Strange bedfellows? An historical analysis of the Scottish National Party's policies on Europe

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Abstract

This thesis examines how and why the Scottish National Party's policies on Europe have changed over time. Though the SNP is currently an overtly pro-European party, this has not always been the case. Until the 1980s, the party argued that the European Economic Community (EEC) was a highly 'centralised' and 'bureaucratic' entity with little space for the expression of regional and subnational interests. Using a novel mix of historical and discursive institutionalisms, this thesis explores the contextual factors behind the party's shift from anti- to pro-European during the 1980s. The extant literature argues that the pro-European shift occurred in 1988 with the launch of the SNP's *Independence in Europe* narrative. This thesis, however, reveals that this narrative actually emerged in 1983 owing to an overlapping of various contextual factors such as European integration, Scottish subnational politics, British domestic politics and the activities of political entrepreneurs.

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Declaration

I, the author, confirm that this thesis is my own work. I am aware of the University's Guidance on the Use of Unfair Means (www.sheffield.ac.uk/ssid/unfair-means). This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other university.

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Table of acronyms

AMS	Additional-Member Electoral System
ASBI	Association of States of the British Isles
BIE	Britain in Europe
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CFP	Common Fisheries Policy
CoR	Committee of the Regions
DI	Discursive Institutionalism
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFA	European Free Alliance
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FNP	Frisian National Party
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
HI	Historical Institutionalism
JMC(E)	Joint Ministerial Council (Europe)
KBO	Keep Britain Out
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
NEC	National Executive Committee
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMOV	One Member, One Vote
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
RET	Road Equivalent Tariff
RegLeg	Regions with Legislative Powers

rUK	Rest of the UK
SCA	Scottish Covenant Association
SNP	Scottish National Party
SSP	Scottish Socialist Party
STUC	Scottish Trades Union Congress
TAC	Total Allowable Catch
UCS	Upper Clyde Shipbuilders

Introduction: why examine the SNP's historical policies on Europe?

In the lead up to the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence from the United Kingdom (UK) - also known as *IndyRef* - the question of Europe became a hot topic of discussion on both sides of the debate. An 'airwar' took place between the official Yes and No campaigns while a 'groundwar' of communities and social media remained wildly out of control of the two official campaigns (Keating, 2015, p. 86). The *Yes* campaign was spearheaded by SNP leader, Alex Salmond with an unfaltering level of support from deputy leader, Nicola Sturgeon. The rival campaign, *Better Together,* was led by MP Alistair Darling of the Labour Party. In the end, the Remain side won whereby 55.3 per cent of Scotland's population voted against independence from the UK.

Central to much of the elite and public debates was the question of Scotland's membership of the European Union (EU). On the one hand, the No campaign argued that Scotland would not easily be able to join the EU as an independent state while the Yes camp maintained that voting to remain in the UK would eventually lead to withdrawal from the EU regardless, considering the growing Euroscepticism in much of Britain and England, in particular. These questions of Scottish sovereignty, European integration and national identity intertwined to produce a distinct political context and historical moment which I believed to be worth exploring. In this context resided the idea of Europe, and what was curious to me was how this idea spanned the airwar and groundwar, and how it featured in the debates for and against Scottish independence.

Not only did I have some intellectual and philosophical questions about this chasm between the two campaigns but also about Scotland's largest political party, the Scottish National Party (SNP). It was clear from the SNP's 2014 IndyRef campaign that the official launch of its *Independence in Europe* narrative in 1988 was still strong. That had not always been the case, however. Until the 1980s, the SNP had always claimed that the European Community (EC) was a 'centralised' and 'highly bureaucratic' polity. Upon further research, I asked the questions: *why this shift? Why at that time?* It became clear, however, that there weren't simple answers to these questions and the existing literature hadn't yet addressed them as fully as I'd hoped they would. This led to my

main thesis research question of *how and why have the SNP's policies on Europe changed over time?*

In this introduction, I will first explain why I have chosen Scotland, why the SNP, and why its policies on Europe. I will then discuss the significance of this research as well as its main contributions. Finally, I will provide a chapter outline to signpost the reader to particular periods of analysis of the party's historical policies on Europe.

Why Scotland?

Scotland has a population of 5.5 million people in a UK state of 66.8 million, making up 8.2 per cent of the population (Office for National Statistics, 2021). While the population of Scotland is smaller than those of Yorkshire and London, it makes up almost one third of Great Britain's landmass and 57 per cent of its coast. Moreover, Scotland is geopolitically important for a number of reasons, including the location of the Trident nuclear programme, as well as its 'critical role' in intelligence, military, and security issues (Hassan, 2016, pp. 11-12). Though small in size, Scotland occupies an important space in Europe and any discussion about self-government and independence has implications for not only Scotland but also for the rest of the UK (rUK) and indeed Europe (Hassan, 2016, pp. 11-12).

As a devolved nation of the UK, Scotland has devolved powers over health, education, law, among others. Many Scots see this as enough autonomy and welcome British conventions including the monarchy and the pound sterling. Though the majority of Scotland voted to Remain (by 62 per cent) in the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum of 2016, the Brexiteer narrative chimed with many and the concept of European identity came into question. Indeed, Scottish identity is a curious case whereby Scottish, British and European identities do or do not cross over, i.e., feeling exclusively Scottish or exclusively British with/without identification with Europe. This makes for a particularly interesting case where the fabric of Scottish national identity is challenged by secessionist politics, whether that's Scotland's secession from rUK or the UK's withdrawal from the EU. While the period of analysis of this thesis is from 1961 to 2014, implications of Brexit on the SNP's policies on Europe will be discussed in the conclusion. In order to contextualise the choice of Scotland as a

country of study, we must also examine the current political context in which Scotland exists.

The free market revolution of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979 - 1990) vowed 'freedom, dignity and prosperity for all' (Hassan, 2016, p. 12). Rather, the poverty gap in Britain is ever growing and this idea of a more liberal capitalism has transformed into 'a cannibalistic crony capitalism, and a corporate order and politics of cartels and closed elites' (Hassan, 2016, p. 12). The economic crash of 2008 was supposed to 'herald a new age of responsibility, and a more socially aware economics' (Hassan, 2016, p. 12). Rather, 'the story was of restoration' (Hassan, 2016, p. 12) and included an obsession with what is considered as the British Money Tree, the almost magical creation of money from nowhere to 'pay pampered elites for, at best, doing nothing, and certainly not creating anything physically real or adding any real value' (Hassan, 2016, p. 12). This has resulted in a backlash from both the public and political parties, with the SNP arguing that an independent Scotland in Europe would be able to escape this capitalist environment.

In more recent years, the UK has had to navigate Brexit, which came into action in January 2020 and posed significant challenges for Scotland and the rUK. Goods are more difficult to import and export from the UK and British citizens are becoming increasingly frustrated with either Westminster or Brussels. Today, the UK is arguably more economically and socially fragile than ever before with Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and the rise in fuel prices, causing much concern and frustration among the public. This thesis aims to examine the years preceding these contemporary changes and will ultimately offer reflections on how the SNP could respond to these changes in the context of European integration.

Europe

The European Union (EU) was formed in 1993 upon the formation of the Maastricht Treaty. Its roots can be traced back to the Western Union, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), formed respectively in 1948 (Treaty of Brussels), 1951 (Treaty of Paris) and 1957 (Treaty of Rome). Now

comprised of 27 member states, the UK became the only country to leave the EU in 2020. On top of Brexit, the EU has undergone many crises in recent years, from enormous levels of youth unemployment in the South Mediterranean countries of Greece (50.4 per cent), Spain (43.9 per cent) and Italy (36.9 per cent), to the 'fiscal fascism' forced on Greece in 2007-2008 (Hassan, 2016). The EU has also had to carefully compose a position on the Russo-Ukrainian war, ongoing since 2014 with a severe escalation at the beginning of 2022. A statement from the European Commission (2022) maintains that:

'The EU and its international partners are united in condemning Putin's aggression on Ukraine. We will provide support to those seeking shelter and we will help those looking for a safe way home. The EU will continue to offer strong political, financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and impose hard-hitting sanctions against Russia and those complicit in the war'.

As Hassan has noted, '...this has become an age of insurgency and protest against conventional elites' (Hassan, 2016, pp. 13-14). We see throughout Europe the emergence of extreme right-wing and even neo-Nazi movements and parties, such as Jobbik in Hungary, Golden Dawn in Greece, the Law and Justice Party in Poland, the True Finns in Finland, and the Sweden Democrats (Hassan, 2016, pp. 13-14). For a long time now, the EU has managed the internal complexities of its member states, such as when it granted East Germany EU membership upon German reunification (Lock, 2017, p. 34). The EU also managed to allow the whole of Cyprus to join in 2004, even though its government is not in control of the north of the country, as well as allowing Greenland a more detached status after it achieved increased internal autonomy within Denmark. Furthermore, the EEA Agreement meant that Norway could exempt the territory of Svalbard from its application. Where does Scotland fit into this picture? While we cannot say that Scotland would follow a similar trajectory we can regard it as a 'case of the type of spatial rescaling happening across Europe as new modes of statehood and sovereignty develop' (Keating, 2015, p. 73).

The global picture

We are living in a time of extraordinary global movement. As of November 2022, 7.8 million Ukrainian refugees were recorded across Europe and this number is only growing (UNHCR, 2002). This raises questions of sovereignty, national identity and to whom do we 'belong'? For a small nation, Scotland has witnessed a profound reshaping of politics since its 2014 independence referendum. It is part of a wider global framework, however, and involved 'homegrown change' (Hassan and Barrow, 2019, p. 12). The West has witnessed a 'crisis of mainstream politics: the hollowing out of and discrediting of neo-liberalism' which posits that a 'corrupted version of markets and rigged capitalism should be the solution to most public-policy choices' (Hassan and Barrow, 2019, p. 12). As Hassan has remarked: 'Change… does seem to be speeding up - and becoming more unpredictable, disorganised and messy' (2016, p. 11).

The COVID-19 pandemic whose first case reached Scotland in February 2020, brought about a redefinition of borders and social interaction. With a two-metre social distancing policy, it is of little surprise that this physical distance also created psychological distance, not only between individuals but between nations. Borders hardened and only reinforced negative attitudes towards immigration. The anti-immigration rhetoric behind Brexit and indeed, COVID, prompted a greater involvement of the SNP with high affairs. While very much guided by the UK government, the Scottish government had its own pandemic policies, driven by First Minister Nicola Sturgeon. Sturgeon's approach, as opposed to that of former UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, was consistent and concise and distilled a great sense of safety and security in Scotland (see Paton, 2022).

The global pandemic has also brought with it the upsurge in popularity of social media platforms such as TikTok. These platforms prompted new and creative ways of political thinking and helped to create and sustain social movements such as Me Too and Black Lives Matter, which have constructed a new narrative of identity politics whereby the world is currently reassessing its perceptions of concepts such as race, gender and citizenship. As Hassan and Barrow (2019, p. 12) have explained: 'There has emerged the

salience of identity and belonging - much of which relates to big questions and forces redefining society'.

Returning to my previous question of *why Scotland?*, we can see that it is part of a nation state with massive complexities which, until recently, had membership of the EU. Though it is self-sufficient to a great extent, Scotland still relies on the UK in areas such as defence, and the relationship between them is often taught and fragile. But with a pro-EU majority, the people of Scotland may see Scottish independence as an attractive alternative since the UK's exit from the EU. Indeed, Nicola Sturgeon announced in June of 2022 year that a second Scottish independence referendum (IndyRef2) is to be held on 19th October 2023. This referendum will raise questions of national belonging, identity and sovereignty in a slightly different way from the 2014 independence referendum now that the UK, and therefore Scotland, is no longer part of the EU.

Why the SNP and its policies on Europe?

The SNP was formed in 1934 and is currently Scotland's largest political party. As arguably Europe's most well-known secessionist party, the SNP has great analytical potential, particularly when analysed in tandem with existing theories and concepts of secessionist parties in Europe. In 2007, the party formed a minority government and proceeded to win the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary Election, forming Holyrood's first majority government. In 2016 the SNP reverted to being a minority government following the Scottish Parliamentary Election. In the 2021 Scottish Parliamentary Election, the SNP gained one seat and established a power-sharing agreement with the Scottish Greens. The party's support has remained high since the 2014 referendum and polls at the end of 2022 indicated continued public support for Scottish independence (*The National*, 18 December 2022).

Eight years on, the topic of Scottish independence has become live again with the announcement of IndyRef 2. A main thread of argument in the SNP's campaign is centred on Brexit and the fact that Scottish people had not voted for the UK's withdrawal from the EU at the 2016 referendum. In particular, the SNP argues that if the people of Scotland had known that the UK's exit from the EU was on the cards, that

much of the electorate would have decided to leave the UK at the first Scottish independence referendum.

As Brexit is the first of its kind since the EU's formation, so too is it the first time a secessionist party has had to handle the consequences of being pro-EU (Scotland) in a majority anti-EU (rUK) country. As an institution, the SNP deserves further analytical engagement than the current body of literature provides. The SNP lends itself well to institutional analysis for several reasons which will be outlined in the following chapter. We know from the existing literature, however, that the SNP has not always been pro-European. This shift occurred in the 1980s and the SNP's Independence in Europe narrative has been used to frame Scottish independence. Indeed, former SNP MSP, Stephen Gethins (2022) noticed that, when he was at university, the SNP was 'avowedly pro-European' and put the European flag on its campaigning literature in a way that other parties wouldn't. By the time of the 2014 independence referendum, the SNP was the strongest pro-European party in the UK (Keating, 2015, p. 84). Therein lies a possible contradiction, however. Why would a secessionist party be in favour of substituting one union for another? Are the SNP and Europe really 'strange bedfellows' (Jolly, 2009)?

Significance and contribution of research

This thesis aims to answer the aforementioned key question through a unique conceptual framework, a rigorous methodology and exploration of themes such as secessionist political parties and European integration, as well as small states' membership of the EU. It draws from and builds upon a broad literature on Europeanisation, Scottish subnational politics, British domestic politics and political entrepreneurship at the heart of the SNP's policies on Europe.

The thesis makes both an empirical and theoretical contribution to the existing literature. Empirically, it is based on archival research and interviews with an emphasis on the former. A wealth of SNP ephemera was brought back to life for the analysis of this thesis, making visible otherwise forgotten materials. Theoretically, I have contributed to the analysis of secessionist parties in a novel way. I have taken the strengths of both historical and discursive institutionalisms to generate a distinct

conceptual framework in which to analyse the SNP's policies on Europe. As a result, the core argument of this thesis is that the SNP's shift in policy from anti- to pro-European appeared in 1983 - five years before the extant literature suggests in terms of the launch of the party's Independence in Europe narrative in 1988. Both of these empirical and theoretical contributions can be used not only to analyse the SNP's policies on the EU, but also for other instances across Europe and the directions they may follow.

Chapter outline

The first chapter of this thesis offers a literature review, with a particular focus on Europeanisation and how the existing body of work cannot alone account for how and why the SNP's policies on Europe have changed over time. Chapter 2 unpacks the conceptual framework of this thesis, focusing on my use of historical and discursive institutionalisms as well as the methods of process tracing, archival research and interviews. It will show how these concepts and methods have been combined in order to effectively analyse the change in the SNP's policies on Europe.

The empirical body of this work begins in Chapter 3 in which I explore the SNP's policies on Europe from 1961-1975. In particular it will examine Britain's failed EEC membership application in 1961 and its subsequent accession to the EEC 1973. This chapter also examines the UK's 1975 EEC referendum and the SNP's narrative surrounding it. In particular, it analyses the activities of prominent SNP political entrepreneur, Winnie Ewing in Europe.

Chapter 4 focuses on the party's identity crisis following the formation of the 79 Group as well as analysing the moment in 1983 when the SNP started to argue for independence in Europe for the first time. It concentrates on the respective 1984 and 1989 European Parliamentary Elections and the party's corresponding discourses.

In Chapter 5, I explore devolution and Europe, in particular, a Europe of the Regions and the prospect of devolution under Alex Salmond who shifted the party to a more gradualist position in the early 1990s. I then examine the 1997 UK General Election and

1999 Scottish Parliamentary Election and the SNP's discourses on Europe within these, including its partial uncertainty around European integration in the late 1990s.

Chapter 6 examines the 2000s in which the party's leadership changed from Salmond to that of John Swinney. It examines a number of elections throughout the decade, namely the 2001 UK General Election, 2003 Scottish Parliamentary Election, 2004 European Elections and 2007 Scottish Parliamentary Election, and the party's then policies on Europe within these contexts. Moreover, this chapter looks at the return of Salmond to the SNP as leader in 2004.

The final empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 7) analyses the historical moment at which Scottish independence in Europe was put to the test at the 2014 independence referendum. It will cover the 2010 UK General Election and 2011 Scottish Parliamentary Election preceding the independence referendum and will focus particularly on Alex Salmond, Nicola Sturgeon and the SNP's pro-independence campaign.

Finally, the conclusion will analyse the main findings of this thesis alongside a consideration of how it has answered the main research question of this thesis. Furthermore, it will discuss the original contribution that this thesis has made alongside an analysis of the future of the SNP's policies on Europe.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

On 18th September 2014, 44.7 per cent of Scotland's population voted for independence from the United Kingdom. Throughout its campaign narratives, Scotland's main secessionist party, the Scottish National Party (SNP) continuously reinforced the mantra that Scotland's 'natural position' was as an 'active participant' in the European Union (Scottish Government, 2013, p. 216). This has not always been the case, however. Until the 1980s, the SNP remained a somewhat anti-European party, claiming that the European Economic Community (EEC) was a 'centralised' and 'highly bureaucratic' polity. Why, then, and how, has such a shift occurred and what can the existing literature tell us about this? This thesis is the first academic study to consider the question of the SNP's shifting discourses and policies on the EU and its institutional antecedents as its primary and sole focus.

That said, the question has, of course, been considered, at least tangentially, in a range of previous studies and literatures. The most common academic explanations for the SNP's changes in discourse and policy on Europe have come from the concept of 'Europeanisation', which, as I will address later in the chapter, remains somewhat confused and, at times, highly contested. Europeanisation scholars tend to concentrate on how regional and subnational entities have been affected by Europe at the domestic level. Others focus on individual actors within the party, such as former MEP, Winnie Ewing, commonly known as 'Madame Ecosse', who infused the party with a pro-European sentiment during the 1980s onwards. Moreover, some have emphasised the importance of British politics in shaping the SNP's interactions with the idea of Europe. For example, some strategic theories of political parties argue that subnational independence movements adopt pro-or anti-European stances depending on which line their central government takes in order to differentiate themselves from the establishment (e.g., Jolly, 2007, p. 113).

This literature review will reveal, then, how explanations for the SNP's policies on Europe tend to fall into either structuralist (Europeanisation/ UK structures) or agential (SNP/UK actors) camps. The primary added value of this thesis in relation to that

extant literature is to show the ways in which structure and agency became interwoven across the European, British and Scottish levels to generate distinct and shifting SNP policies on Europe. Therefore, *the main contribution of this thesis is to provide the first substantial account of the ways in which these policies have changed by considering the interplay between structuralist and agential factors.*

The thesis aims to synthesise and significantly build upon extant structuralist and agential accounts and to show how SNP actors have reacted to different contexts at all three levels. Thus far, nobody has brought together all three of these levels in analyses of the SNP's policies on Europe. As we shall see in Chapter 2, however, the theoretical underpinnings of this research and methods deployed (primarily archival) have allowed me to synthesise these levels in order to reach a more comprehensive understanding of narrative and policy changes over time.

A more dialectical approach to structure and agency is needed for a more balanced analysis of the change in the SNP's policies on Europe. While Chapter 2 will lay out these claims in more detail, it is worth considering while reading this chapter that structure and agency are, in fact, interlaced across the European, British and Scottish levels. Though they are interwoven, this research concentrates on the SNP's policies on Europe and thus the key agent is the SNP and its actors. That said, agents at all levels (Scotland, the UK and the EU) shape the structural context within which SNP actors operate and simultaneously constrain and enable their actions. This thesis is interested in the ways in which all levels and their agents/structures intersect to generate changes in the party's policies on Europe.

In this chapter, I aim to substantiate the above claims by mapping the current state of the art of the literature on the SNP which has at least touched on the issue of Europe. In so doing I will examine the prevailing analyses of the SNP's shifting European policy and point to ways in which a more holistic perspective, encompassing European, British and Scottish politics and a balanced view of structure and agency can help us to better understand this phenomenon. First, I will discuss the contributions made at the European level; that is, what claims are made in relation to the impact of European politics on the SNP's policies on Europe over time? Second, I will address the literature which has explored the impacts of Scottish politics, both in structural and agential

terms, on the SNP's European policies. I will then examine the literature on the ways in which British politics have served to change the party's responses to an ever-integrating Europe. Finally, I will argue for a more balanced consideration of the structure/agency debate, as well as a shift to a more discursive interpretation, in my conclusions.

1.1 Explanatory dimensions

This thesis uses four explanatory dimensions for the change in the SNP's policies on Europe, namely a) European integration, b) Scottish subnational politics, c) British domestic politics and, d) political entrepreneurs. This chapter will first discuss the European level whereby a 'Europe of the Regions' sparked a dual reaction. On the one hand, many thought national institutions' competences would diminish as the EU expanded and would be supplanted by regional powers. On the other hand, there were those who believed that a Europe of the Regions would enable regions to access and shape supranational policy-making (Bullmann, 1996, p. 3). Furthermore, this chapter will focus on the role of transnational political alliances, namely the European Free Alliance, which serves to be a united front for regions in the EU and European Parliament (EP). It will demonstrate, however, how the concept of Europeanisation cannot alone explain the SNP's shift from anti- to pro-European in the 1980s. An argument is made for analysing the concept alongside other structural factors of British domestic politics and Scottish subnational politics as well as the role of political entrepreneurs in shaping the party's discourses on Europe.

This chapter will then explore how Scottish politics have affected the SNP's European trajectory. In particular, it will discuss how other political parties in Scotland have influenced how the SNP has expressed its interests in Europe. It will touch upon how a shift in collective national identity has impacted the party's European policies and how Scottish national identity has become intertwined with a sense of Europeanness which the SNP used for political gains. Furthermore, this chapter will look at the gradualist/fundamentalist divide within the SNP and how it has affected the party's European policies. Indeed, the SNP has witnessed intraparty divisions in how to achieve its goal of Independence in Europe and it is a worthwhile exercise to explore this area in detail.

The British domestic level will also be examined. Devolution, in particular, has had a profound effect on the SNP's situation of its European policies. In other words, UK level reforms provided the SNP with an opportunity to exercise its own European policies. This section will look at how the ideologies of other British political parties have affected the SNP's policies on Europe. In particular, it will explore how intraparty tensions within the Labour Party over EEC membership allowed the SNP to attract Labour voters to its European cause.

The final section of this chapter will explore the concept of political entrepreneurship, showing how prominent SNP figures have shaped the party's approach to European integration. It will explore how political entrepreneurs can reframe political debates and remodel the political landscape (Riker, 1995). The creativity of political entrepreneurs, in particular, is an important aspect of the way in which the SNP's policies on Europe have developed over time.

It is my hope that an exploration of the main academic arguments for each of these explanatory dimensions in this chapter will provide a solid foundation upon which to analyse how the intersection of each of these structural and agential levels have shaped the way in which the SNP has developed distinct policies on Europe over time.

1.2 European level

The concept of a 'Europe of the Regions' became popular during the 1980s and early 1990s as a reaction to institutional progress and new policy in European integration. Subnational actors across the continent considered these new advancements as a way to establish a substitute supranational framework that could meet their territorial needs. The concept was pushed by the Commission under its then president, Jacques Delors (John, 2000, p. 882), yet its other advocates had differing visions of how this would materialise on a practical level. Some believed that national institutions' competences would decrease as the EU grew in size and that they would be replaced by regions with immediate access to the European policy-making process. Others thought that the Europe of the Regions would change the dynamic of the EU from a Europe of the states to a Europe in which regions would occupy a 'third level', where they could influence supranational decision-making (Bullmann, 1996, p. 3).

This new supranational arena in which regional actors found themselves drove scholars to review the implications of this new space. Marks (1993) and others (Hooghe and Marks, 1996; Marks et al., 1996) maintained that the grand theories of European integration, such as neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, were too preoccupied with the relationship between the state and supranational levels and neglected the increasing prominence of substate actors. Rather, some scholars introduced an alternative framework in which to study European integration, whereby authority and power are steadily diffused across multiple levels of governance, rather than remaining exclusive to sovereign states. The earliest version of this multi-level governance theory emphasised 'the relatively open and fluid nature of such a mode of policy making' (Elias, 2008, pp. 484-485), where subnational actors as well as states and supranational institutions had influence (Marks, 1993; Marks et al., 1996).

Those studying European politics have widely agreed that the EU can be conceptualised as a polity with 'negotiated, non-hierarchical' relations between institutions at the regional, national and transnational levels (Jachtenfuchs, 2001; Peters and Pierre, 2001, p. 131; Bache and Flinders, 2004). Yet, other than examining the nature of decision-making at the European level, multi-level governance has been unable to give a unitary theoretical response to explain the European political process. Multi-level governance has offered a 'framing metaphor' (Rosamond, 2000, p. 197) to which other theoretical and analytical approaches can be applied in order to illuminate the nature of political decision-making within the EU (Benz and Eberlein, 1999, p. 330; Jordan, 2001, p. 201). Though there has been a flow of literature that adopts such approaches to study the different 'politics, polity and policy' (Treib et al., 2005, p. 5) types of governance in the EU, very little of it has looked at the regional aspect of European governance.

In what follows, I discuss the impact of Europeanisation on parties and regions and their potential responses. Though the Europeanisation literature is closely related to the regions literature, they are not the same thing as the latter applies to substate governments, regardless of which party is in power. As such, it is also important to examine structuralist accounts of Europeanisation. The SNP literature and the regions literature are distinct but the regions literature has implications for a party such as the SNP, especially when it holds and shares power in a devolved setting.

Where there has been study into regional mobilisation in Europe, the majority of research has used the concept of Europeanisation, whose definition tends to be based on how the EU affects domestic politics. Keating et al. (2015) claim that regional actors have responded to European integration in two ways. On the one hand, a rejectionist regionalism contests European integration on the basis of losing democratic control and having a more isolated national government. This stance was adopted by many regions in the 1970s and continues in some regions today. On the other hand, regional actors consider the EU as a provider of economic and political resources, including economic development and the promotion of minority languages and cultures helpless against large states (Cardús, 1991; De Witte, 1991; Jolly, 2009).

In a similar vein, Keating and McGarry (2001) have studied how the EU has created opportunities for stateless nations to advance their national identities within a larger political space. Both the transformation of the state and a changing international order are prompting the emergence or re-emergence of minority nationalisms. The EU operates in a variety of complex ways that are making state authorities more favourable towards minority goals and demands. As the authors explain: 'Ceding some form of autonomy to national minorities seems to be more thinkable today as a result of the weakening of the concept of sovereignty' (Keating and McGarry, 2001, p. 9). Those European states that have merged their sovereignty in Brussels have been more likely to decentralise power than in previous times of unitary sovereign states. Over the past few decades, the UK, Belgium and Spain have all decentralised. While parties such as the SNP and the Flemish Vlaams Belang advocate their needs for their own independent states, they have made sure to situate their territorial demands within the context of the EU (Keating and McGarry, 2001, p. 10). Subnations have been able to interact across state lines and create several means of access to Brussels, and their existence has been officially acknowledged through the European Committee of the Regions (CoR).

Indeed, parties are able to perceive the EU as either an 'ally' against the central state or as another polity jeopardising national autonomy (Jolly, 2007, 2015). On the one hand, European integration 'decreases the necessity for traditional large states, making smaller, more homogenous states more viable' (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). On the

other hand, regional political entrepreneurs may convince voters that European integration will hinder substate power. By consulting SNP official party rhetoric, Jolly (2007) tests these two competing hypotheses and discovers that regionalist parties tend to be pro-European, with a 'viability logic' driving these attitudes. He found that European integration is an attractive option to secessionist parties because it makes for a more constructive opportunity structure for their subnational autonomy movements in the sense that European integration brings new economic benefits or even the possibility of independence (Heasly, 2001). While Jolly has discovered that regionalist parties tend to be more pro-European, this is not consistent across time and space, as we can see in the case of the SNP. It is therefore important to look at the party's history and to consider how its future policies on Europe will be carved out. As the SNP's stance has shifted over time and has even shown simultaneous 'pro' and 'anti' sentiments towards Europe, it may be unhelpful to categorise parties along such binary lines.

As European integration has deepened and widened, regions have pursued new instruments to become involved in European policy-making (Keating et al., 2015, p. 448). Such instruments have taken the form of territorial lobbies incorporating both private and governmental actors (Keating, 2013). Regions have also been attracted by other facets of European politics, such as the creation of partners in policy-making, institutional matters, the principle of subsidiarity, inter-regional collaboration and cross-border matters. However, regions also remain rivalled in terms of inviting private investment and public funding, and influencing EU policies to align with their regional goals. Keating et al. (2015, p. 450) argue that 'there is a constant tension between promotion of regionalism in general, and the pursuit of regions' individual concerns'. There is a multitude of channels through which regions can act on an individual or collective basis, and 'there is not, nor can there be, a single mode of representation of 'regional' interests in the EU' (Keating et al., 2015, p. 450).

The authors argue that the most significant mode of access is through national governments and that the more successfully regional interests are incorporated into the national policy-making system, the 'better they will be looked after in Brussels' (Keating et al., 2015, pp. 450-451). The majority of regional offices in Brussels focus on liaisons and impending policy initiatives that enable the offices to lobby their national

governments. Moreover, the offices share regional demands and information with Commission officials, who otherwise turn to national governments. The offices also play a representational role by advancing regions at the European level and allowing them to partake in the policy process. Regional lobbies usually require the help of national governments for success at the European level. More analysis on the extent to which the SNP has had access to such 'information' since its rise to power in the Scottish Parliament in 2007 therefore poses as a worthwhile exercise.

While some (Elias, 2009) maintain that regions bypass their member states by having a direct voice in the EU, surveys of regional offices in Brussels suggest otherwise. According to Tatham (2013a), European regions tend to work with their member states to realise policy outcomes rather than bypassing them, and it is rare that interests conflict with the stance taken by the national governments. Keating et al. (2015, p. 454) argue that regions with greater autonomy and regions with the same parties in government as at the national level are more likely to collaborate than regions with less autonomy or whose parties in power differ from those of the member state. Moreover, Hix (1998, p. 55) argues that, while the institutional structure and policy of the EU has changed following Treaty revisions, it remains a secure and established space within which political actors can create political strategies. There has been a gradual opening of regional offices in Brussels (Greenwood, 2003) with many regional and local authorities giving fundamental resources in order to have more of a voice in the EU arena (Moore, 2006).

Elias (2008, p. 483) has also observed, however, the limitations for regional mobilisation within the EU and argues that the Europe of the Regions concept has become less popular over time. She states that, regardless of the gradual transfer of powers from the state to the supranational level, there is little evidence to suggest that the substate level has in fact benefited. For example, rather than being an instrument for strengthening the substate level, the notion of subsidiarity was 'applied predominantly in a very narrow way to decide the legal basis of competence between member states and the European institutions' (Elias, 2008, p. 486; see Evans, 2002; Van Hecke, 2003). It is suggested that regions had not become real partners with member states and the European institutions, but rather national governments acted as gatekeepers, where

substate actors rarely influenced regional planning and spending (Anderson, 1990; Bache, 1998a, 1998b; John, 2000). Others have also observed how only a few regional actors had access to institutional opportunities at the supranational level, while others were constrained in their influence on European decision-making (see Christiansen, 1996; Marks et al., 1996; Jeffery, 2000; Keating and Hooghe, 2001; Nagel, 2004). Elias (2008, p. 486) and others have noted that 'regionalist or autonomist parties who saw in the EU an opportunity for organizing political authority on a post-sovereign basis were also forced to recognise that, in practice, Europe was still dominated by sovereign states and sovereignty-based understandings of politics' (Elias, 2006; Hepburn, 2006; Keating and Bray, 2006).

Elias (2009, p. 541) has also observed how European integration has prompted new relationships between political parties in the form of the European Free Alliance (EFA), a European political party that comprises several European separatist, regional and ethnic minority political parties. The EFA not only connects progressive secessionist parties in the EU, but also validates parties' territorial demands 'by presenting them as part of a much larger movement within the territorial peripheries of the EU for the formal recognition of the rights of nations without a state' (Elias, 2009, p. 541). Elias argues that being a member of such a cross-European organisation 'normalises' secessionist parties at the domestic level. Contrary to her earlier work, she argues that the validity of parties can also be bolstered by representation in the European Parliament as they are able to bypass their central states and argue for national/regional interests at the supranational level. Since 1979, the SNP has had access to the European Parliament via various MEPs, first, with Winnie Ewing and latterly with Heather Anderson until the UK left the EU on 31st January 2020. Yet we know little of the extent to which these MEPs have had influence, particularly when the SNP has not been in power in Scotland.

Yet it is feasible that independence claims seem less isolationist when the nation wishes to be part of an integrated supranational polity and can appeal to voters out with their main support circle (van der Zwet and Hills, 2013). Through documentary analysis and 62 semi-structured interviews from the SNP and the Frisian National Party (FNP), van der Zwet and Hills (2013) found that European integration can facilitate secessionist

parties' transformation from 'niche to normal'. While secessionist parties' territorial demands have often been rejected for being 'anachronistic and dangerous' (van der Zwet and Hills, 2013, p. 19), European integration has made the demands more palatable and legitimate in a couple of ways. First, parties can refer to others in Europe with comparable territorial demands, arguing that their own objectives are not 'unique or idiosyncratic' (van der Zwet and Hills, 2013, p. 19). While such territorial demands are often considered novel and radical, European integration offers a framework in which these demands are both de-radicalised and legitimised. In other words, the process of European integration enables secessionist parties to merge their nationalism with supranationalism to develop an internationalised, inclusive, and contemporary framework for their territorial goals.

Second, the EU's structure is supposed to mean that no one group has the overall majority, in which case minority interests are maybe considered to be more viable than they would be in a state with an overarching political and cultural dominance. Indeed, the EU's slogan of *in varietate concordia* conveys the principle of a union of diverse member states in which no sole majority group dominates (Lynch, 1996, p. 15). Many secessionist parties are attracted to this sentiment as it signifies greater competencies for regional parties and an increased visibility of their constitutional goals. As van der Zwet and Hills explain: 'within such a framework minority nationalist politics are legitimised and present [secessionist parties] as more normal political actors both in the eyes of the electorate and other political parties' (van der Zwet and Hills, 2013, p. 19). European integration also provides a 'framework for continuity' in case of a change in relationship between the state and substate (van der Zwet and Hills, 2013, p. 19). Furthermore, European integration can help to legitimise secessionist parties during times when they are not doing electorally well in their regions.

That small states could have their place in the European Community (EC) was demonstrated through Luxembourg's membership since 1958 and through the accession of Malta, Cyprus and the Baltic states in 2004. The comparative poverty of these new member states implied that Europe had the potential of being more than the 'capitalist club' that nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s had claimed it to be. Economic factors were also at play in changing the European context, such as increased trade

interdependence among EC member states as well as the EC's standing in global trade. In the case of Scotland, the Scandinavian European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states had been significant for nationalists. The SNP considered Norway's wealth and somewhat recent independence in 1905 as an example of what an independent nation with large oil supplies could achieve. The SNP's curiosity of the EFTA states was social as well as economic, where left-wing nationalists were encouraged by Scandinavian social models. Indeed, former SNP MP, Stephen Gethins, stated in an interview that 'what's really interesting is [that] the SNP's evolution of thought around [the question of Europe] matches other similar sized states' (Gethins, 2022). He pointed to the way in which Finnish and Irish politics have changed, claiming that he thinks that 'there are more people who believe in the Loch Ness monster than believe that Ireland should leave the European Union' (Gethins, 2022). As such, the ideas of independence and sovereignty have changed in other parts of Europe (Gethins, 2022). Gethins maintained that the Baltic States, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland all consider the question of Europe to be at the heart of independence and sovereignty (Gethins, 2022). 'All these countries,' Gethins stated, 'hark that this is the idea of independence that the SNP aspires to. The evolution that the SNP has gone through has been mirrored in other similar sized countries [and] nations. So, I don't think this is unique or as big a deal as sometimes people think' (Gethins, 2022).

What Elias (2009) and van der Zwet and Hills (2013) seem to be missing is a richer exploration into the domestic and agential factors influencing secessionist parties' mobilisation in Europe. Indeed, tensions between substates and their centralised governments as well as intraparty dynamics can have a significant effect on the way in which subnational parties are involved in the European integration process. This is why the interplay and mutual constitution between structure and agency needs to be considered in order to fully understand how the SNP's policies on Europe have changed over time. In other words, actors operate within specific structures and can have an effect on these structures at the same time as structures having an effect on actors' decisions.

1.2.1 The 'paradox' of European integration

In her book, *Separatism and Sovereignty in the New Europe* (2008), Laible has examined why, regardless of European integration, separatist nationalism persists in EU member states. She argues that the EU, 'as a context, a set of resources, and a participatory arena', is strongly embedded in the strategy and arguments of separatists. The author examines contemporary Scottish and Flemish nationalism to show how the EU 'sustains the importance of statehood and therefore separatism' (Laible, 2008, p. 3). In other words, the EU establishes new types of 'political capital' that nationalists use in their trajectories of self-government (Laible, 2008, p. 3), arguing that the EU would provide a compassionate framework in which to attain their objectives, whether these objectives were ideologically left- or right-wing (Laible, 2008, p. 98).

Indeed, minority nationalists have started to 'play the European ideological 'game'', which has been moulded by political rhetoric at the EU level (Hepburn, 2008, p. 547). Hepburn (2008) found that this was the case for the SNP and the Sardinian Action Party, Psd'Az, which both supported themes inherent in the EU, such as free trade, multiculturalism and diversity. The author identified several factors that have influenced parties' territorial actions in the EU. Among them is access to European organisations and institutions, where parties function within particular opportunity structures defined by the 'incentives and constraints of state territorial management' (Hepburn, 2008, p. 549). For example, both Scotland and Bavaria have had rather promising contact with European institutions, reflected by their seats in the European Parliament, the Committee of Regions, and membership of groups such as Regions with Legislative Powers (RegLeg). Unlike aforementioned scholars, Hepburn's analyses suggest that the more parties are involved with European institutions, the more disillusioned they become with the constraints of regional roles in Europe. This indicates that the more 'institutional learning' a party experiences, the more likely it is to be dissatisfied with the seeming opportunities provided by European integration.

Moore (2008) claims that, regardless of the regression of the idea of a Europe of the Regions, regional authorities have attempted to strengthen their voice in European politics. She argues that the deployment and success of regional involvement in EU

policy networks largely depend on a variety of domestic factors. Moore tackles the 'current paradoxical situation' whereby the idea of a Europe of the Regions has become increasingly unpopular while, simultaneously, regions are becoming ever more involved in European affairs. Regions have an active presence in the EU, where their number of offices in Brussels have increased substantially over the past few decades (Jeffery, 1997; Bomberg and Peterson, 1998; Heichlinger, 1999; Moore, 2006). It is evident that the visibility of regions in the EU is increasing, where more staff members are being employed and, spatially, regions are occupying 'more prestigious, visible and strategically positioned locations' (Moore, 2008, p. 521).

1.2.2 European Free Alliance

Structuralist accounts have also looked at the role of transnational political alliances and parties. Lynch and De Winter (2008) observe how the electoral success of minority parties within the European Parliament is a vital part of regional representation within the EU, as European integration has aided the establishment of a new supranational party system to push minority nationalists' (De Winter and Gómez-Reino, 2002). While individual regionalist parties have their own distinct European policies, a large number of the parties are members of the European Free Alliance (EFA). This works as a transnational federation of most regionalists and serves to be a united front in the EU and EP. In tandem with the growth of the EFA, its common policy platform has also widened, yet the 'depth' of these policies remains restricted, even on the subject of regionalist autonomy and the notion of a Europe of the Regions (Lynch and De Winter, 2008, p. 584). Not only is the regionalist family ideologically distinct, it also includes a wide range of autonomy objectives, even though the regions are united on the 'core business' of autonomy (Lynch and De Winter, 2008, p. 584). This has shaped the EFA's stance on a Europe of the Regions, where 'it would be difficult for minority nationalists to adopt a common constitutional model for the EU either individually or as part of a common programme within the EFA' (Lynch and De Winter, 2008, p. 584). Individual regionalist parties differ in their support for independence (SNP), full sovereignty (Partido Nacionalista Vasco), federalism (Volksunie/SPIRIT, Partido Andalucista), and more vague approaches to independence and autonomy (Plaid Cymru). Yet, there is very little analysis of how the EFA influenced the SNP's policies on Europe. It may be that being part of a cross-national group has strengthened the SNP's position on Europe

but it may, as Hepburn has noted, also reveal its limitations. Furthermore, agential considerations of how the SNP has functioned within the EFA have not really been taken into account in this literature. In other words, we must consider not only how the EFA has affected the SNP's policies on Europe but also how SNP actors have *used* the opportunity structure of the EFA to advance Scotland's statehood claims.

While the above explanations for how minority nationalist parties understand and react to European integration are somewhat structuralist, more agential contributions that focus on regional actors have been made. Hepburn (2008) has examined the varied ways in which regional parties have reacted to, perceived, and used the 'imagery' of a Europe of the Regions to express their territorial interests. She shows that regional parties have had inconsistent positions on Europe, 'moving back and forth in response to perceived opportunities for regional action in Europe' (Hepburn, 2008, p. 537). Hepburn assesses the Europe of the Regions question through an analysis of the territorial actions of parties in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia spanning 25 years. In particular, she looks at how the imagery of a Europe of the Regions was employed to sustain a number of party objectives, from independence to reducing European competences. Most importantly, she finds that regional party reactions to the EU are affected by a blend of supranational and domestic factors.

Hepburn's turn to a more agential, discursive interpretation of the SNP's attitudes towards Europe is instructive. Indeed, while studying the effects of the EU on nationalist parties' attitudes and interpretations of Europe, it is also important to focus on how the 'idea' of Europe has been used to mobilise territorial claims. Indeed, there are very few discursive analyses of secessionist parties' rhetoric on Europe. Among these is that of Bourne (2014), who has compared narratives and strategies used by pro- and anti-independence movements in the UK and Spain to analyse the influence of the EU on contemporary secessionist politics. She found that both pro- and anti-independence activists used arguments about Europe to reinforce their views on secession. Unlike many top-down approaches to Europeanisation, Bourne uses a bottom-up approach which allows an exploration of how domestic actors may influence EU discourses, policies, or institutions to mobilise change (Lynggaard, 2011, p. 23).

That said, Hepburn's and Bourne's work here have exclusively focused on agential accounts rather than considering the relationship between structure and agency. A deeper consideration is needed of not only how secessionist parties respond to opportunity structures created by European integration but how the European context itself has had an impact on secessionist parties' territorial claims.

1.2.3 Beyond Europeanisation

While the concept of Europeanisation has grown in status in academia since the late 1990s, it has been questioned in its efficacy for the study of European politics (Graziano and Vink, 2007, p. 3). Classic neofunctionalism (Haas, 1958), supranational governance (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997; Stone Sweet et al., 2001) and multi-level governance approaches tend to focus on European institutions and their policies. These traditional integration theories concentrate on the establishment of a European political space and on the implementation of new governance structures rather than on the transmission of EU policies at the national and subnational levels (Graziano and Vink, 2007, pp. 3-4). Sociologists and comparative political scientists are progressively learning that the EU is becoming a staple part of national and subnational politics. Whether this entails novel opportunities for subnational actors or a 'hollowing out' (see Rhodes, 1994) of the nation state, new analytical instruments and a wider empirical record are required to properly comprehend subnational mobilisation in an integrating Europe. Moreover, this concentration on European institutions and their policies do not take into consideration how party actors have used the context of Europe to advance their claims at the subnational and national levels.

While Europeanisation remains a useful concept, it alone cannot explain how and why the SNP's policies on Europe have changed over time. Indeed, Europeanisation is an abstract concept and not simply a secessionist party's 'reaction to Brussels' (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008: 38; Jacquot and Woll, 2004). The SNP's policies on Europe are embedded in a highly contextual framework, which includes factors other than Europeanisation, such as UK domestic politics, intraparty dynamics and agential action. For example, some strategic theories of political parties argue that subnational independence movements adopt pro- or anti-European stances depending on which line their central government takes in order to differentiate themselves from the

establishment (Jolly, 2007, p. 113). It may be the case that the SNP's policies on Europe have indeed been influenced by Westminster politics at various points in time, but we are unable to assume that this is the case without a thorough empirical analysis. Moreover, a significant portion of the literature on subnational party mobilisation tends to concentrate on the structural dynamics of national and European politics and often neglects questions of agential power in creating and changing policies. Again, a more balanced approach is needed in order to properly ascertain the relationship between structure and agency and how this has influenced secessionist parties' policies on Europe. In line with this research, questions of how key SNP figures have responded to and used Europe to advance the party's territorial claims must be taken into consideration. For example, Winnie Ewing, as we shall see, used the opportunities created by European integration to shift the SNP's attitude from anti- to pro-European during the early 1980s.

There also merits further research into how regional actors are mobilised within the EU as well as their strategies for 'interest articulation and policy influence' (Jordan, 2001, p. 201; Dardanelli, 2005; Elias, 2008; Hepburn, 2008). As Elias (2008, p. 486) explains: 'it is [not] clear how subnational politics and policies change under the pressure of European integration. Despite an explosion of scholarly interest in the process of Europeanization, this literature remains very much a region-free zone'. Graziano and Vink (2007, p. 5) also note that 'it is precisely because these gaps in the literature, and thus these shortcomings in our understanding of domestic politics in an integrating Europe, are now becoming increasingly clear that we think a more comprehensive approach to Europeanization research is well-timed…'. The next section therefore focuses on analysis of the SNP's changing stance on Europe at the Scottish political level, considering both structural and agential arguments.

1.3 Scottish level

While Europeanisation remains the most common concept used to analyse how and why the SNP's policies on Europe have changed over time, it is also the case that Scottish politics have affected the party's narratives. While there have been many contributions to the study of Scottish politics, there remains little research on how they

have affected the SNP's stance on Europe. More attention needs to be paid to the trajectories of other Scottish political parties in order to understand the SNP's success and development of policies such as Independence in Europe. For example, the relative success and policies of both the Conservatives and Labour in Scotland over the years has had a distinct impact on the SNP's rhetoric on Europe yet this remains an under-researched area. While more agential contributions have been made in terms of the study of prominent SNP figures who supposedly altered the party's attitudes towards Europe, there is little information on how other Scottish political individuals have affected the SNP's stance.

1.3.1 Scottish political parties from an institutionalist perspective

The fortune and misfortune of other parties in Scotland have partly changed the way in which the SNP has articulated its demands within the European arena. McEwen (2002) has noted how the Conservatives' regression in Scotland was both down to the party's reaction to territorial concerns and its socioeconomic policies. As the welfare state became more significant and religion became less relevant to Scottish politics, the Conservative's pool of support – the Protestant working class – turned to the Labour party. Then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, championed the idea of a unitary state in which assimilation was the principal necessity for free-market liberalisation. This stood in contrast to Scotland's pledge to the post-war welfare consensus (McEwen, 2002). Thatcher continuously stood against devolution and regional concessions for Scotland (Kellas, 1990, p. 428; Bennie et al., 1997, p. 68). Hepburn (2010, p. 56) believes that 'it was a combination of the popular hostility to Thatcher's unitarist project, in addition to a widespread rejection of her neoliberal policies, which catalysed a surge in nationalism, advanced calls for constitutional reform, and unified social-democratic parties in support of devolution'. By the late-1980s the SNP's call for devolution was underpinned by a growing warmth to the idea of Independence in Europe, but as we shall see later in the chapter, intraparty divisions remained an obstacle to this goal.

Furthermore, Hepburn (2010, p. 71) has claimed that the European project was regarded by the SNP to comprise a new way of practising the social-democratic project that Thatcher supposedly attempted to curtail. The SNP's reaction to Thatcherite policy

cannot, however, be the sole explanatory factor in the party's shift from anti- to pro-Europeanism. Indeed, we must account for the relationship between structure and agency on an institutionalist basis. As we shall see in Chapter 2, my conceptual framework regards institutions to follow a logic of path-dependence as well as a logic of communication whereby institutions are maintained or changed according to a) the initial purpose of the creation of the party (i.e. Scottish nationalism) and b) actors' ideas which have an effect on the structure of the party and vice versa.

Hepburn (2010, p. 57) has noted how the SNP's rise in popularity brought with it a new divide contrary to that of the left versus right between Labour and the Conservatives. Suddenly, Labour was in competition with SNP nationalism, which the author claims was a 'cause and consequence of the decline of the Tories' (Hepburn, 2010, p. 57). In tandem with Labour's oscillation on the home rule debate during the last century, the SNP's ideology shifted from left to right in order to exploit support from the Scottish electorate (Lynch, 2009). We must also look at the origins of the party's establishment in order to properly comprehend how its ideology changed alongside its position on Europe. This is where the logic of path-dependence (according to historical institutionalism) comes in. Originally, the SNP did not present either a left- or right-wing ideology, but was considered a 'broad church', stemming from the unification of the right-wing Scottish Party and the left-wing National Party of Scotland, which formed the SNP in 1934 (Hepburn, 2010, pp. 60-61). Yet, by the 1960s, the SNP took on more distinct policy preferences, and the election of Billy Wolfe as party leader in 1969 moved the party to a more overt left-of-centre position. According to Hepburn (2010, p. 61), the motivation behind this was to 'challenge the dominant political position of Labour'. Yet, we do not know how this shift to a left-wing ideology intertwined with the SNP's position on Europe. As aforementioned, it wasn't until the 1980s that the party began to warm to the prospect of European integration, which seemed to be largely tied into the 'left-wing' nature of the party.

It cannot simply be claimed that the party's left-wing ideology put the SNP on an anti-establishment and pro-European path. Indeed, much of the British left was Eurosceptic in the 1970s and 1980s. From the late 1990s, the SNP seemed to morph into a more right-wing party, indicated by its support of business tax cuts in 2003, as well as its

strong emphasis on law and order issues, business development and economic growth (Hepburn, 2010, p. 61). Formed in 1998, the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) 'took some of the wind from both the SNP and Scottish Labour's sails' in the 2000s as it won the votes of SNP supporters who were unhappy with the SNP's move to the centre-right (Hepburn, 2010, p. 63). Hepburn (2010, p. 61) has noted that the 'SNP's new ideological flexibility appeared to appeal to voters, who elected 47 SNP MSPs in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections, enabling the party to form a minority government – the first in the history of the UK with the explicit aim of breaking up the United Kingdom'. Yet, we do not know how this ideological 'flexibility' fits in with the party's stance on Europe. We know that the SNP has been consistently pro-European since the 1980s but has its ideological mutability had an effect on its stance on the EU?

The prominence of other parties in Scotland has partly influenced the way in which the SNP has articulated its demands within the European arena. Thatcherism seems to be a prime example of this, yet it cannot be the sole explanatory factor when describing the SNP's shift on European policy. Thus, a close examination of the empirical record is needed to reveal the different factors at play in shaping the change in the SNP's policies on Europe.

1.3.2 National identity

The shift in collective national identity had an impact on the SNP's policies in Europe yet this remains an under-researched area. Over time, the Scottish population increasingly identified as Scottish rather than British (Dardanelli, 2006, pp. 148-149). While nationalism was rife in Scottish politics from the late 1800s, political nationalism did not gain electoral success until the 1970s. This was indicated by the SNP's polling of 30 per cent of the general election vote in Scotland in October 1974. Many have noted (e.g. Dardanelli, 2006) that the party took advantage of the discovery of North Sea oil adjacent to Scotland in 1973, making the campaign of Scottish independence more appealing to voters on economic terms (Miller, 1991, p. 60). This discovery has been used as an argument by the SNP until the present day as a way to survive economically as an independent state in Europe. While the discovery of the oil may have been a factor in the SNP's increased electoral support, we cannot single this out as the main cause.

National identity could have surged for other reasons upon which the SNP capitalised and later merged with a European identity. Moreover, in order to exploit such a discovery, there needs to be a particular resonance with the public, which comes through strong leadership.

National identity has affected the SNP's policies on Europe in the sense that the party has utilised it as a pro-European argument. Contrary to the view that Scotland is dependent on England, the SNP considers Scotland as a small, rich country akin to those of Scandinavia, with a wealth of natural resources and a skilled population. The party has used such economic arguments to reinforce a sense of national identity that was not thought possible for many due to the economic ties with England. Since the 1980s, the party has used the imagery of Scotland as a small and successful nation as part of the European project. But this has not always been the case. Up until the 1980s, the SNP opposed the EEC for being 'centralised' and 'bureaucratic', contrasting with Scotland's more 'social-democratic' nature. We must therefore ascertain how this sense of national identity has changed and whether or not it has links to the SNP's relationship with Europe.

Furthermore, there merits further exploration into how the 'civic' nature of the SNP has intertwined with its policies on Europe. While Hamilton (1999) claims that Scottish political nationalism is an example of European identity-politics, Nairn (2000) argues that the SNP has been able to rekindle the 'democratic voice of Scotland'. Yet neither of these authors focuses on how such a sense of civic nationalism has been used by SNP actors to maintain or change the party's policies on Europe. As Scotland is defined as a 'civic' nation, anybody is able to be a part of the territory, and thus the 'tariff' for being a nationalist is low (Hepburn, 2010, p. 64). This has enabled the SNP to reach a vast voting electorate, in which non-native-born Scots are part of the 'Scottish nation'. This is confirmed in the establishment of the SNP's affiliated organisations such as Asian Scots for Independence and New Scots for Independence. Dardanelli explains that, 'The SNP's definition of national belonging as voluntary participation in a multicultural society also deflects criticism that the party is exclusionary' (2010, p. 64). It is possible that such civic nationalism also accentuates the party's international nature, making the Independence in Europe narrative more appealing to voters. Indeed, if we consider the

structure here to be Scottish nationalism, we can better understand how SNP actors have used this context to advance the party's arguments.

