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# Rethinking Culpability: National Socialism and Guilt in Reitz's four *Heimat* series

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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I have also profited considerably from the insightful comments and attention to detail of my examiners, Alessio Baldini and Rachel Palfreyman.

While I am not infrequently critical of Edgar Reitz in this work, I wish to note my admiration of his artistic greatness and that I chose to pursue a German degree partly as a result of watching *Heimat*.

Abstract

This work on Edgar Reitz's *Heimat* cycle (1984-2013) considers guilt (in terms of both culpability and conscience) in relation to National Socialism. It is argued that Reitz reveals and conceals, deplores and relativises culpability, sincerely condemning National Socialism, yet also struggling, sometimes with imperfect success, against an urge to encourage viewers to err on the side of lenience in their assessment of complicit Germans not persecuted by the Nazis. Reitz tends to acknowledge and regret the evils of National Socialism (and, in the case of *Die andere Heimat*, European colonialism) in subtle ways that may stimulate viewers to engage carefully and self-improvingly with topics of utmost moral gravity; the subtlety of these acknowledgements may, on the other hand, sometimes be excessive and detract from viewers' awareness of the extreme evils that are a persistent background presence throughout the cycle, with the predominantly indirect depiction of such evils very possibly stemming partly from Reitz not wishing to focus viewers' attention and emotional engagement on the victims of those evils. My original contributions revolve around how Reitz is attracted (particularly in *Die zweite Heimat*) to allusions that point to issues in determining culpability; how Reitz repeatedly challenges the distinction between perpetrator and victim in attempts to lay claim to a morally normal status for the German nation in the wake of National Socialism; and how Reitz engages in rituals, such as sacrificial scapegoating, in the hope of appeasing avenging fate and allowing his narrative and nation to withstand the pressure of the ongoing echoes of National Socialist guilt. Over the course of the cycle, Reitz seeks to move on, taking Germany with him, from the National Socialist period. Reitz's approach is often problematic, but also sometimes very well-meaning.

Contents

## Introduction

In this thesis I consider related aspects of Edgar Reitz's *Heimat* film project with a focus on Reitz's attitude to culpability, primarily regarding National Socialism and its legacy. I consider Reitz's portrayal of culpability especially in relation to concepts of fate, perpetration and victimhood, and how Reitz's attitude to these changes over the course of the *Heimat* cycle. I argue that Reitz uses several means to raise questions regarding the validity of viewing both major characters and the German nation as culpable; for instance, he sometimes suggests the possibility that blame should be laid at the door of fate rather than moral failings in characters. Reitz further challenges distinctions between perpetration and victimhood and between Germans and other groups, partly in order to promote a greater sense of German moral normality against the background of the National Socialist past (although Reitz also has some reservations relating to how, how much and how soon Germans can move on from the legacy of National Socialism). In an attempt to arrive at a more attractive apparent moral balance, Reitz sometimes tends to relativise National Socialism. I consider Reitz's pursuit of an agenda of redemptive sacrifice of, or by, characters in the hope of winning some respite, or even moving on, from the National Socialist past. Reitz, I suggest, seeks consolation in relation to that past in concepts of heroism and tragedy. Generally, National Socialism is in the background of the filmic text (along with, in the case of the fourth series, colonialism); it is, nonetheless, a key background, one which Reitz – while sometimes tempted to partially obscure it – in many instances intends to be perceived and which he implicitly condemns.

### Notes on Terminology

In a number of quotations used in this dissertation – including some drawn from *Heimat* – *German* and *Germans* will be used in a somewhat narrow sense, one that can be exclusionary; for example, in the context of German perpetration under National Socialism *Germans* will sometimes mean (to cite Robert G. Moeller) ''Germans who had met the racial, religious, sexual and political criteria of the Third Reich'' (2005: 170), rather than those Germans who are frequently referred to (in the

context of perpetration and victimhood under National Socialism) rather in terms of being Jewish or other victims of National Socialism, such as (to cite Moeller again) ‘‘homosexuals, Sinti and Roma, Jehovah’s Witnesses and ‘asocials’’’ (ibid.). I will sometimes use *German*(*s*) in ways that follow on from the usage of the terms in cited material; in doing so I do not intend to contribute to a narrow understanding of Germanness but aim rather to indicate that I am addressing the meanings of the term that Reitz (or others) is (or are) using. I will not refer much to Heimat the wider concept, but when referring to the concept of Heimat as opposed to Reitz’s *Heimat* I will use the word without italics; whenever *Heimat* is italicised in this present work I mean by it specifically Reitz’s fiction. *Heimat* consists of four principal parts: *Heimat – Eine deutsche Chronik* (1984), which is set mainly in the fictional village of Schabbach in the Hunsrück region of the Rhineland, revolves around the local Simon family and spans around sixty years, beginning shortly after the First World War; *Die zweite Heimat – Chronik einer Jugend* (1992), which is set principally in 1960s Munich and follows Hermann Simon; *Heimat 3 – Chronik einer Zeitenwende* (2004), in which Hermann returns to the Hunsrück of the 1990s; and *Die andere Heimat* (2013), which features the Simons of the 1840s. There is also the self-explanatorily titled film *Heimat-Fragmente – Die Frauen* (2006). (I do not consider *Geschichten aus den Hunsrückdörfern* [1981]). Writing on *Heimat* has used various terms in various ways to refer to its constituent parts. I will refer to *Heimat* as a cycle consisting of four series divided into episodes.[1] To refer to Reitz’s *Heimat* as a whole, I will either simply say *Heimat* (while always specifying which series when indicating one in particular) or use the term cycle. Reitz has said in an interview that ‘‘all of my films are gradually growing into one film. [… .] I’d like to be able to say I’ve made only one film in my life’’ (in Angier, 1991: 38). My reading of the *Heimat* cycle finds that the four series show the consistent engagement with the same or similar concerns that would be

[1] The inconsistency as to how *Heimat* is best subdivided extends to Reitz himself: while the first *Heimat* announces itself as ‘‘ein Film in elf Teilen’’, Reitz has subsequently referred to it as consisting of ‘‘11 Spielfilmen’’ (2014: 289). While more could of course be said regarding the relationship of four *Heimat* series to one another and how they should be defined, it seems sufficient for the purposes of this work to note that that all four have *Heimat* in their titles and strongly interrelate. Examples of others who refer to *Heimat* as a whole as a ‘‘cycle’’ are Lúcia Nagib (2020: 226) and Hans Krah (2012 [in his title]).

expected on the basis of that statement of Reitz's, and I consider the development of these continuities across the cycle. It is, however, beyond the scope of this project to consider also Reitz's other work except in passing, not least since *Heimat* itself is so large a body of material. I will make occasional reference to the books that Reitz has written in relation to each series. These books consist of scripts with a variable – sometimes sparse, sometimes considerable – quantity of commentary by Reitz and also sections providing various forms of background information (on matters such as Reitz's inspiration, filming, cast et cetera); although the scripts provide their backbone, they do not fall very neatly into any single category such as script, novelisation or companion. These book versions often provide insights relevant to my argument, but I give priority to *Heimat* in its filmic form. Regarding dialogue, there is sometimes an advantage in citing from the published scripts in the book versions, in that it may be useful to see how Reitz himself chooses to set out the dialogue in its written manifestation.

Reitz's *Heimat* and Germany

In the wake of National Socialism questions relating to culpability and the possibility of redemption and Normalisation have naturally loomed large not only for Reitz but also for Germans far more generally. *Heimat* is very much, as Alon Confino notes, ''a project of national identity'' (1998: 199). Reitz's evolving presentation of culpability in his fictional Germany is of great importance to German identity in reality. *Heimat* engages with wider cultural concerns relating to National Socialism such as the feasibility and morality of Germany escaping the legacy of the moral abnormality of National Socialism. Beyond reflecting and discussing prominent issues in German culture, the first *Heimat* series became a landmark development in German identity, while the subsequent series have also been widely, albeit less widely, viewed. *Heimat*, as Eric Rentschler puts it, ''erhielt […] schnell den Charakter eines Nationalepos'' (1993: 310). A national epic is of course a key cultural referent of national importance, one that shapes a nation's understanding of itself, and a national epic is likely to have attained its status as a result of addressing issues that are recognised by much of that nation

as concerns that are particularly relevant to it and very possibly of a truly central importance to its identity. The first *Heimat*'s viewing figures alone (especially but not only in Germany) convey something of the scale of the impression that it made on the nation on which Reitz's fiction is based.[2]

Another indication of the first series' importance is to be found in the flurry of critical praise and condemnation that it was accorded. Within a year of its appearance it was sometimes lauded, often denounced for Reitz's take on how Germany could be portrayed, with the criticism overwhelmingly revolving around Reitz's approach to National Socialism. While they dispute the morality of Reitz's depiction of the National Socialist period, the critics most hostile to the first *Heimat* do anything but question its importance to the understanding of that past. Gertrud Koch sees Reitz's views (as published outside but, she plainly believes, reflected in) the first *Heimat* as a symptom of ''historischer Desensibilisierung'' (1985: 108) that was an indictment of German society more generally when the first *Heimat* appeared: she writes that ''der Erfolg, den er [Reitz] mit *Heimat* hat, belegt, wohin die Wellen des Zeitgeistes derzeit schlagen'' (ibid.: 109); and also recounts her alarm that the people watching it around her in a public viewing do not appear to her to share her condemnation of Reitz's approach (reproduced in Hansen, 1985: 20). The first *Heimat* quickly became viewed, therefore, as a text that must be understood in order to answer questions with far-reaching implications regarding (at least West) Germans' attitude towards the National Socialist past.[3]

Many critics have debated how the first *Heimat* should be interpreted in terms of its representation of National Socialism (as I will describe in my chapter on the first *Heimat*), but in this dissertation I hope to contribute to the understanding of Reitz's approach to National Socialism mainly by means

[2] Michael E. Geisler notes that ''25 million viewers or 54% of the [West German] viewing public watch[ed] at least one or several episodes'' (1985: 25).

[3] By 1985, the year following *Heimat*'s appearance, there were already multiple works (besides Koch's) treating it as such. For instance, Miriam Hansen argued that ''the most significant aspect of *Heimat* is its reception'' (1985: 3), while J. Hoberman suggested that ''far more interesting than Heimat itself is the question of why this glorified miniseries has been so uncritically received'' (reproduced in Hansen, 1985: 10).

of considering the evolution of his attitude to that past across the rest of the cycle – all of which, I argue, is shaped to a large degree by the background of National Socialism. The need to understand how National Socialism is portrayed in works with such significance to German identity as *Heimat* has of course persisted, and I trace the development of Reitz's approach to National Socialism across the entirety of the cycle, considering how it reflects, and is likely to make its own contribution to, the evolution of German (and indeed global) views of National Socialism over the course of the cycle. Critical discussion of the relevance of National Socialism to the second, third and fourth series has been less extensive than it has been in relation to the first. Although National Socialism has certainly been considered in relation to *Die zweite Heimat* (for instance, by Seifert [1999] and Scholz [1996]), I make original contributions to the understanding of the cycle regarding how much of *Die zweite Heimat* is shaped by Reitz's obsession with questions of fate and choice and their implications for determining culpability in the wake of National Socialism, and I also add to the critical debate by considering how these issues relating to fate, choice and culpability are interwoven with Reitz's interest in the possibility of German redemption and Normalisation of Germany. National Socialism and Normalisation have been appreciated as an important background to the third series – I will refer to other relevant criticism in my chapter on *Heimat 3*, but my argument addresses this debate in terms of indicating the range of methods with which Reitz pursues a normalising agenda. I make an original contribution to the understanding of the third *Heimat* in terms, for example, of how Reitz approaches (against the backdrop of National Socialism) the relationship between perpetrator and victim; make original remarks on redemptive sacrifice in *Heimat 3*; and analyse how Reitz depicts some characters as cursed by a fateful National Socialist legacy. I analyse National Socialism's relevance to Reitz's portrayal of culpability in the fourth series. So far little has been written about National Socialism in relation to the fourth *Heimat*. I arguing that Reitz's Normalisation efforts are ongoing in *Die andere Heimat*; that he continues to undermine the perpetrator-victim dichotomy as part of his Normalisation programme; and that he depicts German perpetrators of colonialism in Brazil as victims of fate.

Redemptive Sacrifice

I argue that Reitz allots multiple characters throughout the cycle sacrificial deaths that are intended to pay the price of either their or – more often – their ancestors' complicity in National Socialism. I will consider Ansgar in *Die zweite Heimat* in particular as a character whom Reitz employs as a scapegoat designed to contain and, if possible, expel some of the haunting psychological burden that later Germans inherited from the evils of National Socialism. A. Dirk Moses has proposed that ''the guilt / shame couplet so common both in public German and academic discourses about postwar Germany cannot account for the intergeneration transmission of moral pollution'' felt by non-Jewish Germans as well as his suggested ''alternative couplet: stigma and sacrifice'' (2007ii: 142). The stigma involves, Moses notes, ''the [German] intergenerational transmission of moral pollution signified by Holocaust memory'' (ibid.). Reitz treats this stigma that echoes down the generations as a fateful curse, one that develops in the first series, seems inescapable in the second, and that he tries to lay to rest in the third.[4] I would argue that Moses' ''stigma and sacrifice'' model describes Reitz's approach to National Socialism better than a model that emphasises shame. Reitz has indeed complained (writing less than three decades after the Holocaust) about Germans feeling excessively ashamed of the National Socialist past, writing that ''die Erinnerung verarmt, wenn wir uns schämen; und jetzt schämen wir uns, uns zu erinnern, nur weil eine Fernsehserie [*Holocaust*] uns moralisch niederbügelt'' (no date [1979]: 102). While this statement of Reitz's is certainly highly alarming, he has at least also clearly stated his belief in the importance of Germans combatting any continuation or resurgence of National Socialist-like attitudes, and suggesting that shame is sometimes unhelpful is not necessarily the same as stating that there is nothing to be ashamed of. Reitz regrets, in the same piece in which he complains of German shame, ''daß unsere Reflexe verkümmern, daß wir böse Ereignisse nicht mehr riechen, den Neo-Nazi nicht mehr […] identifizieren'', and notes that this ''Verkümmern der Reflexe ist sehr ernst zu nehmen'' (no date [1979]: 101). While I will argue that

[4] Lisa Hopkins notes Reitz's concern with ''the extent to which the pollution of the past can be purged'' (2014: 28)

Reitz certainly considers National Socialism in terms of guilt (but without the shame with which, as Moses says above, guilt tends to be coupled), Moses' stigma and sacrifice model can be applied well to Reitz's approach to National Socialism, and I will refer to it again in subsequent chapters.

Fate

Lisa Hopkins notes that ''a recurring word in *Die Zweite Heimat* is *Schicksal*'' (2014: 27), and the word is indeed particularly prominent in the second series, but also elsewhere in the cycle. I find that in the three later series – but not the first – these references to fate tend to conceive of fate as something that happens to characters, as opposed to that which they choose to do, of fate as a force against which characters tend to be powerless (although there is no unswerving consistency in this tendency – Reitz sometimes suggests characters have some degree of control over their lives). This concept of fate is then, a form of fatalism, one that casts doubt on the validity of viewing their actions as culpable. I take from Susanne Sauvé Meyer my working definition of ''fatalism about actions'': namely, ''that human intentions, deliberations, choices […] (indeed, all of the psychological contribution that, on most views, makes us responsible for our actions) are in fact irrelevant to our actions'' (1999: 257). This conception of fate is plainly one that lends itself to being invoked in order to deny people's culpability. There are of course other understandings of fate, not all of which are necessarily well suited to defending against accusations of having culpably done wrong. For instance, in the teaching of Augustine of Hippo a belief that actions are divinely predetermined (thus, in terms of being predetermined, fated, as the term is widely understood) coexists with a firm belief in there being a difference between good and evil, innocent and guilty: he states that ''if there is for God a fixed order of all causes, it does not follow that nothing depends on our free choice'', and that ''human acts of will are the causes of human activities'' (2003: 192 [V:9]), meaning that ''it is with justice that rewards are appointed for good actions and punishments for sins'' (ibid.: 195 [V:10]). Although Augustine is distrustful of some concepts of fate, he acknowledges that fate can reasonably be said to exist in terms of being a reflection of divinely (pre)determined order, stating

that ‘‘we should be able to use the word ‘fate’, […] except that this word is generally used in a different sense’’, and that ‘‘It is not that we deny a causal order where the will of God prevails; but we do not describe it by the word ‘fate’’’ (ibid.). The point is that Augustine rejects fatalism as defined above by Meyer (with its implications for culpability), rather viewing people as responsible for how they act, but at the same time, albeit reluctantly, he accepts a certain validity in the widespread view of fate that regards actions as pre-determined, writing that God ‘‘knows unalterably all that is to happen and what he himself is going to do’’ (ibid.). The view that the world has an ‘‘unalterably’’ preordained course is not very far removed from a common understanding of fate (or perhaps more specifically fatalism): to borrow the following definition from Robert C. Solomon, ‘‘fatalism is the idea that what happens (or has happened) in some sense *has* to (or *had* to) happen’’ (2003: 435). I refer to Augustine’s views because his views on predestination are in fact briefly mentioned in *Die zweite Heimat* by Hermann: the latter notes in a Religious Studies examination (I cite from the script as published) that the ‘‘Freiheitsbegriff’’ is ‘‘ein altes Streitthema […] – seit Augustinus. Schon im vierten […] Jahrhundert hat man sich über die Prädestination gestritten’’ (1993: 14). It seems likely that Hermann’s explanation of the significance of these debates – of which only the beginning is heard – will include reference to these debates’ relevance to questions of culpability, since the dialogue tails off at: ‘‘wenn Gott allmächtig ist und gleichzeitig allwissend, dann weiß er…’’ (ibid.). Reitz himself seems instead to be willing to entertain a fatalistic conception of causality.

In the critical literature discussion of issues relating to fate in *Heimat* is predominantly to be found in connection with the first *Heimat* (and I will survey it in my chapter on the first *Heimat*). So, in terms of discussing the relationship between fate and culpability in *Heimat*, the originality of my argument lies largely in my analysis of the other three series. In the second and third *Heimat* series, in contrast, characters belonging to younger generations are presented as victims of the inheritance of this process of supernatural punishment, as victims undeservedly punished for the actions of the

previous generations. Criticism has made fewer references to fate in relation to the second, third and fourth series than in relation to the first.

With the partial exception of some of those readings previously mentioned in this introduction, less sociological views of characters being unable to shape events are neither particularly extensive, nor the central argument of the pieces in which they are made. For instance, while Lisa Hopkins (2014) has discussed the prominence of references to fate in *Heimat*, this argument is subordinate to her main argument that *Hamlet* is an influence on *Heimat*, and her article does not extend very far beyond that principal argument in any depth. Meanwhile, Heinz-Peter Preußer argues that in *Heimat 3* ''die Akteure […] gestalten selbst und haben sich […] so wenig wie am Anfang [of the cycle], als sie unter den Zwängen des Dorfmilieus litten'' (2007: 51). Fate is not, however, a very major concern in Preußer's argument and his article refers almost exclusively to *Heimat 3*. Furthermore, Preußer appears to largely have a sociological view of control over one's circumstances in mind, given his reference to the ''Dorfmilieu[…]'', which suggests that he is thinking in terms of the potential contrasts between the social structures that might be supposed to typify village life in the early twentieth century as opposed to social circumstances more half a century later in the third *Heimat*. I, on the other hand, consider characters' freedom (or often lack thereof) rather in relation to Reitz's portrayal of the legacy of National Socialism as a fateful curse and his broad conception of fate as a somewhat vaguely defined magical force. I explore how Reitz pursues his interest in fate in the second, third and fourth series, and how this intertwines with his engagement with issues of culpability, an engagement which is characterised by (sometimes cautious and critical) attempts to cast doubt on the validity of ascribing culpability by questioning the validity of perpetrator-victim dichotomies and casting doubt on the culpability of German characters by suggesting that they are often mere pawns of fate.

Lack of the ability to choose how one acts – in other words, simply being at the mercy of fate – can be used to mount a challenge to drawing a robust distinction between perpetrators and victims in

the memory of the National Socialist period.[5] Helmut Schmitz observes that ‘‘while suffering is ethically neutral, with respect to the history of National Socialism the concepts of victim and perpetrator are ethically coded, victims being the object of an act of morally reprehensible victimisation’’ (2006: 94). In defining a ‘‘morally reprehensible’’ act many would argue that choosing to commit such an action, possessing malicious intent, is a key element. Elsewhere Schmitz notes that ‘‘within the framework of historiography of National Socialism and the Holocaust, the terms victim and perpetrator have precise meanings, suggesting innocent passivity on the one hand and responsibility and agency on the other’’ (2007: 14). Similarly, discussing the Holocaust as the ‘‘archetypal’’ genocide, Dirk Moses writes that ‘‘to qualify as genocide, the status of the victims is as important as the perpetrator: they must be innocent and agentless’’ (2021: no pagination). The creation of a fatalistic impression of characters’ ability to determine their circumstances thus threatens to undermine their seeming capacity for being perpetrators as defined by Schmitz and is liable to make them tend to appear closer to victims as defined by Schmitz and Moses in relation to the Holocaust. Whereas, Schmitz further points out, ‘‘in Holocaust historiography the term victim implies the agency of an identifiable act of perpetration’’, in some uses of ‘‘the term victim’’ in other contexts ‘‘there need not be a perpetrator’’; rather, the word victim may elsewhere be ‘‘semantically akin to ‘victim of an accident’’’ (2007: 14). Reitz’s approach to fate is, then, a significant factor in his portrayal of culpability given the former’s importance to the perception of the relationship between perpetration and victimhood. Encouragement of a fatalistic perspective can cast doubt on the possibility of there being a perpetrator, someone whose culpability arises from displaying (to cite Schmitz again) ‘‘the agency of an identifiable act of perpetration’’ (ibid.). Reitz’s interest in fate thus interrelates with his challenging of the validity of perpetrator-victim dichotomies (on which more will follow in this introduction), with both tending to undermine the

[5] By saying *simply at the mercy of fate* I mean *powerless against fate* in terms of the stance described by Meyer’s previously cited definition of ‘‘fatalism about actions’’ (1999: 257).

validity of ascribing culpability. Set against the National Socialist backdrop to the *Heimat* cycle, this attack on culpability can be related to some of what can be understood by Normalisation.

Normalisation

As Stuart Taberner observes, German ‘‘‘Normalization’ […] means different things to different people’’ (2005i: xiv). The perceived need for Normalisation essentially stems from, as Dirk Moses puts it, ‘‘the belief that the Holocaust was unique and that the German people/nation and its history were consequently abnormal’’ (2007ii: 151). Lothar Probst remarks that ‘‘until the late 1990s it was quite clear to people in Europe that responsibility for the Holocaust was a purely German matter and that this responsibility determined Germany’s status as an ‘abnormal’ nation’’ (2006: 61). This abnormality was at stake in the 1980s *Historikerstreit* in which, as Taberner and Paul Cooke note, ‘‘conservative historians began to challenge […] insistence on the uniqueness of German crimes and the absoluteness of German guilt’’ (2006: 5). Stephen Brockmann similarly observes that ‘‘the 1986 *Historikerstreit* […] revolved around the singularity or non-singularity of the Holocaust’’, with some of the participants arguing ‘‘that the Holocaust was not singular or incomparable’’ (2006: 26). Such incomparability distances the National Socialist past from the (relative) normality implied by comparability. Comparing National Socialist atrocities to other events and Germans of that period to other people can, then, be attractive to some as a route to a greater sense of German normality. Attempted Normalisation by means of comparison is often viewed as a, or even the, key feature of the *Historikerstreit*: Matthew P. Fitzpatrick comments that ‘‘Habermas [a leading critic of such comparisons …] remonstrated against the historicizing and therefore (in his view) normalization of the Nazi past’’ (2008: 482), while Dominick Lacapra notes that ‘‘during the Historians’ Debate […] tendencies toward normalization were prevalent’’ (1998: 7). Brockmann writes that ‘‘at the core of the […] *Historikerstreit*’’ ‘‘was’’ ‘‘what is known in legal practice as the *tu quoque* (‘you too’) defense, that is, the assertion that not just Germany but also many other nations have been guilty of genocide or other crimes against humanity’’ (2006: 26). Excessive relativisation of National Socialism

threatens to pursue a sense of German normality at the cost of seeming (to cite Robert Moeller) ‘‘to establish the moral equivalence of victims of Germans and German victims’’ (2005: 177). As Bill Niven notes, ‘‘creation of a victim collective in which Jews and Germans rank side by side serves to erase the essential difference between the status of these two groups’’ (2006: 13). I analyse how Reitz suggests equivalence between (non-Jewish) Germans and various other groups (such as Jewish people and Native Americans) in ways that are, I argue, intended to make the case the case for German normality, sometimes at the expense of acknowledging differences in how those groups have been treated.

Normalisation may consist simply of (to cite Taberner) the ‘‘claim that German identity in the present should no longer be read through the prism of the Nazi past’’ (2005i: xxii). Remarking on a major figure in the *Historikerstreit*, ‘‘Michael Stürmer, […] historian and advisor to Kohl’’, Taberner and Cooke summarise the general view of those critical towards him thus: ‘‘he and his political boss were set upon shaping a revisionist version of the Nazi past in order to normalize German identity in the present’’ (2006: 5). The form of Normalisation envisaged in the view described above applies not to pursuit of present and future normality in despite of acknowledged past moral abnormality but rather to a belief that it is necessary to make the past itself appear more morally normal as a prerequisite for the subsequent attainment of a sense of German normality. I will argue that Reitz’s pursuit of a greater sense of German normality at times extends (or, sinks) to attempts to make National Socialism itself seem more morally and historically normal to viewers (although without, I think, Reitz ever consciously seeking to trivialise National Socialism). In my view Reitz’s quest for a greater sense of German moral normality is relatable to the sort of Normalisation that is envisaged by Lacapra when he writes that ‘‘‘revisionists’ […] normalize the abominations of the Hitlerzeit’’ (1998: 12); by Konrad H. Jarausch when he argues that ‘‘Relativierung der NS-Verbrechen’’ (1995: 576) constituted ‘‘versuchten ‚Normalisierung‘ deutscher Vergangenheit’’ (ibid.: 575); by Erich Kuby when stating that to view ‘‘the German people as a people like any other leads, in the last instance,

to see even the 'successes' of its criminal energy as totally normal'' (cited in Moses, 2007ii: 152); and by Jeffrey K. Olick as I will cite him next.[6]

In considering Normalisation I find it useful to borrow Jeffrey K. Olick's terms in distinguishing also between ''normalization as relativization'' and Normalisation as ''regularization or ritualization''; in brief, the former entails the promotion of a sense of normality by means of drawing comparisons between National Socialism and other phenomena (much as discussed above), while the latter involves attempts to bring about normality by ritualistic means (1998: 553). As reflected in the previous paragraphs, Olick has ample company in viewing Normalisation in terms of ''relativisation'', while related concepts of ''ritualisation'' are also to be found elsewhere in connection with issues relevant to Normalisation: for instance, Taberner notes how ''the apparent ritualization of Holocaust remembrance may all too easily metamorphose into […] antipathy to Germany's ongoing engagement with the past'' (2005i: 116).[7] In his quest for a sense of German moral normality Reitz engages both with the ''ritualising'' Normalisation of redemptive processes and ''relativising'' means of Normalisation. Regarding issues that relate to Normalisation and the *Historikerstreit*, Santner (1992), Colin Townsend (1996: 188-190) and Palfreyman (2000: 69-83) have already done much to position the first *Heimat* in the socio-historical circumstances forming the background against which it emerged. Issues relevant to Normalisation as referred to in the paragraphs above will be relevant primarily to my chapters on the second, third and fourth series.

[6] Consider also Charles S. Maier's remark that ''if the Final Solution remains non-comparable […], the past may never be worked through, the future never normalized, and German nationhood may remain forever tainted'' (1997: 1) and Probst's statement that ''Auschwitz […] must always cast a shadow over Germany, and any attempt to commit the history of National Socialism to the past'' is ''thereby to normalize it'' (2006: 63), with ''it'', the direct object relative to ''normalize'' referring to the evil of National Socialism itself rather than only to post-National-Socialist Germany.

[7] Taberner is analysing a particular novel, F. C. Delius' *Flatterzunge*, but is at the same time commenting on circumstances more generally, writing of ''the narrator's generally valid criticism of the way […] public commemoration of the Holocaust can become ritualized, or even unconsciously ritualized as a barrier to an unmediated confrontation with the past'' (2005: 117). Ritual approaches to the National Socialist past can, in short, be used as a shield against full acceptance of that past's abnormality (but for a positive view of ''ritualised memory'' see Pearce, 2007: 7).

The first three series all emerged prior to Merkel's first government in 2005. Correspondingly, trends in German attitudes towards the past from around 2005 onwards (*Heimat 3* having appeared in 2004) are of limited relevance to the cycle – except of course in relation to *Die andere Heimat*. According to Ruth Wittlinger, the early years of Merkel's Chancellorship saw ''unambiguous acknowledgement of German responsibility arising from its Nazi past without any attempts to 'normalize' the German past'' (2008: 14). Writing in 2014, Eric Langenbacher emphasises institutionalisation rather than Normalisation in relation to how National Socialism is remembered: a ''narrative of a slow but steady rise and then an almost consensually accepted institutionalization of Holocaust memory has evolved over the last decade or so'' (2014: 63). Arguing that ''this period has been marked by the comprehensive institutionalization of […] Holocaust-centered memory'', Langenbacher cites as examples ''the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, finished in 2005'', ''the Documentation Center […] on the site of the Nuremberg Party Rally grounds since 2006, and the Topography of Terror museum, which opened in 2010 on the site of the […] Gestapo and SS headquarters'' (ibid.: 57). Such institutions, and other manifestations of such institutionalisation are not particularly reflected in the fourth series due to its period setting. The importance of institutions in Germany's approach to the National Socialist past is referred to in my chapter on the third series. Reitz's treatment of that past has as one of its foci Ernst's planned museum (the gestation of *Heimat 3* partly coincided with the long process leading to the first of Langenbacher's examples above, which, as Langenbacher notes, followed a ''fifteen-year discussion'' [ibid.]). In my chapter on the third series, I argue that Reitz is heavily concerned with attempts to contain the National Socialist past, and Reitz may well be somewhat criticising the sort of institution referred to by Langenbacher as places that some Germans may potentially seek to use to bind the National Past in the hope of winning some respite from it. Forms of institutionalisation were already relevant to the background of the first series too: Edna Lomsky-Feder, Tamar Rapoport and Yvonne Schütze suggest that ''it was the American TV series 'Holocaust' […] that steered a truly society-wide discourse about German crimes […] and strengthened the institutionalization of Shoah memories and commemoration in

Germany'' (2009: 125). Seen from this angle, Reitz's objections to *Holocaust* reflect a wider suspicion towards major trends in such institutionalisation (but probably do not reflect an objection on Reitz's part to the commemoration of the Holocaust per se). If the view of Mary Cosgrove and Annette Fuchs is applied to the first two series, then they essentially appeared too soon: writing in 2006, Fuchs and Cosgrove declare that ''after more than forty years of an institutionalized 'discourse of contrition', it has become possible at last to address the floating gap between the subjective experience of history and scholarly historical explanations'', a development to which they link ''the question of how we can make room for the articulation of the bottom-up experience of history without, however, opening the door to complete revisionism'' (2006: 6).

Dichotomies and Culpability

My discussion of Normalisation complements my consideration of Reitz's undermining of the good-evil and perpetrator-victim dichotomies, since part of the objective of Reitz's attack on these dichotomies is to assert German normality. Reitz states in an interview his determination to ''toujours nuancer la morale''; this declaration of a key principle in his work is a response to a question about the ''combat entre le bien et le mal dans Heimat'' (Eisenreich and O'Neill, 2006: no pagination). In his answer Reitz laments that ''les Américains ne peuvent pas vivre sans cette vision bipolaire'' (ibid.). On a very similar note Reitz complains elsewhere that ''die amerikanische Kultur hat die Ambivalenzen abgeschafft, weil sich das internationale Wegläufervolk mit Helden identifizieren will, die ihren eindeutigen, individuellen Weg machen'' (no date [1981]: 150). Reitz's comment on ''vision bipolaire'' reflects an attitude that is one of the keys to understanding the *Heimat* cycle: Reitz hates bipolar world views, views that cling to the opposites on which dichotomies are often based; hates views that shun a middle ground of nuance and the norms that lie between the opposing poles on scales such as good and bad. A major strand of this thesis considers the manifestations and implications of Reitz's strong dislike of ''vision bipolaire'', and how this dislike drives him to obsessively undermine dichotomies and what he considers to be overly

simplistic moral models in favour of presenting a nuanced, often, a more morally normal, fictional world in which relationships, whether between people, peoples or abstract concepts, defy clear categorisation.

Palfreyman has discussed Reitz's breaking down of binaries in relation to the first *Heimat* in relation to the concept of Heimat. She observes that ''Reitz […] uses an opposition between two women, Maria and Apollonia, to express accepted ideals of Heimat and *Fremde*'', then notes that Apollonia's ''name […] suggests the ambiguity of the Other, whereby the pole of a binary may contain its negative and its opposite within it. Apollonia does not just evoke pagan gods but specifically Apollo who for Nietzsche represented order and was opposed to the chaos of Dionysus'' (2000: 64). In a somewhat similar vein, Barbara Gabriel argues of the first Heimat that ''Reitz's film performs a mimesis of Freud's reading of the *unheimlich* as always already inside the *heimlich*'' (2004: 161). Also discussing the first series, Dagmar C. Stern argues that ''for Reitz, reality became fiction and fiction reality in his filmic synthesis of fiction and reality. Romantic theory, which Reitz echoes, considers such a synthesis of antithetical elements more true than the separate parts'' (1987: 15). Observing that Maria's name suggests ''the iconic virgin mother'' (despite Maria having an affair), Palfreyman asks, ''perhaps the binary structure is disrupted here by an ironic choice of names? Is Reitz setting up binaries only to render them inoperable through the deconstructive reading of the term 'Heimat' that he is undertaking in his text?'' (ibid.). Looking at his use of binaries more generally across the cycle as a whole, my answer is very much in the affirmative as to whether or not Reitz tends to create ''binaries only to render them inoperable''.[8] I find that Reitz suggests and then attacks binaries throughout the whole cycle, and I argue that in the second and fourth series he does so particularly with regard to the perpetrator-victim dichotomy. Discussing the first and, especially, the

[8] Palfreyman also refers to ''the blurring of simple oppositions surrounding the *Heimat* problem'' with regard to another opposition, namely ''Heimat […] opposed to *Beruf*'' (2000: 61). This comment refers to Carl Froelich's film *Heimat*, but, Palfreyman continues, this opposition is also ''an important theme for Edgar Reitz […]; in *Die zweite Heimat* […] Clarissa […] faces a choice between Heimat and Art, both alternatives leading to suffering'' (ibid.).

second series, Palfreyman also identifies a motif whereby two characters share a split identity, and in my own discussion of pairings in the cycle I will borrow Palfreyman's term ''split selves'' (2000: 203-211), and extend its meaning. I see a phenomenon along the lines of a ''split self'' in Reitz's presentation of characters (such as Ansgar, Reinhard and Esther in *Die zweite Heimat*) that are presented as perpetrator and victim in one so as to appear to be morally balanced out, with their moral status appear normal.

In her analysis of the first *Heimat* Gabriel demonstrates that Reitz extensively pairs characters (2004: 177-178, 188, 191-192) – ''characters and events are doubled throughout the film chronicle'' (ibid.: 160). This is an approach similar to Reitz's use of ''split selves'' in *Die zweite Heimat*. Gabriel points, for instance, to the relationships between Maria and Glasisch, ''this Other of Maria'' (2004: 192). Having pointed out the likely influence of Hoffmann's *Der Sandmann* as a source for the first *Heimat*, Gabriel argues that Klärchen's and Apollonia's ''names echo[…] with the split-woman of Hoffmann's ''The Sandman'': Olympia and Klara'' (ibid.: 188).[9] Gabriel does not propose a perpetrator-victim ''split self'' as I do, but she does suggest some broadly similar models: Glasisch is both Maria's ''double'' and ''embodies'' ''the site of exclusion'' ''throughout the film text'' (ibid.: 194) as an ''abjected im-pure of a traumatic history'' (ibid.: 192) to whose ''scarred hands'' the camera ''persistently returns'' (ibid.: 191); Glasisch and Maria, Gabriel's view suggests, are somewhat like a ''split self'' in which one half of the ''split self'' bears witness to elsewhere repressed suffering.[10] This pair is not a perpetrator-victim one, however, since Maria is not a good fit for the former of the two roles. Gabriel also notes the parallels between the treatment of Apollonia and Klärchen (ibid.: 160, 177), but this is a victim-victim pairing. Also, in these pairings, each half has one nature, whereas I consider Reitz's ''split selves'' in the rest of the cycle as pairings in which each half has two natures,

[9] Supporting Gabriel's argument that *Der Sandmann* is a source for the first *Heimat* is the fact that Reitz had previously turned to E. T. A. Hoffmann for inspiration: see Reitz, 2018: 80-81.

[10] This relates to Gabriel's discussion of how ''The dream of purity is exposed not only as an operation governed by repression'' (ibid.: 193), and also her discussion of ''disavowal'' (see, for instance, ibid.: 184, 188, 193). Thinking on somewhat similar lines (although his reading is in many respects very different to Gabriel's), Santner suggests that ''whatever traumata Paul may have brought back from the war […] will lead to a potentially dangerous splitting of the self'' (1990: 86).

being both good and bad, perpetrator and victim. In her identification of Reitz's ''pervasive critique of the dream of purity'' (ibid.: 186), however, Gabriel notes a dominant strand of Reitz's endeavours in *Heimat*, and, while Gabriel sheds light on the concept of purity's central importance to the first *Heimat*, I analyse the progress of Reitz's criticism of ideas of purity across the cycle. Whereas Reitz's undermining of concepts of purity in the first *Heimat* takes a positive form in terms of being a repudiation of National Socialist notions of racial purity, I contribute an analysis of the sometimes rather less positive implications of his approach to purity in the rest of the cycle, in which his hatred of the concept of purity drives Reitz's attacks on perpetrator-victim dichotomies and his creation of perpetrator-victim ''split selves''.

I argue that Reitz suggests and then attacks binaries throughout the whole cycle, and I build on Palfreyman's and Gabriel's discussion of binaries to contribute an argument that they have not made: that Reitz particularly uses ''split selves'' to break down perpetrator-victim dichotomies (principally in the second and fourth series). *Perpetrator-victim dichotomy* is a fairly common phrase in discussions of the representation of National Socialism.[11] In using this phrase I will mean to refer to the firm distinction frequently drawn between perpetrators and victims in this context; use of the term dichotomy reflects how (often though of course not always) in such discussions, as Moeller remarks, ''victims and perpetrators appear as mutually exclusive categories'' (2005: 171). Reitz very much appears to be reacting to this widespread dichotomous approach to the categories of perpetrators and victims in relation to National Socialism. I argue that by attacking the distinction between perpetrator and victim Reitz aims to assert German moral normality in the wake of National Socialism – if all are fated to be perpetrator and victim in one ''split self'', then it is normal for everyone to be the one as much as the other, removing or at least decreasing the potential for a sense of moral abnormality to arise from people (more specifically in Reitz's thinking, Germans)

[11] For example, the phrase is used by two contributors in the volume *A Nation of Victims: Representations of German Wartime Suffering from 1945 to the Present* (Schmitz [ed.], 2007): ''the perpetrator-victim dichotomy'' (Preußer in ibid.: 143); ''perpetrator/victim dichotomy'' (Schmitz in ibid.: 209).

being firmly categorised as either one or the other with regard to the perpetrator-victim dichotomy. If it is the common fate of humanity to be inevitably morally mixed to the extent that clear perpetrator-victim distinctions are in fact essentially invalid, as Reitz tends to suggest, then Germans in the post-Holocaust world – the implication made by Reitz appears to be – should collectively viewed as normal rather than overshadowed by an association with the perpetrator end of the perpetrator-victim dichotomy. Reitz's treatment of the perpetrator-victim dichotomy is highly relevant to wider debates about German victimhood. Aleïda Assmann characterises the perpetrator-victim dichotomy that often shapes discussions of Germans and others in relation to National Socialism as one in which ''die Kategorien von Opfern und Tätern'' come ''mit der größtmöglichen Trennschärfe'' in a ''rigide Klassifikation'' that ''errichtet einen Rahmen, in dem […] keine Zwischentöne, Widersprüche, Dilemmata, Ambivalenzen möglich sind'' (2006: 201) – the very complexities whose absence Reitz laments in his previously cited condemnation (in Eisenreich and O'Neill, 2006 [no pagination]) of ''vision bipolaire''. Questioning the rigidity of perpetrator-victim dichotomies relating to National Socialism can be seen in both positive and negative lights. Schmitz's view, for instance, spans both wariness and approval of opposing a sharp perpetrator-victim dichotomy: he writes that ''as German memory discourse moves into the 6$^{th}$ decade after the war, the potential lifting of a rigid binary perpetrator discourse in favour of a more inclusive picture is to be welcomed'' (2007: 17); elsewhere – in a piece published only a year earlier – Schmitz warns (referring to the period roughly between 1990 and 2006) that in some attempts ''to end the polarised memory discourse of German perpetrators and Jewish victims'' there is in many cases also a ''replacement of the image of perpetrator with that of victim'' (2006: 105) – a process to which I will refer in my chapter on *Heimat 3*, which is set in and made within the period that Schmitz is discussing. Appearing to show a ''replacement of […] perpetrator with […] victim'' in representations of German culpability (even when National Socialism is in the background rather than the foreground) is the great danger in Reitz's attack on the perpetrator-victim dichotomy and assertion of the oneness of perpetrator and victim. I do not suggest that Reitz's advocacy of nuance and

ambivalence is at all a bad thing per se, but consider instances in which it manifests itself in alarming ways.

Overall Summary

Reitz has written, ‘‘unsere Gefühle sind ausgebildet am Schicksalsgedanken, an dem Zusammenhang von Schuld und Sühne, an dem Zusammenhang von Handeln und Nichthandeln, von Heldentum und Feigheit und ähnlichen moralischen Gegensätzen’’ (no date [1981]: 176). Reitz is writing apropos of a particular event, the very sad story of the death of a friend, but the philosophy that he articulates can be traced through the whole of the *Heimat* cycle. Notions of fate, although often not very clearly defined, run through Reitz's four *Heimat* series, and are accompanied – as in the quotation above – by questions of ‘‘Schuld’’, ‘‘Heldentum’’ and ‘‘moralischen Gegensätzen’’. Reitz is consistently preoccupied by issues of culpability and the possibility of expiating that guilt (as per ‘‘Sühne’’). *Heimat* is Reitz's fictional Germany, and in the cycle some of the greatest questions revolve around to what extent, when and how Germany can be redeemed (in reality as well as in his fiction) – set free from some of the guilt inherited from the National Socialist period. Reitz asks – and to an extent answers – questions regarding the viability and implications of Normalisation of the present, questions as to whether Germany is able to escape the legacy of National Socialism that, I will argue, Reitz characterises as a fateful curse. In wondering whether and to what extent Germany can become free from this fate Reitz extensively engages with issues that can be usefully related to the concept of Normalisation. As part of his pondering of the possibility of redemption Reitz creates multiple characters who act (and in particular die) heroically, often self-sacrificingly, for the purposes of attempting redemptive acts. Reitz is not, however, necessarily uncritical of these heroic figures. Indeed, he prefers to present characters, including his (at least in part) heroic ones, as morally complex, and often morally ambiguous. In elaborating on the ‘‘Schicksalsgedanken’’, Reitz refers to ‘‘moralischen Gegensätzen’’ (ibid.). Reitz often shows himself unwilling to accept these ‘‘moralischen Gegensätzen’’ as separate entities (as if not in the ‘‘Zusammenhang’’ to which he refers); rather, he

prefers more nuance, and tends to seek out a more morally normal in between are that lies between clear categories. In the *Heimat* cycle as a whole the most important background to Reitz's exploration of moral issues is National Socialism. Reitz's quest for a moderate, normal (so to speak) moral middle ground should consequently be seen to a large extent in relation to his depiction of National Socialism, and in relation to Normalisation. Reitz has himself stated plainly that his interest in moral complexity is a fundamental motivation for his film making: ''la raison de mon travail repose sur […] volonté de toujours nuancer la morale'' (Eisenreich and O'Neill, 2006: no pagination). Reitz's commitment to moral nuance leads him to attack categories, especially regarding ''moralischen Gegensätzen'', including, and above all, the perpetrator-victim and good versus evil dichotomies, above all in relation to National Socialism. *Heimat* is, therefore, very relevant to wider issues in German recent culture regarding German victimhood and Normalisation. A great question in *Heimat* often concerns whether a character should be viewed as culpable or as victim of fate; and whether, if the character should be viewed as culpable, they must remain so, whether or not a sense of moral normality can be restored via redemptive processes. In addition, however, Reitz also questions the degree to which there is any clear distinction between innocence and guilt or, often, perpetration and victimhood. I analyse how Reitz's portrayal of culpability in relation to Germanness changes over the course of the *Heimat* cycle. I find that Reitz's drive to ''nuancer la morale'' and his Normalisation attempts firmly intertwine, both revolving around questioning the validity of a perpetrator-victim dichotomy and emphasising similarities between (non-Jewish) Germans and other groups as part of ''relativising'' Normalisation (which essentially involves, as I will discuss further, making Germany and/or Germans, in relation to its National Socialist history, appear more normal by means of making comparisons to other nations or other groups).

## The First *Heimat*: Reitz as Oedipus

In this chapter I will begin by surveying the critical debate on Reitz's approach to the Holocaust in the first *Heimat*, and make a few points of my own. The Holocaust is the outstanding atrocity in *Heimat*'s historic background, and, as I will argue over the subsequent chapters, heavily shapes Reitz's depiction of his fictional Germany throughout the entire cycle, particularly as the paramount context to his exploration of culpability. I will argue that Reitz's attitude towards showing German culpability in the National Socialist period is complex and fundamentally characterised by competing urges to both acknowledge and seek refuge from the awareness of the exceptional atrocities of the period. Reitz has referred to himself as ''jemand, der liebenswert und hassenswert in einem ist'' (no date [1981]: 141), and the coexistence of oppositions in this verbal self-portrait is paralleled by his approach to the National Socialist period in the first *Heimat*, an approach that is productive of self-contradiction. The complexity of the first *Heimat* is further increased by the combination of, on the one hand, instinctive and emotional responses and, on the other hand, intellectual reactions that the filmic text is at least intended to provoke in viewers; these two approaches may perhaps compete. In any case, Reitz (throughout the cycle) is reluctant to work in any excessively schematic way, giving his mixed thoughts and feelings considerable rein to create complex tensions and precarious balances – Reitz declares, ''wenn man nicht planen kann, geht alles schief. Aber für den Film ist es umgekehrt'' (in Subini [ed.] [''Tavola Rotonda''] 2008: 164). On the whole, I incline towards the view that Reitz in large part meant for many of his characters to be seen as culpably complicit in National Socialism, but will also consider instances in which Reitz succumbed to the temptation to take steps to undermine the appearance of guilt. Reitz depicts many characters as blameworthy accessories to the evils of National Socialism, but also pleads on their behalf for their status as pitiable victims, while also seeking to bestow on guilty characters a sort of tragic dignity. Reitz's acknowledgement of characters' culpability is in fact intended partly, in my view, to pave a road to forgiveness for morally compromised characters via the redemptive power of (Catholic) confession.

*Heimat* and the Holocaust

The first *Heimat* met with widespread condemnation regarding its portrayal of National Socialism, especially regarding the marginality of the Holocaust.[12] Writing in *Die Zeit* newspaper, Saul Friedländer considered Reitz to be guilty of a ''Verschleiern der Greueltaten'' (cited in Koch, 1985: 108); Gertrud Koch argues that ''um den Mythos Heimat erzählen zu können, das Trauma Auschwitz'' ''muß'' ''aus der Geschichte ausgeklammert werden'' (1985: 107), while Werner Barg similarly perceives an ''*Errettung der deutschen Heimat* durch die weitgehende thematische Ausgrenzung der NS-Verbrechen, speziell der Judenvernichtung'' (1996: 300); Alon Confino sees a desire ''to obscure the Holocaust'' (1998: 208). There is no doubt that in the first *Heimat* the Holocaust is decidedly marginal on a superficial level. As to Reitz's motives for marginalising the Holocaust, critics hostile to him tend to take the view that he simply wished to present a positive view of Germany in the National Socialist period. For instance, Townsend argues that the first *Heimat* ''was a comforting film'', and notes, apparently in a spirit of agreement, that the first *Heimat* ''seemed to'' hostile critics ''to be offering its German viewers not truth, but the image they wanted of themselves […] between 1919 and 1982'' (1996: 193) (see also Koch, 1985: 107).

Regarding the means by which Reitz, it has often been argued, avoids adequately acknowledging the Holocaust, the most common accusation is in essence that he simply decided to omit indications of it: for example, Koch states that ''the film reproduces the standard ellipses concerning the elimination of the Jews'' (reproduced in Hansen, 1985: 16); Graham Bartram writes that ''Reitz's epic bypasses the fate of the Nazis' Jewish victims'' (1996: 17). For Confino, a historian, the problem in the first *Heimat* lies largely in Reitz pursuing ''story telling'' as opposed to history telling: he writes that Reitz wrongly preferred a ''conception of history based on memory, experience and story

[12] References to the marginality of the Holocaust abound. Santner refers to ''marginalization of the fate of the Jews in *Heimat*'' (1990: 94); Alon Confino to ''marginal treatment of the Holocaust'' (1998: 187). See also: Miriam Hansen, 1985: 4; Rob Burns and Wilfried van der Will, 1995: 319; David Morley and Kevin Robins, 1995: 93; Michael Geisler, 1985: 28. Inga Scharf even suggests, somewhat hyperbolically, that ''there are no representations of anti-Semitism'' (2008: 107).

telling'' (1998: 186). A limitation of Confino's reading is that it appears not to fully appreciate that viewers' imaginative engagement with the first *Heimat* may well substantially compensate for problematic absences on the surface level of the narrative.

In terms of criticisms besides those relating to the marginality of the Holocaust, one strand of criticism is exemplified by Townsend's comment that the only Nazis present are portrayed as ''tiny Nazi minorities, despised, ignored or ridiculed by the majority of good, ordinary citizens'' (1996: 196).[13] Reitz's anti-Americanism has also come in for criticism: Elsaesser comments that ''fascism and pro-Americanism are […] closely allied'' (2005 [1985]: 385), while Santner writes that ''the American, America, and American aesthetics […] come to stand for the 'real terror' and for the 'deepest loss' in a film about Germany in the period of history which includes […] the Holocaust'' (1990: 80). In terms of methods of avoiding the proper acknowledgement of the moral status of National Socialist Germany, Reitz has also been criticised for his construction of culpability in relation to characters' degree of choice, but I will describe these criticisms later in this chapter. One strand of criticism of Reitz addresses the first *Heimat* somewhat indirectly at times due to being based very heavily on comments that Reitz has made outside the film.[14] I will also cite Reitz's writings frequently, as they are highly relevant to understanding his filmic work.

Over the course of time criticism has tended to become less hostile to Reitz's portrayal of National Socialism in the first *Heimat*.[15] For instance, writing twenty years after the appearance of the first *Heimat*, Glen Creeber follows in the footsteps of earlier commentators in noting that ''the Holocaust is pushed to the margins of the narrative'' (2004: 41) – but with the crucial difference that he says

[13] For broadly similar comments, see Elsaesser, 2005 (1985): 385 and Hoberman reproduced in Hansen, 1985: 9. Palfreyman argues that ''it is those with material aspirations who wholeheartedly embrace it [National Socialism]. This has the effect of establishing immunity for the peasant farmers and artisans who constitute most of the village'' (2000: 105-106).

[14] As per Koch, 1985: 108 and much of Santner, 1990 – for instance, Santner argues, largely on the basis of his interpretation of Reitz's remarks, that ''the Jews figure, according to Reitz's logic, as a metonymy for the very forces that lead to their destruction'' (ibid.: 81) (see also Wickham, 1991: 42). I would agree that the comments to which Koch, Santner and Wickham refer certainly have suspect elements.

[15] Earlier critics were not unanimously hostile though. For example, Stern described the first *Heimat* as ''an intellectually-sophisticated, multi-layered masterpiece'' (1987: 10).

this in the midst of a defence of Reitz, writing: ‘‘while it may seem unforgiveable that any account of World War II should marginalize the Holocaust, *Heimat* does so in order to construct a different sense of perspective to other filmic or televisual accounts of the war’’, this perspective being ‘‘one which attempts to place the viewer in a deliberate act of identification with its characters, not in order to absolve responsibility for their actions but simply in order to understand them better’’ (ibid.). I would tend to agree with Creeber that viewers are meant to identify with characters complicit in National Socialism, and will be returning to this point.[16] Creeber elaborates that the first *Heimat*’s ‘‘implicitly subjective version of the past reveals the way the German people themselves may have learnt to accept and deny the horrors taking place around them and in their name’’ (ibid.), and this illustration of ‘‘national repression […] offers one of the most revealing insights into how such atrocities can ever occur’’ (ibid.: 42) (see also Martin Swales, 1992: 127). In Creeber’s view, ‘‘the serial does not suggest that the German people were completely ignorant of the facts […], but that they chose simply to push it to one side’’ (ibid.). Stuart Liebman sees in the first *Heimat* ‘‘conspicuous evasiveness’’ and ‘‘token acknowledgements of the Jews’ fate’’ (1996: 43), while Hoberman writes of ‘‘the blatant tokenism with which the film handles the more problematic aspects of German history’’ (reproduced in Hansen, 1985: 9). Creeber’s reading (as cited above) would appear to agree that there is (as Liebman says) a ‘‘conspicuous evasiveness’’ (Liebman, 1996: 43), but sees the evasiveness as a refusal to face unwanted historical realities on the part of Reitz’s characters, as opposed to on the part of Reitz himself.

A central strand of Barbara Gabriel’s defence of the first *Heimat* is broadly similar to Creeber’s argument that, with a didactic purpose in mind, Reitz shows characters repressing knowledge of National Socialist atrocities: she declares, ‘‘far from effacing the darkest corners of twentieth-century German history, Reitz’s epic film is engaged in […] a radical analysis of the structures of the

[16] The first *Heimat* was arguably ahead of its time in terms of encouraging viewers to see from the perspective of perpetrators to some extent. Taberner writes of the early period of Schröder’s Chancellorship, which began fourteen years after the appearance of the first *Heimat*, that ‘‘it was now acceptable to discuss whether it was right to attempt to ‘understand’ the perpetrators’’ (2004: 7).

subject that enabled them'' (2004: 152). Gabriel makes an extremely persuasive argument that Reitz shows characters' repression of clear acknowledgement of the evil in their society, particularly by means of an extensive and elaborate exploration of the theme of vision (2004: 167-178), and I will add several observations of my own on vision in this chapter. It is useful to note that Reitz has an interest in Freud, whose theories Gabriel revealingly relates to the first *Heimat* (more or less throughout her reading).[17] Gabriel demonstrates that Reitz uses the theme of vision to reflect on ''the concept of projection bound up with the making of the Other'' (ibid.: 174) and on how the ''figure of the uncanny eye'' points towards ''disavowal'' (ibid.: 173). As is described by Gabriel's reading as a whole, that which is disavowed is the suffering (almost all it of ultimately relatable to National Socialism) that characters choose not to see, suffering which includes the Holocaust, the Holocaust being, as Gabriel argues, ''the […] event that is the structuring absence of the text'' (ibid.: 184). Gabriel's identification of vision as a dominant theme in the first *Heimat* is borne out by Reitz's declaration that ''film art has the task to slowly and gently learn [sic] us to see […]. A school for the eyes'' (cited in Mijić, 2006: 51). Mijić notes that ''Reitz' Kritik des Illusionskinos lehrt den Zuschauer wieder zu sehen'' (2006: 211). Similarly, Wickham has pointed out that ''Reitz demonstrates the falsity of media presentations of ceremonial events in his depiction of the filming of Anton's proxy wedding'' and also ''foregrounds the aesthetic of Fascist filmmaking'' in another scene, so that ''*Heimat* […] contributes to a raising of the level of media literacy'' (1991: 40). Reitz claims, ''es war mir immer wichtig, nicht die Augen zu verschließen, wenn es um die Abgründe der Geschichte geht. Aber ich finde nicht, dass ich das Urteil über Gut und Böse fertig mitliefern muss. Das müssen wir […] dem Zuschauer […] überlassen'' (2018: 262). Reitz is not amoral, but insists upon viewers learning to look carefully and grow morally by reaching their own moral verdicts rather than being uncritically dependent on others' perspectives. In the first *Heimat* Reitz meant, to a large extent, to teach

[17] For an indication of Reitz's respect for Freud, see Dollner's interview with Reitz (Dollner, 2005: 17) – which will be cited later in this chapter. When Reitz complains (in relation to *Holocaust*), ''die Erinnerung verarmt, wenn wir uns schämen'' (no date [1979]: 102), he is perhaps applying Freud's well-known concept of ''Ich-Verarmung''.

viewers to see further than most of the characters see. Yet, as will be discussed, there was a considerable degree of contradiction in Reitz's objectives; Reitz also employs strategies to limit the extent to which some characters appear guilty.

Gabriel is not the only person to comment on presence as absence in relation to the first *Heimat*: Santner notes that ''Jews never actually enter the frame but are present rather in three different modes of absence: […] fantasy […]; […] cliché […]; or [according to Santner's {1990} reading as a whole, far too] absent cause'' (1990: 94). Regarding characters' subconscious awareness, Barg suggests some instances of ''*unbewußten* ideologiekritischen Haltungen der Figuren'' (1996: 298). Roger Hillman cites Elsaesser on '''the Holocaust in West German cinema: absence as presence''' (Elsaesser as cited by Hillman), and proposes that Elsaesser's comment is applicable to the *Heimat* cycle; Hillman concisely refers to Elsaesser's argument to suggest that *Heimat* is an instance in which ''that history [the Holocaust]'' is ''treated'' ''in concealed form'' (2010: 253) (see also ibid.: 265-270 for Hillman's points on National Socialism in the subtext in *Heimat 3*). As Hillman observes, Elsaesser's argument ''demands a reassessment of much criticism of the New German Cinema'' (ibid.). Elsaesser contends ''that nowhere is the absence of the consequences of the Holocaust more present than in the New German Cinema of the 1970s'' (2008: 109). I would very much agree with Hillman that Elsaesser's argument ''is arresting […] and sustainable too […] for Edgar Reitz's *Heimat* trilogy'' (Hillman, 2010: 253), and would like to briefly build on Hillman's recognition of the relevance of Elsaesser's argument to *Heimat*, an argument which is very much akin to Gabriel's assertion in relation to the first *Heimat* that Reitz ''draws conspicuously on a grammar of […] displacement'' (2004: 158) and that ''history is out of place here as well as out of time'' (ibid.: 159). Of the ''absence as presence'' that he has in mind, Elsaesser writes, ''it often seems to figure 'the right thing at the wrong place, the wrong thing at the right time''' (2008: 109); he gives the following example – ''when the heroine [of *Die Ehe der Maria Braun*] places a rose on a hat stand, and her

handbag in the flower-vase'' (ibid.).[18] Elsaesser's example from *Die Ehe der Maria Braun* seems relatable to some of Reitz's comments in Santner's interview of him: ''in this [hypothetical] apartment you have all the things […] that have meant something to you in your life … . Amidst these things there is a vase. […]. One day it is no longer there and then, perhaps, you feel its absence. […]. I'm trying to achieve something similar'' (Reitz as cited in Santner, 1990: 96).[19] What Reitz is, by his own account, attempting sounds very similar to what Elsaesser discusses in relation to Kluge and Fassbinder (he mostly takes his examples from Kluge's work).[20]

Julia F. Klimek, somewhat like Creeber and Gabriel, argues that ''Reitz […] does not 'leave out' […] parts of history, but shows *how they are left out*'' (2000: 240), and notes by way of example that ''Glasisch-Karl, Reitz's narrator […] casually suppresses events, seemingly oblivious to the evidence before him'' (2000: 242). Wickham writes that ''beyond the level of plot *Heimat* thematizes the processes of representation and mediation and places before the viewer an account of the construction and limitations of its own text'' (1991: 37), and ''provides cinematic cues to prompt activation of the spectator's knowledge of the horrors'' (ibid.: 40). Scholz argues that '''Ausblendungen''' ''verweisen'' ''auf Verdrängungsmechanismen'' (1996: 59), while Palfreyman similarly suggests that ''the omission of anti-Semitism from *Heimat* could […] be read as an allusion to the repression that went on in Germany during and after the Third Reich'' (2000: 105). Thomas

[18] Hillman draws on Elsaesser's argument as published elsewhere (see Hillman, 2010: 270). The article from which I am citing Elsaesser contains closely related material to Hillman's source: as Elsaesser very clearly acknowledges, ''parts of'' the 2008 article from which I cite ''were […] published'' in the source that Hillman is using (Elsaesser, 2008: 118).

[19] While Elsaesser mentions the first *Heimat* in the article in which he argues for ''presence as parapraxis'' (ibid.: 106-107), it stands a stark exception to his general characterisation of the New German Cinema: Elsaesser focuses on ''the 1960s and 1970s'' (ibid.: 107) and refers to ''the excessive looking during the 1980s and 1990s'' – ''excessive [physical rather than metaphysical] looking'' is not a description that fits *Heimat* well.

[20] Santner reads Reitz's remark somewhat differently to how Elsaesser reads rough parallels in films by Kluge and Fassbinder (see Santner, 1990: 96-97), although Santner does note, shortly before quoting Reitz as cited above, that ''Reitz […] insists that his narrative film aesthetic is not without a moral and political dimension'' – but Santner thinks that Reitz does not want viewers ''to engage in […] identifications with superior moral positions'' (ibid.: 96), and is generally mistrustful of Reitz's intentions. In his first sentence after citing Reitz as quoted above, Santner concludes that ''Hermann [… is] arch-mourner in and for the Heimat'' (rather than for, Santner seems to implicitly state, those persecuted by the Nazis) (ibid: 97). In my view Elsaesser's reading of the handbag-and-vase-scene in *Die Ehe der Maria Braun* points to the viability of a charitable interpretation of Reitz's comments about the haunting potential of a vase.

Koebner suggests that ‘‘dem Thema Holocaust eignet ein legitimer Verdrängungseffekt: Es darf […] im Grunde nichts außer ihm geben’’, reasoning that films that approach the Holocaust respectfully ‘‘dulden keine Abschweifungen und Nebenhandlungen’’ (2015: 155).[21] In my view, however, Gabriel (2004) is right in arguing that the first *Heimat* is about the Holocaust to a considerable extent, and that the film's characters repress the Holocaust far more than Reitz does in the first *Heimat*. Santner also perceives a portrayal of repression by characters in the scene showing the persecution of Robert's Jewish neighbour, which Santner views as ‘‘the scene that is most emblematic of […] repression’’ (1990: 92), and writes that this persecution is ‘‘absorbed into a sentimental story of courtship and matrimony, that is, into experience. It is, of course, the filmmaker who is exposing this mechanism, who is depicting how experience forms and constructs itself around blindspots’’ (ibid.: 92).[22] Yet Santner speculates as to ‘‘whether the filmmaker is not in the end complicitous with such mechanisms’’ (ibid.). I would tend to partially agree with Santner; in my view Reitz in part succumbs to much the same temptations as his characters in terms of reluctance to face unwelcome realities, but succumbs less than his characters, and there are compelling reasons to suppose that Reitz's depiction of repression is in part meant to serve an admirable didactic purpose.

Kaes finds that the camerawork ‘‘from the outset implies that the viewer's perceptions are dependent on what the camera captures’’ (Kaes, 1989: 175). Confino, despite being highly critical of Reitz on the whole, acknowledges that ‘‘the film calls upon viewers to be conscious of the deceptiveness of the camera’’ (1998: 189). Richard Kilborn observes that ‘‘stylistically […] Heimat includes no small number of features which encourage a reflective and critical response’’ (1995: 96). Julia F. Klimek argues that some characters ‘‘model strategies for interacting critically with filmic and photographic documentation’’ (2000: 228). These arguments suggest, in short, that Reitz does not in

[21] Galli, meanwhile, suggests that ‘‘Reitz […] parte dal presupposto che è possible rappresentare in modo adeguato l'Olocausto solo all'interno di un contesto rigorosamente documentario […] e *Heimat* è tutto tranne un documentario’’ (2005: 158).

[22] Gundolf Hartlieb also reads this scene in terms of repression, observing that the persecuted Jewish neighbour ‘‘kommt im Film nicht vor, weil er im Denken und Fühlen seiner Nachbarn nicht vorkommt’’ (2004: 75).

fact intend to use his film to narrow viewers' perception of the past (to the exclusion of the Holocaust), but rather to be more aware of the limitations acting on the breadth of their images of the past. Scholz interprets some of Reitz's comments apropos of the American series *Holocaust* thus: ''Repetition des Immergleichen läßt sich als Verlust von Sinn […] begreifen'' (1996: 37). The problem of repetition also features in Kaes' following characterisation of ''the historical films of the New German Cinema'' (amongst which he includes the first *Heimat*): ''they provide alternative ways of seeing with their self-reflexive narrative and visual style […] and, above all, their refusal for the most part to recycle endlessly repeated and clichéd images of the Third Reich'' (1989: 197) (von Moltke also draws on Kaes' comment in relation to Reitz, but applies it to *Die zweite Heimat* rather than the first [2003: 129]). Thinking along broadly similar lines to Kaes and Klimek as cited at the beginning of this paragraph, Creeber argues that Reitz does not make any false claims to be providing viewers with a comprehensive picture of the first *Heimat*'s historical setting and that viewers can reasonably be expected to understand this: ''*Heimat*'s purpose is not to give *the* history of modern Germany, but to give *a* history'' (2004: 41). (In a similar vein, Kaes writes, ''*Heimat* resists the attempt to write *one* history of Germany'' [1989: 173] [see also ibid.: 185].) Creeber elaborates that ''the serial seems intuitively in touch with contemporary historicism, particularly the notion that history is simply another discourse, and that it should never, in any circumstances, be confused with 'the past'' (ibid.: 41).[23] Creeber further argues that (by interrupting the black and white) ''colour sequences […] seem to self-reflexively foreground the fact that these are not *real* events taking place, that they are being 'filtered' by something or someone'' (ibid.: 40), emphasising, therefore, that viewers are seeing a particular history as opposed to what Creeber calls '''the past''', history in a more singular sense.[24]

[23] Carol and Robert Reimer distinguish between ''political history'' and ''personal history'' (1992: 190), the latter – which they also refer to as ''history writ small'' (ibid.: 191) – allegedly being Reitz's preference. Unlike Creeber, the Reimers are critical of Reitz's ''attempt to separate 'History' from 'history'' (ibid.: 188), arguing that due to ''keep[ing] personal history and political history separate, [… *Heimat*] create[s] a subtext that suggests there was a gulf between the people and nazism'' (ibid.: 192). Similarly, Barg sees an ''*Entpolitisierung* der nationalsozialistischen Zeit'' (1996: 299).

[24] Reitz pre-emptively answers a call the historian Robert Moeller makes twenty years after the first *Heimat*'s appearance, a call, made in relation to the Second World War and including Germans, for ''different modes of commemoration and remembrance, many histor*ies*, not one single history'' (2005: 178).

Mijić makes a closely related point in summarising what Reitz implies via his depiction of photography in the first *Heimat*: ‘‘die Fotografie ist nicht die Wiedergabe der Realität, sondern eine kunstvolle Herstellung einer eigenen, selektiven und subjektiven Wirklichkeit’’ (2006: 52). Mijić observes that there are ‘‘zahlreiche Brüche’’ in the narrative, ‘‘die die Selbstreflexion anregen’’ and ‘‘zwingen den Zuschauer, die Augen und Ohren zu öffnen und nicht einem vereinfachenden Filmrealismus auf den Leim zu gehen’’ (ibid.: 66). As those cited above point out, Reitz takes considerable care to highlight *Heimat*’s selectivity and, by implication, the presence of omissions.

To a large extent, attitudes to the first *Heimat* have revolved around selectivity and the history-past relationship. Koch and Confino (for example) appear to essentially take the view that *Heimat* should be judged in large part as a work that fails morally because it is selective in its history and does not allocate National Socialist atrocities an obviously central place in its narrative by showing them clearly (Koch writes that ‘‘was in *Heimat* zu Grabe getragen wird’’ is ‘‘der schmale Konsens darüber, daß von deutscher Geschichte sich nicht reden und denken läßt, ohne Auschwitz mitzudenken’’ [1985: 108]). As Wickham puts it, Reitz’s ‘‘critics would argue that’’ acknowledging the Holocaust more clearly ‘‘is necessary for any text purporting to cover the German history of this period’’ (1991: 37). History in that sense is decidedly singular, more like what Creeber calls ‘‘‘the past’’’ than what Creeber calls history. Creeber’s distinction speaks to broader debates of course. The embrace of histories as opposed to history can, speaking more generally, potentially be seen in relation to a movement away from acknowledgement of German guilt: for instance, addressing (to cite from the piece’s title) ‘‘Contemporary German Memory Culture, Literature and Film’’ around 2007, Schmitz considers as recent phenomena both ‘‘the end of the discourse of guilt and contrition’’ and ‘‘a pluralisation of historical narratives – a renunciation of historical ‘master narratives’’’ (2007: 5).

Wickham remarks that ‘‘references [to persecution of Jews that are present] serve to remind the spectator to provide the well known missing images’’ (1991: 37). Lena Scholz also refers to there being ‘‘Hinweise’’ pointing to the Holocaust (1996: 58), but acknowledges that ‘‘natürlich werden

manche auch diese Verweise übersehen und überhören'' (ibid.: 58-59). To what extent these ''Verweise'' are registered by viewers is difficult to say. Palfreyman writes, ''it is in my view still unclear whether the more differentiated aspects of *Heimat* were ignored by an unsophisticated public, or whether audiences were able to evaluate the film's critical potential'' (2000: 41), and her comment captures a state of affairs that has probably endured up to the time of writing. To a significant extent, I follow the aforementioned arguments in favour of Reitz having very much intended viewers to follow hints that should lead them to recalling the horrors of the German past that are in the background rather than the foreground of Reitz's depiction of the period. It is uncertain, however, as to the extent to which these hints have generally sufficed. Also, I take the view that part of Reitz could not resist taking some measures to muffle the screams of the National Socialist period.

Wickham cites Reitz's remark that '''the question of Jews under National Socialism is a theme which has been treated in an infinite number of stories''' (1991: 37), and comments, ''Reitz implies with this answer that because the theme has been treated in an 'infinite number of stories,' it is well enough known to be supplied by his audience'' (ibid.). Reitz defends himself, then, on the basis that the Holocaust will always be central to the viewer's viewing of the first *Heimat* regardless of whether or not it is shown; from this perspective, depicting National Socialism at all without strongly reminding viewers of the Holocaust is not a possible moral failure but rather a logical impossibility. Palfreyman accepts and summarises the approach that Wickham attributes to Reitz, while also noting that danger lies in *Heimat*'s ''heavy reliance on the input of the spectator'' (2000: 105): she observes that ''many spectators will have some prior knowledge of what happened in the Third Reich and so will view this text with the superimposition of other (visual) texts of the Holocaust'' (ibid.: 108); on the other hand, she suggests, ''perhaps he [Reitz] assumes too much'' (ibid.) on this score. Lena Scholz comments that ''jeder weiß, daß [… the Holocaust] zeitgleich passiert ist'' (1996: 58). Hartlieb writes of the relevant ''historisch-politischen Zusammenhangs'' in the first *Heimat* that ''dieser bleibt als Subtext ja durchaus lesbar'' (2004: 64). Scholz observes that ''zumindest die

Kritiker und Kritikerinnen waren in der Lage, die Kluft zwischen der als ziemlich 'heil' erinnerten Welt von Schabbach und der Realität von Auschwitz zu erkennen'' (1996: 59). In a sense, critics who believe that there is an inadequate recognition of the Holocaust in *Heimat* are extremely well aware of the Holocaust during their viewing of *Heimat*; the Holocaust's superficial absence possibly makes those critics reflect on the Holocaust rather more than a more obvious representation of it would – perhaps this holds true also of many other viewers.[25]

Palfreyman points out that ''a text is not dangerous in a vacuum, it is the dangerous because of the way people view it''; argues in favour of ''mov[ing] away from the idea of a homogeneous reception and towards positing difference modes of spectatorship''; and notes of much criticism on the first *Heimat* that ''frequently it is implied that although the critic […] can see through the ideological problems […] 'ordinary' spectators will not be able to'' (2000: 106).[26] In my view it seems a reasonable supposition that Reitz harbours certain hopes regarding how his films are understood, but it appears highly unlikely that he would wish to impose overly specific meanings on viewers even if he could do so – after all, Reitz defines (good) art particularly in terms of resistance to overly fixed meanings: ''Kunst ist vieldeutig, ein ewiges Rätsel'' (Reitz, no date [1979]: 108). Reitz writes in relation to the fourth series, ''die Zuschauer werden zu keiner bestimmten Interpretation gezwungen. Alles ist in der Kunst mehrdeutig'' (2018: 369). There is a scene in the first *Heimat* in which Wohlleben remarks of rings widely worn by members of the Organisation Todt that ''die Ringe sind gleich aber sie bedeuten jedem was anderes''. Gabriel sees this comment in the following light: ''Reitz persistently returns us to radical questions of the subject […] in national history'' (2004: 182). Viewing experiences of the first *Heimat*, as Wohlleben says of the rings, ''bedeuten jedem was anderes''. In giving Wohlleben this line, Reitz is probably aiming to remind viewers that they are to a

[25] A rough parallel would be an effect that Elsaesser believes to be at work in a scene in Kluge's *Die Patriotin*: a ''nam[ing of] something more insistently by not naming it'' (2008: 118).
[26] Mijić speculates that ''Reitz' subtile Verfremdungstechniken'' (2006: 198) possibly ''nur das Bildungsbürgertum […] oder zumindest einen sehr kleinen Kreis von Kunstfilm-Eingeweihten zu aktivieren vermögen'' (ibid.: 198-199).

large extent responsible for the meanings that they find in *Heimat*. In the context of a fiction that is set partly during National Socialism, it seems a reasonable assumption that morally competent viewers will show some initiative in taking care to watch warily. Bauer writes of Reitz's approach to film, ''das Zusammenziehen verschiedener Eindrücke zu einem Zusammenhang, der sich auf die Kategorien der Konsekutivität und Kausalität beziehen und anhand dieser Kategorien auslegen lässt, obliegt dem Zuschauer'' (2012: 83). In accordance with the logic of Bauer's point, viewers who fail to perceive the evil in much of the first *Heimat*'s setting are perhaps more to blame than Reitz, who writes the following in relation to the fourth series, ''Zuschauer'', ''Interpretation'' and ''meine eigene Absicht'': ''wer es nicht sehen will, wer dafür nicht empfänglich ist, muss es nicht sehen'' (2018: 369). It seems unlikely that Reitz would be able to convince Holocaust-deniers to accept reality by acknowledging the Holocaust in more explicit fashion in *Heimat*, and Reitz probably expected that no historically and morally competent person would fail to be aware of the Holocaust's presence as a key background to the first *Heimat*.[27]

Reitz's reluctance to impose particular meanings should be seen in the light of an anti-Fascist endeavour on his part. Control of narratives was naturally an aspect of National Socialism's totalitarianism, and Wohlleben's insistence that the same rings can have diverse meanings is a small act of resistance to the destructively anti-pluralist ideology summed up by the notorious slogan *Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer*. As someone who insists that ''Kunst ist vieldeutig'' (no date [1979]: 108), so opposed to the merciless pursuit of homogeneity, Reitz presumably views the artistic pursuit of pluralistic complexity as a fundamentally anti-Nazi act. Regrettably, however, Reitz's reluctance to try to restrict the range of *Heimat*'s meanings more tightly may potentially leave the door more

[27] Nonetheless, Reitz has worried that he may have overestimated some viewers' ability to navigate the differences between *Heimat* and reality: ''die Art und Weise, in der die *Heimat*-Trilogie von der Öffentlichkeit oftmals wahrgenommen wurde, wirft meine usprünglichen Ansichten über Film und Wirklichkeit über den Haufen''; he laments that the trilogy, as it was then, ''wurde vom Publikum oft als abgefilmte Realität verstanden'', a case of ''fatalen Verwechslungen zwischen Film und Leben'' (Reitz in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 359).

open than it need be to the first *Heimat* being associated with meanings that serve sinister (mis)readings of the National Socialist past.

