

Prevent Duty and the Securitisation of Citizenship

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Abstract

In 2018, Metropolitan Police's Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, called on all good citizens to be 'counter-terrorism citizens'. This statement signals an expansion of the state's coercive sphere and raises the question: how do ordinary citizens *operate* as 'counter-terrorism citizens'? This research investigates this question by studying the lived experiences of ordinary citizens who have to enact the Prevent Duty as part of their professional roles.

Prevent Duty puts a legal obligation on frontline staff working in health, education, and social work sectors to conduct counter-terrorism monitoring. If we study Prevent enactment only as a professional obligation, we cannot understand how individuals engage with this policy as 'citizens' and come to perceive their surveillance roles as civic duty. To capture these dynamics, this research argues we should analyse Prevent through the framework of securitised citizenship. This not only helps us understand how the state shifts security responsibilities to citizens but also tells us how citizens respond to these obligations. Through these responses we can find out whether citizens want to be counter-terrorism citizens and how they carry out these duties.

The empirical findings of this research demonstrate that engagement with Prevent is diverse and can range from eager compliance to vocal resistance. People's decisions are influenced by a variety of factors and in some instances, they agree to comply or resist the policy against their initial instincts. As such, within citizens' engagement with Prevent Duty, we find a variety of narratives clashing with each other, yielding a messy lived reality where civic agency is diffused with subjection and vice versa. However, within these contradictory dynamics, we can observe an overwhelming concern for the safety of others and the recognition that citizens have a civic responsibility to protect each other. The dominance of this narrative has allowed the state to slowly expand its counter-terrorism framework and co-opt different sections of the society within it.

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Declaration

I, Amna Kaleem, confirm that this thesis entitled *Prevent Duty and the Securitisation of Citizenship* is my own work. I am aware of the University's Guidance on the Use of Unfair Means (<u>www.sheffield.ac.uk/ssid/unfair-means</u>). This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, university.

I would like to declare that some versions and excerpts of chapters 3, 4, 6, and 7 have previously been published in the following outputs:

- Kaleem, A. (2022) The hegemony of Prevent: turning counter-terrorism policing into common sense, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 15:2, 267-289.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The Prevent Strategy¹ and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) 2015, put a statutory obligation on specified authorities, including social work, health, and education sectors, to 'prevent people from being drawn into terrorism' (Home Office, 2015a, p. 18). Frontline professionals employed in these sectors receive Prevent Duty training and are instructed to enact the policy as part of their safeguarding responsibilities. As such, one way of studying Prevent enactment is by focussing on micro-level professional associations or sectoral dynamics. However, this project's empirical findings demonstrate that even though these citizens are introduced to their Prevent Duty obligations through their professional roles, their decision to engage with the policy is influenced by a multiplicity of socio-political factors and narratives. A focus on professional dynamics is useful in telling us how citizens as educators, medical professionals, and social workers articulate their roles within Prevent Duty. However, it does not explain how individuals come to engage with this policy as 'citizens' and see counter-radicalisation monitoring as a 'civic duty', to be carried out both within and outside their workplace. To capture these shifting dynamics, I argue that we should look beyond the professional sectors and study Prevent Duty as a regime of securitised citizenship. This approach shows us how the British state has introduced and normalised Prevent Duty by injecting a security logic in citizenship discourse and turned it into a normative responsibility to be taken on by 'good' citizens. With a focus on citizenship practice as the conceptual site of Prevent enactment, we can also explore the role citizens play in shaping the way Prevent operates across the civil society. By doing so, I will demonstrate that Prevent Duty is co-constituted by both the state and citizens, is influenced by the narratives of civic responsibility and self-governance, and is made up of myriad messy and overlapping interactions that range across an entire spectrum between compliance and resistance.

It is important to see Prevent Duty enactment as a co-constituted practice, because the expansion of this policy across different parts of the society is dependent on citizens not only adopting it but also reinterpreting it as something more than a professional responsibility. Empirical findings show that citizens do not just engage with Prevent as a professional duty, they connect it to a wider civic

¹ Style note: *Prevent* is one of the four strands of British government's counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST. In CONTEST documents it appears as '*Prevent*'. However, it has also been released in standalone policy documents as '*Prevent Strategy*' detailing the scope of the policy. The term '*Prevent Duty*' refers to the guidance that is circulated within different social sectors to explain what the policy is and how it should be enacted. While *Prevent Strategy* and *Prevent Duty* refer to the same policy, they describe slightly different phenomena. This thesis will use *Prevent Strategy* to refer to the wider policy framework, while *Prevent Duty* will be used to describe the stipulations frontline professionals have to follow. Where this distinction is not needed, I will refer to the policy as *Prevent*.

responsibility of protecting other people. This takes their role as Prevent operatives beyond the confines of their professional sectors and into their personal lives. When viewed as a moral or a civic duty, citizens do not stop 'doing' Prevent work when they are off-the-clock, the practice of monitoring seamlessly flows from their professional to their personal spheres. We can capture this expanding scope of Prevent Duty by situating it within citizenship practice. It opens up a multifaceted field of action and allows us to see how the state deploys these narratives of civic duty, safeguarding, selfmobilisation, and self-governance, and in turn how citizens adopt these and interpret Prevent as a civic obligation. Along with problematising citizens' compliance with Prevent Duty, this framework also helps us explain how and why citizens choose to resist this policy. By looking at how citizens justify their opposition to the policy and advocate contestation, I have traced the narratives that influence these thoughts and actions. When juxtaposed against the instances of compliance, we learn that like complying, resistance also manifests as an act of citizenship through which individuals try to reclaim their civic identity and resituate their responsibilities and loyalties away from the state. By analysing my empirical findings through these conceptual tools, I will demonstrate that even when citizens do not articulate their engagement with Prevent in the language of citizenship practice, we can still find the influence of this narrative in how they make sense of their role within Prevent Duty enactment.

The next section will explain how I am using the framework of securitised citizenship by breaking it down in different conceptual tools. This will showcase how this project is using the concepts of securitisation and citizenship that help us problematise compliance and resistance with the Prevent Duty. However, before we move on, I would like to clarify that this project's focus on citizenship does not imply that professional/sectoral dynamics or other social factors are not relevant for the study of Prevent Duty. As stated above, the policy's enactment is informed by a combination of all these factors. However, I believe there is also value in having a narrow but deep approach and isolating one framework to conduct a detailed study of its impact. By adopting a limited focus on the framework of securitised citizenship, I aim to highlight its significance within a complex web of societal relations through which Prevent Duty, but to serve as a starting point of future enquiries.

Conceptual Tools

I am using 'securitised citizenship' to capture the narratives and processes through which the British state has turned Prevent Duty into a component of civic duty and how citizens adopt it. In this way, this term explains how Prevent is recalibrating social dynamics and helps us identify where the focus of our study should be. While useful, the term securitised citizenship, as well as the concepts of citizenship and securitisation on their own, have been subject to prolific academic use and as such carry multiple connotations and usages. Therefore, I will start this discussion by explaining which conceptualisations of these ideas I am using in this project.

Citizenship: Citizenship can be understood in a number of different ways. We can approach it as a legal tool wielded by the state to exclude people or as a technology of behavioural control that allows the state to manage civic conducts (MacDonald et al., 2013a; Marshall, 2006; Schinkel, 2010). Within the context of counter-terrorism and security, citizenship is generally framed solely as a technology of control. Existing work on citizenship and counter-terrorism has focussed on revocation of civil liberties, deprivation of citizenship status – the case of Shamima Begum² being a prominent example, or the creation of suspect communities (Choudhury, 2017a; Gillespie and O'Loughlin, 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). Hence, when we talk about citizenship and counter-terrorism, the focus is predominantly on how the state is controlling citizens' conduct through security measures. While these approaches are useful, my study of Prevent Duty is not state-centric and as such, these conceptualisations of citizenship would not be suitable. Therefore, I turn to a broader understanding of citizenship that sees it as a multifaceted collection of ideas, actions, and practices that can manifest in any area of civic life (Guillaume and Huysmans, 2013; Isin et al., 2008; Staeheli et al., 2012). These actions can be taken by the state and/or by individuals, who may or may not have legal citizenship status. In fact, this understanding of citizenship encourages us to move away from associating it with legal recognition, instead it becomes a marker of identity that can be adopted by anyone who undertakes mainstream or 'alternative' acts of citizenship (Ní Mhurchú, 2016).

Applying this broad interpretation of citizenship to Prevent Duty enactment allows us to widen the scope of our enquiry to include the actions of both the state and citizens. By seeing Prevent Duty as a co-constituted practice, we also open up new sites of activity that would otherwise go unnoticed. When we approach Prevent Duty as an act of citizenship, we can understand why people talk about doing counter-radicalisation monitoring in ordinary and mundane spaces like supermarkets or people's living rooms. In this way, citizenship practice as a conceptual framework helps us to identify new sites and practices through which state control reaches citizens. Along with this, it also gives us the tools to understand how citizens respond to this control. To capture these different dynamics, we can split the citizenship framework into active and activist citizenship (Isin, 2009; Marinetto, 2003).

² Shamima Begum, who was born and raised in England by parents of Bangladeshi heritage, lost her British citizenship for travelling to Syria in 2015 to join the ISIS militant group. Her citizenship was revoked on national security grounds and with the justification that she will not be rendered stateless because she can apply for Bangladeshi citizenship. Her subsequent appeals have been rejected and at the time of the writing she is in a refugee camp in Syria (BBC News, 2023).

Active citizenship, rooted in governmentality, helps us understand how the state uses citizenship as a technology of control to shift responsibilities to citizens and turn them into compliant agent/subjects. This also allows us to see how citizens engage with Prevent Duty by accepting it as their civic responsibility. On the other hand, activist citizenship helps us capture the actions and ideas through which citizens push back against state control and reclaim their civic identity.

Within the study of Prevent Duty enactment, active citizenship shows how the British state has taken existing ideas of citizen self-governance and self-mobilisation and diffused security logics within them. In some cases, we can find this done overtly by making Prevent compliance a way of building civic resilience against extremism (Home Office, 2011a, p. 27; West, 2017). In other cases, the connection is more subtle where we see Prevent Duty being channelled through safeguarding practices. As the empirical discussion will show, despite safeguarding being a professional duty, when citizens think of Prevent as a way of protecting people, they start thinking of it as a wider civic responsibility. Hence, the state deploys the narratives of active citizenship to normalise and de-politicise Prevent Duty and these are accepted and reproduced by citizens to expand the policy's remit. In this way, I will use active citizenship to understand the actions of both the state and citizens. While active citizenship helps us explain compliance with Prevent, the framework of activist citizen allows us to capture resistance to the policy. Given Prevent's statutory status, resistance manifests in a variety of ways ranging from muted and scattered acts of contestation to more vocal displays of defiance. Activist citizenship helps us understand how and why citizens refuse to enact the Prevent Duty. As such, by approaching resistance through the lens of activist citizenship, we can trace the narratives of civic identity, responsibility, and loyalty through which these individuals (re)negotiate their place in the community.

By using this broad framework of citizenship, I will explore a diversity of actions and interactions that set the parameters of civic activity. This approach also allows me to privilege the perspectives of both the state and citizens. I will now explain how I am using the concept of securitisation in this project and how it helps me understand the changing nature of citizenship dynamics in the British society.

Securitisation: Coming out of the Copenhagen School, the original conception of securitisation theory explained the process by which (mostly) elite actors use speech acts to 'intersubjectively establish' existential security threats that allow the suspension of normal procedures and rules (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). Securitisation captures the process that allows power holders to gain control of an issue and institute exceptional changes. These violate normal rules of conduct but are accepted by the

audience because they are deemed to be addressing a security threat. In this way, securitisation theory helps us see how security threats are created and by whom. In some ways, my approach to securitisation aligns with the original Copenhagen School iteration because I identify the British state as the entity that creates the discourse of (in)security and injects this logic in citizenship practice. Similarly, in my analysis, we also have an audience in the shape of the citizens who not only receive the securitising discourse positively, but also reproduce it. However, this linkage is tenuous at best because by limiting securitising acts to verbal interventions made by sovereign actors and associating securitisation solely with the moment of exception, the Copenhagen School approach does not provide me the tools for understanding the operationalisation of Prevent Duty through citizenship practice.

Prevent Duty is not enacted through the creation of an exceptional situation but rather a routinised operation of counter-terrorism work. The security logics are diffused in civic and professional norms in a way that people do not even recognise its coercion and view it as a 'moral duty'. Therefore, this phenomenon is better understood through the Paris School's reinterpretation of securitisation that focuses on finding the exercise of security within ordinary activities. This approach does not situate (in)security making within a single moment of intervention or a speech act, instead it traces it in the 'mundane bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics' (Bigo, 2014; Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008). This helps me find the exercise of security politics by Prevent Duty within the everyday reality of citizenship practice. While I rely heavily on the Paris School approach, I deviate slightly from it because it predominantly focuses on professionals as 'managers of unease', while my subject of study is ordinary citizens (Bigo, 2002). Even though these citizens are frontline professionals, they are not part of the security infrastructure, therefore, when they get co-opted into Prevent enactment, their 'ordinariness' is more enhanced (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2013, pp. 347–348).

Given the various interpretations and adaptations, I would say the concept of securitisation has become something akin to a 'travelling theory' that serves a variety of purposes (Salem, 2021, p. 5). It has been widely used as a handy linguistic device to explain how a certain socio-political problem, not normally situated within security politics, comes to be seen as a security threat. We can see that in a number of studies on the securitisation of immigration, health, social policy etc. (Bigo, 2014; Chung, 2017; Hansen, 2011; Kelle, 2007). My use of securitisation differs from these in the sense that I am not using it to designate citizens as a security risk per se, instead my focus is on understanding how they get mobilised for security purposes. In this way, my work sits closer to those interventions on securitised citizenship that see an injection of security logics and practices within sites, discourses, and actions of citizenship (Muller, 2004; Nyers, 2009; Rojas, 2009; Rygiel, 2007). I am also expanding the conceptualisation of securitised citizenship by using it as a framework through which we can understand how different interactions of control and resistance take place between the state and citizens. As such, my study of Prevent as a regime of securitised citizenship is exploring how the idea of security management gets diffused within citizenship practice, how this enables the state to shift security responsibilities to citizens turning them into self-governing agent/subjects, and lastly, how do citizens respond do this co-optation.

Case Selection

As explained earlier, I am approaching Prevent Duty as a co-constituted practice made up of the actions and interactions of both the state and the citizens. The question of how citizens respond to their Prevent Duty obligations has been at the core of this research enquiry. Therefore, I am rooting my study of securitised citizenship in the experiences of ordinary citizens. Within Prevent Duty enactment, we can find two sets of citizens interacting with the state who can be roughly divided into 'suspects' and 'agents'. This is an arbitrary divide imposed by the state and these labels are very unstable as any individual can find themselves on either side of this metaphorical security border. However, this does help us see how different pockets of the civil society are currently being targeted. On one side we have the frontline staff who have to take on security responsibilities, on the other are those citizens who by interacting with the former become suspects by default. We can look at either of these groups and learn valuable lessons about how mundane activities like going to school or consulting a medical professional have turned into (in)security making opportunities. For this research, I have focussed on the first group of citizens – the frontline staff who are tasked with enacting the Prevent Duty.

One of the predominant reasons for making this choice is these citizens' exposure to different narratives of responsibility and security. As frontline staff, they get introduced to Prevent Duty as a professional safeguarding responsibility. However, as this research will demonstrate, when they speak about their Prevent obligations, they interpret it as a much wider civic or moral responsibility. In this way, the insights of these citizens help us juxtapose different narratives and draw out their influences. This is not to say that the wider public are immune to the securitising effects of citizenship practice, but this study is exclusively focussing on frontline staff as 'ordinary citizens'.

These citizens also make an interesting subject of study because they occupy a unique space within the British society. They are part of the state because they work within the welfare sector, but they traditionally sit outside the coercive sphere of the state and do not have security responsibilities. However, Prevent has co-opted them within a widescale surveillance operation. Before we proceed, I would like to clarify how the term surveillance is being used in this project. Frontline staff in different welfare state sectors carry out some form of monitoring to protect their service users against harm. Whether it is teachers or doctors, it is normal practice to look out for signs of abuse and report these. As such, we can say there is already a culture of 'surveillance' within public sector work and as I have explained in my other work, Prevent Duty has made use of these established practices to diffuse counter-terrorism monitoring within the welfare state infrastructure (Kaleem, 2022). However, it would be useful to differentiate Prevent-led surveillance from other forms of monitoring because the threats being monitored in this case are deemed to be a risk to not just the vulnerable individual but also the wider society. A victim of sexual abuse would be safeguarded differently from an individual deemed me to vulnerable to 'extremism' because while the former is seen as a victim, the latter falls under the dual categorisation of a victim and a threat. Similarly, as I will discuss in the following chapters, the actions taken to mitigate this risk turn the individual 'at risk' into a suspect and expose them to coercive security measures. Therefore, while Prevent engages existing practices of monitoring, it adds a coercive element to these and turns ordinary citizens into agents of the security state.

This co-optation creates two layers of subjection for the frontline staff, firstly, they are under a statutory duty to conduct counter-terrorism monitoring as part of their professional responsibilities. In addition to this, they can also be subjected to this policy and find themselves transformed from being agents to suspects. This gives us a good starting point to initiate this enquiry within a policy regime where power appears to travel in one direction – exerted by the state over the citizen. By situating this study in citizenship practice, we can approach these citizens as more than just securitised subjects. We can see that while they operate within dual layers of subjection, these citizens also have some scope of agency in their engagement with the Prevent Duty. They can push back against the policy and resist it, albeit with certain limitations. This adds a dynamism to Prevent Duty enactment and yields an entire spectrum of civic engagement ranging from eager compliance to vocal resistance. This also shows that the state control maybe pervasive, but it is not absolute and there are small fissures through which we can pry open this regime of control and unpack the various power dynamics at play.

As such, using the framework of securitised citizenship, we start from a place where citizens under Prevent Duty are seen as subjects of state control and recast them as actors with agency. By situating the ideas and experiences in the narratives of active and activist citizenship, we see how they articulate their role within Prevent, why they comply with it or resist it, and how the varying degrees of compliance/resistance manifest in ordinary interactions. This approach will enable me to present securitised citizenship as a site of power relations where subjection co-exists and clashes with agency. We can see different civic interactions emerge within this space that demonstrate the messy and often contradictory reality of Prevent Duty enactment.

Research Questions

To understand how the Prevent Duty has securitised citizenship and explore the nature of this securitisation, this thesis will explore the following research questions:

Why does Prevent rely on shifting security responsibilities to ordinary citizens and how has this been achieved?

To understand how Prevent works in everyday reality, I will start the enquiry with understanding why it operates through the mobilisation of ordinary citizens. This question allows me to trace the philosophical foundations of Prevent Duty and situate these within radicalisation discourse that places the threat of terrorism within communities and recommends a 'nip in the bud' approach with counter-terrorism interventions undertaken at the grassroots level. This discussion also looks at the political context within which different iterations of the Prevent Duty have developed and the ideological influences that have shaped policy responses. In this way, the first research question sets the backdrop for other conceptual enquiries.

How can citizenship practice help us understand Prevent Duty enactment?

This question is essential to this project's theoretical framework and helps me explore not just the different conceptualisations of citizenship but also how it can be securitised by the state. Through this discussion, I establish citizenship as a multifaceted collection of ideas, acts, and interactions that can be undertaken either by the state or the citizens. By putting forward a broad conceptualisation of citizenship, I create a theoretical scaffolding across which we can situate acts of both compliance and resistance to the state in general and Prevent Duty in particular. This discussion helps us anticipate how citizens could potentially engage with the Prevent Duty.

What can Prevent Duty contribute to our understanding of citizenship practice?


This question is answered through the empirical section of this thesis and highlights the iterative relationship between theory and interview data in this project. While the previous question lays out the different ways in which citizens can respond to Prevent Duty, this question looks at how they

actually engage with Prevent Duty in their everyday professional and personal lives. This discussion helps us draw out the different narratives that influence how citizens respond to their Prevent Duty obligations and whether they comply or resist with the policy. More importantly, this question allows us to destabilise the binary divide of compliance/resistance and demonstrate the messiness inherent in the everyday reality of citizens' engagement with Prevent. Exploring this overlap between instances of compliance and resistance expands our understanding of citizenship practice as it shows us that citizens' relationship with the state is not just defined by a top-down distribution of power. This relationship is defined by both agency and subjection with citizens finding ways to exercise agency despite being subjected to coercive security practices.

Research Significance and Contribution

By studying Prevent Duty through the framework of securitised citizenship and approaching it as a coconstituted practice, this research opens up a new area of enquiry where we study how the state shifts counter-terrorism duties to citizens and how citizens receive and reinterpret these responsibilities. While the first part of the enquiry helps us take stock of the current situation, the latter part unveils a series of dynamic interactions that define a citizen's engagement with Prevent Duty. From these interactions, we can draw important lessons about the multidimensional yet conflicting nature of civic engagement, the overlap of clashing narratives, and the instability of binaries. I will explain how these seemingly disconnected insights help us understand the role citizens are (perhaps unwittingly) playing in expanding the scope and remit of Prevent Duty.

A simplistic way of understanding how citizens respond to their Prevent Duty obligations would be to look at it as a matter of compliance or resistance. Citizens either take on their counter-terrorism obligations or they refuse to participate. However, my research shows that the lived reality of Prevent engagement is not as straightforward. Most people are influenced by a variety of narratives and work through different considerations to decide how to engage with Prevent Duty. As such, we see a multiplicity of responses that vary in commitment and vigour. To capture this messiness in Prevent engagement and systematise these responses, I have developed a spectrum of civic engagement. This spectrum maps citizens' responses to Prevent – ranging from eager compliance to vocal resistance bracketed within the overlapping categories of compliance, hesitation, and resistance.



Through this spectrum I show the diversity of ways in which people engage with the Prevent Duty. It is important to highlight this because not all instances of compliance and resistance are driven by the same factors or narratives. Similarly, they are also not uniform in nature. If we just look at the interactions grouped under compliance, we find five different varieties ranging from eager to coerced participation in Prevent Duty. If all of these instances were simply analysed as instances of compliance, we would miss the nuances that motivate or coerce people into engagement. Each gradation of this spectrum helps us learn about the narratives that inform this engagement, the concerns (or lack thereof) that are managed by citizens to reach the decision to comply or resist, as well as the actions through which this compliance or resistance manifests. This also underscores the importance of studying Prevent engagement through the lived experiences of ordinary citizens. Prevent Duty reaches civic sectors through a series of prescriptive guidance and trainings, if we solely rely on these to understand Prevent enactment, we would not be able to capture the thoughts and actions that define a citizen's participation in this policy.

This spectrum also makes an important contribution by showing not just the diversity of responses but also the overlap between different types of engagement. This helps us understand how citizens' decisions to comply or resist are influenced by a variety of (often clashing) narratives. While my limited design skills have only allowed me to chart these gradations in a linear fashion on the spectrum, in the discussion of empirical findings I will show the diverse nature of these overlaps. By taking people's reasonings for compliance or resistance and connecting these to the wider narratives of active and activist citizenship, we can see that citizens' thoughts and their actions do not always neatly line up. Some people speak about challenging the state and not wanting to 'spy' on others but then justify their compliance with Prevent as a way of helping the state. Similarly, for some, resistance to Prevent is the only option for fighting the security state but they concede reluctant engagement with the policy to tackle certain kinds of threats. We find some people's thoughts align with one gradation of the spectrum, but their actions situate them in another. As such, we find crossovers across the spectrum when we trace people's thoughts and actions to the different narratives provided in the theoretical framework.

This diversity of action and the overlap between different forms of engagement brings us to the third point I mentioned earlier – the instability of binaries. To set certain parameters of the enquiry, I started with the binaries of compliance and resistance. As discussed above, these roughly correspond with the frameworks of active and activist citizenship, respectively. However, when these binaries are applied to the empirical data, we find that there is not a clear division. With compliance and resistance split into different overlapping gradations, we find the same happening with the corresponding conceptual tools. Within the insights drawn from research participants, we find a clash between the narratives of active and activist citizenship.

The influence of competing narratives reveals that the binary of agency and subjection is also unstable. We approach citizens who come under a legal obligation to enact the Prevent Duty as agent/subjects of the state. Both the 'agency' and 'subjection' of these citizens are rooted in the responsibility they are given to act on behalf of the state. One can see compliance as an act of agency in line with the securitising narrative of active citizenship. Alternatively, we can situate agency in people resisting the Prevent Duty. In both cases, we find that agency is diffused with subjection. In the case of compliance, citizens are 'empowered' to monitor people, but they do not have the autonomy to refuse these responsibilities. The spectrum of civic engagement shows that we can stretch the limits of this agency. People can choose how to comply and take stock of other considerations before they make a decision. This shows that there is some room to manoeuvre, however, there are limits to this agency. While this is interesting, the important contribution I make is to show the constraints on agency within acts of resistance. A straightforward approach would dictate that we see muted and vocal acts of resistance as an exercise of agency and as citizens desecuritising citizenship by refusing to engage with the Prevent Duty. However, the empirical analysis shows that even when people are resisting their Prevent Duty obligations, they still operate under the influence of securitising narratives of threat, safeguarding, and responsibility. Their agency is curtailed by the influence of the same narratives that create their subjection. Therefore, even when citizens are resisting Prevent Duty, they are unable to escape the securitisation logic that facilitates their co-optation within this regime.

By putting these different insights together, I demonstrate that citizens are playing a role in expanding the scope of the Prevent Duty beyond its enactment in specified sectors. When we explore the overlaps between different forms of engagement, we can see that whether people choose to comply with or resist the policy, they justify their decisions by situating them within the wider narratives of civic responsibility. Whether they see themselves as compliant agents or dissenting subjects of the state, they agree that they have a duty to protect other people. Thus, Prevent comes to be seen as a moral duty that should not be confined to their professional spheres. This sense of a wider duty and responsibility contributes to creating a common-sense approach that demands that citizens play a proactive role in keeping people safe. There are differences of opinion on how this can be done, and we find that in the insights that populate the spectrum of civic engagement. However, there is a predominant acceptance of the presence of threats and the need to 'do something'. This mindset has allowed the state to create an ecosystem of citizen-led counter-terrorism activities around the Prevent Duty. In the past few years, we have seen the launch of programmes like Actions Counter Terrorism that encourage ordinary citizens to take counter-terrorism training from the comfort of their homes and Building a Stronger Britain Together (now defunct) that make funding for community programmes contingent on their counter-terrorism work (Counter Terrorism Policing, 2020; Home Office, 2016; Rodrigo Jusué, 2022). These programmes operate separately from Prevent Duty, but they have been made possible because of the groundwork laid by Prevent since 2006 that has systematically securitised different parts of the British civic life.

Thesis Structure

I start this thesis with the Methodology chapter to outline my epistemological approach and how that has informed my choice of the subject matter and research design. As such, Chapter 2 starts by discussing my use of the feminist epistemology and the focus on recognising that the 'personal is political'. I explain how that influenced me to privilege the perspectives of ordinary citizens and situate my study within the mundane experiences of 'everyday' interactions. I also discuss how my theoretical framework helped me design my interview protocols and also informed the subsequent process of data analysis. In this chapter, I also discuss the ethical challenges of researching a sensitive subject and the risks it can pose to both the participants and the researcher.

I have divided the rest of the thesis into two sections comprising three chapters each. The first section covers the Theoretical Framework of this project. Chapter 3 in the section explores the political and philosophical context within which the Prevent Strategy has developed since its first public release in 2006. I start by identifying how the concept of radicalisation has provided a philosophical foundation for the policy. By developing the idea of ambiguous yet widespread threats present in the body of the individual, radicalisation discourse makes it necessary to shift security responsibilities to citizens as they cannot be managed by the state on its own. In this chapter, I also trace the development of the subsequent iterations of Prevent Strategy and highlight how radicalisation discourse has shaped its evolution over the past 16 years.

Chapter 4 takes this discussion forward by unpacking the concept of citizenship and establishing it is as a co-constituted practice made up of the actions and ideas of both the state and citizens. By exploring the different dynamics inherent in citizenship practice, I explain how and why I have opted to study the Prevent Strategy through citizenship framework. Using active citizenship, I explain how the British state has been able to securitise citizenship to facilitate the operationalisation of Prevent Duty. This chapter also adds to our understanding of citizenship by moving beyond the neoliberal conceptions of 'active citizenship' and introducing the idea of 'activist citizenship'. This helps to open up citizenship as a multifaceted practice that allows both state control as well as resistance to this control. Using this framework and introducing the Foucauldian concept of counter-conducts, I reconceptualise resistance to move away from organised, counter-hegemonic acts of contestations to scattered and irregular techniques of push-back. By analysing Prevent engagement through active and activist citizenship, I also put forward a broad conceptualisation of securitised citizenship as a site of power relations where we can find technologies of both control and resistance.

Chapter 5 concludes the theoretical section with a review of the existing literature. In this chapter, I look at existing work on citizenship and counter-terrorism by dividing the literature in three themes of 'precarious citizenship', 'resilient citizenship', and 'active and activist citizenship'. Through these themes, I highlight how my research engages with and contributes to existing scholarship. I discuss how most of the work on violation of citizenship rights and civil liberties has focussed on understanding the impact of security policies on Muslims and how my work takes this forward by looking at the impact of Prevent on a wider section of the populace that is normally not considered as a 'suspect community'.

The second part of the thesis covers the empirical framework and discusses the research findings of this project. To highlight the multifaceted nature of civic engagement as reflected in my spectrum, I have divided the empirical section into three chapters entitled Compliance, Hesitation and Resistance. These cover the different ways in which citizens articulate their role within the Prevent Duty and conceptualise their civic duty. Chapter 6 on Compliance looks at why people opt to comply with their Prevent Duty obligations, what the factors are that influence this engagement, and how does this compliance manifest. By exploring different types and reasons of complying, this chapter argues that compliance is not uniform, some people engage with the policy because they believe in its core aims while for others it is just a box-ticking exercise. Analysing these findings through our framework of securitised citizenship, I explain how the narratives of active citizenship influence people's engagement with the policy. This serves to explain both the procedural reality of Prevent as well as the attitudinal shifts it causes in citizens.

Chapter 7 on Hesitation charts the grey area between compliance and resistance. It captures the thought processes where citizens deliberate over their engagement with Prevent Duty. The source of hesitation could either be one's initial opposition to the policy or it could be willingness to comply but selectively. In this way, this chapter uncovers an important space that shows that Prevent enactment is not black and white and is influenced by a combination of competing and clashing narratives. People may agree with the policy or oppose it but that may not dictate their ultimate decision to engage with it. By following the thought processes that lead to compliance or resistance, we take stock of all the factors that influence citizens.

The empirical framework concludes with Chapter 8 on Resistance. This chapter puts forward a new way of conceptualising resistance by looking at the different ways in which people speak about not engaging with the Prevent Duty. This discussion is important because Prevent is a statutory duty and as such the scope of resistance is very limited. However, this chapter shows that despite limitations and the coercive weight of Prevent's statutory status, people find different ways in which they can mitigate what they perceive to be the harmful impacts of the policy. This chapter, thus, covers citizens' motivations for contesting the Prevent Duty along with how this resistance manifests. By situating these insights within the narratives of activist citizenship, I show how citizens attempt to reclaim their civic identity by framing resistance to Prevent as an act of citizenship. In this discussion, I also draw out the influence of a wider securitisation logic that keeps people aligned with the state's ideas of threat and vulnerability.

Chapter 9 puts forward a discussion to draw out the lessons we learn from applying the theoretical framework to the empirical findings and what these tell us about citizens' agency and subjection. In Chapter 10, I conclude this thesis with some reflections on how this study of Prevent Duty as securitised citizenship helps us chart the future trajectory of the policy and the changing culture and attitudes towards security, threats, and civilian-led counter-terrorism work.

Chapter 2: Methodology

As I explained in the Introduction, this project is a study of how citizens interact with the Prevent Duty and articulate their roles and responsibilities within this regime of securitised citizenship. I want to start this thesis by discussing my methodological strategy because the first stage in this project was to make the epistemological choice to study ordinary citizens. This informed how I would conduct the research, what conceptual frameworks I would deploy, and how I will frame my empirical and theoretical contributions.

According to Naples, our epistemology 'profoundly shapes the methods we choose and how we employ them' (2007, p. 547), therefore, I will start by discussing the epistemological approach that has informed my choice to focus on citizens and their everyday interactions. The second section will focus on how different theoretical frameworks helped me put together a research design. While epistemology guided whom I would be studying, theory helped me decide how I will conduct this research. This was useful not just in terms of which methods to deploy but to also figure out the themes and narratives I wanted to explore with my research participants. After this, I will explain how I conducted my fieldwork to detail the ethical challenges of researching a sensitive subject and practical challenges of conducting an empirical study during the Covid-19 pandemic. The final section will look at how through the process of data analysis, I revisited my theoretical assumptions and circled back to the starting point of looking at citizens and how they shape our understanding of citizenship and counter-terrorism.

Epistemological Approach

This research project is inspired by feminist epistemology that guides us to 'make visible' those domains of activity that are considered too ordinary or trivial to matter in politics (Enloe, 2014). By opening up new sites, activities, and identities and seeing the power politics at play therein, feminist scholarship has been instrumental in recalibrating our understanding of what should be seen as political. As such, Enloe's assertion that the 'personal is political' has been the guiding principle of this project. By shifting our focus to the private and the trivial, Enloe opens up a new terrain that should be explored in our efforts to understand how the world works (2014). For my study of Prevent Duty as a regime of securitised citizenship, this 'feminist curiosity' has led me to look at the lived experience of ordinary citizens and how they articulate the meaning of citizenship and security (Aradau and Huysmans, 2014; Enloe, 2004). Before I proceed, I would like to clarify which elements of feminist epistemology I have adopted for this project. I am not studying the citizen in relation to group

dynamics or broader structural embeddedness. I briefly touch upon the former in Chapter 6: Compliance, but my approach here is mostly focussed on how citizens receive and absorb different narratives of securitised citizenship. This does not mean they are making these decisions in isolation and I will explain how their decision-making process has an element of the interpersonal because they are acting to fulfil their responsibilities to others. However, the main focus of this study is on the thought processes and actions of the citizens, on seeing how the personal aspect of their civic identity is shaped by and shaping the political. Furthermore, while I am using a feminist approach to guide my case selection, I am not conducting a gendered analysis of Prevent Duty. As Åhäll explains, feminist knowledge creation goes 'beyond studies of gender' to see how the world works (2019, p. 154, 2016, p. 159). This is not to discount the significance of those studies that have applied a gendered lens to understand counter-terrorism and security. However, this research project is a more general study of how acts of citizenship manifest across different identities with the focus placed on centering the lived experiences of ordinary citizens.

A feminist epistemological approach, thus, turns our attention to the political through the personal, but not in a way that maintains the latter as a sphere with sealed borders hosting activity that is strictly contained inside. When approached from a feminist perspective, the personal and the domestic is anything and everything that is suffused with a power dynamic. This makes visible bodies, emotions, stories, interactions, and affects as political processes that inform power relations between citizens and the state (Åhäll, 2016, p. 158). This approach also helps us take the idea of citizenship beyond narrow conceptualisations and opens it up as a collection of ideas and actions that are otherwise considered too mundane to be political. By privileging the personal, feminist epistemology also gives me a new language to talk about those thought processes of citizens that inform their engagement with Prevent. In the introduction, I explained that even though people come into contact with the Prevent Duty in their professional capacities, their actions are steeped in a personal politics of care. Applying a feminist lens on this, we can see this as a '*personalisation*' of a professional obligation. Prevent appeals to citizens' sense of duty, the need to protect the vulnerable, and to shoulder their civic responsibilities. As such, we cannot separate the personal from Prevent because it relies on these personal instincts to mobilise citizens. Similarly, while the civic relationships targeted by Prevent take place in a professional setting i.e. between a teacher and their student, a doctor and their patient, they are informed by principles of trust and confidentiality. It is the personal connection that citizens forge within these professional spaces that has been securitised by Prevent Duty. Therefore, it is important to situate the study of Prevent within the personal, the mundane, and the everyday, because without the personal, there can be no Prevent enactment.

