

**Spain in 1848: On the Edge of Revolution**

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# Abstract

This thesis argues that Spain, like most of Europe, had a revolution in 1848. This revolution was broad-based and geographically widespread, touching both the urban and rural milieux. It was not successful in toppling the government, let alone in remaking the state, but as elsewhere it fundamentally altered relationships of power. It also helped change the nature of the state and the locus of its power in the years which followed.

Like elsewhere in Europe, the revolutionaries used established social networks to organise barricade fighting, riots, mutinies, petitions and support systems. They threatened the liberal political elite at the very heart of their Madrid power base, and on the eve of revolution it looked certain the government would fall. However, government reforms to the state had created a symbiosis between the two, aligning the latter tightly to the former. When revolution broke out, this symbiotic relationship allowed the relatively weak state to act with a rare agility to face down the revolutionaries, not only with violence but also with non-violent means of coercion. This response, along with clement treatment of those arrested and tight control of the narrative through threats to newspaper editors meant that the government’s response was broadly seen as proportionate by a wider public which were already predisposed to support a strong defence of property against public order.

Having been inclined to compromise with the revolution at first, this popular reaction fostered a confidence among the political elite that they could largely exclude the demos from the political system. It also hastened the localisation of state power into the hands of regional strongmen in metropolitan Spain, and cemented it in the colonies. These two features would eventually be formalised by the Restoration system in 1874, but the seed was sown in 1848.

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# Introduction

The Most Reasonable Thing

The story of the Spanish Revolution of 1848 is a largely untold one. Contemporaries and historians have attempted to explain either why Spain did not have a revolution during that tumultuous year or why attempts at revolution were defeated before they had begun. These explanations tend to rely on stereotypes of Spain as politically and economically backward or on an exaggerated view of the strength of the Spanish army. But there is also a sense that this ‘failure’ in 1848 remains an anomaly, and something of a mystery, as few contemporaries expected Spain’s notoriously unstable constitutional monarchy to survive the year. In exile in London, the former Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich could only conclude that, having studied Spanish affairs for thirty-five years, the most reasonable thing was the one least likely to happen.[[1]](#footnote-1) And this view has largely endured even though these interpretations do not accurately reflect the experience of 1848 in Spain. In fact, what happened there in 1848—a broad-based, geographically-widespread, popular revolution—was what could have been (and exactly what was) widely expected. It is just that the continuities of power in Spain, where the government did not fall or flee, are much more obvious than they are elsewhere in Europe, where revolutionaries were able to temporarily capture the government.

1848 was a year of revolution without equal either before or since in both intensity and geographical scope. Although events varied between national and regional contexts, it was a truly European revolution.[[2]](#footnote-2) There may have been no single continental revolutionary group, and individual experiences of 1848 at state and local level differed markedly from one another, but the spontaneous outbursts of popular revolt across the continent cannot be ascribed merely to spatial adjacency. The level of their integration was more profound than that.[[3]](#footnote-3) The aim of greater political representation, the methodologies of revolution and of the dissemination of ideas, and the radical ideology of the revolutionaries were so similar that to see it as anything other than a European revolution now seems impossible.

The revolutionaries at the time had a very clear sense of their connectedness to this broader European experience. A striking feature of the 1848 Revolution was a collective desire for commonality among the participants.[[4]](#footnote-4) The international system, which began with the Congress of Vienna, had cultivated a European political class. Across Europe, including in Spain, people sought out news from elsewhere which they held to be significant to their own interests, regardless of linguistic, cultural or political differences.[[5]](#footnote-5) It was only after the restoration of the *anciens régimes*, which almost everywhere was complete by 1849, that this sense of contemporaneity and connection was lost. It was replaced, instead, with very specific national interpretations designed to fit national teleologies, or *Wege*.[[6]](#footnote-6) As well as de-emphasising both local and transnational readings of 1848, such interpretations separated those countries where 1848 fits neatly into narratives of national emancipation from those on the periphery of Europe where its influence was different but no less important.[[7]](#footnote-7)

By the time revolutionary violence broke out in Spain on 26 March, the French, Austrian and Bavarian governments had fallen, and the Prussian kaiser looked likely to follow. The narrowly-defined Spanish government looked, if anything, even more vulnerable. At the very least, it appeared that it would need to make significant concessions to the revolutionaries if it were to survive. However, by the time the last of the three main outbreaks of revolution had been defeated on 13 May in Seville, it was almost certain that the government would not only survive the year, but that it would be strengthened in the process. What was—or should have been—doubtful all along, however, was that the broader hegemony of the liberal elite could be defeated, or that the liberal state which they had created could be remade. Indeed, the 1848 Revolution served only to strengthen this hegemony. And in this regard, the Madrid correspondent for the London *Morning Post* understood the situation better than Metternich and better than many of the historians who have since written about Spain in 1848. On 28 February, he wrote that the establishment of a republic in Spain was unlikely and that even a change of government was fraught with difficulty.[[8]](#footnote-8)

This difficulty was the result of a pre-existing coalition within the ruling elite, the strength of which was underestimated at the time and has been largely neglected by historians of 1848. It was the sort of coalition which was only established elsewhere in the wake of the revolution. The middle classes and the property-owning poor were sympathetic to the aims of the revolution, and themselves sought broader representation, but they valued public order. Unlike in much of Europe—and in a clear parallel with Britain—they sided not with the revolution but with the government and the hegemonic elite.[[9]](#footnote-9) This story has clear implications for historians of the 1848 European Revolution, whose understanding of the relationship between the simultaneity of the outbreaks and the national, regional and local diversity of experience remains incomplete. But it also has implications for historians of nineteenth-century Spain.

José María Jover described the period from 1831 to 1864 as ‘an iron moderate continuity’, but this continuity extends much further than that.[[10]](#footnote-10) Since the late-eighteenth century, the Spanish elite had been growing in social and economic power, and the 1812 Cádiz constitution had converted this into political power through a classical liberal system of representative government. Although Spain reverted to absolutism after the restoration of Ferdinand VII in 1815, and the 1812 constitution was revoked, this absolutism was short lived. The militarisation of the public sphere combined with a broad belief in the legitimacy of revolution as a political tool to create a culture of bloodless coups by military leaders, known as *pronunciamientos*. In 1820, a young liberal colonel, Rafael de Riego, ‘pronounced’ in Málaga. After an abortive start, the movement in support of Riego spread across Spain and the king was forced to reinstate the 1812 constitution. Although the liberal regime was then defeated in 1823 by a combined Spanish-French army, the political elites continued to broaden and deepen their social and economic power until Ferdinand’s death in 1831.

From then, it appeared that political reform would progress in a linear, if dialectic, fashion, a process largely unbroken even by the events of the First Carlist War. However, the 1848 Revolution fundamentally altered this trajectory. Unlike in Britain, where the working classes were brought into the system—though reluctantly and within an electoral system which ensured that representation remained at least partly chimeric—in Spain the experience of 1848 seemed proof that ‘the people’ could be excluded altogether.[[11]](#footnote-11) After the revolution, the political elite instead strengthened and maintained their moderate liberal hegemony. They further centralised power in Madrid, and they consciously excluded lower middle-class and working-class Spaniards from power. Instead, they relied on their personal and professional relationships, which were built on patronage and often bound up with familial ties.[[12]](#footnote-12) In turn, these networks of social power were reproduced in the networks of institutional power of the nascent state.[[13]](#footnote-13) The government had learnt that popular revolution could be defeated by an agile state apparatus, even if the instruments at its disposal remained weaker than they did elsewhere in Europe. For this reason, although political power was centralised early on in Madrid, state power became wielded on an increasingly local basis.

This process had begun before the outbreak of revolution in Paris in February 1848. The 1845 constitution, for example, had disenfranchised a large section of the middle classes. But, in metropolitan Spain at least, before the 1848 Revolution the government had broadened citizens’ extra-electoral interactions with the state to compensate for this loss of representation.[[14]](#footnote-14) They provided new roads, bridges, markets, and a new rural police force—the civil guard—gambling that political stability would bring prosperity, perhaps the crudest endower of state legitimacy. And it looked as though they would be proved right. But the much-repeated dictum that 1848 was the turning point where history failed to turn remains erroneous in Spain too.[[15]](#footnote-15) Despite months of armed uprising, barricade fighting, demonstrations and civil war, the Spanish liberal state survived and seemed strengthened at the beginning of 1849. 1848 was the point at which the Spanish elites realised that they no longer needed even to create a discourse of representation. This realisation was challenged again by revolutions in 1854 and 1868, but in both cases popular government was short-lived, and the 1874 Restoration system finally formalised this power relationship when much state (though not political) power was ceded to local leaders.[[16]](#footnote-16)

The story of Spain’s nineteenth century is often told as a teleological one of failure, of weak governments, of military strongmen, of vested interests, and of decline.[[17]](#footnote-17) But this is not the real story of nineteenth-century Spain, a place with a lively public sphere, an effective—if small—state, and more years of constitutional government than any other country in mainland Europe.[[18]](#footnote-18) Recent work on the nineteenth century has tended to take one of two broad directions, looking at questions of the Spanish nation or of the bourgeois revolution, or some combination of the two. Both these strands inform the context of this study, and both shaped people’s experiences in 1848, though neither can be considered a *prima facie* cause of the Spanish manifestation of the European revolution.

Scholarship has long emphasised the challenges associated with building a Spanish nation in the nineteenth century, much of it inspired by Eugene Weber’s work on France.[[19]](#footnote-19) This direct and rarely flattering comparison proved of questionable use, and historians now broadly agree that Spanish identity was strong but that it was not imposed from the centre as it was in France.[[20]](#footnote-20) This bottom-up approach leaves room for contested ideas of nationhood along both the vertical and also the horizontal axes. Not only did those in Madrid articulate and feel the nation differently from those in the provinces, but those in diverse provinces did so from one another. Nevertheless, unlike elsewhere in 1848, all the protagonists in the Spanish revolution—the radicals, the Carlists, the military, and the government—appealed to the nation. Extrapolating backwards, it is possible to see inchoate hints at a future in which separatism was a genuine threat to the Spanish state, but in the mid-nineteenth century all political groups saw the Spanish nation as their field of action.[[21]](#footnote-21) And in 1848, the only demands for independence were for provincial self-governance rather than for secession.

As a fundamental part of Marxian understandings of progress and historical change, the question of the bourgeois revolution came to dominate histories of early-nineteenth century Spain. Historians seeking an explanation for a perceived twentieth-century deviation from the continental norm concluded that Spain’s middle class had failed to transform its economy and so to drive through political change.[[22]](#footnote-22) But Spain *was* transformed in the first half of the nineteenth century. A new liberal political elite emerged, drawn—as in Britain and France—from the old aristocracy, the professional classes, and the military. Historians continue to debate whether this change is better characterised as revolutionary or evolutionary, but there is probably some truth to both interpretations.[[23]](#footnote-23) Those in power after 1831 genuinely sought to reform the political system along the British model, expanding the franchise in a way which was intended to cement a liberal hegemony. As in Britain, pressure from below accelerated this process, but in Spain, against a backdrop of the Carlist War, this moved quickly beyond what a large section of the elite felt this hegemony could withstand. For this reason, Spain’s main political parties developed along the fault line of broader or narrower political representation. In understanding 1848, however, what is important is not so much how this elite emerged, but the nature of its power relationships before, during and after the revolution.

Seen from the opposite viewpoint, it is easy to see why historians engaged with questions of nationalism and the bourgeois revolution have paid little attention to 1848, even though it might open up new perspectives on both. The period marks a kind of no man’s land, between the origins of Spain’s half-hearted nation making—dated by José Álvarez-Junco to the Napoleonic period—and the emergence of competing nationalisms in the late-nineteenth century.[[24]](#footnote-24) But experience of the 1848 Revolution was markedly similar across the nation, as nascent national revolutionary networks interacted with more-established local ones. For those interested in the broader liberal revolution, 1848 feels like a non-event, one failed attempt at revolution among many others. But it was different. The 1848 Revolution threatened the nature—sometimes the very existence—of states across Europe, and this was no different in Spain. Everywhere, its aims were transformational, well beyond a simple change of government. The Spanish parliamentary opposition largely supported the government’s anti-revolutionary measures, and few of the revolutionaries who took to the streets in 1848 would have felt they had achieved their aims if there had simply been a change of ruling party. They wanted instead to alter the nature of the state by changing the basis of its legitimacy.

For historians who acknowledge the possibility of a Spanish national revolution in 1848, either it failed or it was defeated. In a crude sense both are right; but in the same sense it failed and was defeated across Europe. Sometimes, the threat to the liberal state has been alluded to, but it has rarely been interrogated.[[25]](#footnote-25) Questions such as, who were the revolutionaries, what did they want, why did they want it, how did they organise, and how close did they come to succeeding, remain largely unasked. The answers lie in the nature of the Spanish state, which developed symbiotically with the country’s conservative liberal hegemony. This determined the state’s penetration of civil society, it delineated those within the state and those without, and it had implications for its legitimacy.[[26]](#footnote-26) 1848 marks a turning point in the actions taken by the government, through the state apparatus and by its functionaries, in determining those granted citizenship and those denied it.[[27]](#footnote-27)

In the short term, this was successful because it bolstered support for the government among groups already predisposed to support it, but in the longer term it was a disaster. Public order became something which was imposed from above and from the centre. As the 1850s and 1860s progressed, this became increasingly untenable. Even the late-nineteenth/early-twentieth century cleavage in Spanish society was made more likely by the competing conceptions of state legitimacy which began to crystallise in 1848.

The state is an important lens through which to frame this analysis because, as well as being an arena in which the conflict played out, the state was an actor in that conflict. More than simply the government, the state has an agency of its own.[[28]](#footnote-28) And in 1848 state functionaries across Europe abandoned existing governments in support of the revolution. Although the state is not the only source of social power, it is the one with which other sources compete and interact. Thus, it provides the key to the Spanish experience of the 1848 Revolution. Yet this picture is complicated because, in mid-nineteenth century Spain, the distinction between state and government was much less clear than it became in the twentieth century. Geography, social background, and wealth meant that Spaniards conceived of and interacted with the state in slightly different ways. However, if it is important to acknowledge these differences, it is important too to highlight an increasing commonality in people’s perception and experience of the state in this period. And this makes it a more, rather than less, useful heuristic. In the nineteenth century, nation states all crystallised as capitalist, militaristic, and at least partially representative. But in each case, this was achieved dialectically, and this created distinctive crystallisations.[[29]](#footnote-29) These crystallisations were importantly not static. The relationship between citizen and state is a symbiotic one: as what it means to be a citizen changes, so too does the state and vice versa.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the relationship between citizen and state extended beyond peninsular Spain.[[30]](#footnote-30) Although most of the empire had been lost in the 1820s, Spain’s remaining colonies—Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines—were integrated into the state more completely than the American colonies had ever been in the eighteenth century. This integration was particularly strongly felt in the metropolitan periphery, and both the empire and this metropolitan periphery shared a similar opposition to rule imposed from Madrid.[[31]](#footnote-31) As elsewhere in Europe in 1848, events in the Spanish colonies cannot be divorced from those in the metropolis. The hegemonic political elite transcended the traditional metropolis-colony divide both economically and politically, and, for most of the nineteenth century, ‘the Spanish state was able to articulate a broadly based national project with colonialism at its core.’[[32]](#footnote-32) The 1848 Revolution allowed the political elite to strengthen its hegemony across the empire, which laid the foundations for a renewed imperialism in the latter half of the century.

Early histories of 1848 emphasised the question of the national. And yet nationalism played relatively little role in the events of February in Paris. Instead, nationalism only became a catalyst for the Revolution in Germany, Italy, and Central Europe, where the location and composition of polities was as much an issue as their government. Spain, like France, was already a nation state. Although it may have been less successful than its neighbour in cultivating an uncontested vision of this community in the collective imagination, there is little evidence that at that time Spaniards had any trouble with the idea of Spain itself.[[33]](#footnote-33) And, given that the ‘concept of the nation did not yet exclude ethnic and linguistic plurality,’ the revolutionaries saw the continent as a community of independent nations.[[34]](#footnote-34) One Spanish writer even went so far as to call Europe itself ‘a grand nation.’[[35]](#footnote-35) What was less well resolved in Spain, however, was the relationship between the nation and the state. To a certain extent, it is true that it was a state because it was a nation.[[36]](#footnote-36) But, like all nations, Spain was a heterogenous entity, and this was reflected in divergent reactions to the development of the centralised state. And it is these divergent reactions which shaped the Spanish experience of 1848, rather than the question of the nation *per se*.

More recent scholarship has de-emphasised the idea of linear progress, and instead has tended to see the 1848 Revolution as a European event which took on important national characteristics.[[37]](#footnote-37) At a time when the historiography of 1848 has moved solidly to considering the transnational, it may seem atavistic to write a new Spanish national history. But the state continues to provide a useful sphere of analysis. Revolutions are against individual government and state powers, and it is those powers which react to the threat. They do not, however, do this in isolation. As it spread through the continent, the revolution acted as a vehicle for internal disputes and grievances, but this does not mean that it lost its Europeanness. Transnational and national are not binary opposites, and one cannot be written without an understanding of the other, revealing ‘a network of dynamic interrelations whose components are in part defined through the links they maintain among themselves and the articulations structuring their positions.’[[38]](#footnote-38)

In 1848, Spain came closest to a successful revolution on 26 March and 7 May in Madrid, and on 13 May in Seville.[[39]](#footnote-39) Here, the parallels with events in Paris, Vienna, Berlin and Budapest are clear. Barricades were built, close-quartered fighting ensued, and cries of ‘*¡Viva la república!*’ rang out as large numbers of civilians and soldiers took to the streets. But these events are only part of the story of the 1848 Revolution in Spain. As elsewhere, the European Revolution took on national characteristics, exacerbating existing political grievances among groups which already presented a significant threat to the elites’ vision of an exclusivist Spanish state.

These groups were broad-based but incoherent. Among them were political radicals, politicians, professionals, artisans, students, and some soldiers, who sought a broader franchise and, at least sometimes, an answer to what was known as ‘the social question.’ They planned revolutions in Zaragoza, Valencia and A Coruña, students protested in Barcelona and Oviedo, and rural radicals briefly occupied the provincial capital of Huesca. But the revolutionaries also included Carlists who had been in open warfare against the state since September 1846. They most prominently featured in *guerrilla* campaigns in Catalonia and the Maestrazgo, but groups were also active in rural Extremadura and Andalucía. The Carlists had fought an unsuccessful civil war against the liberal state in the 1830s and retained some support, primarily in rural areas and among parts of the army. Beyond dynastic change, their aims were nebulous. In 1848, they seemed to flit between autocracy and radicalism, but they remained unequivocally anti-liberal. Finally, although individual soldiers belonged to one (or both) of these factions, the army and its quasi-independent political existence represented another discrete threat to the state. The army, unlike the other groupings, ostensibly supported the liberal state, but its liberalism was of a certain type. Influential military figures increasingly saw the army’s role as the defender of public order, stepping in when civilian authorities could no longer be relied on to do so.[[40]](#footnote-40) In 1848, elements of the army attempted *pronuciamientos* in Ceuta, Santander and Alicante, albeit without institutional support.

These three groups all drew on a common revolutionary tradition dating back to the *Dos de Mayo* uprising against Napoleonic rule. But, despite nineteenth-century Spain’s revolutionary reputation, each attempt in 1848 proved largely ineffectual against the liberal state. Throughout the 1840s, the authorities suspected elements within these groups of constantly planning revolution, but most such plots never progressed beyond idealistic chatter in cafés, salons, and secret societies. Before 1848, uprisings which did take place were small scale, highly localised, and tended to be easily put down by the state. Even the civil war against the Carlists (1834-1840) rarely threatened the power of the Madrid liberals, who held the capital and almost all the provincial cities for the duration of the conflict.

As elsewhere in Europe, the 1848 Revolution provided the opportunity for these various dissident groups to come together. But in Spain attempts at co-operation were not always successful—and there was opposition from the leaders of the individual groups—but together they did nevertheless form something of a Spanish national revolution in 1848. Despite different views on the state’s source of legitimacy, their ability to work together during the revolutionary year suggests that their individual ideologies were as yet only incompletely defined. And this temporary alliance also appears to have created the conditions for a more coherent opposition to the increasingly centralised liberal state in the second half of the nineteenth century, based on the devolution of political, economic and social power.[[41]](#footnote-41)

Sadly, the exact nature of the revolutionary networks active in 1848 remains largely unclear. What is certain, is that they depended heavily on existing social networks. The fact that large numbers of the revolutionaries had taken part in the Galician Uprising of 1846 cannot be coincidental. And the army seems to have been the primary conduit for transmitting news among the revolutionaries. By 1848, the way news spread was changing, but as James Morris suggests, the extent to which railways, roads and the telegraph had transformed communication by the middle of the nineteenth century and whether the revolutionaries had access to these new technologies is unclear.[[42]](#footnote-42) In Spain news of revolution spread quickly, but this spread of information was largely controlled by the state. In the aftermath of each outbreak of violence in 1848, the official and semi-official press heavily emphasised the support which the government enjoyed, citing the relatively small numbers of participants in revolutionary events as evidence.[[43]](#footnote-43) Despite the limitations of official figures and accounting for practical considerations, the question of why more people did not take part in the revolution remains an important one. The explanation lies in the way that, unlike in much of Europe, the economically and socially powerful were already part of the political elite. Indeed, the *moderado* party’s commitment to limited suffrage ensured those with the vote retained a disproportionate influence on the country’s government.

Relatively low participation certainly does not *necessarily* demonstrate support for the administration of Ramón María Narváez and for its counter-revolutionary measures. There is no doubt that there was some such support, particularly for the prime minister himself, but there was also a larger group whose support was for the state rather than for the Narváez government. In France, Victor Hugo called this silent majority the ‘content part of the population.’[[44]](#footnote-44) Their support was conditional on the maintenance of public order on the one hand and on the gradual development of a representative system on the other. After relatively free and fair elections in December 1846, it seems likely that this group still saw in the functions of the liberal state an ability to accommodate their aspirations. But the events of 1848 suggest that they were content with the potential of the status quo, not necessarily with the status quo itself. Sympathy with one or more of the different revolutionary groups was widespread, but many middle- and working-class Spaniards chose not to join them on the barricades or on the battlefield when the opportunity presented itself. This was in contrast to elsewhere in Europe, where these groups tended to join the revolution in greater numbers. But even there they quickly became disillusioned, which was one of the reasons why the old order was able to re-establish itself so quickly in 1849. This did not, though, simply mean a return to the status quo ante.[[45]](#footnote-45)

It is therefore important that the apparent defeat of the revolution in Spain is not seen as a victory for hierarchies over networks, or to borrow Niall Ferguson’s terminology for the ‘Tower’ over the ‘Square.’[[46]](#footnote-46) In part this is because the revolutionary networks kept working through the 1850s and 1860s, but mostly it is because many of the ideas of the revolution had already infiltrated the political elite. The counter-revolution led by Narváez was a symbolic demonstration of the coercive power of the state, but it was an unnecessary one. The 1848 Revolution had been defeated in the hearts and minds of most Spaniards—or it had already become discourse—almost before it had begun. Although far from perfect, the *moderado* governments from 1844 to 1854, particularly under Narváez, sought to provide political representation to the economic and social elite. And 1848 demonstrates that it also had the consent, at least tacitly, of the population at large. Those disenfranchised by the 1845 constitution, even those who had been members of the disbanded urban *milicia nacional*, remained largely quiet, especially outside Madrid.

Legitimacy remains a problematic concept, particularly as, across Europe, 1848 accelerated the change in its meaning from a purely legal term to a political construct.[[47]](#footnote-47) In Spain, whilst some dynastic Carlists clung to the older legalistic understanding, mainstream political thought had either adopted the new political one or was in the process of doing so. Rodney Barker describes legitimate government as ‘a relationship between state and subjects.’[[48]](#footnote-48) And elements of the Spanish political elite already embraced this idea. Many of these *demócratas*, as they would become in 1849, were involved in the revolutionary events of 1848. They called for universal manhood suffrage and some for a republic, but they remained a minority.

Whether Spaniards more generally considered their government—let alone their state—legitimate is difficult to say. But on the outbreak of revolution, every individual exercises their own agency. The motivations of those who man the barricades and of those who try to stop them are perhaps the most obvious, but those who choose not to take part on either side are making an equally conscious decision. In some cases, it will be because they are ill-informed, uninterested, or scared. But often it will be because they are expressing—even if with reservations—their unspoken support for the existing power relationships.

This is particularly true of the middle classes. In mid-nineteenth century Spain, they were a vague group. Some had the vote, but there was a larger group who did not. They included independent farmers, master artisans, manufacturers, merchants, pensioners, minor state and civic officials, clergy, teachers, lawyers, and doctors.[[49]](#footnote-49) They were politically conscious but naturally conservative, and they clung jealously to their own social and economic power. Therefore, even if they did tend to be progressive when it came to political rights, their involvement elsewhere in Europe in an armed revolution with strong working-class involvement was, at least to some extent, a surprise.[[50]](#footnote-50)

Whether the military should be included in the group is difficult to say. In Spain at least, and in marked contrast to later periods, the army at all levels tended to be more progressive than the population at large. However, any attempt to include them requires care because, unlike the other groups, they were inside the state and had important public-order functions. This did not stop them from being restive—indeed it perhaps facilitated it—but it does mean that this restiveness needs to be seen differently. The same is true for opposition politicians, senior civil servants, and senior state functionaries or officials because, like this army, these groups all had means other than revolution at their disposal to affect change in the nascent liberal state.

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There is a remarkable constancy to the histories of 1848 in Spain. While elsewhere successive schools of thought have challenged, reshaped, and rehabilitated old arguments, the contours of recent scholarship on the Spanish experience largely mirror those produced in the immediate aftermath of events. And they share the assumptions made by contemporary officials, journalists, and observers. It is, however, important to concede two points. The first is that there is a necessary reliance on a relatively small number of documents; events in Spain simply did not produce the same volume of writing as those in, say, Paris, Berlin, or Vienna. Or, if they did, these writings have not survived. The second is that the scholarship is beginning to change. In the last decade or so, historians have published new perspectives on events in Spain, for the first time challenging some of the assumptions of those contemporary writers. It also appears that these ideas are beginning to filter through on a European level, but there is still some way to go in terms of research. Since the mid-nineteenth century, historians of 1848 have relegated Spain to a secondary status, unsuited to comparison with France, Germany, Italy, or Austria, where the Revolution fits (or was made to fit) more comfortably into national narratives. It is important to revisit some of these interpretations to interrogate the origins of these myths. It is also valuable to consider the way that 1848 has been approached elsewhere in Europe and to evaluate the benefits of some of these approaches to the Spanish experience.

While there may be broad agreement that the narrative of 1848 is at least to some degree constructed, historicising the construction of this narrative is a persistent challenge. The first histories of the Spanish revolution were told in newspapers. For those events which took place outside Madrid, editors relied heavily on official accounts or on letters from correspondents. They also often simply reprinted verbatim reports from other outlets, particularly those with links to the government. As a result of restrictions on the press in the aftermath of the revolution, most local titles were closed down. This further limited the basis of information, particularly outside the capital. In Europe, this was different as the press became more, not less, free. It is also significant that even Madrid lacked correspondents from international newspapers, so these too tended to rely on official reports either directly or via Spanish outlets. Journalism also tends to focus on results; in 1848 the story was in the victory of the revolution and the defeat of the *anciens regimes*, however temporary. The Spanish experience did not fit into this inchoate narrative of the European revolution. ‘Spain has had its insurrection,’ reported the Spectator in London, as though it were simply taking its turn. But it described it as ‘a poor affair which means no thing.’[[51]](#footnote-51)

The historical record itself also exists within a narrative structure. Although it might not have been quite the exceptionalism the government intended, it is not surprising that they wanted the Spanish 1848 to be quickly forgotten. It is too much to claim that they managed the story entirely, but the government’s rehabilitation in the eyes of the Catholic powers allowed for the possibility of a narrative of Spanish exception across Europe, particularly given the long-standing tendency for othering Spain and its history. Some early Spanish histories of the 1848 Revolution emphasised its Franco-centricity to avoid censure by the government. One work published in Barcelona, for example, stressed the ‘immortality’ of events in Paris and was based on ‘hour-by-hour’ accounts in the French press. ‘The courage, the acts of sublime virtue, the heroic actions which marked this beautiful revolution’ in France were in stark contrast to depictions of the Spanish revolution in the government press.[[52]](#footnote-52) Early histories appeared by Fernando Garrido, Antonio Pirala and others in the 1860s and 1870s.[[53]](#footnote-53) They were not only sympathetic to those who took to the barricades but had accounts first-hand from the fighters. These have clear parallels with Romantic interpretations which emphasise aspiration over experience elsewhere in Europe. But, there, 1848 mostly gained significance because of the emphasis of national aims.[[54]](#footnote-54) And in Spain, it was the government which seemed to speak for the nation in the early narratives.

One of the most enduring archetypes of the narrative of 1848 in Spain is the image of Narváez, a civilian prime minister, donning full-dress uniform and sallying forth to more or less single-handedly charge the barricades in Madrid. But even less melodramatic accounts place the *Espadón de Loja* (the sword of Loja), as he was known, firmly at the heart of events, as this quasi-hagiography seems to have resonated with historians from across the political spectrum. Interestingly, J. Quero Molares, writing on the centenary of 1848, gives Narváez an adversary: José de Salamanca.[[55]](#footnote-55) Spain did not have a Garibaldi or Mazzini figure, and this attempt to create one fundamentally misunderstands the diffuse nature of the leadership of the Spanish revolution. And, in any case Salamanca is an unlikely surrogate for a national hero. Yet there was a strong personal animosity between him and the prime minister, and Salamanca was certainly involved in at least part of the revolutionary events. However, it is Narváez who was and who remains the Romantic hero of the Spanish story, and the revolution secured Narváez’s position in the party, and thus his position in the narrative. And this was largely because he was perceived to have defeated the revolutionaries.

Whilst it is clear that the idea that Spain was ‘exempt’ from the 1848 Revolution is wrong, the narrative of defeat—which is equally if not more prevalent—remains stubbornly pervasive. This idea of failure is, in fact, so pervasive that it has become a truism, rarely interrogated even in the best scholarship. One explanation for this is a lack of familiarity with the geographical breadth of events and their revolutionary potential. Another is that there is some truth to this interpretation, albeit only a rather superficial one. Dividing history into winners and losers, even though things are almost always more complicated than that, often leads to a tautological narrative. For Lewis Namier, for example, that control of the state machine remained with the conservatives throughout was central to the failure of the 1848 Revolution across Europe.[[56]](#footnote-56) This may be true, but explaining it is more complex. The loyalty of state functionaries was important to the construction of the narrative of revolutionary failure. But the involvement of the army in particular encouraged the use of a defeat motif. And while popular support is difficult to measure, it is likely that a majority of the urban middle class backed the government and therefore were inclined to accept their version of events in the aftermath of the revolution.

The narrative that the working classes of the 1848 Revolution were betrayed by the property owners, and that the June Days was the first phase of a class war, became almost canonical in Europe in the mid-twentieth century. There is some evidence too of this among Spanish historians in exile and, after the transition to democracy, in Spain itself. Miguel Artola, for example, concentrated on the failure of the bourgeois revolution in Spain, and Manuel Tuñón de Lara attempted a history of nineteenth-century Spain from below. In their treatments of 1848, both emphasise the way that the revolution was undermined by the lack of *progresista* support.[[57]](#footnote-57) In other words, the working class were betrayed by the middle classes who claimed to support their cause. This interpretation is now considered problematic, particularly as the working-class participants in the revolutionary fighting could nowhere be characterised as truly proletarian.[[58]](#footnote-58) However, in Spain’s case, this interpretation never received such canonical status, perhaps because at least in Barcelona the working classes seem to have been placated by government programmes to combat unemployment. Instead, understandings remain stuck in an era before social and economic forces were taken into account. Histories of 1848 elsewhere are infused with ideas of modernisation—both Marxist and anti-Marxist.[[59]](#footnote-59) By focussing solely on the social conditions for revolution, they tend to underestimate the role played by experience and memory. And here Spain, and the European periphery more broadly, has an advantage. A revolution no longer needs to further the cause of modernisation, and instead can be studied purely as a political action. In this way, unsuccessful attempts become at least as historically valuable as successful ones.

Modern treatments of 1848 in Spain are rare. An article written by Daniel Headrick in the 1970s still serves as probably the best account in English, but it over-emphasises economic factors in an attempt to explain away a non-revolution.[[60]](#footnote-60) In Spanish, Sonsoles Cabeza Sánchez-Albornoz’s book is heavy on the detail of the street fighting in Madrid, but the meaning and significance of this fighting is rarely interrogated beyond expressions of the strength of the state’s coercive power.[[61]](#footnote-61) Despite running for over a thousand pages, Salvador Sánchez Pardo’s work barely mentions the revolutionary events themselves, instead focussing on high politics before and after.[[62]](#footnote-62) Martin Baumeister’s chapter in German in a collection exploring constitutional change in Europe in 1848 is a useful recent addition to scholarship. He is right to emphasise the importance of Spain’s representative government and the alliance between the upper and middle classes, but his work still relies on old assumptions that Spain did not have a revolution in 1848 because ‘the restructuring of the economy and society and ideological differentiation had not progressed far enough.’[[63]](#footnote-63) Historians of revolution in Spain have also considered 1848, although often only in passing.[[64]](#footnote-64) More recent works by Florencia Peyrou, Juan Luis Bachero Bachero and Ignacio García de Paso García have begun important debates about the experience of the 1848 Revolution in Spain from the perspectives of political culture, deportation and the regions respectively.[[65]](#footnote-65) But there has not been a full-length treatment on a national scale for more than thirty years.

Much work still needs to be done on marginalised groups—women, peasants and ethnic minorities—which have begun to receive interest elsewhere in Europe. Power not only contributed to the creation of the narrative, but it is also internalised in that narrative. And it excludes others, and these alternative viewpoints became delegitimised. It is difficult to recuperate the impact the 1848 Revolution had on these groups in Spain precisely because they were excluded at the creation of the narrative. This idea that historical consciousness is ‘a specifically Western prejudice by which the presumed superiority of modern, industrial society can be retroactively substantiated’ is hard to shake off.[[66]](#footnote-66)

In Spain, these groups faced a sort of double peripherality. These groups do not, it seems, provide such compelling protagonists in the narrative of Spain’s nineteenth century as does, say, Narváez. But they also lose out to the character of ‘Spain’, itself defined after 1848 to exclude these very groups.[[67]](#footnote-67) As historians make choices about voice, they ‘unavoidably reveal their own understanding of what constitutes human agency and intentionality.’[[68]](#footnote-68) And it is not just those writing the histories whose subjectivities have shaped meaning and agency, the readers’ subjectivities have done so too. Their values, which are themselves history-laden, shape their ability to hear these marginalised voices in the narrative, even when they are there. Any reading is ‘a situated argument about fields of meaning and fields of power,’ but it is also ‘a guide to possible maps of consciousness, coalition, and action.’[[69]](#footnote-69)

Spain’s peripherality was as much an explanation for its experience as it is a framework through which to study it. It is important to distinguish between space, which is a product of narrative, and place, which relates to geography. Some places are geographically peripheral: remote, inaccessible, perhaps under-populated. However, more significant are the spaces which are peripheral only as a result of their exclusion from the narrative. And this depends largely on perspective. There are a number of works treating the Carlist uprising, for example, but only rarely is this linked to either the national or European pictures. Jordi Canal, for example, wrote that the conflict of 1846-1849 ‘solely affected Catalonia.’[[70]](#footnote-70) This is indicative of a broader tendency to separate the story of the 1848 Revolution, rather than to bring the elements together, which has its origins in the days after the uprisings. Not only were the elites and their writings urban-centric, but they were Madrid-centric. Spaces such as cafés, taverns, and even working-class districts in general were so far outwith the consciousness of the elites that they become akin to twilight zones, where actions were assumed or imagined but where narrative disappeared. And, if space gives protesters agency, ignoring these spaces in the narrative denies them it.[[71]](#footnote-71) This thesis seeks to re-enter these spaces and to retrieve some of the stories lost there.

There are a number of reasons why Spanish historical scholarship tends towards to a regional approach. One is political. Funding is often provided by regional governments, which tend to favour projects that correspond to their geographies. But, in the case of 1848, it is as likely to be historical. The pre-eminence of the military defeats of individual local insurgencies in the government narrative at the time de-emphasised the idea of a Spanish national revolution. More work has been done on the nature of the Carlist threat to the state but this rarely, if ever, looks beyond a factional division to locate the experience in a broader Spanish landscape.[[72]](#footnote-72) This trend is also reinforced by the continued insistence in the general historiography that the 1848 Revolution was a predominantly urban phenomenon.[[73]](#footnote-73) This serves to lessen the significance of the experiences of those on the periphery of Europe. Here, owing in part to population distribution, rural manifestations of the revolution were often a more significant part of the story.[[74]](#footnote-74) The Spanish picture is more mixed, but the contribution of revolutionaries in the rural milieu should not be underestimated here either.

Traditional narratives of government victory and revolutionary failure cannot escape the postmodern challenge of the decentred subject. The language of the elites became the language of the history. The language of victory became a discourse, which in turn helped construct narratives of both victory and defeat. Even now, challenges remain with the recreation of the language, narrative and inflection in the radical rhetoric. However, whilst focus must turn to language as the producer of discourse, doubts have increased about the precision of the culture concept. This has been epitomised by the supposed dichotomy between culture as system and culture as practice. But William H. Sewell Jr. is right to see them as complementary concepts.[[75]](#footnote-75) The relationship between revolutionary and authority, for example, carries recognised autonomous meanings, transcending the particular context of 1848. However, these meanings are malleable, at least to some extent. And they depend on two distinct semiotic communities. The revolutionaries and the authorities both sought to deconstruct existing symbolic meanings of their relationship, albeit in fundamentally different ways. In both cases, they sought to do this through practice, revolutionary or anti-revolutionary respectively. In the end, it was the authorities which succeeded in reconstructing the meaning of this relationship.

Historical narrative is, therefore, a literary project, but the decentring of objective empiricism does not necessarily render it meaningless. Indeed, in the case of the Spanish experience of 1848, it explains the meaning which has been attached to events from the very first newspaper accounts. Nor is it the case that this narrative does not contain important truths for its basis is in the events themselves.[[76]](#footnote-76) There is no doubt, for example, that Narváez was, for many Spaniards, the hero of the story or that the revolutionaries were perceived to have failed. But it is not just the past which has a narrative form, it is the present too. And those elements which were invented rather than found were invented for a reason.[[77]](#footnote-77) This reason is power. To an extent, this was the result of changing power relations on an individual level. Narváez emerged from the tumultuous year more powerful than he had been before, while those who took part in the revolution were weakened by government repression. But more broadly, history must necessarily focus on agency. For M. C. Lemon, the relevance of failed movements is their impact on the experience and response of those in power.[[78]](#footnote-78) He is right, of course; and in the case of the Spanish 48ers, this was hugely significant. However, it also means more than this. It means that history perpetuates and strengthens inequalities of power, and it is within these relationships that historical knowledge is created and sustained.

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There remain few or no documents about 1848 from the perspective of the civilian government. In 1939 a fire destroyed the Archiepiscopal Palace of Alcalá de Henares, which housed the government archives.[[79]](#footnote-79) Correspondence between army authorities and the ministry of war, drawn from the Archivo Militar in Madrid, therefore forms the bulk of the research for this project. These letters were primarily written by the captains general, the senior military officials in a province. These men already had jurisdiction over public order matters and, whenever the *Cortes* granted the government emergency powers, which it did in 1848, they became the supreme authority in their given district. The archive also holds letters from the inspectors general who were responsible for maintaining discipline within a military unit. Both tend to emphasise the loyalty of their troops in general but are nevertheless candid in their coverage of mutiny and provide some of the only surviving accounts of the unprecedented instances of public disorder which took place in that revolutionary year.

Further documents, primarily related to events in Madrid, come from the papers of the British ambassador, housed in the Norfolk County Archive (Norwich) and in printed collections. Although far from a neutral observer—there was suspicion at the time that he was involved in events on the side of the revolutionaries—these again are rare first-hand accounts of the events themselves and of the mood in the Spanish capital. Indeed, his political beliefs make these accounts more rather than less important.

Contemporary newspaper accounts are significant too, and they provide a clear picture of a government struggling to react to events in Europe after the February Revolution from a range of political perspectives. However, particularly after the attempted revolution on 7 May these became subject to stringent restrictions from the government, and therefore they must be read in this context.

Unfortunately, there are few first-hand published accounts of any of the events of 1848. However, significant exceptions include those of Fernando Fernández de Córdova, an army general who fought the revolutionaries on both 26 March and 7 May, Manuel Pavía, captain general of Catalonia, and Benito Hortelano, a radical publisher who took part in the attempt on 26 March and witnessed some of the fighting on 7 May.[[80]](#footnote-80) All these accounts are both highly partisan and self-aggrandising, but they remain invaluable for their unparalleled insights. Historians writing in the second half of the nineteenth century claim to have heard accounts first-hand from some of the participants in the fighting and are therefore sometimes as close to the perspective of the revolutionaries as it is possible to get.[[81]](#footnote-81) Where they intersect, these sources tend to tell a remarkably similar story, differing largely only on minor details.

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Most studies of the European revolution adopt a tripartite approach: revolution, counter-revolution and reaction. Although, across the continent, there are national and regional deviations from this model, it does provide a useful starting point. It also helps emphasise the important fact that, despite its moniker, the revolution lasted well into 1849, and in some cases beyond. However, given the survival of the Spanish government in that revolutionary spring when so many others fell, the model of revolution followed by reaction does not fit so well there.

This work follows a broadly chronological path but with some deviations, where thematic or multifaceted approaches aid understanding of agency and dispossession. Chapter 1 contextualises the events of 1848 in the light of Spain’s economic and political development, its history, and the development of its state apparatus. Given the uneven development of the relationship between state and people, Spain’s experience of 1848 ought not to have been wholly unexpected. Chapter 2 then looks specifically at the run up to the revolutionary events, examining the power relationship between the two sides in more detail: their changing composition, changing ideas of representation, and their response to the February Revolution in Paris. Far from a dialogue of the deaf, both sides were more flexible and compromising than their actions from 26 March suggest, and even then alliances continued to form and reform into the summer and autumn.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine the events of 1848 in Spain and the state’s response in more detail. Chapter 3 provides a chronological narrative of the three most significant revolutionary attempts, 26 March and 7 May in Madrid, and 13 May in Seville. In no way was the government’s victory certain at the outbreak of revolutionary violence, but its use of the state apparatus and its functionaries became increasingly coercive, and this created a polarisation in society which had not been inevitable before 26 March. Chapter 4 considers the remaining revolutionary events of 1848 as the revolutionaries were driven further and further from the centres of state power, reducing their potential to threaten the liberal hegemony. As the revolutionaries were defeated in Madrid, they turned to the provincial capitals. When they failed to gain a foothold here, the revolution spread with Carlist support to smaller towns, particularly in Catalonia, before largely becoming a *guerrilla* conflict in Spain’s vast under-governed countryside as summer turned to autumn. In each case, the revolutionaries struggled to mobilise beyond their existing social networks, limiting their ability to develop even temporary class coalitions.

Chapter 5 considers the implications of the events in 1848 beyond the peninsula, situating events in an imperial and transnational context. It examines the experience of the revolution in the colonial milieu, tracing the fate of the Spanish 48ers, and showing the way in which the revolution shaped increasingly transnational political thought. In each case, the government was able to rapidly deploy the heavily-centralised state to cement its victory, and to push the revolution further into liminal spaces. But in each case this suppression of agency—on a scale beyond anything in the metropolis—had long-term implications for the state’s legitimacy.

In chapter 6, the focus of the analysis changes to explore the ways the Spanish experience of 1848 has been remembered and commemorated, beginning by considering how the idea of a Spanish ‘restoration’ might be a useful heuristic for understanding how the government reasserted its control once its victory had been assured. Then follows a discussion of how and why 1848 has been largely forgotten in Spain, despite sporadic instances of remembering in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this context, it is little wonder that the idea that the 1854 Revolution—a *progresista* led military coup followed by a popular uprising—was the ‘Spanish 1848’ has been so enduring.[[82]](#footnote-82)

# 1

On the Edge of Europe

There is no denying, wrote the Madrid correspondent of *The* *Morning Chronicle* in 1838, ‘that the rule of reason in Spain is different.’[[83]](#footnote-83) And exceptionalism is a persistent feature of the country’s modern historiography. It is true that some features of Spain’s early modern history do set it apart from much of the rest of Europe, and it is impossible to claim that these had no impact on the mentalities and experiences of its citizens. However, the same claim is often used as a tautological explanation for perceived deviations from continental norms.[[84]](#footnote-84) In other words, difference is often explained by difference. Whereas, with similar institutions, a similar political culture, and a similar public sphere, in 1848 Spain was not in fact all that different from Britain or France. And in any case, difference is not the same as backwardness.

One area where there was a clear divergence from the continental norm, however, was in the experience of Napoleonic rule. In 1848, the Spanish revolutionaries could draw on myths of popular opposition to occupation, of the *guerrilla*, and of a constitutional parallel state established by those loyal to the deposed Spanish king. But, unlike elsewhere in Europe, the government and the liberal state were at least joint benefactors of the legacy of Napoleonic rule. Indeed, politics in Spain was virtually synonymous with liberalism in the period.[[85]](#footnote-85) Spain was also already an established nation state, and there was little doubt about its composition or location. While strong regional identities were reinforced in the resistance to French rule, politics in Spain in this period transcended the regional.[[86]](#footnote-86) As, in 1848, did the revolution. Indeed, nationalism was becoming a useful political tool. José Álvarez-Junco was at least partially right when he argued that this was the result of a crisis of penetration of the liberal state, and therefore of a failed national unification.[[87]](#footnote-87) But by the mid-nineteenth century commemoration—particularly of the *Dos de Mayo* uprising during the Napoleonic occupation—had become more associated with the ideals of the governing party, the *moderados*, than with radical politics. This commemoration eschewed ideas of liberty, regionalism and national sovereignty, favouring those of a state based on strong central government and of a Spanish nation rooted in a shared Catholic heritage. It was a Spain consistent with this legacy that the *moderados* promised those who remained loyal in 1848.

Charles Tilly wrote that ‘there is no regular and reliable sense in which modernisation breeds revolution.’[[88]](#footnote-88) In fact, in Spain in 1848 it probably inhibited it. Through a combination of judicious intervention and good luck, the development of Spain in the years before the revolution favoured the government. Economically it was in the middle of the European rankings, and its constitutional political system was among the continent’s most representative.[[89]](#footnote-89) A middle class had emerged and, while its composition changed over time, it had a coherence and an identity. In 1848, only the June Days in Paris can lay any claim to being a proletarian revolution, and even this is now far from certain. Outside the French capital, the European working classes looked and behaved differently, and in Spain both those in urban and rural settings fitted comfortably into this wider continental pattern.

In the years before 1848 the Spanish state modernised to a similar extent as states elsewhere in Europe, and it was a modernisation largely in the government’s image. There were peculiarities in its structure and its nature both because political power in Spain was narrowly defined, and because the state administration had an exceptionally flat structure. It is striking, for example, how much government business was completed through direct correspondence between ministers in Madrid and a single government representative in the provinces. This was no doubt partly a result of a shortage of functionaries, but it was also a process which suited the centralised state. Although it meant that the state apparatus was often more effective in theory than in practice, it gave the state an agility which many in Europe lacked. And the government did not have to rely on the questionable loyalty of a large independent civil service. Further, both the state and the government consciously developed in alignment with the interests of the new propertied middle classes. Combined with a relatively well-run treasury (at least by the standards of nineteenth-century Spain), the government was able to act quickly and decisively against any revolutionary threat. But it did not always need to be coercive, let alone violent. The *moderado* government’s harmonisation with Spain’s economic and political development, its history, and its modernising state administration meant that revolutionary groups struggled to convince ordinary Spaniards of its illegitimacy.[[90]](#footnote-90)

## Napoleonic Inheritances

The legacy of the French Revolution loomed large across Europe in 1848, but after 1815 the beliefs of both restoration conservatives and the liberal opposition were shaped at least as much by the experience of occupation by the post-revolutionary Napoleonic government.[[91]](#footnote-91) There was no desire to return to French dominion, but liberals in Italy, Germany and Austria remembered the unprecedented access to political and economic power enjoyed by their forebears. They articulated their ideology with French loan words, looked to France for revolutionary inspiration, and envisioned post-revolutionary states in Napoleonic terms. On the other hand, the post-1815 order continued to view France with suspicion, even though the Napoleonic Wars had often forced them into similarly centralising reforms.[[92]](#footnote-92) As old concepts of legitimacy based on blood, religion and tradition were challenged by an increasingly politicised middle class, legitimacy came to be understood in terms of liberal government, rule according to a constitution and with the consent of the people. Napoleonic experience had created a common historical inheritance around which liberals in different parts of Europe could rally against the restored aristocratic elites. These elites by contrast were excluded and excluded themselves. In the context of 1848 this is crucial to understanding the early successes of the revolution across much of Europe. In Spain, with its liberal hegemony, those who opposed the government did not enjoy the same monopoly on this Napoleonic inheritance. But this made it perhaps even more central to the Spanish manifestation of the 1848 Revolution.

The experience of Napoleonic rule in Spain had been more divisive and bloodier than almost anywhere else in Europe, causing lasting trauma and financial ruin. But it also gave birth to a competing domestic liberal tradition, centred on the loyalist Cádiz *Cortes*, and so thrust a much larger part of the population into the political arena.[[93]](#footnote-93) The Peninsular War was part of the international war against Napoleon, but it also perhaps more importantly reflected and exacerbated a narrower civil conflict.[[94]](#footnote-94) And it was this underlying internal conflict which explains Spain’s singular experience, and which more than anything shaped the country’s liberalism. The idea that Napoleon’s invasion plunged Spain into a form of century-long civil war permeates the historiography.[[95]](#footnote-95) Although it is tempting to see things in this way, and it is a useful framework up to a point, it demands an altogether too bifurcated reading of the era. It would be more accurate to say that it sparked a period of near constant political violence as the struggle for the nature of the Spanish state was played out according to a distinct, and largely unchanging, revolutionary paradigm. But those who opposed the liberal state frequently changed in composition and nature, and even the state itself was not entirely static. Therefore, while revolutionaries in 1848 in Italy and Central Europe leant heavily on the memory and myths of the Napoleonic period, in Spain these memories and myths were more contested. And, in 1848, this was a complexity which suited the government.

On 2May 1808, after Napoleon had forced both Charles IV and his son Ferdinand to renounce their claims to the Spanish throne, a crowd gathered in occupied Madrid. French troops opened fire, and protest turned into revolt. The causes of the uprising were—and remain—disputed, and it was easily defeated by reinforcements, but it became a seminal event in Spanish revolutionary history.[[96]](#footnote-96) News of the rising spread across the peninsula with unprecedented speed, carried by those fleeing the violence. Insurrections took place in provincial cities, establishing a recurring pattern of local, independent, and occasionally competing revolutions. As in 1848, these provincial revolutions are difficult to synthesise into a coherent national model. Some of the uprisings, such as in Asturias, seem to have been patriotic and aimed against the French, but others were directed firmly at the Spanish authorities. And, although liberal ideas had been present in 1808, they became hegemonic only in the mythologised role *Dos de Mayo* played among the *fernandistas*, the liberals who remained loyal to the deposed Ferdinand. Commemorations combined solemn civic and military events with popular festivities, dances, feasting and drunkenness. Cultural depictions of the uprising with overtly political aims became important almost immediately, notably through the works of Francisco Goya and the plays of Francisco de Paula Martí.[[97]](#footnote-97) In 1846, Roque Barcia dedicated his own play *¡El Dos de Mayo!* to one of the future revolutionaries of 1848.[[98]](#footnote-98) By then, memory had become more important than reality for the ‘proud nation of *Dos de Mayo*.’[[99]](#footnote-99)

Napoleon placed his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, on the Spanish throne and promulgated the Statute of Bayonne, Spain’s first written constitution. However, the occupying state was scarcely constitutional; a condition of perpetual warfare meant that few of the planned reforms to the government, judiciary or the Church were ever enacted. Nevertheless, it did find support amongst a section of the liberals who reacted analogously to their counterparts elsewhere in occupied Europe. These *afrancesados*, named after eighteenth-century admirers and imitators of French fashions and customs, probably numbered no more than twelve thousand in a country of more than ten million.[[100]](#footnote-100) But they were genuinely reforming, and it was partly the threat of progressives siding with the occupying force in greater numbers which encouraged the Cádiz deputies to so embrace liberalism in the Constitution of 1812.[[101]](#footnote-101) Whilst some *afrancesados* were motivated by self-preservation, others saw the opportunity for national renewal in the wake of the inertia of Charles IV’s reign. And even many *fernandistas* in the occupied zone collaborated at least to some extent with the French, if only because they feared the retaliation which the captive royals might face had they not done so. Ideologically, Spanish liberals were broadly aligned with those of the occupying French, but anti-French feeling pushed most of them towards the *fernandistas*. This same tension between ideology and liberty was observable elsewhere in Europe, but in Spain Francophobia was particularly long-established and virulent.[[102]](#footnote-102) The prominent Cádiz liberal Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, for example, was happy to respect and admire Joseph’s liberal principles, ‘provided he exercise them elsewhere.’[[103]](#footnote-103)

Experience of the Napoleonic era in Spain was, however, articulated differently beyond simply this Francophobia. There, the Peninsular War was—and still is—known as the War of Independence. Patriotism became associated with liberation, and with popular revolution. At the beginning of the war, whether opposition to Napoleonic rule could be generally characterised as liberal is still not clear. But the liberals in Cádiz quickly became the most visible and most important loci for resistance to the occupying French. The *Cortes* convened there, and the constitution it promulgated in 1812 formed the basis for the Spanish liberal state and provided a model for native liberalism. It introduced broad manhood suffrage and a constitutional monarchy. Deputies came from across Spain and the empire, and new models of political sociability emerged; these same models would become central to the Spanish experience of 1848. It provided a mechanism for politics, and it was the politics of the street.[[104]](#footnote-104) It also introduced the concept and language of national sovereignty. Spaniards—at least those in Cádiz—spoke ‘liberal’ in the cafés and *tertulias* (salons), where they read, and were read aloud, articles from the free press. Commemorative lithographs from the period entitled *A la nación española* (To the Spanish Nation) reference *los patriotas* (patriots), *el pueblo* (the people), and *la sangre española* (Spanish blood).[[105]](#footnote-105) Even by 1848, almost anywhere else in Europe, such language would have been considered highly provocative, even treasonous.