1.3.3 SNP intraparty dynamics

Many have observed the gradualist/fundamentalist division within the SNP since its inception (e.g., Hepburn, 2009). Gradualists believe that sovereign statehood will be a steady process and have considered devolution as a springboard for the final objective of independence. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, consider independence to be the primary goal and consider devolution to hinder the momentum for independence. As Leith and Steven (2010, p. 267) have noted, 'nationalism as an ideology brings together campaigners of many a political stripe, including those who find themselves at different ends of the traditional left-right political spectrum'. Consequently, the SNP has a mixed bag of candidates in terms of both 'ideological focus and persuasion' and there is an historic pattern of the party being split down ideological lines (Leith and Steven, 2010, p. 267). The authors note that while many regard the principal schism in the party as one between fundamentalists and gradualists, there are also tensions between left- and right-wing members (Leith and Steven, 2010, pp. 267-268). More attention must be paid to the intra-party dynamics through a rich empirical analysis in order to properly understand how such ideological ruptures within the party have affected the SNP's European trajectory.

The SNP has experienced much internal division about how to realise the goal of Independence in Europe. Hepburn (2009b, p. 194) has noted how, after the policy was created in the late-1980s, it was unclear whether the party was in favour of European centralisation or decentralisation, or federalism or confederalism. The 'supranationalists' stressed the need for closer European cooperation whereby a central authority would oversee defence, foreign policy and a single currency. On the other hand, the 'intergovernmentalists' stressed the importance of the state whereby powers would only be dispersed to the EU upon the decision of its member states. In 1990, Allan Macartney MEP tried to explain the SNP's stance, and maintained that the party's policy would involve the establishment of a European confederation – an association of member states 'which pool sovereignty in certain areas but do not surrender total

control to an authoritative body'. The SNP used this argument in its 1992 document, *Scotland – A European Nation: The Case for Independent Scottish Membership of the European Community*, but we do not yet exactly know how the SNP arrived at this discourse. Macartney could have indeed been an influence but without a close examination of the empirical record, we are unable to know the exact inner and outer workings that led to this confederalist position. Indeed, it is probably the case that there is an amalgamation of different structuralist and agential factors playing and interacting with one another to produce a highly contextual discourse.

The issue of Europe has not only split those in the SNP, but has also united the fundamentalist and gradualist wings, particularly in terms of the question of devolution, such as between Winnie Ewing and former deputy leader of the party, Jim Sillars. Indeed, it is the case that even today, there remain anti-EU SNP MPs - estimated at 'up to six' within the party who voted for Brexit (*The Telegraph,* 5 November 2016) - who are not as visible due to the overarching pro-European sentiment of the party. As Leith and Steven (2010, p. 268) have noted: 'The divisions between the fundamentalist wing and the gradualist wing of the party, and any splits between left- and right-centred nationalists, seem to have been avoided under the leadership team of Salmond and his popular deputy Nicola Sturgeon, but underlying problems may remain'. For example, in 2004, SNP leader John Swinney decided to oppose the draft European Constitution, regardless of the party's support of the document for over a year (*The Scotsman*, 22 April 2004). This is an example of how party actors can make decisions independently from the party to influence the structure in which they operate. Furthermore, the common argument that the SNP has been pro-European since 1988 can be contested by several events, such as the party members' unforeseen decision to keep the British pound at their annual conference in 2009 (*The Times*, 16 October 2009). As such, we must look further into the intraparty dynamics of the SNP to see how it has moulded its policies on Europe.

Hepburn (2009, p. 195) has also noted that, in more recent years, some of the SNP's pro-integrationist policies, such as support for Eastern enlargement and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have 'masked a subtle protectionist edge to SNP discourse'. Since the early 2000s, the party has become strongly preoccupied with the Common

Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and has even threatened on occasion to opt out of these policies in order to safeguard Scotland's agricultural and fishing domains (Hepburn, 2009, pp. 195-196). Hepburn (2009, pp. 195-196) notes that this suggests that the SNP is dubious of whether such integrationist policies are positive or negative for Scotland's interests. The author claims that 'a number of contradictions exist within the SNP's policy programme, whose support of further European integration in matters of monetary and economic policy, defence and security, sits awkwardly with the party's demands for an intergovernmental Europe with power residing among the states' (Hepburn, 2009, p. 196). Yet, in order to properly understand these contradictions, we must focus not only on how the SNP has responded in the way that it has but *why*.

1.3.4 Individual actors

The study of the SNP and its most prominent figures has 'waxed and waned' since the party's rise in the late-1960s (Mitchell and Hassan, 2016, p. 1). Several histories have been posited, including memoirs by some of the SNP's leading figures, and hagiographical works, yet research into the party's leaders 'have been struggling to keep up' (Mitchell and Hassan, 2016, p. 1). Each key figure in the SNP has held distinct and mutable positions on the issue of Europe. While the Independence in Europe narrative of 1988, pushed by Jim Sillars and implemented by Gordon Wilson, set the party on a new course of integration, more Eurosceptic positions re-emerged, with John Swinney opposing the draft European Constitution in 2004. This was on the basis of the document's weak conceptualisation of subsidiarity and its failure to recognise the sovereignty of stateless nations. Why Swinney decided at the last minute to oppose the draft deserves further empirical analysis in order to ascertain where this sentiment came from; were SNP policy makers behind this? Was it a rash or long-standing position of Swinney?

Personnel change within the SNP also prompted change within the party. For example, Hepburn has noted that in its early years, the SNP experienced intraparty tensions between the 'independentist' and 'home rule' camps (Hepburn, 2009, p. 191). Those from the home rule side left the party to establish their own rival political organisation

in 1942, spearheaded by John MacCormick. This departure enabled the SNP to solidify its stance on the 'constitutional question' (Hepburn, 2009, pp. 191-192). In the decades to come, the SNP created a more robust discourse of seceding Scotland from the rest of the UK and to create an independent sovereign state in Europe. Following the collapse of the Scottish Covenant Association (SCA) and the death of MacCormick in 1961, the accession of SCA members into the SNP transformed the party's stance on the constitutional question (Brand, 1978) and so emerged the split between fundamentalists and gradualists.

Hepburn (2006) has noted how the result of the 1979 referendum on devolution pushed the SNP to revise its stance on the EC. From 1979, the SNP's first elected representative to the European Parliament, Winnie Ewing, injected the party with a new focus on European integration. The party started to advocate an enhanced role for Scotland in the EEC, which was bolstered by the accession of former Labour politician, Jim Sillars, to the SNP. Mitchell and Hassan (2016, p. 12) have also highlighted two main SNP leaders who have heavily impacted on the organisation of the party. First, Gordon Wilson held an important internal position within the party, even before he became party leader, and his embryonic ideas of the 1960s would impact on the party's development for years to come. Second, was John Swinney (2000-2004) whose reforms to the party's constitution and organisation also had long-lasting effects on the party's operation. These leaders, according to the authors, 'transformed the SNP from an amateur-activist party into a professional organisation' (Mitchell and Hassan, 2016, p. 12). While it is important to look at the more prominent leader figures, it is also essential to look at others in the background. For example, Roseanna Cunningham suggested that the party would accept the EU having powers over defence and foreign policy (Hepburn, 2009, p. 193).

Mitchell and Hassan (2016) have collated essays on all of the SNP's leaders as well as other significant figures, situating them in the context of the evolution of the party and in Scotland's increasing self-government. They have noted how, up until the 2014 independence referendum, the SNP was led by several generations of activists with shared experiences, including those of a personal nature such as births, deaths and marriages. This collective identity and history were reflected in the party's 2011

manifesto which included a section of photographs of such personal events, 'conveying a 'We Are Family' sense of affirmation and togetherness' (Mitchell and Hassan, 2016, pp. 2-3). Indeed, leadership has to be regarded in context, history and traditions, and such leading figures and the relationships with one another are bound to have an effect on the party's policies, including those on Europe.

Contrary to the Westminster parties, the SNP has had leading figures from a diverse range of people, from poets to more conventional politicians. As the SNP has only officially had a leader since 2004, according to the SNP constitution, there is a large number of figures who have contributed to the leadership process. Prior to 2004, the SNP had a convenor and prior to that, a chairperson. As Mitchell and Hassan (2016, p. 4) have noted, 'the SNP chair/convenor was usually only *a* leader and not *the* leader in a party that was suspicious of leaders and preferred collective leadership'. Therefore, there is a need for a distinct empirical analysis of not only individual actors but also the relationships between them and how they influence one another to forge a collective leadership. For example, while none of the party's national secretaries ever became leaders, they influenced its evolution in a number of ways, as we shall discover in later chapters (Mitchell and Hassan, 2016, p. 5).

Indeed, successful leadership may take different forms at different moments in time. Machiavelli argued that this emerged from 'nothing except the extent to which their methods are or are not suited to the nature of the times' (in Mitchell and Hassan, 2016, p. 8). It is certainly the case that founding a political party necessitates different leadership skills from a time when it is in national office (Mitchell and Hassan, 2016, p. 8). The opportunity structures presented to the SNP and its leaders have changed over time, particularly with the creation of the Scottish Parliament. Prior to this, the SNP lacked resources which had an impact on the organisational dimensions of the party (Mitchell and Hassan, 2016, pp. 9-11). Ultimately, actors' agency is an important intervening variable connecting structural aspects of the EU and the UK political systems (Dardanelli, 2006). Central to this is how opportunities and constraints of institutional structures are 'filtered' by actors' views which are characterised by their personal principles, values and beliefs (Dardanelli, 2006, p. 146).

1.4 UK level

1.4.1 Devolution

The prospect of UK devolution had a profound impact on the way in which the SNP responded to the idea of Europe. Glen (2008, pp. 64-65) has noted the failed devolution referendum of 1979 and the consequential decline in SNP support, in addition to the centralising character of the UK government, warmed the party to the idea of EC membership. By the late-1980s, the party had adopted its Independence in Europe narrative and in 1997, the SNP campaigned for a 'yes' vote for the referendum on Scottish devolution. In the Scottish elections of May 1999, the party received 28.7 per cent of the vote and won 35 of 129 seats, rendering it the second largest party in Scotland in terms of vote share and seats. In theory, this allowed the SNP space to implant European ideals in Scotland. Following such constitutional reform, the Scottish Executive and Scottish Parliament became significantly involved in European affairs (Ermisch and Wright, 2005). I argue that this paved the way for the SNP when it came into power in 2007. In other words, UK level reforms allowed more space at the Scottish level for the SNP to adopt its own policies on the EU.

While international and European affairs were under the domain of Westminster, those who had established devolution recognised that the Scottish administration would have an input into the process. Gowland et al. (2009, pp. 186-204) have argued that the 'Scottish and Welsh ministers could not avoid taking a close interest in European issues because of their impact on devolved matters'. By consequence, the Scottish administration has furnished its own bespoke foreign affairs programme, yet 'this should not be misconstrued as being akin to a form of 'alternative' foreign policy to that of the UK' (Gowland et al., 2009, p. 191). As a result of devolution, the Scottish administration set up its own bureau in Brussels, 'thereby supplanting the relatively de-politicised arrangements (Scotland Europa), which pre-dated devolution' (Gowland et al., 2009, p. 191). Whether or not the British government deliberated with the Scottish Parliament was contingent on either the devolved constitutional status or on an understanding between the relevant bodies at the state and substate levels (Gowland et al., 2009, p. 197).

In terms of the Labour Party, Hassan (2019, p. 314) has noted how the party's struggles in both Holyrood and Westminster provided the SNP with an opportunity to advance itself as *the* Scottish party, claiming the prospect of Scottish devolution as its own. By pitting itself against Scottish Labour, the SNP claimed that it was a social-democratic party whose credentials were more in line with those of the EU than with those of Westminster. While devolution has furnished the SNP with a new space in which to articulate its European demands, it has also presented hurdles to the party's main goal of Independence in Europe. Owing to the additional-member electoral system (AMS) of the Scottish Parliament, it is likely that governments will tend to take the form of minority or coalition. As a minority government, such as when the Liberal Democrats refused to form a coalition in May 2007, the SNP has had to negotiate policy matters and cooperate with others (Hepburn, 2009, pp. 196-197). Furthermore, it has been argued that the SNP's demand in 2008 for 'devolution max', was simply a way to win Conservative or Liberal Democrat support for an independence referendum so that it could be passed through the Scottish Parliament (see Hepburn, 2009, p. 198).

1.4.2 Other UK parties

Indeed, it is a fruitful exercise to focus on the ideologies of other British political parties to assess how they affect the SNP's policies on Europe. Hassan and Barrow (2019, p. 13) have noted that, until the 2016 election, the SNP remained in contest with the Labour Party, which both position themselves on the centre-left and often compete for the same voters. For example, during the 1975 EEC membership referendum, the SNP campaigned to 'Get Scotland Out'. Meanwhile, the Labour Party remained split on the idea of secession from the EEC and the SNP was thus able to grasp the leadership of the Scottish No campaign and to attract traditional Labour voters to its cause (Saunders, 2018, pp. 346-347). Such intraparty tensions in Labour had a significant impact on the SNP, which was able to mobilise the anti-European stance within the region. Furthermore, the context for the 1975 referendum in Scotland was characterised by rapid industrial degeneration and uprising nationalist politics. As Saunders (2018, p. 348) explains, 'with both parties pledging some form of devolution and the British state

apparently mired in a crisis of governability, the political and intellectual tides seemed both to be flowing in favour of Scottish nationalism'.

Saunders (2018) has also noted that, while the SNP was open to the prospect that the EEC's 'centralised' and 'bureaucratic' nature could change - in which case Scotland would be interested in becoming a full and equal member - the party found it difficult to 'conceive of any modifications being negotiated by the Labour Government which [would] appreciably help' (Saunders 2018, p. 352). As such, the public position held by the SNP was that Scotland should give a 'tactical No' in the 1975 EEC referendum. Stephen Maxwell of the SNP trusted that this stance would attract both 'the gut anti-EEC vote in Scotland' and those who, while 'broadly sympathetic to the "European idea"', were 'sensitive to Scotland's lack of political status in European affairs' (quoted in Wilson, 2009, p.101). Consequently, some pro-Marketeers were persuaded by the No vote, as a protest against the shape of Europe in the context of British membership as opposed to membership of an independent Scotland itself (Saunders, 2018, p. 353). For the SNP, European integration was consistently presented as an imperial entity, founded on 'absurd dreams of renewed English imperial greatness' (Ewing in Saunders, 2018, p. 354). Saunders (2018, p. 355) has also noted that the SNP often drew parallels between the Common Market and the United Kingdom, claiming that 'Scotland has been bled white by the effects of that Common Market' and has transformed Scotland into the 'industrial slum of Europe'. The party questioned how it could benefit from another common market which was even 'more remote' than the existing one.

Laible (2008, p. 86) has observed how the SNP's 'no' campaign of 1975 offered the SNP a platform on which to advocate its ideas about European integration and Scottish statehood. Strategically, SNP leaders saw the campaign as an opportunity to situate the party as the only one in Scotland that was opposed to Common Market membership. While Edward Heath's Conservative government had successfully negotiated accession to the EEC, Harold Wilson's subsequent Labour government remained divided on the issue. Wilson fought to keep the UK in the EC but other Labour members resisted membership on economic terms (Laible, 2008, p. 86). Therefore, the SNP considered that a distinct anti-European stance would provide it with long-lasting electoral success. Laible claims that the party 'hoped to use the issue of Europe to mobilize support for

independence, to win over voters from other parties, and to demonstrate that a significant difference existed between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom on the question of the EC' (Laible, 2008, p. 86). The SNP hoped that standing in opposition to the rest of the UK with its 'no' vote would reveal the 'illegitimacy' of a Westminster government (Laible, 2008, p. 86). In the UK, European politics 'emerged as a source of conflict in domestic politics' and the SNP was able to convey its ideas about self-government and European integration into a statewide political debate (Laible, 2008, p. 82). The party thought of Europe as an electoral strategic mechanism and used European political arguments to bolster support for nationalism. Laible notes that 'for the SNP, the 1975 UK referendum on EC membership marked a turning point in the development of Europe as a strategically significant issue' (2008, p. 82).

The gradual increase in support for the SNP in the 1980s, according to Leith and Steven (2010, p. 264), was cogently connected to the disapproval of Thatcher's Conservative government. Dardanelli (2006) has noted that under Thatcher's governments, the UK's public policy moved significantly to the right as a consequence of hard-hitting reforms in the regional, social and fiscal fields. In the social field, labour legislation was liberalised and the impact of trade unions was considerably reduced. The 'balance of power' between labour and businesses shifted to the latter's benefit, and such social reforms were related to regional policy. Scotland, in particular, took a shock from these reforms, where a significant portion of the workforce was employed by large industries reliant on government intervention. This shift to the right was also marked by the Conservative reforms of national, and particularly, local taxation. As Dardanelli claims: 'the core principles were simplification of taxation and a general lightening of the fiscal burden but one of the key consequences was the reduced progressivity of the system' (Dardanelli, 2006, p. 143). The most severe example of this was the poll tax, implemented in Scotland one year before England, and this rightward swing positioned the UK's policy output 'further and further away from Scotland's preferences where a broad left-of-centre consensus deeply opposed to this reform remained dominant' (Dardanelli, 2006, pp. 143-144). This provided the SNP the space to assert that the constitutional status quo was becoming 'extremely far removed from Scotland's public policy needs' (Dardanelli, 2006, pp. 143-144). We do not know, however, whether Thatcherite reforms were indeed a main reason for the SNP's shift towards a more pro-

European stance. It could be the case of 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend', but we are unable to know this without an extensive analysis of the empirical record.

In terms of Labour, the SNP painted a picture of the party as being anti-devolution and quasi-Tory and maintained that the SNP was the real guardian of devolution and social democracy (Hassan, 2019, pp. 312-313). British politics were marked by New Labour's election victory of 1997 (Gowland, Turner, and Wright, 2009, p. 186). While preoccupied with blocking Thatcherite policy being enforced in Scotland, Labour had not given much attention to the policies and ideas it would implement during its time in office from 1999 to 2007. Scottish Labour was weakened by its uncertain national leadership and lack of autonomy and placed itself to the left of New Labour and opposed Blairite policies such as city academies, foundation hospitals and tuition fees. As Hassan has explained, 'this reduced Scottish politics to a bidding war between Labour and SNP of who could be the most anti-New Labour, which became easier for the SNP after Tony Blair's decision to support the Iraq War in 2003' (Hassan, 2019, pp. 313-314). The SNP continuously emphasised that Scottish soldiers should not be part of the war and that an independent Scotland would not partake in future wars (Leith and Steven, 2010, p. 264). By 2007, the SNP had reached a significant moment in its party history when it won the majority of seats in the Scottish elections, and was able to form a government, regardless of the fact that it did not secure a parliamentary majority. While these authors' observations are instructive to the analysis of the SNP's policies on Europe, focusing solely on the party's response to other British political parties cannot be the only explanatory factor.

There are many British political actors throughout the SNP's history who could have affected the SNP's policies on Europe. The most notable of these is Margaret Thatcher whose time in office coincided with the SNP's shift in narrative from anti- to pro-European. Keating (1996, p. 236) has noted that Conservative policy in Scotland from the mid-1980s was founded on the idea that a 'dependency culture' had been cultivated by 'too much' support from the government and that an injection of neoliberalism was required to 'liberate' its people. At the same time, however, Thatcher centralised state power to the extent that it violated the autonomy of local agencies and contrasted with Scottish ideas about the power of these agencies, such as in education and housing: both

policy areas with a localised hue and that were considered as the 'basis of Scottish autonomy in the welfare state' (Brown et al., 1998, p. 63). By 1990, Scotland was subject to Thatcher's trial introduction of the poll tax, sparking much civil and political disobedience (Barker, 1992). Many Scots took this to mean that the Conservatives were an 'English' party ignorant of Scottish needs, a sentiment which was further reinforced by the Tories' continuous rejection of constitutional change (Hepburn, 2006, p. 230). As aforementioned, some strategic theories of fringe parties argue that subnational independence movements adopt pro- or anti-European stances depending on which line their centralised government takes in order to differentiate themselves from the establishment (see Jolly, 2007, p. 113). Indeed, Thatcher was 'profoundly influential in Scottish politics' where 'being anti-Thatcher became emblematic of being Scottish' (Scott, 2022). It may be the case that the SNP's policies on Europe have indeed been influenced by Westminster at various points in time, but we are unable to assume that this is the case without careful empirical scrutiny.

Laible has noted that the SNP's enhanced electoral success in the late-1980s 'emphasize[d] the impact of Thatcherism on Scotland as an important explanatory variable' (2008, p. 48). Thatcher's decisions questioned how Scottish local and regional institutions were connected to the centre and how the Scottish working and middle classes understood their relationship to the state. Laible claimed that this interpretation was that 'English politics [was] intruding on Scotland' (2008, p. 48). Indeed, we can contend that Thatcher's decisions most probably had an impact on the Scottish population and on the SNP's policies on Europe, in the sense that Europe offered a viable alternative to Thatcherism in Scotland, but we cannot disregard the European and Scottish political factors at play.

1.5 Political entrepreneurs e

As Schneider and Teske (1992, p. 737) have discussed, political entrepreneurs are 'individuals who change the direction and flow of politics'. Based on this assumption, my definition of a political entrepreneur in the context of this thesis is an actor who has had a significant discursive effect on the SNP's policies on Europe. Notable examples of such entrepreneurs include SNP leaders such as Billy Wolfe, John Swinney, Alex

Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon, as well as other prominent figures such as Winnie Ewing and Jim Sillars. This thesis draws upon biographical and autobiographical works of these entrepreneurs to reveal how their backgrounds, actions and discursive abilities have affected the SNP's European trajectory. Moreover, the interviewees questioned in this thesis have added substantial reflection on the actions of the party's entrepreneurs.

Much of political entrepreneurial theory was developed in the 1980s and 1990s, such as that of Riker (1995) whose work has galvanised a political scientific approach to the analysis of leadership. Riker demonstrates how political entrepreneurs can reframe political debates and remodel the political landscape. The study of entrepreneurship can trace its origins to the field of economics but has since spread to different domains, including politics and art (Schumpeter, 1911/2011). As Petridou et al. (2015, p.1) explain, the concept of entrepreneurship is 'complex and multidimensional' and that its etymological roots in Latin (*entre* and *prendre*) and Greek (*ἐπιχειρῶ*) insinuate 'hands-on action'. As we shall see in the following chapters, SNP political entrepreneurs have used, in particular, distinct discursive abilities to generate such action and European policy change.

Indeed, a political entrepreneur is a unique actor, 'embedded in the sociopolitical fabric', who is cognisant of and acts upon opportunity structures (Petridou et al., 2015, p. 1). As in market entrepreneurship, political entrepreneurship is linked to the concepts of creativity and innovation (McCaffrey and Salerno, 2011; Klein et al., 2010). In particular, we can better understand political entrepreneurship through the concept of creativity, in which 'the strategies the entrepreneur uses are understood to be breaking the mould, to be different from the ordinary, to be creative' (Petridou et al., 2015, pp. 3-4). Actors who have had a significant discursive effect on the SNP's policies on Europe have had to use such creative and innovative thinking in order to shape the party's European trajectory.

It is important to look at political action which Ostrom (2007), defines as 'those human behaviors to which the acting individual attaches a subjective and instrumental meaning'. As we shall see in Chapter 2, this definition aligns well with discursive institutionalism's conceptualisation of how actors' subjective experiences as well as their rhetorical abilities can shape certain policy ideas, in this instance the SNP's policies on Europe. Petridou et al. (2015) have developed an analytical framework

situated in the agency-structure debate which parallels Jessop's strategic-relational approach (1990, 1996) discussed in the following chapter. The authors have explored the ontology of political entrepreneurs and the structures in which they function and this thesis also demonstrates how a dialectical approach to structure and agency can reveal how the SNP's policies on Europe have transformed over time.

Other academic examples of the theorising of political entrepreneurship include a study by Ackrill and Kay (2011) who have examined actors' decisions in European policymaking. In their article on the 2005 sugar reform in the EU, the authors explored the institutional environment of the EU and the absence of an explicit hierarchy. While this institutional environment is split between Directorates General (DGs), each of whom has competency over a distinct policy area, different policy matters influence others. As Ackrill and Kay (2011, p. 78) state, 'policy makers… employ intentional mechanisms to select a policy solution for the agenda they construct from changes in environmental signals'. Likewise, SNP political entrepreneurs have used available opportunity structures to generate action which has led to discursive changes in the party's European policies.

As we shall see in the following chapter, the 'binarity of structure/agency comprises an unresolved deadlock in social sciences' (Petridou et al., 2015, pp. 4-5). In particular, questions of the conditions under which actions occur is central to political science. In order for policy to be generated and enacted, a political system or 'institutional arrangement' has to be present (Petridou et al., 2015, pp. 4-5). The simple existence of an institution, however, does not induce action. Rather, actors must use their agency to develop institutional policy (Petridou et al., 2015, pp. 4-5). As Marx put it, 'People make history but not in conditions of their own choosing' (quoted in Dessler, 1989, p. 443). SNP political entrepreneurs' agency is embedded in a highly contextual and mutable environment and institutions are constantly being created and recreated by the interactions of members' ideas. This concept will be further developed in Chapter 2 within the framework of discursive institutionalism.

It has been observed widely that the concept of political entrepreneurship is a significant factor in institutional change (Kingdon, 1984, 2003; Roberts and King, 1991; Schneider, Teske and Mintrom, 1995; Mintrom, 2000; Sheingate, 2003). Indeed, the intellectual basis of political science comes from the study of institutions (Peters, 2005).

As we shall see, this thesis uses a hybrid new institutionalist approach which can account for the historical changes in the SNP's policies on Europe. Alongside an analysis of the European, British and Scottish levels in which the party's European policies have developed, an analysis of political entrepreneurship can show how SNP actors have discursively 'used' these different levels to generate particular action. As Steelman (2010, p. 4) has observed, 'there are limits to what individuals can accomplish on their own' and the intersection of different structures provides distinct spaces for SNP entrepreneurs to generate policy action.

The existing literature on political entrepreneurship, particularly rational choice and collective action theorists (e.g. Salisbury, 1969; Olson, 1971; Lewis, 1980; Loomis, 1988), favour an analysis of agency over structure. On the other hand, institutionalist scholars (e.g. Kingdon, 1984, 2003; Schneider and Teske and Mintrom, 1995; Meydani, 2009) emphasise the role that structure plays in institutional change. This thesis, however, departs from the notion that there is a dialectical relationship between structure and agency and attempts to overcome the 'artificial dualism' found in much political science literature. As Dessler (1989) has posited, any conceptual or analytical framework must acknowledge and accommodate both structure and agency, 'even if it does not fully explain both' (Petridou et al., 2015, p. 5).

As political entrepreneurship cannot alone account for the SNP's European policy changes, the aforementioned structural levels need to be examined alongside agency in order to provide a comprehensive account of such policy developments. As Petridou (2014) has observed, political entrepreneurship is surfacing as a way in which to effectively analyse policy change.

An important thread of enquiry in this thesis is *who* are the political entrepreneurs? (McCaffrey and Salerno, 2011, p. 553). This question can be answered by examining two types of political entrepreneurs: assigned or emergent leaders (Petridou et al., 2015, p. 7). Assigned leaders hold particular institutional positions, such as the aforementioned SNP leaders. On the contrary, emergent leaders do not hold formal institutional positions. Rather, an emergent leader is 'one that is perceived as such by the other members of the group, regardless of his or her formal position' (Petridou et al., 2015, p. 7). While this thesis mainly focuses on assigned leaders, there exists a distinct relationship between them and the public (emergent leaders). Just as the SNP party

ideas can be diffused to the public via communicative discourses (see Chapter 2), so too can public ideas influence those of assigned leaders. Moreover, other types of emergent leaders can be considered to be notable figures to the Scottish independence question, such as various celebrities like Sean Connery. The success of emergent leadership is largely down to 'communication behaviours' such as being informed, being verbally involved and sparking new ideas (Fisher, 1974; Northouse, 2007, Petridou et al., 2015, p. 7).

Petridou et al., (2015, p. 8) pose the important question of whether political entrepreneurship is the dependent or independent variable. Namely, 'is the focus on the political entrepreneur as an agent of change, or is the research about contextual factors that might or might not foster political entrepreneurship?' (Petridou et al., 2015, p. 8). As I argue in the remainder of this thesis, structure and agency can only be analytically separated and remain ontologically distinct. Therefore, it is the intersection of the agency of SNP entrepreneurs and the different political levels (European, British and Scottish) that provides us with a rigorous analysis of how the party's policies on Europe have transformed over time.

Conclusions

It is clear that valuable contributions have been made on the impacts of European, Scottish and British politics on the SNP and its European policies, and this thesis aims to explore the impacts of each of these levels on the party's policies on Europe. Analyses at the Scottish level seem to have more agential contributions, while analyses at the European and British levels seem more structuralist by nature. Though the Europeanisation literature has demonstrated its efficacy in analysing subnational politics, it alone is unable to explain how and why the SNP's European rhetoric has transformed over time. Indeed, the party's policies are entrenched in a highly contextual framework, which involves alternative factors such as intraparty dynamics, UK domestic politics and agential action. I believe that there also merits further research into other structuralist and agential factors within Scottish politics, such as the influence of other Scottish political parties and individuals on the SNP's position on Europe.

As aforementioned, I argue for a more balanced analytical approach whereby structure and agency are considered to be mutually constitutive across all three levels. Due to the complicated structure of subnational politics, I do not believe we can analyse the SNP's policies on Europe without examining how all three levels intertwine to produce distinct narratives. Furthermore, I suggest a more discursive approach to analysing the history of the SNP and Europe. These matters will be addressed in the following chapter in which I explain the conceptual framework I will use to analyse the empirical body of this thesis. To reiterate, my main contribution here is a thesis-length analysis of how and why the SNP's policies on Europe have shifted over time while using a dialectical approach to structure and agency.

Chapter 2: Conceptual framework

As a result of my literature review, it has become clear that independent variables other than Europeanisation are needed to properly understand the SNP's change in its policies on Europe. Yet, while valuable contributions have been made to the field of European, Scottish and British politics, there has been little study of how the SNP's policies on Europe fit within these analytical frameworks. Analyses at the Scottish level seem to have more agential contributions, while analyses at the European and British levels seem more structuralist by nature. Though Europeanisation has demonstrated its efficacy in analysing subnational politics, it alone is unable to explain how and why the SNP's European rhetoric has transformed over time. I believe that this explanation can be reached, however, by using an historical institutionalist approach with some borrowings from discursive institutionalism. Alongside bringing a more balanced – or dialectical - view of structure and agency, this new institutionalist approach can shed light on how the SNP's discourses have changed over time by focusing on particular notions of path-dependence, critical junctures and ideas.

First, I will outline my own position on structure and agency before discussing the concept of Europeanisation and how it will be operationalised in my thesis. I will then turn to the emergence of the new institutionalist approach in political analysis. I will proceed to examine the concept of historical institutionalism (HI), whose main point is that institutions are shaped by historically unique conditions that evolve over time according to a 'logic of path-dependence'. Then I will turn to its discursive counterpart, discursive institutionalism (DI), whose basic logic is that ideas shape institutions through discursive practices. I will then discuss how I will deploy these two analytical approaches in tandem before explaining the methods used in this thesis. The main goal of this chapter is to set out a framework for analysing how and why the SNP's policies on Europe have changed over time. That framework allows me to go beyond the concept of Europeanisation, which has thus far been the most common explanation for the party's changing narratives.

2.1 Key concepts

2.1.1 Strategic-relational approach

The question of structure and agency in the social sciences is largely contested but central to political analysis including the analysis of institutions. Other than rational choice and discursive institutionalisms, the new institutionalist literature tends to focus more on structure than agency. To overcome the 'artificial dualism' of structure and agency, I adopt the *strategic-relational* approach developed by Bob Jessop (1990, 1996; Hay, 1999; Hay and Jessop, 1995). The first of the approach's ontological premises is that the division between structure and agency is simply analytical. This ontology stands in contrast to disjointed conceptualisations of structure and agency, such as that of Archer (1995) who states that structure and agency exist in distinct temporal spaces, i.e., that the precedency of structure is a prerequisite of agential action. In line with Jessop's approach, my analysis of structure and agency posits that they must be concurrent in any given situation when analysing the SNP's discourses on Europe (Hay, 2002, p. 127).

Put simply, structure and agency are relational in the sense that they are mutually constitutive and dialectical where 'their interaction is not reducible to the sum of structural and agential factors treated separately' (Hay, 2002, p. 127). To use an analogy from Hay (1995, p. 200), structure and agency are best considered 'not so much (*à la* Giddens) as flip-sides of the same coin, as metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged' (Hay, 2002, p. 127). In other words, structure and agency do not exist individually but do so through their 'relational interaction'. While they are analytically separable, structure and agency, 'are in practice completely interwoven (we cannot see either metal in the alloy, only the product of their fusion)' (Hay, 1995, p. 200).

Consequently, the strategic-relational approach provides the opportunity to surpass the dualism between structure and agency by concentrating rather on the dialectical relationship between the two. As such, rather than distinguishing between structure and agency, we can differentiate between *strategic action* and the *strategically selective context*, 'within which it is formulated and upon which it impacts on the other' (Hay,

2002, p. 127). This signifies that SNP actors are strategic and operate in a strategically selective environment. Jessop brings structure into agency, creating a structured context (an action setting) and, at the same time, he brings agency into structure, creating a 'contextualised actor' (a situated agent) (Hay, 2002, p. 128). SNP actors simultaneously take on board their context and act accordingly by selecting different possible actions (Hay, 2002, p. 128-129). As Hay explains, 'strategy is intentional conduct oriented towards the environment in which it is to occur. It is the intention to realise certain outcomes and objectives which motivates action' (Hay, 2002, p. 129). For action to possibly achieve such intentions, however, it must be it must be led by a analysis of the context in which strategy exists and 'upon which it subsequently impinges' (Hay, 2002, p. 129).

The strategic environment is also central to Jessop's dialectical approach, which he maintains to be *strategically selective*, in the sense that it chooses particular strategies over others 'as means to realise a given set of intentions or preferences' (Hay, 2002, p. 129). Yet, it is evident that not all outcomes are possible in any given situation. Regardless of the context, however, the outcome is not fixed by the structure of the circumstances itself and thus results remain structurally undetermined. While political outcomes, such as the SNP's policies on Europe, are dependent on strategic action, the context itself 'presents an unevenly contoured terrain which favours certain strategies over others and hence selects for certain outcomes while militating against others' (Hay, 2002, p. 129). Gradually, such strategic selectivity will introduce a succession of 'systematically structured outcomes'. Accordingly, although the outcome of a certain strategic intervention is capricious, 'the distribution of outcomes over a longer time frame will exhibit a characteristic regularity (given some degree of structural stability over the time frame considered)' (Hay, 2002, p. 130). As we shall see later in the chapter, this relates to historical institutionalism's concept of path-dependence and discursive institutionalism's notion of the *bricoleur* in explaining gradual institutional change.

From this standpoint SNP actors are 'conscious, reflexive and strategic' (Hay, 2002, p. 131). They may be intentional in their actions but may also act out of custom or instinct. Yet, while actors are considered to be strategic and intentional, we cannot presume that

their preferences are static or shaped by their material circumstances. For instance, different SNP actors in similar material circumstances (perhaps subject to different experiences and influences) will 'construct their interests and preferences differently' (Hay, 2002, p. 131). In the same vein, as material circumstances and ideational factors transform over time, SNP actors will 'review, revise and reform' their strategies and demands. As such, when analysing both the intended and unintended consequences of their actions, SNP actors may decide to review, adjust or discard their ways of achieving their intentions (Hay, 2002, pp. 131-132). In this sense, SNP actors are believed to be strategic in that they are able to plan and revise ways to achieve their goals. As Hay summarises, 'This immediately implies a relationship, and a dynamic relationship at that, between the actor (individual or collective) and the context in which she finds herself' (Hay, 2002, p. 132).

Any type of action on the SNP's part is likely to comprise both *intuitive* and *explicit* strategic elements. As Hay asserts 'even the most explicit strategic calculation is likely to be infused with intuitive assumption at the level of "practical consciousness"' (Hay, 2002, p. 132). According to this principle, once strategies are developed, they are operationalised via actions and these actions produce both intended and unintended effects, namely *direct effects* and *strategic learning*. The SNP's strategic action therefore produces immediate influences on the structured contexts within which the party's action occurs and yields a fractional – even if minimal – change of the context. The party's strategic action also produces strategic learning for the implicated actors, enriching their cognisance of structures and the opportunities and/or constraints they enforce. This furnishes the foundation from which successive strategy may be developed and possibly improved (Hay, 2002, p. 133).

In sum, the strategic-relational approach provides us with a vital comprehension of the relationship between structure and agency, 'which resolutely refuses to privilege either moment' in this relational and dialectical interaction (Hay, 2002, p. 134). As Hay has suggested, the approach thus allows us to analyse political change, while remaining sympathetic to the role of ideas in the analysis of political dynamics (Hay, 2002, p. 134). The 'idea' of Europe is central to this thesis and the mutual constitution of structure and

agency allows us to remain mindful of the role of ideas in the analysis of SNP discursive change.

2.1b.2 Europeanisation

As the overarching question of my thesis is *how and why have the SNP's policies on Europe changed over time?,* there must first be a discussion of the concept of Europeanisation, since it is an approach that has been widely used to consider changes in political parties' positions on Europe (see previous chapter). I argue that we must move beyond the concept of Europeanisation to properly understand such changes. Several definitions of Europeanisation have been offered by numerous scholars including that of Cowles et al. (2001, p. 3) who define the concept as 'the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance'. This definition falls into the common tendency of 'reduc[ing] Europeanisation to the "Europe of Brussels"' (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008, p. 36) and views the phenomenon as an end state rather than a process (Goetz, 2002; Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008, p. 39). An earlier definition of Europeanisation by Robert Ladrech (1994) considers the phenomenon as a means of 'construction, diffusion, and institutionalisation of norms, beliefs, formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles and 'ways of doing things''. According to Ladrech, these norms, beliefs, etc. are initially established at the EU level and eventually become integrated into national and subnational political narratives. Yet, this definition is also problematic as it suggests that Europeanisation is an end result that can only be observed once nations have incorporated norms from the EU level, and underplays the agency of national and subnational actors in the process.

Goetz (2000) has warned against Europeanisation researchers making the European factor 'a cause in search of an effect' and that domestic change – even if induced by interactions with the EU – can only be properly observed by starting at the domestic level. Indeed, there is an overwhelming tendency within Europeanisation research to over determine the influence of the EU on domestic politics. Rather, it can be argued that interactions at the European level should be considered to have an effect if they become a reference point in domestic politics. I therefore consider Europeanisation to occur when the EU becomes the *référentiel* – a 'mechanism of fabrication of images,

ideas, and values that constitute a vision of the world' (see Bleich, 2003, p. 26) - in domestic politics. In this instance, I consider the dependent variable of my research to be the SNP's idea of Europe and the independent variables to be not only European integration but also dynamics at the national and subnational levels. As explored in the literature review, these variables include British and Scottish politics as well as intraparty tensions.

2.1.3 New institutionalism

Until the 1950s, political science was dominated by the 'old' institutionalist approach whose primary focus was on constitutions, government structures and legal systems. Essentially, 'institutionalism was political science' (Lowndes, 2010, p. 60). This form of institutionalism, however, was soon challenged by scholars from various fields. In the 1950s and 1960s, behavioural revolutionaries found fault in the approach's formalisms of politics and sought rather to address the question of why people behave in certain ways. Several decades later, rational choice theorists also started to question the assumptions of old institutionalism and attempted to explain politics in terms of the interaction of individuals' self-interests (Lowndes, 2010, p. 60). While behaviouralists and rational choice theorists actively confronted the rigid nature of old institutionalism, they received substantial criticism for being 'undersocialised' (Lowndes, 2010, p. 61) in their approaches. By the late 1980s, an alternative institutionalist approach, new institutionalism, emerged to reiterate the importance of the 'organisation of political life' (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 747).

New institutionalists believed that political scientists needed to return to institutional analysis for a better conceptualisation of individual political actors within institutions. In other words, examining individual behaviour without looking at institutional constraints was resulting in lukewarm understandings of political reality (March and Olsen, 1984, 1989). Within the new institutionalist framework, four main institutionalisms have emerged, the first two of which are rational choice and sociological. Rational choice institutionalism looks at how rational actors achieve their goals and preferences through a 'logic of calculation' within political institutions. In this sense, institutions are viewed as structures of incentives. Sociological institutionalism

regards political institutions as socially and culturally constructed entities whose members act following a 'logic of appropriateness' in line with cultural norms. I decided against deploying either of these new institutionalisms in this thesis, mainly because of their difficulties in explaining institutional change. Rational and sociological institutionalists present institutions as 'given, static and constraining' and explain change to occur via exogenous shocks rather than also from within the institution itself (Schmidt, 2010, p. 2).

While the third main new institutionalism, historical institutionalism, has also been criticised for its conceptualisation of change, when theorised alongside the fourth main new institutionalism, discursive institutionalism, we see that historical institutionalism can provide a more dynamic study for institutional change than once thought. The approach is particularly suited to historical studies and examines how institutions are shaped by historically unique conditions that evolve over time. Discursive institutionalism maintains that institutions are constantly being created and recreated through the discursive practices of its members. As we shall see, combining the strengths of these approaches allows for a more dialectical view of structure and agency as well as a view that accommodates greater institutional change.

The first and perhaps most seminal question to institutional analysis is, what is an institution? Peters (2019, p. 139) maintains that institutions are simultaneously structures and mechanisms whereby individuals and their institution can realise their objectives. New institutionalists claim that there are three fundamental elements to what makes an institution. First, they argue that institutions are a structural property of the society and/or polity. That structure may be formal (e.g., a legislature or a public bureaucracy agency) or informal (e.g., a network of organisations or a shared set of norms). Consequently, an institution 'transcends individuals to involve groups of individuals in some sort of patterned interactions' (Peters, 2019, p. 23). These interactions are predictable and premised upon definitive connections between actors.

Second, Peters argues that an institution contains some stability over time. He uses the analogy of individuals meeting for a coffee one afternoon. This would not be considered an institution. However, if they met at the same time and place every week, that would

start to take on the elements of an institution (Peters, 2019, p. 23). While some approaches of institutionalism claim that some qualities of institutions are very stable and consequently predict behaviour accordingly, other approaches, such as discursive institutionalism, consider institutions to be more changeable. Yet all approaches to institutions necessitate some form of stability (Peters, 2019, p. 23).

The third feature of an institution according to Peters is that it must influence individual behaviour. Some meaning must be allocated to institutional activity, such as holding regular meetings, and, in other words, 'an institution should in some way constrain the behavior of its members' (Peters, 2019, p. 23). These constraints may be formal or informal but they must exist in order for an institution to exist. Finally, there should be a consciousness of shared meaning and values among the members of the institution (Peters, 2019, p. 23). In the case of the SNP, this shared value is, above all, Scottish nationalism.

On these bases, I consider the SNP to be an institution even though some would contest that a political party may not constitute as such. Cappocia and Kelemen (2007, p. 349), however, have argued that institutions can range from an individual organisation, such as a political party, a corporation, or a union. As an institution involves a collective of individuals in such 'patterned interactions', some stability over time, constraints on its members' activities, and a shared awareness of meaning, it is more than feasible to consider the SNP as an institution for the purposes of this thesis.

2.2 Historical institutionalism

The historical version of institutionalism examines how institutions are shaped by historically unique conditions that evolve over time according to a 'logic of path-dependence' (Peters, 2019, p. 80). The basic logic of historical institutionalism is that the implementation of policies when an institution is created will have a 'continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future' (Peters, 2012, p. 70). The approach emphasises the fact that institutional progress is signified by path-dependence where *critical junctures*, or *punctuations*, such as particular events, crises or social pressures, generate new agential action (see Peters 2012 and 2019). The concept

stresses that history is not comprised of individual events and takes a particular interest in the interdependency between multiple important variables (Steinmo, 2008, p. 166). This is instructive when it comes to analysing the various independent variables of my research at the European, national and subnational levels.

Rather than assuming what has influenced the SNP's discourses on Europe over the years, the party's discourses must be examined in their historical context (Steinmo, 2008, p. 158). Here, 'historical' encompasses particular political, economic, and social contexts. As Steinmo explains: 'rather than treating all political action as if fundamentally the same irrespective of time, place or context, historical institutionalists explicitly and intentionally attempt to situate their variables in the appropriate context' (Steinmo, 2008, p. 165). By exposing the social, political and economic currents of an historical moment, we are able to provide much more accurate explanations of how and why the SNP's policies on Europe have come to fruition, than were we to treat such variables 'outside the temporal dimension' (Steinmo, 2008, p. 164). Indeed, Pierson (1998, p. 29) has stated that '[historical institutionalist] scholarship is *historical* because it recognises that political development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time. It is *institutionalist* because it stresses that many of the contemporary implications of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions, whether these be formal rules, policy structures, or social norms'.

My use of historical institutionalism departs from the assumption that the SNP's policy choices made at its genesis will have a 'continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future' (Peters, 2012, p. 70). In other words, the SNP was established in 1934 as a nationalist party. According to historical institutionalism, we should therefore expect that the party's policy choices, including those on European integration, would be affected at least on some part by this original nationalism. While historical institutionalism has been criticised for being too deterministic, adopting a strategic-relational approach to structure and agency assumes that these original policy choices produce direct effects upon the structured context within which the party's action occurs and yields a fractional – even if minimal – change of the context. Yet, at the same time, the outcome is not fixed by the structure of the event and thus outcomes remain structurally undetermined. Gradually, SNP actors' strategic selectivity will

introduce a succession of systematically structured outcomes. Though the outcome of a certain strategic mediation is uncertain, 'the distribution of outcomes over a longer time frame will exhibit a characteristic regularity (given some degree of structural stability over the time frame considered)' (Hay, 2002, p. 130).

2.2.1 Path-dependence and critical junctures

The notion of path-dependence is well illustrated by Arthur (1994) who visualises a particular island to which cars are introduced at around about the same time. The drivers of these cars may choose between the right- and left-hand sides of the road, with each side containing 'increasing returns'. In other words, 'as a higher proportion of drivers chooses one side, the payoff to choosing that side rapidly rises' (Arthur, 1994, p. 14). As such, causal thought suggests that, initially, we would witness a high level of 'randomness' to the proportions of drivers on each side, but that if one side 'got sufficiently ahead' then other drivers would 'fall in' on this side, so that gradually all drivers would position themselves on the same side of the road (Arthur, 1994, p. 14). This outcome would be expected to be determined by a collection of 'small events', such as dogs running into the road, drivers' reactions and the situation of traffic lights (Arthur, 1994, p. 14). In a similar way, the SNP's change in discourses on Europe may be an outcome of a gradual accumulation of small events in an historical (political, social and economic) context.

In a more 'adaptive' and 'modified' strain of historical institutionalism, evolution is emphasised rather than a total adherence to the original pattern (Peters, 2019, p. 84). In this view, path-dependence does not have total control over institutions and their policies. Conversely, it represents a path that is expected to be followed if there is a nonexistence of other pressures (see Huber and Stephens, 2001). While institutional evolution can occur, the possibilities for change can be restricted by the inception of the institution. Yet that path may offer opportunities for choice-making (Ebbinghaus, 2005) and 'hence a path for evolution rather than a deterministic path' (Peters, 2019, p. 84).

Pierson (2000) maintains that path-dependence can be explained through 'positive feedback' from original policy choices and how that feedback strengthens those choices.

Institutions can also transform via learning processes and 'can move along equilibria by responding to new information' (Peters, 2019, p. 93). This information may be informed by experiences as they 'move along their own "path"', or the experience of other institutions may also inform the information (Peters, 2019, p. 93). This can be seen in the case of the SNP's discourses on Europe, where the party frequently refers to and 'learns' from other independence movements in Europe, from Catalonia to Sardinia.

As suggested by Arthur (1994), configurations of institutional or policy development are commonly understood as incremental and slow, yet, it is possible that they may be exposed to periods of swift transformative change, otherwise known as *critical junctures* (Krasner, 1984, pp. 240-43). Such junctures are considered to happen when there are 'rapid bursts of institutional change followed by long periods of stasis' (Krasner, 1984, pp. 242). The intellectual question, as Peters (2019, p. 84) poses is whether these punctuations in the institution's equilibrium are restricted by options or if there is a 'wide (or unlimited) set of possibilities open'.

The concept of critical junctures lies at the heart of Collier and Collier's (1991) study of the political development of eight Latin American countries. They define a critical juncture as 'a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or other units of analysis) and which is hypothesised to produce distinct legacies' (Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 29). Mahoney uses a similar approach in his comparative study of the political development of Central America and describes critical junctures as 'choice points when a particular option is adopted among two or more alternatives', distinguished by preceding historical conditions (Mahoney, 2001, p. 113). Indeed, analyses of critical junctures tend to concentrate not on ad hoc small events, rather on choices made by powerful actors – in the case of the SNP, political entrepreneurs – and look at how, throughout a period of institutional mutability, they are able to shift the equilibrium an a particular direction. As Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 17) explain, 'groups and individuals are not merely spectators as conditions change to favour or penalize them in the political balance of power, but rather strategic actors capable of acting on 'openings' provided by such shifting contextual conditions in order to enhance their own position'. An example of such a strategic actor in the SNP could be

Jim Sillars and his introduction of the *Independence in Europe* narrative in the late-1980s.

The majority of historical institutionalists consider critical junctures to be short periods that may last for several years, rather than as sudden events. In terms of the concept of path-dependence, Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, p. 348) define critical junctures as '*relatively* short periods of time during which there is a *substantially* heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest'. '*Relatively* short periods of time' suggest that the lifespan of the juncture must be materially shorter than that of the path-dependent process it activates. By '*substantially* heightened probability', the authors mean that the probability that actors' choices will influence outcomes must be higher than the probability preceding and succeeding the juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p. 348). This definition seeks to explain that, for a brief interval, actors are subject to a wider than usual variety of possible choices, and that these choices are expected to have a significant influence on subsequent outcomes (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p. 348). Put simply, actors' 'choices during the critical juncture trigger a path-dependent process that constrains future choices' (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p. 348). This would suggest that the choices made by SNP actors during times of political flux would spark a path-dependent process that would determine the party's future decisions.

Drawing on Pierson's work, *Politics in Time* (2004), Bulmer (2009) examines historical institutionalism's views on both path-dependent incremental development and radical change (i.e., critical junctures). He attempts to surpass the idea of historical institutionalism merely involving continuity and consider 'timescapes' that invite opportunities for change, applying Goetz and Meyer-Sahling's (2009) definition of a timescape as 'the manner in which time is institutionalized in a political system along the polity, politics and policy dimensions' (Bulmer, 2009, p. 307). Indeed, there is a lack of attention to political timescapes in the SNP and my conceptual framework uses historical institutionalism to understand many of the longer-term factors that can help us to comprehend how time has become institutionalised within the party. Rather importantly, Tilly has noted the matter of timing: '*when* things happen within a sequence affects *how* they happen' (quoted in Pierson, 2004, p. 54). For example, the

factors that influenced the SNP's narratives on Europe were very different pre- and post-Maastricht Treaty. The two dynamics of radical change and path-dependence help us to understand the nature of the SNP's discourses on Europe, as policy pathways may be exposed to random punctuations (Pollitt, 2008, p. 42). Pollitt has posed several questions in regards to EU policy dynamics, which can also be applied to the institutional analysis of the SNP. Explicitly, what are the mechanisms that hook European policies to particular pathways and under what conditions does momentous change occur? This look at the political, economic and social factors of an historical moment or moments can be complimented by a discursive consideration of institutions.

2.3 Discursive institutionalism

The basic logic of discursive institutionalism, pioneered by Vivien Schmidt (2008, 2010) is that ideas shape institutions through discursive practices. For discursive institutionalists, institutional members' ideas and communications take analytical priority over the formal structure of the institution. This reflects the strategic-relational approach where structure and agency are considered mutually constitutive and dialectical. If social facts, such as institutions, are born from transitory social understandings, then institutions do not signify 'stable platforms of action and stable rules' (Peters, 2012, p. 113) but exist as metamorphic entities. The discursive approach considers institutions to be more of a process rather than a fixed pattern or structure. This conceptualisation of an institution as a process implies that institutions are constantly being 'created and recreated' by the interaction of their members and their ideas (Peters, 2012, p. 134). Individuals simultaneously represent and change institutional discourses and leaders of institutions in particular can be responsible for framing and reframing processes (Peters, 2012, p. 131). It is this co-constitutive nature of structure and agency that I believe has shaped the SNP's discourses on Europe.

The boundary between the institution and its environment is more indistinct in discursive institutionalism than in other institutional approaches. As the discursive model relies on ideas coming from outside the institution, it is difficult to distinguish institutions from the sources of their ideas and they 'must remain open to individuals who are the promoters of new ideas' (Peters, 2012, p. 118). This institutional

porousness means that official hierarchical structure is less important in discursive institutionalism than it is in other new institutionalist approaches. As an institution is defined by its members' ideas and interactions, the institution therefore symbolises a 'short-term equilibrium in the discussion of policy ideas' (Peters, 2012, p. 118). In most descriptions of institutions, they are thought to offer 'permanence and predictability' for society, even during volatile political activity (Peters, 2012, p. 119). A key argument of discursive institutionalists, however, is that institutional change mirrors ideational shifts in discourses (Peters, 2012, p. 114). When attempting to examine such shifts, we must consider the large number of possible independent variables associated with ideas that could be causing the change in discourse. It is here that the usefulness of historical institutionalism's conceptualisation of critical junctures and their contexts is instructive. Is it that the SNP started to frame Scottish independence in the context of Europe as Scotland gained increased representation at the EU level? Or is it that the party's attitudes towards Europe depend on the UK government's position on the matter?

For discursive institutionalists, ideas themselves are significant but become even more so depending on how they are articulated by an institution's members. Ideas are not merely 'hierarchical ordering principles' but outcomes of members' interactions with one another (Peters, 2012, p. 116). According to discursive institutionalism, members' *background ideational abilities* create institutions while their *foreground discursive abilities* allow them to assess, change and maintain them (Schmidt, 2008). The term 'background ideational abilities' is a broad term for Searle's (1995) definition of 'background abilities' that include 'human capacities, dispositions and know-how' related to our understandings and interactions with the world.