By privileging the ordinary, this approach also lets us look beyond elite actors to ordinary people as not just the recipients of politics but also as actors that shape politics. This accords agency to those who are normally seen as passive subjects, bodies that are 'acted upon' (Enloe, 2014, p. 35). This is particularly important for this project as I aim to study how the ideas and actions of citizens co-constitute the Prevent Duty. As such, when we approach these actors as creators of politics and possessors of power, we not only situate them within security politics, we also identify their contribution in making or disrupting security and citizenship. Securitised citizenship then becomes a practice that is not solely defined by the states and elite actors, but also by ordinary people who hold the power to reinforce it or disrupt it as they undertake mundane civic activities.

Foregrounding the personal and fixing our analytical gaze on ordinary citizens, also allows us to enter spaces and understand interactions that are not new per se but that are usually overlooked in the analyses on where security politics unfolds. As such, privileging the ordinary, the individual, opens up 'everyday' as a space where we can look to find the emergence of new meanings of citizenship and security. The idea of 'everyday' here is a 'conceptual rather than descriptive category' that helps us explore how new practices emerge out of ordinary tasks and how new sites of political activity are carved out of regular spaces (Stanley and Jackson, 2016, p. 299). It is important to recognise 'everyday' as a site of (in)security making because this is where counter-terrorism policing unfolds. People are reminded to 'see it, say it, sorted' at train stations (British Transport Police, 2016), they are told 'Actions counter Terrorism' when they go to the movies (Leicestershire Police, 2018), their vigilance is even requested when honouring the passing of a monarch (Metropolitan Police Events [@MetPoliceEvents], 2022). Not only is counter-terrorism and (in)security making diffused within the everyday, it works by securitising the mundane activities of ordinary citizens, who then become both its subjects and agents. While these put different demands on citizens and some are more mundane than other, the diversity of these calls for citizens' participation in policing shows the widespread nature of this securitisation.

Approaching everyday life as a sphere of political activity makes it easy to identify not just who the actors are, what practices they deploy, and in which spaces they carry out their Prevent and civic obligations, it also opens new areas of enquiry where we can study 'how' these actors interact with these practices (Nyman, 2021). As my spectrum of civic engagement demonstrates, the everyday reality of Prevent enactment yields a variety of interactions that range from eager compliance with Prevent obligations to vocal resistance and everything in between. By situating our enquiry within the

banality of the everyday, we can understand the practices that are adopted to meet and resist these obligations, thus uncovering a 'progressive dimension of the mundane' (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016, p. 1189). Finding value in the ordinariness of everyday is particularly important for this research because along with explaining how citizens comply with Prevent through acts of citizenship, I will also put forward a framework of resistance made up of scattered and irregular acts of contestation. As such, I have combined feminist epistemology's focus on the personal and the ordinary with Foucault's counter-conducts and Scott's 'weapons of the weak' to capture mundane instances of resistance as acts of citizenship (Foucault, 2009, 2007; Scott, 1985). This approach allows me to capture a range of interactions made up of scattered resistance, hesitation and deliberation, and acts of compliance carried out reluctantly. All of these make up the political reality of not just the Prevent Duty, but our civic existence in an increasingly securitised society.

Finally, focussing on the everyday also serves the normative aim of uncovering the violence of security politics when it is camouflaged within the mundanity of civic life. By diffusing Prevent Duty obligations within professional and civic obligations, the state hides the coercion of counter-terrorism policing within the sanitised frames of 'safeguarding' and 'pre-crime space'. If we continue to see the everyday as a site where politics does not happen, we give the state the cover to hide these (in)security making interventions (Huysmans, 2009). As such, by adopting a feminist epistemology, we can uncover how and why citizens get co-opted into security politics, how do they respond to this responsibilisation, and what is the scope of civic subjection, complicity, and agency within these domesticated security regimes.

Research Design

While feminist epistemology helped me identify where I wanted to situate my research and whom I wanted to study, I used my theoretical framework as a guide to put together a research design. As the next section of the thesis will explain, I have used a combination of different conceptual tools in this project. Using active citizenship and governmentality, I focussed on techniques of governance through which the state shifts responsibilities to citizens. The British state has injected security logics in active citizenship discourses to turn counter-terrorism monitoring into a civic responsibility. This analytical approach helped me understand that studying how citizens become agents and subjects of state control under the Prevent Duty would be a good starting point. This approach also explained that the kind of control I was investigating was being exercised from a distance and was self-governing. Therefore, I looked for themes on self-governance, compliance, and acquiescence to state control. Given my focus on citizenship practice, I also looked at how both the state and citizens articulate the

concept of citizenship, how they talk about civic duty, and how individuals perceive their obligations to the state and to their fellow citizens.

Following the feminist epistemological approach of privileging the perspectives of citizens, I knew that my main evidence base would be rooted in interviews with frontline staff. However, before I started the interviews, I conducted textual analysis of government documentation to explore these themes from the state's perspective. These findings have been instrumental in writing Chapter 3: Prevent Strategy – Philosophical and Political Context. This process helped me trace the development of the Prevent Strategy through its different iterations and facilitated an understanding of the 'material practices of governing' where power contestations between the state and citizens take place (O'toole et al., 2016, p. 165). I also used Jackson's strategy of conducting first- and second-order critiques to look for internal instabilities and 'employing social theory and wider research findings... to reflect on broader social and political consequences' (2016, pp. 82–83). A critical study of these documents has provided insights into how narratives diffusing counter-terrorism policing within civic duty have been developed and deployed. The focus of the textual analysis has been on finding themes related to citizenship, resilience, and civic duty within these documents. This process has helped to understand the use of language in presenting radicalisation as a risk and securitising citizenship as a solution. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the process of diffusing counter-terror policing within citizenship practice has involved the construction of a narrative which places threat within communities. Language and terminology in the different iterations of Prevent Strategy have played an important role in developing this narrative (Lamont, 2015, p. 91). From no mention of extremism in the earlier policies to a focus on violent and non-violent extremism in later versions, the use of language provides an insight into how the risk is constructed and situated within civic life. A study of the linguistic representation of securitised civic duty, thus, explains how citizens have become part of the security agenda.

The second-order critique is facilitated by the data generated from qualitative interviews with frontline staff working in health, education, and social work sectors. Using the same theoretical template, I focussed on using semi-structured interviews to find out how narratives of responsibility, duty, resistance, and citizenship are articulated by ordinary citizens within the context of Prevent Duty. Therefore, in these interviews I gleaned insights about the practical details about civic engagement with Prevent as well as an understanding of the narratives that citizens absorb and reproduce. In this way, these interviews told me not just how Prevent reaches the grassroots level and

what citizens know about it but also how they speak about threat and security and the role they play in their management.

To capture these different themes in an organic fashion, I decided to conduct my research using semistructured interviews to facilitate 'knowledge construction' in a manner where both 'the interviewer and interviewee' are co-participants (Mason, 2002, pp. 226–227). While I prepared a thematic questionnaire, the interviews were conducted with a flexibility to follow the participants' train of thought (Soss, 2015, p. 165). This was also important because while I wanted to ascertain their views on Prevent Duty and make connections with their understanding of their own civic responsibility, these themes had to have emerged organically and without much prompting.

These interviews were conducted with 63 frontline professionals employed in health, education, and social work sectors across England, but mostly based in the north. As I explained earlier, I chose to interview frontline professionals to draw out the influence of different narratives that inform their Prevent Duty. While they get introduced to the Prevent Duty in their professional capacities, they adopt it as a much broader responsibility to protect others. These sectors are also important because with the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) 2015, the frontline staff are obligated to have 'due regard to keep people from being drawn into terrorism' (Home Office, 2015a, p. 18). Therefore, there is an added narrative of coercion that plays a role in how these citizens articulate their roles and responsibilities within Prevent Duty.

While my focus is on studying Prevent enactment as citizenship practice, I do not dismiss the influence of other factors such as professional cultures and sectoral dynamics. These play a role in shaping how citizens come into contact with the Prevent Duty and how they interact with them. Therefore, I have conducted this study across different sectors to get an understanding of the social and professional dynamics at play. This has been useful because even though there are similarities within the obligations placed on citizens working across these sectors, the power dynamics are very different. A doctor has different professional obligations towards their patients than a teacher does to their students. In both contexts, the relationship is built on trust and has an element of power vested in one party, but the pressures are different in terms of confidentiality and safeguarding concerns. These also dictate how people connect the professional obligation element of Prevent with a wider civic duty. As such, while the end goal of the Prevent Duty is uniform across different sectors, how it is received and implemented and the challenges and opportunities this raises vary significantly. Hence, it was important to conduct this study with staff employed across these different sectors to get a

broad understanding of how different processes, practices, and cultures get diffused with the narratives of securitised citizenship. Along with these I also conducted interviews with Prevent coordinators at different local authorities across England and freelance Prevent trainers to get an understanding of how Prevent stipulations are conveyed to frontline professionals and how the overall enactment is monitored at the local level.

Research Strategy

Ethical concerns in sensitive research: The protection of my participants' anonymity and their wellbeing have been the guiding principles of this research project. The process of safeguarding my participants started before the fieldwork and continues to date (Fujii, 2012, pp. 718–719). This concern has informed how I approached potential interviewees, how, when, and where I conducted the interviews, and how the interview notes and data have been protected since then. I have carried this ethos in the data analysis process as well by trying my best to accurately convey the participants' views and interpret their ideas in a nuanced and reflexive manner.

Before I started fieldwork, the process of securing ethics approval from the University of Sheffield's Research Ethics Committee helped me identify certain concerns and enabled me to put mitigations in place. Given the sensitive nature of the research subject, the ethics review committee directed me to take account of 'practical, moral, and ideological conflicts' that the interviewees could face when speaking about their engagement with the Prevent Duty. This allowed me to reflect on the different kinds of harms I could be exposing my participants to and what I could do to avoid them. I identified emotional distress, harm to professional well-being, and legal repercussions as potential issues that my interviewees could experience while participating in the research project.

To protect my participants against any professional or legal problems, I offered them complete anonymity and took steps to ensure that their identities were protected at all stages of the process. I assigned participant IDs to all the interviewees and stored all the interview data in a password protected folder using the participant ID. The only place where the full name of the participant appears is in a password protected file, stored on an encrypted laptop. I scanned all the consent forms and stored them on an encrypted drive, while shredding the hard copies. During the transcription process, I carefully removed all details from the transcripts that could lead to the participants' identification. Before the interviews, I shared a detailed participant information sheet with the interviewees to give them a good idea of what the interview process entailed. At the start of each interview, I went over the consent form and the participant information sheet with them and ensured they were comfortable with all the details and were giving informed consent. I assured them that they would be in charge during our interaction and gave them the choice of either pausing or discontinuing the interview at any stage. Whenever needed, I gave trigger warnings during the interview if I felt the questions could cause distress.

In the interests of full transparency, I also informed my participants about the exceptional circumstances under which I could have a moral obligation to breach confidentiality. This was informed by the University of Sheffield Research Ethics Policy Note no. 12 that stipulates breaking confidentiality in matters that 'relate to child protection offences such as the physical or sexual abuse of minors, the physical abuse of vulnerable adults, money laundering and other crimes covered by prevention of terrorism legislation'. As a researcher working on the Prevent Duty and the policy's expansive focus, I wanted to make sure the research participants were aware of this therefore, I always flagged this point before my interviews. However, my participants did not seem to share my concerns and either nodded through this or in some instances joked about it and laughed it off.

Protecting yourself as a researcher: Before we move on to the discussion of recruitment and interviewing, I want to talk about safeguarding oneself as a researcher as I believe this should be part of our research strategy as well. Being a Muslim woman of colour, my identity has played a role in my decision to pursue this research on the Prevent Duty and taking a critical approach. It has also influenced how my participants have seen me and interacted with me. As any qualitative researcher would attest, there is always a concern about how your own identity is influencing the responses of the research participants. From my very first interview, I had been conscious of the fact and worked very hard to create a space where my interviewees could speak frankly. During face-to-face interviews, I kept my responses neutral and offered encouraging nods even when participants expressed views that were opposed to my own. However, while I had prepared to deal with how people could alter their responses in accordance with my identity, I had not foreseen being racially profiled in an interview. It was a rather careless comment about how I would understand how Muslims behave because 'I sound Muslim'. The participant also caveated their responses with the claim that they spoke their mind and were not afraid of being called a racist.

It was not a traumatic experience and owing to the fact that it happened over the phone, I was physically removed from the situation. However, I feel the need to record it because I think it is important to be aware of the challenges that we face at different steps of the research process. While this incident happened during the interview, it did not impact me straightaway because during the process of interviewing a researcher is already juggling too many emotions. There is the excitement of having secured the interview – especially in the initial phase of the fieldwork, the nervousness about getting through all the questions within the allocated time, and the tension of watching what you say, and how each question is framed with the right amount of clarity. There is a lot going on so sometimes you let things wash over yourself. However, the gravity of such mundane acts of carelessness can hit you when you start transcribing, as it happened with me. When you sit in a quiet room with all your attention focussed on every word, every pause, every inflection, you become aware of every act of microaggression. It's hard to articulate how they impact you. In some cases, you just keep thinking about one quote and over-analyse it, in others you look for explanations and make excuses. In whichever way you process it, you end up expending a lot of emotional labour.

Recruitment and interviews: I conducted interviews with 63 people between July 2019 and June 2020 comprising frontline professionals employed in social work, health, and education sectors along with Prevent co-ordinators and officials employed at local and regional authorities. Most of the participants had received one or two Prevent trainings, ranging from in-person full or half-day sessions to online e-learning modules. A few participants who had not received Prevent training were aware of the policy and had discussed it with their colleagues. The 'legal' citizenship status of the interviewees was not inquired at any stage of the interview process. This was an active choice because a core belief of this project is the idea that an individual's belonging to a certain community or society should not be determined through the narrow parameters of the legal legitimacy that a state can bestow upon them. As this thesis will demonstrate, citizenship is a much broader concept that allows individuals to carve out a space for themselves through different political and civic activities. The following chart shows a breakdown of the professional sectors and job descriptions of all the 63 research participants:




Figure 2: Distribution of all the 63 research participants across different sectors

I was in the midst of my fieldwork when the Covid pandemic started and I had conducted 22 interviews before England went into Covid lockdown in March 2020. As such, the majority of my fieldwork (41 interviews) was carried out remotely, at the height of the pandemic. I will discuss how this impacted my recruitment and data collection strategy below, but first I want to briefly discuss the pre-lockdown fieldwork experience.

I divided the participants in two categories, category 1 comprised Prevent co-ordinators working at local authorities across England. These interviews were useful in understanding how the local councils and officials translate the policy for enactment. In this way, these people served as a link between national government/policy-making elites and the frontline professionals. Category 2 comprised people employed in the health, education, and social work sectors who have to enact the Prevent Duty as part of their professional roles. I started the recruitment process for category 1 by drawing up a list of Prevent co-ordinators across England, this was done by using different Prevent training documents and guidance manuals. In some cases, I phoned the councils and asked if they had a Prevent co-ordinator/officer. Through this process, I secured interviews with six officials working as Prevent liaison at different local authorities and regional agencies. Three of these interviews took place in person at the workplace of these officials, while the other three were conducted over the phone due to non-Covid related logistical issues. I found all of my category 1 participants to be quite frank in our interviews and they did not evade any questions. With some officials, I felt that their responses were more scripted and rehearsed, this could either be a tactic to deflect questions or this

could be down to the formulaic nature of Prevent enactment that relies on using certain key words like safeguarding, duty of care repeatedly to build a narrative.

During these interviews, I did not openly advertise my critical approach to Prevent and adopted a neutral stance to give my participants the opportunity to discuss the policy and talk about its merits. I did feel conflicted at times and questioned whether I was misleading the participants. However, this decision was influenced by my concern that I did not want my participants to be uncomfortable. Shesterinina has explained that sensitivity to the well-being of participants can shape what they say, and as such, I wanted to create a space where the research participants could speak freely (2019, pp. 192–193). On at least one occasion, I neutralised my tone and wording of the interview to not alienate the participant. In other interviews, I dealt with my concerns about being honest to both my participants and my own research objectives by providing them with detailed information about the research project and offering them the opportunity to request interview transcripts or come back to me with follow-up questions. None of my participants have raised any concerns either before, during, or after the interviews. Some of the category 1 participants invited me to Prevent training events but these did not materialise due to Covid lockdown.

The process of recruiting category 2 participants was slightly more complicated than category 1 recruitment for a number of reasons. Firstly, given the concerns regarding protection of participants' identities and their involvement in the project, I decided not to conduct recruitment through professional organisations such as schools, NHS institutions etc. This would have required me to go through different administrative structures and could have hampered my aims of keeping participation in the project anonymous for my interviewees. Furthermore, unlike the information about Prevent officers and co-ordinators available in different documents, there is not a register of all teachers or doctors I could access. Therefore, I started by reaching out to people using my personal and professional contacts and using the snowball sampling technique for further recruitment. Before the start of Covid, I created an information leaflet and circulated it through different community organisations and unions. I also attended union meetings and social gatherings organised by medical professionals to recruit potential participants. I recruited one participant while canvassing in the 2019 UK General Election.

The start of UK Covid lockdown in March 2020 put an abrupt halt to these recruitment strategies and I had to go back to the drawing board. By this stage, I had interviewed ten people from the education sector, four medical professionals, two social workers, and six Prevent officials. As discussed above, I wanted to conduct a study of Prevent enactment across different sectors to get an understanding of the different social dynamics at play. While I had conducted a decent number of interviews by the start of the pandemic, I did not feel comfortable with the sectoral divide amongst my participants and therefore I knew I would have to continue my fieldwork regardless of the drastically changed circumstances. Since I could not access any social events or union meetings, I turned my attention online and started looking for frontline professionals on Twitter. This was very helpful for finding social workers and medical professionals, I would follow them on Twitter and if they followed me back or had open DMs (direct messaging), I would message them about my research. I also found an online database of freelance social workers registered with British Association of Social Workers and contacted about 100 people on the register.

I chased all the unanswered emails and contacted those I had already interviewed to snowball the sample. This stage of the recruitment process was quite difficult because I had to put myself in very awkward positions and be quite brazen about asking people for favours in terms of recruitment. As a last resort, I sent a message in my neighbourhood WhatsApp group and shared details of my research project to ask if anyone would like to be interviewed or know someone who would be interested. Personally, this was a very difficult step to take because being a Muslim woman of colour, living in a predominantly White British neighbourhood, I have always kept my research on Prevent Duty private because I do not know how it would be perceived. However, I deliberated over the risks and decided to go ahead. As a result, I managed to recruit a few participants through my neighbours' contacts.

While it had its challenges, in some ways conducting fieldwork during the lockdown simplified certain problems. Covid lockdowns were a very difficult and traumatic time for all of us so I do not want to make light of this issue or downplay the challenges we faced during this period. However, I do feel that a discussion of fieldwork during this time would be incomplete if I do not present a well-rounded perspective. The process of updating the ethics application to reflect the new circumstances was simple and expedient. In more general terms, I made sure I considered the new pressures people were facing in the lockdown and tried my best to make sure participating in my project would not exacerbate those. In terms of recruitment, lockdown enabled me to secure interviews with people who had erstwhile been unavailable. However, I recognised that people had extra professional and domestic responsibilities during lockdown, therefore, I organised interviews based on the participants' convenience and made sure my routine was flexible enough to adjust according to their preferences. I also gave them the choice to cancel or reschedule or leave the interview incomplete if they felt the need to do so.

Another advantage of remote fieldwork was the simplified process of conducting interviews. I did not have to worry about travel times and securing appropriate locations for the interviews. Furthermore, since these were being done on phone, I could schedule two or three interviews in one day. A couple of times, I even managed to do an interview with short notice as at least two of my participants expressed their interest in doing the interview immediately when I phoned to recruit them. In these cases, I emailed them the consent forms and also recorded verbal consent. While logistically this was simple and efficient, remote interviewing had its limitations. During an in-person interview, I could create an open space by using encouraging prompts and friendly body language. It was very difficult to make these observations or create a welcoming space over the phone or Skype. While I managed to conduct all of my interviews as free-flowing conversations and provided as much encouragement as possible while maintaining neutrality during remote interviews, it would have been better to have conducted these face-to-face.

Analysing Data, Revisiting Theory

According to Braun and Clarke, 'data are not coded in an epistemological vacuum' (2006, p. 84). As such, the process of data analysis for this project was informed by my theoretical and epistemological considerations. At the start of the research project, theory provided guidance to calibrate the scope of enquiry. However, as the project progressed, this turned into a more iterative process. While theory allowed me to set the parameters of empirical enquiry, I started the data collection process with an open mind to let the empirics help me discover something new about my theoretical approach.

I had set myself the target of concluding the fieldwork by June 2020 so that I could proceed to the next steps of the project. Therefore, after conducting 63 interviews, I stopped the data collection process and started transcribing the interviews. By this stage, I also felt I had enough data because during the interview process I could see some narratives and patterns emerge. After finishing the interviews and conducting a preliminary analysis of my interview notes, I decided to transcribe only 55 interviews. I excluded eight participants from the data analysis process for a number of reasons. The top reason was that none of them had received Prevent Duty training. I should clarify that I have included insights from some participants who had not done the Prevent training, but in those cases, the participants were at least familiar with the policy or had discussed it with their colleagues. The participants I excluded had no knowledge of the Prevent Duty and did not offer any opinions on it, one of these interviews had only lasted 15 minutes.

Following the advice that transcription should be seen as a step in the data analysis process, I opted to transcribe entire interviews myself (Bird, 2005, p. 227). This was a time-consuming process because the average length of my interviews was 35-45 minutes. However, this process was very useful for familiarising myself with the data, picking out initial themes, and noticing throwaway comments and sub-text that were missed in the excitement of conducting the interview. For me, transcription became a way of revisiting the interview and re-acquainting myself with the research participants.

Once I had transcribed and anonymised all the 55 transcripts, I carried out the first round of thematic coding using the NVivo software. I started data analysis by revising the codebook which I had compiled using a preliminary textual analysis of government documents and legislative instruments. Even though the nature of government documents is very different from the interview transcripts, the main themes for analysing these had overlaps. However, while revising the codebook, I added propositional statements to the codes to clarify how the conceptualisation of these concepts would be different in this stage of data analysis, for e.g. the code of citizenship in discourse analysis of government documents highlighted how the state conceptualised the role of the citizens. However, within interview transcripts, especially of participants enacting the Prevent Duty, the concept of citizenship aimed to explore how the participants understood the idea of citizenship, civic duty and how they explained what it means to be a good citizen.

This stage involved a back and forth with the theory chapter. While conducting the data analysis, I revisited the conceptual framework to understand how this project was approaching citizenship, and exercise of control and what other themes were emerging that spoke to governmentality, resistance, and securitised citizenship. As Saldaña explains, coding is a cyclical act comprising different rounds of revisiting and refining data (2016, p. 8). The first round of coding on NVivo allowed me to catalogue all the different themes emerging from the interview transcripts in a systematic manner. I classified the inputs into themes of governmentality, citizenship, state, radicalisation, and safeguarding. To conduct a more in-depth analysis of these themes, I started the second round of coding. For this analysis, I used a project management software called Notion. Even though it is not a traditional data analysis programme, Notion allowed me to split the data in a visually clear manner.

The second round of coding helped me pick out the nuances of the broad labels under which I had categorised my data. In this way, I can say that I started the first round of coding with a scaffolding and the second round allowed me to build a structure around it and add substance to the framework. Unpacking the themes of governmentality and citizenship, I was able to see how citizens articulated

compliance with Prevent, how they spoke about loyalty and responsibility, whether anyone associated Prevent with spying and surveillance, and how resistance to Prevent was conceptualised. Through these codes, I was able to develop the spectrum of civic engagement with Prevent that has been used as a framework for this project's empirical chapters. As such, this process also allowed me to deepen my theoretical assumptions through empirical data. I was able to see that compliance with Prevent mostly corresponds to narratives of responsibility, self-governance, and active citizenship, however, I also found out that these are not static themes. Compliance in itself is multidimensional and cannot simply be understood as a binary to resistance. This process of data analysis allowed me to put forward a whole range of responses that could be seen as compliance but overlap with hesitation or resistance. By taking a deeper look at these themes, I have been able to put forward a theoretical framework that takes account of the messiness and inconsistency in citizens' interaction with the Prevent Duty. This is necessary because to be able to undertake a feminist epistemological approach and situate knowledge creation in the actions and thoughts of ordinary individuals, we have to use tools that allow us to appreciate the dynamism of human behaviour.

While it was very interesting to compare data across participants and sectors, during the two rounds of coding I also realised the limitations of having an effective coding strategy that catalogues data systematically. I found out that in some cases, the difference in attitudes and thought processes emerged not just across sectors and participants but also within the course of a single interview. Given the nature of my interviews, I observed that people articulated a range of ideas and views that were sometimes in contradiction with each other. In some cases, participants would start with a particular position or opinion and during the course of the interview, they would either contradict themselves or change their thinking. In one case, a participant made a racist assumption about asylum seekers but shortly afterwards reflected on their 'judgemental view'. Similarly, some participants expressed their opposition to the Prevent Duty but conceded they would reluctantly engage with it under certain circumstances. As I explain in the empirical section, these discrepancies and dynamism within participants' reflections demonstrate that different narratives influence how they articulate their role within the Prevent Duty. I have analysed this data with the knowledge that my participants' insights are mostly based on hypothetical assumptions. While most of my participants had received some form of Prevent Duty training or were aware of the policy's enactment in their sector, very few had had experiences of actually making a Prevent referral. As such, the views they shared were based on how they thought Prevent works or how they are supposed to enact it. This does not mean that what they had to say was useless or inaccurate. I still believe we can glean useful lessons from these because this is a study of how narratives shape citizens' ideas of the Prevent Duty and their responsibility in

the society. How people think about the policy can shape the wider discourse. Even if citizens are uncomfortable with some aspects of the Prevent Duty but agree that it is needed to protect people, that idea is enough for the development of a common-sense in favour of the policy. Furthermore, even when ideas cannot be matched to actions, we can use these discrepancies to explore which narratives are causing this split. As such, I have welcomed the inconsistencies and the messiness in the data as these tell me that the lived reality of Prevent Duty does not operate along strictly defined binaries. This is discussed in detail in empirical chapters where I apply the conceptual tools to these findings.

In the data analysis process, I became aware that along with using the coded data, in some cases, I will also have to consult the full transcripts to maintain contextual clarity. Therefore, months after concluding the data analysis process, I went back to both the coded data and the transcripts. This was particularly useful while I worked on Chapter 7: Hesitation to find data on how people deliberate over their engagement with the Prevent Duty. This was done to find the grey areas that the binary chapters of compliance and resistance may have missed. I found that at this stage while the coded data was useful, I also had to look at the full transcripts to contextualise individual quotes. Therefore, I went back to the transcripts to trace the participants' train of thoughts. This does not negate the efficacy of having a good coding strategy, but it does show that analysing one's data while staying true to the opinions of research participants is a continuous, iterative process that requires nimbleness on part of the researcher.

This chapter has provided an account of how I planned and conducted this research project. I started with a discussion of my epistemological approach and its influence on my choice of subject matter. I also explained how the theoretical framework of the project played an influential role in directing the early stages of data collection and analysis. I will highlight the iterative relationship between theory and empirics in the concluding discussion of the thesis to show how my research findings have allowed me to build on the initial theoretical assumptions. The discussion of research design and execution highlighted the challenges and opportunities of researching a sensitive topic during the pandemic. Through a discussion of my data analysis approach I explained how I deployed conceptual framings to make sense of my research findings. The next section of the thesis will showcase the theoretical framework of this project that will help me analyse my empirical findings in the subsequent chapters.

Section 1 – Theoretical Framework

The guiding principle of this research project has been the assertion that Prevent Duty should be seen as a regime of securitised citizenship. Therefore, it seems logical to start this theoretical discussion with the question: what is securitised citizenship? We can answer this in a few ways because this concept helps us unpack a number of different phenomena. It allows us to explain the process by which the state shifts counter-terrorism responsibilities to ordinary citizens. We can add to it and say that it also indicates the diffusion of security logics in different civic ideas and practices. These two explanations are helpful because they allow us to see how citizens get mobilised within the enactment of Prevent Duty and why they come to perceive these obligations as a civic responsibility. However, it does not let us capture how citizens engage with the Prevent Duty. Therefore, I would add a third conceptualisation here and say that we should see securitised citizenship as not just a process but as a site of power relations where the state and citizens interact, where the technologies of control are imposed, and where this control is either accepted or rejected. In this way, we use securitised citizenship as an analytical framework for tracking the processes of securitisation and taking account of the challenges posed to them. Using this broader conceptualisation of securitised citizenship, I will take the philosophical and political context of Prevent Duty and analyse it through the framework of securitised citizenship practice, lay out the conceptual tools that help us identify the techniques of governance and resistance operating within Prevent, and apply these to the insights of ordinary citizens to understand the messy and contradictory lived reality of Prevent Duty enactment. In this way, the question of 'what is securitised citizenship' is not something I will be answering in this section alone, it will be addressed throughout this thesis with the help of different theoretical and empirical analyses.

The aim of this theoretical framework is to start laying out some of the components of securitised citizenship before we apply these to this project's empirical findings. The first chapter in this section will set out the philosophical and political context within which Prevent Strategy has developed since its first public release in 2006. In this chapter, I situate the emergence of Prevent Strategy within the discourse on radicalisation to explain how it shaped the threat perception of policymakers. By exploring how radicalisation discourse frames threats and risk, we understand the logic of wide-spread pre-emptive governance embedded in Prevent Duty. This discussion also helps us understand why the Prevent Duty depends on active participation of citizens in counter-terrorism work. To explain the political context around the emergence and subsequent development of Prevent Strategy, I analyse how the different iterations of the policy operated under the New Labour and Coalition/Conservative

governments. This is very useful for understanding how the different governments' approaches to radicalisation shaped the policy's goals and how it was enacted.

In the following chapter, I take a step back and look at the concept of citizenship before explaining how the state has securitised it and why we should understand Prevent Duty as securitised citizenship. I start the discussion by looking at the different conceptualisations of citizenship. This step is important because citizenship has been used to capture different socio-political processes and technologies of control, therefore, it is important to clarify how I am approaching citizenship and why this understanding is suitable to study the enactment of Prevent Duty. Here, I am using citizenship in two ways, the term on its own defines a number of different acts, ideas, interactions through which the state and citizens interact with each. To approach it as a conceptual framework, I use the term 'citizenship practice'. This helps me see it as an avenue of governance that been used by Prevent Duty to shift responsibilities to citizens and inject a security logic in civic practices. To draw out the different ways in which control is exercised by the state and responded to by the citizens, I break down citizenship practice into active and activist citizenship. The former helps me capture the technologies of governing that facilitate co-optation of citizens, while the latter is useful for identifying techniques of resistance citizens can deploy to push back against state control. By analysing Prevent Duty through these concepts, I will show how citizenship gets securitised and how this framework can be used in the subsequent empirical discussion to understand citizens' insights as acts of securitised active/activist citizenship.

The final chapter in this section will present a review of literature on citizenship, counter-terrorism, and Prevent Duty. This discussion helps us see how different understandings of citizenship are used to analyse the impact of counter-terrorism policies on citizens. I have divided this chapter into the themes of precarious citizenship, resilient citizenship, and active and activist citizenship. These different themes demonstrate the variety of ways in which citizens are targeted and/or mobilised by the security state. This discussion also provides insights into the socio-political context that has enabled the imposition of coercive technologies through citizenship practice.

Chapter 3: Prevent Strategy – Philosophical and Political Context

Prevent is one of the four components of the British government's flagship counter-terrorism policy, CONTEST, that tackles different stages of the culmination of the terrorism threat. The policy sits alongside Pursue, Protect, and Prepare strands and is designed to deal with security threats preemptively (Home Office, 2018, 2011b, 2009). Since the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, the Prevent Duty has been granted a statutory status making it a legal duty for public sector institutions to conduct counter-terrorism monitoring (Home Office, 2015a, p. 18). Before we start the discussion on why we should study Prevent Duty enactment through the framework of securitised citizenship, it is important to identify the philosophical and political contexts that have informed the development of this policy. This will help us answer two separate but interrelated questions: Why does Prevent rely on the mobilisation and self-governance of ordinary citizens? And how has it achieved this by gradually expanding and formalising the scope of counter-terrorism governance in British civic life?

The first question will be answered by looking at the philosophical foundations of the Prevent Strategy which can be situated in the concept of radicalisation.³ This highly contested term has come to represent a body of knowledge that explains and predicts the processes that lead to terrorism. Since its inception in the post 9/11 security discourse, radicalisation has become a technique of pre-emptive governance of threats and has played a key role in the development of Prevent Strategy (Heath-Kelly, 2013). In the following discussion, I will explain how the pre-emptive logic of radicalisation has made it necessary to mobilise citizens as key actors in counter-terrorism policing. This concept has not only influenced the establishment of Prevent Strategy but has also shaped its subsequent development through the years. Therefore, after explaining how the policy emerged in the aftermath of 7/7 attacks in London, I will discuss how the knowledge and techniques of radicalisation have informed the subsequent iterations of the Prevent Strategy. I will start by looking at how New Labour governments developed the strategy followed by an overview of the different Prevent iterations released by the Coalition and Conservative governments. I have split this discussion along these lines because these political regimes had different articulations of the concept of radicalisation, and therefore, this influenced the practical enactment of the policy.

³ Style note: Prevent Strategy defines radicalisation as a process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism. When speaking of the threat Prevent tackles, the terms radicalisation and extremism are used interchangeably in policy documents and colloquial use, similarly the terms counter-extremism, counter-terrorism, and counter-radicalisation are also used interchangeably. I have made a style choice to use the term counter-terrorism as it is broad enough to cover the scope of Prevent Duty, but I have also used counter-radicalisation and counter-extremism depending on the context.

Philosophical Context

In the wake of 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, the concept of radicalisation entered academic and political discourse to understand the 'homegrown threat' of terrorism (Baker-Beall et al., 2014, p. 1). This approach appealed to Western researchers and policymakers as the War on Terror being waged thousands of miles from home kept drawing closer with attacks in London and Madrid (Hörnqvist and Flyghed, 2012, p. 320; Kundnani, 2012, p. 4). With the perceived threat of terrorism emerging from local communities rather than coming in from outside, the traditional academic and policy tools for responding to terrorism were proving to be insufficient. As such, from mid-2000s, the focus shifted from 'shock and awe' strategies abroad to problematising why individuals born and bred in Western cultures were turning to political violence (Kundnani, 2012, p. 4). By presenting a range of theories on what draws people to terrorism, academic and practitioner interventions on radicalisation turned into a discourse that not only explained the process 'leading to terrorism' but also devised strategies to stop it. In the UK, the fight to tackle radicalisation gave Prevent Strategy its raison d'état. The first publicly-released iteration of the policy appeared under the New Labour government in 2006 with the stated aim of 'preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals' (Home Office, 2006, pp. 1–2).

