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A Cultural Analysis of the Relationship Between Nationalism and Populism: The Case of South Korea

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A Note to Readers

Concerning the issue of the romanisation of Korean, this thesis follows the guidelines provided by the National Institute of Korean Language, Republic of Korea (NIKL, National Institute of Korean Language, undated), different from the McCune–Reischauer romanisation. The latter is prevalent in the scholarly literature of Korean studies, but this thesis persists in how Korean is pronounced and is characterised in English without breves and apostrophes. Those marks could cause another deviated pronunciation of the terms in Koreans, and some notations of consonants and vowels are far from actual sounds. For example, McCune-Reischauer's system denotes a Korean consonant 'ㅈ' with 'ch', relatively close to 'j' in its pronunciation.

Thus, this thesis mainly adopts the National Institute of Korean Language guideline, of which the principle is to write in accordance with how the Korean language actually sounds. This principle is the same as the References. For example, the author will spell 박정희 with 'Park Chung-Hee' or 민중 with *minjung* when the name for the well-known person's or the concept's original denotation in English exists. However, when the source in Reference is originally written in Korean, the thesis follows NIKL rules with *Bakjeonghee* in the romanisation of the Korean title, using 'Park Chung-Hee' in its translation. This rule is the same as the denotation of loanwords in Korean from the foreign language. For example, when a Korean source has 포퓰리즘 (populism) in its title, the romanisation of the term will be *popyulijeum* following NIKL rule, while its translation in English uses the original spelling of *populism*.

For some key concepts with a common noun, I write in the order as follows: *romanisation with italics* (한글단어, 漢子—Chinese characters of the word, a relevant English word) or 한글단어 (漢子, *romanisation with italics*, a relevant English word), or a relevant English word (한글단어, 漢子, *romanisation with italics*) when I mention them the first time. Then I put romanisation without italics (ex. gungmin, minjung, joongmin) or a relevant English word (ex. subject) from its second reference except when I highlight or remind it. The Chinese characters are absent when I state pure Korean terms.

Declaration

I, the author, confirm that the Thesis is my own work. I am aware of the University's Guidance on the Use of Unfair Means (www.sheffield.ac.uk/ssid/unfair-means). This work has not been previously presented for an award at this university. The Thesis is for the double PhD degree programme between this university and Yonsei University, to which the same work is simultaneously presented.

Abstract

This study focuses on the relationship between nationalism and populism by analysing the political history of Korea. Populism studies have merely dealt with the cases in East Asia on those issues, as general literature remains a normative understanding of those issues and democracy, overlooking the tentative research cases in the region. The comparative studies of populism develop with a minimalist definition, emphasising the antagonism between the homogenous groups—'the elite' and 'the people'. However, this minimalist definition homogenised heterogeneous natures of 'the elite', 'the people', and their forms of confrontations in different regional and historical contexts. This study expands the cases for populism studies while clarifying the relationship between nationalism and populism. The historical experience of people in South Korea is an excellent example of analysing the interaction between the nation-state and society. This thesis contributes to introducing new dimensions, the temporality of political economy and the spatiality of political cleavage.

With nation and state decoupled, the meanings of the people varied significantly across Korean political history, causing the populistic elements in the country. A strong and administrative-oriented state vis-à-vis society resulted in the absence of horizontal confrontation between the Left and Right, instead conceptualising social demands as national, strengthened by a vertical antagonism between society and the state. The rapid development of the national economy enforced this verticality. Korean history has been prevalent with the imagination of power relations between the state high above and the people or society below. Analysing political history in South Korea provides an opportunity to innovate the recent definition of populism regarding its global political activism of nationalism and democracy.

Keywords: populism, nationalism, democracy, Korean politics, cultural analysis

Chapter One

Introduction

"[Populism] is not about one people against another people; instead, it is about one part of the people against another part of the same people."

- From da Silva and Salgado (2018, 255), "Why no populism in Porutugal?"

1-1. Research question and objectives

What is the relationship between nationalism and populism? Moreover, why and in which context are populists prone to rely on nationalistic discourse? Since the late twentieth century, political movements categorised as far-right, political extremists, and populists in Western democratic states are calling global attention to these questions for politicians, social activists, journalists, and students in social sciences. National Front (Front Nationale, nowadays RN, Rassemblement national or National Rally since 2018) in France, Freedom Party (PVV, Partij Voor de Vrijheid) in the Netherlands, Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) and Forza Italia (FI) amongst other such groups are associated with political stances of anti-immigration, anti-globalism, cultural nationalism. The term populism has further gathered global popularity since the election of US President Donald J. Trump and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom in 2016 (Shuster, 2016; Taub, 2016; Wilkinson, 2017). Anti-establishment sentiment and distrust of conventional political forms of representative democracy are prominent features of these cases.

These phenomena overlap with another flow of 'democracy in retreat' (Kurlantzick, 2013) in developing or newly developed countries in non-European regions, such as

Southeast Asia or Latin America, where the conventional wisdom of modernisation theory no longer ensures the success of democracy. In these regions, people of the middle-class distrust popular politics, whereas populist leaders assert themselves as they fight against unreliable elites, appealing to the ordinary people. As the gap between the established and common people deepens worldwide, it is arguable that we see 'the global rise of populism' (Moffit, 2016). However, the existing literature on populism studies has paid little attention to the cases in East Asia despite the concurrent emergence of populism in the region. In addition, the relationship between nationalism, populism, and the democratic state has not attracted enough academic attention, with little differentiating of those concepts.

Focusing on the case of South Korea, this study aims at elaborating on the logic of how populism and nationalism are interrelated. In developing an alternative theoretical approach, I emphasise two concepts of the nation and the state regarding populism. The following section shows that previous literature has biased regional case selections in analysing populism. Over a couple of years since the rise of populism studies (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969), it is one of the recent academic trends that some social scientists reassess the Western far right in past of the 1990s as populism. The recent cases of other regions, such as Southern Europe (Spain, Greece, and Türkiye), competitively emerge in the published articles and editions as a research subject for the concept.

However, amongst this academic frenzy, the question of what far-right nationalism and populism are and how they differ from each other remains a puzzle. This study introduces a cultural analysis of constructing popular nationalism in South Korea, where popular nationalism has historically been affected and constructed in the context of the strongly-perceived state's role in society. By doing so, this study argues that under representative democracy, the coupling of nationalism and populism emerges when people feel temporal

and spatial discrepancies in their apprehension of the political community while there is no alternative symbol of identity but the people of the nation.

That being said, populism is a thin ideology that combines with nationalism when people think that the state does to serve what they believe in the nation, even under the institutional condition of liberal democracy based on pluralism. This point is crucial in emerging populism: people represent their political demands by one signifier, 'the people' or 'nation' *as a whole.* It is because they have few options for choosing the organisation for mediating and representing their diverse interests *in parts* to politics. This as-a-whole-in-parts question is a crucial issue in populism studies, primarily implied by Mudde (2004), theorised by Laclau (2005), and questioned by De Cleen and Stabrakakis (2017) and Brubaker (2020) in terms of nationalism. This thesis critically accepts those theorisations and agendas but not totally agreeing with them, especially Laclau and his Essex school's assertion of populism as the essence of politics (See Chapter Two). This thesis will demonstrate how the logic of populism operates by exploring the elements of populism, which consist of *populistic nationalism* across Korean political history. The main objectives of the thesis are (a) to clarify the relationship between the concepts of nation, the state, and populism; (b) to explain the different understanding of the relationship between political community presented by populist and representative democracy ; (c) to depict how nationalism provides the common people with a way to understand political agendas; and (d) to outline the contexts in which political representation can be explained in terms of the particular style of populism.

First, I examine the literature on populism before summarising this thesis's theoretical view. I will explain why I choose the case of Korean political history as the conventional elements of populism have been prevalent. This thesis adopts discursive institutionalism in analysis to contribute to political science, regional studies, and populism studies.

1-2. Basic literature review and theoretical gaps

A. Regional bias in populism studies

Let us start with a tentative question: why have the scholars problematised the terms far-right, neo-nationalism, political extremism, and now populism? This problematisation is based on an implicit assumption that those phenomena are at odds with a global trend of transnationalism, liberal democracy, and cultural pluralism. In addition, if those phenomena are perceived as global, how do they emerge regionally? Previous literature has focused on the specific regions along with the different periods—populism in North America and Russian narodniki in the nineteenth century; Latin America in the middle of the twentieth century; the countries under democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War and Western democratic societies in continental Europe (cf. Taggart, 2000). As mentioned earlier, populism has become popular partly due to the political turmoil in two major Anglophone countries in 2016. In addition, some studies indicate populistic leadership in South and Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand, and even African countries (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969; Gherghina et al., 2013; De la Torre, 2015; Moffitt, 2015). However, the comprehensive research on Northeast Asian populism is relatively recent, as shown in Section 1-4. This tendency can be understood as 'Atlantic bias' in research on populism, mainly focused on the cases in Western democracy and Latin America (Moffitt, 2015, 293-295).

In this context, why have the studies on populism focused on particular geographical regions? We can consider the conceptualisation of populism through the Post-war modern era as one reason. It relies on the global centrality of Anglo-American liberal democracy, resulting in hierarchies laid over regional distinctions, such as advanced-underdeveloped

countries or First-Second-Third World countries. The very first earliest examples in the study on populism indicate that “so many people are inclined to think that movements’ left-of-Soviet-communism’ […] and students’ movements are the strident reincarnation of populism in the second half of the twentieth century” (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969, 3). This is significant when we consider the academic atmosphere of political and social science in that era, which emphasised more scientific, empirical research on how the political institution of Western democracy could be applied to or incorporated in the Second and the Third World in the Cold War era (Mitchell, 1999, 78-79; Hong, 2022). Liberal democracy is understood by normatively distinguishing the world regionally into the countries close to its ideal and far from it. In so doing, the concept of populism has been used to explain the political reality of whether a particular country or region is inferior to that ideal.

B. Democracy and populism

The regional bias of populism studies leads to another question about how populism can appeal to the people in the democratic state since the modern era. As populistic discourses champion the supremacy of the will of ordinary people in opposition to the elite, the term democracy is adopted to provide legitimacy to their political project. Previous studies are contentious on whether populism is threatening or corrective to democracy: some scholars (Taguieff, 1995; Rosanvallon, 2008) argue that populism is against fundamental values of liberal democracy, such as pluralism, individualism and representative democracy. Others (Cannovan, 1997; Mudde, 2010; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012) emphasise an inherent and inevitable element in democracy itself. Some scholars, especially Ernesto Laclau (2005), imply that populism can be a remedy for the limits of representative democracy or even that it

is an authentic form of politics.

However, regardless of whether populism is antagonistic to or affinitive to democracy, such normative approaches are now being replaced by a minimalist definition of populism for understanding it concerning democracy through a cross-regional comparative analysis (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). As indicated earlier on the link between populism and democracy, two opposite arguments on whether the former is contradictory with or corrective to the latter assume their ideal-types. According to these normative approaches, populism can threaten representative liberal democracy of institutionally mediated participation by regularised elections and other legal measures. It is an ideal form of politics that maximises political representation with more direct reflection and broader comprehension of the people's political will. However, that issue is a matter of the degree to which we interpret the democratic values applied to individual cases (Mudde, 2010, 1178; cf. Müller, 2016). This study adopts the premise that the relationship between populism and democracy cannot be reduced to the pros-and-cons distinction between the two, but the former *transforms* the latter *within* representative democracy without discarding it entirely (italics added, Urbinati, 2019).

According to Urbinati (2019, 7), democracy consists of two spaces: the space of 'will' where the government or constitutional institution realises people's will and the space of 'opinion' where different social demands compete. Populism's demands reformulate the social demands of 'part' in the name of people as a 'whole', aiming at the institutional change to implement those demands (Urbinati, 2019, 47-48). In this aspect, representative democracy cannot be discarded by populists, as any part to be a whole needs the realm of competition with other parts. It is distinctive from Fascism, characterised by the complete homogenisation of the realm of will and opinion. She suggests the relation between populism and democracy with the metaphor between host and parasite (Urbinati, 2019, 21), in which the latter cannot

entirely kill the former for its survival. In this vein, this study rejects the view of the dichotomous relationship between populism and democracy but decides representative democracy as the condition to argue populism. This condition is crucial to see why nationalism appears as one of the main issues in studying populism in the twenty-first century's global politics.

C. Nationalism and populism

Scholars, journalists, and politicians all collapse populist phenomena with nationalism in their description of when certain groups as far-right or populist radical right. In this view, nationalism is considered a *shibboleth* with meanings of exclusive, anti-integration, sometimes anti-liberal, and anachronistic ideology in a global era. In the case of Brexit, the Leave bloc had once constituted and spread the anti-immigrant, anti-EU, racist, and isolationist sentiments via para-political organisations such as the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), former British National Party (BNP), and English Defence League (EDL). They emphasised maximising the autonomy of the British nation-state, free from the external inflow of non-British populations. However, the reason why those groups adopt nationalism as their assets for popular support has been rarely dealt with, leaving us with an inadequate conceptual justification for looking at the rising European Far Rights (Aslanidis, 2017, 273; De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017; Stavrakakis et al., 2017). Coupled with the normative view on the relation with democracy, the ambiguity between the Far Rights and nationalism can moralise the concept of populism, which entails the notion of the strict antagonism between the two *homogenous* groups of the genuine and patriotic people and the anti-nationalistic elite (italics added, Stavrakakis et al., 2017, 424).

However, this thesis does not attempt to rescue populism from nationalism. It is accurate that nationalism and populism are distinct but mutually intersected concepts that cannot be analytically independent (Brubaker, 2020, 45). Concerning this, previous literature maintains a distinction between socio-economic and socio-cultural Left-Right schemes, providing criteria: the Left, as inclusionary and non-nationalistic populism in Latin America (plus Podemos in Spain and SYRIZA in Greece) and the Right, as exclusionary and nationalistic populism in western Europe (Mudde and Rovira Kalwasser 2012; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Kioupkiolis 2016). Similarly, based on the minimalist definition of populism mentioned earlier, Hellmann (2017) once concluded that the socio-economic dimension of (in the Marxist sense) classes and socio-cultural contention in post-material values had been muted in East Asia, which he argues as a necessary condition for the rise of populism based on antagonism between people and elite homogenously perceived.

This argument still serves to strengthen "a specific regional brand of populism [which] represents populism in toto" (Moffitt, 2015, 295). Moreover, 'pure' people and 'corrupt' elites, which exist in a 'homogenous' manner, on which the minimalist definition by Cas Mudde (2004; 2007) relies, are not minimal enough to be used as analytical concepts (Katsambekis, 2016, 391; Brubaker, 2017, 362). At the same time, they can be empirically unrealistic or even contradict reality. This point is evident when we consider populists who can be culturally coarse and 'low' for closeness to common people (Ostiguy, 2017, 79, 91) or such people are not only opposite to the 'upper' elites but to the un-common people who are at the bottom of the society (Brubaker, 2020, 54).

The term 'people' has been historically and conjecturally constructed while it has been related to a nation's concept since the modern era of the nation-state system (Balibar, 1991; Canovan, 2005, 40-64; Brubaker, 2017a; 2017b). Despite its academic significance, the

relation between populism and nationalism is rarely analysed in the literature on populism, strengthening “the a-priori inclusion of nationalism in the definition of populism” (De Cleen and Stavrakis, 2017, 304). As noted above, many existing pieces of research fail to overcome the shortcomings mentioned, designating specific populism to particular regions. Besides, McKean (2016), on the cases of the so-called inclusionary populism of SYRIZA and Podemos and its theoretical basis of ‘populism as political logic’ by Ernesto Laclau (2005), warns that such understanding overlooks the role of race in populism, which is accepted as naturalised and taken-for-granted.

1-3. Theoretical perspectives

A. Introducing the cultural analysis of the state

This study asks why and in which context populists rely on nationalistic discourse. In addition, concerning the relationship between democracy and populism, to overcome the regionally biased literature on populism, we can adopt another variable to grasp how democratic politics since the post-war era has developed in a specific regional context by focusing on the state.

As indicated in Hellmann’s study, US-backed authoritarian regimes in East Asia have achieved capitalist development, repressing the conventional Left-Right political confrontation required for voluntary associations to develop homogeneous people and elites (Hellmann, 2017, 171-172). However, this historical experience can serve as a critical factor in diversifying the global phenomenon of populism. The literature on South Asia or Asian-Pacific countries has begun to focus on its effects via right-wing politics in the region’s post-authoritarian, neoliberal, globalised societies (Chacko, 2018; Chacko and Jayasuriya, 2018;

Hadiz, 2018; Ibrahim, 2018). In sum, 'the state effect' (Mitchell, 1991; 1999) has affected the authoritarian lifestyle and distinction between politics and everyday life. The term authoritarianism does not only indicate a political regime. It is "the belief in a strictly ordered society", and "it does not necessarily mean an anti-democratic attitude, but neither does it preclude one" (Mudde, 2007, 23). When we see the emergence of populism in the region, we need to consider the historically constructed effect of post-authoritarian state roles in East Asia (esp. Ibrahim, 2018).

The cultural theory of the state regards the ontological status of the state as cultural, embedded in everyday life of people who imagine what the state is and how they perceive what politics is (Abrams 1988[1977]; Mitchell 1999; Hay 2014). The conventional understanding sees the state as only a formal institution, such as the government, and its personnel, like politicians and bureaucrats. A cultural view of the state better helps us understand how common people apprehend their political community within a nation-state and in a political and historical context. By doing so, we can understand how they act in relation to the formal institutions, especially the representative liberal democratic system, which binds their political lives. Here the concept of the state provides the institutional and historical context in which political actors negotiate and legitimise their political practices (Hay, 2014). Scholars argue that the literature on populism has had too much focus on the supply side of politics like political ideology, rhetoric, the societal-economic condition of its emergence, and its formulation in the political-institutional sphere through party politics (Kemmers et al., 2015; Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016).

In contrast, the cultural theory of the state aims at conceptualising the demand side in the political process, focusing on how people *live in the state* habitually. The state is a cognitive condition by which people resent that a political institution does not serve a nation's political

purpose (cf. Balibar, 1991). In addition, this cultural system comprises overall actors, regardless of the elite and the people, which enable them to interact and constitute each other. This view is similar to arguing populism as a type of ‘political style’ (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014; Moffitt, 2016). By seeing the state as a cultural entity, we can overcome the shortcomings of previous literature, which presume the categories of homogeneous people and elite as *a priori*, limiting the possibility of analysing more cases with the features regarded as populism.

Previous studies on the politico-economic state formation of (South) Korea have seen the state as a fixed, unitary, and relatively independent institution (e.g. Choi, 1985; Choi, 1989; Choi, 1996; Choi, 2010; Haggard and Moon, 1991; Sonn, 2011, and other literature in Korean on state theory on South Korea prevalent since the 1990s). It is due to the development of state theory in Korea under the influence of a structural approach to the concept of the state (cf. Jo, 1988, 12). This tendency has been conspicuous in the literature on authoritarian military regimes from the 16 May Coup in 1961 to democratisation in 1987. For example, the narrative of most academic literature written in Korean assumes the distinctiveness of a binary demarcation of state and society or anti-democratic v. democratic [반민주 (反民主, *ban-minju*) v. 민주(民主, *minju*)] or the conservative v. the progressive [보수 (保守, *bosu*) v. 진보 (進步, *jinbo*)]. It represents resistant social movements as *the* symbol of the latter, considered *as if* they had never been inscribed in the top-downing, guiding, and superficial state bodies, as the concept of the relationship between the state and society remains abstract.

Such assumptions about the pure democratic, anti-authoritarian people are partial in their representations of the state in Korea. When the antagonism between the elite and people is

discussed here, I attempt to avoid the overemphasis on dominant-resistant confrontation, which misses the most common people who live their lives despite repressive state apparatuses. As Stuart Hall (1988, 139) puts it, discourses of populism and democracy do not belong to any single class: their articulation is the outcome of a particular ideological struggle in different conditions, by which those confrontations can be effectively neutralised for a specific agency (e.g. for Hall, the British Right in the 1980s). Therefore, this thesis questions the binary and homogenising distinction between 'the elite' and 'the people'. I argue that the relationship between those two discursive subjects of ups and downs are de/re-politicised and intertwined, regardless of the dominant-resistant confrontation in a single political conjuncture.

It is not to deny the coercive character of the authoritarian practices of the state. It is rather to re-interpret the state as banal, natural, and oriented towards maintaining hegemony in everyday life, which cannot be caught in the distinction of the *evil state - good society contradiction*. The overemphasis on democratic/dissident social movements as elitist resistance that achieved its goal in 1987 through democratisation leaves the lacuna of the existence of non-elite people. We need to see how the people, who explicitly or implicitly participated in such movements, were also resisting and accepting the strong ideological governmentality of the state on their own. Referring to some recent literature, especially Kim Won's work (2011), this thesis will see how the concept of the (ordinary) people was nationalised or de-nationalised regarding populism vis-à-vis the practice of the state.

This is why Chapter Seven, which deals with the concept of common people (*botong-saram*, 보통사람, 普通사람), is far longer than other previous chapters on Korean political history. The 13th presidential election was an excellent case to understand how the

symbolisation and signification of the term 'common people' are constructed in relation to other competing concepts, though the term itself rarely dealt with not only in previous populism studies in general but in Korean political or social science. This thesis's purpose, the relationship between nationalism and populism, cannot evade the analysis of the meaning of common people around the 1987 democratisation, as that meaning is still relevant to understand the post-1987 democracy and so-called 'street politics' or 'politics in the square' since the 2000s. By juxtaposing the alternative symbols to the national (*gungmin*, 국민, 國民) such as *minjung* (민중, 民衆), the middle classes (*jungsancheung*, 중산층, 中産層), and the people in the middle (*joongmin*, 중민, 中民) in 1980s Korea, this thesis elucidates the completion of populistic nationalism and common people and its role in Korean politics before and after 1987.

B. Nation-state as a temporal-spatial system of political community

This study provides a theoretical approach to analyse how the concept of the nation has obtained its status as the *prima facie* political community. This political community allows individuals to identify themselves as a political subject. This study adopts Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Community* (2006[1983]), which regards the nation as a cultural system. Charles Taylor's suggestion of the 'modern social imaginary' in *A Secular Age* details Anderson's concept to see its effects at the level of the everyday lifeworld (Taylor, 2007). Anderson's work explains how the concept of nation has allowed people to understand the modern temporality-spatiality of the political community, replacing the pre-modern (religious or political) one. Taylor's concept of the modern social imaginary (Taylor, 2007,

159-211) is a more detailed conceptualisation of Anderson's coinage applied to politics. The modern social imaginary is inherent in the popular democracy characterised as a 'direct-access society' (Taylor, 2007, 207-211). This argument provides an intuition to operationalise an analytical frame to explain the difference between the temporal-spatial apprehension in the representative system and populism.

In this thesis, I emphasise a *temporal dimension* of nation-state and populism to innovate previous spatial analyses of the two concepts. Populism studies and nationalism have focused on spatial analysis in a vertical sense (populism with 'the elite'-'the people' axis) and a horizontal sense (nationalism with the 'exclusionary'-'inclusionary' axis) (De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017; Stavrakakis et al., 2017; Brubaker, 2017a; 2017b, 2020, see <Figure 1-1>).



Source: Brubaker's visualisation (2020, 52, Table 1) of De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017, 312)
<Figure 1-1> Two-by-two model of the relationship between nationalism and populism

However, this two-by-two model is limited to assessing the differential quality of each quadrant. Brubaker (2017b, 56, Table 2; see <Table 2-1> in Chapter Two of this thesis)

attempts to revise the simple De Cleen and Stavrakakis' two-by-two model with a two-dimensional one. He duplicated the spatial level of exclusionary-inclusionary of nation/high-low power bloc with the within-outside the polity. It succeeds in including the varied mode of the outsider, such as the 'internal outsider' (explained in Chapters Two and Three) and the outsider with high power, such as global capital. However, it fails to see the dynamic and complexity of those modes of otherising. This is why I suggest the variable temporality by which society requires the consensus on who is outside and insider and the regime's type with which such requirement meets.

The relationship between temporality and politics has been argued in previous research cases. They have focused on the subjects like the articulation of pace, regularisation, and the crisis-handling. They are kinds of the art of government of the modern state that defines the boundary of the sovereignty, citizenry, and the behaviour or memories of people accepted as usual and just in an instance (Gross, 1985; Shapiro, 2016; Cohen, 2018). Previous cultural analysis of the state has also been biased by the concept of spatiality (Fergerson and Gupta, 2002; Jessop et al., 2008; Dalsgaard, 2013). In addition, contemporary literature on the relationship between populism and nationalism has begun to focus on the concept of temporality (Anastasiou, 2020; Vulović and Palonen, 2022). The former emphasises the construction of power relations in the context of a global hegemonic form of the nation-state, and the latter the distinction of the ontological form of the populist movement and the ontic content of nationalism in a 'populist moment' (cf. Mouffe, 2018). In the context of the academic discussion, this thesis attempts to see populism and nationalism based on those two cultural concepts of temporality and spatiality overall.

The introduction of temporality is based on the different emphasis of the state's political performance between liberal representative democracy and populism: the former with a more

gradual apprehension and the latter with a more *immediate* perception of temporality in political reality (italics added, Scheuerman, 2004; Taguieff, 2007, 16-17). In addition, as this study conceptualises spatiality in terms of nation, the horizontal dyad of *monopoly-distribution* will be suggested, replacing the 'in'-'out' or 'inclusionary'-'exclusionary' spatiality in previous literature. This frame will be a crucial standpoint to figure out how populists idealise the state as a legitimate institution of the political community. Populists perceive the usefulness of liberal democracy for demanding and realising their political desire. Therefore, in considering the fast pace of the developmental state of Korea yielding populistic elements, we need to consider the issue in the cultural analysis of the state.

1-4. Case study: Korean political history from 1945 to 1987

Theories of populism need to therefore account for the fact that populism is inherent in democratic societies, and yet every nation-state is quite different in its political and historical context. The minimalist definition of populism by Cas Mudde nominates the existence of an 'antagonism' between the 'homogenous' 'elite' and 'people' in political discourse made by certain groups. However, those entirely homogeneous categories are irrelevant in diversified cases with populistic elements of more varied historical and political contexts. South Korea has experienced a developmental state under authoritarian military regimes, which had driven its economic success by nationalistic mobilisation since the 1960s, and it is now one of the most democratised countries in East Asia since the middle of the 1980s. These rich experiences regarding nationalism, authoritarianism, and democracy and their effects have been historically accumulated and habituated in the daily life of common people in South Korea. Therefore, the case in South Korea is remarkable as a research subject for this study

which deals with the relationship between nationalism-populism-the state.

A. Literature on populism in East Asia

As mentioned earlier, the recent literature on populism rarely focused on the cases in (North) East Asia. In Japan, former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has been described as a populist for handling and securing political initiatives in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Kabashima and Steel, 2007). One author tries to find the potential of Japanese populism by comparing analysis with European populist radical right (Lindgren, 2015). In China, as the academic trend on populism is based on the idea of the representative democratic system and is focused on the success of the populistic leader or the party in electoral democracy (cf. Hellmann, 2017), there are more nuanced, value-biased studies. Perry (2015) evaluated that the mainstream discussion on democracy in China has been betrayed by its populist tradition inherited from Mao Zedong's era in the context of Xi Jinping's leadership (Townsend, 1977). This kind of study nonetheless still maintains the Westernised view on the Second and Third World concerning populism, which the beginning of studies on populism mentioned above had already attempted to overcome (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969, 3).

As for South Korea, in the literature in English, former President Roh Moo-Hyun is frequently mentioned as a populist (Moffitt, 2015, 294; Hellmann, 2017, 163), mainly referring to a single source (Kimura, 2009). In another piece of research published in a policy institute in Korea (Korea Economic Institute), Kim (2008) mentions populistic characters in the online-based popular participation by the supporters of President Roh, indicating that access to more information via technological development can be a background of populism. However, these studies have, in some ways, been affected by public

contention in the domestic politics of South Korea. During the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments, right-wing conservative journalists and politicians accused them of being 'populist' without an academic understanding of populism and primarily for political criticism (cf. Hong, 2004; Kang, 2011; Chang, 2020).

Conversely, the election of former President Park Geun-Hye, the daughter of the former President Park Chung-Hee, has begun to be considered an example of the rise of 'authoritarian and populist politics' in Asia (cf. Hall, 1988; Chacko and Jayasuriya, 2018). However, the literature has not thoroughly examined why Park's government and her support groups can be regarded as populist. Concerning anti-pluralism, the authoritarian statist character of the former Park Geun-Hye administration is examined in the various articles in a special issue of *Journal Contemporary Asia* 4 by non-Korean scholars (Jayasuriya, 2018; Mobrand, 2018). In addition, it is remarkable that the support for Park's regime was a kind of cult, which resulted in the personalisation of politics that populism studies are keen to analyse (Doucette, 2017). These studies agree upon authoritarianism as a way of life encompassing the political elite and civil society, against which the 2016-2017 Candlelight Rallies boomeranged. The need of the many young generations, who are desperate for static social status mobility, frustrated by Park Geun-Hye's authoritative administration, coined by the popular discourse with the buzzwords 'Gold Spoon-Dirt Spoon' (금수저-흙수저) was also introduced in terms of populism in an academic journal (Kim, H.b, 2017). Recently, protests against the beef import agreement and the FTA with the US in the 2000s, candlelight rallies in 2016-2017, and the Moon Jae-in government's practices are also considered populist cases in some literature (Lee, 2019; 2021). Attempts to understand the region in terms of populism also existed recently, such as *Populism in Asian Democracies* (Lee et al., 2021).

Furthermore, the relationship between nationalism and populism in South Korea is one of the recent brand-new research subjects, as the systemised edition on the issue was only recently published in September 2022 (Shin and Kim, 2022). It attempted to diagnose the recent case in South Korea in terms of populism and nationalism. At the same time, there is no theoretical scrutinisation of the subject, which remains the mere description of the phenomena in South Korea.

The academic scrutinisation of populism in Korea in English was made by Han, Sang-Jin and his colleague (Han, S-J.a, 2019; Han, S-J.a and Shim, 2021). However, as this thesis casts the question on Han Sang-Jin's diagnosis of politics in Korea in Chapter Seven, these pieces of literature will be criticised in Chapter Eight, Conclusion. Though these studies try to apply the concept of populism in Korean political history, they are fallen into the trap of the 'gross concepts' (Sapiro, 1989), which reduce the details of the phenomena into one single concept for any reason. It is partly due to the ambivalence of the concept itself of populism that has already been argued in populism studies, regardless of the pros and cons among scholars who see it as its weak point (Taguieff, 2007; Rosanvallon, 2008; Müller, 2016; Urbinati, 2019), or its essence and strong point (Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2018). In this circumstance, we may see contemporary politics after the 2010s of South Korea whether we can find the historical legacy to serve populism in South Korea's politics in the early 2020s.

B. Introduction of the recent Korean politics in the square: *Candlelight* v. *Taegeukgi*

Accepting Urbinati's (2019) premise, this study will assume that the discussion of populism in South Korea should be done during the events *after* institutional democratisation in 1987, as representative democracy is necessary for populism. However, to better analyse the

relationship between nationalism and populism, this study considers these events as the legacy of Korean political history. Many elements of nationalism and populism are entangled and still operate within contemporary social movements. This thesis aims to depict the background on which the social movements below have burst. In addition, contemporary Korean politics in the square is also the background for understanding Korean political history in this thesis. I mean, the recent phenomena that I explain afterwards are the legacy of the peculiar results of political history explained in this thesis, and they construct how we see political history in the contemporary context of South Korea.

As depicted, the phenomena in this sub-section seem to be similar to the recent populist rallies worldwide in appearance. The intertwined elements of nationalism and populistic sentiment are stuck to the two bifurcated forms of rallies below. These phenomena are still under the famous term in South Korea '1987-*nyeon-cheje*' (1987년 체제, 1987年 體制, the System of the Year 1987), by which the constitution and the practice of the state of South Korea nominally have legalised the Left-Right confrontation. However, this thesis sees that the legacy of the verticalisation of political antagonism remains intact, as recurrently explained in Chapter Seven of this thesis. As the appearance does not tell everything about the impressiveness of activism, investigating how these rallies below are possible in contemporary Korean society should be the foremost task. That is why this thesis analyses the construction of populistic nationalism from 1945 to 1987.

The beginning of the routinised and institutionalised street politics or politics in the square in Korea, like Occupy Wall Street in 2011 in New York, can be considered since 2002. The Candlelight Vigil (촛불집회, *Chotbuljiphoe*) first emerged with an anti-conservative sentiment and the need to redress the existing structure of external and internal

politics of South Korea. Since 2003, the conservative-right groups started to come to the square with the National Flag of Korea (태극기, *Taegeukgi*) and the Star-Spangled Banner, of which the country has been considered the ultimate alliance to South Korea since the 1953 treaty between the two countries. For conservative participants, South Korea is a free-democratic nation-state that fights against threats from North Korea alongside the United States. Their emphasis is on the nostalgic nationalism for the former military regime, especially the memories of the Park Chung-Hee regime. These groups also functioned as a grassroots asset of Park Geun-Hye's administration. However, Park's reign prematurely ended with her impeachment and the successive by-election of President Moon Jae-in of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK, 더불어민주당, *Doburominjudang*) in early 2017. Especially with the North Korean government as the 'enemy of the nation', conservative groups insisted on antagonism to the perceived appeasement policies of the liberals of Kim Dae-Jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-In governments called *Jinbojeongbu* (진보정부, 進步政府, the progressive governments), or the conservative disdainingly call them *Jwapajeongbu* (좌파정부, 左派政府, the Lefty governments), as those three administrations proceeded with the appeasement politics towards North Korea.

As of 2023, the Candlelight Vigil's progressive camp represents the social movements that seek to overcome conventional state-centred nationalism. For the conservative camp, the activities such as the Korean National Flag Army (태극기부대, *Taegeukgi Budae*) have been organised in an identical way to express their state-centred nationalism since 2003. While these movements consist of fragmented, unidentifiable organisations with different names,

their ideology is sufficiently regarded as 'collective' as they share similar sentiments against each other: for the progressive camp, the conservatives are 'reactionary', 'old dumbhead' (수구꼴통, 守舊꼴[1]桶), 'collaborator' while its counterpart reacts with the word such as 'Lefty-reds' (좌빨, 左빨[2]), 'commies'. Both social movements have one thing in common: they derive a sense of deficiency from the incumbent political elites and the existing state institution, condemning them as sluggish or unjust governments that fail to cope with threats with immediate response.

(a) Development of Candlelight Vigil

On 13 June 2002, whilst almost all the Korean people enjoyed the fever of the national football squad's successes at that year's World Cup, two female middle school students in Yangju, Gyeonggi Province, were accidentally killed by a US Army armoured vehicle. The US military has had permanent bases within South Korea since the ROK-US mutual treaty of 1953. The accident failed to attract the full attention of public media due to the World Cup event. However, it aroused public anger when the two US soldiers who rode the vehicle were finally acquitted on 26 November of the same year.

On 30 November, almost ten thousand people with a candle in their hands gathered in

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[1] 꼴(ggol) means dumb, and it combines with 통(tong, 桶, a vessel or a can). The word 꼴통 means a dumbhead or a butthead, which is a general spread word in Korean society to indicate a stupid, (regarded as) retard, and old-fashioned person.

[2] 좌(左, jwa) means left, while 빨(bbal) red.

memory of two schoolgirls in the Gwanghwamun square, where the cheering people for the Korean football squad had once filled in the summer of the same year. The number of people soared to fifty thousand in the next week, and it reached one hundred thousand in the following weeks. The concept of the candlelight vigil was alleged to be introduced by one netizen who worked for an independent internet media (Kim, 2002). One particular aspect of activism was notable: participants in the candlelight vigil on 14 December 2002 stopped flying the national flag of Korea. Instead, they tore a couple of the giant Star-Spangled Banners while holding a candle (Kim & KwonPark, 2002). That instance was quietly symbolistic when considering the prolonged alliance between ROK and the US since 1953, which maintained the strong relationship under the US-led Cold War era during Korea's authoritative regimes. As mentioned above, Korean society was anti-communist and disciplined for almost thirty years under military rule. Therefore, the presence of the US troops in Korea since the end of the Korean War signified such an element of the state nationalism maintained by the former authoritative regimes.

The opposition Grand National Party explicitly expressed repulsion toward the popular movement's newly emerging form. The party, in 2023 nowadays, 국민의힘 (*gungmin-eui-him*, People Power Party), had been once the long-reigned party for over thirty years. Its ideological stance was rooted in the Democratic Justice Party (DJP, 민주정의당, *Minjujeongeuidang*) of the Chun Doo-hwan administration and the Democratic Republican Party (DRP, 민주공화당, *Minjugonghawdang*) of the Park Chung-Hee regime.[3] In this

[3] It would be a long story that I detail the complexity of political party history in Korea, but the distinction between the confrontation of the incumbent-the opposition has existed. However, due to the particular context of South Korea as the bulwark of anti-communism and strong alliance with the US against the Second World, the

context, the Candlelight Vigils in Korea became implicitly associated with those opposed to the authoritarian rule of the state and supportive of the Left or progressive camp. Grand National Party and its successive parties of 새누리당(*Saenuridang*, New Frontier Party) of Park Geun-Hye administration and 자유한국당(*Jayuhangukdang*, Liberty Korea Party, LKP) oppositional to Moon Jae-in government symbolised the Right and conservative. They have been associated with their support of economic liberalism, cultural traditionalism, and a hawkish stance on the issue of North Korea.

This trend continued since the 2000s: when President Roh Moo-hyun was accused of violating the law of election and the majority Grand National Party passed an impeachment bill, thousands and more people with candlelight gathered weekly in the spring of 2004 to oppose the bill (Kim, 2004). The Constitutional Court finally rejected the bill, and the majority in the National Assembly was won by the Open Uri Party (열린우리당, *Yolinuridang*, one of the origins of the nowaday's DPK as of 2023) in the next general

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fundamental tenet for the conservative has been close to the developmentalism in economics with the national security against North Korea. In contrast, the progressive has been close to the appeasement approach to the North Korean issues with ethnocentric nationalism, redressing the monopolised power by the state and Chabol-centred economy since the 1960s, but not discarding an alliance with the US. This distinction has been more complex since the emergence of the hegemony of global capitalism in the early 1980s and the rise of China as the conservative Roh Tae-Woo administration established diplomatic normalisation with China. In contrast, the pragmatic stance has been maintained by the Kim Dae-Jung, Rho Mu-Hyun and Moon Jae-In administrations alongside the competition between the US and China since the 2000s. In this respect, the combination of developmentalism and anti-communism can be considered the constant character of the conservative. In contrast, the progressive represents the other political and social demands that the former fails to catch with the pragmatic approach to international relations. After the Three-Party Merger (*Samdang-Hapdang*, 3당합당, 三黨合黨) in 1990, which is another legacy of institutionalisation of horizontal confrontation, the conservative has represented the national security against North Korea. Meanwhile, the progressive has maintained the open door policy to North Korea while the policies of economic issues based on the positional stance are vague according to the respective administration regardless of the conservative-the progressive. About this complexity which is not identical to Western democracy, see Kim (2003).

election held in the same year. This political cleavage implied in the candlelight vigil peaked when the ROK and the US negotiated on importing US beef by the Lee Myoung-bak government in the summer of 2008. Almost a million people with candlelight protested against the conservative government. In addition, people continually lifted the candlelight in 2014 when the Sewol Ferry sank, and that disaster killed three hundred and four people (including five lost). Numerous social rallies targeted the resistant measure by the government to repress the widespread distrust of Park Geun-Hye and her ministries. It is another conservative government after the Lee Myoung-bak, which failed to take timely and appropriate steps with its bureaucratic disorders (Lee et al., 2016). This form of raising the candle when the government became the symbol of the progressive when the conservative government does not answer people's needs is now a symbol of (progressive and left-wing) people. The symbol was once explicitly popularised worldwide in 2016-2017 during the political turmoil on the impeachment of Park Geun-Hye.

(b) Taegeukgi rallies as the counter-social movement against the Candlelight Vigil

The anti-communist rally on 21 June 2003 that Taegeukgi was first re-used as a political symbol after 1987 (Park, 2003), while its symbol began to gain the new meaning of the conservative. At this event, a large Taegeukgi was widely unfolded alongside a large Star-Spangled Banner by crowds holding small Taegeukgi in their hands. As the speakers of the rally overtly distinguished themselves from the Candlelight Vigil, the Taegeukgi started to gain an oppositional meaning to the Candlelight Vigil, or the anti-communist antagonism toward the progressive which gained power since the democratisation of 1987. Taegeukgi had been used usually in popular rallies with the meaning of resistance to the state or ruling

hegemony (Jung, 2007). This new usage of the national flag by the conservative right-wing group was scandalous.

However, the usage of Taegeukgi was not continuous when the political contention on the amendment to the private school law by the progressive Roh Moo-Hyun government emerged. Even once, the Grand National Party used the candlelight vigil to protest when the party members boycotted attendance at the National Assembly, where the major Open Uri Party attempted to pass the bill on private schools in 2005 (Kim, H-S.a, 2018). Though we cannot conclude why the conservative copied the candlelight vigil, it implied that the conservatives could not find their own symbol of protest to appeal to the public. Since the right-wing rally on 23 June 2007, the Taegeukgi became the symbol of the conservatives when five thousand Christians gathered to demand a re-revision of the School law (Ahn and Sun, 2007). It implies that Taegeukgi was gradually adopted by the protesting groups, which are conventionally regarded as anti-communistic, traditional, pro-Grand National Party, and partly Christian conservative.

The full-scale mobilisation of Taegeukgi was first made by the *Parent's Union* (어버이연합, Eobeoi Yonhap) and the *Mommy Squad* (엄마부대, Eomma Budae), which have drawn the public attention since the early 2010s. In specific, their militant stances to support the Park Geun-Hye regime were publicised whenever political contention proceeded by political events such as the Sewol Ferry Disaster in 2014, the ROK-Japan agreement on comfort women in 2015, and the deployment of THAAD in 2017 even after the political scandal of Park was revealed in late 2016. The combination of Taegeukgi and Star-Spangled Banner continuously appeared as most members of the Parent's Union and the Mommy Squad were the aged people who had nostalgia for the ruling of the Park Chung-Hee regime.

However, these two groups have faded away from public attention as they lost their pivotal figure for unity since the impeachment and imprisonment of Park Geun-Hye. Her resignation had shrunken the number of her supporter groups and right-wing in South Korea. This situation was accelerated when another former conservative President, Lee Myung-bak, was arrested on 22 March 2018 and finally sentenced for bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of power on 8 September of the same year. The lower support for the right-wing party resulted in the local election in June 2018, as The Liberal Korean Party gained only 27.8 per cent in terms of total party support, losing 20.7 points per cent of its former result in 2014.

In this circumstance, the consistent popular supporters for Park Geun-Hye were incorporated with the term *Taegeukgi Budae* (태극기 부대, The National Flag of Korea Squad) in public media. With the name representing their usage of the national flag of Korea, they opposed the Moon Jae-In government and the elite politicians of the conservative Liberal Korea Party, whom they accused of failing to protect the presidency of Park Geun-Hye against the left-wing groups. These groups are a significant case in understanding the grassroots, voluntary support to former state-centred nationalism in South Korea, constructed by their self-identification as the true members and the last protectors of the nation-state with the constant support for Park Chung-Hee and his daughter Park Geun-Hye. It can be calibrated when we consider them populist with their personalised apprehension of political preference with the militant support to the strong leaders. This apprehension mutually constitutes their apprehension of reality in terms of the temporality of national narrative and political process, which derives their antagonism to political groups and political elites (regardless of the Left or the Right) as a (potential) threat to *Daehanminguk* (대한민국, 大韓民國, the official Korean name of the Republic of Korea).

The literature on Taegeukgi Budae mainly focuses on its members' age and characteristics. Most participants in the groups are older people who feel they are ignored by younger generations, with a desire for social recognition while maintaining nostalgic sentiments with memories of the past of the Park Chung-Hee regime (Park, 2017; Kim and Hur, 2018). Another study emphasises the emotional dynamic of older people in the anti-impeachment movement, such as anger and fear against social change or self-esteem of identifying themselves as patriots feeling the joy of a crowd (Kim, 2017). In this vein, some research on Taegeukgi Budae focuses on the life stories of older who were young while the former President Park Chung-Hee was in power[4], emphasising the militarism and complexity of hegemonic masculinity in Korean society argued in Chapters Five and Six (Heo, 2017; cf. Choi, 2016).

C. Scope of the research: the reason why the research stops at 1987

In sum, the politics of square by the conservative vs the progressive since the 2000s resulted from the institutionalisation of democracy in 1987. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the conservative had a long legacy that *needed not* come to square against the state as it had taken advantage of the authoritarian rule before 1987. The street had been occupied by the progressive (then dissident intellectuals and students) who had little chance to represent themselves in the representative body of liberal democracy. In this respect, institutional

[4] This nostalgia contains the reminiscence of the ruling of both Parks as Park Geun-Hye, after the assassination of his mother Yuk Young-soo in 1974, played the role of the first lady while she was also deeply involved with his father's rule until his assassination in 1979. After the military coup by Chun Doo-Hwan, she lived her life without a formal connection with politics, as she emerged as a new saviour for the conservative since the 2004-2005 boycott by the Grand National Party to the attendance to the National Assembly.

democratisation in 1987 initiated a period of competition between two roughly equal forces alternating periods in power. It is a necessary condition for the development of populism. Without that institutionalisation, we cannot discuss that very concept of populism concerning any phenomenon, as the definition of populism requires liberal democracy (Urbinati, 2019).

As shown in this thesis, the elements of populism *before* democratisation and its legacy after institutionalisation are analysed to show that we cannot conclude any phenomenon as populism only with those elements without the details of their political context. This error has been prevalent in the contemporary literature of the academic fad on populism since 2017, generally, if we focus on the research case of South Korea by Han Sang-Jin (Han S-J.a 2019; Han, S-J.a and Shim, 2021).[5] If using populism is like wearing the shoes of Cinderella (Mény and Surel, 2002, 3), we need to understand the details of her life story. Whether she must wear those shoes definitely without any question, we cannot conclude whether she wants to wear them.[6] If the shoes do not fit the feet, that is not a problem for the wearer but for the shoes.

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[5] This is why this thesis finishes by dealing with Han's paper in Chapter Eight, Conclusion.

[6] This arbitrariness of scholars is well depicted by Aslanidis (2017, 281-282). According to the favour stance of the researcher to the concept and a phenomenon as a research object, we can draw the two-by-two matrix. If the researcher is fond of both the idea of populism and the phenomenon, the researcher never hesitates to call the research object populism. If the researcher sees the concept as unacceptable and has little interest in the case generally called populism, the researcher quickly calls it populism. If the researcher has little favour for the idea and is intimate with the object, the researcher tries to confirm that it is not populism. And this is not a rare case: if the researcher adores the concept of populism and the case that the researcher hates is generally called populism, the researcher makes every effort to deny that it is not populism. Though this thesis is not free from this arbitrariness as it confines the applicability of the concept of populism after 1987 while it ends the case analysis on that time point, this thesis accepts Urbinarti's (2019) maxim and refrains itself from *naming* populism without an institutionalised representative, liberal democracy even though the elements of populism have consistently been shown in any political history. Considering this point, see Worsley's (1969)'s assessment quoted at the beginning of Chapter Two of this thesis. In sum, the existence of populis*tic* elements can never guarantee the existence of populism. That is why this thesis suggests the concept of *populistic nationalism* in Chapter Three.

This is why this thesis will not directly deal with the era after 1987, as the range timeline of the research subject ends in early 1990. However, the point is that the completion of the construction of populistic nationalism is made around the democratisation in 1987, the re-introduction of the direct election of the president, and the expansion and legal guarantee of rallies, associations, and opinions in the public realm. The condition of discussion of populism, as indicated in Chapters One and Two, is the perception of reliable institutionalisation of representative democracy. This thesis aims to ground the discussion of the Korean case in terms of populism as a global phenomenon, emphasising nationalism and some elements with familial similarity with populism in the history of modern Korean politics, which are still effective in contemporary Korean society.

1-5. Other issues on epistemology and methodology

This study is based on 'sociological institutionalism' or 'cultural institutionalism', which means "institutions influence behaviour not simply by specifying what one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 948). Institutional forms and their actions mutually constitute the identities of social actors. The state forms such as liberal democracy and its sub-divisions (legislation, administration, judiciary) influence the common people in how they apprehend the political community and identify themselves. This study will conduct a historical interpretation of the state-system of the presidential system in South Korea and its construction of nationalism as the state-idea that buttresses those institutional settings (cf. Abrams, 1977[1988]). After that, the discursive analysis of how people in social movements in South Korea understand and signify the meaning of a nation and a state will be conducted. In addition, this study is close to discursive institutionalism, which emphasises the role of the idea that constructs the structure and

agency of the state and society (especially the country where the gap between the state and society had been broad) in an intersubjective manner (Schmidt, 2008). I will investigate the construction of populistic nationalism, which is sometimes congruent to, adjustive with, or competitive with the elite-led official language concerning the ideal nation-state.

In Chapter Three, I develop a three-dimensional matrix of imagining a political community with eight ideal-types, from nationalistic populism to representative democracy. Max Weber (2014[1904]) suggested that an ideal-type is not a simple historical fact. However, it can guide us on empirical cases in which people signify and practice according to their understanding of the world. By these ideal-types, we can analyse how people imagine, signify, and construct political reality and perceive the existing political institutions as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. As social movements adopt and use various symbols of tradition, religion, nation-state, and political associations, we can apply these types to empirical cases, in this case, in the history of South Korea.

For historical interpretation, the study will refer to previous literature on the political system and nationalism of South Korea. Since the formation of the two-state system, popular nationalism has been made concerning the division of Korea, and this condition moulded the practices of the state as well as of people as the origin of sovereignty. The core evidentiary basis for this work is derived from the primary resources, including the speech of political figures, articles written by journalists and intellectuals, and quotations of anecdotes or memoirs of key figures to understand the times with which this study deals.

