The G7 and the management of International Order: The Return of the Old School

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I confirm that the work submitted is my own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

This thesis argues that the role of the G7 in world politics has been largely overlooked by the English School (ES) approach to International Relations. Returning to the thinking of what I define as an 'Old School' group of scholars within the early ES this thesis makes four key contributions to ongoing debates within the ES.

First, the thesis adds theoretical and empirical insight to the importance of economic power within the ES's understanding of legitimacy, and development of shared norms and values. Second, returning to early ES work on the role and responsibility of Great Powers, applying this to the evolution of the G7, the thesis argues that the G7 has similarities with past conceptions of Great Power management of international order.

Third, the thesis argues that the rise of the G7 has not been uncontested; this contestation has been fundamental in shaping the shared norms and values held by the G7. In turn, analysis of the evolution of these shared norms and values, including the G7's response to the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, provides empirical evidence that the G7 does not fit within the pre-existing categories of primary or secondary institutions in the ES. Instead, the thesis argues that the G7 represents a global, but not globally representative, form of solidarist international society.

Fourth, from this historical analysis of the G7 I develop an original framework for understanding the importance of historical norms in shaping contemporary world politics. The Norms Crisis Model (NCM) establishes how historical norms can be revived by key international actors and then re-emerge into world politics. Engaging with overlooked aspects of early ES work the NCM demonstrates the continued importance of an interpretivist approach within the ES. In turn, the NCM has wider implications for the study of historical norms in international relations.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

AFC	1997 Asian Financial Crisis
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
COP21	United Nations Climate Conference in Paris
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CTAG	G8 Counter-Terrorism Action Group
ECB	European Central Bank
ES	The English School approach to International Relations theory
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G5	Group of Five (Finance Ministers)
G7	Group of Seven (Summit, Finance Ministers, Leaders)
G8	Group of Eight (Summit, Finance Ministers, Leaders)
G20	Group of Twenty (Summit, Finance Ministers, Leaders)
G24	Group of Twenty-Four (coordinating aid to Eastern Europe)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GFC	2008 Global Financial Crisis
ICC	International Criminal Court
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IEA	International Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations Theory
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCM	Norms Crisis Model
NDB	BRICS New Development Bank
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P5	Permanent Five Member States of the United Nations Security Council
PPEG	The G8 Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Experts Group
UK	United Kingdom

UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States of America
WFP	World Food Programme
WMDs	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

Chapter 1 – Introduction

'Finally, my purpose in writing this book is not to prescribe solutions or to canvass the merits of any particular vision of world order or any particular path that might lead to it. My purpose, or at least my conscious purpose, is the purely intellectual one of inquiring into the subject and following the argument wherever it might lead.' (Bull, 2002a, p.xxxv)

Recent literature on the structures of global governance have argued that concepts of Great Power politics are a relic of the past, or where they do still exist, they are siloed into economic activities only (Finnemore and Jurkovich, 2014, p.361). This thesis argues that a historical analysis of the evolution of the Group of Seven (G7), using an English School (ES) lens, can help demonstrate that the framework of Great Power management of the international order remains significant and that this remit of maintaining order has expanded well beyond the G7's original economic focus.

The historical roots of the G7's emergence into world politics lay in the geopolitical upheaval of the 1970s, which challenged the pre-existing framework of international economic order and the institutional structures upon which the post-1945 international economic system had rested (Thompson, 2022, p.8-9). However, as Ferguson (2011, p.1-21) rightly points out, the 1970s were largely a period of crisis for the Anglophone world, resulting in part from the non-Western challenge to economic and political hegemony (Getachew, 2019). Ferguson (2011, p.18) is also correct to identify that the 1970s sowed the seeds of future disorder as much as they created the framework of responses to international crises that are still with us today.

Put simply, the past decisions that shaped the creation of the G7 are still relevant today and this is demonstrated by the G7 recently being described by US national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, as 'the steering committee of the free world' (Sullivan, 2023; Rachman, 2023a), a viewpoint that underpins its increasingly important role in shaping the Western-led response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In the past, the G7's role in world politics had largely been understood from a global governance (Dobson, 2007) and international political economy perspective (Baker, 2000; Payne, 2008). The G7's evolution to a leadership position in responding to the Russo-Ukraine war has demonstrated that there is a gap in the field of international relations and IR theory in understanding how an informal group of elitist states plays such an important role in shaping the global response at a time of international crisis.

This thesis situates the G7 more firmly within the field of IR theory, specifically within the ES, where it has largely been overlooked. In doing so, the thesis makes five specific contributions to the field of international relations, IR theory, the ES, and the norms literature.

First, it stresses the importance of studying the evolution of the G7 longitudinally, thus demonstrating how the G7 has gradually increased its influence and power over formal international institutions and organisations and/or has circumvented them to achieve its aims.

Second, it argues that by using an ES lens we can better understand the increasing resemblance that the G7 has to a forum of Great Power politics and how the G7's role in managing, or attempting to

manage, the international economic order provides a degree of international legitimacy. This, in turn, provides further empirical evidence in the development of the ES's understanding of contemporary world politics and the importance of economics and Great Power responsibility, highlighting the still relatively overlooked aspect within the ES of how economic power can come to underpin a 21st Century example of a 19th Century Great Power Concert.[1]

Third, it argues that by returning to some early thinking in the ES it is possible to identify a group of scholars who employed a specifically historical framework to understand change in world politics and how this thinking shaped the ES's development of the concept of international order and the relations between states that formed international societies. This group of scholars, who I define as representing an 'Old School' within the ES approach, had a core focus on historicism that I believe was integral to their ontological, epistemological, and methodological perspective on world politics. By defining this 'Old School' group as integral to the development of the ES, I push the debate for a return to interpretivist strands of the early ES further (see Bevir and Hall, 2020a; 2020b), highlighting how these historical approaches underline the continued importance of Great Power politics in understanding change in the contemporary world.

Fourth, by challenging the pre-existing situating of the G7 within the ES literature as a secondary institution,[2] this thesis argues that the evolution of the shared norms and values held by the G7, as well as its role in exerting Great Power responsibility through the management and control of secondary institutions, means that the G7 aligns more closely with a second-order form of international society that is solidarist in nature. This in turn adds to the growing literature within the ES on differing forms of international society.

Fifth, by highlighting the continued importance of the role of historicism in the ES, and the continued validity of early ES scholars studying the decisions and actions of international elites, this thesis develops a novel conceptual framework for understanding the role and importance of historical norms in shaping global responses to international crises. The development of what I label a 'Norms Crisis Model' (NCM) contributes to the ES by combining elements of Martin Wight's work with the overlooked work of Coral Bell[3] regarding how the fracturing of international society can shape the emergence of conventions, or norms, that are shaped by key actors. This conceptual model also provides an original contribution to the norms literature by unpacking how and why norms may not simply die out but can be revived and re-emerge during international crises.

While this thesis was not originally designed to be a contribution to the now growing literature on crises, or what has now fashionably been termed 'polycrises' (Tooze, 2022),[4] it nonetheless provides

[1] The idea of the G7 being a Concert of powers has been mooted before but never fully developed (Kirton, 1989; Baker, 2006, p.234-238), or has been dismissed (Payne, 2008, p.525). Importantly for this thesis, and the ES, Adam Watson (2009, p.305) argues that the G7 does have similarities to the Concert of Europe, latterly unpicking the 'diffused' hegemonic role the group has the potential to play in world politics (Watson, 2007).
[2] See Naylor (2019a; 2019b) who situates the G20, and therefore the G-Summits more broadly, as secondary institutions. Also see Buzan and Schouenborg (2018, p.29-30).
[3] Overlooked in the ES, but not within foreign policy circles in both the US and Australia where Bell's work has had a significant impact (see Ball and Lee, 2014).
[4] Tooze argues that a polycrisis is the result of a convergence of overlapping crises creating a unique problem for the world. Yet, as Colin Wight (2001) notes, continuity and change in world politics are historically subjective, meaning that Ferguson may have a point when arguing that this current moment in time is 'just history happening' (Drezner, 2023).

the ES a route into this wide-ranging debate, as well as a novel theoretical contribution to the wider academic field for understanding how key actors respond to, and shape, international crises.

In sum, this thesis opens new debates within the ES about the evolutionary path of international societies that do not fall into the pre-existing categories of global or sub-global forms. As a result, the ideas explored in this thesis are the starting point for a wider debate within the ES on the role of informal international groups in shaping world politics, while opening a door for contemporary ES scholars to rethink the potential relevance and heuristic value of early ES thinking. In this light, the aim is to start a dialogue in the ES about both the past and the present, to stimulate a discussion about the overlooked aspects of world politics within the ES that resemble the past, and to continue Hedley Bull's mantra of always asking difficult questions about what we think we know.

1.1 Thesis structure

This thesis applies an ES lens to an in-depth empirical case study examining the historical evolution of the G7 since its origins in the 1970s to the current day.[5] It situates the increasing importance of the G7 in the management, or attempted management, of international order, and does so through an investigation of early ES scholarship and its focus on the role of Great Power politics. The case study runs as a spinal narrative throughout the thesis, with each empirical Chapter focused on a key period in the evolution of the G7 and its expanding remit, or, as it is presented in this thesis, the investigation of key G7 summit 'cycles'.[6]

The remainder of this first chapter outlines the research design and methodology underpinning the project. It also provides a literature review of the contemporary ES both to situate the importance of the G7 as a subject of study, identifying where the contemporary ES has moved its focus away from some of its earlier scholarship on the role of Great Power politics and the perceived importance of international order amongst dominant powers.

Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework for this thesis by returning to early ES scholarship to unpack the ontological, epistemological, and methodological linkages between six key scholars who I argue form an 'Old School' due to a shared focus on historicism that shaped their outlook on the world while also providing the early foundations of ES thinking. In doing so, the chapter aims to open a debate within the contemporary ES about the heuristic properties of its past and how this scholarship remains relevant. The chapter then allows the case study on the G7 to be analysed, in latter chapters, from the lens of Great Power politics showing that perceptions of history are still integral to understanding contemporary change in world politics, particularly in response to crisis.

Chapter 3 engages with early ES scholarship that hinted at the importance of economic power in shaping international order and marries it to recent ES developments examining economic power. It

[5] The numerical definition of the G7 has changed over time. The first Summit in 1975 was as a G6, with Canada joining in 1976. Russia became an official member in 1998, enlarging the Summit format to the G8. Russia's subsequent suspension and expulsion from the format in 2014 returned the Summit to the G7. This thesis uses the term G7 unless it is essential to temporally make a distinction between the G7/G8.

[6] A Summit 'cycle' is the period of rotation between membership from the hosting of the first G7 Summit to when such hosting responsibilities return to the original Summit host (see Putnam and Bayne, 1987).

then applies this analysis, and its relationship to the management of international economic order by dominant or hegemonic powers, to the emergence of the G7 and its first summit cycle (1975-1981). It argues that perceptions of G7 effectiveness in managing the international economic order, and its ability to respond to international economic crises, provided the G7 with a crucial level of legitimacy in world politics.

Chapter 4 then applies the 'Old School' focus on the changing nature of Great Power politics to the second and third G7 summit cycles (1982-1995). The analysis demonstrates that the G7's remit and responsibility in shaping and managing international order grew from an economic focus to a much wider political remit that included responding to terrorism and the end of the Cold War (see Appendix). It argues that the G7, and the leaders of the G7, perceived themselves to hold a special responsibility to manage international order, and that this concept of responsibility and Great Power politics lay at the heart of much of the early ES scholarship, in particular an 'Old School' focus on the role of international elites.

Chapter 5 engages with the challenges posed to the legitimacy of the G7 by rising economic and political powers in world politics. An analysis of the fourth and fifth G7 summit cycles (1996-2010) demonstrates that the G7 adapted to this increased multipolarity by reframing its mandate, in an attempt to counter the emergence of other informal groupings such as the G20 and the BRICS. It argues that the norms and values showcased by the G7, such as democratic principles, in opposition to the norms of these more pluralistic groups frame a concept of 'normative constraint', whereby the co-habitation of these groups in world politics provides a restraint on the actions of each other. The chapter also demonstrates how the G7 adapted and evolved when faced with these new contestations and constraints, and how it preserved its hegemonic power through the inclusion of G7 states as members of the G20, and the evolving focus of the G7's remit on global issues such as international aid and debt relief.

Chapter 6 builds on this narrative by analysing the sixth and seventh G7 summit cycles (2011-present) and the re-emergence of shared norms and values at the heart of the G7 following the expulsion of Russia from its membership. This analysis is informed by a review of the contemporary ES literature on primary and secondary institutions, arguing that the current perception of the G7 as a secondary institution does not adequately understand how it overlaps across primary and secondary institutional functions in a manner that is overlooked within the contemporary ES focus on formal secondary institutions. This chapter therefore argues that the G7 more closely represents a form of solidarist international society that is global in reach, but not in membership. This chapter makes a direct and original contribution to the contemporary ES by opening a debate about the role of informal global groups such as the G7, and the potentially problematic analytical restrictions within current ES understandings.

Chapter 7 returns to the importance of historicism in understanding change in world politics as laid out in Chapter 2. In doing so, it develops a novel theoretical framework, the Norm Crisis Model (NCM), for understanding how historical norms do not simply die off or become redundant as is often suggested.[7] Instead, by analysing the historical evolution of the G7, the chapter argues that past historical norms can be 'revived' and legitimised by key international actors, thus allowing these norms

[7] See Florini (1996) and Panke and Petersohn (2016). Also see Percy and Sandholtz (2022) who challenge this position.

to ‘re-emerge’ from the past to play a key role in contemporary world politics. The chapter situates this analysis both within the contemporary literature on norms and the development or evolution of norms, but it also returns to overlooked aspects of Martin Wight and Coral Bell’s work on the role of ‘fracture’ points in international politics and the development of conventions, or norms, in response to these international crises. As a result, the development of the NCM provides an original theoretical framework for understanding change in world politics based upon the empirical case study analysis of the G7 provided in preceding chapters.

Chapter 8 provides a summary of the thesis and its contribution to both the ES and the wider field of IR. Moreover, it highlights its contribution to the norms literature by signifying the importance of understanding how the G7 has evolved over time, and the impact this has on our understanding of contemporary international relations. The chapter further identifies future avenues of research stemming from the arguments in the thesis. In doing so, it stresses how the thesis can act as the start of a debate within both the ES, and IR more broadly by questioning assumptions about the role and importance of the past in shaping the present.

1.2 Research design and methodology

This research project has been based on an inductive process[8] that began with my first attendance at a G7 Summit in Germany in 2015. The agreements and statements made at that Summit by the G7 leaders indicated, to me, a perception that they saw themselves as holding a special responsibility in managing the relations between themselves as well as the wider stability of world politics. It struck me at the time that this group of largely Western-based states were acting in a quasi-historical manner that seemed out of place in a contemporary globalised world of ‘rising’ non-Western powers and the transnationalism of non-state-based organisations and institutions. This experience, and my direct observations, sparked an interest in G7 governance and informed my case study selection (see Bates et al, 1998, p.13).

The questions that remained after that Summit involved the seeming dichotomy within the academic literature that saw the G7 as either the epitome of global governance structures or as a largely disparate economic gathering on the margins of the formal structures of world politics (see Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Kirton and Daniels, 1999; Baker, 2006; Dobson, 2007; Payne, 2008; Mourlon-Druol and Romero, 2018). The non-academic literature meanwhile seemed to regard the G7 as either a performative farce or as fundamentally immoral, due to its elitist and non-representative nature (see Hubbard and Miller, 2005).

Later in 2015 I attended the G20 Summit in Turkey, which reflects a broader and more representative format than the ‘Western’ dominated G7. At that time a new narrative had emerged, that saw the G20 as the new pinnacle of global governance structures (see Cooper, 2010; Cooper and Thakur, 2013; Kirton, 2013; Slaughter, 2013a), consigning the G7 to the arc of history. A point of view that I was not entirely convinced of.

[8] See Lamont (2022, p.41) on the inductive process as a research method. A process that both Bull (Navari, 2009b, p.2) and Wight (Dunne and Hall, 2019, p.4) used in their research.

My thinking began to coalesce around the following research questions which formed the initial research design of this thesis.

1. What role does the G7 play in managing 'international order'?

2. Has the G7 moved beyond the economic framing of its origins?

In examining these questions it became clear that the pre-existing frameworks for understanding the role of the G7 lacked a broader understanding of the G7's role in international relations. In fact, at the time of the start of this project, the G7 did not feature within mainstream IR theory as a serious subject of study, beyond the G-Summits representing merely another element amongst a myriad of global governance structures.[9] This suggests that within the field of IR more broadly, but also specifically within the ES, there is a gap in understanding how and where the G7 'fits' in the management of the global political economy and other wide ranging non-economic issues (see Appendix).

This research project therefore became a study not only of the G7, but also of how and why the contemporary ES has overlooked the role the G7 plays in world politics. In beginning to explore the literature surrounding the role of the G7, both past and present, as well as the ES, this project began what became a five-stage inductive methodological process.

First, a review of the literature on the G-Summits demonstrated that there was indeed a gap in situating the G7 within a specific IR approach with any sufficient detail. This gap meant that the IR literature either overlooked the importance of the G-Summits, focusing largely on formal international institutions, or where it did engage with the G7, it did so broadly, rather than using any specific lens to analyse and unpack the evolution of the G7 as a meaningful case study.[10]

Second, the theoretical development phase of the research project began with a broad engagement with the ES literature, including many of the more well-known classical texts as well as the contemporary literature and recent reassessments of the field. This review of the literature demonstrated that beyond a few hints at the importance of the G7 in the ES literature (see Watson, 1990, p.108; 2002, p.153; 2007), the ES has largely overlooked the G7.[11]

It also demonstrated that what Hall (2015) has termed the 'early' ES literature provided a degree of focus on the role of Great Power politics and the historical evolution of hegemonic powers, something that key debates in the contemporary ES had begun to move away from. The central characteristic that the concept of international order, and its management, played in this 'early' scholarship provided some coherence to better understanding of the role the G7 was playing in world politics. Furthermore, the focus of some early ES scholars on historicism suggested that there was analytical worth in examining and using this historical interpretivism as a method to better understand the evolution of the G7 and its role in maintaining international order.

[9] The recent work by Beeson and Bell (2017) and Naylor (2019b) have begun to address this gap.
[10] The work of Slaughter on the G20 (2013) gave an early hint at this gap but the more comprehensive work of Naylor (2019a; 2019b) on the G20 (and in part the G7) was published two years after this initial assessment. Similarly, Slaughter's (2019) edited volume has tried to address this gap in the field of IR for the G20.
[11] Writing in the early 1980s Bull (1983b, p.130) argued that Western states needed to come together to control the anarchy that was developing in international economic relations. Similarly, Bell (1994, p.40) indicates that she saw the G7 as representing the economic side of a new Concert of Great Powers.

Third, identification of this theoretical approach within the ES required a deeper exploration of the early ES work beyond the classical texts, including largely overlooked articles and book reviews,[12] which gave considerable insight into the developmental thinking of many of these ES scholars. From this review it became clear that a number of these early ES scholars shared a similarity of position on the role and importance of historicism in shaping their thinking and their deliberations.[13]

Fourth, having hypothesised a similarity of shared purpose and historicism amongst six specific early ES scholars (all of whom were members of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics and who shared a particular interest and focus on the role of history in shaping world politics) a more comprehensive literature review was conducted *on* these scholars to identify what had been written over the past 30-40 years either as conglomerations of their work and thinking, or as testimonials to their lives and scholarship. The triangulation of the six scholars work, contemporaneous writings about them, as well as contemporary reflections of their thinking, provided the theoretical foundations upon which to develop the argument that these scholars represent something of an 'Old School' within ES historical development. In other words, what emerged from the readings was the theme of a shared ontological understanding of history, epistemological understanding of its usage, and methodological understanding of its focus and importance.

Whilst these scholars disagreed on much, there was nonetheless a purpose to this disagreement, which saw them using historical analysis to shape and challenge their understanding of the present. What is described in this thesis as an 'Old School' set of scholars, within the 'early' ES, differs from the pre-existing reflections that the ES has on who was 'in' or 'out' of a club that has been labelled the 'English School' (see Dunne, 1998; Linklater and Suganami, 2006). The development of a cohesive theoretical challenge to the pre-existing assumptions about the history of the ES itself therefore provided this research with a clearer focus for an original contribution to the field.

Fifth, this framework of 'Old School' historicism was then applied to a historical case study analysis of the evolution of the G7, highlighting the continued importance of understanding Great Power politics in contemporary affairs and the maintenance of international order, while also highlighting where these 'Old School' scholars had not gone far enough in their deliberations on issues such as the importance of economic power, and how the ES has still not fully embraced this aspect of thinking when understanding the relevance of the emergence of the G7 in the 1970s as well as its subsequent growth in influence.

This inductive process led to the following five research questions:

1. In which ways has the ES not taken account of the role of the G7 in managing international order?

[12] Key works by Bull, Butterfield, Wight, and Watson are well known in the ES, yet interesting aspects of the developmental thinking of these scholars, as well as Bell and Howard, can be found in a myriad of book reviews and lesser-known articles, all of which are an important insight into the evolution of the early ES. Watson's very early work, for example, was published under a pseudonym while his latter work on the role of hegemonic powers has largely been overlooked in favour of his more famous evolutionary history.

[13] See Hall (2006, p.19) on how the re-reading of past work in the field can be perceived as both an historical analysis of the evolution of the field itself, but also importantly as a critical assessment of this past works applicability to contemporary world politics.

2. Is there value in returning to the 'early' ES work, which prioritised a focus on international order and the role of Great Power politics?

3. Is there an intellectual cohesiveness related to the use of historical analysis among certain early ES scholars, from which they might be referred to as representing an 'Old School' approach to historicism within the ES?

4. Can this 'Old School' thinking and historical analysis provide a heuristically valuable lens in which to describe and better understand the evolution of the G7 and its role in international relations?

5. Does this analysis provide the foundations for understanding the G7 as an ES solidarist form of international society that is based upon shared norms and values?

The analysis of these research questions, and the methodological process used to develop this thesis then followed the approach of developing a 'thick', or 'analytic', narrative of the evolution of the G7 that paid particular attention to context, accounts of events, individual and elite actions, documents, archival sources, and secondary literature, with the aim of understanding actors' perceptions, preferences and decision-making in order to evaluate the outcomes of these processes (Bates et al, 1998, p.10-13). While narrative accounts have in the past been demonstrated to struggle with levels of accuracy and explanation, a return to the richness of historical descriptive material, or 'thick' descriptive narrative (Bevir and Hall, 2023, p.246) when applied to historical case studies has a long history in the ES approach to understanding world politics (Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.89).[14] As Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, p.357) argue, a qualitative analysis can be beneficial when it is framed with a theoretical lens that provides an evolutionary understanding of events and context with the interpretation of theory providing a challenge to our understanding of the case study itself (also see Bates et al, 1998, p.14-17).[15]

The application of theory to a longitudinal case study analysis (George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett and Elman, 2007, p.172; Gerring, 2019) involving the emergence of the G7 in the early 1970s to the present day was, in essence, the development of a genealogical case study approach (Lamont, 2022, p.224) that traces the evolutionary changes of the subject over time, thus providing the opportunity for a heuristically viable and valuable historical account of the subject (Bennett and Elman, 2006,

[14] See the work of Butterfield (1951b), Wight (1977), the edited collection of Bull and Watson (1989), Watson, (2009). Also see Suganami's (2008, p.355) call for a return to this narrative approach which Suganami caveats with the argument that narrative accounts are not unproblematic, but they are nonetheless a means with which to present claims about the world. Also see Farrell (2001) on the commonality of this type of narrative/case study approach in the development of theory more generally.

[15] An important note here is to recognise that unlike some recent ES work that has engaged substantively with archival research and successfully used this to elaborate on the relationship between theory and historical empirical material (see Yao, 2019; 2022), the G7 as an informal grouping of states has no bureaucracy nor institutional set-up that would facilitate the collection of a resource archive. While the University of Toronto G7/8 Research Group maintains a record of past Summit communiques and statements, there are no archival transcripts of the behind-closed doors meetings between leaders and summit Sherpas. This means that the 'thick' description on the historical record of the Summits remains limited in its scope to the recollections of leaders and summit Sherpas, some of which are tainted by political bias or to individual government documents that are still relatively recent and therefore largely inaccessible. This does not make this methodology unusable, but it is important to recognise the limits and differences between this case study and other historical case studies used in the recent ES literature.

p.459). The development of this case study narrative analysis was enacted through a triangulation[16] of tertiary source material such as academic literature, historical and contemporary secondary sources such as media reports,[17] biographies, autobiographies, policy documents, summit statements and communiques, as well as published interviews with international actors involved in G7 preparations and deliberations. While primary interview data was not available (due to the cancellation of field work resulting from COVID-19) to add to the triangulation of information sources, the use of multiple perspectives on the G7 from different sources still provides validity from the lens of the researcher (Creswell and Miller, 2000) in the thematic identification of the growing role of the G7 in world politics.[18]

Epistemologically and methodologically this research follows in the footsteps of the 'classical' ES approach, in that it seeks to find meaning in the words and actions of agents through an examination of their statements, communiques, speeches, declarations, press statements, biographies, autobiographies, and contemporary and past assessments of these actions and deliberations (see Navari, 2009b; 2011; Wilson, 2012; Brütsch, 2014; Wight, 2021a). However, there are limits to the level of understanding and insight that such an interpretive approach can provide, particularly when absent direct access to the key actors involved. These limits do have wider implications for the conclusions drawn in this research, yet, as Navari (2009b, p.12) notes, the self-conception, and self-justification, of actors' actions shape the discourse surrounding the norms of relations between peoples and states. This means that an analysis of these discourses and the reactions to them provide a degree of insight into both the case study and into how we understand the subject from both an empirical and theoretical perspective (see Bevir and Rhodes, 2004, p.135; Wilson, 2012, p.579; Bevir and Hall, 2020b, p.164). In order to place this approach within current debates, the next section seeks to broadly situate this research in the contemporary ES literature, with Chapter 2 unpacking in detail the analytical cohesiveness that a shared historicism held in underpinning part of the 'classical' ES approach to understanding world politics.

[16] See Burnham et al, 2004, p.165; Flick, 2007; Hodder, 2000, p.704; Gerring, 2019, p.147 on the use of triangulation as a methodological research process.

[17] Leading English language media outlets were reviewed for their coverage of the G7 (and the G20) during, before, and after the holding of Summits while this research was conducted. The reliance upon these largely Western oriented sources has significant limitations on the broad contextual understanding of the Summits from a global perspective. These limits were partially overcome by focusing on sources that are deliberately tailored to have a global reach in their coverage, those from the UK for example included *The Economist*, *The Guardian*, and *The Financial Times*, thus providing a broad sweep of politically orientated coverage of topics and issues. These sources were supplemented by additional international media reportage, albeit again with a focus on media sources that were generally representative of member states of the G-Summits as this was reflected in the focus of their coverage. For example, *New York Times, CNN, DW, France24, The Japan Times, The Japan News, UN News and Foreign Affairs*. *The Economist* also has a useful online historical archive which provided some contextual analysis from its coverage of the early G7 Summits in the 1970s.

[18] The use of news sources to document contemporary historical events and draw analysis of the wider sphere of international relations from these sources is a well-trodden methodological toolkit use by individuals such as Wight and Bell in their early research work by providing insight into the beliefs of key actors on the international stage (Hall, 2006, p.47-51).

1.3 The contemporary English School

Identifying a starting point for defining when the 'contemporary' ES begins is inherently subjective. Yet, it is not hugely presumptuous to argue that the late 1980s and 1990s saw a shift in the ES towards the importance of human rights and 'solidarist' norms led by John Vincent's 1999 work (Dunne, 1998, p.161-180; Linklater, 2011, 1179). The shift is also visible in the work of Wheeler (2000, p.55-284), with its focus on examples of humanitarian intervention and the argument that there is empirical evidence to support the theoretical idea that state responsibilities have translated into a norm of protection via military interventions that breach traditional state-based conceptions of sovereignty.[19] This was an undeniable shift in focus in what had been labelled the ES. A shift that placed the individual at the centre of understanding world politics and its normative implications (Wheeler, 2000, p.1-17; Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.155-188).[20] In essence, Wheeler (2000, p.285-310) unpacked the relationship between state sovereignty acting as the restraint to the protection of individual people in the face of mass atrocities, itself a continuation of Vincent's (1999) analogy of the state as an 'egg box' protection against disorder (see Buzan, 2005a, p.45).[21]

However, the plurality of world politics does not provide fertile conceptual ground for the simple transposition of a Hobbesian domestic analogy (Wight, 1960a) of responsibility. In other words, as Vincent (1999) argued, international society as both a concept and practice is meant to provide a bulwark that preserves both the independence and sanctity of a state from an anarchic system *as well* as that of an international Leviathan (Jackson, 1990) or hegemonic power that wishes to act as a world policeman. Thus, discussions over rights and responsibilities and the solidarist vs pluralist debate, helped frame much of the discourse within the ES during this period (see Jackson, 2003).[22]

Further developments since then have seen Buzan (2005a, p.2-3) explore a potential conceptual shift towards a more transnational, or non-state based, framework of relations that *could* represent[23] the hallmarks of a world society. Despite this changing nature of world society, Buzan (2005a, p.91-91) still maintains that states are a key referent object within the ES approach to understanding world politics.[24] For Linklater (2011), however, Vincent's understanding of Great Power politics was also inherently framed by a focus on understanding how issues such as human rights could be embedded

[19] Although Buzan (2005a, p.39-43) doesn't characterise this phase of the ES in the same way he does point out that Vincent's work shifted towards a more normative 'promotion of an evolution in human political affairs' (2005a, p.42) than what had come before. See also Zhang (2016, p.96).

[20] A point that Wheeler is explicitly clear on when he states that both he and Dunne are 'committed to the same normative agenda of radicalizing the ES and our work on ethics and foreign policy is an attempt to advance the solidarist project of exploring how states might act as guardians of human rights.' (Wheeler, 2000, pxi).

[21] See Gallagher (2012); Ralph and Gifkins (2017); Stefan (2021). Also see McKeil (2022) for an interesting discussion on the concept of disorder in the ES.

[22] Also see Beardsworth (2017, p.111) on the role of a progressive framework for norms based around the perceived responsibilities of states and state actors to defend a plurality of national interests. See Williams (2015) for a reassessment of the traditional ES pluralist perspective.

[23] My thanks to John Williams for clarifying that Buzan does not hold a teleological position on this. Buzan (2005a, p.14) does, in fact, argue that there is a difference between normative theory and theorising about norms. The latter approach Buzan uses in his reassessment of the ES, while he ascribes the former to the work of contemporary ES scholars such as Wheeler (Buzan, 2005a, p.71). Also see Jackson (2009, p.21) on the difficulties of separating these normative strands.

[24] See Pella (2013) for an interesting empirical analysis of how non-state actors can shape and influence the actions of states, albeit with states remaining the referent object that is *being* influenced.

in primary institutions,[25] based upon principles of prudence. Gaskarth (2017) also argues that this 'responsibility' is key to understanding the changing nature, or potential membership, of this primary institution of Great Power politics. Meanwhile Falkner and Buzan's (2022) recent edited volume pushes these ideas of responsibility further by arguing that Great Power politics has a potential role to play in responding to the global threat of climate change.

Challenging these traditional ideas of responsibility, and of the Western/Eurocentric nature of how the concept of international society has been developed or expanded, Gong's (1984) fascinating work on the use of 'standards of civilisation' was followed by Keene's (2002; 2014) analysis of how the European legal framing of rules and norms essentially created the concept of international society in the 16th and 17th Centuries.[26]

Zhang (1991; 1998) has also looked at how these standards of civilisation can shape the entry of states into the exclusivity of international society, an analysis pursued by Suzuki (2009) in linking the emergence of Japan's imperialistic behaviour with entry in the Western club of powerful states. Similarly, the more recent work of Yao (2019; 2022) has further unpacked the use of standards of civilisation in controlling, and creating, a Eurocentric notion of international order through the management of nature, and the continued impact these historical norms have on contemporary world politics.

Zarakol (2011; 2022) meanwhile has explored the importance of non-Western forms of international order and how these have both shaped the emergence of 'European' concepts of international order, challenging universal concepts of the functionality of international order. Pella's (2014) work, and Dunne and Reus-Smit's (2017) edited volume, have both attempted to update the 'expansion' narrative weaved by Bull and Watson's (1989) seminal collection, posing difficult questions for the continued use of Western/Eurocentric foundations within the ES itself, while also using empirical case studies to explore the subaltern or spaces that have been overlooked.[27]

For example, Hansen (2017), and Beeson and Bell (2017), have used historical change as a foresight into the changes that the ES needs to adapt to understand world politics by tackling elements that have been undertheorized. Meanwhile, Klotz (2017) and Towns (2017) have both taken 'revisionist' critiques of the early ES work a step further in trying to challenge the underlying conceptual foundations of the approach.[28] Pella (2013; 2015) similarly goes on to explore the role of non-state

[25] Buzan's (2005a) seminal reassessment of the ES, and refinement of the categorisation of primary and secondary institutions has set the scene for much of the last twenty years of the research agenda.

[26] Also see Buzan (2014b). Interestingly, Keene seems to overlook the more diverse material that Bull published on the role and importance of justice in world politics and the inherent links between this contestation and the past (1971; 1972a; 1975; 1979b; 1980c; 1982b; 1984; 2000a; 2000b; also see Makinda, 2002, p.367-368). Ironically, perhaps, considering the exclusionary focus of Keene's (2002) work, he also seems to completely overlook the work of Coral Bell (1953; 1962a) in contributing to the wider arguments regarding colonial practices in contemporary understandings of international order.

[27] Reus-Smit and Dunne (2017), as well as Klotz (2017) and Towns (2017), argue that this 'expansion' narrative would have benefitted from a different conceptual and theoretical approach. See Williams (2021, p.136) who positions this work as 'correcting' that of Bull and Watson (1989). Also see Green (2020) and Neumann (2023).

[28] See Buzan and Lawson (2015a) for a critique of this critique. Phillips (2017) contribution also provides an interesting historical contribution to the pre-European 'expansion', however, this 'revisionist' approach as he states it seems to overlook the point of the original work, which was not to focus on this 'proto' period of history but specifically, again, to understand the spread of the European form of international society *after* this period. See Kwan (2016).

actors in shaping state actions using non-traditional ES case studies on the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the colonisation of the African continent respectively. These non-traditional empirical approaches have provided many of the novel avenues of research within the ES that Buzan (2016) sees as having great potential as an ES contribution to the field of IR.

This shift to focus on the non-Western aspects of international society has also been accompanied within the contemporary ES by a meta-debate about the classification and definitional qualities of the ES as a grand theory approach. Buzan's (2005a) widely lauded reassessment of the need for definitional specificity has been followed by extensive work on expanding and reframing these definitions (Schouenborg, 2011; Friedner Parrat, 2017; 2020).[29] In fact, Knudsen and Navari's (2019) edited volume exploring the important aspects of the role of international organisations, or secondary institutions, in shaping both primary institutions and world politics, also highlights the pre-existing lacuna within the ES.

However, at no point in this volume on secondary institutions is the G7 referred to as a factor when exploring the relationship between primary and secondary institutions.[30] Instead, the focus is primarily upon *formal* international institutions, with an underlying bias towards those intimately related with, and to, norms of international law. This is perhaps underpinned by the widely held concept that international law is a fundamental institution of international society (Knudsen, 2019a, p.34-35). This potentially helps to explain why groupings of states that are neither underpinned by international law nor institutions in the formal sense are overlooked as to their importance.[31] This gap in the contemporary ES is reinforced by recent ES 'guide' books (Buzan, 2014a; Navari and Green, 2014), which omit any mention of the G7 and its role in world politics.[32]

Recent literature has in fact focused on drawing normative theory back away from the 'margins' of the ES, and perhaps its functionalist drift (see Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018), thus centring it more clearly within a framework for understanding the moral purpose of normative contestation and challenge (Schmidt and Williams, 2023, p.2). This has not driven the discussions of Great Power politics away from ES work (Knudsen and Navari, 2019; Falkner and Buzan, 2022a). Nonetheless, this recent turn does broadly argue that the ES has always recognised the concept of international order as being inherently normative (Schmidt and Williams, 2023, p.2).

Yet, there is a distinction here, I believe, between the recognition by Bull (2002a) that international order will always be normative for certain purposes, or the creation of a specific type of order will always be for some purpose and someone (Cox, 1981); and the use of *prescriptive* normativity to deliberately contest or reshape the global order. This is, in many ways, a reflection of the argument that Buzan (2005a, p.14) makes in differentiating between 'theories of norms' and 'normative theory'. That is, that we can theorise *about* international order, without necessarily engaging in a research agenda that normatively shapes, or attempts to shape, the moral and ethical position of international

[29] See Chapter 6 for a more in-depth exploration of this literature as well as its relevance to the evolution of the G7.
[30] Nor does the G7 appear on Costa Buranelli's (2019) lists of secondary institutions.
[31] Interestingly, Knudsen (2019a, p.44) hints at the role of informal groupings such as the 19th Century Concert of Europe as being a 'basic but refined' institutionalisation of Great Power management without a formal organisation, still as a derivative of a primary institution, yet not quite a secondary institution. Something in-between that avoids full categorisation. This falling between the cracks is unpacked further in Chapter 6.
[32] My thanks to Adrian Gallagher for also highlighting this important gap during my PhD 'uplift' defence.

order. Schmidt and Williams (2023, p.3-4) partially contest this analytical 'neutrality' and argue that theorists must recognise the normative implications of their positionality, while recognising that normative inquiry can still be set aside based on pragmatic grounds.[33]

This is a position that also rehearses the narrative made by Herbert Butterfield (1965) in his treatise on the role and use of history as never being wholly separable from the scholars own ontological framing. That is, one can 'do' history in such a manner that provides analytical precision, but one must also be aware of the pitfalls of using history to serve a particular purpose.[34] This does not, however, invalidate the conceptual framework that Buzan (2005a, p.1-2, p.14) puts forward. Namely, that an analysis of world politics can *attempt* to set aside normative considerations with the aim of focusing upon analytical precision.

Importantly, this is a position that also I believe Bull and Watson (1989) were attempting to take in their edited volume on the 'expansion' of European international society. While Bull and Watson (1989, p.9) acknowledge the limits of their own focus and ability to fully understand or engage with aspects of colonial practice,[35] they nevertheless understood that it was important to provide an understanding of the process of European expansion that established, or imposed, a set of international norms that stemmed *from* this European expansion.

As per Dunne and Reus-Smit's (2017) edited collection in reimagining this expansion narrative, the role of contestation within the ES has been further explored by Williams (2021, p.131-132; 2023, p.91) in a move towards a focus on non-elite voices in IR, which can provide a deeper window into both the historical and contemporary perspective on 'global' relations. This work has also built upon that of Keene (2002), and the more contemporary work of Yao (2019; 2022), in deconstructing the colonial, and imperial, legacies of international orders, legal, political, temporal, and spatial.

However, the distinction within the contemporary ES between the normative aspect of world politics changing and evolving from *how it is*, and the normative aspect of world politics being contested as *how it should be*, is one that Friedner Parrat (2023, p.228) argues cannot be separated. Yet, returning to the role of pragmatism mentioned earlier, the fact that the G7 *does not* appear as important to much of the contemporary ES thinking is indicative of a gap in the ES's own understanding of *how* world politics is influenced and shaped *by* a small group of elites in an unjust and unrepresentative manner, reminiscent of the past European international order, which much of recent ES scholarship critiques.

Epistemologically privileging an understanding of the world through the prism of those structures that are *in* the world does not, nor should not, equate to a normative acceptance, or promulgation, of

[33] Here I see the clearest linkages between Robert Cox's (1981) argument regarding theory being always for someone and for some purpose. Although this does not abrogate the need for there to *be* theory of some kind, similar to the positioning of Linklater and Suganami (2006, p.168) on the important role that critical theory has in arguing for what ought to happen, the important principles of Cox's argument that critical theory can also challenge the potential fallacies of a normative positionality that claims pragmatic separation remain key. This position of pragmatic separation is an inherently contested one which some early ES scholars attempted to also frame themselves as using (see Bevir and Hall, 2020b, p.156-157 on Butterfield), though even Bull (2002a, xxxv) was not convinced this was entirely possible.

[34] This analysis was also particularly relevant for the critiques made of E.H. Carr's latter work on the Soviet Union that demonstrated a particular blindness towards alternative narratives.

[35] Acharya makes this point well in demonstrating the limited engagement that Bull and Watson's (1989) edited volume provides on the military, or coercive power, of European colonial actions. Although the Chapters by Bell (1989a), Vincent (1989), and Suganami's (1989) do go some way to addressing these issues.

those structures. It is, instead, a recognition that an ontological position built upon the structures *that do exist* in the world is a necessarily influential factor in shaping any epistemological outlook.[36] Put very simply, the fact that the contemporary ES doesn't take the G7 seriously is an analytical blind spot.[37]

That said, it is important to note that Buzan and Schouenborg (2018, p.20-22) have made an important contribution in this direction through the development of their differentiation approach to global international society, which provides an analytical assessment of what they believe is the diversity of elements or factors that make up international society – but without advocating for a particular aspect of this contextualisation. In essence, they have opened up the conceptual parameters by which the ES has traditionally understood the elements of world politics. This position differs from Friedner Parrat's (2020) argument that a clearer metatheoretical claim to understanding change is required for the ES to fulfil its potential. For Buzan and Schouenborg (2018, p.10) the premise of their work is as an analytical focus, not a normative approach, yet (Friedner Parrat, 2020, p.765) argues that there is a moral obligation in any such analysis to shape concepts, and theory, in a positive manner.

However, where Friedner Parrat (2020) argues for improvement, there is also a lack of a clear framework on what constitutes 'improvement', similar in manner to the critique of a lack of clarity of what constitutes change in the ES.[38] This position seems to argue that by integrating the *is* with the *ought*,[39] this should help define the contemporary ES by also arguing that past empirical work within the ES is inherently normative (Friedner Parrat, 2023, p.228), thus positioning the ES as holding a progressive momentum in this direction.[40] I believe that this argument itself can, and should be, inherently contested within the ES, as to both the need for a clear definitional framework for what 'progressive' means, and for whom this progressive direction serves. To not do so would be to re-run the risk of earlier debates surrounding humanitarian intervention by force or the imposition of standards of civilisation. Additionally, while this directional shift purports to move the ES forward, in doing so it premises many of its key ideas about the history of the ES on a narrow interpretation of how early ES scholars thought about these issues.[41]

There is, therefore, a contestation here between what I see as the shift in the contemporary ES towards a more sociological aspect of understanding world politics. One that engages with elements of social practice theory (Navari, 2010; Friedner Parrat, 2017), grounded theory (Wilson, 2012) or the social constructivist turn (Reus-Smit and Dunne, 2017), which is cemented in a framework of constitutive social practice and relations. This is an important strand of ES scholarship, yet the overt

[36] See Colin Hay (2002, p.63; 2007) for the role that ontology has in shaping epistemology. This is, however, a contested metaphysical field, see Bates and Jenkins (2007), yet I still hold to the position shared by Patomaki and Wight (2000, p.221) that in giving priority to epistemological questions we impoverish ontology.

[37] Again, Watson (2007, p.52) does mention the emerging importance of the G7 but does not take this inquiry any further.

[38] Interestingly, while Friedner Parrat (2020) does engage with the limits of Watson's (2009) 'pendulum' model of change she does not explore Wight's (1977, p.36) concept of 'fracturing' as a framework for change in international society based upon the idea that the status-quo is always in flux due to the risk of the breakup of hegemonic orders in world politics (see Chapter 7).

[39] See Buzan (2005a, p.94) for past 'is' and 'ought' debates within the ES. Also see Buzan and Schouenborg (2018, p.10-11) on the importance of clarifying the 'is' prior to the 'ought' and see Linklater and Suganami (2006, p.9) who characterise the early ES scholars as being firmly on the side of the 'is' aspect of analysis.

[40] Jackson (2009, p.21) believes that ES inquiry is inherently normative, but that there are differing degrees of normative distinction, following Bull, between detached disinterest and political activism.

[41] This perhaps makes sense in light of Friedner Parrat's (2023, p.229) claims about 'impoverishing' the ES if we return to an early period of thinking.

shift in this direction means that the contemporary ES has begun to move away from a deeper understanding of the continued relevance of historical power politics that are inherently *not progressive* in nature and instead represent a fallback to past histories of dominant powers exerting hegemonic control and the imposition of their norms and values. The following section seeks to demonstrate to the contemporary ES the continued value, and relevance, of early ES scholarship in understanding the prominent role that historical elite decision-making has in shaping the management of international order in contemporary world politics.[42]

1.4 Order as fact or order as value? What is the point of the 'Third Way'?

For some of the early ES scholars any academic analysis, or teaching, of IR would be fundamentally peculiar without an understanding of the principles and ideas that form the basis of the international order within which we live (Butterfield, 1966b, p.148; Bull, 2002a, p.3). For Bull (2002a), international order is not only about the protection of key elements of the relations between states, it is the glue that binds states together and allows the development of a collective sense of responsibility and shared interests. In turn, these shared norms form the basis for the evolution of an international society of states, rather than simply an anarchic international system (Bull, 2002a, p.40).

International order as the foundation for the progress in relations between states is not, however, the complete rejection of violence or war between states (James, 1978, p.96; Bull, 2002a; Hurrell, 2002b, p.22). For Bull (2002a, p.xxxii-xxxiii) there will always be limitations to the efforts made to regulate, maintain, or enforce a degree of order in the relations between states, but that this process of *attempting* to manage international order is nonetheless worthwhile.

There is then, for Bull, a sense that international order holds an inherent value in-and-of-itself, even if historical representations of it are inevitably flawed. Progress towards a more utopian vision of relations in world politics would itself hold innate risks because of the challenge this would pose *to* international order. As Bull (2002a) argues more broadly, any vision of normative progress must always be caveated with the understanding that there is, and has always been, a plurality of norms and values in world politics. These underpin the inherently contested and anarchic nature of the relations between states but are also a vital response to the historical practices of some who have attempted to enforce a narrow utopian vision upon world politics (see Wight, 1977; Bull, 2002a; Watson, 2009).

International order then, is not the protector of an anarchic system of states per se, it is the restraint and management of conflict between states that exists, and is shaped, in such a way as to preserve the fundamental elements that underpin the continued existence of relations between states (Manning, 1962; Bull, 1973; Jackson, 1990; Aalberts, 2010). These elements vary from the protection of the principles of sovereignty, the protection of property rights, the preservation and maintenance of agreements and contracts, and indeed the preservation of trust between states, and state actors, with the intention of upholding the status-quo of international order (Bull, 2002a; Watson, 2004).

[42] Williams (2021, p.146) is correct in arguing that there is no reason the ES must retain a focus on elites. Nonetheless, a shift away from the study of elite actions means that certain aspects of hierarchical world politics, such as the G7, are overlooked by the ES.

That these elements of order are integral to the functioning of both diplomatic practice and international institutions – and are the norms and values that underpin a globalised world politics - is clear (Linklater, 2013). What is also clear is that many of these norms, and indeed the principles of *how* contemporary international order is framed, have been carried over from their origins in the European dominated period of colonial transformation in earlier centuries (see Mattingly, 1965; Keene, 2002; Buzan and Lawson, 2015b; Zarakol, 2022).

Studying the fundamental nature of international order, or how select orders have developed, is therefore a value itself. But studying the nature of the pre-existing international order *as it is* enacted, practiced, and controlled, is also of value (Bull, 1961, p.26-27). There is no doubt that the contemporary global order, or orders, have been shaped by European normative values and the prescriptive norms embedded within Western constructed institutions and organisations (see Keene, 2002). These norms are, however, still the dominant and pervasive norms of contemporary world politics and as such they are the norms that shape how contemporary world politics functions and are still the norms upon which international elites, and states, act. They are, in essence, still the 'facts' of international order.[43]

We must, therefore, study both the continued existence of said norms and the contestation of these norms if we are to have a clear understanding of the values and norms that underpin the world politics in which we live (Butterfield, 1966b, p.148; Bull, 2002a, p.3). It is this 'third way'[44] (Roberson, 2002, p.3) approach to understanding the importance of international order, and change in world politics, that lies at the heart of what has become the ES approach to IR, and to paraphrase both Little (2009b) and Buzan (2016), it is this ability to apply a pluralism of study that I believe still gives the ES approach its uniqueness in contributing to the study of world politics.

The origins of this 'third way' emerged out of the historiographic analysis of the weak foundations of 'idealist' thinking in International Relations from the 1920s and early 1930s (Bull, 1975; 1995; Carr, 2001; Waever, 2002), and latterly from the perceived hegemony of liberal norms and values in the 1990s (Dunne, 2010; Hurrell, 2009; Fukuyama, 2012). The development of the ES also reflected the perceived failures of the overt power politics of the 1930s, and the academic field of the latter twentieth century that demonstrated the limits of 'realist' thinking in coping with change in the international system (Bull, 1975; 1982a; 1995; Waltz, 1979; Wendt, 1992; Buzan et al, 1993; Carr, 2001; Waever, 2002; Hurrell, 2009; Mearsheimer, 2014). In essence, the ES developed a framework for understanding change in world politics that does not fall into analytical fallacies regarding the subjective nature of facts, nor the sterility of mechanically functioning relations between states and the people that represent them.

[43] In referring to 'facts' here I largely agree with Jackson and Nexon's (2013, p.551) framing that facts are not neutral observations or declarations of facts but are instead theoretical terms. Wight held a similar position in understanding that historical facts are inherently subject to interpretation (Bevir and Hall, 2020b, p.158). Similarly, Bull's position of seeking detachment from values was challenged by Vincent as not possible and merely sustaining a bias towards the pre-existing order (see Vincent, 2003; Linklater, 2011, p.1182). Yet this almost postmodernist critique is itself based upon a subjective perception that 'facts' are *always* biased, a point that Bull and others in the early ES were reticent to embrace and in fact Butterfield argued one nevertheless had to *try* to provide neutrality (see Bevir and Hall, 2020b, p.156-157). See Section 2.3 and Buzan (2005a, p.25).

[44] See Patomaki and Wight (2000) for a critique of the idea of a 'middle ground' approach.

While these perceived past failures to understand world politics in a holistic manner drove much of the deliberations of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (Dunne, 1998; Vigezzi, 2005; from now on referred to as the British Committee), it has also underpinned the contemporary ES focus on normative and ethical approaches to understanding world politics (Clark, 1993; Wheeler, 2000; Jackson, 2003; Linklater and Suganami, 2006; Williams, 2015; Schmidt and Williams, 2023; see Section 1.3), thus repudiating claims that the ES is merely a form of realism in sheep's clothing (Dunne, 1998; de Almeida, 2003).

As a result, it was the intent and importance of *understanding*[45] world politics (Butterfield, 1953, p.9; Hoffman, 1986, p.182) that drove much of the early ES thinking, and which has differentiated it from alternative theoretical approaches (Butterfield, 1951a, p.36; Grader, 1988, p.40; Wilson, 1989, p.50; Little, 2009b). A raison d'être that the contemporary ES has continued by sustaining a challenge to the dominance of approaches such as Realism and Idealism (Burchill and Linklater, 2013, p.10), as well as neo-realism and neo-liberalism (Linklater and Suganami, 2006), whilst also rejecting the post-traditional and post-modern approaches that provide little foundation for normative solutions to intractable global issues (Vincent, 1979; Jackson, 2003).[46]

The traditional, or classical, ES approach deliberately draws upon elements that exist in a broad range of other approaches to IR (Little, 2002, p.61) with the purpose of avoiding theoretical and methodological intellectual siloes that have led to a limited and flawed understanding of world politics (Bull, 1966; 1975; Bull and Holbraad, 1979; Clark, 1993; Hoffman, 2003, p.16; Jackson, 2003, p.50; Hurrell, 2009). In turn, this has allowed the contemporary ES, to step away from the interminable game of competing theoretical International Relations paradigms, and to forge a more holistic approach to understanding world politics (Buzan, 2001; Hurrell, 2001; Little, 2009b).

It is, however, the very nature of this holistic approach to theory that has undermined the ES in the eyes of some, by relegating it to a lesser status within the field of IR (Jones, 1981; Grader, 1988, p.32; Wilson, 1989, p.149). There have been calls for the ES to achieve a methodological cohesion in order to attain 'grand theory' status (Finnemore, 2001, p.509). Yet these calls have also been ascribed to the more 'scientific' principles of American social sciences (Williams, 2011, p.1236), which, in turn, overlook the premise of much of the early thinking within the ES, which framed epistemological and methodological straightjackets as anathema to a deeper understanding of world politics (Mayall, 2009, p.209; Little, 2009b; Navari, 2009b).

Similarly, perceptions that the ES is the less refined sibling of the now quasi-dominant approach of Constructivism have overlooked the foundational social constructivism of Bull (2002a) and Wight (1977). This has been highlighted by Dunne (1995b) as being overlooked by early Constructivist thinkers such as Wendt (1992).[47] This is important in distinguishing the 'third way' that the ES offers

[45] Here 'understanding' is meant in the Weberian *verstehen* sense that both Bull and Wight understood it to mean. The focus upon interpretive understanding of the concepts and ideas held by those who action them in the relations between states (Linklater and Suganami, 2006; also see Hall 2015 and Bevir and Hall, 2020a). Both Wight and Bell also placed a great deal of importance on understanding the beliefs of key decision makers (Hall, 2014).

[46] See Jackson and Nexon (2013) for a critique of the 'ism's' debate in IR.

[47] Interestingly Reus-Smit and Dunne (2017, p.40) begin to discuss the limitations that they perceive to have been present in Bull and Watson's (1989) edited volume in terms of socially constructed norms and values. There are no doubt limitations to the original study, but this perspective does nonetheless have similarities with past Constructivist points surrounding purpose and clarity of understanding of 'constitutive' forces. Also

between both past and present thinking that dominates the field of IR because the ES has already demonstrated the importance of social construction in shaping the relations between peoples and states prior to the emergence of Constructivism onto the main stage (Long, 2005, p.81; Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.78). Dunne (1995b) also correctly points out the weaknesses of early Constructivist arguments regarding the ability of identity to be altered from within, ignoring the constraining nature of intersubjective practice (Dunne, 1995b, p.373; Navari, 2009c, p.41; Reus-Smit, 2009, p.65).

What is distinct (and important for this thesis) about the ES is that the constraining nature of *historical* norms and values has also lain at the heart of the early thinking within the ES (Hurrell, 2001, p.493). In other words, Constructivist arguments that focus upon the agency of social creations, and the perceived ability to alter and remake international order (Wendt, 1992), overlook the importance that an historical analysis plays in both constraining, and understanding, the evolutionary nature of world politics.

Bull provides a particular insight into the subtle differences between the approaches by arguing that fundamental elements of international society, or primary institutions (Buzan, 2005a) such as the balance of power, cannot simply be amended or removed at will (Bull, 1961, p.62). In other words, international anarchy is what states *could possibly* make of it. This is what gives an early ES focus on international order as both fact and value its inherent importance in understanding world politics. Many of these early ES thinkers shared a positionality that recognised the constraining nature of historical actions and past perceptions in shaping contemporary world politics. International order for these scholars was not just about understanding how order was being managed in contemporary world politics. Core to their thinking was how *past* attempts at managing international order had shaped and evolved the conventions of *both* the past *and the present*.

This means that while contemporary ES developments and thinking are important advances in the ES (see Section 1.3), there is also still a place for this earlier thinking in providing analysis and understanding *through* a lens of historical analysis that focuses upon how historical forms of international order still have relevance in contemporary world politics. Continuing to position an ES study of international order as both fact *and* value is therefore vital in shaping our approach to case studies that seemingly have an out-of-date, or anti-progressive, relationship with both the past and the present.

The case study focus, then, of this research is the evolution of the G7 in world politics and the historical linkages it has with 19th Century conceptions of Great Power management of international order, both in its origins and in its expanding global remit in contemporary world politics. Emerging in the 1970s this group of powerful industrialised economies was formed in response to the growing international economic disorder posed by the increasing dependence upon international capital flows and the now extensive Western[48] reliance upon energy sources produced in the Middle East (see Bell, 1974;

see Buzan (2005a, p.95) who points out that Wendt's (1992) seminal work was in many ways restating general early ES principles.

[48] Although the Bretton Woods system dominated the international financial architecture of the international system, it remained a predominantly Western/capitalist/free market-oriented system centred around international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and GATT (Vreeland, 2007; Cooper and Thakur, 2013) to which the majority of Communist states were not members (Bayne, 2000, p.80; McKenzie, 2020). However, the nature of such a destabilisation, and the increase in energy prices, had a global impact on developing as well as developed states (Eichengreen and Kenen, 1994; Prodi, 2016). For example, the US's retreat from a position of oil production dominance in world politics (Odell, 1975; Merrill, 2007; Thompson, 2022, p.5),

Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.26; Benning, 2011, p.102-104; Bremmer, 2012, p.47-50; Bini et al, 2016; Spohr, 2016, p.11-12; Rabinovich, 2017). Based on the premise that a 'new' format for responding to international crises was required (Bonhomme and Mourlon-Druol, 2016, p.207), the idea of a select grouping of economically powerful state leaders meeting informally emerged, based on a shared purpose and common perception of international responsibility (Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Bayne, 2000; 2005; Baker, 2006; Dobson, 2007).

Yet the evolution of the G7 has largely been understood through the lens of global governance studies or its role in international political economy, with aspects of political performance also providing a 'cheerleading' side to the analysis of the G7.[49] What has been less well studied is the growing remit of the G7 in attempting to manage international order *beyond* its original economic focus. This growth in influence on issues such as international conflict, climate change, international development, post-Cold War independence (Penttilä, 2003; Kirton and Stefanova, 2004; Gstöhl, 2007; Prodi, 2016) demonstrates that the G7 *does* play a role in managing international order and that the G7 leaders have either actively or passively allowed this remit to expand *because* they perceive themselves to hold a special responsibility, as they are some of the most powerful states in world politics, to manage international order.

One of the earliest attempts at framing a political analysis of the role of the G7, that of Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne's (1987) *Hanging Together*, remains an insightful conceptual analysis in understanding the importance of the G7 in world politics. Putnam and Bayne's (1987) work identified what they believed to be three key strands for understanding the G7's influence in world politics. First, what they refer to as the passive endorsement of existing statements or actions of international organisations and institutions.[50] This they argue reflects the G7 protecting the status quo. However, there is a more fundamental point here which is that the G7 *actively* attempts to maintain the pre-existing form of international order in world politics by using their power and influence as dominant

combined with the OPEC induced blockade and subsequent hike in oil prices (Odell, 1975; Merrill, 2007; Benning, 2011; Bini et al, 2016; Spohr, 2016, p.11-12; Colgan, 2021) almost quadrupling within six months (Prodi, 2016, p.6), impacted *all* countries that were dependent upon oil imports for the function of their national economies. However, these events and actions also combined with the wider retreat from the economic stability of the Bretton Woods international order and the backstop of the US as a reliable economic partner which had been undermined by Richard Nixon's retreat from the gold standard in 1971 (Bremmer, 2012, p.49-50; Beeson and Bell, 2017, p.291-292; Tooze, 2019, p.11). In this thesis I use the term 'Western' to refer to not only the traditional concept of European and North American states, but I also include Japan in this framing. Japan's re-emergence in the post-1945 international order has been premised in large part upon its relationship, and corresponding political and economic ties with, European and North American states, as well as its embedding within the international institutional architecture (see Hook and Dobson, 2007).

[49] For a wider discussion on the validity, effectiveness and role of the G-Summits in world politics see Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Kirton, 1989; 2013; Bergsten and Henning, 1996; Hajnal, 1999; Hodges et al, 1999; Baker, 2000; 2006; Bayne, 2000; 2005; Kaiser et al, 2000; Penttilä, 2003; Kirton and von Furstenberg, 2001; Fratianni et al, 2002; Kirton and Stefanova, 2004; Kirton and Takase, 2004; Fratianni et al, 2005; Dobson, 2007; Kirton et al, 2010; Savona et al, 2011; Mourlon-Druol, 2012; Cooper and Thakur, 2013; Slaughter, 2013a; 2019; Bonhomme and Mourlon-Druol, 2016; Kokotsis, 2016; Merlini, 2018; Mourlon-Druol and Romero, 2018.

[50] When Putnam and Bayne (1987, p.160) refer to the G7's early evolutionary impact upon international organisations and institutions they are specifically referring to the influence the G7 has exerted upon the OECD, IEA, IMF, World Bank, and the GATT.

states to endorse and reinforce the principles of the pre-existing form and management of international order.[51] What Watson (2007) would infer is the exertion of collective hegemony.

Second, Putnam and Bayne (1987, p.159) highlight the leadership role that the G7 plays in shaping international actions designed to resolve intractable international issues. They demonstrate that this leadership by the G7 is conducted by *stimulating* action through the pre-existing international organisations and institutions.[52] In essence, the G7 manages international order *through* the pre-existing formal structures of international institutions, confirming the G7's hegemonic role in world politics, but also providing *legitimacy* by acting through said institutions and organisations that are more widely perceived, or accepted, as being legitimate managers of international order on behalf of a plurality of states (see Chapter 3). This is an important point to note here as the G7 has no formal legal bearing in international law nor in the constitutions or legal frameworks of these existing formal international organisations and institutions (Slaughter, 2019). The G7 therefore exists outside of, and above, these international organisations and institutions (Slaughter, 2013a, p.43), a hegemonic power structure that is reminiscent of the concept of Great Power 'responsibility'.