For a concept that has influenced almost two decades of policy programmes, radicalisation remains a contested subject. While there is a general consensus that the term radicalisation denotes a process that leads to extremism and terrorism, there have been several inter-disciplinary interventions on what the process of radicalisation looks like, what are its causes, and how and when does it result in a terrorist attack. Some studies link radicalisation to religious ideology and see the process as a 'conveyor belt' through which one becomes a terrorist (Baran, 2009; Sedgwick, 2012; Silber and Bhatt, 2007). Another body of research is rooted in Social Movement Theory and puts forward kinship, social relations, and the presence of 'radical milieus' as radicalising factors (Malthaner and Waldmann, 2014; Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2005). More recently, Crime-Terror Nexus has been identified as a model for understanding radicalisation of people who move from organised crime into political violence (Lakhani, 2018).

Despite their differences, all of these approaches put forward the idea that the threat is present within the body of the individual and anyone can become vulnerable to it. However, while they tell us that anyone can get 'radicalised', there is no certain way of knowing how far along an individual is in the process of radicalisation and when, if at all, they will commit an act of political violence. From a policymaking point of view, the strength and utility of the concept lies in this very ambiguity because we are working with the idea of a threat that is unknown yet can be present anywhere (Martin, 2014, p. 195). As such, these radicalisation models provide a broad scope of threat and vulnerability that can be applied to individuals based on arbitrary factors such as their ideological leanings, social milieu, personal grievances. This gives policymakers the justification to open up entire communities to policing as the threat can be found in anyone existing within this 'pre-criminal space', where a crime has not been committed as yet (Heath-Kelly, 2017). Whether it is an individual's susceptibility to an extremist ideology or their affinity to an extremist group, the threat is present within communities and the individual becomes a risky body owing to their vulnerability. This understanding puts the focus on policing individuals who have not yet committed a crime. It is this 'nip in the bud approach' that has become the defining characteristic of the Prevent Strategy and similar programmes in other countries. By making prevention of radicalisation its central aim, the Prevent Strategy governs the risk before it develops into a tangible threat. By giving primacy to risk, radicalisation introduces 'uncertainty and the unknowable at the heart of the governing processes' (Aradau et al., 2008, p. 150). The lack of concrete evidence ceases to be a problem and the mere presence of uncertainty becomes actionable. Any individual can be vulnerable to radicalisation and pose a threat to national security.

Using this justification, the British state has repeatedly expanded the criteria of threat identification to a point where everyone is seen as a potential terrorist. I should add the caveat that within the racialised threat criteria of Prevent, Muslims citizens are more readily seen as threats compared to others. However, in terms of enacting the policy, the threat of radicalisation is presented as being ubiquitous and anyone can get 'radicalised' enough to commit an act of political violence. This threat is not tangible or visible and there are no definitive answers to the questions of 'who, when, where, why, and, how' it will manifest. This absence of answers creates a 'permanent ontological condition of waiting for terror' which can only be addressed with a widescale surveillance programme that not only targets citizens but is also implemented by them (Jackson, 2015).

This approach to identifying vague but ubiquitous threats makes it necessary to police mundane activities in civic life, bringing entire communities within the sphere of governance. Given the widespread nature of the threat, it cannot be managed by the state alone and therefore, some of the responsibility for doing counter-terrorism policing has to be shifted to the citizens. Furthermore, since the threat of radicalisation can emerge in any space and manifest in any number of behaviours, utterances, actions in everyday life, it cannot be policed through the mainstream law enforcement infrastructures. If the threat is present in the everyday, then it has to be managed in the everyday, as well. This makes the lived reality of citizens an avenue of security governance and turns them into

agent/subjects of the state. As such, the unknowability of the radicalisation threat not only paves way for pre-emptive policing, it also necessitates shifting policing responsibilities to citizens.

Subsequent iterations of Prevent Strategy have made the connection between radicalisation and acts of political violence and introduced an expansive policy framework that aims to curb the threat of terrorism within the British society. Exploiting the ambiguity in what exactly causes radicalisation, successive British governments have introduced policy interventions that have gradually securitised a wide range of civic institutions and spaces. The following discussion will chart the development of the Prevent Strategy since its inception in 2006. I have divided this discussion to show how the policy developed differently under the New Labour government and then from 2010 under successive Coalition and Conservative governments. The aim of this division is to demonstrate how the different governments' ideological understanding of the concept of radicalisation influenced the development and expansion of the Prevent Strategy. In this way, this discussion will explain how the Prevent Strategy has slowly co-opted citizens in its security framework. The following chapter will explain why we should analyse these developments as securitised citizenship.

Political Context

New Labour and the Battle of Ideas: The early years of Prevent were shaped by Tony Blair's Labour government responding to the shock of 'homegrown terrorism'. These attacks brought the threat present at home in sharp focus and saw the rhetoric shift from the War on Terror abroad to waging a 'battle of ideas' at home (Blair, 2005). Until this point, the government's counter-terrorism strategy was a confidential document, not meant for mass circulation. However, with the aim to tackle the threat of radicalisation, the need for mobilising citizens was recognised and the first iteration of Prevent appeared in *Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy* in 2006.

With its focus on British Muslims, the policy situated the threat in 'radicalised individuals... who use a distorted version of the Islamic faith' (Home Office, 2006, p. 1). Radicalisation was understood as a process that could lead to terrorism, with a nuanced recognition that it's a 'two-stage process', whereby an individual could feel alienated without resorting to terrorism. It was also acknowledged that radicalisation is caused by a combination of different factors that could be unique to a particular individual (*ibid*, p. 10). While 'violent and extremist beliefs' were seen as the drivers of terrorist attacks, the policy also highlighted a sense of grievance and injustice brought about by globalisation, Western military forces in Muslim countries, and the War on Terror as potentially radicalising factors (*ibid*). With the idea of radicalisation as a multifaceted problem, Prevent put forward a three-pronged

programme to address the issue. The policy sought to 'tackle disadvantage... and address structural problems such as inequalities and discrimination', 'change the environment in which extremists operate', and 'engage in the battle of ideas' by challenging the ideologies that justify violence (Home Office, 2006, pp. 1–2). The breadth of solutions put forward at this stage shows that the government envisioned an expansive policy programme that targeted different aspects of the British civic life. As such, Prevent was envisioned as a security policy with a social orientation. The threat was situated within ordinary citizens and hence, the solutions also focussed on the problems faced by these citizens. The policy recommended a renewed focus on helping Muslims with educational attainment, employment opportunities, and housing (*ibid*, p. 11). To change the environment in which extremists operate, the policy referenced legislation to make encouragement, preparation, and instigation of terrorism a criminal offence. While these policy recommendations impacted everyday lives of citizens – particularly Muslim ones – the third strand of the programme – the battle of ideas – had the most far-reaching impact. Not only did this policy reach deep into civic life, it also paved the way for the widespread securitisation of social institutions that materialised a decade later.

New Labour's battle of ideas through the Prevent Strategy set a template that defined what/who the threat was and how it should be tackled. While it was not as overt as the British values rhetoric, we would see a few years later, the idea very much set the parameters of acceptable civic conduct. As we will discuss in the next chapter on citizenship practice, adherence to liberal norms and values is a technique of governance used through active citizenship that sets the criteria to judge eligibility for citizenship privileges. By turning counter-terrorism into a battle of good versus bad ideas, Prevent was presented as an antidote to tackle extremist ideas with an assertion of liberal, British identity. To wage its battle of ideas against extremist ideological motivations, the government called for a partnership with communities. While the previous iteration of the counter-terrorism strategy was never released publicly, this one was designed to encourage public participation. This marked the start of a gradual shifting of counter-terrorism policing to the wider public. At this stage, the co-optation of citizens was quite informal and focussed predominantly on securing partnership with Muslim communities as these were considered to be most vulnerable to radicalisation. This further underscored who was seen as being on the right side in this battle of ideas. The identification of threat within Muslim communities went hand in hand with the responsibilisation of these communities to tackle the threat:

'Muslims themselves are aware of the risk of radicalisation within certain offshoots of their communities and we must work in partnership with communities to identify and respond to the risks that extremism poses.' (Home Office, 2006, p. 6)

The Home Office set up Preventing Extremism Together (PET) working groups comprising 1000 members of the British Muslim community (Home Office, 2006, p. 14). These groups ran activities aimed at reaching Muslim citizens in different avenues of civic life. These ranged from roadshows with Muslim scholars, regional forums bringing together Muslim communities with law enforcement and public service agencies, and a Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board. This iteration of Prevent is significant because it added a social dimension to counter-terrorism policing and placed its operationalisation at the heart of communities. By identifying civic problems like a lack of proper housing and community cohesion as contributory factors that lead to radicalisation, they looked at different welfare initiatives as a means of tackling this threat. This meant that counter-terrorism measures now included interventions that helped people with their social problems. This not only opened up these areas of social life to security governance, it also co-opted civilians who inhabit these spaces into the battle of ideas in this domestic war on terror.

As discussed earlier, the ambiguity inherent within the concept of radicalisation is useful for policymaking purposes as it puts forward an ill-defined threat that could exist within the 'pre-criminal space' of local communities. With counter-radicalisation as its central aim, the evolution of the Prevent Strategy can be seen as the gradual expansion of citizen-led policing across different parts of the community. Although the nature of the threat is ambiguous, the only certainty the state operated on was its presence at the grassroots level. Hence, Prevent proceeded by targeting and co-opting citizens within security governance in different ways.

Following the 2006 policy, the next iteration of the Prevent Strategy appeared in 2008 as a 'guide for local partners in England' and built upon the existing work to mobilise communities to fight radicalisation (Home Office, 2008). This translated into bringing different areas of civic life into the Prevent orbit. Continuing the work with Muslim communities, this policy initiated the formal induction of social institutions into the fight against extremism. This saw the start of shifting of counter-terrorism responsibilities to local authorities, educational institutions, children's and youth services, youth justice boards, prisons and probation services, and even the UK Border Agency in preventing violent extremism. While the 2006 policy recommended informal programmes involving Muslim communities, this policy started the process of co-opting social institutions by identifying these entities as the frontline in the battle of ideas. The people employed in these institutions were deemed to play an important role owing to their proximity to communities and vulnerable individuals (*ibid*, pp. 69). The policy also continued and expanded social programmes such as 'leadership programmes,

citizenship classes, training for imams, myth-busting roadshows, and projects using sport and drama' (*ibid*, p. 2). By doing so, the state permeated counter-terrorism surveillance within every facet of social life, with a particular focus on Muslim spaces.

The 2009 iteration of the policy updated its definition of radicalisation as 'the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups' (Home Office, 2009, p. 11). This change in approach broadened the target of the policy from preventing terrorism, to tackling those who are merely supporting terrorism and extremism. Doing so, allowed the policy to push the goal-posts further back in the pre-criminal space to target anyone who could potentially hold or support extremist views. This also enabled the government to regulate acceptable conduct with the policy insisting the need to challenge legal but intolerant views (Kundnani, 2009, p. 20):

'The duty on all of us – government, citizens and communities – is to challenge those who, for whatever reason or cause, reject the rights to which we are committed, scorn the institutions and values of our parliamentary democracy, dismiss the rule of law and promote intolerance and discrimination on the basis of race, faith, ethnicity, gender or sexuality.' (Home Office, 2009, p. 87)

By speaking of rights, institutions, and values, the state is separating the 'extremists' from the mainstream British consensus built on liberal norms. Furthermore, they are also identifying the right kind of civic conduct that should be espoused by all citizens. It's not enough to adhere to these norms, one also has to challenge those who reject these values. As such, from its very beginning Prevent has been linked to citizenship practice as it was setting the criteria of what 'good citizenship' looks like along the lines of active citizenship. The next chapter will expand on this, but this quote shows us the strong linkages between the philosophy of Prevent and its enactment through citizenship.

Along with setting a normative criterion for civic conduct, the policy also pushed ahead with securitising different areas of civic life. Even though the focus of some of these measures was on state institutions, whether directly or indirectly they had an impact on the lives of ordinary citizens. On the national government level, the provision of education, health, housing etc. became linked with prevention of terrorism, making the delivery of these basic human needs instrumental to counter-terrorism work. Locally, the focus on shifting responsibilities to communities remained the same albeit it was put under the banner of community cohesion, empowerment, and race equality (*ibid*, p.84). While the talk of community cohesion spoke of responsibility on everyone, the policy maintained a

narrow focus on Islam and Muslims. As a result, these policy initiatives continued to disproportionately responsibilise Muslim communities under the guise of empowerment. Large amounts of funding were poured into developing advisory groups showcasing the work of Muslim women and young people, Islamic scholars, and grassroots organisations. These measures created a sub-category of 'good Muslim' that existed alongside that of a 'good citizen' (Mustafa, 2018, p. 128; Spalek and Imtoual, 2007, p. 185). By taking part in these programmes and adopting the state's counter-terrorism agenda, these Muslim citizens could set themselves apart from the 'extremists'.

More broadly, Prevent was presented as a continuation of 'a long tradition of building strong, empowered and resilient communities, tackling all forms of hate crime, and promoting equal opportunities' (*ibid*, p. 87). By co-opting social justice issues of empowerment and racial equality, the policy securitised these areas of social activity for counter-terrorism purposes. As a result, the success and failure of social programmes came to be associated with their efficacy in tackling radicalisation. The narrative of empowerment sanitised the securitisation of civic life and responsibilisation of local communities was presented as 'giving communities a real say over the decisions and services which affect them' (*ibid*). This narrative has strengthened with time as Prevent is often associated with empowering minority communities (Pearson, 2020).

The emergence and development of the Prevent Strategy under New Labour years was influenced by the need to tackle radicalisation to stop terrorism. Approaching radicalisation as a process that leads to terrorism and that can put anyone on to a path of extremism, the government placed the threat within communities, particularly Muslim communities. This focus allowed Prevent to not only target different areas of civic life, it also provided justification for shifting the responsibility to citizens and communities. Starting in 2006 and lasting until the end of the Labour government in 2010, efforts to counter radicalisation under the Prevent Strategy saw security priorities permeate different areas of governance and social life. Government departments managing education, children's services, business, communities were given new counter-terrorism responsibilities, local authorities had to recalibrate bureaucratic structures to accommodate Prevent co-ordinators, grassroots community organisations had to take on Prevent-related targets to secure government funding, and civic responsibility in general got readjusted to include monitoring vulnerability to radicalisation and challenging intolerant ideas as a component of civic duty. While the focus predominantly remained on mobilising communities, we should see the early years of Prevent as laying the foundations of a securitised citizenship regime. In both material and normative terms, these iterations of Prevent identified citizens as actors that should be both policed and be responsibilised with policing. Along

with this, the policy also set parameters for acceptable civic conduct, the ideas that would go on to define good citizenship as active participation in counter-terrorism policing (Dearden, 2018).

Conservatives and Muscular Liberalism: The end of 13 years of Labour government ushered in a new era of governance in Britain. The Conservative Party, in coalition with the Liberal Democrats, brought in a programme of government focussed on scaling back resources and shifting responsibilities to citizens under the slogan of 'Big Society'. The Home Office did not stay immune to these changes and the counter-terrorism strategy was duly put under urgent review to recalibrate priorities. In 2011, the then Home Secretary Theresa May reviewed and released an updated CONTEST and Prevent Strategy.⁴ The new policy made a significant break from its previous iterations that were deemed to be 'flawed' and shifted its focus and remit (Home Office, 2011b, p. 6). By doing so, May laid the blueprint for a widespread cultural change in policing and surveillance that later crystallised as a statutory duty in 2015.

The most important departure from previous policies was a change in the conceptualisation of radicalisation. While this policy retained the understanding of radicalisation as a process by which 'people come to support and in some cases participate in terrorism' (Home Office, 2011b, p. 26), it significantly differed from its predecessors in understanding the causes of radicalisation. All the iterations of Prevent under the Labour government advocated looking at a variety of socio-political factors to explain how and why people could become vulnerable to extremism. Those policies listed micro-level factors such as a lack of basic service provisions like employment and housing and macro-level instigators like grievances over foreign troop presence in Muslim countries (Home Office, 2009, p. 91). The Conservative approach, in contrast, rejected any consideration of 'real and imagined' grievances related to Muslim communities and fixed its focus on ideology:

'Ideology is a central factor in the radicalisation process. People who accept and are motivated by an ideology which states that violence is an acceptable course of action are more likely to engage in terrorism-related activity' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 44).

Even though New Labour framed Prevent as a 'a battle of ideas', the 2011 policy critiqued previous iterations for not tackling the link between terrorist ideologies and extremist ideas 'espoused and

⁴ Prevent Strategy is part of CONTEST but in 2011 a standalone version of Prevent was released alongside the wider counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST. Both documents include identical content on Prevent but the dedicated Prevent Strategy is understandably more detailed. This section will analyse and quote excerpts from both the documents.

circulated by apparently non-violent organisations' (Home Office, 2011b, p. 12). The new policy castigated Labour's inability to target ideas and thoughts that may not necessarily lead to violence but facilitate the development of violent extremism. As such, by situating the main driver of radicalisation in ideological factors, the new policy framework expanded the focus to 'non-violent extremism'. The previous policy had hinted at the need to tackle legal but intolerant views, however, the 2011 policy singled these out:

'In some cases extremist groups carefully operate within our laws, deliberately avoiding open support for violence but knowingly creating an environment in which people can be drawn into terrorism itself. We believe that Prevent work therefore necessarily has to deal with some aspects of extremism.' (Home Office, 2011b, pp. 61–62)

This approach aligned with the Conveyor Belt model of defining radicalisation that assumes a linear progression between ideas and terrorist activity (Baran, 2004). Even though recent iterations of CONTEST have rejected this model, in the early years of the Coalition government, David Cameron talked about young Muslims being on a 'conveyor belt to radicalisation that has poisoned their minds with sick and perverted ideas' (Hope, 2013).

'We believe that radicalisation – in this country – is being driven by: an ideology that sets Muslim against non-Muslim, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and which both obliges and legitimises violence in its defence.' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 18)

By putting violent and non-violent extremism on a linear conveyor belt, the policy further expanded the scope of who could be deemed vulnerable and by extension a threat under Prevent. While previously the focus was on stopping people from becoming terrorists, with this policy, the focus expanded to tackling anyone who could develop extremist ideas. While New Labour called on Muslim communities to reject and challenge extremist ideas, the Coalition government's approach made the scope of acceptable civic conduct even more strict and narrow. Anyone who would fail to challenge radicalisation is not just a bad citizen or a bad Muslim, they could be deemed an extremist themselves. This change in focus was also reflected in the wider discourse on radicalisation and terrorism that insisted on mounting a muscular defence of liberal values. Both Prime Minister David Cameron and Theresa May made repeated interventions on the need to confront the 'ideology of Islamist extremism' by building 'stronger identities' aligned with liberalism (Cameron, 2011; May, 2011). By doing so, they reinforced certain ideas and identities as being good and acceptable, while rejecting everything outside of these norms as being deviant and extremist. A responsibilised citizen who espouses and defends liberal values is a good citizen, while those failing to do so are vulnerable to extremism. Even though this iteration of Prevent talked about focussing on all kinds of extremism, the default option still remained the threat coming from Muslim communities. To break the divide between violent and non-violent extremism, the policy defined extremism as:

'Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 107)

By giving equal weight to the threat coming from both verbal and non-verbal acts, the policy not only expanded the reach of Prevent, it also securitised 'British values' and the idea of Britishness. Unlike New Labour's battle of ideas that sought integration and community cohesion, the Conservative rhetoric around British values was very much designed as an exclusionary tool that offered a narrow, prescriptive understanding of acceptable conducts. By equating opposition to these values as extremism, Prevent became another attack line on those multicultural communities that were seen as living segregated lives within Western, liberal societies (Cameron, 2011). This approach reframed socio-cultural issues as security threats:

'People who distrust Parliament, who believe that ethnic and faith groups should not mix, and who see a conflict between being British and their own cultural identity are all likely to be more supportive of violent extremism.' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 18)

Even though this was not done explicitly, we can see the Prevent Strategy diffusing a security logic within citizenship practice. By making opposition to British values an indicator of extremism, Prevent set the normative criteria for British citizenship. A good British citizen opposes extremism and anyone who fails to do so does not deserve the privileges and rights associated with British citizenship. This not only shifts the responsibility to counter extremism to citizens, it also defines the values good citizens must eagerly adopt and promote. We can see how this logic culminated into material consequences with the revocation of Shamima Begum's citizenship almost a decade after this policy was released (Butterworth, 2019). Although Shamima Begum's case is not directly related to Prevent

Duty, the revocation of her citizenship took place within a discourse of securitised citizenship that made her legal and social exclusion from the British citizenry possible.

While New Labour approached the problem of radicalisation by encouraging integration of Muslim communities within the mainstream British society, the Coalition government's approach was markedly different. Rather than taking Labour's approach of investing in social programmes, the Conservative iteration of Prevent rejected these initiatives, instead it focussed on shifting the responsibility to manage these risks and adopt a liberal, British identity on minority communities and citizens:

'Support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values.' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 5)

Here it is contingent incumbent on the citizen to support British values and show that they belong rather than the state creating conditions to facilitate this belonging. As the next chapter will show, this is rooted in the neoliberal idea of active citizenship that puts the onus on individuals to demonstrate that they deserve to be accepted within the folds of citizenship. This was also evident in how the new government continued to identify a lack of integration and marginalised communities as a cause of radicalisation but refused to spend any resources on programmes to address it. They rejected the New Labour programmes of community cohesion as 'securitisation of integration' and instead shifted the responsibility on citizens and communities to show they can tackle extremism and integrate within the liberal British identity:

'Communities who do not (or, alternatively, cannot) participate in all civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalisation by all kinds of terrorist groups.' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 27)

'Challenging ideology is also about being confident in our own values – the values of democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind.' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 44)

This shifting of responsibilities to communities went in line with the wider Coalition agenda of imposing austerity on the public sector. The policy repeatedly lamented the previous government's wastage of funds on 'projects irrelevant to (Prevent's) objectives' and made the case for getting value for money (Home Office, 2011b, p. 60). It was argued that given the opposition to Prevent, some local authorities used Prevent funding for less contentious community safety projects (Home Office, 2011a, p. 28). This signalled the wider government approach to not viewing community development and safety as antidotes to radicalisation. Citing the inability of these projects to deliver Prevent objectives, the policy made a financial prudence case to stop community cohesion work and broke the link between the Home Office and Department for Communities and Local Government. This was done by presenting 'value for money (VfM)' assessments as a method used across government to judge the viability of projects. According to this, Prevent funding was put through a 'strategic risk model' to figure out where and how money should be spent for counter-radicalisation work (Home Office, 2011b, p. 116). Factoring in financial priorities signalled another operational break from previous iterations. Whilst previously the focus was on addressing wider social issues under Prevent, the new policy advocated linking funding to impact such as 'attitudinal or behavioural change in target audience', rather than obscure outputs assessing how many people have been reached (Home Office, 2011a, p. 37).

The policy also advocated moving Prevent funding from police to local authorities. While this was presented as a prudent use of resources, it was also motivated by the need to reinforce Prevent as a 'pre-criminal process' that works outside mainstream law enforcement channels. However, this was a surface-level attempt to rebrand Prevent because while advocating a move away from the police, the policy expanded the network of Prevent Engagement Officers who are embedded within police forces and work alongside Prevent Co-ordinators based at local authorities (Home Office, 2011b, p. 70). The boundary between these police and civilian roles are blurred as some of the civilian Prevent Co-ordinator roles are filled by former law enforcement officers.

The most significant and long-lasting operational change introduced by the 2011 Prevent Strategy was a renewed focus on working with key civic sectors such as health, education, social work etc. Since the 2009 iteration, Prevent had started identifying key sectors for potential collaboration in counterradicalisation efforts, however, these directives were not formalised. From 2011 onwards, the government put a renewed focus on the role of these civilian-led bodies and started embedding surveillance structures within these institutions. The 2011 policy laid the groundwork by establishing all the major civic sectors as Prevent outposts, therefore, it became easy and almost logical to turn Prevent into a statutory duty in 2015. This change in policy can be marked as the beginning of securitisation of citizenship because it started the process of formalising citizens' involvement in security policing. By shifting responsibilities to public sector institutions, it may appear that Prevent was moving away from the infrastructures of citizenship practice. However, I would argue that these developments should be seen as the starting point of securitised citizenship because by diffusing counter-terrorism priorities within these sectors the policy mobilised thousands of citizens working in these institutions as street-level counter-terrorism agents. As such, while the focus was on health, education, social work sectors, the main target was the citizens working in these sectors not only turned citizens into security operatives, it also diffused a counter-terrorism logic in mundane social interactions and citizenship acts that take place within the provision of these services.

The co-optation of these civic sectors followed the idea that the threat of radicalisation exists at the grassroots level, making people and institutions vulnerable. Since these institutions and the citizens employed within them serve the public by dispensing important services, they were deemed to be both at risk of radicalisation and best-placed to monitor people's vulnerability to radicalisation:

'Radicalisation tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge. Some of these places are the responsibility of Government, some are Government-funded but have considerable autonomy and others are both privately owned and run (but may still be subject to Government regulation).' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 63).

This was the primary justification for expanding and embedding Prevent within the education sector. It was acknowledged that even though there was no evidence of radicalisation taking place in schools, these were still considered to be vulnerable to the influence of 'people supportive of terrorist groups and ideologies' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 67). This reflected the government's approach to tackling both violent and non-violent extremism. As discussed earlier, the expansion of risk to non-violent extremism allowed the government to create new vulnerabilities and new areas of governance. While the involvement of schools in Prevent delivery had already started under the Labour government, the 2011 policy formalised it and expanded it. Additional funding was put in place to widely circulate a toolkit to help schools prevent violent extremism. Along with monitoring pupils for vulnerability to radicalisation, schools were also tasked with building resilience to extremist ideas: 'Schools are important not because there is significant evidence to suggest children are being radicalised – there is not – but because they can play a vital role in preparing young people to challenge extremism and the ideology of terrorism and effectively rebut those who are apologists for it.' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 64)

The focus on the education sector also encompassed higher and further education institutions. Universities were considered to be at risk because '30% of people convicted of Al-Qa'ida-associated terrorist offences' had attended university (Home Office, 2011a, p. 72). The policy concluded that universities were more at risk of being targeted by extremist organisations and singled out the Federation of Student Islamic Societies for its inability to challenge terrorist ideology (*ibid*, p. 74). This approach was influenced by the government's understanding of radicalisation rooted in ideology and the disproportionate focus on the threat coming from Muslim communities. The policy put the responsibility on universities to tackle extremism both on and off campus by embedding Prevent directives in the working of the National Union of Students and establishing partnerships with local authorities. As opposed to the schools that were seen as avenues for tackling radicalisation through the teaching of British values and citizenship education, universities were seen as institutions where the threat was mature enough to be tackled by Prevent policing. The focus on Islamic societies also shows that adult Muslims were regarded as being outside the folds of British citizenship regardless of their legal status.

Within healthcare, the policy boasted about putting a Prevent programme in place by piloting a programme in nine Strategic Health Authorities across England and covering a diverse range of provision from mental health to drug and alcohol programmes. Prevent training was also included in the undergraduate medical curriculum. The overall aim was to ensure medical staff recognise signs of radicalisation and give them 'the attention and care they deserve' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 84). Even though this was presented as an addition to the clinician's duty of care, by separating vulnerability to radicalisation from regular mental health evaluations, Prevent created a new system of care that could potentially criminalise mental health patients. The policy also embedded a new way of looking at health symptoms where now a calculation was to be made to ascertain if certain physical or mental conditions could be indicative of terrorist activity such as unexplained injuries or learning difficulties:

'Healthcare professionals may meet and treat people who are vulnerable to radicalisation. People with mental health issues or learning disabilities (such as Nicky Reilly and Andrew Ibrahim, separately convicted in 2009 for terrorist-related offences) may be more easily drawn into terrorism.' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 83)

The policy weaponised the principles of trust and confidentiality that are embedded within these sectors by marking out these institutions as crucial outposts in the domestic war on terror. When a member of the public goes to access health service provision, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy that allows them to freely interact with the medical staff. Similarly, within social care or educational institutions, citizens trust the service providers to create a safe space for them. Prevent targeted this very trust in the system as an important resource that should be used for counter-terrorism purposes.

By identifying these sectors as key sites of Prevent provision and delinking community cohesion and counter-terrorism, the policy moved funding and resources from social programmes to civic institutions. This move also allowed the government to streamline operations while targeting wide sections of the population. Shifting the focus from community groups and integration programmes meant that government could ensure uniformity in Prevent delivery by putting concrete structures in place. It also made it easier to measure impact of the policy and assess if they were getting value for money. The policy expanded the roll-out of a Prevent training programme – Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) – across different departments and statutory partners. This training module, delivered in person and through a DVD to frontline staff, provides practical and ideological guidance by discussing 'the history of terrorism, radicalisation as a social process, connections to other forms of extremism, the Al Qa'ida 'narrative' and factors which may contribute to vulnerability' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 57). The training, that is still in circulation, is used for both judging Prevent enactment in key sectors along with imparting the government's understanding of radicalisation and extremism. As such, this iteration of Prevent not only started the practice of embedding counter-terrorism priorities within the conduct of professional duties, it also altered how frontline staff articulate risk and vulnerability.

Within the British welfare state system, the health service, educational institutions, social care provision, etc. are public sector institutions, however, these exist within the non-coercive sphere of the state. The 2011 iteration of Prevent broke this boundary by turning these civic institutions into avenues for counter-terrorism policing. Along with these key sectors, the policy also identified charities and faith institutions as partners in Prevent delivery. For a policy that claimed to stop the securitisation of integration and community cohesion, the focus on these civic institutions betrays

attempts to regularise the working of these sectors. By binding them to Prevent provisions, the policy sought to exclude any activity or entity that could fall foul of the government's definitions of extremism and radicalisation.

The development of Prevent under the Coalition government between 2010 and 2015 can be seen as the preparatory phase that laid the foundations for embedding counter-terrorism in the civic sectors. The 2011 iteration of the policy set out to 'widen the scope and narrow the focus', it did the former by expanding the target from violent to non-violent extremism, thus making a wide range of conducts and speech subject to Prevent monitoring (Home Office, 2011a, p. 6). It narrowed the focus by shifting security responsibilities from communities and social programmes to citizens employed in civic institutions. By continuing and reinforcing some existing stipulations and introducing some new ones, the policy primed the civilian infrastructures of these sectors for counter-terrorism work. Hence, when the Conservatives came back with a majority in 2015, these sectors were ready to be formally inducted in the state's coercive sphere.

The year 2015 is quite significant for the development of Prevent Strategy because the stipulations of the policy received a statutory status with the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Article 26 of the act made it a legal duty for 'specified authorities' to 'have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism' (Home Office, 2015a, p. 18). Schedule 6 of the act presented a comprehensive list of the institutions considered 'specified authorities' that included local government, criminal justice, education, childcare, health and social care, and police turning citizens working in these sectors into agents/subjects of Prevent (*ibid*, p. 63). Article 29 gave the secretary of the state the power to issue guidance to the specified authorities to meet these obligations (*ibid*, p. 19). To comply with this, the Home Office issued Prevent Duty Guidance in 2015 that codified the actions different sectors must take to meet their legal duty. Operationally, these two documents paved way for the widest expansion of Prevent as the policy was no longer considered to be in the pilot phase and was rolled out across England.⁵ Regardless of whether a local authority was considered to be at risk or was a 'priority area' i.e. receiving funding from the Home Office, it had to put in place a Prevent delivery plan to comply with the legal duty. In conceptual terms, by virtue of its statutory status, the Prevent Strategy's approach to radicalisation and extremism now became part of the received wisdom.

⁵ This analysis has only focussed on Prevent Duty enactment in England, as there are slight variations in how the policy works in Scotland and Wales.

'Frontline staff who engage with the public should understand what radicalisation means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it. They need to be aware of what we mean by the term "extremism" and the relationship between extremism and terrorism.' (Home Office, 2015b, p. 4)

This not only formalised the induction of ordinary citizens into counter-terrorism policing, it also crystallised the parameters of acceptable social conduct. Anyone who failed to adhere to and promote British values could be seen as an extremist and hence considered to be unworthy of the rights and privileges of citizenship. The sectors complying with their legal obligation to prevent terrorism are bound to the restricted definition of extremism as opposition to British values and radicalisation being rooted in extremist ideology. This is quite significant because a lot of Prevent work relies on citizens' threat perception that has been formed by a mixture of Prevent Duty Guidance, the WRAP training, and wider media discourses. By setting tight parameters of what the threat looks like or where it comes from, the policy implementation has become fraught with instances where certain demographics get routinely profiled as being at risk of radicalisation.

This chapter started with an exploration of the philosophical foundations of the Prevent Strategy rooted in the discourse around radicalisation and explained how this has been operationalised by the British state. By tracing the development of subsequent Prevent Strategy iterations, we looked at the knowledge and the rationality that has informed the development of this policy. We started from how the policy appears on paper and this helps us move towards the practices and narratives through which the policy is conveyed to the citizens. By responsibilising citizens with counter-terrorism monitoring, the Prevent Strategy simultaneously regulates the conduct of the wider populace who are deemed to be at risk of radicalisation along with controlling citizens who are conducting the policing. The discussion so far has used the radicalisation discourse to explain why Prevent targets citizens, to understand how it co-opts citizens into security policing and securitises citizenship, the next chapter will look at citizenship practice and unpack how the principles of neoliberal governance embedded within the concept of active citizenship have allowed Prevent to diffuse counter-terrorism surveillance within civic life. The empirical section will take this discussion forward by looking at the accounts of ordinary citizens to explain how acts of securitised citizenship manifest within everyday Prevent enactment and how they are challenged by citizens.

Chapter 4: Prevent Duty and (Securitised) Citizenship

Citizenship practice gives us a multidimensional blueprint of civic life through which we can understand Prevent Duty as a regime of securitised citizenship and the role both the state and citizens play in co-constituting it. In the previous chapter, we traced the philosophical foundations of Prevent and explored why the state shifts security responsibilities to ordinary citizens. We will continue the discussion here by using citizenship practice to understand how this responsibilisation is made possible. This chapter will unpack the different components of citizenship practice and apply it to Prevent Duty to show the techniques and practices that have been used by the state to securitise citizenship, turn citizens into agents of Prevent, and change common-sense attitudes towards surveillance and counter-terrorism. As I explained earlier, we are using a wide conceptualisation of securitised citizenship that encompasses both the exercise of state control and resistance to it. Therefore, we will also use citizenship practice to open up sites of contestation and resistance. By doing so, we will engage with an understanding of citizenship that is not merely a tool for population management but a co-constituted practice through which citizens reclaim ideas of civic identity and belonging and push back against state control.

Using active citizenship and techniques of governmentality embedded within it, I will explain how the state manages conducts of its citizens from a distance by instilling an ethos of self-governance. Individuals are encouraged to regulate their own and others' activities and behaviour. This shifting of responsibilities to turn citizens into agent/subjects is key to the enactment of Prevent Duty. In this way, active citizenship helps us identify the technique of governance that enables the operation of Prevent Duty as securitised citizenship. To explore how and where resistance to control emerges as an act of citizenship, I will use Isin's concept of 'activist citizenship' (Isin, 2009). This will allow me to situate different acts of resistance and contestation that are possible within the civic enactment of the Prevent Strategy. To explain how activist citizenship can function, I will use Foucault's concept of counter-conducts and put forward a framework through which we can identify resistance to Prevent. By explaining how citizenship framework gives us the tools to understand the exercise of control as well as resistance to it, this chapter will define securitised citizenship as encompassing both active and activist citizenship. This understanding will be taken forward in the empirical framework, where we will start the discussion with compliance to Prevent and gradually move towards resistance to the policy.

