Climate Change an Emerging Threat to Peace and Security in Assam (North-East India): A Political Ecology Approach

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Abstract

This dissertation addresses two broad questions using the Political Ecology (PE) approach: first, the impact of climate change on peace and security in North-East India especially the state of Assam. To answer the question, I broke the research into two separate parts, the first examines the linkage between climate change and security, and the second examines how climate change affects the existing conflicts in Assam, North-East India. The second question, what are the overall political views and developments on the intersection of climate change and security in the region to answer this question, I broke the research further into two separate parts. The first examines how the sub-national and ruling government policy approaches, understand and seeks to address the discourses of climate security. The second examines the recently introduced citizenship bills in the region especially Assam as a case study, which will help to understand the realities and opportunities in addressing climate conflict from a development perspective in the region. The central contribution of this dissertation is to elucidate the challenges facing institutions that have the mandate of addressing climate conflict and wider climate-security connections. While the lessons of this research have academic implications, the evident challenges facing practitioners in conceptualizing and addressing the link between climate change and conflict should serve as an argument for the policy and implementation community to critically examine how their efforts are affected by the discourses and scales of climate-conflict and climate-security.

A wide range of research is available on environmental issues including climate change and its implications for various sectors. Also, being a subject of exceptional importance to the entire global community much printed and electronic data is being produced and shared. However, the impact of climate change on existing conflicts and how it become a significant source of violent conflicts and emerged as a regional security challenge in North India (Assam) using the Political Ecology lens was studied relatively less.

The literature informed by political ecology—generally explores the relationship between climate change and conflict through case studies, employing a wide range of methods that enable understandings not accessible through exclusively large quantitative studies I will be considering climate change an intermediate variable, which indirectly affects conflict by influencing external factors while being mediated by the present socioeconomic, geographic, and political conditions of the case.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where states otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own.

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Contents

Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

Climate change and its impacts have become crucial element of peace and security studies as they have become more obvious. What is unknown is how climate change might become a threat multiplier, and under what circumstances it triggers conflict and jeopardising security and stability. The effects of climate change threating environment, economy, and society, making it the most pressing global problem we face today. The political and social narratives surrounding these conflicts often point to religion, tribalism, nationalism, migration across borders, and scarcity of resources as root causes (Darnell & Parikh, 1988; Baruah, 1986; Hazarika, 1993; Aggarwal, 1999; Baruah, 1999; Barbora, 2008; Baruah, 2003).

 I chose Assam, namely Bodoland, a region of about 9000 square kilometres with over 3,000 communities. It is primarily dominated by the Bodo tribes and other indigenous Assamese populations. Assam is an enthralling state, has often been portrayed in the literatures of peace and security studies as a conflict-prone zone because of constrained resources caused by climate induced migrations. Assam has been shown to be within the most climate-sensitive, vulnerable, and least adaptable regions in the world. The state of Assam is not an exemplary case study to understand how climate induced migration leads to conflict, however it's well acknowledged that racially driven hostilities occur frequently in the region and have shifting agendas.

Ethnic conflict in Assam has multiple causes and has persisted for a long time. H. N. Das (2004: 70) attributes the rise in sub-national and ethnic violence in Assam to factors like lack of justice and prejudice, the need for identity, the benefits of productivity expansion, and the ambitions of local government officials. Whereas Singh (2010) attributes the polarisation of Assam's community and government to worries about immigration and the struggle for natural resource management. Yet, the thesis employing the Political Ecology approach examines socio-environmental tensions and the security interconnections caused by climate change.

The city of Dhaka, which is also known as a "climate migratory hot point," shares a border with the states of northeast India including Assam. According to census data from 2011, the state's gross migration increased by at least 53 percent, which is marked as one of highest influx. Relocations were periodic and long-term in character, per the 2011 census (Census India, 2011; Rajan & Bhagat, 2017). Also, the state's explanation for catastrophic migration is intricately linked to the nebulous political theory of unauthorised border crossings from Bangladesh. Also, the state deals with severe short-term forced migration brought on by regular floods, long-term patterns of displacement brought on by flood erosion and ethnically motivated conflict (ASDMA 2012, 2015; ASDMA).

Due to the cultural diversity, environmental sensitivity, destitution, and administrative complexity, Assam, a border state, emerges as an especially attractive region to study how governments handle migrations brought on by climate change. While there has been much discussion about whether or not climate change will cause massive population shifts, little attention has been paid in regard to the ways in which the consequences of a changing climate might have detrimental repercussions on national security, leading to mass migration. The research will look at both recent and previous migrations of Bangladeshis to the region, as well as the resulting environmental issues. According to several studies, environmental conflicts also depend on how environmental leadership and governance, which stand for governmental goals and capitalist interests, are internalised by local groups and people.

According to Ravindranath et al. (2011), who evaluated the grid-level sensitivity of India's whole north-east, every province in Assam has an extremely high sensitivity to climate change due to its reliance upon natural systems for survival. Assam is also known for having a high interstate migration and outmigration index. "Politically marginalised groups and communities, such as women, peasants, and indigenous populations, may be underrepresented in development programmes because they are typically invisible to policymakers and investment" (Robbins, 2011). Many times, local indigenous and peasant populations bear the impacts of extraction while other areas gain and have opportunities (such as national capitals and other locations of demographic concentration). As a result, trends in environmental conflicts are linked to colonialism, violent periphery integration, and economic reliance (Romero, H.2019).

Bettini, G. (2013) argued, "By highlighting widespread environmental degradation, crisis narratives create the "perception that we are on the edge of global catastrophe, putting strain on a fragile world" (Adger et al., 2001:708-9). Whether it's expanding deserts (cf. Bauer & Stringer, 2009; Lambin, Turner, et al., 2001; Thomas & Middleton, 1994), a fetishized CO2 in the case of climate change (cf. Swyngedouw, 2010a), or rising waves of climate refugees, these narratives tend to externalise the causes of the threat, individuating in an external enemy that "we" should fight against". Using the example of migrations and subsequent conflicts in Assam, I became competent in evaluating the key components, normative content, and political implications of such crisis scenarios with the help of political ecology lens".

With a Political Ecology lens, the tangential relationships between climate change and the security threat can be investigated, with the understanding that the issue generates worries about the scope and severity of predicted climate change implications (Adger et al., 2014; Burke et al., 2015; Abrahams, D. (2018)).

Yet, the literature has produced contrasting findings and disagrees more about the significance of direct and traceable causative mechanisms in comparison to other conflict-causing factors. Future studies should focus on comparing the relative importance of the environment to other sources of conflict (Mach et al., 2019a). This includes figuring out how much political and socioeconomic factors that could cause these effects to change over time affect the relationship between climate conflict and those factors (Gleditsch, 2012; Koubi,

2019). The links will have varying effects on interstate conflicts, civil wars, and individual-level violence.

1.2 Aim and Objective:

The study aims to investigate how climate change may affect the existing conflicts between the Bodo tribe and undocumented Bangladeshi migrants in the Indian state of Assam. It does so via the perspective of political ecology. Environmental vulnerability is strongly influenced by poor socioeconomic development, slow growth, and instability. According to the IPCC, "conflict strongly determines vulnerability to climate change impacts" (Adger et al. 2014, 12). Additionally, this research will investigate the impacts of climate change on regional security and peace as well as mechanisms that could have a destabilising effect in Bodoland. From a Neo-Malthusian perspective, environmental conflicts are said to also include conflict resulting from environmental processes, particularly resource scarcity, which is said to strain social interactions (Dalby 2002, Philippe Le Billon 2015). I will investigate my key research questions from a Political Ecology (PE) perspective, which challenges conventional security approach and key security theories. Romero, H. 2014, highlighted the environmental conflicts as social and political tensions over space, which create and produce territories through often contradictory discourses and socio-ecological power relationships over nature. Since political ecology is grounded in history, is practice-based, and typically avoids the structural and social aspects of uneven power relations, it offers a distinctive viewpoint on resource conflicts and environmental change (Robbins, 2004, pp. 172–186).These shifts have traditionally been influenced by differences in racial, gender, class, and regional allocation. As a result, there have been several disputes that have arisen from these processes of literal and figurative exclusion. Yet, other elements may also contribute to the socio-environmental conflicts in Northeast India, which are more strongly linked to politics and the politization of nature. To ascertain general political opinions as well as perspectives on environmental conflict and climate-induced migration, I will simultaneously do research on public policies, particularly the recently introduced two controversial bills to tackle illegal migration especially from Bangladesh as a case study.

1.3 Research Question
The Research will broadly answer one key research question and one sub-question:

Q1. What are the impacts of climate change on the existing conflicts in Assam (North-East India) and how it's threatening the security of the region?

Sub-question:

Q2. What political beliefs about the relationship between security and climate change are implied by the government's policies?

1.4 Outline of the thesis:

An introduction and two introductory chapters with a literature review, theoretical framework, methodology, case study, and conclusion. The literature review chapter will highlights the existing gap in relations to the interactions of climate change and security using a very distinctive approach of Political Ecology lens. The chapter "Examining the intersection of Climate Change and Security" will give readers a viewpoint on how researchers and the government are concerned about the developing environmental conflicts and security issues. In addition to putting the argument in the context of environmental security and climate security paradigms, it also briefly outlines current issues that have sparked discussions throughout the history of climate-induced conflict and related security problems. This study's theoretical framework is based on political ecology, critical discourse analysis methods, contemporary environmental problems, and post-foundational political theory.

The final chapter ties together the ideas presented in the other chapters. It explores the insights this work offers on the placement of the climate-security nexus and relationships in Assam as well as broader political methods and advancements in the region and summarises a few important "findings" from the study.

The chapters on the theoretical framework and review of the literature provide information on current theories as well as perspectives from security studies, researchers, and political ecologists. As a result, it immediately ties to the theories and integrates a significant amount of the material that served as the foundation for this dissertation. The expansion in possibilities and institutional interests, data collection and analysis methods, and sharply varied opinions on what the information tells us characterise the academic terrain of climate change's impact on conflict.