The French Revolution created the doctrine of nationalism, and nations themselves had existed long before that.[[106]](#footnote-106) But in much of Europe, it was Napoleon who made nation states a concrete reality. In France, this was overt. But his redrawing of the map of Europe meant that, across the continent, national groups, long living in separate states, became political units for the first time. For this same reason, the ruling classes had good reason to be wary of nationalism as a political force. The legitimacy of large multi-ethnic and multi-national empires and of Europe’s many smaller kingdoms and duchies depended instead on history and blood. Thus, nationalism became a key fault line in 1848. German revolutionaries called it the *Völkerfrühling* (Springtime of the Peoples) and there, in Italy and in Hungary, they envisaged national movements rising in solidarity with one another and throwing off imperial oppressors. Revolutionary intellectuals were inspired by Britain, France, and indeed Spain, states where the national question was already largely resolved. Popular nationalism, too, with its roots in the expansive Napoleonic form, resurfaced both before and during the revolution. It brought with it a broader rehabilitation of Napoleon Bonaparte, particularly in France. But liberal nationalism proved scarcely more peaceable, as all the countries most affected by the 1848 Revolution in Central and Eastern Europe waged wars of unification or separation in its aftermath.[[107]](#footnote-107)

In 1848, popular nationalism in Spain remained essentially ethnic in character. It was vehemently anti-French and increasingly anti-British, but it was seldom articulated. And it was not, by itself, a viable political force. Perhaps this was why Spanish liberals made little effort to cultivate a sense of nationhood, taking the nation largely for granted.[[108]](#footnote-108) But it is also difficult to envisage what value such popular nationalism could have had. Elsewhere in 1848, a largely imagined sense of national feeling could be used to bring together a broad range of revolutionary aims. In Spain, where the Peninsular War itself had been an act of national self-determination and the concept of the nation was already established, this was much more difficult. Further, these inchoate nations were often subject to foreign occupation, whereas Spain had no ‘national’ or irredentist cause. As Eric Hobsbawn pointed out, revolting against a legitimate ruler is always more difficult than rejecting a foreign one.[[109]](#footnote-109) Nevertheless, by 1848, there was evidence that the memory of the *Dos de Mayo* uprising was becoming increasingly politicised, and ideas of nationhood, which dated from the period of Napoleonic rule, were beginning to change. In 1835, participants of that year’s anniversary celebration were invited to rejoice at the restoration of the ‘legitimate sovereign.’[[110]](#footnote-110) By the mid-1840s, references to ‘liberty’ had largely been removed from commemorations, replaced by ideas of ‘national independence,’ with a basis in a shared cultural heritage and an emphasis on religious iconography.[[111]](#footnote-111)

Article 12 of the Cádiz constitution underlined the association between the liberal state and the Catholic Church, and religiosity had long been a feature of *Dos de Mayo* celebrations. Services were held at Madrid’s San Isidro church to coincide with civic celebrations at the memorial in the Plaza de Lealtad. No government before 1848 moved to break the ties between Church and state, and even some socialists such as Narcís Monturiol and Fernando Garrido attempted to reconcile their views with Catholicism. Yet the Church was not only anti-liberal but anti-statist, and its continued influence undermined the creation of a civic citizenship.[[112]](#footnote-112) In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Church and liberal state remained, however, subject to a marriage of convenience. Uniquely among Napoleonic possessions the statute of Bayonne also made provision for the continued establishment of the Church, but the French still struggled to shake off their long-held anticlerical reputation. The insurgents on the other hand, who had little in common with the theocratic Church, used religion as an effective recruiting tool. In June 1809, the Valencian *junta* proclaimed that, the French had ‘profaned our temples, insulted our religion and raped our women.’[[113]](#footnote-113) The conflict brought the rapid expansion of the public sphere, and in the absence of established forms of political representation, influential priests often played a central role in local politics.[[114]](#footnote-114) But Spanish anticlericalism was rarely, at least in this period, anti-religious. There were liberals who favoured the disestablishment of the Church, but generally they did so on the principle of ‘laicity, without doubt.’[[115]](#footnote-115)

Certain tenants of the 1812 constitution hinted at a shared liberal inheritance. Others became imbued with divergent meanings, which created a lack of consensus on the form and content of the liberal state.[[116]](#footnote-116) The Cádiz liberals may have been the *de jure* government, but their state had little penetration in occupied Spain, and the constitution remained more aspirational than real. But it did define those who would be granted citizenship of the liberal state, and those who would not. This infused Spanish liberalism with a lasting narrowness and a propensity towards reform from above, as in reality it eschewed the popular and democratic mechanisms the 1812 constitution introduced.[[117]](#footnote-117) Because the deputies believed that the majority shared their values, all propertied men—at least in mainland Spain—had the vote.[[118]](#footnote-118) But elections were indirect, and there is little evidence to suggest the complex system ever worked in practice on a large scale. The landless peasantry was excluded, but many joined bands of itinerant *guerillas* fighting the occupying French. They were not necessarily liberal, but that does not mean they were apolitical.[[119]](#footnote-119) The same is true of women, who were also consciously denied citizenship, described instead as belonging to the ‘citizen family.’[[120]](#footnote-120) This did not stop them expressing their politics either, running *tertulias*, organising conspiracies, writing newspaper articles, and even joining *guerrilla* bands themselves.[[121]](#footnote-121) By 1848, the Spanish political class was little broader, but some of these same excluded groups would employ the same informal strategies to express their citizenship from outside the state during the revolution.

Despite efforts at coordination, the Napoleonic experience also helped cement the provincialized nature of Spanish liberalism.[[122]](#footnote-122) The revolution against Napoleon exposed the primacy of local interests and the difficulty of reconciling these at a national level, something which would prove debilitating for the revolutionaries in 1848. Elsewhere in continental Europe, liberals tended to favour centralisation on the Napoleonic model, whilst localism was associated with the *anciens regimes*. However, Spanish liberals were suspicious of centralisation, and the Napoleonic period had strengthened regionalism.[[123]](#footnote-123) After *Dos de Mayo*, local *juntas* (revolutionary councils) quickly became the centres of power in the provincial cities. Established and organised spontaneously, they became the default model for organising revolutions and post-revolutionary government. In 1810, they theoretically ceded power to the Cádiz *Cortes*, but they remained influential in the *diputaciones* (provincial governments) and *ayuntamientos* (town councils) which it introduced. The regionalism of the period drew on a largely invented domestic tradition of provincial liberties pre-dating the Hapsburg and Bourbon monarchies, and it was this myth which both radicals and Carlists invoked in 1848.[[124]](#footnote-124) It was also the means by which revolution and war became intertwined. Whilst initially superseding old militaristic regimes, in 1808 the local civil *juntas* swiftly began recruiting for the war and dispensing military justice in a bid to restore public order; the *junta* in Seville almost even declared war on its Granadan counterpart. This militarisation of what had been ostensibly a civil revolution, had implications not just for 1848 but for modern Spanish history more broadly.

Among those executed after *Dos de Mayo* were two army officers, Pedro Velarde and Luis Daoiz, and their deaths became central to the conservative interpretation of *Dos de Mayo*, extending the link between the military and revolution to both sides of the political divide. It also helped to mythologise French violence, though in reality this was not limited to one side. As with that against the clergy, violence against those perceived to embody the state became legitimated.[[125]](#footnote-125) The Marquis of Solano, the military governor of Cádiz, and the Conde of Aguilar were both murdered by loyalist mobs after accusations of complicity with the French. The *juntas* set up civilian militias, and these became a feature of progressive ambitions throughout the nineteenth century as part of the development of ‘a state not excessively divorced from the social body.’[[126]](#footnote-126) However, as Napoleon’s forces advanced these militias often became militarised *guerrilla* bands in the vast under-populated and under-governed countryside. Their violence, sometimes brutal and indiscriminate, terrified moderates, while their romance inspired radicals across Europe. Giuseppe Mazzini for example, felt that *guerrilla* warfare was the only way to rid the Italian peninsula of Austrian influence.[[127]](#footnote-127) In Spain, they continued to influence the tactics of rural revolutionaries in 1848. However, even here the inheritance was not one sided. Narváez himself began his military career under the famous *guerrilla* commander Francisco Espoz y Mina fighting for liberalism in Catalonia in the 1820s.

After Napoleon’s final defeat in 1815, the Vienna Congress installed a consciously pre-Napoleonic model on Europe. But it was at least as artificial as the one it replaced, and it could not wipe out people’s memories.[[128]](#footnote-128) It is not surprising therefore that in 1848 across Central Europe, liberals sought to recreate the system which had thrust them into positions of power for the first time. In Spain, on the other hand, the Napoleonic experience had helped establish and shape a competing domestic liberal tradition with strong ties to the Church and the military. And it had brought ‘contested politics of national citizenship.’[[129]](#footnote-129) The revolutionaries set a paradigm which became normative in the first half of the nineteenth century, and which was largely followed again in 1848. The subject of a number of studies in the years before 1848, resistance to Napoleon represented, not just to Spaniards but to radical liberals across Europe, a symbol of what was possible.[[130]](#footnote-130) However, 1848 was not a rerun of 1808; 1848 was consciously different. It was an historically articulate revolution, with distinct elements and modernised aims, though it did undoubtedly occur in a space contextualised and distinguished by these earlier events.[[131]](#footnote-131)

## The Decline of Spain

Long-term decline is a common theme in the historiography of Spain. Although it remained a major European and imperial power until at least the French Revolution, there can be little doubt that, by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the perception both at home and abroad was that Spain was in decline.[[132]](#footnote-132) The Spanish army had been exposed by the war against Napoleon, its navy had been destroyed, and the loss of the American colonies between 1810 and 1824 finally put paid to Spain’s great power pretensions. Post-colonial political power had a precarious nature, even if Spaniards themselves appeared largely equanimous to the loss of the empire.[[133]](#footnote-133) The civil war between the liberal government and the Carlists between 1833 and 1839 took a severe toll. Estimates vary, but it is likely that military casualties alone amounted to some 2.5% of the Spanish population.[[134]](#footnote-134) The conflict also pushed the already embattled exchequer further into debt. Though the victory of the Isabelline troops was complete by 1840, it never guaranteed the liberal state legitimacy.[[135]](#footnote-135) And post-war politics was chronically unstable; between 1840 and 1848 there were twenty different administrations. By comparison, Britain had just three. Both these factors seemed to make revolution in 1848 more, rather than less, likely.

There were a number of barriers to economic development in the hostile Iberian peninsula. New roads and railways were often prohibitively expensive, and local producers therefore lacked access to a national—let alone international—market. This meant that coastal regions were at a distinct advantage, leading to wildly uneven economic development. While the capital still attracted new industry and business, the rest of the centre struggled with depopulation and decline. Industrial expansion in one part of the country often devastated long-standing artisanal economies elsewhere. With the growth of the cotton industry in Catalonia, for example, Medina del Campo—once the centre of the thriving wool trade—became an irrelevant backwater.[[136]](#footnote-136) In 1848, these provincial cities of central Spain largely remained quiet, while those on the coast were centres of conspiracy and threat.

While there were coal mines in Asturias, inefficiency, high transportation costs, and the *derechos de puertas,* a complex system of internal tariffs, meant that coal from Britain was often cheaper in the nascent industrial centres of Spain. But the British government had placed restrictions on exports, making rapid industrialisation of iron and steel impossible; Spain’s first blast furnace, for example, was not built until 1848. That this, in turn, further hampered railway development is evidence of the highly contingent nature of industrial development, and the interdependence of the factors that enabled it. Similarly, expertise had to be imported from abroad at significant expense as the Spanish education system remained deficient in technical subjects, and there were no funds to remedy this.[[137]](#footnote-137) The economy, though capitalist, therefore remained heavily agrarian. A disinclination towards specialisation meant that, except for sherry which by the 1850s contributed more than a third of all Spain’s exports, agribusiness remained largely unviable.[[138]](#footnote-138) It was also very difficult to export perishables because transport was slow and expensive, squeezing already small margins on produce. Within Spain, the *derechos* further encouraged the localisation of markets, and prices could vary significantly between regions.

The inability to generate wealth from agriculture stymied the creation of a large politically-conscious rural bourgeoisie. Instead, most Spaniards remained tenant farmers, sharecroppers or agricultural labourers, and they were probably poorer in real terms at the turn of the nineteenth century than they had been at the turn of the sixteenth.[[139]](#footnote-139) The old landed nobility, too, were mostly poor. And they had lost significant influence both economically and politically since at least the early nineteenth century.[[140]](#footnote-140) Wealth was instead increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small urban upper middle class, and this further depressed the internal market, particularly for manufactured products. This concentration of domestic capital also meant that Spain relied heavily on French and British inward investment, reinforcing already debilitating trade terms.[[141]](#footnote-141) It also tied the market in Madrid to those in London and Paris and, together with increasing corruption and government financial mismanagement, this meant Spain suffered particularly badly from the banking crisis of 1847.

Most of these challenges, however, were not unique, and Richard Herr’s view that, ‘except for France and England, Spain was ahead of the rest of Europe’ has some merit.[[142]](#footnote-142) Spaniards were still, on average, richer than Italians, Austrians, Russians and Germans, and they were getting richer.[[143]](#footnote-143) The loss of the colonies had disrupted government finances, but its economic impact was less severe than it might have been because the Peninsular economy functioned largely separately from that of the Americas.[[144]](#footnote-144) It also provided an urgent impetus to increase domestic tax revenues. Although fiscal reform had little impact on the crippling national debt, by 1848 the government had largely eliminated the budget deficit, which had stood at -2.1% of GDP in 1840.[[145]](#footnote-145) And, of course, the empire had not been completely lost. Spain retained Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, which were all sources of significant income.

Feudalism had long been abolished, as in 1836 had the guild system which still held back industrialisation in Central and Eastern Europe. A free market in land was developing and, although per-hectare yields were declining, in the 1830s *desamortización* (the disentail of Church lands) released vast swathes of previously under-farmed land, and total yields increased. Thus, while much of Europe suffered famine in the late 1840s—an aggravating factor in 1848—Spanish grain prices remained relatively stable. And, although growth remained erratic and fragile with the economy lurching from boom to bust, the structural conditions had been provided for economic development. Evidence even suggests that the Spanish economy outperformed both Britain and France in the 1840s, though from a smaller base.[[146]](#footnote-146)

Industrialisation may have been irregular and inadequate, but there were important preparatory changes.[[147]](#footnote-147) Centres of nascent heavy industry in Málaga and the Basque Country began to develop in the 1840s, and the production of cotton in Catalonia increased by 50% between 1840 and 1850.[[148]](#footnote-148) Those both inside and outside the state apparatus were aware of the challenges Spanish industry faced, and attempts were made to counteract them. After repeated failed attempts to establish a national investment bank, the Banco de Isabel II was finally founded in 1844. It lent recklessly, particularly to railway speculators (among them leading politicians), and investments in British and French financial institutions further exposed it to the banking crisis of 1847. Yet it also provided desperately needed domestic investment capital, including for companies set up to exploit raw materials. For example, no fewer than fifty-six mining companies were established to search for coal in Catalonia alone.[[149]](#footnote-149) Had any been successful, the effects would likely have been transformative, that none were is perhaps further evidence of a dearth of technical knowledge.[[150]](#footnote-150)

Schooling did expand in the 1840s, and it is likely that by 1848 Spain had more educated men than were needed to fill established posts.[[151]](#footnote-151) But these men were mostly professionals, seeking government or legal positions, and they were concentrated in Madrid. Outside the capital, particularly but not only in science and technology, capability remained low. Some industrialists did attempt to intervene to improve technical education.[[152]](#footnote-152) Francisco Tomás Gosálbez, for example, established a chair of mathematics and chemistry in Alcoy in 1838. And, in 1846, the town’s *ayuntamiento* informed the interior minister about the need for a technical college where the artisan could ‘acquire sufficient knowledge in his sphere’ and ‘the most able manufacturers, the competent exercise of their profession.’[[153]](#footnote-153) This was a distinctly liberal form of intervention, independent of the state. But it was scarcely more successful. The *Escuela Industrial Elemental de Alcoy* was finally established, for example, only in 1855.

The alliance between the bourgeois liberals and the *anciens régimes*, often the explanation for the failed bourgeois revolution in Spain, was still uncertain before 1848. It is true that, drawing from the agricultural, industrial, professional and military classes, as well as priests and some wealthier artisans, the Spanish middle class was poorly defined and prone to fragmentation.[[154]](#footnote-154) However, it had a strong cultural homogeneity, and it was concentrated geographically in the larger urban centres. Here, metropolitan elites articulated their class consciousness in the same way as their French and British counterparts. As they began to inhabit new spaces in the changing cities, they cemented their political hegemony, and their alienation from the workers increased both literally and metaphorically. This process, and middle-class culture in general, became associated with both the government and the opposition. Manuel Matheu, for example, who developed a Parisian-style shopping arcade on the site of a disentailed monastery in Madrid, was a friend of the *progresista* hero Baldomero Espartero, while Narváez himself sponsored the career of a famous dancer at one of Madrid’s twenty-six theatres.[[155]](#footnote-155)

On the eve of the 1848 Revolution, this Spanish middle class enjoyed rights their counterparts in much of Europe could only have dreamt of. Between 1833 and 1848, every government in Spain was committed to constitutional and representative government, even if they differed in their ideas of what ‘representative’ meant.[[156]](#footnote-156) In the early 1840s, elections had been decided by an electorate numbering 4 to 5% of the population, well ahead of France and greater even than in Britain; nearly 416,000 Spaniards had cast their votes in 1844.[[157]](#footnote-157) Even the conservative constitution of 1845 had made allowances for well-educated Spaniards who did not meet the new property qualification to continue to vote, and it had maintained freedom of the press. Unlike in much of Central and Eastern Europe, the upper-middle and educated classes were not excluded from the political process in Spain.

However, there remained groups of politicised Spaniards excluded by their country’s relatively advanced political system. In the election of 1846, roughly 130,000 men were eligible to vote, about 1 in 50.[[158]](#footnote-158) This meant that hundreds of thousands of men had been disenfranchised since the 1844 election. The *moderados* believed that these petty bourgeoisie—artisans, professionals, tenant farmers, soldiers, and priests—presented an electoral threat to their increasingly exclusivist vision for the liberal state, and constitutional changes limited the franchise to exclude them. It remains true that the majority of this group supported the opposition *progresistas*, but a significant minority must have voted for *moderado* candidates in 1844. The reforms not only turned political opponents into revolutionaries in 1848, but, by excluding those petty bourgeois supportive of the government, it damaged the legitimacy of the system itself.

In the 1840s, after the civil war of 1833-9, those excluded by the system continued to gather in sometimes incoherent and contradictory coalitions in attempts to reshape the Spanish state, though less frequently under the Carlist banner. While these attempts were sometimes met by violence from state functionaries, this was not always necessary. Most ordinary Spaniards met these attempts with silence. In the Marxist tradition, it is easy to read backwardness and apathy into this silence, to view those who eschewed revolutionary advancement as a *lumpenproletariat*. But this silence was, itself, an expression of their politics. The urban and rural working-classes may have been denied citizenship of the liberal state, but this does not necessarily mean that they opposed it. And the path to successful revolution was far from straightforward. Certainly in 1848, the inclusion of the upper middle class in the political process also meant that, unlike elsewhere in Europe, there was little chance of a broad class coalition in Spain.

E. P. Thompson’s seminal work on the embryonic English working class has no equivalent in Spain, where studies tend to focus on the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. His argument though, that the working class did not appear suddenly and that it made itself as much as it was made, surely applies here too.[[159]](#footnote-159) The abolition of the guild system did appear to make the working class condition a permanent one, and this no doubt accelerated the process of proletarianisation.[[160]](#footnote-160) Labour conflict, which began in Spain with luddite actions in the 1820s, tended to coincide with periods of more progressive rule, something true of social and political conflict in general. In part, this is probably because conservative governments tended to be more repressive, but it is also likely to be because people felt as though they had more of a stake in a progressive regime, or that there was a more obvious path to representation. The period of *progresista* rule in the 1840s, for example, saw the establishment of the first *sociedades de resistencia* (friendly societies). The precursors to trades union, these remained small and local in character. The largest, the *Asociación de Tejedores de Barcelona*, had been banned in 1843, and it probably disbanded shortly thereafter. Nevertheless, there was increasing concern about social problems in Spanish cities.[[161]](#footnote-161) And the spectre of organised labour conflict loomed large in liberal consciousness; after an outbreak of disorder in 1845 the *jefe político* in Barcelona mentioned involvement by the defunct *Asociación*.[[162]](#footnote-162)

Significant regional variations make generalisation difficult, but if the Spanish middle class was fragmented, then its working class was incongruent. In the 1840s, in the absence of a significant industrial proletariat, artisans dominated the urban landscape. Increasing numbers were employed in the textile industry, on the railways and in other new industries such as printing and iron. But unrest among workers continued to have a disjointed, reactionary character. As late as 1847, the night before its opening, a large, mechanised textile factory in Igualada (Catalonia) was burned to the ground. One likely reason for this pattern was that jobs in Spanish industry paid relatively well.[[163]](#footnote-163) The new factories drew their workforce primarily from those used to itinerant agricultural labour, and the pay and conditions represented a significant improvement on that. Elsewhere in Europe, a pressing issue was rising unemployment, and its perceived link to public disorder.[[164]](#footnote-164) However, the Spanish unemployed were likely to have been smaller in number, less geographically concentrated, and less exposed to soaring grain prices than those who took to the streets during the June Days in Paris. Furthermore, the Spanish authorities had already established a programme of public works to provide relief to the unemployed even before revolution broke out in February. This state intervention contributed to the beginnings of a new civic national consciousness, strengthening the already strong national feeling among the political classes, and combining with the alternative forces of nationalisation acting on the general population from outwith the state.[[165]](#footnote-165)

Nationalism was only one force driving politicisation in mid-nineteenth century Spain. Florencia Peyrou has found numerous examples of politicisation even among the oft-considered ‘apolitical’ rurality in the mid-nineteenth century.[[166]](#footnote-166) The period did undoubtedly witness the beginning of a consciousness of alternative identities, which had been articulated through shared histories and languages in daily life for centuries. And, as Josep Fradera argued, any history of Spain must be predicated not on ideas of what a nation should be, but rather on reconciling these diverse imagined communities, both within the peninsula and in the imperial milieu.[[167]](#footnote-167) The working-class groups which would embrace these alternative nationalities in the early twentieth century were consciously excluded from the centralised liberal state. Yet, unlike in Austria for example, there was little in 1848 to suggest that this exclusion would develop into support for competing nationalisms. As in Britain, where national identity also tended to be less tightly defined, there was no significant nationalist threat in Spain in 1848.

This, however, was not guaranteed. On 13 November 1842, workers and members of the *milicia nacional*, constructed barricades across Barcelona in protest against the *progresista* government’s new trade deal with Britain, amidst fears for the uncompetitive local cotton industry. After two weeks of street fighting and skirmishes, the army retreated to the fortress at Montjuïc. The rebels were given 48 hours to disband but, despite pleas to negotiate, an artillery bombardment of the city began on 3 December. The following June, a revolt broke out supporting the overthrow of Espartero, who had ordered the barrage. And then again in August another revolt, known as the *Jamància*, erupted after his replacement Joaquín María López reneged on his agreement with city leaders to respect the constitution. Faced by the *junta*’s armed volunteers, the army retreated again to Montjuïc under the new captain general, Juan Prim. On 7 September, the artillery again opened fire, but with less success. Members of the Carlist rump captured Girona in support of the *junta*, and General Narcís d'Ametller led a partially successful mutiny in Sants. Fighting continued through September in the hinterland, but by the end of the month the tide was changing. Attempted coups in Almería and Granada were unsuccessful, and the *junta* had to provide food relief as prices soared. Bombardments from both Montjuïc and the citadel got progressively heavier through October, and by the time the city finally surrendered on 19 November, some 12,000 projectiles had been launched by government forces.

The significance of the *Jamància* for the 1848 Revolution seems clear. The working classes of Barcelona were politically aware, and they expressed their radical politics through revolution because Spanish liberalism of all shades held limited appeal. But they knew that their political expression would be met with state violence. This created an uneasy relationship between the army and the workers, which made a large-scale revolutionary coalition between the two in 1848 highly improbable. On the other hand, the Carlists who rose in Girona were able to put their vision of an ultramontane Spain to one side to create a seemingly unlikely alliance with the working class radicals. This was largely because the two groups had a localism in common, what Vicens Vives characterised as pre-regionalism. They did not yet question the legitimacy of the Spanish state, but they were increasingly critical of the rationalist centralism which characterised *moderado* liberalism.[[168]](#footnote-168) Although they clearly had a different vision of Spain from the liberals in government, in 1843 the *junta* had only called for Catalan independence from the *Cortes*, not from Spain.[[169]](#footnote-169) In fact, there is evidence to suggest that, even then, the sympathies of most ordinary people were with the government. According to one account, the re-entry of government forces into Barcelona was met with cheering, applause and *vivas* to the queen and the army.[[170]](#footnote-170) Even if such celebrations were partly driven by the privations of life under the *junta*, it is telling that some three quarters of the city’s population had already fled to government territory before the city’s surrender.[[171]](#footnote-171)

The emergent working class, in common with that in Britain, appeared to resist ‘being turned into a proletariat,’ opposing many of the trappings of economic modernity.[[172]](#footnote-172) But this opposition itself demonstrates that, by 1848, a new small Spanish working class was an important political agent in its own right. And they began to conceive of the contradictions inherent in liberalism. As Aleksandr Herzen put it, ‘they saw that the sated is not the comrade of the hungry.’[[173]](#footnote-173) A solution to the social question, what to do about the crises brought on by the radical transformation of society in the wake of rapid industrial change, was one of the most important demands of the revolutionaries in 1848. In Spain too, the question was posed with increasing regularity.[[174]](#footnote-174) But perhaps unsurprisingly, it was in highly-centralised states, notably France, where it gained most traction.[[175]](#footnote-175) In Spain, the process of political centralisation was—whatever the feelings of the pre-regionalists—far from complete, and the disparate nature of industrialisation and the consequent beginnings of a new class system, made the process more difficult still. Although the grievances may have been the same, much of the Spanish working class was still more likely to demand an end to the transformation of society than to seek state intervention to shape it. Indeed, it is not clear that they even conceived of the state as having such a role.

Spain’s difference from the rest of Europe has been the subject of significant historical debate.[[176]](#footnote-176) Yet it is important to note that the continent has never been a single political agent, and that European history in this period is the sum of national and regional actions and of the connections that exist between them.[[177]](#footnote-177) In this context, Spain was as different from other European countries as they were from one another. They faced broadly the same socio-political problems, albeit within markedly different contexts as the role of the state was conceived of differently in different parts of the continent. And this meant that in 1848, the question of legitimacy was not the same question everywhere. In Spain, successive governments had lacked genuine popular legitimacy, and at least some were beginning to question the legitimacy of the liberal state. However, economic, political and social developments in the years before 1848 meant that Spaniards conceived of their state differently from the way outsiders did. And while the middle class was divided between those who considered Narváez’s government legitimate and those who did not, most at least tolerated the Spanish liberal state itself.

## Modernising the State

The instability of the political system encouraged the development of administration in place of politics.[[178]](#footnote-178) The relatively flat structures of the state and the government—the distinction between which was not absolute in this period—affected both the 1848 revolution and the state’s ability to respond to it. Although the functions of the liberal state remained rudimentary by modern standards, they ‘would have seemed beyond the wildest dreams of most pre-revolutionary absolutisms.’[[179]](#footnote-179) In Europe’s absolute monarchies, the leadership of the 1848 Revolution tended to come from the very groups who, in Spain, were already in government (or in parliamentary opposition).

As the Spanish state had developed to align with the interests of this political elite, it had become more centralised. It had also learned more about its citizens and come to control more aspects of their lives. It helped develop a small but politically active bourgeoisie, and this new middle class—propertied, educated, urban and liberal—held proportionately more political power than almost anywhere else in Europe. But, by 1848, genuine modernisation had largely stalled. A shortage of government funds and the absence of a modern tax system stymied the process of state growth by restricting the size of the civil service. At the same time, the difficulties of wealth creation meant that the state rather than enterprise remained the principal generator of wealth.[[180]](#footnote-180) It was this reliance on the state for prosperity which, above all, served to tie the Spanish bourgeoisie to the state. And in 1848, these ties had important implications for the experience of revolution.

In 1836, the prime minister, Juan Álvarez Mendizábal initiated the *desamortización* of monastic property to raise money for the impoverished state, and another round followed in 1841 under Espartero. While existing property owners were probably the largest buyers, there were significant exceptions. And what is certain is that by 1848 Spain had a free market in land. In an articulation of their contested citizenship, some tenant farmers and agricultural labourers—among them a number of women—managed to acquire the land they farmed.[[181]](#footnote-181) Liberal urban elites also became landowners for the first time. Much of the land they bought was in urban areas, but not all. Jaime Ceriola, for example, was a Catalan banker who bought disentailed lands in Ciudad Real.[[182]](#footnote-182) However, this did mean that already scarce capital was redirected from potential investment in commerce and industry. It also helped reinforce the developing oligarchical society, where political and financial power were increasingly intertwined. In Badajoz alone, for example, twenty-seven deputies bought disentailed land.[[183]](#footnote-183) However, among the principal beneficiaries of the process were those close to the government or the opposition, political liberals like Pascual Madoz, Bravo Murillo and José Salamanca. These figures became central to the hegemonic elite, which was increasingly restricted to a small Madrid-centric group with strong familial or social connections.

As oligarchic power replaced theocratic power, there was a striking resetting of relations between Church and state. The Church framed *desamortización* as an anticlerical attack; buyers and sellers of disentailed land were threatened with excommunication, though even priests participated widely in the sales.[[184]](#footnote-184) But in truth, it was a pragmatic rather than a dogmatic policy. It was enabled by the environment of popular anticlerical sentiment in the wake of widespread support among priests for the Carlists during the civil war, but it cannot itself be considered state-sponsored anticlericalism.[[185]](#footnote-185) And, while the relationship between Church and state was changed, it remained strong; almost all politicians remained devoutly Catholic. The Spanish Church remained unstintingly loyal to Isabel, even while the papacy refused to recognise her or her liberal government. Even the Spanish clergy were not universally anti-liberal. Some, including Manuel Lopéz Santaella for example, embraced the more open public sphere. He was involved in efforts to bring the *moderado* party to power in 1843, and he was elected a senator in the same year.

During the 1840s, there was a polarizing of opinion about the Church’s role in the state. As a small number of *progresista* politicians began to call for disestablishment, the *moderados* moved to reconcile with Rome.[[186]](#footnote-186) Despite this, there remained some opposition from within the party to the 1845 constitution, which reaffirmed Spain’s Catholicism and suspended sales of Church lands.[[187]](#footnote-187) Although no move was made to return land already sold, the government was still criticised in the *Cortes* for abandoning purchasers.[[188]](#footnote-188) They also failed to gain party support for a *convenio* agreed in secret with the papacy. Nevertheless, the newly-elected Pope Pius IX and his ‘liberal and tolerant’ nuncio to Spain were widely popular.[[189]](#footnote-189) After he declared an amnesty for political prisoners following his election in 1846, the opposition *Clamor público* compared him favourably with the Spanish government.[[190]](#footnote-190) But while the Church continued to play a central theological and political role, it had to come to terms with a diminished social role in the wake of *desamortización*. The canon of the cathedral in Valladolid preached in 1847 that its ability to offer charity to the poor, for example, had been ‘frozen or deadened.’[[191]](#footnote-191) Yet, as this space opened up for the extension of the liberal state, it lacked the resources to expand into it.

State finances were undoubtedly healthier as a result of *desamortización*, but it did not raise as much as had been hoped.[[192]](#footnote-192) And, like the American gold of the sixteenth century, ecclesiastical lands were a finite resource. This was recognised at the time, and fundamental reforms to the tax system were introduced in 1845. But, based essentially on wealth, these reforms were flawed in both conception and execution. In part this was because *desamortización* had reduced the imperative for modernisation, but the authorities also lacked the resources—and perhaps the inclination—to establish accurate information about the wealth of its citizens. Instead, they relied on locally calculated estimates, leaving the system open to widespread fraud.[[193]](#footnote-193) This clientelism was so blatant that smaller-scale taxpayers considered the system unfair and illegitimate, and tax evasion became endemic among the lower middle classes.[[194]](#footnote-194) The reforms also retained, and even introduced new forms of, unpopular indirect taxation. The *consumo*, a regressive levy on consumption which was theoretically payable even on basic foodstuffs which one produced oneself, elicited particularly vitriolic opposition, especially as the authorities had wide-ranging powers to seize goods acquired fraudulently. A state whose mechanisms are considered illegitimate is unlikely to be considered legitimate itself, but in practice enforcement was erratic.[[195]](#footnote-195) This meant that, at least some of the time, ordinary Spaniards could avoid the demands of the liberal state, often with the help of the state’s own functionaries. And this no doubt weakened popular opposition to its worst excesses.

Opposition was further weakened by the widely accepted principle of a franchise limited by wealth.[[196]](#footnote-196) A growing minority did push for universal manhood suffrage in the years before 1848, but except by a small number of radicals it was not seen as essential to legitimate a government.[[197]](#footnote-197) This left the political system open to manipulation, but it is important to distinguish between electoral corruption, endemic in mid-nineteenth-century Europe, and full-blown electoral fraud.[[198]](#footnote-198) There is little evidence of widespread illegality—stuffing ballot boxes for example—but the exchange of patronage for votes was commonplace. The problem for the state was that such manipulation was systemic, indeed some was government sponsored, and this did affect its legitimacy. During the 1844 election campaign, for example, opposition candidates were imprisoned or deported. In Almería, a state of emergency was declared, ironically because of fears of an electoral conspiracy.[[199]](#footnote-199) There were concerns about the effects of increasing clientelism on the public perception of the Spanish political system. In 1848, albeit after the revolution, politicians from as diverse parts of the political spectrum as Pascual Madoz and Antonio Aparisi Guijarro denounced fraud and proposed electoral reform laws, but these were both ultimately defeated.[[200]](#footnote-200) Whilst Spain’s transition to *caciquismo*—a political system dominated by the power of local political bosses—was not complete by 1848, those within the system already benefitted disproportionally from the growing clientelism and from their ability to use legislation to entrench it. Those excluded were increasingly marginalised. This difference in access to political power served to split the loyalties of the middle classes during the 1848 Revolution.

Generally, European liberals favoured both strong central and strong local bureaucracies. In Spain, José Ortega y Gasset was at least partially right when he identified the failure to create a professional independent civil service as inimical to state construction in the nineteenth century.[[201]](#footnote-201) Successive liberal governments instead filled positions with their supporters, and bureaucrats often came and went with ministers.[[202]](#footnote-202) But, as patronage and the political function of local government became increasingly centralised, the administrative function became increasingly localised. The state lacked penetration locally and, in the absence of an adequate civil service, it came to rely on local governors to enact its reforms. They proved unreliable, and the 1845 *Ley para el gobierno de las provincias* (Law for the government of the provinces) provided for the establishment of *jefes políticos*. Appointed by and responsible to the interior minister, they were given wide-ranging powers at the expense of the *diputaciones*, including oversight of local bureaucracies and finances.[[203]](#footnote-203) This had the effect of narrowing the state as the lines between state and government blurred further. However, a narrow state is able to act quicker when its resources are concentrated. And in a polity where the state is closely aligned to the government, power rests in the hands of the elected ministers, rather than in the hands of officials. In 1848, this put Spain at a distinct advantage compared to both Austria, which had a large and inefficient bureaucracy, and Prussia, where the civil service had a strong sense of independence and widespread sympathy with the liberal revolutionaries.

Weakening local government in favour of centralisation could both legitimise and delegitimise the state in the eyes of its citizens. In the years after the French Revolution, centralisation proved a legitimising mechanism as uniformity was imposed from above, even though local administrations had little real power.[[204]](#footnote-204) The relationship between the 1848 Revolution and local government has been largely neglected, but in Hungary it appears that stronger and more effective local government was a partial solution to the difficulties posed by the national question.[[205]](#footnote-205) In Spain, this difference between whether local administration should constitute an articulation of citizenship or simply an appendix of executive power was fiercely contested, especially in the regional cities which had strong *progresista* tendencies.[[206]](#footnote-206) The *ayuntamientos* were important because they had wide-ranging tax-raising powers, and they controlled the *milicia nactional*, the state’s civilian coercive organ. Local government reform, although a constant feature of the first half of the nineteenth century, remained incomplete and its structure remained contradictory. The reinstatement of the *Ley de Ayuntamientos* in 1845 limited popular elections, made the appointment of mayors the responsibility of central government, and forbade the establishment of *juntas*. This restricted the platform for genuine opposition in 1848 by destroying alternative centres of elected power. In this way, at a local level the Spanish state developed not only to prioritise the interests of central government, but also to preserve social and political order.

The lack of a local bureaucracy and strong central government control of local appointments also meant that, outside the larger centres of population, Spain was persistently under-governed. To help the state penetrate this space, in the 1840s the government instituted a major programme of public works. Poor communication remained perhaps the most significant barrier to state building. The first Spanish railway did not open until 1848, by which point they had been running in Britain for nearly a quarter of a century.[[207]](#footnote-207) It was notoriously often quicker to travel by sea around the peninsula than it was to traverse it by road, but the network had improved. In the mountainous geography, new bridges were often as important as new roads in reducing journey times and transforming communities along the way. The shortage of state functionaries in the provinces with the requisite expertise meant that progress tended to depend on private companies. The tendering process was scarcely transparent, and projects were often dogged by financial irregularities.[[208]](#footnote-208) Yet, generally, the central state was able to move quickly to commission schemes, and there were some notable successes, particularly in the North West.[[209]](#footnote-209) And, by 1848, bridge-building in particular had allowed the state to begin to penetrate even the country’s more liminal spaces. This helped Spaniards to better conceptualise the state and its role in their lives. Although this sometimes brought it into conflict with its citizens, it made it less likely that, as happened elsewhere, they would misconceive of its role.[[210]](#footnote-210)

In the cities, increasing state penetration was more evident still. In 1846, the first law proscribing city planning was passed as Spain took its first steps to approximate European urbanism.[[211]](#footnote-211) In 1834, the opening of the Jardín de las Delicias in Madrid, proof in the words of one contemporary of ‘a new tendency taken by the city’, was just the beginning of the Europeanisation of space in Spain.[[212]](#footnote-212) Revolutions in 1848 were primarily (although not exclusively) urban in nature, and the spaces in which revolutionary events took place were defined by the nature of urbanisation in the period. In Madrid, the concentration of barricades on the narrow streets of the working-class neighbourhoods in which they lived was pragmatic, but the capture of the grand squares—Puerta del Sol and Plaza Mayor—had symbolic significance; Plaza Mayor, reconstructed in 1848, held particular allure as in 1812 it had been renamed Plaza de la Constitución.

Although no Spanish city was completely transformed in the 1840s, *desamortización* allowed some modernisation of the built environment as structures with modern uses replaced disentailed and demolished monasteries. Some such as the Casa Cordero, a modern block of flats built by the *progresista* Santiago Alonso Cordero, played direct roles in the 1848 Revolution. Others were social projects like the Hospital Xifré near Barcelona, and many were local manifestations of state authority like the Palacio de la Diputación in Zaragoza or the Casa Constitucional in Murcia. These buildings did not—and were not intended to—directly coerce Spanish citizens, but they were examples of the production of space by the state. This intervention was designed to reshape and rebalance its relationship with its citizens, and to exercise greater control over their lives and their behaviour.[[213]](#footnote-213)

Fear of mass working-class revolution, however unlikely, meant the maintenance of social order became central to state development more broadly. The judicial system was increasingly politicised and centralised. Its independence did receive some protection in the 1845 constitution. Only the crown could dismiss members of the judiciary who were then subject to trial by an independent court, and judgements in criminal matters were to be made public. However, the constitution made no mention of *judicial power*, instead articulating the *administration of justice* on behalf of the executive. Provincial mayors retained their judicial function, but they were no longer elected, instead appointed by the government or the *jefe político*. Sanctioned on 19 March, a week before the first uprising in Madrid, the 1848 penal code was strongly influenced by Pellegrino Rossi, a conservative Italian jurist with links to the July Monarchy and assassinated by republicans in Rome during the 1848 Revolution there. However, the code itself cannot be considered entirely reactionary, and it included many of the personal and collective freedoms for which revolutionaries elsewhere fought in 1848. Indeed, penal codes are themselves a liberal invention, and Rossi was not without liberal credentials. But the code further extended the reach of politics into the judicial system, and it is infused with the fear of revolution which pervaded *moderado* circles in this period. It became illegal, for example for more than twenty people to gather, without authorisation, to force an increase in the cost of labour or an amelioration in working conditions.[[214]](#footnote-214)

But legislation alone cannot ensure social order, and the Spanish state retained significant coercive power. After the dissolution of the *milicia nacional*, it probably did have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, but it rarely needed to deploy large-scale violence. And, in any case, the significance of this monopoly for state legitimacy has been questioned in recent years.[[215]](#footnote-215) Like the Church, the army remained loyal to the state, even as some of its members did not, and Spanish politics developed a distinctly praetorian nature. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that this necessarily made Spain authoritarian. It is also a mistake to assume that as political leaders, military men have more frequent recourse to the coercive power of the state. In fact, the liberal generals, including Narváez, had fought for parliamentarianism and sought to avoid regular military intervention in government.[[216]](#footnote-216) That said, the army’s increasing role beyond solely a coercive instrument meant the state was in danger of broader militarisation.

To some extent the army compensated for weak bureaucratisation, particularly in the rural world, and the lines between military and civilian became blurred as civilian administrators worked increasingly closely with military leaders.[[217]](#footnote-217) The government-appointed captains general had responsibility for public order within their province, and they had a reputation for authoritarianism. The radical *progresista* José María Orense, for example, claimed that citizens saw their individual freedom at the mercy of the whim of these military governors.[[218]](#footnote-218) But it also meant that the Spanish state faced the 1848 Revolution with an agile structure which emphasised discipline and personal loyalty. Threats were often faced in person by the captain general, who in turn corresponded directly with Narváez as minister of war.

This was in stark contrast to the *milicia nacional*, which had been recruited locally and was closely associated with the *progresistas*. When Narváez came to power, he dissolved it and replaced it with the civil guard. This new outfit functioned it a similar way: policing, maintaining public order and fighting brigandage. It differed primarily in its organisation, becoming subordinate to the army and more militarised in nature. Significantly, guards were posted outside their local communities.[[219]](#footnote-219) This undoubtedly gave the impression of control from above, but it also ensured that the guards were largely immune from conspiracies which originated within local networks. Whilst its establishment owed much to self-preservation, it also demonstrates the genuinely liberal aims of extending the reach of the state and professionalising its functionaries. The *milicia nacional* had been widely perceived as being complicit in—and in some areas even controlling—rural banditry. The defence of property became increasingly important after *desamortización*, and this tenet of liberalism was entrusted to the civil guard.[[220]](#footnote-220) This change in emphasis was symbolic of the subtle realignment of the political power of the Spanish liberal state towards the centre in the years before 1848. It was a process that, for both ideological and pragmatic reasons, remained incomplete, but it provided a unique context for the ideas of the revolution.

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The Spanish state enjoyed a range of structural advantages when compared with states in Central and Eastern Europe. Memories of Napoleonic rule and the Cádiz constitution were contested, but the government had at least a share in their inheritance. And while the constitution failed to provide an exact model for the liberal state, it did provide a broad consensus about its fundamental nature. Spaniards remained relatively well-off and, even if this did not translate to a consistent budget surplus, it allowed the government some flexibility to meet the costs of fighting the 1848 Revolution. They were also more likely to have property to defend in the event of revolution, and therefore more inclined towards public order. The Spanish state remained weak, but in the mid-nineteenth century so too did most others in Europe. And its strength varied throughout the period as its relationship with its citizens developed and changed. Reforms since 1831 had aligned the interests of the state with the propertied middle classes, and on the eve of the revolution they were perhaps as close as they were at any point in the nineteenth century. The state’s victory over autocratic Carlism was complete, and the threat from a militant working class was still far off. There remained those who considered the liberal state, particularly its centralised nature, illegitimate, and the process of modernisation pushed these groups further from the body politic. But any revolution which broke out in 1848 was still at a distinct disadvantage.

# 2

The Shifting Sands

‘I am an old doctor,’ Metternich told the Prussian ambassador in Vienna in October 1847, ‘and I can distinguish between a temporary affliction and a terminal illness; it is the latter which we face now.’[[221]](#footnote-221) He had long recognised that the ultra-narrow model of government re-imposed in Europe after 1815 would ultimately prove unsustainable. In January 1848, Alexis de Tocqueville, on the other side of the revolutionary divide, famously warned the deputies of the national assembly in Paris that they were in danger of ‘falling asleep on a volcano.’[[222]](#footnote-222) Both men recognised something of its causes and background, but a European revolution was still unexpected in February 1848.[[223]](#footnote-223) De Tocqueville’s speech, for example, was met by complacent jeers, and later even he conceded himself that he had never foreseen a revolution such as there was. ‘Who could have expected such a thing?’ he wrote.[[224]](#footnote-224)

In most states, what was clear by the time revolution broke out in February was the delineation of the two sides and the nature of the cleavage which separated them. On the one side were the, often autocratic, elites and on the other, the liberal revolutionaries. In Spain, which already had a liberal hegemony, this distinction was less clear. The ruling *moderados* were divided, but few—if any—had autocratic sympathies, and most were in fact sympathetic to liberal aims elsewhere in Europe.[[225]](#footnote-225) The opposition *progresista* party, long believers in the legitimacy of radical revolution, was also increasingly split. After relatively fair elections in 1846, an influential grouping eschewed revolution altogether, convinced that a path to power lay within the existing system. And they were encouraged by the support of the *puritanos*, a vocal minority of more progressive *moderados*. This reconciliation with the system, though, meant that the party increasingly struggled to represent radical opposition—those who sought much broader representation—at least at national level. Outside the two-party elite and with a strong basis in local politics, potential revolutionary opponents comprised numerous groups, disparate on ideological, geographical and class lines. But most were still recognisable as liberals by European standards.[[226]](#footnote-226)

Some of the contours of the Spanish experience of 1848 prefigure the February Revolution in Paris. There are important antecedents in the country’s revolutionary history and the ideological fault lines were years in the making. Yet, in a sharp reminder of the power of contingency, there was nothing inevitable about the composition of the two sides until news from France reached Madrid. Even then, events of the following month, both in Spain and elsewhere in Europe, brought further changes as alliances seemed to form and reform on an almost daily basis. There would continue to be subtle modifications and ad-hoc local arrangements as revolutionary violence continued into the autumn, but by 26 March the most important questions had been resolved. And the picture that emerged was quite different from that elsewhere in Europe. The liberals were split. Indeed, mostly they supported the government against the revolution. This is important because it is the starting point for all the traditional arguments about the ‘failure’ or ‘defeat’ of the revolution. It explains why no concessions were made as they were elsewhere, why the army remained loyal to the government, and why the insurgents struggled to create the narrative of a national revolution.

## ¡Viva la Pepa!

Social unrest was a persistent feature of post-Napoleonic life, and the idea that by 1848 the Spanish were sick of revolution—attributed to the conservative Marquis de Viluma in 1846—still resurfaces.[[227]](#footnote-227) But before 1848 political unrest remained localised, and such threats to the liberal hegemony was contained by the state apparatus. The Carlists were exceptional in number, with as many as 60,000 men under arms during the civil war in the 1830s, but they too were never able to translate this military power into political power except on a local scale. But, despite this tendency, there was no weakness in Spain’s political culture. Whilst radicalism lacked an established figurehead, by 1848 it was well developed.[[228]](#footnote-228) Evidence from both the public and private spheres—newspapers, *tertulias*, cafés, secret societies and personal correspondence—demonstrate a lively radical movement, which developed predominantly at a local level and built on existing social networks. Nevertheless, it seemed ideologically remote from the political mainstream, represented at national level by just a small number of *progresista* deputies.

The three years of constitutional rule which followed the 1820 Revolution were not the disaster they have long been painted, but they did expose the fundamentally uneasy coalition at the heart of Spanish liberalism.[[229]](#footnote-229) The government faced internal challenges from regionalists and republicans before eventually being deposed by the French army, supported by Spanish royalist volunteers. Between his restoration to absolute rule in 1823 and his death ten years later, Ferdinand directed an unrelenting propaganda campaign against the liberals, such that Spain’s involvement in the next wave of European revolution in 1830-1831 was minimal. The liberal General José María Torrijos did make an unsuccessful attempt at a *pronunciamiento* in Málaga, hoping to reintroduce the 1812 constitution. And, around the same time, the authorities discovered a revolutionary flag, embroidered with the slogan ‘Equality, Freedom, Law’ in the house of the Granadan liberal Mariana Pineda. Despite their contemporaneity, the local and clandestine nature of political networks means it is unclear whether the two were linked, but even as individual examples they demonstrate a continued radicalism across the gender divide. The relaxation of the censorship laws after 1833 allowed this radicalism renewed access to the public sphere. *La Joven España*, for example, published in Reus between 1836 and 1837, was influenced by Mazzini’s Young Italy movement.[[230]](#footnote-230) The republican periodical *El Huracán* was even able to demand that the queen consort ‘be excluded from the tutelage of her daughter and the regency of the kingdom, and that she leave Spain immediately.’[[231]](#footnote-231)

Narváez’s decision to uphold press freedom in the 1845 constitution meant that newspapers continued to be an outlet for opposition, indeed even radical, thought as 1848 approached.[[232]](#footnote-232) One of the most significant titles was *La Atracción*. Heavily influenced by the ideas of Joseph Fourier and edited by the socialist Fernando Garrido, it lasted only six months. But it brought together the men who would establish the radical *demócrata* party after the revolution. Other sources of inspiration were the early anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Etienne Cabet, whose ideas were particularly popular in Catalonia. And it was here, in 1847, that Narciso Monturiol and Abdon Terrades founded *La Fraternidad*. Probably Spain’s first overtly socialist publication, it emphasised an education-led revolution. ‘The future belongs to communism,’ they wrote, ‘because it is reason and it is truth.’[[233]](#footnote-233)

Despite these developments, socialism remained largely a middle-class eccentricity, even if some of its adherents—including Monturiol and Terrades—had been born into working-class families. However, in the weeks before revolution broke out, there is evidence that this was beginning to change. In February 1848 Francisco Javier Moya gave a course on socialism at the Academia del Porvenir, a *progresista* society in Madrid, and on 1 March Garrido first published *La Organización del Trabajo*, which openly called for a resolution to the social question. However, these developments probably came too late to influence more than a small minority before the outbreak of revolution on 26 March.

Although press freedom was guaranteed, journalists found this had increasing practical limitations. Editors were required, after 1844, to deposit significant bonds against future violations by their publications. And on 18 March 1846 the interior minister, Javier de Burgos, introduced a bill authorising the temporary and permanent closure of newspapers for, among other things, ‘assuming that officials are acting with bad intentions.’[[234]](#footnote-234) The move was met with broad opposition, and by 2 May his successor, José Pedro Pidal, had repealed the legislation.[[235]](#footnote-235) But the opposition press did not thank him for it, as this *letrilla* from the satirical *El Tío Camorra* demonstrates:

*Pueden hacer mucho mal They can do a lot of ill*

*entre ella, Mon y Pidal. between her, Mon and Pidal.*

*Pueden hundir la nación They can sink the nation*

*entre ella, Pidal y Mon. between her, Pidal and Mon*

*Puede perder todo el fuego We’ll lose the fire completely*

*de nuestra patria la estrella the star from our* patria

*si no nos libramos luego if we don’t shortly free ourselves*

*de Mon, de Pidal y de ella[[236]](#footnote-236) from Mon, from Pidal and from her*

As well as an outlet for radical thought, this relatively permissive environment allowed more moderate opponents of the government to engage with the public sphere in a non-revolutionary way. Yet in a period of rapid politicisation, even seemingly harmless material could have potentially incendiary effects; the last two lines of the *letrilla*, for example, could easily be interpreted as a call to revolution. While illiteracy levels may have been as high as 90% on the eve of the 1848 revolution, this was no barrier to politicisation.[[237]](#footnote-237) In cafés, opposition newspapers were read aloud, while festivals, songs—including the Hymn of Riego, celebrating the hero of 1820—and chapbooks allowed those without functional literacy access to opposition politics and to radical ideas, helping develop a political sociability among the working classes.

For Maurice Agulhon, this was vital to understanding the nature of events in France in 1848.[[238]](#footnote-238) The conditions in Spain were different, but a similar methodology can be applied in relation to space and nascent—or, as Agulhon would have it, growing—political organisation. Informal encounters took place, as they long had, in the streets and squares of the poorer neighbourhoods, in workshops during the day and in taverns in the evenings. Particularly in the summer months, towns came alive with people meeting, chatting, and relaxing together; often this socialisation, as in the Plaza San Antonio in Cádiz, continued long into the night.[[239]](#footnote-239) The political significance of these informal gatherings was recognised by the authorities, but they took place in spaces which the state struggled to penetrate. In 1845, attempts were made to close taverns in Zaragoza, but they were unsuccessful.[[240]](#footnote-240) Alongside these everyday meetings came increasingly formalised modes of political socialisation. In 1847, Inocencio María Riesco Le-Grand, a monk, soldier and journalist, established the *Velada de Artistas, Artesanos, Jornaleros y Labradores* in Madrid. Located in calle Huertas, the *velada* (evening school) combined the casual socialisation of the street with classes for members and dependents, a games room with cards and dominos, and a mutual aid society. Plans for formalised education and for provincial branches may have come to nothing, but by 1848 it had six hundred members, organised into seventy-four sections based on profession, each with their own elected committee.[[241]](#footnote-241) And such organisations were not exclusive to the capital.[[242]](#footnote-242)

Despite a common experience of informal sociability, individual cities developed distinctive radical cultures based on differing experiences of radical politics. Valencia, for example, developed a particularly active satirical news scene, with *El Sueco* and *El Tabalet* among the periodicals targeting its Catalan-speaking population. Málaga, cradle of the 1820 Revolution and the Torrijos *pronunciamiento*, had several active revolutionary secret societies centred around its masonic lodges. In Barcelona, working-class involvement was more prominent through the friendly societies and co-operatives established to provide support to those working in the cotton industry. Although these were not overtly political, like the *veladas*, they provided an organisational mechanism for the working classes. Smaller towns were not exempt either. In the North West, spontaneous opposition to the Carlists during the war had developed into strong radical networks mirroring existing social networks. So used to local organisation, almost all these groups strongly favoured the devolution of power, and revolutionary unrest often began in the provincial centres. This coherence led Raymond Carr to see the period between 1844 and 1848 as a single prolonged revolution, as ‘an attempt to unite the discontents of the poor and the grievances of soldiers and sergeants.’[[243]](#footnote-243) While this works rhetorically, it tends to obscure the lived reality of this relatively stable period. Although there were revolutionary attempts, they were minor, such as after the *moderado* election victory in 1844, or geographically limited, such as in Galicia in 1846.

After the 1844 elections, the political liberal Juana de la Vega left her post as Queen Isabel’s tutor and returned to her house in A Coruña. Here she hosted political discussions with like-minded Galicians, informed by a flourishing local print culture, including the Proudhon-inspired *El Porvenir*. In Madrid, these *tertulias* were more formalised and more male, like that of *18 de junio* (the date of the 1837 constitution) which had its own building on calle San Jerónimo. But they fulfilled the same purpose: as private spaces for primarily middle class and often radical sociability. In 1846, while this ‘*burguesía de agitación*’ continued their discussions in A Coruña, radical revolution was brewing in nearby Lugo.[[244]](#footnote-244) It was hoped that, as in 1820, a military *pronunciamiento* would spark popular protests. Colonel Miguel Solís and his troops quickly took control of Galicia and began establishing state-like functions, a revolutionary *junta*, and a student battalion. In their newspaper, *La Revolución*, they complained about the liberal ‘dictatorship,’ the suppression of local *fueros* (privileges) and the tax system. They promised instead ‘national independence’, wealth and education. Insisting their uprising was ‘legitimate’ and maintaining their loyalty to the crown, it was in essence the expression of an alternative vision for the liberal state, one with ‘provincialism’ at its heart.[[245]](#footnote-245) In the end, the government dispatched troops and the rebels were defeated just outside Santiago on 23 April. Solís and eleven other men were shot, but they left an indelible mark in the collective radical memory and a revolutionary network which would appear again in 1848.

With the *progresista* party increasingly divided, by 1846 they struggled to advocate for revolution and an alternative radical central *junta* was established. But its attempts to broaden the Galician movement, with uprisings in Madrid and Málaga, proved unsuccessful.[[246]](#footnote-246) The *progresista* figurehead, Baldomero Espartero, remained hugely popular, but radicals had been disappointed by the 1837 *progresista* constitution. It restricted the franchise to around 5% and, together with conscription and an unfair tax burden, had further worn away at mass support for liberalism. In any case, liberalism had probably never been properly understood. After the 1820 Revolution, for example, the new finance minister reported the widespread assumption that taxes would no longer need to be paid.[[247]](#footnote-247) As mass support for liberalism fell, there was a change in radical discourse, most notably a growth of republicanism. During the same period, among the *progresista* elite, popular revolution ceased to be considered a legitimate political tool. Spaniards, particularly those newly excluded from the political system by *moderado* reforms, therefore found new ways to express their politics. This included as many as 776,583 former members of the *milicia nacional*, composed primarily of members of the urban working classes but also professionals, students, and property owners.[[248]](#footnote-248) Their disquiet was exacerbated by increased electoral manipulation and a deficit of representation at a local level, a phenomenon José María Orense called the ‘oligarchy of the districts.’[[249]](#footnote-249)

Even with a reduced franchise and *moderado* attempts to capture the electoral process, the *progresistas* managed to win sixty seats in the 1846 elections, mostly in the major cities. This respectable result helps to explain their adoption of a reformist path within the law and their eschewing of revolutionary phraseology in the years before 1848. But although the threat of *progresista* revolution was no longer articulated, it was not gone completely.[[250]](#footnote-250) At the height of the European subsistence crisis in 1847, riots broke out across Andalucía. The opposition *Eco del comercio* asked of the father, who ‘continually hears his children asking for bread, who perhaps sees them perishing in need: how can he remain impassive to such unbearable misfortune?’ It was better, they wrote, ‘to die from a spear, than from the acute and prolonged pains of hunger.’[[251]](#footnote-251) As George Rudé observed, all authority ignores the legitimate political agency of the poor, instead exceptionally approving of disorder only when politically expedient to do so.[[252]](#footnote-252) It remained to be seen whether it would be so expedient for the party in 1848.

Paradoxically, it has been suggested both that the attempts at revolution in Spain in 1848 were merely bread riots, and that the country did not have a revolution because, by then, grain prices had largely stabilised.[[253]](#footnote-253) However, both explanations ignore the question of political agency. On 7 May 1847, a crowd gathered in Seville to protest at the high price of bread. Their anger was directed squarely at the government, and at the *jefe político* in particular. Women played a prominent role, shielding the men from government forces, carrying stones in their skirts, and launching missiles from their windows at troops below.[[254]](#footnote-254) For Pamela Beth Radcliff, the involvement of women in consumer riots questioned the ‘authority’s ability to live up to its own self-image.’[[255]](#footnote-255) The Spanish state had expanded in the first half of the nineteenth century, but expectation had risen as a result. The political consciousness of the 1847 food rioters was sharpened, not just by their hunger but by a belief ‘that the government had an obligation to act in specific ways’ to remedy it.[[256]](#footnote-256) In the same way, in 1848, the experience of revolution would be shaped by this increased expectation.