These abilities influence how actors rationalise events and operate within a particular discursive institutional environment, according to ideational rules (Schmidt, 2010, p. 55). In other words, there is no external standard of behaviour or norms to follow and norms are established through actors' interactions with one another (Peters, 2012, p. 114). While these background ideational abilities account for the way in which an institution is established and maintained, it is also important to look at the foreground discursive abilities, which allow agents to 'change or maintain' their institutions via a 'logic of communication' (Schmidt, 2008). In other words, these abilities allow actors to

reason externally from their institutions. This notion is key when attempting to understand changes in the SNP's narrative of Scottish independence in Europe. Party officials' background ideational abilities are rooted in distinct political contexts, such as Scotland's representation at the EU level and the UK's policy preferences towards the EU at any given time. Whether these ideational abilities engender institutional change depends greatly on the officials' foreground discursive abilities.

The ideas that lead to institutional change can be *cognitive* or *normative* and can exist on three different levels of generality: policy ideas, programmatic ideas/paradigms and philosophical ideas (Schmidt, 2010, p. 48). At a basic level, cognitive ideas represent 'what is and what to do' while normative ideas represent 'what is good or bad' in terms of 'what one ought to do' (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306). For instance, the SNP's idea of independence from the UK while retaining EU membership is a cognitive idea, while the argument that 'Scotland is more European than the rest of the UK' is normative. Ideas can be expressed discursively in various ways, such as narratives, frames, myths, scripts, stories, collective memories, etc., and are 'the currency for the discursive interactive processes that help produce policy change' (Schmidt, 2011, pp. 8-37).

The first level of generality in which ideas exist is the specific policies or policy solutions put forward by policy makers. The second of these levels is programmatic ideas upon which policy ideas are based. These types of ideas outline the problems for policies to address as well as the issues, goals, norms, methods and instruments to be considered in attempting to solve the problems. Finally, ideas can also exist as common ideologies, philosophical views, or *Weltanschauung*. These ideas underpin policies and programmes and constitute social values, principles, and knowledge. While the first two levels can be considered as foreground as they are regularly discussed and debated, such philosophical ideas tend to be implicit and underlying and are usually only disputed during times of crisis (Schmidt, 2010), i.e., critical junctures according to historical institutionalism.

These different types of ideas can be communicated in two distinct spaces or discourses. First, *coordinative discourses* arise within the institution as its members establish, develop and defend the ideas at the heart of their policy making. It must be noted,

however, that some members have greater knowledge or stronger persuasive abilities on a particular issue. While policy entrepreneurs are the ones who tend to propose and circulate ideas within an institution, members who do not hold this role can also be influential depending on their capabilities. This relates to the previous chapter in which we have seen that there have been SNP actors who have been working 'behind the scenes'.

Ideas can also be communicated via *communicative discourses*. In order for policymaking to remain functional and for societal change to occur, ideas must be diffused to the public and to policy actors in different institutions. As those outside the institution do not share the same commitment to it as its members, communicative discourse can be more challenging than coordinative discourse. Communicative discourse may entail reframing policies and issues as a way of resolving discordant narratives (i.e., policy frames) (Peters 2012, pp. 116-117). Such communicative discourses often seem to be a top-down process whereby policy elites coordinate ideas for political elites who then diffuse them to the public. Yet, this process can also be bottom-up via the discursive activities of social activists, for example. At the same time, there may be no connections between coordinative and communicative discourses when coordinative policy ideas are hidden from the public via closed debates (Schmidt, 2010, p. 57). Moreover, political elites may decide to 'legitimate their policy ideas using arguments other than those used in the coordinative discourse' (Schmidt, 2008). Conducting interviews with SNP individuals as part of my methods for this thesis will help to unearth the nature of the party's coordinative and communicative discourses as the interviewees will be able to comment on whether discourses have been reframed, influenced from below, or hidden from the public.

As mentioned previously, institutional change depends on members' foreground discursive abilities as much as their background ideational abilities, which introduce ideas into an institutional setting. According to Schmidt and Radaelli (2004), a 'good' discourse has strong cognitive arguments, meaningful normative arguments, and a sufficient level of information on which to base its arguments. National values, culture, timing and political salience are other elements that contribute to making a 'good' discourse (Schmidt, 2008). Furthermore, who is speaking to whom in both coordinative

and communicative discourses is also important. In other words, 'discourse is not only about what is said but also about who said what to whom, where, when, and why' (Schmidt, 2010, p. 56).

Discourse is not only the collection of ideas that introduce new rules, values, and practices, nor is it simply a mechanism used by entrepreneurial actors to create and justify their ideas; it is also an interactive and highly contextual process. As Schmidt explains: 'how ideas are generated among policy actors and diffused to the public by political actors through discourse is key to explaining institutional change (and continuity)' (2010, p. 55). Indeed, collective action is rarely taken without the articulation, discussion and justification of individual thought (Schmidt, 2010, p. 56). Yet how can we tell what will disrupt the equilibrium of an institution? One explanation offered by Hay (2008) is that an institution's equilibrium is disturbed if one or more of its participants believes that their ideas are not being advanced within the institution. Participants are then subject to the common choices of 'exit, voice, or loyalty' (Peters, 2019, p. 136; see Hirschman, 1964). Moreover, institutions may reach stability but this may become subverted as new members are recruited to the institution. According to the discursive model, this signifies that new ideas will come with new members, which may disrupt the equilibrium (Peters, 2019, p. 138). We can see this in the case of the SNP, where the positive idea of Europe was introduced to the institution by prominent new member, Jim Sillars, and destabilised the institution's equilibrium.

Yet, while ideas are clearly very significant in the construction of institutions and institutional change, it would be overly idealistic and deterministic to '[see] the influence of ideas and the persuasiveness of discourse everywhere' (Schmidt, 2010, p. 61). It is often the case that new ideas have minimal influence on existing ideas, while discursive practices do not succeed in their persuasiveness. As historical institutionalists assert, processes of change can remain unconscious in that 'people may act without any clear sense of what they are doing' (Schmidt, 2010, p. 61). Furthermore, ideas may be misconstrued and redefined to produce unintended consequences. The key question, then, is in the causality of ideas and discourse. In other words, when do ideas matter and when do they not? Thus, a main thread of enquiry in my research is: when, why, and how have particular ideas about Europe become integrated into the

SNP's narrative on independence and translated into distinct policy preferences? Answering this question will largely depend on the historical context in which the party's discourses are embedded as well as who communicates them in both coordinative and communicative spheres.

2.4 Using both approaches

To begin, I take historical institutionalism's basic logic of path-dependence, namely that the policy choices made at the creation of the SNP, i.e., Scottish nationalism, have an enduring and somewhat determinate effect over future policy. The logic of path-dependence is usually conceptualised as gradual and slow which fits in well with discursive institutionalism's conceptualisation of the *bricoleur* as an actor who will develop new approaches by using a mix of pre-existing ideas rather than by introducing completely new policy perspectives. As Peters echoes: 'one of the more interesting extensions of historical institutionalism is that path dependency does not have to occur only in the simple, straightforward manner…The initial "path" is maintained but it is maintained by adding more elements that elaborate its meaning and create layers within the institution' (2019, p. 83; see Lewis and Steinmo, 2012). As such, when analysing the SNP's discourses, I take into consideration the fact that ideas are not simply independent entities but can develop slowly over time, according to a logic of path-dependence.

Ideas do not have to emerge slowly, however. Historical institutionalism's conceptualisation of critical junctures asserts that there are blocks of time in which quick and transformative change can occur. In the analysis of critical junctures, historical institutionalism tends to concentrate on the decisions made by powerful actors and how, during these junctures, they can induce institutional change. While historical institutionalism considers actors' choices during a critical juncture to initiate a path-dependent process that restricts future action, I prefer to use the language of *influencing* future choices, to align more with discursive institutionalism's conceptualisation of institutions as enabling constructs. As Rosamond (2000, p. 172) maintains: 'agents are bound by structures, but they are also capable through action of altering the structural environment in which they operate, albeit in a way that may be

structurally contained'. This also relates to discursive institutionalism's notion of *foreground discursive abilities,* which allow actors to change or maintain their institutions via a 'logic of communication' (Schmidt, 2008). In other words, these abilities allow SNP actors to reason externally from the party, particularly, as historical institutionalism asserts, during times of exogenous 'shocks'. As institutional structures are not metaphysical, any change they undergo must be explained by actors' interventions (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004, p. 192). Yet, in turn, these interventions may be influenced by structure, such as, in this instance, the national, subnational and European levels.

By considering critical junctures as arising from ideational change (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004, p. 142), we are able to better understand the SNP's fundamental shifts on its discourses on Europe. For example, once an idea has become embedded it can have 'framing effects', acting as 'basic templates upon which other political decisions [are] made' (Steinmo, 2008, p. 169; Hall, 1989). My analysis will concentrate on three main types of gradual ideational change in the SNP's discourses on Europe: *layering*; *drift*; and *conversion* (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). The first of these is a somewhat regular form of change within institutions, where new layers are added to the institution in the form of individuals with ideas. For example, more pro-European members were recruited to the party during the 1980s, which may have gradually altered the party's previous anti-European narrative. *Drift* is also a common type of institutional change by which an institution's rules may be revised over time by its members. Lastly, *conversion* 'represents a somewhat more complete change within the institution, in which the meaning of the institution is altered, or old rules remain in place but are interpreted differently' (Peters, 2019, pp. 91-92). Furthermore, Peters et al. (2004) reveal the significance of political conflict as a source of change in institutional policy, where the establishment of different understandings of policy are the source of punctuations or critical junctures. Yet, in order for conflict to work, there must be a substantive alternative to the institution's ideas as well as carriers of these ideas (Peters, 2019, pp. 94-95).

In line with the strategic-relational approach, I consider SNP actors to be strategic, using their background ideational abilities to establish and sustain the institution. At the same

time, I expect structures to be strategically selective in the sense that, in any given situation, actors only have access to certain options of strategic action and not all options will result in a materialisation of actors' intentions. As social, political and economic contexts are 'densely structured and highly contoured' (Hay, 2002, p. 209), they offer an 'unevenly distributed configuration of opportunity and constraint' to actors. Consequently, while such contexts may allow certain actors to further their strategic interests, they are just as likely to throw up hurdles for other actors who are not as well equipped (Hay, 2002, p. 209). Being ill-equipped with information means that actors must analyse the context in which they operate in order to strategically act upon it. In other words, 'ideas provide the point of mediation between actors and their *environment*' (Hay, 2002, p. 209-2010).

Indeed, for certain narratives, paradigms and ideas to present 'cognitive templates' through which actors perceive the world, they must 'resonate with the actors' direct and mediated experiences' (Hay, 2002, p. 212). As such, the ideational or discursive is independent from the material. As well as enforcing a strategic selectivity, context also enforces a *discursive selectivity*, where actors support or do not support certain 'ideas, narratives and construction' (Hay, 2002, p. 212). As a result, contextual ideas and strategies they underpin develop over time. Yet, whether this produces a 'process of cumulative learning' which may be translated to more efficient policy-making, is, according to Hay (2002, p. 213), 'an empirical question which can be answered only on a case-by-case basis'.

When examining the context, or 'history', in which SNP actors operate, I do not consider history as a chain of independent variables. Rather, I consider there to be an interdependency between multiple significant variables, namely at the European, national and subnational levels. Furthermore, the notion of timescapes allows me to consider how time becomes institutionalised within the party along the lines of polity, politics and policy. In other words, *when* things happen influences *how* they happen. For example, the SNP's *Independence in Europe* narrative of 1988 could have been down to the timing of numerous factors, such as the introduction of new members to the party, EU structural reforms, and opposition to Thatcherite policy in Scotland.

When analysing the SNP's narratives on Europe, I will take into consideration the idea that ideas can be *cognitive* ('what is and what to do') and *normative* ('what one ought to do'). These ideas spread over three levels of generality, namely, policy ideas; programmatic ideas; and philosophical ideas (Schmidt, 2008, p. 8). This relates to historical institutionalism's notion of the historical context (programmatic ideas) and I argue that, at the foreground, this context underpins SNP European policy. Moreover, I will examine how philosophical ideas fortify policy and programmatic ideas which are usually only contested during times of crisis. Historical institutionalism would define these as 'critical junctures'. Furthermore, the communication of ideas can be implemented via intra-institutional coordinative discourses and public communicative discourses.

Despite the ideational flavour of my conceptual framework, it would be somewhat deterministic, as aforementioned, to contend that the influence of ideas is omnipotent and as historical institutionalism suggests, processes of change can remain unconscious (Peters, 2019). The key question, then, is in the causality of ideas and discourse. In other words, when do ideas matter and when do they not? Thus, a main thread of enquiry in my research is: how, when and why have particular ideas about Europe become integrated into the SNP's narratives on Scottish independence and translated into distinct policy references? Answering this question will largely depend on the social, economic and political environments in which the party's discourses are embedded as well as who communicates them in both coordinative and communicative spheres.

To my knowledge, a combination of historical and discursive institutionalism has not yet been implemented in the study of secessionist parties in Europe, yet the connection between the two approaches has been noted (Peters, 2019, p. 81). In particular, the groundwork for institutions in the historical approach tends to be ideas that are used to defend public policies. As Peters (2019, p. 81) maintains: 'as long as the ideas persist and the policy will persist, and if the policies persist then the structures associated with those policies will persist, although perhaps not as distinctly as the policies…And, therefore, to change the institution one needs to change the ideas' (see Béland, 2009; Peters, Pierre, and King, 2004). Peters maintains that historical institutionalism can be deployed alongside other versions of new institutionalism to 'perhaps create something

of an integrated institutionalist theory for political science' (2019, pp. 101-102). This is precisely my aim in seeking to explain the SNP's change in attitudes towards Europe, by using a predominantly historical institutionalist approach, peppered with some of discursive institutionalism's arguments in order to create a discursive and historical look at such change. The table below summarises the main points that the theoretical approaches have led me to look for in the empirical analysis.

Historical institutionalist concepts	**Descriptor**
Logic of path-dependence	Policy choices made at the genesis of an institution will have a 'continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future' (Peters, 2012, p. 70). A path is expected to be followed if there is a nonexistence of other pressures. Path may offer opportunities for choice-making and (internal and external) learning processes, and thus institutional change.
Critical junctures	Particular events, crises or social pressures generate a 'new way of doing things'. Occur when there are 'rapid bursts of change followed by long periods of stasis' (Krasner, 1984, p. 242); a moment when a particular choice is made between two or more alternatives; may be restricted by policy choices.
Timescapes	The way in which time is institutionalised in a political system along polity, politics and policy lines.
Layering, drift, conversion and conflict	Types of more gradual institutional change. *Layering* is a regular form of change where new layers are added to the institution in the form of individuals with ideas; *Drift* involves revising an institution's rules over time by its members; *Conversion* 'represents a somewhat more

	complete change within the institution, in which the meaning of the institution is altered, or old rules remain in place but are interpreted differently' (Peters, 2019, pp. 91-92); *Conflict* can also be a source of change where the establishment of different understandings of policy are the source of critical junctures.

Table 1: Historical institutionalist concepts

Discursive institutionalist concepts	**Descriptor**
Logic of communication	Ideas shape institutions through discursive interactions. Institutions are continuously being created and recreated.
Background ideational abilities	Human capacities that create and maintain institutions. Influence how actors rationalise events and operate within an institution. Norms are established through actors' interactions with one another.
Foreground discursive abilities	Allow actors to assess, change and maintain institution via a logic of communication. Allow actors to reason externally from their institutions.
Cognitive ideas	'What is and what to do'
Normative ideas	'What is good or bad about what is' in light of 'what one ought to do'.
Policy, programmatic and philosophical ideas	Levels of generality in which cognitive and normative ideas exist. Policy ideas are based on programmatic ideas, while philosophical ideas underpin policies and

	programmes and constitute social values, principles and knowledge. Philosophical ideas usually only disputed during times of crisis, i.e., critical junctures.
Coordinative discourses	Intra-institutional discourses that arise as members create, develop and defend ideas at the heart of their policymaking.
Communicative discourses	Extra-institutional discourses diffused to the public and policy actors in different institutions. May involve reframing policies. Can be top-down or bottom-up.
Bricoleur	An actor who will develop new approaches by using a mix of pre-existing ideas rather than by introducing completely new policy perspectives.

Table 2: Discursive institutionalist concepts

I will now discuss precisely how I will research these questions posed by historical and discursive institutionalisms using a multi-method approach.

2.5 Methods

Consistent with the institutionalist approach articulated above, this thesis adopts a broadly interpretivist methodology (see Schmidt, 2020) with the following research methods: archival research; elite interviewing; and process tracing. The main emphasis is on the archival research while interviews were used to supplement my findings. Once I gathered data via the archival research stage and used the interviews to test the interpretations drawn from the archives and secondary sources, I used the process tracing method to (a) establish a chronology of events and, (b) test the processes through which the SNP's discourses on Europe have changed over time. I then applied the new institutionalist approaches to refine the empirical quality of this research by investigating such processes in a more historical and discursive way. This included a

discursive analysis of a broad range of SNP materials, including transcriptions from elite interviews, manifestos, electoral ephemera, speeches, articles and meeting minutes.

It is my belief that there are multiple dynamics that interact in many different ways to produce distinct contexts within which the SNP has formed its discourses on Europe. The analysis of this thesis is premised upon the following question and sub-questions:

How and why have the SNP's policies on Europe changed over time?

To what extent do these policies depend on:

a. European integration?
b. British domestic politics?
c. Scottish subnational politics?
d. Political entrepreneurs?

2.5.1 Archival research

The largest and most time-consuming part of my empirical research was the archival research stage. I decided to use archival research mainly for its ability to provide empirical depth, but also because there is a large SNP archive at the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh. In line with Trachtenberg's (2006) theory-guided selection strategy, I began by gathering and analysing those sources that are easiest to access. The iterative nature of this process allowed me to generate a strong historical reconstruction of events and to strengthen the overall quality of the research by being able to identify the most significant sources (Trachtenberg, 2006, pp. 30-50, 140-146, 163-168).

The archival sources I identified as easiest to access include SNP press releases, manifestos, government papers, policy documents, speeches, legislative minutes and personal papers of politicians. I also encountered most valuable promotional ephemera, including posters, pamphlets, brochures, newsletters and photos. There exists also a wide collection of election ephemera, papers and addresses of General, European Parliament and Scottish Parliament Elections.

I then determined the value of sources by 'mapping' them back to my data-collection plan. This plan was designed so that I clearly and systematically document and justify all of my decisions on data collection (Kapiszewski et al., 2015, p. 170). All archival texts were logged in a book including descriptive and analytical information of texts, a highlighting system to flag significant SNP discourses, and justifications for my judgements. To keep in line with the discursive and historical natures of my research approach, my log-book also contains a chart in which to systematically record brief notes on the objectives, viewpoints, perspectives and biases of the texts' authors. The mapping process allowed me to evaluate the relevance of both anticipated and unanticipated information and revealed the relevance of sources to the overall goals of the thesis. Ultimately, this assisted in the prevention of collecting too much irrelevant data.

2.5.2 Elite interviews

There are several advantages of conducting elite interviews in conjunction with archival research. First, the collection and analysis of pre-existing materials strengthened my interview preparation and contributed to the empirical depth and texture of this project. Second, names of potential interview subjects appeared in newspapers, memoirs and archival documents and consequently encouraged me to contact interviewees I had not considered (Kapiszewski et al., 2015, p. 158). Furthermore, I cross-checked data from multiple existing party discourses with elite interview transcripts in order to enhance the data's strength and credibility.

First is the question of the selection of participants. I interviewed five SNP actors from my list of potential interviewees based on non-probability sampling techniques, distinct in the sense that samples are selected based on the researcher's subjective judgments. I have used the 'snowballing' method whereby I identified an initial subset of interviewees based on their knowledge and experience of the SNP and European affairs. I then introduced a chain-referral process whereby the interviewees were asked to recommend other individuals they believed to be influential (Tansey, 2007, p. 20). This technique was then repeated with the new set of SNP interviewees and allowed me to identify significant actors who may have otherwise been unnoticed (Farquharson, 2005). Furthermore, this method allowed me to ascertain the level of influence elite

actors may have, as the number of nominations that each person receives signifies their significance in the process (Tansey, 2007, p. 20).

I used elite interviewing to corroborate the initial findings from the archival research and to uncover the more informal aspects of decision-making processes. Pre-existing materials may capture SNP viewpoints and decisions as if they were the general consensus of the institution. As such, the interviews hoped to reveal any undocumented debates and disagreements that do not emerge from analysing the party's archives (Tansey, 2007, pp. 8-9). Furthermore, information gathered from the interviews helped me to identify the most significant archives and provided me with the opportunity to test out assumptions during the archival research process. Finally, the interviewing method added a contemporary spin to a largely historical study.

When conducting and analysing interviews, I asked interviewees open-ended questions so that they did not have to answer them according to 'fixed categories' (Tansey, 2007, p. 6). All interviews were online and were recorded and transcribed before being analysed in conjunction with pre-existing materials, and ethics approval was secured by the University of Sheffield. This interviewing method enabled me to better understand both the nature and origin of the party's coordinative and communicative discourses. For example, SNP officials were able to comment on how particular discourses on Europe were constructed in a coordinative sphere and then communicated to the public. Indeed, it may have been the case that discourses were altered from the coordinative to communicative level or may not have even reached the public in the first place.

2.5.3 Process tracing

The process tracing method aligns well with my particular institutionalist framework as it is designed to ascertain how an event (or idea) emerges in discourses. As this research project is historical, it works well with the chronological aspect of the process tracing method. Indeed, Schmidt (2010) recommends process tracing as a viable method for capturing institutional change as it can 'unwrap' the connections between variables and outcomes by recognising intervening influences. The thorough nature of digging through archives will help to uncover these influences and lead to determining

why the SNP's policies on Europe have changed over time. The largely ephemeral and 'nitty-gritty' nature of the available archives result in most valuable sources of process tracing (Kapiszewski et al., 2015, p. 164).

The archival research process can help to identify any significant patterns and time periods within discourses. Pre-existing materials can help to uncover those strategic choices (critical junctures) made by the SNP and whether they contributed towards creating path-dependencies within the party's discourses on Europe (Kapiszewski et al., 2015, pp. 161-162). The process tracing method analyses social actors' responses to internal and external conditions in a contextual way and also accounts for the notion of equifinality: that there are many possible ways to reach a particular end state.

In process tracing, one seeks to surpass simply recognising correlations between independent variables (X) and outcomes (Y) (Beach and Pedersen, 2019, p. 1). Process tracing is usually conceptualised by its goal of tracing causal mechanisms, which can be defined as 'a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts' (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). The method entails endeavouring to pinpoint the 'intervening causal process', i.e., the causal chain and causal mechanism, between independent variables and the outcomes of a dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-7). Such an exploration of causal mechanisms allows us to 'go a step further' when examining causal relationships, enabling us to 'peer into the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying between some structural cause and its purported effect' (Gerring, 2006, p. 45).

It is debated that the process tracing method is the only method enabling us to study causal mechanisms, allowing the researcher to create substantial within-case inferences, whereby outcomes are established, 'enabling us to update the degree of confidence we hold in the validity of a theorized causal mechanism' (Beach and Pedersen, 2019, pp. 1-2). George and Bennett surmise that process tracing thus signifies 'an invaluable method that should be included in every researcher's repertoire' (2005, p. 224). According to process tracing, the ontology of causal relationships involves the use of a *mechanismic* view of causation that concentrates on the process whereby causal forces are diffused through a sequence of 'interlocking parts' of a mechanism to create

an outcome. The method is based on a Bayesian logic of inference, making within-case inferences about the existence of causal mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen, 2019, p.14).

There are several variants of process tracing and the method is used to examine causal mechanisms in a single-case research design. For the purposes of this thesis, I use the *explaining-outcome* form of process tracing, which attempts to establish a 'minimally sufficient explanation' of a perplexing outcome in a particular historical case (Beach and Pedersen, 2019). As Beach and Pedersen explain, 'here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case-centric than theory-oriented' (2019, p. 3). Case-centric researchers concur that the social world is 'complex, multifactored, and extremely context-specific' (Beach and Pedersen, 2019, p. 12). As Humphreys explains: 'The ambition is not to prove that a theory is correct but instead to prove that it has utility in providing the best possible explanation. Explanations are case-specific and cannot be detached from the particular case' (2010, pp. 269-270). As such, the theory and methods used in this thesis are particular to the phenomenon of the SNP's changing discourses on Europe. While this may shed light on other similar phenomena, the goal here is to tie explanations to this particular case.

This explaining-outcome variant of process tracing can be considered as a single-outcome study which aims to unearth the causes of a specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006). As aforementioned, the aim is to produce a minimally sufficient explanation of a specific outcome, where 'sufficiency' is defined as an explanation that 'accounts for all the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present' (Beach and Pedersen, 2019, p. 18; see Mackie, 1965). Creating a minimally sufficient explanation almost always involves merging mechanisms into a heterogeneous causal mechanism to explain an historical outcome. Explaining-outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that attempts to track the intricate mix of systematic and case-specific causal mechanisms that produce the outcome, namely, the SNP's discourses on Europe (Beach and Pedersen, 2019, p. 19). While this type of process tracing is most akin to abduction – the dialectic blend of deduction and induction – it is more helpful in this instance to split this blend when ascertaining the best possible explanation of the outcome of the SNP's discourses on Europe (Beach and

Pedersen, 2019, p. 19; see Peirce 1995). There are three steps to the deductive path. First, the theory is conceptualised as a mechanism; second, empirical tests are established and evaluated against the empirical record; and the third step includes analysing whether a sufficient explanation has been developed (Beach and Pedersen, 2019, p. 19).

Where existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, a second stage of research is required where the researcher chooses either a deductive or inductive path, based on the results of the first empirical analysis. If the researcher chooses the deductive path in this second iteration, different theories must be tested to assess whether they provide a sufficient explanation. On the other hand, the researcher can choose the inductive path, using empirical evidence to construct a 'better' explanation (Beach and Pedersen, 2019, pp. 19-20). The inductive path is regularly used when we are studying a little-researched outcome. At this point, the researcher can advance in a way more akin to 'historical methodology or classic detective work' (Roberts, 1996), for instance, by working backward from the outcome by scrutinising the evidence with the goal of revealing a credible sufficient causal mechanism that produced an outcome. This bottom-up form of analysis uses empirical material to craft a reasonable explanation of causal mechanisms whereby X (or multiple Xs) led to the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2019, p. 20).

The crucial question to process tracing is when does the process end? In other words, how can we recognise a minimally sufficient explanation? As Beach and Pedersen assert, 'there is no foolproof answer to this question' (2019, p. 20). Rather, ascertaining whether a minimally sufficient explanation has been reached is 'based on an assessment of whether all of the relevant facets of the outcome have been accounted for adequately while ensuring that the evidence is best explained by the developed explanation instead of plausible alternative explanations' (Beach and Pedersen, 2019, p. 20). In other words, this is an iterative process where the model is reconditioned until it establishes the 'best possible explanation' (Beach and Pedersen, 2019, p. 21; see Day and Kincaid, 1994).

Conclusions

New institutionalism represented a breakthrough from the old institutionalist approach which was deemed to be overly formal in its analysis of politics. The new discipline turned to institutional constraints in order to examine individual political behaviour. My conceptual framework combines the strengths of two of these new institutionalist approaches, namely historical and discursive institutionalisms. The former of these approaches examines how institutions are shaped by historically unique conditions that evolve over time according to a 'logic of path-dependence'. For the purposes of this thesis, I regard such a logic to be Scottish nationalism, which has had an enduring effect over the SNP's policies on Europe. The latter of these approaches, discursive institutionalism, holds the basic logic that ideas shape institutions through discursive practices, where ideas take a predominant position in its analysis.

These theoretical underpinnings will allow me to explain how and why the SNP's policies on Europe have changed over time. They account for a large range of multiple variables in the changing of discourses and attempt to surpass Europeanisation as the main explanation for changes in the party's discourses on Europe. Rather than viewing Europeanisation as a simple top-down process, my conceptual framework regards the concept to occur when the EU becomes the *référentiel* in domestic politics. I regard the SNP as an institution based on its composition as a group of individuals engaging in 'patterned interactions' with some stability over time. Furthermore, it is considered to be an institution due to its shared awareness of meaning, i.e., nationalism, and due to the fact that it constrains individual behaviour.

While historical institutionalism has been criticised for its struggle in explaining institutional change, coupling it with an ideational approach such as discursive institutionalism can fortify the prior's conceptualisation. If we regard historical institutionalism's critical junctures to arise from ideational change, we can hope to better understand the SNP's shift in its narratives on Europe. Yet, in order to retain the structuring role of institutions, ideas can only alter the SNP's discourses during particular moments and contexts. By situating variables, such as European integration, intra-party dynamics and British politics, in social, political and economic contexts, we

are able to better determine the meaning of an idea. According to both historical and discursive institutionalisms, ideas can also have framing effects upon which other ideas are formulated. It is my hope that using this mixed new institutionalist framework - alongside methods to operationalise the conceptual framework - will lead to novel observations and a strong contribution to both the literature on the SNP and on the Europeanisation of secessionist/fringe parties.

Chapter 3: Engaging with European Integration (1961-1975)

The sentiment in Scotland towards the issue of British membership of the EEC during the early 1960s was frankly one of 'elite disinterest, public indifference, and isolated pockets of support and advocacy' (Devenney, 2008, pp. 321-322). Most Scottish MPs took little interest in the matter and remained on the sidelines of the debate over British membership. This mirrored a hidebound point of view among many Scottish MPs that foreign policy matters were of little relevance to Scotland. Those who did engage in Commons' debates and matters on the EEC mainly argued from within the British national context (Devenney, 2008, pp. 322-323).

As far as the SNP was concerned, it carried little rhetoric on Europe and, as a party on the fringe of Scottish politics, it was preoccupied with strengthening its status and visibility. But with the introduction of new actors, new ideas are filtered into the institution to merge or replace pre-existing ones. Is it that the introduction of new members to the party in the early 1960s brought with it a change of the SNP's policies on Europe? Perhaps, but it is likely that there were a number of intervening factors which led to such a shift. As the SNP became stronger as a party so did its narratives on the EEC. Why was this the case? Is it that, as a more 'serious' party, the SNP began to adopt policies in line with those of major British political parties, matters usually reserved to Westminster 'foreign affairs'? Or is it that certain individuals in the party, when in significant positions, have mobilised various positions on Europe within the party? As well as individual actors, a number of structural factors were possibly also at play such as the economy, British-Scottish relations and the EEC's institutional activity.

This chapter will explore the contexts in which the party's position on Europe changed during the 1960s and early 1970s. First, it will consider how, during the early 1960s, the SNP was preoccupied with strengthening the party and how this would ultimately lead to the introduction of new policies on Europe. The chapter will then focus on how individual actors influenced the SNP's stance on the EEC and how events such as the Hamilton by-election of 1967 marked a turning point for the party's European

trajectory. Finally, this chapter will concentrate on how the SNP responded to Britain's accession to the EEC in 1973 before drawing conclusions about how and why the SNP's discourses changed in the way they did during the mid-20th century.

3.1 Early 1960s: making the SNP more visible and Britain's failed EEC membership application

The 1960s marked a decade of transformation of the SNP from 'a resilient little sect' (Harvie, 2004, p. 162) into an organised political party capable of contesting and winning elections. This was down to several internal and external factors. Following the death of Scottish Covenant Association leader, John MacCormick, in 1961, the nationalist movement fell into the hands of the SNP for the first time in twenty years (Devenney, 2008, p. 325). This resulted in many of its members joining the SNP with new resources and skills (Lynch, 2013, p. 100). Carrying the mantle for Scottish nationalism, the SNP would establish a strong base of support during the 1960s, which would consequently furnish it with a stable platform to advance its European policies.

While EEC policy did not comprise a significant part of the SNP's campaign rhetoric in the early 1960s, when the party did acknowledge it, it did not criticise the idea of Scottish EEC membership itself. Rather, it criticised Scotland's absence of direct representation in European negotiations. At the party's 1962 Annual Conference in Perth, the SNP passed a resolution that disparaged the UK Government's EEC policy, maintaining that it was not capable of taking Scotland into the EEC without appropriate Scottish representation (SNP, 1962). The resolution also demanded 'proper Scottish representation on all matters involving Scotland in the Common Market' (SNP, 1962). This sentiment can be seen in a party pamphlet published in 1963 that discussed the issue of fair trade for Scotland: 'Free Trade is a mirage but freer and fairer trade will be favoured. This is fully possible only between countries having comparable standards of living. The European Common Market is a most attractive example but it would be most unwise to go in without our own Government to negotiate terms of entry and protect our interests after entry' (SNP, 1963).

1960s Scotland was a period of transition. Scotland's traditional industries of shipbuilding, coal, steel, and heavy engineering underwent much turmoil in the decade, and had a profound impact on the Scottish economy. This resulted in declines in national earnings, productivity, wages and incomes, and GDP (Finlay, 2003, pp. 257-258). The economic boom that peaked in 1961 never hit Scotland, but it had to undergo the restrictions put in place in July 1961 when another balance of payments crisis struck Britain (Mitchell, 2017, p. 32). Both Tory and Labour governments consequently pushed new industrial development into Scotland, such as the British Motor Corporation's 1962 truck plant in Bathgate, West Lothian. While there was some subsequent evidence of improvement in living standards for many in Scotland, the opinion was that Scottish industry was under threat and unable to 'maintain its position in a world of increasing international competitiveness' (Finlay, 2003, p. 237). By 1962, Scotland's unemployment rate averaged twice that of Britain during the postwar period but Scotland's population growth had been slower. While the population of England and Wales grew by 5.3 per cent between 1951 and 1961, growth in Scotland was only 1.6 per cent regardless of higher Scottish birth rates. This was down to emigration with an estimated loss of 25,000 people per year (Mitchell, 2017, p. 32). Falling behind the overall British economy, Scots became increasingly disenchanted with the British political establishment and the idea of 'Britishness' (Devenney, 2010, pp. 105-106). As Mitchell has observed, 'it was not surprising that Scots began looking for an alternative' (1996, p. 94).

The SNP offered a nationalist alternative. In 1961, the party made a decision to contest Glasgow Bridgeton on 16th November, its first by-election in nine years. The candidate was Ian Macdonald, a young Ayrshire farmer, who finished third with 19 per cent of the vote. This result was a boost for the SNP and Macdonald gave up his farm to become a fully paid SNP official, becoming national organiser in June 1962 (*Scots Independent*, 11 June 1966). Macdonald saw great promise in the future of the party and believed that coordination would be key to its success. He hoped to see branches in every constituency, with the party capable of contesting every seat in Scotland in a general election. Macdonald believed that this could be achieved relatively quickly and that increased finance and membership drives were the two pillars of success (*Scots Independent*, 11 August 1962). As Cameron has observed, 'Macdonald seemed to sense

that a transition from fringe to mainstream was imminent and he would play a key part in it as national organiser' (2016, p. 225).

The following June 1962, William 'Billy' Wolfe ran for a by-election in West Lothian and finished in second place with 23 per cent of the vote. While Labour still held the safe majority, the SNP had replaced the Conservatives as Labour's main opponent. The by-election not only marked a success for the SNP but also revealed the party's newfound organisational improvement. Wolfe knew that the constitution of the SNP had no provision for constituency associations and that the only body of local organisation was the branch (Wolfe, 1973, p. 17). As such, he established a local structure that offered a forum for the synchronisation of a single campaign rather than several smaller nonadhesive campaigns (Cameron, 2016, p. 226). As Mitchell (2017, 48) has observed: 'The importance of Bridgeton and West Lothian was not only the evidence of an SNP support base but the lessons learned'. These by-elections offered ways into politics for Macdonald and Wolfe who brought with them verve, leadership and organisational skills that would ultimately be of great benefit to the SNP and its advancement of its European narratives.

The party's visibility also increased towards the end of 1962, when Arthur Donaldson, who was to become a key figure in the SNP, made his first appearance on television. In a BBC series entitled *Patterns for Prosperity*, Esmond Wright, later Conservative MP for Glasgow Pollok, interviewed key figures from all political parties, including the SNP. The interview touched upon a variety of topics including internationalism, bureaucracy, nationalisation, the economy and defence (*Scots Independent*, 16 & 23 February 1963). This was a marking point for the SNP to be taken as seriously as other parties and witnessed its engagement with international affairs. From being a tiny party on the fringe of Scottish politics, the SNP was now discussing larger issues of internationalism, usually reserved for 'high' British politics.

By the summer of 1963, Gordon Wilson was appointed assistant national secretary and was asked to do a review of the party's organisation. Part of the need for reorganisation was the unfortunate results of a by-election in Kinross and West Perthshire. Donaldson stood as candidate but finished in fourth place with only 7 per cent of the vote and a lost

deposit. Wilson submitted a report in early 1964, which proposed to refine the responsibilities and powers of different SNP party bodies and offices. He later noted that the new organisational structure lasted for forty years (Wilson, 2009, p. 12) and attributed much of this to advice he had been given by Donaldson. Wilson believed that Donaldson's advice came from years of working for Chrysler in the USA, where he had experience of an environment of executive vice-chairmen with particular responsibilities (Cameron, 2016, p. 227). This is an example of how SNP actors' background ideational abilities influence their foreground discursive abilities in the form of organisational skills. Wilson's major organisational reforms 'transformed [the SNP] into a modern efficient mass political party' (Webb, 1977, p. 103). In 1962, there were only 21 branches in the whole of Scotland; by the end of 1968 there were 472 (Mitchell, 2017, p. 49). Ian Macdonald, in particular, toured the country campaigning and setting up new branches. The speed at which the party mushroomed between 1962 and 1968 was, as one later study stated, 'almost legendary' (Webb, 1977, p. 100).

In 1964, the Conservatives lost the general election and sparked the decline of the Scottish Tories. While England returned more Conservative MPs than Labour, secure wins for Labour in Scotland and Wales capsized the tight Conservative victory in England. Meanwhile, the SNP's branch-building skills continued to strengthen and the party published a booklet on *How to Build up Your Constituency* (1964). The document outlined how to begin with no organisation to a constituency association fighting a general election in three years. In September 1965, the SNP gained its first ever party political broadcast with over a million viewers switching on to Wolfe. By consequence, there was a strong membership drive which brought the total to 20,000 members, the most the party had ever had (SNP, 1965; Cameron, 2016, p. 229).

Public interest in the EEC intensified as several British governments worked on EEC membership applications - first in 1961, then again in 1967 and 1970. The public began to question the fabric of the 'European project' and those against the EEC seemed to be so based on the effect that Europeanisation would have on British society and culture. Socioeconomic arguments were often behind elite anti-EEC views (e.g., Marxism), as were culturally nationalist perspectives, as well as a blend of the two. While there was increased public interest on the European question in the early 1960s, the EEC issue

was not of particular interest to most Scottish political elites (Devenney, 2010, p. 102). As far as they were concerned, the issue was a British foreign policy question that had little influence on the people of Scotland. Very few Scottish MPs took part in the debates in the House of Commons on European integration and those who did considered it to be a matter of high British politics. Scotland was rarely mentioned in the debates and this lacuna left the way open for the SNP to advance its European narratives.

That said, there was little SNP policy innovation between 1963 and 1965 and a resolution made during the 1965 annual conference simply reiterated that of 1962 in a more acerbic way (SNP, 1965). This lack of policy innovation, I argue, was partly due to the fact that the SNP was busy tending to its electoral success. Moreover, as Lynch has noted, Britain's first failed attempt to join the EEC in 1961 made those in the SNP and other political parties dubious of membership as they did not want to spend energy, time and money on a membership that had no fixed date (1996, p. 31).

The backdrop to early 1960s Scotland was one of economic disarray and uncertainty where the public began to lose its sense of 'Britishness'. The SNP offered a nationalist alternative whose position on the EEC was not loud, nor positive. Wolfe and Macdonald's background ideational abilities, i.e., human capacities, translated into electoral improvement for the SNP and put them in significant positions, able to influence the party. Macdonald worked tirelessly to spread party awareness and both party figures brought with him fresh organisational skills. Other significant actors who sought to build up support for the party were Wilson and Donaldson. The strengthening of the party was crucial to the advancement of the SNP's narratives on Europe. In order to be taken seriously as a party and to underscore Scottish sovereignty, the SNP had to be prepared to participate in 'higher' matters such as foreign affairs.

3.2 Opening up the conversation on 'Europe'

By 1966, the idea of Europe had become more pronounced within the SNP and other Scottish political parties. Political elites started to introduce Scottish issues including nationalism and sovereignty into the national EEC debate. This shift was particularly marked by SNP electoral success, 'chang[ing] politics in Scotland, and, more specifically,

the contours of the EEC debate' (Devenney, 2008, pp. 324-325). Visibility was particularly important for the SNP during this time as Harold Wilson announced in February 1966 that there would be a general election on 31st March. This was a significant moment for the SNP as it was the first time it was allowed to have a party political broadcast during an election campaign as it had met the condition of contesting a minimum of one-fifth of the seats in Scotland.

With 23 candidates on the line, the SNP launched its biggest campaign to date. The party's election manifesto was called *Putting Scotland First* (1966a). This was a major moment for the prominence of the SNP's European policy. The manifesto stated clearly that Scotland should not join the EEC while still part of the UK but might become a member following independence from the United Kingdom (Somerville, 2013, pp. 161-162; Cameron, 2016, p. 230). In the end, the party came away with 128,474 votes albeit with no seats. Regardless, it was the SNP's best performance yet. The Conservatives continued to decline in Scotland while Labour had been performing better and the SNP seriously threatened replacing the Liberals as the third Scottish party in terms of votes. The Liberals were more popular in the rural parts of Scotland but the SNP was ahead of the Liberals in the central belt. Finlay noted on the phenomenon, 'The fact that the party was in a position to organise and fund such an extensive campaign should have sent alarm bells ringing in the Scottish political establishment' (2009, p. 30).

Within weeks of the general election, the death of Labour MP, Megan Lloyd George, prompted a by-election in Carmarthen in Wales. Plaid Cymru president since 1945, Gwynfor Evans, stood as candidate and won the seat with 39 per cent of the vote to Labour's 33 per cent. This sent shockwaves through Scotland. The result in Wales and the increased popularity of the SNP gave the party some assurance that it could win a seat, no matter how safe it was (SNP, 1966b; Cameron, 2016, pp. 230-231). These results showed that Scotland was not alone in a strengthening in nationalism in the 1960s. In Quebec, too, a 'Quiet Revolution' was in the waters. Following the Carmarthen by-election, the Conservative Central Office became aware of the 'threat' of Welsh and Scottish nationalism (Mitchell, 2017, p. 44). A confidential paper, written by Chris Patten from the Conservative Research Department on 'Nationalism and regionalism' observed the 'recurrent fear of a rash of Celtic Orpingtons' (in Mitchell, 2017, p. 44).

Scottish and Welsh nationalism were a 'political expression of national grievance' (in Mitchell, 2017, p. 44).

Alongside this new nationalist current, the UK was experiencing economic disorder when, in July 1966, just over three months after winning a landslide majority, the Labour government began to enforce huge cuts in expenditure. The cuts were more severe than those that had undermined Attlee's Labour Government in 1949. The government enforced a wage freeze that lasted through to early 1967. There was a rising pressure to devalue the pound sterling and Cabinet debates 'spill[ed] over into the public, contributing to the sense that all was not well' (Mitchell, 2017, p. 29). The goal of the SNP's autumn campaign was to recruit more members and to build up the party organisation. Evans was invited to speak across Scotland and Donaldson also toured the country making speeches. In December 1966 Donaldson claimed that he had attended 23 branch meetings from September to December with around 100 people on average at each meeting. He observed the traction with which the SNP was gaining members and it was reported that membership had surpassed 40,000 (SNP, 1966c; Cameron, 2016, pp. 231-232).

The year of 1967 was a turning point for the SNP as it eventually gained some leverage in Scottish and British politics. The party was toughened by its reorganisation and this translated into electoral success. This progress was made in 'an advantageous political environment' (Devenney, 2008, p. 328) where the Labour Government's 'ineptitude and bad luck' resulted in a failure of its promise to revamp the economy by fusing technological progress to national planning in the 'white heat of the technological revolution' (Labour Party, 1963, pp. 139-140). In the Glasgow Pollok by-election of March 1967, the SNP polled 28 per cent, leaving the seat to Esmond Wright of the Conservatives. But the Conservative share of the vote in Pollok fell from 48 per cent to 37 per cent and Labour's fell from 52 per cent to 31 per cent. The SNP had achieved a 25 per cent swing from Labour, larger than Evans' in Carmarthen. It was in this by-election that the SNP first established its 'trademarks of SNP campaigning: car cavalcades, jazzy literature and fly posting' (Kellas, 1971, p. 450). In the *Scots Independent*, Donaldson wrote that 'A movement does not march from 2,000 members to 50,000 members in six years without having thrown up capable leadership' (18 March 1967). By the end of the

first quarter of 1967, the SNP had 254 branches and 27 constituency associations (SNP, 1967d). The party had grown so much that allegedly 19 of every 20 SNP members had not been a member four years earlier (*Scots Independent*, 18 March 1967; Cameron, 2016, p. 232).

With greater electoral success, the SNP took a firmer anti-EEC position bolstered by several 'hard-nosed and aggressive' campaigns (Devenney, 2010, p. 106). The most notable of these campaigns is that of the Hamilton by-election of November 1967. In the summer of 1966, it was rumoured that Tom Fraser, Labour MP for Hamilton, was to resign to become chair of the South of Scotland Electric board. The SNP took this seriously and selected the young and enigmatic solicitor, Winifred 'Winnie' Ewing, as a prospective candidate by the end of the summer. Fraser resigned a year later to take up a different chair on the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board and the by-election for Hamilton was called for early November 1967. The seat had been Labour since its foundation in 1918 and it was one of Labour's safest seats in the whole of Britain. Only the previous year Labour had won 71 per cent in a two-party contest with the Conservatives.

From the outset of her by-election campaign, Ewing opposed EEC membership on the basis of achieving Scottish independence (*The Scotsman*, 1967a). In a Wallace Day speech at the place of William Wallace's execution in London in 1305, Ewing articulated an explicit likeness of Wallace's fight for freedom and Scotland's contemporary struggle against being dragged into the EEC by Britain. The inference here was that Scotland would not join the EEC, even if given the choice (*The Scotsman,* 1967b). Mitchell has observed that while Labour was suffering in wage restraints, a sterling crisis leading to devaluation, and an unsuccessful application to join the EEC, Ewing remained 'bright and confident' in Hamilton (Mitchell, 1996b, p. 204). She claimed that 'no event in 20th century Scottish politics provoked more awareness of the Scottish dimension than this by-election' (Mitchell, 2009, pp. 31-32).

While Ewing is well known for her tenacious character, the success of her campaign was also driven by Hamilton constituency association organiser, John McAteer. Ten years later, Hugh MacDonald described McAteer as 'architect of the organisational and

political strategy that shattered the Labour establishment within its fortress of Hamilton. In terms of sheer professionalism, it was the finest piece of organisation and deployment of forces that the National Party has witnessed. He assembled a team of battle-proven activists with just the right injection of new blood to set the whole campaign going. With John McAteer as election agent and Winnie Ewing as candidate, the chemistry, or maybe it was the alchemy, was just right' (*Scots Independent,* 1977).

In the end, the SNP won the Hamilton election with a majority of 1,779 votes. The SNP's share of the vote rose from 0 to 46 per cent, while Labour's fell from 71 per cent to 42 per cent, and the Conservatives' from 29 per cent to 12 per cent. Ewing became the SNP's first MP since 1945 and the first to win against both Labour and the Conservatives on the ballot paper. As Devine has explained, 'the victory truly put the SNP on the British political map and attracted huge press and television interest. The success also sent shockwaves through the other political parties' (1999, p. 574). This success continued into 1968 when the party's local election vote reached thirty per cent (Harvie, 1998, p. 148).

Hamilton has become known as the most famous by-election in contemporary Scotland. Ewing had seized the long-time Labour seat of Hamilton for the SNP with 46 per cent of the total vote, the party's 'most spectacular success since the foundation of the SNP in the 1930s' (Devine, 2016, p. 125). With a complete media frenzy, Ewing instantly became a media personality and 'television cameras and photographers' lenses gobbled her up' (Harvie and Jones, 1999, p. 84). The new MP was offered a weekly column by both the *Daily Record* and the *Express*. Her journey to Westminster was in a Scottish-built scarlet Hillman Imp, accompanied by a pack of fervent SNP supporters (Devine, 1999, p. 574).

In the mid-1960s, the idea of Europe became popular amongst Scottish political parties, including the SNP. The party became more vocal on the matter and included the issue in its 1966 General Election manifesto. Certain figures were of notable influence in stabilising the party during this time. The success of Gwynfor Evans in Carmarthen bolstered the SNP's spirit of contesting and winning seats. Like the early 1960s, the middle of the decade experienced economic turmoil under the Labour government and

many people in Scotland were still looking for a political alternative. The Hamilton by-election campaign was a springboard for the SNP's shift to a stronger European discourse. Despite a fondness for the continent, Ewing included opposition to EEC membership as part of her by-election campaign. The SNP's frequency of discussion about European matters increased and the idea became more pronounced within the party's rhetoric.

3.3 Post-Hamilton and Ewing in Europe

After her Hamilton success, Ewing continued to push the SNP's anti-EEC views in Parliament. She recurrently questioned ministers, including the Prime Minister, about creating a white paper on the effects of EEC membership on Scotland. Met with interruptions and laughter, Ewing spoke of the EEC in 1970 Commons debate, and was called a 'Neanderthal woman' by Labour Foreign Secretary George Brown due to her wish for Scottish independence (Devenney, 2010, pp. 106-107). Nevertheless, the SNP's growing electoral success required the main British parties to acclimatise to a new political reality.

What seemed quite peculiar about Ewing's anti-EEC stance, however, was that she in fact repeatedly referred to herself as an 'internationalist' and had a notable fondness for the continent. As Mitchell has noted, her European experience in the 1950s 'imbued [her] with a keen sense of European politics and recent history' (2017, p. 72). In her autobiography, Ewing describes an evening in the 1950s, listening to Willy Brandt discussing the future of Europe (2004). She would later be known as 'Madame Ecosse' for her strong European political relations. In 1967 at an SNP public meeting in Quarter, a small ex-mining village, Ewing discussed Scotland joining the international community: 'At the UNO we'd sit between Saudi Arabia and Senegal. I want to be an internationalist, I want us to be at all those tables: we have a lot to offer' (The *Observer* 1967, 29 October).

The year 1967 also witnessed a shift in the SNP's attitudes and policy positions towards Europe. The SNP's growing engagement with the issue was partly due to the Labour Government's U-turn on support for British EEC membership. In early 1967, the

Economics and Information sub-committee of the National Executive Committee (NEC) looked at the SNP's attitude towards Europe and the best way to inform party members on the issue (SNP, 1967a). The committee contemplated drafting a memorandum on 'Scotland's case in relation to the EEC' (SNP, 1967b), designed to argue that an independent Scotland was on the horizon. It maintained that an independent Scotland should have warm but 'non-committal relations' with several European organisations, such as the EEC, the Council of Europe and EFTA (SNP, 1967c).

The memo also stated that an independent Scotland would not duly honour treaty settlements made by the British Government. It was not simply intended to inform Scotland or the British Government but also, as Wolfe later argued, to show the leaders of almost twenty-seven European states the intensity of Scottish nationalism (Wolfe, 1973, p. 98). The memo also served as an opportunity to demonstrate Scotland's opposition to being 'dragged' into Europe against its will. The memo was released in June 1967 yet with little significance. In his autobiographical account of the rise of the SNP, Wolfe wrote, 'we are not likely to know the effect of that Memorandum until there are Scottish Embassies in Europe, but I believe that our action…at least let the English Government know, from unexpected quarters, that the Scottish National Party existed and was active' (1973, p. 98).

Another shift in the SNP's discourses on Europe occurred following Harold Wilson's statement in May 1967 concerning a revived application for EEC membership. In a memo to the NEC entitled 'Foreign Affairs: EEC', National Secretary Gordon Wilson outlined his analyses of the party's views on Europe (SNP, 1967d). The SNP's European policy was always linked to the notion of sovereignty, particularly the necessity for an independent Scottish Government. Wilson's memo reinforced this objective by linking Scottish independence to an anti-EEC sentiment. He noted in the memo the 'limited tenor and mild character' of the SNP's earlier policy, claiming that 'In the recent past the [SNP] has not expressed any strong views on whether it would be advisable for Scotland to enter the Common Market as an independent state' (SNP, 1967d).

Wilson contended that the SNP should oppose the EEC itself and not just the accession process. He discussed the economic effects of EEC membership on the Scottish

economy, especially the light and heavy engineering sectors, and how this had contributed to the formation of this new anti-EEC view. Moreover, Wilson emphasised that his main worry was that the EEC was a danger to Scottish national identity: 'I am convinced that if Scotland does go into the EEC on UK terms it will spell the beginning of the destruction of our national identity' (SNP, 1967d). He subsequently argued for an uncompromising and forceful campaign against the EEC that stressed the Community's effect on Scottish independence. The 'cardinal points' as Wilson called them included arguments that entry was illegal under the terms of the 1707 Act of Union; that entry would extinguish Scotland's national identity; that entry would result in higher food prices, further loss of Scottish control to Brussels and London, and an influx of cheap immigrant labour (Devenney, 2008, p. 330).

Devenney (2008, p. 330) has noted that, interestingly, Wilson's cardinal points did not mention any type of cultural nationalist goal, such as the restoration of Scottish Gaelic. As such, 'this reflected the economic nationalism that underpinned the SNP's rise' (Devenney, 2008, p. 330). Wilson considered the campaign to be 'reasonably attractive in Scotland and practicable in European terms' but that the SNP had to do it with a 'hard intransigent' attitude (SNP, 1967d). He maintained that 'what we say and do is being studied and analysed, particularly after recent favourable election results. Any sign of weakness or hesitation will be noted. Our vigour and our intransigence will be embarrassing to the UK Government and will strengthen Scotland's position' (SNP, 1967d). Wilson's campaign suggestions laid out a variety of propaganda initiatives throughout the summer and autumn of 1967, including leaflet distribution, branch resolutions, press releases, delegations to different European capitals and a television broadcast showing the impact of the EEC on Scotland (Devenney, 2008, pp. 330-331).