Writing mainly about *Die zweite Heimat*, Dorthe Seifert discusses Esther's photography and Reinhard's attempts (in connection with the Holocaust) ''das Unsichtbare filmisch festzuhalten'', in relation to which she argues that ''in dem filmischen Diskurs über die Unmöglichkeit eines dokumentarischen Festhaltens und Abschiednehmens von der Vergangenheit zitiert Reitz die Diskussionen über die ››Grenzen der Darstellbarkeit des Nationalsozialismus‹‹ implizit'' (1999: 322). She claims that this ''Diskurs führt […] nicht zu einer Suche nach Alternativen zu den bestehenden Formen'' of representation (ibid.). She applies this criticism also to the first *Heimat*: ''die viel zitierte ››Unmöglichkeit der Darstellung‹‹'' functions, in her view, ''als Alibi für die in *Heimat* und der *Zweiten Heimat* vorgenommenen Auslassungen'' (ibid.).[28] But in my view Reitz's views about representation do not involve a denial of the possibility of suggesting the Holocaust; rather he doubts the efficacy of explicit graphic representation (both regarding the Holocaust and more generally), and correspondingly Reitz encourages viewers to see further than the camera. Seifert argues that Reitz intends to make viewers rely on ''Erfahrung'' as stored in memory (''Erinnerungsbilder'') to succeed where the camera's images fail (1999: 321) (compare Confino, 1998: 204 [which I cite subsequently]). Reinhard's lack of the victims' experience of the Holocaust (this experiential gap will be discussed further in this chapter) cannot of course, as Seifert notes, supply the appropriate ''Erinnerungsbilder'' for Esther (1999: 321). Yet, as Lena Scholz remarks of photographs in the first two series, ''Sinn gewinnen sie nur, soweit sie die Imagination belebt'' (1996: 91). Matthias Bauer argues (of *Die zweite Heimat* more specifically but clearly with the rest of *Heimat* in mind) that ''››the bigger picture‹‹ […] entsteht erst im Kopf der Zuschauer'', who ''meinen […] wahrzunehmen, *wie* und *warum* sich die Figuren, ihre Stimmungen und Lebensumstände

[28] Regarding *Die zweite Heimat*'s presentation of Reinhard's inability to tell the story of the Holocaust survivor Esther Paolo Jedlowski argues that, while Reinhard does not tell it successfully, ''*Heimat 2* il racconto di Esther lo ospita. È Reitz a raccontarlo. Siamo noi ad ascoltarlo'' (2009: 54).

verändern'' (2012: 82). Reitz in fact works on the assumption that viewers can create images of the imagination rather than being wholly dependent on personal experience (although it is perfectly true that Reitz values experience and has referred to it extensively). Reitz does not himself rely solely on personal experience in the first *Heimat* (or elsewhere) – otherwise it would not begin in 1919, over a decade before his birth.

Reitz comments of a scene in *Die andere Heimat* that ''dies ist ein Beispiel dafür, wie man im Film ein Bild zwischen den Bildern erzeugt. Im Grunde wird der Zuschauer selber zum Bildproduzenten, angeregt durch den Schnitt auf andere Bilder'' (2014: 222) – a comment that appears to confirm Wickham's remark that Reitz intends ''the spectator to provide the well known missing images'' (1991: 37). Reitz is referring to two onscreen images combining to produce a new image that is contingent not upon viewers' personal experience but rather upon their imaginative interpretation of onscreen images. Gabriel notes the significance of a scene in which viewers see Hänschen seeing forced labour: through Hänschen's eyes we are shown the labour camp – superintended by a guard who unashamedly tells Hänschen of his willingness to shoot the prisoners – and then teaches Hänschen how to shoot; then the next time we see Hänschen he is practising his shooting, soon to be encouraged by Eduard, the Nazi mayor (2004: 179-181). As Gabriel comments, ''Hänschen's uncanny eye has already delivered up to us a glimpse of the dark historical drama unfolding'' (ibid.: 181). Viewers do not need to have personal experience of being shot at by Nazis in order to put the scenes together and act as ''Bildproduzenten'' as envisaged by Reitz (2014: 222), and the images from the two scenes are very likely to combine with viewers' imagination to produce an understanding of what a boy like Hänschen, already armed and indoctrinated in 1935, is liable to do in the following years (which is not to deny that viewers with direct experience of such evils will tend to have a different viewing experience to those who have not). Viewers' inferential piecing together of the results implied by the two scenes is likely to lead them not to a graphic recreation of the Holocaust involving actors but rather to an awareness of the historical reality itself – Reitz wishes to use his fiction to point to the Holocaust's reality rather than to incorporate the Holocaust into his

fiction. The lack of direct visual representation of the Holocaust is not simply intended to prevent those who did not experience the Holocaust from nonetheless being able to be aware of it.

Caryl Flinn links a complaint that Elie Wiesel made about *Holocaust* to criticism of the first *Heimat*, citing Wiesel on *Holocaust* – ''the show 'transform[ed] an ontological event into soap opera'' (2004: 29), then noting that ''ironically, that charge would later be'' applied to the first *Heimat* (ibid.: 30).[29] Yet *Holocaust* shows the Holocaust graphically (and far more directly in terms of the surface of the screen than the first *Heimat*) as part of its (well-meaning) fictional portrayal of a historical reality of paramount importance, whereas Reitz does not want his fiction to encroach on historical reality as per Wiesel's complaint regarding *Holocaust*; Reitz instead strives (as in the scenes with Hänschen referred to above) to suggest the real horrors in the first *Heimat*'s historic background rather than hazarding the attempted incorporation of that reality into his fiction. I do not mean to deny that aspects of Reitz's approach are problematic (as will be discussed further subsequently), but Wiesel's anger at *Holocaust* shows that far more direct representation of the Holocaust would, in different ways, also have been problematic.

Reitz's comments certainly demonstrate that he sets greater store by the images of the imagination than by the images projected onto the surface of the screen. As Santner notes in relation to Wiegand's quite explicit reference to the Holocaust, ''the Jewish victims remain invisible'' (1990: 94). Yet, as Mehrnoosh Sobhani points out, ''in his essay 'Das Unsichtbare und der Film' Reitz emphasises the significance of looking beyond the physical world and of presenting the invisible in film'' (2001: 122-123). Reitz has written, ''wir müssen aufhören, zu glauben, daß Bilder direkt etwas erzählen'' (no date [1983]: 131). Scholz observes of Reitz's depiction of photography, ''das Problem der Fotografie ist, daß sie nur eine Spur der Existenz ist, die imaginativ gefüllt werden muß'' (Scholz, 1996: 91). Koebner says, in conversation with Reitz, ''ich glaube, die Geschichte mancher Dinge und Räume in *Heimat* gleichsam ‚hinter dem einzelnen Bild' wahrzunehmen'' (in Koebner and Koch [eds],

[29] Wiesel is also briefly cited in relation to *Heimat* by Scholz (1996: 34).

2008: 154), and remarks of Reitz's films in general that a key concern for Reitz is ''welche Bewegungen der Seele unter der sichtbaren Oberfläche der Gesichter vermutlich vor sich gehen'' (2015: 14).[30] I would suggest that Koebner's comment reflects a problem with Reitz's representation of the Jewish victims of National Socialism: excepting only Wohlleben, Jewish people are a faceless presence in the first *Heimat* and regrettably lack a (sur)face presence to facilitate viewers' progress in relating to the extravisual – including emotional – existence of the Jewish victims beyond the surface of *Heimat*'s screen.[31] Reitz probably intends viewers to see the Holocaust in the text on a metaphysical level, and hopes that the associated images of the imagination have a real power, but in practice this approach is probably fraught with potential pitfalls.

In conversation with Koebner (in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008), Reitz describes ''das Spiel mit *On* […] und *Off* […]. Jeder, der ein Bild anschaut, wird spüren, dass der Ort […] nicht dort aufbricht, wo das Bild abgeschnitten ist. Es gibt eine Welt außerhalb dieses Rahmens'' (in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 155).[32] Reitz states that ''*bei allen meinen Lieblingsfilmen habe ich den Eindruck, daß ihre Bilder mehr verschweigen als sie sagen*'', and similarly suggests ''dass die Filmbilder das Wesentliche nur noch mehr verhüllen'' (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 305). In Reitz's view then, showing the Holocaust visually would, presumably, be to conceal rather than reveal it. The image, Reitz stresses, is not ''das Wesentliche'' (ibid.); rather, the essential substance of matters lies at a deeper level, which, one would imagine, was another reason why Reitz disliked *Holocaust*, given that it depicts the Holocaust by visual means so much more directly than *Heimat*. The horror of the Holocaust, Reitz's views on images dictate, can only be truly understood at a deeper level. Discussing Stanley Kubrick's *Eyes Wide Shut* (1999), Reitz praises Kubrick as a ''wahrer Künstler, der begreift, daß die Filmkunst

[30] In a related vein, Koebner points out that ''Reitz erlaubt sich […], die Oberfläche der Ereignisse in Schabbach zu durchstoßen und ins Phantastische vorzudringen. Vornehmlich in der subjektiven Sicht der Figuren verschränken sich Reales und Imaginäres'' (2015: 125). (Koebner gives this example: ''so sieht und hört Paul, wie ein toter Freund zu ihm spricht'' [ibid.]).

[31] Despite having a Jewish mother, Wohlleben is not subjected to genocide, and is – in comparative terms – far less victimised than most Jewish people in the historic reality of National Socialism, which is clearly extremely problematic in terms of Reitz's acknowledgement of Jewish experiences.

[32] As Bauer writes, immediately before citing this comment of Reitz's, ''die Konjektur setzt dabei […] fort, was das zeitlich wie räumlich beschränkte Filmbild zu leisten vermag'' (2012: 82).

nie vom Sichtbaren erzählt'' (2008: 356), and further remarks of *Eyes Wide Shut* that ''dieser Film einem Thema folgt, das absolut nicht identisch ist mit seiner äußeren Handlung. Deswegen wird ihn jeder mißverstehen, der nur auf die Bilder starrt'' (ibid.: 355) – a comment that Reitz would perhaps hope to see applied to his own work.[33] The Holocaust is almost (the younger Wiegand refers to it fairly explicitly on one occasion) entirely absent in any overt form from dialogue as well the onscreen images. But it is indirectly present within the filmic text as well as being present anyway within the awareness of any competent viewer. For example, Gabriel points out that it is no coincidence that Martina recalls her childhood fear of the gas being left on in the oven in association with ''shots of [… Robert's Jewish neighbour's] window [that] repeat the low-angle shots of the *Kristallnacht* episode to make new connections; in both instances the window has become the scene of children crying'' (2004: 159).

Reitz's determination to stimulate the viewer to look more deeply bears comparison to Augustine of Hippo's approach to Biblical interpretation (Hermann's reference to Augustine in *Die zweite Heimat*, along with Reitz's Catholic upbringing, indicate at least familiarity, and perhaps approval of Augustine on Reitz's part). Peter Brown writes in relation to Augustine (and, more specifically, his fondness of allegory) that ''the mind must move from hint to hint, each discovery opening up yet further depths'' (2000: 257). The process of following up the hints is beneficial: Brown continues his account of Augustine's views thus – ''the Bible had been […] 'veiled' by God to 'exercise' the seeker'' (ibid.: 258).[34] Reitz certainly endeavours to exercise, and so to improve, his viewers. Brown's following description of Augustine applies perfectly to Reitz: ''no one could accuse Augustine of

[33] Reitz advocates, ''mit geschlossenen Augen und nach innen gerichtetem Blick zu filmen'' (1995: 254), and declares, ''Kunsterfahrung'' ''wirkt da, wo wir glauben, die Augen geschlossen zu haben und dennoch aufmerksam sind. Kubricks letzter Film trägt auch deswegen den Titel ››Eyes Wide Shut‹‹'' (2004i: 226).

[34] In some respects it may seem strange to compare *Heimat* to the Bible; yet the former strives to record and shape the history of a people, making it partially comparable to the Old Testament to some extent. In his enormous, 3.5-kg book of photographs (2004iii) illustrating moments from across the first three series Reitz introduces episodes with brief descriptions of the doings of characters (pp. 167 and 59, for instance) that are perhaps deliberately reminiscent of short summaries provided at the beginnings of sections of the Bible. In these Reitz uses ''wie'' in a highly repetitive fashion that seems to consciously echo Biblical patterns involving repetition of similarly common words – for example, ''wie Eduard wünscht, dass die Zeit stillstehen möge'' (ibid.: 59).

wanting to be superficial'' (ibid.). According to Brown, for Augustine ''the worst enemies of [… serious] inquiry […] were superficiality […], habitual stereotypes that made a man cease to be surprised and excited, and thus veiled the most vertiginous complexities with a patina of the obvious'' (ibid.: 257). Reitz likewise eschews not only superficiality but also such ''habitual stereotypes'' – as Kaes appreciates when referring to the first *Heimat* as one of ''the historical films of the New German Cinema'' that ''provide alternative ways of seeing with their self-reflexive narrative and visual style […], and, above all, their refusal for the most part to recycle endlessly repeated and clichéd images of the Third Reich'' (1989: 197) – ''images of images [that] circulate in an eternal cycle, an endless loop'' (ibid.: 196). Brown makes the following comments on Augustine's rationale for indirect means of conveying awareness of important matters (in Augustine's case, more specifically in relation to allegory and the Bible of course):

> the need for such a language of 'signs' was the result of a specific dislocation of the human consciousness. In this, Augustine takes up a position analogous to that of Freud. In dreams also, a powerful and direct message is said to be deliberately diffracted by some psychic mechanism, into a multiplicity of 'signs' quite as intricate and absurd, yet just as capable of interpretation, as the 'absurd' or 'obscure' passages in the Bible. Both men, therefore, assume that the proliferation of images is due to some precise event, to the development of some geological fault across a hitherto undivided consciousness: for Freud, it is the creation of an unconsciousness by repression; for Augustine, it is the outcome of the Fall.

(2000: 258).

Like Freud and Augustine, Reitz believes deeply in the need to approach some topics via circumventions. Reitz has declared in relation to National Socialism that ''it is really too much for our eyes'' (cited in Gabriel, 2004: 171). Yet part of Reitz seeks to overcome what he regards as the sheer impossibility of any acceptable direct representation of the Holocaust; he aims, albeit in a conflicted way, to avoid the ''images of images'' to which Kaes refers (1989: 196) – so, representations of representations rather than a more fundamental reality – and instead to provide metaphyiscal

insights into the deeper meaning that may otherwise be obscured by the superficial or the stereotypical, or be hidden by repression, which may be defeated by subtlety but not by an obvious assault. There is certainly scope for approving, at least in part, of Reitz's insistence on acknowledging the Holocaust almost solely by indirect means (with Wiegand's sick remark about Jewish people and chimneys providing an isolated burst of explicit acknowledgement). Nonetheless, John S. Pendergast notes that ''for Augustine, the polysemus nature of signs in the Book of Genesis was what potentially separated fit from unfit readers – the 'rough outer husks' of the text would repel unfit readers, but exhort the good to learning and effort'' (2006: 23). Reitz's predominantly indirect approach to acknowledging the Holocaust may well entail some viewers being, like Augustine's ''unfit readers'' of the Bible (ibid.), less enlightened by the first *Heimat* than those viewers whom Reitz successfully moves to self-improvingly exert themselves. Reitz's approach is definitely fraught with peril.

Still, it is unlikely that Reitz veils the Holocaust only in order to make *Heimat* more intellectually stimulating (or in seeking some respite from awareness of it): as well as being a committed intellectual, Reitz is also a great believer in instinct. Reitz has written (without making any explicit link to portraying the Holocaust) the following about how the mind processes information relayed from the eyes: that ''Dinge, die am Rande der Netzhaut abgebildet werden, weit weniger deutlich aufgelöst werden. […]. Aber gerade deswegen hat sich das Hirn darauf eingestellt, […] große Aufmerksamkeit auf die Randwahrnehmung zu werfen'' (no date [1980]: 139).[35] Being detectable only at the margins of perception, Reitz suggests, makes something not less but rather more likely to be identified as dangerous and especially worthy of attention. Working on the basis of his own

[35] Barg cites Reitz from four paragraphs on from the sentences cited above, but draws a conclusion opposite to mine: he argues of Reitz's approach to ''Randwahrnehmungen'' (a term of Reitz's that Barg cites) that Reitz is pursuing an ''anti-abstrakten künstlerischen Methode'' that involves precise focus on smaller details (1996: 276). In my view Reitz is rather attempting to convey a bigger picture – in which the evil of National Socialism is meant to be far more visible than on the surface of the screen – by abstract means. Barg argues that Reitz seeks ''maximale Konkretion'' rather than abstraction (ibid.) and that Reitz wishes for ''die im abstrakten System unterdrückte 'Welt der Bilder […]' [he is citing Reitz] freizusetzen'' (ibid.: 277), whereas in my opinion Reitz intends rather to avoid becoming bogged down in specific images of reality by circumventing them in favour of an abstracted mental overall view of a metaphysical bigger picture. Despite those views regarding abstraction, Barg nonetheless notes that Reitz attaches importance to ''Erinnern und Assoziieren jenseits des Augensinns'' (ibid.: 279).

understanding of the nature of visual perception, in marginalising the Holocaust on the surface level of the narrative Reitz may well have intended to accord the Holocaust a privileged position (which is not to say that he is necessarily always successful in conveying this impression to viewers). Reitz declares, ''Film ist eine Schule des Sehens, auch eine Schule des Spürens, des Empfindens'' (2004i: 223). Reitz aims to prompt viewers to learn to perceive, not merely to see, as demonstrated by his having referred elsewhere to the importance of scenting (''riechen'') the danger posed by National Socialist ideas (see Reitz, no date [1979]: 101). Reitz's ''riechen'' comment suggests that he wishes to provoke an instinctive, visceral anti-Nazi reaction. Due to Reitz's aforementioned doubts as to the power of onscreen images, visual representation alone may simply seem inadequate to Reitz as a means of inducing the degree of visceral horror that a healthy conception of National Socialism should produce (I will, though, speculate later that Reitz – due to his competing drives to reveal and conceal National Socialist evils – may to some extent avoid visual depiction of the horrors of National Socialism partly in order to distance viewers from that horror). An insistence by Reitz (or part of him at least) on viewers experiencing instinctive revulsion towards National Socialism explains why he repeatedly hints at incest, as I will discuss later. Such an insistence also provides a credible explanation for Reitz's preference for emotional effect over easily comprehensible historiography.

As part of his overarching argument that Reitz ''obscure[s] the Holocaust'' (1998: 208), Confino accuses Reitz of ''ignoring strict relations of cause and effect'' (ibid.: 205) and not wanting ''to understand German history critically'' (ibid.: 204). Confino deplores ''Reitz's objection to *Holocaust*'' in relation to ''attempts to generalize, to order events, to disclose cause and effect''' (ibid.: 195), and contends that ''from the rubble of defeat, the Germans resurrected Heimat as a leading image to imagine German nationhood precisely because it ignored strict historical causality'' (ibid.:197).[36] In

[36] Reitz's dislike of the American TV series *Holocaust* has been very frequently remarked upon. As Paul Cooke notes, ''*Holocaust* (1978) […] sent a shudder through the German public consciousness, [… and] famously provok[ed] Edgar Reitz to produce […] *Heimat* […] as a corrective to what he saw as […] Americanisation of German history'' (2012: 198).

contrast, Caryl Flinn takes a more positive view of Reitz's unwillingness to provide a more clearly ordered representation of the National Socialist past: she has briefly related the first *Heimat* to Freudian melancholia and mourning; sees melancholia rather than mourning in the first *Heimat*; and notes that ''melancholia acknowledges the impossibility of overcoming the past – and even questions the desirability of doing so'' (2004: 55). By linking the first *Heimat* to melancholia rather than mourning she is effectively praising it as a work that refrains from seeking to come to terms with the unmanageably great evil of National Socialism, since she writes of Freudian mourning that ''the rhetoric of conquest and mastery Freud used to describe mourning […] anticipates the language of the victor used by the term *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*'' (ibid.: 55-56). In contrast, a historiographical endeavour devoted above all to ''strict historical causality'' (to return to Confino's comment as cited above [1998: 197]) might potentially tend too much, arguably, towards what Flinn calls ''the language of the victor used by the term *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*'' (2004: 55-56). Discussing Alain Resnais' *Hiroshima mon Amour* and the ethics of representing the Holocaust, Michael S. Roth draws on Hans Kellner to argue that ''the explanatory, or merely domesticating, power of historical discourse 'hides the ''primitive terror'' behind us, obscuring the possibility that a ''non-sense'' lurks behind all ''sense''''' (1995: 99) – ''primitive terror'' is what Reitz seems to be aiming for when referring (as cited above) to importance of smelling Nazis. The historiographic prioritisation of ''strict historical causality'' that Confino advocates (1998: 197) would not, then, necessarily be the best, let alone the only legitimate, approach to the National Socialist period in Roth's view. Roth cites Claude Lanzmann, who declares of the Holocaust that ''there is really an absolute obscenity in the project of understanding'' (cited in Roth, 1995: 99). Apropos of Lanzmann's remark Roth comments, because ''representation is tied to narrative, the very quality that makes an experience traumatic (that we cannot take it through the mental schemes available to us) is lost in the telling'' (ibid.). Reitz's preference for what Gabriel (2004) demonstrates to be an ''uncanny'' (ibid.: 181) portrayal of the National Socialist period seems appropriate in that in the first *Heimat*

Reitz reflects (and subtly condemns) the terrifying and delusional (il)logic of the Nazis.[37] (Nonetheless, the historians' approach, as championed by Confino, is of course essential to learning vitally important lessons about the Holocaust – my point is that not everyone would say that it is necessarily the only justifiable way of approaching the Holocaust in a work of fiction.) I will argue that in the first *Heimat*, and in subsequent series, Reitz takes steps intended to relieve German trauma arising from National Socialism, but not that Reitz tries to detract from the gravity of the Holocaust itself in the first *Heimat*; in the first series Reitz at times strives to shield characters and viewers from the horror of the Holocaust but not by means of intentionally seeking to shrink the objective magnitude of the Holocaust or ever deprive it of subjective horror; sometimes Reitz somewhat distances, yet does not seek to undo, the horror. It is in the other series that Reitz very possibly seeks to make the Holocaust appear more manageable by relativising National Socialism. In the first *Heimat* Reitz, I will argue, encourages viewers to forgive characters, including those complicit in National Socialism, but not to forgive the evils in which they are complicit. While in my view Reitz constructs the Holocaust as extremely important, I will argue later in this chapter that Reitz privileges non-persecuted Germans over the victims of National Socialism in terms of his attempts to stimulate emotional identification and pity in viewers' response to the first *Heimat*'s depiction of people in the National Socialist period.

Experience and Empathy

Schmitz writes that ''the division of labour in Nazi Germany's 'death factories' […] bars the perpetrators from having any experience of the truth of their actions'' (2006: 96). The first *Heimat* heavily focuses on the perspective of Germans who were not persecuted under National Socialism, and can thus be related to what Schmitz calls '''perpetrator-centred memory''' (2006: 95). Confino argues that ''Reitz's reliance on memory is predictably selective: there is no oral history in *Heimat*

[37] The sense of the ''uncanny'' may allow viewers to perceive victims of the Nazis in line with what Elsaesser, also drawing on Freud, calls ''presence as parapraxis'' (2008: 109), as discussed earlier in this chapter.

among Germany's victims, […] although their experience is part of German history too'' (1998: 200). While agreeing with Confino in so far as I believe that Reitz to a large extent prioritises non-persecuted Germans in his depiction of the period, I cannot entirely follow Confino's view that ''Reitz's historical horizons are as wide as his reminiscences and personal experience'' (ibid.: 204). As has been discussed, viewers are given numerous cues that they should perceive the shortcomings of *Heimat*'s surface narrative. Viewers are potentially able to see in their imagination what characters fail to see. While Reitz acknowledges the Holocaust (albeit in what may well be an overly idiosyncratic and obscure fashion), there is still considerable potential for his differing presentation of persecuted and non-persecuted people to be problematic.

Drawing on the work of Dan Diner, Schmitz sets out the following model of National Socialist-era experience: ''the [Holocaust] victim perspective represents the total experience of National Socialism, whereas the perpetrators have no 'experience' in this sense'' (2006: 96). Reitz appears to have anticipated that non-persecuted Germans would make up much of his audience, and, by attempting to fuel viewers' imaginations to see on a mental plane what Reitz's screen does not directly show, Reitz aims to compensate for lack of experience via imagination in a way that respects the fact that non-persecuted Germans experienced National Socialism extremely differently to those who were persecuted. It has been widely noted (see, for instance, Elsaesser, 2005 [1985]: 385) that Reitz has thoroughly condemned (apropos of the American series *Holocaust*) what he calls ''der tiefste Enteignungsvorgang, […] die Enteignung des Menschen von seiner eigenen Geschichte'' (no date [1979]: 102). By encouraging viewers' imaginations to be aware of the Holocaust's offscreen presence, Reitz aims to be able to remain within the limits of experience in the first *Heimat*'s onscreen dimension while (hopefully) overcoming the serious limitations of experience within the dimension of the first *Heimat* that extends beyond the images directly visible on the screen; Reitz hopes to show (indirectly) the experience of others without attempting an ''Enteignung'' of his own with regard to Jewish experience of the Holocaust (although I will subsequently argue that – somewhat hypocritically, given his comments about ''Enteignung'' of ''Geschichte'' – Reitz cannot

resist laying some claim, via Hermann and the Simons, to Jewish identity, particularly regarding Biblical Jews, outside the more specific context of being subjected to the Holocaust).[38]

Schmitz continues his previously cited point with a remark that could have been tailormade to apply to Reitz and the first *Heimat*: ‘‘this fundamental difference in perspective between Nazi victims and Germans is a problem for everyone seeking to relegitimise German experience of National Socialism and the war’’ (2006: 96). Schmitz refers to the view of Friedländer (I am citing here Schmitz’s account of Friedländer’s position): Friedländer notes that there is a deeply morally unacceptable solution to the problem of achieving ‘‘a return ‘to the pleasure of historical narration’’’ in the form of ‘‘removing the Holocaust from the centre of Nazism’’ (ibid: 100). Reitz surely takes a certain pleasure in narrating a story with a historical setting in the National Socialist period that (on its onscreen visual level) is focused on the experiences of non-persecuted Germans. The ‘‘‘pleasure of historical narration’’’ (ibid.) is, effectively, detected in *Heimat* and condemned by those who criticise it for taking a nostalgic approach to the German twentieth century past; they, like Friedländer (himself a critic of *Heimat* elsewhere, as previously noted) essentially object to a nostalgic approach in *Heimat* on the grounds that this flows from a prioritisation of the experiences of those who were not persecuted under National Socialism (see Confino, 1998: 200 [as cited earlier]).[39] Confino argues that ‘‘Reitz’s aim is […] not to understand German history critically but to rewrite it, then embrace, justify and identify with it’’ (1998: 204). While agreeing that Reitz is keen on viewer identification with aspects of the history that he reflects in his story, Reitz does not in my view really mean to ‘‘justify’’ National Socialism; Reitz to some extent encourages viewers to like some complicit characters, but not their complicity itself, and, indeed, Reitz in some instances encourages viewers to reconsider

[38] This time discussing German cinema more generally (although he mentions *Heimat* in this article [2008: 106; 107]), Elsaesser writes, ‘‘it is fairly obvious that a depiction by a German filmmaker of the Holocaust from the perspective of the victims […] would have been at once too much and too little. Too much, in that it would have presumed an act of empathy, as well as an understanding of the ‘other’ that clearly was not present’’ (ibid.: 108). Elsaesser seems to be saying that many German filmmakers did not empathise, not that they could not have done. Lack of empathy (as I will discuss again later) is a problem in *Heimat*, but laying claim to others’ experiences would certainly be problematic.

[39] Many have complained about *Heimat* being nostalgic. For example, Confino sees ‘‘a nostalgic longing for a putatively lost Heimat’’ (1998: 206). See also Omer Bartov, 2005: 104 and Carol and Robert Reimer, 1992: 190.

their opinions of characters whom they are likely to have initially liked without significant reservations (for instance, Eduard is at first very likable but becomes obviously complicit in evil). Elsaesser sees in *Heimat* ‘‘nostalgia, [… and] gratifying identification with victims, and with oneself as victim’’ (Elsaesser, 1989: 278); as Elsaesser appears to expect, it seems likely that many non-persecuted Germans (and their descendants) identify with non-persecuted German characters.

Schmitz argues that empathy is a decisive factor in German views, ‘‘from the ‘Historians’ Dispute’ onwards’’, of non-persecuted Germans of the National Socialist era, linking ‘‘‘perpetrator-centred memory’’’ to a desire ‘‘to relegitimise a German perspective on National Socialism from the vantage point of empathy’’ (2006: 95). A key problem with Reitz’s attitude towards the Holocaust, it is essentially implied by those who criticise Reitz for a nostalgic approach, is that he is too open to feeling, and encouraging viewers to feel, empathy towards non-persecuted Germans of the period (for example, Confino comments both that ‘‘Heimat history is empathetic’’ [1998: 194] and that *Heimat* ‘is full of nostalgic craving for a lost world’’ [ibid.: 205]).

In Schmitz’s view, there was ‘‘in the Walser-Bubis debate […] a switch in public representation from the dominance of images of Nazi crimes to images dominant in German family memory’’, a shift that ‘‘essentially presupposes the sidelining of the Holocaust’’ (2006: 102). (The first *Heimat* was at, or even ahead of, the vanguard of that shift according to Schmitz’s dating.) As Hansen comments, *Heimat* is a ‘‘family-centered narrative’’ (1985: 6), and in terms of the surface meaning of its images, there can be no doubt that the first *Heimat* displays a heavy emphasis on (to cite Schmitz again [2006: 102]) ‘‘German family memory’’ at the expense of ‘‘images of Nazi crimes’’. Reitz’s own family memory is a major source for *Heimat*: the character names Paul, Pauline and Marie-Goot are derived from members of Reitz’s family (see Reitz, no date [1982]: 183). As noted, the images that may be created in viewers’ minds, on the other hand, may potentially balance out the onscreen visual focus on non-persecuted characters. Schmitz writes of the sort of approach to National Socialism that privileges ‘‘German family memory’’ over ‘‘images of Nazi crimes’’ that ‘‘In this framework, Jewish

German citizens become excluded from the German experiential collective at the moment they insist on their necessarily different experiences and perspective'' (ibid.). There was of course, as Schmitz notes, an ''interdependence between German experience and the experience of Nazi victims'' (2006: 102). As Gabriel (2004) shows (in her previously cited comments on the indications of what is repressed by characters but meant to be seen by viewers – for instance: ibid.: 159), Reitz establishes the sort of ''interdependence'' to which Schmitz refers between persecuted and non-persecuted Germans in the National Socialist period. Because of his choice to primarily show only the experiences of non-victimised Germans on the surface of the screen, Reitz certainly does not entirely avoid the sort of presentation of history that Schmitz calls ''a two-track history [… with] origins in Nazi racial politics'', one ''ultimately underpinned by the Nazi-like distinction between the German *Volk* and those who do not belong to it'' (2006: 102). Reitz reflects both tracks in his historical story, rather than only ever suggesting the existence of non-persecuted Germans, but the experience of those persecuted under National Socialism is mostly only perceptible on a ghostly track at the edge of perception, one that is excluded from the surface of the screen, just as (to return to Schmitz's comments) ''Jewish German citizens become excluded from the German experiential collective at the moment they insist on their necessarily different experiences and perspective'' (2006: 102). Reitz encourages non-Jewish German viewers to be relatively more inclusive on an imaginative level than on the level at which Reitz addresses the familial memories of non-persecuted people and their descendants, but the problem to which Schmitz refers is in evidence in Reitz's selection of characters, and later in this chapter I will also consider inequalities in relation to empathy regarding Reitz's attempts to shape viewers' emotions with regard to victims of National Socialist persecution on the one hand and non-persecuted Germans on the other hand.

In his determination to depict ''family memory'', Reitz effectively regarded as acceptable the risk that ''family memory'' might entice some viewers away from acknowledgement of National Socialism's horrors as per Schmitz's aforementioned fears regarding ''family memory'' (2006: 102). Reitz's very strong focus on non-persecuted Germans at the surface level of the first *Heimat* means

that the suffering of those persecuted under National Socialism is certainly very often implicit, and thus regrettably more susceptible to being overlooked than the more directly depicted suffering of the non-persecuted Germans. Reitz is not, however, one to credit the explicit with superiority over the implicit. Reitz has said that the first *Heimat* ''Auschwitz nicht ausdrücklich erwähnt'' (in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 327), with the ''ausdrücklich'' strongly suggesting that he is quite satisfied in his own mind that he does represent the Holocaust implicitly. In his comments on the film *Sans Soleil* (Marker, 1981) one of the lines from the film that Reitz singles out for citation is a line that denies the superiority of the explicit over the implicit: '''ich ermaß die unerträgliche Eitelkeit der westlichen Welt, die nicht aufhört, […] das Gesagte dem Nicht-Gesagten vorzuziehen''' (no date [1983]: 131).[40]

Reitz has made remarks that are thought-provoking in terms of the position of empathy in relation to first *Heimat*'s depiction of the victims of National Socialism. Reitz argues (of film generally) that ''jedes Bild hat ein Off und dieses Off verspricht manchmal viel aufregender, emotional aufwühlender zu sein als das, was wir sehen'' (2008: 156); that ''die eigentliche Projektionsfläche sind meine Zeitgenossen [….] Die Empfindungen, die Seelen der Zuschauer sind das Gegenüber dieser in die Welt blickenden Kamera'' (ibid.: 153); and that film ''hat […] eine Projektionsfläche in den Herzen der Menschen. Da enstehen regelrecht Verwandtschaftsgefühle'' (ibid.). In Reitz's view the vital essence of a film engages not with the eyes but rather with the soul and the heart – the home of ''Verwandtschaftsgefühle'', and the most emotionally powerful elements of a film are often to be found in that which is not directly shown on the screen. The emotionally potent ''Off'' is, however, contingent upon some visual representation (''jedes Bild hat ein Off'' [Reitz, 2008: 156]),

[40] Sobhani also cites these remarks of Reitz's, commenting, ''Reitz attempts to show respect for the 'non-being' and the 'un-said' in featuring the invisible in *Heimat*'' (2001: 83). In my view Reitz does more than respect the unsaid and physically invisible; as Gabriel argues, the Holocaust ''is the structuring absence of the text'' (ibid.: 184). In relation to Kluge's *Die Patriotin* Caryl Flinn cites Dori Laub and Primo Levi on the Holocaust: '''there was no longer an other to which one could say 'Thou' in the hope of being heard, of being recognised as a subject, of being answered' [ – Laub]. Primo Levi described a recurrent nightmare which plagued him even leaving the camps, in which […] family and friends […] carried on as if he were absent'' (2004: 132). Reitz perhaps felt that there was a sense in which he could only address the Holocaust by seeking to speak, in his filmic language, to absence (a paradoxically present state of ''Nicht-Sein'' as per the line from *Sans Soleil*). Levi's nightmare is the sense of absence, suggesting that Reitz would have done better in some respects to combat, rather than contribute to, a sense of association between the Holocaust, its survivors and absence.

and the visible absence of Jewish people and various other persecuted groups in the first *Heimat* is so great that they may be too far removed from viewers, according to the logic of Reitz's comments as cited above, to benefit from the ''Off'' dimension of most of the film's images, although the victims of National Socialism are certainly likely to be linked by viewers to some, and probably very many, images.[41]

Perpetrators and Victims and Dichotomies in the first *Heimat*

Carol and Robert Reimer note that one of the ''major impulses'' behind ''Reitz's rejection of 'Holocaust''' is ''his dislike of melodramatic polarities that divide the world into pure good and pure evil'' (1992: 189). This comment captures a key feature of Reitz's philosophy neatly (as does Murray Smith's remark that Reitz rejects ''the full-blooded, 'Manichaean' melodrama of *Holocaust*'' [2017: 171]). The Reimers add that ''in place of characters who embody a good-evil dichotomy, he substitutes a populace removed from making decisions about good and evil'' (1992: 191). In my view Reitz constructs many of his characters as having culpably refused to see that they should have acted differently, so I do not follow the Reimers' view that ''Reitz makes no attempt to deal with the moral questions'' (ibid.: 191). Although the Reimers note Reitz's distaste for dichotomies with their (to again cite the Reimers as cited above) ''pure good and pure evil'', they nonetheless believe Schabbach to be given a fairly one-dimensional, more or less purely good portrayal: they argue that ''in short, Reitz's film shows how the healthy values of village life helped a family make it through the war'' (ibid.: 190). The Reimers' perception of ''healthy […] village life'' does not account for the boy in the village who blinds his brother, Hänschen, in one eye with a fork, nor for the persecution of Apollonia (who is both driven away and unjustly accused of infanticide). As Palfreyman comments, Reitz ''presents the Heimat with a certain fondness and nostalgia, but there is also a strong sense of

[41] For instance, consider the following: the scene in which the younger Wiegand refers to burning of the bodies of Holocaust victims; the scenes involving gas and the Jewish neighbour that Gabriel refers to, as cited earlier (2004: 159); a scene with Hänschen as analysed by Gabriel, 2004: 180 – which I will cite shortly. For sensitive viewers, more or less any scene involving National Socialism (and they are very numerous) should have an ''Off'' in which viewers have an awareness of the victims of National Socialism.

the repression that a small community can inflict on an individual'' (2000: 41). Although the Reimers' view of a ''healthy'' Schabbach is in part understandable, it most certainly has its limitations.

Also referring to the first *Heimat*, and also to Reitz's writing outside *Heimat*, Santner interprets Reitz's approach to categories (citing Reitz's term ''Schubladendenken'') thus: ''thinking in categories is […] diametrically opposed to the aesthetic of Heimat, which entails a vigilant attentiveness to the unique, regional inflections of human behaviour''; ''*Schubladendenken* […] levels out the rough surfaces of individual experience, memory, personality, for the sake of a preformed image of universal and homogeneous […] types'', with the consequence that ''thinking in categories becomes a mark of complicity in the corruption of Heimat'', with Reitz's image of America being particularly identified as the source of corruption – the American series ''*Holocaust* [… being an] embodiment of *Schubladendenken*'' (Santner, 1990: 74).[42] Santner further suggests that ''the homeopathy of mourning always breaks or tropes the path home across the detour of the pharmakon'' (1990: 79).[43] A pharmakon challenges easy categorisation because, Santner notes, ''the word can signify both medicine as well as poison; it displays the ambi-valence of a philter that can be both beneficent and maleficent'' (ibid.: 76). Santner proposes that ''in the various significations associated with the pharmakon are elements of the character system that structures the social landscape and most of the important narrative displacements within *Heimat*'' (ibid.: 77), but, apart from mourning, he appears to have in mind (see ibid.) a home versus away distinction and what he describes as an ''experience'' versus ''judgment'' ''opposition'' (ibid.: 75) made (according to Santner) by Reitz. Santner refers to the problematic nature of Reitz's treatment of ''moral distinctions'', but mainly in the context of mourning: ''Reitz's interest in and procedures of restoring […] awareness of the passing of time and therewith a certain capacity to mourn […] may have costs at the level of moral distinctions and historical judgments which may prove to be exorbitant'' (1990: 72). I also take the

[42] In relation to categories, see also Palfreyman, 2000: 64, as cited in my introduction.
[43] The homeopathy of mourning, Santner elaborates, lies in ''a certain homeopathic procedure'' whereby ''inducing small doses of loss, separation and disorientation, Reitz claims to sensitize his audience to the ways in which individuals and entire populations become numb to the experience of loss'' (1990: 96).

view that Reitz's judgement sometimes proves markedly imperfect in terms of moral categories. Santner points out a scene in which a reference to the Holocaust is quickly followed by mention of the death of a German soldier, Hänschen, to be precise, and comments that there ''is the creation of a symmetry: all victims of the war are equal, whether German soldiers killed in battle or Jews murdered in Auschwitz'' (1992: 270). In the first *Heimat* as whole, however, Reitz does construct Hänschen's complicity in National Socialism in terms of moral failure: Gabriel demonstrates that Hänschen is associated by Reitz, and potentially by viewers, with the perpetration of murder, remarking of Hänschen's stumbling upon forced labourers that ''we get a set of directions about sharpshooting, which, in a Brechtian ironic mode, unravels the spectacle as a future scene of murder'' (2004: 180), with ''Hänschen's uncanny eye [… providing] a glimpse of the dark historical drama unfolding'' (ibid.: 181). Contrary to Santner's assertion as cited above that Reitz implies a morally ''equal'' ''symmetry'' between Hänschen and victims of the Holocaust, Reitz marks Hänschen as a murderer; Reitz does not, however, associate Holocaust victims with murder in a perpetrator role. Nonetheless, Reitz's fondness for challenging the distinction between categories sometimes extends to problematic implications regarding perpetrator-victim relationships, as I will note also in subsequent chapters.

Fate and Culpability

Discussion of issues relating to fate in the *Heimat* cycle is predominantly to be found in connection with the first *Heimat*. Alexandra Ludewig believes that various characters in the first series are implied to have considerable control over their lives.[44] Julia F. Klimek argues that ''*Heimat*'s deceptively conventional female characters take on a responsibility in the deconstruction of narrative and film that invests them with an agency Reitz's critics have ignored'' (2000: 230).[45]

[44] She writes, for instance, that ''with Maria […] Reitz shows that the path of history can be altered by an individual's decisions'' (Ludewig, 2011: 264) and that ''Martina is shown to be the director of her destiny'' (ibid.: 267).

[45] Klimek notes further that ''Reitz's women […] are disempowered as being neither the makers nor the writers of history'' (2000: 228), and observes that ''Martina is stuck in the cultural expectation of getting married, and

Confino, in contrast, believes that ‘‘Heimat films’’ and *Heimat* ‘‘ignor[e] strict relations of cause and effect between the Nazi regime and post-war conditions while emphasizing ‘just … ‘‘fate’’’ (1998: 205). According to Santner, in the first *Heimat* ‘‘all deaths […] are treated as natural phenomena and […] a piece of fate’’ (apparently meaning by fate, ‘‘subordination of all to the ravages of time and death’’) (1990: 65). Santner also refers to Eduard as ‘‘the hapless pawn of forces beyond his control, […] the passive victim of the blind and anonymous law of time itself’’ (Santner, 1990: 95).[46] Santner is not alone in characterising time as the great destroyer: Elsaesser refers to ‘‘a gratifying identification with victims, and with oneself as victim, if not of history, then of time itself’’ (1989: 278), and comments that ‘‘the main protagonist in *Heimat* is time itself’’ (ibid.: 273). Like Santner, Hoberman suggests that the first *Heimat* presents events of the National Socialist period as natural occurrences rather than apportioning blame: ‘‘Nazism and the war just happened – they’re natural disasters’’ (reproduced in Hansen, 1985: 10).[47] Reitz has indeed referred to the Holocaust as an ‘‘Unglück’’, but qualifies that pronouncement: ‘‘das […] von den Nazis produzierte Unglück’’ (no date [1979]: 98), which is a clear attribution of responsibility that does not seek to deflect blame from people to nature (on accidents and responsibility, compare Schmitz [2007i: 14] as cited in my introduction).

Koebner opines that ‘‘der Krieg und der Sieg der Alliierten […] vernichten die Irrungen und Illusionen, auch der Mitläufer und Vorteilsnehmer, die die Nazis endgültig zur Komplizenschaft zwangen, in dem sie sie als Soldaten an die Front schickten’’ (2015: 139). The tendency to exonerate characters in this comment (as people forced into ‘‘Komplizenschaft’’) appears to be more Koebner’s than Reitz’s. In my reading, Reitz does not suggest that Schabbacher were genuinely subject – deep down,

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while she may take control of, or direct, this scene, her agency is limited to *how* the prescribed goal is achieved’’ (ibid.: 235).

[46] Santner also writes, ‘‘what is absent from *Heimat* is a vision in which ‘local structures produce *histories* rather than simply yielding to *History*’’’ (86).

[47] Hoberman refers to Eric Rentschler’s characterisation of the ‘‘the [Heimat] genre’s characteristics, [which,] according to Rentschler, include […] a fatalistic attitude towards human events […] history itself beyond rational understanding’’, and Hoberman declares that ‘‘all of these qualities are present’’ in *Heimat* (reproduced in Hansen, 1985: 10).

that is – to ‘‘Illusionen’’ regarding events in National Socialist Germany, nor that the Nazis were faced by an extremely widespread necessity to force non-persecuted Germans into complicity (see, for instance, my comments further on regarding Lucie’s car accident). Reitz suggests rather that the Schabbacher are aware of atrocities on the edge of their perception and choose not to look more closely and bring them into focus. In her extensive study of Paul, Marion Dollner (2005) effectively argues that Paul is a victim of what might be called fate (fate in a broad and loose sense of powerful pressures substantially beyond one’s control) in that she reads him as a victim of circumstance (largely in relation to aspects of modernity). Karsten Witte writes that characters ‘‘under no circumstance are given a reprieve from history’’ (reproduced in Hansen, 1985: 8).

Supernatural Punishment and the Question of Religious Redemption

Reitz recalls of his grandfather ‘‘dass er sich viel mit Schuld-und-Sühne-Ideen beschäftigte’’, and that his grandfather told relating stories: ‘‘zum Beispiel war ein notorischer Bösewicht in Frieden gestorben, aber seine Familie wird nun vom Unglück verfolgt. Auf Untaten folgen Schicksalsschläge’’ (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 24). Reitz’s reference to his grandfather’s stories revolving around ‘‘Sühne’’ as well as ‘‘Schuld’’ suggest that the culpability is also ultimately expiated by means of the suffering inflicted by the ‘‘Schicksalsschläge’’. Just such a process of supernatural punishment for the crimes of family members is dealt out by mysterious powers of fate in the first *Heimat*. This is a process that reverberates across the cycle – as Koebner (in conversation with Reitz) remarks of Reitz’s grandfather’s stories, ‘‘richtig alttestamentarisch, Generation für Generation’’ (ibid.). The first *Heimat* shows characters ultimately suffering as a result of participation in the persecution of Jewish people, and this punishment echoes down the generations in the second and third series as a form of fateful, supernatural poetic justice.

Seeing Culpability

Lucie is depicted as guilty. I would suggest that it is particularly significant that she shares her name with a martyr saint who (Donald Attwater and Catherine Rachel John write) is ‘‘invoked against

disease of the eyes'' (1995: 229). Lucie's guilt is constructed in terms of a failure of vision – Gabriel observes that Lucie remarks to Eduard, apropos of some fool's gold, '''at a quick glance everything is gold''' (2004: 180). Lucie drives her parents into a fatal car crash when she takes her eyes off the road in order to look at her parents in the back of the car.[48] So, on an allegorical level, Lucie fails to see the potential for disaster that was just around the historical corner; fails to look in her imagination, search her conscience and perceive the essential need to resist the people who went on to perpetrate the murder of millions of people (and had already perpetrated appalling persecution, as made plain by the chronology).[49] In my introductory chapter I cite Reitz referring to ''Gefühle'' being ''ausgebildet am Schicksalsgedanken, […] an dem Zusammenhang von Handeln und Nichthandeln'' (no date [1981]: 176). This remark appears in the *Produktionstagebuch* (no date: 134-207) that Reitz wrote during the making of the first *Heimat*. Reitz's remark could be rephrased as: to act or not to act – that is the question; this apparent variation on ''To be or not to be – that is the question'' follows on from a reference to fate (''Schicksalsgedanken''), so that there is an implication that the question may be an idle one, that the issue is rather the question of what is fated rather than which road should be chosen.[50] In the case of Lucie's car crash, however, there is no obvious reason to suppose that Lucie had to crash; no obvious reason why she should not keep looking at the road and drive sensibly. Rather than being simply in the hands of fate, Lucie appears to have a choice: to see or not to see. This choice, Reitz suggests, is the defining choice that characters have in the first *Heimat*. Essentially, they choose not to see the evil in their society. Reitz asks viewers much the same question: to see or not to see. As discussed, there are some good reasons to suppose that

[48] That the crash is caused by Lucie looking back at her parents, who presumably remind her of her past, suggests that in this crash scene Reitz is actually criticising a character for being too backward-looking, too lost in fond memories of days gone by, which rather counters the common argument (to which I referred earlier) that the first *Heimat* seeks to promote a pleasurable sort of nostalgia.

[49] Reminiscing decades later, Lucie still appears to closing her eyes to the reality of her National Socialist era actions. In a ''besoffen'' state, Reitz notes in the book version of the first *Heimat*, Lucie tells Maria: ''blendend jeht et mir – ick erzähle jrad'' about ''1933'' – with no conscious reference to National Socialism (1985: 532). There seems little doubt that ''blendend'' is meant to be ironic, and that in this instance Reitz is seeking to expose, without conniving in, self-serving avoidable amnesia.

[50] As mentioned in the introduction, Lisa Hopkins (2014) has considered *Heimat* in the light of *Hamlet*, but does not comment on Reitz's ''Handeln und Nichthandeln'' remark, his version, as I see it, of ''To be or not to be''. With its reference to ''outrageous fortune'', *Hamlet* too links the issue of fate to its famous question.

Reitz sincerely hopes that viewers will, unlike Lucie, look hard and see in their mind's eye the horrific realities of the National Socialist past that lie beyond the visual surface of Reitz's fiction. If it were only a question of characters, not also of viewers, seeing beyond the immediate horizon, then the first *Heimat* would offer little in the way of hope, since characters almost entirely refuse to look properly at the evil around them. Katharina is possibly the only non-persecuted character who does not avert her gaze from aspects of National Socialism. Katharina makes some critical remarks about the regime, and in the book version Reitz emphasises that she sees further than most characters (he refers to her as ''die Seherin'' [1985: 553]). Katharina's resistance – if it can be called that at all – is, however, absolutely negligible – as Barg puts it, ''kindlich-naiv'' and ''hilflos'' (1996: 300). It would be unfair, however, to condemn the emphasis that Reitz places on seeing or not seeing on that basis: the point is rather that if others followed Katharina's example and made a serious attempt to look evil in the eye, then, in sufficient numbers, they might have gone on to resist National Socialism far more meaningfully than Katharina and might have collectively made a very real difference. Viewers, meanwhile, will hopefully look further than the characters, whose failure to look is meant to be seen by viewers (as noted by, for instance, Klimek, 2000: 240, as cited earlier).

In the book version there is a scene in which Pauline and Robert ''essen Äpfel'' in (not coincidentally) 1938 (1985: 212), which symbolically suggests that characters succumb to temptation, eating the forbidden fruit of Eden to precipitate their moral fall (instead of being choiceless victims of fate). This apple eating scene also links vision to moral failure, since, as Reitz writes, their young son Robert ''betrachtet mit großen Augen die Eltern'' (ibid.). While Adam and Eve are conventionally held by Christians to have sinned, and thus be broadly deserving of punishment, the scene also prophesies that the generation of Pauline's and Robert's children (which is also roughly Reitz's generation) will be punished for sins committed by their forebears rather than themselves, since a likely meaning of the scene is that the children will subsequently suffer for their parents' Original Sin, so that this Adam-and-Eve scene simultaneously admits the complicity of Pauline and Robert and

also threatens to divert viewers' emotional engagement from those who were persecuted under National Socialism to the descendants of those who were not persecuted.

In my view fate, as a force that substantially takes choices out of characters' hand, kicks in after characters have become complicit in National Socialism. It is, I would argue, the national failure to prevent the atrocities of National Socialism that dooms characters in *Heimat*; in the second and third series, and in the first after characters have made immoral choices in relation to National Socialism, characters are depicted as being pursued by a fateful supernatural force that punishes them for either their or their ancestors' failure to choose to see the right road. As Gabriel says, characters in the first *Heimat* find themselves on an ''inexorable moral path for which the fourth episode, 'The Highway,' provides the allegorical title'' (2004: 158). I would argue that they are implied to have initially had some choice as to their actions, and an avenging fate took control after that point. As I will discuss much more in subsequent chapters, characters are punished by fate, and consequently appear as victims, a circumstance that Reitz uses to undermine perpetrator-victim dichotomies. In Lucie Reitz allegorises the failings of the German nation; in doing so he both admits this failure and also shows (non-persecuted) Germans (Lucie's parents) as the victims visible on the screen. There is certainly a risk that viewers will see the deaths of Lucie's parents in the car accident on the screen right in front of them without also imagining the allegorically represented consequences of German society collectively failing to prevent the Holocaust, which Reitz has described as a ''von den Nazis produzierte Unglück'' (no date {1979}: 98). As to Reitz's own conception of the accident, Reitz's description elsewhere of the Holocaust as an avoidable (''von den Nazis produzierte'') disaster rather than inevitable accident suggests that Reitz envisages the car accident, one caused by driver error, as a symbolic admission of Lucie's guilt and of her having had an opportunity to do differently. A saint held to promote healthy vision seeming to have abandoned Germany may be a double-edged sword in terms of its potential implications for Reitz's representation of German culpability: on the one hand, it shows Germans to be guilty of failing to see what they should have done; on the other hand, there is possibly also a suggestion that Germany's luck is out – Saint Lucy will not even extend

her protection to a character who bears her name, while, regarding the more superficial meaning of the scene, Lucie figures as a tragically bereaved victim of a car crash, with a less obvious symbolic status of a perpetrator who fails to see her moral duty and steers a course for disaster. The reason why Lucie is not looking at the road properly is also telling: she looks behind her to look at her parents, presumably in order to check that they are comfortable, and her solicitude towards her elderly parents casts her as a well-meaning bringer of fatal disaster. Symbolically, the crash shows Lucie needlessly taking her eyes of the road – she had no particular reason to suppose that her parents needed to be checked on; the crash shows her to be a fundamentally negligent cause of death, but also obscures the National-Socialist-associated culpability to which it symbolically alludes by means of simultaneously giving Lucie a feature that seems calculated to strike viewers as a redeeming feature – namely, love of her family.

Another saint's name is borne by Apollonia; both saints – Lucy and Apollonia – are martyr saints, which threatens to excessively emphasise a victim position forLucie, one of the most morally compromised characters (other female characters bearing the names of martyr saints are Katharina and Lucie's former employee Martina).[51] On the other hand, it is appropriate that Apollonia's name should point to a martyr: she is a victim of xenophobic persecution – as Liebman puts it, she is viewed by much of the community as ''a suspect 'gypsy''' (1996: 43). The persecution of Apollonia begins (early in the first episode) before National Socialism begins to make itself felt in Schabbach, which strongly counters the argument that – as Hoberman makes it – ''Nazism [is] as a bacillus contracted in Berlin'' (reproduced in Hansen, 1985: 10). The persecution of Apollonia shortly after the First World War admits that there was in Schabbach a latent readiness to participate in National Socialist persecution of minorities before anyone in Schabbach had even heard of National Socialism. Gabriel points out that ''the [Schabbacher's] fantasy that Appolonia [sic.] has murdered her baby'' gestures to ''the […] fantasy of the infanticide of the Jews'' (2004: 166). That Lucie, as well as

[51] Further confirmation of Reitz's interest in saints is discussed in the following chapter, and also provided by his devoting a page (relating to his film *Mahlzeiten*) to Saint Elizabeth (no date [1964]: 113).

Apollonia, has a martyr saint's name – despite standing for complicity in far more than victimhood at the hands ofNational Socialism – undermines the distinction between perpetrator and victim, however.

It is notable that, as Attwater and John note, Saint Lucy was ''miraculously saved from exposure in a brothel'' (1995: 229), whereas Reitz's Lucie is ironically a brothelkeeper. Klärchen's name may be similarly ironic: Saint Clare is a virgin saint, while Klärchen is certainly not portrayed as such. These ironies of naming cast doubt on the saintly innocence of non-persecuted characters and their ability to work miracles to redeem Germany. Nonetheless, the indubitable, non-ironic, suffering of Apollonia, Lucie's status as sufferer as well as accessory to the causation of suffering, and the violent death of Martina (a non-persecuted character who dies a violent death like her saintly namesake) all suggest that – despite also casting ironic doubt on possible avenues of Christian redemption – Reitz is unable to relinquish a hope of redemption, and even absolution, via suffering, with the suffering including that of non-persecuted Germans. I will argue that Reitz's consideration of martyrdom and sacrifice as redemptive ways forward for Germany intensifies in the second and third series; Reitz's enthusiasm for redemptive martyrdom and sacrifice is, however, by no means absent from the first *Heimat*.

In terms of seeing, a key scene is the one in the final episode in which the viewer sees many dead characters reappear. Koebner comments that in this scene ''von den Toten angenommen wird, sie seien Zuschauer, die das Leben der Nachgeborenen besichtigen'' (2015: 125). The dead are also implied to be watching the viewer: Maria, for instance, appears to be stare right into the camera. An absence, one that is remarked upon, is that of Mathias. The explanation that Katharina provides for Mathias' absence is that ''der Opa war doch blind''. The explanation suggests that in this scene both characters and viewers can only see those who can themselves see. Reitz writes (of film in general), ''*das gegenseitige Anschauen ist das eigentliche filmische Thema*'' (in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 153) – Mathias cannot see, so there would not be the mutual (''*gegenseitige*'') seeing that Reitz

considers important in film. The camera appears to suggest that characters are in some sense seeing their own reflection as well as each other and viewers: at least, there seems to be a point-of-view shot from Maria's perspective that is answered by a reverse shot in which Maria is walking towards the camera. What viewers see is dead characters seeing themselves and other characters, and those dead characters' ability to be seen apparently depends on their ability to see – to rephrase Voltaire's famous ''I think, therefore I am'', they see, therefore they are, and Mathias does not see, therefore he is not (there). Reitz suggests that Mathias only exists for viewers insofar as viewers and characters are able to see each other, and Reitz uses Mathias' blindness to metaphorise a breakdown of a reflective principle of viewing whereby characters' presence is, logically enough, contingent upon interaction with viewers. Reitz's underlying point, I think, is that fictional characters cannot think for themselves in reality; to adapt Voltaire's statement again, characters are because viewers see / think them into a form of existence in partnership with the author(s) of the characters. Reitz's reference to film being about mutual seeing and the scene in which blind Mathias is absent suggest that Reitz thinks in terms of viewers seeing themselves in the characters whom they bring to life by relating to the fiction containing those characters. Viewers and characters cannot see Mathias because he cannot see back to complete the mirroring, mimetic relationship that Reitz calls ''*das eigentliche filmische Thema*'', as in, Reitz seems to suggest, the theme par excellence. The scene in which Mathias is absent and viewers and the other dead characters watch each other emphasises the importance to Reitz of viewers' building a relationship with characters, while also demonstrating the high degree of responsibility that Reitz ascribes to viewers with regard to how they see characters – characters are a product of what Reitz calls ''*das gegenseitige Anschauen*'' in film and are as such partly a reflection of viewers, who are, Reitz appears to stress, heavily responsible for the various moral messages that viewers can project onto the mirroring screen that Reitz has prepared for us. If viewers have a healthily horrified understanding of the evils of National Socialism and rightly understand characters to be complicit, some of them heavily, in evil, then this understanding will be reflected in the ''*gegenseitige Anschauen*'' between viewers and viewers'

image of characters. Characters' moral status flows partly from the eye of the beholder, not from Reitz's conception of characters in any overly simple way.

The dead seem to see living characters, peering at them through the window's glass (camera and mirrors also have glass of course). The past is suddenly looking at the present, as opposed to the viewer looking at the past. As part of this reversal characters seem to look at viewers, alongside the living characters, as if viewers were being watched and judged by the fictional dead, the present being judged by the past. Ludewig argues that ''by relying on oral history and storytelling, he [Reitz] manages to recreate experiences of historical events as they were perceived by the common people; in doing so, Reitz not only criticizes the moral shortcomings of his figures but also implicates the audience by way of its response'' (2011: 270). Something similar can be said in relation to this scene. Characters have been on trial in a sense; viewers have seen them refuse to properly see the suffering just beyond their gates. With time and the camera's gaze having apparently been reversed, the viewer is in the dock. Reitz puts the following question to the viewer: to see or not to see. Viewers are meant to imagine themselves being looked at, and then to look at themselves and compare their own lives to how they have seen characters lead theirs; are meant to reflect upon their own willingness to see what is around them, including that which they should (but may choose not to) see; are meant to acknowledge what they should oppose. On the one hand, this procedure of reversal may be meant to prompt viewers to reflect on the importance of preventing evils akin to those of National Socialism from reoccurring. On the other hand, there is scope to see in this procedure an attempt by Reitz to judge characters leniently, since an implication of the reversal is that viewers should put aside time to judge themselves rather than focusing unrelentingly (via the camera) on the characters' failings. Viewers are meant to see themselves reflected in the dead characters in the scene. Mathias is absent because the viewer's gaze is not reflected back by his gaze. The scene places viewers in front of a mirror, encouraging viewers to judge the dead characters (some of whom, such as Eduard, are extremely morally tainted) as if they were judging their own reflections, that is, an extension of themselves. Reitz subjects the viewer to the camera's

judgemental gaze for a while, captures viewers in the camera's mirror-glass, and in doing so perhaps suggests to viewers that, having themselves been briefly held for judgement by the camera, they should empathise with characters.

As elsewhere in the first *Heimat*, viewers can only see those who were persecuted under National Socialism in the mind's eye. With the sole exception of Wohlleben, those who were persecuted under National Socialism are not allowed (in any direct fashion) to bear witness to their suffering and admonish viewers to reflect upon the lives of the persecuted and the possible consequences of viewers' own life choices.[52] Koebner sees a visual hint of a (Holy) ''Gral'' in this scene (2015: 125), and, if there is indeed a Holy Grail present, then for Reitz the Holy Grail that is to be sought in filming a narrative rooted in the National Socialist past materialises when he resurrects, through the power vested in him by film, dead characters who (saving only Wohlleben) were not persecuted under National Socialism. Reitz resurrects these non-persecuted characters almost as if for Judgement Day, a Judgement Day on which they are placed around a possible Holy Grail. The potential Grail and the light in this scene suggest that Reitz wishes to guide viewers' judgement upon the characters towards forgiveness: Glenn Stanley writes of Wagner's *Parsifal*, which features the Holy Grail and would be a very likely source for Reitz, that ''redemption is generally acknowledged to be the central idea of the opera'' (2008: 152).[53] Another key theme, Stanley notes, is ''compassion (*Mitleid*)'' (ibid.: 151) – compassion is akin to empathy, which Reitz appears to encourage viewers to feel for the non-persecuted Germans of the National Socialist period.[54] The lives of those victims of National

[52] Although Apollonia is present, she is not precisely persecuted under National Socialism as far as the viewer knows. She is plainly a victimised character, and, as Palfreyman points out, an ''analogue[…] of alterity'' through whom ''psychological anti-Semitism'' is ''alluded to'' (2000: 105). Nonetheless, as Palfreyman comments, ''the use of lesser examples of oppression to represent the suffering of the Jews must […] be regarded as unacceptable at worst'' (ibid.). Even put together, Apollonia and Wohlleben seem rather inadequate as the only clear reminders in this scene of those whose existence the Nazis sought to utterly destroy.

[53] Wolfram Schütte has likened the Hermann of *Die zweite Heimat* to a Parzival seeking in vain for the Holy Grail (cited in Koebner, 2015: 214).

[54] On the influence of Wagner on Reitz (primarily but not solely in relation to *Heimat 3*), see Hillman, 2010: 265-270. Hillman links the end of *Heimat 3* to ''the 'redemption' theme at the end of Wagner's epic [*Götterdämmerung*]'' (ibid.: 270). Regarding the possible influence of *Parsifal*, Elsaesser notes, without elaboration, that in the first *Heimat* ''there are echoes […] of Siegfried and Parsifal myths'' (1989: 274).

Socialism, absent from the surface of the screen, are meant by Reitz to be imagined by the viewer in the first *Heimat*, but this scene with its raising of the dead focuses on characters who were non-persecuted Germans during National Socialism – and shows them drenched in light. As Koebner says of the scene, it is ‘‘die emphatische Schlussbetonung seiner [Reitz’s] Erzählung’’ (2015: 126), and (save only Wohlleben) those who were persecuted under National Socialism are left outside the light. Those who were persecuted may, as Gabriel proposes, be suggested to some viewers by the ‘‘outsize shadows’’ that the strong light produces (2004: 191). The shadows are, however, an extension of the illuminated characters, so cannot very satisfactorily represent the lives of those who were persecuted under National Socialism, lives made so extremely different from the lives of those who were persecuted. There is a markedly problematic symbolism if the lives of the victims of National Socialism are seen as being reflected only in the shadows of non-persecuted people, as if subordinate to the people casting the shadows, owing them their existence (rather than, in fact, their destruction).

When Reitz reverses the camera to show viewers that they are being watched, viewers are almost only clearly shown non-persecuted Germans. It is thought-provoking that Reitz has stated in an interview that ‘‘it’s so important to tell certain stories, for instance the stories of people who suffered under Hitler: reality killed them, but their stories can live forever. This feels like a moral duty’’ (in Angier, 1991: 38). Filmic resurrection of those killed by the Nazis is a ‘‘duty’’ that Reitz does not perform in an obvious way in the first *Heimat*; if ‘‘the stories of people who suffered under Hitler’’ (ibid.) are told, then they are certainly confined to the shadows.[55] Reitz raises the dead twice in the first *Heimat*: towards the very end and near the very beginning (when Paul sees the fallen Helmut, a victim of the First World War). A similarity between Paul’s vision of Helmut and the second raising of the dead is that Helmut (or perhaps rather Paul’s imagining of him) can only see those like himself: Helmut declares that everyone in Heaven speaks like Hunsrücker, indicating a

[55] As previously discussed, a possible justification, in terms of Reitz’s intentions, of his keeping such stories in the shadows is a determination to illustrate repression.

conception of Heaven in which Paradise is a place in which everyone is like oneself, with those whose identities differ being elsewhere. (While Helmut, or Paul's imagination, can only see those like himself, the viewer does not necessarily have to follow suit at least). Helmut's experience of Heaven corresponds to Reitz's following statement about how people typically feel: ''das Gefühl […] orientiert sich beharrlich im eigenen Lebensraum'' (no date [1979]: 99). In the later scene showing the dead, too, out of people persecuted under National Socialism, Wohlleben alone is visible in a scene containing predominantly non-persecuted characters. While part of Reitz appears to hope that viewers will see further than characters while viewing *Heimat* and thus also be aware of the offscreen presence of victims of utterly extreme persecution, Reitz presents viewers with an alarmingly seductive picture of the apparent pleasure taken by dead non-persecuted characters in seeing only the people closest to their ''eigenen Lebensraum'' (ibid.). Viewers' enthusiasm for seeing further than characters may perhaps fail to be much stimulated by the apparent delight of the ghosts of non-persecuted Germans at primarily seeing those whose experiences of life are closest to their own.

Confession and Absolution

Referring to Peter Buchka's comment in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* that the ghost scene is meant ''dem Purgatorium am Ende von […] *Alexanderplatz* gleichzutun'' (cited in Sobhani, 2001: 82), Sobhani proposes that ''Whereas Fassbinder's purgatory reflects the pain […] of Franz Biberkopf's soul, Reitz's feast celebrates a last goodbye to the living *and the dead* in *Heimat*'' (ibid.). The shadows to which Gabriel refers as cited above (2004: 191) significantly dampen the sense that complicit characters are looking on from Heaven.[56] In my view it would better to say that they are shown upon the brink of salvation, with the shadows hinting at a passage through Purgatory, with the scene showing them emerging from Purgatory, Heaven-bound. Admittedly, Reitz has referred to the setting of this scene as ''*der Hunsrücker Himmel*'' (in Koebner und Koch [eds], 2008: 267). Yet I

[56] Galli, meanwhile, doubts that the scene is really ''da leggersi in senso religioso'' (2005: 179).

would argue that Reitz's description points to where the characters in the scene are headed rather than the state in which they begin the scene: after all, the dramatic point of the scene is surely to move the characters and viewers' understanding of them onwards.[57] Purgatory seems a strong candidate for a place in which a hope of heavenly radiance is juxtaposed with strong shadows. Gabriel observes that characters' shadows lend the scene ''a chiaroscuro haunting that returns us to ghosts along with angels'' (2004: 191). Purgatory is a likely source for haunting ghosts, especially considering that Reitz has Catholic sensibilities – Reitz states, ''ich komme aus dieser katholischen Welt'' (2004i: 165).[58] In her discussion of *Hamlet* and *Heimat* Lisa Hopkins notes of the former that ''spirits in Purgatory were what ghosts were assumed to be'' (2014: 34). Rather than showing merely the ghost of (possibly) the father as in *Hamlet*, Reitz haunts his ghost scene at the end of the first *Heimat* with a whole host of relatives and family friends. Several of the characters in fact take their names from Reitz's own relatives (see Reitz, no date [1982]: 183), and, according to his own account, the scene is partly the result of Reitz having himself been insistently haunted by both the first *Heimat*'s characters and his family: he wrote during the making of the first *Heimat*, ''ich träume fast jede Nacht von den Figuren'' and ''hatte […] einen besonders lebhaften Traum'' (no date [1982]: 182) featuring numerous relatives, mainly deceased ones (ibid.: 183). Reitz states that when he awoke his (then) wife informed him, ''ich hätte in der Nacht laut gesprochen und merkwürdige Töne der Zustimmung und der Ablehnung von mir gegeben'' (ibid.: 184). In this haunting encounter Reitz appears to have been torn between competing drives to embrace (as implied by ''Zustimmung'') and to reject (as per ''Ablehnung'') relatives mostly belonging to a generation old enough to have potentially voted for Hitler (people recent enough to have been known by Reitz but old enough to be, in many cases, dead by the 1980s), and I see both conflicting drives, to embrace and to reject that generation, at work in the first *Heimat*. The ''merkwürdige Töne'' in which Reitz cried aloud

[57] In the book version of the first *Heimat* the scene is not so purgatorial (see 552-554), but in the case of the first *Heimat* the book version diverges very considerably from the filmic version – this scene especially.
[58] Regarding Reitz's attitude to religion, see also: Reitz in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 76-78 and 331-334; Reitz, 2014: 223; and Reitz, 2018: 351 and 369.

suggest a sleep troubled by a sense of strangeness and unease (this aspect of the inspiration for the scene seems to confirm that the first *Heimat*'s ghosts are coming from a place less restful than Heaven might be expected to be). Issues relating to mourning may well be at work – as per Santner's (1990) reading of the first *Heimat* as a whole, which links the first Heimat to concerns about ''the unmourned'' (ibid.: 68): Reitz's dreaming mind may have felt that those now ghostly people had not been adequately mourned; this would in part explain the ghostly intrusion upon Reitz's dreams, since mourning, as defined by Santner, involves ''something on the order of a funerary ritual or elegiac procedure lest the spirits of the revenant, vampiric object haunt us eternally from the space of the unmourned, the unconscious'' (1990: 68).

There is, however, more than mourning at stake in Reitz's dream in my view. Reitz remembers of his troubling dream: ''ich bat sie [the revenants], noch ein wenig Geduld zu haben mit mir, denn die Szene, in der sie vorkämen sei noch nicht vorbereitet''; in fact, the scene apparently did not exist before Reitz dreamt the ghosts – ''mir wurde bewußt, daß es sich hier um eine Szene handelte, […], die nicht im Drehbuch stand'' (ibid.: 183). The ghosts, Reitz's comments seem to suggest, appeared to him to entreat him to give them a scene, and it seems useful to consider what ghosts in Purgatory are likely to want, besides mourning. As Diana Walsh Pasulka writes, ''Purgatory is a precursor to heaven, reserved for souls who are ultimately destined for heaven. It is a place […] where souls are purified of their sins so that they may enter heaven'' (2017: 8). It would not be surprising for Reitz's dreams to be haunted by the fear that relatives who lived during National Socialism might well be forced to linger long in Purgatory. In a discussion of the ghost in *Hamlet*, Neil Taylor writes of the inhabitants of Purgatory that they ''call on your imagination, your sympathy, your empathy and your humanity, pleading as they do that your prayers might bring an end to their suffering'' (2016: 86). The first *Heimat*'s ghosts appear to be there in order to plead for empathy as a stepping stone to absolution, to escape from suffering. The ghosts appear close to the very end of the first *Heimat*, somewhat like Prospero at the end of another of Shakespeare's plays, who implores the audience, ''As you from crimes would pardon'd be, / Let your indulgence set me free'' (*The Tempest*, V:I).

Creeber suggests that Reitz ‘‘attempts to place the viewer in a deliberate act of identification with its [*Heimat*’s] characters, not in order to absolve responsibility for their actions but simply in order to understand them better’’ (2004: 41). In my view Reitz does not, as Creeber notes, ‘‘absolve’’ characters of moral ‘‘responsibility’’ (ibid.) in the first *Heimat*, but I would also argue that at least part of Reitz hopes that viewers will nonetheless to a large extent grant characters absolution, but not in the form envisaged by Creeber, whereby characters are exonerated of ‘‘responsibility’’ for their actions. Reitz seems rather to wish to encourage viewers to grant absolution without condoning characters’ sins or doubting the sinners’ guilt in having committed the sin – much as a Catholic priest uttering *Ego te absolvo* at Confession absolves the person without intending to trivialise the sin or deny the sinner’s culpability in having sinned. The first *Heimat*, insofar as it acknowledges the evil of National Socialism, which it certainly does to a considerable extent, effectively came to be Reitz’s act of confession on behalf of the ghosts of relatives who haunted his dreams.

The first *Heimat* is not unique in encouraging viewers to empathise with characters complicit in evil, but without condoning that evil. Hermann drives to Maria’s funeral, arriving in heavy rain. A point-of-view shot shows an elderly man and woman standing under an umbrella (1:11: around 13:00). Holding the umbrella is Paul, a father figure to Hermann. The camera passes back to Hermann looking at them from car, then to the couple under the umbrella again. This sequence perhaps draws on the end of Claude Berri’s *Le Vieil Homme et l’Enfant* (1967), which ends with the camera moving to and from the young Jewish hero waving goodbye from a vehicle to an elderly couple standing under an umbrella in heavy rain (Berri, 1967: around 01:22:19). The boy has – like Hermann – been closer to the old man than to his own father. Both Reitz’s and Berri’s scenes revolve around parting: Hermann parts from the deceased Maria; Berri’s protagonist from people very dear to him – while the viewer parts from Berri’s film, somewhat as Maria’s funeral is a part of the viewer’s long farewell to the first *Heimat*. Like Hermann in relation to Reitz, the young boy of Berri’s film bears a clear relationship to his author (Berri even gives the boy his own real name). Hermann and the boy both

have Jewish ancestry, and are also – against the backdrop of the Holocaust – likened to Jesus, explicitly in Berri's film at one point (see footnote 60 on Hermann and Jesus). Michel Simon, one of the actors, won a Silver Bear at the 1967 Berlin Film Festival for his performance in *Le Vieil Homme et l'Enfant*, so Reitz – a self-declared lover of French cinema in any case – would presumably have seen the film. The couple under the umbrella in Berri's film were reluctant to take down their treasured portrait of Pétain, and the elderly man repeatedly spouts anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. Yet Berri refuses to demonise the couple, whose better selves are lovingly showcased; at the same time, the inconsistency and implausibility of the anti-Semitic beliefs are made plain. Berri said of the old man: '''it was necessary to condemn the fellow at the same time as loving him''' (cited in Reader, 1996: 179) – which would also sum up much of Reitz's approach to characters such as Eduard and Lucie. While Berri is certainly critical of the anti-Semite, he endeavours first and foremost to humanise the anti-Semite's inaccurate image of Jewish people. Reitz similarly focuses not on vilification of people who unjustly vilify others but rather on exposing the errors of their thinking. If Reitz and Berri simply portrayed anti-Semites as appalling people without any conceivable partially redeeming features they would probably be preaching only to the converted; as it is, Berri and Reitz offer characters whom anti-Semites are more likely to be willing to identify with, while – crucially – also illustrating that the anti-Semites' views are wrong (although Reitz does so less explicitly than Berri). Features that the first *Heimat* and Berri's film additionally share include being in black-and-white (throughout in the case of the latter), having numerous key scenes in a country kitchen – plus a picnic scene; approaching the Holocaust as a subtext of paramount importance rather than placing it in the foreground; and using radio to air, respectively, Nazi and French collaborationist propaganda.[59]

[59] The importance of radio in the first *Heimat* has been noted – see Walter Moser, 2004: 58-60 and Mijić, 2006: 111-196. Von Moltke notes of the kitchen (in both the first and fourth series) that ''much of the subsequent action seems to revolve'' ''around'' its ''central pillar'' (2014: 126).

In a voice-over Maria comments on the scene showing the dead, saying, ‘‘aus dem Dunkel in die Klarheit’’, confirming that the dead are in a state of transition, with the destination implied, I think, to be Heavenly salvation: a possible source for Maria’s voice-over appears to be Goethe’s *Faust*.[60] Reitz has written, ‘‘wir beschwören die Toten und lassen sie vor der Kamera erscheinen’’ (no date [1979]: 106). As Helen of Troy appears in *Faust* (2001: 112 [part one, act III]), so the dead of the first *Heimat*, predominantly non-persecuted Germans of the National Socialist era, are conjured to appear before Reitz’s camera, apparently led ‘‘aus dem Dunkel’’, as Maria says, as if being set free from a Purgatorial penance stretching from the end of National Socialism to *Heimat*’s appearance just under forty years later. In her voice-over Maria appears to intercede for the characters, fulfilling a saintly role that is not presented as altogether ironic in this scene, even though some doubt is cast on Maria’s saintliness.[61] Maria thus plays a part like that of Gretchen in *Faust* (Ritchie Robertson writes that ‘‘Gretchen, […] it seems has interceded for’’ Faust [2022: no pagination]). There is also a similarity between, on the one hand, Reitz’s ghost scene in my reading of it as a passage from Purgatory to Heaven and, on the other hand, Robertson’s reading of *Faust*, according to which ‘‘the heaven in which Faust is purified and thus redeemed is also Purgatory’’ (ibid.). Both the first *Heimat* and Goethe’s *Faust* are great dramas of transgression and the possibility of redemption. In *Faust* Goethe has *der Herr* declare that he will ‘‘Faust in die Klarheit führen’’ (2001: 11 [part one, line

[60] Reitz may have had more than one of Goethe’s works in mind: Townsend links the scene to Goethe’s *Egmont* (1996: 187), at the end of which appears ‘‘die Freiheit in himmlischem Gewande, von einer Klarheit umflossen’’ (1828: 296), and which (but perhaps by pure coincidence) has a character called Clärchen.. In the final scene of *Egmont* the eponymous hero exclaims, ‘‘ich schreite einem ehrenvollen Tode aus diesem Kerker entgegen’’ (ibid.: 298), while in the first *Heimat* the dead are possibly on the way to realising the mayor’s prophecy at the First World War memorial that Germans will escape ‘‘diesem Kerker der Erniedrigung’’.