Although the most recent IPCC report's chapter on climate and security stated categorically that "human security would be jeopardised as the climate changes" (Adger et al., 2014, p. 758), (p. 760) "Very confident claims about the influence of climate change on human security are not possible" due to the "many and complicated linkages between climate change and human security, uncertainties in studies on the biophysical elements of climate change, and the character of the social science."

In conclusion, the consequences of climate change and the outcomes of conflicts, which are the result of various, overlapping factors, have a significant place- and time-specific link. I look at how literature in geography and the closely linked field of theoretical approach, including works that were heavily influenced by both disciplines of study, has contributed to our understanding of the environmental conflict situation in the area. I'll thoroughly analyse how the threat multiplier myth, still prevalent, especially in policy circles, is debunked by this

literature. Case studies are the most often used method to study this relationship in the larger subject of climate-conflict after large-N quantitative research (Ide, 2017). I'll look at the current circumstance.

Disagreements are found in the case study's subsequent section. This gives me the opportunity to research governmental viewpoints and advancements about the ongoing conflicts in India's North-East. The analysis and conclusion are essential for understanding how conflict and climate change interact in specific contexts as well as for establishing the validity of the hypotheses put forward in qualitative studies and theoretical arguments. To keep things simple, I typically use this research as an example in practise.

Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Analysing the Link between Climate Change and Security

Climate change and security have been studied by certain experts in international relations; some contend that it is the most urgent security concern affecting both the both current and next generations (McDonald 2016; Burke, Lee-Koo 2016). Yet, despite labelling environmental change as a security threat "securitization" in international legislation, this is not mean to everyone agrees on how resolving environmental issues compromises security or even on whose security it affects.

While some participants have focused on climate change as a catalyst for conflict and related security concerns (Busby 2007, 2008), others have focused on the difficulties with regional security or the survival of vulnerable different populations that are directly impacted by manifestations of climate change (Barnett 2001).

These various interpretations of the relationship between climate change and security can eventually be incorporated into a variety of security narratives, which include frameworks of meaning with various notions of who would be at risk from security threats, what security challenges exist, which institutions are able to provide security or even accountable for doing so, and how. Major argument, which implies that these frameworks support many forms of remedies to the changing environment, is a very important aspect of these disputes (Hardt 2017; Diez, von Lucke ; McDonald 2013; Floyd 2015; and Wellmann 2016;).

Several analyses of the relationship between climate change and security presented the latter as a danger to people's security. Here, the focus was on the needs and rights of those whose well-being would have been significantly damaged by signs of climate change, rather than on maintaining the status quo and preventing the possibility of violent conflict that could result from climate change. This was clear from the perspective of various state aid organisations.

Arguments on ecologically induced conflicts dominated the conversation despite the discourses on environmental security's early momentum and wide-ranging influence. This helped security professionals to comprehend environmental threats as threat to security. While it was "meant to terrify traditional security professionals more about concerns that "really" matter" (de Wilde 2001, 2) and to elevate environmental issues' importance on the legislative agenda, environmental security first seemed like a viable notion.

The word security conjures a series of antagonistic measures associated with the state and the military, which opponents were eager to distinguish from the climate change argument (Deudney 1990). Challenges includes an emergency or potential for the creation of new patriotic impulses to protect the nation's landscape and the threat of militarising the ecosystem rather than promoting green security (Käkönen, 1994). According to Deudney, national security institutions and procedures are insufficient to address environmental problems, and security can also introduce a zero-sum perspective into the environmental debate, resulting in winners and losers and undermining the coordinated approach required by environmental issues (Deudney 1999, 466–468).

Similar concerns were voiced from the south, where people saw environmental security as being related to the safety of the Nordic areas, their access to resources, and the preservation

of their consumption patterns (Shiva 1994; Dalby 1999; Barnett 2001). Maria Julia Trombetta (2008) argued "The debate waxed and waned, but its basic idea gained ground. When the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) discussed the impact of climate change on security in April 2007, there was disagreement among state delegations about whether environmental damage in general and climate change specifically should be considered a security concern (United Nations Security Council 2007)".

The scientific reliability of the statements, their theoretical significance, procedural repercussions, and ethical ramifications have all been the subject of a contentious academic debate spurred by environmental conflict research. Empirical studies showing how often environmental degradation fosters collaboration undermine the idea that environmental scarcity creates conflicts (Hauge and Ellingsen 2001). This, in turn, challenges the idea that resource abundance rather than scarcity determines disagreements (Berdal and Malone 2000).

As a result, we shouldn't inherently embrace the securitization of climate change, even if it entails mobilisation or political attention (see also Dalby 2015b; Floyd 2015). Yet we shouldn't completely forgo security. Obviously, security and climate change are becoming more and more intertwined, making it even more crucial to engage with the dynamics and dimensions of these connections. The idea is too politically significant to be left to strategists, as Ken Booth 1991 & 1999,points out, even while claims of security and threat aid in defining relevance, Security, environmental issues, and even democratic mandate are important issues..

The development of plausible options It may be used as a perspective whereby the environmental change and security nexus is usually perceived is therefore necessary if security is to be considered a site of conflict among various players expressing diverse views of our identities, what we believe, and also how these values should be maintained or promoted (see McDonald 2012). This will help to lead successful responses to challenges as fundamental and existential as global climate change.

2.1.1 Western and Global Intervention: Discourse and Implications

Emerging economies must now deal with concerns such as increasing population, resource depletion, diminishing resources, soaring food costs, and degradation (Pirages 1997; Adger et al. 2003; Brown 2012). With time, these issues will become more severe due to climate change. Barnett (2001) underlines the importance of developing a contingency plan for both internal migration and external migration in developing countries.

Using data from the past, Barnet contended that migration from Bangladesh to India in the past caused conflict in the region. India, which has the largest population in the world, cannot afford to absorb extra "climate refugees" from Pakistan and Bangladesh, two neighbouring countries. Thus, Indian authorities passionately claim that any attempt to occupy their territory in this manner will result in violence. The likelihood of climate change, according to Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall's 2003 argument, might "destabilise the geopolitical environment leading to violent conflicts owing to resource restrictions".

The effects of political instability will need to be lessened by climate change adaptation. This is an improved security architecture that goes beyond military security, according to Lester R. Brown 2009. According to him, the world's food shortages and the ensuing price volatility have become a substantial cause of political instability. The main nations of the globe have begun to pay more attention to non-military threats to international security as a result of the Cold War's east-west confrontation.

This is not surprising given that countries frequently have legal or institutionalised processes for resolving direct disputes that arise within their borders, but the international system is typified by largely ineffective legal or institutionalised processes for resolving nation-nation conflicts, such as water-sharing treaties (discussed at the end). Additionally, the majority of these agreements were made in the middle of the 1990s, when the term "climate change" was still entirely vague. The climate –security nexus and its implications somewhere missing in the key policy documents mapped to highlight non-rational security threat in South Asia especially India and Bangladesh.

Yet, two recent examples of "direct international conflict" include the unrest that has erupted in India over irrigated agriculture rights to the Cauvery River and diplomatic threats to cut off water supplies to Pakistan after the Uri Incident in 2016. This debate and political cautionary remark demonstrate that the possibility of more recent international conflicts is not eliminated by the dearth of conceptual literature in this area.

The US National Security Strategy (NSS) from 2006 states that the threat posed by climate change to national security is still rising and changing. The fight against climate change is the most important area of focus. The study focused on the effects of climate change-related issues such population shifts and shortages of basic necessities like food and water.

Displacement and migration are significantly essential coping mechanisms in response to environmental changes occurring in Southern Asia, such as sea-level rise, coastal flooding, floods, and poor water quality. The group of people who relocate due to unfavourable environmental and climatic conditions has a broad conceptual and demographic scope, whether they do so freely or are forced to do so (Morton, P. Boncour & F. Laczko 2008).

In 2006, the National Security Strategy of Germany discussed how climate change can make security concerns worse. The German Defense Ministry's military strategy guidelines state that the threat posed by climate change could have an effect on German security. The "German Advisory Council on Climate Change" warned in a 2007 report that the threat of climate change would underestimate how well civilizations can adapt, putting an unprecedented level of both national and international security in jeopardy.

The Security Council meeting on April 17, 2007, was a significant occasion that prompted the acknowledgment of climate change as a security problem. As this discussion has already revealed, the majority of member countries do see climate change as a threat to their national security. Margaret Beckett, a former employee of the British foreign ministry, played a significant role in bringing environmental concerns to the UN Security Council's notice. She strongly claimed that if immediate action was not taken, "disruption on a magnitude not seen since WWII" will result (UNSC, 2007).

In many of the documented instances of environmental issues, Larry Elliott (2014) claims that movement of people and the ensuing inter-group rivalry have played a substantial role, exacerbating the conflict scenario. Climate change-related migration is mostly intrastate, but it can also be international. When a place can no longer sustain life, residents make the decision to move, just like in the case of any other disaster. Often, such movement is temporary rather than long-term. When combined with previously present detrimental social factors like poverty and a lack of adequate resources, the economic repercussions of migration increase the chance of conflict. In fact, fights over money can lead to other conflicts that could be violent.

Competition for vital water resources is a major element in the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, according to Verisk Maplecroft's water security research. Climate change would have an effect on all rivers that originate from "Asian water towers," such as the Tibetan Plateau and other glaciated high regions, according to Immerzeel et al. (2011). They also mentioned that the Indus basin, with its sizable population and dependency on irrigated lands, will suffer particularly adverse effects. According to the French White Paper on "Defense and National Security," a number of South Asian nations, notably Pakistan and India, are likely to be dealing with severe water issues that are made worse by a changing climate and could contribute to the bloody struggle.

In the text, it was highlighted that urgent action must be taken to address the issue of climate change, starting with the development of legislation and a strategy. It also argues that while the majority of developing countries, such as Bangladesh and India, are capable of conducting extensive study to find possible dangers, they are unable to effectively handle the current problems, which could lead to violent conflict.

According to a previous Chatham House study titled "Attitudes to Water in South Asia," Gareth Price et al. June 2014, the nations in the region have unequal freshwater management resources. The Royal Institute of International Affairs' main office is located in Chatham House. The report focuses on the grave concerns over the depletion of freshwater supplies in the context of a growing population and shortages brought on by climate change.

