors to this decrease were 'emotion' and 'personalization,' dropping by 8.1% and 6.8%, respectively. This suggests that after the transitional period, political news tends to feature reduced emotional expression and personal characteristics, which are typically used to engage readers and evoke their emotions. Given that these market-driven roles are less valued in relation to journalists' contribution to democratic debate, it can be argued that journalistic role performance improved after the transitional period.

The infotainment role in the four Newspapers




Figure 6. 4 Presence of indicators of the interventionist role split by the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020

Although the popular paper *Apple Daily* performs the strongest infotainment role among the four newspapers, all of the four newspapers tend to be less market-oriented in political coverage (see Figure 6.4). This trend seems to be unusual in the highly commercial and competing media market, which, in other countries, tends to drive news content toward market-oriented performances to increase profits. Considering the sharp drop in advertising revenue in print, Taiwanese newspapers did not turn to market-oriented content as the trends in Western media systems would suggest, and in fact, they decreased their infotainment role in political news. Furthermore, many interviewed journalists stated that their role perceptions shifted toward a more market-oriented approach after democratisation, leading them to prioritise reader reactions and needs more than in the past. This paradoxical phenomenon leads me to investigate the infotainment role further in the next chapter which analyses newspapers' performances on social media. The adoption of social media is discussed in Chapter 7.

It is noteworthy to mention the impact of *Apple Daily* on the other three Taiwanese newspapers. Following the democratisation process, the newspaper market underwent liberalisation, with three Taiwan-originated newspapers, dominating the scene for an extended period. In 2003, a Hong Kong-originated paper made its way into Taiwan, causing significant changes in the industry. In only five years, *Apple Daily* achieved a record-breaking circulation as the most-read newspaper in 2008. Previous research has claimed that the introduction of sensationalism and market-driven journalism by *Apple Daily* in Taiwan has had negative effects on news quality and has led to the homogenisation of other newspapers (Su et al., 2000). On a positive note, three newspapers began to enhance their visual elements, incorporating larger pictures and more colourful pages (Ho, 2007; Yi, 2008). Research in Taiwan indicates that *Apple Daily* placed value on readers' opinions, which compelled three major newspapers to reassess their relationship with readers. However, a negative consequence of *Apple Daily's* approach is the exposure of wrongdoings or corruption through sensational reports, often referred to as "muckraking" (Ho, 2007; Yi, 2008). Their paparazzi often face accusations of invading the personal lives of celebrities or politicians in pursuit of sensational content to boost newspaper sales. Indeed, studies suggest that *Apple Daily* has had a significant impact on traditional newspapers, particularly in their increased focus on entertainment and crime news. My research primarily investigates details of political news. Given that political news is considered more serious than other types of news, the infotainment role may not be highlighted (Mellado, 2021a). However, comparing the four newspapers finds distinguishing differences. Political news could be presented sentimentally, particularly in the popular paper. *Apple Daily*

ranks at the highest level in infotainment roles in 2008 and 2020. It uses four elements most frequently in political news across time, particularly sensationalism with 40.6% and 37.3%, which are twice the percentage of the other papers. Moreover, the indicator of emotion is the only element that slightly increases by around 1.5% (from 28.1% to 29.4%) in *Apple Daily* but decreases by around 10% in the other newspapers in 2020 (see Figure 6.4).

Example:

As aforementioned, the infotainment role in the market-driven *Apple Daily* has predominated over the other three papers since 2008. *Apple Daily* yielded an example of how popular newspapers practise the infotainment role in reporting the corruption scandal of former President Chen Shui-bian in 2008. Former President Chen Shui-bian, DPP chairman, stepped down on 20th of May in 2008. Shortly after, he was accused of money laundering by the Special Investigation Division. However, Chen claimed innocence and asserted he suffered from political persecution by the KMT government to please the Chinese government. He started a hunger strike to protest the persecution.

Apple Daily performed a significant infotainment role when former President Chen stopped his hunger strike during the detention which he claimed was political persecution. It dramatically described the process of how doctors convinced Chen to eat until he had his first meal. The news article applied a storytelling style to heighten emotions and exaggerated the ending of the hunger strike with a comic picture.

"Former President Chen's dramatic hunger strike for his honour and innocence barely sizzled for a fortnight. Just the other day, he finally surrendered to a bowl of rice soup, egg whites, and porridge, rendering his 'heroic' standoff futile. And when the watchful jailer caught Chen chowing down on that porridge via CCTV, well, he couldn't help but squeal with delight, rushing to spill the beans to his higher-up..." (28/11/2008, Apple Daily)

6.5.2 Civic role

After exploring the infotainment role, I delve into the civic role, the polar opposite on the market-orientation spectrum. The civic role performance involves perceiving readers as citizens who need information to motivate them to participate in civil activity (Hanitzsch, 2007; Hanitzsch, 2011; Mellado et al., 2017). Public orientation is a critical value of professionalism in which journalists aim to serve the public interest in society. To explore the details of the civic role and its transformation after the transitional period, I grouped the indicators into two categories, civic educator, and civic agent (see Table 6.11). In Mellado's (2021b) research, the

civic role is divided into two types, civic educator, and civic advocate. I reconceptualised the "civic advocate" to "civic agent" since the indicator related to the support of the citizen's movement, which involves various social agendas, such as unemployment, may not necessarily be covered in political news. Hence, in my coding frame I define the citizens' reactions, questions, and demands as the "civic agent".

Civic role – journalism as an educator or agent

In my research findings, the civic role has not been frequently performed in political news since the transitional period, ranking fourth in 2008 and third in 2020. The result shows that the civic role performance in 2008 (M=0.13) and 2020 (M=0.15) stays at a similar level with a minor increase (see Table 6.11). Contrary to previous research findings in transitional democracies (Humanes and Roses, 2021), the newspapers in Taiwan did not strongly embrace a civic role in their political news. This finding leads us to further discussion into the two aspects of civic role in the following paragraphs.

Table 6. 11: The average scores of the civic role in 2008 and 2020

Two aspects of civic role	Mean value		Main contributing indicator
	2008 (N=386)	2020 (N=276)	
Civic Educator (Including background information, educating on duties and rights, local impact)	0.21	0.28	-Background information (+10.3%) - Local impact (+8.1%)
Civic Agent (Including information of citizen activities, citizens' questions, citizens' demand, and citizens' reaction)	0.08	0.05	-Citizens' reaction (-5.1%)
Total	0.15	0.13	

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

In the civic educator role news stories provide sufficient information for citizens to make political decisions and the role emphasises educating citizens. It includes three indicators (i) background information, (ii) local impact, and (iii) educating on duties and rights. The civic agent role indicates that newspapers can function as citizens' loudspeakers by transmitting their reactions, demands, or questions. It contains four indicators: (i) citizens' questions, (ii) citizens' demands, (iii) citizens' reactions, and (iv) information of citizens' activities.

The result shows that after the democratic transition, the political news in Taiwan performed more frequently as a civic educator more than a civic agent over time. In line with Mellado's research, the civic educator is more pervasive in transitional and advanced democracies. The average score shows that the gaps between the two aspects have widened between 2008 and 2020 (see Table 6.11). In 2008, the average score of civic educators is nearly three times that of civic agents. By 2020, this gap has widened to over five times. This suggests that political news in 2020 had a stronger focus on educating citizens rather than amplifying their voices and motivating them to engage in public affairs. In essence, it reflects a shift toward providing essential information that citizens need to know. The primary factors driving the rise of civic educators are background information (10.3%) and local impact (8.1%). Conversely, the primary factor causing a decline in the civic agent role is reduced citizen's reactions (5.1%).

Table 6. 12: Presence and ranking of indicators of civic role in 2008 and 2020

	Civic role (Public-oriented)	2008 (N=386)	Rank	2020 (N=276)	Rank	difference
Civic Educator	Background information	148 (38.3%)	1	134 (48.6%)	1	+10.3%
	Educating on duties and rights	12 (3.1%)	3	7 (2.5%)	3	-0.6%
	Local impact	54 (14.0%)	2	61 (22.1%)	2	+8.1%
Civic Agent	Information of citizen activities	22 (5.7%)	2	9 (3.3%)	2	-2.4%
	Citizens' questions	7 (1.8%)	4	9 (3.3%)	2	+1.5%
	Citizens' demand	21 (5.4%)	3	6 (2.2%)	3	-3.2%
	Citizens' reaction	49 (12.7%)	1	21 (7.6%)	1	-5.1%

When looking into the specific indicator in the civic educator, I find that following the democratic transition, there is a clear emphasis on providing contextual information, including background information on current events and their potential impact on citizens' lives, with the intention of encouraging citizen engagement in political affairs. Of the three civic educator indicators, "background information" is the most prevalent, appearing in 38.3% and 48.6% of cases in 2008 and 2020, respectively. The second most frequent indicator is "local impact," which addresses the consequences of policy and political decisions on citizens. The least common indicator is "educating citizens about their duties and rights," accounting for 3.1% in

2008 and 2.5% in 2020. Background information is twice as likely to appear as local impact, and it experienced a notable 10% increase in 2020, the highest growth among all indicators. The newspapers acting as civic educators place less focus on educating citizens about their rights and duties. This shift may be attributed to citizens' growing awareness of their civic responsibilities in the post-democratic transition era, thanks to the flourishing civil society. In Taiwan, social movements, and civic organisations, particularly those advocating for labour and women's rights, have seen significant growth since democratisation. This surge in civil society has played a pivotal role in facilitating the country's transition from a one-party rule regime to a democratic one. It underscores how democracy's evolution prompts subtle changes in the journalistic function as a civic educator. Therefore, it is crucial to examine and comprehend the journalistic role within the specific political context of each region, as it is challenging to generalise. This conclusion is also supported by journalist testimonials.

A senior journalist mentioned:

"After democratisation, higher education levels and the emergence of previously forbidden civil organisations in the authoritarian regime have transformed Taiwanese society. This has led to greater citizen awareness of their rights and responsibilities. Journalism has gradually shifted away from its role as an authoritative educator, now serving more as an interpreter, offering information to empower individuals in making informed decisions."(B02)

Regarding the second aspect of the civic role, the civic agent is performed much less frequently than the civic educator since 2008. In the previous research, media in transitional democracies tend to reflect more people's voices in news coverage (Humanes and Roses, 2021). For instance, the "citizen's reaction" is the most frequent indicator, but it decreases from 12.7% to 7.6% over time. This shift in journalism's role could be attributed to Taiwan's progression from a transitional democracy to a more consolidated one, in line with Mellado's (2021b) observation that newspapers tend to assume a stronger civic role when a country is experiencing social movements and protests. Of course, the relatively small percentage in practising the civic agent role should not be generalised to the overall performance of newspapers but only focus on political news.

Civic role in the four newspapers




Figure 6. 5 Presence of indicators of the civic role in different types of news stories split by the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020




Figure 6. 6 Presence of indicators of the civic educator split by the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020

Figure 6.5 shows that the four newspapers all embrace the civic educator more than the civic agent after the democratic transition. Since 2008 the four newspapers generally perform at a similar level in the civic role with a difference of less than 0.1. They share a common emphasis on the civic educator role, exhibiting relatively high average scores, as shown in Figure 6.6. Moreover, this emphasis on the civic educator has consistently grown over time. Interestingly, the popular paper *Apple Daily* shows the most significant shifts in its performance as a civic educator, with a notable increase from 0.18 to 0.25, while the role of the civic agent decreases from 0.13 to 0.03. This contradicts the assumption of market-driven journalism, suggesting that popular newspapers may prioritise providing news tailored to meet readers' desires rather than focusing on information essential for well-informed decision-making (McManus, 1994).




Figure 6. 7 Presence of civic agent indicators split by the four newspapers in 2008 and 2020

The change in the performance of the civic agent role can be explained by the partisanship of the newspapers. In the civic agent role, the four newspapers performed variously as a

loudspeaker for citizens. The pattern is closely related to the different political stances in newspapers. Aside from the popular paper *Apple Daily*, when the ruling party was KMT in 2008, *Liberty Times* showed a high percentage (13.7%). The other two newspapers show lower percentages in reflecting citizens' reactions, i.e., *China Times* (6.9%) and *UDN* (4.1%). In 2020, with the DPP back in power, *Liberty Times* exhibited the lowest frequency in representing citizens' reactions (1.4%). Conversely, citizen reactions were more prevalent in *UDN* (10.5%) and *China Times* (8.9%). It is interesting to find that when the KMT held power, the pro-DPP newspaper, *Liberty Times*, was more inclined to amplify citizens' voices and activities. In contrast, when the DPP was in power, pro-KMT papers became more active in the civic agent role, as depicted in Figure 6.7. This is exemplified by the following article:

Example:

As aforementioned, partisan newspapers reflected people's reactions toward the government, most of which were negative, such as questioning or criticism. The citizens' activities also implied that they were unsatisfied with the government's policies and eager to express their demands or opinions. This can be demonstrated in the performance of the pro-DPP *Liberty Times* when KMT was in power in 2008. *Liberty Times* is coded as having the second most frequent presence of citizens' reactions (13.7%), the most frequent presence of citizens' demand (8.9%), and information on citizens' activities (7.3%). The indicators appear in the news related to the rally against China and safeguarding Taiwan.

"Former President Chen is joining a protest and has met with pro-independence civil groups. Chang Yeh-sen, the head of the Taiwan Hakka Society, shared that nearly twenty local civil groups will march alongside Chen. Chin Heng-wei, leader of the Taiwan North Society, believes that the route chosen by Chen will attract the most participants...." (23/10/2008, Liberty Times)

In 2020, *UDN* performed a stronger civic agent role than other papers, which mainly reflected the indicators of citizens' reactions (10.5%). It can be found in the news related to the policy, such as the import of U.S. pork. Citizens' reactions to the policy mainly focused on criticising or doubting the validity of the policy.

"Young hog farmers have made an appeal to the government, seeking industry improvements, facility upgrades, and cost reductions to enhance their competitiveness on a global scale. A young pork farmer expressed the desire to earn a dignified income rather than relying on subsidies with a sense of shame...." (8/9/2020, UDN)

6.6 Summary

This chapter presents the results of the longitudinal comparison of role performance in news content. The findings show that aside from the infotainment role, apparently practised less in 2020 than in 2008, other journalistic roles performed seem to be relatively stable after democratic transition. However, through in-depth analysis of five journalistic role performances, we reveal significant findings from the variance among specific indicators and give concrete examples about how the theoretic roles are practised in real news content.

My research offers an alternative perspective on newspapers' roles after democratic transition. Instead of being detached disseminators, these newspapers continue to play an active role, shaping agendas and influencing public opinion. The watchdog role remains strong, showing a consistent pattern following political party changes, while the collaborator role is seldom observed except during national security crises. Notably, the infotainment role is on the decline across all newspapers, even in popular ones. Contrary to journalists' perceptions, intense competition does not lead to market-driven journalism in politics. The emphasis is on the civic educator role, providing citizens with essential information, while the civic agent role aligns with partisanship, amplifying citizens' voices when the ruling party is unfavourable.

Chapter 7 The Shift to Digital: Political News on Social Media

7.1 Introduction

After democratisation, newspapers faced a sharp market decline due to the digitalisation of media. Online media has taken over the advertising market, with print advertising declining from U.S.\$37 billion in 1996 to just U.S.\$0.36 billion in 2020 (Lin, 2022). As economic enterprises and political institutions, newspapers strive to balance public service and profitability (Voltmer, 2013; McChesney, 2015). One strategy is to move their news online to capture the growing online advertising market. The size of the audience correlates with revenue in journalism (Nelson and Tandoc, 2019). Before social media was integrated into the publishing model of news media, printed newspaper brands made little effort to provide new or bespoke content on their websites, with most newspapers tending to simply replicate printed editions online (Chang and Chen, 2003). After 2008, Taiwanese newspapers have increasingly relied on social media platforms like Facebook to drive traffic to their websites. This shift is largely because social media has become the primary channel through which Taiwanese people access news content (Lin, 2022). Social media changed the way that newspapers thought about their online content with the opportunity to publish news in a way that encourages clicks and sharing, but this requires a different style of content to that of printed papers. Therefore, it is important to look at how journalistic roles are performed in the output of the four papers I studied to understand the whole picture. Furthermore, the democratic value in political news, in terms of news quality and quantity on social media could be vital to investigate simultaneously to explain the transformation of newspapers' democratic function.

Accordingly, this chapter aims to answer the sub-question related to the comparison of news across platforms. In the first part, I discuss the sub-question: *2.3 What are the journalistic role performances in print and their Facebook pages? How have they changed across platforms?* In the second part of this chapter, I explore two sub-questions (1.2 and 1.4) regarding the democratic value in news content: *1.2: What is the quantity of political news in print and their Facebook pages? How has it changed across platforms?* and *1.4: What is the quality of political news in print and on their Facebook pages? How has it changed across platforms?* In both parts, the findings based on the result of content analysis are discussed first and then the in-depth interviews with print journalists are applied to support the findings.

I sampled political news from the four newspapers in 2020 and the political news on social media is sampled across 2021 and 2022. Although the sampled dates are not the same, the sampled size of the printed and social media equates to five days. As a result, I sampled 276 political news articles from 1,922 news articles in the printed newspapers and 260 political news articles from 2,327 posts in total on the newspapers' Facebook pages.

7.2 Comparing Journalistic Role Performance Across Platforms

As the previous research has shown, the transformation of newspapers from print to online could be a dynamic changing process alongside the evolution of technology. However, the enactment of journalists' role is commonly studied based on one single platform, mostly print (Mellado, 2021a). To fill this gap, my research is designed to compare political news in the newspapers and on their Facebook pages. The principle of comparing the data is similar to the comparison over time I made for the printed editions¹¹ (see Chapter 6). In this section, I provide an overview of role performance in political news posted on newspapers' Facebook pages. Subsequently, I examine the five journalistic roles on Facebook pages and explore the differences in their performance compared to the print edition.

¹¹ In coding role performances within news articles, these role performances are not mutually exclusive so that it's possible to code more than one role performance in a single article. Consequently, the multiple indicators of each role performance can be present simultaneously. In this chapter, the same scoring system for measuring political news in the print is applied to the news on their Facebook pages. The average score for news articles, based on coded indicators in the headline and body, ranges from null to two, with a maximum average score of one per part, yielding the highest overall score of two and the lowest score of null.




Figure 7. 1 Five journalistic role performances performed by the four newspapers in print and on their Facebook pages

In contrast to the mild changes observed in papers over time in Chapter 6, the role performance on newspapers' Facebook pages reveals a very different picture. Among the five roles, a relatively high level of the infotainment role is prominent, in contrast to the significant drop observed in the infotainment role between 2008 and 2020 in printed editions. Only by examining both platforms can we discern the subtle links between the two forms of journalism that the newspapers operate simultaneously. This change is similar to the changes in journalism in countries with a liberal media system, where the online version is more market-driven than the print (Benson et al., 2012). The impact on the democratic function could, however, be more serious since my research particularly focuses on political news, which we might suppose would take more responsibility in advancing democracy. Comparing news in print and online, the infotainment role performance is the only role with a mean value higher on Facebook pages than in print. Figure 7.1 shows the largest gap in the infotainment role between the two platforms (gap= 0.14). In other words, political news on the newspapers' Facebook pages is more sensational and entertaining than the print counterparts. Moreover, the interventionist and watchdog role weaken in the political news on the newspapers' Facebook pages. In print, the two most prominent role performances are the interventionist roles (M= 0.4) and the watchdog roles (M= 0.22). On Facebook, the interventionist role (M= 0.3) and infotainment role (M= 0.27) are the first two, followed by the watchdog role. Political news selected to post on newspapers' Facebook pages contains fewer interventionist elements (gap= 0.1) and shows less

intense watchdog role performance (gap= 0.08). This implies that news content on Facebook pages does not often perform as an interpreter or an advocate. Additionally, the vital democratic function, the watchdog role, and the spirit of the fourth estate are less emphasised on Facebook pages. The interesting contrast is that the practice of the infotainment role on Facebook pages, where it has an average score of 0.27, is twice that of the print (M=0.13). On the other hand, the watchdog role is more pronounced in print, with an average score of 0.22, double that of the watchdog role on their Facebook pages (M=0.14). It is rational to say that the newspapers lower their tone as the watchdog role on their Facebook pages and highlight the infotainment role. The apparent contrast in the watchdog and the infotainment role across platforms forefronts the two types of journalism functions online and offline. More importantly, is that two types of role performance practised by the same newspaper brands. Hence, the result shows that the way newspapers utilise social media may deteriorate the democratic function of journalism, i.e., holding the government to account.

Table 7. 1: The average scores of the five journalistic role performances by each newspaper in print and in news on Facebook

	Apple Daily		China Times		Liberty Time		UDN		Total	
	Print (N=51)	FB (N=49)	Print (N=79)	FB (N=73)	Print (N=70)	FB (N=57)	Print (N=76)	FB (N=81)	Print (N=276)	FB (N=260)
Interventionalist	0.46 (1)	0.43 (2)	0.45 (1)	0.28 (2)	0.36 (1)	0.31 (1)	0.36 (1)	0.24 (1)	0.40 (1)	0.30 (1)
Watchdog role	0.21 (3)	0.14 (4)	0.26 (2)	0.14 (3)	0.15 (2)	0.13 (4)	0.27 (2)	0.16 (3)	0.22 (2)	0.15 (3)
Collaborator	0.04 (5)	0.02 (5)	0.01 (5)	0.01 (5)	0.05 (5)	0.05 (5)	0.01 (5)	0.01 (5)	0.03 (5)	0.02 (5)
Infotainment role	0.28 (2)	0.48 (1)	0.12 (4)	0.30 (1)	0.06 (4)	0.21 (2)	0.10 (4)	0.17 (2)	0.13 (4)	0.27 (2)
Civic role	0.13 (4)	0.16 (3)	0.14 (3)	0.12 (4)	0.13 (3)	0.15 (3)	0.18 (3)	0.11 (4)	0.15 (3)	0.13 (4)

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

In their print editions, the interventionist role holds the most significance for all four newspapers. *Apple Daily*, however, places the infotainment role ahead of the watchdog role as the second most important role. The other three newspapers maintain a consistent hierarchy of role priorities in print, with the interventionist role taking precedence, followed by the watchdog role, infotainment role, civic role, and collaborator role.

Regarding their Facebook pages, *Apple Daily* demonstrates the highest level of infotainment role (M=0.48) which surpasses the interventionist role (M=0.43), ranking first and second, respectively. The level of the watchdog role (M=0.14) decreases from the third most important

role in the print edition to the fourth, being replaced by the civic role ($M=0.16$). *China Times* also practises the infotainment role as the most important role ($M=0.3$), which surpasses the second role, interventionist ($M=0.28$). By contrast, *Liberty Times* and *UDN* still prioritise the interventionist role as the most important ($M=0.31$ and $M=0.24$, respectively), which is consistent with their print editions but with lower average scores. The second most practised role for both *Liberty Times* ($M=0.21$) and *UDN* ($M=0.27$) is the infotainment role, replacing the watchdog role observed in their print editions. In *UDN*'s Facebook pages, the third most practised role is the watchdog role ($M=0.16$), whereas for *Liberty Times*, it is the civic role ($M=0.15$). The collaborator role consistently ranks as the least practised role for each newspaper in both their print and Facebook editions.




Figure 7. 2 Five journalistic role performances performed by the four newspapers in print.

*The range of average scores ($M=0-2$)

***Apple Daily* (N=51), *China Times* (N=79), *Liberty Times*(N=70), *UDN* (N=76)




Figure 7. 3 Five journalistic role performances performed by the four newspapers on their Facebook pages

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

** *Apple Daily* (N=49), *China Times* (N=73), *Liberty Times*(N=57), *UDN* (N=81)

Looking at the newspapers individually, we can see that the transformation pattern is consistent across all publications, as shown Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3, which visualises the five role performances of the four newspapers on two platforms. Political news on Facebook pages shows a similar trend of prioritising the infotainment role while de-emphasising the watchdog and interventionist roles. All four newspapers have a greater level of infotainment, with *Apple Daily* showing the highest difference between the Facebook and printed editions. The level of the watchdog role varies among the four newspapers, but overall, it is weaker in social media content than in print. As for the interventionist role, aside from *Apple Daily*, the other three newspapers show a significantly weak level of performance. Based on the comparison, it can be concluded that newspapers adopt a divergent journalistic approach on their Facebook pages compared to print. The political news selected for distribution and packaged for social media prioritises the infotainment role while weakening the practice of the watchdog and

interventionist roles. This represents a new form of journalistic culture with its own norms and values that may deviate from traditional newspaper journalism. The differing demands of social media and print content could also influence journalists' perception of their roles, which must be negotiated or shifted when serving both platforms (as discussed in Chapter 8).

7.2.1 Interventionist

Table 7. 2 : The average scores of the interventionist role in two aspects in print and in news on Facebook pages

	Two aspects	Mean value		Main contributing indicator
		2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	
Interventionist	Content-driven (Including journalist's opinion, interpretation, and proposals/demands)	0.39	0.29	-Journalist's opinion (-10.2%) -Interpretation (-14.4%)
	Style-driven (Including adjectives, and first-person)	0.42	0.33	-The usage of evaluative adjectives (-18.4%)
	Total	0.40	0.30	

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

In Taiwan, as the previous chapter mentioned, print newspapers perform a strong level of interventionist role over time. It develops along with the "hard news paradigm" ¹² transformed toward the U.S. style of hard news as "information mixed with interpretation" but separate opinion and factor in straight news and features (Esser and Umbricht, 2014). This developing trend may benefit democracy by informing citizens with sufficient contextual knowledge behind political agendas to make informed decisions. However, newspapers demonstrate an alternative role performance on Facebook. Table 7.2 displays that the average score of the print is 0.40, which drops to 0.30 on their Facebook pages. This pattern goes against the expected transformation in the hard news paradigm in print toward information integrated with interpretation but mainly information. The political news on newspapers' Facebook pages displays another kind of journalism. It does not follow the trend of Western media systems, such as in France where there is an interpretative journalistic culture, in which online news

¹² It includes "inverted pyramid writing, balanced reporting, emphasis on verifiable facts and attributed sources, a detached point of view, and the separation of the news and editorial functions of the news organisation. (Esser and Umbricht, 2014:230)".

may develop toward a more interpretative role to attract partisan readers (Benson et al., 2012; Esser and Umbricht, 2014). The role performance on Facebook pages in Taiwan indicates a decrease in the interventionist role, suggesting a reduced level of advocacy compared to the print editions.

Moreover, in both content-driven and style-driven aspects, political news on Facebook pages performed at a lower interventionist level than their print editions with a decline of average scores by 0.1 and 0.09. Among the content-driven aspect, the main contributing indicators of a decreasing interventionist role are "journalists' opinion" (10.2%), and "interpretation" (14.4%). Both indicators decrease by more than 10% in the frequency of appearance in news articles. Regarding the style-driven aspect, the main contributing indicator is "the use of evaluative adjectives", which drops sharply (18.4%). In other words, journalists may hardly express their opinion, interpret political issues, and use evaluative adjectives in political news on their newspapers' Facebook pages. Compared to the finding in print (in Chapter 6), the trend of interpretative journalism does not tend to expand to their online platforms. This aligns with Salgado et al.'s (2017) finding in 16 countries across three media systems that interpretive journalism is more prevalent in newspapers than on TV and least so in online news, especially when it comes to political news. In Taiwan, after the democratic transition, the democratic function including advocacy and interpretation therefore still relies on the printed editions of newspapers despite a declining readership (see details in Appendix 5 Table 2).

The political news published on Facebook pages by print media outlets often focuses on transmitting information rather than expressing opinions. This can be observed through the proportion of news forms, such as straight news and features, selectively displayed on Facebook pages. This finding is in line with previous research that suggests interpretive journalism, which includes editorials, columns, and commentary articles with higher interpretative elements, is less prevalent on Facebook pages compared to regular news (Salgado et al., 2017). In my research, out of the sampled news articles (N=260), only one feature story was identified on *China Times'* Facebook page, accounting for 0.4% of the total. In contrast, 9.1% of political news sampled from newspapers in 2020 consisted of feature stories (see Appendix 2 Table 6). The scarcity of feature stories on Facebook pages indicates a weaker interventionist role compared to traditional news platforms. In simpler terms, social media platforms primarily showcase what is often termed as "conventional news" (Fink and Schudson, 2014:9), emphasising information dissemination and reporting events within a 24-hour window.

The reason why online platforms favour the role of information disseminators over interventionists can be attributed to organisational factors and media affordance. Mellado's (2021b) study suggests that online platforms in Chile, as smaller-scale media organisations, are more likely to prioritise disseminating news due to limited sources available for in-depth reporting. This contrasts with print media, primarily owned by large conglomerates with greater resources available for investigative and in-depth reporting. Furthermore, online platforms offer higher levels of media affordance, particularly in terms of immediacy, compared to print media. The ability to deliver instant news aligns with the disseminator role, as online platforms are well-suited for providing real-time updates and breaking news. In my research, while I examined two types of news outputs from the same newspaper brand, it became evident that the newspapers treated their print and online platforms as distinct entities. This separation could account for the differing degrees of interventionism observed in the news articles of Taiwan's newspapers for print and online platforms.

Reflection on journalists' role perception

The decreasing level of the interventionist role in online news posted on newspapers' Facebook pages is supported by journalists' testimonies. Journalists need to adapt their news content to suit the norms and values of each platform. For instance, journalists express that they write online news with only information, in terms of fact-centred news, without the purpose of agenda-setting or even interpretation of the context. Hence, political news on Facebook pages seems to be shallower and more fragmented. Weaver (2015) indicates that newspapers lead agenda-setting, which serves as an efficient means of shaping public opinion. This is why government, and politicians are responsive to the agenda set by newspapers. In the short term, this democratic function may be hard to be replaced by online platforms. However, an enormous amount of information spread via social media into the media ecosystem has diluted legacy journalism's agenda-setting power. This challenges the classic concept of journalism as a gatekeeper (Zelizer et al., 2022). "Once feared and revered, the centrality of journalism as an institution has become increasingly into question (ibid:15)". Although newspapers contribute information on social media, the performance of online news may not be equal to print. When readers predominantly rely on social media for news, the consumption of shallow and fragmented political information is detrimental for citizens.

"Facebook is a platform for newspapers to disseminate instant information, our editorial desk seldom uses Facebook pages to set agendas, which is mainly operated in print. In

other words, we encourage journalists to write any topics of news articles for online news. In contrast, we select and frame the news for the print edition to set the agenda, reflecting our core values in news organisations." (C02)

"We don't select news for readers on the online platform and all the information is presented. On the other hand, in the print edition, we will interpret the news issues and indicate the possible solutions or problems, leading readers to what to think about. Therefore, the advocate role is mainly practised in print, and the disseminator role is for the online platform." (D03)

7.2.2 Power distance

Table 7. 3: The average scores of the watchdog role in two aspects in print and on Facebook

	Two aspects	Mean value		Main contributing indicator
		2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook pages (N=260)	
Watchdog role	Interventionist (Including questioning, criticism, and denouncement from journalists)	0.06	0.02	Journalists' criticism (-5.7%)
	Detached (Including information on judgment, questioning, criticism, and denouncement from others)	0.35	0.24	Information on judgment (-18.4%)
	Total	0.22	0.14	

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

A weakened watchdog role

Serving the watchdog role is one of the most important democratic expectations of media performance in a new democracy. In print, aside from *Apple Daily*, the watchdog role ranked in other three newspapers as the second strongest performance, second only to the interventionist role. However, newspapers do not emphasise practising a watchdog role in online news published on their Facebook pages. Watchdog role performance falls third in the frequency of practising their role in *UDN* and *China Times*, behind the infotainment role. In *Apple Daily* and *Liberty Times* it falls fourth, even behind the civic role (see Table 7.1). This position is not in accordance with the presumption of a "honeymoon watchdog role" (Mellado and Van Dalen, 2017) as well as the strong watchdog in transitional democracies (Hanitzsch, 2017; Voltmer, 2013). Furthermore, it is against Nelson and Tandoc's (2019) finding that audience metrics lead journalists to chase readers' attention and enact more watchdog role

journalism. I find that the newspaper's Facebook pages may hardly facilitate the print organisations to serve a watchdog role¹³. The watchdog roles on Facebook pages, both detached and interventionist, experienced a drop in their average scores, decreasing from 0.35 to 0.24 and from 0.06 to 0.02, respectively (Table 7.3).

As Mellado's (2021b) research suggests that the interventionist role may be transversal through other role performances, the less interventionist practise could relate to the performance of their watchdog role. For instance, the main indicators that contribute to the decline in the interventionist watchdog are "journalists' criticism" (5.7%) and "journalists' questions" (4.2%). It is reasonable that when the journalist's voice diminishes in the news content, the strength of scrutinizing the government by questioning, criticising, and denouncing may weaken. Moreover, according to my interviews and previous research, newspapers tend to post news articles that attract readers' attention and direct the traffic back to their website, which conventionally contains sensational elements rather than serious or in-depth political news. Numerous newspaper journalists interviewed made similar observations about their journalistic practise. For example:

"Newspapers' Facebook pages aim to post news to attract traffic back to their news websites. They often post intriguing or sensational stories, like politicians' personal lives or using striking language to criticise their opponents. All the shallower political news may not be published in the next day's newspaper. It is because the print edition represents legacy media, which must maintain its traditional reputation, while the online news on their social media platforms does not have the same constraints." (B03)

Partisanship in the watchdog role is less evident on Facebook pages.

Table 7. 4: The average scores of the watchdog role performed by each newspaper in print and in news on Facebook

Mean (Rank)	Interventionist watchdog			Detached watchdog			Total		
	Print	Facebook	Gap	Print	Facebook	Gap	Print	Facebook	Gap
Newspaper									
Apple Daily	0.06 (3)	0.01 (3)	-0.05	0.33 (3)	0.25 (2)	-0.08	0.21 (3)	0.14 (2)	-0.07
Liberty Times	0.02(4)	0 (4)	-0.02	0.24 (4)	0.21 (4)	-0.03	0.15 (4)	0.12 (4)	-0.03
China Times	0.08 (2)	0.03 (1)	-0.05	0.39 (2)	0.23 (3)	-0.16	0.26 (2)	0.14 (2)	-0.12
UDN	0.09 (1)	0.02 (2)	-0.07	0.41 (1)	0.27 (1)	-0.14	0.27 (1)	0.16 (1)	-0.11

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

13 In Chapter 6, newspapers' performance in the watchdog role is investigated in two aspects: the interventionist watchdog, which involves active questioning, criticism, and denunciation by journalists themselves, and the detached watchdog, which relies on citing questions, criticism, and denunciations from external sources.

