Portfolio of Original Musical Compositions With Written Commentaries

Relational Aesthetics: A Practice-Led Investigation into Their Ontological Basis

Lauren Anne Redhead

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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ABSTRACT

Aesthetics is to do with relations. Relational aesthetics can be considered to offer conclusions about how one thinks about the ontology of art, the nature of the relationship of artworks with space and time, appropriate analytical approaches to artworks, and the debate as to whether music can 'do' philosophy. The practice-led component of this research has been an important aspect of the illustration and elucidation of my points. My practice-as-methodology approach allows me to do conceptual analysis through practice which crucially allows me to make conclusions without having arrived at them through language. By explaining the concept of relational aesthetics, and analysing whether it is an epistemological construct arising from existing artworks or an ontological construct from which artworks arise it is possible to show how practice-led research has an important contribution to make to the consideration of aesthetic problems. These aesthetic problems relate to the particular case of music and its prior consideration as a special or different case within the ontology of artworks themselves: considering the case of music from the starting points of practice and theory, relational aesthetics can prove the music is not an exceptional case at all. A combination of poststructuralist analysis of existing (theoretical and musical) work and practice-led conceptual analysis allows further conclusions to be drawn regarding the 'work' itself, its ontology and definition, and other musical features such as quotation and borrowing, and the relationship with time and space. Existing thought, music, and philosophy, have a contribution to make to all of these discussions, but the inclusion of relational aesthetics in these individual investigations makes it possible to conclude that: the work does not exist; there can be supposed to be a work-function which creates the illusion of the work; time and space should be considered topologically different from the real line in order to define them correctly with respect to the work; quotation can be used as a material exemplar in all of these cases. Indeed, the historicity of material and its consequences for aesthetic and artistic autonomy are important factors in the re-reading of all of the aspects of the work presented here. The result of this investigation is the conclusion of the ontological basis of relations, with respect to the work of art, and the assertion that an experiential rather than creator-led approach to the art work is most appropriate when assessing works of music, and indeed all works of art.

in the back there was a pigeon (c) [open instrumentation]
This piece considers various settings of the *tantum ergo* and their status now and at the time of their composition. It approaches the performative nature of liturgy and musical canon from the stand point of examining whether in their structural repetition the creation of their meaning can be identified.

as a name i am a myth [bcl; vln; hpschd; voices on tape; public address loudspeaker]
This piece reviews the status of chamber music within the concert hall by examining the possible forms it might take and the messages that these forms might send. It also places chamber music within a larger tradition of writing and thinking about music, and questions whether this tradition is itself legitimate.

love speed and thrills [open instrumentation; tape; public address loudspeaker; video projection]
love speed and thrills analyses the effect of a proliferation of signifiers within one piece by making them explicitly distinct from each other. Thus music, image, instruction, and text all become seemingly separate and yet integrated within the course of the piece.

the empiricist view [large ensemble]
the empiricist view examines the relationship between an ensemble as a unit, its members, the concert hall, and the music which is played. This is exemplified in the kaleidoscopic nature of the musical material and the construction of a 'concert' for solo 'cello within this theatre which itself is built from a solo 'cello piece intended to be a performance within a theatrical performance.

the enigma machine
the enigma machine 1: hendecaptych of hans memling [mezzosoprano; bfl; vco]
the enigma machine 2a: properties and essence⌣ [pc; afl]
the enigma machine 2b: [no subtitle] [tr; hn]
the enigma machine 3: archipelago [music boxes]
the enigma machine 4: the historicity of cartography [cl; pno; perc]
the enigma machine 5: de nostra re⌣ [organ]
As a project *the enigma machine⌣* examines different kinds of structural and mediaeval relationships in a variety of chamber works. These pieces explore

quotation and relationships with other art works as their starting points and demonstrate the multitude of interrelationships possible from the construction of music from limited material.

green angel [a chamber opera]
green angel is a collaborative opera written between Adam Strickson (librettist) and myself. It combines aspects of opera, Noh theatre, mediaevalism, quotation, intertextuality, and interrelationships in exploring the emotional journey of a single character. As such it also touches on themes of nature, metamorphosis, and identity.

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1.1 THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION

Aesthetics is to do with relations. This short sentence summarises both the point of departure and conclusion of this investigation, which is in whole and in part about aesthetics and what I see as being a long-standing and under-addressed aesthetic problem.

This thesis will present my aesthetic, musicological, and practice-led investigations into the ontological and relational aesthetic basis of the musical work, and the consequences of this for the understanding, reading, analysis and composition of further works of music. This investigation encompasses consideration of the ontology of the work of art, Nicolas Bourriaud's relational aesthetics,[1] investigation into quotation and musical borrowing as exemplars of the outcomes of my analysis, the philosophy of space and time, and the analysis and criticism of musical modernism. All of these themes relate to one central thesis: that the ontology of the work of art is itself relational.

Relational aesthetics considers the position of the listener or viewer of the work of art as paramount in its construction; it can be summed up in Bourriaud's statement 'relational aesthetics considers interhuman exchange as aesthetic in and of itself.'[2] It is from this statement that the reading of relational aesthetics contained within this thesis begins, and also with this statement that Bourriaud himself summarises the concept. I have here used the term 'relational aesthetics' to signify not only Bourriaud's first theoretical work but the entire body of his writings. This is because I believe (and Bourriaud indicates) that his theoretical position does not change over the course of his writings but develops to take into account further developments in artworks, and to better explain them.

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[1] Nicolas Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics* (Dijon: les presses du réel, 2002). I will refer to these relational aesthetics every time I use the term throughout this thesis, as opposed to cultural or institutional theories, and those such as G. E. Moore, 'Ethics in Relation to Conduct' §93-94, *Principia Ethica*, (1903) <http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica> [19.04.2011] which speaks of 'comparative value,' this is sometimes described as 'relational.'

[2] Nicolas Bourriaud, *Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprogrammes the World* (Berlin: Lukas and Sternberg, 2005) p. 3.

Bourriaud describes a relational art as, 'an art taking as its theoretical horizon the realm of human interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an independent and *private* symbolic space.'[3] From this statement there are therefore three elements to be given consideration in order to define what constitutes a relational artwork: the 'theoretical horizon' of the artwork; its consideration or inclusion of the 'realm of human interactions', and the 'social context' in which these take place. All three are important. The 'theoretical horizon' takes into account the conceptualisation of the work, meaning that artworks which are *related to*, despite this never necessarily being an intention of the artwork's creator, are not themselves relational; this aspect of Bourriaud's definition implies that what is important is the consideration of, rather than the absolute certainty of the creation of, relations. The 'realm of human interactions' is much more broad than to simply indicate a kind of art in which the viewer or listener is invited to take part, despite many of the examples cited by Bourriaud in *Relational Aesthetics* involving a participatory element as part of the work. Indeed, Bourriaud is opposed to such a narrow definition, writing that relational approaches, 'do not stem from a "social" or "sociological" form of art. They are aimed at the formal space-time constructs that do not *represent* alienation, which do not *extend* the division of labour into forms.'[4] Consideration of the 'realm of human interactions' therefore invites the possibilities not only for a kind of taking-part on behalf of the viewer or listener but also the inclusion of modes of human relationships in the material of the artwork. For example, on artworks which might induce a certain emotion in viewer or listener, Bourriaud explains that, rather than the experience of the emotion by the perceiver, 'what matters is what is done with this type of emotion: what [the emotions] are steered towards, how the artist organises them among themselves, and to what intent.'[5] Finally the 'social context' of this 'realm of human interactions' is considered important since it defines the relevance of these interactions; it is not sufficient that the possibility for relations be created as a constituent part of the artwork, but it is also necessary that these relations be meaningful and relevant to the work's perceivers.

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[3] Bourriaud (2002) p. 14.

[4] ibid. p. 82.

[5] ibid. p. 64.

This definition focuses on the existence of the artwork as constituted in the experience of the creator and the viewer or receiver, rather than its constituent material parts, as its main quality. Thus Bourriaud, recognising the variable and transitive nature of such a group of interrelations, describes art as 'like an opening to unlimited discussion,'[6] and further comments on the autonomy of such a work by saying, 'contemporary art is definitely developing a political project when it endeavours to move into the relational realm by turning it into an issue.'[7] Both of these assertions are of particular relevance to this thesis since what is considered in the accompanying portfolio of music is the possibility of unlimited semiosis as a result of the meeting of a large number of signifiers in each work and the problematisation of elements of contemporary music (and contemporary music narratives) which could be thought to be concerned with 'independent and *private* symbolic spaces'. In each case the musical work as I have presented it has been considered to exist primarily in the relations that exist between the artwork and the perceivers. Thus the primary form of each of these works is a relational one, and therefore they demonstrate Bourriaud's claim that, 'present day art shows that form only exists in the encounter and in the dynamic relationship enjoyed by an artistic proposition with other formations, artistic or otherwise.'[8]

'Although there is no participatory element in any of these works, as there might be in, for example, an installation, this does not indicate a significant diversion from Bourriaud's intentions for relational art. On this he writes, '[a]s part of a "relationist" theory of art, inter-subjectivity does not only represent the social setting for the reception of art, which is its "environment", its "field" (Bourdieu), but also becomes the quintessence of artistic practice.'[9] This 'quintessence' of artistic practice is demonstrated by Bourriaud to exist first and foremost in works which invite participation (so, before the participation has occurred), and thus participation can be considered to be one of their relational properties. For example, Bourriaud's reading of the work of Cuban artist Felix Gonzalez-Torres focusses not on a theme of gay activism which could be understood by the recurring theme of the depiction of events from Gonzalez-Torres' home-life

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[6] ibid. p. 15.

[7] ibid. p. 17.

[8] ibid. p. 21.

[9] ibid. p 22.

with his boyfriend but on the cohabiting relationship between the two partners; something which is shaped by them as individuals and not by their sexuality, and is entirely separate from the relationships created between the artist and the perceivers who might take his sweets or his posters away from a gallery.[10] In this description of Gonzalez-Torres' work as relational, Bourriaud concludes that, 'the idea of *including the other* is not just a theme. It turns out to be essential to the formal understanding of the work.'[11] Further to this, Bourriaud goes on to conclude that although elements of participation might alert one to the relational nature of an artwork, '[w]hat nowadays forms the foundation of artistic experience is *the joint presence of beholders in front of the work*, be this work effective or symbolic,'[12] indicating that the relationship with art need not be a participatory one at all.

Despite all of this description, Bourriaud's point in *Relational Aesthetics* and his later works is essentially an epistemological one, relating to what one can know about the state of being of artworks; he does not question the state of their existence in the course of his theoretical writings and his work as a curator of modern art exhibitions.[13] It is on this point that my work diverges from that of Bourriaud, since I suspect that what can be known about artworks and as a result of engaging with artworks, and particularly the knowledge that can be gained as a result of their relational properties, must be a result of some aspect of the ontology of the work of art itself. Since few ontological theories of art, and particularly of music, account for its relational properties, it is therefore a goal of this investigation to conclude as to a relational ontology of art that might be fully reconciled with the relational properties of artworks, in part through a study of the relational properties of the works of music connected with this thesis. Bourriaud does not question what the work of art *is* outside of its reception and modes of engagement; through investigation into the ontology of art, and theories of the work which could be posited, I test the theory that the artwork itself is relational.

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[10] ibid. pp. 49-52.

[11] ibid. p. 52.

[12] ibid. p. 57.

[13] Which I consider to be of equal importance: Bourriaud is one of a number of writers who prove that theory can, and should, be practice-led in order to engage fully with current and contemporary artistic issues.

This thesis will also draw upon the writing of Jacques Rancière, whose definition of the 'aesthetic regime'[14] of art can be said to focus on relational issues within the artistic work. He makes explicit the way in which aesthetic definitions arise from social and not from artistic, perceptual, truth, or beauty-related concerns when he writes,

> [A]rt is no longer identified as a specific difference within ways of doing or through criteria of inclusion and evaluation, allowing one to judge artistic conceptions and applications, but as a mode of sensible being specific to its products,[15]

recognising that cultural conditions are as important in the definition of art as the artworks themselves. Rancière also writes that aesthetics,

> designates a mode of thought that develops with respect to the things of art and that is concerned to show them to be things of thought. [It is...] a particular historical regime of thinking about art and an idea of thought according to which things of art are thought.[16]

Here, Rancière proposes that artworks exist with respect to one's social relationship to them. The hypothesis that relational aesthetics is a question of ontology is reached when one considers, as I will demonstrate, that the *nature* of art is not changed when knowledge and understanding about art change. In effect 'art' is itself a socially constructed label.[17] This can be demonstrated from an ontological point of view when the difference between statues and lumps of bronze is considered.[18] Even when more complicated cases are considered, the only thing to differentiate sculpture from chairs or tables, or indeed sculpture of

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[14] Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics* (London: Continuum, 2006).

[15] Jacques Rancière, *Aesthetics and Its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009) p. 65.

[16] Jacques Rancière, *The Aesthetic Unconscious* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009) pp. 4-5.

[17] Arthur Danto, 'The Artworld,' *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 61, no. 19 (October 1964) pp. 571-584 is accepted to be the first mention of 'artworld' as an institution. Just as this institution is constructed in Danto's article, 'art' as understood in contemporary society can be seen as a relatively recent construct.

[18] Trenton Merricks, *Objects and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp. 38-46 outlines the issues when considering these two states, as does John Heil, *From an Ontological Point of View* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp. 181-182. Both stress that different properties are afforded the statue which cannot be said to belong to a lump of bronze.

chairs or tables from chairs and tables themselves,[19] can be said to be a complex web of interrelations which are at the forefront of their nature: the ontology of art is reliant on such a web for its existence. Reductionist theories might deny the existence of statues but not the existence of sculpture since the statue is an object, but the sculpture can be said to be a social construction.

A further question at this point might be that on encountering chairs and tables, for example in an art gallery, one knows to treat them differently than works of art even if there should exist in the same gallery[20] sculpture which consists of chairs and tables.[21] Clearly this is not related to the possible uses of the chairs and tables but to the presentations of the objects themselves. Guy Debord questions the modes by which we engage with art by saying, 'the spectacle is not a collection of images; it is a social relation between people that is mediated by images,'[22] which itself questions that the modes by which art is valued come from the art itself. Marcel Duchamp also makes this clear when he writes,

> [a]ll in all, the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualification and thus adds his contribution to the creative act.[23]

Not only does this provide support for Rancière's description of aesthetics, it explains how it can be made explicit that the modes by which art is valued do not belong to the artworks themselves. This is an experiential judgement and is reliant on interrelationships between the viewer and the art works which are not to do with possible uses.

Bourriaud's *Relational Aesthetics* belongs to a tradition of modern French thought which includes Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière whose writings are

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[19] Merricks (2003) p1 states that there are no chairs, and in pp. 164-170 he outlines the problems with various statements which seem to afford properties to chairs.

[20] Allowing for the social construction of galleries, of course.

[21] For example Frank West, *Viennoiserie* (1998) or David West, *Venice Chair* (1986).

[22] Guy Debord, *Society of the Spectacle*, trans. by Ken Knabb (London: Rebel Press, 1983) p. 7.

[23] Marcel Duchamp, 'The Creative Act,' *Session on the Creative Act* (Houston, Texas: American Federation of the Arts, 1957) p. 2, <http://www.cathystone.com/Duchamp_Creative Act.pdf> [19.04.2011].

respectively influential on theories concerning ontology and the political autonomy of art. Bourriaud falls halfway between the theoretical consideration of ontology, and its applications (Badiou), and the consideration of art as a function in society (Rancière). It is therefore possible to situate the themes of relational aesthetics within a body of older and contemporary writing on aesthetics, and to examine this context, but it should be noted that these writers all represent new thought in the area I am investigating. Since this represents a contemporary investigation the task remains not to contextualise it but to draw together the central themes in a way which can be applied to future practice as well as to a retrospective of recent practice (as all three writers do). Therefore the contextual link made with my own work is particularly important in articulating this thought with respect to music.

Rancière outlines the problem of the relational ontology of art when he says,

> at the most general level [...] there is meaning in what seems not to have any meaning, something enigmatic about what seems self-evident, a spark of thought in what appears to be an anodyne detail. These figures are not the *materials* upon which analytic interpretation proves its ability to interpret cultural formation. They are *testimony* to the existence of a particular tension between thought and non-thought, a particular way that thought is present within the sensible materiality, meaning within the insignificant, and an involuntary element within conscious thought.[24]

This identification of a latent chain of meaning which belongs not to the materials (and here, Rancière uses the word to refer to the constituent physical parts of such artworks, which are of course contestable in works of music) but to signifiers is itself evidentiary of the relational ontology of such works.

Rancière's work re-defines aesthetics with respect to the modes of engagement by which art is constructed and appreciated in society. This seems, on one level, to rob artworks of some of their autonomy. In chapter 3 I shall explain the possibility of differentiating between artistic autonomy, political autonomy, and an overall aesthetic autonomy of art. Clearly not all of these are possible, as is recognised by Rancière when he describes the existence of

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[24] Rancière, *The Aesthetic Unconscious* (2009) p. 3.

> an aesthetic regime in which art is no longer identified as a specific difference within ways of doing or through criteria of inclusion and evaluation, allowing one to judge aesthetic conceptions and applications, but as a mode of sensible being specific to its products.[25]

Whilst I will address this question in more detail in chapter 3, the need to address the political autonomy of art, even that which does not seem to be outwardly engaged in politics, can be seen to arise from Rancière's writing. This is summarised by Peter Bürger, when he says, 'if it is true that art is institutionalised in bourgeois society, then it does not suffice to make the contradictory structure of this ideology transparent; instead one must also ask what this ideology may conceal.'[26] Derrida sets a precedent to investigate such a concept, quoting from Montaigne, 'we need to interpret interpretations more than to interpret things,'[27] and concluding,

> the entire history of the concept of structure [...] must be thought of as a series of substitutions of centre for centre, as a linked chain of determinations of the centre [...] the history of metaphysics, like the history of the west, is this history of metaphors and metonymies.[28]

I also find there to be a precedent for such concerns to be addressed through practice. This is most often to be found in visual art, which accounts for the large amount of theory relevant to this investigation arising from this area. On such a topic, Michael Kelly says that the artists at the 1993 Whitney Biennial, 'offered a challenge which compels us to rethink the genealogy and present constellation of the art-politics relationship [...] I think art is ahead of theory here.'[29] His assessment of these artworks details how existing theory was ill equipped to

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[25] Rancière, *Aesthetics and its Discontents* (2009), p. 65.

[26] Peter Bürger, *Theory of the Avant-Garde*, trans. by Michael Shaw (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2009) p. 14.

[27] Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (London: Routledge, 2009) p. 351.

[28] ibid. p. 353.

[29] Michael Kelly, 'The Political Autonomy of Contemporary Art: the Case of the 1993 Biennial,' in *Politics and Aesthetics in the Arts*, ed. by Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p. 222.

recognise, let alone answer, the aesthetic questions posed by such works and so resulted in their dismissal.[30]

This is contrary to Badiou's position in his essay 'Thinking the Event' where he describes that, 'philosophy is first and foremost the invention of new problems,'[31] and later that,

> the story that philosophy is always telling us, under many different guises [is]: to be in exception, in the sense of the event, to keep ones distance from power, and to accept the consequences of a decision however remote and difficult they may prove. Understood in this way, and only in this way, philosophy really is that which helps existence to be changed.[32]

These questions raise obvious concerns for aesthetics owing to its nature as a philosophical discipline, but also offer the problem that if existence can be changed through philosophy, then the role of aesthetic experience as part of that existence must be at stake too. A relevant study of such experience must consider it in relation to an existence whose nature is changed by the very study of it.[33] In this respect it can also be said that aesthetic experience is relational.

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[30] ibid. pp. 225-235.

[31] Alain Badiou, 'Thinking the Event,' in *Philosophy in the Present*, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek (Cambridge: Polity, 2009) p. 2.

[32] Badiou (2009) p. 13.

[33] I will offer more detail on how this is possible in a later discussion of the quantum logical argument.

If the previous paragraphs have served as an introduction to the theoretical background of this thesis then, in what follows, a musical introduction will also take place. It is possible to present the idea of musical relations in the accompanying portfolio on a very basic level, and I must note here that these basic relations will be considered as a backdrop and a vehicle for the exhibition of the larger, ontological, web of interrelations that I will describe.

The first interrelationship which may be of interest is the relationship between the films, particularly the early films, of Peter Greenaway and the project *the enigma machine*. In creating these works I was inspired by Peter Greenaway's handling of multiple interrelationships, which one could consider to be postdramatic[34] despite not being theatrical. I chose to draw on Greenaway's work, via reference and quotation, not to integrate or imitate it but to build on what I recognise as being a body of interrelationships in order to facilitate a further complicated semiotic structure. Greenaway's work appeals to me particularly because of his references to early music and academia in which I find parallels with my own concerns. The interrelationships presented in the set of pieces *the enigma machine*, and their possible referents, are not intended or believed to be all perceptible at any one time, but can be considered to be at odds with each other throughout the conception, creation, and course of the work. It is therefore possible for me to examine the premise that the work is

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[34] Hans-Theis Lehmann, *Postdramatic Theatre*, trans, by Karen Jürs-Mumby (London: Routledge, 2006) which classes as postdramatic theatrical events which within themselves recognise that there is no need for the traditional dramatic constituents of Aristotelian theatre, and concurrently examine that medium through their creation and performance. Lehmann notes, 'Art, and even more so theatre, which is embedded in society in a number of ways—from the social character of the production and the public financing to the communal form of reception—exists in the field of *real socio-symbolic practice*. While the common reduction of the aesthetic to social positions and statements remains empty, inversely all aesthetic interrogation is blind if it does not recognize the reflection of social norms of perception and behaviour in the artistic practice of theatre' (pp. 18-19), and later that, '[t]he theatre of sense and synthesis has largely disappeared—and with it the possibility of synthesizing interpretation. Recommendations, let alone prescriptions, are no longer possible, merely partial perspectives and stuttering answers that remain 'works in progress'. The task of theory is to articulate, conceptualize and find terms for that which has come into being, not to postulate it as the norm' (p. 25). While Lehmann's focus is theatre, reference to Aristotelean drama can be found in many art forms and Lehmann articulates here what I hope to articulate in this music. The final sentence of the second quotation recognises that that which I posit, although generalisable, is not phenomenological.

mereologically variable[35] by exposing through performance outcomes of the music that a single performance does not itself represent the work. Given that the scores themselves are ambiguous it is also my desire to show that this ambiguity itself is not a cause of the proliferation of interrelationships but an example of it, and that the aesthetic situation proposed by the piece is in fact generalisable to all music; in the relationship with Greenaway's films, which are fixed, with the pieces, which are not fixed, similarities can be drawn relating to the possibility of proliferation of meaning in the reception of both sets of works.

The most obvious relationship in these pieces with Peter Greenaway's work is the separation of the pieces *the enigma machine 1: hendecaptych of hans memling*, *the enigma machine 2a: properties and essence*, and *the enigma machine 2b: [no subtitle]* into 92 sections or fragments.[36] This, and the presentation of the music, are also references to works such as *The Falls* (1980) and *Vertical Features Remake* (1978). Of the latter film, Greenaway says,

> *Vertical Features Remake* is both a celebration and critique of structuralist theory, unthinkingly and stupidly dominant in film circles in the Seventies. The subject is landscape, scrupulously filmed and framed in static "bits" based on verticals. The organisation is based on rigid frame number-counts—after all, cinema is both "truth at twenty-four frames a second" and a process to create the illusion of movement. However, as the filmmakers cannot agree amongst themselves, the film *Vertical Features* has to be made four times. Everyone has his or her needs and everyone should be accommodated. The warring academics were an excuse to explain the methodology, always a structuralist bane. Their explanations, recounted on-screen between the three films, may well be the highlights of the work and a reminder that there is no such thing as history, there are only historians. In the end, though, it is the landscape 'bits' that win out and it is the components of landscape that excite, please, console and delight us all.[37]

This rather long quotation highlights a number of points, not only about structure, where parallels could be drawn between this work of Greenaway and my music: the problematising of history, the rejection of the conflicting concerns

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[35] I shall explain this point fully in chapter 2.

[36] The number 92, the atomic number of uranium, is significant to Greenaway. This presents a relationship with Tulse Luper, who will be discussed later.

[37] Peter Greenaway, Sleeve Notes to *The Early Films of Peter Greenaway 2* (London: BFI, 2003).

of a group of artists who all arrive at the same conclusion, and the final dominance of art over academia are all relevant to this investigation. A final parallel can be drawn between Greenaway's splitting of each remake of *Vertical Features* into eleven parts, his suggestion that *The Falls* can be presented in a number of different orders, and my presentation of the scores mentioned above.

Not all of the pieces have a directly open-form structure. *the enigma machine 4: the historicity of cartography* is fixed in many respects of its performance, however this piece comprises a much larger number of references to Peter Greenaway in its conception than those pieces which preceded it. These references are explicit and implicit to various degrees, depending on ones knowledge of Greenaway's work, but understanding or appreciation of them is not essential in the reception of the work. The first reference is a direct reference to Greenaway's imagined character, the ornithologist Tulse Henry Purcell Luper,[38] by way of implicit quotation of a setting of the Burford Psalm (which is attributed to Purcell but it is highly contested that he is the original author); there is a parallel here between this and many of the works attributed to Tulse Luper in Greenaway's films. A second (deliberately tenuous) reference is also to do with the name of Tulse Luper only. 'Michael Finnissy was born in Tulse Hill'[39] is a line which begins many of the composer Michael Finnissy's biographies and is almost a familiar line to someone who has read many of them in concert programmes, etc. This relationship led me to consider Finnissy's approach to transcription,[40] and also to consider ways of approaching the instrument of the piano with reference to Finnissy's writing. As a result, the piano became the focus of much of the music in *the enigma machine 4: the historicity of cartography*, particularly from the point of view of the cueing relationships within the music. The structure is a reference to, and a variation of, the Jo-Ha-Kyu structure of Noh theatre, which formed the structure of the opera *green angel*: a reference to and interrelationship with my

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[38] Tulse Luper makes numerous appearances in Greenaway's early films, leading eventually to the project *The Tulse Luper Suitcaces*, beginning in 2003, which comprises three feature films, a TV series, 92 DVDs, CD-ROMs, and interactive website, and numerous other supporting media elements such as novels. As Greenaway claims about himself, Luper is presented as a collector of almost anything and uses these collections to represent and understand the world, much as is presented in Umberto Eco *The Infinity of Lists* (London: Macelhose Press, 2009).

[39] 'Biography of Michael Finnissy', *Universal Music Press* <http://www.ump.co.uk/composer%20pages/finnissy.htm> [01.02.11].

[40] Maarten Beirens, 'Archaeology of the Self: Michael Finnissy's "Folklore"' in *Tempo*, vol. 57 (2003) pp. 46-56.

own work. This variation takes on a significance within the interplay of the two references to Tulse Luper and Michael Finnissy: Jo-Ha-Kyu (which could be translated as beginning-breaking-rapidly) becomes represented as the section titles 'Photograph-Chorale-Remake'; these words have significance in the consideration of the oeuvres of Greenaway, Luper, and Finnissy. The subtitle is also a variation on both Greenaway's description of Tulse Luper's life as 'a personal history of uranium'[41] and elsewhere his description of the *Tulse Luper Suitcases* project as 'a history of uranium in the twentieth century,'[42] and the title of Michael Finnissy's *A History of Photography in Sound* (2003). When writing the piece I was also thinking about cartography as another relation to Greenaway: the film *A Walk Through H* (1978) contests ideas about what maps are for, how they are formed, and what is communicated by them. A recent British Library exhibition, *Magnificent Maps* (2010), was also based around the non-neutrality of maps. The structure of this piece, and the words used in the score, bears some signs of these references. The three sections explore different ensemble relationships in presenting what is essentially the same material. The three sections are the same in nature, and are presenting three views of the same piece; there is no hierarchy between them. This also posits the difference between the sections as a difference in the changing interrelationships of the performers rather than any interplay of material.

As a final point, it serves to say that the overall title of the project, *the enigma machine*, has further, obvious, and non-Greenaway related, connotations about codification and complexity. It also inspires a number of other semiotic associations—particularly to do with Alan Turing, Bletchley Park and questions such as whether one can approach data or numbers on a neutral level. The presence of these relationships in the title of the project encouraged me to leave them merely as free-floating referents.

The second large musical undertaking of this thesis is the chamber opera *green angel*. This was written collaboratively with writer and theatre director Adam Strickson and can be said to be composed around three themes: our

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[41] This is often given a subtitle for the entire *Tulse Luper Suitcases* project.

[42] Peter Greenaway, '"Uranium Baby" from Peter Greenaway Tulse Luper Suitcases Interview,' *Tulse Luper Suitcases*, Peter Greenaway's personal website ([n.d.]) <http://petergreenaway.org.uk/tulse.htm> [02.02.2011].

contemporary relationship with nature, the construction and deconstruction of identity, and metamorphosis. I will deal with a reading of these in turn.