Freshwater was "extremely politicised in the region, with strong linkages to food security and the livelihood of the great majority of the people reliant on agriculture," according to the data sources analysed by Chatham House researchers. Participants in the study expressed their thoughts on how they believed the administrations had not given the issues linked to the impact of climate change on water supply the attention they required. Several respondents from Bangladesh and India voiced worry about the length and frequency of downpours, expressing concern that it may affect agriculture and cause food insecurity, which would then exacerbate tension between the two countries over access to water during dry seasons. The melting of the Himalayan glaciers brought about by the escalation of global climate change would have a severe influence on the river water supply in the Asia area. Water sharing has always been a point of dispute between India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan notwithstanding any transboundary agreements that may exist. The most notable and widely reported dispute between India and Bangladesh is to the sharing of water from the Brahmaputra River. The

dispute between India and Pakistan over water sharing and pre-existing accords has grown in significance for national security in recent years.

Chapter 3 Building a new theory from the gaps shown in chapter 2
3.1 Political Ecology Lens: A distinctive approach

Due to its historical roots, field-based methodology, and overall focus on both the structural and social aspects of unequal power relations, political ecology offers a distinctive method for understanding disputes over resources and environmental changes. Political ecologists have conducted numerous research projects linking the climate, conflict, and security. These studies are collectively referred to as the ecological conflict approach or the environment conflict idea (Robbins, 2004, pp. 172–186). By broadening the subjects and players, they encourage a revaluation of the relationship between the environment and security and provide a vastly different perspective from the conventional work on environmental security. The essential components of the Political Ecology approach on environmental conflicts are the significance of resource abundance and scarcity, vulnerability and reliance as fundamental components of ecological conflicts, and the significance of resource ownership and access as the primary driver of disputes. A critical viewpoint on "Environmental Justice," a subject that frequently comes up in discussions about climate change, is also provided by the framework.

My research was greatly influenced by the literature on the relationship between environmental conflicts and security (such as Barnett, 2001; Conca & Wallace, 2009; Floyd, 2008; Levy, 1995; O'Lear, 2016; Dalby, 2016; Wolf, 2009; Forsyth, 2003; Robbins, 2004; Simon, 2008; Watts, 2015).

Research also analyses the arguments and criticism by Abrahams, D. (2018) analysis based on various conflicts and environment literatures provided a strong base to my research to thoroughly examine the climate change intersections with security. The explored literatures includes (Barnett, 2001; Barnett & Adger, 2007; Benjaminsen, Alinon, Buhaug, & Buseth, 2012; Le Billon, 2001; Nords & Gleditsch, 2007; Peluso & Watts, 2001; Raleigh, Choi, & Kniveton, 2015) and (Hayes & Knox-Hayes, 2014; McDonald, 2013; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014a; Swyngedouw, 2010); to understand how climate change affects conflict in particular regions (Ide et al., 2016; Krampe, 2014; Mil (2012), Carr (2013), 2014 (2014), Dalby (2015), Sneddon & Fox (2006), and Watts); and to explore predestinationist narrative (Dalby, 2014, 2016a (1983).

The phrase "political ecology" is a substantial, which accommodates plethora of concepts, according to (Robbins, 2004, p. 14). While some definitions place more emphasis on political economics and others on more formal political institutions, others place more emphasis on environmental change and narratives or tales about that change. Political ecology today explores how power structures functioning across scales affect environmental outcomes in specific regions, at times through a political economic stance. It advances theories of the

political economy of environmental deterioration and change (e.g., Blaikie & Brookfield, 2015; Watts, Bohle, May, & Action, 1993; Watts, 1983; Wisner et al., 2004; Sheppard, 2009). Political ecology is not new; academic research has long examined the links between climate change and conflict. With the publication of "Silent Spring" (Carson, 1962) and during the second wave of the environmental movement, concerns about environmental deterioration were addressed within the perspective of security studies (Trombetta, 2008 citing Brown, 1977; Falk, 1971).

Political ecology considers the reasons why resource planning and the influences on it are not merely 'local,' and that the only way to understand environmental deterioration is through several, overlapping levels of research. Blaikie (1985), detailed study on soil erosions in seven developing nations demonstrates how the location of the cause and the place of degradation of the environment don't always necessarily coincide. Instead, broader inequality is what fuels environmental deterioration and plays a role in it.

Abrahams, D. (2018) explained briefly "Yet, until the publication of Our Common Future in 1987, the subject of environmental security was not generally explored in both the security and environmental communities. The main contention of the discussion was that by endangering the natural systems that sustain human life, the threat posed by global environmental change, particularly global environmental damage (such as the ozone layer's depletion), established new types of vulnerabilities (Trombetta, 2008)". This body of work affected widely read non-academic writing, which in turn greatly influenced the environmental security discourses of the mid-1990s (especially Kaplan's work) (1994). "The Coming Anarchy by Kaplan, which was published in The Atlantic Monthly's February 1994 issue, had major impact on the Clinton administration (R. Kaplan, 1994)". Nonetheless, significant criticism was levelled at this piece and others of a similar ilk for distorting the links between security and the environment (see, for instance, Deudney, 1990; Gleditsch, 1998; Levy, 1995).

Abrahams, D. (2018) argued that despite its importance, Kaplan's work is still criticised in the areas of implementation and policy. For instance, "The Coming Anarchy" received criticism from several organisations even more than twenty years after it was published for altering the conceptualizations of environmental security and, as a result, climate security in a harmful manner that was too reliant on linear interpretations to grasp the nuanced nature of this relationship.

Conflicts may not only be motivated by a desire to conserve resources or by egotism, but also by past events that differ from the sociological perspective and the resource abundance. The discourses around climate conflict and how they impact the creation of policies and programmes are the main topics of this dissertation. Conflict dynamics would be little affected by biophysical effects of a global climate change If only power systems in the political, social, and economic spheres didn't contribute to underlying weaknesses (Raleigh and Urdal, 2007; Barnett & Adger, 2007; Le Billon, 2001). Le Billon (2001, p. 575) claims that a more comprehensive political ecological approach makes it possible to reformulate the main defences for the contemporary resource war.

As a result, this study is enriched by a subset of significant development research that concentrate on narratives, rhetorical creation, and narrative analysis and use them to intervene in the developing world (e.g., Escobar, 1988; Ferguson, 1990; Mitchell, 2002).Discourse analysis uses several techniques to determine how language and meaning are generated and understood, in line with Escobar's "definition of discourses as the politics of truth" (Escobar, 1988, Ferguson, 1990). The linguistic patterns and the political and social context in which that language is used are examined through critical discourse analysis (Campbell, 2009). Some well-known critical studies demonstrate how control and power are intertwined in development discourses (Escobar, 1988; Fairhead & Leach, 2004; Ferguson, 1990; Luke, 1995; Mathews, 2005, 2014; Mitchell, 2002).

For instance, (Ferguson, 1990) looks at how development organisations "framed" Lesotho as a target that needed to be worked on in specific manner despite concealing the essentially political component of progress with technical vocabulary and understanding (Ferguson, 1990). Studies on critical development have benefited from research such as (Escobar, 1988; Ferguson, 1990). The concept that high-level discourse formation is the sole, or even the dominant, component shaping the inputs and outcomes of development programming ignores the power of the various political parties who intake and influence training along all continuity from policy to development.

Abrahams, D. (2018) analysis demonstrated how discourses shift and alter as they are seen and reinterpreted through the positions, goals, and viewpoints of individuals, groups, and institutions to eventually produce observable results (Carr, 2013; Moore, 1999). Similar to Li's (1999), he also argued that a discourse is not determined by a "up there" force but rather by a series of actors and goals that shape results based on context, interests, and power. Various research considered the governmental, administrative, and organizational variables that govern the climatic change discourse weaves itself via numerous institutions, venues, and people perspectives, conforming to scholars' perspectives that go beyond rhetorical production as the driving mechanism behind policy formulation and consequences (Carr, 2013; Corbridge, 1998; Escobar, 1988; McKinnon, 2008; Moore, 1999; Simon, 1997, 2007, 2011; West 2005).

3.2 Contribution from Political Ecology – To Analyses Climate-Security/Conflict Connections

Romero, H. 2014, argued "the literature on environmental conflicts can be broadly divided into two fields: the first has provided "apolitical" interpretations connected to both economic and ecological narratives; the second, known by many scholars as "political ecology," is connected to critical social scientific concepts that clarify environmental change and has an explicit concern for social justice". Romero argued that apolitical answers to environmental concerns are influenced by Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" and Malthusian theories about population growth (1968) and the main drivers of environmental degradation are population growth and excessive consumption. Romero, H. 2014, also argued that conflicts result from a lack of resources and access restrictions, which in turn promote insecurity and social unrest.

Conflict may be the central tenet of political ecology. One of the most significant examples, Martinez-Alier (2003: 71), explained PE as "the study of ecological distribution disputes," supporting the notion that conflict is central to environmental changes. Conflicts related to environmental issues must be taken into account in order to understand the political nature of these issues. Conflicts reveal underlying relations of power and dominance as well as (contradictory) interests (Le Billon, 2015, p. 602). Hence, "resource enclosure or appropriation" by powerful players intensifies scarcities and speeds up conflict (Robbins, 2012, p. 200). This (Neo-) Marxist and systemic explanation of power dynamics and conflict (i.e., conflicts clarified from economic and political hierarchies in upwardly complex societies) is disagreed with by poststructuralist political ecologists, who argue instead for a more common understanding of conflict and authority that evolves in connected networks and rhizomes (Bennet, 2010; Rocheleau, 2015). Additionally, feminist and postcolonial research has emphasised the significance of culture and identity (evolving together across identity politics lines of class, gender, ethnic background, religion, location, and colonial history) in order to understand the emergence of social economic conflicts and struggles (Escobar, 2006; Nightinggale, 2011).