Third, Putnam and Bayne (1987, p.159) identify the reforming influence and ability of the G7 to establish *parallel* international bodies alongside pre-existing international organisations, albeit something that they dismiss as relatively unimportant in terms of the effectiveness of these actions. However, the evolutionary nature of the G7, beyond the timeframe of Putnam and Bayne's (1987) original analysis, has demonstrated that this plethora of international bodies that have grown up via endorsement and support of the G7, have had a significant impact upon intractable global issues.[53] When faced with intractable global issues that the G7 member states feel are beyond the capabilities, or have not been effectively resolved, by the pre-existing structures of global governance, the G7 directs or initiates international action to *go around* these formalised structures. In effect, the G7 shapes an international response in the manner and image of what they perceive to be the most effective way to manage international order, even when challenged by other states (see Chapter 5).

This framework was, however, largely situated within the lens of a liberal institutionalist understanding of world politics (Payne, 2008, p.521). Alternatively, the research design of this thesis uses this early conceptual framework as a starting point for understanding that the G7 *does* attempt to manage international order by endorsing, reforming, and actively shaping world politics. Yet, it then

[51] In the G7's early years this support, and affirmation, was most openly present with the Summits relationship with the IMF and World Bank (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.163).

[52] Again, in the early years of the G7 this stimulation of action and direction was most evident in its relationship with the IEA and, albeit to a lesser degree, in its relationship with the OECD. Importantly the GATT had also been significantly influenced by the directions issued at the 1979 Tokyo Summit on international trade (Putnam and Bayne, 1987). Also see Young (1991) for an interesting discussion on different categorisations of leadership, all of which, structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual, speak to different individuals and cycles of the G7's evolution.

[53] For example, the 1981 Ottawa Summit had a significant impact on changing the direction of the GATT in terms of its decision-making process with the establishment of a finance ministers meeting (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.165). The 1989 Paris Summit saw the establishment of the FATF which has itself evolved into a global financial regulatory body. While the G7 also established the financing for the Global Fund and still holds the purse strings for the GAVI Vaccine Alliance (Bayne, 2005, p.91; Brown, 2010, p.519). More recently the G7 created a global oil price cap in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine (see Chapter 6).

situates this role, and the evolutionary growth in remit, within the core theoretical concepts of the ES such as legitimacy, Great Power responsibility, and power politics.

This case study is therefore important to the 'third way' approach to studying world politics for four reasons. First, the G7 has clear linkages with concepts of Great Power politics and ideas of responsibility in managing international order that have shaped much of the early ES thinking (see 1961, p.59; Bull, 1980a; Watson, 2007; 2009). Second, the ES's continued lack of in-depth engagement with understanding the importance of economic relations between states[54] has meant that the ES has largely overlooked this fact of world politics because it originated from attempts at responding to economic crises, not traditional political or military crises. Third, the origins of the G7 have their roots in 19th Century conceptions of the importance of Great Power Concerts which requires both a historical analysis of these roots as well as an exploration of the thinking of the international elites who shaped the formation and growth of the G7, thus shaping a need to return to the early ES scholarship that has provided the toolkit for expanding this study. Fourth, the G7 is a fact of world politics. It exists, it deliberates, and it acts through informal power (Lipson, 1991; Hajnal, 1999; Morin et al, 2019) to shape both the international economic order as well as a much wider range of political issues.[55] An ES assessment of this case study would therefore benefit from *starting* with what the early ES scholarship had to say about past historical forms of Great Power politics and their attendant limits, prior to opening the door to future research on either the normative possibilities such a grouping has, or the normative limitations it poses to world politics.[56]

The next chapter therefore provides the theoretical framework for the remainder of the thesis by establishing the argument that within this early ES thinking there were a core group of scholars who shared an ontological and epistemological focus on using historical analysis to understand both the past and the present. These 'Old School' scholars also coalesced around a methodological framework of understanding and analysing this historicism through the study of elites in world politics, and how elites also understood the past in shaping their actions. This positions the work of these scholars as an essential starting point in the analysis of the emergence and evolution of the G7. It also shapes this wider analysis along an already open path in the contemporary ES, which calls for a return to the interpretivist aspects of earlier ES scholarship (see Bevir and Hall, 2020a; 2020b).

[54] See Buzan (2005b), Buzan and Little (2010), and Beeson and Bell (2017) who have all pushed at the importance of exploring the economic aspect further within the ES. Also see Buzan and Falkner (2022b) who are beginning to take this more seriously at the conceptual level. For example, Beeson and Bell (2017) mention the G20 once in passing, however, their earlier work (2009) does explore the emerging importance of the G20 in world politics, albeit not from an ES perspective.

[55] For a wider discussion on the importance of informality at the G7 also see Schaetzel and Malmgren 1980; Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Bayne, 2000; 2005; Dobson, 2007; d'Estaing, 2007; Morin et al, 2019.

[56] See Acharya et al, 2019 on calls for an even greater increase in the number of 'G's' running the world. Also see Falkner and Buzan's (2022a) edited volume on the discussion around Great Power's potentially being the format for responding to existential crises.

Chapter 2 – A Return to the Old School?

'I am no more capable than anyone else of being detached about a subject such as this. But I believe in the value of attempting to be detached or disinterested, and it is clear to me that some approaches to the study of world politics are more detached or disinterested than others. I also believe that inquiry has its own morality, and is necessarily subversive of political institutions and movements of all kinds, good as well as bad.' (Bull, 2002a, p.xxxv)

This chapter returns to the early work of what has become known as the ES approach to International Relations (Dunne, 1998; Williams and Little, 2006; Bevir and Hall, 2020a; 2020b). In line with Bevir and Hall's (2020b, p.154) recent work, this chapter argues that an interpretivist approach to some early ES thinkers holds the potential to develop new research agendas for understanding contemporary world politics.

In doing so this chapter challenges Friedner Parrat's (2023, p.222) distinction between the study of the history of thought and the study of world affairs, arguing that the early ES scholars were well aware that practitioners and actors on the international stage were not immune to the influence of the history of political thought. In fact, these actors are just as much shaped by the history of schools of thought as those academic researchers who study their actions and decisions.[57]

Similarly, this chapter is also a challenge to Bain's (2009, p.149) argument that history, at least within the ES, has no didactic quality. As this chapter goes on to discuss, the contemporary ES has been intimately shaped by its own understanding of the history of political thought, but also from the early ES scholars own interpretation and understanding of this history of thought. This continuing influence, and didactic role of history of thought *within* the ES means that what the early ES scholars had to say has as much relevance today to the contemporary ES as it did to their contemporaneous deliberations.[58]

To argue that this history of thought does not have an influence, without maintaining an investigatory link with it, would be to overlook the hermeneutic foundations upon which the ES is built. Where I position this chapter's contribution to the ES though is in my agreement with Bain (2009, p.148) that the early ES scholars had a poorly articulated position on why history was important for the study of the present. This was in part due to their dislike of the overt shift towards focusing on methodology as a key aspect of the study of world politics that emanated from the American field of political science (Vigezzi, 2005), but it was also due the eclectic and diverse nature of the positions of these scholars and how they influenced and shaped each other's own thinking (see Section 2.2).

[57] Friedner Parrat (2020, p.230) does seem to go on to make a similar point later in her article, contradicting one of the main tenets of her critique of Bevir and Hall (2020a; 2020b). See also Bevir and Hall's (2023, p.243) response.

[58] An interesting example of this is William Burns (2009, p.20), now CIA Director, formerly senior US diplomat and currently at the forefront of US-Russian relations over the war in Ukraine, makes clear how his thinking on world politics and history is still shaped by Hedley Bull's teaching on the importance of the lessons of history in shaping the present (see Chapters 5 & 6). Also see Buzan's (2005a. p.11) call to move away from the ES's founding fathers.

This chapter aims to more clearly articulate how and where some of these early ES scholars saw the role and importance of historicism for the understanding of the contemporary world by unpacking and analysing the shared norms held between six of these scholars. I argue that Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, Michael Howard, and Coral Bell[59] were a group who shared an ontological, epistemological, and methodological framework concerning the importance and use of historicism in shaping our understanding of the world around us. In turn, this focus upon the role and use of history shaped and influenced their conception of two key pillars of thinking that have been so fundamental to the development of the ES as an approach, international society, and international order.[60]

This chapter starts from the position that the history of the ES is itself firmly embedded within the early deliberations of the British Committee (Dunne, 1998; Vigezzi, 2005; Buzan and Little, 2007; Watson, 2007).[61] Ian Hall (2015) has already laid some of this theoretical groundwork by arguing that there is a distinctiveness to this 'early' ES with its focus on history and the individual through the lens of interpretivism (Hall, 2015; Bevir and Hall, 2020a, p.121), a position reinforced by Andrew Hurrell (2002a, p.xii-xiii) when discussing Bull, Wight, and Butterfield's work. However, this chapter goes further than Bevir and Hall's (2020b) focus on Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. It argues that within the 'early' ES, and within the British Committee itself, there was a larger group of scholars who had a particular influence in shaping and contesting their deliberations and thinking by focusing upon understanding change in world politics and the role key actors or states play in shaping this change.

This chapter, again, goes further than Hall (2015) by arguing that this focus upon the individual, or elites, from a historical perspective in their role in shaping international order and international society, is more than a continuation of an interpretivist strand of thinking. It also argues that this 'Old School' framing allows us to understand the inherent relationship between the 'early' ES and the contemporary strands of thinking that have developed within the approach, be that the critical, normative, or structuralist wings (Bevir and Hall, 2020a, p.121).

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[59] The inclusion of Coral Bell is an important difference in this group framing from much of the previous work on the 'early' ES scholars. Devetak (2009, p.349) has acknowledged Bell's closeness to the early ES, yet, as Friedner Parrat et al (2020) argue, women have largely been left out of the ES. Coral Bell's contribution is particularly absent from the key texts on the history of the ES (Dunne, 1998; Buzan, 2005a; Linklater and Suganami, 2006; Buzan, 2014a; Navari, 2009a), yet Bell was a member of the British Committee (see Vigezzi, 2005) and her work was important in its focus on key individuals or 'elites' and the shared norms they developed (Hall, 2014, p.45). The importance of which I argue was also shared amongst this 'Old School' group (see Section 2.3).

[60] This classification of an 'Old School' within the 'early' ES will no doubt be challenged as to its importance or relevance. Yet, as Sharp (2016) argues it is a habit of the ES to regularly conduct a stock check of the field and to continue to discuss the historical nature of its origins. Importantly though, both Sharp (2016) and Wilson (2016b) are correct in arguing that there is no singular correct framing of either the ES itself, or of its approach to understanding world politics. The adoption of such a position would be anathema to the nature of what the ES offers in comparison to other IR approaches. Also see Buzan (2016, p.131).

[61] Here it would be conducive to state that I do not necessarily disagree with Wilson (2016b, p.109-110), or Knudsen (2000; 2001), that the ES was already forming as a framework of thinking *prior* to the formalised meetings of the British Committee. Wight and Bull were at the LSE together and Bell was a student of Wight's there. Yet, the coming together of the British Committee was, I believe, pivotal to a cohesiveness forming amongst a group of these scholars (see Dunne, 1998; Vigezzi, 2005).

It is important to note here that I see clear linkages between the framing of this 'Old School' and the work of several contemporary ES scholars,[62] yet, the focus of this chapter is not to draw out those linkages per se, but to lay the foundations for the argument that there was a cohesiveness to a core group amongst these early ES scholars, and that such a conceptual 'grouping' may, in turn, provide fertile ground for further analysis and deliberation on the subject as many past reflections on the ES have done (see Knudsen, 2000; 2001). In essence, this 'Old School' framing provides an in-depth exploration of the ontological, epistemological, and methodological underpinnings of historicism that I believe run throughout this 'early' ES thinking, which in turn further develops the argument about the cohesiveness of the ES as a distinct approach to IR.

This chapter therefore goes some way to addressing the lacuna within the broader understanding of the ES by engaging with the question of why historical knowledge is important (Viotti and Kauppi, 2014, p.248; also see Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.91; Bevir and Hall, 2020a). By engaging with this debate, an 'Old School' framing provides the contemporary ES approach with the opportunity to look back at its own historiography and learn from that plurality of political and conceptual thought that I believe is integral to ensuring the ES remains utilised in the field of IR.

I do not, however, attempt to retrospectively impose a uniformity of philosophical position on the early ES (see Bevir and Hall, 2020a, p.123). Rather I am identifying what I believe to be some of the key strands of analytical positioning that these 'Old School' scholars situated themselves within, interpreting this positionality through the lens of contemporary social science language to push the discussion both within, and outside, the ES, further. There will, I have no doubt, be contestation and disagreement about this classification of a specific group of scholars as an 'Old School'. Nonetheless, as per Bull's (Suganami, 2003, p.255) own position on the early debates surrounding who was 'in' and who was 'out' of an emergent literature on the ES, the very contestation of this framework will bring a level of critical analysis that will benefit the field because, as we have seen in the past, the labelling of groups is in and of itself an intellectually important exercise in classifying and conceptualising key terms, ideas, and the future direction of thinking, something that has been integral to the development of the ES itself.[63]

To make this case the chapter is laid out in four parts. Parts one, two and three unpack what I believe to be the interrelated and overlapping ontological, epistemological, and methodological framework of thought that these 'Old School' scholars shared. Part four situates this conceptual construction within the broader field of IR, and the ES, as to why these social science characteristics are important for enhancing the debate, not merely who is 'in' and who is 'out' of the ES, but also on how this classification of an 'Old School' can provide some coherence to our understanding of the early ES development, acting as a more useful tool in responding to those arguments that see a lack of coherence as inhibiting the wider appeal of the ES.

[62] For example, there is a clear continuation of historicism in the work of Suzuki (2009); Buzan and Little (2010); Buzan and Lawson (2015b); Zarakol (2022). While the focus on the historical role of elites comes clearly through in Jackson (2003; 2009) and more recently in Falkner and Buzan (2022a).

[63] Here I specifically refer to Buzan's (2005a) key work that provided not only a degree of intellectual classification and coherence to the ES (even as I challenge some of the limits to this thinking in Chapter 5; also see Terradas, 2020) as well as providing an important directional shift in the ES's thinking about past concepts and ideas.

2.1 Ontological historicism: An 'Old School' framework for understanding world politics

The ES 'third way' approach to understanding international relations has largely been framed as an alternative to the traditionally dominant realist/liberalism division in the field (Viotti and Kauppi, 2014, p.237). Instead of pursuing this, the current section seeks to explore this avenue of an alternative understanding at the metatheoretical level by arguing that those scholars I term the 'Old School' were also providing a 'third way' approach between the foundationalist/anti-foundationalist division of either indubitable beliefs or diversity of beliefs as the polar positions for understanding international relations. For the 'Old School' scholars there was a co-constituting belief that historicism could provide a solidity of understanding that was open to challenge, but that nonetheless also provided firm enough foundations to position their theoretical concepts as not irreducible to all and every challenge.

In essence, there can be a reality to world politics that is understandable and firmly embedded as a certainty of human relations based upon the past, but that this level of conceptual certainty should be open to theoretical challenge as all historical interpretation is subjective.[64] In other words, the 'Old School' held an ontological position that provided them with a *via media* between the philosophical intellectual structures that restrict other approaches.[65]

Importantly, then, I define 'ontological historicism' not as the metaphysical level of a sum of all knowledge (Tucker, 2022, p.98), but as a framework of secure knowledge that can be conceptually developed out of Anthony Giddens (2012; 2014) theory of ontological security.[66] For Giddens (2014, p.375), ontological security is defined as the 'Confidence or trust that the natural or social worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity.' This, for Mitzen (2006, p.342; also see Giddens, 2012, p.36-40), was predicated upon the relational aspects of identity that were formed through routinised behaviour and the attachments these behaviours form, which in turn form the security of one's own self position in the world.

'Ontological historicism' by this definition then is the self-position of individuals knowledge based upon historicism as a framework of social identity. This was an ontological position, I argue, that was shared by, and established through, the routinisation of analytical challenge and self-criticism that came from being both members of the British Committee (Vigezzi, 2005), but also from a shared attachment (Mitzen, 2006, p.342) to the principals of historical inquiry as a route to understanding world politics. This study of international relations was described by both Wight and Bell as a 'meditation on history' (Hall, 2014, p.45).

Put simply, I believe that the 'Old School' shared a mutual confidence, and trust, in their ontological position that came from a shared understanding of historicism, but that this confidence in a shared mentality also came from the routine of personal interaction and deliberation that was a core part of

[64] There are similarities here between the 'ontological realism' of Critical Realist's for whom there is a reality that is separate from the mind, and that there is an epistemological relativism that underpins the conception that beliefs and ideas, or norms and values, are also socially produced (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p.224). However, I am firmly resting this concept of 'reality' for the 'Old School' on a historical ontology that, in essence, combined both history as *a* reality, but nonetheless one that exists and shapes the world. This was a position held by Wight who did not accept the positivist approach to 'facts' but understood that history cannot be separated from interpretation (Bevir and Hall, 2020b, p.158) Also see Section 2.2 on 'facts'.

[65] This *via media* terminology became popular following the publication of Wight's (1991) lectures (see Linklater, 2011, p.1182).

[66] In this I am following Giddens (2014, p.xxii) own belief in the importance of using and illuminating ideas outside of their original framework.

the British Committee meetings and the correspondence between these scholars surrounding said meetings (see Vigezzi, 2005; but also Dunne, 1998).

In more contemporary terms, as per Wilson (2012, p.584), the relationship between analyser and analytical subject must be underpinned by self-reflection on the process and thinking involved in the collection, analysis, and idea development that makes up the assessment of 'objective' knowledge. For these 'Old School' scholars it was this intimate challenge and period of self-reflection provided by such a scholarly grouping that enabled them to test and re-test their ideas and suppositions against the shared depth of historical knowledge that underpinned their group.

What I therefore attempt to show in this section is that these individuals who made up the 'Old School' all held an ontological position that historicism *could* provide the foundation of what is out there to know, but that this was also intimately tied to the constant introspection and seeking of self-criticism as a process of confidence in that knowledge. In a way I am inverting Giddens (2012, p.36; 2014, p.375) ontological security framework by arguing that for the 'Old School', this security of 'self' knowledge *came from* an historical ontology that provided confidence in its ability to represent the basic parameters of the social world.

This framing has echoes of Lerner and O'Loughlin's (2023) concept of 'strategic ontology' and Jackson and Nexon's (2013) 'scientific ontology',[67] which is itself based upon Patomaki and Wight's (2000, p.215) argument in differentiating between elements of ontological study and prior philosophical inquiry. The ontology of the 'Old School' was first and foremost a philosophical ontology based upon historicism, an 'ontological historicism', that in turn framed the ontological elements of what was real in the world as being based upon historical past experience and the records of interactions between humans which, in the international sphere, was of states existing within an anarchic system shaped between themselves into a society of shared norms, interests, and values in order to manage said anarchy.

Thus, 'ontological historicism' is *both* the substance and process of study *as well* as the philosophical relationship. Jackson and Nexon (2013, p.551) argue that these two elements should be treated differently as the failure to do so muddies the IR waters because 'scientific ontology' can serve explanatory functions but need not frame a specific mode of explanation. Yet, the 'Old School' scholars believed that one could not separate the philosophical question of what is 'out there' from the pre-existing theoretical and empirical work that documented the history of knowledge or historical events. Put simply, a determination of what is out there cannot be separated from historicism.

There is a familiarity to this debate within the pre-existing assessments of the early ES work, and particularly in the relationship between history and theory that Linklater and Suganami (2006, p.95) identify (see Section 2.4), or the debate between empirical case studies and normative output (see Wheeler, 2000; Jackson, 2003; also see Hurrell, 2002a, p.xvii on Wheeler). However, the highlighting of the similarity of contemporary debates surrounding ontological concepts within the field of IR is not designed to merge these strands of thinking with the ES. Rather, it is an attempt at highlighting the similarity between core elements of early ES thinking regarding the process of intellectual inquiry. This is to say, these contemporary social science debates within the field of IR are a useful way of thinking about how a reassessment of the early ES can be grounded within contemporary language and debates surrounding meta-theoretical frameworks.[68]

[67] Also see Jackson (2011).
[68] See Williams (2021, p.141).

The identification of an ontological coherence that framed these 'Old School' scholars goes some way to bringing these elements of intellectual inquiry together as to also contribute to the wider contemporary debates within the field. The following sections of this chapter explore in-depth the work and ideas of these scholars to demonstrate this. However, this argument will no doubt be open to criticism, and the recent edited volume by Dunne and Reus-Smit (2017) does highlight the lack of diversity, and therefore the reliability, of some of this historicism used by the early ES; as does the work of Keene (2002) in highlighting the Western/Eurocentric elements of historical understanding that the early ES relied upon.[69] Williams (2021, p.135) meanwhile highlights the 'active contestation' of traditional conceptions of ontology and epistemology. Nonetheless, it is important to demonstrate that there was a cohesiveness to the ontological position of those scholars who make up this 'Old School' in relying upon historical analysis as the foundations of knowledge.

In doing so this chapter more firmly answers the broader question surrounding the ES of why historical knowledge is important (Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.91); it is because there is a certain *order* to historical analysis that provides a specific sense of secure knowledge that can, and does, shape our understanding of the world (Mitzen, 2006, p.346; also see Giddens, 2012, p.38-40). It was this sense of order in historicism that underpinned the ontological positionality of the 'Old School' scholars who argued that we must look to the past before we can learn something of the present (Watson, 2009, p.1).

As the Introduction to this chapter noted, it is also important to focus on how this ontological historicism has shaped the development of the ES itself. Returning then to Martin Wight's (1979, p.123; 1991) interpretation of the Grotian notion of international society; this understanding was predicated upon the belief that a shared set of interests underpinned the nature of humanity from a universal law perspective, containing the inherent rights of individuals throughout world society, irrespective of creed, religion, or ethnicity (Bull, 2002b, p.80). This positioning has, in turn, underpinned much of the contemporary ES focus on the role and importance of Grotius's thinking on International Relations (see Bull et al, 2002).

This natural law principle, reminiscent of the earlier arguments used by Vitoria (Wight, 1991; Bull, 2002b, p.81), is also based on an almost circular logical conception of the rights and norms of individuals, and the inherently contested nature of those rights when framed within the historical debates of the day. For Vitoria, for example, the rights of the Amerindians were to be protected as they held the same universal value as the rights of Europeans, yet the rights of European colonisers were also to be protected through the imposition of extraterritoriality in defence of acquired lands and territory and the freedom to proselytise (Gong, 1984, p.36-37). In essence, the foundations of Wight's ontological thinking on the importance of common values and norms, was itself, predicated upon a historical understanding of universal rights that is inherently shaped by political and power interests, a point that Watson (2007) understood all too well as historically subjective.

Nonetheless, this is important in elaborating further on the role that Grotius's thinking has played in shaping the ES approach to understanding world politics. Grotius cannot be described as a natural law theorist per se (Bull, 2002b) because much of the basis of Grotius's argument regarding the concept of international society is predicated upon the role and importance of *states* forming an international

[69] Bull (2002a, p.249) does in fact recognise this inherent Eurocentric understanding. He also argued that non-European aspects must be studied but was clear that his focus was on the European aspect of state-centric global developments (Kwan, 2016, p.364).

society rather than the wider conception of humanity as a whole (Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.32). This means that Grotian conceptions of international society *are themselves* based upon the non-universal conception of laws and rules that are shaped and enforced by states, and in this case European states (Gong, 1984), rather than by a wider conception of humanity.

While this argument must be caveated with the fact that Grotius saw in the actions of states the setting of standards and laws which validated certain natural law 'truths' (Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.129), the above argument nevertheless reflects the point that how Grotius has been interpreted by both the early thinkers within the ES, and subsequently contemporary ES scholars, has a particular importance for its focus on a universalistic framework of common cultural norms and values, which were in fact, European in nature. Put very simply, the requirement for the starting point of the formation of an international society within the early ES, of common cultural norms and values, was based upon a European conception of the moral and religious premise of certain 'standards of civilisation' (Gong, 1984; Bull, 2002a; Keene, 2002; Linklater and Suganami, 2006).

This is key in framing an 'Old School' ontological position on international society because Wight (1977), and Bull and Watson (1989), recognised that international society *did* exist as an ontological reality in world politics based upon foundations that had been built upon historical claims of universal rights that were inherently Eurocentric and had 'expanded' outwards. This is to say that historical inequalities in the formation and evolution of international society were well recognised (Watson, 2007; 2009) within an 'Old School' ontology of what is real in the world. But they were also recognised as *still existing* and as having shaped both the past and present formation of forms of international society (Bell, 1953; Bull, 1961, p.39; 1983b; 2002a, p.266). In other words, for the 'Old School', the historical evolution of a European framed international society is still observably 'out there' and directly frames what we can know about it, irrespective of its contested origins.

The historical understanding the 'Old School' held of how international order has been managed in the past, and therefore how this potentially shaped both contemporary and future management of international order varied, but it was nonetheless built upon a shared understanding that there *is a reality* of relations between states and peoples that can be studied.[70] This reality was in turn predicated upon its historical origins and the past evolution of the relations between states. That these historical records were subject to change, or that our interpretation of them can evolve over time, was also a fundamental shared norm of the group.[71]

Yet this 'Old School' group also shared the ontological position that there was still a historical record out there to be studied, and that in 'rediscovering' such a basis of historical study of world politics was key to challenging the 'scientific' shift in the field (see Vigezzi, 2005). The parameters of this ontological position for the 'Old School' were therefore a shared interest in reasserting the primacy of historicism to the study of international relations as the basis of what is out there to know. Yet, each member of the group shared a different interest in which periods of history provided such a basis of

[70] See Navari (2009b, p.8-9) on how the early ES scholars were 'state-centric' but nonetheless understood that it was the state form that has implications for influencing world politics, rather than the 'state' as a definitive object.

[71] Butterfield's (1965) analysis of the subjective use of history was a key contribution to this thinking, as was Bull's (1972b).

knowledge. In other words, each member of the 'Old School' shared an ontological position on historicism, but this historicism was fluidic in its temporal framing.

For Wight (1977) and Watson (2004; 2007; 2009) the importance of history lay in a record that swept back thousands of years. For Butterfield (1965; 1966a) it had both a more 'recent' perspective of a few hundred years that also aligned with Michael Howard's focus (2000; 2006a), but it could also sweep further back into religious and human elements that traversed a longer period (Butterfield, 1949; 1951). Bull shared an eclectic focus on historical time periods that covered his own contemporary period (1980a; 1989b; 1989c), ancient history (1972b, p.252), as well as a wider understanding of periods of colonisation and European expansion (Bull and Watson, 1989); occasionally also reaching back to draw potential analogies with medieval historical structures (Bull, 2002a). Bell meanwhile had a specific focus on the recent past[72] in its immediacy to the present, but with a deeper conceptual understanding of the human element of elite decision-making (1971; 1974; 1977; 1989)[73] that nonetheless drew upon a historicism that understood the importance of the past in shaping the future (Bell, 1971, p.1; Hall, 2014, p.45; O'Neill, 2014, p.41). Even through this diversity of focus this group of scholars nonetheless understood that there is a powerful influence that history has upon both theirs, and others', ontological positionality. These scholars believed that one cannot escape the shaping influence of historical facts or perceptions, irrespective of the unjust, irresponsible, or factually flawed nature of that history (Bull, 2002a, p.247; Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.92).[74]

Nonetheless this diversity is not an incoherent division, it is premised, and specifically shaped by, a shared ontology that the *past matters*. The past underpins what is real or perceived to be real in the world. It is precisely this diversity of historical understanding that unites these early ES scholars into an 'Old School' group because they relied upon, shared, and contested, each other's understanding of the importance of different periods of history in providing an understanding of world politics. An eclectic understanding of the past does not separate this grouping of scholars, it is the direct result of their ontological coherence that different periods of history are *all* important for shaping a holistic understanding of the present.[75]

Yet this use of historicism as a framing of the 'Old School' approach to understanding world politics is not solely based around these scholars understanding of how international society has manifested itself in the past. It is also premised on an ontological position that international order is key to the function and stability of international society as both a concept and in practice. International order, then, is not the *absence* of disorder (Bull, 2002a; also see McKeil, 2022) it reflects attempts at *managing* disorder in the face of an anarchic world politics, to protect and preserve the pre-existing framework of relations between states.

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[72] Although Bell also looked back to the 19th Century in shaping her understanding of Australia's role in balancing between powers (Taylor, 2014, p.71-72).

[73] Also see Hall (2014), Miller (2014), and Richardson (2014) who reinforce this point.

[74] Also see Bulmer (1993; 2009) for an understanding of the historical institutionalist literature. The argument made here isn't the same per se, but it does position the 'Old School' as sharing an ontological positionality with Historical Institutionalists in that international actors cannot fully escape the legacies of the past. Howard also held to a similar position in terms of how historical culture shapes how and why people fight (Mallinson, 2021, p.360). Spandler (2015, p.614-615) has also made a recent ES linkage with these ideas and the definitional qualities of ES institutions (see Chapter 6).

[75] My thanks to John Williams for pushing me to think more clearly on what draws these scholars together by highlighting to me the disparate time periods in which they engaged in study.

For Bull then, a Hobbesian account of an anarchic international system remained partially valid in understanding world politics, not only due to the lack of a clear central authority (Bull, 1971; 1981, p.736; Jackson, 2003, p.185; Millar, 2003), but perhaps more importantly, due to the inherent difficulties in maintaining any such form of order that the Hobbesian account implies. Anarchy in world politics does not, therefore, abrogate the possibility, nor existence, of a form of international order between states (Clark, 1993; Bull, 2002a). It merely indicates the difficulty and the importance of studying efforts in maintaining and shaping said order.

That international order was neither a commodity to be valued, nor a moral value in-and-of-itself was neither relevant nor important for Bull (2002a). That is to say, understanding *how* such order functions, or functioned, in world politics *was* the moral element of human inquiry (Hoffman, 1986, p.182; Hall, 2002; Millar, 2003; Hurrell, 2009) that shaped the ontological position of these 'Old School' scholars' approach to the study of world politics (also see Watson, 1985, p.xi; Hall, 2012, p.424-425 on Butterfield).

Understanding how international order worked was, for Bull (1979b; 1980c; 1989c), the key to understanding any future normative progress towards international justice, which Bull felt later in life was integral to the maintenance of international order itself. This position was not necessarily shared by all the members of the 'Old School', with some arguing that Wight's work was itself anti-progressive in nature (Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.94). However, a focus on international order as a key ontological pillar of the 'Old School' is not anti-progressive in the sense that it avoids focusing upon normative change or international justice. For the 'Old School' international order was a key element of the reality of world politics because history demonstrates that states, leaders, hegemonic powers, and empires have always attempted to *create* a form of international order that served their interests and preserved their own power.

Thus, a focus upon international order, and the elites who shaped or attempted to create forms of international order, was not an abrogation of the need to study other elements of world politics. It was the key referent object for understanding how these other elements were influenced by, and able to influence, the relations between states. International order was the centre of gravity around which issues of justice, equality, power, and political change revolved; it was the reality of world politics.

For Wight (1977) it was the early incarnations of states, or the contestation between states and religious authorities. For Watson (2007; 2009) it was empires or states acting as hegemonic powers. For Bell (1971) it was the leading state actors representing the most powerful states who were at the forefront of managing international order. For Howard (2000; 2006a) states *were* the military actors that both undermined and maintained international order, but it was also the culture of those states that was important (Howard, 2006b, p.147; Mallinson, 2021, p.360). For Butterfield (1966a; 1966b; Bevir and Hall, 2020b, p.157) states were led by people but they acted on behalf of those states in attempting to manage order. For Bull (1980a; 2002a) it was about understanding how states were, again, both the vehicle for enabling international order through different international structures or norms, but also the leading actors in undermining international order (see Bevir and Hall, 2020b, p.161).

There is, then, still a relevance to the 'Old School' ontological position, and that of the Grotian argument, that states continue to hold the mantle, if not the monopoly, on the substance of world politics (Bull, 2002b; Jackson, 2003, p.338). This, in turn, frames an 'Old School' ontological position

that recognises the importance of ethical or moral issues, but also attaches *reasonable weight* to such ethics (Butterfield, 1951a, p.22; Manning, 1962, p.121; Bull, 2002a) with a focus on the role of international order. In other words, the challenge to international order posed by an undermining of the historical rules by which the state-based system has functioned in the past is itself a threat to international order (Jackson, 2003).[76]

The ontological position of the 'Old School', or it's process of establishing what is out there to know, recognised that no theory of IR can therefore ever be value-neutral (Bull, 1975; Jackson, 2009). Nor can it exist beyond the influence of the pre-existing beliefs or circumstances of the theorist (Butterfield, 1965; Carr, 2018). This means that while the early ES attempted to differentiate itself from the 'scientific' debates within the field (Jackson, 2003; Vigezzi, 2005, p.37), it did not position itself as holding an absolute moral right or wrong in its understanding of world politics nor in its use of historicism.[77] The 'Old School' scholars, and some contemporary ES scholars, recognised the inherent restraints *as well as* the potential opportunities that a social and historical understanding provides in shaping human relations at the international level (Butterfield, 1951a; Wight, 1977; Jackson, 2003; Buzan and Little, 2010; Buzan and Lawson, 2015) by at least *attempting* to provide an analytically neutral understanding of both the past and the present (Bevir and Hall, 2020b).[78]

However, in highlighting its focus upon *explaining* and *understanding* world politics from an ontological position of historicism the 'Old School' has, in turn, been accused of limiting its own reach within a field that is determined to provide solutions and change to global issues (Dunne, 1998, p.16). This was, at least in the view of those members of the British Committee, a deliberate distinction that required debate (Vigezzi, 2005). Both Wight (1979) and Butterfield (1951a) were clear that by attempting to separate moral judgement from understanding, one could never escape the premise that any theoretical approach will always be interpretive (Little, 2009b). As Butterfield (1953) argued, both historical interpretation and the understanding of past events are as driven by values as any theoretical approach, underlining that the moral judgements made in our *interpretation* of history also inculcate our understanding of past events and actions with the moral lens of modernity (Buzan and Little, 2009, p.xxv; Watson, 2009; also see Evans, 2018a; 2018b).

Nonetheless, the 'Old School' scholars still positioned themselves around an ontology that recognised that *there were* historical realities that could be studied to understand human relations and international relations. This may, at first reading, seem a contradiction. Yet, for the 'Old School' scholars this historicism was predicated upon a belief that historical interpretation will always be subjective, and exclusionary in the scope of its terms of reference, but that this does not abrogate the need to study it anyway to further our understanding of world politics. This was a deliberate rejection of the post-modernist turn of introspection that has now become the mainstay of much of the contemporary historical (Evans, 2018b) and International Relations field.[79] Put simply, the 'Old School'

[76] See also Buzan (2005a, p.95-96) on different readings of Bull's position on this.
[77] Something that both Bull (1968b) and Carr (2018) recognised as an impossibility, and something that was latterly used to criticise Carr's historical work on the Soviet Union.
[78] Here I see linkages between the historicism of the 'Old School' and the work of Jackson (2003), Mayall (2005), Buzan and Little (2010), Buzan and Lawson (2015), and Zarakol (2022).
[79] See Hurrell (2002a, p.xii) on Bull's philosophical realism that differentiated him from the more reflectivist strands of constructivism and the post-modernist turn, a position shaped by the influence of John Anderson (Bull, 2002a, p.xxxi; Jeffery, 2008), who also shaped Bell's thinking (Hall, 2014, p.47). Also see Mayall (2009)

ontological position was based upon the idea that what *exists* in history can be subjective, but it nonetheless does still exist as a subject of study, and therefore should be approached as such (Bull, 1961, p.39; 2002a, p.266; Hurrell, 2002a, p.xii).[80]

In sum, a shared ontology of historicism amongst this group of 'Old School' scholars both provided them with the eclectic mixture of staring positions and understanding of human relations, but it also provided them with a coherence, or shared appreciation, that they ultimately held to similar beliefs in a certain reality of the past and the present that could be studied to further our understanding of world politics. Did this group of scholars recognise that this assessment of what was real, or what was valid knowledge, was subjective, yes. Did this prevent them from continuing to study, reflect, challenge, deliberate, and re-think their assessments of the past and the present to draw conclusions about lessons or examples that could be learned from history, no it did not.[81] There was a solidity to the security in which these 'Old School' scholars held to their ontological historicism, and this was an important part of what shaped their thinking.

2.2 Historicism as epistemology and the importance of Martin Wight to the English School

The importance of Martin Wight in shaping the thinking of many of the 'Old School' scholars is a key element in the contextualisation of how an 'Old School' group can be conceptualised. Wight and Butterfield were colleagues who convened the initial British Committee meetings, it was Wight who guided the research and the thinking of both Bell and Bull at the LSE, just as he influenced the thinking of practitioners such as Watson, and practitioner/scholars such as Howard, through their interactions in the British Committee and beyond.[82] Thus, Martin Wight's thinking was integral to this 'early' ES development, but it also remains profoundly important in continuing to shape contemporary ES thinking on the key concepts that underpin the approach, such as international society (see Yost, 2021, p.xiv-xvii).

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and Wilson (2012, p.578) on the continued use of empiricism in the ES and the rejection of more abstract approaches to the study of world politics.

[80] This is a theoretical circle that Friedner Parrat (2017, p.626) criticises Peter Wilson (2012) for attempting in contemporary ES work. Yet it is wholly reminiscent of the debates within the early ES in the sense that recognising that definitions are subjective does not abrogate the need for the continued use of definitions as a tool.

[81] Bain (2009) makes an interesting argument that Butterfield and Bull's positions on history were flawed due to the irreconcilable difference between the past being dead and history being premised on present understandings, or the interpretation of ideas and conclusions, rather than facts. This 'fable' dynamic that follows Oakeshott's teaching is itself not gospel within the field of history, but is nonetheless a different way of approaching the role of history in IR. However, I do not judge that this was the position shared by Bull and Butterfield, a point that Bain seems to acknowledge in his attempt at addressing the 'limitations' he sees in their work (Bain, 2009, p.159). Howard (1972), for example, in the same volume that Bain refers to Bull's theory on international politics, provides a narrative account of historical change in the use of force in the world *by* using facts and examples as the foundations for such an argument. This is not to argue that these have not been subjectively selected, yet, Howard, as with other 'Old School' scholars, saw these facts or examples as still providing evidence that is reliable in its outline of historical actions, events, and reactions.

[82] See Howard (2006, p.147), Bell (2008, p.47), Hall (2014, p.50), Miller (2014, p.57), Richardson (2014, p.63), and Barker (2014, p.21).

This continuation of influence is shaped still by Wight's (1991) argument that a singular conception of how international society could be formed was insufficient to understand the diverse human relations that shape the development of common values and norms. In part, this was due to Wight's criticism of the dominant binaries in the field at the time (Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.156-157), but it was also due to Wight's belief in providing a more holistic understanding of the relations between states and statespeople (Jackson, 2003, p.83). In essence, Wight (1977; 1991) saw an understanding of the world as being routed through a pluralist ontological and epistemological positioning.[83]

Returning to a focus upon the importance of the Rationalist, or Grotian tradition, that speaks to rights and responsibilities in shaping relations between states; this approach has, within contemporary ES debates, provided fertile ground for the focus on normative possibilities of international society as a concept (Clark, 1993, p.42; Dunne, 1995a; 2001a). While Wight was known to have leant towards Grotian elements of his own framework (Bull, 1976; Jackson, 1990; Hall, 2006), he nonetheless continued to underline the importance of avoiding the pitfalls of siloing political thinking that alternative approaches to IR had fallen into. This is a key point of epistemological positionality that was shared by Butterfield (1953, p.7) who also saw the role that singular conceptions of how to go about understanding the world could restrict the ability to understand change in world politics. Put simply, Wight and Butterfield both shared an epistemological framework that was both fluid in nature and deliberate in its flexibility.

As the previous sections already discussed, one cannot understand history without being influenced by it. Therefore, to frame a contemporary theoretical analysis of world politics without an historical understanding is not a progressive step forward, it is a step backwards in appreciating the insight and understanding that past thinking has already built. Framing any analysis of contemporary world politics without an epistemological appreciation of the past, would create an epistemological black hole that limits our ability to understand the future (Wight, 1977; see also Hurrell, 2009).

This is contra, then, to Linklater and Suganami's (2006, p.94) claim that Wight's concept of looking back to the past is anti-progressive. By using an historical lens to challenge the status quo thinking within the discipline, this itself provides a degree of normative, or progressive, thinking by challenging the potential status quo direction in which 'novel' understandings of world politics are dominating the field of International Relations (see Bull, 1972b; 1975; Vincent, 1988; Der Derian, 1995). In many ways this was also a reflection of Bell's own thinking in that she sought to interpret the historical beliefs and practices that shape contemporary political actions by explaining their historical evolution (Hall, 2014, p.45).

This is important because while Linklater and Suganami (2006, p.95) are no doubt correct that Bull had reservations about the ontological/epistemological relationship between history and theory that Wight argued for, they in turn potentially fall into the same logical trap that Bain (2007b; see below) does in respect to Bull's work. By arguing that 'theory is integral to history: to have an understanding of the history of international politics is to have a theoretical grasp of the subject' Linklater and Suganami (2006, p.95) have a position that intertwines ontology and epistemology. However, even though Bull (1972b) argued that history and theory are interrelated and cannot be separated, both he

[83] A tradition of conceptual thinking that has been continued by Little (2000) but perhaps more importantly is also very similar to what Bevir and Hall (2020b) have labelled as interpretivism that they argue underpinned the work of Wight, Butterfield, and Bull.

and Wight did position themselves as arguing that there is a privileging of historical knowledge when it came to understanding and developing theory. In other words, an ontological historicism *shapes* and influences the epistemological framework of theory (see Section 2.1 and Hay, 2002, p.63).

There is, then, an inherent influence that an understanding of history has upon the development and use of theory in shaping both what theories can tell us and how theory can, at times, be ahistorical.[84] In fact, both Wight (1991) and Bull (Bull, 1975; Hoffman, 2003, p.18; Jackson, 2003, p.424), shared this point of epistemological principle, that contemporary theories and understandings of events which claim to be novel in nature, or promote themselves as purveyors of new frontiers of human understanding, can fall into the intellectual trap of failing to understand the context and importance of the past in shaping the future, and indeed of the analytical and theoretical shoulders upon which they have built these 'new' approaches.

Similarly, both Vincent (1984) and Watson (2002, p.152) use historical analysis to challenge the wider conceptual gaps surrounding the development of common norms and values *within* the early ES itself. This was similar to Wight's (1977) broader arguments that history shapes our understanding not only of the past but also the present. Much like his contemporaries Manning (1962) and Butterfield (1951a; 1955), Wight did not argue for a retroactive view of history that inhibits progress, rather, Wight argued that any formulation of human progress *without* an understanding of historical precedent would mean that 'novel' ways of thinking about human and international relations were, in fact, not 'novel' at all but firmly embedded in past thinking and understanding.[85]

I don't, then, disagree with Linklater and Suganami (2006, p.95) that there *were* differences of opinion between Bull and Wight on the role of history in shaping theory.[86] The point I am establishing here is that Bull and Wight nonetheless held to the same principle, as did I believe the wider group of scholars I have termed the 'Old School', that history as a foundation of knowledge *will* shape our perception and understanding of theory as an epistemological and methodological tool (Bell, 1971, p.6; Butterfield, 1981; Howard, 2006b, p.147-148; Hall, 2014).[87]

[84] A good example of this is that the 'revolutionary' label assigned by Wight (1991) and other IR theorists to Kant is now contested. My thanks to Garrett W. Brown for pointing this out. Also see Hurrell (2002a, p.xiv) on Bull's reading of Kant.

[85] Garnett (1984, p.5; p.35) makes the same argument regarding the importance of reflecting upon what past theory can tell us, rather than trying to continuously reinvent the theoretical wheel. Itself a reflection perhaps on the important influence that Wight had beyond the ES. Bull also held similar points of view on the role and importance of understanding change in world politics (see Makinda, 2000, p.926). While Bell's thinking was profoundly shaped by Wight and her working relationship with him (Hall, 2014, p.45; O'Neill, 2014, p.35).

[86] Here I do disagree with Buzan's (2005a, p.39) argument that Bull takes a very different 'forward' facing route to understanding the expansion of international society, therefore differentiating from Wight's historicism. Where Buzan asserts that this future looking position was based upon Bull's understanding of European expansionism it seems clear he is overlooking the importance Bull also placed upon understanding the continued impact this history of colonialism had upon contemporary world politics (see Bull, 1982b; 1989a; 1989c; 2000b).

[87] Bell, for example, has been described by O'Neil (2014) as being in harmony with Michael Oakeshott's philosophical positioning, which in turn was built upon the primacy of history in shaping human thought (also see Barker, 2014, p.18).

For Wight (1960a; 1979; 1991), then, to have an understanding of theory one must first have an understanding of history was a key principle in the development of knowledge.[88] To approach the inquiry into world politics in the way Linklater and Suganami (2006, p.95) suggest would be to put the epistemological and methodological cart-before-the-horse.[89] For example, Bain (2007b) argues that Bull's approach to the use of history blurred the lines between the ES framework of epistemological and ontological understanding; creating an ambiguity of purpose in the use of history that rests upon the perception of what *may* happen. In effect the use of history as an epistemological tool to gain knowledge.

I argue here that this is only a partially accurate reading of Bull's position on the role of historicism.[90] Bain's (2007b) understanding of Bull's position on the use of history seemingly disregards the importance Bull (1968a; 1976; 2002a) placed upon the role of history in underpinning an understanding of international relations and theory. In other words, for Bull (1966a) history is as much an ontological foundation as it is an epistemological tool, arguing that it provides a temporal framework for understanding the development of the field of IR (Watson, 2008, p.80), as well as a testing-ground for theory that is vital to any deeper level of conceptual understanding that comes from self-criticism (Bull, 1972b, p.256). Thus, for Bull historicism was both the ontological basis upon which theory was developed, but it was also the knowledge base upon which a challenge to theoretical concepts could be placed.[91]

This is, therefore, a broader reflection of Bull's own position (Bull, 1966a; Neumann, 2011, p.464), which was that the nature of the reality of world politics cannot be separated from the past (Hurrell, 2001, p.489; Richardson, 2003, p.142). For Bull, any inquiry into world politics must be based upon an understanding that history is both something out there *to be studied*, as much as it is something *through which* we understand world politics. To distinguish history as simply a tool to be used is to misapply how Bull perceived the foundations of knowledge. For example, Navari (2009b, p.11) accurately identifies that Bain's positionality on the role of history is taken from Oakeshott's argument that history is a story used to interpret contemporary events (Bain, 2009, p.149). It is clear then that if Bain is applying this lens to Bull, then it sits neatly within the framework of history merely being a tool to be used. Yet, it is also clear from the influence that the 'Old School' group of scholars had upon each other's thinking that Bull shared both Wight and Butterfield's position that meditations on the process of history also fundamentally shape intentions, and historical understandings. In other words, and to paraphrase a tired phraseology, siloing Bull or any of the early ES scholars into just one framework of thinking in respect to historicism would be in opposition of a 'third way' that constantly deliberated between positionalities.

[88] This was a key position shared by Bell who saw theory as the child of its parent, history (see Ayson, 2014, p.94; Bell, 1971), a position also shared by Jackson (2009, p.30) in relation to practice coming before theory. It was also a fundamental principle that underlay Butterfield's concerns about history being made to fit the theory through selective interpretation (1965; also see Watson, 1981, p.7-8).

[89] Again, see Bell (1971, p.6); Buzan and Lawson (2015b); Leira (2015) who make a similar argument. Also see Little's (2009a, p.15) wider critique of the use of balance of power as a concept in relation to historical study.

[90] Based in large part, it would seem, upon Linklater and Suganami's (2006) own reading of Bull and not necessarily a wider engagement with Bull's earlier thinking and writing on this.

[91] For a clear example of this in Bull's (1961, p.4-16) early work see the use of history to refute conceptual and theoretical assumptions surrounding the causes of war and of economic depression.

For Bull (1972b, p.256-257), then, theory can ostensibly be studied *without* reference to history, but the basis of theoretical inquiry can never fully be disassociated from how history has shaped the development of theory. Linking back to the privileging of ontology in Section 2.1, how we epistemologically go about understanding the world can be *theory based*, but we must also recognise, as the 'Old School' scholars did, that the development of any theoretical approach will have been shaped by historicism.[92]

A clear example of this is in the differences exhibited between Bull and Wight on the nature of the evolution of international society as a concept for understanding the relations between states. Wight (1977; 1991), unlike Bull (2002a), was not certain that international society could evolve without a common cultural base. This positionality was directly shaped by Wight's own understanding of the role of religion, culture, and norms in shaping the past historical relations between states (Little, 2002, p.65; Hall, 2006). In other words, Wight could not escape his own dependency on what he saw as the historical trends that defined the relations between states which shaped his own theoretical framework for understanding world politics (Wight, 1991); his ontology shaped his epistemology.

However, pre-existing narratives within the contemporary ES have mis-framed Wight's interpretation of historicism as the basis of the study of world politics and have therefore shifted the focus *away from* the importance of understanding *how* an understanding of history shaped the early evolution of the ES itself. As such, a reassessment of the importance of Martin Wight's thinking is key to understanding the way in which these early ES scholars can also be defined by an 'Old School' historicism.

For example, both Suganami and Linklater (Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.94; Linklater, 2013, p.108) argue that Wight's concept of 'recurrence and repetition' in history is anti-progressive in nature and therefore undermines any arguments concerning both the nature and importance of justice in international relations; diminishing the ability to understand change in world politics. This position would have certainly been anti-progressive and in essence a Realist conception of IR; something that Wight (1991) clearly rejected as a singular and siloed way of thinking (Hall, 2006).

Instead, a more holistic reading of Wight's published and unpublished work (see Vigezzi, 2005; Hall 2006), suggests that Wight argued that understanding past historical human relations is a key heuristic to shine a light onto contemporary world politics. Not providing a mirror-image of how the past will reoccur, but a guide to the past choices, both moral and immoral, that have confounded and shaped human relations before (Hall, 2006, p.50-56).[93]

From this Wight argued that we can begin to understand that the moral and normative debates that shape contemporary international relations are also similar moral and normative issues that have challenged and stumped the relations between humans, states and statespeople in the past, and are

[92] This point is also echoed by Giddens (2014, p.358) in his argument that the divisions between history and social science are non-existent.

[93] There is little doubt that Wight's strongly held Christian beliefs underpinned his desire to see a grand design amongst the historical sweep of human existence. However, Wight was also crystal clear in his ideas and writing that the normative desire for something does not overcome the hard reality of human relations (Wight, 1979). For a wider discussion on the impact of Wight's Christianity in his thinking see Bull, 1976; Howard, 1986; Jackson, 2002b; Hall, 2006. Similarly for a discussion of the impact on Butterfield of his Christian beliefs see McIntire, 1979; Coll, 1985; Watson, 1985, p.x; Hall, 2002; 2012; Jones, 2003; Bentley, 2005; 2011.

thus not a revolutionary or novel way of understanding world politics (also see Butterfield, 1955, p.xiv; Garnett, 1984, p.5). Contra to his critics, Wight's wider understanding, and his lecturing, upon the nature of historical context, human predicaments, human choices, and change in world politics, demonstrates that Wight was far from anti-progressive in his understanding of history (Hall, 2006, p.55-56). In fact, Wight rejected the cyclic view of human relations (Hall, 2014, p.48) seeing it as running contra to Christian historicism and his own religious beliefs.[94]

Therefore, Wight saw that for those who argued that history was *in-and-of-itself* progressive that there was a gap in their appreciation of not only the lives and agency of those that had come before, but also a distinct blindness to the moral and fundamentally human element in looking back to history for examples of failure and success. In other words, there was a duality to Wight's conception of the importance of historicism. First, that he saw in contemporary turns within the discipline a degree of ahistorical understanding in the argument that these emergent approaches were unique in the conceptual and moral clarity.[95] Second, Wight understood that any theoretical or conceptual understanding of human relations would be inherently flawed if it did not also understand the importance that historicism played in underlying the ontological basis of human endeavours. In other words, history doesn't repeat itself, but human beings do look back to the past to learn the lessons of history.

This was an important point that not only Wight, but also other members of the British Committee argued. In fact, the work of the British Committee (Dunne, 1998), and indeed many of its key outputs, also underpinned this argument. Namely, that an understanding of the historical relations between humans are important and vital in shaping our understanding of the contemporary as much as they are in shaping our understanding of the past (Vigezzi, 2005).[96] An argument that has been reinforced by Andrew Hurrell (2009) and a point that Adam Watson continued to underscore later in life (Bull and Watson, 1989; Buzan and Little, 2009b, p.ix; Watson, 2009).

Thus, to argue, as Suganami (Linklater and Suganami, 2006) and Linklater (2013) do - that world politics cannot be reformed or improved if we simply rely upon historical examples; or Neumann's (2003, p.343) argument that Wight's 'butterfly collection' of historical examples denotes an epistemological and methodological reliance upon past events in shaping his understanding of diplomacy - is to misconceive not only the wider context of Wight's thinking (1960a; 1979; Vigezzi, 2005), but also the main thrust of his argument.

Instead, as Hall (2006; 2014, p.49) makes clear, Wight found it intolerant to merely rely upon the work of others in understanding history, placing a significant emphasis on engaging with and unpacking the

[94] It is clear that many contemporary ES scholars have interpreted Wight's thinking as having a 'cyclical' (see Friedner Parrat, 2017, p.624; 2020, p.766 for example) element to it. Yet, there is, I think, an important distinction to be made between recurrent events of the exact same nature, and the recurrence of moral and political dilemmas. Something that Wight was all too aware of, and which framed his own sense that history could not merely repeat itself (also see Hall, 2006, p.65-85).

[95] Bull (1961, p.46) also makes a similar point regarding strategic theorising and the idea that contemporary issues are unique in history.

[96] *The Expansion of International Society* (1989) is a singular example of this (Vigezzi, 2005) in that it *was* a historical example of how scholars have understood the evolution of world politics and indeed the evolution of the discipline. See Dunne and Reus-Smit's (2017) edited collection for a critique of this historical position.

original material or sources upon which much of our understanding of the past is based.[97] Put very simply, Wight understood all too well the subjective nature of historical interpretation, as did those scholars in the 'Old School' (see Section 2.3). This meant that for Wight, history could never simply be an epistemological tool to be picked up and used when needed. Instead, the very foundations of one's own knowledge had to be explored and unpacked by developing one's *own* understanding of the past. This process of ontological and epistemological exploration is a key part of the intellectual glue that held the 'Old School' group of scholars together, and was a core part of Bull's (1961, p.xiii) own thinking on the role of past experience in shaping understandings of the present.

Wight's (1977) historical analysis, for example, demonstrated that the Hellenic system of states and suzerain states in the Mediterranean and Asia were *not* representative of an international society as modern readings assume (Neumann, 2003). This was not based upon a contemporary reassessment of the pre-existing literature in order to fit within the epistemological framework of theoretical inquiry, but was instead a thorough, detailed, expansive and *original* analysis of the historical sources (Hall, 2006, p.5). Wight's original training as a student of history may have been narrow, and indeed parochial, yet it is abundantly clear that in later years Wight not only engaged with more global understandings of international history, and the Western-centric nature of many of those ontological positions within the field, but he also determined to seek out a better understanding of the holistic importance in understanding this historical context *as global* in nature (Hall, 2006).

This re-assessment of the dominant understanding of Wight's conception of history is important for this thesis's argument because the key aspect that would become the focus of much of the ES approach to IR, the concept of international society, is far more nuanced when we take in a more holistic reading of Wight's early work. Wight's (1977) analysis of the relations between the Greek city states, Persia, and the emergent colonial powers in the Western Mediterranean established that they were representative of an *emerging* form of international society, which for large swathes of its history of interactions and diplomatic practice had previously been inhibited by conflicting cultural and social practices (Wight, 1977, p.46-109).

This means that Wight's (1977) analysis of the Hellenic states system demonstrates not only the historical and social *barriers* to a cohesive international society, but also the historical examples of the *emergence* of a society. In other words, Wight's (1977) 'butterfly collection' demonstrates the importance of historical analysis in understanding both *how* change occurs in world politics but also how change also *does not* occur in the political and diplomatic relations between states and peoples. The argument made here is therefore a wider reflection of Wight's own understanding of the inherent importance of recognising how historicism can both shape and limit an understanding of world politics.

This, in turn, links directly into how the 'Old School' approached the study of world politics, and how they epistemologically framed the route to knowledge through the study of state-based relations. That is to say, the historical development and evolution of states was integral to understanding contemporary world politics and the way in which states continue to shape international relations. Whilst this has come to be perceived as a partly out-of-date route to gaining understanding and

[97] A useful contemporary example of this can be seen in Hansen's (2022) critique of Zarakol's (2022) lack of engagement with contemporary historical source material which challenges the wider applicability of some of the arguments made on the differences between international orders.

knowledge of a complicated and globalised world politics (Hurrell, 2002a, p.xv), state-based actions remained integral to the wider picture of international relations for both the 'Old School' scholars and more recent ES scholarship (Jackson, 1990, p.261; Makinda, 2001; Bull, 2002a, p.285)

While this argument may then suffer from the 'conservative' label,[98] it nonetheless remained the premise of the 'Old School' approach to understanding world politics, namely, that the concept of a 'society of states' was just that, a society *of* states. This was fundamental, therefore, to the 'Old School' epistemological framework for understanding both how international society functioned, but also how international order was integral to such functioning. State-based relations were the key aspect of understanding both the evolution and change in international society as a concept. This discussion, and debate, between the 'Old School' scholars was integral to the development and evolution of the concept of international society itself and demarcated what were distinctively different, yet connected, conceptions of what the elements of international society were founded upon (Butterfield, 1949; 1951; 1965; Bell, 1971; Bull and Watson, 1989; Howard, 2000; Watson, 2004; 2009). In other words, whilst each of these 'Old School' scholars focused upon different aspects of human relations, and different norms or values as key to the development of international society, they nonetheless maintained that there was both a tangible international society *to study* and that this state-based international society was the conceptual framework *through which* to study change in world politics.

While this focus may now seem quite limited, particularly in relation to the scope and focus of contemporary ES literature (see Section 1.3), this is nonetheless an important point that this Section seeks to make in relation to the framing of an 'Old School'. These scholars did not perceive themselves to be 'conservative' per se, rather, they saw themselves as challenging the status quo within the field by seeking an inquiry into world politics that was shorn of many of the ideological and constraining elements that underpinned other approaches. The normative positioning of these 'Old School' scholars therefore was that increasing our understanding of world politics *through* inquiry was a moral goal in-and-of-itself (Bull, 1972b, p.265; Vincent, 2003, p.43) and that the route towards this lay through epistemological diversity and challenge.

For Butterfield (Butterfield, 1951a; Hall, 2002) contemporary shifts towards normative of 'progressive' theoretical solutions was almost a non-starter in relation to discussions of justice in world politics. Acceptance of the existence of the status quo set of power relations in world politics had to be the starting point for any inquiry into the relations between states and world politics more widely (Butterfield, 1951a). Any attempts at *starting* with a theoretical framework that advocates normative possibilities, would, in effect, be a rejection of both common sense and reality (see Hall, 2002, p.733).[99] It is this point of argument, regarding the purpose and starting point of theoretical analysis that Butterfield argued was the curse of academic involvement in policymaking (Hall, 2002). In turn, this was something that Bull reflected upon following his own experience in policymaking (Bull, 1961;

[98] Conservative in the sense that Garnett defines the traditional approach to understanding world politics as being reflective of a *defence* of a plurality of approaches against the *zeitgeist* of contemporary interpretations that claim a certain summit of human achievement in the ability to understand the world around us (Garnett, 1984; also see Bull (1976) on Wight). Also see Beardsworth (2017, p.111) for a similar, but slightly different interpretation of 'conservative' thinking that accepts the premise of a 'pluralization of state responsibilities' as being progressive in-and-of-itself, and therefore sees Jackson's (2003) defence of a certain type of order as representative of this. See also Zhang (2016, p.96-97).

[99] Also see Navari and Knudsen (2019, p.7) who argue that this was Bull's 'philosophical realist' position.

1972b; Miller and Vincent, 2003), and a point of critical, and at times empathetic analysis that Bull also provided of Kissinger's own experience in foreign policy (Bull, 1980d).

While Bull advocated the separation of inquiry from practice in international relations (Wheeler and Dunne, 1996, p.91), and Butterfield (1951a; 1965) recognised the pitfalls of trying to bridge this analytical chasm, both nevertheless recognised that part of this paradigm was the unrelenting *injustice* of the relations between states in managing international order. For Bull (1971; 1980c; 2000b; 2002a) it was clear that he could never escape the moral dilemma that any discussion of international relations or framework for understanding world politics can be holistic in nature if it does not engage with a substantive inquiry into *why* the current international system does not substantiate the form of equality between states and people that Bull (1971) understood to be representative of international justice.

However, Bull's relationship between order and justice has been criticised by some as not only 'prudential' (Alderson and Hurrell, 2000) but 'ambivalent' (Harris, 1993, p.731) due to its incomplete definition and clarity of purpose. Yet, these critiques misunderstand the wider essence of Bull's work on order and justice (1980c; 2000b; 2002a). While Bull may have moved more towards a focus upon justice towards the end of his life, he nevertheless continued to argue that order and justice were intimately tied to each other and that he did not have the answers to which took priority in the relations between states (Ayson, 2012). It is clear that Butterfield's argument that there was a moral duty upon them as scholars to scrutinise world politics as it is rather than how it could be (Hall, 2002)[100] had had a clear influence in shaping Bull's own outlook (Hall, 2002; Williams, 2010, p.188). In fact, Bull argued that it was not possible to have a permanent conceptual 'resolution' (Harris, 1993, p.731) to the clash between the two, as conceptions of justice will always be contested (Bull, 2000b; Vincent, 1999).