In Chapter 6, I compared the four newspapers over time and found watchdog roles were practised based on partisanship. Here, the results from newspapers' Facebook pages show similar characteristics but weaker strengths. This is not fully in accordance with previous studies which suggest that Facebook pages have the potential to be an extended field for newspapers to perform partisanship (Benson et al., 2012; Esser and Umbricht, 2014; Nerone and Barnhurst, 2001). My research indicates that partisanship, particular in the performance of the watchdog role, is less pronounced on newspapers' online platforms. In other words, newspapers aligned with a political party do not leverage this opportunity to be more forceful in playing watchdog role on their Facebook pages.

Table 7.4 shows that among the four newspapers, the pro-KMT paper *UDN* performed the highest level of the watchdog role in both print and its Facebook page ($M= 0.27$ and $M= 0.16$, respectively) when DPP party is in power. By contrast, the pro-DPP *Liberty Times* practises the least level of watchdog role on both platforms ($M= 0.15$ and $M= 0.12$, respectively). Overall, for the four newspapers, the two types of watchdog roles were practised less on Facebook pages, particularly the detached watchdog for the two papers, *UDN* (gap= 0.16) and *China Times* (gap= 0.14), when the ruling party is not in their favour. It is noteworthy that *UDN* excelled in the strongest watchdog role, while *Liberty Times* lagged in the weakest role, both in print and on Facebook. When comparing the two platforms, the gap between the two newspapers decreased from 0.12 to 0.04, mainly because *UDN* reduced its scrutiny of the DPP government on its Facebook pages.




Figure 7. 4 The objects of the watchdog role performed by the four newspapers in print and on their Facebook pages

Further evidence that political news on Facebook pages displays a weakened partisanship in watchdog role can be found in the actors of their watchdog role scrutiny. This is also evident in their print editions when comparing the frequency of the governments they scrutinised in 2008 and 2020 (see Chapter 6). Figure 7.4 shows that political news that scrutinises the government in *China Times* and *UDN* is relatively high, with 89.9% and 86.8%, respectively, while *Liberty Times* had the lowest percentage with 25.7%¹⁴. By contrast, political news on their Facebook identifies lower percentages in scrutinising the government, particularly for *UDN* and *China Times*, which dropped approximately half the percentage of their print editions.

¹⁴ The percentage is the number of the actors the news scrutinises within the entire sample of news articles. The indicator of watchdog role may be absent in the sampled news article. Moreover, it is possible to code multiple actors scrutinised in a single news article, so the combined percentages of scrutinised actors may not necessarily equal 100%.

Liberty Times also demonstrates the lowest watchdog role with 20% on Facebook and 25.7% in newspapers. When DPP is in power, the pro-DPP paper *Liberty Times* performs the lowest level of watchdog role toward the government in both print and Facebook pages. The pro-KMT paper *China Times* performs the strongest watchdog role in both print (89.9%) and Facebook, but the latter showed a lower percentage (54.43%).

7.2.3 Market/ public orientation dimension

7.2.3.1 Infotainment role - a leading role on Facebook pages

Table 7.4: The average scores of the infotainment role in print and in news on Facebook

	Mean value		Main contributing indicator
	2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	
Infotainment role (Including personalisation, emotion, private life, sensationalism)	0.13	0.27	- Emotion (+10.3%) - Sensationalism (+10.8%)

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

When the newspapers offer news on Facebook pages, the infotainment role stands out, particularly in *Apple Daily* and *China Times*. Research on the liberal model suggests that when they move online, newspapers provide more sensational and opinion-styled content to attract audience attention for increasing website traffic (Benson et al., 2012; Humprecht et al., 2022). This argument could find supportive evidence in the case of Taiwanese newspapers. According to the findings in content analysis, the infotainment role is the most distinguished performance across the two platforms. Table 7.4 shows that the average score of the infotainment in print editions is 0.13 which doubled on their Facebook pages with 0.27. Sensational elements (39.6%) and emotional elements (26.2%) are the two significant indicators with an uprise of 10.8% and 10.3% compared to print. The two indicators, personalisation, and private life have relatively little difference (see Appendix 6, Table 6). I also find that the frequency of sensational elements, such as dramatic descriptions or metaphors can be found in political news in nearly four out of ten articles on Facebook. This finding echoes the previous research that online news is more likely to contain sensational elements (Cohen, 2002; Benson et al., 2012; Humprecht et al., 2022). In Taiwanese newspapers' social media strategies, market-driven and metrics-driven approaches seem to go hand in hand, resulting in the consequence of sensationalism.

This finding is supported by the interviews with political journalists who expressed concerns about integrating social media into print journalism, as it may promote sensationalism. This is especially problematic when readers transition from print to online platforms, where an abundance of sensational elements in political news could potentially undermine the newspapers' role in facilitating informed citizen decision-making within a democracy. This leads us to the debate on the impact of metrics journalism. When newsrooms pervasively apply audience analytics, in terms of metrics, to evaluate the news content, journalistic autonomy may be undermined (Anderson, 2011; Bunce, 2019; Petre, 2021). Anderson observed the impact as "the dominant journalistic values of autonomy and writing for journalists were being encroached upon by a new set of occupational values" (Anderson, 2011 :555). However, not all newspapers pursue metric journalism and as per Petre's (2021) suggestion, I now consider the impact of metric journalism in relation to the organisational contexts of the four papers.

A similar trend - all newspapers provide more infotainment on Facebook pages

Table 7. 5: The average scores of the infotainment role performed by each newspaper in print and in news on Facebook

	2008 Newspapers (N=386)	2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	The gap between the print in 2008 and 2020	The gap between the print and Facebook after 2020
Apple Daily	0.36 (1)	0.28 (1)	0.48	-0.18	+0.2
Liberty Times	0.11 (4)	0.06(4)	0.21	-0.05	+0.15
China Times	0.22 (2)	0.12(2)	0.30	-0.1	+0.18
UDN	0.20 (3)	0.10 (3)	0.18	-0.1	+0.08

According to Petre (2021), editorial strategies that employ metrics can result in varying role performances in online news. While quality papers tend to maintain their standards online, popular papers often adopt a more market-oriented approach (Jacobi et al., 2016). However, this may not be fully applied in the case for newspapers in Taiwan. The highly homogeneous performance of the four newspapers on their Facebook pages indicates a similar strategy.

Interestingly, Facebook pages appear to serve as a complementary channel for newspapers to provide infotainment news, as demonstrated by the opposite trend observed between print and Facebook pages in Table 7.5. While the infotainment role saw a significant decline in three newspapers' print editions between 2008 and 2020, with an average score of over 0.1, *Liberty Times* experienced a minor drop of 0.05, all newspapers' Facebook pages showed a rising trend in infotainment roles, with a clear increase in average scores.

Furthermore, different types of newspaper demonstrated a similar increase in their infotainment role on Facebook pages, though some variations in intensity still exist. The market-driven *Apple Daily* exhibited a stronger infotainment role in its print edition and reflected this on its Facebook page, with the most significant increase in the average score (M= 0.2) among all newspapers. Conversely, *UDN*, traditionally considered a quality paper, demonstrated less aggression in practising the infotainment role on its Facebook page, with a mild increase in its average score of 0.08.

Online editors perform a stronger infotainment role

Table 7. 6: Two groups of authors in the political news on each newspaper's Facebook pages

Newspaper	Print journalists	Home editors	Other
Apple Daily (N=49)	28(57.1%)	21(42.9%)	0(0%)
Liberty Times (N=57)	42(73.7%)	15(26.3%)	0(0%)
China Times (N=73)	30(41.1%)	37(50.7%)	6(8.2%)
UDN (N=81)	80(98.8%)	1(1.2%)	0(0%)
Total	180(69.2%)	74(28.5%)	6(2.3%)

*Other =both print and home editors or unknown.

Research in the U.S. suggests that audience metrics reshape newsroom culture to form two sets of news standards for journalists to follow (Anderson, 2011; Bunce, 2019; Petre, 2021). Based on my findings, news content on social media illustrates the distinction between online editors and print journalists. In Taiwan's newspapers, due to a lack of workforce, print journalists are the major contributors to real reporting for their online platforms while online editors primarily focus on content aggregation. Hence, political news content on newspapers' Facebook pages can be categorised into two types, that produced by newspaper journalists and that produced by online editors. I established this distinction by examining the by-lines in which authors are named in each news article, and then coded this information in my dataset. For home editors, aside from *China Times*, online editors are named as a whole team instead of the individual's name, such as reported by the team of "instant news". *China Times* is unusual in that it reveals online editors' names in their instant news articles. The result shows that across all newspapers 69.2% of political news on Facebook pages is contributed by paper journalists, but there are variances between the newspapers (see Table 7.6). Most of the political news on *UDN*'s Facebook page, accounting for 98.8%, is contributed by print journalists. Similarly, *Liberty*

Times posts 73.7% of news articles from print journalists. In contrast, *Apple Daily* and *China Times* show a tendency to rely more on instant news from in-house editors on their Facebook pages, with percentages of 42.9% and 50.7%, respectively. Interestingly, online editors tend to practise a higher level of the infotainment role by more than the twofold average score of paper journalists (M=0.49 M=0.18), which is the most prominent characteristic of online editors. Aside from the infotainment role, online editors perform similarly to print journalists in other roles with minimal difference in average scores (see Table 7.7).

Table 7. 7: The role performance of the two groups of authors on newspaper's Facebook pages

	Paper journalist (N=180)	Rank	Home editor (N=74)	Rank	Both (N=6)	Total
Interventionist	0.29	1	0.34	2	0.30	0.30
Watchdog role	0.14	3	0.16	3	0.10	0.14
Collaborator role	0.02	5	0.02	5	0	0.02
Infotainment role	0.18	2	0.49	1	0.25	0.27
Civic role	0.12	4	0.16	3	0.07	0.13

This finding matches the perceptions of journalists described in the interviews. Numerous journalists mentioned that the main task of an online editor is to gather political information online and repackage it as a news story that will increase click rates. Accordingly, they tend to emphasise more sensational or emotional elements of a story to attract the reader's attention. Numerous journalists I interviewed criticised the way it is easy to find clickbait in headlines online instead of in print since it can provoke readers curiosity and increase traffic to official websites. The two divergent standards for online news and print were revealed in the interviews. Print journalists described pursuing two seemingly contradictory aims – one to attract the largest audiences as consumers as part of their KPI (key performance indicators) and also to provide news to make citizens informed. My interview analysis shows that newspapers' metrics-driven strategy creates significant stress for frontline journalists and editors, while online editors, focused on increasing click rates, do not face these conflicting tensions.

"If I were an online editor in charge of news on social media, I would follow the same approach because the click rate is the primary standard the organisations evaluate my performance by. However, this is not the case for newspaper journalists. We are not only having to scrutinise the government but also to investigate truth, explore exclusive news stories, and in-depth news analysis all of which require time. Journalists shouldn't devote all their working hours to real time news due to the monthly click rate demands." (C05)

Previous research indicates that audience metrics are vital in determining journalists' autonomy (Anderson, 2001; Bunce 2019; Nelson and Tandoc 2019; Petre, 2021). According

to Anderson (2001), journalistic autonomy is impacted when readership numbers play a role in the news selection process. Nelson and Tandoc (2019) also suggest that audience metrics can lead journalists to actively chase readers' attention and engage more in the watchdog role. Not all newsrooms use metrics for news selection or evaluating journalists' performance. For instance, *the New York Times*, focused on providing opinions to readers, uses metrics as a reference to understand audience reactions rather than as a news topic selection standard (Petre, 2021). Moreover, metrics can be used to achieve a balance between making a profit and serving the public interest. Nelson and Tandoc (2019) suggest that hard news may not always align with a click-based standard to cater to reader preferences, whereas soft news should invariably be influenced by metrics. The rationale behind this distinction is that profits generated from soft news can be reinvested into the costly production of hard news, which plays a vital democratic role in informing citizens about public affairs and fulfilling the watchdog function.

In the case of Taiwan, the way newsrooms applied metrics led to them performing a strong infotainment role and a weak watchdog role on Facebook pages. This aligns with Anderson's (2001) and Petre's (2021) finding that metrics influence journalistic autonomy by disempowering journalists as workers and replacing their professional judgment with audience analytics. This presents a significant challenge to the trustee model, which relies on the public's trust in journalists' professional judgment to ensure that news serves the purpose of helping citizens make informed decisions in support of a healthy democracy.

7.2.3.2 Civic role

Table 7. 8: The average scores of the civic role in print and in news on Facebook

Types	Mean value		Main contributing indicator
	2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	
Civic Educator (Including background information, educating on duties and rights, local impact)	0.28	0.20	-Background information (-11.7%) - Local impact (-8.6%)
Civic Agent (Including information of citizen activities, citizens' questions, citizens' demand, and citizens' reaction)	0.05	0.08	Citizens' reaction (+9.9%)
Total	0.15	0.13	

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

Newspapers perform at a similar level in the civic role in both print editions and their Facebook pages with the mean value of 0.15 and 0.13. Table 7.8 shows that both practise a higher level of a civic educator than a civic agent. The print editions and their respective Facebook pages function more as civic educators (M=0.28, M=0.20) rather than as civic agents (M=0.05, M=0.08). This result shows that the newspapers across both platforms tend to deliver the news related to what they think citizens need to know instead of reflecting citizens' voices. This finding adds to Mellado's (2021a) research which only investigates newspapers. In terms of the civic educator role, the primary indicators contributing to the decrease in news on Facebook pages are "background information" and "local impact," both experiencing declines of 11.7% and 8.6%, respectively (refer to Table 7.9). This implies that political news on Facebook focuses less on fulfilling the democratic function of legacy journalism which entails educating citizens as well-informed decision-makers.

Regarding the civic agent, compared to the print edition, political news on Facebook pages expresses citizens' voices mildly and the difference lies in a higher proportion of stories including citizens' reaction by 9.9%. Media in transitional democracies tends to incorporate a greater representation of people's voices in their news coverage (Humanes and Roses, 2021). Taiwan's newspapers also follow this approach by fulfilling their civic agent role by prominently featuring citizens' reactions on both platforms, with 7.6% in print and 17.7% for news on Facebook pages. Civil society needs to be given more voice after democratisation. The previous studies suggests that the ordinary peoples' voice is often included passively to support existing discourse, such as vox pop or poll data (Firmstone and Corner, 2017; Firmstone, 2023). This can also be seen in the performance of the civic agent role in Taiwan's newspapers and on their Facebook pages. This is connected to the way citizens' voices are referenced in political news as detailed in Chapter 5 and 7.3.2.

Table 7. 9: Two aspects of the civic role performed by newspapers in print and in news on Facebook

Civic role	Indicators	2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	The difference between print and Facebook
Educator	Background information	134(48.6%)	96(36.9%)	-11.7%
	Educating on duties and rights	7(2.5%)	4(1.5%)	-1%
	Local impact	61(22.1%)	35(13.5%)	-8.6%
Agent	Information of citizen activities	9(3.3%)	2(0.8%)	-2.5%
	Citizens' questions	9(3.3%)	4(1.5%)	-1.8%
	Citizens' demand	6(2.2%)	5(1.9%)	-0.3%
	Citizens' reaction	21(7.6%)	46(17.7%)	+9.9%




Figure 7. 5 The average score of two dimensions in the civil role in print and on their Facebook pages

When looking into two types of the civic role, the four newspapers predominantly function as civic educators rather than civic agents on both Facebook pages and in their print editions (see Figure 7.5). *UDN* and *China Times* show a decrease in the civic educator role on their Facebook pages (gap=0.14). This demonstrates that the self-claimed quality newspapers tend to preserve their educator mission in their print editions. The popular newspaper, *Apple Daily*, maintains relative stability across platforms in its role as a civic educator on its Facebook pages. In Chapter 6, I observed that *Apple Daily* exhibited the most notable change by increasing its civic educator level from 0.18 to 0.25 over time, reaching a level like the other three newspapers. This pattern contradicts the common assumption that market-driven newspapers neglect the provision of political information (McManus, 1994). *Apple Daily's* news on their Facebook pages even demonstrates the strongest level of civic educator (M=0.26) among all the papers. Furthermore, in Chapter 6, I found that the change in the civic agent role in the newspapers related to their partisanship. However, this pattern is not found on their Facebook pages.

7.3 Comparing Democratic Value in News Content

Following the discussion in comparing news across platforms, in the second part of this chapter, two sub-questions (1.2 and 1.4) are discussed: 1.2: *What is the quantity of political news in*

print and their Facebook pages? How has it changed across platforms? and 1.4: What is the quality of political news in print and their Facebook pages? How has it changed across platforms? I address the first sub question (1.2) by analysing the proportion of political news provided on two platforms. The second sub-question (1.4) is analysed by evaluating the presence of three indicators of news quality, including source diversity, source transparency, and partisan bias.

7.3.1 Comparing the amount of political news across platforms

Table 7. 10: The quantity of political news in print and in news on Facebook

Newspapers	2020 newspapers (5 days)		2021/2022 Facebook pages (5 days)	
	Political news	Percentage	Political news	Percentage
Apple Daily	51	11.67%	49	9.55%
Liberty Times	75	12.52%	57	11.80%
China Times	83	15.58%	73	9.55%
UDN	76	18.14%	81	14.29%
Total	276	14.36%	260	11.17%
Average	13.8 political news per newspaper per day		13 political news articles per Facebook page per day	

*The sum of news articles only includes news articles reported by journalists - the editorials, columnists, letters to the editor and supplements are excluded.

**Political news on Facebook pages excludes news from other media and video-only content such as live streams and video-only posts.

Sufficient and high-quality political information advances citizens' political knowledge, a precondition for a healthy democracy (Van Aelst et al., 2017). Newspapers, as the major political actor, are conventionally the major political news provider. In Taiwan, even though most people have turned to social media to access news (Nielsen, 2022; Lin, 2022), newspapers, as a media organisation, are also the dominant news content providers on Facebook pages among all media types, with over one million followers. In Chapter 5, I found that the absolute amount of political news in print decreased by nearly 30% (from 386 political news in 2008 to 276 political news in 2020). However, this decrease contradicts journalists' testimonies that they have become overloaded with providing a greater quantity of news articles in their daily work since the democratic transition (see Chapter 8). To explain this discrepancy, I decided to see if the increase in journalists' workloads related to the newspapers' output on social media on their Facebook pages.

Table 7.10 shows political news in print with the amount of 276 news articles and their Facebook pages presented a similar amount of political news as 260 news articles. Furthermore,

the proportion of political news in print and on Facebook pages reaches a similar level. Table 7.10 shows that the percentage of political news among all news articles in print newspapers is 14.26%, whereas the percentage of political news among all posts on Facebook pages is 11.17%. The gap between the two platforms is lower than 5%. The measurement of political news on Facebook pages did not include videos or live streams. Although it is a relatively small difference, there is a pattern among each of the four newspapers to provide slightly less political news on Facebook pages than in print editions, decreasing from 1% to 5%. *China Times* demonstrates a more significant drop in the provision of political news, and *Liberty Times* maintains the equivalent level. The study in Austria suggests that quality papers' online editions contain political news more widely and frequently than print ones, while popular papers performed oppositely (Jacobi et al., 2016). In Taiwan, the four newspapers present a similar trend of publishing a smaller percentage of political news on Facebook pages. The result seems to partially contrast with the previous study that indicates sensational and soft news tends to dominate Facebook pages (Xiao and Wang, 2018). The fact that political news, traditionally considered hard news, is not given less emphasis implies that political news is still popular on social media platforms. This is in line with previous research in Taiwan that indicates political news has an important place in Taiwanese newspapers (Yi, 2008; Su, 2018).

Given that the total amount of political news provided by newspapers when we combine the output across both platforms increases, the next rational question is whether online news replicates the printed edition or whether different new content is produced for Facebook. In the first part, we discussed the journalistic role performances across two platforms and found the news content offered by newspapers is not identical online and offline. We saw that the critical difference is the new product that newspapers offer in their online platform, i.e., instant news.

After the scale of the digital advertising market gradually surpassed print, instant news on Facebook brought prosperity and the site of another fiercely competing market for newspaper organisations. Taiwanese newspapers all provide instant political news on their websites, which already provides news beyond that in their print editions. The political news on their websites is also not a showcase to replicate news from the print. In my interviews, journalists indicated that when Facebook became another channel to disseminate their online news, the competition in offering instant news dramatically accelerated in the media ecosystem. Newspaper organisations attempt to offer different content on the two platforms to serve divergent audiences. A print journalist mentioned that the editorial desk instructs journalists to save exclusive news for the print edition while placing less significant news or additional

coverage on the online platform. This practice could be a contributing factor to the orientation of journalistic role performance on Facebook pages toward infotainment.

"The print edition doesn't replicate online news due to its more fragmented and shallower nature. To differentiate ourselves, we require more exclusive news and interpretation in news. Therefore, the editorial desk instructs journalists to save exclusive stories or write specific stories to the print edition."(C02)

In Chapter 5, I mentioned that some argue that since Taiwanese audiences use social media as a major channel to access news, their political knowledge may not severely be influenced by the drop of political information in print. In my research findings, the quantity of political news in print and on Facebook pages is similar. However, if the quality of political news on Facebook pages is subpar, even if the number of news articles exposed to readers remains consistent, the impact on citizens' political knowledge would not be the same. The quality of news content is vital for advancing political knowledge. Accordingly, in the following paragraphs, I explore the democratic quality of political news newspapers offer on their Facebook pages.

7.3.2 Comparing the news quality across platforms

There are three criteria of democratic value that I conceptualised to measure the democratic quality of news content over time (see Chapter 5) and across platforms, i.e., source diversity, source transparency, and partisan bias.

Source diversity

Table 7. 11: The amount and percentage of source diversity in print and in news on Facebook categorised in two groups

	Two groups	Count (%)		Main contributing category
		2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	
Source diversity	Political institution (Including sources from the state, DPP, KMT, minor parties, and local government)	592 (84.69%)	384 (61.84%)	-State source (-25.02%) -opposition party KMT source (+5.4%)
	Civil voice (Including sources from civil society, ordinary people, and expert)	63 (9.01%)	191 (30.76%)	Ordinary people (+20.47%)

* The sum of news sources in print editions is 763 and it on Facebook pages is 670.

* The category of "other sources" in two platforms is not listed in the table

Table 7. 12: The amount and percentage of source cited in the newspapers over time and across platforms categorised in two groups

categories	Type of source	2008 Newspapers (N=386)		Sum	2020 Newspapers (N=276)		Sum	2021/2022 Facebook pages (N=260)		Sum
		Number and percentage			Number and percentage			Number and percentage		
Political institutions	State	376	40.21%	689 (73.68%)	292	41.77%	592 (84.69%)	104	16.75%	384 (61.84%)
	DPP	199	21.28%		85	12.16%		62	9.98%	
	KMT	96	10.27%		149	21.32%		166	26.73%	
	Minor parties	6	0.64%		42	6.01%		33	5.31%	
	Local government	12	1.28%		24	3.43%		19	3.06%	
Civil Voice	Civil society	92	9.84%	190 (20.32%)	26	3.72%	63 (9.01%)	26	4.19%	191 (30.76%)
	Ordinary people	64	4.92%		19	2.72%		144	23.19%	
	Expert	52	5.56%		18	2.58%		21	3.38%	
Other	Other	56	5.99%	56 (5.99%)	44	6.29%	44 (6.29%)	46	7.41%	46 (7.41%)
Total				935 (100%)			699 (100%)			621 (100%)

*News sources include transparent and half transparent sources (see 4.4 in Chapter 4)

Based on the findings in Chapter 5, when comparing political news in print, it is evident that journalists have remained heavily reliant on political institutions as sources, with no significant increase in sources from civil society since 2008. Interestingly, when exploring news sources cited in news on their Facebook pages, the reliance on political institutions drops sharply by around 23% and civil sources increase by 20% (see Table 7.11). It is unsurprising that political institutions, especially state sources, heavily dominate printed political news, accounting for 84.69% of appearances. In contrast, political news on newspapers' Facebook pages is less reliant on political institutions, at 61.84%. Furthermore, the percentage of civil voices on Facebook pages is three times their print counterparts, from 9.01% to 30.76%. The most significant difference in civil voices is in the representation of ordinary people's voices, with 23.19% on Facebook and only 2.72% in print editions (see Table 7.12). After the democratic transition, print editions did not increase the representation of citizens' voices and continued to rely on official sources, while their Facebook pages gave more attention to civil society sources.

When journalists turn to official sources as the authoritative perspective to define social issues, other voices may be excluded or considered biased in the given field. It seems newspapers' online news published on their Facebook pages could be an alternative channel to

balance the dependence on official sources rooted in newspaper journalists' routines. The insufficient representation of society seems to be complementary in their online news on Facebook pages. This increase in civil society sources appears to be a positive development but we need to be cautious in assuming this. As will be discussed later, the way ordinary people's voices are utilised can unveil challenges in generalising the citation of civil voices as a positive factor in enhancing democratic value in news content.

Does the popular paper stand for ordinary people?

Table 7. 13: The percentage of source cited in the four newspapers across platforms

2020 Newspaper (N=276)	Political institution	Civil society	Other	Total	2021/2022 Facebook pages(N=260)	Political institution	Civil society	Other	Total
Apple Daily N=51	119 78.29%	20 13.16%	13 8.55%	152 100%	Apple Daily N=49	77 46.95%	75 45.73%	12 7.32%	164 100%
Liberty Times N=70	142 88.20%	9 5.59%	10 6.21%	161 100%	Liberty Times N=57	84 73.04%	25 21.74%	6 5.22%	115 100%
China Times N=79	151 85.31%	14 7.91%	12 6.78%	177 100%	China Times N=73	97 54.19%	62 34.64%	20 11.17%	179 100%
UDN N=76	180 86.12%	20 9.57%	9 4.31%	209 100%	UDN N=81	126 77.30%	29 17.79%	8 4.91%	163 100%
Total	592 84.69%	63 9.01%	44 6.29%	699 100%	Total	384 61.84%	191 30.76%	46 7.41%	621 100%

In chapter 5, I found that the popular newspaper, *Apple Daily*, significantly reduced the number of news sources from civil voices in 2020 compared to 2008. This adjustment led to sourcing practices that were less distinguishable from those of other newspapers following the democratic transition. As shown in Table 7.13 in print, all the four newspapers still show a high dependence on authoritative sources, with nearly or over 80% of sources coming from political institutions. However, the online news on their Facebook pages shows a drop in the institutional voice from the most significant, around 30% in *Apple Daily* and *China Times*, and the least change to 10% in *UDN*. Concerning civil voice, they all show a similar trend on their Facebook pages with an increase of 30% in *Apple Daily* to the smallest increase of 10% in *UDN*. Again, *Apple Daily* stands out from the other three newspapers, citing about 10% fewer sources from political institutions and nearly twice as many civil voices on their Facebook pages. A more significant distinction is performed by its Facebook pages, with almost equal percentages from political institutions (46.95%) and civil society (45.73%). This implies that the popular newspaper's print edition been closer to civil society than other papers, and this role is significantly amplified on their Facebook page.

When analysing the citations from ordinary people in news on *Apple Daily*'s Facebook pages, they mostly come from social media by netizens who comment below the news link or who

discuss news in the online forum instead of conducting a real interview. The comments selected by journalists are usually fragmented and sensational without rational discussion. For instance, in the news related to the import of U.S. pork, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party led a boycott campaign. The dispute about the policy led to physical conflicts between the legislators with various fights in Legislative Yuan. *Apple Daily* published online news that mainly reported netizens' comments from PTT, which is the largest bulletin board system in Taiwan¹⁵. The news article cited anonymous netizens' comments, including "*watching the circus show for free,*" and "*blatant waste of taxpayers' money.*"

Table 7. 14: Social Media Citations in Newspapers: Longitudinal Analysis by Amount and Percentage Across Platforms

categories	2020 Newspaper The sum of news sources= 763			2021/2022 Facebook pages The sum of news sources= 670		
	Facebook	Other	Total	Facebook	Other	Total
Apple Daily	10	2	12 (1.57%)	61	26	87 (12.99%)
Liberty Times	2	0	2 (0.26%)	54	9	63 (9.46%)
China Times	7	1	8 (1.05%)	51	45	96 (14.33%)
UDN	6	1	7 (0.92%)	12	10	22 (3.28%)
Total	25	4	29 (3.80%)	178	90	268 (40%)

*Other=Twitter, Line or PTT, etc.

Along with the development of digital media, using social media as a news source is common nowadays. In Western papers, political news tends to cite more social media sources than other topics of hard news (Broersma and Graham, 2013). In quality papers, Twitter is used to add flavour to expand news coverage to another layer of meaning, which may not be the main component in a news article. However, mainstream news outlets often rely heavily on sourcing content from social media to create news articles. This practice is driven by market competition and the convenience of tapping into public sentiment. According to Firmstone (2023), this approach tends to favour official sources and typically shapes ordinary people's social media posts in a manner that aligns with the established narrative of journalists, rather than highlighting the voices of everyday citizens. This can be likened to the critique of Vox pops, which are criticised for categorising and labelling the public's voice rather than

¹⁵ Initially a platform for National Taiwan University students, PTT evolved into a nationwide forum for various topics. Before Facebook, it was vital for media and journalists in finding news leads. A senior journalist I spoke to stress the need to monitor PTT closely.

encouraging individuals to actively contribute their unique perspectives and expertise (Firmstone and Corner, 2017).

I now look at how often social media is cited and find that social media is commonly cited in political news, and more often in online than print news. Table 7.14 shows that the number of quotes from social media rocketed up on newspapers' Facebook pages. Forty percent of the news sources used when analysing online news published on newspapers' Facebook pages are drawn from various social media platforms. By contrast, in print, the news sources from social media among all news sources is only 3.8%. This highlights the predominant role of Facebook as the primary platform for both print and online news outlets to access and reference sources, including those related to government officials, politicians, and opinion leaders, primarily from their respective Facebook pages.

That online news shows a shift toward citing sources from political institutions' social media poses a threat to journalism's watchdog role. This shift enables powerful individuals to control political discourse, diminishing the traditional negotiation process between journalists and politicians. Politicians can now communicate directly with the public via social media (Broersma and Graham, 2013, 2012), and this reliance on news sources from politicians' or government officials' Facebook pages raises the risk of journalists being lured into reproducing posts designed as "news candy" (Revers, 2014). Furthermore, depending on government sources on Facebook pages limits journalists' ability to scrutinise public affairs and weakens their watchdog function. This concern is corroborated by the testimonies of print journalists in my interviews (see Chapter 8).

"Social media, notably Facebook, serves as a protective barrier for those in power. It acts as an intermediary between news media and the public, enabling politicians to avoid direct interactions with journalists. Instead, they use Facebook to convey carefully crafted opinions and responses to the public. (C01)"

In a nutshell, in Taiwan, the use of social media as a news source follows a similar trend to the literature, with traditional news sources still being the primary go-to for journalists due to their scepticism about the credibility of the internet (Cushion and Franklin, 2015). However, when it comes to online news on Facebook pages, a different story emerges. As such, the balance between traditional and social media news sources must be carefully considered to ensure that journalists can continue to fulfil their role as watchdogs and maintain the quality and credibility of news reporting.

Source transparency

Table 7. 15: The amount and percentage of source transparency in print and in news on Facebook categorised into two groups.

	Two groups	Count (%)		Main contributing category
		2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	
Source transparency	Transparent source	622 (81.52%)	410 (61.19%)	Transparent source (-18.33%)
	Anonymous source* (Including translucent and opaque sources)	141 (18.48%)	260 (38.81%)	Translucent source (+20.33%)
	Total	763	670	

*In print, there are 77 translucent sources and 64 opaque sources. In online news on their Facebook pages, there are 211 sources, with 49 of them being opaque.

Transparency is one of the important criteria to evaluate news quality in Taiwan where public trust in journalism is low and the journalistic profession embraces the ideal of objectivity transplanted from the U.S. Overall, I found that transparency in digital news platforms has not improved as much as I expected. In this research, I focus on the transparency in news sources. The result suggests that online news on Facebook pages cites news sources with much lower transparency than in their print editions. Table 7.15 shows that transparent sources are only 61.19% of news on Facebook pages, whereas the transparent source in print is 81.52%. The main contributing factor in less transparency on Facebook pages is translucent sources, which increased by 20.33%. Political news on Facebook pages often exhibits a higher level of tolerance when it comes to citing sources with partial or anonymous identities, such as politicians' opinions criticising the government or opposing parties. In contrast, the credibility of news in print publications may be perceived as higher than that on their Facebook pages. This contradicts the expectation that digital media, with its limitless capacity to unveil news production details and facilitate greater citizen participation, would be more transparent. Surprisingly, news sources on social media exhibit even lower levels of transparency. Consequently, this undermines the accountability of news content.

Table 7. 16: The number and percentage of transparent sources in each newspaper in print and in news on Facebook categorised into two groups

Categories	2020 Newspapers The sum of news sources= 763		2021/2022 Facebook The sum of news sources= 670	
	Transparent source	Anonymous source	Transparent source	Anonymous source
Apple Daily	122(72.19%)	47(27.81%)	84(50.30%)	83(49.70%)
Liberty Times	148(86.55%)	23(13.45%)	82(65.08%)	44(34.92%)
China Times	165(85.49%)	28(14.51%)	108(51.18%)	103(48.82%)
UDN	187(81.30%)	43(18.70%)	136(81.93%)	30(18.07%)
Total	622(81.52%)	141(18.48%)	410(61.19%)	260(38.81%)

I now look at differences between transparency practises at newspapers. Table 7.16 shows that the market-driven paper *Apple Daily* performed the least source transparency in print and Facebook pages with 72.19% and 50.03% of transparent sources, respectively. On the other hand, *UDN*, considered a quality paper, shows a relatively high level of citing transparent sources on both platforms with around 80% in print and its Facebook page. Based on Karlsson's (2011) research, transparency is a practical indicator of objectivity, which aims to increase the audience's trust in media. From this perspective, the quality paper tends to value its legacy brand and reputation so that they abide by transparency norms on both platforms. Apart from *UDN* and *Apple Daily*, the other two newspapers, *China Times*, and *Liberty Times*, demonstrate a significantly different performance on the two platforms. In the print edition, both have around 80% transparent sources, but on their Facebook pages, *China Times* and *Liberty Times* cited only 51.18% and 65.08% of transparent sources. These two newspapers show a lower standard in maintaining, at least at face value, openness, and credibility of their online news.

Newspapers in print therefore abide by normative norms more strictly than their online news counterparts. This shows that the development and application of transparency as a norm is constrained by the strategies that news organisations choose to implement (Firmstone, 2023). When news organisations allow more translucent sources to be cited in online news, which could be hard to verify, this increases the risk of providing manipulated information. For instance, an unverified source from the internet may be a paid netizen from political parties or the Chinese government. As a result, when readers consume their news mainly on Facebook pages, they may be at more risk of being exposed to disinformation, which might influence public opinion in subtle ways. Such practises are detrimental to the democratic functions of the press, by risking their ability to provide accurate and credible political information for citizens.