The papers in this issue make use of a number of these ideas to understand the controversial nature of resource acquisition and control in Southeast Asia. Political ecologists' studies that relate the environment, conflict, and security are referred to as having an "ecological conflict approach" or a "environmental conflict thesis" (Robbins, 2004, pp. 172–186).

By widening the themes and participants and providing a completely different perspective from the conventional work on environmental security, they encourage a re-study of the relationship between the environment and security. The key elements of the Political Ecology perspective on environmental conflict include the role of resource abundance and scarcity, vulnerability and dependency as crucial features of ecological conflicts, and the significance of resource property and access as the main source of disputes. A critical viewpoint on "Environmental Justice," a subject that frequently comes up in discussions about climate change, is also provided by the framework.

Resource scarcity and vulnerability are concerns that are impacted by population increase as well as governmental relations of power, the structure of the government, social group dynamics, and the arrangement of economic ties among social groupings, according to Political Ecology. These factors govern the utilisation of resources, the effects of environmental restrictions on society, and the influence of those restrictions on concerns (Percival & Homer-Dixon, 2001).

These ideas lack a critical grasp of the historical process that led to resource enclosure and are unclear about the relationship between population growth, excessive consumption, and degradation. The only way for sensible people to cooperate, according to utilitarian economic discourses, is through market mechanisms because nature and society are split in different ways. Some academics began to challenge these notions, especially those who are now known as political ecologists. With a focus on the connection between power and environmental change, these researchers have presented in-depth analyses of the interactions between society and nature. Political ecologists have assessed the historical

backdrop of colonization and post - colonialism, the presence of diverse realities, and the rising environmental issues in society. Early discussions focused on the possibility that war would arise because of resource scarcity, such as when migrated individuals interacts or else when factions fought for control of those resources. In recent time, many scholars argued that the dynamics of climate change were partially to blame for the Syrian crisis and the events that provided emergence to ISIS militants (Berkell 2014; Gleick 2014; Strozier and; Baker 2015).

The notion that climate change may endanger regional and global stability was particularly pervasive in UN deliberations on the relationship between climate change and security. The earlier civil war in Darfur was linked to changing climate by the collective efforts of UN Environment Program and officials, who suggested that it would pose a greater risk to national security (Moon 2007; UNEP 2007).

The relationship between climate and the risk of violent conflict will be investigated from a political ecology viewpoint with the understanding that the subject raises concerns about the scope and severity of potential climate change impacts (Adger et al., 2014; Burke et al., 2015). Conflicting findings from the research have raised questions about the significance of the direct and observable causal pathways relative to other conflict factors. Future research must first establish the relative significance of climate comparing the potential other sources of tension (Mach et al., 2019a). This criterion addresses how much the relationship between climate change and conflicts can be mitigated by political and socioeconomic issues that could cause these effects to shift over time (Gleditsch, 2012; Koubi, 2019). The linkages will take different forms across scales, from individual-level violence to civil conflict to global warfare. It is impossible to see how countries would be able to handle the current and anticipated security concerns brought on by climate change without peace and strong, stable political structures. Yet, conflict-affected countries struggle to respond to and overcome these difficulties without outside assistance, which perpetuates the trend of unrest and lack of development.

Many of these countries struggle with persistent political unrest, rampant corruption, and sluggish economic expansion. In this respect, Hegre et al. (2016), forecast that in the next years, present conflict patterns would probably become even more entrenched in the absence of international help.

Philippe Le Billon 2015, broadly analysed the importance of Political ecology, which provided an opportunity to researchers to connects various historically and geographically contingent actors and processes, or he also explained "what Watts (2004) refers to as the "resource complex," as opposed to a deductive approach based on linear models linking environmental scarcity to social effects like forced migration and social segmentation or associating resource wealth with institutional breakdown and avaricious rebellions. Additionally, it recognises the hybrid "socio-natural" nature of the resources themselves, the importance of placed viewpoints, the historicity of conflicts, and their inherent contingency. In addition to

increasing the number of "variables" while avoiding the difficulties of reductionist "hypotheses," such opening up also increases the number of "variables" in a way that does not fall victim to these traps".

The framework examines power dynamics and nature-society 20 interconnections with a focus on how these connections affect access to natural resources in order to spot unfairness and injustice in the distribution of costs and rewards (Robbins, 2012).

Chapter 4 Methodology:

A variety of methods are used by political ecology and geography, two separate (sub)disciplines or fields of study, to look at how climate change influences conflict, whether it be causing it, preventing it, or even resolving it.

Using a variety of research approaches, both quantitative and qualitative studies on the association between climate variability and conflict have yielded conflicting findings (Buhaug et al., 2014; Hsiang et al., 2013; Selby, 2014). The same war events have given rise to a number of hypotheses, which can be explained by disparate applications of the same research methodology (e.g., Burke et al., 2015) as well as by basic differences between modes of inquiry and epistemologies (e.g., cross-cutting statistical analyses testing hypotheses vs in-depth studies creating theories; Selby, 2014).

Several studies on climate conflict and security discourses are responses to positivist studies that assert a more direct connection between conflict and climate change (Selby,2014). The spatial approach to discourse analysis, which primarily focuses on how power and policy reflect and refract understandings of place and the interaction between people and the environment, is significantly influenced by the Foucauldian and poststructuralist theories. In addition to the critical analysis of the existing material and literature, discourse analysis may also make use of direct observation and key informant interviews.

I applied Merteen Hajer's discourse-analytic approach in relations to critical discourse analysis method to address the primary issues. Discourse analysis is a useful tool for understanding how language shapes our understanding of social phenomena. Hajer's approach to discourse analysis is particularly valuable because it emphasizes the importance of examining both the content and context of discourse, as well as the power relations that underpin it. By analyzing the different ways in which language is used, we can gain a deeper understanding of how ideas are constructed, reinforced, and challenged, and how they shape our perceptions of the world around us. This can be especially useful for understanding the ways in which climate change is discussed and debated in public discourse, and how different actors try to shape the narrative around this critical issue. Discourse analysis can be defined as a "specific ensemble of ideas, conceptions, and classifications that are generated, reproduced, and modified in a particular set of activities and through which meaning is provided to physical and social realities" (Hajer 1995:45). Discourse analysis investigates the narratives used to discuss issues like climate change and operates under the premise that the language used in a certain context defines the type of politics that are there (Hajer 2006). The discourses surrounding the climate issue have been influenced by the non-peer-reviewed Gray literature. It was crucial to include this work in the literature assessment since it is used in campaigns and policymaking and helps to show how the discourses of climate conflict have changed. Following a review of the uses of analysis of discourse in political ecology, the thesis will construct a conceptual framework by defining fundamental concepts of discourse and analysing the controversial situations that structure debate in controversies.

By using Hajer's approach to discourse analysis, I am able to examine how different actors construct and communicate their ideas about climate change and security, and how these ideas are shaped by broader social, political, and economic contexts. This approach allows me

to identify the key themes, narratives, and discursive strategies that are used by different actors, and to analyse how these discourses are received and interpreted by different audiences. Ultimately, this enables me to address my central research question by providing a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the ways in which climate change is being framed and debated as a security issue, and the implications of these discourses for policy and practice.

Hajer's approach to discourse analysis informs both my data collection and data analysis in several ways. Firstly, it helps me to identify the relevant sources of data that are most likely to yield insights into the discourses and narratives around climate change and security. This might include policy documents, media reports, expert interviews, and public debates, among other sources. Secondly, it guides me in selecting the appropriate methods for analyzing these different types of data. For example, I might use content analysis to examine the framing of climate change in policy documents, discourse analysis to analyze the language and narratives used in media reports, and critical discourse analysis to identify the power relations and underlying ideologies that shape different discourses. Thirdly, this approach helps me to ensure that my analysis is sensitive to the broader social, political, and economic contexts in which these discourses are produced and received. This might involve exploring the historical and cultural factors that have shaped different discourses, as well as the power relations that exist between different actors and stakeholders. Overall, using Hajer's approach to discourse analysis enables me to collect and analyze a wide range of data from diverse sources, and to develop a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the discourses and narratives around climate change and security.

To inform my case study on climate change and security, I collected policy documents on CAA and NRC in Assam region, analyzed media reports and public debates. These diverse forms of data provide a comprehensive understanding of the discourses and narratives around climate change and security.

To maintain distance and objectivity from the case study in Bodoland, I took several steps as a researcher, despite being situated in India where there are particular concerns, views, and opinions on the conflict and the situation it is creating. Firstly, I adopted a reflexive approach to my research, which involved critically reflecting on my own background, biases, and positionality as a researcher. This helped me to be aware of my own perspectives and potential biases, and to take steps to mitigate them. Secondly, I engaged with a diverse range of sources and perspectives, including academic literature, policy documents, and interviews with experts and stakeholders from a range of backgrounds and perspectives. This helped me to develop a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the issues involved in the Bodoland conflict, and to avoid relying on a single perspective or source of information. Thirdly, I adopted a rigorous and systematic approach to data collection and analysis, using established research methods such as content analysis and discourse analysis to ensure that my analysis was grounded in rigorous and objective research methods. Finally, I remained conscious of the potential ethical implications of my research, particularly with regard to the sensitivity of the issues involved in the Bodoland conflict. I took steps to ensure that my

research was conducted in an ethical and responsible manner, including obtaining informed consent from participants and ensuring that their anonymity and confidentiality were protected. Overall, by adopting a reflexive and rigorous approach to my research and engaging with a diverse range of perspectives and sources of information, I was able to maintain distance and objectivity from the case study in Bodoland and provide a fair and balanced analysis of the complex and sensitive issues involved in the conflict.

Philippe Le Billon 2015, argued and broadly highlighted the scarcity and social consequences stating that "Political ecology broadens research to include a wider range of historically and geographically dependent actors and processes, dubbed the "resource complex" by Watts, as opposed to using a deductive approach based on linear models that link environmental scarcity to social consequences like forced migration and social segmentation, or equating resource abundance with institutional breakdown and greedy rebellions (2004). Such opening up recognises the hybrid "socio-natural" nature of resources themselves, the significance of situated viewpoints, and the historicity and contingency of conflicts. It also increases the number of "variables" while avoiding the traps of reductionist "hypotheses," among other benefits".