This, then, is a core aspect of the 'Old School' epistemological framework. By basing the route to understanding on the past experiences and examples of human relations the 'Old School' scholars were clear that there are different ways of understanding and approaching the study of world politics, but also that there will never be a clear-cut perspective or moral solution to difficult issues because there has never been such simplicity to human relationships.[101] Thus, instead of Bull *not* defining what he thought justice meant in the international system (Wheeler and Dunne, 1996), Bull was arguing that there can *never be* a clear definition of justice and to argue otherwise is to have a mistaken understanding of world politics and the inherently pluralistic nature of the relations between states and peoples. Bull (2002a) did not presume to attempt to answer *all* of the questions of morality in international politics, as the premise of much of what he saw as the role of academic inquiry was to *ask* the important questions of existing thinking, not presume that satisfactory answers can always be provided (Butterfield, 1951a; Stern, 1973, p.134).

However, for Bull (1968a, p.630) any analysis of the relations between states *without* an aspect of morality would leave a paucity of practical political theory; a point he was largely making as a critique

[100] A position shared by James (1973a) and to a lesser degree also by Jackson (2003, p.16). Yet, Jackson (2009, p.25) clearly argues that this was a position held by the 'classical' ES scholars.

[101] Coral Bell's (1971) study of elite policymakers and leaders in crisis is a particularly clear example of this, as is her analysis of Henry Kissinger (Bell, 1977a). Hall (2014, p.46) describes Bell's focus as an 'agent-centred interpretive theory of international relations. Also see Jackson (2009, p.21) who argues this human centred approach is that which underpins the ES.

of positivist approaches to IR. Yet Bull's (1968a) argument was also based upon a misreading of the intent of Carr's (2001) work in which Bull overlooks Carr's own positioning *on* morality, which was not the absence of morality in itself, but rather a trenchant use of morality as a critique of the existing blindness of utopian thinking by questioning the very foundations of its base through a 'realist' hermeneutic tool (Dunne, 1998, p.23-46).[102]

This is an important point to make here in relation to the development of the foundations of the 'Old School' epistemological approach to understanding world politics. For whilst Carr (2001) was not abrogating the need for morality (Roberson, 2002), he was arguing that there is an inherent morality that lies with questioning the premise of predominant thinking of the day without also requiring the provision of an alternative normative framework (Garnett, 1984; Wheeler and Dunne, 2002, p.43).[103] In essence, political theory without normative *prescription* does not equate to political theory *without morality*.[104]

The shared epistemological historicism of the 'Old School' scholars was not devoid of moral purpose or of normative influence. It was, however, a positioning of these scholars within a framework of seeking knowledge through the lens of historical analysis to ascertain how and why the relations between states and peoples existed as it did. This positionality was inherently shaped by the divergent viewpoints and challenges provided by these 'Old School' scholars to each other, but they nonetheless shared an analytical framework that to understand world politics one must understand the relations between states and the society that these states, and state leaders, have created.

Wight, along with Butterfield, were integral to shaping much of this deliberation by warning that the antithesis of academic inquiry would be to turn political inquiry into a provincial analysis of merely how the world ought to have been, rather than holding to a diversity, or plurality of epistemological positions (Wight, 1991).[105] Bull held a similar position in what Howard (2008, p.127-129) framed as his returning to first principles mentality, which it is also clear from the testimonials was a position shared by Bell.[106] Nonetheless, these 'Old School' scholars did share an epistemological outlook that was diverse and challenging, yet underpinned a coherence in how they investigated the functioning of

[102] A similar point is made by Suganami (Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.38) in demonstrating Buzan's (2005a) misreading of Carr's work. Also see Wilson (2016b, p.112-113) who supports the idea that Carr can be seen as an intellectual stimulation for the development of the early ES.

[103] Butterfield (1965) also shared a similar position on the ethics of historiography, arguing that bringing morality into the equation when studying the past would inevitably undermine the accuracy of any assessment of the past (also see McIntire, 1979, p.54-74; Watson, 1985, p.xi; Bentley, 2005; 2011; Stapleton, 2008, p.555; Hall, 2012, p.424-425).

[104] This is similar, perhaps ironically, to the argument made by Poast (2022) regarding Carr's Realist leanings and distinct opposition to the rejection of moralistic values. Also see Bull's wider analysis of issues of justice in world politics (1971; 1972a; 1972b; 1975; 1979b; 1980c; 1982b; 1984; 2000a; 2000b; 2002a).

[105] As Navari (2009b, p.13) points out, it is never as simple as this in terms of 'conflating is's' with oughts' and that contemporary ES scholarship has demonstrated a spectrum of work that, sometimes based upon empirical material, provides differing degrees of normative concerns. Importantly, Butterfield (1972, p.343) does not argue that there shouldn't be strands of normative thinking in the field, rather, that this should be tempered with more hard-nosed approaches as well, reminiscent perhaps of Wight's (1991) conceptual mode of thinking that requires contestation to provide a holistic framework for understanding humanity. Writing this comment has brought to mind Watson's (2009) pendulum model and whether an adapted version of this would be a useful way of visually interpreting the changing nature of normative driven work within the ES. Something a future research project could endeavour to map.

[106] See the edited collection by Ball and Lee (2014).

world politics. The next section unpacks this further by exploring the methodological similarities between these scholars and the focus they shared in understanding the role and importance of international elites.

2.3 Historicism as methodology: Present, but imprecise

While the 'Old School' were ultimately focused upon states as the core referent objects that shape international order,[107] these scholars also recognised that states are not self-existing structures. They are formed by, and maintained through, human relations in the international sphere, which in turn are dominated by statespeople and those that represent those states (Manning, 1962, p.73; Purnell, 1973; Wight, 1979; Jackson, 1990, p.261; 2003, p.30; Bull, 2002a). States are run by elites acting on the international stage and it is the elites who are acting to create or maintain international order. This means that for the identification of an element of methodological coherence amongst the 'Old School' I refer to what Navari (2009b, p.2) means by methodology, that historicism as a methodology refers to the subject of analysis, which in this specific case is the historical study of elites and their actions and decisions.

Whilst contemporary world politics has changed in ways that involve a myriad of transnational actors also now shaping global order (Slaughter, 2004; Hurrell, 2009), for Bell international relations was about understanding how the beliefs of these key actors moved, shaped, and responded to the power and machinations of others.[108] Similarly, for Wight, it was about getting into the minds of individuals and the time and place in which they lived (Bain, 2009, p.148; Wight, 2021b; 2021c) in order to ascertain and understand the context of their decision-making.

This is an important point that Cornelia Navari (2009c, p.40) reinforces when making an analysis of Wight's thinking on the causal nature of patterns in international society. From an ES methodological perspective, when Wight refers to patterns of ideas, he is not referring to observable or measurable patterns, but rather he is referring to the patterns of ideas that are held in the heads of actors on the international stage. Wight understood that history can provide a framework for understanding how and why humans have held to certain norms and ideals, or have breached and rejected said values, in the face of events or actions. In fact, Wight (1960b) clearly argued that while historical and theoretical examples can shine a light upon events, this light is inevitably looking backwards whilst each international crisis or challenge is unique in its own way.

The supposition therefore that a definitive model that defines how events will occur was not only anathema to Wight's (1960b) own thinking but it also a misunderstands a key element of the British Committee work that draws upon a methodology of historicism as key to understanding change in world politics (Vigezzi, 2005). In fact, Navari (2009c, p.48) makes a secondary, and just as important, point regarding the nature of causality in the thinking of both Wight and Bull. Unlike criticisms of the

[107] For wider debates on this topic see Butterfield, 1966b; Wight, 1966b; 1979; Purnell, 1973; James, 1989; Clark, 1993; Buzan, 2001; Roberson, 2002; Jackson, 2003; 2009; Miller, 2003c; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Navari, 2009b.

[108] See Bell 1961; 1962c; 1963; 1964; 1977a; 1977b; 1978; 1984a; 1984b; 1989b. Richardson (2014, p.63-64) points out that Bell, much like Wight, held a disdain for the overt focus on methodology that has now become the standard in much of the social sciences discipline.

methodological naivety of early ES work, Navari makes clear that both Wight and Bull *understood* the relationship between their work and claims of causality, rejecting the linkage on the premise that causal propositions are those that occur regardless of intentions. In other words, Wight and Bull were interested in evolving our understanding of the development of international society as a *deliberate* and conscious choice of international actors not as the biproduct of 'measurable' actions and events.[109] This holds particular methodological importance for the study of the evolution of the G7 in the following Chapters of this thesis and the deliberate and conscious choices of the Summit leaders in their perceived responsibility in maintaining international order (see Chapters 3-6).

However, while Linklater and Suganami (2006) can be forgiven for interpreting Wight's predilection for the 'regularities' of the past as a pattern of causality in his arguments (see Section 2.2), the reality is that alongside other members of the British Committee (Vigezzi, 2005, p.39), including Hedley Bull (Hoffman, 2003, p.18), Wight understood all too well that the study of world politics remains 'the territory of the contingent and the unforeseen' (Vigezzi, 2005, p.44). This is important because it underlines the point that methodologies predicated upon scientific propositions that understood human beings as mechanical objects with measurable behaviours was anathema to Wight (Howard, 1977, p.364-365) and these 'Old School' scholars who understood the complexity of human relations.

This Section therefore argues that the critiques that a lack of clear methodological rigour have stunted the ES's global impact (Finnemore, 2001; Navari, 2009b) are correct. As Navari's (2009a) edited collection on ES methodology lays out, many of the early ES scholars *deliberately* eschewed a coherent or precise framework of methodological approach because they rejected being siloed into a singular method of understanding human relations and world politics (see Jackson, 2009; Little, 2009b).

Yet, there is also a coherence, if it can be called that, to the eclectic and diverse nature of how these early ES scholars looked at the world (see both Wilson, 2009 and Little, 2009b). Wight and Butterfield were both trained historians, with the concomitant methodological rigour and engagement with methodological debate that this came with at their time.[110] Bell meanwhile was intimately shaped in her work by an in-depth understanding of history and its contextual importance (see Ball and Lee, 2014), a framework also shared by Howard from both personal experience and as a military historian (2006). Similarly, in the work of both Watson and Bull we can see that their ideas and thinking is peppered with, if not premised upon, the use of history as a comparative methodology with the present (Bull and Watson, 1989; Watson, 2007; 2009). While this reliance upon historicism as the empirical material is reasonably well known, what has been less well observed is that these scholars also shared a methodological object of focus in their deliberations and study of key actors and elites in shaping this history. In other words, while these scholars focused upon different historical periods or reflected upon and challenged each other as to the contemporary relevance of these time periods,

[109] For Buzan (2005a, p.12) the 'idea' of international society as being inside the head of statesmen was a key part of one strand of early ES thinking, a strand that Buzan indicates came from Manning's (1962) thinking on the subject. Yet, as demonstrated in the next Section, Manning's ideas clearly influenced the thinking of Wight and Bull, but an understanding of the beliefs and ideas of statesmen was also integral to Bell (1971; 1977) and Howard's (2000) thinking on international relations as well as that of Butterfield and Wight (2019), all of which shaped the thinking of each other (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2).

[110] See Butterfield (1965) on his critique of wayward historical methodology in influencing and shaping interpretations of history.

they nonetheless focused a great deal of their understanding of history not just on the underpinnings of theory, or the structuration of international schema, but also upon the historical role of elites.[111]

Historicism as a methodology, therefore, was intimately shaped not only by the ontological and epistemological positioning of these scholars in relation to the importance of history to understanding knowledge; it was also shaped by a methodological premise that to understand the evolution and management of international order and international society then one was required to study the actions of the elites who shaped these practices (see Wilson, 2012, p.578; 2016b, p.114; Hall, 2015). Put very simply, the 'Old School' method of focusing upon elite driven actions in world politics was a specific choice that was based upon both a historical and contemporary assessment of *who* shapes international order and the management of said order between states. [112]

For Wight it was the exploration of the ideas and institutions held and enacted by agents, the norms held by these elites, that provides the depth of understanding needed in international relations (Hall, 2014, p.50). Similarly, for Bell the idea of 'elite identity' (Tow, 2014, p.110) was a key factor in understanding alliance building, diplomatic relations, and the role these machinations had on international order more broadly. For both Bell and for Wight, understanding the personalities, and interpreting their decisions and how they are shaped by these self-perceptions and constraints that these actors believe they are under, is key to understanding decision-making in world politics.

Taking this linkage further, Terradas (2023) argues that Watson, Wight, Butterfield, and Howard[113] all shared a set of insights into what Watson coined as the *raison de système*, or the underlying belief amongst key actors in world politics that it pays to make the system work. There was a shared methodological aspect for these scholars that understanding the development of this shared set of norms, or beliefs, in the pay-off of maintaining the rules-of-the-game was clearly linked to diplomacy. Thus, the focus of where to study these shared beliefs in maintaining or preserving international order that were enacted because it paid to do so resided between those international elites who were in a position to make the system work for them through diplomatic action (Vigezzi, 2005, p.xv-xix; 117-148; see also Bull, 2002a, p.156-177; Terradas, 2023).

By focusing upon the historicism of diplomatic practice through the actions of elites Watson (2004) also underlined a key aspect of his own personal experience and how this shaped his contribution to the ES.[114] While these 'Old School' scholars were focused upon the historical aspects of what these elites had done, or how they had attempted to shape their decisions and actions,[115] others within the

[111] Jackson (2009, p.28-30) also argues that this is the underlying methodological premise of the 'classical' ES approach.

[112] See Hall (2015, p.36-37) regarding the different positions of 'wings' of the contemporary ES, including the critical and normative. Also see Gong's (1984) detailed and nuanced understanding of the imposition of a European 'standard' of civilisation and how this was contested and challenged (by elites), but nonetheless still became the widely accepted framework for the global society of states. Also see Suzuki (2009) for a more contested analysis of the diversity of adoption/rejection/socialisation of European norms in East Asia. For a more contemporary look see Friedner Parrat (2023, p.232).

[113] Howard's (2009) work on the role of war in Europe, for example, focuses on how elites deliberated and shaped the societal norms associated with conflict.

[114] Terradas uses the term 'craft' to describe Watson's framing of diplomacy, but practice seems to be a more widely used term now that has broader understanding beyond the ES. See Navari (2010).

[115] Butterfield had a focus on monarchs and leading diplomatic figures in history (Coll, 1985, p.1430-153), for Howard (1979) it was how leading actors represented vital state interests in foreign and military policy, while

British Committee were also focused on diplomacy but from a philosophical perspective on how past thinking, rather than past practice, shaped our contemporary understanding.[116]

Similarly, Butterfield's (1966b) deliberations and focus on the importance of the idea of a balance of power (also see Chapter 4) is important because as Navari (2009b, p.9) makes clear, Butterfield and the early ES scholars saw the idea of a balance of power as seen through a perception of power and its use in the eyes and self-understanding of statesmen. Thus, again, reinforcing the point that for many of these 'Old School' scholars it was about an historical understanding of how these statesmen had used these concepts, or the ideas surrounding these concepts, in managing international order or making diplomatic decisions and entertaining negotiations.

In many ways then this framing of a methodological coherence between the 'Old School' scholars runs against the recent trend within the ES to focus on institutional debates, or the unpacking and analysing of the relationship between primary institutions and the role and importance of secondary institutions and organisations in world politics (Knudsen and Navari, 2019; see Section 6.1). This Section does not overlook the importance of these developments, nor this focus, but what it does argue is that these 'Old School' scholars *also* focused on how the *individuals* who worked in and through these secondary institutions were shaped and influenced by ideas and concepts.

This Section therefore argues that an 'Old School' methodological focus on the role of international elites was premised on understanding these institutional structures, or the influence of these norms, but through the lens of studying the key actors who shaped, created, and managed these institutions. While the practice turn that the contemporary ES has recently taken (Navari, 2010; Spandler, 2015; Friedner-Parratt, 2017) would seem, at first glance, to be the route through which to classify this methodological coherence that I have identified between the 'Old School' scholars, particularly when seen through the lens of Navari's (2010, p.526-527) argument that, absent the causational linkage, there are similarities between the early ES focus on agents, or key actors, and how practices or norms of practice influence, rather than direct, actions.

Yet, the foundations of these social theory approaches were anathema to these 'Old School' scholars who rejected many of the underlying principles of this postmodernist, and poststructuralist, turn (see Section 1.4). Instead, Wilson's (2012) route through grounded theory provides more linkages to the 'classical approach' that the early ES has been identified with, but again, does not quite do justice to what I see as a methodological coherence around historicism and the interpretivist aspects of these 'Old School' scholars in focusing on trying to understand the beliefs and decision of key international actors.[117]

The early ES methodological framework for analysing and using history, such as it was (see Navari, 2009b), aimed to provide a pluralistic methodological (Little, 2000; 2009b) analysis of *past understandings* of world politics, as well as a holistic analysis of *current understandings* of the

for Wight (1966, p.116; 2021d) it was about how ethical issues were confronted by statesmen and monarchs (see Howard, 1977; Schweizer and Black, 2006; Terradas, 2023).

[116] Here I refer to Maurice Keens-Soper. See Chapter 8 for the implications this may have in future developments of the idea of an 'Old School', but which I have specifically separated from inclusion in the 'Old School' group.

[117] My thanks to John Williams for nudging me in this direction over the clash between my argument and the practice turn. Also see Navari (2010, p.613).

international system; an analysis which in-and-of-itself cannot escape the impact of *past understandings* (Butterfield, 1951a; Little, 2009b), nor the past methods upon which these were based.

Thus, if both past and present analyses of world politics are to understand contemporary world politics sufficiently to avert the follies of the past (Butterfield, 1951a, p.36), then we must also recognise that an understanding of world politics is greater than the sum of its parts and therefore it must be analysed through a theoretical framework that embraces the historical as well as the social in its assessment (Northedge, 1984; Wilson, 1989, p.49; Hurrell, 2009). What this means is that in using an interpretivist approach to understanding international elites one cannot only understand their perspective on the current, we must also explore how their understanding of the past has shaped this understanding of the present. For example, Bell's (1971) seminal work on the conventions surrounding international crises, which will be explored in Chapter 7, is a clear example of this focus on trying to interpret and understand how and why key actors misinterpreted their opposite number based upon past historical understandings, or interpretations, of actions. Thus, any understanding of present crises must also come with an understanding of how key actors have understood *past crises*. The methodological focus that is present amongst these 'Old School' scholars remains, imprecise and eclectic as it is, wedded to understanding the actions of international elites. The following chapters apply this 'Old School' focus on understanding the actions of elites to the evolution of the G7 as the case study that runs throughout the thesis.

2.4 A label within a label, why the 'Old School' matters for the contemporary English School

The culmination of this 'Old School' framework is important for wider debates within the ES as it continues a well-trodden path of self-reflective assessment of the School's own thinking and how this can shape future thinking. For Dunne (1998), the exclusivity of the British Committee had a reasoning, and design, behind its choice of participants, thus framing the early contributions to the School in a clearly defined manner (Vigezzi, 2005). Yet for Suganami (Linklater and Suganami, 2006) an overt focus upon the specific membership of the British Committee overlooks the important influence that other voices had upon the ideas that were being deliberated at the time within the British Committee, specifically those of Manning (1962) and the development of the concepts of international order and international society (see Vigezzi, 2005, p.115).

What is key here, and largely now available as a reflection, is that much like early reasoning behind the emergence of the British Committee itself, there is a *third way* of understanding the evolution of the ES as an approach to the study of world politics. For the members of the British Committee, it would have been inaccurate to suggest that Manning, or even Carr, were also members of their group. In fact, in the case of Carr, his potential membership was deliberately rejected by both Wight and Butterfield (Vigezzi, 2005, p.113-114). Manning's position vis-à-vis the British Committee is also clear, he was not a member (Dunne, 1998; Vigezzi, 2005). However, while Carr was excluded due to both Wight's perception of his pre-existing grand status in the field and Butterfield's previous negative professional interactions with him (Vigezzi, 2005), Manning in fact played an important role as the

head of department at the LSE where both Wight and Bull worked and therefore did have a professional influence on their thinking.[118]

This influence also had a negative effect in shaping the decision to exclude Manning from the British Committee because of his rather verbose arguments (Dunne, 2000; Long, 2005, p.78; Vigezzi, 2005, p.114) which were more inclined to postulate upon the importance of normative output in international relations, rather than focusing on the *understanding* of both theoretical and real-world issues in the more classical sense (Waever, 1992, p.120). This normativity is perhaps ironic given Bull's clear dislike of Manning's ideas surrounding support for apartheid in South Africa, which were anathema to his own thoughts about international justice (Bull, 1982b; Dunne, 2000, p.235; Hoffman, 2003, p.20). However, where both Dunne and Suganami are correct in their assessment is in the importance of both Carr and Manning in *shaping* the thinking of Bull and Wight *in opposition* to these dominant voices in the field (see Yost, 2021, p.xii).

The origins of the British Committee therefore lay in a direct challenge to the loudest voices in the field (Vigezzi, 2005; Linklater and Suganami, 2006). In developing the debates that categorise who *was in* and who *should be in* the ES, both Dunne (1998) and Suganami (Linklater and Suganami, 2006) have made the same small erroneous step that Bull (1968a) did in critiquing Carr's work; they have overlooked the importance of the role these thinkers played in shaping the deliberations of the early ES thinkers in *contestation*[119] to this work. Both Carr and Manning's work *did* influence the thinking and development of both the British Committee and the seminal publications that have come to define the 'early' ES.[120] This is the key point as to why the theoretical positioning of an 'Old School' grouping of scholars is important in its contemporary contribution to the ES. Understanding which voices shaped the early development of key conceptual ideas and work is integral to also understanding how this work has influenced the *contemporary usage* of this work. In other words, the importance of looking back at the past is not limited to the empirical or subject of study, it is also vital to look back at the development of the theory and the people that shaped this development.

[118] Manning recruited both Wight and Bull to the London School of Economics (Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.35), with Bull latterly contributing to a testimonial publication dedicated to Manning (James, 1973a). Yet Wight and Bull both took their own direction in theorising about the development of International Society (Dunne, 1998; p.138; Vigezzi, 2005, p.12). It was, nonetheless, Manning's role in bringing these voices together within the LSE that provided the opportunity and space for this development (Miller, 2003b, p.3-5) and the subsequent impact it had in shaping Bull's own thinking on international society (see Vigezzi, 2005, p.114-115), albeit in opposition to Manning's own (also see Bull, 1961, p.xiii). Additionally, whilst Manning's ideas were open to embrace of the Americanised 'scientific' direction of travel within the field of International Relations (Banks, 1973, p.193; James, 1973a, p.vii; Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.108), he was not a behaviouralist per se (Banks, 1973; Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.82). However, this eclectic nature of Manning's own thinking was in direct contradiction to that of both Wight and Bull who saw the need for a rejuvenation of a 'classical' approach to the study of International Relations (Bull, 1966a; Vigezzi, 2005, p.115) in order to push-back at the limited conceptual understandings developed in the 'scientific' approach to world politics. Also see Buzan (2005a, p.31).

[119] A point that Hedley Bull himself made when discussing the 'grouping' of scholars into certain 'schools' (Suganami, 2003, p.255) and supported by Vigezzi's (2005, p.11) understanding of the debates both within the British Committee and those which took place in deciding the membership of said Committee.

[120] Here I refer to *Diplomatic Investigations*, *The Anarchical Society* and *The Expansion of International Society* which Dunne (1998), Linklater and Suganami (2006) and Vigezzi (2005) all agree are the seminal works that emerged from the British Committee and have become the backbone of the ES approach to International Relations. See Dunne, 1998; Suganami, 2000; Waever, 2002, p.88; Vigezzi, 2005; Holsti, 2009, p. 127.

The point of this chapter's theoretical contribution is that it provides a different viewpoint on both the historical roots of the ES, but it also provides a challenge to the contemporary interpretations, misinterpretations, and understandings, that underpin much of the recent ES scholarship. It challenges those of us who work in and with the ES to look again at our understanding of the importance of the 'founding fathers'[121] and follows a long-held tradition within the ES of applying a critical lens to the School's own history in order to enhance our own theoretical understanding and open future avenues of research. The application of such a critical reflective lens to our pre-existing understanding of the G7, particularly within the field of IR, is the analytical strand that runs throughout the following chapters.

However, by also challenging past conceptions of the ES, this thesis enables the inclusion of ideas and thinking that have been overlooked or side-lined and enables the renewal of past ideas that have fallen out of fashion but may have relevance today. This was the premise of the coming together of those thinkers within the British Committee, and it is a principle that has underpinned much of the contribution that the ES has made to IR.

The 'Old School', as this chapter has defined them, were a group of scholars who identified through historical analysis a world politics that was inherently anarchic, but a world politics that had been, and continued to be, shaped by attempts at managing said anarchy through forms of international order and societal relations between peoples and states. This ontological position framed their investigation into human relations of both the past and the present. This ontological position also framed these scholars' epistemological positionality which was to look back at history in order to understand and explore the present.

These ontological and epistemological positions were intertwined. That is to say an epistemological approach that relied upon historicism as its guiding principle shaped the direction in which the ontological foundations of the 'Old School' evolved. This argument is, in a way, a reinforcement of Colin Hay's (2002, p.61-65) own argument which, while 'privileging' ontology over epistemology, it also demonstrates that ontology and epistemology fundamentally shape methodology (Hay, 2007, p.118).

This is vital in understanding the characterisation of an 'Old School' within the early ES, and key to understanding why this has important implications for the contemporary ES. For Hay (2007) ontology and epistemology are not dependent upon methodology, they shape it. For the 'Old School' scholars' the overt attention being paid to methodology by the field of social 'science' at the time was tantamount to having the tools of the trade lead the direction of the investigation. In other words, the focus upon which tools are used to discover the world, and how you can reliability test those tools, was to the detriment of asking the bigger questions about how the world interrelated, and how power and order functioned.

This debate may seem to hark back to the 'Great Debates' within the field of IR and to the latter stages of 20th Century, and therefore be of their time. Yet, the implicit, and now explicit, shift within the ES

[121] I use this terminology deliberately because I find it problematic. Coral Bell sits squarely within this grouping of scholars, yet Bell is not regarded as a key founding member of the ES. I will explore the importance of situating Bell's work at the heart of the ES in the following Chapters, with a particular focus on its contribution in Chapter 7, yet there is not space in this thesis, nor was it the focus of this research, to expand upon the underlying gender issues within the history of the ES itself.

towards a normative understanding of world politics (Schmidt and Williams, 2023, p.2) has relied upon a combination of epistemological and methodological toolkits that have begun to privilege that *how* we understand the world *should be* normative. It has also argued that inquiry *should be* conducted through the lens of a methodology that privileges the subaltern, or previously unheard, voices in international relations (Williams, 2021, p.128; 2023, p.87).

This is a positive shift in opening up the ES to a direction of thinking that has potential to widen the approach to a more diverse audience, and to develop new avenues of both empirical and theoretical research. It also holds the possibility of challenging the pre-existing assumptions within the ES about the prioritisation of certain ontological positions around international order. However, this epistemological and methodological shift away from studying the 'elites' (Williams, 2021) comes at a similar cost to that which Beardsworth (2020, p.385) describes the wider field of IR as having suffered in shifting away from an ontological focus upon the continued role of the state. That is, an understanding *of* elites is still necessary to understand how they *continue* to shape world politics.

Put simply, the 'Old School' scholars' held an ontological position that historical records of past elite actions, including colonial, imperial, and hegemonic states and actors, had shaped the management and form of international order in world history. They also held an ontological position that elites *continued* to shape world politics and therefore must be understood both in the context of the present and in the context of the past. These 'Old School' scholars' held an ontology, epistemology and methodology that privileged a focus upon elites *in history*, in order to heuristically understand *how* elites acted in contemporary world politics.

This positionality is not without its limits, and it is clearly subjective in its framing of a historical understanding of largely European, or Western, norms of international relations. Nonetheless, these were the ontological positions of those members of the 'Old School' who assessed world politics from this starting point. This positionality in understanding what exists, or how to understand what exists in the world, has been continued in latter ES work with a similarity of focus or deliberation. For example, the work of Jackson (2003) and Mayall (2005) both demonstrate an ontological and epistemological relationship that prioritises an understanding of the past in shaping and framing how contemporary world politics is understood.

Similarly, Buzan and Little (2010) and Buzan and Lawson (2015b) have continued the rich empirical historicism that is shared with the work of Wight (1977), Watson (2009) and Bull and Watson (1989). Meanwhile Wheeler's (2018) recent work on the role of interpersonal trust seems to build upon the wider framing argument made by Buzan (1993) that understands the emergence of international society as based upon either a process of *gemeinshaft* or *gesellshaft*, the former being the Wightean organic emergence from a commonality of experience and values, the latter the more prosaic Bullian notion of regular intercourse and proximity developing common interests, also sharing an epistemological and methodological focus on the importance of international elites in understanding change in world politics.

In identifying, therefore, the distinctiveness of an 'Old School' historicism that privileged an ontological positionality framed around understanding elite management of international order, which in turn shaped the epistemological and methodological focus upon understanding past actions and conventions, or political expansions and imperial behaviour; this chapter does not seek to subvert the contemporary shift in the ES, but instead seeks to highlight the continued relevance of a *plurality*

of ontological perspectives which lay at the heart of the early ES project, even if they are a continuation of European, and Western, norms of understanding how international order is managed (see Terradas, 2020). This has set the foundations of the inquiry that is unpacked in the following chapters, and the specific case study focus on a Western-oriented forum of powerful states in the G7.

What this chapter has done is to attempt to reinvigorate a 'third way' approach for the ES. It tries to once again bridge the conceptual gap that Bevir and Hall (2020a, p.125) argue has grown up between what they term the structuralist and the interpretivist wings of the contemporary ES. As Bevir and Hall (2020a) rightly argue, these differences of understanding or approaching world politics are also present amongst the different scholars in the 'early' ES thinking (also see Hall, 2015). This chapter has therefore more clearly defined the ontological, epistemological, and methodological parameters that certain key individuals within the 'early' ES worked from. These philosophical principles, whether overtly described or not, cross the boundaries of the interpretivist/structuralist division. The labelling of an 'Old School' is not, then, simply a rehashing of the 'rediscovery' of history debate (See Butterfield, 1955; Elman and Elman, 1997; Vigezzi, 2005; Mackay and Laroche, 2017). It is the reassertion of the importance of understanding the analytical and conceptual bridges that link the ES together. The following chapters apply this approach to historical analysis to the contemporary case study of the G7 in world politics. In doing so, these chapters link up both early and contemporary ES thinking on the role of economic power, legitimacy, Great Power responsibility, and how shared norms and values shape the emergence of international society. In light of the historicism outlined above, this analysis is done by using a historical analysis of the actions and decisions of international elites who were at the centre of the G7's evolution.

Chapter 3 – Economic Legitimacy in World Politics

'…to account for the existence of international order we have to acknowledge the place of rules that do not have the status of law. We have also to recognise that forms of international order might exist in the future, and have existed in the past, without rules of international law.'
(Bull, 2002a, p.xxxiv)

The role of economics within the ES approach to International Relations has traditionally been regarded as the lesser sibling to primary institutions such as Great Power relations or diplomacy (Buzan, 2005a, p.20). This has left a distinctive gap within the development of the ES approach and its versatility in understanding world politics (Jones, 1981; Alderson and Hurrell, 2000, p.55; Buzan, 2005a, p.19; Linklater and Suganami, 2006; Beeson and Bell, 2017). The failure to fully engage with economic issues as core elements of world politics was recognised even by early ES scholars working within the British Committee (Wight, 1977, p.33; Bull, 2002a, p.25; Buzan and Little, 2007, p.xii; Watson, 2007, p.7). Yet, as Buzan (2005a, p.150-151) argues, it is long past time that the ES engaged with this level of interaction and connection between communities and states.

The recent work by Buzan and Faulkner (2022b) in re-imagining the role of economics within the ES, has built upon Mayall's (2016) ideas surrounding a community of states being shaped by liberal economic values.[122] This contemporary work, in turn, adds to Hurrell's (2009) analysis of how economic relations shape the inequalities between people and states and pertains directly to some of the wider ideas surrounding the role of justice that have become the mainstay of the ES (Vincent, 1999). However, the ES has thus far showed little exploration of how economic relations can shape the *a priori* emergence of forms of international society. Buzan and Falkner's (2022b) recent work has indicated a shift in the thinking within the ES surrounding the nature of economic relations and the primacy of the market as a core aspect of world politics, ie: an emergent primary institution.

This chapter frames its focus quite narrowly in respect of these recent developments by aiming to understand not only the implications of globalisation on shared values and interests, but how these shared principles of economic interaction between states can solidify a common economic culture that has implications for understanding the management of international economic order. In doing so this chapter argues that legitimacy in world politics can also be underpinned by the perception of the effective management of international economic order, and thus the legitimacy of a management of said order can also provide the foundations for the emergence of shared norms and practices.

The chapter is made up of three sections. The first section briefly unpacks economic, political, and diplomatic transformation of world politics in the post-1945 era – what has come to be known as globalisation. It argues that this shift in the level of interconnectedness between states not only emphasises the changing nature of world politics but highlights the importance that economic relations now play in the maintenance of international order.

[122] Also see Buzan (2005a, p.157) who argues this could be the foundation of a solidarist form of international society, a point pursued throughout this thesis, but one that culminates in Chapter 6.

The second section then develops the conceptual and theoretical possibilities regarding trade and economic relations that Bull (2002a) and Mayall (2016) only hinted at (Holbraad, 2003, p.200; Miller, 2003a; Buzan, 2005b). Demonstrating the importance of economic relations in shaping not only the evolution of international society as a concept, but perhaps just as importantly, the nature of shared cultural norms and values that underpin the fundamental institutional framework of international society (Buzan, 2010, p.24; Dunne and Reus-Smit, 2017, p.13).[123]

Section three unpacks the empirical case study of the first G7 Summit cycle (1975-1981), building upon the theoretical foundations of the prior sections to demonstrate how the emergence and early evolution of the G7 created a form of international economic legitimacy for a select grouping of hegemonic powers, acting in concert to manage international order in the face of global economic shocks in the 1970s.[124]

3.1 Globalisation and the transformation of world politics

The transformation of relations between peoples and states that has come to be known as 'globalisation' is contested in both definition and timeframe.[125] The specific focus of this chapter is the post-1945 period, which has seen increasing levels of economic interdependence in technological, diplomatic, political and regulatory relations.[126] This has come to represent a time period in which the reliance upon, and interconnection with, the actions of other states in world politics can be argued to be truly global in nature (Held, 1993; Bayne, 2000; Beck, 2004; Held and McGrew, 2004; Hurrell, 2009; Rodrik, 2012; Weiss and Wilkinson, 2012; Hollinger et al, 2022). This post-1945 period saw a significant widening of the number of states that exist within world politics (Bull and Watson, 1989; Jackson, 1996; Bull, 2000b). It also saw the establishment and growth of a series of international institutions and organisations underpinning a form of international regulation and management of the relations between states designed to prevent the return to a scale of disorder in world politics that had fractured the previous framework of relations between states (Bell, 1953; 1971; Malone, 2004; Bosco, 2009; Rodrik, 2012; Conway, 2015; Thompson, 2022).

This post-1945 new world order also saw a relative balance, or degree of stability, between the competing Cold War superpowers in that there was an avoidance of the complete fracturing of the

[123] Bull (1983b, p.139), for example, made it clear that he believed that one of the major threats to international order in the 1980s was the failure by Western states to effectively manage international *economic* order.

[124] As Thompson (2022, p.40) points out, the fact that by the 1970s oil made up 40% of global energy consumption, with particularly heavy reliance in the Western and industrialised states, meant that the OPEC oil crisis was representative of a geopolitical crisis not just an economic one.

[125] For a wider discussion on the concept of globalisation and its contestation see Held, 1993; Bayne 2000; Beck, 2004; 2008; Held and McGrew, 2004; Hurrell, 2009; Rodrik, 2012; Buzan and Lawson, 2015b; Dunne and Reus-Smit, 2017; Hansen, 2020; Economist, 2022f.

[126] The post-1945 world trade system was predicated upon the GATT system (McKenzie, 2020) which witnessed an increase in *annual* rate of the volume of global trade of almost 7% between 1945 and 1990 (Rodrik, 2012, p.71). Similarly, the growth in global trade as a share of gross output has risen from 30% to 60% by the early 2010s, with global supply chains, and therefore the interconnected web of economic and political dependency *between* states, increasing from 37% to 50% of total trade between the early 1970s and 2010 (Keynes, 2021, p.3).

international order upon which this state-based international order was based (Westad, 2018; Spohr, 2019).[127] However, it was the destabilisation of the Western-dominated economic order in the early 1970s that brought the impact of globalisation to bear upon the pre-existing structures and management framework of international order.

In response to these rapidly changing and disorderly (Thompson, 2022, p.8-9) effects of globalisation, the dominant Western powers attempted to control and preserve the status quo power structures through the emergence of regularised summitry between the leaders of the dominant powers (Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.680). This rise of an elitist and exclusionary Summit framework was predicated upon a desire to mitigate, manage, and prevent the further destabilisation of the status quo international order (Bell, 1971; Rodrik, 2012, p.70).

The emergence of the G7 Summits also came in the face of a rising challenge to the dominant economic order and the promulgation of alternative frameworks of economic relationships such as the NIEO (Getachew, 2019, p.2, p.142-175). These exertions of the principles of sovereignty and the emergence of post-colonial states that *challenged* the pre-existing international economic order were also key parts of the destabilising parameters in which the emergence of the G7 came about. For the key actors within the G7's initial emergence (see Section 3.3 below) the preservation of the status quo power structures was a significant factor in facing what they perceived to be the emerging global 'disorder' of this challenge.

This reaction was also in response to the impact that a globalised economic order was having upon the ability of states to continue to independently exert their sovereignty *in practice* (Jackson, 2003, p.109). [128] Put very simply, the evolution of world politics into an interconnected economic construction rests upon the idea that everyday sovereignty *is deliberately* impinged in order to facilitate the functioning of a globalised economy that serves a dominant core of interests amongst powerful economic states (Rodrik, 2012; Tooze, 2019). This *also* meant that global 'disorder' could threaten the exertion of sovereignty and stability *of those* powerful states. The importance of this point, then, is not to regurgitate the extensive literature on the role and importance of globalisation per se. Rather, it is to challenge the lacuna that currently exists within the ES approach that continues to overlook the important role *economic interdependence* can play in the stability, or instability, of contemporary conceptions of international order.

The impact, therefore, of globalisation upon the functioning of world politics can be seen from the perspective of both the challenge *and the risks* this interconnection poses to the economic and social factors (Beck, 2008; Heine and Thakur, 2011) that underpin state-based relations (Watson, 2002, p.152). Thus, whilst the interconnected nature of world trade is not a novel factor in the ES understanding of the relations between states (Mattingly, 1965; Bull, 1983a; Buzan and Little, 2010),[129] it is, nonetheless, the post-1945 increase in *the scale* and *volume* of the interconnected

[127] There were numerous occasions on which this fragile superpower relationship came close to destroying the balance, and indeed the substance, of world politics. See Bell (1971) for a detailed examination of the role and importance of managing these crises, in particular one of the most dangerous of the Cold War period. This 'stability' was also largely Western-centric and does not fully take account of disorder imposed upon non-Western states by both the Superpowers, colonial powers and emerging powers (see Westad, 2018).
[128] Also see Held, 1995; Hurrell, 2009; Held and McGrew, 2004.
[129] See Schouenborg (2014), Beeson and Bell (2017), Palmuljoki (2019) for more recent ES discussions on the topic.

nature of modern trade, as well as the flow of capital and finance across borders, that dwarfs previous historical understandings of the impact an interconnected global economy (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.14; Giddens, 2002; Watson, 2009; Rodrik, 2012, p.71; Keynes, 2021, p.3).

In fact, whilst past historical global economic collapses have been recognised as shaping and destabilising international order (Boyce, 2012; Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.683; Rodrik, 2012; Tooze, 2015), contemporary ES analysis of the relations between states has continued to overlook the impact and importance of global economic crises in shaping the management of international order (Beeson and Bell, 2017). This is an important element of international order that the ES needs to have an answer for. Economic crises on a global scale extend their impact to the very heart of the connections *between* states and intimately shape the cultural, political, diplomatic, and power structures of these relations (Vincent, 1999, p.50; Giddens, 2002, p.10; Hansen, 2020). In turn, economic crises challenge the very nature, and concept, of sovereignty and state-based rights, calling into question the shift in the field of IR towards de-centering the role of the state, allowing a reassertion of the importance of the role that the state has in acting as both an agent of change, and an agent of last resort (Beardsworth, 2020, p.385; also see Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

The continued challenge that globalisation poses to both state sovereignty and the traditional conceptions of state-based functionality and responsibility (Mayall, 2005, p.75; Rodrik, 2012) means that any theoretical understanding of contemporary world politics must also factor in the importance of economic relations in shaping both the maintenance of international order between states but also the conceptual and empirical base for understanding how international society has evolved. In other words, there is a place in the contemporary ES for the reassertion of the role and importance of the state as the key actor during international crises, the reassertion of which both brings an 'Old School' perspective back to the table but also enhances it through a more clarified understanding of the role of economic crises in shaping the relations between states.

In fact, the commonality of certain cultural factors that have dominated much of the 'Old School' thinking (Butterfield, 1949; 1951; Wight, 1977; Watson, 2007) should be reassessed in light of the impact that a shrinkage in communication time lags, the instantaneous connections between peoples of different religions, cultures and regions, and the previously unimagined changes to the interactions between societies and peoples that challenge even recent conceptions of modernity (Clark, 1993, p.98; Giddens, 2002; Vincent, 1999, p.76; Watson, 2002; 2009). The next section begins to unpack the pre-existing understanding of what a common culture meant to the early ES scholars and how the development of a common *economic* culture in world politics can shape a contemporary ES understanding of the relations between states.

3.2 A common economic culture?

Hedley Bull (2002a) had provided hints at the possibility, and importance, of economic relations in influencing the development of international society, albeit erroneously judging them to not be of

primary concern in understanding world politics (Hurrell, 2002b, p.24).[130] Much of the early work of the British Committee, however, had understood the importance of the concept of diplomacy as integral in shaping the evolution of international society (Butterfield and Wight, 2019; Vigezzi, 2005). This is important because the role of diplomatic practice in influencing and shaping the relations between states (Neumann, 2003) has been recognised as a key element in underpinning the formation of international society (Bull, 2002a; Watson, 2004; Buzan, 2014a).

In fact, the historical record of the evolution of modern diplomatic activity was integral to the 'Old School' thinking on the nature and evolution of international society and the spread of common cultural relations between states. For Wight (1977), Bull (2002a), Watson (2004), Butterfield and Wight (2019), and also latterly Jackson (2003), this evolution in diplomatic relations between states not only had their origins in Renaissance Italy, which were then widely adopted throughout Europe, they also played an important part in shaping the spread of these common diplomatic norms and values. Put simply, the *practice* of Renaissance diplomacy also *spread* these norms and values of diplomacy (Mattingly, 1965), which, in turn became a fundamental pillar of European international society.

Bull (2002a) therefore recognised the inherent value of understanding how international trade can be representative of a key distinction between the domestic Hobbesian analogies and the more complicated nature of international anarchy (Vincent, 2003), a point reinforced by Buzan and Little (2010). That is, the relationships developed or engaged with between peoples and states when it comes to economic commerce are an example of the dividing line between a state of anarchy in world politics and the emergence of common interests and values in underpinning and establishing the reliability of agreements and trust between humans.

Yet, whilst each of these scholars denote the importance of diplomacy, again, they also indicate the importance of the *history* of diplomacy and how its modern practices have evolved and changed since the time of the Renaissance. What is key to this point, and the framing of the gap in understanding surrounding the role of economic norms, values, and interests in shaping a common economic culture, is that each of these scholars have relied upon the seminal work of Garrett Mattingly (1965) on the development of European diplomacy. In turn, this work by Mattingly (1965) is not simply a history of the spread of Italian diplomatic practice, it is, in-and-of-itself a detailed and rich account of the influence and importance of *economic norms* in shaping the emergence of a common diplomatic practice that still fundamentally underpins the global diplomatic system in world politics today. For Mattingly (1965), therefore, it was the *economic relations*, between Venice and the East, just as much as it was between Italian city states, that underpinned the development and practice of diplomacy in Renaissance Italy. In other words, it was the perceived need for the establishment of norms and rules or relations between peoples and states in order to maintain and establish economic agreements that drove much of the framework of contemporary diplomatic practice (Watson, 2007, p.8).

For Watson (2007), however, it was Bull's (2002a) conceptual differentiation between an international system and an international society, one that did not put such an emphasis upon common cultural principles, that was problematic in understanding the importance of economic relations in shaping the emergence of common positions. This was, after all, a direct challenge to the importance that both

[130] Also see Brütsch (2014, p.211-212) for a succinct but accurate deconstruction of the limits of both Bull's and Buzan's thinking on the importance of trade.

Wight (1977) and Butterfield (1951a) had placed upon shared cultural practices as the foundations for any framework of international society. Yet what Bull (2002a) was clearly trying to establish in his emphasis upon the importance of transactional relationships based around trade was the role that these relationships can play as they evolve into ever more interconnected agreements and principles of negotiation.[131] As Buzan and Little (2010) argue, the common norms and values surrounding the concept of trade can and do shape the development of relations between humans, peoples, states and groups, a point that, again, Mayall (2005; 2018) began to elaborate upon in his deliberations around the origins of communities of states but never pushed further.

The effects of globalisation on the international system were, in Bull's eyes, diversifying the commonly held principles of values in international society, a process which would undermine the pre-existing consensus amongst states in the functioning of international order. Yet, and this is one of the many contradictions that lay at the heart of Bull's unfinished thinking on the subject, Bull also saw that the modernisation of the international system *away* from European dominance was the only possible route towards justice and equality in world politics (Dunne, 1998, p.151; Suganami, 2003, p.265) - a key element that he framed as being fundamental to the long-term maintenance of international order.

Thus, Bull foresaw the modernisation of world politics, and the shift towards a globalised international system, as both a threat to the stability of common values of international society, and thus international order, but he also saw such a change as a necessary element in maintaining the long-term viability of international order (Bull, 2000b). Where Hurrell (2009) has taken this argument further is in his assessment that contra to Bull's ideas surrounding the potential for a more equitable world politics as it becomes more globalised in nature, levels of inequality, and injustice, continue to undermine the stability of world politics and international order.

Therefore, whilst Bull also saw such a potential shift as being a prerequisite for any future move towards a more cosmopolitan version of world society (Bull, 2002a; Wheeler and Dunne, 2002; Suganami, 2003), he was also under no illusions as to the risks this movement would pose to the maintenance of international order that existed between a diversity of states.[132] Where Bull's thinking on this matter was cut short, both Watson (2001; 2004) and Jackson (2003) have deliberated further on the importance of understanding the impact that *economic* globalisation has had upon both the successful regulation and management of international order, but also how this increased interconnectedness has played out in the face of divergent norms and values. Put simply, whilst Hurrell (2009) has focused upon the route towards a more cosmopolitan, or just world society, for Watson (2007) and Jackson (2003) the hard realities of injustice in world politics have remained core to the assessment of changes brought about by globalisation.

As part of this management of change the role of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF, and the World Bank (Kenen, 1994; Vreeland, 2007; Cooper and Thakur, 2013; Beeson and Bell, 2017) have been to support not only stability in the international economic system, but also provide the impetus and space for economic growth and stability of employment levels for both developed and developing states. Thus, the framework of common norms shared between the states that are members of the

[131] Also see Buzan (2005a, p.19) on this point.

[132] Also see Getachew (2019, p.14-15) for a similar argument regarding an alternative narrative of challenge to the pre-existing international order.

global capitalist economy share a commonality (Mayall, 2016) of both interests and purpose in maintaining economic growth to sustain domestic political priorities.

That this economic growth has largely been predicated upon both an ideological and educational understanding that economic growth comes alongside a growth in trade and economic interdependence is contested, yet nonetheless it remains largely at the heart of shared economic interests of a capitalist based global international system (Rodrik, 2012). The role of the GATT and then the WTO in shaping this economic interconnectedness has also played the role of *managing*, or being perceived as managing, the relations between states to overcome intransient differences in economic policy and therefore provide the impetus for further economic growth (McKenzie, 2020).

The starting point of this reassessment then is to recognise that whilst the shared norms and rules developed between states have provided the necessary order in which economic trade and transactions can occur (Jackson, 2003, p.389-390; Rodrik, 2012, p.9); it is also the origins of trade and economic relations that have provided the social bridge upon which these shared norms and values have evolved. This means that the formalised international institutional framework of economic regulation and management that underpinned much of the post-1945 global economic growth (Rodrik, 2012; Beeson and Bell, 2017) was not only the driver of the growth in economic interdependence, but also the social glue that bound states closer together. For Buzan and Falkner (2022b, p.238) this was built upon a political ideology that saw the market as both a regulating tool between peoples but also a system of protection and governance, akin to other primary institutions such as Great Power management. The thematic proposal that emerges from Buzan and Falkner's (2022b) work though still represents an underlying position of market penetration and influence, irrespective of their post-19th Century categorised time period and the upheaval they imply such a primary institution has undergone.

Where Buzan and Falkner (2022b, p.242-246) do identify a period of overlapping, or common, economic culture as shaping the 'market' as a force is in the post-1945 Bretton Woods period and the emergence and dominance of a 'neoliberal resurgence'. Thus, feeding directly into the position of understanding the emergence of the G7 as the Bretton Woods system began to fracture, and the development of Western-oriented neoliberal responses. We can see that whilst this economic system was clearly hierarchical in nature and dominated by certain economic powers such as the United States, it was also the international management system put in place to provide a certain level of diplomatic reliability based upon the key pillars of the economic system that states relied upon. In other words, irrespective of its unequal power structures the Bretton Woods system, and the neoliberal consensus, were nonetheless forms of interconnected economic relations, norms, and rules that bound many, though not all, states together globally.

However, the shock posed to this system of economic norms, values, and rules, by the challenge of rising economic powers that existed *outside* the formal control, or hegemonic dominance (Watson, 2007; also see Getachew, 2019) of the Western economic powers in the 1970s transformed the international economic order into a period of political and diplomatic uncertainty (Putnam and Bayne, 1987). In the 1970s, then, as the balance of economic power shifted, changed, and took on new political appearances that created new power centres surrounding certain resources such as energy, the traditional global dominance of military powers that held sway in the UNSC for example, and the pre-existing balance of power in world politics, were called into question (Benning, 2011; Rodrik, 2012; Bini et al, 2016; Beeson and Bell, 2017, p.291-292; Tooze, 2019, p.11). The resulting global level of

instability was therefore of a scale, absent global war, that was impossible to manage by individual or singularly powerful members of the society of states.

The impact of these economic crises upon a shared economic culture and system for managing these shared relationships therefore calls into question the premise upon which some members of the 'Old School' based a common *cultural* framework as key to the evolution of international society, in turn primarily based upon a shared religion (Wight, 1977) or European heritage (Bull and Watson, 1989; Bull, 2002a; Watson, 2009). The interconnections that underpinned these traditional conceptions of shared norms and values had been predicated upon an ease of communication and localised, or regional, groupings of culturally similar peoples, even when these shared norms and values had been 'expanded' out to wider world politics (Bull and Watson, 1989). The advent, or imposition, of globalisation upon world politics has shrunk these traditional conceptions of distance and differences, turning the regional into the global (Held, 1995; 2004; Giddens, 2002).[133]

This changing nature of world politics does not, however, abrogate the need for the continued questioning of who makes the rules which regulate these shared economic norms, interests, and values (Rodrik, 2012). This, in turn, begs the question of how and where legitimacy as a political concept and tool is both developed and protected through the management of international economic relations. The following section therefore builds upon the argument made by Ian Clark (2017) in attempting to further understand how and where the emergent hierarchies of economic norms and values have been shaped, and continue to be shaped, in the post-1945 world order.

3.3 Legitimacy through economic order: The rise of the G7 1975-1981

For Clark (1993; 2007; 2009; 2017), then, the formal or informal hierarchical structures of world politics are key to understanding the concept of legitimacy in world politics. This positioning marries up with elements of the 'Old School' thinking of Adam Watson (2007, p.58) who recognised the inherent role that hegemonic powers play in contemporary world politics through the perception of the management of international order, and the degree of legitimacy this perception brings. In fact, for Bull (2002a) this management, or responsibility, for managing international order remained within the sphere of Great Power politics akin to the post-Napoleonic conflict of the 19th Century and the emergence of the Concert of Europe that provided a form of management of international order between European powers (Bull, 1961, p.59; Bell, 1971; 1977; Holbraad, 1971; Kennedy, 1989; Clark, 1993; Watson, 2004; 2007; Keene, 2009; Kissinger, 2013).

However, Watson (2007) went further and argued that the legitimacy of past and present forms of management of international order relied not simply upon the exertion of hegemonic power, or control, but the management *through* or *within* the pre-existing structures of world politics (Watson, 2009, p.131). In simple terms, *ala* Wight (1991) and Clark (1993), hegemonic control was not exerted *only* through hard-nosed power, or revolutionary destabilisation in world politics. Rather, hierarchical control is exerted through an amalgamation of elements that shape a perception of stability in world politics that induces the acceptance of certain practices and conventions in the management of said

[133] See Hansen (2017) for an interesting nod towards the importance of further exploration of these principles of communication and contact as needing revising for the 21st Century within the ES.

stability, even when inequalities remain embedded into those conventions. In other words, international legitimacy is inherently tied to the acceptance and acquiescence of shared norms and values that represent a shared cultural positioning in world politics.

States therefore acquiesce to hegemonic control through hierarchical structures in a similar manner to the Lockean social contract in that legitimacy is provided to those states that perceive themselves to hold a responsibility in managing international order, and act accordingly. As Bull (2002a) made clear though, this is where the domestic/international similarities also divide, as simple theoretical transpositions make for poor analytical understanding. In world politics, for Bull (2002a), any hegemonic control, or attempts at establishing such control, will always be contested. This is an important point for framing the concept of legitimacy in world politics as legitimacy *requires* the consent, or at least the absence of a viable alternative to consent, in order to function. Thus, as Clark (1993) makes clear, legitimacy springs not solely from agreement to the pre-existing hegemonic structures that manage and maintain international order, but also from the *lack* of a viable alternative.[134]

In the contemporary setting then, Watson (2007) posits that any form of international economic order exerted by the dominant powers must be exerted through the international institutions that are designed to, ostensibly through an equality of purpose between states, manage and regulate international economic relations. In this case, the IMF, the World Bank (Vreeland, 2007; Watson, 2007, p.59; Cooper and Thakur, 2013), and their forerunners in the Bretton Woods system of financial stability (Beeson and Bell, 2017). Thus, whilst these structures have been, and continue to be contested, as to levels of equal participation, there is a dearth of politically viable and economically acceptable alternative options that have not fallen foul of the collapse, and rejection, of solidarist versions of communism or socialism in world politics.

The emergence and evolution of the G7 as a framework for managing international economic order *through* the formalised international economic institutions of the IMF and World Bank is an important part of world politics that the contemporary ES has thus far largely overlooked.[135] The legitimacy of the formal framework of managing international economic order, however, relies upon the idea that such a framework pulls other states in the international system towards a form of compliance and acceptance of this common framework of management and responsibility (Franck, 1990, p.16). Thus, the formal international institutions that have grown up in the post-1945 economic order have established in themselves a degree of historical legitimacy, even when they are perceived to have failed to maintain international economic order.

This is an important point to reflect upon at this stage, and it is one this thesis shall return to in Chapter 7, because this historical legitimacy that these formal international institutions have 'gathered'[136] to

[134] See Ian Clark's (2007; 2009) more recent deliberations on the contested nature of the concept and idea of legitimacy. Ultimately the concept of legitimacy put forward in this thesis is an elastic one which is, in essence, whatever the dominant powers at the time decide it to be. As per Clark's arguments the historical context remains key in understanding how 'legitimacy' was used and perceived. Even post-structuralist or post-modernist takes on the idea of 'legitimacy' remain embedded within the contextual nature of the relations between states and peoples.

[135] See Section 1.2 on the pre-existing framework by Putnam and Bayne (1987) for understanding how the G7 works *through* international institutions.

[136] I am indebted to Hortense Jongen for bringing this concept of 'gathering' legitimacy to my attention at a workshop at the University of Durham in the Spring of 2022.

themselves has not been predicated upon a simple conception of institutional agency. Instead, it is premised upon the historical management and direction *of* these institutions by the dominant powers who hold sway within them. For example, the states that make up the membership of the G7 still maintain a significant vote share within international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (Gstöhl, 2007; Vreeland, 2007). This means that not only are these dominant states able to set the agenda, and largely control the voting patterns within these institutions, they are also able, as per Section 3.2, to shape the economic norms and values upon which international economic order is based (Rodrik, 2012).

Contra, then, to wider claims of a post-state new world order (Held, 1995; Slaughter, 1997; 2004; Linklater, 2004) in the governance and management of international affairs,[137] the dominant economic powers in world politics still exert a disproportionate influence and level of control over the international economic and political system, reinforcing not only role of states in world politics (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; also see Chapter 2) but also challenging the perceptions of *how* legitimacy is actually achieved in world politics. In essence, these structures of economic interconnectedness and regulation of the irregularities posed by economic interdependence have attained a degree of international legitimacy due to not only their perceived success and role in maintaining international economic order, but also how that conception of economic success has been defined.

The Western-centric model of global capitalism and economic growth, international debt structures, financial resilience and economic reform practices extolled by institutions such as the IMF, GATT, and World Bank (Kenen, 1994; Vreeland, 2007; McKenzie, 2020) continue to be received as largely legitimate due to the support and maintenance of the dominant, or hegemonic, economic powers of the international system. Again, these dominant powers have exerted influence and power not only in the creation of said international institutions (Vreeland, 2007; Cooper and Thakur, 2013) but also in shaping their continued role and economic ideology that proscribes certain policies or programmes that shape the actions and common outlook of other states in world politics (Franck, 1990; Kenen, 1994; Vreeland, 2007; Cooper and Thakur, 2013).

Recent global economic developments from rising economic powers (Gaskarth, 2015), as well as relatively recent historical attempts at shaping new economic outlooks (Getachew, 2019, p.12) have begun to pick away at the legitimacy of these hegemonic structures. However, as per the previous point regarding viable alternatives, the continued gatekeeping, and control, of the historically 'legitimate' forms of international institutional management of economic order continue to shape the emergent perceptions of unviable or alternative frameworks for managing international economic order.[138]

Ian Clark (2003, p.81) extends this point of argument regarding the role of contestation in framing international legitimacy by identifying the same avenue of thinking that Martin Wight (1977, p.36) touched upon regarding the relationship between key 'fracture' points in the evolution international society, whereby the pre-existing status quo framework for managing international order is no longer perceived as being legitimate. This was, and is, a key element in the understanding of the nature of political legitimacy in world politics. Legitimacy, then, brings both substance and order to an anarchic

[137] Also see Naylor (2019b) for a similar critique.

[138] For a brief discussion on recent challenges see the debate over the emergence of the AIIB and China's 'Belt and Road Initiative' in Dollar, 2015; Financial Times, 2015; Schuman, 2019.

world politics in a manner in which dominance by hegemonic force alone is unsustainable as an effective tool for maintaining the pre-existing status quo of world politics (Bull and Watson, 1989; Clark, 1993; 2003; Watson, 2007).

However, legitimacy in world politics does not equate to international order. It is perfectly possible to construct, or to have been constructed, a form of international order in the international system that is inherently *illegitimate* in the viewpoint of the politics of the day (Clark, 2003). This does not therefore mean that legitimacy in the international system is a key element to maintaining international order per se, but as Bull (2000b) pointed out, there is a continuing conflict between justice (or legitimacy), and the ability to maintain international order in world politics. Yet, as per Bull (2000b; 2002a), order without legitimacy is inherently unstable as it will *always* be contested. Legitimacy, therefore, is not explicitly required for international order to exist in world politics, but it is an integral part of the *maintenance* of international order in the face of change in the international system.

This returns us to the starting point of this chapter, and in fact the overarching narrative of this thesis. The management of international *economic* order is not, in the traditional or historical sense, merely the dominance of certain hegemonic powers exerting control over the global economic order. Instead, the maintenance of international economic order has historically been conducted by dominant or hegemonic powers, often *through* international institutions, which therefore maintain a degree of international legitimacy due to their perceived effectiveness *and* the lack of a viable alternative that matches the shared norms and values of those states that are part of that common economic culture. As Buzan and Falkner (2022a, p.40) point out, the G7 (and the G20) as members of an elite club of powerful states, have been *given* legitimacy by other states in return for maintaining and protecting international economic order.

Whilst this perception of legitimacy remains largely thought of as existing in the eye of the beholder (Franck, 1988, p.706; Clark, 2003, p.80), that is, those states who benefit from the pre-existing global economic structures. This was, and is still, the basis for many historical constructions of legitimacy surrounding Great Power politics (Bell, 1951; 1977; Kissinger, 2013). Put simply, legitimacy in managing the global economic order comes not simply from the visibility of claimed legitimacy,[139] but also from the continuity of legitimacy with what has come before (Franck, 1990; Mitzen, 2013; also see Chapter 7).

In many ways this is also a reflection of Martin Wight's (1960b; 1977) ideas concerning the originality of history; not as his critics have stated, that of repetition (see Chapter 2), but of an interconnected historical evolution that demonstrates legitimacy is inherently connected to past events and perceptions of legitimacy (Bull, 1979c, p.178). When this international economic legitimacy is challenged therefore, the resultant framing of the global response, in order to preserve and protect a degree of legitimacy in what comes next, is framed within, or in comparison to, the pre-existing elements of legitimacy.