The theme of our contemporary relationship with nature within *green angel* is in one way represented dramatically by Ash's nurturing of two sparrows who appear in act two. There are two ways that this image appeared to be significant to me. First, when thinking on the meaning of the phrase 'contemporary relationship with nature,' it seems that as a society, and often as individuals, our relationship with nature is impotent. Many obvious responses to the problem of defining 'our contemporary relationship with nature' focus on the beauty of nature, or of considering ourselves as part of a system. Neither of these things appears to be particularly true to me: something might be considered beautiful until it is no longer commercially viable to think it so, and it would be a very idealised view of even very early civilisations to imagine that they considered themselves part of any natural system; my observation is that humans have never seen nature as anything more than a resource. There is no real reliance on, or sense of utilisation of, nature for the majority of people living in the UK today, certainly not in the way that the protagonist of the opera describes her reliance on it for her livelihood. But the opera is a space in which I wanted to make a strong environmental message. Just as Noh theatre conventions tell the audience, from the moment they see Ash, that it will eventually be spring and she will eventually be Green, I imagined the opera to be a space to make the statement that nature continues despite our perceived relationship with it. Ash's mood and situation change with the seasons despite her initially bleak outlook being one which she perceives as being divorced from nature. Musically, for me, this meant the the conclusion of the opera must somehow be inevitable in the story-telling of the first act, that the descriptions of destruction must somehow contain within them the inevitability of regeneration and metamorphosis. This meant that the ideas of spring must be hidden in the music for the first act: I mainly considered these links to be present in the relationships between the instruments of the ensemble; this is further facilitated by the clear links between each act made in the text of Adam Strickson's libretto. Such links can be signified and embodied in the poem *Foweles in the Frith*:

> Foweles in the frith
> The fisses in the flod
> And I mon waxe wod
> Mulch sorw I walke with

For the beste of bon and blod.

This anonymous 14th century poem does not appear in the libretto but is one the librettist claims was in his mind whilst he was writing it. I therefore set about writing a setting of this poem which appears at various points during the opera, most notably the homophonic rendition of *Lenten Ys Come* in act three, and so I was able to 'quote' the poem implicitly in the score, as well as more explicitly in the tape part of the third act.

The second facet of the relationship between a contemporary relationship with nature and the imagery of sparrows is one which considers the sparrows as a metaphor. M. J. Toswell explores the use of the sparrow in Bede's description of the conversion of King Edwin.[43] As observed by Toswell, and as can be observed in numerous examples of visual art, birds are very important in depicting character and relationships in Anglo Saxon and medieval imagery. The sparrow in Bede's tale represents the soul and the relationship between individual Christians and God. With this in mind, Ash's nurturing relationship with the two sparrows becomes very important: rather than representing her soul as such, they represent and facilitate her ability to reclaim her identity.

The proliferation of birds and the relationship of natural imagery with identity in Anglo-Saxon art caused me to make a link with the opera: the stylised nature of such images is particularly connected with the idea that humans cannot be adequately depicted meaning that in Anglo-Saxon art nature is able to encroach onto images of people without threatening or distorting their identities. This link, then, is between Ash and her tattoos: her stylistic construction of her own identity ultimately does not lead to any destruction of her true self. Imagining this problem on a relational level, Ash's dual identity is very much present owing to her musical double in the ensemble; their relationship is the point at which the expression of this functions. The ensemble singer encroaches on all of Ash's supposedly 'independent' thinking—revealing her true self while remaining a stylistic and characteristic function of Noh theatre. In the text she is given the ensemble singer also facilitates the encroaching of the poetry and quotations into the rest of the libretto and words used by Ash. This dual identity, then, represents something which is inadequately, but stylistically, depicted. It is

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[43] M. J. Toswell, 'Bede's Sparrow and the Psalter in Anglo-Saxon England,' in *ANQ*, vol. 13, no. 1 (2000) pp. 7-12.

precisely the relationship of the audience with the image which allows the communication of the message rather than the image itself. In my compositional work, I was able to represent this situation for myself by producing a sketch which could possibly be performed by up to 8 players or groups of players; and was represented as manuscript with two interlocking squares. Whilst this could be considered as a score in its own right, I was also able to approach it as a compositional tool, to create interlocking layers of the same material within the ensemble.

The second theme of the opera is of construction and deconstruction of identity. This theme has much less of an immediately obvious visual link (except those written into the libretto, such as of self tattooing, and clothing). The whole opera focuses on how one character, Ash/Green, supposedly constructs her own identity. This is in sharp contrast with the other identity-less characters who serve only to help her tell the story of her identity. Perhaps comparing herself with them, she concludes she also has no identity. Instead she chooses to create a new character for herself: Ash. This is very physical and linked to her appearance rather than her behaviour, and, as such, her identity as Green is musically constructed from the beginning of the opera whilst being only visually constructed in the third act. Ash's new constructed identity is broken down due to the need to refer to her past in order even to construct the present. In the first act we see Ash's initial success in transforming her identity through her appearance using tattoos; to her surprise this new identity is eroded, without her consent, as she observes when her tattoos begin to disappear. Construction of identity is a common theme in many operas and I wished to deal with this with as little recourse to convention as possible. This meant that the ultimate deconstruction of Ash's constructed identity was required to be evident musically from the opera's outset; a parallel could be made here between *green angel* and the use of the palindrome in the completion of Berg's opera *Lulu* (1935). Just as a reading of Berg's opera might suppose Lulu's demise to be musically written into the opera due to the 'predictable' nature of the palindrome,[44] Ash's eventual transformation is supposed in the first act through the statement of the musical ideas which construct the three acts. This very much ties in with the inevitability of seasonal change: Ash's double, the singer in the ensemble, is also necessary as a figure who undermines her new persona.

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[44] This analogy was presented by myself as part of a dramaturgical team at Opera North on 16.12.2010.

In contrast are Ash's relationships with the characterless characters of the Old Woman and Diamond. Although she does not introduce the opera as a whole, the Old Woman has the first sung material and introduces all the themes of the opera in the first section of the first act. She has no name and, crucially, no real identity. The purpose of her existence is first to tell the story, and then to help other characters to tell their own stories. But in facilitating the storytelling, the story, and the themes of the opera (and therefore the changes of mood and seasons), she almost shares her identity with the opera. The relational nature of the structure of the music she first sings shapes all of the music in the rest of the opera. In this way, despite her lack of identity, the Old Woman tells her own story in the story of the opera. Diamond facilitates Ash's journey to discovering her real identity by causing her to construct his identity for him. His lack of identity and lack of agency are expressed through the fact that he does not sing, and can express himself only through images (for example of his mother), through writing, and through playing a music box.

Despite there being no specific visual image of this theme, there are a number of visual representations of this on stage during the performance. These are: the use of colour in the set and the libretto—black ink, coloured stones, and the names of characters; the presence of, and reference to, plants—thorns and then flowers; and the frequent references to flight—ravens, bats, and then sparrows. All of these images focus on the 'dark' and then the 'lighter' side of nature. Ash's construction of her identity is focused entirely on the 'dark' symbols: black ink (tattoos), thorns, bats and ravens (with an implication of night and darkness that goes with these last two). However, hidden in this construction of her new identity is her original or true identity which has its roots in the other symbols (sparrows and flowers; day and spring-time). When put in such a list it is very clear how her two identities are linked, and how the seeds of her eventual metamorphosis are sown: in the construction of her false identity, Ash's real identity is also constructed. Nothing is deconstructed (in either a Derridean or literal sense); Ash's identity is this list: colour, plants, and flight.

The final theme of the opera is of metamorphosis. The word 'metamorphosis'

brings to mind Ovid[45] and Kafka[46] amongst the long tradition of writing this theme in literature; these are arguably the most famous examples owing to their bearing the name of the phenomenon. These literary examples explain metamorphosis in the context of a number of characters and offer many ideas connected with it. The importance of metamorphosis in *green angel* is that, despite her many attempts at the construction of her new identity, Ash changes into herself; by the end of the opera we can be sure that her original identity was not her true identity. As in Kafka's story, what appears to be the initially most important transformation is forgotten when a far more important one is discovered. As Ovid uses the theme of metamorphosis to describe the history of the world as a matter of constant revolution, the Noh genre does this by its very structure. Both of these ideas are present in the opera: Ash's change into her initial constructed identity is forgotten in the transformation from winter to spring; the revolution of the seasons is described in her transformation.

Three composers for whom metamorphosis with respect to quotation is presented musically are Chris Newman, Bernhard Lang, Michael Nyman. Nyman, as in the score for *The Draughtsman's Contract* (1982), distorts the image of Purcell through only changes of order and instrumentation, re-presenting the finished product as if it should be immediately recognisable. Newman, as discussed in chapter 3, is able to transform quotation of familiar music to become part of his own compositional work. Bernard Lang's *Monadologie* project transforms works from historical artefacts to relevant contemporary pieces by viewing them through a filter of his own perception. All three of these ideas infiltrate the treatment of quotation and signifiers in the music.

The consideration of the instruments as characters in their own right facilitates the communication of these three themes. The percussionist has a difficult and uneasy role in the opera—in Noh theatre percussion is considered to be at the centre of the sound, and is performed by three instrumentalists, in *green angel* there is only one performer. I therefore considered how it might be possible to use convention to create additional meaning. As such I structured the opera in keeping with the idea of seasonal change, re-orchestrating the ensemble in every scene. As the instruments themselves do not change this re-orchestration takes

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[45] Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, trans. by Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 2010).

[46] Franz Kafka, *Metamorphosis and Other Stories* (London: Penguin Classics, 2007).

place each time as a re-thinking of the roles within the ensemble. Since percussion already has a clearly defined role in Noh theatre it was necessary to redefine this in terms of the opera: this role is used to create a feeling of unease which, like Ash's predicament, cannot be resolved until the end of the opera. Thus the percussionist moves from a role which is comfortable and accepted for opera (an illustrative and accompanying role) to, in the final act, the traditional Noh role of the percussionist as the 'star' of the ensemble (dictating action rather than commenting upon it). As such the repertoire of gestures allowed to the percussion part expands in each act.

In exact opposition to the percussion, the bass clarinet is the 'star' of the ensemble in the first act. Since the bass clarinet is given so much importance in the first act, its sound becomes very much associated with Ash's mood and also with the act of storytelling. Therefore as Ash's mood changes, the seasons change, and she moves from storytelling to the present, the sound of the clarinet begins to disintegrate. The sound has already 'disintegrated' to some extent in the first act (through harsh sounds made by the player), and simply making these more sparse would have merely spread out the associations built up in the first act rather than undermining them. The solution to this problem is that by the third act the clarinet takes on the storytelling role: the associations of the sound remain intact, but rather than a function of the current situation the problems of the past have become a matter of storytelling, as for Ash.

Finally, the accordion and violoncello take on the role of joint protagonists as a duet in the second act. This cannot be conceived of as a transitional act since the season (winter) is distinct from the seasons of the first and third acts (autumn, spring) and also transitionally equal with them due to the continual change of the seasons. The role of the accordion and 'cello in this act is hinted at in the first act in a number of sections where the instruments work independently and yet together to create effects resembling an orchestration of a hurdy gurdy, and when the music draws upon the tuning of other mediaeval folk instruments such as the nykelharpa. The possibility for sustained notes in the accordion and 'cello gives the possibility of a very different soundworld to the first and third acts. As in the first act, where all the performers play small wind instruments at the point which (for me) depicts the character of that act, requiring all the performers to play small toy or poor quality accordions magnifies the soundworld and character of

the second act at a strategic moment. Works for hurdy gurdy by Phill Niblock[47] are brought to mind here and, whilst these are not representative of my own compositional style, they underline the possibility for rich and varied harmony when using sustained notes.

These three distinct orchestrations could also be representative of the three themes present in the opera on an abstract level. Taken in this way, they could also be said to be representative of an interest in tripartite structures in my output as a whole. Tripartite structures can be found in many of the works including *as a name i am a myth*, *love speed and thrills*, and *the enigma machine 4: the historicity of cartography* which all have structures that comprise three distinct sections. In the former and latter works there could also be said to be a link between the tripartite structure and the conception of the work as a trio. Further to this, the opera *green angel* is made up of a number of nested tripartite structures, and sets of three, possibly the highest expression of this interest.

Finally, the significance of the public address loudspeaker speaker in my portfolio has a relationship with my interest in a 'lo-fi' aesthetic. This is particularly relevant to the pieces *as a name i am a myth*, *love speed and thrills*, and the opera *green angel* in which the loudspeaker makes an appearance, but the conclusions can be easily transferred to readings of the other works as well. Such an interest in 'lo-fi' can be seen as a reaction to high technology found in many works: rather than present a highly processed, highly polished set of sounds which can be said to be removed from their receivers by the number of changes they have undergone, instead I present the listeners with a single, mono, part, highly distorted due to the hardware, and often particularly simple in its construction when compared with some uses of technology, consisting of only speech, or recordings of singing or other uncomplicated sound sources. In many ways the content of these tape parts might be described as aesthetically or purposely 'bad' in the same way that this criticism is levelled at Chris Newman's music. Such a description of a lo-fi aesthetic can be found in many instrumental works: for example my use of objects to distort the sound such as the cymbals in the piano in *the enigma machine 4: the historicity of cartography*, the use of dissimilar tuning systems between the harpsichord and violin and clarinet in the instrumental

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[47] Phill Niblock, *Works for Hurdy Gurdy and Voice* (2000).

parts of *as a name i am a myth*, the simplicity of the music-box machinery in *the enigma machine 3: archipelago* and in Diamond's part of *green angel*.

I.III METHODOLOGY

Such associations as I have made here are interesting as examples of interrelationships. However, I do not recognise them to be the elements most pertinent to this investigation despite their reflecting elements which comprise it. In this thesis, and in the music accompanying it, I have assumed that previously accepted meanings can be thought to have no basis. Bas van Fraassen explains this issue with respect to terms when he writes,

> within natural language there is no defining-defined hierarchy and [...] there is no such thing as "the" meaning of a term, although there are meaning relationships (inclusion, equivalence) among terms. Within a specific formulation some terms are defined and others undefined, but the status of being defined or undefined is not invariant under transitions to other formulations of the same theory.[48]

Bas van Fraassen concludes that language cannot explain the problems of quantum mechanics since logical arguments assume meanings of words, but those meanings cannot really be assumed. Or, put more succinctly, giving something a name isn't the same as knowing what it is.

Such conclusions about musical signifiers also affect any investigation involving quotation. The analyses presented will focus on the fact that any quotation is in some way a repetition, of which Eve Tavor Bannet says, 'everything in repetition which is varied and modulated is only an alienation of its meaning.'[49] Thus the alienation of the believed 'meaning' of any quotation is an important point from which to begin such investigations, both in theory and practice. The alienation of such meanings seems to me to be an inevitable consequence, taking into account Heidegger's observation in his *Dialogue on Language* that, 'the language of the discourse constantly destroyed the possibility of saying what the dialogue

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[48] Bas van Fraassen, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Space and Time* (New York: Random House, 1970) p. 195.

[49] Eve Tavor Bannet, *Structuralism and the Logic of Dissent* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1989) p. 247.

was about.'[50] However, despite this, some conclusions are possible since, as M. W. Alcorn notes, the possible experiences of any text are infinite and limited.[51] That is to say that although no fixed meaning may be identified, shifting meanings, and meaning-classes might be, to the effect of being able to discuss perceptive, and therefore aesthetic, effects.

I have taken an integrated philosophical approach, drawing upon thought from both the analytic and the continental traditions. While these traditions are considered increasingly separate there is a growing interest in drawing upon both forms of philosophy among contemporary writers. Badiou addresses this point: his essay, 'The Desire for Philosophy and the Contemporary World,' is one which addresses integration of different philosophical schools by examining their similarities, differences, and contributions to philosophy.[52] He describes four elements, 'revolt', 'logic', 'universality' and 'risk' which comprise philosophy and upon all of which the contemporary world exerts 'an intense pressure.' Badiou's conclusion is that the three philosophical 'currents,' (as he describes them) 'hermeneutic,' 'analytic,' and 'postmodern' would be better replaced by,

> a philosophy which is a rational intertwining of the singularity of the event and of truth. A philosophy open to chance then, but a chance submitted to the law of reason, a philosophy maintaining conditionless principles, conditionless but submitted to a non-theological law.[53]

A number of analytic writers ask questions in aesthetics which could be said to be very close to those belonging to continental philosophy. Roger Scruton describes how, from an analytic position, everything which is possible to be drawn from an analysis of music can be said to have already been true about that music,

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[50] Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, trans. by Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1982) p. 5.

[51] Marshall W. Alcorn Jr, 'Rhetoric, Projection, and the Authority of the Signifier,' *College English*, vol. 49 no. 2 (February 1987) p. 152.

[52] Alain Badiou, 'The Desire for Philosophy in the Contemporary World,' in *The Symptom: Online Journal for Lacan.com* <http://www.lacan.com/badesire.html> [08.01.2011].

[53] ibid.

> [m]usical understanding is a special case of "intentional understanding." [...It] makes use of the concepts through which we perceive and act on the world, and makes no connections that are not already, as it were, implicit in those concepts.[54]

This statement itself echoes the concern of Quine in the essay *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* when he says that analyticity itself is 'a metaphysical article of faith.'[55] Furthermore, Catherine Elgin and Nelson Goodman hold that, 'art is inexhaustible because no interpretation or collection of interpretations can claim to deliver the last word on a work.'[56] Finally, van Fraassen writing on the interpretation of science, subjects such an investigation to the same concerns as an aesthetic investigation, focussing on perceptual issues, and is caused to ask,

> what then is the seductive temptation of metaphysical realism? It consists in the idea that removing [...] impediments leaves a residue of factual questions of a different order, which the philosopher can answer speculatively by postulating abstract, unobservable, or modal realities [...] there cannot be in principle, but only as historical accident, convergence to a single story about our world.[57]

Van Fraassen's conclusion rules out analytic certainty in the interpretation of cases which could be considered semiotically less complicated, and historically and politically less reliant, than those of art. However he is still unwilling to accept narrative and perceived autonomy to be consequences of things themselves rather than the modes of engagement by which they are approached.

In the context of this investigation, theory leads to a proposal for practice. This proposal assumes the function of certain musical elements and then tests this hypothesis in the creation of works. This is a conceptual analysis, and a kind of meta-analysis: I investigate whether such a practical investigation can analyse the concepts in question whilst at the same time conducting the analysis through

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[54] Roger Scruton, 'Analytic philosophy and the Meaning of Music,' in *Analytic Aesthetics* ed. by Richard Shusterman (London: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989) p. 87.

[55] Willard van Orman Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism,' in *From A Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1953) pp. 37-38 reprinted from *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 60, no. 1 (1951) pp. 20-43.

[56] Catherine Z Elgin and Nelson Goodman, 'Changing the Subject,' in *Analytic Aesthetics* (1989) p. 190.

[57] Bas van Fraassen, *Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) pp. 481-482.

practice. I do not consider the performance of the piece to be the test of the outcome, although implications from performance may form part of my conclusions. It is particularly important for me to define that by the end of creating such a piece I do not have *research*, I have *practice*. But I have done *research* and the outcome is *practice*. This is important for me as I hold that there is no difference between practice-led musicology and traditional musicology. I will show that more complex ideas can be best expressed nonlinearly, and this is one such idea. With this in mind I do not consider that practice and research should be considered proportional, primarily since they are fundamentally different things and, although not mutually exclusive, one does not imply the other.

My conceptual analysis methodology highlights that tension between content (form) and structure is a development of the exposition of the relational and nonlinear properties of musical artworks. Content and form can be said to be conflated in this case for two reasons: first because the historicity of materials of which form can be said to be one, and second since the form of a work can be said to be directly reliant on content; the arbitrary nature of material as considered in this thesis would allow for a number of forms with the same content to elicit the same outcome. Structure itself can be considered, in some respects, on a more neutral level than form, although there are some issues of historicity and material even in the consideration of the structure of musical works. The resultant tension could be termed the entropy of what might classically be considered to be musical material and as such is of interest as the point at which true variation and creation of meaning-relations takes place. This consideration might lead to the conclusion that the act of composition takes place much more between uncertain consequences of the possible musical results of a score than in the act of the composer when creating such a thing. Such entropic elements are those which Roman Ingarden describes as being 'existentially potential'[58] in works which are unperformed.

In order to accept this as a methodology, two questions must first be answered, those being: can music do philosophy (both philosophically and musically speaking)? And if so then by what mechanism? Today many attitudes in the debate as to whether music can do philosophy could be encompassed in the

[58] Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of its Identity* (Hampshire and London: MacMillan, 1986) p. 116.

statement 'music *did* philosophy in the 19th century.'[59] This question does not seem to be at the forefront of many musical debates, perhaps to avoid Wagnerian associations, but in saying that music can do research[60] then one must accept that, at least to some extent, there is a claim in this statement that music can do philosophy.[61] There is also an historical precedent for accepting this viewpoint: a study of Beethoven reception[62] seems to agree with the claim that music can do philosophy, at least in this music. Throughout the nineteenth century a perceived link between composers and philosophers also could be said to support this view. However, changes in addressing music as a discipline in the twentieth century seem to mean that this concern is forgotten or put to one side, and there is an

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[59] *The Routledge Companion to Music and Philosophy*, ed. by Theodor Gracyk and Andrew Kania (London: Routledge, 2011) an anthology in which the majority of musical examples are drawn exclusively from the Nineteenth Century. Footnote 57 illustrates the reluctance of other contemporary theorists to address contemporary music.

[60] A description of the assumptions made by this statement can be found in Geoff Poole, 'Composition as Research,' at the *NAMHE Conference: Practice as Research: Towards Consensus* (Oxford Brookes University, 08.05.2004). And reported in Amanda Bayley, *NAMHE Conference 2004* (University of Wolverhampton, 2004) <www.namhe.ac.uk/file-uploads/Conference%20Report%202004.doc> [01.05.2011]. Poole's arguments for composition as research are that research is an 'absolute condition' of composition, it is a practicality of delivering the music curriculum, and that 'what goes into composition' is something which itself is research worthy.

[61] Helmut Lachenmann, *Musik als existentielle Erfahrung Schriften 1966-1995* (Mainz: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1996) 'Theorising is not the same as philosophising, and an introduction in a practice of theory must begin with the conditions of the material of the subject' (p. 35) [Theoretisieren heißt nicht philosophieren, und eine Einführung in eine Praxis der Theoriebildung muß zuallererst die Bedingungen des Materials zum Gegenstand haben—my translation.]

[62] Michael Spitzer, *Music as Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven's Late Style* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006) Spitzer describes ambiguity in Beethoven as being demonstrative of the relationship between music and philosophy (pp. 4-5) and how this relationship is best exegeted in Adorno's criticism (pp. 262-280). This definition of music as philosophy could be said to be one reason why the idea seems to be confined to music of the nineteenth century; it is primarily concerned with a definition of material that will be critiqued in chapter 3. Spitzer writes that in Beethoven's music, '[m]usical material is constructed to the same extent that it is naturalised,' (p25) and that, 'Beethoven's practice, therefore, is to exacerbate tensions which are already implicit [...] between the material [...] and the ideational,' (p. 108). Rejection of such a definition of music would reject music as philosophy were this indeed a correct definition of philosophy itself. As a further indication of how such a definition with regards the music of Beethoven might have come to be accepted Tia DeNora, *Beethoven and the Construction of Genius: Music and Politics in Vienna 1792-1803* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1997) links music ideology and Beethoven's success during his lifetime (p. 4).

increasing focus on history and literary criticism.[63] Some cases which appear to return to a philosophical discussion of music, for example Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf and his contemporaries,[64] focus almost solely on past historical positions, perhaps raising the claim that this music does not do philosophy but merely performs it.

Evidence that music cannot do philosophy in the present day might seem to arise from theoretical examples. Badiou in his *Handbook of Inaesthetics*[65] addresses many artforms including poetry, prose, cinema, dance and theatre, and even translation, but does not address music. Žižek writing on Wagner resorts to making an absurd statement he would not be comfortable with when discussing any other art form: that the 'truth value' of the music is that which is philosophically revealing when addressing Wagner's operas.[66] In my opinion, a possible reason for this state of affairs might be a lack of education in music on the behalf of such theorists. Without an understanding of the internal functions of music as an artform, the idea is created that music is a special case, as is made for it by Hegel,[67] and that the main criterion for this special case is that music is nonrepresentational. However, being nonrepresentational does not actually seem

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[63] Helmut Lachenmann, 'The 'Beautiful' in Music Today,' in *Tempo*, New Series, no. 135 (December 1980) pp. 20-24. Lachenmann outlines the musical and historical lineage for new music, rather than a philosophical lineage. Similarly, a number of works, such as by Ligeti, Perderecki, and Kagel, are lauded not for their philosophical content, but their engagement with material. This maybe indicative of a breakdown not in the perceived relationship between music and philosophy, but between musical material and philosophy.

[64] The series *Music and Aesthetics in the 21st Century*, ed. by Claus Steffen Mahnkopf, Frank Cox, and Wolfram Schurig (Hofheim: Wolke Verlag, 2002-2009) contains a number of essays which illuminate this point.

[65] Alain Badiou, *Handbook of Inaesthetics*, trans. by Alberto Toscano (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005). Badiou has since written Alain Badiou, *Five Lessons on Wagner* (London: Verso, 2010) which focusses on reconciling a number of different interpretations of Wagner rather than on the music itself. It is also pertinent that Badiou's engagement with music focuses on a historical perspective rather than on recent or new art as in the other areas of his writing.

[66] Slavoj Žižek, 'Brunhilde's act, or, why was it so difficult for Wagner to find a proper ending for his twilight of the gods?' *Slavoj Žižek on Richard Wagner*, public lecture at Opera North (10.03.2009) in which Žižek made frequent references to the 'truth value of the music' in order to explain his observations. This lecture can be accessed at <http://zizekstudies.org/video/zizek_wagner.html>.

[67] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 'The General Character of Music from Music, III. The Romantic Arts' in *Aesthetics Volume II*, trans. by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) pp. 893-909.

to be a criterion by which aesthetic experience could be transmitted, nor is it a criterion by which something might do or not do philosophy.

If I refuse to consider that music is a special case then I might consider the question 'can art do philosophy?' Badiou addresses this point in his consideration of art, writing that,

> Philosophy, or rather *a* philosophy, is always the elaboration of a category of truth. Philosophy does not itself produce any effective truth. it seizes truths, shows them, exposes them, announces that they exist. in so doing it turns time toward eternity—since every truth, as a generic infinity, is eternal. Finally, philosophy makes disperate truths compossible and, on this basis, it states the being of the time in which it operates as the time of the truths that arise within it. [...] This question of the existence of truths [...] points to a coresponsibility of art, which produces truths, and philosophy, which, under the condition that there are truths, is duty-bound to make them manifest.[68]

Describing the roles of both philosophy and art in these terms makes it seem possible that music could do philosophy, since the role of philosophy described here might also be a description of the concerns of a work of art.

Badiou's assessment also begins to touch on the mechanism by which music might do philosophy. This does not have to do with being nonrepresentational, but as a mechanism for revealing truth it has much to do with the amount of semiotic ambiguity that is allowed to artworks. On this, Eco writes,

> Art seems to be a way of interconnecting messages in order to produce a text in which (a) *many* messages on different levels and places of the discourse, are *ambiguously* organised; (b) these ambiguities are not realised at random but follow a *precise design*; (c) both the normal and the ambiguous devices within a given message exert a *contextual pressure* on both the normal and ambiguous devices within all the others; (d) the way in which the norms of a given system are offended by a given message is *the same* as that in which the norms of other systems are offended by the various messages they permit.[69]

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[68] Badiou (2007) pp. 14-15.

[69] Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics* (Bloominton: Indiana University Press, 1976) p. 271.

Indeed, this point can hardly be made of language, to which Eco here assigns the possibility of a base-meaning,

> if it is true that the notion of a literal meaning is highly problematic, it cannot be denied that in order to explore all the possibilities of the text, even those that the author did not conceive of, the interpreter must first of all take for granted a zero-degree meaning, the one authorised by the dullest and simplest of existing dictionaries, the one authorised by the state of a given language in a given historical moment, the one that every member of a community of healthy native speakers cannot deny.[70]

This hints that music in fact lacks analyticity, which for Eco can be addressed in the following way:

> insofar as the aesthetic labour aims to be detected and scrutinised repeatedly by the addressee who thereby engages in a complex labour of interpretation, the aesthetic sender must also focus his attention on the addressee's possible reactions, so that the aesthetic text represents a network of diverse *communicational acts* eliciting highly original responses.[71]

To summarise, therefore, the mechanism by which music can do philosophy is a semiotic one.

The works I have written as part of this investigation all reflect various facets of my analysis of ontology and of this philosophical expression. In all of these cases I was careful to analyse whether my compositional writing borrows from convention or tradition, both of which could be considered as quotations. I have sought out ways to undermine or subvert this throughout, and in some of the work I investigated when use of convention can create meaning without it being the sole means on which one relies to create meaning. An example of this is the opera *green angel* which addresses simultaneously the traditions of European opera and Noh theatre. Other works, such as *the enigma machine 5: de nostra re͡* and *in the back there was a pigeon (c)* address a particular tradition directly in terms of material and performance circumstances, and still others such as *the empiricist͡ ˘view* and *as a name i am a myth* address the writing of tradition itself.

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[70] Umberto Eco, 'Unlimited Semiosis and Drift,' in *The limits of Interpretation͡* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) p. 36.

[71] Eco (1976) p. 261.

Such concerns spring from my analyses of existing music which take into account those works which attempt to break from tradition, such as those by Johannes Kreidler and David Helbich, those which borrow heavily from it such as works by Hans Thomalla and those which attempt to write a tradition for themselves such as works by Wolfgang Rihm. In all of these cases the construction and very idea of tradition can be shown to have been instrumental in the construction of meaning of the composers for themselves, which in itself, whether these composers accept or reject it, assumes something about the ontology of works that will be accepted by their listeners.

In chapter 2 I will present a conceptual analysis of the work itself, presenting my practice as a meta-analysis: whilst investigating ideas of relational ontology, I also analyse whether such an analysis is indeed possible through the same practice; this could be considered 'post-dramatic.'[72] This analysis shows how the ontology of the work can be considered relational and how this does not presuppose that meaning cannot be created by the work. When applied to works by composers mentioned above, and to my own work, this allows me to consider which meanings are created and if these indeed tally with supposed possible meanings, composer intentions, and the demands of the tradition of which they form part.