[61] As Palfreyman remarks, Maria’s name suggests ‘‘the iconic virgin mother’’ (2000: 64). Since Maria’s husband is long since estranged and thousands of miles away when Hermann is conceived, Hermann’s conception is a sort of parodic Virgin Birth. Heide Schlüpmann argues that Maria is an ‘‘allegory […] of the good and pure German woman […] a cliché that utilises lighting codes […] to make Maria look etherial [sic.]’’ (Hansen, 1985: 18-19). Gabriel argues rather that ‘‘classical film codes are mobilized’’ but also ‘‘destabiliz[ed]’’ (2004: 195), and suggests that the ‘‘exaggerated lighting’’ to which Schlüpmann refers ‘‘is designed to frame Maria in a self-conscious, oneiric register, whose status as fantasy soon enough comes unravelled’’ (ibid.: 190-191). The Virgin Mary is parodied elsewhere too: Gabriel notes that there is a scene in which ‘‘Lucie cradles his [Eduard’s] head in her lap: it is a profane pieta performed by the madame of a Berlin brothel’’ (2004: 189). Meanwhile, Mauro Giori notes that ‘‘Reitz non è mai tenero con la Chiesa’’ and that ‘‘non a caso a Natale Lucie vi ospita i tre gerarchi nazisti, che paiono le tre nemesi dei re magi’’ (2008: 114).

309]), so that the destination (‘‘in die Klarheit’’) referred to in Maria’s voice-over is a striking match for the destination that is suggested for Faust early on in Goethe’s work. It is not necessary, for the purposes of this point, to agonise over the interpretation of the Goethean line; it is enough that, firstly, the line seems suggestive of ultimate redemption for Faust (as is also perhaps suggested by the end of Goethe’s work), while, secondly, in *Heimat* the passage to ‘‘Klarheit’’ to which Maria’s voice-over refers appears to be unconditional (or the conditions have been fulfilled or are about to be fulfilled), whatever conditions may be attached to its possible source in *Faust*.[62] If Reitz is drawing on that Goethean line there is an implication that the scene showing the dead involves Reitz depicting them as beneficiaries of redemption; there is a strong suggestion that consorting with devils (National Socialist ones in *Heimat*’s case) can in the end be forgiven to an extent great enough for the transgressors to allowed into Heaven. Robertson argues of *Faust* that ‘‘Faust’s ascent to heaven does not imply his exoneration, but initiates a process of purification’’ (2022: abstract), and it would perhaps be overly simplistic to conclude that Reitz’s depiction of morally compromised ghosts moving away from ‘‘dem Dunkel’’ amounts to any full exoneration or conscious trivialisation of the complicity in National Socialism of many of the ghosts. Nonetheless, I would argue that the ghost scene very much reflects a powerful urge of Reitz’s to subtly encourage in viewers feelings of forgiveness towards the ghosts at the potential expense of the endurance of a strong awareness of their guilt. Forgiveness in general serves as a reminder of the past that is to be forgiven as well as pointing towards the future, so a scene showing progress out of Purgatory is by no means doomed to act only against awareness of a sinful past, but an exit from Purgatory is maybe suggestive of a future decline in terms of the extent to which the reasons for the stay in Purgatory are remembered.

<u>Oedipus</u>

[62] Regarding the meaning of Goethe’s line and questions surrounding Faust and redemption, Gerrit Brüning (2010) provides a useful overview.

There is a scene with incestuous overtones in which Hermann gets into bed with two women (Lotti and Klärchen), and he initiates soon-reciprocated sexual interaction (the book version confirms that Hermann is the initiator [1985: 425]).[63] The book version implies that Anton names his daughter, Helga, after a woman to whom he was sexually attracted, namely the other Helga whom Reitz describes as ''*Helga, die Freundin des 16jährigen Anton*'' (1985: 523).[64] In the film version there is a clear-cut instance of incest at the end of the last episode when Hermann and his niece kiss in a way that appears to trespass into eroticism. Hermann has been very widely recognised as bearing an autobiographical relationship to Reitz.[65] As Susanne Marschall cautions, Reitz's ''Alter ego'' is doubtless transformed in the ''künstlerischen Prozess'' so that there is a ''Distanz'' between Reitz and Hermann (2005: 55) (see also Scholz, 1996: 91). Nonetheless, throughout the cycle Reitz can reasonably be said to be represented by Hermann to a noteworthy extent. By having Hermann exchange a kiss with his niece Reitz is, in a sense, casting himself as a practitioner of incest, as one too closely related to his characters to act towards them within the bounds of orthodox morality. Reitz, I will argue, acts somewhat like Oedipus in relation to the first *Heimat*.

Partly, the explanation for the allusions to incest is provided, I would argue, by Gabriel's insight that in the first *Heimat* Reitz is deeply committed to attacking ''the National Socialist master trope of purity'', particularly regarding notions of racial purity (2004: 181). Reitz suggests incest in order to allegorise National Socialism's delusional devotion to Germans marrying only within an imagined Germanic tribal family. Reitz's (to cite Gabriel) ''pervasive critique of the dream of purity'' (ibid.: 186) attacks the centre of the evil of National Socialism, since murder is intimately related to this effectively incestuous pursuit of purity: as Gabriel remarks, notions of (racial) purity constitute ''the

[63] Hermann is not biologically related to the two women, but has grown up under the same roof as one (and she is a distant cousin of Hermann's half-brothers), while the other, Klärchen, possibly had a previous relationship with his half-brother Ernst.
[64] Meanwhile, Palfreyman notes that ''the question of incest is […] significant'' in *Die zweite Heimat* (2000: 194) (see also ibid.: 206-207).
[65] For instance, Santner describes Hermann as ''a rather thinly veiled autobiographical portrait of the filmmaker-artist as a young man'' (1990: 93). See also: Koebner, 2015: 19-20; Scholz, 1996: 60; Knorpp 2007: 126; Rossi, 2019: 146; Brady, 2005: no pagination; Derobert, 2006: no pagination; Gabriel, 2004: 167; Liebman, 1996: 44; Wickham, 1991: 43.

enabling mythos of the death camps'' (ibid.: 178). Koebner notes that ''im Mikro-Kosmos von Schabbach spiegelt sich in vielen Zügen ein Abbild der Welt außerhalb von Schabbach'' (2015: 117), and the Simon family is similarly a microcosm of the larger family of the German nation. As Gabriel puts it, they are an ''exemplary […] family, whose lives provide a […] chronicle of Germany'' (2004: 178). Reitz effectively points to incest as the logical conclusion of pursuing the exclusion of gene flow considered to come from outside one's own supposedly pure *Volk*, the national family for which the Simon family can to some extent be taken to stand symbolically. Rather than supporting any impression that Schabbach ought to invariably guard its borders against outside influences, in his evocations of incest Reitz suggests that danger comes from being inward-looking, from inbreeding. Since incest is a compelling argument against any less than strictly necessary isolation from the outside world, the overtones of incest argue against the accusation that Reitz, following the Nazis, portrays outside influences as predominantly harmful.[66] The intimations of incest seem to answer Martin Chalmers' ''*question* [… as to] *whether* **Heimat***'s rural setting could contribute to idealising rural origins and the myth of the soil*'' (1985: 96). In hinting at incest Reitz encourages viewers to see the incestuous and delusional implications of beliefs in racial purity, and pursues a strongly anti-Nazi agenda.

Liebman believes that ''an unacknowledged Oedipal passion'' is a factor in Maria's behaviour towards Klärchen (1996: 43).[67] Gabriel draws on Freud's theories regarding Oedipus to suggest that several male characters have troubled relationships with their mothers (2004: 185-190) (Liebman

[66] An example of that accusation is to be found in Santner's argument that ''new technologies […] seduce Schabbach out of its protective insularity at the margins of historical process'' (1990: 84). Morley and Robins note that ''the traditional Heimat film genre involve[s] conflict between […] the 'Heimat' and the threatening assault of the 'Fremde''' and declare that ''Reitz's film follows exactly this pattern'' (1995: 95). Koch associates Reitz's world view with ''the pervasive feeling of community which has to be asserted against external influence'' (reproduced in Hansen, 1985: 16). Carol and Robert Reimer argue that Reitz portrays National Socialism ''as an outside force'' (1992: 188).

[67] Tomaso Subini and Mauro Giori take a similar view (2008: 205-206), referring to a ''dinamica edipica'' (ibid.: 206) in relation to those three characters, and lays the blame at Maria's door (ibid.). I would agree that Reitz presents Maria, rather than Hermann, as the characters at fault in the triangle, and it seems to me that Reitz perhaps blames Maria because he himself is drawn to the figure of Oedipus.

presumably also has Freud in mind of course).[68] Reitz certainly lends credence to Freud's views regarding men and their mothers: in an interview with Dollner Reitz states, ''die Männerfantasie sucht […] die Mutter, aber wehe man fände sie. […], dann würde wieder das Inzest-Tabu greifen. Ich glaube, dass Freud diesen Widerspruch ganz richtig beschrieben hat'' (2005: 17). Sophocles' *Oedipus* is of course a background to the Freudian foreground in both Reitz's remark and Gabriel's comments linking vision and castration (as per Freud, as she notes [2004: 170]) in her discussion of the first *Heimat*.[69] I would add that Hänschen being blinded in one eye by his brother figures as a quasi-incestuous act of sexual mutilation, at least from the perspective of the Freudian association between sight loss and castration.[70]

I see more direct allusion to *Oedipus* in Ernst's refusal to see Paul when fate places them in the same bar at the same time (Ernst just walks away). Whereas Oedipus is unable to recognise his father when they cross paths unknowingly, Ernst recognises but chooses not to see (as in approach, talk to) Paul, the father who was absent from most of his childhood. Fate conspires against Oedipus: as Susan Sauvé Meyer says, ''Oedipus is fated to kill his father and marry his mother, and ends up doing both these things despite both his and his parents' best efforts to the contrary'' (1999: 250-251). Ernst, meanwhile, deliberately rejects his father. I will argue in my chapter on *Heimat 3* that Ernst is doomed to suffer by his complicity in National Socialism (and perhaps to an extent embraces this doom), but in his refusal to see his father, he is able to exercise some degree of choice in a matter not directly relating to the legacy of National Socialism (Paul, it should be remembered, does not

[68] For instance, Gabriel argues that for Maria Hermann ''becomes both stand-in for the husband who ran away and the lover who was killed in the war'' (2004: 189). She also interprets a scene with Wohlleben, Ernst and Maria in terms of Wohlleben being Ernst's ''Oedipal rival'' (2004: 170), and suggests that for Paul Apollonia, who is of romantic interest to him, is ''bound up with the figure of the Mother'' (ibid.: 175).
[69] Gabriel argues that the ''figure of the uncanny eye registers […] castration'' (2004: 173), and comments that ''Ernst observes the fractured arm of Otto in a cast, which functions as a visual marker of castration'' in ''an almost exact replication of an incident in Freud's […] case history of Little Hans'' (ibid.: 170).
[70] If Lisa Hopkins is right that *Hamlet* is an influence on *Heimat* (2014), then that would be another instance of Reitz being attracted to a text in which incestuous implications can be seen, given Hamlet's uncle's relationship with his mother – Hamlet's father's ghost describes his brother as ''that […] incestuous beast'' (I: V). *Hamlet* and *Oedipus* have been viewed as texts that invite comparison: for a comparison of them that also considers Freud's comparison of the two dramas, see Lorant, 1985.

have any National Socialism-related guilt to pass on, since he left for America before National Socialism and did not participate in the persecution of Apollonia).

Besides incest, however, there is another theme that *Oedipus* shares with the first *Heimat*: vision. Oedipus blinds himself upon realisation of having committed incest. In the first *Heimat*, too, characters wish not to see the horrors in which they have (on some level of consciousness) knowingly been involved as (in the case of the vast majority of *Heimat*'s characters) non-persecuted members of the National Socialist German national community – the national family, one might say. Being isolated from one's father, like Oedipus, also has a relevance to Reitz's representation of a German family under and after National Socialism.[71] Oedipus having adoptive parents is also relatable to the first *Heimat*, in which Paul is eventually some sort of a father figure to Hermann, while a relative of Katharina's and her husband adopt two children.

Oedipus' response to the realisation of what he has done has a deep resonance with how the first *Heimat* looks back on National Socialism. Reitz himself, via Hermann, is a sort of Oedipus figure: he distances his fictional self from his real father by giving Hermann a Jewish father; Hermann engages in sexual activity with incestuous overtones with Lottie and Klärchen; Hermann becomes a musician – that is, one who shapes the world in terms of sound, not sight. Reitz has stated that ''die Kamera ein Auge hat'' (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 153). Reitz, Oedipus-like, physically (although not metaphysically so much) blinds his filmic eye, his camera, to the genocidal murders tearing apart the German national family; these familicidal murders on genocidal scale were perpetrated in the name of the incestuous fantasy of guarding the national family against genetic influences supposed to be foreign and dangerous to the national family. Reitz appears to follow Oedipus' example in his approach to the murderous incest of National Socialism. In arguing that ''trauma is signalled throughout the film by a troubling of vision'', Gabriel notes that Reitz has said of the horrors of

[71] Koebner notes that Maria's three sons ''sind ohne Vater aufgewachsen'' (2015: 127), and notes the breadth of the wider German cultural background of concepts of ''Vaterlosigkeit'' (ibid.: 128). On fatherlessness see also Palfreyman, 2000: 182-183.

National Socialism that ‘‘it is really too much for our eyes’’ (cited in Gabriel, 2004: 171). Oedipus says of his blinding himself, ‘‘I will not believe that this was not the best / That could have been done’’ (1947: 63), while the chorus speaks of that which is ‘‘Too terrible for eyes to see’’ (ibid.: 62). Gabriel cites Reitz’s ‘‘too much for our eyes’’ remark as evidence of Reitz’s determination to show (and condemn) repression – an argument that is in my view highly persuasive. Reitz’s remark also supports Galli’s argument that Reitz has the ‘‘convinzione che […] le esperienze narrate in *Heimat* raccontano il Terzo Reich forse con più precisione di quanto sarebbe successo se lo spettatore si fosse trovato di fronte ancora una volta violenze, deportazioni, campi di concentramento’’ (2005: 158).

At the same time, however, the ‘‘too much for our eyes’’ remark also reflects Reitz’s drive to take refuge from the horrors of the past. Oedipus says, referring to himself, ‘‘All men [… should] cast away the offence, the unclean’’ (1947: 64) and also says, ‘‘Cast me away this instant / Out of this land, out of the sight of man’’ (ibid.: 65) and ‘‘Hide me at once […], hide me away’’ (ibid.: 64). On the other hand, Oedipus, an ‘‘attendant’’ relates, ‘‘shouts for someone to unbar the doors. / And show all Thebes the father’s murderer’’ (ibid.: 61). Reitz likewise has conflicting drives to conceal and to reveal; hides much from his camera’s eye, yet, as previously discussed, subtly but also persistently and insistently reveals that he is practising concealment. There is much to be said for Santner’s view (cited earlier) that Reitz both reveals and participates in repression (1990: 92). I would suggest, in Reitz’s defence, that his ‘‘too much for the eyes’’ comment also stems from Reitz’s very deeply held belief that merely seeing something is nowhere near enough to understand it (a point covered previously in this chapter), a principle that Reitz appears to apply to the Holocaust (most probably with good motives to a large extent, but potentially with disastrous results in terms of the scope for *Heimat*’s visual depiction of the past to be misinterpreted by some viewers).

Reitz crucially deviates from the narrative of *Oedipus* by admitting that many Germans repressed knowledge of the evil of National Socialism, choosing, like Lucie (as opposed to being fated, Oedipus-

like), not to see further than was comfortable, choosing not to look beyond themselves and extend an empathetic or at least sympathetic gaze to those who were persecuted. Unlike Oedipus, Reitz's characters have an opportunity to properly see what they are doing, and are thus guilty of culpable choices rather than unwitting participants in the horrors of incest and murder. Nonetheless, they are presented as pitiable: there is Lucie's suffering when her parents die as a result of her failure to look at the road properly, and when her son is killed by a mine (which seems to be a fateful judgement upon her). Lucie, like Oedipus, is left having to live with the knowledge that she was a driving force behind the death of both of her parents (and, unlike those of Oedipus, her parents did not threaten her life). There is the death of Hänschen, whose single eye appears to Eduard to be best employed for sharpshooting, and in his guilt over having encouraged Hänschen's shooting Eduard appears as a victim of the knowledge of his guilt, like Oedipus. Santner notes that Eduard covers one of his eyes in response to the recognition of his guilt, gesturing to Hänschen's one-eyedness (1992: 270). In temporarily half-blinding himself Eduard empathises with Hänschen, provides a cue to viewers to follow suit, and in doing so makes a bid for victim status by asserting the strength of his empathetic connection to a fellow member of the national family, Hänschen, who is punished for his (as far as viewers know, uncritical and not unwilling) participation in the National Socialist armed forces by the loss of his life, which may threaten to secure for him, in the eyes of some viewers, a victim status alongside his status of complicity. Simultaneously, Eduard sees the culpable destructiveness of his having encouraged a young boy to devote himself to shooting and obscures his complicity while revealing it in that he hides one of his eyes in solidarity with Hänschen, a solidarity that makes him visually akin to a victim of his grossly irresponsible guidance. The victims of the shooting that Eduard encouraged Hänschen to take up appear to still be beyond Eduard's self-servingly short view. Lucie, Hänschen and Eduard (see Gabriel, 2004: 180 on fool's gold, as cited earlier) are all in some sense metaphorically blind, and all are meant to command the viewers' pity. The attendant in *Oedipus* declares of the blinded Oedipus that ''you shall see a sorry spectacle / That loathing cannot choose but pity'' (1947: 61), a description that fits the image of National Socialist Germany painted by Reitz,

an image meant to be loathed but also to inspire pity, and Reitz intends to channel much of the pity towards those who were complicit in the murderous incest of National Socialism's pursuit of so-called racial purity. Lucie, Hänschen and Eduard all play various parts in contributing to a National Socialist state that must be loathed – and which viewers are indeed encouraged to loathe, but Reitz invites viewers to also pity those whom they must despise. Elsaesser sees in the first *Heimat* scope for ''a gratifying identification with victims, and with oneself as victim'' (1989: 278), a remark that appears to envisage a German viewer relating to *Heimat*'s characters on the basis of a sense of shared victimhood, one shared across generations. About forty years after the defeat of National Socialism Reitz sought to encourage German viewers to hate their national family but also to find some refuge in a sense of self-pity attained via perception of righteousness. According to Nietzsche, ''He who despises himself still nonetheless respects himself as one who despises'' (ibid.: 92 [78]). Reitz certainly in part encourages viewers to hate those complicit in National Socialism (which presumably included some of *Heimat*'s viewers in 1984), but this acknowledgement of guilt also potentially offers comfort, as per Nietzsche's maxim, in the form of a self-respect gained via self-hatred.

Oedipus' transgression is extreme; in his words, ''All human filthiness in one crime compounded'' (1947: 64), so that he asks, rhetorically, ''Is there a name of ill / That is not ours?'' (ibid.: 67). Since they invite such condemnation, the dreadful acts carried out by Oedipus confer a status of victim upon him and his descendants, a status that Reitz covets and lays claim to on behalf of Germans (including those who were not persecuted) who lived during National Socialism (and including those who were only children at the time – as will be discussed in the following chapter). Oedipus addresses his children: ''I think of your sorrowful life in the days to come, / When you must face the world'', suffering from ''The scandal that will cling to all my children / And children's children'' (1947: 67). In *Heimat*, too, the German national family is afflicted over generations – as shown (for instance) by the death of Lucie's and Eduard's son Horst in childhood (which implies innocence), a young death brought about by a mine, a dormant reminder of the war that waits to be stumbled

upon in order to explode out of its hiding place. Reitz acknowledges German culpability in the first *Heimat*, but Reitz does so partly in the interests of pleading for pity on behalf of those Germans who were not persecuted under National Socialism. Oedipus, along with his family, is the victim of his own offences (and those of his parents, which also keeps suffering in the family). By characterising National Socialism as incest, Reitz admirably condemns the destructive madness of National Socialist notions of race, but there is also the downside that Reitz's allegory of incest to a significant extent emphasises victimhood within the (non-persecuted German) Simon family, which threatens to cut the victims of National Socialist persecution out of the picture.

As Teresa M. Danze writes of *Oedipus*, ''the self-recognition and reversal of fortune coalesce in one simultaneous act, yielding from the audience either pity or fear, the primary effects of the mimetic art of tragedy'' (2016: 565). In showing the murderous National Socialist quest for the incestuous horror of so-called racial purity Reitz firmly (yet in very veiled terms) states the case for recognition of German culpability, and in such a way that reflects a sincere revulsion on Reitz's part towards National Socialism (if not, however, towards all those complicit in it). Pity, however, plays a role akin to that of hope after the opening of Pandora's box. What Danze notes of *Oedipus* above may well hold true for some viewers' experience of the first *Heimat*: eyes being opened to having done wrong is a process simultaneous to the tragic evocation of pity for non-persecuted Germans, a pity that Reitz probably expects to operate via mimetic empathy. Moeller writes of the attitude of some Germans in the 1950s that ''German suffering became a form of atonement and collective penance, an acknowledgement of what Germans had done that became the basis for simultaneously making amends and demanding that others recognise what had been done to Germans'' (2006: 37), a comment that could be applied just as well to the first *Heimat*. Oedipus admits to ''such heinous sin / as no mere death could pay for'', and the chorus suggests that ''it would have been better to die than live in blindness'' (1947: 63). Oedipus' sacrifice of his eyes is, then, presented as a self-punishment worse than death, one that is partly an attempt to ''pay for'' ''heinous sin'' (ibid.). Atonement, in pursuit of forgiveness, is sought by Oedipus, while Reitz takes care to endow his non-

persecuted German characters with plenty of suffering in the hope that in viewers' eyes those characters can use that suffering to buy pity. In the first *Heimat* Reitz suggests that viewers should both condemn and forgive many members of the incestuous, murderous, yet also pitifully mutilated German national family. Regarding mimetic pity and those persecuted under National Socialism, a key question would appear to be how well viewers identify, via mimesis, with suffering that is so indirectly depicted in the first *Heimat*. Eduard's mimetic covering of his eye when grieving for Hänschen constitutes a strong visual plea for empathy on behalf of Hänschen, victim first of blinding, then of death. Meanwhile, those whom Hänschen presumably shot are wholly dependent for such advocacy on images of the imagination that viewers may or may not construct.

Danze makes a distinction between forms of pity in her discussion of *Oedipus* that seems worth considering in relation to *Heimat*: ''the spectator who empathizes attempts to feel the same emotion as the object of his emotion through an imaginative leap into the victim's situation'' (ibid.: 569). As Creeber remarks, Reitz ''attempts to place the viewer in a deliberate act of identification with its [*Heimat*'s] characters, […] in order to understand them better'' (2004: 41) – which comes under empathy in Danze's definition. Non-persecuted Germans are on the screen right in front of viewers and displayed with a wealth of detail; they are set up to be the objects of viewer empathy in the first *Heimat*. Those who were persecuted are portrayed (in so far as they are portrayed) in a way that appears to anticipate viewers feeling (to cite Danze on sympathy) ''a removed […] pain at the misfortune of the other that does not attempt to resemble the emotions of the object'' (2016: 569). In the first *Heimat*'s representation of them, Jewish people and other victims of National Socialism are largely segregated from the non-persecuted characters – by the camera as well as by the wickedness of National Socialism; they are somewhere offscreen – viewers can and should infer their existence, but they are kept at a distance, out of sight. This does not mean that Reitz does not expect, and indeed hope, that viewers will experience what Danze calls ''a removed […] pain'' in sympathy with those who were persecuted under National Socialism, but it certainly threatens to place persecuted and non-persecuted people of the era in different categories in relation to pity.

Sharon Todd writes of empathy, ‘‘as a quality of relationality, it appears that there are better candidates for […] the acknowledgment of the Other’s suffering’’, since ‘‘learning through empathy cannot but mask […] the Other’s radically different feelings, experiences, and needs as unique. Empathy necessarily leads to questionable assumptions that the Other is ultimately somewhat like me’’ (2003: 63). Seen from the angle from which Todd is writing, Reitz would perhaps, at least in part, be right not to foster empathy towards those targeted by the Nazis in relation to the audience that Reitz probably anticipated as his primary audience (namely, Germans who were not persecuted under National Socialism and their descendants). Yet, when applied to the Holocaust (Todd discusses empathy more generally, although sometimes in relation to the Holocaust), there seems to be a danger in emphasising what Todd calls ‘‘the Other’s radically different feelings’’ (ibid.): ‘‘radical’’ is an unfortunate word choice in that it is potentially suggestive of inherent (as opposed to artificially constructed and sometimes imposed) difference, since the Nazis violently asserted that those whom they persecuted were inherently, ‘‘radically different’’ (Todd uses the phrase in a less specific context, not directly in relation to National Socialism, although very shortly after discussing the Holocaust and empathy; I am not seeking to traduce her – it is plain that Todd intends to emphasise the importance of differences in experience, and does not at all mean to deny people’s shared humanity).[72] In the particular case of the representation of National Socialism it would appear important to emphasise people’s common humanity, to focus on humanity sharing roots that closely relate to one another as opposed to parts of the body of humanity having the more innately and fundamentally different modes of existence that the Nazis asserted and ascribed to biologically rooted differences in family trees that supposedly led to radical differences in worth between groups of people. In relation to the Holocaust it would perhaps seem better, overall, to stress the uniting shared features of humanity that the Nazis sought to deny. Todd’s understandable concern regarding empathy in relation to the Holocaust is that ‘‘identification […] collapse[s] the distinction between self and Other’’ and that, ‘‘while empathy may be constructive to self-reflection, it is not

[72] Todd also states, ‘‘I am not suggesting that we should not empathize’’ (2003: 63).

about respecting the singularity and uniqueness of the Other'' (ibid.: 62) (this sentence is in a paragraph following a paragraph in which the Holocaust is mentioned). While lack of empathy is doubtless also dangerous, unwary empathy is surely indeed a grave problem should it, as Todd fears, fail to ''respect[…] […] the Other'' (ibid.). Todd's point brings us to a conceivable motive of Reitz's in distancing viewers from those persecuted by the Nazis: Reitz complained in relation to the series *Holocaust* that ''die Amerikaner haben mit Holocaust uns Geschichte weggenommen'' (no date [1979]: 102). Possibly Reitz did not want to lay false claim to experiences belonging to those persecuted by the Nazis and not to Reitz or most of the audience that he is likely to have had in mind.[73] The ethics of empathy are doubtless, as per Todd's comments, complex, while the differences in the forms of pity that Reitz channels towards persecuted, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, non-persecuted people under National Socialism to some extent stem from there being profound differences in groups' experience of National Socialism (as noted by Schmitz, 2006: 96, as cited earlier in this chapter), and these differences of experience are historical differences for which Reitz is not personally responsible. Despite the potential pitfalls, as according to Todd, of promoting empathy towards people with experiences that differ substantially from those meant to feel empathy towards them, it also seems potentially very problematic – potentially more problematic than encouraging empathy towards people with different experiences – that there is an inequality in the forms of pity that *Heimat* appears to be designed to evoke, with non-persecuted Germans being fully fleshed-out and apparently just on the other side of the screen, well placed to garner empathy, while the persecuted are constructed as more distant objects of sympathy. There appears to be a risk that the pity bestowed by some viewers – very possibly following Reitz's example – on non-persecuted Germans may, then, be greater than that felt for people who were persecuted by the Nazis.

[73] A flaw in this defence, however, is that Reitz does, as I will discuss below, appear to lay some claim (on behalf of himself, Hermann and the other Simons) to a sort of kinship with Jews in the first *Heimat*, while, secondly, this defence would in any case be an imperfect one against the serious problem represented by the inequality in the forms of pity that Reitz pleads for.

Some of Reitz's likely motives in not doing more to encourage viewers to empathise with those who were persecuted under National Socialism relate to the wider German problem that Dirk Moses describes thus: ''to have real empathy with the victims of the Holocaust entails a less affective relationship to the family, community and nation because to acknowledge the implication – thus the pollution – of these entities [in relation to National Socialism] destroys basic trust in them'' (2007ii: 152). Moses' remark expresses the logic that presumably underlies Koch's argument, as cited earlier, that ''um den Mythos Heimat erzählen zu können, das Trauma Auschwitz'' ''muß'' ''aus der Geschichte ausgeklammert werden'' (1985: 107). The hope of maintaining his own and many other Germans' ''affective relationship to the family'' (Moses: ibid.) is probably at least one reason why Reitz seeks to make the Nazis' victims more distant from viewers than those who either were Nazis or did not meaningfully oppose them.

Martin Chalmers writes of being unsure as to ''the ability of the family saga form [of the first *Heimat*] to deal directly with questions like Fascism'', explaining that ''the uncle or brother in the SS becomes merely a 'baddy', in the same way that JR, in Dallas, is a villain'' (1985: 96).[74] *Oedipus* provides (along with *Hamlet*) an illustration of the suitability of family dramas for exploring the most serious of topics. Reitz's focus on a particular family also reflects how many Germans may be likely to approach the National Socialist period. Moses claims that for ''Germans and Jews'' ''public discussion about the common past is rooted in the intimate sphere of the family'' (2007ii: 141). Reitz's decision to explore National Socialism especially via a family group may perhaps tend to be effective in stimulating many German viewers to engage with *Heimat*'s portrayal of the National Socialist period and reflect on their own family's history. As Schmitz might caution (as cited earlier), so much ''German family memory'' may regrettably come at the expense of ''images of Nazi crimes'' (2006:

[74] Hansen also wonders, ''how […] does the appeal of Reitz's family-centered narrative differ from that of a commercial TV saga like Dallas?'' (1985: 6). *Dallas* is contrasted with *Heimat* by Tomaso Subini (2008: 32-33; 37). Caryl Flinn claims of *Holocaust*, ''reduced to personal drama, it seemed to diminish that event to the sensationalized fate of one or two families'' (2004: 29-30), and then comments, ''that criticism would later be levied at Reitz's own film'' (ibid.: 30).

102). On the other hand, Reitz attempts to balance the risk of ‘‘German family memory’’ precluding (German) viewers’ clearly acknowledging to themselves the horrors of National Socialism: *Heimat*’s hints at the Oedipal horrors of incest and mutilation (very clearly reflected in the gouging out of Hänschen’s eye) show that Reitz’s image of the German national family under National Socialism very much involves appalling acts. What is in doubt, however, is whether Reitz’s symbolic transformation of those horrors in the first *Heimat* is an attempt to clearly acknowledge in any precise way the genocidal evil of National Socialism. Reitz’s symbolic transposition of genocidal evil into the non-persecuted German Hänschen, for example, perhaps reflects an urge to reveal this evil in a way that simultaneously threatens to conceal the precise historical nature of the Holocaust and the location of its suffering in the bodies and minds of those whom the Nazis actually targeted.

Commenting on Glasisch’s speculations about Apollonia’s pubic hair or lack thereof, Gabriel notes that, Freud-like, Reitz combines ‘‘disgust and desire’’ in Apollonia: to some other characters, notably Glasisch, Gabriel notes, ‘‘she is a figure of both projected disgust and desire’’ (2004: 167), while, likewise, ‘‘the Frenchwoman is both the object of desire and fear’’ (ibid.: 159) and a ‘‘split structure of disgust and desire informs the figure of Klärchen’’ (ibid.: 175). After blinding himself, Oedipus states, ‘‘I am hiding / My eyes, I cannot bear / What most I long to see; / And what I long to hear, / That most I dread’’ (1947: 62). Continuing his previously cited comment about Freud and incestuous male longing for mothers, Reitz says of the generic male that ‘‘wenn er […] sein Mutterbild erobert und schwängert, dann möchte er gleich wieder fliehen’’ (2005: 17). In *Heimat* Reitz strives both to return to and to flee from the National Socialist period, the period in which he was born. One of the most striking lines in the first *Heimat* is perhaps Lucie’s declaration that Hitler reminds her of her mother; in a sense, Hitler is the parent of the National Socialist period, and Reitz simultaneously seeks to recall the society into which he was born and also to blind his camera to some of that National Socialist period Heimat. Gabriel observes that ‘‘*Heimat* takes up the risk of simultaneously staging and refusing the fantasy of plenitude and wholeness […] behind the imaginary idyll of Heimat. This contradictory space is most fully embodied in the character of Hermann, […] the film’s

closest stand-in to the director himself'' (2004: 193). A similar contradiction is present in Reitz's attitude to showing German culpability under National Socialism: drives to reveal and to conceal are locked in struggle. Reitz blinds his camera to many of the horrors of his incestuously racial-purity-obsessed (to borrow a phrase from Palfreyman, 2000: 101) ''Mother-Heimat''. Somewhat as Hamlet suspects his mother of involvement in murder and incest, Reitz is troubled by his ''Mother Heimat'''s complicity in attempts to fulfil the murderous and incestuous objectives of National Socialism. For Reitz, the filmic resurrection of the non-persecuted Germans of the National Socialist era is a project that spans longing and fear, love and repulsion. Reitz remarks of the first *Heimat* that ''die Figuren eindeutig zu lieben oder zu hassen, mißlingt, und ich bin ihnen gegenüber dennoch nie gleichgültig'' (no date [1980]: 141); he also identifies with the characters – ''ich'' ''bin'' ''auf meine Weise auch so'' (ibid.). As previously discussed, when the dead (many of them members of the Simon family) are resurrected in the final episode Reitz clads them in light, which in turn produces potentially frightening shadows – as Gabriel says, the scene is one of ''ghosts along with angels'' (2004: 191). Regarding many of the non-persecuted German characters of the National Socialist era, Reitz ultimately cannot bear either to utterly abandon all hope of redemption, nor – reassuringly – escape the horror brought by awareness of their complicity in the evil of the period. Oedipus' physical blindness does not silence what he calls ''the soul's dark memory'' (1947: 62). Similarly, the blindness sometimes displayed by Reitz's camera is not meant to make viewers actually forget their knowledge of historical realities that they cannot physically see onscreen.

In the first *Heimat* Reitz values a metaphysical vision of the mind over the potentially misleading external appearance of things (hence the presence of fool's gold in the first *Heimat*). In Reitz's view cameras capture ''nur die Oberfläche der Dinge und Menschen'' (Reitz in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 305). Reitz complained that *Holocaust* – which takes a far more direct visual approach to reflecting the Holocaust than *Heimat* – produced ''eine ‚Krokodils-Träne der Nation'' (no date [1979]: 99). With his complaint about crocodile tears and his ''too much for our eyes'' remark Reitz seems to feel that the Holocaust ''lies[s] too deep for tears'' (to adapt a line of Wordsworth's [1895: 95]). In a

somewhat related vein, Aristotle suggests that ‘‘the severities of distress, exciting horror, are incompatible with pity, destructive of this sentiment’’ (1823: 289), and there is also Nietzsche’s maxim that ‘‘disgust with dirt can be so great that it prevents us from cleaning ourselves’’ (2003: 98 [119]). Tears clean eyes, cathartically, and Germans wiping away tears after watching *Holocaust* is perhaps like attempting to wipe away guilt in Reitz’s view – yet, due to Reitz’s conflicted approach to National Socialism and guilt in the first *Heimat*, part of Reitz also aims to move away from the evil of the past. Reitz may well view the horror of the Holocaust as one that lies too deep for tears or eyes, which speaks forcibly for an intention to respect the magnitude of the Holocaust. Reitz perhaps wishes to partially blind his camera to the full horror of National Socialism lest, as per Nietzsche’s observation, the full horror should be (to return to a previously cited remark of Reitz’s) ‘‘too much for our eyes’’ and thus prevent engagement – in Nietzsche’s maxim, ‘‘cleaning ourselves’’. Yet Reitz refers, in relation to the figures haunting his dreams as mentioned earlier, to both ‘‘Zustimmung’’ and ‘‘Ablehnung’’ (no date [1982]: 184), rather summing up the contradictions that to a large degree shape Reitz’s approach to showing National Socialism in the first series. Reitz is torn between acknowledging and half-concealing the full horror of National Socialism. It seems credible that part of Reitz may well have wished also to blunt the horror of the Holocaust by positioning it so as to show up on the edge of viewers’ mental vision.

Reitz has stated that ‘‘die Kamera ein Auge hat und […] sie deswegen, wenn sie in die Augen eines Menschen schaut, sofort versteht’’ (in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 153). By blinding his camera so as to largely prevent direct visual depiction of those people who were persecuted under National Socialism, Reitz prevents it from imparting to viewers the immediacy of understanding that the camera, in Reitz’s own words, conveys when it looks characters in the eye. Reitz states also that ‘‘das größte aller Themen ist im Film das menschliche Gesicht’’ (in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 153). In attaching such importance to faces and to seeing through the camera’s eye – that is, seeing onscreen images, Reitz somewhat contradicts his aforementioned numerous declarations that onscreen images are of secondary importance to viewers’ imaginations. The characters that Reitz’s

camera looks in the eye (and presumably, according to Reitz's above statement, understands) are in fact overwhelmingly non-persecuted Germans, some of them indubitably active Nazis. As Kaes observes, ''the viewer is free to criticize the characters' point of view; but when a realistic narrative is so closely attuned to its characters, it is difficult to make the leap from identification to critical distance'' (1989: 189). As noted earlier in this chapter, however, it is highly questionable that *Heimat* is the sort of ''realistic narrative'' perceived by Kaes (see, for instance Creeber, 2004: 40 – and Kaes himself notes the presence of some '''unrealistic' scenes'' [1989: 176]). Nonetheless, Kaes' comment captures a potential source of bias operating in favour of non-persecuted Germans that Reitz's construction of viewpoint may produce in viewers.

Aristotle argues that ''the disasters of real life are affecting in proportion to their proximity'' (1823: 290). Rachel Hall Sternberg argues that in Greek drama ''it is often sight that triggers pity''; that Greek ''ancient sources suggest that the ability of human beings to see one another creates the possibility of mutual sympathy and understanding, the very bonds that hold society together'' (2005: 26); and that ''power of sight […] was commonly linked to fellow-feeling and the capacity for pity – what modern psychologists would describe as sympathy or empathy'' (ibid.: 27). In declaring that ''die Kamera ein Auge hat und […] sie deswegen, wenn sie in die Augen eines Menschen schaut, sofort versteht'' (in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 153) Reitz appears to share the view that seeing opens the way to understanding, and that understanding in turn opens the door to pity. Although Reitz writes (somewhat in contradiction of his statements about the importance of the invisible in film) that ''das größte aller Themen ist im Film das menschliche Gesicht'' and declares that the camera looking people in the eye produces understanding (ibid.), those who were persecuted under National Socialism are largely deprived of a human face and potentially distanced from some viewers' understanding by the reluctance of Reitz's camera to see them, to look the Oedipal horrors of Germany's familicidal murders in the eye. *Heimat*'s perspective is broadly relatable to Schmitz's aforementioned concept of '''perpetrator-centred memory''' (2006: 95). The camera imitates Lucie's viewpoint when showing her dead parents, who are right next to her. By encouraging viewers to

identify their own perspective with Lucie's, the camerawork encourages viewers to mimetically pity Lucie's parents. In pitying Lucie's parents via identification with Lucie's visual and emotional position, viewers are likely to pity also Lucie. Viewers are prompted to pity her pity, to see her as deserving of pity on the basis that she pities her parents – she is visibly distraught at their deaths; this invitation to viewers to pity Lucie as one who pities her parents is perhaps a stratagem of Reitz's intended to induce viewers to pity not only Lucie, despite her complicity in National Socialism, but also to pity their own parents, even if they should be complicit too. Sight is a vehicle for pity in the first *Heimat*. We see characters fail to adequately pity those in their society whose suffering they would rather not look at closely, but in distancing viewers from the persecuted, Reitz threatens to distance the victims of National Socialism from pity in the viewing experience.

Hänschen being left with only one eye has rich metaphorical potential. Gabriel relates Hänschen being one-eyed to what she recognises as Reitz's ''pervasive critique of ontological purity and wholeness'' (2004: 173). Reitz perhaps makes Hänschen's remaining eye stand for those who were not persecuted and his lost one stand for those who persecuted in an attempt to remove them from the German national body. Reitz remarks, ''ich glaube […], dass es bestimmte *archaische Grundmuster* in menschlichen Beziehungen gibt. Das größte aller Themen ist im Film das menschliche Gesicht'' (in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 153). In film, according to Reitz, faces are key to understanding how people interrelate. Reitz is maybe allegorising the mass murder of so many victims of National Socialism as the torturous removal of one of the eyes of the German national body. If so, then the loss sustained by the German national family is depicted on the body of a member of that family who is not persecuted under National Socialism, problematically representing victimhood under National Socialism as a mutilation borne by one of those people who were not in fact deliberately targeted by the Nazis. There is a scene in which Eduard is terrified by the possibility that the Simons are related to other Simons with potentially Jewish names. The Simons, it is suggested, may well have Jewish relatives. On the one hand, this scene is extremely admirable (as per Gabriel's reading of it [2004: 167]) as an anti-racist refutation of notions of so-

called (non-Jewish) German purity. On the other hand, there are potential drawbacks to Reitz's allowing non-persecuted Germans to appear as joint sufferers occupying one mutilated national body (embodied by Hänschen particularly) along with those who were persecuted: the suffering of the persecuted and the non-persecuted that seems to share Hänschen's body is perhaps relatable to the sort of model of a ''German-Jewish symbiosis'' that, as Taberner describes it, may encourage non-persecuted Germans ''to bemoan their own 'loss', that is, the loss of the German-Jewish symbiosis and of an 'untainted' national identity'' (2005ii: 361). Hänschen's half-seeing face appears well-suited to uniting in one body the victims of persecution to whom Reitz's camera is blind (in terms of providing onscreen images) with the visible, predominantly non-persecuted characters.

Reitz chooses a Jewish father for Hermann. On the one hand, this is highly admirable: Gabriel notes that Hermann ''is both a 'bastard' and part-Jewish'', doubly confounding ''the whole fiction of racial purity'' (2004: 167). At the unveiling of the memorial to the fallen of the First World War (in the first episode), the mayor prophesies that ''eines Tages wird Deutschland den Genius aus seinem Blute wecken, der uns aus diesem Kerker der Erniedrigung holen wird, wie ein Heiland''. As Barg notes, this serves mainly to foreshadow Hitler (1996: 291), but at the same time an anti-Nazi irony emerges when Reitz goes on to portray Hermann, a character with Jewish ancestry, as some sort of saviour. As Galli says, ''l'unico plausibile modo, agli occhi di Reitz, di salvare la 'Heimat' consisterà nel ciò che ha fatto Hermann'', namely, making Heimat into ''un'opera d'arte'' (2005: 176). *If* Hermann can be relied upon as any sort of a redeemer at all, it is as an artistic cultural redeemer as opposed to any redeemer of his genetic kin who might appear to be redeeming the honour of blood supposed to be inherently and exclusively German.[75] On the other hand, by giving Hermann a Jewish grandparent Reitz is at the same time protecting his fictionalised self from paternal culpability. Wohlleben has no good options, and is plainly one of the millions of Jewish victims of National Socialism (albeit, in

[75] While Reitz plainly wishes to redeem aspects of German identity in *Heimat* to some degree, he shows reservations about the viability of this project in the first *Heimat*. Reitz has stated that he began *Heimat* in a spirit of despair rather than hope: ''die Selbstentdeckung als Erzähler (gemeint ist *Heimat*) […] war nicht das Ergebnis einer Suche nach neuen Wegen, sondern eigentlich eine Verzweiflungstat'' (in Koebner, 2015: 35).

relative terms, most certainly less horrifically persecuted than the vast majority of National Socialism's Jewish victims). Eduard is alarmed to find in the record books an Abraham Simon. Although this Abraham turns out to have been a member of a different Simon family, as Gabriel puts it, ''the whole Simon family at the centre of Reitz's history chronicle has a highly ambiguous ancestry'', since ''the Simon name itself has a suspiciously Jewish 'ring'' (2004: 167).[76] Reitz's projection of himself is thus misleading in terms of his own family background: his father was not Jewish. Oedipus-like, Reitz acts somewhat like a patricide in distancing his fictional self's paternal background from his own father, a development that is relatable to A. Dirk Moses' comment that for some Germans ''Jews become […] functional ancestors'' (2007ii: 159) in a process that some Germans consider to offer a degree of salvation according to Moses' argument that (in their eyes at least) ''remembering the Holocaust redeems those Germans prepared to identify with the victims rather than the perpetrators'' (ibid.: 156). By claiming Jewish ancestry via a character partly based on himself, Reitz is in fact indirectly asserting a victim status to which has no claim (although Hermann is – however improbably – not at all persecuted as a result of his Jewish ancestry, somewhat limiting the extent to which Reitz claims Jewish victimhood via his fictional self). In short, both good and bad motives can be proposed for Reitz giving Hermann Jewish ancestry.

In summary, Reitz encourages viewers to understand that they are seeing characters failing to see the evil around them. Overall, Reitz tends to construct this failure to see as a culpable refusal to confront the evil of National Socialism. Reitz condemns National Socialism's notions of racial purity as an insane argument for inbreeding and despises the destructive consequences of the quest for supposed purity. Reitz also, however, seeks, via the Simons and especially Hermann, to suggest parallels between non-Jewish Germans and Jewish Germans in order to undermine the distinction

[76] In a related vein, Katharina von Bülow speculates on there being a Schabbach-Jewish parallel in her comments on the first two series, wondering: ''Schabbach-Sabbat?'' (1993: 170). Referring to *Die zweite Heimat*, von Bülow also criticises the portrayal of German-Jewish ''intégration'' in the Esther-Reinhard relationship (ibid.: 172). More likely explanations of the name Schabbach, however, are Marschall's (2005: 50) and Netenjakob's (2001: 131).

not only between perpetrator and victim in the National Socialist period but even between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans. On the one hand, Reitz's dismissal of differences between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans is an admirable anti-racist enterprise; on the other hand, it simultaneously threatens to create a misleading impression in relation to the obviously profound differences in the National Socialist period between the status of non-persecuted Germans, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Jewish Germans, non-German Jewish people and other victims of National Socialism. Reitz presents most of his characters in the first *Heimat* as culpable, but also cannot help but pity them. Non-persecuted Germans in the first *Heimat* collectively figure as Oedipus-like victims of their own complicity in National Socialism's horrendously destructive incestuous drive to create illusions of so-called racial purity. Whereas Oedipus unknowingly married his mother, Reitz's characters appear mostly to have chosen not to look too closely at what they were doing; yet they are nonetheless portrayed as victims as well as perpetrators – victims of their own complicity in National Socialist perpetration even. Lucie and Hänschen in particular allegorise blindness to evil in the National Socialist period, and this blindness both casts them as guilty of refusing to see the evil of National Socialism and also as victims (because, for instance, Lucie loses her parents to a car crash upon taking her eyes off the road, while Hänschen's one-eyedness both marks him as a victim of his brother's attack on his eye and becomes central to his identity as a sniper who is killed in the war). As Gabriel shows, the metaphor of blindness is used to expose repression (and thus culpability) in relation to National Socialism. The fate of Oedipus, however – blinding himself upon the realisation of his incestuous and familicidal crimes – is also a form of self-sacrifice aimed at atonement. The first *Heimat* seeks partly to show German culpability (albeit rather indirectly) by criticising non-persecuted Germans' metaphorical blindness to the victims of National Socialism, but also shows Germans suffering from the results of this blindness, partly in the form of suffering loss as a result of killing members of the national family (a familicide that plays out in miniature when Lucie kills her own parents, Oedipus-like, through her failure to see the road ahead – but unlike Oedipus, she appears to have had an opportunity to see the effects of her actions in advance). Reitz is very

profoundly aware of the incestuous, murderous horror of National Socialism's pursuit of supposed racial purity, and Reitz intends the viewer too to be aware of this horror despite (and even because of) the frequent spells of historical blindness displayed by Reitz's camera; at times, however, Reitz seeks some respite from this horror. The Germany of the *first Heimat* is not constructed as innocent, but pity plays perhaps the starring role in Reitz's conception of Germany, with much (although not, I think, by any means all) of Reitz's pity appearing to be directed towards non-persecuted Germans, so that viewers should navigate Reitz's fiction with care.

## The Second *Heimat*: Tragic Heroes, Scapegoats and Martyrs

### Introduction

At first glance, *Die zweite Heimat* may appear to be far removed from the first *Heimat*, being set mostly in Munich, not the Hunsrück, and spanning the 1960s rather than the far longer period covered in fewer filmic hours by the first *Heimat*. Character-wise, continuity is provided principally – almost single-handedly – by Hermann, now a student of music in Munich; the change of actor and differences in the characterisation of the Hermanns of the first and second series nonetheless limit this continuity. In terms of topic, too, *Die zweite Heimat* may seem to occupy rather different territory to its predecessor: rural life has been left far behind in favour of the city and characters that tend to have more formal education than those of the first *Heimat*. Art is an absolutely central concern in *Die zweite Heimat*, and (in various forms – musical, literary, filmic, visual) has substantially dominated the critical discussion of *Die zweite Heimat*: the role of music has been analysed by Ulrich Schönherr (2010), David Cooper (2018) and Lúcia Nagib (2020); the prominence of filmic allusion has been pointed out by Schönherr (2010: 118) and Galli (2005: 220), while von Moltke (2003) argues (referring to Santner's [1990] reading of the first *Heimat*) that Reitz ''mourns the passing of'' ''the art cinema to which Die zweite Heimat remains committed'' ''into film history'' (ibid.: no pagination); Palfreyman (2010) demonstrates the powerful influence of literary sources on the second *Heimat*; Palfreyman (2000), Sobhani (2000) and Matthias Bauer (2012) view *Die zweite Heimat* particularly through the perspective of its representation of and attitude towards art generally, of artists and of approaches to artistic method and aesthetics – Sobhani particularly in terms of Reitz's enthusiasm for avant-gardism and Palfreyman especially in relation to gender.

In my discussion of the second *Heimat*, however, analysis of Reitz's unquestionably extensive engagement with art is a means to an end rather than a primary focus. I consider rather Reitz's ongoing preoccupation with questions of culpability and national redemption in the wake of National Socialism. In my view, the continuity between the first and second – and third and fourth –

series is very strong in terms of the endurance of National Socialism as a dominant subtext to Reitz's approach to other topics, including art. I will argue that the numerous intertexts that Reitz weaves into *Die zweite Heimat* are largely chosen in part for their relevance to that National Socialist background and Reitz's very much related drives to explore issues of culpability, the possibility of redemption, and the relationship between perpetrator and victim. Although much of the critical debate considers artistic matters in isolation from National Socialism, the relevance of National Socialism has not gone unnoticed. In her study of the second *Heimat*'s approach to history Scholz considers the representation of National Socialism at times, and notes the consequent mistrust of *Die zweite Heimat*'s young adults towards their parents (1996: 62-63) (also remarked upon by Krah, 2012: 204). Koebner also remarks on generational conflict (2015: 161-162). Dorthe Seifert (1999) considers Reitz's attitude to the perpetrator-victim dichotomy regarding the prominent characters Reinhard and Esther, of whom the latter is a Holocaust survivor. Other critical works that refer to National Socialism in relation to the second *Heimat* will be referred to subsequently as need arises.

I seek to contribute to the understanding of the relevance of National Socialism to *Die zweite Heimat* principally by demonstrating the considerable extent of Reitz's preoccupation with questions of moral responsibility, particularly in connection with concepts of martyrdom, fate and heroism – three concepts that are also key to Reitz's construction of the relationship between perpetrator and victim in the second *Heimat*, a relationship that heavily shapes Reitz's portrayal of Germans in *Die zweite Heimat*. Whereas Seifert essentially argues that Reitz seeks to cast Reinhard, a son of Germans not persecuted under National Socialism, as the victim and Esther as the perpetrator in their relationship, I would argue that Reitz's main concerns in his representation of perpetrator-victim relationships is to cast doubt on the whole validity of distinguishing between perpetrator and victim as separate categories. In attacking the perpetrator-victim dichotomy Reitz indirectly – but very consciously and determinedly – attempts to undermine the image of non-persecuted Germans of the National Socialist period as perpetrators of or at least accessories to National Socialist atrocities. At the same time, however, Reitz also constructs Reinhard as culpable by showing him as

perpetrator as well as victim. By suggesting that everyone is both guilty and deserving of the sympathy that is often attached to victimhood Reitz both avoids simply exonerating Germans complicit in National Socialism and, at the same time – just I have argued in relation to the first *Heimat* – encourages viewers to feel sorry for morally flawed characters (with, Reitz is likely to intend, implications for the level of pity that viewers may direct towards those who were complicit in National Socialism, given the prominence of the National Socialist backdrop). Not only - but particularly – in *Die zweite Heimat* Reitz is determined to present characters who are victims as well as perpetrators to the extent that – according to Reitz's depiction of them – their misdeeds are balanced or even obscured by their simultaneous victim status. One need not deny that people may be both perpetrator and victim in order to note that Reitz's long-lasting obsession with asserting the co-existence of those two characteristics in characters seems likely to reflect a desire to weaken the victim status of groups – notably, Jewish people – who seem to Reitz to threaten to occupy a moral high ground above Germans such as himself.

I argue that Reitz portrays Ansgar and Reinhard as suffering heroically against a supernatural punishment that they inherit as descendants of people complicit in National Socialism, and that Reitz means to guide viewers towards seeing this suffering as an ennobling and redemptive process, a process probably meant by Reitz to make the sufferers pitiable and in some degree expiate the great evil of the previous generation. At the same time, however, Reitz suggests that Reinhard should to some extent be seen as a false martyr and thereby engages in a (perhaps self-critical) critique of German efforts to ritually overcome the burden of the National Socialist legacy (like the first *Heimat*, *Die zweite Heimat* is shaped partly by Reitz's conflicting impulses: on the one hand, to make awareness of the National Socialist more bearable; and, on the other hand, to acknowledge its

horrors). I argue that the narrative of redemptive suffering created by Reitz operates particularly in terms of a process of scapegoating relatable to Greek tragedy.[77]

Ansgar

Guilt Inherited: Ansgar's Parents

As Lisa Hopkins has observed, ''Ansgar is sure his parents have a guilty secret, and this seems to prompt the melancholy which convinces him (rightly) that he will die an early death'' (2014: 30) and understands ''from the outset that this was his fate'' (ibid.: 17). When Ansgar's parents, anxious due to his refusal to communicate with them, pay an unexpected visit, his mother complains: ''wir haben uns gefragt, ob du ja noch lebst'' (2:4: 01:09:06). Ansgar's parents are apparently the underlying cause of his death. They appear shortly before it occurs, and Evelyne feels that they drive Ansgar to despair: ''ich hab dich noch nie so verzweifelt gesehen'' (2:4: 01:17:0). It is made plain that, as Koebner notes, Ansgar ''hasst seine Eltern'', a hatred that relates to his rejection of the parental generation mired in National Socialism: as Koebner adds, ''in seiner Abwehr der älteren Generation ist er nicht kleinlich: Überall sieht er die Hinterlassenschaft des Dritten Reichs'' (2015: 201). Ansgar has voiced a belief that his father collaborated with the National Socialist regime: ''er hat was zu verbergen. Das spür ich genau. Das weiß ich auch'' (2:3: 01:29:15). Although he does not supply any clear confirmation of the justice of Ansgar's condemnation of his father's actions under National Socialism, Reitz does not provide any obvious reason to doubt that Ansgar's assessment of his father is broadly accurate. Ansgar's parents' inability to understand him and his mother's rudeness to Evelyne encourage viewers to take Ansgar's side in his conflict with his parents. Ansgar has also supplied a reason for supposing that his father must have made himself useful to the Nazis, noting

[77] Discussing the Nietzschean ''Janus motif'' in the second series, Palfreyman cites Franz Kuna on Nietzsche: Kuna remarks of '''Greek tragedy''', '''in it we may see […] the underlying Dionysiac essence of all things […] to be […] 'destructively creative'''' while also ''''creatively destructive'''' (cited in Palfreyman, 2000: 205). Palfreyman notes the applicability of said point to *Die zweite Heimat* (ibid.). My interest in Greek tragedy regards scapegoating more specifically – but Ansgar, Reinhard and scapegoats generally tend to create via (self-)destruction.

that his father is a Jehovah's Witness (2:3: 01:29:10). In a study of Jehovah's Witnesses under National Socialism Detlef Garbe notes that ''die Zeugen Jehovahs wurden als erste Glaubensgemeinschaft im ‚Dritten Reich' verboten'' (1999: 11), and that they comprised ''im Dezember 1939 in Mauthausen 5,2 % aller Gefangenen'' (ibid.: 404). Ansgar's father might, then, with good reason be expected to have been appallingly persecuted under National Socialism, so that – it seems to be implied – he must have entered into some sort of terrible *Faustpakt* in order to appear to Ansgar in the light of a collaborator rather than victim of the Nazis.

Ansgar describes his relationship with his parents thus: ''sie verzichten auf ihr eigenes Leben und irgendwie wird so was zum Vorwurf gegen mich, bin ich schuld, dass sie gar nichts eigenes haben'' (2:3: 01:30:05). Although the guilt to which Ansgar is specifically referring is for his parents apparently having nothing, the narrative implies that Ansgar also inherits the culpability that he ascribes to his father. Ansgar fits well into Niven's characterisation of ''the 1968 generation'' as having ''felt itself to be victims of their parents' generation, which had passed down responsibility for confronting Nazism'' (2006: 23). Ansgar's comment on his parents' making him feel guilty comes just after the accusations against his father of having somehow aided the Nazis. Ansgar's belief fits in with Lisa Hopkins' view that in *Heimat* there is ''a hereditary curse inflicted on an entire generation by the sins of its fathers, just as Hamlet's life was shaped by what happened to his father'' (2014: 37). Koebner wonders, regarding Ansgar and Evelyne, ''haben die Figuren etwas falsch gemacht oder nur das falsche Los gezogen?'' (2015: 200). In my view Ansgar does not draw the short straw himself but rather has it forced upon him by his father: Reitz presents Ansgar's death as a form of supernatural punishment for his father's presumed wrongdoing. In the episode ''Ansgars Tod'' Evelyne, the character most closely associated with Ansgar, sings Wagner's lines: ''flieh des Ringes Fluch'' (2:4: 36:23), so that there is even a reference linking Ansgar to the cursed ring from the Nibelungen tradition, which is used in the first and third series (as I will discuss in the following chapter), above all in association with Ernst, to cast National Socialism as a curse with supernatural power, one that can be passed on, via the ring, from one generation to the next. Ansgar's parents

affect Ansgar in such a way that his fate is taken out of his hands: Reitz comments in the book version of Ansgar in the scene in which he encounters his parents unexpectedly that his parents drive him into a ‘‘Zustand der Machtlosigkeit’’ (1993: 299). Reitz’s decision to make Ansgar’s father a Jehovah’s Witness sheds light on how culpability is supernaturally transferred to Ansgar. The classic metaphor for guilt of having blood on one’s hands is deployed by Ansgar, albeit addressed to Gattinger rather than his father: ‘‘an Ihren Fingern klebt Blut’’ (2:3: 24:31). Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot give or take blood (for a short introduction to this topic, see Bock, 2012: 652-653). If the idea of the inability to take on others’ blood is extended to the blood on the hands of the Nazis and their collaborators, then it would explain why the blood that ought to be on his father’s hands is passed on to Ansgar. Blood is of course also just as common a metaphor for genetic relationship, and Ansgar’s father passes on his blood, in both these senses, guilt and heredity, to his son.

As noted above, Ansgar speaks of feeling, ‘‘bin ich schuld’’ in relation to the misery that he sees in his parents’ lives. That Ansgar should refer to himself being burdened by a sense of guilt in connection with his parents seems very odd, considering that he also accuses his father of having ‘‘was zu verbergen’’, apparently something from the National Socialist period. Ansgar, whatever faults he may have, is not of an age to be guilty of anything relating to historic National Socialism. There is perhaps an explanation for Ansgar’s strange remark in Reitz’s respect for Freud, which I have already referred to in the previous chapter. Freud discusses Dostoevsky in ‘‘Dostoevsky and Parricide’’ (as will be discussed, Dostoevsky is cited in *Abschied von Gestern*, a film in which Reitz was heavily involved), and Freud writes (here referring to father-son relationships in general) about ‘‘the hatred of the father’’ and how ‘‘in spite of everything identification with the father finally makes a permanent place for itself in the ego’’ and goes on to become the ‘‘super-ego’’ (1997: 242). Ansgar’s physical discomfort in the presence of his father is visible on the screen, and in the book version Reitz writes of how Ansgar ‘‘stellt sich vor den Vater hin wie ein Angeklagter vor seinen Richter’’ (1993: 298). For Ansgar, his father is a figure who dispenses punishment, and as if to a criminal unrelated to him, and Ansgar is the recipient of the punishment, even though it is his father

who appears to be the one deserving of punishment, if he indeed collaborated with the Nazis as Ansgar claims. To return to Freud on the ‘‘super-ego’’ and fathers and sons, ‘‘if the father was hard, violent and cruel, the super-ego takes over those attributes from him’’ (1997: 242), rendering the ‘‘super-ego’’ of the son ‘‘sadistic’’ and the son’s ‘‘ego’’ ‘‘masochistic’’ (ibid.: 243). In this process, Freud argues, ‘‘a great need for punishment develops in the ego, which in part offers itself as a victim to Fate, and in part finds satisfaction in ill-treatment by the super-ego (that is, in the sense of guilt)’’ (ibid.). Ansgar does not in my view commit suicide, but he appears to derive a perverse pleasure from contemplation of his destruction, talking to Evelyne about the decomposition of the human body in a tone suggestive of attraction as well as repulsion (just as Reitz, as the previous chapter suggests, is simultaneously attracted to and repelled by the National Socialist Germany of his boyhood). Without quite seeking his death, Ansgar shows signs of a psychological need for punishment, a need that can be traced back to his father’s (at least supposed) wrongdoing, and Ansgar – although he attempts to save himself in the moments of his death – partly embraces his foreknowledge that he will die young, and in doing so Ansgar conforms to the aspect of Freud’s model whereby the ‘‘ego’’ of the son of a ‘‘cruel’’ father ‘‘in part offers itself as a victim of Fate’’ (ibid.). As to how ‘‘Fate’’ is to be understood in this context, Freud remarks that ‘‘Even Fate is, in the last resort, only a later projection of the father’’ (ibid.). For Ansgar, his father is his fate; his father’s culpability dooms him fatally – and thus Reitz’s narrative, in showing Ansgar’s punishment, appears to confirm Ansgar’s suspicions about his father’s guilt. According to Freud, fathers who are ‘‘cruel’’ (ibid.: 242) pass on a ‘‘sense of guilt’’ (ibid.: 243) to their sons via the haunting inheritance that they bequeath to the son’s ‘‘super-ego’’ (ibid.: 242-243). This offers an explanation for Ansgar feeling, in relation to his parents, that he too is guilty, despite not having collaborated with the Nazis himself (and Ansgar also has a troubled relationship with his mother, he is particularly disturbed by his father, who – unlike his mother – figures in his mind as both judge and Nazi). When the ‘‘ego’’ of the son ‘‘offers itself as a victim’’ (ibid.), the son enacts self-sacrifice, which will be a major concern throughout this chapter.

Freud argues of Dostoevsky that ‘‘a criminal is to him almost a Redeemer, who has taken on himself the guilt which must else have been borne by others’’ (ibid.: 248). In feeling guilty in relation to his parents, Ansgar seems to wish subconsciously to free his parents – even though he hates them – of some of their guilt; Ansgar wishes, then, at least in part, to be their saviour. Ansgar’s attitude thus parallels the desires that I attribute to Reitz in the previous chapter regarding the non-persecuted Germans of the first *Heimat*, very much including those of his parents’ generation: an attitude characterised by repulsion and condemnation on the one hand and, on the other hand, by an urge to pity them and a desire to see them set free from their Purgatorial state. Ansgar pities his parents as well as hating them, and by showing Ansgar as one who pities Reitz makes the case for Ansgar to be pitied himself. Freud’s reading of Dostoevsky, regarding the near equivalence of the figures of criminal, saviour and scapegoat, has an echo in Reitz’s reading of himself (and other [non-Jewish] German artists after National Socialism): Reitz has complained bitterly of ‘‘Rechthaben in der korrekten Meinung und dieses Abwälzen der Schuld auf die Geschichten-Erzähler’’ (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 329) and of how ‘‘der Künstler verdammt wird, sich mit seiner Gemeinschaft der ambivalent empfindenden Leser heimlich, schuldbeladen und erfolglos im Dunkeln zu treffen’’ (ibid.: 329-330). Reitz clearly identifies, as a ‘‘Geschichten-Erzähler’’, with the figure of the scapegoat, and has written of what he describes (without consciousness of irony) as his ‘‘Schrecken und Panik’’ at the hands of ‘‘das Tribunal der Holocaust-Überlebenden’’ after the first *Heimat* (ibid.: 327). According to Reitz, the ‘‘schuldbeladen’’ artist is sacrificed by society – ‘‘exemplarisch geopfert’’ (ibid.: 329) – as a scapegoat (the recipient of the ‘‘Abwälzen der Schuld’’ of politically correct persons [‘‘Rechthaben in der korrekten Meinung’’]). Ansgar is a failed painter and poet – as Reitz might put it, ‘‘erfolglos im Dunkeln’’ (ibid.), and is also ‘‘schuldbeladen’’, even though the guilt should be his father’s, not his. Ansgar takes on the role of scapegoat (in a masochistic part of himself, willingly, as per Freud’s aforementioned model), and scapegoat is the role that Reitz

attributes to the German artist.[78] Etymologically speaking, the story of a scapegoat is a tragedy (see, for instance, Ward, 2011: 160), and by depicting Ansgar and himself as scapegoats, Reitz asserts his character's and his own credentials as tragic hero (and, due to his classical education and longstanding interest in theatre [see Rauh, 1993: 23; 26-27], Reitz is likely to be aware of the etymology of tragedy). Throughout the *Heimat* cycle the question of German redemption in the wake of National Socialism constitutes a great central drama, and I argue that Reitz is drawn to ritual means of attempting to procure national salvation. Scapegoating is of course a ritual process, and (at least Greek) drama is generally supposed to ultimately be a product of ritual – as Gregory Nagy points out, the term drama ''is derived from the verb *drao*, which designates the performance of ritual'', so that ''working our way backward in time from the Classical Greek period, we find that drama *is* ritual'' (2007: 121). Fate is often viewed as a key element of Greek tragedy: for instance, Nietzsche writes of tragedy (or, at least, ''der alten Tragödie'') that ''der Held'' is ''durch das Schicksal […] gemartert'' (2005: no pagination [17]). Ansgar – along with Reitz's generation – is implied in *Die zweite Heimat* to be the tragically ennobled victim of, even martyr to, fate in the form of the villainous father's haunting legacy. Reitz allots Ansgar a role that he has cast himself in: of scapegoat redeemer, one fated by the sins of the generation of their fathers to suffer, but with the consolation that this suffering can be redemptive – can save others from guilt; the sufferer can, as Freud says in connection with Dostoevsky, shoulder ''the guilt which must else have been borne by others'' (ibid.: 248). Being crushed by the burden of guilt becomes, in *Die zweite Heimat* as in Freud's remarks regarding Dostoevsky, a noble calling, a vocation to save others – future German generations, perhaps. As Jan Bremner writes of Ancient Greek scapegoating rituals, ''the elimination

[78] Santner has related the concept of the scapegoat to the first *Heimat*, and applies the label to characters of whom Reitz, according to Santner, disapproves (1990: 78-79), but, in my view, Reitz bestows the status of scapegoat on characters as a sign of approval in *Die zweite Heimat* and views the scapegoating process in the second series as rationally productive in terms of German recovery after National Socialism (in contrast to the delusions and destruction that characterise the Nazis' genocidal search for scapegoats). Gabriel also refers to scapegoating in relation to the psychology of anti-Semitism (2004: 184) in a passage that I will subsequently cite in this chapter, and as part of her discussion of ''purity ritual'' in the first *Heimat* (ibid.: 166) – like Santner, she considers the phenomenon of scapegoating in relation to the victims of the Nazis' delusions.

of one or two individuals saves the whole community'', and some scapegoats displayed ''noble […] behavior'' in enacting self-sacrifice in order to save their peoples (1983: 302). Becoming a scapegoat offers, therefore, an opportunity to assume an ennobling, heroically self-sacrificing position as the saviour of one's people. Particularly in his portrayal of Reinhard, too, Reitz determines to depict a portrayal of a young German of the 1960s finding in the legacy of National Socialism scope for redemptive heroism in the face of the fateful punishment bequeathed by the monstruous cruelty of so many German fathers in the National Socialist period. In this process, guilt occasioned by the evil of National Socialism serves the purpose of saving the descendants of non-persecuted Germans rather more than respecting the memory of those who were persecuted by the Nazis, providing survivors and descendants of the murdered with redress or preventing future atrocities. In the emphases placed by Reitz's approach to culpability, guilt threatens to displace the wrongs that beget it; the guilty (and their descendants) threaten to dispossess the wronged. Much of Reitz's approach to German guilt is undoubtedly problematic.

''Ansgars Tod''

As Lena Scholz remarks of the episode ''Ansgars Tod'', ''was am Ende passiert, nimmt schon der Titel vorweg'' (1996: 83). On the other hand, I am less convinced that ''es ist also weder das Ziel der Erzählung zu überraschen, noch eine Spannung aufzubauen'' (ibid.), since the manner of Ansgar's death remains to be seen at the start of the episode. The episode begins with an image also used elsewhere in *Die zweite Heimat*: caged birds (2:4: 00:34), which are also seen in episode eight (01:33) shortly before Juan's suicide attempt (2:8: 01:54) and in the episode in which Reinhard dies (2:10: 01:55:42). The recurrent image of the caged birds seems, then, to serve as an omen of death, an omen that associates the deaths that it heralds with the birds' state of captivity. The birds are in a trap from which there is no real hope of escape and can do nothing other sing as beautifully as possible until their deaths. Ansgar too appears to be trapped, in his case by the National Socialism-burdened inheritance that his father passes down to him, and what he can achieve is largely

confined to his tragic swansong. Reitz endeavours to endow Ansgar's swansong, however, with sacrificial value.

There are some reasons to see a suicidal tendency in Ansgar. As Palfreyman remarks of Ansgar, he spends much of his time in a ''courting of premature death'' (2000: 201). Juan says, apropos of Ansgar's death, that he would like to die like Hemingway – ''Ende, wenn ich will'' (2:4: 01:37:17). Evelyne opines that Ansgar was ''verzweifelt'', suggesting suicide. Besides hinting at suicide, however, Reitz raises the question of fate in relation to Ansgar's death. Lisa Hopkins writes of ''Ansgar having foreseen from the outset that this [death] was his fate'' (2014: 36-37) – Ansgar's comments suggest as much (and run contrary to the suggestion of Koebner's question, apropos of Ansgar's death, ''will der Erzähler an die Angst gemahnen, die wir in der Welt haben sollten, da wir unser eigenes Geschick nicht voraussehen?'' [2015: 200]). After claiming to be ''ein sinkendes Schiff'' (2:4: 03:17), Ansgar asks Evelyne: ''glaubst du an das Schicksal?'' (2:4: 03:29). Ansgar's adds: ''gleich ist es zu spät'' (2:4: 03:35), suggesting that he does believe in fate. Evelyne then runs down the street, as if trying to outpace destiny (2:4: 03:38). Koebner argues that Ansgar ''schmückt die Aussagen über die eigene Befindlichkeit mit konventionellen Pathosformeln'', giving Ansgar's comment about sinking as an example, and, on this basis, proposes, ''so kann man sich […] nicht sicher sein, in welchem Maße sich selbstgefällige Wichtigtuerei und authenthische Düsternis der Empfindung durchkreuzen'' (2015: 201). I would argue that Reitz does not set Ansgar up for criticism in terms of the latter's declarations that he cannot be helped. Rather, Ansgar simply seems to be stating the facts of the case. Koebner also notes that during Ansgar's death ''die Kamera nimmt seine Perspektive ein'' (ibid.: 202). Reitz's camera, not Ansgar himself, encourages viewers to emphasise with, to pity, Ansgar in his dying moments. Reitz rather than Ansgar intends Ansgar to be pitied by viewers, while Ansgar wishes Evelyne to love him, not pity him.

In his comments on Ansgar Reitz appears to contradict himself. Reitz comments in the book version of Ansgar's death, ''das Unglück nimmt unerbittlich seinen Lauf'' (1993: 309), seeming to suggest

that Ansgar's death is an accident, so something unintended, that happens ''unerbittlich'' to him. On the other hand, Reitz writes elsewhere, ''ob Ansgar […] sein Straßenbahnunglück provoziert oder ob es nur seinen Weg durchkreuzt, muss offenbleiben'' (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 264-265). Nonetheless, the filming of Ansgar's death strongly inclines towards suggesting that Ansgar in fact attempts to remain alive in the face of an irresistibly lethal fate. Koebner observes of Evelyne's and Ansgar's ''Liebestragödie'', ''ein Unheil, ein Verhängnis offenbar stigmatisierte Personen ereilt und sie, bevor ihre Liebe ein ›natürliches‹ Ende findet, aus der Mitte der Lebenden reißt'' (2015: 200). There is much more to be said as to why Reitz subjects his character Ansgar to his tragic fate, a fate that is tragic, as I will continue to argue, not only in terms of being sad but also in terms of its correspondences to classical features of Greek drama.[79]

The death takes the form of a tram accident, in which Ansgar's foot is trapped inside the door. As the tram moves off, rather than submitting to his long-expected death, Ansgar clearly attempts to maintain his balance and calls ''Halt'' (2:4: 01:23:40). Furthermore, Ansgar's last words to Evelyne (which come immediately before the accident) concern his excitement at the prospect of later joining her at the party currently underway at Fuchsbau. Ansgar resists death as much as possible in his actual death throes, despite his preceding intellectual acceptance of – and, perhaps, partial masochistic pleasure at – the prospect of imminent death. The cause of death, in broad terms, ultimately lies with Ansgar's father having apparently been an accessory to National Socialism; there is, nonetheless, more to be said about the detail in the more immediate build-up to his death. As Dana LaCourse Munteanu notes, ''Greek tragedies often raise the problem of whether or not suffering is deserved, which Aristotle encapsulates in his famous concept of *hamartia*, 'error' of the tragic character'' (2012: 38). Reitz is determined to present Ansgar's suffering as primarily undeserved, but this does not altogether exclude some degree of hamartia as a more minor

[79] Koebner argues, ''der Erzähler braucht den Tod mancher, gerade ›herzensnaher‹ Figuren, um deutlich zu machen, dass sich das Leben selbst von erfundenen Menschen eben nicht in ››unermesslicher Weite‹‹ ausdehnt'' (2015: 206). In contrast, I view the purpose of the deaths of Reinhard and, particularly, Ansgar as sacrifices carried out by Reitz in the hope of obtaining respite from the National Socialist legacy.

secondary cause of his downfall. Losing one's footing is an accident that can happen to anyone rather than a product of a personal fault. That is not to say, however, that Ansgar's actions do not contribute to his death at all: he is – rather symbolically, I would suggest – looking backwards while the tram moves off. There is in fact something of an echo of Lucie's car crash in the first *Heimat* in that Ansgar and Lucie are both looking behind them rather at the danger ahead; when their fatal vehicular accidents occur they are looking the wrong way, including metaphorically. Reitz criticises Lucie for not looking at the horrors of National Socialism that lie ahead. Contrastingly, in Ansgar's case National Socialism is the past rather than (as with Lucie when she has her accident) being primarily associated with the future, and Ansgar is haunted by his father's supposed and Munich's undoubted National Socialist past. Ansgar looks back when the tram moves forward, literally at Evelyne, but metaphorically he looks backwards in general, obsessing over how his parents brought him up and the personal and national past that they represent to him. This tendency to look backwards leads Ansgar to disaster (much more so than his drug addiction, which appears to be entirely irrelevant to his actual cause of death). Peter Burian observes that a venerable and widespread understanding of Greek tragedy takes the view that ''the tragic hero, although caught in circumstances beyond his ken and control is finally to be understood as destroyed by the Gods (or fate) because of his own failings'' (1997: 180-181). The tragic hero does not, then, need to be without fault in order to still be a victim of fate, and Ansgar is both presented as of a victim of fate and as flawed in that he fails to look to the future. When they are sorting out old film, Ansgar talks to Hermann about ''Bilder von Nazis […] die zu jeder Zeit zum Leben erweckt werden könnten'' (2:2: 39:57). Even without the films being brought to life, Ansgar tells Hermann, they are amongst ''Raubtieren und ihren Opfern, und die leben alle'' (2:2: 41:08). Reitz appears to suggest that for Ansgar the past is too present. Rather than providing an altogether approving portrayal of Ansgar's commitment to at least reminding people of the horrors of the Munich of just two decades earlier – which Ansgar refers to far more than most characters – Reitz in fact seems to suggest that this

characteristic is a fatal flaw in Ansgar's character. Reitz threatens to suggest that acknowledgement of the horrors of the National Socialist past is unhealthy.