The importance of this point for the framing of this chapter, and for the wider thesis, is that when the Bretton Woods international economic order fractured and broke down in the 1970s, the response by the dominant Western economic powers in world politics was not to reinvent the wheel of global

[139] Be that religious, political, inherited or seizure by force.

legitimacy. Instead, in responding to this 'crisis of the West' (Ferguson, 2011; Hurrell, 2013, p.216) they acted to continue their hegemonic control of international order by creating a 'new' framework for managing this order *through* the pre-existing structures of global economic institutions. This was done to strengthen their own state-based economic interests *and* their perceived international legitimacy in managing the global economic order.[140]

The first G-Summit, held in 1975, did not therefore appear out of thin air.[141] The impact of the economic crises stretching from the early 1970s to the 1973 OPEC Oil Crisis all had a cumulative effect in shaping the emergence of the G7 through the spread of a perceived global 'disorder' (Thompson, 2022, p.8-9). In fact, the idea of a gathering of leaders to respond to the economic crises had been mooted since 1971 by Henry Kissinger.[142] Yet it was not until 1974 when the leadership of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Germany all changed (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.27) that a clear commonality of shared economic interests and purpose in holding a meeting between leaders became apparent (Mourlon-Druol, 2012).

Whilst some assessments of the rise of the G7 have argued that the Summits origins stemmed from the recognition of a need for an informal economic forum between the French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt,[143] in fact the idea of the 'G7' as a Summit of like-minded leaders more 'formally' emerged from an *informal* lunch meeting[144] between the leaders and foreign secretaries of the aforementioned four Western powers on the side-lines of the 1975 Helsinki CSCE Summit (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.25; Bonhomme and Mourlon-Druol, 2016, p.201; Spohr, 2016, p.20). The emergence of the G7 was, therefore, wholly situated within the realm of elite driven discussions and actions, an analytical focus that the 'Old School' saw as still representative of importance in understanding the changing nature of *how* international order is managed.

The emergence of the G7 was also shaped by a grouping of Finance Ministers who met as the 'Library Group' in 1973 (Dobson, 2007, p.2; Payne, 2008, p.521; Spohr, 2016, p.18), of which both d'Estaing and Schmidt were members (Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.682). The importance of both d'Estaing and

[140] While the 1974 Washington Energy Conference was an attempt at coordinating a response to the energy crisis, and did in fact create the IEA, the disagreement between the parties involved, in particular the French, meant that there was no clear unity of purpose or coordinated action from this 'first' attempt (Washington Energy Conference, 1974; Kissinger, 1982, p.166; Sargent, 2011, p.59).

[141] In fact, Baker (2008, p.104-105) identifies the G7 as having its roots as far back as the 1960s, although he, as with others, identifies the early 1970s 'library group' meetings as key to the group's initiation in its current format. Interestingly, Baker also argues that the Japanese finance minister Kiichi Aichi was key in initiating the longevity of the group's meetings, something that others ascribe largely to Schmidt and d'Estaing. Nonetheless, the premise of there being *key actors* who shaped the emergence of the G7 remains the central focus of this analysis (see Section 2.3).

[142] The linkage with historical reflections is again important to highlight here as it is well established the importance that Kissinger (2013) placed upon the idea of a Concert of powers to manage international order, in part due to his previous research on the role of the Congress of Vienna in shaping the peace in the Nineteenth Century (Bell, 1977a). It is also a conceptual and historical linkage that Kirton (1989) makes with the evolution of the G7 and a wider argument that Penttilä (2003) makes regarding the G8's role in the maintenance of international security in world politics.

[143] For a wider discussion on these origins see Benning, 2011; Mourlon-Druol, 2012; Prodi, 2016; Spohr, 2016.

[144] Amongst the 'Old School' scholars it is Bull (2002a) and Bell (1971) who primarily focus on the importance of the informal side of diplomacy as the glue that binds states and leaders together. Yet Schweizer and Black (2006) also make a clear argument that diplomacy was central to Butterfield's thinking as well.

Schmidt later becoming French President and German Chancellor (Spohr, 2016, p.15) meant that in the run-up to the Helsinki Conference these two leaders collaborated upon the idea and importance of a leaders' summit, whilst also vigorously lobbying US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for an economic summit to coordinate global action on the economic crisis (Benning, 2011, p.193-207). [145] Again, reasserting the perception of legitimacy that was held between international elites in that it should be *them* who reacted to and shaped the decision-making in confronting the growing global disorder.

Reflective, then, of the performative literature on diplomacy (Adler and Pouliot, 2011), the role of elites in shaping perceptions of the management of international order remains a key element of the original thinking of the architects of the G7 (Spohr, 2016). While the 'Old School' scholars within the ES certainly emphasised the importance of elites this performative/practice turn was of less interest than their focus on how these elites saw themselves acting in relation to their historical understanding of past attempts at managing international order (see Section 2.3). For Schmidt in particular (Spohr, 2016) it was vital that the leading Western powers in world politics *were seen* to be managing international order and that they *were seen* to be responding to economic crises, even if the level of impact stemming from their decision-making was not substantive.

Importantly then, where the media, and indeed much of the critical literature, have focused upon the practice of the Summits as a mere performance (Schaetzel and Malmgren, 1980; Bremmer, 2012), this pre-existing literature has overlooked the importance that Schmidt also placed upon getting the leaders *in a room*, behind the scenes in an informal setting, so that they could openly discuss and deliberate in their coordination efforts (Spohr, 2016), and thereby develop a level of interpersonal trust in developing a common position. In fact, it is this informality, or the importance placed upon this informality in shaping the relations between leaders in building cooperative levels of trust (Schaetzel and Malmgren, 1980; Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.29; Hajnal, 1999, p.1; Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.683) that, in turn, speaks to much of the emerging literature on trust and cooperation in the field of International Relations.[146]

However, the importance of trust, and its role in shaping diplomacy in world politics, was also integral to much of the 'Old School' thinking around the maintenance of international order and the evolution of international society (Bell, 1971; Bull, 1961; 1970; 2002a; Mattingly, 1965; Butterfield, 1966a; Watson, 2004). Thus, whilst the role of trust in managing international order has recently returned to the contemporary ES approach (Wheeler, 2018), within the context of historical examples of bilateral arms control, it is clear that informality and trust in the management of international order has always lain at the heart of the 'Old School' approach to understanding world politics.[147] Nevertheless, what is

[145] Kissinger and Schmidt were also close personally which provided additional weight to their shaping of these events (Kissinger, 1982, p.908-909).

[146] For a snapshot of the growing literature on the importance of trust both in IR and more widely see Fukuyama, 1996; Larson, 2000; Solomon and Flores, 2003; Hawley, 2012; Yarhi-Milo, 2014; Klimke et al, 2016; Wheeler, 2018; Holmes, 2019. Interestingly, Rathbun's (2012) articulation of the importance of a close-knit circle of actors in reinforcing trust, with a case study of the emergence of NATO, comes closest to articulating the importance of shared, or common, norms and values in establishing and maintaining trust between states. However, Rathbun's (2012) work is focused upon cooperation within *formal* international institutions and does not, therefore, further the analysis on informal interactions beyond this claim.

[147] The focus on mutual trust and the ability to invest a level of acceptable risk in your opponent was also part of the very early work of Hedley Bull (1961). It is perplexing then that Wheeler (2018) does not engage with this historical work, which was at the time widely regarded as ground-breaking within the field (Bell and

clear is that the original design of the G7, and indeed its original intent, was focused upon the creation of an informal space in which powerful leaders could interact and develop a mutual level of trust through discussion and interpersonal relationship building.[148]

The engorged media grandstanding of past bilateral state meetings and international conferences, with their pageantry and dominance of bureaucratic advisors was, therefore, exactly what the early leaders of the G7, such as Schmidt, sought to avoid (Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.683). Yet, it is not without irony that by the time Schmidt hosted the G7 Summit in Bonn, in 1978, this very same pageantry and 'institutionalisation' of the Summits amid a growing media spectacle had already emerged (Spohr, 2016). Thus, whilst much of the criticism of the grandstanding and show of the G7 can seem legitimate, particularly in recent times, this nonetheless is an aspect that many host leaders have attempted to change by returning to the 'basics' of informality and isolation amongst the leaders (see Appendix). For those leaders, therefore, who acted as progenitors and gatekeepers (see Chapter 7) of the emerging norm of regularised G-summit meetings, the emphasis still lay upon the importance of informal practice and interpersonal relations between the leaders, not on the performance in front of the media spotlight.[149] Thus, returning again to the epistemological and methodological approach put forward in Chapter 2 for the 'Old School', the focus on the role and decision-making of elites in world politics remains as relevant in contemporary politics as it did in the past.[150]

What is important to note here is that the regular use of international summits between the leaders of the dominant, or hegemonic, powers in world politics had fallen out of fashion since the 1940s (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.1).[151] The 1970s saw the re-emergence of summitry not merely with the G7 but also with the use of regularised NATO Summits (Bonhomme and Mourlon-Druol, 2016). The perception of the need for a return to this past historical format for managing international order between the dominant Western powers was, in effect, a reassertion of the importance of placing the key international actors in a room together in order to come to an agreement that would cut through the traditional performative and procedural roadblocks of formal diplomatic practice. This is, in part, a reflection of what Naylor (2019b) terms the 'closure' or membership framework of what now constitutes the management group of international order. This idea of an emergent group of powerful states meant that the G7 was not predicated upon cultural or geographical boundaries as past formations may have been (Naylor, 2019b), but upon economic and political necessity, as well as a collective recognition of the importance and role said states now played in contemporary world

Thatcher, 2008; Howard, 2008; O'Neill, 2008), and therefore speaks directly to the importance that early ES thinking placed upon the level of personal, and inter-state, trust in world politics.

[148] For early examples of this intent and design see Schaetzel and Malmgren, 1980; Economist, 1983. p.25; Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.33; d'Estaing, 2007; Bonhomme and Mourlon-Druol, 2016. Three important examples of the failure of this premise at the G7 are the personal animosity between Helmut Schmidt and Jimmy Carter (Spohr, 2016), and the on-off relationship between Ronald Reagan and Francois Mitterand (Putnam and Bayne, 1987). A more contemporary example would be the breakdown of personal relations between Donald Trump and Justin Trudeau following the 2018 Summit in Canada (BBC, 2018a).

[149] Helmut Schmidt was, and continued to be, a strong proponent of the importance of interpersonal relations and friendship between leaders in shaping collaborative global outcomes, forging a close friendship with both French President Valéry d'Estaing and US President Gerald Ford in the early years (Spohr, 2016).

[150] See Reynolds, 2007; Rodrik, 2012, p.69; Costigliola, 2013; Conway, 2015 for historical examples of elite-focused decision-making.

[151] This is perhaps indicative not of the stability of the post-war international order per se, but of the ideological division between the two Cold War superpowers (Meyer, 2010; Westad, 2018; Spohr, 2019) and the ability of the US to dominate the Bretton Woods system.

politics. It is in this sphere of thinking that the G7 has finally been acknowledged in contemporary ES work.

However, the emergence of the G7 was as more than an exclusionary membership club for a select group of world leaders. Schmidt recognised the inherent importance of responding to, and effectively managing, the spiralling economic crisis that cut across state borders, which without an effective response would nullify all attempts at coordination on wider political issues such as Cold War competition (Spohr, 2016). For Kissinger, the architect of détente with the Soviet Union, but also of many a flawed international policy (Bell, 1977a), the overriding objective of the G7 was not simply the economic side of the crisis, it was more fundamental than that.

Kissinger saw in the G7 the emergence of a cohesive and coordinated group of likeminded Western states who shared similar values and interests in shaping world politics (Spohr, 2016, p.21). Much like his own historical analysis of the importance of a high-table coordination of international affairs reminiscent of the Congress of Vienna (Zamoyski, 2008; Kissinger, 2013); the birth and evolution of the G7 was never a framework for responding to a singular issue or topic, a point that Schmidt, a keen observer of history, conflict, and economics, also advocated in his view that the new global order that was emerging in the 1970s required careful management and the example of coordinated responsibility between the dominant powers in world politics (Spohr, 2016).

The emergence, therefore, of the G7 as a response to the international economic and political crisis of the early 1970s can be seen as a reflection upon the understanding that international leaders at the time had regarding the historical impact of economic recession, and depression, of the 1930s (Boyce, 2012; Rodrik, 2012; Tooze, 2015). It can also be recognised that these said same leaders believed that as the representatives of the dominant Western economic powers that it was their 'responsibility' to manage the effects of the international crises and prevent the slide towards future disorder on a global scale that still haunted many of them (Spohr, 2016).[152]

In fact, the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt saw direct parallels with the economic crises facing states at this time and the potential rise of protectionist economic policies reminiscent of the 1930s and wider policy failures of this period (Benning, 2011; Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.683; Spohr, 2016, p.12). Thus, whilst the Rambouillet Summit did not achieve much in terms of actionable policy (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.37),[153] it did preserve what Schmidt saw as the fundamental import of a common societal outlook amongst the leading industrial democratic states in *avoiding disorder* in the international system (Economist, 1979, p.50; Spohr, 2016).

The formation of the G7, then, as a 'new' system of collective leadership (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.17) was recognised as a legitimate form of governance by the leading economic powers of the day not because of specific economic policies that determined an international recovery, but due to the success of *shared confidence* in the economic policies that were compatible with the interests and economic values of each of the leaders present (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.37). In other words, the

[152] For a wider discussion on the perceptions these leaders held about their responsibility, both domestically and internationally see Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.17; Benning, 2011, p.8; Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.683; Spohr, 2016, p.12.

[153] The 1975 Summit did however provide the direct impetus for resolution of multilateral trade negotiations between the US and European Community, an early example of the impact that Summit directives can have upon formal international organisational practice and outcomes.

importance of the G7 in its first Summit lay in the recognition between the leaders present that each shared common interests and values in preserving the pre-existing international system and in stimulating economic recovery in order to prevent further disorder in world politics (Dobson, 2007, p.5).

The development of this common economic set of interests, alongside a recognition that these leaders *did* share a common set of norms and values that surrounded a common economic culture was therefore in part based upon a shared perspective that these leaders did not want to return to the international *disorder* of the past. That this position was shared by the leaders of dominant economic powers, who were largely also Western, does not detract from the fact that these leaders *did* share a common set of values and a common outlook that it was *they*, as international elites, who held the responsibility to act and shape the international response.

Thus, what we can say from the first Summit at Rambouillet is that whilst the leaders were unable to effectively, or cohesively, coordinate monetary policy (Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Benning, 2011, p.231) they nonetheless coalesced around a consensus on the issues of resources such as oil, as well as trade and international monetary reform (Benning, 2011, p.231; Spohr, 2016, p.23). This consensus was in part built through the ability of the leaders to communicate effectively, informally, and off-the-record in an intimate setting amid the cramped splendour of the Imperial hunting lodge at Rambouillet (Spohr, 2016, p.22), a setting reminiscent of the past splendour of hegemonic power concerts.

Whilst the first Summit did not, therefore, provide an example of a completely unified political and economic front between the member states that some may have wished for, Rambouillet nonetheless underpinned the idea that coordinated action, deliberated between, and led by, the leaders of the G7 member states, could stimulate a level of international investor and consumer confidence in the maintenance of international economic order (Benning, 2011, p.231-232). This confidence in both preserving the stability of the pre-existing the international economic order, or at least in halting the slide towards further disorder and instability (Thompson, 2022), meant that the Rambouillet Summit laid the foundations not only of the future role of the G7 Summits, but also reinforced in the minds of the leaders present the perception of how successful elite 'fireside chats' were in shaping the response to intractable global issues and international crises.

However, even after the early summits, from Rambouillet in 1975, to Bonn in 1978, the wider media reaction to the Summits rapidly became one of a perception of mere 'talking shops' (Schaetzel and Malmgren, 1980) that were largely ineffective and had begun to lose focus by ranging beyond purely economic issues. This is an important point to make here in the early evolutionary stages of the G7 because the early contestation of the G7 did not come from the critique of unequal membership and elitist control that was out of step with a changing world politics. Instead, the critique came from its perceived *ineffectiveness* in resolving intractable global issues and therefore its lack of legitimacy because it wasn't doing *enough* to manage international economic order.[154]

Thus, whilst a formal widening of the remit of the G7 Summits focus was ostensibly resisted by both the French and Japanese, side meetings in corridors or discussions over meals between the leaders began to cover political, military and mutual security topics as well as economic issues (Putnam and

[154] In particular the Puerto Rico Summit in 1976 and the London Summit in 1977 were seen as largely unsuccessful in coordinating economic policy to stimulate global growth (Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.690; Drezner, 2014, p.151).

Bayne, 1987, p.71) as the leaders sought to engage with and resolve intractable global problems that they saw themselves as playing a responsible role in responding to. Even those Summits that were widely regarded as unsuccessful in coordinating economic action were overlooked as to the growing importance that the G7 leaders saw in using the Summits to coordinate on a much wider range of political issues. For example, the 1976 Puerto Rico Summit saw an agreement between the four leading powers, Germany, France, the UK and the US, to collectively respond to the economic and political turmoil in Italy, in order to stabilise and maintain the pre-existing international order as they saw it in the face of rising communist threat (Spohr, 2016, p.25-26). Although the Italian reaction was understandably apoplectic, and contra to the shared 'group' values, it once again highlighted the important role that the G7 elites saw in the use of informal side-meetings to coordinate action between themselves. In fact, by the time of the 1977 London and 1978 Bonn Summits, the leaders of the G7 were already discussing wide ranging global security issues such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism (Garavoglia and Padoan, 1994, p.50-53; see Appendix).

Whilst the 1977 London Summit began a period of institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of the Summit process (Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.692; Spohr, 2016, p.26) it also embedded the Summits as a regularised process of global governance that had a deliberate and important role in shaping and managing international order. The output of these first G7 Summits may have been mixed in terms of overall results, but it nonetheless demonstrated that coordinated Western-backed economic action had effectively blunted the emerging power of non-Western energy producers and stymied the actions of the OPEC oil cartel (Bell, 1977a, p.205). This perception of shared responsibility in managing international order *through* this G-Summit framework (d' Estaing, 2007; Mitzen, 2013) was, in effect, the establishment of a 'new' framework for managing international order by instilling a level of international confidence in the face of crisis (Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.687). International legitimacy was therefore what these leading powers made of it.

The 1978 Bonn Summit was therefore a clear example of not only the widening of the G7's remit in responding to international crises, but also of the shared perception amongst the leaders of their own elite responsibility to act. In response to acts of international terrorism and airplane hijackings the G7 leaders felt compelled to demonstrate a unified, and coordinated, position in responding to these threats to (Gstöhl, 2007, p.24; Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.87). The fact that this common position came from the leaders themselves, not the pre-prepared discussion items, points to a further emphasis on the growing remit that the leaders felt themselves to hold in world politics on positions of common norms and values (Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.697-698; Spohr, 2016, p.28).

The coalescing of these common values and interests amongst the G7 were, however, put to the test during the 1979 Tokyo Summit, following the fall of the Shah in Iran, and the subsequent political and economic crisis that saw global oil output drop by almost 2.5million barrels per day (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.110). This reduction in global oil production caused both a series of price rises throughout 1978-1979 which were combined with the knock-on inflationary pressures in Western industrial countries that had followed the economic stimulus plans agreed at the 1978 Bonn Summit (Putnam and Bayne, 1987). The subsequent decision by OPEC to raise oil prices by 25 percent only the day before the Tokyo Summit (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.115) meant that whilst the leaders of the G7 may now act in concert in managing international order, this management was still contested and challenged in world politics.

Whilst the 1979 economic and political crisis was similar in nature to the one that had faced leaders at the first Summit in 1975, the immediacy of the calls for the leaders to react and respond at the Tokyo Summit was of a different nature to that quasi-coordinated response that had been part of the preparation of the original Rambouillet Summit. Faced with conflicting domestic and economic pressures regarding reductions in dependence upon oil, the leaders at the Tokyo Summit nevertheless agreed to a cohesive and unifying response that for some member states[155] was in direct contradiction of their underlying energy requirements if their economies were to achieve growth in the following years (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.116). In essence, the G7 was already beginning to show signs of becoming a crisis forum for the elite leaders of these powerful Western-dominated states (see Chapter 6 for a more recent exploration of this role over the Ukraine war).

This makes the Tokyo Summit in 1979 an important example of two key evolutionary changes in the role of the G7. First, it demonstrated that the G7 *could* be used as a crisis resolution forum, albeit one that involved tumultuous political and diplomatic disagreement and negotiation. Second, it demonstrated again that even in the face of what would be significant domestic political backlash for some leaders,[156] the developing societal norms of the G7 shaped both the ability and desire of the leaders to achieve a unified decision. This unity of purpose was not, necessarily, a wholesale agreement with the collective policy responses, yet it was an important indication of the growing impact the evolutionary social norms of the G7 Summits were having upon the willingness of the leaders to act in a manner that domestically would be unpopular. Put simply, the collective purpose of the G7 was beginning to also shape the social relations between the leaders to the point at which individual leaders would feel pressured into acquiescing to a *collective* response in order to maintain the unity of the society of the G7 itself, thus further entrenching the shared norms of the collective responsibility that the G7 had in managing *international* economic order.

It is important to note at this point that this growing unity of purpose did not necessarily translate into wholesale trust shared between the leaders. Whilst the 1979 Tokyo Summit did indicate the reluctance of leaders to act in such a way as to breach the growing unity of purpose between them, the behind-the-scenes deliberations of the US and European member states, excluding the host leader Prime Minister Ohira (Schaetzel and Malmgren, 1980, p.134), were an indication of the gaps that still permeated the unity of values between the G7 leaders, and indeed of a somewhat 'Western' centric mode of bilateral meetings that permeated throughout this first Summit cycle.

For example, in 1977 the leaders of France, Germany, the UK and the US met together the day after the London Summit to discuss East-West relations and Soviet actions in Africa (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.71). The 1980 Summit in Venice meanwhile provided an appropriate setting for relationship development with US President Carter and Germany's Chancellor Schmidt using the Summit to have a bilateral discussion that overcame much of the political animosity that had previously existed between the leaders (Spohr, 2016). That this bilateral discussion focused on arms control in Europe

[155] In this case the host state Japan was to agree a reduction in energy imports that would directly affect economic growth potential, whilst Canada, the United States and Italy all succumbed to the pressure to agree a unified response to the crisis that would be both badly received domestically but also potentially destructive to economic growth.

[156] Canadian Prime Minister Clark's government fell in December 1979, in part due to his governments raising of domestic oil prices (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.117). US President Carter lost the 1981 election in part due to economic disorder and instability caused by the 1979 energy crisis and rampant inflation, both leaders had attempted to reduce domestic demand for oil in line with the Tokyo agreement.

(Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.122) is indicative of the importance that the framework of the G7 Summits had begun to take on in relation to dealing with intractable global issues that were not based solely around economic issues. As per Section 3.2, economic issues were the bridge upon which a common social and political positionality between the G7 leaders was beginning to be formed. A focus, therefore, on the power of a 'walk in the woods' (Watson, 2004; see also Wheeler, 2018), or stroll along the beach (Dobson, 2007) amongst key elite international actors remains key to understanding how international order is managed.

The Venice Summit also indicated a wider shift within the G7's perceived remit for responding to international issues with the leaders managing to overcome previous political disagreements over a response to the Soviet Union's military invasion of Afghanistan (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.124). This period of G-Summitry therefore represented a turn in the focus of the G7 leaders' responsibility from economic issues to wider global security issues (Engelbrekt, 2016). However, after 1977 the G7 saw a changing of the political guard with French President Giscard, who had been one of the original proponents for a narrowly focused economic Summit, leaving office and being replaced by Francois Mitterand. US President Jimmy Carter was replaced by Ronald Reagan and the leadership of Japan, Italy and the European Commission all changed prior to the 1981 Ottawa Summit (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.126).

This substantial change in individual leaders had a knock-on effect not only on the previously established levels of trust between the leaders but also in the strength of the common interests shared between the leaders when it came to domestic issues. In fact, the 1981 Ottawa Summit contained leaders of such disparate political and ideological backgrounds that it marked a turning point in both G-Summit relations and topics of discussion until the mid-1980s (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.126). These differences meant that, on economic policy coordination at least, the G7 initiated a wait-and-see mantra that avoided direct contradictions of domestic economic policies (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.128). In essence, this changing membership of the G7 leaders indicated that shared economic norms and values were not yet fully entrenched within the group. This was, in part, driven by the initial disdain that the Reagan, and therefore the US administration, had for these forms of global multilateralism (Smyser, 1993, p.18).

Instead, it was the shift-change in ideological and political responses to the Soviet Union, led by the United States, that underpinned much of the discussions, both economic and political at both the Ottawa Summit and at Versailles in 1982. Following the premise set at the 1980 Venice Summit, it was clearly recognised that the G7 had now evolved into a forum at which it was axiomatic for the leaders present to both discuss, and shape, political and foreign policy problems that faced world politics (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.130). However, the 1979 Tokyo, 1980 Venice, and 1981 Ottawa, (as well as the 1982 Versailles, see Section 4.3) Summits all demonstrated the convergence of economic norms and interests between *some* of the leading members of the G7 in their economic outlook on world politics (Putnam and Bayne, 1987). The perceived failures of the 1978 Bonn Summit, and previous Summits that had based economic and political agreements upon Keynesian growth principles, were replaced by a coherence of economic values around monetarism as the key to both stabilising inflation but also long-term economic growth (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.107). This turn in economic policy focus was part of a wider shift in Western economic and politics which had translated into the election of Margaret Thatcher in the UK in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the US in 1981, who held similar political and economic values that also chimed with the long-held economic values of the German Chancellor

Helmut Schmidt. That these economic values were opposed by the Socialist French President Mitterand was one of the underlying reasons that animosity existed specifically between him and Ronald Reagan (Putnam and Bayne, 1987). Thus, whilst the G7 did not engender these monetarist or centre-right political outlooks per se, this series of Summits did facilitate the convergence of some of these leaders into a space in which they were able to recognise the shared values and interests held by them in what has become regarded as a neoliberalism. Many of the G7 leaders therefore used this shared economic position to politically shape what was regarded as *legitimate* global economic policy (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.98)

This convergence of political and economic values, as well as shared interests in promulgating and entrenching these values at the international level, highlight the importance of the role that the G7 can play in facilitating this *through* formal international institutions (see Chapter 1). It is also important in order to understand the power that a perception of shared values and norms around *coordinated* political and economic action has in shaping the actions and decision-making of G7 leaders, even where this is politically difficult at the domestic level. These emerging economic principles, that globally at least, are reminiscent of those 'standards of civilisation' (Gong, 1984), and which non-member states must adhere to if they wish to be admitted to the global club. This dynamic demonstrates the growing power of the G7 in world politics. In essence, this chapter highlights the growing role the G7 had begun to play in shaping what legitimate action *looks like* at the international level. The next chapter builds upon these ideas of legitimacy, and perceptions of responsibility, in unpacking the growing role that the G7 began to play in its second and third summit cycles (1982-1995); a role that saw the G7 begin to involve itself in areas of world politics that had historically been the purview of Great Power politics.

Chapter 4 – The Changing Nature of Great Power Politics

'…without the sustained and stable understandings between the major powers on the conduct of their mutual relations, then the 'softer' elements of international order (international law, international organisations, the existence of shared values) would be so many castles in the air.'
(Hurrell, 2002a, p.viii)

This chapter explores the 'Old School' understanding of the continued importance of Great Power responsibility in world politics. In his memorial lecture to Martin Wight in the 1970s, Hedley Bull identified what had become, and still is, an overlooked element of Wight's early thinking regarding the importance of these Concerts of powers representing international society writ large (Wight, 1973; 1979, p.39-40; 1977, p.141; Bull, 1976, p.105; Watson, 2009, p.160). Put simply, Bull (1976) argued that Wight's early thinking on the role and responsibility of the Great Powers acting in concert not only represented what Watson (2007) has come to term a collective hegemony of powers dominating contemporary world politics, but that this modern Concert of Great Power management also holds certain elemental factors that shared a *common responsibility* in managing international order (Bull, 1961, p.59). In turn, these Concerts hold historical conceptions of international legitimacy (Clark, 2009).

This continued responsibility of Great Power politics has recently been explored through the work of Falkner and Buzan (2022b, p.6) on the role and impact of climate change, embedding this debate within the ES's conception of Great Power politics (Buzan and Falkner, 2022a, p.14-48; also see Kopra, 2022).[157] This chapter explores the early ES work on Great Powers with a specific focus upon how these works link to the growing role and remit of the G7 in its second and third summit cycles between 1982 and 1995.

The role and influence of the G7 grew during this period to encompass global security issues that had not been within the purview of the G7 during its first summit cycle. This period at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s also saw the G7 take a leading role in coordinating Western actions in response to the end of the Cold War (Morin et al, 2019, p.270-271). The actions of the G7 during this period were therefore a continuation of the previous attempts at managing international order; yet they were also a reflection of the *changing* nature of world politics following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a more globally dominant liberal international order.

The G7 not only acted as if it was responsible for managing this transition, it also acted to preserve this 'status quo' of liberal economic and Western democratic norms and values. In essence, the second summit cycle saw the G7 act to preserve a balance of power between Western democracies and the Soviet Union whilst maintaining the perception of its role as the liberal Western bulwark against communist rule. Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War saw the need for a traditional military balance of power dissipate in world politics. As a result, in the third summit cycle the G7 took on a greater

[157] Also see Kopra (2022, p.215) who identifies the G7 as one of the established Great Power clubs of contemporary world politics. Buzan and Falkner (2022a, p.38) also imply that the G7 is also club of 'Great Powers'. Interestingly, Bell was also of a similar mind about the contemporary role that a form of Great Power Concert could play in avoiding large-scale human catastrophe (see White, 2014).

level of involvement and responsibility in managing, or attempting to manage, intractable global conflicts and civil wars, creating a new perception of the G7 as an enlightened 'Western' group of Great Powers who were responsible for defending and maintaining the norms and values of the new liberal international order.

The irony of this period is that the G7 acted as if it held great responsibility to maintain the rules-based international order, yet the group itself was acting as if it were a 19th Century Concert of Great Powers outside the formal rules and norms of international institutions. The following sections explore how the 'Old School' saw the rules based international order as being maintained and how the concept of the balance of power was integral to the maintenance of international order. The final section unpacks how the growing influence, and actions, of the G7 can be seen not only as attempting to maintain this rule based international order, and to preserve a balance of power, but also as the emergence of a contemporary form of Great Power responsibility in acting to preserve and maintain these elements of world politics.

4.1 Rules based international order

International order for Hedley Bull (2002a; Linklater and Suganami, 2006) was defined by the idea that order between states equates to the security against violence, the protection of property, and the observance of agreements that underpin these elements. International order is that which facilitates and protects the relations between states to the degree to which violence does not occur on the scale that would sunder the ability to continue and maintain said protections, rights, and agreements.

International order was not regarded by Bull (2002a) as a permanent state of affairs in world politics. A point also recognised by Wight (1977; 1979) and in Bull and Watson's (1989) edited collection. Instead, international order was a concept, or idea, that was always contested, thus requiring protection, and maintenance, in the face of the risks inherent in these relations between states that would threaten to fracture the pre-existing framework of world politics (Wight, 1977, p.36).

For scholars such as Manning (1962), who influenced the early ES (see Chapter 2), the concept of international order was of little purpose without a corresponding framework of international law. Bull (2002a) also recognised international law as a key institution of the ES framework, and indeed of international society itself (Buzan, 2014a). Nevertheless, for Bull (2002a) the existence of international law was predicated upon an *a priori* existence of some form of international order in the relations between states. For Wight (1977) this was primarily a similarity of cultural practices and norms shared between states that, *ala* Grotius, could form the basis of a 'global' normative framework of regulations between states.[158] However, Bull (2002a) did not place as much emphasis upon the role of common culture or norms in being a prerequisite for the development of international order, and therefore international law (see Chapter 2). Rather, for Bull (2002a), it was the relations between powerful states which laid the foundations for international order in the form of diplomatic activity and Great Power responsibility in managing and maintaining a degree of order between themselves.

[158] Interestingly, Sharp (2016, p.116) indicates that Butterfield's unpublished notes also establish a similar understanding of the importance of cultural fragmentation driving international change.

The idea, then, that rules of the international system sit above, or beyond, the realm of mere state interest, which has come to be known as international law, is predicated upon an understanding that such rules are part of an international framework that transcends the normality of state interests and reinforces higher values and norms of relations between humans (Franck, 1990). Yet, as Bull (2002a) was inherently aware of, international law as a form of rules that regulate and dominate world politics are the *creation* of states and are *part of* the relations between states. Simply put, states are both the authors of international law and the recipients and subjects of international law, but they are also the guardians and challengers of international law (Jackson, 2003, p.102). States can thus amend or disavow the principles of international law as they choose (Wendt, 1992). International law, while a formalised representation of the rules of conduct of world politics, does not equate to a higher power with the ability to exert control over the actions of states in an anarchic international system.

Instead, the role of the Great Powers in maintaining and shaping the rules of international order, and therefore also the rules of international law, was the mainstay of Bull's continued thinking on the relationship between international order and the evolutionary nature of world politics (Bull, 1980a; 2002a; Bull and Watson, 1989). It was not that Bull did not recognise the inherent clash between normative values and Great Power actions, nor the value and longevity of justice in world politics in underpinning a future legitimacy of international order that may clash with this unequal power politics (Bull, 2000b). Instead, Bull (2002a) recognised that when framing any understanding of world politics based upon international rules of co-existence and rules of regulation (Hoffman, 2003), one must also understand that the continued existence of said rules and norms are inherently shaped by the dominant powers in world politics. That is to say, the hegemonic powers not only shape the rules of international order they also challenge and break them (Bull, 1980a; 2000b, p.222).

In particular, it was the idea that when international order, or its preservation of the status quo, runs directly in the face of international justice that Bull recognised the inherent ineffectiveness that would undermine the idea of international order both as a concept and in practice (Dunne, 1998; Alderson and Hurrell, 2000). The important element to draw out of Bull's thinking here is that he did not perceive the role, or hegemonic position of Great Powers (Watson, 2007), as being invalid *per se*. Instead, Bull understood that international order *could*, and *has been* (Bull and Watson, 1989; Watson, 2007), provided by a select grouping of states who perceived themselves to be responsible for managing international order and who offer a *degree* of international justice alongside the maintenance of international order.[159] In essence, both Bull (2000b; 2002a), and later Clark (2003; 2007; 2009; 2017), recognised that international order can be maintained with a degree of international legitimacy by said order *also* providing a form of justice in the relations between states.

Legitimacy, then, in returning to the argument made in Chapter 3, can be *provided through practice* as much as it can be a framework for *normative assessment*. This deliberation over the role of justice and international order was also at the forefront of Adam Watson's (2004) thinking on the effectiveness of international institutions with the expansion of membership of states following the process of decolonisation and the major questions surrounding international justice and equality in world politics (see Jackson, 1989; 1996). Legitimacy is as much used as a tool of acceptance that is *given* to states, be they post-colonial states emerging into a pluralist world politics and receiving

[159] See Gaskarth (2017, p.290) for a good summary of the need for agency in shaping responsibility, something that the G7 leaders perceive themselves to have as a collective as per their original formation and continued proclamations and communiques.

diplomatic recognition from pre-existing states, as it can be emerging states *giving* legitimacy, or at least deliberately not challenging said legitimacy of the pre-existing dominant powers, in order to gain a seat at the table (Suzuki, 2008, p.60; Newman and Zala, 2018, p.874-875).[160]

However, what Watson (2004, p.164-165) was keen to highlight was that while this equality of representation and input in managing international relations through formalised international institutions no doubt provided the moral positioning equivalent of international justice, the formal rules of international law provided merely the *perception* of state-based equality. In the face of a direct challenge to international order, and to the preservation of the status quo structures of power and Great Power hegemony (Watson, 2007), this diversity and equality was perceived to be a hinderance rather than a solution to the prevention of the fracturing of the relations between states. Nevertheless, Watson (2004), just as Bull (2000b) did, recognised the inherent fallacy in attempting to preserve an international order that was not based upon equality of purpose nor international justice.

To paraphrase Wight (1991), order without justice would be similar to the singular approach to international relations that a mere Hobbesian strand of thinking would provide; whilst revolutionary justice without order would be to advocate for disorder in the relations between states. The idea of international order, for these 'Old School' scholars, must therefore lay its foundations on an amalgamation of both the regulation and maintenance of some form of order as well as justice and equality between states.

In fact, Bull (1980a; 2002a), Watson (2004), and latterly Wheeler (1996; 2000), all continued to believe that the maintenance of international order was based upon the perceived *responsibility* shared between select powers. For Bull (1971) the continued relationship between international order and international justice was an integral element in understanding world politics, yet it was not the base starting point for understanding the relations between states. Bull (1971) saw international justice as denoting the moral rules that confer rights and duties upon states, including the idea of equality of sovereignty, regardless of power in the international system. In other words, Bull saw a clear distinction, but also a symbiotic relationship between the two concepts, believing that one did not exist without the other.

The idea of the rules-based international order has therefore taken on the mantel of providing a framework of regulations and guidance for managing the relations between states in order to both prevent *disorder* in world politics, but also to provide a degree of legitimacy and justice in the relations between states. Thus, while international 'rules' do not constitute codified obligations, nor testable restrictions in front of a higher power, they still remain the binding glue between states that have developed through historical processes (Franck, 1990; Watson, 2004; 2009).

That these 'rules' provide the thin glue over state interactions that conceal the ever-present threat of conflict (James, 1973b, p.66) does not abrogate their importance nor value. But it does frame our understanding of world politics in such a way as to demonstrate that rather than being an indication of progressive attitudes towards a world society of shared values and norms (Buzan, 2005a; Linklater and Suganami, 2006), these rules and norms are inherently open to change, interpretation and contestation by powerful, and weak, states. Rather than being universal frameworks of rigidity that enforce the rules of the relations between states, they are more like the rules-of-the-game, open to

[160] See Getachew (2019) for an empirical exploration of those individuals who challenged this permissive narrative.

manipulation and, absent a clear referee or higher power, open to repudiation when certain interests are served.

This understanding of the role of a rules-based international order was key to both Bull (2002a) and Wight's (1977; 1979; 1991) perception that world politics will *always* be contested, and that as per both Jackson (2003) and Williams (2015) this contestation is a normative element in-and-of-itself as any enforcement by a higher power of a certain set of normative values will inevitably fall into the same historical trap that past 'standards of civilisation' have demonstrated (Gong, 1984; Keene, 2002).

This debate also goes to the heart of the contested relationship in the IR discipline on the role and position of state leadership in a contemporary world politics. For Beardsworth (2017, p.111) there are historical examples where states have lined up national and global 'responsibilities' and shifted the dial on international issues such as post-war reconstruction or the ending of the slave trade. Yet, it is important to note that these framings of national interest aligning with global responsibilities are never a balanced process. They can serve a global interest in providing stability amongst international disorder (see Chapter 3), but these actions can also serve the national, or hegemonic, interests of select states in preserving the status quo in world politics and defending against a form of disorder that threatens to reshape the pre-existing rules of the international system.[161]

The preservation of the rules-based international order, therefore, does not simply rest upon a dynamic of supporting the status quo rules, international laws, or norms shared between some states, nor is it predicated upon a static formulation of an idealised end-point in the relations between states. International order is contested, unstable and changeable. It requires protection by the leading international powers, and protection *from* the dominant powers (Hurrell, 2009, p.28-29).

Yet, international order also came to be perceived by the 'Old School' scholars as a key norm, or value, in-and-of-itself that exists both *within* the rules and regulations of international law, but also *outside* of, and *prior* to, the formalised structures of contemporary world politics. Understanding how international order is managed, enforced, shaped, and how it clashes with the normative framework of international justice, representation, and equality in world politics was a key premise of more contemporary ES understandings of world politics (Jackson, 1989; 1996; 2003).

Importantly, exploring the difference between the contemporary ES focus on the importance of international rules and international law that emanates from formalised international institutions, and the informal perceived rules of the game held by dominant powers that the 'Old School' scholars still saw as vital in understanding how international order was maintained, and how key international elites perceived these rules (See Chapter 2), is key to understanding the evolution of the G7.[162]

For Manning (1962) the rules of world politics were as much about the *perception* of those rules as effective in managing the relations between states as they were about the need to abide by certain principles. This position was in part shared by the 'Old School' scholars for whom understanding the role that political elites *perceived* the rules of the international game to be remained key (see Section

[161] See Getachew (2019, p.176-181) on the resistance to, and ultimate failure of, attempts at developing the NIEO (also see Hurrell, 2013, p.206).

[162] This continued focus upon the role of the Great Powers in world politics was a position held by many in the 'Old School' as still relevant for understanding the perceived responsibility, and therefore actions, of dominant powers in attempting to manage international order. For example, see Bell, 1953; 1971; Bull, 1980a; 2002a; Butterfield, 1966b; Watson, 2007; Wight, 1966b; 1973; 1979.

2.3). Nonetheless, they, and more recent ES scholars such as Jackson (2003, p.103) understood that international law, devoid of a hegemonic power to enforce these formal rules, could also act as restraining norms for which powerful states could act as a bellwether that guides the wider perception of whether these rules should be followed.

There is, however, an important distinction to be made between the breach of international law by a minor power, or by a state that lays largely outside of the norms of international society, and that of a dominant power breaching the norms of international society. In the former case, such a breach can be either punished or reprimanded by the dominant powers who hold an interest in maintaining the status quo international norms and values, without fracturing the existence of international order as a concept. This kind of breach is a semi-regular occurrence in world politics and does not necessarily pose a significant threat to the overall framework of the rules of world politics as long as the dominant powers are perceived, or at least seen, to enforce said rules.[163]

However, the breach of international law *by* a dominant, or Great, power is inherently different in conceptualising the threat posed to the continued framework of international order (See Chapter 6). Such breaches do occur and are endorsed or contested *by* other Great Powers dependent upon their own interests or values. Yet the simple point remains that the validity and continued efficacy of international law/s remains predicated upon their endorsement and protection by dominant states. These dominant states *are* those states which decide the rules, and they are therefore important for maintaining the *perception* that they also obey the rules. Thus, while the Great Powers may largely play by the formalised international rules of international institutions or abide by the emergent norms and values of a changing world politics, they also shape the perceptions of other states of both the validity of said rules as well as the potential consequences that may occur if they breach the rules of international law (Bull, 1980a).

In sum, the idea of international law, and therefore a formal rules-based international order, sits at a crossroads of Hobbesian social contractual obligation within an international sphere (Franck, 1990, p.8) and a form of relations between states that lacks a higher power of enforcement of any breaches of said laws (Jackson, 2003, p.121; Watson, 2004, p.41). Yet the *idea* of international law is fundamentally framed by the choices and actions of the leading and dominant powers of world politics (Bull, 2002a). The international bodies that represent the machinery of international law, the guardians as it were of the formal rules of international behaviour, are not matched by the intrinsic power to enforce said rules and instead rely upon the willingness of the Great Powers to make any move in preserving or protecting international law (Goodwin, 1973; Malone, 2004; Watson, 2004; Bosco, 2009).

The historical evidence of much of the latter part of the 20th Century indicates that states *do* obey international law a significant amount of the time, flying in the face of Realist and neo-sovereigntist arguments (Franck, 1990; Watson, 2004, p.40). Nevertheless, contemporary actions in world politics have demonstrated, once again, the destabilising role that Great Power breaches of international law can play in shaping the maintenance of international order (Morris, 2005; Clark, 2009; Dunne and Mulaj, 2010). The focus of recent ES scholarship on the debates around the validity and purpose of international law, and international institutions, in enforcing and enacting said laws (Wheeler, 2000;

[163] For a wider discussion on the role and actions of the UNSC in enforcing international law against minor states that have been perceived to have broken the rules see Malone (2004), Bosco (2009).

Jackson, 2003; Gallagher, 2012) has, in turn, begun to premise an argument that recognises principles of international law as *a priori* to international order (James, 1993; Wheeler, 2000; Linklater and Suganami, 2006).

This is, in effect, a rejection of the 'Old School' thinking of Bull (2002a), Watson (2007) and Butterfield and Wight (2019) who framed their understanding of world politics not as a rejection of the role and importance of international law as both shaping, and being shaped by, the norms and values of the society of states as they evolve over time; rather, for the 'Old School' the role of international order was in laying the *foundations* for international law to develop. Put simply, international order between states is the precursor to the development of formalised and sustained diplomatic relations, which in turn are a prerequisite for the establishment and evolution of international rules and laws (Mattingly, 1965; Jackson, 2002b; 2003, p.122; Watson, 2004) and the emergence of international society (Vincent, 1988).

The fact that states, including Great Powers, do obey the rules of international law most of the time (Wilson, 2009, p.173), does not preclude the importance nor the significance of these formal rules, but it is important to understand when said breaches *do* occur and whether such breaches undermine the informal rules that maintain international order. The legitimacy of formal international rules and law rests upon both the perception mentioned before - that states should, and do, obey said rules - but this legitimacy also rests upon the idea that these rules were shaped and created *by* legitimate actors (Franck, 1990, p.24). This is a key point in this discussion because the breaching of international rules by Great Powers does occur, has occurred (Bull and Watson, 1989; Watson, 2009) and will inevitably continue to occur. Yet, these breaches do not necessarily indicate that the wider *idea* of international law has been rejected or disposed of (Bull, 2002a; Little, 2009a), thus prefiguring that there is an underlying order to the relations between states that continues to provide the bedrock upon which concepts of international law rest.

There are certain points in world history where the rules of the relations between states have been irrevocably fractured (Wight, 1977, p.36) sundering the pre-existing international order. But there are also cases where the Great Powers have broken, or breached, international rules and laws which *have not* fractured the pre-existing framework of the idea of international law as an important part of the relations between states (Malone, 2004; Morris, 2005; Watson, 2007; Bosco, 2009; Clark, 2009; Dunne and Mulaj, 2010). However, Great Powers also *choose* to breach international laws and rules *in order to preserve* international order when faced with a challenge to the existence of the wider norms and values of international society and the relations between states (Wheeler, 2000; Jackson, 2003; Mayall, 2005, p.97; Bain, 2007a). The perceived role, and responsibility, shared by the Great Powers in maintaining international law is therefore inherently tied to a conceptual idea that maintaining international order is-and-of-itself paramount to all other considerations in the relations between states (Bull, 2002a).

The historical record of Great Power management of world politics is clearly one of both stability and instability, or order and disorder (Butterfield, 1966b; James, 1978; Wight, 1979; Bull, 1980a; Bull and Watson, 1989; Kennedy, 1989). Yet, to overlook the continued relations between states in contemporary world politics as *also* predicated upon a degree of dominant, or hegemonic power management (Watson, 2007) is to overlook the fundamental construct of what Robert Jackson (2003) calls the 'global covenant'. This covenant between states is not only framed as a *protection* for those

leading powers, but also as a protection *against* the nefarious activities of those powerful states in world politics (Jackson, 1996; Hurrell, 2009, p.29-29; Little, 2009a).

Any conceptual understanding of the role and importance of international law, and the formal rules of world politics, must therefore also reflect not only the formalised structures of the management of said laws, but also the inherent role that Great Power politics continues to play in maintaining the foundations of international order. What the historical record of Great Power management of international order tells us is that these informal 'rules of the game', and perceptions of responsibility shared between Great Powers, can mean both the abrogation of the validity of international law as-and-when they wish it to, but it can also mean the breach of international rules and laws in order to *preserve* the norms and values that are underpinned by the existence of international law in the first place (James, 1973b; Watson, 1996a; 1979; 2007; 2009; Bull, 2002a; Clark, 2003).

The relations between the Great Powers, and therefore the foundations of the rules based international order, is predicated upon the principle of a finely managed balance that prevents both anarchic disorder in world politics, but also the emergence and dominance of any one of their number over the others. The next section unpacks the conceptualisation and importance of this balancing act to 'Old School' scholars before then applying it in the following section to help understand the growing remit of the G7 in world politics. In doing so, it highlights not only the similarity between the G7 and concepts of Great Power responsibility, but also the continued relevance of early ES work on Great Power management of international order and its continued relevance in IR.

4.2 The balance of power and the Great Power maintenance of international order

The role of Great Power Concerts, in particular the efficacy of the European post-Congress of Vienna Concert, was of particular interest to many of the 'Old School' scholars in relation to contemporary world politics. Bull (2002a, p.218), Butterfield (1966b, p.154), Wight (1960a; 1979, p.42) all discuss aspects of this European Concert, while all demonstrate reservations about its legitimacy and effectiveness. Nonetheless, all three, as well as Bell (White, 2014), saw in the European Concert of the 19th Century a framework for understanding not only how a balance of power could be achieved between powerful states in preventing global hegemonic conflicts, but also how it could shape the emergent norms and values that underpinned the diplomatic relations of these Great Powers. The balance of power between states was therefore an integral element of the international system (Butterfield, 1966b) for much of the 'Old School' way of thinking about historical aspects of world politics.

In fact, the balance of power as an institutional function in the relations between states has also been recognised as a 'master institution' of international society in the contemporary ES (Dunne, 1995b, p.378). For Buzan (2005a, p.187) the balance of power between states is a derivative of the broader Great Power management of world politics, but nonetheless still a key element in the institutional definitions that have underpinned the ES approach. This institutional framework is not, however, a mechanical functioning of the relations between states but is instead an integral part of the political

and social machinations between states (Hurrell, 2009, p.32).[164] This means that any form of balance of power in world politics is inherently tied to the norms, values and political outlook of those states both acting as part of, or against, a balance of power.

The maintenance of international order through the balancing of the Great Powers is not simply a matter of establishing the correct parameters of an engineering blueprint, or of attaining the perfect balance between forces. It is, rather, a political and social process that is in constant competition and at constant risk of destabilisation and fracture. requiring political and diplomatic convergence between the competing powers on how such a balance will function (Butterfield, 1966b; Wight, 1966b; Bell, 1977a; Kissinger, 2013).

This is an important starting point to begin the framing of Bull's (2002a) own argument that there are distinctly different forms of balance in world politics: regional and global, complex and simplistic. This is also supportive of Wight's (1966b) argument that the contextual nature of each balance of power is key to understanding its relationship with world politics. In other words, the balance of power between states is not a conceptual vacuum that can easily be transposed upon differing historical and political contexts.

For a start, which states participate in a balance of power, their role in said balancing, and how they are perceived by other states is always contextually specific and non-universal in historical comparison. Which states *are* Great Powers, and which merely aspire to such a mantle, are also inherently contested. For Jackson (2003) the conceptual framework for *what constitutes* a Great Power is a state with the military, economic and political power of such magnitude that it sets it apart from other states. However, this definition should be caveated within the contextual and historical parameters of Bull (2002a) and Wight's (1966a) earlier argument that this varies in time, place, region, perception and understanding. The important point to establish here is that how and which states are perceived to be Great Powers, and therefore who plays a prominent role in any *global* balance of power, is open to both change and the perception of change.[165]

Past historical conceptions of a Great Power within the ES have largely focused upon military power and a states' ability to project power (Howard, 2000; Jackson, 2003). Contemporary shifts in the ES have underpinned the analysis of the challenge to 'Western' Great Power dominance (Gaskarth, 2017) alongside what Linklater (2011, p.1189) describes as the intuitive link between Great Power responsibility and political engagement with non-Great Powers that underpinned the thinking of Vincent. What is clear is that both Bull (2002a, p.97) and Watson (2009, p.162) recognised that a purely

[164] For a challenge to this argument see Little (2009a, p.130), however, while Little makes a valid point that Bull does not close-down this possibility of an almost automated framework of elements of the balance of power, a wider encapsulation of Bull's own thinking can also make the argument that Bull deliberately *never* closed any avenue of inquiry down, in turn, this does not mean he didn't prioritise the social elements of relations between states over the mechanical aspects that could not be shaped or amended.

[165] For a wider discussion on the classification of Great Powers and a historical analysis of the rise and fall of Great Powers, as well as the concept of the balance of power in world politics see Schenk, 1947; Gulick, 1955; Langhorne, 1983; McKay and Scott, 1984; Kennedy, 1989; Holsti, 1995; Howard, 2006a; Little, 2009a; Richardson, 2011; Engelbrekt, 2016; Lascurettes, 2020. Also see, in the context of the Ukraine-Russian war, O'Brien (2023) which is in part a continuation of the argument made by Kennedy (1989) on the importance of understanding the economic and technological factors in shaping how we understand and conceptualise Great powers.

military power projection focus on Great Power responsibility was lacking in analytical depth, albeit a point of analytical criticism that neither pursued further.

Nonetheless, the lack of 'Old School' engagement with *economic power* is a vital element that was missing in both early and contemporary ES conceptions of the role of Great Power politics. Put very simply, historical definitions of power based on military strength alone cannot be assessed separately from concepts of economic power that *underpin* the foundations of military, diplomatic and political power (Kennedy, 1989).

When unpacking contemporary conceptions of the balance of power therefore, it is also the *relative* power of states in world politics that can indicate, and shape, the changing nature of the balance of power. For Wight (1979), how the 'grading' of a Great Power is conceptualised is key to perceptions of change in world politics. Much as Kennedy (1989) argues that the relative increase or decrease in economic power is key to understanding change in world politics, for Wight (1979), how a rising or falling power is *perceived* (Manning, 1962) in strength is just as important when conceptualising how the balance of power is changing. Thus, the successful maintenance of international order by Great Powers is not predicated upon a static interpretation of the longevity of the pre-existing balance of power, history indicates that change will always occur (Wight, 1977; 1979; Kennedy, 1989; Bull, 2002a).

Importantly, which states are *recognised* as Great Powers is intimately shaped by the pre-existing Great Powers. In other words, whether through conflict or through admission to the membership club, Great Powers decide who the emerging Great Powers will be and in turn attempt to shape the pre-existing balance of power to reflect their continued position at the apex of world politics and the continued management of international order (Bell, 1953; Wight, 1979; Bull, 1980a; 2002a; Kennedy, 1989; Wendt, 1992; Clark, 1993; 2017; Watson, 2007; Bosco, 2009; Kissinger, 2013; Kyris, 2022). Therefore, much as Bull (2002a) highlighted the diversity of concepts of the balance of power, a modern understanding of Great Power relations and the fine line walked by said powers to achieve a balance in world politics is also based upon an evolutionary understanding of how said balance works (Hurrell, 2002b, p.22; Little, 2009a; Watson, 2009). This was, and is, the framework upon which the 'Old School' scholars deliberately contested each other's conceptions and understandings of Great Powers and the form in which a balance was achieved between them, through historical analysis and reflection (see Chapter 2). Understanding this change is vital not just to an ES understanding of world politics, but also to a wider understanding of the inherent risks involved in contemporary world politics in ignoring the role such a balance continues to play in maintaining international order, and indeed which powers now sit at the top table of Great Power politics (see Zala, 2016).

In fact, for Bull, the balance of power in the modern international system was a necessity for the survival of international society (Hoffman, 1986, p.193; Little, 2009a, p.128), but it was *also* vital as a fluid conceptual framework of how we understand the relations between states (Hurrell, 2002b, p.22). We can see this evolution in Bull's (2002a) own thinking developing on this framework of Great Power classification through his recognition of the inherent shifts in the balance of power in the international system during the Cold War. Bull recognised that the dominant Superpowers of the US and the Soviet Union were joined by China, Japan, and some amalgamation of European powers in the rankings of modern Great Power status (Bull, 2002a, p.98) and responsibility.[166]

[166] For a wider debate and discussion on the nature of the position of Japan and China, particularly in terms of perceptions of 'rising' or Great Power roles in world politics see Bell, 1971; 1989; Purnell, 1973; Warner and

Yet, what isn't fully developed in Bull's (2002a) work is *why* these states shifted to Great Power status. It can be argued that growth in military power was a predominant factor in relative and regional terms, yet at the time of Bull writing neither China nor Japan had developed sufficient military power to equate themselves with the United States or the Soviet Union and therefore place themselves at the front rank of international powers (Bull, 2002a, p.195).

These rising powers did, however, demonstrate an increasingly important influence in *economic* power in world politics. The resurgent Japanese economy from the 1950s onwards, and the scale of the rising economic power and importance of a unified China all threatened the status quo framework of economically dominant Westernised economies. Thus, the *relative* change in the balance of power in world politics is also an important factor in shaping how 'Great Powers' are conceptualised in a changing world politics, and again, which powers now have significant enough economic power to warrant a changed perception in their status and role.

By returning to historical examples, and indeed the early conceptions of the origins of the modern state-based system within the ES, we can see that for Bull (2002b), Wight (1977) and Jackson (2003) the 1648 Peace of Westphalia was not the simple trigger point in changing world politics to a modern framework of state-systems that many within the field of IR continue to rely upon (Purnell, 1973, p.58; Watson, 2004, p.x; Mayall, 2005, p.11). For the 'Old School' scholars (Wight, 1977; Bull, 2002b) Westphalia was, much as contemporary approaches have also shown (Croxton, 2015), the culmination of a wider evolutionary process in the European sphere of power politics that represented the culmination of a much earlier developmental process of the relations between European states and principalities from the Fifteenth Century onwards (Bull, 2002b, p.75; Wight, 1977, p.112; Croxton, 2015). It was this transformational, or evolutionary, element that Watson (1987) argued was key to highlighting Hedley Bull's ideas surrounding the emergence of European international society *from* Westphalia, rather than *because* of Westphalia. In other words, it was the culmination of the development of shared conceptions of norms, values and interests over a significant historical period in European power politics, culminating in the Peace of Westphalia, that shaped the premise of a European form of international society, and thus shaped which powers emerged as key players.

This is an important point to make because this evolutionary process in the emergence of European international society lay not with the culmination of the treaties per se, but with the development and recognition between the states involved, both Great Powers and minor powers, of the historical rules and institutions that bound them in common purpose, but also shaped their common interests (Jackson, 2003, p.11; Wight, 1977, p.147). Put simply, the process of the development, emergence and evolution of shared norms and values that form the foundations of an international society come from not only international crisis and conflict, but from the emergent order and management of world politics that is agreed to, or at least acquiesced to, by a plurality of powers and states in world politics that *choose* to give such a framework legitimacy.

Therefore, whilst the Peace of Westphalia demonstrated the emergence of a form of international society that is distinct in nature from a mere international system of states (Bull, 2002b, p.75; Wight,

Warner, 1975; Yahuda, 1978; 2011; Gong, 1984; 1989; Bull, 1989c; Kennedy, 1989; Suganami, 1989; Vincent, 1989; Franck, 1990; Zhang, 1991; 1998; 2017; Hurrell, 1992; Clark, 1993; Gilpin, 2003; Connaughton, 2004; Totman, 2005; Watson, 2007; 2009; Suzuki, 2009; Kang, 2010; Kissinger, 2012; Rodrik, 2012; Tudda, 2012; Gaskarth, 2015; Engelbrekt, 2016; Rachman, 2016; Radchenko, 2016; Zarakol, 2022. Also see Suzuki, 2008, p.46.

1977, p.152), this was also a transition from 'Christendom' to a wider European system that based its foundations upon the mutual recognition or legitimacy, of sovereignty, rather than subjugation to higher powers such as the Holy See or the Holy Roman Empire (Franck, 1990, p.113; Jackson, 2003, p.156-159; Wight, 1977, p.113; Watson, 2002, p.146). This reflected the assertion of a more *just* form of political control through the rejection, and illegitimacy, of a hegemonic dominance by a single Empire, power, or religious authority (Purnell, 1973, p.58; Bull, 1977, p.18; Vincent, 1984, p.209; Kennedy, 1989; Gilpin, 2003, p.114; Jackson, 2003, p.161; MacCulloch, 2004; Wallace, 2004; Mayall, 2005, p.15; Watson, 2004, p.75; 2009, p.169).

In other words, the historical base for understanding the emergence of international society as a concept was not a rejection of international order and powerful states/groups per se, it was in fact a revolutionary change in the *balance of power* in European politics that saw the rejection of the legitimacy of a singular set of religious and political norms and values. Instead, the emergence of a balance of power, and the international order that this supported, provides evidence of that the European powers of the day *recognised* that the legitimacy of the previous order that had regulated their interactions had ended, and they needed to create a new form of international society to manage relations between themselves (Bull, 2002a; Watson, 2009, p.182; also see Chapter 3 and Chapter 6).

The survival of international society was not therefore, and *ala* Bull (2002a), predicated merely upon the prevention of war or conflict between states (Gilpin, 2003, p.114; Little, 2009). Rather, the balance of power is a conceptual and political framework that is designed to facilitate the prevention of an *escalation* of conflict or war to such a degree that it fractures or destroys the pre-existing system of relations between states (Bell, 1971, p.50; Wight, 1966a; 1977; Howard, 2000; de Almeida, 2003, p.284). Or, in the terms of the emergence of the European state-based order, to provide the semblance of stability in *resolving* such a fracturing and is, at the very least, the premise of the framework of order that emerged from the ashes of disorder in Europe.

This is an important point to make regarding the nature and importance of the balance of power as a concept. The balance of power can be used, as discussed in the previous section, by certain Great Powers to *prevent* hegemonic attempts at dominance by individual or groups of states in order to *preserve* the norms and values of international society (Clark, 1993, p.21; Little, 2009a). The maintenance of a balance of power, and therefore the maintenance of international order is not, *per se*, the establishment of harmony or peace in the relations between states (Kissinger, 2013, p.147).

Instead, the establishment of a *degree* of balance of power in the international system represents a form of stability, or order, that prevents world politics from tipping over towards conflict and facilitates the emergence of a form of détente, or a framework for *competing cooperation* (Bell, 1977a). This balance, and space to compete *within* the framework of international society is that which underpins its stability and the relations between states (see Chapter 5).

For Bull (2002a), then, war was not unavoidable between states, nor necessarily as per Wight's more pacifist beliefs (Hall, 2006), the worst-case scenario in world politics (1966c; 1979a; 1981; 2002a; Jackson, 2003, p.185). The maintenance, and indeed the creation of a balance of power in world politics can sometimes involve conflict in order to prevent the hegemonic dominance of some states over others (Butterfield, 1951a, p.31; Lyon, 1973, p.58; Kissinger, 2013). Attempts at avoiding war altogether and *still* maintaining a balance of power, have, throughout history, rarely succeeded (Butterfield, 1966b; Wight, 1966b; 1977; Bull, 2002a).