1-6. Contribution of the thesis

This study differs from the previous literature in three ways: First, by dealing with the cases of an East Asian country, South Korea, the thesis broadens the range of research on populism

as a global phenomenon, overcoming the regionally-biased case selection of previous literature. Second, in distinguishing the concepts of nationalism and populism, this study remedies the existing presumption that populism is exclusively ultra-nationalistic. In so doing, the thesis focuses on how nationalism constitutes how people think, by which they apprehend their political community and its institutional settings, leading them to populism or other political forms. Finally, by outlining the conditions and characteristics of populistic nationalism through the concepts of temporality and spatiality in distinguishing polities, this study addresses the shortcomings of previous analytical tools that have emphasised the spatial analysis of the elite-people, insider-outsider relationship in populistic discourses.

1-7. Structure of the thesis

This study consists of eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter and a subsequent literature review, Chapter Three outlines the theoretical and analytical frame. In Chapter Two, the concepts of populism will be summarised, referring to the previous key literature. In this chapter, I will articulate how populism studies began since the burgeoning of the post-War social science regarding liberal democracy and how we can see the rare research case of East Asian countries on populism. It will clarify why the relations between nationalism and populism matter for the new theoretical frame in this thesis. In Chapter Three, the cultural analysis of the state based on the Andersonian view on nationalism will be suggested. In so doing, the chapter will show why the new factor of temporality is crucial to understanding liberal democracy and populism, suggesting a three-dimensional matrix. From the matrix, the analytical concept of populistic nationalism will be operationalised to explain the case of South Korea.

From Chapter Four to Chapter Seven, the historical construction of populistic

nationalism will be presented. This will explain and interpret the relationship between nation-state-popular acceptance in South Korea. These chapters focus on the construction of populistic nationalism in South Korea. It is crucial to understand the construction of conditions and signification of the term people in a Korean way in terms of three themes: anti-communism, developmentalism, and distinctive Koreanness.

Chapter Four depicts the division of the Korean Peninsular and the decoupling of the nation and the state. This chapter focuses on the verticality of the antagonism. Chapter Five explains the Third Republic's politico-economic history, highlighting the concept of temporality. Chapter Six, focusing on the spatiality, the rise and fall of democracy in the Park Chung-Hee regime, will be discussed, primarily focusing on the interim period toward Yusin and the cultural policies of Park's regime.

Chapter Seven will analyse the completion of populistic nationalism with the symbolic term 보통사람 (*botong-saram*, 普通사람, common people) in South Korea. The idea of common/ordinary people is depoliticised but re-nationalised and re-politicised regardless of the vague cleavage between the Left and Right, which is a necessary condition of the emergence of populism. As mentioned in subsection A of Section 1-3 above, this chapter is far longer than previous chapters with case studies, considering the lack of academic analysis of common people in South Korea despite its importance in populism study.

Chapter Eight will conclude by applying the matrix to each republic and key state-idea events. By doing so, this thesis visualises the temporal and spatial discrepancy between the state-idea (nationalism) and the response of the state-system (political institution) of each government in Korea until institutional democratisation. Ending this study, I emphasise that gap is an essential factor that populism emerges with the nationalistic discourses in the post-

modernised and globalised world.

Chapter Two

Literature Review: Contextualisation of Populism Studies

"The twentieth century has [converted] large segments of the lower orders into the organi[s]ed mass base of totalitarian parties and has not hesitated to use appeals to popular sentiment [to] recruit [them. But] these movements were anything but 'populist' overall: not for nothing are labels like 'authoritarian', 'fascist', or 'totalitarian' used normally to describe them. Populism is only an element[italics in original], not the dominant feature of this kind of movement."

- From Peter Worsley (1969, 242), "The Concept of Populism"

"When electoral competition was structured primarily around ideological confrontation, populism and technocracy were far less salient as modes of political action."

- From Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti (2021, 8), *Techonopopulism*

2-1. Overview

In this chapter, I will briefly introduce the development of the concept of populism regarding its relationship with democracy and nationalism. As shown in the Introduction, the typology of populism is mainly in relation to how the ideal of representative democracy realises itself in the real empirical cases of various countries. Apart from the dichotomous normativity of populism and democracy argued by contemporary scholars, populism is mainly conditioned by an institutionally representative democratic regime. That being said, the former transforms

the latter without destroying it (Urbinati 2019, 17-26). This necessary condition of populism is the key feature that the scholars discuss in the term populism and its differentiation from other competing concepts such as extremism or Fascism. This chapter briefly introduces the literature on populism studies and focuses on its development since the middle of the twentieth century. The concept could not evade the question of the intrinsic convergence and discrepancy in the idea of democracy and its institutionalised form of representative bodies in the academic genealogy or history of how the concept was born and developed. This chapter first scrutinises and reassesses the Post-War narrative of populism and, in particular, why the concept has been relatively neglected in dealing with Western countries at the beginning of populism studies. It will give us a chance to understand the significance of the (re)emergence of populism as a global phenomenon between the end of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century and why this thesis emphasises the necessity to delve into the relationship between populism and nationalism, explained in Chapter Three.

2-2. Genealogy of the concept

According to the *Encyclopaedia of Democracy,* edited by Seymour Martin Lipset, populism is "a political movement that emphasises the interests, cultural traits, and spontaneous feelings of the common people, as opposed to those of privileged elites. For legitimation, populist movements often appeal to the majority's will directly—through mass gatherings, referendums, or other forms of popular democracy—without much concern for checks and balances or the rights of minorities" (Di Tella, 1995, 985). This feature is a minimum consensus among scholars dealing with populism's emergence in history. Common examples include the People's Party of the Southern parts of the United States in the 19th century,

Narodnik of Russia in the early 20th century, McCarthyism and libertarian movement of post-war America, Peronism in South America, new- or neo-populism of Western Europe since the early 1990s (Taggart, 2000, 25-98). For now, we can first define populism a*s a political movement that maximises the will of ordinary people in relation to the establishment and the elite.*

The relationship between populism and democracy has recently become a full-fledged research agenda in comparative studies on those two concepts (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017, 7). However, from its beginning, populism studies could not evade the question of how they are concerned with each other (cf. Moffitt, 2015, 293-295). At the very burgeoning of the studies, Edward Shils (1960) indicates the characteristics of populism, relating them to the cases of the underdeveloped and democratic states in the countries of New Continents and post-colonial states outside the Anglo-European context. Though his article does not mainly focus on populism, Shils uses the term to explain the different mentalities of the intellectuals of the newborn states of the post-war democracies from those of advanced countries. He also concedes that the very beginning of populism did not just lie in the experience of North America and Russia. Instead, it was an "incipient and fragmentary world-wide intellectual community" emerging in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Shils, 1960, 348-349).

However, Shils focuses more on the ambivalence of elites from post-colonial states, who had once received Westernised education and struggled for nation-building between colonial rule and national independence (Shils, 1960, 338-354). The key factor driving them to populism was their detachment and low opportunities for participation in both the colonial authorities and the newly-built state infrastructure. In this circumstance, those elites attempted to harmonise the indigenous traditional culture with modernisation to appeal to the ordinary people familiar with the former.

In this aspect, the study of populism was at first exemplified by the non-Anglo-European countries or the early days of the North American experience. Hofstadter (1955) analyses the yearning for the American (Yankee) ideal burgeoning from rural areas. For example, individualism and independentism emerged against urban politico-economic connections devouring their homelands with the restless pursuit of their selfish economic interest. According to him, this antagonism to big business and party machine politics was finally institutionalised in conventional party politics, motivating reforms such as the New Deal and making contemporary American politics of the middle of the twentieth century.

In addition, the concept was understood as reflective of a change in the political economy since the late nineteenth century. Its image varies from the opposition to modernisation, based on repulsion to the expansion of urban capitalism, the state's intervention distanced high above from rural counties, or cultural secularisation that changes society rapidly (Berlin et al., 1968). The sentiment and cognition of detachment between old and new, tradition and progress, high and low, developed and underdeveloped, and the rulers and the ruled have been critical themes in discussing populism.

According to Finchelstein, modern populism was born between the legacy of Fascism of the pre-war 1930s and the expansion of representative democracy since 1945, which Latin American leaders had formulated more vertically (Finchelstein, 2017, 140). It implies the necessity of populism being always considered the ideal of democracy, as Urbinati (2019) mentioned above. Political scientists in the early postwar era were preoccupied with promoting liberal democracy outside the First World to communist regimes and underdeveloped countries (Mitchell, 1999, 78-80). Those scholars aimed at establishing political science as 'total science' in an interdisciplinary manner, embracing state and government issues and political culture and its appropriate institutionalisation, understood as

favourable or hostile to democracy.

The effect of this approach on how populism was conceptualised can be seen in the Conference of 1967 at the London School of Economics (LSE, hereafter the 1967 Conference), of which Isiah Berlin (Berlin et al., 1968) wrote his review on the conference, and the discussions are edited into Ernst Gellner and Ghiţa Ionescu (1969). As the Introduction of the edition indicated (1969, 3), populism was understood and thought of in relation to the '[L]eft-of Soviet-communism' of Russia, China, and Cuba and the contemporary student movements worldwide in the late 1960s, which was described as a 'populist international'. In summary, the so-called advanced democracy symbolised by the post-war US and Western European countries was immune to being discussed in terms of populism, but some sporadic cases, such as McCarthyism or Evangelical-religious fundamentalists in the US (cf. Hong, 2022).

Since the early 1980s, further distinctions in the conceptualisation of populism have emerged. These include work on the relationship between liberalism and pluralism and populism in terms of social choice theory (Riker, 1982) and the categorisation of various forms of populism, e.g. between agrarian (landowner, peasant, intellectual) and political (form of ruling, voting, ideology, leadership style) populism (Canovan, 1981). Through these developments, populism began to be understood as an erratic version of democracy or the type of regime and its inherent aspect, which idealises the emphasis on the sovereign wills of people. In this era, the possibility of emergent populism in contemporary Western democracy began to be discussed.

Specifically, the emergence of authoritarian populism (Hall, 1988) was a new issue among the critics from the Left. The issue of populism was first shortly suggested by Ernesto

Laclau's *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (1977; Mouzelis, 1978, 48-49), and he continued his critique on the previous structural and reductionist tendency in the Marxist theory of class and popular mass, arguing the construction of antagonism between the popular-democratic elements and the hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014[1985]). This reflection in Marxist scholars began to be disputed with the emergence of neo-Conservatism, such as Thatcherism and Reaganism from the 1980s. This featured the retreat of the welfare state based on expansive fiscal policy, the shift of the antagonism between Left-Right into external nationalistic expansion, and the emphasis on the traditional patriarchal, personalised family values. These elements themselves do not stand alone as the feature of populism. The conventional horizontal political cleavage between the Left and Right has been converted to significant differences between those who take advantage of the system and those who do not.

In this vein, the positional issues of how the two camps of the Left-the Right approach the political-economic problems were blurred, while the valence issues of right and wrong on the cultural and moral problems emerge as the new contested space to draw the frontier between the elite and people (Laclau, 2005, 129-156; Mouffe, 2018). This tendency replaced the conventional and positional issues with newly emerging valence issues (Stokes, 1963, 373; Roberts, 2019) between the high-above and the low-in-the-bottom. I see this rotation of vertical antagonism in the place of the previous Left-Right horizontal political confrontation as the critical context of the return of populism in Western democracy in the 1990s. This factor of *verticalisation* will be a crucial concept in understanding this thesis, shown in Chapter Three.

Apart from the initial attempt at scholarly understanding of populism since Ionescu and Gellner (1969), the renaissance of populism studies of the late twentieth and the early twenty-

first century is mainly due to the rise of right-wing politics in Western democratic countries. Previous studies have dealt with such political trends by emphasising the exclusiveness of the national community in the context of globalisation, trans-nationalism, marketisation and the increase of immigrant populations: 'extreme right' (Eatwell 2000; Mudde 2000); 'radical populist right' (Betz and Johnson, 2004; Mudde, 2007; 2010); 'radical right' (Minkenberg, 2002; Rydgren, 2013). The relations of competitive concepts of far (or extreme) right and populism will be discerned regarding their linkage with nationalism. This is due to the booming contemporary trend of populism in the academic market: the radical/extreme rights, which had been studied before, have now been 're-bapti[s]ed' as the cases of populism since the late 1990s and the early 2000s (Aslanidis, 2017, 272), which is blurring the distinction among those concepts.

In this context of academic confusion, one of the scholars of the far-right and extremism, Paul Taggart, suggested six key themes of populism (Taggart, 2000; 2004):

(a) hostility to representative politics
(b) identification with an idealised heartland within a community
(c) lack of core values
(d) a reaction to a crisis
(e) the dilemma and limit in institutionalisation with charismatic leadership
(f) chameleon-like adoption of other ideologies

These are widely and selectively accepted by the contemporary discussions, which aim at conceptual definitions as a form of organisation and strategy (Weyland, 2001); an ideology (Mudde, 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012); a political style (Moffitt, 2016) categorised as minimalist definitions of populism. The maximalist definition (Urbinati, 2019,

26-35) by Ernesto Laclau (2005) and Chantal Mouffe (2018) highlights populism as the political logic itself, by which the discursive subjectification of political forces against power or the oligarchy.

Kirt Weyland's definition of populism provides an alternative minimalist definition for an epistemological attempt to analyse Latin American countries regarding political reality. His adoption of populism aims at overcoming the deterministic explanation of dependence theory and socio-economic structuralism in explaining the region (Weyland, 2001, 4-6). In his argument, populism's most remarkable feature is its *low institutionalism*, through which the personalistic leaders attract direct and unmediated support from the poorly organised popular mass. However, this analysis is too broad as it cannot distinguish populism from other phenomena with low institutionalisation (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014, 386), such as authoritarianism, world politics, public rallies or other social movements. Alternatively, it can be too narrow while it fails to explain the phenomena considered populism without the leader and such explicit activism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012, 154). Moreover, the emphasis on the relationship between the leader and the popular mass considers the latter as passively recruited or used by the former, neglecting the voluntary motivation of why populism emerges without intentional mobilisation (Kim, H.c and Seo, 2017, 53).

In this regard, the ideological definition by Cas Mudde emphasises the content of populism. He designs populism studies as global projects that maximise the number of plausible cases by minimising the requisites to decide the empirical facts as populist agendas. His definition consists of three parts of (a) the distinctive groups of people and the elite considered as homogenous; (b) a Manichean worldview that posits the antagonism of the former to the latter with moral superiority (pure v. corrupted); (c) a thin-centred characteristic without the core value but the priority of the people's sovereignty (*volonté general*) (Mudde,

2004, 543; Mudde 2007, 23; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012, 149-150). Populism as an ideology succeeds in gaining global scholarly attention with its methodological development of an ‘ideational approach’ (Hawkins et al., 2019), suggesting and broadening the future agenda for worldwide populism studies (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). However, Mudde and his colleagues (mostly Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser) continuously admit populism’s thin-centredness as ideology (Mudde, 2004, 544; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012, 150-151), which means populism cannot stand alone with other ideologies with its own values and political programmes. They cannot suggest the solution to the vital issue of society with an overall worldview like nationalism (cf. Freeden, 1998). That being said, the core concepts they indicate (the pure people, the corrupted elite and the general will) are still vague to be considered as a unique value to be pursued exclusively in populism (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014, 383-384; Taggart, 2004, 274-275; Kim, H.c and Seo, 2017, 54).

As previous works focus on the content of *what* populism is, Benjamin Moffitt (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014; Moffitt, 2016) emphasises *how* it is conceived or captured as an academic subject. His concept of populism as a political style has an implication that the essence of populism can be understood with its unique way of developing political practices. He argues that the actors such as ‘the elite’ or ‘the people’ are *performative*, as they *do not exist a priori* without a specific discourse of the intersubjective making process (italics added, Moffitt and Tormey 2014, 386-394). He suggests three styles of discourse-making in populism; (a) appeal to ‘the people’ v. ‘the elite’; (b) ‘bad manners’ with an emphasis on common sense; (c) a crisis, breakdown, threat with the evocation of emergency (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014, 391-394; Moffitt, 2016, 41-45). By doing so, populism is caught as a more contextualised and gradational concept (Moffitt, 2016, 45-48). He juxtaposes the populistic way of politics against the polarised style of technocratic (that is, bureaucratised with the ‘good-mannered’

expertise) political practice. In sum, a political way of populism is to appeal to the elite v. people antagonism, emphasising the emergent redress even by the bad-mannered participation of the ordinary people in the political process. In this aspect, his approach can be categorised as a 'social-cultural approach' (Ostiguy, 2017).

In this process, the thinness, which Mudde admits and for which some scholars criticise populism as an analytical concept, is instead considered the primary feature of populism. Such thinness can be studied with enriched vocabularies such as performer, audience, stage, performance, and mise-en-scéne (Moffitt, 2016, 48-50; cf. Laclau, 2005, 3-20). According to Moffitt, the usage of the concepts such as performance or performativity in explaining populism does not remain with the analysis of populistic rhetoric or the discursive effect made by certain remarks or comments by populist actors. For him, such literature posits the binary distinction of the content v. form (or idea v. action). At the same time, in the previous literature, the political actors assumed to be populist exist a priori.

On the contrary, he argues that the very constitution of people and the perception of the existence of such an entity relies on the 'performative operation' (Laclau 2005, 97) itself (Moffitt, 2016, 39). Thus, studying populism focusing on its political style analysis is not merely an analysis of phenomena or the actors' fashioned behaviours. His view is close to the argument that populism and populist as a research subject are conceivable in their relation to how it emerges in which context of the political moment while the form (style) and the content of political phenomena are interrelated and affect each other (Moffitt, 2016, 49).

Concerning the performative aspect of populism, Ernesto Laclau's definition is unique as his definition of populism does not remain a mere analytical explanation. Laclau develops the concept as a basis of a new project (especially for Marxist politics) to overcome the existing

limitations in liberal and representative democracy, radicalising the realisation of popular sovereignty and equality represented by the empty signifier of people. Laclau's definition focuses on the chains of the differential/plural unfulfilled demands in society, which can be equivalently crystallised and represented under the totalising symbol, the people. He distinguishes such fragmented demands as 'democratic demands', which are under the institutionalised formula of the ruling order. In contrast, these demands are congruently condensed with their equivalence of the deficient, their experience of unfulfillment and dissatisfaction, into a 'popular demand' (Laclau, 2005, 125-128). In this condition, populism discursively constitutes the frontier against the ruling hegemony, or that is, the elite or the oligarchy (Laclau 2005, 67-128). In his definition, the antagonism between people and the elite institutionalises the inclusion/exclusion of ruled objects with a political logic (Laclau, 2005, 117).

His partner, Chantal Mouffe's (2018) development of populism as a political logic is critical in understanding its significance in political science. An ideal of the representative parliament system that posits Left-Right competition has been blurred since global neoliberalism. The new era of populism, as she calls it, 'post-democracy' (Muffe, 2018, 16), requires a new dimension of antagonism between popular egalitarian sovereignty and hierarchical oligarchic dominance. As recurrently, she argues, few political parties distinguish themselves from the other as they cannot suggest any alternative political programme in the neoliberal marketised world. This point will be more articulated for the analytical concept of populistic nationalism in Chapter Three.

Laclau's influence on the discursive analysis of the Essex school, in which he and his partner Chantal Mouffe nurtured the pupils like Yannis Stavrakakis and constructed an academic community on the subject, is prominent. It focuses on the formality of the populist

logic in the rhetoric of political leaders or activists while it can distinguish what populism is or not (e. g. nationalism) (De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017; De Cleen et al., 2018). From this approach, populism is articulated in a discursive practice; (a) around the nodal point (that is, the primary reference) of a single signifier people; (b) to the extent that the society seems antagonistically divided into two opposite camps of people (the underdog, the non-privileged, the many, and so on) and the elite (the establishment, the power bloc, and so on) (Stavrakikis et al., 2017, 423).

The attempts to define the concept of populism have little theoretical foundation on why people are prone to support such styles, and some politicians use them. This study agrees that the matter of being populist is not totally based on the specific ideology that distinguishes people and the elite, but practices of political activity and speech with the featured style produce some effects of distinction between people and the elite. However, how and in which context people begin to think of themselves as distinct from the elite or the Other who are wrong should be more elaborated in a theoretical manner. This can be done by clarifying how such a style of populism can be conceptualised with the concept of nationalism and the state.

2-3. Populism, nationalism, and the state

Now we return to the research subject of the relationship between populism and nationalism: how can it be analysed in terms of the cultural theory of the state? As suggested above, when this study deals with the concept of the state, it focuses mainly on the idea of the state. Philip Abrams (1988[1977]) distinguished a state’s conceptualisation into two subcategories: state-system and state-idea. According to his argument, the internal and external relation of

political and governmental institutions (the state-system) can maintain the existence of its concept without the reality of the state, but with the ideological (mis-)representation as a social fact enabling domination and legitimate subjection (state-idea), which should be considered as a crucial object of study (Abrams 1988[1977], 75). This approach is inherited by Timothy Mitchell (1999, 76-77) and Colin Hay (2014, 467-468). Thus, the cultural theory of the state is concerned with the configuration of the state-idea and the state-system. Nationalism is a sort of this state-idea that cannot be departed from the concept of the state, regardless of whether it is an institution, power relations, or a discursive product. Basically, "[t]he nation has been the primary imagined community of those democracies that have been embedded in the institutional framework of the state and state-system" (Lutz and du Toit, 2014, 101).

The key point to understanding nationalism and populism can be conceptualised as an *as-a-whole-in-parts* question between the two concepts (Brubaker, 2020, 49-50). Laclau (2005, 115) once insisted that it is an essence of politics which any part of a society shall insist themselves as a whole of society, though, in reality, they are merely a part. Admittedly, the meanings of the signifier 'people', which populists denote themselves, are varied and inevitably partial to certain confined and vested groups in the modern democratic society represented by the nation-state (remind da Silva and Salgado, 2018, 255, firstly quoted in Introduction). The term people can mainly refer to (a) 'common' people (plebs) who demand the redistribution of respect, resource or political power; (b) 'sovereign' people (demos) who seeks the restoration of the power of people vis-à-vis the relations between state and society, international relations with other nation-states or transnational organisations; (c) the 'bounded' and 'distinct' people (nation) of the political, cultural, and moral community (Brubaker, 2020, 49). For Laclau, this is the essence of the political logic of populism as it

posits the antagonism between plebs and power, which preoccupies the hegemonic status. This means the signifier people inevitably represent a part of society, but it is considered *as a whole* (Laclau 2005, 115-117).

Recent studies on the relationship between populism and nationalism have begun to focus on the spatiality of how populistic actors construct their antagonism vertically and horizontally. This view is theoretically argued by De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017). According to them, nationalism serves as a horizontal demarcation of 'in'-'out' membership and identity, whereas populism with 'down'-'up' apprehension of hierarchy, power relations and recognition of socio-economic and socio-cultural positions (remind <Figure 1-1> in Introduction). This is congruent with the view that the people's meaning is associated with politico-culturally or socio-economically 'low' rank, and the 'high' is defined by the establishment or the elite groups (Ostiguy, 2017). For Laclau, the usual notion of democracy is understood that demands are formulated to the system by an 'underdog' with the egalitarian view and that the emergence of the supposedly excluded or deprived (deficient being) (Laclau, 2005, 125). In this vein, the state and its occupants are considered as above the people, reasserting the vertical perception of the relation between the people-as-underdog and the elite in populism, while nationalism is articulated as differentiating itself with populism as it defines the inclusion/exclusion of the other (De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017). Usually, this aboveness of the power, the state, and its networks is the image of the modern state to secure the governmentality of the concept of the society over below (cf. Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, 982; Foucault, 2007[1978]).[7]

[7] Though Ferguson and Gupta's (2002) analysis of the state is close to blurring the boundary between the state and society, it also alleviates the conventional image of the two in a more horizontal way, their conceptualisation of such conventional image as 'verticality' (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, 982) is a key concept in this thesis. This

De Cleen and Stavrakakis's view serves to purify the meaning of populism to comparatively apply it with the other competing or confusing concepts to the globally emerging cases (Stavrakakis, 2017, 424; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). This attempt to rescue populism from nationalism is relevant when we consider the conflation and reification of the concept with right-wing politics in Western democracy since the late twentieth century.

As De Cleen and Stavrakakis draw the populism space with four quadrants with two axes, Rogers Brukaber suggests 'national populism'. Initially, the concept is borrowed from Pierre-André Taugieff's 'national-populisme' (1995; 2007; 2012), which is detailed in Chapter Three. While Brubaker posits nationalism along with populism, the horizontal in-out is distinguished by the polity of the nation-state, and the vertical up-down is a matter of distribution of power, wealth, education and other prestige differentiated from common. He calls this modification 'a two-dimensional discursive space' of populism (Brubaker, 2020, 56, see <Table 2-1>). Brubaker defines the polarised opposition between 'us' and 'them', not only based on the binary antagonism between common people and the elite, and horizontally as 'insiders' and 'outsiders' (Brubaker, 2017a, 1191-1192), by which even the part of the elite with strong nationalism can be an insider and with little cultural commonness as an outsider. Furthering this argument, he concedes the distinctiveness of nationalism and populism while arguing that the intertwined ambiguity between the two concepts is the essence of the phenomena (Brubaker, 2020, 54-55). When he adopts the concept of 'internal outsider', he focuses on "those living on the inside who, even when they are citizens of the state, are not seen as belonging, or fully belonging, to the nation" (Brubaker, 2017a, 1192;

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will be articulated in the model in Chapter Three.

Brubaker, 2017b, 363; Brubaker, 2020, 52-58).

<Table 2-1> Brubaker's two-dimensional discursive space of populism

<table>
<tr><th colspan="5">Inside-outside dimension</th></tr>
<tr><td></td><th colspan="2">Within the polity</th><th colspan="2">Outside the polity</th></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>Insider</td><td>Internal outsiders</td><td colspan="2">External outsiders</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">high
↑
Power, wealth, education, institutionally consecrated prestige
↓
low</td><td>Leaders who are seen as belonging to the people and therefore legitimately speaking for the people</td><td>The elite</td><td>Global capital, cosmopolitan culture, powerful outside states or organi[s]ations</td><td rowspan="3">Outside cultural threats that are independent of power-wealth-prestige axis</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">The people as plebs, demos, and bounded community</td><td>Those at the margins (defined by culture, lifestyle or gender/sexual identity, not by wealth, power, etc.)</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Those on the bottom, represented also as different (ethnoracially, culturally or morally)</td><td>Potential low-status migrants and refugees, also represented as ethnoracially or ethnocuturally different</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Brubaker (2020, 56) with the modification by the author for readability of the axis

In this aspect, populism cannot be understood entirely as vertical as the horizontal boundary is reaffirmed, refiguring a more subtle skim for an otherising strategy in its discourse. First, the people themselves cannot be as 'pure' against the 'corrupted' elite as the cultural lowness of vulgarity is a distinctive feature of people (Ostiguy, 2017, 91). Secondly,

the vertical relation between people and the elite is duplicated as the bottom of society is redefined as 'parasites', 'spongers', 'addicts', or 'deviants' (Brubaker, 2020, 54). This means the matter of populism is not merely the egalitarian demands of redistribution of resources or power, but it is about *honour, respect and recognition* of common people (italics added, Hall, 1988, 141; Müller, 2016, 23-25; Brubaker, 2017b, 363; Brubaker, 2020, 54). Third, the relationship between the elite and the people is not univocally oppositional. Populists perceive the former as governmental officials, scholars, and journalists, while the latter differentiates themselves from the cultural and ethnic minorities who are horizontally marginal and vertically bottom. Populists emphasise the latter's sensibility of being neglected as ordinary people as a 'moral majority' (Brubaker, 2020, 54). Lastly, the nationalistic in-out relation is dependent not only on the cognition of a mere culturally or ethnically defined community. Populists promise to strengthen the bounded nation-state against the in-flowing global capital, international organisations and the low-status immigrants that the elite in a state is required to open the door to them in a globalised society (Brubaker, 2020, 55). In this aspect, the question of populism, who are people, becomes the central question of nationalism; the congruence of the political community (the state) and national community (nation) is a matter (Gellner, 2006).

As Urbinati (2019, 88) argues, "the sovereign state is the structural condition for populism […] as the [representative democracy] allows the part of the people to enter into competition while speaking in the name of people". This indication is related to the relations between populism and democracy: populism can emerge even (or, rather only) in the democratic context, such as a representative system, the plurality of political parties, constitutionalism, and the free opposition to the ruling elites, which are the basis of the subordination of the people in democracy (Lee, 1997a, 92). As this part-whole question in a

representative democratic society of who the people are productive in analysing populism (Brubaker, 2020, 57), the relation between populism-nationalism-the state is required to be theoretically delved into as shown in the next section.

2-4. Conclusion: no populism in East Asia or anytime?

The ‘Atlantic bias’ or ‘a specific regional brand of populism [which] represents populism in toto’ (Moffitt, 2015, 293-295) since the birth of the concept is still prevalent. As mentioned in the Introduction, recent literature on populism rarely focused on the cases in (North) East Asia, except for some studies which focus on specific leaderships. However, in the case of South Korea, since the global boom of populism study in the middle of 2010s, especially the Impeachment of former president Park Geun-Hye and its consecutive result of the emergence of Moon Jae-In government has been reassessed in terms of populism in recent years. The protests against the import agreement of beef and the FTA with the US in the 2000s, candlelight rallies in 2016-2017, and the Moon Jae-in government’s practices are considered cases of ‘tamed’ populism (Lee, 2019; 2021). According to the author, this term is between the top-down elite-driven mobilisation and the bottom-up social demands represented in the social movements and online participation of people in Korea.

In this aspect, we can detail the argument that Hellmann (2017) once diagnoses why populism studies have neglected the cases in East Asia. As alluded to, he indicates the absence of Left-Right politics in the socio-economic terms in the region. This assessment is partly accurate. As shown in this chapter, one key aspect of the (re)emergence of populism is based on the blurring demarcation between the conventional two camps of political preferences since the post-War representative democracy. This point is relevant as we

consider the most recent explanation of the emergence of ‘techonopopulism’ (Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti, 2017; 2021), as people are no longer attached to the previous party loyalty or ideological tendency for the Left-Right. In other words, they are prone to support or find a new way to represent their demands. At the same time, they focus more on the government’s *competence* or *expertise* (mainly the administrative body) to solve the immediate social problems, in general, more efficiently and more direct communications between people *as a whole* (not an agreement of partisan interest groups) and political elites. Especially in the political history of South Korea and other countries in (East) Asia, the expertise of the state as a problem-solver or Deux ex-machina of society has been the only source for political elites to suffice their lack of legitimacy in the authoritarian or one-party hegemonised political society. In sum, the historical experience of countries in the region is far different from the Left-Right competition in the plural, and representative democracy, in which those two camps serve as ‘orientational metaphors’ in depicting the political disagreement among *mutually equals* (italics added, Dyrberg, 2003, 336-338).

However, suppose we stop the conclusion like this. In that case, it still maintains the Westernised view on the Second and Third World concerning populism, which the beginning of studies on populism mentioned above had already attempted to overcome (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969, 3). As indicated in Hellmann’s study, US-backed authoritarian regimes in East Asia have achieved capitalist development, repressing the Left-Right social dimension based on class which is required for the identification of homogeneous people and elites (Hellmann, 2017, 171-172). However, this historical experience can instead serve as a key factor in diversifying the global phenomenon of populism. In this respect, the rise of populism in the advanced democracies was due to the cognition that “There Is No Alternative (TINA).” since neoliberal consensus between the Left-Right (Séville, 2017; Mouffe, 2018).

Specifically, in Korean political history, the verticality of antagonism combined with nationalism served as the alternative style of political subjectification to the Left-Right horizontality under the Cold War competition between the two Koreas. Thus, contrary to Hellman's conclusion, the reality is that the lack of horizontal confrontation between the Left-Right in the democratic demands is the condition that vertical antagonism emerges. Thus, it is better to argue that there has *always* been the potentiality of the emergence of populistic elements in East Asia, so this cannot be easily rigorously or especially distinguishable as the sudden rise of populism in Western democracies since the early twenty-first century.

The recent publication *Populism in Asian Democracy* (2021) tries to overcome the previous limit in populism studies in Asia, which mainly focused on the critics of leaders in the region (Mizuno and Phongpaichit, 2009). The volume categorises populism in Asia into progressive/authoritarian/redistributive/ethnic and religious populisms. At the same time, it also distinguishes top-down and bottom-up populism in the peculiar context of the region with the authoritarian regimes and the current democratisation process (Lee et al., 2021, 7). This thesis recognises those attempts to find alternative ways to explain the region as a part of global populism, emphasising the historical legacy of nationalism that has comprised people as a whole. However, we are still under the question of how nationalism and populism are theoretically intertwined and in which way that entanglement is embedded in the ideal of democracy, which has been the ideal-type of post-War democracy. This question will be detailed in the next Chapter Three.

Chapter Three

Theory and Analytical Frame: Populistic Nationalism in the Three-Dimensional Matrix

"It is not the dispersal of human cultures in space that leads anthropology to "temporali[s]e" [...] it is naturali[s]ed-spatiali[s]ed Time which gives meaning (in fact a variety of specific meanings) to the distribution of humanity in space."

- From Johannes Fabian (2014[1983], 25), *Time and the Other*

"[D]emocracy is simultaneously cyclical, insofar as political calendars prescribe regular and repeated series of events like elections, and linear insofar as no cycle of rise and decline is expected as long as the citizenry is judiciously engaged in truth-seeking and prevented from imposing their will on future citizenries."

- From Elizabeth F. Cohen (2018, 81), *The Political Value of Time*

3-1. Overview

This chapter focused on the relationship between populism and nationalism as a cultural aspect of liberal democracy, referring to the Andersonian view of nationalism and its application to political science by Charles Taylor. In arguing that nationalism is a cultural system, I adopt the understanding of the nation-state as a temporal-spatial system to apprehend the political community. In so doing, the populistic style of politics is characterised by these three elements: (a) a sense of direct involvement with the higher power holder; (b) the expectation of a prompt answer to popular demands, which devalue the

process of the consensus; (c) the endless making of a part of society as an enemy inside the state, which fixes the previous boundary of the state, nation, and common sense of *the ordinary*. In the conclusion of this chapter, populistic nationalism and its conditions will be operationalised as an analytical frame to explain the history of Korean politics.

3-2. The nation-state as a cultural system[8]

By studying nationalism as the state-idea (cf.Abrams 1988[1977]), this study theorises the temporal-spatial apprehension system of the modern nation-state—this thesis attempt to innovate the previous models by adding the temporality dimension of the immediate-gradual axis. The horizontal axis of in(side)-out(side), provided in the last chapter, the previous models of De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) and Brubaker (2020), will be replaced by an alternative conceptualisation. Suppose nationalism is defined as the political movement to maintain congruence between the boundaries of national and political communities (Gellner, 2006). In that case, we can assume that the gap between the two is inevitable. Nationalism is understood as the state-idea which enables the particular order of governmentality (state-system), believed to suffice that gap (cf. Balibar, 1991; the state institution that serves the political purpose of the nation). The nation-state comprises both concepts of the state (idea and system) and is considered a cultural system based on temporality and spatiality.

Though it has a long history that the concept of time has been made in social and political science since modern history, it was argued in relatively abstract discussions, as political development, political economy, and theories on justice are concerned subjects on

[8] This section 3-2 and consecutive 3-3 to 3-5 are written by adoption, translation, summary, and supplement of two articles (Kim, H. c., 2016; Kim, H.c and Seo, 2017) published in Korean, of which I am the first author.

the issue (Cohen, 2018, 18-25). As Elizabeth Cohen indicates, a political representation, a distributive pattern of policies, duration and endowment of the benefits are concerned with time which is rarely dealt with by previous literature. Concerning the adoption of temporality, the state is understood with its 'maintenance of pattern' of the unity of the governmental system by defining the temporality perceived by people in everyday life (Gross, 1985, 65-67). It is relevant to consider how power relations among actors are constituted via the reservation or propitiation of political demands in a timetable, especially of a governor of a political community (Dalsgaard, 2013). The distribution of the pace of events for people's needs is also shown in the endowment of the residency status of immigrants (Bryan, 2018; Simonsen, 2018). In addition, in the populist nation-time, individuals are not purely autonomous agents of their lives but *float through time* as part of the greater nation (italics added, Taş, 2020, 5), seeking to fix and find themselves in a meaningful event.

Concerning the grammar of nationalism and populism, the nation is defined *over time* with cultural and historical heritage from generation to generation, whereas the people *over space* within the boundary of the state as a source of legitimacy and political sovereignty (italics original, Yark, 2001, 520-523). If we consider the spatial understanding of people (high-low) and nation (inside-outside) suggested by the previous literature (De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017; Brubaker, 2020), this classical understanding of nation and people implies an alternative frame to understand the relationship of nationalism, populism and democracy. As argued later, democracy is based on a certain sense of how subjects exist within the past, present, and future, and populism transforms that timeline in its own style. In this manner, the concept of people never stands alone in maintaining the continuity of their political decision. The adoption of nationalism can secure a sense of linear development of the meaning of people.

Therefore, the relationship between nationalism and populism cannot be understood just as a multidimensional crossing of the vertical people (low/bottom)-elite (high/up) axis and horizontal insider-outsider axis, as De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) suggested. Firstly, as Brubaker suggested, those two spatial concepts of understanding are entangled in the discourses on people (Brubaker 2020, 57). Secondly, understanding nationalism as a temporal system is required to explain populism adequately.

In addition, the entanglement of nationalism and populism has its own template in framing people's apprehension of national narratives (Taş, 2020); (a) an idealised past in restorative nostalgia; (b) victimised people in the recent past demanding the present to be redeemed and rescued; and (c) visions of the future in narratives of the great country or its total demise. These three temporal self-comprehensions reveal a moral antagonism between the elite and people: 'Who is wrong with denying those incidents, and who is right to be awakened to see them?' This linear appreciation can be referred to as a new frame, which comprises the temporality of representative democracy. By suggesting the concept of temporality in the next section, the axes of the cultural frame of nationalism and democracy discussed in populism literature can be modified in the three-dimensional matrix—direct-indirect × monopoly-distribution × immediate-gradual. It categorises how people and the elite apprehend their political community in general, regardless of the kinds of regimes or the nature of the polity.

Benedict Anderson's (2006[1983]) 'imagined community' is not a mere articulation of the essence of a nation as imagination, as the concept is developed by his analysis of the change of temporality and spatiality of modern political community. He insightfully argues that nationalism is a cultural system since the modern era based on the temporality of 'empty homogeneous time' (Benjamin, 2007 [1955]). Temporality is based on linear and

chronological time apprehension without meaning since modernity: it was once defined by recurring religious events (such as the Advent of Christ in the Western Christendom world) in the pre-modern eras.[9] Before the modern era, people could not give a different meaning to a moment that we now call past-present-future because it was always defined by a priest's interpretation of religious canons such as revelation or the edict of the sovereign king. This temporality was considered as a 'cyclical time' apprehension that there was 'simultaneity-along-time' (Anderson, 2006[1983], 24), as each moment was defined by the universal cultural system of understanding the world (such as religion, tradition, sovereign's edict). In this system, the distinction between past, present, and future was meaningless or even banned in the pre-modern era. Individuals could not give meaning to the concept of the present in expectation of the future:

> "We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in remembrance, however. This stripped the future of its magic, to which all those succumb who turn to the soothsayers for enlightenment" (Benjamin 2007 [1955], 264).

However, with the development of modern capitalism, a new focus on measurement, calculation, and prediction emerged, which was regulated in the context of time by the

[9] This is also relevant for the pre-modern Eastern world. For example, in East Asia, the twenty-four divisions of a year and a day are prevalent, and each has had its own meaningful event. Stefan Tanaka's *New Times in Modern Japan* (2004) insightfully contains the transformation of time apprehension in modernising Japan, comparing the event-oriented understanding of time to calculable time for the linear development of nations and individuals. Unfortunately, time apprehension of modernising Korea is rarely studied in a systemical research agenda, as the recent book by Kim Hak-Seon's *Yisibsa-Sigan-Eui Tansaeng: Cheongubaekpalsibnyeondae-eui Siganjeongchi* [The Birth of the 24-hour Era: The Politics of Time in the 1980s] (2020) is the closest academic work written in Korean, which deals with how the political governance by time constituted a new way of life among Koreans since 1980s. This issue is closely scrutinised in Chapter Seven.

calendar, clock, and watch. People's lives were similarly transformed temporarily. They read regularly delivered publications such as newspapers and comprehended their own timeline in daily life, differentiating it into serial, linear moments of past-present-future.[10] In this empty homogenous time, free from the pre-modern era's single cultural system, individuals can define those moments with their *own* meaning. This emptiness without specific meaning enabled the individual to imagine other anonymous individuals who share each moment and potentially consist in the same imagined community. In the place of once-meaningful moments, people can fill them with their imagination of anonymous others, in a single boundary, who have never met each other but share the same 'meanwhile' (Anderson, 2006[1983], 22-46).[11] These conditions enable the national narrative that we share the past-present-future with our ancestors-people nowadays-descendants (Anderson, 1999).

Charles Taylor interprets the political implication of this imagined community. Taylor argues that this community, unfettered from a given 'higher time', brings us into a 'direct-access society' (Taylor, 2007, 207-211). Pre-modern worldviews, hierarchical and mediated by priests, the personal sovereign, have been replaced by modern worldviews, impersonal, horizontal, egalitarian, and directly accessible by individuals to the meaning of the religious or political by themselves. He suggests the concept of 'social imaginary', which means the way ordinary people imagine their social existence and surroundings, shared by large groups of people, making common practice possible and a widely shared sense of legitimacy

[10] Similar intuitions of differential, calculable rationality since modern capitalism are explained in Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (2001[1930]), as life ethics of Protestant churches, influenced by monastery regulation, planning, and currency system, has an affinity with differentiated, calculable, so predictable time planning or double bookkeeping system in the capitalist era.

[11] For example, while reading a newspaper, we can imagine someone without any acquaintance who shares the exact moment but different events: e.g. On 27 April 2018, meanwhile, President Moon Jae-in was meeting Kim Jeong-eun, I was here writing a draft for my thesis to visit my supervisor.

(Taylor, 2007, 171-172). There are three forms of social imaginary in modernity; (a) *economy* replacing God's Providence and independent from polity; (b) *the public sphere* in which people meet through various media to discuss common interests; (c) the practice and outlooks of democratic self-rule, that is, *the sovereign people* (Taylor, 2007, 176-211). In this circumstance, people who imagine themselves as a nation claim the demand for self-determination of the nation, which is the right of the people to construct their own polity (Taylor, 2011, 42-46). In this sense, the modern nation-state can be established by insisting on reviving the past's glory and promising the people a better future.

In summary, temporal-spatial apprehension of the political community since the modern era is defined by (a) the linear, horizontal, abstract temporality of differentiated past-present-future; (b) the vertically direct access to the political ideal or truth by horizontally egalitarian individuals. These two elements of modern temporality replace the pre-modern (a-1) cyclical, vertical, and monolithic temporality; (b-1) limited capability of people who access the meaning of the political indirectly by the interpretation of the elite on the hierarchical order. The point is that this explanation is idealised, and its exact embodiment in political phenomenon cannot help be different in a degree from it.

3-3. Nationalism taken-for-granted: readily available and desirable

Then, how can we understand a concept of the nation with populism in this context? Étienne Balibar argues on the nation 'form':

"In the case of national formation, the imaginary [that is, nation] which inscribes itself in

the real in this way is that of the 'people.' It is that of a community which recognises itself *in advance in the institution of the state* […] [The] ideological form [that is, the nation form] must become *a priori* condition of communication between individuals (the 'citizens') and social groups by relativising all differences and subordinating them to the symbolic difference between 'ourselves' and 'foreigners' which *wins out* and which is lived as irreducible (italics added, Balibar, 1991, 93-94)."

A modern nation-state is legitimised based on the popular belief that *the state institution shall serve the political purpose of the people who imagine and identify themselves with the nation*. In this vein, recent populism is more or less 'national populism' (Brubaker, 2017a), which means that populism emerges during "[the] function of the process of development of societies as they move towards modernity" (Taggart, 2000, 13).

Populism emphasises the sense or belief commonly prevalent to people. In this respect, the epistemological status of nationalism is not ideological. It is taken-for-granted, naturalised hegemony as factuality accepted as *a priori* political form. Here, hegemony means unconscious consent in everyday life, regardless of the dominant and the resistant, which is nonidentical with ideology and insists on specific values with conscious intention (Comarroff and Comarrof, 1991). Analysing modern Chinese nationalism, Jungmin Seo (2005) introduces the concept of 'nationalism as hegemony', which legitimises the political discourses of the ruler and the ruled regardless of their controversial political stances. He suggests (a) nation as a take-for-granted social factuality of political contention; (b) nation as a non-agentive form of habitual practices; (c) nationalistic discourses as a dynamic process of formulation of both domination and resistance (Seo, 2005, 144-155). This conceptualisation

emphasises that a ruling ideology of nationalism logically takes the form of a nation and can serve as a common political grammar of other resistant nationalistic ideologies (Seo, J., 2009). The nation form can be shared among social forces in a nation-state, regardless of ideological stances, such as Left and Right, conservative and liberal, and the elite and people.

As modern popular politics operates based on legitimacy from people, the political elite or leader seeks an 'easy' (Taggart 2000, 92) way to persuade the ordinary people to support their political interest: to identify and emphasise themselves as a member of the nation. It is relevant when we consider the 'availability' of a 'national symbolic', indicated by Lauren Berlant (1991, 22-28). According to her argument, anonymous people project their personal desires in daily life into the national symbol, and that is how that symbol consists of the modern national state-idea by incorporating and legitimating those scattered desires in the form of a more collective and political symbol.[12] By the same token, as nationalism is believed to reduce any disparate interests among its members, regardless of class, gender, and the difference between elites and common people, "populism is a logical extension of one element in nationalist doctrine, the supremacy of nation (It is also a dimension of democratic doctrine, the participational one)" (Smith, 1983, 264).

For cultural analysis of the capitalist developmental state (CDS) in East Asia, Han and Ling (1998, 62) juxtapose the hegemony propagation of 'knowledge' for economic development with the construction of a 'desire' for national sovereignty, state power, and economic wealth in the region. In a post-colonial-feminist approach, the East had been

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[12] Lauren Berlant suggests the example of 'the Statue of Liberty', which immigrants in early American history might face as they embarked on the shore of New York with their American dreams. For them, the Statute of Liberty symbolises a 'Muse' who could realise their desire in a new land. This signification is 'available' to anyone who looked at or imagined it, regardless of its actual acquisition, legal owner or builder. In this respect, Berlant compares the structure of desire that enables 'national fantasy' with pornography (Beralnt, 1991, 27).

regarded as the female Other to the male West: the masculinised nation is humiliated by the latter, so it should be invigorated by a catch-up strategy. It is relevant in the Park Chung-Hee regime, explained in Chapters Five and Six. Like the Cold War system maintained targeting the most intimate, private, and inner realm of people's lives (Kwon, 2020), nationalism and populism meet at the very point of the mind full of *desire*. Here, rationality and emotion entangle; as Balibar (1991, 94) puts it, "*[a]ll identity is individual* (italics original)". It is the main issue of this thesis as I attempt to elucidate the historical construction of populistic nationalism in Korea.

Here we know how populism is 'easy' to reproduce the *existing* national discourses. Populists and populist parties are not 'prophets' who articulate a new ideology or value but 'purifiers', which refer to an existing ideology betrayed or diluted by established politics (Lucardie, 2000; Mudde, 2010, 1179). Meanwhile, populism appears in an attempt to make an organic ideology and a leader in transforming widespread distress for mobilising the masses toward the conquest of the existing democratic government (Urbinati, 2013, 139). Here the significance and the limit of populism as an ideology which adopts another thin-centred ideology (or rather, hegemonic) nationalism is evident, as explained in Section 3-7. As for populists, creating a new symbol or value is not a matter of politics. Instead, using or appropriating existing political resources is one of the main characteristics of populism politics.

3-4. Populist temporality: the rejection of reserving the political desire

As mentioned in the Introduction, it has been not a long time since the concept of temporality has been directly dealt with in the literature of populism studies (Anastasiou, 2020; Vulović

and Palonen, 2022), though its significance was implied in respective populism events such as Brexit (cf. Clake and Newman, 2017). With underscoring those studies' arguments, this thesis argues that the concept is crucial in understanding the relationship between nationalism, which provides the social imaginary (Taylor, 2007) of (post) modern nation-state system and affects the widespread sense of pace, rapidity, and change, crisis, development and democratic representation in (post)modern political community.

In a mass society, since modernity consists of individuals who can access the ideal of the nation-state, they have the potential to judge the performance of the state institution, whether it serves or not the nation's purpose that they consider essential, genuine, and just. To Abram's distinction between the state-idea and the state-system, the belief in the state institution is the state-idea, and the policy, organisational settings and their personnel and its network (that is, of the elite politicians) are the state-system. The history of the democratic system is marked by attempts at compensating for the gap between the two: the erosion of confidence in the practical limit of the regularised electoral system is alleviated through checks and balances by formal institutional powers (legislation, administration, judiciary) and informal social counter-powers, defined as 'organising distrust' (Rosanvallon, 2008, 4). In addition, Canovan (1999) argues that populism, participatory radicalism and radical democracy can emerge in a democratic society through the interaction between 'redemptive politics' and 'pragmatic politics': the former overcomes the gap between political ideal and reality and the latter devises the peaceful solution of political contention. It reflects the institutional conditions of modern representative democracy, which Robert Dahl characterises with the term 'polyarchy', which consists of (a) elected officials; (b) free, fair, and frequent elections; (c) freedom of expression; (d) access to alternative sources of information; (e) associational autonomy; (f) inclusive citizenship (Dahl, 2000, 85-86).

The gap between the political idea of individuals and its realisation by the state institution is basically perceived as a *temporal* gap. As Sheldon Wolin puts it:

> "Political time, especially in societies with pretensions to democracy, requires an element of leisure, not in the sense of a leisure class (which is the form in which the ancient writers conceived it), but in the sense, say, of a leisurely pace. This is owing to the needs of political action to be preceded by deliberation and deliberation, as its "deliberate" part suggests, takes time because, typically, it occurs in a setting of competing or conflicting but legitimate considerations. *Political time is conditioned by the presence of differences and the attempt to negotiate them*. The results of negotiations, whether successful or not, preserve time. […] In contrast to political time, the temporalities of economy and popular culture are dictated by innovation, change, and replacement through obsolescence" (italics added, Wolin, 1997).