The relevance of National Socialism to Ansgar's death is shown particularly by the scene temporally parallel to Ansgar's death, namely the party at Fuchsbau, to which the camera takes viewers before and just after showing Ansgar's death, so that the scene of Ansgar's death is in a sense embedded in the party scene, which is divided between Fräulein Cerphal talking to Juan on the one hand and the rest of the circle of friends on the other hand. Not long before the news of Ansgar's death arrives at Fuchsbau, Fräulein Cerphal shows Juan a painting of a gathering at the house in 1932 (2:4: 01:20:08), so that a scene containing a reminder of Hitler's coming to power is coupled to the scene of Ansgar's death. The painting is in the attic, and Scholz observes that the attic is full of ''Gemälde aus der Weimarer Zeit, verstaubte Relikte – vielleicht eine Metapher für die nicht aufgearbeitete Vergangenheit der Villa'' (1996: 89). Fuchsbau's past has been locked up in the loft. As Seifert puts it, Fräulein Cerphal has ''den ››Spuk‹‹ der nazionalsozialistischen Herrschaft […] weitgehend verdrängt'' (1999: 309). One of the paintings shows the well-known Jewish novelist Feuchtwanger at Fuchsbau with Brecht, making it a poignant reminder of the violent dispossession (and, of course, worse) of those whom the Nazis – such as current occupant Herr Gattinger – drove out. The paintings are an artistic witness to evil that Fräulein Cerphal generally seeks to obscure. When Fräulein Cerphal open up the attic, she unintentionally also allows the light to illuminate the National Socialist past. The fictional paintings of Fuchsbau are used by Reitz to show how art can be a vessel containing reminders of the past that can be hidden away in order to suppress painful records of the past that lie latent in art. In his critical portrayal of Fräulein Cerphal Reitz condemns the (ab)use of art as a means of seeking to contain painful pasts (possibly as a response to the numerous accusations, as cited in the previous chapter, that Reitz sought to hide the evils of National Socialism in the first *Heimat*). In his filmic art Reitz opens the door confining the fictional paintings in the attic and unleashes their haunting associations. The painting including Feuchtwanger is also a scene of loss. Von Moltke has discussed *Die zweite Heimat* as a work of mourning in relation to the New German

Cinema (2003). In the case of the painting showing Feuchtwanger, however, what Reitz wishes to mourn is the artistic scene of the Weimar Republic before it was destroyed by the Nazis. This mourning appears to be an instance of Taberner's conception of a ''German-Jewish symbiosis'' whereby Germans ''bemoan their own 'loss'' (2005ii: 361). Wolfgang Benz writes, apropos of the idea of a ''German Jewish symbiosis'', that ''mourning for Germany's cultural losses [as embodied by Jewish figures] amounts to virtual self-pity'' (1992: 102). The painting is of a gathering at Fuchsbau and is viewed at Fuchsbau, placing the emphasis on Fuchsbau's loss, a loss measured in terms of the relative cultural impoverishment of Fuchsbau after National Socialism, rather than the emphasis being placed on the lives of the people who were lost to the evil of National Socialism. The painting preserves an artistic window looking onto a lost world that Reitz mourns as Fuchsbau's loss and as the loss of his generation, perhaps threatening to place the loss of Jewish life into the background of this scene of mourning.

The past hidden away in the attic being revealed in the scene parallel to Ansgar's death strengthens the causal link between his demise and the legacy of National Socialism: as the attic is opened up and the light kindles the paintings' power, Ansgar's life is taken by the narrative, as if to appease the so appallingly wronged ghosts conjured up by the paintings' release from the darkness. The ghosts are of people who were once able to frequent Fuchsbau, and then were safe nowhere in the entire country. Behind them, these people leave ghostly traces that make Fuchsbau a haunted house, one representative of (to borrow a phrase of Gabriel's) ''Germany's haunted house'', an expression that Gabriel applies to Reitz's depiction of Germany in general in the first *Heimat* (2004: 155). Reitz's writings indicate that he takes vengeful ghosts very seriously: in connection with Marker's *Sans Soleil* (as part of remarks referred to in the previous chapter), Reitz declares that ''Marker bringt […] eine sehr wichtige Botschaft an uns Filmemacher mit'', namely to respect ghosts. Reitz proceeds to cite Marker on pausing '''bei roter Ampel''' to respect '''die Geister der Autowracks''', measures ''die Geister der nichtabgeschickten Briefe zu grüßen'', and on how ''man muß die Geister der zerrissenen Briefe ehren'' (no date [1983]: 131). Having cited Marker – at some length – on respecting ghosts,

Reitz states his own conviction that he lives in a society that ‘‘umgibt sich […] mit den Geistern der weggeworfenen Dinge, die an uns Rache nehmen werden’’ (ibid.). As Gabriel notes in her analysis of the theme of purity in the first *Heimat*, ‘‘Reitz […] has said that the Jews were treated as ‘refuse’ within National Socialism’’ (2004: 165). If the ‘‘weggeworfenen Dinge’’ (Reitz, no date [1983]: 131) can wreak revenge by leaving ghosts behind, then surely people can achieve a posthumous revenge too (according to Reitz’s logic) if they have been murdered by people who viewed them as rubbish to be disposed of. It seems likely, then, that Reitz fears the ghosts of Jews murdered by the Nazis. Reitz’s phrase ‘‘Rache nehmen werden’’ – as opposed to, for argument’s sake, *may take revenge* – is curiously emphatic and certain; the vengeance of ghosts apparently figures in Reitz’s mind as an inevitable certainty, a coming doom that cannot now be prevented – and this is also basically how Reitz presents Ansgar’s death.[80] The ghosts of people whom the Nazis treated as less than human and sought to dispose of accordingly – to whom the painting of Feuchtwanger gestures – are disturbed when the Fuchsbau attic is opened, and a process of supernatural punishment avenges the wrongs done to those ghosts by taking Ansgar’s life. That Ansgar’s cause of death is ultimately fateful punishment for inheriting the legacy of National Socialism from the previous generation is further indicated by Ansgar’s economic motive in becoming a tram conductor – that is why he is boarding the fatal tram: namely his determination to be financially independent of his suspect parents.[81]

Supernatural punishment for his father’s apparent wrongdoing under National Socialism appears to be a key factor in Ansgar’s death. Reitz thus presents Ansgar’s death as an instance of the children of accessories to the evil of National Socialism ultimately being amongst the victims of National Socialism’s bringing of death. While his father’s supposed dealings with the Nazis must logically have

[80] In the Reinhard narrative, meanwhile, Reinhard speculates, regarding the destruction of Fuchsbau, that ‘‘verjagte Ortsgeister’’ may ‘‘sich […] ganz bitter rächen’’. As Seifert says of these musings of Reinhard’s, Reinhard ‘‘beschwor[t]’’ ‘‘eine mythologische Vorstellungswelt’’ ‘‘in der […] Verbrechen von göttlichen Mächten bestraft werden’’ (1999: 318).

[81] Ansgar’s mother reproves him for being behind with his rent and asks, ‘‘hast du denn die Überweisung nicht gekriegt?’’. Ansgar responds: ‘‘ich arbeite jetzt bei der Straßenbahn. Ich komme schon durch’’.

contributed to the mass murder, genocide and other atrocities against those whom they persecuted, the victim of his father's crimes that Reitz shows the audience is Ansgar. As in the first *Heimat*, the most visible victims in *Die zweite Heimat* are within German families that were not persecuted under National Socialism (while Esther is a visible Jewish victim, being the daughter of an SS-man places her in the family of perpetrators as well as in her mother's Jewish family). Ansgar's father even comes to appear as the victim of his own misdeeds when they fatally rebound on his son. Consequently, Ansgar's father's complicity in National Socialism is represented as a family tragedy in a family that does not include people persecuted by the Nazis (since Ansgar's parents apparently were not persecuted even though many other Jehovah's Witnesses were).

Although Ansgar's father was, according to his son, on the side of the Nazis rather than a victim of them, there is an allusion that asserts an at least spiritual kinship with those whom the Nazis persecuted most fanatically: Ansgar's father is seen to pray, citing words addressed to Abraham, ''ich bin dein Schild und Lohn'', which comes from Genesis, XV:I. As Abraham was prepared to sacrifice Isaac, so Ansgar's father is apparently willing to sacrifice his son. As I have remarked, the Ansgar narrative substantially matches Reitz's model of the artist as scapegoat, and the subtle reference to Abraham and Isaac reinforces this strand of the Ansgar narrative: somewhat as the sacrifice of a scapegoat is intended to save others, so divine providence famously presented Abraham with a lamb to sacrifice in Isaac's stead. Ansgar's father's Biblical quotation is, however, nonetheless intended as damning indictment by Reitz: Ansgar's father is implied to be willing to sacrifice the next generation in order to pass on the blood that should be on his hands and so save himself at the expense of others (both by sacrificing Ansgar and – so Ansgar's comments imply – his religious convictions and perhaps people in order to emerge unscathed from the National Socialist period). Meanwhile, the allusion to Abraham and Isaac casts Ansgar as a son of Abraham, and potentially as a Jew. This may well be a case of Reitz seeking to endow non-Jewish German characters with an ostensibly Jewish identity in order to blur the image of Ansgar's non-Jewish and suspect father as perpetrator rather than victim in relation to National Socialism. In isolation, Biblical allusion involving Jewish figures in a

narrative in which Christianity features heavily would not of course necessarily appear to be an attempt to lay claim to Jewish identity; in combination, however, with Reitz's coveting Jewish identity in the first *Heimat*, as discussed in the previous chapter, and aspects of the fourth series (which will be discussed in Chapter Four), it is striking.

Given the persecution meted out to many Jehovah's Witnesses, in portraying a Jehovah's Witness as accomplice rather than victim of National Socialism Reitz strives to combine perpetrator and victim as one, a procedure that will be discussed further later in this chapter. Reitz appears to flirt heavily with challenging the moral inferiority of the figure of the perpetrator under National Socialism by constructing characters from persecuted groups as perpetrators too. Jehovah's Witnesses, besides having been in themselves a heavily persecuted group, occupy a position partially similar to that of Jewish people under National Socialism – Garbe observes that ''die Zeugen Jehovahs sind in der NS-Zeit derart intensiv und vehement verfolgt worden, daß in Geschichtsdarstellungen sogar der Vergleich mit dem jüdischen Schicksal gezogen wurde'', and gives three examples of such comparisons (1999: 11). In his vilification of Ansgar's father, a Jehovah's Witness, Reitz is perhaps indirectly launching an assault on the understanding of Jewish people as occupying a status under National Socialism overwhelmingly characterised by victimhood as opposed to perpetration. In conjunction with Ansgar's father being a member of a severely persecuted group, the allusion to the Biblical Abraham gives the impression that Reitz constructs Ansgar's father almost as a Jewish figure in disguise, and a figure whom Reitz holds responsible for destroying the life of Ansgar, a member of a German generation near Reitz's own, a generation whose parents were adults under National Socialism. Ansgar's father unites the figures of the victim of National Socialism and the perpetrator of it rather alarmingly. There were of course sometimes historic moral complexities under National Socialism whereby many people, including those in persecuted groups, had horrific moral dilemmas forced upon them. In suggesting that Ansgar's father was one of these and became morally compromised under awful circumstances Reitz is not necessarily seeking simply to falsify viewers' images of the past (and Reitz is perhaps rather too harsh in his negative presentation of Ansgar's

father, considering the painful choices that a person from a persecuted group might have been exposed to, if they were left with any choices at all). On the other hand, Reitz does not provide any indication that Ansgar's father may have had to make himself useful to the Nazis under duress, while the portrayal of Ansgar's father is, furthermore, merely one of many instances in which Reitz merges associations of perpetration and victimhood, and the extent to which Reitz does so may well reflect a desire to temper – very probably to an excessive degree – viewers' awareness of many Germans having had a role characterised far more by perpetration than by victimhood under National Socialism.

Ansgar ennobled as Greek Hero destroyed by Fate

Ansgar correctly believes that he is inevitably doomed by the *Heimat* process of punishment for involvement in National Socialism, dying a foreseen but unchosen death that is constructed as bearing out the wisdom of Reitz's grandfather's belief (as referred to in the previous chapter) that the relatives of evildoers become ''vom Unglück verfolgt. Auf Untaten folgen Schicksalsschläge'' (Reitz in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 24). In Ansgar's case, the evildoer who exposes his family to the blows of a supernatural force of vengeance is Ansgar's father with his alleged history of complicity in National Socialism. The avenging fate aroused by his father's misdeeds appears to be irresistible.

Reitz is at pains to pin the blame for Ansgar's death on his father: his father's presumed wickedness provides the financial motive for Ansgar's involvement with trams; Ansgar's father speaks the words of a Biblical filicide. Ansgar himself – despite his willingness to muse on death – visibly attempts to save himself in the accident. Reitz suggests that Ansgar's death is provoked by culpable actions and that these are the fault of the father, not the son. Reitz's purpose in this firm allocation of blame, I would argue, is to build a solid case for Ansgar as a victim of the father who is deserving of pity particularly because his actions are not deserving of death (his mistreatment of Olga is portrayed negatively but not as a cause of his death). Aristotle declares, ''let pity be defined that uneasiness or pain that arises on beholding destruction […] endured […] by persons undeserving of it'' (1823: 286-

287), and Reitz takes care to place Ansgar in that category. A key role that Reitz assigns to Ansgar's father is to make Ansgar pitiable, a role that the former is perhaps designed to play more than the role of reminding viewers of the likely victims that, according to Ansgar, his actions will have created during National Socialism (rather than in the 1960s setting of *Die zweite Heimat*). I have already discussed pity in relation to the first *Heimat* (drawing on another piece by Danze) and considered how Reitz seeks to steer viewers towards seeing morally compromised characters through a lens that focuses on pity as much as condemnation. In *Die zweite Heimat*, however, pity is guided towards the younger generation, such as Ansgar, at the expense of the generation of their parents.

While he appears to rightly feel that his imminent death is inevitable Ansgar exercises what choice he has in an attempt to avoid dying young. Ansgar can be said to act admirably in terms of Stoic morality, whereby, according to Susanne Sauvé Meyer, ''the virtuous person […] will care only about choosing or deciding correctly; therefore, she will not be distressed or grieved when external misfortune prevents her from achieving what she has decided to pursue'' (1999: 270). Ansgar only shows strong signs of distress at the very moment of his death, not in the waiting time during which he is convinced that it will come to him soon. Ansgar does not relish dying, yet at the same time he faces what he identifies as his looming doom with considerable composure, with a certain courage and the dignity of self-control. Penelope Chatzidimitriou writes that ''ancient Greek tragic heroes' dignity lies in the fact that despite their failure and their defeat they are driven by their desire to fully meet and grasp their misfortune'' (2017: 100). Rather than shying away from death, Ansgar muses on the decomposition of the body (in Hamletian fashion, as noted by Lisa Hopkins [2014: 35]). Fate as defined as an invincible external power that cannot be resisted no matter how prudent a person's choices may be is a concept to which Reitz has referred: Reitz describes as one of ''die Elemente der Mythenbildung'' ''Das Schicksal, als eine über den Menschen stehende Instanz, eine metaphysiche Bindung'' (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 317).[82] Fate is a power beyond Ansgar's

[82] This definition of fate that Reitz attaches to ''Mythenbildung'' is relevant to Reitz's authorial approach to *Die zweite Heimat*. Reitz writes that ''die Geschichten der Zukunft werden […] sich unabhängig von einzelnen

choices. The very limited freedom of choice with which Ansgar is able to choose (in some instances virtuously) by no means suffices to negate the overwhelming power of fate arrayed against him. Reitz places Ansgar in a fictional world that guides the viewer towards adopting what Meyer, in her discussion of Stoicism, calls ''*fatalism about outcomes*, the view that outcomes […] are determined independently of anything we might try to do'' (1999: 254), but Reitz does not embrace (to cite Meyer again) ''*fatalism about actions*, the view that our actions […] are determined to occur independently of what we decide or choose, or will'' (ibid.). Ansgar acts well in the face of doom, as per what constitutes virtue in Meyer's reading of Stoicism: ''the difference between the virtuous and non-virtuous person lies in how the virtuous person responds to the external causal factors to which […] we are inextricably linked in the fabric of fate'' (ibid.: 271). The deaths of Ansgar and Reinhard are presented as consequences of an unstoppable supernatural process of punishment that holds them accountable for the crimes of a large part of the previous generation. Ansgar strives to act morally in the face of this inexorably National Socialist legacy. For instance, Ansgar refuses to accept the money that his parents are determined to give him because he evidently suspects that their money is morally tainted by his father's presumed collaboration with the Nazis. Ansgar's death is constructed fatalistically in terms of its outcome, but not so much in terms of Ansgar's actions. Through his efforts to act virtuously in relation to National Socialism and his impotence against the outcome represented by his death, Ansgar thus achieves the Stoic model of virtue set out by Meyer.

On the basis of his virtuous denunciation of the Nazis and those who collaborated with them, including even his own father (so he believes), Ansgar attains, Reitz suggests, a virtuous, a heroic status. I suggested in the previous chapter in relation to Oedipus that in the first *Heimat* Reitz aims at a tragically elevating portrayal of various characters who were not persecuted under National

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Autoren […] zu modernen Mythen ausbilden'' (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 316), and Reitz appears to have been attempting to achieve that effect in *Die zweite Heimat*, since he also pursues the topic of artistic material's independence from the author while discussing *Die zweite Heimat*, claiming that ''ich will als Erzähler nicht der Liebe Gott sein'' and ''ich will beim Geschichten-Erzählen dem Leben auf die Spur kommen. Diese Spur ist nicht in mir, sondern in der Welt'' (ibid.: 264). In these comments, Reitz also seems to be distancing himself for responsibility for his narrative, emphasising that his fiction – presumably along with any aspects of it that may be considered problematic – lies outside himself and his moral responsibility.

Socialism. In *Die zweite Heimat* Reitz moves, in the case of Ansgar and, as I will argue, Reinhard, to showing the children of non-persecuted – and, indeed, complicit – Germans in a heroic light. Ansgar's firm condemnation of National Socialism and refusal to profit from it financially by taking suspect parental largesse is, then, used by Reitz to burnish the image of the son of a character implied to have been complicit in National Socialism. The victims of the wrongdoing of which Ansgar suspects his father remain – like most of those who were persecuted in the first *Heimat* – rather invisible. Reitz's depiction of Ansgar rejecting his father and the complicity that he stands for in Ansgar's eyes is very possibly intended to direct viewers' sympathy towards Ansgar rather than to those persecuted under National Socialism. That Ansgar's moral stance towards the National Socialist legacy is not taken into account – in his favour – by the supernatural process of punishment is probably meant by Reitz to appear to cast doubt on the fairness of that avenging fate echoing down the generations. For this reason also, Reitz is perhaps emphasising the victimhood of those descended from people complicit in National Socialist atrocities at the expense of clearly acknowledging the primary victims of the parents' misdeeds. Evelyne asserts that Ansgar's tram conductor's uniform – in which he dies – looks like a ''Soldatenuniform'' (2:4: 01:22:50), an image that conjures haunting associations with National Socialism, the inherited cause of Ansgar's downfall. Reitz is anxious to salvage some dignity for Ansgar and to partially dispel the haunting image invoked by Evelyne's verdict on the conductor's uniform. Evelyne declares that Ansgar's image must be changed, proposing a telling choice of fancy dress for the party at Fuchsbau that Ansgar intended to go later: she promises him, ''ich mach aus dir einen griechischen Jüngling mit Lorbeerkranz, einen Helden'' (2:4: 01:22:40). Reitz strives, as in the first *Heimat*, to convert the sinister uniform-encumbered image of Germans into an image of Greek heroes, with Ansgar bearing the blows of avenging fate with Stoic dignity.

<u>Art as Redeemer of the Ill-fated</u>

Twice, swans are to be seen in the background to Ansgar's and Evelyne's romance: at a park and, in the case of one swan, in a cemetery being pushed along in a perambulator by an eccentric lady, as if it were a human infant. Swans are of course an animal associated with death, and, more specifically, with dying beautifully, with the grace and dignity of a swansong, something with a beauty that seems to snatch something from death's oblivion in a redemptively artistic act. Swans complement Evelyne's fantasy of Ansgar as laurel-crowned Greek hero nicely – there is a hint of the Greek myth of Leda encountering Zeus in swan form, a commentary on Evelyne's and Ansgar's romance that raises Ansgar's stature even to Olympus. Reflecting the ritual of scapegoating, the term tragedy meant in origin something along the lines of goat-song (Ward, 2011: 160). In the tragedy of the scapegoat Ansgar Reitz is determined to mingle swansong and goat-song in order to emphasise the dignity that attaches to Ansgar's socially important role as scapegoat and the artistically redemptive power of suffering. Reitz suggests that the inheritance of the cursed legacy of National Socialism is the solution, via the redemptive suffering it brings, as well as the problem for Ansgar's generation. Reitz has complained that ''jüdischen Kritiker'' ''wissen sich in ihrer Leidens- und Erinnerungsgemeinschaft geborgen, wenn sie einen Deutschen in die Pflicht nehmen können'' (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 327). Jewish people, according to Reitz, are fortified by the power of suffering, which, so Reitz claims, grants them a secure sense of community forming a bastion from which they can safely sally out to criticise Germans. A logical implication of Reitz's complaint appears to be that, if only Germans were to suffer more (or at least cultivate a stronger sense of themselves as victims of suffering), then they would be well on the way to saving what Reitz considers to be their own German sense of communal identity – an identity that was gravely endangered, so Reitz laments, by the fallout from National Socialism: ''das millionenfach und kollektiv begangene Unrecht der Deutschen hat ein fürchterliches Mißtrauen hinterlassen gegenüber jeglichem Gemeinschaftsempfinden deutscher Menschen'' (ibid.). In Francisco Rodríguez Adrados' summation of the typifying features of tragedy, ''the only constant thing is the theme of human sorrow, inseparably joined with the action of the superior human being, in quest of a salvation granted only

at this price'' (1975: 61). Ansgar, so haunted and fêted by Evelyne as a laurel-crowned Greek hero, is presented as just such a nobly suffering personage whose suffering may bear, Reitz appears to hope, the cost of the salvation of his society. Gregory Nagy writes of the drama of Ancient Athens that ''negative actions of heroes in the heroic age needed to be purified by way of ritual reenactment in the drama of Athenian State Theater'' (2020: 451). Reitz similarly seeks to use his filmic drama as a means of exorcising the ghosts left by Germany's appalling past, and Ansgar's fictional suffering is meant to contribute to the ritual salvation of the real-world society with which Reitz's fictional character is associated. Because of his suffering, his horror of his parents and obsessive thoughts on National Socialism and death, Ansgar is honoured by Reitz as a heroic figure who offers a glimpse of salvation for Germany after National Socialism, salvation via the purificatory power of the ritual of tragedy, in which art and heroism meet.

The combination of a Bavarian setting, swans, a troubled man and a strange death also suggest that King Ludwig of Bavaria, builder of Neuschwanstein, may be somewhere in the background. At the beginning of Syberberg's *Ludwig, Requiem für einen jungfräulichen König*, Ludwig is first shown as a crown-burdened infant, a fake moustache extending the innocence of youth to his later self; he pulls a swan along on a string behind him, as if doomed from the cradle to achieve no more than a swansong (he has just been cursed by Wagnerian Norns to suffer as a result of the deeds of his ancestors – much as Ansgar is cursed by the actions of his father).[83] There is a partial similarity between Syberberg's scene and the scene of Reitz's that features the bizarre image of the woman pushing a swan around a graveyard. In Ansgar's case not Wagnerian Norns but Evelyne lends the audible element of the character's swansong – however, the difference is not so very great: we hear Evelyne singing some Wagner (2:4: 36:23). Swans are very much the bird that emblematises Reitz's objectives with regard to Ansgar (and, to a significant extent, Reinhard): as Greek hero stoically dying as well as possible with a swansong romance with Evelyne, Ansgar embodies Reitz's ambition to find

[83] For Reitz's *Bilder in Bewegung* (1995) he selects Syberberg as one of his interviewees, indicating some degree of appreciation for Syberberg on Reitz's part.

three interrelating forms of consolatory redemption in the narrative of Ansgar's death as a result of his father's sins: a dignified Stoic heroism in the face of doom; artistic redemption in death; and the inducement of viewers into pitying Ansgar – as swansong is lamentation, and thus implies a mournful emotional attachment characterised by empathy and regret, so viewers are meant to pity Ansgar as a hero dying a young and tragic death. As noted above, Ansgar's suffering is presented as primarily undeserved, his misfortunes stemming from his father's (presumed) wrongdoing under National Socialism and the wider misdeeds of a large proportion of his parents' generation. Pity, LaCourse Munteanu notes, is, in Aristotelean terms at least, ''paired with hatred'', which, LaCourse Munteanu continues, begs this question: ''if the spectators respond with pity to the undeserved suffering of a hero, should they also feel simultaneously 'hatred' toward those who inflict such suffering?'' (2012: 38). If pity for Ansgar is in a dialectical relationship with hatred for others, as an Aristotelean model of drama and emotion may suggest, then the hatred is channelled by Reitz principally towards Ansgar's father. If the hatred is meant to be for the National Socialist evils of which Ansgar plainly believes his father to be guilty (but of which viewers are shown no clear evidence), then this hatred may well be directed at a deserving target in the form of the horrors of National Socialism. On the other hand, it is worth considering that Ansgar's father is a member of a minority that was heavily persecuted under National Socialism and that his character is possibly conceived by Reitz as a sort of disguised Jewish figure – seen from such a perspective, Reitz's pleas for pity for Ansgar run the risk of suggesting that viewers should correspondingly hate his father, a character associated not only with perpetration under National Socialism but also with its victims.

The swan in a perambulator marries the associations of birth and death, of infant and dying swansong; the swan-infant's juxtaposition with Ansgar encourages viewers to imagine Ansgar as an innocent baby whose very cradle is stalked by a beautiful but implacable herald of death. Much as Reitz wished viewers to pity morally compromised characters in the first *Heimat* – even though this pity may come at the expense of those who were persecuted under National Socialism, in the second *Heimat* Reitz channels empathetic pity towards characters not persecuted by the Nazis,

while the victims of the National Socialist atrocities that haunt Ansgar's relationship with his father are not granted any mourning swans to focus attention on their suffering. Rather, those persecuted under National Socialism figure as the ghosts that haunt Ansgar, as apparently pitiless, unmerciful witnesses to Ansgar's death as much as – if not more than – they are witnesses to their own deaths. Ansgar's death is presented as beautiful and clearly depicted onscreen, while the deaths of the victims of the Nazis remain hauntingly invisible, as in the first *Heimat*. Rather than mourning those persecuted by the Nazis, Reitz gravitates towards mourning characters who have not been persecuted under National Socialism. Ansgar is an artist-scapegoat, a tragic figure whom his own father is apparently prepared to sacrifice. Reitz constructs Ansgar as a tragic hero who becomes a sacrificial offering aimed at appeasing the supposedly vengeful ghosts of those murdered by the Nazis. In creating the fiction of Ansgar, Reitz perhaps hopes to confine punishment for Germans' ancestral wrongdoing to the realm of fiction. There is a passage in the Bible describing how a (scape)goat is used to relieve people of their ''iniquities'': ''Aaron shall […] confess over'' a goat ''all the iniquities of the children of Israel[…], putting them upon the head of the goat[…]: and the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited'' (Leviticus, XVI:XXI).[84] Reitz may hope that his creation, Ansgar, will bear off some of the National Socialist legacy into the fictional world of *Die zweite Heimat*, a land uninhabited by real people – that his fictional, artistic sacrifice of a scapegoat will contribute to protecting real Germans of the second half of the twentieth century from the inherited burden that lays Ansgar low. Thus Reitz shows signs of wishing to avail himself of art, of fiction, as a magic with which avenging ghosts can be ritually bound. As sacrificed hero, Ansgar is also meant to draw pity; his fate as tragic scapegoat asserts his claim to the role of victim in

[84] Jan Bremner cites this passage of the Old Testament to begin his article ''Scapegoat Rituals in Ancient Greece'', and also gives further instances that demonstrate the ubiquity of concepts of scapegoating (1983: 299). In his apparent interest in scapegoating Reitz is, then, not only drawing on his classical education and interest in Ancient Greece (as demonstrated by his film of the myth of Jason and the Golden Fleece, *Das goldene Ding* [1972]) but also on the Bible and what is perhaps a wider human urge to enact scapegoat rituals.

the tragedy that Reitz constructs around him, so that the victims of National Socialist persecution are placed at risk of being upstaged.

## Reinhard

I will now argue (firstly) that Reitz continues to explore questions of choice versus fate and how they impact of on culpability in relation to Reinhard, a major character of *Die zweite Heimat*. Secondly, I consider how Reitz is attracted to the notion of moving away from a robust distinction between perpetrator and victim by means of combining the two – the attraction of this procedure to Reitz appears to be explained by the burden borne by Germans in the form of having been so strongly associated with the status of perpetrator rather than victim as a result of National Socialism. Thirdly, I also suggest that the process of martyrdom that Reinhard undergoes constitutes an attempt by both Reinhard and Reitz to ritually contain the legacy of National Socialism in order to protect the descendants of Germans who were not persecuted under National Socialism from supernatural punishment and feelings of guilt arising from the complicity of many of their parents and grandparents in National Socialism. At the same time, however, Reitz hints that Reinhardshould not be simply viewed as an admirable martyr; Reitz to an extent suggests that Reinhard's pursuit of martyrdom is self-serving. Overall, Reitz appears to be strongly attracted to the idea of the children of non-persecuted German adults of the National Socialist period being heroic figures martyred by their parents' sins in a redemptive process – as per Ansgar, but in the Reinhard narrative Reitz manages to retain enough sense of proportion and self-critical capacity to realise that such a story of martyrdom is problematic, besides threatening to appear rather absurd, given how far Reinhard takes his intimations of martyrdom.

### Martyrdom

As Dorthe Seifert points out (1999: 331), shortly before his friends realise that Reinhard has disappeared, Clarissa is struck, on a visit to a church near the site of Reinhard's disappearance, by the carvings of decapitated saints (2:10: 02:03:11; 02:03:34); and, on being asked about the second

figure, a nun informs Clarissa that it is St Alban and that he was beheaded because he ‘‘hat die christliche Botschaft verbreitet’’ (2:10: 02:03:46). To Seifert’s observation of this indicator of martyrdom, the following indications can be added. Earlier there is a shot of Reinhard with an image of a saint, including halo, just next to his head (2:10: 47:54). Despite the efforts of divers, Reinhard’s body cannot be located, a circumstance which has, like his death, been foreshadowed: in Venice the camera takes in a poster referring to the Assumption (of the Virgin Mary into heaven): ‘‘SOLENNITA` / DI / MARIA / ASSUNTA / IN CIELO’’ (2:10: 01:17:41).[85] Besides this there is the information that Reinhard was 33, the same age as Jesus at time of death – we are told Reinhard’s age twice and Jesus’ age is mentioned on the first occasion (2:10: 21:53; 02:07:59). Reinhard sharing Jesus’ age at death points to the parallel between Ansgar and Reinhard as scapegoats (see Bremner, 1983: 307 for an example of Jesus being compared to the scapegoats of Ancient Greece). Seifert notes briefly that ‘‘sich das Bestreben [Reinhards], die nationalsozialistische Geschichte Deutschlands im Film zu thematisieren, als geradezu märtyrerhafte Angelegenheit erweist’’ (1999: 332), and that there is, therefore, a parallel drawn between the martyr saint’s evangelising and Reinhard’s attempts to write a filmscript that involves the Holocaust, a parallel that allots the crown of martyrdom to Reinhard (ibid.: 331).

Reinhard’s death is firmly embedded in a Catholic martyrological tradition. Augustine of Hippo defines martyrs thus: ‘‘the holy martyrs […] are presented by their persecutors with this choice; either to abandon the faith or to suffer death’’ (2003: 514 [VIII:4]), those who go on to become martyrs making the latter choice of course. Martyrs are subjected to persecution, and prefer death to making compromises of the sort that would be incompatible with the demands of their faith. As a result of this stand against sin, Augustine writes, the martyr receives ‘‘the award of the palm of

[85] Reinhard’s watery death is also further foreshadowed by, for instance, the scene in Renate’s U-Boot, a dive in which Reinhard and Hermann and their circle of friends drink and watch Renate artistically (she hopes) frolic in a tank of water. Renate’s aquatic performances are in bad taste, given that, only two decades after the Second World War, she has named her establishment after killing machines implicated in the drowning of huge numbers of people, so that the U-Boot name provides yet another link between National Socialism and Reinhard’s related end.

victory as the just reward of righteousness'' (2003: 517 [VIII:7]). An attraction of martyrdom is, therefore, what Aleïda Assmann describes as a ''radikale Inversion von politischer Unterlegenheit in religiöse Überlegenheit, von Trauma in Triumph'' (2006: 87). Reinhard seeks to abuse this transformation to convert Esther's trauma into his own triumph. So martyrdom achieves a fundamental reversal of roles: the victor on a mundane level is the spiritual loser and the victim on a mundane level the spiritual victor. Seifert has noted the relevance of this aspect of martyrdom – its utility in bringing about reversals – to the Reinhard-Esther relationship: she observes that Reinhard is presented as Esther's victim in their martyrdom-associated relationship, and concludes on this basis that in Reitz's portrayal of Esther and Reinhard ''das Verhältnis zwischen Tätern und Opfern wird […] in der Post-Holocaust-Ära verkehrt'' (1999: 332). Although Seifert's conclusion has a logical basis and is confirmed at some levels of the text, I will argue over the course of this chapter that this conclusion of Seifert's has a major limitation: Reitz is anxious to depict both Esther and Reinhard as each being perpetrator and victim in their own right, rather than either being firmly one or the other. As part of his longstanding drive to, as he says, ''nuancer la morale'' (Eisenreich and O'Neill, 2006: no pagination), Reitz portrays the Holocaust survivor Esther extremely problematically at times, but I find that he also does far more than simply reversing the perpetrator-victim roles with Reinhard and Esther. By providing viewers with reasons to doubt the saintliness of Reinhard, Reitz suggests that Reinhard should not, despite (at least superficial) appearances, be viewed solely or even primarily as a victim. Besides, even if Reinhard's martyr status were not brought into question, it would anyway be the case that martyrs are inherently resistant to occupying only one end of a binary in so far as they are both winner and loser at the same time. While Seifert's reading sees the polarity reversed regarding martyr and persecutor, the two poles in that relationship in fact have an inner contradiction that arises from the way that martyrdom brings victory via defeat, and Reitz takes this winner-and-loser contradiction further by making both Reinhard and Esther persecutor and victim in one. Reitz also links both Esther and Reinhard to a complex web of telling intertexts that consistently point to a coexistence of perpetrator and victim in one self.

From a rational point of view, it would seem likely that Reinhard jumps in the lake from which he disappears (and that the water is too cold for instinct to successfully contrive a swim to safety); in terms of the Romantic filmic world that Reitz conjures up, however, Reinhard magically disappears, his life sacrificed in the hope of redemption, absolution of the inherited sins of National Socialism. Reitz is attracted to martyrdom in the narrative of Reinhard's death partly because it provides a way of seeking self-redemptive self-destruction without being considered to commit suicide from a Catholic viewpoint (as mentioned in the previous chapter, Reitz has strong Catholic leanings despite not necessarily being a believer himself). In a mainstream Catholic framework of martyrdom the martyr, despite sort of making a choice, is a victim of murder rather than the perpetrator of their own demise. While despair and suicide have often tended to be viewed as sinful in Christianity, glorious achievement is attributed to martyrs. The distinction between suicide and martyrdom is sometimes viewed as dubious. For instance, Alfred Alvarez writes that ''suicide, thinly disguised as martyrdom, was one of the rocks on which the Church had first been founded'' (1981: 29). From a viewpoint sympathetic to Reinhard it is the other way round in the story of his death: Reinhard's death is a martyrdom disguised as suicide. Augustine of Hippo advises that death may be ''set before men as something to be accepted when that acceptance means the avoidance of sin'' (2003: 516-517). Augustine indicates that martyrs effectively have no choice: ''the holy martyrs […] are presented by their persecutors with this choice; either to abandon the faith or to suffer death'' (ibid.: 514 [VIII:4]). Augustine argues further that ''a partial death is certainly accepted. [… . And] the separation of soul from body is accepted, so that the soul may not be separated from God'' (ibid.: 517 [VIII:8]), meaning that the martyr's choice is essentially between Heaven and potential damnation for the abandonment of their faith – not much of a choice, then, from a religious perspective. Reitz has said of suicide that he has ''in meinen Filmen niemals die Möglichkeit eines freiwillig gewählten Lebensabschieds als Lösung anbieten wollen'' (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 264). Suicide is not, therefore, seriously presented as a choice either for the Catholic martyr (in Augustine's framework at least) or for Reitz's characters. Schmitz remarks that ''in the framework of

historiography of National Socialism, the terms victim and perpetrator have precise meanings, suggesting innocent passivity on the one hand and responsibility and agency on the other'' (2007: 14). According to the framework typical of Catholic martyrdom, the martyr has death forced upon them, so that the ''responsibility and agency'' that Schmitz ascribes to the figure of the perpetrator of National Socialism appears lacking from the figure of the Catholic martyr, who basically has very little choice other than to accept death in martyrdom as vastly preferable to apostasy. In not being responsible for their deaths, not being suicides but rather victims of murder, martyrs are opposites of the figure of the National Socialist perpetrator as described by Schmitz. In suggesting that Reinhard is in part a martyr, Reitz is distancing him from the Nazis who comprised much of the generation of both Reinhard's and Reitz's parents.

In being a martyr Reinhard garners the sympathy bestowed upon the powerless by being a victim of what has become an inexorable fate, unable to escape imminent death – other than by risking damnation – once locked onto the martyr's course. Like Ansgar, Reinhard becomes a sacrifice required to overcome the burden of the inheritance of the descendants of Germans complicit in National Socialism. As Moeller remarks, ''the German word *Opfer* can denote both passive victimisation and sacrifice or suffering in service of a higher cause'' (2006: 38). As a martyr Reinhard stakes a claim to victimhood, as opposed to the perpetrator status of the generation of his parents, and also a claim to being an instrument of redemption in that he is a sacrifice. In exchange for that which the sacrifice redeems, the victim being sacrificed, the *Opfer*, is sanctified, and their submission to death sanctioned – unlike that which is considered to be suicide and not martyrdom. As Greg Eghigian points out in his discussion of German political discourse between the wars, the word *sacrifice* ''means to make holy or sacred'' (2002: 93-4), and the element of sacrifice – productive exchange – is what allows a martyr's death to be religiously condoned. Eghigian further notes that the range of meaning of *Opfer* emphasises that ''sacrifice implies both a victim and constitutes a sacred contract between the one offering the sacrifice and the divinity'' (ibid.: 94). The sacrifice embodied by Reinhard is aimed at securing redemption for Germans in the wake of National

Socialism. Sacrifice can offer, as Eghigian notes, ‘‘restoration, redress and regeneration’’ (ibid.: 94). Reitz’s enactment of sacrifice through his characters is aimed at redressing the balance on the conceptual scales of victimhood and persecution in relation to the image of non-persecuted Germans and their descendants as perpetrators or descendants of perpetrators, and aimed also at restoring German dignity after National Socialist. In the process of the martyr achieving victory via victimhood there is the productive exchange entailed by sacrifice. A martyr, Assmann observes, ‘‘umkodiert’’ ‘‘das ‹Sterben an›’’ ‘‘in ein ‹Sterben für›’’ (2006: 87). The martyr’s death is to be understood as a highly productive exchange, one that, according to Augustine of Hippo, has a redemptive potency that can achieve ‘‘the cancellation of sins committed’’ (2003: 517 [VIII:7]). The sins on Reinhard’s mind, of course, relate to National Socialism; the sins that he hopes to have expiated by the magic of martyrdom relate to nothing less than genocide.

A doomed Greek tragic hero and a Christian martyr both tend to be confronted by a death that cannot really be avoided, and both figures belong to the realm of sacrificial ritual. The ideas that Reitz explores with Ansgar and Reinhard thus run parallel. In my introductory chapter I referred briefly to Olick’s discussion of Normalisation as ‘‘ritualization’’ (1998: 553), in relation to which Olick refers to ‘‘atonement rituals’’ (ibid.: 554). Olick writes that ‘‘acknowledgments of historical responsibility had become regular features of the political liturgy’’ (ibid.: 553), and that consequently ‘‘whether or not the German past was a normal past, it was to a large extent a normal part of West German political ritual. It had been largely domesticated’’ (ibid.: 554). Reitz’s interest in enacting the ritual processes of tragedy and martyrdom in *Die zweite Heimat* appears to stem from a desire to ritually manage the burden of the National Socialist past, just as, in Olick’s view, West German politicians collectively established ritual frameworks as a coping mechanism in the face of that past.

Assmann describes the evolution of the term *martyr*, pointing out that ‘‘‹martys›’’ not only ‘‘verweist […] auf einen religiösen Kontext’’ but is also ‘‘das griechische Wort für Zeuge’’ (2006: 87). She further notes that ‘‘das Wort ‹Martyrion› bedeutet ursprünglich ‹Zeugenbericht über den

Opfertod eines Menschen›''. Consequently, Assmann notes, ''beim Begriff des Märtyrers […] verschränken sich die Rollen des Opfers und des Zeugen in einer einzigen Gestalt'' (ibid.). In setting out to make a film about Esther's experience as a Holocaust survivor, Reinhard intends to bear witness to the National Socialist persecution of Jewish people. The etymology of the word Holocaust points to sacrifice, and Jewish people and others were notoriously scapegoated by the Nazis, who claimed to be eliminating threats to society – as per the use of scapegoats as sacrifices in Ancient Greece – by means of mass incarceration and genocide.[86] As a martyr, a witness in relation to sacrifice, Reinhard appears – from an etymological viewpoint at least – to be well positioned to attempt to make a film featuring the Holocaust. Reinhard does not, however, complete the film, and his friend Stefan's attempt to continue the project is also implied to ultimately fall through. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Reitz has referred to German artists as social scapegoats, secular artist martyrs, and Reitz bears witness to Reinhard's martyrdom, to how the latter fatally fails to make a film telling Esther's story. The Holocaust is not witnessed successfully by Reinhard or *Die zweite Heimat*. Reitz bears witness to Reinhard ostensibly bearing witness to Jewish suffering more than Reitz bears witness to Jewish suffering, and Reitz places the son of Germans who were not persecuted under National Socialism in the starring victim role. Instead of witnessing the scapegoating of Jewish people by the Nazis, Reinhard instead strives to witness his own suffering, and Reitz suggests, although with qualifications, that Reinhard is playing the role of a scapegoat in being martyred due to his inheritance, as a German, of the tainted legacy of the generation of his parents and grandparents.

A. Dirk Moses observes the scope for a self-serving instrumentalization, by non-Jewish Germans, of Jewish victims of National Socialism: the ''moral learning process'' by which Germany's past is

[86] As discussed by John Petrie (2000) and Heather Blurton (2014), the etymology of the word Holocaust and the significance of that etymology are complex, but it seems certain that sacrifice was, from early on, a key element in the evolution of the meaning of the word Holocaust. The concept of sacrifice has often been considered to be relevant to the Holocaust – for examples see Petrie, 2000: 31-32, and the etymological association has been considered extremely harmful to understanding of the Holocaust (for an example see Petrie, ibid.: 33). Reitz's preoccupation with National Socialism, study of Greek and general breadth of learning all suggest that he would have a good grasp of Holocaust's etymological meaning.

‘‘‘mastered’’’ necessarily uses – and, as Moses suggests, sometimes abuses – ‘‘the memory of murdered Jews’’ (2007i: 47). Thus, as Moses puts it, ‘‘there are good reasons to find suspicious a narrative in which the memory of murdered Jews redeems Germany’’ (ibid.). Reinhard purports to be trying to tell Esther’s story via his filmscript, in doing which he would be witnessing her suffering in a film that might potentially, if handled sensitively, have a positive didactic purpose. In fact, however, Reinhard is seeking to redeem himself – as per the sort of narrative that Moses has in mind – by remembering the murders of the Holocaust in a way that, Reinhard hopes, will make him a martyr – a victim as well as a witness. The attempt make himself a victim as well as a witness in relation to the Holocaust is of course extremely problematic. Schmitz points out that ‘‘the ‘neutral’ use of the term victim [in connection with (non-Jewish) Germans in relation to National Socialism] threatens to historically de-contextualise German wartime experience and makes it eminently re-inscribable into a narrative of […] (Christian) redemptive sacrifice’’ (2007: 14). The decontextualisation to which Schmitz refers occurs partly because, as Schmitz notes, ‘‘the term ‘Opfer’ denotes both victim and sacrifice’’ (ibid.). Reinhard’s witnessing of Esther’s life as a Holocaust survivor turns into an example of the sort of ‘‘narrative of […] (Christian) redemptive sacrifice’’ to which Schmitz refers (ibid.). The treatment of martyrdom in relation to Reinhard is deeply alarming, but Reitz does, I will argue, also cast considerable doubt on the validity of Reinhard’s martyrdom, meaning that there is some scope for viewing Reitz’s depiction of Reinhard as a critique of (as opposed to instance of) abuse of ritual in bearing witness to the Holocaust. On the whole, it seems likely that Reitz was rather torn between condemning and abetting his character’s attempts to redeem himself via martyrdom.

<u>Reinhard as Mary Stuart</u>

Reinhard's martyrdom is informed by an allusion to Schiller's *Maria Stuart*, which Trixie refers to having read at school (2:10: 46:38).[87] *Maria Stuart*'s relevance to the Reinhard-Esther narrative probably derives largely from Schiller's play engaging with the question of martyrdom; furthermore, Mary Stuart was beheaded, like the martyred Saint Alban. Schiller's Maria presents herself as a martyr, claiming to have to sacrifice herself for the Catholic Church – as Todd Kontje puts it, ''Mary canonizes herself'' in a ''flattering interpretation'' of her death (1992: 94). She understands well that martyrdom offers her a form of victory, telling a follower just before her execution: ''Ihr seid zu Eurer Königin / Triumph, zu ihrem Tode nicht gekommen'' (Schiller, 2015: 125 [V:VI: 3496-3497]). As with Reinhard, Maria's saintliness is suggested partly by reference to the Virgin Mary: the two Marys are referred to in quick succession as ''der irdischen Maria'' and ''der himmlischen'' (2015: 98 [IV:IV: 2813-14]). In Trixie's reading, Maria is a heroic character, whom she describes as ''so eine edle Frau''. In *Maria Stuart*, however, there is an accusation against the titular character that it would have been perfectly feasible for her to have saved herself by coming to a tolerable accommodation with her cousin, yet ''wollte lieber / Gefangen bleiben, sich misshandelt sehen'' (ibid.: 8 [I:I: 109-110]). Schiller raises the question of whether Maria is truly a martyr or abuses the tradition of martyrdom in order to enjoy the privileges that martyrdom can bestow in terms of how posterity remembers the martyr. It is possible that by referring to *Maria Stuart* Reitz may well be hinting that the viewer should see through Reinhard and condemn him as a false martyr. Reitz has stated that *Die zweite Heimat* is ''un portrait de la jeunesse qui voit le monde comme un produit de son imagination'' (Eisenreich and O'Neill, 2006: no pagination). This comment of Reitz's perhaps suggests that the viewer is intended to distinguish between Reinhard's viewpoint and a more objective reality. Kontje suggests of Maria's martyr credentials that ''Schiller gives us enough evidence to make his audience resist the temptation to experience something akin to religious rapture'' (1992: 93). Something similar can *almost* be said in relation to Reinhard's presentation of

[87] It seems plain that it is Schiller's *Maria Stuart* that has seized Trixie's imagination, since she is ''in der Deutschstunde […] drauf gekommen'' (Reitz, 1993: 700).

Reinhard – except that Reitz seems to be imperfectly capable of resisting the urge to guide viewers towards the veneration of Reinhard and a sense of religious redemption in relation to the legacy of National Socialism that Reinhard confronts.

The invocation of *Maria Stuart* does as much to contribute to the aura of noble martyrdom in which Reitz clads Reinhard as it does to dispel it. The reference to Mary Stuart also complements the background role in the stories of Reinhard and Ansgar of another Romantically unsuccessful monarch, Ludwig of Bavaria. As Ansgar is presented as a Greek hero, Reinhard is associated with a royal character whose appeal to Trixie, an admirer also of Reinhard, lies in her supposed nobility. In both the stories of Ludwig according to Visconti and Mary Stuart (according to Trixie's reading of Schiller's interpretation of her) there is a narrative of failure, and ultimately death, in the attempt either to hold on to (Ludwig) or secure (Mary) a position that depends on inheritance (both asserting their claims to power on the basis of their royal ancestry). The burden that kills Reinhard, Mary Stuart and Ludwig revolves around the identity inherited from one's ancestors. Reitz casts doubt on Reinhard's saintliness, but at the same time struggles to resist endorsing it. Schiller's portrayal of the conflict between the British cousin-queens also appeals to Reitz's project of emphasising the coexistence of perpetrator and victim within the same person: both queens order the death of the other, and, as Kontje says of Schiller's depiction of the pair, ''neither is morally superior to the other'', although ''Mary puts on a better show, so to speak, as she stages her execution as an effective melodrama'' (1992: 89). Reitz's presentation of Ansgar and (much of his more critical presentation of) Reinhard emphasises that they have rather limited ability to resist the destruction visited upon them by their fatal inheritance of the fathers' faults, but also suggests that they make the most of their limited ability to shape their futures by facing death in a heroic fashion, and the Mary presents herself in a very similar light: citing her declaration that ''Maria Stuart wird / Als eine Königin und Heldin sterben'', Kontje observes that ''she has accepted her impending death with heroic dignity'' (ibid.: 93). For Maria – and for Reitz regarding Ansgar and Reinhard, death is sacrifice more than defeat, and a sacrifice that is to be well rewarded: Kontje notes that ''once Mary accepts

death as inevitable, she begins to interpret herself as an innocent sacrificial victim on her way to heaven'' (ibid.: 94). In his citation of *Maria Stuart* Reitz appears to be drawn to a model of a morally complex relationship in which a character strives to cope with an ultimately lethal familial inheritance by enacting a tragedy and a martyrdom in the hope of using these ritually potent forms to salvage their image and then live on in posterity, having paid the price of death, as tragically ennobled figures – with the crowns of martyrdom and tragedy overshadowing reminders of that character's faults (in *Maria Stuart*'s case, Mary's willingness to plot her cousin's death; in *Die zweite Heimat*'s case, the evils of National Socialism that Reinhard martyrdom threatens to somewhat obscure).

Ludwig and the Lake: The Redemptive Beauty of a Noble Death

Reitz has linked Reinhard's vanishing from a lake to the death of an acquaintance, Raimund Rühl, in a Bavarian lake: Rühl's death, Reitz indicates, is ''ein Vorbild'' for the Reinhard narrative, and Reitz relates that ''Rühl ertrank […] im Wörthsee, einem kleinen See bei München, in dem man eigentlich nicht ertrinken muss. Wenn das Boot kentert, kann man sich schwimmend an jedes Ufer retten, er aber nicht'' (in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 266). Physically speaking, the story of Reinhard's final moments is one in which – as per Rühl's last moments as according to Reitz – Reinhard should have been able to save himself, but in which, in practice, some strange power of fate intervenes to contrive his death. King Ludwig is also probably somewhere in the background of Reinhard's disappearance from the lake. Katherina von Bülow remarks that ''Reinhard Dörr se noiera […] dans un lac (tel le roi Louis de Bavière)'' (1993: 170). Michael Kaiser suggests that ''in dem Ort des Verschwindens, einem bayrischen See, gibt Reitz einen Verweis auf den Bayernkönig Ludwig II'' (2001: 273), and notes that there is a similar element of mystery in Ludwig's death and Reinhard's disappearance – ''erst durch das Mysterium erlangt er [Reinhard] seine Unsterblichkeit'' (ibid.), while Ludwig, another ''Kunstliebhaber, […] erst durch die mysteriöse Art seines Todes zu Unsterblichkeit und später Anerkennung fand'' (ibid.). To von Bülow's and Kaiser's arguments for a

Ludwig influence on Reinhard I would add that there is a probable visual echo of Visconti's *Ludwig* (1973) in Reinhard's disappearance. Reitz has referred to Visconti as one of the directors '''*die ich verehre*''' (cited in Kaiser, 2001: 195) (see also Reitz in Subini [ed.] [''Tavola Rotonda''] 2008: 148-149). Although Visconti shows Ludwig's body being retrieved from the lake, the actual death, as per Reinhard, is off camera, while both Visconti and Reitz show two boats searching the lake, loitering in a small area, almost circling. The search for Reinhard begins at dusk but is still ongoing in darkness at the very end of the episode, and the boats have flashing lights; Visconti's boats search in the dark and are lit by torches. Visconti's film would appear to have inspired Reitz. Reinhard is also linked to Visconti's Ludwig by the latter's reference to his ultimately abortive wedding preparations as ''un vero martirio''. As Giorgio Biancorosso observes, a key strand of Visconti's Ludwig is ''his absorption in and self-definition through art'' (2010: 333), and the same can be said of both Reinhard and Reitz. Ludwig says that ''affogare è una bella morte'', and Reinhard's watery presumed grave forms part of the artistic beauty with which Reitz seeks to invest his death. Reinhard seeks to escape consciousness of Esther's suffering by drowning his own memory, and perhaps also desires to use the cleansing power of water to wash away the sin of his self-serving exploitation of Esther's life story. Ludwig claims that drowning leaves the body without disfigurement, and in his wishful thinking the body perhaps stands for a person's image; he appears to hope that the water will leave his reputation in posterity undisfigured – and this seems to be the cleansing-related appeal of a watery grave for Reinhard too. Where facts fail to please, fiction can offer something better, appears to be Reinhard's conclusion, and possibly Reitz's.

## Perpetrator and Victim

### Romeo, Juliet and Vampires: German-Jewish Relationships

As Moses writes of ''Germans and Jews'', ''the vocabulary of victims, perpetrators and bystanders permeates the discussion, dividing the population into distinct lineages connected to the lives of their parents and grandparents in the 1930s and 1940s'' (2007ii: 141). In *Die zweite Heimat* Esther

and Reinhard are not encountering each other during the National Socialist period, but their relationship is absolutely overwhelmingly defined by the experiences of their ancestors under National Socialism, so much so, in fact, that Reitz largely uses the Esther-Reinhard narrative to seek to influence viewers' judgements on the relationship between non-Jewish Germans and Jewish people both during and after National Socialism – there is much at stake in the Esther-Reinhard narrative. As Seifert argues, Reitz uses Esther as ''einer allegorischen Filmfigur'' to reflect ''das Schicksal der deutschen und europäischen Juden'' (1999: 325) and Esther's and Reinhard's relationship is meant to encapsulate ''allegorisch eine moderne Beziehung zwischen Deutschen und Juden'' (ibid.: 328). There is, Seifert adds, in Esther and Reinhard a ''deutsch-jüdische[…] Symbiose'' in which can be seen a desire of Reitz's for ''Verschmelzungsutopien'' between non-Jewish Germans and Jews (ibid.: 331). Identifying the Biblical Esther as a source for Esther (ibid.: 323) and briefly noting that Reinhard is associated with martyrdom (ibid.: 332), Seifert argues that ''das Verhältnis zwischen Tätern und Opfern wird dabei in der Post-Holocaust-Ära verkehrt'' (ibid.:). While Seifert notes (citing him) Reitz's '''Faszination von Ambivalenzen''' (ibid.) and observes that Esther, due to her (Jewish and SS) parentage, is ''eine komplexe Figur, die sich nicht leicht in […] Kategorien einordnen läßt'' (ibid.: 325), Seifert does not see the ambivalence in Reitz's portrayal of Reinhard as victim, seeing a straightforward reversal of the perpetrator-victim dichotomy in the portrayal of Esther and Reinhard. I do not ultimately see any straightforward reversal in the perpetrator-victim relationship that is at stake in the Esther-Reinhard relationship; rather I argue that Reinhard should be understood as both saint and sinner. In contrast to Seifert, I would argue that Reitz subtly undermines the presentation of Reinhard's self-presentation as martyr, suggesting that it is an abuse of martyrdom – although Reitz is unable to entirely resist the temptation to partially condone his character's self-serving attempts to become a martyr.

Seifert argues that ''Assoziation des jüdischen Opfers mit dem Verfolger Gerold Gattinger'' ''suggerierte'', in relation to Esther's mother, ''eine eigenständige Beteiligung am eigenen Untergang'' (1999: 332). I would certainly agree that the representation of Esther's parents is deeply

problematic. Herr Gattinger, the former SS-man, had a relationship with Esther's (Jewish) mother. The only Jewish character allowed on the screen by Reitz in *Die zweite Heimat* has, therefore, a family history of perpetration as well as victimhood in relation to National Socialism.[88] As I have noted, the presumed collaboration of Ansgar's father is presented as an aspect of an intra-familial tragedy centring around father and son, which threatens to overshadow the (inter)national consequences of National Socialism; I have made a similar argument in relation to the first *Heimat*. In somewhat similar fashion, the story of Esther's parents approaches the Holocaust via a small family unit. There is a brief episode in which Renate (who aspires to an acting career) recites the role of Juliet. Gattinger, it then transpires, has studied the role of Romeo well enough to reply. Reitz thus draws a definite parallel between Shakespeare's ''star-cross'd lovers [who] take their life'' (I:I) and Esther's parents. Gattinger the SS-man is cast by Reitz in the light of Romeo, a victim of a cruel destiny, rather than being responsible for his failings, and victim of love and familial feuding.[89] The allusion that Reitz makes seems rather generous – to put it very mildly – to an apparently impenitent Nazi; it also indicates a preference on Reitz's part for portraying the mass persecution of Jewish people on the disproportionately small scale of family tragedy (and Esther's half-SS parentage bars her from being a character representative of the collective body of Holocaust victims). Besides these in themselves problematic aspects of the allusion, there is also the implication that Holocaust victims (of whom Esther's mother is presented as being representative) and their persecutors (embodied by Gattinger) loved one another in a relationship that was beset by lethally unlucky misunderstandings (perhaps driven by unfortunate alignments of the stars). Shakespeare's lovers ''with their death bury their parents' strife'' (I:I) – a vastly happier outcome than that of Esther's parents' love story, which leaves the SS-man alive and the Jewish Juliet sacrificed (as per the etymology of the word Holocaust)

[88] We are told that Juan, like Hermann, has a Jewish grandparent, but only Esther is strongly characterised in terms of Jewishness.

[89] As Augustine of Hippo notes, ''when people hear the word 'destiny', the established usage of language inevitably leads them to understand by the word the influence of the position of the stars'' (2003: 179 [v: 1]), so that to be crossed by the stars is to be subjected to the fateful decrees of a higher power against which one can do little if anything.

by the Nazis in the hope of genocidally ‘‘bury[ing]’’ the ‘‘strife’’ that the Nazis imagined Jewish existence to cause. The allusion is a disappointing choice for Reitz to make. Reitz threatens to gift Gattinger the tragic role of lover subjected to ‘‘misadventured piteous overthrows’’ (ibid.), which would take to a nasty extreme Reitz’s efforts (as discussed also in the previous chapter) to promote feelings of pity towards non-persecuted Germans of the National Socialist period. Shakespeare’s lovers die jointly, united by love and tragedy in defiance of their parents’ hatred; they become inseparable victims, tragically linked in a sort of posthumous symbiosis – a form of symbiosis inappropriate for the portrayal of Esther’s parents because of the radically different outcomes for the two characters. In Reitz’s defence he may well mean for viewers to see the irony in Gattinger reciting Romeo’s lines. It is not an irony, though, that Reitz seems to particularly emphasise.

Is Reinhard a vampire? He is accused of being a metaphorical one by Fräulein Cerphal: ‘‘ihr Künstler seid Blutsäuger, richtige Vampire’’ (2:10: 01:44:38). She is addressing Reinhard, but it is significant that the accusation could also apply to Esther in so far as she is also an artist. Esther also accuses Reinhard of preying on her life story in his approach to the filmscript about her that he is writing, telling him: ‘‘ich schenke dir mein Leben als Stoffe und Drehbuch’’ (2:10: 01:36:23). As Koebner comments, Reinhard ‘‘beutet […] die Lebensgeschichte von Esther aus’’, ‘‘ihr Leben raubt’’ for his script (2015: 204). Reinhard’s attempts to live the life of a film-maker certainly come to feed off the story of Esther’s life parasitically. Yet ultimately the script about Esther – his failure, that is, to complete it – takes Reinhard’s life, so that both Reinhard and Esther give each other their lives. Both Reinhard and Esther are in a sense vampiric. Esther asks Reinhard: ‘‘weißt du, dass ich deinen Nacken liebe? Er ist so eine ungeschützte Stelle’’ (2:10: 01:50:10). Esther poses, then, a vampiric threat to Reinhard’s neck. Esther and Reinhard, Jewish woman and non-Jewish German are both portrayed as perpetrator and victim, vampires locked in a fatal embrace. Being generally understood as a sucker of others’ blood, a vampire is an obvious parasite. Writing about the concept of a ‘‘German Jewish symbiosis’’, Benz comments on ‘‘the term symbiosis’’ possessing a ‘‘potential association with parasitism’’ (1992: 102). Rather than only presenting the Jewish character in the

relationship as a vampire, however, Reitz also makes the non-Jewish character in the relationship vampiric. Parasitism is implied by Reitz to be an artistic characteristic, and one not unique to Jewish artists – there is a hint of vampirism also in the relationship of another pair of artists, Hermann and Clarissa: the former tells the latter, ''ich muss immer an mein Blut denken, das in deine Binde fließt''. The (non-Jewish) German-Jewish vampiric symbiosis that Reitz suggests is portrayed in an unfavourable light in that is depicted as a parasitic relationship; on the other hand, in characterising artists as vampiric Reitz may be criticising himself and a non-Jewish character as much as criticising a character whose vampirism Reitz may conceive of as stemming from her art rather than her ancestry.

Esther's remark, ''weißt du, dass ich deinen Nacken liebe? Er ist so eine ungeschützte Stelle'', is possibly a verbal echo of Truffaut's *Jules et Jim* (1962). Jim says to Cathérine, whom he loves: ''j'ai toujours aimé ta nuque, ce morceau de toi que je pouvais regarder sans être vu'' (01:05:08).[90] There is a link between Jeanne Moreau, who plays Cathérine, and a character in Reitz's film *Mahlzeiten* whom Reitz and Koebner, in conversation with one another, have discussed in relation to vampirism (in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 57-58). Koebner suggests that in *Mahlzeiten* there is ''dieses Sujet der im übertragenen Sinne ‚vampirischen' Frau'' (ibid.: 57). Reitz says in response that ''ich habe zum Beispiel Jeanne Moreau im Sinn gehabt, die in französischen Filmen […] immer wieder diese ‚fressende Frau' spielt'' (ibid.). Rauh cites Reitz describing the actor playing the female lead in *Mahlzeiten* as a ''weiblichen Frau mit dem fressenden Blick'' (1993: 97). Admittedly, it is Jim, not the female character, who is attracted to a bit(e) or morsel (''morceau'') of neck, but the terrible gaze is Cathérine's. Reitz's two remarks cited above connect Moreau with a vampiric gaze (''fressenden Blick''). Palfreyman observes that Esther ''concentrates on photographing images of death and decay

[90] *Jules et Jim* is one of the several films that Reitz cites by giving the viewer glimpses of film posters (2:7: 01:33:41). Kaiser notes that ''als […] Hermann and Clarissa […] über den Freiheitsdrang Clarissas sowie Hermanns geplante Hochzeit mit Schnüsschen sprechen, prangt als eindeutiger Verweis auf die Dreiecksbeziehung ein Plakat von Truffauts *Jules et Jim* an einer Tür in Hermanns Zimmer'' (2001: 314). The influence of *Jules et Jim* is also in evidence when Juan contemplates jumping off a bridge, which would emulate Cathérine's doing so.

– still-life compositions of dead cats and rats in Venetian canals'' (2000: 197). At one point when Esther is photographing Reinhard he has his mouth loosely open and his eyes closed so that he resembles one of her dead animals, as if he had been slain by her gaze, killed by incorporation into her camera (Reitz remarks of Reinhard and Esther in the book version at this point, ''er ist ihr Opfer'' [1993: 721]). Reinhard is shown as a victim of Esther's vampiric photographer's gaze, her determination to bring him into the camera that is an extension of her identity, while Esther falls victim to Reinhard's appropriation of her life story for his filmscript – he tells her, ''deine Geschichte ist meine Geschichte geworden'' (2:10: 01:51:34). As noted in my chapter on the first *Heimat*, Reitz has an interest in Freud, and it is tempting to relate his references to vampirism in relation to Esther and Reinhard to psychoanalytic takes on the symbolic import of biting. Magdalena Zolkos notes that '''infantile regression' [she is citing Ernst Simmel] to the oral stage'' ''in psychoanalytic theory is associated with the desire for violent incorporation of the other (biting, devouring, etc.)'' (2022: no pagination). Reitz's depiction of Esther and Reinhard as mutually vampiric suggests that Reitz wants each character to become part of the other, that Reitz wants the figure of the victim to incorporate the figure of the perpetrator and thereby undermine the distinction between the two. Esther tries to incorporate Reinhard into herself by visual means, whereas Reinhard attempts to incorporate her into his film script. The obsession with their mutual incorporation reflects Reitz's desire to overcome the association between Germans with his background and perpetration via a perpetrator-victim ''split self''. Flinn writes of ''incorporation'' (in relation to Kluge's *Die Patriotin*) that it ''brings a foreign object inward into the self, […] sealing it off from consciousness. In hiding the object and the loss it represents, it is a refusal to mourn'' (2004: 132). Esther's and Reinhard's mutual drive to incorporate each other into themselves may represent an attempt to consume and then constrain in concealment the haunting history of which each reminds the other. Flinn has briefly referred to *Die zweite Heimat* as a melancholic work (ibid.: 56 [cited in my chapter on the third *Heimat*]). By insisting (in Esther's case) on photographing animals' moments of death – that is, eternalising the moment rather than moving on from it – and being incapable of finishing his filmscript about the evil

in Germany's past (in Reinhard's case), Esther and Reinhard are both melancholics in Freudian terms (Flinn defines a melancholic as someone ''condemned to repeated lamentations that cannot get past their object'' [ibid.]). Santner (1990) argues of the first *Heimat* that Reitz is obsessed with mourning. Although Flinn sees it as melancholic as a whole, I would note that in *Die zweite Heimat* Reitz enacts a progression away from melancholic revisiting of the past: Freudian melancholic behaviour is brought to an end when Reinhard disappears, when Esther casts aside her camera and when the similarly past-obsessed Ansgar is scapegoated, sacrificed in the hope of allowing Reitz and his audience to move on from the horrors of the past.

As with his allusion to *Romeo and Juliet* in connection with the relationship between Gattinger and Esther's mother, Reitz implies that there tends, as a more general phenomenon, to be a love affair between perpetrator and victim, which perhaps constitutes a model of a perpetrator-victim relationship that threatens to potentially be something of an apologia for the perpetrator, a sympathetic portrayal of the perpetrator as prey to their own passions. Reitz perhaps wishes to think of (non-Jewish) German-Jewish relationships (during or after but overshadowed by National Socialism) in terms of the desire to produce (as such relationships produce children) in order to challenge the heavily dominant image of the destruction as the key drive in the image of (non—Jewish) German-Jewish relations in connection with National Socialism. Reitz's enthusiasm for Esther's being a result of an SS-Jewish love affair may be worryingly suggestive of a reluctance to feature an SS-man more typical of the historic reality. As with the father-son relationship between Ansgar and his father, Reitz approaches the Holocaust via a familial relationship, one that is vastly smaller in scale than the subject that it addresses – and the SS-Jewish relationship of Esther's parents cannot of course be taken to be representative of the wider historic reality. The parallel – namely, that characters threaten with death those whom they love – between Cathérine's relationship to Jim and Esther's relationship to Reinhard is emphasised by the fact that Cathérine threatens to kill Jim at one point. Jim fears Cathérine's gaze; Reinhard Esther's camera. Gattinger's Romeo joins an organisation tasked with killing his Juliet. There is a third instance of Reitz alluding to

a text in which a character is killed by someone in love with them: Palfreyman has observed that Reitz draws on Thomas Mann's *Doktor Faustus*, in which Ines fatally shoots Schwerdtfeger (2000: 193-197).[91] As Palfreyman points out, Schwerdtfeger's death may be a source for Ansgar's, since Munich trams are involved in both deaths (ibid.: 196). Ansgar is not, on the other hand, murdered by the woman who loves him, while Reinhard's and Esther's romance is a fatal one. Seifert applies to the Esther-Reinhard relationship Koch's characterisation of a '''deutsch-jüdische Symbiose''' '''als Liebes- oder Freundschaftsverhältnis mit tödlichem Ausgang''' involving ''die Koppelung des jüdischen mit dem Todesthema'' (Seifert, 1999: 331) (Koch is, in this instance, not writing about *Heimat*). The allusion to *Jules et Jim*, reinforces Reitz's construction of Reinhard's and Esther's perpetrator-victim relationship as a fatal mutual romantic relationship. On the other hand, it seems unfair to suppose that Esther's Jewishness is the reason why Reitz makes death a key theme in the Esther-Reinhard narrative: death also dominates the story of Ansgar, and looms large in the stories of other characters such as Alex and Trixie, without Ansgar or those other characters being Jewish or in relationships with Jewish people. There is also a positive in Reitz's portrayal of Esther's and Reinhard's relationship in that Reitz clearly rejects National Socialist notions of racial purity. Instead of seeking, Nazi-like, to preserve the supposed purity of his blood, Reinhard has a genuine redeeming feature in that he is willing to physically (sexually) and metaphorically (vampirically) exchange his bodily fluids with Esther. Reitz suggests that such German-Jewish relationships are likely to be haunted in the sixties setting of *Die zweite Heimat*, so soon after the war, but it does not necessarily follow that Reitz is against such relationships – it seems probable that he hopes that they will flourish.

In Seifert's view, Reitz directs ''das Mitgefühl der Zuschauer auf'' Reinhard, whereas ''entsteht kein Moment, in dem die Zuschauer zu einer vergleichbar unmittelbaren Sympathie für Esther bewegt werden'' (1999: 328). While partially agreeing that Reitz tends, very problematically, to favour

[91] Hillman also links Mann's work to the *Heimat* cycle as a whole (2010: 266).

Reinhard over Esther in terms of his guidance of viewers' emotional reaction to characters – and that this is likely to be a product of some degree of anti-Semitic authorship, I would note that Esther is also portrayed as deserving of pity: Reitz shows her forlornly going in search of Reinhard, having travelled hundreds of miles to see the spot where he disappeared, and in this fashion Reitz invites viewers to join with him in pitying a Jewish character who is portrayed as a faithful, albeit (unwillingly) fatal, lover, a deeply-moved victim of bereavement, rather than simply portraying her as a monstrous parasite any more than is Reinhard (or more than photographers or film makers perhaps are generally, according to Reitz – Esther's attraction to corpses as objects of photography is relatable to Reitz's display of the naked murdered woman in the first series). I would argue that viewers are meant to experience strong emotional identification with Esther when she is seen to grieve for Reinhard – grieving the loss of a prominent character who appears to die young is the position that viewers are likely to be in when she makes her pilgrimage to the place of Reinhard's disappearance: in this instance at least Reitz seems to be aiming to prompt viewers to feel that they are sharing something of the emotional viewpoint of a Jewish character and to bond with that character as a result of sharing an emotion as powerful as grief. Nor is Reinhard ultimately portrayed as so very different from Esther – indeed, viewers' last, faint glimpse of Esther seems to be of her taking a boat out onto the lake, emulating Reinhard, and, since she is not to be seen very clearly, this links her to Reinhard's evasion of the camera. As von Moltke has discussed, Reinhard suffers disillusionment with photography (2003: 126) and so too does Esther (ibid.: 128-129), and this shared experience emphasises similarity as opposed to difference between Reinhard and Esther. Reitz depicts the relationship between Esther and Reinhard as a meeting of kindred spirits with similar flaws – both meet with disappointment by seeking answers via photography – as opposed to suggesting that Reinhard has a moral or intellectual superiority over Esther. In the Reinhard narrative Reitz cannot altogether resist the temptation of seeking relief via martyrdom, but a large part of him – as I will argue further – is anxious to undermine Reinhard's martyr credentials.

As noted, a reference to the martyred Saint Alban foreshadows Reinhard's disappearance. One reason why Reitz selects this particular saint appears to lie in the dreadful punishment visited upon his executioner, who becomes blind upon decapitating the martyr saint (see, for instance, Matthew Paris, 2010). Esther despairs of the power of photography, and – at first glance – Reitz's implicit reference to the story of Saint Alban supplies the following possible interpretation for this circumstance: that Esther is being punished and Reinhard vindicated, which would reverse the perpetrator-victim relationship as per Seifert's interpretation of the Esther-Reinhard narrative (1999: 332 [as cited earlier]). Yet Esther is not herself blinded; her camera is blinded – much as the camera is blind to many important dimensions of the *Heimat* cycle as a whole.[92] In learning to mistrust her camera, Esther in fact gains far more powerful metaphysical sight in Reitz's terms; she grows as a character by learning to look beyond physical images – just as viewers are meant to grow while watching *Heimat* and as achieved by Jakob in *Die andere Heimat*. The blinding of Esther's camera does not show Esther as an executioner, nor does it conceal Jewish suffering: von Moltke demonstrates that the blinding of Esther's camera opens viewers' eyes – he notes that ''Reitz uses the shortcomings of Esther's camera to invest his own camera with the ability to give meaning to […] the concentration camp'' (2003: 130). Reinhard's disappearance is a triumph against the visual, and his martyrdom does not blind an executioner so much as the camera. The rejection of photography unites Esther and Reinhard.[93] Rather than suggesting the moral superiority of the one over the other, the defeat of the physical image asserts that viewers should pierce the surface of the screen and understand what film is suggesting in the wider context of the world. As discussed in the chapter

[92] Rob the cameraman is temporarily blinded, but there is no reason to view him as Reinhard's executioner. Von Moltke demonstrates that, although Reitz casts doubt on the abilities of the camera, he also shows that it does have a power worthy of respect (2003: 126; 130). A reasonable conclusion would appear to be that Reitz, unsurprisingly for a filmmaker, respects the capabilities of cameras and film, but is suspicious of overreliance on images and fears viewers potentially failing to engage actively enough with onscreen images (Bauer writes of the ''virtueller Text'' in objects in Reitz's work, ''es kommt nur darauf an, dass man sich den Objekten gegenüber responsiv verhält'' [2012: 83]). Von Moltke argues that ''we invest'' the camera ''with hope and pity'' (ibid.: 127) – pity and hope are feelings that, in my view, Reitz particularly wishes through much of the cycle to prompt in viewers when they behold those characters portrayed on the surface of the screen.

[93] Scholz observes that Esther remarks on the limitations of photography ''gerade so als wollte sie Reinhards Philosophie bestätigen'', namely (Scholz is citing the character Rob on Reinhard's views) '''alles Wesentliche im Leben ist unsichtbar und entzieht sich der Optik einer Kamera''' (1996: 91).

on the first *Heimat*, Reitz has many times been accused of seeking to distort viewers' image of reality by encouraging them to seek refuge in film as an alternative reality; actually, however, a large part of Reitz is keen to encourage viewers to look past the screen and see the wider realities beyond.

Seifert has pointed out that Esther shares her name with the Biblical Queen Esther to whom the Book of Esther is devoted (1999: 322-323). As Seifert notes, ''*das Buch Esther* handelt von dem vereitelten Plan einer Judenvernichtung'' (ibid.: 322), and ''das Verbrechen gegen die Juden wird […] sowohl verhindert als auch bestraft'' (ibid.: 323). Queen Esther manages to turn the tables on Haman, so that ''the king granted the Jews which *were* in every city […] to destroy, to slay, and to cause to perish, all the power of the people and province that would assault them, *both* little ones and women'' (ibid.: VIII:XI). The perpetrator-victim reversal described in the Bible is dramatic, strikingly similar in extent to the role reversal that Reinhard seeks. I would speculate that this Biblical passage appealed to Reitz because, in Reitz's likely reading of it, the behaviour of those Jewish people involved in the episode described appears to trespass into genocide: the Book of Esther reports that ''the Jews smote all their enemies with the stroke of the sword, and slaughter, and destruction'' (ibid.: IX:V), even children (ibid.: VIII:XI) (I am conjecturing as to Reitz's reading of this passage, neither giving my own reading of the Biblical passage nor endorsing Reitz's probable view of it). By drawing on the Book of Esther, Reitz maybe intends to find an example of Jewish people being the perpetrators rather than the victims of genocide. Esther is a key part of the Biblical Jews' revenge in the Book of Esther: ''then said Esther, If it please the king, let it be granted to the Jews […] to do to morrow also according unto this day's decree, and let Haman's ten sons be hanged'' (ibid.: XIII). *Heimat*'s Esther is involved in mass murder only as a victim of it; she is, however, heavily involved in the death of Reinhard, who is an unwilling heir, on the level of nationality, to a genocidal state. Unlike Haman, Reinhard is not a highly dangerous anti-Semite whose continued existence poses a present and future threat to Jewish people; he is, however, like the ten hanged sons of Haman, a son of a war criminal of the National Socialist era (at the very least in relation to Guernica, which Reinhard's father, he recounts, bombed). It seems likely that in Reitz's reading of the Book of

Esther neither Haman nor Queen Esther is only perpetrator or solely victim. Haman plans a genocide but his own family is wiped out; Esther's people almost falls victim to Haman's plans but Esther herself then causes a great deal of blood to be shed, including of children. (I am not myself suggesting that the Book of Esther should be read in this way, only suggesting that it is likely that Reitz reads it along such lines.) Reitz probably makes this Biblical allusion as part of his efforts to construct Esther and Reinhard as each being both perpetrator and victim simultaneously.