Despite Wilson's efforts, the NEC decided to adopt a more palatable campaign. Wilson had suggested a resolution during the annual conference in June to highlight his recommendation to shift the party's position towards the EEC. The NEC's submission of the resolution was accepted by the conference as party policy. The resolution echoed the SNP's insistence that Scotland should have an independent government in order to protect Scottish concerns in the EEC negotiation process. It referred to the 1707 Act of Union, maintaining that the UK could make 'no material change' to the terms without

Scotland's permission and threatened once more to 'repudiate any [international] Agreement under which Scotland has no separate national representation' (SNP, 1967e). Yet, the resolution differed very much to the one that Wilson had proposed. Wilson's version was more vigorous, stating that '[this conference] declares further that entry into the European Economic Community at the present time may prove disastrous to our heavy and light engineering industries, to our agricultural industry and to our successful exporting pattern' (SNP, 1967f). The NEC removed this statement, indicating that there was still reluctance within the party to adopt a direct anti-EEC party line (Devenney, 2008, p. 331).

This resistance was partly down to a lack of information. While party funds during the 1960s were stabilised by branch subscriptions and football pool, Alba Pools, they were not sufficient and it was not until August 1968 that the SNP employed a full-time Research Officer (Wolfe, 1973, pp. 109-110). It was the NEC and party volunteers who had previously occupied this role and were often found without adequate resources. Following the party's success in 1967 and its increased prominence in Scottish politics, the SNP required a more thorough examination of party policy. This requirement was particularly crucial following the publication of a Scottish opinion survey commissioned by the party which revealed that many Scots held negative views about the SNP leadership, considering them to be 'unbalanced types' who were elusive on policy matters (SNP, 1967g). Consequently, in consideration of Wilson's memo, the NEC stated that it required further information before a campaign could commence and invited the executive vice-chairmen, under the direction of Wolfe, to meet and discuss Wilson's proposals (SNP, 1967h). In August, Wolfe's sub-committee submitted a report to the NEC about the anti-EEC campaign proposed to happen in the autumn of 1967. The NEC accepted the report, which described a campaign in which 'the constitutional position of Scotland would be kept in view', and 'would be positive and not negative' (SNP, 1967i).

Wilson's anti-EEC stance was finally adopted by the party between 1968 and 1970. Contrary to the NEC's desire, Wolfe's campaign in the autumn of 1967 was heavy in anti-EEC rhetoric. The SNP's emergency conference in June spoke negatively of EEC membership and some critics believed that 'by spending so much time erecting barriers and declaring warnings about Scotland's international relations, the SNP was merely

covering up a greater philosophical hostility to the European project in general' (Devenney, 2008, p. 332). This view was also bolstered by the Hamilton by-election campaign, which recurrently stressed the EEC issue and the matter of keeping Scotland out without consultation (*The Scotsman,* 1967a). Wolfe has stated that the SNP received more analysis and press coverage than ever before after the Hamilton by-election (1973, p. 108), and the EEC was also subject to this stronger interest. An example of this is from regional newspaper, the *Falkirk Herald*, in December 1967 where an anti-SNP editorial disparaged the party's line in rather 'rich and excited language' (Devenney, 2008, p. 333). The writer claimed that the SNP's anti-EEC stance would involve 'customs barriers at Gretna and Berwick. Would the next step be compulsory Gaelic in Scottish schools?' (*Falkirk Herald*, 1967).

In May 1967, under Prime Minister Harold Wilson, the Labour government began its application to membership in the EEC (Lewandowski 1990: 30-31). This had an effect on the SNP in that the party began to more frequently argue against being 'dragged' into the EEC. Though not accepted by the NEC initially, Wilson's ideas were finally adopted by the SNP during the late 1960s. This would pave the way for a more refined view on Europe and how EEC membership would affect Scotland.

3.4 Britain's accession to the EEC

Following Heath's unexpected success in the 1970 General Election, the new Conservative Government bound itself to strongly advocating British membership in the EEC. French President Charles de Gaulle was no longer in power and had previously blocked the UK's two attempts to join in 1961-63 and 1967. Now that de Gaulle was gone, the EEC states had warmed to the idea of British membership. The two years after Heath's victory involved a long and prickly debate that exposed cleavages within all the major parties on the issue of EEC membership. The public was also becoming more anxious about the matter. In response, the Heath Government tried to calm parliamentary and public opposition and found support in the British industry, pro-European party committees such as the Conservative Group for Europe, pro-European pressure groups like the European Movement and most of the British media.

Scottish parties were divided on the EEC issue but it was the SNP that campaigned the most dynamically and regularly under the Heath Government. The SNP was the only party to include EEC membership as a significant issue in its 1970 election campaign and this continued into the rest of the decade. The party actively campaigned against EEC membership, taking the matter to the House of Commons, holding petitions and local constituency referendums, distributing leaflets, and including it as part of its 1971 by-election campaign in the Stirling and Falkirk constituency. In February 1970, the Labour Government had produced another White Paper on the UK's membership in the EEC (Devenney, 2008, p. 334; Labour Party, 1970). In the succeeding parliamentary debate, Ewing was full of energy and interjected speakers to make points on Scotland and the EEC. She even gave a speech on the first day in which she described the SNP's stance on membership. This was often met with interruptions, laughter and unruly behaviour. The speech was anti-EEC, coining the EEC an 'undemocratic community…controlled by bureaucrats' (in Devenney, 2008, p. 334).

The most significant part of her speech to this research is that she began to frame Scotland as 'international'. She stated: 'Our going into the Community will be divisive…I am an internationalist, which means that I believe in a relationship between nations. I speak for one nation, and I do not find it amusing that I am the only one in this House to do so' (in Devenney, 2008, p. 334). She then further questioned the economic upsides for Scotland and stressed that the alleged English benefits stood contrary to Scottish interests. She concluded her speech by claiming: 'The world recognises that the Scots are very good internationalists. We do not think that entry to the Common market by the United Kingdom will advance that cause in any respect whatsoever' (in Devenney, 2008, p. 334).

In addition to its activities in the Commons, the SNP sent some of its officials to Brussels, Paris and Norway several times between 1970 and 1972 to vocalise the party's stance and to meet with other anti-EEC activists in Europe (SNP, 1971). Donald Stewart, the SNP's only MP – since Ewing lost her seat in the 1970 UK general election - also coordinated with UK-wide anti-EEC campaigns. Stewart was an important member of the former Liberal and free trader Christopher Frere-Smith's Keep Britain Out (KBO) organisation (Kitzinger, 1973, p. 245). In an analysis report for the NEC, Wolfe wrote

that the SNP had taken 'a very important step' in advancing its presence, qualities and objectives in the EEC (in Devenney, 2008, p. 335). The party's Vice-Chair for Publicity, Michael Grieve also stressed that the trip to Brussels, 'apart from making an impact on EEC officials largely unaware of Scotland and the SNP, also achieved useful publicity in Britain' (SNP, 1970b). Devenney has suggested that it might be these contacts at the European level that shifted the party's mentality, 'as for good or for ill they witnessed up close various EEC officials' levels of interest in national issues' (2008, p. 335).

The delegation, however, did not reflect well upon the trip and criticised EEC representatives for 'show[ing] an almost religious determination to end national awareness' and for being 'rather vague regarding the freedom of member countries to make their own financial and industrial policies' (SNP, 1970a). This influenced the party in taking a harsher approach and, according to Wolfe, 'the discussions with the Scottish National Party following the return of our delegation to Brussels clarified our view of the Common Market and consequently hardened our opposition to it. Ours was essentially a political view' (1973, p. 138). Ultimately, the SNP's campaigning efforts were not a success. By adopting such an unmovable position on the EEC, the party found difficulty in acclimatising to a changing political environment. The party leadership soon came to realise this and made efforts to reconstruct its position on the EEC. In November 1970, Malcolm Slesser, a member of the SNP's NEC, wrote a report analysing the party's strategy towards the EEC. The report claimed that the SNP's present position was problematic and would 'fail to impress, except by its consistent obstructionism' if the UK did not join the EEC (SNP, 1970c). Consequently, Slesser proposed a number of strategic changes.

First was to compare England's and Scotland's respective economic strengths, where the former was deemed to be weaker and must accede to the EEC to prosper economically. Second, to acknowledge that British parties understood this and were masking it with 'aggressive British nationalism' (SNP, 1970c). Third, to argue that the EEC was not a viable internationalist organisation, and fourth, to 'stop opposing the EEC on principle and show that Scotland has more options to stay in or out if independent' (SNP, 1970c). This approach, Slesser argued, would make the party appear 'to be the reasonable, the international, the balanced party' while also showing that other British

parties were 'simply out to save England, even at the expense of the dignity of the English people and economic survival of Scotland' (SNP, 1970c). The NEC debated the report and came to accept its conclusions, handing the task of implementation to Wolfe (SNP 1970d). This new stance posed problems, however, as it made the SNP's message vaguer. While it may have served to ease conflict between pro- and anti-EEC factions within the party, it ultimately made the party position more convoluted. As Devenney describes, 'This ambiguity would later cause the party more difficulty as the seemingly settled debate over British membership continued' (2008, p. 341).

Both Ewing's Commons speech in February 1970 and the SNP's presentation to the EEC Commission in March reflected the party's hardened position on EEC membership. Internal party discussions and public statements made in 1969-1970 also reveal this phenomenon. In early 1969, for example, the NEC External Affairs Committee, under the direction of James Halliday, established a foreign affairs policy review accepted by the NEC in late March. The review outlined the policy positions of a 'free' Scotland and suggested obtaining membership in the United Nations, the Nordic Council and the Council of Europe; remaining in the British Commonwealth, and assuming the requirements of NATO membership while retaining the right to liaise with the UK and United States on foreign bases in Scotland (SNP, 1969). The document also emphasised that Scotland would continue its membership of the EFTA rather than the EEC and maintained that 'future trading developments in Europe will be kept under constant review, and Scotland's attitude to the European Economic Community will be assessed in the light of circumstances prevailing upon the attainment of independence' (SNP, 1969). An undated party electoral handbill, most likely from mid-1970, also reflected this movement by using somewhat strong political rhetoric. It read: 'These men (and their parties) are DANGEROUS! Heath, Wilson, Grimond. Heath and Wilson (and Grimond too) are hell bent on dragging us into the Common Market with neither choice nor voice… We would have NO VOICE at Brussels. THE COMMON MARKET IS NOT AN ELECTION ISSUE FOR THEM, BUT IT IS FOR YOU' (SNP, 1970c).

The move in party policy was also reinforced by hot-headed statements from party leaders. During a speech in Paisley on 31st March 1970, Wolfe described the EEC and its political centralism as a type of 'conglomerate fascism' that would turn Scotland into a

dystopia like that of George Orwell's *1984* (*Scots Independent,* 1970). He argued that the EEC was more than a trading bloc and was, in fact, a significant threat to Scottish national identity. He stated:

'The distinct shape of the political centralism which is now clearly over the horizon is an ice-berg, and we have seen only the tip of its dangerous and destructive might. It threatens to crash into Western Europe and destroy all the ideals of national freedom and national identity which Western Europe has developed, often painfully, over the last 700 years. The ideals, the principles of participating democracy and modern nationhood, were born in Scotland. We must defend them' (*Scots Independent,* 1970).

He continued to characterise pro-EEC supporters as apparatchiks who were 'as doctrinaire centralist as their opposite numbers in the Kremlin in Moscow'. He claimed that they had turned 'the noble vision of the founding fathers of the Common Market…into a most frightening nightmare…' (*Scots Independent,* 1970). Wolfe believed that this nightmare had been 'desperately damaging to Scotland's people and to her economy. The centralism of the Common Market would be a cancer which would eat the very heart out of Scotland with no hope or cure' (*Scots Independent,* 1970). As Devenney (2008, p. 337) has noted, 'vitriolic rhetoric and dire warnings of disaster had replaced the more cautious and tempered positions of the mid-1960s'. As its membership status remained in limbo, the issue of the EEC became more salient all over Britain. A heightened public awareness allowed external anti-EEC voices to penetrate the debate. These various coalitions tried to garner a nationalist and populist rhetoric in opposition to EEC membership. This budding anti-EEC stance stood against the old national paradigm and suggested a redefinition of British identity in the 'postwar world' and what Scotland's relationship to the 'new' Europe should be (Devenney, 2010, p. 99).

By 1971, a distinct majority of the Scottish population remained against EEC membership (Devenney, 2010, p. 102). This was down to a number of factors, including the influence of the SNP, the nationalist campaign on North Sea oil, the activities of Scottish branches of the British anti-EEC pressure groups, and a gradually deteriorating industrial economy. The EEC debate as a whole concerned regional issues, such as

during the October 1971 Commons debate, where the Government dedicated one day of the six day debate to focus on Scottish and Welsh anxieties about the EEC. This had never happened in any previous EEC Commons debate. Ultimately, Heath managed to ease public hostility and won parliamentary support for membership. On 28th October 1971, a vote was cast to approve the notion of membership, with the Government receiving a majority of 112 with the support of 69 dissident Labour MPs. On 22nd January 1972, the UK signed the Treaty of Accession with the EEC and following an intense parliamentary fracas over the particular clauses of the European Communities Bill, the UK officially joined the EEC on 1st January 1973 alongside Ireland and Denmark. In the process, the UK left EFTA.

Support for EEC membership was mainly found in the Labour and Conservative Parties. Political unionism was falling out of favour as an ideology of Scottish politics and political nationalism began to take its place. As Devenney explains 'Since unionism was what political nationalism was supplanting, it was sensible to adopt the opposite position on the EEC' (2008, p. 337). Being an 'upstart populist political movement' defending Scottish interests against an 'out-of-touch' political establishment evidently benefited the SNP (Devenney, 2008, p. 337). The uprising of Scottish nationalism pushed the main British political parties to navigate a new political reality, one that stressed the issues of nationalism, identity, and sovereignty.

3.5 The UK's 1975 EEC membership referendum

While the UK gained EEC membership in 1973, the next two years were dominated by debates regarding British membership. The Labour Party had previously pressed for a renegotiation of the conditions of membership as well as a public referendum on the matter. When it returned to power in 1974, the party was keen to meet this manifesto promise and a referendum date was set for June 1975. Scottish opposition to the EEC remained strong throughout 1973 to 1975 and the SNP attempted to 'galvanize a coordinated campaign' to have Scotland vote against EEC membership as a springboard for realising Scottish independence. The party's campaign, however, was a 'muddled, ambiguous affair' with many intra-party tensions (Devenney, 2008, p. 341).

That said, the SNP's 1975 referendum campaign, *Get Scotland Out*, presented the party with a prime opportunity. With the Labour Party split on the subject of EEC membership, the SNP was able to capture the leadership of the Scottish No campaign, targeting traditional Labour voters across the country. On an intellectual level, the SNP was well versed in fighting issues of sovereignty, self-government and national identity. The European debate offered the party a chance to mobilise these ideas (Saunders, 2018, pp. 346-347). However, the campaign also revealed splits within the party. While the SNP's official position was to reject membership 'on London's terms', the party still showed opposition to membership on principle. This was a sore point for many MPs. Losing the referendum would put the party back in its electoral success over the preceding years (Saunders, 2018, p. 347).

The background for the 1975 referendum was one of rapid industrial decline and uprising nationalist politics. Prior to 1970, the SNP had never won a seat in a general election. By October 1974 it was the 'rising force' in Scottish politics, winning eleven seats and a third of the vote (Saunders, 2018, p. 348). The SNP had pushed the Scottish Conservatives into third place on votes cast, building a stronghold in their former rural heartlands and had come second in 35 of the 41 Labour seats. With both Labour and Conservatives suggesting some form of devolution and the British state supposedly stuck in a crisis of governability, the 'political and intellectual tides seemed both to be flowing in favour of Scottish nationalism' (Saunders, 2018, p. 348). From this view, Scotland appeared to be fertile ground for the No campaign. Scotland's economy was more reliant than that of England on declining heavy industries, which tended to be more opposed to European integration. The decline of the Scottish industry had undermined the status of the 'London Establishment' while the imminent oil boom allowed people to imagine a prosperous future outside the EEC (Saunders, 2018, p. 348).

The challenge was to assemble the various fragments of a Scottish 'No' campaign into a single, unified movement. The SNP and Labour were in fierce competition with one another and there was little view for collaboration when the SNP was including membership forms with its campaign literature. Moreover, the Scottish TUC, under the leadership of 'genial Communist', Jimmy Milne, considered the nationalists as 'bastards'

and avoided any collaboration with them. The anti-EEC Conservatives tended to be both aggressively anti-Socialist and Unionist while Labour Antis experienced factional conflicts (Saunders, 2018, pp. 348-349). This left the SNP as the principal carrier of the anti-EEC campaign. A report for 'Britain in Europe' settled that the SNP were 'the only anti-Marketeers of consequence' in Scotland, a view that the party was enthusiastic to push (Saunders, 2018, p. 351).

Yet the SNP did not want to come across as isolationist. The party's leaders had always situated Scotland within a wider international framework, from a 'Dominion' within the British Empire to a participant in the UN. At the start of the anti-EEC referendum campaign, Wolfe set out on a 25-day tour of North America, planned to advertise the party's campaign theme of 'Scotland International' (*Scots Independent,* 1975). Throughout the campaign, the SNP argued that Scotland should participate fully in the international order, through bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Labour Organization (SNP, 1975). Its anti-EEC stance, the SNP insisted, remained compatible with the party's commitment to an 'outward-looking, internationalist' Scotland (Saunders, 2018, pp. 355-356). Ewing lampooned pro-Marketeers as 'political flat-earthers…so obsessed with a narrow European "regionalism" that the rest of the world does not exist for them' (SNP, 1975b). The SNP stressed Scotland's internationalist character, founded on a long history of migration and trade (Saunders, 2018, pp. 355-356).

As UK governments became more interested in the issue of Europe, the SNP strengthened its anti-EEC stance. As Saunders (2018, pp. 351-352) suggests, 'This owed something to the classic 'mirroring' of insurgent parties, taking positions at odds with Westminster; but there were also political and intellectual forces behind the party's changing attitude'. The SNP's electoral success in 1974 was found mainly in fishing and farming constituencies, which were very cautious of common agricultural and fisheries polities. The rhetoric of supranationalism posed a challenge to a party devoted to Scottish nationhood. In 1975, Wolfe compared the EEC to the rise of Bismarck's Germany and the development of a fully-fledged customs union appeared to mirror that of the United Kingdom on a continental scale (Harvie, 2016, p. 258).

Intra-party divisions also affected the SNP's discourses on Europe during this time. There were party members who were keen for Britain to remain in the EEC. Deputy leader, Gordon Wilson, later recalled that 'a significant portion of the party was pro-European' and it was generally assumed that an SNP government would fight for EEC membership once Scottish independence had been achieved (in Saunders, 2018, p. 352). However, prominent SNP figures such as vice-chair, Isobel Lindsay, press officer, Stephen Maxwell, and parliamentary leader, Donald Stewart, advanced a tougher stance which rejected membership on principle (Wilson, 2009, p. 101). Wilson recalled that the SNP's stance on Europe was a 'flimsily clad' compromise that refuted entry to the EEC 'on anyone else's terms' (Wilson, 2009, p. 101). The party believed that Scotland should have representation at all levels of European government and until that happened, the party's policy would be 'No Voice, No Entry'. As former MEP Alyn Smith (2021) explained, 'if we were going to be representing ourselves as Scotland, we didn't want to be represented in it by the UK'. This policy was designed to transfer attention from the EEC to Scotland's right to make its own decisions (Saunders, 2018, p. 352). That said, the policy was deemed to be 'far too self-referential rather than [considering] the actual reality of the wider world' (Smith, 2021).

While the SNP was officially in opposition to the EEC, policy documents required a 'tortuous balancing act', aiming to appeal to both sides of the debate (Saunders, 2018, p. 352). Ewing assured voters that it was 'not out of sympathy with the ideals behind the EEC', but that Europe had 'strayed from those ideals', establishing 'a cumbersome and centralised bureaucracy which is the antithesis of what Scotland looks for from a truly democratic and responsive Government' (quoted in *Scottish Daily News*, 9 May 1975). If Scotland did achieve full statehood then the SNP would be interested in becoming a full and equal member of the EEC, but until then it would refuse membership 'on London's terms' (*Scottish Daily News*, 9 May 1975).

SNP activist, Stephen Maxwell hoped that the SNP's 'tactical No' would appease both 'the gut anti-EEC vote in Scotland' and those who were 'sensitive to Scotland's lack of political status in European affairs' (quoted in Wilson, 2009, p. 101). Indeed, in an interview with Professor Drew Scott, Stephen Maxwell came up as a particularly

important figure who had an impact on the SNP's trajectory in Europe. Scott (2022) explained that while Maxwell was against European integration, he remained pro-European. His hostility towards the EEC was based on it being an 'exclusive club'. As Scott (2022) explained, 'Europe, for Stephen, wasn't the EU; Europe was Europe'. Maxwell's tactical voting strategy was not amongst the SNP's general consensus. As Saunders has written, 'Right from the start… there was pressure to rule out membership on principle' (2018, pp. 353-354). SNP leader at Westminster, Donald Stewart, argued that the EEC 'represented everything the party was fighting against – centralisation, undemocratic procedures, power politics and the fetish to abolish all the cultural differences that gave life and variety to nations' (*Glasgow Herald* 1975, 2 June). Since the 1960s, Stewart had been active in 'Get Britain Out', working with individuals such as Christopher Frere-Smith and the Conservative Richard Body.

The 'tactical No' advanced by Maxwell was essentially ignored by the SNP's monthly newspaper, the *Scots Independent*, and rather the paper argued against the very existence of the EEC. It declared that Scots 'should have no part in the homogenising…of man's work and spirit; which is the EEC's purpose' (*Scots Independent*, June 1975). It then claimed that Scots 'should have no part in super-power political and military pretension; which is the EEC's purpose'. That Scots 'of all people', should 'abhor the idea of empire; which is at the heart of the EEC'. And finally, that Scots should 'ignore the views of political strategists and economic tacticians and return an unambiguous 'No'' (*Scots Independent*, June 1975). These openly hostile views were also expressed by prominent figures in the party. Ewing described the vote for membership as 'a death warrant' for Scotland', claiming that 'the EEC was one of the most undemocratic bodies in the world. It was a political superpower and was unacceptable to the SNP' (SNP, 1975c; *The Scotsman,* 9 May 1975). Stewart cautioned that EEC membership would take Scotland back into 'a 'dark age' of bureaucracy and remote control', threatening the very existence of Scottish democracy (SNP, 1975d). The party continued to describe the EEC as an imperial entity built on 'absurd dreams of renewed English imperial greatness' (SNP, c1971).

At points, the SNP would adopt anti-English rhetoric to augment its views on Europe. Ewing claimed that Scottish Antis had 'proved their loyalty and commitment to Scotland

over years', while 'Yes' campaigners were products of 'the London Establishment and multi-national companies who have exploited Scotland for decades' (SNP, 1975e). SNP rhetoric was interspersed with references to 'the discredited London establishment' and 'the British propaganda machine', which had been forced into the EEC as a 'province of the United Kingdom' (quoted in Saunders, 2018, p. 354). As Wolfe observed, a majority of Scottish MPs had voted against the European Communities Act in 1972 but had been outweighed by English votes (SNP, 1975f). The idea that only assistance from the EEC could provide national success was scorned as 'an English argument, which has no place in the Scottish debate' (SNP, 1975g). Indeed, comparisons were often made between the United Kingdom and the EEC. Addressing a rally in Banchory, Iain Murray stated that Scotland joined a Common Market in 1707 and 'has been bled white by the effects' (quoted in Saunders, 2018, p. 355). David Rollo, a vice-chairman of the SNP who had launched 'Radio Free Scotland' in 1956 maintained that 'the common market of Britain' had transformed Scotland into 'the industrial slum of Europe' (SNP, 1975j). The question was why should Scotland expect a better deal from an even more remote common market? (SNP, 1975j).

While vehemently against the EEC in its campaign, the SNP's main aim was not principally to win the referendum. Making up less than 10 per cent of the UK electorate, Scotland would have little influence on the result. The true significance of the vote for the SNP was the chance to establish support in traditionally dominated Labour industrial heartlands. A report on 'Enemy Action' by Britain in Europe (BIE) claimed that the SNP was 'treating the Referendum as an election issue to strengthen their case' (1975). The party had its logo printed on referendum campaign material and handed them out along with membership forms and information about SNP events (Saunders, 2018, p. 356). For some time, Margo MacDonald, former MP for Glasgow Govan and SNP deputy leader, had been arguing for a 'southern strategy' to focus on Labour's industrial heartlands in major cities. By dislodging Labour as the main vehicle of the No campaign, MacDonald sought to muster industrial workers who felt the threat to their jobs under the Common Market. The party's referendum activity was merged with the existing 'Save Scottish Steel' campaign which cautioned the danger to heavy industry from European centralisation (Britain In Europe, 1975). The SNP targeted Strathclyde in particular, the largest of Scotland's voting regions and home to many of Labour's

strongholds. The party claimed to have delivered at least 800,000 leaflets during the campaign and it was called the SNP's 'biggest campaign on any one issue' (*The Scotsman,* 1975b).

The SNP's slogan of 'It's Scotland's oil' had seen some success at Westminster and the party hoped that it would prove to be just as strong against the Common Market. Regardless of the avowal from the UK government, the Commission and the oil industry itself that the Community had no more intentions for North Sea Oil as it did for French vineyards or German coal, the SNP continuously claimed that a Common Energy Policy would exploit Scottish oil for the continental, and not Scottish, consumers. Those from the anti-EEC camp argued that Scotland should follow in Norway's footsteps, which had prospered from oil revenues while keeping its independence. References to the Norwegian model - a type of non-EU Europeanisation - became an essential line in SNP rhetoric and the party even invited Bjørn Unneberg, who had a significant role in the Norwegian 'No' campaign in 1972, to speak at SNP rallies in Scotland (SNP, 1975k). As the *Scotsman* dourly observed, the SNP 'mounted this steed at the outset, saddled it with oil predictions and Norwegian comparisons, and rode it grimly all the way through' the campaign (1975c, 5 June).

The SNP also feared for Scotland's fisheries as, with some of the EEC's most extensive coastline, increased competition from European fleets could jeopardise the industry. The party presented petitions at Westminster from Shetland fishermen, where the matter helped to secure one of only two No votes in the UK. Douglas Henderson, whose East Aberdeenshire constituency comprised key fishing ports such as Peterhead and Fraserburgh, cautioned that a Yes vote would be 'one of the last nails in the coffin which the London Government has been building for Scotland's fishing industry' (quoted in *The Economist,* 5 April 1975, p. 72).

Despite the SNP's faith in its campaign, the anti-Marketeers fought a 'chaotic and ill-conceived' campaign that failed to resonate with the public (Saunders, 2018, p. 358). With minimal funds and a muddled strategy, the Scottish 'No' campaign was divided both along and between party lines. The SNP's strongholds were mainly rural areas yet the party's campaign concentrated principally on industrial Scotland, where Labour was

popular. The SNP's campaigning was as much against Labour as it was against the EEC and Labour Antis remained split over the issues of devolution and the future of the left (Saunders, 2018, p. 358). The referendum result both in Scotland and in the rest of the UK (rUK) of 5th June 1975 was a huge disappointment to anti-Marketeers across the political spectrum. The decision to continue EEC membership won by a majority of 67.2 per cent over those who had voted against. While a smaller majority in Scotland, the electorate still voted to remain in the EEC by 59 per cent to 41 per cent. Gordon Wilson compared it to 'blitzkrieg' and claimed that the No campaign 'was bulldozed out of the way by weight of numbers, money and…resources' (quoted in Saunders, 2018, p. 358).

In the end, following a heavily financed pro-European referendum campaign – which Ewing described as buying 'Scottish votes with English gold' – the UK voted to remain in the EEC by 67 to 32 per cent (*Glasgow Herald*, 26 May 1975). Scotland voted by 58.4 per cent to 41.6 per cent to remain in the EEC. The result was celebrated both by pro-Marketeers and by Unionists, who had worried that a Scottish 'No' might dissolve the United Kingdom.

Despite the disappointing result, the SNP vowed that its campaign had been a success (SNP, 1975h). In a conversation with the press a few days after the referendum, Donald Stewart maintained that the SNP had never expected to win the vote. Rather, the party had two aims: one, 'to demonstrate the divergence between Scottish and English opinion' and, two, to secure 'wide-ranging guarantees of Scottish interests' within the EEC (SNP, 1975i). Stewart claimed that both of these aims had been met. He also announced that Scotland's Yes vote had been given 'reluctantly' and on six particular conditions:

1. Separate Scottish membership of the EEC, with Scotland represented on community institutions as a separate nation;
2. Total non-interference with Scottish ownership of Scottish oil;
3. No restrictions on the Scottish Development Agency;
4. The right for 'Scottish housewives' to buy food as cheaply inside the Community as out;

5. No interference with the Scottish steel industry;
6. Renegotiation of the Common Fisheries Policy.

The SNP claimed that the result was only binding if those six conditions were met. If they were not – especially if Scotland was denied equal representation with countries such as Ireland and Denmark – 'then the whole question of Scottish membership will be revived' (SNP, 1975i).

Other voices within the party, however, were not so optimistic. Wilson described the campaign as 'a shambles' with the SNP's 'intellectual confusion' on the issue resulting in 'a failure to have any line for or against the Common Market other than "No Voice, No Entry" (quoted in Saunders, 2018, p. 363). The referendum result was a 'great shock' to the party and marked a shift in the SNP's performance, which had until then been continuously strong. In 'a campaign that was run from London', it seemed that 'Scots were quite prepared to be steered to vote on a British basis' (Gordon Wilson quoted in Saunders, 2018, p. 363). This would prompt a change in direction on the SNP's strategy on Europe. Pro-Marketeers in the SNP were vitalised and SNP MP, George Reid, reported to journalists that 'Scotland's future obviously lies in Europe' and that he would happily accept the vote.

Other figures in the SNP during the 1970s also had an impact on the shift in the party's narrative from anti- to pro-European. In the interview with Scott (2022), he posited that Scottish legal philosopher and SNP politician, Neil MacCormick was a real 'author of change' in the party's European policy. Scott believed that the SNP's shift from anti- to pro-European was down to MacCormick's idea that 'nationalism was a utilitarian exercise' (Scott, 2022). For MacCormick, nationalism was not based on ethnic constructions. Rather, he 'more or less developed the concept of civic nationalism as a legal philosopher,' moving 'away from the tartan shortbread and bagpipes nationalism' (Scott, 2022). Scott (2022) stated that he thought that MacCormick's activities were a 'very powerful reason why the SNP moved away from anti-Europeanism in the '70s towards embracing it'.

While Reid and MacCormick were developing pro-European ideas during the 1970s, there remained much opposition in the party during this decade, particularly from its leadership. As Scott (2022) explained, 'Gordon Wilson was a very influential leader - there's no question about that - and I would imagine that no change would take place outside of the leadership agreement. But of course, in most political movements, you've got the intellectual movement and you've got the political movement'. 'Politically,' Scott explained, 'moving the party from its anti-European stance was the leadership's job…but the intellectual movement had to be there and I think people like [aforementioned] Macartney and MacCormick provided that' (2022). Scott recalled how this intellectual movement was led by MacCormick and Macartney, and how a lecture on gradualism by MacCormick in the 1970s was 'very badly received' and considered an 'apologetic, devolutionist approach' (Scott, 2022). That said, the SNP figures' suggestions for positive engagements with the EEC would become the party status quo from the mid-1980s.

3.6 Analysis

3.6.1 Historical institutionalist analysis

During the early 1960s, the SNP's main agenda was to transform the institution from a small fringe party into an organised political party capable of contesting and winning elections. With the collapse of the SCA in 1961, the SNP was able to carry the torch for Scottish independence. The introduction of new members represents historical institutionalism's concept of layering whereby new layers are added to the institution in the form of individuals with ideas. The SNP's position on the EEC during this time was one of opposition, yet not to European integration itself, but to Scotland's lack of direct participation in the membership negotiating process.

Consequently, the SNP followed a logic of path dependence whereby policy choices made when an institution was created have a 'continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future' (Peters, 2012, p. 70). The SNP was established as a nationalist party and therefore its goals around Europe tended to be situated in a nationalist context. The strengthening of the party during the early 1960s

was crucial to the advancement of the SNP's narratives on Europe. In order to be taken seriously as a party and to underscore Scottish sovereignty, the SNP had to be prepared to participate in 'higher' matters such as foreign affairs.

In the mid-1960s, the historical context in which the SNP operated shifted slightly as the Conservatives lost the general election and induced the decline of the Scottish Tories. This left the way for the SNP to continue to focus on building up the party and the publication of *How to Build up Your Constituency* (1964) was followed by a party political broadcast with over one million viewers. This resulted in a strong membership drive and was testament to the activities of Macdonald, Wolfe and Wilson, in particular. As perceptions of the EEC began to change throughout the UK, the SNP became electorally stronger and more visible. It was now operating in a context where the prospect of EEC membership was imminent, with the British governments working on membership applications twice in the 1960s. While the public was beginning to question the fabric of the European project, Scottish political elites barely mentioned the issue. With a strengthened electoral base, this left the way open for the SNP to advance its European narratives.

The party became more vocal on the matter and included the issue in its 1966 General Election manifesto. Certain figures were of notable influence in stabilising the party during this time. Externally, the success of Gwynfor Evans in Carmarthen bolstered the SNP's spirit of contesting and winning seats. The moments of Evans' and Ewing's victories induced a change in the SNP's policy on Europe. Evans' victory gave the Scottish nationalist movement impetus for winning by-elections. It was an important moment in the party's European narrative as the opportunity structures became available for a young and enigmatic Ewing with internationalist ideas to race to the top of the SNP within a matter of a year. The Hamilton by-election campaign was also a turning point for the SNP's shift to a stronger European discourse. Despite a fondness for the continent, Ewing included opposition to EEC membership as part of her by-election campaign. The SNP's frequency of discussion about European matters increased and the idea became more pronounced within the party's rhetoric.

The SNP followed a logic of path-dependence via its European policy in the sense that Scottish nationalism always underpinned its policies. For instance, the party argued in the 1960s that it was not averse to EEC membership but that it did not want to do it to the detriment of Scottish autonomy, i.e., being 'poorly' represented by the UK. As historical institutionalism asserts, the 'historical' encompasses economic, social and political factors. The early 1970s marked a new era of Conservative rule and changed the historical context in which the SNP expressed its policies on Europe. It can be argued that the party's negative view of the EEC was partly due to the SNP adopting an alternative view to the British establishment. Moreover, the SNP's European delegation reinforced the party's anti-EEC stance in the sense that EEC representatives disregarded national awareness.

The same year that Ewing was elected to the party, the SNP shifted its policy on the EEC, going from a distanced and generally hostile relationship to one of warmth and non-commitment. Yet not all in the party were on board. In a memo from 1967, Gordon Wilson argued that the SNP should oppose the EEC itself and not just the accession process. His line was much harder than that of Ewing and indeed the rest of the party. As such, the NEC decided to pursue a less aggressive campaign and stressed the fundamental point that Scotland should have an independent government to protect Scottish interests during EEC negotiations. Again, the path-dependent process always comes back to the issue of sovereignty. As Wilson's particular anti-EEC view wrestled with that of the NEC, it eventually came out on top when it was formally adopted by the party between 1968 and 1970. This is an example of how conflict can induce institutional and thus policy change.

The party's adoption of a harder anti-EEC line happened within a changing British political context when the Conservatives regained governmental power in 1970. With the Heath government strongly advocating British EEC membership, the SNP was the only Scottish party to include the issue in its 1970 campaign. Ewing was the central SNP figure in the debates on the EEC in the House of Commons and seemingly entered a paradox whereby she opposed EEC membership while continuing to stress her position as an internationalist. The European context had also changed, with Charles de Gaulle no longer French president, making it much easier for Britain to envisage membership

of the EEC. Indeed, the party began engaging more at the European level when it sent some of its officials to European capitals during the early-1970s. These European activities served two purposes. First, the SNP received some recognition within the European arena and second, within the British media. Yet the delegation's perceived negative experiences in Europe rehardened the party's policy towards the Common Market. This new policy position did not benefit the SNP however, as it remained rigid in a changing political context.

The dominance of the SNP's anti-EEC discourse is reflected in the fact that the majority of the Scottish population opposed EEC membership in the early 1970s. This was not merely just the SNP's influence on the public, however. A deteriorating industrial economy, the discovery of the North Sea oil and anti-EEC pressure groups all contributed to the growing anti-EEC sentiment. In the end, Heath won parliamentary support for membership and Britain's accession to the EEC in 1973 stimulated the party's general mantra of opposition to Europe.

The accession process triggered a series of effects. When the Labour Party returned to power in 1974, it set an EEC membership referendum for June 1975. The SNP campaigned fiercely against membership along lines of Scottish sovereignty, self-government and national identity. The ambiguity of the party's campaign, however, did not help its cause, as there was confusion as to whether the SNP was opposing membership on London's terms or in principle. For instance, Wolfe's tour of North America at the start of the campaign followed the theme of 'Scotland International', a sign that the party had adopted Ewing's internationalist outlook. Yet, Wolfe continued to make a number of bold statements on the EEC, such as comparing it to Bismarck's Germany. Here is an example of the push and pull of ideas for dominance in the political order. The SNP moved back and forth between an anti-bureaucratic and anti-centralist position to one of warm internationalism. It seemed that it was still going through the puberty of its European policy process and had yet to find a solid, unified stance on the issue. This is further reflected by the intra-party divisions where, according to Wilson, a significant portion of the party was pro-European, while some prominent figures, such as Donald Stewart and Isobel Lindsay remained opposed to membership on principle.

The movement between the party's pro- and anti-EEC positions can be witnessed in the 'tactical No' position advanced by Maxwell and the *Scots Independent*'s argument against the very existence of the EEC. What is important to note is the arguments from the main figures of the party, including Donald Stewart, Winnie Ewing and David Rollo, most of whom had a very dark view of the future of Scotland and the EEC, Ewing describing it as a 'death warrant'. The 1975 EEC referendum marked a pivotal moment for the SNP and its discourses on Europe. With the Labour party split on the subject of EEC membership, the SNP was able to capture the leadership of the Scottish No campaign. The party's electoral success during the first half of the decade primed the party to debate 'higher' matters – such as the EEC - with which it was previously disengaged. The main theme running through the campaign ephemera of the 1975 referendum is that London had sold Scotland short in EEC.

The SNP's ambiguous message translated into electoral failure at the referendum, yet the true significance of the vote was to establish support in traditionally dominated Labour industrial heartlands. Its other aims were to make clear the deviation between Scottish and English politics and to secure Scottish interests in the EEC. As far as Donald Stewart was concerned, these aims had been met. Stewart's making Scottish membership conditional symbolises another shift in the SNP's European policy. Yet, as we shall see, pro-European voices in the party such as that of George Reid, would become the dominant discourse by the middle of the next decade. Actors' activities such as those of Reid represent the institution's drift, whereby rules are revised over time by its members. Following a disappointing referendum result, the SNP had to change its stance on Europe. Following historical institutionalism's logic of path-dependence, the party's nationalist nature would continue to be threaded into its European policies. As we shall see, this would ultimately change the SNP's course of action on Europe in succeeding years.

3.6.2 Discursive institutionalist analysis

The context of building up party support was 'used' by a number of individuals in the SNP. For example, candidate for the 1961 Glasgow Bridgeton by-election, Ian Macdonald toured the country setting up new branches. Another actor significant to building popular support for the party was Billy Wolfe, who ran for the West Lothian by-election of 1962. Wolfe directed himself towards establishing a local structure that offered a forum for the synchronisation of a single campaign. These new directives were bolstered by Arthur Donaldson's television appearance at the end of 1962 in which he discussed the party's policy on larger issues of internationalism, usually reserved for 'high' British politics. These actors learned that the SNP would have to increase its visibility before having a real voice in international relations. Wolfe's and Macdonald's background ideational abilities translated into electoral success for the SNP and put them in significant positions, able to influence the party. Macdonald worked tirelessly to spread party awareness and both party figures brought with them fresh organisational skills. While neither of them won, Macdonald and Wolfe had direct effects on the party through their actions, and the SNP rapidly grew in size between 1962 and 1968. It was arguably Gordon Wilson, with his organisational reforms, however, who transformed the party from fringe to mainstream.

The party's silence on Europe in general, but particularly on policy innovation, between 1963 and 1965 is instructive to our understanding of the SNP's European policy. Indeed, silences can be telling. Institutional quietness can often be the sign of the play of strong coordinative discourses, where the party works internally to establish new policies before diffusing them to the public. The new European context enforced a discursive selectivity within the party as it decided how to approach EEC integration. The SNP's general election campaign of 1966 was its biggest yet and its manifesto, *Putting Scotland First* (1966a), reiterated the party's line that Scotland should not join the EEC while part of the UK but might become a member following independence. The election marked the SNP's best electoral performance to date and provided promise for the advancement of the party's European discourses.

The 1967 Hamilton by-election brought about a change in the party's stance on Europe. Ewing became discursively persistent in her arguments in Parliament on the issue of EEC membership in Scotland. At the same time, she revealed her background ideational abilities through the repeated emphasis on her 'internationalist' character. Other prominent members of the SNP such as Wolfe and Wilson also pushed the SNP's anti-EEC membership stance through memos and campaigning. Ewing's background ideational abilities as a solicitor used to vocalising her opinions translated into foreground discursive abilities whereby she was able to reinforce the SNP's growing anti-EEC sentiment. That said, Ewing's cognitive ideas of 'what is and what to do' and her normative ideas of 'what is good or bad' in light of 'what one ought to do' were very much embedded in an internationalist framework. This seemingly paradoxical stance was diffused to the public and policy actors in institutions such as Westminster via communicative discourses. Other actors such as Wolfe and Wilson also used their foreground discursive abilities to engender change in the SNP's discourses on Europe. Wilson can be considered as a *bricoleur* in the sense that he developed a harder anti-EEC line by using a mix of the party's pre-existing negative attitudes towards Europe. While this was not accepted by the NEC initially, Wilson's ideas were finally adopted by the SNP during the late 1960s. This would pave the way for a more refined view on Europe and how EEC membership would affect Scotland.

Ewing's background ideational abilities alongside her foreground discursive abilities allowed her not only to maintain the SNP's stance on the EEC but to reinforce it. This is evidenced in the prominence of the EEC in Ewing's by-election campaign, her activities in Parliament following her election, and her engagement at the European level itself. The party began to take a bolder anti-EEC position and Ewing, in particular, was a discursive vehicle for this new sentiment. This type of language continued into her European rhetoric and as others have noted, her European experiences in the 1950s primed her for her liaisons as 'Madamme Ecosse'.

The hardening of the SNP's discourses on Europe can be argued to have happened for a number of reasons. First, the logic of communication as per discursive institutionalism posits that ideas shape institutions through discursive interactions. These ideas were carried by individuals such as Ewing and supported by others such as John McAteer.

This discursive combination translated into a vigorous campaign that incorporated the idea of Europe. Moreover, Ewing's charisma and confidence brought a new level of intrigue to the party that would later be of benefit in the SNP's European relations. As Ewing declared, 'I'm a solicitor who works in the harsh limelight of Glasgow Sheriff Court and I'm used to making myself heard in public' (*Sunday Post* 1967).

In 1967, the Labour government's reversal on British EEC membership had an effect on the SNP's European policy in that the party began to more frequently argue against being 'dragged' into the EEC. The Hamilton by-election enhanced SNP success and therefore the party began to revamp its discourses on Europe to keep up with other British political parties. This can be seen in a memo from Gordon Wilson in 1967 within which opposition to the EEC itself and not just the accession process was included.

We can perceive another shift in the SNP's policy on Europe when Malcom Slesser proposed a number of strategic changes in 1970. Slesser's main message was to make the party appear to be reasonable, international and balanced and the NEC tasked this to Wolfe. Discursively, however, Wolfe did not follow the NEC's requests and made a series of colourful statements, describing the EEC's political centralism as a type of 'conglomerate fascism'. While Slesser had attempted to soften the party's image, its new stance on the EEC appeared vague and convoluted. This hardened position was considered by some in the party, such as Slesser, to be obstructive and, like Wilson, Slesser acted as a *bricoleur* in 'softening' the party's approach to the EEC.

The SNP's communicative discourses of the 1975 referendum were much 'stronger' than that of the late-1960s and early-1970s in the sense that they contained a large number of normative arguments. These normative arguments – from Scotland's oil to the dissatisfaction of Scottish fishermen – became layered to create a narrative of 'No voice, No entry' and the SNP had finally injected its own voice into the national EEC debate. At the same time, voices of dissent from within the party threatened to spoil the party's 'unified' stance on the EEC. While there were not many pro-European voices within the SNP during this time, they still existed and still had the capacity to change the direction of the party's European narrative. Indeed, the very fact that there was a national referendum forced the SNP to engage with the European question.

Conclusions

How and why, then, did the SNP's policies on Europe change during the 1960s and first half of the 1970s? To what extent did these changes depend on a) British domestic politics, b) Scottish subnational politics, c) European integration and d) political entrepreneurs?

Through a conceptual mixture of historical and discursive institutionalisms, we can surmise that the changes in the party's policy on Europe during this time period were down to an intersection of the above factors in highly specific contexts. Drawing together the above analysis, I would argue that these policies largely depended on British domestic politics. As many people in Scotland began to lose their sense of 'Britishness' during the early 1960s, the SNP stood as a nationalist alternative. Yet, before the party could implement a stronger European narrative, it had to improve its electability and visibility at Westminster. With the Conservatives' loss at the 1965 general election, the SNP was able to focus on strengthening the party and particularly its European policy.

When the Conservatives regained governmental power in 1970, the SNP took this opportunity to restate its anti-EEC line. The party's negative view of the EEC was partly dependent on taking an alternative stance to the Conservatives' more pro-European narrative. The context within which the SNP operated its discourses on Europe had changed. While the Conservative government became gradually more on board with European integration, the SNP became more opposed. It is too simplistic, however, to put this all down to an anti-establishment line. Other British structural factors also contributed to the SNP's negative view of the EEC during this period, such as the London 'establishment's' neglect of Scottish affairs in the European debate.

On the political entrepreneurial level, we can see that there are several figures who had an impact on the SNP's policy on Europe during this time. For example, Ewing was able to use her background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities at the British level in order to advance the SNP's claims on Europe. Her position at

Westminster provided the party with an opportunity to toughen this narrative and is a demonstration of how political entrepreneurs can maintain or change an institution's policy ideas. Furthermore, this chapter has shown how institutional layering can change policy formation, such as when Wilson attempted to reinforce the SNP's anti-EEC line, against the advice of the EEC. At the same time, we can see how conflict can activate institutional change after Wilson and Wolfe continued to exert their anti-EEC views as part of party rhetoric despite the NEC's recommendation. Both Wilson and Slesser can be considered as *bricoleurs* throughout this period of analysis, albeit for different reasons. While both incorporated pre-existing ideas on Europe, Wilson attempted to harden the party's position on the EEC while Slesser tried to soften it. This resulted in a convolution of the SNP's message, however, and it needed something stronger to carry the No stance in the 1975 EEC referendum.

This chapter has also shown how the hardening of the SNP's discourses on Europe during the mid-1960s was down to the discursive interaction of ideas. Ewing carried rather strong ideas on Europe and remained anti-EEC *and* internationalist. While her identification as internationalist may have come across as contradictory to the SNP's anti-EEC stance, it may have also provided some credibility to the party's claims. Ewing's background ideational abilities were distinctly rooted in an 'informed', internationalist framework and therefore gave some integrity to her anti-EEC claims. Her discursive interaction with John McAteer translated into a hearty by-election campaign with a distinct anti-EEC dimension. This by-election marked a serious change for the SNP in the sense that the party had never done so well electorally and was now in a position to securely debate 'serious' affairs such as the EEC.

With a deteriorating industrial economy, the discovery of the North Sea oil and anti-EEC pressure groups, the SNP's negative attitude towards Europe only intensified. That said, the party's attitudes towards the EEC became ambiguous whereby there were intra-party divisions on what basis the SNP should oppose EEC membership: either opposing membership on Westminster's terms or by principle. This ambiguity contributed to the electoral failure at the 1975 EEC membership referendum and according to some prominent voices within the SNP, the party had to soften its approach.

This chapter has also shown how the SNP's EEC policy was dependent on its negative experiences of European integration in the form of its European delegation. Furthermore, the absence of Charles de Gaulle opened a space for Britain to imagine a future within the EEC. This prompted a new engagement of the SNP with the EEC which ultimately produced negative experiences. As such, the party's policy towards the Common Market stiffened even further and demonstrates how the SNP's policies shifted back to an anti-EEC stance.

The extent to which the SNP's European policy depended on Scottish subnational politics was lesser than the effect that British politics had on the party's EEC stance. Save for the SNP, Scottish elites rarely discussed the European project. This silence allowed the SNP to advance its European narratives in Scotland. At the public level, the majority of the Scottish population opposed EEC membership in the early 1970s. The SNP took this opportunity to reinforce its anti-EEC stance and is an example of how Scottish politics maintained the institution's hostile position. The SNP's change in its European policy highly depended on certain political entrepreneurs within the party. While it generally took an anti-EEC stance, the party demonstrated an oscillated trajectory as it swayed between opposition to the EEC on the basis of Scottish sovereignty and by principle. While the referendum result was disappointing for the SNP, it had managed to make itself more visible by engaging with 'high' politics. It therefore had a more credible voice on European matters than it did prior to the party's rise in popularity. This would be essential in the following decade when the SNP's stance on Europe would do a full U-turn.

The main contribution of this chapter has been a distinctive analysis of the history of the SNP's policies on Europe using a new institutionalist framework. As we saw from the literature review (Chapter 1), the most common way to analyse the SNP's policies on Europe has been through the concept of Europeanisation. This is problematic, however, as it does not take into account the different levels that have influenced the party's policies on Europe (British, Scottish and European). Through an historical institutionalist approach, we have seen how the layering of ideas in the form of individuals with ideas, particularly Ewing, Wilson, Wolfe and Slesser had a profound effect on the party's policies on Europe within this chapter's period of analysis. These

political entrepreneurs used their background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities to attempt to change the party's position on Europe. While some tried to intensify it (Wilson), others attempted to soften it (Slesser). This push and pull for ideas is an example of how conflict can induce institutional and policy change. Furthermore, we have seen how the SNP continued to follow a logic of path dependence whereby its policies on Europe were situated in a nationalist context.

Chapter 4: From Euroscepticism to critical juncture (1976-1989)

The 1960s to mid-1970s was overall a challenge and success for the SNP in terms of increased visibility, electoral wins and advancement of its discourses on Europe. Key figures of the party's 'European movement' included Gordon Wilson, Billy Wolfe, Arthur Donaldson, Jim Sillars and, most notably, Winnie Ewing. These actors used their background ideational abilities – whether they were skills gained while working for Chrysler (Donaldson) or a love of Europe (Ewing) – to rationalise events and operate within a particular context. They also used their foreground discursive abilities to reason externally from the party. This resulted in a layering type change whereby new layers are added to the institution in the form of individuals with ideas. The SNP followed a logic of path-dependence, which, according to historical institutionalism, entails an institution following the policy choices made during its creation. In other words, the party's principal objective of Scottish independence was crystalised in its discourses on Europe.

There exist very few SNP discourses on Europe from 1976 to 1980. Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, silences can be telling. During these few years, the party's electoral performance was deteriorating so it had to focus on improving its visibility, winning back members and branches, and resolving financial difficulties. It therefore had little time to dedicate to the development of its European policies. Yet, by the early 1980s the issue of Europe once again came to the fore. This chapter will explore how the party officially revised and shifted its stance on Europe during the 1980s and will focus on issues of intra-party factionalism, Thatcherism and engagement with the EEC.

4.1 The 79 Group and the SNP identity crisis

The SNP experienced a significant loss of members and branches from 1976 to 1978 and the party 'threatened to fall down like a house of cards' (Lynch, 2013, p.153). Consequently, the SNP's visibility in Scotland decreased and the party found itself in a financial crisis as thousands of pounds in expected revenues from sales of membership

cards and branch dues were lost (Lynch, 2013, p.153). Yet, it was not completely fruitless as the SNP's success in the district council elections in 1977 guaranteed that Labour reintroduced the matter of devolution after the failure of the Scotland and Wales bill in January 1977. While devolution was negotiated by the Lib-Lab pact in London, it came to dominate the SNP over other issues such as independence and oil. As expected, however, the matter of devolution caused tensions within the party, particularly during the period of 1974 to 1979 (Lynch, 2013, pp. 154-155).

The party reacted to devolution by pushing the notion of independence into political debates. Its 1975 conference slogan of 'On to Independence' transmuted into 'Independence Nothing Less' in 1977. This masked the fact that the SNP had essentially become a devolution advocate in the House of Commons. However, it also served to reassure the party's grassroots that independence was still the party's ultimate goal. Devolution also necessitated provocative policy changes within the SNP. The most significant example of this was at the party's annual conference in Motherwell in 1976, where the party conference voted by 594 to 425 to 'accept' devolution (Lynch, 2013, pp. 155-156). The collapse of the devolution bill during this time resulted in the SNP's gain in opinion polls, reaching 36 per cent in March 1977, while Labour's support shrunk to 27 per cent, the same as the Conservatives (Lynch, 2013, p. 157).

After a summer of deliberation and secret talking with the Liberals, Labour introduced the Scotland bill on 4th November 1977, which became law on 31st July 1978 (Lynch, 2013, pp. 158-159). Labour could now show that it was active on the subject of devolution and the SNP experienced significant reverses at three by-elections held in 1978 – Glasgow Garscadden, Hamilton and Berwick, and East Lothian (Lynch, 2013, p. 158). The Act anticipated establishing a Scottish Assembly as a devolved legislature for Scotland. However, at the devolution referendum the on 1st March the following year, the Act did not win the necessary level of approval and never materialised until much later under the Blair governments. It was clear that the SNP's popularity rested on the prospect of devolution and the party would have to balance this with its goal of independence in order to retain support.

The period following the devolution referendum saw the party's only significant case of organised factionalism in its history. While the SNP had experienced internal groupings such as the 55 Group and the 1320 Society, what made the 79 Group unique was that factionalism within the party had never been so strong and divisions covered both ideology and party strategy. In essence, the conflict was between the gradualists and fundamentalists and involved a wide range of individuals, from grassroots to SNP leadership. Considering the frustration with the devolution referendum results and the SNP's electoral demise at the 1979 general election, a bout of internal conflict was expected, but not at all to this scale (Lynch, 2013, p. 179).