William E. Scheuermann (2004) argues Wolin's point regarding the different temporalities among the three powers of the governmental body under liberal democracy. Legislation is prospective or future-oriented; judicial activity is retrospective or past-oriented; the executive is contemporaneous or present-oriented (Scheuermann, 2004, 29). In this 'temporal separation of powers', legislators must be deliberate to minimise future uncertainty and unpredictability and coordinate the future. In addition, for the present majority, "the possibility of correcting or reversing present majority decision making must be available to them as they are only legitimate as they make up part of a future majority" (Scheuermann, 2004, 32). Suppose this promise is broken or neglected in the context of social acceleration

(and in a time of crisis). In that case, there is a tendency to promote the executive power with its expeditious dispatch, capable of fulfilling political function immediately, weakening the representative legislatures, constitutionalism and the rule of law (Scheuermann, 2004, xvi). As I explained in Chapter Two, this is relevant to the recent emergence of populism in Western European politics and other regions, which is characterised by the blurring of ideological distinction of Left-and Right and the decoupling of politics from society. This necessitates direct communication between people as a whole and the elite's responsiveness to the people's immediate needs and their expertise and competence for *problem-solving* (italics added, Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti, 2021).

In this respect, liberal democracy is based on *the reservation of present political desire*. Populists abandon and regard it as hypocrisy. Populism is considered an attempt to *nullify* the temporal gap between political need and its realisation and the distance between the representative and the represented (Taguieff, 2007, 16-17). In the view of populism, in the linear temporal system of liberal democracy, which reserves the concept of the future, the parallax between past and future obscures a need to settle the present's contradiction in a political community. In this respect, we can operationalise the dyad of political temporality: the difference between populism and liberal democracy of *immediate-gradual* realisation of the political demand of the people.

As Jan-Werner Müller argues, populists assert an 'imperative mandate' that people directly and immediately command rather than a 'free mandate' based on accountability by the regularised electoral system (Müller, 2016, 30-31). Paradoxically, such an imperative mandate can provide populists with an excuse for policy failure, saying, 'We have done what you demand, so this is not my fault.' (Müller, 2016, 31)

In addition, this emphasis is on the realisation of political demand in the present. On this temporality of immediacy, let us reconsider the previous argument that populism rejects bureaucratised, regularised, constrained types of leadership (Taggart 2004, 276). Mudde (2004, 547) indicates that populism accepts technocratic measures as they can be used to drive out the existing establishment and realise the people's political will. Christopher J. Bickerton and Carlo Invernizzi Accetti (2017; 2021) also emphasise the complementarity between technocracy and populism. They both prefer *a single answer* to specific political issues, opposing the mediation of political conflicts through competition among political parties and a procedural conception of political legitimacy. This issue is also related to the recent analysis on meritocracy's tentative role in preventing populism: in reality, considering the case of Singapore or China, meritocracy cannot be the panacea of liberal democracy as it also coexists with the populist elements (Chou et al., 2020). It is relevant when we consider Scheuermann's emphasis on social acceleration and the prevalence of the executive bodies in the polity relative to the representative institution based on the election.

3-5. Populist spatiality: the paradox of 'direct-access society'

As populism emerges in the process of modernisation of society, it is nonidentical with conservatism, which acknowledges the demand for political rights by mediating groups such as traditional authorities and voluntarily gathering associations (such as kinship or local community, Nisbet, 2007 [1986], 44, 61-77). Populism is maintained and supported in that it is believed it allows direct access of individuals to a nation's ideals without the existing institutional system occupied by the established elites. Its followers never explicitly hand over their autonomy of interpretation and meaning-giving to others as people in the pre-

modern era did. In this respect, populism prefers direct democracy to representative democracy as an ideal political system.

However, since modernity, the state has been an impersonal order of power structure and authority (Held, 1984, 29). Populists detour around that impersonal, institutional setting of liberal democracy, supporting a personal leader, or if that kind of character does not exist, identify themselves with the idea of a nation or any other instance of a signifier that represents *people as a whole* without any mediation. Such identification can be regarded as 'personal nationalism' (Cohen, 1996), which justifies the personal judgement of rights and wrongs for the sake of the *collective* identity of a nation on the level of the *personal* (See <Figure 3-1>).



<Figure 3-1> Representative democracy's confrontation and populist antagonism

One crucial point is that this feature of populism is, ironically, the outcome of the very impersonal order. That is, though populist seems to be the radical critic of representative democracy, without the concept of popular sovereignty secured by the constitutional setting, populists have no basis for claiming the realisation of the general will. “[Populism] is not a revolutionary movement because it does not create people’s sovereignty but intervenes once people’s sovereignty exists and its values and rules are written in a constitution” (Urbinati, 2013, 145).[13] Populists bring about their monopolisation of interpretation of what people or nation is (cf. Müller, 2016) provided by the existing state-system. The state is the basis of the distribution of political rights, materials and symbolic resources in the political community, excluding the alternative imagination of the nation and its embodiment in the state-system by other pluralistic political groups. Moreover, as quoted by Cohen (2018, 18-25, 81) earlier, this distribution is affected by temporality delved by the state institution.

As quoted from Fabian (2014[1983]) earlier, this distribution is coupled with the temporalisation of the different cultures across the spaces or, in this thesis, the political agenda in the space of vertical antagonism and horizontal confrontations shown in <Figure 3-1>. By distributing the immediate and reserved agenda, a particular demand comes prior and superior to the others, making them unequal vertically.

Populism is not only a matter of antagonism between the elite and the people. It is a way or style of how the meaning of the people is *purified* by constituting and maintaining that antagonism; as Mary Douglas (1966) argues, the concept of purity needs pollution and taboo.

[13] This is why populist parties with exclusive and anti-pluralistic parties are possible. They do not *deny* the entire electoral system and do not drive themselves to choose to subvert the existing system or take only the means to exercise direct democracy. If a certain populist takes power and changes those basic settings of representative democracy with the idea of plural competition with enem(ies) that they indicate, we no longer see populism and another dimension of the regime.

By doing so, the populists "[make] its leaders and elected officials use the state to favour, consolidate and extend [the] constituency" (Urbinati, 2013, 140). It explains how the paradoxical term 'internal outsider' is possible, by which a specific group of people is legally accepted as a member of the state, but majorities deny them. Ironically, we return to the part-whole question here again: *To be as a whole, we need a part. A part insists on itself as a whole by otherising another part.*

This process is accelerated in technopopulism, which means the decline of mediated ideological contentions by party politics and separation between society and politics, which mould the latter to be more mobilisable for actors and movements that had no direct connection to the social world of ideological politics (Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti, 2021, 10). Specifically, Bickerton and Accetti indicate what populism matters regarding the conventional democratic competition in liberal democracy. They clarify the shrinking places for the equally *horizontal* (italics original) confrontation between the Left and Right and the shifting to the political antagonism between the society (people) *as a whole* (italics added) versus the parts to the *vertical* (italics original) dimension (Bickerton and Incwenizzi Accetti, 2021, 34-35). We have seen the difference between confrontation (or political cleavage) in <Figure 3-1> above. They argue that the former claims their 'monolithic conception of popular will' or 'political truth', which technocrats have access to in virtue of their competence or expertise, considering them as *superior to* the other (italics added, Bickerton and Incwenizzi Accetti, 2021, 34).

In this vein, individuals in a direct-access society can be populist when we only consider the vertical dyad of spatiality (*direct-indirect*), which is decided by how much individuals try to access the meaning and value of the political. The horizontal dyad of spatiality is determined by the degree to which those individuals attempt to personalise and monopolise a

particular political ideal. That ideal is considered collective, so required to be mediated by communication in the public sphere, which is another kind of social imaginary that Charles Taylor suggests (See section 3-2). This personalisation of political ideal, or truth, is evident in the case of so-called 'Post-truth' since the Brexit and Trump phenomenon in 2016. "What is at stake is what people *feel* to be true" (italics original, Nathan Rabin's interview with Stephen Colbert, 2006, quoted in Clake and Newman, 2017, 116).

In addition, Brubaker rightly emphasises internal outsiders, "[who are] living on the inside which, *even when they are citizens of the state*, are not seen as belonging, or fully belonging, to the nation" (italics added, Brubaker, 2017b, 363). Populism is not only a matter of antagonism against ethnic and cultural foreigners, immigrants, or refugees, as emphasised in the literature on the Western radical populist right. It is a matter of monopolising or (re)distributing the previous political, economic, symbolic, and particularly temporal-spatial (remind Bryan, 2018; Simonsen, 2018) resources to previously marginalised, unseen, disregarded subjects who are in or coming into a community.

In sum, by this concept of the internal outsider, this study defines the otherising style peculiar to populism, which is defined as the antagonism based on a monopolised apprehension of a political community to the have-been-marginalised individuals or groups which is becoming included and legitimated by a formal political institution. This study suggests an alternative horizontal dyad of *monopoly-distribution*, replacing the previous 'in'-'out' or 'inclusionary'-'exclusionary'. Here the term monopoly means *a part* monopolises the cultural capital to comprehend the people as *a whole*. In contrast, the term distribution means *parts* accept time to understand other parts of *a whole*.

3-6. The three-dimensional matrix of temporal-spatial apprehension of political community

Including the concept of the internal outsider in the two-fold distinction between vertical populism and horizontal nationalism by De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017, <Figure 1-1> in this thesis), Brubaker (2020, 57, <Table 2-1> in this thesis) suggests a two-dimensional category of populism. By adopting temporality as an additional axis to capture the concept of populism, this study alternatively articulates a three-dimensional understanding of political community to compare populism with radical democracy. This articulation comprises other appreciation styles besides populism and liberal democracy in a cultural system of nationalism (depicted as a cube).

The matrix in <Figure 3-2> comprises three-axis (direct-indirect × monopoly-distribution × immediate-gradual). The temporal axis expands the previous two dimensions of vertical-horizontal spatiality. The four quadrants are modified into eight octants. Each octant has an ideal-type of apprehending political community by the people. Empirical facts cannot be fully populist or liberal democratic; each government, elite network, and social movement uses various symbols and tactics to aggregate politico-social demands. By doing so, I juxtapose the populistic scheme to see the political community (Type 1) with the one of representative democracy (Type 8) as polarised by each other. Thus, we can analyse the discourse or social movements (state-idea) and the state-system by applying this matrix and comparing the case within its ideal-types.

The state-system and the state-idea of research cases are analysed regarding their temporal and spatial characteristics. In the national (political community) time-space (a whole cube or each cube of octant), the degree on those axes entails the operationalised concepts of *verticalisation / horizontalisation*. They show one of the critical differential

features of populism and representative democracy, depicted in the <Figure 3-1> above before I put the temporal axis. That is the form of political contention in society. As explained, these spatial concepts depend on both the spatiality and temporality of the case studied.

A. verticalisation / horizontalisation: these mean a vector value for speed (immediate-gradual). As the pace at which demands are diversified, they are negotiable and equal to horizontal confrontation. As the need for immediate performance of the state or the community's executive body increases, that institution's vertical intervention or people's demand for it also increases. In this condition, the political cleavage and antagonism rotate vertically. Politics becomes a matter of coping with the executive body or the state considered high above the society (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, 982), which each demand tries to access respectively.
B. The degree between monopoly and distribution means a plurality of political actors or societal demands. Their existence in and of itself does not guarantee the horizontal co-existence of those demands: here, accessibility matters.
C. The indirect-direct axis refers to the degree to which people can access political society while making their values the most important. It also reflects the actors' autonomy and liberty to represent their political desire directly or indirectly by mediating organisations, mandated leaders, and politicians. However, this directedness concerns top-down access from leader to people, and bottom-up detours around the mediation, especially in a society with solid verticalisation.



<Figure 3-2> Three-dimensional matrix of apprehending political community

By this matrix, we can determine eight types of people's imagination (state-idea) of how they apprehend the time-space of a political community and its realised institutions (state-system) as below.

Type 1 sits at the immediate-direct-monopoly nexus and can be defined as **populism in a (post) modern nation-state system**. This form of apprehending the political community is our mainframe to explain populism. With their own understating of the idealised nation, people monopolise the initiative to interpret the meaning of the nation. That interpretation can be made by a mall organisation or even a person. As people believe they can access the political truth, national ideal, or any other meaning of symbol which comprises people

directly, they believe in the rightness of their thinking without accepting the possibility of its error or shortcomings. When state institutions seem to be slow in immediately realising their political desire, people demand their political will with radical expression. This is especially pronounced when people's political participation is restricted only to regularised elections. As emphasised, populism prefers executive intervention, such as presidential order or a single-round referendum. By doing so, the spatial form of political cleavage/antagonism rotates to be vertical.

Type 2 is located in a nexus of immediate-direct-distribution, defining **radical democracy**. As Canovan (1999, 15) and Mudde (2004, 545-547) argue, the difference between radical democracy or revolutionary politics and populism is the existence of a blueprint for realising specific political values and the acceptance of possible change of people themselves in a new revolutionised or reformed society. In this respect, people are more distributive in interpreting who the people are or what the nation is. Such an inclusive understanding of political community enables the redistribution of existing political, economic and cultural resources in a community to marginalised groups or outsiders. The static meaning of the nation itself can be changed or even discarded. As a means of revolution, the executive state agency can be preferred by revolutionaries during a sudden political change. In this respect, political cleavage is not defined systemically.

Type 3 consists of a gradual-direct-monopoly combination, which can be read as a **traditional (kinship) community** characteristic. This type of political form is close to the traditional society, which is constituted by voluntary and natural needs. The head of the community, for instance, the chief of the tribe or household, and their associates may monopolise interpretations of tradition, religion, or rituals and decisions on the critical issues of everyday life of a community. People in a community can access those meanings through

direct, face-to-face relations with prominent figures. However, their intervention in those interpretations is relatively limited compared to the modern direct-access society. The community and its institutional setting remain relatively static without rapid change. Still, it can occasionally adapt to new circumstances through discussion and the new interpretation of the community's previous values by members' participation. However, political cleavage in the modern sense is rarely observable.

Type 4 has the characteristics of a gradual-direct-distribution **participatory democracy**. This type is a more institutionalised form of radical democracy (Type 2). People can access politics through organised practices such as hearing, petitioning, or grassroots participation in sub-national local communities. As this form prefers more participants in decision-making for redistribution of various resources, the pace of realising the political desire of people is relatively gradual compared to (Type 2). Due to the gradual-distribution combination, the political cleavage is relatively horizontal.

Type 5 shows an immediate-indirect-monopoly style of polity, exemplified by **an authoritarian regime in modern society or monarchy**. This type can be a more institutionalised form of populism (Type 1), which emphasises the immediate realisation of a particular political purpose. As Taggart (2004, 276) suggests, populism undergoes the dilemma of institutionalisation. After a populist leader comes to power, losing the former charisma which has once directly connected the person to the people. Now, a leader and political elites rely on a more bureaucratised and regularised legitimation of leadership, which Max Weber indicates as 'the routinisation of charismatic leadership' (Weber, 1978, 246-254; 266-277). Legitimation of the regime relies on the promise of a prompt solution to political change, coping with crises or threats. Thus, the institutional setting of the political community prefers the executive, hierarchically bureaucratised, centralised agency, of which

a leader is on the top and capable of political resolution. By this institutionalisation, people come to be alienated from the political society which has once been believed as they are accessible. This is similar to the pre-modern monarchy, led by a personal, arbitrary sovereign who monopolises all the interpretations of what the political is *right now*, welding the prerogative overriding any other political processes. The political cleavage is hierarchical between the state-people, and the alternative of political preference in a diverse, horizontal way is limited.

Type 6 shows a possibility of an immediate-indirect-distribution community with a **benevolent monarchy or responsive administration of any kind**: This type is ruled by a benevolent, personal sovereign who is open to reformative consultation by their associates or even common subjects. Alternatively, it is understood as the form of the executive body of any regime with resilience to the change of society or plural social demands, but few elites or one leader dictate the relevant answer to those challenges with less deliberation of actors with those demands to a political community. The satisfaction of various needs of people is plausible. However, the limited direct participation of those people cannot guarantee the concept of political cleavage or contention, as this type is hardly thinkable in a modern liberal democracy.

Type 7 is exemplified by a gradual-indirect-monopoly **religious organisation from the pre-modern era**. This type can be applied to a religious organisation with its long history. The interpretation of certain myths, written cannons, or rituals by laypeople is minimal. The clergies of the organisation monopolise it on a certain level approved by tradition and regulation. However, for the organisation's survival, it takes a moderate stance on the other groups and organisations in a secularised society, gradually adapting to the changing circumstances. In this respect, it is distinguished from religious fundamentalist groups since

the modern era *close to populist*, which has direct access to the canon, and its interpretation is un-mediated by certain organisational tenets, principles, and a group of elites in the high-middle level, enabling everybody believes themselves as the true prophet of the divine.

Type 8 defines the idealised gradual-indirect-distribution **liberal democracy**. It is a conventional government functioning through a representative body of polity. Though people can directly access the meaning of politics through mass communication and more open and direct media, its realisation is temporarily reserved, mediated, and crystallised by the institutionalised party machine, bureaucratic administration, and judiciary body. The idealised community of this type is inclusive citizenship to people at stake in the political process as much as possible, emphasising more distribution of resources in the community. However, its actual practices inevitably result in a gap between what people believe and what people feel that they get *right now*. In this circumstance, the diversity of alternative representation is crucial in horizontalising/verticalising the political cleavage/antagonism.

From the perspective of the cultural theory of the state, the relationship between nationalism and the state can be caught in how people apprehend their political community, which consists of the ideal of the community (nation) and its institution that serves its political purpose (the state). Since modernity, the concept of the nation provides a cultural system by which people can access political meaning directly, immediately, and autonomously. As people who identify as members of the nation-state perceive the gap between the temporality and spatiality of the state and nation, their broken belief in the state institution results in political dissatisfaction and concomitant contention.

The eight ideal-types in the three-dimensional matrix (direct-indirect × monopoly-

distribution × immediate-gradual) are designed to measure that gap by pointing or marking a zone in the cube to show what people imagine as the ideal of political community (state-idea) and what the institution does (state-system). Type 1 shows that populists in the nation-state system prefer the immediate solution by the state per their monopolised interpretation of the meaning of the nation, which is derived from their belief that they can directly access the political society, political truth, or the political ideal. It shows the cultural system of populism contrary to radical democracy, which might be understood as inclusive populism (especially Laclau, 2005; Mudde and Rovira Kaltvasser, 2012).

However, we are still under the question of nationalism's exact function. This matrix consists of eight ideal-types, which merely provide the roughly determined location for the particular case. This should be detailed by analysing the degree to which the case is close to the ideal-type in each octant. For this purpose, this chapter details the exact concept to describe the cases of a combination of nationalism and populism. This concept determines to which ideal-type or dimension we weigh the point of emphasis in the case of East Asia, especially South Korea, in this thesis. Simply put, how do we *name* the case of South Korea? As we cannot do it such as 'it is just between (Type 1) and (Type 4)' or 'it sometimes goes to the (Type 2) and comes back to (Type 4) or (Type 1)' for the conclusion of this thesis, I finally determine an analytical concept: *populistic nationalism*.

3-7. Analytical concept: populistic nationalism

Populistic nationalism reverses the order of the norm and adjective of 'national populism', suggested by Taguieff and Brubaker mentioned in Chapter Two. In effect, Taguieff (1995, 12) uses the terms 'populist nationalism' or 'national populism' interchangeably, addressing

its features: (a) an orientation of *unity* and *integration*; (b) one of *identity* and *exclusivity,* while he also indicates the prewar German nationalism or referring to Gaullism in France with the term 'populist-nationalist-racial *völkisch*' (italics original). As explained in the previous section, Brubaker also uses the term to emphasise the horizontal in-and-out notion decoupled with the vertical up-and-down of common people's perception in a nation-state (Brubaker, 2017b, 362-364).

Constructing an antagonistic frontier between the oligarchy and the people (Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2018) is too simplistic. Mudde's definition based on the confrontation between the corrupted elite and the pure people with the supremacy of the latter's *volonté générale* is unrealistic as there are few cases of being pure or unitarily corrupted. Here we face the conundrum of two thin-centred ideologies: nationalism (Freeden, 1998) and populism, already recurrently indicated by the literature of Mudde in Chapter Two. Ideology is "[a set] of political ideas, beliefs and attitudes that involve the adoption of practices which explain, support, justly or contest socio-political arrangements, and which provide plans of action for public political institutions" (Freeden, 1998, 749). In this regard, nationalism "is incapable of providing on its own a solution to questions of social justice, distribution of resources, and conflict-management which mainstream ideologies address" (Freeden, 1998, 751).

This feature of nationalism is derived from its tendency to select, exclude, and its limited political programme (Freeden, 1998, 750-751) without the universalisable core concept such as individual freedom (of liberalism) or equality (of socialism). That *core* is contextualised and nuanced in a particular circumstance of the group, population, or membership (Freeden, 1998, 751-752). It is the same with populism (Taggart, 2000, 2,4; Wayland, 2001; Mudde, 2004, 544). It cannot stand alone without combining other political programmes or content that figure out the meaning of people as a whole against the elite and its 'point de caption as

an empty signifier' to aggregate various democratic demand*s* into a unitary popular demand (Laclau, 2005). Specifically, in a low institutionalised political setting of state-system, with an exigency of the fulfilment of a popular demand such as in the crisis or rapid development, such signifier can be *personalised*, that is, a leader or a humanised nation incarnating the eternality with past-present-future of political community (Anderson, 1999; Weyland, 2001, 14; Laclau, 2005, 99-100; Mouffe, 2018, 70).

In this regard, populism and nationalism, both without universalisable core value, depend on each other, sufficing the lack of one another: populism provides nationalism with the political style or form of the vertical direction of antagonism with the objects to request a national demand upward (the elite) and the objects to blame or degrade downward (internal outsiders). Nationalism, in turn, provides populism with the horizontal boundary of people or signification that endows the content of who 'we, the *common* people (not the elite or internal outsiders) are'. The recent literature with a similar distinction between populism and nationalism also argues that populism is ontologically a form to carry the content of nationalism, which provides the ontic dimension of populism (Vulović and Palonen, 2022).

This process accompanies the replacement of horizontal confrontation (recall the <Figure 3-1>) with the external/internal distinction based on the picture of the nation that people imagine (see Chapter Six explaining how the Park's regime invented and prioritised nationalism over other democratic demands). In sum, this thesis will see populism as a style, form, or vessel in which nationalism gets its social significance and popularity, conveying the particular boundary and endowing materiality of people contextually.

Then why populistic nationalism, not nationalistic populism? Though many scholars argued about the conditions of the emergence of populism, Mouffe (2018, 32-33) painfully

mentioned her own reflection on the failure of the Left. She diagnoses that the Left has neglected the vertical antagonism among people since Thatcherism and Reaganism. In her assessment, such ignorance has accompanied neoliberalism which replaced the conventional horizontal confrontations between the Left and Right, as emphasised recurrently. This chapter emphasises this point when I quote the different temporality of politics and economy argued by Sheldon Wolin (1997). The difference between previous political parties based on different ideologies is now blurred, and it is perceived by many people that there is no alternative to representing themselves with the distinctive factions in the institutionalised representative democracy.

Then, how can we understand a nation-state, with the long historical experience of such a 'blur' among political parties, since its very beginning of nation-building? A lack of horizontal confrontations of democratic demands is the condition by which vertical antagonism emerges. Thus, it is better to argue that there has always been the potential for populistic elements to appear in East Asia. It cannot, therefore, be easily, rigorously or significantly distinguishable from the sudden rise of populism in Western democracies since the early twenty-first century.

In this condition, an alternative for the association with the political community outside the party system is the concept of popular nationalism. In this regard, this thesis suggests populistic nationalism as an analytical concept to explain the history of Korean politics.

Here are the conditions for the emergence of populistic nationalism:

(a) the vertical antagonism between the common people and the elite (up) and internal outsiders (down) when there is *no alternative* of horizontal antagonism between the *equal* and *plural* Left-Right, idealised in a liberal and representative democracy

(b) low institutionalisation of party politics, which is incapable of representing democratic demands distinctive from each other: the operation of party politics relies on the personalised power relation (e.g. a direct symbolic connection with a leader with people, elites materially connected with elites) in the context of tradition or culturally habituated convention

(c) for an individual, there are few chances to associate her/himself with representative associations, but a strong sense of nationalism pervades a society

Based on these elements, the fusion of nationalism and populism occurs through temporality, spatiality, and otherisation of people in the matrix.

3-8. Conclusion

In summary, the temporal and spatial characteristics of the fusion of nationalism and populism come to these elements under the three conditions for populistic nationalism mentioned in the previous section. Each condition is interlinked and constitutive of the following three characteristics of populism, but it is paired one by one with the most related elements of populist style and characters:

(a-1) *A sense of direct involvement with the higher power holder* accelerated in the context of 'audience democracy' backgrounded by image-oriented communication via journalism, which promotes the close interaction between the politicians and the mass (de Beus, 2011). This tendency facilitates the construction of online imagined communities in which the audience of political communication is selectively formed, especially since the twenty-first century (Marwick and boyd, 2010; Kavoura, 2014; Lutz and du Toit, 2014).

(b-2) *The expectation of a prompt answer to the popular demand:* devaluing the

consensus process in the representative democratic system in the emergence of economic crisis, digital innovation, and environmental problems, which precipitate technocratic or professional answers. They usually give *one* answer as the phrase “there is no alternative”, as Magaret Thatcher emphasised (Hall, 1988, 192), in terms of authoritarian populism or the selective affinity between populism and anti-party technocratic politics, or ‘technopopulism’ (Bickerton and Accetti, 2017; 2021).

(c-3) *The endless making of a part of society as an enemy inside the state, fixing the boundary of the state and the nation,* which is the heartland (Taggart, 2000, 3). We can recall the phrase in the previous section 3-5: “To be as a whole, we need a part. A part insists on itself as a whole by otherising another part”. Common people think they are upper than the scapegoated enemy at the bottom. Through this dual process of identification, common people maintain a belief, hope, or wish for their well-being accompanied by the development of the nation-state.

In sum, if we consider the populistic reason as the hegemonic struggle that “the whole is always going to be embodied by a part” (Laclau, 2005, 115), the incongruence between a political community and a national community is inevitable. “[Populism] pertains to the interpretation of democracy itself” (Urbinati 2013, 146), so to argue populism, the institutional setting of representative democracy is *a necessary condition*, apart from the normative contention of populism and democracy’s pros and cons. The discrepancy between the national and political community in a democratic society serves as the source of both new alternative spaces for political subjects, including marginalised or, on the other side, political competition for hegemony, deteriorating the plurality in a representative democracy (Urbinati, 2019, 138-145).

Finally, this thesis adopts the term *common/ordinary* people, not just 'the people' or 'the pure people', scholarly and generally accepted since Mudde (2004). In the case of British authoritarian populism, Stuart Hall (2988) suggested an insightful analysis. The success of Thatcherism relies on its capability to *burrow into*[14] the chasm between the organised and institutionalised representation of the Left (such as the Labour Party or trade unions) and ordinary people who are desperate for their daily living (on the moral issue concerning family, education, and incomes) in the economic crisis. The dilemma those people experienced has been well-known, depicted by his analysis (Hall, 1988, 80-92) and in famous films like *Brassed Off* (1996) by Mark Herman and *Billy Elliot* (2000) by Stephen Daldry.

The gap between an idealised society and the necessity for adaptation to the given circumstances constitutes the relationship between the elite and the people. The former is divided into oligarchic power (as Laclau or Mouffe means) and some parts of elites between the establishment and the ordinary people. This relation is a classic issue of Gramscian tradition with the term 'organic intellectuals'.[15] Between the subaltern people's stance of whom needs to be spoken (Spivak, 2010[1999]) by the critical elites and their own common knowledge and recipe of their own life in 'good sense' to live out their lives (cf. Gramsci, 1971, 328), individuals comprised as elites also are *of those common/ordinary people* (italics added, Gramsci, 1971, 331), sharing such common senses. This commonness of people has rarely been dealt with in previous literature of populism studies, under the iron-ruled definition of the phrase 'antagonism between the elite and people'. This thesis details this

[14] This term is initially interpreted by this researcher, not Hall.

[15] This term repeatedly appears in his literature, but the relationship between intellectuals, common sense, and the philosophy, see Gramsci (1971, 325-343).

subject as a critical point for populism research in Chapter Seven.

As already implied in Laclau (2005, 139-164), people comprise *heterogeneity* sometimes. Critical intellectuals should actively include it. However, people also evade the homogeneous categorisation of those critical or activistic 'intellectuals', finding their own way to survive or collaborating (?) with hegemony. As one literature argues, the meaning of the people that populists interpellate and how it is negotiated, reproduced, or challenged should be the research agenda for critical cultural analysis (Moran and Litter, 2020, 866). Consider "[O]nly 37.4 per cent of the United Kingdom voted for Brexit and 26.7 per cent for Trump in 2016" (Moran and Litter, 2020, 855). How does a small part of people consider themselves *as a whole* against the elite in the name of populism? Furthermore, how do that small groups disguise the remaining 72.6 / 73.3 per cent of people as *outside, not a part* of them? The cultural analysis focuses on this inclusion/exclusion, regarding the culture as a 'way of life' (Williams, 1983, 91) or 'semiotic practice' in political science (Weeden, 2002) by which the common/uncommon, or so normal/abnormal, operates in politics, in the case of the political history of South Korea.

Chapter Four

Between Nation and the State (1945-1960): Verticality Begins[16]

4-1. Overview

As mentioned in the Introduction, this study focuses on the temporal and spatial discrepancy between the state (state-system) practice and the ideal range and borders perceived by people who consider themselves members of the nation (state-idea). Many political scientists in South Korea have already discussed a similar discrepancy with the term 'simultaneity of the non-simultaneous' borrowed from the concept by Ernst Bloch, indicating that a two Koreas situation follows the Westernised standards of political, economic, and cultural development while overcoming, re-inventing, or denying the limit or inheritance of tradition or underdevelopment (Park, 1996, 59-60; Kang, 2012; Im, H. B., 2014). This study takes their points of view while emphasising the exigency of temporality and the duality of the spatial imagination of nation-states as the source of the elements of populist*ic* (not entirely populist) styles in Korean politics before democratisation in 1987. For this purpose, this chapter focuses on constructing and re-signifying people in the nation-state in the context of post-colonial nation-state building with the spatial division of the nation of two Koreas.

Due to the difference between two-state systems in one nation, the case of (South) Korea is unique regarding the conformity in the range of nation and state in the globalised nation-state system. Nationalism in Korea is characterised by a 'nationalism complex' (Kang 2012),

[16] In this chapter and the next two, the names of Korean figures or scholars will follow the order of the family name-given name in a way that Korean language is caracterised.

which means the two state-systems compete over the legitimacy of claims about constituting the one state-idea of the nation. The post-colonial nation, which had undergone Japanese colonial rule, faced the absence of a legitimate state institution in 1945. Instead, the end of the Korean War ushered the nation-building process of the two post-colonial states, which also meant making people 'people' in the postwar system in the middle of the 20th century. In this situation, the significance of the term 'people' was questioned by the popular masses and the elite, who identified themselves as rulers of the burgeoning nation-state. Besides, the division of the national community into a two-state institution (ROK, DPRK) is far from the conventional ideal, the 'nation=state formula' (Balibar, 1991, 93; Hobsbawm, 1992, 19; Gellner, 2006, 1-7), which is generally accepted as an ideal of the modern national state according to the theoretical heritage of the Western developed countries.

Due to the ideological competition between the two state-systems of ROK and DPRK, the conventional understanding of Left-Right politics cannot proceed in South Korea because the Left has been politically taboo. This scene is far different from the Left-Right competition in the plural, and representative democracy, in which those two camps serve as 'orientational metaphors', depicting the political disagreement among *mutual equals* (italics added, Dyrberg, 2003, 336-338). For the people who lived at the frontline of the Cold War system in South Korea, being called or calling themselves '좌파 (*jwapa*, 左派)', which refers to 'the Left', has the same meaning as being the public enemy. In this asymmetry and inequality between the two poles on the political spectrum, the language of the term *nation* was the alternative indication which can be used to identify political competitors to the ruling blocs with anti-communism, developmental nationalism, and military and authoritarian regimes. North Korea and its communist regime were considered *far away* from or *abject* but *mythical*

by people in South Korea. Regarding the vertical antagonism of populism (Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2017; De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017), this distance constructed the images of North Korea as the state *high above* in North somewhere or dangerous communists *low below* infiltrated *our* democratic society of South Korea, while the frontier between the Left and Right was absent or blurred. The horizontal frontier of nationalism replaced that spectrum, but the signifiers of the Left and communism belonged to the enemy and were nationally wrong, overlapped with the image *below*. It is how the concept of the 'internal outsider', indicated by Brubaker (2017), has been constructed in South Korea under the reality of the Peninsula's division.

In this chapter, I argue that the popular sense of the discrepancy between the nation and the state is the primary source for various forms of nationalism, and such variation is the engine for the dynamics of antagonistic politics between in-and-out and high-and-below in the political scene of South Korea.

4-2. The legacy of colonial rule and the Korean War in making people 'people' *(minjok / gungmin / inmin)*[17]: politics of vocabulary

Contrary to the general model for Western countries, the two Koreas have *simultaneously* experienced nation-building and state-building processes. As Freeden (1998) argued, nationalism as 'a thin-centred ideology' supplements its deficiency of a structural inability to

[17] From now on, the word people without quotation marks ('') will be used to indicate people generally meant in the literature of humanities and social science. When the contextualised meaning in Korea (인민, *inmin*) is indicated, it will be quoted as 'people'. This is the same with other words, such as nation ('nation', 민족, *minjok*) or nationals ('nationals', 국민, *gungmin*).

provide a political programme with its value system by selectively including or excluding, correlating or suppressing the other ideological concepts within the contextualised circumstance. As nationalism cannot originally stand alone, nationalism in Korea morphed itself, entangling with the discourses during the state-building process combined with the ideological competition between the Left and Right. As alluded to in Chapter Two, the nation is defined *over time* with cultural and historical heritage from generation to generation, whereas the people are defined *over space* within the boundary of the state as a source of legitimacy and political sovereignty (italics original Yark, 2001, 520-523). After independence, while the state's boundary was not evident in the absence of the state, the question of which people had existed *in advance* (italics added Balibar 1994, 93) was raised. In this context, post-colonial Korea was defined as a 'time-space for the people' where the signifier 'people' overflowed in almost all parts of society (Im, C-M, 2014, 193). In this respect, the competing concepts of 'nation' (민족, 民族, *minjok*), 'people' (인민, 人民, *inmin*), and 'nationals' (국민, 國民, *gungmin*) became entangled, intersubjectively constructing each other during the nation-state building process in Korea.

This phenomenon was not confined to politics, but those words with the meaning of community explosively appeared in contemporary poems with differentiated and invested purposes by poets (Kang, 2008), indicating the prevalence of those concepts' application in everyday life. For the Left-wings, 'people' were considered to exist before the state was preferred, while the Right-wings and nationalists preferred 'nationals', referring to the members inside the state's boundary (Kim, 2009, 74). However, as both groups prioritised the establishment of a new government in the context of ideological competition, the meaning of 'people' and 'nationals' were *politicised* while the two states of ROK and DPRK were

simultaneously *nationalised* (cf. Yark, 2001). People in the Korean Peninsula were born as *gungmin* ('nationals') in South Kora and *inmin* ('people') in North Korea, both endowed with the state-centred meanings of the 'unitary nation' (단일민족, 單一民族, *Danilminjok*) after the Korean War.

Before colonial rule, the term nation was seldom found in newspaper articles other than to refer to the people or nationals (Kwon, 2007). When the concept of a nation was introduced to Korea, the word was similar in meaning to *race* or *ethnicity* because it was differentiated with nationals, which implied the *persona ficta* vis-à-vis the state (Park, 2008, 97-99). It is the colonial legacy that popularised the term nation. For example, in a newspaper, *Korea Daily News* (대한매일신보, *Daehanmailshinbo*), published by the English journalist Ernest T. Bethell, the frequency of the term nation had rapidly increased from zero in 1905 to 139 in 1908 following the invasion of Japan (Kwon, 2007, 198). In these times, the general public was referred to as people or the whole subjects (백성, 百姓, *baekseong*) in political contexts, and the usage of the latter decreased as the fate of the Joseon Dynasty monarchy gradually faded and ended in 1910, followed by 36 years of Japanese occupation. The word 'nationals' also experienced an increase in its usage with 'nation' (Kwon, 2007, 198). Rather, 'nationals'was more frequently used than 'nation' as the political subject in need of liberation from the early stage of the rising moment of colonial rule, around 1907 (Park, 2008, 116). This phenomenon implies the political situation that the popular perception of the crisis in sovereignty due to the threats from the imperial aims of invasion, especially from the requirement of being a 'new people' in the modernised world who needs the restoration of sovereignty (Park, 2008, 116). The point is that 'nationals' and 'people' were

used interchangeably at this time without the politicisation of the Left-Right cleavage in Korean politics.

This tendency continued during the colonial era, as seen in The Provisional Charter of Korea (대한민국임시헌장, 大韓民國臨時憲章, *Daehanminguk Imsi Heonjang*), which was declared on 11 April 1919, the word 'people' was generally used over its clauses to indicate the people bound to the jurisdiction of independent government (Kim, 2009, 72). After liberation in 1945, the signifier 'people' represented that situation of an amorphous time-space in which any ideology (democracy or nationalism) failed to conquer the hegemonic stance in Korean society. Thus, anything could be defined as the newborn social order after the disruption of the imperial/colonial regime (Im, C-M, 2014, 194-195). In this period, whether on the Left or the Right, every political camp was competing to define the meaning of 'people' (not 'nation' or 'nationals') as the word was understood as (a) an ultimate goal of the state and politics; (b) a criterion to judge the quality of the state and state organisations; (c) a source of criticism of the competing ideologies; (d) a basis for the legitimation of political programme for the establishment of dominant order by political groups; (e) a source of the criticism of the contemporary dominant ruling structure and orders (Im, C-M, 2014, 202-211).

Since September 1945, when the nation was divided into the Left and Right, the political meaning of the terms of people and nationals has been differentiated (Kim, 2009, 73). State-centred thinking became prevalent among the Right, while revolutionary thinking characterised the Left (Kim, 2009, 73-74). This difference resulted from their different views on the source of legitimacy for the establishment of the new government in Korea. For the pan-Left, the state-building activism was based on the organisations named the People's

Committee (인민위원회, 人民委員會, *Inminwiwonhoe*) derived from the numerous branches of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI, 건국준비위원회, 建國準備委員會, *Geongukjunbiwiwonhoe*) which voluntarily emerged nationwide. On the other hand, the pan-Right considered itself as the inheritor of the legal tradition of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea (PGROK, 대한민국임시정부, 大韓民國臨時政府, *Daehanminguk Imsi Jeongbu*) established in Shanghai, 1919 (Kim, 2009, 76). Both groups prioritised state-building, but their vocabulary differed, and these differences distinguished the Left and Right. This discursive power caused the signifier 'people' (인민, 人民, *inmin*) to lose its sovereign power among Right-wing activists and people in South Korea. In other words, the concept of the people from Western democracy was endowed with a more state-centred meaning in South Korea, where it translated to 'nationals' (국민, 國民, *gungmin*), which is a combination of Chinese characters 國 (국 *guk,* which means the state) and 民 (민 *min,* which means people).[18]

[18] This distinctive usage of the term 'people' by the Left and 'nationals' by the Right was perceived by the politicians of those days. For example, Lyuh Woon-hyung, the centre-right chairman of the CPKI was dismayed by the public perception of using 'people' as a symbol of the Left (Park, 2009, 75) and regretful when the term was appropriated for the name of the new state People's Republic of Korea (조선인민공화국 *Joseon Inmin Gonghwaguk*) (Henderson, 2000[1968], 195). Since then, the CPKI was gradually taken by Left-wing activists, ultimately leading to the foundation of the communist state of North Korea. Gregory Henderson evaluates if the name suggested by the CPKI had been the Democratic Republic of Korea, the process of state-building was different from the depiction that we now know (Henderson, 2000[1968], 195-196). Similarly, Yu Jin-o, who drafted the constitution for the Constitutional Assembly of ROK in 1948, at first adopted the word 'people' to refer to the Korean people to avoid an overly state-centred appearance, but the members of the Assembly

Political scientist Im Hyug Baeg referred to the Republic of Korea (대한민국, 大韓民國, *Daehanminguk*) established on 15 August 1948 as a 'defective modern state' where the coherence between *demos* (민, 民, *min*) and *ethnos*/*ethnie* (족, 族, *jok*) that had remained intact for thousands of years had been broken (Im, H. B., 2014, 154). Here, we see the word 'nation', translated to *minjok* (민족, 民族), gained popularity during the colonial period and came to the fore in Korean politics as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (조선민주주의인민공화국, 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國, *Joseonminjujueui Inmin Gonghwaguk*) was established on 9 September 1948 as North Korea. Since the boundary of the two new states was defined by the 38th Parallel between South and North Korea, two kinds of people for each state were constructed vis-à-vis the practice of the state-system, making two ideals of the nation (or finally, two nations of two nation-states).

4-3. Korean War: One nation, two states, two peoples (*gungmin* / *inmin*), and then two nations

Anthropologist Kwon Heonik (2020) estimates the consequential construction of national communities in the two Koreas during and after the Korean War as:

"In post-colonial Korea, the process of actualisation involved two separate state

corrected it to 'nationals' to avoid a charge of Left-wing-like implications in the Constitution (Kim, 2009, 82-84). In his memoir, Yu later deplored this correction, saying, "We lost the good word ['people'] to communists" (Yu, 1980, 65).

institutions and powers, each of which was committed to building a single national community and to incorporating all traditional communities into that *single unity*. The two also regarded each other as an illegitimate political entity and identified the prospect of a meaningful national community with the elimination of the rogue state entity. The national community envisioned by each of these states was *unitary and exclusive*. In contrast, the communities that these states sought to bring to the mo[u]ld of the envisioned political community were *plural and inclusive*, if seen in relative terms to the very sphere of absolute political cohesion and homogeneity coerced by the warring state" (italics added, Kwon, 2020, 63).

Though the concept of nation was crucial to resist colonial rule, its emphasis on the *oneness* of racial and ethnic commonness by the term *danilminjok*, (a unitary nation) was derived from the situation of the division of the Peninsula (Park, 2010, 108-208). It resulted in the new concept of people who began to recognise the discrepancy between the range of *one* temporal nation and *two* spatial people*s* of the two states. This paranoia is inscribed in the first Constitution of the ROK in Chapter One, "The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands", which has never been revised through the five consecutive amendments and remained as of 2023. This clause indicates the exigent pressure for reunification, buttressing the spatial elements of nationalism in Korea. In the principle of the 'nation=state formula', the people considered as the political subjects must imagine a nation *prior to* the state (Balibar, 1991, 93-94). It is not applicable in the two Koreas. The sense of one nation is accepted as given to the *two peoples* (*gungmin* and *inmin*) whom the highly centralised and authoritative states have constructed during the state-building process following the Korean War.

This process subsequently created the ideal *two* nation*s* (the unified 'nation' – *Minjok* – by the liberalist *or* communist states) imagined by two kinds of people. This duplicated discrepancy was a fundamental basis of the popular nationalism of South Korea at the very beginning of its establishment. <Table 1> shows the temporal-spatial (in)congruence between the state-system and the state-idea in terms of territory, nation, and the peoples of two Koreas. The table is derived from the Andersonian definition of a nation: a cultural system of sharing time and space among anonymous people who have never met.

<Table 4-1> (In)congruence between time and space of two Koreas

	Colonial rule	Liberation space	After Korean War
Time (state-idea, nation) - history/event	congruent	congruent	Congruent but with differently remembered later
Space (state-system, the state) - territory - state institution	Absent or unidentifiable but congruent	Congruent but in the process of discrepancy	incongruent

Ushering a new government in 1948, the first president of South Korea, Rhee Syngman, declared '일민주의' (一民主義, *Ilminjueui*, One-People Principle) as the ideology of the newly-created ruling party called 대한국민당 (*Daehangungmindang*, Korean Nationalist Party, KNP) in 1949 and the basic principle for the new government, promoting its distribution as national activism (Seo, 1997, 155; Kim, 2004, 448). The principle itself emerged as a breakthrough of the political stalemate between Rhees without the

organisational basis and his primary oppositions led by 한국민주당 (*Hangukminjudang*, Korean Democratic Party, KDP). However, it shows Rhee's intention to supplement the low institutionality of his support with his charismatic virtue as '국부' (國富, *Gukbu*), which means 'the Father of the Country' (Kim, 2004, 445-448; Hong, 2015, 95) extending his supporters and legitimacy nationwide.

> "Our nation is one. The national territory is one; the spirit is one; life is one; treating each other is one; politics and culture are one everything. *If there is something that cannot be one, we must make it one. If there is something to interrupt, we must eliminate it.* Whoever with the individual thought harming to the one, discard that thought […] DIVIDE WE FALL UNITE WE LIVE […]" (italics added, *Ilminjueuigaeseol* [Introduction of One-People Principle], Rhee, 1954, 7-8)

Rhee Syngman was originally sceptical of party politics as he disdained partisans or factionalism even since the colonial era when he was the president of PGROK (Im, H. B., 2014, 364). The foundation of the KNP can be understood partly as a manifestation of his changed views of party politics. However, the party was not characterised by its political stance (the Left or Right) or interest groups (Kim, 2004, 449). It is considered 'the party of people', 'the sole party', and the extension of the public campaign for nationalistic movement (Kim, 2004, 449). Initially, Rhee Syngman's supporters consisted of the peasant class who benefited from the farmland reform implemented in 1949, while the opposition KDP's members were mostly from the class of former landlords (Im, H. B., 2014, 219).

In this context, the introduction of the One-People Principle may be understood as a mere expansion of the support groups for the ruling elites near Rhee. Still, it impedes the development of political parties in South Korea according to the class interests or other political values but the nationalistic sentiments of the masses. The distribution of the principle was carried out by para-governmental organisations (not the KNP), and Ahn Ho-sang, the first Minister of Culture and Education, used his administrative power to systemise and develop the principle (Kim, 2004, 450-457). The Yeosun Revolt by the Left-wing military officers and civilians in October 1948 prompted this process, as the National Security Law, first legislated on 1 December in the same year, catalysed the disciplining governmentality of the society (Im, H. B., 2014, 388). The government-led paramilitary student organisation called 학도호국단 (學徒護軍單團, *Hacdohogukdan*) in all schools over the secondary level also served as a state-ideology apparatus to inculcate the principle with the slogan of 'the unification of nationalism ideology' (Hong, 2015, 95-96). This organisation had existed in South Korea, even in the 1980s during the Fifth Republic. It must be remembered that although similar organisations were sprouting in Korean society during the Korean War in 1951, they had no legitimacy based on the law as the new incumbent, as Rhee's personalised Liberal Party (자유당, *Jayudang*), rebuilt from KNP in 1951, was established with the view that 'The person is better than the institution' (Hong, 2015, 97).[19]

The initiation of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 accelerated this process of personalisation of politics by Leader Rhee. While the frontline between the South and North

[19] On the personalization of the party *Jayudang* by Rhee and its supportive quasi-political organizations, see Lee, K-R.(2009).

changed several times as the war progressed, it meant civilians from both sides of the North and South faced exodus: for the residents nearby the border area, every change of occupant armies forced them to choose their national identity or flee (Kwon, 2020, 76). In this situation, their future security was jeopardised, like immigrants waiting for residential status in a new country (cf. Bryan, 2018; Simonse, 2018), as the two states' boundary was uncertain and unpredictable while it was moving ups and downs. People around the frontline kept flags of both states (태극기, *Taegeukgi*, the national flag of ROK and 인공기, *Ingonggi*, the national flag of DPRK) and flew whichever reflected the current occupation in their village (Jung, 2007, 149-150). Families were divided by ideological differences, sometimes culminating in acts of violence, killings, and unanticipated farewells among family members, friends, and lovers. An elder brother may have chosen to go to the North, while his younger sister would excuse their situation when the ROK troops interrogated her about her brother's whereabouts. The Korean War targeted those intimate relationships, as Heonik Kwon (2020) insightfully explains: the emergence of the modernised self as an individual might hide the essence of the social self inside. However, the overt departure from that familial and social self concluded in the development of the political community (the nation-state), idealised at the surface level as the combination of individuals, but essentially functions as an extension of the family, which can be called as 'politics of kinship' (Kwon, 2020, 19-20).[20]

The exigency to be *one* destabilised the one-nation-two-states system driving exclusive support for the leaders of both states, resulting in a desire to annihilate the other state (Choi,

[20] This theme is the essential point that this thesis maintains as a key concept to understand why individuals identify themselves with a kind of a signifier of *as a whole* (Laclau, 2005) when they feel fragile in crisis or there is no alternative of organisation, association, and political party to mediate their immediate, intimate and personal desires in realising them, mainly shown in Chapter Seven.

1996, 70). This governmentality of the state, governing people from above (Foucault, 2007[1978]) or hiding but watching them (Foucault, 1995[1975]), combined with the inscription of the anti-communist and patriot soul into the body and its intimate relationships. One of the most explicit mechanisms for creating political tension was the principle of 'guilt by association' (Kwon, 2020, 90-110) applied to the family members of suspected communists, by which the morality of personal relationships was politicised, and the politics by the state moralised. Anti-communism in South Korea was not merely an acceptance of the ruling ideology, but its embeddedness in Korean society was accomplished through the living *fear* of invasion and its consequences of pain and poverty (Choi, 1996, 80).

As the state institution of the ROK experienced the war, its size in the repressive apparatus was rapidly increasing (Im, H. B., 2014, 176-180). The development of highly centralised bureaucracies in the post-colonial state was isolated or shrunk vis-à-vis society, forming an 'over-developed state' (Choi, 1985; 1996, 80-81). Choi's concept, adapted from Alavi (1972), explains how post-colonial states differ from European states. Contrary to European states, which serve the purpose of the single bourgeois class, the state apparatus of a colonial state, especially a bureaucratic-military state, is 'over-developed'. This means that the state during colonial rule coercively halts the voluntary growth of indigenous social classes, maintaining its dominance over society even after independence. Choi's explanation of post-colonial states echoed widely among scholars in the 1980s, especially his treatment of the special context of Korean colonial history, which was one of the most compelling issues among the student-led social movements. The issue of colonial legacy is discussed in Chapter Seven, explaining the category *minjung* (민중, 民衆).