The framework examines power relationships and nature-society interactions, paying close attention to how these relationships interact and affect access to natural resources, in order to discover inequities and injustices in the allocation of costs and benefits (Robbins, 2012). The security studies narrative surrounding national security has been replaced in the research on climate-induced migration by a more nuanced picture of human security and adaptability (White, 2011; Homer-Dixon, 1994). Campbell et al. (2007), Elliott (2010), Bhattacharyya and Werz (2012), and Bettini (2013) are some examples.

For having neoliberal underpinnings (Felli, 2013), concealing mitigation efforts (Methmann & 22 Oels, 2015), and undermining concerns about fairness and humanitarianism, its conception as a form of adaptation strategy for climate change has also drawn criticism (Giovanni, et al., 2016).

The study will contribute to filling this vacuum in the literature by using a political ecology lens to analyse the intricate and multidimensional dynamics of the climatic conflicts brought on by unauthorised Bangladeshi migration.

Chapter 5 Case Study (Climate-Induced Migration, Conflicts, and Recently Introduced Citizenship Bills (CAA, NRC, NPR)

5.1 Introduction

I have chosen Bodoland owing to various reason as the region is a good site for exploring the relationship between climate and conflict and addressing the questions of the thesis for several reasons. Firstly, the region is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including erratic rainfall, floods, and droughts, which have significant implications for the livelihoods of local communities and the social and political dynamics of the region. Secondly, the region has a history of conflict and violence, including between different ethnic groups and between state and non-state actors. This makes it an interesting case study for exploring the ways in which climate change interacts with existing social and political tensions to exacerbate conflict and insecurity. Thirdly, there is a growing recognition among policymakers and academics of the need to better understand the relationship between climate change and conflict in the context of South Asia, which is one of the region's most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Overall, by exploring the relationship between climate and conflict in Bodoland, the thesis can contribute to a better understanding of the complex and dynamic ways in which climate change is shaping social and political dynamics in the region, and the implications of these dynamics for peace and security.

The chapter broadly uses the critical discourse analysis method to critically review the language and communication shaping the climate-security interactions and its understanding in environmental-security discourse.

Bangladesh is particularly vulnerable to climate change due to its low-lying topography, reliance on subsistence farming, and dense population. Natural disasters and the devastation of livelihoods in Bangladesh caused by saltwater incursion into agricultural areas have led more immigrants north into Assam (Ziegler, 2013; Vivekanada & Smith, 2007). Yet Assam is also at risk from climate change.

Ziegler (2013) claimed that 1.4 million people were displaced by flooding in 2012 in 18 of Assam's 27 districts. Assam is home to four to ten million immigrants from Bangladesh, according to estimates (Singh, 2010). Yet, because there is little publicly available data on these figures, it is difficult to assess how much the migrants have changed the local social dynamics (Singh, 2010). It seems obvious that uncontrolled immigration would exacerbate the already fragile state of a region that is already susceptible to social, economic, and environmental upheaval (Ziegler, 2013).

Attacks on Bangladeshi immigrants are still frequent nowadays, and they are frequently publicised by the employment of state-sponsored armed forces. Ethnic violence will continue to be a threat in the Assam region as long as the government does not put up a clear plan to alleviate the tension, claims the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) (Das, 2012).

Rapid population growth and the negative effects it has, such as climate change, global flooding, heat, and environmental stress, lead to migration on both a national and global scale.

Policy makers, demographers, economists, experts in international relations, and most lately peace and conflict analysts are all very interested in the wide-ranging implications that environmentally induced migration has on peace, security, and stability in national, regional, and global contexts.

Locally, there are many different perspectives on illegal immigration. Illegal immigration from Bangladesh are seen to be a political, economic, and demographic threat. The 19 tribes of Tripura are a manifestation of these concerns among the smaller ethnic groups in Northeast India who perceive Bangladeshis as a threat to their demographic position. The Nellie Massacre resulted from these underlying forces. Other estimates place this number slightly lower at between 1200 and 1753 (Hazarika, 2000), but the lessons to be learned are the same: ethnic population groups were driven from their land by illegal immigrants, and pressures over scarce resources led to a vicious reaction. This happened in Nellie, Assam, in February 1983, killing roughly 2,000 Bengali-Muslims in one night (Roy, 2003).

Another aspect of Bangladeshi illegal immigration is its security component. Despite this being acknowledged, this component has occasionally not gotten the required attention at the highest levels (Sinha, 1998). The government of Bangladesh "is not doing enough," according to a Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) investigation, to prevent the country from becoming into a safe haven for Islamic terrorists in South Asia (Habib,2003). This element first attracted a lot of attention when it was covered by international media as well (Time, 2002), but it finally fell by the wayside. There hasn't been any in-depth research or analysis done on the possibility that militant organisations' actions in Bangladesh also have a regional and international component. (Habib, 2003) claims that India has frequently disregarded such developments. Rajeshwar's claim that "the problem of unlawful migration has an extraordinary potential for the worsening of the security situation in the East and Northeast of India" has not been followed by many attempts and very few policy decisions (Saikia, 2003; Narahari, 2003; Saikia, 2005). Unfortunately, contentious issues are at play, and some local politicians "harvest" immigrant votes for personal gain while seeming to defend the rights of minority population groups. Unfortunately, neither a policy nor even the debate that precedes it seem to be having any effect. Until that time, "an poor migrant community retaining little or no attachment to the host nation" (Pioneer, 2001) will continue to increase in both numbers and networks.

There are many more factors besides climate change that affect migration, and this list is by no means exhaustive. They include things like gender discrimination, colonial past, institutional inequities, economics, and resource accessibility (Baldwin 2012; 2017). Migration is such a daunting problem to government because of how deeply it is intertwined with so many other facets of society, including its history, social structures, physical infrastructure, economy, and culture. Because of this, it is challenging to construct the precise causal relationships and succinct narratives necessary for a typical governance structure (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Climate change may have a considerable impact on the availability of

resources, agricultural productivity, the rise of environmental refugees, coastal flooding, and economic output. The combination of declining economic output and expanding economic achievement gaps, both of which could be made worse by climate change, was one of the types of conflict caused by the environment. Disputes can result from uneven resource distribution, differences in how natural limits are applied, and resource depletion. In the modern world, developing countries must contend with issues such rapid population growth, water shortages, the loss of natural resources, rising food prices, and deforestation (Pirages 1997; Adger et al. 2003; Brown 2012). With time, these issues will become more severe due to climate change.

Homer-Dixon (1994), who reaches the conclusion that environmental scarcity/abundance (which includes environmental change, population growth, and unequal resource distribution) causes violent conflict, offers some support for these relationships. Although there is still room for debate, it is becoming increasingly accepted that environmental degradation at the very least fuels conflict and instability. According to (Penny, 2007; Ball, 2009), climate change may cause desertification, interruption of agricultural cycles, extreme weather patterns, or a decrease in water supplies, all of which may worsen resource shortages. According to various research organisations with a security focus in their publications and political leaders in their statements and interviews, water security is essential for a nation's survival.

Migration has historically benefited all ethnic groups in South Asia and has had a significant social impact.

But when migration is forced because of a lack of resources or because migrants are frequently viewed as outsiders or intruders, a humanitarian crisis results. Recent climate change has increased the severity and frequency of climate-related threats, causing people to evacuate their homes at all costs and exposing them to issues with their health, housing, education, poverty, gender inequality, and other areas. Many Bangladeshis choose to move to India because of India's abundance of land and other non-renewable resources, as well as the lack of economic opportunities and social mobility in Bangladesh. When it comes to the quantity of foreign migrants who travel between the two nations, the route from Mexico to the United States comes in second. Between 12 million and 17 million Bangladeshi immigrants are thought to have arrived in India during the 1950s; the majority of them settled in the north-eastern states of West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura. Many intergovernmental reports and academic research have addressed this, drawing attention to the growing concerns about the global migration from Bangladesh.

In Assam, there has historically been a tendency for violence between immigrant and native communities since the 1970s and 1980s, when significant concentrations of Muslim Bangladeshis immigrated. Due to the high rate of immigration, indigenous communities are increasingly vying with one another for territory. It is debatable whether environmental migrants fleeing the harsh weather in Bangladesh are to blame for the ethnic unrest in Assam (Ziegler, 2013).

While the government has made an effort to address the issues faced by Assamese ethnic groups, violence continues unabatedly and has taken hundreds of lives. The two countries' administrations haven't properly considered how the ongoing hostilities in the region can be exacerbated by its changing climate. The low-lying topography, dense population, and sizeable subsistence agricultural base of Bangladesh all add to the strain on Assam's population flow brought on by climate change. Almost 15 million people may be displaced from due to a rise in storms, desertification, and a scarcity of potable water to support agriculture in the South Asian nation. By 2050, 11 percent of land in Bangladesh will be submerged due to the effect of rising sea, according to an Asian Development Bank Report 2013.

It is expected that Bangladesh will account for the majority of environmental migrants in South Asia since there, mitigating measures won't be sufficient to halt the effects of climate change phenomena like sea level rise. Rising sea levels are anticipated to flood a sizable portion of Bangladesh, potentially forcing its 18 million inhabitants to escape. Population transfers from Bangladesh historically have gone to India, particularly in the north-east, but it is anticipated that this will change because India will not be able to handle the anticipated amount of migrants. This has exacerbated community tensions and placed pressure on already-scarce resources. The current agreements and processes for the Farakka Barrage do not take climate change and the predicted decline in rainfall during the dry season into consideration. According to experts, a basin-wide approach to water management, including Nepal, would be required to appropriately minimise these consequences and ensure that the Ganges has enough flow throughout the dry season.

The majority of Bengali immigrants, wherever they went, left their home country between the ages of 25 and 35, resided in the host country for around half of their lives, and then returned, according to a 2002 study by Siddiqui and Abrar. The ongoing cross-border migration in North-East India over the past few decades has been extremely worrying. Bengali immigrants face competition with locals for resources like land, water, services, and jobs as "settlers" in the region. (Singh 2009) Because of this, their presence is viewed as a possible threat, one that might escalate tensions and violence between locals and migrants and alter the region's demographic and political landscape.