Although much revolutionary activity before 1848 took place in the cities, there was also support for radical politics in the countryside. And banditry was perhaps the most primitive form of organised social protest.[[257]](#footnote-257) For José Santos Torres, it was an expression of social conflict between oppressor and oppressed.[[258]](#footnote-258) But it was also more than that. It was evidence of a disconnect between local and state conceptions of legality. These bandits captured the public imagination as Romantic heroes; José María Gutiérrez de Alba’s play about the eighteenth-century Sevillian bandit Diego Corrientes, for example, was staged for the first time in February 1848.[[259]](#footnote-259) By the 1840s this type of armed banditry was in abeyance, but smuggling contraband, with its own antecedence in the *guerrillas* of the Peninsular War, was significant in the mountainous areas of Navarre, Catalonia, Aragón, Valencia and parts of Andalucía.[[260]](#footnote-260) It was no surprise that the resurgent Carlists, now more heavily emphasising localism, found support primarily in these areas.

María Cruz Romeo urged caution in identifying factors which made individuals, who were integrated into communities and corporations, join the Carlists. But she was also right when she argued that broadly they saw liberalism as destructive to their traditions and ways of life.[[261]](#footnote-261) Eugen Weber insisted that peasants saw national issues through local lenses and that ‘national politics’ for most in the countryside was reduced to the extraction of taxes, the imposition of public order, and the meting out of justice.[[262]](#footnote-262) But for some at least, it was also something more: it was about reshaping the Spanish state. This would have local benefits but could only be done on a national scale, and across Europe these rural-urban connectivities were more important to the revolutionary experience than has often been acknowledged. In Hungary, for example, the Society for Equality held its banquet on 8 September, a market day when they knew that large numbers from the countryside would be in Budapest.[[263]](#footnote-263)

In Spain, however, this presented a conceptual as well as practical challenge. *Pueblo* did not have the same meaning as *peuple* or *Volk*.[[264]](#footnote-264) All were projected identities encompassing both nobility and also ignorance. But it was this latter that was most prevalent in Spanish liberal discourse by the mid-nineteenth century, as memories of the 1812 constitution were displaced by ideas of limited suffrage. In France and the German states, the 1848 Revolution itself contributed to the rehabilitation of these concepts as a mechanism for legitimising the movement, but intellectually the process had begun before that. There is little evidence of this in Spain. Press coverage of Espartero’s return from exile in 1848 demonstrates that, even among more progressive sections of the middle classes, views of the ignorant *pueblo* persisted. ‘Considering the miseries and exactions’ the people had suffered, wrote *El Clamor público*, ‘without thinking, perhaps, they turn to the man, whose continuous efforts were focussed on providing for their well-being and freedom.’[[265]](#footnote-265) This sufferance, this reliance on a ‘hero’, and this denial of agency is in stark contrast to the evocations of *peuple* and *Volk* around the same time. It is, however, typical of what Juan Francisco Fuentes called the ‘cyclothymic *pueblo*.’

This was an essential part of their mythologisation. One day the *pueblo* are portrayed rising fearlessly in revolution only to retreat thereafter submissively into the background.[[266]](#footnote-266) This idea has a strong historical antecedence. The *guerrilla* fighters of the Peninsular War were turned into heroes in public, but they were mocked in private.[[267]](#footnote-267) And Restoration Spain was scarcely a place fit for such heroes. The *guerrilla*, even their conservative commander Francisco Espoz y Mina, barely figured in post-war politics. And the same was true of every revolution in the first half of the nineteenth century. Even the radicals, who were committed to universal manhood suffrage, excluded at least one element of the Spanish people. They identified an underclass of the ‘idle,’ whom they deemed inassimilable into society.[[268]](#footnote-268) Geographically, too, it was easy to background the *pueblo*.

It was increasingly clear that the liberal vision for the state was exclusive, with large numbers of increasingly politicised Spaniards deliberately excluded from the political process. However, other than in Galicia where marginalisation under the 1846 electoral law had certainly contributed to the uprising there in the same year, most of Spain remained peaceful and there continued to be little threat to the established order. Traditional explanations do little to explain this unexpected tranquillity. Spaniards were not backward or apolitical, they were not tired of revolution, and they may have been rural, but this did not stop them from being radical. Instead, it may have been this lively radical culture which provided an outlet for the revolutionary momentum which built up everywhere in Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century. Yet there was a practical element too. The opposition remained incoherent, with numerous barriers to both ideological and class coalition, perhaps the most significant of which was that it was not clear whom these groups were opposing. Elsewhere, as 1848 approached, autocratic (or in France’s case increasingly authoritarian) rulers and their ministers personified the state, providing revolutionaries with a clear target. Certainly there were Spanish republicans who opposed the idea of the monarchy, but the constitutional queen Isabel II could not provide such a unanimous rallying point. And while the state was increasingly made in the image of the *moderados*, the party did not yet personify it.

## Moderantismo

Francisco García Chico, a retired cavalry captain, was the head of the Madrid secret police. Known as the *ronda de capa* (the patrol of the cloak), it was primarily a criminal police force. Although crimes could have a political dimension (the building up of arms caches for example), the *ronda’s* influence over politics extended well beyond its nebulous statutory role.[[269]](#footnote-269) It targeted opponents of the *moderados*, and its officers became feared and hated by both radicals and Carlists, even though unlike the political police of the twentieth century terror was not their primary tool, rather a by-product of their activities. In any case, purely coerced control—either for anti-revolutionary purposes or for personal gain—can only ever be possible in a concentrated core.[[270]](#footnote-270) The *ronda*, therefore, functioned more as internal spies, relying primarily on informants. Despite their only mixed success, concerns were growing about Chico’s influence; rumours even suggested that he addressed Narváez using the informal *tú*.[[271]](#footnote-271) The head of the *ronda* and his deputy, Miguel Redondo, were both well-known figures in Madrid, and they had amassed a combined wealth far beyond that of mid-ranking state functionaries. Paintings by Velázquez, Rubens, and Goya adorned Chico’s house in plaza de Mostenses, where he also kept several mistresses.[[272]](#footnote-272) Even in a society where corruption was widespread, this brazen behaviour was criticised even by many *moderados*.

On 15 January 1847, a government commission was established to investigate alleged abuses in Chinchón (Madrid) during the 1846 election. It concluded that even those allegations which could be proven had not influenced the result in the district, and that the victorious *moderado* deputy ought to be admitted to parliament. The opposition presented proof not only that Chico had been in Chinchón at the time, but that he had interceded on behalf of the *moderado* candidate, and that he had threatened the opposition. The government’s response, that he could not have interfered in the election because he did not hold an official post in the town, was wholly unconvincing. But what happened next belies any suggestion that the party had embraced authoritarianism before the February Revolution.

At the end of two days of debate, deputies voted to annul the result by 80 votes to 63.[[273]](#footnote-273) This typifies the *moderado* approach to politics, at least before 1848. The party remained essentially constitutional, not only accountable to the *Cortes* but committed to parliamentary government. Limiting the franchise helped the party electorally, but there was also a genuine belief that a larger franchise was too open to manipulation. A small electorate, they believed, would act ‘independently and on their own initiative’, considering the national interest which was ‘united with their own.’[[274]](#footnote-274) The party took every opportunity to capture the electoral process, but this was common in Britain at the time too.[[275]](#footnote-275) And it did not guarantee success. In provincial elections in the following July, Chinchón voted overwhelmingly for the *progresista* candidate.[[276]](#footnote-276)

The *moderados* had been in power since 1843, when a *pronunciamiento* toppled Espartero’s government. But hegemony had not brought stability. Before Narváez’s return as prime minister on 4 October 1847, the party had had eight different administrations (including two led by Narváez himself). The two parties, joint heirs to the 1812 constitution, had diverged during the 1820-1823 triennium primarily owing to differing interpretations of representation.[[277]](#footnote-277) But by the 1840s this distinction was less clear, and the two parties had become ideologically cumbersome and convergent. To complicate matters further, a significant faction emerged within the *moderado* party—the *puritanos*, and they favoured a system of alternating in power with the *progresistas*. Called the *turno*, the *puritanos* thought it would preserve the legitimacy of the parliamentary system and limit the threat of military-backed revolution.[[278]](#footnote-278) It was this group which seemed to be in the ascendency within the party, controlling administrations for much of 1847, sometimes with the support of the opposition.

If revolution came to Spain in 1848 and pitted moderate *progresistas* against more authoritarian *moderados*, there was no certainty about which side the *puritanos* would take. It is, nonetheless, a mistake to say that the *moderados* were not a party except in name.[[279]](#footnote-279) While the *puritano* faction did stand in the 1846 election against other *moderado* candidates, they differed mainly in approach. And, within the wider party, only the most authoritarian element rejected working with the opposition completely. There continued to be a large degree of coherence about the location of political power. The *moderados—*including the *puritano* faction—favoured the centralisation of power, through the centralisation of the state apparatus, exemplified in the 1845 constitution. For Diego López Garrido, this represented the occupation of the state by the party.[[280]](#footnote-280) But if it did so, then by 1848 this occupation was far from complete.

The party’s legal reforms—culminating in the penal code of 1848 and the civil code of 1851—emphasised this centralised uniformity, but they too were only partially successful. The metric system, for example, officially replaced several different local measurements, but usage was inconsistent. *Fueros* remained in Navarre and the Basque Country, but they were not extended to other regions. The continued reliance on indirect, locally-collected taxes was partly the result of a *moderado* belief that it was vulgar to collect the necessary information for a national tax on income. But the state lacked the ability to do so in any case.[[281]](#footnote-281) The authority of the *jefes políticos* was concentrated in the major towns, and even then it was often precarious. Outside these urban strongholds, regional differences in governance bred discontent and undermined the party’s centralising agenda.

Under *puritano* leadership, the party established the Ministry of Commerce, Education and Public Works, a forward-thinking department designed to ‘govern and administer’ Spain, a kind of guiding light.[[282]](#footnote-282) It also aimed to create the local functionaries which the central state apparatus needed if it were to reduce its reliance on local centres of power. And there was some success. Reforms to the university system, for example, meant that rectors became civil servants, answerable to the interior minister but retaining some intellectual independence.[[283]](#footnote-283) However, most public services—from primary education to public health—were still administered locally, and this led to wide variations in provision.

Although *moderado* centralisation may have been only incomplete, it still made access to power difficult for those outside the existing political class. Some centres of local power did change in social composition during the period, but the same was not true of central power, which remained narrowly defined.[[284]](#footnote-284) This, however, also meant that the *moderados* were unable to exploit the local nature of political sociability in the period to broaden their support base. The *puritano* faction had argued for the development of a local party apparatus to rival that of the *progresistas*, but this was never achieved. Instead they came to rely on greater state administration to compensate for the deficit in representation. This strategy, also employed by the Prussian elites, was first identified by Reinhart Koselleck, who described it as *Verwaltung als Verfassung*, or administration as constitution.[[285]](#footnote-285) This growth of the state administration was aimed primarily at self-preservation. Yet an increasing obsession with preventing revolution proved counterproductive. The state increasingly penetrated civil society, but this process was unchecked by still limited political representation. This led to a kind of chronic stasis for fear of furthering the cause of the revolutionaries, and the government ended up caught between the increasingly politicised working class on the one hand and the disenfranchised capitalist bourgeoisie on the other.[[286]](#footnote-286) It was to this latter group in particular to whom the *puritanos* appealed.

The doyen of their movement was José de Salamanca. Born in Málaga in 1811, he was elected as a deputy in the 1837 elections, moving to Madrid to take up his post. While still serving in the *Cortes* he beat Narváez to the state salt monopoly, one of a number introduced by the 1845 tax reforms. This began a long-standing (but almost certainly exaggerated) rivalry between the two men. Business interests and speculation on the stock market made Salamanca probably the richest man in Spain, and in March 1847 he was named finance minister. Recent work by Miguel A. López-Morell has brought into question the traditional view that his politics were motivated purely by personal gain. Instead, Salamanca instituted reforms to protect the fledgling financial system, as others within the party threatened its suppression. He also devalued the *real* to a more realistic level, improving Spain’s commercial position.[[287]](#footnote-287) However, he did personify a certain reckless brand of liberal capitalism. He had been accused of deliberately spreading panic in the stock exchange to profit from short selling, and the bank he established—the Banco de Isabel II—had to be merged with another after he used its capital to make irresponsible investments. It is, nevertheless, probably unfair to single out Salamanca, even if the scale of his speculation was unrivalled. There was little understanding of the need for regulation, and it is now clear that speculation was itself a principal driver of economic development in the period.[[288]](#footnote-288)

This oligarchic relationship between capital and political power became characteristic of Spanish liberalism, and of *moderado* ideology in particular. In a way, this is hardly surprising. Given that a significant level of wealth was a prerequisite for participation in the political system, it stands to reason that politicians would be among the few who had access to the kind of capital the stock market needed. When he returned to power in October 1847, there was little to suggest that Narváez—who himself continued to hold significant business interests—would seek to alter this relationship. ‘The progress of civilization,’ he told the *Cortes*, depends ‘on the increase in general welfare, which always develops in proportion to the productive power of societies.’[[289]](#footnote-289) In the event, owing to pressure from the party’s conservative wing, Salamanca’s monetary reforms did not survive a week. New regulation was introduced, which not only curbed the worst excesses of the liberal economy but suffocated private enterprise altogether. This undermined the strategy of *Verwaltung als Verfassung* because, once the state became a barrier to the creation of private wealth, the *moderados* alienated the small but increasingly important Madrid financial centre. Many of these men fell just short of the franchise requirement, but now had little chance of earning their way into the political power.

After 1845, the Spanish political system was consciously developed in a way which emphasised order. Because of the long-standing belief in revolution as a legitimate political tool, liberal politics had a reputation as disorderly. The *moderados* sought to remedy this by manipulating the political process, but also by more closely controlling society. This made some sense because memories of the period between 1820 and 1823 centred on disorder. This reputation, encouraged by the propaganda of Ferdinand, was largely misconceived, but it was one which persisted.[[290]](#footnote-290) As a result, the party increasingly aimed to manage public opinion. In the mid-nineteenth century, this was a bold ambition. But they recognised the power of the press; new *moderado* titles flooded the market in the years before 1848. And it was not just the press. In 1847, the interior ministry, established a national theatre to counteract the ‘growing tendency of Spanish theatre to be contentious, mocking, and political.’[[291]](#footnote-291) It is difficult to judge the efficacy of these measures. The party’s opponents understood what was taking place. Newspapers sympathetic to the government had a reputation for propagandising, and their circulation was low.[[292]](#footnote-292) However, the process demonstrates the intention of the *moderados* to expand the idea of ‘order’ into the public sphere, and they would exploit the events of 1848 to exactly this effect.

Narváez had also vowed to carry on the work of the *puritanos*, to ‘regulate the constitutional organism and make possible the *turno* of all parties which truly recognise the queen.’[[293]](#footnote-293) He oversaw Espartero’s return to Spain and appointment as a senator, and his promotion of prominent *progresistas* Facundo Infante and Francisco de Luxán was heralded as another great compromising move.[[294]](#footnote-294) But, unlike the *puritanos*, he did not inspire the trust of the opposition. The *progresista* press accused him of re-opening the *Cortes* only to ‘legalise his acts of reaction, all his atrocities’, and it claimed that even his own deputies would ‘submit to,’ rather than support him.[[295]](#footnote-295) He had a reputation as a domineering presence; *El Espectador* feared his government would be ‘pure Narváez’, Narváez in every ministry, ‘Narváez multiplied by seven.’[[296]](#footnote-296) For *El Clamor público*, he would bring the *moderado* factions together because he was like ‘the sun, king of the planetary system.’[[297]](#footnote-297) Although he was hailed as a compromise figure within the ruling party, this talent was overstated. In truth, his parliamentary majority was insecure, and he was increasingly beholden to the authoritarian wing of the party in matters of policy and reliant on the *ronda de capa* to enforce internal discipline. Soon after he returned to office, between six and eight officers of the *ronda* followed Francisco Serrano and Antonio Ros de Olano, former *puritano* ministers of war and education respectively, to a late-night meeting.[[298]](#footnote-298) A few days later, both men left Madrid.[[299]](#footnote-299)

Despite increasing criticism of his influence over the party, Narváez had a genuinely fair reputation as a liberal. In 1837, he had supported the return of the 1812 constitution and widespread newspaper coverage by Andrés Borrego had made him a hero of the Carlist War. Yet the *moderados* were the party of the elite; Juan Valera wrote that they were ‘long on champions but short on people.’[[300]](#footnote-300) It is likely that when the *moderados* claimed widespread popularity of their programme in 1845, it was ‘closer to propaganda than reality.’[[301]](#footnote-301) In fact, according to one foreign observer writing in 1847, Spanish politicians of all persuasions were deeply unpopular.[[302]](#footnote-302) However, even *Eco del comercio* ‘painfully’ admitted that there were Spaniards who would support the Narváez ministry in 1847.[[303]](#footnote-303) And, at a time when only one percent of the population was eligible to vote, the importance of widespread popularity must not be overstated. The *moderados* were committed to this restrictive franchise, neither seeking the support of the masses nor generally articulating its support in terms of the popular will. Instead, they sought backing from a coalition of the politically powerful: the urban upper-middle class and the rural nobility—by the 1840s these two groups overlapped somewhat—together with smaller numbers of professionals. If they were popular, it was in a paternalistic sense. The *moderados* believed their policies to be good for the poorer classes, offering them ‘order in the face of revolution.’[[304]](#footnote-304) It was on this, rather than crude popularity, that they hoped to rely.

Public order was a priority for the new propertied middle class, and the question preoccupied politicians of all persuasions. For the *moderados* it became an obsession, not just maintaining public order but being *seen* to maintain it. Narváez, it was said, offered ‘asylum in the shadow of his dictatorial sword.’[[305]](#footnote-305) But this was only ever a myth. While rhetorically public order may have been a precondition for state modernisation, really it was a legitimising mechanism for the liberal hegemony. Even then, it was one to which the *moderado* party’s commitment wavered in the face of short-term power gains. The clearest example of this was the coup which brought them to power in 1843, which Borrego described as the most popular Spain had seen since 1808.[[306]](#footnote-306) Nevertheless, the 1846 election demonstrates that the party remained mostly subordinate to the law. Low-level interference may have been widespread, but Chinchón was unusual, and the result seems to have been broadly fair. This legality also united the *moderado* party. The *puritanos* may have favoured accommodating the *progresistas* within this legality, but they feared popular revolution as much as the rest of the party. Moreover, public order increasingly relied upon recourse to state violence, and this began to erode *moderado* support among urban liberals. On 5 October 1847, the day after Narváez returned to government, Chico walked triumphantly through the Puerta del Sol as though he had never been away. The opposition press considered it ‘the worst symptom of the new situation, and the one that most characterises the future policy of General Narváez.’[[307]](#footnote-307)

Although it remained low, the *moderado* reforms since 1843 had increased the capacity of the state apparatus. But perhaps more importantly they had increased its agility, making it dramatically more effective than it had been, even if only where its capacity was concentrated. This meant that the *moderados* did not have to rely solely on coercive power to guarantee public order. In May 1847, the bakers of Madrid wrote to the *jefe político* urging action as prices climbed to levels likely to provoke unrest. ‘Hunger,’ wrote *El Tiempo* in a typical response by the conservative press, ‘is a malicious adviser to the people and a very powerful auxiliary to the revolutionary parties.’[[308]](#footnote-308) As a result of this increased expectation across the political divide, the state’s intervention in response to the European food shortages was almost unparalleled. To some extent, this was an embrace of populism to avoid public disorder. The internal tariffs and unpopular *consumo* were suspended—a tactic the government would repeat in March 1848. But the government’s response also encompassed an export ban and the establishment of a state grain reserve.[[309]](#footnote-309) In this way, it was an expression of the benefits of state centralisation as, arguably, the initial reaction to hoard grain by some local authorities had exacerbated the crisis.[[310]](#footnote-310) It was also an example of *Verwaltung als Verfassung*, which in turn increased that expectation and broadened it to incorporate an expectation of greater political representation. And this was not the only tension at the heart of *moderado* ideology.

For the party, public order was a priority, but this was increasingly conceived of as an extension of political order. Such a conception may have garnered them support in the short term, particularly among those who associated more progressive forms of liberalism with chaos, but it was only partially successful before 1848. And these attempts to impose political order entrenched an inflexibility into the liberal system, undermining confidence in the political process.[[311]](#footnote-311) The 1846 election reveals that, while the party had not yet succumbed to authoritarianism in an effort to keep its grip on power, this was increasingly in the balance. Which way it would tip would only become clear when revolution broke out in 1848.

## News from Paris

The first revolutionary event of 1848, an uprising in the Two Sicilies, is often side-lined by historians because the relationship between the February Revolution in Paris and the revolutions in Central Europe is much more obvious. However, at least in the Spanish case, the events which began in Palermo on 12 January deserve greater consideration. As the rebels quickly overwhelmed the army, the Spanish ambassador, the *moderado* Duke de Rivas, interceded with the king on their behalf. Through the queen mother, he helped persuade the king to grant a constitution based on the *moderado* constitution of 1845. Jubilant crowds made their way through the capital Naples, cheering the ambassadors in turn. ‘Long live Queen Isabel! Long live her representative! Long live constitutional Spain!’ they cried when they reached the Spanish legation. The duke congratulated the protesters, leading them in *vivas* to the king, to the new constitution, and to the Neapolitan people.[[312]](#footnote-312) He had believed that liberal concessions were the best way to safeguard the Bourbon throne. However, a letter from the author Juan Valera—working then as a junior diplomat in the Spanish embassy—shows that such liberal concessions were soon no longer sufficient to appease the Sicilian revolutionaries.[[313]](#footnote-313) It is important not to push the comparison with Spain too far, but the duke’s attitude towards the revolution cooled markedly as its implacable demands became clearer. The Spanish government would perhaps learn this lesson too well.

In 1789, the prime minister, the Count of Floridablanca, had done everything he could to keep the news from Paris out of the newspapers. In 1848, there was no hope of doing the same. On 25 February, the first news of the grand opposition banquets in the French capital appeared in the Madrid press. *Eco del comercio* predicted that for the government there, ‘a few more days existence means nothing: the end is inevitable.’[[314]](#footnote-314) The following day the British ambassador received a telegram with the news, and the *progresistas* asked for clarification in the *Cortes* as rumours spread at the stock exchange. The foreign secretary replied that he had received no official confirmation, but he would not have to wait long.[[315]](#footnote-315) Assurances in the *moderado* press the next day, that Spain would ‘remain completely calm, while our neighbours cross the stormy sea of ​​revolutions,’ did little to reassure the public.[[316]](#footnote-316) In Barcelona, people dressed in Phrygian caps in apparent solidarity with the Parisian revolutionaries.[[317]](#footnote-317) On 29 February, the queen’s cousin, Enrique de Borbón proclaimed his support for the provisional government from Toulouse, where he was living in exile.[[318]](#footnote-318) He had a reputation as a revolutionary, and whilst claims of his involvement in the 1846 Galician uprising are difficult to verify, he retained strong connections with the Spanish radicals.[[319]](#footnote-319) However, the government were sufficiently confident that his support would lead to no immediate revolutionary contagion that its own newspapers reprinted the article early in March.[[320]](#footnote-320)

After the events in February, there appeared to be a geographical and chronological coherence to the uprisings which followed. This coherence was fostered by revolutionaries across Europe, and Spain was no exception.[[321]](#footnote-321) ‘There are times that are stronger than men,’ anticipated *El Observador*.[[322]](#footnote-322) As usual, the *moderado* press emphasised Spain’s singularity, chiefly the unique popular support which the government continued to enjoy. The majority of the nation, reported *El Heraldo* wryly, ‘has not yet noticed this alleged tyranny which overwhelms them.’[[323]](#footnote-323) Nevertheless, although the official message was that Spain would prove untouched, even this was a concession that a revolutionary wave was likely to break over the continent. Further belying this supposed hubris, on 28 February, Narváez presented a bill to the *Cortes* requesting the suppression of individual guarantees, as well as the authority to collect emergency taxes and to raise a loan of 200 million *reales*.[[324]](#footnote-324) It was a significant, though probably not seminal, moment. And such a course of action had certainly not been inevitable. Although the government had resolved to prepare for trouble, there were strong indications that ministers would recognise a Spanish republic were the revolution to install one.[[325]](#footnote-325) In part, this was an atavistic continuation of the belief in revolution as a legitimate political tool, but also there was no appetite for another civil war. The *moderados* realised, however, that the opposition were in a difficult position too. ‘Would our *progresistas* accept the support of the French republicans to topple the Spanish throne?’ asked *El Heraldo* mischievously.[[326]](#footnote-326)

Neither this dilemma nor the interventions of the *jefes políticos* stopped the opposition press reacting uproariously to the bill. And the government’s censure of *El Espectador*—for calling on the queen to veto it—was met with a joint highly-critical editorial which ran in all the *progresista* titles the following day.[[327]](#footnote-327) The opposition press pinned their hopes on a peaceful change of government, which, they reasoned, would head off the dual threats from *moderado* authoritarianism and radical revolution. The problem was that there was no obvious candidate to lead it. Espartero seemed content in internal exile in rural Logroño and, in any case, was embroiled in a row over drawing a salary and requesting back pay for his regency. Although he remained popular with ordinary Spaniards, even if he had been inclined to lead a coup, he was under constant surveillance.[[328]](#footnote-328) In a speech to the *Cortes* on 3 March, the *progresista* deputy Salustiano de Olózaga offered to form a government to ‘maintain tranquillity, increase the prosperity of the country, free it from civil war, anarchy and foreign troubles.’[[329]](#footnote-329) He had been prime minister in the early forties and was a possible candidate to take on the role again. However, according to the British ambassador, though he was ‘anxious for this kind of power,’ he was ‘reluctant’ to seize the opportunity. He recommended, instead, Patricio de la Escosura.[[330]](#footnote-330) But neither he nor the radical José María Orense, who had impressed with interventions in the *Cortes* against the emergency measures, could command parliamentary support.

It was not just these internal weaknesses which disrupted *progresista* plans. If the emergency legislation was simply a power grab, then the government went to great lengths to disguise the fact. The preamble to the bill reiterated that the powers would only be used as a last resort, and it was as much directed at the threat of French invasion as at domestic revolution.[[331]](#footnote-331) It was also entirely legal. Article 8 of the 1845 constitution specifically allowed, through legislation, for the suspension of individual liberties in extraordinary circumstances if the security of the state required it.[[332]](#footnote-332) It was likely this which united the *moderado* party; of the *puritanos*, only Andres Borrego voted against the government. ‘At critical moments,’ the *moderado* Alberto Felipe Baldrich told the senate, ‘danger gives legitimacy.’[[333]](#footnote-333)

This put the *progresistas* in a difficult position. In February 1848, it was clear that the security of the state was threatened by popular revolution and, given the way the radicals had drifted from the mainstream opposition, there was no guarantee that the *progresistas* would be called on to form a post-revolutionary government. Furthermore, the country at large was increasingly fearful of the radicals. As the British ambassador wrote, ‘the name Republick is so unpopular here.’[[334]](#footnote-334) In the event, many *progresista* deputies voted with the government, demonstrating what Borrego sardonically called their ‘proof of patriotism.’[[335]](#footnote-335) This did not necessarily mean that they supported the establishment of a dictatorship. The bill did not make provision for the suspension of the *Cortes*, which was eventually done by royal decree rather than by parliamentary vote.[[336]](#footnote-336) Nevertheless, it was clear that the *progresista* leaders would not lead a revolution, despite support from the more radical minority and from some local parties. This also demonstrated the limits of localism among the party elite. They favoured local diversity of institutions into which the populace was organised, but they could not accept locally independent corporate strength over the authority of the state.

Although the radicals enjoyed support from large numbers of soldiers, they lacked representation among senior officers. The strength of anti-radicalism among the *progresista* generals meant that a *pronunciamiento*—which by 1848 was the primary mechanism for changing a government—was also beyond the reach of the revolutionaries. Significantly, the *pronunciamiento* still retained some measure of legitimacy; popular radical revolution on the other hand remained largely untested in this respect. Although 2 May 1808 had been mythologised in such a way, Spain had little history of popular revolution on the French model. The working class of Madrid were less politicised and markedly fewer in number than their Parisian counterparts, and the city lacked the social and cultural dominance of the French capital. Grain prices had largely recovered, but the working classes were still poor both historically and relative to elsewhere in Europe. Some at least were therefore concerned more with day-to-day survival than with politics. While poverty could have been a catalyst for popular revolution among the working classes in the nascent industrial centres, the government had learnt its lesson from the bread riots of 1847. Threats of rising unemployment in Catalonia were met with a large state-sponsored road-building programme.[[337]](#footnote-337) This intervention in the labour market left students, artisans, professionals, and lone or small bands of soldiers as the groups from which a revolutionary core was most likely to emerge. Yet these groups lacked both a coherent leadership—leaders rarely emerge from the crowd—and the numbers for a mass movement.[[338]](#footnote-338)

Any hopes that help would arrive from across the Pyrenees were dashed when the French revolutionary government sent a manifesto to the European powers on 2 March. Alphonse de Lamartine, the foreign minister, insisted that France wanted ‘to join the family of established governments as a regular power, and not as a threat to the European order.’[[339]](#footnote-339) Persuading Spain of its amity was particularly important as, in case of trouble with the other powers, the French government needed to avoid fighting on two fronts. What is more, they named Ferdinand de Lesseps, who was friendly with the *moderados*, as ambassador designate. Given their previous cordial relations with the government of Louis Phillipe, the *moderados* could scarcely have counted on this when revolution broke out in February. Instead there had been genuine fear of, and largescale preparation for, a revolutionary invasion. It is difficult to judge the significance of these developments across the border. They certainly strengthened Narváez’s hand, and it is likely that they also hardened his approach.

The British government by contrast to the French was naturally predisposed towards the *progresistas*. However, in 1848 Lord Palmerston, the foreign secretary, remained deeply fearful of popular uprisings and their effect on the European balance of power. Britain may have supported a *pronunciamiento* to install a *progresista* government but, despite the pervasiveness of the narrative, it is highly doubtful that they would ever have supported a popular armed insurgency.

Strengthened by geopolitical changes, the government was granted powers to suspend constitutional guarantees on 13 March. The passing of the bill, the suspension of the *Cortes*, and the decision to resist the revolution by force are often conflated to suggest that the government was ‘ready to fight’ when revolution broke out in Paris.[[340]](#footnote-340) But it was not until 22 March—more than a week after the bill was passed—that, with revolution imminent, the *Cortes* was suspended by decree. It had remained sitting, for example, despite reports of the republic being proclaimed in Marbella (Málaga) on 17 March.[[341]](#footnote-341) There also remained hope that a last-minute compromise with the *progresistas* would stave off the threat of armed conflict. There was little of surprise in their demands, which included electoral reform, reinstitution of trial by jury, rearming the *milicia nacional* and reform of local government. ‘We are not moved or blinded by self-interest or petty party calculations,’ they wrote.[[342]](#footnote-342) There seemed to be a genuine cross-party interest in avoiding revolutionary violence. The cabinet met on 24 March to discuss the threat of imminent revolution. Francisco Martínez de la Rosa, who had served as prime minister after the 1820 Revolution and had a reputation for compromise, admitted that events in Central Europe had taken him by surprise. He argued for the urgent adoption of a more liberal policy, and Narváez seemed inclined to agree. It was reported that he was ready to grant at least some of the concessions demanded by the *progresistas*.[[343]](#footnote-343)

This met with fierce resistance from Antonio de los Ríos Rosas and Pedro José Pidal on the authoritarian wing of the party, who insisted on a policy of armed resistance.[[344]](#footnote-344) How much persuasion Narváez took is not clear, but he was certainly under pressure. Rumours began circulating that the authoritarians were ready to replace him with the former captain general of Cuba, Leopoldo O’Donnell.[[345]](#footnote-345) Others within the party felt that he was too authoritarian, though nothing came of the British ambassador’s claim that his replacement by the Marques de Miraflores, an anodyne party grandee, was imminent. But, even as late as 22 March, José de Salamanca had an audience with the queen mother about forming a *puritano* administration to stave off the radical threat. Enthusiasm for Narváez may have been limited, but no other candidate could command enough support to replace him; Salamanca’s meeting, for example, lasted just ten minutes.[[346]](#footnote-346) And, in truth, fighting the revolution was probably the only option palatable to the majority of *moderados*. Although the state had experience of suppressing popular revolution in Galicia in 1846, there was no guarantee of success. The Swedish army had put down a rising in Stockholm on 15 March, but it is unclear whether news of this had reached Spain before the cabinet meeting, and as Martínez de la Rosa noted events elsewhere in Europe gave little reason to be optimistic about such an approach.

Interpretations which suggest that a revolution suited the *moderados* are therefore probably wide of the mark.[[347]](#footnote-347) However, the absence of the spontaneous contagion seen elsewhere did give the government time to further prepare and strengthen the state apparatus. Rumours that Chico was arming former royalist volunteers were probably just that.[[348]](#footnote-348) But Barcelona, with its five-thousand strong French population and proximity to the Carlist conflict, for example, had a garrison five battalions strong.[[349]](#footnote-349) The captains general were warned to be vigilant of threats to public order and, there was little to suggest that the army would not remain loyal. Nevertheless, concerns about the precarity of the liberal consensus persisted. The February Revolution had exposed profound disagreements within the elite about the location of political power, about the extent of representation and about the nature of the state. By late March, for some these disagreements had become a cleavage which could no longer be resolved through normal, constitutional means. *Progresista* support for the lawful suppression of individual guarantees did not necessarily equate to support for military action against the revolution, and many individual *progresistas* would strongly oppose it. That said, neither the party nor their allies in the army were likely to support the revolution either, therefore this cleavage was increasingly likely to be resolved by the very kind of popular uprising which Narváez, the government and the opposition had so desperately tried to avoid.

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As is always the case with revolutions, a cleavage opened in the body politic. What made 1848 in Spain unusual was that neither the nature nor the locus of this cleavage was certain until revolution broke out on 26 March.

In the month after news arrived from Paris, some of the contours of the revolution had become clearer. The government could be reasonably certain that it no longer faced a threat from the *puritanos* within its own party, from the opposition *progresista* elite, or from revolutionary France. None of this could have been taken for granted before the February Revolution. Furthermore, it was making good progress against the Carlist insurgency in Catalonia and had built up a small but agile state apparatus to ensure public order, both coercively and through the amelioration of everyday life. It could also be reasonably confident in the loyalty of the army and of the Church.

But there is nothing quite like the outbreak of revolution to expose hidden weaknesses in an apparent edifice of state strength. And it would only be in the mêlée that its legitimacy would be tested among the population at large. The events which followed did expose some of those assumptions and, as the year progressed, the revolution presented threats which could scarcely have been conceived of on 26 March.

# 3

The Spanish Revolution of 1848

Despite the preventative actions by the government, the revolution could not be contained. And when it finally broke out on 26 March, it hit right at the heart of *moderado* power in Madrid. This was the first of three occasions when the revolution mobilised large numbers in the spring of 1848. Violent clashes between government forces and radicals erupted again in the capital on 7 May, and then less than a week later on 13 May in Seville, the country’s third largest city. These were more serious outbreaks of revolutionary violence than the others in Spain during that tumultuous year. And they fit comfortably within the European revolutionary paradigm of 1848, where those excluded from political power took up arms to demand representation. All three had the potential to bring down the government, both in reality and—perhaps more importantly—in the perceptions of the revolutionaries and the authorities alike.

On each occasion, the state response was rapid and decisive, with Narváez himself taking to the saddle on more than one occasion. And this marks a rupture with the pattern in other European capitals, where authorities seemed largely paralysed in the face of the revolution.[[350]](#footnote-350) However, the narrative of a straightforward military defeat is too neat, oversimplifying the complexities of the three events, as on each occasion the balance tipped more than once in favour of the revolutionaries.

The state had a number of structural advantages, but revolution—particularly when the army was involved—remained a powerful force in Spanish politics. It may have been clear that the *progresistas* would not initiate an armed uprising, but that does not mean that they would not have sought to take advantage of one. 1848 was the first concerted national revolutionary attempt since the state reforms of the 1840s, and it was also not clear how ordinary Spaniards would react to the violent suppression of revolution, which was still considered by many to be a legitimate political tool. Although in the end the government was able to rely on the support of the bulk of the middle class, this support was far from certain on 26 March. On the one hand, bourgeois interests had come to align closely with those of the state, but on the other, there was still a significant deficit of representation among the increasingly politicised middle and working classes. While in France it had been attempts to suppress legal modes of opposition which had been the catalyst for the February Revolution, in Spain concerns about public disorder had exposed the growing authoritarian tendencies of at least some within the *moderado* leadership. The government could decide to fight, but this did not guarantee that they would win.

In some ways, the three major revolutionary attempts in 1848 followed the pattern which had been established in the years since Riego’s *pronunciamiento* in 1820. However, there were some significant departures from this model, and these departures make the influence of the European Revolution clear. As the locus of state power and the most governed space in the empire, Madrid was an unusual centre for revolution. Almost all Spain’s previous revolutions had broken out in the less-governed provincial cities. The uprising of 13 May in Seville, therefore, fits much more neatly into this Spanish national revolutionary paradigm, but here too there were important deviations in the broad leadership and composition of the revolutionaries. And, unusually for revolutions in Spain during the first half of the nineteenth century, the 1848 Revolution struggled to make even short-term gains. In each case challenges proved insurmountable, and Miguel Artola was essentially right when he wrote that the Spanish 1848 Revolution was a ‘total failure of synchronisation.’[[351]](#footnote-351) But the reasons for this failure of synchronisation are diverse, and none is entirely satisfactory, particularly as revolutionaries elsewhere in Europe overcame largely the same barriers.

## 26 March (Madrid)

On Sunday 26 March 1848, the fragile peace was broken. The queen, accompanied by a number of her ministers, was enjoying the pleasant spring evening in the Salón del Prado, a tree-lined avenue to the east of the city. At six o’clock, shots were heard. Panic broke out, and within ten minutes the park was deserted. Shawls, canes, umbrellas, and hats lay abandoned on the lawns.[[352]](#footnote-352) Along the promenade cries of ‘*¡Viva la república!*’ rang out, including some possibly directed at the queen herself. Not far away, the bullet-riddled carriage of Juan Bravo Murillo, minister of commerce, instruction, and public works, was overturned.[[353]](#footnote-353) In those first hours, there was little to suggest that the Spanish government would not succumb, just as those elsewhere in Europe either had done or would do that spring. But, like every revolutionary attempt in Spain in 1848, the 26 March insurgency ultimately proved unsuccessful, and—to widespread surprise—the government survived to see 1849.[[354]](#footnote-354)

The outbreak of revolution was the result of combined plots by José María Orense, the radical *progresista* deputy, and Lieutenant Colonel Joaquín de la Gándara. De la Gándara had previously attempted unsuccessfully to solicit support for a revolution from the French minister, Armand Marrast.[[355]](#footnote-355) And by the time the two leaders finally met on 24 March through Francisco Labrador, an intermediary and civil servant, de la Gándara’s conspiracy was already well-advanced.[[356]](#footnote-356) Providing funding from his own pocket, he had instructed Lieutenant Ricardo Muñiz—who had been acquitted of involvement in a similar plot in September 1845—to co-ordinate the build-up of arms.[[357]](#footnote-357) The lieutenant employed artisans, including a shoemaker, in four separate workshops. One workshop was almost discovered by the local police, but the revolutionaries proved generally adept at avoiding the attention of the authorities.[[358]](#footnote-358) Their wives were sent out to purchase gunpowder in small quantities on their behalf, for example, suggesting women in the period were less likely to arouse suspicion than men, even though they were also involved in political conspiracies.[[359]](#footnote-359) At their meeting, the conspirators discussed who would lead the insurrection. Consideration was given to Gregorio Villavicencio, who had been governor of Barcelona during the *Jamància*, but they eventually took the advice of another veteran revolutionary Miguel Ortiz Amor. ‘Gallego’, a café owner from Tirso de Molina who claimed to have four hundred men, was chosen to lead the day.

Little is known about the man. *El Español* reported that the leader ‘seemed foreign or Catalan, with a very strong accent.’[[360]](#footnote-360) But Gallego is both a common surname and the Spanish word for a Galician. Given the many other connections between the two events, it is certainly possible that he was a veteran of the 1846 uprising in the North East. And it appears that he was never caught. Most revolutionaries were unlikely to have known or recognised these leaders, even if they knew their names, as they were organised into local cells. Communication was also difficult. They had to devise a system of signs to identify one another, and a blast of artillery was supposed to signal the beginning of the revolution on 26 March.[[361]](#footnote-361) While it is possible that a shot fired in one part of the city would be heard elsewhere, amidst the noise or armed street fighting it was hardly guaranteed.

Cafés became central to the events of 26 March, so perhaps it should not be surprising that a café owner was chosen as the movement’s leader. The cafés were, as Balzac described, ‘the parliament of the people,’ a space where different social groups converged.[[362]](#footnote-362) And this was important for a revolution that so struggled to broaden its appeal beyond existing social networks. On the day itself, the leaders—who on 26 March did transcend different social groups—met at the Café de San Sebastián and also in the offices of the opposition newspaper *El Espectador*.[[363]](#footnote-363) There had already been a disagreement about the date of the rising, Orense had won the argument despite reservations from de la Gándara that they needed time to stockpile more arms. This general shortage of firearms was felt by revolutionaries everywhere in 1848, and the contemporaneity of the uprisings across Europe had further increased demand.[[364]](#footnote-364)

Quite what had driven Orense’s urgency is uncertain. One argument is that the British had come out in favour of a *progresista* uprising.[[365]](#footnote-365) The evidence for this is a letter from the British foreign minister, Lord Palmerston, dated 16 March. Although later published in *El Clamor público*, it was not public knowledge before the middle of April. Indeed, it is not clear that Palmerston, or his ambassador in Madrid Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, did in fact support the revolution. They certainly favoured the return of the *progresistas* to government, and within the *moderado* party this was understandably unwelcome. However, this does not mean that they supported violent popular revolution, particularly as *progresista* involvement would be decidedly limited. Bulwer himself was disparaging of the revolutionaries, describing them as ‘the most inconsiderate and inconsiderable of the malcontents,’ who took to the streets ‘without plan or order.’[[366]](#footnote-366) And most British politicians worried about the consequences of mass revolutionary violence, even those sympathetic to the aims of the revolution. It is not even certain what, on 26 March, these revolutionary aims were. The original plan seems to have been to seize the queen and her ministers and hold them hostage until they agreed to a new *progresista* ministry led by Patricio de la Escosura.[[367]](#footnote-367) Alternatively, or more likely additionally, the revolutionaries intended to capture the post office in Puerta del Sol by force.[[368]](#footnote-368) Too close an association with either action was scarcely likely to appeal to the British.

The *moderado* government probably already knew about the plans before 26 March, although this did not mean that their victory was assured. And their information was not wholly reliable. On 24 March, the quasi-official *El Heraldo* published a story claiming that a conspiracy had been uncovered and disrupted.[[369]](#footnote-369) But they did not have the details, and a number of individuals were falsely accused. For example, a priest, named by the *moderado* newspaper *El Popular* as among those involved, wrote a strong refutation on hearing the news from friends two days later.[[370]](#footnote-370) However, by the time fighting broke out on the afternoon of 26 March, the authorities did know the specifics of the plot. Fernando Garrido attributes this to an informer, who sold the revolutionary plans to the authorities.[[371]](#footnote-371) The porous nature of conspiratorial networks—in spite of their basis in social networks—would become a recurring problem for the revolutionaries in Spain in 1848. But even the most optimistic of *moderados* could hardly have foreseen this at the time.

On the morning of 26 March, large numbers of armed civilians gathered expectantly in their districts. Estimates differ and claims of individual participation are difficult to verify. The leaders of the Prado district, who met in the Café del Recreo, may have led as many as 1,200 men.[[372]](#footnote-372) But it seems unlikely that so many were involved in the actual fighting, at least not all at the same time. There is also some doubt whether the 400 fighters, whom Gallego had promised the leaders of the revolution, ever actually turned up.[[373]](#footnote-373) The British ambassador estimated that between five and six hundred men manned the barricades across the city, a figure also quoted by Miguel Morayta.[[374]](#footnote-374) This seems a reasonable estimate, but this number would not have been fixed. The fighters came from a variety of backgrounds, and they would have come and gone as the evening progressed. Among the revolutionaries were twelve Aragonese from Zaragoza, who reportedly formed a ‘legion of demons’ in the fighting around Sol.[[375]](#footnote-375) In Plaza Mayor, a fourteen-year-old boy, José Iglesias, was among the fighters.[[376]](#footnote-376) And among the leaders was a man who gave his name as Barbès and claimed to be French.[[377]](#footnote-377)

According to Pirala, around midday, word got back to the leaders from Gallego that most of these revolutionaries had gone to lunch and that the insurrection would have to be called off.[[378]](#footnote-378) This much-repeated story is convenient for those who wished to juxtapose the chaotic revolution with the government’s apparently more efficient approach.[[379]](#footnote-379) But Garrido’s account seems more convincing. He wrote that the leaders called off the revolution because the plot had been compromised, and that it continued because some of the men either did not receive the order to stand down, or they were suspicious of its veracity.[[380]](#footnote-380) This ties in with what Narcisco de la Escosura, who was in charge of the Lavapiés district, later told the British ambassador. He and José Arellano, at the Café Español, ignored the order and took to the streets because they felt, as the plans were already known to the government, it was too late to stop.[[381]](#footnote-381) And there seems to have been broad support for this course of action. Those guarding de la Gándara’s armouries in Lavapiés, for example, gave the fighters access to their weapons.[[382]](#footnote-382) However, de la Escosura may also have been stockpiling his own armoury because, even beforehand, he had had misgivings about the leadership.[[383]](#footnote-383) Hortelano claimed similarly that the men of his district waited in the Prado for the appointed hour without hearing the artillery signal, before being told to stand down.

Men cried out, ‘Betrayal! They’ve sold us out!’ The leaders returned to the Café de Recreo while the fighters stayed, still waiting for the signal. The men from the Prado district found their armoury empty, and by the time they reached the other armouries these too were also empty, giving further fuel to the rumours of betrayal.[[384]](#footnote-384) Although on this occasion the revolutionaries had managed to forge a conspiracy which brought together people from different social groups, keeping this coalition together proved more difficult. The fighters abandoned their leaders and made for Plaza Mayor where they built barricades at the entrances to the square and engaged with government troops, shouting ‘*¡Viva la república!*’

At about four o’clock in the afternoon, revolutionaries led by de la Escosura left Lavapiés and headed to Tirso de Molina, joining smaller bands and recruiting residents on the way. Once there, they exchanged fire with the *ronda*, and Miguel Redondo was killed. One allegedly shouted, ‘There is no greater authority than the people’ at his wounded body.[[385]](#footnote-385) Chico’s deputy died from his injuries a few days later. As during the *Dos de Mayo* rising, violence against those perceived to embody the state had become legitimated.[[386]](#footnote-386) One problem with defining state and political power in such narrow ways is that those at the top are well known, and they can become targets of revolutionary violence. Another group of revolutionaries, from the *Velada de artistas y artesanos*, marched to Plaza de Santa Ana. There, they stormed the house of General Manuel de la Concha, ransacking his property and launching roof tiles and brickwork as well as braziers at the soldiers below. And there were similar, though unsuccessful, attempts to storm the houses of the conservative ministers Mon and Pidal.[[387]](#footnote-387)

The revolutionaries took over the Teatro de Príncipe and erected barricades using cobblestones and furniture from a local café.[[388]](#footnote-388) These barricades took on a cultural role in the European revolution, and their proliferation suggests that the individual insurrections which occurred across the continent were related not just temporally, but materially. In many of the cities in which they appeared, including in Madrid, there was little or no antecedence for barricade fighting in the national revolutionary idiom.[[389]](#footnote-389) And contemporaries recognised them for the pale imitation that they were.[[390]](#footnote-390) But, as in Paris, they reveal much about the neighbourhoods that most opposed the government, and about the people who opposed their vision for the liberal state. Those who lived there were working class, and yet they were still very much connected to and inspired by events elsewhere in Europe; events which they brought to their own locale.[[391]](#footnote-391)

Barricades were also erected around Puerta del Sol by elements from the *Academia del porvenir*, and fighting broke out by the Iglesia del Buen Sucesco on the edge of the square. The revolutionaries there—among them the opposition politicians Orense, Domínguez, Luzaro, and José Ordax Avecilla—attacked the church from the balconies and windows of the *Tertulia de 18 de junio*, killing one army captain.[[392]](#footnote-392) Despite their numerical disadvantage, the government forces were much better armed and trained, and they eventually overcame the barricades with bayonet charges and by climbing onto the roofs from the windows of the houses.[[393]](#footnote-393) After two hours of fighting, which also extended through the narrow streets east of the square, many were arrested, but twenty-two insurgents escaped and made for the Teatro del Príncipe to join the fighters there.

Fighting erupted not only in the central districts, which tended to be more heavily policed, but on the edge of the capital too. Revolutionaries engaged troops from the Granada regiment near Puerta de Toledo in the south of the city, and after sustained firefighting they fled towards the Plaza de la Cebada. Official figures suggest two-hundred fighters, among them the lawyer Francisco Salmerón, faced government troops and fifty civil guards.[[394]](#footnote-394) According to Bulwer, despite apparently having just a handful of rifles between them, those manning the barricades there managed to drive back the cavalry twice.[[395]](#footnote-395) Among the government forces, there were five dead and fourteen injured.

There were deaths on both sides, although the number of revolutionaries killed or wounded is difficult to verify from so few (and generally contradictory) sources. Hortelano was probably exaggerating when he wrote that the blood of the people ‘ran in abundance,’ and that even greater were the number of innocent bystanders killed by the police.[[396]](#footnote-396) But the *moderado*-supporting *El Español* was scarcely credible either when it reported a total of ten deaths among the rebels and injuries to just two women onlookers. [[397]](#footnote-397) These women, Tomasa Sota and her maid, had been on their way home when shooting broke out. But other bystanders were killed too, including Henry Whitwell, a quaker from Darlington. When challenged by a soldier, he was unable to answer on account of a speech impediment and was summarily shot.[[398]](#footnote-398)

An English lady’s maid, Margaret Hunter, needed her leg amputated after being shot by a policeman. Her chaperone was shot in the back, suggesting that they were retreating at the time.[[399]](#footnote-399) In the British ambassador’s correspondence, it is assumed that she was in the wrong place at the wrong time. But there is nothing to say that she was not a revolutionary fighter herself. Certainly among those arrested after the revolution was a woman named Josefa Martín.[[400]](#footnote-400) However, as elsewhere in Europe, these are only glimpses of the stories of the women who joined the revolution. The ‘formative power of gender relations in events, presentations, social and national movements and biographies’ meant that their stories were rarely told at the time and have been largely impossible to recuperate since.[[401]](#footnote-401)

Attempts were made by the revolutionaries to join with sympathetic troops, which proved such a successful coalition elsewhere in Europe.[[402]](#footnote-402) During the fighting, they shouted slogans at the advancing forces such as ‘The troops must not fire on the people!’ and ‘The troops proceed from the people and to the people they must return!’ But, like the population at large, most soldiers remained loyal. At the Santa Isabel barracks, for example, rather than join the revolutionaries, the garrison opened fire on them.[[403]](#footnote-403) Narváez called in the artillery, but by the time it was mobilised the rebels had already been defeated by regular forces.[[404]](#footnote-404) The authorities quickly regained control in Plaza de Santa Ana and, by eleven o’clock, the revolutionaries were holed up in the Teatro de Príncipe there. Those sheltering in the market in Plaza de la Cebada continued fighting until midnight, and they were eventually defeated only by government reinforcements and two pieces of artillery.[[405]](#footnote-405) In Plaza Mayor, the revolutionaries held off government troops until the early hours, by which time their number was reduced to just eighteen. They took refuge in the house of Pedro del Prado, Marquis de Acapulco. Others had already simply gone home for want of equipment, or because the authorities blocked their way as they tried to join the uprisings from other parts of the city. Even the leaders of the revolution, including de la Gándara, were unable to reach the fighting as they could not get from the north of the city.[[406]](#footnote-406)

After the fighting, the army occupied the sites of the insurrections, and some two hundred fighters were arrested. When Benito Hortelano returned home, he was accosted by officers of the *ronda*. He recalled how his wife and daughter, who knew that he had taken part in the revolution, cried ‘Don’t shoot!’ at the police from the balcony. Amidst the commotion, a man playing dead in the street got up and ran down the road. The officers gave chase, Hortelano’s wife managed to open the door, and he took the opportunity to run in.[[407]](#footnote-407) The fighting had stopped, but that was not an end to the conflict. There were revenge attacks such as when, at eleven o’clock the following day, Chico summarily shot a taverner named Pinto in Plaza Mayor. Yet such incidents were exceptional rather than systematic. Indeed, it was not always clear who had even been on which side. Bravo Murillo, for example, had to intercede on behalf of Juan Acero, a clerk who was arrested as he tried to rescue the minister’s carriage from the revolutionaries.[[408]](#footnote-408) Bulwer gave refuge to several opposition figures in the aftermath of the fighting, and although this angered the government, it was an established convention in Spain. Even the Duke of Sotomayor, the foreign minister, conceded that, in the ambassador’s position, he should have done the same.[[409]](#footnote-409)

After the initial insurgency ended in the early hours of 27 March, a few shots were heard and there were reports of a small number of fatalities, but the government quickly established checkpoints throughout the city. The terrifying sight of the cuirassiers sallying forth from the Prado to occupy the city’s squares likely dented any remaining enthusiasm for the revolution, at least temporarily.[[410]](#footnote-410) And this climate of fear seemed to be reinforced when the hastily-assembled *consejo de guerra* (military tribunal) sentenced many of the arrested revolutionaries to death. But, once again, coercive power was far from the only means at the liberal state’s disposal. The Spanish judicial process was a constitutional one; the rebels were allowed to be represented by, among others, Nicolás Salmerón, who would take a key role when revolution broke out again on 7 May.[[411]](#footnote-411) Furthermore, the capital sentences were commuted by the queen almost immediately, and this act of clemency probably cemented the government’s victory. Though benign in this case, this was a decision which demonstrated the government’s increasing ability to employ the justice system as a tool with which to wield political power.

The following day, all was calm. The queen appeared on the balcony of her palace to watch the parading garrison.[[412]](#footnote-412) Their near universal loyalty allowed the government the option of a proportionate response. Although the government was able to call on the coercive power of the state, it was its liberal and lawful approach to revolutionary justice which proved most successful in defeating the revolution. Bulwer’s view that clemency was a necessary step to prevent retaliation or inflaming the situation is largely the same argument from the opposite angle.[[413]](#footnote-413)

The state’s recourse to violence to defeat the barricade fighters is important—not least because so few soldiers sided with the revolution—but it is not the whole story. More significantly, the state was able to mobilise quickly to reinforce this victory, using executive powers to declare a state of siege. This allowed them to close the *tertulias*, to restrict the progressive press, and to close the university. And less obvious uses of state power, such as the decision to keep the street lights on until dawn, further demonstrate the government’s ability to impose its authority in non-coercive ways.[[414]](#footnote-414) The editors of *El Clamor público*, the newspaper most sympathetic to the revolution, felt that they no longer had the ‘freedom to write what the circumstances demand[ed].’[[415]](#footnote-415) On 28 March, the opposition *El Espectador* printed just one page instead of its usual three because its staff could not get into their offices.[[416]](#footnote-416) In the days that followed, both newspapers simply reprinted accounts from outlets more friendly to the government. On this basis, the *moderado* party might be seen as reactionary, but this is not entirely accurate. There was, for example, a reluctance about the measures which the government considered necessary given the level of public disorder.[[417]](#footnote-417) And there was genuine belief in the view reported in the newspaper, that the majority of Spaniards ‘prefer calm to revolt’.[[418]](#footnote-418)

With hindsight, it is easy to see events teleologically and to view a government victory on 26 March as inevitable. However, amid the fighting and even once the army appeared to have won the day, this was not the case. Bulwer reported that some members of the government felt that their fate was sealed, and even that the queen seemed resigned to losing her throne. He was scarcely a non-partisan observer, but he remained convinced of the ultimate victory of the revolution. Indeed, even after the events of 26 March, it was this which drove his support for the movement and its leaders, for fear of their turning instead towards the new French Republic. He conceded that the repressive measures introduced by the government might have succeeded in defeating the revolution except for ‘the general European movement in which it seems almost impossible to prevent this country from taking apart.’ A day or two after the uprising, he visited General Manuel de la Concha, whose house had been ransacked by the revolutionaries and who was a *moderado* rival of Narváez. De la Concha cautioned that the army would not necessarily remain loyal next time.[[419]](#footnote-419)

## 7 May (Madrid)

Despite government fears, there were only minor instances of public disorder during April, and it looked for a while as though Spain might actually achieve the *moderado* fantasy of both freedom and order.[[420]](#footnote-420) ‘Europe,’ reported *El Heraldo*, ‘looks on in amazement.’[[421]](#footnote-421) But a sense of foreboding belied this hubris. Attempts by the British ambassador to encourage the reconvocation of the *Cortes* were unsuccessful, and Madrid, with troops permanently in the streets, seemed ‘in the possession of a foreign enemy.’ [[422]](#footnote-422) This took its toll on the soldiers too. April was wet and cold, and the capital’s garrison were increasingly miserable. Reports of assassinations of sentinels on night duty were repeatedly denied by the government but, it is not difficult to imagine the effect such rumours would have had on morale. Seditious pamphlets began circulating which promised the disbandment of the garrison in the event of a successful revolt.[[423]](#footnote-423) Rumours of a rebellion of the San Marcial regiment planned for mid-April came to nothing, but twenty-three soldiers were arrested at the San Gil barracks. After this disappointment, de la Gándara, Clavijo, and Serrano Bedoya made for the French border in order to co-ordinate efforts from there.[[424]](#footnote-424) On 29 April, the queen, accompanied by Narváez, surveyed the entire Madrid garrison on horseback in the Prado. Although intended as a demonstration of military force and to reassure the assembled crowds of the army’s loyalty, there was little evidence of enthusiasm for their role in the counter-revolution beyond half-hearted cries of ‘*¡Viva la reina!*’[[425]](#footnote-425)

On 7 April, *El Clamor público* reported that the British ambassador had addressed to the Spanish foreign minister Sotomayor a note criticising Spain’s handling of the domestic political situation. He warned that confronting the revolution was likely to prove counter-productive, and that compromise would be a better strategy.[[426]](#footnote-426) It was simply the latest in a series of similar letters, and of course ministers themselves had seriously considered such a course of action before 26 March. However, the report (on the back page of a *progresista* newspaper) infuriated Sotomayor and seemed to confirm *moderado* suspicions of British involvement with the revolution. The foreign minister replied, emphasising what he considered to be British double standards with respect to Ireland and the empire, and warning that any further attempt to meddle in government affairs would result in the expulsion of the ambassador.[[427]](#footnote-427) The significance of this correspondence has probably been overstated, but it highlights the differing interpretations of the Spanish state’s response to the revolution. For Sotomayor, it had stopped a minor insurgency becoming a revolution and ensured the survival of the government. For Bulwer, it was precisely this course of action which had imperilled the government in the first place. The truth was somewhere in between, but two things were clear. After 26 March the uncompromising elements of the cabinet were firmly in charge of policy, and the diplomatic row with Britain shaped Spain’s second major revolutionary event when it came on 7 May.