While the North Korean army was established as the 'liberation army' and the DPRK as

a ‘democratic basis’ for the proletariat revolution and liberation of South Korea, the main purpose of the establishment of the ROK Army was to ‘guard’ the status quo and maintain the security of Korean society against Left-wing activism (Han, 2010, 162-165). The Soviet occupation of North Korea was accompanied by the former’s support of Kim Il-Sung to seize power and eliminate his rivals, such as Cho Man-Sik and Park Hon-Young (Lee, 2010). On the other hand, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), at first, fostered competition between various associations or groups, but this is understood as the ‘standardisation’ of political participation without any consideration of actual resources, organisation, capacity or the substantial support of the people in Korea (Im, H. B., 2014, 159).[21] Political engagement was divided between the Left-wing nationalists with popular support and the US Military Government and Right-wing native elites (Choi, 1996, 54). This resulted in the rapid growth of the Left-wing organisations’ numbers, while the Right-wing continued to form coalitions and partitions (Im, H. B., 2014, 164-165). However, the US Military Government abandoned their plan to cooperate with the Left-wings due to the decision around the issue of trusteeship in the first US-Soviet Joint Commission and its subsequent disputes among the Left-Right. It, in turn, resulted in the radicalisation of the Left, followed by illegal activism, violent struggles, and guerilla movements (Im, H. B., 2014, 166-171). This situation allowed the police and army to gain experience and develop a network for the administration of the state. For example, after the autumn harvest uprising in 1946, the state control consolidated in the county-level governing organisations. This

[21] When General John Reed Hodge, the military governor of South Korea, opened the discussion to the native leaders in September 1945, nearly 1,200 people gathered. The number of political parties increased from thirty-three on 12 September 1945 to forty-three on 10 October. When Rhee Syngman came to Korea after a week, more than fifty parties and organizations existed, increasing to three hundred a year later (Henderson, 2000[1968], 212).

centralised top-heavy system spread into the countryside, and Rhee Syngman's Right-wing irregular youth groups, which filled up the lacuna of the state apparatus' reach, repressed the Leftist activism nationwide (Cumings, 2002, 244). Following Japanese colonial rule, the police officers, who were the people's target, expanded their size from eight thousand in August 1945 to twenty-five thousand in October 1946 (Im, H. B., 2014, 179). There were 113,000 soldiers at the beginning of the War and 600,000 by 1953 (Im, H. B., 2014, 318).

During this process, an unequal distribution of power was granted among the administration, parliamentary and judiciary (Henderson, 2000[1968], 240-259). For Koreans, the government had been considered the administrative power, which was perceived as far away from the public, who only encountered the state authority via the police in town or local communities' personnel in their daily lives (Henderson, 2000[1968], 247). Interestingly, elections were regularly held, even during wartime (Im, H.B., 2014, 375-376). Two years after the constitutional assembly election in 1948, the general election was held. In 1952, the presidential and the first local elections were held after the wartime capital was moved to Busan for strategic reasons. However, these elections were flawed by Rhee Syngman's ambition for a long-term presidency. The direct election of the president in 1952 was a result of the constitutional amendment attempt to revise only the clauses related to the election, combined with sabotaging or arresting the oppositional assembly members and mobilisation of quasi-governmental organisations to secure the number of votes in the Assembly. The president's direct election was first introduced in the Constitution of ROK, aiming to encourage personal leadership and the support of people who are explicitly considered *outside* the institution. This event was the first in Korean society in which people perceived politics as focusing on the presidential election rather than parliamentarian discussions. It also marked the first of the eight consecutive amendments to the constitution in modern

Korean history until 1987, seven of which dealt with the issue of how to elect the president (Bae, 2001, 251). However, the election experience in the early part of the beginning of the new state functioned as a *regular event* in which Korean people realised themselves as the sovereign people of liberal democracy and distinguished themselves from people in North Korea under socialist rule (Im, H. B., 2014, 319).

4-4. Time of people: the April Revolution and the emergence of vertical antagonism

The Korean War introduced the concept of the exigency for unification concerned with the concept of oneness and the centralisation of the state institution in Korean politics. Through the civil resistance on 19 April 1960, people, for the first time since the establishment of ROK, succeeded in making their temporality in the nominally democratic state contrary to the state's time, which drove itself into the perpetuation of one leader. Rhee Syngman's administration contributed to the start of the modern democratic nation-state by institutionalising the election or successful land reform that liberated the peasants—70 per cent of the population (Im, H. B., 2014, 231) from the traditional dominant rule of the landlords. However, the administration wasted its prestige by interrupting the temporality of liberal democracy, distorting it with president-driven statesmanship, which undermined the popular support needed to curb Rhee's rival elites. It can be understood as the Korean version of Bonapartism (Marx, 1978[1851-52]; Im, H.B. 2014, 233-237, 352-359). That means one populistic leader comes to power above the highly administrative state with the support of anonymous people without the vested interest ('potatoes in a sack') of the existing Left and Right elites who failed to secure hegemony in society. In the circumstance of post-war competition with North Korea and its status as 'the bulwark of the liberal bloc', South

Korea's nationalism was politicised with anti-communism, and its liberal democracy was nationalised with the necessity of reunification via the centralised state apparatus.

The cleavage between the Left and Right lost its significance in Korean society because the former was totally expulsed from the political discourse; thus, symbols of or identification with the Left (좌파, 左派, *jwapa*) had no public currency, the elites opposing Rhee were fairly ideologically aligned with him. In this circumstance, Rhee's ruling bloc could abuse the constitutional amendment process mentioned above in 1952 (introducing the direct presidential election) and 1954 (allowing exceptional consecutive terms to the first president). The election for President and Vice-president on 15 March 1960 was held based on this third amended constitution, which was seriously flawed in allowing for a series of vote-buying, fabrications, and supervised vote casting to advantage Rhee and his running mate, Yi Ki-pung. These attempts to rig the election were rumoured among the public before March (Henderson, 2000[1968], 266).

The second-level education students first reacted to the illegality of the Rhee government through group activism (Oh, 2020). The significance of the student in society and their size in number was increasing: the number of high-level educational institutes, such as the university, had doubled from 31 in 1948 to 62 in 1960, supporting an increase in students from 24,000 to 97,000 at the same time; the number of secondary schools grew from 97 in 1945 to 166 in 1952 and 357 in 1960 as students quadrupled between 1945 and 1962 (Henderson, 2000[1968], 261). Between 1948 and 1960, 10.5 per cent of the government's annual budget was spent on education (Oh, 2020, 23). However, at first, the public perception of university students was cynical: they were considered 'opportunistic, decadent, or impure' people who failed to satisfy the social expectation for them to partake in a leading role in the

social problems, it was middle or high school students who led the protest to the government (Kwon, 2010, 99; Kwon and Cheon, 2012, 37). As only 30 and 10 per cent of males and females, respectively, attended secondary high school, the secondary students were also considered 'the elite' in Korean society alongside the university students, who accounted for only 10 per cents of the students-aged population (Oh, 2020, 24, 28).

In sum, these students initiated the nationwide protest against the in-effect quasi-competitive authoritarianism (Im, H. B., 2014, 381-391) of Rhee's regime for the alleged security of the liberal democratic system on the surface. The social disorder was also prevalent due to the increasing unemployment of about 230,000 of 9,130,000 employable people in 1958 (Ha, 2020, 83). In this context, the city's rapid concentration accompanied the rise of the urban poor, potentially unsatisfactory actors against the Rhee government (Henderson, 2000[1968], 260-261; Ha, 2020).

In fact, a series of constitutional amendments by Rhee Syngman and his power bloc represents the legitimacy crisis of the Rhee government. In a normative sense, the institution of liberal democracy and political competition cannot be entirely denied by the government because those elements were the only source of legitimacy for the ruling bloc to maintain its supremacy in the circumstance of post-Korean War ideological competition, which Rhee himself deteriorated by his attempt to extend his presidential power (Choi, 1996, 89). Since the protest rally by the high school students of Daegu on 28 February 1960, about 130 protests by middle and high school students had taken place by 30 April (Oh, 2020, 35-38). For example, the protest on Sunday, 28 February 1960, was due to the government's enforcement of school attendance mandates that were explicitly enacted to prohibit students from participating in the election campaign of the most considerable opposition, the

Democratic Party (민주당, *Minjudang*) (Pyeonjipsil, 1984, 16). The temporality of uprisings consisted of four periods (Pyeonjipsil, 1984, 11-41; 16; Oh, 2020, 38-52).

(a) From 28 February to 14 March: the high school students emphasised their 'purity' against the corrupted and mute old generations without raising electoral issues.

(b) From 15 March to 11 April: the unfair election on 15 March provoked uprisings in Masan, with civil casualties from police gunfire and the body of a high school student shot by a tear-gas bullet found by the sea of Masan on 11 April.

(c) From 11 April to 19 April: the death of a youth sparked the second protest in Masan, which spread to the neighbouring cities and provinces, and the students of universities in Seoul joined the flows of uprisings between 16 and 18 April, which resulted in the 'Bloody Tuesday' on 19 April, with six thousand casualties by police.

(d) From 20 April to 26 April: the government declared emergency martial law in Seoul, Busan, Gwangju, and Daejeon from 19 to 20 April, and 258 professors of universities joined the rallies on 25 April, demanding Rhee step down. The martial law army was reluctant to stop the protests, resulting in Rhee's proclamation of his resignation on 26 April.

It was the first time in modern Korean history that the people's direct actions succeeded in realising their political need to oust the corrupted leader outside the institutionalised setting of political machines, such as a party or other representative system. It was also the first instance under the rule of a republican state that the concept of the vertical contention

between 'bottom' and 'up'[22] was explicitly incorporated into a political event.

However, the need of the people varied among the protestors: for example, according to the five newspapers which covered the student protesters; demands, they consisted of academic freedom (23 per cent), denial of the unfair election (17 per cent), denouncement of corruption and dictatorship (15 per cent), and even the objection of the enforced subscription to the newspaper (0.7 per cent) while support for the opposition party accounted for only 1 per cent (Kim, S-T., 1983, 197): these demands were incorporated under the term 'freedom' or 'civil right'. According to Hong (2020, 197-198), one scholar at Seoul University once published an article in his university newspaper at that time, characterising the uprisings as the institutionalisation of democracy once considered an 'imported good' from the US. The intellectuals of the age commonly agreed with the perception that democracy is imported from Western countries without a stable establishment in the Korean context (Hwang, 2020, 254). However, the April Revolution showed that people's perception of the political reality was at odds with the learned content and ideal of democracy found in textbooks (Hwang, 2020, 240), which was the very reason that they engaged in social movements outside the institutional norms of democracy.

Low institutionalisation is due to the 'premature' democratic institution adopted at the beginning of a state-building process (Choi, 1996, 20-23; Im, H.B., 2014, 378). Contrary to the experience of advanced democratic countries, the general election rights were, *in default, given* to the people in Korea without the political struggle to broaden the election right. In

[22] In this regard, Hwang (2020, 271) indicated and criticized that the estimation of the revolution of intellectuals of the age was biased to be elitist because they reduced the role of the people in general by focusing on the participation of the students and intellectuals, which can be understood as horizontal or the 'revolution from beside'.

this circumstance, labourers, peasants and any other social interest groups had few chances or need to organise their interests in the form of the political party, while political elites had no need to engage in political exchange with them (Im, H.B., 2014, 378). Though the event of the election is regularised in people's everyday lives, even in the midst of the Korean War, democracy was understood, focusing on the action of the election itself and gathering votes relying on the fame of political notables and the personal connection between candidate and electorate. This political culture was later maintained in modern Korean politics, even during the general election on 29 July 1960, the first election held under the new constitution based on the parliamentary system (Lee, 2000, 87). Because the pledges of political parties, whether conservative or progressive, were ideologically similar due to the political expediency of anti-communistic sentiments, the critical factor for the election was *who* would achieve those pledges. The focus on personal relations, localism, familial connection, and rewards for the vote was still prevalent after the revolution on 19 April 1960.

Meanwhile, the convergence of political agendas between the Left and Right following the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s was the context for emerging populism or post-democracy in Western democracy (Mouffe, 2018, 16,-17, 36, 84-85). In this aspect, modern politics in Korean history already had latent elements that could be characterised as populistic from the very beginning of the state-building process. Whether Korean politics can be characterised as populist will be further scrutinised in the rest of this chapter. Considering this issue, the coup d'état on 16 May 1961, which broke out at the level of relatively 'up' but which cannot be characterised as entirely 'up' in the vertical antagonism between the elite and the people, became the critical point that affected the development of several populistic elements in modern Korean politics and society.

4-5. Conclusion

This chapter emphasised the discrepancy between the nation and the state as a key source for political dynamism. In the context of the end of the Cold War and the beginning of neoliberal marketisation of politics, Mouffe (1993, 1-8) once warned of the absence of the political, which could occur in disguise by the convergence between the Left and Right in the name of consensus. Her point was that such convergence wears out the plural forms of antagonism, reviving the non-negotiable issues of moral value and essentialist identities, such as religious, nationalistic, and ethnic identity. Her first remedy in 1993 was a radicalisation of liberal democracy, which was withdrawn in the context of the mobility of horizontal antagonism between the Left and Right to the vertical between the elite and the people in her project of 'Left Populism' (Mouffe, 2018). Suppose that change in the Western democracies concerning emerging populism since the late twentieth century had already existed in South Korea under the post-colonial cum Cold War ideological competition, accompanied by the Hot War inside one nation: people in Korea could not experience the horizontal competition between 'adversaries' (like the Left and Right) at the level of domestic politics. The state's official stance was the essentialised, moralised antagonism against the 'enemy': the communist Left. In this vein, the voluntary associations against the state, which should have been institutionalised in terms of 'organising the distrust' (Rosanvallon, 2008, 4), were made vertically: the establishment versus the people at the beginning of the nation-state building process at South Korea. This was also unintentionally caused by personalistic leadership *outside* the low institutionalisation of electoral politics during the Rhee government.

However, we cannot be sure of the direct access between Rhee and the people, though his strategy is close to detouring around the institution, without the evidence of general support nationwide for his approach. Thus, the April Revolution, the time of people, was the

result of these complex elements. However, without the matured horizontalisation of confrontations of plural democratic demands, this verticality is distinguished from the morph of popular demand into populism, as Laclau (2005) theorises.

For now, we cannot jump to the conclusion that Korean politics has been populistic from scratch since its nation-building, as its necessary condition of representative democracy was not yet firmly institutionalised. The degree of or discursive construction of this institutionalisation would be the key to understanding *the time of state* starting in 1961, covered in the next Chapter Five.

Chapter Five

The Proto-Type of Populistic Nationalism and Democracy with Adjective 1: The Rapid Road to Development (1961-1967)

5-1. Overview

As explained in Chapter Three, the temporal and spatial discrepancy between the nation and the state resulted in the heterogeneous interpretation, application, and appropriation of the meaning of people. It was due to the fluid boundary of the state(s) while the simultaneity of colonial legacy and the experience of the Korean War was felt in both Koreas. The top-down normativity of a 'unitary nation' was (un)intendedly coercive for two peoples (*gungmin* / *inmin*) in the Korean peninsula to follow the two state-systems (ROK/DPRK). The politicisation of the nation was urgent, winning out the possibility of other forms and content of political cleavages to emerge as democratic demands. The political issue shrunk into the question of whether the state keeps the promise of the political purpose of the nation, not who else can be the next to take power competitively, while Rhee wielded his power by aiming at his eternal incumbency. Against this, the April Revolution was the beginning of the vertical high-low conception of power relations as considered democratic in Korea, not the competition between equal and plural forces in society. The Chang Ministry of the Second Republic failed to – or had little capacity to answer the explosive democratic demands.

The ruling elites had no incentive to hear the people in the context of their absolute majority, which was just a benefit from the ousting of Rhee in the first and last parliamentary system in Korean politics. This was not only a matter of their incapacity, but it is due to the lack of their own agenda to maintain their ruling position, which a sudden political event has

given to them. Borrowing the term from Scheuerman (2004) and Rosanvallon (2008), the acceleration of political events failed to give the elite and people sufficient time to organise the distrust of society. Ironically, the mere assertion of the symbolised political capital of the new ministry and the only legitimation of so-called democratic forces was that they were just anti-Rhee. They just came to power in a sudden situation, and they had little chance to develop which democratic demands they represented.

This issue will reproduce other political scenes in Korean history before and even after 1987 between the authoritative-anti-democratic-conservative-evil state and democratic-antistate-progressive forces. The conservative and the progressive have constructed each other, depending on the widespread resentment against each other: *without the antagonism of the former to the latter, the latter has no legitimacy to exist, and vice-versa.* This scheme between enemy and foe, not between competitors or adversaries, by which they depend on their own raison d'étre by the antagonism against the counterpart, culminated during the process of Korean political history and the relationship between the two Koreas. It is shown in its climax after 1972 in Chapter Six.

The new nine-month-old ministry in 1960 was overturned by the military coup in 1961. The coup emerged from the pushing factors inside the military and pulling factors in societal demands for modernisation, national development, and normalisation of politics. In the absence of distinctive and mutually competitive political forces or parties such as the Left and Right, nationalism was the only place where (un)conscious agreement constitutes the union of the new ruling bloc and the democratic demands. This agreement began to be broken, beginning with the anti-Japanese social movements in 1964 concerning the normalisation of diplomatic relations with Japan. However, another event during the same year, the dispatch of Korean military troops to Vietnam, disclosed the two-faced characteristics of Korean popular

nationalism: the sentiments from the one origin of colonial rule and the awareness of national backwardness. The result of the presidential election in 1967, shown as the popular support for Park Chung-Hee's second term, became the turning point for the regime's transition to dictatorship, implying a complex of elements between populism and fascism. The emergence of the Park's regime and its development gives the complexity in understanding populism, especially in the view of contemporary students in the early 21st century who advocate the concept favourable to liberal democracy.

5-2. Time of the state: the night of 16 May 1961

The possibility of the rise of the military as a political actor had been inherent since the Korean War. However, the civilian control by the Rhee government was efficient (Im, H. B., 2014, 438) in preventing this possibility. However, as the police and the protesters clashed during the revolution, the military was the last resort for public security; martial law was declared at 13:00, 19 April 1960 (Pyeonjipsil, 1984, 34). The military commander Song Yo-Chan proclaimed a neutral position between the Rhee regime and the people, refusing to fire on the protesters, and alleviated military suppression of peaceful rallies. This positioning moved the momentum of power relations from the ruling bloc to the protesters and the democratic associations (Kwon, 2010, 107; Im, H. B. 2914, 438). Also, it was the moment that could be understood that the military might feel the impetus to wield their power to move domestic politics first in modern Korean history, in contrast to their conventional role of external security against the communist bloc (Im, H. B., 2014, 438).

The widespread awareness of the military in Korean society has been *favourable* since the 1950s. Joining the army was one of the few chances for poor or peasant-class young

people to enhance their social status, and protesters generally considered the military position as being on the side of the people during the revolution (Kwon, 2010, 106-107; Im, H. B., 2014, 443). However, inside the military, the implicit connection between the officials of Rhee's government and the high-ranked soldiers was perceived as another form of *corruption*, and the unfairness in promotion distorted by the experience of the Korean War was a dissatisfying element for young officers in the military (Cho, 2007, 38; Kwon, 2010, 106; Im, H. B. 2014, 443-444).

Meanwhile, after the April Revolution, Korean society underwent a series of expectations of a new democratic government, the explosion of political demands and its resulting chaos, and scepticism about people's ability to live with democracy. After the resignation of Rhee, intellectuals and public media requested the students to return to school. The university students began to take a more measured approach following the height of tension in the uprising (Hong, 2020, 196-208). They carried out social campaigns, such as the enlightenment movements promoting lifestyle changes suitable for a democratic society or the education of rural populations, like the Narodniki movement by intellectuals in the First World War in Russia. However, they failed to do or rather restricted themselves from organising those movements through continuous political participation. Instead, they emphasised the difference between 'politics' and 'enlightenment movements', and their main task was to focus on 'developing the fatherland', 'overcoming the backwardness', and 'modernisation' (Hong, 2020, 202).

In this regard, the discrepancy between the democratic state and the deficiency in modernity, enlightenment, and development was the critical issue, and that deficiency reflects the frustration of the desire to be the 'normal' nation in world history (Hwang, 2020, 275). In this circumstance, nationalism was associated with those sentiments among elitist

intellectuals (Hong, 2020, 207-209). Some university students with enthusiasm for the rapid reform of society expressed that liberal democracy was not practical, while the new ruling Democratic Party continued to repeat internal factionalism, disappointing the public. The term 'benign dictatorship' was frequently circulated among the very 'young lions' who had led the April Revolution in the name of democracy and liberty (Kwon and Cheon, 2012, 58).

Despite the victory in the general election on 29 July 1960, the new ruling Democratic Party could not represent all the political needs of post-April Korean society. First, the number of periodical publications rose from 709 to 1,509, including newspapers and daily press (Im, H.B., 2014, 430). The number of trade unions increased from 621 before April to 821 after April 1960, and strike unions from 30 to 189 (Paik, 1996, 125). However, the ruling party could not reflect those demands and had few incentives to answer them (Paik, 1996, 124-129; Kim, 1996, 163). The party took the absolute majority in the parliament, accounting for 75.1 per cent of seats in the Lower House. However, they consisted of the political notables who were internally divided into the Old Faction based on the former KDP of the landlord class and the New Faction comprising the bureaucrats and politicians marginalised during the Rhee government.

Against this background, considering the election culture mentioned in the previous chapter, they were totally insulated from the exploding political demands. The significant support for the Democratic Party was mainly based on the hatred of Rhee's dictatorship, and after the revolution, the amendment of the constitution from the presidential to parliament system was the only significant change led by the political society in the National Assembly separated from the civil society (Kim, 1996, 164-168). Social conditions were also devastating: economic growth dropped from 5.5 per cent in 1958, 3.8 in 1959 and 1.1 in 1960, while unemployment was estimated at about 4.5 million, and 74 per cent of agricultural

families were indebted (Lee, 1996, 321-322). It is ironic that the first motto of the Chang Myon Ministry was 'economy-first', establishing the Five-Year Development plan based on economic aid from the US and the liberal economic principle (Lee, 1996, 313-314; Huh, 2005, 234; Im, H. B., 2014; 432-433).

Portents of a coup were clear since the Chang Ministry's beginning (Cho, 2007, 38; Im, H. B., 2014, 438-447; Koh, 1991, 275-295). As mentioned above, the officers of middle-high ranks struggled to receive promotions, while some generals who had benefited from the quick rise during the Korean War maintained their positions. Some generals were considered as they collaborated with Rhee's government, and the regime change after the revolution aroused sentiments of a need for 'cleaning' personnel inside military organisations. A group of field rank officers gathered secretly, including Kim Jong-Pil, who had commonly started their career as the eighth enlisted student at the Korean Military Academy. The group's leader was Major General Park Chung-Hee, who had continued his military career since his service at the Manchurian Military Academy during the Japanese colonial rule and the Korean War.

Those officers showed some political ambition, for example, by visiting the newly appointed defence minister and insisting on high-ranked personnel issues or taking group activism on the agreement between the Army Chief of Commander and Director of the US military support bureau. The government and the army viewed these actions as a form of political action or mutiny. After going before a military jury, some were punished or transferred to the first reserved force. After this, on 9 November 1960, they had a secret meeting in Park's house and determined *19 April 1961* as the coup's D-day, the April Revolution's first anniversary. It meant that the coup group identified their revolt with the April Revolution, using the positive image of the military during that event (Kwon and

Cheon, 2012, 45). At that time, the radicalisation of social movements, especially progressive unification activism, was perceived by the Chang Ministry (Im, H. B., 2014, 435, 439), and the mobilisation of the military for public security in March and April was considered. Though 19 April 1961 passed peacefully without a chance for the coup, the Park's group succeeded in executing their plan at midnight on 16 May of the same year after the second failure on 12 May due to leaked information (Im, H. B., 2014, 440). Roughly 3,600 of the South Korean Army's 600,000 troops (Koh, 1991, 275) were mobilised in the coup. Casualties were minimal, and resistance from government officials non-existent, including President Yun Posun, and the Chang Ministry ended its short term of nine months in a single night.

In sum, the April Revolution was a time in which the people's sovereignty was manifested, and the demands of the people were achieved in the name of 'gungmin'. The personal dictatorship and its consequential distortion of the institutional setting were solved by Rhee Syngman's resignation and the amendment to the constitution, which introduced the parliamentary system for the first and (so far as of 2023) last time in Korean political history. However, such an amendment was not based on the institution's merit. It was read as a mere counter-measure by the political consensus between the former ruling Liberty Party and the new ruling Democratic Party (c.f. Paik, 1996, 120; Kim, 1996, 165-168) just for *coaxing* people's immediate hatred of the state's previous practice, represented by Rhee's abuse of the presidential system.

In this process, the parliament's role as a mediating institution was not enough because it was insulated from society's demands. The political culture of focusing on the leader's personality remained intact. In this circumstance, the political discourse on the exigency for modernisation and development emerged; even for the critical activists or intellectuals, those

projects were also considerable. The night of 16 May 1961, the beginning of 'the time of the state', resulted from those complicated variables that comprised the vague belief of the people (or the Coup participants) that the military was considered the most bureaucratised and well-organised body in the hierarchical order in South Korea, making it the ideal candidate for realising rapid change in Korean politics and society.

5-3. Developmental State: Acceleration of Society and Need of 'the sack *for* potatoes'

Mabel Berezin (2019, 13) indicates that previous studies of populist subjects are prone to stop analysing the demographic characteristics of groups that support populism. She mentions that it is due to the general tendency of social scientists who regard the research subjects as 'the sacks of potatoes', the metaphor by which Marx once described the anonymous peasants of masses who supported Louis Napoleon (Marx, 1978[1851-52]). According to Berezin, "even potatoes need a sack if they are not to spill all over the ground".

The process of state development following the 16 May Coup can be understood as the task of the government analogous to the construction of a 'sack'. Despite this, the military regime, following the coup, attempted to erase the discrepancy between the monolithic ideology of *Ilminjueui* and the patrimonial state of the previous Rhee era (Im, H. B., 2014, 391-398) by totalising the state-system, the state-idea, and the distance between the state and society based on the speedy growth of the economy. The critical issue of the Park Chung-Hee era was making 'gungmin' in a modern sense, in the level of their idea and the way of life and everyday practices of common people. It was not only the issue of development itself but the critical guideline of the state, which faced issues of democratic legitimacy since its creation. That sense of lack or defect was reflected during Park's regime, which ended in

1979 after roughly eighteen years, making the regime and society stiffen in politics and accelerate in the economy as time went on.

A. The other-way-round 'revolution'[23]

The members of the coup established the Committee of the Military Revolution, declaring emergency military law (Koh, 1991, 276). The cabinet members of the Democratic Party were arrested. The committee implemented a financial freeze, the closure of air and sea lines, the dissolution of parliament and local assemblies, and a ban on striking or engaging in any political rally or gathering. One of the most critical events for the democratic institution was the repeal of the local self-government and assemblies (Henderson, 2000[1968], 279). Since the coup, the mayors of cities with populations greater than 150,000 and provincial governors were to be appointed by the cabinet with the approval of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR, 국가재건최고회의, *Gukgajaegeon Choegohoei*), the official name of the military junta (1961-1963). Those governors then picked the chiefs for lower-level communities. This policy was maintained during subsequent military governments until the revival of the local election was enshrined in the constitution of the Sixth Republic in 1987. These measures were the first step to synchronise the temporality of the policies of the state and the national consciousness perceived by the people. By annihilating the process in elections at a local level and confining that process only to the main governmental bodies, the administrative state could reduce the time to propel its tenet of development from the top of

[23] The members of the group responsible for the coup characterise their actions as 'revolution'. This section follows the scholarly practice of referring to this event as a 'coup' (Im, H. B., 2014, 448) and using the term 'revolution' in quotation marks.

the state to the bottom. It was the beginning of the state's timeline of developmentalism, and anti-communistic nationalism was moulded in a top-down manner, pushing the state and the nation to see forth linearly. The fervour for democracy in April Revolution was losing its significance and influential force in the eyes of the common people.

The Supreme Council made six pledges of the coup: (a) anti-communism as a national policy; (b) obedience to the UN Charter and international agreements and the consolidation of friendliness with the liberal bloc countries led by the US; (c) eradication of social corruption and the 'old evils' [bad customs in Korean soceity] for the establishment national spirit; (d) settlement of the public plight and rebuilding of the national economy; (e) cultivation of capability for the unification against the communist regime; (f) transmission of the regime to the civilian government and return to the military after the accomplishment of the goals above (Ji, 1961, i-ii).

As Park Chung-Hee was once accused of practising in the Left-wing party before, the Council attempted to eradicate the constitutional and ideological deficiency in their legitimacy by emphasising cooperation with the US and anti-communism. The coup was also embarrassing for the US because South Korea was one of the 'bulwarks against communism' and 'a shopwindow of democracy'. Therefore, even among the US official who resided in Korea, there was confusion and worry about how to deal with the event (Im, H. B., 2014, 450; Koh, 1991, 277-278). A series of statements of agreement and disagreement on Park's emergence by the US embassy was publicised, suggesting the transmission of the power to civilian rule with a presidential and unicameral legislature constitution. This meant the new regime's main policy aim was focused on the Cold War competition at the international level. President Yun Posun ordered the cabinet to handle the situation on 16 May. After two days, the approval *ex-post* of the emergency military law was made. The coup was officially

legitimised just three days after it occurred. This prompt approval reflected that freedom during the April Revolution was replaced by the need for bread, demonstrated by the fact that no one was explicitly agreeing and resisting (Kwon and Cheon, 2012, 40-51).[24]

The 'revolutionary' government implemented a series of policies for social legitimacy: the punishment of illicit wealth and illegal elections, the dissolution and reorganisation of political groups, the eradication of social evils (crime organisation, lavish customs, corruption), rearrangement of the mass media organisation, the alleviation of the debts of agriculture and fisheries households and eradication of corrupted businessmen, and the enactment of anti-communist law (Cho, 2007, 24-29). For the social control and development of the state, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, which proved to be one of the most influential organisations in national security and social surveillance during the regime, was established on 10 June (Koh, 1991, 283).

B. The economy with plans and the reformation of the state

The most significant feature of the Park Chung-Hee regime's influence on Korean economics

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[24] However, the connivance of the public to the coup was due to the disappointment of the former Democratic Party and the promise of the Supreme Council to transmit their power to civilian rule in the future. Twenty days after the coup, about two thousand Korea University students gathered against the US Embassy on 6 June and two thousand Seoul University students rallied on the process of the Korea-US Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). On 9 June, three thousand Daegu University students also protested the brutality of US troops. These movements were superficially opposed to US policies in Korea but also implicitly opposed to the military junta. The overall media control aroused the objection of journalists, and President Yun Posun resigned in a complaint to the authoritarian stance of the junta. This implied that the ruling authority now needed to shape their political appearance, enabling the establishment of the Democratic Republican Party (DRP, 민주공화당 *Minjugonghwadang*). However, for now, the expectation of Park's nationalistic stance in policy maintained among the university students (and the public sentiment) during the presidential election in 1963, which showed the latent fissure concerning the issue of the Korea-Japan normalisation dispute beginning in 1964 (Koh, 1991, 285; Oh, 2007, 308-309).

and society was its consecutive Five-year Plans, beginning in 1962, which were continuously declared seven times even after the dissolution of Park's government (1962-1966, 1967-1971, 1972-1976, 1977-1981, 1982-1986, 1987-1991, 1992-1997) (National Archives of Korea, undated-a). The junta established the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction over the previous administrative organisation (Haggard, Kim, and Moon, 1991, 860). The Economic plan was submitted, which was once developed under the Chang Myon ministry (Cho, 2007, 44), and the working group for an Economic Planning Board was established.

The essence of the Economic Plans was setting up the precise economic goals *that should be achieved in a defined period* (Choi, 1996, 166, italics added). Considering the concept of the "speed (how fast or slow time feels), pace (the tempo, rate, or intervals of registering events within time), and duration (the length of time within which these events are registered)" (Puar, 2007, xxi), the eighteen years of economic growth with those consecutive *plans*, could not help be felt quickly, as the experience of those periods has generally been explained as 'compressed industrialisation' (Im, H. B., 2014, 452). The goals focused on equalising the industry sectors, import substitution industrialisation, and establishing the energy and transportation infrastructure (Park, 2007, 319-323). Regardless of their significant achievement, the annual goals for the key indexes were written in the documents, and the whole country was reformed according to that plan.

As Park Chung-Hee cared about accomplishing the plan, and all bureaucrats and business people were tasked with accomplishing the goals, many processes were rushed (Han, S-J.b, 2016, 327-331). For example, there were anecdotes about the extreme reduction in construction time for building the highway and tunnels, resulting in a development *myth* in those days. However, the obsession with rapid development was accompanied by the destruction of nature and the old towns and frequent revising, changing, and delaying of

construction plans (Han, S-J.b, 334-335). The national goal of development, based on export-oriented industrialisation, prompted an exceptionally fast, compressed, and geographically concentrated pattern (Koo, 2001, 20), moulding a way of life for Koreans that extended to their workplaces, familial or personal relationships and politics. The structure of production and sectoral distribution of the labour force during the period of rapid development is shown below in <Table 2> and <Table 3>.

<Table 5-1> Structure of production (percentage distribution of GDP in price as of 2001), 1960-1999

Sector	1960	1970	1980	1990
Agriculture	39.9	31.1	14.6	9.0
Industry	18.6	28.4	41.4	44.7
Mining	2.3	1.3	1.4	0.5
Manufacturing	12.1	19.1	29.6	28.9
Construction	3.5	6.4	8.2	13.2
Utilities	0.7	1.6	2.1	2.1
Service	41.5	40.5	44.0	46.3
Total (GDP)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1978, 1995; National Accounts, 1994 (quoted in Koo, 2001, 33)

<Table 5-2> Employment structure by industrial sectors

	Total	Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries		Mining and Manufacturing		Social Overhead Capital and Other Services	
		Number of Persons	% of Total	Number of Persons	% of Total	Number of Persons	% of Total
1965	8,522	4,999	58.7	880	10.3	2,643	31.0
1969	9,347	4,797	51.3	1,335	14.3	3,215	34.4
1970	9,573	4,826	50.4	1,372	14.3	3,375	35.3
1971	10,066	4,876	48.4	1,428	14.1	3,762	37.4
1973	11,139	5,569	50.0	1,821	16.3	3,749	33.7
1975	11,830	5,425	45.9	2,265	19.1	4,140	35.0
1978	13,490	5,181	38.4	3,123	23.2	5,186	38.4

Source: Reorganised based on the information in Republic of Korea (1971, 45; 1979, 80)

The plans focused on developing secondary industries, not abandoning primary industries, to foster self-sustaining agriculture, causing rapid demographic change between rural and urban areas (Republic of Korea, 1962, 41-42; Cho, 2007, 118). Compared to other countries in Asia, the rate of urbanisation in South Korea in the 1960s was extraordinarily high at 28.3 per cent in 1960 to 43.1 in 1970, while the average rate of urbanisation of Asian countries during the same period moved from 21.2 to 24.2 (Kang, 1999, 64-65). The rate of increase in urban development during the same time in the advanced countries was 0.60 per cent and 0.40 in the developing countries, while Korea showed 1.31 per cent (Kim, 1980, 151-52). <Table 4> shows the change in total urban and rural populations, indicating the exodus of labour forces from agricultural lands to the secondary and tertiary industries, or '*peasant-isation of the cities*' (italics added, Kang, 1999, 66), meaning that an influx of peasants moved to the cities in search of work during the Park's regime.

<Table 5-3> The growth rates of total, urban, and rural populations

Years	Total populations (A)	Urban populations (B)	Rural populations (C)	Urban-rural growth difference rate (B-C)
1949-1955	1.02	4.33	0.11	4.22
1955-1960	2.88	5.51	1.96	3.55
1960-1966	2.71	5.96	1.29	4.67
1966-1970	1.90	7.16	-1.16	8.32
1970-1975	1.98	5.37	-0.81	6.18
1975-1978	1.84	4.89	-1.25	6.14
1955-1966	2.81	5.79	1.69	4.10
1966-1978	1.92	5.84	-0.97	6.81

Source: Kim (1980, 151)

During this rapid timeline, the state saw the anonymous populations of masses who left their traditional way of life and means of production and possessed nothing but their bodies and enthusiasm for well-being. In addition, they had the electoral right granted to them by a historical resistance against the rulers, which is the idealised story of liberal democracy in Western democracies. In the 1960s, the Engel index in Korea was over 50 per cent, and the population surplus in the rural areas led to increased migration to cities, resulting in increased unemployment rates and urban poverty (Kim, 2011, 233). The economic migrants were vulnerable to poor living conditions, economic hardships, and the allure of 'group activism' to express dissatisfaction with the government or the temptation of communism if we assume that the state was watching these scenes. A sack to contain the potatoes now spilling over to the city needed to be woven. Quoting Hobsbawm (1996, 135), Finchelstein (2017, 154) once emphasised that the masses mobilised in fascism feared what they might lose, and in populism, those who had nothing to lose. Hobsbawm (1996,135) also indicated that the main enemy was external for fascism and internal for populism. The Korean people who swarmed into the city and left their rural hometowns were of both the populist and fascist mindset. They imagined and projected their own personal desire onto the state-led developmental process, like the migrants looking at the Statue of Liberty coming into New York during the 18th and 19th centuries (Berlant 1991). The Park's regime had to rely on imbuing the development with national symbolism to facilitate such projections and maintain their rule.

5-4. The popping of democracy with adjectives: *Nationalistic Democracy*

A. Nationalistic Democracy

Though Park's regime after the coup was considered highly authoritarian, the appearance of

liberal democracy was sustained throughout the 1960s (Sonn, 2011, 365; Im, H. B. 2014, 463-466). As shown in the previous section, the relationship between the US and South Korea prompted the latter to form a democratic state with regular elections and direct selection of congresspersons and presidents. As the local assemblies had been repealed following the coup in 1961, those elections and multi-party competitions served as the *only* index for Park's regime to appear as a liberal democratic government.

However, this appearance was unstable during Park's regime in relation to the leadership of the government and a couple of uprisings by resistant groups, such as students or dissident activists. The seesawing balance between the ruling bloc and oppositional forces was made at the high demand of nationalism, which had emerged during and after the April Revolution. The newly-emerged military ruling bloc promoted its popularity in the name of '민족적 민주주주의 (民族的 民主主義, *Minjokjeok Minjujueui*)',[25] which can be translated as 'Nationalistic Democracy' (Im, 203, 473; Oh, 2007, 296-304). Park's camp first utilised the term in the campaign for the presidential election in 1963, which was held during the transfer of rule from the junta to the civilian government. As mentioned above, popular and academic views on liberal democracy were not apparent because the public generally perceived

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[25] At first, criticising the previous administration and ministry and mentioning the 'peculiarity' of Korean history, Park suggested the term '행정적 민주주의 (*Hangjeongjeok Minjujueui*, 行政的 民主主義, Administrative Democracy)' in his publication in February 1962 titled 우리 민족의 나아갈 길 [*Uri Minjok-eui Na-a-gal Gil*, The Way Our Nation Will Take] (Park, 2005[1962], 452-454). His criticism focused on the corruption of party politics (especially during the Chang Myon Ministry) and the entity for correcting those problems as an administrative polity, not parliamentary or judiciary bodies. By doing this, he believed that the minimal level of democracy would be spontaneously maintained when the people became accustomed to the new culture of political performance directly provided by the governmental offices from the president to the local-level public servants. However, this term was replaced with 'Nationalistic Democracy' in 1963; though there is no evidence of rationale for this shift, this new term allowed the people to face Park's nationalistic discourse and to perceive him as a nationalist leading up to the presidential election (Oh, 295-296).

themselves as more or less underdeveloped in implementing democratic politics.

Concerning the subject of populism, Park's electoral strategy focused on the distinction of the new generation, which overcame the political system with corruption by the old strata of the ruling elites with the background of landlords in the former Democratic Party (Park, 2005[1962], 435-445), who now gathered under the new name of *Minjeongdang* (민정당, Civil Right Party) with the other opposition groups and small parties against the junta. Park frequently emphasised his 'humble' and 'lowborn' background in the countryside, and his effort to gain power was his own. That is, he emphasised that he did not rely on the heritage of the former generation, emphasising that he "[denied] privileged classes and factional genealogies, and disdain[ed] ruling association" (Park, 2005[1963], 657). However, Yun Posun, the former president, planned to expose Park's alleged involvement in the communist rebellion in Yeosu-Sunchoen in 1948.

This difference in the rhetoric of the two candidates' public campaigns functioned more or less subtly among the electorates, especially among the young generations (Cho, 2007, 49-52). While about seventy-one per cent of the members of the coup seemed to have a background in rural communities in the middle-low classes, and only twenty-one per cent of the personnel in the junta belonged to the landlord class. Meanwhile, about forty-one per cent of the opponent parties' members were considered representative of the former order of landowners. As even Park also once mentioned that the repulsions of '*ban-bonggeon*' (반봉건, 半封建-反封建, semi-feudal or anti-feudal)' and '*ban-sikminji*' (반식민지, 半植民地, semi-colonial) vestiges were the first and foremost task in his new project to rebuild the national economy (Park, 2005[1962], 388).

This rhetoric seemed to catch the enthusiasm for change and revolutionary legacy following the April Revolution mentioned above, even among critical scholars and students (Cho, 2007, 50). As implied in Chapter Seven later, those two terms were frequently mentioned among dissident scholars and student social movements, especially National Liberation factions, during the military regime of Chun Doo-hwan. Park may not have coined these phrases, but his usage of the terms indicates that he was struggling to gain popular support, appealing to the common people directly to overcome his lack of legitimacy. At the same time, he might be understood to be sincerely devoted to the same goals as the scholars and students who still had an ambiguous appreciation between the April Revolution and the 16 May Coup.

However, it was apparent when he mentioned the phrase ‘Administrative Democracy’, at first, that they recognised the inevitability of anti- or un-democratic elements in Asia, in contrast to the ‘affluent’ Western liberal democracies (Park, 2005[1962], 449-450). Park and his DRP framed the first election since the junta as ‘the confrontation of National Democracy versus *pretentious* liberal democracy’ (Kwon and Cheon, 2012, 52). One journalist of *Chosun Ilbo* published an article in *Sasanggye* (『사상계』), the most prominent and critical journal at that time. Its chief editor was Chang Chun-Ha, who would later become one of the most dissident figures during Park’s regime. Even the author of the article estimated that the previous ‘conservative’ bloc represented by Yun Posun attacked Park as he tried to find support from the people in agriculture, fishery, and some intellectual strata of people, while he did not forget to question Park’s ambiguous stance on democracy (Nam, 1963, 54-55).

Park’s ambiguity on democracy and the result of his candidacy for presidential election symbolised another beginning of a vertical confrontation between the establishment and the

common people in the early stage of Park's regime in the term 'Nationalistic Democracy'. Regarding the temporality of populism theoretically explained in Chapter Three, contemporary intellectuals already considered Park's stance on democracy as a kind of *reservation* of political desire under the basic principles of liberal democracy for the other exigent desire of national development, which should be realised *right now without reservation*. This distinction of something to be reserved and immediately achieved (national development) was considered a matter of *choice and concentration* at the beginning of Korean political history.

In sum, the meeting point between the belief towards Park and the doubt of intellectuals and the popular mass was their agreement on the significance of nationalism. Strong nationalism from the legacy of colonial rule routinely experienced by Koreans and the regime's emphasis on economic development were the *only* sources of the regime which sufficed its democratically deficient legitimacy. Nationalism was the common grammar (Seo 2005; 2007) for the ruling elites and people by which they communicated its meaning with compliance, competition, or resistance (cf, Kim, 2013). Referring to 'democracy with adjectives' (Collier and Levitsky, 1997), such as 'nationalistic' since the presidential election in 1963 or '한국적' (*Hangukjeok*, 韓國的, Korean-style)[26] in the Yusin regime since 1972 (explained in the next chapter) were the result of the compromise between complex variables concerning development, anti-communism, and (liberal) democracy.

It implies three kinds of common knowledge in Korean politics: a) democracy had to be indigenously revised in an eclectic manner with respect to *the Korean way*; b) *nationalism*

[26] The term itself was already used with 'Nationalistic Democracy' in 1963; however, its official usage had been prevalent since the Yusin regime (Cf, Nam, 1963).

was always latent, ready to be used by the state to provoke disputes between the ruling elites and the people; c) the ideal of liberal democracy, mentioned in Chapter Three earlier in the term ‘polyarchy’ (Dahl, 2000, 85-86), was reduced to *a quick process* of electoral politics for the sake of the rapid realisation of national development, while procedural features of democracy, such as freedom of expression, consultation or association became tools with which the state and the people excruciatingly negotiated and competed.

B. Meeting people is not easy: the two-faced friction and convergence in the national temporality of Park’s regime, elites, and common people

One of the most notable events in which popular nationalism and state-led developmentalism collided was the dispute concerning the Korea-Japan diplomatic normalisation treaty in 1965 (Cho, 2007, 62-99), about which social disputes peaked in 1964. Several attempts to reach an agreement between the two countries since 1951 had come to rupture, and before it transitioned into a civilian government, the military government in 1961 precipitated the negotiation with Japan to secure the governmental budget for economic development. With some critical issues vaguely mentioned, including the sovereignty of Dokdo (in Japanese Takeshima) islands, which had not been clearly settled in the San Francisco Treaty in 1945 (Bong, 2013, 195-196), the memorandum between Japan Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi and The Chief of the Korean Intelligence Agency Kim Jong-Pil in 1962 aroused widespread anger for its secret way of reaching agreement and securing the reparation by the Japanese government of thirty billion dollars plus the government bonds up to twenty billion and the private loans over ten billion. The popular view on the negotiation process was that it was conducted too hastily and amounted to ‘humiliating diplomacy’, even leading some to the

total rejection of the normalisation on the ground that money could not make up the thirty-six-year repressive history of colonial rule.

On 20 May 1964, students at Seoul University held an event to symbolise and demonstrate their latent opposition to the military regime, which had been disguised under the umbrella of nationalism. The ritual of '민족적 민주주의 장례식' (*Minjokjeok Minjujueui Jangnaesik*, 民族的 民主主義 葬禮式, The Funeral of Nationalistic Democracy) (Lee, 1988, 58; Oh, 2007, 309-317) in the uprising was explicitly carried out to oppose the military regime that had promised government rule based on nationalism combined with democracy. This event was the first in which nationalism proponents began to bifurcate into state nationalists and popular nationalists, and the vertical frontier between the ruler and the ruled was constituted *inside* by the same grammar of nationalism.

As mentioned in the previous sub-section, Park and his government *did not ignore* nationalism and its popular sentiment. However, the vocabulary used to deliver nationalistic messages differed between the government and society, especially the student movements (Oh, 2007, 315). As previously mentioned, the term *ban-bonggeon* was also used by Park. This term itself had been widely used in a dissident movement, along with the terms '반외세' (*ban-woesae*, 反外勢, anti-foreign influence) and '반매판' (*ban-maepan*, 反買辦, anti-comprador) like an idiom of the composition of those three words. However, as Oh (2007) indicates, '자주' (*jaju*, 自主, self-independent) and '자립' (*jarip*, 自立, self-reliance) were more frequently used by the officials in Park government. Their meanings were reduced to the signification of economic development, which is indicated in the title of the book of

Park's quotations published in 1972, 『자립에의 의지(*Jarip-e-eui Euji*, The Will to Self-Reliance)』 (Shim, 1972). In sum, the normalisation revealed two different conceptions of the nation's ideal—that of Park's regime and that of Korean students who once supported him. The latter's disappointment resulted in a public perception gap between the two. From this event, student and dissident intellectuals began to promote their own ideal of the nation, emphasising anti-foreign sentiments, with the emerging representation of social demands such as labour conditions or welfare to the public, democracy, and pacification or reunification with North Korea (Oh, 2007, 314, 319).

In effect, the normalisation between the two countries, particularly reparations, the legal status of Koreans in Japan, and fishery rights, was made in 1965 (Lee, 1988, 62). It was despite the widespread dissatisfaction among Koreans on critical issues, such as the atrocities committed during colonial rule, territorial issues, forced labour, political repression, and (even then-non-mentioned) sexual slavery/comfort women of Korea taken by the Japanese Army[27] (Bong, 2013; Seo, 2021). In this regard, the normalisation in 1965 was popularly understood only to secure the financial liquidity needed for rapid development (Cho, 2007, 71-72), without ameliorating people's grievances regarding colonial issues nor the accompanying anti-Japanese sentiment, neither of which could be quantified through rational calculation between the statespersons of the two countries (Seo, 2021). It also meant that the

[27] The issue of comfort women/sexual slavery was not publicly recognised or considered during discussions of reparation, even for the Korean masses and activists, until the early 1990s (Seo, 2008). In the context of masculine nationalism, coupled with the 'hypermasculine developmentalism' (Ling, 1999, 283-285; Kim, N., 2015, 282) aimed at overcoming the post-colonial underdevelopment and impotence to become a part of the globalized (Western) world, the issue of women's abuse during colonial rule was considered a 'national humiliation' by Korean men.

synchronisation of temporality between the state and the people was not a simple task, which could not be achieved by institutional settings (e.g. eradication of local government) under the legacy of colonial rule. People were still living with the trauma of colonial rule, whereas the state was required to cover the past as just past, precipitating the goal of the developmental state.

On the contrary, the decision of the ROK to dispatch troops to Vietnam during the same year as the anti-Japanese uprisings in 1964 had an ambivalent aspect (Lee, 1988, 65-67) concerning the peculiarity of South Korean popular nationalism. The military support for the US during the Vietnam War can be explained in various ways, as the role and interest of Korea concerning each of the four decisions to support the US additionally have different dimensions (Kim, K., 2014). Most of all, we can consider those decisions irrational because it was the situation in which the small country, Korea, supported a global power that supported its own security under threat from North Korea or China (Armstrong, 2001, 532). This was the US's consistent stance towards Korea's suggestion before 1964 (Kim, K., 2014, 21).