However, the idea that states can breach the norms of international order *in order* to establish a political, economic, or military balance in many ways goes back to the distinction that Herbert Butterfield (1966b) made between the balance of power as *practice*, employed by political actors, and the assessment of world politics as a *state of affairs* (Navari, 2009b, p.9). Placed within a historical analysis, the theoretical concept of a balance of power has a lineage going back to the ancient states system (Watson, 2009; Wight, 1977). Yet, the idea of actively using the concept of balance of power as a conscious use of political *practice* has its origins in the Italian Renaissance and the conflicts between Milan, Florence and Venice in the 15th and 16th Centuries (Mattingly, 1965; Watson, 2009, p.161).

This, again, is an important point to make because as per the first part of this section, the concept, usage, framing *and* understanding of the balance of power in maintaining international order *changes* over time. Therefore, while a theoretical turn away from envisaging the balance of power as a contemporary tool of world politics is one possible avenue, this does not mean that the concept will not be viewed differently as events change world politics in the future (see Chapter 6 for further discussion on Russia's invasion of Ukraine).

For example, the political thinkers of Renaissance Italy did not think in terms of creating imperial dominance, or the absolute destruction of opposing powers, but rather in terms of the nature of banking and finance, that of providing a balance to the affairs between independent city states that would enable a degree of order to exist which would *prevent* the emergence of a dominant or hegemonial power (Mattingly, 1965; Watson, 2009, p.161). This concept of the balance of power is reflected in Kissinger's (2013; Bell, 1977a) historical analysis of the end of the Napoleonic wars and the emergent Concert of Europe that provided an arguable degree of stability *in* European politics (Bull, 1966b; Bell, 1971, p.34; Holbraad, 1971; Kennedy, 1989, p.205; Clark, 1993, p.105; Kennan, 1994; Howard, 2000; Watson, 2004, p.110; Keene, 2009, p.117).

Yet, as Bull (1980d) makes clear, transposing such historical conceptions directly onto contemporary world politics rarely makes either political, moral or analytical sense. In other words, perceiving the balance of power as a tool of hegemonic dominance in preserving and promoting the interests of certain states through foreign policy actions can be both anti-progressive and unjust in nature, but it is also to misunderstand the historical usage and practice of the balance of power and to therefore misconstrue its normative role in also *preventing* injustice through the maintenance of order through a plurality of states (Jackson, 2003).

This is an important distinction for understanding both the emergence and development of the concept of balance of power in the international system. The *practice* of a balance of power has its roots in the idea of anti-hegemonial conceptions, even if the *state of affairs* in the system entails, at times, a hegemonial framework in political reality. Put simply, the practice of the balance of power in Renaissance Italy was framed, much like the Ancient Hellenistic world (Watson, 2009; Wight, 1977), as preventing the emergence of a singular dominant and hegemonic force that would control the political system. The reality, however, of both political systems was that this anti-hegemonial practice in turn led to the creation of a balance between the leading powers of the day, in effect creating a collective hegemony over the remaining powers in the political system (Watson, 2009).[167]

[167] The concept of hegemony that is used throughout this thesis reflects both Watson (2007; 2009) and Clark's (2017) ideas that move the framework of hegemony away from the idea of a singular dominant power,

In fact, as both Bell (1977a) and Kissinger (2013) point out, the balance of power *alone* is insufficient to maintain a degree of stability, or international order, in world politics. Instead, a balance of power is the precursor, and the foundations, for the emergence of a more cohesive concert of powers who can find common diplomatic agreements and positions, in order to preserve international order. This is an important point to make here in respect of the 'Old School' scholars' approach to understanding the role of Great Power politics and the attempt at managing a balance between these powers. For the 'Old School' the Great Powers used the concept of the balance of power as a tool to maintain a degree of order between themselves that was neither the perfect option nor immune from abuse, yet it nevertheless was the only option available that had some historical premise of working to establish and maintain a semblance of order in world politics (Bull, 1964).

For these scholars there was little historical or contemporary evidence of a more progressive form of managing relations between Great Powers that has been shown to be more effective in maintaining order (Butterfield, 1966b; Kennedy, 1989). Whilst the formalised structures of the post-1945 world order may seem to be framed around a more equalised international institution in reality the UNSC was, and is, a tool of the Great Powers in managing a balance between them through formalised diplomatic practice (Malone, 2004; Morris, 2005; Bosco, 2009).

The essence, then, of both Bull (2002a) and Wight's (1973; 1979) conception of Great Power responsibility was in the continuation of the importance of the *responsibility* itself. In other words, it mattered not that the nature of those powers that perceived themselves to hold a responsibility in managing international order were unequitable or unrepresentative in world politics. What mattered was that *some* powers chose to *take* responsibility (Bull, 1980a; Clark, 2017) in maintaining the foundations upon which international society can function.

While this position may seem to challenge Bull's own alleged shift towards the importance of justice in world politics, the idea of such a transformational shift in Bull's thinking remains predicated upon those who were writing *about* Bull (Wheeler and Dunne, 1996, p.99), rather than in Bull's own ideas (Bull, 2000b; 2002a). Thus, Bull (2002a) and Wight (1979) both argued that world politics *does*, and *can*, change, but that the fundamental elements of Great Power politics mean that certain key powers will continue to see themselves, rightly or wrongly, as responsible for managing international order to maintain the foundations that support international society (Hurrell, 2002a, p.viii). The next Section of this chapter goes on to explore how the G7's growing influence and interest in international affairs *beyond* the economic sphere demonstrates how the group began to act as if *they* were responsible for managing international order.

4.3 Great Power responsibility: The G7's remit grows over two summit cycles 1982-1995

The lack of a coherent, or coordinated, global economic policy shared between all of the G7 leaders, which had stymied the output of the latter Summits in the first cycle was beginning to change as new leaders entered office. As discussed in Section 3.3, the emergence of some G7 leaders who shared key political and economic norms meant that there were the beginnings of a more unified political position

towards a collective grouping of powerful states and a hegemonic dominance that is legitimised. Beeson and Bell (2009) also develop a similar framework of collective hegemony in their analysis of the G20.

amongst many in the group, but this unity was in part still held back by personal animosity between certain individuals, again, emphasising the importance of interpersonal trust between the leaders in shaping the effectiveness of the G7 as a group.[168]

The lead up to, and meeting of the leaders, at the 1982 Versailles Summit would demonstrate again just how important this common purpose was in enabling the G7 to act, or be seen to act, in maintaining international order. The US economy's freefall into its deepest recession since the 1930s had knock-on effects for both the global economy as well as the economies of fellow G7 member states (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.132). On non-economic issues the leaders responded to the Falklands invasion with declarations of support for the UK, also calling for a ceasefire over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.136), yet the leaders at the Versailles Summit did not go as far as forming a common purpose on non-economic issues as had been seen at the 1980 Venice Summit. In essence, the political differences between the leaders impeded the G7 in 1982 from cohering around a shared set of outcomes to maintain or respond to growing economic and political disorder in world politics.

The real impact of the 1982 Summit was, however, not to be felt until after the Summit had finished. Backtracking by the French on promises agreed over East-West trade, combined with the subsequent punitive economic reaction from the US (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.137), created a perception amongst the leaders of a fracturing of trust in the group. The role of ideological, and political, differences, as well as the lack of interpersonal bonding between Reagan and Mitterand underlines the fallibility of a Summit process that relies upon informal relations between leaders to effectively manage international order. This failure to agree, or failure to overcome personal disagreement, has all the hallmarks of the issues that have sundered Great Power Concerts in the past, issues that the formalised boundaries of a rules-based institutional international order were meant to provide the space for compromise and deliberation to overcome.[169]

The Versailles Summit can therefore be understood as an example of the fallacy of relying upon a Summit format for maintaining international order. However, what the 1982 Summit, and its fallout demonstrates is that irrespective of interpersonal differences and the failure to maintain a united or cooperative front from the G7, the societal norms that had evolved surrounding the forum and purpose of the G7 Summit *itself* was sufficiently strong to overcome the personal differences of some leaders and the individual failure of a single Summit. In other words, the legitimacy of the role of the G7 in attempting to manage international order was perceived by the G7 leaders as still an integral part of their role and responsibility in world politics.[170]

The fact that these same leaders would meet again in 1983 at Williamsburg, and that there would be a very different political outcome built upon the substantive points of agreement from Versailles rather than the procedural failures of the Summit (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.140), is a stark reminder of the importance of commonly held values and interests bringing the leaders together under the

[168] See Wheeler (2018) for an exploration of the importance trust and interpersonal bonding between political leaders.

[169] See Kissinger (2013) on the Congress of Vienna; Holbraad (1971) on the Concert of Europe; Bosco (2009) on the UNSC.

[170] For example, while Mitterrand repeatedly denounced the G7 Summits as a waste of time, and was vocal in his public differences, this did not stop his attendance at the Summits nor his attempts to use them as political platforms to further both his and French political interests (Putnam and Bayne, 1987).

aegis of the G7. The 1983 Williamsburg Summit, and to a similar extent the 1984 London Summit, initiated a step-change in how the G7 was to function. The perceived failures of the Versailles Summit had indicated to many leaders that the heavy preparation and pre-Summit negotiations conducted by Sherpas (Hajnal, 1999)[171] were to the detriment of a clear and cohesive Summit meeting, in large part due to the bureaucratisation of the whole Summit process (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.171). Thus, the G7 leaders rejecting the formalised procedures of international institutions and once again aiming to reassert the value of the 19th Century fireside discussion as key to coming to a coordinated position on intractable global and political issues.

The 1983-1984 G7 Summits therefore took on a more streamlined format that focused upon the importance of the discussions between leaders *themselves* in shaping an agreed, and coherent, communique to present to the world. A point that had become increasingly important following the exponential growth of media interests in the G7 process (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.172). This growth in interest inevitably shaped not only the domestic implications of any decision reached by the Summit leaders, but also impacted the leaders' ability to reach a compromise position in the informal discussions if said agreements impinged upon domestic priorities as they had done for several leaders in the first Summit cycle (see Section 3.3).

The Williamsburg and London Summits were therefore important in the evolution of the G7 for two key reasons. First, under an increasingly heavy media spotlight the leaders of the G7 deliberately began to downplay the importance of its role in world politics in order to manage expectations of clear results (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.174). This is, again, a reflection of the importance of the perceived legitimacy of the G7 in managing international order. If the G7 is seen to be at the apex of managing global disorder in world politics, and its leaders fail to effectively respond to this disorder, then the legitimacy of the G7 as a forum is called into question. By lowering the conceptual bar of success for the G7, this also lowers the political threshold at which the legitimacy of the G7 is called into question. The leaders recognised that the G7's legitimacy *did* rely upon the Summits being *perceived* as effective in maintaining international order.

However, these Summits also reframed the actual functioning, and agenda setting role, of the G7 in its relationship with formalised international institutions and organisations. Returning the technical, macroeconomic policy discussions to the more structured summit preparations was both a reflection of the changing levels of economic expertise amongst the leaders,[172] but also represented the desire of the leaders to broaden out the discussions at the Summits onto a wider decision-making framework in which expertise would be fed *into* the 'fireside chats' (Putnam and Bayne, 1987). In other words, the leaders wanted to *expand* their remit on global issues and wanted experts on key issues to feed into their discussions in order to provide them with more time and space to broaden their involvement in non-economic affairs. The Williamsburg Summit was indicative of this when the leaders discussed how to respond to criticism of NATO plans for storing Pershing II missiles in Europe (Engelbrekt, 2015,

[171] Sherpas are senior government officials who meet regularly throughout the year to negotiate and discuss political positions on the key issues that will be discussed at the upcoming Summit. In the early years of the G7 these tended to be finance ministry officials but in later years this role has extended to foreign service officials and other areas of government expertise. Also see Rewizorski (2017); Crump and Downie (2018).

[172] Schmidt and d'Estaing had both been finance ministers and Wilson a lecturer in economic history at Oxford. Reagan and Thatcher did not hold such experience upon taking office.

p.538), demonstrating that the G7 was willing to also involve itself in the affairs of a military alliance on contentious issues.

Second, the 1983-1984 G7 Summits also began to embed a more widely apparent commonality of political values and interests amongst the leaders, in particular in the convergence of values held between the predominantly 'Western' member states and Japan in respect of a common military positioning towards missile deployment and the Soviet Union (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.181). These two elements are important for understanding the gradual evolution of the G7 during this cycle from a policy-oriented deliberative forum to an international decision-making and agenda setting body. Put simply, the second Summit cycle was beginning to see the G7 move even more towards a Great Power framework of directly managing international order *through* international institutions and organisations on a much wider range of issues.

In fact, the Williamsburg and London Summits were also indicative of a now growing political, and personal, commonality between the leaders. Albeit still diverse in terms of political ideologies, the conservative majority amongst the leaders and the consistency in their attendance[173] had begun to forge an appreciation and interpersonal bond between them that factored into their consideration that the decisions made at these Summits would have an impact on the domestic outlook of each leader at the ballot box. In particular, President Reagan identified the important role that the identification of shared interests and the humanisation of face-to-face meetings can bring to the development of mutual trust and cooperation (see Holmes, 2019). This was made clear at the Williamsburg Summit when Reagan placed a great deal of emphasis on the *personal* touch and the *process* of allowing informal bonding to occur between the leaders present in shaping a common outlook, if not significant progress towards policy solutions to the global issues under discussion (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.178-179).

The importance of this growing commonality of purpose between the leaders was demonstrated at this Summit with the group not wishing to jeopardise British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's re-election campaign by attempting to agree a global response to what would be a contentious domestic issue. Similarly, the following year at the 1984 London Summit the leaders did not wish to impinge upon the re-election campaign of Reagan in the US (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.184). While these political actions can be understood as also serving the interests of the leaders not up for re-election, in that both leaders were highly likely to be re-elected and retain their seats at the G7 table, this political nod towards domestic considerations also enabled the leaders to reinforce the pre-existing interpersonal relations between them, rather than having to develop new bonds with new leaders.[174] What this demonstrates is that not only had the leaders developed a shared position, learnt from previous Summits, on the cost of domestic implications, they had also developed a more homogenous commonality of purpose that emphasised the importance of maintaining a collective forum in which to manage international order. In other words, the leaders perceived that it was *their continued responsibility* to attempt to manage international order, and that the interpersonal bonds developed between them were key to this being effective.

[173] All bar Italian Prime Minister Craxi were now experienced Summit-goers (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.183).
[174] See Wheeler (2018) and Klimke et al (2016) for the difficulties surrounding changes in leaders and the maintenance of trust.

The evolution of these commonly held norms and values between the G7 leaders continued at the 1985 Bonn and 1986 Tokyo Summits where economic growth and monetary issues were once again discussed, but deliberations were based upon broader principles rather than specific policy applications. Nonetheless, the nature of these discussions also engendered an off-topic agreement between the leaders at the Bonn Summit on the need for, and creation of, a common global response to illegal narcotics (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.201). Indeed, this demonstration of global leadership on the subject was a clear indication of what Putnam and Bayne (1987) categorised as the *stimulation* and *direction* power of the G7 in shaping a global issue that had both been outside the previous purview of the Summits and had largely been the responsibility of individual states. This growth in scope of the G7's remit in managing global issues demonstrated not only the perceived responsibility of the G7 leaders to manage these non-economic issues it also indicated that by acting as the stimulant in coordinating a global response the G7 was establishing its own legitimacy in doing so.

In turn, when the 1986 Tokyo Summit came only a week after the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine, this again demonstrated the flexibility and determination of the G7 in responding to international crises (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.213). The G7's response to the nuclear disaster underlined the growing commonality of purpose that the leaders shared in producing an *endorsing* statement of the importance of the Soviet Union in co-operating with the IAEA, rather than falling back on simpler forms of condemnatory statements that had shaped much of the Cold War. The collective actions of the G7 in response to this disaster were representative of those of a Concert of Great Powers acting in a situation in which there was no clearly defined good response to such a crisis, but they nonetheless felt it was their *responsibility* to attempt to manage the international consequences. It is, however, clear that this coordinated response was also a way for the leaders to manage difficult domestic considerations with many G7 states heavily reliant upon nuclear energy (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.214), yet the G7 acted in such a way as to underline at least a perception of legitimacy in them coordinating the 'West's' response to the disaster.

The Bonn and Tokyo Summits were also indicative of a growing cohesiveness in the G7's representation of Western responses to state-backed terrorism from rogue international states such as Libya (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.214). Whilst political differences continued to underpin some of the interpersonal relationships between the leaders, the common purpose developing between the leaders as holding a responsibility in responding to international security threats was growing (Gstöhl, 2007, p.21-25). However, the covert political and military actions of President Reagan regarding arms sales to Iran, and the subsequent misleading of fellow G7 leaders (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.256-7) represented a clear breach of the trust established at the Summits and represented another example of how the reliance upon interpersonal relationships in a framework for managing international order has potentially weak foundations for both legitimacy and effectiveness.

The Toronto Summit in 1988 stands out from the previous Summits in this cycle in its initiation of discussions on debt relief for low-income countries that would frame the narrative of many of the following Summits (Bayne, 2000) right up until the culmination of a key policy delivery at Gleneagles in 2005. This is an important point, and agenda issue, to highlight in the evolution of the G7's legitimacy in world politics. The perception of responsibility in managing international economic order had now shifted towards the rising contestation of the hegemonic dominance of Western economic systems that promulgated an institutionalised framework of economic loans, debt, and poverty in low income, and largely post-colonial, states (see Rodrik, 2012). The shifting sands of economic legitimacy

in world politics meant that the G7 began to respond in kind to be seen preserve and protect its role as the responsible management forum at the apex of world politics. In essence, Toronto was the first indication that the G7 would be taking on a new mantle of responsibility in terms of economic justice and global inequality.

Much of this shift, however, was to be overshadowed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (Bayne, 2000, p.60; Meyer, 2010; Westad, 2018; Spohr, 2019). This meant that when the new Summit cycle began in Paris in 1989 it was a very different beast to that which had come before. The previous group of leaders that had been in domestic political office for a significant period were to be replaced with new leaders of varying political and ideological positions. In the US George H. W. Bush replaced Ronald Reagan, followed later by Bill Clinton. Margaret Thatcher was replaced by John Major in the UK. Japan went through a period of political instability that saw a series of changing Prime Ministers whilst upheaval continued to permeate through Italian politics (Bayne, 2000, p.59).

This is an important point to re-highlight here because the inherent challenge posed to such an informal forum of political leaders is how to sustain, or re-establish, the interpersonal bonding process when leaders change.[175] Overcoming these initial personal barriers at the 1989 Summit the leaders found themselves forming a unified position on debt relief that was anathema to the internal policies of the IMF at the time, a position that would ultimately underpin the IMF's reversal on debt relief later that year (Bayne, 2000, p.64; Spohr, 2019, p.93). The emerging role of the G7 during this period then was one in which the leaders saw it as their responsibility to not only work through formal international institutions, but also to shape the *reform* of said institutions. This was a significant shift in both the remit of the G7 but also the perception of the G7's legitimacy in world politics. In other words, these formal international institutions now began to acquiesce to the G7's legitimacy in initiating such reforms.[176]

In a similar linkage to the emerging role of the G7, the opening of Eastern Europe that came late to the agenda of the Paris Summit nonetheless saw the G7 leaders endorsing the formation of the 'Group of 24' OECD countries to coordinate support (Bayne, 2000, p.67; Morin et al, 2019, p.271) to the states emerging from behind the Iron Curtain (Bayne, 2005, p.27; Spohr, 2019, p.95). Again, this indicates the importance of the G7's role in working *through* pre-existing international structures such as the OECD, yet also *going around* the pre-existing format that the G7 leaders felt was incompatible with the needs and requirements for maintaining international order and preventing further disorder in Europe.

[175] Wheeler uses a particularly relevant example in his unpacking of the trust-based relationship between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, which has already widely underpinned a significant amount of literature on the subject. However, Wheeler (2018) also uses this pre-existing trust/bonding between leaders to highlight the initial *absence* of trust between Gorbachev and George W. H. Bush when Reagan left office and the latter became President (Wheeler, 2018, p.14). Meyer (2009) and Rofe (2016) also highlight similar issues yet there is no systematic development on how these issues are overcome as democratic leaders change regularly.

[176] The 1994 Naples Summit was the first of several Summits in this cycle to directly engage with the issue of international institutional reform (Hajnal, 1999, p.60; Bayne, 2000, p.118) indicating that the evolution of the G7 during this period was going beyond simply *endorsing* or *stimulating* international action (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.158-9). Instead, the G7 was evolving into taking the lead in both directing *and reforming* (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.159) the structures of global governance that were formally meant to manage international order.

The Paris Summit also saw the leaders drill further down into tackling the growing international illegal drug problem with the creation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as separate from, but intimately linked to, the role and importance the G7 placed upon tackling the financial aspects of transnational threats (Gstöhl, 2007, p.25; Lesage, 2007, p.113). Again, the 1989 Summit saw the G7 working both *through* and *around* the pre-existing international regulatory institutions, taking on a distinctly powerful leadership position in world politics that saw the leaders continue to coalesce around their shared responsibility in maintaining international order.

The example of the creation of FATF is of particular relevance to the historical analogies drawn out in the work of Yao (2019, p.352) and the creation of the Danube Commission. Both are examples of 'Great Powers' exerting control over the creation of an international organisation that exerts *international* authority over key issues that do not directly, or at least geographically, relate to their positions in the world. The G7 was exerting its 'Great Power' responsibility in the same shape and form that past historical 'Great Power' creations exerted control through the purported maintenance of international order.[177]

The following year at the 1990 Houston Summit the widespread effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union were to dominate the response of the G7 leaders as they sought to inculcate the newly emergent Eastern European states into democratic entities with free market economies that would fit into the pre-existing Western-based 'community' of states (Mayall, 2016).[178] In essence, the G7 leaders were attempting to manage the emergence of former Soviet-bloc states in such a way as to not undermine the pre-existing framework of *Western* international order.

However, the Houston Summit was overshadowed by the continued disagreement, and refusal from the American side, to actively contemplate economic support to the collapsing Soviet Union (Spohr, 2019, p.302). Once again domestic political issues, in the shape of embarrassment over the spectre of raising taxes for George H. W. Bush (Spohr, 2019, p.303), put-a-hold on the ability of the G7 leaders to effectively manage the impending political and economic crisis flowing from the break-up of the Soviet Union (D'Anieri, 2019, p.261; Spohr, 2019, p.304-305).

Where the G7 did take-action was in its agreement to commission an investigatory report into the Soviet economic situation led by the IMF, World Bank and the OECD (Spohr, 2019, p.429). In effect, demonstrating once again that whilst the G7 may not always find a cohesive response in acting to *directly* solve all international problems, they nevertheless exert both an instructional and agenda setting power *through* the formal international institutions over which they ostensibly hold no legal sway. This hegemonic Western control of the international economic and political agenda (Watson, 2007), following the fall of the only contemporary global challenge to Western norms and values, placed the G7 in a unique position as a form of Concert of Great Powers that had not only 'won' the struggle against the opposing ideology, but were now at the vanguard[179] of shaping the end of history

[177] The FATF would also go on to have an increasingly important role in the post-9/11 sphere of monitoring international financial transactions (see OECD, 2004).

[178] In many ways this was successfully achieved with the majority of former Soviet-bloc Communist states becoming members of the IMF and World Bank, with many also joining the GATT (Bayne, 2000, p.81).

[179] Whereas Buzan (2005a, p.237) uses the term 'vanguard' to represent 'the West' in a general sense I am using it with a specific focus on the G7 and the shared norms and perceived responsibilities that the G7 states and leaders hold.

and the emergent community of liberal economic and democratic states that dominated world politics (Fukuyama, 2012; Mayall, 2016).

At the Houston Summit the leaders were also split in their response to what some perceived to be a rising threat to these Western norms and values from China. In the case of the US and Japan, the agreement to maintain US sanctions, whilst also acquiescing to Japanese loans to China, was, in effect, the cause of a moral and political split between the European member states and the others (Spohr, 2019, p.561-562). Nevertheless, what was codified in the G7's coordinated response to international events was the unfaltering sense that the pre-existing political order had not only fundamentally changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but that it was the G7's *responsibility* as the dominant 'Great Powers' to *manage* the impact of rising economic powers such as China upon the pre-existing Western international order.

The ramifications of these changes in world politics continued to resonate at both the 1991 London and 1992 Munich Summits where the G7 leaders attempted to respond to the unfolding military and humanitarian crises of the Gulf, and the fall of Yugoslavia respectively (Bayne, 2000, p.60). In fact, it was the London Summit that created a fundamental shift in the format of the G7 through the invitation to attend as a non-member state to Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev (Prodi, 2016, p.7; Spohr, 2019, p.431; Plokhy, 2022, p.11). This was not, though, a reshaping of the 'Great Power' membership club of the G7, rather, it was part of a coordinated pattern of political effort in managing the economic support plan of aid towards the Soviet Union (Plokhy, 2022) and therefore managing the *disorder* that the collapse of the Soviet Union was bringing to world politics.

The fall of Yugoslavia, and the wider regional impact this had, featured heavily at the 1992 Munich Summits deliberations, whilst the 1991 London Summit was, in effect, a demonstration of the continued coalition of the willing in responding to the fallout from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the first Gulf War (Wheeler and Morris, 1996, p.145; Bayne, 2000). This is an important point to highlight at this stage of the G7's evolutionary role in managing international order. Whilst the Japanese were not part of the NATO or the CSCE deliberations surrounding both Yugoslavia and the Gulf, the inclusion of these issues at the G7 Summits (Bayne, 2000, p.60; Morin et al, 2019, p.271) brought the only traditionally 'non-Western' member state firmly within the collaborative and decision-making structures of Western oriented military and security norms and values. The combined effort of the G7 leaders to also present a unified political and military front to the demands of an emergent Russia over the contestation of territory with Japan also cemented the cohesive political nature of the G7 in the post-Cold War era (Spohr, 2019, p.547).[180]

Yet, this political cohesiveness still contained divisions. At the London Summit the French and the Germans were in support of providing substantial economic assistance to Gorbachev, beyond the already significant degree of bilateral aid that some European states had been providing; while the US and other G7 states rejected the Soviet appeals for aid without clear and defined political and economic reforms going alongside any support package (Spohr, 2019, p.433). Put simply, aid without economic reform that embraced the liberal norms and values of the G7 was anathema to a now globalised Western economic agenda that had emerged in the 1980s and now become the dominant

[180] It is also important to note that Japan's inclusion in the G7 at its formation in the 1970s was also an early recognition that the G7 was not merely defined by an Atlantic oriented set of states, but by a commitment to liberal norms and values (Banyan, 2022, p.51).

and 'legitimate' framework of world politics. What is clear from this period is that the G7 now saw themselves as responsible for managing the disorder posed by these international events (Bayne, 2000, p.70), and further saw this remit of responsibility extending to regional conflicts and civil wars, as well as rising powers and collapsing powers. In other words, the G7 *were* the legitimate Great Powers who held the responsibility for managing this *global* transition to a Western liberal international order.

Ultimately though, this financial aid to Gorbachev, and later Yeltsin (who attended the 1992 Summit), was slow in coming, and largely insufficient to deal with the economic problems facing a new Russia emerging onto the world stage (Service, 2003, p.496; Spohr, 2019, p.547). This would have serious long-term consequences for the accommodation of Russia into the same societal norms and values held by the other G7 member states (Tsygankov, 2010; Menon and Rumer, 2015, p.161-162; Spohr, 2019, p.447-448; also see Chapters 5 and 6).

The 1993 Tokyo Summit continued to see a myriad of political initiatives being used by the G7 to set the agenda both on international and domestic affairs in their preferred direction. In Tokyo the leaders provided the political impetus to overcome the final hurdles of the ongoing Uruguay GATT negotiations, assisting in the completion of the agreement in 1993[181] (Bayne, 2000; Carin and Smith, 2005; McKenzie, 2020). However, the Tokyo Summit, and the 1994 Naples Summit also saw the G7 member states and leaders take direct political action in both underwriting continued international support for the troubled Russian Federation, but also in inviting Russia as a participant in the Summits rather than simply as an observer status (Prodi, 2016, p.7), in essence the beginnings of an expansion of the membership club of this Great Power group.

However, individual G7 leaders still had a clear hesitation regarding Russia's actual standing within the Group, particularly on how far the Russian's had actually come in embracing the G7's norms and values (Tsygankov, 2010, p,.67-68).[182] Yet, the G7 leaders were determined to also support the emerging Russian state from a chaotic period and to avoid a resurgence in a Communist ideology amongst the political elite in Russia (Burns, 2019, p.93) that may threaten the dominance of the Western liberal international order in the future. This was, then, the G7 acting as a *pre-emptive* defence of any future challenge to the now dominant Western norms and values that it represented.

This evolutionary role of the G7 at the vanguard of Western norms and values is important to understand in the context of the new issues that the G7 began to tackle over the next Summits. In particular, the emerging ethos from the London Summit in 1991, and backed by British Prime Minister John Major's call for a streamlining of the Summit process (Hajnal, 1999, p.7; Bayne, 2000, p.115),[183] was a reassertion of the G7's perceived need to go back-to-basics by focusing on its core values (Ikenberry, 1993, p.134-135). The 1994 Naples Summit, therefore, marks a key point as it is the first Summit to openly engage with the concept, and implications, of globalisation (Bayne, 2000, p.113; see

[181] The Uruguay round negotiations also saw the GATT transform itself into the WTO (Carin and Smith, 2005; Rodrik, 2012; McKenzie, 2020).

[182] As Payne (2010, p.738) points out, Russian's accession to the G7 undermined the idea that the group was based around a set of shared liberal norms and values, further reinforcing the idea that it was simply an elitist club (see Chapter 6 for when this changed).

[183] This call for a streamlining of the Summit process and shorter communiqués was a repetition of that rejection of the institutionalisation of the G-Summits that had also occurred in the early 1980s.

Chapter 3) and the role that the G7 perceived itself to play in effectively managing the challenges posed by this process.

The importance of a growing economic interconnectedness, and the role of emerging technology in shaping the world combined with a change in the leaders that indicated a political shift to a more centre-left interventionist position in managing international order (Bayne, 2000). In turn, the direct attempts at the management of international crises by the G7 began to take on an increasingly dominant position in the discussions and statements of the G7. From Bosnia and Chechnya at the 1995 Halifax Summit, to international terrorist attacks on US military targets in the Gulf at the 1996 Lyon Summit (Bayne, 2000, p.115; Gstöhl, 2007, p.27), the range and nature of international events that the G7 leaders decided required their engagement, particularly in security matters, grew exponentially during this period of summitry (Engelbrekt, 2015, p.538).

What is of particular importance for this Summit series is that this period between the 1994 Naples and 1997 Denver Summits also spawned a series of working group ministerial level Summits under the directive of the G7. Those topics which the G7 leaders felt required further deliberation or engagement with that were beyond the limited time period of the leaders' Summit, were to be followed up ministerial meetings which were, at times, contradictory of pre-existing international organisational and institutional remits (Hajnal, 1999; Bayne, 2000, p.115). Thus, although the G7 Summits themselves did not necessarily provide clear policy actions on many topics during this end period of the Summit cycle, the follow up ministerial Summits began to gain increasing traction in terms of delivering concrete international action (Bayne, 2000, p.116) and began to influence those who increasingly saw the G7 as taking a legitimate role at the pinnacle of global governance structures (Kirton and Daniels, 1999).

The expanding scope and remit of the G7 on global issues during this period reinforces the point that the G7 leaders increasingly saw these issues to be *their responsibility* to manage. Threats to the now dominant Western balance of power in world politics were to fall under the remit of the G7 and the interpersonal deliberations of the leaders themselves. If these issues were of a complexity that required further deliberation, or a compromise political position could not be reached between the leaders, then this was assigned to the growing remit of ministerial level Summit meetings. In sum, the G7 leaders saw it as their responsibility to not only manage international order, but to also act to maintain their dominance of the new post-Cold War balance of power in world politics.

It was the 1995 Halifax Summit that signalled a challenge to this responsibility when the impact of the 1994 Mexican financial crisis on regional and international financial institutions demonstrated the need for reform of the pre-existing international institutional structures (the IMF and the WB) that both the G7 and Western states had used to maintain economic dominance (Bayne, 2000, p.121). While these reforms built upon an already established movement towards reform (Hajnal, 1999, p.45-53; Bayne, 2000, p.122), it was, nonetheless, the weight and influence of the G7 member states in presenting a united front on the need for reform that was ultimately vital in shifting the balance of thinking internationally.

The G7 recognised that the legitimacy of not only these international institutions, but also of Western economic norms and values, relied upon the perceived effectiveness of these institutions to respond to international crises. The G7 was demonstrating that it understood that the foundations of

international legitimacy and hierarchical power lay in reform and revision of ineffective international institutions and the effectiveness of international responses to global disorder. More importantly for the conclusion of this chapter, and reflective of 'Old School' notions of Great Power management of international order, the G7 saw itself as responsible for this reforming remit. The next chapter goes on to explore how this perception of responsibility is also underpinned by a shared set of norms and values that seemingly sets the G7 apart from the diversity of world politics.

Chapter 5 – International Society

'One of the themes of the present time…is the clash between the preoccupation of the rich industrial states with order (or rather with a form of order that embodies their preferred values) and the preoccupation of poor and non-industrial states with just change. (Bull, 2002a, p.xxxiii)

Hedley Bull (2002a, p.13) defined international society as existing 'when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions'. This definition has continued to frame many of the debates within the ES, not least over the pluralist/solidarist division between differing forms of international society (see Wheeler, 2000; Jackson, 2003; Buzan, 2005a; Linklater and Suganami, 2006; Williams, 2015).

For Bull (2002a), the idea of any conception of such a club of states was inherently contested, and contestable, therefore any movement towards a universal conception of said club covering the entirety of world politics would be difficult to conceptualise. As such, the either/or debate that Buzan (2014a, p.16) argues is essentially nonsensical means that this chapter pushes past this dichotomy and instead develops further Knudsen's (2019b, p.180) ideas surrounding the push-pull nature of the competitive side of the relationship between solidarist and pluralist principles.

In doing so this chapter accepts the challenge posed by Linklater and Suganami (2006, p.114-115) that the next generation of ES scholars need to engage with more detailed studies of the evolution of social relations between states, and builds further on the foundations laid down by Buzan and Schouenborg (2018, p.30-32), which argue there is the conceptual possibility of a plethora of regional and sub-global forms of international society existing alongside a global international society. As such, this chapter shines a light on the sub-global, yet global in reach, evolution of the G7 and the evolution of its shared norms and interests in the face of global contestation.

The use of the G7 as the continuing case study, however, goes further than either of these ES arguments by providing a unique example of where this contestation, and 'co-habitation', occurs in an *informal* setting in world politics. This is important because Knudsen's (2019b) analysis so far only engages with the formal international organisations and institutions that have a legal aspect of restraint, or coercion, to them.[184] This chapter therefore explores how the G7, a group of states that held certain norms and principles that could be described as more solidarist in nature (see Chapter 6 for further expansion on this), responded, and was forced to respond, when confronted with the challenge of rising economic and political powers in world politics and the need to co-opt these powers that hold differing norms and values into the emergent G20.

This chapter is broken down into three sections. Section 1 provides an overview of the broader context outside of the G7 and the economically and politically powerful states that were not part of the G7 'club'. It engages with the issues of multipolarity, and Acharya's (2017) 'multiplex' model for understanding this international diversity. It sets the scene for the contestation by these emergent

[184] See Knudsen (2019b, p.191) on the use of international law to enforce solidarist norms through the ICC.

powers and their attendant groupings, such as the BRICS and the G20, in how they have shaped the G7's role in world politics. Section 2 then explores the work of the 'Old School' scholars on the primacy of shared norms over interests in shaping the foundations of the concept of international society. Section 3 then combines these points of analysis and uses them to unpack the idea of 'co-habiting' forms of international society through the lens of the evolution of the G7 in its fourth and fifth summit cycles (1996-2010).

5.1 Multipolarity and the 'rise' of 'the rest'?

As we have seen from the previous chapter, the Cold War dominated much of the geopolitical thinking during this period of the G7's growing ascendancy, but it was also a period which intimately shaped non-Western, or 'third world', states economic growth and political stability (Hurrell, 2013, p.205-206). The end of the Cold War and the transformation of economic and political outlooks of many 'emerging' (Hurrell, 2013, p.209) economies meant that traditional terminology began to be challenged as many of these 'third world' states became regarded as 'rising powers' that had the potential to threaten the status quo balance of power in world politics (see Gaskarth, 2015; 2017. p.288), or a contestation of the secondary institutions and their representative nature (Newman and Zala, 2018, p.972).

This shift away from the dominance of the West in international politics has been described by Buzan and Falkner (2022a, p.18) as a move towards 'deep pluralism' with the delegitimization of Western cultural, political, and economic dominance. The emergence of the BRICS group has underpinned claims that these increasingly powerful states may one day rival the shared economic power of the G7 (Pant, 2015, p.92) and have the potential to be a unified voice of multilateralism (Nayyar, 2016, p.587). The BRICS have demonstrated a willingness to go against the grain of the pre-existing rules and interests of the liberal international economic order (Biren Nanda, 2014, p.5-7; Sornarajah, 2014), as well as challenging the Western-led approach of leading economic states financing the threat from climate change through multilateral bodies such as the G20 (Thirlwell, 2014, p,248).[185] Yet despite an early regularity of meetings between the BRICS and the development of an alternative political narrative (Thirlwell, 2014, p.242-243; Sarkar, 2017, p.128), as well as the establishment of separate international financial institutions, such as the New Development Bank (NDB)[186] (Cooper, 2017; Acharya et al, 2019, p.72; Chaguan, 2023, p.54), the BRICS have not yet formed a coherent alternative form of multilateralism that is more representative of a challenge to the elitist nature of the status quo international order (Thakur, 2014; Thirlwell, 2014, p.243; Sarkar, 2017, p.129). There is, however, no doubt that these rising economic powers pose a challenge to the pre-existing international order and have forced the previously dominate Western-led framework of global governance structures to respond to this challenge (Laïdi, 2011; Hurrell, 2012, p.217; Hopewell, 2017, p.1378-1379).

[185] See Gaskarth (2017, p.288) on variations of these powers challenging Western approaches to climate change and trade in differing global endeavours.

[186] It is important to note that there are significant differences in scale between established lending institutions and the NDB. The NDB's total lending since 2015 is only a third of that which the WB lent in 2021 alone, while the voting rights distribution in the NDB is as similarly uneven as the IMF and WB that it purportedly challenges (Economist, 2023f, p.56).

In particular, the fallout of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has provided both the opportunity, and the expectation, that the BRICS would become the driving force of the global economy (Beausang, 2012, p.68; Käkönen, 2014, p.86). Nonetheless, groupings such as the BRICS have only made small steps in terms of collective policy development (Buzan and Falkner, 2022a, p.21),[187] with the NDB not yet achieving much under competition from its Chinese driven competitor the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Beeson and Zeng, 2018, p.1967). At the same time the previous pace of economic development amongst this group of rising powers has stalled impinging upon their ability to shape and influence global order (Pant, 2013, p.96-97; Acharya, 2017, p.275). Perhaps more importantly for this Chapter though is the fact that even labels assigned to groups of states such as the BRICS are exactly that, labels *assigned*.[188] In other words, these labels have been used to describe disparate groups of states who share very different political, economic, and military interests and who, at times, are in direct conflict with the interests of each other on the international stage (Beausang, 2012, p.92-93; Conley Tyler and Thomas, 2014, p.259-260; Acharya, 2017, p.275; Verma and Papa, 2021, p.511-512; Curtis and Grossman, 2023).[189]

However, Newman and Zala (2018, p.881-882) correctly identify the not insignificant uptick in collaborative action between the BRICS since their first official summit in 2009 (Cooper, 2017, p.275). Yet, what the BRICS group does demonstrate is that cohesiveness, or the development of shared norms, is not a quick nor simple process. The integration of shared interests only goes so far in providing the normative glue that binds states together in shared norms and values. Instead, as Acharya (2017, p.277) argues, there is a 'multiplex' of different sets of norms and values held, and shared, by states in contemporary world politics that provides not only the opportunity for the development of these shared norms, but also the contestation of them and the option of there being *alternative* norms that states can coalesce around (Chaguan, 2023, p.54). These alternative norms, based around more complex elements of trade and production that interconnect states in a quasi-symbiotic relationship are for some scholars the basis upon which the contemporary world is built, differentiating this 'multiplex' framework from past historical time periods (Acharya et al, 2019, p.70-71).[190]

However, as Thirlwell (2014, p.243) points out, groupings such as the BRICS have far less in common than the G7, beyond the wish to challenge the status quo (Tallberg and Verhaegen, 2020, p.117). This is reinforced by Conley Tyler and Thomas (2014, p.259-262) who argue that beyond certain economic issues, such as the reform of pre-existing international institutions (Newman and Zala, 2018, p.877-878; Acharya et al, 2019, p.71), the BRICS have little common purpose politically or culturally (Käkönen, 2014, p.91) beyond the group's competition with the Western dominated G7 (Cotterill, 2023, p.8). This means the format is one of economic dialogue focused on trade (see also Khalid, 2014, p.186)

[187] The recent expansion of the membership of the group has not led to a more cohesive shared position on most global issues (O'Neill, 2023).

[188] The term BRICS, for example, was the creation of Goldman Sachs investment banker Lord Jim O'Neill (O'Neill, 2001; Thirlwell, 2014, p.242; KCL, 2023; also see Pant, 2013, p.103).

[189] This is of particular importance for the distinctive differences of the G7 and the BRICS for as Bell (1977b, p.25; White, 2014, p.122-123) notes, a concert of powers has to come from deliberate diplomatic construction in order to underpin the shared duty, or responsibility, in avoiding global disorder (which Bell saw as hegemonic war), not simply shared interests.

[190] Bell also saw the importance of understanding that world politics had changed into a multipolar order (O'Neill, 2014, p.40-41).

rather than one of shared economic, diplomatic, or political values (Thakur, 2014, p.1792) that have the potential to trump domestic issues.[191]

While Hiscock and Io Lo (2014, p.310) argue that the BRICS resemble the early years of the emergence of ASEAN, the BRICS still lack the mutual, or collective, interest in coalescing around shared norms and values for geographical, political, and economic protection (Beausang, 2012, p.96; Pant, 2013, p.95; Beeson and Zeng, 2018, p.1963). The existence of difference does not imply an inability to coalesce around shared norms and values (Newman and Zala, 2018, p.881), yet as Chapter 6 makes clear, recent events led by a key BRICS state have fundamentally challenged the meaning and cohesiveness of past declarations of shared principles such as inviolable sovereignty and interdependence. This means that it is important to understand that conflicting ideological positions also shape the differences between a heterogeneous grouping of states that is increasing the diversity of its membership (Cotterill, 2023, p.8). But the group still remains dominated by a single state that does not necessarily share the same values as other member states, ie: China (Economist, 2023f, p.54-56; Kynge, 2023, p.21); nor with that of a more cohesively ideological group, dominated by a single state, ie: the US, that shares an ideological position on the importance of Western liberal norms and values.[192]

The challenge to the status quo posed by these rising powers led to calls for not just the reform of the G7, but to its inevitable eclipse in a short period of time (Fues, 2007; Lesage, 2007a; 2007b; Payne, 2008, p.528; Baker, 2010, p.647). The subsequent rise of the G20 following the GFC also indicated to many that time and responsibility had begun to pass the G7 by as the G20 represented a more diverse and potentially more effective format for resolving intractable global issues (Payne, 2010, p.729; Van de Graaf and Westphal, 2011).[193] Yet, as Chin (2010, p.693) makes clear, even in the early years of the G20 there were already signs of disfunction emerging in this new group around being able to make coordinated decisions, albeit with evidence that the G7 states *within* the G20 were still reluctant to release their hold on the G-Summitry process, while powerful states such as China were also opposed to US led actions in the group (Kahler, 2013, p.714).[194] Similarly, as Cooper and Pouliot (2015) identify, the G20 still contains the same exclusionary practices that have underpinned much of the criticism of the G7 itself.

However, this shift to a multipolar world *has* threatened the central role that the G7 had found itself playing for thirty years (Lesage, 2007, p.114). It is this role, in attempting to export a singular belief system around the international political economy that Baker (2000, p.177-182) has identified as being an important aspect of the G7's influence in world politics. This 'fourth-dimensional diplomacy' (Baker, 2000, p.177) is similarly representative of the promulgation of a set of standards of civilisation remnant of past Western imperial practices in coercing and enforcing the expected norms and values of an integrated global economy and the attendant imbalance in global power this results in, which, in turn, has led to the contestation of these hegemonic norms and values by emerging powers.

[191] See Thakur, 2014, p.1792; Beeson and Zeng, 2018, p.1965. Also see Sections 3.3, 4.3, and 6.3 on the differences between this position and the choices made by the G7 to prioritise shared positions, albeit not always consistently.

[192] Pella (2013, p.76) highlights the important role that ideology can and should play in an ES understanding of change in world politics.

[193] See Cooper (2011) on the lack of regional diversity in the G20.

[194] See Knaack and Katada (2013) on the G20 discovering the same problems that the G7 has encountered in the past on issue proliferation watering down effectiveness. Also see Baker (2006, p.250) on the US's prominence, although not dominance, within the G7.

What has been less well explored is how the relationship *between* the G7 and the G20 has shaped the reproduction and creation of shared norms (Dobson, 2012, p.236).[195] By using an ES framework of analysis we can see that for many non-Great Powers the concern lays primarily with influencing and gaining entry to the high-table of Great Power politics in order to protect and preserve their own interests and security.[196] Even Vincent (1999, p.131), who became one of the leading ES proponents of advocating for international justice and normative progress, supports Bull's (2002a) starting point of analysis for world politics as beginning with an understanding how the structures that protect and preserve the social and economic rights of states are managed. It was these hard-won rights that were the bedrock of the protections and legitimacy of the relations between states that many post-colonial states advocated for in order to defend against incursions upon their sovereignty in the name of international justice or the preservation of international order (Jackson, 1989; 1996),[197] only to find themselves on the receiving end of a profound shift in the normative discourse following the end of the Cold War (Wheeler, 2000; Jackson, 2003).

What this means is that the idea of the 'rise' of other non-Western powers does not inherently mean that this is a challenge to the foundations of world politics. Rather, that this contestation (Slaughter, 2013b) in a multiplex world (Acharya, 2017), and the relationship between the G7 and the 'rise of the rest' in the form of the G20, can take the form of contestation over norms and values, rather than an interest in fundamentally changing the nature of a hegemonic system whereby the dominant table of power politics now contains more seats. Understanding how these competing sets of norms and values function, and 'co-habit' within a complex world politics is important in helping us understand the changing nature of the role of the G7 during its fourth and fifth cycles.[198]

5.2 Shared norms or common interests?

Paraphrasing both Bull (Bull, 2000a, p.184; 2002a) and Wendt (1992), the social construction of the relations between states means that if states wish to shape a form of international society between themselves based upon common interests and norms they will do so. That this formation of a shared set of common interests does not necessarily translate into shared cultural values does not matter. The moral values of states, and leaders, are both flexible and dependent on the context in world politics. Even Martin Wight's (1960a, p.45) own rather esoteric argument that when interactions between states are involved in violence then international law becomes preeminent, yet when cooperation is the mantra of the day then international law crawls in the mud of positivism underlines the point that states *do* accept a societal relationship between themselves and other states that is *not* based simply upon shared norms, but upon the vested interests in continuing this societal association (Wendt, 1992, p.413).

[195] Also see Suzuki (2008).
[196] For a wider debate on this idea see Northedge, 1973; Franck, 1990, p.116; Clark, 1993, p.47; Miller, 2003c, p.80; Naylor, 2019b. Also see Acharya (2017) and Dunne (2010) on the idea that rising powers may uphold elements of the liberal international order.
[197] See Getachew (2019, p.16-17) for a challenge to this argument.
[198] In fact, this point was recognised even in the early days of the G7 with President Giscard d'Estaing referring to the importance of Saudi Arabia and OPEC states in dominating oil production in his reflection on the need for the G7 states to reach out through a North-South dialogue (Economist, 1983, p.26).

This is of particular importance here because the 'Old School' scholars recognised that international society was a fluid concept that was not only open to conceptual change, but more specifically *evolved* over time. International society does not, therefore, exist as a static framework of analysis, rather it changes as the perceptions and ideas held by states and state actors surrounding its existence are changed and influenced by international actors and events. In essence, this remains the premise of the thinking of both Martin Wight (1966a; 1991) and Adam Watson (2007) who argued that the key question regarding international society was *how far* it extends in world politics, not whether it was universal in the sense of either/or. Thus, Wight (1977; 1991), like Watson (2007; 2009) saw international society as based upon historical precedent in that the social relations between states and state actors are predicated upon and shaped by historical events and historical relations which underpin the *evolutionary* nature of international society.

This is important because these ideas preceded the work of Buzan and Schouenborg (2018, p.39-40) with the demonstration of historical forms, or examples, of smaller and more cohesive forms of international society that had not been global in nature, but nevertheless also recognised the existence of other forms of international society that *did not* share the same common set of values and norms that formed their own society of states (Wight, 1966a; 1977; Little, 2000; Watson, 2007; 2009). This understanding of the historical nature of world politics, stretching back further than perhaps is the focus of much of the recent ES work (see Buzan and Lawson, 2015b; Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018), establishes that the 'Old School' thinking on the concept of international society demonstrates that these forms of past international society that have been sub-global in nature have co-habited with other forms of international society that have had a diversity of cultural and normative values.

For example, the idea that *both* solidarist *and* pluralistic forms of international society can exist in tandem within the international system (Hurrell, 2009, p.9) and have an interconnected relationship between themselves is supported by Wight's (1977, p.46-109) analysis of the Greek/Persian version of states systems which was predicated upon the inside/outside division between the differing forms. These 'co-habiting' examples of international society are therefore overlapping, and indeed interrelating, parts of a wider 'world' politics.[199] But perhaps more importantly they existed within a framework of relations that meant, *ala* Wight's (1977) Greco/Persian divide, that they shape and influence the relations not only between themselves but also between themselves and the wider gamut of states/peoples in the international system, at times competing in the spread and defence of shared norms and values.

Importantly, then, Wight's argument further indicates (1977), much as the authors in *The Expansion of International Society* (Bull and Watson, 1989) also establish, that there have existed forms of international society that were historically not universal, and indeed largely regional (Buzan, 1993), but which developed and evolved *alongside* different forms of international society that held different norms and values.[200] The concept of a 'global' or exclusionary form of international society was

[199] 'World' in the historical sense of the world the Greeks and Persians understood or knew of existing (Wight, 1977).

[200] Whilst Wight focused on the Greek/Persian/Greek settler community dynamic there have also been similar arguments made in respect of other examples of the interconnected and opposing forms of norms, cultures and interests in the ES's historical analysis. For a wider analysis of the influence and relationship between the Ottoman Empire and 'European' international society see debates in Mattingly, 1965; Gong, 1984; 1989; Naff, 1989; Jackson, 1996; 2003; Watson, 1987; 2004; 2007; 2009; Mayall, 2005; Inalcik, 2020. Additionally, for a

therefore a point of debate within the deliberations of the British Committee, and therefore amongst the 'Old School' scholars, during a period of significant change in world politics as the process of decolonisation challenged the status quo world order (Scipio, 1965; Watson, 1995; 2007; Vigezzi, 2005, p.66). The point of the debate was that this period of decolonisation demonstrated the inherent conceptual difficulty in maintaining a 'universalistic' base of normative, or Western, values in a clearly altered pluralistic world politics. In other words, the concept of a universal form of international society whereby states and state actors share similar norms and values in their interactions is based upon a rejection of a reality of world politics in which there continues to be an exclusionary form of relations that denotes which states are *in* and which are *outside* of *an* international society (Jackson, 1990; 1996).

The reality for Jackson (1990; 2003) was that the pluralistic nature of states and state actors means that there *are* some dominant states that shape what it means to hold responsibilities in international society and there *are* some states that are *excluded* from international society when they are deemed not to meet these qualifications. This, in turn, is reflective of the wider debates about European 'standards of civilisation' (Gong, 1984; Keene, 2002) and the promulgation of European norms and values as the foundations for world society. The concurrent rights and responsibilities that entail from this categorisation would imply that *all* member states of international society are equal in both the values they gain from being a member of said society, but also in the responsibilities they share in upholding said values.

This shared responsibility is not predicated upon the formalised role of holding a specific permanent seat within a certain organisational structure per se but is also based upon the common *perception* of a shared responsibility in shaping and maintaining international order (Bain, 2007a). This shared outlook on the management, and performance, of maintaining international order, held, for Wight (Wight, 1966a; 1973; Bull, 1976), a higher purpose in the sense that said shared outlook laid the foundations for not only the preservation of the rules and norms of world politics, but also the potential for the evolution of a specific form of international society *based* upon those shared norms and values. Thus, international society is not simply about sharing *common* values and norms, it is also about using those norms and values to create a protection for those states that are members of international society. Or more simply put, to preserve the international order that guarantees state sovereignty and the protection of state rights as they exist within the international system.

That this membership can be rescinded when the rules of the club are broken (Jackson, 1996, p,196), much as membership can be withheld when existing member states deem other states to not hold the same values or norms, remains the bedrock of solidarist debates within the field. Those states that are pre-existing members of a form of international society can and do act as the gatekeepers of not only membership, but also the protections, rules, and norms that membership affords states. This means that for Jackson (1996, p.198) if the criteria for membership of international society rested upon common moral values alone, then membership of international society would contain few if any states. Kwan (2016, p.364-365) makes a similar argument, using the case study of regional relations in Asia, underlining the important point of Bull's (2000a), that shared culture need not be the starting point of the formation of international society, rather, that shared interests of common norms of

wider discussion of the pre-existing interconnected relationships between China and the West see Gong, 1984; Zhang, 1991; 1998; 2017; Zarakol, 2011; 2022; Hansen, 2020.

practice and relations can be the building blocks upon which the common values, or even a common culture of interaction over these values, can then develop.[201]

This point of argument does not, however, inhibit the development and spread of forms of international society *based upon* shared cultural norms and values, such as human rights and the protection of the individual (Vincent, 1999; Wheeler, 2000). But the conceptual understanding of the evolutionary development of said forms of international society must continue to also recognise that these norms and values are *not held universally* but rather they exist and function *within* and are *contested* by a pluralist world politics (Jackson, 2003; Williams, 2015). As Buzan (2005a, p.48-49) notes, the plurality/solidarist divide can be seen as either a zero sum, either/or process, or a more nuanced spectrum along which rights and responsibilities are contested.

In fact, for Wheeler (1992), Hedley Bull had recognised, yet not fully solved, these inherent contradictions between states acting in their own self-interest and the upholding of the commonly held principles or norms of international society (Hoffman, 2003, p.29). What is interesting about Bull's (2002a) positioning, however, is that Bull believed that when such a conflict exists then states will abide by the commonly held rules and norms of international society, even in the face of contrasting national interests, but that there will always be exceptions to the rule and that sometimes states will breach said norms of international society (Wheeler, 1992, p.465; see Chapter 6 for the example of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its expulsion from the G8).

This, in turn, feeds directly into the conceptual basis of the *idea* of international society, and the institutions that form it, as a conception *in the minds* of statesmen and diplomats (Manning, 1962; Wilson, 1989, p.53; Buzan, 2005a, p.12; Linklater and Suganami, 2006, p.107). That is, and to paraphrase Manning (1962), if statesmen and diplomats *perceive* there to be an international society in which they work and interact, then the fact that international society *exists in their minds* is sufficient to make international society a reality of world politics (Wilson, 1989, p.53; Wheeler, 1992, p.466). Thus, the concept of international society as *only* being based upon shared cultural norms and values is *also the creation* of those who are the actors within the play, which in turn, is not far off the social reality that Bull (2002a; Wilson, 1989, p.53) recognised as forming international society. Put simply, it does not matter if international society is a social construction of those statesmen and diplomats who act on behalf of states in the international system. By *perceiving* it as such a reality because they share a common interest in forming and maintaining diplomatic relations said actors shape and act in world politics as if international society does exist, thereby creating *the reality* of international society (Wilson, 1989, p.53).

This is an important point to highlight here in a reflection on both the thesis's theoretical and methodological foundations, as well as that of the ES. The importance of an 'Old School' lens, as opposed to a the more social constructivist lens of some of the contemporary ES, is that the 'Old School' scholars recognised the importance of the historical influence such a social creation has upon future choices. Put simply, the 'Old School' thinking demonstrates the fallibility of social agency in escaping, or avoiding, the historical path dependency of social constructions on future actions and interactions. History does not repeat itself, but neither is history fully avoidable in world politics (see Chapter 2).

[201] Also see Phillips, 2017; Rae, 2017; Spruyt, 2017; Gong, 1984; Zhang, 1991; 2017; Suzuki, 2009; and Watson, 2009 for a wider historical discussion.

To paraphrase Michael Howard (1973 quoted in Vigezzi, 2005, p.102), it is not just that there is a shared culture nor a set of shared interests that is important, it is *the type* of shared culture, values and interests that underpins the nature of international society as a concept. In other words, the mutual or shared interests between statespeople that recognise the need and value in cooperation within world politics to achieve shared interests also holds the inherent potential for said same mutual interests to develop into a more established and permanent formation of shared legal and moral frameworks *if states wish it to* (Wendt, 1992; Bull, 2002a).[202]

In sum, for the 'Old School' there was a diversity of position on how and where common cultural norms shaped the evolution of international society. Yet, for some within this group the premise of shared interests as a *starting point* meant that there was the possibility that shared moral values could evolve over time. However, what the 'Old School' scholars could agree on is that the historical record provides examples of a diversity of forms of international society, many of which at the sub-global level co-existed and interacted to differing levels. This conceptual framework has latterly been developed by contemporary ES work, yet what the next section does is open this work up to the importance of informal groupings in world politics and how the evolution of interests and values has shaped the co-habiting relationship of differing forms of international society.

5.3 Informal Co-habitation and normative constraint: The G7 diversifies 1996-2010

The post-Cold War shift in international relations had indicated to some that a 'new world order' had appeared (Slaughter, 2004; Fukuyama, 2012). This shift, which also involved the breaching of the previously *de rigueur* premise of state-based sovereignty (Jackson, 1996; 2003) focused the debate within the ES around issues of justice and human rights (Wheeler, 2000). However, for Jackson (2003) and Watson (2007) this purported shift in universal moral principles continued to be predicated upon *Western* norms of international behaviour and morals, much of which was now only possible due to the hegemonic dominance of Western powers in the post-Cold War era of world politics (Spohr, 2019).

The 'co-habitation' concept developed in this Section argues that the relations between states of differing forms of international societies are more representative of Bull's (2002a) competing nature of norms and values that shape the relations between states. For example, much as the sharing of accommodation with other people shapes and constrains our ability to openly and freely act in any manner that suits our own norms and values, the co-habitation of differing forms of international society shapes and constrains the ability of each society to act freely within their regional/global sphere of relations, that is, contestation is inherent in *shaping* and *constraining* each society's norms, values, and interests (see Newman and Zala, 2018). Put more simply, if a solidarist international society co-habits with a pluralist international society within world politics then what impact does each international society, and the contestation between the differing norms and values, have upon the expansion, evolution, and development of the other.

[202] Also see Jackson (2003, p.114-115) on instrumental and non-instrumental aspects of self-interest or shared interests. Also see Bell (1971) on the evolution of conventions of interest even between parties on opposite sides of the value spectrum.

The focus, therefore, of this section is to enhance our theoretical understanding of the *possibilities* that a co-habiting framework of international societies provides to the foundational concept of international society itself. The fact that solidarist and pluralist international societies are not mutually exclusive has been explored in the literature before (Buzan, 2005a, p.45-62; 2014, p.16; Knudsen, 2019b, p.178). What this chapter seeks to do is explore this mutual relationship further from the position of what I term 'normative constraint'. That is, the idea that both solidarist and pluralist forms of international society in their co-habitation can act as restraining forces on the normative output of each other.

For example, a solidarist international society co-existing within a pluralist world politics, or co-habiting with a pluralist international society, means that the normative intent, outlook, and interests of said solidarist international society are challenged, restrained, and constrained *by* the pluralist international society's norms and values. Thus, any form of exertion of hegemonic norms and values of a solidarist framework would be contested and shaped in the global promotion and adoption of said norms by the pluralist norms and values of its co-habiting partner. Similarly, the more diverse pluralistic norms and values of an international society that co-habited with a solidarist international society would also be shaped, constrained, and moulded by the impact of the values of its partner international society.

There is an important distinction to make here between the traditional pluralist conception of norms and values envisaged by Jackson (2003) and the contemporary re-assessment of a value-based pluralism articulated by Williams (2015). A pluralist international society is not the *absence* of shared norms and values, it is simply a *different* set of norms and values. What Image 1 below therefore reflects then is that this overlapping and interrelated concept of co-habitation between international societies opens possible avenues of conceptual and theoretical development within the ES that have not fully been explored, such as the *value* in there being an element of 'normative constraint' present in the inherent contestation between pluralist and solidarist forms of international society.

Image 1 is an adapted version of Little's (2009b) model for visualising the potential relationship between system, society, and world society. However, what this visual, and conceptual, imagery of co-habitation also does is to include and adapt Wight's (1991) concentric circle model of relations between Christian states that are *inside* a historical form of international society based on European/Christian norms and values, and those states that are not Christian and therefore *outside* of international society. This inside/outside model of Wight's (1991) is, in turn, a rehashing of the natural law/positivist law debate (Bull, 1979c). By adding Wight's (1991) inside/outside conception to this reassessment we can also acknowledge the importance of Jackson's conceptual contribution (1996) which demonstrated the relational aspects of recognising that some states *do* sit inside and some outside international society. As a result, we can begin to unpack further the idea that it is not simply that states are inside and outside *a* form of international society, rather, they are inside and outside *certain* forms of international society. Being excluded from *a* form of international society does not necessarily imply, as per Wight's argument (1991), that a state is therefore *not* a member of international society.