Before we can start analysing Prevent Duty through citizenship, it is essential to determine the parameters of this framework. As mentioned above, citizenship is a multifaceted concept, we can approach it as a regime of control that facilitates Prevent enactment or as a practice that allows citizens to resist their co-optation within security politics. Therefore, it will be useful to start this discussion with an exploration of the different ways we can understand the concept of citizenship. Following this I will discuss how active citizenship helps the enactment of Prevent Duty in civic life and how activist citizenship gives citizens the tools to resist the policy. This exploration of the different aspects of citizenship will also allow us to approach the concept from both the state's and citizens' perspectives. To understand active citizenship, our analysis will focus on how the state defines a role for citizens by setting the criteria for ideal civic conduct. The discussion of activist citizenship, however, will shift the focus to citizens to see how they respond to this control and reclaim their identities and responsibilities.

Conceptualising Citizenship

The study of citizenship can be approached in a number of ways. We can define it as a legal status that gives an individual a right to belong to a country and benefit from the privileges that this status brings with itself. In this sense, citizenship is understood as a marker of belonging, a status that ties an individual to the territorial and political structure of the state. They are 'bonded to a state through their legal status' or are untethered from it due to a lack thereof (MacDonald et al., 2013a, p. 4). This static legal conception of citizenship can be extended by associating certain rights and duties individuals enjoy and fulfil as a result of their contract with the state (Marshall, 2006, p. 34). This social dimension to the relationship between a citizen and the state comes to signify individuals' status, rights, and obligations, and can determine inclusionary or exclusionary circumstances for them. When an individual is included within the folds of citizenship, they are given rights and privileges and in turn have to undertake certain responsibilities. If these obligations are not met or if an individual is deemed unworthy or incapable of fulfilling them, they are excluded. Citizenship can thus be understood as a multifaceted contract incorporating legal and social components operating 'within the territorialised logic of the nation-state' (Schinkel, 2010, p. 165). This form of citizenship becomes a tool for identifying the in-groups and the out-groups, who belongs and has the rights, and who exists outside the folds of legitimacy.

As the literature review chapter will discuss, states can use this contractual element of citizenship as a weapon for security purposes. However, this understanding of citizenship is narrow in its scope and only allows us to see it as a tool wielded by the state. By focussing on how a state can deprive its citizens of their legal status, we privilege the state as the main actor and by default reduce citizens to passive subjects of this control. Citizenship in this sense becomes something that is determined by the actions of the state. By allowing an individual to be identified as a citizen or deprive them of this right, the state controls who can and cannot 'do' citizenship. Furthermore, it also does not explain how the Prevent Duty operates through citizenship in everyday life. Prevent obligations have permeated society through the management of civilian conduct, therefore, citizenship should be explored as a contextual practice through which the state regulates citizens and the citizens respond to this control. Instead of thinking of citizenship in narrow terms as simply a legal status, it is helpful to conceptualise it as something that is not only broader in scope but is also not limited to the acts of just one entity in the polity. As such, citizenship should be seen as an intersection of different conceptual tangents, that include, but are not limited to, laws, ideas, acts, and practices that 'delimit a political community' and shape an individual's everyday existence (Huysmans and Guillaume, 2013, p. 66). This approach is particularly useful for my study of Prevent Duty enactment because it opens up for analysis different spaces and activities that have been securitised by the state in the name of counter-terrorism. Furthermore, it also lets us understand how citizens interact with and in some ways contribute to this securitisation.

Once we go beyond a narrow understanding of citizenship as just a legal status, we open it up as an identity-making phenomenon that takes place in a variety of social processes, be it legislative instruments created by the state or mundane activities undertaken by individuals. Isin advocates looking at 'acts of citizenship' to understand how individuals become 'citizens' and in the process either become controlled subjects or empowered agents (2009, p. 371). Looking at acts also helps us identify who are the main actors who can *do* citizenship and the sites where these acts can take place. In Isin's analysis, this approach allows them to explain citizenship as taking place in a variety of 'sites and scales' that are overlapping and connected (*ibid*, p. 377). It is not limited within the strictly defined confines of the state but can take place anywhere and can be enacted by anyone. Within the context of Prevent Duty enactment, the act of complying with the duty or contesting it becomes an act of citizenship as it is carried out by citizens within the conduct of their everyday professional and civic activities. This connection is further emphasised when citizens articulate their engagement with Prevent by interpreting it as a civic responsibility. As this thesis will demonstrate, this association with citizenship narratives comes through in the cases of compliance as well as resistance. As such, whether people accept or reject their Prevent obligations, they think of their actions as serving a purpose bigger than merely fulfilling a professional duty.

When we approach citizenship as a contextual practice made up of acts, we also include actions of those people who are not necessarily in the 'in-group' chosen by the state. If we take citizenship to be constituted by any act through which an individual participates in the society, we expand the label of citizenship to also include those who do not have the legal status but they undertake acts of citizenship nevertheless (Isin, 2009, pp. 370–371). In this way, we do not restrict the scope of citizenship to those who are considered legitimate citizens by the state, instead we approach it as a practice that can be undertaken by anyone who exists within the polity.

Another way of understanding citizenship is by demarcating its geography, the spaces where acts and practices of citizenship unfold. Staeheli et al. situate citizenship in 'communities and everyday practices' asking us to take account of not just the 'institutionalised spaces of citizenship' but also the 'hidden' ones (2012, pp. 638–641). This expands the idea of citizenship beyond the recognised avenues of state such as government and public sector organisations to personal spaces. Citizenship then becomes a practice that is constituted in different pockets of civic existence and is made up of ordinary acts carried out by individuals. Here, citizenship is more than simply a legal tool of domination, it exists within and through actions of citizens and state and the interactions between the two. This approach to identifying a diverse spatiality of citizenship is going to be particularly useful in our discussion of 'activist citizenship' that will explore how citizens can contest the securitisation of citizenship.

In their work on citizenship, Staeheli also makes linkages between high and low politics to explain the co-constitutive nature of citizenship. They explain the domestic basis of a widespread political movement like the Arab Spring protests to show that acts of citizenship are spread over different spaces and link the material reality of the home to the street (*ibid*). This also makes citizenship an amorphous concept because it exists in a multiplicity of spaces and acts and is in a constant state of flux because it is being defined and redefined by both the state and the citizens and all the institutions in between. This very quality of citizenship makes it ideal as an analytical framework for studying Prevent because while the duty emerges from a counter-terrorism strategy with strictly defined parameters, the enactment of the policy has relied on its diffusion within the everyday mundanity of civic acts that have almost camouflaged it as a safeguarding act or a civic duty.

If we recognise the fluid character of citizenship, we also have to acknowledge Isin's assertion that it can be a tool of both domination and empowerment (2009, p. 371). If citizenship is more than just a legal status or a strategy of population management, if it is co-constituted by the actions of both the

state and the citizens, then it can also be used as a means of exercising agency. If the actions and interactions of citizens define what citizenship is, then the acts of citizenship can range from upholding civic norms to disrupting them (Lewicki and O'Toole, 2017, p. 153). If paying taxes and voting in elections are acts of citizenship, then so are protesting against the state and civil disobedience. This conceptualisation then helps us situate acts of resistance and contestation within citizenship practice and chart a course for locating means of resisting Prevent. This also helps us see that resistance and deviation from norms can take place in less extreme forms by redefining citizenship not through the legal right to be considered a citizen but by undertaking civic activity regardless of one's citizenship status. Ní Mhurchú has written about refugees and asylum seekers undertaking 'alternative' acts of citizenship to establish their place within the communities they inhabit (2016). Their actions and interactions are part of the civic fabric, they behave as political subjects of the state even when the state does not recognise them as such. In this way, they reclaim the meaning of citizenship by taking part in civic life on their own terms. By studying Prevent enactment through citizenship practice, we can explore this scope of resistance and contestation to the policy. As Chapter 8: Resistance will discuss, when Prevent gets diffused within civic and professional obligations, its enactment is reliant on ordinary citizens. While some people see implementing Prevent as a civic obligation, for others resisting the policy can also be seen as a way of doing their civic duty. The subsequent section on 'activist citizenship' will explore contestation within citizenship practice in detail.

We move forward with an understanding of citizenship as an umbrella concept that incorporates a variety of actions, interactions, thoughts, and practices co-constituted by the state and citizens. Like the term citizenship, the concept of citizen is also expansive and is not determined by the legal status of an individual sanctioned by the state, a citizen can be anyone who takes on the role of upholding or disrupting civic norms. While we agree on a broad conceptualisation of citizenship, this does not mean we are negating the fact that it is used as a technology of control by the state. The aim of expanding the parameters of citizenship is to also take stock of other power dynamics that exist within this practice. Citizenship practice can be used as a way of managing populations and it can also be an avenue where contestation and resistance to this control can develop. To encapsulate the wide range of actions possible within citizenship, this discussion will first focus on the idea of 'active citizenship' to explain how citizenship is deployed to exert state control. We will then move to 'activist citizenship' to take stock of the different ways in which citizens can push back against the state. It is important to look at these different themes because they help us make sense of the way Prevent Duty has been introduced in civic life. While 'active citizenship' tells us how and why ordinary citizens have been chosen to enact the Prevent Duty, activist citizenship explains how citizens can resist the hegemonic

control of the Prevent Duty in their professional and personal lives. In this way, active citizenship becomes a technique of governance, while activist citizenship encapsulates technologies of resistance. We bring them together under the framework of securitised citizenship to understand how control and resistance manifest within Prevent Duty enactment. This discussion maps on to the three empirical themes discussed in the following chapters.

Active Citizenship

An important reason for defining what is or what could be considered citizenship is to determine the function it serves. Most conceptualisations of citizenship, especially within counter-terrorism studies, see it as a tool of dominance or control. When approached as a legal status, citizenship is a tool wielded by the state to deprive people of rights or to bifurcate the population into outsiders and insiders. However, control through citizenship can also be exerted in a more subtle way that combines repressive techniques with productive ones (Mustafa, 2018, p. 123). This form of control is captured by the term 'active citizenship'. This control is indirect, self-governing, and fluid so its parameters can change according to the state's priorities. An active citizen is a good citizen because they take on responsibilities to self-govern their conduct and participate in civic life. This not only allows the state to manage the conducts of its citizens from a distance, but it also makes it possible to change the criteria of good citizenship as it sees fit (Foucault, 1994a, p. 341). We can understand active citizenship as a technique of governance rooted in governmentality and dictated by the principles of restricted government and individual responsibility (Joseph, 2010, p. 203; Peters, 2008, pp. 170–172). Citizens are identified as active agents following an ethos of self-governance. They exercise 'agency' by monitoring their conducts, actively participating in the community, and reducing their reliance on the state. However, the agency and empowerment offered by active citizenship is not emancipatory but is a type of subjection that shapes citizens into self-governing entities (Marinetto, 2003, pp. 109–110). This makes 'active citizenship' useful in this study of Prevent Duty because it helps us trace the political discourse that has enabled the shifting of security responsibilities to citizens. Since good citizens are to govern their own conducts and actively participate in the society, it makes logical sense to shift security responsibilities to them as well.

Starting from earlier conceptualisations of citizenship in the works of Thucydides and Aristotle, to recent interventions on the subject, active citizenship puts forward a template of civic conduct that shifts the rights and duties balance between the state and the citizen (Schinkel, 2010, p. 167). It recalibrates the social contract and turns citizenship rights into something that has to be earned by citizens' active participation in public life (Delanty, 2000, p. 10; Van Houdt et al., 2011, p. 410). This

activation of citizenry has been captured by Schinkel through the concept of 'moral citizenship' that allows the state to exert control over its citizens (2010, p. 165). They explain that moral citizenship is the recognition that an individual has 'integrated' well into the society (Schinkel and Van Houdt, 2010, p. 704). This is an additional layer of control, while formal citizenship allows the state to determine the legal parameters of legitimacy, moral citizenship refers to the social conditions that should be abided by to be part of the 'in' group. It defines the duties and responsibilities an individual has to take on to earn the privilege of citizenship. This allows the state to exert a dual technology of control. It is not enough to just meet the legal requirements to be called a citizen, one has to continuously work to prove that they deserve the privilege.

Moral citizenship makes population management easier because, unlike formal citizenship, which is regulated by national and international laws, moral citizenship's normative criteria is hard to define. There are no fixed, universal principles which determine what constitutes good citizenship as different societies 'create their image of ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured...and towards which aspiration can be directed' (Marshall, 2006, p. 34). This makes citizenship practice malleable to political influences. States can redefine the criteria for good citizenship and the rights and obligations associated with civic duty on the basis of political expediency. As we can see in the case of Prevent Duty, this malleability of citizenship allows the state to securitise different civic activities and recalibrate the criteria for separating a good citizen from a bad one along security priorities. This turns active citizenship into securitised active citizenship. Nyers explains this as the 'forms of governance that are responsive to – and constitutive of – fears, anxieties, and insecurities' (2009, p. 5). Here, we see the discourse of active citizenship governance that relies on responsibilising citizens and monitoring their conducts get injected with state's security priorities. The insecurity created by the threat of radicalisation within the 'precriminal space' is mitigated by creating a security governance regime that turns citizens into agent/subjects of the state. In this way, when we talk about securitised active citizenship, we are referring to two distinct but interconnected phenomena – the mobilisation of ordinary citizens to do security policing and the co-optation of civic practices, norms, and spaces through which this policing is to be conducted. This discussion of securitised active citizenship will unpack both of these practices within the enactment of Prevent Duty.

In terms of shifting responsibilities to citizens, Prevent has securitised citizenship with ease because it has moved into an already existing governance regime characterised by neoliberal principles (Rygiel, 2008, p. 211). Citizenship practice has served as an amenable apparatus for different governmental strategies ranging from the targeting of welfare systems in social democratic societies to the governance of migration politics that make it incumbent on citizens to become 'neoliberal subjects' to earn the privileges associated with citizenship (Isin et al., 2008, p. 5). Therefore, it has made logical sense for the state to deploy the Prevent Duty through the framework of citizenship and make counter-terrorism one of the many tasks 'good citizens' should be undertaking. Securitised citizenship under Prevent has thus, allowed the 'the activation of citizenry for security governance' (Jarvis and Lister, 2013a, pp. 660–661).

As the previous chapter explained, the success of Prevent relies on citizens participating in policing activities. Under securitised active citizenship, this need for civilian participation is presented as an important factor in enhancing community resilience. According to the strategy, 'Communities who do not (or in some cases feel they cannot) participate in civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalisation,' (Home Office, 2011b, p. 61). By making a lack of citizen participation symptomatic of vulnerability to radicalisation, the policy not only underscores its reliance on citizens adopting its regulations, it also highlights the good/bad, risky/at risk binaries inherent in Prevent philosophy. It makes participation in the state's security agenda an indicator of a citizen's resilience against extremism, thus, reinforcing the idea that a good citizen is an active citizen who undertakes different civic responsibilities. As such, the population management conducted by Prevent is reliant on the already established norms of civic participation within the society which have now been readjusted to include counter-terrorism duties.

This co-optation of citizens has been gradual and not very overt. As discussed in the previous chapter, the initial years of Prevent shifted security responsibilities to citizens by deploying the narrative of community cohesion and integration. By speaking of securitisation in terms of a collective responsibility, Prevent camouflaged the coercive nature of counter-terrorism policing within the guise of civic duty. Chapter 6: Compliance will discuss how this narrative has trickled down and become part of the consensus on Prevent with citizens using the language of responsibility and civic duty when they talk about the policy. In terms of the diffusion of security logics in everyday norms and practices, Prevent has done so by what can be called securitisation through co-optation. As Dresser points out, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, which gave statutory footing to Prevent regulations, normalised and 'depoliticised' counter-radicalisation work by diffusing it in everyday activities and professional norms (2018, p. 148). The Prevent Duty Guidance 2015 underscores this point by stating that the duty does not 'confer new functions on any specified authorities' and the counter-radicalisation policing should be conducted along with the regular dispensation of duties by using existing mechanisms for understanding the risk of radicalisation (HM Government, 2015b, p. 5, *ibid*).

As a result of this, security practices have become part of the 'everyday' manifesting in different avenues of civic life. Local authorities have to incorporate counter-terrorism monitoring within multiagency arrangements such as local safeguarding boards and youth offending teams. Along with the legislative power of the Counter-Terrorism Security Act 2015, Prevent implementation is also regulated by the Local Government Act 1999. This shows that counter-terrorism policing has also coopted existing legislative instruments (*ibid*, p. 8) In the education sector, schoolteachers have to monitor students for signs of radicalisation and incorporate the teaching of British values in lessons under the Prevent Duty guidance issued by the Department of Education (Department for Education, 2015, p. 5). In the health sector, reporting extremist views is done by doctors and nurses as a safeguarding duty, in the same vein as safeguarding against substance or sexual abuse (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018, p. 10). In mental health services, radicalisation screening of all service users has been integrated in the Comprehensive Risk Assessments (*ibid*, p. 3).

By co-opting the bureaucracy of sectors such as health, education, and local government, Prevent has normalised counter-terror self-governance in spaces which are not only routine and mundane, but also considered safe. These spaces now serve as sites through which governance is filtered down to citizens, functioning as the 'object and target for the exercise of political power while remaining external to politics' (Rose, 2000, pp. 1400–1401). Like the narrative of community cohesion, by targeting professional sectors, Prevent has entrenched counter-terrorism practices in civic life in a way that it hides them in plain sight – surveillance has become a professional practice. However, while people come into contact with Prevent within professional settings, the overall narrative of protecting the vulnerable does not remain restricted to their professional roles. As the empirical discussion will demonstrate, once people accept Prevent Duty as a safeguarding responsibility, it becomes a civic responsibility that needs to be carried out all the time, whether an individual is at work or not. Thus, safeguarding people from the threat of extremism becomes something a good/active citizen must be ready to do at all times. This expands the scope of Prevent Duty obligations outside the remit of professional responsibilities and places them within a wider context informing a citizen's relationship with the state and their fellow citizens.

A big factor that contributes to shaping Prevent Duty as an act of active citizenship, something that goes beyond a mere professional responsibility, is its incorporation into safeguarding practices of different social sectors. Even though safeguarding is a professional practice, routing counter-terrorism work through this norm serves to mobilise citizens and makes a coercive practice more palatable. When Prevent is presented as a safeguarding duty, it stops being an act for surveillance and becomes a duty of care. It turns into a responsibility to protect vulnerable people that is not just restricted to professional settings but speaks to the broader moral duty that should be undertaken by all good/ active citizens. This makes compliance with Prevent a logical extension of the existing safeguarding principles people must espouse both within and outside of their professional roles.

Along with sanitising a coercive policy, framing Prevent as safeguarding has also had practical uses in terms of diffusing the policy within civic sectors. The British welfare system has duty of care ethos embedded within different sectors. Adult and children's safeguarding are part of the care provision extended by local authorities, the health sector has safeguarding responsibilities towards abuse of any kind, and the education system offers a wide range of pastoral care support to students depending on their age and vulnerability status. Hence, the different civic sectors that have been tasked with implementing the Prevent Duty have already had some form of safeguarding or duty of care infrastructure in place. By presenting Prevent as a safeguarding duty, the government has been able to push for its expansion on both moral and practical grounds. I would argue that diffusing Prevent Duty within safeguarding practices should be situated within the active citizenship discourse because while safeguarding and duty of care are professional norms, they are rooted in a wider civic principle of protecting the vulnerable. They are not simply professional practices that people take on while they are at work and disregard as soon as they are off-the-clock. The safeguarding ethos operate across the personal/professional divide, hence, when a doctor or a teacher is trained to think of Prevent Duty as their safeguarding responsibility, they will carry this into their wider civic conduct as well. As the discussion in Chapter 6 will demonstrate, certain participants I interviewed spoke of Prevent as a 'civic or moral duty' that they should be carrying out even when they are not at work.

Framing Prevent as safeguarding has not only impacted the way the policy is received and adopted by citizens; it has also become a strong selling point for the state to convince people to engage with the policy. In almost all the interviews I conducted with six Prevent co-ordinators working across England, the term safeguarding was used to describe Prevent operations at their respective local authorities. One co-ordinator advocated expanding Prevent work beyond professional duties because it is considered safeguarding:

'It is part and parcel of the safeguarding process... people want to keep other people safe... your job as a professional, be it social worker, it's all about safeguarding, you know! I don't think you can get away from that duty, if you are truly professional then you wouldn't... if you're a doctor and somebody is bleeding out on to the street, you're gonna go and help them' (Prevent Co-ordinator, PC01).

'I think people are now recognising as well that it's a role for everyone to play at an early stage. Bit of a cliché, you will hear this from everyone you speak, no doubt, that we are just trying to safeguard young people and as public servants, we have a duty of care towards our citizens, so whether it's drugs or guns or whatever it might be, terrorism is no different' (Prevent Co-ordinator, PC02).

These quotes show that by appealing to people's civic duty towards their fellow citizens, Prevent has shifted security responsibilities in a way that it gets camouflaged in existing norms. As a result, people think about citizenship when they speak about Prevent because it is seen as a moral duty. This also serves to change the way the state sets the parameters for active/good citizenship. The malleability of citizenship practice has allowed the state to make good citizenship equivalent with securitised citizenship whereby 'good citizens are counter-terrorism citizens' and counter-terrorism training can be taken from the comfort of one's kitchen table (BBC News, 2018; Counter Terrorism Policing, 2020).

Before we move on to the discussion of 'activist citizenship' and how citizens challenge the state control, I want to discuss another technique of active citizenship governance that has been deployed by Prevent. As active members of the community, citizens are also expected to demonstrate their adherence to and promotion of liberal values. In active citizenship discourse this can be seen in the well-established tradition of urging those, who are mostly considered outsiders, to join the 'British way of life' (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p. 412). This reduces British civic identity to a narrow and prescriptive criterion of conducts that determines whether someone is eligible for moral citizenship or not. This rhetoric has been useful for othering ethnic and religious minorities and immigrant communities by demanding their integration and demonising them for failing to comply (Ford, 2007; Mason and Sherwood, 2016).

Under the Prevent Duty, this insistence on adopting a 'British' civic identity has been co-opted within the counter-terrorism agenda in a number of different ways. Under New Labour, we saw a focus on 'shared values' to establish social cohesion and demands for a full participation in British society to build one's resilience to radicalisation (Home Office, 2008, p. 17). Along with this, citizenship education was also seen as an avenue of security governance through which young people could be made aware of the threats of terrorism and extremism (Guillaume and Huysmans, 2013, p. 30). This approach saw the introduction of Islam & Citizenship Education (ICE) Project to 'encourage more madrassahs to adopt citizenship programmes' to fight extremism (Home Office, 2008, p. 22). Here, (British) citizenship was presented as an antidote to individuals who were considered to be vulnerable because they did not have a strong sense of British identity.

On a broader scale, Prevent has packaged this prescriptive identity as British values to regulate civic conducts. This was formalised by the 2011 Prevent Strategy that firmly established the relationship between counter-terrorism, civic participation, and values by defining extremism as 'vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values' (Home Office, 2011a, p. 107). These values are used to differentiate radicalised or extremist citizens from those actively participating in the promotion of British values (Flynn, 2009, p. 158). David Cameron's demands for a muscular defence of liberal values to fight radicalisation came as a 'reconstructive citizenship intervention' which sought to reconstitute active citizenship as adherence and promotion of liberal British values (McGhee and Zhang, 2017, p. 939; Wright and Taylor, 2011). A good citizen is one who is actively following and disseminating British values in the name of counter-terrorism. By making adherence to British values a necessary virtue, the state directly controls the forms of actions and speech deemed acceptable within securitised citizenship practice. This prescriptive understanding of active citizenship is problematic because it exploits the discriminatory dynamics of citizenship practice and excludes people who are not perceived to be adhering to these values. By making British values a form of fight against terrorism, Prevent has effectively securitised certain behaviours and activities as threatening because absence of or opposition to British values is not just deviant citizenship, it is indicative of extremist behaviour. Furthermore, this form of control goes beyond those citizens who are tasked with conducting counterterrorism monitoring to the entire citizenry (Home Office, 2006, p. 2). These values and the actions associated with them are to be adopted by all citizens to show they are not vulnerable to radicalisation. As such, by co-opting the requirement for citizens to adhere to and promote liberal values, Prevent exercises a control at both micro and macro level.

This discussion of the active citizenship discourse has shown how it serves as a technique of Prevent governance, turning counter-terrorism monitoring into an act of (good) citizenship. With its focus on shifting responsibilities to ordinary citizens, Prevent has been able to co-opt the neoliberal logics and practices of active citizenship and make counter-terrorism policing a civic duty obligation. The active citizen shares the security responsibilities of the state and becomes more subservient as the balance between rights and obligations is recalibrated in the favour of the latter. This sees the state shrink in size but become more entrenched within the society by 'governing through citizenship' (Rygiel, 2008,

p. 227). Along with turning some citizens into state operatives, Prevent as securitised active citizenship also changes the nature of citizenship practice by altering the 'social contract' and shifting the power dynamic between an individual, their wider community, and the state (Jarvis and Lister, 2013, pp. 660–661; Rygiel, 2008, p. 231). While this helps us see how Prevent has permeated different avenues of British civic life, this still tells us half the story. As mentioned above, the aim of this thesis is to unpack the multiplicity of power dynamics within Prevent enactment, therefore, the following section will look at the concept of 'activist citizenship' to explore how citizenship can also serve as an avenue where citizens can resist state control. Together the two strands of citizenship will help us understand how Prevent as securitised citizenship operates within the mundanity of everyday.

Activist Citizenship

In our discussion of securitised active citizenship so far, citizens seem to have a relatively passive role as entities who receive state control and channel it for their own self-governance in different areas of civic life. However, if we restrict our analysis of Prevent within this framework, we are tied to a statecentric approach to understanding how this policy operates within the civil society. The state becomes the principal entity in Prevent enactment that co-opts citizens within an expansive security regime. This leaves no space to conceptualise citizens as actors that can do more than simply submit to state control. However, this research aims to study Prevent enactment by foregrounding the lived experiences of ordinary citizens and the agency they possess in dealing with the state within the parameters of the Prevent Duty. As such, the idea of citizenship that takes citizens as passive subjects does not help with our enquiry. We need a framework of citizenship that expands the meaning of 'active' beyond that of self-governance to something that has the scope for citizens to exercise some agency in resisting the state control. In this way, we move towards a more multifaceted understanding of citizenship, that goes beyond understanding it as merely a technology of state control to looking at it as a practice that is co-constituted by the actions of both the state and citizens.

Citizenship is constitutive of technologies and practices that are neither constant nor fixed. They are constantly changing as they are defined by the interactions that take place between the citizen and the state. By accepting or rejecting state control, citizens are redefining what citizenship practice means and what it can do. Isin encapsulates this role played by citizens in defining an alternative understanding of citizenship with the term 'activist citizenship'. This is introduced to counter the narrative of 'active citizenship' and reclaim civic participation in a way that does not acquiesce to state control. In this way, an 'activist citizen' is different from an 'active citizen' because while the latter 'acts out already written scripts', the former is 'creating the scene' (Isin, 2009, p. 381). It is as an

attempt to put forward a new variety of actions and interactions that should be seen as acts of citizenship.

It should be clarified that the term 'activist' is not being used in the traditional sense of the word that denotes an active involvement in a social cause. Like Isin's approach, I am rooting 'activist citizenship' in the Foucauldian concept of counter-conducts that capture scattered and irregular acts and practices of contestation (Foucault, 2009, p. 201). An activist citizen is not necessarily leading a march or pursuing an abolitionist movement, they are silently pushing back against the system, working it without overtly challenging the state and in the process reclaiming citizenship. This makes activist citizenship a useful framework to understand the multitude of interactions that take place within the contours of Prevent Duty. Just as political subjects constitute citizenship practice by virtue of their submission to state control, the refusal to take on this role also leads us to an understanding of citizenship. Here we are moving away from a conceptualisation of citizenship that is solely contingent on the actions of the state or how much control the state can exercise over its citizens. We recognise that the terms of this practice are not defined by the state alone and citizens are also political entities whose actions co-constitute citizenship practice (Mitchell, 1991, p. 93). The way citizens interact with Prevent and how they relate their existing civic obligations to their new coercive duties shows us how they do citizenship. As this research will demonstrate, compliance with Prevent comes with a deference for the state and the perceived citizenship obligations, an acceptance and recognition that the authority of the state is legitimate and that citizens must work across different spheres to carry out their duty. Conversely, resistance to Prevent indicates a refusal to be deployed as an agent/subject of the state. Here, we can see that how citizens respond to these obligations is defined by how they conceptualise the idea of citizenship and the responsibilities associated with it.

This is also the point in this thesis where I shift the focus from what the state does to the citizens to how the citizens respond to the state. After we conclude the theoretical discussion with the literature review chapter, the empirical framework of this thesis exclusively focuses on how ordinary citizens engage with Prevent and respond to it. As such, it is fitting that we move our analysis to privilege the narratives and perspectives of citizens in line with this project's feminist epistemological approach.

So far, we have seen how the state uses citizenship practice as an avenue of governance, this discussion of 'activist citizenship' will help us understand how citizens co-constitute citizenship and how they can use it as a process of either claiming agency or accepting subjection. As the empirical section will demonstrate, this engagement gives us an entire spectrum of responses ranging from

submission to rejection of state control, but nevertheless it is important to highlight this side of the process as both Prevent and citizenship as governance regimes rely on an exchange between the state and citizens.

It is important to explore this alternative conceptualisation of citizenship because it opens up a space where citizens can challenge state control and reclaim agency. As such, by juxtaposing 'active citizenship' with 'activist citizenship', we can explore the ways in which citizens can resist the Prevent Duty. When we move beyond a prescriptive understanding of citizenship, we are also able to review how we look at resistance because this discussion leads us to new acts and practices through which citizenship is enacted. Neveu asks us to look at 'low-noise acts of citizenship' that can be found in feelings, attachments, and relationships (2014, p. 92). This puts us in touch with our feminist epistemological approach of finding the political in the personal and privileging the ordinary. When we accept that citizenship can be constituted through something as banal as discussing problems or sharing experiences, we can also reconceptualise what should count as resistance to the securitisation of this citizenship.

Isin talks about non-traditional sites of citizenship contestation – bodies, courts, streets (2009, p. 371). We can also look at non-traditional acts of citizenship as contestation – if Prevent has created a common-sense narrative that doing counter-terrorism is a citizenship act, then rejecting this narrative should be seen as an act of contesting this citizenship or perhaps reclaiming it. As the empirical findings will demonstrate, when people talk about resisting their Prevent Duty obligations, they also speak the language of civic responsibility. However, the orientation here changes from a sense of loyalty for the state to solidarity with fellow citizens. In this way, they reclaim their identity as a citizen and reinterpret their civic duty obligations. Like the cases of compliance, in these instances we can find some citizens comprehend their reasonings in the language of citizenship, while others talk about it in a different way, but we can still trace the influence of the citizenship narrative. This discussion, thus, puts forward an alternative understanding of both citizenship and resistance because to foreground the scattered acts of civic contestation that take place in everyday life, we not only have to alter the way we think about citizenship, securitisation, and control, but also how we think of resistance. We have to go beyond organised, counter-hegemonic acts of contestation and highlight the irregular and the scattered thoughts, actions, and practices that are normally considered to lie outside the domain of political activity.

An exploration of how activist citizenship works shows us that the tools for resisting the control are embedded within the same technologies that exert it. Guillaume and Huysmans find the possibility of contestation not sitting outside securitised citizenship but within it (2013, p. 35). They reject the dichotomising of citizenship into democratic and securitised variants and insist that citizenship should be seen as a practice of 'negotiating, configuring, and enacting political beings' that can be either 'mobilised in line with or against' the processes of securitisation (*ibid*). We can unpack this further by looking at the governmentality embedded within active citizenship, that has helped us understand how citizens get co-opted as subjects within a regime of control. While this concept helps us recognise the nature and scope of control that creates subjectivities, it is also useful for exploring the possibility of resistance to this control because Foucault's 'politicisation' is not just defined by the expansion of state power, the existence of adversaries who resist this power is also present within it (2009, p. 390). In this way, the technology of resistance is built into the framework of control. The power hierarchy created by state control nurtures subjectivities that both acquiesce to and challenge the control.

This conceptualisation of malleable control gives us a useful entry point into situating resistance within citizenship practice. If the state uses citizenship practice to enact Prevent, then this very process also opens up the possibility of contesting this control. This is what Isin refers to when they talk about citizenship being a tool of both domination and empowerment. As such, citizenship practice, and by extension Prevent Duty, create spaces and practices where subjection co-exists with agency. However, it should be clarified that Prevent is not being seen as a source of agency per se. I want to put forward a conceptualisation of agency that captures the acts of defiance and resistance. This approach is in direct contrast to narratives rooted in active citizenship that present Prevent Duty enactment as a source of empowering citizens and enabling them to act like good citizens (Pearson, 2020). By expanding our analysis through activist citizenship, we can find a counterpoint to these narratives and privilege those actions and ideas that advocate not being subjected to these self-governing conducts under Prevent Duty.

This challenge to subjection can also be found in Foucault's approach to power. The decentralised nature of power in Foucauldian thought alters the nature of subjectivities as it keeps circulating: 'Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power' (Foucault, 1980, p. 98). While this does not completely diminish subjection, it leaves open the possibility for the 'subjects' of power to exercise some agency. It would be valid to question the nature and scope of this agency because it can be argued that as 'vehicles of power',

citizens are still subjected to it. However, it is this ambiguity in the agency, or lack thereof, that makes this conceptualisation of power useful for understanding the Prevent Duty. By making citizens both agents and subjects of counter-terrorism policing, Prevent puts them in a similarly contradictory position where the nature of their agency and power is circulatory and fluctuating.

This instability is explored further in *The History of Sexuality* where Foucault decentralises the act(s) of resistance by dispersing them 'everywhere in the power network' (1978, p. 95). Resistance thus becomes varied in its nature and frequency. In this understanding of resistance, what we are looking at is not an active rebellion or uniform revolt but a 'plurality of resistances' that can be 'spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent' (*ibid*, p. 96). By making resistance a mainstay of power relations in a political arena, Foucault throws wide open the possibilities of contesting control through decentralised, incoherent, and often contradictory acts. This diversity in the actions and thoughts of resistance is also captured by Scott's 'weapons of the weak' that foregrounds minor acts of defiance and 'individual self-help' that operate within the everyday spaces without posing an overt threat to the status quo (1985, pp. 29–30). Scott developed this thesis in their analysis of the daily struggles of Malaysian villagers to conceptualise the subtle acts of opposition that sustain the peasantry through seemingly interminable control of the landed classes. Within the context of Prevent, the control comes in the form of a statutory duty imposed alongside other legal obligations. While the nature and extent of control varies in different sectors, the obligatory element exists in one form or another.

Another intervention that helps our effort to put together a technology of resistance is the concept of counter-conducts. The coining of this term can be seen as Foucault's attempt to put a finer point on the politics of resistance. What is being explored here is the possibility of resisting not exploitation per se, but the act of 'conducting', such as the technologies of governmentality. With the mysticism of the Middle Ages and 18th century secret societies as reference points, Foucault came up with 'counter-conducts' to explain something that is more 'diffused and subdued' than his already amorphous conceptions of resistance. As such, he put forward the term to capture the struggle against the 'processes implemented for conducting others' (2009, pp. 200–210). The concept is introduced with the caveat that it is not meant to be 'absolutely and wholeheartedly resistant to any governmentalisation', but rather alludes to 'the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price' (Foucault, 2007, pp. 72–73). While it may appear that this exploration of Foucauldian thought is taking us further away from our goal of conceptualising resistance, the concept of counter-conducts is particularly useful for putting together different gradations of resistance on our spectrum of civic engagement with the Prevent Duty. The term enables us to problematise

restricted narratives of contestation and takes into account the 'low-noise' and 'non-traditional' acts of citizenship that take place within the banality of everyday civic existence. This is all the more important because given the statutory constraints of Prevent Duty, anarchic resistance is not possible, therefore, we need tools of contestation that allow us to take into account the risks and hurdles present at the grassroots level. As such by situating the analysis of resistance in counter-conducts, we can capture those ideas and actions that would otherwise go unacknowledged.