However, the US's foreign policy attempted to unite East Asian countries against communist societies; thus, the rapprochement between Korea and Japan was crucial for that purpose since the US military intervention in Vietnam (Chun, 2004). In fact, while the conflict in Indochina Peninsular took on the aspect of an independence war against France, the Korean government initially suggested the dispatch in 1954 during the Rhee administration for the sake of regional anti-communist collective security (Kim, K., 2014, 21; Yun and Ha, 2014, 132; Bae, 2015, 369). On 11 November 1961, after the coup, the Chairman of the SCNR Park directly mentioned the dispatch to Vietnam when he visited Washington, though the John F. Kennedy administration was not considering the military intervention in the civil war in the Indochina Peninsula (Lee and Chung, 2014, 76). This

suggestion by the Park administration and the reluctance of the US was repeated a couple of times until the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in April 1964, after which the Lyndon Johnson administration decided to request the participation of its allies by military or material support for the Vietnam War under the 'More Flags Program (Yun and Ha, 2014, 130)'.

The aggressiveness or *desperation* of the ROK for being a supporter of the Vietnam War was explained in the previous studies focusing on domestic (Han, 2003), economic (Lee, J-K., 2009, 658-659), and military factors. However, compared to the anti-Japanese social movements in 1964, it is hard to understand why there was little nationalistic opposition to the decision to dispatch troops. About forty-nine thousand Korean troops were sent to Vietnam by 1969 (Nguyen, 2018, 210), and 326,000 Korean men participated by March 1973, leaving their last footprints on the battling country until the total retreat of the US from Vietnam (Kwak, 2003. 35), while even the US was preparing the withdrawal of their own troops since the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 (Kim, K., 2014, 30-31).

These two instances of international relations during Park's regime (normalisation with Japan and the participation in the Vietnam War), which occurred in the same year of 1964, showed a two-faced approach to the nationalism of the post-colonial modernising/developing state. Contrary to the anti-war sentiment and the new wave of social movements against the post-war nation-state hegemony among the US, European countries and even Japan, the fighting efficiency of Korean soldiers peaked in 1968, and similar social resistance was rare in Korea (Kim, J-H., 2016, 42).

However, the two events added complexity to the vertical frontier between the elite and the people. In one sense, the anti-Japanese sentiment and the uprisings on 3 June 1964 were characterised as people's denial of the legitimacy of the Park's regime since the coup, while

the overturn of power did not occur because the military was on the side of the ruling government, unlike their stance in the April Revolution in 1960 (Lee, 1988, 61). On the other hand, roughly 10,000 civilians departed to the warring country as reconstruction labourers in 1966 (Kim, J-H., 2016, 48), regardless of the economic and military support from the US to Korea and the salary of the dispatched troops. This deployment indicated that the Vietnam War was publicly considered a chance for economic empowerment, not only for the country as a whole but also for the common Korean people striving to improve their own well-being.

The participation of Korea in the Vietnam War was not purely about the military engagement of the nation-state; it also changed the landscape of Korean nationalism. It was an event that Koreans took pride in the fact that their country now stood shoulder to shoulder with the global superpower of the US (Lee, J-K, 2009, 664; Kim, J-H., 2014, 168-169). Contrary to the anti-Japanese nationalist sentiments, which exposed the external enemy, the image of Vietnam was entangled with the danger of another communist threat and the chance for the rebuilding of an underdeveloped nation. The reproduction of the resentment based on colonial history, which constituted the *self of the humiliated*, was relieved through the effectiveness of the Korean military in Vietnam and their pro-civilian performance, in contrast to the repeated military failures of the US army. It was also a replication of imperialism conducted by Japan and the US, as 'subimperialism' (Lee, J-K., 2009) towards the land of *a chance* of the Southeast Asian countries (Kim, J-H., 2016, 53-59).

The image of dispatched Korean soldiers represented in the contemporary Korean popular song '월남에서 돌아온 김상사' (*Wolnam-eso Dora-on Gimsangsa*, Sergent Kim Back from Vietnam, 1969) sung by the famous singer Kim Chooja (2016), was one example of how the media and the government popularised and romanticised the engagement of

ordinary people in the national military manoeuvre.[28] This thesis does not need to reexplain the reality of the reality, such as the civilian massacre committed by Korean soldiers indicated in the previous studies and the revelation by Korean media since the early 2000s (Armstrong, 2001; Kwon, 2006). However, the point is that Korean popular nationalism was grown with the ambivalence of envy (to Japan) and dissatisfaction with the state and the superiority of the nation (to Vietnam and Southeast Asian countries or else of other underdevelopment countries) and the support for Park's regime in the name of 'Nationalistic Democracy'. It was not long before the adjective 'national' *won out* (Balibar, 1991, 94) the relative emphasis on the adjectivised norm 'democracy', rather making the latter a mere adjective to the former (Kim, J-H., 2014 161). In the name of '한국적 민주주의' (*Hangukjeok Minjujueui*, 韓國的 民主主義, Korean-style Democracy), Park's regime lastly discarded the key elements of the ideal of liberal and representative democracy with the constitutional affirmation of the dictatorship of the president.

5-5. Conclusion

As shown in this chapter, Park's regime was situated between liberal democracy and authoritarianism led by the personalistic leadership of Park and the imposed institution, which was derived from the structural limitation of the country's stance in the Cold War: the

[28] To introduce the song, the story of lyrics contains how a once-troublemaking-young man in a town has now been changed into a brave and polite hero with tanned skin, who is his mother's pride and attracts young unmarried girls. This story also reflects the hypermasculinity mentioned in the previous footnote and the narrative of the transformation of the individual and nation during the developmental era. As Lee, J-K.(2009, 656) points out, the military labour of South Korean Troops was "a particular kind of sexual proletarian labo[u]r where masculine sexuality is deployed".

shopwindow of democracy towards the Communist bloc. However, Park's regime manoeuvred its own style of the recipe of governmentality in the name of 'Nationalistic Democracy', as the regime relieved the tension between the Western ideal of liberal democracy and its absence of horizontal antagonism between the Left and Right, which is the backbone of modern liberal democracy. The only space in which the various societal forces connected and communicated about politics was nationalism, with the heritage of colonial experience that affected both the ruling bloc and the people, including the dissident groups. The event that dismantled this compromise was the normalisation with Japan in 1964; however, the same year, popular sentiments were friendly to the regime and supportive of the dispatch of the Korean military troops and other civilian workers. It was the result of the ambivalence of nationalism to catch someone (the Western Democracy represented by the US) and the ignorance, plus making the other as 'something-below' of Vietnam people. In this process, the term '민족적(民族的, nationalistic)' was strengthened, which paved the way for '한국적 민주주의' (韓國的 民主主義, Korean-style Democracy) in the 1970s.

Chapter Six

The Proto-Type of Populistic Nationalism and Democracy with Adjective 2: Anti-Communism and Koreanness (1967-1979)

6-1. Overview

Even though there was emerging antagonism between the state and society, the second term of Park's presidency was smoothly achieved in 1967 compared to the first civilian transition election in 1963. The agreement between the new ruling elites and society was made based on nationalism and enthusiasm for development. The opposition parties could not compose a matchable and effective alternative to Park's regime because they could not ideologically distinguish themselves from the ruling bloc. However, the contention around the Third Amendment was the beginning of a pattern of the regime which rigidly acquiesced to social demands, while their only achievement was reduced to economic development. As the social demands of too rapid development became overwhelming, Park's 'adversary' for matching as oppositional parties and social movements were becoming more popular. Park's option for a third-term amendment boomeranged, threatening his renewed incumbency. As the state became increasingly rigid in coping with society's demands, the state's ability to use an alternative strategy became more restricted. In this situation, the crisis of descendency was another issue for the ruling bloc. Park initiated another reformation, responding to the change in international relations with the US and North Korea. In this regard, the only factor that Park could find his insurance to be on power was the people or the way direct to that people, *without any mediation* of the institutional mediation and even his loyal elites. This chapter will analyse the context and reason why he chose the way, Yusin regime and how he legitimated that choice in terms of populism and nationalism.

6-2. The Third-Term Amendment (삼선개헌, *Samseon-Gaehoen*) and frictions in-and-out

A. The propulsion of another amendment and the cleansing of the succession issue

Park Chung-Hee succeeded in his re-incumbency during the presidential election in 1967 (Im, H. B., 2014, 68). Unlike Park's marginal victory of 156,026 votes against the former president Yun Posun in the previous civilian-government transition election in 1963, Park received 51.4 per cent of the votes in the 1967 election, defeating his opponent Yun Posun by over a million votes. His emphasis on economic development, accompanied by a comprehensive foreign policy such as the dispatch to Vietnam War, represented the performance of the state, and it had popular appeal. As mentioned above, people evaluated the state's performance based on the significant material changes people could directly feel in their daily lives. Park's regime, at least by its second term, was constitutionally guaranteed as superficially democratic, with the internal mechanism of the authoritarian culture of the bureaucratic and military elites (Lee, K-R., 1997; Im, H. B., 2014, 464). The tension between the demands of the people and the satisfaction of state elites intensified through the controversy of the Third-Term Amendment of the Constitution (삼선개헌, 三選改憲, *Samseon-Gaeheon*) from 1967 to 1969.

For Park, the start of his second term, which was then constitutionally approved, led him to another question: 'Who would be the next?' As explained by Weyland (2019), because power relations depend on the plebiscitary personalistic rule, the fragility in power-holding in the electoral system leads populistic leaders to secure their position by hyper-constitutional means, such as transforming the previous system to become more authoritarian and allowing leaders to sustain their hold on political power (cf. Urbinati, 2019, 113-157). There was

competition among the Park's highest party members in this regard. Every authoritarian regime has a common power-sharing dilemma between the leader and the ruling bloc, typically resulting in a personalised dictatorship (or, in other words, from the contested autocracy to the established autocracy) (Svolik, 2012, 53-84).

Park adopted the conventional *divide-and-rule* strategy (Kim, Y-S.c, 1988, 59) for his close right-hand men (Im, H. B., 2014, 507-513). He selected his favourite political allies on a case-by-case basis depending on domestic political needs and other factors of international circumstances, such as the change of the diplomatic stance by the US and the provocation and marginal compromise with North Korea. Concerning the explanation of why The Third-Term Amendment was possible during the late 1960s, it was obvious that Park felt the 'succession crisis' (Im, H.B., 2014, 512), which pressed him because there was no one to continue the developmental economic strategies to maintain the previous export-oriented light industrial platform with its transformation to the heavy chemical industry (HCI), as the literature on the bureaucratic authoritarianism (BA) argues (Im, 1987). However, the economic structure transition to HCI cannot be the only reason why Park proceeded with the *Samseon-Gaeheon,* which foreshadowed the way to the Yusin regime. In this situation, Kim Jong-Pil, one of the most prospected successors to Park Chung-Hee and his factions were ousted because the anti-Kim faction supported the Amendment (Ryu, 1997, 68; Im, H. B, 2014, 510).

B. Between authoritarianism and populism?

This issue aroused widespread anger and disappointment concerning the *appearance* of the operation of democracy. For several reasons, the general election held on 8 June, about one month after the presidential election in 1967, was considered fraudulent. Vote-buying,

blackmail by political gangsters, shredding of valid votes and mandated voting were testified to and revealed by the newly elected opposition members in the National Assembly (Kim et al., 1967). Those oppositions saw this as unfair as Park's attempt to secure the number of congresspersons for the amendment of two-thirds of the Assembly members, the minimal condition for passing the amendment bill. For this context, the road to Yusin in 1972 can be understood as pre-destined for the long incumbency of Park, not the reaction to changing international relations or economic structures.

Considering this, it is difficult to determine whether the Third Republic from 1963 to 1972 (officially, including the transition period of three years from 1969 when the third-term amendment was passed) should be considered a purely authoritarian regime or a unique sort of regime with populistic elements. Though the regime derived from the undemocratic coup, the Third Republic guaranteed competition between the ruling and opposition parties (Lee, K-R., 1997, 93-100). Alternatively, perhaps the regime did not exemplify 'competitive authoritarianism' (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Although it had strong relationships with and was influenced by major democracies, such as the US, it was also characterised by extremely coercive organisational power of the state, with relatively strong democratic social movements in contrast to the Post-Cold War new democracies (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 56, 69). At least before the third-term amendment contention (1967-1969), the constitution and its subsequent legislatures were relatively soundly logical and even progressive considering the circumstance of rapid development in the Third Republic. However, ironically, the constitution served as a pretext for dissident social movements and opposition parties to claim the democratic demands of the people, which were legally inscribed but actually unrealised (Im, H. B., 2014, 518). This issue is dealt with later.

We can posit that there were both top-down and bottom-up populistic features of the

government during the critical era of the late 1960s and early 1970s in South Korea. For the former, Park's personalised leadership led to general popular support for his regime in the 1967 presidential election. The performances of Park's administration concerning economic development in terms of GNP <Table 6-1>, wage <Table 6-2>, consumption <Table 6-3>, and employment <Table 6-4> are shown below.

<Table 6-1> Changes in Per capita GNP (1971)

(Unit: Won)

	Amount			Rate of Increase (%)	
	1968	1969	1970	1969	1970
Current market prices (1971)	51,713	66,544	81,807	28.7	22.9
1965 constant market prices	36,999	42,460	45,773	14.8	7.8
Converted into US dollars ($)	164.7	198.0	223.3	20.0	12.8

Source: Office of Planning and Coordination (1971, 17)

<Table 6-2> Trends in Wages (1968-1970)

	Index (1965=100)			Rate of Increase (%)	
	1968	1969	1970[29]	1969	1970
Nominal Wages					
Mining	171.7	214.4	247.3	24.9	15.3
Manufacturing	182.6	224.9	279.9	23.2	24.5
Rural	163.4	220.0	248.6	22.4	24.3
Real Wage					
Mining	125.6	139.6	138.6	11.1	-0.7
Manufacturing	133.6	146.4	156.9	9.6	7.2
Rural	112.1	126.4	137.4	12.8	8.7

Source: The Economic Planning Board and the Bank of Korea,
Office of Planning and Coordination (1971, 18)

[29] Preliminary estimates.

<Table 6-3> Changes in Per capita Private Consumer Spending (1968-1970)

(Unit: Won)

	Amount			Rate of Increase (%)	
	1968	1969	1970[30]	1969	1970
Current Market Prices	39,114	47,847	59,342	22.3	24.0
1965 Constant Market Prices	28,617	31,528	34,470	10.0	9.3

Source: The Economic Planning Board and the Bank of Korea,
Office of Planning and Coordination (1971, 19)

<Table 6-4> Employed and Unemployed Population (1968-1970)

(Unit: 1,000 persons)

	Employed			Unemployed	
	Economically Active	Number of Persons	Employment Rate	Number of Persons	Employment Rate
1965	9,199	8,522	92.6	677	7.4
1969	9,818	9,347	95.2	471	4.8
1970					
Projected	10,689	10,069	94.2	620	5.8
Actual	10,009	9,573	95.6	436	4.4

Source: The Economic Planning Board,
Office of Planning and Coordination (1971, 45)

As shown in the tables, most of the indexes were favourable to the regime's performance shown to the people: the scale of the national economy was increasing, people were earning higher wages and spending more, and the unemployment rate was also decreasing, just according to the sheets in the papers published in the Office of Prime Minister. The record-breaking rise of GNP (15.9 per cent), the increase in agricultural income due to the abundant harvest, the decrease in unemployment (to the level of 4.8 per cent), and the lowest price rate since 1962 (from 11 per cent of the previous year to 9 per cent) demonstrated the good performance of the Park regime (Ryu, 1997, 69).

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[30] Preliminary estimates.

Against this background of success, the inner factions in government, like Kim Jong-Pil's faction, and the social demands for democracy were losing their leverage to check the power of Park, his other faction, which he preferred, and popular support for Park's performance. Amid the conflicts between Park, the inner factions like Kim, the oppositional parties and social activists, in the summer of 1969, Park declared that the referendum for the amendment would receive the government's confidence (Im, H. B., 2014, 510). The participation rate was 77.1 per cent, 65.1 per cent of whom voted in favour of the amendment. This is slightly below the civilian-government transition amendment's 85.2 per cent participation rate, with 78.8 per cent approval in 1962 (National Election Commission, undated-f).

C. Conversion of the verticality of antagonism?

However, this bright appearance masked politics covering the reality of the economic structure (Sonn, 2011, 366-372). The government was pressured to repay invested foreign currencies with an imbalance of international payments derived from export-oriented industries, which relied on another importation of intermediary and capital goods. Businesses were also burdened by high employment rates and wages. Most of all, the previous economic strategy inevitably required the sacrifice of the labour classes. Too rapid development led to social instability and quantitative growth of the national economy. The three events (or near disasters) listed below became 'critical junctures' (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 942) to radically change the public view on the Park regime and its direction of development later. They are listed below in the reverse-chronological order, emphasising (or imagining) how the people and the elite at that time remembered and perceived the shock from those events:

(a) A twenty-three-year-old fabric factory worker, 전태일 (*Jeon Tae-il*), self-immolated on 13 November 1971 to protest inhumane working conditions. This event caused social outrage and brought attention to harsh labour circumstances and urban poverty. This event was not of people at that time, but it became the symbolic resistance to the authoritarian regime in Korean political history until these days of the 21st century. Social organisations, such as churches and institutes, joined in the student movements sparked by the event (Kim, Y-S.c, 1988, 62; Lee, 2007, 33). The event was *not* an attempt to *change* the law or *overturn* the socially hegemonic order, as he screamed, 'We are not a machine!' 'Let us rest on Sunday!' 'Don't exploit workers!' and most of all, '*Abide by the Labour Standard Laws!*', which implied that the labour conditions did not satisfy the official guarantees by the stipulated legislation (italics added, Koo, 2001, 70).

(b) Another symbolic event of the urban-poor riot, 광주 대단지 봉기 (*Gwangju Daedanji Bonggi,* Gwangju Settler's Riot) in July of the same year was considered as a critical threat to the Park regime, which became the moment that Park's regime enforced its previous oppressive measures, such as the strengthening the police, over-execution of the administration based on the variable interpretation of the National Security Law to criminalise social agitations as treason and espionage (Ryu, 1997, 69-70). The event was then called '폭동' (*pokdong*, 暴動, violent disturbance) in media and governmental announcements. *Gwangju Dadanji* (Gwangju Large-Scale Complex), for now, Seongnam-shi, Gyeonggi Province, was fostered by the populations of forced immigrants (most of them were urban poor) from Seoul,

without the prepared residence, water supplies, or other infrastructure to be designated as 'towns'. Roughly 30,000 to 60,000 people gathered (Kim, 2011, 319). The event was the first urban riot in Park's regime, substantial enough to qualify as a 'security threat' (Kim, 2011, 327). One scholar argued that the event between the people and the state worked as the origin of the *Gyeonggi-Dongbu Yeonhap* (Eastern Gyeonggi Alliance), one of the factions of the national liberation (NL) student movements in the 1980s (Lim, 2013).[31]

(c) One of the most striking disasters to common people was 와우아파트 붕괴 사건 (*Wau Apateu Bungoe Sageon*, Wau Apartment Collapsing Disaster),[32] which occurred on the Mountain Wau, Mapo, Seoul on 8 April 1970. As mentioned in the previous chapter, rapid development, especially combined with the number of construction projects, was characterised by a reduction in the construction period and repeated plan changes, which increased the risk of an accident (Han, S-J.b, 2016, 327-336). 아파트(*Apateu*, apartment) was/is not merely a form of residence. It symbolised/symbolis*es*, during Korean modernisation and even nowadays in 2023, the achievement, success, and independence of ordinary/common people, as one French geographer once called Korea 'La République des Appartements' (Gelézeau, 2007; Oh, 2017, 45). The Wau apartment was built as a part of the promotion of 'civilian houses' and reconstruction of slums prompted by Seoul Mayor Kim Hyeon-

[31] For the detailed story of the riot, see Kim (2011, 297-333).

[32] This disaster was depicted well in a fantasy web cartoon titled『어게인(*Eogain*, Again)』by Gangpool (2009).

Ok (Gelézeau, 2007, 34), who was then famous for his nickname 'Bulldozer Mayor' due to the massive civilian engineering projects he commissioned around the city (Sohn, 2002). The collapse of fifteen out of sixteen buildings of the complex resulted in thirty-three deaths and thirty-eight injuries among residents and one death and two injuries from people in neighbouring houses. One article by *Chosun Ilbo* said of the disaster that, for the contemporary intellectuals, it was the collapse of the corrupted government (of Park), and the congresspersons of the ruling DRP deplored that "it sounds as if the number of our votes is falling apart" (Choi, 1993).

These three events cannot explain the whole context of Yusin and the other social demands not satisfied by society or the state. However, the key point was that the developmental strategy, once the only effective measure for the legitimation of the regime, began to crack. In addition, the popular thoughts bifurcated, with nationalism since 1964 divided into state-led developmentalism and dissident nationalism, which emphasised democratisation and the reunification movements. The state's promise of serving the nation's political purpose was starting to be broken by the very act of the state (Balibar, 1991).

In this regard, we can assume that popular demands can soar into populistic sentiments, while such sentiments were, in fact, not prevalent. As mentioned above, the cleavage of Left and Right was now being replaced by anti-democratic state versus democratic politics, led by dissidents, intellectuals, students, and now in the opposition party with some popular figures, such as Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung of 신민당 (*Sinmindang*, New Democratic Party, NDP). They were relatively free from the image of the previous opposition parties' landlord-class orientation. Thus, as the election was held regularly, the oppositional parties gained in

popularity. They combined their critical function of checking the government whenever social protests erupted, raising the public livelihood issue with the criticism of the government's anti-democratic policies. After the *Martyr of Jeon Tae-il*, student movements began to prioritise labour issues. In response to social demand, churches organised self-government committees to investigate the urban poverty problem, which led to several other social movements (Kim, Y-S.c, 1988, 62-63; Im, H.B., 2014, 515). It was the first moment that the verticality, as repeatedly emphasised in this thesis, *seemed* to be horizontal, representing *another* choice for people aside from the ruling bloc.[33] This mood peaked at the presidential election in 1971, held based on the very amendment in 1969, which enabled Park to extend his third candidacy with difficulty.

6-3. Rise of the Korean-style democracy

A. An optimism

The presidential election in 1971 resulted in Park's third presidency, but the ruling party's mood was quite pessimistic (Im, H., B., 2014, 516-517). Kim Dae-Jung, a new counterpart of Park Chung-Hee, pinpointed the contemporary social demands with his own thoughts 대중경제론(*Daejung Gyeongjeron*, 大衆經濟論, The Mass Economy). It promised mass welfare, the distribution of economic development and cost, a wealth tax, an employee stock ownership plan, a joint labour-management committee, and a reformation for agricultural incomes, which were seen as innovative to the people in general, with pacifistic policies

[33] However, this tentative reasoning wil be reassesed in the conclusion of this chapter.

towards North Korea. He earned 45.25 per cent of the total votes, whereas Park received 53.19, with about only a 49,000 difference in the number of votes (National Election Commission, undated-b). During the election, the dissident intellectuals and students organised 민주수호전국청년학생연맹 (*Minjusuho Jeonguk Haksaeng Yeonmang*, The National League of Youth and Students for Protection of Democracy) and 민주수호국민협의회 (*Minjusuho Gungmin Hyeopeuihoe*, The National Committee for Protection of Democracy), to observe the election and conduct a campaign for fair election (Kim, Y-S.c, 1988, 67-68).

Kim Young-Sun (Kim, Y-S.c, 1988) explains that the organisations reflected the regime change expectations shared by students, intellectuals, and the people in general in the condition of the impartial election. Im Hyuk Bak (2014, 516) also assesses this as the first movement in which all the non-governmental social movement forces gathered under one umbrella, securing their stake, and aggregating social demands. In addition, this attempt can be understood as the active and voluntary intervention by non-governmental organisations *into* the state, not just a protest *outside* the realm of the government as the only measure for people to represent their demands. This mood persisted for one month following the general election held in May 1971 (Kim, Y-S.c, 1988, 68). The NDP gathered eighty-nine seats in the National Assembly, over double the number compared to the previous forty-four. This was twenty above the blockage line of sixty-nine for the constitutional amendment, constituting the highest rate of occupation by the first opposition party in constitutional history. Among the ruling DRP, these two elections were accepted as ‘defeats’ despite pre-emptive measures to ensure their success, such as vote-buying, interventions by the governmental offices, and

attacking Kim Dae-Jung with his regional origin (Jeollahdo) and alleging suspicion of his thought as communism (Im, H. B., 2014 516).

B. External factors: the US and North Korea

However, the relations between the US and North Korea were also rapidly changing. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the Nixon Doctrine changed the pan-Asia policies of the US and South Korea. It directly affected the situation of dispatched Korean troops to Vietnam. The Vietnam War was not just a military manoeuvre but was also one of the chances for the common Korean people who supported Park's regime. In addition, the ongoing discussion on the reduction of the USFK (US Force, Korea) since the early 1960s was realised by Nixon's order on 20 March 1970 (Hong, 2006, 74). As North Korea increased its armed attacks against South Korea as the indirect support of North Vietnam (Kim, K., 2014, 29), the security threat from North Korea was critical even to the public. Since 1968, including the 21 January Incident (North Korean agents' failed attempt to invade the Blue House) and the Pueblo Incident in 1968, the number of armed provocations increased from fifty in 1966, 566 in 1967, 761 in 1968 (Lee and Kwon, 2010, 310). The casualty also increased from 359 in 1967, 484 in 1968, and 100 in 1961, regardless of the Korean army, USFK, and civilians (Hong, 2017, 262).

These events came, at first, as a threat to the regime and South Korean civilians, but Park took advantage of them to enforce his power as a leverage or propaganda tool. First, Park's regime successfully characterised the event as a crisis to national security (Hong, 2006, 78-79), though Nixon Doctrine itself in international society was Détente, leading to US-China diplomatic normalisation. Park interpreted the appeasement mood between the two great

powers as an intense fluidity of the power relations in the Korean Peninsula. In January 1971, the enforcement of the school military drill was declared, which aroused public opposition in the circumstance of melting the mood between the East and West (Kim, Y-S.c, 1988, 64).

Second, the reconciliation between the US and China was inevitably affecting North Korea's position, by which Kim Il-Sung and Park's interest converges into the reinforcement of their own dominance in each Korea (Im, H. B., 2014, 525-528; Hong, 2017, 271). Park first suggested the inter-Korea dialogue in the inaugural speech of the anniversary ceremony of Independence Day on 15 August 1970. The investigation of the situation of dispersed families was implemented via Korean Red Cross on 12 August 1971. The peak of the appeasement mood between the two Koreas was 7.4 남북공동성명(*Chil-Sa Nambuk Gonding Seongmyeong*, The 4 July South-North Joint Communiqué) in 1972, which was the first official inter-Korean joint agreement regarding reunification and inter-Korean relations since the Korean War. Though the reunion of dispersed South-North Korean families was realised in 1985 (explained in Chapter Seven), the inter-Korean dialogue was sufficient to appeal to nationalistic sentiments. However, on 17 October of the same year, amid a widespread expectation of reunification, Park's regime declared emergency martial law with its successive measure: dissolution of the National Assembly, prohibition of political activity and parties, and the special announcement in the name of the president with a new constitution amendment bill, so-called 유신 헌법(*Yusin Heonbeob*, Yusin Constitution) (Kim, Y-S.c, 75).

C. The spirit of Korean-style democracy: verticality strengthened once again

Thus, the choice for Park was repression when the state was overwhelmingly strong vis-à-vis society (Im, H. B., 2014, 519). He chose to appeal directly to the people between himself and elite groups, of which even ruling bloc elites were divided and of which dissident elites, students and even some churches consisted.[34] It can be understood that Park relied on populism to approach the people detouring around the mediated institutions, not only the National Assembly but the whole state apparatus (except his administration). However, it was not populism as the initiative of such directedness was not in the people, but the leader himself, plus through the strong repressive state apparatus, which can directly deliver his will to people. It was not a matter of strategy to get the support from the masses, as Weyland (2001; 2019) argued on the purpose of populism, that is, for more votes *under* the representative democracy. Rather, the previous appearance of representative democracy was swollen by its parasite (Urbinati, 2019). Now what he needed was only popular support, as Laclau (2005, 159-171) implied while he described the dual constitution between the represented and the representer, that is, the leader, who indicates a popular demand of people (*gungmin*) who are not given a priori (as liberal democracy posits).[35]

[34] As there is no centralised church in Korea, such as the Anglican Church in the United Kingdom or other European countries with a national religion, churches in South Korea were relatively independent of the state's intervention, while decentralised organisations had a free voice to the political and social issues. However, such churches, including the Catholic and the Protestant, were ambivalent about the Park regime. Especially the huge Protestant churches in South Korea had a history of collaboration with the Parks regime and the successive Chun Doo-Hwan government. In contrast, other churches became a hotbed or shelters for democratic movements. On the relationship between Park's nationalism and the convergence-competition-conflict movements of the Protestant churches, see Kim (2013). The literature was influenced by Kang (2006)'s masterpiece on anti-communism and Korean Protestant churches and the works by Jesamsidae Grisdogyo Yeon-gu-so (2017).

[35] Though Laclau did not support Fascism, he used an analogy about how the relationship between the leader and people is constitutive of each other. His stance on fascism is close to the analytical subject, on which any

Park already had shown his personal opinion on liberal democracy. He considered it as more than just an eclecticism of indigenous democracy. Instead, his dual perspective of hyper-masculine developmentalism (Han and Ling, 1998) and scepticism of liberal democracy were revealed when he insisted on Nationalistic Democracy. According to the metaphor below, the developmental strategy so far was to grow the height of Korean people, whereas the Yusin regime was to mend a suit, cut the sleeves, and reduce the size of the clothes.

> "Consider buying, say, a suit from a foreign country. Though the garment is good and well-stitched, when we wear it, for such a short person like me,[36] the width would be too broad and sleeves and trousers too long as it was initially for a foreigner of six-feet tall height. […] Imagine a short person like me walking down Seoul's streets, wearing such a suit for a six-feet person. Isn't it unsightly or not? I see this as a *scarecrow democracy*. I see this as a *pretentious democracy without kernels*" (Italics added, Park's electoral speech in a middle-high school ground on 28 September 1963, Shim, 1972, 229).

This thesis does not need to list the repressive policies of the Yusin regime, but the constitution, in effect, denied representative and liberal democracy. For example, a clause in Article 1, "All state authority shall emanate from the people", changed to "People exercise their sovereignty through *their representer* or *referendum*" (italics added).[37] By depriving the

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non-normative stance has been taboo in previous populism studies (Laclau, 2005, 171).

[36] Actually, Park was rather short (five foot three/one hundred and sixty-five centimetre).

[37] Korean Ministry of Government Legislation (undated) provides an English version only of the latest

rights of inspection of the governmental offices while reducing its session to 150 days, the constitution downsized the manoeuvrability of the Assembly (Kim, Y-S.c, 1988, 75). In addition, one-third of the Assembly members were indirectly elected among the candidates appointed by the president in 통일주체국민회의(*Tongiljuche Gungminhoei*, the National Conference for Unification), where the president was indirectly elected. Concerning the judiciary, all the juries were selected by the president, and their impeachment was held in the committee of the constitution. The bill was passed in the referendum on 21 November 1972, with 91.5 per cent of voters' approval (National Election Commission, undated-f).

In this regard, it is not necessary to reaffirm the concentration of power to Park; however, by what logic could its justification be possible?

Historical anthropologist Kim Hang (2019) once indicated the populistic elements in the modern democracy of Korea by tracking the intellectual journey of Han Taeyeon, one of the drafters of the Yusin Constitution. In the present thesis, an article written by Kal Bong-Geun, another drafter, is analysed (Kal, 1975). The same text was once briefly dealt with in Lee (2018b, 130), focusing on the *personalisation* of power and a leader's image. The article was published in a famous periodical in Korea, 『신동아(*Shindonga*)』, which delivered political news, inside history of politicians, and columns for popular readers. I think this text is worth analysing again in this thesis. It pinpoints similar term usage with today's populists in the twenty-first century, such as *responsibility* or *directedness* between the leader, as a

constitution enforced in 1988, as all constitutions in history are provided in Korean. However, the clause has never been changed or missed in the constitution except in the Yusin Constitution. The translation of the clause of the Yusin constitution is the author's work.

representative of power, and the people.

Kal begins with the familiar issue of the absence of indigenous democracy in Korea, as he argues it should be 'efficient' (Kal, 1975, 54) if it exists.[38] Then he moves to the issue of responsibility (52), mentioning uncritical acceptance of Western democracy, which serves to delegitimise tradition. He then considers the critical issue of *personalisation* of power, which is inevitable *not only* in underdeveloped countries but is rather a generalised phenomenon (54-55); strikingly, he argues *it is abnormal if depersonalisation of power occurs*.

Referring to the French political scientist Alber Mabileu, Kal explains the meaning of personalisation as a (a) concentration of power and (b) 'personalification' (*personification*).[39] The former is about the exercise of power by a personality, and the latter is the representation of power. Then he subtly criticises divisions of power as irresponsible and insists that general opinion tries to combine (a) and (b) into a particular personality (56). According to him, the divisions of power are obsolete, mechanical, and idealistic. Then he emphasises a stalemate in complex power relations in/around Korea, which determines the nation's destiny. *Someone should be responsible*; that is a leader. Then he argues that as the participation of popular masses[40] increases, the *contact* between the leader and people increases, and the personalisation of power becomes *popular*. Then he argues that this tendency satisfies the

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[38] From now on, only the page number will be written to refer to Kal (1972). The sentence without the reference, the summary of the text, is my own work. All italics are added by me.

[39] He seems to confuse the spelling of *personification*, as neither English nor French has a word with the such spelling of personalification. Mentioning personification (의인화, *euinhwa*, 擬人化) in Chinese characters, he re-wrote it side-by-side in parentheses the word using the English alphabet. For convenience, this thesis will use *personification* for now.

[40] I am *intentionally* translating the Korean word 대중(大衆) into popular masses, while Kal uses the term with a similar meaning to 'the people'. For now, the researcher is neutral on whether his argument is populistic.

depersonalised technocracy, which is inevitable when pursuing economic democracy based on equality.

The most striking part of this article is on page 57, where Kal pinpoints the relationship between personalisation and the popular masses. He defines democracy as the institutionalisation of power, which is *hard to understand* for most people. The elite takes advantage of this situation. He argues that the popular masses seek an individual to represent them in this circumstance. Then he argues that the rise of the popular masses is the reason for the re-personalisation of power, as political parties are also re-personalised as a national leader emerges (57-58).

He concludes his article with the idealised image of the leader in the Yusin regime as a *prophet,* while he does not forget to legitimise (legal or illegal) violence to solve conflicts of legitimacy when the oppositional minority is strong (58-59). Then he emphasises that a referendum is a suitable measure in the Yusin Constitution to catalyse *direct contact* between 'a leader' and 'the people' (*gungmin*) (60).

We see in Kal's article the legacy of Schmitt's criticism of liberal democracy (Schmitt, 2010[1934], 16-52) and feel a kind of déjà vu of Laclau (2005)'s theorisation (explained in Chapter Two) of democratic demands into the popular demand to be represented by one empty signifier. Some of the populism literature, especially that warns about the danger of populism to democracy, mentions the problem of responsibility concerning mandate representation (Müller 2016, 30-31; Urbinati, 2019, 128). Compared to the free mandate in liberal democracy, an imperative mandate stipulates the direct relation between the represented and the representer, and the former loses the right to account for the latter's action. Rather, the mediation between the representer and the represented allows space for

negotiation between the two to seek accountability on the result of the representer's action, who is responsible for answering that accounting.

This is true when the ideal of liberal democracy operates as it should, a possibility that Kal denies, insisting that the *only way* to find someone to be responsible is to mandate everything to a leader. However, as the ideal of liberal democracy is sometimes not realised, a responsible leader is also unrealistic when we consider the hierarchical power relations between people and a leader, especially for the Yusin regime. Kim Hang (2019) questioned the inevitability of the personalisation of modern democracy in reference to the case of the Yusin regime, and this subject is worthy of further research.

In addition, as shown in the text of Kal, the power relations are described vertically in a leader-elites-people hierarchy, while other alternative forces are reduced to the 'oppositional minority', which cannot locate its place in the image of the political community, neither vertically nor horizontally. The oppositional minority may be considered mere outsiders by Kal, though this thesis emphasises its internality. As the concept of the 'internal outsider' (Brubaker, 2017a; 2017b; 2020) is explained in Chapters Two and Three, those outsiders are not mere outsiders in populism (and Fascism). They are *legally* members of the community, but *actually,* their social status is that of any enemy or traitor. In this sense, the regime needed to strengthen its horizontal inside-outside boundary, which is accompanied by emphasising *ours* (not us or we) as a possessive, essentialised, and thus protected and monopolised Koreanness. Urbinati (2019, 74) rightfully indicates the difference between liberal democracy and populism in how they signify popular sovereignty. The former considers popular sovereignty as a *condition of power* for plural competition, while the latter as a *possession*, interpreted as an exclusive way to push out from the polity the agencies considered to have little common things with *ours*. Consider the difference between '*W*e the People' and '*Our*

People'. In the same vein, the invention of Koreanness was not an answer to the mere question of 'Who are we?' Rather, it was to the questions, '*What is ours?'* or '*What do we have?*' compared to others or outsiders.

6-4. The Invention of Koreanness

A. Externalisation of horizontal confrontation to nationalistic antagonism

A similar concept of Korean nationalism, based on anti-communism and developmentalism, was inherent before Park's regime. However, its subtle institutionalisation in Korean society was strengthened around the Yusin regime. The temporality of past-present-future in national populism (Taş, 2020) existed, but its popularisation was explicitly systemised and realised as 'real' (Hay 2014) in people's everyday life during the 1960s-1970s. As one scholar puts it, "[during Park's era, especially the Yusin regime,] culture was the locus of self-conscious recuperation on the part of both the state and those who thought alternative narratives out of the past and into the present" (Ryu, 2018, 12). The hegemonisation of nationalism serves itself as the only source of the rules of the game by which political subjects can be imagined under the unitary and iron rule of the anti-communist state. This cultural system is based on the state's governmental arts and the simultaneous consent of the people, whether voluntary or not, yielding the unique political styles of Korean politics, which contain a couple of populistic elements.

As the young populations flowing into the cities were susceptible to the varied ideas on politics and society and Westernised pop culture, the inculcation of modernisation, anti-communism, and economic development into those people was a crucial task for the Park Chung-Hee government (Cho, 2018, 74-77). People's pop culture or morality was initially

one of the main targets for the perpetrators of the coup, who declared that their purpose was to redress the 'people's decadent way of life and national spirit' (see Chapter Five). Though nationalism based on the divided system of South and North Korea has been formed since the First Republic of Syngman Lee, its nuanced meaning was changed during the Park Regime.

As shown in Chapter Four, the nationalism in Rhee's government emphasised the 'oneness' of the people, aiming at reunifying the North and South through anti-communism, which demarcates the frontier between the Right *over* the Left inside one society. Park's regime inherited this demarcation, though its emphasis moved from reunification to anti-communism through governmentality in the Foucauldian sense (Hong, 2019). As previously mentioned, as a regime prioritises rapid economic development, the ruling bloc should mould people's way of life to fit that purpose. This art of governmentality was effective for making *homo eoconomicus* and compensating for the regime's lack of legitimacy by the people's stable and top-down voluntary consent. This attempt to form hegemony not only relied on the cunning discipline of individuals but also on constructing the communality or social bond potentially undermined by rapid urbanisation (Seo and Kim, 2015, 73-78). However, ones who were content with the regime "could stand, stretch, or eat freely"; Yusin Korea was a place "where it was never certain what, in fact, was permitted" not only for intellectuals, journalists or artists but also for the common people (Kee, 2018, 261).

As De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) distinguish the horizontal and vertical antagonism of nationalism and populism, the making of Korenness during Park's regime can be understood as the construction of horizontal frontiers of the nation inside and outside based on the agony of addressing communism and the West (or Western Democracy) (Ryu, 2018, 24). For this task, not only the questions 'Who are we?' and 'Who are we not?' but also *"What is ours?"* in relation to communist North Korea and the West had to be answered.

Concerning this crucial question, opposing the Other is essential in constructing identity without content beyond mere antagonism. When we consider the construction of the frontier of 'us' and 'them' in populism (Laclau, 2005, 67-128) and nationalism, the common experience of dissatisfaction with power or the oligarchy among differential demands constructs that antagonism regardless of the content of those demands, which cannot be fixed on the endless chains of equivalences. However, the frontier of nationalism consists of the easily identifiable object of antagonism and the self-assurance of solid bonds based on nationalistic content.

For this, the Park regime's cultural policies, especially regarding historic sites and physical structures, focused on (a) overcoming national crises, (b) restoring the structure of national cultural significance, and (c) promoting the concept of loyalty and filial piety (Kim, 2018, 25-26). This popularised content of nationality re-invented and renovated based on the historical figures and national memory or *jeontong* (전통, 傳統, tradition), was intended to counter the emerging culture of *nodongja* (노동자, 勞動者, workers) (Koo, 2001, 20), which can be an alternative signifier for the frontier between people and the ruling regime. This antagonism was explicit in various social resistance movements during the authoritarian rule but failed to compose the overall and universal equivalent chains for populistic antagonism. However, the terms for indicating 'Koreanness', '(ethnic) nationality', and 'nationals' (*gungmin*) were gaining general acceptance as political signifiers, eventually becoming part of the common political vocabulary or grammar for South Korean people (cf. Seo, 2009).

B. Everyday nation: between common banality and grandiosity[41]

The main elements for *Koreanness* (한국적인 것, *hangukjeock-in-got*) were constructed via (a) the narrative of national history; (b) the popular augmentation of heroic historical figures and their ethics; and (c) the construction of disdain for Western or Japanese culture. The Bureau of Cultural Heritage Management, established in 1961, prompted cultural heritage, and the Cultural Heritage Protection Law was passed in 1962 (Kim, 2018, 27). Concerning popular culture, the Culture and Art Promotion Act of 1972 was remarkable. The administrations concerning cultural politics were reorganised in 1973 (Kim, 2018, 29-30). In specific, the censorship of film was subtle and ambivalent (Kwon et al., 2015), as the government promoted the film industry with annual awards, such as 대종상(*Daejongsang*, 大鐘賞, the Grand Bell Awards), beginning in 1966. The media or film was strictly censored during the Yusin regime, while the government promoted the production of films, which promoted national history and the independence of national culture. By this procedure, terms like *minjok* (nation), *jeontong* (傳統, tradition), 국민영웅(*gungmin-yeong-ung*, 國民英雄, national hero), 사명(*samyeong*, 使命, mission) 위인 (*wee-in*, 偉人, great figure) gained their popularity and currency in the everyday lives of people. As Anderson (1999) indicates, the linear sense of past-present-future, which is shared by the anonymous deceased-living people-future members of a nation, now makes a spectacle of history at the level of the individuals.

[41] This sub-section is written with the revision of some parts of Kim, H.c (2017), once presented in the International Studies Association International Conference 2017 (17 June), The University of Hong Kong.

During this process, every member of the common people was tasked with becoming a worker for national development. This sort of interpellation as a national subject sometimes allowed individuals to depart, even liberate themselves from the restriction of conventional traditions, finding their own sense of the modern self (Hwang, 2004). This process was coupled with the popular sentiments of people's desperation under devastating economic hardship that they tried to overcome daily. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Park Chung-Hee himself identified with such 'common people' against conventional political and economic elites and emphasised that every person in the nation should focus on economic development (Park, 2005[1962], 329-330, 450; Park, 2005[1963], 643-657). This focus on his 'commonness', through which he himself emphasised that he shared the same desire with people, was combined with the reservation of democratic politics for productivity around the establishment of the Yusin regime (Park, 2005[1971], 763; Park, 2005[1978], 805-821).

The routinisation, or making banal (Billig, 1995) of national symbols, was an effective way to proliferate Koreanness. In 1966, the new standard for flying Taeguekgi in ceremony was introduced by Notification No. 2 of the President (Republic of Korea, 1966). In 1968, 국민교육헌장(*Gungmin-gyoyuk-heonjang*, 國民敎育憲章, The Charter of National Education), which started with the phrase, "We have been born into this land, charged with the historic mission of regenerating the nation[…]" was enacted (National Archives of Korea, undated-b). The Charter was recited by every elementary, middle, and high school student at the beginning of class starting the following year. Recitation contests for students were held, and some children were punished by their teacher when they failed to memorise the Charter.

In February 1972, the national anthem of Korea (*Aegukga*, 愛國歌) became obligatory to

be played in every theatre before any musical or cinematic performance. This began under the guidance of the Ministry of Culture and Public Information and was re-considered for repeal in 1988 (Ministry of Culture and Public Information, 1988). In April of the same year, the present Pledge of Allegiance prototype was nationally officialised by the Ministry of Education (1972), which was first locally proposed and promoted by one educator in Chungchung Province beginning in 1968. Since 1976, by the prime minister's direction (1976), the daily ceremony of lowering the national flag was formalised, as the ceremony was already being held without a legal basis. In this direction, the ceremony had become mandatory every day in every governmental office, school, and public organisation. The ceremony included playing the national anthem loudly over street speakers, where every passer-by had to stop and salute toward the place the song was heard.[42]

In summary, as Hong (2019) emphasises, making *gungmin* was the result of the combination of the top-down governmentality of the Yusin regime and the bottom-up desire of common people, as the latter was guided by the former. The point is that this process of making gungmin through their daily desires and practices was not an image of playing *marionettes* but rather the production of desire, the object for projection, negotiation about regulations and attempts to transcend them, which were prevalent among the popular masses. In this regard, Park's regime skilfully took advantage of the common desire for living held by people in general and some of the elite statuses, though this dimension is not fully dealt with in this chapter. This recipe for governing continued in the Fifth Republic, which was

[42] This scene is well-depicted in the film *Ode to My Father* (2014). One married couple was fighting over the husband's choice to volunteer as a Vietnam reconstruction worker. Then, the National Anthem was heard, and the National Flag was lowered. A man nearby the couple stared at them with his scornful face, until the husband quietly stood up and salutes the flag. Then the wife also stood up, repressing her tears and beating herself on her chest as she showed her troubled mind.

established after another coup d'état by General Chun Doo-Hwan on 12 December 1979, a little over a month after the assassination of Park on 26 October.

6-5. Conclusion

Im Hyug Baeg (2014, 518) argues that the crisis of Park's regime in the early 1970s was due to the reduction of support groups in public. However, the need for weaving the sack under the name of *gungmin* was fulfilled at last, as the regime drew the boundary line for the potatoes not to spill over outside of it. The horizontal demarcation of Koreanness was crystalised on the verge of the people's desire and the state's need to cross the horizontal antagonism onto the previous vertical antagonism between the state and the dissident groups. This horizontality, once emerging during the transition period from the Third Republic to the Yusin regime, was when the NDP gained its popularity and rose as an alternative to the previous DRP and Park's ruling bloc. The Yusin regime, by preventing the possible development of horizontal confrontation between the pluralised political competition, inscribed to people a hierarchical conception of power relations between the state and the ruled. In this regard, the pursuit of forming a *political alternative* was focused on the normalisation of liberal democracy as the foremost task, which became based on a normative *mission* for the people. In this respect, democratisation was, for a while, not a matter of *practical solutions* to suffice their everyday needs. Yusin strengthened this verticality and normativity around democracy in Korea.

In this regard, it is insightful that Im (2014, 514) points out that the oppositional, dissident social movements of students, intellectuals, and religious organisations had been based on *political cleavage* rather than *social cleavage* or *class distinctions* (italics added)

since the third-term amendment contention. The seventh presidential and subsequent general elections in 1971 temporally provided an opportunity for the quality and spatiality of that cleavage to morph into a horizontal one, similar to the Left-Right opposition in an idealised liberal democracy. In this process, external factors, such as the speciality of the division of the Korean Peninsula beginning in 1945, played a role once again. Given these circumstances, the desire for egalitarianism succumbed to the state-led horizontal antagonism of nationalism.

Kenneth M. Roberts suggests that contemporary populist parties differentiate themselves based on the generalisable, value-oriented agenda (Roberts, 2019). Applying Stokes' (1963, 373) distinction between 'position-issues' and 'valence-issues', Roberts points out that when the conventional political parties on the Left and the Right (State-Market), based on positional competition, converge with each other. This convergence creates a valence issue based on the positive-negative value of the political outcome, such as the cultural dimension vertically crossing the horizontal axis of positional issues (Roberts, 2019, 153). In this scheme, the nationalist and populist right radicalises cultural conservatism because in conventional positional issues, both the Left and Right take moderate positions, with little differentiation. According to this argument, since the Yusin regime, politics in Korea had been reduced to the valence issue of democratisation without the matured development of positional issues.

Thus, verticality stands firmly in Korean politics. This spatiality of political antagonism was not only of the common people but also of the elite classes, who were on the side of dissident social movements. The antagonism between different political actors and interests, which is inevitable in politics (Mouffe, 1993), was constituted in the simple and homogenous

names of 민주-반민주 (*minju-banminju,* 民主-反民主, democracy-anti-democracy), which refers to the scheme between the people and the state, as the people and the oligarchy, as indicted in contemporary populism studies. This scheme would be partly solved in terms of institutional democratisation in 1987. However, the meaning of that institutional democratisation was too focused on the revival of the direct presidential election, which further symbolises the verticality of power relations.

This verticality would be deeply inscribed in the Korean society of the Fifth Republic when another indirectly elected Chun came to the top of the power hierarchy. How was this verticality sustained in both old (Park) and new (Chun) military regimes over nearly thirty years (1962-1987)? The story begins with an issue of the people, especially intellectuals' categorisation and the response by the people to those attempts. It is discussed in Chapter Seven at length, compared to the previous three chapters.