Instead, this argument makes the point that a state may not be a member of say, a solidarist form of international society with the attendant culture, norms, and values of that solidarist society, but said state may in turn be a member of a pluralist form of international society that holds different norms and values that ascribe closer to those of the state. In fact, Little's (2002) critique of Buzan's (1993)

gemeinshaft and *gesellschaft* debate highlights the conceptual similarities between Buzan (1993; 2005a) and Wight's (1991) thinking, as well as the limits to both avenues of theoretical travel. Limits in the sense that both continue to demonstrate the problems associated with a lack of plurality of understanding regarding the dividing lines between an international system and an international society (Little, 2002). For Wight, these limits were predicated upon his understanding, and perceptions, of the role of religion in shaping the relations between states, whilst for Buzan (1993; 2005a) it is the focus on the ES adopting clear definitions that are repeatable or understandable by a more methodologically focused audience within the field of International Relations (see Section 6.1). Buzan does, however, posit his own version of conjoined 'Yin and Yang' elements of pluralism and solidarism (Buzan, 2014a, p.83-87) as integral to the debates within the ES.[203]

It is important for a secondary point of analysis here, that of the *exclusionary* principle itself, Wight's (1991) inside/outside model demonstrates how and why non-Christian states were apparently excluded from the European international society at the time. However, this principle of exclusion, as per Jackson (1996), is not a historical anachronism but still a key element of contemporary world politics. Whilst Wight (1977; 1991) saw those states that were *inside* international society as different from those that were *outside* and simply existed in an international system; Little (2002; 2009b) demonstrates that the barriers to entry this argument puts up are more malleable and elastic than first thought. In fact, Wight (1977; 1991) perceived there to be clear distinctions between society and system or a clear-cut process of socialisation or norm development that differentiated between the formation of an international society and the simpler formation of relations in an international system, a point also made by Neumann (2011).

However, this argument overlooks the developmental differences, and conceptual elasticity noted by Little (2002) that are available to the formation and evolution of international *societies* in the plural sense. In sum, Wight's (1977) historical examples denoted this conceptual grey area in the development of differing forms of international society, but his conceptual understanding of the importance of religion and religious culture in shaping the idea of international society as a concept also stymied his theoretical framing of the evolutionary possibilities of international society in practice.

As Image 1 demonstrates, the path from international society to world society does not merely flow through a singular form of international society, it must negotiate the *contested* waters of the *relationship* between solidarist and pluralist forms of international society. This visualisation more closely articulates the 'Old School' ideas that saw any movement towards a world society as being inherently contested and perhaps never achievable due to this contestation.

[203] See Zhang (2016, p.101).



Adapted from Little (2009) and Wight (1991)

Image 1

Importantly then, Jackson (1989; 1996) has pursued this idea of 'dualism' pioneered by Wight (1977; 1991) by pushing the boundaries of previous conceptions of sovereignty in the post-colonial period, demonstrating that dualism enables us to understand the development of international society through the lens of the colonisation of Africa and Asia by European powers in the latter stages of the 19th Century (Jackson, 1989, p.535; also see Bull and Watson, 1989; Dunne and Reus-Smit, 2017). In unpacking the impact of this colonial imperialism that has reinforced the concept an *inner* circle of European and European spin-off states (Jackson, 1989, p.535), as part of a universal international society, Jackson (1989; 1996) has demonstrated the inequality of relations in contemporary world politics.

What the process of decolonisation has historically demonstrated then is that the emergence of a plurality of states that *did not* share similar cultural or normative values as European/colonial powers constrained the ability of the previously dominant powers to hegemonically control the 'new' global norms and values. This is, in fact, the key principles of debate that challenged the thinking of the British

Committee (Watson, 1995; Vigezzi, 2005) during this period and called into question the universality of the concept of international society. The important point for this part of the thesis's argument however is that these 'Old School' debates highlighted the inevitable restraints that exist in the transformation of world politics towards a universal conceptual framework of norms and values. Co-habitation of both pluralistic and solidarist norms and values, represented by differing forms of international societies, therefore more closely represents a diverse world politics that lacks a unifying cultural, religious, or hegemonic power.

This normative constraint can be seen during the G7's evolution in this post-Cold War period. For example, the 1996 Lyon Summit saw the French President Jacques Chirac invite the heads of the IMF, WB, WTO, and the UN to meet the G7 leaders and issued a joint statement that reinforced not only these formal institutions semi-supplicant position in respect to the G7, it also reinforced the G7's own perceived legitimacy in controlling and managing the institutional norms (Bayne, 2000, p.123) that promulgate a Western-oriented international economic order (also see Chapter 3). This directional power, both working *through* these institutions as well as *going around* them when there were institutional roadblocks, on issues such as debt relief for developing countries (Vreeland, 2007), is a clear example of how the G7 shared and pushed a set of shared norms that surrounded historical policies of hegemonic economic control.[204]

When the 1995 Halifax and 1996 Lyon Summits attempted to tackle reform of the UN the success of the G7's recommendations and direction setting for improved coordination between the UN and other international institutions such as the IMF and WB, albeit with internal UN leadership support (Bayne, 2000, p.125), was yet again another example of the increasing influence of the G7 in shaping the management of international order by *setting* the reform agenda. Yet this reforming agenda failed to re-materialise at the 1997 Summit as the momentum amongst the leaders had shifted when the Denver Summit became the 'Summit of the Eight' as a Russia that held ostensibly different norms and values was embraced by the group (Bayne, 2000, p.130; 2005, p.37; Prodi, 2016).

However, it was shortly after the Denver Summit that world politics, and in fact the pre-existing management of the international economic system, and its legitimacy, was fractured by the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) (Agénor et al, 2000; Bayne, 2000; Sharma, 2003; Rodrik, 2012; Vestergaard, 2012; Tooze, 2019, p.255). The 1998 Birmingham Summit was therefore remarkable for two distinct changes in the format and role of the G7. First, the membership of the G7 expanded, formally admitting the Russian Federation to a permanent seat at the table (Bayne, 2005, p.37). Second, but perhaps just as important, the mooted reforms of the previous Summit cycle in challenging the institutionalisation of the G7 came to fruition under the UK's hosting (Bayne, 2000, p.152).[205]

[204] This level of influence must be caveated with the fact that certainly in the 1990s there was still institutional pushback against G7 led decision-making (Baker, 2000, p.178).

[205] When looking longitudinally at the evolution of the G7 one can begin to see a pattern whereby some host states feel that unfinished business from one Summit should be continued/resolved when they next host again. Using just the UK as an example we can see the failure of John Major to return to back-to-basics Summitry at the 1992 London Summit was still a preoccupation of the host state at the 1998 Birmingham Summit even though the UK Prime Minister was now Tony Blair. Similarly, this pattern emerges again at Carbis Bay in 2021 following the failure to agree clear principles on global tax regimes at Lough Erne in 2013. Perhaps this is explainable by the more consistent post holding of Summit Sherpa's who shape the agenda and communiqués of the Summits (Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Hajnal, 1999) but this remains unclear. This is,

The lengthy and convoluted nature of the Summit communiques were significantly reduced, and the nature of the leaders' discussions were transformed into a quasi-monastic retreat without ministers or advisors present (Hajnal, 1999, p.25; Bayne, 2000, p.152) to deepen the informal rapport building interactions between the leaders themselves (Solomon and Flores, 2001; Bayne, 2005, p.8). However, what is perhaps more important in terms of facilitating the perceived return to informality at the heart of the G8 is that the breadth of the agenda discussed by the G8 leaders did not shrink from its wide-ranging remit discussed above. Instead, the G8 developed the use of extensive ministerial pre-Summit meetings (Bayne, 2005, p.38) to discuss, prioritise, and dismiss items that should not be placed on the leaders own agenda (Bayne, 2000, p.153). In essence, the push towards reclaiming the informal 'fireside chat' nature of the early Summits also required the institutionalisation of a far more structured pre-Summit set of ministerial level meetings to ascertain the Summit priorities, settle the easier decisions or debates between members, and frame the context of the G8's ultimate decision-making process.

This development of extensive pre-Summit ministerial meetings, albeit not novel in format, did however set the stage for the next evolutionary step in the G8's role in managing international order. Although the leaders, and the decisions made during their informal discussions, were ultimately key to much of the G8's influence, the ministerial level pre-Summit meetings also took on a role and influence of their own. The finance or foreign ministerial mini-Summits acted as both gatekeeper of G8 discussion topics, but also as the G8's own delegated decision-making infrastructure, adding a further tool to the arsenal of the G8 in shaping both international institutional action as well as influencing and coordinating the response to international crises in the management of international order (Bayne, 2000; 2005; Kaiser et al, 2000; Kirton and von Furstenberg, 2001; Kirton and Takase, 2002).

It is important, then, at this point to return to the methodological focus of the 'Old School' scholars discussed in Chapter 2. By focusing on the role and decision-making processes of both the leaders and the senior ministers at both the G7 Summits and the pre-Summit meetings, we can begin to unpack and analyse how these individuals act in shaping and influencing the global response to key events. This is particularly important when looking at the international economic crisis facing world politics at the time of the 1998 Summit. The economic collapse of multiple large Asian economies[206] following the beginning of the AFC in July 1997 had seemingly been stabilised by the time the leaders met at Birmingham (Bayne, 2000, p.156). However, the G8 leaders' endorsement of both the finance ministers, and IMF and WB actions, was insufficient to prevent the economic collapse and debt default of the Russian Federation, nor the subsequent spread of economic disorder to wider parts of the

therefore, fertile ground for future research into the G7, particularly into the importance, from an 'Old School' methodological perspective, of the role that both the leaders and sherpas, as elites, have in shaping the Summits themselves.

[206] The Thai, South Korean and Indonesian economies collapsed (Bayne, 2005, p.40), however, the crisis also had a significant negative knock-on impact on multiple other economies such as Russia, Brazil and Argentina and subsequent wider global implications (Agénor et al, 2000; Sharma, 2003; Bremmer, 2012; Rodrik, 2012; Vestergaard, 2012; Tooze, 2019, p.255).

international system (Bayne, 2000, p.156). Thus, the wider efforts of the IMF, WB and G7[207] finance ministers in shaping further international response to the crisis were both the route through which the G8 leaders delegated as well as endorsed said actions. This was, again, both a widening and *going around* the formalised international institutional structures by establishing the finance minister level meetings as having the legitimacy to act on behalf of the G7 leaders in instructing and coordinating the actions of formal international structures in world politics.[208] In effect, the role of the finance ministers was legitimised *by* the G7 leaders which, in turn, legitimised the perception that the G7 had the authority and legitimacy itself to create these new structures.

These actions, however, also encompassed a reform agenda that brought on board a newly created informal gathering, the 'Group of 22', who's membership spanned a myriad of differing states and significant economies in world politics that had both been affected by (Bayne, 2000, p.157), and had the ability to affect, the future international economic order. In essence, the leaders of the G7 believed they had the legitimacy to act in leading the global economic response, but changing world politics meant that they also needed the acquiescence of a more diverse grouping of economic powers to sustain this legitimacy.

It is important to note here that the reaction and response of the G7, and subsequent emergence of the 'Group of 22', was also driven by the perceived failure of regional organisations to respond to the growing economic crisis. The AFC had not only once again demonstrated the global impact that such an economic crisis could engender (Tooze, 2019, p.255), it also exposed the inability of regional organisations such as ASEAN to respond with a clear and united position in attempting to stem the crisis (Acharya, 2004, p.260). The failure of international institutions to do enough to halt this economic crisis, and the perception that regional organisations were unwilling to step up, meant the G7 leaders once again perceived themselves to hold responsibility for coordinating and managing the unfolding crisis and maintaining international economic order.

What the ES has therefore continued to overlook is the importance of historical longevity in economic crises that represent what Bell (1971) termed a 'crisis slide' that builds momentum over time and through a multitude of events. Thus, the AFC that emerged at the beginning of July 1997 was similar to the financial crisis that originated in Mexico in 1994 (Bremmer, 2012, p.37), in that it required IMF intervention and access to capital to stem the economic instability from spreading. Yet, the AFC was different in scale as it stemmed both from an inability to defend domestic currencies against the dollar and a flight of capital out of the system (Rodrik, 2012, p.92) that importantly had many of its roots in failures of the private economic system rather than state driven instability as had been the case in Mexico (Agénor et al, 2000; Sharma, 2003; Bayne, 2000, p.173). What this meant was that the AFC was truly *global* in its threat to the pre-existing stability, and legitimacy, of the international economic order, but also that the international institutional and organisational structures designed to manage this economic order were still insufficiently prepared to deal with such a crisis.

Thus, whilst the AFC came on the back of purported international financial reforms advocated by the G7 and the finance ministers after the 1994 Mexico crisis, it demonstrated that not only had these

[207] At this point it was clear that whilst Russia had always been slightly side-lined in its economic influence within the G8, the collapse of the Russian economy and government debt default meant that the Russians were in no position to influence or support further actions at resolving the economic crisis.
[208] Baker (2000; 2008) unpacks in detail what he believes to have been the dominant role that finance ministers and central bankers play in underpinning the G7's evolution in world politics.

purported reforms failed to fully materialise from the 1995 Halifax Summit (Bayne, 2000, p.172), they had also failed to stem the tide of disorder emerging into the international system from the fallout of the ongoing AFC due to the increasingly interconnected nature of international finance as well as the ability of private financial actions to destabilise domestic as well as global international economic order (Bremmer, 2012, p.37-38; Tooze, 2019, p.255-256; also see Chapter 3). The questions of legitimacy, and effectiveness, in the IMF's ability to manage this spreading crisis, when combined with the failure of the financial reforms initiated and shaped by the G7, meant that the legitimacy of the pre-existing framework for managing international economic order was being called into question due to the continued economic disorder. The G7 leaders, and finance ministers, therefore, saw the need for another overhaul of these pre-existing structures in managing international economic order if both effectiveness and legitimacy were to be maintained (Baker, 2000, p.178; Vestergaard, 2012; Martin, 2013).

The reform proposals drawn up by G7 finance ministers prior to the 1998 Birmingham Summit (Hajnal, 1999, p.62), and subsequently endorsed by the leaders, were in essence a regurgitation of the proposals decided upon at the Halifax Summit that were not fully implemented, albeit with the inclusion of a role for the private sector in resolving economic crises (Bayne, 2000, p.174). Thus, in August 1998, in part due to the reluctance of fellow G7 lenders to continue to bail out Western based creditors, the financial tap of IMF and state-to-state loans for Russian economic reforms was turned off and the Russian state defaulted on its debt (Bayne, 2000, p.174). The economic fallout from this collapse in sovereign debt spread around the international system, threatening the Brazilian economy as capital fled markets with uncertain futures, and impacted directly upon the leading economic power in the international system as large US based lenders collapsed into insolvency and the US federal government was forced into creating emergency financial rescue packages (Bayne, 2000, p.175).

The implications of this economic disorder were clear on two main points. First, the G7 demonstrated to rising and emergent economic powers that they could not be relied upon to prioritise global economic stability over their own domestic politics. This, in turn, would add weight to the latter calls for economic reform to be more equitable in formal international institutions and for greater vote share for developing economies. These seeds of future normative constraint were being further sown by the disparate and beggar-thy-neighbour policies of the G7 economies.

Second, although the G7 finance ministers were able to agree on what the problems were, they were unable to agree on the solutions or reforms. Instead, the G7 finance ministers turned to reform proposals that had emerged from the G22 group of leading and developing economies that had been informally instigated by the US during the crisis (Bayne, 2000, p.175). The inclusion of developing economies in the decision-making process, under the aegis of the G7, was the first step in the G7 finance ministers and leaders recognising that the interconnected nature of the modern international system had fractured the previously dominant economic position the G7 had exerted over world politics. The evolution of the international system and the impact of globalisation meant that the economic power of the G7 member states alone was no longer sufficient to effectively stem the tide of international economic crises when the international system now contained a plethora of emerging global economic powers whose actions or inactions had global ramifications (Bayne, 2000, p.209). The reform proposals presented to at the 1999 Cologne Summit that stemmed from these deliberations therefore provided the foundations, albeit not yet formalised (Bayne, 2000, p.175), for the G22 group

to emerge as the G20 Summit of finance ministers that would shape and remake the management of international economic order in the future.

The 1999 Cologne Summit, therefore, is a particularly important steppingstone in shaping our understanding of the evolution of the G8. The leaders of the G8 member states found themselves attending a Summit of once again like-minded, and politically centre-left leaning,[209] individuals that further underlined the political interventionist shift in the role and actions of the G8. Similar then to the importance of the political shift of the G7 leaders in the 1980s (see Chapter 4), this centre-left political leaning of the G8 not only underpinned parts of the reform driven nature of this Summit cycle (Bayne, 2005, p.49), it also underlined the changing nature of how the leadership of the G8 perceived the role and importance of more diverse, or pluralistic, forms of global governance practice.

This continued growth in the G7's perception of its remit in world politics was apparent following the G8 foreign ministers meeting in Bonn in early May 1999. This meeting laid the groundwork for a political agreement between the G8 leaders over a peace settlement and international peacekeeping force in Kosovo, overcoming what had been the worst period of political relations between Western European NATO allies and Russia since the end of the Cold War (Bayne, 2000, p.162). This in turn overcame some of the roadblocks that had stymied a resolution to the conflict through the UNSC.

This was, in part, due to the informal and interpersonal nature of the G8 setting. The agreements made latterly at the Cologne Summit, and their endorsement by Russian President Boris Yeltsin (Bayne, 2000, p.163), were indicative of the continued importance that the G8 now held in world politics for non-Western states. First, the Russian political leadership, primarily Yeltsin, wanted to maintain the level of international respect and 'Great Power' symbolism that political leaders now placed in both achieving and maintaining a seat at the high-table of world politics (Bayne, 2000, p.164; Tsygankov, 2010, p.59 Spohr, 2019, p.548). Put simply, personal agreement to the terms of intervention and resolution of the conflict in Kosovo was largely based upon Yeltsin not wanting to risk being subjected to political rejection on the global stage and the importance he placed upon being part of this 'club' of shared norms and values.

However, the second key point here is that beyond the performative nature of the perceived role of the G8 the Summits had now become a de-facto forum in which international security issues, such as Kosovo, could be deliberated upon and potentially find a settlement outside of the traditional UNSC framework of Great Power politics (Engelbrekt, 2015, p.538).[210] With the G8 *going around* the formalised and roadblocked structures of the UN system, the G8 exerted both a Great Power mentality in resolving intractable conflicts as well as claiming a symbolic legitimacy in maintaining international order by doing so. The importance of this socialisation of the legitimacy of the G7 at the apex of world politics is a point that requires further unpacking here. For example, the evolving relationship between the G7 and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation and its political leadership since the end of the Cold War was of a particular importance to the perception of the G7 leaders in their responsibility in shaping the emergent Russia into a *fellow member* of this liberal international order. In other words,

[209] The election of Gerhard Schroeder as German Chancellor meant that alongside Blair in the UK, Clinton in the US, Chrétien in Canada, d'Alema in Italy and the left wing French Prime Minister Jospin, the majority of G7/8 leaders now came from a centre-left political and ideological background (Bayne, 2005, p.49).

[210] Although NATOs direct military involvement in the conflict then superseded the G8's role in it (Engelbrekt, 2015, p.538). See Chapter 6 for where the G7 continues to take a leading role in a conflict in which NATO is supplying, training, and providing tactical and intelligence support to Ukraine.

from the early requests for an invitation to attend from Mikhail Gorbachev to the importance Boris Yeltsin personally placed upon being seen, both internationally and domestically, as interacting as an equal with the other G7 leaders, meant that the G7 has exerted a normative constraint on the *potential* for an emerging challenge to its role in world politics by accommodating a powerful 'emerging' power *within* its exclusive club.

The ideological and political structures of the collapsing Soviet Union, and the emergent Russian Federation, were divergent of most of the inherent and established values of Western-based G7 member states. Yet, the G7 leaders took it upon themselves to mould and shape the entry of the Russian Federation into world politics, whilst also acting as an example of a Great Power club that Russia could aspire to enter as an equal member if it chose to adopt the same norms and values as them. Legitimacy in world politics therefore came through agreement and acceptance of the new 'Western' standards of civilisation, but it also came as a tool of hegemonic dominance in shaping and constraining any revival of a Cold War mentality (Meyer, 2010; Westad, 2018; Spohr, 2019) that could normatively constraint the actions of the leading Western powers. This is important because while much of the ES literature has recognised the importance of Russia in shaping the European balance of power, and the 'Old School' scholars understood all too well the role of the Cold War in shaping their outlook, the ES has continued to overlook the importance of the G7 in influencing the stabilisation of international order during this period.[211]

The 2000 Okinawa Summit was therefore a continuation of this intent by the G8 leaders, albeit some more than others, to demonstrate the importance of an inclusionary process through a more substantial effort at 'outreach' to non-G8 states by inviting a diversity of global leaders to attend the Summit (Bayne, 2005, p.79; Engelbrekt, 2016, p.xvii). This was both representative of a shift in the thinking of the leaders of the G8 away from previous levels of reluctance in inviting non-member state representatives to attend the G8, but it is also a clear framing of the importance that G8 leaders placed upon the role of membership in the G8, and the resultant societal norms and values this has the power to promote.

While the outreach process that gained traction at Okinawa has continued at further Summits with a regularised invitation list being used, this process remained exclusionary in nature as these leaders were never invited to sit around the top table of decision-making.[212] This process can be criticised as mere window dressing, yet the perception of its importance underpins the earlier point made in this section regarding the importance of the *drawing power* that both membership and attendance at the G7 Summits have upon outsiders. Put simply, the G7 exerts a powerful pull in world politics for leaders to be seen to be attending, and potentially have an opportunity to gain some input at the high table of managing world politics. This acts as a two-way highway of normative constraint. First, the G7 leaders exert this hegemonic pulling power to bring states *within the tent* without providing full membership benefits, offering this only to states that play by the rules. Second, non-member states exert normative constraint by being willing to attend as guests *if* the G7 engages with aspects of these

[211] See Fawn and Larkins (1996) edited volume that mentions the G7 only once, and only in the context of the First Gulf War.

[212] Outreach to civil society organisations and NGOs, which had been expanded at Birmingham in 2000 on debt relief (Payne, 2008, p.519) was further developed at Okinawa, yet, as with invited leaders these CSOs were largely removed from any meaningful contribution (Szczepanska, 2018). This was also the case at both Ise-Shima in 2016 and Hiroshima 2022 when CSOs and NGOs were relegated to separate premises away from the leaders and the media (authors field notes).

states' interests, at the same time demonstrating to the G7 that it cannot be seen to act alone on global issues anymore. Similarly, the underlying risk of guest states rejecting or complaining about the G7's actions or lack of actions is a serious issue of message-management that the G7 host and leaders will go to great lengths to avoid.

The focus at Okinawa on the importance of recognising, and collectively responding to, infectious diseases at a *global* level (Brown, 2010, p.517-518) reinforced the premise of a shared responsibility held between the G8 leaders and states in resolving present and future threats to international order (Morin et al, 2019, p.271). In other words, the G8 leaders continued to exhibit a perception of shared responsibility in managing a plethora of global issues even after the creation of a more diverse G20 that contained member states for whom these issues were more apparent in their immediacy of threat to economic and political stability. Further example of this can be seen at the following Summit in Genoa when the G8 leaders not only agreed to the idea of this shared responsibility on topics of global health, they signed a commitment to establishing and financing what became the Global Fund to fights HIV/AIDS (Bayne, 2005, p.91; Brown, 2010, p.519), and the GAVI Vaccine Alliance, entrenching the G8's role in shaping the global response to non-traditional security threats both in the present and into the future (Engelbrekt, 2016).[213] What this demonstrated was that the G8 was now increasingly susceptible to outside normative influence, both from non-member states and from transnational organisations, in both lobbying and in responding to threats to international order that may not have such immediacy to the G8 itself, but were in effect future-proofing against international disorder on a global scale.

Both Genoa in 2001 and Kananaskis in 2002 were also constrained by events with extensive rioting in Italy resulting in the police killing of a protestor (Rachman, 2010) and the Canadian Summit occurring in the shadow or the terrorist attacks of September 11th (Bayne, 2005, p.127). Yet, both Summits demonstrated again the important focus that the 'Old School' scholars placed upon the individual decision-making of elites in understanding change in world politics. At Genoa, Russia President Vladimir Putin and the newly elected US President George W. Bush were to have what has been described as a 'fruitful' bilateral discussion on the edges of the Summit regarding arms control, yet the lack of personal trust between the two leaders meant that these discussions did not bear any successful fruit (Bayne, 2005, p.99). Similarly, the US's move away from tackling climate change, and its abrogation of the Kyoto Protocol did not provide a cohesive framework for group collaboration, yet other leaders were able to use side discussions at Genoa to encourage member states such as Japan, Canada, and Russia (Bayne, 2005, p.99) to ratify the protocol.[214]

However, the secluded, and more intimate, nature of the 2002 Kananaskis Summit did provide a fertile format for relationship and trust building between the leaders present. From early morning gym meetings between Bush and Blair in the lead-up to the Iraq War (Bayne, 2005, p.127; Engelbrekt, 2015,

[213] Importantly, as Labonte and Schrecker (2004, p.1662) point out, while the G7 states had met their individual commitments to global health over the last three Summits, these commitments had been less than adequate to deal with the challenges. The establishment of the Global Fund was, in part, a recognition of the scale of the work needed to be done, and led by, the G7.

[214] Japan subsequently ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, Canada in 2002 and Russia in 2004 (Bayne, 2005, p.103).

p.541), to the growing integration of Vladimir Putin into the G8 fold,[215] this Summit, much like the 1983 Williamsburg Summit, focused on the importance of the deliberations between the leaders themselves and the results of those discussions were communicated to the world directly, rather than as a formal communique (Bayne, 2005, p.129).

In this specific case it was the interpersonal relationship between Bush and Putin, and the role of the G8 Summit in facilitating informal bilateral discussions, that cemented G8 led funding and direction for international action in preventing the spread of weapons and materials that had the ability to cause mass destruction (Bayne, 2005, p.130). Thus, reinforcing an 'Old School' point that the role of elites is still an important aspect in understanding the management of international order and that side meetings at Summits are often where much of the management of international order *actually* occurs (see Chapter 2).

However, whilst a newly minted emphasis was placed upon the direct discussions between the leaders at the end of this Summit cycle, it was, nonetheless the coordinated actions of the G7 finance ministers that underpinned the action plan that targeted the financial funding of international terrorism which was to be implemented *through* the pre-existing FATF. In essence, the role and position of the G8 acting in a cohesive and unified group to target and enforce a crackdown on terrorist funding was to be implemented by an organisation that existed *outside* of the pre-existing formal structures of global governance yet provided guidance and agenda setting direction *to* the UN, World Bank, and IMF (Gstöhl, 2007, p.28-29) by, and from, the G8. The idea of normative constraint from rising powers through formal international institutions was therefore, once again, called into question when the G7 was able to avoid such introspection by working through an international body that it had created, and which was essentially beholden to none of the levers of constraint available to other states.

This growing remit meant that the 2003 Evian Summit was both a step-back towards the heavily prepared, and document heavy style of the third Summit cycle (Bayne, 2005, p.142), but with a continuation of the importance of personal relationships between the leaders remaining key to effective coordination action in managing international order. The Second Iraq War beginning in 2003 had divided the G8 membership between those supporting the US led action and those vehemently opposed to said military action (Bayne, 2005, p.141). Following the fall of Baghdad in early Summer, the Evian Summit at the beginning of June provided the opportunity for leaders such as US President George W. Bush and French President Jacques Chirac to bridge the differences that had led to lengthy periods of non-communication between them (Bayne, 2005, p.141). Again, emphasising that the importance of the G7 extends beyond the group function to the individual interpersonal level interactions in rebuilding trust between leaders.

In fact, the continuing fallout of the shift in political focus surrounding the events of 9/11 and the US-led War on Terror had demonstrated the resolve of like-minded leaders and the shared norms of international solidarity that had been present at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit to evolve into a coherent framework for responding to international terrorism. The result was the creation, at the 2003 Summit, of the G8 Counter Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) which was designed to directly support the efforts of third-party non-member states in effectively fighting terrorism on a global

[215] It was at Kananaskis that the leaders agreed to Russia hosting its first G8 Summit in 2006 and the previous division of G7 leaders meeting without Russia prior to the formal G8 meeting was disbanded (Bayne, 2005, p.129; Payne, 2008, p.522).

scale.[216] Again, acting outside the pre-existing structures of global governance by *going around* them in creating new task forces the G8 continued to expand its role into security issues such as counter-terrorism, beyond the previously limited economic scope that had seen the formation of the FATF, into active and directed support for individual state-based efforts at combatting international terrorism (Penttilä, 2003; Engelbrekt, 2015, p.539). The creation of this G8 designed framework once again demonstrated that there were limits to the normative constraint that non-member states could have on the G8, particularly when it came to the response to international security issues.

However, while these initiatives were indicative of *some* shared political interests in responding to perceived threats the US's expansion of military interventionism around the globe that underlay many of the disagreements present in formal international institutions such as the UN (Newman, 2008; Bosco, 2009) continued to permeate through the leaders' discussions at the G8 as well. These issues also drove the coordinated action of non-G8 members in forming a group of like-minded states (Brazil, India, and South Africa) in coordinating their engagement with the G8 leaders via the invitations offered to them, thus pooling their strength in discussions (Laïdi, 2011, p.3-4) in order to exert greater leverage, and therefore stronger constraint, on the G8's independent actions.

However, the Evian Summit also demonstrated the inherent weaknesses in leader-led initiatives that do not have sufficient preparation, or development prior to the Summit. The failure of the leaders to agree on funding for the Global Fund because of this lack of preparation (Bayne, 2005), and therefore lack of substantive pre-Summit buy-in, underpinned the problematic nature, and weaknesses, of attempting to manage international issues without sufficient preparation and grip by the leaders of the G8 themselves. The first Summit of the fifth summit cycle therefore underlined not only the continued importance of informal face-to-face meetings between the leaders in resolving international tensions between them (Yarhi-Milo, 2014; Holmes, 2019), it also reinforced the point that the historical image of a mere 'fireside chat' as a substantive solution to intractable global problems was a continued misconception shared amongst many of the leaders.

This also meant that the increasing influence of non-member states upon the ability of the G8 to effectively manage international economic order, and the subsequent need to reach out to these rising states meant that this Summit cycle would be dominated not only by what the G8 could do *for* developing countries, but also by what developed and developing countries could *also do for* the management of international economic order. For example, the 2004 Sea Island Summit demonstrated the growing influence the BRICS[217] would pose to the G8's dominance of the global economic system. At the outset the US had been reluctant to engage with such a committed outreach programme to non-G8 member states as the Canadians and the French had done in 2002 and 2003. However, the importance of the ongoing troubles in Iraq continued to provide the impetus for much of the Sea Island Summit's agenda and in particular the US's Middle East reform initiative (Bayne, 2005, p.156). Thus, although the US was reluctant to recognise the growing importance of a pluralistic grouping of global powers in managing international order, the need for buy-in and influence from

[216] CTAG directly helped improve the capacity of the UNSC's Counter-Terrorism Committee and strengthened the implementation of international agreements (Engelbrekt, 2015, p.541), again, demonstrating how important the overlooked aspect of the G7's role in working *around* pre-existing structures by creating *new* independent bodies (see Section 1.2 on Putnam and Bayne's original framework).

[217] At this stage Russia is a member of the G8, however the 2003 Evian Summit was also the first in which Russia had been invited to attend the economic part of the leaders' discussions which had previously excluded Russia due to its sovereign debt default and perceived economic weaknesses.

regional powers in the Middle East drove much of the 2004 Summits pull towards engaging with what other non-member states could do to support the G8's ideas and initiatives, with some evidence to attribute the renewal of negotiations over the Israeli/Palestinian peace process to the impetus of the leaders of the G8 (Bayne, 2005, p.159).

Similarly, the Proliferation Security Initiative begun by Bush just prior to the Evian Summit now had the full participation of the member states of the G8, including Russia, and had demonstrated its success in halting the transfer of nuclear materials to Libya (Bayne, 2005, p.160; Engelbrekt, 2015, p.538). While the 2004 Summit also ended with the coordination of the G8 Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Experts Group (PPEG) and its future involvement in activities in Africa training and equipping militaries (Engelbrekt, 2015, p.541), demonstrating again the G8's willingness to become proactively involved in non-Western security issues.

However, it was the lead up to the 2005 Gleneagles Summit that fully demonstrated the fundamental shift in the influence of rising powers on the actions and deliberations of the G8 with a dedicated outreach programme inviting the leaders of Brazil, India, South Africa, Mexico, and China for part of the G8 discussions (Payne, 2008, p.530; Cooper and Thakur, 2013, p.10). Although still exclusionary in the sense that these states were not invited as full members, it was nonetheless a significant shift in the opening of the G8 discussion processes. At the same time the Gleneagles Summit began its deliberations alongside mass protests regarding poverty in Africa and Live8 concerts that were coordinated to influence the leaders meeting in Scotland (Payne, 2008, p.519), once again demonstrating how the G8 was now open to influence by non-state-based organisations and activities in shaping its normative output.

Although the Summit was overshadowed by terrorist attacks in London, the leaders, and the host Tony Blair, deliberately chose to keep the Summit focused on debt relief and aid proposals for Africa. The result was a coordinated debt relief response that went beyond previous G8 initiatives (Butler and Schiermeier, 2005) in both scale and remit. The G8's ability to set, and shape, the agenda of international institutions was fundamental here with the leaders' initiating key reforms in the debt structuration at the IMF and WB which had previously been the roadblock to serious global debt reform action, with these institutions then launching the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (Gstöhl, 2007). Again, this reflects the importance of focusing on how the actions of these specific leaders shaped the global level response that went both *through* and *around* the pre-existing institutional barriers by leveraging their hegemonic group control of these institutions.

It was this, and other future-oriented agreements between the G8 leaders, that confirmed a degree of international legitimacy upon the Gleneagles Summit, and the wider G8 framework due to the perception that, finally, the leaders had managed to make a real difference to international economic injustice, and therefore provide a modicum of sustainable international order. In fact, these efforts at a global programme of debt relief were also met with a commitment from the G8 leaders to renew investment in the Global Fund to combat Malaria, AIDS, and Tuberculosis (Butler and Schiermeier, 2005), overcoming the problems inherent in the G8 since the 2003 Evian Summit on the issue of global health. However, while the G8 leaders also recognised the growing problems associated with energy security at the 2005 Summit (IEA, 2006), premonitions perhaps of the future risks that were to come, the G8 nevertheless chose to act *through* the OECD and IEA in initiating both bodies to conduct further investigations and reports on future energy issues.

Perhaps ironically then, the following year at the St Petersburg Summit the topic of energy security was top of the agenda for the G8 leaders (G8, 2006; Burns, 2019, p.215). Yet, the G8 continued to instruct the IEA to focus on developing energy strategies for the future through follow-on reports and action-oriented solutions (IEA, 2008), rather than forming a cohesive strategy for future-proofing global energy needs.[218] The G8's focus on energy at this stage was a recognition that sustainable and steady energy supplies for the future were the foundations of economic growth for both the G8 member states as well as for developing and emerging economies.[219] The effective maintenance of international order therefore required a cohesive strategy for energy sustainability that went *beyond* just the interests of the G8.

However, the immediate focus of both the 2006 and the 2007 Heiligendamm Summits was upon the growing concerns surrounding non-proliferation and nuclear weapons (G8 2006; G8 2007). The growing threat of terrorist related threats, and the destabilising nature of certain 'rogue' states such as Iran and North Korea had become part of the ongoing agenda for the G8 which now perceived itself as holding an increasingly central responsibility for managing a plethora of global security issues (Penttilä, 2003).[220]

Both Heiligendamm and the following Summit at Hokkaido brought to the fore the emerging risks of economic growth and climate change (Payne, 2008, p.531), but simply highlighted the inability of the G8 states to find a cohesive position on emission reductions (G8, 2007; 2008). Yet the G8's focus was clearly returning to the economic sphere and problems in maintaining international economic legitimacy in a changing world. In 2007 the G8 called for a significant review of the IMF's budget and leadership considering the flawed developmental programmes that continued to exert economic pain on developing states (Brütsch, 2014, p.207), a recognition, again, of the growing influence and voice that emerging economies were having in shaping the G8's deliberations.

In the lead-up to the 2008 Hokkaido Summit, however, the G7 Finance Ministers met under the auspices of what was a growing banking, and financial crisis in the global economic system. Although the full impact of what was to become the 2008 GFC was still unclear, the shared interests amongst the G7 Finance Ministers in being able to openly, and frankly, discussing the emerging problems to overcome these intractable issues was also apparent (Darling, 2011, p.90-92).[221] However, it was also clear to many of these finance ministers, such as the British Chancellor, that any effective *global* response to such a growing crisis would be impossible if it relied still upon the now insufficient

[218] As Van de Graaf and Westphal (2011, p.24) point out, while the G7 makes a large number of commitments on energy and following the St Petersburg Principles has submitted self-assessment reports, the lack of an oversight mechanism for effective compliance means that the G7 does not live up to its potential on this issue.
[219] See Umar et al (2021, p.10) for the impact of oil shocks on both oil producing and BRICS economies.
[220] Another example of the importance of the side discussions at the G7 is that Bush and Putin used the Heiligendamm Summit to meet bilaterally to discuss the mutual use of radar facilities to mitigate the risks of North Korean nuclear missiles (Burns, 2019, p.234-235). Again, emphasising the importance of understanding these interpersonal encounters between global elites.
[221] Darling (2011, p.280) again makes this point about the informal and remote setting of the 2010 Finance Ministers who met alone, in front of log fire, in a hotel in the Arctic Circle where they were able to have off-the-record discussions with fellow ministers, many of whom had long-standing personal relationships. Baker (2008, p.105-106) makes a similar argument about the importance of the interpersonal relationships developed between the 'deputies' who are usually senior finance officials assigned to coordinate between each other throughout the year.

economic reach of the G8 states alone which excluded the second largest economy in the world from the table (Darling, 2011, p.91).

Importantly, then, the response to the GFC, when it came, was the rise of the G20 to a leaders' level Summit (Cooper and Thakur, 2013) which was not simply the creation of a *new* format of global governance, but the re-emergence of an already well-recognised need for the greater inclusion of rising economic powers within the G-Summit framework for managing international economic order (see Chapter 7). The importance, then, of the coordination efforts of the G7 Finance Ministers in agreeing to government bailouts for major banks to stem the economic 'crisis-slide' (Bell, 1971) in 2008 (Bush, 2009, p.147; Darling, 2011, p.167-168) is again key to understanding the evolution of change at this point in world politics.

The GFC once again demonstrated the importance of getting finance ministers, and leaders, in a room to discuss unparalleled global economic coordination was just as key to resolving contemporary global crises as it had been in in the early 1970s and the first G7 Summit at Rambouillet (Putnam and Bayne, 1987). The important point for this Chapter, however, is that even though the G20 emerged as an alternative, and more diverse, format for managing international order, the G8 leaders and finance ministers continued to exert a significant amount of power and control, if not necessarily the same level of legitimacy, in managing international order. In other words, both the emergent G20 and the residual power of the G8 *within* the G20 enabled a more cohesive and intertwined framework for normative constraint now that this wider group of powers all shared the high table of global politics.

Subsequently, the earthquake shattered town of L'Aquila that hosted the 2009 Italian Summit was more than merely a reflection of political solidarity amongst the G8 leaders (G8, 2009; Hooper, 2009), instead it underpinned an agreement between the leaders, prior to the Copenhagen Climate Summit in December, that they would aim to prevent global temperatures from rising more than 2 degrees centigrade (Schiermeier, 2009). The importance of this solidarity in common purpose, and in signalling to the rest of the world that the G8 leaders were now together on this issue of climate change was symbolic but also representative of the cohesive position surrounding values *and* interests that the G8 leaders had begun to develop on this key future threat to international order.

The linkages, then, between climate issues and security became more apparent on the G8's agenda at this Summit where the G8 used its *stimulating* power to drive action by the World Food Programme (WFP) in mobilising significant financial pledges to deal with non-traditional security issues on food scarcity (Engelbrekt, 2015, p.542). Similarly, the Summit also saw the establishment of coordination between the G8, UN and African Union (AU) of the Africa Clearinghouse which established a global network of peacekeeping training centres (Engelbrekt, 2015, p.541), again, demonstrating that the G8 was also active in shaping traditional military-based activities well outside of its original economic remit. The emerging cohesiveness of these interests and values exerted by the G8 leaders was premised upon the idea that the G8 now argued that climate change, natural disasters, economic growth, energy and food security, and terrorism were intertwined and solvable only through concerted effort on *all* the issues at once (G8, 2009),[222] and could only succeed in coordination with emerging powers (G8, 2009).

[222] See Falkner and Buzan's (2022a) recent edited volume on Great Power responsibility for climate change which skirts around the role of the G7. Although Kopra (2022, p.215) does engage with the G7, they argue this

The 2010 Muskoka Summit saw a performative reinforcement of the differences between the G8 and the now widely regarded as more important G20 (Kirton, 2013), with the G8 leaders' specifically highlighting the distinctiveness of the G8 being able to hold frank and open conversations about difficult issues (Dobson, 2010, p.251). In essence, the G8 was attempting to find its place in a world more focused on the diverse G20 by discussing issues that were largely anathema to the larger group, such as transparency and accountability, positions that the G8 claimed were integral to international legitimacy (G8, 2010). In many ways then this reflected the increased level of normative constraint that the G20 placed upon the previous actions of the G8 alone. The divergent set of norms and values held by the G20 states meant that there were many political and economic issues that were simply not viable to discuss or find a cohesive position on in this wider framework.

The advent of the GFC had posed an existential threat to the legitimacy of the G8 because it brought to a head the long developing issues of the challenge that rising economic powers had placed upon the ability of the G8 to either act independently or effectively in managing international economic order. The need to diversify the membership of such a powerful group had been driven by the already present normative constraint on the G8's actions, as has been seen by the increasing impact in this Chapter of non-member states, but it was nonetheless the creation of the G20 at a leaders' level summit that finally put this constraint on a firmer footing.

However, the still active group hegemony of the G8 *within* the G20 was, and is, a powerful indicator of the constraint that this smaller group still exerts on the normative aspects of the more pluralistic and diverse grouping of economically powerful states. In other words, the G7 and the G20 now co-habit within the same informal international order management space, and this co-habitation has ramifications for both the effectiveness of each group but also in how the norms and values of each group are shaped and evolve. While the G7 can, and does, act as a more cohesive form of shared norms and values it can only act within the normative constraints of other leading powers that the G7 requires to politically buy-in to any actions the G7 takes.[223] In other words, there are common issues, norms, and value areas where the G7 *can* act independently of other states, but there are also issue areas that require the political buy-in of other states in order to be effective.

The next chapter goes on to explore this dynamic further by arguing that the historical evolution of the G7 indicates the growth in solidarist norms and values that make it distinctive from the more pluralistic G20 (Cooper and Thakur, 2013; Slaughter, 2019), but also from the wider norms and values of a diverse world politics. It argues that this exclusivity of the G7 between a small group of states based upon largely Western liberal norms and values has strengthened these shared positions in *response* to the contestation of rising powers and the more multipolar aspects of a changing international order. In essence, the G7 has come to represent a form of solidarist international society in a more pluralistic world politics.

shows a partial level of responsibility. Importantly, this work was published prior to the emergence of the G7's 'Climate Club' which has seen the G7 take a more concerted approach to responding to climate change.

[223] Whilst the G7 remains largely the holder of the purse strings for global funding of areas such as the GAVI Alliance and vaccination responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, the G7 still requires the political agreement and buy-in of G20 member states to *facilitate* these responses. My thanks to Garrett W. Brown for this insight into global health governance.

Chapter 6 – A New World Order

'We must indeed all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.' Benjamin Franklin quoted by Putnam and Bayne in *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits* (1987)[224]

Recent scholarship that has challenged Western-oriented thinking on the management of international order has regarded the G7 as a 'relic' of the past (Acharya et al, 2019, p.73) that is no longer fit for purpose in a changing world politics (see also Newman and Zala, 2018). Yet, recent geopolitical events following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have fundamentally challenged these conceptions of how a society of states can effectively be managed through a diversity of 'normative leadership' on specific issue areas (Acharya et al, 2019, p.74) when confronted with the imperialistic ambitions of key global powers (Dharmaputra, 2023; Radchenko, 2023, p.58; Tisdall, 2023, p.33-36).

This chapter attempts to open the debate further on Buzan's (2005a, p.22-23) methodological call for clarity regarding typologies in assessing sub-global forms of international society by adding a new example to the mix. It argues that the evolution of the G7 can be seen as the emergence of a sub-global form of solidarist international society that has coalesced around a shared set of norms and values held by the member states and their leaders.[225] These norms and values are a promulgation of Western-oriented positions extolled through a hegemonic economic positionality. Yet, they are also the *defence* of a set of 'liberal' norms and values shared by these powerful states in the face of what their leaders perceive to be the threats posed by international disorder and the challenge posed by alternative norms and values. In essence, this chapter highlights the importance of 'Old School' thinking in shaping an analysis of quasi-Great Power forums that are deliberately exclusive in nature, and the norms that these groups share.

The chapter is laid out in three sections. First, there is an exploration of the recent ES scholarship on primary and secondary institutions. It argues that where the G7 has been engaged with, it has been in a limited capacity, and the G7 has been categorised as a secondary institution, a position that does not fully encapsulate the broad role that the G7 plays in world politics. Second, the evolution of the G7 in its sixth and seventh cycles (2011-present) is unpacked in relation to the re-emergence of common values and norms at the heart of the group, following the Russian expulsion from the G8. The final section then builds upon this analysis, and the argument established in Chapter 5, positioning the G7 as a solidarist form of international society that represents a set of shared norms and values in world politics distinct in its cohesiveness and implications.

[224] This quotation was also used by Henry Kissinger to describe the first incarnation of the G7 just prior to the Rambouillet Summit in 1975 (Spohr, 2016, p.21).

[225] Interestingly Wilson (2016b, p.111) very nearly hints at this possibility, amid a list of other international groupings and organisations that he believes could represent the development of what Buzan (2014a) has framed as state-centric solidarism.

6.1 The overlapping nature of primary and secondary institutions

Buzan's (2005a, p.161-204) work on classifying primary and secondary institutions has set the scene for the past twenty years of debate within the field. Yet, as Buzan (2005a, p.176) makes clear, this contemporary classification is open to change as world politics evolves.[226] Nonetheless, the framing of Great Power management of international order, diplomacy, and global markets as primary institutions (Buzan, 2005a, p.187), with international organisations, regimes, and bureaucratic institutions as secondary institutions has provided the ES with a definitional specificity that had allowed it to confront many of its methodological critics, as well as providing the bedrock for evolutionary thinking on the subject.

Schouenborg (2011, p.30), for example, has taken this framing further by highlighting the definitional inconsistencies in Buzan's work, pushing the debate towards a more sociological/institutionalism framework (Schouenborg, 2011, p.39-41). While Navari (2016, p.122-124) and Knudsen (Knudsen, 2019a; Navari and Knudsen, 2019, p.1-2) argue secondary institutions embed and shape the evolution, and devolution, of primary institutions, which for Spandler (2015, p.617) reproduce the norms that underpin the function of primary institutions as well as shaping those norms. Friedner Parrat (2017, p.623) similarly argues that primary institutions are therefore practice based elements of international society that are discursively constructed, yet secondary institutions such as international organisations can and do influence the construction and function of these primary institutions (Friedner Parrat, 2017, p.624).

The basis of the relational aspects of primary and secondary institutions means that the more static definitional boundaries drawn up by Buzan (2005a) can be challenged as to their flexibility in the face of change. This is an important point to establish here because these arguments provide a tangential link to the early thinking within the ES that deliberately framed conceptual definitions with a degree of fluidity (Wilson, 2012, p.568-570; Friedner Parrat, 2017, p.625; also see Chapter 2).

Situating the contribution of this chapter is therefore important in this contested and emerging field of institutional study within the ES. Where this thesis engages with these approaches then is not towards the more subjective end of the spectrum that envisages the opening of conceptual space to 'new' institutions (Friedner Parrat, 2017, p.624; Falkner and Buzan, 2019) per se.[227] Rather, it argues that the Buzan version of definitional classifications has led the ES into a more methodologically driven theoretical space that leaves some elements of world politics either dropping through the conceptual gaps in the floorboards, or being at risk of mischaracterisation due to their subjective classification

[226] In fact, Buzan and Falkner (2022b) and Falkner and Buzan (2019) have both developed arguments advocating the addition of primary institutions to this list. See also Wilson and Yao (2019). Also see Knudsen (2016, p.103-104) who argues that Buzan's premise for changing primary institutions may not be as fluid as he claims, arguing that there is a degree of continuity in the constitutive principles that underlie the associated practices of primary institutions. This continuity concept is particularly important for challenging the idea that primary institutions, such as colonialism, can disappear (see Buzan, 2016, p.129). A position that would overlook the continuity of colonialism enacted by the Soviet Union in the Cold War, or the rampant acts of colonialism/Imperialism in Russia's recent actions (see Sections 6.2 and 6.3). For example, Buzan and Schouenborg (2018, p.60; p.70), erroneously, argue that the world has moved away from European colonising practices and that Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea was not a challenge to the development of global norms that reject the acquisition of territory by force.

[227] See Wilson's (2012, p.574-575) critique which essentially asks where does this open-ended list stop.

(see Wilson, 2012, p.577) as they hold some similarities to pre-existing organisations or institutional set-ups.

In essence, what this clarity of framing does not do is provide *all* the answers to those functional aspects of world politics that do not neatly fit within either the primary or secondary category (see Schouenborg, 2011). As both Spandler (2015, p.612-613) and Knudsen (2019a) argue, the definitional criteria for what constitutes, or differentiates, primary and secondary institutions is both intersubjective and not settled. Similarly, Spandler (2015, p.613) implies that traditional concepts of norms and rules, ie: regimes, may also contain elements of *both* primary and secondary institutions. In essence, the definitional characteristics of what are primary and secondary institutions, where emergent or evolutionary norms and practices fit into these categories, and who decides these categories, are theoretical concepts that are open to change and contestation.

In turn, Friedner Parrat's (2017, p.629) relational practice-based argument leaves itself open to criticisms of lacking specificity when it argues that states wishing to be recognised as Great Powers require a seat at the UNSC, and therefore broad international recognition of their arrival in this exclusive club, as informal participation in exclusive clubs such as the G7 are insufficient. Yet, Friedner Parrat (2017) does not then specify *why* the formalised structure of the UNSC remains the only high table of diplomatic practice, nor why this historical structure is not open to the same conceptual and practice related change that the author argues is key to updating concepts of institutions within the ES. This conceptual fixation within in the contemporary ES upon formal structures and organisations means that by remaining within these identifiable boundaries any calls for conceptual fluidity remain stuck within their own epistemological and methodological siloes. Namely, that what matters in world politics are *these* structures.

This chapter challenges these pre-existing assumptions by engaging with Wilson's (2012) critique that the categorisation of institutions within the ES needs to be more firmly grounded in empirical evidence. Thus, by identifying that the G7 plays the role of a modern version of Great Power management of international order (see Chapter 4) we can begin to empirically unpack how the G7 manifests itself as an elitist, closed, Great Power Concert form of diplomatic practice focused upon controlling and re-exerting hegemonic dominance over international markets (see Chapter 3). At the same time, we can also empirically see that this framework for managing international order is contested and constrained in its promulgation of norms and values, or derivatives of international institutional practices, (see Chapter 5). What this establishes is that an empirical analysis of the evolution of the G7 does not neatly fit within the confines of pre-existing primary *or* secondary institutional categorisations.

For example, even Schouenborg's (2011, p.39) more elastic framing of functional categories (regulating conflict, trade, authoritative communication, international organisation) represent the performed, or at least attempted performance, of the G7's actions in world politics (see Chapters 3, 4 & 5). Thus, while pre-existing work on the G-Summits more broadly has explicitly positioned them as a secondary institution (Naylor, 2019a, p.84), and certainly not as equating to a primary institution,[228]

[228] It is interesting to note that, as per Chapter 3 and Chapter 7, some of the early supporters of the creation of the G7 saw it as the embodiment of a new 'Great Power Concert' akin to the Concert of Europe. While the early years of the G7 perhaps did not live up to this expectation, the gradual expansion of the G7's remit and the recent shift in the role of the G7 (see following Sections) poses important questions as to why the G7 has

this chapter aims to empirically challenge these representations by arguing that the G7 demonstrates that it embodies multiple elements of primary institutional functionality. Moreover, at the same time, it will be argued that the G7 does not fit neatly within the formalised structural categories of secondary institutions. Instead, the G7 fulfils many of the claimed reinforcing roles that secondary institutions play in structuring primary institutions, albeit *by managing* these secondary institutions.

Therefore, as the previous chapters have demonstrated, the evolution of the G7 has not only seen it grow exponentially in terms of its remit and influence, confounding expectations in terms of working *around*, as well as *through*, pre-existing secondary institutions in a manner reminiscent of Great Power political management of world politics, it has also seen the G7 exhibit many of the characteristics of primary institutions.[229] For example, Kopra (2019, p.151) defines a secondary institution as 'stable, goal-oriented international bodies intentionally designed by international actors to manage and regulate common problems in specific areas of pragmatic issues and to govern cooperation according to collectively settled norms and rules, whether legally codified or not'. The G7 was designed by its original members and architects to manage shared economic problems. While it was designed initially as an economic group, even as some of its architects envisioned a wider remit, it has nonetheless evolved beyond specific issue areas and is now involved in almost all aspects of international affairs and global governance structures (see previous chapters). The G7 was not established according to settled norms or rules, in fact it was established in the face of direct competition to rising powers and the challenge to the Western-dominated global governance system (see Chapter 3). The G7 holds no legal codification, nor a legal basis in which it operates in relation to other international institutions and organisations, and it cannot be regarded as being an institution (Baker, 2008, p.103). The G7 is also not what would perhaps be generally regarded as an international 'body' in the sense that it does not have a secretariat, nor a permanent base, nor an institutional framework that formal international bodies such as trade organisations or traditional membership groups, beyond the premise of an annual occurrence and its ministerial sub-sets.

What this means then is that the G7 fits *some* of the characteristics that have come to broadly define a secondary institution, yet it also confounds the expectations of other elements of this definition. Consequently, because the G7 does not clearly fit within the pre-existing definitions of primary and secondary institutions does not necessarily mean that there is a clear route to simplifying our understanding of the G7 so that it does fit. The G7 offers something different, akin to the differing historical examples of fundamental institutions offered by Wight (1977; 1979; see also Buzan, 2005a, p.174), that challenges these pre-existing definitional frameworks. The argument made here then is not that the G7 simply falls through the definitional cracks, but that the G7 has involved into a norm that bridges the differences between the classification of primary and secondary institutions.

Put simply then, rather than being categorised *as* an institution of international society, this chapter argues that the G7 is a form of 'second-order' (Buzan, 2005a, p.190) international society that is

never been considered as embodying the faculties of Great Power management that have been classed within the ES as being a primary institution.

[229] For example, Wilson and Yao (2019) argue that sanctions are a new form of primary institution, yet we can see from the growing remit of the G7 that the G7 both *creates* and *imposes* sanctions, particularly in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine both in 2014 and 2022.

solidarist in nature and underpinned by a 'thick' number of primary institutions.[230] In turn, the G7 exerts significant influence and control over secondary institutions, which are in many ways both supportive of and influential in maintaining the function of this solidarist form of international society. In this vein the following Section will unpack this argument further with a focus on the most recent Summit cycles (2011-present) and the re-emergence of shared norms and values between the member states in the face of global disorder.

6.2 The re-emergence of common values: The G7 rises again 2011-2023

The norms and values that we began to see the G7 start to coalesce around in opposition to, or at the least in contestation to, the emerging challenge of rising powers and the G20 in Chapter 5 provides the starting point for understanding how this was to evolve in the next summit cycle. The fallout and ramifications of the Arab Spring on both regional and international order (Bowen, 2013) were to have a major impact at the Deauville Summit in 2011 (G8, 2011a; 2011b). The impact of these uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa were of particular importance to European members of the G7, especially those who had past colonial relationships with many of these states. The catastrophic breakdown in social and political order as popular calls for freedom and democracy turned into violent civil war and repression brought this regional conflagration directly to the G7's table.

The purported prominence of shared democratic norms and values of the G7 inevitably clashed with some of the careful diplomatic balancing acts these states were attempting to manage between political support for established regimes and the political, as well as military action, to protect civilians (Hilsum, 2013). In fact, the marrying of these principles with the political, at least on paper, support for those on the streets calling for more freedom in the Arab world was a remarkable about-face for many of the G7[231] leaders who had welcomed, and indeed were involved with direct support for many of the regime leaders in the region.

The value, then, of these shared norms and values being promoted as what the G7 *stood for* in world politics was a reassertion not only of the G7's performative role in world politics, but also a recognition amongst the G7 member states that in upholding and sharing these norms and values the present political repression amongst many of these Arab and North African states was now a symbol of *injustice* in world politics and therefore, ala Bull (2000b), a destabilising factor that threatened international order. The Deauville Summit therefore came to represent a new normative high-water mark for many of the G7 states at this point in the Summits framing of its role in world politics. Similarly, the solidarity shown with Japan in the face of the worst civilian nuclear disaster to ever face the country, following a massive earthquake off the East coast of the country and the meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear power plant, was a symbol of cohesive unity in the group.

However, events in the Middle East and North Africa would sunder much of the cohesive unity amongst the group as the divergent political norms and values between the G7 states and fellow member Russia came to the fore as military intervention in Libya came unstuck and turned into regime

[230] See Pella (2014, p.101-102) for an historical example of perhaps a less 'thick' form of second-order, or regional, international society. Also see Ibrahim (2019); Spandler, (2019).
[231] I use the G7 here because the Russians continued to maintain support for the Syrian regime.

change in direct opposition to what the Russian's had agreed to when not vetoing the UNSC resolution on militarily intervention by Western powers to protect civilians (Hilsum, 2013). The partial collapse of the regime in Syria, and the retreat of the Iraqi government from the North of the country in the face of a rampant Islamic insurgency, turned the regional tinder-box into a burning pit of transnational terrorist organisations asserting their own statehood and the direct military intervention into the region of many of the G8 member states, in a quasi-19th Century 'Great Game', that would have serious long-term repercussions for the region and the basis of the pre-existing society of states. This breakdown in relations not just between the US and Russia, but more widely between the other members of the G7 and Russia over regional interventions underlined a more fundamental split in the emergent norms and values of the group as hard power politics returned to the world in a way that had not been seen since the end of the Cold War.

The following two Summits at Camp David in 2012 and Lough Erne in 2013 were indicative of this breakdown in the management of international order in world politics. Ostensibly covering global issues such as the disruption to global oil supplies brought about by the Arab Spring (G8, 2012a) the Camp David Summit nonetheless still focused upon economic growth and how to boost confidence in international economies. In particular, the focus was upon G7 member states and Europe, as the fallout from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Eurozone crisis continued to bite, but also have wider global implications on the stability of international economic order (G8, 2012b; Tooze, 2019).

Nevertheless, the political and economic issues of climate change, food security and energy security were once again on the agenda at both Summits as the implications of the disorder in the Middle East and North Africa continued to undermine both energy supply and impact upon food shortages in the region (G8, 2012b; 2013). The Lough Erne Summit did, however, diverge from many of the previous Summits by developing a specific focus upon tax transparency and equalisation in supporting development and economic growth (G8, 2013). However, while welcoming the OECD's efforts on analysing this issue, and indeed extolling the virtues of the OECD in drawing up future proposals for the leaders to consider, it was clear that in 2013 there was insufficient focus and agreement between the G7 leaders to warrant any significant progress.

This is an important issue to focus upon for the relationship between the perceived legitimacy of the G7 and the management of international order. Much as the 2010 Muskoka Summit had deliberately focused upon issues of transparency and accountability that set it apart from the G20, the Lough Erne Summit built upon this narrative by making transparency in tax, and ultimately equality and fairness in global financial regimes, a key pillar of its call of the ending of international financial *injustice* in world politics. Thus, whilst this call was primarily about equalising tax regimes between developed states, it was nonetheless intended to have a wider impact by establishing an international financial order that would remove serious elements of injustice and preserve the longevity of the pre-existing liberal economic framework.

The following Summit in 2014, initially meant to be held in Sochi, Russia, is where the pre-existing G8 Summit framework for managing international order was fractured. The post-Cold War international security status quo was sundered when Russia invaded its neighbour (Engelbrekt, 2016). Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, the G7 leaders met separately from Russia and at first suspended and then expelled Russia from the Group (Smale and Shear, 2014; Menon and Rumer, 2015; Prodi, 2016,

p.7). This breach of international norms, and of Ukrainian sovereignty, was a shock to the principles, norms, and values not only of the G7, but also of the wider international community. The reversion to Great Power politics and acts of 19th Century colonial practice were anathema to the shared liberal democratic norms and values held by other members of the G8 who rejected the hosting of the Summit in Sochi (Engelbrekt, 2016, p.107) and instead held the Summit at a 'neutral' setting of Brussels, hosted by the EU.[232]

The message from the Brussels Summit condemned the Russian actions, yet the qualified nature of the support for Ukraine (G7, 2014a) was a reflection not only of the reluctance of some G7 member states to be drawn into a wider conflict with Russia, but also of the myriad and complicated relationship between some European member states, such as Germany and Russia over historical, political, and energy reliance issues. In fact, these political condemnations, and statements of foreign policy coordination from the newly re-emerged G7 were also caveated due to the ongoing instability and disorder in the Middle East and North Africa. As the situation in Libya continued to spiral out of control and the Russian interference and support for the regime in Syria continued to drive a civil war and refugee crisis that was beginning to have much wider implications for both Europe and the G7 member states as a group, the need to keep a delicate political balance was apparent to many G7 states as a necessity in maintaining some semblance of the effective management of international order.[233]

The Brussels Summit therefore concluded with pledges of financial assistance to Ukraine, and indeed sanctions upon targeted individuals and organisations in Russia (G7, 2014b). These were, however, limited in nature and the overarching narrative that emerged from Brussels was of a G7 that had acted to preserve its own set of norms and values by ejecting Russia from membership of its society of powerful states, but did not have the political will to rally a stronger response out of fear of destabilising the pre-existing framework of international order.