River flow in Bangladesh has diminished as a result of India's damming of the Ganges. Due to the effects of the damming on agriculture and the rise in soil salinity, many people from Bangladesh were forced to relocate to north-east India. The migration of Bangladeshis to India's Assam State has increased racial tensions. If upstream damming changed the Brahmaputra's flow, the likelihood of ethnic conflict between India and Bangladesh might increase. Chinese efforts upstream have the potential to exacerbate the water deficit in the area downstream, which might lead to a significant exodus that would have an impact on the entire region. As the upstream riparian nation of the Brahmaputra, China continues to enjoy favourable circumstances. Theoretically, it might choose to hide hydrological information and create the infrastructure required to deliberately prevent water from flowing downward. In Bangladesh, excessive groundwater use has caused supplies to decline. Climate change, which includes less rain during the rainy season, has made the situation worse.

It is challenging to find water for drinking and agriculture during the dry season since many wells fall below a particular level and stop functioning. The lower rainfall brought on by climate change is anticipated to make recharge worse. The issue might become much worse with any more challenging river growth.

The climate and insurgency from porous borders have caused problematic migratory politics in South Asia in recent years. Another significant possibility is that people will move from Bangladesh to India as a result of cyclones or other rapid-onset events like rising sea levels. In the case of Bangladeshi migrants entering states in India's northeast, an increase in migrant flows could exacerbate tensions over the country's ongoing illegal immigration patterns. Although deforestation and human encroachment have made flood conditions worse and made it more difficult for Bengalis to access natural resources, Bangladesh has traditionally been subject to natural disasters.

As a result, many millions of Bengalis have migrated to the states of Assam and Tripura in northeastern India. Migrations have harmed native cultures, changed the balance of political power in many states, and increased competition for scarce resources. In both states, ethnic wars have resulted in the deaths of thousands of people. Tensions between the Bodo tribe and the Muslim community, which had largely grown as a result of an increase in Bangladeshi immigration to the state, erupted in 2012.

Many Bangladeshis—Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Christians, and others—continue to cross the permeable border into the states of Assam, West Bengal, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Tripura, which are bordering India. They do so in search of fortune and a higher standard of living, but peace and tranquilly are what they most desire. Overpopulation, political unrest, economic hardship, a lack of security for one's life and possessions, and natural and man-made disasters are a few of these issues (Das, 1980).

All of these factors combined with the perceived fear of the indigenous population of losing their identity and culture in their own country, similar to the other northeastern states of Tripura and Sikkim, as a result of extensive migration from neighbouring countries and states (although this fear cannot be supported by reliable statistics) have further exaggerated the issue (Hazarika, 2000). Due to the lack of a formal Agreement or Accord between the governments of India and Bangladesh on the return of illegal migrants as well as the government of Bangladesh's denial that any of its citizens had emigrated to India illegally, the matter has gone unresolved for a long time (Ramachandran, 2005). The lack of a coherent strategy to handle the enormous influx, along with insufficient border administration, an undelineated boundary of 40.6 km, a second boundary in dispute of 6.5 km, and India's proximity to Bangladesh make the issue significantly worse (Pathania, 2003), The largest problem, however, is that the authorities can't discern the difference between legal and illegitimate settlers because these territories are ethnically, culturally, and linguistically identical to Bangladesh's and Assam's border districts (Weiner, 1983). As a result, the perceived threat to the state's stability and security as well as the identity of its indigenous people is Assam's top concern right now (Sinha, 1998).

Hugo (2003) asserts that there would be a large demand for international movement if global warming causes the sea level to rise dramatically, burying significant areas of Pacific and Indian Ocean islands and heavily populated lowlands in nations like Bangladesh. Several climate studies have shown that by 2050, the rising sea level would put an estimated 26 million Bangladeshis in danger (Brauch, 2002).

The "Climate Change Perception Study 2012 " by the Asia Foundation on Bangladesh found that 96% of respondents had personally experienced a natural disaster and associated climate change with these characteristics. The study asserted that this phenomenon's primary effect was the loss of agriculture, which contributed to food security. Forecasts indicate that South Asian countries would likely have a severe food crisis by the year 2050, and that the issue of food security will only get worse over time. Just a few instances of the extreme weather that is anticipated to occur more frequently and severely include floods, hurricanes, and droughts. For instance, according to data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the South Asian monsoon is predicted to get stronger by 2050 and bring up to 20% more rain to eastern India and Bangladesh.

According to Larry Elliott (2014), in many of the documented instances of environmental challenges, the mobility of people and the ensuing intergroup rivalry have considerably aided in the ongoing escalation of the conflict scenario. Climate change-related migration is frequently intrastate, but it can also be international. Like any other catastrophe, when a place can no longer sustain life, the inhabitants decide to move. Such migration is frequently temporary rather than long-term. When there are already unfavourable socioeconomic conditions existing, such as poverty and a lack of sufficient resources, conflict is more likely to occur. Migration has economic implications.

The majority of relevant large-scale empirical studies on the link between conflict and climate change focused on simple meteorological indicators as potential indicators of intergroup and civil conflict (e.g., Buhaug 2010; Burke et al. 2009; Couttenier and Soubeyran 2013; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Fjelde and von Uexkull 2012; O'Loughlin et al. 2012; Raleigh and Kniveton 2012; Theisen 2012). Despite the fact that all of these analyses were restricted to Africa or particular regions of the continent and by design took into account some contextual factors, only a few specifically took into account interactive and conditional climate effects, and they all fell short of establishing a comprehensive and reliable link between climate change and conflicts.

Another, more encouraging phase of research is to simulate climate-conflict linkages in a staged manner, taking into account the conflict impact of unfavourable socioeconomic developments that are predicted to be impacted by swift climatic alterations (e.g. Buhaug et al. 2015; Caruso, Petrarca, and Ricciuti 2016; Koubi et al. 2012; Schleussner et al. 2016; Smith 2014; van Weezel 2015; Wischnath and Buhaug 2014). There is a wealth of literature that links climate change with conflict in an indirect manner, with the intermediate effects of food poverty, production shocks, and migration standing out. Before we can make certain statements regarding the nature and strength of such linkages, more research is necessary. It highlights an innovative area of study that uses the lens of political ecology to address socio-environmental problems.

5.3 Analysis of the Political Approach and Governance:

There is currently no compelling research-based material demonstrating how existing issues can escalate in violence and pose a serious threat to national and regional security, despite the fact that the Indian government is now viewing Bangladeshi migration as a security concern. The government's top priority is to retaliate harshly against the 30 million projected undocumented immigrants. In order to decrease the number of unauthorised Bangladeshi migrants crossing into India, the Indian government has increased border security over time and started constructing a barrier all the way along the border with Bangladesh. It has sometimes deported unauthorised Bangladeshi immigrants as well. Also, there are growing conflicts between the Bangladeshi and local Indian communities. The massive influx of immigrants from Bangladesh, especially in border states, has changed the demographics and way of life in the north-eastern Indian states. The most well-known example is from the Indian state of Assam, which has long offered refuge to Bengali immigrants, regardless of whether they have legal papers or not. Nonetheless, animosity is increasing between Bangladeshis and Assamese-born Indians.

The growing influx of Bangladeshi immigrants into Assam, particularly the Bodo ethnic minority, threatens the state's territory, resources, rights, and identity. Bangladeshi deportation proposals were prominently discussed during the most recent elections in Assam. Given the high levels of existing enmity between local Indian populations and Bangladeshi immigrants and the Indian government's security posture towards unregistered Bangladeshi migrants, a sudden influx of Bangladeshi climate-induced migrants won't be warmly welcomed. In a similar vein, if Bangladesh insists that there is no illegal migration from its territory to India's north-eastern region, India will not be able to provide Bangladesh with the evidence that any Bangladeshi citizens are living there illegally. Nonetheless, the major political parties and previous Indian administrations have repeatedly vowed to track down foreigners who are allegedly living illegally in different parts of the country. India continues to steer clear of discussing the issue with Bangladesh. Nonetheless, ethnic communities' concerns about being disproportionately outnumbered by non-indigenous people there have been linked to the emergence of organised resistance actions in the country's north-eastern region. As a result, a number of agreements have been reached in which the central government promised to making an effort to track down foreigners from the region. The country's modified citizenship laws and Assam's recently updated citizens' registration have angered several of the region's ethnic minority.

The ruling administration had stated that the National Register of Citizens (NRC) would be finished throughout India by 2024 once the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) was put into effect; nevertheless, two contentious laws have recently been filed in connection to ongoing conflicts. Since India has historically been a centre for illegitimate migration, particularly in Northeast India, the government insisted that the NRC will create a registry that will remove anyone who cannot verify their identification, including immigrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Many academics believe that this behaviour is detrimental to society.

Although it would be challenging for illegal immigrants from Bangladesh to oust the upper levels of the Assamese middle class, the early signs of such economic upheaval are obvious for the lower classes. It was hoped that these illegals would be hired when 5000 constable vacancies were advertised in Assam at the beginning of the year to assist fill the vacuum left by local youth unemployment. The proceeding was thankfully stopped by the judiciary. Yet when illegal immigrants gain political influence and numbers do count, getting a bigger piece of the economic pie will only take a matter of time.

5.3.1 Government Action Plan – Controversial Citizenship Bills

Due to the NRC procedure being done twice in Assam in fast succession (in December 2017 and July 2018), four million applicants were unable to apply for Indian citizenship. In a subsequent drought in July 2019, approximately two million people were taken off the list of citizens. 2019 (Sharma). A wide spectrum of civic and political groups were unhappy with the outcome, vulnerable people were left in perilous situations, and some people were reluctant to leave their flooded homes out of fear that they could lose papers that would jeopardise their NRC status (Barbora 2019). The NRC system relies on individuals being able to present proof of citizenship and on the state being able to process this proof, which attests to possessions, employment, and residency evidence. India has utilised various bureaucratic methods in the past, with unpredictable and occasionally devastating outcomes. Gupta 2012, explained the confusion created by what at first glance appears to be a reasonable governmental apparatus could have unintended consequences and prolong structural violence that is supported by the state against the weak and vulnerable poor, making it difficult for them to obtain basic commodities. The Assam NRC draft that followed raised several issues with corruption, targeted citizenship sweeps, and a disregard for paperwork (Paulose 2019). Barbora (2019) also claims that "the poor suffer bureaucratic indifference much more profoundly and personally than others, particularly because their capacity to maintain documents and comply to legal processes is relatively limited" (19). The majority-Muslim districts were found to have the highest rejection rates, partially as a result of the Muslim population's poverty and illiteracy, which prevented them from having the necessary documentation to prove their citizenship and from understanding the processes or available technology to update their NRC status (Ranjan 2021).