Approaching resistance through counter-conducts also allows us to revisit the scope of citizens' agency and subjection. As Death points out, by expanding what can count as resistance, we open up different possibilities to explore the creation of 'militant and intellectualised subjects' (2016, pp. 216-217). This form of subjection moves between acquiescence and resistance, a relationship between the state and citizen that Foucault has described as 'work with and be intransigent at the same time' (1994b, p. 456). This framing can help us explore how citizens tasked with implementing the Prevent Duty navigate the decentralised terrain of power where they are both agents and subjects. This approach also helps us problematise the overlap between different points of the spectrum. As the empirical section will demonstrate, the lived reality of Prevent enactment is messy and inconsistent, people move between compliance and resistance with sometimes their ideas falling under one gradation, while their actions signal another orientation. Combined with Scott's weapons of the weak, this approach helps us understand resistance by looking at the acts that may be irregular and disparate, but allow some agency to citizens. Scott conceptualises 'symbolic compliance' as a form of resistance specifically deployed to mask the insubordination that goes on in the background (1985, p. 26). This further blurs the fine line between agency and subjection, as the act of submission could also serve as an act of resistance. These themes will be explored further in Chapter 8: Resistance.

By opening up citizenship as a practice that can be redefined by the actions and thoughts of citizens, we expand it beyond the restrictive narrative of state control. This not only allows us to privilege the perspectives of citizens but also helps us find acts and spaces through which control can be resisted. As such, when we study Prevent Duty through the framework of securitised citizenship practice, we understand that despite being a coercive security policy, it should not simply be seen as a technology of state control but also a process of constituting citizenship. By accepting the legal stipulations of Prevent, citizens accept state control, by rejecting the policy, citizens contest it. As such, Prevent exists through the citizenship practice and the way citizens interact with Prevent constitutes citizenship. The acts of complying or resisting Prevent create a loop where the citizenship practice is constantly being reconceptualised. When ordinary citizens challenge the securitisation of their professional and

personal lives under the Prevent Duty, these interventions shape citizenship practice, and in exchange the act of contesting Prevent becomes an act of doing citizenship. Before we apply these theoretical framings to our empirical findings, the next chapter will discuss existing research on counter-terrorism and citizenship to take stock of the different ways citizenship has been used to understand securitisation of life. This discussion will help us understand the deep connection between the two regimes and will also enable me to identify the areas in which this thesis can contribute to existing knowledge on the subject.

Chapter 5: Literature Review

Citizenship is a useful analytical frame for understanding security and counter-terrorism because it provides us a broad canvas to unpack how different aspects of civic life can be securitised by the state. Citizenship as a legal status can determine an individual's access to rights and security, while the revocation of this status can be used to declare someone a risk to the nation's security. Citizenship practice can be used as a barometer to judge one's commitment to the state and can also serve as an avenue through which people can be turned into patriotic, resilient citizens who keep each other safe. By looking at citizenship, we can see how the state does security, and as McGhee explains, by looking at security, we can see how citizenship is 'remade and remoulded' by the state (2010, p. 6). Hence, when we think of citizenship and security, there is a symbiotic exchange where one feeds into the other. As discussed in the previous chapter, how citizens enact Prevent Duty can help us understand the multifaceted nature of citizenship practice. In return, by approaching the everyday (in)security of Prevent Duty through the analytical framework of citizenship, we get to open up new avenues of activity and introduce new actors in our study of these citizen-led counter-radicalisation practices. This thesis is exploring this symbiosis to demonstrate how citizenship practice gets securitised in the enactment of the Prevent Duty. To continue this discussion, it would be useful to take stock of existing research that puts forward different conceptualisations of citizenship to make sense of security and counter-terrorism practices. Some of the research discussed here focuses on Prevent Duty and its impact on different aspects of people's civic existence and identity. However, this literature review also looks at scholarship that does not directly engage with citizenship or civic duty, but instead focuses on community cohesion, integration, and politics of othering. These interventions are also useful for this thesis because they shed light on how security and counter-terrorism shape life experiences of ordinary citizens in different ways. In some cases, citizens are co-opted into security practices more actively, while in others they are passive recipients of state policies.

Furthermore, this discussion provides an overview of the socio-political dynamics that have facilitated the development of a policy like the Prevent Duty. By looking at different ways in which citizenship has been linked to security and counter-terrorism, we get an understanding of how the British state has gradually expanded a governance regime that has turned some people into suspects and others into security agents. These developments do not take place in isolation but are informed by decades of social engineering that has been establishing norms about who belongs inside the polity and who are the outsiders. These questions have directly fed into our present-day understandings of what a (good) British citizen looks like, who is worthy of this title, and who needs to be singled out as a suspect. As such, by exploring the different aspects of securitised citizenship, we can start with a good

understanding of the socio-political context in which the Prevent Duty currently operates. The research discussed here covers both critical and problem-solving approaches emerging from Security Studies and Critical Terrorism Studies. However, I have limited this literature review to scholarship focussing on British security and counter-terrorism policy to explain how the wider social and security policy programme has led to the development of Prevent Duty.

To showcase the existing research on citizenship and security, this literature review will be divided into three themes focusing on different aspects of citizenship. This will allow me to highlight how citizenship has been understood with reference to security in different ways, what these approaches can tell us about civic engagement with Prevent, and identify the gaps in literature that my research will address. While different, these themes have several overlaps because the research on citizenship, counter-terrorism, and security is situated within the same socio-political discourse. Hence, even when people look at citizenship from different perspectives, they are drawing on the same empirical evidence focussing on how ordinary people have been impacted by and co-opted into post 9/11 security politics. Most of the literature discussed here focuses on the experiences of Muslims and their framing by the British state as an outsider or suspect community. Therefore, the different citizenship themes discussed in this chapter will focus on similar social contexts, but it is still useful to divide the literature because it shows the different ways in which citizenship has been securitised by the state.

I will start this discussion by looking at research on 'precarious citizenship'. These interventions focus on the state using citizenship deprivation as a legal tool in the name of security. Citizenship here is predominantly understood as a legal status and how it gets weaponised by the state. This theme does not directly relate to the securitisation of citizenship under Prevent, but it is still useful to engage with this literature because it provides useful contextualisation of the wider societal dynamics that have facilitated the development of the Prevent Strategy. The discussion will continue under the theme of 'resilient citizenship' to discuss how the state deploys citizenship as a technology of control. These studies focus on wider narratives that shape the idea of what good citizens should be doing. The final theme of 'active and activist citizenship' looks at literature that sits closest to the aims of this research. It takes stock of existing work on how the state has shifted security responsibilities to citizens and how that has changed the meaning of citizenship. This theme differs from the previous two because these studies approach citizenship as a contextual practice and hence also help us see how control can be resisted using acts of citizenship. In this way, the literature in this final theme speaks directly to the conceptual framings discussed in the previous chapter.

Precarious Citizenship

As discussed in the previous chapter, a common approach to understanding the relationship between security and citizenship is how citizenship as a legal status can be used as a counter-terrorism measure. While removal of citizenship status has been a British policy since 1914, following the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks it has been used more frequently, with the case of Shamima Begum being one of the most prominent examples (Choudhury, 2017b, p. 227; Kapoor, 2019). As such, a lot of work on counter-terrorism and citizenship has focussed on understanding how the latter has been securitised by the former. These studies look at the different legal and ethical issues associated with depriving an individual of citizenship status (Masters and Regilme, 2020; van Waas and Jaghai, 2018; Zedner, 2016), While they may not directly speak to how this thesis is conceptualising citizenship, it is still useful to unpack this approach to studying citizenship because it shows us the different ways the state can weaponise a citizen's right to belong within the society and cast them out as a security risk. As such, by looking at how the state can use one's citizenship status against them, we can glean some insights about how citizenship practice is used as a technology of social control.

A good place to start this discussion is Choudhry's genealogical analysis of citizenship deprivation as a government policy (2017). This study traces the evolution of citizenship deprivation in British security policy and is very useful because while he focuses on citizenship as a legal status, he also contextualises the removal of one's citizenship status within the wider social reality. In this way, he puts forward a multi-dimensional understanding of citizenship as not just a technical designation but also a 'social practice embedded in a wider matrix' that is articulated through 'issues of national identity, belonging, and values' (ibid, p. 228). This helps to understand how over time, the meaning of citizenship in British security governance has changed from being a guarantee of rights to a reward that is given for being a compliant subject. Within this analysis, Choudhry highlights the wide-ranging impacts of different security and immigration legislations that can deprive one of legal citizenship status and also define the parameters of acceptable civic behaviour.

Situating these legislative and policy developments against the backdrop of 2001 race riots and the protests over the publication of Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses, Choudhry traces the emergence of a political and social discourse in the UK that has facilitated the exclusion of Muslim and other ethnic minority communities from the mainstream British identity. Over the past two decades, this rhetoric has only intensified and with the passage of subsequent counter-terrorism legislation, the concept of 'good citizenship' and adherence to British values has become more firmly embedded within national security considerations. Citizens who espouse the state-mandated British values are considered 'good'

and worthy of the legal status, while those failing to commit to these values are 'tolerated' or worse considered 'failed citizens' (ibid, p. 229). Choudhry's discussion of failed citizens uncovers another perspective on the idea of 'responsibilised citizenship' that sees revocation of one's citizenship as not something the state has done to an individual but what the citizen has brought upon themselves, by their own actions. This rhetoric of responsibilisation was instrumental in the case of Shamima Begum. Discussing his decision to remove Begum's citizenship, Sajid Javid, then UK Home Secretary, deployed an 'othering' narrative that placed Shamima Begum in opposition to the British citizens (Masters and Regilme, 2020, p. 350). She was framed as someone who chose ISIS over her British identity and loyalty to this country, hence she deserved to be stripped of her legal rights. While this case and other citizenship deprivation cases sit outside the remit of Prevent Duty, they have contributed to creating a common-sense that makes one's citizenship (both social and legal) contingent on a certain form of conduct. Prevent defines this conduct as playing an active part in counter-terrorism monitoring and promoting British values. It is not being claimed that failure to comply with Prevent will lead to someone losing their legal citizenship status, however, these studies give us a good framework to understand how the idea of 'good' or 'failed' citizen manifests in Prevent enactment. As the empirical discussion will demonstrate, people have internalised these labels to the extent that one's commitment to their Prevent Duty obligations determines whether one is a good or a bad/failed citizen.

Gillespie and O'Loughlin give us a wider interpretation of precarious citizenship by exploring people's articulation of their civic identity as a way of understanding citizenship politics. They explore this precarity in a more in-depth way by moving beyond the threats to citizenship as a legal status (2009b). In their work on the discursive reality of citizenship, they look at the experiences of British Muslims who felt they had to do self-censorship in public debate or 'retreat into Muslim-only spaces' to safeguard their citizenship status in the charged environment of the War on Terror (Gillespie and O'Loughlin, 2009, p. 100). This approach adds a new dimension to the straight-forward conceptualisation of citizenship as a legal status to understand how citizenship as a social identity can also be threatened and rendered precarious. Even though Gillespie and O'Loughlin focus on the experiences of British Muslims, we can take their idea of precarious citizenship and apply it to a wider context. Most of the cases of citizenship deprivation involve non-white British or naturalised citizens because of the racist, colonial foundations of this policy. Given Prevent Duty's expansive reach, we should explore if this insecurity towards one's claims to citizenship is also being felt by people beyond the Muslim communities. Is it possible for white, British people to feel their social citizenship is being

questioned if they do not enact the Prevent Duty? As mentioned above, the common-sense discourse around Prevent has created a mindset that has turned surveillance into a professional and civic norm. As the following chapters will demonstrate, people talk about enacting the Prevent Duty as a civic duty, something they have to do as good citizens. By exploring the different ways in which people interpret their roles within Prevent, this thesis will contribute to this work on precarious citizenship. My work will not only widen the scope of enquiry, it will also introduce new circumstances in which this precarity can occur. As it stands, when we think of precarity within citizenship, our focus is only on people losing their rights. However, we can also take the concept of precarious citizenship and apply it in a different way to Prevent Duty enactment. Rather than looking at deprivation of rights, we can instead explore whether citizenship can be rendered precarious if the state adds new duties and responsibilities to one's social contract. Can we see a new form of precarity when citizens get obligated to enact the Prevent Duty and they do not want to do so? This approach will allow us to study a wider demographic who may feel their claim to citizenship is being weakened not necessarily in a legal way, but in a more social context, due to the Prevent Duty obligations the state has enforced on them.

Resilient Citizenship

While analysing citizenship through the precarity framework allows us to see how the state can use it as a tool for punitive purposes, resilient citizenship explains how it can be wielded as a mode of social education. Here the focus shifts from understanding citizenship strictly as a legal status a citizen may or may not be given by the state. Under this theme, citizenship is understood as an avenue through which the state can train citizens to become resilient subjects. As Joseph explains, this resilience can be used to prepare the citizenry against any challenges be it natural disasters to development strategies (2018). In the past two decades, civic resilience has been identified as an antidote against security threats as well. This has brought increased focus on what kind of citizenship ethos people should espouse to be resilient against extremism. West provides a comprehensive account of how the British state has reframed citizenship as a resilience-building tool in her analysis of 'civic resilience' in British counter-terrorism policy framework (2017). She opens up citizenship practice as a space where the state can introduce social interventions for 'redesigning civil society' for national security considerations (*ibid*, p. 318). She moves away from a positive framing of resilience as a means of empowering citizens and instead sees it as a 'technical, systems approach' that shapes citizens' conducts in line with the state's counter-terrorism agenda (West, 2017, p. 317). Like Choudhry's work on precarious citizenship, the work on resilient citizenship is also situated within the socio-political discourse that sees Muslims and to some extent other ethnic minorities as outsiders and hence vulnerable to extremism. As such, we will see that most of the studies looking at resiliencebuilding through citizenship focus on how the British state has targeted Muslims with policy interventions aimed at making them 'good citizens'. In her study of civic resilience, West gives an overview of the different civic initiatives introduced by the New Labour government in the early years of Prevent to give a sense of belonging and civic identity to Muslim women and young people. She explains how all of these programmes were designed to 're-educate' citizens and inculcate them with a sense of British identity to ensure 'future national stability' (*ibid*, pp. 321-322). This shows that resilient citizenship is not just about shaping conducts, but it is more than that. These interventions define citizenship as a specific kind of British identity that is an antidote to extremism. One must not only be a good citizen but should eagerly adopt an assimilationist British identity. We already saw this in the discussion of precarious citizenship and how Shamima Begum was castigated for giving up her 'British identity' by joining ISIS. A similar discourse is also at play in resilient citizenship, albeit, in a less punitive way.

The idea of a resilient British identity as an antidote to extremism gained significant purchase under Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron and his quest to assert a 'muscular liberalism' to fight terrorism (Cameron, 2011). As the previous chapter discussed, this form of citizenship is propagated through the concept of British values that need to be defended and promoted to build resilience against extremism. While British values are not always spoken of in the context of citizenship, these are seen as the tool to build active, responsible citizens. They have also become the defining criteria for good citizenship because failure to adhere to British values is seen as an indication of extremism.⁶ This has taken the idea of being a 'British citizen' from a legal signifier of citizenship status to a more ideological definition of an ideal citizen. Hence being British is not just possessing the right to be called a citizen of this country, one has to be a resilient, active citizen to be worthy of this title.

There are two streams of research that look at these trends of equating Britishness with resilience. One has focussed on the promotion of British values and citizenship education within schools as a lot of Prevent enactment has taken place through this route. Another is the development of a community cohesion agenda targeting Muslim communities. Most of the British values research focuses on Prevent enactment in the education sector and does not make the connection with citizenship, as

⁶ The 2011 CONTEST defines extremism as 'the vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs' (Home Office, 2011b, p. 62).

such it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a complete overview of this rich area of study (Habib, 2018; Revell, 2018; Revell and Bryan, 2015; Winter and Mills, 2020). However, it is still useful to look at how British values has been used as a policy intervention to create resilient citizens. Starkey approaches British values through citizenship framework by differentiating between citizenship education in schools that predate Prevent to the British values agenda that have seemed to co-opt the former. He explains how prior to Prevent, the British state approached citizenship education in schools as a 'site of political education and critical thinking' (2018, p. 150). These lessons saw citizenship separately from nationality and country of origin but instead focussed on the value of diversity. In this way, Starkey puts forward a favourable analysis of the benefits of citizenship education. He explains that the previous approach has been side-lined since the British state's policy to counter extremism became synonymous with promoting a national identity based on British values (2018, p. 154). He criticises the co-optation of an established citizenship curriculum by a regimented British values programme that can only offer commercialised narratives of Britishness represented by 'quaintly touristic vision including red phone boxes, fish and chips, teapots and the Queen' (*ibid*, pp. 155-156). While Starkey takes an overly positive view of citizenship education before the introduction of British values, this is an important intervention that shows how even in the narrow context of education, citizenship can be used as a technology of shaping conducts and identities. In the case of citizenship education, Prevent has securitised the existing curriculum by replacing it with the promotion of British values.

McGhee and Zhang provide an alternative framing of citizenship taught through British values by viewing it as a 'citizenship reconstruction initiative through education' (2017, p. 940). This approach also aligns with seeing citizenship as a means of creating resilient subjects, although it takes a more positive view. Situating their study of Prevent enactment and promotion of British values within schools and further education colleges, McGhee and Zhang see this as a means of inculcating 'qualities of good citizenship' in pupils that they will espouse as 'adult members of society' (*ibid*, p. 947). This study is interesting because it helps us understand citizenship as a technology of social control, a way of creating resilient (good) subjects along with presenting Prevent as a means of achieving this aim. In this way, it reinterprets a counter-terrorism policy as a civic education programme. Edwards puts forward a similar approach that not only makes a more direct link between resilient citizenship and Prevent, it sees the former as a way of promoting the latter (2021). He recommends schools should adopt a programme of 'agonistic citizenship' education for pupils and equip them with debating skills so they can engage with 'extremist arguments' and counter them with 'good ones' This is seen as a capacity building exercise for active citizenship, a precursor to the role children are expected to take

on once they enter the society as responsible adults. This is an overly positive view of Prevent that sees the policy playing a 'progressive and emancipatory role' in schools (Edwards, 2021, p. 49). Edwards does not engage with the chilling effect Prevent can have on pupils' ability to talk freely about controversial ideas and the restrictive nature of what kind of ideas can and should be debated in schools (Winter et al., 2021). However, this aligns with the state view that sees citizenship as a technology of moulding the ideal subjects. Under New Labour, the government introduced citizenship education in mosque schools through the Islam & Citizenship Education Project that aimed to dispense civic ethos to young people beyond the traditional educational institutions (Home Office, 2009). The current programmes are an extension of the same approach.

As mentioned above, the other area of activity that has seen policy interventions in the name of resilient citizenship is community cohesion. These were made early on during the New Labour years of Prevent Strategy. It is useful to look at existing research on Prevent and community cohesion because these help us make important connections with both citizenship practice and the mobilisation of ordinary citizens for counter-terrorism work. While some of the work in this area does not directly deal with citizenship per se, these policy programmes were enacted under Prevent with a clear aim of creating a good, moderate citizens who choose the British state over 'extremist ideology'. As such, looking at the literature on Prevent and community cohesion provides us with useful insights on how the state cultivated an idea of good citizenship behaviour, thus defining the parameters of ideal civic conduct at the meso level of community. Before proceeding with this discussion, it should also be added that the focus of this thesis is on individual experiences of Prevent rather than a communitylevel analysis of the issue and therefore, I will not be contributing any insights on the impact of Prevent on communities. However, it is still useful to look at existing research on the mobilisation of the community through policies of community cohesion and integration because these help us explore one more avenue of activity through which the British state has attempted to diffuse counterterrorism within British civic life.

MacDonald et al.'s research on the UK security discourse between 2001 and 2011 is very helpful in explaining how citizenship came to be identified as an avenue of counter-terrorism governance through community cohesion (2013a). Here they explain how the state reframed citizenship as something more than just a legal status but a practice that had to be carried out by citizens. Like British values, the community cohesion programmes were also rooted in the fear of 'homegrown' threats and the perception of Muslims as outsiders who were seen as being at risk. MacDonald et al. explain that the New Labour community cohesion agenda targeting ethnic minorities predated Prevent and

could be traced to the aftermath of 2001 riots in the north of England. This shows that the deployment of citizenship practice as a tool for political control is neither new nor unique to counter-terrorism, the British state has simply repurposed it within the Prevent discourse. They explain the development of the community cohesion agenda by unpacking the concept of community as both a 'locale' inhabited by citizens as well as a social group that provides security to its members. Given the multicultural fabric of British society, MacDonald et al. explain how the perception that Britain was a 'community of communities' became an uneasy reality following the race riots and the state attempted to find common ground between the different communities (2013a, p. 5). Under the Prevent Strategy, this commonality morphed into an identity defined by British values and muscular liberalism. The study by MacDonald et al. speaks to a specific time period and is not strictly relevant to how Prevent operates now, however, it is still useful to engage with this work because it allows us to situate the starting point at which citizenship turned into a responsibility to be shouldered, not a right that was earned automatically. This makes it easier to see why enacting the Prevent Duty is seen as an act of citizenship, both by the state and the citizens.

The literature on community cohesion is also useful because it helps us see how the British state has gradually expanded the counter-terrorism infrastructure under the Prevent Duty. As Chapter 3 explained, the early years of Prevent focussed on counter-terrorism through cohesion of Muslim communities. A 2011 report by O'Toole et al. explains how initially the state only targeted areas with a certain percentage of Muslim population (2011, p. 3). However, from 2011 onwards, the Prevent agenda shifted from a 'community-oriented' to a 'sector-oriented' approach. By contrasting the two approaches, O'Toole et al. warn that embedding Prevent in different civic sectors would not only have 'worrying ramifications' for British Muslims, but also expand the remit of counter-terrorism policing to a wide range of citizens who will get co-opted into delivering the programme (2011, p. 5). My research explores this very problem identified by O'Toole et al. about a decade earlier. We are now at a stage in Prevent's evolution where the state has side-lined the community cohesion programmes but the philosophy of outsider, suspect communities, and earned citizenship remain active. These policies have been predominantly targeted at Muslims because they are meant to assimilate the outsiders to the British way of life. However, as this thesis will demonstrate the citizenship interventions made under Prevent are more pervasive and expansive now. While Muslims are still the clear target as the recipient of these policies, the other way citizenship practice is recalibrated under Prevent is by mobilising a wider group of citizens to police this assimilation. By putting Prevent Duty obligations on all citizens employed in public sector institutions, the state has made them a subject of

counter-terrorism governance as well. Hence, we can see a dual technology of citizenship at play, one group being pitted against another, while the state tries to mould both into model subjects.

A more positive take on community cohesion and responsibilisation of citizens comes from Thomas, who takes a pragmatic approach to the 'third way communitarian' politics of New Labour and its influence on Prevent enactment (2017). Even though he takes stock of the many issues that arose due to the securitisation of community cohesion policies and shifting of counter-terrorism responsibilities to Muslim communities, Thomas sees it as a way of allowing some agency to ordinary citizens for tackling these problems and acknowledging the limitations of the state in solving these issues. He also frames the involvement of Muslim citizens in Prevent as a way of empowering them and giving them a role in the policy, rather than the state treating them as passive subjects (2017, pp. 311–312). What makes Thomas' intervention quite useful for this research is that like O'Toole et al. (2011) he provides a genealogical account of the shifting policy priorities within Prevent. He starts by giving a useful account of how Prevent started as a project of communitarian politics under New Labour espousing active citizenship principles with a focus on community cohesion and integration. He then explains the shifting of priorities under Conservative-led home secretaries and the wider mobilisation of citizens working in state sectors in line with neoliberal governmentality and 'conduct of conduct' (2017, p. 312-317). This has provided useful context for the discussion on the political and ideological development of Prevent Strategy presented in the previous chapters. However, unlike Thomas who draws a clear distinction between communitarian ideas of active citizenship and governmentality, I argue that both the concepts are closely linked and serve as technologies of social control. In this way, while I have found it useful to engage with Thomas' approach, I have diverged theoretically and put forward a different perspective.

Another way to take stock of the role played by citizens is looking at the activities of civil society actors as done by Massoumi (2021). Even though her research does not directly speak to citizenship practice, it provides a good overview of how the state has created a 'Prevent enforcement network' outside of its traditional coercive sphere. Massoumi gives a detailed overview of civil society campaigns that promote the state's agenda for creating the model citizen such as projects aimed specifically at Muslim women to 'empower them to make a stand against extremism' (2021, pp. 967–968). While Massoumi focuses on civil society actors to participate in counter-terrorism policing, a study by Thomas et al. (2020) looks at ordinary citizens reporting on their close friends or relatives. The former takes a very critical approach to Prevent, however, the latter is a more traditional, problem-solving approach to mobilising citizens within Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) policies. The main focus of the study is identifying the issues that keep people from reporting on their 'intimate' contacts, however, there is a brief discussion on how some Muslim respondents advocate reporting on fellow community members to demonstrate 'active citizenship' and show to the authorities that they have done their 'civic duty' (Thomas et al., 2020, p. 652).

Lying somewhere between Massoumi and Thomas et al.'s work is the study conducted by Altermark and Nilsson that analyses two counter-radicalisation programmes that targeted Muslim women in the UK and young Muslims in five EU countries (2018). They explain that these programmes understood citizenship as a technology of neoliberal governance that shifted responsibilities to citizens and exercised control from a distance. In both the programmes, the state sought to protect citizens against radicalisation by turning them into self-reliant actors who can tackle extremist ideas and actively participate in civic life (*ibid*, p. 54). Altermark and Nilsson point out that these programmes highlight the prescriptive nature of resilient citizenship whereby citizens are given a template to follow to become 'good citizens' – or in the case of these programmes' target audience 'good Muslims' – without allowing them the agency to come up with a different idea of what ideal civic conduct could look like.

The scope of resilient citizenship is ever-expanding, despite the changes in counter-terrorism approaches of subsequent British governments, the need to 'empower' citizens to do security has survived in one form or another. This is expertly highlighted in a recent study on how the British state is active promoting the idea of 'counter-terrorism citizens' by Rodrigo Jusué (2022). Even though this paper on citizenship and counter-terrorism does not necessarily look at Prevent, it is still useful to this study because I would argue that the policy initiative under review here is closely linked to the security logics introduced by Prevent. This research shows how far the concept of active citizens can be stretched to incorporate more and more sections of the society in counter-terrorism infrastructures and expand the reach of the state's coercive sphere. Analysing the Actions Counter Terrorism (ACT) training, Rodrigo Jusué articulates the state's ideal of a resilient 'counter-terrorism citizen', who is not vulnerable or scared but is aware of the threats and knows how to counter them. The agency of said active citizen is rooted in their participation in counter-terrorism training and enforcement. These model citizens are also depoliticised because it is assumed that their views on radicalisation and counter-terrorism are the same as those espoused by the state. As such, what is offered here is a limited form of agency that can only be exercised in a way pre-approved by the state. This study is a useful sounding board for my research because it looks at what happens once we have become comfortable with Prevent as a citizenship practice. Prevent does not brand frontline professionals as

'counter-terrorism citizens' like the ACT training does, however, it has been sowing the seeds of this approach for over a decade now (Counter Terrorism Policing, 2020). To understand how and why ACT conceptualises counter-terrorism citizens, we can take a step back and study how citizens have been slowly co-opted within security governance since the Prevent Strategy was first publicly introduced in 2006.

I would conclude this theme by revisiting the research done by West on civic resilience (2017). By looking at the different ways the concept of citizenship was mobilised to build resilience, West explains that the ultimate goal of these interventions was for the state to access social spaces that intelligence agencies could not access. As such, the goal of creating resilient, active citizens had little to do with inculcating civic values in isolated communities but to establish surveillance networks in these harder to reach spaces. This has been underscored by Rodrigo Jusué's work that shows that by using the language of 'counter-terrorism citizens' the state is now openly advertising its main purpose behind the resilient citizenship agenda. As this thesis will demonstrate, Prevent has taken this approach and expanded it to different sectors of the civil society to create an army of counterterrorism citizens. Even though West's focus is on how the state uses resilience, this study provides useful insights into how citizens start to see themselves within this regime of civic resilience as the state makes it their responsibility to 'transform themselves from suspects' to active citizens supporting the state. This provides a useful starting point for how citizens see themselves within Prevent which this thesis will explore in detail in the empirical chapters. Furthermore, West's work is also very helpful in showing how social norms can be co-opted to further the state's security agenda, the next chapter on Compliance will discuss this in detail by exploring how the norms of civic duty and safeguarding have been used to normalise a surveillance logic in everyday professional activities.

Active and Activist Citizenship

In line with the discussion introduced in the last chapter, the final theme in this literature review covers existing research that helps us make sense of citizens' mobilisation for security purposes and their resistance to this control. While the two previous themes have discussed how security governance gets further embedded in civic life, this theme will help us focus directly on why and how citizens get co-opted in counter-terrorism work. In this way, studies discussed in this theme sit closest to my theoretical framework. Precarious citizenship explains how the state can weaponise a person's legal status or their right to have rights, while resilient citizenship gives us a wide-angled view of what kind of citizenship values the state wants its citizens to espouse. The previous themes have also explained how different parts of the society become sites of (in)security making such as social sectors

and communities. This theme lets us zoom in to see how the state sees individual citizens and the role they can play in furthering the security agenda. It also expands the focus from certain minority communities to all citizens who are seen as actors who need to play a role to earn their citizenship rights. The discussion of active citizenship also allows us to explore different facets of a citizen's relationship with the state. By articulating citizenship as a technology of control, we can look at how the state shifts responsibilities to citizens and manages their conducts. Within this discussion, we will also look at work that lets us explore how this control can be challenged by citizens. We can foreground the experiences of citizens and look at their perspectives to understand how they articulate their security responsibilities. This then enables us to investigate the scope of citizens' agency and ability to resist state control. In this way, the literature falling under this theme is most useful for my own research aims as it highlights different ways in which we can study how ordinary citizens participate in and get impacted by quotidian counter-terrorism work.

As explained in the last chapter, to understand how state control is exercised through active citizenship, it is useful to move beyond the conceptualisation of citizenship as merely a legal status and look at it as a social phenomenon made up of actions, thoughts, and affects. The extensive research conducted by Jarvis and Lister on citizenship and counter-terrorism is very useful as they approach citizenship as a subjective practice in their study of how citizens understand security (2015, 2013a, 2013b, 2010). They advocate understanding citizenship as a 'lived and enacted experience' to explore how counter-terrorism policies have been diffused within different acts of citizenship and how this impacts ordinary people (2013a, p. 656). By framing citizenship in these terms, we get to understand it as a discursive phenomenon defined by the 'making, meeting, or refusal of identity claims, obligations, and participation in public life' (Jarvis and Lister, 2015, p. 6). As such, it is not just the state that gets to define what citizenship is, the citizens also have a say in this matter. Citizenship practice is co-constituted by both the state and the citizens so to understand how it is being changed we should move beyond the discourse set by the state and focus on the experiences of ordinary citizens. This provides a useful blueprint for my own research as I study how citizens interact with their Prevent Duty obligations to understand the changing dynamics of securitised citizenship.

In their work on counter-terrorism and citizenship, Jarvis and Lister explain that both of these practices cannot be understood 'objectively' and as isolated phenomena because these are experienced and embodied by individuals, so we need to take into account the 'ideas, language, and practices' that 'bring them into being' (2015, p. 5). By highlighting this, they establish citizens as important actors that need to be studied to understand how the state does security. They then bring in citizens into the

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discussion in a number of different ways. One approach is to focus indirectly on citizens by looking at how the state has historically shifted security responsibilities downwards. Tracing the gradual 'activation of citizenry for security governance', Jarvis and Lister provide a detailed account of the different ways in which ordinary citizens have been co-opted as both agents and subjects within counter-terrorism measures (2013a, pp. 660-661). They put forward the concept of 'stakeholder security' to conceptualise this changing nature of citizenship under counter-terrorism (Jarvis and Lister, 2010). In this discussion, they provided a detailed overview of policy frameworks and political discourses regarding counter-terrorism in both the UK and USA. Tracing the different campaigns encouraging people to report suspicious activity, Jarvis and Lister situate the more formal shifting of security responsibilities to citizens within a wider historical context dating back to 'behind the blinds' surveillance campaigns (*ibid*, 2010, p. 181). They connect these to more recent security discourses including Prevent Strategy and beyond where citizens are asked to report on friends and family members over extremist activity. The examples given in their study provide useful contextualisation for the enactment of Prevent Duty and demonstrate that the British state's decision to make it a statutory duty did not take place in isolation but was the culmination of decades' long work on shifting counter-terrorism obligations to grassroots level.

Along with understanding how citizens have been co-opted into security governance by the state, we can also take another important insight from this work (Jarvis and Lister, 2010). By tracing the history of civic involvement in security, we can study the perils of responsibilisation. As discussed earlier, citizenship can be rendered precarious not just by the removal of rights but by an imposition of new duties. While most work exploring the impact of counter-terrorism policies tends to focus on removal of civil liberties and constraints on citizenship; the stakeholder security model allows us to look at a different aspect of counter-terrorism, focusing on the responsibilisation of citizens in the fight against terrorism. The citizenship discourse shifts from violation of liberties to addition of responsibilities and as such this gives us a framework to analyse how the state has gradually been shifting security responsibilities to citizens to regulate conducts and set the criteria for 'good citizenship'.

Jarvis and Lister's approach to citizenship and counter-terrorism is useful because it does not conclude with a discussion of how citizens get responsibilised. They explain that citizens are no longer just passive recipients of these new counter-terrorism obligations, given the state's increasing reliance on citizens, the latter should be seen as 'the subjects, objects and tools of anti-terrorism' (2015, pp. 58– 59). This helps us situate citizens within the counter-terrorism policy frameworks in a more multidimensional capacity who should be heard as vocal actors in the enactment of security practices. Highlighting the 'performative' element of citizenship practice, they explain that we cannot understand the impact of diffusion of security in civic life without looking at the experiences of and interventions made by citizens.

The discussion in earlier themes helped us understand why citizenship should be studied in the diffusion of counter-terrorism practices within civic life. The work on active citizenship pushes this further and explains that it's not just citizenship practice that we need to focus on, but also the experiences of ordinary citizens. In this way, while we are looking at the issues embedded within the same socio-political discourses as the previous themes, our focus here has shifted instead to what citizens are being asked to do and how they do it. Furthermore, while it may seem as a given that an analysis of citizenship would focus on citizens, this is usually done in a top-down approach where we look at the state's narrative on citizenship or how the state policy is reaching the citizens. This work on active citizenship instead forces us to start our analysis at the grassroots level by foregrounding the voices and experiences of the citizens. In this way, exploring the research contributions in this theme also gives us a new epistemological roadmap to follow.