This addresses the question of authority. Although I identify myself as the author of the works I present, I also concede that much of what is ⌜*written*⌟ has little to do with my intervention other than on an organisational level. This is the basis for the ⌜*work-function*⌟ which I propose. It also removes the issue of author intention from any proposed explanation I make of such works. This is a desirable consequence for two reasons. First, as noted by Kieth Moxey,

> [t]he collapse of the distinction between author and writing, the notion that there is nothing beneath the surface of language, has also consequences for our view of interpretation. Instead of moving from surface to depth, interpretation remains on the surface of the work, refusing to "stand/under" (understand.)[73]

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[72] Lehmann (2006).

[73] Kieth Moxey, *The Practice of Theory: Post Structuralism, Cultural Politics and Art History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) p. 56.

So, I hold that there is nothing to be gained from an analysis of the music I write which might address 'depth' rather than surface and sociosemiotic relations. Secondly, I consider Trevor Wishart's description of the expectations of composers on this question:

> it is implied that the public has an obligation to try to understand the artist i.e. that art accords with some socially-external laws of meaningfulness, truth, etc. while it is our responsibility to judge it against these laws [...] rather than that the artist or critic has an obligation to convey his meaning to the public i.e. that a work is only meaningful via its social existence.[74]

This represents a system of modes of engagement which are at stake in the analyses I offer, so to request a similar engagement with that which I create myself would be contradictory. The preferable system described by Wishart is also one which requires a relational stance on the analysis of the work I present, and one which offers the opportunity to test its relational basis.

Conclusions from such modes of engagements as those I prefer above reveal the fallacy of modernism. Such a statement of course requires a definition of modernism, and such a definition is forthcoming from the works I analyse. At various points I investigate consequences of definitions of modernism which encompass capitalism and construction, but the basic definition of modernism on which I am focused is that which is predicated upon a teleological idea of progress which has its origins in the nineteenth century and encompasses an historical ideal of material. This definition, although not conceptualised in the way I present it, belongs to Adorno[75] and his commentators whom I believe to be looking backwards (Claus Steffen Mahnkopf et al). The fallacy in this definition is in what can be shown to be supposed and assumed about the present by it, and in chapter 3 I show this not to be incorrect.

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[74] Trevor Wishart, 'On Radical Culture,' in *Whose Music? A Sociology of Musical Languages*, ed. by John Shepherd (London: Latimer, 1977) p. 238.

[75] First mentioned in Theordor Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, trans. by Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster (New York and London: Continuum, 2002) pp. 32-36. Of material Adorno writes 'all its specific characteristics are indications of the historical process,' (p. 32). A discussion of this definition is also given in Max Paddison, *Adorno's Aesthetics of Music* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp. 85-86; pp. 149-183 and Andy Hamilton, *Aesthetics & Music* (London: Continuum, 2007) pp. 163-170.

William Weber has described the construction and origins of this fallacy, writing,

> canon has been so central to musical culture in the modern age that scholars have taken its hierarchies as a given and thought it inappropriate to ask why they arose. The failure to inquire into this history has helped reinforce the musical judgements, aesthetic dogma, and social ideologies implicit in the canon, and thereby seriously distorted many perspectives of music history.[76]

He notes that in the Eighteenth Century, 'it was change in the fundamental structure of ideas and discourse by which music was perceived and defined that made canon formation possible.'[77] Such a construction implies that its continuation is therefore steeped in historical ideology, which itself can be said to construct a picture of art, its meaning relations, and its value systems which can be said to belong not to art works but to this ideology.

Adorno notes that,

> [i]n art, the criterion of success is twofold: firstly works of art must be able to integrate materials and details into their immanent law of form; and second, they must not try to erase the fractures left by the process of integration, preserving instead in the aesthetic whole the traces of those elements which resisted integration.[78]

This itself requires that the criteria which define such an 'immanent law of form' be accepted by all who create and witness art. It is possible to say, however, that such a law is not immanent to artworks themselves, but to the ideology and modes of engagement which construct them. Kramer describes how a change in such a relation to art can change its perceived character entirely, writing,

> [m]odernism favours models of communication based on the capacity of a single medium, language, to classify, refer to, and make truth claims about the real. It does not matter whether these functions are meant to be cherished or begrudged,

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[76] William Weber, 'The Intellectual Origins of Musical Canon in Eighteenth Century England', in *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, vol.47 no.3 (Autumn, 1994) p. 488.

[77] Weber, p. 493.

[78] Theodor Adorno, 'Art, Society, Aesthetics,' in *Continental Aesthetics: Romanticism to Postmodernism, an anthology*, ed. by Richard Kearney and David Rasmussen (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) p. 246.

> cultivated or transcended; what matters is that their status is foundational. Whatever their social or aesthetic value, they are epistemologically primary [...] modernism privileges the *constative*, that which is judged true or false, over the *performative*, that which is judged successful or unsuccessful.[79]

A move to considering a relational system of modes of engagement, construction of meaning, and success, breaks down these immanent laws in order to move to what might be said to constitute art.

As a final example, in chapter 4, I present time and space from the point of view of relational aesthetics, conceptualising and describing these as nonlinear. In this case, relational thinking shows that a traditional (linear) conception of time and space when re-considered shows that such description of these elements finds them to be constituent parts of the work rather than spaces in which it takes place. I believe that this traditional and linear description of time and space can be supposed in the definition of modernism previously described, and that the criticisms I include in chapter 3 also support the argument that works considered modernist take such a definition for granted.

Adorno supposes that time and space become materials, along with forms, due to the collapse of tonality. This can be read into his description that tonality has collapsed.[80] Such a definition of time and space as I have proposed in chapter 4 supposes that they, as understood in many traditional musical definitions, always were materials but have been fundamentally misunderstood as being fixed entities.

All of the examples and analyses I offer consider quotation. The example of quotation is an important one as I believe that it exemplifies the interrelationships I describe. This situation is made clear through the foregrounding of the elements of historicity present in all musical material in the familiarity of quotations. There are a number of types of quotations and approaches to quotation to be considered. Quotation itself cannot be said to be a new phenomenon, although twentieth- and twenty-first century composers are particularly attracted to quotation, it would seem, and the examples I will draw

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[79] Lawrence Kramer, *Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) pp. 10-11.

[80] Adorno, 'Letter to Krenek in 1929', in Hamilton (2007) p. 164.

on are in no way either exhaustive or indicative of the work of 'quoting composers.' They can, however, be said to be representative of categories of quotations which can be identified as trends in contemporary music.

Bourriaud identifies three types of quotations, which distinguish between different types of outcomes rather than just the re-placing of something in a new context:[81] the first of these he calls quotation or 'citation,'[82] such as when I quote Bourriaud and I write, Nicolas Bourriaud says, 'relational aesthetics consider interhuman exchange as aesthetic in and of itself.'[83] The second outcome Bourriaud calls 'inhabiting,'[84] such as Michael Nyman's use of Mozart,[85] or Bernhard Lang's *Monadologie* project.[86] The third outcome is named 'using' forms: sampling, taking something and using it to make your own comment in a way which is wholly dependent on its new context even to the extent of erasing its previous identity—Bourriaud's example is of DJs.[87] These categories are not discrete but are useful in demarcating the different possible reasons for, and uses of, quotation, and also lay some emphasis on reading the motivation of the author as well as the function of the quotation in its new context. Further to this, Philip Keppler in 1956 outlined two aims of quotation. His assessment is

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[81] Nicolas Bourriaud, *Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprogrammes the World* (Berlin: Lukas & Sternberg, 2005).

[82] Bourriaud (2005) p. 9.

[83] And in the text I cite: Bourriaud (2005) p. 32-33. The quotation is 'othered' in its new context and likely its original source is stated or already known. This is not considered by Bourriaud to be an innovation in art.

[84] Bourriaud (2005) p. 15; pp. 85-94.

[85] Pwyll Ap Siôn, *The Music of Michael Nyman* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) pp. 59-114.

[86] Bernard Lang, *The Difference Engine* at <http://members.chello.at/bernhard.lang/> [01-07-10].

[87] Bourriaud (2005) pp. 35-38. 'Plunderphonics' might be another possible example of this, and is well, if not completely accurately, described by Richard Barrett in a way which points out that it is not specifically linked only to electronic media: 'the point of "plunderphonics" seems to be that the found sounds are placed inside quotation marks, so that the listener is supposed to recognise, if not their exact origin, then a sense of their cultural embeddedness, and thus their "difference" from the aesthetic intent of the music of which they form part and which is intended to be understood by "subverting" them, by removing them from their original context and placing them in one which contradicts their original (most often commercial) function'. Richard Barrett, 'FURT interview with Stefano Isadoro Bianchi' in *Blow Up Magazine* (Italy, 2005) reproduced at <http://furtlogic.com/interview2.html> [14-10-08]. This description is in a good example of the aesthetic intent of the composers whose music I will describe as 'quoting' in chapter 3.

primarily of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century composers who evidently have different concerns to those composers writing one hundred years later. Keppler finds the intentions of those whom he calls 'quoting composers' falling somewhere on a scale which ranges,

> from misappropriation to [...] association, [and that] such quotations have two features in common: [...] the delivery of a concealed comment [...] and a reliance upon the listener's foreknowledge of the quoted source, without which the full effect of the comment will be lost.[88]

This assessment will show that both of Keppler's ideas are as relevant in today's music by way of the examples given.

The music I focus on in chapter 3 can be associated particularly with the nineteenth century:[89] through association due to use of quotation and also through ideology which has its origins in the nineteenth century. This use of quotation in itself seems to be linked to a specific aim of dealing with identity and with the past, something which is becoming an increasingly important concern. Many composers in fact cite addressing, and even deconstructing, history as an aim in quotation.[90] 'History,' in each of their interpretations, refers to an objective entity rather than a notion which is being continuously and consistently re-written. This acceptance of an objective history can be said to be part of the problem I am assessing.

The example of quotation given throughout this thesis can be said to be generalisable to the musical aesthetic situation of musical and other artworks as a whole. Quotation represents a significant trend in contemporary art, and for this reason is worth investigating, since its function of making explicit for me

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[88] Philip Keppler Jr. 'Some Comments on Musical Quotation' *The Musical Quarterly*, vol. 42. no. 4 (October, 1956) p. 473.

[89] 'Nineteenth Century': I will consistently use this term to refer to the western canon from around 1780-1914, the theoretical ideas from this period, and the ideology surrounding this, rather than a particular time period itself.

[90] Or else their commentators do it for them. Alastair Williams, 'Swaying with Schumann: Subjectivity and Tradition in Wolfgang Rihm's *Fremde Szenen I-III* and related scores' in *Music and Letters*, vol. 87 no. 3 (2006) pp. 379-397 is vocal in underlining that Wolfgang Rihm is deconstructing the tradition he quotes although he does not present much evidence for this.

problems relating to aesthetics and ontology, must also be perceived by other artists as a process of making explicit something which forwards their concerns.

In order to conclude from all these themes I will offer a summary of the evidence relating to the relational ontology of musical, and indeed all, artworks. I will also conclude onto the instrumental role that practice has played in this investigation. I believe that is is possible to say that practice itself deals with knowledge and therefore truth, and thus relates specifically to the definitions of aesthetics and philosophy I have offered in this introduction. In final conclusion, as an expression of the relational aesthetic conclusions that are made possible by this investigation, it will be possible to offer the following statement: art exists because people experience it; aesthetics is to do with relations.

II.I Object Theories of the Work

Aesthetics is to do with relations. In order to study these relations, and therefore aesthetics, it is necessary to define where these relations occur and what their relevance is to artworks. I have already posited that these relations occur on what could be described as the most fundamental level that aesthetics is concerned with (without making claims to 'first philosophy'): the ontological level of the work. Such a claim says that these relations exist regardless of conceptual or epistemological claims, and that perception is necessary for aesthetic experience not because of any ability to glean things from the nature of artworks, but because such experience of the work cannot occur without the perceiver.

In order to say that the work is ontologically relational, it is first necessary to define what the work itself *is*, so that it is possible to say that this mode of being is itself relational. In the case of the work of music this is not traditionally seen to be as simple as with other artforms. In the past, theorists have chosen to make a special case for music,[91] or not to discuss it at all. Considering a survey of ontological claims about music over time, it is possible to see the 'work' considered in a number of ways; most of these ways require it to be (at least concurrent with) an object. It is on this particular point that I identify a major criticism of these theories, and also on this particular point that the idea that music is a special case arises since a number of objects seem to be concurrent with the work of music. Those theories of the work that do not consider the work to be necessarily concurrent with an object consider it to be the consequence of some objects or other. My criticism here is that this requires that there be something special about objects of art themselves, that such properties could be attached or concurrent with them. Where music is concerned this also requires that it be a special case since the object of art in the case of the work of music is not well defined (or is contestable), or if it were to be agreed upon (such as the score, or the recording) many works of music would become contestable as works of art. This also explains why non-western art is often seen as a problematic case.

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[91] Hegel (1975) pp. 893-909: it is my belief that most of the special cases made for music stem from this definition although earlier examples of such belief could be mentioned. Hegel's definition gives 'modern' theoretical credence to the claim.

Roman Ingarden has contemplated this problem at length, writing that in many traditional conceptions of musical works,

> the work itself remains like an ideal boundary at which the composer's intentional conjectures of creative acts and the listeners acts of perception aim [...] the work thus seems to be an intellectual equivalent of a higher order, belonging to a whole variety of intentional acts. [...] At that ideal boundary, the work remains one and the same in contrast to the many concretions in specific performances and thus [...] it is in some respects de-individualized, although it does not cease to be individual.[92]

Ingarden goes on to say that it is possible to give the work of music the character of an intentional object, and that,

> this object, as purely intentional, is neither purely the perceptual experience in which it is given nor an experience that creatively designates the object, nor yet any part or element of these experiences. It is solely something to which these experiences refer, it is neither mental nor subjective.[93]

Finally he notes that the perception of the work of music as an artistic work at all relies on a social exchange:

> the construction of a musical work as an intersubjective aesthetic object demands that both the composer and the listeners should fulfill certain specific mental and physical acts called aesthetic experience or, or if you wish, aesthetic perception.[94]

Ingarden contrasts this aesthetic ideal with the reality when applied to musical works, writing on unnotated performable characteristics,

> if the work remains in the form in which it has been notated, these further elements remain existentially potential, as though there were only a possibility of their future realisation in individual performances.[95]

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[92] Ingarden (1986) p. 119.

[93] ibid. p. 120.

[94] ibid. p. 122

[95] ibid. p. 116.

Once performed, these characteristics give rise to the problems of many performances of the work being non-identical. On this, Ingarden says,

> it does, however, appear certain, because of the incomplete nature of musical sources, that every work as a schema designates *some* multiplicity of possible concrete profiles. The multiplicity depends not only on the degree of the schematicism of the work—that is, partly and indirectly on the degree of precision in the scoring—but also on the kind of multiplicity of possible performances of the work as a schema that is designated by the work's areas of indeterminacy,[96]

and that,

> the profile of the work in performance undergoes a more or less profound alteration in relation to what it ought to be in any given performance. We are, however, rarely aware of these shifts. Spontaneously, we trust our own aesthetic experience, and therefore, the work constitutes itself in the manner in which it appears to us.[97]

Nevertheless, Ingarden's investigation is inconclusive. It also focusses mainly on the objects which can be said to be concurrent with the work: scores, recordings; and representations of these, which is to say, performances.[98]

Expressing similar concerns about the identity of the work of music, Julian Dodd outlines a type/token theory of musical ontology, summing up that,

> [t]he crucial difference between types and sets is this: whilst the identity of a set is determined by its actual membership, the identity of a type is determined, not by which tokens actually

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[96] ibid. p. 151.

[97] ibid. p. 154.

[98] Ingarden dismisses recordings altogether as being contributive to the identity of the work. Instead, he finds them to be representative of, rather than the work, one particular performance, and thus only as useful to his investigation as a single performance would be. This is a point on which I concur with him, and thus from hereon in this investigation will not consider recordings as contributive to the ontology of the work. There may seem to be special cases, such as tape pieces, but even these have performance contexts which are not 'dead,' cf. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (London: Continuum, 2004). I would hold that 'dead' repetitions could only occur *inside* a computer, and, even in the cases of physical media and data, this is debatable (Greg Egan *Permutation City* (London: Gollancz, 2008)for a literary debate of this problem. A simpler debate might focus upon the issue of entropy.)

> exist, but by the condition that something must meet to be one of its tokens.[99]

As I will go onto explain, a non-set theory explanation of the ontology of musical works does indeed seem most appropriate and to illustrate this I will provide a

[99] Julian Dodd, 'Musical Works: Ontology and Meta-Ontology,' in *Philosophy Compass*, vol. 3, no. 6 (November 2008) pp. 1113-1134 <http://0-onlinelibrary.wiley.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/doi/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00173.x/full> [01.04.2011] §2. Dodd also discusses the Type/Token theory of ontology with respect to music in Julian Dodd, *Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) pp. 82-142 and Julian Dodd, 'Musical Works as Eternal Types,' in *British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. 40, no. 4 (October 2000) pp. 424-440.

mereological explanation.[100] Dodd notes that, 'the type/token theory nicely explains musical works' repeatability; once indicated structures are *distinguished* from types, the umbilical cord to this *explanans* is severed, and any light shed on the phenomenon of repeatability is dimmed.'[101] However Dodd also points out that he has little to say about the 'individualisation' of works,'[102] the same problem that Ingarden finds with some of the initial proposals he makes, and this is the problem I hold with this theory: it is one thing to be able to account

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[100] Badiou draws conclusions that are similar to mine from set theory rather than mereology in Alain Badiou, *Being and Event* (London: Continuum, 2010). If I consider Badiou's sets to be whole-parts relationships I can draw similar conclusions to mine from his ontology. Badiou is certainly correct when he writes, '[o]ntology, if it exists, is *a* situation,' (p. 25). He goes on to say that, '[i]f there cannot be *a* presentation *of* being because being occurs in every presentation—and this is why it does not present *itself*—then there is one solution left for us: that the ontological situation be the *presentation of presentation*,' (p. 27). This seems to be an adequate explanation of the situation. Heinrich Herre, 'The Ontology of Mereological Systems: A Logical Approach,' in *Theory and Applications of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. by Roberto Poli and Johanna Seibt (New York: Springer, 2010) notes that for general situations set theory is not an adequate representation is all cases when he writes, '[s]ituations are introduced as parts of the world that can be comprehended as wholes. Sets exhibit a particular type of wholes whose parts are subsets. Sets are atomistic i.e. they are the mereological sum of its atomic parts which are singletons.,' (p. 79). In a mereological construction, being part-of is a *relation*. The important property of a relation is that it is reciprocal, whereas for a set the influence the set has upon its parts is not the same as the influence that the parts have on the set. For the work function I will describe to work at all, its relations must be reciprocal (or else what is signified is a work-concept, or, worse, a work-object). Richard M. Martin, *Logical Semiotics and Mereology* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 1992) notes that mereology is necessary since, 'we live not in a "world of individuals" [...] but rather in a structured world-of-individuals-in-indissoluabe-union-with-one-another,' (p. 121), and Tim Bayne, *The Unity of Consciousness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) presents an account of mereological unity in what he describes as, but does not name as, aesthetic experience. He writes of phenomenal experience, '[m]y total experience is a state which includes within itself various experiential parts, such as my overall perceptual experience, my overall auditory experience, and my experience of the diesel trucks outside my window. One's overall phenomenal field is an experience which contains within itself other experiences, like nested Russian dolls within each other. Indeed, we might venture the thought that total phenomenal states are heteronomous: all of the parts of which they are composed share their experiential nature,' (p21) .For Bayne, experience takes on tripartite structure comprising experience, subject and relations (pp. 21-30). Of this, he writes, 'an expereince is to be understood in terms of the instantiation of a phenomenal property by a subject at a time. We can think of these instantiations as phenomenal events. And in light of this, phenomenal unity can be understood in terms of mereological relations between phenomonal events. At any point one's stream of consciousness takes the form of a single highly complex phenomenal event that subsumes a number of less complex events. It is the fact that these less complex events are proper parts of more complex events that accounts for their unity,' (p. 29).

[101] Dodd (2008) §3.

[102] ibid. §6.

for works as types, but another to be able to account for all works as ontologically similar once their individual characteristics are taken into account, and to make a link between the work of music and other artworks.

Such works of art, as described by Ingarden and Dodd, which are concurrent with, or a consequence of, objects, cannot exist. In this chapter I will explain why these properties cannot apply to objects (for example, by using the Sorties game)[103] and I also will explain why further theories are not viable in all cases or not viable for music. I will then describe the work as a function. Author theories (such as those by Eco, Barthes, Foucault)[104] focus on the absence of the author in the act of reception of the text, and the absence of the author in the text. These theories may name the author but they focus on the text and the receiver. I also focus on the receiver and on the act of transmission; this belongs to the listener/viewer. I hold that the "text," when the work is considered, is actually no different in the case of music to other works of art—so either theories which consider music to be a special case are incorrect or music is not the same as other works of art and different from a traditional definition of art. So there must be a problem in the logic of the work if a definition arises from it that considers music to be a special case. Such an argument comes from Hilary

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[103] cf. Merricks (2003) pp. 32-37. The Sorties game considers whether that which is at stake still exists at the removal of a single one of its constituent parts. For Merricks these are atoms. After the removal of each individual atom, the question can be asked of the subject of the game (for Merricks this subject is Michelangelo's *David*) if it still exists. On the game's conclusions, Merricks says, 'I deny that there are co-located multiple *David*–candidates. And I reject metaphysical vagueness. So I conclude that, if *David* exists at the start of the game then there is a point during the game at which annihilating a single atom tears *David* from determinate existence to determinate non-existence. Thus we should conclude that *David* does not exist at the start of the game. For the result that a single annihilation could "make all the difference" in *David*'s existence is unacceptable,' (p. 33).

[104] Umberto Eco, *The Open Work*, trans. by Anna Cancogni (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989); Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author,' in *Image Music Text* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1977) pp. 142-148; Michel Foucault, 'What is an Author?' in *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*, ed. by Paul Rainbow (London: Penguin, 1991) pp. 101-120.

Putnam's quantum logical argument, and concludes by saying it is necessary to produce a new definition and logic of the work order to avoid a logical fallacy.[105]

Theories of the work can be split into two categories: those which consider primarily the object and those things relating to it, and those which are more holistic. In the following descriptions I have used the example of the *Mona Lisa* as the motif of 'the work.' Although a painting is not a work of music, it has two advantages. First, it is not a statue. Many analytic aesthetic theories consider statues as a simple base-case.[106] Despite recognising that many useful things can be said about statues—for example, Merricks can conclude ontologically about statues, writing, 'atoms are *arranged statuewise* if and only if they both have the properties and also stand in the relations to microscopia upon which, if statues existed, those atoms composing a statue would non-trivially supervene [...] this implies that statue-composition follows from statuewise arrangement,'[107] and that, 'statue [is] epistemically prior to the concept of being arranged statuewise'[108]—there are many complex things which cannot be said about statues. The complexity of the ontological case of the work of music shows that there is a need to consider a more complex base-case in order to reach conclusions which make sense for the work of music. This is possible to do, since there are many conclusions about statues which can safely be accepted. Second,

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[105] Hilary Putnam, 'Is Logic Empirical?' in *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. 5 (1968), pp. 216-241, reprinted as 'The Logic of Quantum Mechanics' in *Mathematics, Matter and Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 174-197. Putnam describes the logical steps involved, 'instead of arguing: "classical logic *must* be right; so something is wrong with these features of quantum mechanics," [...] one may perfectly well decide "quantum mechanics may not be right in all details; but complementarity and superposition of states are probably right. If these are right, and classical logic is also right, then either there are hidden variables, or there is a mysterious cut between the observer and the system, or something of that kind. But I think it is *more likely that classical logic is wrong* than that there are hidden variables, or "cuts between the observer and the system," etc. Notice that this completely *bypasses* the issue of whether adopting quantum logic is "changing the meaning" of "and," "or," etc. If it is, so much the worse for "the meaning,"' (p. 189) Hilary Putnam, 'How to Think Quantum Logically,' in *Synthese*, vol. 29, no. 1 (December 1974) pp. 55-61 also concludes that, '[t]he heart of the quantum-logical interrelation is that the logical relations among physical states of affairs [...] are themselves an empirical matter,' (p. 56).

[106] Merricks (2003) pp. 38-46, and John Heil, *From an Ontological Point of View* (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2003) pp. 181-190 both make ontological arguments regarding statues which are relevant to this investigation but do not address the whole picture. Such arguments will be assumed to be true, but will not be re-iterated here.

[107] Merricks (2003) pp. 4-5.

[108] Merricks, (2003) p. 7.

the *Mona Lisa* is a suitable motif since it is not a work of music; the *Mona Lisa*, in some theories, could be said to be concurrent with a single object and so, whilst the problem of the multiplicity of objects in the case of the work of music has already been considered, object-related conclusions can be drawn from it. I will finally test my conclusions with respect to musical works through reflection on my practice-led conceptual analysis which has formed part of, and draws upon, this theoretical investigation.

This first, most obvious, and clearly most obviously dismissible, theory considers that the work *is* a physical object, i.e. the *Mona Lisa* consists of oil paint and canvas and is hanging in the Louvre. At first glance this seems to work well and fits with our understanding of what the *Mona Lisa* is. However, it is necessary that this theory fits all art forms since the 'work' itself is not limited to a single discipline. In the case of a painting the physical object is easily identified, but in the case of, for example, a novel the physical object is not so readily identifiable. It is clear that in this case many things could be identified as such: every re-print, the original manuscript, audio books, etc. In which case, it is unclear which we should read if we want to access the genuine text, and in identifying an object it seems that reading may not even be important in defining the work in the novel-case. With a piece of music, this becomes even more complicated: the score, a recording, a performance may not all marry with each other and the production of many varied physical objects itself implies that no one of these can really *be* the work.

But it is essential that one must say something about the physical object(s) of a work. A mereological nihilist argument would conclude thus: something is hanging in the Louvre, and when I refer to the *Mona Lisa* most all would agree that this object may well be the referent, or is at least referred to by this term. I do not deny that *Mona Lisa* does refer to this object but merely that this is not all the term *Mona Lisa* refers to. So I must conclude on the nature of the object hanging in the Louvre and I do so by saying that hanging in the Louvre there are atoms arranged *Mona-Lisa*-wise[109] and when one refers to an object by saying *Mona Lisa* this is often what is meant. But I deny that the atoms of the *Mona Lisa*, and thus the physical object, could be the definition of the work, since to say that these atoms *are* the *Mona Lisa* would be to say that in their current

[109] Merricks (2003) pp. 5-8.

arrangement they are ontologically different from atoms which do not make up the *Mona Lisa* and this is clearly not the case.[110]

The second theory of the work to be considered is also a very functional one. Physically it might be possible to say that work is equal to energy expended over time; in this case the work's product would be representative of expense of energy. From a musicological perspective this is an odd but useful definition. If one wanted to accept it, it would allow for easy qualitative assessment and would sit well with some presumptions in the genius concept (in the terms of the value of the work). However this is clearly not a workable theory. First, if this were the case, the 'work' would be something we would be incapable of judging or speaking about in cases where the amount of energy expended is unclear. This is not the case: it is believed to be possible to judge the value even of works which remain anonymous. Second, it is very easy to show that in every case energy expended is unclear since there is no definition of who expends the energy, nor to what end. If this were merely in the creation of objects, the object as a representation of energy expended would be subject to the same objections as in the first definition offered. If not, then how this could be measured (except in calorific value) is also unclear. If one chose to measure calorific value then this would imply they must first seek to define those things which count as 'work' or 'working' to quantify them, leading to the conclusion that expense of energy is merely a consequence of work rather than part of the ontology of the work itself.

Whilst a critique of such a definition of the work may seem unnecessary it bears mentioning here since many of the examples proffered in the next chapter seem, albeit not explicitly, to have accepted a definition of *some* works which bears some relation to the definition given above. That is to say, there may be some genius-value attached to some works which assumes that some genius-work has taken place in their creation. This also has relevance when considering the judgement that some work could be considered a better expense of artistic energy than others (a high-low art distinction, perhaps) which is also present in a number of the case studies in chapter 3. In refuting this definition I have considered all works submitted with this document equally, and without allowing

[110] A modal or possible worlds argument can be used to strengthen this argument, but it is not possible to make this here. David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004) and John Divers, *Possible Worlds* (London: Routledge, 2002) are examples of such an argument.

more weight to any of them on the grounds of length or instrumentation. I believe that a piece such as *the enigma machine 3: archipelago* is as relevant to this investigation and as equally capable of performing conceptual analysis as a much longer piece such as the chamber opera *green angel.* Therefore expense of energy as a constituent part of work is actively disengaged with in the construction of this document.

The third and final theory that defines the work as a single, object-related, thing states that the work is supervenient upon its aura.[111] This includes the theory that the work is defined by having an aura, since such an assessment requires the aura to exist, and also takes into account the thesis 'the work is a collection of its constituent parts plus its aura' since the elimination of the aura means that by *modus tollens* this statement is denied by the denial of the aura being the definition of the ontology of the work. The problems with this thesis are that while this may seem to make some sense (the idea that there is something about the work which is metaphysical), it does not account for the fact that there *are* physical objects which appear to have something to do with the work and does not explain how these objects can be accounted for, nor the connection between them and the aura. These objects are dismissed in such a theory since a version of the Sorties game would, in this case, always dismiss the existence of the work at the point at which the aura, rather than any of the atoms of such physical objects, was removed:[112] by this reasoning it becomes absurd that a minute difference at a point in the process of creation defines that something has now become a work, thus leaving the possible conclusions that either the aura always existed independent of the work, and this point can be dismissed since it is metaphysically vague, or that the aura does not in fact exist at any point, and thus is not in fact a constituent part of the work (does not exist).