Several Muslim women lacked official documents other than certificates supplied by local panchayats, which refused by the apex as national identity documents to prove citizenship. The exclusionary process was thus glaringly sexist (Tarai 2020). Voters who were excluded from NRC draft were categorised as "D" voters, and the Foreigners' Tribunals made decisions about their futures. The Assam government is actively extending the development of detention facilities though many of those arrested are being held in jail cells until others waiting. No steps have been done to acknowledge deportees as nationals of Bangladesh, despite directives from the Highest Court to establish contact with that country. As the majority of them entered India illegally, those who lose their appeals will forfeit their claim to citizenship (Bagchi 2017). Instead of making the assumption that people who aren't included on the NRC lists are inevitably illegal or aren't Indian citizens, we emphasise the negative consequences of doing so (considered to have a state to return to). Forecasting potential for

Assam in 2019, CAA and the NRC administration were both considered as a state modernization initiatives that could potentially lead to statelessness in practise.

Children with any one parent designated as illegal would be ineligible for citizenship by naturalisation or lose citizenship (Bagchi 2017), making statelessness a "inherited" condition. This disqualifier from citizenship was added by the Assam Accord's changes to citizenship laws, particularly the legalisation of the 2005 CAA. The outcomes of these controversial drafts are exacerbated by these changes after the Assam Accords. Many restrictions brought on by minor modifications to Indian citizenship rules, which intended to be eased by the 2019 CAA, but only for specific groups. Opponents argue that this is nonsensical, runs against the democratic principles of India, is unconstitutional, and unfairly discriminates the Muslims. The most terrifying aspects of the Assam case for the interested observers were the failures of the NRC exercise (corruption, targeting, and the enormous burden of proof), the exclusion of residents from the various draft, the treatment of these now non-citizens with precarious status in India (arrest, incarceration, and detention), and the threat of deportation and statelessness. With a flexible cut-off date and the removal of the residency requirement, the CAA might be modified to include other religious minorities, but detractors assert that some people would still be exposed to the unfavourable effects of imprisonment, deportation, and statelessness. The NRC's flaws and impacts will disproportionately affect rustic, tribal, slum-dwelling, homeless, and impoverished communities since they will find it difficult to fill out the requisite paperwork due to, among other things including lack of education, incompetence, and impoverishment (Shitole 2020). Moreover, the minority Muslims, came to India won't be able to prove that they did so out of fear of being persecuted (Chandrachud 2020).

Hence, many Muslim minority community may see risks to their safety and security as well as considerable financial and emotional costs (Shitole 2020). The Assam case serves as a cautionary tale regarding the negative effects and possible dangers of a nationwide adoption of NRC practises. The Assam case highlights two major issues: the removal of undocumented immigrants from Indian citizenship and the lack of a strategy for addressing statelessness that would be brought about by such bureaucratic procedures. According to Matthew Gibney (2009), the greatest injustice faced by stateless persons is not the absence of a state in which they can call home, but rather the state's failure to recognise them as citizens. Due to India's general shift towards jus sanguinis (citizenship by ancestry) and more stringent jus soli (citizenship by birth) rules, many people may be compelled to live in a political-legal vacuum. India is required by the 1984 Torture Convention to support the principle of nonrefoulement, however those who are deemed illegal cannot be threatened, hence it does not apply to them (Sen 2015). The condition of those unable to authenticate their citizenship, excluded from NRC exercises, and rendered stateless is possibly worse than that of refugees because they cannot benefit from the principles of non-refoulement6 or coerced re-admittance (Sharma 2019).

The 2019 CAA and the NRC administration are both considered state modernization initiatives that could potentially lead to statelessness in practise. Children with any one parent designated as illegal would be ineligible for citizenship by naturalisation or lose citizenship

(Bagchi 2017), making statelessness a "inherited" condition. This disqualifier from citizenship was added by the Assam Accord's changes to citizenship laws, particularly the legalisation of the 2005 CAA. The outcomes of these bills are exacerbated by several changes. The 2019 CAA would ease a number of restrictions brought on by minor adjustments to specific groups. The argument put forth by critics is that this is illogical, goes against India's secular foundations, and unfairly discriminates against Muslims in India.

5.4 Climate Change, Conflicts and Governance

The fights in the NER have certain peculiar characteristics, including asymmetry, ambiguity, and difficulty identifying allies and foes. They are also waged unconventionally, employing political and psychological strategies, and eventually they tend to develop into drawn-out battles of attrition. Violence in the region is also exacerbated by the state government's failure to provide adequate protection. This has led to the development of alternative ethnic militia organisations for security. A private ethnic militia is viewed by its ethnic base as a more dependable source of security when attacked by another ethnic group that has its own militia. The State government frequently fails to maintain security when there is ethnic unrest, and the Army's actions are perceived as political.

Together with shifting patterns of human settlement and floods, Assam has a turbulent past marked by internal conflicts between competing religious and ethnic factions. The conflict between Muslim Bangladeshi immigrants and members of the Bodo tribe is one of the most serious of these disputes. The Bodo are an indigenous people of Western Assam, making up around 5% of the state's total population. After fighting the government for years, they were finally granted a modest level of autonomy over 3,000 settlements in 2003. Nonetheless, in recent years, they have frequently struggled with Muslim immigrants over land rights. Almost 400,000 people were forced to flee their homes, and nearly 100 individuals died as a result of the largest fighting, which took place last summer. The Bodo and other indigenous populations' anti-immigration attitudes arose as a result of rumoured but unverified incidents by Bengalis, which had a catastrophic impact that was equal to that of the actual conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. Even groups purporting to represent indigenous Assamese tribes held a press conference to demand that illegal immigrants be detained in camps or placed under house arrest. The violence in Assam also continued to affect the entire country as hundreds of residents boarded buses to return home to support indigenous marches and demonstrations. Where is all this data coming from? You need to provide citations.

Climate change-related stressors may have domino effects that amplify underlying tensions and eventually upset social, political, and economic cycles. For a place like Assam, where stability is already threatened by war and widespread population migration, the risk is doubled.

5.4.1 Existing Conflicts and Security Dynamics

Resentment of "foreigners," or people from outside Assam, whose language and culture are very different from Assamese, is the biggest ethnic problem in the region (i.e. Bangladesh). The "foreigners' agitation" of 1979-1985 propelled Assam into the forefront.

The problem may be dated back to the first decade of the 20th century, when landless people started migrating to the lush Brahmaputra valley, which had previously been largely fallow, from East Bengal's adjacent overpopulated districts. During the racial disturbances in East Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, other waves of migration from the minority group there took place. Eventually, a second wave of immigration—this time involving members of the dominant group—was brought on by rising unemployment, land fragmentation, and the struggle for Bangladesh's independence. Because of their fear of being "swamped" politically and culturally, Assamese people developed resentment, which led to one of the longest and most intense agitations in independent India. Although though the Union and State Governments have given the process of finding and expelling unlawful migrants (foreigners) a high priority, the problem nevertheless persists. The "original" residents assert that "vote bank politics" is to blame, and those who share the religious and linguistic traits of the "foreigners" assert that they are being bullied and harassed.

In the years preceding up to the CAA in 2019, concern that the indigenous people living in the NER could lose their identity, culture, and land was on the rise once more. Now that Assamese is the primary language of 48% of the population, many fear that Assamese may face a similarly gloomy future as Tripura, where the indigenous population has been reduced to 30% and has lost more than 40% of its territory to immigration. It is undoubtedly believed that the fears are the result of xenophobia, but this is inaccurate because land is crucial to populations whose livelihoods depend on subsistence farming. When the state cannot provide security, people's greatest fear is not of religion or the "other," but of really losing their livelihood and way of life. The CAA facilitates more immigration, putting the linguistic, cultural, and social fabric of the area under peril. That can be a sign of ethnic unrest.

The loud protests in December 2019 have specifically targeted the one thing the people believe they have been able to hold onto—their identity—after years of historical marginalisation. The sense of danger permeates the NER as a whole. Native People who reside in border regions face challenges in establishing and maintaining the integrity of their cultural identity. The bulk of the locals are subsistence farmers who lack any legal or constitutional provisions to guarantee their ownership of the land. It was believed that the CAA was laying the groundwork for unregulated demographic shifts that would also affect their political human rights to unrestrictedly occupy their territories.

My thesis on the relationship between climate change and conflict in Bodoland (Assam) provides several key insights into climate security and the lessons that can be drawn from this for climate security scholarship. Firstly, my research highlights the importance of adopting a holistic and integrated approach to climate security that takes into account the complex and dynamic relationships between climate change, conflict, and security. This involves recognizing the multiple drivers of conflict and insecurity in the context of climate change, and the need to develop solutions that are inclusive, sustainable, and context-specific. Secondly, my research emphasizes the need for greater attention to be paid to the experiences and perspectives of local communities in climate security scholarship and policy. This involves recognizing the ways in which climate change is affecting the livelihoods and well-being of vulnerable communities, and the importance of engaging these communities in the development of climate security strategies. Overall, my thesis provides important insights into the complex and dynamic relationships between climate change, conflict, and security in the context of Bodoland, and the lessons that can be drawn from this for climate security scholarship more broadly. By adopting a holistic, inclusive, and political ecology approach to climate security, we can better understand the complex and pressing challenges posed by climate change and conflict, and work towards more sustainable and equitable solutions.