In a special issue commemorating *Dos de mayo*, the opposition *El Espectador* printed slogans about working together to overcome tyranny, and about the promise of better days to come. It also announced that it would cease publication of all editorials in the current circumstances, trusting that its subscribers would understand the eloquence of this silence.[[428]](#footnote-428) Neither message was exactly subtle. Although the response to events of 26 March had dampened the fire of revolution, the embers had not been extinguished. But, with most radical politicians either under arrest or in hiding, it was not clear how they would be reignited. One potential leader of a new uprising was the former finance minister and rival of Narváez, José de Salamanca. He had been widely suspected of planning and financing revolution in the past, and he had been on the run since 26 March when he had evaded Chico by escaping through the back door of his house.[[429]](#footnote-429) He was at least acquainted with Joaquín de la Gándara, and at the beginning of May his doorman was arrested, but otherwise there is little concrete evidence of his involvement with the revolution.[[430]](#footnote-430)

Despite the government’s suspicion that another revolutionary attempt was imminent, on 4 May the state of siege was lifted in the capital. This had little practical effect beyond making the civilian *jefe político* rather than the captain general ultimately responsible for public order, but it suggests that the government still sought to appear to be acting lawfully. Security arrangements were nevertheless largely maintained, and the authorities remained on high alert. The officers of the *España* and *América* regiments, from which the bulk of the rebels on 7 May would come, had suspicions about their sergeants’ spending habits.[[431]](#footnote-431) On 5 May, Lorenç Milans del Bosch was arrested and unsuccessful attempts were made to arrest Santiago Alonso Cordero and José Ordax Avecilla, while Álvaro Gómez Becerra was sent away to Cuenca.[[432]](#footnote-432) But, unlike on 26 March, it seems that the authorities had little idea of the detail of the insurgency being planned.[[433]](#footnote-433) And the conspiracy was once again brought forward, this time in part because on 8 May the queen was due to leave for her palace in Aranjuez, some thirty miles away, taking with her the troops at the centre of the conspiracy.[[434]](#footnote-434)

In the early hours of the morning of 7 May, around fifty armed insurgents arrived at the back door of the barracks in calle San Mateo. With them—or perhaps leading them—was José Joaquín Domínguez, a writer and lexicographer. The rebels overpowered the guard and unlocked the door using a copy of the key provided by one of the soldiers from the *España* regiment billeted within. They divided into two groups. The first went to raise the friendly troops while the other went to arrest the officers, who because of the heightened threat of mutiny had been sleeping in the barracks. Led by Sergeant Manuel Buceta, they then marched through the city to Plaza Mayor. There, there developed a festival-like atmosphere, with cries of ‘*¡Viva la republica!*’ and musicians playing the *himno* of Espartero.

It is less clear who was behind the conspiracy than it had been on 26 March. It is possible that its leader was Brigadier Joaquín Moreno de las Peñas.[[435]](#footnote-435) And he was suspected by the authorities, who issued a warrant for his arrest.[[436]](#footnote-436) But given that this was part of the broader purge of *progresistas* in the army, it makes his involvement uncertain. Suspicion also fell on Luis González Bravo. He had been the first *moderado* prime minister of Isabel’s reign, but he also had a history of radicalism and of provocative journalism, having edited the satirical *El Guirigay*.[[437]](#footnote-437) And he was seen as a threat to the authoritarian clique developing around Narváez at the head of the party. On assuming power, Narváez had sent him to Lisbon as plenipotentiary, far away from Madrid, so it seems unlikely that he was actively involved in events on 7 May. Two chests of gold Napoleons were later found in the barracks of the *España* regiment, and both Salamanca and Bulwer were accused of financing the uprising.[[438]](#footnote-438) Although the involvement of neither man was ever proved, it was a convenient explanation for the authorities, depoliticising the actions of the conscript soldiers and their civilian supporters. The government believed that those to whom Bulwer granted asylum after 26 March took part in these events too, and he was accused of complicity once again, hiding four sergeants in the embassy in the aftermath of the fighting.[[439]](#footnote-439)

Just as on 26 March, things quickly began to turn against the insurgents. And, once again, it was issues with co-ordination on the day and the enduring loyalty of the majority of troops which proved most difficult to overcome. After releasing the troops of the *España*, Domínguez went next to the barracks of the *Baza* regiment—whose sergeants had also been involved in the conspiracy—but this time, on giving the signal, he was shot dead by loyalists.[[440]](#footnote-440) Buceta had been second in command to Miguel Solís in the 1846 uprising in Galicia and had been a captain of the civil guard, but he was not the hero the revolution needed. The leader was supposed to have been an officer from Salamanca named Sebastián Arias, another veteran of the 1846 Revolution. The plan was for him to lead the *San Marcial* regiment, but in the event he remained with relatives in the Casa Cordero.[[441]](#footnote-441) Exactly why he did so is not clear, but it left the movement with only a sergeant at its head.

Unusually for such a high-ranking functionary of the liberal state, José Fulgosio, the captain general of Castilla La Nueva, had fought with the Carlists during the civil war. He commanded a permanent regiment on Puerta del Sol and, from there, intended to lead his forces to engage with the rebels. His adjutant went to find out whether they could join the *América* regiment in the Hospicio, but he was accosted on the way by armed civilians. While waiting, Fulgosio himself was shot and killed. A man, dressed in the *café con leche*-coloured cloak of the *ronda*, emerged from the callejon de Cofres, opposite the post office. He was able to walk right up to Fulgosio and shoot him with a hidden blunderbuss, although Hortelano suspected that Narváez was the intended target as the perpetrator had asked for ‘the general’ rather than Fulgosio by name.[[442]](#footnote-442) In the resulting mêlée of spooked horses, the assailant escaped back down along the narrow alleyway. His identity was never discovered. Newspaper reports at the time suggested that it was Buceta himself, but given that he was leading the troops this seems unlikely.[[443]](#footnote-443) It was an embarrassment for the government, but it did not change the course of events. While the captains general wielded considerable power, they did so within the increasingly sophisticated apparatus of the Spanish state. The death of one functionary did little to compromise the system.

There had been hopes that more civilians would join the mutinous troops; ‘*¡Viva la unión del ejército y del pueblo!*’ was among the cries heard during the night. And perhaps a hundred or two did so, although Fernández de Córdova recalled civilians ‘in large numbers’ in the early stages around Fuencarral and the Red de San Luis, so it is possible that their involvement waned through the night.[[444]](#footnote-444) Those that joined the fighting included Ordax Avecilla, who had been in the *Tertulia de 18 de junio* on 26 March, the former deputy Domingo Velo, and the Massa brothers, sons of the consul of the Two Sicilies. Also involved were Manuel Becerra, who led a band of seventy-two students, Nicolás Salmerón, and Marcelino López, although as a former lieutenant he was scarcely a typical civilian. Other locals, almost certainly including a number of women, brought food and drink and tended to the wounded. Garrido described larger numbers of armed civilians, congregated in various districts. He attributed the failure of the movement to the death of Domínguez, without whom the civilians had no orders; in calle Toledo, for example, one group were shot by government soldiers while they waited for instructions.[[445]](#footnote-445) Pirala described a spontaneous gathering on the Rasto to the south of the city, but this may have been of fighters fleeing Plaza Mayor.[[446]](#footnote-446) It is also possible that many civilian supporters simply did not have enough time to join the fighting. The conspiracy had been kept much narrower than on 26 March, and some of those who had fought on that occasion, including Benito Horetelano, had no forewarning this time.

Despite the similar aims of the participants, the events of 7 May felt different from those of 26 March. Instead of idealistic (and seemingly under-armed) civilians revolutionaries, these were mostly well-equipped soldiers, if in smaller numbers and primarily conscripts. The fighting lasted only a short time, possibly as little as two hours.[[447]](#footnote-447) Although other reports suggested a more protracted fight with artillery involvement.[[448]](#footnote-448) Hortelano, who was at home when the uprising began and attempted unsuccessfully to join the fighting. Later, he too reported hearing artillery fire.[[449]](#footnote-449) And some of the damage to the fabric of the city could only have come from artillery shells.[[450]](#footnote-450) This was not, however, a straightforward military defeat by overwhelming force of numbers or materiel, again in contrast to 26 March. Amid the fighting a band of riflemen arrived in Plaza Mayor, shouting the slogans of the revolution. Their cornet signalled a pre-arranged code, and the soldiers pointed their rifles towards the ground indicating a truce. At their head was a man on horseback whom the revolutionaries first assumed was Domínguez. It was in fact General Francisco Lersundi, but his sabre was tied with a handkerchief: it appeared he was there to join the revolution.[[451]](#footnote-451) The revolutionaries embraced the reinforcements and shouted, ‘*¡Viva el general Lersundi!*’[[452]](#footnote-452) At that moment, two battalions of troops loyal to the government emerged from behind a blind corner and opened fire; Lersundi’s loyalist riflemen formed a deadly rear-guard.[[453]](#footnote-453)

Some twenty-six civilians and fifty rebel soldiers died in Plaza Mayor that night.[[454]](#footnote-454) Many more were injured, including Antonia Nuñez, a ragwoman, who was shot in the cheek and suffered a fractured jaw.[[455]](#footnote-455) The Italian brothers were later shot by the *ronda* on their way to the gaol at the Correos. But reporting was not always accurate. Miguel Ortiz, former editor of *El Espectador*, was among those suspected of having been killed, and his death was widely reported. On 10 May, *La España* printed a retraction, while on the other hand *El Espectador* confirmed his death anew.[[456]](#footnote-456) It is not clear whether he was, in fact, killed or not. For their part, the authorities reported eight fatalities among government troops and 184 injuries, of which 66 were classed as serious.[[457]](#footnote-457)

The army command was quick to occupy the other sites of the 26 March insurgency, such as Plaza de la Cebada. Again Narváez himself was involved in the fighting, charging on horseback from las Platerías. The *Princesa* regiment of hussars, based at the palace, was disbanded, and a number of artillery officers were arrested. [[458]](#footnote-458) One insurgent was captured and taken to the barracks of the *San Marcial* regiment, where sympathetic soldiers conspired to help him escape. Among the other soldiers able to escape were six sergeants from the *España*: Francisco Delsas, Esteban Pinilla, Hermenegildo Martínez, Julián González, Antonio Fernández and Cosme Belio, who were sought across Spain.[[459]](#footnote-459) However, most of the garrison had remained loyal, and there were even reports that some of the rebel soldiers absconding to re-join the government forces during the fighting.[[460]](#footnote-460) The state of siege was quickly re-established by the new captain general, Juan de la Pazuela, and this time was fully lifted only on 28 June. Once again a *consejo de guerra* was convened to try the insurgents, and its sentence was the decimation of the *España* regiment and the re-conscription of the remainder into alternative regiments.

The government’s response contrasted sharply to that of the events of 26 March. *El Heraldo* reported that ‘the entire population *en masse* demanded exemplary punishment.’[[461]](#footnote-461) Prisoners, including Simón Rodríguez, Juan Gómez, Pedro Moreno, Domingo Polanco and Don Trino Quijano, were marched through the streets of Madrid in ropes from the Saladero in the middle of the night.[[462]](#footnote-462) In a letter to his wife, one of the accused, Marcelino de Mariana López, likened the sentence itself to an assassination and accused a senior officer of having lied to implicate him in the murder of Fulgosio.[[463]](#footnote-463) After the proceedings, Pazuela allegedly threatened to shoot the chaplains, who had been reading the last rites slowly in a bid to stave off the executions.[[464]](#footnote-464) One sergeant, two corporals, five soldiers and five civilians were shot that day: Mariana López, Lorenzo Joaquín García, Atanasio Rubio, Eusebio Manzanedo and Miguel Espiga—one of Becerra’s students. Becerra himself escaped.[[465]](#footnote-465) A further thirteen sergeants and one civilian were also sentenced to death, but they were pardoned and sent to serve in the ranks overseas.[[466]](#footnote-466)

There are two reasons for this change of approach. The first was that those arrested were primarily soldiers and were therefore subject to martial law at all times. The second is that public opinion seemed to be hardening. In an almost exact replica of the decree issued by Fulgosio on 27 March, Pazuela demanded that within twenty-four hours, all firearms be surrendered to the police. All non-residents were required to present their passports to the same, and any person attempting to disturb public order, including shouting *vivas*, would be shot. The next day, the editors of the Madrid newspapers were called to a meeting at Pazuela’s house where they were threatened that they would be held personally responsible for anything in their publications which might provoke either the garrison or the inhabitants.[[467]](#footnote-467) And no one could leave the city without permission from the authorities.[[468]](#footnote-468) A state of fear existed among opponents of the government, in part at least because it was not clear what the legal basis for these measures was or how they would be enforced. The *ronda* denounced opponents of the government, which left vulnerable those who had come under their suspicion before the revolution. But for the most part, the threat of repression was enough.

In 1843, while fomenting the *moderado* revolution with both Narváez and Sotomayor, Salamanca had hidden in the house of the Danish minister, the Chevalier d’Alborgo. It was an act for which d’Alborgo was gratefully ennobled by the victorious *moderados* as the Baron del Asilo (Baron Asylum). In the aftermath of the events of 7 May, in a flagrant breach of convention and with more than a hint of hypocrisy, Sotomayor ordered that the baron’s house be searched by the Spanish authorities for his erstwhile co-conspirator. When no sign of Salamanca was found, attention turned to the adjoining Belgian legation. The *chargé d’affaires* there, the Comte de Hamal, refused entry, and so his house was surrounded by officers of the *ronda*. The sources are largely consistent up to this point. Hence, however, the reports become highly politicised, and it is difficult to ascertain whether the *jefe político* was invited in or whether he stormed the building. Bulwer’s account pushes the story into farce, claiming that Salamanca had been hiding on the very chest on which the *jefe político* sat during a break from the search for the former finance minister.[[469]](#footnote-469)

The story of Salamanca’s escape relies on the testimony of his friend Fernández de Córdova, who risked upsetting Narváez (another friend) to play a pivotal role. Having rejected the possibility of bribing the police, he and José de Zaragoza, another *moderado*, visited Salamanca to explain an alternative plan. A few days later, at eleven o’clock at night, a carriage stopped outside the Belgian legation. A cloaked figure rushed out and climbed in as it pulled away. The *ronda* gave chase and quickly managed to stop the carriage, but it had been a ruse. Taking advantage of the confusion and the absent guards, the real Salamanca had walked calmly out of the door to the house of Fernández de Córdova in the calle de Alcalá. A few days later, a party of twenty *carabineros* (customs officers) was ordered from Madrid to the French border by no less than José de Orive, the force’s commander. Among them, wearing a false moustache and the uniform of a sergeant, was José de Salamanca. On discovering his betrayal, Narváez called Fernández de Córdova to his house to demand his resignation. But later that day, at a palace ball, he had second thoughts, wondering whether everything might have worked out for the best after all.[[470]](#footnote-470) How much of this story is true is difficult to say, but Salamanca did certainly escape to France. And shortly afterwards, Narváez offered Fernández de Córdova the captaincy general of Catalonia and, in September, José de Zaragoza replaced the conde de Vistahermosa as *jefe político* of Madrid.

After defeating the uprising, the government received numerous letters of congratulation. Each letter was signed by dozens of ordinary Spaniards, civilians and both serving and retired servicemen.[[471]](#footnote-471) The *moderado* newspapers emphasised that public opinion was strongly with the government and, to some extent, these newspapers were able to create a narrative of ‘public opinion’.[[472]](#footnote-472) There is no doubt that there were sections of the population strongly supportive of the government, but many of those who chose to stay at home on 26 March and 7 May continued to oppose the government. Instead, ministers relied heavily on the narrowness of the political class and the support of influential groups close to the state. *El España* reported a meeting at the palace between grandees and capitalists, including the banker Nazario Carriquiri. They offered Narváez ‘all manner of sacrifice, of life and fortune if these were necessary for the maintenance of order.’[[473]](#footnote-473) The *progresista* newspapers, meanwhile, were limited to publishing verbatim reports from the *moderado* press. Editions of *El Espectador* from 7 May were seized by the authorities and are not available to read, while *El Pueblo*, which did manage to publish, emphasised the wasteful loss of Spanish life.[[474]](#footnote-474) *El Clamor público* was fined 50,000 reales. While in the days that followed, rumours of further sporadic unrest in the opposition press seem to have been little more than that.[[475]](#footnote-475)

## 13 May (Seville)

Less than a week after the events in Madrid on 7 May, Major José Portal, another veteran of the 1846 uprising in Galicia, led an insurrection in Seville. This was yet more bad news for Bulwer, who knew the Portal family well. And unsurprisingly rumours quickly spread of his direct involvement in the uprising.[[476]](#footnote-476) It is not possible to say with any certainty how accurate these rumours were, but again his participation has probably been overstated. On 13 May, the same day as the uprising, he did write to Palmerston claiming that the loyalty of the army could not be relied upon, and that he expected risings in Málaga, Seville, and other places.[[477]](#footnote-477) And, as the testimony of one participant suggests, it remains possible that this was because he was involved directly with them.[[478]](#footnote-478) However, it is more likely that he simply realised—as the revolutionaries did—that the Spanish state penetrated society less effectively outside the capital, even in the major provincial cities.

After a second defeat in Madrid on 7 May, Bulwer would not have required inside knowledge to predict that if the revolution were to resurface, it would likely do so in these less-governed provincial capitals. For his part, Portal rejected claims of British financing, writing that ‘not a single maravedi was given to me by anyone.’[[479]](#footnote-479) And in a letter to the British consul in A Coruña, more than a year after he had left his post in Spain, Bulwer maintained his innocence. Portal’s insurrection, he wrote, ‘was not only a foolish, but a most selfish affair.’ He complained that the young major had not considered how the matter would reflect on him. Although, of course, a lack of involvement in the uprising is not the same as ignorance of it, and in the letter Bulwer also claimed to have been offered ‘great bribes’ to become involved in the conspiracy.[[480]](#footnote-480)

This typifies the British ambassador’s behaviour in Spain in 1848. Although the most salacious claims about him fomenting revolution are almost certainly untrue, he had entangled himself with those at the centre of the conspiracies. His distinctly partisan approach to his role alienated the *moderado* party, and large payments to leading *progresistas* suggest naivety at best and complicity at worst. *The Morning Post* reported that after his letter to Narváez had been published there had been only a ‘hollow reconciliation,’ and that Palmerston had promised to move him to a new post.[[481]](#footnote-481) But he never got a chance; the ambassador was expelled by the Spanish government on 17 May. Over twenty years later, Bulwer still defended his conduct. ‘There appeared,’ he wrote, ‘every probability of the ultimate victory of the [*progresista*] party.’[[482]](#footnote-482) But herein lay the problem. Bulwer—and the British government—heavily backed the losing horse. Whilst the *moderado* victory had not been certain when revolution broke out, the ambassador’s opposite assumption represented a crassly inflexible reading of a situation which was fast developing in favour of the government. *Ultima hora del popular* was probably exaggerating when it reported that ‘the name of M. Bulwer is becoming reviled throughout Spain.’ But its claim that he intended to make of ‘the people of *Dos de Mayo*’ a ‘debased and humble colony’ had clear propaganda value, not just diplomatically but in managing the narrative of the 1848 Revolution more broadly.[[483]](#footnote-483)

In mid-March, the *moderado* press raised concerns that a speech against the monarchy by the radical politician Nicolás Rivero was gaining popularity in Seville.[[484]](#footnote-484) And around the same time, Ricardo Schelley, the captain general of Andalucía, sent a letter to his commandants general, warning them that amidst the European tumult the tranquillity and well-being of Spain rested on the ‘loyalty and discipline of the army.’[[485]](#footnote-485) He subsequently sent the commanders of units stationed in Seville a list of strict instructions to ensure the continued quietude of the garrison and the defence of key sites in the city, including the artillery foundry. There were obviously concerns about the reliability of the troops stationed there. But, despite this, it was they who were trusted to occupy the poorer districts of the city to ensure public order.[[486]](#footnote-486) It was a significant risk, but it was probably a calculated one.

Like those in Madrid on 26 March and 7 May, the events of 13 May in Seville presented a credible popular threat to the *moderado* government and their vision for a narrowly-defined, exclusivist liberal Spanish state. At around 9 o’clock in the evening, Portal led parts of the *Guadalajara* and *León* regiments to join the *Infante* cavalry in rebellion. There are clear parallels with the 1820 Revolution, which was also led by a relatively junior officer who, after capturing an Andalusian city—in that case Málaga rather than Seville—was able to build momentum and march on the capital. The *moderado* reforms of the 1840s had increased state oversight in the provinces, but this was still much weaker than it was in Madrid. There was no provincial equivalent of Chico’s *ronda de capa*, for example, and Narváez was not able to personally coordinate the state’s response. Furthermore, it was a revolutionary event which sought to create a large-scale coalition of civilians and soldiers. Although some soldiers had been involved on 26 March, and some civilians had joined the rebel troops on 7 May, neither event had truly combined the two forces in the way which had been so effective elsewhere in Europe.

Little can be said with certainty about the way the uprising was planned. According to the testimony of one participant, the leaders had only managed to persuade the troops to take part by telling them that the movement was sweeping all of Spain.[[487]](#footnote-487) Portal allegedly met civilian leaders at his house. Among them was perhaps Federico Rubio y Galí. Rubio would go on to become a popular medic to the city’s poor, but in May 1848 he was a student preparing for graduation that June. José González de la Vega, a former deputy from Cádiz, had promised some fifteen hundred civilian fighters, but in the event he proved unable to recruit that number.[[488]](#footnote-488) Other civilians involved included Eduardo Feld, a lawyer, Juan José Hidalgo, who had worked for Nicolás Rivero, N. Ariño, who wrote for the radical newspaper *El Porvenir*, Manuel Carrasco, a local businessman, and Julián Pellón, a highly-respected university lecturer, who only weeks before had been awarded a prize from the Sevillian Academy of Literature.[[489]](#footnote-489)

Like their counterparts in Madrid, revolutionary groups from the poorer neighbourhoods of Triana and San Roque had been building up arms caches.[[490]](#footnote-490) And the plan seems to have been to create a diversion, allowing the various groups of military rebels the opportunity to join up. For Vega, civilian involvement was particularly important. ‘Seville,’ he told Portal, ‘had to wash the stain that had covered its walls since 1843.’[[491]](#footnote-491) That year, like Barcelona, the city had declared against the government of Baldomero Espartero and had suffered a similar bombardment.[[492]](#footnote-492) That the revolutionaries seemed to make little distinction between the current *moderado* government and previous *progresista* administrations provides an insight into the way they conceptualised their aims in 1848. It emphasises that they did not simply seek a change in the leadership of the government but that they were attempting to remake the power relationships which had become entrenched over the previous twenty or so years. And it is likely that this aim extended beyond the leadership of the revolution and that the ordinary working class Spaniards who joined the fighting wanted this too.

The queen’s sister, Luisa Fernanda, and her husband the Duke of Montpensier, the youngest son of the newly-deposed French king, were in Seville for festivities to celebrate the birthday of the king consort. A public hand-kissing ceremony had been arranged at the Archbishop’s Palace, as the Alcázar, where such events would normally take place, was being refurbished. A plot was hatched for rebel troops to seize the royal couple during the ceremony, co-ordinated with the civilian uprising. But, at the last minute, the ceremony was moved back to the Alcázar, the refurbishment having been completed ahead of schedule. It was also brought forward so that the royal couple could attend the theatre production of a new play by Manuel Bretón de los Herreros at the San Francisco Coliseum, aptly titled *A Hidden Enemy*. This meant that one of the key conspirators—the commander of the royal guard—was unable to take part as he was not on duty until later in the day.[[493]](#footnote-493) The ceremony passed without incident, and the duke and duchess went on to the theatre. It was just as they arrived there that the military rebellion began.[[494]](#footnote-494)

Two companies from the Carmen barracks marched on Plaza Gavidia, which was dominated by the Gavidia barracks, the seat of the captain general. They continued thence to Plazas del Salvador and de San Francisco. From there they headed along calle Hernando Colón towards the cathedral to try and join with cavalry who were still in their barracks at Puerta del Carne in San Bernardo, on the other side of the city. Accounts differ as to whether they shouted *vivas* to the republic or to the queen. The correspondent of *La Esperanza* even heard *vivas* to Espartero.[[495]](#footnote-495) In common with the revolutionaries elsewhere, all were probably true. According to Portal’s own memoirs, there was no talk of republican ideas at the planning meetings.[[496]](#footnote-496) And Pirala claims that there was no republican involvement. However, that does not mean that there were no republicans at all among the revolutionaries. Indeed, republicanism was likely to have been one of a number of co-existing ideologies, particularly given the popularity of Rivero’s speech in the weeks before the outbreak.

Schelley ordered the play to be stopped and had the duke and duchess moved to the Alcázar. He rode to the barracks of the *León* regiment and placed himself in command of the troop; according to the testimony of his deputy, this ensured that despite their role in the conspiracy the majority remained loyal to the government. He then led the forces out of the city to defend the artillery barracks, a primary target of the rebels.[[497]](#footnote-497) Government forces also aimed for the Carne barracks, but they met strong resistance from armed civilians—probably from the working-class district of San Roque—in the alleys around the city wall. This allowed a number of cavalrymen in the Carne led by Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Gutierrez and Captain Domingo Moriones to surprise their officers and, in a repeat of events in Madrid on 7 May, to lock them up. They were placed under the guard of Lieutenant Carlos Saenz, while the rebels attempted to join the infantry from the *Guadalajara*. In all, around 300 troops took part in the attempted revolution.[[498]](#footnote-498)

Portal had been reluctant to authorise Schelley’s assassination, even though plans for him to be betrayed by a lieutenant on his staff were well advanced.[[499]](#footnote-499) Had he done so, events may have ended differently. Schelley’s troops, joined by the civil guard and *carabineros*, were able to keep the two rebel forces separate for the duration of the fighting. They repelled the *Guadalajara* with artillery from the cathedral steps, and in calle de Genova they captured cannon from the rebels. They also successfully defended Plaza de Santo Tomás and Puerta Nueva de San Fernando. But things did not go all their own way. As the rebels reached the Arquillo de Colón, they opened fire on a group of officers on their way to the artillery foundry. Schelley himself rode out to order the rebels to return to their barracks, but they opened fire. The artillery director José Aguilar was killed, as was José Rivas, deputy director of the foundry; Aguilar’s son was also wounded in the incident.[[500]](#footnote-500)

The authorities were worried that the rebels would try to target the Alcázar, both to occupy a strategically important artillery location and to capture the duke and duchess.[[501]](#footnote-501) In the event, loyalists were able to hold the fortress and protect the royal couple, who fled on a steam ship along the Guadalquivir river.[[502]](#footnote-502) There were at least eleven killed, and many injured on both sides, as fighting continued in the city until 1 o’clock.

The rebels engaged the *carabineros* and civil guard around the *ayuntaminento* in the Plaza San Francisco, before gathering in Arenal where they hoped that supporters from the working-class district of Triana, on the other side of the river, would join them. But although the residents may have cheered the rebels, few joined them. A civilian from the Sierra del Norte, who did join the fighting, told Portal that people in Triana and La Macarena were beginning to leave their houses. But, according to one account, when a group arrived at the Plaza del Duque—named after Espartero—and heard the fire, they lost heart.[[503]](#footnote-503) It is certainly possible that, faced with government artillery, ordinary Spaniards—either unarmed or under-armed—reconsidered their involvement in the revolution. It is also significant that the fighting had broken out some twenty minutes from both the working-class neighbourhoods of Triana and San Roque. In stark contrast to Madrid, particularly on 26 March, where the insurgency broke out in the poorer neighbourhoods themselves, rebels reached Triana to recruit civilians only when it was clear that the government forces had the upper hand. They had been able to occupy the roads around the Plaza de Toros which led to the city’s only bridge, the Puente de Barcas.[[504]](#footnote-504) In capturing the bridge, they stopped the rebels returning to the city and no doubt deterred all but the most fervent civilian revolutionaries from joining the fighting.

The remaining insurgents—among them a number of civilians including Carrasco—surrendered the city before dawn, leaving through Puerta del Arenal and Postigo del Aceite. On their way, Portal allegedly managed to extort 1000 *duros* each from the police chiefs of Triana and the town of Castilleja de la Cuesta, but it was little consolation.[[505]](#footnote-505) The loyal forces of the *León* regiment gave chase towards Huelva. According to the testimony of one participant, villagers shouted *vivas* to the queen, to liberty, and to the republic as they passed.[[506]](#footnote-506) On 15 May, Portal’s forces engaged government troops and the civil guard in the town of Sanlúcar de Mayor. As well as part of the garrison from Seville, the civil guard, and the *carabineros*, troops from Huelva tried to cut off the retreating rebels, and cavalry reinforcements arrived from Granada. But, despite the government’s overwhelming military superiority, the rebels escaped. First into the mountains and then across the border into Portugal.[[507]](#footnote-507) According to Schelley, there they offered their services to the Portuguese *guerrilla* leader, António Manuel Soares Galamba, but their offer was turned down.[[508]](#footnote-508) The beleaguered insurgents became increasingly restive.[[509]](#footnote-509) And, with little other option, they surrendered to the Portuguese authorities, who confiscated hundreds of their weapons and returned them to the Spanish military.[[510]](#footnote-510)

Schelley invested significant capital in the unsuccessful chase to the Portuguese border. However, he was careful not to commit too many men from the Seville garrison. He was understandably concerned that, if he did, the radicals in the city would revolt while the troops were away.[[511]](#footnote-511) At eight o’clock in the morning of 14 May, a state of emergency was declared. Artillery was placed around Plaza de la Constitución, even though the area remained calm. The same day, *El Independiente*, a Seville newspaper announced to its subscribers that it would follow the instructions of the *jefe político* and cease publication. Also banned were the pealing of bells and all public gatherings and shows.[[512]](#footnote-512) The provincial cities were an important locus of the liberal state’s power, and when faced with revolution the government retained support among the local establishments. In Seville, for example, General Francisco Armero, a former naval minister who had taken part in the defence of the city during the bombardment in 1843, joined the fight against the insurgency. But this power remained precarious and was ultimately guaranteed only by the garrison. Once the rebels had been driven from Seville, they posed little threat in the Andalusian countryside; the real danger remained in the city. On 16 May, students at the university barricaded the door and shouted, ‘Death to the rector!’ They dispersed only after the arrival of a detachment of the soldiers who had remained in the city.

News reached Madrid quickly by two extraordinary despatches. In stark contrast to the events in the capital, the official *Gaceta de Madrid* did not mention the uprising at all. Despite assurances from the authorities that the civilian population had played no part in the events, numerous civilians were taken prisoner.[[513]](#footnote-513) For example, Antonio Lamoneda, a magistrate, José Crecet, a businessman, José Sanjuro, Francisco Lemos, a master tailor, Antonio Quijano, an innkeeper, and Julián Pellón, Eduardo Féld and Juan José Rodríguez.[[514]](#footnote-514) The aftermath of events demonstrates the interconnectivities of Spanish high society. The sister of José Portal—rumoured to be a mistress of Henry Lytton Bulwer—was at the palace when she heard the news and apparently burst into tears, imploring the queen to forgive her brother.[[515]](#footnote-515) Moriones and Gutierrez were sentenced to prison terms, while Saenz was sentenced to death. A number of prominent Sevillian residents went to the Alcazár to ask for clemency. Among their number were members of the city council and the liberal—though certainly not revolutionary—Archbishop Judas José Romo y Gamboa. Romo had been among those who had signed a public letter congratulating the queen on her victory after the events of 7 May.[[516]](#footnote-516) Even Luisa Fernanda and Schelley proved sympathetic. They too interceded with Madrid, helping to ensure that Saenz’s death sentence was eventually commuted.[[517]](#footnote-517)

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In some ways, the events of 13 May were the least likely to worry the government; Seville was a long way from the centre of *moderado* power in Madrid. And, whatever the imprecision of the figures, clearly fewer people joined that phase of the revolution than had done so on 26 March or 7 May. Yet, this was still a combined military and civilian uprising in a major provincial city, something which would have been dangerous to any government. The fall of the capital would always have been a greater prize for the revolutionaries, but Madrid was also where the *moderado* power relationship was already most firmly entrenched. The events of 13 May were an attempt by the revolutionaries to turn this to their advantage, to follow that well-trodden path of provincial uprising. But, by 1848, the government had expanded the state sufficiently into cities like Seville. Partly by vesting power in individuals like Ricardo Schelley and partly by expanding other sources of social power; the familiar *moderado* relationship between people and state had become increasingly relevant in the provincial capitals. Yet it remained more precarious that it did in Madrid, and it would be tested again.

# 4

Españolización

As the 1848 Revolution spread through Europe, it took on distinctive national characteristics, reflecting local political and social realities. *Españolización* was thus the process by which 1848 became Spanish, acquiring facets of the Spanish revolutionary idiom. Because the penetration of the Spanish state differed between the provincial cities, the smaller regional towns, and the vast under-governed countryside, experience of the revolution varied across the country. But there were certain common characteristics in the experience of 1848 which can only be appreciated when considered from a Spanish perspective. As chapter 3 has shown, old arguments that Spain was unaffected by the 1848 Revolution are no longer sustainable, though the complexity of the picture suggests it is easy to see how such a narrative came to be widely accepted. Students gathering signatures for a congratulatory petition to the French revolutionary government, for example, may appear to have little in common with *guerrilla* fighting in the name of an ultra-conservative pretender. But everywhere the 1848 Revolution was shaped by existing political and social grievances, which both transformed national movements and created the contours of the European Revolution.

None of the revolutionary threats: radical, Carlist or military was entirely new, and outside Madrid and Seville all centred on established social, organisational, or familial networks. The three revolutionary groupings, although ostensibly quite different, were similarly effective in taking the revolution from conspiracy to action on a local basis. To mobilise a national revolution, however, this reliance on established networks proved as much a hinderance as a help. And in 1848 all three groups struggled to extend revolution beyond these individual networks; co-operation between different networks tended to occur where they converged by chance of geography. Yet these groups drew on shared ideological and revolutionary traditions and similar grievances. Individual revolutionaries often had multiple loyalties, and the different groups were often thrust together in the heat of the moment. It was much more difficult, however, to create any kind of permanent alliance. In part this challenge was inherent, but it was also exacerbated by the agility of the Spanish state. This agility allowed it to concentrate its response, which continued to prove coercive only as a last resort. It was this multi-faceted, and broadly measured, reaction which helped legitimise the *moderado* state in the eyes of the public, building on the broad—if not necessarily deep—support for a government whose central tenet was increasingly the maintenance of public order.

The defeats on 26 March and 7 May proved that Madrid, the heart of *moderado* power, was beyond the reach of the revolution. But opposition to the government was traditionally local, and recent uprisings in provincial cities—the *Jamància* and the Galician uprising, for instance—had enjoyed at least some short-term success. And it was in these cities, as in Seville on 13 May, where the revolution emerged next. But, just as in Seville, the *moderado* reforms of the 1840s meant that the state now had purchase in these cities and so saw off uprisings there of both a civilian and a military nature during 1848. State power in the semi-industrial city of Barcelona was both stronger and more coercive than in many other provincial capitals, but revolutionary networks dating from the Carlist War were also larger and better established. This meant that the neighbouring towns became important centres for the revolution in Catalonia, and that the experience of the city and its hinterland became more closely integrated than elsewhere. Nevertheless, in the towns too, the state was able to rely on a loyalist majority, and the revolution was driven into the vast, under-governed *campo* (countryside) as the year progressed. Here, in a space the state struggled to penetrate, the revolution continued largely unchecked. But most revolutionaries knew from experience of the Carlist War that territory in Spain did not equal power, and that once outside the urban centres they could present little threat to the government.

## The Radical Cities

Despite partially successful attempts to centralise political power in Madrid, the Spanish provincial capitals retained significant social and cultural influence. In 1848 cities with existing radical networks, where there was a tradition of opposing liberal centralisation, witnessed the most intense unrest. But unlike in earlier insurrections—notably the *Jamància* in 1843 and the Galician uprising in 1846—it proved particularly difficult to turn local actions into regional movements, let alone into a national revolution.

In a lecture on events in Britain in 1848, the radical orator George Holyoake argued that London’s political influence over the country simply could not be compared to that of Paris over France.[[518]](#footnote-518) And the same was true of the relationship between Madrid and Spain; 26 March was the first time that Madrid had been the epicentre of an attempted national revolution since *Dos de Mayo*. News of its outbreak spread quickly, but by the time the provinces responded with uprisings of their own the revolutionaries in the capital had already been defeated. This lack of co-ordination was certainly fatal to the chances of the revolution, which never managed to build the momentum needed to inspire a mass movement.[[519]](#footnote-519) And this was partly the result of greater penetration by the state and partly the result of the government’s ability to employ both its coercive and non-coercive functions with new agility. However, given that the penetration of the Spanish state was increasingly uniform—even if it continued to vary between the urban and rural milieux—it cannot simply be the case that the revolution was strongest where the state was weakest. If anything, Madrid, where the revolution broke out first, was where the *moderado* vision of the state and of the state’s relationship with the Spanish people was already the most established. Instead, the explanation for this failure of synchronisation lies in the way the Spanish revolutionaries organised in a highly-localised way and therefore interacted with the state on this same basis.

As elsewhere in Europe, radical students were among the first to join the revolution. In Vienna students played a leading role in the uprising, and in Paris their contribution was significant in turning insurrection into revolution.[[520]](#footnote-520) In Spain, while students from universities across the country took part in and supported revolutionary events, their intervention had no such effect. Their relative mobility helped to spread radical ideas into and out of the provincial cities and caused concern to the authorities, but their actions failed to act as catalysts for revolution. In Barcelona, students took to the streets on 30 March in response to events in Madrid, and they were followed by students in Valencia, who assembled at midday on 3 April. Neither group was successful.[[521]](#footnote-521) In the *progresista* stronghold of Zaragoza, news from Paris had arrived while residents were celebrating the ten-year anniversary of the expulsion of Carlist forces. Despite significant measures by the authorities to prevent public disorder, amid the fiesta, shots were heard across the city. A week or so later, local students signed a petition in support of the new French government, and on the morning of 10 April a bill proclaiming ‘*¡Viva la república!*’ was pinned to the door of the university.[[522]](#footnote-522) In Santander too, radical students began a congratulatory petition to the French provisional government, but it was seized by the authorities while the students were out collecting signatures.[[523]](#footnote-523) On 23 May, some two weeks after the second insurrection in Madrid, student disorder in Oviedo fizzled out after the arrest of two or three students.[[524]](#footnote-524)

In each case, students were unable to persuade those outside their social networks to join them. There are two complimentary explanations for this. Firstly, the *moderado* reforms of the 1840s had made rectors into civil servants and, in close co-operation with local authorities, they largely managed to contain the revolutionary events using institutional—rather than legal—processes. There were a small number of expulsions but, significantly, an even smaller number of arrests; only in Barcelona and in Seville (in the immediate aftermath of the 13 May uprising there) were troops called in to face the students. That the state could rely so heavily on its non-coercive agents is the result of its broad increase in capacity in the decade before 1848, but the way in which the *jefes políticos* and the rectors co-ordinated their responses demonstrate an agility at its senior levels. Unlike the Viennese professors, who had prepared petitions and led a student demonstration on 13 March, in Spain staff remained loyal to the state. In Zaragoza, the rector and the professors lined up in front of the student demonstration in a show of authority, and the dean of philosophy identified one of the students to the police.[[525]](#footnote-525) The few members of staff there who did waver—like Bartolomé Martín, a professor of mathematics, who signed the students’ petition—were quickly dismissed.[[526]](#footnote-526) The close links between the government and loyal agents of the state meant that student involvement in the revolution could in most cases be suppressed without the recourse to violence.

The second reason for the students’ difficulty in recruiting non students was that, according to press reports, their revolutionary attempts were borne out of solely educational grievances. *La Esperanza*, for example, emphasised that a number of students in Zaragoza had previously been expelled, whilst *El Barcelonés* printed the report from the president of the *diputación provincial*, who simply said, ‘several disaffected students’ had ‘disrespected their dignified superiors.’[[527]](#footnote-527) In Barcelona, a journalist reported students yelling ‘Rector out!’ and ‘Down with the curriculum!’ This may have been true, but his claim that, when requested, they removed their barricades from the door, let the *jefe político* in, and listened to him in ‘pious silence’ seems far-fetched. Educational issues could certainly be a catalyst for an uprising—the students in Vienna had a number of educational aims too—but framing events solely in this way allowed the government to control the narrative. Through their allies in the press, they sought to divorce these events from the 1848 Revolution, even as the timing, the language, and the aims of the students substantiated an irrefutable connection. In turn, this divorced students from other sections of society, exacerbating pre-existing structural divisions among the revolutionaries. It was, therefore, a discourse which suited local authorities, too. In Valencia, for example, it was the authorities who themselves reported to the government that the students’ actions there also had only educational aims.[[528]](#footnote-528)

In the period, the press was largely centred on Madrid and the provincial capitals. It provided a ‘simulacrum of an open and accessible public sphere, presenting the views of the elite as views of the people.’ But it could also be used to retell the story to that elite.[[529]](#footnote-529) Although legislation since 1844 had eroded some press freedoms, Spain retained a varied and lively newspaper scene. Alternative power bases situated in civil society could circumvent state controls because of the historical strength of the public sphere.[[530]](#footnote-530) Opposition editors could use their position to diffuse tensions and protect the revolutionaries while still nominally supporting the maintenance of public order. The students were portrayed as hot-headed and idealistic, but their demands were naïve rather than seditious. This mirrored public opinion: there was widespread sympathy for the revolutionaries and their aims but, owing to concerns about public order, less with the revolution itself. It is therefore unsurprising that, in 1848, both sides were content to suppress the narrative of revolution in favour of one of public disorder. This was particularly the case in smaller communities where people often knew the revolutionaries personally.

Radical opponents to the *moderado* hegemony from small towns and cities saw the provincial capitals as the locus of the liberal state’s power, and they were right to do so. Surveillance in these major centres may not have been as heavy as it was in Madrid, but it still remained difficult to plan uprisings under the increasing watchfulness of loyalist state functionaries.

In Alicante, at the beginning of May, three sergeants from the city’s garrison were arrested for their part in a revolutionary plot to seize the Castillo de Santa Bárbara. The castle had been the site of an important liberal rebellion in 1844 and thus had historical as well as strategic significance. It is not clear how close to action the revolutionaries came before their arrest, but the conspiracy was quite advanced. All three men—Antonio Peñarubio, Antonio Cienfuegos and José Sesane—made detailed confessions in which they betrayed their co-conspirators, ‘seeking a pardon and to save their lives.’[[531]](#footnote-531) Although much counter-revolutionary justice relied on confessions and denunciations, few original documents have survived and so these revelations provide an insight into the revolutionaries’ perspective, as well as the nature of the government’s methods. In 1848, the Spanish army had the capability to defeat the revolutionaries in combat, but the confessions explain why the state rarely had to resort to such means.

All three accounts emphasise the radical nature of their actions and it is also clear that the three men and their associates had been acquainted before their arrival in Alicante and had links to wider civilian conspiratorial networks. Like many of the leaders of the 1848 Revolution, some of their number had been involved in the Galician Revolution of 1846, and others had met the previous year in political discussion groups in Madrid. With restrictions on movement for the general population, the army was one of the ways by which the revolution could be spread. There were even claims that one conspirator, Nicolás Narváez, was in communication with revolutionaries in Madrid during the spring.

Cienfuegos claimed that two others reported seeing orders from General Francisco Serrano.[[532]](#footnote-532) The sergeant provided no evidence to support this, and although Serrano may have been sympathetic to the revolution, whether he had any knowledge of events is unclear. But, even if he were not involved, this testimony remains important. Either Cienfuegos believed it to be possible, or he knew the sort of thing to say to appeal to his interrogator. Sesane and Peñarubio both named a civilian called Carratalá as the head of the conspiracy: Peñarubio identified his initial as ‘J’ and claimed that he had promised Cienfuegos forty armed men, although he makes no appearance in Cienfuegos’ own testimony.[[533]](#footnote-533) According to Sesane, they met twice at his house and thence at the house of his lover, in order to disguise the nature of their meetings.[[534]](#footnote-534) Again, women were involved in hiding the revolution from the authorities. During these visits, the conspirators planned the assault on the castle and to assassinate the governor and other leaders.

On account of the sergeants’ testimony, five other sergeants were arrested, including Nicolás Narváez and José Sánchez de la Orden, who was only nineteen.[[535]](#footnote-535) The director and staff at the regimental hospital were also arrested, although they were all later released.[[536]](#footnote-536) Among the civilians implicated were Pepe Pascualet, a barber, Agustín Baeza, who owned a grocer’s shop opposite, and Francisco Limañana, a dock worker. What is striking about this is the limited nature of the civilian involvement, especially if the leader had been a civilian. Carratalá was the name of a high-profile publishing family in Alicante, including a Juan José, but there is no proof of his involvement. Alternatively, they could also have been referring to Francisco Carratalá—whose middle name was Javier and who went on to be active in the 1868 Revolution—but he would only have been seventeen in 1848. Despite Peñarubio apparently giving his address, no man named Carratalá was ever caught. It is possible that it was the sergeants themselves who masterminded the plot. With their conspiratorial pasts, links to other revolutionaries and obvious politicisation, they would have needed no outside leader. They were sentenced to death, but once again local residents interceded on their behalf, asking the queen for clemency.[[537]](#footnote-537) Although the three informants had already had their pardons, the other sergeants and three civilians had their sentences commuted to ten years imprisonment; Limañana and Baeza were given six years each.[[538]](#footnote-538)

On 12 May, Manuel Masip, a doctor from Faura (Valencia), fled authorities in the provincial capital for Segorbe, a small town in the Vall de Sagunt. On the way he and around forty followers attacked the coastguards in Xilxes, seizing their weapons, and then captured three *moderado* landowners in Faura for ransom. According to the press, Masip enjoyed ‘significant influence in those valleys,’ but even then only a few local men joined his band, led by the lawyer Manuel Alegre.[[539]](#footnote-539) Reports that locals ‘looked on in terror’ were almost certainly hyperbole, but they remained largely unimpressed. Government forces and civil guards chased the revolutionaries from Segorbe after just one day, and they mostly dispersed into the hills.[[540]](#footnote-540)

Shortly afterwards a radical lawyer, Juan Bautista Ferrer, led some hundred or so men in an uprising in Chiva, to the west of Valencia. The press reported that they were mostly detainees from the town’s prison, although their number included a former commander of the *milicia nacional*, Félix Jover, and a doctor, Luiz Monzó, so they were scarcely common criminals. On 18 May, the radical group engaged with troops, civilian volunteers, and the civil guard, but they could not persuade other towns to rise with them. They were defeated and fled into the Vall de Cofrents.[[541]](#footnote-541) Although the state still struggled to penetrate these rural towns, such localised uprisings remained relatively easy to subdue. However, these defeats did not always nullify the threat completely as the revolutionaries often escaped into the under-governed countryside, allowing them to regroup and then target the provincial capitals anew.

Remnants of both Masip and Ferrer’s bands swelled the ranks of a larger radical group gathering to the south in Pego (Alicante). Led by Joaquín Antonio Sendra and Antonio Ivars, in mid-May they attempted to take Valencia. The city had already been the site of an attempted insurrection on 24 April, foiled when the *jefe político* received a warning an hour beforehand. And on this occasion, the authorities quickly set up surveillance at the alleged meeting places. They arrested the leaders and seized arms and ammunition. According to the correspondent of *El Faro*, the whole city had been against revolution, but as so often proved the case in Spain in 1848, it only took one informant alerting the authorities to disrupt a conspiracy.[[542]](#footnote-542) Had they not warned and thus been unable to stop the revolution, it remains to be seen whether the residents would have still been so against it.

Sendra and Ivars hoped to circumvent this problem by bringing the revolution into the city from outside. Two of the movement’s other leaders, Luis Monzó and Antonio Casanave, a veteran of the Carlist War, released proclamations promising residents a quick victory. ‘*Valencianos*,’ they wrote, ‘the hour has come to fight, the blood spilt during the Madrid days must be avenged… Unfold the banner of liberty and national sovereignty.’ Each member of the city’s garrison was promised six *reales* and their equivalent rank in the revolutionary army if they joined the uprising. However, despite rumours that the rebels numbered as many as 4,000 and were equipped with the latest British weapons, they made little impact on the city’s residents and only a handful of soldiers absconded from the garrison to join them. There was some disorder in the fishing districts and a few arrests, including of Ferrer’s father and brother. However, patrols by the army and the civil guard shortly after the fighting had stopped found the city surprisingly peaceful.[[543]](#footnote-543) General Boiguez, charged with subduing the rebellion, suggested two possible explanations for this. Firstly, that although numerous, the rebels lacked organisation and training. Secondly—and more significantly—that civilians armed themselves against the rebels, pursuing and capturing them.[[544]](#footnote-544)

Vigilantism is, in some respects, the antithesis of revolution. ‘Violence aimed at the redistribution of values may be identified as either “revolutionary” or “reactionary,” while violence aimed at value maintenance may be termed “vigilante.”’[[545]](#footnote-545) Vigilantes deploy similar levels of violence to maintain the status quo, often compensating for gaps in the state apparatus. It is most commonly associated with the defence of property, as was the case with shopkeepers in response to the Chartist threat in Britain in 1848. In Spain, vigilantism had a precedent during the war against the Carlists, and it is likely that, here too, this had some basis in seeking to defend private property. In most cases though, it is reaction to a specific threat which stimulates vigilantism, and this partly explains why vigilante groups are generally ephemeral. The absence of charismatic leadership and compelling ideology tends to leave the group without a mechanism for cohesion.[[546]](#footnote-546) However, experience of fighting together before—even if at the time it had been to maintain the status quo—helped create social networks, and these could be used just as effectively to spread revolutionary ideas. And, in 1848, at least one group with its origins in vigilantism did join the revolution.

In the autumn, a group of radicals who had previously taken up arms to fight the Carlists left the rural *comarca* (district) of Cinco Villas (Aragón). They marched east and captured the provincial capital Huesca, expelling the garrison and local civil guard. But they struggled to hold the city, and only about a hundred residents chose to join them.[[547]](#footnote-547) By 30 October, news reached nearby Zaragoza that the rebels had abandoned the city and had instead occupied the nearby town of Siétamo. Brigadier Ramón Angles led loyalist troops through driving rain to join up with the expelled civil guards and local *carabineros*. They found the revolutionaries defending the town square, the church, and several houses. Fighting broke out, but by half past five on 31 October government troops were in control of the town and 203 men had been arrested, including the radical leaders Santos Castejón and Manuel Abad. Those arrested were ordinary men, many with strikingly rural occupations. As well as the kind of professionals, tradesmen and labourers encountered elsewhere, there were shepherds, weavers, millers, craftsmen and muleteers.[[548]](#footnote-548) Experience of having fought together against the Carlists and a charismatic leader allowed the conspiracy to extend beyond an intimate social network in a way that was largely unique in Spain outside Madrid and Seville in 1848. Yet, though undoubtedly larger, it still brought together a number of existing networks and was geographically limited. According to arrest reports almost all the revolutionaries hailed from Cinco Villas.[[549]](#footnote-549) And in any case, this made little difference to their ability to spread the revolution among the population of Huesca, who provided them with little support.

The government was quick to employ the state apparatus to stifle revolutionary activity, limited though it was even in the provincial capitals such as Huesca, let alone in its rural hinterland. The civil guard had huge areas to patrol. And although this indicates the precarity of the state’s grip on the countryside, it did mean that the guards had a broad geographical familiarity which the revolutionaries could not match outside their own locales. In Siétamo, for example, their significantly superior knowledge of the town proved decisive. The civil guard was also centrally controlled, and this made it both more reliable and more agile than the *milicia nacional* had been. In his report, Angles praised the civil guards and the *carabineros*, who it seems ‘rivalled the army in bravery and loyalty.’[[550]](#footnote-550) Troops could be deployed directly through the captains general with little bureaucratic wrangling, and the promise of this kind of coercive safeguard no doubt helped ensure that other state functionaries in the provinces remained loyal to the government too. Angles commended the *jefe político* of Huesca, who, he wrote, ‘did much to avoid trouble in the city.’[[551]](#footnote-551) This loyalty also allowed order to be restored almost immediately after the military victories. At the first sign of danger, the *jefe político* had transferred the local government apparatus to the Santa Clara monastery, just outside the city, allowing it to continue to function even while the city was in the hands of the rebels.[[552]](#footnote-552) In this way, the state and its functionaries had learned much from previous revolutionary attempts.

In Galicia there would be no repeat of the successful combined military and student uprising of 1846, but there were widespread outbreaks of revolutionary violence. At the beginning of September, a group of twelve men from A Coruña, Santiago, and Padrón were arrested. They included the archivist Manuel Somoza and Pío Rodríguez Terrazo, who had been president of the revolutionary *junta* in 1846. The details are sketchy; sympathetic newspaper reports suggest that the arrests were without cause.[[553]](#footnote-553) However, it coincided with several conspiracies uncovered around that time. On 17 September, a group of local civilians and soldiers were caught trying to bribe officers of the garrison in A Coruña.[[554]](#footnote-554) However, once again, as soon as the conspirators attempted to expand beyond individuals or groups they knew they could trust, they were exposed by those sympathetic to the state. Indeed, this went further. The governor of Pontevedra warned that groups were gathering over the border in Portugal with the aim of joining revolutionaries in Galicia. The interior minister had instructed him to ‘organise and arm respectable civilians from the villages in readiness to resist the small factions which may spring up in the country and to maintain order.’ The governor entrusted the local *alcaldes* of Mondariz, Arbo, Salvatierra de Miño and other villages to identify those civilians who could be relied upon, based on their ‘social position’ and ‘sound political history.’[[555]](#footnote-555) This demonstration of the reach of the state, and its ability to ascertain those citizens it could trust even at such a local level, is fundamental to understanding the nature of the 1848 Revolution in Spain.

Around the same time, documents were uncovered relating to a masonic conspiracy in Málaga, another place with a strong revolutionary tradition. Among those arrested were José de Pino, master of the *Independencia nacional* Lodge, Joaquín Segovia, master of the *Bética* Lodge, José Pérez and Sebastián Mojador—both officers from the *África* Regiment—as well as a retired captain, Ysidro Nieva.[[556]](#footnote-556) The authorities suspected links to a planned revolutionary expedition from Oran, in Spanish Algeria, to the Serranía de Ronda, and evidence suggested that the revolutionaries were trying to stir up the poorer Málaga neighbourhoods of El Perchel and La Trinidad. The attempt ultimately came to nothing. Masonic lodges were places where discontent with the *moderado* vision of the state could brew and revolution could be readily fomented beyond the reach of the state, but getting opposition out onto the streets was less straightforward. The captain general explained that these middle-class serial revolutionaries did enjoy the support of the local working classes. Although everyone in the poorer neighbourhoods knew who the conspirators were, he wrote, no one was willing to testify against them in court.[[557]](#footnote-557) However, despite this apparent sympathy for the revolutionaries, those beyond the lodges did not join the conspirators in significant numbers. In the same way as occupation and geography, overcoming networks limited by class proved an insurmountable barrier for the revolutionaries.