This point is exemplified in my portfolio. I have supposed, as a result of these conclusions and the further investigations which will follow, that there is no single identity in the any of the works which make it up, nor that there is a single identity to be communicated in performance. All of the pieces contain some sort of open form which varies from the use of spatial notation which requires the players to react to each other (such as in *the empiricist view* and *as a name i am a*

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[111] Such as described by Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, trans. by J. A. Underwood (London: Penguin, 2008).

[112] Which might happen after the removal of any of the atoms, or none.

myth) to pieces where the structure and order of elements is not fixed, or where a number of options are offered to the performers (such as in many of *the enigma machine* pieces). It is important to note that I do not believe the form to be open merely due to my compositional intervention; it is my intention to expose that all works can be said to be open form to some extent through the explicit communication of the openness of these works in their performance. Such a concern is not unique to composition: it can be demonstrated, for example, in current trends in historical performance practice.[113] In some works in particular this is most explicit, and those are the works in which I have presented multiple versions to be considered as the 'score' or work. These are *the enigma machine 1: hendecaptych of hans memling*, *the enigma machine 2a: properties and essence* and *the enigma machine 2b: [no subtitle]*.

II.II Musical Examples

the enigma machine is a project, consisting of six distinct pieces, investigating practice as conceptual analysis whilst at the same time exploring practical conceptual analysis of my theory of relational ontology. That is to say that the purpose of the project is to allow me to conclude whether conceptual analysis using practice is possible and also to use my practice to explore whether or not the nature of these pieces, and of music itself, is indeed relational and not objective. I seek to ask the question about and through these pieces, 'how and where does music exist in this case, and in all cases?' All the pieces are chamber works and, after originally considering multimedia work, I decided to conduct this investigation through a series of chamber pieces for reasons of practicality (performance opportunities and requests for the music) and generalisability (inclusion of multi- and new-media elements can lead to a dismissal of the conclusions as being unrelated to the situation of music as a whole).[114] I considered every medium available in the construction of chamber music, including considering titles and programme notes as further media through

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[113] Robert Hull, '"Overcoming Romanticism": on the Modernization of Twentieth-Century Performance Practice,' in *Music and Performance during the Weimar Republic*, ed. by Bryan Gilliam, Cambridge Studies in Performance Practice 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp. 37-58, and George Kennaway, 'Bookcases, Fish Pie, and my Piñata: Musical Scores Considered as Sets of Instructions,' *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music* (Forthcoming, December 2011).

[114] Harry Lehmann, Johannes Kreidler and Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf, *Musik—Ästhetik—Digitalisierung. Eine Kontroverse* (Hofheim: Wolke Verlag, 2010) comprises a debate on the use of new technologies in music which exemplifies this very point.

which to explore how many interrelationships could be brought together to be presented as a piece without the imposition of my sorting them into a coherent narrative whole.[115]

The first piece in this project is a trio for mezzosoprano, bass flute, and 'cello. The text used in the vocal part comes from the titles of the sections of an online composition guide, written by Alan Belkin.[116] This guide represented a state of over-romanticism and nostalgia in music which I wished to critique but not to make an explicit aim of the piece. There is also a discrepancy in the authority of the figure of the composer implied by the presentation of my piece and that implied by the text I have chosen to use. The title, which includes the term hendecaptych (in eleven parts), also contains a reference to the film *Vertical Features Remake* by Peter Greenaway which presents its constituent parts in eleven sets. I present the configurations by categories, which would only become clear if all combinations were presented consecutively (something which I regard as highly unlikely in a performance situation, despite my interest in it as a performance outcome). The reference to Hans Memling in the title recognises him as an artist adept in creating works with many parts, although on my part there is no more conscious link than that. The composition of the title caused me to draw connections between the act of painting and the performative aspects of the work, and as such I attach to the piece is also the following programme note:

> Here the word painting may refer to interpreting and is to be distinguished from that by Francis Bacon which is on oil and linen. That is: to be an album or a rock band is not the same as being attached to the bow of a boat. Covering, for instance, is creating but is on the surface. Many interpreters are painters but fewer are representative.[117]

The programme note explores 'painting' as a category and a descriptive term; indicating the number of things painting could be thought to refer to. This reflects a number of relations with the word 'painting' which could then be

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[115] Lehmann, (2006).

[116] Alan Belkin, *A Practical Guide to Musical Composition* (2008) <https://www.webdepot.umontreal.ca/Usagers/belkina/MonDepotPublic/bk/index.html> [03.02.2010].

[117] Lauren Redhead, *Programme note to the enigma machine 1: hendecaptych of hans memling* (2010).

associated with the music by someone who hears a performance and reads the programme note. By its very nature this further creative act invites more interrelationships than those already present by suggesting the possibility for their creation. The idea that the work itself could be considered as a painting links with the motif presented in this chapter. The number of configurations presented at the start of the score which can be chosen by the performers, along with the possibility of further configurations and the freedom which is allowed within the notation erodes the perception of the score or a single performance being definitive before a single performance has taken place.

This notion is extended in the second piece of the project, which is actually two pieces. A duet for flute and piccolo comprises half of the second investigation in this project. This piece builds on what was already established in the first instalment but does not include text; this was an important action for me as it was necessary to show that what went before was not reliant on ambiguity or construction related only to the text and not to the music. The second half of this second investigation is another duet, for (24-tet)microtonal trumpet and horn. These two duets for pairs of very similar instruments allow me to make a necessary theoretical point: the score for part 2b is another version of what I could have written as part 2a of this series. As a further investigation, this piece when presented alongside (the possibility, if not a performance, of) part 2a this piece posits that the 'material' itself does not belong to the instruments or their associated techniques. The subtitle, *[no subtitle]*, implies the possibility of other text being used in this space and therefore attempts to destroy the possibility of reading the piece as a blank canvas or, as Steve Altoft suggested it could be presented, as a Wandelweiser-style experiment about sound (I would have no issues with this presentation, only with the suggestion that it reveals the 'meaning' of this music). In this case multiple interrelationships are opened up in the suggestion of no interrelationships, to my mind implying that these are not all interrelationships which can be said to be constructed by the composer.

This briefly comprises the problems set out to be discussed in the whole set of pieces, stemming from a desire to make explicit the non-objective ontology of these and all works. As a set of pieces *the enigma machine* showcases and exposes the same relationship in each piece in a variety of different ways. I believe that all pieces come to the same conclusion which is that the interrelationships present in each work are that which makes up the work itself, and that the

composed interrelationships cannot themselves be said to be the cause of this. A further possible consideration, that this music foregrounds the interrelationships present but that music itself contains and is made up of such interrelationships whether or not such foregrounding takes place, allows me to consider a work or the work as a concept as intrinsically and ontologically relational.

II.III Object Property Theories of the Work

The three theories or claims outlined above have focused on the work having a single definition. In order to account for the conclusions of the above mentioned set of pieces, I will outline two more theories. These will allow for the work to be made up of a number of different parts, and allow for a mereological definition of the work. I believe that such a theory is necessary since it is not possible to solve to problem of the ontology of the musical work by looking at the multiplicity of physical and aesthetic objects as contributing to the ontology of a single thing. Therefore I will look at the question from the point of view of the constituent parts of the work of music contributing to the multiplicity of physical and aesthetic objects. If the previous theories can be described as 'object' theories of the work, then those below can be described as 'object property' theories.

Lydia Goehr in the essay *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*[118] proposes a 'work-concept' which I believe comes much closer to the truth: the work itself cannot be considered to be set in stone but as something evolutionary, in which changing social perceptions, performance practices and interpretations all contribute to, rather than vary, its definition. Goehr describes the 'work-concept' as 'a result of a specific and complicated confluence of aesthetic, social and historical conditions.'[119] For Goehr, my perception of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is not the same as a contemporary listener's at the time of its premiere, nor as that of Beethoven who was nearly deaf at the time he wrote it, yet Beethoven, the contemporary listener, and myself all refer to the same work when we talk about Beethoven's Fifth Symphony; my need to refer to the work at all is cast as purely social, my need to create a work a product of this same society.

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[118] Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[119] Goehr, p. 245.

However there are some problems with this theory, the most objectionable being that there is an implication that the work is cumulative rather than mereologically variable. So, I refer to a larger accumulation of things when I talk about Beethoven's Fifth Symphony than does Beethoven or his contemporary listener. There is an element of craftsmanship which can occur outside of this work concept (or at the beginning of it) which has little to do with the need to refer to works or authors and much more to do with the creation of chairs and tables (and these themselves, given the correct context, may be considered works). This is clearly inadequate as there can be no accounting for all the parts of the work at any one time (and I will go on to discuss this further in my next point), and inherent to this definition is some linearity in the progression of the work concept which will be subject to greater scrutiny in chapter 4. Related to this are the questions, if some of the interpretations are lost, then what can we say of the work? Is it now incomplete? If society need not refer to works or authors do they cease to exist? What about these enduring physical objects? The correct part of this theory is that it supposes that there are a number of constituent parts that need to be considered in the ontology of the work and this is certainly a significant step forward from the previous three explanations.

I have already addressed the possibility of multiple interpretations of the music that comprises my portfolio, which in some ways exemplifies this point. In addition to this, some works deal directly with the medium to which they belong in their performance. These works interact with the 'museum' in which they could be said to be included and thus challenge the idea that a single work is a discrete entity, conceptualised socially or otherwise. In this respect they are postdramatic.

The first example of this from my portfolio is the relationship of the piece *as a name i am a myth* with the medium of chamber music. The visual significance and prominence of the public address loudspeaker might be conceptualised as a visual quotation of the film *Bab El-Oued City*[120] in which the protagonist, tormented by hearing the announcements from the loudspeaker above his room, tears it down. Such loudspeakers might also be seen frequently at outdoor events and train stations. This visual image conveys the idea of facts, truths, or neutral

[120] Merzak Allouache, *Bab El-Oued City* (1994).

information being conveyed via the loudspeaker and thus it reifies what could be described as 'subliminal' messages about the medium of chamber music through a survey of aesthetic thought relating to chamber or new music. The scene that unfolds also presents the chamber music set-up as bizarre: the musicians continue to play on despite the commentary on their endeavours. The 'set' (of notes) which can be said to comprise the 'material' of the piece is expanded upon in the instrumental parts in a number of ways: from a quasi-serial row at the outset to a quasi-fugue texture at the close of the piece. The result is that all of these methods of tonal organisation seem remarkably similar to each other by the end of the piece and that the chamber set-up itself is posed as 'material.'

The second example is the piece *love speed and thrills*, which is an open instrumentation piece, with projection and tape. The use of music and visuals concurrently is taken to be an opportunity to encourage, and comment upon, the possibility of interactions between a musical performance and its circumstances. To this end I presented with the piece the following programme note,

> Don't you sometimes wonder
> 'Bout sound and vision?[121]

Rather than accompanying the film clip, the music in this piece instead comments upon its situation. The public address loudspeaker also features, performing a similar role to that in the piece *as a name i am a myth* particularly with regards to the quasi-opera music at the end of the piece, but rather than commenting on the music, the tape part controls the ensemble by providing a number of aural cues. The comedic nature of the film is contrasted with what could be considered a more dark character of the concurrent music. However there is descriptive function taking place and, although I have considered some categories of sounds in parts of the piece which may relate in some ways to the images on offer, this relationship is one which could be drawn but is not forced by the composer. The piece critiques its own position as music for a film (the reason for its composition: the piece was written for the 2009 Leeds Film Conference as part of a concert presenting new music for film) since there is an attempt to relegate the visuals to being the least important element of the work: they do not react to any other elements and can only be varied in their

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[121] Lauren Redhead, *Programme note to love speed and thrills* (2009), quotation of David Bowie, 'Sound and Vision' from *Low* (1977).

perception as the other parts vary. Thus the medium of music 'accompanying' visuals is at issue, and the constituent parts of the piece cannot simply be said to be live music, tape, and visuals.

As a further theory of constituent parts, Umberto Eco's account of the ontology of artworks through the medium of lists is of interest.[122] Although he does not explicitly seek to define the work within the course of his text, as with Lydia Goehr's definition there is certainly an element of truth about the definition Eco offers and it seems to be the case that it solves many of the problems posed by the previous definitions mentioned in this chapter. Eco writes, 'we use definition by properties when we do not have a definition by essence or if this last does not satisfy us'.[123] His final conclusion is that a conclusive list of properties and essence which would itself be the definition of something would be a non-normal list, in that it would contain itself.[124] If a list defining the work could be made in this way, then it would include the physical object, the energy expended in its production, the possibility of the work's aura, its social and historical significance; it would indeed be possible to say 'that is the work'.

Should this list be created then I accept that it indeed would be the work. But I hold that it would not be possible to create this list.[125] Thus should I choose to define the work in this way, I should seek to define something which does not exist with something which cannot exist, and this gets me nowhere. Much easier, with an infinite amount of archival research, would be to complete the definitive list of a single work, and arguably this may have been the pastime of historical musicologists over the last 200 or so years. However these individual lists would get me no closer to my ultimate work-list. Further to this, were I to create this ultimate, infinite list which defines the work, even were it to be a non-normal list which also contained itself, a reasonable argument could be made that this list itself is now *a* work and thus the ontology of *the* work must have changed, or at least been incorrectly defined within the bounds of the list (an argument along the lines of the classic theological argument that if there is anything outside of God then that must itself be God). Therefore I return to my original problem of

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[122] Eco (2009).

[123] ibid. p. 218.

[124] ibid. pp. 395-396.

[125] ibid. p. 218-219.

seeking to define the work within the bounds of something which cannot define it.

A number of pieces within my portfolio present lists as a way to make explicit their constituent parts. Many of *the enigma machine~* pieces present lists in some way or another. This is particularly explicit in *the enigma machine 3: archipelago* and the title of *the enigma machine 2a: properties and essence~*. The title of the latter piece uses two words pertinent to my concerns in this project and the argument by Eco described above. 'Properties' contains within it a reference to the different kinds of instrumental techniques and categories which form the piece and which could be revealed in multiple performances covering all the suggestions given. As this is unlikely, it can be said that these categories are hidden in plain sight: the possibility for their revelation is present in the construction of the music but the actuality of their revelation is improbable, much like the totality of the interrelationships present in the work. The use of the word 'essence' invites the question, 'what is the essence of this piece?' Such a question might equally be re-phrased as 'where is the aura of this piece?' I find this a question which is not necessarily helpful, as in some ways it considers the work as an object, and one which is contested by Eco who remains unsure as to whether the essence of an artwork can possibly be expressed.[126] The 'essence' of the piece, if it exists, is revealed, through structure and the possibilities in multiple performances of the piece, as something which does not belong to the piece but is built up as/in interrelationships—it is relational.

Whilst the first three pieces in *the enigma machine~* series all retain a similar structure, in continuing this investigation it was necessary for me to show that the structure itself was not responsible for that which I claim about the ontology of these works. The first piece to explore a variation in structure is a piece for multiple music boxes, *the enigma machine 3: archipelago*. The unusual instrumentation and limits of what was achievable make this an ensemble for which music must be focused on either structural or theatrical elements, or both. My solution takes into account both of these things: the theatricality of punching the holes for the music boxes to read live, and the idea that the piece is actually present in its structure. The number of repeated repetitions and variations in this case feels close to being fulfilled as they cannot likely do in

[126] ibid. p. 217.

performances of the previous works, and, owing to the nature of the instruments involved, this is very exposed. The subtitle, *archipelago*, refers directly to structure and was inspired by Bourriaud's explanation of his curating of the exhibition 'Altermodern' at the Tate Modern in London, in 2009:

> the archipelago [...] functions here as a model representing the multiplicity of global cultures. An archipelago is an example of the relationship between the one and the many. It is an abstract entity; its unity proceeds from a decision without which nothing would be signified save a scattering of islands united by no common name.[127]

This reference helped me conceive of how I could showcase this element—how I could incorporate a number of disparate elements and cause them to be considered to be unified when, taken separately, there might be little case for this. For me this stands as the same situation supposed in the concept of aesthetic unity in any piece of music.

The final example of such lists is that of intertextuality in *green angel*. I have discussed the role of interactions in this piece, and it suffices here to say that intertextuality could be seen as a catalogue which makes up the nature of the piece, should that be definable. Intertextuality, in the Derridean sense, in *green angel* is in fact dependent on the entire work (as one would expect). There are many 'texts' made reference to, quoted, and alluded to, but the significance is not in their number but in their possible and collective implications. There are a number of references which are explicit or semi-explicit (such as to the dramatic conventions of Noh theatre, medieval poetry, and early music) and further references (for example a relationship with Benjamin Britten) which are not explicit, but are there to be read should one look for them. There is also the more complicated case of the possibilities for reading the text without prior knowledge of my research or artistic background, or that of my collaborator, or of Noh theatre or opera. Therefore story of the opera can in some ways be said to be about the problem of intertextuality: Ash struggles to read the multiple texts presented to her situation within the story in order to find the message in the jumble of their referents. She is, in effect, in the aesthetic position of the audience who are watching this (or, indeed, any) work. To list the interrelations and influences would be to attempt to define the work and this situation.

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[127] Nicolas Bourriaud, *Altermodern: Tate Triennial*, ed. by Nicholas Bourriaud (London: Tate Publishing, 2009) pp. 1-2.

Finally, the idea of list-making can be seen in a small example towards the end of the piece *the empiricist view*, in particular sections 4 and 6, where one instrument causes the others to react to it. In section 4 the piece can be said to perform its own analysis: using semiotic analysis in the style of Nattiez[128] (therefore assuming the score to be a kind of neutral or base-level), of the piece *The Broken Melody* by August van Biene:[129] single instruments are connected with particular aspects of the music. These forced interrelations, between aspects of the quotation and the ensemble, 'perform' the piece as if its constituent parts have individual meaning; the quotation becomes a list whereby various gestures always result in a certain interaction. This is distilled further in section 6 when various instruments of the ensemble, concluding with the percussionist, derive responses from the instruments of the ensemble through disparate aspects of technique, or various sonic possibilities. This ends with the inevitable breakdown of order in the ensemble, and of relations between the percussionist and conductor.

II.IV Defining the Work in Light of the Author

Defining the work is proven to be difficult in the above examples since it seems like such a definition must encompass properties which are transient, not perceived by all who encounter a work, and not possessed by objects. It is also difficult to reach a definition of something which is considered in different regard in different cultures and by different groups. There are issues with definitions which try to negate these problems, such as that they are too wide, too specific, allow absurdities to be assumed, are inapplicable to much modern art, or assume depth in the work. My solution is to propose a definition of the work which takes into account that the problems identified must themselves express something about the ontology of the work. This is a quantum logical approach: logical problems in concluding on the nature of the arguments above can be said to be problems with the logic of the work itself. That is to say: the work cannot be summed up in an object theory because it is not an object (although there may be atoms arranged object-wise); the work cannot be

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[128] Jean-Jacques Nattiez, *Music and Discourse: Towards a Semiology of Music* trans. by Carolyn Abbate (Princeton, New Jersry: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[129] *The Broken Melody* is most often attributed to Auguste van Beine and, although he may not be its composer, it was certainly written for him to play. This piece, along with the 'cellist himself, was the subject of a radio programme of the same name, George Kennaway 'The Broken Melody,' *BBC Radio 4* (16.04.2009) [Radio Broadcast].

quantified because it is not a quantity (and should I be eliminativist about this then I would say things which can be quantified within the work are ontologically separate and cannot contribute or testify to its existence). It also takes into account that all of these theories rely on the existence of things which imply or signify that there is a work, but none conclude on the existence and nature of the work.

The work does not exist. I am not proposing this theory to say that it is not useful to talk about the work or the work concept, this is to say that the work is not an object, nor is it made of constituent parts which can be said to discretely exist, nor can it be said that there is composition between those parts which make up the work. Just as in the case of the *Mona Lisa* I recognise that there are atoms which are arranged painting-wise, I recognise that there a number or constituent parts which collectively signify the existence of the work. I also accede that in the musical work-case this is more complex than in the painting-case. It is necessary for me to define a base unit which comprises all of these constituent parts and in the case of the work, as in the case of the author, I recognise that these are relations. This is not so radical: it is a relational aesthetic point, but also the point at which my thinking differs from Bourriaud's. Where Bourriaud identifies relations in the reception of the work, I pinpoint them at every exchange which constitutes the work: semiotic, interpersonal, and otherwise. I claim that this comprises not only relations between the author and the work, the reader and the work, the author and the reader, or indeed any of the other relations which involve these figures, but all relations which involve no human interactions but are relational all the same that are at work in constructing the identity and ontology of the work. In other words there is something relational in the process of signification that is intrinsic in the ontology of the 'work concept' and it is these relations which suppose the work and can therefore be said to be necessary for the supposition of its existence above all else. 'Work' is certainly a signifier for something, but that something does not exist.

In place of a definition of the work, or a work-concept which relies on social understanding of the work, I propose a work function which has parallels with Foucault's author function. This is predicated upon the fact that one must believe in the work in order to assume the correct systems of engagement when perceiving it. In the case of structuralist arguments one must even believe that

these are necessary in order to perceive depth. However, the theory that I propose does not require these modes of engagement in order to have credence. This work function theory holds even when: the work was not intended as art (e.g. western appreciation of a non-western cultural object); the author is unknown; and/or when there is no object to which the art can be connected. Such a definition is also supposed by Derrida,

> [i]t became necessary to think both the law which somehow governed the desire for a centre in the constitution of structure, and the process of signification which orders the displacements and substitutions for this law of central presence which has never been itself, has always already been excluded from itself into its own substitute. The substitute does not substitute itself for anything which has somehow existed before it. Henceforth it is necessary to begin thinking that there was no centre, that the centre could not be thought of in the form of a present-being, that the centre had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of situations came into play.[130]

The author problem, and the discussion of this, highlight a trend in aesthetics. The importance of this trend is symptomatic of the importance of relations in defining both what aesthetics is and in how aesthetics can solve problems.

Foucault's reasoning in his essay 'What is an Author?' is that it is not enough to conclude that something may not exist (in his terms, 'has disappeared') but that we must also 'locate the space left empty by [this] disappearance.'[131] I intend not just to define this space but to also locate the relations which suppose it and the processes which allow for its definition. In defining an 'author function' which allows for the existence of those relations which suppose the author, Foucault accepts that there is something which is in need of definition in the space where the author needs to be; in short there is no 'empty space' and thus there must be something in need of definition in the elimination of the author. By the same reasoning, after the elimination of the existence of the work, I must suppose that there is something in need of definition which has previously been thought to be the work.

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[130] Derrida, pp. 353-354.

[131] Foucault (1991) p. 105.

Foucault also outlines the problem of the definition of the work when he says '[h]ow can one define a work amid the millions of traces left by someone after his death? A theory of the work does not exist, and the empirical task of those who naively undertake the editing of works often suffers in the absence of such a theory.'[132] There are a number of things to be said here that show that Foucault only solves half the author problem. The 'author function' is defined in relation to a work and our relations to said work, but the work itself remains undefined. The notion that this becomes a problem after the author's death also supposes the physical presence of the work's creator as one which eliminates this problem and this is unfortunately not so. In order to fully conclude on the relationship between the author and the work, the ontology of the work itself must first be decided upon. This author function requires a 'work function' to relate to, in order to function at all.

In addition to the open form critiques of what itself constitutes a work of music, some of the music forming my proposal critiques the way existing works relate to older or established works. A much longer assessment of quotation will be undergone in chapters three and four, but it is worth mentioning here the treatment of, and relationship to, Bach and Buxtehude in the piece *the enigma machine 5: de nostra re⌣*. This piece is the final piece in this project and is for solo organ. It is built up from quotations of Bach's and Buxtehude's settings of the chorale tune 'Wachet auf': these composers are considered to be important figures in the history of organ playing and writing, although not the only important figures, and also considered to be important figures when considering the composer-organist as one person. Both are composers whose place in the repertory has been secured by others looking at their work with an historical gaze. Of such a construction of history in the revival of music by Bach and Handel, Robert Hull writes,

> [t]he Bach and Handel revivals [...] satisfied the need for spiritually intact heroic national figures. The increasing emphasis on a canon of tonal works by deceased composers, and the emerging interest in historical performance practice can be seen in a similar light. We, the children of the twentieth century, needed an uncorrupt authority that would confirm to

[132] ibid. p. 104.

> us our differences from the world that had been shattered by the First World War.[133]

Arguably Buxtehude has not undergone the same revival in Britain as Bach and Handel, and there are reasons for this which are as much to do with organ construction as anything else, however the picture of an historical figure painted by Hull can be said to be true of both Bach and Buxtehude.

It could be said that *the enigma machine 5: de nostra re⌣* offers a performance practice of Bach and Buxtehude which considers them not as author-figures, and the scores not as authoritative, but as the respective creators and containers of a body of historical material which could be accessed by myself as a composer. Of course, as a composer I am not unique in this position of access and that is an important part of what I hope to communicate. The constituent parts of this piece are familiar and yet unfamiliar; gesturally there is much that seems to make sense within the historical view of the musical canon, but the interrelationships with that body of music (by time period, nationality, etc.) are not present in the piece in the authoritative symbol of the composer's name. The structure of the piece is static but within this the music is also variable in terms of time and space, etc. This is a familiar approach to many graphic or more indeterminate scores, but the approach to Bach and Buxtehude as if they were indeterminate is the important facet of this as the familiarity with the codes and conventions of the music remains when its authority is eroded. The most obvious interrelationships presented are those between Bach, Buxtehude, and the new context in which the quotations appear. Even where these do not seem to be explicit, the interrelationships are based in the tension present between the quotations and their new location. I accompanied the piece with the following programme note:

> Wachet auf, ruft uns die Stimme
> "Buxtehude for life" – Holger Waernecke
> "Not every musician believes in God, but they all believe in Bach." – Mauricio Kagel[134]

The programme note exposes what could be considered the unconventional but irreverent relationship with both composers and is in many ways also the

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[133] Hull (1994) p. 38.

[134] Lauren Redhead, *Programme note for the enigma machine 5: de nostra re⌣* (2010).

medium in which I communicate my anti-modernist approach to the music: I do not accept a progression from Buxtehude and Bach to myself, or even to the music of my contemporaries, and placing my performance amid these quotations exposes this. This piece perhaps also questions whether the organ is an instrument that perhaps resists modernism since although I performed pieces which experiment with its sound, none of them dispense with its harmonic tradition which itself is intrinsically linked to the way its sound is produced. This piece, as well as challenging perceptions of the quoted material throughout history, posits its own performance as historical through its relationship with the instrument on which it is performed. The quotations themselves perform the task of making the work-function of the piece explicit: the constituent parts of a work for solo organ (gesture, relationship with historical tradition, and with the space and instrument) are felt to be made present through the presence of the implicit quotations. The work itself appears to exist only as a result of its relations with these things.

It can be said that the problem which supposes such a work function is a problem of representation, and most notably a problem to be solved through a causal theory of representation, since it deals with relations and not with 'works' or products (objects). Such a theory of representation has little to do with whether artworks can be said to be representational or not but to do with what is semiotically supposed in the modes of engagement which refer to them.

A traditional theory of representation with respect to the work of music might suppose a semiotic interrelationship between the performer/performance and the score or text, between the same and the listener or reader, and between all three of these and the work as an entity. These are well accepted and are not to do with the work, but to do with Lydia Goehr's 'aesthetic, social and historical conditions.' Since all of these are interrelationships, that is exchanges that take place in both directions, even between the text, reader, performer, and the work, it can be said that all of these supposed relations allow the work to exert influence on the score/text, performer, and listener/reader. They *are* the work concept.

The theory which I propose would consider the interrelationships between the text, reader, and performer unchanged. However in the place of an interrelationship with the work, I claim all of them exert a one-way relationship

on the work. That is, they exert a pressure onto the place where the work *should be* and thus the work itself is supposed by the system but cannot exert any influence of its own. In this case, these relationships represent what I will call the work-function, which works in a very similar way to the author-function described by Foucault.

This means that the work-function supposes the work despite its non-existence and is important to keep the system in balance, but for this to be the case, there is no need for the work to exist. This one-way relation also means that nothing is represented by the work, but nor is it important that it should be.

Rancière describes exactly this situation when he writes of what is meant by the 'order of representation': 'In the first place it is a certain order of relations of what can be said and what can be seen [...] a certain order of relations between knowledge and action.'[135] Rancière can be said to support a post-Humian theory of representation in the creation of meaning. Such a theory is also supported by Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford who present causes as vectors.[136] Anjum and Mumford claim that '[a] cause should be understood [...] as something that disposes towards a certain effect or manifestation.'[137] Their theory claims that modelling causes as powers (and therefore vectors) takes into account their direction and magnitude, and therefore does not necessitate their effects ('causal production is not the same as causal necessitation').[138] Anjum and Mumford

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[135] Rancière, *The Aesthetic Unconscious* (2009), pp. 17-18.

[136] Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford, 'A Powerful Theory of Causation,' in *The Metaphysics of Powers*, ed. by Anna Marmodoro (London: Routledge, 2010) pp. 143-159. For a longer discussion cf. Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum, *Getting Causes From Powers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) (Forthcoming, 2011).

[137] ibid. p. 144.

[138] ibid. p. 158.

therefore show that representation, as a causal relation, can be modelled as a complex web of interrelationships between constituent parts.[139]

This can explain why music is nonrepresentational and yet seems to have meaning. Some causes, and therefore potentials for representation, have a greater magnitude, and cumulatively result in the causation of meaning. Examples of these could be learned behaviours (for example, the significance of the diminished seventh to educated musicians), and what could be considered to be stronger cultural references for some observers. This also explains why this is not the same for every perceiver: the magnitude of such causes is not a fixed quantity but determined, once again, by Goehr's 'aesthetic, social and historical conditions.' Such causes could be seen as relations between the meanings and the supposedly representational elements of works. In other words, if representation via causal means is relational, and the ontology of the work, which does not exist in any other way than that supposed by such causes, is relational, then such creation of meaning is a consequence of the ontology of the work whilst not being a part (meaningwise) of the work itself.