It is well acknowledged that a number of factors, including climate change, interact with one another to cause conflict (or build peace). The region's most likely to experience conflict as a result of climate change also tend to have pre-existing tensions, even if focusing primarily on areas with a reliance on primary production and little opportunity for adaptation unfairly confines our knowledge of conflict outcomes. Conflict makes people more vulnerable to climate change. Conflict may arise as a result of adaptation efforts.

Moving beyond linear studies of how climate change impacts conflict results in more effective methods to understanding the link between climate and conflict, according to the political-ecological literature. Despite the clear bifurcation of the conflict-climate-change link, the threat multiplier frame, a conflict risk lens, continues to dominate much of the scientific research and policymaking groups working on this subject. Although it is essential to shifting away from causative frames evident in both older environmental security discourses and certain current climate-security framings, the threat multiplier paradigm is unidirectional and provides no information about the dimensions, both temporally and geographically, on which climate change may interact with conflict.

I contend that this disparity stems from past studies on the subject primarily ignoring the problem of how to effectively address the link between changing climate and conflict. Vivekananda, Schilling, and Smith (2014) offered a case study while stressing the limits of substantial research. The statistical literature's emphasis upon showing connections and demonstrating causation between changing climate and conflicts has provided little value to the peace-building world, despite the fact that it fails to explain how these two phenomena may be connected. We believe that knowledge and practise might benefit from the qualitative, very particular spatial and temporal framings that have distinguished research on

the climatic change and conflicts intersections at various level. This sort of study conducts in-depth evaluations of specific conflict situations in order to discover areas for beneficial intervention such as programme creation, adaptation, or conflict abatement. It also provides explanations to war and climate change trends observed in general literature. Yet, in order for these in-depth, qualitative discoveries to be valuable and generally applicable, they must investigate useful links between case-based research and bigger statistics that enable its comprehensive conclusions to lead work in a broader variety of scenarios.

A more efficient strategy for policy making that attempts to tackle the connections between changing climate and conflicts will result from shifting further than conceptual frameworks that are only grounded in security vulnerabilities, most particularly the idea of "changing climate as a threat multiplier" and engaging directly to concepts like conflict as a component in environmental issues vulnerability and the possible risks of adaptation efforts.

It is well acknowledged that a number of factors, including climate change, interact with one another to cause conflict (or build peace). Although there are currently tensions in the areas where conflicts are most likely to occur as a result of climate change,

Academics have long thought that environmental degradation and climate change could be factors in migration and war. Although these projections are frequently dismal and apocalyptic in nature, it appears that everyone is calculating the threat posed by climate change and the following population shift that it will bring about. Because of this, the problem now appears to be almost outside the purview of government intervention. Even though the worst-case scenario has not yet occurred, climate change is still a hot topic in politics and academics, and awareness of it is expanding over time. Although global attempts to reduce greenhouse gas have demonstrated to be futile and arctic ice shelves are still melting at an accelerated rate, there is still time to address climate change, but there is also time for the worst scenarios to materialise.

One of the elements that has contributed to the relevance of climate-induced migration is the relationship between the nexus between security and migration caused by the environment. It shouldn't be surprising that a variety of actors endorse this perspective and circumstances. There is a lot of research that investigates how migration difficulties have been susceptible to securitization processes over the past few decades, both empirically and theoretically, if we concentrate on the "mobility" side of the nexus (such as Huysmans, 2006; Bigo & Guild, 2005; Cohen, 2006; Watson, 2009; Bigo, 2002). The relationship between climate change and migration has received more attention in policy and advocacy circles, but less so in scholarly ones. Few scholars have acknowledged the connection between environmental/climatic pressures and resource shortages and conflicts, notably regards to climate induced migration (Burke et al., 2009; Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994; Reuveny, Maxwell, et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2007).

Bettini, G. (2013) argued that most academic studies (e.g., Barnett, 2000; Dalby, 2009; Detraz & Betsill, 2009; Deudney, 1990; Hartmann, 1998; Nords & Gleditsch, 2007; Raleigh, 2011; Scheffran, Brzoska, Brauch, et al., 2012) have been important in establishing the link between climate change and security. The claim that climate impacts will result in conflicts is debatable

due to the patchy empirical evidence supporting it (Nords & Gleditsch, 2007; Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, et al., 2012), methodological problems (Baechler, 1998; O'Lear & Diehl, 2007), normative presumptions, and political implications (Barnett, 2000; Dalby, 2009; Hartmann, 2010; Smith, 2007; White, 2011). Reading the arguments and failure to understand climate-security and conflicts connections, political ecology lens ideally provided more clarity.

This thesis investigated how migration and conflict have been impacted by climate change in Assam (North-East India). In this setting, climate change is a common occurrence, but it grafts onto existing complex and troubled civilizations. Many interethnic clashes and local conflicts have caused millions of people to be uprooted since the country's establishment. Moreover, droughts have frequently compelled people to give up their land. The conflicts are so complex and intricate that it is hard to reduce them to climate change. This form of simplification also shifts focus from the socio-political issues that interact with climate change to it. Conflict-related migration appears to be a factor in Bangladesh, where it also appears to be the primary reason of movement. Pastoralists are put under increased pressure when agricultural land deteriorates as a result of climate change.

Many aspects of climate change and its effects on security have been researched, examined, and debated from a variety of angles on a worldwide scale. However, it appears that there were no political talks on the same level in Bangladesh and India. Because of a variety of factors, most notably a general lack of awareness, environmental concerns have received little attention in both countries' political cultures and public discourse. The report provides a lens through which to view the prioritisation of boosting regional security preparation to face emerging challenges and building resilience. Political ecology studies may provide knowledge that can be used to reformulate and put into practise governmental policies. The study will serve as a resource for future academics, particularly those studying and specialising in the South Asia region and examining the region's security paradigm. Understanding of how climate change affects peace and security is rising, but there is also evidence that the numerous international forums, aid programmes, and climate change projects may create an ideal setting for dialogue between opposing sides to further their peaceful coexistence. To better understand the risks and opportunities presented by climate change, regional research findings and national and international policy processes must be linked. We might be able to fill the "missing centre" required for context-appropriate policy responses by addressing both sides of the problem.

We conclude that political ecology's (and "geography's") contributions to the conflict and climate change debates run counter to claims that climate change is a hazard multiplier and claims that climatic vulnerability and conflict are related. Political ecology studies, however, draw attention to the risks of conflict-instigating climate adaptation measures as well as the potential advantages of climate change for encouraging peace. Also, it was asserted that evaluations that are grounded, nuanced, and politically conscious may offer recommendations that are more insightful and practical than those that come from oversimplifying models. In fact, the argument that climate change—in the form of a severe drought—was a major contributing factor in the outbreak of the Syrian war provides a great example of how to employ a political ecology approach in discussions of the connections

between the environment and conflicts. Selby et al. (2017a) refuted the claim made by Kelley et al. (2015) that climate change has had a significant impact on the conflict in Syria since 2011. For instance, Kelley et al. (2015) used data from the Fertile Crescent, a region that is home to many countries, including Syria. They did not use rainfall data, despite claiming that the drought brought on by climate change was the cause of the war. Selby et al. (2017a, b) come to the conclusion that there is no conclusive evidence that climate change started (or caused) the Syrian war, led to internal movement inside Syria, or sparked emigration from the nation after reviewing a number of sources. Furthermore, Selby (2018) argues that political ecology, exactly because it encourages regionally localised and in-depth inquiries, provides a suitable framework for understanding the Syrian war. He concludes that long-term structural problems such severe water resource degradation, the failure of an oil-driven agrarian development model funded by oil rents (which failed), and the unique histories in a contested border region were the primary causes of the war.

This research leaves us with several important directions for future research, including the need for more comprehensive and nuanced analyses of the complex and dynamic relationships between climate change, conflict, and security in different contexts, and the implications of these relationships for policy and practice. Future research could also explore the potential for climate change adaptation and mitigation measures to contribute to peacebuilding and conflict resolution in different contexts, and the ways in which these measures can be designed and implemented in a sustainable and inclusive manner. Finally, future research could explore the potential for new and innovative approaches to climate security that are grounded in the perspectives and experiences of local communities, and that prioritize the needs and well-being of vulnerable populations. Overall, my thesis provides a valuable starting point for future research on climate security, and underscores the urgent need for a more integrated, inclusive, and gender-sensitive approach to addressing the complex and pressing challenges posed by climate change and conflict in the South Asian region and beyond.

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Appendix 1: Acronyms

AAGSP - All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad

 AAMSU - All Assam Minority Students Union

 AASU - All Assam Students' Union

ABSU - All Bodo Students Union

ACF - Adivasi Cobra Force

AGP - Assam Gana Parishad

AIUDF - All India United Democratic Front

ALRD - Association for Land Reform Development BBS Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics

BLT - Bodo Liberation Tigers

BPL - Below Poverty Line

BSF - Border Security Force

BTC - Bodoland Territorial Council

CHT - Chittagong Hill Tract

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

CPI - Communist Party of India

DDT - Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane

DHD - Dima Halim Daogah

DIG - Deputy Inspector General of Police

FGD - Focus Group discussion

HCR - Head Count Ratio

HPC-D - Hmr People's Convention-Democracy

IDP - Internally Displaced Persons

IMDC - Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

IMDT - Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal

INC - Indian National Congress

IOM - International Organization for Migration

IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ISI - Inter-Services Intelligence

KLNLF - Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front

KLO - Kamatapur Liberation Organization

MULTA - Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam

NDFB - National Democratic Front of Bodoland

NGO - Non-Governmental Organization

NPR - National Population Register

NPRTI - National Population Training Institute

NRC - National Registration of Citizen

PHC - Public Health Centers

PIP - Prevention of Infiltration from Pakistan

PTCA - Plains Tribal Council Association

SRDI - Soil Resources Development Institute

ULFA - United Liberation Front of Assam ULFBAUnited Liberation Front of Barak Valley

UN-DESA - United Nation Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNDP - United Nation Population Division

UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

 UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UPDS - United People's Democratic Solidarity

UTNLA - United Tribal Liberation Front

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