The following year in Schloss Elmau the G7 leaders extolled the virtues of their shared democratic norms and values that supported the territorial integrity of states in world politics (G7, 2015; Stiles, 2015). Yet, again, the condemnation of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine was divided. Premised instead upon a division of responsibilities between the member states with France and Germany leading the way in a quasi-bilateral/trilateral 'Normandy Format' in negotiations with the Russians that framed the original Minsk Agreements (G7, 2015; Hadano, 2020). These negotiations were, however, a framework of negotiation that prioritised the perspective of those European states, as well as Ukraine at the time, in trying to achieve a military settlement at the earliest possible opportunity, but not a wider solution to the international crisis that was sliding further out of control (D'Anieri, 2019, p.246-249).

Put simply, the responsibility for managing international order, and negotiating with Russia, had been handed off to those states who had the most interest in drawing together a settlement that acquiesced to at least some of Russia's territorial gains, and avoided dealing directly with the revived imperialism of Russian nationalism. The G7's lack of purpose and unity in this case meant that they

[232] The EU has had a seat at the G7 table since 1977, although it is not accredited as a 'numerical' member the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council, on paper at least, have an equal voice in the discussions.

[233] This balancing act was also representative of relations in the UNSC.

had maintained the illusion of shared liberal democratic norms and values *between themselves* but had abrogated their own perceived responsibility in maintaining international order, similar in nature to the failures of the Cold War Superpowers to demonstrate effective leadership in world politics (Bull, 1980a).

While the G7 did attempt to focus on global issues such as the upcoming COP21 the affirmations on climate, global health, and cross-border cooperation on tax at Schloss Elmau (G7, 2015) were lacklustre at best. The ongoing crisis in Ukraine overshadowed any specific action point that the 2015 Summit was able to articulate, or indeed find agreement on. The legitimacy of the G7 based on the perception of effectiveness as the framework for managing international order was being undermined, yet the leaders were unable, or unwilling, to find a common position that recognised the scale of the change, or the ongoing 'crisis slide' (Bell, 1971) in world politics.[234]

This modern 'Concert of Great Powers' (Kirton, 1989; Watson, 2007; Mitzen, 2013) was, therefore, only as effective, and legitimate, as its ability to instil, shape, and promote its set of norms and values as the standard at which international order would be set. The expulsion of one of its own members due to the breaching of the pre-existing framework of international order, and the subsequent inability of the G7 to go beyond symbolic condemnation meant that the excommunication of Russia from the G8 was not in-and-of-itself enough to frame a new narrative of international legitimacy for a fractured G7.

Instead, the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit attempted to pivot from the wider engagement with the Russo-Ukrainian conflict towards a host-led focus upon economic policies. Much as Lough Erne had focused on the key issues of tax transparency that animated the UK government, for the Japanese hosts the importance of global economic growth in supporting the stimulus policies of 'Abenomics' (Reuters,

[234] The Russian annexation of the Crimea, and large parts of the Donbas region, by 'little green men' in 2014 (Ostrovosky, 2018, p.8; D'Anieri, 2019, p.1) was the culmination of a political and economic conflict between the contesting viewpoints and ideologies of an expanding Europe and a post-Cold War Russia that wished to reassert its historical regional and global role in world politics. It was a conflict long in the making, brought about through the power politics clash of 19th Century conceptions of traditional Russian spheres of influence (Bechev, 2017; D'Anieri, 2019, p.251; Spohr, 2019, p.594) and a rising Russian nationalism in the face of the decadent and encroaching 'West'. The tipping point for Russia had been the unexpected fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 (Ostrovosky, 2018, p.314) following street protests and political uprisings (Spohr, 2019, p.598) as Yanukovych tried, and failed, to play both sides of the competing geo-political spheres of interest (Menon and Rumer, 2015; D'Anieri, 2019, p.251). This was the trigger, and the excuse, for Russian President Vladimir Putin to restore 'order' and 'protect' Russian minorities in the East and South of Ukraine. The Western response to this conflict through the imposition of economic sanctions were both largely ineffective. Even additional sanctions following the Russian downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 over Eastern Ukraine (Menon and Rumer, 2015, p.xiii; D'Anieri, 2019, p.244) were largely symbolic and reflective of the inherent hold that Russian energy and mineral exports held over many European states. For historical background and a wider discussion on the relationship and causes of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the wider relationship between Russian perceptions of Great Power status and spheres of influence, see Warner and Warner, 1975; Wight, 1977; Gong, 1984; Kennedy, 1989; Watson, 1989; Pavliuk, 2002; Service, 2003; Connaughton, 2004; Zielonka, 2007; Haukkala, 2008a; 2008b; 2015; 2016; Zamoyski, 2008; Tumanov et al, 2011; Saivetz, 2012; Macfarlane and Menon, 2014; Pridham, 2014; Ross Smith, 2014; Menon and Rumer, 2015; Neumann, 2011; Lieven, 2016; Plokhy, 2016; 2018; 2022; 2023; Bechev, 2017; Ostrovsky, 2018; Westad, 2018; Burns, 2019; D'Anieri, 2019; Spohr, 2019; O'Brien, 2023.

2016) were key to encouraging the coordinated economic efforts of G7 member states (G7, 2016). The Ise-Shima Summit was, then, a reflection of the recognition amongst the leaders of the G7 of the need for them to work cooperatively together on interconnected global issues they could agree on by building on the close personal rapport that many of the regular Summit attendees had developed over time.[235] Yet, this informality and close personal bond between many of the G7 leaders did not translate into a coordinated effort to tackle the growing challenge posed by Russian aggression in part because these leaders were united in agreement that provoking further conflict would be *destabilising* to international order, even if the unjust nature of the conflict clashed directly with their perceived role in defending liberal international norms and values.

However, the changing of the leaders who were to attend the 2017 Taormina Summit fundamentally altered not only the pre-existing bonds between the G7 leaders, it also demonstrated again the inherent problems associated with a framework of managing international order that relies on the agreement between individual leaders.[236] While the disorderly conduct of the Trump administrations international actions were only beginning to show early signs of its wider impact at this point, it was clear from very early on that the disruptive nature of the individual himself would be translated into the interpersonal setting of the G7.[237]

The focus of many of the G7 leaders, including the new French President Emmanuel Macron, was to try and develop an interpersonal relationship with the US President to establish a basis for a common outlook on global issues (Reuters, 2017). This 'spirit of cooperation' at Taormina (G7, 2017) extolled by the leaders' communiqué was a clear example of the failure to find a common bond between the leaders on intractable issues. Instead, the concern of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict and the 'shared interest in maintaining the rules-based international order' (G7, 2017) were statements directed just as much to the internal membership of the G7, and the leader of its leading state, as they were to a wider world politics.

Nonetheless, discussions prior to the Taormina Summit had resulted in the G7 Finance Ministers agreeing the *Bari Policy Agenda* which saw the G7 beginning to tackle structural economic inequalities that were stymieing economic growth and perpetuating economic inequality in both member states and at a global level. This represented a significant step towards the G7 engaging with a new global issue that had previously been outside of their remit (Martelli et al, 2018, p.228).[238] In fact, this agenda on inequality was continued at the 2018 Charlevoix Summit with a further commitment to equality in economic growth (Martelli and Bartolomucci, 2019, p.275), yet this leaders' Summit continued to reflect the fundamental breakdown in interpersonal trust and cooperation that sustains the shared norms and values of the G7 itself.

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[235] Barack Obama, Angela Merkel, David Cameron, and Shinzo Abe had all been regular attendees through the previous five or more Summits. In fact, the close personal rapport between Barack Obama and Angela Merkel at the Schloss Elmau Summit was apparent to all (CNN, 2015).

[236] The US, UK and France all changed leaders between Ise Shima and Taormina.

[237] See Buzan (2005a, p.155) who highlights the important point that the sustainability of solidarist forms of international society are vulnerable to domestic political challenges.

[238] Martelli and Bartolomucci (2019) identify that the G7 came to a common agreement but there were no country-specific commitments put in place. While some G20 countries have taken up specific commitments, there was a lack of common agreement amongst the G20 on the issue of inequality. See Chapter 5 for this constraint on normative agreements and actions.

The fracturing of the relationship between the Canadian host Justin Trudeau and the US President Donald Trump was a wider reflection of the instability and gridlock within the G7 (BBC, 2018a). The lack of a common framework of cooperation on key issues such as international trade and economic tariffs that had underpinned much of the past discussions of G7 leaders meant that the Charlevoix Summit was held in the shadow of the now apparent divergent norms and values *within* the G7 itself. This was fundamentally undermining of the G7's perceived legitimacy, and effectiveness, in managing international order in the face of rising *disorder* in world politics with further Russian exertion of political and military power in the Middle East and the use of chemical weapons on UK soil to target a political dissident (BBC, 2018b). These clear breaches of the norms and values that underpinned the pre-existing structures of a liberal international order were a direct challenge to the G7's purported ability to manage such crises, and the leaders were failing to respond in a cohesive and coordinated manner (G7, 2018).[239]

While this inability to comprehensively agree on firm policy solutions, or even coordinated economic action was neither a new principle nor a rare occurrence in the history of the G7 Summits (see Chapters 3, 4 & 5), the scale, and specific nature of the disagreements, in particular over the rejection by the US of the pre-existing framework of international norms on trade and international dispute resolutions (Zaccaria, 2022), meant that the principle of behind-closed-doors informal deliberation was also being hung out for all to see.

The fracturing of the norms held by the G7 were still apparent in the run-up to the 2019 Summit in Biarritz with President Trump openly calling for the readmission of Russia to the Group (France24, 2019), while other G7 leaders were condemning the impact and norm breaking taboos of the use of chemical weapons on the soil of one of their own (UN News, 2019). Amid these increasingly chaotic acts of international destabilisation enacted by Russia from the East of Ukraine to Syria; from growing involvement in the Libyan Civil War (CSIS, 2020) to the use of mercenaries across the African continent (Fasanotti, 2022) in the pursuit of resources in a quasi-19th Century Great Power 'scramble' for influence and global political leverage, (Scipio, 1965, p.25; Bull, 1989a; Pakenham, 1991; Jackson, 2003, p.12), the global disorder facing world politics was growing. Whilst the host state was able to further push its Sahel Action Plan (G7, 2019b) for countering rising extremism and terrorist groups across vast swathes of Central Africa, reflective again of the G7's widening remit in attempting to manage growing security threats to international order (Penttilä, 2003; Engelbrekt, 2016), this was the high point of any agreements made at the Summit.

With the Biarritz Summit succinct in its final communiqué in asserting the unity of the Group's shared norms and values, it nonetheless had to throw a minor gift to the US President by floating the idea of WTO reform (G7, 2019a) to overcome the perception of a diplomatic rupture amongst the group. However, the disruptive nature of the Trump Presidency was once again not only setting the agenda of the G7 it was also tearing it to shreds in terms of policy convergence, agreements, or even clear action points for effectively working *through* international institutions and organisations (G7, 2019a). Put simply, it was not possible for the G7 to cohesively set the agenda or instruct these international institutions on taking-action when the leader of the US wished to dismantle and break up the formal institutions that underpinned the framework of the rules-based international order, and that the G7

[239] See Duncombe and Dunne (2018); Lawson and Zarakol (2023); Bajpai and Laksmana (2023) for examples of challenges posed to the liberal international order.

relied upon to exert hegemonic control. The perceived role of the G7 in managing international order was, therefore, under growing threat from not only outside the G7 group of states (see Chapter 5), but also now from within.

This level of disunity amongst the G7 was further enhanced the following year when COVID-19 struck the globe. As the world economy stuttered to a halt and the life cycle of globalisation as a concept was called into question, the pre-existing international order upon which the global relationship between states had been built fractured and came apart as barriers to trade, movement and interpersonal connections were once again raised or turned into online bubbles.[240] The impact upon the G7 was no less apparent. The 2020 Summit that had been due to be held at Camp David was transferred online, and then cancelled entirely. The first time a G7 Summit had been cancelled since its inception in 1975.

However, as the scale of the impact of the pandemic became apparent the G7 leaders held an emergency online meeting in March 2020 where they discussed the coordination of their efforts and a global response (G7, 2020). In the face of clearly divergent efforts and understandings of the scale of the pandemic amongst the leaders of the G7, in particular President Trump (Wintour, 2020), the coordination effort of the G7 was to set the agenda *for* finance ministers and health agencies to coordinate at the lower level of global policy management in stymieing the slide of the international crisis (G7, 2020) even without clear agreement from the US.

Thus, the re-emergent role of the G7 in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic had almost returned it to its historical roots as an agenda setter (Baker, 2006; Dobson, 2007) in coordinating the financial response to an economic crisis by delegating to finance ministers and international institutions to act *beyond*, and *around* the traditional frameworks for managing international economic order. Looking back at the historical record of the G7 (see Appendix) we can see that while the level of divergence in the norms and values between the leaders was of a new type that challenged certain fundamental norms and values that had developed between the group, the specific disagreements over policy responses were not significantly out of sync with earlier Summit cycles. Contra, then, to rather prosaic predictions of the demise of the importance of the G7 in managing international order (Bremmer, 2012; Archarya et al, 2019, p.64), even in the face of the internal challenge posed to the cohesive norms and values of the G7 by the US Presidency of Donald Trump, the G7 still managed to act to maintain international economic order and to sustain its own legitimacy by coordinating the political agenda for others to follow at the global level.

The COVID-19 pandemic, whilst threatening the very nature of a globalised and interconnected world did not, ultimately, fracture the pre-existing international economic order beyond what the coordinated, and individual, financial stimulus actions of the leading economic powers were able to cope with. The 2021 Summit at Carbis Bay was, then, both a reflection of the survival of the pre-existing framework of the relations between states, but it was also an indication of a change in the G7's remit and role in world politics as the new US President, Joe Biden, began to make serious efforts at not only repairing the diplomatic damage done to the US's reputation by the previous administration, but also began to drive forward a coordinated effort at cohesively addressing global

[240] Naylor's (2020) study on the breakdown of these key elements of interpersonal relations during the online G-Summits is particularly important for framing why this element is key to the G7.

issues through a cooperative grouping of powerful states that shared similar norms and values (Foreign Policy, 2021; Sevastopulo et al, 2021).

The Carbis Bay Summit was therefore a game-changer in terms of both G7 cooperation but also in the reassertion of a concerted set of 'Western' norms and values held by the G7 leaders (Rachman, 2021). The re-emergence of a cohesive set of norms, principles and values held by the G7 member states and leaders based upon democracy, freedom and the rules-based international order was underpinned by this change in political leadership amongst the G7. From the cohesive agreement on transnational coordination of corporate tax policies (Financial Times, 2021; Giles and Strauss, 2021; Sandbu, 2021), an issue that had been unmoving since the Lough Erne Summit, to the global coordination of vaccine deliveries and pledges to vaccinate the poorest in the world (G7, 2021a; Parker et al, 2021a),[241] the G7 was once again demonstrating a united front. With the additional promise of a global economic stimulus (Parker and Politi, 2021) to reverse the effects of the pandemic on growth and prosperity the G7 was again asserting itself as a concert of leading powers who held the legitimacy in acting as the guardians of international order and the foundations of a cooperative international society (G7, 2021a; Tett, 2021).

While much of these coordination efforts in further establishing global tax policies, and the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as stimulating economic growth (G7, 2021a) were interrelated with the actions and role of the G20,[242] there was no doubt that the G7 leaders' now saw themselves once again at the 'apex' (Hajnal, 1999; Baker, 2006) of global governance structures in setting the agenda for other institutions, organisations, and Summits, to fulfil the policy directions they had initiated. However, the concerted effort made by President Biden to drive forward G7 action in the face of a perceived rising threat to international order from China was reflective of the past roadblocks that certain member states, such as Germany, had placed in front of a coordinated and common responding to Russian revisionism at both the 2014 Brussels and 2015 Schloss Elmau Summits. The internal contestation between the political norms and interests of the G7 member states continued to undermine any unity of purpose on the issue of China (Parker et al, 2021b; Parker and Cameron-Chileshe, 2021).

These differences in foreign policy objectives were highlighted once again by the abrupt US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the subsequent collapse and chaos that resulted in an emergency G7 Summit to coordinate the response and manage the threat to international order from the fallout (G7, 2021b). However, by bringing together both the leadership of the UN and of NATO, the G7 once again asserted its role as the international coordinator (G7, 2021b), and manager, of a

[241] Even if this was perceived as inadequate in scale to deal with the global health crisis (Peel et al, 2021).
[242] The G20 in the post-2014 fracturing of the G8 Summit model seemed to have adopted an almost deliberate blindness to state-based actions linked to international conflicts (Engelbrekt, 2016, p. 109). As this section latterly demonstrates the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine dramatically changed the cooperative dynamic within the G20 ministerial level meetings (see Parkin and Schwartz, 2023; Wheatley, 2023; Wintour, 2023b) and has led to the embedding of political and diplomatic dysfunction in the G20, certainly in comparison to the G7 (Giles, 2023). A clear example of this that links to the differing norms and values argument laid out in Section 5.1 is that the agreed declaration from the 2023 G20 in Delhi was fraught with disagreement and had to settle on wording about Russia's invasion of Ukraine that member states held 'different views and assessments' on the conflict (Ellis-Petersen, 2023).

disparate grouping of formal international institutions and organisations which were, on paper at least, those who held the authority and responsibility to manage the response to international crises.

In other words, the G7's role in tackling international security issues (Penttilä, 2003; Engelbrekt, 2016) had now taken on a starkly different managerial role as it began setting the agenda for organisations that had previously been seen as outside the purview of the G7, or military based alliances that the G7 had no real role in coordinating. This turn in events is an overlooked shift in our contemporary understanding of the changing role and importance of the G7. Not only was the G7 now acting *through* these international organisations it was also leading from a position whereby the G7 *represented* the ideals shared by these groups in defending the liberal international order. As we will see next, the once thin curtain that obscured any pretence that the G7 had in acting as a Great Power Concert was soon to be stripped away further following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine[243] was, and is, of a very different nature and scale to the 2014 conflict. The resurgent nationalism and hybrid warfare-come politically repressive propaganda of the Russian state has framed this conflict as an existential threat from Ukrainian nationalists and 'fascists' that Russia must purge for the benefit of the unified Russian and Ukrainian people (Kuzio, 2022; Smart, 2022). In reality, this conflict is imperialistic and colonial in nature (Bechev, 2017). It represents not only a fracturing of contemporary conceptions of sovereignty (Jackson, 2003), but also of the norms and values surrounding arguments in favour of the breaching of sovereignty (Wheeler, 2000). Put simply, contemporary debates within international relations had focused upon conflicts intended to defeat specific adversaries such as non-state actor groups, or to intervene in other states to prevent acts of genocide, not, as per this new world order, a return to the historical practice of colonisation (Lieven, 2022). The revival of Russian colonial ambitions, and the use of military force to acquire such territories has fractured the pre-existing norms and values that underpinned much of the post-Cold War period (Hurrell, 1992) and created a new world disorder (Rachman, 2022d).

The war in Ukraine, and the 'crisis slide' (Bell, 1971) that has brought the world to this point, has not only brought a major land-based war to the European continent for the first time since the end of the Second World War, it has also demonstrated the fundamental fracturing of the global liberal economic order that had been based upon mutual economic cooperation and dependence (Menon and Rumer, 2015). This cooperation and interdependence have become weaponised by Russia through the use energy as a tool of economic and political pressure, no longer only upon states that Russia sees as within its sphere of influence, but also on powerful European states (Hill, 2002; Bechev, 2017; Astrashheuskaya et al, 2022; Dempsey et al, 2022; Sabadus, 2022). These actions have the historical hallmarks of the OPEC oil cartels punishment of the US and Europe in the 1970s for its support of Israel, and indeed the origins of the G7 itself (Economist, 2022g; Rachman, 2022e; Romei and Smith, 2022). However, the historical similarities are, importantly, different in their magnitude. The 1973 Yom Kippur war saw the dominant superpowers maintaining a degree of balance between themselves and other parties (Bell, 1974; Rabinovich, 2017). In this case the war in Ukraine is being conducted *by* the

[243] For wider coverage, and analysis, of the 2022 invasion see Brower and Olearchyk, 2022; FT, 2022; Hall and Olearchyk, 2022; Olearchyk, 2022; Olearchyk and Rathbone, 2022; Rachman, 2022a; Rathbone and Seddon, 2022; Rathbone et al, 2022; Sabbagh, 2022; Seddon, 2022; Seddon et al, 2022; Seddon and Brower, 2022; Schwartz, 2022; Tondo, 2022; Tondo and Sauer, 2022.

former superpower who wishes to reassert its role as a Great Power on the international stage, while the Ukrainian defenders are being armed, supplied, and supported by the leading international power and several former, or quasi-former, Great Power states.

The fact that Russia used to be a member of the G8 is therefore all the more damaging for the G7's reputation and standing, yet this war has forced a fundamental re-think amongst the Western-led powers on both how to respond and how to overcome their own internal differences. Where the G7's response to this conflict differs from that of 2014 is not merely in the overcoming of personal differences between the leaders on geopolitical priorities, albeit this has assisted in framing a more unified response (Broadman and Abdallah, 2022; DW, 2022), but instead in the manner in which the G7 now sees itself at the vanguard of responsibility to stand up to this rising aggression and threat to international order (White House, 2022).

This leading role in shaping and managing the Western-led response to the war can be seen with the G7 holding multiple emergency Summits, both online and in-person, to coordinate action in the run up to the 2022 Schloss Elmau Summit (G7, 2022a; 2022b; 2022c).[244] The G7's response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has been both unified and cohesive (Spohr, 2022; Wintour, 2022). From political condemnation to economic sanctions and the seizing of economic assets (Economist, 2022e; Reuters, 2022; Seddon et al, 2022) the G7 member states, along with many other Western states, have combined in presenting a unified front towards the Russian aggression with many member states actively facilitating, and supplying, the Ukrainian efforts at resisting and pushing the Russian forces back.[245]

When combined with the wider concern that potential Russian success on the battlefield would be a symbolic reassurance to other perceived revisionist and assertive powers such as China (Kang, 2010; Yahuda, 2011; Rachman, 2016; Hille, 2022b; Politi et al, 2022b), the G7 also discussed and emphasised the principles of territorial integrity that they hold to be sacrosanct in world politics. In sum, the discussion of formerly taboo subjects such as repression in Hong Kong and the threat posed to an independent Taiwan (Economist, 2022a; G7, 2022d) are a deliberate and direct message to other revisionist powers that the G7 will stand firm and respond accordingly to any future attempts at revitalising imperialistic practices that further threaten the principles of the liberal international order.

The 2022 Schloss Elmau Summit has also reflected the wider responsibility, and indeed remit, that the G7 sees itself in holding when tackling the fallout from this conflict. On the agenda of the 2022 Summit were the interconnected issues of global food security in the face of serious risks of starvation around the world due to the blockading of Ukrainian ports (Economist, 2022c; 2022d; Rathbone and Terazono, 2022; Ustenko, 2022); as well as energy security for both Europe and the wider global impact that have resulted from oil being used as a hegemonic tool of control in stoking disorder between rising

[244] Much of the pre-Summit diplomacy between the G7 powers over the impact of sanctions and the attempted bans on Russian crude oil were largely resolved prior to the 2022 Schloss Elmau Summit itself. Whilst there is no doubt there was disagreement, and indeed there still is disagreement over other issues, the leaders were nonetheless able to present a united front in June that went beyond mere pageantry. For a reporting of these diplomatic disagreements prior to the Summit see Kazmin, 2022; Politi et al, 2022a; Rachman, 2022c; Rovnick et al, 2022; Slaughter, 2022; Varvitsioti et al, 2022.

[245] For wider reporting on the response by the G7 see Chazan, 2022; Chazan et al, 2022a; Chazan et al, 2022b; Fleming et al, 2022; Fleming and Chazan, 2022; Politi and Fleming, 2022; Romei et al, 2022; Sabbagh and Elgot, 2022; Walker and Sparrow, 2022.

and established powers alike (Colgan, 2021; Economist, 2022h). At the same time the G7 has not been reticent in responding to other threats to international order with the G7 foreign ministers meeting to discuss the resumption of North Korean missile testing over Japanese islands (Ninivaggi and Johnson, 2023; Observer, 2023, p.42) prior to the 2023 Hiroshima Summit.

Again, this demonstrates not just that the role and influence of the G7 has gone beyond its management of economic issues, but that the G7 is no longer shy in involving itself in serious global problems that would have in the past been either avoided or handled less confrontationally in light of the perceived diversity of interests and values held by those rising powers who contest the G7's legitimacy to be involved. For example, the G7's growing response to the Russo-Ukraine war can be seen in its ground-breaking creation, and imposition, of a global oil price cap to stymie the financial benefits that Russia gains from its exporting of fossil fuels (Wilson et al, 2022). While there is clear evidence that both the Russian state and other groups have actively attempted to circumvent this oil price cap[246] (Cook et al, 2023, p.1; Wilson et al, 2023, p.6), the long-term economic effects of this and more cohesive international sanctions pushed by the G7 have clearly had a detrimental impact on the Russian economy (Economist, 2023c, p.17; Financial Times, 2023, p.1).[247]

These economic sanctions, and the attempt at global regulation of oil sales from Russia, have demonstrated yet again that the G7 gains its legitimacy *through action*. In other words, while the oil price cap and international sanctions regime may not be recognised as legitimate by many states, these states are nonetheless having to act *around* these economic rules and norms as the G7 has the power to shape the rules of international economic order.[248] Further examples of this are the G7's coordinated actions in restricting less well known aspects of international trade in both rare gems and minerals (Cornish et al, 2023; Pickard et al, 2023) in order to stymie the Russian economy. Much as the G7 did in the 1980s with the creation of the FATF, where the G7 chooses to act independently of pre-existing international institutions when there are no viable frameworks for acting, the G7 is able to exert hegemonic control over economic revenue sources, shaping the future rules of international trade in commodities (Engelbrekt, 2015, p.539-540).

Further reinforcement of the G7's role in managing international order outside of the economic sphere can be seen in its recent statement *at* the NATO Summit in Vilnius declaring the G7's 'enduring' support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression along with bilateral security commitments (Foy et al, 2023c; G7, 2023a). Importantly, the G7 has demonstrated not only that it is willing to act in a more cohesive manner than international organisations such as NATO it is also direction-setting for other international organisations, such as the European Commission, the ECB, and other central banks,

[246] Many states who have not agreed to the G7's oil price cap, such as fellow BRICS states India and China, have been more than willing to import additional oil from Russia at discounted prices (Economist, 2023b, p.56; Seddon and Leahy, 2023). This not only highlights further the disparate manner in which the Ukraine war has been responded to at the international level, both economically and ideologically (see Section 5.1), but it also demonstrates that the holistic effects of the G7's oil price cap and the discounted subversion of this has led other groups such as OPEC to deliberately reduce production in order to support a price floor (Brower and Sheppard, 2023), further impacting the Russian economy (see Lex, 2023, p.24).

[247] For wider reporting of the impact of economic sanctions led by the G7 and its member states see Foy et al, 2023a; Keatinge, 2023; Mason, 2023; Pickard et al, 2023; Politi et al, 2023; Rankin and Borger, 2023; Sevastopulo et al, 2023; Stognei, 2023; Tankersley, 2023; Wilson, 2023; Wilson et al, 2023.

[248] India, for example, has benefitted from discounted oil imports from Russia but has also said it will obey the oil price cap imposed by the G7 (Economist, 2023b, p.56).

who are waiting to take the G7's lead on the use of frozen Russian assets (Economist, 2023d, p.27; Economist, 2023e, p.27).

The 2023 Hiroshima Summit not only continued this united front from the G7 on Ukraine it also demonstrated the growing political, diplomatic, and military influence of Japan in the group with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida declaring that:

> 'Russia's aggression against Ukraine has marked the complete end of the post-Cold War world. This is a moment that will transform history,' (Kishida, 2023a)

This clear and unambiguous position from the East Asian power within the group has demarcated a transformational moment in not only the broader reach of the international condemnation of Russia's actions, but also in the unified global response from the G7. It has unified member states who have not traditionally acted in a leading role in military affairs since the post-1945 international order was created.[249]

The response of the G7 to this international crisis and the threat to the liberal international order has been remarkable not merely for their cohesiveness but also for the comparative with other states in world politics who have responded in a remarkably different manner to the flagrant breach of the norms of international sovereignty that many of these states had held up as the cornerstone of true multipolar anti-hegemonic international order.[250]

The Hiroshima Summit can therefore be seen as a clear example not only of the G7's unity in the face of rising global disorder, but also as a high-water mark in its unified position and role in supporting Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.[251] The leaders of the G7 demonstrated a unity of purpose amid both their statements (G7, 2023b) and their imagery of solidarity with Ukraine by inviting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as a surprise guest to the Summit (Japan News, 2023d; McCurry and Mason, 2023). The decisions made in the build up to the Hiroshima Summit culminated in a clear statement to the world that the G7 will continue to support Ukraine financially and militarily[252] in order to protect the norms and values of the liberal international order.[253] This point was emphasised further by the G7 increasing its directed criticism at what it sees as the rising military ambitions of China and the destabilisation of the pre-existing international order (Davidson, 2023; Sevastopulo et al, 2023).

This growing cohesiveness of the G7 on shared norms and values has also indicated a shift in the perceived legitimacy of the group amongst other international actors and international NGOs with

[249] See Dobson (2003) and Hook et al (2011) as well as Kishida (2023b).
[250] For examples of this lack of response to Russia's actions and to the hypocrisy of positions that leading states had previously held as sacrosanct see Cotterill et al, 2023; Foy et al, 2023b; Leahy et al, 2023; Pitel and Chazan, 2023; Wintour, 2023a. Also see Zagorski (2010) on Russian perspectives on what a multipolar world order looks like.
[251] For reporting on the deliberations and decisions of the G7 leaders in Hiroshima see Japan News, 2023a; 2023b; 2023c; Johnson, 2023; Johnson and Ninivaggi, 2023; Ninivaggi and Johnson, 2023;
[252] For examples of military support agreed just prior to, and at, the G7 Summit in Hiroshima see McCurry, 2023; Sabbagh and Borger, 2023; Schwartz et al, 2023.
[253] Jake Sullivan, US President Biden's national security advisor, has described the G7 as 'The steering committee of the free world' (see Rachman, 2023a). Also see Japan News (2023e).

some states arguing that the G7 should be given a formal role in designing a future global economy based around a green transition (Rachman, 2023b), or that the G7 should now become the focal point for efforts at mitigating and responding to regional and global crises (International Crisis Group, 2023). This re-emergence of common norms and values at the forefront of the G7's deliberations means that the G7 has now taken the leading role in representing the bulwark of global, though largely Western, opposition to Russia in the face of the failure of formal international institutions such as the UN to respond effectively (Borger, 2022; Economist, 2022b; Luce, 2022). Put simply, in the face of a new world order (Financial Times, 2022; Wolf, 2022a) the G7 has once again become a unified group of powerful 'Western' states (Penttilä, 2003; Mitzen, 2013; Economist, 2023a) who see it as their shared responsibility to meet the challenge posed to international order by the Russian invasion; acting in concert to preserve and protect the modern 'standards of civilisation' that reject a return to 19th Century norms of imperialistic and colonial practices of territorial acquisition and ethnic cleansing (Bechev, 2017; D'Anieri, 2019, p.276; Plokhy, 2023).

6.3 The G7: A Solidarist form of international society?

For Buzan (2005b, p.119), then, the concept of a solidarist form of international society fits closely with the shared economic interests, norms, and values of a liberal economic system (Mayall, 2016), which has underpinned the growing interconnectedness of a globalised world politics (see Chapter 3). Buzan's (2005a, p.59) argument that there is the possibility of pluralist 'thin' forms of international society based around some shared values and the creation of rules is counterposed by the argument that there can also be 'thick' solidarist forms of international society based upon widespread shared norms and values, as well as a collective outlook on shared gains and the collective management of global disorder. In fact, for Buzan (2005a, p.141) the definition of solidarism is one that implies not simply a unity of interests and values amongst a group of actors, but also the collective ability and will to act upon those shared norms and interests.[254]

A key part of Linklater and Suganami's (2006, p.8-9) contemporary reassessment of the ES has been to make the point that thus far ES scholars have not developed a generalised theory of the evolution of international society towards a unified 'community' of world politics. By 'community' Linklater and Suganami (2006, p.9) infer more than either a pluralistic or solidarist form of international society. Instead, they push the normative boundaries of the concept of international society towards a universal and cosmopolitan framework in which the pre-existing boundaries of states and cultures no longer apply. Yet for Buzan (2005a) 'community' can mean a more nuanced focus on the development of a solidarist form of international society, even at a sub-global level. However, where Buzan (2005a, p.146-150) highlights possible examples such as the EU, or security communities such as NATO (also see Jackson, 2003, p.351-355), these examples are based upon formalised constructs of positive law that structure relations between states (see Section 6.1).

Where this chapter diverges from these examples, and highlights a lacuna within the ES more broadly, is in investigating the role of *informal* 'communities' in developing the same underlying definitional

[254] Also see Brown (1995) who argues a similar point that modern international society has shifted from the European cultural base of past conceptions towards common political and normative systems.

principles of a solidarist form of international society. The G7 is both global *and* sub-global in the sense that its membership is elitist and therefore not representative of a wider global set of states, nor is this possibility open to fundamental change due to the social closure of such membership clubs (see Naylor, 2019b). Yet, the G7 acts *on* the global stage and involves itself *in* global issues to a greater degree than other regional or sub-global examples that have been discussed in recent ES work (see Ahrens, 2019; Ibrahim, 2019).

For Knudsen (2019b, p.179), for example, solidarist principles and practices do not merely emerge, they evolve or are designed through diplomatic interaction surrounding the pre-existing framework of rules and norms in world politics. Similarly, Spandler (2015) has built upon Knudsen's ideas in developing a multi-category framework for constituting and institutionalising elements of primary and secondary institutions through practices (also see Navari, 2019, p.62-64). These practices and their resultant output are nonetheless still based upon formal legal norms or role categorisations. The culmination of this chapter is to therefore provide the empirical case study that moves the ES away from its overt focus on formal, legal, and institutional frameworks for understanding international society and into the informal community side of world politics.

As has been seen the previous chapters, the G7 has no basis in international law, it has no formal structure or institutional framework, nor does it have a secretariat or bureaucracy that is embedded within the international legal structures that make up the formal framework of global governance. Thus, the G7 has emerged *without* the legal framework that much of the contemporary ES relies upon when discussing the emergence, or evolution, of solidarist elements of international society, particularly when focused upon formal international organisations (see Ahrens, 2019; Costa Buranelli, 2019; Friedner Parrat, 2019; Kopra, 2019; Schmidt, 2019).

For Navari (2009b, p.14-15),[255] then, the labelling of an international society requires the following; '(1) the demonstration of a self-conscious understanding, on the part of diplomats and state leaders, of a social relationship existing between them; (2) a set of reciprocally understood rules of conduct; and (3) less articulated but rather assumed by ES writers, a minimally shared understanding among political elites in different countries of the role of the state in respect of citizens and subjects'. The question then is whether the G7 in its creation, actions, deliberations, and membership, demonstrate these faculties.

First, the G7 leaders share a self-conscious understanding that they share a special responsibility to not only themselves, but also the group, in attempting to collectively manage intractable global issues (see Chapters 3 and 4). This is a shared self-perception held by each of the G7 leaders. Even when there have been differences of political opinion, each of the member states and their leaders have maintained an understanding that they share a social relationship between each other that is specifically unique in its closeness as part of an elite and selective group. In fact, the exclusively of such an informal community as the G7 means that social closure (Naylor, 2019b) is a well-recognised principles within the 'Old School' thinking on how membership of such societies is determined *by the pre-existing* members (Watson, 2007), and thus representative of a self-conscious understanding amongst the member states of who is and who isn't inside the societal club.

[255] Responding to Finnemore (2001).

Second, the G7 leaders share a reciprocal set of rules or norms of conduct in how they treat each other and how membership of the group entails certain shared rules of conduct such as when a violation of those rules results in the expulsion of a member state. Petty differences between political leaders have come and gone over time,[256] but they have not fundamentally altered nor threatened the status or foundations of the societal relationship of the G7. Instead, as this chapter has deliberated upon, the challenge of *other* non-member states rising in power and influence have in fact reinforced the importance of the shared rules of conduct amongst this social group.

Third, the G7 leaders and states share a common perception of the role of their state as being the protection of both their citizens but also the norms and values of their citizens with each member state being a liberal democracy. They also share a self-perception that the nature of their powerful membership grouping means that they also share a responsibility to globally protect such a framework of liberal international order that in turn protects the concept and values that they believe underpin a modern, liberal, democratic polity.

The key point here is that economic relations, and the interconnected norms values and interests that shape these relations, can and do have a wider impact upon the relations between states than the ES has appreciated in the past (Buzan, 2005b; Beeson and Bell, 2017, p.303). In the context of Brown's (1995) argument on the changing nature of the spread of 'Western' norms and values we can see that Wight's (1977) static conception of cultural norms as underpinning the formation of an international society is challenged by the fact that the geographical boundaries that once intimately shaped shared cultural norms and values no longer fully apply.[257]

In establishing that these shared and interconnected economic relations can shape a form of common values and norms between certain, selective, groupings of states (see Chapter 3), the case study of the G7 now allows us to go further by establishing that the origin of these shared economic relations have been the foundations that have allowed the development of shared norms and values that are 'thick' in nature and are representative of solidarist norms and values that *cross* traditional cultural boundaries.

The potential for this emergence is further highlighted by Buzan and Falkner's (2022a, p.36) recent work where they discuss the role that certain Great Powers can choose to play in managing the global economy through a shared set of values and norms that they perceive to hold them responsible in conducting this management. The emergence, then, of the G7 in the early 1970s in response to a significant challenge posed to the pre-existing management of international economic order and the dominance of 'Western' liberal economic norms (Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Dobson, 2007) feeds directly into Buzan's (2005a, p.157) argument that shared economic values can form the basis of a solidarist form of international society. The following statements from the G7 help demonstrate this narrative.

[256] See Mitterand and Trump (Chapters 4 and 6).
[257] For example, see Hansen (2017) on the overlooked importance of changing communication patterns in the ES.

The G7 Summit Communique from the first meeting at Rambouillet in 1975 states that:

'We came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. We are each responsible for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement. Our success will strengthen, indeed is essential to, democratic societies everywhere'
(G7, 1975)

This framing of not only the shared norms and values that the member states hold, but also the responsibilities this therefore entails to manage international order, as well as protecting and promoting these shared values globally, already underpinned the collective mentality of the emergent G7 member states. This was reflected by the fact that although five of the early member states are European or North American, the inclusion of Japan as a key founding, and leading member state, is key to a diversity of culture and values, but not divergent of the *shared* norms and values held by this society of states.

Put differently, while the founding member states of the G7 did not share a historical cultural similarity, they did all share a common set of pollical norms and values that coalesced around democratic representation, liberal market economics, and a perception as the leading economic powers of the day who shared a responsibility, as well as interest, in managing international economic order. For example, Clark (1993, p.177) has critiqued what he sees as the return to idealism in the response to the 1973 Oil Crisis in the shape of 'collective economic security', however, he nonetheless recognises the importance of how this response was shaped by a fear of the economic disorder that had faced the international system in the 1920s and 1930s, and that the scale of the economic crises had fractured the pre-existing confidence in the post-1945 methods of maintaining order and economic stability (Clark, 1993, p.177).

The emergence of the G7, then, was not simply an affirmation of the political culture of shared democratic norms. If this had been the case, then the membership of the group would have been potentially much larger. Instead, the forming of the G7 was based upon the *principle* that each member state should be a democracy because that was perceived as an integral element of the pre-existing structure of world politics that was under threat. However, the impetus behind the formation of the G7 was the shared *economic* interests in stabilising and maintaining the pre-existing framework of international economic order that continued to serve those member states interests. Put simply, the shared economic interests of these powerful states were the guiding principle of the formation of the G7. The shared cultural and political values between them were a 'standard' by which they guarded the membership of such a group based on both values *and* interests.[258]

We can see this dynamic of interest driven relations, supplemented by shared political and cultural values that are used to gatekeep the emergent 'solidarist' form of international society, play out in the post-Cold War era. The revival of a newly minted Russian Federation onto the world stage underlined the perceived need amongst the G7 leaders to clearly define what exactly the G7 stood for in its societal norms and values. Whilst welcoming, at least partly, the admission of Russia as a quasi-

[258] Both Lesage (2007, p.111) and Payne (2008, p.533) have identified this social element of what they term Western, or Kantian, culture and politics coalescing as part of the bedrock of the G7.

member to the G7, with full membership and expansion to the G8 not occurring until 1998, the G7 member states were acutely aware of both the issues surrounding the norms and values held by the former Communist state, but also the rising problem posed by such an admission on the desire of other powerful states to seek admission to the exclusive club (see Chapters 4 and 5).

In effect, the risk of China, or other states (Hajnal, 1999, p.28-32), demanding a seat at the high-table (Engelbrekt, 2016) of world politics forced the G7 leaders to more clearly define the G7 as a group of 'democratic states' (Spohr, 2019, p.418) with a distinct set of norms and values that they purportedly upheld and protected in the name of a liberal international order. Yet, the perception of Russia's newly emergent democratic principles,[259] embrace of free market economics and financial reform were also ascribed as being key, prior to the Birmingham Summit, in underpinning the legitimacy of admitting Russia to the G7 (Hajnal, 1999, p.27). Essentially the G7 were holding Russia to a new 'standard of civilisation' for admittance to this club of shared solidarist norms and values.

As has been demonstrated in this thesis so far, the G7 has evolved with a perception of shared responsibility amongst its member states to not only manage international order, but to manage international order based on a shared set of norms and values. While this evolution has at times been contested, and the G7 has had to co-habit with a more pluralist world politics in general, or the emergence of specific forms of more diverse and pluralist informal groupings of powerful states (see Chapter 5), the G7 leaders nonetheless saw themselves as representing a more cohesive set of shared norms and interests amongst an elitist membership group. That these shared norms and values have evolved and changed is clear, yet the fundamental norms of democratic political systems, liberal economic policies, and a shared role in defending the liberal international order that surrounds these norms quite clearly frame the G7 states as forming a solidarist society between themselves.

What is important about the emergence of the G7 as a solidarist form of international society can be seen through two key elements. First, the truly global nature of the membership and shared norms and values of the G7. These are not, as mentioned, restrained or dependent upon geographical or cultural boundaries, they are in effect a representation of a newer form of world politics that no longer regards the boundaries of time and space as immutable, but shares a common *global* outlook on how the relations between states should be managed. Second, the fact that this emergent and evolving form of solidarist international society is not framed in *direct opposition* to the wider pluralistic form of international society to which most states belong (Jackson, 2003), is in and of itself distinctive.

The historical record of previous forms of international society that have been exclusive, the European international society of the 19th Century for example, have largely been formed not only to manage relations *between* member states, but also to manage those relations in exclusive opposition to those states or peoples that exist *outside* (Jackson, 1989; 1996; Naylor, 2019b; 2022; Wight, 1991) of international society. Put simply, while the G7 emerged as a form of solidarist international society *in response* to the challenge posed by *other* states to the management of international order, the G7 has become a form of international society that co-exists and attempts to manage the relations *between* the solidarist elements of its international society and those of a pluralist world politics.

[259] Which were in doubt even at the time of admission (Payne, 2008, p.522).

In fact, if we were to use the summary characteristics of a solidarist form of international society put forward by Knudsen (2019b, p.177-178), of the protection of international law or the norms of the rules of international society and the protection of those who exist under those rules, the use of force for the common good and an adherence to the importance of global governance structures and international organisations as integral to upholding these principles, then we can see the G7 as meeting this specific criteria, but also exerting a hegemony over the management of these issues.

The G7 has, and does, promulgate the obeyance of the rules of international law and advocates for the protection of populations by adherence to international law and international norms. Members of the G7 have acted with the use of force to protect these individuals in the past, in the case of Libya for example, or more recently they have coordinated the military and economic support for Ukraine to continue fighting in its defence. Additionally, the G7 works *through* international institutions and organisations, advocating for the status quo usage of the pre-existing structures of global governance, albeit with reforms to improve them. Yet, the G7 also *works around* these structures and can coordinate and influence multiple examples of secondary institutions in achieving its aims.

Nonetheless, while the evolution of the G7 can be viewed, as Adam Watson (2007, p.52) viewed it, as an emergent form of consultative hegemony in world politics, it is not yet the enforcer of a globalised standard of norms and values. This does not, however, mean that the G7 has not *attempted* to enforce a certain solidarist standard on a multitude of issues such as economic rules or political values during its evolution (see Chapters 3 - 6). Yet, as per Bull (2002a), the exertion of these solidarist viewpoints, and indeed the G7's perception that is has a responsibility to exert these norms and values to the wider pluralistic form of international society and world politics as a whole, has not meant these norms and values have not been contested. As the many examples of successes, partial successes, and failures of the G7 have shown; the co-habitation of the G7's form of solidarist international society within a more diverse world politics is not a direct reflection of the historical 19th Century European imposition of norms and values. Instead, this co-habitation (see Image 1) is representative of the co-existence of these differing norms and values, as well as the importance of these differing norms and values shaping both the development of the G7 *as* a solidarist form of international society *as well as* the norms and values of a more pluralistic world politics.

However, the recent response of the G7 to the Russian invasion of Ukraine does indicate some signs of the promulgation of a new 'standard of civilisation' by a select grouping of power states, reminiscent perhaps of the European standards of the 19th Century that came to dominant contemporary world politics. As discussed in Section 6.2, there has been a concerted effort by G7 leaders to coalesce around norms and principles that they perceive Russia to have violated, and which they believe poses a threat to the liberal international order. The expulsion of Russia from the G8 in 2014, and the changing of key members of the G7 leadership in 2021, has meant that the G7 has been able to collectively pivot to a more aggressive framework in defence of their shared norms and values, actively promoting them by acting as the vanguard of the preservation and protection of the liberal world order that is now under threat from international disorder.[260]

[260] This is a different conception of the development of a vanguard to that put forward by Buzan (2005a, p.252) in that this vanguard did not develop in order to 'expand' as per historical examples of empires (Watson, 2009, p.319-321) but in order to *defend* the pre-existing norms and values of a Western dominated world politics.

This is an important point in highlighting the strength of these shared norms and values in the G7, and therefore the underlying framework of these states as forming a solidarist international society. The coalescing of the G7 around shared norms and values in the face of a threat to the pre-existing framework of managing international order that emerged in the 1970s is mirrored in the statements of the G7 almost fifty years later at both Schloss Elmau and Hiroshima. For example, in the 2022 communique the G7 stated that:

'We, the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), met in Elmau on 26-28 June 2022, at a critical juncture for the global community, to make progress towards an equitable world. As open democracies adhering to the rule of law, we are driven by shared values and bound by our commitment to the rules-based multilateral order and to universal human rights.' (G7, 2022d)

While at Hiroshima in 2023 the G7 stated:

'We, the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), met in Hiroshima for our annual Summit on May 19-21, 2023, more united than ever in our determination to meet the global challenges of this moment and set the course for a better future. Our work is rooted in respect for the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and international partnership.'

'We once again condemn in the strongest possible terms the war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine, which constitutes a serious violation of international law, including the UN Charter. Russia's brutal war of aggression represents a threat to the whole world in breach of fundamental norms, rules and principles of the international community. We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes to bring a comprehensive, just and lasting peace.' (G7, 2023b)

The similarities between the statements from 1975 and 2022 are stark in their cohesiveness to shared norms and values. The Hiroshima statement further reflects these principles in more aggressive terms that extend the G7's shared norms to a position of defending them in the face of injustice and aggression at the international level. This collective response by the G7 is also indicative of what Terradas (2023) refers to as the problem of a breach of the perceived rules-of-the-game that serve everyone's interests in maintaining international order. Russia's rejection of Watson's *raison de système*, is, in essence, a clear message that Russia does not feel that it pays sufficiently to play by the rules anymore. The G7's solidarity in response is therefore both a defence of the shared norms and values they hold, but also a defence of the concept of *raison de système*, which they see as maintaining and protecting those shared norms and values.

In conclusion, this chapter has argued that the current ES conceptual understanding and categorisation of the G7 does not fully understand the importance of its informal nature and its role and evolution in world politics. By analysing the last two Summit cycles, and the G7's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this chapter has argued that the G7 has evolved into a solidarist form of international society that is underpinned by solidarist norms and values that lay at the heart of the G7 leaders own conception of what the G7 is and what it stands for in the world. Since January 2022 the G7 has demonstrated not just that it holds these solidarist norms and values, but that it is willing to act in concert to protect and promote the stability of the liberal international order and what the G7 sees as the *raison de système* that underpins this. This vanguard position now held by the G7 has been contested by states who do not hold the same norms and values, as has been the case in the past. Yet, the fact that the G7 co-habits with a more pluralist world politics only emphasises the importance of

understanding the fact that the G7 *does* coalesce around solidarist norms and values and that it *acts* on them *as* an exclusive society of states.

The next chapter builds on this, and the wider work of the thesis, by unpacking the conceptual relationship between international crises and the emergence and evolution of the G7 and the G20. In doing so it, again, highlights the importance of the 'Old School' historicism in influencing our understanding of how historical norms can shape contemporary world politics.

Chapter 7 – 'Norm re-emergence' in International Crises

'Evolving the conventions which sustain order (or at least reduce the most damaging forms of disorder) opens one way towards the possibility of justice.' (Bell, 1971, p.124)

This chapter builds upon the argument developed in Chapter 2 surrounding the importance of historicism in shaping our understanding of contemporary world politics and applies it to the evolution of the G7 expanded upon in Chapters 3 to 6. Combining the work of Coral Bell (1971) on how the culmination of multiple crises can develop a momentum that leads to a 'crisis slide', with aspects of Martin Wight's (1977, p.36) thinking about how pre-existing forms of international society, and the structures of international order that underpin them, 'fracture', this chapter provides two key contributions.

First, for the ES it highlights the importance of two aspects of 'Old School' scholarship that have largely been overlooked in their relevance to the field.[261] Second, it contributes to the field of norms, both inside and outside of the ES, by developing the Norms Crisis Model (NCM), which demonstrates that past norms do not simply die away, they can be revived by key actors and 're-emerge' in a contemporary setting in response to international crisis.

Where this chapter distinguishes itself from recent ES scholarship on norms is to posit a question regarding causation and effect. For Navari (2009b, p.6), much of the ES differentiates itself from more mainstream theories on norms by treating norms as effects only. They are in essence, the result of other properties. This chapter questions this by asking whether norms, and in particular *historical norms* influence both 'upstream input' and 'downstream output' (Navari, 2009b, p.6). As this chapter will go on to unpack, historical norms, that is those norms that are believed to have died off, or have become dormant, can still shape and influence decision-making amongst key actors, which in turn, means that these norms may have a historical residue that provides a degree of input into key decisions, particularly during crises, which in turn may shape the output form of the re-emergent norm.

This is, in essence, a study of *past norms*, which, ala Coral Bell, was not about solving crises but about understanding how actors have prevented these crises from getting worse and threatening to end with a catastrophic conflict on a global scale (Ayson, 2014, p.98). That such an understanding could provide the learning of lessons *from* the past was also key to Bell's (1971, p.124) thinking and therefore opens future normative possibilities for the ES. However, this chapter's primary purpose in developing the NCM is to highlight the problematic nature of key actors, and scholars,[262] relying upon interpretations of the past in shaping their response to contemporary international crises. As this chapter will demonstrate, how key international actors view past successes in dealing with

[261] As Navari (2019, p.73) notes, many contemporary ES scholars share an understanding of the importance of the historical aspect of change in world politics, something that Spandler (2015, p.617) notes as being aligned with 'shocks' for significant transformations to occur. Yet, the contemporary ES has not looked back to the early ES work that already focuses upon these key historical junctures that are shaped by international crises, which can also 'fracture' the pre-existing status quo.

[262] See Falkner and Buzan (2022b) for a possible recent example of this. Also see Sears (2020) and the *In Memoriam* section to Nathan Sears in *Global Policy: Next Generation* (2023) which posits similar arguments to Falkner and Buzan (2022b) on the role of Great Powers in responding to existential risk.

international crises can have a significant impact in shaping the future emergence of political and governance norms that continue to influence contemporary world politics.

This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 7.1 unpacks the theoretical framework that underpins the NCM using the work of two 'Old School' scholars. Section 7.2 reviews the literature in the norms field, identifying the gap that exists in understanding the continued role of historical norms and developing the idea of 'norm revisionists' who control the 're-emergence' of past norms. Section 7.3 builds on these conceptual foundations by laying out the broader conceptual framework of the NCM. Sections 7.4 to 7.7 then unpack these concepts and the NCM through the empirical case study of the evolution of the G7 and the emergence of the G20 in relation to the G7.

7.1 International Crises and 'fracture' points in International Society

In *Conventions of Crisis* Coral Bell (1971) analyses the role that beliefs play in shaping the behaviour of key international actors and how they can shape outcomes in international relations. While this study focused on the Cuban Missile Crisis as its case study, Bell was nonetheless aiming to draw wider applicability to the importance of shared conventions, and their misunderstanding and flaws, when they evolve and develop around points of international crisis. This work is of particular importance in understanding the overlooked aspects of the early ES in that Bell went further than Wight, and arguably Bull, in shaping a clear understanding of how change occurs in world politics (Hall, 2014, p.54).[263]

For Martin Wight (1977, p.36) an understanding of when empires or political or religious hegemonies that have sustained a form of international order collapse, and the attendant impact this has on a society of states, is key to understanding change in world politics. Wight's (1977, p.36) framing of these points as fractures, or schisms, was of particular importance to him in demonstrating how and why these events also undermined the conventions of international society that had bound it together. By marrying Bell's work with Wight's broader theoretical premise this chapter argues that understanding the development of such crises, and the importance of the point whereby this 'crisis slide' is impactful enough on the pre-existing norms of international society and the management of international order, is key to understanding further empirical examples of where the society of states has 'fractured' and how that has shaped contemporary world politics.

Both Butterfield (1966a) and Clark (1993) have argued that historical norms have the potential to shape the future, and while this conceptual framework of historical norms and the importance of international crises in stimulating a norm 're-emergence' is novel, the ideas and concepts that are brought together in developing this framework are not.[264] By laying the conceptual foundations on

[263] See Bell (1985; 1994; 1999; 2000a; 2000b) on change in world politics. Also see Miller, 2005 on how Bell's work has been overlooked outside of foreign policy circles.

[264] As Thompson (2022, p.5) points out, arguments that frame contemporary international crises, or geopolitical ruptures, as epoch defining are usually based upon a level of ahistoricism that overlooks the commonality of such crises. See Tooze (2022) on 'polycrisis' which is not far removed from Bell's own conception of a 'crisis slide' ie: that an accumulation of crises, like a boulder gathering moss down a mountain, can create key periods of fundamental challenge for international order, albeit Bell did not frame this as absent from clear linkages with past historical examples (Bell, 1971, p.14).

Coral Bell's wider thinking on the importance of historical turning points (Bell. 2007; Thatcher, 2014, p.24) I am returning some of this 'Old School' thinking on crises to the contemporary ES.[265]

Similarly, by focusing on Wight's (1977, p.35-39) conception of fracture points in history I am bringing to the fore the idea that Wight, and others in the 'Old School' put forward, that there are past examples where the society of states has broken apart, and not just in the recent examples of the European dominated form (see Chapter 2). For Wight (1977), the premise of this fracturing was not based solely upon the destructive nature of conflict, or the ideological positioning of the differing states involved, but rather the integral element of division and challenge to the existing status quo. In other words, Wight framed his historical analysis around the schism, or fracture, of the norms that underpinned the maintenance of international order between states.

Wight used specific examples, such as the European religious wars that sundered the pre-existing norms of religious power through claims of sovereignty and political independence, or the revolutionary aims of Napoleonic France that sought to exert hegemonic control, or the political motives and aspirations that underpinned the Peloponnesian War (Wight, 1977, p.36-37). Each of these examples shaped Wight's reading of world politics in such a way as to indicate the importance of understanding that there are key moments in history in which the pre-existing system of states, or international society, is fractured by a challenge to the norms of how international order is maintained, and therefore the foundations of that form of international society.

This challenge, as Wight points out in relation to the Hellenic system of states (1977, p.38), need not be purely an ideological or religious revolution of the status quo, but it can also be a directed by the perceived political need to challenge the dominant power/s in the states system. In fact, as Wight hints at with his brief exploration of the Period of Warring States in China (1977, p.39), it is the combined elements of political, ideological, and belief systems that holds the key to understanding the challenge posed by a schism, or fracture in the pre-existing system of states. This fracturing, put in more simplistic terms, is not a challenge to the *idea* of a system of states, or the idea of an international society per se.

Instead, this fracturing is a challenge to the core norms of *how* that international society is managed and *whom* the dominant states or powers are. In many ways then there is a similarity between this idea and the work of Adam Watson on a 'pendulum' swing between empire, hegemony, and anarchy, yet Watson's (2009) metaphor implies an almost free flowing rhythm as world politics shifts and changes. The point that Wight (1977, p.35-39) was making was that the historical record of states' systems, including those outside of Europe, indicates that there are key points at which this notion of societal relations between states shudders to a halt as the pre-existing management of international order is sundered. Put very simply, a society requires a form of norms that constitute the rules of the road, which also means that those rules need to be managed. If these rules are directly challenged, and therefore no longer manageable, then this fractures the very foundations of the society itself.

Yet, it is Bell's (1971) articulation of the importance of understanding the *conventions*, or norms, that shape and influence such a build-up, as well as the response by key actors, that are important here.[266]

[265] See Spandler (2015, p.619-620) and Friedner Parrat (2020). Also see Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, p.342) from a Historical Institutionalist perspective.
[266] See Bull (2002a; Hoffman, 2003, p.23), Hurrell (2009, p.13), and Beeson and Bell (2017, p.288) who also argue this point.

For Bell (1971) the conventions that stabilised the balance of power in world politics, or the norms that shaped how the leading states *avoided* all-out conflict and the destabilisation of international order were key to understanding the fundamental nature of the relations between states. The relations between Great Powers, or indeed Superpowers, were for Bell predicated upon the realisation that there *will* inevitably be international crises that threaten the status quo of world politics (Bell, 1968).

If, therefore, there are key points in history that we can identify as recognisable as fracture points whereby the pre-existing management of international order is challenged so extensively that it is no longer viable in its status quo form, then we can ascribe to this point the definition of an international crisis. While the pre-existing literature on international crises covers expansively the nature and shape of conjoined events, or the historical sweep of events leading up to international crises,[267] the definition used in this chapter is that an international crisis is that which threatens the pre-existing framework of international order itself.

For Bell (1971), this was the equivalent to a threat to the pre-existing balance of power between the superpowers in the Cold War. Whilst for Wight (1977), the historical record demonstrated the inherent instability posed to societies of states by either the destabilisation, or 'fracturing', of the pre-existing legitimacy and shared common values of those states or peoples who made up the status-quo order. This 'fracturing' could, then, be the result of both external, as well as internal threats. Similarly, for Bell (1971, p.14) there could be an accumulation of events that form a 'crisis slide' towards this 'fracturing' point, or there could be standalone crises of significant enough magnitude to have the same effect.

As per the argument made in Chapter 4, the changing nature of world politics means that not only do the shifting role, or position, of Great Powers pose a direct threat to the pre-existing balance of power in the international system (Wight, 1960b, p.307; Bell, 1971, p.13-14; Kennedy, 1989) but that a changing world politics also has wider implications for the pre-existing norms, values and interests that frame international society. Thus, the changing nature of world politics that results from a fundamental shift in the perceived legitimacy of the status quo order, such as through the process of decolonisation in the post-1945 era, can also pose a fundamental threat to the pre-existing framework, and legitimacy, of managing said order.[268]

Importantly, however, it is the overlooked relevance of international *economic crises* and the impact they have in changing world politics that Beeson and Bell (2017) highlight as a lacuna within the pre-existing framework of the ES, and which has been a theme running throughout this thesis with the case study focus on the G7. As Kennedy's (1989) historical sweep of the rise and fall of Great Powers demonstrates, economic crises not only shape economic relations, but they can also fundamentally alter the balance of power and the classification of who ranks as a Great Power and who is able to maintain the political, military, economic, and diplomatic power to sustain such a position.[269]

[267] For a wider discussion on the role of international crises see Langer, 1969; Bell, 1974; Cohen, 1979; Brecher and Yehuda, 1985; Roberts, 1988; Kennedy, 1989; Richardson, 2011; Dobbs, 2012; Bennett, 2013.
[268] A point that Bull (1989c); Kedourie (1989); Lyon (1989), Vincent (1989) and Watson (1997) were all acutely aware of, and a more recent argument that Acharya (2011, p.99) also makes.
[269] See O'Brien (2023) for an insight into the debate around the classification of Great Powers that argues *previous* conceptions of who *is* a 'Great Power' can also shape the relations between powerful states and perceptions of balance in world politics.