Conceptual analysis through practice has also allowed me to make these conclusions since the music presented shows that the work is mereologically variable and, although the structures of this music, and the historical and backwards-looking nature of many approaches to structure, reveal this, the structures themselves are not the cause of this property. This project successfully managed to present a conceptual analysis since within its constituent parts I was able to break down exactly what it would mean for me for the work to be relational, and mereologically variable, and re-present it in a way that the same conclusion could be drawn without that conclusion itself being foregrounded

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[139] A vector model of causation is more open to the many possible outcomes of artworks: 'according to the Vector Model, each causal relation is associated with a range of spatial geometries in addition to a particular temporal organisation. As a consequence, the model is able to handle causal relations that are highly problematic for probabilistic models, in particular those in which the cause and effect occur simultaneously.' Phillip Wolf and Matthew Zettergren, 'A Vector Model of Causal Meaning,' in *Proceedings of the 24th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*, ed. by W.D. Gray and C. D. Schunn (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002) pp. 944-949; p. 949. This also allows me to say of works of art, as Walton, Kendall, L, *Mimesis as Make Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990) does, that, 'there are no such properties as being mythical or illusory or imaginary or fake or real or genuine, not even ones which it it fictional that anything possesses,' (p. 428). In fact the only properties it is possible for me to say with certainty that artworks possess are relational properties.

prior to the reception of the pieces. In concluding on whether this would be possible in all cases, I can at this point posit that such conceptual analysis would be possible in all cases of dealing with aesthetic questions. Aesthetic questions themselves must be intrinsically linked to the nature of the artwork and thus this method of conceptual analysis could hope to expose whether such questions are based in the true nature of the work.

In conclusion, this offers evidence as to the mechanisms at work when one can say about the work of music, as Derrida claims for the text, 'the absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely.'[140] When considered in the way I have presented, the work cannot be said to exist and theories which consider the work can be said to conflate it with the objects of the work of music. Instead, I have shown that it is possible to say that what we suppose to be the work is represented by the collection of things which signify it; it cannot be said to be one thing. In connection with this, Rancière's assertion that,

> [p]olitics and art, like forms of knowledge, construct 'fictions', that is to say *material* rearrangements of sign and images, relationships between what is seen and said, between what is done and what can be done,[141]

is relevant. The work itself can be said to be one such fiction, represented in these 'material rearrangements.' Representation is the important word here since the work can be represented despite its being a negative existential; this does not have consequences for perception, and therefore does not have consequences for aesthetics. Rancière makes this situation clear when he writes, 'the word aesthetics does not refer to a theory of sensibilty, taste, and pleasure for art amateurs. It strictly refers to the specific mode of being of what ever falls within the domain of art, to the mode of being of the objects of art.'[142] What is most important in this conclusion is the existence of a work-function which is a relation. As it is a relation, it can be said that this is aesthetic; aesthetics is to do with relations.

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[140] Derrida, p. 354.

[141] Rancière (2004) p. 39.

[142] ibid. p. 22.

III.I Defining Material

Aesthetics is to do with relations. Such relations are considered between music and other musics, or other artworks, in the course of almost all works of music, through the use of what can be considered as quotation and, ultimately, material. Further relations are considered in the interactions between works of music and extramusical stimuli. A consideration of these relations in the creation of musical meaning is necessary to assess whether the relational ontology of musical works has any bearing on their reception.

The definition of the work proposed in the previous chapter provides significant scope for analysis of existing musical works. The starting point for such analyses is that there are aesthetic problems posed by a mis-definition of the work, such as any of those outlined in chapter two, which can be read in works which have accepted these definitions. These problems include those such as: the acceptance that musical meaning might be part of the ontology of the work; the belief that meaning can be created by simply combining different kinds of materials in order to build a comment out of the meanings these things already have; the consideration of the work as a vehicle for (at least possible) universal communication; the consideration that a work might be able to be imagined to have a correct interpretation; the assertion that the composers' intention can be considered of any real interest except to the composer and those people who concern themselves directly with such things. It is of course necessary that any aesthetic questions relating to the work should concern themselves with the *potential* for meaning (which is infinite and limited)[143] but should not conflate the terms 'reading' and 'meaning' when referring to conclusions drawn from such analyses.

In the following case studies I draw on semiotic readings which are influenced by Eco and poststructuralism, but also by Lacan, and by other positions such as situationism. These analyses reveal that often a chain of meaning can be traced in a work or its creation by analysing the historicity present in the materials which it uses. This chain of meaning can be read in opposition to an explicitly or

[143] Marshall W. Alcorn Jr, 'Rhetoric, Projection, and the Authority of the Signifier,' in *College English*, vol.49, no.2 (February 1987) p. 152.

implicitly expressed or intended meaning. This is one occasion where I have concerned myself directly with statements from composers and their commentators, not as a source of authority, but as another link in such a chain of creation of meaning. Such statements, which often play a large role in the continuing myth of a piece or its traditions, can most often in the cases of the works I address be said to be nonconcurrent with the possibilities for meaning inherent in the piece. I posit that aesthetic conclusions lie in the tension between such intended meaning or tradition and further possible readings of such works.

Finally, the presentation of my own work will invite such multiple readings of the possibility for meaning created by my own approaches to musical material, autonomy, and meaning which arise in part from the analyses presented in this chapter. I would invite the reading of my interpretations to be considered in opposition to the works presented, and do not consider myself to be the author of arbitrary meaning or narrative in these works. Instead, I present their construction as evidence of the conclusions I make regarding material and autonomy, and consider their reception to be separate from this. Concerns relating to open form and open notation are separate from these conclusions: the point that I wish to make is not Cageian, but instead one which concerns all works in all forms.

The analyses presented in this chapter touch on the aesthetic problems of the definition of music and the autonomy of music. Such problems relate to the *aesthetic* autonomy of art since, by a relational definition, such aesthetic autonomy cannot exist (this itself does not preclude artistic autonomy). However, despite the problems concerning artistic autonomy, for example that one must admit something to be art for it to be considered art, as explained in the work of Heil,[144] Merricks,[145] and Rancière,[146] art could be considered to have some aesthetic autonomy when one considers how it is free to create meaning, as explained by Eco.[147]

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[144] Heil (2003) pp. 183-190.

[145] Merricks (2003) pp. 186-189.

[146] Rancière (2007) pp. 17-19.

[147] Eco (1989) pp. 53-55; pp. 87-104.

The question of autonomy is important when considering the interaction of art with extramusical concerns. Often such a relationship between music and these concerns is considered in one of two ways: either music has its own, autonomous meaning (is aesthetically autonomous) and is able to comment on extramusical stimuli through autonomous creation of meaning, or music has no autonomous meaning and can make political or social comments due to being inherently social or political, although it cannot be considered in a way which does not interact with society or politics (there is no artistic autonomy). A third, less extreme case, in which artistic but not aesthetic autonomy can be assigned to music, is the one I will consider in this chapter. Aesthetic autonomy in the case of artworks would be negated by my definition of the work, and will be shown to be untenable by the definition of material I will give below. Artistic autonomy is not negated by either of these definitions, however.

Michael Kelly uses such a definition of autonomy when describing criticism of what he terms 'political art.' Kelly writes, 'the art-politics choice is false for two reasons [...] neither side of the choice can be sustained without the other [...] art and politics are mutually dependent.'[148] Kelly notes that the understanding of their own theoretical background of critics of such art was at fault since, 'modern *aesthetic theory* did not typically separate art and politics more than any modern art typically did,'[149] and finally that, 'the line between art and politics can never be eliminated without abandoning art in the process.'[150] Kelly makes it clear that the artistic autonomy of the works discussed made it possible for the relationship they had with politics to be conceived of. On accepting such a definition of autonomy, Kelly concludes that the consequence for making aesthetic judgements will be that, 'the issue will no longer be "is it art?" or "is it necessarily bad art?" but rather "as art, are its voices, strategies and ideas convincing aesthetically as well as politically?"'[151]

Kelly also addresses why in art extra-aesthetic and extra-artistic influences should be considered as part of the artwork, writing that for his case study,

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[148] Kelly, (2000) p. 223.

[149] ibid. p. 223.

[150] ibid. p. 237.

[151] ibid. p. 245.

> believing that the meaning of art must be intrinsic to the works themselves the first group of critics [at the 1993 Whitney Biennial] argued that [...] art was subservient to political messages [or that] art can be political, but [...] it can only be so through the formal conventions of art, not its content.'[152]

Eventually, Kelly notes, the critics declared 'political art is bad art' and that art which is political 'privileged the signified.'[153] For mine and Kelly's purposes it can be said that such critics' positions are in our favour: since such signifieds cannot be said to be fixed to particular signifiers, such a strong attachment to the relational aspect of art only testifies to its importance.

In addressing where the consideration that art's 'voices, strategies and ideas' are convincing aesthetically might not have occurred, I will take account of the following observation of Rancière: '[Freud] also poses the paradoxical condition of (this) hermeneutics: for the banal to revel its secret it must first be mythologized.'[154] The cases that I will examine all deal with myth in some way, that is to say that a myth or narrative has been 'written' and accepted at some point in their creation, and that a reliance on this myth is what can be supposed is needed for the creation of meaning within these works.

The thing which has become mythologized in these cases is musical material. Material itself is supposed in many of the cases I will present here to have meaning of and for itself. This is the basis on which aesthetic autonomy has also been presumed. Adorno describes how, 'the subject is made a 'slave of the material' since 'the historical subject is able to achieve agreement with the historical element of the material only in the region of the most general definitions.'[155] However, his claim for atonality was that the 'correctness' of 12-tone music is in its system and so 'this encourages the subject to liberate itself from its material.'[156] Adorno describes an historical progression of material, which is also described in commentary on Adorno in a number of ways. On this, Andy Hamilton writes, 'the historical progress of mediated musical material is,

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[152] ibid. p. 221.

[153] ibid.

[154] Rancière, *The Aesthetic Unconscious* (2009) p. 37.

[155] Adorno, (2002) p. 117.

[156] ibid. p. 118.

for Adorno, an aspect of what he calls the Dialectic of Enlightenment—the progressive domination of nature and the rationalization of all aspects of social life.'[157]

Similarly, Paddison describes such an 'inner life' of musical material in Adorno's writing when he writes, 'Adorno insists that 'material' is not simply that which is formed and shaped in the compositional process of any particular musical work, as 'raw material' *(Stoff)*; musical material itself is already historically 'pre-formed' [...] before any individual act of composition begins.'[158] Moving from a traditional to a more open definition, Paddison quotes Adorno's definition from *Aesthetic Theory,* 'Material is all that the artist is confronted by, all that he must make a decision about, and that includes forms as well, for forms too can become material,'[159] to then note that, 'from the perspective of Adorno's modernist aesthetic there is a historical tendency for 'forms' to become 'second matter' *(Stoffen zweiten Grades)*, and for art to undermine its traditional forms. Thus forms and gestures become in their turn part of the available material.'[160] Elsewhere he describes how, 'in rationalizing a tendency which Adorno considers had become an immanent-historical pressure within the material, the basic set, with all its derivatives, now becomes itself the material, functioning both pre-compositionally and at the most fundamental level of the work.'[161] Finally, about this, Dahlhaus writes, 'Adorno's concept of material is an historical category, whereas Cage's idea of material is a natural one.'[162]

This survey of the use of the term 'material' is necessary to fully describe 'material' as an historical category, rather than a neutral set of ideas. Such a definition is important and assumed in all the analyses I present in this chapter. But I do not limit this definition to that given by Adorno; I posit that it must be stretched to its logical conclusion. For me that means historicity is not limited to what could be described as pre-atonal materials, it must encompass forms, and

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[157] Hamilton (2007) p. 170.

[158] Paddison (1995) p. 149.

[159] Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* p213 quoted in Paddison (1995) p. 151.

[160] Paddison (1995) p. 152.

[161] Paddison (1995) p. 85.

[162] Carl Dahlhaus, *Schoenberg and the New Music*, p. 277 quoted in Paddison (1995) pp. 274-275.

structures (as mentioned in chapter one), it must encompass the gradually emerging single pitches in Lachenmann's solo 'cello piece *Pression*, since I acknowledge their potential as quotations, and the defintion must encompass that which is 'existentially potential' in materials such as these.[163] Hamilton quotes Adorno writing to Krenek,

> When I maintain that atonality is the only possible manner of composing today, it is not because I consider it ahistorically to be "better," a handier referential system than tonality. It is rather because I think that tonality has *collapsed*, that every tonal chord has a meaning we can no longer grasp.[164]

My assertion in this chapter is that *material* has collapsed. This is made possible when such an historical definition as given above is accepted, and I believe there is good reason to accept such a definition. The analyses I give below demonstrate this, the collapse of material, and the consequences for my own practice.

III.II Musical Examples

The following examples consider musical material in existing works where quotation is used, taking care to examine not history itself but its signifieds when considered as a material. This music demonstrates a number of ways in which history is used as a material that could be considered nostalgic.[165] This use of quotation in itself seems to be linked to a specific aim of dealing with identity and with the past, something which is becoming an increasingly important concern. However within the use of these quotations is a kind of nostalgia that is described by Svetlana Boym, that which is, 'a sense of loss not linked to personal history,'[166] and something which could be said to produce 'erroneous

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[163] A short analysis of the structure of Helmut Lachenmann, *Pression* (1969) which notes the context in which these single pitches appear can be found in Suzanne Farrin, 'Review of *Helmut Lachenmann: Streichquartette* (Arditti Quartet) Kairos CD 0012662KAI (2007) in *Search: Journal for New Music and Culture*, Issue 6 (Fall 2009) p. 2.

[164] Theodor Adorno, *Letter to Krenek* (1929) quoted in Hamilton (2007) p. 164.

[165] This investigation into quotation and nostalgia can also be found, in more detail, in Lauren Redhead, '"A Father who Presents a Constant Challenge to the Present": Nostalgia and Utopia in Quotations of the Nineteenth Century in Late Twentieth Century Music,' in *Proceedings of the 2010 Belgrade Conference, 'Between Nostalgia, Utopia, and Realities'* (Forthcoming, 2011).

[166] Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (London: Basic Books, 2001) p. 6.

representations.'[167] It is possible to consider this in the following musical examples.

The first is the quotation of Haydn in Hans Zender's *Dialog mit Haydn*. Zender says of this piece, 'Haydn becomes a short structure, free of the doubts of the twentieth century,'[168] and by this means Zender 'escapes from the dilemma of today's composition with a *salto mortale*, [neither] resuming the historically dead tradition of the avant-garde, with their involvement in our technical thinking reflecting rationalism, nor going in search of the warmth and immediacy of our art, and being sucked back into the abyss of subjectivism.'[169] Zender is 'quoting' Haydn (in the terms of Bourriaud): he allows Haydn to speak for him. The dialectic here is present in his assessment of the 'dilemma of today's composition,' and results in a supposed synthesis which *is* Haydn, rather than a reading of the composer or his tradition. It is possible to argue, therefore, that this work merely re-presents Haydn without re-contextualising or re-assessing the music. In making this explicit (and also in his 'discussion' through the course of the music) Zender negates his reading of Haydn; Haydn simply cannot be the synthesis of his dilemma: the nineteenth-century notion of progress forbids it. So, through the use of quotation, Zender fails to address either Haydn or the twentieth century: in studious avoidance of the theoretical concerns of the avant-garde he also presents Haydn as a composer for whom philosophical and theoretical considerations were not an issue or an influence.

In this case Zender's Hegelian synthesis *is* nostalgia. In fact, synthesis between Zender's original and Haydn's quoted music does not occur; in particular this is because the constructed binary opposite between Zender and Haydn not to be as opposite as it seems Zender has assumed it to be, first rendering such dialectical synthesis impossible (if it indeed were possible in the first place), and in his explicit statement elevating the importance of what could be formulated as

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[167] ibid, p. 6.

[168] Hans Zender, 'Notes to *Dialog mit Haydn*', at *Boosey and Hawkes Composer Homepage*, <http://www.boosey.com/pages/cr/catalogue/cat_detail.asp?site-lang=de&musicid=1006&langid=2> [14-10-08] (my translation).

[169] ibid.

a nineteenth century concern over the concerns of the present.[170] This is the point at which one can say nostalgia is present in the piece. In his reading of, and desire for, synthesis, Zender shows desire for, longing for, or *nostos* for musical integration and as such for an imagined time when this was always possible. Haydn is therefore the symbol of his nostalgia, which functions as described by Rousseau: '[m]usic does not act precisely as music but as a memorative sign.'[171]

Second, Hans Thomalla's *momentsmusicaux* for small chamber ensemble[172] addresses the Brahms Clarinet Quintet, speeding up and slowing down the quotation, and musically examining its function in each case. This is contrasted with Thomalla's description of musical unity. Thomalla describes the Brahms quotation he uses in the piece as a, 'synonym of an historic endpoint of a music that articulates "unity."'[173] Elsewhere Thomalla mentions that it is not only possible but essential to deconstruct the musical tradition of the past, and that quotation is the method through which this can be done.[174]

Thomalla is quoting Brahms, and allows Brahms himself to speak. Thomalla's claims for the work fall down here in his lack of control over what it is that Brahms says or may say in his piece: this music has its roots in nineteenth century programme music; without Thomalla's explanation the likelihood of our coming to the same conclusions as he does in his notes to the score is slim and the purpose of the piece undermined. In his reading of Brahms, Thomalla reveals his nostalgia for musical unity, for a time when music appeared to be 'held together'[175] symbolised for him by this quotation.

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[170] cf. footnote 81. Haydn and his construction by Zender might both be said to belong to the 'long nineteenth century' as referred to be the tern 'nineteenth century' in this thesis. Robert Hull (footnote 125) also describes how this construction of Haydn belongs specifically to the nineteenth century.

[171] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Dictionary of Music*, trans. by W. Waring and J. French (London, 1779) p. 267 quoted in Boym, p. 4.

[172] Hans Thomalla, *momentsmusicaux*, score received from the composer [unpublished].

[173] Hans Thomalla, 'Notes to *momentsmusicaux*' at *Hans Thomalla, Personal Website*, http://www.hans-thomalla.com/id27.html> [14-10-08]. These can also be found in the front of the score to *momentsmusicaux*.

[174] Hans Thomalla, 'Proposal for Fremd,' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Stanford Univeristy, 2006).

[175] By tonality. This itself is the fundamental organisational principle underlying Brahms's 'developing variations' technique, and hence the selection of the quotation from Brahms is here particularly important.

The final example is of the scene towards the end of Wolfgang Rihm's chamber opera *Jakob Lenz* marked 'Ein Art Traumbild' (like an image from a dream).[176] In this scene, the listeners or audience, and the children in the opera, observe Lenz' deterioration, and Schumann's music tells us how this could have happened.[177] Of this scene, Alastair Williams writes 'Rihm is in the process of re-evaluating a tradition that can no longer take its cultural pre-eminence for granted',[178] but later that Rihm 'casts the European canon in the ghostly role of a father who presents a constant challenge to the present',[179] and this is the important point. Rihm makes little attempt to re-contextualise this work, in fact he relies both on the context and culture of quotation of the nineteenth century, and a biographical knowledge of Schumann coupled with the need to recognise the quotation, for the success of his music due to 'correct' interpretation by his listeners, and he relies on their musical knowledge to interpret the quotations. In short, if the listeners do not accept the nineteenth century as a cultural ideal, they don't 'get it.'

Rihm is a more complicated case in which to pinpoint the source of nostalgia. There are certainly elements of nostalgia for musical integration and musical unity but also in Rihm's author-centred critique a nostalgia for a certain image of the composer and his authority;[180] a nostalgia for a time when the composer was revered in his decisions rather than critiqued and, as for Zender, was not asked to justify his theoretical concerns as well as his musical ones.

In the revelation of this nostalgia in these examples, one can see a link with Rancière's description of one of the problems with a modernist approach to art. He writes,

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[176] Wolfgang Rihm, *Jakob Lenz: Kammeroper*, libretto frei nach G Büchners "Lenz" von Michael Fröhling (Universal Edition, 18066, 1978) p. 81.

[177] This is further emphasised by Rihm's revisiting of the quotation in *BILD 10*, where Lenz mimics the children in their re-iteration of the quotation.

[178] Williams (2006) p. 379.

[179] ibid. p. 381.

[180] For further evidence of this see a recent newspaper interview: Tom Service, 'Wolfgang Rihm: the musical omnivore' in The Guardian, 04.03.2010 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2010/mar/04/wolfgang-rihm-interview> [01.07.2010]. Of particular interest are Rihm's comments relating to nature and problems relating to creativity.

> notions of modernity and the avant-garde [...] actually confuse two very different things: the historicity specific to a regime of the arts in general and the decisions to break with the past and anticipate the future that take place within this regime. The notion of aesthetic modernity conceals—without conceptualizing it in the least—the singularity of a particular regime of the arts, that is to say a specific type of connection between ways of producing works of art or developing practices, forms of visibility that disclose them, and ways of conceptualizing the former and the latter.[181]

This neatly describes the problems arising from the situation outlined above: the singularity of the aesthetic regime of art to which these works belong is never questioned, and it is precisely from the acceptance of this singularity that the rest of the music arises.

I have attempted to avoid this singularity of approach in my music, not through a variety of genres or what could be described as postmodern pluralism, but through writing into the works of a questioning of the modes of intelligibility which might be supposed in their reception. As with the examples given above, this can be examined in particular with respect to quotation. A survey of these quotations highlights what is and can be considered as a musical material within this music, and how such a relationship with these quotations affects the readings of this music with respect to a particular historic and aesthetic regime of art, that is to say, musical modernism.

History is considered as a material in the music presented particularly through quotations in the following pieces: the quotation of settings of the *tantum ergo* in the piece *in the back there was a pigeon (c)*; quotation of a Bach chorale setting in the piece *love speed and thrills*; the quotation of John Dowland's *Lacrimae* in some sections of *green angel*; the quotation of a piece at one point attributed to Purcell in *the enigma machine 4: the historicity of cartography*; the quotation of Bach's and Buxtehude's settings of *Wachet auf* in *the enigma machine 5: de nostra re*. All of these quotations could be described as 'implicit' quotations: they form the basis of that in which they appear, but they do not appeal to aural modes of intelligibility which would mark them out as specifically belonging to another time, history, or author. In the case the imagining of *nostos* as part of a collective memory linked

[181] Rancière (2006) p. 20.

to quotation is undermined. As a listener it may be possible to hold onto something half-remembered, or to piece the quotation back together from the point of being made aware of its existence, but at no point do these quotations invite a reading of a specific meaning; they hold the non-hierarchical meaning that Adorno supposes the twelve-tone row holds.

The definition of implicit meaning in these cases could be extended to include many other musical elements within these works. The content of the projection in the piece *love speed and thrills* could be considered a quotation from the longer film from which it was drawn, the final phrases of the tape part of the same piece could be considered a quotation of a half-remembered experience of opera. The structure of the piece *in the back there was a pigeon (c)* could be considered a quotation drawn from numerous liturgical, ritualistic, or call-and-response situations. The opera *green angel* draws on 'quotation' of numerous aspects of opera and Noh theatre. Musical instruments themselves, the chamber music situation, and the concert hall could all be considered 'quoted' when they stray into the material, or perceptual experience, of the piece, as in the cases of *as a name i am a myth* and *the empiricist view*. In each case, referring to Bourriaud's categories, I use or inhabit the quotations rather than merely quoting from the works themselves. This, then, reveals that what is at issue is the question of whether musical modernism is flexible enough to accept a true definition of material: returning to Rancière's assessment given above, the singularity of modernism can be said to exclude all interpretations which do not fit within its narrative.

Therefore the above investigation into material also informs and supports my anti-modernist position. Having accepted the historicity of material, which is evident in such case studies and also in a philosophical investigation into the nature of material itself, I can say that there is no possible teleological progression of musical material. This can be said to be true since music which supposedly constitutes the nearer end of this progression can be shown not to be progressive at all. The modernist position is based on a definition of material which itself based on a post-Hegelian and nineteenth-century ideology which looks forward to the achievement of the conclusion of a teleological progression

of material. Arthur Danto describes this conclusion as, 'the end of art,'[182] the important thing about his interpretation being that such a construction means that art was indeed over before it began.

Often a link can be made within music between the idea of an avant-garde and modernism. The terms can be used interchangeably, not to refer to their literal meanings but to refer to what could be conceived of as an almost self-styled group of composers who place themselves and their tradition at the forefront of the teleological progression of material mentioned above. For the purposes of this chapter I shall refer, *sous rature*, to the ideology of this group as 'modernism' and their collective identity as 'the avant-garde.' It must be said that this is not a qualitative judgement of the music produced by these composers.

Addressing the idea of an historical or literal avant-garde, Eco writes, 'the avant-garde is a trick of history meant to hasten the 'death of art' or, rather, art's transition from the cultural function it fulfilled in the past to a completely different one.'[183] Addressing a different group from that of the composers to which I refer, but in a way relevant to this investigation, Peter Bürger writes,

> [d]uring the time of the historical avant-garde movements, the attempt to do away with the distance between art and life still had all the pathos of historical progressiveness on its side. But in the meantime, the culture industry has brought about the false elimination of the distance between art and life, and this allows one to recognise the contradictoriness of the avant-garde undertaking.[184]

Both of these quotations highlight that the modernist undertaking involves a removal from everyday life on the behalf of the composer or artist. The value of progression is assumed as primary and unquestioned, whilst the reality of such progression is not to be investigated. The signifier of the value of progression for this group is 'material.'

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[182] Arthur C. Danto, *After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of History* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997) and Arthur Danto, 'The End of Art,' in *The Death of Art*, ed. by Berel Lang (New York: Haven Publishers, 1984) pp. 5-35.

[183] Eco (1989) p. 171.

[184] Bürger, p. 49.

Žižek sums up such a relationship with material when he writes,

> in our "post-ideological" era, ideology functions more and more in a fetishistic mode as opposed to the traditional symptomal mode. In the latter mode, the ideological lie which structures our perception of reality is threatened by symptoms *qua* "returns of the repressed"—cracks in the fabric of the ideological lie—while the fetish is effectively a kind of *envers* of the symptom. That is to say, the symptom is the exception which disturbs the surface of the false appearance, the point at which the repressed Other Scene erupts, while the fetish is the embodiment of the Lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable truth.[185]

Here, it is noted that such a tie to material and progression can continue even in the face of the evidence of its fallacy.

The attitude to material mentioned can be seen to be all-encompassing within the language and discourse of modernism. Rancière writes that, 'the notion of the avant-garde defines the type of subject suitable to the modernist vision and appropriate, according to this vision, for connecting the aesthetic to the political.'[186] In other words, this ideonymic group defines the acceptable materials, modes of engagement, and even definitions and aims of art, meaning that art itself becomes encompassed by the definition of modernism. This is an excellent ground for the perpetuation of learned behaviours and meanings. The persistence of modernism in the face of artistic experience which seems to counter it is the point on which I will make the majority of my critiques below. Of this, Robert Hill writes,

> the dark side of modernism becomes increasingly apparent only as its unfulfilled dreams assume gloomy proportions in our picture of the experience of our own century, as we witness the alienation of man from himself, his environment, his fellow man,[187]

and more specifically Rancière adds that,

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[185] Slavoj Žižek, *First as Tragedy, Then as Farce* (London: Verso, 2009) p. 65.

[186] Rancière (2006), p. 29.

[187] Hull, p. 37.

> modernism is a conception of art which holds onto the aesthetic identification of art but refuses to accept the forms of identification in which it is carried out; it wants to hold onto art's autonomy but refuses to accept the heteronomy that is art's other name [...] A "specificity of art" is thereby defined which each art allegedly realises by its own specific means, means that are fully distinct from those of its neighbouring art. By the same token, it is claimed, this also substantiates the global distinction between art and non-art.[188]

My music and the successful examples given below could almost all be labelled as non-art in a modernist sense.

In order to perpetuate the myth of modernism it is necessary for its proponents to sell the myth of their destination as the avant-garde. This myth is what legitimates what is suitable for inclusion and exclusion. Christopher Fox makes some attempt to dispel the idea that this narrative is arbitrary with respect to the music it encompasses: he notes that with regard to the 'Darmstadt Myth,' 'people at its centre have played an active part in its development,'[189] but his analysis of this does not uphold his claim that '[today's works of modernism] liberate us from nostalgia,'[190] and his analysis of anti-modernist positions deliberately avoids intellectual engagement with them. Such a reassessment of narrative fails because of the acceptance of the narrative by the author who is reassessing it. Underpinning this is the belief that *some kind of narrative* must explain musical development, even if the one on offer is not perfect. And underpinning this belief is the idea that musical development is itself a given and not an intrinsic part of the narrative at stake.

In my rejection of this position, and in the analyses offered below, I accept three statements which have already been defined: material itself is historical; works cannot have meaning in themselves; authority does not come from works or authors. These three statements will allow me to reject the influence of such narratives in my assessments, and in my own music. It also seems that music which considers itself modernist cannot consider history to be a material due to its inability to accept these three statements. As I have begun to describe,

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[188] Rancière, *Aesthetics and its Discontents* (2009), pp. 68-69.

[189] Christopher Fox, 'Darmstadt and the institutionalisation of Modernism', *Contemporary Music Review*, vol.26, no.1 (01 February 2007) p. 115.