The 79 Group was formally established at a conference organised by the Interim Committee for Political Discussion at the Belford Hotel in Edinburgh on 31st May 1979. Key figures on the left of the SNP comprised the group and the conference debated a string of discussion papers on the future of the SNP. Most of these papers disparaged the way in which the party had 'fudged' class and ideological issues in the 1970s (Lynch, 2013, p. 179). The 79 Group devoted itself to three principles: independence; a socialist redistribution of power, income and wealth; and the establishment of a Scottish Republic. Only the first of these principles was official SNP policy (Lynch, 2013, p. 179).

Notwithstanding its strong determination, the 79 Group's candidates for office were seriously defeated at the 1979 SNP conference. The conference saw the SNP take a fundamentalist direction and its slogan became *Independence Nothing Less* (Lynch, 2013, p. 180). Nonetheless, the 79 Group strived to have its members involved with party bodies such as the National Assembly, and as the group's minutes in early 1980 read, 'the importance of attending National Assembly was stressed as party policy was formed there, often with a poor turnout' (quoted in Lynch, 2013, p. 181). The group also attempted to amend a large number of SNP policy resolutions at the 1980 annual conference, asserting that 'we must demonstrate in 1980 that the 79 Group is a force to be reckoned with' (Lynch, 2013, p. 181).

Internal conflict and organisational decline within the party during the early and mid-1980s saw it, 'in the grip of a kind of nervous breakdown' (Lynch, 2002, p. 161). Gordon Wilson claimed that 'the civil war within the Party raged at all levels', where the 79

Group's strategy was to assume control at the local level in order to then take overall command of the party (Wilson, 2009, p. 209). This was considered by others in the party to be divisive, leading to annoyance and animosity, and such intraparty tensions led to an SNP identity crisis. Indeed, the SNP struggled to define itself in the early 1980s as it essentially moved from an 'all-encompassing movement' to a left-wing social-democratic party (Ehrlich, 1997, p. 217). Similarly to British Labour radicals post-1979, new generation SNP members began to challenge the older and more conservative establishment. Indeed, Wilson stated that the SNP's intra-party tensions mirrored those of British Labour at the time other than the fact that the disputes of the former 'were arguably more bitter' (2009, pp. 205-206). Wilson sought to save the party from falling apart by trying to persuade the different factions to work together. He felt like the 'conductor of a discordant band' but remained hopeful that the situation would improve, and when this time came, he wanted to introduce policy reforms to improve the electability of the party (Wilson, 2009, p. 210). Many of these reforms would take the form of a more positive attitude towards Europe.

The 79 Group's perceived divisiveness was deemed by the National Executive Committee (NEC) to be incompatible with SNP membership, and letters of expulsion were sent to members of the 79 Group in October 1982 (Wilson, 2009, p. 215). At a National Council meeting at the end of April 1983, the Council voted to uphold the expulsions, yet Alex Salmond spoke on behalf of the appellants 'with a complete absence of nerves' and the appeal was accepted by the vast majority (Wilson, 2009, p. 216). Wilson saw this new sense of relief among the delegates as an opportunity to make a strong call for unity in contesting the General Election (Wilson, 2009, p. 217).

Most notably, the 79 Group had an effect on the SNP's European policy. When former Labour MP, Jim Sillars, joined the SNP, he 'instantly became an idol of the 79 Group' (Brand, 1990). Regardless of the fact that the left of Labour had generally been anti-EEC, Sillars supported the European Common Market and diffused this sentiment into the SNP. Within the SNP, those who were anti-EEC tended to be the 'old guard' of the party. The Marketeers tended to be in their 20s and 30s and 'almost exclusively 79 Group members' (Brand, 1990). He believed that Scotland needed Europe to become a modern nation state, especially economically. As Brand has explained, 'only in the EEC was there

a convenient and large market' with the opportunity for Scotland to collaborate with other states of similar size and 'shake off the dominance of England in the same way as Ireland had' (1990). Sillars' influence on the 79 Group's pro-European sentiments combined with his foreground discursive abilities would contribute to a reversal in the SNP's anti-EEC stance by 1984.

The SNP's reputation and identity were further questioned early in 1982, when President Billy Wolfe wrote a letter to the Church of Scotland journal *Life and Work*, protesting the appointment of the papal legate as an ambassador from the Vatican, referring to Pope Pius XII as 'the Nazi Pope' (Wilson, 2009, p. 211). This letter had inflammatory consequences for the West of Scotland where sectarianism was rife and a visit from the Pope was scheduled for later on that year. The SNP subsequently took action to reassure the Catholic Church that the party welcomed the papal visit and Wilson and his wife accepted an invitation to the papal mass at Bellahouston Park on 1st June 1982. Wilson explained: 'We were not naïve enough to think that there had been no political damage done to the Party's prospects amongst Catholic voters. The Labour Party would make sure that Billy Wolfe's misguided views were attributed to the SNP as a whole and the affair would take a long time to live down' (2009, p. 211).

4.2 Warming to Europe: using the idea of the EEC as an alternative to Westminster

During the early 1980s, the SNP was preoccupied with improving its electability by opposing Thatcherism and resolving internal factions, and hardly referred to Europe in its discourses during this time. Thatcher's attempts to resolve the economic crisis involved huge Scottish de-industrialisation, resulting in mass unemployment and redundancies, while cuts to university and college places saw thousands of young Scots emigrate. Those living in the central belt of Scotland retained a deep loyalty to Labour which 'easily drowned out' the SNP's social democratic stance (Wilson, 2009, p. 206). In his speech to the SNP's Annual Conference in 1980, leader of the party, Gordon Wilson, accused the Labour Party of 'steadying the hand that wielded the Thatcher axe' (Wilson, 2009, p. 206). This was the first of many allegations that Scottish Labour MPs were not defending Scotland (Wilson, 2009, p. 206).

In Brussels, however, Highlands and Islands MEP, Winnie Ewing, sought to put Scotland on the European stage in a number of ways. As Alyn Smith (2021) stated, 'Ewing's influence on the party's platform when she was an MEP was fundamental'. In the early summer of 1980, she organised taking her European Parliamentary group to the Highlands and Islands for a study visit, where members of the group had a chance to meet farmers, fishermen and oil workers. Ewing claimed that the visit helped to enhance the members' 'knowledge of Scotland and what Scotland wanted and needed from Europe' (2004, p. 205). The MEP also ensured that Wilson and other senior SNP members had the chance to meet the group during its visit to Scotland. The meetings, according to Ewing, were 'very valuable, cementing our place in the group and giving the Irish and French a clear perspective on who we were and what we wanted' (2004, p. 206). Ewing's view was that the EEC needed some kind of reformation but that the party sought to be in it 'as Scotland' (Smith, 2021). As Smith (2021) explained, 'that's the north star for us'.

Later on in 1980, while the SNP was undergoing a period of internal factionalism, Ewing and some others in her Parliamentary group went to Athens in preparation for the accession of Greece in 1981. They visited the Greek Parliament to meet various parties to assess whether any would be suitable partners for the group and Ewing admits that she was particularly interested in 'courting the Greeks' because their accession to the EEC greatly increased the number of populated islands in the polity. She was interested in making 'common cause' with the island representatives (Ewing, 2004, p. 206). Her affinity with Greece may also have come from the fact that the Greek Government was trying to establish small-scale industries such as those used by the Highlands and Islands Development Board (Ewing, 2004, p. 206). 'Although no promises were made,' Ewing wrote, 'it was obvious that the fourteen new Greek MEPs, who would be nominated by their Parliament until the time of the next direct election, were going to be useful allies in a number of causes, and they would also be Europeans who looked to the Community to help them build a better future' (Ewing, 2004, p. 207).

From her autobiography, *Stop the World* (2004), edited by Michael Russell, it is clear that Ewing also engaged with European elites on a personal level. Describing one of the group's 1982 study days in Madrid, while Spain was preparing for accession to the EEC,

she wrote: 'I was early for our first group dinner and was waiting at the top of the grand staircase at the Ritz wearing a pink sparkly dress, when President Mitterrand arrived. He walked up the stairs and kissed me warmly on both cheeks' (Ewing, 2004, p. 207). From Madrid, Ewing went to Catalonia where the principal goal among parties was to preserve democracy. She was invited to speak to the Convergence, the alliance of nationalist parties in power, and was impressed by the Catalan Parliament, which could trace its origins back to the twelfth century (Ewing, 2004, p. 207).

While the SNP's discourses on Europe were seldom during the first few years of the 1980s, Ewing had certainly set much of the groundwork for its policies to come. The general consensus is that the SNP's pro-European shift began in 1988 with the launch of the party's Independence in Europe narrative, led by Jim Sillars. I argue, however, that 1983 was the pivotal point at which the SNP started to warm to the idea of Europe. The party's shift in its position on Europe in the summer of 1983 seems to have happened very quickly. In May 1983, the SNP published its General Election manifesto, *Choose Scotland – The Challenge of Independence*. In terms of the party's position on Europe, the manifesto declared that it wished to cooperate with 'our European neighbours' but did not wish to join the Common Market (SNP, 1983a). The party maintained that the EEC had been detrimental to many of Scotland's interests and that its 'centralist thinking' was as 'ill-suited for Scotland as that from London' (SNP, 1983a, p. 10). It claimed that through the Common Fisheries Policy negotiated with the EEC, the UK Government had 'sold Scottish fishermen short' (SNP, 1983a, p. 22).

As an alternative to EEC membership, the SNP proposed negotiating a trading association with the EEC, similar to those of Austria and Norway. According to the manifesto, this would safeguard exporting industries and Scotland could use its strategic oil supplies to 'obtain favourable terms' (SNP, 1983a, p. 10). While opposing EEC membership, the SNP stated that it would allow the people of Scotland to decide on this issue through a referendum (SNP, 1983a, p. 10). The manifesto concludes with a quote from the American Declaration of Independence (1976) and a statement from SNP President, Donald Stewart, stating that there was much to gain from an independent Scotland, and that Scotland will have a place in the UN and be able to contribute to international affairs, 'making sure our voice is heard' (SNP, 1983a, p. 24).

At the SNP's annual conference in September 1983, Wilson argued for Scottish independence through, for the first time, the lens of Europe. For Wilson, the conference in Rothesay provided the opportunity to 'bring the SNP back into the mainstream of Scottish politics and rebuild our popular support' (Wilson, 2009, p. 223). In his Chairman's speech to Conference he chided the SNP over its 'isolationist approach' to devolution and Europe:

'If we were really serious about obtaining our freedom as a nation, we must be prepared to work within the international scene. For strategic reasons, if none other we must convince other nations that their interests will not be adversely affected by the creation of the Scottish state. Otherwise, they will side with England and refuse to give us the recognition, or influential support we may need' (Wilson, 2009, p. 223).

He argued that the terms of entry negotiated by Westminster were diabolical with dire consequences for Scotland's fishing industry. 'These mistakes would not have been made by any Scottish Government,' Wilson claimed (Wilson, 2009, p. 223). He then moved on to the concept of an independent Scotland in Europe:

'Of course, it will be for our Government after independence to reach decisions on these matters but during the election I noted how many industrial workers in export industries have modified their anti-EEC views. Nevertheless if, again we are serious about independence, the EEC offers a first class way of pushing the advantages of political independence without any threat of economic dislocation, however imaginary, which the enemies of Scotland might desperately wish to advance. Within the common trading umbrella, the move to independence can take place smoothly and easily' (Wilson, 2009, p. 224).

In defending the 'myth' that the SNP stands only for independence, Wilson claimed that this could only be said for the party for the one and a half years between the 1979 and 1981 Conferences. He then concluded this point by saying: 'Since independence is dependent on an electorally strong SNP, then automatically, anything which does not assist support of the Party undermines the cause of independence itself' (Wilson, 2009,

p. 224). Indeed, if internal anti-European sentiments were undermining support for the SNP, there needed to be a sharp revision of the party's position on Europe.

The following day at Conference, a resolution easing the opposition to Europe moved by Alex Salmond and supported by Winnie Ewing was passed, providing the SNP with the opportunity to build a new coalition. The resolution stated that 'this Conference, recognising that the EEC provides a forum in which the voice of Scotland can be heard, accepts that SNP Euro-Members will play a full and active part in the Community, until Scotland becomes an independent country again…Conference confirms SNP policy of putting the question of membership, or of associate membership, to the people in the referendum to be decided by majority vote' (SNP, 1983b). The prospect of Europe served to unite on some level the warring factions within the party and impressive speeches from Jim Fairlie and Jim Sillars during the debates attracted strong media attention (Wilson, 2009, p. 226). For Wilson, the 1983 Conference 'altered the course of the Party radically and in my view for the better. The gamble had paid off. The separatist, isolationist image had been shattered' (Wilson, 2009, p. 226).

A combination of factors can be argued to have led to such a quick shift. A few months prior to the conference, the Conservatives had one of the most decisive election victories since Labour in 1945 and the SDP/Liberal Alliance was strong in Scotland. The SNP retained only two seats from the 1983 general election, those of Gordon Wilson and Donald Stewart, and support for the party was weak. This weakness, in part, came from the intra-party tensions created by the establishment of the 79 Group and threatened the party's unified image. Wilson attempted to use the SNP's loss as a way to unify the party by using a new European framework and, arguably, it seemed to work. While the legacy of the 1975 No campaign remained strong within the party, Wilson's argument was nevertheless adopted by the SNP who supported continued membership if supported by a popular referendum and given positive negotiations over Scotland's status within the Community (Lynch, 2013, p. 197). Another factor may be that the Thatcher government's rejection of a Scottish Assembly encouraged the party to put a different spin on its statehood goals via the opportunity of European integration. Furthermore, Ewing's efforts to connect European and SNP seniors through study visits

may have made a positive impression on Wilson and other members, leading to a greater acceptance of the EEC.

The SNP's budding pro-European stance was bolstered by agreement between elite members of the party. Factionalism had deteriorated since the ending of the 79 Group and party elites decided to cooperate in order not to return to the internal conflict of the early 1980s. The idea of independence in Europe benefited from this consensus as both traditionalists such as Winnie Ewing, Margaret Ewing and Gordon Wilson, and gradualists such as Jim Sillars and Alex Salmond, supported the policy. Certain old left members such as Isobel Lindsay and Tom McAlpine remained opposed to this new narrative but they were 'easily sidelined by a pragmatic coalition of traditionalists and leftist gradualists' (Wilson, 2009, p. 226). The support for Sillars and Salmond meant that the left of the party was on board with the Independence in Europe narrative. This shared focus on Europe led to a sense of internal unity.

The moderation of the SNP's stance was to both increase electoral support and to emphasise the notion of an independent Scotland separate from the group of fundamentalists. In other words, to transform the party from 'extreme' to 'mainstream' (Dardanelli, 2003, pp. 276-277). The EEC can be seen as one such vehicle to improve the party's electability and to make the prospect of Scottish independence more palatable and less extreme. At the next annual conference in 1984, however, the SNP's new pro-European position was challenged by anti-Europeans whose aim was to change the party's proposition of a referendum on increasing powers of the EEC. The anti-Europeans also opposed economic integration, particularly economic and monetary union. The proposal was defeated by 158 votes to 115, indicating that outside of the elite consensus, SNP hostility to the EEC was still significant in 1984 (Lynch 2013, p. 201). That said, in the interview with Gethins, he maintained that 'the party has gone from being maybe split on the question of Europe like other parties to being really quite united on the question of Europe' (Gethins, 2022).

4.3 Hardening its European policies: the SNP at the 1984 European Parliamentary Elections

The lead-up to the 1984 European Parliamentary Elections provided the SNP with an opportunity to advance its new European narrative. In the campaign manifesto, *Scotland's Voice in Europe* (SNP, 1984a), Wilson admitted that experience of the Common Market had eased fears that the EEC would become a 'superstate' and recognised that its 'bureaucracy' had not drowned out national rights (SNP, 1984a, p. 1). In other words, the party started to suggest that the idea of Europe had become compatible with the SNP's statehood goals. Wilson acknowledged that some of these fears were eased with the enlargement of the Community which 'diluted some of the dangers of centralism' (SNP, 1984a, p. 1).

Wilson argued in the manifesto's introduction that Conservative and Labour governments had failed to protect Scottish interests in Europe and is a theme running throughout the publication. He then used this as a discursive springboard for Scottish independence, arguing that Scotland could have independent representation similar to that of Luxemburg, a country 'with half the population of Edinburgh!' (SNP, 1984a, p. 1). He recognised that Scotland would have its own representation on the Council of Ministers and in the Commission, 'and have sixteen, not a mere 8, Members of Parliament' (SNP, 1984a, p. 1). Wilson then argued that the election of SNP MEPs would 'break Scotland's unhealthy psychological dependence on London', reminding voters: 'Let's not forget that when we go direct to the European Parliament, we by-pass London, and all Scots know that's a good idea!' (SNP, 1984a, p. 1).

Throughout the manifesto, the SNP used the image of Europe to distil animosity towards other British political parties: 'Unlike the other Parties who have to toe the London line, SNP MEPs will be totally committed to getting Scotland a better deal within the Community' (SNP, 1984a, p. 1). Europe had become an alternative bargaining chip in selling the SNP's nationalism. Wilson claimed that the European Parliament had listened to the needs of Scotland more than Westminster ever had. Furthermore, the party used negative imagery of London and positive imagery of Scotland to appeal to voters. The SNP recognised, 'unlike London', that Scotland was Europe's 'natural centre' for

research into all types of alternative energy, including wind, wave, solar, hydro and peat (SNP, 1984a, p. 6). The manifesto maintained that SNP MEPs would try to release the large available EEC funds which were not given to Scotland because 'the hopeless London government is actually reducing its own regional aid' (SNP, 1984a, p. 5).

Moreover, the SNP was unhappy with London's refusal to implement the Road Equivalent Tariff (RET), which based ferry fares on the cost of travelling an equivalent distance by road (SNP, 1984a, p. 5). The party supported the European campaign for cheaper air fares and more direct air connections, claiming that they would better enable Scotland to integrate into Europe and to 'compete more effectively' (SNP, 1984a, p. 6). The manifesto also pointed to other peripheral EEC nations such as Ireland, Italy and Greece, claiming that SNP MEPs would campaign for multinational support for a new transport policy. This policy would include a scheme of subsidies 'to place distant areas on level terms with others at the centre' (SNP, 1984a, p. 5). The party claimed that London failed to safeguard subsidies for Scotland to enable goods to reach mass markets without high transport expenditure, asserting that there could be no real Common Market until all members were treated equally (SNP, 1984a, p. 5). The manifesto guaranteed the protection of key Scottish interests, particularly fishing, steel and oil. It also argued against English ministers 'hatching' deals with the Commission and other countries because they 'know nothing of Scotland and care less' (SNP, 1984a, p. 1). The most notable case of this was when Westminster conceded to accept fishing limits of twelve miles when international law gave 200 miles to Scotland.

Positive imagery of Scotland was reinforced in the document to advance claims for Scottish independence while using the EEC as a means by which to achieve this. The party was confident that Scotland's oil and gas resources would put it in a strong position to negotiate new terms for remaining part of the EEC (SNP, 1984a, p. 2). It argued that Scotland's net food self-sufficiency and huge oil and gas production (almost 90 per cent of the Community total) meant that an independent Scotland would not be missing out on the UK budgetary subsidy (SNP, 1984a, p. 5). The party asserted that Scotland would expect EEC concessions due to the energy and resources that the independent country would bring. One such concession was the EEC's acknowledgment that Scotland needed to preserve control over labour and equipment content of offshore

development, such as the rate of exploration, development and production (SNP, 1984a, p. 6). The manifesto equated successful European integration with independence: '…independence is vital if Scotland is to participate in and benefit from the development of the Community' (SNP, 1984a, p. 2). The SNP wanted to 'place [Scotland] firmly on the European map' through increased SNP representation (SNP, 1984a, p. 2).

The sense of Scotland being an 'international' country was reiterated throughout the manifesto. The SNP described Scotland as 'internationally minded' and vowed to participate in EEC enlargement to include other European nations (SNP, 1984a). The manifesto also recognised the mutual contribution of Scottish and European culture and maintained that it would be of great benefit if there were increased cultural exchanges between European nations (SNP, 1984a, p. 8). At the same time, it maintained its hard line that national interests come before European integration and assured voters that the party would seek associate membership status if negotiations of full membership proved unsatisfactory (SNP, 1984a).

The SNP listed its short term aims in the manifesto, the first of which was *to achieve a greater national and international standing so that Scotland is no longer treated as an 'insignificant province'* (SNP, 1984a, p. 8). The party claimed that the Scottish legal system had much more in common with that of Europe than that of England, and for the development of the Scottish legal system, it was vital that it gained full recognition through permanent representation on the European Court (SNP, 1984a, p. 8). Second, the party sought *a more substantial share of EEC funding to boost vital industries*, such as steel, fishing and hill farming. The SNP called for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), claiming that SNP MEPs would press for implementation of the Agricultural Development Programme (ADP) which Ewing persuaded the EEC to establish (SNP, 1984a, p. 3). The party would work towards a transfer of a proportion of the CAP spending to national governments (SNP, 1984a, p. 4). In addition to helping farmers, the SNP stated that the agricultural policies must better reflect consumer interests: 'Let's have cheaper food for our people – not for the Russians!' (SNP, 1984a, p. 4). Furthermore, the manifesto claimed that the party would push once again for the European Parliament to create a separate Fisheries Committee to protect existing fishing fleets if Portugal and Spain, with their large fishing fleets, were to become

members of the EEC. Finally, the SNP listed one of its short term goals as establishing a Research Institute of the EEC, like those of other states, to generate thousands of jobs: 'Scotland would be the ideal location for such an Institute studying the Community's problems of remote areas' (SNP, 1984a, p. 5).

While the manifesto seemed to reflect the SNP's dramatic shift in attitude towards the EEC, it was not without its criticisms. It maintained that the party rejected the establishment of a unitary European State, claiming that the 'best international harmony' lies in the 'widest representation of national interests' (SNP, 1984a, p. 3). The party also criticised the CFP for not materialising its promises of the guarantee of fishing opportunities, fair quotas and policing (SNP, 1984a, p. 4). It asserted that an independent Scottish Government would re-open CFP negotiations with the goal of creating an exclusion 100-mile Scottish zone and complete control of up to 200 miles (SNP, 1984a, p. 4). The manifesto also disapproved of the EEC's inaction on extending the rights of consumers and believed that it must be dedicated to enhancing international trade. This included reducing external tariffs and improving the global monetary system to incite a rebirth of world trade (SNP, 1984a, p. 7).

Eight candidates stood for election in the 1984 European Elections and campaign ephemera, particularly of Glasgow candidate Norman MacLeod and Lothians' candidate David Stevenson, reveal that the Independence in Europe theme was starting to significantly push its way through to the party's communicative discourses. An election flyer for MacLeod indicated his confidence in Scotland as a European and international player: 'The World welcomes the friendship and co-operation of the Scots. An independent Scottish voice for Glasgow in Europe will contribute to the harmonious development of international peace and understanding' (SNP, 1984b). Stevenson's ephemera are more comprehensive and appear to be based around a couple of key themes. In a similar vein to Wilson's manifesto letter, one flyer asked Stevenson's voters 'why go through London operators' when you can 'Call Europe Direct'? (SNP, 1984b). The archive also contains a handful of different coloured flyers addressed, in handwritten capitals, to Stevenson's 'friends from outwith Scotland' and are printed in Italian, Urdu, French, Scottish Gaelic, German, Norwegian, Danish and Hindi (SNP, 1984b). In each language, the flyer called for the electorate to vote for Stevenson, 'a

voice for the Scottish community in the European Parliament' (SNP, 1984b). While neither of these candidates won in the end, their campaign ephemera revealed that Europe had become a tangible alternative to the perceived confines of London.

At the European Elections on 14th June 1984, the SNP gained 17.8 per cent of the vote and Winnie Ewing was re-elected as MEP for the Highlands and Islands. This was no surprise to Wilson, who maintained that Ewing had made a 'significant impact' on the European Parliament (2009, p. 222). While the SNP's pro-EEC position was only just beginning to gain traction publicly, Scotland's place in Europe had been advocated several years before the 1984 elections by Ewing when she first became MEP in 1975. In Wilson's eyes, the SNP's policy on Europe increased the party's overall vote. For Ewing, the European arena was a refreshing change from hostile Westminster politics as other European MPs had no 'hang-ups' about the SNP (Wilson, 2009, p. 222).

The European Elections of 1984 coincided with the UK miner's strikes - major industrial action within the British coal industry to curtail Thatcher's colliery closures. This was based on Thatcher's view that 'there's no such thing as society; there's only individuals' (Scott, 2022). Thatcher's closing down of the coalfields prompted intervention from the EEC whereby it implemented regional funds to 'support the unemployed within these communities' (Scott, 2022). As Scott (2022) noted, 'It was driven by the wives. It was a women's campaign' to which the EEC reacted with such funds. Furthermore, he acknowledged that the colliery closures partly comprised a shift in the Scottish 'political sensitivity' to the UK government where the EEC became considered to be 'not a safe haven, but certainly as a sympathetic friend' (Scott, 2022). Indeed, Europe was considered a 'benevolent friend, not a foreign dictator. Thatcher was seen as the foreign dictator' (Scott, 2022).

In 1985, Jim Sillars produced a pamphlet, *Moving On and Moving Up in Europe*, which put forward an argument revising the SNP's position on Europe. Sillars helped the SNP to establish the intellectual case for independence in Europe by analysing the economic and political benefits of membership, the development of the European Community, and the role of nation states in the EEC's institutions. Through his work, he managed to gain support both within the party and public for the new position on Europe. Central to the

position was the idea of Scottish membership of the EEC to enable a simple transition to Scottish independence (Sillars, 1985). The EEC would offer political and economic stability for Scottish independence, avoiding interruption to international trade, economic uncertainty and disinvestment (Lynch, 2013, pp. 197-198). When asked to what extent Sillars was an author of the Independence in Europe narrative, Scott suggested that it was, in fact, Sillars' wife, Margo MacDonald who was particularly influential in the campaign. 'Margo had a brilliant mind. An utterly brilliant mind,' Scott reflected (2022) and described her as an 'extraordinary strategist' for the SNP.

Following some debate in 1986, the SNP's National Council accepted that the Single European Act was accordant with Scottish independence (Lynch, 1996, p. 40). The way was now clear for the party to debate the detailed stance of independence at its 1988 conference at which the SNP's Independence in Europe policy was born. As former MEP, Alyn Smith explained in his interview, this shift was owed partly to the evolution of the party and partly the evolution of the European question (2021).

4.4 *Independence in Europe* and the 1989 European Parliamentary Elections

The SNP's campaign for the 1989 European Parliamentary Elections was much more substantial than that of 1984. Jim Sillars had laid out the case for independence in his work and the Independence in Europe narrative was formally adopted by the party at its 1988 conference. Eight candidates stood for election in 1989 and each of them had a wealth of campaign materials to circulate their constituencies. Lothians' candidate, Jay Smith was pictured on one flyer with the two famous Proclaimers brothers, reinforcing a sense of cultural Scottishness in the context of Europe (SNP, 1989a). Smith's campaign focused on post-1992 Europe when the Single Market was to be established. He acknowledged that those at the top of the EEC would 'shape our future' and that Scotland must have a direct influence on the critical decisions made around jobs, welfare and the environment (SNP, 1989a). Smith used the Independence in Europe slogan, claiming that without, Scotland was 'doomed [to be] a backwater economy and a social desert' (SNP, 1989a). He also pointed to Thatcher's Conservative government, claiming that it had been anti-Scottish and was also becoming anti-European. Smith vowed that Labour's unpopularity in England meant that 'they can do nothing for

Scotland yet again' (SNP, 1989a). He went on to discuss how the EEC is not perfect yet a strong group of SNP MEPs would improve it: 'Scotland's strong independent voice, not simply fighting Scotland's corner but fashioning better European policies as well' (SNP, 1989a). That said, Alyn Smith (2021) acknowledged that the SNP's pro-European shift might have partly owed to opposition to the position of the Thatcher government but it was more down to the party's 'warming [to] the [EEC]. Smith (2021) explained that this was down to the SNP's familiarity with the reality of the EEC, 'rather than any domestic context. Though it wouldn't be above our guys to adopt a position to annoy the Tories'.

Furthermore, Jim Smith argued that the SNP wanted European Regional Policy to encourage new enterprise and to protect existing enterprises from 'greedy external takeover' (SNP, 1989a.). The party wanted a European energy strategy to get rid of nuclear power and to use natural energy resources. It also wanted 'vastly improved infrastructure' and to create direct Scotland-Europe transport links (SNP, 1989a). Moreover, the flyer called for appropriate farm and fishery policies for Scotland. The SNP wanted Europe to coordinate its social policy through a Worker's Charter that safeguarded employment rights, as well as increased investment in education and job training. The party also campaigned for a minimum European pension which would be 'better than Britain's, which is the lowest in Europe' (SNP, 1989a). While the SNP's 1984 European Election campaign was less focused on European policies and more on improving SNP electability, the 1989 campaign material focused on how specific policies would benefit both Scotland and Europe. Again, the discursive use of Europe here served as a protest against the United Kingdom where an independent Scotland in Europe would be 'neither in England's shadow nor echoing England's voice' (SNP, 1989a).

Another argument used for Independence in Europe was Thatcher's poll tax, a system of taxation to replace domestic rates, implemented first in Scotland in 1989, and then in England and Wales from 1990. The SNP considered the poll tax to be 'illegal, immoral and unwanted', and stated that an independent Scotland would not have this system (SNP, 1989b, p. 4). The party had a campaign called 'Can Pay – Won't Pay' advanced by Kenny MacAskill, in order to protest the poll tax and to by-pass Thatcher for Europe. Smith's campaign material included a cartoon captioned: 'Don't let Thatcher cut you off!

Call Europe Direct' (SNP, 1989a). As an alternative, the SNP suggested the local income tax, which many European nations had already implemented. The party claimed that this was the SNP's preference for an independent Scotland in Europe (SNP, 1988, p. 4).

The SNP argued that the 1992 removal of all trade barriers amplified the importance of the EEC and that without Independence in Europe, Scotland would lose around 20,000 jobs through increased competition (SNP, 1988, p. 4). The party claimed that its demand for more 'political muscle' for Scotland had made the idea of Europe the centre of Scottish Politics. Smith claimed that only an independent Scottish Parliament could be a real voice for Scots, be it 'fighting for Scottish jobs in Europe or fighting Thatcher's Poll Tax at home' (SNP, 1989a). The party also used Nirex, the UK government's nuclear technology plan to dump nuclear waste near the Dounreay power station in Scotland, as another argument for Independence in Europe (SNP, 1988, p. 2). Nirex planned to transport nuclear waste from Sellafield to Dounreay by road and rail and the SNP claimed that the plan did not take into account the safety and security of those in Scotland. The party wanted to stop Nirex's transformation of Scotland into a 'full-scale nuclear dump' and campaigned against the proposition in the European Elections (SNP, 1988, p. 2). The constituency of Banff and Buchan had a referendum whose result revealed that 98 per cent of people opposed Nirex, yet this was not taken into account when selecting the site for the dump. Moreover, Nirex was invited to speak at a meeting organised by Banff and Buchan Against Nuclear Dumping but did not attend which caused bitterness among locals and the SNP (SNP, 1988, p. 2).

The SNP predicted that its chances of winning the 1989 elections were high, claiming that some political commentators had suggested that the party would win all eight seats. Wilson shared this confidence and claimed that every one of the meetings he had attended throughout Scotland showed strong support for the SNP's case. The Tories' attacks on the SNP following the Govan by-election and the continued failure of Labour's 'feeble 49' prompted people to think carefully about their future. In a BBC/Glasgow Herald poll, 61 per cent of Scots indicated that Independence in Europe was their preferred narrative. This, in combination with the 'hated Tory Poll Tax' was considered to present new opportunities for the SNP and Scotland in Europe (SNP, 1989b, p. 1). A Grampian TV opinion poll revealed that a 2 to 1 majority of Scots believed that

'Scotland's interests after 1992 would be better served if Scotland were an independent country within the EC' (SNP, 1988, p. 1). This view was constant across the political spectrum but especially amongst SNP and Labour supporters (SNP, 1988, p. 1).

Strathclyde East candidate, George Leslie, called for better land, sea and air transport links between Scotland and Europe in order for Scottish goods to be 'speedily whisked' into European markets (SNP, 1989b, p. 1). This call for improved transport links followed Ewing's attempts to seek European funding for improved rail connections with the Channel Tunnel, which was opposed by 14 British Labour MEPs. Moreover, the deregulation of bus services and the proposed 'sell-off' of the Scottish Bus Group held much uncertainty for rural areas of Scotland (SNP, 1989b, p. 1). The party had concerns that the increase in European economic integration would require modern transport infrastructure and quality transport connections between Scotland and the rest of Europe. The SNP stated that an independent Scotland in the EEC would push for Scottish transport links to be a priority in the Community's development programmes (SNP, 1988, p. 3).

Furthermore, the SNP called on the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) to back the party on its EEC strategy (SNP, 1989b, p. 3). Following a decade of the Thatcher veto over improvements in conditions at work, the SNP sought to implement better working conditions such as those of other European countries. During the campaign, the SNP's Publicity Director, Alex Neil, requested that the STUC establish a working party to explore the benefits of Independence in Europe. Independent Scottish membership of the Community would include the 'social Europe' provisions agreed in the EEC and a say in establishing new protection for workers as the 1992 free movement of jobs and investment came closer. Neil claimed that if those such as General Secretary of the STUC, Campbell Christie, could 'throw off his prisoner of the Labour Party' image, then Scottish trade unionists would unearth tangible opportunities for union members through a strong Scottish voice in the EEC' (SNP, 1989b, p. 3). The campaign also focused on dispelling the 'myth' of the 'subsidised Scot'. In the SNP's estimated budget for Scotland for 1989-1990, it was revealed that a surplus of £2 billion, or £7 per Scot, was to be collected in Scotland to be sent to London. This myth was used as an argument against the common belief that Scotland was dependent on the rest of the UK

and that the nation would thrive much more through Independence in Europe (SNP, 1989b, p. 2). When asked whether European integration had influenced the SNP's policies on Europe, Scott posited that there was a 'simple' answer to that: 'there was money' (2022). He explained that money coming from Europe made Europe 'more attractive' for the Scottish electorate and harked back to utilitarianism (Scott, 2022).

The party's campaign was also supported by younger members of the party. The youth wing of the SNP, the Young Scottish Nationalists, launched a 'Charter for European Youth' to advance the voice of young Scots during the European Elections. The group was supported not only by the SNP MEP candidates but also by those of Welsh national party, Plaid Cymru (SNP, 1989b, p. 4). An independent Scottish government was thought to provide the 'progressive and just society' young people needed by looking to other European countries (SNP, 1989b, p. 4). Rather than 'Mickey Mouse' youth training schemes introduced by Thatcher, which gave 'starvation wages' and low job prospects, an independent Scotland would implement a youth apprenticeship scheme akin to that of Denmark or West Germany, offering valuable skills and guaranteed employment (SNP, 1988, p. 4). Furthermore, MEP candidate for Strathclyde West, Colin Campbell, called for Scots to turn to Europe in order to resist the imposition of the 'disfigured English schools model' in Scotland (SNP, 1989b, p. 4).

A special seminar was held for women members of the SNP to meet their prospective MEP candidates in order to cultivate policies to benefit women throughout Europe. The SNP claimed that the UK fell behind other European countries in terms of maternity leave and benefits, and that the UK government had blocked the introduction of rights to parental leave and leave for family reasons. All workers would profit from these rights but women in particular, who often merged external work with work at home. The number of part-time workers was increasing and most of these were women, whose employment rights needed to be safeguarded, according to the party. The SNP considered these rights and other workers' rights to be an essential step towards the Single European Market in 1992 (SNP, 1989b, p. 4).

In terms of agriculture, the SNP called for the British government not to sell out Scottish farming as rural Scotland could not withstand any more unemployment, depopulation

and bankruptcy (SNP, 1989b, p. 4). Rural communities in the North-East of Scotland in particular were under pressure to reduce agricultural surpluses as well as facing an increasing demand for recreational use of these areas. There was much concern that these pressures would lead to significant changes in patterns of agricultural production and economic activity. The SNP believed it was best to turn to the EEC for support for a Scottish Rural Development Programme to aid these communities with such changes (SNP, 1988, p. 2). North East Scotland candidate, Allan Macartney, pleaded to the UK government's response to help farmers hit by the 1988 summer gales, and was 'disgusted' with its reply that it would not be able to offer compensation. This was a bitter blow to the SNP and Scotland as growers in the South of England were offered compensation after a hurricane had hit the UK in 1987 (SNP, 1988, p. 3).

The SNP encouraged fishermen to vote for the party in the 1989 European elections, claiming that they would benefit from a strong nationalist voice in the European Parliament. There were serious concerns about adjusting the 4° line for pelagic fishing (midwater trawling), imposed by the EEC. The party understood that the EEC 'could not have anticipated the movement of the fish' but that it needed to be revised, and considered Independence in Europe to be able to deliver this (SNP, 1988, p. 3). Moreover, the party believed that Scotland's fish and oil resources would put it in a stable bargaining position, and Ewing had already gained a good reputation among fishing communities for her ability to gain grants from the EEC for boat building. Once again, the party referred to other small states to put forward the case for Independence in Europe: 'Denmark has been successful in looking after the interests of her fishermen – yet Denmark is no bigger than Scotland (five million people). With Independence we could have the same clout in negotiations as Denmark – if not more' (SNP, 1988, p. 3). The SNP was displeased that, regardless of having most of the UK's fishing industry, Scotland had to 'bow to' the English Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing, which represented the whole of Britain at the EC Council of Ministers. Rather, it called for a European team of Macartney and Ewing to represent 95 per cent of Scotland's fishing industry (SNP, 1988, p. 3).

Ewing had managed to guarantee that the introduction of the Single Market in 1992 would not interfere with the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) quota and access agreements

of the CFP, which were primarily scheduled to continue until 2002. At a meeting in Brussels, Ewing voiced concerns to President of the EEC Council of Fishers Ministers, Herr von Gelderen, that the Commissioner for Fisheries, Cardoso e Cunha, had suggested that it would be a 'free for all' once the Single Market was implemented. Cunha had stated that it was a mistake to allocate quotas based on the social and economic circumstances of fishermen. Ewing suggested that Cunha was 'throwing to the winds safeguards for regions heavily dependent on fishing built into the CFP after years of hard and bitter negotiations' (SNP, 1988, p. 3). She expressed her view that free-market principles in fisheries would be 'a recipe for an all-out war between member states' (SNP, 1988, p. 3). Von Gelderen guaranteed Ewing that at a recent Council of Fisheries Ministers, only one member state was in favour for a 'free for all' from 1992, and that the majority of member states remained opposed to this suggestion. He assured Ewing that the CFP would continue until at least 2002 as always planned (SNP, 1988, p. 3).

Ultimately, the party claimed that it was 'nonsense' to discuss Scottish autonomy without considering the European dimension (SNP, 1988, p. 3). It argued that Labour's devolution plans, which didn't mention Europe, were 'more suited to the 1960s than to Scotland's needs in the 1990s and beyond' (SNP, 1988, p. 3). Reference was also made to other British parties. SNP Vice-Chairman, Allan Macartney, challenged Scottish Liberal Democrats leader, Malcolm Bruce, to debate the case for Scottish independence in Europe. Macartney wrote an open letter to the Gordon MP, which expressed his surprise and disappointment of Bruce's 'wild attacks' on the Independence in Europe narrative (SNP, 1988, p. 2). Macartney told Bruce that the notion had appealed to many members of the Scottish Liberal Democrats and that he 'must surely accept that there is no chance of achieving 'wholesale reform' in Mrs Thatcher's Britain' (SNP, 1988, p. 2). The SNP MEP candidate argued that British devolution, or even federalism, would still silence Scotland in the important matters decided at the European level (SNP, 1988, p. 2).

4.5 Analysis

4.5.1 Historical institutionalist analysis

The late 1970s and early 1980s posed a significant challenge for the SNP as it struggled with its identity, devolution and the repercussions of Thatcherism. As such, the party had little time to focus on establishing its European policy. Mired in an identity crisis due to the factionalism of the 79 Group, the party faced a period of change, particularly concerning the SNP's discourses on Europe. This policy area became of particular importance to the party as notions of statehood were being debated on the ground while unsuccessful UK devolution was being played out. The conflict within the party was a source of change (see Chapter 2) where different understandings of policy created a shift in the party's European trajectory.

Indeed, the emergence of the 79 Group is instructive to our understanding of the SNP's EEC policy. The gradualist-fundamentalist divide came to the fore of party politics and the SNP struggled with retaining a clear identity. Ideological factors spun the party into confusion as the 79 Group advocated more left-wing policies along the lines of not only independence, but the establishment of a Scottish Republic and a socialist redistribution of power, income and wealth. The creation of the group was a moment that generated a new way of doing things, particularly in regards to Europe. The group's composition of radicals demonstrates historical institutionalism's concept of layering: a regular form of change where new layers are added to the policy in the form of individuals with ideas (see Chapter 2). While the radicals' ideas can be regarded as a conflictual form of change, they also reveal institutional drift whereby an institution's rules are revised over time by its members. Specific ideas about Europe were introduced by the 79 Group's members such as Jim Sillars, who supported the Common Market and Scotland's involvement in European integration. The young radicals began to challenge the SNP's aversion to the EEC and stressed the importance of Europe to Scottish independence. While the 79 Group was a faction of the party, it continued to follow a logic of path-dependence in that nationalism was at the kernel of its European discourses.

It was not only intra-party factionalist tensions that prompted a change in the SNP's EEC policy. The context of British politics, particularly Thatcherism, steered the party towards a deeper anti-establishment rhetoric. This, accompanied by the SNP's experience in Europe, via Winnie Ewing, were undercurrents of change to the party's EEC policy. By 1983, the notion of European integration had become a central component of the SNP's nationalist rhetoric and certain individuals, most notably Wilson, used the notion as a way to unify the party. Contrary to his rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s, the Chairman believed that the SNP should become less isolationist and advocated, for the first time, EEC membership for an independent Scotland. With the adoption of a resolution to shake off its hostile attitude towards the EEC, the SNP's European policy had shifted. This shift was represented somewhere between drift and conversion forms of change. On the one hand, figures such as Gordon Wilson and the influence of the 79 Group represented drift whereby the institution's rules on Europe were revised by its members. On the other hand, the concept of conversion signifies a more complete institutional change where the 'meaning' of the institution is altered. The meaning had gone from one of nationalism to that of nationalism within an international context. Its meaning still followed a logic of path dependence, however, as the party continued to fight for independence through the framework of the EEC.

The 1984 European Parliamentary Elections also marked an important change in the SNP's discursive trajectory on Europe. The party's experience of the Common Market had eased the fears that the EEC was a bureaucratic 'superstate' and the SNP used negative imagery of other parties' failures to protect Scottish interests as a justification for the party to become more integrated with Europe. We see an instance of institutional layering here, where different ideas - from the hostility towards other British parties to the comparison of Scotland to other small EEC states – are combined to produce a prototypic discourse for the party's Independence in Europe narrative of 1988. The SNP started to warm to specific EEC structures and processes such as subsidies and the European campaign for cheaper air fares. It also used the argument that Scotland's natural resources would put it in good stead within the Community. All of this indicated that the image of Europe had become entwined in the SNP's vision of an independent Scotland.

Unlike any of its previous manifestos, that of the 1984 European Parliamentary Elections unpacked the prospect of European integration in a number of ways, such as reflecting on the protection of key Scottish interests such as fishing, steel and oil. This engagement at the micro level showed that the SNP's EEC policy had become thicker and more refined, giving it an enhanced authority on matters of European integration. At the same time, the party followed a logic of path-dependence by maintaining that national interests trumped European integration. Certain aspects of European integration in particular influenced the SNP's narrative on the EEC. For example, the party began to call for a reform of CAP. Unlike its previous literature, which was hostile to the EEC by principle, this manifesto took existing EEC policies and proposed their modification in order to better serve Scotland's interests. This is an example of how institutional layering had affected the party's discourses on Europe in that new layers were added by individuals such as Ewing, whose direct experiences with CAP and CFP informed the SNP's EEC stance. Ewing's re-election as MEP for the Highlands and Islands was testament to her activities in the European Parliament but also to the way the SNP had gained support through its European narratives. The discursive change was reflected in an electoral shift and the party's new EEC policy had gained credibility and validity.

The influence of British politics on the SNP's EEC policy became more apparent in the party's 1989 European Parliamentary Elections campaigning activities. Jay Smith, for example, argued that the Thatcher government was becoming increasingly anti-European. This harks back to Jolly's (2007) theory on fringe parties taking an alternative line to the establishment. Again, the party's EEC policy followed a logic of path-dependence whereby Scottish nationalism underpinned the SNP's stance. In particular, the party used Thatcher's implementation of the poll tax in Scotland as an argument for Independence in Europe. Furthermore, the SNP also claimed that Nirex was another reason to take a pro-EEC stance in order to prevent Scotland becoming a 'full-scale nuclear dump'. These are two distinct examples of how British politics influenced SNP figures into creating institutional layers whereby its discourses shifted towards a stronger pro-EEC stance.

The changing architecture of the EEC also had an impact on the SNP's European narratives. With the 1992 removal of all trade barriers resulting in increased European competition, the importance of the Independence in Europe narrative had become more salient. I argue, however, that the main influence of change came not from the infrastructure of the EEC itself but from the SNP's aversion to the unfolding pattern of British politics and its shift to the left. For example, the SNP had had enough of the Thatcher veto over improvements in conditions at work and used other European countries' experiences as a way to argue for such improvements. Indeed, it was perhaps the influence of the 79 Group that moved the party to the left at exactly the time Thatcher's government was moving UK policy to the right. Other arguments including women's rights, agriculture and fishing were put forward in the party's campaign, which maintained that these areas would be better represented by a nationalist voice in Europe.

4.5.2 Discursive institutionalist analysis

The party's coordinative discourses of the mid-1970s tell us that the SNP was an advocate of devolution in the House of Commons. Yet, its communicative discourses remained greatly nationalist, pushing the notion of 'Independence Nothing Less'.

While the SNP was still not completely unified on its European policy, certain party figures during the early 1980s helped to redefine and refine its stance on the EEC. With their background ideational abilities, such as Ewing's direct experience with Europe, party elites brought fresh ideas on Europe to the party. These abilities were combined with foreground discursive abilities, such as Wilson's leadership, and the SNP's policy on Europe shifted. The party's attitudes towards Europe also followed a logic of communication whereby ideas shape institutions by discursive interactions. These interactions included Ewing's meetings with EEC officials as well as intraparty discursive interactions at conference. Indeed, SNP conferences are often the locus of policy changes.

The shift in the SNP's European trajectory helped the party to change from extreme to mainstream in the sense that its support of the EEC made the prospect of Scottish

independence more imaginable. While there remained hostility towards the EEC from some members of the SNP, the 1984 European Parliamentary Elections provided the SNP with an opportunity to really engage with the project of European integration on both intellectual and practical levels. The party argued against Scotland's psychological dependence on the British government and used the EEC as an alternative framework in which to achieve Scottish sovereignty. Both normative and cognitive arguments were used, such as maintaining that Scotland was a 'natural' part of Europe and had much to offer in terms of alternative energy. Yet, through its criticisms of the EEC, the party's communicative discourses reveal tensions in the coordinative discourses, in that not all ideas – of which individuals are carriers – were pro-European. This was particularly the case for the Common Fisheries Policy. We see here not only incidents of layering but also of the aforementioned *bricoleur* effect, where leader Gordon Wilson put together the ideas of key figures such as Ewing and Sillars. These ideas were pro-European in nature and evolved into a formalised shift in party rhetoric in 1985 with the publication of *Moving On and Moving Up in Europe*.

The 1989 European Parliamentary Elections was a pivotal moment for the SNP's discourses on Europe and posed a prime opportunity for the party to harden its ideas both in coordinative and communicative spheres. We are able to see how smaller, individual ideas underlay the Independence on Europe narrative. For example, one significant idea running through the campaign ephemera is that Thatcher's government was becoming more anti-European. Another is that Scotland would have improved pensions if it were independent in Europe. These normative ideas of 'what is good or bad about what is' in light of 'what one ought to do' are much more common in the party's 1989 European Parliamentary Elections manifesto than in that of 1984. These ideas interact via actors' foreground discursive abilities which allow them to change the institution via a logic of communication.

The prototypic discourse for the Independence in Europe narrative advanced by Wilson in 1984, and the publication of Sillars' *Moving On and Up in Europe* (1985), are intrinsically linked to the texts of the 1989 European Parliamentary Elections campaign. While it was not formally called 'Independence in Europe', the idea had been rooting itself in the party since the beginning of the decade. Contrary to 1984, the idea of

Europe was not only being communicated by party elites. There were now eight candidates who were diffusing ideas about Europe to their local constituencies. The idea of Europe was beginning to embed itself on a local level. We can see this in the increased discursive frequency in the mention of issues at the heart of constituencies such as fishing and agriculture. The party's communicative discourses had also become stronger, indicated by the presence and involvement of bodies such as STUC and the Young Scottish Nationalists.

Conclusions

The main contribution of this chapter and arguably of the whole thesis is to expose the critical juncture in the SNP's policies on Europe. This juncture occurred at the SNP's annual conference in 1983 when the party began to argue for independence in Europe for the first time. Though it did not reach communicative discourses until 1988 upon the official launch of the SNP's Independence in Europe narrative, the idea had started to germinate in the party's coordinative discourses five years earlier. Indeed, as historical institutionalism asserts, critical junctures arise from particular events and crises. I argue that the crisis of the 79 Group was one such inducer of the critical juncture in the sense that the lack of identity within the party encouraged a revision of policy, including that on Europe. That said, incremental change can also lead to critical junctures and the events of the 1960s and 1970s also had a part to play in the change in SNP policy on Europe in 1983. For example, the activities of political entrepreneurs such as Ewing in Europe as well as structural factors such as British politics and European integration had an effect on the party's policies into the early 1980s.

The SNP's shift from anti- to quasi pro-EEC during the 1980s can largely be explained by British politics. The 1983 general election was a huge success for the Conservatives and, with Thatcher's rejection of a Scottish assembly, the SNP had to fight back. This fight entailed situating Scottish nationalism in a European context which was most apparent at the party conference in 1983. Thus, the move towards pro-European policy cannot only be explained as a way of unifying the party but also as a protest against Thatcherism. The SNP's disenchantment with the Conservative government's representation of Scotland in Europe encouraged the narrative of by-passing London to

Europe directly. The party maintained that the Conservative government was not only anti-Scottish but also anti-European and the SNP's new pro-European stance stood in contrast to that of the Tories. Thatcher's implementation of the poll tax was used as another argument for Independence in Europe, with the SNP claiming that an independent Scotland in the EEC would adopt a system of local income tax instead. Furthermore, within the framework of the EEC, the party campaigned to stop Nirex's nuclear dumping in Scotland as well as improving workers' rights.

On the level of European integration, MEP Winnie Ewing, tried to make Scotland relevant to the EEC by organising study visits and meetings between European and SNP elites. This served to warm the party to the prospect of Europe, and the SNP's hostility to the EEC shifted at its annual conference in September 1983 when a resolution passed, recognising the Community as a place in which Scotland's voice could be heard. Elite consensus from both SNP traditionalists and gradualists benefited this new view and in addition to Ewing's work to shift the party's perspective on Europe, Jim Sillars was also influential to the cause. The 1989 European Elections were much more substantial than those of 1984 because of the renewed vitality of European integration. They were particularly focused on post-1992 Europe when the Single Market was to be established. The SNP argued that the 1992 removal of all trade barriers increased the importance of the EEC and said that an independent Scotland in Europe would push for improved Scotland-Europe transport links to ensure that Scottish goods could reach European markets. This shows the effect that European integration and the opening of new European spaces encouraged a revision of the party's policies on Europe.

From the above, we can see how the British and European levels intersected to produce a highly contextual environment in which the SNP had to formulate and communicate specific EEC policies. This chapter has shown how the critical juncture of 1983 rested somewhere between drift and conversion forms of change (see Chapter 2). It is considered to be drift in the sense that the party's rules on Europe were revised by its members and conversion on the basis that the 'meaning' of the institution was altered. In other words, the meaning had shifted from nationalism to nationalism within an international context. Despite this shift, this chapter has shown that the SNP continued

to follow a logic of path dependence as it argued for Scottish sovereignty in the framework of the EEC.

Chapter 5: Devolution and Europe (1990-2000)

The 1990s came to be known as the 'Salmond Decade' as the SNP professionalised under the leadership of Alex Salmond. In September 1990, Wilson resigned as leader of the party. It was expected that Jim Sillars would stand for election yet it came down to a contest between Margaret Ewing and Alex Salmond. Initially, Ewing was the favourite candidate yet was disadvantaged for several reasons. First, she had two campaigns: the 'official' one and the 'Left Caucus' campaign of Sillars. Second, as Hassan (2016, p. 420) has noted, Ewing was missing a real agenda and displayed a level of complacency in her work. Sillars stood strongly behind Ewing's campaign while showing increasing opposition to Salmond. When Salmond won the 1990 contest, Sillars was left with a 'personal bitterness' for the next two decades (Hassan, 2016, p. 420). Yet Sillars had set the groundwork for the SNP's Independence in Europe narrative.

As literature around this decade primarily discusses the significance of Salmond to the party's professionalisation, it only seems right to have a section of this chapter dedicated to understanding more about his background discursive abilities. For if we are able to comprehend them, we are also able to understand how Salmond used his foreground discursive abilities to engender change within the party, particularly in strengthening the SNP's pro-European stance. After analysing Salmond's background, this chapter will primarily focus on the discourses of the SNP's manifestos during the 1990s. Finally, this chapter will draw conclusions about the main drivers of change in the party's policies on Europe during this period.