It was not that there was no appetite for radical politics in Spain, and across the country charismatic leaders did appear. Abad, for example, was a decorated hero of the Carlist War. He had grown up and studied in Huesca, and remained a well-known figure in the city, described by the correspondent of *El Clamor público* as a ‘living genius.’[[558]](#footnote-558) But radical political networks were local. While this meant that most of the radical outbreaks took the state by surprise, they also took people by surprise who lived outside these localities. And public sympathy with the revolutionaries did not convert into mobilisation, and this may have been a question of conceptualisation. It was not just that radical organisation was predominantly local, but also that radicals articulated their challenge to the centralising state in terms of localism. In contrast, public order was increasingly seen in Spanish terms. The narrative in the press, the *moderado* reforms of the state, and the increasing wealth of the middle classes all helped to reconceptualise this question as a national one. In 1848, most Spaniards in the provincial cities sought the order promised by the state rather than the representation promised by the revolution.

## Carlo-Republicanism in Catalonia

On 26 March, the same day as the first uprising in Madrid, a group of some fifteen to twenty unemployed youths from the city of Barcelona arrived in the small Catalan town of Molins de Rei. They wore Phrygian caps, sang the Hymn of Riego, the hero of the 1820 Revolution, and shouted ‘*¡Viva la libertad!*’ at passers-by. When met by the civil guard, they quickly dispersed, but not before causing serious alarm to both the authorities and residents.[[559]](#footnote-559)

The revolution reached Barcelona itself four days later, and it looked and felt much like it did elsewhere. Students from the university took to the streets in response to events in Madrid. Troops were quickly dispatched to garrison the city, notably the Royal Dockyard at Drassanes, which in 1843 had been at the centre of fighting during the *Jamància*.[[560]](#footnote-560) And there were signs that the government was preparing to respond to unrest as Espartero had. An artillery battery was set up on the corner of carrer del Carme, on which the university was located, but this did not put the revolutionaries off. Street fighting broke out, shots were fired, and one woman was killed.[[561]](#footnote-561) The leading *progresista* newspaper in the city, *El Barcelonés* claimed that the woman was killed accidentally after a solider had been stabbed.[[562]](#footnote-562) And fighting was blamed on a group of locals who attacked troops after the students had left, though the revolutionaries were much more likely to have been a combination of the two groups. As is so often the case in 1848, the identity of this woman is unclear, but she was probably involved in the insurgency in some way. Perhaps as elsewhere, she was helping build barricades, bringing supplies to the insurgents, tending the sick, or perhaps she had even taken up arms herself.[[563]](#footnote-563) In any case, the revolutionaries were defeated by government forces, but again this does not tell the whole story.

Barcelona was particularly well-prepared for unrest.[[564]](#footnote-564) Yet it was the non-coercive actions of the liberal state which most contributed to the maintenance of public order there. With its nascent industry, the city was considered especially vulnerable to the 1847 financial crisis, though in the event it was the political crisis of 1848 which caused greater economic uncertainty.[[565]](#footnote-565) But the authorities had prepared. The cities of Catalonia, wrote the captain general, Manuel Pavía, are great industrial centres and ‘subject to manufacturing crises, which give rise to sudden and dreadful hardship.’[[566]](#footnote-566) In Madrid the minister of finance, Bertran de Lis, suspended taxes on raw materials and products of the Catalan textile manufactories, and in early March the *jefe político* agreed to a plan by the Barcelona *ayuntamiento* to establish a public works programme. Unemployed citizens would be put to work on road and canal building as well as the construction of municipal buildings.[[567]](#footnote-567) But still more needed to be done. On 1 April 1848, Pavía convened an extraordinary meeting with politicians, newspaper editors and industrialists, where it was decided to provide up to 4 million *reales* in loans to safeguard the region’s factories. This intervention in the local economy allowed Pavía to provide the working classes with ‘bread to feed their children.’[[568]](#footnote-568) But it did more than that. It tied the fate of thousands of working-class people to the fate of the local *moderado* elite, formalising the tacit support which the liberal hegemony enjoyed elsewhere.

Despite these measures, the resurgent Carlist insurgency added a further layer of complexity to the character of the revolution in Catalonia. The Carlist defeat at the end of the 1833-1840 civil war had been complete, and the movement alone no longer represented an existential threat to the Spanish liberal state. But that did not mean that it presented no threat at all, particularly as the state was preoccupied with uprisings in the radical cities. And there is a multi-temporality to the movement which is not always recognised.[[569]](#footnote-569) In 1845, Don Carlos renounced his claim to the throne in favour of his son, Carlos Luis. While the movement remained ostensibly a legitimist one, it had developed an intellectual basis of its own, focussing particularly on localism and the role of the Church in society.[[570]](#footnote-570) Its religiosity attracted large numbers of clergymen, but equating Carlism with ultra-conservativism and counter-revolution is, at least in 1848, wholly inaccurate.[[571]](#footnote-571) Instead it represented a possible alternative model for the development of the state, offering—or appearing to offer—something to a broad range of opponents to the vision of the liberal *moderados*. Its opposition to centralisation, and particularly Carlos Luis’ promise to maintain the *fueros*, appealed in Catalonia to conservatives and radicals alike.[[572]](#footnote-572)

Despite this avowed opposition to centralisation, Carlism’s relationship with the governing party was complex, and the boundaries between Carlism and the liberal state were sometimes blurred too. Its newspaper, *La Esperanza*, first printed in 1844 had a relatively large national readership and would become the most popular in Spain between 1850 and 1854.[[573]](#footnote-573) What is more, after 1840, many former Carlists had returned to the service of the liberal state. And even during the 1848 Revolution, the Carlist general, José Pons, defected to the *moderado* government, taking with him his ‘services, knowledge and expertise.’[[574]](#footnote-574) On the other side, there were some *moderados* sympathetic to a more formal alliance with the Carlists.[[575]](#footnote-575) But they remained marginal, and there was much animosity between the two groups too. Most Carlists considered Pons a traitor and denied the legitimacy of the liberal state’s armed forces, particularly after the army’s alleged involvement in the extra-judicial killings of two prominent Carlists, Bartolomé Porredón and Bertran Tristany. If, however, the relationship between Carlism and *moderantismo* was complicated, then on the surface the relationship between Carlism and the revolution seems paradoxical. They did share a common enemy, but this was more than just an uneasy coalition.

In 1847, a second Carlist conflict had broken out. It was more *guerrilla*-like than the first and on a much smaller scale, although the number of Carlist troops did continue to grow throughout the year.[[576]](#footnote-576) And it demonstrated the continued violent rejection of the legitimacy of the liberal state by many Spaniards, primarily in the North West. Yet a series of proclamations explain how the nature of this rejection began to change after the February Revolution. In a seemingly unpublished proclamation of 21 March, Rafael Sala combined the classic Carlist tropes of ‘king’ and ‘religion’ with newer ideas of ‘the people’ and complaints about taxation.[[577]](#footnote-577) It is not surprising that, amidst the tumults of 1848, these ideas became complementary rather than contradictory. The famous cry of ‘*¡Viva la constitución y Carlos [V]!*’ is possibly apocryphal, but it is not as incongruous as it seems.[[578]](#footnote-578) Though the leadership of neither faction was entirely pleased. When, on 1 April, Josep Masoret was named commander of the Carlist forces in Catalonia, he felt obliged to issue a proclamation eschewing radical help for the cause. Though, in doing so, even he evoked regional loyalties and called the February Revolution in Paris ‘divine providence.’[[579]](#footnote-579) On the other side, on 1 July, the Catalan republican Abdon Terrades, who had been one of the leaders of the *Jamància*, launched a proclamation encouraging fellow republicans to action while criticising the alliance with the Carlists, who, he argued, would enslave Spain ‘under the popular banner.’[[580]](#footnote-580)

But Terrades was in Parisian exile, far from the realities of the 1848 Revolution in Catalonia. In truth, many Catalan revolutionaries were both political radicals and Carlists, or at least had sympathies with both groups. This may appear contradictory, but it was not uncommon. Mid-twentieth century assumptions about the importance of ideology as ‘fairly tightly-woven sets of action-orientated ideas’ continue to shape understandings of nineteenth-century politics.[[581]](#footnote-581) In reality, neither radicalism nor Carlism was entirely ideologically coherent.[[582]](#footnote-582) But both appealed to similar groups with concrete grievances against the liberal state. Studies which have attempted to ascertain the numbers of revolutionaries who were nominally Carlists or nominally radicals, are therefore almost impossible to verify.[[583]](#footnote-583) And it is difficult to judge the level of support for legitimism *per se*, but it was not likely to have been very high in this period. It was perhaps for this reason that the government felt able to grant a general amnesty to Carlist exiles on 17 April, at the height of the 1848 Revolution.[[584]](#footnote-584) And they were right to be confident. On 23 June, Ramón Cabrera, the hero of the first Carlist War, returned to Spain. Although symbolic, his return did not change the *guerrilla* nature of the war. It remained fundamentally rural, and throughout the summer, the Carlists suffered a series of humiliating defeats. Even Cabrera himself came to doubt the viability of a purely military campaign against the liberal state.[[585]](#footnote-585) It was clear that Carlism, far from being a discrete threat, was increasingly a vehicle for opposition to the government and their vision for the state. In this way, it became part of the 1848 Revolution in Spain, and it needed the revolution in order to further its aims.

At the beginning of October, Fernando Fernández de Córdova, by then captain general of Catalonia, reported the discovery of a conspiracy in Barcelona. Although it never progressed to action, contemporary correspondence reveals the alarm this combined Carlo-Republican conspiracy caused in official circles. Nevertheless, even encompassing both support bases, the conspirators could not persuade people to join the revolution in large numbers. Fernández de Córdova reported that the ‘pacific citizens, confident in the protection which the authorities afford their interests and security,’ continue to support the queen.[[586]](#footnote-586) When the conspiracy was uncovered, twelve men were arrested: four army officers and eight civilians, including three musicians from the *Liceo* theatre.[[587]](#footnote-587) It is difficult to say how far each of these different groups were involved in the plot—in the end only three military officers were ever charged—but it demonstrates the changing nature of political sociability in the period. Changes to the public sphere in the first half of the nineteenth century brought together people from different revolutionary traditions in cafés, theatres, and public spaces. And in Catalonia in particular, it seemed to connect the provincial capital with its surrounding towns. Yet, even here and even when these groups worked together, their ability to spread revolutionary activity beyond their own separate networks was limited because these changes in the public sphere also increasingly excluded the working class, both physically and symbolically, from political discourse.[[588]](#footnote-588)

The three officers, Ramón López Vázquez, Juan Valterra and Joaquín Clavijo were sentenced to death for crimes of a ‘Carlo-Republican’ nature ‘against the legitimate government’ and ‘against the social order.’[[589]](#footnote-589) Their sentences were met with an unprecedented outpouring of public support for clemency. Two hundred and nine prominent Barcelonese, ‘representing the majority of classes in the city,’ signed a letter to Fernández de Córdova, decrying the ‘severity of the ordinance’ and requesting a pardon.[[590]](#footnote-590) He received further requests for clemency from the vicar general, members of the *ayuntamiento*, as well as business and industry leaders; even the *jefe político* was said to be sympathetic. The French consul also interceded on their behalf. He stressed that his government had abolished the death penalty for political crimes and hoped that the Spanish government might be persuaded to do the same.[[591]](#footnote-591) This was clearly problematic because these intercessions were from precisely the groups which represented the *moderado* power base in Spain and from their allies abroad. Among them were those ‘pacific citizens’ who equated legitimacy with public order, and yet here they evoked their loyalty to the queen and to the government. This separation of the revolutionaries from the revolution in the collective imaginary is seen throughout Spain in 1848, and the government had to be careful not to undermine its support by conflating the two and acting too harshly against the former.

On 9 October, Fernández de Córdova received another letter. This one was from the military governor of the citadel, where the three men were being held. He wrote that Ramón Vásquez López promised to tell the captain general about a ‘highly important rebellion’ to ‘avoid the shedding of blood and to ensure the triumph of the [*moderado*] party’, if only Fernández de Córdova would guarantee him a pardon.[[592]](#footnote-592) The captain general was tempted. He felt it could hold the key to the final defeat of the revolution in Catalonia, but he was also understandably suspicious of Vásquez López’s motives since this was significantly more than he had said when he was first questioned. In the end, it was concerns of a more political nature which swung the decision. He worried that overturning the sentence would cause conflict within the governing party and that, for many *moderados*, justice had to be seen to be done. Those petitioning for his release, he wrote, must ‘understand the necessity that the law be abided by and that whosoever breaks it must suffer the consequences.’[[593]](#footnote-593) This idea of justice being *seen* to be done is significant because public order was everywhere becoming an articulation of the legitimacy of the centralised state. And this needed to be overt particularly in Barcelona with its regionalist sympathies. The three men were duly executed—according to Fernández de Córdova, Vásquez López’s last words were an energetic cry of ‘*¡Viva la república!*’—but this was not the end of the government’s troubles.[[594]](#footnote-594)

Sporadic fighting continued in the Catalan hinterland through the summer, but events in the autumn brought the Carlo-Republican nature of the revolution to the fore here too. In late October, radicals in the town of Olot (Girona) were reported to be working with Carlists.[[595]](#footnote-595) On 23 November, fifteen men with histories of radicalism disappeared from the nearby town of Tortella. An apothecary, three weavers, a tanner and eight cutlers (the dominant local industry) were assumed to have joined the rebel bands.[[596]](#footnote-596) These men, artisans and small businessmen, were typical of the foot soldiers of the 1848 Revolution across Europe, but they were scarcely typical legitimists.[[597]](#footnote-597) Indeed, four of the men had fought with Narciso Ametller during the *Jamància*.[[598]](#footnote-598) And yet, this alliance was largely the same one that had been characteristic of revolutionary activity in Barcelona in the spring. The identities of those arrested help explain why, again, both the groups within the coalition struggled to recruit larger numbers to the revolution.

By the beginning of November the Olot rebels, consisting of ‘*trabucaires’*, ‘*jamancios’* and ‘*republicanos’*, had been defeated. The most senior military man captured was an old absolutist captain who spent his days discussing politics in the town’s cafés. But other officers arrested included the republican Rafael Zenea, the democrat Antonio Santos, and the ill-educated, apolitical, but ambitious Lieutenant José Fabregat, who was seduced by promises of promotion. Two army trainers seemed to be at the centre of the conspiracy: Francisco Vinader and Ramon Serra. Vinader was a ‘furious republican’ with radical ideas ‘beyond comprehension.’ While as a student, Serra had been involved in a political assassination in Barcelona.[[599]](#footnote-599) At the same time, a number of civilians were arrested for their part in the events. They included José Estolch, a lawyer, José Tora, an apothecary, Jacinto Molas, a wealthy manufacturer, and three *jornaleros* (day labourers).[[600]](#footnote-600) On the face of it, it does seem that the revolutionaries managed to appeal to quite a broad cross section of society here. However, the reality was that these men already knew one another, and many had taken part in the 1843 uprising, had been members of the *milicia nacional*, or were members of the local *ayuntamiento*.[[601]](#footnote-601) The *jornaleros*, who had been tasked with being intermediaries between the leadership and the ordinary people, proved singularly unsuccessful. Again, while sociability helped spread the message of the revolution, it also ensured that it remained relatively constrained.

Although there were further attempts to reignite the Carlo-Republican project, they were largely more imagined than real. Notable among them was that of Tomàs Bertran i Soler, variably both a republican and a monarchist, who attempted to set up a constitutional local government, sometimes cited optimistically as a Catalan nationalist endeavour. But, in 1848, there was no contradiction between regionalism and Spanish nationalism.[[602]](#footnote-602) As with previous revolutionary activities, the revolution enjoyed support in principle but failed because this support could not be converted into action against the government. In this way, it was indicative of the wider problem of the Carlo-Republican insurrection and of the 1848 Revolution in Spain more generally. By the time Cabrera crossed back into France in April 1849, the fighting had petered out. The Carlist forces had been defeated and the radical *juntas* had been uncovered and destroyed. Both movements, separately and together, had failed to convert revolution into mass mobilisation. In common with Spaniards elsewhere, when given the chance, most Catalans chose not to join the revolution.

As across Spain, it is important not to equate this reluctance to join the revolution as long wholehearted support for the *moderado* government, and for their vision of the Spanish state. In fact, as the intercessions on behalf of the October conspirators in Barcelona demonstrate, the mood at least at times was sympathetic to the revolutionaries and strongly against the government. This, in turn, explains the longevity of the conflict and the ability of the rebels to remain at large for so long. Edward Shorter makes a similar argument about the doubts the German middle classes had about the 1848 Revolution there, in spite of their enthusiasm for its aims: their fear of modernity and desire to regress ‘to an ill-remembered social order’ based on ‘paternalistic authority and organized along corporate lines.’[[603]](#footnote-603) The nature of the Carlo-Republican revolution also highlights another feature common across Europe: although the rurality was not excluded—indeed, in Spain it was at least the equal of the urban sphere—even in Catalonia, there was little interaction between the two spaces and the residents often behaved differently. William Fortescue highlights a similar phenomenon in rural France, where legitimists made significant gains in elections to the provisional government in April 1848.[[604]](#footnote-604) However, in Spain, that both groups remained unsuccessful, demonstrates the growing legitimacy of the Spanish state. Its exclusion of the popular classes—both Carlist and republican—from the political sphere was a conscious decision based on hegemonic liberal principles.[[605]](#footnote-605) And it was a hegemony broadly accepted by the population, and it was for this reason that the revolutionary alliance failed to turn the ‘extraordinary’ into the ‘ordinary’ in the minds of most Catalans.[[606]](#footnote-606)

## The Campo

As the revolutionaries were driven out of the provincial cities and larger towns, they joined *guerrilla* bands operating in Spain’s mountainous countryside (*campo*). This vast, under-populated expanse proved perennially difficult to govern. By 1848, the state had begun to penetrate it, but it lacked the resources to do so in anything more than a superficial way. What governance there was, was highly militarised. Madrid relied on the army, the civil guard and the *carabineros* to impose its will on the people. In some ways, this made the *campo* the perfect arena for the revolution. During the Carlist War the rebels had managed to capture large swathes of countryside, and at least in some regions the revolutionaries were able to do so again in 1848. But in the same way that the state’s penetration of these areas proved largely superficial, so too did their occupation by the revolutionaries. In other words, the absence of state power made the *campo* a tempting but ultimately worthless target for the revolution. It could only be a realistic threat here if sufficient numbers of troops could be persuaded to mutiny. Throughout 1848, there were several such mutinies, but like in the cities and in the towns all would struggle to reach a critical mass.

Spain has a long history of military intervention in the state. It was not uncommon for military men to dominate the political space in nineteenth-century Europe, but in Spain the weak and heavily centralised state was especially vulnerable to militarisation. And the military as an institution came to exercise significant political power independent of the civil state, including intervening unconstitutionally in the political system.[[607]](#footnote-607) In the first half of the nineteenth century, these interventions, or *pronunciamentos*, almost always led to revolution as soldiers and civilians joined forces to overthrow the prime minister and install their champion in his stead. Juan Bravo Murillo would later claim that Spaniards were ‘hypnotised by epaulettes.’[[608]](#footnote-608) But during the nineteenth century, these interventions tended to be liberal rather than anti-liberal: demands ‘for political change in the name of liberty in general or insistence upon a specific set of freedoms.’[[609]](#footnote-609) Although some revolutionaries in 1848 used the language of *pronunciamiento*, the events of that year do not fit neatly into this paradigm.

The most important difference is that the military leaders of the 1848 Revolution were more junior officers than would be associated with the traditional *pronunciamiento* model. Just like Joaquín de la Gándara and José Portal, officers elsewhere tended to have little or no public profile. The government did purge some *progresista* generals, including Agustín Nogueras, Juan Van Halen and Ignacio Gurrea. Evidence of their involvement in the revolution is patchy at best, but as political opponents they may have provided rallying points for the revolutionaries—particularly those serving in the army—had they not been removed. Where general officers were involved with the revolution, they were retirees or relics of the Carlist War. While popular figures within their factions, they were never able to convert that popularity into the wider population, particularly in urban areas. Therefore, they were not men in the mould of Riego, Espartero, or even Narváez himself. Nevertheless, members of the armed forces played a part in many of the revolutionary events in Spain in 1848. This involvement was not, however, uniform; instead, it spoke to the broader heterogeneity of experience during that year. Some soldiers absconded as individuals or in small groups to join the Carlists in the *campo*. A larger number joined radical civilian insurrections in the cities, either individually or in groups, sometimes as part of the garrison implicated in radical networks. In other cases, just as in Seville, it was members of the military who were the driving force behind the disturbances, but as political agents in their own right rather than simply as soldiers.

As elsewhere in Europe, the Spanish army remained nominally subordinate to civil government. But the 1845 constitution established military jurisdiction over matters of public order, and in the years that followed administrators worked more broadly with the armed forces to further the development of the state, particularly in the countryside.[[610]](#footnote-610) This meant that, by the late 1840s, military power in Spanish society was becoming a political issue. Both the *moderados* and the *progresistas* criticised one another for using the military to undermine the rule of law. While this was true in both cases, it was also evident that the rule of law ultimately relied upon military power for its enforcement as it did everywhere in Europe in the period. Writing in 1846, the conservative intellectual Jaime Balmes doubted that, without it, it would be possible to maintain public order at all. And he claimed that public order was such an urgent priority that ‘secondary things must be sacrificed to its conservation.’[[611]](#footnote-611) He rightly identified that the longer-term answer was to strengthen civilian power within the state (although, for him, this meant religious power), rather than to weaken the power of the military. But he captured the public mood when he wrote, ‘it is better to resign oneself to the inconveniences that military command brings, if there is no other means for the preservation of public order.’[[612]](#footnote-612)

For the government, this ultimate reliance on the military was a significant risk. It is telling that, in so much of their correspondence with the minister of war, the captains general emphasise the loyalty of their troops. And the risk of rebellion was exacerbated by structural problems within the Spanish army. Many soldiers—including the 25,000 or so newly drafted in response to the February Revolution—were conscripted largely from the countryside according to the deeply unpopular *quinta* system. And sometimes this system itself proved a catalyst for public disorder. In Padrón and Santiago (Galicia), for example, there were *quinta* revolts in March 1848.[[613]](#footnote-613) Also in Galicia, in Carril a similar armed uprising was met by part of the garrison of Pontevedra, the local civil guard and *carabineros* from the neighbouring town of Cambados. On the outskirts of nearby Betanzos, locals ambushed civil guards, pelting them with rocks. But both movements were subdued in the same way by the authorities before they could gain momentum.[[614]](#footnote-614)

The success of the revolution in 1848 elsewhere on the continent often hinged on the unreliability of conscripted soldiers, and there were doubts about their loyalty in Spain too. In mid-March, the British ambassador wrote that the *moderados* ‘rely wholly upon the army.’[[615]](#footnote-615) But, once the insurrections begun, he doubted whether they would ‘long remain faithful.’[[616]](#footnote-616) The army also had too many officers, as the fall of Espartero and the marriage of Isabel II had prompted waves of promotion by the *moderados*.[[617]](#footnote-617) Although those promoted were predominantly officers loyal to the party, it created a mood of resentment particularly among the more junior ranks. Like with the educational demands of the students, it is not possible to simply separate the military grievances of the soldiers from their politics, as military disloyalty ‘is a social and political rather than a military question.’[[618]](#footnote-618) The longevity of the *quinta*, for example, was the result of political disagreement and indecision not because it was considered a sensible method of recruitment to the armed forces.[[619]](#footnote-619)

The loyalty of the army was, therefore, a source of significant concern for the authorities in the early months of the revolution. Rumours of plots abounded, and Spain’s long, porous borders with France and Portugal seemed particularly vulnerable. In April, the captain general of Galicia received news from the consul in Porto that eighteen Carlists had left Southampton bound for Lisbon, from whence they planned to travel to Braga to join up with rebels and launch an attack on Spain. In response, authorities stepped up surveillance along the border and notified the naval authorities in Ferrol.[[620]](#footnote-620) Despite these efforts, intelligence received at the end of April suggested that 20 crates of weapons were to be smuggled over the border into the rural *comarca* of Viana, northwest of Bragança.[[621]](#footnote-621) Whether these threats were serious or not is difficult to say, but the authorities certainly took them seriously.

Another major threat was garrisoning troops in smaller towns and cities, where boredom and exposure to opposition political culture intensified existing grievances, creating the conditions for rebellion. The authorities around the Straights of Gibraltar and in Spain’s North African enclaves—both of which tended to have cities with large garrisons—had been sufficiently worried about disloyalty to threaten troops with precautionary deportation after the insurrection in Seville in May.[[622]](#footnote-622) Despite this, on 7 June, two sergeants and two soldiers were shot and a further nine imprisoned after the discovery of a conspiracy in Ceuta.[[623]](#footnote-623) Given the demographics of the enclave, it is likely that this had little or no civilian input and instead relied solely on politicised elements within the army. The area remained restive throughout the year with revolutionary attempts by the garrisons in Tarifa and Algeciras (both Cádiz) in September, but in each case the conspiracy was quickly discovered and put down.[[624]](#footnote-624) Betrayal proved to be as much of a problem for the military revolutionaries as it did for the radicals and the Carlists.

In June, General Blas María Royo de Léon, a veteran of the first Carlist War, released a proclamation to the citizens of Extremadura, Toledo and La Mancha, but its intended audience was more likely to have been soldiers garrisoned in the provinces rather than the peasant farmers who made up most of the population. In common with the radicals in Valencia, any soldier who joined Royo’s troops would have his rank matched and receive commensurate compensation. The proclamation was ostensibly in support of legitimism, but as elsewhere his language was clearly influenced by the revolution. He called on ‘true Spaniards’ to reclaim their ‘national independence’ and foretold that through the horrors of war would their ‘heroic nation’ be renewed. This is precisely the sort of language which caused conservatives such dismay across the continent. That is not to say that Royo was not a Carlist, only that he was employing the rhetorical devices of the revolution to appeal to those without the same allegiance to Carlos Luis. He also demonstrates at least some understanding of the social aspect of the revolution. He bemoaned the recent progress which other nations had experienced, but which had been denied to Spain. This made sense as he had spent time in exile in Britain, as did the promise of well-being and prosperity for those who backed the ‘legitimate successor’ of Ferdinand VII.[[625]](#footnote-625)

At the beginning of July, twenty officers, including Royo, and thirteen soldiers crossed the border from Portugal.[[626]](#footnote-626) Four of their number were soon arrested, including José Melo de Curruchaca and Modesto González, a cache of weapons was seized and three died fighting government forces.[[627]](#footnote-627) But despite this early setback, the rebels made significant progress, fighting in Extremadura, Castilla la Nueva and Andalucía into the Autumn. This suggests that Royo’s proclamation was successful in recruiting significant numbers of local fighters, but their progress was still limited to sparsely populated rural areas. Equally unsuccessful was the plan to combine forces with the Andalusian faction under the command of Félix Gómez Calvente and José María de Arévalo, protégés of another Carlist general, Miguel Gómez. They planned an audacious attack from the sea, which failed because of the actions, both ‘military and political’, of the garrison in Algeciras.[[628]](#footnote-628) The state struggled to hold territory in these liminal rural areas against the armed bands of revolutionaries. But in nineteenth-century Spain territory did not equal power, and the revolutionaries rarely threatened larger towns, let along the provincial capitals. This kind of *guerrilla* fighting, with its antecedence in Spain during the Napoleonic period became a rural revolutionary paradigm not just in Spain but across the European periphery in 1848.[[629]](#footnote-629) But its successes proved similarly limited elsewhere too.

In late October, in Ciudad Rodrigo (Salamanca), local *carabineros* were bribed to allow exiled revolutionaries to slip over the Portuguese border and take part in a planned *pronunciamiento* by officers from the Mallorca Regiment.[[630]](#footnote-630) One early newspaper report described it as a ‘grand conspiracy’ and highlighted the significance of sending so many men from Valladolid to face them, considering that a storm had made the roads near impassable. Nevertheless, the events themselves were scarcely reported in the press.[[631]](#footnote-631) The men allegedly received the help of two priests, from the border villages of Mieza and Hinojosa de Duero.[[632]](#footnote-632) And two of the conspirators were identified as civilians, Corbalán and Arias. It was later presumed that, suspecting that their plans had been uncovered, Corbalán and Arias and most of the others had escaped back to Portugal. This lack of information about the events themselves is typical of the challenges facing the state in reacting to the threat of the 1848 Revolution in the *campo*. Nevertheless, as elsewhere, the state was able to mobilise its limited apparatus quickly. In the days after the conspiracy was uncovered, a number of sergeants were closely watched, as were residents of the Ciudad Rodrigo who inspired distrust owing to their past political allegiances. Those *carabineros* felt to be compromised were moved elsewhere, away from temptation, and their commander, Rafael Piquer, was replaced.

It was convenient for the captain general of Castilla la Vieja to blame the *carabineros*—who ‘by the nature of their work’ were vulnerable to corruption—and unknown exiles from over the border in Portugal. But his assurances that the garrison was ‘a model of discipline and loyalty,’ and that there was ‘not a single individual’ who did not have his total confidence, would quickly prove misjudged.[[633]](#footnote-633) Six officers were arrested and, although nothing could be proved against them, there were inconsistencies in their testimonies.[[634]](#footnote-634) Captain Melitón Ayala was sentenced to two months in prison and Lieutenant Luis Rubiales to one. Lieutenant Antonio Buceli was sentenced to two years for failing to inform his senior officers about his prior knowledge of the plot.[[635]](#footnote-635) For a state apparatus increasingly reliant on intelligence to penetrate revolutionary conspiracies, this failure to disclose important information had serious implications for maintaining public order and, by extension, for perceptions of its legitimacy. The state needed to maintain public order to compensate for its inability to find and prosecute many of the revolutionaries. It seems that neither Arias nor Corbalán were ever found, for example. Though Arias could have been Juan Arias Girón, deputy for Ciudad Rodrigo and suspected of absolutist sympathies, or Captain Sebastian Arias, who had been allegedly involved in the 7 May uprising and who was later sentenced to ten years in a *presidio* for sedition in January 1849.[[636]](#footnote-636)

Most soldiers, and, crucially, the army as an institution, did remain loyal in 1848. In the short term, this helped the government maintain public order and endowed the state with a measure of legitimacy. On 7 September, a number of civilians revolted in Tarifa (Cádiz) and attempted to persuade three sergeants, José Lourdes, Manuel Barrena and Luciano González, to join them. Instead, the three reported the men to their commanding officer. This allowed the authorities to arrest the revolutionaries, and the sergeants received commendations from the ministry of war.[[637]](#footnote-637)

The story of Juan Ruiz Gutiérrez, alias ‘Cobanes’, particularly demonstrates not only how the state came to rely on the loyalty of the army, but that they were able to do so. On 15 May, Ruiz was removed from his post in the army on account of his radical political ideas but, on hearing of an uprising by rebels in the Valle de Pas, near Santander, he volunteered to re-join to fight them.[[638]](#footnote-638) Narváez’s gamble to take him at his word paid off as the uprising was quickly defeated. More broadly, the government forces sent to suppress every single engagement with the revolutionaries in 1848, both military and civilian, remained loyal. But this loyalty came at a price. It exacerbated the creeping military preponderance over civil authority, which came to characterise the Spanish state in the second half of the nineteenth century.[[639]](#footnote-639) The armed forces, according to an article in the army newspaper *Revista Militar* from September 1848, ‘is the only barrier behind which the civilised world can take refuge from the torrent of disorder and barbarism.’[[640]](#footnote-640) And this had devastating implications for the legitimacy of the state in the longer term.

Yet whether Spanish praetorianism ‘did more to prevent than foment revolution’ remains an important question.[[641]](#footnote-641) On the one hand, it is true that the army played a key role in the state reaction to revolutionary events. This occurred both on an individual level, fighting in urban and rural settings, and on an institutional level. By embodying local and national public-order functions the army helped ensure that the state could react with agility to pre-empt and counter revolutionary threats. However, the state’s response was not a purely military one. Narváez’s dictatorship, although ultimately depending on the loyalty of the army, was constitutional and retained civilian control of the military. And this is testament to the strength of civil society in Spain in 1848, particularly when compared with later in the nineteenth century.[[642]](#footnote-642) It is, however, also indicative of the precarity of state power in the *campo*. Unlike in the cities, where the state could increasingly depend on non-coercive means to ensure order, in the *campo* order remained by necessity largely imposed. Deep-rooted structural problems lessened the fitness of the armed forces to achieve this, and the army in particular functioned as a social network in its own right, helping to spread revolutionary ideas. But ultimately, although some of the revolutionary outbreaks within the army seemed dangerous at the time and were able to make significant territorial gains, these were only short-lived and restricted geographically to more liminal areas.

The *campo* provided the ideal place for urban revolutionaries to regroup beyond the reach of the state. But, once outside the cities, they became a nuisance rather than a threat. As in the cities rural revolutionaries struggled to recruit beyond their existing social networks, and in the countryside these networks were naturally smaller. That is not to say that villagers were apolitical, but they lacked the organisational mechanisms—the *tertulias*, the friendly societies, the *veladas*, and so on—which helped spread conspiracies in the cities. There was sympathy for the ideas of the revolution, particularly for localism, but unlike during the Carlist War of the 1830s this did not translate into large-scale mobilisation among the peasantry. One possible reason for this was the rapprochement between the *moderados* and Rome. Although the Spanish Church had remained institutionally loyal to Isabel, *desamortización* had allowed the Carlists—with the support of the pope—to create a narrative of Catholicism against the liberal state. By 1848, this was much more difficult. Other than the state, realistically the Church remained the only organisation which transcended rural localities. Once it was clear that the clergy would not support the revolution in large numbers, a large-scale mobilisation in the *campo* was impossible.

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By the autumn, the Spanish state had largely driven the revolution from the cities into the *campo*, where it more or less fizzled out. The state remained weak, defined both narrowly and flatly. But this narrowness and this flatness helped make it more agile, and its effectiveness lay not in its strength but in its agility. Through its representatives, both military and civil, the government reacted to threats of revolution by deploying troops, offering incentives to betray conspiracies, enforcing curfews, but also by introducing public works programmes and dealing with student unrest through university authorities. In the short term, these measures were largely successful and helped the state appear legitimate to a public who, like the *moderados*, increasingly defined legitimacy in terms of the maintenance of public order. For opponents of the government, however, this wish to bypass local government and to impose its will through local intermediaries, undermined the legitimacy not only of the government but also of the liberal state which was increasingly defined in the *moderado* image. Furthermore, the 1848 Revolution was not defeated entirely. Instead, it continued in the more liminal spaces where the state struggled to penetrate. There are two complimentary reasons for this. The first is partly because of that agility of the Spanish state, and the way this enabled the government in Madrid to impose its will on different parts of the country. But it is also because this intervention generally found a sympathetic public, significantly restricting the spread of the revolution through different social strata and different geographies.

# 5

Beyond the Peninsula

The 1848 Revolution was undoubtedly an international event, and the revolutionary experience is increasingly situated in a transnational or supranational context.[[643]](#footnote-643) In Spain, the revolution was similarly shaped by interactions with external forces. The liminal spaces of empire and exile, and the realm of ideas—which the state could never control—help both to define the experience and to explain the consequences of the revolution. They allowed the revolutionaries the opportunity to escape the more heavily governed spaces of the peninsula and generally proved more fruitful than the *campo* as arenas for the revolution. In turn, they became loci for new threats to the liberal hegemony. Sometimes, such as in the uprisings by enslaved Puerto Ricans, the inspiration of the European Revolution was overt. Other events in the imperial sphere, such as piracy in the Philippines, had different origins but took on new meanings against the backdrop of events in Europe. Similarly, the revolution hastened the spread of socialism and communism, and inspired by their experience on the barricades the radicals split from the *progresistas* to form a parliamentary bloc—the *partido demócrata—*for the first time.

If these liminal arenas allowed the revolution to spread and to continue long after the barricades had come down, they also allowed the government the opportunity to expand its own reach. Colonial rule relied heavily on local, often military, elites, and the inhabitants of the empire were denied many of the rights enjoyed by those in the Peninsula. This allowed the state’s coercive apparatus to be deployed with even more agility than in the metropole, even if its penetration remained much weaker. The hegemony of the conservative elite on the mainland, which had looked in danger at the beginning of the year, was further strengthened by exile. The process had long allowed the government to shape the contours of citizenship, and deportation to the colonies removed the threat increasingly posed by lower-class revolutionaries, while also supporting the colonisation and Hispanicisation of the overseas territories. At the same time, the renewed focus on public order and the defence of private property, underpinned by a return of Catholicism to the centre of the public sphere in both metropolitan and imperial Spain, helped create the beginnings of a popular conservatism. The central tenets of this more conservative mainstream proved particularly popular with the growing middle classes, and this consensus helped provide the liberal elite with a further two decades of control.

But these external forces proved, to some degree at least, beyond the control of the government, and even some of their successes portended badly for the future. The question of slavery would need to be faced, and that of colonial representation would be raised again in a much more urgent fashion in the 1860s. After 1848, agreement on how to approach both issues seemed even further away. And Spanish politics was left ideologically fragmented as previously broad groupings became increasingly exclusivist. Spain remained recognisably liberal, but this liberalism was increasingly defended using concepts—such as colonial violence—with which it was fundamentally incompatible. And, while liberalism remained hegemonic among the elite, few ordinary Spaniards ever truly embraced liberal politics. Instead, they aligned and realigned themselves with a range of individual policies. This ideological unpredictability made those in power wary of increased representation, even while elsewhere in Europe the *demos* was increasingly relied upon to legitimise liberal and conservative governments. Instead, governments in Spain turned to the state and its functionaries—who were largely aligned with its aims—to consolidate its rule beyond the peninsula.

## Empire

Although Spain had lost much of its empire in the 1820s, it retained Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, as well as smaller territories in the Pacific and Africa. Since 1825, the captains general in the colonies had been invested with *facultades omnímodas* (emergency powers) in perpetuity, and these were reiterated at the beginning of March 1848.[[644]](#footnote-644) And it was not just in the colonies that these colonial elites held such power; they had a disproportionate influence on metropolitan politics too. Leopoldo O’Donnell, the governor of Cuba, was a rising star in the *moderado* party, and before 26 March he was touted as a possible replacement for Narváez. Elsewhere, the colonial elite were able to convert social and economic power into political power with relative ease. Juan Menéndez Fuertes, for example, was a slave-trader who used his wealth to become the largest purchaser of disentailed land in the province of La Coruña in the 1830s and 1840s. From 1847, he sat in the senate.[[645]](#footnote-645) Conversely, this administrative system of government routinely denied colonial inhabitants even the rights afforded to upper middle-class citizens in the metropole. As a result, as 1848 approached, Spain’s colonies were increasingly restive.

In 1841 in the Philippines, a revolt broke out against Spanish control of the Catholic faith. Led by a priest, Apolinario de la Cruz, it was forcibly put down by the colonial authorities. In Cuba in December 1844, a conspiracy with a broad geographical spread was uncovered. It was led by free mixed-race Cubans, who particularly resented Spanish rule. They organised and led enslaved islanders, apparently supported by the British. But, in 1848, this restiveness transcended individual grievances; to some extent at least, the upheavals in Europe were ‘a crisis of empire, as much as they were an outbreak of revolution.’[[646]](#footnote-646)

The convincing thesis which Miles Taylor applied to Britain—that the authorities allowed the revolution to spread in the colonies to release funding for anti-revolutionary measures on the mainland—might apply to some extent in Spain too.[[647]](#footnote-647) But there were important differences. Economically, the Spanish empire consistently outperformed the metropole. Cuba in particular had seen spectacular growth since the 1820s and was, by 1848, one of the wealthiest places in the world per capita.[[648]](#footnote-648) Yet here, as elsewhere in the Spanish Empire, government remained imposed, rather than by even partial consent. And this caused tensions among the populations of the colonies.[[649]](#footnote-649) Furthermore, Spain’s scarcity of civil servants led to the disproportionate influence of the military, even more strikingly so than in the metropole. In 1848, some 32,000 Spaniards were in colonial service in Cuba, Puerto Rico, or the Philippines, and all but about 1,200 were soldiers.[[650]](#footnote-650) And by contemporary standards Spanish spending on its empire was low; including the entire naval budget it constituted less than 0.7% of government spending in 1846.[[651]](#footnote-651) This meant that, even had the authorities wanted to redirect spending to public order in the metropole, there was little available. Yet, the revolution did send a comparable wave of discontent through the Spanish Empire, and it similarly altered metropole-colony relations in fundamental ways.

Colonial revenues were an important source of income and were central to the development of the Spanish state in the nineteenth century. The empire was ‘not only a reminder of the collapse of the old order, but also central in the construction of the new.’[[652]](#footnote-652) To ignore the colonial milieu is to miss important sites in the construction of the discourse of power.[[653]](#footnote-653) ‘Colonialism,’ wrote Aimé Césaire, ‘works to decivilise the coloniser, to brutalise in the true sense of the word, to degrade, to awaken to buried instincts, to lust, to violence, to racial hatred, and to moral relativism.’[[654]](#footnote-654) Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, experience of imperial administration shaped the government of the metropolis, particularly in relation to the role of the military in maintaining public order. Michel Foucault identified from as early as the sixteenth century the ‘boomerang effect colonial practice can have on the juridico-political structures of the West.’[[655]](#footnote-655)

Throughout the period, colonial and metropolitan political and financial power intersected. Spain’s smaller nineteenth-century empire and the expansion of the state allowed those in government to integrate the remaining colonies in a way that their predecessors had never been able to integrate the American colonies. And, in 1848, the threat of revolution in the metropolis brought back memories of the 1820s and gave hope to those living in the colonies who sought to reshape this imperial relationship.

In Cuba, Narcisco López, a Spanish liberal general had been dismissed from colonial service on the appointment of O’Donnell in 1843, but he had remained on the island and was a thorn in the side of the authorities there. On 24 June 1848, he waited at his home in the city of Cienfuegos for the arrival of an American ship. He hoped that US troops demobbed from the war with Mexico would help him launch a revolution against the Spanish government. In some ways this was typical of the opposition to the developing *moderado* colonial power relationship, but it was a discordant movement. It reflected the broader cleavage between Cuban opposition groups, which had been taking place mostly in exile. Some sought to remain in a reformed Spanish empire. José Antonio Saco, for example, argued that only remaining a Spanish colony would preserve Cuba’s Hispanic heritage. Others favoured annexation by the United States. López initially had some sympathy with retaining the island’s Hispanic heritage. But, when it became clear that the Spanish government would not countenance any form of self-governance, he began to collaborate with the Club de la Habana, who favoured annexation.

His conspiracy centred around the mountains of Manicaragua. It was planned for 24 June, and it involved a number of local young men, including José María Sánchez Iznaga. Sánchez’s father, Pedro Gabriel, found out about the plans and denounced the conspirators—including his own son—to Federico Roncali, the governor general.[[656]](#footnote-656) López managed to escape to the United States, but he was sentenced in his absence to death. And, although Sánchez was sentenced to six years imprisonment, he too escaped.[[657]](#footnote-657)

The American government, led by the president, James K. Polk, attempted to negotiate the purchase of Cuba in June 1848. Coming just a few years after a wave of patriotic opposition to the attempted purchase of the Spanish African islands of Fernando Po and Annobón, the government in Madrid reacted furiously. Although one of the arguments used by the Americans was that Cuba was on the brink of revolution, the Spanish flatly refused.[[658]](#footnote-658) Much had changed in Spanish attitudes to colonialism since the loss of the American colonies, which had been met largely with indifference.[[659]](#footnote-659) And the Spanish reply to Polk’s offer suggests that the 1848 Revolution in Europe only served to further strengthen the colonialist feeling in Spain. The inhabitants of Cuba, it insisted, compare their situation favourably with that in the former American colonies; ‘and they cannot but turn their eyes to Europe and the rest of the world and thank the hand of providence, which has preserved them from otherwise universal misfortune.’[[660]](#footnote-660)

Slavery played an important role in this debate. It was increasingly central to the colonial economy, and the island’s sugar—almost exclusively cultivated by indentured labourers—had become particularly competitive after Britain adopted free trade in 1846. But some members of the Club de Habana had abolitionist tendencies, while others were prominent planters. Many of those sympathetic to US annexation, including López, were driven by the fear that Spain would bow to pressure from its European allies and abolish slavery, but they also sought greater representation for the island’s white population. Some years later, López encouraged Cubans not to become too distracted by the question of slavery. ‘Do not be scared, Cubans, by the bogeyman of the African race, which has so allowed our oppressors to perpetuate their tyranny.’[[661]](#footnote-661) Ann Laura Stoler noted that, even when not articulated, ‘bourgeois identities in both metropole and colony emerge tacitly and emphatically coded by race.’[[662]](#footnote-662) It was not just a language of difference, but one of superiority.

In Puerto Rico, this was perhaps even more obvious. Juan Prim, both the governor and captain general, was a particularly virulent racist. He had played a key role in the repression of the *Jamància*, and in 1848 he followed a similar path to the government in mainland Spain. He viewed the recent outbreak of war in Yucatán (Mexico) and in Venezuela, and of disorder in Haiti and the Dominican Republic solely through a racial lens. These events had particularly captured his imagination, and he directed the state’s full coercive power against the colony’s black population. ‘The safest thing,’ he wrote, ‘is to impose a healthy terror on individuals of the African race…both slave and free.’ He was concerned not only with discouraging enslaved Puerto Ricans from rising against their masters, but with avoiding imagined racial violence more generally. He considered black people a different species and ‘the natural enemies of the whites.’[[663]](#footnote-663) In his declaration of emergency measures, he referred to ‘a fight for extermination between the races.’[[664]](#footnote-664)

On 30 May, a ship of the French coastguard landed on the island. Its 46 passengers were fleeing nearby Martinique, where slaves freed after the February Revolution were in open revolt. The Puerto Rican authorities provided them with food and shelter, and their story caused alarm across the island. A few days later, Prim wrote to warn of the specific threat of invasion by freed slaves from elsewhere in the Caribbean, in no doubt that events in Europe were the cause of this perceived menace.[[665]](#footnote-665) The minister of war only encouraged Prim to remain vigilant, to try and stop the revolutionaries landing, and if they did instructed that he should ‘respond as appropriate.’[[666]](#footnote-666) In the mid-nineteenth century, it was impossible to actively administer colonies at such a distance, and so the captains general were given significant leeway. Indeed, in May even before writing to the government, Prim had enacted harsh measures against black Puerto Ricans—around 50,000 out of a population of 500,000.[[667]](#footnote-667) Draconian sentences were introduced for such ill-defined misdemeanours as ‘insulting’ white people (article 3). Significantly, slave owners were given free rein to punish their slaves as they saw fit (article 4). And local authorities were forbidden from holding judicial proceedings which exceeded twenty-four hours (article 6).[[668]](#footnote-668) For Josep Fradera, it was nothing short of a declaration of race war.[[669]](#footnote-669) But it was something else too. It was the *moderado* vision of the exclusivist liberal state taken to its extreme.

Despite these measures—or perhaps because of them—on 18 July, a conspiracy was discovered in Ponce, on the island’s south coast. Santiago, an enslaved man, reported that two other enslaved men, Pablo (or Yambó) and Francisco, had incited him to join a rebellion. They had planned to demand their freedom, to burn down the *haciendas*, destroy the villages and—according to Prim—to slaughter the entire white population. On questioning, Francisco betrayed three other enslaved men involved in the plot from different plantations: Agustín (or Goleta), Nicolás and Pedro de Tristani. He also denounced a further six more who, he claimed, had knowledge of the plans. It did not save his life, he and Yambó were executed on 26 July, while Agustín suffered the same fate five days later. Three other enslaved men, including Ramón were sentenced to ten years in a *presidio*, it being judged that they knew about the plot but did not reveal details of it to the authorities. Five more received 100 lashes. Those executed were shot in front of an assembly of ten enslaved people from each estate in the area.[[670]](#footnote-670) The message of the state’s coercive power was clear, but as in the metropolis it was only part of the story. Santiago was granted his freedom, once again demonstrating how, in 1848, those involved in conspiracies could be induced by the state to betray their comrades without resorting to state violence.

And, also as in the metropolis, this display of exemplary justice did not prove much of a deterrent. A month later on 13 August, around 50 miles away in Vega Baja on the northern coast, another conspiracy was uncovered. This time, a mixed-race enslaved man named Miguel told his master that he had heard from another enslaved man, Juan Domingo, that an uprising was being planned. Among its leaders were Simón and Manuel Grande, from two different plantations; Miguel himself worked on a third plantation. On the same day, other witnesses reported hearing cries of ‘Compañeros! Now is the time!’ from a black man on horseback riding between the different plantations, and they claimed this was Florencio, a enslaved man from yet another plantation. Simón was sentenced to death, Florencio to eight years in a *presidio*, and Manuel Grande to two. Unlike Santiago, Miguel was not granted his freedom, but he did receive 100 pesos as a reward. Juan Domingo, who had told him the story originally, received nothing.[[671]](#footnote-671)

As with the revolutionaries on the Spanish mainland, the enslaved Puerto Ricans spread their conspiracy through social networks and relied on trust to keep their plans secret until they could begin the action. Although unfree, they were evidently able to maintain these networks with friends and acquaintances from different plantations. However, and not uniquely in 1848, the networks did not prove to be wholly reliable. The state, through the colonial authorities, was able to incentivise individuals to betray the confidence of their co-conspirators, in this case, with promises of freedom and money. In most cases in metropolitan Spain in 1848, it is not clear what motivated those who chose not to take part in events or who chose to side with the government. However, in Santiago’s case it can be deduced with some certainty that his motivation was the promise of freedom, and had the revolution succeeded he would have certainly achieved it. Yet he still chose to side with the state, which enforced the very structures which allowed and prolonged his enslavement, suggesting that liberal power relationships were already well-ingrained beyond the metropolis.

But this relationship depended heavily on individuals, particularly the captains general. Politically Prim was a *progresista*, and he was ambitious. He saw the captaincy general as a stepping stone to political success in metropolitan Spain. The French consul suggested that he had been sent to Puerto Rico because of fears that he would lead a revolution on the mainland.[[672]](#footnote-672) And he was not trusted by the government, particularly after he was sent into exile for conspiring against—and allegedly encouraging the assassination of—Narváez. He was contemptuous of even the very limited norms of colonial government, and in March 1848 he sought to place all remaining organs of the imperial state under his direct command.[[673]](#footnote-673) From the island, he wrote to his mother that ‘no one cares what happens here.’[[674]](#footnote-674) But the government, which still remained committed to legal and constitutional processes did care. Prim’s racist policies proved too much even for the Spanish colonial administration, and if anything his unilateral offer of help to subdue the Danish colonies was met with even more outrage in Madrid. He was replaced in July by Juan de Pezuela, a moderate abolitionist.[[675]](#footnote-675)

Even in the distant Philippines, where the revolution seemed to have no effect on public order, developments in 1848 took on new meanings in light of events in the metropolis. The colony’s relationship with the peninsula was already conceived of differently from those of Cuba and Puerto Rico; it was more subordinate.[[676]](#footnote-676) Race was a significant reason for this, as outside Manila there were as few as 295 Spaniards in 1848.[[677]](#footnote-677) But there was still evidence—albeit inchoate—of *Verwaltung als Verfassung* in the archipelago. 20,000 pesos was provided for the construction of a road between Tarlac and Pangasinan in 1847.[[678]](#footnote-678) And the expansion of state power was accompanied by an expansion of military power. 1848 marked the culmination of a long campaign to defeat the Moros pirates in Sulu. In subduing the pirates, Spain extended its influence over large parts of Mindanao, and on 1 May the queen bestowed Spain’s highest military honour on the governor, Narciso Clavería, for his role in bringing ‘peace’ and ‘order’ to the islands.[[679]](#footnote-679) Manila remained quiet throughout 1848, but in October, a new newspaper appeared, *El Diario de Manila*. ‘The people,’ wrote Clavería’s successor Antonio María Blanco, ‘enjoy the greatest tranquillity.’[[680]](#footnote-680) But it was tranquillity which came at a cost. There was an even greater arbitrariness to colonial power in the Philippines, with almost no checks on the power of the colonial authorities. They often simply refused to follow instructions from Madrid, meaning that cronyism was even more engendered.[[681]](#footnote-681)

Extrapolating these colonial examples to the 1848 Revolution more generally is not without its dangers, but there are underlying similarities. Most Spaniards believed that their interests were more aligned with the state—and its proven capacity for gradual change—than with the revolution and its vague, and perhaps unrealistic, promises of freedom and representation. Such feelings can only have been strengthened after news reached the colonies of unrest on neighbouring islands. This allowed the government to expand the state in the colonial sphere using similar methods to those employed in the metropolis. Unlike in the British Empire, the threat of public disorder in the colonies was not met with constitutional reform.[[682]](#footnote-682) But civilian involvement did increase after 1848.[[683]](#footnote-683) And there were concessions to the local and colonial elites, and these concessions allowed the government to extend its influence once the threat of revolution had abated.

And it was not just in their existing overseas territories where the Spanish government sought to extend its influence. In January 1848, Spain established a garrison on the Chafarinas Islands. A couple of miles off the coast of Morocco, the French had planned to occupy the archipelago to support their colonisation of Algeria, while Spain needed it to support the North African enclave of Melilla. In March, amidst the pre-revolutionary crisis, discussion turned to colonisation and the construction of an artillery battery under the command of Francisco Serrano. The opposition criticised the plan, concerned that it was simply a rouse to remove the *progresista* general from the political situation in the capital.[[684]](#footnote-684) Although these three small uninhabited islands may seem insignificant, their occupation by Spain represents a new self-confidence within the Mediterranean sphere, and as it became clear that the government was going to survive the revolutionary year this self-confidence increased further. In the Caribbean, Juan Prim’s concerns about racial unrest led him to offer assistance to the governor of the Danish colonies of St. Thomas and St. Croix at the end of May.[[685]](#footnote-685) The governor replied, thanking Prim for his offer but assuring him that no such assistance would be required.[[686]](#footnote-686) However, by early July, the situation had changed after the emancipation of slaves there. The governor general wrote requesting Prim’s assistance after a rebellion on St. Croix.[[687]](#footnote-687) Prim sent 500 men, two artillery guns and a detachment of engineers to the islands. More than 40 slaves were killed.[[688]](#footnote-688)

Then, in 1849 together with France, Spain despatched an expeditionary force to Rome to help restore the temporal power of the pope and to defeat the Roman Republic, which had been established during the 1848 Revolution. Spain was included in a congress of Catholic powers held on 21 December 1848, and the following February Pius IX urged armed intervention. Francisco Martínez de la Rosa was instrumental in securing Spanish involvement. So successful was Spain at in the congress that the government even hatched a plan to rescue the pope and bring him to the peninsula.[[689]](#footnote-689) In the event, the Spanish army played only a marginal role in the events, but it was at least a partial diplomatic success. The government gained recognition of Queen Isabel from the pope and the Catholic powers, which helped cement Spain’s place in the conservative restoration system. It was indicative of a broader move towards an international focus for the *moderado* government as a further legitimising mechanism.

Since the loss of the American colonies, Spain had played almost no role in continental European affairs, instead often being the recipient of diplomatic intervention itself. The Roman expedition allowed the government both to internationalise and to legitimise its counter-revolution. Like the government’s colonial project, the intervention in Italy brought domestic benefits too. There was a wave of patriotic support for intervention, which included the collection of subscriptions. Attempts were made to create a volunteer Spanish Legion, which would permanently garrison Rome to protect the pope from future revolution. This public support represents a marked contrast with the popular opposition to the leaked draft of the *convenio* in 1845. But even this outpouring of conservative nationalism was not without its dangers for the government. They were wary of a permanent Spanish garrison in Rome as they feared that it was as likely to spread revolutionary ideas back to Spain as it was to defend the Papal States against them.[[690]](#footnote-690)

In the short term, events in the Spanish Empire in 1848 helped those in power to cement their hegemony and provided support for their counter-revolution. The means differed somewhat from those employed by the British, who allowed their empire to become an escape valve for domestic revolutionary fervour in order to redirect funding to the metropolis. The much smaller Spanish colonial budget did not have this flexibility, and so Spain ended up with the worst of both worlds: a colonial crisis which proved little economic help to the mainland. But, as in the metropole, the state showed some agility in its response. This strengthened the *moderado* hegemony. Yet, while the government was strengthened, this strength in the face of the 1848 Revolution undermined the liberal state in the long term. A sustained programme of foreign intervention to return Spain to great-power status was never realistic, and the country’s role in the Roman expedition angered Piedmont, the emerging power in the Italian peninsula. In the Empire, issues of slavery, race, and representation remained unresolved, as was Cuba’s relationship with the United States. After 1848, Narcisco López, in exile in the United States, attempted two filibustering military expeditions to capture Cuba from the Spanish with a force composed largely of Americans, along with some Germans and Hungarians, like him exiles from the 1848 Revolution.[[691]](#footnote-691) And it was exile which perhaps most clearly demonstrates the precarity of the liberal hegemony in the aftermath of the revolution.

## Exile

In the state’s response to the 1848 Revolution, its relationship with its people was shaped by exile. In a way, this was nothing new. Exile—both foreign and domestic— had long been used to remove the leaders and potential leaders of revolutions, and Spain was no exception. However, 1848 marked an acceleration of Spain’s deportation of revolutionaries and potential revolutionaries to liminal colonial spaces; the newly-occupied Chafarinas Islands, for example, became a destination for political prisoners almost immediately. Deportation was another mechanism for strengthening the *moderado* liberal hegemony, and at least in part it was an effective one. Spain’s highly-localised revolutionary networks rarely survived the geographical separation brought on by deportation. Yet it was an inherently violent tool, and this had implications for the legitimacy of the Spanish state.