To summarize the source diversity and transparency, the strategies for utilising social media play a decisive role in the diverse performance among newspapers. The popular paper *Apple Daily* demonstrates a strong tendency to cite more voices from civil society, but it also shows the lowest level of source transparency. Anonymous citizens' comments are the main citations they use to represent "people's voice." This performance is exaggerated in online news on its Facebook pages. The popular paper cites civil sources and political institutions in equal proportions, coinciding with a decline in transparency. On the other hand, *UDN*, a quality paper, whether in the print edition or on Facebook pages, mostly depends on political institutions and keeps a similarly high level of source transparency in the news on Facebook pages. The other two newspapers, *Liberty Times* and *China Times* tend to perform as quality papers in their print edition by citing mostly political institutions and transparent sources. However, their news on Facebook pages is similar to the popular paper with more civil voices but less transparent news sources. As a result, the newspapers exhibit varying sourcing strategies between their print and online news content. Future studies should delve deeper into this phenomenon by examining specific newsroom culture and editorial policies.

Partisan bias- in tone and news source

Table 7. 17: The gap between two poles of the tone toward the government in print and in news on Facebook

	Newspapers (N=276)	Facebook (N=260)	The most positive and negative paper
The gap of two poles in average score	0.84	1.55	Newspaper: The most positive: Liberty Times (M= 0.51) The most negative: UDN (M= -0.33) Facebook pages The most positive: Liberty Times (M= 0.70) The most negative: China Times (M= -0.85)

*The range of average scores (M=-2 to 2)

Analysis of average tone scores in news articles reveals a significant widening of the gap between the most positive and most negative attitudes toward the government, particularly on Facebook pages. In Chapter 5, when comparing the tone toward the government, a slight increase in the difference between the most positive and most negative stances is observed, with pro-KMT and pro-DPP newspapers representing the two poles (see Chapter 5). Extremism and polarisation trends are evident on newspapers' Facebook pages, which exhibit significant partisan characteristics. In Table 7.17, the gap between the most positive tone (*Liberty Times*, M=0.51) and the most negative tone (*UDN*, M=-0.33) is 0.84 in print. On Facebook pages, this

gap doubles to 1.55, with the most positive tone (*Liberty Times*, M=0.70) and the most negative tone (*China Times*, M=-0.85). This means that news shared on Facebook by newspapers conveys a more pronounced partisanship and overt stance toward the government.

This finding supports the previous section (7.2.2) in which I argue that the partisan watchdog role is prevalent in print and extends to their Facebook pages. Nevertheless, the less intensive watchdog role is performed on Facebook pages, as does the frequency of scrutinising the government in news articles. A lower frequency of scrutinizing those in power does not necessarily indicate a milder tone in their expressions. In online news, such scrutiny might occur less often, but when it does, it often involves stronger criticism or the use of highly negative language toward the government, compared to the print edition. For instance, political news concerning the government on *Liberty Times'* Facebook pages tends to have a more positive tone, while on *China Times'* Facebook pages, a very negative tone is more common. This aligns with research from the U.S., indicating that adopting polarised partisanship was a strategy employed to establish their brand and attract partisan readers (Nerone and Barnhurst, 2001).

Table 7. 18: Tones toward the government in three sections of news articles in print and in news on Facebook

Newspapers				
	Headline	Quote from others	Journalists' voice	Average
Apple Daily(N=25)	0.04	0	0	0.01
China Times(N=53)	-0.77	0.13	-0.30	-0.31
Liberty Times (N=40)	0.50	0.58	0.45	0.51
UDN(N=47)	-0.74	0.11	-0.34	-0.33
Facebook pages				
	Headline	Quote from others	Journalists' voice	Average
Apple Daily (N=11)	-0.64	-0.27	0	-0.30
China Times(N=34)	-1.00	-0.85	-0.71	-0.85
Liberty Times (N=21)	0.38	1.10	0.62	0.70
UDN(N=30)	-0.60	-0.40	-0.17	-0.39

*The range of average scores (M=-2 to 2)

I now look at how partisanship is expressed in different sections of news articles such as the headline, the quotes used from sources and the journalists' voice. Table 7.18 shows that when political news is related to the government on Facebook pages, *Liberty Times* stands out as the only newspaper consistently using a more positive tone in every section of a news article. Its average score of positive tone slightly increases from 0.51 in the print edition to 0.70 on its

Facebook page. By contrast, *China Times* holds the most negative tone toward the government in political news on its Facebook page in all sections of news articles. Its average score of negative tone also surges from 0.31 in the print edition to 0.85 on its Facebook page. The other two newspapers demonstrate diverse performances in their tone toward the government. *UDN* shows the most stable tone toward the government with an average score of negative tone of 0.33 and 0.39 in print and its Facebook page. The market-driven paper *Apple Daily* shows the most contradictory attitude toward the government. When the print edition expresses a positive tone with an average score of 0.1, news on the Facebook page demonstrates a negative tone with an average score of 0.30. This may support Hallin and Mancini's (2004) presumption that partisan papers are rooted in a journalistic culture which could differ in various media systems. Therefore, *Apple Daily* which is a sister paper of *Apple Daily* founded in Hong Kong may demonstrate less consistency in its political position.

Partisanship in Taiwan is broadly and in-depth discussed in electoral studies, but political bias in the daily news is lacking in media studies. Based on McCargo's presumption, partisan bias may inevitably permeate journalistic daily practise (McCargo, 2012). In this research, I provide robust and innovative evidence that partisan bias in Taiwan is not only practised in electoral news and permeates into daily news "between election democracy" (de Vreese, 2017:175) as I find it in print and further exaggerated on newspapers' Facebook pages. Partisanship can impact media systems positively by encouraging civic engagement. However, if partisanship revolves around unresolved differences like religious or identity-based divisions, it can lead to polarised partisanship, increasing the risk of hatred and even civil conflict (Veltmer, 2012). In Taiwan, the partisanship of the newspapers is grounded in two political ideologies: unification and independence, related to different identities that are hard to bargain or resolve. Although the four newspapers all claimed their profession as objective and fair, my empirical research proves that in newspapers' daily political news, the partisan bias has perpetuated into it and is at the forefront of their Facebook pages. It has only been possible to show this by comparing news content over time and across platforms.

7.4 Summary

This chapter presents the results of the comparison of political news across different platforms. Regarding role performance, the chapter reveals that political news on Facebook pages exhibited a higher infotainment role relative to newspapers' print counterparts. This manifestation indicates that all the newspapers, including popular and partisan papers, consider

Facebook a click-driven journalism platform. Consequently, their strategy is profit-driven rather than public-oriented on social media. This innovative finding regarding role performance in media convergence showcases various results. It sheds light on Mellado's (2021a) research which investigated media by categorising it with traditional typologies, the newspapers, and broadcasters, that assume a sole type of journalism can be performed. In fact, a single media organisation can operate multiple platforms that serve different roles. Due to media convergence, the boundaries between, for example, print and online editions of the same media brand have become blurred, requiring a holistic approach to their management.

Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that newspapers operate two types of journalism with divergent professional standards. My study indicates that the democratic value of political news on Facebook pages is only superior to print newspapers in terms of diversity, i.e., citing diverse civil voices. However, citizens are presented passively rather than as active participants in shaping the news, which echoes previous research about the use of citizens in television news (Firmstone and Corner, 2017) and raises doubts over the efficacy of online news production practices in increasing diversity. Moreover, the lower level of transparency practised by the four newspapers on their Facebook pages contradicts Karlsson's (2011) suggestion that transparency may increase on digital platforms. Furthermore, my findings corroborate previous studies indicating that the partisan tone tends to intensify when print media transitions to online platforms in media systems with a partisan tradition (Benson et al., 2012; Humprecht et al., 2022).

Chapter 8 The Transformation of Role Perception

8.1 Introduction

The transformation of Taiwanese journalistic culture is interrelated with democratisation. When the authoritarian era ended, the media was supposed to be free and independent from the state in way that would serve a new democratic society. Nevertheless, research in other countries suggests that journalistic culture changes slowly, as it takes 15 to 20 years for a generation to thoroughly be replaced by another in the workforce (Joseph, 2013). This chapter highlights the subtle changes in Taiwanese journalistic culture through an analysis of journalists' role perceptions by exploring *RQ2: What are the journalistic roles in Taiwanese newspapers, and how have they changed from 2008 to 2020?* Political journalists working at the four newspapers in the study, with and without experience of the democratic transition, were interviewed. The interview results from journalists representing two generations are examined in three sections: (i) journalistic culture, (ii) journalists' role perceptions, and (iii) the perceived challenges in practice and influential factors. The first two sections aim to answer the sub-question *"2.1: How are journalists' role perceptions integrated with Confucian culture? How has this relationship changed since 2008?"* and the third section provides the answer regarding the sub-question *"2.4 What factors do journalists perceive cause a gap between journalistic role perception and role performance? Why and how do these factors cause a gap?"* Having established the differences and similarities in news content by comparing output across two points in time, and across print and Facebook platforms in the previous chapters, this chapter focuses on the qualitative in-depth interviews with political journalists. It is noteworthy that the statistical data presented in this chapter is derived from rankings based on interviews conducted with 23 participants, thereby offering valuable insights into the perspectives of the sampled individuals rather than encompassing the entirety of journalists.

8.2 The Transformation of Journalistic Culture

As previous chapters mentioned, Confucianism was imposed by the state power to assert the orthodoxy of Chinese culture and legitimacy in representing China. This occurred after the KMT party retreated to Taiwan following fifty years of Japanese colonisation. Confucianism was practised on all fronts of society, including the belief that journalism had a responsibility to help save the country. During that period, two commercial newspapers, *UDN* and *China Times*, were proclaimed as the paradigm of Confucian literati newspapers. After

democratisation in 1996, the instrumentalisation of Confucian journalistic culture was gradually freed from state control. However, cross-national comparative research suggests that it remains the main characteristic of the journalistic culture in Asian countries (Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Mellado, 2021b; Wu, 2022). Whether it still exists in Taiwanese journalistic culture, how it transformed over time, and its relation to democracy requires further research. In this research, I suggest that the commonly held assumptions about the influence of Confucian culture on journalistic role perceptions in East Asian countries, including Taiwan, may not be as straightforward as previously believed. Instead, I consider the nationally specific understandings and practices of key concepts such as social harmony, which unique historical and political contexts may shape. That is to say, the importance of polarisation in Taiwanese society as shaping culture cannot be understated.


My research highlights that the changing political climate in Taiwan has had a significant impact on the evolving journalistic culture. According to Hanitzsch (2007:369), journalistic culture is "a particular set of ideas and practices by which journalists, consciously and unconsciously, legitimate their role in society and render their work meaningful for themselves and others." Journalistic culture is shaped by various factors such as political, economic, and social structures, as well as historical traditions and professional norms. Role perception is one of the important dimensions of journalistic culture (Hanitzsch, 2012).

Given that this research investigates role perceptions, I conceptualised four distinctive indicators of Confucian culture correlated to Hanitzsch's three dimensions of role perception (see Chapter 4). The first dimension of interventionism is related to the indicator of national destiny (*journalists should be responsible for the destiny of their country*). The second dimension is the power distance which presents two indicators of social harmony (*journalists have the responsibility to monitor the government but also need to maintain social harmony and stability*) and legitimacy (*journalists can scrutinise the government but only in a way that will not deteriorate its legitimacy*). The third dimension, market orientation, refers to the indicator of ethics (*journalists are responsible for providing news based on social morality and ethics rather than only considering the economic profit or readership*).

The interviewees, both senior and junior journalists, were asked to rate each indicator based on how well the statements aligned with their personal experiences, "*To what degree that you feel the description is true as a journalist?*" (1= almost never true, 2= usually not true, 3= occasionally true, 4= usually true, and 5= almost always true). Then, they were able to elaborate in

the interviews. A total of twenty-three journalists were interviewed, comprising thirteen senior journalists and ten junior journalists.

8.2.1 Confucian Culture in journalism: a fading connection with China



Note: 1. Interview question 8: Journalists ranked four indicators on a five-point scale (1 is almost never true, 2 is usually not true, 3 is occasionally true, 4 is usually true, and 5 is almost always true).
 2. (1)National destiny: journalists should be responsible for the destiny of their country, (2) Social harmony: journalists have the responsibility to monitor the government but also need to maintain social harmony and stability, (3) Legitimacy: journalists can scrutinise the government but only in a way that will not deteriorate its legitimacy, (4) Ethics: journalists have the responsibility to provide news based on social morality and ethics rather than only considering the economic profit or readership.

Figure 8. 1 The degree to which senior and junior journalists feel the description is true in four indicators

In the past, scholars claimed that, following democratisation, the influence of Confucian culture declined as fewer journalists identified themselves as Confucian literati (Huang, 2013; Feng, 2020). This study explains further how this change occurred and why. The results, derived from rankings based on 23 interviews, show that after democratisation, Confucian characteristics in role perceptions no longer predominated in journalistic culture in Taiwan. From the journalists' rankings, the average score of Confucian culture is 2.6, which is located between "usually not

true" and "occasionally true." Furthermore, comparing the rankings between the senior and junior generations, the senior journalists tend to recognise more influence of Confucian culture than junior counterparts (with an average score of 2.8 and 2.4, respectively). Senior journalists ranked every indicator slightly higher than juniors (see Figure 8.1). This implies that senior journalists who lived through the imposition of Confucianism by the state during the authoritarian period may be more deeply influenced by Confucian culture (Fetzer and Soper, 2013).

Among the newspapers, journalists from *UDN* and *China Times*, which were proclaimed as Confucian literati newspapers, show a higher level of recognition of Confucian culture than those from *Liberty Times* and *Apple Daily*. The average score for Confucian literati's papers, *UDN* (mean=3.0) and *China Times* (mean=2.9), both ranked slightly higher than the other two commercial newspapers, *Apple Daily* (mean=2.6) and *Liberty Times* (mean=2.0). This shows that journalists from two Confucian literati newspapers tend to perceive Confucian characteristics in journalism as "occasionally true." Journalists from *Liberty Times* ranked the lowest score, considering Confucian elements are "usually not true." This is in line with the organisational culture where *Liberty Times* emphasises Taiwanese identity and is against Chinese identity, while Confucian culture is deemed the backbone of Chinese culture. Additionally, journalists from *Apple Daily* held varied perspectives (individual's average score from 1.25 to 4.75) on the Confucian culture, ranging from "usually not true" to "occasionally true."

The explanations given for these positions by journalists further illustrates these divergent role orientations among the two types of newspapers, in terms of Confucian literati paper (*UDN* and *China Times*) or businessman's paper (*Apple Daily*, *Liberty Times*, and *Want China Times*). In the first type of newspaper, journalists seldom actively mentioned the Confucian spirit in their organisation. When I proposed their founders celebrated the Confucian spirit, most responded with a bitter smile.

"At the entrance of our media company, there stands a statue of our founder. Many senior employees would bow to it each morning upon entering the office. The founder embodies the spirit of the company. The newspaper is currently under the management of his son, who comes from a business background. It's challenging to ascertain the extent to which the original spirit has been preserved." (D01)

A young journalist in *UDN* expressed that the Confucian spirit in the organisation's history does not impact his role perception and news practice. Wang Ti-wu, the founder of *UDN* and a proponent of Confucian culture, wholeheartedly embraced the idea of operating a newspaper

with intellectuals, often referred to as Confucian literati's papers. He held the spirit of intellectuals and knowledge workers in high regard, setting UDN apart from the profit-centric approach prevalent in many other enterprises.

"During the orientation for new employees, our organisation has highlighted how the founder upheld the Confucian ideal of publishing this newspaper to save the country. However, for me, it remains a historical narrative in a particular context. On an organisational level, I haven't personally perceived Confucian culture as having a direct impact on my day-to-day news work." (D05)

In the second type of newspaper, journalists in *Liberty Times* or *Apple Daily* may not have such a tradition of Confucian culture in their organisational history. However, some journalists in these papers still expressed that they perceived Confucian culture to be integrated into their journalistic role perceptions. Most of them mentioned that Confucian culture is a system of social values. They learned it from school and their families rather than media organisations.

In sum, from the interviews, it is hard to verify to what degree Confucian literati's papers still retain Confucian characteristics that ensure their journalists are influenced nowadays. Although the scores of indicators show that journalists at two newspapers perceived a higher level of Confucian culture, the influence of organisational cultures is not supported by journalists' elaborations. Furthermore, senior journalists, on average, scored higher in their belief in the influence of Confucian culture in journalism compared to their junior counterparts. Interestingly, these supporters of Confucian journalism hail from various newspapers. This observation suggests that Confucian culture have deep roots within the social fabric rather than being confined to any specific publication or organisation.

The interpretation of Confucian culture by journalists

In previous research, journalists who started their career in the authoritarian era are more likely to deem themselves Confucian literati than those who started after democratisation (Lin, 2006; Huang, 2013). My research shows the decline of Confucian journalistic culture between the senior and junior generations again. In general, Confucian journalistic culture is described as a paradigm which is out of date and old-fashioned by most political journalists. Although the senior journalists generally value Confucian culture more than the juniors, journalists' perception of Confucian journalistic culture is not, however, so neatly divided. This aligns with the broader perspective of Confucian culture in Taiwan. The state's ability to enforce Confucian culture as the legacy of Chinese culture, weakened after the first political party alternation in

2000; as the DPP ruling party with Taiwanese awareness adopted a de-Sinicisation strategy, rejecting the orthodoxy of Chinese culture. This fuelled the conflict between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity in society. Consequently, some interviewees, in favour of Taiwanese identity, associated Confucian culture with the Chinese identity promoted by the KMT party. As a result, they expressed disagreement with the Confucian characteristics of role perceptions.

A senior journalist with experience at the now-defunct KMT party paper (*Central Daily News*) pointed out that certain Confucian characteristics in journalism were applied as the instrument for the one party-state (KMT) to control media. Journalists taking this stand often stressed that the democratisation of Taiwan should not be attributed to Confucian culture in journalism. In contrast, Confucianism is the first concept that should be challenged in democratisation.

"Confucianism is viewed as promoting regime consolidation and social order, which tends to discourage revolutionary movements. However, the progress of civil society and the cultivation of democratic values in Taiwan are not rooted in this ancient Chinese tradition but rather in the empowerment of civilians from Taiwanese society within a diverse cultural context." (B01)

The argument on the side of anti-Confucian culture implies an eager attempt to cut off the connection with China since Confucianism originated from Chinese culture. Moreover, in authoritarian Taiwan, Confucianism was utilised as the political instrument by the KMT party to control the press, known as 'State Confucianism'. Some senior political journalists shared similar views with Taiwanese democratic activists and politicians. They deemed Confucianism in a single dimension related to the authoritarian regime and as impeding Taiwan's democracy (Fetzer and Soper, 2013).

Only a few senior journalists show a positive attitude toward Confucian culture and suggest that the influence of Confucianism is a tradition or even a part of the consensus rooted in Taiwanese society. A senior journalist pointed out that while Confucian culture may not be as prominently emphasised in contemporary society, it still exerts an influence on his perception of his role. He mentioned that the impact of Confucian culture has been internalised as a standard for individual behaviours, which might not be readily apparent to individuals themselves. Therefore, in this context, it is reasonable to suggest that post-democratisation, Confucian culture may be more a part of an individual's values rather than a widely held journalistic ethos. As a result, the Asian characteristic of journalistic culture seems to have

been retained among a small group of older generations but has not been passed down to the younger generation. This implies that Confucian culture is no longer a shared journalistic value after democratisation.

"I wouldn't say that Confucian culture in journalism is outdated, but these days, it's rarely discussed. Nonetheless, its influence remains deeply ingrained in our culture. For instance, when writing a news story, I naturally consider the potential societal consequences. If it could lead to severe repercussions that threaten the stability of the nation, I might opt not to publish the news." (D01)

In sum, the once-celebrated paradigm of Confucian literati's newspapers during the KMT one-party rule regime is not upheld as a prestigious journalistic culture in Taiwan's print journalism. As this transformation implies, the process of democratisation has turned the page on journalistic culture to a new chapter.

8.2.2 Four indicators of Confucian culture

To further understand how Confucian culture faded away in journalism, I now delve into each role dimension in detail, providing specific indicators and offering examples that illustrate how journalists interpret them.

In the dimension of interventionism, journalists as Confucian literati are encouraged to be an advocate rather than a disseminator (Huang, 2013; Lee, 2006). From the interview data, the indicator of journalists' responsibility for the "national destiny" is ranked as "occasionally true". Junior journalists with professional backgrounds, i.e., those who hold a degree in journalism or a related field, are typically ranked lower than their senior counterparts or those without a professional background. Most young journalists claimed that it is an old-fashioned idea based on Confucian tradition. In other words, they are less likely to be an advocate based on the concept of saving the country. The reason why young journalists perceived themselves as an advocate is irrelevant to the Confucian ethos and more related to worrying about China's threats to Taiwan's sovereignty. In the testimonies of certain senior journalists, a similar pattern emerges where they embrace the advocate role but express disapproval when it comes to linking their advocacy with the perception of Confucian culture. These journalists emphasised that their role as advocates is directly linked to the precarious situation of the nation which faces constant threats of annexation and encroachment from China. Their claim is similar to development journalism (Hanitzsch et al., 2019) in which journalists advocate for building the country.

"Due to the threats from China, Taiwan is a nation with heightened anxiety about its sovereignty and territory. In this context, it's not so much Confucian culture but rather a deep-seated Taiwanese awareness that makes me feel that journalists bear responsibility for the nation's fate." (A02)

In the dimension of power distance, two indicators of "legitimacy" and "social harmony" were considered relatively untrue in journalistic role perception. "Legitimacy" is the indicator that journalists perceive the least true. Journalists pervasively disagree that scrutinising the government should not significantly impact its legitimacy. Most interviewees argue that this concept could only be true in the authoritarian period. Some criticised the basic logic of stated Confucian culture as utilised to consolidate power. Since Taiwan is a democratic regime with legitimacy from the election system, that journalists should be a watchdog is the overarching value of professionalism.

Regarding the indicator of social harmony, most interviewees expressed that the last thing that journalists should worry about is social harmony. Western normative values are pervasively accepted as the critical role perception for Taiwanese journalists. However, it is too early to say that maintaining social harmony has been thoroughly erased from the journalistic culture in Taiwan. Social harmony is traditionally deemed a vital element in the journalism of transitional democracy and a core value of Confucian journalistic culture (Hanitzsch et al., 2019). A few journalists ranked high scores in this indicator and justified it with the concern that the polarised political ideologies could affect social harmony, escalating the country's tension. Here, the interpretation of social harmony by journalists has transformed from supporting an authoritarian government to avoiding splitting society. In other words, social harmony is now more about preventing the negative effects of polarisation, which is not exclusive to Confucian culture.

"The meaning of social harmony in Confucianism is to help consolidate the regime, but my concern is more related to improving dialogue between two contrasting political ideologies. The polarisation of political ideologies threatens our democracy while China has never given up its attempt to occupy Taiwan." (A02)

In the dimension of market orientation, the concept of ethics ranked by journalists is more than "occasionally true." Numerous journalists believe that this indicator is relatively essential since it is more in line with journalistic ethics rather than from Confucian culture.

"I am not sure that complying with the ethics is due to the influence of Confucianism, but I prefer to interpret this indicator from my professional training in journalistic ethics. For instance, I write a news story because it may influence public interest rather than other purposive motivation." (D04)

Since journalists acknowledge that they must balance public and market orientation, most tend to perceive that they embrace the public interest in line with ethical codes more than profits. Taiwanese ethical codes explicitly mention that journalism and journalists should value the public interest more than the market interest, in terms of *"Chinese journalists' creeds"* (1942) and *"The Code of Ethics for ROC press"* (1992) (see Chapter 2). The ethical codes of journalism, which prioritise public interest over profits, have remained unchanged since the establishment of democracy, during a time when Confucian culture exerted a dominant influence on journalistic practices. As a long-term norm and value for journalists to abide by, this indicator is ranked higher than other indicators of Confucian culture.

8.2.3 Discussion

After analysing each indicator, I concluded that two facets of Confucian culture could be identified as the authoritarian and traditional values. Regarding the authoritarian value, the two indicators— maintaining "legitimacy" and "social harmony"— are ranked relatively low as are usually not true amongst generations. By contrast, the traditional values, "national destiny" and "ethics" are ranked close to be occasionally true. My finding shows that since democratic transition, journalists have increasingly distanced themselves from the authoritarian facets of Confucian culture. This transformation is directly linked to their role as watchdogs. Prior research had suggested that journalism in Asian cultures often leaned toward collaboration with the government and showed respect for their authority, even in the watchdog role, where they tended not to oppose the government as adversaries. Nonetheless, these two indicators, highlighted in the literature as the main characteristics of Confucian journalism, have seen a substantial decline following democratisation. What endures in journalism exhibiting Confucian characteristics, although infrequent, may now lean toward traditional values that are frequently entwined with personal beliefs, making them challenging to distinguish.

Moreover, the interpretation of key concepts may vary to adapt to the present social and political context. This finding challenges the presumption that Confucian culture is a common characteristic of journalists' role perceptions in East Asian countries. At least for Taiwan, the transformation of journalistic culture over the last 20 years has not preserved a strong orientation to favour maintenance of social harmony and respecting authority, which are known as the Asian traits in studies of world journalism (Yin, 2008; Voltmer, 2013; Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Mellado, 2021b; Wu, 2022). The fact is that the interpretation of the "Confucian concept"

such as social harmony, has transformed along with democratisation and challenges the general concept of social harmony used to survey journalism around the world and to categorise Asian traits in journalism. The meaning of social harmony among journalists has changed from protecting the authoritarian regime to reducing the tension caused by a polarised society. This concept of social harmony also speaks to different understandings of roles in Taiwan. In developing countries, social harmony may be applied by the state as an excuse to control the media to stabilise society. The concept of social harmony in Taiwan is still worshipped by some journalists, which reflects a shared anxiety that the polarising ideologies based on ethnic identities may divide society, impeding democratic consolidation. From the Western perspective, the emphasis on maintaining social harmony can be seen as a trait that is used by the government to control the media, as journalists often exhibit deference toward authority in their culture. However, journalism in Taiwan transforms the negative implication of maintaining social harmony into a positive interpretation. It shows that diverse perspectives for explaining the concept of social harmony are needed when social harmony comes to explaining split societies beyond the boundary of geographic or cultural regions.

In summary, prior research has highlighted the generational decline in the influence of Confucian journalistic culture (Lin, 2006; Huang, 2013; Liu, 2022). My research has taken this a step further by examining two key facets of Confucian culture in journalism and identifying variations across newspapers and generations. The findings indicate a fading influence of Confucian culture, encompassing both authoritarian and traditional values, with a significant shift from authoritarian values toward democratic consolidation. Moreover, there remains a range of perspectives on the impact of Confucianism among individuals. The senior generation's approach to their roles, especially within *UDN* and *China Times*, continues to be shaped by the influence of Confucian culture. Nevertheless, the interpretation of specific concepts, such as social harmony, can evolve in response to changing social contexts.

8.3 The Transformation of Journalists' Role Perceptions

Journalistic role perception is an important factor in shaping news content which reflects journalists' values and beliefs in their social role. As Firmstone (2023) conceptualises, "the role of journalists in the production of news as a combination of beliefs and practice" (ibid:73). Differences in role perceptions are likely to be reflected in the actual news content (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Patterson and Donsbach 1996; Firmstone, 2023). An individual journalist's role perceptions are inevitably embedded in the journalistic culture. When the Confucian

culture in journalism faded away after democratisation, journalists' role perceptions also changed. In the following sections, I discuss in depth how journalists perceive their role and how it changed over time based on three sections of interview questions. The first section is related to three dimensions of journalists' role perceptions: interventionism, power distance and market-orientation. The second section is about the perceived difficulties of practising these roles. The third section explores the factors that journalists perceive to have been influential in transforming journalistic roles.

8.3.1 Interventionism: disseminator and advocate

The interventionism dimension "reflects the extent to which journalists pursue a particular mission and promote certain values" (Hanitzsch, 2007:372). The most interventional pole means that journalists are involved profoundly and attempt to motivate readers. On the negative pole, journalists are detached and regulate themselves with objectivity, impartiality, and neutrality. Journalists tend to advocate for social change and drive political and social reform as the change agent or the educator in transitional democracies (Voltmer, 2012; Hanitzsch et al., 2019). When Taiwan had just transitioned from an authoritarian to a democratic country, its professional norm championed a neutral and objective approach. Previous quantitative surveys indicate that Taiwanese journalists perceived their role as disseminators during democratisation in 1994, 2004, and 2014 (Lo, 1998; Liu and Lo, 2017). This role is embedded in the context of the declining influence of Confucian culture and the indoctrination of U.S. professionalism in print. After the lifting of the press law, newspapers undertook self-regulation with "*The Code of Ethics for ROC press*" in 1992. The code suggests that the freedom of newspapers is to serve democracy, protect people's rights, and improve the public interest (see Chapter 2). For reporting news, the normative norm is accurate, objective, impartial, and avoids personal opinion. For commentaries, the normative norm is to be impartial while on behalf of the public to speak for their interest and never comment on private life, which is irrelevant to the public interest. Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that journalists may transform their advocate role to a disseminator after the transition.

Table 8. 1: Journalists located on the spectrum of interventionism

	Total number of newspaper journalists (N=23) (Senior: Junior)					
Advocate	3 (2:1)	5 (3:2)	6 (3:3)	8 (4:4)	1 (1:0)	Disseminator

Note: Interview question 2: "If the degree of interventionism is a spectrum, the "advocate" pole suggests that journalists are deeply involved in attempting to motivate readers, while the "disseminator" pole indicates journalists who are uninvolved, detached and remain objective, impartial, and neutral. Please locate your position of the journalistic role in the spectrum."

Since journalistic role perceptions are not static and fixed, it is interesting to see the dynamics and nuances in role perceptions after democratisation. The first interview question asks journalists to locate themselves on the spectrum of interventionism (Question 2). One pole represents an extreme advocate, while the other pole is an extreme disseminator. Nineteen out of twenty-three interviewees located themselves somewhere in the middle between the two extreme poles. Only one journalist perceived their role as a pure disseminator, and three journalists see themselves as pure advocates (see Table 8.1). This echoes previous studies that most journalists conventionally perceived both roles instead of a pure disseminator or advocate (Cohen, 1963; Johnstone et al., 1976; Weaver and Wilhoit, 1986; Weaver and Willnat, 2012).

Table 8. 2: Indicators of interventionism ranked by both generations (M=1-5)

	Indicators	Senior (N=13)	Junior (N=10)	All (N=23)
Disseminator	Be an absolutely detached observer	6 (3.38)	4 (4.10)	6 (3.69)
	Be objective, impartial, and neutral	2 (4.15)	1 (4.20)	2 (4.17)
	Strictly separate the fact and opinion	1 (4.46)	1 (4.20)	1 (4.35)
Advocator	Influence public opinion	3 (3.92)	1 (4.20)	3 (4.04)
	Set the political agenda	5 (3.77)	6 (3.70)	5 (3.74)
	Advocate for social change	4 (3.85)	5 (3.80)	4 (3.83)

Note: Interviewee Question 3: Please rate the statements based on their importance to you using a five-point scale, where 1 indicates "not important at all," 2 indicates "not very important," 3 indicates "somewhat important," 4 indicates "very important," and 5 indicates "extremely important."

To distinguish priority, journalists are asked to rank the indicators of the advocate and disseminator role (Questions 3). The result shows that among the six indicators, journalists ranked the most important as "strictly separate the fact and opinion" and "be objective,

impartial and neutral," which refers to the disseminator role. The third important one is "influence public opinion," belonging to the advocator role. The fourth and fifth important indicators are "advocating social change" and "setting political agenda". The least important is "be an absolutely detached observer" (see Table 8.2). During the interview, political journalists noted that their social functions align with normative norms, i.e., ethical codes. In a quantitative survey, this also explains that most journalists perceive themselves as leaning toward a disseminator rather than an advocate during the transitional democracy (Liu and Lo, 2017). The U.S. newspaper normative norm is presumed to operate in a non-partisan press, but Taiwanese journalists serve in a highly partisan media system. This may cause a latent inner conflict in their journalistic work. A young journalist confided in me, the profound struggles and overwhelming sense of despondency they experienced while attempting to adapt to the journalistic practices that deviated significantly from the ideals they were taught during their professional school training.

"After learning to report news from a biased perspective for our partisan newspaper, I felt uncomfortable and conflicted. This contradicted the principles of neutrality and objectivity I learned in journalism school. It became clear that these academic ideals were often impractical in the real practice in the journalistic field." (B05)

Among all indicators, political journalists widely considered the most critical indicator is "strictly separate the fact and opinion", representing fact-centred discourse that implies political neutrality and the absence of opinion in news stories. This interpretation is found particularly in U.S. newspapers, but it is relatively ambiguous in UK papers (Firmstone, 2019). A young journalist explained that this indicator is vital since it is a more practical indicator in the disseminator role.

"Every newspaper has its political stance, which is easy to find in their editorials, features and even normal news articles. Nevertheless, rigorously distinguishing between facts and opinions remains a more practical approach in the daily practice of journalism, given that achieving professional standards like objectivity and neutrality can often be seen as an unachievable goal." (D05)

Compared to "separating opinion and fact," the second most important indicator is "be objective, impartial and neutral" which is more ideal and harder to reach. Journalists admitted that these norms as the ideal principles in journalism have never been practised. Therefore, "news balance" is a routine for journalists to manifest their effort to stick by normative norms such as neutrality. Nevertheless, many of them acknowledge that news balance only contributes to superficial impartiality. This aligns with Tuchman's (1972) strategic rule in the newsroom,

where newspapers strive to apply ethical codes to their journalistic practices and assert neutrality and objectivity, which may seem naïve.

"Every news article must contain a certain perspective, from the headline, the position within which pages, and the number of related articles. All these elements reflect the subjectivity of the newsroom. News balance is a formulation to present so-called neutrality. Still, it can be biased depending on the number of quotations from each side and how you quote their opinion. We called it the false balance." (A03)

Of the three advocate indicators, "influencing public opinion" is considered the most crucial, with "advocating social change" and "setting political agenda" receiving less emphasis. Journalists pointed out that the influence of newspapers has waned, and it is challenging to effectively shape the political agenda. This suggests a decline in the characteristics of a developmental journalistic culture that once had a strong commitment to advocating for social change in the Taiwanese context (Hanitzsch et al., 2019). A senior journalist indicated that social media, or Key Opinion Leaders (KOL) on social media, have gradually replaced the newspapers to set the agenda in political news. A KOL is an influential individual, typically an online personality, with a significant following and impact on social media, shaping trends and public opinions. In the political realm, notable number of Taiwanese KOLs (Key Opinion Leaders) like Kuan Chang, the founder, and CEO of Fitness Club, have become internet celebrities. They actively engage in political activism and use their popular livestream platforms to discuss political issues, drawing large audiences. This popularity has made them attractive to politicians looking to collaborate or be featured as guests on their programmes. The partnership between politicians and KOLs through social media has emerged as a trending phenomenon, marking a new political culture in Taiwan. In the past, broadcasters would typically follow political headlines in newspapers every morning. However, in today's digital age, broadcasters increasingly turn to Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs) on social media to determine the daily political agenda. This shift has resulted in newspapers having little option but to also focus on the trending news of the day.