Palfreyman has spotted that Esther is influenced by the photographer in Antonioni's *Blowup* (2000: 197). As Palfreyman says, Esther's ''aggressive use of the camera when she photographs Reinhard'' (ibid.) is an allusion to Antonioni's photographer. Palfreyman notes that Reinhard's counterparts in *Blowup* are women whom Antonioni's photographer exploits (ibid.: 197-198), and that Esther's ''dominant, ruthless streak in pursuit of the photographic image [… results in] a painful abuse of Reinhard's body'' (ibid.: 197). Palfreyman notes with regard to gender in the allusion to *Blowup* that Esther's ''use of the camera when she photographs Reinhard […] is an interesting mirror of the male photographer'' (2000: 197) and that ''the question of whether aggressive photography is indeed masculine, or whether Esther as an artist is drawing on a masculine principle is posed (though not answered)'' (ibid.: 198). In *Die zweite Heimat* it is Reinhard who is accused by Esther of exploiting her in order to make (as a male) a film (thus visual) version of her life, but this scene that alludes to *Blowup* suggests multiple reversals that cast Reinhard as the victim of Esther, the visual (as indicated by the camera) and sexual violence, which is more frequently perpetrated against than by women. Yet in Antonioni's film there is a suggestion of a reversal of perpetrator and victim roles in a scene of male sexual violence towards women when two women are implied to sexually assault the (male) photographer (after he had first attacked them). Reitz is probably attracted to *Blowup* because it refuses any straightforward perpetrator-victim dichotomy: the photographer displays predatorial behaviour towards women, certainly, but also appears to be sexually assaulted himself; the mysterious character played by Vanessa Redgrave is targeted by the photographer's camera, yet she apparently gets the better of him ultimately, leaving him in a state of impaired sanity.

I have several further points to add to Palfreyman's observations on *Blowup*'s influence. *Blowup* plays with visual storytelling in a way that presumably appealed to Reitz's preoccupation with the (un)reliability of the photographic image, a theme in *Heimat* in general and especially regarding Esther and Reinhard.[94] The allusions to *Blowup* thus lend support to the explanation – advanced by the character Rob, a cameraman – for Reinhard's corporeal disappearance that has been accepted by several critics: namely, that the invisibility of Reinhard's death is an indictment on the limitations of the camera.[95] This explanation is compelling as a part of an explanation for the disappearance, as I discuss further below. Rob's explanation, nonetheless, is only a partial one, insufficient on its own without taking into account the many features that construct Reinhard's bodily disappearance as a miraculous event in a martyrdom – elements of which Rob can only partially be aware. The concern with the shortcomings of the camera compliments Reinhard's martyrdom in explaining why Reitz does not show us a body. In combination with the many martyr credentials bestowed on Reinhard, the reference to the Virgin Mary's ascent into heaven demonstrates that Reinhard's disappearance is, however, in large part to be explained as a miraculous martyr's exit.[96]

There is a headless statue of a woman in *Blowup* (22: 35) that is paralleled by the carving of the decapitated martyr that helps to set the scene for Reinhard's martyrdom, which strengthens the link between Reinhard and the exploited women of *Blowup*, therefore further asserting his victimhood. On the other hand, the photographer in *Blowup* is faded out so that he appears to vanish into thin air in the last seconds of the film, an exit partially similar to Reinhard's, associating the latter with the photographer, rather than the female models. *Blowup* and the Book of Esther have this in common: they are able to assist Reitz in his pursuit of a destabilisation of the perpetrator-victim dichotomy. Antonioni's photographer is both an exploiter of models and also a victim of the camera

[94] On Esther's and Reinhard's photography and Reitz's interest in the limitations of photography and images more generally see Scholz, 1996: 91-95; Sobhani, 2001: 118-126; Seifert, 1999: 320-322; and von Moltke 2003: 126-130.
[95] Rob's explanation is remarked on and accepted by Scholz (1996: 91-92) and Sobhani (2001: 118).
[96] Especially since the reference to the Virgin Mary is in Venice, which is linked to the fatal lake by the water theme in Reinhard's death. Dying in water also has the potential to point to the religious nature of his body's disappearance due to water's spiritual properties, as per baptism.

himself when he is tormented by doubt as to whether or not his camera really captured something in a key scene. Anxiety over the abilities of the camera is to be seen in both Esther and Reinhard. Indeed, *Blowup*'s photographer can be seen in Reinhard and Esther to a roughly equal extent: Esther is linked to him by the pose in which she photographs Reinhard, while Reinhard similarly evades the camera in his exit.

Perpetrators and Victims as ''Split Selves''

Their sharing of aspects of Antonioni's photographer contributes to the portrayal of Reinhard and Esther as two halves. Palfreyman has discussed Reitz's use of such pairings in the first two series, especially the second, and in discussing them I will borrow Palfreyman's term ''split selves'' (2000: 203-211). Reinhard makes this pairing particularly evident by quoting Grillparzer to Esther: ''Gegrüßt seist du, Halber dort oben, / wie du bin ich einer der halb''. I will go on to argue that Reitz uses the ''split self'' device especially in order to bring the figures of perpetrator and victim together. Palfreyman notes in relation to her discussion of ''split selves'' that there is a pronounced ''Janus motif'' (2000: 205) in both the second and first series (ibid.: 204-206) but applies it principally to the Hermann-Clarissa relationship and to issues relating to art and gender and, more briefly, to Reitz's attitude to the concept of Heimat (ibid.: 204, 211) as ''a two-faced […] phenomenon expressing either security […], or repression'' (ibid.: 211). In my argument, the ''split self'' ''Janus motif'' is relevant specifically to the relationship of the concepts of perpetrator and victim. Palfreyman remarks – apropos of the representation of ''Hermann and Clarissa as artist twins'' – that ''It is suggested that perhaps a 'unified' self can only exist at the cost of suppressing the other within the self'' (ibid.: 206). In relation to Reitz's use, as I see it, of the ''split self'' also to combine perpetrator and victim in one, on the other hand, I would argue that Reitz suggests rather that a healthy '''unified''' self-image should consist of an understanding of oneself as both perpetrator and victim – as I noted in the previous chapter, Reitz describes himself as ''liebenswert und hassenswert in einem'' (no date [1981]: 141). For Ansgar and Reinhard, salvation from the guilt that they inherit lies

largely in embracing a heroic victim role. Reitz suggests that Esther is both perpetrator and victim (in relation to Reinhard at least). In seeing both the good and the bad in oneself, Reitz perhaps indirectly suggests, one should be able to guard against the feeling of superiority towards others that contributed to the Nazis' perpetration of genocide. I have argued in the previous chapter (applying Danze's distinction between empathetic versus sympathetic pity) that Reitz encourages viewers to feel sympathy towards those persecuted by the Nazis but empathy towards non-persecuted Germans. Although he very problematically favours Reinhard over Esther in terms of his attempts to steer viewers' pity in *Die zweite Heimat*, Reitz at least suggests in his incorporation of Esther and Reinhard into a ''split self'' that the two must be thought of together, as opposed to the Jewish character being mentally compartmentalised elsewhere by viewers, and (when viewers and Esther join in grieving the loss of Reinhard) Reitz fosters an empathetic response to Esther.

As noted above, Palfreyman sees in Reitz's exploration of art and gender via ''Hermann and Clarissa as artist twins'' a consideration of the possibility that ''a 'unified' self can only exist at the cost of suppressing the other within the self'' (2000: 206). This is an intriguing proposition in relation to the psychology of National Socialism, most specifically in relation to the destruction of those imagined to be enemies of the national body. Gabriel discusses the first ''*Heimat*'s own preoccupation with the logic of screen projection'' in relation to Adorno's and Horkheimer's argument (as Gabriel sums it up) ''that anti-semitism is based on false projection'' (2004: 184), and she then links this argument to a remark of Fassbinder's on the Holocaust, namely: '''in reality one wanted to eliminate that which one did not want to acknowledge in one's own person''' (Fassbinder as cited in ibid.: 185). In Gabriel's view, Adorno's and Horkheimer's and Fassbinder's related readings of the psychology of genocide is reflected in Reitz's ''history writing'' in the first *Heimat* (ibid.) – she argues, in relation to Lucie's and Eduard's discussion of Bielstein, a Jewish banker, that ''the phantasmatic of the crooked Jew-speculator is their [Lucie's and Eduard's] own disavowed screen image'' (ibid.: 184) (Lucie and Eduard build their villa on the basis of financial speculation in the form of a loan from the banker). Gabriel's selection of quotations from Adorno and Horkheimer (Gabriel, 2004: 184) succinctly

reveals the relevance of scapegoating ritual to the desire to destroy (to return to Fassbinder's remark as cited above) '''that which one did not want to acknowledge in one's own person''': Gabriel cites Adorno and Horkheimer arguing that Jewish people function as '''scapegoats''' to whom '''is attributed''' '''economic injustice''' generally, which, in '''bourgeois anti-semitism''', serves the '''concealment''' of others' culpable involvement in the aforementioned '''economic injustice''' (Gabriel, 2004: 184). In *Die zweite Heimat*, I would suggest, Reitz perhaps continues to view as a key motivation of the Nazis' the desire (as articulated by Fassbinder) '''to eliminate that which one did not want to acknowledge in one's own person'''. In constructing ''split selves'', Reitz may intend to combat the highly dangerous psychological manoeuvre of projecting one's own faults on to others – one should rather, Reitz perhaps means to suggest, acknowledge in one's self the perpetrator role rather than projecting it onto a scapegoat and then seeking to use the scapegoating process to eliminate that scapegoated other in the attempt to purify oneself of a fault of one's own that one has disavowed (as per Lucie's and Eduard's disavowal according to Gabriel's aforementioned reading of the first *Heimat*). Accepting one's dual status as good and bad, in some part victim and in some part perpetrator is something that Reitz probably aims to encourage in the hope that such an attitude will acts as a decent barrier against feelings of self-righteous superiority that might otherwise threaten to allow a conscience to justify the dangerous treatment of others as inferior, as profoundly less deserving than oneself, as per the Nazis' treatment of many groups.

Reitz's eagerness to unite perpetrator and victim may well stem in part from a desire to promote the flow of empathy from perpetrator to victim: if the perpetrator sees the victim as part of a shared wider human self, then perhaps feelings of empathy will arise in the perpetrator, with pity and mercy following in turn. But the bond that Reitz suggests between perpetrator and victim (especially but far from exclusively via his Esther-Reinhard ''split self'') is probably intended to work both ways: Reitz probably intends to promote feelings of empathy towards figures viewed particularly as perpetrators (whether his characters or real people such as non-persecuted Germans of the National Socialist era); as in the first *Heimat*, Reitz pleads for empathy, potential parent of forgiveness, on

behalf of the figure of the perpetrator. If a criticism of a form of scapegoating – of the urge to destroy in another what one does not want to have in one's self (to adapt Fassbinder's remark as cited above) – is intended by Reitz's enthusiasm for combining the figures of perpetrator and victim in ''split selves'', then something of a seeming contradiction emerges: Reitz appears to be criticising the scapegoating process by rejecting the ''false projection'' (to return to Gabriel's summation of Adorno and Horkheimer's argument [2004: 184]) of one's frustrating imperfections onto scapegoats embodied by selves perceived to be other to one's own self; meanwhile, Reitz himself, I have argued, seeks to use a scapegoating process (particularly in the Ansgar narrative but also to an extent with Reinhard) in order to exorcise Germany's ghosts, to purify Germany in the decades after National Socialism. Reitz definitely denounces the scapegoating of Apollonia in the first *Heimat* and may partly aim his ''split selves'' against a form of scapegoating in the second series, but the form of scapegoating in these instances is different to the one that Reitz himself employs with regard to Ansgar and Reinhard: in the former cases, the scapegoating concerns the real, historic, genocidal scapegoating that the Nazis perpetrated against those whom they imagined to be social threats that needed to be purged; in the latter instances, Reitz engages in a far less sinister type of scapegoating – his use of Ansgar and Reinhard as scapegoats involves sacrificial deaths that are only fictional, and this latter form of scapegoating that Reitz explores is not genocidal. There remains, however, some degree of irony that Reitz – as Gabriel has demonstrated (2004) – is opposed to the pursuit of German national purification in the first *Heimat* but is eager, I would argue, to ritually purify Germans in the second *Heimat*. This somewhat self-contradictory approach to scapegoating is not, perhaps, confined to Reitz but rather a characteristic of many Germans: Moses argues that the sacrifice of scapegoats has been essential to both National Socialism and then also to German ''stigma management'' after National Socialism, writing that ''whereas for the Nazis the Jews were stigmatized and considered unclean, polluting German blood'', later it is ''the former Nazis and nationalists'' – ''who contaminate the new republic'' – ''who are stigmatized'' in the hope that ''Germany can emerge phoenix-like from the ashes […] by its ritual purification through cathartic

expulsion or banishment of ex- and neo-Nazis'' (2007ii: 160). Moses' phrase ''ritual purification through cathartic expulsion'' is undoubtedly a description that can be applied to Reitz's scapegoating process and its aims in *Die zweite Heimat*, although a noteworthy difference is that Reitz's scapegoat Ansgar is not any sort of Nazi – rather Reitz prefers a scapegoat innocent of that evil so that Reitz is able to portray his scapegoat's suffering as undeserved (allowing him to appeal to viewers' pity in accordance with an Aristotelean model of pity) and to portray his non-Jewish German scapegoats as victims (which draws a stark contrast between them and the post-National-Socialist German scapegoats referred to by Moses as ''ex- and neo-Nazis'' [ibid.]). Reitz accepts that the genocidal scapegoating carried out by the Nazis has led to Germans experiencing what Moses calls an ''intergenerational transmission of moral pollution'' (2007ii: 142), and, while criticising the Nazis' all too real scapegoating, Reitz feels a need to carry out a fictional scapegoating of Ansgar and Reinhard in order to bring a halt to ''intergenerational transmission of moral pollution'' in his fictional Germany – which explains why Reitz chooses as his preferred scapegoats two characters who have no children. Ansgar and Reinhard have no heirs to burden with an ongoing familial chain of such pollution, while the sacrificial aspect of their deaths is meant to lift the polluting curse by appeasing the supernatural powers that seem to wreak vengeance on the young Germans of *Die zweite Heimat* as a result of the appalling misdeeds of so many of their parents. While in his perpetrator-victim ''split selves'' Reitz strongly acknowledges the existence of the figure of the perpetrator in the German national self that has evolved over the course of history, his fairly elaborate enactment of scapegoating ritual in relation to Ansgar and Reinhard indicates that Reitz is at the same time unable to resist attempting to use his fiction to alleviate the burden of German national self-knowledge relating to National Socialism – as in the first *Heimat*, Reitz is thoroughly torn between acknowledging and exorcising the long-haunting guilt of so many Germans during National Socialism.

Throughout the cycle Reitz rejects notions of racial purity and superiority with reassuring firmness and consistency, but his pursuit of purification, redemption for (non-persecuted) Germans and their descendants is a quest for national moral purification (carried out particularly by means of sacrificial

characters) that at times threatens to overshadow his acknowledgement of the evils of the Nazis' differing notions of purifying Germany. A problem with Reitz's combination of Esther and Reinhard in a victim-perpetrator ''split self'' is that the moral parity that this may imply is so inappropriate to the two characters in relation to the family histories that define them in their own eyes and in viewers' eyes; considering Esther's and her murdered mother's experiences, it is dangerously misleading of Reitz to suggest that Reinhard can lay any claim to equality in victimhood with Esther in their ''split self''.

Reitz perpetrator-victim ''split self'' is intended as both the acknowledgement and attempted diminution of German culpability in one: on the one hand, Reitz inclines towards suggesting that it is normal to be – as he says of himself – ''liebenswert und hassenswert in einem'' (no date [1981]: 141), meaning that Germans are morally normal on a collective level, rather than collectively tainted to an internationally abnormal degree by the legacy of National Socialism; on the other hand, Reitz at least rejects the rejection of perpetration as a key background to his German characters' understanding of their position in their national history. In Moses' view, in the wake of National Socialism ''the majority of Germans'' ''maintain the conventional core self and its attachments to parents and Germany by denying that the group self ought to be stigmatized'', which is a ''rhetoric of normality'' that ''reflects a desire for national innocence – the end of stigma – so that the collective self ('we Germans') can become a nontraumatized component of the self'' (2007ii: 154). Reitz portrays Reinhard and Ansgar as both victim and perpetrator (Ansgar in terms of his markedly abusive treatment of Olga and Reinhard for reasons to be discussed below) and repeatedly alludes to texts (such as *Blowup*) that firmly renounce dichotomous approaches to perpetration and victimhood or good and evil, and Reitz thereby avoids the self-exonerating model of German views of the self that Moses describes above: instead of proposing for Germans the ''nontraumatized'' form of ''self'' and ''end of stigma'' referred to by Moses, Reitz indicates that, due to their national history, the stigma of perpetration must be seen as inseparable from the selves of his German characters. Nonetheless, Reitz also pursues a ''rhetoric of normality'', as per Moses' model, but a

different one, a rhetoric that defines the German Holy Grail of a sense of moral normality relative to other nations in terms of the normality of occupancy (or, in the case of Ansgar's and Reinhard's generation, inheritance) of a perpetrator role: by insisting on the coexistence of perpetration and victimhood in one self Reitz pursues what Brockmann (as cited in my introduction) categorises as ''the *tu quoque* […] defense'' (2006: 26) that is aimed at making Germans appear less morally abnormal in relation to other nations in the wake of National Socialism. Everyone is in part perpetrator and in part victim, Reitz implies with his characterisation and choice of allusions, and this circumstance is meant to indicate in turn that Germans, despite National Socialism, should not be viewed as a nation stigmatised to an abnormally great extent.

Seifert cites Reinhard's quotation of the lines by Grillparzer that I quote above (1999: 329), and sees in Reitz's treatment of Esther and Reinhard an instance of ''Verschmelzungsutopien'' (ibid.: 331), in which Jewish people and (non-Jewish) Germans come together and which, she argues, Reitz constructs ''als tödliche Gefahr'' (ibid.: 332). Katharina von Bülow has also criticised Reitz's treatment of Esther for the assimilation of non-Jewish Germans and Jewish victims, writing that ''la rédemption du peuple allemand ne passera sans doute par l'intégration ‹‹ anecdotique ›› de tel ou tel destin juif isolé dans la vie de l'ensemble d'une generation'' (1993: 172). Von Bülow also points out the assimilation process inherent in Esther's parentage, commenting that it is ''une impossibilité […] intégrer dans la chronique d'une ‹‹ jeunesse allemande ›› l'histoire d'une victime, telle Esther, fille d'une juive et un père SS, sans frôler la caricature ou l'indécence'' (ibid.).[97] Esther's parentage does indeed assimilate victimhood and perpetration into one self, herself, so that she is, in a sense, a child of both poles of the good versus evil of the victim-perpetrator dichotomy. The Grillparzer lines that Reinhard recites can thus in a sense be applied to Esther on her own as well as to the Reinhard-Esther ''split self'': ''halb gut und halb übel geboren''. Nonetheless, despite being Gattinger's

[97] In the same vein, von Bülow also suggests that Reitz wants ''marier […] son désir de s'affranchir d'un passé, celui des juifs assassinés inassimilable au sien mais dont il ne pouvait faire abstraction, comme, si sommé par le monde, cet ailleurs des vainquers et des victims, quelque chose s'interposait subrepticement entre lui et cette patrie qu'il désirait tant reconstituer et restituer à une jeunesse a-topique'' (1993: 170).

daughter, Esther's Jewishness is the aspect of her heritage that is emphasised, as illustrated by Reinhard's attitude towards her and the reference to Queen Esther in her name. Even so, the nature of Esther's heritage is certainly significant as an instance of the union of perpetrator and victim.

There is a question of purity in the contrast that Reitz draws between Ansgar's father as anti-vampire and Reinhard and Esther as characters who, one way or another, take each other's lives and exchange elements of their identity. Ansgar's dislike of his father is triggered especially by the former being, Ansgar says, a ''Heuchler''. Discussing the first *Heimat*, Barbara Gabriel argues that ''*Heimat*'s over-arching thematics […] is a critique of purity […]'' (2004: 152); the context of this critique is the ''National Socialist mythos of purity'' (2004: 186). I contend that the theme of purity is also of great importance in Die zweite Heimat. Ansgar criticises his father on the basis that the latter claims it undeservedly. Reitz constructs the Esther-Reinhard relationship as a story of impurity, in which a perpetrator-victim dichotomy is destabilised and characters associated with perpetration and victimhood (both associated with both) are constructed as a ''split self'' that, rather than being pure, is, as per Grillparzer's poem, ''Halb gut und halb übel''. Purity was of course a National Socialist obsession. As I note earlier, Esther and Reinhard's intimate relationship would obviously be considered the gravest of threats to national purity. Seen in that light, a coming together of a Jewish and a non-Jewish character is an assault on the catastrophic National Socialist obsession with purity. Viewed as an opposite of a National Socialist take on purity, the amalgamation of Esther and Reinhard as an impure ''split self'' appears very positive.[98] Reitz's dislike of the notion of purity extends, however, beyond National Socialist understandings of it, and in *Die zweite Heimat* this dislike leads him to challenge also the notion of firm distinctions between perpetrator and victim in the understanding of National Socialism, since they too entail a purity that is necessary to keep the two categories separate. This sort of purity is very evident in the sort of perpetrator-victim

[98] In her discussion of the theme of purity in the first *Heimat*, Gabriel discusses how Reitz shows the absurdity of the ''hygienic myths of National Socialism'' (2004: 167), noting, for instance, that ''Wilfried […] unwittingly exposes the whole fiction of racial purity'' (ibid.).

dichotomy that Moeller refers to as one in which ‘‘innocent victims speak an unassailable truth and guilty perpetrators can never have any claims to victim status’’ (2005: 177). As Gabriel shows, Reitz undermines the concept of purity in the first *Heimat* for an admirable reason: to attack National Socialist notions of purity (2004). In *Die zweite Heimat*, however, the attack becomes problematic because it threatens to excessively undermine the distinction between those whose relationship with National Socialism was principally one of complicity and those whose relationship to National Socialism overwhelmingly involved their victimhood at its hands.

Questioning the Possibility of Culpability

‘‘Man hat eine zweite Heimat, in der alles, was man tut, unschuldig ist’’, reflects Ulrich in Musil’s *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* (1978: 119). Ulrich’s ‘‘zweite Heimat’’ appears to be an internal mental space in which one tends to arrive at self-satisfying moral judgements, and Reitz’s Hermann likewise links the search for a ‘‘zweite Heimat’’ to a quest for moral autonomy (and thus, by implication, deliverance from the potentially unwelcome moral conclusions of others): Hermann declares, ‘‘endlich entschied ich allein, was gut war oder böse, […] was erlaubt sein musste and was vielleicht verboten war. […]. Ich zog aus und suchte meine zweite Heimat’’ (2:1: 14:25). Palfreyman has pointed out that Musil’s novel is a major influence on *Die zweite Heimat* (2000: 205-207), and discusses its influence in terms of the characterisation of Hermann and Clarissa as a ‘‘split self’’ in relation to art and gender (ibid.: 207). I would add that Musil’s novel is one of the intertexts present in *Die zweite Heimat* that are greatly concerned with questions of culpability. When he sees a drunk being arrested for making imprudent remarks, Ulrich believes ‘‘daß dieser Mensch in seinem Zustand nicht imstande sei, eine Beleidigung zu begehen’’ (1978: 157). Ulrich’s willingness (in some of the novel at least) to accept lack of control as defence against justifiable blame extends much further; he is markedly sympathetic towards Moosbrugger, a horrifically violent misogynistic murderer. Ulrich says of Moosbrugger and the horrendous crime that he committed, ‘‘er kann nichts dafür’’ (ibid.: 86). Reitz’s idea of a perpetrator-victim, good-evil ‘‘split self’’ seems likely to be

influenced by concepts in *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* such as Ulrich's declaration that ''niemand für seine Fehler kann, wenn man sie mit seinen eigenen Augen betrachtet; sie sind für ihn […] Irrtümer oder schlechte Eigenschaften an einem Ganzen, das ihrethalben nicht weniger gut wird, und natürlich hat er vollkommen recht!'' (ibid.: 262). Ulrich is described (by Walter) as believing that ''alles ist […] Teil in einem Ganzen'' (ibid.: 65). Reitz has written longingly of ''Gefilden der Kindheit, in denen man […] war […] ungetrennt vom Ganzen und ohne individuelle Moral Teil einer Gemeinschaft!'' (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 327). This remark is from Reitz's defence of Walser, so it makes sense to see Reitz's nostalgia for childhood innocence in relation to German culpability in relation to National Socialism, and in the remark Reitz comes close to the behaviour that Moses describes thus: ''maintain[ing] the conventional core self and its attachments to […] Germany by denying that the group self ought to be stigmatized'' as a result of National Socialism (2007ii: 154). Reitz's comment confines such grounds for innocence to childhood, however; the comment is, nonetheless, symptomatic of Reitz's longing for exoneration of the German national self with regard to National Socialism. In portraying characters as ''split selves'', containing good to neutralise the evil, and as members of a wider social whole Reitz does battle with the concept of there being people who can justly be defined as individually bad. In fighting back against the burden bequeathed to the consciences of young Germans of *Die zweite Heimat* by their parents Reitz shows signs of being very strongly tempted to question whether good and evil are separable from one another.

Yet another film relevant to Reinhard and Esther is Alexander Kluge's *Abschied von Gestern* (1966).[99] Reitz writes in the book version of *Die zweite Heimat* that ''Reinhard ist […] zurückgekommen, und […] findet […] seine Freunde, eine ganze Jugend vor, die sich von einem ››Gestern‹‹ verabschiedet'' (1993: 689). Admittedly, this comment applies to a point in a scene at which, Reitz writes, ''ertönt

[99] Johannes von Moltke refers to *Abschied von Gestern* in connection with *Die zweite Heimat*, but without suggesting directly that Kluge's film has any bearing on Esther and Reinhard. Von Moltke writes of *Abschied von Gestern* and *Die zweite Heimat*: ''the film [*Die zweite Heimat*] chronicles the structural traumas of adolescence […] in a manner evocative of the idiosyncratic historical materialism of Kluge's project [….] *Lebensläufe* […. which] contained the narrative that would form the basis for *Abschied von Gestern*'' (2003: 131).

das Beatles-Lied ››Yesterday‹‹'' (ibid.). Nonetheless, it seems likely that Reitz has *Abschied von Gestern* in mind as well as the Beatles. Strikingly, 1966 is the year of Reinhard's death and also of the appearance of *Abschied von Gestern*, which – just like Reinhard – made its way to Venice (more precisely, the 1966 Venice Film Festival). Additionally, the central character of Kluge's film is a German Jewish woman of much the same age as Esther. Furthermore, Reitz was very heavily involved in making *Abschied von Gestern*. He is credited for camerawork on the film, and in an interview of Kluge by Reitz Kluge describes Reitz as a driving force behind *Abschied von Gestern*: ''ein Film, den ich nie alleine hätte machen können. Du, meine Schwester [who plays the lead role] und ich, das war ein Dreieck. […]. Das war eine kollektive Arbeit'' (Kluge in Reitz, 1995: 81). *Abschied von Gestern* has an interest in the question of culpability, an interest that, as in *Die zweite Heimat*, accompanies material regarding Jewish people and National Socialism and its legacy. The question of culpability – or perhaps rather an answer to it – has the final say, indeed, in *Abschied von Gestern*, since the film ends with the title: '''jeder ist an allem schuld, aber / wenn das jeder wüßte, / hätten wir das Paradies auf Erden'''. In his reading of *Abschied von Gestern* J. C. Franklin identifies those words as a citation of Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* (Franklin, 1979: 98). The cited statement, with its universal collectivisation of guilt, undermines the basis for moral distinctions, such as between good and bad or perpetrator and victim. Esther appears to be in part a version of Anita G., the Jewish woman in *Abschied von Gestern*, and the quotation from *Crime and Punishment* forms an objectionable commentary on Anita G.'s moral status: the quotation, in this context, effectively suggests that Anita and other Jewish people share in the blame for the Holocaust and bar non-Jewish Germans' way to ''Paradies auf Erden'' by failing to acknowledge that ''jeder ist an allem schuld'' (ibid.). Like his allusions to *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, *Doktor Faustus* and the Book of Esther, Reitz's revisiting of *Abschied von Gestern* constitutes an engagement with texts that have, in Reitz's view, potential to be interpreted as suggesting defences against the moral responsibility of individuals. Also, there is a debate in *Die zweite Heimat* as to whether or not it is right for Olga to play Esther in the film version of her life. Perhaps Reitz had the casting of Anita G., the Jewish

woman in *Abschied von Gestern*, in mind. Anita G. is played by Alexandra Kluge, who, along with her brother of course, is not Jewish. The question of who has the right to write, direct and act Jewish stories is, as discussed earlier here, a major concern in the story of Esther and Reinhard.

Issues surrounding rights over particular experiences are also highly prominent in another film to which Reitz nods via a poster, namely *Hiroshima mon Amour* (and Reitz has made an intriguing comment about Hiroshima [see Reitz as cited in Kaiser, 2001: 88]). Esther's comments on concentration camps bear comparison to comments made by the heroine around the beginning of *Hiroshima mon Amour*, and the film is relatable to *Heimat* in a number of ways. One similarity between Resnais's film and the *Heimat* cycle is a very deliberate overlapping of the figures of perpetrator and victim. However unjustly (she does not appear to have lent any meaningful aid to the Nazis as far as the viewer knows), the heroine of *Hiroshima mon Amour* is considered by many of her compatriots to have been a collaborator, associating her with a perpetrator role. At the same time, she is the victim of severe trauma that she has experienced personally, while she is determined to channel the trauma of those at Hiroshima.

As previously mentioned Seifert notes ''Reitz' ››Faszination von Ambivalenzen‹‹'' (1999: 332), but finds that the martyrdom associations surrounding Reinhard point unequivocally to a presentation of him as victim. She argues that, although Esther ''besteht auf dem Recht zu einer komplexeren Identität'' regarding ''das allegorische Täter-Opfer-Verhältnis'', Reinhard ''versucht […] in seinem Drehbuch, Klarheit und Eindeutigkeit zu schaffen'' and Esther ''nimmt […] die Identität an, die ihr Reinhard im Drehbuch anbietet (››mein Gutes ohne Würde, das Böse ohne Gewalt‹‹)'' (1999: 329). In my view, Reitz's interpretation of the Grillparzer poem from which Reinhard quotes (as cited by Seifert above) in fact revolves around the lines ''Halb gut und halb übel geboren'' and ''wie du bin ich einer der halb'', and both halves are in themselves half good, half evil, which is why ''Gutes'' can be without ''Würde'' – because the line rejects automatically placing qualities with generally positive associations (exemplified by ''Würde'') automatically in a category defined as good, preferring rather

to conceive of qualities straddling a division into good and bad. In Reitz's reading of the poem, I think, the first person voice that identifies as one half of a whole describes itself, addressing the other half, as being ''wie du'' because both halves are alike in that they are half good and half evil, each capable of possessing ''Gutes ohne Würde'' or ''Böse ohne Gewalt''. Reitz undermines (as well to as an extent supporting) Reinhard's status as martyr. There could scarcely be any greater contrast than that between Reinhard's relationship with Trixie and, on the other hand, Jesus and the Virgin Mary, even though Reinhard apparently also quits the world without leaving behind a body, dies at the same age as Jesus and has his death foreshadowed by a poster referring to the Assumption of the Virgin Mary. Reinhard's relationship with Trixie casts him as an anything but saintly character: Reitz describes her as ''ein etwa fünfzehnjähriges Mädchen'' wearing a ''Bluse […], die zwei riesige Brüste verbirgt'' (1993: 690); and Reinhard is slow to discourage her amorous interest in him. This circumstance poses a question as to whether the purity contained in Reinhard's name is ironic. Are we meant to read the bizarre contrast between the religious model and the *Heimat* retelling of it as an irreverent parody? Despite Reitz at times supporting Reinhard's casting of himself as martyr, it seems highly likely that Reitz also casts doubt on Reinhard's martyrdom.

In his construction of Reinhard as saint and sinner Reitz seems likely to be drawing on Thomas Mann's *Doktor Faustus*. Palfreyman has demonstrated that Mann's novel is a source for *Die zweite Heimat* (2000: 193-197).[100] Besides the indications of Mann's influence mentioned by Palfreyman, there are several aspects of *Doktor Faustus* that have a bearing on my reading of *Die zweite Heimat*. For instance, Zeitblom, Mann's narrator, recounts that the artist-Faust figure, Leverkühn, likened himself to ''Johanni Martyr im Ölkessel'', imagining ''siedendes Öl, worin ich andächtig sitze'' (2007: 514-515). Making reference to Christian martyrdom in texts that engage heavily with National Socialism is thus a similarity that *Doktor Faustus* and *Die zweite Heimat*, share. Another striking

[100] More briefly, David Cooper discusses a possible link between Mann's Leverkühn and Reitz's Hermann, suggesting that the latter's vow not to love again can be related to that of Mann's character (2018: no pagination).

similarity between Reinhard and Leverkühn is that both are afflicted by headaches (Zeitblom tells of Leverkühn's ''Neigung zur Migräne'' [ibid.: 38]). Zeitblom refers, in connection with Leverkühn's suicide attempt, to ''eine mystische Rettungsidee […], daß Teufelsbeschwörer allenfalls ihre Seele zu retten vermöchten, indem sie den ››Leib darangäben‹‹'' (ibid.: 735), and the idea of sacrificing the body in pursuit of salvation appears also to be at work in Reitz's approach to Reinhard's death, in which Reinhard's body vanishes, as if taken up by the heavens as an accepted sacrifice. Reflecting on the state of Germany in the wake of National Socialism, Zeitblom asks, ''wann wird […] ein Wunder […] das Licht der Hoffnung tragen?'' (ibid.: 738). Like Zeitblom, in the Reinhard narrative Reitz sees a need for a miraculous redemption of Germany.

Zeitblom describes Leverkühn's lifestyle as monastic, referring to his ''klösterlich-ländliche Abgeschiedenheit'' (ibid.: 497) and to Leverkühn living ''in mönchischem Détachement von Liebesdingen'' (ibid.: 435), while Leverkühn's handwriting is described as ''eine[…] Mönchsschrift'' (ibid.: 323). Zeitblom's narration endows Leverkühn with an air of saintliness so that saint and sinner are paired within the same central character in Mann's Faustian narrative. Mann refers to saintliness as well as sin, to heaven as well as hell – as per *The Divine Comedy*, which he quotes at the beginning of his novel (ibid.: 9) and to which Leverkühn refers in conjunction with a reference to hell (ibid.: 517). Just as saintliness and damnation are strikingly close in Mann's novel, perpetration and victimhood are placed together by Reitz in ''split selves''. There is a Faust narrative within a Faust narrative in the form of the fictional Faust created by Leverkühn himself, and Leverkühn's character, Zeitblom's narration reports, ''sterbe, sagt er, als ein böser und guter Christ'' (ibid.: 706). Of the musical Faust narrative created by Leverkühn, Zeitblom comments that there is a ''substanzielle Identität des Seligsten mit dem Gräßlichsten, die innere Einerleiheit des Engelkinder-Chors mit dem Höllengelächter'' (ibid.: 705). Reitz alludes, then, to a work featuring a leading character who contains two opposites in one self and appears to defy any remotely neat distinction between good and evil, and the references to saintliness suggest that Leverkühn's character influences Reinhard's.

I have argued that Ansgar is an ill-fated tragic hero and noted that Reinhard is to a considerable extent similar to Ansgar. Mann described his character Leverkühn as ‘‘den tragischen Helden meines Romans’’ (cited in R. Wimmer [in Mann, 2007], 2007: 740). Reitz, as cited earlier in the chapter, has described the artist as a scapegoat who is (like Faust in some versions of his story) ‘‘verdammt’’ (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 329). As a German artist (a film-maker, like Reitz), Reinhard is presumably ‘‘verdammt’’ as such in Reitz’s view; at the same time, Reinhard is a saintly figure – he is good and evil, perpetrator and victim in one. Furthermore, both appear to have their fate sealed in Italy: Leverkühn first has (or imagines) an encounter with a diabolical figure in Italy, while Reitz writes in the book version that ‘‘Venedig ist Reinhards Schicksal geworden’’ (1993: 721). Leverkühn and Reinhard (and Ansgar) are alike also in that they are represented as victims of a cruel fate that seeks them out: the reader is told by Zeitblom in the very first sentence of Mann’s novel that Leverkühn’s story is that of a ‘‘vom Schicksal so furchtbar heimgesuchten […] Mannes’’ (2007: 11). The temptation to lay culpability at the door of fate seems likely to be a factor in Reitz’s enthusiasm for Mann’s *Doktor Faustus*. Leverkühn declares that ‘‘der Mensch zur Seligkeit oder zur Höllen geschaffen und vorbestimmt ist, und ich war zur Höllen geboren’’ (2007: 722). With Ansgar and Reinhard, Reitz suggests that they are predestined, born to suffer as a result of their German parentage; and, since they are apparently ‘‘zur Höllen geboren’’, Ansgar and Reinhard are implied to be innocent of bringing their destruction upon themselves by means of their own actions. While Reitz suggests that Ansgar’s and Reinhard’s father are guilty due to complicity in National Socialism, the victimhood generated by this parental culpability is shown falling on their children rather than the victims of the National Socialist period and the latter’s children; while Reitz allocates blame in the first *Heimat*, in the second he is attracted to a view of predestination – such as referred to by Leverkühn as cited above – that emphasises the notion that one’s acts tend to lie outside blameworthiness by virtue of being determined by the (mis)fortunes surrounding one’s birth.

As seen in the previous chapter, names in *Heimat* tend to be carefully chosen. Trixie (presumably being Beatrix in full) encourages the viewer to wonder in what way she is blessed.[101] The name seems to be ironic: later, after Reinhard's death, we see her boyfriend overwhelmed by a drug overdose, and, an addict herself, there is no indication that her life is on a good trajectory. Besides meaning *blessed* in origin, the similarity of Trixie's name to that of Dante's Beatrice suggests that Reitz may be making reference, like Mann in *Doktor Faustus*, to *The Divine Comedy* in his own discussion of art and National Socialism. Like *The Divine Comedy*, the story of Reinhard tours Heaven and Hell with its hints at martyrdom and allusions to the legend of Faust. The Reinhard narrative revolves heavily around the (im)possibility of redemption for Germany in the first few decades after National Socialism and around questions of moral responsibility, such as whether actions are ''vorbestimmt'', as Mann's Leverkühn claims (2007: 722).

Seifert has proposed that Reinhard, a film-maker like Reitz, is to some extent a self-portrait of Reitz (1999: 321). Reitz tends to portray Reinhard – just as Leverkühn portrays himself – as one who has been ''zur Höllen geboren'' (Mann, 2007: 722). This is also how Reitz portrays himself (and other German artists): as I have already noted in relation to Ansgar, Reitz argues that after National Socialism the German ''Künstler wird verdammt'' (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 329), a point confirmed by Reitz also regretting the fate of ''verteufelte Kollegen, die es wagten, ihr Heil in deutschen Gefühlen zu suchen'' (ibid: 328). Mann and Reitz both turn to the concepts of Heaven and Hell in order to understand German artists' predicament during or after National Socialism. For Reitz, Hell ironically represents a sort of salvation. The ''Heil'' that ''verteufelte'' German artists seek is actually to be found in damnation in a sense, in that being ''zur Höllen geboren'', as Leverkühn asserts of himself, offers the salvation of not necessarily appearing responsible for how one should

[101] There is an additional possible explanation: an inspiration for the name Trixie may be the name of a collaborator of Reitz's, Beate Mainka. (For a list of films in which she and Reitz were both involved, see Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 382, 383, 385-387, 390, 393.) Mainka, later Mainka-Jellinghaus, edited these films, which include *Abschied von Gestern*, which is particularly relevant to the Esther-Reinhard narrative. Trixie's sister edits Reinhard's film, so some sort of connection between Trixie and Beate Mainka is perhaps suggested. Nonetheless, the attraction to Reitz of a name meaning *blessed* surely lies to a very large extent in adding to the theme of (dubious) holiness surrounding Reinhard's death.

be judged due to having simply had one's status – damned or not – imposed by a higher power that renders one's own responsibility irrelevant. Reitz's Faust – a role in which he casts himself and Reinhard – appears to be a Faust who is born damned, a Faust whose faults are more his father's than his own, and who treads a tragic path ennobled by his own efforts as an artist to bear witness to his own suffering. A conception of Faust as sinner is not strongly foregrounded, but is not absent either – I will discuss below Reitz's hints that Reinhard is a dubious martyr. In any case, Reitz embraces Mann's narrator's concept of ''die innere Einerleiheit des Engelkinder-Chors mit dem Höllengelächter'' (2007: 705), preferring a Faust as sufferer to a Faust as sinner and emphasising an indivisibility of good and evil. In Mann's Faust narrative, National Socialism is a clear background to the concept of damnation, and Reitz strongly indicates that Reinhard's and Ansgar's problems go back to National Socialism, in relation to which a Faust who is saint as much as sinner, and presented as a victim of being predestined to make a *Faustpakt*, is deeply problematic. As Palfreyman has noted, a shared feature of *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, Mann's *Doktor Faustus* and *Die zweite Heimat* is an interest in Nietzschean ideas.[102] The philosopher is of course famous for looking *Beyond Good and Evil* (from which I have already cited [2003]), as one of his well-known titles goes.

Greatness in Evil

Lisa Hopkins comments that ''if Germany is Hamlet, then at least it is a country where even failure can have a tragic grandeur and bear the marks of nobility and aspiration'' (2014: 37)**.** Ansgar and Reinhard are in some respects failures, but in depicting their failures (although Ansgar is perhaps a success as a scapegoat in Reitz's eyes) Reitz draws on the power of some exceptionally potent works to help make *Die zweite Heimat* a success. In the first *Heimat* there seem to be echoes of the great dramas of Faust and Oedipus (more specifically, Goethe's and Sophocles' versions of them

[102] Linking the ''Janus motif'' to ''the Nietzschean idea of the relationship between opposites'', Palfreyman points out that ''the Janus motif is […] important in both Mann and Robert Musil'', including ''*Doktor Faustus* […] and *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*'', and applicable to ''Reitz's film as well as to the [aforementioned] novels he invokes in his text'' (2000: 205). See also, for instance, Herbert W. Reichert, 1966 on the very strong influence of Nietzsche on *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* and, on Nietzsche and Mann's *Doktor Faustus*, John C. Blankenagel, 1948.

respectively) as well as *Hamlet*. The second series returns to Faust (but Thomas Mann's this time) and *Hamlet* as it grapples with National Socialism and its legacy. Nietzsche declares that ''the great epochs of our life are the occasions when we gain the courage to rebaptize our evil qualities as our best qualities'' (2003: 97 [116]). Condemning National Socialism as murderous, incestuous madness is an admirably strong rejection of it, but at the same Reitz thereby elevates complicit characters in the first series. Lucie and Eduard, for instance, do not appear merely in the light of brothelkeeper and clown because the seriousness of the evil in which they become complicit forces reasonable viewers to see them also in a very serious light. Eduard's status is thus elevated from that of occasional comic interlude to serious villain, allowing him to take a turn on the grand stage of tragedy, almost in an inversion of another Nietzschean maxim: ''around the hero everything becomes a tragedy'' (ibid.: 102 [150]) – around such tragedy even Eduard acquires the sort of gravity and dignity associated with a hero (for instance, when covering his eye in remembrance of Hänschen).

Reinhard's martyrdom as a result of his attempt to tell a story about the Holocaust comes to be predominantly about German victimhood (although Reitz is at least somewhat, perhaps even heavily, critical of Reinhard). Reitz's devotion of so much energy to showing the suffering of Ansgar and Reinhard and his lionisation of Ansgar for rejecting National Socialism are relatable to Henryk Broder's following comment on ''den deutschen Sündenstolz'' (a term describing some German attitudes to National Socialism in recent times), which Broder defines in the following terms: ''wir sind die größten Verbrecher und auch die größten Sünder. Die Art, wie wir Reue leisten, entspricht der Größe unseres Verbrechens'' (2003: 9). The grandeur (achieved partly via allusions) with which Reitz endows Ansgar's and Reinhard's deaths elevates characters who are victims of the legacy of National Socialism, but not so much those who were victims of deliberate persecution at the hands of the Nazis. To apply Broder's above remark to *Die zweite Heimat* in adapted form, Reitz reflects the ''Größe'' of the offence in the ''Reue'' that Ansgar and Reinhard ''leisten'', rather than in the representation of the suffering of those persecuted by the Nazis. Nietzsche suggests that ''a

criminal's lawyers are seldom artists enough to turn the beautiful terribleness of the deed to the advantage of him who did it'' (2003: 97 [110]). Reitz does not attempt to ''turn'' the ''Größe'' or ''terribleness'' of National Socialism ''to the advantage'' of the Nazis, but he has the artistry to draw on the ''terribleness'' of the acts of the generation of Ansgar's and Reinhard's parents in order to repurpose that ''terribleness'' to assert (as per the wider tendency that Broder is commenting on) the ''Größe'' of Reinhard's and Ansgar's penitence.

Reinhard and the Figure of the Father

Besides discussing *Maria Stuart*, Trixie also alludes to another of Schiller's dramas: *Don Carlos*. Like Ansgar and many Germans of his generation, Schiller's Don Carlos has an extremely troubled relationship with his father. Trixie's reference to *Don Carlos* points to a play in which the eponymous hero says to a friend: ''Sprich mir von allen Schrecken des Gewissens, / Von meinem Vater sprich mir nicht''; ''Schauer / Und Missetäters Bangigkeit ergreifen / Bei diesem fürchterlichen Namen mich'' (1965: 15 [I:II: 304-308]). *Don Carlos* has a distinct resonance for Reitz's depiction of the German 1960s generation whose parents were in many cases to varying degrees complicit in National Socialism. Yet Carlos protests that, nonetheless, ''Ich hasse meinen Vater nicht'', an attitude akin to that of Reinhard towards his father, who likewise admits his father's appalling failings but claims not to hate him, agreeing with Esther that his father was a murderer but adding, ''aber lieb''.[103] It seems possible that Reitz gravitates towards *Don Carlos* also because *Heimat* shares with it interlinking interests in culpability, fate and sacrifice – as shown by Schiller's drama containing phrases such as ''Es ist ein hartes Schicksal, aufgeopfert werden'' (ibid.: 19 [I:III: 454]), ''Wessen Schuld ist es?'' (ibid.: 25 [I:V: 616]) and ''Die traurige Zergliederung des Schicksals, / Dem Sie und ich gehorchen müssen?''

[103] A curious twist in Trixie's allusion to *Don Carlos*, however, is that she accuses Reinhard of playing the ''Großinquisitor'', to whom Don Carlos is abandoned by his father. Reinhard is undoubtedly himself a Don Carlos figure, haunted by his father's participation in the bombing of Guernica just as Don Carlos is troubled by his father's programme of religious persecution in the Low Countries. Like Don Carlos, Reinhard professes a desire to make amends for his father's failings. Yet in referring to *Don Carlos* Trixie casts Reinhard as a persecutor of herself. Reinhard, like so many others in the cycle, is thus suggested to be both perpetrator and victim in one. Trixie's interest in *Don Carlos* perhaps recalls that of the character Manuela in *Mädchen in Uniform* (Leontine Sagan, 1931), who is of a similar age to Trixie and plays Don Carlos in a school production.

(ibid.: 28 [I:V: 719-720]). The last of those phrases is not alone in its strong hint of fatalism: Carlos declares, ''Ich erwarte / Mein Schicksal – es sei Leben oder Tod'' (ibid.: 26 [I:V: 656-666]). This fatalistic emphasis on being to a significant degree at the mercy of fate also ties *Don Carlos* to Reitz's portrayal of Ansgar and Reinhard.

Don Carlos' father, the end of Schiller's drama suggests, effectively kills his son (as does Ansgar's father). The son is both a victim of painful knowledge of the father's guilt and ultimately killed by the father in the cases of both Don Carlos and Reinhard (since the cycle's process of supernatural punishment takes its toll on the latter due to paternal culpability). The allusion to *Don Carlos* serves a similar function to Ansgar's father being likened to the would-be filicide Abraham, and between them these allusions constitute a reversal of the story of Oedipus. (The story of Oedipus is itself connected to *Don Carlos* due to the strife between father and son and the son's sexual interest in his step-mother – see Otto Rank, 1912; and Hamlet, Oedipus and Don Carlos have all been compared to each other – see ibid.: 102 for a comparison of Hamlet and Don Carlos in relation to step-parents).[104] In the first *Heimat*, I have suggested in the previous chapter, Reitz acts somewhat like Oedipus himself while empathising with the, in many instances, (metaphorically) incestuous and murderous Germans of the National Socialist period who, in relation to Reitz, are a parental generation. Although in the story of Oedipus the parental generation (relative to Oedipus) does not precisely appear innocuous, since the father attempts to arrange Oedipus' death, Reitz, as I argue in the previous chapter, empathises strongly with characters in the first *Heimat* who are of roughly the generation of his own parents, portraying them as metaphorically blind and tortured victims as well as authors of dreadful acts – thus he casts the generation of his parents more as Oedipus figures than as the parents of Oedipus figures. The generation of Reitz's parents is not cast as filicidal in the first *Heimat*, but the father becomes a filicidal threat in *Die zweite Heimat*. As I have argued, in the first *Heimat* Reitz carries out a form of fictional patricide by giving Hermann, his fictional self, a

[104] For comparison of *Oedipus*, *Hamlet* and *Don Carlos*, see Rank, 1912 and Lorant, 1985.

Jewish father – the son kills the father (while Lucie kills her parents, albeit accidentally). In contrast, in *Die zweite Heimat* the dominant theme in the father-son relationship is the father killing the son. In *Die zweite Heimat* Reitz channels viewers' pity overwhelmingly towards the next German generation (his own generation and also those adjacent to it – Reitz was slightly older in the 1960s than Hermann and his friends), with that later generation now being positioned by Reitz to receive the lion's share of viewers' pity. Don Carlos' father, a king, and Abraham, the great patriarch, are, like Oedipus, males in dominant positions in which they exercise rule, and the old kings of Reitz's allusions in *Die zweite Heimat* are now firmly presented as villains rather than objects of pity (if Lisa Hopkins [2014] is right to see *Hamlet* in *Die zweite Heimat*, then there is yet another intertextual background featuring a king whose actions lead to the death of his heir). There is, then, a striking difference in how Reitz judges the generation of his parents in the first two series: when Reitz shows the National Socialist period in the first *Heimat*, he encourages viewers to pity as well as condemn the generation of his parents; when he shows the 1960s, he directs all pity overwhelmingly towards his own generation. What Reitz's approach to pity has in common in both series is that the intended objects of pity are those who are most obviously present – so, the generation of Reitz's parents in the first *Heimat* versus his own generation in the second. The generation of Reitz's parents is very much constructed as culpable in both series, but not also as pitiable when Reitz's own generation comes to the fore in the second series. Those who are absent or less prominent receive a significantly lower priority in each series, in terms of the extent to which Reitz constructs them as deserving of pity. Both the first and second series' focus on characters in the foreground, regarding Reitz's attempts to stimulate pity in viewers lends some support to Confino's contention, regarding the first *Heimat* that ''he constructs the image of twentieth-century German history in the image of his own experience. It is an image rooted in presentism'' (1998: 204). In my view Reitz intends viewers to be aware of those groups less obviously present throughout the cycle, but, as per my argument regarding the first series in the previous chapter, Reitz means viewers to pity those most obviously present most. The shift in how Reitz allocates pity over the first two series also suggests

that Reitz's moral judgement of his characters shifts depending on viewpoint (which largely shifts from the generation of his parents to his own in the transition from the first series to the second); this suggests in turn that Reitz views culpability as a matter of perspective, as subjective rather than objective. This focus on the subjective in relationship to culpability appears potentially dangerous in relationship to the Holocaust, a key background to both the first and second series. The objective status of the culpability of the Nazis (that is, objective relative to mainstream moral frameworks) does not seem to be wholly recognised by the subjective shifts in perspective that shape Reitz's willingness to construct the generation of his parents as pitiable. *Don Carlos* bears a similarity also to the first *Heimat* in that there are victims of persecution offstage and offscreen respectively: the Protestant victims of Carlos' father's religious intolerance are only ever referred to, whereas Don Carlos is a visible victim; victims of National Socialist persecution are overwhelmingly offscreen in the first *Heimat*, whereas non-persecuted Germans are visible potential objects of empathy. A problematic element of Reitz's reversal, murder-wise, of the narrative of *Oedipus* (in terms of the father killing, or being prepared to kill, the son in the case of Ansgar / Isaac and Reinhard / Don Carlos) is that, as I have also argued in relationship to the first *Heimat*, the most visible murders are kept within the families of Germans who were not persecuted under National Socialism (apparently Ansgar's father was not persecuted, despite being a Jehovah's Witness), which threatens to marginalise from Reitz's narrative of murder those who were persecuted under National Socialism.

## Conclusion

Ansgar and Reinhard are presented as victims of fate. The limited freedom that Ansgar and Reinhard are able to exercise is used to achieve what *Heimat* presents as heroic deaths. Reitz suggests that Reinhard is perpetrator and victim in one, rather than overwhelmingly the latter. Reinhard is accused of vampirism but portrayed as a victim as well as a perpetrator of vampirism, whereas Ansgar's father – as a Jehovah's witness, unable to take blood, either through spilling it or in a transfusion – can be termed the polar opposite of a vampire, passing the blood on his hand on to his

son. Ansgar's father refuses to accept guilt, while Reinhard in contrast accepts the bloody legacy of National Socialism. The lifeblood of Reinhard's script is Esther's story, but his actual life is taken by Esther and her vampiric, death-focused camera, so that the vampirism is a matter of mutual exchange.

The cohabitation of saint and sinner, perpetrator and victim in both of the two halves of the Reinhard-Esther ''split self'' plainly defies the drawing of clear moral divisions between two characters each constituting similarly good and evil halves. The moral judgment that this effect encourages is that both Reinhard and Esther are equally good and bad, equally guilty and innocent. Reitz's construction of Esther and Reinhard does not, then, I find, imply that Reinhard is innocent and Esther guilty – does not suggest that the perpetrator-victim relationship is simply reversed as Seifert argues. Reitz's Esther-Reinhard ''split self'' implies (at the least) a moral equality between a Holocaust survivor and a German film maker who was not persecuted during National Socialism but is troubled by guilt arising from the National Socialist legacy. Still, Reitz probably intends viewers to understand that Reinhard's fictional suffering cannot reasonably be viewed as counterbalancing the real suffering that the story of Esther and her mother fictionally reflects. Nonetheless, aspects of the representation of Esther are certainly very highly problematic. Ansgar and Reinhard are young Germans – more specifically, young German men whose fathers are (or, at least, are believed to have been, in Ansgar's case) complicit in National Socialism, and Reitz shows a great determination to portray them as heroes who nobly suffer under an inexorable and undeserved fate that they inherit. While Reitz (perhaps self-critically) hints that Reinhard can be viewed as a self-seeking, false martyr, Ansgar is celebrated as a noble tragic hero and scapegoat with potential to ritually alleviate his generation's suffering under the burden of the legacy of National Socialism.

## ***The Third Heimat*: Sacrifice, Containment and Legacies**

### Introduction

In *Heimat 3* Hermann and Clarissa are, in terms of characters, almost the only link to *Die zweite Heimat*, while the setting has shifted from Munich to the Hunsrück (but with a few excursions) and from the 1960s to the last decade of the twentieth century, ending in the early hours of the (by Christian reckoning) newly dawned millennium. In terms of location, although not time period, the third series thus appears closer to the first than to the second, and Reitz also revisits Hermann's half-brothers Ernst and Anton, major characters in the first *Heimat* who are absent from the second. Thematically, however, the third series is tied to the second as much to the first: key themes in both the second and third series include questions of inheritance – particularly with regard to the National Socialist legacy that Reitz constructs as a supernatural curse – and the theme of sacrifice, which, I will argue, Reitz uses to control the guilt echoing down from National Socialism. Reitz also manages that legacy of culpability by means of ''relativising'' Normalisation. I will conclude that Reitz visits punishment on Schabbach for National Socialism, sacrificing characters in the process, in the hope of propitiating and exorcising the ghosts haunting Germany and achieving closure in relation to the echoing evil of National Socialism in time for the end of the twentieth century.

*Heimat 3* has been discussed particularly in relation to globalisation and the evolution of Germany identity. Simone Costagli writes, ''zusammenfassend kann man das Thema der letzten vier Folgen unter dem Stichwort der ‚Verortung' der ‚Heimat' in der globalisierten Welt angeben'' (see also Galli,

2005: 233), and adds that ‘‘der Schwerpunkt auf der Frage nach dem ‚Erbe‘ der ‚Heimat‘ liegt’’ (2008: 243). In Roger Hillman’s view a major concern in the series is ‘‘Germany’s Europeanisation and globalisation of the ’90s’’ (2005: no pagination) (see also Alasdair King, 2011: 258 and an anonymous reviewer, 2004: 56). Besides reunification, Jedlowski also identifies as elements of *Heimat 3*’s exploration of identity its inclusion of immigrants to the Hunsrück, and notes the importance of family and inheritance (2009: 110). *Heimat 3*’s parallel exploration of the themes of family and heredity, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, national identity meet most closely in Matko, a victim of xenophobia as a refugee, and an object of envy because of the wealth he appears set to inherit.

My focus is on Reitz’s efforts to lay to rest the ghosts left by National Socialism that continue to haunt *Heimat 3*. I argue that, in order to exorcise these ghosts, Reitz turns to sacrifice – as in *Die zweite Heimat* – and also to forms of ‘‘relativising’’ Normalisation (to return to Olick’s model as cited in the introductory chapter). The sacrifices made tend to involve forms of art, and in *Heimat 3* Reitz grapples with the legitimacy and limitations of art as a medium through which to make his own peace and his nation’s peace with the National Socialist past. In my view Reitz retains an awareness of the ethically dubious status of attempts to lighten the burden, for descendants of Germans who were not persecuted under National Socialism, of the unwanted national inheritance of the National Socialist past; Reitz is indeed, I will argue, critical of Ernst’s attempts to use art to constrain the legacy of National Socialism. Nonetheless, Reitz also struggles – in vain at times time – to resist the urge to, somewhat like Ernst, avail himself of artistic means, particularly in relation to artistically meaningful, sacrificial deaths, to attempt to redeem Germany and open the gates to a more normalised, less guilt-conscious future Germany. Reitz additionally uses ‘‘relativising’’ Normalisation in his consideration of how Germany fits into the wider world (or at least the rest of Europe – in my view there is far more Europeanisation in *Heimat 3* than globalisation).

A major strand in Reitz's exploration of inheritance is constituted by allusions to the Nibelungen, centring around Ernst and Matko, a boy to whom he becomes emotionally attached and who appears to Ernst's heir in spirit. While a fateful legacy from National Socialism is a key force throughout *Heimat 3*, there are signs of this legacy beginning to peter out, creating space for a future in which Germany has become (at least significantly more) normal after the extreme moral abnormality of National Socialism and the sense of abnormality that the legacy of National Socialism conferred on the rest of the German twentieth century. Besides taking note of more time having elapsed since the National Socialist period (than is the case in the second series), generational change and indications of Normalisation as in Germany, Reitz, I argue, also pursues active Normalisation strategies (as discussed in my introductory chapter) in *Heimat 3*, with both ''relativising'' and ''ritualising'' elements.

Normalisation

The concept of Normalisation was a prominent topic in the period in which *Heimat 3* is set (more or less 1990-2000), as well as the years in which it was made (likewise about a decade, from 1994-2004).[105] Stuart Taberner's notes that the 1990s saw Normalisation ''become a much less controversial term'' (2002: 1), although he writes elsewhere that, more precisely, this process had to wait until the late 1990s and early 2000s to actually come to fruition: ''Schröder's government had made progress in an endeavour which, only four years earlier, had appeared […] controversial […]: this was its effort to make transparent and complete the process of German 'normalisation''' (2004: 6). *Heimat 3* very much emerged in a period of transition, a state of transition that applied to the concept of Normalisation as well as Germany more generally. As to the Normalisation of Normalisation itself, Taberner writes that ''Schröder's [first] government had made 'normal' the idea that Germany should strive to be just that – 'normal''' (ibid.). As Frank Brunssen notes, the

[105] According to the timeline in the volume *››Edgar Reitz erzählt‹‹* (apparently compiled by Koebner, but this is not made entirely clear), ''erste Recherchen'' for *Heimat 3* began in 1994 (Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 230). See ibid.: 230-234 for an account of *Heimat 3*'s progress up until 2000.

popularity of the concept of Normalisation in the 1990s is partly explained by ‘‘the fact that unification appeared to transform Germany into a more normal state’’ – or at least ‘‘that is, a state more similar to her European neighbours’’ (2002: 26). It has been widely remarked that unification is a key background to *Heimat 3*.[106] Describing Germany around the early 2000s, Pearce notes that ‘‘the importance of European integration and enlargement’’ are amongst the issues that figure ‘‘as reflections of a ‘special’ German responsibility ensuing from the Nazi past [that] frequently occur in speeches delivered as part of German historical commemorations’’ (2007: 81). German Normalisation and Europeanisation can be said to intertwine in reunified Germany, and also in Reitz’s representation of it. Roger Hillman notes the relevance to *Heimat 3* of ‘‘Germany’s Europeanisation and globalisation of the ’90s’’ (2005: no pagination), and implicitly refers to Normalisation in remarking that *Heimat 3* charts Germany’s ‘‘welcome back to the world stage’’ (2005: no pagination). Regarding Europeanisation, globalisation and normalisation I analyse the relevance of Matko, who points to conflict in the former Yugoslavia, in connection with normalisation by ‘‘relativisation’’.

Reitz remarks that the third series ‘‘erzählt wie unser Leben immer weniger deutsch wurde’’ and wonders whether the millennium will bring ‘‘ein Wunder […] das uns alle rettet’’ (2004i: 216). There is evidently an association in Reitz’s mind between the passing of time, redemption and what he identifies as a decline in German national specificity. Regarding globalisation, in his defence of Walser Reitz effectively points to globalisation as a liberator from German guilt. He writes that ‘‘In den 90er Jahren trat […] eine Generation von Filmemachern an’’ and claims they are ‘‘eine glückliche Jugend […], die gar keine deutschen Gefühle mehr kennengelernt hat und nun in der Lage ist, ihre heiteren Allerweltsgeschichten aller Welt erzählen zu können’’ (2008: 328). There are also other developments affecting the concept of Normalisation in the relevant period. Brunssen also comments that ‘‘ordinary Germans regarded the amalgamation of the two states as a psychological

[106] See Jedlowski, 2009: 109 and Cooke, 2012: 244-5. Galli agrees that reunification is the ‘‘motore e […] sfondo ai primi due film’’, but argues that the theme then fades away (2005: 233).

normalisation, since the division had often been understood as a kind of sentence or punishment for the War and the Holocaust'' (ibid.). I argue that Reitz too takes a particular interest in the aspect of Normalisation regarding the possibility that punishment for National Socialism can end or begin to end in the 1990s. Brunssen also sees this sense of new freedom as a companion to greater normality as a result of the radical political changes of the period, writing that ''the citizens of East Germany appeared to take their destiny into their own hands'' (ibid.: 25), and referring to the events of unification as ''acts of self-determination'' (ibid.). Elements of the 1990s concept of normalisation can thus be said to speak to Reitz's longstanding interest throughout the cycle in freedom of self-determination (and lack thereof) and punishment for National Socialism.

While the concept of normalisation in the 1990s evolved, the key background to Normalisation remained substantially the same: as Schmitz spells out, ''in these [1990s normalisation] debates the history of Nazi Germany and particularly the Holocaust figured as the prime obstacle to a desired national normality'' (Schmitz, 2007: 17). In some of *Heimat 3* Reitz is careful not to engage in the excessive forms of Normalisation efforts that are liable to attempt to overcome that ''prime obstacle'' by denying or downplaying the importance of remembering the gravity of National Socialism. For instance, I suggest that, even if Reitz is in some respects quite sympathetic towards Ernst, he is also critical of Ernst's attempts to escape this past. Ernst's legacy, which is so entangled with the National Socialist one, is another topical element of *Heimat 3*. As Annette Fuchs and Mary Cosgrove put it, ''the memory debates of the 1990s were characterized by a huge investment in the idea of generations, along with the scrutiny of generational conflict and transgenerational dialogue'' (2006: 2). Reitz's focus in *Heimat 3* on younger generations inheriting from parents and grandparents extends also to Anton and Hermann and their descendants, and involves plenty of conflict. I argue that Ernst attempts a Normalisation of his own, one that entails both a suppression of the memory of his complicity in National Socialism, and an attempt to secure for his legacy a transformation from perpetrator to victim via the generational change involved in his plans to make Matko his heir.

Ernst and the Nibelungen

Before turning to Ernst and Matko in *Heimat 3* it is necessary to go back to the first *Heimat* to trace the development of the Nibelungen hoard motif. Barbara Gabriel has noted ''key allusions to Wagner's Ring Cycle'' in the first *Heimat* (2004: 158), but does not discuss them in relation to Ernst. In the first *Heimat* a parallel is drawn between the treasure of the mythical *Nibelungen* and the wealth (in the form of art) that Ernst begins to accrue. Ernst himself first makes this link, referring to a ''Nibelungenhort'' (1:8: 01:26:03). This initial hoard consists of precious stones (1:8: 01:25:56), but by Heimat it has predominantly become an art collection. Commenting on *Heimat 3*, Roger Hillman points out ''elaborate allusions to Wagner's *Ring* – in script, original score, and images (above all the rainbow above the bridge to Ernst's/Alberich's lair as the Rhine floods)'' (2005: no pagination), with the flood being ''like […] the end of Götterdämmerung'' (ibid.). As Simone Costagli observes, ''mehrmals als Nibelungenhort genannt, erleidet die Sammlung ein Schicksal, das dieser Bezeichnung würdig ist'' in being stored in a mountain (by both Ernst and Alberich) and lost to an earthquake, and that ''als sich [Ernsts] Untergang nähert, wird der Nibelungenhort immer häufiger zitiert'' (2008: 243). To these observations can be added that by the end of *Heimat 3*, one of the Simons (Hermann's grandson Lukas) is almost trapped by the flood at the mountain in which the hoard is deposited (3:6: 56:50), almost echoing the eventual fate of one of their hoarding mythic counterparts according to the legend of Dietrich von Bern – the counterpart being trapped in the mountain (on Dietrich von Bern see, for instance, Magee, 2004: xxvi-xxvii for a brief account). Furthermore, the loss of the Simon hoard in the mountain matches one version of what Magee refers to as ''Legends of the Ring'' very closely indeed (the mountain treasure chamber becomes inaccessible in both instances).[107] The Alberich character in ''Legends of the Ring'' is dispossessed of their ring (or similar treasure), then curses the ring (or treasure), and their curse pursues whomsoever should subsequently possess the cursed item. In Wagner's Alberich's words: ''verflucht

[107] I borrow ''Legends of the Ring'' from Magee (2004) as a term of convenience for the various but related Germanic myths alluded to here.

sei dieser Ring […] nun zeug' sein Zauber Tod dem, der ihn trägt'' (scene four). Reitz's interest in the curse element of the story is demonstrated partly by a reference to it in *Die zweite Heimat*: Evelyne sings ''Flieh des Ringes Fluch'' (2:4: 36:23) as part of her musical training. There is a reason why the hoard is cursed.

Reitz indicates that the hoard is morally compromised, and uses it a means of discussing the evolution of the legacy of National Socialism. In *Heimat 3* Ernst hints at the origin of the hoard, linking its acquisition to ''der Zeit als man mit Kultur viel Geld verdienen konnt, weil durch den Krieg alles kaputtgegangen war'' (3:4: 01:15:06). Both the art collection's dual identity as symbolic *Nibelungenhort* and its tainted nature are hammered home when the (by then deceased) local innkeeper (appearing as a ghost or in a vision to Hermann) refers to the art as the ''Nibelungenhort'' (3:6: 47:00) and suggests that the art is being confiscated by the authorities (3:6: 47:30), the subtext presumably being that the authorities suspect the collection of containing works stolen from Jewish owners. There are in fact multiple reasons to suppose that at least some of Ernst's collection was acquired under morally dubious circumstances and includes, as King briefly refers to it, ''plundered art'' (2012: 110), even though this is not plainly stated. Fear of the legitimacy of his ownership being questioned would help to explain why Ernst is generally so secretive about the hoard and swears Tobi to silence when he does show it to him, explaining to Tobi that he fears ''Gerüchte'' about the collection (in the book version: Reitz, 2004i: 116). Ernst also tells Tobi, ''der verschollene Zigeunerjunge'' spent forty years in a cellar (2004ii: 115-116) and to Tobi's question as to how he acquired it Ernst replies only, ''das möchtest du wohl gerne wissen!'' (ibid.: 115). Reitz indicates, regarding Ernst's activities in the early post-war period, that ''Ernst hatte sich […] mit Schwarzhandel durchgeschlagen und damit seine Kunstsammlung begründet'' (2004ii: 440). A good indication that at least some items in the collection have passed through the Nazis' hands is provided by the presence of a painting by Otto Müller, one called ''Zigeunerjunge'', of which Ernst is particularly fond (and which I will return to later). Writing about the fate of Müller's art under National Socialism, Cor Hermans notes that in 1937 ''the Nazis had confiscated more than 350 of Mueller's works'' and that

‘‘at the 1937 Munich Entartete Kunst exhibition his colour lithographs of Roma were shown’’ (2017: 330). The presence at that infamous exhibition of paintings related to one in Ernst’s possession is at the very least suggestive as to the sort of people whom Ernst is likely to have been doing deals with in the acquisition of his hoard. Given that the Müller painting seems likely to have taken a highly unsavoury journey into Ernst’s possession, it seems reasonable to suppose that other pieces in his collection may well have been stolen from Jewish and other persecuted owners under National Socialism. The progress of Ernst’s hoard is thus a narrative of the after-effects of the misdeeds of the Nazis. Regarding the Müller painting Ernst has very possibly obtained under deeply dubious circumstances an artwork that has considerable historic importance as a painting used (or at least connected to painting used) by the Nazis for propagandistic purposes in their attempts to justify a world view that, within a few years’ time of the aforementioned 1937 exhibition, had led to the Holocaust. There is much at stake in Ernst’s *Nibelungenhort*, and Reitz uses Ernst’s hoarding as a symbolic vehicle to discuss the wider legacy of National Socialism.

As to the ownership of the stolen wealth bringing disaster to its unrightful possessor, Ernst’s death by crashing into a cliff meets the requirements of the legends. The cause-and-effect relationship between the hoarding and Ernst’s death in a plane crash is confirmed by Ernst’s announcement – back when he first refers to his *Nibelungenhort* – that he intends to use it to buy a plane. There is a curious irony in his words: ‘‘in 99 Jahren kauf ich mir davon ein Flugzeug und flieg weg’’ (1:8: 01:20:16). These words are addressed to his former commanding officer in the Luftwaffe of the Second World War, emphasising the nature of Ernst’s myth- and Wagner-inspired hoarding as a consequence of National Socialism, as Ernst’s attempt to channel the legacy of National Socialism into art. That an original intention underlying Ernst’s hoarding was also to generate the money necessary for him to regain the power of flight also suggests that he wishes to escape from the reality of postwar Germany. Instead of looking back on the appalling reality of National Socialism Ernst prefers, his remarks to his former officer indicate, to fantasise (he says, ‘‘in 99 Jahren kauf ich’’…). Ernst’s reaction to the reality of National Socialism is flight, both physical and intellectual,

and the myth of the *Nibelungenhort*, alongside physical flight, structures Ernst's attempts to suppress the full horror of his awareness of the evil of the regime that he served via an escapist pursuit of a mythical treasure. (While Ernst was doubtless conscripted and is not portrayed in any unequivocal way as being especially enthusiastic about National Socialism, in the first *Heimat* the viewer never sees him show the slightest reluctance to provide air cover that helped to enable genocide).[108] In exploring Ernst's *Nibelungenhort*, Reitz explores an approach to managing the burden of the National Socialist legacy.

The Nibelungen hoard: a Curse Inherited

The details of Ernst's death are unclear; it is very difficult to be sure as to whether or not he commits suicide. In Galli's view the rejection of the museum plan ''getta Ernst nella disperazione a tal punto che va a sfracellarsi […] contro la rupe della Loreley'' (2005: 231). Preusser, in contrast, attributes the crash to engine failure (2013: 204). I am inclined to agree with Alasdair King that the crash ''is filmed ambiguously so that the audience cannot be certain whether this is a form of suicide or a tragic accident'' (2011: 271). Reitz takes care to keep the question open as to whether Ernst's crash is deliberate or not, including in his comments on *Heimat 3*, stating simply that Ernst ''kommt […] ums Leben'' (2004i: 233) and that ''Ernst verunglückt nicht ohne Grund an Deutschlands mythischstem Ort'' (ibid.: 234). The word choice ''verunglückt'' may be taken to point towards an accident more than towards a deliberate act, while ''Grund'' may suggest intentionality, although perhaps Reitz is referring to his authorial intentions rather than those of his character. In the book version of *Heimat 3* Reitz does point towards an accident more than suicide, but still hints at the latter.[109] The stories of

[108] Ernst's passions for modern aviation and ancient myths are not entirely incongruous: after all, the character Fafnir of some versions of the story of the cursed ring becomes a dragon, and dragons share the power of flight with Ernst's aeroplane, in which Ernst meets his ultimate fate in a blaze of flame, almost as if it were a dragon's fiery dying breath (Reitz has even briefly mentioned dragons in a discussion of Ernst's passion for flying [2004i: 233]).

[109] Reitz comments that ''Ernst nimmt verschiedene Kurskorrekturen vor'' (2004ii: 456), but these ''Kurskorrekturen'' may be aimed at hitting the Lorelei rock rather than at survival, since Reitz also writes that ''Ernst ist fest entschlossen, die ‹‹Schabbacher Scheiße›› hinter sich zu lassen'' (ibid.: 455). Consider also Reitz on suicide in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 264 (as cited in the previous chapter).

the Lorelei figure associated with the Lorelei Rock do not make it much easier to interpret Ernst's end; they do not agree as to whether Lorelei commits suicide or not (see Feuerlicht, 1980: 82-87 for a concise history of the Lorelei figure and the various spellings of the name).

Even if Ernst's death is not suicide, the Nibelungen curse motif indicates that it was not precisely accidental or unpredictable. As with the deaths of Reinhard and Ansgar in *Die zweite Heimat*, there is a strong sense that Ernst was doomed to die a violent death, like his mythical counterparts, regardless of whether he was suicidal or not. Ernst's death shares with those of Ansgar and Reinhard the characteristic they are constructed as essentially unavoidable consequences of the legacy of National Socialism. Another continuity between series two and three is that all three deaths also relate to art: Ansgar and Reinhard are failed artists, while Ernst is likewise unsuccessful with his art museum. Besides his projected museum, Ernst seeks – as I will discuss in more detail – another form of legacy in the character Matko, whom he clearly comes to view as his genuine heir. Ernst's death leads to a legal claim, made supposedly on Matko's behalf, to Ernst's wealth, which in turn leads to the jealous persecution of Matko and, in turn, his death, so that Matko's death is determined overwhelmingly by the legacy of his relationship to Ernst. As King puts it, ''caught up in a battle about inheritance and family ties, he [Matko] climbs the Lorelei rock and throws himself off'' (2011: 271). The inheritance of the Nibelungen curse from Ernst claims Matko's life as well as Ernst's.

Matko's suicide, Hillman observes, is ''reminiscent of Ernst's earlier death as his plane crashes into the cliff'' from which Matko jumps (2010: 268). By choosing Ernst's death site for his suicide, Matko emphasises the link between himself and Ernst, and the former's death seals his position in the legacy of Ernst's tragic trajectory. Matko undergoes a DNA test that indicates that Ernst is not his biological father (3:5: 01:39:10). The ancient problem of doubt as to paternity seems to have been banished by technical progress in terms of genetic inheritance. Hillman describes Matko's suicide as ''a variation of [… Wagner's] *Ring* [cycle], with the family's feuding, greed, and envy culminating in the sacrifice of a false son, one wrongly deemed to be the only direct heir'' (2010: 268-269). It seems

to me, however, that Matko's death results not from being ''a false son'' but rather from actually being Ernst's true spiritual heir as far as Reitz is concerned. Matko does die partly due to persecution by those who believe him to be ''a false son'', but Matko is strongly marked as Ernst's genuine heir. Matko's obvious inheritance of Ernst's personality emphatically disputes that Ernst is not his father: both Matko and Ernst obsess over flight, valuing it over money; both are rather marginal to the wider community; both care for each other more than for anyone else.