In his work on responsibilisation and contestation within Prevent enactment, Thomas advocates looking at the grassroots to understand the lived reality of the policy rather than relying on elite-level policy discourses (2017, p. 311). This article is interesting because while the main focus is not citizenship practice per se, Thomas emphasises the importance of studying Prevent enactment by foregrounding the experiences of the 'individual street-level bureaucrats' (2017, p. 306). This, he asserts, is useful for understanding the complex reality of how a policy gets implemented within the community. This point is particularly useful for me because not only does Thomas give us a template to study the everyday reality of Prevent, he also reinforces the importance of choosing ordinary citizens as our referent and privileging their experiences. Jarvis and Lister also focus on a bottom-up analysis of understanding citizenship and security. Like Gillespie and O'Loughlin discussed earlier (2009), they draw on the inputs of ordinary citizens to understand how they make sense of their civic identity within the security discourse. To foreground the experiences of ordinary citizens within what they call the 'anti-terrorism/citizenship nexus', they conducted a focus group study of citizens divided in different groups based on ethnicity and geographical locations (2013a). Their research participants were given open-ended questions on the impact of anti-terrorism measures on themselves, their communities, and the UK. Jarvis and Lister used their focus group study to look at themes of participation and community cohesion and how different communities felt whether they had to do more in their capacity as citizens. This opens up an interesting line of enquiry as their data shows some

Muslim participants wanting to do more as citizens, feeling the responsibility to integrate and how counter-terrorism efforts could actually discourage them by stigmatising Muslims (*ibid*). The empirical data I have collected shows a similar trend but in a different context. By looking at civic engagement within the strict parameters of Prevent Duty, I have gleaned insights on how a coercive policy like Prevent can actually be seen as a way of asserting one's citizenship. Admittedly, I have worked with a small sample size, so these are not generalisable findings but in my research, I have found ethnic minority and Muslim participants speak of their compliance with the Prevent Duty as a form of undertaking their civic duty. The next chapter on Compliance discusses this in detail.

Their findings also show a 'diminishment of citizenship' under counter-terrorism measures as they impact citizens' feelings of belonging and 'dampening their political engagement' (2013a, p. 668). While these insights are useful, they still frame the entire issue in the precarity narrative whereby citizens talk about what is being done to them and what is being taken from them. With my study of Prevent and citizenship, I am putting forward an alternative narrative that looks at what citizens are being asked to do. Hence, rather than looking at the diminishment of rights per se, I am focussing on the imposition of responsibilities on citizens under Prevent. This does not mean Prevent does not impact on an individual's civil liberties, however, by focussing on citizens as 'agents of Prevent', we can develop a different understanding of how new forms of subjectivities are created.

Jarvis and Lister's research contributions also stand apart from other work in this area because a majority of research has focussed on the impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim populations. This is understandable as these policies do predominantly focus on Muslims. However, Jarvis and Lister expanded their research samples to include the inputs of non-Muslims belonging to both white and ethnic minority groups (2013, pp. 662–663). This diverse sample not only allowed them to add a comparative element to their research, it also opened up this area of research to a multiplicity of experiences. This approach has been influential in my own research design to target ordinary citizens based on their professional roles rather than their ethnic or religious identities. This is not to say these factors have not played a role in my analysis. However, the selection of research participants was not determined by these identity signifiers. I take forward Jarvis and Lister's work by looking at how a wide section of the civilian population gets co-opted within counter-terrorism policing. In their research, they found that their white research participants did not perceive any direct impacts of security policies on their lives. However, given the expansive nature of Prevent, I can explore how these differentiations do not apply as everyone gets included within the Prevent infrastructure, regardless of their ethnic or religious identity.

The discussion of active citizenship has so far explained the importance of understanding citizenship as a co-constitutive process and the need to foreground the voices and experiences of ordinary citizens. We can now look at existing work that speaks to the idea of 'activist citizenship' to open up citizenship as a space where power can be contested. In terms of the terminology, unlike my theoretical framework, these studies use the term 'active citizenship' to capture the different ways in which we can understand citizens' agency. This may sound counter-intuitive because the term active citizenship itself has come to denote a form of social control through which the state dictates how citizens should behave and earn their rights. However, literature on the subject argues that the multifaceted and co-constitutive nature of citizenship practice allows both exercise of control by the state and resistance to it by the citizens. In this way, while we start by approaching citizenship as a technology of social control, we proceed by taking it apart to understand how this control is challenged. This particular aspect is very important for my research because my study on Prevent Duty is unpacking the idea of securitised citizenship to explore the possibility of resistance and contestation by citizens. As such, having a conceptualisation of citizenship as a site of resistance is useful for situating my own empirical evidence within this theoretical framework.

Along with explaining how citizens react to their security responsibilities, Jarvis and Lister have also conducted research on the different ways in which practices of resistance can be situated within the citizenship framework (2013b). They explain that citizens resist by opposing the anti-terrorism architecture, by refusing to be seen as victims, and by refusing to withdraw from political engagement. This paper reconceptualises citizenship as a site of resistance to explore the different ways in which people make sense of their place within the wider security infrastructure. This is a good starting point to explore the multifaceted nature of citizenship practice as not just a site of control but also as a site of resistance. I take this discussion forward in Chapter 8: Resistance by putting forward a new understanding of resistance rooted in a taxonomy of scattered and irregular acts that take place within the restrictive framework of Prevent Duty.

In their study of state's engagement with Muslim citizens under Prevent, O'Toole et al. also put forward a useful theoretical framework for unpacking the messiness of social control and find spaces where the agency of 'passive subjects' can be explored (2015). Advocating a practice-based approach, this research skilfully establishes the importance of looking at 'governance spaces' to understand the state's interaction with citizens and how citizens can 'affect more autonomous agendas' (2015, p. 166). This then turns these spaces defined by absolute control into 'spaces for change' (*ibid*). This

framing is very helpful for recognising the agency of ordinary citizens and testing the limits of state control. It is within this exploration of agency where we can find possibilities of contestation and resistance. By focussing on Prevent enactment in Leicester, Tower Hamlets, and Birmingham, O'Toole et al. give us a good overview of how local dynamics play a role in modifying policy implementation. Through their extensive research they found out the different ways in which local authorities continued community cohesion work by separating it from Prevent and focussing on social programmes instead. This research was carried out before the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 that granted statutory status to Prevent Duty, so this kind of contestation may not be possible now but it is useful to identify these acts of contestation. This study also focussed on Muslim civil society organisations to highlight the tensions between the work being done by grassroots actors and the policy initiatives and funding coming from the state.

This research also provides useful insights on the pushback emerging from grassroots communities through local councils and Muslim civil society organisations. This shows how different interventions are adopted to tackle the stigma associated with Prevent within Muslim communities while not compromising the wider community cohesion agenda. These insights give us a good starting point to situate our analysis at the grassroots level, but they only analyse contestation within a specific demographic. Both the local authorities and civil society organisations are acting because of the pressures exerted by Muslim citizens, this leaves us with the question of whether contestation is even possible outside of these British Muslim communities? Can people be motivated to resist if the policy is not seen to be directly targeting them? And if the answer to that is yes, then how does this contestation manifest? The parameters of Prevent have changed significantly since the early years that were defined by integration-focussed policies. Both the priorities of this programme and its remit have changed, so to understand what contestation looks like now, we need to adjust our research focus accordingly. As such, while my research speaks to these valuable existing studies, it builds on this work to focus on engagement with Prevent outside of the bounds of these defined demographics markers. By collecting insights from people belonging to different religious, ethnic, and political backgrounds, I am putting forward a new theoretical understanding of compliance and contestation that takes account of wider dynamics.

As this discussion demonstrates, existing research helps us understand the mobilisation of citizens for counter-terrorism purposes and the use of neoliberal and communitarian concepts of active citizenship in security politics. It has been established that the idea of 'active citizens' is a useful tool to shift security responsibilities to individuals existing beyond the state's coercive sphere. While there

have been studies on how citizens think about security, how they interpret their own security obligations, and the impact of these policies on their daily lives, there has not been a targeted study approaching Prevent Duty as the site of securitised citizenship practice. This is important because given the statutory status of Prevent, citizens employed in different public sectors have a legal duty to enact this policy. While the pressure to enact the policy differs from one sector/institution to another, frontline staff have an awareness of their obligations. This sets Prevent apart from other counter-terrorism duties and vigilance narratives deployed by the state because these either impact a small section of the society or were to be taken on voluntarily. The reach of Prevent is much more expansive and it brings within its fold even those sections of the society that have erstwhile enjoyed the luxury of observing security politics from a distance. This does not mean it equally impacts everyone because the policy enactment is rooted in racialised narratives, so the brunt of the policy is predominantly borne by Muslims. However, given its wide remit, the policy does draw in a wide variety of citizens either as subjects or its agents.

Section Conclusion

This thesis argues that we should analyse Prevent Duty as a regime of securitised citizenship to understand how the state co-opts citizens into its coercive sphere and how citizens respond to this. This theoretical framework has put forward different conceptual tools to explain why and how this securitisation of citizenship has taken place within the enactment of Prevent Duty.

To understand why the state shifts security responsibilities to citizens, I started with an exploration of the philosophical context and political development of the policy since its first public release in 2006. This allowed me to situate the operational philosophy of Prevent within the radicalisation discourse, a body of knowledge that purports to explain the process that leads to extremism and terrorism. It is useful to situate Prevent's origins within this discourse because the academic and policy interventions made on the subject not only claim to explain what causes extremism, but they also situate the threat within a 'pre-criminal space', directing action towards individuals who have not yet committed a crime. This form of pre-emptive policing not only turns entire communities into suspects, it also calls for a large-scale recruitment of citizen-agents who can monitor these threats at the grassroots level. This opens up vast sections of the society to the kind of policing that is done from within, people's conducts are managed by their fellow citizens. As such, by looking at the rationality of Prevent emerging out of the radicalisation discourse, we get an understanding of why the state shifts counterradicalisation responsibilities to citizens and turns them into self-governing agent/subjects of security. However, this governance does not take place in isolation. This shifting of security responsibilities to citizens is facilitated by diffusing the Prevent logic into existing norms of citizenship – more specifically the idea of active citizenship that sees ideal civic conduct as one that self-governs and self-disciplines. Therefore, we take this discussion forward by looking at citizenship practice to identify the techniques and tools of governance that enable the Prevent Duty to operate and expand with ease.

It can be argued that we can take an alternative approach and find the techniques of Prevent enactment within the practices and cultures of professional sectors where the policy is implemented as a legal duty. However, I advocate using citizenship as an analytical framework because it gives us a broad canvas to understand the different ways in which the state and citizens interact. As the discussion in Chapter 4 demonstrates, citizenship as a concept has multiple meanings and usages, it can be seen as a legal status that determines one's access to rights, a technology of control through which civic conducts are managed, or it can be seen as a collection of acts and practices through which individuals assert their identity. The latter two approaches are useful for making sense of Prevent enactment within British civic life.

When we understand citizenship as a co-constituted practice, we open up our analysis to a variety of ideas, practices, and spaces where civic activity takes place. This broad canvas is useful for understanding the scope of Prevent because as the following chapters will demonstrate, counter-radicalisation work does not remain restricted within the workings of the professional sectors. The responsibilisation of citizens under Prevent means they carry their 'safeguarding' duties into their personal spaces and conduct surveillance through different activities. Therefore, at a very basic level, we can say that Prevent is an act of citizenship because it is enacted by citizens in their everyday lives. However, this would signal just a surface-level engagement with this framework. We can move beyond this and use different aspects of citizenship practice to develop a better understanding of how the Prevent Duty is enacted as well as resisted in the society.

Using active citizenship, we can take account of the neoliberal logics of responsibilisation which facilitate the diffusion of Prevent Duty stipulations within everyday life. As a technology of control, citizenship allows the state to define a good citizen as someone who takes on responsibilities to manage their conducts and discipline others. They actively participate in the community by behaving like model citizens and also encourage others to do so. Prevent Strategy has securitised this discourse by adding a surveillance logic within it. While previously active citizens were mobilised to manage their conducts, so they are not a burden on the state, now they are being called on to take on counterradicalisation responsibilities. The insecurity that is found in the 'pre-criminal space' can be managed by these active citizens who monitor others for vulnerability to extremism and promote British values to tackle illiberal ideas that put us at risk. As such, we can see active citizenship morph into securitised citizenship that makes citizens responsible for each other's safety.

Active citizenship also helps us capture a different kind of responsibilisation that is less tangible but more pervasive. This mode of self-governance relies on policing thoughts and ideas to make sure good citizens subscribe to the liberal values of the state, usually encapsulated by the phrase 'our way of life'. Historically, this rhetoric has been used as a yardstick to measure the integration of ethnic and religious minorities. Within the British context, we have seen this in discussions of immigrants' inability to speak the English language or participate in social and cultural activities. This discourse is designed to judge whether an individual is suitable enough to be identified as a (good) citizen. While a failure to meet these criteria does not automatically translate into actual exclusion from the state, there is

an element of cultural othering within it that marks certain groups as outsiders. The Prevent Duty has also co-opted this form of self-governance by requiring citizens to fully participate in the British society and adhering to and promoting British values to fight extremism. This form of policing also expands the scope of Prevent because the requirement to support British values or actively participating in counter-radicalisation is not just limited to citizens who work in the professional sectors. There is an expectation that 'all good citizens should be counter-terrorism citizens' and the warning that those 'who vilify the country' will be deradicalised (BBC News, 2018; Hymas, 2022). By situating the analysis of Prevent Duty in citizenship practice, we can thus trace these narratives to an existing socio-political discourse and understand how the policy has securitised them.

While active citizenship helps us understand the technologies of control that explain Prevent enactment, we can also expand the concept of citizenship to understand how citizens can resist control and assert a different civic identity. Using 'activist citizenship', we can move beyond governmentality and look at counter-conducts and theories of resistance that challenge the self-governing regime (Isin, 2009, p. 381). These tools allow us to open up Prevent Duty enactment as a multidimensional interaction between the state and the citizens that is not simply defined by the binary logic of compliance or resistance and agent or suspects. What we have is a more fluid circulation of agency and subjection where the state and citizens are constantly negotiating the norms around citizenship and civic duty.


Understanding resistance to Prevent Duty through the framework of activist citizenship allows us to look at the scattered and irregular modes of contestation that would otherwise go unnoticed. As explained above, citizenship is made up of different acts and practices, some of these belong in high politics while others are 'low-noise' actions that define our everyday existence (Neveu, 2014, p. 92). In this way, while citizenship practice helps us understand how Prevent exerts control from a distance, it also gives us a framework to understand how this control can be resisted. In some instances, we can find Prevent Duty documents making direct reference to citizenship and civic duty, but even when the self-governance and responsibilisation of citizens is not explicitly linked with citizenship practice, we can find a connection with the wider narrative. As such, whether directly or indirectly, Prevent is changing the way we think about belonging, responsibility, and our place in the society.

Using these different elements of the citizenship practice, we move forward with an understanding of Prevent as securitised citizenship. We move beyond a restrictive understanding of securitised citizenship and see it as encompassing narratives of both active and activist citizenship. While it is a useful conceptual device for understanding how the state has shifted counter-terrorism responsibilities to ordinary citizens and injected a security logic into social norms of civic conduct, it also helps us problematise different actions and ideas that can resist this responsibilisation.

The theoretical framework presented in this section provides us a template to analyse the empirical findings that will be introduced in the following chapters. While this discussion explains why Prevent should be seen as a regime of securitised citizenship and what are the parameters of control and resistance found within it, the empirical section of this thesis will put forward findings that helps us see how these dynamics manifest in the mundane reality of everyday life. I will continue the discussion in the next section by introducing this project's empirical framework. The following three chapters will showcase findings from my fieldwork and discuss how citizens articulate their Prevent Duty obligations, what are the dominant narratives that inform their compliance or resistance, is there consistency between their ideas or actions, and how do these dynamics manifest in the everyday interactions of these citizens.

Section 2 – Empirical Framework

The theoretical framework of this thesis explains why we should look at Prevent Duty through the framework of securitised citizenship. The discussion so far has outlined how Prevent has developed as a governance regime by diffusing security logics into existing social dynamics and co-opting civic practices. By looking at active and activist citizenship, we get a broad canvas to situate the different ways in which citizens are governed by the Prevent Duty and how they respond to this control. We get a variety of conducts that range from self-governing discipline to contestation through high and low-noise acts of citizenship. This section will take the guidance provided by the theoretical framework and apply it to systematise the empirical reality of Prevent enactment. By bringing in the perspectives of ordinary citizens, I will put forward a spectrum of civic engagement with the Prevent Duty to highlight the different ways in which citizenship gets done within the enactment of this policy. The different gradations of this spectrum will help us understand how active/activist citizenship manifests in everyday life. This will also help us identify the overlap between the different types of engagement and the fluid boundaries between the binaries of active and activist citizenship.



By allocating security responsibilities to citizens employed in health, education, and social work sectors, the British state has not only extended the reach of its coercive sphere, it has also expanded the network of civic exchanges that take place between the state and its citizens. Within the context of Prevent, these interactions influence the conduct of all the citizens, whether they are the ones being responsibilised with security obligations or the citizens who are at the receiving end of these counter-terrorism measures. This research is focussing on the experiences of the former to identify the dominant narratives of citizenship that facilitate the co-optation of citizens into the state's security infrastructure as they find themselves turning into both the agents and subjects of counter-terrorism policing. To unpack this tension, the following chapters will draw on interviews with frontline staff employed in health, education, and social work sectors to understand how citizens articulate their

counter-terrorism obligations and what motivates them to either undertake surveillance work or resist these responsibilities.

Civic engagement with the Prevent Strategy can be crudely divided into the two categories of compliance and resistance. Prevent has been a subject of debate amongst policymakers, academics, and practitioners, who either vociferously champion it as protection against terrorism or critique it as Islamophobic surveillance (Ali, 2020; Arbuthnot, 2019; Baldet, 2016; Cowden and Picken, 2019). However, as this discussion would demonstrate, beyond the realm of public discourse, at the grassroots level engagement with Prevent does not fall into these neat categories. The everyday reality of enacting this policy does not always yield well-articulated responses of resistance or compliance. Unlike the policymakers or academics who approach Prevent through this binary focus, the people who actually have to implement the Prevent Duty articulate their role and responsibility within this regime through a number of different narratives. As such, the resulting engagement with Prevent is messy, uneven, and sometimes contradictory, straddling a space between active and activist citizenship.

There are instances of compliance where engagement with the policy is done unwillingly or as a last resort, and there are proclamations of resistance that do not manifest in concrete action. Some citizens overlook the perceived negative impacts of the policy in favour of positive aspects, others oppose the policy but end up following it to either meet professional obligations or out of a sense of civic responsibility. So far, we have looked at the different conceptual tools that give us an outsider's perspective on how and why these interactions unfold. We can now add citizens' perspectives to this analysis and understand how different forms of citizenship manifest through the thoughts and actions of people who have to enact the Prevent Duty. By systematically cataloguing these different responses along a spectrum of civic engagement, we can map out the narratives that inform how citizens articulate their roles within this governance regime. By doing so, we take the work started in the previous section forward because while our theoretical interventions give us a framework for cataloguing different responses along a spectrum bracketed by active/activist citizenship or compliance/resistance, the empirical data shows us the overlap between these categories and highlights the messiness of securitised citizenship.

While we are trying to move beyond the crude categorisation of compliance and resistance, they do serve as useful endpoints to bracket our analysis with the aim that we can unpack the multifaceted nature of these terms. Therefore, we start the discussion with the chapter on compliance to

understand how self-governance manifests in everyday interactions. We focus on dominant narratives that influence citizens' compliance with the policy. Some of these relate directly to citizenship discourse with people speaking of Prevent as a civic/moral duty, in other cases, compliance is influenced by a sense of responsibility to others. To take this discussion forward, we move along the spectrum to explore the grey area of hesitation. Within this space we can find those instances of engagement that do not neatly fit into either of the other categories. By focussing on hesitation, we can unpack the processes of deliberation that dictate one's compliance with or resistance to the Prevent Duty. This exploration is important because hesitation can be seen as a starting point, a place where the decision-making process unfolds and moves towards either end of the spectrum as an action. Therefore, this approach allows us to take both a linear and a non-linear analytical route to understand how citizens respond to Prevent.

The third chapter in this empirical overview will focus on resistance to draw out the reasons why people want to disengage from their Prevent Duty obligations and how they manage to do so given the different constraints and power dynamics involved in such policy regimes. Within this discussion we can find a strong connection with the narrative of activist citizenship and can see people trying to reclaim their civic identity and resituate their loyalties away from the state. Interestingly, the responsibilisation element that forms the core of active citizenship can also be found in the interventions in this discussion, however, the orientation of this sense of responsibility is more towards serving one's fellow citizens rather than being a self-governing subject for the state. By highlighting the diffusion of these different narratives, we will be able to highlight the fluidity between the binaries of active and activist citizenship.

The three chapters will cover overlapping themes with the chapter on hesitation unpacking some themes on compliance and some on resistance. As such, the chapter division should not be taken as a firm delineation of conceptual boundaries but rather a rough categorisation of the different gradations of our spectrum into manageable sections.

Chapter 6: Compliance

The chapter will examine and problematise compliance with Prevent to understand how and why citizens interact with this duty. It will look at what does it mean to comply with the Prevent Duty, what motivates this compliance, and how the different types of compliance – ranging from eager adoption to indifferent acceptance – manifest in citizens' professional and personal lives. At the very basic level, compliance with Prevent means accepting the responsibility to 'prevent people from being drawn into terrorism' (Home Office, 2015a, p. 18). How this responsibility is carried out differs based on sectoral dynamics, nature of professional roles, and frontline staffers' relationship with members of public who are to be subjected to this monitoring. In some institutions, Prevent implementation is more closely monitored, such as schools and nurseries where the government agency Ofsted monitors compliance. However, in other sectors and institutions, policy enactment is left more at the discretion of different administrative structures, for e.g. universities have so far had an arguably light-touch approach to Prevent or the health sector where compliance is measured in a more decentralised manner. While these enforcement and assessment measures provide useful insights about the scope of compliance with the Prevent Duty, this approach would give us a one-sided picture devoid of any contextual information about the wider social dynamics. Therefore, this thesis is analysing Prevent compliance by situating it within the citizenship framework and looking at how ordinary citizens interact with this policy. This will allow us to not only explore the varied nature of Prevent compliance, but also understand how these correspond to existing narratives of citizenship, civic responsibility, and loyalty.

As the spectrum demonstrates, when we talk about compliance, we are not looking at a uniform concept simply sitting in opposition to resistance. There are different gradations of compliance within our spectrum that correspond to different social and cultural narratives. An initial analysis of my fieldwork data would suggest that a majority of the research participants are either comfortable with enacting the Prevent Duty or are simply indifferent enough to comply with its stipulations. This could be seen as a testament to the policy's success. However, an in-depth look at these insights suggests that this compliance with Prevent is more multifaceted. As explained earlier, these interactions exist on a spectrum of activity and manifest through a variety of responses, these range from wholesale acceptance to reluctant compliance of Prevent's surveillance obligations. Some people comply with every aspect of the duty with wholehearted consent. Some are not so eager but see some efficacy in enacting the policy. Then there are those who are opposed to Prevent but comply only because of the policy's coercive weight i.e. its statutory status. All the actions fall at different points along this scale with eager implementation of Prevent falling close to compliance while a reluctant adoption of the policy lying further up the spectrum, closer to resistance but not quite reaching that particular

endpoint. As such, compliance should be seen not as a self-contained space or action, but as an endpoint situated on the spectrum of civic engagement. By situating our responses along this spectrum, not only can we draw out the different motivating factors that go into making Prevent a mainstay of civic life, we can also interrogate the messiness inherent in citizens' engagement with this policy. Furthermore, we can understand compliance as a complex process that is influenced by different narratives and manifests in a variety of ways.

Based on the insights of my research participants, I have identified five different types of compliance that populate the spectrum – eager, indifferent, measured, selective, and coerced. This chapter covers the first two by focussing on eager acceptance of and indifferent involvement with the Prevent Duty. The remaining types of compliance are discussed in Chapter 7: Hesitation because the process of deliberation involved in these is slightly more circuitous with people going back and forth between different ideas. This does not mean the two types of compliance discussed here do not result from a thoughtful engagement, they do, but the participants show a clearer resolve within these subcategories. Within this discussion, we can easily identify citizens' intentions to comply while developing a nuanced understanding of the narratives that drive this compliance. In some cases, there is an overlap in motivating factors for e.g. safeguarding concerns can encourage both eager and indifferent compliance depending on how people receive the policy's core message, where they are situated within the professional hierarchy, and what are their personal circumstances. This discussion will also show that a single individual can engage in different types of compliance by going back and forth between eager and indifferent compliance. As such, while I have separated the different types of compliance on the spectrum, these gradations do not represent a neat division of responses but instead show the multidimensional nature of citizens' engagement with not just Prevent, but also their civic responsibilities.

I have argued that we should see Prevent through the framework of citizenship, this allows us to draw a link between the different varieties of compliance and active citizenship whereby citizens behave as self-governing, disciplined agent/subjects. However, by unpacking the variation in compliance, we see that the idea of active citizenship is also multifaceted. Some citizens take on responsibilities eagerly, while for others becoming an active citizen is something to be done selectively or even reluctantly. In this way, we continue the discussion started in the theory section and add more layers to our understanding of how compliance and active citizenship manifest in everyday life. This also helps us draw a symbiotic link between the two concepts, while active citizenship helps us make sense of compliance, the manifestation of compliance adds to our understanding of what active citizenship can look like in action. The following two sub-sections will discuss 'eager' and 'indifferent' compliance to showcase the different ways in which people articulate their responsibilisation under Prevent and take on the role of securitised active citizens.

Eager Compliance

Compliance of Prevent is predominantly rooted in the idea that enacting the policy is not necessarily a counter-terrorism surveillance measure, but an act of safeguarding vulnerable people. As Chapter 3 discussed, by diffusing Prevent into existing principles of duty of care in different sectors, the British state has made it indistinguishable from other responsibilities of safeguarding and civic duty. This subsection will focus on how citizens have adopted this framing to justify taking up Prevent obligations. The positive consensus on Prevent that influences compliance is informed by a variety of norms and beliefs that have been mobilised to diffuse this policy in different facets of civic life. One of the most dominant narratives informing compliance with Prevent is the perception that implementing Prevent is fulfilling a moral, civic, or a safeguarding duty, if not all three of these simultaneously. This framing of Prevent serves to justify the act of monitoring others as a welfare duty that must be carried out to protect them. As such, the insights discussed here will show that while people mostly come into contact with Prevent through their professional roles where they are told it is a safeguarding measure, this narrative also corresponds to a broader sense of civic responsibility that active citizenship inculcates in citizens. As a result, when some people talk about Prevent, they do not view the policy as a counter-terrorism measure or even a professional duty, but something much bigger:

'It's not even a Prevent Duty, it's just a basic moral duty and I don't think there's anything specific about it, it's just part of being a good human being. You shouldn't have extremist views yourself and you should expect people, your work colleagues, not to have those kinds of views, and you shouldn't have tolerance to those kinds of views as well.' (Trainee Psychiatrist, HE04)

This junior doctor repeatedly referred to Prevent as a moral duty unprompted. Their approach to Prevent is not just limited to their own responsibilities, they understand Prevent to represent a worldview whereby people shun extremist ideas and expect others around them to do the same. By turning a surveillance obligation into a marker of good human behaviour, this doctor has adopted Prevent as common-sense and expects others to do the same. Their self-governance is not just limited to carrying out their Prevent Duty obligations, they also talk about shunning 'extremist views'. As discussed earlier, this need to support and promote certain (liberal) values has been a crucial component of active citizenship, what Van Houdt et al. have described as the state's emphasis on outsiders joining the 'British way of life' (2011, p. 412). By speaking of not tolerating 'extremist values', this medic shows us how Prevent has securitised the principle of espousing liberal values to be a good, active citizen. This intervention is not just rooted in this doctor's sense of professional duty, it speaks to how they situate themselves in the wider society as a responsible citizen. This broad sense of responsibility to protect others or look after their welfare is evident across different sectors and professional hierarchies. A social worker acknowledged the risk of discrimination and prejudice embedded within Prevent implementation, however, they still advocated that all social workers should follow this duty because protection against harm is seen as protecting the human rights of the wider public:

'I think that it's about the values, it's about human rights, it's about making sure that vulnerable people aren't groomed, it's about making sure we keep people safe and well... If they (social workers) are not looking out for the safety of vulnerable people who might be being groomed or the safety of citizens in the community who might be harmed by a terrorist act, then any teacher or social worker has a duty to make sure that we are uphold[ing] the human rights of all the citizens.' (Independent Mental Health Social Worker, LA06)

This social worker connects their duty to protect others to professional roles, but their focus is not just on their service users but the wider community. As a social worker, they are obligated to protect the person considered vulnerable, but their engagement with Prevent is influenced by a need to protect even those people for whom they are not professionally responsible. This shows that even though people do not always articulate their role within Prevent as a civic duty, we can still find an underlying narrative that corresponds to self-governance and responsibilisation advocated by active citizenship. This also means that even when people do not have well-defined safeguarding obligations in their professional roles, they still interpret Prevent compliance as a way of protecting other people from harm. When discussing Prevent, a university lecturer favoured compliance with the policy by focusing on the risk of radicalisation against which they need to save not just their students but also their colleagues:

'I see radicalisation as something that people should be saved from, so I don't see it so much as spying, spying refers to something that perhaps you are doing kind of... So, yes, I think I don't have a problem, if I care about a colleague, I would want to help them. It's the same with students, I would probably try and speak to them before I would refer them to anywhere else, but if I see that I can't get through and it's not good then yeah.' (University Lecturer, ED-H01)

Even though this lecturer was aware that monitoring students and colleagues could be seen as 'spying', they rationalised this worry by focussing on the safeguarding element. A similar sentiment was echoed by another university lecturer who had initial scepticism towards the policy but were satisfied with the Prevent training's message that it is a safeguarding initiative:

'I think it has been introduced because of the more frequent occurrence of the terrorist acts and I think similarly to the school education, we as pastoral care [sic] and tutors of students have absolute responsibility to help and observe and not be like, you know, I don't care, this is not my responsibility, definitely not.' (University Lecturer, ED-H05)

These interventions by university staffers are interesting because within the British higher education sector, there are pastoral care responsibilities towards students, but these are usually dispensed by designated staff members, such as personal tutors, welfare officers, and counselling services to name a few. University lecturers do not have the same safeguarding duty that schoolteachers or health and social care workers have, their role is mostly limited to signposting students to relevant services. However, these lecturers still conceive their Prevent obligations in the language and logic of protecting people. This shows that the element of civic responsibility and active citizenship within Prevent helps it to go beyond the remit of professional obligations. This also allows the policy to introduce a new layer of safeguarding responsibilities that are defined by the risk of terrorism. By appealing to citizens' sense of responsibility and being active in protecting others, Prevent has not only camouflaged surveillance within everyday life, it has turned it into a duty that should be taken on by everyone because it's more than a professional duty, it's a civic obligation. I would also add that while we are linking Prevent enactment to a social dynamic that goes beyond the working of different welfare state sectors, the policy is also changing the culture of these civic institutions. Within higher education, we can see that Prevent is establishing a new narrative of safety and vulnerability and introducing new infrastructures through which this form of safeguarding can be offered. As such, by analysing Prevent enactment to citizenship practice, I am not saying we should ignore the impact on different sectors, I am just trying to link these localised developments to a broader narrative of securitisation of citizenship.

Prevent has targeted safeguarding practices and norms because these are rooted in the principle of responsibilisation. Since frontline professionals take on the duty to safeguard vulnerable people, it is relatively easy to connect this responsibility with a wider active citizenship ethos of self-governance and looking after each other. This creates a link between citizens' perceptions of their professional and civic duties because the underlying theme is taking on this duty to protect others. In sectors such as schools, health, social work, where safeguarding is a well-identified responsibility, Prevent has been crystallised as an extension of the existing welfare work. Within social work, Prevent is included in the mandatory safeguarding training undertaken by social workers and public-facing staff. By embedding a security logic in routine care provided by social workers, local authorities across the country are bringing a wide range of service-users within the realm of security governance (Prevent Co-ordinator, PC05). This approach has been successful in normalising Prevent enactment amongst social workers who see Prevent monitoring in the same light as managing other welfare-related concerns:

'I think it's part of safeguarding, yes! Because at the end of the day, we're protecting vulnerable adults, aren't we? Regardless of what is happening, whether it be radicalisation or safeguarding them from exploitation, financial abuse or whatever else. It's still preventing them from being victimised whichever way around, isn't it?!' (Independent Social Worker, LA04)

'I think it's really, really connected and it was one of the things that we argued that safeguarding and counter-terrorism should go arm in arm because of the fact that there were so many vulnerable people or lonely people or isolated people, who were being groomed because of their vulnerability.' (Independent Social Worker, LA06)

The focus of these social workers on the vulnerability of individuals demonstrates that monitoring their service users for signs of radicalisation is a form of protection which is being extended to them. The sanitising impact of Prevent framed as safeguarding also came through in an interview with a school governor who, despite their initial scepticism of Prevent and strong opposition to coercive state policies, expressed relief when the policy was presented to them as a safeguarding issue:

'When we first became aware of it, I think we realised that really, it's just another thing to think about as part of safeguarding, so actually it was really reassuring to find "oh phew! we already think like that".' (School Governor and Parent, ED07)

Framing Prevent as a safeguarding initiative is also having an impact that goes beyond just encouraging compliance with the policy. It is slowly changing the culture of these sectors by making norms around trust and confidentiality more flexible and malleable. By routing Prevent compliance procedures through safeguarding channels, the state has put counter-radicalisation in the same category as other issues where breaking confidentiality is considered acceptable and even necessary. This co-optation of the professional common-sense is worrying because not only are medical professionals being conditioned to break confidentiality to counter the risk of radicalisation, they are being asked to do so with a very limited understanding of what this risk looks like. The Royal College of Psychiatrists has raised concerns about the risk of reporting patients 'without evidence of exploitation or current plans to harm' (2017, p. 4). These concerns are not baseless because Prevent monitoring relies on crude threat identification criteria mostly rooted in cultural prejudices (Home Office 2012; 2021). As Heath-Kelly and Strausz have explained, in the Department of Health's Prevent guidance risk identifying symptoms are racialised with characterisations such as 'feeling of distance from cultural and religious heritage' and discomfort regarding one's place in the society (2019, 93). As such, frontline staff are being encouraged to break confidentiality on ill-defined ideas of risk and vulnerability. However, within the discourse of Prevent, all of these concerns are overshadowed because it is presented as a safeguarding duty. In my interviews, I noticed that a number of health professionals were quite comfortable with breaking confidentiality without exploring these aforementioned problems with Prevent. The trainee psychiatrist who spoke of Prevent as a 'moral duty' dealt with questions about doctor-patient confidentiality by focussing on the need to protect the wider public:

'The same principle applies when safeguarding vulnerable adults and safeguarding children. I mean you're not going to worry about confidentiality if you know that a child is in danger from their parents... We have to maintain patient confidentiality obviously, but we are allowed to break it, if we think that public safety is at stake. This comes under that, that's part of our professional responsibility anyway.' (Trainee Psychiatrist, HE04)

This shows that the co-optation of the practice of safeguarding has also led to the co-optation of the idea of safeguarding. By infusing Prevent's risk logic within safeguarding, the individual at risk is also seen as a risk to others thus collapsing the fine line between '*at-risk*' and '*risky*' (Chivers, 2018; Heath-Kelly, 2013). As a result, while normally safeguarding efforts would focus on the welfare of the individual at risk, with the Prevent logic added to the equation, the priority shifts from protecting the individual to protecting the wider public. This is turning safeguarding practice into a component of securitised active citizenship because it shifts responsibilities to individuals with the end goal of

meeting the security priorities of the state. The duty to protect patients, students, and service users has turned into the duty to protect the state and the wider public. This shift in priorities was also noticed in the interview with a consultant physician who reiterated this calculation whereby concern for the 'at-risk individual' turns into a worry for the safety of others. This shows that despite the Prevent Duty being presented as a safeguarding measure, the safety of the at-risk individual is very swiftly set aside. When asked if they would be worried about a patient referred to Prevent, they said:

'If I believe that referral is true and the risk is quite high, I have to weigh the welfare of the person versus the welfare of the society. So, I won't use the word worried about the welfare [of the patient], I might be interested to know what happened, for example, they have been mistreated or something, yeah, I would probably be interested to know. But I do not think, if it's a high-risk referral, I would be weighing more towards the welfare of the society, rather than the welfare of that particular individual.' (A&E Consultant, HE17)

By clearly differentiating between the 'welfare of the society' and the 'welfare of an individual' and identifying their primary responsibility to the state and the wider society, this doctor is readily accepting their role as an enterprising, active citizen working as the 'subject, object, and tool' within the Prevent regime (Jarvis and Lister, 2013a, pp. 660–661). Through this reframing of vulnerable individuals as a risk to others, the Prevent-led safeguarding approach also normalises the involvement of law enforcement in medical treatment and welfare work. By centring the risk to others, the individual becomes a threat to be managed all the while maintaining the safeguarding narrative. This turns the role played by the state as that of a protector with the citizens serving as its enforcers. A therapist, who had some concerns about Prevent, seemed to follow this line of thinking:

'If a young person tells me that they've been raped... I work with a lot of rape victims, and the person who raped them is still out there and we think they might be doing it to somebody else, then I would want the police to get involved, I would be happy that I could break confidentiality, in terms of keeping people young people safe.' (Psychotherapist, HE05)

By approaching vulnerability to extremism as sexual abuse, this psychotherapist is unable to see how the two issues would be dealt with differently by the police. A young person who has been raped would be treated as a victim by the police, but a young person deemed to be vulnerable to radicalisation would be treated as both a victim and a suspect, so their interactions with the police would be not be the same as those of other subjects of safeguarding. However, presenting Prevent as safeguarding and civic duty, hides this dichotomy in a blind spot because the end goal is to keep the state safe from this risky individual. This shows that the state has not only succeeded in making surveillance more palatable and acceptable, it has also hidden the policy's inherent violence within layers of safeguarding and responsibilisation narrative. As a result, despite being a mental health professional, this psychotherapist is unable to see that they could inadvertently be causing harm to their patient by exposing them to a coercive counter-terrorism process.