"In the past, the headlines of newspapers, which are the collaborative output of editors and journalists, might have become the breaking news in the broadcasting news the next day. In the era of social media, who now decides tomorrow's newspaper headlines? In many cases, posts by influencers or key opinion leaders (KOL) on Facebook pages set the agenda for the press. It's no longer the newspapers themselves." (A07)

With further analysis, among all the interviewees, senior generations are more likely to identify themselves as advocates than younger generations. Senior journalists who experienced democratisation tend to perceive themselves as advocates based on their personal experience and journalistic culture at that time. Junior journalists entered the profession after the

democratic transition, and few identified clearly as advocate. Most of them (40%, four out of ten) embraced the disseminator role more than the advocator one. Many believe that Taiwan has already achieved democratic consolidation, and as a result, there is no major shared goal to pursue, such as overthrowing an authoritarian regime or changing political parties. Journalists also attempt to demonstrate that they work in accordance with the values of journalism as a profession, defined by the U.S. professionalism in print as a neutral disseminator. This aligns with Liu's (2022) research, which shows that senior journalists from 1988-1999 tend to advocate for social change more than their junior counterparts. Liu's research also suggests that journalists from the millennial generation (2000-2009) struggled with balancing partisanship in the media while preserving their professionalism, hindering the development of U.S.-style professionalism.

The shifting between disseminator and advocate by the news genre and issue

Previous studies on the journalistic role in Taiwan often assume journalists' role perception as a static state, neglecting the dynamic nature of shifting perceptions of journalistic roles. As a result, there has been limited discussion on the dynamics and transitions of journalists' role perceptions. To fill this gap, my research explores how journalists reprioritise their role perceptions and the results show how journalists shift between the two role perceptions in two ways. Taiwanese journalists distinguish their role perception clearly by (i) the news genre and (ii) the news issues. First, interviewees clarified that they tend to assume the role of a disseminator when reporting straight news, but they shift toward an advocacy role when working on features and in-depth reportages. This aligns with ethical codes that stress the separation of facts and opinions. The variety of news types allows journalists to justify these shifts in their role perceptions.

Second, when the news issue aligns with their personal values, journalists tend to become more engaged. This suggests that their role perception, whether as an advocate or disseminator, can be flexible and responsive to the specific news topics rather than being fixed or static (Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Mellado, 2021a). Journalists who typically view themselves as disseminators sometimes embrace an advocacy role when addressing issues, they care about. On the other hand, those leaning toward advocacy may adopt a disseminator stance when dealing with topics that go against their beliefs or values. Notably, journalists with opposing political views to their newspapers find it easier to distance themselves and act as detached disseminators to resolve cognitive dissonance. Interestingly, the values supported by different

generations exhibit subtle distinctions. Senior journalists, with their confident advocacy for nation-building, may reflect characteristics often found in transitional democracies. In contrast, the junior generation's advocacy roles are more diverse, driven by their personal beliefs and a wide range of social values.

"When significant personal issues, like the same-sex marriage bill, are under legislative review, the younger generation, including myself, naturally feels a sense of duty to support progressive values. This extends beyond political matters, such as national unification or independence, as various societal aspects and diverse values deserve focus and advocacy through feature writing to shape public opinion."(C04)

Furthermore, journalists who identified themselves more as advocates mostly recognised that their political ideology is in favour of Taiwan's independence, particularly journalists from *Liberty Times*. They expressed significant concerns about national destiny and identity, particularly in the context of strong Chinese government influence. This is closely tied to the newsroom culture of *Liberty Times*, as evident in the newspaper's brand slogan: "The priority to Taiwanese profits." This slogan reflects the newspaper's political stance, prioritising Taiwan, and Taiwanese interests in all aspects of politics, it implies the endorsement of Taiwan's independence and embraces Taiwanese identity. Both senior and young journalists in *Liberty Times* believe that journalists need to advocate instead of only disseminating information. I quote a senior and a junior journalist from *Liberty Times* to demonstrate how they emphasise the factor of China in their news work.

"Newspapers are often labelled based on their partisan ties, but this categorisation isn't entirely accurate. Take Liberty Times, for example. It supports Taiwan's identity, advocates for localised policies, and opposes moving closer to China. In the past, during the years when the Kuomintang (KMT) held sole power, Liberty Times backed the local faction within the party, comprised of Taiwanese KMT politicians rather than mainlanders. After the democratisation process, it shifted its support toward the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In reality, Liberty Times prioritises its stance on cross-strait relations over party affiliations. As a result, news related to China and cross-strait issues holds great significance for Liberty Times and is often featured prominently on its front page." --A senior journalist

"Taiwan has a specific status in the international society since China has great ambitions toward us. Political parties or newspapers in Taiwan can't avoid taking sides. They have to define their relationship with China. While dealing with political news, I have my own political purpose while trying to influence the issue evolving toward the way I expected." --A junior journalist.

8.3.2 Power Distance: Watchdog and Collaborator

After democratic consolidation, the role of the media as a watchdog to monitor and scrutinise the government has been fully accepted as a vital element of the journalistic profession. This is a common trait of transitional democracy where journalists finally have a legitimated position to take the side of ordinary citizens against the power holders (Hanitzsch et al., 2019). In some transitional societies, the trend toward a greater degree of watchdog journalism is only a honeymoon at the beginning of transitioning to democracy (Mellado and Van Dalen, 2017). Taiwan has not experienced a revolution, but the gradual democratic progress conducted by the original ruling party. Therefore, it was not anticipated that journalists would immediately perceive their role as an extremely strong watchdog following democratisation. Rather, the democratisation process liberated the "Big Two", *UDN* and *China Times*, from clientelism, which may have had a greater impact on the decline of their collaborator role. This transformation in the power-distance dimensions can be observed in Taiwan.

Table 8. 3: Indicators of power distance ranked by both generations (M=1-5)

	Indicators	Senior (N=13)	Junior (N=10)	Total (N=23)
Watchdog	Act as watchdog toward the government	1 (4.62)	1 (4.70)	1 (4.65)
	Act as watchdog toward business elites	2 (3.92)	2 (3.80)	2 (3.87)
Collaborator	Support official policies to bring about prosperity and development	3 (2.54)	3 (2.50)	3 (2.52)
	Convey a positive image of political and business leadership	4 (1.46)	4 (1.80)	4 (1.61)

Note: Interview question 3: Please rate the statements based on their importance to you using a five-point scale, where 1 indicates "not important at all," 2 indicates "not very important," 3 indicates "somewhat important," 4 indicates "very important," and 5 indicates "extremely important."

In responding to the question related to the power distance dimension (Question 3, see Table 8.3), journalists show the most consistent agreement on the extreme importance of acting "as a watchdog toward government" and then "as a watchdog toward business elites." By contrast, the two indicators of collaboration are considered less important, including "support official policies to bring about prosperity and development" and "convey a positive image of political and business leadership". Hanitzsch (2019) argues that the watchdog role is less emphasised in Asian countries with lower political freedom like China, Singapore, and Malaysia, but it is highly prioritised in Hong Kong, South Korea, and Japan. Since Taiwan has considerable press

and political freedom, we would expect journalists to appreciate the watchdog role more than the collaborator role and the findings align with this expectation. Notably, the indicator "Act as the watchdog of journalism" received the highest average score, nearly the highest possible score. There does not seem to be a significant difference between the older and younger generations in their emphasis on the watchdog role within the journalistic culture post-democratisation.

The diminishing role of collaborators

Given that previous studies suggest that role perceptions are not mutually exclusive, the watchdog role and collaborator role can exist simultaneously. This is reflected in the indicator of "support official policies to bring about prosperity and development," which is still considered important for 17% of journalists (four out of twenty-three), a characteristic of developing or transitional societies. Voltmer (2012) notes that the transforming process of journalistic culture is a long and critical period for new democracy after the collapse of the authoritarian regime. In Taiwan, not many journalists (only 17% of interviewees) still value the collaborator role after democracy is relatively consolidated in 2020. It seems the collaborator role imposed on journalists' role perception by ethical codes during the transitional period has seen a great decline in the journalistic ethos.

The indicator of "support official policies to bring about prosperity and development" is not pervasively considered against their profession. Across generations, numerous journalists indicated that the media should not be against everything the government has done. To endorse policies that benefit the public interest or improve the international image of Taiwan is part of their role but not the most important. For Taiwanese journalists, the collaborator role is to bolster confidence in a new democracy to some extent. Additionally, the indicator "Convey a positive image of political and business leadership" is considered the least important. Journalists prioritise other aspects of their work over this, as it is not their primary focus.

8.3.3 Market and Public Orientation

Table 8. 4: Indicators of market orientation ranked by both generations (M=1-5)

	Ranking (Mean)	Senior (N=13)	Junior (N=10)	Total (N=23)
	Indicators			
Market orientation	Concentrate mainly on news that attracts the widest possible audience	4 (3.08)	3 (3.40)	4 (3.22)
	Provide the audience with the information that is most interesting	3 (3.54)	4 (3.20)	3 (3.39)
Public orientation	Provide citizens with the information they need to make a political decision	1 (4.54)	1 (4.30)	1 (4.43)
	Motivate people to participate in civic activity and political discussion	2 (4.08)	2 (3.50)	2 (3.83)

*Interview question 4: Please rate the statements based on their importance to you using a five-point scale, where 1 indicates "not important at all," 2 indicates "not very important," 3 indicates "somewhat important," 4 indicates "very important," and 5 indicates "extremely important."

In this dimension, journalists agreed that both market and public orientations are important roles, with a stronger inclination toward public orientation. The indicators related to public orientation are ranked as "extremely important" or "very important," but the indicators of media orientation are mostly ranked as "very important" or "somewhat important" (see Table 8.4). The most valued indicator of this dimension is "provide citizens with the information they need to make political decisions." After democratic consolidation, journalists are fully aware that the democratic function of media is to increase citizens' political knowledge to make informed decisions. The second key indicator is "Motivating people to participate in civic activities and political discussions." According to several journalists, it's challenging to ensure that their news articles lead citizens to take specific actions. Thus, providing substantial and meaningful political information is seen as more vital than trying to motivate citizens. In recent research, Taiwanese journalists ranked encouraging citizens' participation in public affairs as their important role due to the rise of social media (Liu and Lo, 2017). However, political journalists in my research did not express the same perception and held more negative comments on it. Many interviewees criticised social media-based participation as shallow and lacking in rational discourse.

"Social media can't be a space for rational discussion. The comments section under news articles was intended to foster deeper interactions with readers, but many comments without reading the full article, relying solely on the headlines. Biased comments can be emotionally charged, discouraging engagement with negative individuals. Particularly in political news, supporters of opposing parties may criticise unfavourable reports. Therefore, when considering the current state of sensational and biased social media comments, I believe they do not contribute to promoting diverse perspectives or fostering rational debates." (A03)

The ethical codes mention that journalists should always consider the public good instead of the individual's interest and never exaggerate news issues as part of the dignity of being a professional journalist (Liu, 2007). Public orientation has been part of the ethical code since 1991. My interviews note that journalists assert their professionalism by aligning more with public orientation than market orientation. In a Western context, Hallin and Mancini (2004) highlight public orientation as a significant pillar of professionalism. Journalists need to claim their profession as they lack "esoteric knowledge" that sets them apart from other occupations (ibid:35). In my interviews, many journalists in the most market-oriented newspapers expressed a preference for public orientation, creating a notable conflict in values and leading to a relatively high level of cognitive dissonance.

Meanwhile, Journalists face pressure from their media organisations to produce engaging news that attracts readers. This market-driven pressure has led political journalists to increasingly accept a market-oriented role. Out of the interviewees, only two rank the indicators "Concentrate mainly on news that attracts the widest possible audience" and "Provide the audience with the information that is most interesting" as the least important. This implies that the perception of attracting readers by adopting interesting elements holds significance in the journalists' social function.

Based on my interviews, role perceptions were rarely perceived to have transformed over time in the first two dimensions (interventionism and power distance), journalists revealed that there have been changes in the market-oriented role. In the past, newspapers struggled to gauge which news stories resonated with readers solely through total circulation numbers. Nowadays, reader interest is directly reflected in the click rates for each individual news story. Political journalists have observed that soft and sensational stories tend to generate higher click rates compared to hard news.

"We can see the crucial statistics that journalists made enormous efforts to analyse a policy in-depth, but it only attracted a hundred clicks. However, the news about a politician's messy bedroom was the most popular news with millions of click rates today. It's frustrating." (A01)

Since journalists are encouraged to publish sensational and soft news, they internalise the standard of "good news" from direct commands or the unspoken atmosphere in newsrooms. After democratisation, journalists indicated that the transformation of their role perception to some extent has gradually shifted toward a more market-oriented approach. In my interviews with junior journalists, I found that they tend to be more receptive to market-oriented demands. One young journalist mentioned that an intriguing headline can be seen as clickbait, drawing readers to click on the news article, where the information they provide is what citizens should know. However, the intensive cognitive dissonance experienced by several senior journalists led them to leave the newspaper.

"I can't say marketisation of news content is the sole reason for my left, but it's certainly a crucial one. The relentless pursuit of high click rates has hindered journalists from fulfilling their professional responsibilities. Journalists should invest their time in scrutinising the government and reporting on matters of public interest, rather than focusing on soft stories and making it as sensational as possible to attract the reader's attention." (T01)

In sum, to explore the transformation of journalists' role perceptions in three dimensions after democratisation, I indicate that this transformation may not involve a significant shift from one pole to another, such as from advocate to disseminator or collaborator to monitor. In reality, role perceptions are dynamic and contingent. They are constantly negotiated by journalists in their daily routines, considering multiple factors. When comparing two generations, the nuanced transformation of role perception between them reveals a dynamic evolution in journalists' role perception. The trend is still moving from advocate to disseminator, emphasising the watchdog role while retaining some aspects of collaborator. Furthermore, with the political transition toward democratisation, the rapid advancement of media technology has hastened the transformation of the entire media landscape. This has resulted in a significant impact on the newspaper industry, placing increasing pressure on journalists to adopt a market-oriented approach.

8.4 The Perceived Difficulties in Practising the Role Perception

The second and third sections of the interview questions are analysed in the following section. In the second section, political journalists were requested to rank six role perceptions by the level of importance and difficulty from one to six (Question 7). When they indicated the difficulties in practising each role, I followed up with the next question about when and how they perceived their autonomy as restrained (Question 8). During the interviews, participants

discussed various influential factors, as outlined in the third section. In this section, I requested them to rank the significance of these factors, although some could only identify the most and least important ones.

The most critical role but the hardest to practise is the watchdog role.

The rankings for each role from interviewees are added to the total score. I use the total score to refer to each role's priority in the important and difficult levels to practise. The roles are ranked as follows: watchdog being the most significant, followed by advocate, disseminator, and public orientation. The least important roles are market orientation and collaborator. Notably, the difficulty level as ranked by journalists aligns with the order of importance for these roles. To delve deeper, I examine the journalistic role that most interviewees ranked as the most significant. The result shows that the watchdog role is the most important and most challenging to practice by ten out of twenty-three interviewees, respectively. Five out of twenty-three interviewees ranked the advocate role as the most important and the hardest to practise. Next, the disseminator had three interviewees rank it as the most important, and five interviewees perceived it as the most difficult to practise.

Following the ranking question, journalists elaborated on why they perceive each role as the hardest to practise. I am specifically interested in the watchdog role as the most important while most difficult to practise. The main point that has been observed to change across generations is the intensity of the watchdog role toward the government, as revealed by many journalists. Journalists working in newspapers that have a strained relationship with the government tend to express a higher level of commitment to their watchdog role. The perceived strength of the watchdog role among journalists is influenced by the alignment of their political ideology with the ruling party, particularly regarding issues of unification with China or Taiwan independence. The roles of watchdog and collaborator lie on opposite ends of the power-distance spectrum. Based on journalists' testimonies, the intensity of the watchdog role tends to increase when newspapers exhibit partisanship, while the intensity of the collaborator role diminishes, and vice versa. A young journalist candidly shared with me that she encountered internal conflict when adopting a partisan stance, as she had been taught to uphold journalistic values of neutrality and objectivity as professional standards.

"I can't deny that I might be less critical of the government when its political ideology aligns with mine and that of the newspaper I work for. At times, I find myself supporting their policies. On the other hand, when it comes to a government led by the opposing party, I take on the role of a vigilant watchdog to scrutinise their actions. I'm aware

that it might not align with the expectations of a professional journalist to admit this, but it's the way I perceive and practise my role."

A young journalist from UDN indicated, *"If I were in Liberty Times, I would not be able to practise the function of the watchdog role well since the ruling party now is DPP."* Indeed, some journalists from *Liberty Times* confessed that the partisanship of the media could influence the intensity of the watchdog role. These attitudes align with the findings of a previous study that demonstrated Taiwanese journalists often choose to work on newspapers that share a similar ideology with their own (Wu and Lin, 2013).

"While the ruling party is KMT which stands on the opposite side of political ideology, I can intensely criticise the government and stand in the position the media is assumed to be, in terms of a watchdog role. I knew that the organisation would back me up (if my news coverage caused any issues with the government). Even when the government threatened to withdraw the advertisement, the newsroom told journalists that the owner encouraged us not to be afraid. The organisation doesn't care about the economic interest that the government may provide to other newspapers. On the other hand, while DPP was the ruling party, I perceived that it was hard to play the monitor role due to personal affection and relationship with DPP and the pressure from the organisation, which has a closer relationship with DPP party. They may tend to reduce the strength of criticism toward the DPP. Even when the news is based on fact, it may not be published in the newspaper due to the government's intervention."(C01)

The partisan media serve readers with specific political orientations, encouraging or discouraging journalists from fulfilling their watchdog roles. Coverage is not just influenced by a newspaper's partisanship; it also takes the political preferences of readers into account. Due to direct feedback from click rates, which brings revenue for newspapers, the watchdog role is subordinate to readers' political preferences. A journalist from *Liberty Times* indicated, *"It is obvious that our readers are not in favour of the negative reporting toward DPP government which is reflected in the low click rate."* The same trend is mentioned in the newspapers in favour of the KMT party. When journalists report positive news about the DPP government, readers typically respond by either criticising the journalists or ignoring the news, resulting in lower click rates. As a result, some journalists have concluded that readers in Taiwan should explore a variety of newspapers to achieve a more balanced and informed news consumption.

"Not only for readers, but for journalists as well, we are used to reading newspapers in favour of KMT party to realise the internal affairs of KMT party since politicians trust journalists in these papers more than us, and they usually can have more information behind the scenes, and vice versa."(C03)

The newspapers with the high level of partisanship can choose to endorse a specific political party, which can be positive for encouraging citizens' participation in public affairs, such as the case in UK newspapers (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). However, the whole media system should be considered since the external pluralism of the media system is vital for healthy democracy (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Previous studies in Taiwan found significant quantity bias, source bias, and presentation bias in the four Presidential elections from 1996 to 2008 (Lin and Lo, 2010) and in specific issues (Liu, 2009). In the 2012 Presidential election, Wu and Lin's (2013) empirical study still shows the partisan bias that exists in TV News and newspapers with clear blue (pro-KMT) and green camps (pro-DPP). Newspapers are even more partisan than TV news. Most importantly, my research revealed how partisan bias has permeated everyday political news, extending beyond features, and encompassing general straight news. Through my content analysis, I provided evidence that newspapers in Taiwan exhibit partisan bias through selection bias, such as the imbalance in the number of government sources used, as well as performance bias, reflected in the positive or negative tones employed toward the government based on which party is in power (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, the newspapers' watchdog role also exhibits partisan tendencies, which can only be observed when there is a change in the ruling party. This is evident in the divergent frequencies of questioning, criticism, and denunciation directed toward the government (see Chapter 6). Based on this comprehensive analysis of partisanship practice by analysing the news content, my interviews further find that journalists have internalised the practice of partisan watchdog role as part of the journalistic culture. When a media system characterised by partisanship, encompassing both print and broadcast media, adjusts its watchdog role according to who is in power, it can contribute to a divided society.

8.5 Perceived Influential Factors

In the third section of interview questions, journalists were asked to elaborate on the factors that influence their journalistic work and give rankings. Based on journalists' responses, news organisations and new technology emerge as the most significant factors. Eight out of twenty-three journalists ranked these factors at the top. Six interviewees chose economic factors as the most influential. Four and one interviewees, respectively, selected political and governmental factors as the most important influences. This result suggests that, in contrast to Hanitzsch et al.'s (2019) findings for Asian countries, where political and economic influence was dominant, a more global trend emerges, with organisational factors being the most influential in shaping journalists' roles. It highlights that journalists may not fully perceive the extent of political and

economic power until these factors are mediated or negotiated by their organisations, which directly impact their daily work. Furthermore, these influential factors are interconnected. When journalists discussed the influence of their organisation, their explanations often revealed the interplay between the organisation and the external political and economic factors. This reiterates that these influential factors intersect with each other (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Shoemaker and Reese, 2013). In the following sections, the top three influential factors are discussed.

8.5.1 The strong organisational influence: owner's interest and political ideology

In comparison to journalists in other countries, those in Asian countries tend to be more accepting of and attentive to the hierarchical power structures within newsrooms and organisations (Hanitzsch et al., 2019). My interviews have specifically demonstrated that organisations affect journalists' autonomy primarily through the owner's interests and political ideology.

First and foremost, the owner's interests play a crucial role in organisational influence. Aside from *Apple Daily*, the three newspapers, *UDN*, *Liberty Times*, and *China Times*, are family-owned businesses, with ownership being passed down to the next generation during the democratic transition. The ownership structure of newspapers is relatively straightforward. They are often family-owned, with the founder serving as the majority shareholder and passing on the ownership to their successors, typically their sons. Examples of such newspapers include *UDN*, *Liberty Times*, and *China Times*, although *China Times* was later sold to WantWant Food Company. The owner's interest and political ideology could influence the organisation directly. To a certain degree, protecting the owner's commercial interests in newspapers has been the golden rule of editorial policy. In other words, Taiwanese journalists' autonomy is constrained heavily by the owners' interests and political ideology.

Without editorial autonomy, journalists' professionalism is under threat. Journalists expressed frustration about serving the owner's interest and the disturbance in their profession. A senior journalist states that "*The independence of newsrooms is relatively underdeveloped in Taiwan. The owner's interests become the superior concern in the editorial decisions.*" In a particular paper, several journalists revealed that the owner's intervention in editorial decisions has severely deteriorated professionalism. It caused a wave of resignations, specifically from political journalists, in this newspaper after 2008 when the ownership was shifted from the

family business founded by self-claimed Confucian literati to a business tycoon. The following statement was from a senior journalist when he and his colleagues decided to resign due to the owner's intervention in editorial autonomy. It is a process that erodes the integrity of the journalistic profession, and they perceive it as a form of humiliation.

"The choice of news topics and perspectives is not only influenced by the owner's interests but also by the advantages enjoyed by their political or business associates. In practice, the owner's extensive network of connections means that any news story may inadvertently offend someone they know. Due to the owner's lack of experience in media management, their media businesses are sometimes treated as marketing ventures, which may result in a lack of journalistic professionalism."

After democratisation, journalism became independent from the state and should serve democracy. However, many have critically argued that contemporary journalism prioritises the interests of specific individuals over the interests of democracy. The owner's interest was projected on the political stance of the newspaper. *Want Want China Times* is a good example. Since the mother company, Want Want Food, is one of the major food manufacturers in China, the newspaper tends to self-censor news content to maintain the relationship with the Chinese government. For instance, journalists implied that sensitive topics such as "June 4th" (Tiananmen Square Protests) or human rights, which offend the Chinese government, would never be published in the paper.

"You can't criticise the Chinese government. The editorial desks filter out sensitive topics related to China, such as human rights, which means that the news articles are excluded from the next day's newspaper. The editorial desk provides no explanation for rejecting the news, leaving journalists to figure out the rules on their own. Initially, I attempted to fight for the opportunity of publishing my articles, but the outcome remained unchanged. Eventually, I chose not to waste my time and energy on reporting issues that were not permitted to be published in our newspaper." (T02)

Secondly, the political ideology of newspapers has dominated the level of autonomy that journalists perceive. Since the interviewees are political journalists, the perceived autonomy will be significantly influenced by the partisanship of newspapers. Traditionally, the political ideologies of newspapers in Taiwan can be placed on a spectrum, with one end favouring unification with China and the opposing end advocating for Taiwan's independence. *UDN* is closest to supporting unification with China, while the former *China Times* is more liberal than *UDN* but does not stand on the side of Taiwan's independence. After 2008, *Want Want China Times*, with the stance of supporting the development of cross-strait relations, is deemed as more pro-China in political ideology. *Liberty Times* is located close to Taiwan's independence. Finally, *Apple Daily* in Taiwan appears to have unclear political ideologies but holds a

prominent stance against the Chinese Communist Party, particularly during and after the Hong Kong Umbrella Revolution in 2014 (See Chapter 4). No matter which political ideology that newspapers endorse, the political stance toward China is inevitably exposed in their news practice. To explain why no media can refuse to take a side in the relationship with China, a journalist provides a specific case during the COVID-19 pandemic. Since November 2019, when the coronavirus was found in Wuhan, the term "Wuhan Virus" had been widely used worldwide, including the Taiwanese government and media. However, in March 2020, the Chinese government and WHO urged the world to use COVID-19 instead of "Wuhan Virus" since "Wuhan Virus" represented a stigma and discrimination in China.

"The naming of the virus became a political issue in Taiwan due to its connection with China. Even the choice of how to name Covid-19 reflected the political stance of the media. Starting in April 2020, both China Times and UDN changed the name of virus from Wuhan virus to Covid-19, yielding to pressure from the Chinese government. In contrast, Liberty Times continued to use Wuhan Virus, aligning with the position of the Taiwanese government." (A02)

This case offers insight into why objectivity and neutrality are considered ideal norms that are difficult to achieve. When the name of a virus takes on political connotations, journalists feel compelled to comply with editorial policies that reflect the political ideology of their media organisation. In an overview of literature about objectivity we are reminded that objectivity is an unattainable goal, but that does not mean we should not strive for it (Firmstone, 2023).

According to the interviewees, they perceived more autonomy when they worked in a newspaper with the same political ideology and vice versa. Journalists who perceive themselves as advocates expressed higher autonomy in news decisions aligned with the editorial line. Two senior journalists from two different newspapers illustrated how the owner's ideology influenced their news topics and news frame.

"I'm aware of the editorial desks' preferences, especially their focus on topics related to examining Chinese society's drawbacks or strategies for Chinese government unification. These subjects are easily accepted and sometimes featured on the front pages of my newspaper. Occasionally, I might advocate these issues more vigorously than initially requested by the newsroom." (C03)

"During the Hong Kong Umbrella Revolution, our newspaper reported a significantly higher number of articles in support of Hong Kong compared to other local newspapers. It's undeniable that this aligns with the owner's political and personal interests, but it also aligns with our fundamental values, including democracy and human rights." (A03)

In contrast, when journalists worked in the newspaper with the opposite political ideology, they experienced massive intervention from the editorial desk. The owner's political ideology has been transformed as the editorial policy, which dominates the choice of news topics and angles of news without much space for negotiating.

"Don't be naïve to challenge the political ideology of newspapers. If I worked in a newspaper favouring unification with China, I wouldn't write the news related to the advantages of Taiwan's independence and vice versa." (C01)

Both factors are interrelated since the owner's interest often overlaps with their political ideology. When the owner's interest conflicts with the political ideology of the newspaper, the former is surpassed. For instance, *Liberty Times* favours the DPP party with the ideology of Taiwan independence. However, according to interviewees, when the DPP proposed a policy to advance labour rights, *Liberty Times* was fiercely against it. A journalist said, *"We are not allowed to organise the labour union since it may damage the owner's interest."* Based on the interview results, it is fair to say that the owner's interest is superior to the political ideology. Accordingly, the partisanship in the newspapers displays a pattern that usually backs a favoured party with conditional support. The previous research suggests that this type of partisanship can be located in the middle among the five levels, from unconditional loyalty to non-partisanship (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990). The loyalty of newspapers may change when the policy proposed by the opposite party is in line with their interest. Based on the case of Taiwan, the primary condition of loyalty toward the party partisanship is not against the owners' interest. This finding adds another layer of understanding into how partisanship is practised in print journalism since the democratic transition.

8.5.2 The impact of the economic factor: the vulnerability to other external influences

Among the five influential factors, new technology and economic considerations were the most highly ranked by most interviewees. Interestingly, these two factors are interlinked and jointly affect journalistic work. With the sharp decline in print circulation and advertising revenue, newspapers have faced financial challenges, and online profits have become a primary means of survival. In my research, two interviewees from different newspapers disclosed that 70% of their organisation's profit comes from their news websites, with only 30% from newspaper advertisements and sales. However, commercial sensitivities prevented the journalists from the other two newspapers from revealing the specific proportions, yet they emphasised the significant impact of online platforms. Meanwhile social media has emerged as the primary

news source for the Taiwanese population, further intensifying competition among newspapers to provide real-time news and garner clicks on their digital platforms.

Most journalists believed that the drawbacks of new technology outweighed the benefits, particularly when intertwined with the economic drive to maximise click rates on news websites. This corresponds with Western research, which has shown that audience metrics have become a crucial factor in influencing journalists' autonomy (Anderson, 2011; Nelson and Tandoc, 2019; Petre, 2021). Senior journalists perceived that their autonomy was limited by political power in the past, but this has now deteriorated by the market force in terms of click rates. Journalists indicated that social media accelerates the speed and competition of providing instant news. This decreases their freedom to choose news topics and angles since soft news or sensational headlines often attract the highest number of clicks.

"Since Taiwan has democratised, the government and political influence has decreased. In other words, the news media has strategies to protect or go against political intervention by insisting on editorial autonomy in a democratic regime with high press freedom. Nevertheless, the most significant influence on journalists' autonomy stems from media organisations, as well as the combined effects of new technology and economic factors, which directly impact the survival of newspapers." (D01)

In the U.S. context, the influence of algorithms on journalists' autonomy depends on how news organisations apply it (Petre, 2021). The quality papers, such as *New York Times*, may not allow their frontline journalists to access all the reports of the click rates. They value journalists' news judgement in deciding what readers should know rather than the click rate. Unfortunately, in Taiwan, most newspapers place considerable pressure on journalists to chase high click rates. In some newspapers, where the number of clicks is linked to journalists' payments as a key performance indicator (KPI), journalists find themselves with limited freedom to select their news topics.

"Journalists' KPI revealed every month is how media organisations evaluate our contribution. The standard click rate is 300,000 per month for each journalist. It means that if one news story only has one thousand clicks, I must write three hundred news stories monthly. It's a huge pressure for frontline journalists since they must consider how to attract the reader's attention. It mostly ends up choosing market-orientation topics to write about." (D02)

The chase of click rate not only causes the pressure of practising market-oriented roles, but also hinders the practise of the watchdog role. Due to the overwhelming load, frontline journalists are exhausted with providing instant news on websites and writing news articles for tomorrow's paper. Therefore, investigative reports are less emphasised in newspapers

nowadays. Journalists only focus on monitoring the government through their daily routines. Due to unresistant pressure from the shrinking market, senior journalists indicated this phenomenon had become a pervasive problem in undermining the function of scrutinising the powerholders.

"I consider myself more of a detached watchdog than an investigator uncovering scandals. Cases like the "Watergate scandal" are occasional news events that we can't simply wait for or request. Present-day journalists have exceptionally busy daily schedules, especially compared to the period before 2008 when social media wasn't a primary news source. Back then, newspaper journalists only needed to provide news for the next day, allowing more time and energy for investigative and in-depth reporting. Today's frontline journalists must deliver immediate news during the day, write articles for print editions in the evening, and produce videos on specific topics. This leaves little room for producing comprehensive investigative reports scrutinizing the government. Additionally, the declining readership and advertising revenue have led to stream down workforce, which further impede our ability to fulfil our scrutinizing function."(D04)

The click rate is accelerated by instant news on social media, which influences journalists' autonomy and changes the relationship between journalists and news sources. Journalists perceived the difficulty of practising the watchdog role since politicians and the government tend to use social media to respond to political issues or publish significant policies. The influence of news media as the vital mediator to provide information to citizens has decreased. As I mentioned, the advantage of offering "information subsidies" to journalists as a bargaining tool with politicians in exchange for free publicity is diminishing. This is because social media platforms provide a more influential, timely, and free means of accessing the public for politicians and political institutions.

As the newspaper market contracted, news organisations became increasingly susceptible to economic enticements from the government. While only one journalist ranked the governmental factor as the most influential, they vehemently criticised newsrooms that requested journalists to report on "news" containing government policy advertisements funded by the government's budget, referred to as embedded advertisements. Taiwanese scholars warned that product placement in journalism damages editorial autonomy and challenges journalistic ethical codes and professionalism (Lo and Liu, 2006; Liu, 2005; Lin, 2005). After 2008, the clear notice of policy advertisement in news reports was regulated by laws. However, journalists indicated that the budget for policy advertisement had become an invisible tool for the government to invade journalists' autonomy. The government tends to punish those papers

when their reporting does not favour them. The democratic function of the press as a watchdog is under threat.

"When I reported on the issue concerning the close relationship between the government officer and the company, which had the potential to tarnish the government's image, I received a threat that they would withdraw their advertising budget from my newspaper." (C03)

"In the span of a week, I was instructed by the editorial desk to cover three "news events", essentially paid government advertisements. This situation made me question my role - am I a salesperson or a journalist? When media overly relies on government advertising, there is limited room for journalists to critically examine and oversee those in power." (D01)

Most journalists said, *"They have heard this happened in other beats, but at least on political beat, they haven't experienced it."* Few journalists admitted they had reported the "news" as embedded advertisements from the government with extra payment. While asking them whether it caused damage to their autonomy, they started to justify themselves *"I write it as regular news so that it doesn't influence my independence."* Senior journalists acknowledged that democratisation released journalists' autonomy from the political cage, but an economic swap has gradually swallowed it. While the economy has shrunk, the editorial autonomy of newspapers is hard to withstand external influence. This aligns with the previous research that the strong market force may protect journalism from government intervention (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

"I don't think the attempts of the government to influence the news media decreased due to democratisation. No matter which party is in power, the government always wants to influence the media to report more positive news than negative ones." (C04)

In conclusion, the news organisation is the most influential factor in shaping journalists' role practices, exerting varying degrees of influence on their role perceptions. It is important to note that the organisation's influence on journalists' role perceptions does not necessarily equate to the change of their role performance, i.e., news content. However, the findings from my content analysis reveal an undeniable fact that we should not overlook the influence of organisations in shaping collaborative news output.