State violence need not necessarily be callous and indiscriminate.[[692]](#footnote-692) Indeed the violence associated with deportation might have been seen as legitimate; convictions were part of a constitutional judicial process, and sentences were a legal punishment carried out by state functionaries. But this legitimacy was precisely what was disputed by the government’s opponents in 1848. Recourse to deportation could be seen by these opponents only as an expression of arbitrary state violence, and thus it became ‘an inextricable part of the revolutionary experience.’[[693]](#footnote-693) Just as governing the colonies boomeranged back into the juridico-political structures of the metropolis, so too did colonial exile boomerang back into its revolutionary consciousness.

At the beginning of 1848, there were already large numbers of Spaniards in exile. These long-time opponents of the *moderado* vision of the Spanish state often strongly sympathised with the revolution, and many took part in the events themselves. Among them was Nicolás de Balza, who had been president of the *Junta de Armamento y Defensa* in Barcelona during the *Jamància*. He was instrumental in the establishment of the Spanish Democratic Committee in Paris during the February Revolution, leading *vivas* to Spain, to the new republic, and to the brotherhood of peoples.[[694]](#footnote-694) Exiles gave revolutionary Paris an international feel. On 16 March amidst the threat of post-revolutionary violence, the German writer Fanny Lewald remembered being assured of her safety by ‘a Pole and a young Spanish duke, both residing in Paris, both members of the [revolutionary] national guard.’[[695]](#footnote-695) Many more Spanish exiles lived in the south of France, including Enrique de Borbón who had been in exile in Toulouse when he learned of the revolution. And they were joined by others, exiled during the revolutionary year as a precautionary measure. The Marquis of Camancho, leader of the *progresistas* in Murcia, and José Marraco, a wealthy businessman from Zaragoza, for example, were both exiled without ever having had the chance to join the revolution.[[696]](#footnote-696) This seemingly indiscriminate deployment of state violence fits comfortably into the narrative of the government crushing the revolution.[[697]](#footnote-697) But most examples during the revolutionary year suggest a deliberateness to the process and a basis in liberal ideology.

After the individual uprisings were put down, some of the participants were executed. On 13 May, the justice minister, Lorenzo Arrazola, wrote to the judiciary encouraging zealous sentencing in public order cases. For Javier Paredes, this was indicative of the way both liberal parties undermined the judicial function, how they turned judges into agents of the police.[[698]](#footnote-698) Nevertheless, throughout 1848, executions were the exception. The vast majority of those convicted—and even this was often only a very small proportion of the number of participants—were given much lighter sentences: short terms of imprisonment followed by exile. Eduardo Asquerino, for example, was likely held for a couple of months in Madrid’s Saladero prison before being expelled from the capital.[[699]](#footnote-699)

Those with the means and the connections were often simply permitted to leave Spain. The French Ambassador, de Lesseps, remembers that Brigadier Joaquín Moreno de las Peñas was denounced by his own side and sentenced to be shot.[[700]](#footnote-700) Following his intercession—and because he was an old friend of Narváez—Moreno was allowed to escape to France, where he published a Spanish-language newspaper for the diaspora.[[701]](#footnote-701) Often it was enough just for the revolutionaries to withdraw to the provinces. Estanislao Figueras, for example, returned to legal practice in Tarragona. Even Colonel Mauricio Rengifo who had been exiled eleven times before was only sent to El Puente del Arzobispo (Toledo), just a hundred miles from the capital.[[702]](#footnote-702) Generally, though, it was lower-ranked soldiers who bore the brunt of government repression with over 1,500 arrests, but 1,000 also evaded arrest and went on the run.[[703]](#footnote-703) After fleeing the capital after the failure of the 7 May uprising, Manuel Buceta allegedly led a band of *guerrillas* in Galicia (where he had been second in command of the 1846 uprising) and then fled to Portugal.

Some of those convicted were deported to the colonies. There was little consistency to, and certainly no transparency in, these sentences. The most prominent opponents of the regime were rarely deported. Olózaga—who had opposed the revolution—was arrested and taken to an army barracks. He went quietly with the police so that his daughter would not have to see her father being dragged away. When he got there, however, the commanding officer, Colonel Mendinueta, told him he did not have to stay. ‘I am not a gaoler, nor is the Spanish army a dungeon,’ he reportedly said.[[704]](#footnote-704) Nevertheless, Olózaga chose not to flee, and at three o’clock in the morning he was taken to see Chico who informed him that he was to be deported. He did eventually manage to escape whilst being transferred to Cádiz. Patricio de la Escosura was sentenced to a similar fate, but he too managed to escape but only after having arrived in the Santa Catalina castle in Cádiz. By the end of May, many of the most prominent radicals were in France, having either fled or been expelled. In Bayonne, Escosura, Orense and Ametller met Enrique de Borbón.[[705]](#footnote-705) And then, on 25 June, three Spanish conspirators Olózaga, José de Salamanca and Patricio de la Escosura, met in exile at the Clarendon Hotel in London where they agreed to make Espartero the head of a provisional government, using language which, suggests, concludes Adrian Shubert, that Isabel would be deposed.[[706]](#footnote-706)

Outside the political elite, many revolutionaries were successfully deported, although even then the process was rarely straightforward. Plans to deport fifty-one prisoners—including Colonel José Tajuelo and José Sterling—to Ceuta in May were thwarted after the authorities there uncovered plans for a demonstration to coincide with the men’s arrival.[[707]](#footnote-707) Tajuelo and Sterling, together with the Asquerino brothers, Santiago Alonso Cordero, Rengifo and others, had been involved in a conspiracy with Joaquín de la Gandara and Ricardo Muñiz in 1844. Fernando Fernández de Córdova, presiding over the court martial at the time, had sentenced Tajuelo and Sterling to exile and Rengifo to death—reduced to exile amid pressure from the press.[[708]](#footnote-708) It is not clear what involvement Tajuelo and Sterling had in the 1848 Revolution, and the *moderado* government almost certainly drew on long-standing grudges to remove those who had threatened their vision of the state in the past. But it is also possible that these men, through their existing networks, became involved in the fighting in 1848. In either case, Tajuelo and Sterling were eventually sent to the Philippines in the summer, among 550 who made the voyage in August and September.[[709]](#footnote-709) After the events of 7 May, some seven hundred men were sentenced to deportation, including a number of names drawn from the register of the *milicia nacional* taken from the *ayuntamiento* in Madrid. They were sent to Valencia for deportation to the Canaries and the Philippines.[[710]](#footnote-710)

Those sentenced to deportation came from a variety of backgrounds. Miguel Ortiz Amor, involved in planning the 26 March rising, was among 109 men exiled to Ibiza. Another was his friend the actor and playwright Francisco Robello Vasconi; the two men had previously been in exile together in the 1820s. Julián Pellón was sentenced to six years in Ceuta.[[711]](#footnote-711) However, he managed to escape before being deported.[[712]](#footnote-712) His friend Juan José Hidalgo was sent to Cuba, returning only after the revolution in 1854. Sebastián Arias was sentenced to ten years in a *presidio* for sedition in January 1849.[[713]](#footnote-713) Antonio Romero Ortiz, Manuel Somoza Cambero, Manuel Fernández Poyán, Waldo Chicharro and José Arias Uría, among others, were arrested in the castle of Santo Antón in A Coruña. All had been involved in the 1846 Galician uprising. Fernández Poyán was deported to the Philippines. As was Agustín Revertér. After the *Jamància* he had been arrested and exiled as a prominent member of the *junta* in Barcelona but was subsequently pardoned. He was arrested again in Madrid in connection with the events of 26 March.

After the eventual surrender of the Huescan revolutionaries, thirteen men—seven leaders, and six soldiers chosen at random—were summarily shot in the streets in the provincial capital.[[714]](#footnote-714) The rest were sent to Valencia, and thence to Cádiz, for deportation to the Philippines on 3 January 1849.[[715]](#footnote-715) The residents of Sádaba, in Cinco Villas wrote a letter to the queen requesting clemency. Unlike other such letters written on behalf of the revolutionaries, a large number of the signatories were women, writing on behalf of their ‘sons and husbands.’[[716]](#footnote-716) The political views of these women remain unclear; their letter may have simply been a sign of desperation at the prospect of the death of a loved one. However, so many men leaving such a sparsely populated area almost certainly did so with the blessing of the women they left behind. More generally, at least two women were among the revolutionaries deported to the Philippines and five were sent to Ibiza; others voluntarily accompanied their husbands into exile.[[717]](#footnote-717)

Some 10,000 Carlists also went into exile, primarily to France.[[718]](#footnote-718) However, this picture is more complicated than it seems. Many were already in French exile at the beginning of 1848. On 17 April, in the midst of the revolutionary outbreak, the government granted an amnesty to all Carlist exiles.[[719]](#footnote-719) This appears counterintuitive with hindsight. Even more so given that the Spanish consuls in Sète, Perpignan and Marseille were instructed to provide financial support to help their countrymen return home.[[720]](#footnote-720) However, at the time, the government was under pressure from the French authorities, particularly in the border *départements*, where Spanish exiles were holding meetings which threatened public order.[[721]](#footnote-721) The Carlist conflict was also largely under control, and 131 officers had requested to re-join the government forces.[[722]](#footnote-722) It is unlikely that the government foresaw Carlism becoming a vehicle for the 1848 Revolution. And in some cases the return was short-lived. Francisco Ballera, for example, left Spain again in May.[[723]](#footnote-723)

For the rich, exile continued to be a comfortable experience. However, for those less well off, the conditions in which they found themselves were often grim. One doctor from near Bordeaux complained that sixty-nine refugees were living in squalid conditions on board a barge barely able to accommodate them. He mentioned that the air was fetid, there were no beds, no shelter, and the only food was biscuits, rice and water. It was little surprise that as many as half suffered from disease.[[724]](#footnote-724) Among those in Bordeaux at that time was the publisher Benito Hortelano.[[725]](#footnote-725)

At the same time, Spain became a haven for revolutionaries from other European countries, particularly France. This may seem paradoxical, but it reflects the relative permissiveness of the Spanish public sphere, even after the revolution. Xavier Durrieu, for example, a member of the French republican government and former editor of *le Courier français*, fled to Madrid where he took a job as a clerk for a railway company.[[726]](#footnote-726) In exile, he communicated frequently with his former colleagues across Europe and contributed to *l’Homme*, an exile newspaper in London.[[727]](#footnote-727) He was not the only one to find sanctuary in Spain. The far-left deputy Antoine Félix Mathé, like Durrieu a cosignatory of the *Au Peuple* declaration of 17 October 1848, fled to Barcelona after the failed coup d’état in 1851. Another, Cyrille Lacambre, was a medical doctor, vice-president of the Central Republican Society and a close associate of Auguste Blanqui. He had escaped to London but, disliking the ‘city of black mud and smoke’, moved to Spain.[[728]](#footnote-728) He travelled via Gibraltar and settled in Valencia, because it had a large French population. ‘Amongst these compatriots,’ he wrote, ‘I found a memory of what I had lost.’[[729]](#footnote-729) He helped Pierre Turmel, a veteran of the June Days, establish himself as a hatmaker in the city sometime after he was sentenced to deportation to Algeria in 1852. Two men, Mauny and Charlier, who were both sentenced to deportation to Bône (Algeria) for their part in the June Days, managed to escape to Spain and request pardons from the French government.[[730]](#footnote-730)

In June 1849, the Spanish government granted a general amnesty to those convicted during the 1848 Revolution.[[731]](#footnote-731) Commutations and amnesties allowed governments to both demonstrate their humanity and to offer a corrective to an apparent injustice without having to address the fundamental iniquities of the system.[[732]](#footnote-732) They were also, in themselves, a sharp reminder of the state’s ultimate power over life and death, emphasising a ‘victory’ discourse to both domestic and foreign audiences after the revolution. And there were limits to the state’s benevolence. After the amnesty, Manuel Buceta returned to Madrid in October 1849 only to be imprisoned in a civil guard barracks. It was only after a campaign in the opposition press and after being brought to the *Cortes* as a guest of Nicolas Rivero that he was finally released. Calixto Fernandes had his death sentence commuted to exile.[[733]](#footnote-733) But when he tried to escape, he was shot dead. In 1852 José Portal, in a letter to Henry Lytton Bulwer from exile, wrote unhappily that ‘the government does not want to forget the Seville business.’[[734]](#footnote-734) Even after the 1854 Revolution, Agustín Revertér still protested his innocence and believed that his amnesty had been a fraud.[[735]](#footnote-735)

Judging the efficacy of deportation and exile is not easy. Many of those involved in the 1848 Revolution had already been exiled before, only to have returned to Spain. ‘What did the government hope to achieve with these deportations?’ wrote Revertér. ‘Did it perhaps believe that it was deporting the revolution with them?’ He clearly felt the notion ridiculous—and maybe it was—but he alludes to three ways that the process could be considered a success from the government’s point of view. Deportation of rank-and-file revolutionaries decimated a movement whose basis was solidly local; individual deportees were left, according to Revertér, thoroughly deflated. He then asks why, through deportation, common crime should be conflated with political innocence. But it suited the government to do so. It was important that those who took part in the revolution were seen—like criminals—as outside society, something exile itself reinforced. Finally, and framed in highly racialised terms, Revertér concedes the possible benefits of deportation to the colonial project.[[736]](#footnote-736)

Its role in colonisation was, however, at best mixed. Theoretically, penal deportation provided ‘an entry point into the ideal of the making of empires as an ongoing process.’[[737]](#footnote-737) But, in the Spanish context it was an ineffectively slow one, and few of those deported ever actually settled in the colonies. Javier Morillo-Alicea described colonialism as ‘a comparative project.’ And there is little doubt that Spain learnt about colonial deportation from other European powers both before and during 1848. He emphasised the importance not only of the dialectic relationship between colony and metropole, but also of that between colony and colony.[[738]](#footnote-738) And this probably proved more useful to the colonial project, certainly in the longer-term.[[739]](#footnote-739)

There was a symbiosis to the relationship between revolution and exile in nineteenth-century Spain. There was a clear logic to it from the government’s perspective. It disrupted radical organisation, it helped reduce acts of political agency to common criminality, and it supported colonisation. At the same time it took pressure off the chronically underfunded and overcrowded prison system. But, in practice, this logic was not always faultless. It was not just the estrangement which was significant, but ‘the proscription, the dishonourable exclusion, as a dissolvent and asocial element, from society.’[[740]](#footnote-740) And this had an alternative consequence too. It created communities in exile, and deportation became part of the revolutionary experience. Significantly, it also became part of the revolutionary myth, providing a commonality of experience with revolutionaries who had gone before and those who were still to come. Indeed, it became such an integral part of this long-term story that Manuel Tuñón de Lara even suggested that deportees in 1848 had been sent to Fernando Po, a Spanish possession in tropical West Africa which would not be used as a destination for exiles until the 1860s.[[741]](#footnote-741)

## The Revolution of Ideas

The 1848 Revolution, held Lewis Namier, was a failure because it ‘exhausted itself without ever achieving concrete results: it left its imprint only in the realm of ideas.’[[742]](#footnote-742) Yet this is a false equivalence; it was in this realm of ideas that the many of the concrete results of the revolution can be found. If the pre-revolutionary period was one of rapid politicisation, then the events themselves witnessed an explosion in political participation and political consciousness. And it was a process which even those governments which survived the revolutionary tumult could not control completely. The events of 1848 and 1849 proved that the heterogenous opposition groups were uneasy coalitions, but they also gave Europeans the opportunity for political realignment. The *anciens régimes*, which had considered themselves largely apolitical, joined elements of the new political elite in adopting social and political conservatism, often supported by the established Churches and by senior state functionaries. They embraced nationalism, but they transformed it into an exclusivist and antagonistic force. Meanwhile the revolution had divided its participants into moderate progressive and radical groupings, and these divisions endured and sharpened in the post-revolutionary landscape. Increasingly, progressives eschewed nationalism—which had been a powerful recruiting tool for the revolution but one reason for its eventual failure in much of Europe—in favour of international solidarity. But conservatives did not have it all their own way. Inspired by experiences during the revolution, radicals continued to seek out ideas from across national and regional borders, and these flows proved almost impossible to police.

The ideological discord associated with the spread of ideas is exemplified by Metternich’s famously dictum that, ‘when Paris sneezes, Europe catches a cold.’ He may have seen the French capital as patient zero of a revolutionary contagion, but others saw events there as the Zolaesque germination of exciting new ideas.[[743]](#footnote-743) More fundamentally, however, the causal relationship between events in Paris and those elsewhere are difficult to prove. This is particularly true of Spain which did not experience the kind of spontaneous uprisings seen elsewhere. Diffusion theory may help to explain both the limitations of the initial revolutionary contagion and also the concurrent and subsequent spread of ideas. Normally rational calculations about the likely success of regime change set outer limits to diffusion, but it is likely that across much of Europe the ease by which Louis Philippe was deposed replaced this rationality with irrational hope or fear, depending on one’s viewpoint.[[744]](#footnote-744) Even where the meaning was misinterpreted or the reference misapprehended, news from elsewhere remained meaningful.[[745]](#footnote-745) And this was the source of its irrational appeal. In Spain, recent revolutionary experience—notably the *Jamància* and the 1846 uprising in Galicia—provided important rational counterweights to events in Paris. But, even here, news of revolutionary successes in Central Europe in March appeared to change the nature of this rational calculation, at least in the short term.

The 1848 Revolution relied on the interconnectivity of urban centres, and it might be more usefully conceptualised as a translocal rather than transnational phenomenon. Delegitimising activities for example, which political activists conducted on a local scale, gained in importance in the light of this interconnectivity and the exchange of ideas.[[746]](#footnote-746) Yet there was a limit to the transmutability of the February Revolution; events of 1830 had brought with them a shift in the place of labour in French society and politics.[[747]](#footnote-747) This allowed the highly-politicised Parisian working classes to turn a middle-class insurrection into a broad-based revolution in 1848. In Spain, similarly politicised artisans and day labourers were much smaller in number and more fragmented. Paris could, therefore, be both the catalyst and inspiration for the revolution, but it could not provide a readily exportable model for it. Recognition of this may explain why revolutionaries increasingly looked beyond France for inspiration. The 1812 constitution, for example, remained a significant Spanish contribution to European progressive thinking.[[748]](#footnote-748) In 1848, there were debates about its possible revival in the Two Sicilies.[[749]](#footnote-749) And after the revolution, as the product of a domestic intellectual tradition, both Marx and Gramsci saw it as an ideal to aspire to.[[750]](#footnote-750)

The feeling that part of the Spanish population was immune to these new ideas—perhaps immune to politics altogether—was prevalent across the political spectrum. Conservatives evoked the *pueblo sencillo*, or simple people, of the eighteenth century, but even progressives saw political ignorance as broadly a good thing.[[751]](#footnote-751) Spain’s ‘backwardness in modern doctrines,’ wrote Ramón de la Sagra, ‘can help guarantee the preservation of order, not through despotism, but through a rational approach to social reorganisation.’[[752]](#footnote-752) But this was not unique to Spain. It was mirrored across Europe. Massimo d’Azeglio, for example, noted a general ambivalence towards the idea of liberty in particular. He wrote: ‘The gift of liberty is like that of a horse, handsome, strong and high-spirited. In some it arouses a wish to ride; in many others, on the contrary, it increases the desire to walk.’[[753]](#footnote-753) Although this sweeping generalisation ignores the revolutionary leadership, who tended to be intellectuals, it is true that most Europeans remained conservative after 1848, even those who supported increased representation. In post-revolutionary elections, rural areas of both France and Prussia, for example, voted solidly for candidates of the right.[[754]](#footnote-754)

1848, therefore, represented a shift in emphasis towards ‘popular’ conservatism. There can be little doubt that most Spaniards did not join the revolution, though they often did not support the *moderado* government either, and the distinction between the active majority and the passive minority has probably been exaggerated.[[755]](#footnote-755) It was this silent minority which became the focus of debate as the claim to popular support became increasingly important. In the weeks after the uprisings in Madrid and Seville, the *moderado* press was filled with letters of support for the government and the crown. The implication was that the Spanish public approved of the government’s handling of the revolution. But, in August, *El Clamor público* published a study which claimed that just 58,603 out of a population of 12,429,248 had signed the declaration of loyalty to the crown of 8 May.[[756]](#footnote-756) In its response the next day, the *moderado* *La España* used the figures to claim the opposite: that to assume the rest of the country supported the revolution was mistaken. Furthermore, they argued that it was a nonsense to take the whole population as a basis and that, once children, the elderly, ‘miserable’ day labourers, the revolutionaries, and the majority ‘completely ignorant of political questions’ had all been disregarded, the number of signatories looked less insignificant. This disagreement about the composition of the silent majority is, of course, broadly the same as the disagreement about the breadth of representation. Interestingly though, the original study included women, who had been among the signatories of congratulatory letters to Espartero on his return to Spain. *La España* felt that they too must be disregarded.[[757]](#footnote-757)

This debate was indicative of a broader concern about modernity in the aftermath of the revolution. There was an acute awareness on both sides of the serial nature of modern revolution.[[758]](#footnote-758) That Spain had avoided the sort of revolution experienced elsewhere in 1848 did not make it less susceptible to future waves. Indeed, the supremacy of public order in Spanish liberal discourse was reinforced by events of 1848, but the relationship between respect for the rule of law and this public order was not always acknowledged. Andés Borrego, writing to the queen in 1852, warned that the threat of revolution was largely the result of a government imagining itself ‘above the law.’[[759]](#footnote-759) While the *moderado* party’s authoritarian shift pre-dated 26 March, it was intensified by a perceived vindication of its approach, even if its decisiveness before the outbreak of revolution turned out to be more imagined than real. This was part of what Stanley Payne described as the creation of a new political mainstream, as those opposed to revolution increasingly framed their ideology in these terms. Within the *moderado* party, the conservative faction initially criticised the cabinet’s response to the revolution. But by the summer, there had been something of a reconciliation, and in July Pidal was appointed foreign minister. Though, more broadly, the party remained divided. After the re-opening of the *Cortes*, Mon and Ríos Rosas were involved in a public spat during the election for president of the council of ministers, but there was little doubt that the political mainstream had shifted in favour of the conservatives.[[760]](#footnote-760)

This Spanish conservatism was largely characterised by the same phenomena as elsewhere in Europe. It was anti-individualistic but not entirely anti-liberal, having emerged from within rather than outwith the liberal tradition. It emphasised loyalism with xenophobic undertones. The Bulwer affair and the emergence of a popular domestic protectionism—through, for example, the 1847 *Asociación defensora del trabajo nacional*—suggest that this process predates the 1848 Revolution, but it was hastened by the events of the spring as ideas of public order and defence of property gained new audiences. As in Britain, it marked the beginning of a broad consensus as the priorities of the property-owning classes increasingly aligned with those in power.[[761]](#footnote-761) But this consensus was a precarious one. The insurrections of 1848 undermine any assumption of a natural and universal Spanish conservatism, and in the mid-nineteenth century the working classes were unlikely to fully embrace a single political identity. Instead, they flirted with elements across the spectrum in a way which was not always consistent, and which sometimes even seemed mercurial.[[762]](#footnote-762) Those in power thus sought to sustain this consensus by delegitimising alternative ideologies. The *puritano* Nicomedes Pastor Díaz, gave a series of lectures to the *Ateneo* on ‘the Problems of Socialism.’ He acknowledged the theoretical attraction of equality but condescendingly claimed that ‘if the general wealth were distributed, all would be beggars.’[[763]](#footnote-763) Such attempts at delegitimisation ought not to be surprising. Social and political power is inscribed in language, and claims to authority are always linguistically represented.[[764]](#footnote-764)

This ability to shape discourse was further enabled by the beginnings of a reconciliation with the Church. The *moderados* had made efforts at reconciliation before, but it was Spanish help in restoring the pope and a shared fear of socialism heightened by the revolution which paved the way for the recognition of Isabel by the Catholic powers and for the 1851 Concordat. Religion thus became a fundamental element in the defence of social order and, after 1848, a central tenet of European conservative thought.[[765]](#footnote-765) It did predate the February Revolution. In November 1846, Pius IX had written to Catholic leaders worldwide denouncing socialism and describing it as contrary to natural law.[[766]](#footnote-766) While in Spain, one observer wrote that ‘there prevailed at Court a panicked terror that is impossible to describe: each day, each hour, each moment an insurrection was expected.’[[767]](#footnote-767) But 1848 had a double result; it moved Spain towards Rome and the pope towards Spain.[[768]](#footnote-768) In some ways, this was seen in terms of the natural order of things, building on the ideas of the Renaissance philosopher Francisco de Vitoria.[[769]](#footnote-769) But it was also a consciously anti-modern alliance. And this made it a curious choice of legitimising mechanism for the liberal state.

Such religious legitimation has become particularly associated with the Narváez dictatorship in 1848, Juan Donoso Cortés’ impassioned parliamentary defence of which is probably more famous than the events of that year in Spain themselves.[[770]](#footnote-770) However, his speech, in response to Manuel Cortina’s insistence that the government was not—and ought not to be—above the law, was based on the more modern principle of legality.[[771]](#footnote-771) The dictatorship was constitutional, and it had broad political support.[[772]](#footnote-772) Donoso’s real interest was the crisis which he perceived was exposed by 1848: the failure of individualistic liberalism.[[773]](#footnote-773) Later, he would frame it in the apocalyptic terms of religious hermeneutics, but in 1848 his focus was decidedly more profane.[[774]](#footnote-774) He called Narváez ‘the column which holds up the edifice: the day the column falls, the whole edifice will crumble.’[[775]](#footnote-775) Although this proved to be more a commentary on a rotten system than a compliment to Narváez, the prime minister’s ideas for reforming the political system, read by Bismarck and Napoleon III among others, transformed conservative perceptions of representation.[[776]](#footnote-776) Spain’s other well-known conservative thinker, Jaime Balmes, had made a similar observation on the eve of the revolution. ‘Do you want to avoid revolution?’ he asked. ‘Then embrace evolution.’[[777]](#footnote-777) He argued for a reconciliation between *moderados* and Carlists and for Catalan regionalism within a united Spain.[[778]](#footnote-778) And, in 1848, Catholicism was not simply the opposite of the revolution. That year Jeroni Bibiloni, a Mallorcan priest and academic, for example, published a pamphlet in Palma seeking to reconcile Christianity and socialism.[[779]](#footnote-779)

Much emphasis has been placed on the emergence of the democratic party and its place in transnational radicalism which developed in the aftermath of the 1848 Revolution. It was certainly significant. In a commission held in December of that year, the more radical *progresistas* struggled to reform the party’s ideology and, as a result, broke away to form a separate party—the *partido demócrata*.[[780]](#footnote-780) And there can be little doubt that the manifesto of the new party proclaimed on 6 April 1849 was heavily influenced by the ideas of the revolution. It included among its priorities the rights of man, those of assembly, association and free primary instruction, and it advocated the intervention of the government to guarantee social security.[[781]](#footnote-781) Unlike the *progresistas*, the new party did not eschew revolution completely. Its make-up was heterogenous both in social background and ideology, but at the beginning at least its leadership was from the extant political class. More fundamentally, because it pursued a primarily constitutional path towards its aims, the party did little to challenge the locus of power or to undermine the concept of government ‘by the intelligent.’[[782]](#footnote-782) And, of course, nothing was done to challenge the exclusion of women from the political class.

Having played roles in the organisation and planning of the revolution as well as fighting on the barricades, women across Europe might have expected a re-evaluation of their place in society. But none was forthcoming. Liberalism was inherently exclusivist, and after 1848 things probably got worse. In Spain the government press emphasised that women fighting elsewhere had undermined support for the revolution.[[783]](#footnote-783) But they did not necessarily oppose the idea of women as political agents, rather they approved of it only when women were passive supporters of conservative politics. In December 1848, in an article for the satirical *Fray Gerundio*, Modesto Lafuente criticised the increased role of women in French politics. In France, he wrote, it is ‘good when women become men, and men become women. And I do not say more but that God give me women who are women, and men who are men, and each sex in its place, and this is the true civilization.’[[784]](#footnote-784) But the emergent democrats were rarely sympathetic towards women’s politicisation either. An 1851 article in *El Sueco*, for example, made fun of some of the petitions Spanish women might raise given the opportunity enjoyed by their French counterparts, culminating in an imagined feminine *pronunciamiento* in Spain.[[785]](#footnote-785) Nevertheless, 1848 marked the emergence of Carolina Coronado, perhaps Spain’s first widely-read female writer of the period. Though supportive of traditionalism and in some ways deeply sceptical of the ideas of the 1848 Revolution, Coronado highlighted the way liberalism hypocritically denied women the freedom to change their position in society.[[786]](#footnote-786)

Despite its limitations, the *partido demócrata* did two significant things. Firstly, it provided a legal route for radicals wary of revolution, and secondly it would become part of a wider international network. This network developed in sharp opposition to the post-revolutionary conservative consensus, and it emerged from connections forged before and during the revolution.[[787]](#footnote-787) Ideas were spread primarily through press reports and transnational sociability, although in the first case censorship became a barrier to effective transmission in the years after 1848 particularly in the provinces, where the *jefes políticos* were able to close local titles. In Madrid, the opposition press was better able to resist this, but even here editors often chose to reprint reports on contentious events from official or semi-official organs, rather than risk prosecution.

Private correspondence was also important. Ángel Fernández de los Ríos received the mission to report the behaviour of the progressives to Mendizábal, who was in Paris. The diplomatic corps provided news from the rest of Europe and a means to circumvent government censorship. Bulwer’s contribution was clear, but de Lesseps also proved a conduit for ideas from elsewhere. Although the French consul in Barcelona was more friendly to the *moderado* government, he was instrumental in the establishment of the Institut Français and was a member of the Ateneu, which offered courses in French, English, Italian and German.[[788]](#footnote-788) But none of these means alone was sufficient. Merely knowing people is not the same as being able to influence them. Ideas were transmitted in 1848 because those who met these conduits wanted to transmit them; people wanted to be associated with the revolution.[[789]](#footnote-789) And, in 1848, these transnational networks, which proved conducive to the spread of new ideas, already existed.

Across the continent, one of the most versatile of the revolutionaries’ demands was for universal manhood suffrage, and most newly-installed governments introduced constitutions which immediately broadened the franchise. In Spain, the extent of formal political participation was not changed by the revolution, but 1848 was the catalyst for a much broader awakening of the collective political consciousness, even if this is not easy to prove. It was not until much later that mass politics became the norm in Spain, and any assumption that those who used words like ‘democracy’ on the barricades meant the same thing as one another—let alone the same thing as it means today—seems unwise. Indeed, like conservatism, the democratic movement emerged from within liberalism and, in its aims, sometimes seemed indistinguishable from those of the *progresistas*.[[790]](#footnote-790) But it was consciously European. That thirst for news from elsewhere and that sense of shared victory which emerged during the revolution sustained into the following decades, as radicals increasingly considered themselves ‘patriots struggling for the emancipation of all peoples.’[[791]](#footnote-791) Given that in 1848, both the government and the revolutionaries emphasised their Spanishness, it is tempting to suggest that the country was immune to the kind of nationalism which accelerated the revolution elsewhere. But the two groups conceived of the nation in profoundly different ways.

For the *moderados*, 1848 accelerated its belief in centralisation. At a time when Europe was moving towards nation states, this moved Spain in a more imperial direction. But this contest was not resolved in 1848.[[792]](#footnote-792) The aetiology of the competing nationalisms—particularly in Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia—which emerged in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century is a complex one. However, 1848 was an important early step, particularly for cultural nationalism, which unlike political nationalism does not rely on mass mobilisation. The recognition of the irreconcilable difference in conception of the state led intellectuals, particularly in Barcelona, to embrace local languages and customs, in turn rehabilitating ancient national identities. In time, these ideas were transformed by professionals, journalists and politicians into concrete political, economic and social programmes. But these had their germination in precisely the same ‘crisis of identity and purpose that is rooted in the modern world.’[[793]](#footnote-793) There remained those more progressive politicians for whom 1848 strengthened a belief in the Spanish nation. The democrat Bernardo Iglesias, for example, had been in Parisian exile during the February Revolution. He was later sent as governor to Barcelona in the 1870s to combat the rise of Catalan regionalism.[[794]](#footnote-794) But most radicals—long used to organising in communities—embraced this localism, and they continued to see no contradiction between it and their Spanishness.

Particularly at a local level, military defeat did not mean the end of the revolution in Spain. Radicalism not only survived the dictatorship, it flourished albeit clandestinely. It was what Mikhail Bakunin called the ‘cunning of revolution.’ Bakunin viewed 1848 in distinctly Hegelian terms, and there can be little doubt that the questions posed by the revolution remained unanswered. Like much of the Spanish radical press, *La Fraternidad* had closed down on 5 March, but its contributors, including Francesc Sunyer i Capdevila, Josep Anselm Clavé and Narcís Monturiol i Estarriol, continued an intellectual revolution in Barcelona in the years that followed. Many of the new titles which emerged after the revolution, such as Fernando Garrido’s *El Eco de la Juventud*, were overtly socialist. But it was a socialism of a less utopian kind. Socialists ceased to use the ‘language of virtue,’ embracing instead ‘the neopositivist ideals of the Third Republic.’[[795]](#footnote-795) It was thus more pragmatic, but not necessarily more violently revolutionary. In 1849, the Venezuelan Ramón María Baralt, editor of the *demócrata* newspaper *El Siglo* before and after the revolution, published *Programas políticos* with Nemesio Fernández. For Baralt, the socialist revolution would be achieved without the violence of 1848.[[796]](#footnote-796) With hindsight this kind of path within the system may seem naïve, but it was precisely the sort of opposition to the *moderado* vision of the state which the revolution not only enabled but encouraged. And it was precisely the sort of idea which the state was powerless to stop.

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In a series of lectures to the Collège de France, Michel Foucault explained how power has become articulated in terms of the defence of society. ‘We must defend society,’ he imagined those in power saying, ‘against all the biological threats posed by the other race, the subrace, the counter-race that we are, despite ourselves, bringing into existence.’[[797]](#footnote-797) For the Spanish elites in 1848, this ‘other race’ was the poor, the ignorant, and the radical—as well as those of other ethnicities in the colonies. In the imperial milieu, through exile, and in the realm of ideas, they sought to governmentalise these ‘others’, using the state apparatus and state functionaries. They did so by concurrently creating myths: myths of Hispanicism, of citizenship, and of conservatism. They were powerful myths. They certainly succeeded in cementing the government’s victory over the revolution, and they helped the elites to continue to govern Spain. But these elites did not have a monopoly on myth-making. In each case, those resisting this governmentalisation created myths of their own. In the colonies they were myths of independence and abolition, in exile they were myths of freedom, and in the intellectual world they were the ideas of the 1848 Revolution itself. These were myths which were impossible to governmentalise and which would prove their power as the nineteenth century progressed.

# 6

Reconciling the Periphery

Spain’s experience is often treated as peripheral to the story of the 1848 European Revolution. This was true both when the revolution was seen as a series of connected revolutions, and it still applies now that 1848 is more commonly seen as a single event with different national and regional manifestations. The explanation for this treatment lies in Spain’s broader peripherality. The Spanish experience of the revolutionary year was remarkably like that in the rest of the continent. The only variation in the pattern is the lack of an early, ill-fated breakthrough by the revolutionaries. Indeed, it is perhaps because of this initial failure to bring down the government that revolutionary violence was probably longer-lasting and geographically more widespread than it was in much of Europe.

Although nowhere was the return to the status quo ante entirely possible, the process of restoration which occurred across Europe had strong parallels in Spain. And, by the mid-1850s, Spanish politics had notable similarities with post-revolutionary politics elsewhere. This was despite the Spanish government never losing power as other governments did. Nevertheless, it was able to draw on the same middle-class fears to ‘restore’ a moderate, liberal, middle-class hegemony, which ironically had looked less secure before the revolution broke out.

Histories of the 1848 Revolution in Spain have failed to question the construction of the narrative of government victory and revolutionary defeat, which reflects reality in only a superficial way. It is undoubtedly true that, ultimately, the revolutionaries were defeated by the overwhelming superiority of the government forces. However, this does not mean that the events should be read teleologically. Not only were some of the battles hard-fought—with no guarantee of victory for the government forces—but time and again there was genuine fear that those government forces would defect to the revolution. Narratives are, at least to some extent, constructed by those in power. History is not only written by the victors; in a way, it also creates those victors. Deconstructing this narrative from its beginnings in the aftermath of the events is it possible to understand why it diverges so completely both from narratives elsewhere and from lived reality. Only once this teleology is unravelled can a new, more representative narrative emerge, one which emphasises the contingency of events and the agency of individuals.

Both the collective processes of remembering and forgetting the 1848 Revolution began almost as soon as the barricade fighting was over. It is difficult to overstate the importance of both phenomena in shaping present-day understandings of events in Spain. Perhaps more than any other event in the nineteenth century, the history of the 1848 Revolution is entwined with its memory. There is no objective historical account of events, only competing interpretations designed to further competing political agendas. These interpretations stand testament not so much to lived experiences but to imagined realities, aspirations which the revolutionary events failed to fulfil.[[798]](#footnote-798) These metanarratives have evolved as political priorities have changed, but unlike elsewhere, 1848 has never proved a useful point of reference in Spain. In other countries, the revolution has been replaced in the consciousness of those fighting for greater political representation with the memory of other events, which perhaps feel less remote. In Spain, this process happened too, and it happened much earlier. The more recent and more obviously successful revolutions of 1854 and 1868 provided stronger inspiration to radicals during the later nineteenth century. However, it was not just that memories of 1848 were displaced, but rather that these experiences were actively forgotten as part of the national story.

## The Spanish Restoration

When she re-opened the *Cortes* in December 1848, Queen Isabel declared that the revolution had failed because of the reason and loyalty of her subjects, the courage and discipline of the army, and the vigorous determination of the government.[[799]](#footnote-799) The idea of a Spanish ‘restoration’ when there had been no fallen government to restore may seem counter-intuitive. However, it is a useful tool for understanding the immediate impact and the longer-term effects of the events of 1848 on the Spanish state and on its political system. And nowhere in Europe was the restoration after 1848 a complete reversion to the status quo ante, but beyond that the quality of the change is less clear. This is an old problem; it was Aristotle who asked, ‘how are we to tell whether a state is still the same state or a different one?’[[800]](#footnote-800) There are important similarities between the *moderado* state which emerged after the revolution finally fizzled out at the end of 1848 and the restoration states elsewhere in Europe. However, elsewhere the restorations were more obviously restorative, bringing back—albeit with a broader support base—a ruling elite which had been temporarily defeated in the springtime of the peoples. In Spain, the same result restored the kind of moderate, middle-class hegemony of the 1830s which, on the eve of the revolution, had seemed so precarious.

After the 13 May uprising in Seville, the threat of revolutionary contagion was largely domestic (that is within the Spanish Empire). Unlike the February Revolution, the June Days uprising in Paris did not prove a catalyst for further outbreaks of public disorder in Spain. By the time the fighting broke out over the border in France, the threat of large-scale revolution had largely dissipated. John Breuilly called this the point when the revolution ceased to follow the script. Its connectiveness diminished as common tools proved inadequate to deal with geographically specific issues.[[801]](#footnote-801) Paul Ginsborg argued that the June Days accelerated the counter-revolution, as the forces of reaction combined in a way that the forces of revolution did not.[[802]](#footnote-802) Both are compelling arguments, but it is important to emphasise that in 1848 the June Days would have been impossible anywhere other than in Paris. The June Days were unusual within the context of the revolution because they were a primarily working-class uprising. It is important, however, not to exaggerate the significance of this, not to conflate it—as Marx did—with class war. The participants were revolting specifically about the closure of the National Workshops, which had been established to provide unemployed Parisians with primarily unskilled manual work. They may have been working class, but they were scarcely an industrial proletariat.[[803]](#footnote-803) In Madrid, there had been a comparatively large-scale working-class involvement in events, particularly on 26 March, even though the city could not match the size or politicisation of the French capital’s working class, or their specific grievances. But in both cases working-class involvement proved intolerable for the authorities.

After the revolution it was easy for both domestic and foreign observers to forget that, beforehand, the Spanish government had considered concessions to more moderate opponents. However, once the insurrection began, there could have been no such compromise, and a victory for the state’s coercive and non-coercive functions was the government’s only hope of survival. Revolution strengthens those who defeat it, and there can be little doubt that the Spanish government continued to fight a revolutionary threat until at least the end of 1848. Indeed, Catalonia remained under a state of emergency well into 1849. Yet it is equally important to emphasise that the party willingly submitted again to parliamentary scrutiny. Just as the *Cortes* had been suspended in accordance with the constitution, so too was it reconvened at the end of 1848 in accordance with the constitution. Elections were held in August 1850, almost four years after those in 1846—a period of almost unprecedented electoral and administrative stability in nineteenth-century Spain. And, by the end of 1848, opposition newspapers were beginning to reappear. Some were direct replacements for those which were forced to close down. The satirical *Don Circunstancias*, for example, was established in August, edited by Juan Martínez Villergas and the team behind *El Tío Camorra* which had closed at the height of tensions in May. It was hardly the sign of an reopened public sphere, but it demonstrates a new self-confidence on the part of the government and the beginning of a renewed tolerance of opposition.

Despite this the *moderado* vision of post-revolutionary Spain remained an exclusivist one, and even the crown was implicated in this. Isabel lamented that ‘sedition has raised its head a number of times, bloodying the very streets of the capital and the cities and fields of the peninsula.’[[804]](#footnote-804) For the government, the revolutionaries had no legitimacy. And whilst the revolution may have been suppressed, the radical poor who took part in it still needed suppressing. This emphasis on public order, although popular with the middle classes, resulted in the loss of flexibility of the liberal system.[[805]](#footnote-805) Henry Kissinger characterised the defence of the old order in times of revolution as ‘the conservative dilemma’; this very act of defending the old opens up the possibility of the new.[[806]](#footnote-806) Before the revolution, disagreement was primarily within the system, whilst afterwards it became about the system itself. Throughout 1848, the government relied on the army to maintain public order. They recognised their importance and continued to pay them at the expense of civil employees; every civilian government employee was forced to contribute one month’s salary to the exchequer.[[807]](#footnote-807) Yet, while the *moderados* took a more conservative and authoritarian turn after their relative success in 1848, they did not become entirely regressive. Instead, it allowed them to accelerate the installation of liberalism from above, albeit an installation which was gradual and limited in nature.[[808]](#footnote-808)

For Christopher Clark, after 1848, there was something of a revolution in government as the restoration powers increasingly used legislation to bring about the more moderate aims of the revolutionaries whilst, at the same time, also strengthening the state apparatus. It was from this point that ‘the agenda was set by a post-revolutionary *rapprochement*.’ He traces Spanish involvement in this process to 1854. Actually, it began—as elsewhere—in 1848. Although the political class was already less fragmented on the eve of the revolution than it had been at the beginning of the 1840s, it was the threat of popular revolt which renewed its broad hegemony. Here too, it was a consensus which answered ‘the aspirations both of the more statist and moderate elements of the old liberalism and of the more innovative and entrepreneurial elements among the old conservative elites.’[[809]](#footnote-809) In Spain the interests of the old elites and the upper middle class had largely merged before 1848, but the revolutionary year brought a *rapprochement* among this ruling class even if it was an uneasy one.

Robert Gildea’s argument that Spain survived the European Revolution because it was already an oligarchy is partly right.[[810]](#footnote-810) However, cracks had been appearing in the edifice in the years before 1848, and it was only when faced with the choice between *rapprochement* and popular insurrection that the *progresistas* chose *rapprochement*. Indeed, suspicion persisted that the choice was made only after it was clear that the revolution would not succeed.[[811]](#footnote-811) After the revolution, owing to the weakness of the state apparatus, its development as an instrument of public order and its chronic impoverishment, this could only ever be partially successful. This led to compromises that suited no one, and Clark is right that the alliance only became formalised in 1854. But, after 1848, revolution from below was impossible in a way which was still uncertain on 26 March.

Traumatic news of events elsewhere in Europe did much to harden ordinary Spaniards against the revolution and to encourage them into the arms of the *moderado* party. Those who remained quiet in 1848 became mythologised. De Toqueville compared the feeling among the Parisian middle class, for example, to that of the Romans anticipating the Vandal and Goth hordes.[[812]](#footnote-812) As France embraced authoritarianism, first under Louis-Eugène Cavaignac and then under Napoleon III, it became a more natural ally of the post-revolutionary *moderado* party. It was the emergence of this latter figure which perhaps had the most obvious impact on the nature of the post-1848 Spanish state. The two central tenets of Napoleon’s programme for government, universal manhood suffrage and an engagement with the social question garnered little enthusiasm on the other side of the Pyrenees. But, as a strong executive figure who could protect private property, he provided a model for Narváez.[[813]](#footnote-813) The Spanish prime minister was careful not to revert completely to pre-revolutionary power relationships. The former French prime minister, François Guizot believed that Narváez had, in fact, welcomed the February Revolution as ‘it left him more entirely his own master.’[[814]](#footnote-814) Geopolitically, the relationship would remain unequal, but it was perhaps less unequal than it had been. For example, during Napoleon III’s campaign for power, Narváez had lent him five hundred thousand francs.[[815]](#footnote-815)

Elsewhere in Europe, the conservative powers took back control of the state apparatus, but these restored governments were often acutely aware of the way the revolution had changed the political landscape. This led to a perceptible change in the conception of the state. Long viewed with suspicion on the right, the centralised state, its institutions, and its reach, came to be seen as the best guarantor of long-term stability.[[816]](#footnote-816) A similar process occurred in Spain. Here, the process had a longer gestation, but 1848 represented its marked acceleration. In July 1848, for example, the government established the *ronda d’en Tarrés* in Barcelona. Similar to the *ronda de capa* in Madrid, it was named after its deputy leader Jeroni Tarrés. Tarrés was a criminal who recruited other criminals. And together, as officers of the *ronda*, they committed acts of assault and even murder against perceived enemies of the state. This step up in the use of state violence against public order threats seems likely to have been enabled by the perceived successes of the *ronda de capa* before and during the 1848 Revolution. Proudhon wrote that, ‘the fate of European democracy has fallen from our civil hands to those of the praetorians.’[[817]](#footnote-817) In the Spanish case, this is probably still an exaggeration. Yet, given that the process of normalising Spain after the Carlist War was far from complete, the role of the military in 1848 was only likely to increase the influence of the army within the post-revolutionary political system.[[818]](#footnote-818)

It is also indicative of a broader trend: the increasing power wielded by the *jefe político* and captain general, both agents of central government. Given that the locus of political power was—together with the question of representation more broadly—at the heart of the 1848 Revolution in Spain, this is unsurprising. However, grievances associated with this extension of state power into the local milieu sowed the seeds of regionalism, and of the alternative nationalisms which appeared later. When the Carlist threat re-emerged on a large scale in the 1870s, for example, it was an overtly regionalist party. And there were also intellectual challenges to the government’s centralising programme. In Catalonia, for example, the attempted imposition of a unified civil code led to a successful campaign by lawyers to defend local laws.[[819]](#footnote-819) Tomàs Bertran i Soler’s attempt to create a Catalan government—the *Diputació General de Catalunya*— in November 1848 with Carlist and radical leaders has been seen as a nationalist endeavour.[[820]](#footnote-820) It is perhaps better seen in these regionalist terms, as an attempt to formalise the revolution’s broad alliance of opponents to the *moderado* party’s exclusivist vision of the state.

The years after 1848 witnessed a sharpening of the phenomenon which had begun before the revolution: the increasing distinction between Spaniards who were inside the state and those who remained outside. This is particularly visible in the changing role of the Catholic Church. The Concordat of 1851 consolidated the Catholic confessionalism of the state, but this rise in clericalism as the Church took a more central role in the state was accompanied by a broad dechristianisation. Its role in education was strengthened, leading to something of an abandonment of primary education by the state. In 1852, 67.5% of public spending on education went to universities, by contrast only about 1% was spent on primary schools.[[821]](#footnote-821) At a time when there was already pressure to withdraw children from education to work the land, a poor quality education was unlikely to be much of an incentive to attend school.[[822]](#footnote-822) For the *moderados*, this was of little importance. For them, the purpose of education was moral rather than intellectual.[[823]](#footnote-823) This use of clerics as effectively agents of the state led to increased levels of anticlericalism. Much of it was small in scale: break-ins, the drunken disruption of services and isolated examples of disrespectful behaviour towards priests, and as it long had been it was directed at individuals rather than at religion more broadly.[[824]](#footnote-824) On an institutional level, the Church may have been the indirect beneficiary of the revolution as the Concordat gave it greater freedom to exploit the liberal system.[[825]](#footnote-825)

This attempt to bring together various groups within the system is also evident in the government’s approach to industry after 1848. It heralded an era of financial stability as there was less capital available to use to speculate on the stock market, and Spanish business thus began to attract foreign investment.[[826]](#footnote-826) In 1850, a major exhibition of Spanish industry was held in Madrid, and the report by José Caveda, director general of agriculture, industry and commerce, emphasised the value of manufacturing to the state.[[827]](#footnote-827) Yet, as it had been for much of the century, the state itself remained the principal generator of wealth, and social mobility remained limited by status; wealth still did not necessarily bring power.[[828]](#footnote-828) And many Spaniards remained excluded altogether.

The alliance between the Carlists and the radicals seemed to break down in this restoration period. The former were undermined by the *moderado* reconciliation with the Church and the arrest and exile of its leaders, and the latter found the *partido demócrata* a more hopeful vehicle for furthering its agenda. But it would resurface again. For example, in Barcelona the urban working classes were again driven into the arms of the Carlists during the 1855 general strike.[[829]](#footnote-829) Although by then the *moderados* were out of government, the *progresistas* under Baldomero Espartero had done little to address the post-1848 exclusion of the urban working class from the public sphere. But the coalition between the working classes and the Carlists was not only sustained by the exclusion of the former from the post-revolutionary settlement.

If the French Second Republic was the republic of the peasants, then the state which emerged in Spain after 1848 was the opposite.[[830]](#footnote-830). While the state had ultimately succeeded in quashing the Carlo-Republican threat, the government did little to address the underlying grievances of the rural poor which drove it. Aligning themselves with the vested interests of large landowners, the government failed either to create a class of gentlemen farmers or to sever the link between the peasantry and the countryside and thus to encourage industrialisation.[[831]](#footnote-831) But the Spanish countryside had long been difficult to govern. The events of 1848 demonstrated a continued lack of state penetration, and this applied equally to the question of development as it did to that of public order. In 1849, the Galician deputy Juan Ferreira Caamaño complained about the lack of progress with the road-building programme in the province and its effect on the commercial position of Vigo.[[832]](#footnote-832) In the same way that the under-represented working classes were pushed towards the Carlists, the Carlists were pushed in the other direction by the continued attempts to centralise power in Madrid and continued under-government of the countryside. This meant that Carlists and provincial radicals would work together again, notably in the turbulent years of the First Republic.[[833]](#footnote-833) Though these later revolutionary attempts against the hegemony of the liberal elite met with scarcely more long-term success than those in 1848.

The government used their strengthened position at home to increase Spain’s influence abroad. In the imperial sphere, although the captain general had theoretically been given near absolute power under the 1837 constitution, 1848 demonstrated this in practice in the Caribbean colonies. The twenty years which followed were characterised by prosperity, albeit accompanied by significantly increased levels of political violence as the colonies became the epitome of Spanish elite hegemony.[[834]](#footnote-834) Meanwhile in Europe, 1848 marked the re-entry of Spain into continental diplomacy, albeit on a small scale. The expedition to Rome had gained Isabel’s recognition by the Catholic powers, but Spain also found itself thrust back into Italian affairs and on a collision course with an increasingly belligerent and powerful Piedmont.[[835]](#footnote-835) This culminated in Spain’s support for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies against Garibaldi’s expedition, backed by the Northern Italian kingdom, in 1860. However, there was more at stake for Spain than dynastic loyalty to Naples—which, in any case, was not always appreciated.[[836]](#footnote-836) A unified Italy would present competition to Spanish influence in the Mediterranean. Although Britain had long supplanted Spain as the preeminent naval power, after the 1848 Revolution and the capture of the Chafarinas Islands the Spanish navy exerted renewed regional influence. This process fits into a broader one of international divergence after 1848, as belligerent foreign policies were increasingly used by European powers to channel the domestic grievances unresolved by the restorations, notably nationalism but also demands for more competitive economies.[[837]](#footnote-837)

As works on other polities increasingly emphasise continuity, in Spain’s case it is important also to emphasise change. The experience of 1848 elsewhere taught the restored regimes the importance of compromise with the conservative elements of the emergent middle class and of gradual reform within the existing system. In Spain, on the other hand, it created a renewed hubris among the liberal elites. It allowed them to ignore calls for greater representation, even from those sympathetic to the system. In the early 1850s Spain may have looked much like states across Europe, but there this was not progress, it was regress. The aftermath of 1848 was an opportunity for the liberals to turn hegemony into legitimacy, but it was missed. Under Narváez’s successor, Juan Bravo Murillo, *Verwaltung als Verfassung* went a step further, becoming ‘menos política y más administración’, or less politics and more administration.[[838]](#footnote-838) Even the return of the *progresistas* to government did not fundamentally alter the basis of the power relationship. This meant that voices which should have been heard after the revolution—regionalists, industrialists, the lower middle class—were silenced. The exclusion of these groups, who were all broadly sympathetic to liberalism, weakened the state in the long term. Centralisation further reinforced the hegemony of the narrow Madrid elite, even if after 1848 the captains general and the *jefes políticos* did, paradoxically, gain significant power to act in a distinctly local way.[[839]](#footnote-839)

## Memory and Oblivion

Although the 1848 Revolution was defeated on Europe’s streets, it continued in its history. The cleavage in society which developed in the pre-revolutionary era was not magically healed by the defeat of the barricades. Most of those who had taken part in the uprisings remained outside the post-1848 consensus, clinging to stories of heroism, of sacrifice and of solidarity, and to the commemoration of their fallen comrades. And there is evidence of this in Spain, too, in the years immediately after 1848. In particular, the role played by former members of the *milicia nacional* found its way into the organisation’s mythology. According to Joaquín Ruiz de Morales, they had ‘fought with valour and heroically suffered executions and deportation.’[[840]](#footnote-840) However, here the revolution was remembered as an incompetent failure from the start. Some of this was undoubtedly the result of Orientalism, such as with Gustave Flaubert’s depiction of a bumbling Spanish revolutionary in *l’Education sentimental*.[[841]](#footnote-841) But it is also true that the revolution had not brought down the government. Priscilla Robertson was right to ask what, in 1848, a ‘successful’ revolution might have looked like.[[842]](#footnote-842) Everywhere the revolution was what Georges Duveau called a ‘lyrical illusion.’[[843]](#footnote-843) Nowhere had the pre-revolutionary power relationships actually been dismantled, and many of the structures the *anciens régimes* left behind endured revolutionary rule. Indeed, 1848 represents only one episode in the struggle for representation, a struggle which is seemingly never finished. The Civil Rights protests in the twentieth century, for example, show that it does not even end with universal suffrage.

In the aftermath of events, memories of 1848 were contested, and they remain so. This reflects the heterogeneity of experience, but it was also the result of deliberate actions by those who had been involved. The revolutionaries created paradigmatic heroes from among the barricade fighters, and at the same time the government created their own heroes from among those who had fought and died in defence of the legal government. The right won more than simply the battle of the streets; it seemed to win ownership of the Spanish experience in the years after the events.

Yet 1848 had transformed the *moderado* party. Where before 26 March—even on the very eve of the insurrection—the party’s instinct had been to compromise with the revolution, its ‘victory’ created a hubris. This was accompanied by a need to live up to their new uncompromising reputation, one which had never been reality. There was something Rankean in its veneration of martyrs in the armed forces and the civil guard, presented as proof that Spain had succeeded where other states had failed.[[844]](#footnote-844) The government reinforced this further by legislating for compensation for the families of those who lost their lives in ‘defending the throne and public order.’[[845]](#footnote-845) The broader narrative that the revolution was defeated by force also suited the government. The reality was more akin to Helmuth von Moltke’s observation that, in the heat of battle, mediocrity is quite an achievement.[[846]](#footnote-846) Nevertheless, it made 1848 an important event in the creation of the myth of Spanish exceptionalism which played well with an increasingly nationalistic middle class.

With a more transient lifestyle and shorter life expectancy an individual killed on the barricades in the mid-nineteenth century was unlikely to have even been remembered for more than twenty-five years by friends and family.[[847]](#footnote-847) But even after the memories of these individuals had been lost, 1848 remained in the collective consciousness through representations in the cultural milieu. Pedro Antonio de Alarcón’s 1881 novella *El Capitán Veneno*, for example, tells the story of an army captain wounded fighting the radicals in Puerta del Sol on 26 March.[[848]](#footnote-848) In the 1940s and 50s, it was adapted into film three times, in Argentina, Mexico and Spain. 1848 also provided the setting for Benito Pérez Galdós’s first historical novel in his *Episodios Nacionales* (National Episodes) series, in which he sought to create a national Spanish history. *Las tormentas del 48* is set against the backdrop of the revolution, and the narrative covers the unease of the characters as news arrives from Paris, the hopes for French intervention in March, and the dashed hopes pinned on the liberalism of Pius IX.[[849]](#footnote-849) Around the turn of the century, there was a renewed interest too in works inspired by the French Revolution of 1848.[[850]](#footnote-850) These works, although they did little to keep alive the memory of individual Spanish actors, did at least keep the events of the year in the minds of Spaniards.