Koebner notes the link between a scene in the first *Heimat*, in which ''Ernst 1939 Nelken vom Flugzeug auf Schabbach hinabfallen lässt'' (2008: 151), and the scene in the third *Heimat* in which Matko does much the same, casting flowers from the Lorelei Rock before his suicidal leap, so that ''plötzlich taucht eine Beziehung auf zwischen den Nelken, die 1939 und 1999 […] von einer nächsten Generation in einem mysteriösen Ritus fortgeschleudert werden und ihre Schönheit entfalten'' (ibid.: 152). The flowers assist in lending the suicide a certain tragic beauty, and, as Koebner points out above, ritually conjure yet another link between Matko and Ernst. In relation to this echo, Koebner refers to a ''Motiv'' that he describes as a ''traumhaft-magische Weitergabe eines Dinges von der Hand des einen in die des anderen'' (ibid.: 151). There seems indeed to be a sort of magical passing of a generational baton from Ernst to Matko. Although Matko may perhaps conceivably have heard about Ernst having done so from someone, as far as Reitz shows the viewer, Matko does not know that Ernst threw down flowers before him. The echo of Ernst's flower throwing cannot seem coincidental, and there is an impression that the urge to do so is passed on in by magical means that transcend biological inheritance and firmly defy the notions of heredity with which the Nazis were so obsessed. Matko is not ultimately the heir to Ernst's material fortune but he is undoubtedly his spiritual heir. Although they are not able to escape the National Socialist legacy as Nibelungen curse, Ernst and Matko do in fact succeed in a sense in choosing their heir and father respectively. Reitz refers to the Günderrodehaus (as Clarissa and Hermann call their house) as the ''Treffpunkt einer Wahlfamilie'' (2004ii: 629), and Ernst and Matko can be said to constitute just such a family of choice. While characters in *Die zweite Heimat* struggle to avoid their inheritance

from their parents, via which they are burdened by the National Socialist legacy, Matko is substantially able to play the role of a son to a man who is not his biological father. There is a suggestion of later generations having a greater ability to choose their inheritance. This promises Germans a greater ability to escape from their national inheritance.

Issues relating to paternity certainly do not start in *Heimat 3*. There is, nonetheless, a change between *Die zweite Heimat* and *Heimat 3*. Who Reinhard's and Ansgar's fathers are is not in question, and the strength of the genetic father-son relationship is such that it carries fatal inherited guilt. This genetic transmission of guilt continues into *Heimat 3* to some extent: when Lukas Simon is almost claimed by the flood engulfing his half-great-uncle Ernst's Nibelungen hoard. The genetic element has, however, considerably weakened – as shown by Lukas' survival. As Lisa Hopkins has written of *Heimat 3*, ''this time the focus is principally on the destruction or displacement of 'natural', biological fatherhood'' (2014: 29). Matko represents a departure from this genetic focus in inherited guilt for which characters are punished. It is also a return as well as a departure, in that the relationship between Matko and Ernst is very reminiscent of the one between Hermann and his half-brothers' father Paul. A difference is that, since Paul was out of the picture before National Socialism arrived in Schabbach, there is no guilt for any of the characters to inherit from him, genetically or otherwise. Matko's suffering due to Ernst's affinity with him represents a break with genetic inheritance that takes place against a backdrop of the persistence of the inheritance of National Socialism. While King sees ''dangers posed'' to the Hunsrück in the form of ''trans-European flows of […] people'' (2011: 258), a major element of the story of Matko is that of an incomer (by birth and ancestry) encountering an existing threat – the National Socialist legacy in the form of Ernst's Nibelungen hoard – rather than bringing danger. Matko's susceptibility to the contagion of the National Socialist legacy – in contrast to its transmission through the German family in *Die zweite Heimat* – reflects Germany, including the National Socialist inheritance, and the Hunsrück being increasingly globalised, and in this process the burdens of German history correspondingly exhibit a dilution of their identity as German problems. In highlighting xenophobia, the story of Matko also

points to a problem that Germany shared and shares with others. Describing the period between 1989 and 1998, Jeffrey K. Olick argues that ‘‘the major issue complex for images of the Nazi past […] has clearly been that involving the rise of the New Right, neo-Nazism, violence against foreigners […]’’ (1998: 563). Having discussed ‘‘relativization’’ as a major strand of (the form of) Normalisation (that he has in mind, as discussed in my introductory chapter), Olick continues: ‘‘indeed, the similarity of the French, German and Italian New Rights has paradoxically served the trope of relativization, making Germany’s problems seem like the same ‘normal’ ones shared by its neighbours’’ (ibid.). The curse on Matko’s inheritance begins with National Socialist crimes (art theft and Ernst’s lack of opposition to the regime), but when working against Matko the curse begins to manifest itself also as the more universal, rather than specifically German, problems of greed and xenophobia. The National Socialist legacy certainly gives to rise to the curse surrounding inheritance in *Heimat 3*, but, in the series’ 1990s setting, the curse begins to show some signs of petering out.[110]

Matko and ‘‘Relativising’’ Normalisation

In stark contrast to his presentation of anti-Semitism in the first *Heimat* Reitz shows the ethnically motivated persecution of Matko primarily from the victim’s perspective: for instance, the only point-of-view shots shown to viewers are from Matko’s perspective when xenophobic thugs chase him and then kill his pet bird by throwing a stone into the house. We see the bird’s fragile body being broken through Matko’s eyes. Since the bird serves as a sort of avatar of the flight-obsessed Matko, in a sense the viewer pre-emptively pities the shattering of Matko’s own life on the larger mass of stone forming the base of the Lorelei cliff after a leap that Matko makes with arms outstretched, as Koebner notes, ‘‘als wolle er fliegen’’ (2015: 227). The viewer is likely to have suffered much at least of Matko’s pain before his death, so that a strong emotional bond is likely to have been formed with Matko in advance of his death, a bond likely to pique the viewer’s pity when Matko is seen standing

[110] Matko is not the only character to be driven to ruin by issues surrounding inheritance. Hartmut, Anton’s son, is nearly destroyed by his disputes with his father over inheritance. Not coincidentally, the symbolically-loaded car that Hartmut drives is, as he tells Matko at one point, a ‘‘Horch, Baujahr 1938’’ (3:5: 17:03).

on the cliff edge. The foreshadowing of Matko's death when the bird dies not only serves to heighten pity for Matko but also serves to lend his death a sense of inevitability – a circumstance reminiscent of Reitz's treatment of Ansgar and Reinhard – and, additionally, serves to confirm, given the cause of the bird's death, that the reasons for Matko's downfall relate to xenophobia in the Germany of the 1990s. (This xenophobia is, it should, however, be noted, intimately bound up with Nibelungen curse, being sparked particularly by envy of Matko's prospective financial gain from inheritance of the hoard; the xenophobia is not a cause of death independent of Matko's inheritance of Ernst's National-Socialism-tainted *Nibelungenhort*, while the 1990s xenophobia also functions as such as a reminder of National Socialism and its relevance to the Matko narrative.) Reitz seems, then, to have been determined to ensure in so far as possible that viewers condemn – emotionally as well as intellectually – the xenophobia to which Matko is subjected.

The stone-throwing closely parallels the stoning of the window of Robert's Jewish neighbour in the first *Heimat*: both stone-throwings are motivated by xenophobia, fed partly by perpetrators' delusions that the victims are unjustly richer than their persecutors; both scenes involve a stone or stones being thrown up at an upper floor of a building from below; both scenes foreshadow even worse developments for the victims. A key difference between the two scenes is very much that Reitz now favours the victim perspective. I would speculate that Reitz's motive for this reversal may perhaps be a desire to leave less to viewers with regard to their emotional identification with victims of persecution or, conceivably, a greater willingness to show a non-Jewish victim of xenophobia, perhaps a willingness motivated either by possible shortcomings in Reitz's attitude towards Jewish suffering or by a feeling that it is easier to satisfactorily depict Matko's terrible but still relatively less appalling experience of persecution than to do justice to Jewish suffering under National Socialism. It would not be necessary, in order to reflect and deplore the ethnically motivated massacres in the former Yugoslavia, for Reitz to pursue such a marked parallelism in his presentation of the attacks on Matko and Robert's neighbour.

Reitz's unmistakable and vigorous attack on xenophobia in relation to Matko coexists, I would argue, with an urge to explore in the character of Matko means of relativising National Socialism – in Olick's terms as referred to in my introductory chapter, ''relativising'' Normalisation. Taberner observes of German attitudes towards National Socialism in the 1990s and early 2000s that ''ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, and elsewhere'' fostered ''a tendency to contextualize German perpetration within a long, global history of genocide'', and Taberner suggests that ''German 'normalization' might in fact imply the country's gradual approximation to the tendency […] to both restate […] values such as the inalienability of human rights, anti-racism […] and, at the same time, concede a lack of confidence in the viability of those very same values'' (2005i: 128), a ''lack of confidence'' that may encourage ''a form of historicization that is allied with an apologist view of human nature [that] may lead to the relativization of guilt'' (ibid.: 129). Taberner's characterisation of German attitudes towards xenophobia as rather conflicted in the 1990s into the early 2000s appears to capture something of Reitz's approach to his character Matko (whom Reitz created in more or less precisely the timeframe that Taberner is addressing): on the one hand, Reitz is plainly against xenophobia; on the other hand, Matko's presence gestures to the interethnic strife, including large-scale ethnically motived massacres and other atrocities, in the former Yugoslavia (when we see Matko's mother her face very visibly bears the scars of war), and I would argue that Reitz exploits Matko's parental background, his mother's living in the former Yugoslavia during appalling conflict, as a justification for (to revisit Taberner's comment [ibid.]) ''an apologist view of human nature [that] may lead to the relativization of guilt''.[111] By paralleling the persecution of Matko with the persecution of Robert's Jewish neighbour in the first *Heimat* Reitz appears to wish to relativise – and thereby diminish the sense of the uniqueness of – National Socialist persecution of Jewish people and thereby also relativise the guilt of Germans complicit in National Socialism, while Reitz at the same time hopes to strengthen viewers' resolve to counter xenophobia.

[111] In addition to his mother's serious and prominent injuries, there is discussion of the war when Ernst and Matko first meet.

Reitz has posed the following question apropos of *Heimat 3*: ‘‘gibt es überhaupt noch ein spezifisch deutsches Schicksal?’’ (2004i: 217). In posing this question Reitz can be said to be asking how successful Normalisation has been – if Germanness has lost much of its specificity, then it is presumably more difficult to associate phenomena, including the perpetration of genocide, as specifically German. As mentioned in my introductory chapter, Lothar Probst comments that ‘‘until the late 1990s it was quite clear to people in Europe that responsibility for the Holocaust was a purely German matter and that this responsibility determined Germany’s status as an ‘abnormal’ nation’’ (2006: 61). *Heimat 3* was created partly during the later 1990s, and in his attempts to somewhat alleviate the burden of German feelings of culpability in relation to National Socialism Reitz avails himself of changing views of genocide and German moral abnormality relative to other nations. Referring to Srebrenica as an example of mass murder motivated by hatred of an ethnic group and the United Nations recognising mass killing in Rwanda as genocide in 1994, Niven notes that ‘‘the world has recognised that genocide is a contemporary as well as an historical phenomenon’’ and that ‘‘concern at other genocides does represent a release of pressure on Germany’’ (2004: 237). As a result, Niven continues, of ‘‘the globalisation of Holocaust memory’’, ‘‘instead of being the pariah amongst nations, Germany is now one of many nations with a duty to remember. The burden is divided’’ (ibid.). In Schmitz’s definition, ‘‘a globalisation of Holocaust memory […] inscribes the Holocaust as universal victim narrative into a (western) transnational memory culture’’ (2007: 5). This globalisation effect on attitudes to the Holocaust and genocide more generally thus lends itself to Reitz’s programme to relativise German culpability relating to National Socialism by pointing to non-German perpetrators in order to make Germans appear more morally normal as a nation. The suffering of Matko’s biological family in the former Yugoslavia points away from National Socialism towards a more global, or, as Schmitz says, ‘‘universal victim narrative’’ (ibid.), and in this narrative of victimisation the victimisers are spread around the globe rather than concentrated in Germany.

It is revealing to consider ‘‘the globalisation of Holocaust memory’’ (to reuse Niven’s phrase as cited above [2004: 237]) in conjunction with one of Reitz’s comments relating to Martin Walser with regard to the desirability of being in a group – namely, Reitz’s reference to ‘‘Gemeinschaften […], die uns moralisch entlasten könnten’’ (in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 326). Apropos of the controversy surrounding Walser’s fictional murder of a Jewish critic, Reitz writes regretfully of ‘‘Erziehung zum Individualismus’’, lamenting ‘‘niemand nimmt dir die Verantwortung ab, du hast sie ganz allein’’ (ibid.). Reitz then asserts, ‘‘und deswegen: Gerade die Künstler (wie auch Walser) fürchten das Alleinsein’’ (ibid.) – being a German artist himself, Reitz is presumably very much speaking of his own feelings when referring to a fear of not being able to divest himself of moral responsibility. In a community (such as a globalised international community) moral burdens can be, as Niven puts it above, a ‘‘burden […] divided’’ (2004: 237). I would argue that Reitz uses Matko in order to further a ‘‘relativising’’ Normalisation of Germany’s status in the 1990s in pursuit of the moral unburdening to which he refers as cited above: via Matko Reitz aims to prompt viewers to bear in mind the mass murders in the former Yugoslavia and to reflect that, as Niven puts it, ‘‘Germany is now one of many nations with a duty to remember’’ (2004: 237). Alexandra Kaiser claims of Germany memory after unification, ‘‘with increasing temporal distance, Auschwitz has changed its meaning from a German crime embedded in a historical context to a *symbol* of crimes against humanity, mass killing, and organized brutality in a broader sense’’ (2008: 36).[112] Such a development, in the minds of those to whom Kaiser’s characterisation of attitudes to the Holocaust applies, will tend to diminish feelings of German national guilt because, as Kaiser continues, ‘‘if everyone remembers Auschwitz, specific German responsibility appears to decline’’ (ibid.). By pairing the persecution of Matko with the even more horrendous persecution to which the first *Heimat* gestures when Robert’s Jewish neighbour’s window is stoned Reitz may wish to somewhat undermine the specificity of the genocidal persecution of Jewish people by the Nazis. With the stories of Ernst and Matko Reitz explores how

[112] Similarly, Assmann writes that ‘‘in its symbolic reconstruction, the Holocaust came to represent inhumanity in general’’ (2010: 110).

Germans may see the passing of time and globalisation as an opportunity to be exploited in the hope of moving away from carrying an especially heavy national historical burden.

Ernst's Attempts to become a Victim

Besides being linked to Robert's Jewish neighbour, Matko is associated with victimhood at the hands of the Nazis by a scene that takes place before Matko himself first appears. Before he finds Matko we see Ernst contemplating a painting in his collection, ''Zigeunerjunge'', by Otto Müller, and wishing that he had a son. Ernst appears to be fantasising about having a ''Zigeunerjunge'' for an heir. Matko is the flight-enthusiast heir that Ernst seems almost to magically wish into being – Ernst tells Matko, ''manchmal habe ich mir einen Sohn gewünscht, so einen wie du, der sich für die Fliegerei interessiert'' (2004ii: 444), and Matko is identified with a frequently victimised group, one subjected to genocide by the National Socialist regime. The association with Romani sought by Ernst via Matko and the painting suggests a desire to identify with victims of National Socialism, whereas in reality Ernst was far more complicit in National Socialism than an opponent of it.[113] Matko's arrival on the scene being foreshadowed by a painting in Ernst's *Nibelungenhort* collection emphasises that Ernst's desired legacy consists of both Matko and his *Nibelungenhort*. Via the association with Romani, Matko is also further associated with the Nazis' Jewish victims: Stewart Dearing observes of Müller's Romani paintings that they were painted in the context of an old and widespread tradition of perceiving ''similarities between Gypsies and Jews as eternally wandering races of outcasts in Europe'' (2010: 194). Dearing notes that at the 1937 National Socialist exhibition of so-called degenerate art Müller's ''*Gypsy Encampment* (1925) was hung above the slogan 'the Jewish longing for wilderness reveals itself […]''' (ibid.: 192). Matko, Ernst's chosen heir, is, in short, quite strongly

[113] While Ernst, in *Heimat 3*, condemns the Nazis' attitude to so-called degenerate art, in the first *Heimat* he shows no signs of being an unwilling Luftwaffe pilot, nor of any unease about any aspect of National Socialism. In the brief scene in the first series when Ernst, still recovering from a crash, has evidently heard the news of Hitler's death recently, Ernst appears to struggle to accept that Hitler has gone and does not appear to welcome the news. Ernst further appears to be willing to potentially benefit from the theft of artworks from Jewish owners, given his aforementioned worries about ''Gerüchte'' concerning his collection and the fact that he begins to amass his *Nibelungenhort* – the first series shows – shortly after the war.

linked to Jewish people under National Socialism by the cumulative weight of the subtle gestures with which Reitz constructs him as a virtual proxy Jewish person. Gabriel notes that in the first series ''Hermann listens to his oratorio to the Hunsruck [sic] from a gypsy caravan-like trailer'' and that ''later, gypsy music returns to haunt the soundtrack of the opening episode of *Heimat Two*'' (2004: 167), while David Cooper observes that Hermann's composition ''Klärchenlied'' makes ''use of the so-called 'Gypsy' scale'' (2018: no pagination). As discussed in the first chapter, Hermann can be – and often has been – viewed partly as Reitz's fictional version of himself, and Reitz appears, therefore, to share some of his character Ernst's desire to have an heir (given that Hermann forms part of Reitz's artistic legacy) associated with Romani, so with people subjected to genocide by the Nazis.[114] Somewhat like Ernst, Reitz (born in 1932) appears to wish for an heir, thus a legacy, that associates him with a position of victimhood that he did not in reality occupy while living under National Socialism.

In a chapter on ''German Victimhood at the Turn of the Millennium'', Bill Niven remarks that ''it is as if some Germans would like to appropriate the status of absolute victim generally attributed to the Jews'' (2006: 15). In Reitz's 2004 film set in the 1990s Ernst very much appears to have designs upon victim status regarding Matko, who, he hopes, will (along with the *Nibelungenhort*) define his posthumous legacy. Besides being ultimately driven to suicide by persecution, Matko is virtually a young orphan – he grows up without his parents (his mother has returned to the former Yugoslavia without him, for unknown reasons, while his father is even more mysterious).[115] The characterisation of Matko thus seems to be partly an exercise in creating a victim par excellence. Ernst's attempt to make Matko his heir involves a dramatic transformation from complicity to victimhood in relation to Ernst's legacy. Ernst seeks to emulate Anton's ''Unsterblichkeit durch

[114] The similarity between Reitz and Hermann is strengthened in the third series by Salome Kammer – who plays Clarissa, Hermann's partner – being married to Reitz by the time it was made.
[115] In the book version Reitz indicates that Matko's mother ''lebt in Bosnien, und er hat sie nicht mehr wiedergesehen, nachdem sie in den Krieg gefahren ist, um beim Vater und der kleinen Schwester zu sein'' (2004ii: 406) – the father and sister make no appearance.

Fortpflanzung'', as Ernst puts it (Anton Simon has many children), and in such a way that Ernst's planned reproductive immortality through Matko includes the transition to ultimate victim.

By making a person strongly associated with victimhood his heir, Ernst is in fact attempting a manoeuvre perhaps not very far removed from what Schmitz calls ''replacement of the image of perpetrator with that of victim'' (2006: 105). Reitz is to an extent complicit in this attempted perpetrator-to-victim transition via the generational shift from Ernst to his putative son, insofar as Reitz provides support for Ernst's view that Matko is his heir. On the other hand, however, Reitz's plotting – which sees the ruin of Ernst's plans – suggests authorial condemnation of those of Ernst's schemes that are designed to disguise Ernst's complicity in National Socialism. Nonetheless, there is something that can be said in Ernst's favour: namely that in Matko he sees himself rather than – like Matko's xenophobic persecutors – an outsider to be excluded, like Robert's Jewish neighbour in the first *Heimat*. Additionally, Ernst's desire to make Matko his heir may in part reflect a desire to make some form of reparation to a victim of persecution (although not, it seems notable and regrettable, to someone who was actually persecuted by the Nazis).

Art, Suicide, Redemption and the Viability of ''Ritualising'' Normalisation by the Artist

The National Socialist legacy is plainly a major factor in the tragedy of Ernst and Matko. Besides the internationalisation of the legacy that can be observed in this strand of the story, there is a major source for the suicide theme in *Heimat 3* that does not relate to National Socialism, whereas the suicide theme in *Die zweite Heimat* is intimately bound up with that legacy. *Heimat 3* introduces Karoline von Günderrode and her suicide (Hermann and Clarissa take up residence in a house the locals call the Günderrodehaus). Clarissa is also linked to Günderrode by playing Dido, queen of Carthage in Purcell's opera *Dido and Aeneas*, since Dido's suicide offers a parallel to Günderrode's, especially as the suicides were motivated at least partly by love.

Galli suggests that Ernst chooses the Lorelei rock as his death site because it is a ''simbolo di quella sintesi di cultura e ''Heimat'' che a lui non è riuscita'' and that this is Ernst's response to the local

authorities' lack of support for the planned museum and culture in general (2005: 249). In Galli's view, then, Ernst's death would be intended to act as a self-sacrificial *Liebestod* for the sake of achieving a fitting symbolic burial for his thwarted project. If Ernst's crash is intentional, then he certainly achieves a striking gesture by ending his life on the Lorelei. It is of course a gesture that depends on the sacrifice of one's life, so that, if deliberate, Ernst's death is comparable to Reinhard's and Ansgar's in that it is a productive exchange, of life for a desired effect. Even if the crash was unintentional, there is still the dramatic impact of a life being lost on the Lorelei rock just after the authorities have scorned culture by rejecting the museum. Preusser refers to Ernst's death as a ''Drama'' (2013: 204). As noted in my chapter on *Die zweite Heimat*, the term drama in origin referred to ritual, and, as Gregory Nagy observes, ''working our way backward in time […], we find that drama *is* ritual'' (2007: 121). I would argue that in *Heimat 3* (in ways relating to those discussed in the previous chapter) Reitz uses film to enact dramatic ritual, more specifically tragic ritual involving the sacrifice of scapegoats in pursuit of cathartic, propitiatory and expiatory effects in relation to the legacy of National Socialism.

Hillman describes Matko's suicide as ''a latterday performance of the Lorelei legend'' (2010: 268), while Preusser points out that the Lorelei figure ''deutlich überkodiert aufscheint im Tode des Fliegers Ernst'' (2007: 179). Koebner notes that Matko ''streut'' ''14 rote Nelken in die Luft'' as ''eine Trauergeste'' for Ernst ''und zugleich Vordeutung auf sein eigenes Ende'' (2015: 226) and then ''wählt […] den erprobten Ort auf der Loreley'' (ibid.: 226-227). Before Matko's dramatic and ritually potent death with sacrificial overtones, a historic figure mentioned in *Heimat 3* had already partly emulated the fictional Lorelei, namely Günderrode (since she lends her name to the house the Clarissa and Hermann buy, her name is heard quite frequently). In Clemens Brentano's 1801 poem his literary Lorelei laments, ''Mein Schatz hat mich betrogen'' (1801: 508) and soon after she ''lehnt […] sich hinunter'' from the Lorelei Rock ''Und stürzet in den Rhein'' (ibid.: 510). In 1806 Günderrode, a friend of the Brentano family, committed suicide by stabbing herself next to the Rhine. In the third *Heimat* we are told (what Reitz presents as) the local legend regarding her death,

according to which Günderrode cast herself into the Rhine to drown (3:1: around 15:00). Reitz comments, ‘‘die Legende von der Günderode habe ich mir ausgedacht, sie ist auch literaturgeschichtlich völlig falsch’’ (Reitz in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 237) (Reitz is probably referring to the connection with the house – Günderrode’s suicide was not drastically different).[116] Links between Günderrode, the Lorelei and the deaths of Ernst and Matko are together suggestive of death as an imitation of art in life through death.[117] There are thematic connections with topics relevant to Reinhard and Ansgar in *Die zweite Heimat* (due to the role of heroism and sacrificial redemption in their deaths), since Günderrode’s death is open to being read as an instance of suicide as self-sacrifice. Liesl Allingham notes Günderrode’s ‘‘desire for a meaningful death, more specifically her desire to die a ‘heroic death’’’ (2014: 42). The prominence of the Günderrode-Lorelei theme and the sacrifice it suggests support – without definitively confirming – Galli’s aforementioned suggestion that Ernst decides to kill himself on the rock to provide fitting burial for his artistic ambitions (2005: 231), almost a sort of *Liebestod* for Ernst’s *Nibelungenhort*. Allingham notes that in Günderrode’s work there is ‘‘the recurrent theme of a *Liebestod*’’ (2014: 46). Dido’s legendary or mythical suicide is also suicide for love. In Brentano’s poem the song of the fate of Lorelei (although he writes Lore Lay) echoes down from the cliff, and Ernst’s and Matko’s death echo each other’s death and also Lorelei’s death and Günderrode’s death (or Reitz’s story of it) in a complex echo.[118] There is a certain Romantic logic to Matko’s following Ernst into death in a sort of platonic *Liebestod*. Nicholas Saul writes of Günderrode’s *Briefe zweier Freunde* that they ‘‘qualify the outcome of the love-death as the union […] of ultimate elements of the self which evince affinity

[116] According to Bettina von Arnim’s account (1839: 118-121).
[117] Reitz is reinforcing a relationship between art and death that is already very substantial. Günderrode’s suicide was seen as a form of art even before it happened: in admonishing her against suicide Friedrich Karl von Savigny wrote to her in 1805 that ‘‘daran künsteln […] ist sehr unheilig’’ (cited in Steven Martinson, 2005: 314). On aspects of Günderrode’s artistic practice playing a key role in her death, Martinson writes that ‘‘Almost all scholars agree that Günderrode’s decision to commit suicide cannot be adequately explained on the basis of biographical information alone. The intricate fabric of her collected writings contains clues as to the reasons for and significance of her suicide’’ (ibid.: 315).
[118] Brentano appends to his poem a reference to the Lorelei Rock’s ‘‘vielfachen Echo’s’’ (1801: 510).

with the beloved other'' (2009: 168).[119] Anna Ezekiel argues in a similar vein that Günderrode's poem '''The Malabarian Widows' does not characterize death as oblivion; rather, it emphasizes the unification of the lovers after death'', in demonstration of which point Ezekiel cites the poem's line ''Vereinet die getrennten Elemente'' (2014: 779). I have noted that Ernst sees Matko as both other to and part of, or a close reflection of, himself, and Matko's suicide proves his kinship to Ernst, so that the narrative purpose of his death is partly to contribute to Reitz's attack on the obsession with biological heredity that the Nazis carried to appalling and ultimately genocidal extremes. Matko's death also plays a starring role in Reitz's dramatic sacrificial rites designed in response to the inheritance of the legacy of National Socialism as particularly symbolised by *Nibelungenhort*.

For all his faults, Ernst appreciated the art as art, whereas the anti-immigrant mob that persecutes Matko sees only money in the collection and so threatens to devalue Ernst's legacy by refusing to recognise its artistic merit.[120] Although Reitz's narrative to a large extent frustrates Ernst's plans for his legacy – probably due to Reitz's disapproval of Ernst's attempts to distance himself from the historic reality of his complicity in National Socialism, Matko nonetheless salvages something from the wreck of Ernst's plans in that Matko, in the tragedy of his suicide, prevents Ernst's legacy from simply collapsing into a sordid struggle for money – which is largely what motivates Matko's persecutors and the internal squabbling of the Simons. Terrible though it is, Matko's suicide has a tragic and redemptive power. Reitz writes of Matko's suicidal moments of flight before impact: ''er fliegt noch einmal, bevor er stirbt, ohne Flugzeug […] von einem hohen Felsen herunter. Das Fliegen

[119] Nonetheless, if Ernst has self-sacrifice in mind – which seems likely albeit uncertain – it remains important to observe that he is driven to such desperation above all by the effects of the Nibelungen curse: after all, the attempts to thwart Ernst's ambitions for the museum should be seen as an effect of the Nibelungen curse, meaning that self-sacrifice for art's sake would not really be a cause of death separate to the Nibelungen curse anyway. Thus, destruction due to the National Socialist legacy remains highly significant in *Heimat 3*, even though the theme of suicide – like that of family and inheritance – demonstrates movement away from that legacy.

[120] Reitz has said that Ernst ''spürt, dass nicht nur seine Kunst- und Kunsthandwerks-Sammlung untergehen würde, sondern dass sein ganzes Leben entwertet würde, wenn sich niemand fände, der sein Erbe übernimmt'' (2004: 212).

wird zum Erlösungstraum'' (2004i: 234). At stake in this redemptively potent scene is not only Ernst's personal legacy but also the German nation in the wake of National Socialism.

The suicide sequence (the final scene of the fifth episode) is lent great dramatic power by the pathos invoked by the sight of a boy driven so unjustly to such a young and hideous death, by the visceral fear that may be induced in viewers by the camera's embrace of the dreadful height, a physical height that reflects the scene's stature on a metaphysical scale, with the Lorelei rock's physical presence amply reinforced by the grandeur of the Rhine valley backdrop. The camera lingers for a moment on a shot, from the bottom of the cliffs, in which Matko is dwarfed by the rock; shortly before that shot, it shows Matko on the cliff edge at an angle not far from vertical. There are two brief possible point-of-view shots giving Matko's perspective (showing Meise), but his death is shown either entirely or almost entirely from the point of view of onlookers (such as his mother – whose horrified gaze provides the visual representation of Matko's very final moments, Meise and the police psychologist) or from an impersonal perspective. Matko more or less ignores the people around him; he is not looking at the people around him. Rather than giving us Matko's visual perspective, which appears to be focused on the Rhine below, Reitz encourages viewers to see the person through whom the dramatic ritual is performed, and to be moved as are the characters who witness Matko's pain. As mentioned in the first chapter, fear and pity are in Aristotelean terms, as Danze puts it, ''the primary effects of the mimetic art of tragedy'' (2016: 565), and these are the emotions that Reitz prompts viewers to vicariously feel when watching Matko's suicide. Viewers are meant to fear the xenophobia and greed that drive Matko to ruin and to pity him. Throughout the cycle, Reitz appears keen to encourages viewers, whether German or not, to tend to assume, or at least bear in mind, a German perspective on events.[121] Viewers are slightly distanced from Matko by Reitz's choice of visual perspective, with the consequence that there is no illusion (as might be

[121] As noted in my chapter on the first *Heimat*, Creeber argues that the first *Heimat* ''attempts to place the viewer in a deliberate act of identification with its characters'' (2004: 41), and in my view this remains the case in subsequent series.

momentarily produced by opting for Matko's visual perspective) that viewers are falling with Matko; rather Matko is ritually scapegoated, expelled from the narrative, and viewers are left behind to watch the rest of *Heimat 3*, a Heimat in which Matko's tragic suffering has now come to an end. Viewers do not see death from Matko's eyes because he dies for them, not they with him. Viewers are not, however, greatly distanced from Matko in terms of emotional support: the sympathy of decent people will naturally be on his side, although the perspective taken by the camera in Matko's last moments suggests that Reitz is not aiming to spark outrage at the treatment of Matko rather than vicarious emotional pain stemming from identification with Matko. Certainly, though, Matko's death is invested with a huge emotional force aimed at drawing viewers into the scene that represents the pinnacle of Reitz's use of redemptive sacrificial ritual in the third series; viewers are drawn into the ritual as beneficiaries of sacrifice rather than as the sacrifice. The Rhine flows on through much of Germany and holds sway over German national consciousness, so that the proximity of the Rhine to Matko's suicide asserts the act's potential for exercising symbolic power on a national level. Viewers – especially German ones – are thus invited to comprehend Matko's death, which Reitz relates to an ''Erlösungstraum'' (2004ii: 234), as an event of potentially national relevance. The ''Erlösungstraum'' that is at stake in Reitz's comment above, I would suggest, is not only Matko's but also Reitz's yearning for German national salvation in the wake of National Socialism. The mimetic power of tragedy commands viewers' emotional participation in Matko's suicide, which is a story of redemptive sacrifice. Reitz channels viewers' pity quite directly towards Matko in a manner aimed at promoting the empathetic relationship with the object of pity that is potentially lacking in the first *Heimat* due to the distance from the screen of the most heavily persecuted people in the narrative of the first *Heimat*. Reitz thus encourages viewers to relate to Matko, which is admirable as a plea to viewers to fully acknowledge a xenophobically persecuted person as a fellow member of the human family. Reitz most probably hopes that identification with Matko is morally improving for viewers. Simultaneously, Reitz potentially gratifies some German viewers' desire to, as Dirk Moses remarks, ''identify with the victims rather than the perpetrators''

(2007ii: 156). Emotional identification with Matko on the part of the Germans not persecuted under National Socialism and their descendants may perhaps potentially occur in ways far more commendable than the sort of coveting of victim status that Niven presumably has in mind when remarking, as cited earlier in this chapter, that ‘‘it is as if some Germans would like to appropriate the status of absolute victim generally attributed to the Jews’’ (2006: 15). In seeking to promote viewers’ emotional identification with Matko’s status as a considerably victimised person Reitz is not attempting to rewrite non-persecuted Germans’ position under National Socialism in the type of procedure that Schmitz describes as ‘‘replacement of the image of perpetrator with that of victim’’ (2006: 105). Rather Reitz seeks to promote viewers’ emotional engagement with the plight of a persecuted character, not to encourage unwarranted pretensions to a victim status that many viewers will not possess. At the same time, German viewers burdened by feelings of guilt in relation to the National Socialist past are presented by Reitz with escapist, perhaps pleasurable, vicarious suffering in their empathetic relation to Matko’s tragic anguish.

Matko’s welfare is fatally sacrificed to the merciless greed of his persecutors’ pursuit or jealously of his potential financial inheritance. Besides being sacrificed to others’ avaricious ambitions, another level on which Matko is a sacrifice is the level on which he is the scapegoat of a tragedy, as per the etymological meaning of tragedy as scapegoating that was discussed in the previous chapter. With Ernst’s crash and Matko’s dreadful leap Reitz seeks to hasten the burial of the legacy of National Socialism with Ernst and Matko, two characters cursed by Ernst’s National-Socialism-tainted *Nibelungenhort*; Reitz aims to propitiate supernatural powers of justice by sacrificing these two scapegoats and thereby lessen the burden of the legacy of National Socialism. The deaths of these scapegoats displays several characteristics that – as already described in the preceding chapter – are characteristic of the related Ancient Greek concepts of scapegoating and tragic heroes: the deaths are tragic (particularly in Matko’s case); they possess a certain dignity in that Matko has the courage to hold true to his terrible resolution in the face of Meise’s undignified attempts to bring him back from the brink of death for base financial motives, while Ernst in a sense – even if the crash is

entirely accidental – dies on his own terms insofar as he is in his element – the air – when he dies; both Ernst and Matko have a certain nobility – indicated by their ambitions to master flight and their contempt for financial avarice; and Matko is very much scapegoated in life also in the sense of being pressured to leave the area and country by thugs wishing to find an immigrant to blame for problems real or imaginary; the deaths have redemptive power.[122] In the book version of *Heimat 3* Reitz comments on the visual power of Matko's death: ''das Bild des völlig unbewegten Jungen über dem Abgrund hat eine eigentümliche Schönheit, die Meise die Knie zittern lässt'' (2004ii: 503). The image of Matko's death strikes awe even into one so morally bankrupt as Meise; it is dramatic in the extreme, with the grandeur of the scenery and the shaking of Matko's mother as she tries (with little success) to conquer her fear of heights and talk Matko down from the cliff.[123] Matko's death is a powerful tragic scene, and is both tragedy and drama in their etymological senses (as referred to in Chapter Two) of scapegoating and ritual respectively. In Matko's death scene the camera mostly avoids Matko's perspective; viewers watch the suicide unfold somewhat like spectators in a theatre, seeing with their own eyes rather than those of characters, external to the action rather than placed within it by a focus on point-of-view shots. When Matko jumps, there is potentially a sense of catharsis accompanying the horror – the suspense is broken; hope of life destroyed; the nervous wait ended. In the completion of the dreadful act the viewer is released from foreboding, and the story of Matko's scapegoating, of the xenophobic persecution of a perceived outsider who supposedly has too much money – in short, a narrative suggestive of the evil of National Socialism towards Jewish people – has essentially come to an end once Matko has jumped; a narrative of scapegoating has in a sense itself been scapegoated, as in expelled from the wider narrative,

[122] Regarding the relevance of these factors to scapegoating ritual, see, for example, the following as cited in Chapter Two: Bremner, 1983: 302; Chatzidimitriou, 2017: 100.

[123] In the book version Reitz seems to confirm that it is indeed Matko's mother (2004ii: 505). Meanwhile, the contrast between Matko's passion for flight, his feeling at home high up, on the one hand, and his mother's terror of heights, on the other hand, emphasise that Matko is truly Ernst's heir; he is far closer to Ernst even than to his own mother.

promising viewers an opportunity to move on from reflecting on xenophobic scapegoating and its particular relevance to Germany.

In his comments on sacrifice and German identity after National Socialism (which I have referred to in previous chapters) Dirk Moses writes of Germans striving to ‘‘emerge phoenix-like from the ashes’’ via ‘‘purification through cathartic expulsion […] of ex- and neo-Nazis and garden-variety nationalists’’ (2007ii: 160). In one sense, Reitz deviates from this aspect of Dirk Moses’ model with regard to Matko: in his tragic drama, his ritual scapegoating, Reitz cathartically scapegoats not the xenophobic scapegoaters but rather the person being xenophobically scapegoated (albeit it in a way that shows firm moral condemnation of Matko’s persecutors). On the other hand, Reitz does seek to expel Matko’s persecutors in terms of aiming to deprive them of viewers’ sympathies. Reitz encourages viewers to emotionally embrace Matko and exclude Meise and the thugs who target him from the circle of characters with whom viewers are likely to identify emotionally.

In making Matko the object of viewers’ emotional identification Reitz shows signs of acting in accordance with Dirk Moses’ characterisation of many Germans as determined to ‘‘identify with the victims rather than the perpetrators’’, ‘‘with the sacrifice of Jesus rather than the figure of Pilate’’ (ibid.: 156). Moses argues that certain Germans ‘‘keep resacrificing the Jews in regular, national rituals in the same way as Christians regularly celebrate the Eucharist’’ so that ‘‘memory of the murdered Jews thereby serves as a permanent resource for collective regeneration’’ (ibid.). Moses’ view that many Germans ‘‘keep resacrificing the Jews’’ appears very applicable to Reitz’s echoing of the persecution of Robert’s Jewish neighbour in the story of Matko. There is also some scope for seeing a Crucifixion scene in Matko’s suicide. Matko’s arms are most probably held out in order to suggest the wings of an aeroplane or bird – more specifically, his own murdered pet bird; at the same time, however, they echo the position of Jesus’ arms when Jesus redeemed humanity through sacrificial death, according to a worldview towards which Reitz is sympathetic, even though he

appears not to be a convinced Christian.[124] Furthermore, Meise casts aside his briefcase in apparent repentance – perhaps a plot development influenced by the salvation of one of the criminals crucified along with Jesus. Matko's suicide takes place at a height primarily because of its Lorelei and aviation associations; nonetheless, when Matko is seen on a height with his body in the shape of a cross Golgotha may appear in the background, particularly given the presence of a crowd of onlookers that includes his mother. Matko's death has potential to be seen as a Eucharistic sacrifice as per Moses' model as cited above.

Besides being very relatable to Moses' concept of ''resacrificing'', Reitz's choice to reenact a scene of scapegoating from the first series fits into what Schmitz describes as ''the […] most widely used'' of ''concepts of mourning in relation to the issue of German wartime memory'', namely ''the Freudian model of remembering, repeating and working through'' (2010: 27). As noted in my chapter on the first *Heimat*, Caryl Flinn discusses Freudian mourning and melancholia in relation to the New German Cinema, and briefly mentions the first two *Heimat* series, characterising them as the work of a melancholic as described by Freud – that is, in her definition, someone ''condemned to repeated lamentations that cannot get past their object'', a melancholic ''process'' that ''the serial format of Reitz's two televised *Heimat*s intimates'', ''given its near inability to conclude'' (2004: 56). In *History and Memory after Auschwitz* Dominick Lacapra also refers to Freud's views on mourning and melancholia in relation to National Socialism, remarking of melancholia that ''the […] traumatized self, locked in compulsive repetition remains narcissistically identified with the lost object'' (1998: 44-45). Reitz is compulsively repeating the death of Robert's Jewish neighbour, a death which serves in *Heimat* as a representative symbolic location for Germany's wider national trauma; Reitz is not, however, a melancholic in the third *Heimat* in his approach to National Socialism, whereas Flinn's

[124] Reitz declares: ''ein Stück Katholizismus ist mir geblieben. In meinem Verhältnis zur Landschaft'' (2008: 77); ''in Italien und überhaupt in allen katholischen Ländern erlebe ich immer wieder diese spirituellen ‚Zustände' in der Landschaft'' (ibid.: 78). It would be in keeping with his self-declared tendency to view landscapes with a Catholic gaze for Reitz to superimpose Golgotha onto the Lorelei in Matko's death scene.

identification of the first *Heimat* as melancholic seems partly apt.[125] As I have noted above, in Matko's death scene the camera (at least mostly) provides a perspective other than Matko's own; this is because, in contrast to the Freudian model of a melancholic, Reitz is not (as described by Lacapra above) ''narcissistically identified with the lost object'' (1998: 44-45). In Flinn's similar account of the Freudian melancholic's perspective, ''the subject cannot separate the body-ego from the loss to which it is purportedly fused'' (2004: 56). In the filming of Matko's death the viewer's perspective is at (at least mostly) distinct from that of the ''the loss'', so Matko; the viewer's ''body ego'' is separate, paving viewers' way towards mourning as opposed to melancholia. In mourning, Lacapra says of the Freudian model, there is ''a relation to the past that recognizes its difference to the present and enacts a specific performative relation to it that simultaneously remembers and takes at least partial leave of it'' (1998: 45). Reitz is more mourner than melancholic in *Heimat 3*. Matko's death recalls the death of Robert's neighbour while being distinct from it and carrying associations absent from that past event (for instance, Matko's death – unlike that of the Jewish neighbour and the Holocaust victims towards which the neighbour points – is also connected to the comfortingly fictional death of the Lorelei). Lacapra continues, ''In line with Freud's concepts, one might suggest that mourning be seen as a homeopathic socialization or ritualization of the repetition-compulsion'' in aid of ''counteract[ing] compulsiveness […] in ways that allow […] change, […] and renewal'' (ibid.: 45). In the third *Heimat*, I would argue, Reitz is compelled to ritually reenact the attack on Robert's Jewish neighbour, through Matko, by the hope of homeopathically overcoming the sort of ''repetition-compulsion'' to which Lacapra refers, using mourning as it is

[125] I would suggest that the second *Heimat* is at least not melancholic in all respects: its enthusiasm for scapegoating ritual reflects a striving for cathartic progress more characteristic of Freud's view of mourning. In describing it as a melancholic work, Flinn provides an unusual line of defence for the first *Heimat*'s portrayal of National Socialism, since she writes approvingly of melancholia that ''melancholia acknowledges the impossibility of overcoming the past – and even questions the desirability of doing so'' (2004: 55), whereas ''the rhetoric of conquest and mastery Freud used to describe mourning […] anticipates the language of the victor used by the term *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*'' (ibid.: 55-56). Nonetheless, I would argue that the first *Heimat* is far from being altogether melancholic: although Reitz does not – unlike in *Heimat 3* – try to bury National Socialism in the first *Heimat*, Reitz's attempt – as I view it – to release characters from Purgatory in the scene with the dead is, nonetheless, meant by Reitz to provide some closure for characters and viewers, the release of the rite of Confession.

described by Lacapra in relation to Freud: namely, ‘‘as a crucial mode of working-through’’ (ibid.). Reitz reenacts the persecution of the Jewish neighbour both as a reminder of it and as a means of moving away from it: the stone-throwing is repeated, but there is change also, progress away from the past because the story of Matko’s death moves on from the stone-throwing. Unlike the fleeting portrayal of the persecution of Robert’s neighbour, the persecution of Matko has a cathartic culmination.

In *Heimat* victims of xenophobia, Matko and Robert’s Jewish neighbour are being mourned on one level; at the same time, however, Ernst is also being mourned via Matko’s respectful and affectionate emulation of him. In the narrative of Matko’s death Reitz probably seeks a Freudian easing of trauma by means of repetition. Extremely problematically, Reitz indirectly ties the trauma of Ernst’s plane crash to the very different trauma of a Jewish victim of the Nazis, since Matko’s experiences distinctly echo those of both Ernst and Robert’s Jewish neighbour. Tackling trauma via reenactment is older than Freudian practice. As discussed in the previous chapter in relation to Ansgar, Gregory Nagy explains with regard to drama in Ancient Athens that past ‘‘negative actions […] needed to be purified by way of ritual reenactment in the drama of Athenian State Theater’’ (2020: 451). Reitz’s reenactment of the xenophobic scapegoating of Robert’s neighbour in the drama surrounding Matko in part seems to seek to ritually contain the horror of the past by the slightly paradoxical means of partially reenacting that past under controlled conditions to produce a cathartic effect. In the story of Matko’s suicide Reitz partly seeks to ritually contain via sacrificial rites the burden of the National Socialist legacy. Yet it should be noted in Reitz’s favour, however, that he most probably hopes that viewers will have time to sympathise – conceivably, even empathise – with Matko and strengthen their resolve to oppose xenophobic persecution before Reitz cathartically brings to an end the story of Matko’s victimhood as scapegoat and thus releases viewers from having to reflect upon xenophobia, naturally a topic particularly and painfully poignant for morally and historically competent descendants of people who lived under National Socialism. Reitz seeks to make the National Socialist past more bearable for non-persecuted Germans and their

descendants (rather than for those who were persecuted and their descendants) and also sincerely wishes to contribute to preventing future persecution by means of producing filmic drama that is meant to be morally improving for viewers.

Reitz strives for artistic, beautiful deaths. The National-Socialism-associated Nibelungen curse inherited from Ernst is being worked through in the hideous ‘‘Schönheit’’ to which Reitz refers regarding the scene of Matko’s suicide (2004ii: 503), so that Reitz is trying to wrest beauty from a narrative deeply concerned with the legacy of National Socialism – evil is being converted into beautiful (albeit, more appropriately, also disturbing) art. While Reitz, I will argue, is critical of Ernst’s attempts to snatch artistic beauty from the National Socialist legacy in his art collection, Reitz appears to be somewhat guilty of what he criticises in his character. The artistically redemptive element of Matko’s suicide certainly resists the artistic devaluation of Ernst’s legacy that is caused by the lack of appreciation that Meise and the mob show for the estate’s aesthetic rather than financial properties.

Matko’s death makes him a redeemer of Ernst’s legacy. Tragedy often spans the realms of art and morality, and in moral terms, the emotional force of Matko’s death overcomes base material concerns, as illustrated by the greedy and dishonest Meise casting aside his briefcase in repentance when Matko jumps. Besides its role in scapegoating ritual and Reitz’s assertion of the power of art, Matko’s death is further endowed with purpose – as are sacrificial and martyr deaths generally – in that it gives rise to hope for Meise’s eventual moral rehabilitation. There is another instance in *Heimat 3* in which suicide is associated with hope as well as despair: Böckle, the destroyer of Hartmut’s business, has a brief breakdown when telling Hermann the story of a victim of his who committed suicide. Although, admittedly, we do not see Böckle mend his ways, the shock of the debtor’s suicide moves Böckle enough to provoke him into striking up an unsolicited conversation with Hermann, driven by what Koebner aptly describes as a ‘‘Beichtimpuls’’ (2005: 80), and so encourages some hope that Böckle does at least possess a conscience. When Meise casts aside his

briefcase after Matko jumps, his repentance at having largely caused a suicide may be greater than Böckle's, given that the suicide unfolds right before Meise's eyes. The story of Ernst's *Nibelungenhort* and the destruction of the hoard and its owner has travelled some distance from the sordid opportunism that sees Ernst shamelessly exploit the Nazis' effect on the availability of certain forms of art. As Ernst himself says, Otto Müller's paintings – at least one of which ends up in his collection – were categorised as degenerate art by the Nazis; as Ernst does not say, Müller's paintings were stolen by the National Socialist state and publicly displayed as examples of so-called degenerate art. The story of many of Müller's works is thus very significantly intertwined with the Nazis' programmes of mass theft and their ideological supposed justification for the destruction of Jewish people and others such as the Romani subjects of many of Müller's paintings. When Ernst's heir commits suicide he appears, potentially, to show the way to Meise's moral rehabilitation, since the briefcase that Meise abandons symbolises his financial ambition and prioritisation of financial success over moral competence. The narrative of the evils of National Socialism threatens, perhaps, to become slightly lost, therefore, in a less specific narrative of financial greed and potentially becomes a narrative of redemption despite having begun with the unforgivable evil of National Socialism. The de facto rite of confession constituted by Meise's laying down his briefcase suggests that one of the final strands of the *Nibelungenhort* narrative becomes the sort of ''narrative of […] (Christian) redemptive sacrifice'' that Schmitz identifies as a common and potentially problematic feature of German reflections of National Socialism around the millennium (2007i: 14). Given the prominence of xenophobic jealousy and violence in it, the story of Matko's death undoubtedly speaks to Germany's National Socialist history, and Reitz draws on that history not only to condemn National-Socialist-like xenophobia and thuggery but also uses that historical background in a story of the possible redemption of the 1990s present with regard to Meise's briefcase-renouncing apparent belated repentance. As in the first *Heimat*, Reitz condemns xenophobic persecution such as carried out by the Nazis yet also struggles – partly in vain – to resist the temptation to salvage a partial happy ending via confession in the hope of ultimate redemption.

An intriguing feature of the theme of sacrificial death in *Heimat 3* is that, more specifically, a fiery death is either portrayed or alluded to in several instances: Ernst's fatal – and, as I have argued, probably sacrificial – crash sees him enveloped in flames, ''in einem Feuerball'', as Reitz spells out (2004ii: 502); and Clarissa sings Purcell's Dido, and Reitz chooses to show us Dido, as performed by Clarissa, dying by fire (Purcell does not specify the precise form of suicide).[126] Meanwhile, Günderrode's poem, ''Die Malabarischen Witwen'', describes death by fiery self-sacrificial ritual – her poem declares that ''Zum Flammentode gehn […] / Die Frauen, ohne Zagen'', ''Zu ihrem Priester selbst den Tod geweiht'' (and, although the Lorelei figure of Brentano's poem actually ends by descending from a cliff, she also declares, ''legt mich in die Flammen!'' [1801: 508]).[127] It seems overwhelmingly likely that Reitz is well aware of Günderrode's poem about women being sacrificed by fire, especially since a minor character, Toni, comments in relation to Anton's cremation, ''wir sind doch hier net [nicht] in Indien'' (2004ii: 367). Günderrode's poem is set in the subcontinent, and Toni's remark appears to confirm that Reitz refers to Günderrode in *Heimat 3* largely because he shares her interest in sacrificial death, particularly by fire. Günderrode's poem about women sacrificing themselves by burning is also probably very consciously paralleled by Reitz's choice of the part of Dido for Clarissa, since Dido kills herself (in Reitz's depiction, by fire) because she is mourning the loss of her beloved Aeneas. Reitz establishes Clarissa and Hermann in a house that takes its name from a figure whose significance to Reitz lies in an obsession with sacrifice. Lisa Hopkins notes that ''each of the three films is structured around a house'' (2014: 33), and Koebner points out the national extent of the symbolic value of the renovation of the Günderrodehaus: ''parallel zum Aufbau des neuen Staates Deutschland von 1990 an, entsteht aus einer Fachwerk-Ruine ein neues

[126] Clarissa sings a verse using words composed by Günderrode in which ''Tod'' is rhymed with ''glühend Rot'' (Reitz, 2004: 487), emphasising a connection between Clarissa, Dido, Günderrode, death and fire.

[127] With, for instance, its reference to priests, Günderrode's poem very much deploys the trappings of ritual sacrifice. Charlie Louth writes that the poem ''works because it fits the ritual it describes, the self-immolation of Hindu widows on their husbands' funeral-pyres, to the poetic ritual of the sonnet'' (2009: 76). I am citing the poem as it appears in Stephanie Galasso, 2017: no pagination. Galasso notes that the widows' appalling deaths are ''imagined'' as ''sacrifices'' (ibid.). Wendy C. Nielsen writes that ''audiences must read'' the ''violent ends'' of ''Günderrode's women warriors'' ''through the lens of noble sacrifice'' (2013: 84).

[…] Haus'' (2015: 222). As I will briefly discuss again subsequently, the Günderrodehaus is a haunted house; it is disturbed by strange noises and unexpected voices; it is rumoured to be haunted by Günderrode's ghost; its inhabitants are prey to uncanny feelings – for instance, Hermann refers to ''Aufwinde vom Tal, die uns keiner erklären konnte'' (3:3: 10:49), which is indicative of Reitz's depiction of the Günderrodehaus as a place haunted by events that the conscious mind cannot quite understand and that the subconscious makes into a place of fear.[128] As part of her demonstration of the relevance of Freud to the first *Heimat* Gabriel refers to ''Germany's haunted house'' (2004: 155), and in the Günderrodehaus Reitz constructs for the third *Heimat* a symbolic house that needs to be exorcised of uncanny, seemingly supernatural forces that spook the subconscious by suggesting unresolved traumas. These characteristics of the house confirm what is suggested by Reitz's treatment of Matko, as discussed above: namely, that Reitz sees the Germany of the 1990s as a place that still very much entails a need for Freudian psychiatric treatment.[129] The literary figure from whom the house takes its name suggests that echoes of death and sacrifice – echoing like the Lorelei Rock – are what haunts the house around which Reitz symbolically builds the *Heimat* of the third series. As Charlie Louth notes, ''love and death are Günderrode's main preoccupations'' and said ''focus […] and her […] interest in […] mythology, lead her to ritual'' (2009: 76). Nielsen remarks that ''death often symbolizes a path to freedom for Günderrode in her fiction'' (2013: 84). I would argue that Reitz very much also sees in death, more specifically ritualised sacrificial death (in the third series, especially by fire), as a way towards release from the horror of the echoes of Germany's earlier twentieth century.

[128] In Hillman's view Günderrode is but one of many ghosts – ''Wagner […] and his ghosting on the soundtrack complement the strong presence of Schumann, Günderrode, […] the Lorelei […], Caspar David Friedrich'' (2010: 269) – but I would suggest that Günderrode is possibly the most important haunting figure, at least after Wagner.

[129] The link between the house's presented haunted state and National Socialism is suggest by, for instance by, by Hermann's agonising experience with a pine martin trap just outside the Günderrodehaus. The trap recalls the pine martin trap of the first series, and when Hermann stumbles on the trap in *Heimat 3* a reminder of an earlier Germany makes itself very painfully felt.

Sacrifice haunts the Günderrodehaus, the symbolically laden house the centre of *Heimat 3*; sacrifice explains the deaths of Ernst and Matko and troubles Anton's remains. There is a word that can carry the meaning of sacrifice by fire: Holocaust.[130] As if the potential for a relationship between burning bodies and the Holocaust were not already clear enough in a German context, there is a snatch of dialogue in Molz's inn that strengthens this connection: still discussing Anton's cremation, Toni declares ''ihr müsst euch das vorstellen, wie im KZ'' (Reitz, 2004ii: 368). While Toni's obligative appeal to imagine the crematoria of the Holocaust is addressed to fellow patrons in the inn, Reitz is possibly also anxious to direct viewers to associate images of the Holocaust with their picturing of Anton's death.[131] These circumstances, in combination, suggest a sinister fascination on Reitz's part with non-persecuted Germans being consumed by fire, a suspect interest perhaps partially similar to that of which Jörg Friedrich, author of *Der Brand*, has been accused in relation to his depiction of Allied bombing of Germany during the Second World War. (For example, Brad Prager writes that

> even Friedrich's title […] recalls the Greek origins of the term 'holocaust'. His title does little to protect against the exchange of the Germans for the Jews as the primary victims of the violence of the Second World War. *Der Brand* is filled with other similarly problematic uses of language, including the provocative contention that the bomb shelters in which Germans were forced to take refuge grew to be as hot as crematoria

[2005: 312].)

[130] As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, Petrie (2000) provides a body of evidence that the word holocaust, before and also for several decades after the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis, was frequently used in a way partly divorced from its etymological meaning of sacrificial offering made by means of burning; nonetheless, as demonstrated by Petrie's own citations of various accounts of the perceived sacrificial connotations of the term Holocaust as applied to the Nazi-perpetrated genocide, the concept of sacrifice has had a major impact on various influential understandings of the implications of the term Holocaust (for examples, see ibid.: 31-32).

[131] Santner reports the following regarding his interview of Reitz: ''Auschwitz is, in this [Reitz's] view, 'the most extreme example of the *Wegwerfgesellschaft* […]: human beings become refuse''' (1990: 81). Alarmingly, Reitz depicts non-Jewish Germans of the later twentieth century in a somewhat similar way by having Toni discuss people's cremated remains in the following manner: ''dann tun sie die Asche […] verteilen, und was übrig bleibt, tun sie dann heimlich […] auf den Müllberg'' (Reitz, 2004ii: 368).

In the book version, Reitz describes an American military aircraft, a Galaxy plane, Reitz notes, flying over the heads of German anti-nuclear weapon protestors and writes that the aircraft causes an ‘‘Inferno’’ around the German protestors (2004ii: 217), while, on film, the aircraft fills the screen. The protestors are, as Reitz admits (ibid.), in fact unharmed by the aircraft passing overhead – which is any case only a transport aircraft – and yet Reitz gravitates, as in several other instances in *Heimat 3*, towards positioning Germans not persecuted by the Nazis as the victims of fiery annihilation (and the word choice ‘‘Inferno’’ subtly points to infernal forces and is liable to cast Germans as the victims of diabolical evil dedicated to engulfing them in hellfire). Reitz's decision to have Anton cremated rather than buried and his dialogue about cremation tend to bear out Niven's aforementioned remark that (around 2000, so around the period of *Heimat 3*) ‘‘it is as if some Germans would like to appropriate the status of absolute victim generally attributed to the Jews’’ (2006: 15). Reitz's enthusiasm for fiery sacrificial death can be related to Moses' argument that some Germans engage in ‘‘hyper-identification with the terrible fate of the Jews’’ in order ‘‘to release religious-like energies of identity reconstruction’’ (2007ii: 159) by ‘‘identify[ing] with the victims rather than the perpetrators’’, ‘‘by identifying with the sacrifice of Jesus rather than the figure of Pilate’’ (ibid.: 156). Reitz, in (relatively) favourable contrast to the far worse behaviour of which Friedrich has been accused, does not suggest that some Germans were historically treated in much the same way as victims of the Holocaust due to Allied bombing, but Reitz's enthusiastic embrace of a theme of sacrificial death by fire (or, in Anton's case, cremation) in *Heimat 3* is possibly suggestive of a strong urge to experiment, within fiction (rather than in historiography, at least), with making Germans the sacrifice, much as per Moses' aforementioned view of many Germans' thought processes in relation to the Holocaust. Reitz appears to potentially feel, on some mental level, that non-persecuted Germans should be associated with burnt offerings – so, etymologically speaking, Holocausts – of their own, conceivably in order to somewhat balance out, in terms of the ritual work of Reitz's fiction, the genocidal evil perpetrated by the Nazis.

In his apologia on behalf of Walser Reitz suggests that ‘‘unsere jüdischen Kritiker’’ assail non-Jewish German artists from a position of enviably superior communal security because the rather homogeneously depicted Jewish critics of Reitz’s world view ‘‘wissen sich in ihrer Leidens- und Erinnerungsgemeinschaft geborgen’’ (2008: 327). A logical solution to non-Jewish Germans occupying, according to Reitz, a position of inferiority relative to Jewish people would appear to be for Germans to suffer more and thereby establish, with masochistic pleasure, a rival community of suffering. Reitz’s fondness in *Heimat 3* of Germans experiencing fiery destruction would appears to stem for a longing on Reitz’s part for suffering that would, in Reitz’s apparent view, strengthen Germans’ position in relation to the burden of culpability that echoes down from the National Socialist period, like the fall of Lorelei from her rock.[132] Reitz’s outrageous attempt to associate Anton’s cremation with Holocaust crematoria, along with other attempts to make Germans into fiery sacrifices, is probably in part an endeavour to overcome the wider German problem that Schmitz describes thus: ‘‘due to the guilt of the war, praising the German dead as ‘Opfer’ in the sense of sacrifice was impossible’’, which obstructed ‘‘symbolic and ritualized forms of mourning’’ (2010: 29). The extraordinary reference to death camps in relation to Anton being cremated suggests a remarkable determination on Reitz’s part to make it possible to mourn Anton by connecting his death with the genocidal murders that his military service actually allowed to continue, with Anton being associated with the victims, or as Dirk Moses might put it, ‘‘with the sacrifice of Jesus rather than the figure of Pilate’’ (2007ii: 156). In their botching of Anton’s funeral his children accidentally victimise Anton in a sense, and so Reitz endows Anton with a victim status intended by Reitz to make it easier for Anton to be mourned. Admittedly, Anton, a Wehrmacht veteran, is mourned as a family member, decent local employer and football team owner (as Reitz chooses to emphasise [see Reitz,

[132] Reitz’s method of assuaging guilt relating to Jewish suffering by conjuring up images of non-Jewish Germans burning as propitiatory sacrifices is vaguely reminiscent of Santner’s remarks (referred to in my chapter on the first series) on ‘‘the homeopathy of mourning’’ in the first *Heimat* (1990: 79). Taking a somewhat homeopathic approach, in the third series Reitz aims to cure or at least alleviate non-Jewish German suffering caused by awareness of Jewish suffering by supplying imagery of non-Jewish German suffering – to put it slightly differently, Reitz’s answer to Jewish suffering is non-Jewish suffering, which may threaten to engage in the process that Schmitz names ‘‘replacement of the image of perpetrator with that of victim’’ (2006: 105).

2004ii: 367]) rather than as a former soldier fighting for the National Socialist regime. Nonetheless, Reitz appears to be anxious to associate the cremated Anton with the victims of the regime that he actually fought for in order to guard against his past being a barrier to Anton being properly mourned (reflecting the anxieties about mourning that Santner [1990] discussed regarding the first series). To some extent, Reitz maybe even flirts with the post-Holocaust German attitude to National Socialism that Schmitz describes in terms of ''replacement of the image of perpetrator with that of victim'' (2006: 105): Molz the publican asserts of Anton's projected cremation, ''das wär das erste Mal, dat in Schabbach einer verbrannt wird'' (Reitz, 2004ii: 367), a statement that insensitively ignores the fact that some Jewish people who lived in the wider region will undoubtedly have been cremated in Nazi crematoria, albeit not in Schabbach. Reitz has Hermann's brothers, both of whom fought for Hitler, end as ashes, their morally compromised pasts cleansed by fire.[133] The fiery sacrifice of Ernst may well be meant to both channel viewers' pity towards him and appease supernatural forces of justice that Reitz hopes to placate in order to move Germany on and away from the National Socialist past.

Ernst's Museum

In *Heimat 3* art comes closer to offering redemption from the evil of the past – but without being implied to quite achieve this. In Ernst's case, his desire to transform his private collection into a museum – and thus the hoard, as Preusser says, ''der Öffentlichkeit übergeben'' (2013: 204) – can be aptly termed a redeeming feature. He demonstrates a wish to move away from the decades of hoarding and to allow the art to come to life in the light of appreciation rather than forever lying in the darkness of the mountain. Ernst in fact, then, shows signs of escaping from the Nibelungen curse by intending to make his private treasure publicly available. A major moral flaw in his plan, however, constitutes a serious impediment to Ernst escaping the curse: his scheme must be heavily criticised

[133] In the book version Reitz stresses, ''merkwürdig ist, dass nun auch Ernsts Leichnam, wie der seines Bruders Anton […] als Asche beigesetzt wurde'' [2004ii: 457] – it cannot be ''merkwürdig'' for Reitz, since he is the creator of the narrative; rather, he presumably means that readers and viewers must mark well the fiery destruction of the bodies.

for the lack of interest that Ernst shows in establishing (or perhaps, rather, acknowledging) the circumstances under which his collection came on the market. Besides this grave moral deficiency, there is another significant issue regarding what legacy Ernst deserves. If Ernst's plan were to be successful, the museum project would commemorate him as a great patron of the arts, rather than as a profiteer who did not scruple to snap up works very possibly stolen from Jewish owners. After all, Ernst's jocular ''Sesam, öffne dich'' upon unlocking the door into the mountain has a serious implication: it associates him with the story of the Forty Thieves.

Ernst is obsessed with his legacy, as confirmed by his desire for an heir and his simultaneously mocking and envious remark to Anton, apropos of the latter's large family, about ''Unsterblichkeit durch Fortpflanzung''.[134] Now an old man, Ernst is very much aware of his mortality. The museum represents for Ernst a form of posthumous survival. As to what will die with Ernst, it should be noted that – having been a young man in the early 1940s – he has become part of a minority of Germans in terms of having lived through the time of the Holocaust. Writing around three years after *Heimat 3* appeared, Schmitz notes that ''the institutionalisation of the memory of the Holocaust [is] at the heart of contemporary German historical identity'' (2007i: 4). The prominence of this ''institutionalisation'' is due in part to the passing of ''the 'experiential generation''' able to remember life under National Socialism (ibid.: 5), a generation of which Ernst is a member. A museum is an institution, and Ernst intends to use the museum to shape memory in a way that contrasts starkly with the form of ''institutionalisation'' of memory to which Schmitz refers above, for Ernst does not seek to preserve his memories of the National Socialist period in the museum.

In his portrayal of Ernst Reitz shows an abuse of the transition from the individual memory possessed by ''the 'experiential generation''' (Schmitz, ibid.) to what may be termed cultural memory. Ernst sees an opportunity to shape an attractive legacy that will long outlive him in

[134] If it is suicide, Ernst's death can actually be read as a bid for an immortality of sorts, in terms of being such a memorable exit.

features that Aleïda Assmann categorises as aspects of ‘‘kulturelles Gedächtnis’’: that it can be ‘‘transgenerationell’’ or lie in ‘‘materielle Träger’’ (2006: 54) (and Assmann lists museums as a part of ‘‘kulturelles Gedächtnis’’ [ibid.: 58]). I have already discussed how Ernst seeks to shape a transgenerational legacy via Matko. Assmann’s discussion of ‘‘materielle Träger’’ can be usefully applied to Ernst’s paintings and the projected museum to house them. Assmann notes that such ‘‘materiellen Überreste’’ offer a ‘‘Chance eines ›zweiten Lebens‹ in Institutionen’’ (ibid.: 54). In short, Ernst attempts to channel his legacy into two forms of afterlife: one via Matko, as previously discussed, while the second is a museum, which – because it would be created on Ernst’s terms – would doubtless not preserve the memory of his complicity in aspects of National Socialism, but which would establish a role in posterity much more to his liking – that of champion of art. As Assmann remarks, museums are amongst the ‘‘kulturelle Orte, an denen eine Gesellschaft die Überreste und Spuren der Vergangenheit aufbewahrt, nachdem diese ihre lebendigen Bezüge und Kontexte verloren haben’’ (ibid.). The paintings in Ernst’s collection are such an example of what Assmann calls ‘‘den Überresten, die um so vieles langlebiger sind als ihre Besitzer’’ (ibid.), and Ernst hopes that the portion of his afterlife that (according to his plan) will exist in the museum will become separated from the memory of his part in National Socialism – to which his acquisition of the paintings relates – due to the paintings losing the context that they had within Ernst’s lifetime (to adapt and apply to Ernst Assmann’s comment above regarding ‘‘lebendigen Bezüge und Kontexte’’). Ernst talks (to Matko and Tobi) about his hoard in terms of artistic beauty, not in terms of history. Ernst’s planned afterlife is a place of art that is separated from history, leaving Ernst’s place in posterity untarnished by the doubts as to the legitimacy of his acquisition and ownership of the paintings. Furthermore, as Ernst himself remarks (Reitz, 2004ii: 116), Müller’s paintings – such as ‘‘Zigeunerjunge’’, now in Ernst’s possession – fell victim to National Socialist suppression of so-called degenerate art. Ernst shamelessly tries to collect his way into victimhood by casting himself as a champion of such art and to prevent his being remembered as someone who profited from National Socialism. In his planned ‘‘Unsterblichkeit durch Fortpflanzung’’ (to return to a remark Ernst makes

to Anton) Ernst almost intends to become a persecuted painting that has come to life, since Matko is Ernst's chosen heir, an heir that Ernst seems almost to magically coax from the painting, Pygmalion-like. Ernst's longing musings on the painting appear to be made real in Matko, and in his projected legacy Ernst seeks to turn his fantasy version of himself into a reality. Ernst's attempts to translate this fantasy version of himself into reality involve a painting targeted by the Nazis that is of a member of an extremely persecuted group, so that the painting strongly associates Ernst's miraculous heir with victimhood in the form of persecution.

The good aspects of Ernst's plan do not undo his culpability in profiting from art that seems likely to have been dishonestly acquired from Jewish owners; it is not enough to save him from the Nibelungen curse. What emerges from the second and third series' juxtaposition of art and redemption is an assertion of the value of art but also a healthy scepticism regarding its limitations as a means of dealing with the National Socialist past. Preusser argues that scepticism redeems the third series: ''dass die romantische Synthese nachher in den einzelnen Lebensentwürfen auseinander fällt […] rettet im Schluss […] das Gesamtkonzept, das an der Überfülle an Bedeutung zu scheitern schien'' (2013: 190). This leads, Preusser continues, to ''Skeptizismus [that] macht sich breit und lässt alle allein, die in der Euphorie des Wiederbegegnens auf Neues aus waren, das doch nicht zu finden ist'' (ibid.). Scepticism is to be found especially in Reitz's attitude towards art as a cure for the curse of National Socialism – a scepticism that (so I would agree with Preusser) saves the series morally. In line with this scepticism, Ernst is not permitted by Reitz to escape the Nibelungen curse by opening a museum. In contrast to Ernst's overambitious, morally unsatisfactory attempt at self-redemption by art museum, Matko's death is an instance of the art of tragedy having a morally improving effect (at least – Meise's apparent repentance strongly encourages the viewer to hope so). There is, then, also a degree of optimism regarding art's moral power, an optimism that Reitz does not take too far by sanctioning Ernst's attempted abuse of art. Reitz's own, filmic, art in the second and third *Heimat* series is to a large extent an art that explores the possibility of redemption

for Germans, the extent to which their national past dooms them, and what freedom the future may hold.

Satan the American

There is perhaps an attempt at a ''relativising'' Normalisation in Reitz's depiction of the United States of America. In *Heimat 3* characters are clearly still haunted by the past, but not only the National Socialist one. The soon-to-have departed Americans initially haunt the radiators of the Günderrodehaus, which accidentally receive American radio (while Clarissa's tinnitus is another source of noises that haunt her). The ghostly voices emanating from the radiators indicate that in *Heimat 3* ''Germany's haunted house'', as Gabriel refers to the Germany of the first *Heimat* (2004: 155), still has not been exorcised of its ghosts, but now the ghosts' voices are overlaid with American accents. While Ernst is still cursed by the National Socialist past, Hartmut is haunted by an American legacy of destructive capitalism. Buying a decommissioned airbase associated with nuclear weapons and buying into American ideals doom Hartmut in a way somewhat reminiscent of the effect of the Nibelungen curse on Ernst, so that the American Cold War and National Socialist legacies are twinned as destructive powers in *Heimat 3*. This pairing is reinforced by a parallelism between, on the one hand, the earthquake that buries the Nibelungen hoard and causes major property damage elsewhere in Schabbach, and, on the other hand, the formidable vibrations caused by the departing American aircraft, which, as Brady comments, ''shake Schabbach to its foundations as they depart like ponderous birds of death'' (2005iii: no pagination). The earth shaking foreshadows the major tremors that later bury Ernst's collection, so that the tremoring of the earth caused by the aircraft pairs America with National Socialism as a source of evil. Reitz sacrifices nuance and moderation to his desperation to make Americans, as well as and almost even as much as Germans, the villains of his fictional reflection on German history.[135]

[135] As noted in Chapter One, Santner has effectively argued in relation to the first *Heimat* that Americans, rather than the Nazis, are the chief villains in Reitz's world view (1990: 80).

America is not only associated with ghosts and death. As Palfreyman has observed, there is a Faust theme in *Die zweite Heimat* (2000: 193-197). It continues in *Heimat 3*. In the latter there is Mayor Faust of Simmern and brief mention of a Doctor Götte (3:5: 12:16). There is also Böckle, who convinces Hartmut to sell his financial independence and happiness in exchange for the illusion that Hartmut is going to strike gold in the Wild West of business (at one point Hartmut refers admiringly to ''Kalifornisches Büffelleder, direkt aus dem Wilden Westen''). Böckle is, in Koebner's words, ''diabolisch unheimlich[…]'' (2015: 30). Reitz has made plain in an interview that Böckle ''est le diable'' (Eisenreich and O'Neill, 2006: no pagination), and the nature of the deal with Hartmut means that, more specifically, Böckle is a Mephistophelean figure. Böckle is, as Brady says, a ''vampire of capitalism'' (2005iii: no pagination), and Reitz's construction of Böckle points to America-associated capitalism as the key diabolical force in 1990s Germany – an association strengthened by Reitz's intriguing fantasy of an American military aircraft subjecting German peaceful protestors to an ''Inferno'' (Reitz, 2004ii: 217).[136] As discussed by Palfreyman (2000: 193-197), in *Die zweite Heimat* Thomas Mann's National Socialism-orientated approach to Faust dominates with regard to the Faust theme.[137] Mann's Mephistopheles figure declares that German ''Ist gerad recht meine Lieblingssprache. Manchmal versteh ich überhaupt nur Deutsch'' (2007: 326). In *Heimat 3*, however, Mephistopheles prefers American English – the branch of Hell that the tempter Böckle works for operates under the English name Food & Non-Food, and the company's diabolical nature lies in it being part of what Böckle calls ''das amerikanische System''. In short, Reitz has moved away from using Faust to discuss German National Socialist perpetration to using Faust to discuss what he constructs as German victimhood at the hands of American capitalism. Further connections are formed between National Socialism and the impact of America. Costagli argues that in the first *Heimat* disaster (in the form of National Socialism) comes from outside a ''heile Welt der

[136] A complexity of Böckle's character is that, as discussed, he is also shown to be a victim of his employer and to have an inner humanity when he tells Hermann about his victim in Göppingen. But we are given no indication that Böckle's hellish company has any redeeming features, and his Mephistophelean role as its servant is in no doubt.

[137] Although she notes that there are also references to Goethe regarding Faust (ibid.: 195).

Heimat'', whereas in *Heimat 3* ''Gefahr kommt dieses Mal von der Hunsrücker Gemeinschaft selbst'', but with the exception of the outside threat posed by the American system to which Böckle refers (2008: 243). Costagli's observation reveals another parallel between Reitz's portrayal of American influence and National Socialism. *Heimat 3* is a vision of Germany in which National Socialist demons are in the process of being replaced by American diabolical enterprises.

Ghosts and Burial: ''Ritualising'' Normalisation

Lisa Hopkins writes that ''if Germany is Hamlet, then at least it is a country […] where, by the end of the play, closure can be found and the ghosts of the unquiet dead finally laid to rest'' (2014: 37). Krah notes that the final episode ''dem medialen ‹‹Abschied von Schabbach›› (so der Titel der Folge) gewidmet ist'' and includes the symbolic ''Beerdigung von Rudi Molz, der als Gastwirt von Schabbach als ‹‹Seele des Dorfes›› zu Beginn dieser Staffel neu installiert wird'' and ''Einsturz der Höhlen'' (2012: 220). Before Molz's funeral there has already been a symbolic burial: at Anton's funeral in episode four Hermann's first wife says to him, ''dein Bruder war für mich immer der Hunsrück''. Molz's funeral is disturbed by the unfinished business regarding the Nibelungen hoard, which embodies a past yet to be buried, a past that needs to be dealt with before Schabbach's soul can be properly laid to rest. Molz's funeral is disrupted by the earthquake that buries Ernst's collection in the mountain, and with it some of the curse of National Socialism that lies upon it. In an effort to prevent further movement from the mountain, cement is poured into the disturbed ground to stabilise it, rendering the collection still more inaccessible – as Brady comments, the concrete ''entombs the paintings forever'' (2005vi: no pagination), and Lulu refers to the rock and cement now covering the hoard as a ''Sarkophag''. The juxtaposition of Molz's funeral and earthquake emphasises that this sarcophagus is also a part of the burial of Schabbach. Now that the National Socialism-haunted hoard has been entombed Schabbach can be laid to rest. On the other hand, in the very scene in which that past seems to be buried there is at the same time a paradoxical demonstration of the folly of Ernst's attempts to manage the tainted hoard by sealing it in a

mountain and investing in a supposedly impenetrable state-of-the-art door. Ernst's efforts are swept away by the flood – as Martin Brady comments, ''a flood of biblical proportions'' (2005vi: no pagination). To the mythologically inspired closing of the mountain and the treasure being lost to the Rhine are added Biblical overtones of divine judgement washing away sin. Moses writes of ''the [German] intergenerational transmission of moral pollution signified by Holocaust memory'' (2007ii: 142). With Ernst's hoard Reitz explores the transmission of the polluting legacy of National Socialism across generations (mainly from Ernst to Matko, but the curse also nearly drowns Lukas, Ernst's great-nephew when the mountain can no longer contain the hoard). When the flood bursts forth the whole of Schabbach is threatened by the failure of the mountain (and, symbolically, the hoard within) to contain Ernst's cursed legacy. Drawing on and citing Jeffrey Alexander's work, Assmann characterises the Holocaust as a ''symbol of radical evil'' in the following terms: it ''cannot be easily contained; 'it overflows with badness'. […] 'it drips and seeps […] and its seepage polluted everything'''; thus ''German guilt […] spilled over to taint and stigmatize the whole nation'' (2010: 110). Ernst's *Nibelungenhort* symbolises National Socialist evil generally rather than the Holocaust, yet necessarily points indirectly to the Holocaust. Reitz illustrates the failure of Ernst's attempts to contain and shape his tainted legacy in a way that bears a distinct similarity to the imagery of polluting, uncontainable currents quoted above. When the flood at the end of the third series comes close to engulfing the rest of Schabbach as well as the mountain, Ernst's tainted legacy threatens (to adapt Assmann's remark) to ''spill[…] over to taint and stigmatize the whole'' of Schabbach due to the impossibility of containing the hoard in the way that Ernst had planned. Besides also referring to pollution as cited above, Moses argues that historians ''need to be alive to the subterranean biblical themes flowing beneath the surface'' with regard to ''German political emotions'' (2007ii: 142), a comment remarkably applicable to Reitz's fantasy of the mighty Rhine washing away the pollution represented by the tainted *Nibelungenhort*.