According to Voltmer (2012), the transformation of journalistic culture in a new democracy is a gradual and ongoing process, characterised by the persistent struggle between role perception and role enactment as an everyday challenge. After democratisation, journalists suggest the economic factor integrated with click-driven journalism leads the organisation to

impose the requirement on their news work. This may transform their role perception leaning toward market orientation. It is worth mentioning that the role perception changed toward marketing-oriented predominantly when providing news online. Taiwanese journalists must balance their media organisation's economic and political preferences and the normative norms in their journalistic culture. As a result, they present more flexibility in conceding to the role dimension of market orientation instead of other journalistic role perceptions. It echoes Firmstone (2023) who suggests that journalists struggle with the vital tensions between the priorities in news products and the competing interests in their journalistic work.

Based on the result of five role performances in news content, the levels of each role practised by the newspapers remained relatively stable between 2008 and 2020, apart from the market-oriented role (Chapter 6). It seems that how journalists perceive their role perceptions is insignificant if their autonomy is substantially curtailed by news organisations. This does not diminish the importance of journalists' role perceptions. On the contrary, the interview findings highlight the growing struggle between ideals and actual practice that journalists face in their daily work following the democratic transition. Recognising the gap between role perception and role performance can pave the way for further exploration of strategies to address this issue within the journalistic profession in Taiwan.

8.6 Summary

This chapter presents the results of the third element of comparison in the thesis, which aims to investigate political journalists' role perceptions across generations. The findings challenge the Western perspective of the Asian trait in Confucian journalistic culture, which do not apply in Taiwan's current context. The investigation was conducted using innovative indicators that I conceptualised for measuring the role perceptions of political journalists. Additionally, I identified shifting patterns in journalists' role perceptions based on news genres, partisanship, and platforms. These findings contribute to Hanitzsch et al.'s (2019) theory that role perceptions are not static but rather contingent on the content being covered.

The semi-structured interviews conducted in this study revealed that journalists ranked the watchdog role as the most important but also the most difficult role in practice. Interestingly, my research findings do not fully align with Hanitzsch's assumption that political and economic factors may be vital for the media in transitional democracies. Rather, journalists suggest that organisational factors are pivotal in influencing their journalistic work. Based on these findings,

I conclude that polarised partisanship in the newspapers poses significant hurdles for journalists who strive to perform the watchdog role effectively. Furthermore, newspapers with partisan characteristics may offer an illusion of autonomy for journalists who serve newspapers with similar political ideologies.

Chapter 9 Conclusion and Discussion

9.1 Introduction

Taking an approach that adds to the de-Westernisation of journalism studies and uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches, this thesis has investigated the unique transformations in Taiwanese newspaper journalism since the country's transition to democracy. This thesis delves deeper into the specific historical and cultural aspects, offering a comprehensive and detailed view of the country's journalism landscape. My empirical findings demonstrate an in-depth analysis of the Taiwanese media system, and fill a gap in the existing research, providing valuable insights that are not available through broader cross-national studies.

In this chapter, I begin by presenting a comprehensive review of the main findings derived from critical reflections on the research conducted. Subsequently, I discuss the implications of these findings and further explore their relevance in the context of Taiwan's democratisation. Lastly, I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the limitations of the study and providing suggestions for future research directions.

9.2 Key Findings in the News Quality

In this section, I present the answer to the first research question *RQ1: What are the democratic values of news content in Taiwanese newspapers, and how have they changed from 2008 to 2020?* With comparison as one of my major methodologies, I analysed the democratic value of political news in 2008 and 2020 to give a longitudinal view (Chapter 5) and an evaluation across print and social media platforms (Chapter 7).

9.2.1 The quantity of political news

In relation to the amount of political news which is relevant for advancing political knowledge in a new democratic society, Chapter 5 shows that the overall amount of political news in print has decreased since the democratic transition. We knew that in Taiwan fierce competition in the media market has caused a decrease in the amount of hard news in newspapers after democratisation (Liu, 2020). Liu's research did not include other platforms that newspapers operate on. Therefore, this may seem to be a conflict when other qualitative research in Taiwan

shows that print journalists perceive an overload due to the dual platforms they need to serve (Huang, 2013). In Chapter 7 I found that the political online news on the newspapers' Facebook pages not only replicates print versions but is also updated regularly with instant news. This finding is supported by newspaper journalists' testimonies in Chapter 8. When senior journalists compared their workload during the print-only era, they strongly criticise the mounting pressure from serving two platforms and having to produce more political news every day than in the print-only era. Combining qualitative and quantitative findings, I determined that while the print distribution of political news by these four newspapers has decreased, their Facebook pages continue to offer a similar amount of real-time political content. Notably, the political news shared from their websites on Facebook is only a fraction of their overall online news output. Therefore, these newspapers contribute more political information to the media landscape in 2020 than in 2008. My findings underscore the profound influence of the media system's transformation, particularly the fusion of social media with print journalism. This integration places journalists under the dual pressure of delivering content for two distinct platforms.

In addition to examining the quantity of political news across platforms and over time, my research specifically analyses the proportion of political news, providing a unique advantage for an in-depth understanding of the relative quantity of the news. Despite the shrinking print market leading to cutting the published pages in the four newspapers studied, my research finds that the political news remains at a similar level with a slight increase in proportions. This implies that even facing budget constraints, each of the Taiwanese newspapers still prioritise political news over soft news. I later found, through my interviews with journalists, that this is due to the Taiwanese newspapers' firm intention to be seen as political actors. The newspapers represent the two sides of political ideologies which reflects the existing cleavage in Taiwan's society. The newspapers want to have a voice in the ongoing contentious debate in Taiwanese society where national identities and the future of the nation (independence or unification) remain divisive. The newspapers in Taiwan are politicised and continue to view themselves as dominant political actors after the democratic transition (see Chapter 5). Therefore, they are inclined to reduce soft news in their print editions rather than hard news. In summary, due to enduring controversies involving national identities and the future of the country, Taiwanese newspapers are expected to maintain their focus on political news and leverage their role as political actors.

9.2.2 The quality of political news

I now discuss the quality of political news in relation to three criteria which I deem critical for Taiwan's democracy. I developed an innovative approach to measuring news quality by measuring three indicators of news quality: source diversity, source transparency, and partisanship. This research design is innovative as it goes beyond previous studies that often focus on individual aspects, without delving into the specific framework of democratic values in news content. For instance, after lifting the press ban, research related to the diversity of news sources agrees with the conclusion that governmental sources remain prioritised in all types of news articles (Cheng and Lo, 1988; Liu, 1989; Cheng, 1991; Su, 1995). Subsequently, with the sensationalism introduced by *Apple Daily*, researchers focused on the tabloidisation in news content, which may lead to a deterioration in news quality (Ho, 2007; Yi, 2008; Su, 2018). However, a comprehensive standard of news quality for advancing democratic consolidation is hard to find.

Regarding the three criteria of democratic values investigated in my research, I find that transparency serves as the key foundation for upholding democratic values in news content. Source transparency performed pervasively and remained at a stable high level, over eighty percent, among all the newspapers. This may be caused by the credibility of newspapers which is consistently challenged by the public due to partisanship within the media system. Therefore, transparency acts as a shield to justify the professionalism of journalism.

As for the other two criteria of news quality, both have apparent changes since the democratic transition. First, source diversity, the official sources continue to dominate political news. My longitudinal analysis shows that news sources do not get more diverse despite the opportunities afforded to a wider range of sources to have their voice heard via social media. In contrast, the reliance on political institutions as major news sources increases after the democratic transition. Second, the partisanship: the newspapers with opposing political ideologies exhibited a shift in tone performance and source selection following the democratic transition. The gap between these two extreme stances, characterised by the most positive and the most negative tones toward the government, is more distinct, indicating a polarised partisan bias.

The first criterion of news quality: Source diversity

As Chapter 5 shows, newspapers increase their reliance on institutional sources instead of civil society in print news. Previous studies have shown that sources affiliated with the government are consistently the most used news sources (Sigal, 1973; Brown et al., 1987; Bennett, 1990; Heim, 2021; Mellado and Scherman, 2021). In Taiwan, research related to the diversity of news sources was mostly conducted during the democratic transition. After democratisation, scholars were eager to determine whether press freedom would provide newspapers with more autonomy in selecting sources and reflecting diverse voices from civil society. However, their findings indicate that the trend of reliance on governmental sources has not changed significantly since democratisation (Cheng and Lo, 1988; Liu, 1989; Cheng, 1991; Su, 1995). The slight difference observed is that newspapers give more voice to social movement actors compared to the authoritarian period (Chen, 1991). The dominance of official sources presents a challenge for transitional democracy, where the existing power structure of society may be strengthened due to the limited diversity in sources (Schudson, 2013).

My research demonstrates that, following the transitional period, the reliance on political institutions as news sources has not only remained unchanged but has worsened (increasing from 73.69% to 84.69%) between 2008 and 2020. Political news in Taiwan has become excessively reliant on political institutions due to convenience being prioritised over considering the news value of sources. Testimonies from journalists reveal that the intensive workload of serving dual platforms in 2020 has gradually influenced them to restrict their sources to official channels. This implication of a detrimental effect on news quality, resulting from the integration of social media into newspapers, is seldom discussed in previous studies. This approach carries the risk of consolidating the existing political structure within a new democracy. Chapter 5 provides a vivid example of this replication of power structure within the political system. It highlights that the inclusion of news sources from small parties in political news is directly linked to the number of seats they hold in the national legislative institution, Legislative Yuan.

Another significant finding is that, despite journalists acknowledging that social media has increased the diversity of news sources (Liu and Lo, 2017), this shift is not adequately reflected in journalistic practices. My research reveals that all four newspapers utilised fewer sources from organised citizens, ordinary people, and professionals in 2020 compared to 2008. From the perspective of the representative function of media, when the press presents fewer voices from civil society, it is less likely to reflect diverse opinions. This contradicts the normative expectation for new democracies where the media should be a forum to present the diversity

of voices from society instead of being dominated by official voices (Votmer, 2006). The lack of diversity in sources is opposite to my assumption that the ideal democracy in Taiwan should include various voices from the whole society to advance mutual understanding and ease the conflict between discrepant national identities. Over time, this leads to a negative impact on new democracies, which should strive to be more inclusive and represent diverse voices, especially those of ordinary people.

In addition to the quantity of civil voices presented in political news, the manner in which they are presented and the reasons behind their selection are of greater significance. Despite the availability of various social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, sources from social media are often cited in news articles primarily for their sensational elements rather than their comprehensive political arguments, if any. Chapter 5 demonstrates how the voices of ordinary citizens are referenced in news coverage. Previous studies have indicated that in the authoritarian period, this is common to manipulate public opinion (Chen, 1991). During the transitional period, Taiwan's newspapers were more independent from the government but still tended to favour news sources that aligned with their political stance, and sometimes even expressed their own opinions using other experts or citizens to enhance credibility (Su, 1995). In my interviews, journalists' testimonies prove this strategy of selecting news sources, particular citizens' voices to endorse the political agenda they advocate by their favoured party. Therefore, the practice of selecting news sources in alignment with the newspapers' viewpoints as a strategy has continued even after the democratic transition. Social media, on the other hand, have simply provided a convenient platform for citing sources that are endorsed by the newspapers, requiring minimal time and financial investments.

Interestingly, the online news posted on the newspapers' Facebook pages tells a different story. Political news on these pages uses 23% fewer sources from political institutions. Although there is a rise in featuring voices from the public on online platforms, we should exercise caution regarding how these sources are presented. Based on testimonies from journalists, online news tends to highlight more sensational citizen voices compared to the print edition. Senior journalists believe that netizens' comments or criticism are used as clickbait, which is not considered worthy of publication in traditional print media. Furthermore, there is a significant difference in the utilisation of social media as a news source between print and online news across these four newspapers. The popular paper, *Apple Daily*, fills its online political news with sensational elements and anonymous responses from netizens. In contrast,

other newspapers like *UDN* adhere to a more traditional journalistic approach, refraining from citing netizens' comments from online platforms.

The second criterion of news quality: Transparency

Regarding transparency in citing news sources, as shown in Chapter 5, political news presented a very high level of transparent sources— over eighty percent, with stable trend overtime after democratisation. My significant finding shows that legacy media, newspapers, have a strong commitment to identifying news sources by citing transparent news sources. This has been applied as a journalistic ritual for justifying their objectivity and neutrality. In contrast, I find that when newspapers share news on their Facebook pages, they tend to exhibit reduced transparency in citing sources, as discussed in Chapter 7. Online news articles often rely more on anonymous sources, specifically referencing ordinary individuals from online platforms. The use of vague identities like 'a Facebook netizen' can undermine the credibility of online news, making source verification and information accuracy challenging. My research contributes to our comprehension of transparency, as prior studies typically concentrate on either print or online news without considering both platforms. I specifically identified that newspapers, as news organisations, apply different professional standards regarding providing transparency offline and online. The print media abide by normative norms more strictly than their online news counterparts do. As Karlsson (2011) notes, transparency is a practical measure of objectivity for building audience trust. My finding indicates that self-claimed quality newspapers are keen on maintaining their legacy brand and reputation and, therefore, adhere to professional norms on traditional platforms. This provides evidence in the Taiwanese context to confirm findings from other countries, that transparency in news content is constrained by the strategies that news organisations implement (Chadha and Koliska, 2015; Karlsson, 2010).

Another innovative finding about transparency is presented in Chapter 5, where I note the divergent strategy to use anonymous sources operated by different types of newspapers. Aside from *Apple Daily*, the other three newspapers tend to use anonymous sources from political institutions, such as the government and political parties. This behaviour reflects the traits of newspapers as political actors who are eager to influence the political agenda. As such, during interviews, journalists admitted that they may be willing to compromise transparency norms in exchange for insiders' stories or confidential government information. Relying on anonymous sources from politicians carries the risk of being used as a tool to attack political rivals, whether

the journalists involved are aware of it or not. Therefore, newspapers, as political actors, rely heavily on transparent sourcing to establish their professionalism and neutrality. In Taiwan's media system with its own characteristic of partisanship, the use of transparent sourcing can be seen as a defensive strategy aimed at building trust with the audience, rather than simply adhering to journalistic norms, as noted by Chadha and Koliska (2015). By contrast, the popular paper, *Apple Daily*, cites anonymous sources, mostly from civil sources, particularly ordinary people from social media with the purpose of catching eyeballs and increasing online profit.

The third criterion of news quality: Partisanship

Partisanship plays a crucial role in Taiwan's media system. This partisanship is closely tied to the media's stance toward China. Print media tend to align themselves along a spectrum ranging from independence (Pro-DPP) to unification with China (Pro-KMT). Previous studies have examined partisan bias in Taiwanese newspapers during presidential elections, and my research further confirms and illustrates how this partisanship extends into daily news reporting. In this research, I compared two points in time when KMT and DPP were in power, in 2008 and 2020 respectively, to investigate partisanship with two aspects- the performance in partisan tone and selection bias in news sources. Among the four newspapers, *Apple Daily* stands out as an outlier. Due to its lack of historical background in Taiwan, it exhibits characteristics more aligned with popular papers rather than displaying strong partisanship, in terms of supporting unification and independence. *Apple Daily* cites governmental sources relatively infrequently, regardless of which party is in power. Hence, when discussing Taiwan's partisan bias with the implication of pro-unification or pro-independence, *Apple Daily* seems to be an outlier.

When focusing on three newspapers in Taiwan, I highlight their partisanship as the primary characteristic after democratic transition as evidenced by my research, which includes partisan bias in tone and source selection. First, the partisan bias in tone has become more extreme over time, as the gap between the two newspapers, one with a positive tone and the other with a negative tone, has widened. In 2008, with the KMT in power, *China Times* had the most positive tone, and *Liberty Times* had the most negative tone. In 2020, *Liberty Times* had the most positive tone, while *UDN* had the most negative tone toward the DPP government. This finding demonstrates that the polarised partisanship is not only a political environment perceived by journalists based on their testimonies but is also reflected in the content of political news daily. The pro-KMT and pro-DPP newspaper which direct their positive and

negative tone toward the government provides evidence that partisan media change their political stance in the watchdog role depending on which party is in power.

Secondly, there is a notable selection bias in the choice of news sources. My findings indicate that these three newspapers in Taiwan employ a partisan sourcing strategy, citing more governmental sources when the party in power aligns with their editorial leanings. This finding expands on previous research that investigated partisan bias in news sources, focusing on specific political issues and including editorials in newspapers (Su, 1995) before democratisation. In contrast, my research excluded editorials, as they are assumed to represent the political stance of the newspapers, and instead focused solely on general news articles. The results demonstrate that after democratisation the bias in citing more governmental sources to enhance the exposure and publicity for the political party they favour is not limited to specific political issues but extends to daily news coverage.

In Chapter 7, I find that the partisan tone in news content is exacerbated on newspapers' Facebook pages. On the social media platform, political news shows accentuated political ideologies by expressing their positive or negative tone toward the government more strongly. There is a significant gap between the most positive and negative tones among Taiwan's three newspapers. As mentioned before, in print in 2020, this gap is 0.84, with *Liberty Times* exhibiting the most positive tone and *UDN* displaying the most negative tone. On Facebook, this gap is even wider, doubling to 1.55. *Liberty Times* again demonstrates the most positive tone, while *China Times* exhibits the most negative tone. This shows that news posts on Facebook by the three Taiwanese newspapers may reveal a more distinct attitude toward the government. Thus, newspapers' Facebook pages not only serve as channels for news dissemination, as previous research has indicated (Lin, 2015), but also as platforms that amplify partisanship through metrics-driven journalism. "The *click rate tells us everything*," said a journalist justifying that the audience's taste is also partisan. Consequently, the interaction between three main political actors, i.e., media, politicians, and audience (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995), composed an echo chamber to amplify the polarisation in public opinion.

9.3 Key Findings in the Role Performance

In this section, I present the key findings in journalistic role performance. These findings address the sub-questions (2.2 and 2.3) within the second research question "*RQ2: What are the journalistic roles in Taiwanese newspapers, and how have they changed from 2008 to 2020?*"

With comparison as one of my major methodologies, I analysed the journalistic role performances in the content of political news in 2008 and 2020 to give a longitudinal view (Chapter 6) and across print and social media platforms (Chapter 7).

9.3.1 Interventionist role

As shown in Chapter 6, the analysis of journalistic role performance in 2008 reveals that the interventionist role was the most prevalent, followed by the watchdog and infotainment roles. The civic role ranked fourth, while the collaborative role was the least common. This aligns with findings from previous research into journalism in transitional democracies showing that journalists embrace being interventionist to assist in building the country and advocate social reforms (Veltmer, 2014; Hanitzsch et al., 2019). After the transitional period, looking at the journalistic role performance in 2020, I find that it surprisingly demonstrates little changes in the interventionist role although the normative norms transplanted from U.S. journalism emphasise being detached, neutral, and objective in Taiwan.

One of the key findings of my research is that the influence of U.S. professionalism in print is evident in the newspapers in Taiwan in terms of a clear distinction between facts and opinions made in different types of news coverage. This is consistent with the "hard news paradigm" (Esser and Umbricht, 2014; Høyer and Pöttker, 2005). I find that since the democratic transition, journalists have become more rigorous in separating their opinions from factual reporting. This supported by journalists' interviews where the highest consensus among journalists is the objective norm (Chapter 8). Another finding is a difference across platforms - the interventionist role in the news on their Facebook pages is lower than in the print version. The political news selected to post on their Facebook page mostly consists of straight news or conventional news, providing information on current political affairs rather than in-depth analysis or features (see Chapter 7).

9.3.2 Watchdog role

As shown in my content analysis and interviews (Chapter 6), a partisan watchdog role may be considered the second prominent characteristic of the Taiwanese media system. A key finding of my research is that the level of watchdog content remains relatively constant over time, yet the choice of newspaper for disseminating such content varies contingent upon the incumbent government, as newspapers frequently exhibit a diminished watchdog function when their favoured political party is in power. This demonstrates the merit of using a comparative

approach, which allows for the identification of differences over time. Additionally, the watchdog role is less practised on their Facebook pages, while the partisan trend is similar with their print edition (Chapter 7).

Another significant finding in the watchdog role is that, based on Mellado's (2021a) theoretical framework, I introduced a new indicator that assesses toward "whom" the watchdog scrutinises in news articles. This enhances our understanding of how partisan media engage in biased reporting in their daily news coverage. In my findings of role performance, the extreme trend in partisanship is supported by the critical evidence. The gap between the highest and lowest level in performing the detached watchdog role toward the government deepens over time. In 2008, *Liberty Times* scrutinised the government in news stories nearly three times as often as *China Times*. By 2020, the situation had reversed, with *China Times* having approximately four times more articles scrutinizing the government than *Liberty Times*. This reflects the previous research that indicates Taiwan's newspapers tend to cite from the third party to support their own political stance during the transitional period (Liu, 2013). My research further provides robust evidence that this common trait of the newspapers in Taiwan after democratic transition remains apparent. When using the journalists' voice as an intervening watchdog, the trend of partisan watchdog is more accentuated. The frequency of scrutinising the government in the news stories of *Liberty Times* was nearly three times that of *UDN*. In 2020, the percentage of articles scrutinising the government in news stories of *UDN* was more than four times higher than it in *Liberty Times*. In summary, there was an escalation in the disparity of government scrutiny frequency between newspapers, both in terms of detached and interventionist watchdog roles.

Previous research shows that polarised political ideologies not only exist in commercial broadcasters (Liu, 2009; Lin and Lo, 2010) but also in newspapers, which are even more partisan during presidential elections (Wu and Lin, 2013). As shown in Chapters 5 and 6, I indicate that partisanship has penetrated daily news and is practised in various forms. When the two conflicting political ideologies, unification, and independence, are amplified by newspapers, democracy is at risk, as these discourses could cause political conflict and even hatred in society (Volmer, 2012). The polarised political ideologies among the newspapers were not only found in news content, but also verified by certain journalists' testimonies as discussed in Chapter 8. Taiwanese partisanship hinges on conflicting national identity concepts and Taiwan's future. This duality underscores the watchdog role's significance and its practical

challenges, especially when the newspaper's ideology aligns with the ruling party, making criticism of their actions politically sensitive within the newsroom.

9.3.3 Infotainment role

The most notable shift in journalistic roles in Taiwan post-democratic transition is the reduced emphasis on infotainment in political news coverage between 2008 and 2020. This finding contradicts existing literature in Taiwan but is supported by my interview results in Chapter 6. In 2020, the infotainment role dropped significantly in the print version, with a major decrease in emotion and personalization elements. Initially, we may think that this shows that journalistic role performances reduced in relation to market-driven elements in political news after the transitional period. Although *Apple Daily* has the strongest infotainment role among the four newspapers studied, they all tend to be less market-oriented in political coverage. However, by including social media output in the comparison, my findings reveal that newspapers did not give up their infotainment role or become more interested in serving the public interest after democratisation. Rather, newspapers shifted their infotainment role from print to online platforms. Existing literature suggests that in the liberal model (i.e., the U.S.) when the print moves online, newspapers provide more sensational and opinion-styled content to attract audience attention and increase website traffic (Benson et al., 2012; Humprecht et al., 2022). My comparison in Chapter 7 found that news on Facebook pages is specifically selected to attract readers back to the website, showing that Taiwanese newspapers also follow this model. Chapter 7 shows that the average score of infotainments in print editions doubled on their Facebook pages, with a sharp increase in sensational and emotional elements. Market-driven and metrics-driven approaches seem to go hand in hand in Taiwan print journalism, which leads to the consequence of sensationalism. This is supported by political journalists in interviews who are wary of the integration of social media in print leading to sensational journalism. This also explains why many journalists perceive their role perception to have shifted toward a market orientation.

While Taiwanese newspapers, including popular and quality papers, adopted similar editorial strategies of utilising social media platforms as profit-driven platforms, I still found a mild difference in newspaper types. This shows that Taiwanese newspapers are developing their social media strategies in similar ways to papers in other countries. For example, Petre (2021) suggests that editorial strategies that employ metrics can result in varying role

performances in online news; others find that while quality papers tend to maintain their standards online, popular papers often adopt a more market-oriented approach (Jacobi et al., 2016). The market-driven *Apple Daily* exhibited a stronger infotainment role in its print edition and reflected this on its Facebook page, with the most significant increase in average score among all newspapers. Conversely, *UDN*, traditionally considered a quality paper, demonstrated less aggression in practising the infotainment role on its Facebook page, with a mild increase in its average score.

9.3.4 Civic role

The civic role in political news in Taiwan has shown limited frequency, ranking fourth in 2008 and third in 2020, with no significant change over the 12-year period. As for the two specific ways that newspapers performed the civic role, after the democratic transition, the political news in Taiwan performed more frequently as a civic educator than a civic agent over time. This is in line with Mellado et al.'s research (2021a), where she found that the civic educator is more pervasive in transitional democracies and advanced democracies.

A significant finding is that the variation in the degree of performing the civic agent role in newspapers corresponds to their political party alignment. When the KMT was in power, the pro-DPP paper *Liberty Times* was keen to transmit citizens' voices and their activities. By contrast, when DPP was in power, pro-KMT papers became more active in serving the civic agent. When looking back at the news content in Chapter 6, civic voice is usually used to criticise the government or the ruling party. As mentioned earlier, in Taiwan's newspapers, news source selection tends to favour viewpoints aligned with their own stance, rather than fostering public political dialogues.

Regarding the online platform, I found that newspapers exhibit a comparable level of performance in their civic role on both their print editions and Facebook pages (Chapter 7). The civic educator role is more prominent on both platforms. Moreover, newspapers display a higher frequency of citing citizens' reactions in online news on their Facebook pages than their print editions. Existing literature suggests that ordinary people's voices are often included passively to support existing discourse, such as through vox pops or poll data (Firmstone and Corner, 2017; Firmstone, 2023). In Taiwan's newspapers, I discovered that citing citizens' reactions serves as a tool to reinforce existing narratives rather than empowering citizens to play an active role. Further exploration using methodologies such as discourse analysis may be necessary to examine how newspapers passively incorporate citizens' reactions.

9.4 Key Findings in Role Perceptions: Moving from the old paradigm to the new face

In this section, I present the key findings related to role perceptions across generations and the disparity between role performance and role perception. These findings address the sub-questions (2.1 and 2.4) within the second research question, "*RQ2: What are the journalistic roles in Taiwanese newspapers, and how have they changed from 2008 to 2020?*"

The traditional paradigm of Chinese journalism was centred around Confucian literati who aspired to educate and exert influence on the public through their writings, with the overarching goal of founding a new nation on the mainland of China. However, this paradigm underwent transformation when the KMT retreated to Taiwan and introduced U.S. journalistic professionalism. As the standard of the journalistic profession, the normative norms now include the objective norm, widely accepted by newspapers, and reinforced through journalism school education. Political journalists in Taiwan are educated and trained to adopt the role of a detached disseminator, emphasising the watchdog role, and serving the public interest. However, some journalists may still hold onto elements of traditional Confucian culture nostalgically. It is important to keep in mind that the heterogeneity of journalists allows various values to coexist in the journalistic culture. Thus, in the context of Taiwan, we can observe the slow transformation of journalistic culture after democratisation with variations between generations.

As Chapter 8 shows, the commonly held assumptions about the influence of Confucian culture on journalistic role perceptions in East Asian countries has transformed Taiwan with nationally specific understandings and practice. I applied an innovative approach to measuring Confucian journalistic culture by conceptualising four indicators and developed Hanitzsch's three dimensions of role perception measurements specifically to suit the unique context of Taiwan. The concept of "national destiny" underscores journalists' responsibility for their country's future and aligns with an interventionist approach. "Social harmony" entails the dual role of monitoring the government while safeguarding societal stability, reflecting a power distance perspective. "Legitimacy" permits government scrutiny if it does not undermine its authority, which is also associated with the power distance perspective. "Ethics" emphasises delivering news rooted in social morality and ethics, rather than prioritising economic profit, and is linked to a market-oriented role perception.

Here the thesis makes a pivotal contribution to taking a de-Westernised approach to researching Asian journalism since there are few studies that investigate Confucian journalistic culture from the perspective of journalistic role perceptions. The results show that after democratisation, Confucian characteristics no longer dominated journalistic culture in Taiwan. From the journalists' rankings, the average of four indicators is located between "usually not true" and "occasionally true". Particularly in the power-distance dimension, the indicators of Confucianism - legitimacy and social harmony - are least endorsed as true by journalists. As Chapter 8 showed, Confucian culture has more of an impact on senior journalists than junior counterparts because senior journalists have experienced the State Confucianism imposed on the whole of Taiwanese society (Fetzer and Soper, 2013), whereas their junior counterparts have not. Moreover, I find that among the newspapers, journalists from *UDN* and *China Times*, which are proclaimed as Confucian literati newspapers, show a higher level of recognition of Confucian culture than those from *Liberty Times* and *Apple Daily*.

This provides strong evidence to suggest that Taiwan's evolving journalistic culture does not adhere to the traditional emphasis on maintaining social harmony and respecting authority, which are often referred to as "Asian traits" in world journalism (Yin, 2008; Voltmer, 2013; Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Mellado, 2021a; Wu, 2022). The notion of social harmony has evolved substantially during the democratisation process. In Taiwan, for instance, the definition of social harmony has transitioned from serving as a tool to safeguard authoritarian regimes to one that now seeks to mitigate tensions between two polarised political ideologies—unification and independence—that have the potential to divide society. This new interpretation challenges the conventional understanding of social harmony as an Asian trait and has important implications for journalism around the world (as discussed in Chapter 8). In fact, I argue that social harmony can serve as a valuable framework for comprehending other societies facing divisions based on ethnicity, religion, or nationality, as seen in Pakistan or Malaysia. In these contexts, journalism can play a crucial role in promoting mutual understanding and achieving social harmony.

Role perception

After providing an overview of the findings obtained from analysing role performance in content, this section delves into the examination of role perceptions, which were investigated through interviews.

1. Interventionism dimension

Previous studies about Taiwanese journalists' perceptions of their role have been examined every decade through large-scale quantitative Western theoretical-based surveys (Lo, 1998; Lo, 2012; Liu and Lo, 2017). Prior surveys have not delved deeply into journalists' perceptions of their roles as advocates and disseminators, and their transitions between these roles remain uncharted. As Chapter 8 showed, journalists' role perception is not as stable as previous research suggests, where they have always embraced the disseminator role the most for three decades since the democratic transition. Instead, through a qualitative approach, I analysed in-depth journalists' elaboration of their role perceptions.

My interviews with Taiwanese journalists have revealed at least two types of shifts between these two role perceptions. Firstly, the journalists I spoke to clearly distinguish between their role perceptions depending on the news genre and issues they covered. They explained that while they saw themselves as disseminators when reporting straight news, they often took on the role of advocates when writing features and reports. Secondly, when covering news issues that aligned with their personal values, they became more involved and took on a more advocacy-oriented role. This suggests the role perceptions of journalists as advocates or disseminators are contingent on the news subject and are not static (Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Mellado, 2021a).

2. Power distance dimension

I find that the watchdog role has predominated in journalistic culture since democratisation across generations, but collaboration has not yet thoroughly disappeared. This overlap underscores the argument in role research that role perceptions are not mutually exclusive, and in Taiwan's context, both the watchdog and collaborator roles coexist. As we can see in Chapter 8, the collaborative role became more prominent in the four newspapers when President Tsai visited a military base and Chinese warplanes frequently entered Taiwan's air defence identification zone in 2020. This highlights that the strain in cross-strait relations is a key motivator for Taiwan to embrace the collaborator role. Likewise, the advocate role adopted by interviewed journalists arises from their concern for Taiwan's sovereignty amid China's threats, with some stating that our nation is not yet fully established.

Here, we can distinguish Taiwan's subtle variation in development journalism (Hanitzsch et al., 2019) in which journalists advocate for building the country, and the collaborator role is performed to consolidate the legitimacy of the current political regime and maintain social order after dramatic political changes, such as revolutions. In Taiwan, the collaborator role is rarely used by political parties and is the least favoured by journalists when supporting

government policies. However, despite Taiwan's de facto status as a nation, its ongoing struggle for wide international recognition, which is suppressed by the Chinese government, occasionally leads to the adoption of the collaborator role in journalism as a democratic response to counter threats to its sovereignty.

Previous research has indicated that journalists in Asian countries often emphasise social harmony and respect for authority, possibly leading them to scrutinise the government less, giving the perception of being in opposition to those in power. However, I contend that this may not necessarily hold true for Taiwan, as the journalists I interviewed do not strongly uphold Confucian culture, particularly maintaining social harmony and government's legitimacy. In Taiwan, the main characteristic of scrutinising the government is in their partisan watchdog role. Journalists strategically operate their watchdog role by adjusting its intensity based on their own perspectives, which often align with their newspapers' political ideology. Some journalists expressed concerns about maintaining social harmony while fulfilling their watchdog role, as mentioned before, to prevent sharp conflicts about Taiwan's future within society.

3. Market orientation dimension

My findings suggest that while journalists acknowledge the importance of both market and public orientation, they tend to prioritise the latter. This emphasis on public orientation is not surprising given that it has been part of the ethical code and taught in journalism school after democratisation. It reflects the view that public orientation is a key element of journalistic professionalism (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), as journalists lack the "esoteric knowledge" that distinguishes other professions (ibid:35). Remarkably, even journalists employed by the most market-oriented newspapers exhibited a preference for public orientation, causing significant cognitive dissonance. They found themselves in a situation where their desired actions did not align with their actual practices. In Chapter 8, I noted generational differences in accepting market-oriented role perceptions. Although there is a prevailing preference for public orientation among journalists, generational variations emerge. Some journalists acknowledged a slight shift toward a market-oriented approach when presenting political news online. Before 2008 social media, such as Facebook, had not been introduced in Taiwan and widely integrated by newspapers. During that period, most journalists were only responsible for the print edition, not multiple platforms. Younger journalists are generally more open to market-oriented demands, as they begin their careers with the expectation of serving both platforms. This integration of social media into newspapers, involving dual-platform responsibilities, has led

to some senior journalists experiencing cognitive dissonance. The disparity between their ideals and real-world demands creates anxiety and resistance, potentially causing some journalists to depart from their newspapers, as Hanitzsch (2019) has proposed.