[190] Fox, p. 122.

musical material is the vehicle through which the myth of modernity is reified. In this respect many things are 'up for grabs' as a material: form, space, and time, as well as the traditional pitch, rhythm, and gesture which belong to musical thinking pre-Schoenberg. History, as the total number of events and documents which make up the narrative alluded to by (in this case) modernism, however, is not considered an acceptable material and the reason for this lies in the avant-garde myth: the illusion of history is what is perpetuated and performed in the works which rely on this myth for their reception. To consider it a material would be to consider the possibility of an avant-garde which existed outside of the myth itself. This is the point at which a point of modern-postmodern tension can be situated: there is an increasing trend for works which belong to the Darmstadt and avant-garde myths to quote from the tradition that legitimises them. This seems, by Jonathan Kramer's definition,[191] to make such works postmodern, but, as discussed earlier, rather than making the past present, such works render their present musical details firmly in the past. The definition of material which they accept necessitates this.

Such an analysis and criticism of the narrative and myth of modernism can be found in existing musics. For example the music of Kagel addresses this question, most significantly in the film *Ludwig Van* (1970). The use of quotation in the film *Ludwig Van* can be read to gain insight into Kagel's perspective, into Beethoven, into the state of music itself, and into culture and society. In terms of understanding Kagel's insight, his point of view about commodification and the treatment of music is made very clear. Possibly the most obvious and yet most compelling representation of this is the distortion of the image of Beehoven's house. Björn Heile notes that the film *Ludwig Van* had 'unsettling relations both to Beethoven and its own time'[192] and claims that 'just as Beethoven had been made safe by commodification, so the avant-garde had been made safe by being contained in its niche.'[193] This is in fact a point of Kagel's own as he told Max Nyffeler in an interview: Beethoven's works, 'had been transformed into the bastions of the cultural establishment by people who had built up vast industries

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[191] Johnathan D. Kramer,'The Nature and Origins of Musical Postmodernism,' in *Postmodern Music, Postmodern Thought*, ed. by Judy Lochhead and Joseph Auster (London: Routledge, 2002) pp. 13-26.

[192] Bjoern Heile, *The Music of Mauricio Kagel* (London: Ashgate, 2006) p. 109.

[193] ibid.

of mass-produced trivia around [his] work.'[194] This tells me that Kagel sees the lasting aural impression of music as one of a number of connected signifiers within a piece (including the visual even in non-visual media for example a concert score) rather than as something with an inherent meaning and function of its own. With regard to Beethoven the film explains that contemporary listeners do not know what Beethoven sounds like, particularly through the images which bring to mind Beethoven's deafness at the end of his life. Kagel highlights this point in the instructions for the film, '[h]is music should sound as he could hear it in 1826. Awful throughout.'[195] So the viewer of the film is metaphorically placed in Beethoven's position with respect to the music. Beethoven is also presented as a cultural object rather than as an individual or a composer, and his image, visual or aural, as a signifier with no meaning in itself.

Music itself, as a result of these conclusions and the atmosphere and images which make up the film, is shown as indefinable and transient; a cultural commodity which is perhaps worthless or unnecessary to those who peddle it. Culture is treated as something of which music is one signifier within society. It has no meaning or value as an end in itself and no real definition. It is saleable. There is no direct engagement with the (notes of the) music as it is only important in its signified. Society is presented as a collective consciousness, susceptible to advertising and unable to discern between signifiers without instruction. Kagel's film shows that he can signify Beethoven through aural or visual signifiers, and this is the strongest argument of the whole work: the distortion of Beethoven presumed in the change that has allowed a visual object to be an equally compelling signifier for Beethoven is equally as present in the experience of his music. The film *Ludwig Van* makes the point that in every situation (the concert hall, as a film soundtrack, in cultural and daily life) Beethoven exists only as a signified.

A further example of an anti-modernist position in existing music can be found in the music of Chris Newman. This music can very much be said to perform the material and tradition of the avant-garde whilst concurrently having been

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[194] John Warnaby, 'Bach according to Kagel: 'St Bach Passion'' *Tempo*, New Series, no.156 (March 1986) p. 38.

[195] '[s]eine Musik wird so klingen, wie Er sie 1826 noch hoeren konnte. Durchwegs schlecht.' Mauricio Kagel, 'Excepts from the Instructions for the Film *Ludwig Van,*' in Sleeve Notes to *Ludwig Van: A Report by Mauricio Kagel* (Harmonia Mundi, 2008).

allowed no part in their narrative. An example of Newman's music pertinent to this discussion is the piece *the reason why I cannot live as a composer in my country is a political one* (solo piano, 1984). Although similar conclusions could be drawn from most of Newman's œuvre, this example raises a number of interesting points.

One does not have to look far for the historicity present in the material of Newman's works. Use of material is the first, and most obvious, place this manifests itself in a myriad of recognisable and unrecognisable quotations. *the reason why* opens with a semi-explicit quotation from Sibelius' Symphony no. 5: the quotation is distorted by the removal of its original tonality but is still recognisable in its shape and form. Of this Newman says, '[it is] the familiar thing [...] I wanted to take something and stretch it as far as I could [...] and stretch the stretchings.'[196] This presents an insight into his view of material: there is nothing special about the quotation, only about the result. Newman describes a compositional process which is inherently constructionist (and therefore modernist) but denies the historicity of the material from the outset. He says of material, 'I don't initially think about music as music, but potentially anything, and the musical material is rock-bottom, grade A1 shit [...] these thoughts get concretised into pieces or paintings or whathaveyou. [sic]'[197] However, despite the arbitrariness he claims for his material, it is necessary to reconcile with this the fact that Newman did choose to quote from Sibelius, and it is recognisable. What is the significance of Sibelius in this context? I am inclined to claim that it is exactly the recognisability of the quotation that legitimises its selection. The listener must hold onto something and it is made clear that this is our 'way into' the music from the outset. As a 'way in' Sibelius' significance in history is eroded, to be replaced with only a significance in the mind of the listener. His authority, and therefore his place in the canon is eroded. The significance of the canon is eroded. History becomes a material. The criticism of arrogance which could be levelled against Newman in this act is also negated in the quotations from his song cycle *New Songs of Social Conscience* (voice and piano, 1990) in the piece *song to god* (solo organ, 1994). Permitting such a function to quotation of Sibelius means it must be equally ascribed to Newman's self quotation. There are of course a number of differences: not all listeners may be familiar with Newman's earlier work; even when familiar

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[196] Chris Newman, communication with the author, dated April 2009.

[197] ibid.

listeners might not be so eager to consider Newman's newer work in opposition to his earlier work, the arbitrariness ascribed to Sibelius cannot be equally given to a quotation of music written by Newman when one would imagine a degree of intentionality when he wrote it. However, even when considered in the context of these concerns, in the light of his other uses of quotation, this case also points to Newman's recognition of the historicity present in his own work only four years after its composition. If past music is subsumed into an historical tradition that legitimates the present, Newman's work has become 'up for grabs' as a material equally steeped in historicity as Sibelius'.

In Newman's use of quotation the historical tradition of which the avant-garde sees itself as a descendant is very much 'up for grabs' as a material. The sacredness of history preserved in the avant-garde narrative is violated from the outset. And yet Newman offers music which is in many ways suitable for, presentable in, and accepted into the concert hall: the very church of such a history. It deals directly with the instruments through which such a history is mediated: the pianist as virtuoso, the composer as authority. The very presentation of the music allows it to make this a 'performative' critique. The use of quotation externalises the modes of engagement needed to make such a comment: the listener can be picked up and swept along by what Newman calls 'something familiar,' unwittingly complicit in the degradation of history from an historical narrative to a material. This action can be described as self-alienating, on the behalf of the composer himself and others.

In fact, Newman turns his musical author-critique, a practice-led performance of what Barthes and Foucault have put into writing, into a geographical situation. Newman's oft-mentioned exile from the UK, alluded to in the title of *the reason why*, is in fact a self-imposed exile. His residency outside of his home country of course has political overtones relating to the way music is valued and funded but geographically represents the distance of the author from the reception of his music once history and the canon as written into the narrative of the avant-garde are dispensed with. And yet Newman's music performs the material of the avant garde. On many levels it continues to perpetuate the same material: the historicity of tradition and the canon, the need to draw upon this, the positioning of oneself at the end of a chain of 'great' composers, the social etiquette of performance situations; these things are enduring in his work. But one is left with the impression that all is not well. Where is the tradition of the

pianist in a piece which doggedly maintains a strict tempo whilst interrupting each phrase before it reaches its 'climax'? Aside from the treatment of material and history, the modes of engagement through which these are frequently presented become at issue.

III.III Against a Modernist View of Material

Such a use of quotation as in the examples of Kagel and Newman could be described as examples of what Guy Debord calls 'détournement.' In the case of a work which 'détournes' another, Debord writes that, 'any sign or word is susceptible to being converted into something else, even into its opposite.'[198] There is no other way that this might occur than through the infinite interplay of signifiers. Structuralist depth, therefore, cannot be present in the work. Debord directly addresses the issue of the relationship of a belief in such depth with society when he writes, 'Structuralism does not prove the transhistorical validity of the society of the spectacle; on the contrary, it is the society of the spectacle, imposing itself in its overwhelming reality, that validates the frigid dream of structuralism.'[199] Such structuralist depth implies a belief in the ownership and authorship of ideas; an ideology which accepts this will also be strongly in favour of copyright and ownership, even despite the use of quotation in musical works.

This anti-modernist position is evident in my own music through the adoption of the practices of quotation of Kagel and Newman. As already noted, form itself might be considered a material, and therefore also possible to consider as a 'quotation.' Form is treated in the same way as the quotations in the examples form Kagel and Newman—broken down and distorted before being re-presented. In the cases of *the enigma machine 1: hendecaptych of has memling*, *the enigma machine 2a: properties and essence* and *the enigma machine 2b: [no subtitle]* the material has been given a form in its conception which, in an historical manner, has considered categories of sounds and the development of certain aspects of the music as groups to be heard together, but these groups have been split apart. The possibility of their reassembling, of course, belongs to the score, but their

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[198] Guy Debord and Gil J Wolman, 'A Users Guide to Détournement,' (1956) in *The Bureau of Public Secrets* (Berkeley, California: [n.pub] [n.d.]) <http://www.bopsecrets.org/SI/detourn.htm> [14.01.2010].

[199] Debord (1983) p. 111.

joint identity when assembled does not belong to the music. In contrast, *the enigma machine 4: the historicity of cartography* appears to offer a form to the material that allows it to develop over the three sections, but in reality the material is only repeated without any development taking place at all. In each of these cases the form of 'developing variations' functions as a quotation, and in each of these cases the expectation and illusion of development is signified without its being manifest in the musical outcome.

Highlighted here are relational aesthetic questions about history posed by the use of quotation. These questions are those such as: is history present in this music? Does history exist at all? What is the relationship of history with borrowed material? How does our relationship to borrowed material change in its performance? What is (the nature of) quotation? All of these are complex questions but can be reduced to the single question: what does this piece tell me about its relationship to other pieces, and to the wider world? Through quotation, there are many comments which can be made but it is first important to stress that these comments themselves are not neutral. Kendall Walton notes that in any quotation, '[t]he difference between the quoted character's relation to the text and that of the quoting character is significant: it is likely to be fictional in our games that we read or hear the speech of the latter but not the speech of the former,'[200] or more simply that any quotation tells the reader as much about the quoter as about the relationship with the quotation. In terms of an analysis of works which could be described as part of a musical canon, the question of the authority of this canon must also be read as something which contributes to the writing of the quotation—particularly in cases where the recognisability of the quotation can be seen as a requirement. Of such a canon, Weber writes, 'a performed canon [...] sprang from the bestowal of intellectual authority upon them, and that brought the musical values and social expectations directly to bear upon performance of the music.'[201] And of all of these historical influences it may be said that they are all possibly present for some listeners, some of the time. In the following assements I will not assume all possible reading to be equally present and risk the problem described by Eco when he writes, 'some

[200] Walton, pp. 355-356.

[201] Weber, p. 490.

interpretations of *Finnegan's Wake* risk being more interesting, informative and entertaining than the work itself.'[202]

In this respect, I do not consider any analysis I offer to be a description of the exact perceptual experience of every listener at every performance of the piece. However, any analysis of the approach to history in existing works must consider all possibilities and the possibilities of other possibilities as yet unconsidered, the aim being not to present an analysis which is more interesting than the works themselves but to attempt to consider the works within a frame of their total possible effect and not simply how they are constructed for me alone. And, therefore, just as I consider these with regards to other musical examples, I must consider the role of history in my own music and the role of my own music in history. Both of these are cases of looking at material: at what I consider to be a material and at how I consider my own works to be artistically autonomous and thus legitimate materials in themselves.

It is necessary, therefore, to look for examples of a use of material where it can be said that the composers have circumnavigated the problems caused by a modernist approach to history, the canon, and the avant-garde. It is also necessary to outline how the works I have presented attempt to do the same. In the case of existing works, one often finds that works which have been successful in this respect are considered to be at the fringe of mainstream contemporary music, or indeed are not considered at all. However, successful, or positive, examples of the use of history as a material, exist in relatively recent music. Like Bourriaud, I find that it is at the forefront of contemporary practice that work can be found which exhibits where theory is lacking, and also highlights what the solution to understanding the problems of art should be. These examples, in a way which might be considered on one hand interesting and on the other entirely predictable, whilst described as being at the 'forefront of contemporary practice' by myself are excluded from such a definition by their exclusion from the mainstream of contemporary performance. In many ways they exhibit the anti-modernist sentiments I espouse in this chapter, something which precludes their inclusion into a canon of such works (although I have noted that for some composers, like Kagel, this has been possible. Often this is possible when an

[202] Eco (1989) p. 171.

'explanation' of their music can be focussed on the otherness of the composers themselves).

Two such examples can be found in the music of Johannes Kreidler and David Helbich. In contrast to the historical examples presented so far, quotation in these pieces is considered as a genuine material, in precisely the sense that I have described that it should be considered. Quotation, and its logical extensions, are not given any real historical relevance, significance, or meaning in these works.

If the construction of the musical canon can be said to illustrate a belief in myth, and the acceptance of the white, male, European, narrative hidden within the notion of musical progress, such a canon must be demonstrated in repeat performances, must be considered as real in order to be financially viable, and the importance of this must be stressed at all points which could be considered performative in order to sell scholarship, as well as music, and to underpin the idea that some music must always be *learned*. The music of Kreidler and Helbich is successful because it addresses the second and third points mentioned as well as the first: it refuses to conform to modes of commercial viability, or to accede to scholarship. In this way, it can also be said that this music is free from nostalgia, and so constructs the present rather than the past in its use of material.

Johannes Kreidler's music constructs the present in a number of ways. The first of these is the use of media. As demonstrated in the book *Musik, Ästhetik, Digitalisierung*[203] this can be used as a very shallow refutation of this music. However, technology in Kreidler's music is not used to inject a feeling of the 'new' in terms of sound or material but to access audiences and issues which are alien to the concert hall. These concerns fall outside the interests of musical modernism, which often makes claims to socialism or to belonging to those outside the annals of power, but which is situated firmly within the concert hall. The piece *Fremdarbeit* (2009) makes use of advances in technology to extend the sonic possibilities of the work not in the creation of the sounds themselves but to outsource its composition using the possibilities of the internet to make contact and commercial exchange with the composers enlisted to write the music. The very nature of material is at issue here: for Kreidler the process of

[203] Lehmann, Kreidler and Mahnkopf (2010).

composition has taken place in the commercial exchange, within the presentation of the whole project, and in the possibility of discussion which arises from it; the traditional modernist conception of material encompasses only that which Kreidler has purchased causing many of the objections to the work.

The second facet of Kreidler's music is his use of quotation. He maintains a relationship with the musical canon which is irreverent, but also supplements this with a relationship with popular music, non-mainstream historical musics, and indeed anything which is accessible to him at the time of his compositions. His opinions of such popular musics, which he describes as, 'anonymous common pop music [...] easy to understand as the kind of music that is produced like fast food,'[204] and also arguably therefore his opinion of repeated performances of classical musics, prevent him from taking copyright law seriously and means that his music becomes about the nature of creativity, and does not accept the myth that the musical work and the composer are, or should be, inherently creative. This attitude reaches its extreme in the piece *Product Placements* (2008) which presents 70200 'quotations' of both aural and visual stimuli in 33 seconds. This, combined with Kreidler's assertion that the delivery of the consequent 70200 forms to the *GEMA* is 'music theatre'[205] sends a clear message about his beliefs about copyright and succeeds in describing copyright itself as performative.

Finally, Kreidler's music engages with the experience of the audience as part of the work via its inclusion of press conferences, documentary, and other modes in which the audience are directly engaged, as *part* of the work. This tackles the notion of the composers' desire for engagement by audiences by presenting them with multiple means of possible engagement, and by legitimising all responses to the work by particularly inviting those which do not agree with the composers' position.

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[204] Johannes Kreidler, communication with the author dated 01.10.2008.

[205] Johannes Kreidler, *Johannes Kreidler GEMA-Aktion product placements doku*, uploaded to *YouTube.com* by mirko124 on 27.02.2009 < Harry Lehmann, Johannes Kreidler and Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf, Musik—Äesthetik—Digitalisierung. Eine Kontroverse (Hofheim: Wolke Verlag, 2010).> [05.04.2011].

Similarly, the music of David Helbich addresses the same set of problems, albeit in slightly different ways. The first of these is through social situations: for Helbich, music becomes a non-concert hall activity and the myth that the concert hall can only be engaged with from within in shattered when the discourse becomes about experience. As part of this, Helbich's music draws on his audiences' real experiences. The piece *Hallo 5* (2002) for air guitar appeals to a cultural consciousness that could not have existed for composers before the 1950s and thus resisted being written into the musical modernist project by way of the time of its creation. And yet the legitimacy of such a material is no less so than that of the serialist row: they can be found to be equals in their seriousness as in their arbitrariness. This is an important point: the lack of seriousness is something which can be said to exclude Helbich from musical modernism at all. It is, in fact, on this very point that Helmut Lachenmann denounces Hans Werner Henze.[206]

The major difference between the works of David Helbich and Johannes Kreidler is that Helbich's music does not explicitly quote from the classical musical past, considered by some to be a postmodern necessity. Instead, Helbich shakes off all allusions to the classical tradition in this respect and borrows from popular culture. A piece such as *Shootout* (2009) is understandable to a non-new musically educated audience—something which has dangerous consequences for modernists who also need to make sure their audience understand *why* the canon is important as well as that they accept it. Such works as Helbich's, which negate its need at all, undermine such a concern.

In the case of my own works, I seek to avoid the problems of history, the canon, and the avant-garde by presenting their materiality on the surface. This is essentially poststructuralist: my lack of belief in even the possibility of depth in these or any works compels me to present this materiality in a way which might be more traditionally described as 'at the surface' so that the argument can be made that this surface and that which constitutes the work are one and the same.

For example, the piece *the enigma machine 3: archipelago* takes its title from Nicholas Bourriaud's assessment of the concept of the 'altermodern' which he

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[206] Helmut Lachenmann and Jeffrey Stadelamn, 'Open Letter to Hans Werner Henze,' *Perspectives of New Music*, vol. 35, no.2 (Summer 1997) pp. 189-200; pp. 193-194 are of particular interest.

demonstrates through practice by way of an exhibition. In the inspiration for this title can be found also a description of the status of the signifier in the musical artwork.[207] Such a relationship is highlighted in the material of the piece which is all very much at the surface: this material consists of the materials of the music boxes, including their machinery, the cards, and the means by which the sound is produced including punching the holes; the single line melody which might be describes as the goal of each performer separately; and the relationships between the two of these which form the aural reality of the piece in performance. The piece fits exactly Bourriaud's description of the archipelago, and is constituted by nothing more than that which is on the surface.

In *Relational Aesthetics* Bourriaud also describes a further example of material which is on the surface, but has the opposite effect to that in the piece mentioned above. He writes, 'the spread of "curiosity cabinets" [...] attests to the absolute loathing of the public place and shared aesthetic experimentation, in favour of boudoirs earmarked for experts.'[208] This image resonates particularly with visual artworks by Damien Hirst such as *Isolated Elements Swimming in the Same Direction for the Purposes of Understanding* and *Pharmacy*.[209] The function of these sculptures: to elevate the consideration of the mundane; to present a new, sometimes 3-dimensional, look at that which they present; to give a new, albeit eerie, life to their contents, cannot be said to be the case in musical artworks which 'preserve' a number of different quotations in similar ways. Works such as those mentioned in this chapter, which continue to signify the canon and its related myths 'preserve' a logical fallacy whilst being completely unaware of it. And thus they 'preserve' the problem with a modernist approach to quotation: the 'quoted' source overwhelms the mode in which it is presented begging the question of such quotations: 'is it art because it's pickled, or is it pickled because it's art?'

Bourriaud has also noted that there is a question relating to the usage of such quotations for their cultural capital. He writes,

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[207] As highlighted by Bourraiud (2009) pp. 1-2, quoted in full in this document, footnote 120.

[208] Bourriaud (1996) p. 58.

[209] These works comprise a number of different fish suspended in formaldehyde, and a number of shelving cabinets filled with containers, respectively.

> once introduced into the exchange circuit, any kind of production takes on a social form which no longer has anything to do with its original usefulness [...] it is devoted, right away, to the world of exchange and communication, the world of "commerce," in both meanings of the term.[210]

The uses of historical quotation that have arisen in this chapter resonate with this idea. Such a notion has parallels with Kagel's description of Beethoven as 'mis-braucht'[211] in the film *Ludwig Van*. The commercial value of the quoted music, albeit a cultural one, has overwhelmed its signification within the works which quote it. This can also be noted to be the exact function of quotation upon which Johannes Kreidler plays in his works.

Finally, Debord argues that, '[Duchamp's] drawing of a mustache on the Mona Lisa is no more interesting than the original version of that painting. We must now push this process to the point of negating the negation.'[212] Thus as a final comment it can be said that the repeated acts of quotation which can be found in the modernist tradition, along with the assertion that they are subversive, have had the same effect: that which they signify is no longer negated, a quotation itself can no longer stand for an act of subversion of the canon, particularly one its author would seek to be a part of.

Such a positive reading is possible of all of the acts of quotation in my own works which have been described in this chapter. I believe it is also possible of the aspects of the music which could be described as 'non-quoted.' In these aspects, such as the instrumental writing in the piece *as a name i am a myth* and in all sections barring section four of *the empiricist view*, where the material itself cannot be described as quoted it makes allusions to traditions without ever accepting them. *as a name i am a myth* presents a survey of methods of pitch organisation without committing to any one. *the empiricist view* opens with a gestural language familiar to the modernist convention of the concert hall, only to move through a number of other different allusions: from an ensemble texture, to the character of music which might accompany an imagined silent

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[210] ibid. p. 42.

[211] cf. the TV studio scene in Mauricio Kagel, *Ludwig Van* (1970).

[212] Guy-Ernest Debord, 'Methods of Détournement,' in *Les Lèvres Nues* (May, 1956) in *The Library of Nothingness* ([n.p]: Situaltionalist International, [n.d.]) <http://library.nothingness.org/articles/SI/en/display/3> [20.01.2011].

film, to a series of mistimed unisons and homophonies. The refusal, in each of these works, to commit to a single style or category of material values them all equally highly (or lowly). Such an attitude to material values it only for its relational qualities, not for its potential for signification.

The conclusions that can be made from the case studies offered here point to towards an assessment of artworks which focusses on their relationship with society, their audience, and the modes of engagement which are the arbiters of their value, but not with an imagined history which gives them authority. On this point, Bourriaud has written, 'if today we are able to envisage a form of modernism this is only possible starting from the issues of the present, and assuredly not by an obsessive return to the past, whatever its attributes,[213] and elsewhere that, 'it is not modernity that is dead, but its idealistic and teleological vision.'[214] The case studies also agree with Bourriaud's observation that 'too often, people are happy drawing up an inventory of yesterday's concerns, the better to lament the fact of not getting any answers.'[215]

This problem can be described as a problem of philosophy as well as a problem of art. Nicholas Wolterstorff writes that, 'Romantic theory of the arts [...] is best thought of as the ideology of our modern Western bourgeois institution of high art. The institutional realities of high art have combined with Romantic theories of art to produce a picture of art which has shaped analytic philosophy of art,'[216] and that, 'the direction of analysis was foundationalist and constructionalist.[217] In other words philosophical and analytic practices have helped to perpetuate the very approach problematised in this chapter. As a possible solution to this problem, Wolterstorff's suggestion that,

> if we reject Romanticism in the arts and approach art from the side of its social practices, and if the philosophy of art we then develop rejects the Kantian/Hegelian dialectic and adopts instead a realist orientation, then we will see the social practices

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[213] Bourriaud (2009) p. 5.

[214] Bourriaud (1996) p. 13.

[215] ibid. p. 7.

[216] Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'Philosophy of Art after Analysis and Romanticism' in *Analytic Aesthetics* (1989) p. 54.

[217] ibid. p. 35.

> of art as not just dealing with actuality but with possibility and improbability; and not just with particulars but with properties and actions and kinds,[218]

is particularly relevant. Although not expressly described as such, this kind of approach can be said to be relational.

As shown by my analyses and examples in this chapter, a relational approach to quotation is successful when: no reading of the borrowed material is necessary; there is no need for a construction of 'difference' or 'otherness' between borrowed materials; it allows for an open space in which the listener can create the work. These three requirements can be said to be necessary as a musical approach within themselves for the success of a relational approach to art as a whole. It is my desire that the work that I create exemplifies these three characteristics.

I believe the same criteria for success can be found to be met in the music which makes up my portfolio. The first, when no reading of the borrowed material is necessary, is met in all of the cases where the quotation is implicit. This is particularly clear in the pieces *in the back there was a pigeon (c)*, *love speed and thrills*, certain parts of *green angel* and *the enigma machine 4: the historicity of cartography* in which there is no reason for the listener to even be aware of the existence of a quotation to be read. This can also be said to be the case for a more explicit quotation, such as the 'cello solo in the fourth section of *the empiricist view*, since the quoted piece, *the broken melody*, may not be well known to the listener, and although it may be said to sit uneasily with the rest of the work, the kaleidoscopic nature of much of the music does not necessarily invite the reading of this solo as being particularly historical or 'quoted.' Even those quotations which might be said to be more explicit are not written from the point of deliberate juxtaposition which might make them seem designed to be read or understood in a certain way. This lack of an aural request for understanding on the behalf of the composer also means that there is no need to construct difference or otherness for or through the quotations in order to make them, or the other music in the works of which they form part, intelligible. In each case what can be said to be 'othered,' if anything, is present outside of the piece but does not make up part of that which constitutes it. This links with the final

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[218] ibid. pp. 55-56.

criteria for success: such works create an open space for the listener to create the work precisely due to the absence of those things described previously. The open form nature of notation and performance, coupled with the lack of semiotic messages which could be described as learned behaviours, such as in the examples of nostalgia I have presented in this chapter, mean that these works are open to be constructed by and for their audience.

In the case studies I have offered, the consideration of the relational ontological basis of works has significantly altered the possible readings of the works at stake. From my perspective these are perceptual differences, and since they are perceived and in the minds of the works' audiences, there are aesthetic differences. As such it can be said that such analyses show that aesthetics is to do with relations.

IV.I Time

Aesthetics is to do with relations. A particularly important set of relations, as highlighted by the case studies thus far, are those with other artworks and with history. However, one possible conclusion of the analyses presented in the previous chapter is that history, as constructed by the narrative of modernism, does not exist. The evidence for its existence resides in works which themselves are legitimated by a modernist view of history, and readings of these works do not confirm the legitimacy of such a view. On its own this statement is not particularly helpful: if modernist history is the narrative of modernism, and I reject this and other narratives, then it may appear that there is little of use left from which to construct musical contexts. Despite such conclusions as this, one can note that music does take place in a timeframe, and losing an historical narrative which appears to explain the nature of such a timeframe does not equate to the loss of the timeframe itself. I am careful to use *timeframe* and not *time* in this context because such conclusions as those in the first paragraph also lead to the statement that time does not exist. In the construction of history I have described history *is* time, since nothing can be conceived of outside of it. Whilst in the musical context of the works discussed this seems to be a false statement (other musics, for example, can easily be conceived of, since their existence is known already), the practice of excluding anything from a canon of what might be described as acceptable works essentially leaves these musics outside of history, and therefore outside of time as it has been constructed. And thus it does not take many steps to come to the conclusion that time is a construct.

The construction of time is described by J. M. E. McTaggart, who writes,

> Nothing is really present, past, or future. Nothing is really earlier or later than anything else or temporarily simultaneous with it. Nothing really changes. And nothing is really in time. Whenever we perceive anything in time—which is the only way

> in which, in our present experience, we do perceive things—we are perceiving it more or less as it really is not.[219]

Thus he concludes his essay in which he shows that the temporal names given to times are not expressive of their nature, and that 'nothing that exists can be temporal.'[220] If accepted, there are two important points contained within this assessment: firstly that perception of events 'unfolding in time' is incorrect, and thus aesthetic questions about art which concern themselves merely with perception are focused on an unreal element of art. Secondly, the assertion that music is a special aesthetic case due to its being a time-based artform, as opposed to other artforms which do not deal directly with time, is also the assertion of an impossibility. Both of these conclusions are taken to be correct within this chapter.

The analyses presented in chapters 2 and 3 have implications for the way in which one might conceive 'musical' space and time, or indeed space and time at all when considering their relation to artworks. They present the idea that considering time with respect to art can be a different matter than considering time with regard to everyday life, and that it is possible to consider these as differently constructed in different pieces and artworks. They also dispense with the idea that interrelationships might have some sort of historical basis, since it is possible for interrelationships to occur with events 'outside of' history, and so an investigation into the function of interrelationships with respect to the construction of time and space is also necessary in order to adequately describe them.