For Wight, then, it was an understanding of the norms that shaped key actors, or elites, which provided a broader understanding of how and why events (Hall, 2014, p.50), and therefore crises, occurred and were responded to. Similarly, Bell's (1977; 1989b) focus on understanding the interactions and beliefs held by key international leaders was at the forefront of her thinking on how the conventions in responding to these crises were shaped (Hall, 2014, p.45). Yet as Linklater and Suganami (2006, p.93) make clear, for Wight 'historical knowledge does not necessarily supply a good guide to political action; good political judgement does. And good historians are not always good politicians – because the knowledge of history may mislead'. In other words, while historians and politicians are both flawed individuals when it comes to responding to events, nonetheless, a study of history provides the perception of lessons learned or good examples that can shape both scholarly and policy driven decision making.

For example, the view of the original architects of the G7, including the role that Henry Kissinger played in shaping US support for its emergence, was one of stabilising and maintaining the pre-existing international economic order in the face of growing global disorder. Thus, the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of the NIEO which was a fundamental departure from the norms and structures of the international economy (Getachew, 2019, p.161-162), when combined with the increasing power of emerging energy states under the auspices of OPEC, was seen as an inherent global crisis that threatened an 'economic revolution' (Getachew, 2019, p.160) and the hegemonic dominance of the Western-led international economic order. The G7 therefore emerged, in part, as a bulwark in defence of the status quo management and control of international order,[270] the development of a 'new' convention used by the dominant Western-led powers to prevent this economic crisis slide from further destabilising the existing power structures in world politics.[271]

The next section assesses the understanding of the development of conventions, or norms in the literature, situating this 'Old School' historicism lens within the norms field, before returning to this focus on how key international actors, or elites, can shape the 're-emergence' of historical norms.

7.2 Norm development: Looking back at history

Norms are the framework for actions between peoples and between states. They are the glue that binds human relations by shaping the social beliefs that are shared, reproduced, and enacted through social practice (Farrell, 2001; Wendt, 2006). Norms are also the grouping of common values and mannerisms that shape and influence how people, and states, expect others and the interactions with others to play out (Katzenstein, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). In essence, norms are the very fibres of relations between states in world politics.

But norms can also be the manual that international, and domestic, actors look to for guidance in how to act, how to respond, or to describe and imply the boundaries of accepted practice (Florini, 1996; Farrell, 2001). As such, norms also have the ability, consciously or not, to shape the beliefs and practices of both those consulting the manual, but also those who have authored the manual of best

[270] I would like to thank the audience participants at a BISA panel in Glasgow in 2023 for their insightful comments on this aspect of the Chapter.

[271] See Sargent (2015, p.207) on the role that Kissinger also played in offering dialogue on some of the key issues underlined by the NIEO proposals, whilst also behind the scenes seeking to nonetheless maintain the status quo power structures of the pre-existing international order.

practice. Understanding how norms are developed, and evolve, is key to understanding not only past historical actions, but also contemporary actions, restraints, rules, and prohibitions (Manning, 1962; Fierke and Wiener, 1999; Stefan, 2016; Abraham, 2022).

The pre-existing literature on norms has extensively covered these aspects of relations between peoples and states. For example, studies of norm development have explained the role of norm emergence and norm cascading (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), norm evolution (Florini, 1996), diffusion (Checkel, 1999; Stevenson, 2013; Brown, 2014), norm spiralling (Badescu and Weiss, 2010), norm transplantation (Farrell, 2001), norm grafting (Price, 1998; Acharya, 2004), norm subsidiarity (Acharya, 2011), norm translation (Zimmermann, 2017), localised adaptation (Acharya, 2004; Brown, 2014), norm degeneration and death (Panke and Petersohn, 2011; 2016; 1017), and the relationship between norms and the emergence of international regimes (Krasner, 1982; 1983; Keohane and Nye, 1987; Young, 1991; Haas, 1992; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).

Latterly the focus within the field has increasingly engaged with ideas surrounding norm contestation and an understanding of how norms evolve and change when they are not merely received but also challenged (Acharya, 2004; 2011; 2014; Badescu and Weiss, 2010; Brown, 2014). This has, in turn, built upon the earlier debates within the field between the functionalist understanding of norms as solutions to problems and the more intersubjective analysis regarding the importance of understanding how norms shape both the problem *and* the solution to issues (Kratochwil, 1984; Jackson, 1989; Florini, 1996; 2003; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Wiener, 2007).

It is important to highlight, from as ES perspective, that Bull (2002a) and Wight (1977) were also very aware of the importance of the contestation element of pre-existing or dominant norms and values, again, a reflection of the pre-constructivist social analysis of world politics that underpinned much of the early ES scholarship (see Chapter 1). For constructivists (Wendt, 1987; Katzenstein, 1996), however, the ability of norms to shape the preferences and actions of states is key to the social construction element of the international system. Yet, constructivists focus on the endogenous role of norms, and the rejection of the importance of outside, or exogenous, factors associated with more dominant approaches to IR. Where an ES understanding of norms comes to the fore is in asserting the importance of understanding the combined role of both endogenous and exogenous norms in shaping the interactions between states (Ralph, 2001; Bull, 2002a).

However, to focus purely upon the socially constructed elements of either domestic or relational aspects of state relations would be to overlook the exogenous power of *historical norms* in determining and shaping state preferences and actions. In fact, the importance of common historical and cultural understandings has been recognised as key to the diffusion, acceptance and transplantation of norms within the literature (Checkel, 1999; Farrell, 2001; Wiener, 2007). What has largely been overlooked though, in the shift towards the dominance of constructivism in this side of the IR field, is that the premise of understanding the importance of a common culture and common historical values in shaping world politics are the ideas that underlay much of the early ES understanding of change in the relations between states (Butterfield, 1949; Bull, 1966c; 2002a; Wight, 1966a; 1977; 1979).

This chapter therefore moves away from the rational actor arguments for state action (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Fearon, 1995; Laffey and Weldes, 1997) *and* the agency-inhibiting early constructivist frameworks (Checkel, 1999; Dunne, 1995b), but does not imply the need for a whole-hearted

directional shift towards the intersubjective end of the analytical spectrum. Instead, by reasserting the importance of an interpretivist understanding (Bevir and Hall, 2020a; 2020b) of the importance and power of historical norms in shaping both traditions and perceptions amongst international actors, in essence codifying the rituality of relations between states through a holistic understanding of what those actors thought, said, and acted upon, the ES can begin to unpack the role that past historical norms have played in shaping world politics.

Focusing, then, upon the role of historical influences in shaping norms this section now unpacks the relationship between *how* norms are shaped and moulded, and how norms can then be manipulated in these processes. For example, the widely accepted premise of the 'norm life cycle' model (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) in understanding the process in which norms spread is that norms retain their meaning throughout the diffusion process. However, Stevenson (2013) rightly challenges this dynamic by arguing that norms are often internalised by actors during the diffusion process, thus altering both the perception and understanding of said norms.

Taking this a step further for the argument made in this Chapter, the emergence, or 're-emergence' of historical norms can be understood not to simply be the 're-emergence' of the *same* norms in their past format, but rather, in being 'revived' these historical norms are perceived, altered, and understood by the 'norm revisionists' in the way they wish to use them. In other words, how historical norms are understood and perceived is also dependent upon *whom* and *how* they are revived.

This is a key point that Laffey and Weldes (1997) establish in their critique of rationalist models of understanding the influence of ideas. Historical norms are not just *used* by state actors for their own interests. The very perception of a norms applicability and effectiveness is shaped by the past historical experience and understanding of the norm (Reus-Smit, 1997; Acharya, 2004). The contextualised past meaning of the norm (Fierke and Wiener, 1999), which in turn shapes the interests of state actors when selecting certain norms and not others (Laffey and Weldes, 1997), is also shaped and altered by the historical perceptions of the norm 'revisionist'.

This returns us to the ideas of Farrell (2001) and Florini (1996) who argue that past historical norms can act as both a manual, or guide, to those wishing to consult the past for solutions or successes. But the context and usage of the manual, and the use of the past itself, also shapes the reemergent norm through a process of internalisation (Larson, 2000; Stevenson, 2013; Yarhi-Milo, 2014) that does not abide by a simple framework of transferability, or diffusion (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Thus, the role that historical norms have played in the past is both subjective and intersubjective.

Yet, the historical *perception* and individual *understanding* of said norms (Wiener, 2009) affects whether those norms *are* to be revived, what their perceived applicability is, as well as *why* they are revived, and the appropriateness of the norms role in meeting the required standards of behaviour. This means that the importance of past knowledge *and* forgotten historical knowledge (Buzan and Hansen, 2010) in shaping and influencing the norms that are deemed appropriate, as well as the guidance that comes with said norms, is key.

Put simply, if certain international actors perceive a historical norm to reflect contemporary issues or problems, and they perceive the way that they interpret the role of said norm as appropriate in responding to the issue or problem, then this will influence the 'revival' of that norm irrespective of past historical problems associated with those norms. This is, in essence, a reassertion of the argument made by Stephenson (2013). Those actors with a particular viewpoint of history will internalise the

appropriateness of a past historical norm for contemporary world politics in whichever way suits their purpose because they perceive it to be appropriate irrespective of whether this is driven by intentional design or merely lack of knowledge.

Florini's (1996) genetic analogy for understanding norms and its relationship between the inheritance of remembered factors in norm evolution is important because it can assist us in understanding the role of historical norms in shaping state behaviour, However, where Florini's (1996) argument leaves a gap in its applicability is where it argues that when norms are contested and challenged that they can also die out as well as evolve (also see Panke and Petersohn, 2016). Yet, as Percy and Sandholtz (2022) make clear, norms rarely die out even when contested. Instead, they adapt, merge (Acharya, 2004; 2011), or go dormant in the memory of historical analysis and conceptions of the past.

This challenges the assumption within the field that uncontested norms simply disappear or are merely substituted (Panke and Petersohn, 2011, p.719) in a process of natural selection akin to the 'scientific' analysis of Florini (1996). Instead, the perception of the viability and relevance of norms are altered and shaped over time, meaning that norms do not cease to exist, they have the potential to be brought back to life by actors who choose to 'revive' them. What I refer to here as 'norm revisionists'. As discussed above, norms do not simply re-emerge in the same form as before, human perceptions of the world and these norms meanings are socially constructed around relations and interpretations of both the past and the present (see Manning, 1962), meaning that key actors can choose to 'revive' them if they perceive them to be effective.

This, therefore, challenges the narrative developed by Panke and Petersohn (2016, p.5) that norm violations as a general accepted practice mean that pre-existing norms have either died out or been abolished. Importantly, for the context of the case study presented in the latter parts of this chapter, the emergence and evolution of the G7 as a 'revived' version of a Great Power Concert model of managing international order did not result in the death of the post-1945 multilateral order. This is key as the 're-emergence' of a past norm does not imply that it replaces, or subsumes pre-existing norms, a point that Panke and Petersohn (2016, p.8) acknowledge has precedent in world politics, albeit from their perspective as a confirmation of the stability of a challenged norm. Instead, the conceptual focus in this chapter is not on the relative stability or survival of *pre-existing norms* but on the analytical understanding of how *past norms* can be 'revived'.

7.3 Norm 're-emergence' and the role of 'hegemonic norm revisionists'

Norms, however, are not stand-alone objects in the sense that they have an influence in and of themselves. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) make clear, the adoption of norms requires certain 'norm entrepreneurs' to shape and influence state actors into accepting these norms. For Panke and Petersohn (2016, p.6) this need not be a majority of actors but can in fact be a majority of *crucial* actors. These crucial actors, or entrepreneurs, act not in a way in which they are simply creating, shaping, or diffusing norms, but are instead *reviving* past historical norms that they perceive to be effective historical examples of resolving intractable global problems.

Instead, these key actors are 'norm revisionists' who act both within their own shared historical framework of understanding, but also act to deliberately shape the wider perception of these past historical norms. In effect, 'norm revisionists' internalise the past historical norms that suit their

perceptions of need or effectiveness in solving certain problems,[272] and act as 'norm gatekeepers' by diffusing these past norms as the new status quo in world politics (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

The framing of the 're-emergence' of these past historical norms is conducted in such a manner that the 'norm gatekeepers' exert a 'hegemonic' control over the acceptance, or diffusion, process that manages[273] any contestation of said 're-emergence' within a framework of a clearly defined set of appropriate solutions (Legro, 2000; Zimmermann, 2017). This framing not only simplifies, or narrows the available choices (Kratochwil, 1984, p.707), but is deliberately constructed in such a manner as to require any serious contestation to directly challenge the position of the 'hegemonic norm gatekeepers' who have 're-vived' said norms (see Zimmermann, 2017).

The fact that these 'hegemonic norm gatekeepers' are, in effect, the leaders of the dominant states in world politics, and therefore the 'critical actors' required to enforce this hegemony (see Panke and Petersohn, 2016) is key to the effectiveness in establishing and maintaining the framing of said norms (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Brown, 2014, p. 890).[274] These key actors are also essential in establishing and reinforcing the legitimacy, and wider perceptions of legitimacy (Stefan, 2021), of the adoption and acceptance of these revived norms (see Frank, 1990; Florini, 1996).[275] In essence, these 're-emergent' norms are given legitimacy *by* the crucial actors who have acted as 'norm revisionists' *because* they are the ones who have 're-vived' them.

Importantly, then, the 're-emergence' of past historical norms should not be understood to only be based upon historical norms that, either in the context of their time or not, were perceived to be legitimate. There are historical examples of past practices of global domination or governance that are now widely recognised as *illegitimate*, such as colonialism or imperialism (see Gong, 1984; Bull and Watson, 1989; Keene, 2002; Dunne and Reus-Smit, 2017), yet have been revived by powerful states in contemporary world politics (see Chapter 6 on the Russian invasion of Ukraine).

However, the importance of this chapter and of the development of the NCM is the recognition that past or present concepts of illegitimacy do not necessarily matter. In other words, powerful actors can act as 'hegemonic norm gatekeepers' in the promulgation and spread of ideas and perceptions, which in turn shapes the validity, legitimacy, and effectiveness of these re-emergent historical norms, irrespective of whether they have been contested in the past as either illegitimate or ineffective. Studying, and interpreting, how and why these actors understand these past norms to be relevant, effective, or legitimate, in the present is key to understanding elite driven change in world politics.

[272] See Axelrod (1997) and Johnston (2001) on why the perception of effectiveness is seen as important to legitimacy.

[273] See Watson (2007). Also see Kingsbury and Roberts (2002, p.6) and Waever (1992) in noting this principle in the writings of Grotius, which clearly also filtered through to Wight (1977; 1979; 1991) and Bull's (2002a; 2002b) understanding of historical power structures.

[274] See Archarya (2014) for a challenge to this narrative of the effectiveness of international leaders in shaping the diffusion of norms.

[275] Although not directly related to crises per se, the work of Yao (2022) on key actors shaping the outcomes of international conferences holds similarities to this argument in the way that key actors sought to transplant what they saw as effective management tools from a European context to a non-European setting. For a wider discussion on how well-established perceptions shape international actors' beliefs and responses see Larson (2000) and Yarhi-Milo (2014).

The 'Old School' scholars such as Butterfield (1949; 1951), Wight (1979), and Bell (1962; 1977a) were acutely aware of the pitfalls of a selective interpretation of history, as was Bull (1980d) in his critique of Henry Kissinger's attempts to manage international order, an point that we will turn to in the next Section. This is important because 'hegemonic norm gatekeepers' perceive themselves to hold a special responsibility to manage international order not just for themselves or their states, but as a fulfilment of a wider responsibility to maintain stability, or balance, in world politics between differing norms and values (Butterfield, 1951a; 1966b; Wight; 1966b; 1973). This perception of responsibility shapes their belief in the validity of their own actions, and the rightness of their interpretation not only of past events in relation to their applicability to the present, but also that *they* are acting in a legitimate manner because *they* hold a special responsibility, thus the framework within which they act must also therefore be legitimate.

Image 2 (below) is a visual articulation of the process outlined above. Put succinctly, a 'crisis slide' (Bell, 1971) of events and actions reaches a culmination, or 'fractures (Wight, 1977, p.36) the pre-existing framework of the management of international order, thereby threatening the status quo norms of international society. The impact of this crisis, and the threat that it poses to the status quo, leads the 'hegemonic norm gatekeepers' to look-back-at the past for an effective, and suitable, response to the crisis. This 'gatekeepering' of the response to the crisis controls both the narrative surrounding the applicability of the emergent response, but also its legitimacy. The historical norm that has been revived by these 'hegemonic gatekeepers' then becomes a de facto norm for managing both the crisis but also the wider political response. In essence, this revived historical norm is no longer dormant but active in world politics.

The concept, and place, of this 're-emergent' norm in world politics then remains part of the framework for managing international order until the rise of a new crisis, or group of crises, that challenges its perceived legitimacy and/or effectiveness. No norm can remain unaltered indefinitely (Franck, 1990; Florini, 1996, p.364; Attiná, 2002, p.218), and the resultant 'crisis slide' (Bell, 1971) that once again fractures the status quo of world politics and threatens the pre-existing form of international society is no different in this sense.

Importantly, though, the revival of these historical norms is also a reflection of what Baker (2006, p.39) refers to as 'inherited legacies'. In the context of Baker's (2006) analysis of the G7 (as we will see in the following sections), these 'legacies' are the framework of interaction knowledge that has been accumulated by the Summit participants through their past meetings and deliberations. In other words, the G7 actors are shaped not only by perceptions of past historical forms of the management of international order they are also shaped by the inherited practice, perceptions, successes, and failures of these past summits.[276] What this means for the more general NCM framework is that the 'hegemonic norm gatekeepers' are shaped by both past personal reflections on the failures of actions *as well as* past interpretations of historical events that are beyond their lifespan. This inherited framework of what these key actors believe to be best practice, in the sense of what also protects their interests and hegemonic power, in responding to international crises inherently shapes their

[276] For example, Kissinger's enthusiasm for the emergence of the G7 was shaped by his perception of the failure of the 1974 Washington D.C. Energy Summit to find a clear level of agreement between the parties on concerted action due to French intransigence (Washington Energy Conference, 1974; see Chapter 3).

perception of the legitimacy of the choices they make (Bulmer, 1993; 2009; Baker, 2006; Spandler, 2015, p.615-616).[277]

Norms Crisis Model (NCM)



Image 2

The following sections apply the NCM to the case study of the evolution of the G7 in response to international crises that drove the 're-emergence' of a quasi-19th Century norm of Great Power politics (Kissinger, 2013; Mitzen, 2013). It is then applied to the example of the challenge posed to the G7 by emerging economic powers and the rise of the G20 in the 1990s in response, followed by the transformation of the G20 to an equal footing as the G7 as a leaders' level summit (also see Chapter 5). The final section then unpacks the challenge posed to both the G7 and the G20 by the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the following invasion in 2022. The resultant return of the G7 to the apex of world politics was a 're-emergence' of this elitist Western-led concert of powers that has been carefully 'gatekeepered' in the protection of its hegemonic role as a dominant norm in the management of international order.

[277] Where this point differs from much of the Historical Institutionalist literature is in its avoidance in relying upon the idea of advantages in effectiveness being a key factor in shaping path dependencies (see Thelen, 1999, p.390-391). The emergence and evolution of the G7 has not always been based upon said format being of significant advantage either materially or output wise, but it has nonetheless been perceived by the leaders who participate in the Summits as being of use to them and of providing a powerful group platform irrespective of output. Also see Watson (2009, p.318) who provides a much broader historical perspective on how cultural legacies are inherited from past societies.

7.4 The G7: The historical norm 'revived'

The 'crisis slide' that underpinned the 'revival' of this quasi-19th Century Great Power model of managing international order was an economic and political breakdown in the post-1945 Bretton Woods dominated Western/global order (Kenen, 1994; Mead, 2001, p.74; Bayne, 2005, p.17; Benning, 2011; Rodrik, 2012, p.69; Beeson and Bell, 2017). The increasing levels of globalised and interconnected economic relationships that had provided a degree of legitimacy in the non-Communist parts of the globe was now being contested both externally (Getachew, 2019), and internally with the leading Western power stuttering due to the Vietnam war, rising levels of debt, and 'America First' policies of the Nixon Administration (Benning, 2011; Rodrik, 2012; Tooze, 2019; Buzan and Falkner, 2022b, p.243; Thompson, 2022). As seen in Chapter 3, this disruption to the pre-existing framework for managing international order, and the sundering of the norms and rules of the Bretton Woods system, had created a 'crisis slide' that then reached a 'fracture' point following the energy price shock caused by the OPEC oil crisis (Odell, 1975; Merrill, 2007; Bini et al, 2016; Colgan, 2021), that combined to push the world economy into recession (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.25; Spohr, 2016, p.11-12).

This 'fracture' point (see Image 3) had created anarchy in the global economy in the sense that the pre-existing framework had lost its perception of legitimacy in being able to *effectively* manage the international economic order. Faced with this disruption, and the need for a form of cooperation between the leading Western economic powers to preserve the status quo and bring back order, the leading actors in Western-led international politics decided to look to the past for a 'new' framework to manage the crisis. The decision-making around this process was then 'gatekeepered' by a small group of leaders who perceived themselves to be able to informally develop and discuss a solution if they were to embrace the concept of a 'fireside chat' (Schaetzel and Malmgren, 1980, p.130; Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.8).

The meeting between what became known as the 'Library Group' (Dobson, 2007) was not only the precursor to the emergence of the G7 it was also an indication of the emphasis that leading Finance Ministers placed upon informality and elitist management of international order. That the leading proponents of the emergence of the G7 as a leaders Summit, Schmidt and d'Estaing, were present at the 'Library Group' meeting and subsequently became state leaders themselves (Mourlon-Druol, 2012; Spohr, 2016) is important in understanding the shared perception of *responsibility* to manage this economic crisis.

The 'gatekeeping' by these leading international actors was premised not only upon past historical norms of what-had-worked before,[278] but also a contemporary example of what they perceived to be the most effective way to manage an international crisis (Carin and Smith, 2005). Schmidt and

[278] For example, Henry Kissinger's (2013) academic treatise and belief in the historical importance of the Great Power concerts in the management of international order (Bell, 1977a; Ferguson, 2015) underlay much of his cheerleading for the origination of the G7 (see Chapter 3). In fact, Kissinger held a philosophy of history based upon the idea that an understanding of history can provide an understanding of how *similar*, but not the same, problems have been responded to in the past (Ferguson, 2015, p.300). Kissinger also held that studying statesmen, or elites, would also provide examples of political and moral similarities in decision making (Ferguson, 2015, p.291), further emphasised by his argument that there are points in the past where key actors have turned the tide of history and that this level of agency is key in international relations (Ferguson, 2015, p.453). This reinforces the point that some of the key actors in the creation and support of the G7 saw themselves as holding a special responsibility in using this moment of international crisis to shape history.

d'Estaing, now Chancellor of Germany and French President, had built a good working relationship together, framed by their shared time as finance ministers (see Benning, 2011; Spohr, 2016). Similarly, the leading proponent of this Great Power format in the US administration, Henry Kissinger, had developed a close personal relationship with Schmidt (Kissinger, 1982, p.908-909). In other words, the 'Library Group' meeting served to reinforce to these leaders that the framework of a 'fireside chat', and the interpersonal relationships between powerful world leaders was the route through which global problems could be coordinated and solved.



Image 3

Thus, the 'hegemonic norm gatekeepers' that shaped the 're-emergence' of a norm of elitist behind-closed-doors management of international order in the format of the G7 were acting on two key factors. First, to create an informal space for the leaders of the most powerful 'Western' states to cooperate, coordinate and set the agenda in managing international economic order (Baker, 2006; Dobson, 2007; Mourlon-Druol, 2012) that they believed had worked in the 'Library Group' format. Second, the successful framework *for* this informal management of international order was shaped by these political actor's own perceptions of the historical role, responsibility, and success, of Great Power congresses and concerts in maintaining, preserving, and renewing the pre-existing hegemonic control of world politics (Watson, 2007; Costigliola, 2013; Kissinger, 2013; Mitzen, 2013; Spohr, 2016).

The establishment of this modern 'collective hegemony' (Kirton, 1989; Watson, 2007; Beeson and Bell, 2009) in the shape of the G7 was not only the reassertion of Western economic dominance, it was a reflection of the importance of historical perceptions in shaping the actions of key elites who believed that it was both their responsibility (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.246; Mourlon-Druol, 2012, p.686) to

respond to this 'fracturing' by acting *outside* of the formal, constraining, and now contested arenas of world politics that had previously acted in this role.

By forming a small, elitist, and more cohesive group centred around both the shared interests and values of its members in preserving the pre-existing norms of world politics that served their own hegemonic control (Watson, 1995, p.xiv-xv; 2007), these leaders were shaping the evolution of the G7 not merely as a format for informally managing international economic order but as the 'revival' of a past historical norm of quasi-Great Power politics that would have repercussions for the future. The next Section unpacks how this evolutionary path was disrupted by further economic crisis that saw the rise of a more diverse, yet still elitist, norm of G-Summitry in contemporary world politics.

7.5 The G20: The 'new norm'

The onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in the late 1990s created a global 'crisis slide' that threatened the stability of the pre-existing international economic order (Agénor et al, 2000; Sharma, 2003; Vestergaard, 2012; also see Chapter 5). The emerging threat from both rising economic powers and an increasingly interdependent financial and banking system that had grown up to support and profit from these emerging economies became a threat to the still Western-dominated management of an economically globalised world politics (Fischer, 1998; Agénor et al, 2000; Sharma, 2003, p.26-38). The 'crisis slide' gathered momentum as one economy after another, even some that were not regarded as 'emerging' per se,[279] became increasingly unmanageable through the pre-existing framework of both formal and informal economic levers (Feldstein, 1998; Fischer, 1998; Acharya, 2004, p.260; Beck, 2008, p.7; Rodrik, 2012) as even the US found itself having to bail out its own financial institutions who were tied to these destabilising economies (Bremmer, 2012; Tooze, 2019).

This posed a legitimacy problem for the G7 states who were, ostensibly, the gatekeepers and guardians of the management global economic order because, as a group, they no longer had sufficient global economic firepower to stem the 'crisis slide' (Sharma, 2003, p.7). The leaders of the G7 had understood perfectly well that they were no longer the dominant force in world politics that they had once been, the record of outreach, expansion, and wider engagement on a myriad of political and economic issues throughout the G7's evolution had demonstrated this (Bayne, 2000; 2005).

The legitimacy, or the perceived legitimacy, of the G7 was embedded within its acceptance by the wider international community (Bayne, 2005, p.223), but this legitimacy was also built upon the perception of effectiveness in managing the international economic order. In acting to preserve this legitimacy, the G7 member states argued for the creation of a wider framework of managing and coordinating global economic responses to international economic crises. Importantly, however, this framework was to remain *below* the leaders' level of the G7 and be initiated and coordinated at the finance minister level, which would in turn be shaped influenced and controlled by the decisions of the G7 (Beeson and Bell, 2009; Cooper and Thakur, 2013). These actions were therefore designed to preserve the status quo global financial architecture and continue to push the G7 economic agenda (Baker, 2006, p.87) through a 'new' informal finance minister framework that now included a much

[279] For example, Russia and Argentina.

more diverse number of states, and therefore the opportunity to influence and manage the global economic order both *of* and *through* these emerging powers (Payne, 2010, p.731-732).



Image 4

In effect, as Image 4 demonstrates, the G7 member states and their leaders deliberately shaped the recognition, and solution, to their waning hegemonic power by acting as 'norm gatekeepers' in facilitating and controlling the emergence of the G20 finance ministers Summit that remained under their control and agenda shaping power. The 're-emergent' norm that came about from this international 'crisis slide' was not a 'new' framework, convention, or norm of global economic governance. It was, in fact, simply a 'revived' norm of informal, close-knit, and exclusive management of international order based upon the model of the G7 that was perceived to have worked before.

Although the G20 was a far more diverse, and indeed pluralistic when we consider the norms, values, political outlooks, and political structures that the member states hold, the G20 was nonetheless at this stage still very much under the auspices of the direction and agenda setting framework of the G7 (Cooper and Thakur, 2013). That the G20 member states *also* contained the member states of the G7 meant that the influence and power of the G7 to control the G20's responses, in that they did not necessarily diverge too fully from the protection and preservation of the pre-existing international economic order, was significant (Beeson and Bell, 2009).

That the member states of the G20 had been *selected* by key figures within the financial architecture of the G7 and the US, meant that these states had been selected not merely for their influence and growing power in world politics, such as China, India and Brazil, but also for their perceived support

for the pre-existing framework of international economic order (Cooper and Thakur, 2013; Naylor, 2019b, p.153; Slaughter, 2019, p.10).

This adoption of a wider framework of managing international economic order, with the former hegemonic powers *providing* a seat-at-the-high-table for rising powers (Engelbrekt, 2016; Naylor, 2019b; 2022) helped mollify or absolved the overt contestation of the legitimacy of the G7. Put simply, the evolution of the G7, and the emergence of the G20, have become a fait accompli of global governance structures through the acquiescence of significant emerging global powers to this 'new' economic order (see Chapter 5 on contestation). In turn, this acceptance largely provided the emollient to accusations of historical Great Power 'hypocrisy' (Hubbard and Miller, 2005; Acharya, 2011) in managing international order, and therefore the diminution of any serious form of contestation to the 'gatekeeping' of the 're-emergent' historical norms of G-Summitry *by* the rising powers.

The AFC not only 'fractured' the perceived legitimacy of the G7 in managing international economic order by demonstrating that it no longer had the global impact needed to stem an international 'crisis slide', it also finally made a serious crack in the hegemonic control that the G7 states had continued to exert through the widening up of G-Summitry membership, albeit in a watered-down form. As the next Section makes clear, this temporary plastering over the cracks that had appeared in the status-quo management of international order were to be ripped asunder by the onset of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC).

7.6 The G20 'revived', again

Another economic 'crisis slide', underpinned by weak regulation and understanding of the risks inherent to global financial interconnection, was inevitable when the lessons of the AFC has not been fully learnt by global policymakers (Agénor et al, 2000; Sharma, 2003; Vestergaard, 2012). When the GFC fully struck in 2008 it destabilised the entire global economic order, 'fracturing' the legitimacy of both the global financial system and the perception that it was being effectively managed (Rachman, 2010; Rodrik, 2012; Drezner, 2014; Beeson and Bell, 2017; Tooze, 2019).

The actions of the 'hegemonic norm gatekeepers', both the G7 leaders and now also the finance ministers of the G20, was to emphasise the importance of a globally coordinated response amongst the dominant economic powers in world politics in order to halt the slide towards further economic disorder, or a global economic recession not seen since the 1930s (Bush, 2009, p.147; Beeson and Bell, 2017; Tooze, 2019). Once again, the dominant powers in the G7 recognised that acting within the parameters of *their* membership would be insufficient to stop the economic 'crisis slide' towards further global disorder.

The resultant actions of the G20 member states, including a myriad of central banks in responding to the economic crisis in stimulating liquidity in the global system (Tooze, 2019, p.239-254), meant that the G20 suddenly became regarded as the pre-eminent framework for global governance response to the international economic crisis (Kirton, 2013; Slaughter, 2013a). However, while the G20 was not the only global forum for responding to the GFC, it is abundantly clear that the G20 provided the *leadership* and coordinated *agenda setting* role that individual state-based or formal international global institutions had failed to, or were unable to, provide in halting the 'crisis slide' towards a global economic depression (Darling, 2011; Drezner, 2014; Prodi, 2016, p.9; Beeson and Bell, 2017; Naylor,

2019a; Slaughter, 2019; Tooze, 2019).[280] Importantly, then, the 're-emergence' of this framework of international leadership was still based upon the original format of the G7 of informal and interpersonal Summitry as the solution to intractable global crises (Beeson and Bell, 2009, p.79; Darling, 2011).

At this stage of the 'crisis slide' though it was also clear that a meeting of the finance ministers alone could not provide the political buy-in needed to effectively manage the growing problems. The result (see Image 5) was that the G7 leaders and combined finance ministers of the G20 acted as 'hegemonic gatekeepers' by looking back to the past record of G-Summitry as to what the solution should be. The resultant raising of the G20 to a leaders' level Summit, an 'off the shelf solution' (Martin, 2013), demonstrated not a 'new' form of more equitable management of international order (English et al, 2005; Thakur and Thompson, 2005; Cho and Kelly, 2012; Cooper and Thakur, 2013), but the 're-emergence' of an historical norm of quasi-Great Power politics, just with a more diverse membership.

While the emphasis on the role of the G20 is contested[281] it was nonetheless 'revived' as a leaders level Summit, which created the informal political space for the key actors to agree *not* to raise trade barriers at the Washington Summit, overcoming concerns of that the 'crisis slide' would lead to a similar situation as to the 1930s and the Great Depression (see Tooze, 2019). Similarly, the following London Summit also underpinned the collective decision to initiate fiscal expansion and to invest *through* the IMF to stem the crisis (Derviş and Drysdale, 2014, p.4; Engelbrekt, 2015, p.542). In essence, the 're-emergence' of a form of G-Summitry as the solution to the GFC was, in part, predicated upon the lack of coherent contestation to the rise of the G20 because it was perceived as being both effective and more representative world politics, and therefore legitimate (Cooper, 2010; Kharas and Lombardi, 2012).[282]

[280] Alistair Darling (2011, p.297-298) makes a similar comparative point in relation to the G7 Finance Ministers being unable to successfully encourage the Germans and the IMF to coordinate their response to the Eurozone crisis in Greece that occurred after the GFC. In effect, the lack of a coordination and leadership *worsened* the crisis. Also see Beeson and Bell (2017) and Tooze (2019). See US President Bush's remarks on the coordinated interest rate cuts by G7 states as well as the wider coordination with the G20 (Bush, 2009, p.147).

[281] Helleiner (2014), for example, regards the G20 as merely a country club setting for world leaders and places the focus on the actions of the US Federal Reserve in halting the 'crisis slide' from going any further. While Helleiner (2014) is correct that the Fed did do much of the heavy lifting, the G20 was never designed to fully transform the global financial system in a normative fashion, its 're-emergence' was based on a historical idea that a 'new' format was needed to *preserve* the status quo (Darling, 2011; Rodrik, 2012, p.260-261). This is a point that Helleiner (2010, p.619) also seems to acknowledge in his analysis of the limited innovation in global financial governance that emerged from the crisis. Also see Slaughter (2015) on how the G20 has taken a leading role in legitimising global capitalism *using* socially responsible practices that reinforce the status-quo. See Kirton (2017) for a much more positive overview of the G20's role in overcoming the economic crisis.

[282] Russia, for example, was keen to maintain both its position in the G8 *and* in the G20, seeing the G20 as a more representative format but not seeing its seat at this table as equivalent to that which it held at the G8 (Zagorski, 2010, p.39) highlighting the role that even non-Western powers play in 'gatekeeping' by being reluctant to see the G8 removed from its position as the 'high-table' in world politics (Englebrekt, 2016).



Image 5

The legitimacy of this 'revived' form of G-Summitry, and indeed of the continued role of the G7 both within and alongside the G20, would be called into question when the next 'crisis slide' struck in 2014. Although this crisis was of a different nature to those that had shaped the evolution of G-Summitry thus far, with the crisis being driven by a return to past historical norms of colonialism in Europe, the 'fracturing' of the G-Summitry model nonetheless had its roots in the emergent contestation that would develop *within* and *between* the different forms of G-Summitry and the discordant relationship between norms, values, and interests. The next Section explores how the 2014 crisis shaped the next 're-emergence' of the historical norm and the future of the G-Summits following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

7.7 Back to the future: The G7 under old ownership

The roots of this next 'crisis slide' had its origins in the emergence of the post-Cold War order in Europe and the transformation of ex-Soviet spheres of influence into independent states, many of whom wished to move closer to Western institutions and organisations such as the EU and NATO. Increasing Russian dissatisfaction with this change in the balance of power, and the unwillingness of Russian elites to see democratic and nationalist revolutionary movements in these states succeed, brought

the region to a 'fracture' point in 2014 when Russia militarily intervened in Ukraine to seize territory and 'support' ethnic Russian separatist groups in the East.[283]

As Jackson (2003, p.331) notes, the dominant powers within international society, and indeed the non-dominant powers (Jackson, 1989; 1996), had in the past not look kindly upon territorial breaches of sovereignty which were in breach of the post-1945 international order. However, whilst Jackson's (2003) arguments were largely confined to a period of intervention and emergence of humanitarian intervention and a norm of 'responsibility to protect' around the turn of the 21st Century (Gallagher, 2012; Stefan, 2021), there was still an underlying global normative rejection of the forced changing of territorial boundaries and the return to a period of territorial acquisition and 19th Century colonial practices.

The annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia in 2014 was a direct rejection of these norms of international society, and indeed the post-1945 norms of international order (Hille, 2022a; Rachman, 2022b; Sevastopulo et al, 2022).[284] The result was that the 'hegemonic norm gatekeepers' *within* the G7 group acted in concert to at first suspend, and then expel, Russia from the G8, returning it to its original format.

This was a clear rejection of not only the destabilising actions of Russia, but also the assertion of a more cohesive form of relationship between the G7 member states themselves, something that had continuously been an issue and a concern since Russia's admission in the 1990s. As Image 6 shows, the 're-emergence' of the G7 was the result of these G7 leaders looking back to the past for a solution to this internal as well as external threat now posed to both the legitimacy and role of the G7 in world politics.

The result was, at first, a rather muted affair that focused upon the G7 extolling the virtues of its own *shared* norms and values now that Russia was no longer a member, without overcoming the inherent political and economic differences between the members over their continued relationship with Russia (Stiles, 2015).[285] In essence, the expulsion of Russia from the G8 created a situation whereby the G7 member states were able to assert their shared norms and values in *opposition* to Russian aggression (Rewizorski, 2015, p.33), but were still able to maintain these wider relationships, not least by remaining sat around the table within the framework of the G20.

[283] See Bechev, 2017; Ostrovosky, 2018; D'Anieri, 2019; Spohr, 2019, p.594; Plokhy, 2023.

[284] Although powerful states such as the US have also breached the norms of sovereignty, the difference here, contra to Dunne and Mulaj's (2010) position, is that it is clear there are some powerful states who fundamentally reject the norms of the liberal international order and are conducting themselves in a rejection of these principles not simply by overlooking issues of sovereignty, but in the case of Ukraine, and perhaps Taiwan, rejecting the very notion that different nations or states have the *right* to exist, or attempting to whitewash the past to claim they have *never* existed.

[285] As Hadano (2020) makes clear, there were also multiple different multilateral tracks of negotiations in an attempt at finding both short-term and longer lasting resolutions to the conflict.



Image 6

Thus, the 're-emergence' of the G7 in 2014 was a reassertion of the Western-oriented norms and values that had underpinned the original creation of the G7 in the 1970s (see Chapter 6). The challenge to these norms, and in fact the underlying norms of the liberal international order, saw the G7 leaders once again reach back to the past and their perceptions of what had been a success in managing international crises. For them, it was the coherence and legitimacy of a more selective and elitist group of quasi-Great Powers who *shared* similar norms and values.

The strength of these norms and values was put to the test once again in February 2022 when the underlying 'crisis slide' of the conflict and relationship between Russia and Ukraine that had never been resolved burst back into the open as Russia conducted a full-scale military invasion with the intent of erasing the Ukrainian nation under the auspices of a Russian elites perception of the importance of imperial history to a future global order that challenges the West (see Plokhy, 2023).

The fallout from the 2022 invasion of Ukraine has had a dramatic cumulative economic impact on the current international economic order with rising energy prices, increased food shortages and rampant inflation not seen since the 1970s 'crisis slide' (Wolf, 2022b). The real risk of long-term economic shortages (Economist, 2022c), logistical bottlenecks exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic (Hollinger et al, 2022), increased energy instability and price increases driving global inflation (Astrashheuskaya et al, 2022; Dempset et al, 2022; Sabadus, 2022), as well as the ever-present shadow of 1970s style stagflation (Wolf, 2022b) all frame this international crisis as a threat to the economic, political, and normative framework of the pre-existing liberal international order.

The G7 has now carved out a role for itself at the vanguard of the response, and defence, of the liberal international order by placing its shared norms and values front and centre in its support for Ukraine and in its economic response to the crisis (G7, 2022a; 2022b; 2022c; 2022d). The G20, which still includes Russia as a member, has failed to effectively respond to the crisis by attempting to mitigate or challenge the international effects of energy pricing or sanctions (Khalaf and Wilson, 2022; Wilson, 2022). This is an indication of the G20's inability to act in the face of an international crisis caused by one of its own (Engelbrekt, 2016, p.109; Giles and Smit, 2022; Tett, 2022; Giles, 2023; Parkin and Schwartz, 2023; Wheatley, 2023; Wintour, 2023b).

In summary, the choices made by the G7 leaders in their role as 'hegemonic norm gatekeepers' deliberately shaped the 're-emergence' of the G7 at the forefront of world politics because it served as a protection of their own legitimacy through the contestation it provided in cohering around a set of shared norms and values that Russia, and other states, do not adhere to. Yet the 'revival' of the G7 as a cohesive and elitist group was also shaped by the historical perception that these foundations of shared norms and values *were* that which made the G7 effective in responding to international crises that threatened *their* version of international order.

Once again, the G7 has *become* a distinctive value-based forum which not only attempts to maintain international order but also argues that it has a special responsibility to do so in the face of future threats to the international norms and values that have underpinned the pre-existing framework of the society of states. Russian attempts at returning to historical spheres of influence and 19th Century conceptions of Great Power management of world politics has in a way, and perhaps ironically, succeeded. The 're-emergence' of the G7 as a cohesive Western Great Power concert in response to Russian aggression is a reflection not only of the original conceptions of the norms and values that the G7 stood for, but also a reflection of the continued importance, and power, of the historical norm of Great Power management of international order in contemporary world politics (see Bell, 2005; 2007; Kissinger, 2013; Mitzen, 2013; Ball and Lee, 2014, p.5).

This chapter has built upon the narrative developed throughout this thesis in understanding and analysing the emergence and evolution of the G7 in world politics from an 'Old School' historical lens. In doing so this chapter has then taken pre-existing conceptual and theoretical ideas regarding emergent norms and deepened our understanding of the role played by past historical norms in shaping the 're-emergence' of contemporary informal structures in world politics. By returning to the ideas of Coral Bell and Martin Wight this chapter has developed an original conceptual framework for understanding the role, and importance, that historical perceptions of past successes in managing international order play in world politics when states, and state leaders, are confronted with an international crisis that threatens to fracture the pre-existing society of states.

The NCM contributes to both the ES understanding of past norms, as well as bringing the overlooked work of both Wight and Bell to the fore for reassessment by contemporary ES scholars. The NCM also contributes to the ongoing debates within the norms literature by highlighting the role that historical norms can play in shaping the future by remaining dormant until they are 'revived' by key actors and 're-emerge' into world politics in differing forms, rather than simply dying out (see Percy and Sandholtz, 2022).

Chapter 8 – Conclusion

'Ask the big questions and get the big picture, be sceptical about every generalization, including this one, hold up every fashion to the mirror of history; and acknowledge the extent to which we are in the dark rather than pretending that we can see the light.'
John Vincent (1988) on Hedley Bull's legacy

My aim in this thesis has been to explain the role the G7 plays in international relations and the importance this informal Great Power group has for the ES understanding of change in world politics. In unpacking this empirical case study, the thesis makes five key contributions to ongoing debates within the ES.

First, the thesis adds theoretical and empirical insight to the still largely underrepresented importance of economic power within the ES's understanding of legitimacy as well as the development of shared norms and values. Chapter 3 has provided an analysis of the emergence and early stages of the evolution of the G7. Doing so demonstrates how the perception of effectively responding to international economic crisis can provide a degree of international legitimacy, even to unrepresentative hegemonic groupings of powers. At the same time, Chapter 3 has also begun to explore how economic relationships between states can provide the foundations upon which further shared norms and values can coalesce and potentially develop into the principles that would underpin international society as a concept.

Second, by returning to much of the early ES work on the role and responsibility of Great Powers, and in applying this in Chapter 4 to the second and third G7 Summit cycles, the thesis argues that how Great Powers are both defined and how they act in contemporary world politics has significant similarities with past conceptions of Great Power responsibility within the early ES literature. It also demonstrates how economic power can shape the membership criteria of these Great Power clubs, and how the actions of the G7 can, and do, exist outside of the formal rules based international order, reminiscent of a 19th Century European Great Power Concert. The contribution to the ES here is that these Great Power responsibilities are neither a thing of the past, or perhaps a future response to existential emergency, but are present in contemporary world politics under the aegis of the G7.

Third, the rise of the G7 has not been uncontested, and as Chapter 5 argues, this contestation has been a fundamental aspect in how the G7 has evolved and how it has adapted to the normative constraints imposed upon it by emerging powers. Chapter 5 therefore makes a small contribution to the wider ES debate around the relationship between differing norms and values, and the pluralist/solidarist spectrum or divide, by arguing that the overlapping nature of these norms and values means that they both exert constraining influence on the excesses of the other. The case study of the G7, and the rise of alternative groups such as the G20 or the BRICS, provides an analytical window for the ES into how these norms and values interact and are shaped by their co-habitation in world politics.

Fourth, by focusing on the shared norms and values within the G7 that have evolved over time, but also held to a core nexus that was at the very foundations of its emergence, the recent case study

example of the Russian invasions of Ukraine and the G7's response has provided empirical evidence to argue that the G7 does not fit neatly within the pre-existing primary or secondary institutional characteristics that define the field. Instead, Chapter 6 argues that the G7 both embodies many primary institutional characteristics, while also controlling or influencing the actions of multiple secondary institutions. These elements, combined with the recent prominent reassertion of shared norms and values, underpin my argument that the G7 actually represents a form of solidarist international society. This Chapter therefore contributes to the wider debates within the ES around differing forms of international society, yet it distinguishes the G7 as unique in comparison to pre-existing regional or global examples. This is because the G7 is *both* global and *not globally representative* at the same time. This case study analysis provides the ES with potentially new avenues of research into informal groups of powers in world politics that offer a challenge to the pre-existing conceptual understanding of international societies.

Fifth, the theoretical spine that runs through this thesis is the importance of returning to the early ES work that provides insight into the role and evolution of such an informal collective hegemony that the G7 represents. The particular focus on the work of six key scholars, whom I have referred to as an 'Old School', has sought to provide a degree of clarity around the shared ontological, epistemological, and methodological approach to history that underpinned their thinking. This framing was not designed to meet the requirements of clearer social 'science' methodology, which it is often argued that the ES requires in order to take seat that the IR high table (see Chapter 1; Finnemore, 2001, p.509). Instead, this thesis gives us a better understanding of the shared perspectives that these 'Old School' scholars had about the role and use of history in understanding world politics.

In providing these definitional characteristics, and in using the language of contemporary social science debates, this theoretical analysis makes two contributions to the ES. First, it reassesses the role that some overlooked scholars played in shaping the early ES, while also highlighting the misconceptions of some of the ideas that have filtered down into contemporary ES thinking. Second, this 'Old School' framing provides a novel way of thinking about the ES's own history which in turn opens up the possibility of new avenues of research and debate within the field.

In defence of the thesis's broader narrative, I believe that looking back at the ES's own history is a well-trodden path within the approach, and it is also not a door that should be thought of as being firmly shut. There is always more that we can learn about our present thinking by looking back, and reassessing. In this way I believe the theoretical framing of an 'Old School' follows on the heels of tradition. However, this reassessment, and its specific framing, will inevitably be firmly challenged, and rightly so. This thesis does not claim to position its theoretical contribution as the final answer, only that it is a different way of approaching and looking at the ES's past, which I hope, in the words of Wilson (2016a, p.94) will open a 'vigorous debate'.

In regards to whether this 'Old School' framing provides some weight to the calls for methodological certainty in the ES, it does so only in the sense that it reconfirms Little's (2009b, p.78-79) argument that the ES is based upon a plurality of methodological approaches. What this 'Old School' framework highlights are the similarities between these six scholars, which shaped their focus on historicism and political elites, but it does not claim that this was their *only* focus. The contemporary ES embraces a wide range of epistemological and methodological routes to studying world politics, and this is still, in my eyes, one of the key contributions that the ES makes to IR. What this 'Old School' framework provides is some depth to our understanding of the history of the ES's development by demonstrating

where there were similarities in approaches between certain scholars and how this has then shaped the trajectory of thinking within what has become the ES approach.

8.1 Research significance

Building on the above contributions to the ES, this research also has two broader contributions to the study of world politics. The development in Chapter 7 of the Norms Crisis Model (NCM) provides an analytical heuristic for understanding the importance of historical norms in shaping contemporary world politics. It establishes how these historical norms, in the case study of the G7, 19th Century concepts of Great Power Concerts, can be revived by key international actors and then re-emerge into world politics in an amended form for contemporary usage. By looking back to overlooked aspects of early ES work, the thesis highlights why it is still important to approach the study of world politics by interpreting, and trying to understand, the insights, deliberations, and historical conceptions that key actors have of the past and how these can come to shape the future.

The NCM therefore provides a contribution to the ES's own understanding of norms, and of the role of international elites in shaping these norms based upon perceptions of the past. However, it also provides a novel contribution to the broader field of norms literature by building upon the recent debates that challenge the idea that norms simply die off, or are no longer relevant, when successfully challenged. Instead, Chapter 7 argues that these historical norms can lie dormant and then be revived and used when international crises shape the perception amongst key actors of the need for a solution that they believe has worked in the past. I believe this norms model has wider implications, and importance, for IR theory and beyond. Understanding how key actors are shaped by their perceptions of the past when they shape the conventions or norms of the future can also be better understood by studying the reference points and historical examples upon which they base such responses.

Consequently, the thesis makes a more specific contribution to the field of IR in its contemporary understanding of the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, which to date has largely been debated *within* the frameworks that continue to dominate the field (see Poast, 2022; Walt, 2022). This thesis highlights the importance that an ES lens can play in shaping our understanding of how informal international groups such as the G7 have attempted to manage a Western-led response. The concept that the G7 is an international 'plate spinner' (Dobson, 2007, p.89), holding together a myriad of differing global problems, holds true as much today as it did in the past. Yet, what this thesis demonstrates is that the fundamental challenge posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine to the concept of a liberal international order has seen the G7 go beyond even its pre-existing remit in managing international affairs.

The G7's response to this re-emergence of 19th Century imperial aspirations has, in turn, seen the assertion of its role as the vanguard in defence of the pre-existing liberal international order and the shared norms and values that underpin it. The genealogical case study analysis that runs throughout Chapters 3-6 of this thesis provides the analytical justification to the argument that the G7 has, in effect, become the global steering committee for the 'Western' response to Russian aggression.

8.2 Future research

This research has the potential to open up several avenues of future research, not least the role of informal groups in world politics and how they fit, or do not fit, within the pre-existing conceptual characteristics of primary and secondary institutions in the ES. The fact that this research only focuses on a single case study approach is a significant limitation in its broader applicability, and to the strength of its conclusions. Nonetheless, I believe that the path this research has laid out provides the opportunity for future case studies, and potentially comparative case studies, to be taken up. In this light, there are several new research agendas that could emerge from this thesis.

The first is a challenge to my own theoretical framing of who counts as a member of the 'Old School'. In essence, I am hoping that this 'Old School' label will be challenged in terms of its membership criteria in order to stimulate future discussion *about* these scholars' work, and to highlight some of the overlooked aspects of this early scholarship and how this can, or has, shaped the contemporary ES understanding of world politics. For example, I have left Maurice Keens-Soper out of this 'Old School' classification, yet there is an open case for his work on diplomatic thinking to be part of this group. My reasoning behind this exclusion was based upon the focus that Keens-Soper placed on the role of elites in the development of political theory, rather than shaping international action, yet this is a theoretical overlap that has been potentially left ajar.[286]

Second, as has been mentioned throughout the thesis, the work of Coral Bell is relatively overlooked by the ES. This undervaluation of Bell's work on alliances, the norms of deterrence, and the interactions of key political actors, is, I believe, of detriment to both the ES and the wider field of IR. My aim is to take some of the research developed on the relationship between Bell and other early ES scholars to make the case for firmly situating Coral Bell as an integral, and influential, member of the ES.

Third, I believe that the NCM provides a framework that has the potential be applied to different scenarios or empirical examples, not in the sense of providing a cause/effect analysis, but as a tool which can assist interpretivist scholars in understanding how the past, or perceptions of the past, can shape the actions of contemporary policy makers and key actors. For example, recent ES work led by Falkner and Buzan's (2022) edited collection on the role of Great Powers in managing climate change also opens up a direct possible application for the NCM *within* the ES. By returning to a historical route for managing international crisis, and indeed for managing a global response to impending international disorder and global threat, the essays in this volume are reaching back to the past in their assertion of the need for a framework of global order that they perceive *to have worked*.

In other words, similar to many of the architects of the emergence of the G7, concepts of 19th Century Great Power politics and Concert models for managing intractable global issues seem to be, once again, the fashion of the day. My hope then is that the NCM can be a useful analytical tool in questioning such routes towards a global response by opening up questions about conceptual and historical origins,

[286] See Sharp (2016, p.116). Also see Terradas (2023) on the unexplored links between Watson and Keens-Soper's potential collaborations. However, Navari (2010) perhaps provides some distance between Keens-Soper and my classification of those scholars within an 'Old School' due to the influence of Oakeshott's ideas on practice in his work.

but also the role that perceptions of past historical successes have in shaping future theoretical and policy directions.

Appendix

The information in this Appendix focuses upon the key issues discussed at the G7 Summits that are highlighted in the main Summit communiqués. As such they do not necessarily cover all issues/topics/events discussed at each Summit. Source material has been triangulated from Summit Communiqués, press releases, news sources, and tertiary literature to highlight the growing remit and responsibility of the G7 in world politics.

Date	Location/Host	Topics
The First Summit Cycle		
15-17 November 1975	Rambouillet, France	- OPEC oil crisis - Economic recession - Monetary reform
27-28 June 1976	Puerto Rico, United States	- Economic recovery - Canada joined the group
6-8 May 1977	London, United Kingdom	- Economic growth - Inflation - Nuclear proliferation
16-17 July 1978	Bonn, Germany	- Economic stimulus - Trade - Energy - Terrorism - Air hijackings
28-29 June 1979	Tokyo, Japan	- Oil crisis - Iran crisis - Energy - Oil import reductions
22-23 June 1980	Venice, Italy	- Energy - Personal side meetings - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
19-21 July 1981	Ottawa, Canada	- Economic policy - East-West trade - International trade
The Second Summit Cycle		
4-6 June 1982	Versailles, France	- East-West trade - Establishment of G5 Finance Ministers 'surveillance group' - Fracturing of trust between leaders post-Summit
28-30 May 1983	Williamsburg, United States	- Media management - Trade liberalisation - Shared political, military and economic response to Soviet Union - Arms control - Domestic election impact (UK)
7-9 June 1984	London, United Kingdom	- Domestic election impact (US) - Third world debt - International trade

		- Terrorism - Iran-Iraq war - Democratic values
2-4 May 1985	Bonn, Germany	- Economic and monetary policy - Drug policy - Famine relief - GATT negotiations
4-6 May 1986	Tokyo, Japan	- Chernobyl - State-based terrorism - Libya - Iran-Contra - Post-Summit betrayal of trust - G7 Finance Ministers meeting alongside G5 group
8-10 June 1987	Venice, Italy	- Domestic elections impact (UK and Italy) plus run up to 1988 elections in US and France - Foreign policy - Terrorism - Gulf conflict - Soviet politics
19-21 June 1988	Toronto, Canada	- Debt relief for low income countries - Stock market crash - Monetary policy
The Third Summit Cycle		
14-16 July 1989	Paris, France	- End of the Cold War - Debt relief - Instructing IMF - Environment - Financial Action Task Force created on money laundering
9-11 July 1990	Houston, United States	- Democracy in Eastern Europe - Trade - Agriculture - GATT - Backed creation of the WTO - Environment - Drug policy
15-17 July 1991	London, United Kingdom	- Gulf crisis - Trade/GATT - Backed creation of the WTO - Debt relief - Environment - Third party attendance (USSR)
6-8 July 1992	Munich, Germany	- Yugoslavia crisis

		- Trade/GATT - Collapse of the Soviet Union - IMF support for Russian Federation - Boris Yeltsin attends Summit
7-9 July 1993	Tokyo, Japan	- Trade tariffs - GATT success - WTO - Financial and political support for Yeltsin/Russia - Deliberately narrower focus on issues at Summit - Return to Library Group mentality
8-10 July 1994	Naples, Italy	- Debt relief - Globalisation first referenced - Russia attends as participant, not simply as a guest - International institution reform
15-17 June 1995	Halifax, Canada	- Bosnian crisis - Chechnyan war - International institution reform - International finance - Terrorism
The Fourth Summit Cycle		
27-29 June 1996	Lyon, France	- Terrorism - Environment - Development - International institution reform - Debt relief
20-22 June 1997	Denver, United States	- Russia joins as a 'member' of the group - Hailed as the 'Summit of the Eight' - Institutional reform - Development - Terrorism
15-17 May 1998	Birmingham, United Kingdom	- Russian membership confirmed - Asian Financial Crisis - Debt relief - Global financial architecture - International crime - Nuclear testing
18-20 June 1999	Cologne, Germany	- Kosovo

		- Global Financial Architecture - Creation of the G20 - Debt relief - Human security - Crisis prevention - Conflict prevention - Asian Financial Crisis
21-23 July 2000	Okinawa, Japan	- Outreach to non-members - Debt relief failures - Conflict prevention - Infectious disease - Putin's first Summit
21-22 July 2001	Genoa, Italy	- Riots - Global Fund on AIDS/TB - G7 Economic meeting and declaration still excludes Russian participation - Genoa Plan for Africa - Leadership on trade and development
26-27 June 2002	Kananaskis, Canada	- 9/11 attacks - Conflict prevention - Africa - Polio eradication - Economic growth - Terrorism - Ex-Soviet WMDs
The Fifth Summit Cycle		
1-3 June 2003	Evian, France	- Failure on Global Fund - Disagreement over Iraq overcome - Africa Plan - Outreach to BRICS - WMDs - North Korea - Iran - Terrorism - CTAG set up
8-10 June 2004	Sea Island, United States	- FDI in development - Middle East initiative - Outreach to regional powers - Non-proliferation - Terrorism
6-8 July 2005	Gleneagles, United Kingdom	- Debt relief - Terrorism - IMF/WB launch debt relief initiative - LIVE8 - MDGs - Terrorism - Aid to Africa - Energy security

15-17 July 2006	St Petersburg, Russia	- Energy security - Counterterrorism - Non-proliferation - Education - Infectious disease
6-8 June 2007	Heiligendamm, Germany	- Engagement with major emerging economies - Climate change - Trade - Development - Non-proliferation
7-9 July 2008	Hokkaido, Japan	- Health and development - Energy - Climate change - Food security - Corruption
8-10 July 2009	L'Aquila, Italy	- Natural disasters - Climate change - Food security - Non-proliferation - Counterterrorism - Cooperation with rising powers
25-26 June 2010	Muskoka, Canada	- 2008 GFC/G20 - Accountability - Shared norms and values - Development - Food security - Climate change
The Sixth Summit Cycle		
26-27 May 2011	Deauville, France	- Arab Spring - Nuclear disaster/safety - Freedom and democracy - African growth - Online protections
18-19 May 2012	Camp David, United States	- Oil supply shock - Economic growth - Impact of Eurozone Crisis on economic growth - MENA political transition
17-18 June 2013	Lough Erne, United Kingdom	- Economic growth - Tax evasion - Trade - Infrastructure - African investment
4-5 June 2014	Brussels, EU hosted (original location Sochi, Russia)	- Russia's suspension/expulsion - Ukraine - Syria - Libya - Energy security
7-8 June 2015	Schloss Elmau, Germany	- Russia's expulsion - Ukraine - Economic recovery - De-carbonisation - Development

		- Women's empowerment
26-27 May 2016	Ise Shima, Japan	- Economic growth - 'Abenomics' - Health - Trade - Climate change - Technology - Infrastructure
26-27 May 2017	Taormina, Italy	- 'Spirit' of cooperation - Cyber warfare - Chemical weapons - Syria - Ukraine - Minsk Agreements - Trade distortion
8-9 June 2018	Charlevoix, Canada	- Lack of trust - Post-Summit Trump tantrum - Trade - Tariffs - Russian influence in Syria - UK chemical weapon poisoning - Iran - Disagreement on climate change - Trump advocates for Russia's return
The Seventh Summit Cycle		
24-26 August 2019	Biarritz, France	- Gender equality - Trump/disagreements - Trade - WTO reform - Sahel Action Plan - Counterterrorism
16 March 2020	Online	- Emergency Summit to discuss COVID-19 pandemic
2020 – Postponed/Cancelled	Camp David, United States	- Cancelled due to COVID-19 pandemic
11-12 June 2021	Carbis Bay, United Kingdom	- R+D technology - Global tax regimes - Economic stimulus - Vaccine rollout/donations
24 August 2021	Online	- Emergency Summit to discuss Afghanistan
24 February 2022	Online	- Emergency Summit to discuss Russian invasion of Ukraine - Coordination of action - Sanctions
24 March 2022	Brussels	- Emergency Summit to discuss ongoing war in Ukraine - Coordination of action

		- Sanctions
8 May 2022	Online	- Emergency Summit to discuss ongoing war in Ukraine - Coordination of action - Sanctions
26-28 June 2022	Schloss Elmau, Germany	- Energy crisis - Inflation - Ukraine - Food insecurity - Russian sanctions - Crackdown in Hong Kong - Pandemic preparedness - Taiwan strait/South China Sea - Green transition - Biodiversity - Shared democratic norms and values
19-21 May 2023	Hiroshima, Japan	- Support for Ukraine - Energy - Nuclear energy - Nuclear weapons - Russo/Ukraine war - Shared norms and values - Chinese military actions - Food security - Artificial Intelligence

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