Between role perception and role performance

My research findings indicate a significant gap between role perception and role performance, primarily attributed to market orientation and public orientation. Specifically, the extensive use of infotainment roles on Facebook pages leads to conflicts between journalists' perceptions and their actual practices. The second crucial gap arises from the interventionist role adopted by newspapers, despite most journalists perceiving their role as primarily that of a disseminator with a slight inclination toward advocacy. The aspect of power-distance consistently aligns with journalists' role perception. The watchdog role emerges as the second most prominent role performed in newspapers and is perceived as the most critical by most interviewed journalists. Similarly, the collaborator role is considered the least important and is also performed the least in newspapers. In conclusion, journalists in Taiwan face a growing struggle between their ideals and daily practices since the critical changes in the media system. The transition to democracy, a contracting print market, and increased emphasis on partisanship have accelerated the incorporation of social media into newspapers. These changes in the media system inevitably influence how journalists perceive and perform their social roles.

9.5 Discussion: The changing role of print journalism after democratic transition

The latent risk of democracy lies in the weakened print market

For Taiwanese journalism to evolve from clientelism prior to democratisation and make a valuable contribution to democracy, I argue that we should expect to see growing professionalism reflected in news content that embodies democratic values, such as diversity, transparency, and neutrality. However, my research has shown that in fact, these three criteria of news quality have not progressed in the ways that we might expect in print journalism and are presented even less on newspapers' Facebook pages.

This change leads us to the core of the discussion in the changing role of print journalism after the democratic transition. In Hallin and Mancini's (2004) theory, commercial newspaper circulation is crucial for assessing market strength and mass-circulation papers can enhance democracy through the public sphere. On the other hand, in their Plural Polarised Model, the market structure is weak because newspapers are historically subsidised by political actors and only serve a small group of political elites.

Based on Voltmer's (2008) suggestion, in transitional democracies, the media market acquires strong economic power due to digital media and the liberalisation of political regimes. This argument is evident in Taiwan after lifting the press ban, as circulation and advertising revenue increased following rapid economic growth (Lin, 2004). During the democratic transition, newspaper diversity flourished, with a wide range of political stances, such as evening papers, media groups, and professional papers, contributing to high external pluralism with multiple papers representing various viewpoints. Readers eagerly consumed political information from the media, resulting in high circulation and profit. In 1996, the three major newspapers, i.e. *UDN*, *China Times*, and *Liberty Times*, claimed they had over one million circulations. This was a remarkable achievement, especially when considering the country's population at that time, which stood at around 21 million. Print journalism held a pivotal role during this era, as television and newspapers were the dominant media platforms prior to the digital media era. This prominence aligned with the fundamental democratic functions of journalism, serving as a primary source of information and representation (Voltmer, 2008).

By 2008, as mentioned in chapter 2, the print market had decreased but remained the second popular channel for accessing news. During this period, research focused on news quality in print, particularly the sensationalism introduced by *Apple Daily* (Ho, 2007; Yi, 2008). They argued that the three major newspapers were impacted by market-driven journalism. This was also supported by my research finding, where *Apple Daily* emphasised infotainment over the watchdog function more than the other three newspapers (see Appendix 4, Table 1). During the twelve years, the media structure underwent significant changes. The readership and advertising in the print market significantly dropped. Online platforms replaced legacy media as the most popular channel for Taiwanese to access news (Newman et al., 2022). The print no longer had mass circulation in society, which poses a latent risk, as Hallin and Mancini's theory (2004), where the function to mediate vertical communication between the state and civil society could be impeded. When newspapers only serve a small group of people in the political party, higher partisanship is more likely to develop, similar to the Polarised Pluralist Model. In my research findings from Chapter 6, it seems that when print newspapers shift their infotainment role to their Facebook pages, the print editions do not necessarily result in an increased public-orientation or a greater emphasis on news aligned with public interest. The civil role stays at a similar level, and the reliance on news sources from political institutions, instead of civil society, is higher. What is even worse is the heightened partisan bias in their

political news coverage. Their source selection exhibited increased bias, and newspapers with differing political leanings adopted more extreme tones, becoming notably more positive in their coverage of the favoured government while growing more negative in their news of the disfavoured one. Furthermore, their watchdog role has been found to scrutinise the government less when their favoured party is in power. This implies that when print journalism finally becomes independent from the state and no longer practises clientelism toward the one-party rule regime, the change in the media market may drive them toward increased partisanship following a democratic transition. Newspapers continue to strive for a role as political players within the media system, with the interventionist role being the most frequently assumed role among the four newspapers over time. Nevertheless, without substantial mass circulation and reader support, their capacity to shape agendas or exert political influence diminishes, as senior journalists pessimistically stated.

When newspapers in Taiwan struggle to generate profits from the market, I indicate that they adopt two approaches. The first is transitioning news content online and utilising social media as a primary channel to draw online traffic, compensating for financial shortfalls in the print division. However, click-driven journalism has led to lower news quality in transparency and passively presented citizens' voices despite citing more from civil society and increasing the partisan tones (see Chapter 8). Moreover, their online news on Facebook pages has shown increasingly extreme levels of positivity or negativity toward the government, depending on the newspaper's party alignment. Based on journalists' testimonies and readers' partisan behaviour reflected in click rates, there is a reciprocal reinforcement of newspapers' partisanship. This paves the way for the second approach: when Taiwanese newspapers face profitability challenges, they tend to further solidify their political ideology to cater to their specific readership in both their print and online edition. This alignment with the second pillar of the media system, political parallelism, is discussed in the subsequent section.

From a hybrid media system to a partisan media system

As previous research argues, in transitional democracy the relationship between political party and the media is contingency. As Voltmer's (2013) research showed, Taiwanese media have been closely related to particular political parties, "their loyalties are diffuse and hardly follow the pattern (ibid: 188)". New democracies in Asia bypassed the phase of forming a political and media system and transitioned from authoritarian to hybrid forms of governance alongside hybrid media structures (McCargo, 2014). The hybrid media system is applied to

describe transitional democracies since they do not fit into western typologies as a catch-all category. To go beyond this, I suggest that the Taiwanese type of partisanship based on two political ideologies is formulating a partisan media system after democratic transition.

In this research, I found the evidence in the pattern of partisanship lies in the two political ideologies "unification and independence", reflecting unsolved national identities and inner tensions. In the changing political landscape since 2008, the "Taiwanese identity" overtook "both Chinese and Taiwanese" as well as "Chinese identity," establishing itself as the prevailing political ideology by 2020, as discussed in Chapter 2. From journalist's testimonies, this shift in ethnic identity has increased the anxiety for the newspapers which least champion being a Taiwanese, while reinforcing the certainty for newspapers that endorse a Taiwanese identity. As I discussed in Chapter 2, two political ideologies, the unification and independence, regarding the future of Taiwan and the attitude toward China, are related to ethnic identities. These are the basis of Taiwan's partisanship between political parties and media.

Alongside the shrinking print market, partisan bias in newspapers has increased over time and across platforms. The evidence supporting this can be found in the news content and is further reinforced by journalists' interviews (see Chapter 5). The decreasing amount of political news in print amplifies the partisan bias. Furthermore, the crucial democratic watchdog role of journalism is portrayed in a partisan manner, with the level of government scrutiny varying depending on the party in power. In this thesis, I term this concept the "partisan watchdog" (see chapter 6). The characteristic of a partisan watchdog extends to newspapers' Facebook pages, although the watchdog role is less frequently performed on the online platform. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 7, when "partisan watchdog" is put into practice online, the positive and negative tones toward the government become more overt and intense, driven by the feedback received through click rates.

With this evidence, we still could not conclude Taiwan's print in the media system is overall partisan since the popular paper *Apple Daily* is an outlier. *Apple Daily* launched in Taiwan in 2003 and quickly rose to become the top-selling newspaper by 2008. During this period, the print market was more diverse, and the media system possibly had a hybrid nature. However, after 2020, the three partisan newspapers still strive for survival, but *Apple Daily* fully dropped out in 2022 during the time of this research. I argue that political news is valued in Taiwan's newspapers, and this influence extends to the popular paper *Apple Daily*, despite it claiming to be a politically neutral and market-driven newspaper (see Chapter 5). The proportion of political news in *Apple Daily* has increased over time to a similar level as the other three

newspapers. Nonetheless, due to the absence of a distinct political ideology regarding unification and independence, such a popular newspaper appears to lack a specific niche to attract partisan readers, making it increasingly challenging to thrive within the highly partisan media system.

The landscape of Taiwan media in terms of broadcasters and print media, most of which can be categorised based on their political ideology, is supported by previous research (Sullivan, 2018; Liu, 2022). The public television service (PTS) is relatively weak, with a smaller scale of audience and financial subsidies, despite being higher in the public trust (Lin, 2023). Although independent media has recently gained traction online on a small scale, such as "Reporter" founded by the public, the media system's overview is still dominated by large media company owned broadcasters or the print. Therefore, based on my observations, after the democratic transition, Taiwan's specific type of partisanship has formulated a vital part of the media system, especially concerning the print media. My findings contradict Chen's (2011) prediction that after democratisation Taiwan's media system lies between the Polarised Pluralist Model and the Liberal Model, but it would gradually shift toward the Liberal Model.

The challenge of journalistic professionalism

In this section, following the previous discussion, I raise a vital question about the challenge of journalistic professionalism: When partisanship dominates print media, to what extent is the U.S. normative norm applicable, and how has it transformed in the context of Taiwan? Critics argue that U.S. journalism lacks sensitivity toward the circumstances of transitional democracies in developing nations (Voltmer, 2012). The U.S. professionalism in print, with its emphasis on disseminating news and adhering to objective, neutral, and detached norms, has not fully adapted to the context of Taiwan. While Taiwan's democracy is relatively consolidated, the country's sovereignty is constantly under threat from China. This reflects on my research findings that the pervasive and stable interventionist role was performed by the four newspapers after democratisation. The concept of development journalism, which focuses on building a country (Voltmer, 2012; Hanitzsch, 2019), has been adapted to fit the specific political environment in Taiwan.

This adaptation came as a response to the threats to the country's survival when a hostile country constantly raises tensions across the strait. As discussed in Chapter 6, in 2020, China conducted military exercises near Taiwan, escalating its pressure during President Tsai's second term. According to my research, when these military threats began, both the

interventionist and collaborative roles of Taiwan's newspapers increased, with variations in intensity depending on their positions regarding unification or independence. This illustrates that in a young democracy like Taiwan, facing the threat of annexation from a neighbouring country, journalists cannot abandon their role as advocates and interveners to adopt a neutral or passive stance. This highlights the limitations of U.S. print journalism when transplanted to Taiwan where society is divided between two conflicting political ideologies, as commercialisation did not motivate them to embrace the detached disseminator. Nevertheless, journalistic professionalism in Taiwan has adopted the U.S. newspapers' normative norms pragmatically by accepting the hard news paradigm, in terms of separating fact from opinion. This allows for an advocate role in features, although my research finds that partisan bias continues to infiltrate into straight news. This is a compromise and adaptation when the old journalistic role transforms into a new role that is not inherited from their cultural and political context.

The pillar of U.S. professionalism in print implicit in Taiwan's high partisanship media system is the separation of fact and opinion. This practice becomes more pronounced after the transition to democracy and is widely perceived as crucial by journalists. The clear distinction between news facts and opinions is seen as a practical way to adhere to objective standards. Based on interviews, this separation serves as the minimum requirement that journalists use to convince both the audience and them of their neutrality when delivering general news. However, they acknowledge that even in straight news reporting, journalists and their newspapers can strategically shape the news to align with their preferred political stance, whether by selecting source perspectives or using third parties to express their own opinions. During the interviews, I observed that most journalists decide to take it as normal by arguing that objectivity is unattainable idealism. This is the reason why journalists tend to select work in the newspapers with a similar political ideology or at least not against their political ideology. They know that even the straight news could be framed in line with editorial political stance, which has become the "normality" among the newspapers with a higher level of partisanship. Hence, journalists claim that they have higher autonomy when they serve the newspaper with the same political ideology. My research advances the understanding that multiple layers of the disseminator role are practised in journalist routine and presented in news content.

The emergence of hybrid journalism in Taiwan

In Chapter 2, I referenced a Taiwanese scholar's observation that Taiwanese journalistic professionalism has integrated elements from the U.S. without detailing how this integration occurred. My research not only offers empirical evidence but also provides a detailed explanation of how the influence of U.S. professionalism in terms of newspaper normative norms has become ingrained in Taiwan's newspaper journalism. My conclusion echoes Voltmer's (2012:198) assertion that "the transformation of journalism entails different interpretations and actions that stem from journalists' past role during the regime, the obstacles in the post-authoritarian context, cultural traditions, and the impact of Western models". Adopting Western-style journalism in diverse cultural contexts leads to several modifications and adaptations due to its emphasis on objectivity, detachment, and adversarial (Voltmer, 2012). This results in the emergence of hybrid forms of democracy and journalistic role perceptions in regions. In the context of Taiwan, I indicate that the diverse interpretations and adaptations of the U.S. print journalism, combined with the previously dominant Confucian journalistic role and the political system with two major political ideologies, have contributed to the emergence of hybrid journalism.

My research reveals that the hybrid journalism in Taiwan differs from the new professional role that journalists practise in developing countries, such as Africa, where journalism integrated elements of development journalism ideology with the adversary role from the liberal model (Voltmer, 2012). In Taiwan, the adversary role is the least valued function for journalists. Some may argue that U.S. journalism is incompatible with non-Western cultures due to unique cultural norms such as social harmony in Asia. I argue that social harmony is an important idea for Taiwanese journalists who are reluctant to play the adversarial role. This reluctance is not to consolidate the political regime but to deter the splitting of society by two divergent political ideologies. Thus, Taiwanese hybrid journalism integrates elements related to democratic principles of checks and balances, the responsibility to defend the survival and democracy of the country, as well as prevention of a polarised and split society.

The looming crisis of print journalism's democratic functions

As my thesis suggests, the shrinking media market in Taiwan has made newspapers more susceptible to external influences, including metrics-driven journalism on their online platforms, increased partisan bias, and government intervention through advertising budgets. I argue that the autonomy shared by political journalists is more constrained than they have acknowledged in their interviews or surveys in the previous research due to the conditional

nature of autonomy inherent in the partisan media system. This research found that political journalists in Taiwan perceived strong influences from the owners' political ideologies, in terms of unification and independence as well as their business interests. The influence of the owners' political ideologies is accentuated. This finding is compatible with previous research mentioned in Chapter 3 that journalistic autonomy is undermined by the owners' intervention in Taiwan (Liu, 2022; Taiwan Media Watch Foundation, 2019). This implies that journalism is not independent enough after democratisation to gain public trust, resulting in the journalistic profession still being fledgling. Additionally, the partisanship in the media system gives journalists an "illusion" of higher autonomy when their political ideology is in line with the newspaper. By investigating journalistic autonomy in the partisan media system, my findings shed light on the conditional nature of autonomy in Taiwan.

Furthermore, the role of social media is another significant aspect of my research. I conclude that the democratic function of print is not being replaced by social media. My research findings indicate that political news in print media outperformed its online counterparts in terms of transparency, partisan bias, and public-oriented news. I shed light on how social media is pervasively used to disseminate news content that could lead to the dysfunction of newspapers in transmitting quality news (Lin, 2022). Print journalism operates two different types of journalism offline and online in Taiwan but faces the crisis of deterioration of news quality and credibility. The diminished quality of online news results from a reluctance to expand the workforce, coupled with insufficient financial support and the challenge of sustaining the print media business model.

However, it may not be thoroughly pessimistic, when brand print organisations still gain higher credibility in their online news; it may be an opportunity for newspapers to rethink their strategy for operating online news on Facebook pages. It is crucial for newspapers to avoid solely using social media as a profit-making platform and neglecting its potential democratic function. My conclusion echoes Anderson's (2013) critical analysis of the Philadelphia newspaper industry, which is particularly relevant in the case of *Apple Daily's* failure to adapt its business model to the digital era. The newspaper industry in Taiwan would do well to heed the lessons of the past to avoid similar outcomes. This is vitally important, especially if the trend of audiences moving online continues. Print media cannot expect their democratic function, or their status as the fourth estate, to remain the same without readers. Therefore, they must make significant efforts to enhance their news quality and strengthen their democratic function in their online content.

In conclusion, the democratic functions of hybrid journalism in Taiwan are currently at risk due to competing political and economic forces. As my research shows, the lack of a new business model for operating both online and offline journalism has caused a financial crisis. This has led to frontline journalists being overloaded with the responsibility of playing two types of journalistic roles based on the platform they serve. I indicate that in print journalism, the quality of news deteriorated after the democratic transition. News content now relies heavily on political institutions, squeezing out civil voices. Present citizens' opinions are relatively passive, and civic engagement is gradually neglected. There is also a polarised partisan bias in political news. Furthermore, their Facebook pages have not replaced the democratic function of print journalism, despite digital advertising revenue becoming a major financial support for print journalism. Political news on Facebook pages provides less democratic value in news content, with a weak watchdog role and a high focus on infotainment, while foregrounding partisan tones. As a result, Blumler's (2010) two-legged crisis of journalism consisting of two major threats: financial and moral, is currently happening in Taiwan's print journalism. The reduction in the financial resources of journalism puts its viability at risk. This, in turn, leads to the inability of journalism to promote democracy and citizenship, which poses a moral crisis. Therefore, it is crucial to find sustainable ways to secure funding for journalism and to rediscover journalism's role in fostering democratic values and civic engagement. This requires not only reporting the news but also providing context, analysis, and a platform for public discourse that reflects diverse voices and perspectives. Only by addressing these issues can journalism regain its status as a vital institution that serves the public interest and democracy.

9.6 Limitations and Suggestions

Limitations

Although I have made every effort to investigate the transformation of journalism after democratisation, this research inevitably has its limitations. A limitation of the study is its narrow focus on political journalism in newspapers, which may not provide a comprehensive view of journalism after democratisation. This selective focus could potentially magnify specific journalistic roles in both perception and practice. For instance, journalists covering government and political parties may exhibit a stronger watchdog role. Therefore, further research is warranted, as diverse findings have been observed in various countries (Mellado, 2021a).

The second limitation is the discussion regarding constraints on autonomy. Hallin and Mancini (2004) indicate that in a polarised pluralist media system with a higher level of partisanship and weaker market structure, journalistic autonomy may be vulnerable to political force. In this research, political journalists are more likely to perceive political pressure on their autonomy due to partisanship, which may not be experienced by journalists covering other news topics.

The third limitation is related to the changing media environment. During the research period, a sampled newspaper, the only popular paper *Apple Daily*, unexpectedly ceased publication in 2022 for complicated reasons, including the pressure from China and the failure to use a paywall on its website (Lin, 2022). How does newspaper journalism in Taiwan function without this market-driven popular paper? Does its absence contribute to the democratic functions of journalism or further polarise the partisan media system? These questions warrant further investigation in future research.

Suggestions

For future research, I propose two suggestions that may further the understanding of journalists' role perceptions and the scope of hard news. First, a qualitative approach is essential to delve into role perception. My research indicates that employing qualitative methods to examine journalistic culture can extend beyond the Western context. The results reveal varying interpretations of terms believed to be universal in the literature: such as the concept of social harmony, conventionally connected with a series of Asian traits such as respect for authority, collectivism, and obedience, is subject to multiple interpretations depending on the social context. This highlights not only a potential drawback in using cross-country surveys to gauge role perceptions and assert their comparability but also raises the necessity of using more qualitative approaches such as discourse analysis.

Second, this study examined the flow of political information only in newspapers and their Facebook pages using specific criteria for assessing news quality. However, due to the limitations of the research scope, not all types of media were surveyed to determine the general trend of political news after democratisation. To enhance the assessment of journalism's impact on political knowledge, future studies should consider broadening their evaluation beyond newspapers to encompass all forms of media. This broader approach could provide a more holistic insight into how journalism significantly contributes to political knowledge.

Bibliography

- Aalberg, T., van Aelst, P. and Curran, J. 2010. Media Systems and the Political Information Environment: A Cross-National Comparison. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*. **15**(3), pp.255–271.
- Allen, M. 2017. *The SAGE Encyclopaedia of Communication Research Methods*. SAGE Publications.
- Anderson, C.W. 2010. Journalistic Networks and the Diffusion of Local News: The Brief, Happy News Life of the “Francisville Four”. *Political Communication*. **27**(3), pp.289–309.
- Anderson, C.W. 2011. Between creative and quantified audiences: Web metrics and changing patterns of news work in local U.S. newsrooms. *Journalism: Theory, Practise & Criticism*. **12**(5), pp.550–566.
- Anderson, C.W. 2013. *Rebuilding the News: Metropolitan Journalism in the Digital Age*. Temple University Press.
- Anderson, C.W. 2015. Up and Out: Journalism, Social Media, and Historical Sensibility. *Social Media + Society*. **1**(1), p.205630511557867.
- Anderson, C.W. 2017. Knowledge, Expertise, And Professional Practise in the Sociology of Michael Schudson. *Journalism Studies*. **18**(10), pp.1307–1317.
- Anderson, C.W. 2019. Journalism, online and offline *In Media and Society*. Bloomsbury Academic, pp.227–244.
- Anderson, C.W. 2021. ‘A journalism of fear’. *Journalism*. **22**(8), pp.1912–1928.
- Bachmann, P., Eisenegger, M. and Ingenhoff, D. 2021. Defining and Measuring News Media Quality: Comparing the Content Perspective and the Audience Perspective. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*., p.1940161221999666.
- Bandurski, D. and Hala, M. 2010. *Investigative journalism in China: eight cases in Chinese watchdog journalism*. Hong Kong: University Press.
- Barnhurst, K.G. and Mutz, D. 1997. American Journalism and the Decline in Event-Centered Reporting. *Journal of Communication*. **47**(4), pp.27–53.
- Bazeley, P. 2018. *Integrating Analyses in Mixed Methods Research* [Online]. 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP: SAGE Publications Ltd. [Accessed 24 September 2022]. Available from: <https://methods.sagepub.com/book/integrating-analyses-in-mixed-methods-research>.
- Bennett, W.L. 1990. Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States. *Journal of Communication*. **40**(2), pp.103–127.
- Bennett, W.L. 2003. The Burglar Alarm That Just Keeps Ringing: A Response to Zaller. *Political Communication*. **20**(2), pp.131–138.
- Benson, R., Blach-Ørsten, M., Powers, M., Willig, I. and Zambrano, S.V. 2012. Media Systems Online and Off: Comparing the Form of News in the United States, Denmark, and France. *Journal of Communication*. **62**(1), pp.21–38.
- Berelson, B. 1952. *Content analysis in communication research*. New York: Hafner.

- Berkowitz, D. and Pritchard, D. 1989. Political Knowledge and Communication Resources. *Journalism Quarterly*. **66**(3), pp.697–701.
- Blumler, J.G. 2010. Foreword: The two-legged crisis of journalism. *Journalism Studies*. **11**(4), pp.439–441.
- Blumler, J.G. 2018. Book Review: *Journalistic Role Performance: Concepts, Contexts, and Methods*. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*. **23**(2), pp.270–271.
- Blumler, J.G. and Gurevitch, M. 1995. *The Crisis of Public Communication*. Psychology Press.
- Broersma, M. and Graham, T. 2013. Twitter as a News Source. *Journalism Practise*. **7**(4), pp.446–464.
- Brown, J.D., Bybee, C.R., Wearden, S.T. and Straughan, D.M. 1987. Invisible Power: Newspaper News Sources and the Limits of Diversity. *Journalism & mass communication quarterly*. **64**(1), pp.45–54.
- Bunce, M. 2019. Management and resistance in the digital newsroom. *Journalism*. **20**(7), pp.890–905.
- Carey, J.W. 1993. The mass media and democracy. *Journal of International Affairs*. **47**(1), p.1.
- Carey, J.W. 1997. Afterword: In: E. S. Munson and C. A. Warren, eds. James Carey [Online]. *A Critical Reader*. University of Minnesota Press, pp.308–340. [Accessed 6 May 2020]. Available from: www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttsvzt.21.
- Carey, J.W. 2007. A Short History of Journalism for Journalists: A Proposal and Essay. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*. **12**(1), pp.3–16.
- Carlson, M. 2017. Journalistic Authority: Legitimizing News in the Digital Era In: Journalistic Authority [Online]. Columbia University Press. [Accessed 26 November 2023]. Available from: <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7312/car117444/html>.
- Carpini, M.X.D. and Keeter, S. 1993. Measuring Political Knowledge: Putting First Things First. *American Journal of Political Science*. **37**(4), pp.1179–1206.
- Chadha, K. and Koliska, M. 2015. Newsrooms and Transparency in the Digital Age. *Journalism Practice*. **9**(2), pp.215–229.
- Champlin, D.P. and Knoedler, J.T. 2006. The Media, the News, and Democracy: Revisiting the Dewey-Lippman Debate. *Journal of Economic Issues*. **40**(1), pp.135–152.
- Chang, C.H. 2011. Analysis of the News Placement and Coverage of Three Chinese Buying Groups by Taiwan's Four Main Newspapers from the Perspective of van Dijk's Discourse and Manipulation Theory. *Chinese Journal of Communication Research*. (20), pp.65–93.
- Chen T.M. 2009. The market of publication in 2008 In: *2009 Publication Annual*. The government of R.O.C, pp.24–32.
- Chen, Xue-Yun 1991. *A Study on the Construction of Social Reality by News Media in Our Country: A Case Study of Social Movement Reporting*. PhD's thesis, Taiwan: National Chengchi University.
- Chen, H.K. 2011. *Media and Politics of Political Transition: A Comparative Analysis of Media system between Taiwan and Italy*. [Online] Doctoral dissertation, Taipei: Shin Hsin University. [Accessed 15 August 2021]. Available from: <https://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/gswweb.cgi/login?o=dnclcdr&s=id=%22099SHU05376006%22.&searchmode=basic>.

- Chiu, C.Y. 2014. Reviewing the Professional Roles of Taiwan Journalists from News Awards Conferred 1974-2013. *Journal of Communication Research and Practice.*, pp.117–173.
- Christians, C.G., Glaseert, T.L., McQuail, D., Nordenstreng, K. and White, R.A. 2009. *Normative theories of the media : journalism in democratic societies*. Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois Press.
- Clark, T. 2021. *Bryman's social research methods*. Sixth edition / Tom Clark, Liam Foster, Luke Sloan, Alan Bryman; editorial advisor, Elena Vacchelli. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, B.C. 1963. *Press and Foreign Policy*. Princeton University Press.
- Creswell, J.W. 2011. *Designing and conducting mixed methods research* Second edition. Los Angeles, CA; SAGE.
- Cushion, S. and Franklin, B. 2015. Public Service Broadcasting: Markets and 'Vulnerable Values' in Broadcast and Print Journalism In: *Can the media serve democracy? essays in honour of Jay G. Blumler*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.65–75.
- Curran, J. 2011. *Media and Democracy*. Taylor & Francis.
- Curran, J., Iyengar, S., Brink Lund, A. and Salovaara-Moring, I. 2009. Media System, Public Knowledge and Democracy: A Comparative Study. *European Journal of Communication*. **24**(1), pp.5–26.
- Cushion, S. 2012. The Democratic Value of News: Why Public Service Media Matter. Macmillan International Higher Education.
- de Vreese, C., Esser, F. and Hopmann, D.N. 2017. *Comparing political journalism*. Abingdon, Oxon; Routledge.
- Denzin, N.K. 1978. *Sociological methods: a sourcebook* Second edition. New York; McGraw-Hill.
- Denzin, N.K. 2006. *Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook* [Online]. [Accessed 6 November 2022]. Available from: <https://www.routledge.com/Sociological-Methods-A-Sourcebook/Denzin/p/book/9780202308401>.
- Donsbach, W. 2012. Journalists' Role Perception In: *The International Encyclopaedia of Communication* [Online]. American Cancer Society. [Accessed 5 June 2020]. Available from: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781405186407.wbiecj010.pub2>.
- Donsbach, W. and Patterson, T.E. 2004. Political news journalists: Partisanship, professionalism, and political roles in five countries In: *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges*. Cambridge University Press, pp.251–270.
- Dzwo T. and Lee C. 2010. A Study of Biased News Coverage during the 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections. *Communication & Society Journal*. (11), pp.141–163.
- Eilders, C. 2000. Media as political actors? Issue focusing and selective emphasis in the German quality press. *German Politics*. **9**(3), pp.181–206.
- Esser, F. and Umbricht, A. 2014. The Evolution of Objective and Interpretative Journalism in the Western Press: Comparing Six News Systems since the 1960s. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*. **91**(2), pp.229–249.
- Fell, D. 2012. *Government and politics in Taiwan*. London: Routledge.
- Feng C. 2020. Analysing Cross-strait News and Commentaries of Taiwan's Main Newspapers: Focusing on the United Daily News (1951-2019). *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly In Social Studies*. (115), pp.151–235.

- Fetzer, J.S. and Soper, J.C. 2013. *Confucianism, democratisation, and human rights in Taiwan*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Fink, K. and Schudson, M. 2014. The rise of contextual journalism, 1950s–2000s. *Journalism*. **15**(1), pp.3–20.
- Firmstone, J. 2019. Editorial Journalism and Newspapers’ Editorial Opinions. *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Communication*. [Online]. [Accessed 16 August 2022]. Available from: <https://oxfordre.com/communication/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-803>.
- Firmstone, J. 2023. *The Shaping of News: A Framework for Analysis*. Palgrave MacMillan.
- Firmstone, J. and Corner, J. 2017. Reporting the ‘Public’—Discourses of Interpretation, Evaluation and Prediction In: *The Mediated Politics of Europe: A Comparative Study of Discourse*., pp.175–199.
- Galletta, A. 2013. *Mastering the Semi-Structured Interview and Beyond: From Research Design to Analysis and Publication*. NYU Press.
- Galston, W.A. 2001. Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education. *Annual Review of Political Science*. **4**(1), pp.217–234.
- Gans, H.J. 1979. Deciding what’s news: Story suitability. *Society*. **16**(3), pp.65–77.
- George, C. 2013. Diversity around a democratic core: The universal and the particular in journalism. *Journalism (London, England)*. **14**(4), pp.490–503.
- Gold, T.B. 1997. The democratic consolidation in Taiwan In: *The opportunities and Challenges of new democracies*. Ya Chiang publisher, pp.244–291.
- Groeling, T. 2013. Media Bias by the Numbers: Challenges and Opportunities in the Empirical Study of Partisan News. *Annual Review of Political Science*. **16**, pp.129–151.
- Gulyas, A. 2013. The influence of professional variables on journalist’s uses and views of social media. *Digital Journalism*, 1:2,207-285
- Gurevitch, M. and Blumler, J.G. 1990. Political communication systems and democratic values In: J. Lichtenberg, ed. *Democracy and the Mass Media: A Collection of Essays* [Online]. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.269–289.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1989. *The structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hallin, D.C. and Mancini, P. 2004. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics. *Cambridge Core*. [Online]. [Accessed 18 November 2019]. Available from: </core/books/comparing-media-systems/B7A12371782B7A1D62BA1A72C1395E43>.
- Hallin, D.C. and Mancini, P. 2012. *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hallin, D.C. and Mancini, P. 2017. Ten Years After *Comparing Media Systems*: What Have We Learned? *Political Communication*. **34**(2), pp.155–171.
- Hallin, D.C. and Mellado, C. 2018. Serving Consumers, Citizens, or Elites: Democratic Roles of Journalism in Chilean Newspapers and Television News. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*. **23**(1), pp.24–43.

- Handcock, M.S. and Gile, K.J. 2011. Comment: On the Concept of Snowball Sampling. *Sociological Methodology*. **41**(1), pp.367–371.
- Hanitzsch, T. 2007. Deconstructing Journalism Culture: Toward a Universal Theory. *Communication Theory (1050-3293)*. **17**(4), pp.367–385.
- Hanitzsch, T., Anikina, M., Berganza, R., Cangoz, I., Coman, M., Hamada, B., Hanusch, F., Karadjov, C.D., Mellado, C., Moreira, S.V., Mwesige, P.G., Plaisance, P.L., Reich, Z., Seethaler, J., Skewes, E.A., Noor, D.V. and Yuen, K.W. 2010. Modeling Perceived Influences on Journalism: Evidence from a Cross-National Survey of Journalists. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*. **87**(1), pp.5–22.
- Hanitzsch, T. 2011. Populist disseminators, detached watchdogs, critical change agents and opportunist facilitators: Professional milieus, the journalistic field and autonomy in 18 countries. *International Communication Gazette*. **73**(6), pp.477–494.
- Hanitzsch, T. and Mellado, C. 2011. What Shapes the News around the World? How Journalists in Eighteen Countries Perceive Influences on Their Work. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*. **16**(3), pp.404–426.
- Hanitzsch, T. and Vos, T.P. 2018. Journalism beyond democracy: A new look into journalistic roles in political and everyday life. *Journalism: Theory, Practise & Criticism*. **19**(2), pp.146–164.
- Hanitzsch, T., Hanusch, F., Ramaprasad, J. and Beer, A.S. de (eds.). 2019. *Worlds of Journalism: Journalistic Cultures Around the Globe*. Columbia University Press.
- He, Q. 2019. *Red Infiltration: the Truth About the Global Expansion of Chinese Media*. Taipei: Gusa publishing.
- Heim, K. 2021. Tweets and Source Diversity: Newspapers' Sourcing of Twitter Posts from 2009 to 2016. *Mass Communication and Society*. **24**(3), pp.394–417.
- Ho, H.C. 2007. The Thoughts and Operation of Market-driven Journalism: A Case Study of 'Apple Daily'. *Chinese journal of communication research*. (11), 243– 273.
- Høyer, S. and Pöttker, H. 2005. *Diffusion of the News Paradigm, 1850-2000*. Nordicom.
- Hsiao, Y. 2014. Political polarisation in Taiwan: An analysis on mass feeling thermometer toward political parties. *Journal of Electoral Studies*. **21**(2), pp.1–42.
- Hsiao, Y.C. and Cheng, S.F. 2014. Citizens' Perceptions of the Left-Right Ideology in Taiwan: Replacing Left-Right Ideology with the Unification-Independence Issue to Measure Taiwan's Party Polarisation. *Taiwan Political Science Review*. **18**(2), pp.79–138.
- Hsueh, H. 2016. The historical development and problem of Taiwanese identity. *New Century Forum*. **74**, pp.60–73.
- Hsu, J.H. and Lo, V.H. 2019. The problem of Taiwanese newspapers *In: Deconstruction of Taiwanese media again*. Taipei: Chuliu Book, pp.153–176.
- Huang, C.L. 2009. *The Changing Roles of the Media in Taiwan's Democratisation Process*. The Brookings Institution.
- Huang, J.N. 2017. The China Factor in Taiwan's Media: Outsourcing Chinese Censorship Abroad. *China Perspectives*. **2017**(3), pp.27–36.
- Huang, S.S. 2013. *The weight of journalists: The imagination and practise of Taiwan's political journalists (1980-2006)*. Taipei: Chuliu.