Another far-reaching impact of Prevent's securitisation of safeguarding has been the expansion of the state's coercive sphere. Conversations with frontline staff have demonstrated that Prevent also targets the networks of trust and confidence established in other areas to expand the reach of surveillance. This shows another way in which Prevent Duty goes beyond the professional sectors and thus, should be studied through a broader framework of citizenship practice. The responsibilities of the securitised active citizens do not remain restricted to their places of work, they are encouraged to remain vigilant everywhere. Within the education sector, along with monitoring activity inside the classrooms, teachers are encouraged to use their interactions with pupils' families to observe their conducts:

'It was always about constantly looking for signs but it linked in with safeguarding, as you would be looking for signs of abuse or neglect, it was all under the umbrella of safeguarding and also I do remember they talked about that because you get close contact and get relationship with the parents. Similarly, if you're looking at all behaviours when you're at the school gates say social things like have they been drinking, it all came under the umbrella of looking after the welfare of the children, and to ensure that you are constantly looking for signs within the safeguarding, so Prevent came underneath that.' (Former Primary Schoolteacher, ED10)

Similarly, social work and social care safeguarding is seen as a natural fit for Prevent-led monitoring because of the access social workers have to people's lives:

'We have that access to home, bedroom, things like that... well obviously you always ask for permission but you know, you can obviously snoop around someone's home if you really wanted to, we obviously check if there's food in the cupboards for children, things like that, so we do have a bit of a closer access to people's home.' (Children's and Families' Social Worker, LA01) 'Social workers work in a relational way generally so you're in families and you're working with those relational issues and you might be very well-placed to pick up things that are going wrong and I see it very much as a part of safeguarding.' (Independent Social Worker, LA07)

'Sometimes we visit people regularly, we go inside their houses, we build this relation and we can sort of monitor them, specially nurses or carers who go day-to-day to some families, so yeah they know sometimes people really well from different side as a family or friend. So, yeah, looking from [sic] different eyes at those people really.' (Community Physiotherapist, HE08)

All of these quotes show that not only is there willingness to comply with Prevent obligations, but frontline professionals identify their unique placement within the heart of community as the reason why they should be doing counter-terrorism surveillance. Similar to the case of the physiotherapist discussed earlier, the narrative of protection is hiding the coercion of counter-terrorism policies. When people think of Prevent as a way of protecting people and dispensing their professional/civic duty, they are unable to see how their co-optation in this security policy could cause harm that spreads beyond the confines of their professional spaces. So not just a pupil within a classroom but a parent at the school gates can also become subjected to surveillance, while every space from a hospital's emergency room to a family's living room can become a site of intelligence gathering. However, since these acts of surveillance are carried out in the name of safeguarding, they are conducted willingly and comfortably without much interrogation. Not only that, since these are rooted in a sense of responsibility that citizens must take on, Prevent is seen as a civic activity in which all citizens should be proactively participating.

As this discussion demonstrates when the Prevent Duty reaches ordinary citizens operating at the grassroots level, the surveillance work is camouflaged in safeguarding obligations, hence it is received as a much-needed welfare intervention by frontline professionals. However, it is not just one-way traffic, by adopting these ideas, citizens are adding a further layer of sedimentation to the collective common-sense. This is not only entrenching a security logic within different facets of civic life, it is also expanding it to citizens operating beyond the designated professional sectors. As it is seen as safeguarding duty, compliance is deemed necessary from everyone. A GP supported the idea of retail workers being trained on Prevent as these spaces are frequented by a large number of people:

'Everyone has a role, not 100% as I said, no one can do this duty on the their own, so services should be established where anyone can get help if they have any concerns, it's not about a medical professional, it can be a store keeper in Tesco as well, because people go there for shopping and people have conversations and if there is someone hearing a conversation which is really alarming about someone, I think people should raise an alarm because you never know where you will hear something which will be seen again. So, everyone can play a role in Prevent Duty.' (General Practitioner, HE03)

A retired head teacher, who identified as Muslim, made a case for the Muslim community to be more active in Prevent compliance. While they recognised the biases inherent within Prevent and its chilling effect on Muslims, this was seen more as a problem of perception. They viewed Muslim community's engagement with Prevent or lack thereof as a result of the operational problems with Prevent's rollout. They advocated setting aside these concerns to focus on the role Muslim communities should be playing:

'There are real issues out there that do need tackling, for example the young girls that went to Syria...There are mosques that are not doing enough... the solution sometimes needs to come from within, from amongst the community themselves. But I feel that the community rather than tackling the situation maybe has taken up a defensive stance... so they have been on the back-foot, but if the community took a step or a stance themselves and said we don't agree with that... then the solutions come from within the community themselves rather than something being imposed upon a community.' (Retired Head Teacher, ED11)

Here the sense of duty is being transferred to the entire Muslim community that needs to take ownership of not just the problem but also the solution. Compliance with Prevent is being equated with the rejection of extremist ideas and the community's lack of engagement with Prevent is seen as their failure to exercise agency. Compliance is also being seen as a tool of empowerment, with the assumption being made that involvement with Prevent would enable the community to put forward their own solutions. It is interesting that the community's stance against their perceived victimisation is not seen as an exercise of agency, but as an act of capitulation. This perspective sits within the narrative of resilient citizenship that calls for Muslim citizens to take on a proactive role in managing the threats within their communities. Here, a section of the society is being asked to take on the responsibility to self-govern their conducts to show that they are good, resilient citizens. In this case, active participation in the state's security agenda is seen as demonstrating their resilience against extremism. Therefore, failure to comply could not only mean they are bad citizens, it could also signal that they are vulnerable to extremism and thus posing a risk to others.

The insights discussed so far can be situated within the narratives of safeguarding and protecting the vulnerable. I have explained how these connect with the wider discourse on responsibilised active citizenship. Now I will discuss some instances where the influence of ideas of civic duty and citizenship is more direct in encouraging compliance with Prevent. Even though almost all of my research participants had been introduced to Prevent within the context of safeguarding in their professional responsibilities, some very clearly articulated this as a duty they need to conduct outside of their professional roles. This could be explained by the fact that those employed in the public sector have a sense of obligation to the community along with a professional common-sense of protecting vulnerable people. However, this overlap also demonstrates that within Prevent enactment different narratives are intersecting with different sensibilities feeding into the idea of self-governed active citizens taking on counter-radicalisation work. A doctor who had expressed concerns about the policy and was generally quite wary of having to follow Prevent as a legal obligation, made an unprompted connection between the policy and civic duty:

'I personally think that you touch up on civic duty, I think it's a reasonable thing to ask for any member of society. If they are in contact with any person becoming increasingly radicalised and they've got valid concerns... I think they've got a responsibility to act upon it. But I don't see the civic institutions of this country as being separate to the average Tom, Dick, and Harry on the street, I think everybody should have that responsibility. Whether to legally impose on people is a different matter and that sits quite uneasy with me, the legal imposition of notifying people to the authorities.' (Ophthalmology Surgeon, HE15)

The last part of this quote is interesting because here we can see the doctor is quite comfortable with not just following the duty themselves but having others do it. While they do not want to follow Prevent as a legal obligation, they see a role for citizens to undertake some form of monitoring work as their civic duty. Despite their unease with the Prevent Duty and its statutory status, they support citizens taking on counter-radicalisation responsibilities because keeping others safe is the 'reasonable thing' to do. This is one of the few cases where professional ethos of safeguarding gets eclipsed by a broader idea of civic duty and self-governance. They are still thinking of safeguarding people, but they do not see it as their duty as a doctor but more as a citizen. This then also leads them to support compliance on a large scale with 'everybody' sharing this responsibility. A social worker also spoke of Prevent work as something good citizens should be doing:

'If you see something that is very concerning, other people or another person might get hurt, then you should be doing what you can to stop that, that's with crime, harm to children, harm to adults . . . it's not just Prevent, that's a general [sic] what a good citizen would do.' (LA07, Independent Social Worker)

Similarly, when a teacher was asked about their motivation for compliance with Prevent, they also linked it to their wider responsibility to the state and community:

'Well, civic duty, really! I just felt that was my role to safeguard these children and my colleagues and myself, so anything like that, I did feel like it was my duty, because that's a big part of my role as a teacher.' (Former Primary Schoolteacher, ED10)

Framing Prevent as civic duty also instils a sense of agency. By presenting Prevent as a responsibility that citizens undertake to protect themselves and their communities, the surveillance element fades into the norms of civic obligation and service. Instead of becoming a security imposition, the counter-terrorism responsibilities become an organic element of civic life. Here the teacher is taking ownership of this duty not just as a teacher but also as a citizen to protect vulnerable individuals.

This discussion on eager compliance shows how people explain their compliance with their Prevent Duty obligations. This form of compliance is quite strong and people engage with Prevent with the idea that they are protecting vulnerable people and fulfilling their civic responsibility. Here we have seen the professional norms of safeguarding merge with a broader narrative of active citizenship that encourage people to comply with Prevent Duty stipulations and see it as something they have to do as good, responsible citizens. Some participants articulate their role within Prevent by talking about how they need to protect vulnerable people, for some the sense of responsibility is rooted in concerns about protecting the wider community from vulnerable people. For others, Prevent Duty is not just a professional responsibility but a moral/civic duty that should be carried out by everyone. Whether people explicitly link Prevent with an ethos of self-governance or make implicit references to it, we can find the narrative of securitised active and moral citizenship running through all of these insights. As discussed in Chapter 4, Prevent has securitised citizenship with ease because the British citizenship practice already operated on neoliberal principles of shifting responsibilities to citizens and turning them into agent/subjects. Within Prevent, we can see the evidence of this neoliberal governance of conducts in the insights of these enterprising, active citizens who not only accept their co-optation within a coercive security regime, they see it as a normative duty that should be fulfilled by all good citizens. The following section will look at a different variety of compliance whereby people generally favour engaging with the policy, but this compliance is not rooted in any strong ideas or beliefs.

Indifferent Compliance

The findings discussed so far signal a willing adoption of Prevent Duty obligations, these participants were at ease with taking on their new surveillance duties and expanding them beyond the remit of their professional roles. However, within the data on compliance, there is also evidence of people just complying with the policy without putting much thought into it. Prevent Duty is complied with not out of a sense of civic or moral duty, or for safeguarding concerns, but just because it is something that they have to do like the mandatory fire safety training. This discussion may seem to contradict the findings in the preceding section where I argue that compliance with Prevent Duty should be seen as citizenship practice because it is rooted in a broader sense of civic responsibility. However, by highlighting the indifference in some instances of Prevent compliance, I want to draw attention to the varied nature of Prevent's neoliberal governance. Eager compliance helps us see how citizens perform when they readily accept the active citizenship narrative and see themselves as being responsible for their and others' conducts. The insights discussed here will tell us that compliance takes place whether people buy the narrative or not. Such is the nature of the Prevent Duty operation that people still enact it even when they do not necessarily see it as a moral or civic duty. The securitised active citizenship that calls for self-governance is not wholly reliant on people eagerly adopting the ideas of responsibility and duty, the latter will still function as cogs in the state machinery even without a cognitive conversion. This was evident in the interview with a trainee GP, who had not received Prevent Duty training at the time of the interview but seemed to approach it as a routine activity. Their knowledge of Prevent was gleaned from discussions with colleagues and based on this they appeared confident that conducting Prevent monitoring would not be different from their regular exposure to situations that require law enforcement interventions:

'We deal with a lot of weird and wonderful things, probably wouldn't faze me to be honest. We deal with awful child protection cases and things, I've rung police about people before, so I suppose, if I had to, then I would... [we] probably do make quite a lot of nasty decisions all day.' (Trainee General Practitioner, HE02) It is interesting they use the term 'nasty decision' which could be seen as an acknowledgment of Prevent's detrimental impact on their patients, but they appear to be at ease with it as making 'nasty decisions' is part of the routine activity. This quote provides a different interpretation of the safeguarding duty that relies on routinely involving law enforcement, therefore, making a Prevent referral about someone or reporting them to the police is not seen as a coercive act. In this way, Prevent is normalising the frontline staff's reliance on the police to manage concerns. As Pettinger explains, in cases where a Prevent referral is deemed 'risky enough', the referred individuals are visited by the police (2020, p. 974). Even though Prevent operates within the 'pre-criminal space' and this form of police involvement is consensual, I would argue that this process is coercive and violent. As a 2020 survey demonstrated, ethnic minorities in the country do not trust law enforcement authorities to have an unbiased approach towards them (Dodd, 2020). For these communities, the police are seen as a symbol of state aggression and as such, even an informal chat with friendly police officers can become a source of distress. This could be observed in the case of the four-year-old boy who was referred to Prevent for saying that his father had "guns and bombs in his shed" while talking about the video game *Fortnite*. This resulted in the family being visited by police officers at 10:30pm creating a lot of stress for the boy's parents. (Townsend and Stein, 2021).

In some ways, the informal nature of such interventions is more coercive because the referred individuals are not deemed to have committed an offence, therefore, they can be interviewed by the police and counter-terrorism officers without any protections outlined by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This can result in children being questioned by the police or Prevent officers without the consent of their parents or a responsible adult being present (Holmwood and Aitlhadj, 2022). This raises important questions about the securitisation of safeguarding practices specifically and how involving police in managing concerns about vulnerable people in health and education sectors can do more harm. These questions lie beyond the scope of this thesis and as such I will not be engaging with them. However, this does provide us important guidance to look at how these sectors' reliance on law enforcement has facilitated the introduction of Prevent Duty within daily activities. Even when the Prevent referrals do not involve police officers, they can create stressful situations for not just the referred individuals but also their families. Reports by Medact and Prevent Watch provide useful insights on the negative impacts of Prevent referrals on people's emotional and physical health (*ibid*; Aked, 2020). These show that not only is the policy violent and coercive, a lot of this violence is hidden or does not meet the threshold of conventional understandings of state aggression, hence it can continue without much interrogation by those who are perpetrating it.

The diffusion of Prevent in normal practices also means that people do not see it as an invasive practice that exposes a potentially vulnerable individual to the coercion of the security state. When it becomes one of the many things teachers or doctors have to look out for, the time allocated for this kind of monitoring is limited. As a result, the process of making a Prevent referral goes from being an important decision that can have a long-lasting impact on someone's life to something you flag up to the relevant team and move on. This was conveyed by the trainee GP while agreeing that the health sector has a role to play in counter-terrorism:

'I think it's just a case of recognising it and informing the right person and hopefully you've done your bit overall. Patients come to see us, we've got 10 minutes in GP, you know you're not going to be sitting there asking them everything about their religious beliefs or whatever, but I think if there's [sic] brief little things that you can pick-up on... then you're more likely to have a positive result.' (Trainee General Practitioner, HE02)

Interestingly, a secondary schoolteacher who otherwise demonstrated a well-thought out view of Prevent displayed a similar nonchalance while discussing the day-to-day implementation of the policy. They showed a surface-level engagement with the practical side of Prevent compliance, relying on other people further up the institutional hierarchy to make the difficult calculations. They saw monitoring students as a routine, almost harmless activity because they only had to make the initial assessment:

'I don't have to make a moral judgement about whether or not it is radicalisation, and I don't have to make the judgement about whether or not this is something that needs to be investigated and whether or not actually sending in this team and putting this through this procedure will actually make them worse or better... I do think in some cases it does make it worse, but it's not my job to decide and I don't have enough information to make anywhere near those sorts of judgement calls about that and I shouldn't really because my job is not to investigate, my job is not to talk to the parents or talk to the family or even really to ask the child questions, it's just to say this isn't right, something is going on, can someone please find out.' (Secondary Schoolteacher, ED01)

While it makes sense to rely on the school's safeguarding team to conduct a thorough assessment of pupil's vulnerability, this approach also betrays a shunning of responsibility that frontline professionals have towards the people they serve. A Prevent referral can have long-term

consequences for an individual, however, because this process has been routinised and reduced to a minor act of intervention, its impact gets lost on those making these decisions. Hence, even when this teacher fears that a Prevent referral could make matters worse, they are still willing to do it. This shows that Prevent is designed in a way that not only turns monitoring and surveillance into normal activities, it embeds it within different layers of bureaucracy to keep the frontline staff from seeing the actual impact of the policy on those who are referred by them. This puts those who have the duty to make Prevent referrals at a distance from the consequences of the policy. Since a teacher cannot see Prevent's impact on their pupil, it becomes easy to treat it as a tick-box exercise and move on.

Even though we have focussed on professional practices and infrastructures to understand this detached compliance, we can also glean some insights about securitised active citizenship. The trainee GP (HE02) discussed here is fulfilling what they see as their responsibility to protect some entity – be it the vulnerable person, the community, the state. However, this duty is being carried out without much interrogation of what it is, what harms it can do, whether there is another way of doing this. They are operating as an active citizen who takes on security responsibilities without much articulation of what they are not drawing on the narratives of safeguarding or civic duty because they do not see the need, for them they have a duty and they will do it by leaving the rest up to the system to manage.

The case of the teacher (ED01) is slightly different, while they display a similar nonchalance about making a Prevent referral and just passing on the concerns, their engagement with Prevent is not entirely indifferent. As explained above, they are aware of the policy's potential harm and as an idea they critically engage with the policy, but there is an incongruence in their thoughts and actions. When it comes to the practical task of enacting the policy, they do so without thinking much about the consequences. This shows that the different forms of compliance and resistance do not exist in hermetically sealed silos but overlap one another. A single individual can display more than one gradation on our spectrum. The views expressed by this teacher (ED01) can be placed along the different points of the spectrum, straddling the space between indifferent compliance, measured compliance, and perhaps even selective resistance. People can have a nuanced approach towards one idea but a cynical or practical view of another aspect of Prevent. How they respond to the policy and their involvement with it is dictated by a myriad of factors and therefore, how they speak about their role in it can also correspond to different narratives with people situating their loyalties and sense of responsibility within different entities and going back and forth within them. This means that while

they end up acting like responsibilised citizens to play an active role in the society, the thought processes that drive this participation are not always consistent or stable. As such, by drawing out the overlaps and contradictions we find within citizens' engagement with the Prevent Duty, I want to show the multifaceted nature of social dynamics that define a citizen's relationship with the state.

This overlap between different types of compliance could also be observed in the input of people who would otherwise be eager champions of Prevent but veer towards an indifferent approach because of the problems with the bureaucratic system. A retired head teacher who was very supportive of not just the Prevent Duty but the policy of having police officers embedded within schools, expressed frustration about the lack of support for Prevent-related cases. They complained that they did not receive any 'feedback' about their Prevent referrals and were unaware of how their concerns were being addressed so they were forced to take it as just a box-ticking exercise:

'We have done our duty, we have passed it on, we're not expecting anything to happen, but we fulfilled all our professional responsibilities. If it goes pear-shaped, we have done our bit in line with the training and that's not a good attitude that should creep in but in the face of being repeatedly getting no feedback and not knowing where all this is all going, if anything is happening... people become very matter of fact about these things, we've fulfilled our professional responsibilities, if something happens, it's not our responsibility.' (Retired Head Teacher, HE04)

These quotes show the fluidity within the different gradations of our spectrum. Unlike the schoolteacher (ED01) who had some concerns about Prevent but engaged with its practical implementation in a more detached manner, this retired head teacher wants a more eager engagement with the policy but is being let down by the system. Hence, people can move between points of the spectrum or even straddle the space in between due to the influence of different factors. This shows that compliance with Prevent is not just dictated by a person's job description or their place in the professional hierarchy but also by the circumstances and bureaucratic structures that surround them. In some cases, embedding Prevent stipulations in mundane practices makes the compliance more eager because Prevent is seen as an extension of existing norms. However, in other cases, the presence of different structures and practices makes the compliance less eager, people do it as something that needs to be done without being emotionally invested in the act. In both the cases, the end goal is to ensure some form of engagement with the policy and whether people do it willingly or in an indifferent manner, it yields the desired results.

Conclusion

To unpack Prevent Duty as a regime of securitised citizenship, we have started this discussion by understanding how compliance with the policy takes place, what narratives do people draw on, and what are the impacts of other social and sectoral dynamics on these actions. The Prevent Duty is formally enacted within professional settings and as such citizens come into contact with the policy in their work as educators, medical professionals, or social workers. This was also the case with the research participants of this project, most of the people I interviewed had received Prevent Duty training as part of their professional roles. The discussion in this chapter has taken insights from these participants and situated them within the wider narrative of citizenship, with a focus on active citizenship's ethos of civic responsibility and self-governance. This approach is not designed to ignore the professional dynamics that shape Prevent enactment, but this discussion is focussed more on drawing out the influence of different social narratives that facilitate citizens' positive engagement with their Prevent Duty obligations.

To explain the multifaceted nature of civic engagement within Prevent, I have mapped the different ways people interact with this duty along a spectrum. This helps us move beyond the binaries of compliance/resistance by unpacking these concepts into different variations. It also shows that people can move beyond different gradations of the spectrum depending on how they see their role in the policy, where they situate their loyalties, and how they articulate their responsibilities. Unpacking these different dynamics also helps us understand that securitised active citizenship manifests in a variety of actions dictated by different narratives.

This chapter focuses on the first two points on the spectrum and looks into 'eager' and 'indifferent' compliance. These two types of compliance may appear to be on opposite ends but they both cover those instances of Prevent engagement where people enact the policy and support the idea that others should actively participate in it as well. Within eager compliance, we identify different motivations for enacting the Prevent Duty. These citizens see their Prevent Duty obligations as being part of a wider duty to protect vulnerable people and the community. As such, they do not see the policy as a counter-terrorism intervention but as a means of safeguarding people. By viewing Prevent as a 'moral duty' or as a way of protecting human rights, we can see frontline staff not only articulate their roles and responsibilities within Prevent enactment but also put it forward as a normative duty to be taken up by everyone. These insights show that citizens readily adopt the state rhetoric and reproduce it in both their thoughts and actions.

This form of compliance is not just limited to practical implementation of the policy, there is also a cognitive element whereby citizens encourage others to reject extremist ideas. These findings demonstrate the kind of self-governance and responsibilisation that is characteristic of active citizenship. These citizens should be seen as neoliberal agent/subjects who espouse enterprising values and participate actively in the society. While some people make a direct connection with the framework of citizenship practice and identify Prevent as a civic duty or something that all (good) citizens should do, almost everyone speaks of safeguarding and looking out for others. This shows that even when citizens do not see their Prevent enactment as an act of citizenship, their actions are informed by a latent understanding of civic responsibility.

We can also situate Prevent compliance within the broader narrative of active citizenship because when people speak about safeguarding and Prevent, their concern switches from protecting the 'vulnerable' individual to keeping the wider community safe. This takes the 'vulnerable' person from being 'at risk' and turns them into a 'risk' to the community (Heath-Kelly, 2013, p. 397). By shifting the focus from protecting the vulnerable to protecting the community, these citizens situate their loyalties with the state rather than the individual they are responsible for as a frontline professional. As such, even if they speak of Prevent as a professional duty, their engagement with the policy is motivated by a broader intention of being a responsible citizen. By making this connection between active citizenship and Prevent compliance, we can make sense of this kind of engagement that seems to defy the professional norms of individual protection in the favour of assisting the state in keeping people safe. This is not to say that Prevent is single-handedly changing professional norms, as we discuss later on, there is a reliance on coercive measures even within the safeguarding practices of welfare sectors, however, Prevent tips the balance more in favour of exposing vulnerable individuals to law enforcement measures in order to protect the wider public.

This discussion also shows that people advocate expanding the scope of Prevent by taking the policing activities beyond the immediate sites of their professional practice and expanding the geography of this counter-terrorism work. A teacher spoke about their proximity to parents at school gates who could be monitored. A social worker and a medic explained how they have access to people's homes, so they are in a position to find out more about them. These quotes came up in the context of these research participants justifying their role within Prevent enactment, to explain how they are best placed to take on this responsibility. However, this also shows that because Prevent is seen as a civic responsibility to protect others, it should not be confined to the remits of professional spaces. A GP

took this thinking forward and suggested that retail workers should be trained to enact Prevent Duty, something the former National Coordinator for Prevent has also advocated (National Police Chiefs' Council, 2019). These interventions underscore the need to situate citizens' engagement with Prevent within a broader framework of citizenship because even though it is a legal duty in specified sectors, the policy and its ethos of securitised self-governance is not meant to stay restricted within these practices and spaces. By highlighting the underlying narratives of active citizenship, we can understand how the policy has been presented as something that all citizens should take on, paving the way for the creation of 'counter-terrorism citizens' (Dearden, 2018; Rodrigo Jusué, 2022).

Within the discussion of eager compliance, we can trace the narratives of active citizenship and responsibility with relative ease because even when individuals did not talk about Prevent as a moral or civic duty, they grounded their motivations in this need to protect other people. This is not the case within the analysis of indifferent compliance. The insights discussed here signal a detachment that is hard to situate within any of the dominant narratives found in eager compliance. However, this in itself tells us a lot about the varied nature of neoliberal governance that characterises Prevent enactment and citizenship practice. While eager compliance signals that people engage with the policy because they buy the narrative of responsibility and safeguarding, indifferent compliance shows that people will still engage with the policy whether the wider ideas of moral or civic responsibility resonate with them or not. These participants speak about enacting Prevent Duty because it is something they have to do in their professional roles. For them making a Prevent referral is just a tick-box exercise they do and pass on to other people to manage. While this form of compliance may appear to be rooted firmly in professional practices detached from the narratives of moral duty, I would argue that we can still learn some lessons about securitised active citizenship here. By taking Prevent Duty obligations at face value and enacting the policy without much interrogation of what it is or what impacts it could have on others, these citizens are readily accepting their co-optation within the state's security infrastructure. They may not articulate their involvement through the narratives of a normative duty, but they are still performing as active citizens and conducting counter-radicalisation work for the state. Within this discussion, we also found a detachment within people's thoughts and actions that resulted in indifferent compliance. These insights not only help us see the fluidity between different types of Prevent engagement but also a contradiction between citizens' thoughts and actions. People may think critically or favourably about Prevent compliance, but their practical enactment is indifferent, and they see it as a box-ticking formality. Here we can see the narratives of responsibility and moral/civic duty clash with the bureaucratic realities of different sectors.

This chapter has started the discussion by highlighting the narratives that drive compliance with Prevent Duty obligations. The following chapter will move further up the spectrum and look at more types of compliance and resistance to draw out the overlaps and fluidity between these different categories. While we proceed along the spectrum, this should not be seen as a strictly linear trajectory, people go back and forth between different ideas, their compliance is muddled within different types, and sometimes overlaps with resistance. Therefore, the next chapter should be seen as a link between the instances of compliance and resistance rather than a separate space enclosed within strict borders.

Chapter 7: Hesitation

As we move along the spectrum of Prevent engagement away from compliance, we get to an area where compliance gradually starts getting weaker and actions start moving towards resistance. This is a grey area of sorts where citizens' interactions with Prevent cannot be neatly slotted into either of the poles. This is not due to a lack of engagement per se, because within this space we do find people either complying with or resisting the policy. However, what sets these interactions apart is an element of hesitancy that requires some form of calculation to be made before taking actions. Therefore, this discussion should not be seen as being separate from compliance and resistance but as the interlinking space in between. Hesitation occupies the middle area in the spectrum and by focussing on this, we can move in either direction. Therefore, the insights discussed here represent a stage of deliberation that precedes the decisions of compliance and resistance.

I have chosen to situate this discussion in a separate chapter because there is also an overlap between compliance and resistance where people move back and forth. We can find this oscillation within the gradations of measured compliance, selective compliance, selective resistance, and coerced compliance. These actions see citizens weigh different options that lead them to often act against their initial judgements or park their doubts in favour of complying or resisting. As such, this space of 'hesitation' allows us to conceptualise a stage of deliberation where citizens negotiate clashing narratives of Prevent's statutory duty, their civic and professional obligations, their sense of responsibility, and their feelings and circumstances. This is not to say the cases we discuss in the chapters on compliance and resistance do not impact how people make sense of their civic identity, hesitation lets us see this process more clearly. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, this stage of hesitation feeds into both compliance and resistance so it should not be seen as a stage separate from these processes but rather the intermediary stage in decision-making process. This discussion allows us to explore how citizens act against their primary instincts and more importantly, why they do so. Excavating this new space between compliance and resistance then becomes not so much about understanding which actions are taken in the end but rather about unpacking the cognitive processes that lead to these actions. This is the space where we pause and explore how people make sense of their roles within Prevent and the wider society.

It is useful to focus on hesitation because civic engagement, regardless of where and how it is unfolding, is seldom neatly slotted into definable categories. We often engage with our civic obligations despite having reservations about them. By exploring the interplay of different dynamics here we can also take forward the discussion we started in the last chapter and see how the narratives of active and activist citizenship play out in these processes. Within compliance, we can draw clear linkages between people's readiness to engage and a broader sense of civic responsibility, this chapter should help us understand the instances where different narratives clash with one another.

Prevent puts a legal obligation on frontline professionals employed in public sector institutions to conduct counter-terrorism monitoring and reporting. This statutory status gives it a coercive character that further influences both compliance and resistance to it. As the preceding discussion on compliance has explained, the policy does not solely rely on the weight of its statutory status to ensure engagement, however, an exploration of hesitation will show that this factor does have a bearing on citizens' decision-making process. Whether citizens are leaning towards complying or resisting, the legal obligation of Prevent stipulations usually serves as the final consideration in the deliberation process. However, this does not make this discussion of hesitation redundant by making compliance a foregone conclusion. Even if the legal status of Prevent ensures compliance, it is still important to map the journey that leads to this final stage. Some people interpret the statutory nature of Prevent as a coercive tool wielded by the state to shift security responsibilities to ordinary citizens. For others, however, this grants Prevent a normative authority that corresponds to their wider duty as a responsible, active citizen. As such, how citizens understand and interpret Prevent's statutory provisions tells us how they articulate their relationship with the state, their civic identity and obligations, and their place in the wider civic milieu.

Civic engagement within this space is measured and selective owing to the influence of different factors that come into play as citizens make sense of their role in this expanded security infrastructure. By taking stock of how people deliberate over Prevent, we get to understand what acts of citizenship they will perform. Those hesitating to resist or comply on safeguarding or duty of care principles see themselves as being responsible for protecting their fellow citizens. These deliberations show a kaleidoscope of calculations about loyalty, responsibility, belonging, and freedom. Where citizens situate their loyalties is dictated by how they identify themselves and their role as a good citizen. In this and the following chapter on Resistance, we will also interrogate the idea of good citizen and explore whether there is an alternative conceptualisation that situates acts of good citizenship outside of the neoliberal framework of active citizenship.

This discussion also shows us the messiness and inconsistencies inherent in the deliberation processes. Whether it is people thinking about resisting the policy or complying with it, interviews with ordinary citizens reveal that how people feel about an issue or articulate its usefulness is not

directly matched with how they engage with it. Unlike the instances of overt compliance or resistance, the insights discussed in this chapter help us explore this disconnect between thoughts/feelings and actions. We touched upon this briefly in the discussion of 'indifferent compliance' where there is a divergence in how eagerly people view the policy and how they practically enact it. This discussion will pick at a different kind of divergence where people oscillate between compliance and resistance. As such, by focussing on the process of deliberation, we can map the journey of this disconnect – how do people start from an ideological position but do not translate that into action. What does it take to make this change possible and how does this change manifest in their actions? We can explore this detachment by looking at how people deal with their doubts and concerns, how they reconcile them with external stimuli to make a decision that runs counter to their starting position.

Interview data show that when it comes to articulating the Prevent Duty and implementing it in daily professional routines, there are blurred boundaries between what is deemed acceptable by people and what they would end up doing. In this research, some participants have demonstrated a critical engagement with the policy and are wary of some or most aspects of Prevent and the impact it can have on certain communities. However, despite their reservations with the policy, they agree to comply with it, albeit with some hesitation. This manifests in the different gradations of compliance on our spectrum, these actions have undergone some form of mutation to enable people to deal with the perceived negative impacts of the policy. In this way, hesitation can be seen as the process through which people learn to act against their instincts or negotiate with them to deal with less than ideal conditions. It may sound counter-intuitive, but this disconnect in how people think and how they act is a way of articulating one's civic identity and their place in the society. By reconciling themselves with factors that cause discomfort, people are actively claiming one piece from their identity mosaic over another. This also shows that through the process of hesitation citizens take stock of their civic responsibilities and determine their priorities. They may feel uneasy about complying with Prevent and may feel that their actions could harm the vulnerable person in their care, but this could be overridden by a concern for the safety of other people around them or a sense of responsibility to the state. In this way, we will be able to find how citizens' thoughts and actions map on to citizenship practice. While eager compliance demonstrated a willing acceptance of one's civic duty, this discussion will highlight the kind of engagement where the narrative of active citizenship is dominant but there is unease around it.

Hesitation can take many forms because the factors causing hesitancy are not uniform – people can feel hesitant to act or resist based on a vague idea or a strongly-held belief. The common thread in

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these instances of hesitation is the fact that people undergo a process of internal reflection and negotiation and decide to act despite their concerns or against their primary instincts. In some cases, the concerns are minimised while in others they retain a dominant position in the decision-making process and can be brought to the surface in future interactions.

It is also useful to explore this space because it shows there is a link between compliance and resistance and allows us to unpick the different threads that tether these seemingly disparate actions. While most deliberations result in compliance in one form or another, the process of reaching compliance shows that at several points it clashes with resistance. Hesitation is rooted in a form of uncertainty that makes people consider the merits of both resisting and complying. Some people are worried about the negative impact of the policy on their or other people's well-being, others are more concerned about the prejudices the policy weaponises. However, regardless of the reasons that force people into this process of hesitation, we can see an overlap between resistance and compliance.