Even at the time, the Spanish experience of the 1848 Revolution was more nuanced, more uncertain, and therefore less usable than the experiences elsewhere.[[851]](#footnote-851) That the government survived and that there was no contemporaneous emancipatory nationalism meant that what had to be remembered was a complex if perhaps valiant failure. It is also reasonable to ask how much remembering people could have been expected to do. Although people died during the revolution, people died a lot in the nineteenth century; life went on, and blood dries quickly. Jay Winter explained how, after the First World War, people had to both remember and forget, and live through both, in order to transcend the trauma.[[852]](#footnote-852) While the scale of the 1848 Revolution in Spain was different, it must have had similarly devastating effects on individual neighbourhoods, villages, and communities. And in most cases, there were daily reminders of the death of loved ones as the streets in which they died were the same streets where they lived and worked. But, as after the First World War, it was not possible to only remember. People had to grieve; they had to go through the ‘process of separation from the dead.’[[853]](#footnote-853)

Those who lived through the events of 1848 could, to some extent, hold onto Romantic notions of revolutionary heroes—a more abstract remembering. But, particularly in Madrid and Seville, the reality of barricade fighting in the narrow streets and alleys was likely to have been bloody, chaotic, and terrifying. This fear meant that, although there was certainly sympathy for the revolutionaries, stories of heroism and glory did not have the effect they might have done elsewhere. It may even be that this process had begun in Spain before 1848 with the trauma of the First Carlist War and the *Jamància*, and in this way memory of revolution was itself a barrier to mass mobilisation.

There was another challenge for the post-revolutionary storytellers too. It was—and remains—difficult to weave the individual events of the 1848 Revolution in Spain into a coherent whole. These events were contingent in a sometimes quite ephemeral way. Although it was this contingence of each uprising on others which gave the revolution in Spain its coherence, this relationship was difficult to articulate beyond an urgent contemporaneity. As time went on memories of 1848 were therefore superseded by memories of other events, notably the 1854 Revolution. With its popular reaction to an elite coup, it had a more concrete—perhaps arguably even a more objective—reality. In Spain, where successful revolutions were often thoroughly planned and highly choreographed affairs, it made sense not to dwell for too long on a complex series of popular insurrections, seemingly both unsuccessful and held together at best by a rope of sand.

For the Carlists, although 1848 marked a clear intensification of hostilities, their uprising had started before the revolutionary year. It was therefore less obviously contemporaneous with the European Revolution. Furthermore, the alliance with the radicals undermined the identity which they fostered in later years. As early as 1869, the Carlist writer José Benítez Caballero called the conflict ‘a small military insurrection.[[854]](#footnote-854) As well as being demonstrably false, it is unthinkable that within twenty years people could have remembered events in this way. In the 1880s, in the aftermath of a third conflict, Carlism became conflated with integrism: the supremacy of Catholic thought in the political and social spheres. This ideology emerged in conscious opposition to liberalism, and it was incompatible with the actions of the Carlists in 1848. This later generation looked instead to an imagined mediaeval religiosity, downplaying earlier associations with radicalism.[[855]](#footnote-855) A faction did try to keep alive the traditionalist principles, but even their champion Jaime de Borbón positioned his programme ‘against the liberal and revolutionary.’[[856]](#footnote-856) And the two factions merged again after 1932. More recently, the Carlist participation of events of 1848 have been remembered by some as a Second Carlist War. Each year a festival is held in Avinyó (Barcelona) to mark the defeat there of government forces. There is no mention of radicals; instead they celebrate a solely Carlist force.

Yet the ideas of 1848 continued to echo in political thought throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century. The periods of post-revolutionary government after 1854 and 1868 witnessed an intensification of remembering, though in both cases this was fleeting. After the successes of 1854, there was a perception among the new government that the 1848 Revolution had been conquered. ‘We have silently devoured so much shame and so much outrage,’ read the report of a commission on 1848. Parliament voted to declare the revolutionaries of 1848 *Beneméritos de la Patria* (meritorious of the homeland), and provision was made to compensate those deported or exiled.[[857]](#footnote-857) This obscures the at least passive complicity of the *progresista* opposition in the post-revolutionary repression, but it reflects the fluidity of revolutionary politics. Blas Villate, for example, won awards from the government for his bravery in the fight against the barricades in 1848, but he was among the revolutionaries in 1854.

After the shared mistakes and the catastrophes of 1848, it was natural for all the nations of Europe to surrender to the fruitful repose which, other than in the rarest circumstances, public order provides. And Spain, more than any other…

These lines began an exhortation to rebellion published on the eve of the 1854 Revolution.[[858]](#footnote-858) Among its authors were Domingo Dulce, who had fought for the government against the Carlo-Republicans in 1848, and Leopoldo O’Donnell, who had been the doyen of the authoritarian *moderados* before the revolution broke out. After the 1868 Revolution, with more distance from events, there was some recuperation of memory. The biographers of the new deputies in the revolutionary *Cortes*, for example, were keen to emphasise involvement in the events of 1848.[[859]](#footnote-859) And, in Valencia, republicans gathered to hear a mass for Calixto Fernandes, who had been involved in the revolution there.[[860]](#footnote-860)

After 1875, just like after the return of the *moderados* in 1856, 1848 was again largely forgotten. The Restoration system, developed by Antonio Cánovas de Castillo was heavily influenced by the post-1848 *moderado* vision of the state. During the revolutionary year, Cánovas had been a twenty-year-old student in Madrid, and on the night of 7 May, he was dining at the home of Diego Mier, a deputy from Huelva. He told his host that, if he were ever in power, he could be counted upon never ‘to replace order with anarchy.’ After the Restoration, Mier wrote to the now prime minister that, ‘the prophecy of 7 May 1848 has come true.’[[861]](#footnote-861) Although this story may be apocryphal, it contains a truth about the lifelong influence of the events of 1848 on Cánovas. In 1867, he had spoken in the revolutionary *Cortes* of the way the government had been able to restore both material and moral order after the events of May 1848.[[862]](#footnote-862) He recognised the value of religion in the defence of public and social order, and he hoped to create a Hegelian synthesis between the conservative order and the revolution.[[863]](#footnote-863) Although it was a comparable attempt to strengthen the moderate hegemony against radical opponents of classical liberalism, this time there was no pretence of representative government. 1848 had demonstrated to Cánovas that a coalition of liberals who had captured the political process, could not only defeat a revolutionary attempt, but given the right circumstances could also pretend that it never really happened.

After 1898, Spanish intellectual thought was so warped by defeat in the Spanish-American War that post-colonial Spain had little interest in recuperating individual events from a period consigned to collective oblivion. Much of this has to do with the modern—Marxian—conception of revolution as an accelerator of a largely determined historical process. It is interesting that, although the destination and the process more broadly have both now been largely rejected, revolutions are still often seen within this framework. The idea that nineteenth-century Spanish revolutionaries failed became a general memory, one into which 1848 already fitted neatly. One exception to this pessimism was an article in *El Motín* which painstakingly attempted to list the names of the victims of political violence in the nineteenth century. Individuals, they wrote, to whom ‘we owe the triumph of freedom in Spain.’[[864]](#footnote-864) However, even this needs to be seen in the context of post-colonial crisis. It was characteristic of regenerationalism, a somewhat nebulous intellectual response to the events of 1898. Accompanied by a new intensity of popular protest, the radicals harked back to earlier attempts to remove the liberal oligarchy which they now saw as the cause of Spain’s troubles. For example Joaquín Costa—although scarcely a radical himself—called for a radical revolution led by a nineteenth-century praetorian liberal, an ‘iron surgeon’, a Narváez figure.[[865]](#footnote-865)

In countries where 1848 had become part of the national narrative it could be used by those on the right as well as those on the left. The Spanish experience of the 1848 Revolution had little value to Francisco Franco and his production of national memory in the aftermath of the Civil War. Indeed, the ‘national’ could be used to bring a number of groups with disparate political ideologies together. In Spain, where the national question had been resolved before 1848, the opposite was true. Memorialising collective historical memory became a moral imperative, infused with ideas of good and evil, and for Francoists liberal Spain had been a divisive disaster.[[866]](#footnote-866) It had failed to secure public order, a heavily-mythologised and almost entirely subjective concept. But the memory was not lost entirely. On the centenary of the revolution in 1948, there was a brief flurry of articles in the heavy-censored Francoist press which sought to paint 1848 as a defeated Marxist uprising, but even such blatant propaganda proved short-lived.[[867]](#footnote-867) And there was nothing like the body of work produced elsewhere in Europe. On the 125th anniversary in 1973 the press made scarcely any mention of events.

Unlike elsewhere on the continent, there was no moment of liberation in Spain—however fleeting—from the establishment of a popular conservative liberal hegemony. This is, in part, the reason why the elites failed to create such a hegemony in the years that followed. The 1848 Revolution in Spain, therefore, is perhaps best conceptualised in terms of Jacques Lacan’s interpretation of Freud’s *Nachträglichkeit* (afterwardsness). Its symbolic value would only ever have been determined ‘through its integration into the history of the subject.’ In Spain’s case this never took place, or at least has not yet done so. And it therefore has remained ‘a thing which, at the moment of its occurrence, *will have been*.’[[868]](#footnote-868) After the Civil War of 1936-1939, those opposed to Franco chose alternative inspirations from history, inspirations which did not require them to explain an alliance with the Carlists, who had aligned themselves with the fascists in the 1930s. That said, there were, and there continue to be, exceptions to this forgetting, primarily on a local scale. In the cemetery of Huesca, the city he could not persuade to join his insurrection, Manuel Abad is commemorated in a monument erected in 1885. And he continues to give his name to a local republican society based in the city.

In the years after the transition to democracy, Spanish history became plural. However, the actions of those who took on the *moderados* (and their narrow vision of the liberal state) in 1848 do not play a central role in any of the competing historical narratives. Unlike in Hungary, it has not been embraced by the far right, as there is no obvious nationalist inheritance. On the other hand, for Basque and Catalan separatists, it was paradoxically too ‘Spanish’ and too geographically widespread, even though there was a strong regionalist motivation among the revolutionaries. Most commonly, though, the story of Spain in 1848 has simply been forgotten. In 1998, the sesquicentennial, in an article about commemoration of events elsewhere in Europe, *El País*, promisingly reported that ‘Spain was in a fervent too.’ But it went on to explain that it was the result of the beginnings of a new ‘Iron Age’ as it was the year of the establishment of the first blast furnace.[[869]](#footnote-869) No mention was made of the parallel political struggles of so many of their countrymen. Similarly, in the Spanish post-16 history curriculum, these struggles are mentioned only in passing in discussion of 1854, and not at all in the syllabus about 1848 elsewhere in Europe. In one textbook, a multiple-choice question even asks students to identify the European city in which there was a revolutionary movement; ‘Madrid’ is one of the incorrect options.[[870]](#footnote-870)

‘Forgetting, and I would even say historical error,’ wrote Ernest Renan, ‘are an essential part of the creation of a nation.’[[871]](#footnote-871) And the regionalist undercurrent to Spain’s 1848 Revolution may help to explain something of why it has been forgotten. If historical narratives—and particularly national histories—are creations of power, then what is not said becomes as important for memory as what is.[[872]](#footnote-872) The tension between central and local power, which the Franco regime claimed to have resolved, has resurfaced since the transition to democracy. After an initial transformation towards devolution, the process slowed to a stop, and it now seems to be heading into reverse. The focus on this problem of memory in contemporary Spain is often the Civil War or the Franco dictatorship, but it applies to earlier periods too. The post-transition moderate hegemony has strong parallels with the one established in the nineteenth century. Voices are silenced in the same way, both systemically as then, but also overtly through the tacit ‘pact of forgetting’ which accompanied the transition. Alison Ribeiro de Menezes described the 2011 occupation of Puerta del Sol—one of the centres of events in 1848—as ‘a claim to a new order through a radical reconfiguration of the elements that are permitted to enter debate in the first place.’[[873]](#footnote-873) As long as the nature, or the extent, of representation is contested, for those in power the nineteenth century will remain better forgotten.

However, today Spain is a thoroughly modern European nation, and the value of the story of the Spanish 1848, when the nation marched in step with the rest of the continent, is clear. Further, from a Spanish perspective, it is a story of a diverse group of ordinary people from across the country coming together to fight for a future in which people like them had a stake. Ironically, now that the value of the story has increased, it is probably more unfamiliar than ever. Yet hope is not lost. Memory can be resurrected. Perhaps the revolution’s heterogeneous composition, which has so long encouraged Spaniards to forget the events of 1848, is better suited to our increasingly decentred conception of the past. Memory, wrote Ribeiro de Menezes, is ‘inherently disruptive. It creates dissensus and disagreement, but it also creates new perspectives via a rethreading of the entangled fibres of the past into the warp and weave of the future.’[[874]](#footnote-874)

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The experience of the ‘restoration’, and the creation of narrative and memory together have shaped the story of 1848 in Spain. But the three cannot truly be separated. The process of forgetting began on 27 March, when the guns fell silent for the first time. Although not as active as that of, say, the Civil War, this forgetting was equally deliberate and equally intended to imagine away a continuing cleavage in society. The hegemonic middle class controlled the narrative in the aftermath of the military defeat of the revolutionaries, and they established a discourse of mass consensus in support of the government’s reaction. It was a consensus which did exist, but it was also one which was created. And it is one which has never really been challenged. Elsewhere in Europe, history and memory have combined to exaggerate the significance of the 1848 Revolution. In Spain, they have done the opposite. Although the cleavage between centrists and regionalists and the exclusion of radical politics from the public sphere have continued, perhaps Spain’s only popular revolution of the nineteenth century remains largely ignored. Instead, its history remains the history of those still in power. It is an example of what Slavoj Žižek called ‘history as a closed continuity of “progression” leading to the reign of those who rule today.’ Time has left ‘out of consideration what failed in history, what has to be denied so that the continuity of “what really happened” could establish itself.’[[875]](#footnote-875)

# Conclusion

La portion contentée du peuple?

There was a revolution in Spain in 1848, a revolution which differed markedly from other instances of revolution in Spain in the nineteenth century, in 1820, 1854 and 1868. This was not a revolution sparked by an elite coup, it was a genuine popular uprising. In the context of 1848, it was not the same as the revolution in France, or in Prussia or in Austria. It was not even the same as the revolutions elsewhere on the periphery of Europe. But, just like those other revolutions, rebellions, uprisings and outbreaks of public disorder on the edge of Europe, it was similar enough that it must be considered part of a wider European Revolution. And it is not possible to understand this European revolutionary moment without understanding events in Spain. This thesis has demonstrated that Spain’s 1848 was a genuine popular national revolution, arguably its only one in the nineteenth century. The work sheds important light on the geographical spread of action and the implications this has for understandings of the Spanish nation. Most importantly, it has brought the stories of individual revolutionaries back to life, and these men and women are at the heart of the revolutionary story.

Although the nature and events of the 1848 Revolution in Spain has been the main focus, this study has also had to consider interrelated questions about the development of the state and its relationship with individuals—both in metropolitan Spain and the colonies—of representation, of the liberal conservative hegemony and of the importance of public order in the popular imagination. Work remains to recuperate more individual stories, to better understand the nature of the revolutionary networks and to examine the changes to the state as a result of the revolution, but a story of Spain’s 1848—and of its relationship with other themes in nineteenth-century Spanish and European history—has at least now been told.

Unlike the revolutions in the European centre, the Spanish revolution did not topple the government. But, as shown, this had more to do with the development of the Spanish state than it did with the revolution itself. In the 1840s, the reforms of the *moderado* government had created a small, agile state apparatus, whose interests were broadly aligned with its own. This allowed the government to respond quickly to outbreaks of revolutionary violence. It also meant that, in doing so, ministers could be reasonably confident in the loyalty of state agents, both the army and the civil service. This was the primary difference with the experience in the European centre, but it is typical of that in other states on Europe’s periphery, where state development had been undertaken by governments with at least some level of representation. Where governments did fall in 1848, it was because they could not rely on the agents of the state. This is important for understanding the role of the state in the nineteenth century as a coercive actor but more importantly as a guarantor of public and social order, even when in the service of unpopular and unrepresentative governments.

Spain was not a democracy but, like Britain, it had an elected government. This thesis has demonstrated the ways this afforded the government a measure of legitimacy, at least among the political class. James Vernon explained that nowhere had the nineteenth-century political subject confounded the post-modern critique of the ‘autonomous, rational, centred individual.’ Rather, in Britain, those in power had only pretended it had, ‘addressing people as though their identities were stable and coherent.’[[876]](#footnote-876) Those in power in Spain were never consistently able to do so in the same way. There could be no consistent reconciliation between a real local heterogeneity on the one hand and an imagined national homogeneity on the other. However, limited in space and time, such a reconciliation was just about possible, particularly in the face of a serious threat to property and public order. 1848 proved that a government, which was widely considered legitimate even if it remained unpopular, could resist change from below by holding together a coalition of primarily urban Spaniards. It could create a pretence, albeit temporarily, to stability and coherence.

But this could not last. Against the background of an increasingly inauspicious economic climate, this coalition, which sustained the politics of the 1850s, eventually frayed and came undone under the pressure of internal divisions in the 1860s. The ‘social question’ returned in an even more challenging form. And yet, Spain remained broadly liberal and constitutional. Nárvaez, for example, even opposed the re-establishment of the dictatorship in 1852. And the middle classes were eventually brought into the system in much the same way as they were elsewhere in Europe.

Yet 1848 demonstrated just how insulated the Spanish political elite was from outside pressure for most of the nineteenth century. In Britain, the constitution became increasingly exclusivist as democratic political forms were closed off and radical libertarian traditions stifled, despite the apparent increases in representation.[[877]](#footnote-877) The working classes became firmly shut out of the political system. And, between 1832 and 1868, Spain largely followed this same path, returning to it after the turbulent revolutionary parenthesis of 1868-75. 1848 is thus not the end of the story—this process became official only after the Restoration in 1874—but it is perhaps the beginning of the end. The revolution created a hubris among the elite that classical liberalism could survive the challenge of modernity, and it engendered a belief that there was no need to continue to create the pretence of representation.

But this pretence of representation in the years before 1848 may explain why the revolution struggled to expand beyond existing social networks, another important theme of this study. It could be that others would have joined the revolution but for a fear of the state, and certainly in Madrid and the provincial capitals such a fear was realistic. Persecution by the *ronda*, loss of state or government patronage, and, of course, the risk of death on the barricades awaited, particularly if the revolution did not succeed. And success for neither side was guaranteed, so those hedging their bets could do so. There was also a genuine and well-placed fear of betrayal, particularly well-documented on 26 March. Yet this cannot provide the whole explanation. In the Valencian hinterland, for example, Masip’s bands were more or less in control in the Vall de Sagunt, and he was evidently a charismatic and popular leader. In this case the short-term interest of the people was clearly to join the revolution. It could scarcely have been a trap. Yet still they did not do so.

It could be that those who did not join the revolution were apolitical, or disinterested in the result, but this makes little sense given the enthusiasm of their compatriots from such a broad range of backgrounds. It can only be that they still believed their long term interests would be better served by remaining loyal to the government, a feeling that may even have extended to enslaved peoples in the colonies.

To some extent, the aims of the 1848 Revolution had already been achieved in Spain. The middle classes were active—arguably predominant—members of a representative, constitutional system. The working classes could rely on the government to step in at times when starvation was a real threat. But, more than that, power was already located in the hands of the social and economic elite. Adolphe Thiers, the first post-revolutionary French prime minister, wrote :

…we must defend society against dangerous sectarians; —we must defend it by force against the armed attempts of their disciples,—by reason against their sophisms; and to that end we must condemn our own mind as well as that of our contemporaries, to a long and methodical demonstration of truths, hitherto the most generally accredited.[[878]](#footnote-878)

In Spain, society was already reasonably well-defended. *Verwaltung als Verfassung* had softened opposition among groups who lacked representation. But, while elsewhere in Europe, the revolution brought conservative powers to the realisation that administration or state-building could no longer compensate for representation, in Spain it seemed to have the opposite effect.

Although the elites were able to largely control the narrative after the revolution, this too proved to be a double-edged sword. The non-coercive measures taken by the government—the statist interventions in the economy, for example—were forgotten. Instead, a narrative of military victory was created, and this only further encouraged the development of an exclusivist state in the years which followed. Had the government fallen in that turbulent year, perhaps it would have forced the elites to sufficiently broaden the basis of their rule to guarantee its stability into the twentieth century.[[879]](#footnote-879) As it was, they eschewed even the semblance of representation and relied on *Verwaltung als Verfassung* as the basis for the state’s legitimacy long after it was possible to do so. In 1848, Spanish history reached its turning-point. It did not fail to turn, but it did perhaps turn in the wrong direction.

# Linguistic note

Translating nineteenth-century Spanish sources into twenty-first-century English is fraught with difficulty, and some of the decisions I ultimately made were remade and made again over the course of this project. Hopefully, any use (or misuse) is, at least, consistent. All translations, unless specified, are my own.

Spanish spelling in 1848 was erratic and this is reflected in the sources. Generally, therefore, I prefer the modern English equivalent. However, when I choose to keep the Spanish version of a word for clarity or where there is not a satisfactory English translation, I use modern Spanish. This is the case even if I never (or almost never) encountered it in that form in the sources, for example I use the modern *jefe* rather than the ubiquitous *gefe*. Otherwise, it is largely arbitrary. For example, I prefer the English *civil guard* but the Spanish *militia nacional*, simply because I think it avoids confusion with the common revolutionary demand for ‘national militias’ across Europe in 1848. Further detail can be found in the Glossary.

With people’s names, I generally prefer the modern Spanish spelling. In 1848, official documents were written exclusively in Castilian Spanish. I have generally changed names into the local vernacular, where individuals are now more commonly known in this way. In other cases, I have only modified names to take account of modern spelling rules, e.g. *Ramón* rather than *Ramon*. For place and street names, I use the modern official name. This will always be an imperfect process, but I am safe in the knowledge that most Spaniards in the mid-nineteenth century would have been quite comfortable with such inconsistency.

# Glossary of Spanish Terms

Alcade Mayor

Ayacuchos Officers from the Spanish-American wars, opponents of Espatero

Ayntamiento Town hall; locally-elected (town/city) council

Carabinero Customs officer

Consumos Taxes on consumption, often on basic goods paid on entrance to towns

Cortes parliament

Desamortización Disentail; sale of monastic lands

Diputación regional/provincial council

Espadón Sword; military leader of a political party

Exaltado radical liberal (1820-36)

Fueros traditional regional laws and privileges of the Basque Country and Navarre

Hacienda large ranch or plantation

Jefe político local representative of civil government

Jornalero Day labourer

Lathyrism a neurodegenerative disease caused by eating a primarily grass-pea diet

Latifundio estate, greater than 250 hectares in area

Letrilla popular song

Maestrazgo mountainous area encompassing parts of present-day Valencia, Teruel and Castellón

Mayorazgo inheritance of aristocratic lands by eldest son (or daughter), abolished 1820

Milicia nacional national civilian militia established by the *progresista* party

Moderado more conservative liberal

Presidio penal settlement

Progresista more progressive liberal (also sometimes *liberal*)

Pronunciamiento revolutionary pronouncement by the military

Pueblo town; people

Puritano influential minority within *moderado* party; favoured conciliation with *progresistas*

Quinta the draft

Tertulia salon

Turno peaceful alternation of government by different parties

Velada evening school

# Index of works cited

Archives

AHN Archivo Histórico Nacional (Spain)

AHU Archivo Histórico Universitario (University of Santiago de Compostela)

AMM Archivo Militar Madrid

AN Archives nationales (France)

NCA Norfolk County Archive

Newspapers and Magazines

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*I, the author, confirm that the Thesis is my own work. I am aware of the University’s Guidance on the Use of Unfair Means (*[*www.sheffield.ac.uk/ssid/unfair-means*](http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/ssid/unfair-means)*). This work has not been previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, university.*

1. Klemens von Metternich, *Mémoires, documents et écrits divers laissés*, VI (Paris: E. Plon, 1883), 681. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Recent scholarship almost entirely agrees on this point. See Dieter Dowe, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Dieter Langewiesche, Jonathan Sperber (eds), *Europe in 1848: Revolution and Reform* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2008), Axel Körner, (ed.), *1848: A European Revolution? International ideas and national memories of 1848* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), Mike Rapport, *1848: Year Of Revolution* (London: Hachette, 2008), Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851* (Cambridge: University Press, 1994) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See Pitirim Sorokin on the integration of cultural elements, in *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, I (Cincinnati, OH: American Book Company, 1937), 2-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See Kurt Weyland, ‘The Diffusion of Revolution: '1848' in Europe and Latin America’, in *International Organization* 63/3 (2009), 391-423. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Dominique Kirchner Reill, *Nationalists Who Feared the Nation: Adriatic Multi-Nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste, and Venice* (Stanford, CA: University Press, 2012), 158. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. In France, Alphonse de Lamartine’s early treatment established 1848 as a step closer to realising the promise of the Revolution of 1789, in *Histoire de la Revolution de 1848,* II (Leipzig: Brockhaus & Avenarius, 1849), 14. Elsewhere in the European centre, it was ‘the Springtime of the peoples’, where the nations of Italy, Germany, Hungary and others were reborn, or at least the point at which national emancipation movements seemed to gain momentum. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Axel Körner, ‘The European Dimension of the ideas of 1848’, in Idem (ed.), *1848: A European Revolution?* [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *Morning Post* 7 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Clare Pettitt has a good summary of the events in Britain in *Serial Revolutions 1848: Writing, Politics, Form* (Oxford: University Press, 2022), 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. José María Jover, *La civilización española a mediados del siglo XIX* (Madrid: ‎Espasa-Calpe, 1991), 50. The historiography has often hidden this trend by breaking the history of the nineteenth century into small periods, based on the comings and goings of individual administrations. Classic works such as José Luis Comellas, *Los moderados en el poder, 1844-1854* (Madrid: CSIC, 1970) have shaped historians’ understanding of this periodisation. But the idea seems to have a contemporary origin, see *La* *Iberia* 17 September 1854. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. James Vernon, *Politics and the People: A Study in English Political Culture, c. 1815-1867* (Cambridge: University Press, 1993), 7-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Gracia Gómez Urdáñez, ‘The Bourgeois Family in Nineteenth-Century Spain: Private Lives, Gender Roles and a New Socioeconomic Model’, in *Journal of Social History* 30/1 (2005), 66-85. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914* (Cambridge: University Press, 2012 [1993]), ch.3; Mary Vincent, *Spain 1833-2002, People and State* (Oxford: University Press, 2007), 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Cf. Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Staat und Gesellschaft in Preußen 1815-1848’, in Werner Conze (ed.) *Staat und*

    *Gesellschaft im deutschen Vormärz 1815-1848* (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1962), 79-112. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. G. M. Trevelyan’s initial use, in *British History in the Nineteenth Century (1782-1901)* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1922), 272, was perhaps intended to be specific to Britain. But it has since been applied to Europe generally and to individual countries, probably most notably by A.J.P. Taylor in, *The course of German history: a survey of the development of Germany since 1815* (London: H. Hamilton, 1945), 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. In caciquism, which characterised the post-1875 political system, administrative power was ceded to local elites, or bosses, on the basis of patronage. See Joaquín Romero Maura, ‘El caciquismo: tentativa de conceptualización’ in *Revista de Occidente* 127 (1973), 15-44 and José Varela Ortega, *Los amigos políticos: partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración (1875-1900)* (Madrid: Alianza, 1977) [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. This was keenly felt by some at the time, but perhaps the most influential modern text is Pierre Vilar*, Spain: A Brief History* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1967) [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Adrian Shubert, *A Social History of Modern Spain* (London: Routledge, 1990), 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford, CA: University Press, 1976) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Vincent, *Spain,* 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. This broadly aligns with the conclusions reached by Josep M. Fradera, in ‘La política liberal y el descubrimiento de una identidad distintiva de Cataluña (1835-1865)’, in *Hispania* 60/205 (2000), 673-702, especially 694-697. See also Xosé-Manoel Núñez, ‘The region as essence of the Fatherland: Regionalist variants of Spanish nationalism (1840-1936)’, in *European History Quarterly* 31/4 (2001), 483-518 for a discussion of the relationship between region and nation. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The classic example is Miguel Artola, *La Burguesía revolucionaria, 1808-1869* (Madrid: Alianza, 1973). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Jesús Cruz, for example, emphasised the familial links between the new liberal elite and the eighteenth-century aristocracy, in *Gentlemen, bourgeois and revolutionaries: Political change and cultural persistence among the Spanish dominant groups, 1750-1850* (Cambridge: University Press, 1996). The alternative view is deftly presented by Isabel Burdiel in her review of his book, in T*he Journal of Modern History* 72/1 (2000), 242-244. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. José Álvarez-Junco, ‘La invención de la Guerra de la Independencia’, in *Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea* 12 (1994), 75-99; Idem.*, Mater Dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX* ( Madrid: Taurus , 2001) [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Martin Baumeister, ‘“Liberale Diktatur“ – “liberale Revolution“: Spanien in der Zeit der europäischen Revolutionen von 1848/49‘, in Martin Kirsh and Pierangelo Schiera, *Verfassungswandel um 1848 im europäischen Vergleich* (Berlin Dunker & Humblot, 2001), 233-248, especially 237-238. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. The idea of a ‘crisis of penetration’ was identified by Juan Linz in ‘Early state-building and late peripheral nationalisms against the state: the case of Spain’, in Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt and ‎Stein Rokkan (eds), *Building States and Nations, Analyses by Region* II (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), 32-116 and developed by José Álvarez-Junco in *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (Manchester: University Press, 2011), 321-348. On the idea that the Spanish state was not just weak but that it lacked legitimacy, see Vincent, *Spain*, especially 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. The idea that some Spaniards were denied citizenship of the state is from Carr, *Spain: A History*, 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Theda Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’, in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: University Press, 1985), 3-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Mann, *Sources of Social Power,* II, 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, ‘“La España Ultramarina”: Colonialism and Nation-Building in Nineteenth-Century Spain, in *European History Quarterly* 34/2 (2004), 191-214. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Josep M. Fradera examined how this integration shaped the relationship between peripheral nationalisms and Madrid in the later nineteenth century in ‘The Empire, the Nation and the Homelands: Nineteenth-Century Spain’s National Idea’, in Joost Augusteijn and Eric Storm (eds), *Region and State in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Nation-Building, Regional Identities and Separatism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 131-148, especially 141-145. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century* (Pittsburgh, PA: University Press, 2006), 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. This idea of the nation is from Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2016 [2006]), especially 5-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Konstantina Zanou, *Transnational Patriotism in the Mediterranean, 1800-1850: Stammering the Nation* (Oxford: University Press, 2018), 197. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. *Eco del comercio* 15 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Guillermo Gortázar (ed.), *Nación y estado en la España liberal* (Madrid: Noesis, 1994), 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Particularly Reinhart Koselleck, ‘How European was the Revolution of 1848/49’, Körner (ed.), *1848: A European Revolution?*, 209-233. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of

    Reflexivity,’ *History and Theory* 45 (2006), 30-50, 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. It is difficult to conceive of a definition of ‘revolution’ which does not exclude events widely considered to be revolutions, which includes other forms of civil disorder, or which does both. And the task is further complicated by contemporary understandings. The *Diccionario de la lengua castellana por la Academia Española* (Madrid: Francisco María Fernández, 1843)defines ‘revolución’ as both a ‘change or new form of the state or government’ and also as simply ‘unrest’ (*inquietud*), 637. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017 [1962]), 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Isabel Burdiel, ‘Myths of Failure, Myths of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth‐Century Spanish Liberalism’, in *The Journal of Modern History* 70/4 (1998), 892-912, especially 909. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. James Morris, ‘The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Danubian Principality of Wallachia’ (The University of Cambridge, Doctoral thesis, 2020) [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. For example, *El Heraldo* 9 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables* (Paris: J. Hetzel et A. Lacroix, 1865), 453. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. R. J. W. Evans, ‘From Confederation to Compromise: The Austrian Experiment, 1849-1867’, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 87 (1994), 135-167; Christopher Clark, ‘After 1848: The European Revolution in Government’, in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 6/22 (2012), 171-197. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. This framework is proposed by Niall Ferguson in *The Square and the Tower: Networks, Hierarchies and the Struggle for Global Power* (London: Penguin, 2018), although not specifically with relation to 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Begriffsgeschichte and social history’, in *Economy and Society* 11:4 (1982), 425-426. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Rodney Barker, *Political Legitimacy and the State* (Oxford: University Press, 1990), 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. *cf*. Veit Valentin, *Geschichte der deutschen revolution von 1848-49*, I (Berlin: Ullstein, 1931), 291-299. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Edward Shorter, ‘Middle-Class Anxiety in the German Revolution of 1848’, in *Journal of Social History* 2/3 (1969), 189-215, 195. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. *The Spectator* 8 April 1848, 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. L. Rollind, *Los Tres días de febrero en París o sea Revolución francesa de 1848* (Barcelona: Sra. V. e H. de Mayol, 1848), 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Antonio Pirala, *Historia contemporánea. Anales desde 1843 hasta la conclusión de la actual guerra civil*, I (Madrid: Manuel Tello, 1875); Fernando Garrido, *Historia del reinado del último Borbón de España*, III (Barcelona: Lujo, 1869). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Charlotte Tacke (ed.), *1848: memory and oblivion in Europe* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2000) [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. J. Quero Molares, ‘Spain in 1848’, in François Fejtő (ed.), *The Opening of an Era: 1848* (London: Allan Wingate, 1948) [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Lewis Namier, *1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992 [1946]), 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Artola, *Burguesía revolucionaria*, 215; Manuel Tuñón de Lara, *La España del siglo XIX*, I (Madrid: Akal, 2000 [1960]), 176-177. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Sperber, *The European Revolutions*, 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Ibid., 271. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Daniel R. Headrick, ‘Spain and the Revolutions of 1848’, in *European Studies Review* 6 (1976), 197-223. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Sonsoles Cabeza Sánchez-Albornoz, *Los sucesos de 1848 en España* (Madrid: Fundación universitaria española: 1981) [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Salvador Sánchez Pardo, *La revolución de 1848 en España* (Madrid: Ediciones Universidad Complutense, 1985) [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Baumeister, ‘“Liberale Diktatur“ – “liberale Revolution“, 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Antonio Eiras Roel, *El partido demócrata español (1849-7868)* (Madrid: Rialp, 1961), 147-153; Clara E. Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución en la España del XIX* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1972); Tuñón de Lara, *España del siglo XIX*, 175-179. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Florencia Peyrou, ‘1848 et le Parti démocratique espagnol’, *Le Mouvement social* 234 (2011), 17-32; Juan Luis Bachero Bachero, ‘La deportación en las revueltas españolas de 1848’, *Historia Social* 86 (2016), 109-131; Ignacio García de Paso García, ‘“Ya no hay Pirineos”: La revolución de 1848 en Aragón’, *Jerónimo Zurita* 91 (2016), 183-203. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 209-212 [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Alun Munslow, *The Future of History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Donna Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1991), especially 77 and 114-115. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Jordi Canal, 'Guerras civiles en Europa en el siglo XIX o guerra civil europea', in Eduardo González Calleja and Jordi Canal (eds), *Guerras civiles una clave para entender la Europa de los siglos XIX y XX* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2012), 25-38, 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Katrina Navickas, *Protest and the politics of space and place, 1789–1848* (Manchester: University Press, 2016), 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Jaime Carrera Pujal, *Historia política de Cataluña en el siglo XIX, IV: La segunda guerra carlista y las revoluciones de 1848 y 1854* (Barcelona: Bosch, 1957); Joan Camps Giró, *La guerra dels Matiners i el catalanisme polític (1846-1849)* (Barcelona: Curial, 1978); Jordi Canal, *El carlismo* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2004), 129 [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. For a recent work, which otherwise employs a novel methodology, see Claus Møller Jørgensen, ‘Transurban interconnectivities: an essay on the interpretation of the revolutions of 1848’, in *European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire* 19/2 (2012), 201-227. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. See, for example, James Morris, ‘Locating the Wallachian Revolution of 1848’, in *The Historical Journal* 64/3 (2021), 606-625. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. William H. Sewell Jr., *Logics of History Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 164-167. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. David Carr, ‘Narrative and the Real World: An Argument for Continuity’, in *History and Theory* 25/2 (1986), 117-131. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Hayden White, ‘The historical text as literary artifact’', in *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural, Criticism* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 81-100, 82. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. M. C. Lemon, *The Discipline of History and the History of Thought* (London: Routledge, 1995), 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. José María San Luciano, *El incendio y destrucción del Archivo General Central, Alcalá de Henares, 1939* (Madrid: Lema Domiduca, 2009) [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Fernando Fernández de Córdova, *Mis memorias íntimas* III (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1889); Benito Hortelano, *Memorias de Benito Hortelano* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1936). [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*; Garrido, *Historia del reinado*. These tend to be more sympathetic to the revolutionaries. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. It is difficult to trace the origin of this idea, but an early treatment is Hippolyte Castille, *Portraits politiques au dix-neuvième siècle 14: Espartero et O’Donnell* (Paris: Ferdinand Sartorius, 1856). It is a central argument of Victor Gordon Kiernan, *The Revolution of 1854 in Spanish History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. *The Morning Chronicle* 12 November 1838. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Nigel Townson, ‘Introducción’, in Nigel Townson (ed.), *¿Es España diferente? Una mirada comparativa, siglos XIX y XX* (Madrid: Taurus, 2010), 11-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Javier Fernández Sebastián, ‘What Did They Mean by *Política*? Debating over the Concept, Value, and Place of Politics in Modern Spain’, in Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, Willibald Steinmetz and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds), *Writing Political History Today* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2013), 99-126, 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. See Linz, ‘Early State-Building’, 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Álvarez-Junco, *Spanish Identity*, 321-329. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Charles Tilly, ‘Does Modernization Breed Revolution?’, in *Comparative Politics* 5/3 (1973), 425-447, 442. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Manuel Santirso, *España en la Europa liberal 1830-1870* (Barcelona: Ariel, 2012), 246 [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Álvarez-Junco wrote, ‘many citizens simply did not consider the government a legitimate one or recognise its authority’, in *Spanish Identity*, 326. At times in the nineteenth century, this was a serious problem. But in 1848, at least, it simply could not be true. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. For an overview of the broader impact of the period, see Stuart Woolf, ‘The Construction of a European World-View in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Years’, in *Past & Present* 137 (1992), 72-101. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. For example Anna Ross, *Beyond the Barricades: Government and State-Building in Post-Revolutionary Prussia, 1848-1858* (Oxford: University Press, 2019), 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Ronald Fraser, *Napoleon’s Cursed War: Popular Resistance in the Spanish Peninsular War* (London: Verson, 2008), xii. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Alberto Gil Novales, *Prensa, guerra y revolución: los periódicos españoles durante la Guerra de Independencia* (Madrid: CSIC/ Ediciones Doce Calles, 2009), 28-29. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Canal, *El carlismo*; Linz, ‘Early State-Building’, 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. For differing interpretations, see Fraser, *Napoleon’s Cursed War* and Charles Esdaile, *Spain in the Liberal Age: From Constitution to Civil War, 1808-1939* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. David Thatcher Gies, *The Theatre in Nineteenth-Century Spain* (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), 53-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Ángel Duarte, ‘El pueblo indómito: La Guerra de Independencia en la memoria histórica del republicanismo español’, in Christian Demange et al. (eds), *Sombras de mayo: mitos y memorias de la Guerra de Independencia en España (1808-1908)* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2007), 169-185, 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. *El Tio Camorra* 5 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Spain and Portugal*, II (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), 421. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Michael Broers, ‘Spain and Portugal, 1800-14: Introduction’, in Michael Broers, Peter Hicks and Agustín Guimerá (eds), *The Napoleonic Empire and the New European Political Culture* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. For an overview of the same phenomenon in Italy, see Michael Broers, ‘Italy and the Modern State: the experience of Napoleonic rule’, in Francois Furet and Mona Ozouf, *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, III: The Transformation of Political Culture, 1789-1848* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989), 489-509, 493. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. quoted in Michael Ross, *The Reluctant King: Joseph Bonaparte, King of the Two Sicilies and Spain* (New York, NY: Mason/Charter, 1977), 178. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Massimo d' Azeglio [Count Maffel, trans.], *Recollections*, II (London: Chapman and Hall, 1868), 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. http://www.memoriademadrid.es/buscador.php?accion=buscarAvanzado&pagina=&busqueda\_libre\_02\_tipo=autor&busqueda\_libre\_02=Tomás LÓPEZ ENGUÍDANOS [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London: Methuen, 1977), 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Dieter Dowe et al. (eds), *The European Revolution of 1848* in *Europe in 1848: Revolution and Reform* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2008), 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Álvarez-Junco, *Spanish Identity*, 113 [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Manchester: University Press, 1959), 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Shubert, *Social History*, 204. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Christian Demange, *El dos de mayo: mito y fiesta nacional, 1808-1958* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2004), 171-172. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Álvarez-Junco, *Spanish Identity*, 332. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. quoted in Ross, *The Reluctant King*, 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Elsewhere, it was 1848 which brought about the same process. See Jonathan Sperber, ‘Churches, the Faithful, and the Politics of Religion in the Revolution of 1848’, in Dowe et al. (eds), *Europe in 1848*, 708-730, 709. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Manuel Suárez Cortina, *Entre cirios y garrotes: Política y religión en la España contemporánea, 1808-1936* (Santander: Editorial de la Universidad de Cantabria, 2014), 19-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. María Cruz Romeo, ‘The Civil Wars of the 19th Century: An Exceptional Path to Modernization?’, in Nigel Townson, (ed.), *Is Spain Different? A Comparative Look at the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2015), 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Ángel Bahamonde, *Historia de España, siglo XIX* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1994), 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Carlos Darde and Manuel Estrada, ‘Social and Territorial Representation in Spanish Electoral Systems: 1809-1874’, in Raffaele Romanelli (ed.), *How Did They Become Voters?: The History of Franchise in Modern European Representation* (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 1998), 133-154, 141-142. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Ronald Fraser suggested that as many as 20% of *guerrilla* fighters may have been from the labouring classes, in *Napoleon’s Cursed War*. For a discussion of *guerrilla* motivations, see the same book, 482 and Charles Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers, 1808-1814* (Yale, 2004) [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. *DSC*, 15 September 1811 [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Juan Francisco Fuentes and Pilar Garí, *Amazonas de la libertad: Mujeres liberales contra Fernando VII* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2014), 46-47; Gloria Espigado, ‘Las mujeres y la política durante la Guerra de la Independencia’, in *Ayer* 86/2 (2012), 67-88; Juan Luis Sánchez Villanueva, ‘Una tertuliana. Una fourerista: Margarita López de Morla’, in M. Gloria Espigado and María José de la Pascua Sánchez (eds), *Frasquita Larrea y Aherán: europeas y españolas en la Ilustración y el Romanticismo* (Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 2003), 157-180, particularly 161-163 and 166; Beatriz Sánchez Hita, ‘María del Carmen Silva, la Robespierre española: una heroína y periodista en la Guerra de la Independencia’, in Irene Castells Oliván et al. (eds), *Heroínas y patriotas: mujeres de 1808* (Madrid: Cátedra, 2009), 399-426. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Miguel Artola, *La España de Fernando VII* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1989), 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Alfredo Gallego Anabitarte, ‘España 1812: Cádiz, Estado unitario, en perspectiva histórica’, in *Ayer* 1 (1991), 162-163. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Núñez, ‘Region as Essence of the Fatherland’, 589. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Barbara H. Stein and ‎Stanley J. Stein, *Crisis in an Atlantic Empire: Spain and New Spain, 1808-1810* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2014), 120-121. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Diego López Garrido, *La Guardia Civil y los orígenes del Estado centralista* (Madrid: Alianza, 2004 [1984]), 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Guiseppe Mazzini, *Scritti editi ed inediti,* III (Imola: Cooperativa Editrice B. Galeatti, 1906), 222. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. A. J. P. Taylor, ‘Introduction’, in Fejtő (ed.), *Opening of an Era*, xviii. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, II, 680. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Probably the most significant is José María Queipo de Llano, *Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España*, first published in 1835 and then again in 1847. Some authors did seek to rehabilitate the legacy of the French Revolution (as distinct from Napoleonic France), including Alejandro Oliván, José Ordax Avecilla and Abdon Terrades. See Alberto Gil Novales, ‘Repercusión de la revolución francesa en España (1835-1859)’, in Jean René Aymes (ed.), *España y la Revolución Francesa* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1989), 372 and 374. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 269 [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Dan Royle, ‘Winning the War and Losing the Peace: Spain and the Congress of Vienna’, in *The International History Review* 44/2 (2022), 357-372. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Michael P. Costeloe, *Response to Revolution: Imperial Spain and the Spanish American Revolutions, 1810-1840* (Cambridge: University Press, 1986), 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Geoffrey Jensen, ‘Counterinsurgency at home and abroad’, in Wayne H. Bowen and José E. Alvarez (eds), *A Military History of Modern Spain: From the Napoleonic Era to the International War on Terror* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Vincent, *Spain*, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Carr, *Spain: A History*, 5; See also the example of the Catalan cotton industry destroying the Galician linen and Castilian wool industries in Jordi Nadal, ‘Un siglo de industrialización en España, 1833-1930’ in Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz (ed.), *La modernización económica de España, 1830-1930* (Madrid: Alianza, 1985), 89-101 [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. For a discussion about the relationship between education more generally and Spanish economic development, see Gabriel Tortella Casares, *The Development of Modern Spain: An Economic History of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 12-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Alan S. Milward and S. B. Saul, *The Development of the Economies of Continental Europe 1850-1914* (Oxford, 2011), 230. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. For a discussion about the absolute and relative GDPs between 1500 and 1850 see Carlos Álvarez-Nogal and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, ‘The decline of Spain (1500–1850): conjectural estimates’, *European Review of Economic History* II (2007), 319-366. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. See Burdiel, ‘Myths of Failure’, 892-912. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolution*, 29, 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Richard Herr, *An Historical Essay on Modern Spain* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971), 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Santirso, *España en la Europa liberal*, 245-246 [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. David Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the ‘Spanish miracle’, 1700–1900* (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. Santirso, *España en la Europa liberal*, 274; By 1850, national debt stood at 3,900 million pesetas, see Tortella Casares, *Development of Modern Spain*, 187. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Santirso, *España en la Europa liberal*, 243, 246. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. Sánchez-Albornoz, *Modernización económica*, 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. # Jordi Domenech and Joan Ramon Rosés, *Technology Transfer and the Early Development of the Cotton Textile Industry in Nineteenth Century Spain* in Tomoko Hashino and Keijiro Otsuka (eds), *Industrial Districts in History and the Developing World* (Singapore, 2016), 33-34.

     [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Antonio Gómez Mendoza, ‘Transportes y crecimiento económico, 1830-1930’, in Sánchez-Albornoz, *Modernización económica*, 106. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. A fair-sized coalmining industry was developed to exploit deposits in Catalonia in the later-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. See Oleguer Ribera, ‘Les concessions mineres i l’estudi del territory (1869-1944)’, in *Treballs de la Societat Catalana de Geografia* 82 (2016), 223-236. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Stephen Jacobson, *Catalonia's Advocates: Lawyers, Society, and Politics in Barcelona, 1759-1900* (Chapel Hill, NC, USA: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 246; see also Lenore O’Boyle, ‘The Problem of the Excess of Educated Men in Western Europe 1800-1850’, in *Journal of Modern History* 42 (1970), 472-95, particularly 493-494. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. Overcoming a deficient education system is a slow process, but some progress was made. There were almost 2000 new schools between 1846 and 1850 and an increase in matriculations from 653,738 in 1841 to 781,727 in 1850. See Clara Eugenia Núñez Romero, *La fuente de la riqueza: Educación y desarrollo económico en la España contemporánea* (Madrid: Alianza Universidad, 1992), 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. quoted in Georgina Blanes Nadal and Rafael Sebastiá Alcaraz, ‘La burguesía industrial y el mecenazgo en la formación técnica alcoyana del siglo XIX’, in *Llull: Revista de la Sociedad Española de Historia de la Ciencas y de las Técnicas* 68 (2008), 5-20, 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. In common with elsewhere in Europe. See Raffaele Romanelli, ‘Borghesia, Buegertum, bourgeoisie. Itinarari europei di un consetto’, in Jürgen Kocka (ed.), *Borghesie europee dell'Ottocento* (Venice: Marsilio, 1989), 69-94, 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. Thatcher Gies, *Theatre in Nineteenth-Century Spain*, 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. I tend to agree with Martti Koskenniemi, that ‘constitutional’ and related terms are, in the nineteenth century, ‘riddled with dichotomies and tensions that were not really amenable to resolution. Instead, they accounted for the very usefulness of those concepts as platforms of struggle and controversy in the first place.’ See ‘Preface’, in Kelly L Grotke and Markus J Prutsch (eds), *Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power: Nineteenth-Century Experiences* (Oxford: University Press, 2014), vi. However, I use the term here loosely to mean ‘according to a constitution’, as opposed to the systems of government elsewhere, which did not have written constitutions. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. Albert Carreras and Xavier Tafunell (eds), *Estadísticas históricas de España: siglos XIX-XX* (Bilbao, 2005), 1089; Santirso, *España en la Europa liberal*, 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. Carreras and Tafunell (eds), *Estadísticas históricas*, 1089. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1963), 194 [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. Manuel Perez Ledesma, ‘The Formation of the Working Class: A Cultural Creation’, in José A. Piqueras and Vicent Sanz-Rozalén (eds), *A Social History of Spanish Labour: New Perspectives on Class, Politics, and Gender* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), 19-42, 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. For the example of prostitution in Madrid, see *El Tiempo* 4 August 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. Manuel Tuñón de Lara, *La Movimiento Obrera en la historia de España*, III (Madrid: Laia, 1977), 64-65. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. S. T. Wallis, *Glimpses of Spain; or, Notes on an Unfinished Tour in 1847* (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1849), 32-33 [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. *El Clamor público* 13 February 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. Fernando Molina and Manuel Cabo, ‘An Inconvenient Nation: Nation-Building and National Identity in Modern Spain. The Historiographical Debate’, in Maarten Van Ginderachter and Marnix Beyen (eds), *Nationhood from Below: Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 47-72. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. Florencia Peyrou, *La Comunidad de Ciudadanos: El Discurso Democrático-Republicano en España 1840-1868* (Pisa: Edizioni Plus, 2006); Idem, ‘Spanish republican discourses on the countryside, 1840-1874’, in Laurent Brassart, Corinne Marache, Juan Pan-Montojo, and Leen Van Molle (eds), *Making Politics in the European Countryside: 1780s-1930s* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2022), 247-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, ‘After “Spain”: A Dialogue with Josep M. Fradera on Spanish Colonial Historiography’, in Antoinette Burton (ed.), *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and Through the Nation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 157-169, 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. in Juan Linz, ‘Early State-Building’, 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. Juan Francisco Fuentes, *El fin del Antiguo Régimen (1808-1868). Política y sociedad* (Madrid: Síntesis, 2007), 143; For more about the way the juntas, though deriving their power from local sources, did not question the unitary nature of the Spanish state, see Antoni Moliner i Prada, R*evolución burguesa y movimiento juntero en España* (Lleida: Milenio, 1997) [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. T. M. Hughes, *Revelations of Spain in 1845*, I (London: Henry Colburn, 1855), 175-176. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. *Diario de los sucesos de Barcelona en setiembre, octubre y noviembre de 1843* (Barcelona: Pablo Riera, 1843), 86. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. Thompson, *English Working Class*, 831. [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. Aleksandr Herzen [Judith E. Zimmerman (ed. and trans.)], *Letters from France and Italy, 1847-1851* (Pittsburgh, PA: University Press, 1995), 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. For example, Nicomedes Pastor Díaz, *A la corte y a los partidos: palabras de un diputado conservador sobre las principales cuestiones de nuestra situación política* (Madrid: Corrales y compañía, 1846); Ramón de la Sagra, ‘Organización del trabajo’, in *El Corresponsal* 5 March 1841; See also Jordi Maluquer de Motes, *El socialismo en España, 1833-1868* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1977), 158-159. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. Heinz-Gerard Haupt and Friedrich Lenger, ‘Bourgeoisie, Petit Bourgeoisie, Workers’, in Dowe et al. (eds), *Europe in 1848*, 620. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. Townson (ed.), *¿Es España diferente?*, especially 11-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. Koselleck, ‘How European was the Revolution of 1848/49?’, 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. Fernández Sebastián, ‘What Did They Mean by *Política*?’, 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolution*, 236 [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. Cruz, *Gentlemen, bourgeois and revolutionaries*, 273. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. Ángel Ramón del Valle Calzado, *Desamortización eclesiástica en la provincia de Ciudad Real, 1836-1854* (Cuenca: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 1995), 262; Shubert, *Social History*, 75-77. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. Valle Calzado, *Desamortización eclesiástica*, 156. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. Francisco Martí Gilabert, *La desamortización española* (Madrid: Rialp, 2003), 124 [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. Vincent, *Spain*, 19 [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. Enrique A. Sanabria, *Republicanism and Anticlerical Nationalism in Spain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 25 [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. *Gaceta de Madrid* 20 January 1844 [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. William J. Callahan, *Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 1750-1874* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. Nancy A. Rosenblatt, ‘Church and State in Spain: A Study of Moderate Liberal Politics in 1845’, in *The Catholic Historical Review* 62/4 (1976), 589-603, 594. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. *Eco del comercio* 30 May 1847. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. *El Clamor público* 30 July 1846. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. In Callahan, *Church, Politics, and Society*, 225. [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. Josep Fontana, ‘La desamortización de Mendizábal y sus antecedentes’, in Ángel García-Sanz and Ramón Garrabou (eds), *Historia agraria de la España contemporánea*, I (Madrid: Critica, 1985), 219-244, 233. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. see for example Vincent, *Spain*, 21-22 [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. Juan Pro Ruiz, ‘El poder de la tierra: una lectura social del fraude en la contribución de inmuebles, cultivo y ganadería 1845-1936’, in *Hacienda Pública Española* 1 (1994), 189-202. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. Miguel Artola, *La Hacienda del siglo XIX: Progresistas y moderados* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1986), 251-252. [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. ‘la propiedad, cuando es patrimonial, supone una educación respectivamente más esmerada, y cuando es adquirida por la industria propia, prueba una inteligencia más que común.’ Ley electoral (20 de julio de 1837) at http://www.ub.edu/ciudadania/hipertexto/evolucion/textos/electoral/1837.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. José María Orense, *¿Qué hará en el poder el Partido Progresista?* (Madrid: La ilustración, 1847) [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. Claudia A. Herrera and Augustin E. Ferraro, ‘Friends’ Tax: Fiscality, and State Building in Argentina and Spain’, in Miguel A. Centeno and Augustin E. Ferraro (eds), *State and Nation Making in Latin America and Spain: Republics of the Possible* (Cambridge, 2013) 157-182, 159-160 [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. Natividad Araque Hontangas, ‘Las elecciones de 1844: normativa, desarrollo y fraude’ in *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 29 (2007), 155-172, 160 [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. Manuel Estrada Sánchez, *El significado político de la legislación electoral en la España de Isabel II* (Santander, 1999), 68 [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. José Ortega y Gasset, *España invertebrada: Bosquejo de algunos pensamientos históricos* (Madrid: Calpe, 1921) [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. Carlos Carrasco Canals, *La burocracia en la España del siglo XIX* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de, Administración Local, 1975), 205-298. [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. Pedro Díaz Marín, *Después de la revolución: centralismo y burguesía en Alicante, 1844-1854* (Alicante: Gil-Albert, 1998), 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. Alistair Cole and Peter John, *Local Governance in England and France* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2001), 37-38. [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. John Breuilly, ‘1848: Connected or Comparable Revolutions?’ in Körner (ed.) *1848: A European Revolution?*, 41 [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. Rafael Zurita Aldeguer, ‘La representación política en la formación del estado español’, in Salvador Calatayud et al. (eds), *Estado y periferias en la España del siglo XIX. Nuevos enfoques* (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat, 2009) [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. The *Compañía del Camino de Hierro de Barcelona a Mataró* was established in 1845, but construction of the 17½ mile long line took more than three years to complete. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. For example, the British railway contractor William Mackenzie wrote in his diary for 3 November 1847 that ‘Co. Barcelona and Matero [sic.] owe us £39,000 pounds Stirling’, in David Brooke (ed.), *The Diary of William Mackenzie, the First International Railway Contractor* (London: Thomas Telford, 2000), 461. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. Leonardo Fernández Troyano and Amaya Sáenz Sanz, ‘Los puentes: materiales, estructuras y patrimonio’, in Manuel Silva Suárez, *Técnica e ingeniería en España: El Ochocientos: de los lenguajes al patrimonio* (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando El Católico, 2007), 451-497, 474-475 [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. For example, Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. José María Cardesín Diaz and Jesús Miras Araujo, ‘Historic Urbanization Process in Spain (1746-2013): From the Fall of the American Empire to the Real Estate Bubble’ in *Journal of Urban History* 43 (2017), 33-52, 38 [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. In Jesús Cruz, *The Rise of Middle-Class Culture in Nineteenth Century Spain* (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, 2011), 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. ‘State control’ is a problematic translation of Henri Lefebvre’s idea of ‘production étatique,’ which sits somewhere between ‘control’ and ‘influence’. See Joe Painter, ‘Prosaic geographies of stateness’, in *Political Geography* 25 (2006), 752-774, 755. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. quoted in Genís Barnosell Jordà, *¿Un reformismo imposible? Organización obrera y política interclasista (Cataluña 1820-1856)*, in Calatayud et al. (eds), *Estado y periferias*, 251. [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, II, 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. Clive Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford: University Press, 1999), 242-243. [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. Manuel Ballbé, *Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional (1812-1983)* (Madrid: Allianza, 1985), 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. Orense, *¿Qué hará en el poder?*, 4; see also Borja de Riquer i Permanyer, *Escolta, Espanya: la cuestión catalana en la época liberal* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001), 83-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. See López Garrido, *La Guardia Civil*, 142-170 [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. Juan Pan-Montojo, ‘Los liberalismos y la agricultura española en el siglo XIX’, in Calatayud et al. (eds), *Estado y periferias*, 131-158, 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. Guido von Usedom, *Briefe und Charakteristiken aus der deutschen Gegenwart* (Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1849), 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. *Annales du parlement français*, X (27 December 1847 to 24 February 1848), 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. Almost all recent scholarship agrees on this point. See, Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, ‘1848-1849: A European Revolution’, in R. J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (eds), *The Revolutions in Europe 1848-1849: From Reform to Reaction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1; Roger Price, *The Revolutions of 1848* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 17; Michael Rapport, *1848: Year of Revolution* (London: Little Brown, 2009), 50; Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 71, (although he also argues that it ought to have been, 111). [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Souvenirs* (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1893), 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. A few, increasingly prominent, deputies could be considered authoritarian before 1848, among them Alejandro Mon, Pedro José Pidal and Antonio de los Ríos Rosas, but even this group did not favour autocracy. By 1848, it was a position defended only by elements within the Church—although not by the Church hierarchy—and the Carlist leadership. [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. For a good general overview of European liberalism in the period, see Jerrold Seigel, ‘European Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century’, in Warren Breckman and Peter E. Gordon (eds), *The Cambridge History of Modern European Thought* (Cambridge: University Press, 2019), 172-195. For a compelling analysis which considers the relationship between liberalism and the arbitrary power of the state, and which has informed my understanding, see Jeremy Jennings, ‘Early Nineteenth-Century Liberalism’, in George Klosko (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy* (Oxford: University Press, 2011), 331-347. [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. José Luis Comellas, *Los moderados*, 250-251; Mark Lawrence, *Nineteenth Century Spain: A New History* (London: Routledge, 2019), 111; Koselleck, ‘How European was the Revolution of 1848/49?’, 120-121. [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. For example, Esdaile, *Spain in the Liberal Age*, 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. For many years, the period of liberal government was painted as a failure albeit a noble one, see Alberto Gil Novales, *El Trienio liberal* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1980). Recent work, notably by Ramon Arnabat i Mata has sought to re-evaluate this legacy. For example, ‘El Trienio Constitucional (1820­1823): revolución y contrarrevolución’, in *Ayer* 127/3 (2022), 23-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. Guy Thomson, ‘Mazzini and Spain, 1820-72’, in C. A. Bayly and E. F. Biagini (eds), *Giuseppe Mazzini and the Globalization of Democratic Nationalism*, 1830-1920 (Oxford: University Press, 2008), 237-274, 247-248 [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. *El Huracán* 24 September 1840 [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. *La Fraternidad* 16 January 1848, quoted in María Antonia Fernández Jiménez, ‘El Comunismo Icariano de La Fraternidad (1847-48)’ in Alberto Gil Novales (ed.), *La Revolución Liberal* (Madrid: Ediciones del Orto, 2001), 653. [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. *Gaceta de Madrid* 19 March 1846 [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. *Gaceta de Madrid* 3 May 1846 [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. *El Tío Camorra* 16 February 1848. *Ella* almost certainly refers to the queen mother, María Christina. [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. Carlos Marichal, *Spain (1834-1844): A New Society* (London: Tamesis Books, 1977), 206; Molina and Cabo Villaverde, ‘An Inconvenient Nation’, 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. Maurice Agulhon, ‘Working class and sociability in France before 1848’, in Pat Thane et al. (eds), *The Power of the Past: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm* (Cambridge: University Press, 1984), 37-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. Manuel Morales Muñoz, ‘La sociabilidad popular en la Andalucía del siglo XIX: elementos de permanencia y de tradición’, in *Baetica: Estudios de arte, geografía e historia* 15 (1993), 383-396, 386. [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. Jorge Uría, ‘La taberna. Un espacio multifuncional de sociabilidad popular en la Restauración española’ in *Hispania* 63/214 (2003), 571-604. [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. They included carpenters and cabinetmakers, printers, tailors, painters, shoemakers, goldsmiths, peasants, actors, masons, bookbinders, locksmiths, hairdressers, gilders, bakers, glassmakers, engravers, sculptors, veterinarians and farriers. Jean-Louis Guereña, ‘Les antécédents du “Fomento de las Artes”: la “Velada de artistas, artesanos, jornaleros y labradores” (1847-1858)’, in *Bulletin hispanique* 92/2 (1990), 761-787. [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. *Reglamentos y adiccionales de la Reunión recreative é instructiva de artesanos* (A Coruña: Francisco Arza, 1848) [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. Raymond Carr, *Spain: 1808-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 231. [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. José María Jover Zamora, *Conciencia burguesa y conciencia obrera en la España contemporánea* (Madrid: Ateneo, 1952), 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. *La Revolución, periódico oficial de la Junta superior de Galicia* 17 April 1846 [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, 447-450. [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. José Canga Argüelles, *Diccionario de hacienda con aplicación a España*, II (Madrid: Marcelino Calero y Portocarrero, 1834), 234. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. According to the last official figures before their disarmament. See Fermín Caballero, *Manual Geográfico-administrativo de la Monarquia Española* (Madrid: Antonio Yenes, 1844), 361; For the composition of the *milicia nacional*, see Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, *Milicia nacional y revolución burguesa. El prototipo madrileño (1808-1874)* (Madrid: CSIC, 1978), 426-427. [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. *DSC* 6 February 1846 [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. Jorge Vilches García, *Progreso y libertad: El Partido Progresista en la revolución liberal española* (Madrid: Alianza, 2001), 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. *Eco del comercio* 12 May 1847 [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. George Rudé, *The Crowd in History* (London: Serif, 1995 [1961]), 214-215. [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. Bahamonde, *Historia de España*, 51; Helge Berger and Mark Spoerer, ‘Economic Crises and the European revolutions of 1848’, in *The Journal of Economic History* 61/2 (2001), 293-326. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. Wallis, *Glimpses of Spain*, 182-183. [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. Pamela Beth Radcliff, ‘Women's Politics: Consumer Riots in Twentieth-Century Spain’, in Victoria Lorée Enders and Pamela Beth Radcliff (eds), *Constructing Spanish womanhood: female identity in modern Spain* (New York, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), 301-324, 306. [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. Louise Tilly, ‘The Food Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France’, in *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 2/1 (1971), 23-57, 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. José Santos Torres, *El bandolerismo en España: una historia fuera de la ley* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1995), 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. Ben Dodds, ‘Representations of Bandits in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Spain’, in *Cultural and Social History* 9/2 (2012), 207-225, 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. Wallis, *Glimpses of Spain*, vi and 40-41. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. Cruz Romeo, ‘Civil Wars’, 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. Laszlo Deme, ‘The Society for Equality in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848’, in *Slavic Review* 31/1(1972), 71-88, 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. In Spanish, the word has two meanings, a ‘people’ and a ‘village’, and most Spaniards lived in these small, contained communities. [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. *El Clamor público* 16 January 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. Juan Francisco Fuentes, ‘Mito y concepto de pueblo en el siglo XIX: Una comparación entre España y Francia’, in *Historia Contemporánea* 28 (2004), 95-110, 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. Ibid., 96. [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. Genís Barnosell Jordá, ‘“Libertad, Igualdad, Humanidad”: la construcción de la democracia en Cataluña (1839-1843), in Manuel Suárez Cortina (ed.), *La redención del pueblo: la cultura progresista en la España liberal* (Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 2006), 145-182, 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. *La Esperanza* 20 March 1848; *El Espectador* 31 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. This sociospatiality of military power in Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: University Press, 1986), 26, applies equally to the coercive power of political policing. [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. *El Clamor Público* 28 October 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. Pedro de Répide, *Las Calles de Madrid* (Madrid: Afrodisio Aguado, 1981) [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. *Diario de las sesiones del congreso de los diputados en la legislatura de 1846 a 1847*, I (Madrid: Imprenta nacional, 1847), 103; 129; 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. ‘Proyecto de ley para la elección de diputados á cortes’ (11 March 1845), in *Diario de las sesiones de cortes. Congreso de los diputados. Legislatura de 1844 a 1845*, III, (Madrid: La Viuda e Hijos, 1876) 1764. [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. Robert Saunders, *Democracy and the Vote in British Politics, 1848-1867: The Making of the Second Reform Act* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 89. [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. # *Asamblea constituyente de 1854. Biografías de todos los diputados y todos los hombres célebres*, II (Madrid: Julián Peña, 1855), 315.