- Humanes, M.L. and Roses, S. 2021. Audience Approach: The Performance of Civic, Infotainment, and Service Roles *In: Beyond Journalistic Norms: Role Performance and News in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Routledge, pp.125–144.
- Humprecht, E., Castro Herrero, L., Blassnig, S., Brüggemann, M. and Engesser, S. 2022. Media Systems in the Digital Age: An Empirical Comparison of 30 Countries. *Journal of Communication*. **72**(2), pp.145–164.
- Hung, C. Y. 2015. Tradition meets pluralism: the receding Confucian values in the Taiwanese citizenship curriculum. *Asia Pacific Journal of Education*. **35**(2), pp.176–190.
- Huntington, S.P. 1991. *The third wave: democratisation in the late twentieth century*. University of Oklahoma Press.
- Jacobi, C., Kleinen-von Königslöw, K. and Ruigrok, N. 2016. Political News in Online and Print Newspapers. *Digital Journalism*. **4**(6), pp.723–742.
- Johnstone, J.W.C., Slawski, E.J. and Bowman, W.W. 1976. *The news people: a sociological portrait of American journalists and their work*. University of Illinois Press.
- Joseph, B. 2013. How much democracy does journalism need? *Journalism*. **14**(4), pp.474–489.
- Karlsson, M. 2010. Rituals of Transparency. *Journalism Studies*. **11**(4), pp.535–545.
- Krippendorff, K. 2019. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* [Online]. 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320: SAGE Publications, Inc. [Accessed 22 October 2022]. Available from: <https://methods.sagepub.com/book/content-analysis-4e>.
- Larcinese, V., Puglisi, R. and Snyder, J.M. 2011. Partisan bias in economic news: Evidence on the agenda-setting behavior of U.S. newspapers. *Journal of Public Economics*. **95**(9), pp.1178–1189.
- Lauk, E. 2009. Reflections on changing patterns of journalism in the new EU countries. *Journalism Studies*. **10**(1), pp.69–84.
- Lee, C.C. 1993. Sparking a Fire: The Press and the Ferment of Democratic Change in Taiwan. *journalism monographs*. (138), pp.163–200.
- Lee, C.C. 2004. *Beyond Western Hegemony: Media and Chinese Modernity*. Hong Kong: Oxford.
- Lee, C.C. 2006. The Conception of Chinese journalists: ideological convergence and contestation. *In: Making Journalists*. Routledge, pp.107–126.
- Lee, C.C. 2019. Sparking a Fire: The Press and the Ferment of Democratic Change in Taiwan *In: C.-C. Lee, ed. China's Media, Media's China* [Online]. Routledge, pp.163–201. [Accessed 25 January 2020]. Available from: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9780429703324/chapters/10.4324/9780429041754-10>.
- Lee, G. 2017. Verb objectivity and source qualification: Comparison of quotation attributions in offline and online newspapers. *Journalism*. **18**(7), pp.890–906.
- Lee, G. and Koh, H. 2010. Who controls newspapers' political perspectives? Source transparency and affiliations in Korean news articles about U.S. beef imports. *Asian Journal of Communication*. **20**(4), pp.404–422.
- Lee, S. 2020. Probing the Mechanisms Through Which Social Media Erodes Political Knowledge: The Role of the News-Finds-Me Perception. *Mass Communication and Society*. **23**(6), pp.810–832.

- Lee, T.S. 2004. *Newspaper political journalists' perception of professional role and practise*. Master's thesis, Taiwan: National Chengchi University.
- Levy, D., Aslan, B. and Bironzo, D. 2016. UK press coverage of the EU referendum. *UK press coverage of the EU referendum*.
- Lin, C. C. 2005. Political Knowledge among the Electorate in Taiwan. *Journal of Electoral study*. **12**(1), pp.147–171.
- Lin, C.C. 2013. Convergence of new and old media: new media representation in traditional news. *Chinese Journal of Communication*. **6**(2), pp.183–201.
- Lin, C.C., 2014. Chinese Media does not care about social media. In Luo, Shih-hung and Tong, Jing Rong (Eds.), *Social Media and Journalism*, Taipei: Quality Journalism Development Association. pp.121–138.
- Lin, C.C. 2015. The Analysis and Critique on the Role of Newspapers through Convergence: A Case Study of 4 Mainstream Newspapers in Taiwan. *Chinese Journal of Communication Research*. **28**, pp.3–34.
- Lin, F.M. 2006. *Different generations vary in their values and behavioural models due to their different living environments and growth backgrounds*. National Science Council.
- Lin, L.Y. 2004. *The history of communication in Taiwan*. Taipei: Chuliu.
- Lin, L.Y. 2008. A Historical Experiment with Deregulation: The Changes and Challenges of the Press after the Lifting of the Press Ban in Taiwan. *Mass Communication Research*. (95).
- Lin, L.Y. 2022. *Digital news report* [Online]. Reuters Institute for the study of journalism. Available from: <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2022/taiwan>.
- Lin, L.Y. 2023. *Digital News Report 2023* [Online]. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available from: <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2023/taiwan>.
- Lin, P.Y. 2006. The imagination of the history of Taiwan's Communication Studies by integrated paradigm. *Annual conference of Chinese communication society*., pp.1–26.
- Lin, X. 2009. Sir, We Purchase the China Times Group! *Commonwealth Magazine*. (416).
- Lin Y.C. and Lo V.H. 2010. Partisan Bias in Taiwan Television Enterprise's Coverage of the Four Presidential Elections in Taiwan: 1996-2008. *Journal of Electoral Studies*. **17**(1), pp.55–90.
- Lippmann, W. 1922. *Public Opinion*. Harcourt, Brace.
- Liu, C. 2007. The Political Economy of Media Ethics: State, Capital, and the Formation of Journalistic Norms. *Chinese Journal of Communication Research*. **11**, pp.111–153.
- Liu, C. 2020. The impacts of social media and messaging apps on the journalistic profession. *Journalism Studies*. (142), pp.1–58.
- Liu H.C. 2009. A Study of Partisan Bias in the TV News: Using the Reporting for the 312 Wei-Xin Incident of TVBS-N and SET-N as Examples. *Communication and Management Research*. **9**(1), pp.33–64.
- Liu, H.L. 1989. *Characteristics and Handling of Newspaper News Sources*. Master's thesis, Taiwan: National Chengchi University.
- Liu, H.L. 2005. Crisis of the Utilisation of Product Placement in News: The Exploration of the Public Interest of News Media in Taiwan. *Chinese Journal of Communication*. (8), pp.179–207.

- Liu, H.L. and Lo, V.H. 2017. Changes in Media Role Perception and the Third-Person Effect. *Chinese Journal of Communication Research*. (31), pp.191–225.
- Liu, H.W. 2013. Net-users as news source: The production order of TV news in digital era. *Journal of Audio-visual Media and Technologies*. **36**, pp.37–68.
- Liu, H.L. 2022. *The Journalists from Democratisation to Digital Convergence: A Comparative Study across Generations*. Taipei: Chuliu Book.
- Liu, J. 2018. Socioeconomic Status, Media Use, and New Media Use. *Chinese Political Science Review*. **66**, pp.29–63.
- Lo V.H. 1989. The comparison of editorials after lifting martial law. *Journalism Studies*. (41), pp.9–24.
- Lo, V.H. 1998. The new Taiwan journalists: A sociological profile. In: D. H. Weaver & L. Willnat (Eds.), *The global journalist: News people around the world*. pp.71–88. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.
- Lo, V.H. 2012. Journalists in Taiwan. In: D. H. Weaver & L. Willnat (Eds.), *The global journalist in the 21st century*. New York: Routledge, pp.104–112.
- Lo V.H. and Huang Y.C. 2010. Television Coverage of the 2008 Presidential Election in Taiwan. *Communication & Society Journal*. (11), pp.165–189.
- Lo, V.H. and Huang, W.W. 2000. Newspaper Coverage of the 2000 Presidential Election. *Journal of Electoral Studies*. **7**(1), pp.1–20.
- Lo, V.H., King, P.T., Chen, C.H. and Huang, H.L. 1996. Political bias in the news coverage of Taiwan's first presidential election: A comparative analysis of broadcast TV and cable TV news. *Asian Journal of Communication*. **6**(2), pp.43–64.
- Lo, V.H. and Liu, H.L. 2006. Product Placement in Journalism and Its Impact on Reporters. *Journalism Studies*. **89**, pp.81–125.
- Lo, V.H., Wang, H.H. and Hou, G.C. 2007. Newspaper Coverage of the 2004 Presidential Election in Taiwan. *Journal of Electoral Studies*. **14**(2), pp.95–120.
- Lu, D.X. 2012. *Taiwanese newspaper industry: The struggle between politics and media*. Taiwan: Taiwan Interminds Publishing Inc.
- Luk, Y.L. 2003. From Orthodox Practitioners to Esoteric Workers? The Accommodation and Self-Identity of Taiwanese Journalists with the Next Magazine. *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*. **50**, pp.171–216.
- Luker, K. 2008. *Salsa Dancing into the Social Sciences*. Harvard University Press.
- Macnamara, J.R. 2005. Media content analysis: its uses, benefits and best practise methodology. *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal*. **6**(1), pp.1–34.
- Masahiro, W. 2014. *The history of politics in Taiwan after World War II*. National Taiwan University Press.
- Márquez-Ramírez, M., Sergio Roses, Silke, H. and Dasniel Olivera 2021. Power Relations: the Performance of Watchdog and Loyal-Facilitator Roles In: *Beyond Journalistic Norms: Role Performance and News in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Routledge, pp.103–124

- McCargo, D. 2012. *Partisan Polyvalence: Characterizing the Political Role of Asia Media In: Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.201–223.
- McChesney, R.W. 2015. *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*. The New Press.
- McManus, J.H. 1994. *Market-Driven Journalism: Let the Citizen Beware?* 1st edition. Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- McNair, B. 2009. Journalism and democracy *In: The Handbook of Journalism Studies*. New York: Routledge, pp.237–249.
- McNair, B. 2017. *An introduction to political communication* Sixth edition. London: Routledge.
- McNair, B. 2018. Journalism as Public Sphere *In: Journalism*. Handbooks of Communication Science. Boston/Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Inc., pp.149–168.
- McQuail, D. 2010. *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*. SAGE.
- Media Agency Association 2009. *2008 Annual report of Media*. Media Agency Association.
- Media Agency Association 2021. *2020 Annual report of Media*. Media Agency Association.
- Mellado, C. 2015. Professional Roles in News Content: Six dimensions of journalistic role performance. *Journalism Studies*. **16**(4), pp.596–614.
- Mellado, C. (ed.). 2021a. *Beyond Journalistic Norms: Role Performance and News in Comparative Perspective* [Online] 1st ed. Routledge. [Accessed 9 December 2021]. Available from: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9780429758201>.
- Mellado, C. 2021b. Journalistic Role Performance and the News *In: Beyond Journalistic Norms: Role Performance and News in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Routledge, pp.3–21.
- Mellado, C. 2022. Comparing Journalistic Roles and Role Performance in 38 Countries: Methodological Updates, Study Design, and Theoretical Underpinnings.
- Mellado, C. and Scherman, A. 2021. Mapping Source Diversity Across Chilean News Platforms and Mediums. *Journalism Practise*. **15**(7), pp.974–993.
- Mellado, C. and Van Dalen, A. 2014. Between Rhetoric and Practise: Explaining the gap between role conception and performance in journalism. *Journalism Studies*. **15**(6), pp.859–878.
- Mellado, C. and Van Dalen, A. 2017. Changing Times, Changing Journalism: A Content Analysis of Journalistic Role Performances in a Transitional Democracy. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*. **22**(2), pp.244–263.
- Mellado, C. and Van Dalen, A. 2017. Changing Times, Changing Journalism: A Content Analysis of Journalistic Role Performances in a Transitional Democracy. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*. **22**(2), pp.244–263.
- Mellado, C., Blanchett, N., Stępińska, A., Mothes, C., Lecheler, S., Blanco-Herrero, D., Chen, Y.-N.K., A. Cohen, A., Davydov, S., De Maio, M., Dingerkus, F., Elhamy, H., Garcés-Prettel, M., Gousset, C., C. Hallin, D., Humanes, M.L., Himma-Kadakas, M., Kozman, C., Lee, M., Lin, C.I.-H., Márquez-Ramírez, M., Maza-Córdova, J., McGuinness, K., McIntyre, K., Mick, J., Milojevic, A., Navarro, C., Olivera, D., Pizarro, M., Sarasqueta, G., Silke, H., Skjerdal, T., Stanziano, A., Szabó, G., VanLeuven, S. and Zhao, X. 2023a. Does News Platform Matter? Comparing Online Journalistic Role Performance to Newspaper, Radio, and Television. *Digital Journalism*., pp.1–24.

- Mellado, C., Hallin, D.C., Blanchett, N., Márquez-Ramírez, M., Jackson, D., Stępińska, A., Skjerdal, T., Himma, M., McIntyre, K., Hagen, L.M., Amiel, P., Abuali, Y., Fahmy, N., Boudana, S., Chen, Y.-N.K., Davidov, S., De Maio, M., Frias Vázquez, M., Garcés, M., Humanes, M.L., Herczeg, P., Lee, M., Lin, C.I.-H., Melki, J., Mick, J., Mincigrucci, R., Ninković Slavnić, D., Nolan, D., Olivera, D., Olmedo, S., Pizarro, M., Quinn, F., Szabó, G., Van Leuven, S., Viveros Aguilar, D. and Wyss, V. 2024. The societal context of professional practice: Examining the impact of politics and economics on journalistic role performance across 37 countries. *Journalism (London, England)*.
- Mellado, C., Márquez-Ramírez, M., Van Leuven, S., Jackson, D., Mothes, C., Arcila-Calderón, C., Berthaut, J., Blanchett, N., Boudana, S., Chen, K.Y.N., Davydov, S., De Maio, M., Fahmy, N., Ferrero, M., Garcés, M., Hagen, L., Hallin, D.C., Humanes, M.L., Himma-Kadakas, M., Keel, G., Kozman, C., Krstić, A., Lecheler, S., Lee, M., Lin, C.I.H., Mazzoni, M., McGuinness, K., McIntyre, K., Mick, J., Navarro, C., Olivera, D., Pizarro, M., Silke, H., Skjerdal, T., Stępińska, A., Szabó, G. and Viveros Aguilar, D. 2023b. Comparing Journalistic Role Performance Across Thematic Beats: A 37-Country Study. *Journalism & mass communication quarterly*.
- Mellado, C., Mothes, C., Hallin, D.C., Humanes, M.L., Lauber, M., Mick, J., Silke, H., Sparks, C., Amado, A., Davydov, S. and Olivera, D. 2020. Investigating the Gap between Newspaper Journalists' Role Conceptions and Role Performance in Nine European, Asian, and Latin American Countries. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*. **25**(4), pp.552–575.
- Mencher, M. 1991. *News Reporting and Writing*. W.C. Brown Publishers.
- Merkley, E. 2019. Partisan Bias in Economic News Content: New Evidence. *American Politics Research*. **47**(6), pp.1303–1323.
- Napoli, P.M. 1999. Deconstructing the diversity principle. *Journal of Communication*. **49**(4), p.28.
- Napoli, P.M. 2015. Social media and the public interest: Governance of news platforms in the realm of individual and algorithmic gatekeepers. *Telecommunications Policy*. **39**(9), pp.751–760.
- NCCU, 2022. *Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys (1992-2022.06)* [Online]. The Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. [Accessed 3 August 2022]. Available from: <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7804&id=6960>.
- Nelson, J.L. and Tandoc Jr., E.C. 2019. Doing “Well” or Doing “Good”: What Audience Analytics Reveal About Journalism’s Competing Goals. *Journalism Studies*. **20**(13), pp.1960–1976.
- Nerone, J. and Barnhurst, K.G. 2001. Beyond Modernism: Digital Design, Americanization and the Future of Newspaper Form. *New Media & Society*. **3**(4), pp.467–482.
- Neuendorf, K.A. 2017. *The content analysis guidebook*. Second edition. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Robertson, C.T., Eddy, K. and Nielsen, R.K. 2022. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2022.
- Norris, P. 2009. Comparative Political Communications: Common Frameworks or Babelian Confusion? *Government and Opposition*. **44**(3), pp.321–340.
- Page, B.I. 1996. The Mass Media as Political Actors. *PS: Political Science and Politics*. **29**(1), pp.20–24.
- Patterson, T.E. and Donsbogh, W. 1996. News decisions: Journalists as partisan actors. *Political Communication*. **13**(4), pp.455–468.

- Peng, B. 2007. Hard/soft news preference, democratic values and voting. *Journal of Electoral Studies*. **14**(1), pp.85–117.
- Peng, J. 2008. *Advanced News Writing: Theory, Analysis, and Examples*. Taipei: Wu nan tu shu
- Petre, C. 2021. *All the News That's Fit to Click: How Metrics Are Transforming the Work of Journalists*. Princeton.
- Pothong, K. and Nielsen, R.K. 2016. Reuters institute digital news report 2016: Asia-pacific supplementary report. *University of Oxford, Reuters Institute for the study of journalism*. [Online]. [Accessed 14 June 2020]. Available from: <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reuters%20Institute%20Digital%20News%20Report%202016%20-%20Asia-Pacific%20Supplementary%20Report.pdf>.
- Revers, M. 2014. The Twitterization of News Making: Transparency and Journalistic Professionalism. *Journal of Communication*. **64**(5), pp.806–826.
- Riffe, D., Aust, C.F. and Lacy, S.R. 1993. The Effectiveness of Random, Consecutive Day and Constructed Week Sampling in Newspaper Content Analysis. *Journalism Quarterly*. **70**(1), pp.133–139.
- Robinson, J.P. and Davis, D.K. 1990. Television News and the Informed Public: An Information-Processing Approach. *Journal of Communication*. **40**(3), pp.106–19.
- Rupar, V. 2006. How did you find that out? Transparency of the newsgathering process and the meaning of news. *Journalism Studies*. **7**(1), pp.127–143.
- Salgado, S., Strömbäck, J., Aalberg, T. and Esser, F. 2017. Interpretive Journalism *In: Comparing Political Journalism*. Routledge, pp.50–70.
- Sartori, G. 1987. *The Theory of Democracy Revisited: Part One: The Contemporary Debate, Vol. 1*. Chatham, New Jersey
- Schudson, M. 1999. Social Origins of Press Cynicism in Portraying Politics. *American Behavioral Scientist*. **42**(6), pp.998–1008.
- Schudson, M. 2011. *The sociology of news Second edition*. New York; W.W. Norton & Company.
- Schudson, M. 2013. *Why Democracies Need an Unlovable Press*. Polity Press.
- Seymour-Ure, C. 1974. *Political Impact of Mass Media* First Edition. London: CONSTABLE.
- Shoemaker, P.J. and Reese, S.D. 1996. *Mediating the message: theories of influences on mass media content* 2nd ed. White Plains, N.Y: Longman.
- Siebert, F.S. 1956. Four Theories of the Press : The authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and Soviet communist concepts of what the press should be and do. Stratford, N.H: Ayer
- Sigal, L.V. 1973. *Reporters and Officials: Organisation and Politics of News making*. Lexington (Massachusetts): Imprint unknown.
- Soroka, S.N. 2012. The Gatekeeping Function: Distributions of Information in Media and the Real World. *The Journal of Politics*. **74**(2), pp.514–528.
- Spina, N., Shin, D.C. and Cha, D. 2011. Confucianism and Democracy: A Review of the Opposing Conceptualisations. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*. **12**(1), pp.143–160.
- Stępińska, A., Szabó, G., Amado, A. and Silke, H. 2021. Journalistic Voice: The performance of Interventionist Role *In: Beyond Journalistic Norms: Role Performance and News in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Routledge, pp.85–102

- Strömbäck, J. 2005. In Search of a Standard: four models of democracy and their normative implications for journalism. *Journalism Studies*. 6(3), pp.331–345.
- Su, H. 1995. News Sources and News Values: How Newspapers Reported the Effect of Hsu Li-nung's Resignation from the Party. *Mass Communication Research*. 50, pp.15–40.
- Su, H., Niu, L.G., Huang, M.Y. and Chao, H.N. 2000. Rethinking the Transformation of Taiwan's Major Newspapers from 1998 to 1999. *Journalism Studies*. (64), pp.1–32.
- Su, H. 2002. *The Newspaper in the Age of Competition: Theory and Practice*. Taipei: Shi Ying.
- Su, H. 2018. Professional Journalism: Media Practise and the issues Facing Taiwan. *Journal of Communication and Culture*. 17, pp.16–51.
- Su, H., Niu, L.G., Huang, M.Y. and Chao, H.N. 2000. Rethinking the Transformation of Taiwan's Major Newspapers from 1998 to 1999. *Journalism Studies*. (64), pp.1–32.
- Sullivan, J., Feng, C., Smyth, J. and Ming-yeh T. Rawnsley 2018. The media in democratic Taiwan *In: A New Era in Democratic Taiwan* [Online]. Routledge, pp.104–122.
- Sun Z. 2016. *The everlasting wisdom and modern missions of Confucianism*. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press.
- Taiwan media watch foundation 2019. *The credibility of Taiwanese news media*.
- Tandoc, E.C., Hellmueller, L. and Vos, T.P. 2012. Mind the Gap. *Journalism Practise*. 7(5), pp.539–554.
- Tien, H. 1997. The prospect of democratic consolidation in Taiwan *In: The opportunities and Challenges of new democracies*. Ya Chiang publisher, pp.244–291.
- Tong, J. R. 2011. *Investigative Journalism in China: Journalism, Power, and Society*. A&C Black.
- Tsai, C.Y. 2007. *National Identity Ethnic Identity and Party Identity in Taiwan.pdf*. School of Law University of Maryland.
- Tu, W.M. 1997. 'Chinese philosophy: A synoptic view': *A companion to world philosophies*. Eliot Deutsch&Ron Bontekoe(ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell publishers.
- Tuchman, G. 1972. Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen's Notions of Objectivity. *American Journal of Sociology*. 77(4), pp.660–679.
- Tuchman, G. 1977. The exception proves the rule: The study of routine news practise. In: *Strategies for communication research*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp.43–62.
- Van Aelst, P., Strömbäck, J., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., de Vreese, C., Matthes, J., Hopmann, D., Salgado, S., Hubé, N., Stępińska, A., Papathanassopoulos, S., Berganza, R., Legnante, G., Reinemann, C., Sheaffer, T. and Stanyer, J. 2017. Political communication in a high-choice media environment: a challenge for democracy? *Annals of the International Communication Association*. 41(1), pp.3–27.
- Van Erkel, P.F.A. and Van Aelst, P. 2021. Why Don't We Learn from Social Media? Studying Effects of and Mechanisms behind Social Media News Use on General Surveillance Political Knowledge. *Political Communication*. 38(4), pp.407–425.
- Voakes, P.S., Kapfer, J., Kurpius, D. and Chern, D.S.-Y. 1996. Diversity in the News: A Conceptual and Methodological Framework. *Journalism & mass communication quarterly*. 73(3), pp.582–593.

- Voltmer, K. 2006. The mass media and the dynamics of political communication in process of democratisation *In Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies*. New York: Routledge, pp.1–20.
- Voltmer, K. 2012. How Far Can Media Systems Travel? Applying Hallin and Mancini's Comparative Framework outside the Western World In: *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.224–245.
- Voltmer, K. and Wasserman, H. 2014. Journalistic norms between universality and domestication: Journalists' interpretations of press freedom in six new democracies. *Global Media and Communication*. **10**(2), pp.177–192.
- Voltmer, K. 2013. *The media in transitional democracies*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Wang, F. 2008. The Role of Ethnic Politics Issues in Taiwan's Democratisation Transition. *Taiwan Democracy Quarterly*. **5**(2), pp.89–140.
- Wang, A.H.E. 2019. The Myth of Polarisation among Taiwanese Voters: The Missing Middle. *Journal of East Asian Studies*. **19**(3), pp.275–287.
- Watts, R. and Maddison, J. 2014. Print News Uses More Source Diversity than Does Broadcast. *Newspaper Research Journal*. **35**(3), pp.107–118.
- Weaver, D. and Drew, D. 1993. Voter Learning in the 1990 Off-Year Election: Did the Media Matter? *Journalism Quarterly*. **70**(2), pp.356–368.
- Weaver, D.H. 2015. Journalists, Journalism and Research: What Do We Know and Why Should We Care? In: *Can the media serve democracy? essays in honour of Jay G. Blumler*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.87–98.
- Weaver, D.H. and Wilhoit, G.C. 1986. *The American Journalist: A Portrait of U.S. News People and Their Work*. Indiana University Press.
- Weaver, D.H. and Willnat, L. 2012. *The Global Journalist in the 21st Century*. Routledge.
- Wengraf, T. 2001. *Qualitative research interviewing: biographic narrative and semi-structured methods*. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE.
- Willnat, L., Weaver, D.H. and Wilhoit, G.C. 2019. The American Journalist in the Digital Age. *Journalism Studies*. **20**(3), pp.423–441.
- Wok, S. and Mohamed, S. 2017. Internet and social media in Malaysia: Development, Challenges and Potentials In: *The Evolution of Media Communication*. InTech, pp.45–64.
- Wu, H.M. and Lin, T.Y. 2013. *The media is sick: The symptom and remedy for the Taiwanese news environment*. Taipei: Chuliu.
- Wu, N. 2002. Identity conflict and political trust. *Taiwanese Sociology*. **4**, pp.75–118.
- Wu, N. 2005. Romance and Bread: A Preliminary Study of the Identity Change in Taiwan. *The Taiwanese Political Science Review*. **9**(2), pp.5–40.
- Wu, N. and Cheng, T. 2011. Democratisation as a Legitimacy Formula: KMT and Political Change in Taiwan In: *Political Legitimacy in Asia: Challenges for Leaders*. New York: Palgrave, pp.59–87.
- Wu, S. 2022. An Asian version of data journalism? Uncovering “Asian values” in data stories produced across Asia. *Journalism.*, p.14648849221133298.
- Xiao W.J. and Wang W.C. 2018. The News Feed Algorithm, Visibility, and News Business: Using Facebook as an Example. *The Journal of Information Society*. (34), pp.63–104.

- Yi, C.J. 2008. *Tabloidization of Political News in Newspapers - Before and After the Publication of Apple Daily in Taiwan*. Master 's thesis, National Chengchi University.
- Yin, J. 2008. Beyond the Four Theories of the Press: A New Model for the Asian and the World Press. *Journalism & Communication Monographs*. **10**(1), pp.3–62.
- Yu, C. 2021. Media Use and Political Polarisation in Taiwan *In: Taipei*. [Accessed 5 November 2022]. Available from: https://ah.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=159756.
- Zaller, J. 2003. A New Standard of News Quality: Burglar Alarms for the Monitorial Citizen. *Political Communication*. **20**(2), pp.109–130.
- Zelizer, B. 2013. On the shelf life of democracy in journalism scholarship. *Journalism*. **14**(4), pp.459–473.
- Zelizer, B. and Allan, S. 2011. *Journalism After September 11*. Routledge.
- Zelizer, B., Boczkowski, P.J. and Anderson, C.W. 2022. *The Journalism Manifesto*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Zeng, Y. 2018. Detached disseminator, populist watchdog and facilitative change agent: The professional role perception of foreign correspondents in China. *Journalism*. **19**(9–10), pp.1397–1416.
- Zhu, J.H., Weaver, D., Lo, V.H., Chen, C. and Wu, W. 1997. Individual, Organisational, and Societal Influences on Media Role Perceptions: A Comparative Study of Journalists in China, Taiwan, and the United States. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*. **74**(1), pp.84–96.

Appendix 1: Semi-structured Interview Questionnaire

Section 1: Perceptions of journalistic role

Taiwan has been through third times of party alternations. During this process of democratization, based on your working experience, please answer the questions below:

1. How do you perceive the journalistic role, in terms of the media's functions in Taiwan?

2. If the degree of interventionism is a spectrum, the “advocate” pole suggests that journalists are deeply involved in attempting to motivate readers, while the “disseminator” pole indicates journalists who are uninvolved, detached and remain objective, impartial, and neutral. Please locate your position of the journalistic role in the spectrum below:

Advocate

--	--	--	--	--

 Disseminator

3. The table below shows some statements which contribute to the dimension of interventionism in role perceptions (the extent to which journalists pursue a particular mission and promote certain values). Please rate the statements based on their importance to you using a five-point scale, where 1 indicates "not important at all," 2 indicates "not very important," 3 indicates "somewhat important," 4 indicates "very important," and 5 indicates "extremely important. Also, please choose the most important statement and explain your rates.

The indicator	Rank
a. Influence public opinion	
b. Set the political agenda	
c. Advocate for social change	
d. Be an absolutely detached observer	
e. Be objective, impartial and neutral	
f. Strictly separate the fact and opinion	

Can you give an example of how you fulfil these functions in your work?

4. How do you describe your relationship with the government?

5. The table below shows some statements which contribute to the dimension of the relationship with the power in role perceptions. Please rate the statements based on their importance to you using a five-point scale, where 1 indicates "not important at all," 2 indicates "not very important," 3 indicates "somewhat important," 4 indicates "very important," and 5 indicates "extremely important. Also, please choose the most important statement and explain your rates.

The indicator	Rank
a. Act as watchdog of the government	
b. Act as watchdog of business elites	
c. Support official policies to bring about prosperity and development	

d. Convey a positive image of political and business leadership	
---	--

6. How do you describe your relationship with the readers?

7. The table below shows some statements which contribute to the dimension of market orientation in role perceptions. Please rate the statements based on how important are for you as a journalist by using a five-point scale where 1 is not important at all, 2 is not very important, 3 is somewhat important, 4 is very important, and 5 is extremely important. Also, please choose the most important statement and explain your rates.

The indicator	Rank
a. Concentrate mainly on news that attract the widest possible audience	
b. Provide the audience with the information that is most interesting	
c. Provide citizens with information they need to make political decision	
d. Motivate people to participate in civic activity and political discussion	

8. The table below shows four statements which contribute to Confucius characteristics in role perceptions. Please rate the statements based on to what degree that you feel the description is true for you as a journalist. Please use a five-point scale where 1 is almost never true, 2 is usually not true, 3 is occasionally true, 4 is usually true, and 5 is almost always true.

The four statements	To what degree that you feel the description is true for you as a journalist				
	1	2	3	4	5
a. Journalists should be responsible for the destiny of their country.					
b. Journalists have responsibility to monitor the government but also need to maintain the social harmony and stability.					
c. Journalists can scrutinize the government but only in the way that will not deteriorate its legitimacy.					
d. Journalists have responsibility to provide news based on social morality and ethics rather than only considering the economic profit or readership.					

9. From the historical and cultural perspectives, journalists tend to think themselves as intellectuals who have social responsibility to enlighten citizens and save the country during the war time. Then in the authoritarian period, journalists tend to have a common goal in

propelling democratization of Taiwan. After 2008 democracy in Taiwan has considered more consolidated, how do you define the social responsibility as a journalist in this period?

Section 2: The gap between role perceptions and role performance

10. The table below shows the dimensions and indicators of journalists' role perceptions which may contribute to the democratic functions in the progress of Taiwan's democratic consolidation. Please rank the journalistic roles in order of the importance that you think and then in order of the most difficult for the you to practice starting at 1 as the most important /difficult and ending with 6 as the least important/difficult. Please elaborate on your rankings.

Based on Hanitzsch's (2007) Role perceptions	Most/Least important role	Most/Least difficult to practice
Advocate		
Disseminator		
Watchdog		
Facilitator		
Populist		
Public orientation		

11. Are there ever any issues that you would like to report on, but feel unable to? Why? Can you give an example?

Section 3: The influential factors

12. Economic factor:

12-1: In such competing media environment, have you experienced the requirement from advertisers or advertising considerations on your news work? (i.e., product placement)

12-2: Have you perceived the editorial policy with profit expectations (such as encouraging news which should appeal the most readers based on the market and audience research)?

12-3: How do you negotiate or adopt the pressure of market force in your daily work and change your role perception? Can you give an example?

13. Political factor:

13-1: Have you perceived your newspaper taking an editorial position on supporting a political party or taking an editorial position on political issues (i.e., Taiwan independence or unification with China)? How the newspaper's editorial position towards a particular party impact on your work?

13-2: How does your newspaper's political position shape your work and change your role perception? How do you negotiate and adopt the influence in your daily work? Can you give an example?

14. Governmental factor:

14-1: Have you perceived the Taiwan/China government try to influence your news work directly or indirectly (i.e., Product placement or censorship)? Whether you take such practices as a problem?

14-2: How do you negotiate or adopt these influences in your daily work and change your role perception? How do you negotiate or adopt the influence in your daily work? Can you give an example?

15. New Technology:

15-1: How has new technology especially social media changed or influenced your work and change your role perception?

15-2: How do you negotiate or adopt the influence in your daily work? Can you give an example of how social media has positively and negatively influenced your work respectively?

16. We have talked about a lot of different factors that shape journalistic work – is there anything else that you think influences your work?

17. Which factor do you think is the most/least importance of these influences (Economic factor, political factor, governmental factor, and new technology) on your work? Whether the rankings were different since you started the journalistic career? Why?

Section 4: Personal Background:

18. What is your age and gender?

19. How many years have you been working as a journalist?

20. How many years have you been working for your current media?

21. What is your level of education?

22. Did you graduate from a major in journalism and communication?

23. Do you join in any association of journalists?

Appendix 2: Codebook

1. Overview

1.1 Introduction

The codebook provides instructions for coders in the process of coding news articles from the four major Taiwanese newspapers. Each news article will be coded according to a set of predefined variables, detailed further in the following sections. The results will be utilized for the quantitative analysis of democratic values in news content.

1.2 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this research is defined as a single news article. Editorials and commentaries written by external authors are excluded since the primary focus of this research is the analysis of journalists' performance within the news articles provided by journalists.

2.1. Section 1: News Article Information

Variable 1: The Name of Newspaper

The name of newspaper in which news article was published.

1= Apple Daily 2= China Times 3= Liberty Times 4= United Daily News

Variable 2: Date of news

2.2. Section 2: Advanced information

To begin this section, you will code advanced information about the *political news* using the following variables.

Variable 3: Author/ journalist's name

Variable 4: Journalist as the interviewee of in-depth interview

0=No

1=Yes, more than one author

2= Yes, only one author

Variable 5: The generation of journalist

1=senior

2=junior

3=both

Variable 6.1: Type of author (For news on Facebook pages)

0= Can't tell

1= Home editor

2= Journalists

3= both

Variable 6.2: Placement (For the print edition)

1= Front page (A1)

2= Inside page _____

Variable 7: Story type

Please record the format of the news article. If you are unsure of the format, please use the category “other / can't tell”.