Chapter Seven

The Emergence of the Ideal of 보통사람 (*Botong-saram*, Common People) and the Completion of Populistic Nationalism: The Fifth and Sixth Republic since Democratisation (1980-1987 and later)

"*But I won't cry for yesterday*
There's an ordinary world
Somehow I have to find
And as I try to make my way
To the ordinary world
I will learn to survive."
- From the lyrics of "Ordinary World (1993)" by Duran Duran (2018), a British synthpop band

"Rent a flat above a shop
Cut your hair and get a job
Smoke some fags and play some pool
Pretend you never went to school."
- From the lyrics of "Common People (1995)" by Pulp (2011), a Britpop band

"Despite the despair of non-my-own house, regardless of rent or sold-in-lot, if I can get mine as President [Rho Tae-Woo] promised, that will be a little miracle. That will be a great time if days come when even common people achieve such wonders (Roh, 1989, 7)*."*

- From an audience letter by a housewife to President Roh Tae-Woo's Weekly Radio Speeches

7-1. Overview

The song "Ordinary World" from their seventh self-titled studio album (*Duran Duran*, 1993) by Birmingham band Duran Duran and the fifth studio album, *Different Class* (1995) by Sheffield band Pulp, have a common theme about being intimate, convenient, and living well. As the latter song intends to mock the high classes' naïveté to be common, the things that Duran Duran accepted would be for those high classes obvious, while they might not be obvious to common people. In any sense, those things might be likeable or desirable goals in human life. Some find their intimacy in family, others in personal relationships, social statuses, and individuals' self-awareness privatising them into personal boundaries. Some form of intimacy, such as family, symbolises one of the necessary conditions for an individual in the view of someone's parents, relatives, or close friends, representing a desire to be *ordinary* or *common*, which decides one's normality or fitness following the standard of society. It is also the most innate desire of the individual, societal, or at times the public discourses to meet together, contracting or warping over the gap between the private and the public or between the elite and the people.

As repeated in this thesis, it is the very point that national and global power relations vis-à-vis the state target (Kwon, 2020). Such targeting of intimate desire has been a savoir-faire of governance of the South Korean government since Park Chung-Hee, as explained in Chapters Five and Six. Jo Eunjoo (2018) also elucidates the historical analysis of family and governmentality in South Korea. As Han and Ling (1998, 69-73) indicate, 'procedural' democratisation of a former masculine authoritarian state entails more tasks for 'substantive' democracy: democracy in "[the] privatized, personal domains associated with family and home" (Han and Ling, 1998, 70). Considering Mudde's (2007, 23) argument on the authoritarianism of populism, this is not a matter of mere kind of regime but of the lifestyle

under any regime. This chapter attempts to show the difference between the dynamic of regime change and how common people's lives changed in 1980s South Korea. In this chapter, I argue that the construction of populistic nationalism in Korea was completed on the basis of the former legacy of vertical antagonism in politics, the contentious nationalism on the horizon, and the new introduction of institutionally adopted liberal democracy in 1987.

Considering its characteristic of generalisable application in a nation-state, marital and familial governmentality on population is a means to making normal/abnormal, which is a familiar and recurring theme for Foucauldian readers. However, I will put aside the task of the genealogy of the construction of normal, as that subject needs a thorough analysis of more specific and distinct elements of life in Korean society. For example, mentioned Jo's work (2018) focuses on family, and Kim Hak-Seon (2020) focuses on the creation of time in the 1980s. By referring to such literature, additional media resources, and remarks of key political figures and elites, this chapter will focus on how that *given* concept of common or ordinary based on the individual intimate desire became the central political issue concerning populistic nationalism in the 1980s. We cannot evade the requirement to analyse the meaning of commonness/the ordinary to understand populism; as Geoffrey Engbolm, in the 1967 Conference, mentioned that populism "[is] often a romantici[s]ation of the ordinary" (Berlin et al., 1968, 149).

Back to the quoted two songs, suppose you hear each of them. You will find they unleash the different stories on commonness/ordinariness written by the different British musicians. It might also be due to the different eras of the two band's heydays, as Duran Duran has gained massive worldwide fame since the early 1980s. In comparison, Pulp gathered relatively little popularity in the middle of the 1990s after almost twenty-year of their unknown days since its first formation in 1978, when Duran Duran also did their first gig. These two songs symbolise

the light and shadow in the British ‘ordinary world’, affected by the political-economic changes since the Thatcherian era combined with the hegemony strategies in culture (Hall, 1988). Here, culture comprises its varied definitions of a ‘way of life’ (Williams, 1983, 91) and ‘semiotic practice’ (Weeden, 2004) of how leaders, the elite, and the people signify and negotiate what is at first in politics. For the Thatcherian era (and Korean society), culture in politics emphasises the patriarchally family-oriented, self-survival, self-regulating individual. The same will also be within Koreans, especially since the late 1990s (Seo, D-J., 2009), while in the 1980s, they seemed to be partially gathering some fruits of a developmental state before. However, those two common people’s temporal and spatial perceptions on the verge of national development and their everyday lives differed in the direction of their own desires, wishes, or sense of possibility, concerning the mobility of their level of life: for *bontong-saram-deul* (보통사람들, 普通사람들, common people).[43] At least in the 1980s, *optimism*, which is the result of state governmentality, still existed in Korean society; for now, in the twenty-one century, it has been revealed as *cruel* by the Economic Crisis in 1997 (cf. Berlant, 2011).

Contrary to the previous chapters, the explanation is mainly focused on the depiction of Korean society and three forms of the alternative understanding of people to *gungmin* (국민, 國民): 민중 (民衆, *minjung*), 중산층 (中産層, *jungsancheung*, the middle classes) and 중민 (中民, *joongmin*, people in the middle) around the democratisation in 1987. Political history will be depicted like snapshots, helping the reader understand the meaning of these three

[43] *deul* is a postpositional particle for norm plural in Korean.

forms of categorisation of people. This chapter aims to deconstruct the conventional distinction between the elite and the people in the previous literature on populism studies, which cannot be understood in a homogenous sense, as discussed earlier.

7-2. Populism issues in the 1980s South Korea compared with the UK case

Laclau (2005, 78-79) and Mouffe (2018, 25-38) once lamented that the Left lost its popularity as it depended too much on the essentialistic understanding of class as a group of actors. Thatcher's strategy was her subtle conceptualisation of common people who deserved *honour* or being 'respectable normal folk' (Hall, 1988, 282) against the leaders of trade unions and Labour Party elites, combined with scattering social category of people into working individual independent from public welfare service (Hall, 2012, 20; Mouffe, 2018, 32). By moving the frontier of antagonism between the horizontal left-right to the vertical and hierarchical chasm between the elite and established representatives of labours and ordinary hard workers and taxpayers, the new image of the *homogenous* national-popular majority cast the problematic question for the Left.

Then, how about the 'ordinary world' in Korea, which encompasses the proto-type of anti-communism, developmentalism, and Koreanness explained in the last chapters in the view of people, then the subjects to be re-called by dissident scholars, government, and reformists? Wasn't there any gap in South Korea similar to the one between Duran Duran's 'Ordinary' and Pulp's 'Common'? How has the newborn political bloc, which was based on the former military regime, succeeded in *burrowing into* that gap that creates the common people's desirable hope even in the ongoing authoritarian regime? That strategy constructed a power-winning point in the first presidential election after the fifteen-year absence of the

president's direct election, which revived in the Sixth Republic in 1987.

As emphasised in the literature on populism studies (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Goodhart, 2017; Jansma, 2019), (subjective) social status is a crucial factor in populistic support. It means to be considered ordinary or defined as 'the level of social respect or esteem people believe is accorded them *within the social order*' (italics added, Gidron and Hall, 2017, S61). In explaining the social chasm in the Brexit referendum in 2016, we can also witness that people feel stable by belonging 'Somewhere', while they do not afford to choose to be 'Anywhere' (Goodhart, 2017) in the context of the highly-horizontal globalised mobility. Specifically, the latter is perceived to disguise the low-vertical social mobility in a developed country, considered unfair and arbitrarily advantaging the elite at the expense of the fair chance and outcome ordinary people deserve (Protzer and Summerville, 2022). This identity of common people distinguishes itself from the internal outsiders, such as the higher-profile elite or/and the lower-profile disadvantaged people than themselves. In addition, this process combines the national identity, which highlights and appeals to national greatness (Gidron and Hall, 2017, S62).[44] This process is where democratic demands of people articulate the equivalent chains, while hegemonic nationalism and state institutions (including the incumbent elite) appropriate a part of those demands to create the alternative frontier of antagonism and to prevent the construction of confrontation between the horizontal competition between the represented democratic demands *in part*, both for Britons and Koreans in the 1980s.

However, contrary to the British commonness since neoliberalism in the early 1980s,

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[44] For further agenda concerned and modelling the relationships among social status, national identity, and redistribution, see Shayo (2009).

Korean popular nationalism, which had already such vertical demarcation of antagonism between the dominant-the dominated, morphed itself with the birth of the common people during another subsequent military regime which ended by the democratic social movements in 1987. This vertical imagination in Korean society was maintained even among the most dissident, critical, progressive scholars and enthusiastic students who aimed for democratisation. It was due to the absence of a horizontal confrontation between the Left and Right in Korean politics at the institutional level of liberal democracy, understood in terms of securitisation under the Cold War context (Chapters Four-Six). Still, even such critical elites failed to overcome and rotate the spatiality of antagonism to the horizontal one, affected by the state's view that considers the Right as 'above' and 'ordinary' whereas the Left as 'below' and 'uncommon', regardless of the political communities in Korean society.

In this context, the ruling political members of the Chun administration from 1980 to 1987 were partly getting its governmentality, differentiating the realm of politics and other sectors such as economy or popular culture. I call them Two Spectacles in 1980s Korea, borrowing the concept suggested by a situationist Guy Debord (2005[1967]). Concerning the concept of the spectacle, Hong Kal (2011) also once analysed the aesthetic construction of Korean nationalism. He referred to the materialised sources focusing on the construction of spaces in Seoul, museums, and memorial parks in the context of colonial history, the Korean War, and rapid urbanisation based on the view of an art historian. However, he did not adopt Debord's concept directly, as he emphasises the visualisation of a spectacle Benedict Anderson has once indicated, exemplifying map and museum (Kal, 2011, 15; Anderson, 2006[1983], 170-185). Compared to Kal (2011), the analysis of the two spectacles in this chapter is closer to the meaning of temporality. In this chapter, I attempt to depict or re-produce contemporary imaginations in the same Andersonian terms of incidents, events, and

junctures of the 1980s Korean politico-economic history based on intellectual discourses, anecdotes, and commentaries in publications and journals.[45]

Concerning Spectacle One, the government and its oppositional forces maintained their push-and-pull relations under political opportunity structures while using their own advantages according to the changing circumstances in political society (Yun, 1999; Im, H. B., 2014, 598-617). In this situation, forming and becoming 'an alternative force' (Yun, 1999, 125) against Chun's authoritative regime was vital for dissident groups to people. For these groups, *the sack of potatoes* (cf. Marx, 1978[1851-52]) interwoven in the name of gungmin, primarily by the Park Chung-Hee regime, should be torn, bursting out the contents of the social movements for democracy in an appropriate basket.

In this regard, intellectuals started to discuss new categories for signifying 'the people': minjung, jungsancheung, and joongmin. However, the concept of *botong-saram* (보통사람, common people), another category publicly promoted by the camp of the candidate Roh Tae-Woo, during the first presidential election since the new democratic constitution in 1987, won out. The new government in 1987 declared *Botong-saram-deul-eui Sidae* (보통사람들의 시대, The Age of Common People), de-politicising and re-nationalising the image of popular mass. This process was NOT degrading the level of life by the retreat of the welfare state as done in the 1980s United Kingdom. Rather it was done by making the imagination of hope and optimism that everyone could be a part of jungsancheung: with my car, my house, and my child(ren), by the state which promoted people's potential and the state's capacity during

[45] Ironically, Hong Kal is the son of Kal Bong-Geun, whose article on the Yusin constitution in *Shindonga* is analysed in Chapter Six.

the expansion of the consumer-oriented capitalism. This optimism, as maintained among Korean society in the 1980s, shown in Section 7-4, provides the background for the latent possibility of populism since the institutionalisation of representative democracy in 1987: as Thatcher recalls common people as 'tax-payer', 'diligent workers', and 'good family members' to weaken the representativeness of the left elites, such hope of vertical status mobility to be a jungsancheung operated as a magic spell for people to feel a distance between themselves and dissident elites.

Applying the recent analysis of neoliberalism, nationalism, and populism mutation (Scheiring, 2022), we can consider the figure <7-1> below that has similarly emerged in South Korea in the 1980s.



Source: (Scheiring, 2022, 9)

<Figure 7-1> The national-populist mutation of neoliberalism in dependent economies

Though this figure mainly depicts Türkiye's response to neoliberalism since the early 2000s combined with Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, it simplifies how relatively contradictory concepts, nationalism and neoliberalism, are incorporated into the policy and populism. In this chapter, the completion of populistic nationalism is not only for policy

decision-makers but also for Korean society. The 'accumulation driven by transnational capital' is, in the case of South Korea in the 1980s, irrelevant as the state still controlled the essential capital for development in tandem with the big businesses, *Chaebol*, as the foreign aid and financial support had been distributed by the central bank owned by the government (Lee, Y., 1997). However, considering the 'exhaustion, economic crisis' is relevant mentioned above the global economic change since the late 1970s.

We need to concede that the economic technocrats in South Korea's government had a self-image of more or less nationalist as they legitimised themselves in the name of the nation (민족, 民族, *minjok*), the state (국가, 國家, *gukga*), or country (나라, *nara*) (cf. Hay, 2014). Park Chung-Hee's nationalism, as explained in Chapters Five and Six, was once outlined in the publication by Oh Won-Chul (2006), one of Park's loyal and close technocrats in the 1970s HCI project. In his memoir, Oh named Park 'Commander Technocrat' in the 'Era of Technocrats of the 1960s-1970s'. He also described his own participation in the planning of HCI as a blueprint for the nation's next generation in the 2000s with the thousand-year prospect (Oh, 2006, 427-428; 467-525). Kang Kyeong-Sik, who started his career as a middle-level economy bureaucrat in 1961 until he was appointed as the minister of the treasury department in 1982, left his memoir titled *It is the Country That Relives Poverty* (가난 구제는 나라가 한다, *Ganan-guje-neun nara-ga handa*) (Kang, 1992). However, as shown in Section 7-4 below, the polarisation of those technocrats emerges during the government change from Park's to Chun's. For economic technocrats in South Korea, the adoption of neoliberalism was made in the name of national development since the birth of the developmental state to be a *seonjinguk* (선진국, 先進國, developed country) in the

segyehwa (세계화, 世界化, globalisation) era in conformity with the global capital (Seo and Kim, 2013; Kim, J-T., 2017, 58-80).

One factor that should be added to <Figure 7-1> is the role of dissident social movements in understanding the whole picture of the 1980 Korean political economy. The yearning for democratisation was not only a matter between the authoritarian state and the dissident elites, as some economy bureaucrats pushed their own democratisation by liberalising Korea's economy. The establishment of the Fair Trade Commission, the liberalisation of finance, and the (failed) attempt at the real-name financial transaction system[46] (later implemented under the Kim Young-Sam government in 1993) by the economy bureaucrats were considered the 'economic revolution' or 'economic democratisation' among them and the promotion of a widespread sense of justice in Korean society (Lee, 2008, 225-260; Lee et al., 2002, 205). These are the overall context in which this chapter explains populistic nationalism with the term Two Spectacles.

7-3. Spectacle One: *Minjung* against the authoritative regime

Minjung (민중, 民衆) had a huge currency among the dissident elites. This Korean term is alleged to refer to 'common people' according to Lee Namhee (2007, 1), with a more nuanced meaning than botong-saram (보통사람, 普通사람), which consists of a pure Korean

[46] Until 1993, it has been possible to open the bank account in an assumed name with loose identification of the customer.

term *saram* (사람, human or people) without the signification provided by writing in the Chinese characters and *botong* (보통, 普通, common/ordinary). Lee (2007. 52) also emphasises this nuance: they are different from 보통사람(ordinary people), *gungmin* (국민, 國民, nationals), *daejung* (대중, 大衆, mass), and even *simin* (시민, 市民, citizen). The term minjung was suggested by dissident scholars and student social movements in the 1970s, and its peculiar meaning was constructed during the democratic movements in the 1980s. The word comprises people in general. However, it denotes the *lower*, or rather the *lowest* class of society or anonymous *devastated* people who have never been the subject of history: during colonial rule, the experience of the Korean War, and authoritative military regimes. This image was made in the view of scholars and dissident elites who regarded themselves as *indebted* or *responsible* to Korean society (Lee, 2007, 4). In this regard, the concept of history, nation, and subjectivity were central themes for intellectuals and student movements.

Kenneth M. Wells indicates this point of minjung's ambiguity, which cannot be reduced only to one class or any specific group (Wells, 1995, 11-14). In this respect, as Wells indicates, it belongs to 'populist idealism' (Wells, 1995, 11); its uncertainty as an analytical concept is similar to the deployment of 'the people' in other populist movements, by which Laclau (2005) argues more differentiated, marginalised groups, or individuals can be included. In addition, the concept of antagonism between in-out and up-down exists, as it assumes 'non-minjung forces' which afflict minjung and should be collapsed with their 'brittleness' of cruelty (Wells, 1995, 13).

For intellectuals, the foremost task was to awaken 'the people of the foundational

classes' (기층민중, 基層民衆, *gicheung-minjung*). The invocation of minjung by activists functioned to recognise themselves as active 'subjects' (주체, 主體, *juche*) who had the potential to overcome the reality and oppression of unfair labour conditions and authoritarian regime. According to Han Wan-Sang, elites are homogenous while interacting materially, whereas minjung people are scattered like grains of sand (Han, 1978, 14). For Park Hyeon-Chae, the meaning of minjung was close to the working class in the sense of political economy (Park, 1978[1974]). His view on minjung can also be implied by his usage of terms like 'alienation' (Park, 1978[1974], 18) of minjung from the relations of production in Park's work; 'Minjung, who construct the basis of society, are the politically ruled' but 'they consist of the political and economic power which sustain the society' (Park, 1978[1974], 19). In this sense, his view on minjung was close to the proletariat class in a Marxist sense.

Social movements based on minjung consciousness also focused on labour movements, night educational classes for workers (to awaken them to see their devastation), and the direct involvement of students in the workplaces as labours. Some university students stopped their academic careers for this task, and some abandoned personal relationships (especially love or marriage). These *undercover* university students were called '학출 노동자(*Hakchul Nodongja*, 學出勞動者, literally translated, workers who originally are students; or with nuance, Uni labours)'. They were both consciously and unconsciously distinctive from other ordinary workers in the workplace who work for their livelihood, as *Hakchul* themselves thought of as working for revolution or democratic movements (Kim, 2009, 46-56). One of their motivation was *guilty*, and the recurring source of that sentiment was the 18 May Gwangju Democratic Uprising (5.18 광주 민주화 운동, *Oilpal Gwangju Minjuhwa Undong*)

in 1980 (Lee, 2007, 52; Choi, 2012). With a self-consciousness of 'awakened' educated elites, students felt that they did nothing or little to fight against the authoritarian regime to prevent the massacre by the Korean army special forces in Gwangju.

The Uprising saw that the standing army force of one country committed ruthless violence toward their own civilians, barricading the city and the media reporting. This was sparked by the introduction of a new emergency martial law by the new military authority led by Chun Doo-hwan on 17 May 1980. Casualties of life were over two hundred, and 4,300 were injured. By slightly leaking what was happening there with the state intervention, the Chun authority composed the spectacle of their power, and this society of the spectacle was the primary form of governmentality in the 1980s. In this respect, it was the conventional *pre*-modern 'spectacle governmentality of scaffold' (Foucault, 1995[1975], 32-69) in the Foucauldian sense: to show off the state power to kill people who defied its authority as an example of the rest people in Korea.

After this, Chun organised the National Security Emergency Response Committee (NSERC, 국가보위비상대책위원회, *Gukgabowi-bisangdaechak-wiwonhoe*) as the military junta on 31 May 1980, provoking the terroristic atmosphere to society in the name of cleansing the corrupted politicians or repressing the criminals. It was seen as the intention of Chun's will to power but became '[in Im's usage of the term] the birth defect' in the legitimacy of his administration (Im, H.B., 2014, 584-585). He was officially and indirectly elected as the president on 27 August 1980 by the National Conference for Unification once, and after the declaration of the new constitution, he was again indirectly elected as president and started his term on 25 February 1981 (National Election Commission, undated-e).

As Choi Jeong-Un (2012, 69-79) argues, the discourse on the massive state violence in

Gwangju was monopolised by the student movements, as there was limited knowledge about the event in broader society.[47] As explained, these ambivalent sentiments among students caused a sense of debt and responsibility for their 'abandonment' of Gwangju (Lee, 2007, 52). In this aspect, for dissident activists and the elites, state authoritarianism became the enemy above high (vertical), and antagonism towards the hegemonic bloc of developmental state bureaucracy was prevalent in the context that horizontal competitions with those hegemonic elites in the National Assembly were limited.

In this regard, we can focus on the spatiality between the elite and minjung (or, as Lee slightly alludes to, common people, 2007, 1). As this thesis mentions, the concept of the elite cannot be understood as only a corrupted homogenous entity. As explained in Chapter Three, Gramsci's organic intellectuals cannot be thinkable without their commonness with the people. The mood among dissident intellectuals and university students in the 1980s, who were then considered in Korean society as at the top of the elite classes, was close to that organic attitude to the devastated, repressed, and *unconscious* mass of fragmented individuals called minjung. Therefore, the key issue for those dissident intellectuals was the gap between those *who spoke for* minjung and those imagined individuals considered as minjung *who did not speak for* themselves (cf. Spivak 2010[1999]) and *even did not feel to need to speak* (Han, 1978; Ahn, 1984; Kim, 1984; Song et al., 1984, 39-43). In this respect, contemporary intellectuals warned themselves. The distance between the (dissident) elite and minjung (or, in populistic vocabulary, common people) would cause another question on the ambiguity of who the members of minjung are or the (ir)reducible gap between them when minjung was

[47] For this thesis, I restrain myself from detailing the Uprising in 1980. As Choi (2012, 344) indicated, *what really happened* on 18 May Gwangju, 1980 is, at times, easily objectified in the name of *truth ascertainment* as the real victims are hard to tell or remind (italics added).

elaborated as a particular subject or distinguished entity to the rest of society.

For example, Han Wan-Sang (1978; 1984, 58-64) has distinguished the quality of minjung into two categories borrowing the Hegelian or Marxist connotation: minjung-in-itself (*jeukjajeok minjung*, 즉자적 민중, 即自的 民衆) who are not aware of their reality and not yet awakened, and minjung-for-itself (*daejajeok minjung*, 대자적 민중, 對自的 民衆) who are awakened so see themselves objectively to be critical to the unjust social structure. On the tension between those two concepts, (organic) elites were in charge of being media for minjung to find themselves.

However, this distinction also implies a kind of elitism that dimly demarcates the line between 'who knows' on the social circumstance around minjung and the very people of that minjung 'who do not know'. Meanwhile, we cannot conclude that such dissident intellectuals are mere *elitists*, but such latent demarcation would cause another problem of leader-follower, stratal or fragmented understanding of people. Actually, they warned themselves about the danger of such elitism. One of those dissident intellectuals, Kim Gye-Yeon, puts:

> "Recently, one literature author, a so-called *minjung writer,* has once argued: to write minjung-like pieces, the author needs to jump into minjung and write in their language [...] It makes sense, in a way. However, say, if we apply the same logic extensionally, we can induce: there is a language of intellectuals for intellectuals; there is a language of farmers for farmers; there is a language of workers for workers. So they have their own local/sectional (*gukbujeok*, 국부적, 局部的) literature without communicating with each

other. I am worrisome that this might result in the vernacularisation (*bang-eon-hwa*, 방언화, 方言化) of literature. The genuine victory of minjung does not rely on the authorisation or idolisation of the name of *minjung* […]" (Kim, 1984, 85)

In this quote, Kim argues that the *minjung-isation* (minjunghwa, 민중화, 民衆化) of all strata (or classes) would dissolve the qualitative differences among the varied class conditions and erase the cultural gaps among people. In this respect, Kim chooses to be minjung, but in this notion, we can assume that there was still (un)consciousness that they are not minjung. If we look at some arguments, especially made by Christian intellectuals, especially Seo Nam-Dong or Ahn Byeong-Mu, who eagerly put forward the concept of the minjung as the legitimising subject for their activism, this distinction was evident in that era of the 1970s and 1980s (Seo, 1983; Ahn, 1987). Without detailing the context that repressed them or reconstructed their outer image or depressed structurally in society, they easily and frequently referred to the people who were (in their view) considered *lowest* in society, such as 'thieves', 'murderers', 'crooks', 'the disabled', 'the sick', 'orphans', 'beggars', or 'prostitutes' (Seo, 1983, 176-177), whom they (logically) argue that Jesus Christ had focused on as the main subject for salvation in the view of God. However, they were also people whom ordinary people considered out of their realm of the living world, and Seo and Ahn could not identify themselves with them considering their original social status. They failed to redress the reproduction of social views on those *lowest* in general. Instead, Minjung theologists' interpellation of those subjects *more or less reaffirmed* such views intact. Those subjects remain inside, with mere *speaking for and by* themselves, a single big image of

minjung *as a whole*, 'who has never been the subject of history'(Lee, 2007, 4).

The *de-valuation* in describing and imagining minjung had an unintended result: it was not only the acute emphasis on common people's hardship under the authoritative capitalistic society of Korea but the *relative exaltation (or maintenance) of intellectuals' moral superiority and status* to the relatively low minjung. Ahn Byung-Yeong, one of those dissident intellectuals, argues that scholars have 'their peculiar sympathy and nostalgia, and their social sense of duty', implying 'the character of *inminjueui* (인민주의, 人民主意, literally translated, ideology for people or populism)' with the perspective on the relations of the dominating-the dominated as confrontational (italics added, Ahn, 1984, 114).

Here it is hard for us to understand that the term *inminjueui* that Ahn uses here means populism argued in this thesis. Still, as we remind the definitions of populism in Chapter Two, the term is not far from their meaning of the latter, which superiorities people's sovereignty to other values in society, in the distinction of 'underdog below' and 'the oligarchy (elite) above'. This thesis never concludes that Ahn criticised minjung intellectuals as populists. However, this emphasis on minjung's characteristic underdogs by scholars who are not considered as part of those underdogs has an ambivalent effect: demarcating themselves from minjung, neglecting their commonness of desire for lives (or, in a Gramscian term, a good sense) with ordinary people. The dissident intellectuals legitimise their discourse with their high sense of self-responsibility to the Chun's unjust era. This normativity *disguises* their own desire to live commonly.

On this ambivalence between their own lives and their duty as activists, the analysis of the contemporary novels of the 1980s, made in Oh Ja-Eun's thesis (2017, 210-264), is considerable. Oh's research insightfully explains such ambivalence reflected in Park Wan-

Seo's novels: it was an in-between sentiment of responsibility felt by students to the Korean society and fear of her/his family that the student would be arrested or tortured, which would harm not only the body and mind of the child but her/his or their own status in the society because dissident students were individuals, who were considered from the stratum of middle classes (Ko et al., 1987, 47) with a high status in the 1980s Korean society.

This is connected to the self-romanticisation of these writers as engaged intellectuals. Ahn clearly indicates that dissident intellectuals' actual social and cultural status is different from minjung (Ahn, 1984, 114). It is akin to Abu-Lughod's (1990) 'the romance of resistance', which pinpoints the problematic distinction between Western anthropologists' external positions and their observable subjects. For Abu-Lughod, Beduin women, considered the alternative subject for resistance to Western hegemony, in fact, accept that hegemony in the very practices of resistance to the traditional patriarchy in Beduin society. Therefore, we should distinguish the way (or political style, as Benjamin Moffitt emphasises) how those intellectuals imagined and signified minjung as the latent social forces against the Chun administration and the effect of that image on the dissident groups and people, interpellated as minjung. Figuring out the actual desire of the minjung whom they had called and its impact, we can look at another category for interpellation by both the state and the intellectuals: *jungsancheung*.

7-4. Spectacle Two: *Jungsancheung* (middle classes) and the rise of a consumer-oriented society

After the end of 1983, appeasement was made between the state and society (Im, H. B., 2014, 596-628). The arrested politicians, professors, and students were released, opening the space for 'mobili[s]ational civil society' (Im, H. B., 2014, 597) led by dissident elites for social

movements. Meanwhile, society was, in another dimension, changing. In 1982, the curfew was lifted, which had been implemented since the introduction by the Syngman Rhee government in the name of national security (Kim, H-S.b, 2020, 53-60). The government implemented these movements in terms of 자율화 (自律化, *jayulhwa*, self-regulation), 개방화 (開放化, *gaebanghwa*, open-door policy), and 자유화 (自由化, *jayuhwa*, liberalisation). One of the reasons for those measures of liberalisation by the Chun administration was the decision of Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Olympics on 30 September 1981(Kim, H-S.b, 2020, 54). By this moment, terms like 'citizen of a developed country' and 'first-class gungmin' were circulating among the media. As Jean Comarroff (2011, 107) once indicated in arguing populism of nondenominational religious mega-gatherings, the 'massification of immediate experience' of preparing the mega national events and its transmission among common people constructed another spectacle of socio-economic Koreanness.

One anecdote of Kim Jae-Ik, the first head of Korean economics appointed by Chun, symbolises the central tenet of Chun's economic policy during the 1980s. Kim was an idealist technocrat with ambition who thought the foremost mission of the Korean economy since the 1980s was stabilisation (안정화, 安定化, *anjeonghwa*) (Lee, 2008, 27-35). It had been neglected in the rapid developmental strategy during the former Park regime. The high price rate, the new shock from the oil crisis, the ending of the Bretton-Woods system, and the creeping trend in countries worldwide of austere neoliberalism were the challenges to the Korean economy (cf. <Figure 7-1>).

If we consider former president Park's style of *caring* about economic plans, Chun, who also had a similar situation that the only way to be legitimated relied on economic success,

was also as obsessive about the economy as Park. However, his style had a slight difference from Park's. At the first meeting with Kim in September 1980, Chun, who had just come to power after abhorrently slaughtering civilians a few months ago, remarked.

"No need to argue. On the economy, you are the president!" (Lee, 2008, 27)

This anecdote means that Chun gave all authority to Kim, at least in the economy, which is contrary to Park's overall leadership style as a 'Commander Technocrat', as mentioned. It is rather fortunate for the Korean economy, as 'tamed Chun Doo-Hwan' (Lee, 2008, 39), in listening to technocrats' suggestion of economic policy, agreed with his bureaucrats' ambition without mere knowledge of his own on the economy. Instead, Chun demanded that Kim teach him the basic principle of the economy for undergraduate-level students in cabinet meetings, during private luncheons, and even via direct phone calls regardless of day and night (Lee, 2008, 27-35). Chun's full confidence in Kim and his colleagues provided them to broaden the manoeuvrability in planning and implementing economic policy.

Apparently, the economic bureaucrats' liberal stance in Chun's administration was the seed of abundance, promotion of consumption, and stable domestic market expansion, directly affecting common or ordinary people in Korea. In addition, this change in the tenet of economic policy was based on the challenges in domestic politics since the latter years of Park's regime, such as the Busan-Masan Democratic Protest in 1979 provoked by the first introduction of the value-added tax (VAT) in Korea and the different opinions on developmentalism and stabilisation among the bureaucrats (Park, 2018). Kim Jae-Ik was a symbolic figure of those stabilisation-centred technocrats against the former development-

oriented bureaucrats in the ministry of commerce and industry or the ministry of treasury that led the economy under Park's regime.

The legacy of the developmental state and gradual change in the 1980s' political economy can be regarded as ushering in the regulatory state of South Korea, which differed from the British's interventionist state (Lee, 2002, 62-67; Lee et al., 2002, 205; Lee et al., 2004, 29). Both states had been more or less interventional, but how those two states retreated from the market and society was different. The former focused on reducing subsidiaries to businesses and banks, whereas the latter on reducing welfare. This change in the policy atmosphere in the economic board in the cabinet constituted the contingency of nationalism and neoliberalism, as the introduction of neoliberalism was considered an alternative strategy to maintain the development of the nation (Seo and Kim, 2013). It was combined with the economic optimism called '3저 호황, *Sam-jeo Hohwang*, Three-Lows Boom (low oil price, low interest, and low-weak dollars)' combined with the appreciation of Japanese currency (Lee, 1997b, 54) from 1986 to 1989. In summary, the political economy in South Korea gradually shifted to a consumer-oriented society based on a relatively expanded financial asset base produced as a result of the Three-Lows Boom.

In this circumstance, jungsancheung was to be nurtured in the view of the governments in Korea for social stability and the index to show the performance of the government. To understand the meaning of the term, we need to look up how to be translated into English or other languages. The term jungsancheung (people in the middle classes), usually translated into the middle class(es), has a nuanced meaning in Korean society. Literally, they indicate the people in the middle of the social strata. However, it comprises the people *under* such demarcation who desire to be jungsancheung. In this respect, the term jungsancherung cannot

be understood with the technical distinction that Marxists once dealt with the people who are not proletarians or the owner of the relations of production (capital) (Hong, 2005, 28-32). Jungsancheung in South Korea means that they are in the normal position in society so that they make their *own* lives in the even authoritative regime combined with the world capitalist neoliberalism since Thatcher and Reagan. Thus, jungsancheung cannot be reduced to the middle *class* (중간계층, 中間階層, *junggangyecheung*) in Korean society. That is why this thesis translates *jungsancheung* not to the middle *class* but to the middle *classes*.[48]

In this respect, "Jungsancheung was a Being that should have come in future " since the 1960s (Park, 2019, 68); if we recall how the developmental state in Korea has been legitimised in general, which focuses on nurturing people free from poverty since the nation-building. In this respect, it was also a kind of empty signifier, both for the elite and common people, as there was no accumulation of historical construction experienced in the developed countries due to the experience of the Korean War and rapid development (Oh, 2017, 7-14). In specific, as Oh Ja-Eun (2017, 12) indicates, such emptiness served as a *lettre*, firstly promoted by the governments but circulated among people, to symbolise the individuals who achieved economic success during the developmental state, which created the anonymous individuals in between the *jungsancheung-wannabes* and the *unable-to-identify internal-outsiders*.

For critical intellectuals, the possible political participation of the middle classes was a crucial issue in terms of their conservative or progressive stance on social problems (Ko et al., 1987). The government first interpellated them during the developmental state of the

[48] Considering how to translate jungsancheung to English literature, see Kim, B. H. (2017).

1960s (Ko et al., 1987, 29; Hong, 2005, 6; Oh, 2017, 37, 39-49). The discourses on them were the space that dissident scholars and the state targeted to draw their potential to be mobilised for their own political purposes of two forces. For authoritarian regimes, the middle classes are required to maintain a stable society with less social dissatisfaction with state governance; for the dissident intellectuals, they are awakened and educated vital actors who can lead democratisation. The phrase of the question after the 1987 democratisation shows the duality of *hope and fear* among (dissident) intellectuals to the middle classes: "중산층이 민주화를 주도할 수 있는가 (*Jungsancheung-eui minjunhwa-reul judohal su inneunga*, Can the middle classes lead democratisation, Ko et al., 1987)?" included in the special edition of『민족지성(*Minjokjiseong*, Intellect of Nation)』(October), as those scholars had the different view on them. In this thesis, these discussions are worthy of scrutinisation and analysis.

Jungsancheung could not be parsimoniously determined by contemporary scholars then, and in the 2020s, it still remains an ambiguous meaning, floating above the societal discourses. Consider the album's name of the quoted song "Common People" (1995), *Different Class*. The term 'class' has various meanings according to its context, and in the 1980s South Korea, scholars had difficulty defining its relevant significance to see Korean society. The discourses in South Korea on the middle classes and other classes' distinctions were divided into the discourses on the difference between the middle *class* (중간계층, 中間階層, *Junggangyecheung*) and jungsancheung. The former was prone to be defined by economic factors such as income, education, and whether the individual has their own house.

In contrast, the latter is closer to the meaning of cultural factors, such as how s/he consumes in the market and which s/he has the orientational consciousness in terms of cultural capital that s/he has.

The discrepancy between *what I have* and *what I want to have* is vital to understanding how the state made people in the 1980s with *hope and fear*: the cultural status that the ordinary people have undergone alongside two spectacles mentioned: on the one side, successive events on the quest for democratisation by dissident intellectual and student social movements until 1987; and on the other side, national mega-events such as the 1985 Re-Union of Departed Families after the Korean War, the 1986 Asian Games, and the 1988 Olympics; both spectacles became the spaces where ordinary people participated as an audience. The people of jungsancheung were signified as the third sector over which the state and the dissident competed to draw their support between those two sceneries. Until the first direct presidential in the 1987 election, they were considered by the incumbent Democratic Justice Party (DJP, 민정당, *Mingungdang*) and other oppositional parties and dissident social activists as literally 'casting voters', which were the game changer who would win in the election (Cotton and Kim van Leest, 1996, 193).

Specifically, urbanisation and the influx of population into the cities resulted in differentiation within the category of jungsancheung—*gu*[old]-jungsancheung (구중산층, 舊中産層), which comprises agricultural workers and small business owners, and *shin*[new]-jungsancheung (신중산층, 新中産層), most of them white-collar labourers in the city (Lee, Y-D., 1987, 60-61). The former was bifurcated into the urban small business owners and urban labourers, and the latter's emergence exceeded the former's decrease, resulting in the

overall expansion of the middle classes. Due to their differentiated categorisations, they were at times considered a part of labour classes (for white-collar) included in minjung and manual labour. According to the scholar Han Sang-Jin (Lee, G-B., 1987, 82; Han, S-J.a, 1987[1986], 122-124), jungsancheung is potentially an allied force to the minjung against big businesses (Chaebol) and the state. Small business owners and the cultural characteristic of the white-collar can be considered a buffer zone between capital and labour, stabilising society's quantitative and qualitative development. This view is considered more moderate to the middle classes as 'gradual reformism' (Lee, Y-D., 1987, 61). Despite their ambivalent and fragmented characteristics, the middle classes attracted intellectuals to their phenomenal consciousness and behaviours (Lee, G-B., 1987, 83).

Between these complex stratifications in the middle classes and other statuses such as labour and minjung, university social movements served as points of liaison among those classes, which connect, mediate, but significantly colour themselves with the ambivalence of the middle classes on the direction of overall social movements in Korea. Eun Soo-Mi (2006, 216-217) describes a hegemonic change in students' social movements from labour-centred to nationalistic-capacity-centred after democratisation on 29 June 1987. If I deliver Eun's argument literally, students can now focus on the inside-University movement: "the possibility of combining the prospect for livelihood [as a student] and the prospect for social movement without engaging themselves in the labourers of the workplace [like *hakchuls*] has been opened" (Eun, 2006, 217).

As mentioned in the last section, students involved in the social movements were pressed with the normative motivation against the authoritarian regime and living well on their own as the middle classes. This ambivalence appears to be more 'idealisation' or 'idolisation' of the concept of the minjung, resulting in the differentiation of the dissident's social position

and the devastating situation of the former. Adopting the concept of the nation or minjung, not the labour, shows how the former two concepts circulated among the student, lessening their dilemma between being (middle classes') students and activists. The popularity of minjung discourses, which combined with the national discourse, could be possible with the counter-discourses on the middle classes comparable to the former in the 1980s, showing how the concept of designating people as a whole wins out (Balibar 1991; Laclau 2005) over other modes of representation.

Then we can question the actual orientation of the middle classes and minjung or botong-saram-deul in the 1980s. Institute of Social Science (ISS), Seoul National University and *Hankook Ilbo* [The Korea Times] conducted a systemised survey on this issue (ISS, 1987; Lee, Y-D., 1987, 61). This survey was conducted during the political turbulence in 1987, between January and June, with a sample of 1,043 people with 2.5 times the minimum family average income of Koreans (ISS, 1987, 10-11). This survey showed that 72.0 to 84.0 per cent of respondents identified themselves as the middle classes. In addition, compared to the controlled sample by ISS research, the surveys of more randomised samples reported by the contemporary newspapers were more striking, as shown in <Table 7-1>. This table contains the objective stratification based on the level of property in time. Still, respondents' subjective orientation to jungsancheung in the survey is considerable compared to the former. Specifically, *JoongAng Ilbo* conducted the "National Survey on Life Consciousness" annually since 1981, providing good indices for understanding the popular subjective orientation of status in 1980s Korean society. The table states the discrepancy between 'on which status people *actually stand*' and 'on which status people *want to stand.*' In addition, we can trace how newspapers described the expansion of the middle classes' consciousness (중류의식, 中流意識 *jungryu-euisik*) widespread among the populace. Newspapers surveyed

income and particular items for which people spent, such as colour television, refrigerator, and car (JoongAng Ilbo, 1985a), or even how the criteria changed in choosing a potential spouse for young respondents.

<Table 7-1> Status consciousness survey results reported by mainstream newspapers in the 1980s

Year (and month)	Newspaper	Size of Sample	Size (Percentage) of middle classes or its subjective orientation	Remarks
1976-1978 (JoongAng Ilbo, 1980)	JoongAng Ilbo	unidentified	(65.9%)	• sampled based on the entire population of inheritance tax-payers • tax-payers with properties of 10,000 – 50,000 are considered middle classes (31.3 % of entire property owners). • conducted by International Monetary Fund investigators on the tax system in Korea
1981, September (JoongAng Ilbo, 1981a)	JoongAng Ilbo	13,028 (male 4,886, female 8,142)	• the article considered all the respondents as the middle classes	• respondents with an average income of 110 to 300 (59.2% of males and 50.9femalese) • 52.4% of respondents are a house-owner. • report of a survey titled *Who are the common people in Korea?* by the monthly publication, 샘터*Saemteo*
1981, September (JoongAng Ilbo, 1981b,c)	JoongAng Ilbo	1,073	901* (86.4%)	• respondents on the subjective level of life • 7.7% upper-middle / 48.3% middle-middle / 30.4% lower-middle • 0.7% as upper classes / 12.9% as lower classes • the newspaper's anniversary special project
1982 September (Lee, 1982;	JoongAng Ilbo	1,589 (Stratified cluster	572* (36%)	• respondents on the subjective level of life • respondents on subjective

JoongAng (1982a,b; 1985c)		sampling[49])	1,266* (79.7%) (pan-middle classes: 7.4% upper + 36% middle + 36.3% lower middle classes)	criteria of the middle classes' income: 500 (thousand won), 25.3% / 300, 18.4% /400, 17.5% / 600, 12.4% / 700, 6.8% • actual urban average monthly income: 338 • two respondents (0.8%) from the strata with income lower than 100 consider themselves as 'upper classes,' whereas 4.2% from the strata with income lower than 700 consider themselves as 'lower classes.'
1983, January (Lee, 1983)	Dong-A Ilbo	1,223 residents in Seoul	958 (78.4%)	• in tandem with the Institute of Urban Affairs (recently named Institute of Public Affairs), Yonsei University • respondents on the subjective level of life • 178 (14.6%) upper-middle / 462 (37.8%) middle-middle / 318 (26%) lower-middle
1983, September (JoongAng Ilbo, 1983b,c,d; 1985c)	JoongAng Ilbo	1,591 (Stratified cluster sampling)	1,312* (82.5%) (percentage of respondents named as pan-middle-classes; upper + middle + lower middle classes)	• respondents on subjective criteria of the middle classes' income: 500, 32.5% / 300-700, 78% • average monthly spending of household: 251.488 (Economic Planning Board) • respondents who feel the life level is higher than last year: 37.8% - respondents to the same question in the last three years (24.9% → 23.2% → 20.3%)

[49] The number of samples is decided as 1,600 at first at the national level, and this number is distributed to the urban and rural areas proportionally to the whole population. The big cities are distinguished into districts, as the same unit as the middle-small cities. Rural areas were divided into the unit of counties. From these units, the survey team chose hundreds of towns randomly, and the postgraduate researchers visited one of every three houses in each town for the survey. This method was used from the 1982's to the 1984's surveys, which were conducted in tandem with the Institute of Journalism and Broadcasting (recently named Institute of Information and Culture), Korea University (JoongAng Ilbo 1982a; 1983b, 1984c). A similar method was adopted by JoongAngSVP in 1987 (JoongAng, 1987b).

1984, September (JoongAng Ilbo, 1984a,b,c; 1985c)	JoongAng Ilbo	1,574 (Stratified cluster sampling)	1,341* (85·2%)	• percentage of respondents named as pan-middle-classes • respondents on subjective criteria of the middle classes' income: 500, 34.2% 400, 18.4% / 300, 11.7% / 600, 14.6% (overall 67.2%) • respondents on the critical element of success in society: individual efforts (52.9%), capability (43.5%), education (27%), personal spirit (23.2%), familial background (2.1%), personal trick (2.7%), personal networks (6.1%) • respondents on the criteria for potential spouse: health (53.1%), character (48.5%), promising-ness (29.6%), capability (22.5%), wealth (4%), religion (4.3%), appearance (7.8%), familial background (7.8%)
1985, September (JoongAng Ilbo, 1985a,b,c,d)	JoongAng Ilbo with its branch JoongAngSVP	1,498 (randomised sampling)	864* (57.7%)	• respondents on the subjective level of life as 'middle/common' • 34.4% as 'poor' (0.4% lower than the last year) / 'living well' 2.4% (5.4% lower than the last year) / 'direly poor' 5.4% (on the same question 19.7% in 1982) • respondents on subjective criteria of the middle classes' income: 500, 30.1% 600, 17.2% / 400, 16.7% • A term *New Rich* appeared in the article contrasting the *New Poor* in the developed countries, while the newspaper prospects the former's expansion in Korean society • 72% of respondents think,

				"Anyone can achieve success if he or she works hard."
1986, January (Dong-A Ilbo, 1987)	Dong-A Ilbo	17,000 households in the national survey	9,010* (53%)	• 7,242* (42.6%) lower class / 748* (4.4%) high class • increase of 13.8% in middle-high classes consciousness compared to the same survey five years ago • summary report of the *1986 Social Statistics Survey* by the Economic Plan Board, Republic of Korea
1986, September (JoongAng Ilbo, 1986b,c,d)	JoongAng Ilbo with its branch JoongAngSVP	1,499 (randomised sampling)	897* (59.9%)	• respondents on the subjective level of life as 'middle/common' • 32.2% as 'poor' • respondents on subjective criteria of the middle classes' income: 500-700, 68%
1987, September (JoongAng Ilbo, 1987a,b)	JoongAng Ilbo with its branch JoongAngSVP	1,497 (Stratified cluster sampling)	905* (60.5%)	• respondents on the subjective level of life as 'middle/common' • 34.3% of respondents on the same question as 'poor' and 'direly poor' • respondents on subjective criteria of the middle classes' income: 500-700, 39% 300-500, 24.8% / 700-1,000, 17.4% / over 1,000, 15.4%
1987, November (Nam, 1987)	Dong-A Ilbo	25,600,000 of the estimated constituency for the 1987 presidential election	15,360,000* (60%)	• estimated by the electoral camp of the Democratic Justice Party for the presidential election in 1987 • business owners, small-middle self-employed people, elder labours, people with a stable salary, abundant agricultural-fishery workers

Unit of the property and income mentioned: a thousand Korean won of the price at the time of the survey)

*. estimated numbers by the author based on the articles

Source: author's recomposition based on each newspaper article

Contemporary commentators had warned about the exaggerated *jungryu-euisik*. Already in the late 1970s, the growth in the middle classes' consciousness was cautiously understood as the qualitative aspects of public ethics, morality, and how they act should be considered (Josun Ilbo, 1979). Regarding the result of DongA Ilbo's surveys, another scholar warned that the high yearning for the middle classes was a reflection of people's 'changeable', 'longing', or 'expectation' to live well (Oh, 1982). Oh related it as a source of social instability when individuals get frustrated by the discrepancy between social reality and the desire to be a part of a higher class. In this respect, regardless of the governmental or dominant ruling ideology or the intellectual opposition, there was a cautious stance on the excessive consumption trends (과소비, 過消費, *gwasobi*). According to one publication titled『우리시대의 보통사람들을 위하여(*Uri-sidae-eui Botong-saram-deul-eul Weehayo*, For the common people of Our Time)』(1986) by an organisation named the National Spirit Education Promotion Committee (NSEPC, 국민정신교육추진위원회, *Gungmin-jeongshin-gyoyuk-chujinweewonhoe*):

> "There is a conflict between 'the haves' and 'the have-nots'[…] Relative poverty and dissatisfaction incessantly blister in society, such as "They have their own car, but why don't I?" It is indeed due to the careless lifestyles of the haves: they squander their money in the golf club, hostess bar, sauna, vacation etc., tearing up others [who cannot afford them], though they should be cautious and humble as they earn more (NSEPC, 1986, 18)."

“What in the world are mink coats, furniture made in Italy, perfume from France, American water beds, and why do we import toothpicks and diapers for the baby? It is foolish to grumble, “I just spend my money and [what is the problem]?” without the basic knowledge of the economy (NSEPC, 1968, 35).”

The intellectuals saw the potential of the middle classes for democratisation. Also, they emphasised the popularisation of consumerism culture as an excessive orientation towards a higher class and a massive yearning for status equality (Ko et al., 1987, 31, 44). One of the solutions to the gap between the labour class and the middle classes is the promotion of a ‘sound consumption lifestyle’ (건전한 소비생활, *geonjeonhan sobisaenghwal*, Ko et al, 1987, 49). Even one commentator, who was sceptical of the middle classes’ role in democratisation, worried that the *normative theme* of finding the possibility to expect their expansive activism by scholars would cause the fictional existence of the middle classes (italics added, Lee, Y-D., 1987, 66). He even argues such normativity disguises the fundamental contradiction of the antagonism between the capital and labour and results in voluntary totalitarianism such as Nazism.

The ruling bloc in the 1980s feared social dissatisfaction, which would lead to political discontent. For dissident intellectuals, it was one of the critical issues to *downgrade* the consuming lifestyle of the middle classes to lessen the gap between them and labours, represented mainly by the term minjung. Between those gaps, botong-saram-deul was a floating signifier, as directly mentioned in the publication title by NSEPC in 1986, between a consumer in the booming economy and potential actors for democratisation.

In summary, Chun’s administration fantasised about a more liberal, deregulated, and de-

politicised life of being able-to-be-common-people with a dream of being part of the middle classes by technocrat-oriented governmentality. It can be comparable with a society of technopopulism, characterised by 'the high level of individuali[s]ation, automi[s]ation, and the decline of [the] orgni[s]ed interest that [mediate] the relationship between individual voters and the exercise of political of power' with the shrinking place for ideological contentions by party politics (Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti, 2021,10). As mentioned, this has been revealed as a cruel reality after the economic crisis of 1997 and the subsequent neo-liberalisation of Korea since the 2000s (cf. Berlant, 2011, 23-49; Seo, D-J., 2009). However, between these Two Spectacles that arose from 1985 to 1987, the sense of optimism and efforts for its realisation coexisted among the people. We will connect nationalism in the 1980s to democratisation in the last section of this chapter. Before that, there was also an alternative category which once attempted to moderate jungsancheung and minjung.