     [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. On the origin of political parties in Spain, see Carlos Marichal, *La revolución liberal y los primeros partidos políticos en España. 1834-1844* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1980) and Ignacio Fernández Sarasola, *Los partidos políticos en el pensamiento español: De la Ilustración a nuestros días* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009), 13-100. [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. Andrés Borrego, *De la Situación y de los Intereses de España en el Movimiento Reformador de Europa* (Madrid: Francisco Andrés, 1848), 115; Francisco Cánovas Sánchez, *El partido moderado* (Madrid: Centro de estudios constitucionales, 1982), 128 [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. Esdaile, *Spain in the Liberal Age*, 88. Political parties are complex things in the nineteenth century, unrecognisable to modern eyes, but Frank O’Gorman and Peter Fraser explain something of this, in ‘Party Politics in the Early Nineteenth Century (1812–32)’, in *The English Historical Review* 102/402 (1987), 63-88. See also, Miguel Artola, *Partidos y programas políticos, 1808-1936, I: Los partidos políticos* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1977), especially 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. López Garrido, *La Guardia Civil*, 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. Vincent, *Spain*, 21-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. *Boletín oficial del Ministerio de comercio, instrucción y obras públicas* 2 January 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. Carmen García, *Génesis del sistema educativo liberal en España. Del ‘Informe’ Quintana a la ‘Ley Moyano’ (1833-1857)* (Oviedo: Publicaciones de la Universidad, 1994), 95-98. [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. Cruz, *Gentlemen, bourgeois and revolutionaries*, 273. See also, for an example, Ramon Arnabat i Mata, ‘La revolució liberal a Barcelona. Política de classes i classes de política’, in *Barcelona quaderns d’història* 10 (2004), 11-58, 51, [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. Koselleck, ‘Staat und Gesellschaft’, 79-112. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. This interpretation owes much to Niklas Olsen, *History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2012) [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. Miguel A. López-Morell, *The House of Rothschild in Spain, 1812–1941* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 89. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. The most infamous example in the mid-nineteenth century, Railway Mania in Britain, was certainly a qualified success. See Mark Casson, *The World's First Railway System: Enterprise, Competition, and Regulation on the Railway Network in Victorian Britain* (Oxford: University Press, 2009), 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. ‘Discurso parlamentario’, in *Boletín oficial del Ministerio de comercio, instrucción y obras públicas*, I (Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1848), 432. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. See María Cruz Romeo, ‘Lenguaje y política del nuevo liberalismo: moderados y progresistas, 1834-1845’, in *Ayer* 29 (1998), 37-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. Thatcher Gies, *Theatre in Nineteenth Century Spain*, 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. For example, British Consul in A Coruña to Bulwer, 10 June 1848. NCA BUL1/28/58 [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. Vilches García, *Progreso y libertad* , 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. José María Luxán Meléndez, ‘Los políticos del progreso. Científicos en el gobierno y en el Partido Progresista (1833-1868)’, in *Cuadernos de Gobierno y Administración Pública* 3/1 (2016), 15-37, 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
295. *Eco del comercio* 6 October 1847 [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
296. *El Espectador* 5 October 1847 [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
297. *El Clamor público* 6 October 1847 [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
298. *El Clamor público* 7 October 1847 [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
299. *Eco del comercio* 12 October 1847 [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
300. Juan Valera, *Historia general de España*, XXIII (Barcelona: Montaner, 1887), 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
301. Cánovas Sánchez, *Partido moderado*, 253 [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
302. Wallis, *Glimpses of Spain*, vi, 40-41 and 369. [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
303. *Eco del comercio* 6 October 1847 [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
304. Bahamonde, *Historia de España*, 293. [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
305. *El Clamor público* 30 September 1847 [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
306. Andrés Borrego, *Lo que ha sido, lo que es y lo que puede ser el partido conservador* (Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1857), 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
307. *El Clamor público* 6 October 1847; *El Espectador* 9 October 1847 [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
308. *El Tiempo* 30 May 1847 [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
309. ‘Real órden, mandando á los Gefes políticos adopten las medidas que su prudencia les dicte, antes de recurrir á prohibir la extraccion de cereales sin motivo justificado’, in *Colección legislativa de España*, XLI (Madrid: Imprenta nacional, 1849), 12; See also, Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, *Las crisis de subsistencias de España en el siglo XIX* (Rosario: Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, 1963), 21 and 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
310. S. T. Wallis claims that authorities in Córdoba were hoarding grain, leading to a surplus there and a deficit in Southern Spain, in *Glimpses of Spain*, 180. This seems to be corroborated by figures in Rafael Barquín Gil, ‘El precio del trigo en España (1814-1883)’, in *Historia Agraria* 17 (1999), 177-217, 197. [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
311. Fradera, ‘The Empire, the Nation and the Homelands’, 136. [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
312. Ángel de Saavedra, *Obras completas*, I (Madrid: Sucesos de Rivadeneyra, 1894), 104-107. [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
313. Juan Valera to his mother (21 March 1848), in Juan Valera, *Obras completas*, III (Madrid: Aguilar, 1958) [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
314. *Eco del comercio* 25 February 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
315. Bulwer to Palmerston, 27 February 1848. NCA BUL1/53/12; Pedro Díaz Marín, *Política de Estado: Los discursos de la Corona durante la Década Moderada (1844-1854)* (Alicante: Publicacions de la Universitat d'Alacant, 2018), 222. [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
316. *El Heraldo* 27 February 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
317. Manuel Pavía, *Memorias sobre la guerra de Cataluña* (Madrid: D. B. González, 1851), 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
318. *Journal de Toulouse* 2 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
319. Pirala suggests that he was in A Coruña ‘at the time’ in *Historia contemporánea*, 435; Francisco Tettamancy cites a newspaper article written by Ramón Alvarez de la Braña which suggests that Enrique came ashore disguised as a civilian to meet Solís before the revolution, in *La revolución gallega de 1846* (A Coruña: Librería regional de Carré, 1909), 227. However, the article, ‘Un episodio de nuestras luchas civiles’ does not seem to appear in the number of *La Correspondencia gallega* which he cites (22 August 1904). [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
320. *El Heraldo* 7 March 1848; *El Popular* 7 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
321. Kirchner Reill, *Nationalists Who Feared the Nation*, 158. [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
322. *El Observador* 28 February 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
323. *El Heraldo* 26 February 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
324. *DSC: Congreso de los diputados* 28 February 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
325. *Morning Post* 7 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
326. *El Heraldo* 27 February 1848, supplement [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
327. *El Espectador* 3 March 1848. The original article is in *El Espectador* 2 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
328. *El Heraldo* 23 February 1848; *Morning Post* 7 March 1848; Adrian Shubert, *El Pacificador: Baldomero Espartero y la Formación de la España Contemporánea (1793-1879)* (Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenburg, 2018) [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
329. *DSC: Congreso de los diputados* 3 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
330. Bulwer to Palmerston, 5 March 1848. NCA BUL1/53/17; Bulwer to Palmerston, 16 March 1848. NCA BUL1/53/20 [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
331. *DSC: Congreso de los diputados* 28 February 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
332. *Constitución de la monarquía española* (Madrid: Imprenta nacional, 1845), 9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
333. *El Clamor público* 10 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
334. Bulwer to Palmerston,17 February 1848. NCA BUL1/53/13 [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
335. Borrego, *De la situación*, 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
336. *DSC: Congreso de los diputados* 22 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
337. *El Fomento* 27 February 1848; J. Fuster Sobrepere, *Barcelona i l'estat centralista. Indústria i política ala dècada moderada (1843–1854*) (Vic: Eumo, 2006), 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
338. Rudé, *Crowd in History*, 19-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
339. Alphonse de Lamartine, *Manifeste à l’Europe* (Paris: Pagnerre, 1848), 3-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
340. Headrick, ‘Spain and the Revolutions of 1848’, 199. [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
341. *La Esperanza* 20 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
342. *El Clamor público* 7 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
343. *El Clamor público* 23 March 1848; *El Clamor público* 24 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
344. *El Observador* 28 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
345. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, 605. [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
346. NCA BUL1/53/1-82 (20, 24b); *El Espectador* 23 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
347. Joaquín Ruiz de Morales, *Historia de la Milicia Nacional* (Madrid: Prats y Ruiz, 1855), 601 [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
348. *El Clamor público* 8 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
349. Pavía, *Memorias*, 87. [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
350. William L. Langer, *The Revolutions of 1848* (New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1971 [1969]), 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
351. Artola, *Partidos y programas políticos*, 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
352. Fernández de Córdova, *Memorias íntimas*, III, 160. [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
353. *El Español* 28 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
354. Word had reached Spain, for example, of celebrations in Sardinia after news had erroneously been received there of a successful Spanish revolution on 23 March. *El Popular* 10 April 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
355. Miguel Morayta, *Historia general de España*, VII (Madrid: Administración, 1895), 1286. [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
356. It seems likely that it was the Francisco Labrador described in Carrasco Canals, *La burocracia*, 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
357. *Eco del comercio* 5 March 1846 [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
358. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, 606. [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
359. An early example is Adrián García Hernández, *España y el Vizconde Palmerston* (Madrid: D. G. Royo, 1848), 50-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
360. *El Español* 28 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
361. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 150.

     Morayta, *Historia general*, 1287. [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
362. See W. Scott Haine, *The World of the Paris Café: Sociability Among the French Working Class, 1789-1914* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
363. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, 610; Hortelano, *Memorias*, 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
364. Jonathan Sperber, *Rhineland Radicals: The Democratic Movement and the Revolution of 1848-1849* (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1991), 425. [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
365. Quero Molares, ‘Spain in 1848’, 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
366. Bulwer to Palmerston, 28 March 1848, *British and Foreign State Papers* 38, 936. [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
367. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 149, 152. [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
368. Morayta, *Historia general*, 1287. [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
369. *El Heraldo* 24 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
370. *El Popular* 28 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
371. Garrido, *Historia del reinado*, 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
372. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
373. Francisco Pí y Margall and Francisco Pi y Arsuaga, *Historia de España en el siglo XIX* I (Barcelona: Seguí, 1902), 683. [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
374. Bulwer to Palmerston, 29 March 1848. NCA BUL1/53/25a; Morayta, *Historia general*, 1239. [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
375. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
376. Ibid., 152-153. [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
377. Louis-Antoine Garnier-Pagès, *L'Europe révolutionnaire en 1848* (Paris: Bibliothèque libérale, 1876), 305. [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
378. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, 610. [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
379. *El Español* 28 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
380. Garrido, *Historia del reinado*, 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
381. Bulwer to Palmerston, 29 March 1848. NCA BUL1/53/25. [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
382. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, 611. [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
383. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 152. [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
384. Ibid., 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
385. Morayta, *Historia general*, 1238. [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
386. Stein and ‎Stein, *Crisis in an Atlantic Empire*, 120-121. [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
387. *El Español* 28 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
388. Report on the actions of troops under the command of Field Marshal José de Orive, 2 April 1848. AMM 5870.25/74. [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
389. Robert W. Lougée observed other examples of non-native revolutionary phenomena in Germany, in *Midcentury Revolution, 1848: Society and Revolution in France and Germany* (Lexington: MA, Heath, 1972), 114. [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
390. Francisco Vargas Machuca, *Vida política, militar y publica del Excmo. Sr. Don F. Lersundi* (Madrid, El Libro de la Verdad, 1851), 273-281. [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
391. Laurent Clavier and Louis Hincker, ‘La barricade de Juin 1848 : une construction politique’, in Alain Corbin and Jean-Marie Mayeur (eds), *La Barricade* (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 1997), 209-220, 219. [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
392. Garrido, *Historia del reinado*, 39; *Revista Militar*, 435. [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
393. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
394. Report on the actions of troops under the command of Field Marshal José de Orive, 2 April 1848. AMM 5870.25/76. [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
395. Bulwer to Palmerston, 29 March 1848. NCA BUL1/53/25a. [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
396. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
397. *El Español* 28 March 1848; *El Clamor Publico* 28 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
398. Bulwer to Palmerston, 31 March 1848. *British and Foreign State Papers* 38, 939. [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
399. Edward Stopford to Bulwer, 31 March 1848. *British and Foreign State Papers* 38, 940-941. [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
400. *El Clamor público* 1 April 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
401. Gabriella Hauch, ‘Women’s spaces in the men’s revolution of 1848’, in Dowe et al. (eds), *European in 1848*, 639-683, 642. [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
402. Morayta, *Historia general*, 1239 [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
403. *El Español* 28 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
404. *Revista Militar*, II (1848) 439. [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
405. Report on the actions of troops under the command of Field Marshal José de Orive, 2 April 1848. AMM 5870.25/76. [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
406. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, 611. [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
407. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 151-152. [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
408. Bravo Murillo to Figueras, 27 May 1848. AMM 5870.25/6 [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
409. Bulwer to Palmerston, 3 May 1848. *British and Foreign State Papers*, 38, 970-971. [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
410. *El Español* 28 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
411. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* 27/7 (1873), 103, 105-106 [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
412. *Ultima hora del popular* 27 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
413. Bulwer to Palmerston, 29 March 1848. NCA BUL1/53/25a. [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
414. *Eco del comercio* 31 March 1848; *El Observador* 31 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
415. *El Clamor público* 27 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
416. *El Espectador* 28 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
417. *El Heraldo* 31 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
418. *Ultima hora del popular* 28 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
419. Bulwer to Palmerston, 29 March 1848. NCA BUL1/53/25a; Bulwer to Palmerston, 31 March 1848. NCA BUL1/53/28a. [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
420. *El Heraldo* 6 April 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
421. *El Heraldo* 23 April 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
422. Bulwer to Palmerston, 10 April 1848. *British and Foreign State Papers*, 38, 945-946. [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
423. Ibid., 947. [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
424. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, 613. [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
425. Bulwer to Palmerston, 3 May 1848. *British and Foreign State Papers*, 38, 972-973. [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
426. *El Clamor público* 7 April 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
427. Sotomayor to Bulwer, 10 April 1848. *British and Foreign State Papers*, 38, 949-951. [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
428. *El Espectador* 2 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
429. *El Observador* 29 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
430. *El Popular* 5 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
431. Morayta, *Historia general*, 1243. [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
432. *El Observador* 8 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
433. Garrido, *Historia del reinado*, 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
434. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, 613. [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
435. *Biografías de los diputados á Cortes de la Asamblea Constituyente de 1869,* I (Madrid, Spain: Tomas Alonso, 1869), 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
436. *El Genio de la libertad* 21 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
437. Richard Ford, *A Handbook for Travellers in Spain*, II (London: John Murray, 1865), 667. [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
438. *La España* 9 May 1848; *El Heraldo* 8 May 1848, supplement. [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
439. Sotomayor to Isturiz (9 June 1848) [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
440. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 155. [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
441. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, 613-614. [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
442. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 158-159. [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
443. *El Observador* 9 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
444. Fernández de Córdova, *Mis memorias*, 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
445. Garrido, *Historia del reinado*, 55,56. [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
446. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, 614; Fernández de Córdova, *Mis memorias*, 174. [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
447. Bulwer to Palmerston, 11 May 1848. *British and Foreign State Papers*, 38, 980. [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
448. Garrido, *Historia del reinado*, 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
449. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 156. [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
450. *El Observador* 8 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
451. Morayta, *Historia general*, 1244. [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
452. Hortelano, *Memorias*, 157. [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
453. Garrido, *Historia del reinado*, 56-57 [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
454. Pí y Margall and Pi y Arsuaga, *Historia de España*, 687. [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
455. *El Espectador* 9 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
456. *La España* 10 May 1848; *El Espectador* 10 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
457. List of casualties from captain general of Castilla la Nueva to minister of war. AMM 5934.2/18. [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
458. Bulwer to Palmerston, 11 May 1848. *British and Foreign State Papers*, 38, 980; Pí y Margall and Pi y Arsuaga, *Historia de España*, 687. [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
459. *Gaceta de Madrid* 8 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
460. *Revista militar*, II (1848), 611. [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
461. *El Heraldo* 8 May 1848, supplement. [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
462. *La España* 9 May 1848; Garrido, *Historia del reinado*, 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
463. Morayta, *Historia general*, 1245. [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
464. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
465. Ricardo Pérez y Verdes, ‘Manuel Becerra, de barricadista a ministro’, in *CROA* 6 (1996), 22-25, 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
466. *El Popular* 10 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
467. *El Tio Camorra* 10 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-467)
468. *El Observador* 8 March 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-468)
469. Bulwer to Palmerston, 11 May 1848. NCA BUL1/53/1-82 (65). [↑](#footnote-ref-469)
470. Fernández de Córdova, *Mis memorias*, 178-179. [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
471. AMM 5943.2 contains many examples of such letters. [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
472. *El Heraldo* 9 May 1848; *El Tio Camorra* 7 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
473. *La España* 7 May 1848, supplement. [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
474. *El Pueblo* 9 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
475. *El Observador* 11 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
476. *El Popular* 17 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
477. Memorandum, 7 May 1848. NCA BUL1/53/70, [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
478. Testimony of a soldier from the Infante cavalry regiment, 30 June 1848. AMM, 5940.14/300. [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
479. In Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, I, 619. [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
480. Bulwer to British consul in A Coruña, 12 September 1849. NCA BUL1/448/2. [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
481. *Morning Post* 16 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
482. Henry Lytton Bulwer, *The Life of John Henry Temple, Viscount Palmerston: with selections from his correspondence*, III (London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1874), 244. [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
483. *Ultima hora del popular* 13 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
484. *El Observador* 17 March 1848. For more on the speech, see Clara E. Lida, ‘The Democratic and Social Republic of 1848’, in Guy Thomson, *The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Americas* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2002), 46-75, 53 and Eiras Roel, *Partido demócrata*, 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
485. Circular to commandants general of Cádiz and Campo de Gibraltar, 8 March 1848. AMM 5940.14/236. [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
486. Captain general’s orders to the officers of the garrison, 1 April 1848. AMM 5940.14/232. [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
487. Testimony of a soldier from the Infante cavalry regiment, 30 June 1848. AMM 5940.14/300. [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
488. Modesto Lafuente, *Historia general de España*, XXIII (Barcelona: Montaner y Simon, 1890), 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
489. *El Heraldo* 30 April 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
490. José Velázquez y Sánchez, *Anales de Sevilla de 1800 a 1850* (Seville: Hijos de Fe, 1872), 676. [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
491. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, I, 616-617. [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
492. Pilar Vilela Gallego, ‘Triunfar o perecer: El bombardeo de Sevilla de 1843’, in *Andalucía en la historia* (October 2013), 50-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
493. Velázquez y Sánchez, *Anales de Sevilla*, 677. [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
494. Deputy captain general of Andalucía to minister of war, 14 May 1848. AMM 5940.14/66. [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
495. *La Esperanza* 17 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
496. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, I, 615. [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
497. Deputy captain general of Andalucía to minister of war, 14 May 1848. AMM 5940.14/66. [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
498. *El Observador* 18 May 1848; Subinspector of 3rd department of artillery to minister of war, 18 May 1848. AMM 5940.14/70 [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
499. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, I, 616 [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
500. Subinspector of 3rd department of artillery to minister of war, 18 May 1848. AMM 5940.14/70 [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
501. Deputy captain general of Andalucía to minister of war, 14 May 1848. AMM 5940.14/66. [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
502. Subinspector of 3rd department of artillery to minister of war, 18 May 1848. AMM5940.14/70 [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
503. In Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, I, 620. [↑](#footnote-ref-503)
504. Deputy Captain General of Andalucía to Minister of War, 14 May 1848. AMM 5940.14/66. [↑](#footnote-ref-504)
505. *La Esperanza* 17 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-505)
506. Testimony of a soldier from the Infante cavalry regiment, 30 June 1848. AMM 5940.14/300. [↑](#footnote-ref-506)
507. Deputy captain general of Andalucía to minister of war, 19 May 1848. AMM 5940.14/82. [↑](#footnote-ref-507)
508. Captain general of Andalucía to minister of war, 23 May 1848. AMM 5940.14/87. [↑](#footnote-ref-508)
509. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, I, 619. [↑](#footnote-ref-509)
510. Captain general of Andalucía to minister of war, 25 May 1848. AMM 5940.14/131. [↑](#footnote-ref-510)
511. Captain general of Andalucía to minister of war, 14 May 1848. AMM 5940.14/161. [↑](#footnote-ref-511)
512. Velázquez y Sánchez, *Anales de Sevilla*, 679. [↑](#footnote-ref-512)
513. Deputy captain general of Andalucía to minister of war, 14 May 1848. AMM 5940.14/66. [↑](#footnote-ref-513)
514. *El Independiente* 19 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-514)
515. *El Observador* 17 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-515)
516. *La Esperanza* 16 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-516)
517. Velázquez y Sánchez, *Anales de Sevilla*, 682-683. [↑](#footnote-ref-517)
518. Edward Royle, *Revolutionary Britannia? Reflections on the Threat of Revolution in Britain* (Manchester: University Press, 2000), 148. [↑](#footnote-ref-518)
519. Artola, *Burguesía revolucionaria*, 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-519)
520. John G. Gallaher, *The Students of Paris and the Revolutionaries of 1848* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 105-106 [↑](#footnote-ref-520)
521. Sub-inspector of artillery to Director General, 3 April 1848. A.M.M. 5918.5/282. [↑](#footnote-ref-521)
522. García de Paso García, ‘“Ya no hay Pirineos”’, 185-187. [↑](#footnote-ref-522)
523. French Consul in Santander to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 April 1848. *Documents diplomatiques de Gouvernement provisoire et de la Commission de pouvoir exécutif, février-juin 1848*, I (Paris: Imprimerie national, 1953), 955. [↑](#footnote-ref-523)
524. Artillery director of the fábrica de armas de Oviedo to Director General of Artillery, 24 May 1848. A.M.M. 5918.5/160. [↑](#footnote-ref-524)
525. *La Esperanza* 13 April 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-525)
526. *El Clamor público* 14 April 1848; *El Clamor público* 29 April 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-526)
527. *La Esperanza* 13 April 1848; *El Barcelonés* 15 April 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-527)
528. Subinspector de artillería de Valencia to Director General of Artillery, 3 April 1848. AMM 5918.5/285. [↑](#footnote-ref-528)
529. José Valero, ‘Intellectuals, the State, and the Public Sphere in Spain: 1700-1840’, in Thomas Lewis and Francisco J. Sanchez (eds), *Culture and the State in Spain: 1550-1850* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017 [1999]), 219. [↑](#footnote-ref-529)
530. Michael Mann, ‘The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results’, in *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 25/2 (1984), 185-213, 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-530)
531. Report of confessions gained by Lieutenant Colonel Joaquin Lasso de la Vega, June 1848. AMM 5927.1/50 [↑](#footnote-ref-531)
532. Statement of Antonio Cienfuegos, June 1848. AMM 5927.1/74. [↑](#footnote-ref-532)
533. Statement of Antonio Peñarubio, June 1848. AMM 5927.1/76. [↑](#footnote-ref-533)
534. Statement of José Sesane, June 1848. AMM 5927.1/75. [↑](#footnote-ref-534)
535. Captain general of Valencia and Murcia to minister of war, 27 July 1848. AMM 5927.1/80. [↑](#footnote-ref-535)
536. Sentences of the Tribunal suprema de guerra y marina, 10 September 1848. AMM. 5927.1/166. [↑](#footnote-ref-536)
537. Letters from residents of Alicante to Queen Isabel II, 9 and 11 August 1848. AMM 5927.1/87,92. [↑](#footnote-ref-537)
538. Sentences of the Tribunal suprema de guerra y marina, 10 September 1848. AMM. 5927.1/166. [↑](#footnote-ref-538)
539. *El Observador* 17 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-539)
540. *La Esperanza* 18 May 1848; *La Esperanza* 25 May 1848; *El Popular* 16 May 1848; *El Popular* 18 May 1848; *El Heraldo* 11 May 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-540)
541. *La España* 23 May 1848; *El Heraldo* 22 May 1848, supplement. [↑](#footnote-ref-541)
542. *El Clamor público* 29 April 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-542)
543. *La España* 23 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-543)
544. *Boletín extraordinario de la Provincia de Alicante* 23 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-544)
545. H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sederberg, ‘Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence’, in *Comparative Politics* 6/4 (1974), 541-570, 543-544. [↑](#footnote-ref-545)
546. Ibid., 566. [↑](#footnote-ref-546)
547. *El Clamor público* 4 November 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-547)
548. List of deportees to the Philippines, 6 November 1848. A.M.M. 5878.3/54. [↑](#footnote-ref-548)
549. Captain general of Aragon to minister of war, 6 November 1848. A.M.M. 5878.3/32. [↑](#footnote-ref-549)
550. Captain general of Aragón to minister of war, 6 November 1848. AMM, 5878.3/32 [↑](#footnote-ref-550)
551. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-551)
552. *El Clamor público* 2 November 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-552)
553. *El Clamor público* 6 September 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-553)
554. Subinspector of the fourth department to director general of artillery, 19 September 1848. AMM 5918.5/105. [↑](#footnote-ref-554)
555. Governor of Pontevedra to captain general of Galicia, 16 September 1848. AHU 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-555)
556. Captain general of Granada to minister of war, 3 October 1848. AMM 5937.2/3. [↑](#footnote-ref-556)
557. Captain general of Granada to minister of war, 13 October 1848. AMM 5937.2/5. [↑](#footnote-ref-557)
558. *El Clamor público* 4 November 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-558)
559. *El Observador* 31 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-559)
560. Subinspector of artillery to director general of artillery, 30 March 1848. AMM 5918.5/54. [↑](#footnote-ref-560)
561. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-561)
562. *El Barcelonés* 30 March 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-562)
563. For an examination of women involved in revolutionary fighting elsewhere, see Gabriella Hauch, ‘Did Women have a Revolution? Gender Battles in the European Revolution of 1848/49’, in Körner, *1848: A European Revolution?*, 64-84, 72-77. [↑](#footnote-ref-563)
564. Carrera Pujal estimates the number of French citizens in the city at 5,000 in *Historia política*, 82; Pavía, *Memorias*, 50-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-564)
565. Carles Sundrià Triay, 'Pluralidad de emisión y formación de un sistema bancario moderno, Europa y España', in Daniel Díaz Fuentes et al., *Orígenes de la globalización bancaria. Experiencias de España y América Latina* (Mexico City: El colegio de Mexico and Genueve ediciones, 2017), 52-53 [↑](#footnote-ref-565)
566. Pavía, *Memorias*, 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-566)
567. Quoted in Fuster Sobrepere, *Barcelona i l'estat centralista*, 133 [↑](#footnote-ref-567)
568. Pavía, *Memorias*, 193-194. [↑](#footnote-ref-568)
569. Canal, *El carlismo*, 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-569)
570. See for example, the works of Magín Ferrer. [↑](#footnote-ref-570)
571. Canal writes that this is a common comparison, though not one he makes, in *El carlismo*. [↑](#footnote-ref-571)
572. Canal, *El carlismo*, 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-572)
573. Pedro Gómez Aparicio, *Historia del periodismo español: Desde la "Gaceta de Madrid," 1661, hasta el destronamiento de Isabel II* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1967), 325. [↑](#footnote-ref-573)
574. Fernando Fernández de Córdova, *La revolución de Roma y la expedición española a Italia en 1849* (Madrid: Manuel G. Hernández, 1882), 201-202. [↑](#footnote-ref-574)
575. Cánovas Sánchez, *Partido moderado*, 194-203. [↑](#footnote-ref-575)
576. Estimated at 4,000 at the end of the year, in Josep Carles Clemente, *Los carlistas* (Madrid: Istmo, 1990), 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-576)
577. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea. Anales desde 1843 hasta la conclusión de la actual guerra civil*, II (Madrid: Manuel Tello, 1875), 13-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-577)
578. The first reference I can find is in Román Oyarzun, *Historia del Carlismo* (Madrid: Editones Fe, 1939), 269. He attributes it to Bertran Tristany, but he does not attribute a source. Later, Camps, in *La guerra dels Matiners*, attributed the same cry to Guerxo de Ratera but also provided no source, 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-578)
579. quoted in Leopoldo Augusto de Centurión, *El conde de Montemolín: Historia de la vida pública y privada de D. Carlos Luis Borbón* (Madrid: Manuel Alvarez, 1848), 318-322. [↑](#footnote-ref-579)
580. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, II, 36-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-580)
581. James Thompson, *British Political Culture and the Idea of 'Public Opinion', 1867-1914* (Cambridge: University Press, 2013), 9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-581)
582. Jordi Canal described Carlism as a reactionary amalgam in *El Carlismo*, 9-27, but even this suggests a broad political consensus which the movement lacked in 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-582)
583. For example, Robert Vallverdú, *La Guerra dels Matiners a Catalunya (1846-1849): Una crisi econòmica i una revolta popular* (Barcelona: Abadia de Montserrat, 2002), 319. [↑](#footnote-ref-583)
584. *Gaceta de Madrid* 18 April 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-584)
585. Pirala, *Historia contemporánea*, II, 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-585)
586. Captain general of Barcelona to minister of war, 1 October 1848. AMM 5878.2/3. [↑](#footnote-ref-586)
587. List of arrestees, 1 October 1848. AMM 5878.2/5. [↑](#footnote-ref-587)
588. Cruz, *Gentlemen, bourgeois and revolutionaries*, 274. [↑](#footnote-ref-588)
589. Sentences. AMM 5878.2/20. [↑](#footnote-ref-589)
590. Letter of support for a pardon for those arrested, 8 October 1848. AMM 5878.2/16. [↑](#footnote-ref-590)
591. Captain general of Barcelona to minister of war, 9 October 1848. AMM 5878.2/10; Consul general of France to captain general of Barcelona, 9 October 1848. AMM 5878.2/27 [↑](#footnote-ref-591)
592. Military governor of the Barcelona citadel to captain general of Barcelona, 9 October 1848. AMM 5878.2/27. [↑](#footnote-ref-592)
593. Captain general of Barcelona to minister of war, 9 October 1848. AMM 5878.2/10. [↑](#footnote-ref-593)
594. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-594)
595. Commandant general of Olot to Captain general of Barcelona, 9 October 1848. AMM 5878.2/27. [↑](#footnote-ref-595)
596. Commandant general of Olot to Captain general of Barcelona, 24 November 1848. AMM 5878.2/36. [↑](#footnote-ref-596)
597. These groups are, however, representative of those in Ignacio Javier Castán Andolz, ‘La sociología del carlismo catalán durante la guerra de los “matiners”’, in *Hispania Nova* 2 (2001-2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-597)
598. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-598)
599. Captain general of Barcelona to minister of war, 28 November 1848. AMM 5878.2/20 [↑](#footnote-ref-599)
600. Captain general of Barcelona to minister of war, 28 November 1848. AMM 5878.2/22 [↑](#footnote-ref-600)
601. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-601)
602. Núñez, ‘The Region as Essence of the Fatherland’ [↑](#footnote-ref-602)
603. Shorter, ‘Middle-Class Anxiety’, 196. [↑](#footnote-ref-603)
604. William Fortescue, *France and 1848: The End of Monarchy* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 109. [↑](#footnote-ref-604)
605. Fradera, ‘The Empire, the Nation and the Homelands’, 136. [↑](#footnote-ref-605)
606. This idea is from Andres Kalyvas, *Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) [↑](#footnote-ref-606)
607. Rudé, *Crowd in History*, 264. [↑](#footnote-ref-607)
608. In Carr, *Spain: A History*, 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-608)
609. Miguel Alonso Baquer, ‘The Age of Pronunciamientos’, in Rafael Bañón Martínez and Thomas M. Barker (eds), *The Armed Forces and Society in Spain Past and Present* (New York, NY: Colombia University Press, 1988), 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-609)
610. Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 4; Ballbé, *Orden público*, 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-610)
611. Jaime Balmes, ‘La Preponderancia Militar’, in *Escritos Políticos* (Madrid: Sociedad de Operarlos del mismo Arte, 1847), 643-646. 643. [↑](#footnote-ref-611)
612. Ibid., 646. [↑](#footnote-ref-612)
613. Captain general of Galicia to minister of war, 31 March 1848. AHU CGG143 [↑](#footnote-ref-613)
614. Captain general of Galicia to minister of war, 28 April 1848. AHU CGG 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-614)
615. Bulwer to Palmerston, 16 March 1848. NCA BUL1/53/20 [↑](#footnote-ref-615)
616. Bulwer to Palmerston 29 March 1848. NCA BUL1/53/25a [↑](#footnote-ref-616)
617. Esdaile, *Spain in the Liberal Age*, 100. [↑](#footnote-ref-617)
618. Rudé, *Crowd in History*, 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-618)
619. Artola, *Burguesía revolucionaria*, 170-173. [↑](#footnote-ref-619)
620. Captain general of Galicia to minister of war, 9 April 1848. AHU 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-620)
621. Captain general of Galicia to minister of war, 30 April 1848. AHU 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-621)
622. Bulletin from captain general of Andalucía, 17 May 1848. AMM 5918.5/8. [↑](#footnote-ref-622)
623. Commandant of artillery to director general, 12 June 1848. AMM 5918.5/5. [↑](#footnote-ref-623)
624. Commandant of artillery to director general, September 1848. AMM 5918.5/22;23;27. [↑](#footnote-ref-624)
625. Proclamation of Blas María Royo de Léon, June 1848. AMM 5918.7/80. [↑](#footnote-ref-625)
626. Captain general of Extremadura to minister of war, 7 July 1848. AMM 5918.7/29 [↑](#footnote-ref-626)
627. Captain general of Extremadura to minister of war, 11 July 1848. AMM 5918.7/31,32,39 [↑](#footnote-ref-627)
628. Commander of artillery of Algeciras to director general of artillery, 28 July 1848. AMM 5918.5/11 [↑](#footnote-ref-628)
629. Maurizio Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile: Italian Émigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (Oxford: University Press, 2009), 32: Tasos Vournas, *Το ελληνικό 1848. Αγώνες για κοινωνικό και πολιτικό μετασχηματισμό στην Ελλάδα κάτω από την επίδραση των ευρωπαϊκών αστικοδημοκρατικών εξεγέρσεων* [*The Greek 1848. Struggles for social and political transformation in Greece under the influence of the European bourgeois-democratic uprisings*] (Athens: Tolide Publications, 1983 [1952]); Niall Whelehan, *The Dynamiters: Irish Nationalism and Political Violence in the Wider World, 1867–1900* (Cambridge: University Press, 2012), 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-629)
630. Captain general of Castilla la Vieja to minister of war, 12 November 1848. AMM 5929.14/17 [↑](#footnote-ref-630)
631. *El Observador* 8 November 1848. [↑](#footnote-ref-631)
632. Captain general of Castilla la Vieja to minister of war, 22 October 1848. AMM 5929.14 (7) [↑](#footnote-ref-632)
633. Captain general of Castilla la Vieja to minister of war, 12 November 1848. AMM 5929.14 (17) [↑](#footnote-ref-633)
634. Captain general of Castilla la Vieja to minister of war, 2 December 1848. AMM 5929.14, (17) [↑](#footnote-ref-634)
635. Tribunal Supremo de Guerra y Marina, 6 July 1849. AMM 5929.14 (26) [↑](#footnote-ref-635)
636. After being described as an absolutist in *Eco del comercio*, he wrote to the editors in an attempt to emphasise his liberal credentials. *Eco del comercio* 13 August 1847; *El Archivo Militar* 6 May 1849. [↑](#footnote-ref-636)
637. Commandante Vicente Villasante to director general of artillery, 9 and 11 September 1848. AMM 5918.5/18,27; Minister of war to Vicente Villasante, 14 September 1848. AMM 5918.5/23. [↑](#footnote-ref-637)
638. José Simón Cabarga, *Santander en el Siglo de los Pronunciamientos y las Guerras Civiles* (Santander: Institución Cultural de Cantabria, 1972), 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-638)
639. Gabriel Cardona, ‘El problema militar en España’, in *Historia* 16 (1990), 58-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-639)
640. *Revista Militar*, II (25 September 1848). [↑](#footnote-ref-640)
641. Headrick, ‘Spain and the Revolutions of 1848’, 202, 203. [↑](#footnote-ref-641)
642. Carr, *Spain: A History*, 207. [↑](#footnote-ref-642)
643. This process is still, however, perhaps not as advanced as it ought to be. Körner (ed.), *1848: A European Revolution?* remains the most innovative treatment, and even this concentrates on the traditional European core. [↑](#footnote-ref-643)
644. Arturo Morales Carrión, ‘El año 1848 en Puerto Rico: aspectos del mando de Prim’, in *Revista de* *Occidente* 17 (1975), 211-242, 217. [↑](#footnote-ref-644)
645. Martin Rodrigo y Alharilla, ‘Spanish Merchants and the Slave Trade: From Legality to Illegality, 1814-1870’, in Josep M. Fradera and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara (eds), *Slavery and Antislavery in Spain's Atlantic Empire* (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2013), 176-200, 191-192. [↑](#footnote-ref-645)
646. Miles Taylor, ‘The 1848 Revolutions and the British Empire’, in *Past & Present* 166 (2000), 146-180. [↑](#footnote-ref-646)
647. Ibid., 157. [↑](#footnote-ref-647)
648. Seymour Drescher, ‘From Empires of Slavery to Empires of Antislavery’, in Fradera and Schmidt-Nowara (eds), *Slavery and Antislavery*, 291-316, 302, 315. [↑](#footnote-ref-648)
649. For example, Residents of Yauco and Coamo (Puerto Rico) complained to local authorities that Spain’s failure to provide sufficient shipping for cereal exports was paralysing the island’s economy. Captain general of Puerto Rico to delegate superintendent of the royal treasury, 18 September 1847. AMM 5595.5/10. [↑](#footnote-ref-649)
650. Jean-Philippe Luis, ‘Aproximación cuantitativa al estudio de la administración pública de Ultramar en el siglo XIX’, in Idem. (ed.), *L'État dans ses colonies: Les administrateurs de l’empire espagnol au XIXe siècle* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2015), 75-96, 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-650)
651. *Presupuesto general de ingresos y gastos del Estado para el año económico de 1846 á 1847* (Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, 1846), 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-651)
652. Christopher Schmidt‐Nowara, ‘Colonialism and hegemony in Spain and the Antilles in the nineteenth century’, in *Social History* 21/1 (1996), 99-103. [↑](#footnote-ref-652)
653. Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-653)
654. Aimé Césaire, *Discours sur le colonialisme* (Paris: Présence africaine, 1970 [1955]), 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-654)
655. Michel Foucault [David Macey (trans.)], *Society must be defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976* (New York, NY: Picador: 2003), 103. [↑](#footnote-ref-655)
656. Federico Córdova (ed.), *Gaspar Betancourt Cisneros, el Lugareño* (Havana: Editorial Trópico, 1938), 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-656)
657. Robert Granville Caldwell, *The Lopez expeditions to Cuba 1848-1851* (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1915), 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-657)
658. James Morton Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations: A Historical Study in American Diplomacy* (Baltimore, MA; Jonh Hopkins University Press, 1899), 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-658)
659. Costeloe, *Response to Revolution*. [↑](#footnote-ref-659)
660. *Gaceta de la Habana* 27 December 1848, in Justo Zaragoza, *Las insurrecciones en Cuba*, I (Madrid: Manuel G. Hernández, 1872), 589. [↑](#footnote-ref-660)
661. In Vidal Morales y Morales, *Iniciadores y primeros mártires de la Revolución Cubana*, II (Havana: Cultural, 1931), 165 [↑](#footnote-ref-661)
662. Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-662)
663. Captain general of Puerto Rico to foreign minister and minister of war, 10 June 1848. AMM 5595.6/18. [↑](#footnote-ref-663)
664. Declamation of emergency powers by captain general of Puerto Rico, 31 May 1848. AMM 5595.5/38 [↑](#footnote-ref-664)
665. Captain general of Puerto Rico to foreign minister and minister of war, 10 June 1848. AMM 5595.6/18. [↑](#footnote-ref-665)
666. Minister of war to captain general of Puerto Rico, 24 September 1848. AMM 5594.2/1. [↑](#footnote-ref-666)
667. Declamation of emergency powers by captain general of Puerto Rico, 31 May 1848. AMM 5595.5/38; Declaration of punishments by captain general of Puerto Rico, 9 June 1848. AMM 5595.5/39. [↑](#footnote-ref-667)
668. Declamation of emergency powers by captain general of Puerto Rico, 31 May 1848. AMM 5595.5/38. [↑](#footnote-ref-668)
669. Josep M. Fradera, *Colonias para después de un imperio* (Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2005), 295. [↑](#footnote-ref-669)
670. Captain general of Puerto Rico to minister of war, 1 August 1848. AHN 5068.28/2 [↑](#footnote-ref-670)
671. Captain general of Puerto Rico to minister of war, 26 August 1848. AHN 5068.29/2 [↑](#footnote-ref-671)
672. Morales Carrión, ‘El 1848 en Puerto Rico’, 216. [↑](#footnote-ref-672)
673. Fradera, *Colonias*, 293-294. [↑](#footnote-ref-673)
674. Rafael Olivar Bertrand, *El caballero Prim: Vida intima, amorosa y militar*, I (Barcelona: Luis Miracle, 1952), 313. [↑](#footnote-ref-674)
675. Direccion de gobierno Ultramar to captain general elect of Puerto Rico, 13 July 1848. AHN (Ultramar) 5069.3/1; Direccion de gobierno Ultramar to captain general elect of Puerto Rico, 20 July 1848. AMM 5595.6/57. [↑](#footnote-ref-675)
676. Schmidt-Nowara, *Conquest of History*, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-676)
677. Rafael Díaz Arenas, *Memorias históricas y estadísticas de Filipinas* (Manila: Diario de Manila, 1850), ch.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-677)
678. Captain general of the Philippines to minister of finance, 16 March 1847. AHN (Ultramar) 432/14.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-678)
679. *Real decreto* 1 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-679)
680. in Miguel Luque Talaván, ‘Narciso Clavería y Zaldúa: Gobernador y Capitán General de las Islas Filipinas (1844-1849)’, in *Revista Complutense De Historia De América* 23 (1997), 209-246, 244. [↑](#footnote-ref-680)
681. Robert MacMicking, *Recollections of Manilla and the Philippines* (London: Richard Bentley, 1851), 53-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-681)
682. Taylor, ‘1848 Revolutions and the British Empire’, 175. [↑](#footnote-ref-682)
683. Luis, ‘Aproximación cuantitativa’, 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-683)
684. *El Clamor público* 11 January 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-684)
685. Captain general of Puerto Rico to governor general of the Danish Antilles, 31 May 1848. AMM 5595.5/44. [↑](#footnote-ref-685)
686. Governor general of the Danish Antilles to captain general of Puerto Rico, 4 June 1848. AMM 5595.5/46. [↑](#footnote-ref-686)
687. Governor general of the Danish Antilles to captain general of Puerto Rico, 4 June 1848. AMM 5595.6/40. [↑](#footnote-ref-687)
688. Captain general of Puerto Rico to minister of war, 10 July 1848. AMM 5595.7/31 [↑](#footnote-ref-688)
689. Ivan Scott, *The Roman Question and the Powers, 1848–1865* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-689)
690. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-690)
691. Herminio Portell-Vilá, *Narciso López y su época*, III (Havana: Compañía Editora de Libros y Folletos, 1958), 483-495. [↑](#footnote-ref-691)
692. Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its nature, development and prospects* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 5-6 [↑](#footnote-ref-692)
693. Dan Royle, ‘The Deportation of Political Prisoners to Fernando Po and the Spanish State (1866-68)’, in *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 21/3 (2020), 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-693)
694. Jean René Aymes, *Españoles en París en la época romántica, 1808-1848* (Madrid: Alianza, 2008), 109-115. [↑](#footnote-ref-694)
695. Fanny Lewald, *Erinnerungen aus dem Jahre 1848*, I (Braunschweig: Friedrich Vieweg und Sohn, 1850), 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-695)
696. *El Espectador* 3 May 1848; *El Clamor público* 4 April 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-696)
697. Garnier-Pagès, *Histoire de la révolution*, 305; Bachero Bachero, ‘La deportación’, 110-111. [↑](#footnote-ref-697)
698. Javier Paredes, *La organización de la justicia en la España liberal: los orígenes de la carrera judicial, 1834-1870* (Madrid: Cívitas, 1991), 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-698)
699. The uncertainty surrounding this story stems from Asquerino having been already incarcerated in the Saladero in 1846 during a crackdown on political opponents after the Galicia uprising. But, given his involvement in events, it is likely that he was sent there again in 1848. Certainly, this model was typical of post-revolutionary sentences. See Leoncio López-Ocón Cabrera, *Biografia de la “América”: una crónica hispano-americana del liberalismo democratico espanol (1857-1886)* (Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones cientificas, 1987), 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-699)
700. Ferdinand de Lesseps, *Recollections of Forty Years,* I (London: Chapman and Hall, 1887), 124. [↑](#footnote-ref-700)
701. *El Genio de la libertad* 25 June 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-701)
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710. Captain general of Castilla la Nueva to minister of war, 20 May 1848. AMM 5934.2/143. [↑](#footnote-ref-710)
711. *El Independiente* 19 May 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-711)
712. *El Heraldo* 1 August 1848 [↑](#footnote-ref-712)
713. After being described as an absolutist in *Eco del comercio*, he wrote to the editors in an attempt to emphasise his liberal credentials. *Eco del comercio* 13 August 1847; *El Archivo Militar* 6 May 1849 [↑](#footnote-ref-713)
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715. Commandant General of Cádiz to Minister of War, 7 January 1848. AMM 5878.3/40 [↑](#footnote-ref-715)
716. Letter from residents of Sábada to Queen Isabel II, 7 January 1848. AMM 5878.3/40 [↑](#footnote-ref-716)
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863. Julio Miñambres, ‘Nicomedes Pastor Díaz en el crisis de 1848: Una clave del pensamiento social de Antonio Cánovas del Castillo’, in *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* CLXXXII/III (1985), 413-470, 418; José Luis Comellas, *La Restauración como experiencia histórica* (Sevilla: Publicaciones de la Universidad, 1977), 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-863)
864. *El Motín* 3 May 1902 [↑](#footnote-ref-864)
865. See Joaquin Romero Maura, ‘Il Novantotto Spagnolo. Note sulle ripercussioni ideologiche del disastro coloniale’, in *Rivista Storica Italiana* 84/1 (1972), 32-52; Sebastian Balfour, ‘Riot, regeneration and reaction: Spain in the aftermath of the 1898 Disaster’, in *The Historical Journal* 38/2 (1995), 405-423, 413. [↑](#footnote-ref-865)
866. This is similar to José Álvarez Junco’s ‘two nations’ argument in *Spanish Identity*. [↑](#footnote-ref-866)
867. For example, *La Hora* 13 February 1948 [↑](#footnote-ref-867)
868. Jacques Lacan [Jacques Alain-Miller (ed.) & John Forrester (trans.)], *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 1: Freud's Papers on Technique 1953-1954* (Cambridge: University Press, 1988), 158-159. [↑](#footnote-ref-868)
869. *El País* 22 February 1998 [↑](#footnote-ref-869)
870. Roberto Blanco Andrés and Mariano González Clavero, *Historia de España 2º Bachillerato* (Madrid: Editex, 2020), 207; Id. & ead., *Historia del mundo contemporáneo 1º Bachillerato* (Madrid: Editex, 2019), passim. For the question, see 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-870)
871. Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1882), 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-871)
872. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past.* [↑](#footnote-ref-872)
873. Alison Ribeiro de Menezes, ‘Memory as Disruption: Entanglements of Memory and Crisis in Contemporary Spain’, in *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 94/8 (2017), 883-901, 886. [↑](#footnote-ref-873)
874. Ibid., 885. [↑](#footnote-ref-874)
875. Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989), 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-875)
876. Vernon, *Politics and the People*, 335. [↑](#footnote-ref-876)
877. Ibid., 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-877)
878. Adolphe Thiers, *The Rights of Property: A Refutation of Communism & Socialism* (London: R. Groombridge & Sons, 1848), x. [↑](#footnote-ref-878)
879. Vincent, *Spain*, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-879)