At the same time as indulging himself in the fiction of the Rhine purifying Schabbach by drowning Ernst's legacy – that is to say, experimenting in symbolically overcoming the legacy of National

Socialism – Reitz also suggests that it is not possible for Ernst to symbolically contain a legacy tainted by association with National Socialism: with the awesome power of the flood and earthquake Reitz comments shatteringly on the impossibility of Ernst ultimately containing the hoard and the past to which it refers by storing it under lock and key. At the same time, however, that Reitz demonstrates that Ernst's attempts to contain the hoard must fail, Reitz himself does what he does not allow Ernst to get away with: Reitz is determinedly going about his own containment of the *Nibelungenhort* by burying it in the mountain, which collapses in on the hoard due to the cleansing waters of the Rhine sweeping the ground from under Ernst's collection. While Reitz shows that Ernst's symbolic containment of the legacy of National Socialism is doomed, Reitz is very thorough in his own attempted containment of the hoard.

Preusser has compared *Heimat 3*, *Das Wunder von Bern* and Kleist's *Die Hermannsschlacht* as ''Deutsche Gründungsmythen'' (2007). He notes of *Heimat 3* that its ''Held'' is ''auch ein Hermann'' (ibid.: no pagination), doubtless implicitly noting that Reitz's Hermann may well be named after Kleist's defender of the German nation.[138] Preusser argues of *Heimat 3* that ''die scheinbare Heimkehr, die nach den zwei verlorenen Kriegen auch für Deutschland einen neuen Gründungsmythos bereithält, die romantische Synthese will nicht gelingen''; rather ''Skeptizismus macht sich breit'' (ibid.). Reitz is critical of Ernst's attempts to found a museum to house the collection that he describes in terms of the *Nibelungenhort* of myth. Yet I would argue that Reitz is not altogether sceptical about the power of myth to redeem Germany. Reitz declares that Ernst dies ''an Deutschlands mythischstem Ort'' (2004i: 234); Reitz seems to mean the Lorelei Rock, but he also may mean by extension the Rhine that washes its feet. By symbolically locating the legacy of

[138] As I have previously noted, many critics see in Hermann a reflection of Reitz. Yet Reitz does not identify in a straightforward fashion with Hermann as in Arminius: an Italian collection of essays on *Heimat* (Subini [ed.], 2008) amusingly begins by singling out the following remark of Reitz's: ''non sono affatto un tedesco […] e sono nato nell'Hunsrück, una regione dove 2000 anni fa le truppe romane hanno generato molti figli…'' (ibid.: 5). This declaration of Reitz's was presumably selected for an Italian work on *Heimat* as a playful assertion that Reitz is a son of Rome, so an Italian of sorts. Reitz's comment certainly lays some claim to a Roman identity – that is, to an identity that is a shared inheritance for much of Europe and thus probably appeals to Reitz as an attractive partial alternative to being a German of his generation. Reitz is torn between defending and seeking to escape German identity.

National Socialism particularly within the Ernst's *Nibelungenhort* Reitz shows signs of wishing to trap that reality in the more malleable stuff of myth. Reitz's use of the Lorelei Rock as sacrificial altar on which to offer up Ernst and Matko appears to confirm Reitz's desire to deploy the power of places that he regards as mythically potent in order to combat the accursed memories of National Socialism that still trouble his vision of 1990s Germany. The Rhine, the great German river, is enlisted in Reitz's quest to cleanse Germany ahead of the millennium. As in myth, the Rhine drowns the *Nibelungenhort*, and in so doing bathes it in the pliable material of myth. In *Heimat 3* Reitz does not – as Jörg Friedrich has been accused of doing – seek to alter his audience's image of historical Germans' acts under National Socialism in order to emphasise German victimhood at the expense of recognition of the victim status of those whom the Nazis actually persecuted. Reitz does, however, shape his fictional reflection of Germany in accordance with a desire to expel the ghosts of National Socialism from the world of the living, to bind them in burial, and in pursuit of that goal Reitz is attracted to mythic representations of Germany as an attractive alternative to historiography. Confino argues in relation to the first *Heimat* that ''since the 1880s the Heimat idea's symbolic capital enabled Germans to construct mythic pasts'' (1998: 189) and that ''Reitz's approach to understanding the past blends myth and reality'' (ibid.: 200), partly due to ''a moral decision to conceal parts of history and to highlight others'' (ibid.: 202). Koch claims (again, of the first series) ''um den Mythos Heimat erzählen zu können, das Trauma Auschwitz'' ''muß'' ''aus der Geschichte ausgeklammert werden'' (1985: 107). In the third *Heimat* Reitz does not try to force awareness of the Holocaust out of his myth making but rather struggles, with imperfect success, with the temptation to incorporate the National Socialist past into his myth making in ways that involve attempts to constrain the memory of National Socialism within mythic structures (such as the *Nibelungenhort* and the Lorelei fiction that informs Ernst's end) that are more malleable than historical ones and with which Reitz to some extent endeavours, somewhat as per Confino's criticism of the first series, to make the German past seem more bearable, with awareness of its evil neither obliterated not really hidden but carefully contained.

The dialogue's references to the authorities' legal objections to Ernst's hoard, with the mundane rationality of their potential impact on the narrative direction, are largely swept away by the forceful visual spectacle (and loud booming) of the flood and the emotional drama of the need to rescue Lukas Simon from it. The mythologically inspired closing of the mountain and the power of the flood – with its Biblical overtones of divine judgement washing away sin, mixed with the myth of treasure being lost to the Rhine – overshadow rational causality in favour of the supernatural logic of a story that proves committed to being a morality tale. The earthquake in Schabbach punishes the wider community and, immediately after this punishment, contains the National Socialist legacy symbolised by Ernst's *Nibelungenhort*, allowing Schabbach to then move on from the aftershocks of National Socialism with the coming of the new century. The stone that buries the hoard is tellingly likened to a ''Sarkophag'', and Reitz's symbolic burial of the National Socialist legacy threatens to be excessively thorough.[139] Discussing German approaches to trauma relating to National Socialism and ''ritualized forms of mourning […] in support of the coherence of collective and state'', Schmitz notes the particular potency of burial, drawing on Donovan J. Ochs' description of '''funeral rituals with their symbolic behaviour […] as '[a] culture's single most potent 'containment' practice''' (cited in Schmitz, 2010: 29). Reitz invites viewers to mourn the cremated Anton, Ernst, now also turned to ash, and even – by giving it a ''Sarkophag'' – Ernst's misbegotten hoard; this mourning process is aimed at firmly containing the National Socialist past by means of binding rituals. On the other hand, Matko's experience of xenophobic persecution and the reference to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia that *Heimat* makes in telling his story do provide a firm, emotionally charged reminder that some of the hatreds that drove National Socialism have not been contained – unlike the *Nibelungenhort* – and must be fought.

[139] The earthquake disrupts the process of mourning Molz; the emphatic burial of the Nibelungen hoard clears the way for the mourning to resume. Santner remarks of the first *Heimat* that Reitz's preoccupation with achieving a mourning process ''may have costs at the level of moral distinctions and historical judgments which may prove to be exorbitant'' (1990: 72). Reitz's judgement in *Heimat 3* that the time has come to bury the curse is certainly questionable.

After his exertions towards the symbolic containment of the echoing curse of National Socialism Reitz has Clarissa sing, at a party celebrating the passing of Germany's twentieth century, the lyric, ''maybe this time I'll be lucky'' (3:6: 01:33:41), a line that seems to tentatively express the hope that Germany can move on and experience a substantially successful Normalisation. The line is potentially worrying with regard to Reitz's approach to National Socialism, causality and culpability. I have argued that in some instances Reitz portrays characters in the first *Heimat* as culpably complicit in National Socialism rather than – as some have suggested (as noted in my chapter on the first series) – portraying them as victims of fate. The words that Clarissa sings may possibly suggest that at the end of the third series, however, Reitz to some extent forgetfully and longingly inclines towards remembering the evils of the German twentieth century as misfortunes as much as misdeeds. Ideas relatable to fate (in broad terms) crop up several times towards the end of *Heimat 3*. Hermann remarks to Clarissa, ''der Kosmos ist gnadenlos pünktlich'' (3:6: 06:15); in an exchange between two minor characters Udo tells Tellmann, ''wenn wir wegfahren, im Neuen Jahr – da muss was passieren. Das muss einfach sein'' (3:6: 01:32:10). Apropos of *Heimat 3* Reitz refers to Germans as victims of the century rather than having actively, sometimes culpably, shaped it: ''Das 20. Jahrhundert hat die Menschen in Deutschland […] herumgewirbelt'' (2004i: 213), a remark to which one could apply Elsaesser's assertion about the first *Heimat* regarding ''a gratifying identification […] with oneself as victim, if not of history, then of time itself'' (1989: 278). Reitz opines (discussing, it seems, *Heimat 3* particularly but also with reference to the rest of the cycle and his general beliefs), ''welche Protagonisten der Weltgeschichte eigentlich das Rad der Geschichte drehen, ist unbeantwortet''; rather than blaming people for events, he states that ''Geschichte wird von […] anonymen Kräften gemacht''; he plays down the importance of choice – ''der Ausgang von Wahlen […] ist eigentlich nicht der Sieg von Personen […], sondern die Sichtbarmachung von Atmosphären und allgemeinen Stimmungen'' (2004i: 222) – or one might just as well invoke fate. At any rate, Galina declares, ''das Leben ist ein Karrussel'' (3:6: 01:23:05), suggesting the concept of the wheel of fate (which also materialises as a carrousel at the end of the first series, besides having something of

a parallel in Reitz's phrase, cited above, ''Rad der Geschichte''). Reitz's references to a wheel or carrousel of life or time or (implicitly) fate draw on a long figurative tradition. In a book summarising (to cite its title) *Das Weltbild des mittelalterlichen Menschen* Aaron Gurevic notes that ''auf zahllosen Zeichnungen wurde das Rad der Fortuna dargestellt'' and that the concept included ''die Figur des Opfers des unbeständigen Glücks'' (1997 [1972]: 170). In a study of (to cite her title) *Weltbild und Metapher: Untersuchungen zur Philosophie im 18. Jahrhundert* Vanessa Albus shows that the wheel of fate remained a metaphor that some Germans lived by (to adapt the title of George Lakoff's and Mark Johnson's work *Metaphors we live by* [1980]): characterising key views contemporary to the period, Alba writes, ''so hängt es […] vom ‚Rad des Schicksals' ab […]. Ans Rad gefesselt sind […] die Neigungen der Nationen. Sie werden , umgerüttelt ' und vom Schicksal ‚mitgeführt'' (2001: 337) (the word choice ''umgerüttelt'' is reminiscent of Reitz's ''herumgewirbelt'' as cited above [2004i: 213]), and Albus refers to the sense of ''die Ohnmacht des Einzelnen gegenüber der Allmacht der Zeit'' (2001: 337). The wheel of fate is a metaphor that Reitz too seems to live by. Reitz's interest in fate in relation to the third series appears to be twofold: on the one hand, the concept of fate is meant to shield against blameworthiness; also, however, *Heimat 3* continues the process of punishment observable in the preceding two series, fateful punishment for National Socialism that still drives events up until the flood and earthquakes that bury Ernst's collection. Shakespeare wrote that the ''the whirligig of time brings in his revenges'' (*Twelfth Night*, V:I), and Reitz's ''Rad der Geschichte'' also brings revenges, such as when Ernst – who originally began his hoarding of immorally acquired riches in order to save up to buy a plane – dies by plane crash decades later. In *Heimat 3* the wheel of fate that Reitz imagines brings a mountain crashing down on the *Nibelungenhort*; unleashes a flood that both destroys and purifies; most unjustly hurls Matko from the Lorelei Rock to punish Ernst's wrongdoing by dragging the former into a cycle of suicides that echoes down from Brentano's Lorelei and Günderrode; then – as hoped by Clarissa when she sings ''maybe this time I'll be lucky'' – the wheel of fate may perhaps alter its course to mark the coming of a new millennium (according to Christian time marking), content that it has now punished Ernst,

his heir, Anton and the Schabbacher threatened by flooding and the shaking of the earth. While his characters are subject to the all too often viciously spiked wheel of fate, Reitz suggests that as an artist he can to an extent control the vengeful wheel of fate, ''das Rad der Zeit'', stating: ''in gewisser Weise kann man sagen, dass wir mit den Mitteln der Kunst das Zeitkarrussel anhalten'' (2004i: 226).[140] In his filmic ritual drama of cathartic punishment by cursed Nibelungenhort Reitz expels Ernst and Matko from the narrative as scapegoats sacrificed (like Anton's corpse) to propitiate the vengeful ''whirligig of time'', to placate which Reitz lavishes the cleansing powers of both (sacrificial) fire and (flooding) water. In seeking to, on the one hand, contain the Nibelungen curse that destroys Ernst and Matko by ritual means such as burial and, on the other hand, to expel it via scapegoating Reitz strives in *Heimat 3* to use his art to bring to a conclusion the cycle of destruction that is begun by National Socialism in the *Heimat* cycle.

When singing ''maybe this time I'll be lucky'', Clarissa is, as Lisa Hopkins notes, singing a song sung by Sally Bowles in *Cabaret* and Clarissa acts ''like a personified Germany emerging from the shadows of a century in which it […] lost two world wars'' (2014: 30). The emphasis seems misplaced in Reitz's choice of allusion, which includes the lines – sung by Clarissa, ''maybe this time I'll win'' and ''nobody loves me''. Reitz focuses not on those persecuted under National Socialism but rather on non-persecuted Germans and their descendants being apparently unloved. When Clarissa sings Dido we hear her implore, from amidst the flames, ''remember me but forget my fate'' (3:1: 01:23:50), which maybe hints that Reitz is desperate for the Germans of the twentieth century not to be forgotten but sorely tempted to use his art to foster a selective recollection of them, of their ''fate'' – which some people might rather call their decisions.[141] Lisa Hopkins observes that ''Sally Bowles'' is ''neglected by her father'' (ibid.), so a possible implication of the allusion to *Cabaret* is that the

[140] Reitz muses, ''das Erlebnis, mit der Zeit, die im Leben doch unaufhaltsam dahinrauscht, frei umzugehen […] ein ganzes Jahrzehnt in zwölf Filmen zusammenzuraffen, ist wahrhaft befreiend'' (2004i: 226). Reitz is keen to use *Heimat 3* to artistically contain a period of time – one in which the legacy of National Socialism still echoes on – in pursuit of a sense of liberation.

[141] As noted in my chapter on the first *Heimat* Confino complains of the first series that ''Reitz's reliance on memory is predictably selective'' (1998: 200).

descendants of Germans who were not persecuted under National Socialism are victims of their parents, just as they are represented in *Die zweite Heimat* (and as Matko is represented, regarding his spiritual father Ernst and his absent biological parents – Reitz is critical of his mother [see Reitz, 2004ii: 505]). As in the second series, a focus on characters complicit in National Socialism victimising their children threatens to overshadow the representation of those whom the Nazis intentionally persecuted, although Matko constitutes a distinct reminder, at least, of the victims of National Socialist persecution. Sally Bowles is a non-German living in Germany. By casting Clarissa in her mould Reitz almostverges on suggesting that Germans are almost becoming foreigners in Germany, even to the extent that Clarissa turns to English to mark the end of twentieth century Germany – a linguistic choice that forms part of Reitz's stated intention to assert that ''unser Leben immer weniger deutsch wurde'' (2004i: 216), a development in which Reitz sees an opportunity to shed some of Germans' inherited sense of guilt. Reitz wonders (in a somewhat unclear context), ''ist es wirklich wahr, dass wir am Ende des Jahrhunderts auf ein Wunder warten, das ››Wunder von Schabbach‹‹, das uns alle rettet?'' (ibid.). The most miraculous event in Schabbach in *Heimat 3* seems to be the sudden flooding and collapse of the mountain housing Ernst's hoard, cataclysmic events designed to bury the legacy symbolised by the *Nibelungenhort*, and which bury Ernst's misdemeanours almost in a former geological level as well as a millennium that is over by the final moments of *Heimat 3*. Before ritually burying the National Socialist past Reitz relates National Socialism to later xenophobia in Germany and ethnically motivated hatred in the former Yugoslavia, both seeking to make German guilt more bearable by arguing against it being so very exceptional and also sincerely hoping to encourage viewers to reject xenophobia.

## The Fourth *Heimat*: Going Back in Time to Find a Way Forward

### Introduction

*Die andere Heimat: Chronik einer Sehnsucht* (2013) is set in the early 1840s, separated from the beginning of the first *Heimat* by around three quarters of a century, but firmly linked to the beginning of the cycle and *Heimat 3* by location (Schabbach) and the Simon family. This fourth *Heimat* also connects with *Die zweite Heimat* in that all four series display multiple thematic similarities. The fourth *Heimat* series is tied to the rest of the cycle by a common interest in questions of culpability, issues of perpetration and victimhood and fate. In *Die andere Heimat* the central character is Jakob Simon, who idealises indigenous Brazilians and – along with many other Hunsrücker – dreams of escaping to Brazil. Ultimately, however, Jakob remains in the Hunsrück and marries Florinchen, while his brother, Gustav, emigrates to Brazil, married to Jettchen, whom Jakob had wished to marry.

Reitz states, ‘‘Jakob ist ein verborgenes Porträt meines Bruders’’ (2014: 190). Guido Reitz had a similar fascination with Native Americans, especially several South American languages (see ibid.: 190-191). As Georg Seeßlen remarks, however, in Jakob ‘‘genug Edgar Reitz steckt, um die magische Biografie in allen Filmen zu sehen’’ (reproduced in Reitz, 2018: 381). Thomas Wortmann has

observed that ‘‘Jakob ist eine Spiegelfigur des Regisseurs’’ (2014: 36:20) and that ‘‘Reitz schreibt sich in seinen eigenen Film ein’’ (ibid.: 36:55). The cinematography frames Jakob as Reitz’s own reflection: when Reitz shows himself to viewers at the very end of the *Heimat* series, he is playing a humble Hunsrücker seated on the ground in the country, shown in one shot almost at the centre of the screen (4:2: 01:48:30); this shot is soon mirrored by a shot of Jakob sitting on the ground under a tree, with Jakob at the centre of the screen, shot from more or less exactly the same distance as Reitz in the twinned shot, and sitting in very much the same posture (4:2: 01:51:18). The shot of Reitz is directly preceded by a view of Jakob, whom we see looking around him, so that the shot of Reitz is introduced in a way suggestive of a point-of-view shot, as if Jakob is looking at Reitz (and the shot of Jakob looking around is further tied to the shot of Reitz by the continued audibility of Jakob’s heavy breathing after the camera has switched to Reitz). This short sequence at least half-rhymes with Jakob apparently having a vision of Jettchen (4:1: 43:37) – likewise, Jettchen enters the screen as if in a point-of-view shot heralded by a shot of Jakob opening his eyes wide, but it apparently transpires that Jettchen is in fact elsewhere. Reitz thus appears in his text almost as if Jakob were imagining him. The paired shots of Jakob and Reitz present the two to the viewer as equally real inhabitants of the screenworld who mirror each other, reflecting how Jakob is in part a reflection of Reitz and Reitz in turn a reflection of Jakob and *Die andere Heimat*, since Jakob and the rest of the series shape Reitz’s legacy. Jakob seems to reflect also Reitz’s vision of an ideal German hero in the form of a great xenophile who has considerable ability and imagination but refrains from any aggressive imposition of his fantasies on the rest of the world – in stark contrast to Jakob’s brother Gustav. Jakob’s status as Reitz’s take on a German hero revolves around a peaceful enthusiasm for people, cultures and languages beyond Germany that is coupled with a hard-won ability to value his homeland and seek to improve his more immediate surroundings (for instance, by preventing further mechanical accidents) while maintaining dialogue (for example, with Humboldt – played by

Werner Herzog) with regard to more distant places.[142] In his (mediated and intellectual) embrace of the world beyond Germany, Jakob is an antidote to the National Socialist vision of Germany that continues to shadow the background of the fourth series (but less than it does the previous series).[143]

Eithne O'Neill (2013) discusses *Die andere Heimat* particularly in terms of its historical setting, linking this to Romanticism, utopian visions, the portrayal of industrial development in a pastoral setting and migration. Von Moltke has pointed out some of the strong parallels between the first *Heimat* and the fourth (2014: 126), considered aspects of the colonial context, and focuses on how *Die andere Heimat* ''expands the meanings of the titular term, plumbing the complexities of its spatial, (pre)colonial, and sentimental logic'' (ibid.: 130). Koebner gives a wide-ranging account of *Die andere Heimat*, referring particularly to the genesis of the work, migration, the German historical context, the pastoral dimension and style (2015: 237-261). Wortmann (2014) has discussed the fourth series' relationship to the other series, ''Fernweh'' and the importance of written text (referring, for instance, to ''Lesen als Grundlage von Fernweh'' [around 13:00]). Andrea Schmidt has commented on the *Die andere Heimat* as an example of the *Indianerfilm* being comparable to the *Heimatfilm* as ''a form of alternate history'' that can be used for the purpose of ''silencing the past'', the past in question being either National Socialist or colonial (2016: 68). Palfreyman (2019) has analysed the fourth *Heimat* in terms of gender, migration and its relationship to the wider concept of *Heimat*, especially in terms of the fourth *Heimat*'s place in time, and also considers stylistic approach.

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[142] As Koebner comments, in relation to Reitz ''Herzog könnte man als Gegenbeispiel erwähnen'' as ''Typus des Abenteurers'' (2015: 11) (ibid.: 12) (see also Palfreyman, 2019: 115). Schmidt observes that Reitz ''establishes von Humboldt as an alien explorer in his own country'', and notes that ''Humboldt has his assistant set up a telescope'' near ''Schabbach, which von Humboldt renders as foreign'' (2016: 85). Later Humboldt looks at Florinchen, who is quite close to him, and Humboldt's view of Florinchen is communicated to the viewer via a point-of-view shot in which Florinchen is distinctly out of focus (4:2: 01:47:31). Jakob, in contrast, has learnt to appreciate both his surroundings and distant places – as Jakob says, ''Ich brauche nur die Augen zu zumachen [sic], um jedes Ziel zu erreichen'' (Reitz, 2014: 183). Jakob's new maturity lies in an enhancement of his metaphysical vision, which is reflected by the pairing of a nascent beard and glasses – which he only acquires at the end – as the twin signs of his growth as a character.

[143] Wortmann notes that Brazil appears in ''vermittelt'' form (2014: around 19:00). Santner writes in relation to the first *Heimat* and Reitz's anti-Americanism of ''the evil of mediation'' (1990: 85); the fourth series positively celebrates mediation.

Palfreyman has already pointed out that ‘‘the colonist-migrants are both victims and perpetrators’’ (2019: 121), but I add to this point in relation to how the parallels that Reitz constructs between Germans, Jews and Native Americans challenge distinctions between perpetrators and victims.[144] (Other works will be referred to as the need arises.)

My contribution to critical understanding of the *Die andere Heimat* centres around the following issues, which have either not been discussed by critics or only much more briefly referred to. This chapter considers Reitz's at first glance paradoxical, but in fact logical, struggle to, on the one hand, undermine the distinction between perpetrator and victim, coloniser and colonised and, on the other hand, to maintain the distinction between Self and Other and portray a German character as a model anti-racist and philo-Semite. I argue that, in relation to Reitz's attempts to challenge the distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish Gemans, Reitz draws on Old Testament figures in his representation of Jakob and Gustav. The chapter also notes the reversals that make the fourth *Heimat* a tellingly different mirror image of the first *Heimat*, a mirror image in which non-Jewish Germans are portrayed as victims in ways that partly parallel the victimhood of Jewish people under National Socialism. Regarding the relationship between National Socialism and colonialism in *Heimat*, Schmidt has already compared Reitz's treatment of the two, arguing that there is a ‘‘silencing of the past’’ (2016: 68) in both instances. I would argue rather that, like National Socialism in the first *Heimat*, colonialism is not really absent from the fourth *Heimat*, although I agree that Reitz's approach to Native Americans (and National Socialism) is sometimes problematic. In my view Reitz does not aim at the ‘‘silencing’’ to which Scholz refers: instead, he tends, firstly, to be very subtle in his indications of the evils of colonialism (perhaps partly – but not, I think, solely – out of a desire to muffle, but not precisely silence, the screams); secondly, Reitz doubts his ability and right to portray Native Americans. Also, as discussed in my chapter on the first *Heimat*, Reitz values evocative suggestiveness over crude clarity. He intends to encourage viewers to have an awareness

[144] In the same vein Palfreyman points out that ‘‘there are undeniable risks in presenting German colonists as victimised adventurers’’ (2019: 123).

of suffering that is not at all directly shown, although Reitz should, nonetheless, most probably do more to speak in recognition of Native Americans' experiences. I would suggest that the fourth series is not in all respects necessarily best seen, as per Scholz, in the light of ''a form of alternate history'' (2016: 68); it is rather a fiction that lays no claim to be providing a comprehensive history and does not intend to function or be viewed as historiography. Viewers are warned, albeit often subtly, to pay attention to their dependence on particular perspectives and to omissions, and I will argue that Reitz's portrayal of Gustav reflects a strong dislike of colonialist aggression on Reitz's part.

*Heimat*'s Mirror Images

The title *Die andere Heimat* has a doubling effect: the combination of ''andere'', ''Heimat'' in the singular and the definite article implies that the Heimat is one of a pair – although there may be multiple candidates as to what constitutes that pair. As discussed in my second chapter, Palfreyman shows that ''split selves'' are prominent in *Die zweite Heimat*. Doubling and mirroring of characters are also to be found in *Die andere Heimat*. Palfreyman notes that when Jettchen ''takes one last look in the mirror she is doubled and split off from her mirror-sister'' (2019: 117). On the back of that observation, Palfreyman refers to a wider mirroring, a ''mirrored depiction of the Heimat and its other'' (ibid.: 118). She also considers the scope for seeing Jettchen and Florinchen and Jakob and Gustav as contrasting pairs (ibid.: 120); notes an instance of mirroring in plot (ibid.: 122); and compares the fourth *Heimat* to the first in relation to ''a […] mirrored […] pattern of Heimat production'' (ibid.: 112). Wortmann also discusses doubling (''verdoppelt'') in relation to a scene (2014: around 25:40). In her discussion of *Die andere Heimat* Eithne O'Neill briefly suggests another form of pairing: ''le principe thématique et formel de *Heimat*'' revolves around ''l'indissociable lien entre l'obscurité et la clarté, l'envers et la face du destin humain'' (2013: 50). In the fourth *Heimat* the most important pairing, in my view, is of the German Self and the non-German Other. The German hero of the fourth series is Jakob, whom Reitz, as he has stated, based partly on his brother and whom he portrays very affectionately. The Other in the fourth *Heimat* is constituted largely by

the 'Indianer', but I will argue that a key Other in Reitz's conception of the fourth series is a Jewish Other.[145]

As Christopher Wickham observes, ''any definition of ''Heimat'' depends on the definition of its opposite: *Fremde*'' (1991: 42). Relatedly, von Moltke remarks in relation to *Die andere Heimat* that ''*Ferne* [… is] the paradoxical anchor of *Heimat*'' (2014: 125). Discussing identity more generally, Thomas Altfelix declares that ''realizing who one wants to be requires an Other either as model or antithesis'' (2000: 46). The Other Heimat that Reitz's title refers to serves as the ''model or antithesis'' against which the German Heimat of the series is defined: the Other Heimat of Brazil appears to be antithetical to the German one in that, for instance, it is largely imagined or filtered via writing (the letter from Jettchen and Gustav, the books that Jakob reads) rather than shown by the camera, while Jakob's conception of the alternative Heimat of Brazil is also antithetical to his German Heimat in that the former is – so Jakob fancies – a place of freedom, whereas the latter is characterised by oppression and injustice. Another candidate for the Heimat-Other pair is jointly constituted by the twentieth century Heimat versus the nineteenth century Heimat. The Other Heimat that is the 1840s, as opposed to twentieth century Germany, is also antithetical to the twentieth century German Heimat of the other three series in that the hero of the fourth, Jakob, longs (as per the title – … *Chronik einer Sehnsucht*) for the Other, whereas the twentieth century German Heimat firmly secured a place in history as a nation guilty of genocide prompted by extreme xenophobic ideology.[146] As described in previous chapters, Gabriel notes the thematic pairing in the first *Heimat* that combines ''discourses of purity and contamination'' into one ''critique of the dream of purity'' (ibid.: 186). In Gabriel's reading of the first *Heimat* ''violent exclusion'' (ibid.: 187) – of Apollonia, Klärchen and Glasisch, for instance – is indispensable in a critical portrayal by Reitz of

[145] Regarding the term 'Indianer', Schmidt writes: ''I will follow the lead of previous critics'', using it to ''refer[…] to the representations or concept of indigeneity in German culture'' (2016: 54 ft.). It is in any case necessary to use the word 'Indianer' in order to be able to cite from *Die andere Heimat*, and I in turn follow Schmidt and those before her in using the term much as Schmidt defines it above.

[146] Two or more of the previous three series have been discussed in relation to antitheses by Preusser (2007: 177) and Koebner (2008: 207).

notions of ‘‘the idyll of Heimat itself’’ (ibid.: 186), to maintain the purity of which the contaminating ‘‘stranger […] must be repelled’’ (ibid.: 151). Whereas in the first *Heimat* perceived Others are subject to the ‘‘violent exclusion’’ referred to above, instead of wishing to expel perceived outsiders and preserve the purity of the Schabbach Heimat, Jakob’s drive is to penetrate the encircling Hunsrück Heimat boundary in order to reach the faraway Heimat of his dreams. There are Simons and Wiegands, and those who leave Schabbach and those who stay, in both the first and fourth series, but between the two series there is also the difference as well as similarity implied by mirror images: the fourth *Heimat* is intended as antithesis, or even antidote, to the first *Heimat* in that it focuses heavily on a character, hero in fact, who is defined largely by his enthusiasm for the Other (whereas, in the first *Heimat*, there is no hero who seriously opposes the Nazis’ genocidal xenophobia).

Hartmut Lutz uses the term ‘‘Indianthusiasm’’ to describe the phenomenon whereby ‘‘German writers have postulated a special affinity, even brotherhood, between themselves and Indians’’ (2002: 169). Susanne Zantop, taking up Lutz’s term, provides a definition with several aspects that fit Jakob’s approach to Native Americans very neatly: she refers (in commenting on a passage by Karl May) to ‘‘the exoticized, yet sympathetic, even idealizing depiction of the Other’’ and ‘‘the erotic attraction to the Other experienced by the European newcomer’’ as some of ‘‘the elements that fired German ‘Indianthusiasm’’’ (2002: 3). Schmidt sees Reitz’s interest in ‘Indianer’ in the light of a search for ‘‘alternative heritages’’ (2016: 84). While agreeing that ‘Indianer’ are attractive to Reitz as a conceptual opposite to the burdened post-Nazi German national image, I would argue that Reitz is keen to preserve a sense of difference between Germans and ‘Indianer’, rather than trying, as per Schmidt’s argument, to draw on concepts of ‘Indianer’ to attempt ‘‘the displacement or dislocation of *Heimat* into an *Ersatz-heritage*’’ (ibid.: 55); Reitz does not in my view at all suggest that Germans can look upon themselves as having any form of ‘Indianer’ heritage, but rather points to some broad similarities (but no kinship closer than that between Germans and any other non-German people) between Hunsrücker and the indigenous Brazilians in the shadows of the text – as will be further

discussed, they are both positioned as victims of oppression.[147] I will, however, suggest that Reitz seeks to use Biblical Jewish figures as (to use Moses' term [2007ii: 159]) ''functional ancestors''. While the first series at one point implies that the Simons are descendants of Abraham, Reitz does not appear to me to link Native Americans to the Simon family heritage as such.

Jakob displays an ''Indianthusiasm'' that provides a mirror that reflects the imagined Brazilian Other Heimat to show a flattering reflection of Germany. Discussing xenophilia and philo-Semitism as general phenomena, Altfelix argues that ''self-reifying readjustments in subject-positioning will always be considered by the in-group in relation to perceived difference, i.e. *away from the Other* (= xenophobia) or *towards the Other, without intending to arrive* (= xenophilia)'' (2000: 46). If Altfelix's model is to be applied, Reitz, Jakob and ethnic-majority German viewers would constitute the ''in-group'', while 'Indianer' would be the Other. Altfelix's explanation of ''in-group'' self-definition by means of xenophilia accounts for Reitz's decision not to actually arrive in the Other Heimat of Brazil. Altfelix notes that '''non-arrival' needs to be stressed'' (ibid.), partly because – Altfelix observes, drawing on A. Wierlacher – ''the process of learning about otherness involves '[…] recognition of alterity, not its subjugation, […] but instead […] familiarization through […] distance''' (ibid.: 46-47). Thus, Altfelix continues, ''xenophilic approximation of the Other must remain without destination'' (ibid.: 47). Largely, the true destination of Reitz's engagement, via Jakob's longings, with a conceptual Other Heimat is introspection, as reflected in the prominence of mirrors and mirroring shots. Altfelix states that, from a xenophilic perspective, ''the Other assumes a […] passively functional role: acting only as a series of reference points against which the in-group takes self-defining bearings'' (ibid.). To a large extent, the figure of the Other in *Die andere Heimat* is passive, like a mirror that generates mirror images reactively rather than having an independent existence of

[147] Schmidt writes that ''*Indianerkultur* signifies a desire of German culture to return to its imagined roots, an act that erases or changes the past'' (2016: 54). In my view Reitz represents Jakob's xenophilia positively without wanting to make viewers simply forget – or, as envisaged by Schmidt, (subjectively) ''change[…]'' – the evils in the German past. Reitz's / Jakob's xenophilia is, in part, an attempt to atone for, not deny, past (and to some extent ongoing) evils.

its own (although I will argue that, in pursuit of a goal of secondary importance to him, Reitz sometimes seeks to encourage viewers to imagine the realities experienced by Native Americans and how these may differ from Jakob's fantasies). Reitz's use of xenophilia involves an exploitation of Native Americans as concept, yet – since Jakob's fancifulness is so obvious – Reitz at least effectively makes plain that Jakob's conception of Native Americans includes some fictionalisation of their reality. At the same time as acting as antithesis to the German Heimat, the Brazilian Heimat of Jakob's imaginative longings functions as a model for Jakob, a model onto which he can project – in the secure environment of his imagination – his egalitarian and Other-embracing ideals. For viewers as well as for Jakob, the notion of otherness relates to providing a model to emulate: the focus on Jakob's imaginative construction of the world in accordance with what he would like to see is an encouragement to indulge in seeing the German Heimat in a more attractive light than was long possible in the post-Holocaust shadows. Made in and for the twenty-first century, *Die andere Heimat* regales German viewers with a pre-Holocaust Germany for which Reitz appoints as hero a character who longs for the Other, not for the Other's destruction: *Die andere Heimat* is thus antithetical to the Heimat that the Nazis so appallingly stained with blood and also a model for a future Other-embracing Germany that longs for a Heimat other to the National Socialism-tainted one.Von Moltke notes several strong parallels between the first and fourth series (2014: 126). *Die andere Heimat* encourages viewers to compare it particularly with the first *Heimat*. In his discussion of *Die andere Heimat* Koebner makes a loose connection between 1840s and 1930s emigration from Germany, remarking that Germany was in the nineteenth century ''ein Auswanderungsland […] – und ist es in verschiedenen Phasen seiner Geschichte immer wieder gewesen. Nicht zuletzt […], als die Nazis jüdische Mitbürger verfolgten, beraubten, bedrohten, über die Grenzen trieben und ermordeten'' (2015: 250-251). Koebner mentions this after referring to the Hunsrücker suffering under Prussia's ''unmenschlich strengen Maßregelungen'' (ibid.: 250) as one of the motivations for emigrating. Koebner's remark (which acknowledges with good thoroughness the range of evils to which the Nazis subjected Jewish people) reflects a problematic potential reading that Reitz was possibly keen

to encourage. In reality, there plainly were enormously great differences between the levels of injustice suffered, on the one hand, by various groups under the Nazis and, on the other hand, the plight of many Germans under nineteenth century Prussian rule. I would not argue that Reitz wishes to encourage any overly straightforward identification between nineteenth-century German and twentieth-century Jewish suffering under National Socialism. Nonetheless, victims of persecution in the first *Heimat* and the ethnic majority German Schabbacher of the fourth *Heimat* occupy similar positions in terms of expulsion from the Hunsrück *Heimat*.[148] With the fourth series Reitz has gone back in time to portray an earlier mirror image of the later Schabbach as a place of exclusion, with a reverse in perspective whereby ethnic majority Germans, rather than minorities, are now the victims of expulsion (by poverty, tyranny and, as I will discuss, fate) from their Hunsrück *Heimat*. Reitz perhaps seeks to balance out – or even reverse the image of the majority of Germans under the Nazis by emphasising a victim status for their historic counterparts in the fourth series (given that those historic counterparts predominantly do not appear to belong to groups later persecuted by the Nazis).

Jakob, Gustav and Esau

Wortmann has noted that Jakob's middle name, ''Adam'', positions him as an ''Ahnherr'' (2014: 23:55) – although it is ultimately Gustav and Jettchen who, as I will note later, go to a putative paradise containing snakes, emphasising the extent to which Gustav usurps Jakob's potential future. Reitz suggests further connections between Germans – or, more precisely, Simons – and Jewish people. I would argue that Reitz explores questions of migration and ethnicity in the fourth *Heimat* also by drawing on the Biblical Jacob. Jakob is clean-shaven (except at the end); Gustav bearded. The Biblical Jacob remarks that ''Esau my brother *is* a hairy man, and I *am* a smooth man'' (Genesis, XXVII: 2). There is some similarity in the Simon household to the Biblical situation in which ''Isaac

[148] On the prominence of the theme of exclusion in first *Heimat* see Santner, who refers to the ''expulsion'' of ''Appolonia and Klärchen […] from the community'' (1990: 78), and Gabriel, 2004.

loved Esau […] but Rebekah loved Jacob'' (Genesis, XXV: 28), with Jakob's father preferring Gustav to Jakob, while the brothers' mother saves Jakob – and his beloved books (as at the very beginning of *Die andere Heimat*) – from his father's wrath. Jacob wrestles an angel (Genesis, XXXII: 24), while Jakob and Gustav wrestle with one another. Jakob having relationships with both Jettchen and Florinchen and originally preferring Jettchen may be partially inspired by Jacob marrying Leah and Rachel and initially being frustrated in his attempts to marry his first choice. Gustav growing to hate the land of his birth and departing for ever can be related to Esau having ''sold his birthright'' (Genesis, XXV: 33). Jakob is the ancestor of the Hunsrück Simons; Gustav's male line descendants become the Brazilian Simons. While ''Esau *is* Edom'' (Genesis, XXXVI: 8), ''the father of the Edomites'' (ibid.: 9), Jacob becomes Israel (Genesis, XXXII: 28), and his twelve sons become its twelve tribes, so that the allusion creates a parallel between the Hunsrück Simons and Jacob's Jewish descendants, and even between Schabbach and Israel.[149]

In my chapter on the first *Heimat* I discussed multiple links suggested between the Simons and Jewishness. The viewer is also prompted to take note of the potential Jewishness of the surname Simon in *Heimat 3* when Meise says to Hermann ''ganz koscher sind Sie mir jedenfalls gar nicht'' (3:5: 01:30:07), making Hermann a victim of anti-Semitism. (While Hermann does in fact have a Jewish paternal grandmother, Meise does not know this and is latching onto the surname, so that other Simons – who have no known Jewish ancestry – might just as easily have been victimised due to the name). Reitz's drawing on the Biblical Jacob in the fourth *Heimat* combines with the reference in the first *Heimat* to an Abraham Simon (all the more so due to Jacob being a grandson of the Biblical Abraham).

To return to the fourth series, there is also Reitz's choice of ''Exodus'' (2014: 199; 200) for describing the emigration (in the book version), a term with distinct Biblical overtones. Due to its strong Biblical associations, the application of the term *exodus* to the Hunsrück emigrants suggests that they are

[149] Compare von Bülow as cited in my first chapter (1993: 170).

fleeing victims of tyrannical injustice, so that the term has the potential to be seen as referring not only to Jewishness generally but rather also more specifically to Jewish people as victims, since the term *exodus* may direct thoughts to the injustices to which Christian and Jewish scripture refer regarding the circumstances in Egypt out of which Moses led his people. Koebner, who also refers to an ‘‘Exodus der Hunsrücker’’ (2015: 238), suggests that Moses is one of ‘‘mythologische Vorbilder’’ of the figure of the ‘‘›Weggeher‹’’ (2015: 238) (‘‘Weggeher’’ is a term that Reitz has used in his writings). Also drawing on comments of Reitz’s and analysing Reitz’s attitude to Jewish people and ‘‘Weggeher’’, Santner sees Jewish people identified in the first series as ‘‘the archaic embodiment of the ethic of the *Weggeher*’’ (1990: 81). In the fourth *Heimat* the ‘‘Weggeher’’ are non-Jewish Hunsrücker, and, as Koebner’s comment and the influence of Esau illustrate, there is scope for relating these Hunsrücker to Jewish people on the basis of the Biblical parallels that Reitz conjures. Reitz even remarks of Jakob’s imagining of the journey to Brazil that he ‘‘befindet sich im Geiste schon in dem Gelobten Land’’ (2014: 124). Thus, even though Jakob does not ultimately leave, the Brazil of his imagination gestures to Biblical Jewish migration. The emigrating Hunsrücker, these German-Jewish parallels created by Reitz appear to assert, should be seen as the spiritual descendants of Biblical Jews, many of whom were forced into migration by tyrants, rather than instead being seen as the ancestors of the Nazis.

Reitz’s sustained efforts to associate Jewishness with the Simons’ ancestry partially correspond with – but also diverge considerably from – the model proposed by Dirk Moses according to which some ‘‘Germans have made victims of the Holocaust their ancestors’’ (as in adoptive ‘‘functional ancestors’’) (2007ii: 159). Reitz shows very strong signs of wishing to adopt Jewish ancestors on behalf of the Simons and non-Jewish Germans more generally. This adoption very much links the Simons to the victims rather than the perpetrators of the Holocaust (and this despite Eduard Simon becoming mayor of Schabbach during National Socialism), and is relatable to Dirk Moses’ model, in which, by ‘‘identify[ing] with the victims rather than the perpetrators’’, some non-Jewish Germans hope to ‘‘have left their sinful selves behind and walk in grace’’ (ibid.: 156). On the other hand,

Moses associates such behaviour with ‘‘non-German Germans’’ who ‘‘no longer identify with the ‘perpetrator generation,’ their own ancestors’’ (ibid.: 159). On the face of it, the Simons of the fourth *Heimat* are not actually Jewish (they are mostly Protestant but Jakob’s sister converts to Catholicism), while the strong parallels between the first and fourth series encourage viewers to see the Schabbacher of the 1840s as closely related to those of the first series (there is also an ancestral Wiegand), and, as discussed in my first chapter, Reitz tends to encourage to viewers to empathise with and feel akin (as Reitz does himself) to non-persecuted Germans in the first *Heimat*. Reitz does not, then, fit well into Moses’ category of the ‘‘non-German German’’ who does not ‘‘identify with the ‘perpetrator generation’’’ (ibid.). Rather, Reitz seeks to suggest that his non-Jewish German characters are not really different from Jewish people. As in the previous series, Reitz’s efforts in this direction are admirable as an anti-racist endeavour that refutes anti-Semitic notions of there being innate differences (as opposed to differences of position arising from historical circumstances) between Jewish people and non-Jewish Germans, but Reitz’s efforts simultaneously threaten to tend towards denying, or subduing viewers’ awareness of, the vast differences in the treatment that Jewish and non-Jewish people received under (besides often before and after) National Socialism (the shadows of which inform Reitz’s approach to the entire cycle). The potential conflict here between anti-racism and denial of historical differences is a wider issue in ‘‘Indianthusiasm’’ – Katrin Sieg poses the following question in relation to German ‘‘Indianthusiasm’’:

> Is the hobbyists’ revision of biological concepts of ‘race’ […] a welcome step toward overcoming racism? Or does the transformation of Native American identities into cultural roles that can be donned by white Europeans continue the history of cultural theft and ethnic chauvinism?

(2002: 219). Reitz’s use of quasi-Jewish (to return to Moses’ aforementioned phrase) ‘‘functional ancestors’’ for non-Jewish German characters emphatically rejects the Nazis’ notions of race, yet also seems to aim at providing a comforting respite from contemplation of what many Simons and many non-fictional Germans did under National Socialism. Reitz’s rejection of National Socialist beliefs about German ancestry appears to involve additionally a rejection of a need for descendants

of non-persecuted Germans to distinguish between their actual ancestors and the Jewish ancestors that they might like to have. As opposed to the situation envisaged by Moses, in which some Germans ‘‘no longer identify with […] their own ancestors’’ (2007ii: 159) and ‘‘one entity is given up for the benefit of another’’ (ibid.: 157), Reitz suggests that (non-Jewish) Germans can have it both ways: he constructs the Simons of the fourth *Heimat* as both ancestors of the non-Jewish and non-persecuted Simons of the first *Heimat* and also as quasi-Jewish. Reitz thus more or less assimilates into one family the identities of the groups (non-Jewish German on the one hand and Jewish on the other) of the groups from which (respectively) the perpetrators and victims of the Holocaust emerge in the historic reality that follows the historical setting of *Die andere Heimat*.

Altfelix argues that ‘‘philosemitic attitudes towards Jewishness in the post-Holocaust era represent […] positive in-group re-evaluation via an ostentatious display of xenophilia towards a discriminated out-group’’ (2000: 42). He suggests that the ‘‘positive evaluations of the out-group’’ (ibid.: 42) can very much involve ‘‘striving for self-benefit’’ (ibid.), the benefit of the ‘‘in-group’’ rather than the ‘‘out-group’’: ‘‘displaying xenophilia’’ can be ‘‘for the sake of in-group status enhancement’’ (ibid: 53). To apply Altfelix’s model to the fourth *Heimat*, Reitz (and other Germans who were not persecuted under National Socialism) and his character Jakob belong to the majority ‘‘in-group’’, along with most of the characters of the fourth series (although the minor characters Margot and Fürchtegott are heavily marked as internal outsiders). The ‘‘out-groups’’, meanwhile, are constituted by the ‘Indianer’ of Jakob’s imaginings and by Jewish people. In Reitz’s representations of them, ‘Indianer’, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Jewish people fulfil broadly the same role as victimised ‘‘out-groups’’. Altfelix argues that ‘‘philosemitic tendencies are accompanied by a general celebration of difference’’; that, ‘‘consequently, in the wake of the Holocaust, the ‘suffering Jew’ has become an object of xenophilia amenable to all national narratives’’; and, relatedly, refers to ‘‘abstractions of ‘the Jew’’’ (ibid.: 55). In relation to philo-Semitism Altfelix defines ‘‘abstraction’’ as ‘‘refashioning and re-presenting the Other so as to make its image amenable to’’ (ibid.: 49), amongst other things, ‘‘reflect[ing] well upon the in-group’’ (ibid.: 50). Reitz’s enthusiasm for a Native

American Other perhaps reflects a preference for an Other towards which non-Jewish Germans can feel far less guilty, on a historical national level, than they – particularly Germans of Reitz's generation – tend to feel in relation to a Jewish perceived Other. The idea of 'Indianer' in the fourth *Heimat* to a large extent serves as a somewhat generic concept of Otherness, and partly as an abstracted, translated reflection of the Jewish Other that has played a far larger role in German history. Regarding the similarity between 'Indianer' and Jewish people as concepts in the fourth *Heimat* I will also argue subsequently in this chapter that 'Indianer' are represented in the fourth series in a way similar to that in which Jewish people are (indirectly) represented in the first *Heimat*. A complicating factor in Reitz's portrayal of ''in-groups'' and ''out-groups'' is that Reitz also associates the ''in-group'', the Simons, with Jewishness, drawing on the Old Testament to make Jakob an Old-Testament-inspired patriarch of the Simons of the series set in later periods; furthermore, Jakob – who is jokingly called the ''Indianer'' by fellow Schabbacher – sees the Other, in the form of the 'Indianer' of his imaginings, in himself (or, one could just as well say – he sees himself in the Other, in pleasing contrast to the Nazis' catastrophic lack of empathy towards those whom they saw as Other to themselves).[150] When Meise, one of the most obvious villains of the third series, directs the aforementioned anti-Semitic remark at Hermann viewers are primed by Reitz's sympathetic portrayal of Hermann (rather than only by general disapproval of anti-Semitism) to condemn the pleasure that Meise visibly derives from accusing someone with a possibly Jewish-sounding name of not being ''koscher''. In *Die andere Heimat* Reitz not only condemns anti-Semitism but shows a positive liking for Jewish origin stories in wishing to adaptively borrow them for the Simons. Reitz's character Jakob draws quite heavily on the Biblical Jacob and Reitz's characterisation suggests that he is well disposed towards his source, which he follows in casting Jakob as the hero

[150] Viewers are told that ''im Dorf nennen sie ihn schon den Indianer'' (4:1: 18:00). Jakob's uncle refers to him as ''unser Indianer'' (4:1: 42:32). At the very beginning, Jakob's father complains that Jakob sees himself as an ''Indianer'' (around 4:1: 02:30).

and Gustav, like Esau and the Edomites in Jewish scripture, more negatively (I will discuss Reitz's condemnation of Gustav later).

Anthony D. Kauders regrets what he regards as a widespread tendency whereby ''historians choose potential philo-Semites only to show that their philo-Semitism was a cynical machination'' (2003: 109) and ''assum[e] that philo-Semitism is anti-Semitism in disguise'' (ibid.: 112). It seems overwhelmingly likely that Reitz's xenophilia, which at times includes philo-Semitism, is not solely a self-serving performance, not only, to return to Altfelix's model, ''for the sake of in-group status enhancement'' (2000: 53). Jakob's xenophilia reflects a genuine willingness on Reitz's part to look positively on those whose identities differ from his own and to condemn xenophobic persecution (as Reitz clearly does in relation to Matko in the third series and Apollonia in the first). Reitz's enthusiasm for associating the Simons with Jewish people and also Jewish ancestry shows that Reitz is happy to conceive of Germans as people whose ancestors could perfectly well and desirably include the Jewish Abraham Simon who – for a moment in the first series – seems to be one of the family's progenitors. Nonetheless, Reitz's creation of Jakob simultaneously also serves a less altruistic purpose: Jakob is also a reassuring character for Germans to add to their inventory of images of ''in-group'' Germans, an addition designed to balance out the terrifying images of genocidal xenophobes that have for decades necessarily traumatised decent Germans looking at the long reflections cast by the mirror of German national self-image. Jakob is conceived as a xenophilic role model suitable for assuaging, by fictional example, common German anxieties surrounding xenophobia in relation to their self-image. Very problematically, Jakob's association with the Biblical Jacob may well in part reflect a desire, effectively, to obscure via association with Jewishness the National Socialist-era Simons' status as people who were not, in fact, persecuted.

Reitz wages war on the haunting image of the German as perpetrator – this is the ultimate objective of both his undermining of the perpetrator Self and victimised Other distinction in the fourth *Heimat* and also of his exertions to portray his hero, Jakob, as an ''in-group'' German Self that longs lovingly

for the Other. Thus – no matter how metaphysically present they may be in Jakob's daydreaming – the 'Indianer' are still plainly outside Schabbach physically and distinct from Jakob (and, in reality, distinct from his imaginings of them); likewise, although the Old Testament figures Jacob and Esau are echoed in Jakob and Gustav, the latter two are still German Protestants without known actual Jewish ancestry. So, ''in-group'' and ''out-group'' remain notably separate in the fourth *Heimat*, but the most prominent character in the ''in-group'', Jakob, is designed to reap moral credit by identifying with an ''out-group'' ('Indianer'), while Reitz also aims to improve the image of non-Jewish Germans by asserting similarities between the Simons, an ''in-group'' family, and the most famous ''out-group'' in German history, namely Jewish people (to note that Jewish people have calamitously been often treated as an ''out-group'' in German and wider European history is not to endorse any notion that they are inevitably or should have been treated in exclusionary fashion). Reitz partially bridges a key ''in-group''-''out-group'' divide in an attempt to atone for ''in-group'' Germans' persecution of ''out-groups'', including Jewish people; Reitz also perhaps seeks to narrow that dividing gulf in the hope of slightly dampening awareness of, the related perpetrator-victim dichotomy under National Socialism that has naturally stigmatised (non-persecuted) Germans (and their descendants) over the course of Reitz's lifetime from the age of about twelve onwards.

The categories of ''in-group'' and ''out-group'' are significantly blurred in Die andere Heimat, due to Reitz's project to undermine distinctions between members of ''in-groups'' guilty of, or at least associated with, persecution of members of (at any rate, perceived) ''out-groups''. Nonetheless, it also suits Reitz's purposes to only partially undermine the distinction between members of the ''in-group'' and the ''out-group[s]'', since, as Altfelix argues, ''positive evaluations of the out-group may be particularly useful for the xenophile'' (ibid.). Altfelix observes that ''if there were a fusion of Self and Other, it would not only signify the surrender of self-identity […], but also cause a dissolution of difference depriving the act of xenophilia of any meaning'' (ibid.: 46). To be given credit for xenophilia, Reitz must juggle two tendencies that enjoy low mutual compatibility: he must challenge boundaries between the Self and the Other; he must not, however, demolish these boundaries too

thoroughly, lest he should deprive himself of the credit for making forays across boundaries. This juggling act explains an exchange between Jakob and his friend Olm, in which Jakob likens dialects of a Native American language to dialectal distinctions in the Hunsrück. In agreement with Jakob's assertion of similarity between Hunsrücker and the speakers of the relevant Native American language, Olm comments, ''die Menschen sind eben überall gleich'' (2014: 117), but Reitz must then have Jakob challenge Olm's conclusion in order to assert a sufficient degree of difference for viewers to give Jakob (and Reitz) credit for xenophilia, so Jakob responds to Olm, ''nein, wenn's so einfach wär', bräucht ja keiner mehr auszuwandern'' (ibid.). Reitz seeks to challenge the distinction between German ''in-group'' Self and Other in order to bridge the divide between, on the one hand, the image of the German (not persecuted under National Socialism) as perpetrator or at least accomplice and, on the other hand, victimised ''out-group''; yet Reitz also seeks to maintain a distinction between ''in-group'' Germans and Others so that Jakob, plainly Reitz's hero and maybe his idea of an ideal German, can cross the Self-Other divide to redemptively defy National Socialist ideology and provide a positive role model for German viewers, a role model whom probably Reitz intends (as per his use of Matko in *Heimat 3*) to point German viewers towards anti-xenophobic self-improvement, should such improvement be necessary.

Although it is necessary for Reitz to maintain a degree of distance (which stems particularly from sheer physical distance) between Jakob and Native American Others, Jakob's ''Indianthusiasm'' is very marked, and Jakob insists on a partial unity spanning all humanity. While Jakob tells Olm that there are differences between peoples, he also declares that they are still all fundamentally related: ''es muss ebbes [etwas] gebe[n], was alle Sprachen miteinander verbindet'' (2014: 117).[151] In his acceptance of his membership as part of a world-spanning wider human family from which no peoples can reasonably be excluded, Jakob emphatically refutes the (il)logic of the Nazis that Reitz

[151] Reitz's comments in the book version reinforce this assertion of universal kinship between all peoples: ''er [Jakob] sucht nach einem Wort, an dem er Olm zeigen kann, dass alle Menschen nach dem Ausdruck von Gefühlen suchen, das sie alle kennen'', the answer being ''Mutter!'' (2014: 117).

critically engages with in the first series. In an article discussing National Socialism and colonialism Matthew P. Fitzpatrick begins by citing and summarising from *Mein Kampf*:

> Until the time of Frederick the Great, he [Hitler] argues, 'it still entered no one's head to regard the Jews as anything else but a 'foreign' people.' Thereafter, he asserted, came a period of transition wherein Jews 'had the effrontery to turn Germanic.' The rest of the chapter […] presents the reader with a vitriolic casting out of Jews, described as 'parasites' and a 'noxious bacillus,' from the German body politic.

(2008: 477). Hitler's description of Jews as a ''bacillus'' appears to have found its way into a scene in the first *Heimat* featuring Katharina's determination to thoroughly clean Pauline's wound, which, not coincidentally, it would seem, results from a fragment of glass broken by thugs stoning the window of a Jewish man. As Gabriel has noted, the cut triggers Katharina's ''superstitions'' in relation to ''contamination'', and is relatable to the Holocaust (2004: 159). One would expect Katharina to be worried about infections generally, yet she specifically expresses her fear of a bacillus. In this scene Reitz shows Katharina to be participating in the paranoid terror of infection from supposedly alien bodies of people that gripped millions of those Germans who were not persecuted by the Nazis. Katharina's act of cleansing alludes to hatred and violence unsurpassed; yet on a surface level it is an act of not only innocuous but admirable maternal devotion to her daughter. Worryingly, Reitz criticises Katharina and millions of other Germans who did not prevent the rise of National Socialism in a covert way that overtly praises Katharina. Reitz's ambivalent policy of revealing and concealing characters' complicity in National Socialism is certainly highly problematic in terms of the scope for viewers drawing undesirable conclusions. Nonetheless, the scene of cleansing is still a condemnatory acknowledgement of what Fitzpatrick is describing as cited above: Hitler's obsession with ''casting out […] Jews, described as […] a 'noxious bacillus,' from the

German body'' (ibid.).[152] Katharina's cleansing fails: Reitz's verdict on the viability of producing a German Self separate from the wider world.

The cause of Pauline's injury is shown to be the xenophobia of her compatriots, and in *Die andere Heimat* Reitz again counters the Nazi-like mindset (exemplified by Hitler's comments as cited by Fitzpatrick [ibid.]) whereby Germans are at risk of infection from those considered to be outsiders. In the fourth series disease – which is a significant theme and carries off Jettchen's first child – spreads within the community without being associated with harmful external influences (the doctor wonders whether he spreads it, but he is not at all presented as an outsider or malevolent force). Jakob's xenophilic ''Indianthusiasm'' does not unleash any plagues or other disasters whatsoever upon his community, and his belief in the importance of looking beyond the confines of the village by reading is emphatically vindicated when his reading leads him to build a safe steam engine featuring correct usage of a governor. Jakob's correspondence with Humboldt apparently revolves around comparative linguistics and the difference between language and dialect (which Reitz perhaps treats as less subjective than it is). Jakob's interest in the relationships between languages stems from a wider conviction that human groups can and should be related to another by means of comparison – not in pursuit of hierarchisation, with all the evils potentially entailed thereby, but rather in the spirit of emphasising the shared underlying humanity of all peoples, an ultimate oneness that emphasises the fundamental falsity of National Socialist beliefs about supposed German racial exceptionalism. Whereas Hitler obsessed over the psychological erection of racial boundaries, Jakob's labours are directed towards that ''was alle Sprachen miteinander verbindet'' (2014: 117). While German xenophilia in the fourth *Heimat* is partly self-serving, Reitz also aims to serve humanity as a whole by having his hero devote himself to the recognition of relationships between languages and, by extension, their speakers.

[152] Katharina and Hitler may seem to be radically opposed figures in the first *Heimat*, yet Hitler is in fact cast in a maternal light by Lucie likening him to her mother.

After citing Hitler's ranting as quoted above, Fitzpatrick then draws on Julia Kristeva and Lacan to relate mirrors and mirroring to sense of Self (2008: 477-479) – as noted earlier, mirror images are a theme in the fourth *Heimat*. Fitzpatrick uses Kristeva's work to better understand why Hitler raved that ''Jews 'had the effrontery to turn Germanic''' and had to be removed (2008: 477). As Fitzpatrick shows, Kristeva's concept of the ''abject'' serves admirably to explain how ''in seeking to expel the 'Germanic Jews' from the *Volkskörper*, Hitler sought to expel that part of the German self that, in his view, was a source of weakness and taint'' (ibid.). Fitzpatrick summarises Kristeva's concept of the ''abject'' thus: ''the abject, that which was once considered a part of the self, is apprehended as the unclean detritus of the self that evokes a powerful sense of disgust, […] and a desire to expel that impure element''; ''the abject is neither self nor other'' (ibid.: 478). By countering Olm's suggestion that all people(s) are ''gleich'' (Reitz, 2014: 117), Jakob denies that the Native American Other shares a Self with Olm and himself; Jakob also, on the other hand, plainly identifies strongly with Native Americans and stresses that all languages (and people) are connected. Jakob's ''Indianthusiasm'' is the specific form taken by his love of humanity's having both diversity and common ground, and Jakob's personal form of ''Indianthusiasm'' does not (at least not always) work in the dichotomous terms of Self or Other: rather, Jakob and Native Americans are not, as he tells Olm, the same – that is to say, sharers of one particular Self constituting a subdivision of the human family; instead Jakob sees Native Americans and himself as different, yet crucially connected, members of humanity, which is not quite the same as viewing them as fundamentally Other to himself. Reitz, via Jakob, champions an alternative to the ''abject'', an alternative that entails acceptance rather than rejection of those seen as related to but outside the Self – in other words, Reitz advocates a mode of seeing people(s) that is capable of operating beyond the dichotomy of Self or Other and of viewing groups positively as possessors of a specific identity to which not all people can rightly lay claim, but which nonetheless is related to one's own identity insofar as one is a fellow stakeholder in the human family as a whole. Thus, when Jakob makes what seems to be an amorous declaration to Jettchen in a Native American language, viewers can, as human beings, understand an underlying

(most probably) romantic meaning even though their (linguistic et cetera) identities are understood to be distinct from the mores specific identity of the native speakers of the language.

To return to Fitzpatrick, he explains why he cites Hitler on the Self and Kristeva on the ‘‘abject’’ in order to introduce a discussion of National Socialism and German colonialism by relating the following key questions to ‘‘delineation between the self and the other’’ and ‘‘the Kristevan notion of the abject’’: ‘‘can epistemological continuities (which might have translated into material continuities) in the delineation of national identity be traced between the colonial and Nazi eras?’’; ‘‘how well do comparisons between the status of Jews under the Nazi *Weltanschauung* and colonized peoples […] hold up?’’ (2008: 479). The aforementioned similarities and contrasts between the first and fourth series show that Reitz is interested in similar questions, and he too explores them via extensive engagement with notions of Self and Other. Before further discussing how Reitz may be answering these questions it will be useful to give more consideration to how ‘Indianer’, plainly on the filmic text’s most important Others, are approached by Reitz.‘Indianer’

Jakob’s image of Native Americans is a dominant feature of *Die andere Heimat*. Brazil is more particularly the focus of Jakob’s longing, but images of South America as a whole and in fact also North America are highly relevant. German and wider European conceptions of indigenous peoples are often in general to an extent applicable across the Americas, as demonstrated by the use of Native Americans (or Jakob’s term ‘Indianer’) to describe indigenous peoples in both Americas. Furthermore, Reitz’s recalls, ‘‘interessanterweise fand sich in Guidos wissenschaftlicher Bibliothek auch der gesamte Karl May’’ (2014: 190). May is famous for his novels about Apache (so North American) characters. As a major source of inspiration for the fourth *Heimat*, Guido Reitz would appear, then, to have pointed Edgar Reitz towards material relating to Native Americans that spans both Americas while also embracing both fact and fiction. The relevance of North American Native Americans to the fourth *Heimat* is additionally demonstrated by the fourth series’ visual style: Philipp Stadelmaier observes that at times ‘‘erinnert Reitz’ vierstündiges Epos natürlich an

Siedlertrecks aus den Western'' (reproduced in Reitz, 2018: 378). In considering *Die andere Heimat* it makes sense to take a broad view, encompassing both Americas, of German approaches to Native Americans.

Jakob looks towards the New World, more precisely, Brazil, as an ideal future, and his image of Brazil is populated particularly by indigenous Brazilians, rather than the European colonists whom he would joining in pushing into new territory. As Palfreyman observes, ''the colonist-migrants are both victims and perpetrators'' (2019: 121). Germans are potential beneficiaries of the European colonialist expansion that promises the conquest of new territories at the expense of indigenous Brazilians. As I will discuss later in connection to the reality in Brazil, their letter to Schabbach strongly suggests that Jettchen and Gustav will play an active role in expanding the area under effective European control. Von Moltke comments that ''to equate Jakob's (and, for that matter, Humboldt's) learning with a colonial project would be to confuse knowledge with conquest, and travel with subjugation'', although he also writes that ''the colonial context undeniably colors the historical narrative'', that ''the film compels us to consider the place of colonial fantasies in the German imagination'' (ibid.: 129), and that ''colonialism'' is ''palpable just below the surface of the plot'' (ibid.: 130). There is, however, a significant difference between Jakob and Humboldt in terms of financial circumstances. Although Palfreyman notes that historically some German arrivals in Brazil ''did in fact return, disappointed by the conditions they encountered'', she also remarks of Reitz's presentation of Jettchen's and Gustav's emigration that ''for people of their means and social class, it is implied, there is no going back'' (2019: 117) (see also Koebner, 2015: 251). Having travelled, Jakob would most probably be obliged to become a permanent settler, and it is quite likely that he would not be settling on land that was previously unused. Describing the misdeeds of some German settlers in Brazil not so very long before the fourth *Heimat*'s setting, Yuko Miki writes of some ''German colonists who arrived'' in Brazil the years leading up 1822 that they '' found themselves on the battlefield of an anti-Indian war'' and that ''their readiness to subdue the region's 'savage' Indians had played no small part in the Crown's decision to give them a land grant

(*sesmaria*) in 1819'' (2014: 1) – Gustav and Jettchen are similarly allotted land by the (slightly later) imperial authorities. Miki argues that these German settlers in Brazil may not have originally intended violence, yet nonetheless became deeply implicated in evil: ''they may not have foreseen the remarkable cycle of violence they would help unleash in the new nation'' (ibid.). Jakob's in part scholarly interest in indigenous Brazilians makes his interest in them appear benign, but when Jakob is on the verge of leaving for Brazil he is in fact also on the threshold of a journey that would lead him to most probably become complicit in aggressive colonial expansion.

Barbara Rossi observes that Werner Herzog in his cameo as Humboldt, probably the most famous figure in the history of German engagement with South America, has ''una duplice identità'' that creates a continuity between nineteenth-century German interest in South America and the New German Cinema (2019: 68). Andrea Schmidt considers the fourth *Heimat* in relation to her discussion of Herzog's *Fitzcarraldo* and how ''if the silencing of the [National Socialist] past occurs in the *Heimatfilm*, the same takes place with the *Indianerfilm*. It not only provides a form of alternate history, but also 'silences' indigeneity'' (2016: 68). Schmidt also writes that in *Die andere Heimat* ''Herzog plays a historical figure that perpetuated the absence of indigenous voices in European cartography'' (2016: 84), and that including ''Herzog in the film makes reference to his time spent in South America, perpetuating an imaginary of the indigenous peoples based on Westernized frameworks'' (ibid.). As Schmidt says, there are indeed no indigenous voices in *Die andere Heimat*, and this is naturally a serious issue. Bearing in mind Reitz's earlier work and beliefs, it is, however, possible to see some good intentions underlying this problematic absence. I would agree with Schmidt that Reitz portrays Native Americans in the fourth series and Jewish people in the first series in a similar fashion (she writes that the first *Heimat* ''engages in a silencing of the past through the lack of acknowledgement to the Holocaust'', much as in her view Herzog's cameo, for instance, renders *Die andere Heimat* complicit in ''perpetuat[ing] the absence of indigenous voices'' [2016: 84]). Nonetheless, in my view the persecution of Jewish people or Native Americans is not so thoroughly absent from either filmic text (although they both sometimes portray persecution and

various groups problematically). There is, however, in both series a focus on (non-Jewish) German suffering that seriously threatens to be foregrounded at the expense of viewers' perception of the suffering of groups victimised by Germans, while acknowledgement of persecution of Native Americans – like acknowledgement of genocide in the first *Heimat* – is acknowledged perhaps oversubtly for some viewers.

Palfreyman argues that ''we are bound […] to hear the uncomfortable silence of the indigenous voices of South America'' (2019: 121). Palfreyman's comment can usefully be seen in relation to a line of defence that various critics have used in support of Reitz's approach to the Holocaust in the first *Heimat*: as described in my chapter on the first *Heimat*, it has been asserted in Reitz's defence that viewers will necessarily see much that is not shown, including the Holocaust, in their mind's eye despite its onscreen absence. Palfreyman writes that ''Jettchen cannot greet indigenous Brazilians who have been seemingly cleared away'' (ibid.). I would agree that the indigenous Brazilians – without their voices or any photographic images of them at all appearing – appear in Reitz's narrative to have been expelled from their land. (I will elaborate later on the indications that Reitz includes as to the experience of indigenous Brazilians.)

Reitz particularly encourages viewers to perceive parts of the wider historical reality that lies beyond his story. As noted in my chapter on the first *Heimat*, Creeber argues that the first series makes plain that the occurrences portrayed ''are not *real* events taking place, that they are being 'filtered' by something or someone'' (2004: 40). Viewers are likely to speculate as to how reality may compare with Jakob's fantasies, and to notice that they are heavily dependent on the filtering of Jakob's perspective, encouraging viewers to consider how others – including the indigenous people who are the object of Jakob's fantasies – actually experience Brazil. Although viewers see books about South America that Jakob is reading, and these books may at first seem to potentially offer a perspective on Brazil separate to Jakob's, it is strongly emphasised that the viewer only sees the books through Jakob's eyes: for instance, we see a page, with an illustration of Native Americans, that Jakob is

reading superimposed over a close-up of Jakob's eyes (4:1: 21:05). The cinematography also encourages viewers to note the significance of perspective in, for instance, a sequence in which the viewer first sees Jakob imagining Jettchen (4:1: 43:37): the camera picks out Jakob's eyes and then shifts to Jettchen in a point-of-view shot; then it becomes clear, however, that Jettchen is in fact elsewhere, beyond the reach of Jakob's eyes; after this, Jettchen is shown reflected in some water (4:1: 43:49). Consequently, perspective has shifted in quick succession from Jakob's mind's eye to the camera showing Jettchen alone independently of any character's perspective, after which the shot of Jettchen's reflection shows Jettchen looking at her watery reflection, potentially prompting viewers to reflect on how Jettchen sees herself and how this may differ from Jakob's vision of her (Palfreyman comments on a partially similar scene in which Jettchen ''is doubled and split off from her mirror-sister'' [2019: 117]). The care that Reitz takes to show Jettchen seeing herself also reflects the importance that he attaches to seeing oneself in relation to identity construction. As discussed earlier, Matthias does not appear, so it is explained, with the other dead at the end of the first *Heimat* because he is blind; his having become blind would not prevent sighted members of Reitz's audience from seeing him, but Reitz encourages viewers to imagine Matthias as he perceives himself rather than as the other dead perceive him (so as someone who no longer sees himself physically). With Matthias at the end of the first *Heimat* and Jettchen when she sees herself in the mirror or the pond Reitz invites viewers to look beyond themselves and endeavour to imaginatively understand how people perceive themselves. Although Native Americans are, and problematically, completely invisible on the screen of *Die andere Heimat*, over the course of the cycle Reitz at least seeks to prompt viewers to reach out with their minds towards others and *not* to understand other people solely on the basis of how they appear to others rather than to themselves.

Drawing on Reitz's own comments, Wickham remarks of the reasoning behind the indirect nature of Reitz's portrayal of Jewish suffering in the first *Heimat* that ''Reitz implies […] that because the theme has been treated in an 'infinite number of stories,' it is well enough known to be supplied by his audience'' (1991: 37). It is widely known that European settlement across the Americas very

frequently involved violent conquest (sometimes extending even to genocide).[153] Reitz nonetheless still does not rely entirely on the viewer's background knowledge, as will be discussed later.

Reitz avoids laying claim to experiences too far removed from his own. Reitz has advocated making ''Geschichten aus der Geschichte in der uns eigenen Art, wobei wir sehr genau darauf achten müssen, ob sie uns auch *wirklich eigen* ist'' (no date [1979]: 104-105).[154] The boundaries of experience that Reitz sets himself result in the *Indianer* being treated – that is, alluded to rather than shown – rather like Jewish people in the first *Heimat*, so that there is a Jewish-Native American parallel arises in the fourth *Heimat*, not a laboured parallel, yet a notable one. Koebner remarks that, although apparently Reitz considered in some way showing the Brazilian reality in a relatively direct fashion, ''die große Distanz zur Normalität des Alltags in Brasilien, zumal im 19. Jahrhundert, ließ Reitz zögern'' (2015: 238), whereas ''Nähe stellte sich zu den Hunsrückern im Hunsrück ein'' (ibid.), and ''so blieb die Chronik einer Sehnsucht übrig, die im alten Europa wurzelte'' (ibid.: 239). Reitz preferred to remain, if not precisely within the boundaries of his experience regarding time period, within Germany at least. Alon Confino argues in relation to the first *Heimat* that ''by basing his understanding of the past on experience, Reitz […] limits a 'true' understanding of German history to Germans. The implications of this view are disturbing, for Reitz in effect delegitimizes the opinion of foreigners […] regarding German history'' (1998: 200). In his approach to *Die andere Heimat* Reitz to some extent acts along the lines envisaged by Confino but with a reversal: instead of doubting non-Germans' ability to deal with German history, Reitz doubts the moral legitimacy of his using his own voice to articulate the experiences of the indigenous Brazilians in any direct way. The absence of indigenous Brazilians' own voices may encourage the viewer to turn not to Reitz but

[153] In relation to nineteenth-century German settlement in Brazil more specifically, see Miki (2014), as cited subsequently in this chapter.

[154] Consider also Reitz's following statement in relation to colonialism in the fourth series (the statement is made in a different context): ''es handelt sich hier weniger um eine ‚Dramaturgie des Wegschauens' als um eine ‚Dramaturgie des genauen Hinschauens'' that ''erfordert, dass ich nicht von Dingen spreche, die ich nicht weiß'' (Reitz in Koebner and Koch [eds], 2008: 263). Reitz does, however, imaginatively venture beyond what he knows intimately and personally, beyond the boundaries of his direct knowledge, and (at least to some extent) prompts viewers to likewise be aware of much (including the suffering of others) that they have not experienced first-hand.

rather to indigenous Brazilians in order to hear their perspective. Reitz declared of the series *Holocaust*, ‘‘die Amerikaner haben mit Holocaust uns Geschichte weggenommen’’ (no date [1979]: 102). Presumably, Reitz would, according to his own logic, be guilty of laying false claim to Native Americans’ experience of colonialism if he portrayed Native Americans’ experiences in a way that fails to reflect the distance between nineteenth century indigenous Brazilians’ experiences and Reitz’s own. To some extent Reitz does, however, prompt viewers (with the letter from Brazil, for instance) to be aware via their imaginative engagement with his filmic text of the colonial horrors offscreen.

As noted in my chapter on the first *Heimat*, Schmitz, writing more generally on German approaches to National Socialism, sees what he calls ‘‘‘perpetrator-centred memory’’’ as a result of a desire ‘‘to relegitimise a German perspective on National Socialism from the vantage point of empathy’’ (2006: 95). A second problematic aspect of Reitz’s approach to Native Americans is that his colonist-filtered perspective risks a misplaced empathetic bias towards the coloniser rather than the victims of colonisation. In his theorisation of pity Aristotle states that ‘‘the disasters of real life are affecting in proportion to their proximity’’ (1823: 290). The viewer’s visual and emotional proximity to the suffering of the colonising Hunsrücker (particularly Jettchen) is especially problematic when set against Reitz’s distancing of the viewer from the Native Americans in the background of the text. Reitz’s exclusion of Native Americans from any direct representation probably stems from a mixture of motives that range from, on the one hand, a sincere and respectful belief in Native Americans’ right to take a lead in the representation of their ancestors’ experiences to, on the other hand, an inclination to place Germans in pole position to receive viewers’ empathetic engagement in a way that privileges Germans’ national self-image, rather at the expense of viewers’ emotional identification with non-Germans.