This, then, is no longer a question of the relational ontology of artworks, but an epistemological investigation relating to what can be communicated by them when certain constructions of the media 'in' which they take place are considered. This presents itself as a particularly abstract investigation, especially since any conclusions which find time and space to be different from traditional conceptions might be said to have no real effect for anyone who accepts them, particularly when McTaggart's conclusions are taken into account. Even if these

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[219] J. M. E. McTaggart, 'The Unreality of Time,' in *The Philosophy of Time*, ed. by Robin le Poidevin and Murray MacBeth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) p. 34.

[220] ibid. p. 23.

consequences might be said to apply especially to composers, or musicians in general, or artists in general, or even those who experience art in general, they could be criticised as lacking in universality. However, such conclusions as these, which could be said to have no present effect upon anyone unless they should wish it, are not unique to this investigation and could be described as *quantum logical*.[221] That is to say that they reveal a fallacy in the logic of that to which they refer, and although many cases may not require such a complex explanation the sake of completeness of those that do requires such conclusions.

Putnam notes that such abstract thoughts and propositions are necessary to logical thought when he says, 'at present reference to "classes", or something equally "nonphysical" is indespensible to the science of logic. The notion of logical "validity", on which the whole of science rests, cannot be satisfactorily explained in purely nominalistic terms,'[222] and later that 'the question of to what extent we might revise our basic logical principles, as we have had to revise some of our basic geometrical principles in mathematical physics, is an especially fascinating one.'[223] Further to this, Bede Rundle also comments on the need for such conclusions when he says,

> [one] cannot take refuge behind a protest that the distinction between the empirical and the conceptual is unclear, that the standing which a form of words has today may not be the standing it enjoys in the future; if it is unclear how someone is using the words, then it is up to that person to remove the unclarity, to make up their mind how they wish to be understood, if they are to have any hope of putting forward a proposition which is sufficiently determinate to be a candidate for truth or falsity. And it is no advance to cover up the lack of clarification by labelling the proposition "metaphysical."[224]

I consider, equally with Rundle, that the approach to time and space taken in my own and other (musical) artworks should be made clear. Making these explicit, such as through considering the relationships of materials with their

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[221] Putnam (1995).

[222] Hilary Putnam, *Philosophy of Logic* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971) p. 23.

[223] Putnam (1971) p. 76.

[224] Bede Rundle, *Time, Space, and Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p. 64.

circumstances as I will outline in this chapter, reveals fallacies in the traditional logic of space and time as considered by artists and in relation to artworks. Finally, I accept that 'the time' in which I experience a piece of music and 'the time' in which I experience the *Mona Lisa* may not be the same. But I then conclude that the dissimilarity does not stem from properties of the artworks but from a logical fallacy in the consideration of time in each of these cases. As described by Charles Alteri, 'modes must acknowledge the conditions which make their differences intelligible and significant'[225]: I believe that in each of these cases, on the occasion of witnessing the artwork, I that 'the time' in which I experience the artwork is time itself, therefore 'the time' of the artwork, although arbitrary and subject-specific, is a condition of its intelligibility. Time and 'the time' are not the same.

I will explore this problem through a further link with quotation in existing and my own music. Whilst I do not believe that quotation is the only way in which relations with time and space are evident, it is a way in which this is easily made explicit. This is because quotation has an obvious relationship with history and the past which allows other relationships to be more easily discussed. However I believe that this relationship is not unique to history when the definition of material, as given earlier, is taken into account. Therefore the interrelations present in the interactions of quotations with time and space are equally present in the interactions of other materials with time and space. The nature of quotation allows these to be sometimes at the forefront of the listener's mind in a way which is not possible except for a suitably conscious listener in other cases.

I have already outlined a number of the particular cases of quotation in the music I have offered as part of this investigation. Some of these cases bear repeating since they relate particularly the case at hand. I also find it necessary to re-iterate the importance of these quotations since it is my wish not to present a single reading of any of the pieces, but to offer a number of positions from which they can be viewed, as a small number of the totality of positions from which it is possible to view them. The particular quotations which I will focus upon in this chapter are outlined below. The first is the cello solo in the fourth section of *the empiricist view* which can be said, rather than to present a direct juxtaposition

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[225] Charles Alteri, 'Style *as* the Man: From Aesthetics to Speculative Philosophy' in *Analytic Aesthetics* (1989) p. 73.

between the quotation of *The Broken Melody* and the composer's contemporary context, to present a situation in which the past can be said to be controlling the musical present, despite this actually being a construct of the composer. The second example includes the quotations of Bach and Buxtehude in *the enigma machine 5: de nostra re⌣*. These pieces, as described in chapter 2, could be said to rely on the historical context and relationship with the organ of the quotations in order to construct the legitimacy of the piece. However, again this itself is a construct and the legitimacy of the piece can be said to arise equally from the possibility of such interrelations as much as from the interrelations themselves. Next, the quotations of settings of the *tantum ergo* in *in the back there was a pigeon⌣ (c)*, and similarly the quotation of Bach in *love speed and thrills* and the quotation of Dowland in *green angel*, are implicit quotations: not at all recognisable in the performance of the piece (or sections, in the case of *green angel*), and yet underpin it completely. Finally, the text which makes up the spoken part of *as a name i am a myth* is, in contrast, constructed of almost completely explicit quotations of which it is not necessary to recognise their original sources in order to recognise their status as quotations. All of these situations present the contemporary piece as having an immediate temporal relationship with an 'history' or a 'past' which does not specifically belong to it. The exact nature of this relationship is determinate on the temporal nature of time which supposes such an 'history' or a 'past.'

A postmodern approach to music might say that quotations are both past and present, as Jonathan Kramer describes,

> although they reject the linearity of historical progress, postmodern artworks regularly quote from history [...] as the past becomes present the concept of historical progress becomes problematic.[226]

Thus Kramer describes how there is a sense of the past which can be said to belong to artworks in the present, and a rejection of a reading of the past does not reject this sense of time. There is an issue of the nature of time present here since the function of quotation described by Kramer is not one which could be ascribed to composer intention. Thus one can say that it is impossible to tell

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[226] Kramer (2002) p. 17.

between quotations in works which are intentionally postmodern and in those which merely quote from history (as demonstrated in the previous chapter) by looking only at the quotation itself. Kramer also notes that in the process of quotation, 'history is recast as a process of rediscovering what we already are, rather than a linear progression into what we have never been.'[227] What is made explicit in Kramer's writing is the perception of time as a linear progression, even in artworks which claim to reject such a progression. For the sake of mathematical completeness it is necessary to say that such a progression is representative of the real line. Kramer assumes that quotations, and thus the works which quote from them, can refer to and exist upon multiple points along the line. In many ways his use of the word 'history' can be seen to refer to the modernist narrative of the musical past. Similarly, this modernist narrative can be said to assume that works which quote refer to earlier points on the line. Linearity is the key concept in both definitions.

Equally, a discussion of space might be subject to many of the same problems and objections. This is inextricably linked to a discussion of time by the parameter of duration. 'Space' in music and art can be defined by the area or location in which an artwork appears or takes place, or in music by a link with the score which represents the work, or by other arbitrary parameters such as register, dynamic range, etc. All of these have a link with duration: the length and breadth of a room are equally defined by the length of time taken to traverse them, the range of a musical parameter by the time taken to travel from one extreme to the other. Thus the investigation into space will draw heavily from the conclusion made about the nature of time in art and otherwise.

[227] Kramer (2002) p. 18.

A key concept in re-defining time, and space, therefore, is nonlinearity.[228] Defined as 'a lack of proportionality between two related quantities,'[229] this term is applicable to the current investigation since there cannot be assumed to be a geometric equivalence between 'the time' in which a piece of music takes place and time itself, nor 'the space' in which a piece of music takes place and space itself. Thus two features on which many works of music might be said to rely cannot be said to be concurrent with the properties of those features; 'musical space' and 'musical time' are themselves undefined, and hence meaningless.

In terms of a musical system this has a number of implications. In terms of intentionality, the composer must think of the system of the chain of signification which takes place differently for each listener who interacts with the music. Although present in every experience of every piece of music, this chain of signification must become the primary concern for the composer, despite and precisely because of, its associated uncertainty. This uncertainty has implications for reception and communication, of course, but also makes a contribution to the quatum logical argument by which the nature of space and time could be deduced, and their relationship with 'the space' and 'the time' experienced in musical works. One might imagine a system in which time is the input and 'the time' is the output. The relationship between these is one which should be expanded upon. On this topic, Ricœur writes that such an exchange occurs, 'to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and the narrative attains its full significance when it becomes a condition of temporal existence.'[230]

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[228] An earlier version of the following ideas can be found at Lauren Redhead, 'Musical Nonlinearity and the Aesthetics of Time and Space', in ACT Revue, Volume 4 (Foundation Destellos, 2009) <http://www.fundestellos.org/ACT4.pdf>.

[229] non-linear, adj., *The Oxford English Dictionary*, ed. by J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, 3rd Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989; Third edition, December 2003; online version March 2011) <http://0-www.oed.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/Entry/127994> [25 March 2011]. An entry for this word was first included in *A Supplement to the OED* II, 1976. An important distinction must be made here between my use of the word nonlinear and other uses of the word which coincide with non-narrative or non-unidirectional.

[230] Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative Volume 1*, trans. by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) p. 52.

My nonlinear definition of time does not suppose time to be a representation of the real line. I reject this since Kramer's description of quotations existing simultaneously at different points on the line cannot be plausibly explained, and I have already rejected the modernist narrative which would allow quotation to refer to points in the past of the line. In fact it can be successfully posited that any theory of time which uses the description of time as a representation of time as the real line is actually a theory of duration.[231] That is, that which can be described by such a representation can be shown to be a duration. This duration could successfully be described as 'the time' in which a musical work takes place. And I do not dispute that works have durations. This also qualifies such a theory of time as a theory of space. But such durations do not have the same implications for the *Mona Lisa* as for Beethoven's Fifth Symphony: music might be often described as a time-based medium, however cases of quotation make explicit that 'the time' (duration) of a piece is not the same as 'the time' of quotations used within it. This inherent contradiction rejects a linear definition of time and defines music as a duration or linear-time based medium.

It is possible, instead of such a definition, to accept time to be a topologically closed curve,[232] and in such a case one could come to the following conclusion: 'time exists, but it is really the actual temporal structure of the totality of events; it was a mistake to conceive of the latter as simply one of many possible structures in time'.[233] Such a closed curve is homeomorphic to a line and could be easily mistaken for the real line (when 'on' the curve it would be impossible to distinguish between this state and the state of being on the real line), but has two important properties: it contains the possibility of infinite revolutions and 'overlappings'; the 'speed' at which one might traverse the curve is not fixed. Thus, this model makes the possibility of quotations which are both past and present completely plausible and accepts a linear narrative to be one or may possible readings of a section of the curve. Both linear definitions which I reject can be explained within this definition.

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[231] Bas van Fraassen, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time and Space*, (New York:Random House, 1970) for his conclusions about numerous theories of time.

[232] As proposed by Bas van Fraassen, and also elsewhere. This definition precludes time from having a beginning or an end and also allows that the nature of things which take place 'in time' (including revolutions of the earth, etc.) do not define the nature of time itself.

[233] Bas van Fraassen (1970) p. 106.

This conclusion about time means that we can thus say that 'the time' of a musical work is only defined within itself (its actual temporal order) and therefore that it is a logical space, and a cultural object, something which can and should legitimately be considered as a 'material'. This is aesthetically important for a composer since it means that time (as a cultural object) is created separately in each piece or structure, an important point of concern. In this respect time could be described as multi-dimensional; Bas van Fraassen writes that, 'dimentionality should be defined in topological terms.'[234] Although there are various issues arising from considering time to be multidimensional as opposed to nonlinear, a topological understanding of time presents the possibility of a less simplistic understanding of quotations and their possible readings.

This is exemplified in a number of ways within the previously described musical examples. The 'cello solo in the fourth section of *the empiricist view* treats time as a cultural object by the metaphorical placing of the 'cello solo in the centre of the ensemble. Since a quotation can be said to be perceived as a general reference to the past as well as a reference to a specific point on a past time-line, the placement of the quotation in this section is pertinent. Time is constructed as stemming from the quotation which dictates the ensemble's actions, thus 'the time' of this section is equal to 'the time' of the quotation. This is in contrast to the material of the previous sections in which the conductor has an intervention in or control over the time of some or all the members of the ensemble at most points. Since this involves the conductor, it is also a visual relationship: the contemporary time of the piece being in some ways signalled by the conductor and the past time of the quotation being signalled by the cellist, whose playing technique with mute and much vibrato also functions as a signifier for 'past.' In this respect, the ensemble led by the conductor are presented as a spectacle, about which Debord writes, 'the spectacle, considered as the reigning society's method for paralysing history and memory and for suppressing any history based on historical time, represents a *false consciousness of time*.'[235] Such false consciousness is at issue when the relationship between the conductor,

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[234] ibid. p. 134. For a discussion of the implications of a multidimentional theory of time see Murray MacBeth, 'Time's Square,' in *The Philosophy of Time* (1993) pp. 183-202. 'A world in which time is two-dimensional is a world in which the temporal properties of events can vary continuously in two independent ways,' (p. 187).

[235] Debord (1983) p. 90.

ensemble, and concert hall is destroyed, and 'the time' of the piece challenges the audience to contemplate it as existing within their time.

The quotations of Bach and Buxtehude in *the enigma machine 5: de notra re͜* present themselves as a reification of a relationship which is essentially historical. The link between the organ and these quotations is particularly strong due to both of their religious contexts, and in a similar way to the quotations, the organ itself as a vehicle for the presentation of music rather than a liturgical instrument can be seen as a quotation or reference to the past since it no longer holds the prominent function in the former role as it once did. Debord writes that, '[e]xamining history amounts to *examining the nature of power*,'[236] and it could be said that this reference to history provides the means to do just that. The piece presents time as a cultural object since 'the time' in which the quotations were written could be considered to be a 'great age' of liturgical music, of music for the organ, and such composers as Bach, Buxtehude, and their contemporaries, the composers of the music that some listeners and concert programmers would particularly like to see to be associated with the instrument. Placing the organ in 'the time' of this music is a way to foster such a continuing association. However, the piece *the enigma machine 5: de nostra re͜* in fact has the opposite effect: 'the time' of the piece is constructed for the listener as being contemporary and present, particularly in the interspersing of the implicit 'historical' quotations with the much more 'contemporary' quotation of Michael Nyman. Even despite the distortion of the 'historical' time of the piece, something continues to be harmonically 'not quite right': even the distorted quasi-quoted harmonic world sits uneasily with quotation from Nyman which can be found in the interludes. Therefore the presence of an historical time is disturbed and the organ itself removed from its status as a quasi-quotation.

The piece *in the back there was a pigeon (c)* quotes implicitly from a number of settings of the *tantum ergo*. This piece treats time as a cultural object which is described in the repetitive acts of ritual. Rather than construct a specific 'time' of the piece, the music constructs the idea of cyclical time in which all ritualistic repetitions evoke the same time. This is the situation described by Debord when he writes, '[t]he unconscious movement of time becomes manifest and *true͜*

[236] ibid. p. 77.

within historical consciousness.'[237] In this respect the idea of the linearity of time is eroded in the memory of a repeating time. Similarly, the text which makes up the spoken part of *as a name i am a myth* treats time as a progression of ideas as itself being a cultural object. The idea of the existence of 'the time' of the piece is constructed against the repetition of a quasi-theoretical commentary which describes the path of progress taken in order to have arrived at 'the time' in which the piece could be written. This is also described by Debord who writes, '[t]he triumph of irreversible time is also its metamorphosis into a *time of things*.'[238] Both of these examples show how a piece can demonstrate the disintegration of the legitimacy of the time in which they are presented through the creation of a different perception of the nature of time through their performance. The chamber opera *green angel* also uses quotations of text, and of music from a similar period. The inclusion of such quotations treats time as a 'cultural object' in the sense that it is a legitimate material for the composer and librettist. It also treats time as a cultural object in the sense that these relationships to a specifically western cultural history, although most often implicit (or where explicit not specifically designed to be recognised) can serve to orient listeners and audience members within a structural form that belongs to Japanese culture. This accords with Debord's observation that, '[t]he time officially recognised throughout the world as the *general time of society* actually only reflects the specialised interests that constitute it, and this is *merely only one particular type of time*.'[239] Here, time is constructed to create the impression that the opera belongs as much to the audience as to the characters.

Bas van Fraassen, having reached a description of time as a topologically closed curve, goes on to conclude, 'spatiotemporal terms are defined, but that they are definable, in terms of causal connectibility.'[240] Here, he recognises that time is subject to the same problems as language is subjected to in poststructuralist theory. In terms of meaning time could be subject to the same criticisms and modes of engagement as musical works themselves, such as in the two previous chapters. As a composer it is possible to consider time as only a part of what

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[237] ibid. p. 73.

[238] ibid. p. 83.

[239] ibid. p. 85.

[240] Bas van Fraassen (1970) p. 195.

might be described as 'musical language,' in itself having no meaning. In this event one must accept this not as a constraint, but as an opportunity to create or invite meaning: divorcing time from the idea of objective reality means that meaning need no longer be constructed (or thought to be constructed) by the movement or development of other objects through or in time; the associated meanings of these objects can now be focussed on in greater detail.

In this way, time can be said to have been used in my music to exemplify the many other objects within the pieces. There is of course the very obvious case of short fragments being repeated and protracted in time which is accepted to draw attention to details such as sound, placement of sound, and its nature. Such repetition slowly changes the memory of what has gone before, creates expectation of the future and causes a fleeting and specifically varying perception of the present. It can be said to be exemplified particularly in the œuvre of the composer Matthias Spahlinger, and in many of the works published by Wandelweiser. The understanding of time in the terms of McTaggart, as explained above, exemplifies and gives credence to such a reading, and empirical and perceptual evidence seems to confirm it. I will take this as read, and although interesting in itself and possible to identify within my own work, it is not the most pertinent element of the use of time in my portfolio.

In the piece *the engima machine 1: hendecaptych of hans memling* some of the 'objects' exemplified are the individual character of the words and single events, and particularly the relationship between the different instruments. As well as the above mentioned characteristics relating to sound quality, the cueing system and specifically the order in which the instruments play becomes particularly prominent. The continuingly contested notion of hierarchy becomes the focus of the piece. The use of text also prevents the focus from being merely on sound; as in any case of the use of words with music, the text invites a host of interrelationships between the accepted meanings of the words and the supposed meanings of the music. Similarly in the pieces *the enigma machine 2a: properties and essence* and *the enigma machine 2b: [no subtitle]* a similar situation to that described above is created. The absence of text in these cases allow the focus to be on extensions of the creation of sound: exemplified are tuning systems and microtonal character in addition to instrumental technique. The issue of hierarchy becomes a power struggle between two instruments and the pieces

could be read as a series of differently (mis)timed unisons. In contrast to these situations, the piece *the enigma machine 3: archipelago* exemplifies the line which is built up between the music boxes. Because the order in which the melody is constructed is not the order in which the notes are heard, the continuous repetition of punching and playing the cards creates a jigsaw effect in which time is fragmented for different ways for each performer and in a state of flux which is only resolved by its conclusion. The nature of the musical line itself is therefore presented as nonlinear.

The final example of this approach to time is the Noh theatre structure of *green angel*. In this case, amongst the objects exemplified are the emotional journey of Ash, the central character. Ash's journey of grief is not connected to time; the universality of the situation she finds herself in is important in creating this impression. It could be considered that it does take some amount of time for this journey to take place: in the opera it takes around 75 minutes of 'real time' whilst 'the time' of the opera is not explicitly specified but is given as the passing of three seasons. However, the link of the Ash's changing emotions with the changing seasons also creates the impression that this may not be a 'real' passing of time, either, but merely a metaphorical representation of the changes taking place on behalf of the main character. This particular journey of grief can be considered different and personal for each listener/viewer and yet the journey itself is considered a shared experience outside of time, as exemplified by many of the responses to the audience survey which was conducted.[241] In this respect, and in a number of other dramatic considerations, time is an important aspect in Noh theatre: the original mediaeval plays lasted many hours and, although this expanse of time was not paralleled in *green angel,* the time taken over the narrative of one character and the focus on small details belongs more to the conventions of Noh theatre than to opera. In many readings of the work, time itself could be said to be merely symbolic of other, more important aspects of

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[241] Librettist Adam Strickson conducted an audience survey after the premiere including the question, 'do the characters and/or the story relate to anything that has happened in your own life? If this is the case, please tell us briefly about the connection.' The responses included 'the cyclical way you deal with things in life.' 'Emotions/experience of mourning and loss. Death in family.' 'Definitely the memories of 9/11. The survivor with photo looking for his mother brought back memories of people who had losses among the victims of the Tower destruction.' 'The loss of a loved one is a universal theme.' 'Story of disaster, fire, as I used to live in Saudi Arabia and my school got bombed.' 'I have 2 parents and a little sister who, while both alive, I have left 3000 miles away to pursue my education. The feeling of loss is similar.'

the narrative, and not in itself pertinent to the narrative: the given of the passing of time in Noh theatre and in *green angel* itself takes the significance of the passing of time out of the equation.

Merleau-Ponty's statement, 'time is, therefore, not a real process, not an actual procession that I am content to record. It arises from *my* relation to things,'[242] sums up this relationship explained in the above examples. For many composers, as outlined in chapter three, this relationship might be characterised by a somewhat dubious link with deconstruction, but what is more at issue is the perception of the linear development of the western canon (or indeed the entirety of western musical history): this perception itself being an ideal theory. However, there is no necessity in this development, and therefore no reason also to also to suppose having 'arrived' anywhere.[243] Music which makes this explicit, through what Merleau-Ponty identifies as a personal relationship, erodes the ideal theory.

Two particularly good examples of this can be found in the music of Bernhard Lang and Chico Mello. The music of these two composers contains many references to the parts of their own personal history: for Chico Mello this is his South American heritage, and for Bernhard Lang it is his experiences with popular music and culture. The person of the author is not as important here as I appear to have made them. Such composers and such music do(es) not rely on the correct identification of the quotations by the listener, but incorporates a tension between personal history and the perceived history of the tradition. However, despite this, the music of Lang and Mello is more traditionally associated with the western avant garde. The influences mentioned here often result in an absence of traditional 'development' as can be found in western classical music and modernism, and also enable the composers to present a restriction of musical elements usually considered the target of modernist process-based composition (particularly pitch and rhythm). The effect of this influence is to allow the composers to include fairly disparate personal elements of musical experience into their music in a way which is not nostalgic, and which

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[242] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*., trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1962) pp. 411-12 quoted in Rundle p. 43.

[243] Further details of this discussion can be found in multifarious other sources, there is little need to continue it here.

again presents repetition in a way in which the perceptual aim and actual outcome are not focussed on sound. A particularly good example is the music theatre piece *Fate at Eight* by Mello which dwells on the multiple possible outcomes of one seemingly insignificant domestic situation, ranging from a variety of emotional responses, to extreme soap-opera style conclusions, to hints at sinister relationships under the surface of a harmonious everyday arrangement. Similarly Bernhard Lang's *Das Theater Der Wiederholungen* presents three contrasting situations despite the seeming similarity of his compositional approach. About Lang's music it is often noted that a dialectic is presented between the hypnotic uses of repetition, and its essentiality to learning and memory. This point is made by Wolfgang Reiter, who writes,

> Difference, in its turn, makes it possible for us only to progress from the identity of the kind of perception and memory specifically designed [in the piece]. Sophisticated music demands an analytical consciousness, ones ongoing intellectual detachment from the immediacy of the primary sound experience on one's own behalf.[244]

Such music as the examples from Mello and Lang given here can be read as a constant re-reading and re-writing of the modernist and western avant-garde tradition, and a new approach to quotation, facilitating a departure from the increasingly internal concerns associated with avant-garde composition. 'Quotation' from one's own personal history within the constructed history and narrative of western modernism becomes the point at which the 'real time' of such influences meets and subsequently breaks down the constructed time of the musical history of which these pieces find themselves part. Repetition itself makes a reference to the repetitive nature of constructed and particularly performed traditions: something which is explicitly recognised by composers who, for example, quote from their own folk traditions or those of others, but within the western classical tradition such repetition is frequently and significantly aligned with a claim of quality rather than the production of canons. Such quotations or references to personal history in this case have the effect of

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[244] Wolfgang Reiter, *Das Theatre Des Wederholungen: Musiktheatrer von Bernhard Lang* (2002) posted on Bernhard Lang's personal webpage <http://members.chello.at/bernhard.lang/werkbeschreib/ueber_theaterwiederh_reiter.htm> [26.04.2011]. 'Die Differenz wiederum macht es uns erst möglich, von der Identität des Gleichen zur Wahrnehmung und Erinnerung einer bestimmten Gestalt fortzuschreiten. Differenzierte Musik verlangt analytisches Bewusstsein, ein sich fortwährendes intellektuelles Loslösen von der Unmittelbarkeit der primären Klangerfahrung.' My translation.

shifting the ownership of Mello's and Lang's music from a tradition of western modernism to a perceivable personal ownership by shifting 'the time' of these works from a time which belongs to modernism to a time which belongs to the composers themselves.

Similarly in my own work, I make regular reference to my personal history. This is not out of a need for autobiography, or for listeners to identify with such a history in the same way I do, or to lay claim to these elements. It merely stems from the fact that I must choose *some* materials; I must make use of *something*. Since I accept the historicity of material, I do not perceive a qualitative difference between the materials I choose but I do recognise that my history is not the history of modernism, or of music, or of any other such construct. Therefore in drawing on my personal relationship I posit a tension in this respect which I recognise and which may seem to be made explicit in some readings of the works. Examples of this include the relationship with Peter Greenaway that runs throughout *the enigma machine* project. Greenaway is an example of an artist with a nonlinear project which develops over a long period of time and as such I have maintained a longstanding interest in his films, especially those relating to or making reference to Tulse Luper, which has no bearing on the results of my PhD investigation, yet I find enough personal inspiration to encourage me to forge links with my own creative work, and thus force the outcomes of my creative endeavours into 'my time' rather than 'the time' of a classical tradition to which they might be said to belong. Similarly I find in the quotations of Bach and Buxtehude in *the enigma machine 5: de nostra re* a relationship with my personal practice as an organist. There is some scope to argue that my personal relationship with the instrument perhaps equips me to deal with its machinery, and with its symbolic machinery relating to the repertoire associated with it, but also further scope to argue that some of the relations I draw with the quotations are based on personal history, compounded by my experiences as a performer of my own piece, and present only for me. I do not see this as a negative outcome but one which demonstrates how links with personal history can be more important for authors than for perceivers. I would not regard these relations necessary to be explained in order for someone to receive the piece. Finally, the self-quotations in *green angel* could be said to link with a tradition of self quotation, and to situate the piece within a body of work. In the act of self quotation it might be possible to say that I draw a parallel

between myself and Beethoven, but this might also be described as my perceiving in the journey of the opera, parallels to an artistic journey I could be said to have undertaken, which is imperceptible to the audience in the course of the piece.

These last two examples are relevant to me since they take place within my personal time, but do not take place within 'the time' of the piece or the audience. This is similar to that which Bourriaud calls the 'journey form.'[245] Revealed in a number of contemporary artworks, the 'journey form' forges a link between the finished artwork and the artists' personal process; this in itself can be considered to be an artistic aim. The 'journey form' links time and space not as concurrent but as a single material with possibilities for exploration, topological fluidity and temporal bifurcation within single artworks. With respect to this 'journey form' Bourriaud writes, '[t]he artist has become the prototype of the contemporary traveller, *homo viator*, whose passage through signs and formats highlights a contemporary experience of mobility, displacement, crossing.'[246] It is then possible for Bourriaud to say of artworks,

> [t]hrough a compositional principle based on lines traced in time and space, the work (like the Lacanian unconcious) develops a chain of linked elements—and no longer within the order of a static geometry that would guarantee its unity. This spontaneous conception of space-time [...] has its sources in a nomadic imaginary universe that envisages forms in motion and in relation to other forms, one in which both geography and history are territories to be travelled.[247]

Therefore the distinction between space and time becomes blurred within the 'quotation' of personal history; their composition and performance becoming a kind of psycho-history on the behalf of the composer.

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[245] Nicholas Bourriaud, *The Radicant*, (New York: Lukas & Sternberg, 2010) pp106-131.

[246] ibid. p. 113.

[247] ibid. p. 117.

Having discussed time in the terms above, and having already made the link between space and time in terms of duration, one might then ask the question 'what then defines space within time?' Here, the word 'space' might just as easily be replaced by 'placement' or even 'narrative' but the description of time as a function given above makes it clear that this is not a question of space as such, but of causality. So then, we might come to the conclusion, 'the fragment [...] constitutes the most "numological" writing of organicity,'[248] but the corollary that music which is nonlinear must be fragmented is erroneous. It makes more sense to say that our syntagmatic and paradigmatic understanding of music is much more fragmented than our understanding of language: fragmented understanding is the most that can be expected from any piece of music.

In this respect, a nonlinear approach to space relies on ambiguity with respect to causality and purpose, and this can be created through various acts of distortion. One important way this is created in my musical approach is through repetition, both within the course of a piece and also through re-creation (quotation, either direct or indirect). For the most part I have already discussed the important aspects of this with respect to time. It can also be noted that distortion is a necessary outcome of repetition, and Eve Tavor Bannet notes that 'everything in repetition which is varied and modulated is only an alienation of its meaning.'[249] This is true also of quotation, and it is necessary to make clear that through quotation of existing music I do not claim or wish to deconstruct the music or the tradition it makes up, but to alienate culturally imposed meaning and significance.

A case study of the use of borrowed material in which space becomes a central consideration can be found in the case of art which consists of drawing on

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[248] P. Lacouse-Labarthe and J. L. Nancy, *The Literary Absolute: the Theory of Literature in German Romanticism*, trans. by Philip Barbard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998) p. 14.