5.1 Alex Salmond

Alex Salmond joined the SNP while studying at the University of St Andrews in 1973. Elected MP for Banff and Buchan in 1987, he defeated Margaret Ewing as party convenor in 1990. Salmond's first decade as party leader mainly involved playing out the party's Independence in Europe and devolution narratives (Ritchie, 2016, p. 281) as well as rejecting exclusionary ethnic narratives of Scottish nationalism that had 'typified the SNP's understanding of the nation whilst also reviving its electoral fortunes'

(Mycock, 2012, p. 55; see Leith, 2008; Lynch, 2009). The new leader injected the party with a more civic nationalist view whereby Scotland recognised borders and the implications of statehood, such as separate education and legal systems (Mycock, 2012, p. 55).

Ritchie has claimed Salmond as 'arguably the most effective politician in the United Kingdom', casting the party in his own image – 'feisty, non-conformist and driven by conviction' (Ritchie, 2016, pp. 281-282). As Salmond himself has explained, the strongest shaper of his nationality and identity was his grandfather, Sandy Salmond, who 'instructed' him in the Scottish oral tradition (Devine and Logue eds, Being Scottish, 243-44; Torrance, 2010, p. 13). That said, Salmond reflected that joining the SNP in the early-1970s was not planned, and was 'more a kid of act of rebellion than anything else' (in Torrance, 2010, p. 29). The European question was strong at the beginning of Salmond's involvement with the party as the UK prepared for the 1975 European Communities membership referendum. Salmond was heavily involved in the referendum and stood as EEC Convener of the St Andrews Federation of Student Nationalists. A number of speeches from this time show Salmond's opposition to the EEC, claiming, for example, that 'Scotland's bright economic future will be jeopardised by the remote and centralised policies of the Common Market' (*St Andrews Citizen*, 10 May 1975). Though negative, this engagement with European politics would prime Salmond for navigating the party's shift from unquestionable opposition to warmth in the course of the next decade.

5.1.1 Gradualism and devolution

Indeed, the SNP was 'becoming the sort of party Salmond personified' (Ritchie, 2016, p. 286). Democratic and legitimate, the SNP had demonstrated peaceful campaigning of a gradualist nature. This aligned with Salmond's 'famous gradualism' which was the source of much frustration of the fundamentalists within the party who proposed more direct action (Ritchie, 2016, p. 286). By the October 1974 election, the SNP emerged with eleven MPs and a third of the Scottish vote, and overnight turned into a notable electoral force. 'Salmond's first major political campaigning experiences were the general elections of February and October 1974, at which Wolfe was once again the SNP

candidate for West Lothian' (Torrance, 2010, p. 32). Salmond was unimpressed by the Labour Party's fickle approach to devolution and published a series of assaults against the party in 1976 while editor of the Free Student Press (*Linlithgowshire Journal and Gazette*, 27 August 1976).

To properly understand Salmond, it is also important to look at his relationships with others in the party. Shortly after Jim Sillars joined the SNP in 1980, Salmond described him as 'one of the most eloquent figures in Scottish politics and will prove an immense asset to the SNP' (*Linlithgowshire Journal and Gazette,* 6 June 1980). According to SNP activist, Isobel Lindsay, the relationship between the two was like 'mentor and protégé' (*The Salmond Years,* STV, 18 February 2001*)*. Though, according to Ritchie (2015, p. 292), the two were like 'oil and water' when it came to working together. Sillars seemed frustrated with not getting his own way and became ever divergent and disconnected from the party. Sillars was a fundamentalist and Salmond a gradualist, who argued that legal gradualism was the solution, whereby the party would win elections, find a voice in Parliament and proceed to persuade the legislature to accommodate independence. In response to a cutting remark by Sillars on Salmond's gradualist tendencies, Salmond jadedly said 'sometimes I think on the night of independence when the people are celebrating along Princes Street there'll be Jim in a shop doorway shouting "we're getting our independence the wrong way"' (in Ritchie, 2016, p. 292).

The two actors took the SNP further to the left and created their own aforementioned 79 Group. Party leader at the time, Gordon Wilson, banned the group and its members, including Salmond. Out of the party and unable to enter Parliament, Salmond was frustrated with the SNP's intra-party politics and was not readmitted with his partner rebels until the early 1980s. In an interview with journalist Andrew Marr, Salmond expressed how the expulsion was 'traumatic' and that 'even after a few years in the SNP I'd become extremely loyal and passionate about the party, and was extremely disconcerted not to be in it' (Marr, 2013, p. 191). The experience had moderated Salmond's stance and he began to 'settl[e] in as a middle-of-the-road nationalist' (Ritchie, 2016, p. 289). While still left on social issues, he displayed some right-wing economic standpoints and was often seen with successful businessmen and celebrities with similar views, most notably actor, Sean Connery.

In the 1987 general election, Salmond won Banff and Buchan with a majority of 2,411. By this point, Salmond was able to shape the party's media coverage in his role as deputy convener for publicity. Shortly before becoming deputy leader of the SNP in 1987, Salmond cautioned the party 'It's not enough to argue for independence and nothing else. The constitutional case must not be presented in isolation but as the route to social and economic change in Scotland. The priority is to win the economic argument for independence, but we must also present Scots with a challenging, outward-looking vision of Scotland's potential as an independent state' (*Glasgow Herald,* 25 September 1987). For most of his first period in Commons, Salmond concentrated on organising the party and working towards the time when devolution would give the SNP enhanced power. He had a longstanding opinion that in modern democracies opposition parties will ultimately have the opportunity to govern. Salmond regarded a Scottish parliament or assembly as the mechanism for this and worked hard on planning its implementation. Indeed, after Salmond's election, the SNP began its transformation from a growing movement to a credible political party (Ritchie, 2016, p. 291-293).

As the notion of devolution became more tangible in the late 1990s, Salmond put forward his gradualist approach when he announced that he would take an anti-fundamentalist position with his Declaration of Devolution. The left-leaning leader began to see the value of a European platform upon which to continue the social democratic project that Thatcher had attempted to end (Hepburn and McLoughlin, 2011, pp. 388-389). Following the 1997 devolution referendum result, Salmond told the Scotsman, 'Everything has changed. The gravity of Scottish politics has now shifted. We are now fighting on a Scottish agenda. The key elections are no longer the elections for the next Westminster parliament; the key elections are 1999 and the elections for the Scottish parliament' (*The Scotsman*, 24 September 1997). Salmond's gradualist approach can be summed up in his following words: 'If the Scots get a devolved Parliament and see how constitutional change works to their benefit, they'll obviously want more of it,' (in Ritchie, 2016, p. 294).

5.2 Early 1990s and Europe of the Regions

While the Independence in Europe narrative was officially adopted by the SNP in 1988, it was still not entirely clear how the party wanted to implement this policy. There existed much uncertainty as to whether the SNP supported centralisation or decentralisation, or federalism or confederalism in the EEC. Those on the 'supranationalist' wing supported further European unification whereby a central authority would have control over defence, foreign policy and a single currency. On the other hand, those on the intergovernmentalist wing advocated the importance of states where powers would only be shifted to the EEC upon agreement between member states (Hepburn, 2009, p. 194).

In 1990, Allan Macartney MEP, attempted to elucidate the SNP's position on these matters. He maintained that the Independence in Europe policy would involve the establishment of a European confederation: an association of member states that pooled sovereignty over some areas but would not give up all powers to a particular authority. This approach would enable Scotland to have a say equal to that of other small member states (Macartney, 1990) and is mirrored in *Scotland – A European Nation* (SNP, 1992, p. 5) where the party claims that 'many decisions affecting the lives of every European will continue to be taken in Brussels. And…those decisions will be reached by representatives of independent member states in the Council of Ministers'.

As Lynch (1996, p. 50) highlights, the Europeanisation of the SNP's policy agenda reveals the acknowledgment of the constraints of independence and the restraints upon nation states functioning in an international system and global economy. The SNP's 1992 General Election manifesto title – *Independence in Europe: Make It Happen Now* - demonstrates the SNP's growing pro-European stance during the early 1990s and the centrality of European discourse to the party's strategy. Salmond (SNP, 1992, p. 3) described the party's commitment to Independence in Europe in the following way:

'…Right across Europe, nations are asserting their right to self-determination – a fundamental principle enshrined in international law. The newly-liberated nations of Eastern and Central Europe – many of them smaller and all of them poorer than

Scotland – are queuing up to join the European Community, alongside many of the former EFTA countries. None of them would settle for some sort of second-rate regional status; all insist on becoming independent member states in their own right…'

The SNP's idea of an independent Scotland entailed being a member of the United Nations, being a non-nuclear country like the Irish Republic and Austria, and having a constitutional monarchy like Denmark. The party envisioned Scotland sharing a monarchy with the English, like New Zealand and Canada (Macartney, 1990, p. 37). The SNP also had a longstanding policy of an Association of States of the British Isles (ASBI), modelled on the Nordic Council, which would involve having routine meetings on shared interests such as railways (Macartney, 1990, p. 38). Yet, there was 'basic contradiction' in the SNP's stance on the EEC, where 'the SNP [was] trying at one and the same to be Integrationist and Nationalist' (Maxwell, 1989, p. 24). The party's implementation of the 'Scotland in Europe' narrative during the 1990s was, according to Dardanelli (2005), rooted in 'political pragmatism that recognised the subsidiarity allowed for bypassing of the UK government and empowering the Scottish government'. To sum up, the partage of sovereignty with the EU was considered to boost the case for Scottish independence and soothe public worry about 'going it alone' (Dardanelli, 2005).

5.2.1 Europe of the Regions

While many minority nationalist parties were circumspect about Europe in the late 1970s, by the early 1990s there was a union of support for a 'Europe of the Regions' (Hepburn, 2008, p. 1). The idea of a Europe of the regions was not new, however, but was 'given contemporary resonance' during this time due to the EU's structural fund reforms in 1988 (Antunes, 2017). There was now a particular level of institutional acknowledgment of regional and local governments in the EU and work was done to advance the regional level at succeeding EU treaty revisions at Amsterdam, Nice and at the Convention on the Future of Europe.

The idea of a Europe of the Regions has become explicitly linked to the self-determination demands of minority nationalist parties and members of the EFA have

largely accepted the principles of European integration, extending their autonomy objectives to encompass the European element (Keating, 2001). Minority nationalist parties were among the first to associate self-determination with Europe and called for various compositions, such as a Europe of the Peoples, a Europe of the Small States, and, like the SNP, independence in Europe (Hepburn, 2008, pp. 1-2). The EEC was coming to be seen as a unit with many new opportunity structures as well as new prospects for symbolic and constitutional recognition 'outside the confines of the state' (Keating, 2001).

Indeed, it has been broadly claimed that the alteration of state and European structures has fashioned new political and economic environments in which territorial actors function (Hooghe, 1995; Lynch, 1996; Keating, 1998; De Winter 2001). European integration became an element of party competition and was linked to opportunities for domestic constitutional change (Hepburn, 2008, pp. 1-2). The regional and European electoral domains have become more significant and have merited new strategies from political parties formerly preoccupied with state electoral competition (Hough and Jeffery, 2006). European institutions, networks and lobbying organisations have offered opportunities for territorial actors to find new political expression (Keating, 2006). Such opportunities were once 'closed' by the expansion of the nation state (Bartolini, 2005) but now parties are required to acclimatise to complex multi-level political systems in which the European, state and regional levels are mutually constitutive (Deschouwer, 2003; Hepburn and Detterbeck, 2009). This may involve 'bypassing' the state (see Keating, 1999) but also may necessitate regional parties to cooperate with statewide actors and institutions to achieve their goals (Jeffery, 2004).

Regional parties' increasing participation in the European project has occurred for several reasons. First, the decentralisation and Europeanisation of regional policy created direct channels to EU decision-making procedures and inspired the articulation of 'political demands in regional terms and provided objects for political mobilisation' (Hooghe and Keating, 1994, p. 370). Second, European directives have an influence on subjects of regional competences, such as social rights, the environment and economic development. Regional parties are required to form responses to and policy positions on these changes within the regional electoral sphere (Hepburn, 2008, p. 2). Finally, the

EU has offered a vital symbolic or discursive space in which regional parties can pursue their self-determination goals (Keating, 2006; Elias, 2006).

Significantly, the imagery of a Europe of the Regions had both constitutional and policy repercussions. From one point of view, it represented the possibility of reaching fundamental policy demands, such as regional representation, economic resources, and greater control over regional competences. From another, the imagery of a Europe of the Regions became the 'constitutional *leitmotif*' of regional parties, signifying common disillusionment with the largely intergovernmental operations of the EU, which have neglected the rights and identities of regions and stateless nations (Hepburn, 2008, p. 3). Thus, for regional parties, a 'Europe of the Regions' did not indicate a 'uniform' institutional level in the EU. Rather, it was used to 'capture a
set of political, constitutional and economic goals directed towards Europe that enabled the realization of their specific territorial interests' (Hepburn, 2008, p. 3).

While the SNP pursued a confederal Europe with a concentration of power at the member state level in the Council of Ministers, it also became involved in debates about the regionalisation of Europe. Indeed, during the 1990s in Scotland, a Europe of the Regions was championed by parties pursuing constitutional reform. With Jacques Delors' new project of social integration in 1988 and the implementation of the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), regional parties began to warm to the idea of Europe. The SNP saw the EEC as a new structure for security and trading prospects that could supplant the 'external' structure of the UK state (SNP, 1992). The party supported the establishment of a Committee of the Regions (CoR) in 1993. The same year saw the establishment of the EU which included the European Community (formerly the EEC). The question of the Committee of the Regions caused a big party divide when SNP leaders made a 'secret deal' with the Conservative government to gain more seats on the Committee for Scotland (*The Scotsman*, 9 April 1993). The SNP also favoured the creation of a Scottish Minister for European and External Affairs, the establishment of Scotland House, and the development of enhanced connections between the Scottish Parliament and other European substate governments. As Alyn Smith (2021) explained, it was 'the evolution of the party's interaction with the wider world' as well as the SNP's 'grow[th] in seriousness... that we got real on the EU'.

From 1995 onwards, European regional parties began to ask whether their territorial interests could be achieved in Europe. This questioning was induced by the persistent centralisation of powers at the state level in the Council of Ministers, the CoR representing nothing more than a 'talking-shop', and the absence of a strong regional voice in the draft European Constitution (Hepburn, 2008, p. 10). The SNP alongside Bloque Nacionalista Galego threatened to oppose the draft European Constitution in national referendums. This 'closing' of opportunities for regional action in Europe caused an end to cross-party consensus on achieving regional autonomy in Europe. As these opportunities diminished, some regional parties began to rely once again on state channels. Others took on more Euroscpetical views. Indeed, Chambers (2007, p. 112) has noted that the SNP has regularly criticised the idea of a 'Europe of the Regions' supported by devolutionists. The party argued that it would entail lesser representation in European institutions as opposed to national representation on all the EU's bodies. It claimed that, while a Europe of the Regions would affect the decision-makers, it would not allow regions to become decision-makers themselves (Chambers, 2007, p. 112).

The SNP's wavering between independence and enhanced regionalisation reflected a cleavage present in the party since the unification of the pro-independence National Party of Scotland with the pro-home rule Scottish Party (Hepburn 2009). It is the same old question between gradualism and fundamentalism where, in this instance, fundamentalists were strongly opposed to the decision to support the yes-yes option in the 1997 devolution referendum. The first question was 'I agree there should be a Scottish Parliament' and the second, 'I agree that a Scottish Parliament should have tax-varying powers'. Fundamentalists maintained that devolution would hinder the progression of Scottish independence (Hepburn and McLoughlin, 2011, p. 389).

5.3 1997 UK General Election and 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Election

With the rightward shift of the Labour Party under Tony Blair, the SNP coined Labour as a 'Thatcherite' party. The Scottish Elections Surveys of 1997 and 1999 showed that between the UK and Scottish elections of those years, the proportion of Scots who believed that New Labour represented working class needs had fallen from 90 to 51 per

cent. The surveys also showed that the number of people who believed that the Labour Party represented Scotland's interests had dropped from 68 to 40 per cent (Chambers, 2007, p. 107). Many of those disillusioned Labour voters were targeted by the SNP which had by then successfully 'branded' itself as a social democratic party in Europe. As SNP media officer, Joe Middleton stated, New Labour 'represents a watered down form of Thatcherism disguised by muddled middle class values' and that 'the terrible exploitation of the poor and weak in our society began by Thatcher and continued by Major will not be stopped by Labour' (in Chambers, 2007, p. 107).

Considering the popular support for devolution in Scotland, the SNP felt compelled to support the referendum campaign of 1997. During the official launch of the 'Yes, Yes' campaign on 22nd August 1997, Salmond declared: '…we believe that devolution is not an end, but a beginning – a step towards real Independence. We hope to persuade the people of Scotland to share that view and to act on it. But to commence on any journey, we must take our future into our own hands…' (in Lynch, 2002, p. 223). Salmond persuaded the party to give unequivocal support for devolution in the 1997 devolution referendum (Ritchie, 2016, p. 281). During the same year, Salmond claimed that an independent Scotland could:

…play our part in the political reform of the Community, arguing for greater democracy and accountability within EC structures to close the 'democratic deficit'. Our objective is not a European super state but a confederal Community of independent nations which choose to share their sovereignty and cooperate more closely for the benefit of all, while still retaining their rich diversity…(in Kikas, 1997).

5.3.1 1997 UK General Election manifesto and Europe

The 1997 UK General Election manifesto asserted that the SNP had a 'traditional openness' to Europe. As we have seen from previous chapters, this is not so much traditional as the party only really opened to Europe in the early 1980s. Yet, the SNP vowed that membership of the EU would allow Scotland to 'defend and promote its interests in a world that shrinks each day' (SNP, 1997, p. 30). The document maintained that Scotland would be a full member of the EU and would participate in its institutions

alongside having full voting powers in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. In a Europe which was 'increasingly dominated by small member states', the SNP saw Independence in Europe as a way to escape the 'powerless' observer status proposed by Labour in its devolution plans (SNP, 1997, p. 30).

The SNP maintained that an independent Scotland would be a member of the Council of Europe and its offshoot, the European Court of Human Rights (SNP, 1997, p. 30). Furthermore, the manifesto declares that Scotland would help to establish an Association of States of the British Isles which would include England, Wales and Ireland (SNP, 1997, p. 30). The SNP claimed that an independent Scotland would participate and benefit from international cooperation in terms of conflict resolution, peacekeeping and training. The party supported an EU Common Security and Defence Policy and vowed that it would be involved with the Western European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and the Partnership for Peace. In particular, the SNP stated that a Peacekeeping college would be established in Scotland (SNP, 1997, p. 30).

Being 'left on the sidelines' is a strong theme in the manifesto and the party maintained that having a direct voice in the EU would allow Scotland to safeguard its national interests (SNP, 1997, p. 30). Part of the sentiment of being left on the sidelines came from Scotland paying its share of the UK diplomatic budget but receiving little in return. The party claimed that an independent Scotland in Europe would receive much more for this contribution (SNP, 1997, pp. 30-31). Most notably, the manifesto states that 'Independence means joining in, not staying separate'. This is very removed from the sentiment of the 1960s to early 1980s whereby the SNP remained opposed to EEC membership on the grounds that it was a centralist entity very much *separate* from Scotland and its interests. The manifesto also states that the 'real separatists' are the establishment which has sidelined Scotland in European affairs (SNP, 1997, p. 31).

As an independent state, Scotland would have an opportunity at the European Presidency which, the party claimed, would hold huge benefits for the nation. It would create embassies and consulates to look after Scots, promote Scottish trade and industry, and 'represent the best of Scotland to the world' (SNP, 1997, p. 31). In

particular, the party prioritised negotiating the new CFP and to 're-orientate' the CAP towards 'those who work the land' (SNP, 1997). Moreover, the SNP ensured that rural and urban areas of Scotland would receive maximum assistance from the right EU funds (SNP, 1997, p. 31).

The SNP's long standing opposition to nuclear weapons also appears in this manifesto as well as in its predecessors. It maintains that the party would negotiate a phased removal of Trident from the Clyde and invest its savings in conventional defence, health and education (SNP, 1997, p. 31). Rather than having nuclear weapons, the SNP advocated investing in defence diversification and participating in European defence structures (SNP, 1997, p. 31). Again, the SNP referred to other small European states to exemplify how an independent Scotland could function. In particular, it refers to the Scandinavian models (SNP, 1997, p. 32).

5.3.2 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Election

Established only in July 1999, the Scottish Parliament is young and was created when European integration had advanced quite substantially and parliaments had to contend with various obstacles (Högenauer, 2015, p. 1). The transfer of competences from established parliaments to the European level was considered to result in a loss of parliaments' legislative and control powers (Maurer and Wessels, 2003). The Scottish Parliament is a unique case, however, as its domestic competences were officially increased with devolution and were instantly constrained by the EU's competences (Högenauer, 2015, p. 1). Contrary to instances of more advanced federal states, such as Austria or Germany, where European integration merged subnational and supranational competences, the Scottish government had to 'face the challenge of an extensive overlap already at the time of their establishment' (Högenauer, 2015, pp. 3-5). This was particularly the case in areas such as justice, agriculture, fisheries, economic development and the environment, where the Scottish parliament had wide competences under the Scotland Act (Carter and McLeod, 2005, p. 67). However, the EU also had a wide range of competences under its supranational Treaties (Högenauer, 2015, pp. 3-5).

Even more problematic is the fact that EU affairs are a reserved matter (Scotland Act, 1998), meaning that the UK government is responsible for the negotiations when the European Commission's proposals are formulated under a domain of Scottish competences. That said, the resultant European legislation may 'force' the Scottish institutions to alter their policies or adopt new ones, the institutions have a direct interest in the UK's negotiations (Hazell and Paun, 2010, p. 167). The Scotland Act of 1998 had little information on daily harmonisation between the two levels of government. The Act guaranteed compatibility with EU affairs by stating that an act of the Scottish Parliament cannot become law if it is in breach of EU law. It also states that the UK government can enforce European responsibilities via secondary legislation, including in devolved areas. As such, the Scottish Parliament and Executive do not have a statutory right to be involved in EU decision-making, unlike their Belgian and German equivalents (McFadden and Lazarowicz, 2010, p. 171).

The Act set out the division of legislative responsibilities between the Scottish Executive and Westminster. The Executive gained control over a wide variety of domestic matters, including health, justice, education, agriculture and fisheries, while all external relations issues are reserved to the UK Parliament. Essentially, this means that the authority to negotiate policies in devolved areas returns to Westminster when the EU is involved. Furthermore, under the Act, the Scottish Parliament is forbidden to implement legislation that goes against EU law. However, while external relations are reserved, observing and implementing obligations under EU law are not (McLeod, 2003). As such, the Scottish Parliament is expected to analyse and enact EU legislation in areas that come under its competence (Glen, 2008, p. 65).

As with other subnational territorial units in the EU, Scotland's interests were represented through various formal and informal channels, both top-down and bottom-up. The clearest channel by which the EU affects its regions is through legislation. However, as member states and not EU regions are legally responsible to implement directives, domestic political arrangements determine the level at which regions are involved. In the UK, these arrangements notably shifted following the creation of the Scottish Parliament, which implemented a system of shared competences, substituting a highly centralised arrangement of authority (Glen, 2008, p. 65).

The SNP's 1999 manifesto was especially intended to appeal to longstanding Labour voters through its social democratic policies, such as enhanced public spending in health, education and housing, which it suggested to fund through an increasing income tax. The manifesto also decided to back devolution but only as a way to reach full independence in Europe. It stated that the party would hold a referendum on independence within its first four-year term. It is clear from the document that the SNP viewed devolution as a springboard for both independence and, more importantly, independence in Europe (SNP, 1999, p. 1). What is different about this manifesto, however, is that it was the first ever manifesto for the Scottish Parliamentary Elections. The context was reframed as Scotland now had devolved powers.

The imagery of an independent Scotland in Europe became fuller in the 1999 manifesto, with references to making Scotland the 'science and innovation capital' of Europe. An SNP government would establish 'high tech spots' for new jobs and industry as 'world wide centres of excellence in advanced technologies' (SNP, 1999, pp. 11-12). Furthermore, the manifesto argued that with Independence in Europe, Scottish business could go much further. For example, an independent Scotland could adopt a macroeconomic policy tailored to Scotland's interests rather to those of the south east of England economy. This would improve the growth rate of the Scottish economy and make the personal tax system more just. It would also create a significant shift in trade and industry policy, which would include replicating that of Austria, Ireland and Sweden who have reduced the rate of corporation tax significantly and increased revenues following the creation of more 'high value added operations' (SNP, 1999, p. 13). Again, the party emphasised that the aforementioned are 'all small European countries' (SNP, 1999, p. 13). This comparison serves to discursively bolster the claim to independence in Europe: i.e. if others can do it, so can we. This indicates that the party was now immersing itself in a new European context – one of modernisation, technology and with a very clear focus on the future.

The SNP acknowledged that it was not able to change UK economic policy or manage the strong pound, which 'seriously depressed market prices and cut the value of support payments from Europe' (SNP, 1999, p. 16). It did, however, vow that the Scottish

Parliament would be able to deploy certain measures to address key challenges to crofters and farmers (SNP, 1999, p. 16). For example, by prioritising European representation on farming interests and by creating a Quality Assurance Scheme to recover Scotland's market position in the UK and Europe (SNP, 1999, p. 16). Furthermore, the party wanted to do the same for the Scottish fishing industry in Europe whereby it would shape EC policy progress to uphold the original values of the CFP. At the same time, however, the party stressed that the CFP is not a 'free-for-all' (SNP, 1999, p. 17) and that in the EU, Scotland must create a thorough but just policing regime which would be 'equally enforceable' in all EU waters (SNP, 1999, p. 17). Scotland should also pay more attention to technical procedures to conserve fish stocks (SNP, 1999, p. 18). Moreover, the manifesto argued that European fisheries policy must be better constructed to safeguard places with a strong dependence on fishing, low populations and peripherality – such as those of Scottish fishing communities (SNP, 1999, p. 18).

The party continued to use the benefits fishing and agriculture would receive as an argument for Independence in Europe. The manifesto stated that an independent Scotland would provide the nation's key rural industries, such as agriculture and fishing, with direct representation in the Council of Ministers where 'the big decisions are made' (SNP, 1999, p. 18). The party argued that Independence in Europe was key to Scotland's rural industries and communities as demonstrated by the capitulation on fishing policy, the BSE crisis and the loss of Objective I status SNP, 1999, p. 18).

With devolution now more tangible, the SNP had a firmer platform upon which to promote its European ideas and policies. 'Holyrood, like any national parliament,' the manifesto stated, 'will want to ensure that its relations with other parliaments and neighbours are both good and constructive' (SNP, 1999, p. 30). The party vowed to create an External Affairs Ministry, which would oversee liaisons with the European Commission and the European Council of Ministers. Additionally, it swore to create mechanisms to shape and keep an eye on European policy developments and to open relations with EU institutions where funds from Europe would be managed and analysed to 'Scotland's best advantage' (SNP, 1999, p. 30). The External Affairs Ministry would be monitored by a parliamentary committee at Holyrood, which would consider

in particular the formation of the ministry's responses to EU directives and policy directions (SNP, 1999, pp. 30-31). Finally, the party would establish a Scottish-European Assembly which would act as a forum for MSPs, MEPs and members of the Committee of the Regions. The Assembly would be the hub of networking and unification of the European institutions (SNP, 1999, pp. 30-31).

5.3.3 The late 1990s and the uncertainty around European integration

While the respective 1997 and 1999 manifestos were Europhilic by nature, minority nationalist parties became increasingly uncertain about European integration from the late 1990s onwards. Hepburn has noted how the SNP became more vigorous in its opposition to the intergovernmental style of European decision-making that neglected regional strategies (2008, p. 10). She identified four key factors that have influenced minority nationalist parties' territorial strategies in Europe, including the SNP. These are (1) access to European institutions and organisations, (2) economic resources (3) European party competition and (4) constraints of state structures. In terms of the first variable, political parties function within distinct opportunity structures that are shaped by the incentives and limitations of state territorial management. As such, parties' access to European institutions and organisations varies across time. This access directly influences parties' capabilities to shape the formation of agendas in Europe (Hepburn, 2008, p. 10).

Hepburn found that parties' increased engagement in European institutions correlates with a 'greater sense of disillusionment with the limits of regional empowerment in the European project' (Hepburn, 2008, p. 11). Her case analyses of Bavarian and Scottish parties demonstrated that both became progressively dubious about their limitations in Europe. Consequently, it seems that the more 'institutional learning' parties experience in Europe, the more likely they are to be disatisfied with the opportunities offered by European integration. Parties that have had direct participation in European institutions and networks better understand the limitations for European regions. The more aware they are of the constraints Europe poses for territorial activity, the more likely they are to fall back on lobbying mechanisms via the state (Hepburn, 2008, p. 11).

As for the second factor, Hepburn found that the economic position and resources of substate territories influence parties' territorial strategies in Europe. In particular, parties seeking independence in Europe needed economically viable projects. For the SNP, its electoral upsurge in Scotland occurred only after it refined its economic arguments for independence, formulated on the oil revenues from the discovery of the North Sea oil in the 1970s (Hepburn, 2008, p. 11). Indeed, the oil narrative remains constant to this day and has acted as a safety net for the party's economic case for independence in Europe. Third, Hepburn found that European and local party competition have influenced minority nationalist parties' strategies in Europe. For example, the economic protection of Scotland's coastal fishing communities from European competition was particularly important to the SNP. As aforementioned, the party claimed that it would oppose the draft European Constitution in a national referendum if the EU did not secure the devolution of fishing competences (Hepburn, 2008, p. 11).

The fourth and final factor Hepburn found was that the development of territorial strategies in Europe is influenced by state limitations (Hepburn, 2008, p. 11). As Scotland operates within a devolved state, the SNP has had to react to the opportunities and constraints this poses in order to access European institutions and organisations. For example, since 1999 the devolved Scottish Executive/Government has contributed to UK negotiations in Europe via intergovernmental channels and the Joint Ministerial Council (Hepburn, 2008, p. 12).

5.4 Analysis

5.4.1 Historical institutionalist analysis

Salmond's election as SNP leader in 1990 marked a distinct change in the party's European policy journey as it effectively generated a new way of doing things. Salmond spent his first decade as party leader rejecting exclusionary ethnic constructions of Scottish nationalism and promoting a more civic nationalist view. The leader's new strategy followed a logic of path-dependence whereby Scottish nationalism was at the heart of the party's decision-making process. By reframing nationalism as 'civic',

Salmond maintained this path by adding more elements that elaborate the path's meaning and create layers within the institution. One of the outcomes of this adoption of civic nationalism was the party's shift towards gradualism. This is an example of the conflict type of change where the party oscillated between Sillars' fundamentalist position and Salmond's gradualist outlook. In the end, the gradualist view came out on top even though it was following a fundamentalist establishment of the Independence in Europe narrative.

In the early 1990s, the party's new gradualist approach was situated in a specific context where the poll tax was a particularly contentious issue. This issue also contributed to enhancing Salmond's prominence in Scottish politics as he openly supported the 'Can Pay Won't Pay' poll tax campaign. Rather, the party suggested alternative tax systems such as those of some Scandinavian countries. Here is an example of how different elements can be added to an institution in the form of individuals with ideas to maintain the institutional message which, in this case, is autonomy from the UK. These particular elements were achieved through institutional learning whereby the SNP looked to other institutions to generate policies that would be favourable in a European context.

Indeed, the European structural reforms of 1988 had opened up a symbolic and discursive space for minority nationalist parties. The SNP became more vocal on the idea of Europe, including an increase in its references to other successful, small European states. The opportunity structures created by European integration were highly contextualised whereby the establishment of certain treaties allowed for greater regional representation at the European level. Pre-regionalisation of the EU, the party had feared that regions would lose their voices and national identities in the wider European framework. The SNP's institutional learning explored in the previous chapter gifted the party with the insight that Europe was not centralist and bureaucratic and that small nations' interests could be met at this level.

The decentralisation and Europeanisation of regional policy created immediate channels to EU decision-making processes and inspired the SNP's expression of regional demands. As Pierson (2000) maintains, path-dependence can be explained through

positive feedback from original policy choices – namely, the choice to become involved with the EU regionalisation project. The positive feedback the SNP received through its experiences of the Europeanisation of regional policy strengthened this choice. Institutions can also transform via learning processes and 'can move along an equilibria by responding to new information' (Peters, 2019, p. 93). The information of the success of other small states in Europe maintained the SNP's Independence in Europe policy of 1988. The launch of this narrative coincided with the EU's structural reforms so it is of little surprise that independence – even if it was to be achieved in a gradualist way – was contextualised in the image of a regionalised Europe. Furthermore, as European directives have an influence on areas of regional competences, such as social rights, the environment, and economic development, the SNP had every interest to be involved as much as possible.

Another actor important to the SNP's policies on Europe during the early 1990s was MEP, Allan Macartney. In his 1990 paper, Macartney attempted to elucidate the SNP's position on the confusion over the party's federalist/confederalist position. By maintaining that the Independence in Europe policy would involve the creation of a European confederation, he created another layer in the party's policies on Europe. These layers became even more intricate with Macartney's explanation that the SNP wished for an independent Scotland to be a member of the United Nations, a non-nuclear country like the Irish Republic and Austria, and having a constitutional monarchy like Denmark. Again, the party displays a level of institutional learning here whereby it refers to the success of other states to justify the prospect of an independent Scotland.

The British political context of the mid- to late-1970s can tell us much about the conditions in which the SNP's policies on Europe were operating. With the growing public disillusionment with New Labour, the SNP targeted this demographic in its 1997 General Election manifesto. The SNP used this disillusionment as an argument for Independence in Europe in that it sought to escape the 'powerless' observer status proposed by Labour in its devolution plans. The manifesto included more European policies and thus more discursive and institutional layers. For example, the party maintained that an independent Scotland would be a member of the Council of Europe

and its offshoot, the European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, Scotland would help to establish an Association of States of the British Isles and remove Trident from the Clyde. These layers serve to not only maintain and strengthen, but also to change the SNP's policies on Europe. And the change from the decade before - during which the SNP was just beginning to shed its anti-European image – is marked in many respects.

One of the main changes came when the Scottish Parliament's domestic competences were officially established with devolution and instantly constrained by the EU's competences in 1999. The Scottish government had to deal with this policy overlap, particularly in areas such as justice, agriculture and fisheries for which both Scotland and the EU had a wide range of competences. The party's opportunity structures were simultaneously opened by devolution and closed by the EU's competences which require that Scottish-EU affairs go back to Westminster. As the notion of devolution materialised in the late 1990s, the context in which the SNP's discourses on Europe operated once again changed. British politics were very much part of this context and Salmond began to argue that the European platform would allow Scotland to carry on the social democratic project that Thatcher's Conservative Government had tried to stop. The context of devolution allowed Salmond to project the party's commitment to Independence in Europe by claiming devolution as a stepping-stone to the real thing. This was very far removed from the party's European policy in the previous decade which was led by Sillars and was fundamentalist in nature.

The 1999 manifesto revealed a layering of ideas such as the proposal that Scotland should be the science and innovation capital of Europe. Other ideas included the Scottish Parliament's ability to deploy certain measures to address key challenges to crofters and farmers. This layering of ideas resulted in a more refined image of a modern and innovative independent Scotland in Europe. That said, these ideas also included negative views of the intergovernmentalist style of European decision-making that neglected regional strategies. The SNP's institutional learning in Europe meant that the party became rather disillusioned with the opportunities offered by European integration. It was also able to exploit the new opportunity structure due to the introduction of devolution in parts of the UK. As institutions follow a logic of path-dependence, however, it is expected that the SNP's decision-making would be centred

around its original goal of Scottish autonomy. Therefore, anything that served to make that possible, such as European integration, was at the top of the party's agenda. Thus despite pockets of negative rhetoric against the intergovernmental workings of the EU, the party's overall policy was one of warmth to Europe.

5.4.2 Discursive institutionalist analysis

As we know, discursive institutionalism's concept of background ideational abilities – human capacities - influence how actors rationalise events and operate within an institution. The first section of this chapter focused on Salmond and such abilities, revealing that he was raised in a nationalist environment. This nationalism remained with Salmond throughout his school and university days and he attempted to imbue the SNP with a sense of civic nationalism during his time as party leader. Indeed, Salmond's identification as Scottish first and British second aligned with the general purpose of the SNP. In particular, these background ideational abilities gave Salmond apparent authority on certain issues, particularly that of the economics of North Sea oil. This issue was extremely pertinent to Scottish independence in Europe and Salmond's expertise gave more credibility to the party's claims that Scotland's oil could sustain the independent state.

It is equally important to examine Salmond's foreground discursive abilities which allow actors to assess, change and maintain an institution via a logic of communication. An example of this was Salmond's ability to attract media attention in the Commons in the late-1980s which consequently saw the SNP jump in the polls. Foreground discursive abilities also allow actors to reason externally from their institution. Salmond reasoned externally from the SNP as an institution in several ways. First, he made continuous discursive references to the success of other small European states to bolster the claim for Scottish independence in Europe. Second, his external reasoning during his time at the Scottish Office and the Royal Bank of Scotland allowed him to construct a particular narrative on Scottish independence and oil. This narrative would maintain the Independence in Europe policy that had been implemented some years before, particularly due to Salmond's aforementioned credibility on the matter.

As discursive institutionalism asserts, philosophical ideas underpin policy ideas and constitute social values, principles and knowledge. Salmond's longstanding opinion that in modern democracies opposition parties will ultimately have the opportunity to govern is one such philosophical idea. This underpinned his conceptualisation of the Independence in Europe policy idea and that of devolution. Yet, the SNP's message of the late 1980s was not entirely clear, particularly around how it wanted to implement the Independence in Europe policy. This caused confusion in both coordinative and communicative discourses. On the coordinative level, there remained a federalist versus confederalist divide within the party which translated into ambiguity at the communicative level. Alan Macartney clarified these issues in 1990 by stating that the SNP welcomed the establishment of a European confederation. This hardening of the party's communicative discourses was reflective of the SNP's confidence in the Independence in Europe narrative under its new leader.

Macartney's layering of ideas mostly took the form of normative arguments whereby Scotland would be a non-nuclear independent state with a constitutional monarchy. Other normative arguments included being a member of the UN and establishing an Association of States of the British Isles. These normative ideas served to strengthen – and thus change - the SNP's policies on Europe and Macartney's role as a *bricoleur* helped to solidify the party's stance on the EU during the 1990s. Indeed, by the 1997 general election the SNP was still putting forward normative arguments such as the aforementioned establishment of an Association of States of the British Isles. The continuation of these policies indicates Macartney's efficacy as a *bricoleur* and Salmond's strength at maintaining the institution through his background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities.

Conclusions

This chapter has shown how the 1990s was a decade of real transformation for the SNP under the leadership of Alex Salmond, including for its policies on Europe. Chapter 1 revealed the extant literature's absence of analysis of the SNP's policies on Europe over three particular levels: Scottish, British and European. This chapter, however, has given

equal weighting to these levels of analysis and has found that, as in the 1960s and 1970s, British politics in particular had a profound impact on the SNP's policies on Europe. Moreover, this chapter has shown how political entrepreneurs, namely Salmond, have helped to shape these policies.

First, we have seen how the party's Independence in Europe narrative took on a gradualist flavour as Salmond led the party towards devolution. This was distinct from Sillars' fundamentalist construction in the mid-1980s of the 'official' Independence in Europe narrative. The aim was the same but the journey to get there was different. This is demonstrative of historical institutionalism's concept of layering - a type of gradual institutional change whereby new layers are added to the institution in the form of individuals with ideas. It is also demonstrative of conflict type change where the SNP swayed between Sillars' previous fundamentalist position and Salmond's gradualist outlook. Second, this chapter has shown how we can assess the significance of Salmond's political entrepreneurship through the concept of discursive institutionalism. Indeed, Salmond's background ideational abilities were distinctly shaped by nationalism and were translated into foreground discursive abilities, which allowed him to maintain (and indeed, strengthen) the SNP's policies on Europe during the 1990s.

Dovetailed with Labour's introduction of devolution in 1997, the prospect for Scottish independence in Europe became more palatable and imaginable and was a huge structural change that allowed the SNP to express its subnational interests. As such, the SNP's policies on Europe depended very heavily on British politics as well as the political entrepreneurship of Salmond. This point can also be seen in issues such as the poll tax which the SNP and Salmond in particular vehemently opposed and suggested an alternative, more 'European' tax system. Another way in which British domestic politics influenced the SNP's policies on Europe was the growing disillusionment of the Labour government which was 'sidelining' Scotland in European affairs and the SNP's ability to use this as an argument for Independence in Europe. Again, the extant literature has not deeply explored the effect that British politics had on the SNP's policies on Europe during the 1990s. This chapter has thus made a contribution by examining the intersection of the British and European levels in particular, using a unique conceptual approach of historical and discursive institutionalisms.

Finally, this chapter has shown how the SNP's policies on Europe also depended somewhat on European integration itself. The EU's structural reforms occurred only two years before Salmond was elected as leader. He entered a highly contextualised space whereby the reforms as well as Scottish devolution had opened up a symbolic environment. Thus, European integration had opened up an arena for greater articulation of the SNP's regional demands. The factor of European integration also worked with the factor of political entrepreneurship to produce a narrative on Europe much more comprehensive than ever before. As a political entrepreneur, Salmond used this new regional space created by the reforms to play out his gradualist version of independence in Europe. In sum, the SNP's discourses on Europe became thicker and more detailed under the leadership of Alex Salmond. We cannot say that this was solely down to Salmond and his abilities, however, as British and European politics also clearly contributed to the SNP's hardening of its European policies. This chapter has gone beyond the concept of Europeanisation (see Chapter 1) in its analyses by revealing the intersection of multiple structural and agential factors.

Chapter 6: A 'victory of continuity' (2000s)

Less than a year after the Scottish Parliament was created, Alex Salmond unexpectedly decided to stand down as party leader and MSP in 2000. This decision sparked substantial media speculation as Salmond was resigning when he was shadow First Minister at the SNP's electoral peak in the new devolved Scotland (Lynch, 2013, p. 249). Among other things, the media suggested illness and gambling debts as the reason for Salmond's resignation (Torrance, 2010, p. 203). The contest to replace Salmond was 'a relatively straight-forward one with no surprises' (Lynch, 2013, pp. 249-250).

Two candidates stood as National Convenor – the official title of the SNP leader – John Swinney and Alex Neil. Swinney had an impressive history as Senior Vice-Convenor, National Secretary and Vice-Convenor of Publicity. He had been MP for North Tayside since 1997 and MSP for the same seat since 1999. Swinney was a gradualist yet had substantial support from the traditionalists/fundamentalists within the party. This put him in a 'commanding position' in the leadership contest (Lynch, 2013, pp. 249-250). Neil was a candidate of a different flavour. He joined the SNP from the former Scottish Labour Party of Jim Sillars in the early 1980s, held several SNP offices and were elected as a regional list MSP for Central Scotland in 1999. Neil was on the left of the party and also its leading neo-fundamentalist, yet he had difficulty in separating himself from Sillars and the neo-fundamentalists to appeal to the party at large. In the end, Swinney was elected as National Convenor at the SNP conference in September 2000 by 547 votes to 268: 67 to 33 per cent (Lynch, 2013, pp. 249-250). Swinney's victory was 'one of continuity' as he was involved in implementing the SNP's gradualist strategy. He continued to implement the approach after 2000 in the lead up to the 2003 Scottish election (Lynch, 2013, pp. 249-250).

This chapter will consider the SNP's responses to European integration during the 2000s. First, it will examine the party's leadership and how this created space for further articulation of the SNP's policies on Europe. Second, it will analyse the manifestations of European policies in its manifestos of this decade and pinpoint certain influences. Finally, it will look at how the election of Alex Salmond as First Minister of

Scotland shaped the party's attitude towards Europe before drawing conclusions about the main currents of change in the party's EU policy.

6.1 2001 UK General Election

The 2001 UK General Election was a 'unique challenge to the SNP' (Lynch, 2013, p. 250). Since 1997, the party had stressed the significance of the Scottish Parliament and the importance of minimising Westminster powers. SNP MPs at Westminster had all become MSPs and intended to retire from Westminster in 2001, 'effectively decimating the party's representation at a stroke' (Lynch, 2013, p. 250). The absence of the party's prominent figures in Westminster had repercussions for the party, particularly as lesser-known candidates had to contest the Westminster seats. The SNP's Westminster campaign was also distinguished by the fact that it was the first to be led by John Swinney. Though it was his first election as party leader, Swinney had played an important role in crafting campaigns on several occasions (Lynch, 2013, pp. 250-251).

The Westminster campaign was designed to unveil the new SNP leader to the public at a UK election rather than at the 'strategically more vital' Scottish election of 2003 (Lynch, 2013, pp. 250-251). As such, the UK election was not just a dress rehearsal for the party's policies for 2003 but was also a chance to promote Swinney in a 'fairly safe' election versus the more tense background of the Scottish election. Moreover, there posed a challenge between Swinney's visibility compared to that of Salmond who was extremely well-known in Scottish politics. As Lynch has noted, 'whoever replaced Salmond was always likely to face an uphill battle to establish themselves in the public consciousness' (2013, pp. 250-251). However, the timing of Salmond's retirement gave Swinney over two years before standing in the Scottish elections as the main opposition leader in the Scottish Parliament (Lynch, 2013, pp. 250-251).

As Lynch (2013, pp. 251-252) has noted, the SNP strategically used the Westminster election to mark its policy positions for the Scottish election in 2003. In terms of its European policies, the 2001 manifesto gives more credence to the idea than it had in previous manifestos. While the 'SNP stands for Scotland in Europe', the manifesto

highlights circumstances in which it would not welcome additional policy moves to the European level, including taxation and natural resources (Jolly, 2007, p. 123).

6.1.1 The SNP's 2001 General Election Manifesto

The manifesto begins by asking readers to examine the SNP's Contract with the People to understand how the party would ensure the protection of Scottish public spending from London cuts (SNP, 2001, p. 1). The SNP explicitly referred to itself as a 'democratic left-of-centre political party committed to Scottish independence' and stated that it wanted to establish a 'just, caring and enterprising' society by enabling Scotland to flourish as an independent nation in the 'mainstream of modern Europe' (SNP, 2001, p. 2). The party maintained that it had an 'open and inclusive' approach to Scottish citizenship where all those living, born and with a parent born in Scotland would have the automatic right of citizenship (SNP, 2001, p. 3). The manifesto read that 'the SNP stands for Scotland in Europe' and that EU membership would benefit Scotland enormously. It would solidify Scotland's voice in Europe with full membership of vital policy- and decision-making bodies (SNP, 2001, p. 7).

In particular, the party supported a confederal union in Europe and opposed developments of a European 'Super State' (SNP, 2001, p. 7). The SNP maintained that it was in favour of increased cooperation in foreign affairs, trade, defence and the environment, but resisted abolishing national vetoes on matters of taxation, natural resources and the constitution (SNP, 2001, p. 7). Moreover, the party called for a stronger commitment to subsidiarity whereby competences would revert to member states, such as coastal fisheries under the CFP. In other words, 'sharing of sovereignty should be restricted to defined areas where it brings clear benefits' (SNP 2001: 7).

In terms of Scottish membership of the single currency, the party stated that this could only be realised under the right economic circumstances, when an adequate exchange rate was established and when public consent had been attained in a referendum (SNP, 2001, p. 7). Furthermore, the SNP supported EU enlargement on the basis that it would increase the importance and visibility of small and medium sized nations. The manifesto stated: 'Clearly, after Nice, Scotland will have significantly greater influence in the

European Union as an independent nation than as part of the United Kingdom' (SNP, 2001, p. 7). Again, Scottish representation was discussed in the manifesto and the SNP pointed to the fact that, as part of the UK, Scotland only had half as many MEPs as Finland or Denmark – countries with comparable populations. It claimed that the Treaty of Nice would further reduce the number of MEPs for Scotland within the UK but would benefit an independent Scotland whereby the nation would have its full quota of 13 MEPs, seven weighted votes in the Council of Ministers, and membership of the European Commission (SNP, 2001, p. 7). This stood in contrast to the status quo, where Scotland had no votes and no Commissioner as part of the UK (SNP, 2001, p. 7).

Culturally, the SNP claimed that it would seek visibility in the UK, European and global media and would continue to press for the gradual devolution of powers over schedule and budget to BBC Scotland, arguing for the 'Scottish Six' (SNP, 2001, p. 8). Additionally, the party maintained that it would bid for the 2008 European Football Championships to be held in Scotland (SNP, 2001, p. 8).

6.2 2003 Scottish Parliamentary Election Manifesto

Similarly to its manifestos of the late 1980s onwards, the SNP's 2003 Scottish Parliamentary Election manifesto stated that the party would enhance Scotland's links to Europe and the wider world (SNP, 2003, p. 2). For example, the party focused on Scotland's energy resources as a way to independence in Europe. It maintained that, with 25 per cent of Europe's potential for renewable energy, Scotland could be 'the green powerhouse of Europe' (SNP, 2003, p. 14). Yet it argued that this would only be possible through independence. Again, the SNP used the British political context in the manifesto as a vehicle for its European policies. The party sought to end the 'secrecy of inter-governmental relations within the UK' and to extend its trading partnerships with other parts of Europe. This was considered to enrich Scottish representation internationally in order to promote tourism, trade and inward investment (SNP, 2003, p. 24). The notion of Independence in Europe is reiterated and claimed to be the 'gateway to the representation we [Scotland] deserve' (SNP, 2003, p. 24). The language of 'sitting at the top table' was used in this manifesto, like its predecessors, and the

party vowed that Scottish farmers and fishermen would not be given the 'second-class treatment' they experienced under UK governments (SNP, 2003, p. 24).

The agriculture sector was also discussed in the manifesto and its main emphasis was on the fact that the 'high-quality' Scottish agriculture sector was being constrained by the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs in London. According to the SNP, the department had too much control over Scottish agricultural affairs and the Labour-LibDem coalition had permitted this to continue to the detriment of Scottish farmers (SNP, 2003, p. 16). Moreover, the party asserted that reform of the Common Agricultural Policy was long-delayed but Scotland had no say in the matter due to its peripheral status. As the manifesto read: 'We need to argue the case for Scottish farmers, and ensure that CAP reform is to our benefit and not our disadvantage' (SNP, 2003, p. 16). The party acknowledged the extent of the EU's role in agricultural policy and vowed to protect Scotland's industry competitiveness by guaranteeing that new regulations were only introduced in Scotland after they have been applied by a majority of EU nations (SNP, 2003, p. 16). Specifically, the SNP highlighted the need to resolve the lack of control of imports, the advancement of an organic farming plan and a more just rural stewardship scheme. Furthermore, the party advocated the introduction of a single 'country of origin' labelling and marketing project to promote Scotland's 'high quality reputation' as well as the promotion of the interests of small farmers and crofters (SNP, 2003, p. 16).

In terms of fisheries, the SNP asserted that it intended to capitalise on EU financial support and of help from the UK Treasury. It vowed that it would immediately renegotiate the current EU fisheries deal and demand that Scottish ministers front the UK delegation, using European and bilateral negotiations to handle industrial fishing (SNP, 2003, p. 17). Transport was mentioned as a way to promote Independence in Europe. Scotland's prosperity, the SNP claimed, 'is linked to our ability to move people, goods and services within our country and to access European and world markets beyond'. In order to do that, the party proposed an integrated transport, bespoke to Scotland's needs (SNP, 2003, p. 21). It argued that Scotland needed to be 'more accessible' in order to properly compete in the global economy. The party pointed out that most international destinations were only accessible through London and that it

would seek to create more international flights to and from Scotland via the Route Development Fund (SNP, 2003, p. 22).

While the SNP projected a positive image of Europe in the 2003 manifesto, it also ensured to reinforce its dedication to Scottish nationalism. As a partnership of independent states, the party claimed that Scotland would 'get the most out of Europe when we are there in our own right, making our own decisions and alliances, and working flat out to protect all Scotland's interests and industries' (SNP, 2003, p. 24). This translated to policy preferences whereby the SNP promised a referendum and the opportunity to join the euro when the economy allowed it (SNP, 2003, p. 24). The protection of Scottish interests was also a reason for the SNP's support of an enlarged EU as a confederation of nation states. Yet, the party maintained that some vital competences must remain in Scotland which is why it opposed tax harmonisation in the EU (SNP, 2003, p. 24). Finally, the SNP touched upon the right to representation of trade unions and workers through a statutory Charter of Trade Union Rights. It berated Westminster for having 'the most restrictive legislative framework in the EU' and called for an expansion of its powers through Scottish independence (SNP, 2003, p. 28).

The Scottish Parliament election of 2003 was a particular challenge to the SNP. While it had more success than the 2001 UK general election, the party lost both seats and votes. The 2003 election saw the surfacing of small parties and independents. In particular, the Scottish Socialist Party won small but meaningful shares of the vote that may have otherwise gone to the SNP (Lynch, 2013, pp. 253-254). The election uncovered the extent of the SNP's core support whereby there was an absence of a sizeable voter base and a migration of voters to other parties, particularly Labour (Paterson, 2006, p. 59). The party was no longer attracting a broad social mix of supporters, even the young, and had problems attracting support from voters who wanted to see enhanced powers for the Scottish Parliament.

These problems put a distinct strain on the party after 2003. The SNP was also struggling organisationally and only spent £473,107 at the Scottish election compared to Labour's £726,702. Though Swinney's time in office dovetailed with a decrease in SNP support, he introduced a series of organisational reforms – like Wilson in the

party's earlier days – that renovated the party's structures, membership and financing. One such change, which was endorsed at a special conference in the Spring of 2004, was the candidate selection process. The new rules signified that the leader and deputy leader would no longer be elected by conference delegates, but by 'one member, one vote' (OMOV) election of all party members (Lynch, 2013, pp. 255-257). Furthermore, the SNP's new membership scheme involved collecting membership fees as well as regular monthly donations from members, which significantly improved the party's financial status (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns, 2012, p. 42).

The special conference also witnessed the SNP shift its aims from 'self-government' to 'independence', reflected on an amended statement in its constitution and on party membership cards:

'2(a) Independence for Scotland; that is the restoration of Scottish national sovereignty by restoration of full powers of the Scottish Parliament, so that its authority is limited only by the sovereign power of the Scottish People to bind it with a written constitution and by such agreements as it may freely enter into with other nations or states or international organisations for the purpose of furthering international cooperation, world peace and the protection of the environment' (in Lynch, 2013, p. 257).