<u>Fate, ‘‘Indianthusiasm’’ and Victimhood</u>

While Reitz is anxious not to intrude on the particular experiences of Native Americans, he is at the same time very willing to make comparisons between the particular histories of various groups and to assert the strength of similarities. While I can see some probable good intentions behind Reitz's indirect portrayal of Native Americans, Reitz also creates a problematic parallel between German colonialists and Native Americans as joint victims of his story. Curiously, then, (and somewhat as per his warring drives in the first series) Reitz claims, on the one hand, that one should be very cautious and keep one's distance when telling stories that lie too far beyond one's own experience, while, on the other hand, he asserts parallels between the experience of Germans, Indians, and to some extent, Jews in *Die andere Heimat*; the assertion of such parallels is aimed at undermining the image of Germans as perpetrators in favour of creating a more positive image in which Germans appear more morally normal, on a national level, compared to other groups.

After citing Jakob's father on the inescapable power of divine will, Wortmann comments of Jakob, ''der Hunsrück ist sein Schicksal'' (2014: 30:40). Seeßlen remarks of the fourth series that the characters are ''Menschen, die ‹‹Ausdruck ihrer Zeit›› sind'' and ''sich dagegen auflehnen. Gegen die Götter, gegen das Schicksal, oder auch nur gegen Gewohnheit und Macht'' (reproduced in Reitz, 2018: 380). I would argue that they are portrayed as struggling rather vainly against their times and fate. Jakob describes joining the colonisers in Brazil as ''dem Ruf der Zeit […] folgen, ein Ruf, der stärker ist als all unser eigenes Wollen'' (4:1: 09:38). According to Jakob, leaving for Brazil is not a matter of choice, with the culpability that choice would entail with regard to participation in frequently violent European colonial expansionism, but rather it is a product of an irresistible *Zeitgeist*. This is reminiscent of the role attributed to time in the first *Heimat* by Elsaesser, with time, as opposed to people, as the villain of the piece: Elsaesser refers to ''a gratifying identification with victims, and with oneself as victim, if not of history, then of time itself'' (1989: 278). In the book version Reitz refers to the ''Schicksalsergebenheit'' (2014: 40) of Schabbach life. Noting the strength of the push factors experienced by the Hunsrücker in Reitz's portrayal of 1840s Schabbach, Koebner refers to ''die beklemmende Ausgangslage in Deutschland, die etliche dazu brachte, ihr Heil auf der

anderen Seite des Ozeans zu suchen'' (2015: 238), and Koebner's description probably captures Reitz's intentions well, since those intentions appear to revolve heavily around presenting the 1840s Schabbacher as victimised people compelled to go to Brazil – ''das Paradies Gottes'', as Pastor Wiegand calls it – in quest of salvation. There are also visual nods to the concept of the wheel of fate that I referred to in the previous chapter: the furious spinning of the cogs on Gustav's ill-constructed steam engine come close to achieving his not entirely undeserved destruction, as if the fates had half a mind to weave a hideous judgement upon him (the engine is ominously laden with symbolism by Gustav's naming it after the child that he begot by rape); a wheel (a circular ''Kaffeemühle'', as the book version clarifies [Reitz, 2014: 185]) is also shown being loudly ground round and round after Margarethe's death, as if to remind viewers that the wheel of fate spins on in the face of death (4:2: 01:52); the fourth series also has an image of the vulnerable character Fürchtegott partially submerged in his own waterwheel pit (around 4:1 35:40) and endangered when the wheels begin to spin, suggesting perhaps that he should fear fate rather than God, despite his name, an ironic name for a suicide in relation to contemporary Christian condemnation of suicide, which is emphasised by Reitz showing Fürchtegott being buried in unhallowed ground. Margarethe Simon bears the name of the patron saint of childbirth (Margaret of Antioch). The name Margarethe is tragically ironic – ironic like the saint's name Lucie in the first series, given that many of the children of Schabbach die in infancy, including several of her own. The uselessness of Margarethe's name in eliciting favour from the patron saint of childbirth contributes to Reitz's determined promotion of the impression that the Schabbacher are victims of cruelly unremitting misfortune despite their best efforts.[155] The cold winter and comet further emphasise the powerlessness of the German characters against their circumstances and fate.[156] Reitz's labours to depict the Hunsrücker as victims of the very sky above

[155] To be more precise, (as Leah Pope Parker writes) ''Margaret is still to this day considered by many Catholics a patron saint of childbirth, though she was removed from the […] Church's calendar of saints' feast days […], due to an absence of evidence for her historical existence'' (2020: 210).

[156] The comet is read by characters as ''ein Zeichen''. Stars, comets and their ilk have often been and are related to concepts of fate or destiny (see Augustine of Hippo, 2003: 179 [v:i], as already cited in my chapter on *Die zweite Heimat*).

them are probably aimed at convincing viewers that the Hunsrück colonists heading for Brazil should be pitied as victims of the fates ruling their world more than they should be recognised as being, in many cases (including those of Gustav and Jettchen), the beneficiaries of European expansionism into violently acquired new territories. Presenting the displacement of Native Americans as fateful inevitability, as opposed to culpable perpetration of gross injustice, has a history. Discussing German views of Native Americans in the nineteenth century, Jeffrey Sammons writes that ''there was a […] conviction that nothing could be done, that the cause of the Indians was doomed, a verdict of history that no imaginable force could reverse'' (2002: 185). Similarly, Zantop writes of an influential view of the European conquest of America that it ''covertly blames the annihilation of the indigenous peoples on fate, or rather, on nature: because of their physical inferiority the 'savages' *had* to be destroyed'' (Zantop, 1997: 50).[157] In *Die andere Heimat* the colonists who carry out this destruction go to South America are, according to Jakob, victims of the times fated upon them – an excuse that was used historically by the perpetrators of aggressive European colonialism. Native Americans dispossessed of their lands and German colonialists are both depicted as victims of fate in the fourth *Heimat* as part of Reitz's project to improve the image of people generally associated with perpetration more than victimhood (such as Germans in most of Reitz's lifetime) by means of stressing similarities between perpetrators and victims.

Schmidt argues (in relation to her discussion of *Die andere Heimat*) that ''*Indianerkultur*'' ''manifests itself in the form of an alternative heritage through which Germans try to work through the past, as well as its continuation into the present'' (2016: 54). I would agree that Reitz uses the concept of 'Indianer' in this way – for instance, by encouraging viewers to see broad parallels between nineteenth-century Germans and Native Americans as victims of oppression. Lutz identifies as a key attraction of ''Indianthusiasm'' an accompanying belief that ''it allows Germans to identify with the victims of history, rather than with the victimizers'' (2002: 169). Susanne Zantop draws attention to

[157] This is a mid-eighteenth-century view that Zantop is referring to, but, as shown by the similarity to the discourse of a century later as cited by Sammons, a long-lived view.

eighteenth and nineteenth-century German comparisons of (some) Native Americans and Germans (1997: 90-97) and shows that Germans were often linked ‘‘not with the colonizers but with other colonized and oppressed peoples’’ (ibid.: 95). Zantop shows that frequently German ‘‘colonial liberation ideology, covertly directed at Germany’s ‘‘colonizer’’ France […] is both liberating and expansive-hegemonic, that is, anticolonial *and* colonist at once’’ (ibid.: 94). Zantop notes that ‘‘as German states are overrun by French revolutionary armies, (some) Germans discover their kinship with other ‘enslaved’ or ‘colonized’ peoples’’ (ibid.: 82). Reitz likes to characterise Hunsrücker as victims of French expansionism: French occupation is referred to both by Jakob’s uncle and Jettchen’s mother, while Reitz, in his comments in the book version, favours readers with his unfavourable opinion ‘‘des falschen Kaisers Bonaparte’’ (2024: 90). Jakob laments that the king of Prussia, ‘‘der uns alle vergessen und im Stich gelassen’’ (4:1: 13:24). Complaining about the tyranny of Napoleon and 1840s Prussia is reasonable, but Reitz may possibly wish to provide a distraction from the violent expansionism displayed by many German colonists in Brazil, and also from the perpetrator or accomplice status of so many Germans during National Socialism.

Sex and Criticism of Colonialism

Jakob has a vision (4:1: 41:51) of a woman whom Reitz describes as ‘‘einer schwarzen Schönheit’’ (2014: 43), a vision suggestive a European male tradition of seeing a so-called New World of sexual opportunity (on said tradition, see Zantop, 1997: 44). Since the vision is triggered (Reitz clarifies) by ‘‘einen Bericht über eine Urwaldexpedition, in der ein hübsches schwarzes Mädchen erwähnt wird’’ in Jakob’s ‘‘geliebtes Buch über die Wälder Brasiliens’’ and Reitz writes that in said book ‘‘Es ist von weiteren schönen Mädchen die Rede, die zu den Wilden gehören’’ (2014: 43), it seems plain that Reitz envisages the woman as indigenous.[158] While the descriptor ‘‘schwarz’’ and, possibly, the woman’s appearance might be taken to suggest African ancestry, the narrative constructs her as an

[158] As to others’ view of her, Philipp Stadelmaier, for instance, describes her as an ‘‘Indianerin’’ (partially reproduced in Reitz, 2018: 378).

imaginary image of indigenous Brazil. Prior to the vision viewers have been shown Jakob reading another of his books (with the legible title *La Beauté Captivante Des Tropiques*), and a close-up of Jakob's eyes has superimposed upon it an illustration of Native Americans, with a topless woman in the centre of the screen (4:1: 21:05). Very clearly marked as a point-of-view shot, the superimposed image confirms the implication of the book's title to indicate that Jakob's ''Indianthusiasm'' is strongly charged with sexual desire. Later the ''schwarze Schönheit'' appears in the centre of the screen in another point-of-view shot. Jakob's fantasy may not altogether be an instance of those male fantasies described by Zantop in which ''sexual bliss cloaked obsession with conquest and appropriation in cross-cultural, cross-racial romances'' (1997: 3), but nor is this vision, despite Jakob generally appearing to have good intentions, very different from aggressive colonial fantasies. In the vision Jakob's dream of settling in Brazil obviously merges with sexual fantasy, making plain a distinct association in his mind between going to Brazil and sexual prosperity. At first glance, describing it as involving conquest perhaps seems an unjust characterisation of Jakob's daydream as sinister, since his fantasy undoubtedly envisages a purely consensual (and perhaps more romantic than erotic) realisation of his twin goals with regard both to the attraction of the fantasy female and encountering indigenous Brazilians. Still, Jakob's fantasy vision is in broad terms relatable to a sinister tradition of European fantasies regarding settlement of Native Americans' countries: Zantop summarises some representative fantasies thus: ''the conquerors' penetration of virgin territory […] is achieved by mutual consent. Or rather, the conquest is the result of an act of seduction'' (1997: 53). Jakob's vision involves such a welcome from the attractive indigenous Other – he sees the woman holding out potatoes towards him, as if happily placing her country's produce (and, symbolically, herself) at his disposal. Zantop discusses an example of European thought on the colonisation of South America in which marriage ''becomes the ultimate metaphor for the successful colonial encounter'' (1997: 61). The attractive feminine form of his imagined Other suggests that Jakob fantasises that coloniser and colonised will be harmoniously joined together like a married couple. The woman also addresses Jakob in Hunsrück dialect, challenging her position – which is

otherwise firmly asserted by her appearance in the film and Reitz's written description of her – as apparently Other to the Schabbacher: familiar Hunsrücker and the willing indigenous woman of Jakob's fantasy merge into one. The woman's dialectal utterance – ''mir mache Krumbiere aus'' (Reitz, 2014: 43) – is both familiar to Jakob and yet also consistent in its confiding simplicity with what Zantop describes as ''the innocent, childlike American'' woman of ''conquest fantasies'' in which ''the violent dispossession of the natives [is portrayed] as the woman's voluntary surrender'' (1997: 122). Jakob's vision involves a peaceful, even blissful, union of coloniser and colonised, a union that stands in contrast to the violence frequently perpetrated by the coloniser in reality and that may possibly threaten to weaken viewers' awareness of the moral distinction between victims and perpetrators of often violent colonial expansion.

While Jakob envisions his own prosperity in love (with Jettchen) and colonial settlement, Gustav actually settles in Brazil, and also shatters Jakob's romantic dreams of Jettchen through a rape that Reitz appears to have constructed as a condemnatory allegory of colonialism. Gustav advances on Jettchen in a sexual manner and leads her into an alleyway. Jettchen neither flees nor calls for help from the friends and neighbours round the corner, and holds her skirt up as instructed by Gustav. It is, nonetheless, made clear that Gustav – as Reitz spells out in the book version – is a ''Vergewaltiger'' (2014: 264), and that Jettchen is held captive by shock and, perhaps, fear of scandal at the prospect of being found with Gustav down a dark alley: her facial expression and ragged gasps indicate that Jettchen closes her eyes in trepidation rather than pleasurable anticipation before Gustav penetrates her (4:1: 01:33:32); she seems to shrink away from him, but is trapped against the wall; her distraught appearance afterwards (4:1: 01:36:46) provides still further confirmation of the indications that she was non-consensually caught by surprise by Gustav (who surprises the viewer, too, since shortly before the rape he engages in a perhaps not unwelcome flirtation with Florinchen and remarks to her that Jettchen and Jakob would make a good couple).

The rape's allegorical narrative function is enabled by the connection between Jakob's twin passions for Brazil and Jettchen and the link between Jettchen and Jakob's vision of the ''schwarze Schönheit''. Shortly after Jakob visualises the ''schwarze Schönheit'' (4:1: 41:50) there is another point-of-view shot in which Jakob imagines Jettchen, standing alone and facing the camera in a medium shot, like the ''schwarze Schönheit'', although slightly to the right of centre and with a more enigmatic expression (4:1: 43:37). As noted, viewers are shown Jakob looking at a drawing of Native Americans with a topless woman in the centre of the screen, superimposed on a close-up of Jakob's eyes. To introduce Jakob's vision of Jettchen and very clearly mark it as a point-of-view shot a close-up of Jakob's eyes recurs, forming a link between his perspective on Jettchen and his reading about Native Americans. Furthermore, Jakob's desire to mould Jettchen according to his sexually tinged dreams about Native Americans is demonstrated (4:1: 24:30) by his giving Jettchen a feather (just after he has spied on her rolling down the hill naked) – a feather that he has been wearing round his head and that, as Schmidt points out, is ''representative of the *Indianerfederschmuck*'' (2016: 82). The feather's connection to Jakob's ''Indianthusiasm'' is emphasised by it having dropped from the gerfalcon that one of his books about South America seems to conjure into being.

The evil of Gustav's approach to Jettchen exposes by implication the brutal violence often involved in the reality of the European conquest of Brazil. While Reitz shows a fantasy of Jakob's that has very suspect elements in relation to colonialism, Jakob's fantasy (since it remains only private fantasy) of the biddable woman nonetheless is at least less bad than what Gustav does in reality. Gustav, as Palfreyman notes, is ''the masculine one, the physical one, the soldier who emigrates'' (2019: 120); Gustav actually participates in European colonial expansion in Brazil rather than confining himself to fantasy. Reitz indirectly shows his strong disapproval of Gustav's aggressive colonialism by allegorising as rape Gustav's approach to settling in Brazil on land of which indigenous Brazilians are to be dispossessed. Jettchen is the victim of the rape that is also devised by Reitz as a figurative verdict on Gustav's colonialist undertaking. While the rape allegorises the evils perpetrated against Native Americans by violent European colonialists the victim of the actual rape is an ethnic majority

German. The rape of Jettchen, therefore, not only implies condemnation of German involvement in the extreme exploitation of Native Americans by many European invaders but also undermines Jettchen's own status as an accessory to colonialist evil.[159] As in the *Die zweite Heimat* in particular, Reitz is determined to combine perpetrator and victim in one, probably (at least partly) in order to make more bearable the German burden of association with perpetration rather than victimhood in relation to National Socialism. As Palfreyman says of Reitz's representation of the German settlers generally, ''the colonist-migrants are both victims and perpetrators'' (2019: 121). This statement is especially apt when applied to Reitz's conception of Jettchen: she is a victim of rape and (problematically) at the same time presented as a beneficiary of the figurative rape of the so-called virgin territory in which she and Gustav settle (and Jettchen cannot be seen as innocent in relation to joining the Euro-Brazilian colonialist enterprise: Palfreyman points out that ''it is not Gustav, but Jettchen who has made the decision'' to ''emigrate'' [2019: 116], although Gustav seems very willing to go). When Jakob has a vision of a Hunsrück-accented (as Reitz describes her) ''schwarzen Schönheit'' while in love with the similarly Hunsrück-accented Jettchen he is combining his ''Indianthusiasm'' with his desire for Jettchen and seeking to endow her with Native American characteristics. As Shelbi Nawhilet Meissner and Kyle Whyte describe, ''colonial logic codes indigenous lands and bodies as objects for the taking'' (2018: 159). The fantasy Native American version of Jettchen, the ''schwarze Schönheit'', appears to anticipate her rape by Gustav, the future male European colonialist. Reitz, like Jakob, in a sense projects Native American identity onto Jettchen by making her the site of Gustav's highly symbolic rape, and Reitz thereby transposes the identity of Gustav's Native American victims onto a German character. The indigenous Brazilians robbed of the land on which Gustav and Jettchen settle are given no human face to which viewers can empathetically relate, while Jettchen is a well fleshed out and well-meaning character, easy for viewers to relate to. Gustav's rape of Jettchen condemns (subtly and indirectly) his complicity in

[159] The rape also further casts Gustav as a despoiler of the German Heimat, since Jakob (probably not realising that Jettchen was in fact raped) invites comparison between Heimat and Jettchen by referring to his German Heimat as ''die untreue''.

moral crimes against Native Americans and also simultaneously overshadows the offscreen victimisation of Native Americans in favour of foregrounding the more directly, concretely and visibly recounted victimisation of Jettchen. The symbolic rape that is Reitz's characterisation of Gustav's colonial misdeeds is located in such a way that the Native American suffering that it indirectly represents in the text is stripped of its specificities and reinterpreted as the suffering of a German character who is also involved in European colonialist expansionism.

Reitz makes his Jacob a very sympathetic figure, so that his allusion to the Old Testament lends itself to being seen in a philo-Semitic light and constitutes (to return to Altfelix's model) ''an ostentatious display of xenophilia towards a discriminated out-group'' (ibid.). Jakob's peaceful passion for 'Indianer' – despite it problematically involving fanciful distortions of Native Americans' real lives – is an admiration that, relatively speaking, contrasts positively with the shameless determination of so many nineteenth-century Europeans to ruthlessly exploit, dispossess and even mass murder Native Americans. Jakob's ''Indianthusiasm'' is fundamentally akin to philo-Semitism in being a desire not to crush but rather to embrace (to cite Altfelix again) ''a discriminated out-group'' (ibid.). Jakob's ''Indianthusiasm'' is displayed (by Reitz rather than by Jakob) ostentatiously as per Altfelix's model, and the ''Indianthusiasm'' and allusion to the Old Testament's Jacob and Esau point in the same general direction, both serving what Altfelix's model of philo-Semitism calls ''positive in-group re-evaluation via an ostentatious display of xenophilia towards a discriminated out-group'' (2000: 42). Reitz strives for ''positive […] re-evaluation'' of the Simons, who as discussed in previous chapters, are in part fictional versions of himself and his own family, and Reitz thereby offers ''in-group'' Germans more generally opportunity for attractive reassessment in the light of Reitz's portrayal of the hero of his nineteenth-century German Heimat, Jakob, as a peaceful xenophile – so the polar opposite of the Nazis.[160] While Reitz portrays Jakob and Humboldt as pacific men of learning who

[160] As noted in Chapter One, many commentators observe that (to cite Scholz by way of example) Hermann is Reitz's ''alter ego'' (1996: 60); furthermore, in the first series several names of Simons and their relatives honour Reitz's own relations (see Reitz, no date [1982]: 183).

offer an alternative to the often extremely aggressive expansionism of Germany's (in the 1840s) more colonially prolific neighbours, Reitz nonetheless takes care to show Gustav as a rapist-colonist whose arrival in an area of Brazil previously uninhabited by European incomers is implied (possibly too subtly for some viewers) to bear a violent causal relationship to the absence of indigenous Brazilians as reported in the letter from Brazil (that is not to say that Gustav personally evicts indigenous Brazilians from their land, but he makes himself a beneficiary and contributes to driving demand for land and then, by occupation of that land, preventing the reclamation of land by those from whom it was stolen). There is some balance in Reitz's portrayal of German engagement with European expansionism in South America, some acknowledgement – and indeed sincere condemnation on Reitz's part – of the complicity of some Germans in horrors produced by nineteenth-century European colonialism – that is why he makes Gustav a rapist as well as a coloniser. Nonetheless, much of Reitz's enthusiasm (it is clearly Reitz's as well as Jakob's enthusiasm) for 'Indianer' derives from a longing to cast Germans as (at least ostensibly) virtuous xenophiles, rather than stemming primarily from altruistic inclinations towards Native Americans (which might, in any case, run a serious risk of appearing patronising). Still, Reitz's fondness for Jakob, his passionately xenophile hero, is undoubtedly a reflection of a great determination to resoundingly reject the xenophobia of National Socialism and help to inspire Germans to (in many cases) continue to make amends for the National Socialist past, and with some altruistic ideals rather than being purely in pursuit of self-benefitting improvement of Germans' national image.

The transposition of allegorised Native American suffering to Jettchen's body, a part of the German national body, suggests that Reitz – in his indirect evocation of Native American experiences – seeks partly to use the veiled Native American suffering in the narrative to contribute, firstly, to a narrative of German victimhood and, secondly, to characterise human suffering as an affliction of the whole human body, the species as a whole, a manoeuvre that threatens to undermine awareness of differences in the experiences of groups. In defence of this transposition of others' suffering onto Jettchen's body, on the other hand, Aristotle's view of pity asserts that ''sufferings apprehended in

our own persons, will always be the surest to excite our compassion'' (1823: 290), and Reitz has made a remark highly relatable to this Aristotelian pronouncement: ''normalerweise weint ein Mensch nur über Dinge, die ihm selbst zustoßen oder die ihn an sein eigenes Leben erinnern'' (no date [1979]: 100). Reitz may, then, possibly intend to use Jettchen to bridge a potential identificatory gap between European viewers and Native Americans by inflicting the transposed suffering on a German body in order to encourage more empathetic engagement with the Native Americans who, like Jettchen, are victims of Gustav (although this would be contingent upon viewers perceiving the rape as a critical allegory of the colonialism of which he is also guilty). In a rather problematic way, Reitz makes Jettchen the victim of a crime that she herself figuratively participates in as a European settler situated in a place and time in which settlement tended to involve violent conquest. Jettchen's defence against appearing as a usurper of land that belonged to Native Americans before they were ''vertrieben'', as the letter says of the snakes, is that her offence is a distorted but recognisable mirror image of Gustav's crime against her. Reitz subtly casts her as almost the victim of her own misdeed as a person complicit in colonialist violence (although perhaps considerably less complicit than Gustav) – somewhat as Ernst is portrayed as culpable on the one hand, yet also a victim of his misdeeds when his cursed hoard leads him to a fiery death that, probably not entirely coincidentally, sees him reduced to ash like (in that respect) many victims of the Holocaust, whom Ernst did nothing to help. As in previous series, Reitz recognises (although sometimes somewhat obscurely) the plight of those victimised by Germans, but tends strongly towards emphasising Germans' own victim status, sometimes as the victims of their own wrongdoing.

The rape may perhaps even allude to other acts of evil perpetrated by Germans. Elsaesser analyses a depiction of rape in a Kluge film in a way that may shed light on Jettchen's otherwise baffling readiness to forgive Gustav. (In the historical context it is of course strongly preferable for Jettchen to be married in order to account for her pregnancy, while the common stigmatisation of those subjected to rape can explain her decision not to go to the law; in terms of finding a tolerable

husband, however, she could have turned to Jakob, so it is necessary to seek some reason for Reitz's decision to have Jettchen reconciled with the rapist Gustav.) Elsaesser argues in relation to Kluge's rape scene and the Holocaust that Kluge is attracted to ''the insanely forlorn hope that in the […] always present trial of the German nation regarding the responsibility for the Holocaust, the victim – typically imaged as a raped woman – might testify on behalf of the guilty party'' (2008: 113). Elsaesser adds, ''Jewish people become 'feminized,' and genocide becomes a sort of 'consenting rape'' (ibid.) – a description that calls to mind Zantop's comment (as cited earlier) on historic depictions of European colonialism in South America that ''violent penetration of virgin territory […] is [portrayed as] the result of an act of seduction'' (1997: 53) (and for an example of ''feminization of the natives'' see ibid.: 51). The symbolism of the rape may well be a product of Reitz's engagement with the two evils of National Socialism and colonialism that are both in the background of the fourth series. Jettchen's acceptance of Gustav after he has raped her is probably best understood as a product of Reitz's desperate advocacy of boundless forgiveness due to it being the only hope that many Germans of his parents' generation have in the wake of the Holocaust, broadly the same advocacy of forgiveness that is at work in the scene at the end of the first *Heimat* when the dead return. Jettchen's forgiveness of Gustav (or rather her male author's forgiveness of him) is problematic in the extreme, regarding both the severity of Gustav's crime against her and the other evils in the assault's symbolic background.

Brazil and the *Indianer* in Reality

The only characters who come (relatively) close to indigenous Brazilians are Jettchen and Gustav. In their letter to the Simons remaining in Schabbach they report that ''Indianer haben wir noch keine gesehen''. Besides gently contradicting Jakob's fantasies of Brazil, this remark encourages the viewer to wonder about the reality of interactions between the Hunsrück settlers and indigenous Brazilians. We are informed by their letter that Jettchen and Gustav are allotted land in the jungle, thus on or beyond the edge of the area thus far settled by Euro-Brazilians – the plot ''ist […] größten Teils

Urwald gewesen'', the letter says (2014: 187). This is land that they are being given to clear, rather than land already long since cleared; and, as Palfreyman briefly points out, ''native Brazilians […] have been seemingly cleared away along with the forest'' (2019: 121). Another development considered important enough to be reported back to Schabbach is that ''die Schlangen sind vertrieben''. Miki draws on an account from 1824 (so within twenty years of Gustav's and Jettchen's arrival in Brazil) to note of a group of (in many cases) German settlers in Brazil that ''their volunteering to remove the Puri and Botocudo Indians 'infesting' the virgin forest suggests slaving activity'' (2014: 7). The letter's description of the snakes as ''vertrieben'' suggests that Gustav, and perhaps Jettchen, saw them as an infestation in (to return to Miki's above remark) ''the virgin forest''. The virginal ''Urwald'', as the letter refers to the territory, is conquered by the rapist Gustav. The expelled snakes more or less function as a metonymic reference to the indigenous inhabitants of the area, pointing to their displacement – the letter mentions the absence of indigenous Brazilians immediately after recounting the vanquishing of the snakes, rather as if Jettchen and Gustav were (at least subconsciously) aware of a causal link between the two sentences.[161] The indirect means of conveying the likely reality experienced by the local indigenous Brazilians is maybe intended to reflect Jettchen and Gustav to some extent either being silent on, or repressing awareness of, their probable role in the absence of indigenous inhabitants. While snakes figuring as a metonymy for indigenous inhabitants at least primarily reflects an unpleasant state of mind in Reitz's characters rather than Reitz, it is troubling that in his comments in the book version of *Die zweite Heimat* Reitz makes a potentially dehumanising connection between Native Americans and animals: in the same sentence Juan – whom Schnüsschen elsewhere describes as having ''Inkablut in den Adern'' – is described by Reitz as acting both ''wie ein Eingeborener'' and ''wie ein empfindsames Tier'' (1993: 619). Reitz's ''Eingeborener''-''Tier'' comparison strengthens the case for Reitz using the snakes metonymically. Meanwhile, the word choice ''vertrieben'' is tellingly applicable to the displacement

[161]. Gabriel has noted that ''many of the […] first *Heimat*'s] meanings are produced through structures of metonymy'' (2004: 159).

of people (as in the term *Heimatvertriebene*).[162] The theme of conquest of land and *Vertreibung* in *Die andere Heimat* may indeed conceivably be an indirect reflection of the Second-World-War-era German *Heimatvertriebene* having been topical when the fourth series appeared: as Langenbacher notes, Merkel ‘‘consistently supported various expellee initiatives’’, such as ‘‘an information and documentation center for the Flight, Expulsion and Reconciliation Foundation opening in 2015’’, while – just before the fourth series was released – ‘‘in the 2013 grand coalition agreement, she also endorsed the establishment of a commemorative day for expellees’’ (2014: 61). I will be returning later in this chapter to Reitz’s interest in Germans as victims of expulsion, which is in evidence in a certain emphasis on the status of the emigrating 1840s Hunsrücker as people deprived of reasonable land rights at home in relation to the forests.

In relation to the same heavily German group of settlers who voluntarily drove out indigenous Brazilians around 1824, Miki cites evidence from 1842 – so within a year or two of Gustav’s and Jettchen’s arrival in Brazil – that some of the agriculture was carried out by enslaved people (2014: 8). Miki comments, ‘‘the enlightened European colony had degenerated into a slave plantation’’ (ibid.). Perhaps Jakob’s enlightened ideals would have come under strain had he not remained in Schabbach. Nor would circumstances in Brazil be likely to undergo immanent moral improvement: Miki writes of the aforementioned group of German settlers that in 1858 the community ‘‘was home to […] 200 people of European and Brazilian origin, and close to 2000 slaves’’ (ibid.). Summarising the expansion of the Brazilian frontier in the mid-nineteenth century, Miki notes that ‘‘territorial conquest was effectively realised though slave plantations […] and the reduction of indigenous citizens into slavery, when they were not outright massacred’’ (ibid.: 15-16). In its historical context Jettchen and Gustav setting up a farm on newly conquered ‘‘Urwald’’, from which perceived threats have been ‘‘vertrieben’’, is suspect in the extreme.

[162] Palfreyman refers to ‘‘‘Heimatvertriebenen’’’, making a link to Florinchen’s gift to Gustav and Jettchen (2019: 122).

In Gustav's and Jettchen's defence it can be noted that they are plainly not owners of a large plantation but rather of a farm of modest size (about 120 acres, the letter reports), and – at first glance – it may seem doubtful that they would have the capital to enter into the direct exploitation of enslaved people. On the other hand, in a study of small-scale farmers in Brazil in the nineteenth century from 1850 onwards (admittedly, an imperfect source in terms of time period), Hebe Maria Mattos de Castro observes that many small farmers (in at least one part of Brazil) ''did not have enough disposable capital to initiate their own agricultural enterprise'', so ''depended on financing by fazendeiros [bigger landowners] […], in exchange for political loyalty'' (1988: 472). Mattos de Castro finds, regarding ''poor farmers'', that ''until 1875, only 23% of the cases studied did not register ownership of slaves'' (ibid.: 483). Mattos de Castro concludes that in at least some of Brazil ''small producers dedicated to subsistence agriculture […] until the middle of the last [nineteenth] century, could […] count on one or two slaves'' (ibid.: 486) – which is highly alarming in relation to Jettchen and Gustav, although it still seems conceivable that, in their particular case, they would be doing all the work themselves, since they appear to be predominantly devoting their land to a modest herd of cattle (in the letter they refer to having just ''vierzig Stück Rinder'' and what seems like an impractically small, easy-to-manage amount of wheat), whereas de Castro is describing a landscape of crops (see ibid.: 466-467), which seem likely to require far more labour than fewer than fifty cattle. Gustav and Jettchen apparently settle somewhere around Porto Alegre, which is in Rio Grande do Sul in the far south of Brazil. In a study of ranches in Rio Grande do Sul, Clarissa Sanfelice Rahmeier lists ''the slave quarters'' as part of such a ranch's ''core complex'' (2012: no pagination), although the ranches she discusses appear to be on a larger scale than Jettchen's and Gustav's (Sanfelice Rahmeier is vague as to acreage, but she discusses as an example a ranch built in the 1840s that, by the 1880s, consisted of ''2618 animals, including pigs, sheep, horses, mules and cows'' [ibid.] – far more livestock than would be expected on Jettchen's and Gustav's 120 acres). There is, however, an indication that Gustav and Jettchen would quite probably be receiving money from oppressors of enslaved people, since San Felice Rahmeier notes that ranches in Rio Grande do Sul

‘‘were the main suppliers […] of the cattle used’’ for ‘‘the production of […] salted and sun-dried beef, which was extensively sold […] as food for slaves’’ (ibid.). It seems overwhelmingly likely that, one way or another, Gustav and Jettchen become complicit in great evil by going to Brazil.[163]

Explicit references to slavery are not absent from the fourth series, occurring not once but twice: viewers hear potential settlers being promised ‘‘zwölf Sklaven’’ (4:1: 50:21); and Jakob translates for the baron a passage referring to slavery in South America (4:1: 34:30). Given that he refers to slavery and the striking absence of Native Americans, Reitz probably expects and also hopes that viewers will have sufficient historical and moral competence to realise, and regret, that there are appalling aspects to Gustav’s and Jettchen’s new Heimat to which they do not wish to admit in a letter to their relatives. Nonetheless, considering the extremity of the evils of which many Europeans in Brazil, including many born in Germany, were guilty at the time, Reitz should arguably be more extensively and explicitly condemnatory of colonialism.

The Concept of Heimat and National Socialism and Colonialism compared

As Palfreyman remarks, Jettchen and Gustav find that ‘‘a lockable door is a significant milestone’’ (2019: 118). The references to having to secure the entry point to their new home and clear the land further imply that Jettchen and Gustav are part of a broader colonial enterprise in which indigenous Brazilians are likewise being kept away – in other words, deprived of their land. In this new Heimat the house must be defended against outside danger. Santner describes ‘‘the so-called Heimatfilm’’ (1990: 77) as a genre that ‘‘features […] seduction, […] loss of innocence and purity […]. Quite often the fall into alienation is precipitated by a parasitic intrusion from the outside and alien into the closed world of Heimat’’ (ibid.: 78). In the fourth *Heimat* the Hunsrück Heimat has been partially

[163] As part of the wider European economy, the Hunsrück at this period was of course itself an economic beneficiary of the exploitation of enslaved people elsewhere. After Margarethe’s death we see coffee being ground. Philip D. Curtin writes that ‘‘coffee alone was important enough to account for the entire increase in Brazil’s foreign trade in the first half of the nineteenth century. New agricultural enterprises on new ground brought the usual demand for imported labor – met in the usual way, through the slave trade, at least until the 1850s’’ (1998: 190-191). Nonetheless, the economic benefits derived by Jettchen and Gustav at the expense of enslaved people would, had they remained in the Hunsrück, presumably have been smaller than in Brazil.

presented as a reverse of the Heimat model envisaged by Santner, a reverse Heimat in which safety lies not within but without, with escape providing that safety. Yet upon Jettchen's and Gustav's arrival in their New World they find a more conventional Heimat model in which the home is surrounded by potential danger that must be prevented from creeping in. That is the sort of Heimat narrative invoked to by Santner when he refers to there frequently being a ''fall'' (1990: 78). The snakes in the new Heimat are suggestive of a Biblical Fall. Reitz has remarked in the book version that amongst the historical nineteenth century Hunsrücker emigrants ''der Traum eines verheißenen Paradieses […] sich wie eine Heilsbotschaft verbreitete'' (2014: 202). The concept of salvation is also strongly in evidence in Pastor Wiegand's description of Brazil as a ''Paradies Gottes'' (4:1: 13:02). Jakob's image of Brazil is likewise, as O'Neill remarks, an ''éden rêvé'' (2013: 50) or, in Wolfram Schütte's description, ''das irdische Paradies'' (cited in Reitz et al., 2018: 382). In the context of a supposed Edenic paradise, it is striking that snakes are picked out as a threat.

Gustav takes possession of land full of snakes, and since he is already a rapist before leaving for Brazil, it is subtly implied that he is bound to fall into temptation and bring evil into any Garden of Eden on which he can impose himself.[164] Correspondingly, Gustav carries out a programme of *Vertreibung* against the pre-existing life in his new Heimat. Heimat-creation, Reitz seems to wish to self-critically warn, takes its toll of victims; this is maybe further suggested by Margarethe apparently being named after a dragon-slaying saint. Palfreyman notes that Margarethe is ''a symbolic representation of the Heimat'' (2019: 115), and this embodiment of Heimat takes her name from a saint supposed to afford people (more specifically, pregnant women) protection via the violence of destroying dragons, somewhat as serpents are slain to create a new Brazilian Heimat. The function of the rough-sleeping Margot is partly to contrast the misery of life outside to the impoverished yet still comforting interior of the Simons' house; the narrative depends on Margot's

[164] Reitz blames Adam, as gestured to by the rapist Gustav, rather than Jettchen's Eve, for the destruction of the ''Urwald''-Paradise – a stance critical of aggressive masculinity that is less prominent in the preceding series. Palfreyman points out that there is ''inversion of gender clichés'' (2019: 116) in the fourth series.

comfort being sacrificed in order to create a sense of comparative comfort, a sort of Heimat-warmth, with which to envelop the Simons' house. Meanwhile, Katharina in the first series has a name that – upon onomastic investigation, or perhaps very obviously to someone, such as Reitz, who has knowledge of Greek – implies that comforting domesticity comes only at the cost of cleansing (Katharina – catharsis), since the name gestures to purity, the pursuit of which – as demonstrated by Gabriel (2004) – is shown in the first *Heimat* to be a horrifically dangerous process and ''the enabling mythos of the death camps'' (ibid.: 178). The ''parasitic intrusion from the outside and alien into the closed world of Heimat'' to which Santner refers as a characteristic of Heimat narratives (1990: 78) is provided by the rapist-colonialist Gustav, with the victims of his intrusion plainly being the indigenous Brazilians displaced in order to provide land – *Lebensraum* even – for incoming Germans.[165] Reitz has referred to Anton – who was involved in making Second World War propaganda – recalling ''die alte Wochenschauregel, dass deutsche Soldaten im Film immer von links nach rechts zu marschieren hatten, um den Eindruck des Vormarsches zu erzeugen'' (2018: 215). In *Die andere Heimat*, in contrast, the wagons of emigrating Germans sometimes go from right to left (see 4:1: around 03:00 and 4:2: 01:37:10). Reitz is keen not to emulate Nazi propaganda in his portrayal of Germans violently pushing into others' lands. The European colonial advance against indigenous Brazilians is not glorified by Reitz – as is particularly emphasised by Reitz's allegorisation of it as rape. To a significant extent, then, Reitz is willing to depict Germans as the villains of his Heimat narrative in the fourth series. The perpetrator status of the German colonialists is, however, very considerably balanced, perhaps indeed overbalanced and potentially overturned for some viewers, by Reitz's determination to emphasise their status as victims and to lionise Jakob, the most prominent character, as a great xenophile.

Reitz suggests links between Jakob and Jewishness and Native American indigeneity in order to associate him, and Germans more generally, with victimhood that tends to overshadow the more

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subtly evoked suffering of the Native Americans and people of African ancestry victimised by the likes of Gustav. Reitz also employs a degree of parallelism in his representation of poor Hunsrücker and indigenous Brazilians as victims of oppression. It is not necessary to at all condone forms of oppression perpetrated by European élites against less socially advantaged Europeans in order to see potential problems with Reitz's enthusiasm for asserting a certain equivalence between indigenous Brazilians and poor Hunsrücker as people deprived of land rights. While Hunsrücker are unjustly disadvantaged by extensive aristocratic or royal privileges, some of those Hunsrücker become complicit in depriving indigenous Brazilians of far more than is denied to the Hunsrücker.[166] Yet Reitz in fact spells out the woes of the Hunsrücker far more clearly than he does the even greater sufferings of the indigenous Brazilians who have been compelled to vacate land for the German invaders. As in *Die zweite Heimat* especially, Reitz is prone to a desire to dampen any impression that some groups are in some situations more victimised than Germans like himself. For that purpose, Reitz begins the second part of *Die andere Heimat* by rather extensively listing the various useful activities that the Hunsrücker are not allowed to do in the region's forested areas. *Die andere Heimat* is predominantly economical in its narrative method – for instance, Jakob's mother tells him to marry; then, without time having been set aside for even the shortest of wedding scenes, Florinchen appears pregnant and clarifies that they are married by means of just two words (by referring to Jakob as ''meinem Mann''). It is telling, therefore, that Reitz lavishes some 173 words (see the start of the second part or Reitz, 2014: 90-91) on impressing upon the viewer all the things that the Hunsrücker cannot do in the forests. Reitz's objective in dwelling on forest regulations appears to lie in convincing viewers that Hunsrücker have in effect been robbed of their own (wood)land just as indigenous Brazilians are indirectly acknowledged to have been robbed of the

[166] In his comments Reitz makes a well-meaning but dubious comparison between 1840s German immigrants going to Brazil and immigrants going to Germany around the time that the fourth series was made (see Reitz, 2018: 361) (the good intentions underlying the comparison have been pointed out by Palfreyman [2019: 121]). In stark contrast to immigrants entering Germany in the time period in question, the mid-nineteenth-century German immigrants going to Brazil are being given land that is being violently made available to them and are being encouraged to settle, as Miki remarks of a heavily German colony in Brazil, ''to foster racial whitening and colonization of the hinterlands through […] conquest'' (2014: 10).

‘‘Urwald’’ to which Jettchen’s and Gustav’s letter home refers (in his comments Reitz emphasises a link between indigenous Brazilians and ‘‘Urwald’’, referring to the former, for instance, as ‘‘Urwald-Indianer’’ [2018: 360]). Reitz casts both coloniser and colonised as having been expelled from their forests, and in doing so Reitz seeks to slightly shrink the moral distinction between aggressive coloniser and colonised in favour of the German colonists. In the book version Reitz supplements his already lengthy proclamation of German victimhood regarding forestry laws by spelling out, in one of his comments, that ‘‘die Menschen im Hunsrück sind es seit Jahrhunderten gewohnt […] geknechtet zu werden’’ (2014: 90). The usurpation of the indigenous Brazilians’ lands, in contrast, must be read between the lines.

Despite the marked parallels between the first and fourth series as already mentioned (and for more examples of which see von Moltke, 2014: 126), the *Vertreibung* of the indigenous Brazilians, as metonymically referred to via the letter’s banished snakes, is not presented as a precise parallel to the similarly indirectly acknowledged central evil of the first series, namely the Holocaust. In the fourth *Heimat* Reitz does not draw very firm comparisons between victims of persecution in Nazi Germany and victims of European colonialism, but there are some parallels drawn in relation to psychological dehumanisation of others by perpetrators of colonialism or National Socialist evils (such as is to be found in the letter’s perhaps unconsciously euphemistic reference to clearing away snakes on the newly colonised land). Reitz acknowledges the evils of National Socialism and colonialism in similarly veiled terms and (sometimes very subtly) condemns both, but imaginings of Native Americans in the fourth series are significantly more prominent and sympathetic than are references to Jewish people and most other victims of National Socialism in the first series.

Nonetheless, besides approaching victims of National Socialism and colonialism in moderately comparable fashion, Reitz asserts a broad similarity between the perpetrators of European colonialism in *Die andere Heimat* and the perpetrators of National Socialism in the first *Heimat*. In both cases, the murderous evil is characterised by Reitz in three ways: as acquisitive crime; as a

result of a quest for a sense of purity (as Gabriel [2004] has demonstrated regarding National Socialism in the first series); and relatedly – as Gabriel also notes – as an attempt to boost self-image via the vilification of those perceived to be Other to oneself, for instance, by psychological displacement of one's own faults onto others – a process that involves the creation of an ''abject'' scapegoat that features a characteristic of one's own that one would like to view as Other to oneself.[167] Thus Eduard and Lucie participate in National Socialist discourse about Jewish people and themselves hypocritically engage in fraud by ultimately stealing a Jewish man's money to construct their villa, while acquisition of Jewish-owned property, in the form of *Fuchsbau*, is also a major feature of the second series' treatment of National Socialism, and in the third series National Socialism is explored largely in relation to Ernst's *Nibelungenhort*, which possesses considerable financial as well as artistic value, a circumstance that heavily motivates the persecution of Matko. With regard to improving self-image by mistreating others, Gabriel has pointed out (as mentioned in more detail in my chapter on *Die zweite Heimat*) that ''the phantasmatic of the crooked Jew-speculator is their [Lucie's and Eduard's] own disavowed screen image'' (ibid.: 184). In the fourth series, meanwhile, Gustav complains about the baronial privileges surrounding wine sales, presenting himself as a victim of injustice imposed from outside his immediate community, yet he soon goes off to help to impose worse injustices on indigenous Brazilians (although Reitz is not very obviously critical of Gustav's hypocrisy). Hunsrücker colonisers more generally also inflate their self-esteem by casting themselves solely as victims and not looking at the part of themselves that is perpetrator too – that is, they are liable to shrug off an awareness of their own complicity in unjust power structures by acknowledging that fault of theirs in their own oppressors in the Hunsrück

[167] After discussing Fassbinder, Horkheimer, Adorno and Reitz in relation to scapegoating and abjection as psychological procedures underlying National Socialism (2004: 184-185 [as cited in my chapter on *Die zweite Heimat*]), Gabriel further considers the ''structure of abjection bound up with the making of the stranger'' (2004: 185), relating aspects of ''Kristeva's account'' of ''abjection'' to National Socialist ''discourses of purity and contamination that are connected to boundary maintenance'' (ibid.: 186). (With its celebration of their house having an ''abschließbare Tür'' [Reitz, 2014: 187], Jettchen's and Gustav's letter from Brazil attests to the importance to them of roughly the sort of ''boundary maintenance'' that Gabriel is referring to, but this time in relation to the European colonisation of Brazil rather than to National Socialism.)

rather than in themselves and volubly declaring their own victim status (a manoeuvre of which Reitz is not particularly critical).[168] The pursuit of purity in the first series has a counterpart in *Die andere Heimat* in the references to Paradise and the fixation on snakes in Jettchen's and Gustav's latter from Brazil (surely there must have been much else in the way of flora and fauna to clear in order to set up a ranch); the eradication of snakes seems to indicate a psychological need to create a new Eden. The more practical motivation underlying the vanquishing of the snakes is to gain land, which will be converted into money at others' expense. Since the land will, logically, have been previously possessed by, and probably forcibly taken from, indigenous Brazilians, the expulsion of snakes and Native Americans is a form of acquisitive crime. Reitz does, then, appear to be asserting a marked parallel between at least some perpetrators of National Socialism in the first *Heimat* and European colonialism as practised by Gustav and Jettchen and Florinchen's brothers.

There are also differences in the motivations of perpetrators of National Socialist evil in the first series and the colonialists of the fourth series (the colonisers are also drawn by adventure and, unlike the National Socialists in the first series, pushed by genuine severe oppression at home); still, there is a substantial overlap in their motives in multiple respects. Regarding perpetrator motivation, Reitz is to an extent drawing a parallel between nineteenth century European colonialism and National Socialism. Furthermore, in the first series National Socialism is anticipated by the exclusion and lies directed at Apollonia, and the National Socialist period is somewhat relativised by the mirroring of Apollonia's internal exclusion within the community by the treatment of Margot, the girl who sleeps rough and appears to be an orphan (or is perhaps not acknowledged by a surviving father, while there is no indication of an extant mother). Margot is verbally abused by Jakob's uncle not only on the basis of suspected bastardy but also due to her atypical foot development, which leads him to demonise her by joking in appalling taste that she was sired by the Devil. The gross

[168] Florinchen's brothers both lead opposition to the aristocratic privileges regarding wine sales and go on to profit from their status as Europeans in the extremely unjust social model of mid-nineteenth-century Brazil, while Jakob repeatedly complains of tyranny in Germany yet does not condemn exploitation of Native Americans even though he would appear to have read more than enough to be aware of it.

disrespect directed at Margot in Die andere *Heimat* and Apollonia in the first *Heimat* have common roots. The former is associated with the Devil due to her disability and (supposed) illegitimacy, while Apollonia is effectively denounced as a witch and Gypsy, as she is called, and possible infanticide. Bastardy seems to be considered to deprive Margot of the right to a roof over her head, while the other Schabbacher, no matter how poor, have some sort of ancestral roof to call their own. Margot and Apollonia are, in short, both stigmatised as un-Christian (as a daughter of the Devil and witch respectively) and as people whose ancestral roots are believed to be alien to those of the majority of the community – so they are in fact marginalised on the basis of perceptions that have long been instrumental in driving the persecution of Jewish people in Europe. The treatment of Margot suggests that the Schabbach of the fourth series is not particularly different from Schabbach shortly after the First World War in terms of the inhabitants' social readiness to participate, had the opportunity arisen, in the persecution of those considered not to belong is broadly similar to that of the later generations in Schabbach in the years leading up to the Holocaust.

While the first *Heimat* has, as mentioned earlier, been related to the *Historikerstreit* (see, for instance, Palfreyman, 2000: 69-83), the comparison of National Socialism and colonialism makes the fourth series relatable to what Steffen Klävers dubs ''Historikerstreit 2.0'' (2022: no pagination) (Urban [2022] does likewise [in her title]), namely a dispute in which, as Klävers succinctly puts it, ''while one side argues for integrating National Socialism and the Holocaust within a global imperial / colonial framework, the other side argues against such an understanding because of certain peculiarities associated with National Socialism'' (ibid.). Friedländer – very much in the latter camp – sets forth a similar summation of the former party: ''Dirk Moses and others now question the singularity of the Holocaust from the perspective of comparative genocide research and with a view towards the history of colonial violence'' (2022: no pagination), a view to which Friedländer makes the following central objection, ''the Holocaust is not different from other historical crimes only in minor respects; it is fundamentally different'' (ibid.). Friedländer is sceptical as to both the viability and desirability of finding connections between colonialism and National Socialism (he writes that

Moses appears to have ‘‘explored every conceivable application of the words ‘colonization’ and ‘imperialism’ in an attempt to somehow link them to the fate of Europe’s Jews’’ (ibid.), and Friedländer asks, ‘‘is this necessary […]?’’ (ibid.). Citing one of Moses’ works, Klävers identifies the following reason as a key rationale for Moses’ approach (2022: no pagination): namely Moses’ position that the view that ‘‘the Holocaust is ‘unique’, ‘unprecedented’ or ‘singular’’’ necessarily has ‘‘dire’’ ‘‘implications’’ – essentially, ‘‘that the moral caché [sic.] of indigenous survivors of colonialism is less than that of Jews’’ (cited in Klävers, 2022: no pagination). (Meanwhile, Birthe Kundrus draws an opposite conclusion regarding the comparison of National Socialism and [German] colonialism, fearing that ‘‘to heighten the perceived significance of colonial history by declaring it a prelude to National Socialism’’ may obstruct ‘‘study of the colonial period in its own right’’ and sees ‘‘a danger that the German colonial period may be reduced to a mere precursor of National Socialism’’ [2005: 300]).

Friedländer is not alone in very strongly criticising some of Moses’ views.[169] Nor is Moses by any means the only person to advocate greater scrutiny of colonialism in relation to National Socialism.[170] It is far beyond the scope of this present work to engage thoroughly with the wide-ranging debates that continue to rage at the time of writing around National Socialism and colonialism; such important matters deserve more space than can be allotted here. Since, however, I cite Dirk Moses multiple times in my discussion of *Heimat*, it seems useful to note that neither the general accuracy nor the ethical implications of Moses’ arguments in themselves determine the applicability of his theories to *Heimat*, which appears to me to include features that are relatable to

[169] See, for instance, Susanne Urban, 2022, who similarly focuses particularly (although not exclusively) on Dirk Moses (ibid.: 86-90) in her discussion of comparisons of colonialism and National Socialism. Urban offers a useful overview of various other key figures and developments in these controversies.

[170] For example, Assmann (2021) is in favour of moderate comparisons; she writes of factors ‘‘currently curbing […] important discussion’’ in relation to the Holocaust, and states that ‘‘‘relativization’ of the Holocaust is now being qualified as an antisemitic tool. The ban on ‘relativization,’ in turn, has been extended to include the ban on ‘comparison’’’ (2021: 408). She regrets what she perceives to be ‘‘the argument of the new antisemitism specialists […] that the very fact the Holocaust is mentioned together with other crimes against humanity, such as slavery, colonial genocide, or apartheid, calls its uniqueness into question’’ (ibid.). In arguing for comarisons sometimes being acceptable, Assmann cites Confino on there being a need to ‘‘‘draw[…] on the history of European colonialism’’’ in relation to the Holocaust (Confino cited in ibid.).

some of Moses' models; regardless of whether or not one approves of these models, some capture logics – whether admirable or otherwise – that are suggested by Reitz's filmic texts (themselves controversial of course). Just as it is beyond the scope of this present work to pore over all of Moses' writings and their potential implications, it would be pointless here to seek to do justice to the task of properly evaluating (and either agreeing or disagreeing with) the contributions of other participants in these debates, important though the various relevant issues of course are.

Fitzpatrick argues in favour of some degree of comparison between colonialism and National Socialism for the following reason: ''the trope of uniqueness belies a kind of moral hubris or *Sündenstolz* […] that implies that […] only the German nation […] must face the profound existential questions related to states whose histories are steeped in programs of eradication, genocide, and the politics of violent exclusion'' (2008: 483). Fitzpatrick also declares that ''it does not deny the horrors, nor the scale of the Holocaust, to investigate whether there were other horrors throughout history that may or may not have borne structural or intellectual similarities, perhaps even links'' (ibid.). Klävers notes that recognising the specificities and exceptional extremity of the Holocaust need not necessarily be incompatible with acknowledgement of other outstandingly extreme evils, giving an example of a proponent of the Holocaust's uniqueness who expressly disclaims any competitive intention by quoting Steven T. Katz: '''in arguing for the uniqueness of the Holocaust, I am *not* making a *moral* claim […] that the Holocaust was more evil than […] other events [… such as] the enslavement and mass death of black Africans during […] slavery''' (cited in ibid.). Assmann remarks that ''the singularity of the Holocaust only becomes apparent when we have compared'', and declares that ''comparing does not mean levelling or equating'' (2021: 408).

In presenting the motivation of perpetrators of colonialism in the fourth *Heimat* and perpetrators of the evils of National Socialism in the first *Heimat* somewhat similarly, Reitz tends rather towards the views of Moses than towards Friedländer's insofar as Reitz suggests at least loose parallels between National Socialism and earlier European colonialism. To revisit Fitzpatrick's consideration of the Self

and Other in relation to the perpetrators of, on the one hand, National Socialism and, on the other hand, European colonialism (although he is more specifically concerned with German colonialism), Fitzpatrick suggests that (mores specifically, Imperial German) colonialism and National Socialism were significantly different in relation to their defining approaches to the Self and the Other, but also that ‘‘colonial and Nazi genocides are, albeit distantly, linked’’, at least ‘‘in (the rather weak) sense that they offered mechanisms for the eradication of an ostensibly surplus population, a means of clearing the ground’’ (2008: 502). In the first *Heimat*, Jewish people are all exploited by non-Jewish characters (Eduard’s and Lucie’s financial backer, Wohlleben with his engineering skills, Robert’s Jewish neighbour as scapegoat) in ways that conceive of them as ultimately dispensable and correspondingly vanish (presumably horribly in the case of the first and third as well as the second); they are all ‘‘ostensibly surplus’’, to cite Fitzpatrick on the victims of National Socialism and colonialism alike (ibid.). In the fourth series, the indigenous Brazilians are implied to vanish as a result of Gustav (to return to Fitzpatrick’s comment once more) ‘‘clearing the ground’’ (ibid.). In short, Reitz traces a line from earlier colonialism to National Socialism that is similarly loose to the one suggested by Fitzpatrick. Reitz seems to be in broad agreement with Fitzpatrick also that ‘‘the Holocaust is best seen as an attempt to exterminate not the objectified other but the abject, that element of the body politic that […] instills […] the fear of pollution’’ (ibid.: 501-502). In Fitzpatrick’s view, (German) ‘‘colonial genocides’’ contrastingly ‘‘amounted to the attempt to exterminate an objectified alterity in response to attempts by indigenous peoples to overturn the European construction of them as a servile helot class’’ (ibid.: 501). From Gustav’s perspective, Native Americans appear to be a poorly imagined Other, seen mainly as an obstacle to be eradicated alongside trees and snakes (Gustav is willing to go to Brazil with Jettchen because he does not fear contact with the Other). Reitz’s reading of the colonial dimension in the background of *Die andere Heimat* would, then, appear to be roughly like Fitzpatrick’s interpretation of colonial genocides. Jakob, however, is clearly a different case (even though his image of Native Americans sometimes crosses into problematic territory): instead of imagining Native Americans as particularly Other to

himself or as the same as himself, Jakob aims to respect them as distinct from himself yet critically related as equally human. Jakob does not hold the Other in either hatred nor contempt, nor hate the Self in the form of the ‘‘abject’’. Instead, Jakob learns to love his Hunsrück Self, ultimately being content not to emigrate, while maintaining his xenophilia via imagination and literacy (as noted in the following section). Jakob at first struggles to accept his everyday reality, but by eventually overcoming his dissatisfaction with the Hunsrück, he is able to avoid choosing to emigrate to join, as a relatively and unjustly privileged member, a white supremacist-controlled society in the form of mid-nineteenth century Brazil. It is Jakob's acceptance of his Hunsrück Self that prevents him from going to participate in the extreme oppression of those whom the likes of Gustav conceived of as non-European Others to be overcome. The Holy Grail that Reitz seeks in his characterisation of Jakob is Germany's acceptance of itself and also of the rest of the human family throughout the world, with, in Jakob's case, the acceptance of the former making it easier to respect the latter.The Superiority of the Imagination

Jakob is tempted to emigrate to Brazil for much of the narrative. Yet there are strong hints that he prefers the Heimat of his imagination and a world of books to any reality – Jakob is, as Wortmann observes, ‘‘lesesüchtig’’ (2014: 13:12), while both ‘‘Fernweh’’ and Heimat are effectively ‘‘durch Texte hervorgerufen’’ (ibid.: around 12:00). Even at the start of the narrative Jakob's stated intention is ‘‘die Welt zu sehen, so wie in Büchern beschrieben’’. As Koebner comments, ‘‘In seiner Einbildung ist er [Jakob] schon in den Süden Amerikas vorgedrungen’’ (2015: 240). Palfreyman has pointed out that ‘‘Jakob is the theoretician and Jettchen the practitioner’’ (2019: 118), while von Moltke remarks that in parts of the fourth *Heimat* ‘‘fantasy […] takes the place of historical acts – whether of emigration or colonization’’ (2014: 130), which holds true in relation to Jakob, albeit not in relation to Jettchen and Gustav. Jakob's absorption in fantasy limits his complicity in the usurpation of the lands of indigenous Brazilians, although Jakob is not wholly innocent, since his interest may help to inspire Gustav to participate in violent colonial expansionism. As Gabriel observes, in the first *Heimat* paranoid fantasies about those perceived to be Other drive the

persecution of Apollonia (2004: 166). In the fourth *Heimat* the 'Indianer' principally take the role of the Other and fantasies are likewise projected onto them; yet in the fourth series fantasy is contrasted favourably with the evils of reality (reality being Gustav's realm). Reitz's substantially positive reappraisal in the fourth *Heimat* of German fantasies about (perceived) Others reflects a considerable degree of Normalisation in the fourth *Heimat* (although, as I have discussed, National Socialism remains a key background, just less than in all the other series).

Besides the self-serving aspects of xenophilia as discussed earlier in relation to Altfelix, there is another reason to find some fault with Reitz's approach to the figure of the Other: for Reitz the perfect Other turns out to be one that is thousands of miles distant, too far away to be perceived as a threat to Schabbach or be harmed by those who remain in the Hunsrück. Lutz suggests that 'Indianer' have been viewed by some Germans as the sort of Other that anti-Semites felt able to approve of due to 'Indianer' being so far away, at ''a safe distance'', and thus apparently unthreatening, whereas ''Jewish Germans lived 'right there''' (2002: 168). It is very tempting to conclude the same of Reitz's attitude to perceived Others (although, in his defence, Reitz always condemns rather than approves the persecution of those considered to be Other when he shows it).

There is some scope for doubting the sincerity of Jakob's attachment to the Other in reality. Jakob's fondness for fantasising about Native Americans is so great that, rather than bringing him closer to Native Americans, it distances him from the objects of his ostensible longing in a way that not only prevents him from sharing Gustav's villainy but also shields him against awakening to a realisation of the appalling nature of credible explanations as to why Gustav and Jettchen apparently never see any Native Americans. Wortmann notes that the Hunsrück landscape is prominent, with ''Hügel'' that ''konkurrieren'' with those of the Americas (2014: around 34:40). When seemingly pristine Hunsrück woodland and the inclusion of drums in the score are meant to evoke indigenous Brazil, a pastoral-patriotic paean to the Hunsrück landscape appears almost to be masquerading as enthusiasm for the world beyond. It seems, however, unlikely that all of either Jakob's or Reitz's

xenophilia is disingenuous, but Germany (or at least the Hunsrück) is what *Die andere Heimat* most ardently longs to show in a loving light. In this respect the fourth *Heimat* seems broadly comparable to another early twenty-first century attempt to use fiction to find Germany's place in the wider world in a way likely to encourage German audiences to find contentment within Germany: Daniel Kehlmann's novel *Die Vermessung der Welt* (2005) similarly contrasts Humboldt with a German who stays at home (for which purpose Kehlmann selects the mathematician Carl Friedrich Gauss), and, as Katharina Gerstenberger writes, ''the novel overall sides with Gauss and his ability to conceive of space in the abstract'' (2011: 108).[171] Although Reitz portrays Jettchen sympathetically (and her desire to move on is very understandable given the traumas she has suffered), he clearly prefers Jakob, the character who remains in Germany, to Gustav, much as Kehlmann arguably prefers Gauss. In his approach to the fourth *Heimat* Reitz champions German intellectual engagement with rest of the world in a manner that stems from an embrace of a Germany that (for Reitz, albeit not all of his characters) has become a home to be happy with, in stark contrast to the Germany of the Nazis that drives Ansgar, Ernst and many other characters in previous series to ruin.

Hope for Ophelia and Germany

In my first and third chapters I referred (drawing on observations by Flinn) to the question of melancholy in relation to National Socialism and the *Heimat* series. In the fourth *Heimat* Reitz undoubtedly feels compelled to return not only to his previous work but also to National Socialism, a background inextricable from the earlier series and persisting into the fourth. Lisa Hopkins argues of *Hamlet* in relation to the first three series (she does not consider the fourth) that it speaks to Reitz in relation to

[171] There are many further points of similarity between *Die Vermessung der Welt* and *Die andere Heimat*. Gerstenberger's following comments on Kehlmann's novel could, with minimal adaptation, be said just as well of the fourth *Heimat*: ''Kehlmann's novel does not offer an explicit critique of colonialism'', but rather ''limits itself to comparatively brief, yet unambiguously critical, comments on the effects of the European presence in Latin America and instead focuses on the experience of the colonizer'' (2011: 109); ''reality and its representation are at the core of Kehlmann's project'' (ibid.: 115); ''the novel endorses the importance of the imagination and illustrates the open-ended nature of representation'' (ibid.: 120).

> questions about remembering the dead, […] father-son relationships, young love, the relationship between what one studies and what one experiences […], the nature and purpose of the age-old rite of burying human corpses, and, above all, the extent to which the pollution of the past can be purged and countries in which something has once been rotten can be put right.

(2014: 28).

All of the above are highly relevant also to the fourth series, while intergenerational relations and ''the pollution of the past'' are relevant to National Socialism.[172] Lisa Hopkins has also claimed in relation to the first three series that *Hamlet* appeals to Reitz partly because *Hamlet* offers Reitz a ''language of fate – 'There is special providence in the fall of a sparrow''' (2014: 37). Multiple characters remark upon the comet, which is referred to as ''ein Zeichen'' (for instance, by Margarethe [4:2: 69:40]). There is, then, an element of augury in *Die andere Heimat*. Seen from this angle, it is striking in relation to *Hamlet* that Doktor Zwirner should refer to sparrows, since Hamlet declares, ''we defy augury; there is a special providence in the fall of a sparrow'' (V:II). The doctor is linking sparrows to the heavenly body represented by the comet and to the unusual, indeed, supernatural-seeming events that the comet, as it transpires, appears to have portended or even caused: Doktor Zwirner muses, ''das Frühjahr ist nach dem Kometen später gekommen als sonst […] und im letzten Jahr die Spatzenplage'' (Reitz, 2014: 127). Although the *Die andere Heimat*'s sparrows are a plague, Reitz draws on *Hamlet* not only in suggesting that Hunsrücker are severely victimised by fate but also to assert that there is, nonetheless, hope for Germany.

Jettchen for a time sinks into a madness that nods to Ophelia. She disrupts the funeral service for her daughter and other children by singing, Ophelia-like, of flowers (''*Blümelein*'' [Reitz, 2014: 134]). Already, her father's death has borne a loose similarity to that of Polonius in that, as a suicide, Fürchtegott is buried in unhallowed ground in the absence of the pastor and most of the community (who, Reitz notes, ''halten sich fern'' [2014: 114]), while Polonius has ''obscure burial'', ''No noble

[172] Regarding the ''studies'' versus ''experience'' theme, see Palfreyman, 2019: 118 (already cited earlier in this chapter).

rite'' (IV:V). Fürchtegott's death is relatable to Ophelia's both in terms of being suicide and being associated with water, since viewers are warned that he is a danger to himself when he has to be coaxed out of his own watermill pit. Shortly before Jakob has to lead Fürchtegott to safety, Jettchen looks at her reflection in water (4:1: 43:49), associating her with Ophelia in light of what follows. At her father's funeral Jettchen leans towards the grave and has to be caught by Gustav to prevent her from falling in, which is vaguely reminiscent of Ophelia's having (according to Gertrude's account) fallen (''fell'') into a watercourse (IV:VII). Jettchen is apparently inclined in part to emulate Ophelia in quickly following her father into death adorned with flowers: Reitz writes that ''Mit ihrem Strauß von Feldblumen geht sie immer näher an das Grab, als wollte sie dem geliebten Vater in die völlige Dunkelheit folgen'' (2014: 115).]. Yet after a while Jettchen recovers; she overcomes her madness and moves on, a tragic melancholic no more. Reitz too moves on; he suggests that enough time has now passed for Germany to make major progress with the Hamletian horror at the deeds of a previous generation of one's family. The similarly veiled representation of the persecution of Native Americans and Jewish people (in the fourth and first series respectively) suggests that Reitz's thoughts were to some extent still returning to the National Socialist crime scene compulsively. Showing the nineteenth century push for South American *Lebensraum* is similarly telling (and perhaps an attempt at ''relativising'' Normalisation of National Socialist-era German territorial expansion). But the fourth *Heimat* emphasises progress over Freudian melancholia, and progress without the cost of forgetting. Jettchen doubtless does not forget her dead firstborn as a result of her return to hope from Ophelia-like obsession with what is gone, and nor does Reitz forget the horrors of the persecution of those whom some members of communities wish to sever from the collective body: Reitz is markedly sympathetic towards the outsiders Margot and Fürchtegott – whose suffering is all the more telling in its silence, as Reitz perhaps intends his acknowledgements of violence to be, while there are reflections (condemnatory ones) on the violence of colonialism as personified by Gustav (although the condemnation is very possibly oversubtle and excessively balanced with various excuses that Reitz is keen to supply, such as fate and the perpetrators'

credentials as victims in some respects). While still remembering the earlier series and the persecution of perceived Others, in the fourth series Reitz is able to invoke some of *Hamlet*'s meanings without succumbing to melancholia. His Ophelia is brutalised and unfortunate, yet she is a strong survivor who holds onto hope for the future. As with his Oedipal drama of incest in the first *Heimat* and his representation of Ansgar's father as an Abraham whose son-sacrifice is not miraculously averted, in the fourth series Reitz emphasises suffering within the German national family at the expense of clear or emotive acknowledgement of victimised people positioned outside the families that are visible onscreen. The colonising couple's possible failure to see the suffering in which (by the time they have sent their letter home) they have most probably become complicit need not necessarily, however, be the viewers' failure too, given Reitz's hints at offscreen horrors.

Conclusion

While portrayed affectionately, Jakob's views of South America are so evidently naïve that there is little danger that viewers will uncritically fall for his excessively positive mental picture of an 1840s European-controlled Brazil whose economy was heavily based on the exploitation of enslaved people and which often expanded its territory with extreme violence. Yet, as per criticisms of *Heimat*'s portrayal of Jewish suffering, evils brought about by European expansion in the Americas are only ever in the subtext. The oppressed victim element in the identity of the Hunsrück emigrants bound for Brazil threatens to obscure or appear to balance out the other half of their identity in which they are perpetrators of the displacement of indigenous Brazilians and overwhelmingly likely to become complicit in the exploitation of enslaved people. Besides forming parallels between Hunsrücker victimhood and indigenous Brazilian victimhood (for instance, by representing both as having been expelled from forests), Reitz suggests that German emigrants were more or less forced (by fateful comets et cetera) to take part in colonialist expansion. Nonetheless, Jakob's fantasy peregrination to the supposed paradise of Brazil is portrayed as morally superior to the real emigration of Jettchen and Gustav, which is unfavourably contrasted with Jakob's approach to Brazil

partly for the laudable reason that Gustav's more concrete engagement with Brazil involves the colonialist aggression that is symbolically foreboded by his rape of Jettchen.

There is a strong similarity between Reitz's approach to conveying victimisation of Native Americans and his indirect, but present, acknowledgement in the first series of National Socialist persecution of Jewish people, which suggests that in the fourth series Reitz is still engaged with the process of revisiting the National Socialist past and, as with Matko in the third series, returning to the trauma of persecuted people being destroyed. Nonetheless, because the persecution of Native Americans is so far from the surface level of the fourth series' narrative, *Die andere Heimat* appears to reflect a fading of the trauma of the past from Reitz's point of view. Jettchen's resistance to Ophelia-like madness also argues for a triumph of progression over melancholia. In the third series, we see the horror of Matko's death unfold before our eyes; in the fourth series the implied forced disappearance of Native Americans from Gustav's and Jettchen's new Heimat must be read between the lines of their letter and inferred from Gustav's act of rape. The reconciliation of Jettchen and Gustav, her ''Vergewaltiger'', as Reitz calls him, is extremely disturbing, and unpleasantly tempers Reitz's condemnation of the figure of the rapist-colonialist. Reitz's determination to cast Jakob as a comfortingly xenophilic hero also threatens to distract from the real persecution, meted out by men like Gustav, of the distant Native American Others to whom Jakob feels akin without having to experience the racist persecution inflicted upon them. Jakob is at least, however, clearly a German hero who emphatically rejects the xenophobia that drove the Nazis and is the polar opposite of Gustav in terms of his actions.

## Concluding Remarks

In the first *Heimat* Reitz was torn between revealing and concealing the evil of the National Socialist period. Reitz certainly intended viewers to both be aware of and condemn the suffering of those persecuted by the Nazis, suffering that is not directly seen but is meant to be perceived beyond the surface of the screen – a strategy accompanied by both potential advantages and grave potential for problems. The first series is anti-Nazi yet also reluctant to wholeheartedly condemn non-persecuted Germans of the National Socialist period, who haunted Reitz's dreams, prompting him to implore viewers to look with pity upon morally compromised characters (in some cases highly compromised ones). The non-persecuted members of the German national family are portrayed by Reitz as tragically mutilated and pitiable victims of their own wrongdoing, people who have – like Oedipus – done exceptionally appalling things (and, unlike Oedipus, without having been fated to do so). Reitz

hopes that viewers' willingness to forgive those characters (but not their actions) will liberate characters and the historic people whom they broadly represent from a Purgatorial state, with the potential liberation dependent upon the empathy-influenced verdict of viewers, who are part of the wider jury of posterity that sits in judgement of Germans of Reitz's parents' generation. Reitz's approach to National Socialism in the first Heimat is partly intellectual, partly emotional and instinctive, exacerbating the complexities and even contradictions arising from his conflicting drives to show and to veil the evils of the period.

In *Die zweite Heimat* Reitz continues to be haunted by questions of culpability, and toys with concepts of fate (not in very clearly defined, but broadly fatalistic, forms) as a possible defence against culpability. With Ansgar and Reinhard Reitz lionises the children of parents (apparently at least) complicit in National Socialism, and in doing so seeks a tragic and heroic status. The German young adults of the second series are pursued by seemingly supernatural punishment for the evildoing of so many of their ancestors, much as per Reitz's grandfather's ''Schuld-und-Sühne'' stories – the ''Familie wird nun vom Unglück verfolgt. Auf Untaten folgen Schicksalsschläge'' (see Reitz in Koebner and Koch, 2008: 24 [as cited in my chapter on the first *Heimat*]). Partly to appease punishing fate, and partly to show Germans as victims of their past in order to challenge the predominant association due to National Socialism between non-persecuted Germans and perpetration of or complicity in evil, Reitz performs a scapegoating ritual in the form of Ansgar's suffering at the hands of his father. The sacrifice of Ansgar is intended to allow Germans to progress onwards from the past by paying a price – via a scapegoat – for past evil and break with the melancholic inability to move on that characterised Ansgar. Reinhard is similarly a sacrificial character, although there is the difference that Reitz appears – perhaps in self-critical mode – to cast a significant degree of doubt on Reinhard's martyr credentials in acknowledgement of the villainy of an excessive focus on the suffering of non-persecuted Germans and their descendants at the expense of those who were persecuted by the Nazis. Reitz's endeavours to combine the figures of perpetrator and victim in ''split selves'' is extremely problematic in relation to Esther.In *Heimat 3*

Ernst and, most unjustly, Matko are driven to their deaths by Ernst's accursed morally tainted art collection, via which Ernst seeks to leave a legacy that associates him with those deliberately victimised by the Nazis, a status that he did not possess, and Reitz is to an extent critical of Ernst, much as he is of Reinhard in the previous series. With the deaths of Ernst and Matko Reitz seeks to bring an end to the cycle of supernatural punishment unleashed by the evil of National Socialism. The Günderrodehaus is a house haunted by sacrifice, and Reitz tries to lay the ghosts to rest via the sacrifice of Ernst, the scapegoating of Matko and the cleansing power of flood and fire, with Reitz's use of fiery deaths having profoundly disturbing associations. As in the second series, Reitz deploys fictional German suffering in an attempt to balance the real suffering of those persecuted under National Socialism. At the same time, Reitz strives to promote in viewers acceptance of Matko, a character with ancestry outside Germany.

*Die andere Heimat* is the part of the cycle least troubled by National Socialism in terms of Reitz's approach to it. The fourth series' comparison of National Socialism and colonialism, in contrast, is relatable to often complex and highly contested debates. In *Die andere Heimat* Reitz remains determined to undermine a sense of difference between perpetrator and victim and emphasise shared suffering over culpable involvement in producing suffering. Like National Socialism in the first series, colonialist evils are acknowledged, condemned and also placed in the background. Viewers are encouraged to engage with the filmic text imaginatively and look further than the camera shows. Reitz stakes no serious claim to Native Americans' experiences, preferring to stimulate viewers to have an imaginative awareness of what a rapist like Gustav is likely to do in Brazil at a time when extreme exploitation of non-Europeans by white Europeans blighted Brazil (which is not to deny that aspects of the presentation of Native Americans have distinct problematic potential). Given the importance of viewers' understanding the intolerable evils of National Socialism and European colonialism, it is certainly problematic also that Reitz strongly tends towards (sometimes great) subtlety in criticism of such evils, and Reitz's condemnation is tempered by a powerful urge to

profoundly empathise with Germans complicit in acts of exceptional wickedness, whether in the 1840s or about a century later.

In the fourth series and the cycle as a whole, characters function as mirrors with which viewers are meant to interrogate their own morality and longings. While Reitz does not seek to tightly control how viewers react to characters, he encourages viewers to see similarities between perpetrators and victims of persecution, which rejects the Nazis' ideology of inherent, racial differences leading to vast discrepancies in the value of people's lives, yet also threatens to mask the culpability of perpetrators at times. Reitz flirts with fate as a defence against culpability. He urges viewers to see beyond the surface of the screen metaphysically and to pity characters both seen and unseen, but Reitz's pity appears to be focused most intensely, consistently and enthusiastically on fellow (non-persecuted) Germans. As per Jakob's xenophilia, Reitz generally aims to respect people who experience the world differently to himself in important ways, yet he has a tendency to keep them at a distance, certainly in relation to physical visibility and probably in emotional terms (although Matko is an exception). In several instances spread across the second and third series Reitz dedicates an extensive amount of screentime and intellectual effort to elaborate scapegoating manoeuvres in order move away from the evils that were perpetrated by much of his society when he was very young. I do not intend to be an apologist for some of Reitz's not infrequently, and sometimes extremely, problematic representations of, and remarks about, various groups (Jewish people, Native Americans and women, for example). Reitz sincerely condemns violence and exclusion throughout the cycle, albeit sometimes in ways obscure enough to be potentially problematic in terms of viewers' reactions. Reitz is subtle and (to a large extent too) restrained in his condemnation of the rapist-colonialist Gustav, yet viewers are surely meant to follow Reitz's example in preferring the doubtless imperfect but essentially pacific and gentle Jakob, who, in stark contrast to the Nazis, admires those who constitute his principal conception of otherness. It does not seem too generous to give Reitz the last words here, since he is capable of self-criticism: as Reitz says of himself, he is ''jemand, der liebenswert und hassenswert in einem ist'' (no date [1981]: 141).

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