[249] Tavor Bannet, p. 247.

sculpture. Jon Wood describes various ways in which this functions,[250] going on to note that 'such graphic interventions into the works of others create imaginary new third works, poised layer-like not only between curves and histories, but also media and materials.'[251] Furthermore, Wood makes the link between structure and material, writing, 'Barthes has written about photographs as "laminated objects" in which image and referent, photography and sculpture, are hermetically sealed. Over-drawing clearly ruptures this lamination, disturbing this indexical coalition.'[252] In this case, Wood notes that space must not necessarily be considered as a geometry of musical or other works, and it is in fact the interaction of 'the space' of an artwork with extra-spatial elements that meaning is created.

This is exemplified particularly in the piece *the enigma machine 4: the historicity of cartography* which could be considered to be heterochronic. Restructuring occurs throughout the piece, which can be said to use the same material in each section. It begins with a situation in which the piano seems to control the other two instruments, moves through a heterophonic situation, to a situation in which all of the instruments play independently. However at this point enough links have been forged between different aspects of the material within the previous two sections to make the final section seem to be one in which the amorphous possibilities of the structure have been more specifically dictated by the composer. The 'material' of this piece thus changes in shape, size, speed, and character throughout the three sections though only the medium of repetition. It is precisely its interaction with the space in which it is presented which makes this possible. In relation to this, two observations of Nicholas Bourriaud regarding the 'journey form' of such a piece are relevant. Firstly, Bourriaud writes,

> [a]lthough the radicant forms a line, it cannot be reduced to a one-dimensional linearity. If the function of the ego is to unify the different perceptual and cognitive lines of an individual, we know that the latter—equipped with technologies that profoundly alter his or her experience of space-time—cannot be

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[250] Jon Wood, 'Drawing on Sculpture: Graphic Interventions on the Photographic Surface' *Henry Moore Institute Essays on Sculpture*, no. 55 (Leeds: Henry Moore Institute, 2007) pp. 3-4.

[251] ibid. p. 6.

[252] ibid. p. 10. cf. Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida* (London: Vintage: 2000) pp. 5-6.

> reduced to the classical definition of the subject, any more than to a linear monographic narrative.[253]

Therefore such a piece, with a narrative that can only be described as relational to the psycho-historic position of the composer and the performers, more accurately describes the idea of a personal history than one with a linear narrative or structure could be said to do. In addition to this, the intervention of the performers contributes to the authenticity of the 'journey form' itself. Bourriaud writes also that, 'we now live in times in which nothing disappears anymore but everything accumulates under the effect of frenetic archiving,'[254] which explains well the effect of memory on attaching significance to the perceived order and hierarchy of sounds in the third section of the piece as described above. The use of Bach in the piece *love speed and thrills* could equally be described as radicant[255] or perhaps irreverent: this represents an intervention on the surface of Bach. The quotation itself is implicit, but it is used to define the space to be explored within the piece. In both of these cases it is not necessary that the quotation (of Bach or of Purcell in the case of some of the material of *the enigma machine 4: the historicity of cartography*, or of the material from the previous section in the case of the same piece) be explicitly recognised, as with the works Wood describes it is most important that the works are recognised as independent or evolving artworks in their own right. The intervention takes the form of destroying the autonomy of the original work in its new context; autonomy belongs only to the perceptual exploration of space.

When appraising such ideas as this, J. R. Lucas writes, 'Sklar says that, according to the relationist view, "space is nothing but a collection of actual objects and possible spatial relations between actual and possible material objects,"'[256] and also that, '[a] space is characterised by its relational structure and [...] no point

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[253] Bourriaud (2010) p. 121.

[254] ibid. p. 122.

[255] Bourriaud uses the term 'radicant' to refer to art which denies the value of its roots as origins but instead considers them as a starting point from which to re-create the modern in contemporary art.

[256] L. Sklar, 'Incongrous Counterparts, Intrinsic Features, and the Substantiviality of Space', *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 71, (1974) pp. 277-290 (p. 281) quoted in J. R. Lucas, *Space, Time, and Causality: An essay in Natural Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 148.

can have any significant properties of its own,'[257] offering the conclusion, 'the dimension number of a continuous space is a topological invariant.'[258] So therefore, space itself can be considered unchanging and as asserting no influence on that which is perceived to occur 'within' it. To talk of 'spaces' or 'the space' does not make sense in this context. Therefore space cannot be said to be an x,y,z set of co-ordinates. As outlined in the context of representation in chapter two, a vector approach to the creation of 'spaces' or 'the space' would support this. Placement is not the same as concrete existence, as the above quotations make clear. This means in spatiotemporal terms it is possible for me to write that the *Mona Lisa* is not in the Louvre. The painting (the physical or actual object) is in the Louvre, but the concurrent artistic or aesthetic object is not linked to its physical placement. This point is also made with respect to works of music by Roman Ingarden who describes a difference between ideal (those which might have a tenuous link to Plato's forms) and aesthetic objects (such as a piece of music, in which an element of perception is involved in their experience).[259]

An obvious example of such an approach to space is the Noh theatre structure of *green angel.* This relation allows the question to be asked: does the artwork exist within the space of the performance? Noh theatre, in all its appearances and guises, can be said to constantly refer to a sign which is a kind of ur-Noh, a symbolic cultural form which is expressed imperfectly in all performances. Therefore all Noh performances, including *green angel* refer constantly to a larger space of possibilities of which they inhabit varying dimensions and different times; they are also heterochronic. Of such a sign, Barthes writes,

> [t]he Japanese sign is empty; its signified flees; there is no God, no truth, no morality within these signifiers that reign without compensation. And above all, this sign's superior quality, the nobility of its assertion and the erotic grace of its lines, are attached to everything, the most trivial objects and behaviours, those that we usually dismiss as insignificant or vulgar.[260]

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[257] Lucas, p. 72.

[258] Lucas, p. 71.

[259] Ingarden (1986) pp. 121-122.

[260] Roland Barthes, *L'Empire Des Signes* (Paris: Flammarion, 1980) back cover, quoted in Bourriaud (2010) p. 75.

This all-pervasiveness of signification can certainly be said to be present in *green angel* even to the extent of colouring the elements of the work which do not make specific references to the structure. Bourriaud expands on such a spatial relationship further when he writes,

> the signs that structure the Japanese culture stand out against an empty background, in a pure organization of signifiers installed on nothingness. Its forms are mobile and distinct because they are cut off from all pathos, all original meaning.[261]

Such an assessment rings true, particularly in the case of *green angel* which is removed from the original context of Noh theatre by both historical time and geographic space. Therefore the psycho-historical dimension of the work belongs only to the composer, librettist, and audience, and yet the Noh form as signifier is firmly foregrounded. There is evidence here, then, that Noh itself is a 'journey form.'

The spatial element of the piece *love speed and thrills* is accentuated through the projection which can be seen to function as a window into another interpretation of the music. The possible connections to be made between sound and images are much more numerous than those to be made between different aspects of the music alone, and the presentation of a commentary on a piece of film which clearly has its own (unknown) history before and after the piece, both in its own continuing narrative and in the unknown of its reception as an autonomous artwork cause the music to occupy a larger space in its comment on these unknowns that if it were merely accompanying this part of the film in a larger performance. In a similar manner, the concert hall becomes at issue within the piece *the empiricist view*. The inclusion of the concert hall as a material instead of the medium of an aspect of classical music practice by inviting the audience into the space of the performers, through the exchange which takes place between the percussionist and the conductor at the end of the piece, prevents the music from being perceived as existing within a vacuum, within 'the space' of the music, without making it site-specific. In these three examples the existence of quotation or artworks is dependent on links between overlapping

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[261] Bourriaud (2010) p. 75.

but perhaps non concurrent times and spaces. If the work is relational it can be said to exist precisely in those links.

I therefore claim that, as a composer, it is possible (as Bas van Fraassen claims) to 'postulate abstract, unobservable or modal realities.'[262] The question remains as to the mechanisms by which these are created. I have already described vehicles for the creation of semiotic meaning that themselves can be mistaken for time and space, and mentioned that distortion and repetition are also useful tools for this. I believe the result of such uses of quotation and repetition is the alienation of culturally imposed musical meaning. To expand on how this may be possible, I will briefly discuss three physical/cosmological ideas that are of interest when describing time and space, and ultimately nonlinear aesthetics.

The first idea is the concept of supersymmetry (and the break in supersymmetry). Supersymmetry presents consequences for the way we think about representation and causality since force and matter are paired but at any given time at least half of this pairing remains undetected.[263] Whilst I would never wish to say that I was presenting a musical model of this, supersymmetry does model an interesting philosophical question relating to perception. Should there be other forces asserting constant pressure on matter, McTaggart's conclusion that perception is always incorrect is validated scientifically. Musically this idea is not described, but is paralleled in the pieces *the enigma machine 3: archipelago* and *in the back there was a piegeon (c)*. The repetitive and ritualistic nature of the structure of these pieces leave the listener in continuous anticipation of the next iteration; the music is locked in a constact chain of causality of which the end point can be said to be reached in a manner which is fairly arbitrary—dictated only by the length of the melodic fragment in the former, and the decision by the composer to include twelve iterations as a further liturgical reference in the latter, case. It is also possible for me to imagine performative parallels with experiments which observe particles (such as those currently being undertaken at CERN and Fermilab) which are not intended as an

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[262] Bas Van Fraassen (2000) p. 482.

[263] Michael Dine, *Supersymmetry and String Theory: Beyond the Standard Model*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Ian Aitchison, *Supersymmetry in Particle Physics; An Elementary Introduction*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

element of either piece but which can easily be created when such a causal link is considered.

The second related idea is of anisotropy within the perception of the universe.[264] Anisotropy also has consequences for representation and causality as one can observe that the same parameter exhibits properties with different values when measured along axes in different directions. This is also linked to the third idea since anisotropy in the Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation is also part of the evidence for inflation. The idea that small differences in very similar surfaces, sounds, textures, or repetitions are important and present is a familiar one. Such small differences could be said to be the character of a piece or sound, and the point at which meaning is created. Such small differences in sound are revealed particularly in those pieces with repetitive structures, *the enigma machine 1: hendecaptych of hans memling*; *the enigma machine 2a: properties and essence*; and *the enigma machine 2b: [no subtitle]*. Such pieces also exhibit a problem of causal interconnectedness of different and disparate elements depending on the configuration which is chosen by the performers. Those possible configurations offered by the composer group the fragments in order to emphasis different aspects of the performance, but the possibility of further connections being drawn is also written into the piece. Such causal connectedness is not a perceptual necessity in any performance, but is nevertheless present.

The final idea is of inflation.[265] Inflation confirms why the universe appears flat. From this it is possible to tell that time, when defined as a representation of the real line, has not always been moving at the same rate. There is also evidence to show how two things which seem to never have been in causal contact can be connected. Again there are consequences for the ways one thinks about representation and causality. This is emphasised in the piece *the empiricist view*. The sections of the work each look closer and closer at the relationships between the ensemble: metaphorically time is 'slowed down' as the magnifying glass of the performance moves closer and closer to its geometrical edge. Those relationships which can be taken for granted between conductor and musicians

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[264] A. D. Linde, *Inflation and Quantum Cosmology*, (Boston: Academic Press, 1990) and John D. Barrow and Joseph Silk, *The Left Hand of Creation: The Origin and Evolution of the Expanding Universe*, London: Heinemann, 1984).

[265] The books referenced in the previous footnote are also of interest for this topic.

(and thus 'appear flat') are exposed in an amount of detail which revel their complexity and negate their 'naturalness.'

These three examples present further evidence that time is not a representation of the real line, at least in the way we understand it, and further evidence that it should be considered as a musical material, and separately from issues of 'duration' or 'development'. They also make the limits of both scientific and visual or empirical representation clearly evident. The implications of this are several. There is more to be considered about musical signifiers than merely 'sound' or physicality. Much of the semiotic activity which takes place during the experience of a piece of music is in fact non-musical. This is trivial when considered empirically, but significant since when considering this a definition can be arrived at. Finally, integration of musical elements is not the only possible way to represent causality of connectedness. The conclusion that can be made is that aesthetics is not linked only to perception.

Once again it can also be said that quotation exemplifies the relational nature of the conception of time and space, as outlined in this chapter. Although explicit quotation makes it obvious, this is resident in all quotations, including those which are implicit, and resident in the nature and definition of musical material. For example, the single, open string notes in Lachenmann's piece *Pression* do not make this point explicit but there is not an epistemological requirement for this relational ontology—the web of interrelations exists whether it is present in the forefront of the mind of the listener or not, as also made clear in the scientific and philosophical evidence which deals with non-perceptual data.

This is summed up in two quotations. Firstly, Bas van Fraassen describes that, '[t]he claim of the causal theory of time is not that spatiotemporal terms are *defined*, but that they are *definable*, in terms of causal connectibility.'[266] Hence there need not be a clear phenomoneological description of every aspect of time and space in order to adequately describe them in terms of topological and causal function. This is also quantum logical: such descriptions are plausible precisely because all other definitions can be shown to be implausible when all perceptible evidence is considered. Finally, Vandevelde reads Ricoeur in the following way:

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[266] Bas van Fraassen, (1970) p. 195.

> Ricoeur establishes a connection between object at text in terms of objectifications: the text makes visible and explicit what is implicit in action [...] Ricoeur does not believe that we have to choose between an immediate meaningfulness, present in expressions of life, and indirect methods of quantification as in natural sciences. An objectification can be performed from inside when implicit features and structures are made explicit.[267]

Here Vandevelde makes the link between explicit and implicit information, which in my case may be inherent in materials or quotations, and that which becomes explicit in their performance. Time and space continue unchanged when history is eroded. From this conclusion, one can extrapolate that history is in itself a set of relations which are perceived in artworks; aesthetics is to do with relations.

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[267] Pol Vandevelde, 'The challenge of the "such as it was": Ricoeur's Theory of Narratives,' in *Reading Ricoeur*, ed. by David M Kaplan (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2008) p. 144.

Aesthetics is to do with relations. I have presented here a survey of aesthetic investigations all of which conclude with this statement, and I have explored the possible consequences of this understanding for practice and analysis. This has encompassed a number of themes which can be arrived at either by beginning from practice, by investigating through practice, or by analysis of practice after it has occurred. This methodology has allowed me to reach relational aesthetic conclusions relating to a number of issues. With respect to the ontology or definition of art it has been possible for me to conclude that the artworks themselves are relational; it is not possible to suppose their existence without the conception of a work-function which supposes the existence of a work as a singularity when confronted with the pattern of interrelations which is different for every listener. A survey of modern philosophy of space and time has also supposed that the conception of space and time in a traditional definition of the work is erroneous: a recourse to topology and a relational approach to spatio-temporal concerns can result in a conception of these within a work which does not rely on the listener or receiver accepting certain truths about history in order for the work itself to be 'properly' understood. When addressing musical modernism, the problems arising from a belief in the singularity of musical works, and an erroneous conception of space, time, and history become apparent. Taking a relational aesthetic position it is possible to analyse works which can be said to belong to a contemporary musical modernism, reading such works in opposition to statements which are made about them to find out if claims which are made about the function of material in these works are indeed correct. These analyses take place within the backdrop of a larger consideration of the state of musical borrowing at the end of the twentieth- and in the early twenty-first centuries. It has been possible to conclude that where borrowing strays from outright quotation then it is most successful in achieving outcomes which are not merely to do with re-presenting that which is quoted. The final important conclusion of that which I have presented here is that it supposes the future and further understanding, reading, analysis and composition of works of music: it is not in any way meant to be a fully comprehensive assessment but instead an indication of the kinds of work which are yet to be done by, through, and because of this investigation.

The structure of these arguments within this thesis could be summarised as below. Chapter one introduced relational aesthetics from Bourraiud's point of view and set out the themes of this thesis which have been reflected in the chapter titles: works and authors; material and autonomy; space and time. This introductory chapter also introduced the music of my portfolio as being inherently and internally interrelational; a necessary point from which to move to considering these, and other, works as being externally relational. Chapter one also sought to define aesthetics and the nature of aesthetic investigations for the purposes of this thesis. Chapter two examined the ontology of the work itself, considering a number of definitions and concluding with a largely mereological explanation. This took into account conceptual analysis done through practice and through detailed analysis of statements which could be made about works. A comparison with existing conclusions about authors allowed for the proposal of a work function and consideration of a vector model of representation to allow some description of the nature of the work. Chapter three discussed an historical definition of material and its consequences for the autonomy of works, especially when considered against the backdrop of the work function concluded upon in chapter two. Analysis of existing music, and consideration of my own, allowed me to conclude as to a relational aesthetic position with regards to the position of material in the work of music and the consequences this has for the possibilities of the meanings of, and comments made by, artworks. Chapter four considered philosophical approaches to time and space and how positions with respect to these are assumed in artworks and aesthetic writings. This built on the conclusions about the construct of history made in chapter three, and considered, through practice and through consideration of existing music, how time and space can or might be perceived and approached.

My investigation has encompassed consideration of this ontology of the work of art, Bourriaud's relational aesthetics, and both of these with respect to investigation into quotation and musical borrowing at all levels of the musical work. I have considered quotation to be an exemplar of the outcomes of my analyses, to be pertinent in the philosophy of space and time, and in the analysis and criticism of musical modernism, and to be a particularly important part of the construction of my own works. All of these themes have suggested that the logical conclusion is to consider Bourriaud's relational aesthetics as ontological rather than epistemological, and to extend their implications to consider as material, all aspects of works. Bourriaud himself has begun to consider these

same ideas in his conception of radicant aesthetics and the altermodern.[268] Bourriaud can be said to incorporate some of these ideas in the following observations. Firstly, he writes that,

> the major aesthetic phenomenon of our time is surely the intertwining of the properties of space and time, which turn the latter into a territory every bit as tangible as [physical reality].[269]

This very much describes the artistic situation that would be supposed by accepting the definitions given in chapter four. Secondly, Bourriaud notes that, 'today's art seems to negotiate the creation of new types of space by resorting to a geometry of translation: topology.'[270] Here he supposes exactly that methodology which I have chosen. The topological approach to time is one which allows one to arrive at the conclusion of relational ontology due to the interaction of space and time in musical and other artworks. Artists who achieve this are described by Bourriaud as 'radicant,' subject to longer explanation below,

> in a radicant universe, principles mingle and multiply by means of combinations. No more subtraction, but constant multiplication. That profusion, that absence of clear hierarchies, is in keeping with this precariousness, which can no longer be reduced to the use of fragile materials or short durations but now imbues all artistic production with its uncertain hues and constitutes an intellectual substrate, an ideological backdrop before which all forms pass in review.[271]

This, then, describes how the situation sought out by those artists at the forefront of contemporary art is actually that in which all artworks find themselves. The possibility of this situation in some works causing the breakdown of structuralist hierarchies in all works. This situation is given explicit description by Bourriaud when he writes,

> Contemporary art commits its most serious act of breaking and entering against our perception of social reality. It essentially

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[268] Bourriaud (2010). This investigation began, for Bourriaud, with the exhibition 'Altermodern' at the Tate Triennial in 2009.

[269] Bourriaud (2010) p. 79.

[270] ibid. p. 79.

[271] ibid. p. 83.

> renders everything it touches precarious; such is its ontological foundation.[272]

This statement is of particular importance since it is the first time that Bourriaud equates the effect and sociosemiotic situation of contemporary art with its ontology explicity in writing. Here he has essentially gone on to suppose my point in this thesis. The second important aspect of this, although it is of no less importance than the first, is that while I have begun from theory, through practice to reach this conclusion, Bourriaud has begun from a survey of practice to reach this theory. Our methodologies meet in the arrival at the statement 'the work of art is ontologically relational.' It is therefore my belief that, just as my conclusions are legitimated by Bourriaud's eventual arrival at them, so his conclusion is legitimated through my supposition of it through an opposing methodology.

Bourriaud describes the radicant artist as a '*semionaut*: a creator of paths in a landscape of signs.'[273] I can think of no better word for my goal as a creative artist. In fact, the examples from my own work which I have provided present an artistic goal of being just that: the survey of signs, symbols, and referents in these works demonstrate that I have drawn from a number of disparate disciplines in order to reach a single, coherent, conclusion across the body of works.

Bourriaud is not the only thinker who helps to legitimate my conclusions, he is simply the only thinker who also arrives at them directly. In this investigation I have taken an integrated philosophical approach which has also taken into account analytic aesthetics. There are a number of reasons for this, some already given in chapter one, but the main one of interest to recap here is that this has allowed me to deal directly with perception and so to answer the question 'do we perceive that which I claim here to be aesthetic?'

In this respect, my integrated approach has been important since sometimes it has been necessary to make statements which are *analytic*—for example it has been important for me to be able to say that the *Mona Lisa* is concretely *not* the object in the Louvre in order to describe the work adequately. Sometimes it has also been important to make more abstract judgements—for example to answer

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[272] ibid. p. 99.

[273] ibid. p. 103.

the question, 'what is the phenomenology of relations?' which I believe cannot be tested out in language and logic. It seems to me that philosophy must be concerned with *both* types of questions in order to make statements which are relevant to the experiences of artists and audiences, and therefore to describe the work, its ontology and its various perceptual issues adequately. I have found that, on the majority of occasions, there are significant areas when analytic and so-called continental or postmodern philosophy overlap without one ever acknowledging the other. This same point was made by Quine in *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, in which he described how the analytic/synthetic distinction is false.[274] Christopher Norris also summarises Quine, and the very reason why an integrated approach is necessary, when describing that the issue with analytic truths, created through the medium of language, is that 'our very notions of truth, meaning and analyticity are embedded in that language.'[275] If analytic truths cannot be understood alongside a discussion which considers extra-linguistic factors, then there may be an issue with their claims to truth. However, if other truths cannot be expressed succinctly and truthfully in language or mathematics then there may also be issues with their claims to truth. In order for aesthetic concepts to be expressed truthfully then both approaches are needed, since aesthetics deals with extra-linguistic factors, but is communicated through language.

My experience with analytic aesthetics also allows me to say that of any artwork the 'aesthetic' as an identifiable quality in a statement, artwork, or experience; 'the aesthetic' is in fact the relational quality of such a thing. This definition is an important one for me since it encompasses *all* texts and I do not have to make a special case for music: I can say that music is equally relational with other artforms, since perceived relations for one listener or viewer do not constitute the sum of all relations. 'The aesthetic' like 'the analytic' is, in fact, not difficult to look for as its potential is latent in all signifiers. It does not require society to define art, it does not exclude popular or non-western art, and it does not require the audience of the art to be aware of it. It allows the artwork a certain degree of autonomy, although like Roman Ingarden I note this is a more general case.[276]

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[274] Quine (1951).

[275] Christopher Norris, 'Reading Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Right Interpretation,' in *Analytic Aesthetics* (1989) p. 105.

[276] Ingarden (1986) pp. 121-122.

This position finds support in the works of other so-called continental writers. I have particularly noted how Rancière's aesthetic regime of art is one which explains how a certain kinds of relations are preferred in our society, and one which finds much relevance when considered along side relational definitions of art. One area I have not focused on in any great detail is the criticism of art itself. I have noted where some composers and their commentators seem to wish for a structuralist explanation of meaning in the works they describe, but have not described how composers, artists, and critics describe their valuing of art as a whole. Such an investigation could fill another chapter of this thesis and so I will not provide much detail here, I have already mentioned above my reasons for avoiding the testimony of composers. However, the following example from Michael Kelly shows how an investigation into criticism and critical values placed on artworks can result in the uncovering of a mis-definition of the artworks where a relational definition would have been more suitable.

Michael Kelly's description of the issues with the criticism of one of the artists from the 1993 Whitney Biennial focuses on how the description of what was and was not acceptable, what was and was not political, is relational to the position of the critic. He writes,

> perhaps she crossed the line, but the line remains even when it is crossed; in fact the crossing re-affirms that there is a line, even if it is removed as a result of the crossing, and the presence and persistence of the line is evidence, in this case, of an integral relationship between aesthetics and politics.[277]

In other words, any position which is taken is relational to the art itself, and therefore there is no view of the art which can negate it as art or negate its value. It is possible to be reminded at this point of the statue and the lump of bronze: the description of the atoms as a statue negating the supervenience of the description of a lump of bronze. Kelly does not describe this art as avant-garde despite the number of contentious issues surrounding it. He notes, instead, the problems with avant-garde as a movement, which have been solved by the works he addresses, writing,

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[277] Kelly, p. 244.

> it is because the avant-garde did not fully recognize the political autonomy of art that it failed.[278]

The fact that the critics overlooked the relation of their position to the artworks, in order to come out in favour of an artistic position which they would have found more favourable, is the reason Kelly can describe their assessment as being removed from the artworks almost entirely. I believe that I would be able to come to a similar conclusion if I were to undertake a similar investigation, as described above, into the modes through which contemporary musical artworks are valued by their critics. That investigation is, however, to be undertaken in the future.

This situation is described in more abstract terms by Charles Alteri when he writes,

> In art and in life, what is alive in the sentence defines the modes of intentionality which idiosyncratic occasions make visible in and as human existence.[279]

This situation is such that 'what is alive in the sentence' is personal, in the above example to the critics, but in a more general example to the receiver. Thus the outcome is far from general. Alteri also insists,

> We postulate selves in terms of what will enable us to provide motives for the expressive modality of such an utterance. Yet because the provocation to such contexts remains among the public features of the language, the entire analytic process is in principle recuperable by others *as* constituents for their own particular uses,[280]

which makes it clear how such a proliferation of meaning which was present in the artworks in Kelly's example, and in all artworks in general, could be overlooked by a group such as of critics, or of composers with a certain ideological aim, or of receivers who may have been conditioned to believe that language, and therefore also art, has specific meanings. This supports my

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[278] ibid. p. 231.

[279] Alteri (1989) p. 80.

[280] ibid. p. 76.

argument that the work is relational but also presents a reason as to why this fact is not widely accepted in society.

I believe that I have given conclusive proof that this investigation is aesthetic as well as ontological. A dismissal of its conclusions which finds them not to be directly to do with music can be said itself to be anti-aesthetic. Rancière says of such a position that,

> contemporary 'anti-aesthetics' is, then, the defensive form of modernism, unremitting in its attempt to exercise from 'its' version of the 'specificity of art' that aesthetic regime of art which brings art into being, but only at the price of disappropriating it,[281]

and that in the case of the evaluation of art valued by such a position, it can be said that,

> this arbitrary division between the gesture and the forms it produces is here called into question insofar as it is the very image of contemporary alienation: the cannily maintained illusion, even in art institutions, that objects excuse methods and that the *end* of art justifies the pettiness of the intellectual and ethical measures.[282]

Here Rancière makes it clear and, just as in Danto's assessment of the 'Artworld,' modes of valuing art cannot be said to legitimate art when the creators of patrons of the artworks and the authors of the modes of engagement, are one and the same.

I have referred consistently to contemporary music. This is not because I believe the problems and situations presented to be unique to contemporary music but because, contrary to the assertion that new theory must address old artworks in order for it to be comprehensible, I believe that new theory and new artworks must be considered together in order for the theory to be truly relevant and the artworks to be truly contemporary. I do not in this consideration make any claims to a particular style, however. William Weber notes that the issue with a

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[281] Rancière, *Aesthetics and its Discontents* (2009), p. 69.

[282] Bourriaud (2008) p. 48.

defining any group of artworks under a single banner of style, genre or period is that,

> [an] historiographical problem [...] there is great danger of homogenizing the arts historically if we portray a movement sweeping across the cultural map.[283]

Therefore the use of terms such as 'modernist' and 'avant-garde' have been useful to me in defining prevailing ideological positions but not in describing artworks themselves. I believe that I have not, however, presented a postmodernist position in either musical style or ideology. The main reason it can be said not to be is covered in the arguments in chapter four: a postmodernist position always takes (modernist) history as a starting point despite any good intentions of the artists. Bourriaud describes this very problem when he writes,

> It is this prefix, "post-" that will ultimately turn out to have been the great myth at the end of the twentieth century. It points to the nostalgia for a golden age at once admired and hated. It refers to a past event that supposedly cannot be surpassed, an event on which the present depends and whose effects it is a question of managing.[284]

Bourriaud therefore refers to truly contemporary art not as postmodernist but as artworks which he believes to deal with the contemporary situation itself. I have considered this situation at every point in the musical investigation through the implementations of my hypotheses and conclusions in the music presented. The key facet of this is to use, present, and to exist within, interrelations at every point during the compositional process. Bourriaud describes exactly this, saying,

> today's art meets [the challenge of how one can dwell in interrelations] by exploring this new space-time of conductivity, in which supports and surfaces have given way to journeys. Artists become semionauts, the surveyors of a hypertext world that is no longer the classical flat space but a network infinite in time as well as space; and not so much the producers of forms as the agents of their viatorization, of the regulation of their historical and geographic displacement.[285]

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[283] Weber, p. 491

[284] Bourriaud (2010) p. 183.

[285] ibid. p. 184. Bourriaud uses the word 'viatorize' to mean 'gives movement and dynamics to form.'

As a final description of this situation I will quote Bourriaud's particularly poetic assessment of what an artist dwelling in interrelationships means for the perception of an artwork.

> The random comes together here with precariousness, understood as a principle of non-membership: that which is constantly moving from place to place, which weakens origins or destroys them, which viatorizes itself and proceeds by performing successive translations, does not belong to the continental world to this new altermodern archipelago, this garden of wandering.[286]

This, then, represents the aesthetic goal of these artworks. I believe it is made possible by the acceptance of the conclusions with respect to the ontology of the artwork, the role and function of history, the topological definition given of time and space, and ultimately the role of relations in the constitution and signification of all of these. What is most important in this conclusion is the existence of a work-function which is a relation. As it is a relation, it can be said that this is aesthetic; aesthetics is to do with relations.

[286] ibid. p. 185.

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