It corresponds to the type of news article being coded.

1= Brief. A short story providing information of contingent events. It has up to three paragraphs and does not usually include subtitles.

2= Article/News Report. This is the most frequent type of story and reports on what happened (who, how, when, and where). It also usually includes sources. It contains more than three paragraphs and may include subheads and photos.

3= Feature/ News Analysis. To be coded in this category, the news article must describe individual experiences and testimonials by the author as a witness to one or more events or use literary language (dialogues, hyperboles, setting descriptions, characterization of people, among others).

4= Reportage. A news article is usually longer in length than a regular article. This type of news article includes reporting facts and in-depth analysis of recent events that have already been covered by the media and did not necessarily happen the day before the news article is published. Reportage usually includes several sources, as well as contextual information, which is considered part of the report.

5= Other / can't tell

2.3. Section 3: News sources

In this section, you will code the number and diverse types of news sources in the *political news article* using the following variables.

Variable 8: Source type

The main actor including person and organization in news articles including directly quoted and indirectly mentioned. Please record the type of the main source. If this is difficult to determine, please use the label “other / can't tell”. If you cannot identify a main source for the news article, then use the label “not applicable.” When coding each type of source, the coder should categorise it into transparent or translucent or Opaque source.

Variable 8.1 the number of state source

Variable 8.2 the number of DPP party source

Variable 8.3 the number of KMT party source

Variable 8.4

the number of Minor political party source

1= People First Party

2= New party

3= Partisan Solidarity Union

4= Taiwan Solidarity Union

5= New Power Party

6= Taiwan State Building Party

7= Taiwan People's Party

8= Taiwan Radical Wings

9=Other

Variable 8.5 the number of Business elite

Variable 8.6 the number of Civil society source

Variable 8.7 the number of Ordinary people source

Variable 8.8 the number of Expert source

Variable 8.9 the number of other source(including business source, media source, opinion leaders etc.)

Variable: 9 the number of anonymous sources

1=Transparent:

2=Translucent

3=Opaque

9=Not applicable

Variable 10: Sources from social media

This refers to the number of sources from social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, Line, and others.

0=No 1=Yes

Variable 11: The number of sources from social media

1. Facebook

2. Twitter

3. Line

4. Others

Variable 12: Quote from social media

If there is a source from social media, please write down the quote and from who in full. (String variable)

2.4. Section 4: Partisanship

In this section, you will code the partisan bias of the *political news article* using the following variables.

Variable 13: The tone

After code the main issue of the news article, you must code the positive or negative tone from the headline, and then reading the entire article to decide the journalists' tone. If there is quote from others, you also need to code their tones. If the quotes from more than one source with equally weight in positive and negative tone, you can code it as “neutral/balance.” If the sources present more in positive tone than negative tone, it should code positive tone.

Variable 13a: headline

-2= very negative

-1= somewhat negative

0= neutral/balance

1= somewhat positive

2= very positive

Variable 13b: quote from others

- 2= very negative
- 1= somewhat negative
- 0= neutral/balance
- 1= somewhat positive
- 2= very positive
- 9= Not applicable (No quote from others)

Variable 13c: journalist's tone

- 2= very negative
- 1= somewhat negative
- 0= neutral
- 1= somewhat positive
- 2= very positive

Variable 13d: Toward whom

- 1= the government
- 2= the DPP party or politicians
- 3= the KMT party or politicians
- 4= more than one party and politicians
- 5= business elites
- 6= the government or officials of China
- 7= other political parties and politicians
- 8=Others

2.5. Section 5: Journalistic role performance

In this section, five variables are designed for journalistic role performance. To measure how journalists practice their journalistic role in news content includes three dimensions: interventionism, power distance and market/public orientation. In each dimension, diverse variables are defined as indicators for specific role perception.

The variables apply the scoring system which records the appearance of each sub-variables in different components of news articles including the headline and the body. The existence of each element can score one point. Therefore, the element that appears in the headline and body of news articles can be considered as two scoring parts by yes or no question.

Variable 14: Interventionist role

In this dimension, five sub-variables including journalist' opinion, interpretation, proposal/demand, the usage of adjectives, and first person, are defined as below to measure the degree of interventionism.

Variable 14 a: journalist's point of view (taking sides or a position)

In the news article, journalists express his/her point of view explicitly from which you can locate their position regarding approval and disapproval or in favour of specific side.

- 1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 14 b: interpretation

In the news article, journalist try to explain the cause and possible consequence of the issue based on the fact which is not necessarily involved judgement.

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 14 c: proposal or demand

In the news article, journalist propose a way or action for audience to response to the issue or solve the problem.

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 14d: use of adjectives

In the news article, journalist use adjective to describe the scene or person which implies evaluations.

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 14e: first Person

In the news article, journalist use first person (I, we, me, my, our) to describe the story or express their opinion.

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 15: Watchdog role

In this journalistic role performance, five sub-variables are defined to measure the degree of watchdog role including information on judgments, questioning or criticism from journalists/others, denouncement from journalists/others and investigating reporting.

Variable 15a: information of judgement

Does the story include information on judicial/administrative processes against individuals or groups of power? If yes, where does the information appear?

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 15b: questioning from journalists

By means of statements or expressions, does the journalist express doubt about the validity or truthfulness of what individuals or groups in power say or do? If yes, where does the information appear? It is always about to whom the doubt is directed.

0=No

1=Yes, government/state

2=Yes, political parties/politicians (DPP)

3=Yes, political parties/politicians (KMT)

4=Yes, other political party (i.e., Taiwan People's Party, New Power Party)

5=Yes, business/economic elite

6=Yes, civil society (unions, etc.)

7=Yes, other (Please write it down)

Variable 15c: questioning from others

Does the news article include any assertion or reference from someone other than the journalist, in which (s)he judges or condemns what individuals or groups in power say or do? If yes, where does the information appear? It is always about to whom the criticism is directed.

0=No

1=Yes, government/state

2=Yes, political parties/politicians (DPP)

3=Yes, political parties/politicians (KMT)

4=Yes, other political party (i.e. Taiwan People's Party, New Power Party)

5=Yes, business/economic elite

6=Yes, civil society (unions, etc.)

7=Yes, other (Please write it down)

Variable 15d: criticism from journalists

By means of statements or expressions, does the news article include any assertion or reference from the journalist in which (s)he judges or condemns what individuals or groups in power say or do? If yes, where does the information appear? It is always about to whom the doubt is directed.

0=No

1=Yes, government

2=Yes, political parties/politicians (DPP)

3=Yes, political parties/politicians (KMT)

4=Yes, other political party (i.e. Taiwan People's Party, New Power Party)

5=Yes, business/economic elite

6=Yes, civil society (unions, etc.)

7=Yes, other (Please write it down)

Variable 15e: Criticism from others

Does the news article include any assertion or reference from someone other than the journalist, in which (s)he judges or condemns what individuals or groups in power say or do? If yes, where does the information appear? It is always about to whom the criticism is directed.

0=No

1=Yes, government

2=Yes, political parties/politicians (DPP)

3=Yes, political parties/politicians (KMT)

4=Yes, other political party(i.e.Taiwan People's Party, New Power Party)

5=Yes, business/economic elite

6=Yes, civil society (unions, etc.)

7=Yes, other (Please write it down)

Variable 15f: Denouncement from journalists

Does the news article include an assertion or reference from the journalist in which s(he) accuses or makes evident something hidden, not only illegal, but also irregular or inconvenient concerning individuals or groups of power? If yes, where does the information appear? This may include, for example, cases of poor administration, corruption, abuses, scandals, fraud, harassment, political blocking to legal initiatives, or misinformation, among others.

0=No

1=Yes, government

2=Yes, political parties/politicians (DPP)

3=Yes, political parties/politicians (KMT)

- 4= Yes, other political party (i.e. Taiwan People's Party, New Power Party)
- 5= Yes, business/economic elite
- 6=Yes, civil society (unions, etc.)
- 7=Yes, other (Please write it down)

Variable 15g: Denouncement from others

Does the news article include an assertion or reference from someone other than the journalist, in which s(he) accuses or makes evident something hidden, not only illegal, but also irregular or inconvenient concerning individuals or groups of power? If yes, where does the information appear?

- 0=No
- 1=Yes, government
- 2=Yes, political parties/politicians (DPP)
- 3=Yes, political parties/politicians (KMT)
- 4= Yes, other political party (i.e. Taiwan People's Party, New Power Party)
- 5= Yes, business/economic elite
- 6=Yes, civil society (unions, etc.)
- 7=Yes, other (Please write it down)

Variable 16: Collaborator role

In this journalistic role performance, seven sub-variables are defined to measure the degree of collaborator role including defence/support activities or policies from journalist or others, positive image of the political elite, progress/success of the country, and promotion of the country's image.

Variable 16a: Support/ Defence policies from journalist

Does the journalist praise, promote, or defend by an explicit endorsement specific official policies or measures of improvement carried out by the political or economic powers? If yes, where does the information appear?

- 1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 16b: Support/ Defence policies from others

Does the news article include someone other than journalist to praise, promote, or defend by an explicit endorsement specific official policies or measures of improvement carried out by the political or economic powers? If yes, where does the information appear?

- 1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 16c: Support/ Defence activities from journalist

Does the journalist praise, promote, or defend by an explicit endorsement specific official activity carried out by the political or economic powers? If yes, where does the information appear?

- 1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 16d: Support/ Defence activities from others

Does the news article include someone other than journalist to praise, promote, or defend by an explicit endorsement specific official activity carried out by the political or economic powers? If yes, where does the information appear?

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 16e: positive image of the political elite

Does the news article present a positive image of the political elite? For example, does the journalist favourably stress or highlight leadership or management skills, as well as personal characteristics, of political leaders? If yes, where does the information appear?

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 16f: progress/success

Does the journalist emphasize that their own country is progressing or success and doing better than before in any relevant dimension? If yes, where does the information appear?

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 16g: promotion of country's image

Does the news article highlight activities or actions organized with the objective of promoting the country's image? If yes, where does the information appear? Note that the story should largely be about the activity or action.

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 17: Market orientation

In this journalistic role performance, five sub-variables are defined to measure the degree of market-orientation including personalization, emotional description, private life, sensationalism.

Variable 17a: personalization

Does the news article provide specific information regarding one or more persons and their different intellectual, physical, mental, social characteristics (i.e., competence, leadership, appearance, capacity), or personal background (where they worked, studied, their name, marital status, etc.)? If yes, where does the information appear? Simply providing the name or/and position of a person or a picture of a person is not enough to be included in this category.

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 17b: emotion

Does the news article make explicit references to or include feelings or emotions through textual? If yes, where does the information appear? Research literature defines six basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. In news texts, these can be exhibited either by the journalist describing the emotional state of people.

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 17c: private life

Does the news article refer to the private life of one or more individuals? If yes, where does the information appear?

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 17d: sensationalism

Does the news article include the use of style elements or descriptions in the story that highlight or emphasize the unusual, incredible, and spectacular? If yes, where does the information appear?

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 18: Public orientation

In this journalistic role performance, seven sub-variables are defined to measure the degree of public orientation including background information, information of citizen's activities, educating on duties and rights and citizen's questions/demands/reactions and local impact on citizens.

Variable 18a: background information

Does the news article provide political, economic, or social background information to make decisions as citizens (to participate in elections, affiliation, and support of political parties, participate in protests, to make sense of how their communities can be affected by political decisions, etc.)? If yes, where does the information appear?

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 18b: information on citizen activities

Within the news article, does the journalist give information about citizen acts, such as campaigns, collective actions, commemorations, demonstrations, and protests? If yes, where does the information appear? Normally, this type of story includes information on where and when these activities occurred and can also explain the importance of these acts for the community.

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 18c: educating on duties and rights

Does the news article inform people on their duties and rights as citizens (economic, social, and/or political)? If yes, where does the information appear? For example, when the government gives a subsidy and the news article informs where to go, or how to justify voter absenteeism.

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 18d: Citizen questions (Citizen's voice)

Does the news article include inquiries from common people for politicians or those who are in power? Citizens may be included via quotes, or references made of them. If yes, where does the information appear?

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 18e: Citizen demands (Citizen's voice)

Does the news article contain the demands of regular or organized citizens on how political measures/ decisions should be handled? Citizens may be included via quotes, or references made of them. If yes, where does the information appear?

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 18f: Citizen reaction

Does the news the article contains the reactions of regular or organized citizens on how political measures/ decisions should be handled? Citizens may be included via quotes, or references made of them. If yes, where does the information appear?

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Variable 18g: local Impact on citizen

Does the news story mention or depict the impact of certain political decisions on citizens' right and life, including national or local level? Citizens may be included via quotes, or references made of them. If yes, where does the information appear? If yes, where does the information appear?

1.headline (0=No, 1=Yes)

2.the body (0=No, 1=Yes)

Appendix 3: Information Sheet

Information Sheet: The Transformation of Journalism in Taiwan and its Democratic Functions

Thank you for taking the time to consider participating in this research project. This sheet will tell you what this study will involve and what we are going to do if you decide to participate. Please read this information sheet carefully before you move on to the consent form.

What is the purpose of the project?

This research explores how journalism in Taiwan transformed between 2008 and 2020 as well as its democratic functions. It investigates the journalistic role perceptions, and its relationship with the changes of news content.

Why have I been chosen?

Since this research is related to the journalistic role perception along with democratic functions of journalism, political journalists who closely observe and interact with the government in daily routines and deal with news related to the public affairs are considered as the suitable objectives to interviewee. This research will interview twenty journalists of four major newspapers in Taiwan through snowball sampling.

Do I have to take part?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form or ask for verbal consent. You can still withdraw without any reason. However, once the result has been written up, withdrawal would not be possible. It normally will be one month after the interview.

What do I have to do?

If you agree to participate in this research, you would be interviewed in the Café or any public place near your workplaces. The interview will take around one hour while it will be audio recorded. I will provide the outline of interview questions in advance which involved with how you perceive the journalistic role and what are the main influencing factors of the transformation such as marketization, the state or social media.

During the interview, I may ask your experience of journalistic practice and discuss the difference of journalistic role which you perceived across time or news organizations. Some sensitive questions may be asked in the interview, such as the political influence related to news work, but you have the right to not respond. The interview may take around one hour with semi-structured questions. I expect interviewees to answer questions based on honestly personal experience and conceptions. After interview, if there are some following up questions, I will contact you via telephone, email, or instant messaging.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

Some of the interview questions may lead you to explain the intervention from political or market forces outside or inside the media organization. Some questions may be politically sensitive (such as the influence from the government). However, it is your right to stop the interview at any point should you feel uncomfortable, or you can choose not to answer those questions. I will also take steps wherever possible to anonymise the research data so that they will not be identified in any reports or publications.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?

Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it is hoped that this work will advance the knowledge of how journalism influence the development of democracy in Taiwan.

Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used?

The audio recordings of your interview made during this research will be transcribed into interview record for analysis. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original recordings.

What will happen to my personal information?

Your privacy will be protected through anonymization and data protection. You will be anonymised in the analysis and discussions of data in order to protect your privacy. The information provided will be cited in my PhD dissertation, so it will not be confidential. However, your identifiable indicators will be replaced, and I will produce a code sheet of your identifiable indicators to conduct this research. It means that no identifying information will be published. The interview will be recorded from my mobile phone, protected by password and fingerprint recognition. Recordings will be transcribed, and both recordings and transcripts will be transferred to secured independent folders on M:drive of the University of Leeds and also be stored on encrypted portable storage. The original recordings in mobile phone will be deleted after transfer to M:drive and the portable storage. The portable storage will be locked in the cabinet. No one outside the project will be allowed access to the code sheet, recordings, and transcripts.

What will happen to the results of the research project?

All the contact information that we collect about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential and will be stored separately from the research data. I will take steps wherever possible to anonymise the research data so that you will not be identified in any reports or publications. In the results of the research, your working experience in specific media organization may be mentioned but the other information such as your title, gender, and specific beat will not be revealed. I will avoid any possibility of deductive disclosure of your identity.

What type of information will be sought from me and why is the collection of this information relevant for achieving the research project's objectives?

The results of this will be published in academic publications and presented at conferences. Your words maybe used, and your identity and personal information will remain confidential.

Contact for further information

If you have any further questions regarding this study, please feel free to contact me, Lin, I-Chun. I am a PhD researcher with the School of Media and Communications in the University of Leeds, United Kingdom.

Email: meil@leeds.ac.uk

If you do not feel comfortable to contact me, you can contact my supervisors, Professor Chris Anderson (C.W.Anderson@leeds.ac.uk) or Dr Julie Firmstone (J.A.Firmstone@leeds.ac.uk) in the School of Media and Communications, University of Leeds.

Finally

You will be given a copy of the information sheet and a signed consent form.
Thank you for taking the time to read through the information.

Appendix 4: Participant Consent Form

Consent to take part in the project: <u>The Transformation of Journalism in Taiwan and its Democratic Functions</u>	Please tick here if you agree with the statement
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 2020/08/24 explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.	
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw without giving any reason until one month after the interview and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline. [If you decide to withdraw from the study, the interview data will be fully removed from research and the related record will be deleted.]	
I understand that my legal name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research.	
I understand that the data collected from me may be stored and used in relevant future research in an anonymised form.	
I understand that if I agree to be interviewed, it will be audio recorded.	
I agree to take part in the above research project and if I have further questions or concerns, I will contact the lead researcher or her supervisors.	

Name of participant	
Participant's signature	
Date	
Name of lead researcher	
Signature	
Date*	

Appendix 5: Democratic values in news content

Table 1: News source of political news in newspapers and Facebook pages

Categories	Type of source	2008 Newspapers (N=386)		2020 Newspapers (N=276)		2021/2022 Facebook pages (N=260)				
		Count and percentage	Sum	Count and percentage	Sum	Count and percentage	Sum			
Political institutions	State	376	40.21%	689 (73.68%)	292	41.77%	592 (84.69%)	104	16.75%	384 (61.84%)
	DPP	199	21.28%		85	12.16%		62	9.98%	
	KMT	96	10.27%		149	21.32%		166	26.73%	
	Minor parties	6	0.64%		42	6.01%		33	5.31%	
	Local government	12	1.28%		24	3.43%		19	3.06%	
Civil society	Organised people	92	9.84%	190 (20.32%)	26	3.72%	63 (9.01%)	26	4.19%	191 (30.76%)
	Ordinary people	46	4.92%		19	2.72%		144	23.19%	
	Expert	52	5.56%		18	2.58%		21	3.38%	
Other	Other	56	5.99%	56 (5.99%)	44	6.29%	44 (6.29%)	46	7.41%	46 (7.41%)
Total				935 (100%)			699 (100%)			621 (100%)

* News sources include transparent and half transparent sources

Table2: Transparent source in four newspapers across time and platforms

Categories	2008 Newspapers		2020 Newspapers		2021/2022 Facebook pages	
	Transparent source	Anonymous source	Transparent source	Anonymous source	Transparent source	Anonymous source
Apple Daily	226(78.20%)	63(21.80%)	122(72.19%)	47(27.81%)	84(50.30%)	83(49.70%)
Liberty Times	277(87.11%)	41(12.89%)	148(86.55%)	23(13.45%)	82(65.08%)	44(34.92%)
China Times	147(79.03%)	39(20.97%)	165(85.49%)	28(14.51%)	108(51.18%)	103(48.82%)
UDN	147(86.47%)	23(13.53%)	187(81.30%)	43(18.70%)	136(81.93%)	30(18.07%)
Total	797(82.76%)	166(17.24%)	622(81.52%)	141(18.48%)	410(61.19%)	260(38.81%)

* Anonymous sources include translucent sources and opaque sources

Table3: The number and the percentage of half transparent source in the four newspapers in 2008

News source	State	DPP	KMT	Minor party	Local gov	Civil society	Ordinary people	Expert	Other	Total
Apple Daily	11	8	2	0	0	2	20	3	0	46.00
	23.91%	17.39%	4.35%	0.00%	0.00%	4.35%	43.48%	6.52%	0.00%	100.00%
Liberty Time	12	4	5	0	0	2	4	3	1	31.00
	38.71%	12.90%	16.13%	0.00%	0.00%	6.45%	12.90%	9.68%	3.23%	100.00%
China Times	8	1	3	0	0	0	8	2	1	23.00
	34.78%	4.35%	13.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	34.78%	8.70%	4.35%	100.00%
UDN	17	3	4	0	0	8	0	6	0	38.00
	44.74%	7.89%	10.53%	0.00%	0.00%	21.05%	0.00%	15.79%	0.00%	100.00%
Total	48	16	14	0	0	12	32	14	2	138.00
	34.78%	11.59%	10.14%	0.00%	0.00%	8.70%	23.19%	10.14%	1.45%	100.00%

*The number of the news articles=386

Table 4: The number and the percentage of half transparent source in the four newspapers in 2020

News source	State	DPP	KMT	Minor party	Local gov	Civil society	Ordinary people	Expert	Other	Total
Apple Daily	9	8	1	0	0	1	9	0	2	30.00
	30.00%	26.67%	3.33%	0.00%	0.00%	3.33%	30.00%	0.00%	6.67%	100.00%
Liberty Times	4	2	4	0	0	0	1	1	1	13.00
	30.77%	15.38%	30.77%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.69%	7.69%	7.69%	100.00%
China Times	2	2	0	0	0	2	3	0	3	12.00
	16.67%	16.67%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	16.67%	25.00%	0.00%	25.00%	100.00%
UDN	5	4	1	3	0	2	4	0	3	22.00
	22.73%	18.18%	4.55%	13.64%	0.00%	9.09%	18.18%	0.00%	13.64%	100.00%
Total	20	16	6	3	0	5	17	1	9	77.00
	25.97%	20.78%	7.79%	3.90%	0.00%	6.49%	22.08%	1.30%	11.69%	100.00%

*The number of the news articles=276

Table 5: The number and the percentage of half transparent source in the four newspapers' Facebook pages

News source	State	DPP	KMT	Minor party	Local gov	Civil society	Ordinary people	Expert	Other	Total
Apple Daily	0	1	6	0	1	2	70	0	0	80
	0.00%	1.25%	7.50%	0.00%	1.25%	2.50%	87.50%	0.00%	0.00%	100%
Liberty Times	0	5	6	0	0	9	13	0	0	33
	0.00%	15.15%	18.18%	0.00%	0.00%	27.27%	39.39%	0.00%	0.00%	100%
China Times	2	1	14	0	0	0	41	13	0	71
	2.82%	1.41%	19.72%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	57.75%	0.00%	0.00%	100%
UDN	0	1	5	0	0	1	19	1	0	27
	0.00%	3.70%	18.52%	0.00%	0.00%	3.70%	70.37%	0.00%	0.00%	100%
Total	2	8	31	0	1	12	143	14	0	211
	0.95%	3.79%	14.69%	0.00%	0.47%	5.69%	67.77%	0.00%	0.00%	100%

*The number of the news articles=260

Table 6: The average tone toward the government in the four newspapers and their Facebook pages across time

Towards government	2008 newspapers		2020 newspapers		2021/2022 Facebook pages	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Apple Daily	-0.48	21	0.13	25	-0.3	11
Liberty Times	-0.19	87	0.51	40	0.7	21
China Times	0.54	55	-0.31	53	-0.85	34
UDN	0.24	54	-0.33	47	-0.39	30
Total	0.07	217	-0.17	165	-0.31	96

Table 7: Tones toward the government in four newspapers across time and platforms

2008 Newspapers	Headline	Quote from others	Journalists' voice	Average
Apple Daily (N=21)	-0.57	-0.48	-0.33	-0.48
China Times(N=55)	-0.04	1.87	-0.22	0.54
Liberty Times(N=87)	-0.80	0.87	-0.64	-0.19
UDN(N=54)	0.11	0.39	0.22	0.24
2020 Newspapers	Headline	Quote from others	Journalists' voice	Average
Apple Daily (N=25)	0.04	0	0	0.13
China Times(N=53)	-0.77	0.13	-0.30	-0.31
Liberty Times(N=40)	0.50	0.58	0.45	0.51
UDN(N=47)	-0.74	0.11	-0.34	-0.33
2021/2022 Facebook pages	Headline	Quote from others	Journalists' voice	Average
Apple Daily (N=11)	-0.64	-0.27	0	-0.30
China Times(N=34)	-1.00	-0.85	-0.71	-0.85
Liberty Times(N=21)	0.38	1.10	0.62	0.70
UDN(N=30)	-0.60	-0.40	-0.17	-0.39

*The range of average scores (M=0-2)

Table 8: The number of transparent and anonymous sources in political news in the newspapers in 2008 and 2020 and their Facebook pages

	2008 newspapers (N=386)	2020 newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook pages (N=260)
Transparent	797	622	410
Half-Transparent	138	77	211
Opaque	28	64	49
Total	963	763	679

Table 9: The number and percentage of source from social media in the four newspapers across time and platforms

categories	2008 Newspaper The sum of news sources= 963	2020 Newspaper The sum of news sources= 763			2021/2022 Facebook pages The sum of news sources= 670		
	Other (PTT, blog, etc.)	Facebook	Other (Twitter, Line or PTT, etc.)	Total	Facebook	Other (Twitter, Line or PTT, etc.)	Total
Apple Daily	4(0.40%)	10	2	12 (1.57%)	61	26	87 (12.99%)
Liberty Times	0	2	0	2 (0.26%)	54	9	63 (9.46%)
China Times	1(0.01%)	7	1	8 (1.05%)	51	45	96 (14.33%)
UDN	0	6	1	7 (0.92%)	12	10	22 (3.28%)
Total	15(1.56%)	25	4	29 (3.80%)	178	90	268 (40%)

Appendix 6: Role performance

Table 1 : The indicators of each role performance with two sub-groups

Three dimensions of journalistic role	Role performance	Two groups of journalistic role	Indicators
Interventionism	Interventionist role (Five indicators)	Content-driven	(1) Journalists' opinion (2) Journalists' interpretation (3) Journalists' proposals or demands
		Styled-driven	(1) The use of evaluative adjectives (2) The use of the first person.
Power distance	Watchdog role (Seven indicators)	Interventionist watchdog	(1) Questioning: Journalists (2) Criticism: Journalists (3) Denouncement: Journalists
		Detached watchdog	(1) Information on judgement (2) Questioning: Others (3) Criticism: Others (4) Denouncement: Others
	Collaborator role (Seven indicators)	Active supporter	(1) Defend or support policies from journalists (2) Defend or support activities from journalists. (3) Positive image of the political elites (4) Nation's progress or success (5) Promotion of country's image.
		Passive supporter	(1) Defend or support policies from others. (2) Defend or support activities from others
Market-oriented/ public-oriented	Infotainment role (Four indicators)		(1) Personalization (2) Emotion (3) Private life (4) Sensationalism
	Civic role (Seven indicators)	Civic educator	(1) Background information (2) Local impact (3) Educating on duties and rights
		Civic agent	(1) Citizens' questions (2) Citizens' demands (3) Citizens' reactions (4) Information of citizens' activities.

Table 2: The performance of five journalistic roles in the four newspapers across time

Mean (rank)	Apple Daily		China Times		Liberty Time		UDN	
	2008 (N=64)	2020 (N=51)	2008 (N=101)	2020 (N=79)	2008 (N=124)	2020 (N=70)	2008 (N=97)	2020 (N=76)
Interventionist	0.37 (1)	0.46 (1)	0.49 (1)	0.45 (1)	0.34 (1)	0.36 (1)	0.39 (1)	0.36 (1)
Watchdog role	0.30 (3)	0.21 (3)	0.25 (2)	0.26 (2)	0.23 (2)	0.15 (2)	0.19 (3)	0.27 (2)
Collaborator	0.01 (5)	0.04 (5)	0.02 (5)	0.01 (5)	0 (5)	0.05 (5)	0.02 (5)	0.01 (5)
Infotainment role	0.36 (2)	0.28 (2)	0.22 (3)	0.12 (4)	0.11 (4)	0.06 (4)	0.20 (2)	0.10 (4)
Civic role	0.15 (4)	0.13 (4)	0.13 (4)	0.14 (3)	0.15 (3)	0.13 (3)	0.10 (4)	0.18 (3)

*The score range 0-2

Table 3: Presence of indicators of the interventionist role in the newspapers

		Content-related			Style-related	
		Opinion	Interpretation	Demand/ Propose	Use of adjectives	Use of first person
2008	Mean (N)					
Apple Daily	0.37 (64)	15.6% (N=10)	76.6% (N=49)	0 (N=0)	56.3% (N=36)	6.3% (N=4)
Liberty Times	0.24(124)	15.3% (N=19)	60.5% (N=75)	3.2% (N=4)	51.6% (N=64)	1.6% (N=2)
China Times	0.49(101)	32.7% (N=33)	78.2% (N=79)	7.9% (N=5)	68.3% (N=69)	8.9% (N=9)
UDN	0.37(97)	19.6% (N=19)	59.8% (N=58)	4.1% (N=4)	54.6% (N=53)	0 (N=0)
2020	Mean (N)					
Apple Daily	0.46(51)	15.7% (N=8)	82.4% (N=42)	2.0% (N=1)	74.5% (N=38)	7.8% (N=4)
Liberty Times	0.36(70)	14.3% (N=10)	72.9% (N=51)	1.4% (N=1)	50.0% (N=35)	10% (N=7%)
China Times	0.45(79)	15.2% (N=12)	74.7% (N=59)	6.3% (N=5)	64.6% (N=51)	6.3% (N=5)
UDN	0.36(76)	15.8% (N=12)	65.8% (N=50)	2.6% (N=2)	52.6% (N=40)	3.9% (N=3)

*The score range 0-2

Table 4: Two aspects of interventionist role performed by the four newspapers across time and platforms

Interventionist	Indicators	2008 Newspapers (N=386)	2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	The gap between the print in 2008 and 2020	The gap between the print and Facebook after 2020
Content-driven	Journalist's opinion	81 (21%)	42(15.2%)	13(5%)	-5.8%	-10.2%
	Interpretation	261(67.6%)	202(73.2%)	153(58.8%)	+5.6%	-14.4%
	Proposals /Demands	16 (4.1%)	9(3.3%)	2(0.8%)	-0.8%	-2.5%
Style-driven	Adjectives	222(57.5%)	164 (59.4%)	117 (45%)	+1.9%	-14.4%
	First Person	15 (3.9%)	19 (6.9%)	11 (4.2%)	+3%	-2.7%

*The score range 0-2

Table 5: Two aspects of watchdog role performed by the four newspapers across time and platforms

Watchdog	Indicators	2008 Newspapers (N=386)	2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	The gap between the print in 2008 and 2020	The gap between the print and Facebook after 2020
Interventionist Watchdog	Questioning: Journalists	40 (10.4%)	15(5.4%)	3(1.2%)	-5%	-4.2%
	Criticism: Journalists	42(10.9%)	18(6.5%)	2(0.8%)	-4.4%	-5.7%
	Denouncement: Journalists	15(3.9%)	2(0.7%)	2(0.8%)	-3.2%	+0.1%
Detached Watchdog	Information on judgement	101(26.2%)	64 (23.2%)	13 (4.6%)	-3%	-18.6%
	Questioning: Others	75(19.4%)	63(22.8%)	49(18.9%)	+3.4%	-3.9%
	Criticism: Others	93(24.1%)	78(28.3%)	77(29.6%)	+4.2%	+1.6%
	Denouncement: Others	52(13.5%)	43(15.6%)	31(11.9%)	+2.1%	-3.7%

*The score range 0-2

Table 6: The infotainment role performed by the four newspapers across time and platforms

Indicators	2008 Newspapers (N=386)	2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	The gap between the print in 2008 and 2020	The gap between the print and Facebook after 2020
Personalization	50(13.0%)	17(6.2%)	25(9.6%)	-6.8%	+2.6%
emotion	92(23.8%)	44(15.9%)	68(26.2%)	-8.1%	+10.3%
Private life	18(4.7%)	6(2.2%)	4(1.5%)	-2.5%	-0.7%
Sensationalism	77(19.9%)	52(18.8%)	103(39.6%)	-1.1%	+10.8%

*The score range 0-2

Table 7: Two aspects of civic role performed by the four newspapers across time and platforms

Civic role (Public-oriented)	Indicators	2008 Newspapers (N=386)	2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	The gap between the print in 2008 and 2020	The gap between the print and Facebook after 2020
Educator	Background information	148(38.3%)	134(48.6%)	96(36.9%)	+10.3%	-11.7%
	Educating on duties and rights	12(3.1%)	7(2.5%)	4(1.5%)	-0.6%	-1%
	Local impact	54(14.0%)	61(22.1%)	35(13.5%)	+8.1%	-8.6%
Agent	Information of citizen activities	22(5.7%)	9(3.3%)	2(0.8%)	-2.4%	-2.5%
	Citizens' questions	7(1.8%)	9(3.3%)	4(1.5%)	+1.5%	-1.8%
	Citizens' demand	21(5.4%)	6(2.2%)	5(1.9%)	-3.2%	-0.3%
	Citizens' reaction	49(12.7%)	21(7.6%)	46(17.7%)	-5.1%	+9.9%

*The score range 0-2

Table 8: Two aspects of collaborator role performed by the four newspapers across time and platforms

Collaborator	Indicators	2008 Newspapers (N=386)	2020 Newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook (N=260)	The gap between the print in 2008 and 2020	The gap between the print and Facebook after 2020
Active supporter	Defense/support policies: Journalists	7(1.8%)	5(1.8%)	0	0	-1.8%
	Defense/support activities: Journalists	4(1.0%)	2(0.7%)	1(0.4%)	-0.3%	-0.3%
	Positive image of the political elites	5(1.3%)	6(2.2%)	8(3.1%)	+0.9%	+0.9%
	Nation's Progress/ success	0	6(2.2%)	1(0.4%)	+2.2%	-1.8%
	Promotion of country's image	0	8(2.9%)	4(1.5%)	+2.9%	-1.4%
Passive supporter	Defense/support policies: Others	7(1.8%)	5(1.8%)	5(1.9%)	0	+0.1%
	Defense/support activities: Others	3(0.8%)	5(1.8%)	6(2%)	+1%	+0.2%

*The score range 0-2

Table 9: The number and the percentage of the news articles in the four newspapers across time and platforms

	2008 newspapers (N=386)	2020 newspapers (N=276)	2021/2022 Facebook pages (N=260)
Brief	5(1.3%)	2(0.7%)	3(1.2%)
Straight news	334(86.5%)	248(89.9%)	256(98.5%)
Features	45(11.7%)	25(9.1%)	1 (0.4%)
Reportage	2(0.5%)	1(0.4)	0 (0%)
Total	386(100%)	276(100%)	260 (100%)