The latter half of the statement mirrors the party's attitude towards Europe while reinforcing Scottish sovereignty.

6.3 2004 European Elections

The manifesto begins by pointing to the end of intra-European divisions during the Cold War and the fact that ten new nations joined the EU on 1st May 2004. The SNP's commitment to confederalism is set out in an introductory statement:

'The Europe of today is one of 25 proud, independent nations. All these nations respect each other's history and culture, giving Europe strength in diversity. Despite this continent's turbulent past, the Europe of today and tomorrow offers peace, stability and prosperity' (SNP, 2004, p. 4).

The document then proceeds to give a utopian image of Europe, one in which its citizens can 'enjoy rights to travel, trade, live and work' (SNP, 2004, p. 6). This is far removed from its 'centralist' and 'bureaucratic' descriptions of the EEC until the late-1980s. The SNP calls it the 'new Europe' in which Scotland 'should play a full and equal part' (SNP, 2004, p. 6).

Once again, the party accused Westminster of not defending Scotland's interests from issues such as the fishing industry to European funding. It also disparaged Scottish politics on the terms that the Lib-Lab Scottish Executive 'has failed to defend our country' (SNP, 2004, p. 6). For example, Executive ministers only attended one in ten vital EU Council meetings that involve Scottish policy-making. The SNP described many issues having a 'unique Scottish dimension… but of little relevance to London' (SNP, 2004, pp. 6-8).

The manifesto refers to other small states and offers a quotation from Kristiina Ojuland, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia: 'Smaller states already take a more international view because we cannot afford to ignore the existence of bigger states. But we will take every opportunity to influence events because if we do not we will be just as affected by them, and have things done to us instead of playing our part in shaping events and preparing for them' (in SNP, 2004, p. 6). Furthermore, Roderick Pace from the University of Malta explained that Malta had taken advantage of its small size in EU accession negotiations. In other words, 'small states tend to be more flexible and can therefore adopt their negotiating positions more easily. At the same time this flexibility is usually strengthened by and linked to the fact that they exhibit stronger social coherence or unity in their domestic domains than is the case in larger countries' (in SNP, 2004, p. 14).

Perhaps in order to shake off its formerly anti-Europe message, the manifesto states that 'Scotland's problem is not Europe - it is our lack of a voice in Europe. But it doesn't have to be this way. Scotland needs Independence to have a voice in Europe' (SNP, 2004, p. 8). While the party supported further regionalisation within the EU, it maintained that 'regional status will always be second best' (SNP, 2004, p. 8). It claimed

that Scotland would only be able to be involved with the European decision-making process upon independence (SNP, 2004, p. 8).

In terms of laying out the benefits for Independence in Europe, the SNP went into further detail than it had done in previous manifestos. It focused on the four most important decision-making bodies in the EU. First, the party claimed that Scotland had no direct representation on the Council of the European Union, even if the responsibilities discussed belong to the Scottish Parliament. With independence, the SNP claimed, Scottish government ministers would be able to advance Scottish issues and vote in the subnation's interest. Second, the manifesto examined the European Council in which strategic decisions about the EU are made. Comprised of the heads of all the EU governments, Scotland had 'no seat at the top table' (SNP, 2004, p. 10) and the party stated that an SNP prime minister would do several things: veto proposals to remove tax and social security from national control; veto proposals to increase the EU's effect on fishing policy and to class fisheries as an exclusive competence in any EU constitution; and to support increased collaboration on matters of justice to implement efficient reactions to cross-border crime and terrorism, while upholding Scotland's 'distinctive' legal system (SNP, 2004, p. 10).

Third, the party focuses on the European Commission and the fact that, from 2004, every member state - no matter how small - can appoint a Commissioner (SNP, 2004, p. 12). Yet the SNP complained that as Scotland is not a member state it does not have this right to appoint. The manifesto reminded voters that 'the presence of a citizen of each state in the Commission guarantees that the Commission acts with an understanding of each country's political and social circumstances' (SNP, 2004, p. 12). Finally, the European Parliament was discussed, particularly the fact that the Scottish Parliament was required to enforce EU law in devolved areas. This was all the more reason for the SNP to advocate electing 'strong voices to Parliament'. It claimed that, 'thanks to the Labour government in London', Scotland was about to lose one of its seats in the European Parliament, from 8 to 7 (SNP, 2004, p. 12). The party claimed that 'when we are independent, we will have 14' (SNP, 2004, p. 12).

The SNP then drew back on its conceptualisation of the EU as a confederation of states. The manifesto stated: 'We believe in the fundamental right of nations to their own sovereignty' and that matters such as Scotland's taxation system and national constitution should remain under national control. In particular, 'the past failure' of the Common Fisheries Policy encouraged the party to support fishing matters to be organised in Scotland, not Brussels (SNP, 2004, p. 12). At the same time, the SNP maintained that 'there are some issues that are best decided collectively' and that 'this commitment to co-operation reflects both our internationalist values and our belief that sharing sovereignty on certain issues is in our national interest' (SNP, 2004, p. 14). Such issues that 'require action across national boundaries' include citizens' rights, poverty, illness, the protection of children, equal opportunities and managing international crime (SNP, 2004, p. 14).

The manifesto acknowledged the 'huge advances' in securing essential human rights and liberties of all citizens. In particular, the party believed that more could be done to encourage social justice, inclusion and tolerance, and to manage poverty and inequality. Furthermore, it maintained that European nations must work together to handle global issues such as pollution and climate change. Shifts in world order and stability meant that the old approaches and structures for maintaining peace and security are 'increasingly out-of-date' (SNP, 2004). The party welcomed proposals for a common European international and security policy, where Scotland's security needs and international responsibilities of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention 'can best be met through a European framework' (SNP, 2004, p. 16). In particular, the party stated that if Europe were to implement suitable policies for Africa, the Middle East, Russia, and the Ukraine, it must harden its approach to foreign and security matters, such as 'do[ing] more' to manage the arms trade. The SNP also welcomed new European suggestions for improved collaboration on justice and home affairs but maintained that Scotland's unique legal system and its values must be safeguarded (SNP, 2004, p. 16).

The manifesto also discussed the new EU Constitution, negotiated by the 25 independent nations for the 'new enlarged Europe' (SNP, 2004, p. 16). The party recognised that the collection of EU treaties should be condensed into a constitution where European citizens 'should be guaranteed fundamental rights and liberties' (SNP,

2004, p. 18). The SNP acknowledged that this included the protection of local interests but, unlike the 25 nations, Scotland had no voice for its 'special circumstances' (SNP, 2004, p. 18). The SNP approved of the draft constitution on the basis that it wished to see 'a more effective and democratic confederation of states crossing to share sovereignty over defined policy areas for mutual benefit' (SNP, 2004, p. 18). Yet, it criticised the EU for control over its fishing: 'We have seen far too many of our great, national industries destroyed. We cannot sit back and watch another one - fishing - go the same way' (SNP, 2004, p. 18). The party claimed that if Scotland were independent, it would use the veto power to get rid of the idea of making fishing an exclusive EU competence (SNP, 2004, p. 18). Despite the SNP's vigorous campaigning on this issue, all veto powers remained with London (SNP, 2004, p. 18). Furthermore, the party supported Tony Blair's decision to hold a referendum on the constitution but would only win the SNP's support 'if the absurd clause that hands over control of Scottish fishing to Brussels is dropped' (SNP, 2004, p. 20).

The manifesto included a quotation from Winnie Ewing, SNP MEP from 1975-1999: 'It is vital to elect MEPs who will, first and always, stand up for Scotland. Time and again, I have watched MEPs from the London parties sell out Scottish interests' (SNP, 2004, p. 20). Examples of MEPs standing up for Scotland in the future of Europe included when Neil MacCormick became a member of the Convention to draft the new European constitution. MacCormick was Scotland's only elected politician on the Convention and while the UK's representatives neglected Scottish interests such as fishing and oil, MacCormick defended Scotland's national interests (SNP, 2004, p. 22). Furthermore, the party asserted that it was the only party to have continuously fought for Scotland's fishing communities, led by MEP Ian Hudghton: 'While Labour, the Liberals and the Tories were happy to support the new CFP, the SNP alone recognised the disastrous implications for Scotland' (SNP, 2004, p. 22).

Additionally, the manifesto maintained that the SNP would stand up for the environment, cultural diversity and social justice. During the last term of the parliament before the manifesto was published, the SNP pushed Europe to 'honour its wider global responsibilities' (SNP, 2004, p. 24). The sense of Scotland being internationally minded was reinforced once again here and the party engaged with issues such as the treatment

of asylum-seekers' children in the Dungavel detention centre and research into AIDS/HIV. The party 'has demonstrated the compassion for which Scotland - and Scots - are renowned' (SNP, 2004, p. 24).

The party laid out six key aims for its MEPs:

- To defend Scotland's people, communities and industries with a strong presence in Europe.
- To support the EU as a confederation of sovereign states, where some matters are resolved collectively and others locally.
- To demand democracy via referenda on issues such as the euro and the Constitution.
- To protect the Scottish environment and its consumers. The party vowed to do what it could to keep Scotland GM free, such as ensuring clear labelling of GM ingredients.
- To defend and improve human rights across all nations of the EU, including protecting human rights against the war on terrorism.
- To seek European funding for Scotland's social and economic problems and to call for a stop to the CFP that has 'decimated the fishing industry in Scotland' (SNP, 2004, pp. 24-25).

In an interview with former MEP, Aileen McLeod, she reflected on her time in Brussels between 2004 and 2009 alongside another former MEP, Alyn Smith. In particular, she described the need to 'mainstream' the SNP's European policy as it had predominantly focused on fisheries (McLeod, 2022). 'Obviously fisheries [are] a big issue, particularly in the North East of Scotland,' McLeod (2022) observed. 'I think it was also important to be reflecting other policy areas and I think it was a case of looking at how can we bring the EU back home to Scotland?' (McLeod, 2022). Indeed, she noted that European policy was not a foreign policy issue, rather 'very much part and parcel of our domestic policies' that influenced financial services, regional policy, climate change and energy policy (McLeod, 2022). During these five years in Brussels, McLeod and Smith attempted to gain a greater grasp of the influence of EU policy on various domestic

policies that were relevant to Scotland. McLeod (2022) noted that this 'also helped to build the case of the benefits of an independent Scotland's membership in the EU'.

During her time in Brussels, McLeod worked to emphasise that Scotland was not going to be an 'awkward' partner. Rather, she reiterated from previous discursive interactions that Scotland had 'something positive that we could bring to the table' and wanted to be there as 'an equal partner, working together with our European partners and neighbours to tackle the common challenges that we face', such as climate action (McLeod, 2022). Furthermore, the SNP sought to advance European policies on the basis of Scotland's domestic policies (McLeod, 2022). That said, McLeod (2022) noted that it was a tricky matter in advancing Scotland's interests at the European Council when 'you're seeing other countries of a similar size to Scotland who are sitting at the table and able to have their voice…and concerns heard [while Scotland sat] in the row behind the UK government minister'.

6.4 The return of Salmond and the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections

Following disappointing European elections results, Swinney resigned as party leader on 22nd June 2004. The party's support had fallen to 19.7 per cent, a loss of 7.5 per cent compared to the 1999 European elections. The SNP retained two MEPs but the result was the third poor electoral result under Swinney's leadership. The 'endless speculation' destabilised Swinney's position as party leader and his resignation initiated the SNP's first OMOV election (Lynch, 2013, p. 257). The result was a hurried leadership contest between Nicola Sturgeon, Roseanna Cunningham and Mike Russell. There was also talk of Alex Salmond returning to the party and while he initially denied it, he met with his preferred candidate, Nicola Sturgeon, and they agreed that he would return to stand as leader with Sturgeon as deputy leader (Lynch, 2013. p. 257). When Salmond announced his candidacy for leadership, he vowed that he would become SNP leader and then First Minister of Scotland in 2007 (Lynch, 2013. p. 257).

Salmond won the leadership contest in an OMOV ballot of party members announced on 3rd September 2004. Yet, his opponents noted the irony of Salmond being in Westminster when he had left the Scottish Parliament. The leader's absence from

Holyrood and particularly First Minister's questions meant that Salmond 'was missing from a vital political arena' (Lynch, 2013. pp. 257-258). While he was replaced by deputy leader, Nicola Sturgeon, Salmond faced challenges of remaining an MP and re-election in 2005, running the SNP from London in the meantime, and then standing for re-election to the Scottish parliament in 2007. These challenges were all so that he could become First Minister, which 'open[ed] up charges of hubris' (Lynch, 2013. pp. 257-258). Salmond's re-election was to become 'pivotal' in the SNP's journey of electoral success, though this was not obvious until two years into his leadership. He gained much credibility from the OMOV election in 2004 and benefited from Swinney's organisational reforms. These reforms made the SNP 'more manageable, better organised and better funded' (Lynch, 2013. pp. 257-258). That said, Salmond faced an imminent UK election and was challenged by the task of raising money for both it and the 2007 Scottish election (Lynch, 2013. pp. 257-258).

The 2005 UK general election was unfortunate for the SNP. While Salmond's return as leader had pushed the party back into action, he was primarily preoccupied with the Scottish election of 2007. Winning the election was dependent on Salmond being re-elected in Banff and Buchan as MP at the 2005 UK general election. The SNP's 2005 campaign was rather disorganised and party support dwindled again but successful targeting increased the SNP's share of seats to six – adding the Western Isles and Dundee. Yet, the party's loss of support under Swinney was not altered under Salmond and the SNP polled its poorest result since 1987. While Labour kept its strong position in 2005, the Liberal Democrats were the 'real winners' as the party came in second in Scotland and performed well across Britain (Lynch, 2013. pp. 258-259). This was largely down to a popular leader in Charles Kennedy, a variety of popular policies, and disenchantment with the Conservatives and Labour. The SNP was replaced in second place by the Liberal Democrats, making Scottish politics seem less like a two-party contest between Labour and the SNP (Lynch, 2013. pp. 258-259).

6.4.1 The SNP's 2007 Scottish Parliament Election manifesto

The idea of Europe was particularly dominant in the SNP's 2007 Scottish Parliament manifesto compared to those of previous Scottish Parliament manifestos. First, the

manifesto laid out the priorities of the First Minister, which included establishing a Council of Economic Advisors to offer independent guidance so that 'we can make Scotland the best place in Europe to do business' (SNP, 2007, p. 8). The priorities also included creating an enriched relationship with the EU and a 'partnership of equals' with Westminster (SNP, 2007, p. 8). The party assured voters that it would cooperate with the UK government to 'increase and enhance' Scotland's voice in the large variety of policies falling under the responsibility of the Scottish Parliament (SNP, 2007). Once again, the party made a call for more visibility for Scotland in Europe and declared that it would work on strengthening liaisons with the Commission, improve Scottish Parliamentary analysis of EU legislative proposals and establish stronger relationships with other parliaments. It proposed 'enhanced procedures' for executing European legislation in Scotland and improved 'post-implementation monitoring' to allow Ministers to introduce legislation bespoke to Scotland (SNP, 2007, p. 16).

The particulars of European integration were more strongly articulated in this manifesto than before. For example, the SNP outlined its plans for a North Sea supergrid and stated that it would liaise with the Norwegian government and the EU Commission in order to transfer electricity from offshore Scotland and Norway to markets in mainland Europe. It was listed as a prime concern for an SNP government and the party claimed that it would arrange an early meeting with Norwegian ministers to discuss the initiative (SNP, 2007, p. 17). Furthermore, the SNP stated its economic target to 'match the growth of small European nations' as this would result in an 'independence bonus' of a further £19 billion in the economy over ten years, or £10,000 per Scottish family (SNP, 2007, p. 21).

The SNP also had several proposals to both Europeanise and nationalise education. First, it assured voters that Scottish children's education would have a European and international focus, with a stronger weight on foreign languages in order to 'extend horizons and widen opportunities in later life' (SNP, 2007, p. 52). Second, the party vowed that it would recommend all school pupils to learn about the institutions and governance of 'their country', as well as about the EU and other supranational bodies (SNP, 2007, p. 53). Finally, the manifesto proposed a stronger awareness of the Scots language and its literature which would involve including a question on Scots in the

census and upholding EU requirements to nurture it. The party also stated that it would endorse the implementation of Scots in education, broadcasting and the arts (SNP, 2007, p. 57).

As usual, the SNP had much to say on the EU's agricultural policies and voiced its concern about the failure of the then recent CAP reforms to reduce the amount of paperwork and restrictions. It articulated its support of an evaluation of the execution of subsidy regulations and argued that 'farmers who commit innocent errors in their paperwork are made to feel like criminals' and that the penalties do not always match the offence (SNP, 2007, p. 69). The SNP acknowledged the vital role Europe had in Scotland's agricultural policy but claimed that the Labour-LibDem coalition had little influence in Brussels. It put this down to a poor UK approach that did not denote enough importance of Scottish farming matters (SNP, 2007, p. 70). It argued that an SNP government would give Scotland a 'strong and independent' voice in Europe that would defend Scotland's agricultural needs. 'Scotland cannot and should not should not be denied a say in the EU', the party asserted (SNP, 2007, p. 70).

The party's regular bone of contention – fisheries – was brought up once again in this manifesto which claimed that the disaster of sequential UK Conservative and Labour governments, as well as the Labour-Lib Dem Executive, to efficiently represent and safeguard the concerns of Scotland's fishing industry 'is one of the biggest failings of the current constitutional settlement' (SNP, 2007, p. 72). The document claimed that Scotland's fishermen were labelled as 'expendable' when the UK joined the EU and described this view as 'the hallmark of successive governments' treatment of this industry' (SNP, 2007, p. 72). This failure, the SNP claimed, was mirrored in the 'disastrous' Common Fisheries Policy and its effect on Scotland's fishing industry (SNP, 2007, p. 72). As Drew Scott (2022) explained, 'Scottish society benefited from the European Union with the exception of fishermen… there's no question that fishermen suffered as a result of the way the Common Fisheries Policy was written'. The party stated that the priorities of the Department for Rural Affairs were to head the UK delegation to EU fisheries negotiations and to solicit support within the EU for the repatriation of fisheries competences (SNP, 2007, p. 13). That said, attempts to change the CFP were futile as 'you can't change the policy. The policy's the policy' (Scott, 2022).

The manifesto pointed to two events in particular: the reduction in days at sea at December 2006 negotiations in Brussels and the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs' decision in March 2007 to 'give away valuable prawn quota' to Germany without warning Scotland's fishing communities. It claimed that these events indicated the need for a new approach (SNP, 2007, p. 72). The SNP argued that as Scotland has approximately three quarters of the UK fishery, it should head the UK's Ministerial delegation at EU meetings, in the same way as Flanders does for Belgium. The party stated that 'the current system whereby landlocked Austria and Luxembourg have a great say over Scotland's fisheries than Scotland does is unsustainable' (SNP, 2007, p. 72).

Moreover, the SNP vowed to keep on planning withdrawal from the CFP and that it would oppose any future European Constitution that gives the EU 'exclusive competence' over this domain (SNP, 2007, p. 73). The party maintained that it would collaborate with its partners to gather support for the repatriation of fisheries competences to member states: 'We favour national control over fisheries, which conserves stocks as well as the livelihoods of fishing communities' (SNP, 2007, p. 73). Though the SNP acknowledged that international cooperation was necessary to the management of fish stocks, conservation had not been attained in the CFP. The party pointed to its 'maritime neighbours', Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands, which all run economically fruitful and environmentally sustainable fisheries externally from the CFP, and argued that 'Scotland could emulate their success' (SNP, 2007, p. 73).

The party developed its environmental commitments in Europe by stating that it would establish an EU wide green energy research centre and make this 'the focus of our external affairs efforts in the EU' (SNP, 2007, p. 32). The centre would be located in Aberdeen and would allow Scotland to contribute to decades worth of offshore energy expertise as well as being close to some of the world's 'most promising' renewable energy locations (SNP, 2007, p. 32).

The SNP emerged as the largest party from the 2007 election with 47 seats – an increase of 20 seats since the previous election. Initially, the SNP approached the Lib Dems for a

coalition government but was turned down. In the end, the Greens agreed to form an SNP minority government, with Alex Salmond as First Minister. Van der Zwet and Hills (2013, pp. 11-12) have noted how, at least up until the financial crisis in 2008, the SNP has related independence to a narrative of the 'arc of prosperity', likening Scotland's position to those of Norway, Ireland and Iceland. Considering Norway and Iceland are outside the EU, this narrative makes the SNP's position on European integration more unclear. That said, Ireland's success up until 2008 revealed the difficulties of being a smaller nation in the EU. Furthermore, there has been less concentration on the Independence in Europe strategy within the party itself due to the fact that the debate on Scotland's position in Europe 'has been won by those in favour of Scottish independence within the EU' (van der Zwet, 2013, pp. 11-12). Indeed, van der Zwet found that none of the SNP elites he had interviewed wished for an independent Scotland outside the EU. At the same time, all interviewees criticised particular facets of European integration, such as the Euro, centralisation, lack of democratic deficit, the CFP and high levels of bureaucracy (van der Zwet, 2013, pp. 11-12).

6.5 Analysis

6.5.1 Historical institutionalist analysis

Salmond's resignation as SNP leader and MSP in 2000 generated a new way of doing things for the party. While his replacement, John Swinney, was a gradualist, he had strong support from traditionalists/fundamentalists within the party which made him electorally appealing. Indeed, his victory was 'one of continuity' as he continued the SNP's gradualist strategy which had been implemented a decade before by Alex Salmond. The party followed a logic of path dependence whereby the continuation of the gradualist approach was rooted in a nationalist context. The SNP's goal of minimising Westminster powers is also reflective of the logic of path dependence as this was a gradualist strategy towards achieving Scottish independence.

We can witness the shift in context between Salmond's leadership to that of Swinney and the effects this had on the party's European policies. Salmond's first stint in Westminster was preoccupied with rooting civic nationalism and devolution in the

party's approach and also navigating social ills, such as the early 1990s' poll tax. Swinney did not have such a distinctive task. While the party's 1997 general election manifesto mainly focused on how Scotland would become integrated in Europe, in the 2003 general election manifesto, Swinney focused more on particular policies, spanning green energy, the agriculture sector, fisheries and transport. Again, we see an instance of layering here whereby smaller ideas are introduced to change or solidify the larger idea. In the case of the 2003 manifesto, it appears that the arguments were made to congeal the party's nascent idea of Scottish sovereignty. We can therefore surmise that the SNP continued to follow a logic of path dependence in its European policies during the early 2000s.

The campaign for the 2001 UK general election was both strategic and an example of institutional layering - a regular form of change where new layers are added to the institution in the form of individuals with ideas. Such ideas included the party's approach to Scottish citizenship within the context of the EU and opposition to a European 'Super State'. The manifesto also included the maintenance of the SNP's confederalist position whereby it would reject the abolition of national vetoes on several matters, including taxation and the constitution. By calling for a stronger commitment to subsidiarity, the party followed a logic of path dependence whereby nationalism was at the root of its European policies. The SNP also followed this logic in terms of culture, arguing for nationalist initiatives in a European context, such as in broadcasting and sport.

The theme of Scotland's powers in Europe being constrained by Westminster featured heavily in the 2003 manifesto, particularly in terms of agriculture. The party claimed that the Scottish agriculture sector was being constrained by the Department for Environmental, Food & Rural Affairs in London and it also wanted a say in the EU's CAP reform. This built on the agricultural policies articulated by the party in its 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Elections manifesto. The policies were fleshed out to highlight the need to resolve the lack of control of imports, the advancement of a sustainable organic farming plan and a more just rural stewardship scheme. The 'country of origin' labelling and marketing project is another example of the nationalisation of agricultural policy in Europe and the party's commitment to the logic of path dependence. This logic

was also evidenced in the party's repeated conceptualisation of the EU as a confederation of nation states and in its opposition to European tax harmonisation.

Though the policies of the 2003 manifesto were more systematic than that of the 1990s manifestos, the SNP did not perform well electorally. This doesn't necessarily mean that the party's European arguments were not effective. Indeed, Europe only comprised a small part of each manifesto. Rather, it was perhaps Swinney's visibility compared to that of Salmond that did not translate into electoral success. Furthermore, the financial and organisational pressure on the party resulted in a much less expensive campaign than that of Labour. Recognising these difficulties, Swinney sought to implement a number of organisational reforms to renovate the party's structures, membership and financing. Most significant was the change to the candidate selection process, the implementation of membership fees, and the party's amended constitutional statement.

The statement saw the SNP shift its aims from 'self-government' to 'independence'. Here we witness an example of *drift* form of change whereby an institution's rules are revised over time by its members. It could well be that the party's return to a more fundamentalist position in the early 2000s correlated with a decrease in support since the 1999 European elections, yet I argue that a number of factors were at play. For example, the British political context had changed from one of volatile Thatcherism to a coalition government. It was perhaps the case that the SNP no longer stood as a viable alternative considering the emergence of small and independent parties after the 2003 election. The party therefore had to ensure that its European policies in the 2004 European election campaign struck a chord with voters who were disenfranchised with the coalition. The SNP's changing imagery of Europe from 'centralist' and 'bureaucratic' to one of 'peace, stability and prosperity' (SNP, 2004, p. 4) is indicative of the *conversion* form of change whereby the meaning of the institution shifts as old rules remain but are understood in a different way. The party had not only shifted its language from 'sovereignty' to 'independence' but had also traded in its rigid nationalism for confederalism.

The SNP has also referred to smaller European states to reinforce the need for independence in Europe. Kristiina Ojuland touched upon the peripheral existence of

smaller states and how that reinforces their internationalism. Furthermore, Maltese academic, Roderick Pace, was quoted in the manifesto explaining how small states have a distinct flexibility. By including this quotation, the SNP was stating its self-perception as a mutable state. At the same time, the party followed a logic of path dependence in its attitude towards EU regionalisation whereby it prioritised independence in order to attain fuller representation at the European level. This was further articulated in the manifesto's assessment of the European decision-making bodies through which, the party claimed, Scotland was poorly represented. It argued that an SNP prime minister with the powers of independence would realise several policy positions such as increased powers over fishing policy and to support increased co-operation of justice issues to tackle cross-border crime and terrorism. The party continued to adhere to its nationalist path by stating that Scotland's 'distinctive' legal system would be upheld (SNP, 2004, p. 10).

The party's continuous confederalist position reveals its commitment to the logic of nationalism, particularly on matters of taxation and the national constitution. Once again, the SNP pressed for fishing matters to be played out in Scotland rather than Brussels. There were other areas, however, where the SNP advocated an internationalist approach, such as citizens' rights, international crime and the environment.

We see another instance of institutional layering in the 2007 Scottish Parliament manifesto with the party's priorities of creating a Council of Economic Advisors, reforming Scottish Parliamentary analysis of EU legislative proposals and establishing closer relationships with other parliaments. The SNP further substantiated its commitment to increased Scottish involvement in the EU by outlining plans for a North Sea supergrid as well as situating its economy target in a European context. The party continued to follow the logic of path dependence in its nationalisation of education in Scotland. This was paralleled with a Europeanisation of education, however, which again reinforced Scottish nationalism within an international context.

While Keating (2017, p. 307) has observed that the SNP came into government in 2007 as 'an unashamedly pro-European party', the 2007 manifesto reveals that the bone of

contention about the CFP was becoming more serious. Blame was cast two ways. First, the SNP pointed to the failure of consecutive UK Conservative and Labour governments to effectively represent and safeguard Scotland's fishing industry. Second, the party criticised the EU's CFP as well as the CAP reforms. This suggests that both British politics and European integration had a substantial effect on the SNP's European policies. It was the UK's approach to the CFP and CAP, however, that took the brunt of the blame. This stood in contrast to the party's commitment to getting Scotland a better deal in the EU to protect fishing and agricultural benefits. Again, the logic of path dependence was followed in 2007 in the sense that national interests were put above European interests.

6.5.2 Discursive institutionalist analysis

Swinney's history as Senior Vice-Convenor, National Secretary and Vice-Convenor of Publicity meant that his background ideational abilities were well developed and suited to the party, particularly in the continuation of the SNP's gradualist strategy. Indeed, background ideational abilities influence how actors rationalise events and operate within an institution. Swinney's experience in crafting campaigns translated into his foreground discursive abilities which allowed him to maintain the institution via a logic of communication. This maintenance was somewhat of a challenge for Swinney, however, as he did not enjoy the same charisma as Salmond. Swinney maintained Salmond's conceptualisation of Scottish citizenship and civic nationalism in a European context, as well as support for a confederal EU. We also see attempts of institutional change whereby new ideas are filtered into the party via foreground discursive abilities. For example, the 2001 manifesto includes cognitive and normative cultural ideas, situating Scottish nationalism in an international context.

Other normative ideas included establishing Scotland as the 'green powerhouse of Europe' as featured in the 2003 Scottish Parliament Election manifesto. In this instance, these normative ideas resulted in institutional maintenance, rather than institutional change. Under Swinney's leadership, smaller ideas were layered to reinforce the SNP's main idea of Independence in Europe. The party's coordinative discourses on Europe were strong but this did not translate into electoral success for Swinney. Though he had

strong background ideational abilities, his foreground discursive abilities were not as evident as those of Salmond.

The SNP's framing of its European policies in the context of British politics continued under Swinney's leadership, with the party seeking to end secret intergovernmental relations within the UK. The SNP used its familiar arguments of Scottish farmers and fishermen being sold short in the UK's negotiations with the EU and the maintenance of these normative ideas reinforced the party's Independence in Europe narrative. In terms of its position on the EU, the SNP highlighted areas (CAP reform) which could be improved for Scotland's benefit. While it did not explicitly disparage the EU itself, the party argued that the UK had silenced Scotland in the EU's agricultural policy process. Several new ideas were included in the 2003 manifesto, such as the proposal of a single 'country of origin' labelling and marketing project. These smaller ideas fortified the SNP's Independence in Europe policy and added sustenance to the idea that Scotland could 'go it alone' in Europe. Indeed, nationalist ideas - such as opposition to EU tax harmonisation - were included in the party's communicative discourses in order to show how Scotland could benefit from being an independent member of the EU.

One of the most marked changes in the SNP's policies under Swinney was a shift in the language from 'self-government' to 'independence' for Scotland at the 2004 special conference. This shift followed a logic of communication whereby ideas shape institutions through discursive interactions. These interactions took the form of communicative discourses and the SNP's commitment to independence was made even more explicit. This is an example of how institutions are continuously recreated through discursive interactions, both within and external to the party.

The 2004 European Elections provided the SNP with a distinct opportunity to articulate its vision for an independent Scotland within an internationalist framework. The party used historical ideas, such as the end of intra-European divisions during the Cold War, to call for EU unity. At the same time, however, the SNP retained its commitment to confederalism to reinforce Scottish sovereignty. The idea of a 'new Europe' was also used in its communicative discourses to situate Scottish independence in a more palatable framework. To further emphasise this position, the party referred to other

small European states, such as Malta, which had taken advantage of its small size in EU accession negotiations. By likening Malta's flexibility to that of Scotland, the party sought to assure voters that Independence in Europe was a viable option.

What is distinct about the 2004 manifesto is that the party discussed in depth the decision-making bodies of the EU. These cognitive arguments provided credibility to the party's claims for independence in Europe. At the same time, this discussion served to expose Scotland's underrepresentation at the EU level. The party claimed that, upon independence, an SNP prime minister would realise certain objectives. These objectives, apart from cooperation on justice, were all situated within a nationalist context. Furthermore, the SNP's cognitive idea about Scotland having more MEPs upon independence added flesh to its autonomy claims. At the same time, the party used negative imagery of the EU, such as its past 'failure' of the CFP, to strengthen its case for Scottish independence. This was balanced, however, by the party's commitment to cooperation within Europe on cross-national issues such as citizens' rights and international crime.

While the SNP articulated its commitment to cross-border issues, such as increased cooperation on justice and home affairs, it stressed the autonomy and integrity of Scotland's 'unique legal system'. This shows how such normative ideas are used to fortify the party's key commitment to Scottish independence. Though the SNP had warmed to the idea of Europe over the past two decades, Scottish nationalism remained at the front of its policies on Europe.

Other SNP actors' foreground discursive abilities translated into a stronger Independence in Europe narrative. For example, Neil MacCormick defended Scotland's interests in his membership of the Convention to draft the new European constitution. The manifesto laid out six key aims for SNP MEPs. Most of these aims were situated in a nationalist context with an emphasis on protecting Scottish interests. While the party was committed to greater cooperation with EU states, its main goal - Scottish independence - always took precedence in its European narratives. Anything that posed a threat to Scottish national interests, such as the EU's fishing and agricultural policies, was used as a normative argument to sustain the narrative of Independence in Europe.

Swinney's resignation following disappointing European results reopened a space for Salmond to stand for party leadership. Swinney's institutional reform of the OMOV voting system saw the reelection of Salmond and the organisational reforms in general made the SNP better funded and managed. This suggests that Swinney's foreground discursive abilities induced rather significant institutional change from which Salmond benefited. While the European election results were poor, Swinney's resignation and organisational reforms set the groundwork for Salmond to develop distinct European policies. That said, the 2005 UK general election results showed that the SNP's electability had not improved since Salmond's reelection and the party was replaced in second place by the Liberal Democrats. This shift from a two-party contest between Labour and the SNP was significant. It presented the party with an opportunity to revise its policies, including those on Europe.

The SNP's 2007 Scottish Parliament manifesto gave the party an opportunity to revise these European policies. Its old ideas were reiterated, including establishing an augmented relationship with the EU and a 'partnerships of equals' with the UK government. Moreover, new ideas were introduced to the party such as the First Minister's priority of establishing a Council of Economic Advisors to make Scotland 'the best place in Europe to do business'. This idea was given credibility given the fact that Salmond had strong background ideational abilities as an economist, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Other cognitive and normative ideas were expressed in the 2007 manifesto to support the Independence in Europe narrative, such as the party's proposal of a North Sea supergrid. The principal idea of Independence in Europe was fleshed out through such arguments and that the SNP had thought about the specifics of such initiatives granted it with a greater sense of credibility. While these new ideas generated a sense of deeper European integration, the party retained its commitment to the nationalisation of key Scottish areas, such as education. At the same time, it paralleled this nationalisation with Europeanisation, thus situating Scottish independence within an international framework. These normative ideas served to show that Scotland was prepared to cooperate on the EU level whilst retaining its sense of national identity.

Once again, the party used negative imagery of British political parties to defend Scotland's role within the EU. In particular, the SNP put Scotland's lack of say in agricultural and fishing matters down to the Labour-LibDem coalition's approach in Brussels. While these communicative discourses used negative imagery of UK political parties, they also pointed to aspects of EU integration that hindered Scotland's domestic control, such as fisheries. By opposing membership of the CFP and any future European Constitution that gives the EU 'exclusive competence' over this domain, the party revealed a certain rigidity of its European policies. In other words, the SNP was not prepared to accept full European integration at the cost of national interests. The 2007 manifesto contained evidence of the party members' foreground discursive abilities in the form of such new ideas and the continuation of old ideas. Indeed, these abilities allow actors to assess, change and maintain their institution via a logic of communication. Finally, though the SNP was clearly still in favour of EU membership, its likening of Scotland to Norway and Iceland made the party's narrative on European integration more ambiguous.

Conclusions

The extent to which the SNP's policies on Europe depended on political entrepreneurs during the 2000s is noteworthy, as is the influence of European integration. This chapter has demonstrated how Salmond's resignation in 2000 sparked a new way of doing things for the party and how Swinney's introduction of a number of organisational reforms strengthened the party in several ways. Described as a 'victory of continuity', Swinney continued to implement Salmond's gradualist strategy. Through historical institutionalism, this chapter has shown that the party followed a logic of path dependence whereby the continuation of the gradualist approach was rooted in a nationalist context. The SNP's goal of minimising Westminster powers is also reflective of the logic of path dependence as this was a gradualist strategy towards achieving Scottish independence.

This chapter has also explored historical institutionalism's concept of layering whereby smaller ideas are introduced to change or reinforce the larger idea. As Swinney did not

have the task, as Salmond did, of establishing civic nationalism and devolution in Scotland, he arguably had more time and space for policy development. Such policies included those on Europe and Swinney had outlined a number of new ideas such as green energy and transport. Under Swinney, the SNP continued its confederalist rhetoric as well as using negative imagery of the UK to bolster its EU claims. In the case of the 2003 manifesto, it appears that the arguments were made to congeal the party's nascent idea of Scottish sovereignty. We can therefore surmise that the SNP continued to follow a logic of path dependence in its European policies during the early 2000s. In terms of European integration, the party supported withdrawal of the CFP and opposed any European Constitution that gave the EU exclusive competence over fisheries. As such, the party's narratives on Europe were influenced by EU integration as well as SNP political entrepreneurs.

Finally, this chapter has revealed that, unlike in previous decades, the SNP's policies on Europe were little influenced by Scottish politics during the 2000s other than the fact that the SNP was pushed down electorally by the Lib Dems. Arguably, the SNP's poor electoral performance gave it the opportunity to revise its policies, including those on Europe. It used both cognitive and normative arguments to strengthen the Independence in Europe narrative but was more vocal in its criticisms of the EU since the establishment of the narrative of the 1980s. As we shall see in the next chapter, these criticisms would lessen during the 2010s as Scotland was given a material chance to vote for independence from the UK in the 2014 independence referendum.

Chapter 7: Attempting Independence in Europe (2010s)

This chapter will explore the pivotal moment of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and the SNP's responses to Europe within this narrative. In particular, it will analyse the background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities of then First Minister Alex Salmond and his deputy, Nicola Sturgeon, and how these affected the party's policies on Europe. Finally, this chapter will use historical and discursive institutionalisms to analyse how the SNP's discourses on Europe functioned during the 2010s.

7.1 2010 UK General Election and the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary Election

Even though it had greater resources for the 2010 UK election campaign, the SNP was only able to spend £315,776, which was less than a third of what it spent on the Scottish elections of 2007. According to Lynch, 'lack of enthusiasm on the ground' resulted in the party underspending its election budget (2013, p. 276). The typical 'two-party squeeze' at Westminster elections pushed the SNP further out of the conversation as the Liberal Democrats strengthened, bolstered by three televised UK leader debates. While the SNP took legal action to challenge its omission from the TV debates, it came to nothing yet it did create media interest. The party struggled to find an angle for the UK election campaign so in response promoted its MPs and candidates as 'local champions' who would take Scottish interests to Westminster (Lynch, 2013, p. 276). The party's election slogan was 'more Nats, less cuts' (SNP, 2010).

The SNP's policies on Europe in its 2010 manifesto were centred on establishing a new approach to the way Scotland was represented in the EU. Independence, the party argued, would give Scotland its own seat at the 'top table of Europe' and until that came, the SNP would push for Scotland to have a stronger role within the UK, including leading on matters such as fisheries in which Scotland had the majority UK interest (SNP, 2010, p. 19). As stated in the manifesto: 'We will provide a strong voice for our fishing and agriculture sectors, holding the UK government to account while they

represent these economically important industries in Europe' (SNP, 2010, p. 15). Furthermore, in order to safeguard the incomes of many Scottish farm businesses, the party vowed to oppose UK plans on CAP reform which would involve the removal of the First Pillar funding (SNP, 2010, p. 15).

The party promoted 'fairer funding arrangements', including fiscal autonomy for Scotland in order to better support jobs and generate a more competitive business environment (SNP, 2010, p. 11). This autonomy would allow Scotland to lower corporation tax – a tactic used in 'similar nations' across Europe, resulting in higher levels of economic growth, higher tax revenues and more high-paid jobs (SNP, 2010, p. 11). The SNP claimed that it would be a 'win-win' policy for Scotland (SNP, 2010, p. 11). Furthermore, fiscal autonomy would allow Scotland to save a proportion of its 'growing energy wealth – from oil and gas today and renewable energy in the future' in an Energy Fund (SNP, 2010, p. 11). The fund would function like a national savings account or, as the SNP stresses, a 'national pension fund' as the Norwegians call it (SNP, 2010, p. 11). This was considered to provide better financial security and an income for Scotland 'well into the future' (SNP, 2010, p. 11).

The SNP continued to refer to other countries in the EU, claiming that the UK should employ the same type of tax derogation on fuel sold on the island and remote communities as is present in other parts of the EU (SNP, 2010, p. 13). Finally, the party assured voters that with independence, it would be able to 'remove the obscenity of nuclear weapons from Scotland's shores' and 'represent ourselves at the top table in Europe'. With independence, Scotland would be able to better support young families and strive to emulate the universal childcare support in comparable EU nations (SNP, 2010, p. 18).

Though the SNP's election campaign did not go especially well, the final outcome of the election opened up a political space for the party as the country waited for a coalition government. The SNP's manifesto opposed involvement in a formal coalition and rather argued for supporting a government on an issue-by-issue basis (SNP, 2010, p. 11). As Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats were in discussion about forming a coalition at Westminster, Alex Salmond put forward the idea of a 'progressive

coalition' of Labour, Liberal Democrats and Nationalists as an alternative to a Conservative-led coalition. While Salmond's proposal came to nothing, it aligned the social democratic SNP with similar popular centre-left parties in Scotland (Lynch, 2013, p. 277) which also happened to be pro-European.

7.1.1 2011 Scottish Parliamentary Election

The SNP's performance a year later at the 2011 Scottish Parliament Election was astonishing. The party won an unparalleled majority at Holyrood, which made possible the prospect of holding an independence referendum: a key component of the SNP's strategy since the establishment of devolution. The party spent £1,141,662 in 2011, much more than Labour, and it began planning the campaign after the poor UK general election results in 2010. The SNP held focus group research which revealed the popularity of key policies since 2007 in addition to those to be developed in the 2011 manifesto (Torrance, 2011, p. 25). The party's 2011 campaign centred on incumbency, where the SNP portrayed itself as 'the Scottish Government' (SNP, 2011). Curtice (2011, p. 61) has noted that this strategy chimed with voters, who witnessed a capable government and popular First Minister, and who were overall positive about the party's government performance. This made the SNP's European arguments in the Scottish Parliament Election all the more credible as it continued to project the Independence in Europe narrative both cognitively and normatively.

As in its previous manifestos, the party used the concept of green energy as a springboard for positive European narratives. It claimed that it was working hard to make Scotland Europe's 'green energy powerhouse' to take advantage of Scotland's 'vast green energy potential' and to generate new jobs (SNP, 2011, p. 10). The SNP also alluded to Scotland's other 'comparative advantages' in financial services, creative industries, sustainable tourism, food and drink and life-sciences (SNP, 2011, p. 10).

The party reasoned that it would spend £64.6 million of European Structural Funds to contribute towards providing a wide variety of employability and training services for the lowest paid, the unemployed and those from deprived areas, from early engagement to in-work support and skills development (SNP, 2011, p. 12). Once again, the SNP

explained how it would implement policies similar to those of other areas in Europe (SNP, 2011, p. 22). For example, it stated that it would follow the necessary steps to increase childcare support in Scotland to 'match the best in Europe' (SNP, 2011, p. 22). Indeed, moving to universal free childcare was listed as one of its 'ambition[s] for Scotland' (SNP, 2011, p. 28).

More specifically, the party focused on language learning based on the European Union 1+2 model whereby Scotland would allow all children to learn two languages in addition to their own mother tongue (SNP, 2011, p. 24). This model would be rolled out over two Parliaments and would accompany advancing the concept of 'Scottish Studies' in schools, which would focus on Scottish literature, history, current affairs, culture as well as Scots and Gaelic languages. All pupils would have access to this area of study at both Primary and Secondary levels (SNP, 2011, p. 24).

The manifesto discussed how an independent Scotland would renew its relationship with the rest of the UK, creating a 'partnership of equals' – a social union as opposed to a political one (SNP, 2011, p. 28). As members of the EU, there would continue to be shared rights, open borders, free trade and broad cooperation. As the manifesto explained, 'The big difference will be that instead of only deciding some issues here in Scotland, independence will allow us to take decisions on all the major issues. That is the reality of independence in this interdependent world' (SNP, 2011, p. 28).

The party discussed Scotland's place in the world, and assured voters that it would establish key relationships with global partners during its time in office. It stated that it would implement its revamped engagement plan with the USA and its new Canada plan. It would also continue to update and carry out its China and South Asia engagement plans with a concentration on education, culture, trade, business, tourism and science. The SNP claimed that it would pursue an 'enhanced role' for Scotland in Europe, such as through the Scotland Europa Office in Brussels (SNP, 2011, p. 29). The party also discussed its North Sea Supergrid plans, which had been backed by the EU and nations across the North Sea, and was imminent (SNP, 2011). The supergrid would enable Scotland to transport its vast offshore energy to markets across Europe. The SNP also said that it would prioritise North Sea Carbon Capture and envisioned Scotland as a

centre for technology, transportation and storage: 'We want Scotland not only to rule the waves with marine renewables, but to lead Europe in Carbon Capture' (SNP, 2011, p. 34).

The SNP maintained that it would continue to urge the EU to increase its carbon reduction target from 20 to 30 per cent and liaise with the UK government to abolish barriers in areas such as transmission charges. This would allow Scotland to 'make the greatest possible carbon reduction contribution' (SNP, 2011, p. 35). The SNP also planned to push the EU on other issues, such as CFP reform, to attain 'discard-free fisheries' in Scotland and to increase the value of landings for Scotland's fishermen. It argued for an overall reduction in mortality rates and more fish landings, but this would require a revised tactic at the EU level. The party claimed that it would 'continue to make the case for radical reform of the EU's fisheries policy to give a greater say and control to the fishing nations and to the fishing communities. The CFP is well past its sell-by date' (SNP, 2011, p. 39). The SNP also discussed CAP which was to be reformed over the next few years. It maintained that Scotland had distinctive farming needs and that it would continue to fight for the farming sector with UK ministers and in discussions at the European level. In particular, the SNP would push for the furtherance of direct support and a move against historic payment, towards 'a regime that rewards active agriculture and caters for new entrants' (SNP, 2011, p. 39).

According to Lynch (2013, p. 278) the SNP performed so well at the 2011 elections, not because of any swell in support for Scottish independence, but because of the strength in its performance and policy competence. This is demonstrated in opinion polls either side of the election day which showed that only 29 per cent supported Scottish independence (Curtice, 2011, pp. 59-60). The SNP made striking constituency gains in 2011 from Labour and the Liberal Democrats, as well as some from the Conservatives. It won an extra 32 constituency seats compared to 2007 – 'a far cry from its days as the regional list party in 1999 and 2003' (Lynch, 2013, p. 278). The SNP gained 22 seats from Labour, nine from the Liberal Democrats and one from the Conservatives. As Lynch explains, 'Labour became the list party through having a minority of constituency seats and the SNP became the party that dominated the constituencies: a spectacular reversal of previous patterns' (Lynch, 2013, p. 278).

Party	Constituency Vote		Regional Vote		Whole Election	
	Votes	**Seats**	**Votes**	**Seats**	**Votes**	**Seats**
Scottish National Party	902,915	53	876,421	16	1,779,336	69
Scottish Labour	630,461	15	523,559	22	1,154,020	37
Scottish Liberal Democrats	157,714	2	103,472	3	261,186	5
Scottish Conservatives	276,652	3	245,967	12	522,619	15
Green	-	-	86,939	2	86,939	2
Margo MacDonald	-	-	18,732	1	18,732	1
Others	21,534	-	135,840	-	157,374	-
	1,989,276	73	1,990,930	56	3,980,206	129

Table 3: 2011 Scottish Parliamentary Election results

7.1.2 Seeking an independence referendum

Since the SNP announced its desire for an independence referendum after its election triumph in 2011, the Independence in Europe strategy adopted by the party since the early 1980s has been challenged by opponents of independence. In particular, there existed much doubt as to whether an independent Scotland would need to re-apply or re-negotiate entry into the EU. The SNP maintained that as the UK is a union of states and Scotland has the same standing as the other members, it would be able to continue its international treaties and agreements. Others argued that Scotland would be thought of as a successor state and would thus have to re-negotiate its international treaties, including EU membership. They argued that other EU member states, especially those with their own regional minorities, would veto Scotland's membership as they would not want to set a precedent (van der Zwet, 2013, p. 12).

That said, on 15th October 2012, the UK and Scottish governments signed the Edinburgh Agreement which solidified the terms of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. Both governments came to the agreement that the referendum should be

legislated by the Scottish Parliament, have a clear legal basis and respect for its result (The Independent, 15 October 2012). The Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013 was passed by the Scottish Parliament in November 2013 following an agreement between the devolved Scottish government and the UK government. The Act stipulated that the independence proposal would need a simple majority to pass and all EU or Commonwealth citizens living in Scotland, aged 16 or over would be allowed to vote. This represented the first time that 16- and 17-year-olds were allowed to vote in Scotland. The referendum was to be held on 18th September 2014 and would involve a hot and heavy referendum campaign from the SNP as it tried to steer Scotland towards Independence in Europe.

7.2 2014 Scottish independence referendum campaign

Two official bodies were recognised in the 2014 referendum campaign: *Yes, Scotland* (including the SNP, the Greens and Scottish Socialists) for independence, and *Better Together* (including the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties) for the union. The *Better Together* campaign was thought to receive more money due to the support of business and wealthy individuals but chance circumstance saw Yes Scotland receive 80 per cent of the finance for *Yes Scotland* from a pro-independence couple from Ayrshire who won £161 million in the Euromillions lottery (Keating, 2015, p. 85). Keating (2015, p. 85) has observed that campaigning functioned at two particular levels. The first level saw an 'air war' between the official Yes and No campaigns, based on huge amounts of statistical evidence reported in printed and broadcast media. There were two televised debates between Alex Salmond and former Labour minister and leader of the No campaign, Alistair Darling. The second level was the 'ground war' of communities and social media, which was largely out of control of the two official campaigns (Keating, 2015, p. 86).

The Scottish independence referendum took place just a few months after the 2014 European Parliament election in the UK. As such, Scotland's independence referendum was held in a very distinct context which witnessed growing Euroscepticism elsewhere in Britain, pushed by the leader of right-wing populist party, UKIP - Nigel Farage. In an interview with SNP activist, Robbie Turnbull (2021), he explained that while

campaigning for the 2014 European election, the main arguments used for remaining in the EU were based on a 'shared vision' of 'trying to show the things that the EU does like regulat[ing] food and workers' rights'. Turnbull (2021) maintained that the SNP tried to 'sell' the EU in a number of ways, including promoting the benefits of the work and study scheme (the Erasmus programme) for younger people, as well as the safeguarding of workers' rights and food standards. He concluded that the party's main message in the European elections was that 'the SNP will stand up for Scotland's voice in Europe' (Turnbull, 2021). When asked how the EU itself has had an impact on the SNP's policies on Europe, Turnbull (2021) stated that the party has always picked up on the fact that Scotland's birth rate is 'too low' and therefore arguments for migration are often made.

Indeed, in an interview with Aileen McLeod (2022), she stated that the SNP ensured that in every election campaign, the party and its activists had a grasp of how the EU was influencing Scotland. Moreover, the SNP pushed a narrative of success that described 'what the SNP was trying to deliver at the European level' (McLeod, 2022). At the local level too, party candidates promoted the benefits that European integration had brought to these areas. As McLeod (2022) noted, 'I think that was also a kind of significant moment in helping to bring the EU back home to Scotland rather than having something that was getting dealt with somewhere else'.

That said, the issue was not as prevalent in some local areas than others, such as the Fife constituencies, according to the interview with Turnbull (2021). Rather, it was more about the activities of the Scottish government, such as the Council Tax freeze. As Turnbull (2021) explained, 'It was more on the Scottish election side that the European thing would get brought in'. For example, he explained that when it came down to the local Fife Council elections, the EU topic 'wasn't as important' (Turnbull, 2021). He also alluded to the dichotomy of the Yes/No campaigns whereby the issue of losing EU membership was argued from both sides. In other words, those who argued for Scottish independence maintained that it would protect Scotland's EU membership from the increasing Euroscepticism in the UK, while those from the No camp assured voters that Scotland would lose its membership by not being able to rejoin as an independent country. When questioned on Jolly's (2007) aforementioned theory of fringe parties taking the opposite line of the establishment, Turnbull (2021) suggested that the SNP

could have merely been adopting a pro-EU message not only to stand in opposition to Westminster, but also as 'a kind of tool to grab voters'. Moreover, Alyn Smith (2021) explained that the party 'calibrate[d] [its] position relative to the UK parties to a point because that's the arithmetic at Westminster…to deal with'.

7.2.1 Alex Salmond and the SNP's 2014 Scottish referendum campaign

Almost unthinkable for the SNP considering its former political exposure, Alex Salmond enjoyed much media attention throughout the 2014 Scottish referendum campaign. This gave a chance for the leader to use his foreground discursive abilities to sustain the SNP's Independence in Europe narrative. Two televised debates with the face of the *Better Together* campaign, Alistair Darling, gave Salmond the opportunity to advance the SNP's views on Europe in a politically highbrow environment - something unimaginable to the SNP in the past.

Analysis of the televised debates between Salmond and Darling is instructive to our understanding of how Salmond's foreground discursive abilities pushed and sustained the SNP's Independence in Europe narrative during the IndyRef campaign. In response to claims that the Yes campaign represented a limited nationalist agenda, Salmond persistently stressed that he was promoting an 'outward-looking' approach and portrayed Scotland as an important global citizen (McAnulla and Crines, 2017). For example, he emphasised the significance of the 1320 Declaration of Arbroath as the first ever contractual theory of monarchy in Europe (Salmond, 2014b). He also highlighted the fact that Scotland was the first country to provide universal education for all, which helps to explain the successive line of Scottish inventors whose work influenced the modern world (Salmond, 2014a). Yet Salmond also argued that Scotland could accomplish more through independence and lists remarkable contributions made to world politics by small independent countries such as Finland (research and development), Norway (peace-building), and Singapore (economic development). As such, Salmond insinuated that it is not the country's size that matters, but what it gives to the international community. (Salmond, 2014c). Salmond reinforces the idea of Scotland being internationally-minded through reference to great Scottish innovators:

‘Our hard-won reputation for being Bravehearts in the battle, but our hard-won reputation for invention which generated wealth… in Arthur Herman’s phrase ‘it sometimes seems as though Scotland has invented the modern world’ (Salmond, 2014a).