7-5. *Joongmin* (people in the middle) 1: Catalytic role in the democratisation

Han Sang-Jin, a professor of sociology at Seoul National University, attempted to bridge the gap between the economic-oriented understanding of the middle classes and the alienated minjung's perception as passive through the development of a third category of 'people in the middle' – 중민(中民, *Joongmin*). This was conceptualised as one of the stratal groups, among jungsancheung, was considered another alternative revolutionary-reformative (변혁, *beonhyuk*)[50] subjects with high levels of education and relatively liveable income (Han, S-J.a,

[50] The Korean term 변혁(*byeonhuck*, 變革), translatable into 'change,' 'reform,' or 'revolution,' according to the context, was frequently used among the dissident or non-governmental scholars or activists around the 1980s.

1987; 1987[1986]; 1989; 1991a; 1991b; 1991c). Han saw this social stratum existing between the ruling bloc and the ruled minjung, arguing that they should and could lead the qualitative enhancement of democracy in Korea around the 1987 democratisation.

As mentioned in the previous section, the contention between scepticism to the middle classes focuses on the common people or minjung to awaken their class consciousness in a Marxist view. Those intellectuals focused on the devastated situation of the 'have-nots', whereas they considered 'the have' to be conservative as too individualistic and consumerist. Meanwhile, scholars with a Weberian understanding of classes emphasise an individual's ability, in the market and society, not only to produce the goods but to '[gain] a position in life' and '[find] inner satisfaction' in a 'self-styled' way (Weber, 1978c). This view enables a more multifaceted understanding of classes than the Marxist dichotomy between capital and labour (Ko, 1987, 90-91; Yang, 1987). Ko Young-bok also emphasises that people's pursuit of status opens the way to include other variables, such as culture or education, to understand the middle classes in a Weberian way (Ko, 1987, 94-95). However, he also implies that the difference in the culture of white-collar of shin-jungsancheung and blue-coloured labours or minjung may deepen the cleavage between the two. Contrary to this, Han Sang-Jin considers that those variables will be critical points by which shin-jungsancheung can sympathise with minjung.

This term is the result of the particular context of South Korea, where the word 'revolution (혁명, *hyukmyeong*)' was strictly banned or tabooed in public discourses as it was considered to imply communistic meaning. By *byeonhuk*, some authors emphasise the reformative, gradual change in Korean society, whereas other radical Marxists aim for a sort of proletarian revolution. Thus, this thesis translates the term with a compound noun or subjective 'reformative-revolution(ary)' or 'revolutionary-reform(active)' according to the context or the author's stance on the sources referred. This is the same with the literature or sources in Reference.

Han first explores his take on joongmin theory at first in his article “한국 중산층은 과연 보수적인가 (*Hanguk jungsancheung-eun gwayeon bosujeoginga*, Are the middle classes in Korea really conservative?” (Han, S-J.a, 1987[1986]). Based on his participation in the special edition of『민족지성(*Minjokjiseong*, Intellect of Nation)』, he distinguishes himself with mentioned Marxist and Weberian perspectives. According to his argument, the former easily equates the middle class (junggangyecheung) with the middle classes (jungsancheung), whereas the latter is prone to emphasise the subjective orientation of status while he denies not only consider the economic-oriented view (Han, S-J.a, 1987, 51-54). His categorisation, which is maintained in his successive publications, composes the objective and subjective criteria as formative and structural elements (Han, S-J.a, 1987, 55-57) as below in <Table 7-2>.

<Table 7-2> Han’s categorisation of the middle classes

Subjective criteria (orientational consciousness to the middle classes)	Objective criteria (income, occupation, education)	
	Sufficient	Insufficient
Sufficient	the middle classes	Subjective middle classes without an objective foundation
Insufficient	Objective middle classes without the subjective orientation	Non-middle classes

Source: Han, S-J.a(1987a, 57; 1987b, 128)

One of his points is to criticise the conventional equation of the middle *class* with the middle *classes* (Han, S-J.a 1987, 122): “If the former is the same with the latter, we cannot include the labours into the latter [as people with lower income could not be the middle

classes], or all of the former will be included in the latter [as people with sufficient income with insufficient subjective consciousness will be understood as middle classes]. I think this is problematic, considering the socio-economical result of the classes."

Considering his understanding of minjung, he rather promotes not only enlighting minjung or intellectuals' speaking for minjung but their self-subjectification as he recognises their 'realistic thinking' to perceive their own 'actual life' and 'manage it skillfully' (Han, S-J.a, 1984, 155). It is relevant that his criticism of the previous view of '객관적 법칙' (*gaekgwanjeok beopchik*, 客觀的 法則, objective law) of (Marxist) social science in the dichotomous understanding of capital and labours (Han, S-J.a, 1984, 156; 1989, 176-179), as the revolution is a structural consequence of history. This criticism of 'objectivity [of history]' is directed at radical Marxist intellectuals. In addition, he also keeps himself from the nationalistic criticism of the capitalistic, dependent, and authoritarian state (Han, S-J.a, 1989, 179-195). Han argues that the contradiction critics emphasise is not only from the state and capitalistic rule in South Korea but also from the Korean peninsula's division. Therefore, too much emphasis on nationalism disguises the overall contradiction in North and South Korea, concluding that the only way to overcome this is through the socialist state.

Specifically, he warns about the emerging emphasis on the nation (minjok). Since late 1986, student movements in South Korean society have been affected by a new emerging faction called National Liberation (NL, 민족해방, 民族解放, *minjok-haebang*) (Yoo, 2015, 432), influenced by the view of South Korea's capitalist state as dependent to global capitalism, mainly the United States and Japan in Asia. An overemphasis on the nation might see South Korea as a '(neo) colony' and fantasise about North Korea as 'liberated', arousing

the widespread backlash affected by the ruling ideology of anti-communism (Han, 1989, 223). In this respect, Han's attempt can be understood that he tried to make an alternative theory which catches the complexity of class relations which are biasedly understood in a term like labour or (ethnic) nation (minjok) by the contemporary dissident intellectuals. Though he does not deny the three aspects of the contradiction of capitalism, bureaucratic authoritarianism, and the division of the nation, he instead seeks to find a positive dynamic of the successfully developing Korean society, inevitable social differentiation as follows:

> "The bureaucratic authoritarianism of Korea is a representative case which achieved success in economic development and the change of industrial structure than any other Third World country. […] *Successful* bureaucratic authoritarianism brings about the inevitable structural change from economic success […] *New young and highly educated groups* (italics added) and the social forces with competence in criticism increase in the institutions, organisations, and sectors at the centre of society […] They all are adventurous in *ascending* with dynamics, contrary to the social categories *being deposited* [at the bottom of the society] in damage and grievance. [...] [They] do not satisfy with the ancien regime with political, legal, material, ideological, violent, repressive apparatus, rather they challenge it and insist that there must be a fundamental change in the established structure." (emphasis original, Han, S-J.a 1989, 213)

His optimism was not without evidence. According to the National Life Consciousness Surveys by Dong-A Ilbo, those 'young and highly educated groups' of the urban populations were prone to be critical of the ruling Democratic Justice Party and to support the opposition

New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP, 신한민주당, *Shinhanminjudang*) (JoongAng Ilbo, September 1986c). In addition, in the National Life Time Survey by Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) in May 1985, people had more free time for leisure and rest (JoongAng Ilbo, December 1985f). Remarkably, men and women spent more time reading newspapers and magazines and less watching television. For men, time spent sleeping and women doing domestic labour decreased. The yearning for democratisation, such as the reintroduction of the local government system (3.7 → 15.0 per cent), more activation of the National Assembly and political parties (6.0 → 14.0 per cent), and political neutrality of the military (5.4 → 11.2 per cent) all increased from 1983 to 1985 (JoongAng Ilbo, 1985b). Respondents were also asked about the government's most urgent task, which was mostly answered as the settlement of foreign debts (33.2 per cent), economic development (26.8 per cent), bridging the gap between rich and poor (26.1 per cent), and appeasement between South and North Korea (21.3 per cent) (JoongAng Ilbo, 1985c). Considering the salience of economic issues and security in Korean society, the rising interest in political matters among the new middle classes was considerable.

This trend should be read alongside the result of the 12th general election on 12 February 1985. The Democratic Justice party won the former 11th election in 1981 against/with the oppositional bloc parties loyal to the new military regime, while it inhibited the political participation and movements of dissident activists and the main opposition figures like Kim Young-Sam or Kim Dae-Jung. However, in the 12th general election in 1985, the NKDP, in which two figures were indirectly involved while they were still restricted in the direct participation in the election by the Chun government, won 50 seats out of 184 local constituencies. In contrast, the ruling DJP failed to secure the majority with 87 (National

Election Commission, undated-a). In this election, a higher vote rate with 84.6 per cent of all constituents' participated in voting than the previous election turnout of 77.7 per cent (National Election Commission, undated-d). In this mood, most newly elected congress members of one of the bloc parties Democratic Korea Party (DKP, 민주한국당, *Minhandang*), joined with the NKDP (Im, H. B., 2014, 604-607), constructing a substantially alternative choice for the people and the democratic movements against the government inside and outside the institutionalised politics. This construction of an *alternative to people* was the first time since the seventh presidential and the eighth general election discussed in Chapter Six. One of the prevalent issues of the 12th general election was the constitutional amendment with the direct presidential election, which NKDP promised to proceed with and earned its massive popularity even within a couple of months since it formed.

After the election, the issue of constitutional amendment became the main agenda regardless of the incumbent and opposition forces. On 20 November 1985, the Committee for Winning Democratic Constitution (*Minju-heonbeop-jaengch-wiwonhoe*, 민주헌법쟁취위원회) was established by the Association for Democratic Reunification Minjung Movement (민주통일민중운동연합, *Mijnju-tongil-minjung-undong-yonhap*). NKDP, de facto led by Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, joined the Committee's street struggle on 3 March 1986, refusing the DJP's proposed amendment by 1989 (Seo, 2011, 148-149). In the National Life Consciousness Survey in September 1986, 50.0 per cent of respondents were optimistic about the prospect of a constitutional amendment, as 38.6 per cent of 'young and highly educated' respondents thought "it would be responsible for the ruling party DJP if the agreement on the amendment failed" (JoongAng Ilbo, 1985b, c).

Around 1985 and 1986, as Han expected, the voluntary civil movements of common people, besides the dissident groups, were blooming against the government, like KBS Subscription Fee Boycott (1985-1986). Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) is a national broadcast in South Korea. When the Chun administration came to power, it first forced the mergers and acquisitions of media companies in 1980, centring KBS as its propaganda institution to control the mass media (Seo, 2011, 116). At that time, KBS owned 70.0 per cent of Munhwa Broadcasting Center (MBC) stocks, another famous national broadcast, 99.0 per cent of Seoul Shinmun, and 30.0 per cent of Yonhap News Agency. Chun appointed the Head of KBS with the recommendation of the Minister of Culture and Information, and the minister chose the directorial board members at the request of the Head of KBS. Therefore, the boycott was considered resistance to the authoritarian regime, as intellectuals also tried to find a sign showing common citizens' power (Ko et al. 1987, 40).

In addition, an explosive report by *Monthly Speech* (월간『말』, *Wolgan Mal*) on 'Press Guide' by the government around 1985-1986 and the arrest of journalists, the sexual harassment by Buchon police station on the Uni-labour activists in July 1986 aroused public resentment to the Chun administration (Seo, 2011, 120-136). These aroused people's dissatisfaction with the state's injustice, making them more critical of Chun's administration. Meanwhile, NKDP split into the moderate negotiable faction led by the party's president Lee Min-Woo, and hardliners like Kim Dae-Jung, who eagerly fought for a direct presidential election as a non-negotiable condition (Im, H.B., 2014, 612-613). Finally, the two Kims dissolved NKDP and prepared to form a new party named Reunification Democratic Party (RDP, 통일민주당, *Tong-il Minjudang*) together to focus all the party's capacity on winning a direct presidential election. The critical moment for the June Democracy Uprising (6월 항

쟁, 六月 抗爭, *Yuwol Hangjaeng*) in 1987 was the death of Bak Jong-Chul on 14 January, a 21-year-old Seoul National University undergraduate student who was violently interrogated and tortured by police. The incident was exposed by the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice (천주교정의구현사제단, *Cheojugyo-jeong-yi-guhyun-sajedan*) on 18 May, who showed that the Chun administration tried to manipulate and disguise the details of the incident.

In this circumstance, on 13 April, Chun tried to break through the legitimacy crisis by declaring that he would hand over power by the election under the existing constitution (4.13 호헌, *Sa-il-sam Hoheon*, 四一三護憲, 13 April Protection of Constitution). As shown in the survey mentioned (JoongAng, 1986b), this was directly against public opinion, not only the dissident movements and opposition politicians. Even the ruling party members were astonished as the political situation of almost two years on the constitution amendment was halted all of a sudden, as they had negotiated with the opposition parties insisting on a parliamentary system, preparing for the revival of the local government system (Dong-A Ilbo, 1987a).

DJP planned the party convention on 10 June to appoint Roh Tae-Woo as the next presidential candidate. Against this, pan-dissident and opposition groups also organised a national-level protest to demand to 'withdraw the Constitution Protection Declaration (호헌철폐, *hoheon-cheolpae*)' on the same day (Seo, 2011, 257-278). In response to the latter, the committees of thirteen university student unions in Seoul promoted a one-meal-a-day hunger strike campaign since 1 June, and resolution protests by each University in Seoul and Busan

were spreading like an unquenchable fire. On 9 June, Lee Han Yeol, a 20-year-old undergraduate student from the School of Business, Yonsei University, was shot in the head by a pepper gas can triggered by riot police while participating in the Yonsei student resolution protest for the next day's gathering. By this moment, the planned protest began to unexpectedly expand its size as the national uprising from the next day to the 29 June Declaration by Roh Tae-Woo, conceding the ruling authoritarian regime's failure and promising the immediate constitutional amendment to introduce the direct presidential election.

7-6. ***Joongmin*** (people in the middle) 2: Shin-jungsancheung and botong-saram

Seo Jung-Seok, a renowned Korean historian, assessed how the 10 June protest spread to the national-level uprising as 'non-planned and non-expected' like 'the Cunning of Reason' (Seo, 2011, 311). In fact, social views on the student's participation in the dissident movements were not favourable even in JoongAng Ilbo's survey (JoongAng Ilbo, 1985c; 1986b). In 1985, a question that suggested "University students shall focus only on the study" was affirmed by 53.9 per cent of the respondents, and 22.7 per cent agreed that students' activism should be confined within the university. In addition, even the labourers' demonstrations were rejected by 60.9 per cent. In 1986, group activism and protest by students and workers were still viewed unfavourably by 48.9 per cent and 65.2 per cent of respondents, respectively. This changed dramatically within a few months with potential joongmin groups: the shin-jungsancheung and botong-saram.

The remarkable participation of white-collar workers during June 1987 is still highlighted among scholars. The previous sections show that minjung was close to the

underdogs vertically at the bottom of society, and jungsancheung is a multifaceted concept comprising the haves and the wanna-haves. Han Sang-Jin's joongmin theory attempts to mediate them. As mentioned, he firstly emphasises minjung's 'good sense' in their own livelihood, which cannot be defined by a law of social science of political economy always to be a subject of socialist revolution. His connotation is close to distinguishing the shin (new)-jungsancheung from the gu (old)-jungsancheung. He empirically shows the stratus mobility from labour to the middle classes and the gu-jungsancheung's downward change to the labour, in which the former is prone to progressive and the latter conservative (Han, S-J.a, 1987b, 134-145). If we overlap these arguments, joongmin is a *part* of or the centre of the minjung, which comprises people who succeed in moving *upward* as *a part* of the middle classes (Han, S-J.a, 1989, 214). The evolution from 'not haves' to 'now haves' under the specific economical circumstance of rapid development of Korea can alleviate the understanding of minjung as static or biased only to be gicheung-minjung mentioned in Section 7-3. In this respect, compared with minjung discourses, joongmin theory can be understood as intendedly or unintendedly trying to avoid comprising the people in a single term, as it distinguished the leading agencies of social movements differed from populism. However, it also failed to evade the understanding of vertical confrontation in Korean society without the horizontal competition between equal political associations.

Han's constant emphasis on the vertically upward mobility of the stratum results in the comprehension of three groups: shinjungsancheung, modern industrial labourers (who succeed in entering the middle classes through increased income and high education), and young students (Han, S-J.a, 1989, 227-228). He conceptualises these three sub-categorisations with their roles; the first in democratising politics, economy, and society; the second in organising democratic trade unions and fighting for income inequality; and the

third in national and reunification movements.

In this context, the participation of shin-jungsancheung around the June Uprising was encouraging to scholars (Ko et al., 1987, 40; Seo, 2011, 626-628). The term *Necktie Budae* (넥타이 부대, Squads with Neck-ties) indicated the participation of salaried people, giving strength to the street resistance by the dissident elite of previous social movements and by university students. Specifically, in June 1987, students and residents from several districts in Seoul held frequent demonstrations around the Myungdong Cathedral located in the centre of the city, where many buildings of financial companies are located. Watching this scene, thousands of white-collar employees of those workplaces clapped and cheered for the protestors through the windows. Also, they themselves came out and *ambushed* the streets as the protestors during lunchtime and fled into their offices when they encountered the riot police's tear gas attack. According to Seo Jung-Seok, their participation was not organised and remained largely anonymous,[51] unlike students, labourers, and farmers. However, it was rather clever that they were like guerilla strikers who *did not* harm their work time, so they had no reason to be accused by their owners and police, while the latter focused mainly on the students in the street. In so doing, they showed how a sense of solidarity among people in general spread against the Chun administration.

Kim Sungsoo (2008, 129) explained the role of the middle classes represented by those

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[51] According to an anecdote (Seo, 2011, 628), eighty-five office workers from Korea Exchange Bank once donated an envelope with collected money to protesters in front of Myungdong Cathedral, with the memo 'We strongly support and agree with the democratic struggles of patriot students and citizens'. Considering the banks' controlled situation by the state in South Korea in 1987 mentioned in Section 7-2, this can be understood that, as Han (1991, 228) argues, they are examples which show people who are in the position of the middle in the organisation, with dissatisfaction and criticism to the obsolete convention. It also implied Gramsci's 'good sense' in Chapter Three, which emphasises that people cope with the situation in their own way, participating in the resistance to the hegemony while securing their life positions.

office workers as a value shift among shin-jungsancheung: most of them had the combined value system of the traditional Confucian value and Christianity during modernisation, which enhanced their post-material concerns about 'the quality of life' and 'moral justice' including political freedom, individual liberty, equality, environmental issues, and human rights. That trend began to appear at the beginning of the 1980s and was highlighted in public (Dong-A Ilbo, 1980, a,b,c). According to the survey "Consciousness structure expecting the 1980s" by Dong-A Ilbo and ISS, 72.8 per cent of respondents thought democratisation was more important than economic development, and the enhancement of human rights and freedom was the most urgent problem (23.3 per cent). Other questionnaires on environmental issues or dissatisfaction with social justice were also remarkable; 'Prevent the environmental pollution even if it reduces the income' (73.0 per cent), 'Social justice is getting better' (disagree: 31.8 per cent, agree 22.8 per cent), 'It is difficult to achieve success without a personal connection, or familial background' (74.5 per cent), 'Those who live by the law always lose' (62.2 per cent). Ironically, the motto of the Chun administration at the beginning was 'the embodiment of the *just* welfare society' (Chun, 1981).

In this respect, the expectation of a rise of joongmin was not without evidence, as Han consistently attempted to show their existence empirically. Considering the participation of shin-jungsancheung in the June Uprising in 1987, one of the most crucial factors in the consistency of such awakened, critical, and watchful stratum against the state was the self-conscious orientation of joongmin. In Han, S-J.a(1991b), he used data collected twice in June and August 1987 from 1,667 manufactural (63.5 per cent) and middle-level office labours (36.5 per cent) in Seoul and Gyeonggi province (all industrial sector), Changwon and Ulsan cities (Gyeongsang province, HCI), and Yongwol county (Gangwon Province, mining industry). Han also conducted focused group interviews (FGI) with a sample of 509

participants (under 300-sized companies), 604 (300-999 sizes), and 518 (over one thousand sizes). Applying the categorisation in <Table 7-2> above, he categorised the participants who identified themselves as both jungsancheung and minjung as joongmin, whereas there was also a ‘two-way denial’ answer choice for those who thought they were neither jungsancheung nor minjung (1991b, 65-66). In a nutshell, there was no term ‘joongmin’ on the answer sheet for the participants. According to his findings, the orientation to minjung is higher among females and office workers with higher education, lower income, and young age. At the same time, jungsancheung is higher among office-working, younger, and higher educated respondents (1991b, 72-74).

To strengthen the accuracy of estimating subjective orientation and the existence of joongmin, his FGI included a four-point questionnaire which assesses the degree of class orientation: “Which word most appropriately represents your situation and stance, ‘minjung’ or ‘jungsancheung’?”: (a) both appropriate (b) ‘jungsancheung’ than ‘minjung’ (c) ‘minjung’ than ‘jungsancheung’ (d) neither appropriate (1991b, 75-84, 95). According to this, the previous dichotomy between minjung or jungsancheung is alleviated by (a), and the two-way denial is explicit by (d) as the latter help to catch the tendency and strength of subjective orientations assessed by each unit (occupation, age, education, gender). <Table 7-3> shows Han’s data, which the author sorted and composed in one table.

<Table 7-3> Types of class orientation by Han

Orientation	Respondents (percentage in a unit)	Total (percentage)
Jungsancheung (a)	• Occupation - manufactural labours, 147 (19.6); office labours, 113 (22.4) • Age - under 29, 136 (18.7); 30-39, 87 (20.8);	257 - 260 (20.7 - 20.8)

	over 40, 35 (34.3) • Education - under the middle school, 47 (23.5); high*, 125 (19.0); over college, 78 (23.1) • Gender - male, 208 (21.9); female, 52 (17.3)	
Minjung (b)	• Occupation - manufactural labours, 258 (34.4); office labours, 162 (32.1) • Age - under 29, 270 (37.2); 30-39, 125 (29.9); over 40, 23 (22.5) • Education - under the middle school, 55 (27.5); high*, 264 (37.1); over college, 99 (29.3) • Gender - male, 313 (32.9); 106 (35.2)	418 - 420 (33.4 - 33.5)
Joongmin (both agreed) (c)	• Occupation - manufactural labours, 92 (12.3); office labours, 121 (24.0) • Age - under 29, 144 (19.8); 30-39, 61 (14.6); over 40, 5 (4.9) • Education - under the middle school, 22 (11.0); high*, 92 (12.9); over college, 99 (29.3) • Gender - male, 143 (15.1); female, 69 (22.9)	210 - 213 (16.9 - 17.0)
Both denied (d)	• Occupation - manufactural labours, 253 (33.7); office labours, 108 (21.4) • Age - under 29, 176 (24.2); 30-39, 145 (34.7); over 40, 39 (38.2) • Education - under the middle school, 76 (38.0); high*, 221 (31.0); over college, 62 (18.3) • Gender - male, 286 (30.1); female, 74 (24.6)	359 - 361 (28.7 - 28.9)

Total	• Occupation - manufactural labours, 750 (100.0); office labours, 504 (99.9) • Age - under 29, 726 (99.9); 30-39, 418 (100.0); over 40, 102 (99.9) • Education - under the middle school, 200 (100.0); high*, 712 (100.0); over college, 338 (100.0) • Gender - male, 950 (100.0); female, 301 (100.0)	1,246 - 1,251(100.0)

*. Including quitters

Source: Han, S-J.a(1991b, 78-82)

The significance of Han's joongmin theory relies on the size of (b) and (c) and their proportional composition in terms of each unit. As shown, 'young and highly educated groups' tend to identify themselves as both minjung and jungsancheung: this means they are inclusive of both categories, especially among office workers (Han, S-J.a, 1991b, 78). Specifically, the most significant driver of joongmin consciousness is *education*, as its degree of increase to the change of orientation is more explicit than other units (highlighted in yellow in <Table 7-3>). Han emphasises that only the respondents in joongmin show an apparent increase as they are young, highly educated, and white-collar labourers (1991b, 84). Considering the data, his attempt to figure out the existence of joongmin seems relevant. However, as he indicated (d) as '*without the consistent self-orientation and changeable to the issues*' (italics added, 1991b, 77), we can analyse this data with a more comprehensive view of this thesis: the existence of botong-saram-deul.

First, we can question the objective orientation of (d): are they upper class or lower class as they deny both jungsancheung and minjung? It may not be a matter of consideration for Han as he controlled for the income of the sample: lower than 200 thousand won (14.3 per

cent); 200-400 thousand won (42.3 per cent); 400-600 thousand won (30.3 per cent); over 600 thousand won (13.1 per cent) (Han, S-J.a, 1991b, 68). As we consider the remarks in <Table 7-2>, most of them are middle-low and middle-middle classes. It could be criticised that his sampling is not enough and broad to see the whole society; however, such criticism can be relieved by emphasising that Han's main focus was to diversify the monolithically understood middle classes.

Nevertheless, we need to look up the ideological stances of each category (Han, S-J.a, 1991b, 87), as how he settled its significance affecting class identification should be reassessed. He suggests radicalism, reformism, and conservatism regarding the stance of labour movements and inequality (1991b, 84, 95-96). In his analysis, he argues that ideological stance and orientation variables are 'interchangeable', as both can be independent or dependent on each other. He consistently emphasises the high correlation between office workers, reformism, and joongmin. This argument is, in effect, non-arguable as the reformist stance of office workers is shown the highest (jungsancheung 63.7 per cent; joongmin 76.0 per cent; minjung 76.5 per cent; neither denied 58.9 per cent) amongst all respondents in his original analysis (1991b, 87). However, he only shows two tables, one with the outcome of the total respondents (IV: ideological stance, DV: orientation) and the other with the result of the office workers (IV: orientation, DV: ideological stance) in his paper (Han, S-J.a, 1991b, 87), *changing the relations of IV-DV*. On this, he merely mentions that manufacturing labourers are the same as the office workers in that the conservatives are prone to be jungsancheung and the radicals to be minjung.

Thus, I count backwards the manufacturing labourers' ideological views in <Table 7-4> and <Table 7-5>, which Han has not detailed. In addition, I also inversed IV: ideological stance and DV: orientation of office labours in <Table 7-6>. The P-value is adopted from

Han's tables mentioned, as both tables of the total respondents and the office labours define it as 0.000.

<Table 7-4> Manufacturing labourers' ideological stance calculated from Han's data (orientation IV, ideology DV)

	Jungsancheung	Joongmin	Minjung	Both denied	Total
Radicalism	14 (9.5)	12 (13.2)	51 (19.8)	45 (17.8)	122 (16.3)
Reformism	76 (51.7)	37 (40.7)	149 (58.0)	147 (58.1)	409 (54.7)
Conservatism	57 (38.8)	42 (46.2)	57 (22.2)	61 (24.1)	217 (29.0)
total	147 (100.0)	91 (100.0)	257 (100.0)	253 (100.0)	748 (100.0)

$\chi^2 = 31.843$, df = 6, p = 0.000

unit: respondents (%)

Source: Author's calculation based on Table-16 and Table-17 in Han, S-J.a (1991b, 87)

<Table 7-5> Manufacturing labourers' classes orientation calculated from Han's data (ideology IV, orientation DV)

	Radicalism	Reformism	Conservatism	Total
Jungsancheung	14 (11.5)	76 (18.6)	57 (26.3)	147 (19.7)
Minjung	51 (41.8)	149 (36.4)	57 (26.3)	257 (34.4)
Joongmin	12 (9.8)	37 (9.0)	42 (19.4)	91 (12.2)
Both denied	45 (36.9)	147 (35.9)	61 (28.1)	253 (33.8)
Total	122 (100.0)	409 (100.0)	217 (100.0)	748 (100.0)

$\chi^2 = 31.843$, df = 6, p = 0.000

unit: respondents (%)

Source: Author's calculation based on Table-16 and Table-17 in Han, S-J.a (1991b, 87)

<Table 7-6> Office labourers' classes orientation calculated from Han's data (ideology IV, orientation DV)

	Radicalism	Reformism	Conservatism	Total
Jungsancheung	6 (11.1)	72 (20.5)	35 (35.7)	113(22.5)
Minjung	25 (46.3)	124 (35.3)	13 (13.3)	162 (32.2)
Joongmin	5 (9.3)	92 (26.2)	24 (24.5)	121 (24.1)
Both denied	18 (33.3)	63 (17.9)	26 (26.5)	107 (21.3)
Total	54 (100.0)	351 (100.0)	98(100.0)	503 (100.0)

$\chi^2 = 39.048$, df = 6, p = 0.000

unit: respondents (%)

Source: Author's calculation based on Table-17 in Han, S-J.a (1991b, 87)

<Table 7-4> shows most manufacturing labourers are prone to be reformists with a lower ratio than the answers of each office worker's orientation. The most notable difference is the joongmin-manufacturing labourers' strong conservative stance of 46.2 per cent (cf. in Han's analysis, 76.0 per cent of office labourers with joongmin orientation were revealed as reformists). Considering Han's emphasis on the reformist and inclusive characteristics of the joongmin, this figure cannot evade the question of the joongmin's overall picture comprising manufacturing and office workers. In his other article, Han once mentioned that the labour classes who become the middle classes are prone to be critical of the government (Han, S-J.a, 1987b, 137). Though the two studies use different data sources, his attempt to demonstrate the potentiality of joongmin's progressive stance loses its strength.

The conservatives of the manufacturing and office labourers are dispersed even along the classes orientation, relative to other ideological stances, shown <Table 7-5> and <Table 7-6>. Meanwhile, one of the eye-catching items is joongmin's reformism and jungsancheung's conservatism among the office labourers in <Table 7-6>. Among whom can be considered reformist white-collar—we should not forget that the category of joongmin is just an

operational definition by Han, of whom answered 'both agreed' to minjung and jungsancheung—they identify themselves with minjung, not joongmin with the most significant size. A notable figure is the proportion of white-collar's conservative jungsancheung (35.7 per cent) in <Table 7-6>. It is more effective than conservative-manufactural jungsancheung labourer (26.3 per cent) in <Table 7-5>, to the entire conservative-jungsancheung that Han demonstrates in his article (29.2 per cent, Han, S-J.a, 1991, 87). As he emphasises the degree of the white-collar joongmin influence on the existence of an inclusive stratum among the respondent, the white-collar jungsancheung in <Table 7-6> cannot be ignored as one of the total numbers of the conservative.

We cannot miss the high proportion of the conservative and the both-denied among the manufactural labours in <Table 7-5>. It needs to be deliberate with the second high proportion of 'both-denied' (or 'nobody') in radicalism among two kinds of labourers, highlighted in coral blue (Han also does not miss it without his apparent explanation, Han, S-J., 1991, 87-88). These figures mean that there are radical people without a solid vested consciousness of class orientation who feels the demand for change *without a name*. On the manufacturing conservative's high tendency to identify neither jungsancheung nor minjung, we can expect the combination of the increase in the manufacturing labourers (or manual workers) in an unstable economic situation may cause a rise in radicalism *and* conservatism, which we see in the early 21st century.

In summary, the purpose of Han's joongmin theory was to criticise both 'ideological radicalism' and 'conservatism' on the ground that the former pushes the middle classes into conservatism and the latter fixes the middle classes as 'satisfied groups within the system' (Han, S-J.a, 1991, 63-64). By seeing the middle class*es in parts*, not as *a whole*, he invoked the necessity of looking at society through the mediating stratum. His effort to dig out the

dynamic, positive, and upward energy of *people in-between* the lower and high classes achieved the desired results, as shown in 1987 and his empirical studies analysed in this section. In addition, by admitting and positively understanding the upward desire of people, he overcame the *normativity* into which conventional dissident movements are easy to fall, as explained in Chapter Six and Section 7-3 of this chapter.

However, he failed to scrutinise the quality of that upward desire of the middle classes and its turning direction in future under the institutionalised democracy since 1987. For example, while he regarded education as a foremost factor for being joongmin, the overheated education in Korean society has focused on the individual's accomplishment to be jungsancheung, called '*the birth of homo eoconomicus*' (Lee, 2018a), already existed in the 1980s.

First, The Chun administration promoted a more or less overheated popular boom of interest in the economy. The Economic Planning Board installed a branch, the 'National Economic Education Promotion Team', which later became the independent department under the Blue House. Many books, catalogues, and slideshows on the basic economic concepts were published, and the controlled broadcasts organised the television programmes to invite famous and celebrated commentators in the economy (Lee, 2008, 71). In this circumstance, ordinary people were pressed to live better economically and abundantly. Lee's article (2018a) contains many anecdotes about how ordinary people seek to evade the authority's restriction on private home-schooling, which had been illegal since the ruling of the NSCER: a university student used to be hired as explicitly a housekeeper but in fact an undercover domestic teacher. Even some parents dared private schooling in a car parked on the side of suburban highways to avoid the crackdown of governmental officers. These anecdotes were believe-or-not stories backgrounded by Spectacle Two.

Seo Dong-Jin (2009) once analysed the construction of the neoliberal subject as a self-improvement subject in 1990s Korea and rapidly highlighted it since 1997. However, such *homo eoconomicus* (Lee, 2018a) of an individual 'who is isolated from society so devote oneself to the pursuit of greedy interests' had already been pre-destined among botong-saram-deul in the 1980s. In sum, education could awaken people in the middle as joongmin, but it could also be a means for an individual to self-satisfaction.

In addition, he also maintains the conventional vertical understanding of power relations (verticalisation of political confrontation) among the sectors in society, which is the most explicit character of Korean society in this thesis.[52] It may be the common and inevitable obstacle of the intellectual and social movement for reformation or democratisation under hierarchical governmentality. Like those groups 'progressive' (진보, 進步, *jinbo*) or other dissident intellectuals, Han is also more or less *normative* in emphasising the dynamic of joongmin. He overlooked the existence of those, significant in number, *who denied both* or *any category* or who *might feel stable* as an individual or instead who *might not feel to* seek alternative identification.

They may be 'individuals who are not the autonomous agents of their lives, while they *float through time* as part of the greater nation (italics added, Taş, 2020, 5), seeking to fix and find themselves in a meaningful event' as argued in Chapter Three. Apart from the search for progressive subjects for democratisation, which remained on the level of normativity, 'the progressive' in South Korea failed to alleviate the detachment of politics from the everyday

[52] Remind that Han's academic deliberation is focused on including a part of jungsancheung into the lower strata of the minjung, which is sceptical of the conventional social order. His theory, at last, does not get the point of creating a horizontal and alternative force to cope with or compete with the existing ruling bloc as an equal adversary.

life of common people. It gave the conventional Right in South Korea to catch their immediate desire for upper mobility in social strata, individualising the politico-economic matters to the simple answer of 'There is no alternative(TINA)' to adapt to reality.

Then, where could all those *nobodies* go?

7-7. Into the common grammar: nationalism and common people *as a whole*

To situate my analysis of nationalism in the 1980s, at first, I quote a part of Chun Doo-Hwan's New Year's State of the Union on 16 January 1986, which is considered the prelude to the 13 April Declaration for Constitution Protection in 1987 (Dong-A Ilbo, 1987a):

> "[…] We have a task by the spring of 1988 to establish a new tradition that the state leader finishes his defined term[53] and transfer the position to the next leader *for the first time in our constitutional history*. After that, in the autumn of the same year, we must host the Olympic Games in Seoul for *the first time in the history of our nation [minjok]* to show off the invincible potential of our folks (겨레, *gyeore*) entirely to the world.
>
> Until that time, we must lay the foundation to prevent the relations between *South and North Korea from continuing the century of fear and division of war anymore*. […] Our nation's history is now suggesting to us the way with *the turning point* that our generations and all of us never experienced, the unknown journey: we must consider this.

[53] As explained in Section 7-3, Chun was indirectly elected as the president under the new constitution in 1981 to the Yusin consitution. The constitution defined the term of the president as seven-year without re-election for the first time in Korean constitutional history, as shown in the previous Chapters.

[…] *If we do not* use this turning point and ruin that chance, *we will not only cease heaping up to the level of developed countries but undergo the frustration of stalemate and regression*. […]

[He emphasises the administration's effort to strengthen the relations with the allies like the United States, Japan, and European countries and open-door policy to the communist countries like the People's Republic of China and the Third World.] […] Through these policies and efforts, I strengthened the economy and trade conditions to contribute to the successful hosting of the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Last year, we saw the touching moments when the dispersed family members in South and North Korea hugged together [Here, he mentions the 1985 Korean War Dispersed Family Reunion, explained in sub-section B follow], commuting the six hundred miles between Seoul and Pyeongyang. […] In this respect, I believe that it is people [gungmin]'s request to me to aim at *"big politics" by aggregating the state's power and increasing the wealth of the nation*. […]

In the past times before, the governments tried to seize the long-term reign, and the opposition parties struggled and resisted any measure to prevent it. *However, the government I am in charge of is unlike those governments.* […] Retrospecting how countries worldwide chose their governmental form, *it is rare that developed democratic countries choose the direct presidential election system*. […] Instead of the *"institution without a performance of the peaceful regime change",* the new constitution [the constitution since his reign in 1981] chose the institution that guarantees that change. [While he lists a number of the policy tasks on the economy] […] We have to kick off the pre-emptive preparation towards two thousand years. To enter the groups of developed countries by the end of this century only in fifteen-year, we must predict and

prepare for the global wave of technological innovation[54] and structural reformation of industry carefully while we make full use of this chance. [After that, he emphasises that the crisis will come when the tasks he listed are not accomplished when he emphasises the importance of hosting the Asian Games and Olympic Games. In conclusion, he implies his full term service as president and the election of the next president under the existing constitution].” (italics added, Chun, 1986)

I quote his speech at length because it contains almost all elements of the state-centred nationalism during the Chun administration: (a) developmental nationalism inherited from Park; (b) the emphasis on necessity and the warning of the crisis from its failure; (c) mega-events oriented toward the global world with the exigency of the issue to be prepared and settled; (d) co-existence combined with antagonism with North Korea; (e) the hope for comparison with the developed countries and fear of being left behind; (f) the result or efficiency-oriented approach to the electoral system or democracy in the name of the nation; (g) the differentiation of his government from the former ones.

These elements are almost identical to the ones under Park’s regime. In addition, (b), (c),

[54] It is a famous anecdote in Korea about Samsung’s first investment of the conglomerate’s all effort in the semiconductor industry since the early 1980s despite the government’s refusal. As the late Lee Kun-Hee strategically stated to his employees, ‘Change everything but your wife’, it could not be denied that the fruit of this concentration has been accessed as the foundation for Samsung’s worldwide oligopoly of the mobile-phone market nowadays. In the Kim Dae-Jung government, the economic authority proceeded with Big-Deals among Chabols’ scattered and ruthless expansion of industries, making them devote themselves to their most competitive enterprises in the global market (e.g. Samsung to electronic devices, LG to domestic appliances, Hyundai to automobiles and heavy industries, SK to energy or mobile-communications infrastructure, and former Daewoo to shipbuilding. This kind of division of market competence was already forced by the Chun administration first, but then the Chaebols once had refused to accept government intervention in the name of economic liberalisation (Lee et al., 2002, 212).

(f), and (g) are similar to Taggart's (2000) ideal types of populism (see Chapter Two), regardless of their significant influence on the popular mass. Instead, some elements, especially (b), (d), (e), and explicitly (f), boomeranged as a massive backlash from the people, as shown in June Uprising in 1987. In this section, I will analyse nationalism in 1980s Korea popularly understood, focusing on three themes: resistant nationalism, the 1985 Korean War dispersed Family Reunion, and popular nationalism concerning Japan.

A. resistant nationalism (related to Spectacle One)

One of the remarkable events for resistant nationalism was the 18 May Gwangju Uprising (Lee, 2007, 116-127), as it was the first time that the United States was targeted as an accomplice of the violence in Gwangju. The fundamental reason was the recognition of the unequal relations between South Korea and the US as an 'imperial power', as is symbolised by the existence of the US-Force-controlled Combined Forces Command (CFC) between the two countries. In fact, the Commander of the CFC did not have operational control over the unit of Korean special forces, one of the main culprits that committed the atrocities in Gwangju. However, rumours about the US's approval or connivance on Gwangju and even the 26 October coup were widespread among dissident activists and students (Lee, 2007, 120-121; Choi, 2012, 72-73; Seo, 2011, 195-202). The Busan United States Information Service (USIS) Arson Incident (1982) and the Seoul USIS Occupation Incident (1985) symbolised the fierce anger toward the US among university students and dissident activists. It was a newly emerging phenomenon since the early 1980s as South Korea had been mainly considered located in the calm latitude for anti-Americanism worldwide (Lee, 2007, 112).

Specifically, both incidents were triggered by the fierce anger of the US army,

considered indifferent to the Gwangju Uprising and massacre. The former was done by a couple of theological students with relatively low public attention. However, the occupation in 1985 was in the public spotlight as seventy-three students broke into the USIS buildings and later voluntarily handed themselves over to police while their demand of apology by the US on Gwangju was nationally televised. This scene aroused pros and cons by contemporary commentators as it was the first case that the authority accused the students of being guilty based on their motivation of anti-Americanism (Lee, 2007, 122).

The spark to this growing anti-Americanism in the middle of 1986 was the popularisation of the underground pamphlets, so-called *Gangcholseosin* (Letters from Gangchol, 강철서신, 鋼鐵書信) written by an anonymous writer whom it was revealed later as a third-year undergraduate student named Kim Young-Hwan (Lee, 2007, 134-138; Yoo, 2015, 484, 498-508). The pamphlets introduced 주체사상(主體思想, *juchesasnag,* Juche ideology), North Korea's ruling ideology, in a simple and reader-friendly writing style, contrary to other pamphlets full of jargons, duplicated combinations of abstract concepts, and abbreviations from numerous factions among student movements. Combined with the growing anti-Americanism and hatred against the government in South Korea, the letters were explosively circulated among students. It became the motive for the rise of the National Liberation People's Democratic Revolution, and one of its factions, National Liberation (NL, 민족해방, 民族解放, *minjokhaebang*), which dominated students movements since 1986. NL-led students influenced the line of popularising movements, simplifying the movements' emphasis on *minjokmosun* (민족모순, 民族矛盾, the contradiction in the nation) to be solved as a priority over other contradictions of such as class or the complex problems in the

domestic politics in Korea. The NL faction more or less influenced the popularisation of student movements to the public, using easy terms like 자주 (*jaju*, 自主, autonomy), 해방 (*haebang*, 解放, liberation), and the most popular term *minjok*. It can be interpreted as a change in the line of the dissident movements to touch on prevalent issues even to the public, such as reunification (통일, 統一, *tong-il*) without the influence of the 'imperial power' US and the state-monopolised policies toward North Korea.[55]

Regardless of the influence of a specific faction and its detailed line, terms like *minjok* and *tong-il* had been volatile and ready to burn anytime in Korea (as I will explain in subsection B). For example, on 15 October 1986, one member of the National Assembly, Yoo Seong-Hwan (NKDP), was arrested after he remarked in his speech during the regular session in the Assembly held a day before as: 'The tenet of the state (국시, 國是, *guksi*) should be *tong-il*, rather than *anti-communism*.' '[…] The terms like tong-il and minjok should be set forth over other words like *communism* and *capitalism*.' (Dong-A Ilbo, 1986) The Chun administration promptly requested the arrest of MNA Yoo based on the national security law, and this aroused a negative view of not only the NKDP but the media against the Chun administration, strengthening the public demand for the direct presidential election amendment (Kim, 1986; Lee, 1986).

Nationalistic terms were arenas in which the state and the oppositional, dissident force compete for their political purpose. Popular nationalism not only accepts the top-down

[55] Considering the history of Korea with the colonial rule and division of the nation, these terms are familiar to common people relative to the terms that the former student faction had used based on the theoretical discussions on how to see Korean society.

inculcation of state-centred nationalism and uses them in resistance. One day before the 10 June protest planned in 1987, the security authority cancelled the outdoor broadcast of the national anthem to prevent the passersby from singing it. As they expected the authorities' banning, the protest organisers planned to change the campaign song from the national anthem to "우리의 소원은 통일 (*Uri-eui sowon-eun tong-il*, Our Wish is Reunification)"—most famous songs with the theme of reunification in Korea—with its changed lyrics *tong-il* to *minju* (민주, 民主 democracy) in promoting people's participation (Seo, 2011, 274-266). At this point, we can see that a very authority usually considered promoting nationalism through its national anthem banned the song, as the dissident groups and the public sang it for resistance. This event shows that the Chun administration was already losing its substantive legitimacy. The point is that the state ceased to be an agency of nationalism, with little legitimacy to serve the nation's political purpose. At the same time, the resistance actively uses the national symbol without hesitation if there is no legal intervention. Even in that intervention, the dissident usefully adopted another popular nationalistic song, combining their political aim with nationalism.

As explained in a section of Chapter Six, since the Park's regime, the ceremony of descending the national flag had been performed in every governmental office building as the passerby had to stop and salute the flag. The Chun authority even dared to stop the national ceremony as it feared that the people might sing the national anthem: once the ceremony to strengthen the regime now became the chance for the resistance. It shows the dynamics surrounding national symbols and rituals not only for the state but against the state when the state loses its legitimacy. It is also a probable example that culture does not always serve power, though the relation between power and culture is not reversed shown in Geertz (1979)

and Kwon and Chung (2013[2012]). However, it shows the culture's autonomy and impartiality with *its own logic and raison d'être* to any (political) agents, even though it has a long story of being mainly manufactured by the authoritarian state.[56]

B. 1985 Korean War Dispersed Family Reunion (horizontal plaza)

In subsection A, I mentioned the song "Our Wish is Reunification", implying the song is popular and has a deep nationalistic meaning of overcoming the division between two Koreas. Chapter Six explains that Park's regime once proceeded with the reunion of dispersed families in vain, which was revealed as a distracting policy towards people from the massive change in politics after several months. Ironically, Chun's administration succeeded in the Reunion in 1985, as Chun himself boasts in the quoted speech to the people above.

Back in 1972, when Park's regime once propelled the reunion, it was due to political and legal circumstances that the two parties of the Red Cross from South and North Korea failed to reach an agreement (Jung, 2020, 33-34). South Korea rehashed the primary points of the humanitarian issue and raised the issue of the kidnapped South Koreans to the North (Korean Red Cross, 2016, 78-79). North Korea demanded the elimination of legal obstacles in South Korea, such as the Anti-communism Law or National Security Law, which defines North Korea as an enemy. In the context of the Yusin in South Korea and the guarantee of Kim In-Sung's permanent reign in the North, the existence of the dispersed families was politically

[56] On this dynamic, especially focusing on the national flag, see Jha (2016); and on the national flag of Korea and its change in symbolic meaning and social movements, see Jung (2007); Kim (2017)

critical to both parties. It meant that there were *defectors*, regardless of whether voluntary or coerced, who moved from each part to the other since the Korean War, in which both authorities of each Korea had a political burden to concede formally (Seo, 2006, 13-20).

One unexpected event that aroused national attention to the issue was the Special Live Broadcast "이산가족을 찾습니다 (*Yisan-gajok-eul chotsumnida*, Finding Dispersed Families)" aired by KBS at first on 30 June 1983 (KBS, 2014a,b). The broadcast was initially planned as a one-time temporal section of another TV show to connect the dispersed family members within South Korea[57] since the Korean War (Huh, 2000, 232-235). However, after the episode airing, almost two thousand inquiries were rushed to the headquarters building of KBS in Yeouido, Seoul. From its first airing to the last on 14 November, the daily live broadcast continued for about 138 days, 454 hours 45 minutes. Almost all people in the country could not help watching the nearly 60 minutes live broadcast every day simultaneously, indirectly experiencing the despair and desperation of 53,536 people who testified on their life stories and lost families during the War and 10,189 families' reunions. It would be redundant, but the event was a relevant example to detail here how Anderson (2006[1983]) emphasises the media in imagining a nation whose members share the same temporality (see Chapter Three). About four months was enough to mould the most intimate (in)direct experience that individuals without acquaintance, who are now experiencing the possibility that one of those strangers could be their family, converging into the yearning for

[57] There have been many types of dispersed families since the Korean War: many families departed each other during inter-Korea migration during the War, and the closure of a cease-fire line halted them from going back to their hometowns. Or it could happen *within* each Korea as families lost its member during the rapid and immediate circumstances without an efficient communication system. Some were adopted by other families in other regions in Korea or even became overseas orphans in the US or Japan.

one nation. In addition, considering the first introduction of colour television only in 1980 and its rapid popularisation (Byun, 1980; JoongAng Ilbo, 1984d), the experience of the reunion was more than vivid to common people.

This phenomenon allowed the Chun administration their governmentality over people via their intimate realms, as recurrently mentioned in Kwon (2020). The government was also positive about (or rather got the unexpected chance to use) the broadcasting and installed the places for the reunion and offices for legal issues on family in Yeoido square, near the headquarters building of KBS (Kim, K-M., 1983). Korean Red Cross made its own list of families besides the applied cases to KBS. In a month, about 180,000 cases of the dispersed families were collected. Chun also implied that he could use this chance to secure his leverage in resuming the dialogue with North Korea when he visited KBS and encouraged the staff concerned (Dong-A Ilbo, 1983a). Actually, the Korean Red Cross president officially suggested the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue on the dispersed families issue, emphasising the massive effect of the KBS live show (Dong-A Ilbo, 1983c). The eighth central meeting between the two Red Crosses was held on 20 November 1984 as a result of North Korea's support for South Korean flood victims in the same year (Korean Red Cross, 2016, 86-104). The first inter-Korean visit of 300 dispersed family members, 100 art performers, and 100 reporters between Seoul and Pyongyang was held from 20 to 23 September 1985. This event was also massively broadcast to the whole country and headlined regardless of mass media.

In summary, during these successive events, Korean society was like a colossal theatre of the mood of nationalism, especially touching its emotions, expectation, sadness, and hope around the division of the Korean peninsula. The Chun administration actively used those events to enhance their character by showing off governmental performance and pressure on

North Korea. On this issue, though North Korea once cast doubt that the KBS programme was fabricated and planned by the Chun administration (Dong-A Ilbo, 1983b), it was a rather unexpected event explained above. Instead, the government jumped onto the unexpectedly appeared bandwagon of nationalism. This unexpected aspect of nationalism's consequence reveals its own dynamic as a discourse (Seo, 2005). In addition, by burrowing into the deep stories of families, which could not have been fully demanded due to political obstacles, the event gave the anonymous individuals the moment to gather in the horizontally-looking square of the nation (in Yeoido, Seoul, and Pyongyang).

C. botong-saram and Japan's *ichiokusōchūryū* (related to Spectacle Two)

However, as recurrently emphasised, nationalism is not always horizontal. As it touches the universal and intimate field of family, it is also invested in the vertical direction of individuals' desires, as explained in Spectacle Two.

As shown in Chapters Five and Six, nationalism in Korea has tended to be *a relative concept* vis-à-vis comparison and contradiction to other developed and underdeveloped countries, with the sense of high and low, beyond and behind, and *ours* and *of others*. The object to be compared has been changing in the transforming circumstances in politics and the economy: North Korea was the foremost competitor under the regime competition. The information that the GNP per capita of Two Koreas had been reversed was already reported in 1969 (Lee, 1975). The ambivalence of common people in Korea toward Japan was expected. As shown in Chapter Five, Korea-Japan diplomatic normalisation resulted in the aftermath of the bifurcation of nationalism—state-centred nationalism based on developmentalism (and maintenance of regime) and resistant nationalism, which questions

the legitimacy of the state based on the diversifying meanings of the nation. As the former proceeded with the economic reason, the popular perspective toward Japan was also inevitable to consider the economy. The JoongAng Ilbo (1984a) survey shows it clearly: Japan was the most hated country (38.1 per cent), higher than North Korea (30.4 per cent) or the Soviet Union (24.6 per cent), whereas the respondents also considered Japan as necessary for economic interest (29.3 per cent) and national security (8.0 per cent) after the United States.[58] It is another reflection of the same survey a year before (Joong Ang Ilbo, 1983a) that 42.3 per cent of respondents were worried about Japan's military buildup as a threat to national security rather than seeing this as helpful (18.5 per cent) or insignificant (17.5 per cent).

Regardless of political and historic uneasiness, how the media dealt with the issue in Japan was worthy of notice in the 1980s. While JoongAng Ilbo conducted the national survey, they frequently compared the result with Japan's middle classes consciousness (1982b; 1983c; 1985c,d; Shin, 1982) and reported its decrease (Shin, 1981, 1985). This focus on Japan was a general atmosphere across media: the special series such as *Ilbon, Ilbonin, Geu Jeongche* [Japan, Japanese, Their Identity, 일본, 일본인, 그 정체] (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1982a-h, total ten series); *Geugil-eui Gil: Ilbon-eul Alja* [The Way to Win:

[58] In the same survey, the friendliness toward the United States is expectedly high as the most favourite country (37.3 per cent), necessary for economic interest (55.9 per cent), the relationship for security (84.3 per cent), and most influential country to culture (50.7 per cent), though the rise of anti-Americanism among students in subsection A. One of the impressive results is the rise of favorability toward the People's Republic of China. In the survey in 1982, PRC (13.0 per cent) was lower ranked than Saudi Arabia (18.8 per cent), West Germany (13.9 per cent), and South Asian countries (13.8 per cent) but already higher than the Republic of China (6.2 per cent) (JoongAng Ilbo, 1982a). This ranking is changed in JoongAng Ilbo (1983a), as the PRC is the most favourable country (16.8 per cent) (except the US and Japan) than West Germany (12.4 per cent), Saudi Arabia (12.0 per cent), and Southasia countries (12.3 per cent). This tendency continued in 1984 as the most important country for national security and economic interest after the US and Japan.

Knowing Japan, 극일의 길: 일본을 알자] (Josun Ilbo, 1983a-c, total forty-seven series); *Ilbonbyeonmo Samsipgunyeon* [Japan's Transition in Thirty-Nine Years, 일본변모 39년] (Jeong, 1984a-f, total twelve series) created a media frenzy.[59] This increased attention may have been due to the upcoming twentieth anniversary of the two countries' normalisation in 1965. Still, the emphasis of the articles remained mainly on the lifestyle, thrifty character and high interest in the economy, and people's character, accompanied by the social problem in Japan: stating the relatively low interest in politics and history itself.

*Kyunghayng Shinmu*n noted problems within Japan's rapid development, including an ageing society (1982e), adolescent problems (1982f), and dualism in people's appearances and minds (1982a,b). The newspaper also reported the change in the conventional image of Japanese workers' over-loyalty to the workplace to their ambivalent pursuit of personal well-being (1982c,d), with the static representative politics without change centred on the long-reigning Liberal Democratic Party (1982g).

Dong-A Ilbo also warned about the Right-wing oriented character in politics and expansive foreign policy (Jeong, 1984a,b). However, it also emphasised pragmatic and innovative industrial culture replacing Western commodities, which maximises the strong competency of Japan's high-end and small-light-complicated electrical goods (Jeong, 1984d,e). The press also indicates Japan is 'culturally poor in the material abundance' (Kim, 1986), with confusion in the social values (Jeong, 1984c), touching Korean people's anti-

[59] Due to the massive numbers of each article of those series to be included, I just quoted and listed in the References the first and last piece of each series which state the total number of the series, with other articles with the content to be analysed.

Japan sentiment while reproducing Japan's image as a wealthy country.

In sum, between the two polarised concepts of ‘winning Japan (극일, *geugil*, 克日)’ and ‘knowing Japan (지일, *jiil*, 知日)’ (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1982h), the popular image of Japan in 1980s Korea was constructed, which was one of the bases of the self-image of Koreanness of the last Chapter Six.[60]

The attitude toward learning from Japan accompanies this sense of rivalry with or having-in-mind in Japan. Notably, *Josun Ilbo*’s “The Way to Win: Knowing Japan” was a one-year project that started on 1 January and ended on 10 December, lately translated into Japanese with the title *Japan on Korean’s Eyes* (Josun Ilbo, 1983a, 1983b, 1984). *Josun Ilbo* made a self-evaluation in the last episode article of the series, with the interview of its readers’ appreciation that the series was ‘balanced’ (1983b). However, it was also criticised by a reader’s letter, which requested the newspaper to deliver a more critical view of Japan (Josun Ilbo, 1983c). In addition, the following themes were common across the media: ‘Japan’s wealth is based on using domestic goods’ (*Kyunghyang Shinmun*, Kim, Y-S.b,

[60] In fact, this ambivalence of Koreanness is inherited from the Park regime, as explained in Chapter Six. The national hero, such as Admiral Yi Sun-sin during the Japanese Invasions of Korea in 1592-1598, was actively mobilised to emphasise the national potential to overcome the crisis and step forward to the next level of development, strengthening Park’s image as a nationalist (Kim, 2018, 28-29; Cho, 2018,78). As explained in Chapter Five, the diplomatic normalisation with Japan was the moment in which the popular nationalism based on anti-Japanese sentiments was bifurcated from state-centred nationalism. Since then, Park had always been pressed with proof that his pro-Japanese image was wrong, as he had also once served as an enlisted military in the Manchurian Army during colonial rule. For example, Park frequently testified for himself as ‘anti-Japanese’ even during the normalisation process, such: “In fact, if you [Korean people] ask me about Japan, I will state a deep and severe anti-Japanese resentment in my mind. Suppose you ask me whether I am pro-Japan or anti-Japan. In that case, with a flank sentiment, I will frankly say I am anti-Japan without hesitation.” (Park’s remarks on the normalisation, quoted from 18 minutes 15 to 18 minutes 19 seconds in *KBS Archive Project Modern Korea: Postmodern Korea*, 2021) This *verification* of the anti-Japanese stance of the leaders of Korea had been inevitable, as shown in the same broadcast episode, including Chun and Kim Young-Sam.

1984); ‘Win Japan by Japan’s management way’ (*Maeil Kyungje*, 1982)[61]; ‘Preciously to the small thing, frugal Japanese character’ (*Josun Ilbo*, Lee, 1984) Also, the press introduced the new consumer culture in Japan, precisely using the term *New Rich* (신흥부자, 新興富者, *shinheungbuja*), mentioning shin-jungsancheung in Japan (‘New Rich in Japan enthusiastic on a luxury’, JoongAng Ilbo, 1985e).[62]

The Japanese term *ichiokusōchūryū* (一億�December中流) symbolises the economic boom in the late 1970 and 1980s in Japan. The term was popularised as the income and lifestyle increased, and the gap between the classes—regardless of white-collar, blue-colour, farmers, and self-employed—was reduced even to be called a ‘non-class society’ (Hong, 2005, 40-41; Song, 2012, 67). One economic professor in Korea (more or less in haste) once mentioned Japan with the latter term, comparing Korea’s classed society since Rhee Syngman’s administration and Korea should also aim at ‘Japan’s classless structure’ (Im, 1985). The term *ichiokusōchūryū* came from the circumstance as almost 90.0 per cent of once identified as the middle classes already in the middle of the 1970s. Even one Japanese scholar

[61] This article is originally written to introduce a report from *Yomiuri Shinmun* that explains the information from a US representative’s analysis of Japan’s success. Though *Maeil Kyungje* is not clear whether Korea should learn from Japan, it implies the US also recognises Japan’s growing power.

[62] These ambivalent views on Japan were not confined to the newspapers. The radio and televised broadcasts delivered various perspectives and popular sentiments of Korea toward Japan: from anti-Japanese emotions based on historical experience to the preference or efficiency of Japanese culture and necessary goods. One recent documentary TV show by KBS (mentioned in a previous footnote) has complied their own broadcasts emitted from the 1960s to the early 1990s, like snapshots to deliver the change and construction in the political, academic, and widespread identity of Korea vis-à-vis how Koreans had seen Japan (*KBS Archive Project Modern Korea: Postmodern Korea*, 2021). For example, some scenes show one correspondent reporter from Korea to Japan looking around a supermarket in Japan, comparing the goods, food, and liquor made in Korea, or another location delivers the interview with kids who like Japanese cartoons, which some scholars criticise as too suggestive or violent in a scene changed.

Murakami Yasusuke (村上泰亮), suggested that the term 'class' lost its significance as he replaced it with a new term, *shinchūkantaishū* (新中間大衆, new middle mass) (Song, 2012, 71-21). Song (2012) argues that this subject orientation to the middle classes symbolises the rise of mass society, as it also means rebuilding the nation-state's image *as a whole*. Similar terms and their using examples are also found in the remarks of Chun and his next successor, Roh Tae-Woo:

> "It is hard to get beyond two thousand GNP per capita in dollars, but as we get over that hump, the middle classes will increase highly, and society will be stabilised." (during Chun's meeting with the local notables in North Chungchung province, giving examples of Japan and Singapore, Kim, O-J., 1983)

> "All benefit policies by the government for veterans should set their goal to make them all the middle classes." (during Chun's meeting with the Minister of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, JoongAng Ilbo, 1986)

> "DJP representative Roh suggested […] that the party will change the existing "National wealth-centred policy" to "People's wealth policy" for the "all nationals to be the middle classes." (a press report on Roh's declaration of DJP's policies for democratisation (Lee and Ahn, 1986).

This subsection does not conclude that Japan's experience entirely influenced the consumerist culture in Korea. The point is that Spectacle Two, the stratification of the society in 1980s Korea, set up the (absolute) criteria of jungsancheung in the middle. Such discourse operated in a way that people in general or common/ordinary people, who think of themselves as under that criteria, were pressed to follow the standardised lifestyle. In this process, the existence of the image of the other, 'wealthy Japan', had one role in converging the individual's everyday desires in consumerising Korean society. These processes of constructing an image of a nation *as a whole*, or botong-saram's *due image,* imply that nationalism is not entirely horizontal and exclusive only to the others outside its boundary. It is vertical according to people's satisfaction on whether they fit that due image.

In summary, I emphasise that the high expectation of being included in the higher social status is a combination of changing political and economic circumstances and expanding consumer society that emphasises mine/ours. It is one of the populistic aspects of a possessive understanding of political rights: distinguishing our citizens from the other, leading to fragmented factionalism, and taking power as the utmost goal (Urbinati, 2019, 11-12, 21, 31-32). Between the Two Spectacles shown in Sections 7-3 and 7-4, this offers another alternative to common people as an orientational group, strengthening people *as a whole*. It is directly contradictory to Han's academic journey in the 1980s and early 1991, who eagerly refused to see minjung or jungsancheung *as a whole*. He also failed to show the horizon of substantially equal choices of political preference, just recurrently reemphasising the moderate reformation. That is the context in which common people, the slogan of Roh Tae-Woo's camp, could win out the various demands bursting after the June Uprising, only about six months before the first direct presidential election in December 1987.

7-8. Conclusion: the choice of *botong-saram*: between what we should or what we want

In concluding this chapter, <Figure 7-2> describes the relationship between nationalism, the structure of Two Spectacles, the power relations between the hegemonic and dissident elites, and common people in 1980 Korean society.



<Figure 7-2> Two Spectacles and nationalism entangled in 1980s Korea[63]

The Two Spectacles spinning around the plaza of nationalism are like a kaleidoscope,

[63] I thank one of my colleagues Kim Jinwook at Yonsei University, the first author of Kim and Hur (2018), mentioned in explaining *Taegeukgi Budae* in the Introduction. This figure is a result of a free discussion with him on 29 November 2021 in a café on Yonhee Street, Seoul. His first metaphor was based on a scene in *La vita è bella* (1997), where a protagonist was driving a bicycle alongside narrowed buildings on a hill down to the plaza centred on the town.

and the structure of the two plazas is like a roulette table in a casino. Common people come from the screen of one spectacle, another, or both. They are just freely rolling around this vessel, and both kinds of elites are too. The political plaza, where once the 'scaffold' (Foucault 1995[1975], 32) was installed in Gwangju in May 1980, is occupied by hegemonic elites. They push dissident elites and common people out of politics from the higher position, making political confrontation vertical. Nationalism serves as a neutral zone: it could provide a route upward to the political plaza (e.g. the June Uprising), a meeting place (e.g. the reunion of dispersed families), or a hotbed for even developmentalism conservatives who think of themselves as working for the nation.

The figure shows the effect of the rapidity of the spinning. The inclination of the slope around the core and fringe of the nationalism plaza determines the situation on the political plaza. The rapidity is on political, economic, and social change; the slope near the core is institutionalisation for horizontal competition among equal ideological stances, or it can be a means of upward mobility such as education (cf. Han Sang-Jin). If the rapidity is too fast, any agencies (marbles) on the political plaza are temporal, without gradual discussion or competition, or thrown out of the vessel (society). If it is too slow, the agencies on each plaza are not changed. Any situation strengthens populistic nationalism, depicted like a roulette table in this figure. The slope around the fringe of the nationalism plaza (explained in subsections A and C of 7-7) is a degree of how society is affected by nationalism. Suppose the slope near the core is substantially flattened by democratisation. In that case, the political plaza will expand until it covers the effect of nationalism, making the slope around the fringe more even until nationalism becomes banal, so evident and undetectable (cf. Billig, 1995; Seo, 2005).

In this respect, I want to remind readers of the result of the 13th presidential election, the

first direct presidential election under the present constitution of the Sixth Republic of Korea, as follows in <Table 7-7>.

<Table 7-7> Result of the 13th presidential election, 1987

Candidate	Roh Tae-Woo (DJP)	Kim Young-Sam (RDP)	Kim Dae-Jung (PPD[64])	Kim Jong-Pil (NDRP[65])	Shin Jung-Il (Hanju-eui-tong-ilhangukdang)	Remarks
The rate of the vote earned (%)	36.64	28.03	27.04	8.06	0.20	Total vote rate 89%

Source: National Election Commission (undated-c)

Some Marxist scholars argued that this result was due to the betrayal of the middle classes who had participated in the June Uprising, including joongmin (Seo, 1988, 258; Han, S-J.a, 1991, 128-129). Many other analyses could be possible: the failure of unification between YS and DJ Kim due to their ambitions; the beginning of regionalism according to the primary basis of the candidates (Rho: North Gyeongsang province, YS Kim: South Gyeongsang province, DJ Kim: two Jeolla provinces, JP Kim, two Chungcheong provinces); differences in ideology (Rho: the conservative since 1980, YS Kim: pragmatic moderate-conservative, DJ Kim: moderate-progressive, JP Kim: old conservative) and so on.

[64] PPD, Party for Peace and Democracy (평화민주당, 平和民主黨, *pyonghwa-minjudang*), was formed by Kim Dae Jung and his followers in RDP after Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung failed in unifying the presidential candidate for the direct presidential election held on 16 December 1987, under the new constitution after June Uprising in the same year.

[65] NDRP, New Democratic Republican Party (신민주공화당, 新民主共和黨, *shin-minju-gonghwadang*) was formed by Kim Jong-Pil as he gathered the old members from the former ruling party DRP.

In this respect, we should recall Han's empirical analysis of the existence of joongmin, in which he set the ideological stance as IV and class orientation as DV in his article (Han, S-J.a, 1991, 97, <Table 16>). As I reversed his tables' variable relations in <Table 7-5> and <Table 7-6>, now here is the last table of total respondents' identification (IV) according to ideological stance (DV).

<Table 7-8> Classes orientation and the ideological stance calculated from Han's data (orientation IV, ideology DV)

	Jungsancheung	Joongmin	Minjung	Both denied	Total
radicalism	20 (7.7)	17 (8.0)	76 (18.1)	63 (17.5)	176 (14.1)
reformism	148 (56.9)	129 (60.8)	273 (65.2)	210 (58.3)	760 (60.8)
conservatism	92 (35.4)	66 (31.1)	70 (16.7)	87 (24.2)	315 (25.2)
total	260(100.0)	212 (100.0)	419(100.0)	360 (100.0)	1,251 (100.1)

$\chi^2 = 49.116$, df = 6, p = 0.000

Source: Author's calculation based on Table-16 in Han, S-J. (1991, 87)

Juxtaposing <Table 7-7> and <Table 7-8>, we can find that the conservative tendency of each class is higher than radicalism, with the exception of the minjung class. At the same time, they also show a similar percentage of being radical and conservative among them. Notably, the conservative percentage of jungsancheung and joongmin is almost identical. As explained above, even in Han's table, the percentage of conservatives is relatively even across the classes. Considering the two reformist candidate's independent participation in the election, the chances for the one conservative candidate to be successful were not, in retrospect, surprising.

Kim Hak-Jun, the former president of Incheon National University who participated in Roh's electoral camp, testified how their key slogan, *Botong-Saram* (Common People), came about (Bae, 2016). He recalled that one DJP MNA mentioned US President Andrew Jackson's 'average people', and then, in his mind, two columns in *Josun Ilbo* were influential. One of those is partly quoted below:

> "It is worse than explicitly boasting; if someone is sarcastic, that s/he is of common people, but in their mind, s/he has a sense of superiority over others, so it is hidden self-esteem. I feel such a shadow when someone uses terms like minjung or daejung, and it makes me uneasy. […] If I do, I want to define common people as 'people who live quietly and sincerely, without coming forward or being left behind, living with talent as good as others and steady effort'. […] To be a common person with both a good inside and good outside is harder than to be a hero's hero. […] If this country's reality is wrong somewhere, it is not due to the lack of sages' words, the low level of people's intelligence, or the absence of excellent theory or amazing machines. […] It is due to the loss of the beginner's mind of people who stand afront politics; people who act in front of the minjung, people who boast of their knowledge; people who say they love the country with all sorts of things needed. […] It is not a common task that common people achieve common things in common thinking—[…] [F]or making a true common country where true common people are happy."
>
> - From Sunwoo Hwi, "Great Common People (*Widaehan Botong-Saram*, 위대한 보통사람)"(Sunwoo, 1985)

Sunwoo himself was a well-known novelist and critic in 1980s South Korea. In this column, he attempted to construct a universal story of humanity and people living diligently, enhancing the value of commonness that he thought the contemporary elite easily ignored. He also meant to be sympathetic to the tentative readers of his article, ordinary people, with the eyes of an elite himself. Some elites may be too blatantly untruthful, but the sense that all elites are indifferent to the need of common people is perhaps a simplification. The terms 'great' and 'true', which he used, simplify and strengthen the existing distinction between the (lazy or arrogant) elite and (humble) people.

In this respect, his usage of the term *Great Common People* could resonate with slogans like *Make America Great Again* about thirty years later in the US. We cannot conclude that his intention was for political subjectification. However, his disdain for the terms minjung and daejung would not be a matter of only boasting of elites that he excluded from ordinary people. In this respect, the dichotomy of populism between the elite and people is not from the demand-sided worldview of people; the distinction between the *true* elite and the *corrupted* elites is a production of *the particular elite group* who distinguish themselves from common people *as a whole*. If we recall Section 7-3, it is not a matter of conservative versus progressive but the elites who see the political society as *vertical*.

In sum, the Roh camp chose 'The Age of Common People' with other slogans like 'We will be together with people (gungmin) with their dream and even their pain'; or 'Now it is stability'. Meanwhile, YS Kim chose the four-syllable catchwords *Gunjeongjongsik* (군정종식, 軍政終熄, End the Military Regime, and DJ Kim *Pyeonmin-eun Pyeongmindang*

Daejung-eun Gimdeajung[66] (Yonsei University Institute of State Governance Studies, 2013, 44; Bae 2016). While the Roh camp tried to *buy* the mind of the common people, YS Kim staunchly put forth the normative demands of democratisation, and DJ tried to be friendly to the constituents in vain.

However, we can analyse how the conservative elite strategically understood and semiotically practised (cf. Weeden, 2002) to construct the desires of ordinary people to homogenise them as identical, as Sunwoo did above. The two reformists, YS Kim and DJ Kim, focused on the ongoing tasks for structural change in authoritarian legacies. Meanwhile, the conservatives succeeded in *equalising* the diverse democratic demand *into a single desire that is easily immediately recognisable to people* (shown in Sunwoo's conceptualisation), seeing them *as a whole*. It was effective in the rapid moment when the election was so soon after the introduction of the new constitution.

In effect, in terms of institution, the New Constitution in 1987, as a result of the combination of those demands, partly succeeded in representing it. It is not only about the direct presidential election; the primary condition for horizontal and equal competition between diverse needs are stipulated[67]: freedom of speech; freedom of union; the political

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[66] I just romanised the original slogan in Korean, "평민은 평민당, 대중은 김대중" as it is a kind of wordplay using the homonym relations among the name of the candidate (Kim, Dae-Jung) and the abbreviation of party's name (Pyeongmindang, dang means 'party'), and other common nouns to indicate common people (Pyeongmin, 平民) or mass (daejung).

[67] In this respect, the movement of old and new conservatives around the late 1980s is noteworthy, especially the Protestant conservatives. Those groups, who had once needed no intermediary organisation in developing their size in Korean society, while they just only clung to the connection with each authoritarian government. However, the conservatives felt they were no longer under the state's custody in the context of the institutional guarantee of diverse demands and the possibility of liberal or progressive forces being in power. For example, the ecclesiastic or progressive churches had gathered themselves into organisations like the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) in social movements competing with or resisting authoritarian governments. In 1989, the conservative churches organised themselves under the Christian Council of Korea (CCK, 한국기독교

neutrality of the military controlled by the civilian government; and the enhancement of the clauses on democratisation in the economy (경제민주화, 經濟民主化, *Gyeonje-minjuhwa*)[68] (Korea Ministry of Government Legislation, undated). In this respect, the institutional condition was technically possible, while the significant realisation of those clauses in the level of the law, ordinance, and rule of each level of government would be the tasks to be settled. It was too rapid moments from the June Uprising to the presidential election in December 1987 to expect those demands to be satisfied and felt in people's everyday lives.

In this respect, as Lee Yeonho (2013, 314-326) argues, the democratisation in 1987 is understood in terms of the 'de-authoritarianisation' in the 1980s Korean society from necessities of concerned actors *in parts*, not from normativity *as a whole* for one purpose of democratisation. According to Lee, the economic liberalisation in the Chun administration gave the Chaebols a chance to pursue their own profits free from top-downed obligation to the development of the nation under former Park's care of the economy. As explained in

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총연합회-한기총, Hanguk Gidokgyo Chong Yeonhaphoe-HanGiChong), emphasising the waning anti-communism since the democratisation. For the details, see (Kang, 2007, 89-90, 603, 281-2). For the CCK and fundamental evangelists' political influence, see Kim (2013, 64-74). This means the conservative was prompt to catch the changing environment, as the previous vertical power relations between the state and society, which they had taken advantage of, are no longer guaranteed. Consider who came to the square against the candlelight vigils in 2003, mentioned in the Introduction as the first voluntary social movement by the Korean right-wing: it was mainly driven by the conservative churches.

[68] The demand for an equal distribution of economic fruits in Korean society was popularly shown in the National Life Consciousness Survey and the intellectual diagnosis after democratisation in 1987, recurrently referred to in this thesis (Dong-A Ilbo, 1981b, 1984a, 1985c, 1986c; Ko et al., 1987, 44-47). The gap between rich and poor or the enhancement of welfare was intermittently positioned from the second to the fourth important task that the government had to solve (the most frequently mentioned as the most urgent was the stabilisation of prices). Reflecting these demands, the minimum wage system and the stipulation of democratisation of the economy were first made in the 1987 constitution. As the June Uprising was the dismemberment of the monopoly of political power, those clauses of economic democratisation decided the dissolution of the existing Chaebol's trust, driving them into the competition and the inclusion of more plural economic actors (labours, the small-middle business) to the participation and representation in the market (Im and Lee, 2020, 227-228).

Section 7-4, the technocrats were also divided into the development-centred Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the stabilisation-centred Economic Planning Board, represented by Kim Jae-Ik. For the latter, liberalisation and an open-door policy to the global market gave them manoeuvrability. It resulted in their need for liberty in policy, as shown they propelled the 'economic revolution' to set up the minimal rule in the market. For labour, the aggressive policies and high prices (see footnote above) under the authoritarian governments could not be bearable anymore. The popularised consumer society and need for a more elevated lifestyle showed them the need for liberty in life, based on more even and equal distribution by welfare. It accompanies the subjective and objective orientation of jungsancheung, who pursue *secularised needs* (Lee, 2013, 317) for more individual freedom. That is how at the moment of the event June Uprising made them gather under the name of the introduction of the direct presidential system. Then, several months later, that is how the discourse of botong-saram won out the other demands, such as moral purpose (like *End the Military Regime* suggested by YS's slogan) for democratisation, in December 1987. For dissident intellectuals, labours, and student activists, 1987 was a failed revolution of democratisation *as a whole* because they would repeat the actual failure of being caught in normativity. As shown in this chapter, it handed over the diverse demands onto the hegemony, ironically reducing them into botong-saram's single desire *as a whole* and maintaining the vertical antagonism against dissident elites in the 1980s.

In sum, due to the little development of equal competition between the conventional Left-Right, politics in South Korea, *in parts,* has been prone to focus on the one matter of (normative) democratisation, the recovery or newly-building of a representative institution for the horizontal confrontation, which overcomes the vertical antagonism between the state and society. At the same time, in politics, without substantial ideological competition for the

well-being of people, the purpose of problem-solving lost its political confrontation. As mentioned in Chapter Three, this is easily a matter of technocratic intervention of the elite without the public discussion on which answer should be adopted (Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti, 2017; 2021). In 1987, YS and DJ Kim failed to build *substantial* horizontality while they were still normatively captured in the image of vertical antagonism between *minju-banminju* (민주-반민주, 民主-反民主, democracy-antidemocracy).

In this circumstance, the existing normativity remains intact as a matter of politics detached from society, and any government's salient (economic) performance becomes a matter to be solved by the expertise of elites. It enabled the vertical antagonism between the elite and people as a whole, who had had little opportunity to understand themselves as in parts of the middle-interest groups, individualising themselves to see themselves against the abstract concept of the nation-state. 'Both denied' in Han's tables, without such a sense of being mediated by the substantial identity or organisation, could not help identify themselves as botong-saram.

As I argued elsewhere (Kim, H.c, 2015), individuals without such mediation have the potential to be vulnerable to the most prominent entity they can afford or have in their hands in representing themselves as a political subject. Here it would be symbols of the nation and state. They could, by chance or temporally, yield the sense of being mediated by the representative organisation, such as political parties or other groups. This phenomenon is the background for the emergence of populism at any time in Korean society. It is characteristic of people's demand to see themselves *as a whole* against the establishment. At least in 1987, or since then, it took a long time for people to have a more plural understanding of the existence of particular interests as *in parts*, closed and veiled under a signifier for people *as a*

whole—gungmin, minjung, daejung, common people, and sometimes even simin.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

"Most people need a lifetime to see themselves clearly.

As for me, in my hometown Feng Town, my life was like water at the bottom of a well.

Modest and unstirred.

But after I entered the Qin Palace, a door was unlocked.

I saw the ambition deep within my heart, raged like an ocean."

- A monologue by Liu Bang (the founder of the Han Dynasty) in a fictional film *Wang de Shengyan* (王的盛宴, The Last Supper) directed by Lu Chuan (2012)

From liberation in 1945 to democratisation in 1987, this thesis attempts to analyse the change in the temporality and spatiality of the imagination of people in South Korea. That change of imagination is the critical source of political polarisation and antagonism in Korean politics. We cannot assume the Korean people as one person who lived through these long times, as Liu Bang mentioned above, came from a very humble status to the top of the empire. However, though the above monologue is fictional and contemporary, the minds of Korean people may have experienced a similar feeling in their journey of life: the enthusiasm for independence, division of the nation entailing the pain of atrocities during the Korean War, ousting the dictator, resulting in the military coup, rapid development to keep pace with the developed countries, the invention and discovery of Koreanness, spectacle friction with another military regime for the institutionalisation of democracy during another spectacle of consumerist capitalism. This journey of desire, from personal prosperity to the public power

of a sovereign people, is the background against which the state has maintained its governmentality regardless of the good or bad characteristics of regimes throughout Korean political history.

As students of populism studies agree, it is not easy or desirable to categorise a country with phrases like 'a populist regime', 'of populistic people', or 'with a populist leader': the concept of a 'Cinderella Complex' is still (perhaps always) applicable because the term 'populism' is too loose for some instances and too tight for others (Mény and Surel, 2002, 3). Therefore, this thesis suggested the term *populistic nationalism*. This terminology avoids treating the people, common or elite, as a whole or monolith. Populistic nationalism has three elements: (a) the verticalisation of political cleavage; (b) the low institutionalisation of mediating organisation of people's diverse demands in the forms of a living community,[69] interest groups, and political parties capable of significant competition on the horizon of the political arena; (c) and the existence of nationalism as the only option for common people to identify themselves and participate in politics. Those three conditions and elements combine the degree of temporality and spatiality of politics between populism and representative

[69] For this subject, the existence of alternative organisations to aggregate the demands of people is controversial if we consider the active participation of churches in democratisation (Kang, 2006) or their functions of addressing needs for the welfare system that the state evaded (Jeong, 2017), or the state-organising communities, such as a monthly neighbourhood meeting (반상회, *bansanghoe,* 班常會, Seo and Kim 2015), or the experience of individualising function of the Saemaul Movement (새마을 운동 運動, Hwang, 2004). However, the existence and actual function of these organisations and their substantial effects on institutionalised politics, which can even *change* the regime in an institutional due process, and the guarantee of that process is another matter to be studied. Those organisations could give people efficacy of autonomy and decision-making in their livelihood. Still, such efficacy was also a means for the regime to maintain its governmentality, *excusing the alibi* to those people, as the quoted three studies also imply. In this respect, the absence of an analysis of the Saemaul Movement is one of the significant shortcomings of this thesis. Nevertheless, this thesis focuses on the elements of populism because it understands that populism is a matter of representative and fully-institutionalised democracy.

democracy.

It is why the thesis does not *clearly* identify whether any specific regime throughout political history in Korea was populist. Those regimes conditionalised the construction of populistic nationalism until 1987, when the Korean people achieved representative democracy, gaining the chance to organise diverse alternatives in formal and legal institutional forms for political choice. In this respect, this thesis also argues that populism is a matter in which people do not feel the possibility of various and equal options and their regularised efficiency in their everyday lives. When people *feel* there is no alternative to representative democracy, they become sceptical of it and seek to find themselves in the idealised form of a nation, which is the easiest and fastest option for them. That feeling under the inflexibility of the institution yields a yearning for a rapid, immediate, direct solution, totalising the diverse demands into one signifier of *ours*, confronting another single signifier of the enemy, not the adversary. Nationalism could be one of the only cultural and political systems that allow common people to feel belonging to *somewhere*, who cannot afford to be *anywhere* when there is no alternative (TINA), as shown in the development of democracy in Korea. Alternatively, people cease to choose, remaining *nowhere* in politics and being just *personal or ordinary/common*, as 'Both denied' in Chapter Seven did in the strictly alienated relationship between politics and society.

That is why this thesis advances its argument by mentioning the scene of the square divided into two groups in subsection B of 1-4 in the Introduction: Taegeukgi vs Candlelight vigils. Most Koreans in the South share the memory of the authoritarian rule that followed the Korean War. The state apparatus has imposed anti-communist traditions in the name of security from the threat of North Korea. During the Park Chung-Hee regime, such 'Nationalistic Democracy' and 'Korean-style Democracy' was legitimised in the name of the

security and economic development of the nation. At the same time, all heterodox ideas and demands were limited and oppressed. Park's disdain toward pluralist liberal democracy was regarded as a 'disguised democracy', 'political overheat', or a kind of luxury (Park, 2005[1963], 650, 652) for Korea at that time. It is evident for the developmental state that the *reservation* of the ideal function of the legislative body was legitimised by the viable performance made by the immediate intervention of the state's executive body, of which temporality was far from gradual (as explained in Chapter Three). It prompted the emphasis on 'the state', the power-wielding president and the sub-executive bodies, such as task forces, committees of technocratic specialists, and the high ranks of government officers. Those legacies have constructed the symbolic capital of the Korean conservative (보수, 保守, *bosu*) against *minju-jinbo* (민주-진보, 民主-進步, democratic-progressive), while conservatism has also been exposed to competition since 1987, losing the previous advantage of the state's support or custody.

However, it is another matter that those *jinbo seryocks* (진보 세력, 進步 勢力, the progressive forces) are free from the previous vertical sense inherited since 1987. They also retain or try to find their political capital relying only on their own self-image that they are still fighting against the hegemony. The emergence of the Candlelight Vigil in 2002 was due to anti-American sentiments inherited from the 1980s, as explained in Chapter Seven. In addition, as those forces had once succeeded in gaining a majority or coming to power in 1998 (the election of Kim Dae-Jung, the first case in Korean political history of 'peaceful regime change' between the incumbent and the opposition), and in 2003 (the election of Rho Moo-hyun, the first case of a former opposition reformulating their party through legally

binding elections), and 2017 (the regime change under the constitutional approval of resistance to the former Park II administration). However, they still failed to differentiate themselves from the conservatives: maintaining a vertically rotated political spectrum. As Lee (2019; 2021) argues, the Moon Jae-In government also spent most of its government capacity focusing on the 'accumulated evil (적폐, 積弊, *jeokpye*)'[70] in a top-downed manner in the context of the existence of the enthusiastic supporter to Moon, comparable to Taegeukgi Budae's enthusiasm for the former president Park Geun-Hye. When the Moon government has been fighting against the 'accumulated evil', for the last six years, as of 2023, one of the critical bills that not only distinguishes the demands of society *in parts* but the *jinbo* can give an alternative against the *bosu*, the anti-discrimination or (equality) bill [차별금지(평등)법, 差別禁止(平等)法, *chabyolgeumji(pyeongdeung)-bob*] is still pending in the National Assembly (Shim, 2022). That bill has been repeatedly suggested and repealed by the once-ruling Democratic Party of Korea over the last fifteen years. Such attempts were excused in the name of 'social agreement'. However, the real cause is over-represented right-wing Christians (Kim, J-G., 2022). Against this background, another *bosu* President, Yoon Suk-Yeol, was elected in March 2022 with the strong support of the male youth generation with anti-feminist, anti-communist, and anti-Chinese sentiments (Kim, J-M., 2022). It can be understood as a repeated phenomenon to see the *true* people *as a whole* against 'boasting' intellectuals or advocates of political correctness, once touched on in Sunwoo's (1985) column in Chapter Seven.

[70] As explained in Chapter Two and Five, the differentiation of leaders to the former power bloc, as bad or evil, is one characteristic of populism, as Park Chung-Hee did after the coup.

Aside from contemporary Korean politics nowadays, we can conclude this thesis by considering an analogy from the analysis of Korean politics. Populistic nationalism is based on cognition of the discrepancy between the institutional setting in real politics (state-system) and the ideal state of the nation (state-idea). It aims to maximise the latter at present, assertively denying the pluralistic and gradual conversations in democracy, as shown in Chapter Three. In this regard, politics in South Korea was affected by the vertical understanding of power relations between the establishment and the common people. Due to the lack of history of accumulation with political competition between the equal Left and Right, politics in Korea has reflected the political confrontation between the 'up' and 'down'. In this context, various democratic demands outside of that distinction have been reduced to the fight between the normal, anti-communist, developmental enthusiasm of the (South Korean) nation and the revenge of the so-called jinbo seryock or 'minju seryock' [민주세력, 民主勢力, democratic forces].

In concluding this thesis, we can visualise the three-matrix model in each Republic of Korea until 1987, as below <Figure 8-1>. This figure shows the discrepancy between the state-ideas (and their practice as social movements or coups, I call them 'state-idea events' in orange) and the state-systems (in blue). In these figures, we can assess the degree of populism in politics in the time-space of nationalism.


1st Republic
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7
8
direct
immediate
monopoly
distribution
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indirect


April Revolution
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
2nd Republic
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
Bursting demands for national
development and 16 May coup
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
3rd Republic
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8
direct
immediate
monopoly
distribution
gradual
indirect


The 7th presidential election and the
8th general election
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distribution
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
4th Republic
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8
direct
immediate
monopoly
distribution
gradual
indirect


5st Republic
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gradual
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

*. red arrow: the intense gap between the state-idea and state-system
green arrow: the reflection of state-idea into the new state-system
blue arrow: the challenge of the state-idea to the existing state-system
red slash: the accidental rupture

<Figure 8-1> State-system of each Republic and state-idea events

The First Republic is referred to as 'Korean-style Bonapartism'. This regime was one of the closest to populism. However, the low institutionalisation of party politics is due to the nation-building process and the Korean War as immediate challenges. There was little room for people to become political, regardless of the top-down approach of Rhee's governance via para-governmental organisations.

The April Revolution emerged due to Rhee's recurrent violation of democratic principles, which aroused people's desire for the genuine embodiment of democracy. It resulted in Rhee being ousted. However, emerging groups interpreted the meaning of a nation more inclusively: the plurality of social actors was not caught in the media through the urban poor, and other various actors participated in the revolution.

Second Republic's state-system was the antithesis of the First Republic. It entailed the

technical application of the indirect, gradual, distributive ideal of representative democracy. However, people's demands with numerous agendas were without connectedness to essential institutions, such as political parties or efficient civil associations. At the same time, the ruling and opposition parties still constituted networks of the 'notables' who had little motivation to meet those demands.

Bursting demand for national development and the 16 May coup were backdropped even by the intellectuals. They were sceptical of democratic institutions and corruption since the First Republic in one of the most bureaucratised and professionalised organisations, the military, caused the push factor for young middle-ranked officers to stage a coup as an immediate action.

The Third Republic focused on rapid development as the foremost task for the state. Regularised elections and the existence of the opposite party were allowed. However, as recurrently emphasised, the parties' significant ideological differences were vague. Political communities during this time could not be fully distributive in interpreting the meaning of people or the Korean nation, especially considering that people were unlikely to have any direct access to politics. However, the bifurcation of state nationalism and resistant nationalism opened more or less space for political communications.

The emergence of new figures characterised the seventh presidential and eighth general elections, Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung. Their progressive direction on key policy issues, such as the economy, and reunification, gave people an alternative to Park's regime. In contrast, Park's ruling bloc had undergone internal friction [for example, the revolt of the jury (사법파동, 司法波動, *sabobpadong*) in 1971], resulting in Park being isolated from the elites.

The Fourth Republic (Yusin Regime) was characterised by the direction of the change of state-system opposite to the people's state-idea, reflected in the election results of the seventh presidential and the eighth general elections. The Park administration employed a more rapid, indirect, monopolising power system for HCI development. However, the official state-idea legitimising logic was directed to people in a top-down manner without the mediation of the elite, as Park himself tried to embody the people's will. Thus, the regime was especially fragile given that the contradicting state-idea and state-system coexisted in a single regime, as shown by the revolt in Busan-Masan in 1979. The end of the fragility of state-system's rigidity with a gap with state-idea resulted in the assassination of Park and the subsequent coup by Chun on 12 December 1979, as shown by the severance in the slash in red (/) in the figure above.

The Fifth Republic began as the Chun administration employed an indirect-monopolised style of governmentality in politics (Spectacle 1), whereas in the economy, liberalisation, stabilisation, and open-door policies were gradually pursued (Spectacle 2). However, the demand for the direct presidential election, economic democratisation, and expanding consumer-centred society were seeded for diversifying those demands. At the same time, Chun finally refused to accept those demands in the Spectacle 1 scene (13 April Constitution Protection). Meanwhile, the national mega-events and the nationalism which touched the desires and minds of the individuals in Korean society were slowing down the rapidity and immediacy of change.

The June Uprising was derived from the antagonism between the demand for democratic changes by the dissident social movements and the authoritarian regime. With the diversification of the dissident' demands and the differentiation and stratification of the people in the developed society, the state-idea was understood in a more distributive way.

Thus, the moment of the June Uprising was close to radical democracy, as the dissatisfaction with the people's demands would cause massive aftermath that the regime could not handle, as the 29 June Declaration promised immediate amending of the constitution.

The Sixth Republic maintains until nowadays. Though a substantial change in people's everyday demands and their satisfaction did not occur, the expectation of the first direct presidential election and existing consumerism generally reduced people's radicalism, though the labourers' struggled massively during three months in 1987 (Ko et al. 1987, 49; Yoo, 2015; 355-395). Against this background, people chose stability over the previous demands for structural change in the state apparatus and industrial structure, focusing on their expectation to climb the status ladder by themselves in the name of botong-saram. In conclusion, *the System of the Year 1987* (87년 체제, 87年 體制, palsibchil-yeon cheje) has been established. It is institutionalised the mediation of indirect/direct access of people to politics, with a greater need for diversity in interpreting who constitutes 'the people' and how the distribution of political, economic, and cultural capitals should occur according to that inclusive interpretation of gungmin, simin, and 'the people'.

The point is that the direction of the distribution in each matrix means the expansion of horizontality, as it means increased plurality in representative democracy. As shown in <Figure 8-1>, the lack of horizontality was replaced by the external antagonism of nationalism, yielding the incessant up-down subjects like women, labours, immigrants, and cultural minorities such as LGBTQ people, as they still have little sense of significant democratisation in everyday life for their own demands. However, in terms of institutionalisation, the recovery of the direct election of the president was a significant achievement in 1987.

In the modern sense of the King, the president is always willing to wield his power of the prerogative, as Locke (2005, 75) indicated. Such governmentality by which people try to evade the 'inconvenience' of societal disputes in the absence of a sovereign like God or some other transcendental authority outside the government in a specific political conjuncture. That is why modern democracy is always shifting between the potential of personalisation and the *im*personalisation of power (Held, 1984). The space between such convenience and the extreme difficulty of a democratic process is where populism emerges. In this regard, we cannot judge whether this space will return to Korean society, which is globally affected by the rapid, improvised, and economic-oriented policies that common Korean people have already experienced since the rise of the time of the state in 1961.

In concluding this thesis, I now clarify the findings and significance of my arguments along with the purpose of this research. First, this thesis shows the conceptual ambiguity of populism by applying it to the case of Korea. The concept's ambiguity has been regarded as a limitation (e.g., by Müller and Urbinati) or an essential characteristic of its applicability (especially by Laclau and Mouffe) for analysing political issues. The minimalist definition by Mudde (and his prominent colleague Rovira Kaltwasser) renders the concept more rigorous for comparative analysis. However, the minimalist version failed to overcome the dichotomous dominance-resistance distinction, loosening itself to be applied (sometimes) even in pre-democratic cases.

Han Sang-Jin (Han, S-J.a, 2019; Han, S-J.a and Shim, 2021) did it. He, now focusing on the possibility of populism's dynamic function in Korean politics, writes on populism and Korean politics, which is partly understandable but rigorously entirely wrong. As this thesis consistently emphasises, the inevitability of transforming horizontal confrontation into vertical antagonism is the crucial element explaining why populism has become a

contemporary research agenda for various scholars. Han also emphasises verticality in Korean politics, reducing all of Korean politics to populism, not only in the modern era since 1945 but also reaching back to the late nineteenth to explain the *Donghak* (동학, 東學) revolution in the late Josun Dynasty. This event significantly influenced the student social movements in the 1980s, which formulated their activism to reflect the resistance of *minjung* (Lee, 2008, 55-59). However, if the history of Korean politics were considered populistic at any time, nothing would be considered populistic. Because any difference among millions of cases would be reduced to one concept, weakening the concept's significance for study. If Han's analysis is significant, we may be able to argue that such verticality had existed since 1789 in France, so it was also a case of populism studies.

This thesis argues that students of populism need to fix the condition in cases of *discussing populism* (not only the condition of the emergence of populism). This thesis emphasises that condition as the maxim of liberal, representative democracy and how populism transforms that system (Müller, 2016; Urbinati, 2019). Thus, politics in Korea before 1987 could not be understood entirely as populist, as we can merely mention such elements. That is the reason that this thesis suggests the alternative term, populistic nationalism, not nationalistic populism, just indicating populistic elements of each Republic.

Second, by scrutinising the case of Korea, we can now overcome the regional bias of populism studies. As shown in the Introduction, this issue is related to the very concept of populism offered by Mudde, as the analysis of Hellman (2017) failed to investigate the role of the state and the various meanings of 'the people' in the region. While this study acknowledges that one cannot apply populism to understanding authoritarian regimes, we should not ignore the populistic elements in any regime type. We must also acknowledge the

danger of categorising a regime as populist only based on those elements.

Third, adopting temporality in investigations of populism provides us with a chance to enrich our analyse. Four previous spatial distinctions between horizontal nationalism and vertical populism and its variation (e.g. Brubaker) inherently regard the case as fixed in the linear timeline concept. When arguing about nationalism, we cannot evade the question of two ideas of time (Anderson). Its relationship to populism is also affected by the temporality of the regime, events, media, and people's imagination. The case of Korean politics shows that the verticality of antagonism is affected by the necessity of leaders, people, the survival of the nation's political community, and the exigency of achieving democracy. This temporality resulted in the populistic elements, and we can discuss populism by focusing on the recent cases of Korea and East Asia (Lee 2019, 2022; Lee, 2021; Yang, 2021). These studies and this thesis remain in qualitative discursive and historical analysis. However, the temporality of the regime can allow for quantifying the variables for populism, such as the regularity of elections, the gap between the ruling party's pre-election propaganda and its embodiment in policies coupled with the reaction of the public to that embodiment. This quantification can overcome the ambiguity of other interpretations of populism as a matter of degree which can be attempted in the further research project after this thesis.

Fourth, we can finally see the detailed fragmentation in the concept of 'the people' and 'the elite' in political representation, shown in Korea's 1980s politics and society. In a populist system, emphasised in Lacalu (2005), one single desire of people wins out while it is regarded as *not harming* other desires in a single name of people, nation, or a particular demand in a specific political context (e.g., for the case of South Korea, the impeachment of Park Geun-Hye). However, populism by ruling elites also simplifies those demands in a single term (e.g., the development of the Korean nation in the Park Chung-Hee regime,

Minjung discourse, and Sunwoo's botong-saram in the 1980s), which *harms a* variety of actors, demands, and colours of people. In this circumstance, the possibility of an alternative becomes narrowed, and political confrontations become vertical antagonism. The inter-dynamic between those elements among the people and the elite decides the transformation of the existing representative democracy. At that time and space, we can see a case and determine whether it will be called *populism*.

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Abstract in Korean (국문 요약)

문화적 접근을 통한 내셔널리즘과 포퓰리즘의 관계 연구: 한국의 사례를 중심으로

본 연구는 내셔널리즘과 포퓰리즘의 관계에 주목하여 한국 정치의 역사를 분석한다. 기존 포퓰리즘 연구는 동아시아 사례를 상대적으로 적게 다루웠다는 점, 그리고 두 개념과 민주주의에 대한 규범적 이해로 잠재적인 연구 사례를 제한해 왔다. 최근 포퓰리즘의 비교정치 연구는 개념의 최소주의적 정의, 즉 '동질적인' 두 집단인 '엘리트'와 '인민' 사이의 적대라는 정의를 발전시켰다. 하지만 이 최소주의적 정의는 동질적이지 않은 '엘리트'와 '인민'이라는 개념과 그것의 지역적, 역사적 맥락을 동질화한다는 한계가 있다. 본 연구는 이를 극복하기 위해 내셔널리즘과 포퓰리즘간의 관계를 명료화하고 포퓰리즘 연구 사례를 확장하고자한다. 한국 정치사는 국민/민족국가와 사회 간의 상호관계를 분석하기에 탁월한 사례이며, 본 연구는 여기에 정치경제에서의 시간성과 정치균열의 공간성의 개념을 도입하여 기존의 포퓰리즘 연구에 기여하고자 한다.

네이션(민족/국민)과 국가가 분리된 상황에서, 한국 정치사에서 인민을 칭하고 의미화하는 과정은 다양해 왔으며, 이 가운데 포퓰리즘적인 요소들이 나타났다. 강하고 행정 중심주의적인 국가와 사회와의 관계는 좌-우라는 수평적인 정치적 스펙트럼의 부재를 야기했다. 대신 사회의 다양한 요구들은 민족/국민적인 것으로 의미화되고, 이는 사회와 국가 간의 수직적인 적대를 강화했다. 민족/국민경제의 급속한 발전이 이 수직성을 강화했고, 이는 한국 정치에서 국가-사회간의 상하관계적 권력 공간 인식을 만연하게 해 왔다. 이러한 한국 정치사를 분석함으로써, 본 연구는 최근의 포퓰리즘의 정의를 개선하는데 기여하며, 이는 내셔널리즘 및 민주주의를 둘러싼 전 세계적인 정치적 행동을 바라보는 대안적 시각을 제공하고자 한다.

핵심어: 포퓰리즘, 내셔널리즘, 민주주의, 한국정치, 문화적 분석