While Salmond alluded to famous cultural memories or myths (Bravehearts), he gives rhetorical priority to Scottish innovation. Moreover, Salmond’s description of identity also communicates his view of an internationalist Scotland:

‘We’re comfortable with the idea of over-lapping identities – we know that you can be Scottish and British, Scottish and European, Scottish and Polish or Scottish and Pakistani…(there are) many threads to the Scottish tartan of identity’ (Salmond, 2014c).

Salmond defined the Yes campaign as ‘an inclusive, civic – and above all democratic and constitutional movement’ (Salmond, 2014c). Furthermore, he also used Scotland’s pro-EU stance to dismiss claims that independence could result in isolationism. Following Manuel Baroso’s statement that an independent Scotland would not automatically be granted EU membership, Salmond stressed the inconvenience and lack of legal basis to Baroso’s claim (*The Scotsman*, 2014). Indeed, Salmond ‘became momentarily more aggressive’ on the matter, maintaining that without EU membership, Scotland could block other countries’ access to fishing zones (2014c). Moreover, he claimed that Scotland’s contribution to the EU could be greater if it were independent as it would no longer be tied to the anti-Europeanism of England (Salmond, 2014c). That said, several of the interviewees of this thesis denied that Spain had explicitly stated that it would veto Scotland’s accession to the EU (Gethins, 2022; McLeod, 2022; Smith, 2021). As Smith (2021) explained, ‘nobody in Spain has ever said this. Nobody, nowhere, ever. If you look for it, you’ll not find it’. The ‘strongest Spain ever got’, Smith (2021) stated, was in a statement from Mariano Rajoy in the lead up to the 2014 independence referendum where he said ‘it’ll be difficult’.

To counteract claims of the Anglophobic nature of the SNP, Salmond highlighted the ‘healthy’ relations between Scotland and England, describing England as Scotland’s

'closest friend' and stressing 'the ties of family and friendship' (Salmond, 2014d). He maintained that these ties are 'facts of geography, not acts of Parliament' (Salmond, 2014d) and that under his leadership, Scotland and England would continue to share not only a social union, but an economic union and the same monarchy. Salmond rejected claims of unionist politicians who warned of England becoming a 'foreign country'. He referred to the 1949 Ireland Act in which Ireland was not considered foreign by the UK. Salmond argued that 'Scotland will not be a foreign country after independence, any more than Ireland, Northern Ireland, England or Wales…We share ties of family and friendship, trade and commerce, history and culture' (Salmond, 2014e).

The SNP was also cognisant of the fact that Scottish independence could render the North East of England more dominated by the South East. Furthermore, some on the Left have argued that Scottish independence from the UK would increase the likelihood of England having Conservative governments in the future. Salmond opposed these claims by maintaining that Scottish independence could bring many benefits to the North of England, citing Tony Travers, who claimed that 'London is the dark star of the economy, inexorably sucking in resources, people and energy' (Salmond, 2014e). He highlighted the 'north-south divide' and the fact that the UK has the highest levels of regional inequality in the EU. For example, he notes the large differences in transport spending between London (£2,700 per head), the North East (£130 per head), and the North West (£5 per head) (Salmond, 2014d). Salmond implied that a stronger Scottish economy could act as a 'counter-weight to London and the South-West' and a 'Northern light to redress the dark star' which could help regions such as Northumbria and Yorkshire (Salmond, 2014d). To counteract claims that this was a mere pipe dream, Salmond pointed out the fact that, under devolution, Scotland had become the third wealthiest part of the UK, following London and the South East (Salmond, 2014d).

Salmond played on the low-rating of senior Conservative politicians in Scotland and continuously challenged David Cameron to a televised debate even though he knew Cameron was unlikely to accept this challenge. This served to reiterate the idea that the No campaign could not positively contribute to the independence debate. Salmond claimed that Westminster politicians had 'badly misread the character of the Scottish

people' (Salmond, 2014b). Indeed, Salmond repeatedly stressed the idea that the Conservatives' views were entirely different from most Scots. He also explicitly used emotional language to play on the strong anti-Tory feeling within large portions of the Scottish electorate. For example, on the matter of welfare, Salmond acknowledged the 'striver versus skiver, shirkers or workers' rhetoric coming from Westminster and noted that this type of language 'scarcely features in Scotland' (Salmond, 2014c). He also highlighted that Scotland often ends up with Conservative governments it did not vote for. Rather than describing an unfortunate happenstance, Salmond's rhetoric functioned to point out the political and cultural chasm between Conservative elites and the majority of Scotland. This is considered to be evidenced in many Scottish voters' opposition to NHS 'privatisation' and the renewal of Trident (Salmond, 2014g). Furthermore, Salmond states that, with independence, 'the era of Tory governments handing out punishment to the poor and the disabled will be gone' (Salmond, 2014h). This negative view of Westminster rule was neutralised by Salmond's focus on the positive facets of Scottish self-government: 'Over the last 15 years, the Scottish Parliament…has delivered real social gains for this country. World-leading homelessness legislation, the ban on smoking [in] public places, the most ambitious climate change targets in the world, free university tuition and personal care for the elderly' (Salmond, 2014h).

When it came to the question of what currency an independent Scotland should use, many deemed Darling to have 'won' the first debate based on Salmond's difficulty in justifying the matter (McAnulla and Crines, 2017, p. 486). Salmond stipulated that the Better Together campaign's remonstration of a shared currency was a construction of 'Project Fear', 'involving both distortion and mistruths in order to frighten voters about the prospect of independence' (McAnulla and Crines, 2017, p. 486). Darling maintained that the question of currency was linked to the wider economy and that unsureness of the matter endangered 'public sector investment and private sector confidence' (McAnulla and Crines, 2017, p. 487). He contended that the uncertainty of the issue of currency could jeopardise Scotland's welfare. Salmond responded that an independent Scotland would not cease to use the pound sterling and that other nations of the British Isles could continue to use the currency despite having a political union (McAnulla and Crines, 2017, p. 487).

7.3 Nicola Sturgeon's influence on the SNP's European policies

As Salmond's Deputy First Minister, it is worth exploring the background ideational abilities of foreground discursive abilities of Nicola Sturgeon in relation to the SNP's policies on Europe. As the main biographical work on Nicola Sturgeon, this next section will rely strongly on the accounts of David Torrance to lay the groundwork for the Deputy First Minister's background. His biography of *Nicola Sturgeon* (2016) tells us that, born in 1970 in the Scottish town of Irvine, Sturgeon grew up in a working class family who later moved to Dreghorn - a village whose main industry was coal mining. By the early 1980s most local mines had been closed under the former Labour and Conservative governments. Thatcher's 'monetarist experiment at its destructive height' was, according to Sturgeon, that politics became personal to her (Torrance, 2016, p. 17). The miner's strike of 1984-1985 had a detrimental effect on Ayrshire as well as the teachers' strikes of the same time, both of which had turned 'previously sympathetic' Scottish voters against Thatcher's second government (Torrance, 2016, p. 23). The governmental effects on unemployment and housing conditions, which had been growing since the late 1970s, had a huge impact on Sturgeon politically (Torrance, 2016, p. 23). 'Thatcher', Sturgeon explained, 'was the motivation for my entire political career. This was the genesis of my nationalism. I hated the fact that she was able to do what she was doing and yet nobody I knew in my entire life had voted for her' (in Torrance, 2016, p. 26).

It wasn't until after the death of her grandfather that Sturgeon had realised that he had been a member of the SNP in the 1960s (though another account states it was her uncle) (*The Week in Politics*, STV, 30 October 2003). 'You think you're a trail-blazer,' she explained, 'and it turns out it's been in your genes all along' (*Sunday Mail*, 12 August 2007). Though she never felt any political persuasion 'one way or the other' by her family (*The Week in Politics*, STV, 30 October 2003), she did recall a 'sliver' of a political memory when, on the morning of 2nd March 1979, she came downstairs to witness her parents - SNP voters but not activists - discuss the result of Scotland's first, contentious, devolution referendum (*The Week in Politics*, STV, 30 October 2003). Though her home environment did not put any pressure on her politically, Sturgeon certainly felt a

political influence at school from two teachers in particular. While her modern studies teacher didn't support the SNP, Sturgeon believed that he 'awakened a real political interest' in her (*Holyrood*, 31 May 1999). On the contrary, her English teacher was a Labour councillor who presumed that she would join the Labour party. Sturgeon has stated that 'perhaps my decision to join the SNP when I did was as much to prove a point to him that there was a real alternative to Labour in Scotland' (*Holyrood*, 31 May 1999).

There was a certain romance to Sturgeon's version of nationalism (though she later described herself as a 'utilitarian') (Torrance, 2016, p. 21). Where most teenagers would have posters of their favourite pop stars stuck to their bedroom wall, Sturgeon had a poster of Jim Sillars, and was particularly taken with Lewis Grassic Gibbon's *Sunset Song*. This 'chimed with her nascent belief in Scottish independence' (Torrance, 2016, p. 21), 'at a time when other things were taking shape in my head' (*Scotland on Sunday*, 9 November 2014). Sturgeon also remembered the 'perverse pride' of her hometown's appearance in the Proclaimers' hit single, 'Letter From America' which had become her 'political anthem' (*Daily Record*, 6 July 2014). This song 'solidified the feeling [she] had - which took [her] into politics - that things weren't as they should be and places like Irvine should be doing much better' (*Daily Record*, 6 July 2014).

Having grown up in a working-class family in a working-class area, Sturgeon held a 'very Scottish fear of failure' (in Torrance, 2016, p. 27). She was the first of her family to go to university but according to journalist Peter Ross in his 2014 profile of Sturgeon, she was a 'recognisable type' - 'the clever girl from the small town; the lass o'pairts; sensible, dutiful, a grafter' (*Scotland on Sunday*, 9 November 2014). This would prime her for her studies at the University of Glasgow which she began in 1988. Not long after Sturgeon had begun her degree, Jim Sillars returned to the House of Commons as an SNP MP and she actively campaigned for him in the 'high-profile by-election' (Torrance, 2016, pp. 29-30).

As Torrance (2016, p. 30) has observed, 'it was an era of protests, pickets and politics'. In 2003, Sturgeon recalled that 'the first couple of years at university reinforced, reconfirmed the beliefs that had taken [her] into the SNP' (*The Week in Politics,* STV, 30

October 2003) and international politics had a particular effect on her. More specifically, she was referring to the anti-Apartheid campaign which was very active in Glasgow and had allowed Sturgeon to express her nationalism in an international context (Torrance, 2016, p. 30). This was reiterated by Pat Kane, political commentator and pop star, who described the SNP's approach as 'a modern, intellectual, progressive nationalism, which simultaneously maintained our sense of nationhood and connected it with other European cultures' (2001, p. 141). Indeed, the SNP's Independence in Europe narrative emerged at the time of Sturgeon's undergraduate degree (Torrance, 2016, p. 30) and undoubtedly had an effect on her understanding of and belief in nationalism within an international context. Moreover, Kane stated that 1990s' nationalism had to 'continue the development of a plural and principled national identity' which welcomed Scots Asians and other 'ethnic cultures' and clicked with Sturgeon's beliefs (Torrance, 2016, p. 31). As Sturgeon herself stated: 'One of the reasons young Scots have turned to the SNP in such large numbers is our internationalism…we will turn Scotland from the invisible nation of Europe into a nation which plays a full part in Europe and contributes to the great international issues' (*Herald*, 23 April 1992).

7.3.1 Sturgeon and Europe

Nicola Sturgeon's relationship with Europe is also notable. During the mid-1990s, the SNP was particularly engaged with European politics, especially following the Maastricht Treaty in which the term 'European Union' was formed. In response to European Commissioner, Bruce Millan's remark about Scotland and Sweden sharing a 'natural affinity', Sturgeon voiced to the *Herald* that, while Sweden would 'play a full and direct part in decision making at the highest levels of the EU', Scotland would still be 'a second-class member of the EU, excluded from the decision-making process, hoping in vain that an often unsympathetic London Government will look after her interests' (*Herald*, 18 November 1994). At the SNP's conference in the following year, future MSP John Mason among others lambasted the party's Independence in Europe narrative. Sturgeon responded, 'Europe is our flagship policy…It is far too important to be dealt with by a mish-mash of statements which leave us facing different directions at once' (*The Scotsman*, 22 September 1995). While some in the SNP believed that independence was inharmonious with EU membership, Sturgeon maintained that Scotland would

benefit from 'equality of status with other European nations and a direct Scottish voice in the decision-making bodies of the EU'. She also credited the SNP on its willingness to debate, ''openly and fully, the many complex issues arising out of the development of the EU' (*Herald*, 27 September 1995).

In 2007, Sturgeon claimed to MSPs that 'Scotland would automatically be a member of the European Union upon independence. There is a legal opinion to back that up. I don't think the legal position is in any doubt' (in Torrance, 2016, p. 177). In March 2012, the BBC's Andrew Neil questioned Alex Salmond whether he had 'sought advice' from his Scottish law officers, to which he responded 'yes, in terms of the [debate]', but could not 'reveal the legal advice of law officers' (*Sunday Politics* (BBC1), 4 March 2012). However, in July 2012, the Scottish (Freedom of) Information Commissioner proclaimed that ministers must publicly announce whether they had sought advice on Scotland's EU membership, the Scottish Government took the matter to court. It was obvious that the SNP had not focused on its European policy for some time and, rather, the party relied on some fragile points of debate. For example, Sturgeon referred to three 'eminent legal authorities' (Emile Noel, Lord Mackenzie-Stuart and Eamonn Gallagher) behind the SNP's stance (*Sunday Herald*, 4 November 2012). Only Mackenzie-Stuart had in fact practised as a lawyer and the advice from all three 'authorities' was given long before 2012 (between 1989 and 1992) and predated Maastricht, the single currency as well as the Lisbon Treaty (Torrance, 2016, pp. 177-178).

In October 2012, however, Sturgeon surprised opposition MPs when she told the Scottish Parliament that the SNP had, in fact, not received any such advice. This resulted in Salmond's worst bombardment of headlines since he assumed office in 2007, with the Scottish Sun claiming him as an 'EU LIAR' (Torrance, 2016, p. 178). Sturgeon told the BBC that it was 'unfortunate' that the party had given the impression of having 'legal advice that we were not prepared to reveal because somehow it didn't suit our purposes' (*Daily Record*, 25 October 2012). Then, in February 2013, the UK government released its first of its 'Scotland Analysis' papers, the first of which maintained that the rUK would be considered as the 'continuing state' and thus an independent Scotland would have to apply for EU membership. In response, Sturgeon characterised the international law on state secession as 'ambiguous' and the UK government's argument

that ‘an independent Scotland would have no rights betrays a near colonial attitude’ (in Torrance, 2016, p. 178).

Sturgeon used the example of the reunification of Germany in 1990 to demonstrate that the EU was a ‘flexible institution’ (in Torrance, 2016, p. 179). She argued that ‘when the Berlin Wall fell in late 1989, ‘few at that point would have expected a united Germany to be part of the then European Community within less than twelve months - but that is exactly what happened when German reunification took place on October 3, 1990’ (in Torrance, 2016, p. 179). Moreover, Sturgeon claimed that Scotland’s case was different from that of Germany and was ‘more straightforward’ considering its forty years of ‘existing membership’ (in Torrance, 2016, p. 179). As Torrance has observed: ‘That much was also true, for Scots were already European ‘citizens’, a legal identity that could not easily be withdrawn’ (Torrance, 2016, p. 179).

When it came to treaties and opt-outs, Sturgeon maintained that it was ‘perfectly reasonable’ to state that Scotland would ‘jointly inherit’ the existing UK’s opt-out of the single currency. Moreover, she argued that a new member state could not be ‘forced into euro membership’ and that Scotland’s EU partners ‘would understand’ its preference to remain out of the borderless Schengen Zone whereby it would instead cooperate with the rUK, Ireland and Crown Dependencies via the Common Travel Area (*Sunday Herald*, 16 December 2012). While Sturgeon attempted to make a strong case for the above issues, none of it was guaranteed (Torrance, 2016, p. 179).

Following a number of statements made by then European Commission president, José Manuel Barroso, both the SNP’s finance secretary, John Swinney, and Nicola Sturgeon, responded in two conflicting ways. Swinney dismissed Barroso’s words as having ‘no foundation’ while Sturgeon considered them to be ‘important’ and ‘ought to be respected’. She even wrote to the heads of the EU’s other 27 member states and requested a meeting with Barroso to which he declined (Torrance, 2016, pp. 179-180).

On British soil, the EU debate was rife, especially following David Cameron’s statement in 2013 for another referendum on UK membership of the EU. The Prime Minister stated that if the Conservatives were to win the next election, they would ‘seek to

negotiate the UK's relationship with the EU' and subsequently allow the British people to choose whether to remain in or leave the EU under those terms (BBC, 20 February 2016). This gave Sturgeon the opportunity to acknowledge the irony of the UK government's caution that Scottish independence was the *only* threat to Scotland's continued membership of the EU (Torrance, 2016, p. 180). In 2014, however, Sturgeon had announced that she was 'not a huge enthusiast for ever more integration' and that the EU's democratic deficit was 'not acceptable' (in Torrance, 2018, p. 180). Moreover, she emphasised that David Cameron's suggested 'journey' was at odds with that of the Scottish government as an in/out referendum would instil 'uncertainty' and possibly 'deter foreign investors' and endanger employment. That said, the SNP dismissed the idea that the Scottish referendum would cause as much turmoil as the Brexit referendum (*PA Newswire*, 25 January 2013). When asked about what Sturgeon's role is in terms of shaping SNP European policy, Gethins (2022) maintained that she, like Salmond, has been 'important because all leaders of political parties are important in shaping the forward look of the party'. That said, Gethins gave a reminder that the European policy was 'there anyway' (Gethins, 2022).

7.4 Outcome and aftermath of the Scottish independence referendum

The Scottish independence referendum of 18th September 2014 was a highly momentous event, one that Scotland and the SNP had never seen the likes of. The party's decades-long fight for Scottish autonomy had finally been put to the test and its coverage was spread throughout Europe. Keating has described the referendum as a 'highly unusual event, an agreed popular vote on secession in an advanced industrial democracy' (Keating, 2015, p. 73). Though the result – 45 per cent for independence and 55 per cent against – seemed decisive, it was in fact paradoxical as the Yes camp, driven primarily by the SNP, 'emerged in better shape and more optimistic' (Keating, 2015, p. 73). The Conservative Party's promise of a Brexit referendum in 2017 also served as fuel to the SNP's fire whereby the party used its oldtime argument of Scotland being taken out of the EU against its will. Another part of the outcome and aftermath of 2014's IndyRef was the appointment of Nicola Sturgeon as First Minister in November 2014 following Salmond's decision to step down. As such, though the referendum result

did not see Scotland secede from the UK, the Yes campaign performed much better than thought at the beginning of the campaign.

The referendum voting can be analysed based on several factors including gender, age, party affiliation, socioeconomic status and geography. In particular, there was a distinct correlation between socioeconomic status and voting whereby those of 'lower' status groups were more likely to vote Yes (Mullen, 2014, pp. 632-633). In terms of gender and age, men were more likely than women to vote Yes and older people were more likely to vote No. Furthermore, people born outwith Scotland were more likely to vote against Scottish independence, with those born in the rUK the least likely to vote for it (Mullen, 2014, p. 633).

Party affiliation was also a factor when it came to the referendum vote, where roughly 80 per cent of SNP voters voted Yes, 43 per cent of Liberal Democrats, 31 of Labour, and a mere 2 per cent of Conservative supporters (based on the 2011 election results for the Scottish Parliament) (Mullen, 2014, p. 633). Only four of the 32 local authorities returned a majority vote for Scottish independence: West Dunbartonshire, Dundee, North Lanarkshire and the city of Glasgow (Mullen, 2014, p. 633). As Mullen (2014, p. 633) has noted, the areas with the highest Yes returns were those with strong levels of poverty and deprivation. This figure is supported by a MORI poll which indicated that in the 20 per cent of the most impoverished areas of Scotland, 60 per cent of the population voted for independence (Mullen, 2014, p. 633).

Other Scottish election studies (see Johns et al., 2010; Carmen et al., 2014) have revealed that a party's ability to 'stand up for Scotland' is inextricably linked to voting. As McGarvey (2015, p. 38) has noted, 'the SNP have replaced Labour as the party perceived by most to be best placed to do that'. As the independence referendum enhanced the importance of Scotland's constitutional status, the SNP's *raison d'être* (or, its logic of path dependence), continues to be a pronounced issue in Scottish politics (McGarvey, 2015, p. 38).

7.5 Analysis

7.5.1 Historical institutionalist analysis

The SNP's language surrounding the 2010 UK general election reveals the party's continued commitment to nationalism. Even in a state-wide election, the SNP used terms such as 'local champions' to describe its MPs. This shows that the party prioritised the local level over the UK level, thus following its logic of path dependence rooted in Scottish nationalism. The party's policies on Europe during this time were centred on establishing a new approach to the way Scotland was represented in the EU. One element of this approach was greater representation at the EU level, particularly in terms of fishing and agriculture. Indeed, these two areas have been continuously threaded through the SNP's discourses on Europe to justify a nationalist approach within an international environment.

This nationalist approach is further evidenced in the party's layering of new ideas, such as fiscal autonomy for Scotland in Europe whereby Scotland would be able to lower corporation tax. Other ideas posed in the manifesto were the establishment of an Energy Fund similar to that of Norway, tax derogation on fuel, the abolishment of nuclear weapons on Scotland's shores and the management of universal childcare support. These new ideas are layered to create policy change but continue to follow a logic of path dependence. However, referring to Norway (a non-EU state), as the party has done in previous campaign literature, makes the SNP's message on European integration somewhat ambiguous. That said, the party's commitment to Independence in Europe was as strong as ever and the idea of Scotland gaining a seat at the 'top table' was repeatedly used in the manifesto.

The layering of new ideas about Europe is also seen in the SNP's 2011 Scottish election manifesto. The party used imagery of Scotland as Europe's 'green energy powerhouse' as well as ideas of how to use the European Structural Funds to improve Scottish wellbeing. Furthermore, the prospect of universal free childcare like that of other European states, was used as an argument for Independence in Europe. While these ideas were nationalist by nature, other pro-European ideas were layered to bolster the

SNP's narrative of independence in Europe. Such 'European' ideas included language learning based on the European Union 1+2 model but were balanced with nationalist rhetoric of establishing 'Scottish Studies' at primary and secondary school levels.

The idea of Scotland renewing its relationship with the UK to create a 'partnership of equals' represents a type of change somewhere between layering and drift. In previous manifestos, the SNP focused on the power of the UK over Scotland whereas in the 2011 manifesto, it seemed to have warmed to the idea of partnership with the UK. Rather than concentrating on secession alone, the party used language of cooperation. This rhetoric may have been used to ease unionist fears of 'going it alone' and to make the idea of Scottish independence more palatable. At the same time, the party discussed Scotland's place in the world and focused on establishing relationships with global partners such as the USA, Canada, China and South Asia. This served to show that the party had thought clearly about the steps that would need to be taken in an independent Scotland.

As in the previous chapter, the SNP continued to use the idea of a North Sea supergrid to justify Scotland's independence in the EU. It built on this idea with proposing to lead Europe in Carbon Capture. These ideas followed the institutional logic of path dependence where nationalist ideas were articulated through an internationalist framework. Once again, the party discussed CFP and CAP reform and though it did not criticise the EU as heavily as in previous manifestos, it still connected these ideas to Scottish nationalism. It is difficult to know the extent to which the SNP's policies on Europe affected the party electorally but, as Lynch (2013: 278) has noted, the SNP performed well at the 2011 Scottish elections because of its policy competence. The marked victory of the SNP in this election opened up a space for the party to advance its European policies and to work towards Scottish independence in the EU. The challenge of the SNP's Independence in Europe strategy gave the party room to further articulate its vision. For example, in response to claims that Scotland would have to reapply or re-negotiate entry into the EU, the SNP maintained that Scotland would have the same status as other member states as the UK is a union of states. Indeed, the party used its constitutional arrangement as a discursive stepping stone towards Independence in Europe.

The 2014 Scottish independence referendum campaign was a distinct moment in the party's history. It allowed the SNP, particularly Salmond, to put forward its Independence in Europe strategy and use such arguments to build support for an independent Scotland. There is a strong instance of institutional layering here, and the televised debates required Salmond to think on the spot. This encouraged the leader to introduce 'new' ideas to the party's narrative such as that of overlapping identities. Indeed, Salmond admitted that it was possible to have both Scottish and British identities. As in the 2011 manifesto, the rhetoric of a 'partnership of equals' with Britain was used in the campaign. Moreover, that Scotland would continue to share an economic and monarchist union with the rUK was another idea used by Salmond in the independence campaign. Again, this may have been implemented to ease unionist fears of isolation and to make the prospect of independence easier to envisage. Indeed, by arguing that Scotland would not be a 'foreign' country after independence, Salmond stressed the theme of continuity of Anglo-Scot relations.

One distinct new idea that Salmond put forward was that Scottish independence could benefit the North of England. This stood in stark contrast to the party's alleged Anglophobia of previous years and he put Scotland in an almost saviour position as a 'northern light to redress the dark star' (Salmond 2014d). This Scottish exceptionalist rhetoric was further bolstered by references to great Scottish innovators and the fact that Scotland was the first country to provide universal education. These arguments were paralleled with the notion of the 'Westminster elite' and the ideas merged to create a distinct discourse on independence. This discourse involved the emphasis of civic nationalism while opposing the Westminster establishment, including on the basis of falling living standards since the financial crisis of 2007. Indeed, the party followed a logic of path dependence whereby positive imagery of civic nationalism was used alongside negative imagery of Westminster to defend the prospect of Scottish sovereignty.

7.5.2 Discursive institutionalist analysis

Both cognitive and normative ideas were used throughout the 2010s to bolster Scottish self-determination claims in Europe. For example, the arguments for universal free childcare and the European 1+2 language model indicated that the SNP was strongly committed to European integration.

The background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities of SNP elites, particularly Salmond and Sturgeon, show how the party maintained its Independence in Europe narrative during the 2010s. While we have explored Salmond's background ideational abilities in more depth in Chapter 5, this chapter has touched upon those of Nicola Sturgeon, who carried certain ideas about Europe from a young age. From a study of Sturgeon's background, we can see that she situated her nationalist politics in an international context from her early days at the University of Glasgow. The Independence in Europe narrative was officially launched by the SNP just two years after Sturgeon joined the party in 1986, aged 16. These experiences shaped Sturgeon's background ideational abilities which were then translated into foreground discursive abilities which she used to sustain the SNP's Independence in Europe narrative throughout the 2010s.

Since the mid-1990s, Sturgeon expressed the party's rhetoric in communicative discourses. For example, she argued that Scotland had second-class membership of the EU unlike other European states. While this built on a pre-established narrative, Sturgeon's status as a young law graduate gave her some credibility on European matters. Though there was some intra- and extra-party confusion about whether the SNP had sought legal advice on Scottish independence, Sturgeon cleared up matters in 2012 albeit to the detriment of First Minister, Alex Salmond. That said, Sturgeon's dedication to the party as a whole once again gave her a unique solidity and is akin to when Gordon Wilson attempted to unify the party in the 1980s.

On the basis of her foreground discursive abilities, Sturgeon used both normative and cognitive arguments when arguing for Scottish independence in Europe. Cognitively, she described the EU as a 'flexible' institution and pointed to the historical example of

Germany's accession to the EU in 1990. She then coupled this with a normative argument that it would be even easier for Scotland than it was for Germany to become a member of the EU upon secession from the UK. She was careful not to anger EU officials, such as Barroso, by recognising the importance of his statements. This showed the SNP to be a cooperative actor in Europe and gave sustenance to its Independence in Europe narrative.

That ideas shape institutions through discursive interactions is key to the logic of communication posed by discursive institutionalists. Institutions are continuously being created and recreated by these interactions. We can witness this in Salmond's extra-party discourses, such as in the televised debates with Darling, where the idea of Scottish independence in Europe could be considered to have 'softened'. Indeed, emphasising the idea of continuity of positive relations with the UK recreated the SNP's position on Scottish independence in the EU. In other words, the rUK was no longer portrayed as 'centralist' and 'bureaucratic' as it had been in previous campaign literature. Moreover, Salmond made a point of noting that it was the 'Westminster elite' and not the rUK that was holding Scotland back from independence.

Both Salmond and Sturgeon were significant political entrepreneurs in the SNP's formulation of its EU policies during the 2010s. These ideas were based on their respective background ideational abilities and communicated via their foreground discursive abilities to sustain the party's Independence in Europe narrative of the 1980s.

Conclusions

This chapter has shown how the SNP's continued commitment to both nationalism and internationalism was evident in the 2010s. Its commitment to the former was demonstrated through language used surrounding the 2010 UK general election, such as 'local champion' MPs. The party's commitment to the latter was evidenced in its strong arguments for European integration such as language learning and universal child care.

The intersection between the party's nationalist and internationalist approach can be seen in the layering of ideas such as fiscal autonomy for Scotland in Europe. Once again, the SNP referred to Norway in its 2010 UK general election manifesto, claiming that it would establish an Energy Fund similar to that of Norway. This was a misleading message, however, considering that Norway was a non-EU state. Nevertheless, the party's commitment to its Independence in Europe narrative was obvious. The SNP's 2011 Scottish election manifesto also introduced new ideas, such as the prospect of universal free childcare and the European Union 1+2 model, and became layered to produce a revitalised Independence in Europe narrative.

This narrative was carried by two significant political entrepreneurs: First Minister, Alex Salmond and Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon. These actors had background ideational abilities which were influenced by their fight for Independence in Europe since its launch in 1988. These nationalist and internationalist ideas translated into foreground discursive abilities whereby Sturgeon and Salmond used cognitive and normative arguments to bolster the party's European claims. For example, they both defended Scottish interests in Europe in their communicative discourses while taking a less hostile approach to the UK, considering them as 'neighbours' rather than 'foes'.

By the time of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the SNP's policies on Europe were well established and the 1980s narrative could finally be put to the test. Though the Yes camp lost its referendum campaign, the quick appointment of Nicola Sturgeon as First Minister introduced questions of consistency and continuity. In other words, how the SNP's policies on Europe will progress under her leadership. Though this extends beyond the period of analysis of this thesis, the conclusion will offer some thoughts on the matter.

There have been several international and national developments since the end of my period of analysis (1961-2014) and several reflections will be made on the future of the SNP's policies on Europe in the conclusion of the thesis. Some of these reflections are based on Nicola Sturgeon, still First Minister of Scotland, and her approach to Independence in Europe. The maintenance or shift of this narrative will largely depend

on her background ideational and foreground discursive abilities explored in this chapter as well as profound global, national and subnational restructuring.

Conclusion

The central question laid out at the beginning of this thesis was *how and why have the SNP's policies on Europe changed over time?* The thesis has offered an historical study of the SNP's policies on Europe from the early 1960s to the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. In particular, it focuses on the dependence of the party's policies on four main areas: European integration; British domestic politics; Scottish subnational politics; and political entrepreneurs. Its methodological emphasis was on archival research with interview supplementation and used an historical/discursive institutionalist approach to analyse the findings.

Considering that this study is historical, I believe the best way to conclude is with an historical account of how these factors interacted to induce a change in the SNP's policies on Europe. I will then clarify the contribution of this thesis to the existing literature before questioning the future of the SNP and Scotland in Europe as well as recommendations for further research.

Literature review

Valuable contributions have been made to the fields of Scottish, British and European politics. Previous analyses of the Scottish level have generated more agential contributions, while analyses at the British and European levels are more structuralist. The Europeanisation literature has shown its strength in analysing subnational politics but is alone unable to explain how and why the SNP's European rhetoric has transformed over time. As we have seen in this thesis, the party's European policies are embedded in a highly contextual framework which include alternative factors such as Scottish subnational politics, British domestic politics and the agential action of particular political entrepreneurs.

There is a small body of research aimed at analysing SNP figures significant to the party's European trajectory, namely Winnie Ewing and Jim Sillars. This thesis has aimed to analyse the agential action of other SNP political entrepreneurs in the party's European policy-making process and has identified particular individuals such as Gordon Wilson, John Swinney and Alex Salmond. This research has shown that internal factionalism, particularly that of the 79 Group and the fundamentalist/gradualist divide

generated a new context in which the SNP's policies on Europe operated. Moreover, this thesis has shown that more recent UK Prime Ministers such as David Cameron have also had a significant impact on the SNP's European trajectory. From archival research and interviews, we have seen that there are a number of structural influences on these narratives, including Scottish subnational politics, British domestic politics and European integration.

This thesis has provided a more balanced analytical approach, using Jessop's strategic-relational approach whereby structure and agency are considered to be mutually constitutive across various political levels. The complex nature of subnational politics has shown that we cannot analyse the party's policies on Europe without examining how these political levels have intertwined to produce distinct SNP policies on Europe. Moreover, the roles of political entrepreneurs cannot be separated from the mutable political and institutional framework across the European, British and Scottish levels.

Conceptual framework

The conceptual framework of this thesis is based on a combination of historical and discursive institutionalisms, where the former posits that institutions follow a 'logic of path-dependence' while the latter argues for a 'logic of communication'. Discursively, this thesis has aimed to show that the SNP as an institution has also followed a logic of communication whereby ideas shape institutions through discursive practices.

Though historical institutionalism has been attacked for struggling to explain institutional change, I have combined it with an ideational approach (discursive institutionalism) in order to strengthen the former's conceptualisation of narrative shifts. By regarding HI's critical junctures to arise from ideational change, the thesis has attempted to provide clearer explanations for the SNP's change in its European policies. Indeed, I have identified the key critical juncture of the SNP's discursive trajectory on Europe to be the resolution passed at its 1983 conference which marked an anti- to pro-European shift. In order to retain the structuring role of institutions, however, we have seen that ideas can only shift the SNP's policies on Europe during particular moments and contexts. This thesis has shown that the context of this critical juncture had been

underway for some time (since 1961), manifesting at the SNP's 1983 conference when the party shifted its position on Europe.

These theoretical underpinnings, coupled with a rigorous methodological approach, have allowed me to explain how and why the SNP's policies on Europe have changed over time. As we have seen, this hybrid new institutionalist approach has accounted for a range of distinct multiple variables in the shifting of narratives and has attempted to surpass Europeanisation as the main explanation for change in the SNP's policies on Europe. This thesis has considered Europeanisation to occur, not as a simple top-down process, but when Europe becomes the *référentiel* in domestic politics.

Engaging with European integration (1961-1975)

As argued in Chapter 3, the SNP's policies on Europe during the 1960s and first half of the 1970s mostly depended on British domestic politics. Many Scottish people were beginning to lose their sense of 'Britishness' during the early 1960s. With a decay in the industrial economy, the discovery of the North Sea oil and anti-EEC pressure groups, the SNP's overall message remained very anti-EEC. This gave the SNP the opportunity to advance its nationalist alternative stance, one which was particularly opposed to Westminster control. Before the party could advance a meatier policy on Europe, however, it had to strengthen its electability and visibility at Westminster.

In particular, Chapter 3 conceptually explored the British context in which the SNP was able to formulate distinct policies on Europe. The Conservatives' loss at the 1965 general election allowed the SNP to concentrate on strengthening the party and especially its European policy. The respective victories in the by-elections of Carmarthen and Hamilton in 1967 lifted the SNP's spirits about being electorally viable. While the Hamilton champion, Winnie Ewing, was known for having an affable view of Europe, she remained opposed to EEC membership and her presence at Westminster allowed her to reinforce this position. This chapter has therefore shown how political entrepreneurs can maintain or change an institution's policy ideas using their background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities.

Chapter 3 has also demonstrated how concepts of historical institutionalism can be used to analyse changes in policy. For example, the NEC considered Wilson's arguments made in his memo of 1967 too extreme and decided to make amendments. As historical institutionalism tells us, this is an example of *drift* change, whereby an institution's member attempts to amend its rules. At the coordinative discursive level, the NEC resisted Wilson's reinforcement of an anti-EEC position partly due to the lack of information available on the EEC and partly down to the SNP's lack of finances for research. The NEC's dilution of Wilson's anti-EEC arguments did not put him off trying to change the status quo, however, and this chapter has shown how conflict can engender institutional change. Though it took some time, the party eventually adopted Wilson's position between 1968 and 1970.

The change in the SNP's narrative on Europe during the mid-1960s partly owed to the discursive interaction of ideas. Though Ewing's two paradoxical stances of being against the EEC *and* being internationalist may have created some internal and external confusion about what the SNP stood for regarding Europe, she may have also given some credibility to the party. Indeed, Chapter 3 revealed that Ewing's anti-EEC claims were made more credible due to her background ideational abilities, informed by her experiences with Europe. Her discursive interaction with John McAteer grew into a robust by-election campaign with a particular anti-EEC element. The Hamilton by-election was a profound change for the SNP in the sense that the party had never performed so well electorally and now had the opportunity to debate 'high' affairs such as the EEC.

Indeed, the SNP used this opportunity in 1970 when the Conservatives regained governmental control. In part, the SNP's negative stance on the EEC was about taking an anti-establishment line. As the Conservative government increasingly warmed to European integration, the SNP became more opposed. As aforementioned, however, it is too simplistic to conclude that this was pure anti-establishmentarianism. Other, mainly British and European, structural factors enhanced the SNP's anti-EEC view during this time, including Westminster's neglect of Scottish interests in the European debate and the party's negative experiences with its European delegation. By employing discursive institutionalism, this chapter has shown how political entrepreneurs develop new

approaches by using a mix of pre-existing ideas rather than by introducing completely new policy perspectives. Some in the SNP at this time believed the SNP's position on Europe to be obstructive and, like Wilson, Slesser was a *bricoleur* in 'softening' the party's approach to the EEC. This ended in an ambiguous party message, however, which would need to be clarified in order to carry its No stance in the 1975 EEC referendum campaign.

Again, through discursive institutionalism, Chapter 3 has shown how ambiguity was found in both coordinative and communicative spheres whereby coordinative intra-party ambiguity translated into an external convoluted message. This ambiguity rested on the basis that the SNP should oppose EEC membership: either opposing membership on Westminster's terms or in principle. This resulted in a conclusion from significant figures in the party that the SNP needed to soften its approach to Europe.

Furthermore, we have seen in this chapter how the structural changes of the EEC affected the SNP's policies on Europe. The absence of Charles de Gaulle from the European arena after his resignation in 1969 allowed Britain to visualise a future within the EEC. This induced a new engagement of the SNP with the EEC which ultimately resulted in negative experiences, such as those of its European delegation. This shows how the party's EEC policy also depended on European integration at this time. As a consequence of these disheartening experiences in Europe, the SNP's policy towards the Common Market hardened even further and the party retreated to an even stronger anti-EEC stance.

Scottish subnational politics had a lesser effect than British politics on the SNP's European policy during the 1970s. Other than the SNP, the European project was rarely discussed by Scottish elites and this silence allowed the SNP to advance its European narratives in Scotland. The majority of the Scottish population opposed EEC membership in the early 1970s and the SNP took this opportunity to reinforce its anti-EEC stance. While the party generally took an anti-EEC line, it displayed an oscillated trajectory as it swayed between opposition to the EEC on the basis of Scottish sovereignty and by principle. While the referendum result was disappointing for the SNP, it had managed to make itself more visible by engaging with 'high' politics. It

therefore had a more credible voice on European matters than it did prior to the party's rise in popularity.

The principal contribution of Chapter 3 has therefore been to analyse the history of the SNP's policies on Europe using a new institutionalist framework. By surpassing the sole use of Europeanisation as a concept to analyse these policies, this chapter has shown, through historical institutionalism, how political entrepreneurs' layering of ideas had a distinct impact on the party's policies from the early 1960s to mid-1970s. At the same time, using discursive institutionalism, this chapter has demonstrated how the background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities of SNP figures allowed them to begin to change the party's stance on Europe.

From Euroscepticism to critical juncture (1976-1989)

As revealed in Chapter 4, it was rare for the SNP to discuss Europe during the early 1980s as it was focused rather on the reverberations of Thatcherism, Scottish devolution and party electability. When the party did make the odd comment, it was on the basis of the EEC being centralist and harmful to national interests. While the radical position of the 79 Group put the SNP's credibility to the test, Wilson worked tirelessly to unify the party. Meanwhile, Ewing attempted to connect Scotland to the EEC by organising study visits and meetings between European and SNP elites. These activities helped to habituate the party to European integration and led to the main critical juncture identified in this thesis: when *the SNP's hostility to the EEC shifted at its annual conference in September 1983*.

As we have seen from the other literature discussed in this thesis, the general consensus is that the Independence in Europe narrative began in 1988. I have argued in this chapter, however, that a distinction must be made between the coordinative and communicative currents of this narrative. The 1983 conference passed a resolution which recognised the EEC as a place in which Scotland's interests could be expressed and heard. In addition to Ewing's work to shift the party's line on Europe, elite consensus from both SNP traditionalists and gradualists bolstered the party's change from anti- to quasi- pro-EEC.

On a conceptual level, this chapter has shown how this shift can be principally explained by the British politics of the 1980s. The Conservatives gained huge electoral success at the 1983 general election and coupled with Thatcher's rejection of a Scottish Assembly, the SNP began to retaliate. This retaliation included positioning Scottish nationalism in a European context. The party's move towards a pro-EEC position can thus be explained as a way to unite the party but also as a protest against Thatcherism. The Conservative government's poor representation of Scotland in Europe intensified the SNP's position and it began to pursue the narrative of bypassing London to Europe directly. As the SNP stood as a national alternative to public disenchantment with the concept of 'Britishness', so too did the concept of Europe stand as an alternative to Westminster. Based on Scotland's profuse oil and gas resources, the SNP considered itself to be in a strong position to negotiate new terms for an independent Scotland in Europe.

Moreover, Chapter 4 has shown how cognitive and normative ideas were used to further the SNP's stance on Europe. The party claimed that the London Establishment was purposefully deaf to Scotland's needs in terms of fishing, agriculture, education and transport and used the EEC as an alternative to better these areas of concern. Ewing was re-elected as MEP for the Highlands and Islands at the 1984 European Elections, winning 17.8 per cent of the overall Scottish vote. The SNP now considered the EEC to be a political and economic force of stability for Scottish independence and the party formally adopted its Independence in Europe narrative at its 1988 conference.

This chapter has also explored the overlapping of European integration with other contextual factors to produce a notable party stance on the EEC. Owing to the renewed vitality of European integration in the late-1980s, the SNP's European policies during the 1989 European Elections were much heartier than those of 1984. There was a particular party focus on post-1992 Europe when the Common Market was to be established and the SNP argued that the 1992 removal of all trade barriers increased the importance and urgency of the EEC. The party argued that, in an independent Scotland in Europe, the SNP would advance the argument for improved Scotland-Europe transport links to guarantee that Scottish goods could reach European markets.

The party continued to argue that the Conservative government was both anti-Scottish and anti-European and that the SNP's new pro-EEC stance contrasted with that of the Tories. Furthermore, Thatcher's execution of the poll tax in Scotland was used as another argument for Independence in Europe where the SNP maintained that an independent Scotland in Europe would implement a system of local income tax as an alternative. The party also campaigned, within the context of the EEC, to improve workers' rights and to stop Nirex's nuclear dumping in Scotland. Fishing and agriculture were another two vital areas on the SNP's European agenda, and the party argued that these communities would be able to access greater funding through membership of an independent Scotland in Europe. Finally, the SNP drew comparisons of Scotland to other small European states to encourage its Independence in Europe narrative in order to dispel the 'myth' that Scotland was not dependent on the UK government for subsidies. As such, this chapter has revealed how the party continued to follow a logic of path dependence in the 1980s by arguing for Scottish sovereignty within the context of Europe.

Devolution and Europe (1990-2000)

Chapter 5 has shown how, it is without doubt that the most significant political entrepreneur of the SNP during the 1990s was party leader, Alex Salmond. This was a decade of metamorphosis for both Europe and the SNP's European policies following the formation of the EU in 1993. As Salmond led the party towards Scottish devolution, the Independence in Europe narrative was imbued with a gradualist strategy. This stood in contrast to Jim Sillars' fundamentalist position of the mid-1980s whose objective - Scottish independence in Europe - was the same as that of Salmond albeit following a different trajectory. Salmond's coupling of the idea of Scottish independence in Europe with devolution served to make the SNP's pro-European stance more publicly appetising. This chapter has thus shown how Salmond's new strategy followed a logic of path dependence whereby Scottish nationalism was at the heart of the party's decision-making process.

As in previous years, the party's European policies were heavily reliant on the British politics of the time, particularly on Thatcher's aforementioned implementation of the

poll tax in Scotland. Salmond, in particular, was opposed to the tax and began to discursively introduce a new idea of a 'European' tax system. Moreover, the growing disenchantment of the Labour government, elected in 1997, influenced the SNP's policies on Europe. In particular, the SNP's argument was that the Labour government was 'sidelining' Scotland in Europe and used this in its formulation of the Independence in Europe narrative. Chapter 5 has therefore shown, through historical institutionalism, how political entrepreneurs' addition of different elements can maintain an institutional message, namely Scottish autonomy from the UK.

We have also witnessed how European integration was also another factor influencing the SNP's policies on Europe. The EU's structural reforms were launched only two years before Salmond was elected as party leader and he thus entered a highly contextualised space whereby the reforms had opened up a symbolic and discursive environment for minority nationalist parties. European integration had therefore provided a revamped arena in which the SNP could articulate its regional demands. The factor of European integration also intertwined with the factor of political entrepreneurship to create much more thorough policies on Europe than the SNP had formulated in previous years. Salmond used the new regional space constructed by the European reforms to test out his gradualist version of Scottish independence in Europe. To conclude, the SNP's policies on Europe became more concentrated and comprehensive under the leadership of Salmond, but we cannot owe this purely to his background ideational and foreground discursive abilities. Rather, it was a unique mixture of political entrepreneurship and British politics, most notably Thatcher and devolution, which intertwined to harden the SNP's European policies.

A 'victory of continuity' (2000s)

Chapter 6 has demonstrated how European integration and political entrepreneurs were enormous inducers of change in the SNP's policies on Europe during the 2000s. Party leader, Alex Salmond's resignation in 2000 made way for another leader whose organisation reforms nourished the party in a number of ways. John Swinney managed the continuation of Salmond's gradualist strategy but was not required, as Salmond was, to establish Scottish civic nationalism and devolution. This consequently gave Swinney

more time and space for policy development, including the SNP's policy on Europe, and he proposed a number of new ideas including green energy and transport. Again, this is demonstrative of how historical institutionalism can be used to analyse the concept of path dependence whereby Swinney's continuation of Salmond's gradualist approach was rooted in a nationalist context.

Furthermore, we have seen how the SNP's confederalist narrative continued under Swinney's leadership and negative imagery of the UK was used to reinforce its EU claims. Where European integration was concerned, the SNP supported withdrawal of the CFP and opposed any European Constitution that gave the EU exclusive competence over fisheries. This shows how, at the time, European integration was a significant influence on the party's narratives on Europe in addition to the influence of political entrepreneurs like Swinney, whose strategy of continuation allowed the introduction of new ideas into the institution. Again, this is an example of how cognitive and normative ideas, as per discursive institutionalism, were used to reinforce the SNP's logic of path dependence.

Finally, Chapter 6 has revealed that the 2000s, unlike preceding decades, saw little influence from Scottish politics on the SNP's policies on Europe, other than the fact that the party was pushed electorally down by the Lib Dems. As argued in this chapter, the SNP's poor electoral performance at the 2003 Scottish Parliament Election allowed it time and space to revise its policies, including those on Europe. While the party's use of cognitive and normative arguments served to strengthen its Independence in Europe narrative, these arguments were more critical of the EU than in any other time since the creation of the narrative in the 1980s.

Attempting *Independence in Europe* (2010s)

Chapter 7 has demonstrated that by the 2010s, the criticisms of the EU had subsided as Scotland was given a material chance to vote for independence from the UK in the 2014 independence referendum. The SNP remained committed to both Scottish nationalism and internationalism via membership of the EU should Scotland become independent. The party's nationalist tendencies followed a logic of path dependence and were

expressed in language used at the time of the 2010 UK general election, such as 'local champion' MPs. At the same time, its commitment to internationalism was shown in the 2010 manifesto's arguments for European integration such as universal childcare and language learning. As per historical institutionalism, this layering of ideas produced a highly distinct and revitalised Independence in Europe narrative.

By the time of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the SNP had a well-established leader in Alex Salmond and his deputy, Nicola Sturgeon. With strong background ideational abilities and a political career starting in tandem with the launch of the Independence in Europe narrative in 1988, Sturgeon was able to argue this narrative in both coordinative and communicative spheres. She tied up any loose ends such as the question of whether the Scottish government had sought legal advice on an independent Scotland's membership of the EU. This indicated the strength of her foreground discursive abilities which would serve her well when she was appointed as First Minister in 2014. This chapter has thus shown that, though the independence referendum result was disappointing to the SNP, it brought with it a new leadership change and potential for a new kind of party with a new approach to European integration.

Answering the research question

Each of these chapters has attempted to address and analyse the SNP's responses to Europe from 1961 to 2014. As we have seen, there are four main interactive factors that have shaped the party's policies on Europe: Scottish subnational politics, British domestic politics, European integration and political entrepreneurs. While the importance of each of these factors varies over time, they are ontologically inseparable based on the strategic-relational approach outlined in Chapter 2.

To succinctly summarise the answer to the research question, *how and why have the SNP's policies on Europe changed over time?*, I conclude that the party's responses to Europe have depended on the unique composition of these four contextual factors. As historical institutionalism asserts, critical junctures can emerge within institutions to generate a new way of doing things. I have identified the SNP's 1983 party conference to be this juncture. While externally this seemed like a sharp revision of the party's

previously anti-European stance, the coordinative discourses explored in this thesis reveal that it was rather an instance of gradual ideational change in a distinct historical context.

Since the early 1960s, the SNP argued that the EEC was a centralised, bureaucratic polity and a threat to national identity. In the 1970s, the SNP became unclear on the message about whether it opposed EEC membership in principle or due to Scotland's poor representation by Westminster in Europe. By the time of the party conference in 1983, a number of structuralist factors including a decaying industrial economy, Thatcherism, etc., provided the SNP with a distinct context in which to uphold its objective for an independent Scotland. Owing to the interaction of these four factors, the party's objective was recontextualised and it began to operate its position on Europe through the official launch of the Independence in Europe narrative of 1988. Since then, this narrative has been somewhat constant, save for opposition to the CFP.

The party's policies on Europe have depended on a number of contextual factors including Scottish subnational politics, British domestic politics, European integration and political entrepreneurs to varying degrees over time and space. This means that, should a regeneration of contextual factors occur (which, inevitably, it will), the SNP's policies on Europe might manifest themselves differently. As historical institutionalism asserts, an institution follows a logic of path dependence whereby its policies will align with the *reason* the institution was established in the first place. This logic can be fulfilled through the concepts of layering, drift, conversion and conflict as posed by historical institutionalism. The SNP's policies on Europe have always met with the institutional purpose, regardless of contextual factors. In other words, *the SNP's policies on Europe depend on how they benefit the party's narrative of independence from the rUK*.

Contribution of thesis

This work has aimed to make both empirical and theoretical contributions to the existing literature. Empirically, this thesis is based on archival research and interviews as well as on the literatures of Europeanisation, Scottish subnational politics, British domestic politics and political entrepreneurs at the heart of the SNP's policies on

Europe. I hope to have added to these literatures by offering new reflections on previously unexplored archival data as well as a distinct mix of interviewees.

Theoretically, I have contributed to the analysis of secessionist parties in a novel way. I have taken the strengths of both historical and discursive institutionalisms to generate a distinct conceptual framework in which to analyse the SNP's policies on Europe. This thesis has attempted to answer the aforementioned key research question through a unique conceptual framework and a rigorous methodology. From a historical institutionalist perspective, this thesis has explored different concepts of change, including *layering*, *drift* and *conflict*. It has shown how these types of change can accumulate gradually and how critical junctures generate new institutional responses.

Both empirically and theoretically, this thesis has revealed an important critical juncture in the party's narratives on Europe and challenged assumptions that the Independence in Europe narrative was adopted in 1988. Through archival research, this thesis has shown that, while this narrative was formally launched at the communicative level by the SNP in 1988, it was actually in 1983 that the narrative appeared at the coordinative level.

It is my hope that using this mixed new institutionalist framework has led to new observations and a strong contribution to both the literature on the SNP and on the Europeanisation of secessionist/fringe parties.

The future of the SNP's policies on Europe

With a second Scottish independence referendum on the horizon, what can this research teach us to expect? We cannot predict the future of the SNP's policies on Europe any more than we can predict Scotland's future in the EU. Though we cannot precisely forecast the future of the party's policies, we can assume through an historical institutionalist viewpoint, that the party will do whatever it can to uphold the objective of Scottish independence. Yet, it is not legally certain that there will be a second independence referendum. If an independent Scotland were to one day join the EU, it may eventually return to its anti-European stance if Scottish sovereignty and national identity came under threat. Whether or not a second referendum will take place will be

dependent on political developments in Scotland, the UK and the EU that may be completely detached from the European question. Furthermore, the referendum result will rely on SNP entrepreneurs and leaders in their utilisation of the unique conditions that come to the fore. It is significant that the SNP's version of Scottish independence has constantly been from the rUK - this means, according to historical institutionalism, that it will do whatever it can to stick to this objective.

Structures have once again changed since 2014 and further research into the SNP's policies on Europe since IndyRef is merited. We now live in a world where the space of Europe has been redefined through various events, not least Brexit and Covid. As McEwen et al. (2020) have noted, 'Brexit and the coronavirus pandemic have put relationships between the UK government and its devolved counterparts under growing strain'. Moreover, the recent election of Rishi Sunak as Conservative Prime Minister as well as the death of Queen Elizabeth II may redefine what it means to be 'British'.

All of these events have had national implications for Scotland and therefore the SNP's policies on the EU. The party has maintained its anti-establishment line through opposition to Brexit but this opposition cannot merely be based on disenchantment with the current Conservative government and its policies on European integration. As we have seen, it is down to an idiosyncratic mixture of a number of intervening agential and structural variables. By acknowledging the mutually constitutive nature of structure and agency, further research could build upon this thesis to offer a fuller analysis of the SNP's more recent policies on Europe as Scotland prepares for its second independence referendum. Thus, the idea of the SNP and Europe being 'strange bedfellows' continues to evolve over time depending on the intersection of highly contextualised factors of European integration, Scottish subnational politics, British domestic politics and political entrepreneurs.

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