To unpack this space of hesitation, we can look at how the mid-point relates to either ends of this continuum. As such, we will unpack the interactions that fall within the gradations of measured compliance, selective compliance, selective resistance and coerced compliance. These sub-categories help us capture different factors that motivate people to deliberate their actions with reference to the Prevent Duty. However, it should be acknowledged that given how intertwined compliance and resistance become in the process of deliberation, it is a bit difficult to neatly categorise different motivations and reasons for hesitating. Instead, these gradations help us look at the starting point of these processes, do people start with the intention to resist the policy or do they start from a more favourable place where they subscribe to the policy's core message but are also conscious of its negative aspects. In gradations falling near the endpoint of compliance, the act of hesitating is not driven by the intention to refuse compliance but the opposite – individuals in these cases are hesitant in resisting the policy. They have doubts about the policy, but they do not want to resist it altogether. We will see that these deliberations are driven by the ideas embedded in active citizenship that make people choose their responsibility to protect others over their own concerns.

Further along the scale, within reluctant and coerced compliance, our starting point is a place of mistrust of the policy and by extension the state. People do not agree with the core principles of surveillance embedded in the policy and see it as a form of harm rather than safeguarding. They see themselves as standing between the state and the ordinary citizen who is being subjected to Prevent. Here we can see the emergence of activist citizenship with people trying to reclaim what the idea of

civic responsibility and resituate their loyalties away from the state. However, this thinking seldom manifests in outright resistance. People get persuaded to set aside their concerns to engage with the policy, albeit in a manner that mutates Prevent into a more amenable programme of governance. This discussion will be capped off with a look at selective resistance, this gradation features instances where people would generally comply with the policy but are not happy with some aspects of it. Hence, the resistance is selective and does not necessarily signal a wider disengagement with the policy.

Measured Compliance

As explained in the previous chapter, re-framing Prevent as a safeguarding duty has been instrumental in not only convincing people to engage with it but to also connect it with a broader sense of civic responsibility. Once people start seeing surveillance work as a means to protect those who are vulnerable and fulfilling a civic duty, the policy stops becoming a coercive intervention in civic life and becomes a necessary component of the duty of care. This has come through very clearly in interview insights of participants who had a favourable view of the policy. However, we can find similar narratives emerge in those cases where there is a more critical form of engagement with the policy. Not all participants interviewed for this research had an explicitly positive opinion of Prevent. Whether resisting or complying, these participants approached the idea of Prevent with a certain caution. In this section, we can look at how people negotiate their concerns about the policy in favour of ultimately complying with its stipulations. As such, measured compliance looks at those participants who acknowledge the shortcomings of the policy and its implementation but do not advocate resisting it completely. Their hesitation in engaging with Prevent Duty varies in both intensity and motivations, but they favour enacting it as this would enable them to fulfil their other perceived civic obligations.

Before any formal engagement with Prevent takes place, there is an internal negotiation whereby an individual makes sense of the policy, their positionality, and their professional and civic duties. This deliberation is often characterised by conflicting thought processes as was evident in the discussion with a primary schoolteacher (ED09). As a white, British man, they spoke about the policy's tendency to make them look differently at minorities. They acknowledged that Muslim communities feel threatened by Prevent and that white working-class children could be more at risk of prejudicial Prevent referrals for 'racist views' without any effort to understand their grievances. They also expressed concerns about the expanding remit and securitisation of civic activity asking if any kind of radical politics can be targeted by Prevent in the future and expressed fears that if they were a student, they could be watched under Prevent given their own political views. Throughout the interview they

demonstrated a thoughtful assessment of the Prevent Duty and its impact on different communities. However, while they expressed concerns and acknowledged different critiques of Prevent, they justified their engagement with the policy by prioritising their different obligations over personal misgivings:

'I know there's quite a lot of opposition to Prevent and even though I'm far from an expert, I'm not completely comfortable with it, although I also see some reasons for it too. So, yes, it's not like I'm just fully behind [it], it's more a case of... I just feel there is a duty in terms of just as an adult in the position of care, it is my duty to help children or vulnerable people, based on my professionalism, rather than because I have to do it for Prevent or for the police or something or the government.' (Primary Schoolteacher, ED09)

By taking account of the negative impacts of the Prevent Duty but then side-stepping them to fulfil their duty to 'children and vulnerable people', this teacher is attempting to disconnect Prevent from the wider security agenda. They can see the potential harms this policy can do, but for them, the risks can be mitigated by focussing on the duty of care aspect of their role. They say they do not do it for the government or for Prevent, but the overriding concern here is protecting people. They may not identify their focus on protecting children as an act of citizenship, but this thought process is rooted in a wider ethos of being a responsible citizen. It is interesting because on the surface, they seem to be shunning the government-assigned label of an active citizen, instead thinking their motivations are rooted in something more organic. This raises the question whether Prevent compliance could also be seen as a case of activist citizenship, whereby an individual is motivated by protecting their fellow citizens rather than following a policy. In the case of this teacher (ED09), they have doubts about the policy but since this is presented as a way of protecting children, they are opting to see the policy as being disjointed from its coercive elements. In addition to a sense of obligation towards their pupils, this engagement with Prevent is also informed by an urge to do the 'right thing' and to cover their back (ED09).

This is similar to the intervention of a medic discussed in the previous chapter who spoke of Prevent as civic duty and 'a reasonable thing to ask for any member of society' (HE15). While this teacher's motivation is not to play a part in the state's security agenda, they still speak the language of active citizenship. While expressing unease with the idea of monitoring their colleagues for Prevent, they said 'I'd find it very uncomfortable, but then I suppose I would like to do it if I thought it was appropriate' (ED09). They provided similar insights on the mass vigilance and surveillance regimes already in place, while criticising the possibility of a 'spying society' they said they didn't necessarily have a problem with the 'see it, say it, sorted' messages at train stations. This back and forth between their concerns over the coercion of security policies and the duty to protect people is evidence of a negotiated compliance with this policy in particular and the wider security agenda in general.

Interestingly, towards the end of our interview, when asked if they felt they had a choice *not* to implement the Prevent Duty, this teacher actually recalled an incident where they chose to opt out of Prevent. This is discussed in the next chapter under 'muted resistance', however I am mentioning this here because throughout the interview, the participant's views were situated within the range of 'measured compliance'. The fluctuation in ideas and actions seen here reflects the instability of binaries. They express concerns for people but support enacting the Prevent Duty, while also choosing not to do so when given the chance. It is clear that they see themselves as a responsible citizen and a professional who has a duty to safeguard others, but they seem to have shifting ideas about how this duty can be carried out.

Furthermore, even though they do not see their compliance with Prevent as being in service to the government, they are following the path the British state has set out for active citizens who take on the responsibility to protect others. This shows that the narrative of responsibilisation gets absorbed in different ways and can permeate even critical stances on the security state. It is possible for a citizen to be wary of surveillance measures but still participate in them because they see their involvement through the narrative of safeguarding and protection, rather than reinforcing coercion. By using the analytical framework of citizenship practice, we can make sense of these contradictory dynamics and understand how and why people accept the responsibilities placed on them by the state.

While this teacher (ED09) manage their own discomfort with Prevent by focussing on the duty of care principles, insights from another interview with a social worker (LA09) showed a different approach to making sense of their unease with the Prevent Duty. Their insights show that while people can feel uneasy about the portrayal of Prevent as a racist and discriminatory policy, they detach the criticism from the actual policy by terming it a branding problem. This social worker, who is a Muslim woman of colour, reiterated their support for Prevent despite the 'perception' it targets Muslims:

'Prevent is necessary, absolutely necessary, but let's not call it Prevent! The policies and all have to be re-looked at and this kind of work has got to be implemented but let's not just focus on the religious aspects of it... because when you do that, it becomes totally a Muslim issue... I know that Prevent also works with right-wing ideas and issues... the white population could be eastern European, could be any religion, but when it is identified for black families, it seems to be Muslims. So, Prevent then comes into it as religious discrimination, it's because of our religion, and that should not be... that should be taken away from that...' (Independent Social Worker, LA09)

This social worker who has decades of experience working with ethnic minority families in different parts of England is quite familiar with the dominant discourses in Black and South Asian communities. They are cognisant of the grievances related to the issues of racism and discrimination. However, with reference to Prevent, they appear to dismiss these grievances as misconceptions that need to be corrected by a different branding. Their engagement with Prevent is rooted in the idea that Prevent was started with 'very good aims' of protecting young people who saw themselves 'fighting a crusade' when 'they have been born and brought up in this country'. Like the Muslim head teacher discussed in the previous chapter, this social worker (LA09) not only situated the problem of radicalisation within Muslim communities, they also saw Prevent as waging a battle of ideas against these deviant viewpoints. They support the work of Prevent Duty by drawing on both active and resilient citizenship that requires citizens to adopt and promote liberal values while monitoring others deviation from these values. This social worker is aware of how people feel about Prevent and recognise that this causes unease even within their own family members, however, they put so much value in the perceived safeguarding qualities of the policy that they favour its compliance, albeit with some cosmetic changes. It is interesting that they do not suggest any other changes in the policy that could make it less discriminatory for the communities they serve.

A similar theme of disconnect was also observed in the conversation with a former school governor and safeguarding lead (ED13). Their overall view of Prevent Duty was quite positive and insisted that teachers should receive Prevent training even when there is no pressure by the Ofsted. However, while their views were supportive of the policy, the way they envisaged Prevent appeared to be quite disconnected from its coercive elements. They kept speaking of Prevent in terms of a 'very wideranging safeguarding' intervention that looks at the 'health, well-being and mental health of children and the families'. For them, the monitoring aspect of Prevent did not matter much because safeguarding is all about monitoring. This is seen differently from 'spying' because safeguarding-led monitoring is about identifying areas/individuals who need help: 'I think it's quite dangerous, getting people to spy on each other because like you say, what may be quite normal for some people is not quite normal for other people. But on the other hand, if you don't have people looking out for each other, then the role of the state is much bigger, isn't it?! For instance, if I worked with homeless people... if I knew one of the people there was a very violent man and was planning to do something, then I would tell the police.' (Former School Governor and Safeguarding Lead, ED13)

They approach Prevent as a means of dispensing help, not necessarily conducting policing. Like the trainee GP (HE02) discussed in 'indifferent compliance', this educator has accepted the use of coercive practices for safeguarding. For the trainee GP (HE02), reporting patients to police was a matter of routine activity, while for this former school governor, 'looking out for each other' is different from 'spying'. This again signals the presence of a securitised logic in welfare services that precedes the introduction of Prevent Duty but that has facilitated its normalisation. By referring to the size of the state they also inadvertently deploy the neoliberal narrative that calls for a smaller state and 'governance through citizenship' (MacDonald et al., 2013b; Rygiel, 2008). So, here again we can see the narrative of active citizenship come through even when the connection is not being made explicitly by the research participant.

The insights of this educator (ED13) are particularly interesting because their deliberations are informed by diverging narratives. They speak of a smaller state and responsibilising people, but then also interpret 'good citizenship' as going on demonstrations and challenging the state while 'respecting other people' and being non-violent. They seem to be straddling the divide between active and activist citizenship by taking on responsibilities for the state while also contesting its control. This divergence can also be seen in the way they approach practical enactment of the Prevent Duty. While they sidestep the coercion inherent in monitoring people's conducts for identifying threats, they advocate non-coercive measures for helping people who are considered vulnerable. They also advocate a wholistic care approach where the entire family receives support and reiterate the need for early intervention services such as youth clubs that can 'try to stop radicalisation'. As such, this engagement with Prevent is situated in the space of hesitation because despite expressing support for the policy, they support deradicalisation strategies that move away from the law enforcement infrastructures. They advocate a programme based on community support and welfare instead of criminalisation and securitisation. In some ways, their measured compliance is not very far from subdued resistance that mutates Prevent into a less harmful intervention, but their inability to engage with the coercion of Prevent keeps them from moving further up the spectrum towards resistance.

In the cases discussed here, the process of deliberation and hesitation leads to compliance, but the act of enacting Prevent Duty is not blind or without doubts. These people are weighing up the consequences and impacts of Prevent whether in terms of making a referral or in providing the support afterwards. The process is characterised by a negotiation of different factors that lead to the conclusion that despite one's concerns, Prevent stipulations should be followed. Seeing these instances as straightforward compliance would mean overlooking the doubts and fears these people have about the policy. They may end up complying with Prevent but it is a guarded engagement that takes the policy's drawbacks into account. Similarly, it would be simplistic to judge all of these interventions favouring compliance as straight-forward active citizenship. While the neoliberal responsibilisation narrative is quite strong in these interventions, the buy-in is not without some form of critical reflection. While they see Prevent compliance as an act of citizenship, they are also interrogating the risks, harms, and shortcomings involved. As such, what we get is something between active and activist citizenship, whereby the process of undertaking civic responsibilities is not done blindly. We can also connect this process of thinking about harms with 'cognitive resistance' that will be discussed in the next chapter. While the end result of these deliberations is still compliance, we can also see the nuanced approach to the policy as a starting point of contesting these harms.

Within these gradations that we place under the banner of hesitation, there are different reasons why people feel uncomfortable with Prevent. People may exist in similar gradations but their motivations for hesitating can be different, albeit with some overlaps. While for one educator (ED09), the concern is with balancing the negative impacts of Prevent with the responsibility to protect others, for another (ED13), the policy is seen detached from its harms. As this discussion will reveal, people make sense of Prevent by weighing and privileging different factors. Another such factor is a concern that Prevent is a surveillance tool. This is mentioned in passing by both the education sector workers discussed above (ED09, ED13) and it also comes up in other conversations. While Prevent is overwhelmingly framed as safeguarding, several participants made unprompted linkages between the policy and surveillance. A teacher seemed to oscillate between their discomfort with the idea of 'spying' on pupils and the recognition that the government needs help. Their intervention shows a confusion between their duty to their pupils and their duty as a citizen, with them negotiating over where their ultimate responsibility lies:

'The reason I'm there is to teach them languages, it's not to do all this other stuff, but I have to recognise that I can't do that job without caring about children and therefore what's happening to them. So, I suppose it's like what you said about civic duty, just as a person, I have a responsibility to notice if something is not right and to act on that. And I suppose the initial fear with the Prevent Duty was am I being used as a kind of spy? I don't... am I involved in counter-terrorism? I don't think I should be! But equally, I understand that we are hundreds of eyes on the ground in places that the government can't get to.' (Secondary Schoolteacher, ED16)

Here we can see the duty of care principles colliding with fears of being co-opted into a surveillance programme. Similar to former school governor (ED13), this primary schoolteacher is also torn between wanting to protect their pupils and resisting being part of a coercive regime. Similarly, they are also conscious of their role as a citizen in helping the state. They accept their duty to safeguard children, but they also do not want to do 'counter-terrorism'. We can see the push and pull of different factors in this brief quote. They talk about their fears convincingly, but they ultimately decide to prioritise their duty to the children, which in this case means complying with Prevent. They mention civic duty that shows that they are also cognisant of their role in the society as a citizen who serves as the eyes and ears of the state. The phrase 'hundreds of eyes on the ground' betrays a surveillance logic but despite their concerns about the coercion of such practices, they are, perhaps inadvertently, advocating this approach to fulfil their professional and civic duties. This is particularly interesting because during our interview, they talked about not being 'immensely loyal to the government' and often disagreeing with the 'way the government teaches' (ED16). They also mentioned they would ignore teaching government-mandated lessons if they didn't agree with it. However, despite their general scepticism of the state, they also see their place in the security infrastructure due to their proximity to the grassroots and their responsibility towards their pupils. As such, despite their critique of the government, they also hold views consistent with those of a securitised active citizen. This inconsistency in instinct and action underscores the importance of exploring this space of hesitation. By mapping these processes of deliberation, we can see how people often advocate actions that may not necessarily match their wider belief systems. This also underscores the instability of binaries, be it compliance/resistance, agent/subject or active/activist citizenship. People are moving between these divides and negotiating their position in the society constantly.

A similar dichotomous approach was revealed by a social worker (LA01) who also explained their role in the Prevent Duty as an agent of the state due to their proximity to people. Like the schoolteacher (ED16), they are not very enthusiastic about the inclusion of Prevent Duty in their professional role, but they understand why that is the case: 'I can see why we would be the ones that would be able to identify concerns... with Prevent, I feel like we can probably be the eyes, it's very big brother... like just watching, snooping and things like that, it's probably what they want us to do... I think if somebody was obviously glaringly like oh God! we are very worried about this child, this young person whose got a keen interest in... I don't know... but then what is extremism as well, could be a lot of things.' (Social Worker, LA01)

They use the term 'big brother' that attaches a negative connotation to the act of monitoring others, and they express uncertainty about what can be identified as extremism, but they still situate themselves within the security state as a professional and a citizen. Interestingly, this linkage between Prevent and surveillance was made by participants from different sectors. This shows that despite the policy's generally successful attempts to present this work as safeguarding, the narrative about spying also cuts through. This tension was evident in some discussions where the perception of Prevent as a surveillance policy was brought up unprompted by the participants. However, they seemed to make a calculation between the worry of spying or being spied on and the overall safety of people, opting for the latter, albeit with some unease:

'I don't want to live in a state where you feel your neighbour is watching you all the time and I don't really believe in the idea of making it people's duty to spy on each other... I think it is somewhat where this might go... but equally I think there is a duty, if you know harm is going to occur you should try to prevent it. But I think how certain you have to be before that duty kicks in, I don't know!' (Secondary Schoolteacher, ED01)

This quote reveals that compliance with Prevent comes with certain reservations, but it also shows that the common-sense around civil liberties alters when it gets dominated by concerns around security. The hesitation in the measured compliance reveals how securitisation of active citizenship dilutes the coercion of security policies in favour of ensuring one's active participation in the society and assisting the state. From teachers to social workers, we can see a similar message being articulated about the unease with spying which then takes a backseat to the overriding concern for public safety. This also shows that when security logics enter the mainstream discourse, they create little pockets of exceptional activity that permit otherwise questionable practices. What is most interesting is that these exceptions sit alongside progressive ideas that people hold. As such, one can have very progressive views on individual liberty and freedom, but they can simultaneously advocate

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or tolerate a security state and facilitate the creation of a mass surveillance infrastructure. While this highlights an entrenchment of neoliberal security logics within the society, we should not ignore the presence of progressive ideas and critical engagement because these create the possibility of resistance. As such, we see some indications of activist citizenship co-existing alongside active citizenship with people's views fluctuating between the different ways of being 'good citizens'.

Selective Compliance

This type of compliance starts from a place of resistance and contestation. People demonstrate a stronger sense of unease with the policy and in some cases express their vocal opposition. As such, on the continuum of civic engagement this activity lies closer to resistance than compliance. However, despite the initial resistance, these instances result in some form of selective compliance with the policy that is done with a healthy measure of reluctance. This shows that despite having doubts or feeling unease, people end up opting for compliance because it is either the only viable option or the consequences of not complying would create more trouble for the citizens.

One of the dominant reasons behind overcoming resistance to Prevent Duty is the need to tackle rightwing extremism. People in this space demonstrate a form of very reluctant compliance that emanates from a position of resistance to the policy. The two notable inputs in this case came from a trainee primary schoolteacher (ED03) and a social worker (LA05), for both of them compliance with Prevent only became an option when it came to addressing concerns about right-wing extremism. These participants expressed strong opposition to Prevent on the grounds that it unfairly targets Muslim communities and discussed the need for a more nuanced approach to understanding the causes and indicators of radicalisation. During the interview, they also talked about their activism for social justices causes and demonstrated a keen engagement with wider political issues as compared to other participants from their sectors. These factors show that in comparison to other participants, they are more aware of the wider discourses on Prevent. While they expressed their opposition to the policy for most part of our discussion, they reluctantly agreed to rely on the Prevent Duty to deal with rightwing extremism. Discussing a family receiving social care intervention that openly displayed threatening right-wing behaviour, the social worker said:

'You could easily have considered referring them to Prevent, though we didn't, it was in the early days, maybe it wasn't on our radar yet... they were regularly involved in behaviour that would bring them to the attention of the police and would make no effort to just hide their extremist views... maybe, I would consider [making a Prevent referral] if I haven't done it. In some extreme circumstances, I would consider it, whether or not I would do it, I am not sure, I think it would take a high threshold rather than their recommended low threshold.' (Social Worker, LA05)

This social worker was very open about their opposition to the Prevent Duty. As the next chapter will discuss, during our interview they talked about their efforts to resist enacting the policy in their professional role. However, despite their vocal opposition to Prevent, they contemplated the possibility of using it as a way to deal with right-wing extremism. They also admitted this could be seen as a 'cop-out' that they were relying on Prevent rather than dealing with the problem in another way. This is a contradictory stance, but it shows the overlap between compliance and resistance, not everyone's views on the policy are uniform and, in some cases, people take up positions that are messy and contradictory. In a similar conversation, a trainee primary schoolteacher (ED03) who had strong reservations about Prevent and was actively involved in anti-racist activism, mentioned a case where they found a pupil reading *Mein Kampf*. They discussed how as a teaching assistant they could not escalate the situation but would consider making a Prevent referral if they come across a similar incident now. When asked if they would do the same if a Muslim pupil has a book on ISIS, they said:

'Yeah, I would do it as well, yeah! I would do it, but again, I think I don't want to. I mean if they had a book about ISIS I would do it, because it is... I mean... but I think there's a fine line here that you can be very religious and a student can become very religious and I don't have to say anything about that, it's not my business I would say and I think that's where Prevent can be extremely problematic.' (Trainee Primary Schoolteacher, ED03)

This response shows that while Prevent is seen as a racist policy by those who strongly oppose it, it can also be seen as a legitimate avenue for mitigating threats of far-right extremism. The same teacher discussed how they would make a Prevent referral if they suspected a pupil was exposed to Fascist ideas. During our interview, they defended this approach by saying that the white family would not feel 'the same pressures' from the police as they would not be exposed to racism like a Muslim or ethnic minority family. They reflected on this stance and conceded that perhaps they do have 'double standards' in how they would approach students from different backgrounds. Our discussion gave them a space to consider different options and they gave thoughtful responses. There was considerable introspection on their part, and they were not scared to admit that they do have different in the political climate we live in is often inconsistent, people move between compliance and resistance

under different circumstances. The compliance we observe here is very selective and limited to a specific kind of threat.

This co-existence of compliance and resistance in these interventions also points to an overlap between active and activist citizenship. Should the selective compliance of this teacher and social worker be seen as their willingness to be deployed as an agent of the state or are they seeing Prevent compliance as a means of anti-racism and thus indicating activist citizenship? I would argue that this engagement with Prevent is more a case of the latter, not necessarily because we are approaching activist citizenship in a literal sense and alluding to the individuals' activism and social justice work. Their actions should be situated within activist citizenship because they are setting the parameters of their involvement. Their participation in Prevent is limited to tackling issues that cannot be adequately addressed by other channels. This reliance on Prevent is due to what they see as a lack of alternative options to deal with right-wing extremism. Viewed against the backdrop of wider societal dynamics, we could put this compliance down to the argument that Britain is institutionally racist whereby many forms of right-wing rhetoric are not seen as a threat and as such there are not many adequate avenues or a general willingness to tackle these problems (MacPherson, 1999, p. 50; OHCHR, 2023; Runnymede Trust, 2021). In this situation, for this social worker (LA05) and the teacher (ED03), Prevent Duty appears to be one of the few ways of mitigating these threats. This also makes us revisit our understanding of activist citizenship as only manifesting within resistance to Prevent. These cases show that even instances of compliance can be seen as activist citizenship whereby citizens negotiate their involvement in coercive practices to minimise harm. This falls in line with Guillaume and Huysmans' explanation of citizenship as a practice of 'negotiating, configuring, and enacting political beings' that can be either 'mobilised in line with or against' the processes of securitisation (2013, p. 35).

During my interviews I also came across a form of selective compliance that was motivated by a completely different set of concerns. These instances involved people who were otherwise quite comfortable with enacting the Prevent Duty but expressed unease about monitoring one's own colleagues. While Prevent is mostly targeted at ordinary civilians – students, patients etc. – who use the services offered by the different welfare sectors, the remit of Prevent expands to anyone with whom a frontline professional interacts, and this also includes their co-workers. The logic behind this approach is that anyone can be vulnerable to extremism. In some training sessions, this is conveyed more openly while in others it is not made very obvious. During the interviews, I asked all the participants about their comfort and willingness to monitor their colleagues under Prevent and this is where I found most of the instances of both selective compliance and resistance. I asked how they

would feel about monitoring their colleagues' actions under Prevent to get an understanding of the boundaries people draw when it comes to such coercive actions. While some maintained the same eager approach to following the Prevent Duty stipulations, even extending it to friends and family, other participants did not support the idea. However, despite their disagreement with this particular aspect of the policy, they agreed to follow it. I find these cases interesting because unlike in the cases discussed above, the difference in opinion on Prevent does not straddle the compliance/resistance divide, but a more subtle form of eager/reluctant compliance binary.

A medic who seemed to be on board with other stipulations of the Prevent Duty, did not agree with the principle of monitoring their own colleagues:

'It's a very, very difficult decision, very, very difficult action! I will probably do it, it's not a comfortable thing to do, it's not an easy thing to do, but this is something I or other people have to do, so, in those meanings, comfortable doing I would say yes. But in the meanings of comfort, like comfortable, yeah, it's not comfortable, it's quite painful thing to do, it's a difficult thing to do. So, in those meanings, it's not an easy thing.' (Consultant Physician, HE17)

Their general outlook to Prevent and other security policies was quite positive. During our interview they said they were 'up for any measures which keep public safe' even if that included compromising people's personal data, freedom, or civil liberties (HE17). Their willingness to give up their right to privacy and freedom in the name of security sits in sharp contrast with their discomfort with monitoring their colleagues. Their earlier responses about giving up their rights for security were also interesting because as a practicing Muslim person of colour, they would be more at risk of being perceived as a threat under Prevent. This disconnect in their attitudes to different aspects of Prevent could be down to the fact that subjecting one's colleagues to surveillance is a more tangible concept than 'giving up civil liberties'. When you are asked to betray the trust of people you work with on a daily basis and share a bond of trust with them, perhaps it is easier to visualise the impact that will have on you as opposed to some theoretical idea of 'giving up your civil liberties'.

This contrast in views could also be observed in my interview with a former schoolteacher (ED10). They spoke of enacting Prevent as a 'civic duty' and saw it as a way of safeguarding children. They spoke emphatically about the role teachers can play in protecting their pupils. None of the training they had received had mentioned the need to monitor colleagues but when I asked them if they would agree to do so, they veered towards compliance but with a lot of discomfort:

'It's a tricky one isn't it?! I would yeah if I thought a colleague could pose a threat, if I was in a position that I could give valuable information and could monitor them, then yes I would, but I wouldn't be comfortable, it would be a bit anxiety-inducing, but no I would agree to that.' (Former Primary Schoolteacher, ED10)

While they concede to subjecting their colleagues to Prevent stipulations, they see this as something that will not be easy and cause them anxiety. However, they did not express any such worries when discussing their responsibility to monitor students. As compared to other health and social work staff, teachers spend a lot more time with their pupils than medics or social workers do. The rapport and bonds of trust that teachers have with their students are stronger than other frontline professionals share with their service users. However, despite this, the former schoolteacher had readily adopted responsibility to subject their students to surveillance but felt discomfort at doing the same towards their colleagues. This could partially be due to the framing of Prevent as a safeguarding duty in the training they received. Their first introduction to the policy was through a lecture during their PGCE qualification course that contextualised Prevent as a means of protecting students. Perhaps if the training had also discussed monitoring colleagues in a similar way, their view would be different, and they wouldn't express such unease with the idea.

Similarly, a trainee GP (HE02) who took monitoring patients as a routine activity and veered towards indifferent compliance expressed unease on the issue of monitoring colleagues:

'I feel like my responsibility is towards patients, I guess if there is a doctor and their views might put patients at risk then I might feel some responsibility, but I am not sure I feel comfortable sort of covertly monitoring somebody really, I feel like that's perhaps more police's responsibility, but then obviously they can't be there 24/7. I don't know that I would feel comfortable going out of my way to try and listen in to the conversations, but if I did hear anything else then I would bring it up.' (Trainee General Practitioner, HE02)

Like the former schoolteacher (ED10), this medic (HE02) appeared to be quite comfortable with the idea of enacting Prevent and monitoring patients. However, when it came to doing the same to their colleagues, they started questioning the ethics of 'covert monitoring'. Before we unpack the

implications of these double standards towards the ideas of monitoring and surveillance and a disconnect between how people view their colleagues and other citizens, it would be useful to discuss the next gradation on our spectrum: 'selective resistance' because the insights discussed in this gradation are also motivated by an unease with 'spying' on one's colleagues. These responses have very subtle differences, but I think it is important to situate them at separate points along our spectrum to adequately demonstrate the variations in civic engagement within Prevent Strategy.

Selective Resistance

These interactions are very closely related to the insights discussed above under selective compliance because the underlying reason behind selective resistance is the same: discomfort with monitoring one's colleagues. As such, most of the engagement that falls within this grey area has elements of compliance and resistance, this makes separating out instances of resistance a bit difficult. Owing to the legal status of Prevent Duty, resistance seldom materialises as very vocal and overt opposition. The next chapter will explore the different nuances of resisting Prevent in detail, in this section, we can look at how selective resistance manifests. This is the kind of opposition that co-exists with compliance because these respondents do not necessarily oppose the idea of enacting Prevent Duty, they are just uncomfortable with some aspects of it. As such, this gradation of our spectrum captures a level of unease with the policy that is not enough to change individuals' minds about the whole policy, but just enough to maybe not do it wholeheartedly. While these responses could be coded as 'selective compliance' because they are motivated by the same reasons as the ones discussed above, it is better to group them under 'selective resistance' because the process of deliberation starts from a place of compliance but ends in a decision to not comply. Unlike the ones discussed above who despite their unease and anxiety, agree to monitor their colleagues, the participants discussed here express an unwillingness to comply. These interventions also demonstrate that even when people take on the role of an active citizen, they do not have a uniform view of whose conducts should be monitored. There can be a hierarchy that separates the vulnerable who should be safeguarded and the people who are considered to be one's peers and beyond the scope of managing.

This was evident in my interview with a STEM professor (ED-H03) who had a generally positive outlook of the Prevent Duty. They said they work closely with the government and given the nature of their research, they were quite comfortable with the idea of assisting the state. It should be mentioned that at the time of our interview, they had not received the Prevent Duty training and said they know 'very little' about the policy apart from the fact that 'it's, you know, bit of common-sense if we expect students of being essentially terrorists, we report it!' (ED-H03). Their lack of training does make their responses hypothetical, but it is still worth taking into account their inputs because despite a lack of 'proper introduction' to Prevent, they still have an understanding of it as a 'common-sense' duty. This demonstrates how pervasive Prevent discourse is within different public sectors that even those frontline staff who have not been formally introduced to it have adopted its rhetoric. However, it should also be acknowledged that this academic's responses might vary if or when they receive Prevent Duty training. During the interview, they demonstrated an awareness of not just the Prevent Duty but the role of universities in tackling security threats referencing the threat from the 'public school cohort' at Oxbridge in the 1960s. As such, they were not opposed to the idea of Prevent and their deliberations of the policy started from a place of measured compliance. They were in favour of a 'subtle, light touch' form of monitoring but expressed discomfort about the idea of staff turning into police officers. They expressed the strongest opposition to the idea of monitoring their colleagues and said they 'wouldn't want to be actively suspecting people, that's a bit of a problem' (ED-H03). As modes of resistance go, this response is admittedly rather timid, and one could easily question whether it is even resistance at all. However, I believe this exchange should be seen as an act of selective resistance because their overall approach had been very supportive of Prevent. When asked about the role of higher education in Prevent Duty, they straightaway responded positively by saying there is a threat from overseas students that needs to be tackled. As such, their discomfort with the idea of monitoring their colleagues sits in contrast with their overall approach and should be seen as an act of selective resistance. This demonstrates a certain paternalised tendency whereby people are happy to subject their students or patients to the Prevent Duty because they are perceived to be in the professional's care. However, when it comes to monitoring one's colleagues, it becomes a matter of subjecting your own peers to a form of suspicious safeguarding that makes people uneasy. We can also see a clash of narratives here because they adopt the logics of securitised active citizenship when they talk about the role staff can play in tackling threats. They are comfortable with the idea of shifting security responsibilities to citizens, however, this idea clashes with the lived reality of doing constant surveillance that could have them target the people they trust. Like the medic discussed above (HE17) who felt comfortable with 'giving up their civil liberties' but took exception to monitoring their colleagues, perhaps this academic is also unable to reconcile their support for coercive activities and their practical enactment.

A similar response trajectory was also observable in my interview with a primary schoolteacher (ED14). Their overall view of Prevent could be categorised as indifferent compliance. They supported the idea of schoolteachers and citizens in general playing a role in counter-terrorism and said that anyone not engaging with the Prevent Duty is 'not respecting the values of society' (ED14). However, they also kept on insisting that because they teach primary school children and given the young age of their pupils, Prevent is not really a concern. As such, they existed in a space where theoretically they agreed with the principle of Prevent Duty and saw it as an important safeguarding duty, but given the age range of their pupils, and perhaps also the demographic they serve, they did not think they would have to be concerned about their pupils' vulnerability to extremism. While they were on-board with the idea of enacting Prevent Duty, they emphatically refused to monitor their colleagues saying, 'I don't feel that would be my role to do that' (ED14). This marks a sharp contrast with their approach to monitoring their students or even reporting suspicious behaviour as a good citizen. They are comfortable doing that, but they refused to monitor their colleagues under Prevent Duty. This refusal to comply is interesting and slightly puzzling because they are happy to conduct counter-terrorism work as a teacher and as a citizen but subjecting their colleagues to Prevent is seen as something they are not supposed to do. The unease here is influenced by both a sense of loyalty to colleagues and also an idea of what their professional responsibilities entail.

These responses in both selective compliance and selective resistance demonstrate a disconnect in how people make sense of security and surveillance. There seems to be a social hierarchy where people see their co-workers as being part of the circle of trust and thus beyond the scope of monitoring but people who they are teaching or treating as patients fall outside of this group. It is acceptable to subject the latter to monitoring because they could pose a threat, but it becomes uncomfortable when you have to do it to your colleagues because these are the people you know and trust. This betrays a sort of insider-outsider divide whereby it is considered acceptable to conduct surveillance on the general public – the outsiders, but not within the inner sanctum. Here Prevent is etching a security border within different civic spaces where binary identities are imposed on citizens by frontline professionals, hence dividing the society into 'suspects' and 'agents' categories. Even though this is not always overtly conveyed in Prevent trainings and literature, but we can see that given the structure of Prevent, this discriminatory logic diffuses itself in institutional cultures making people adopt double standards.

In the discussion of 'selective compliance', we looked at the reluctant engagement of a teacher (ED03) and a social worker (LA09) and interpreted those actions as activist citizenship because they set strict parameters within which they would engage with the Prevent Duty. It is worth revisiting that point to explore if these instances of selective resistance should also be seen as acts of citizenship through which people push back against state control. We can see that people exercise agency when they refuse to enact the policy in circumstances that make them uncomfortable. In these instances, they

are also actively choosing to situate their loyalties away from the state and within their immediate social circles. This shows us that we have to approach society as a multifaceted entity with a hierarchy of connections. Therefore, the choice to not subject one's colleagues to Prevent monitoring could be seen as what Neveu has termed a 'low-noise' act of citizenship (2014, p. 92). However, I would not classify these inputs as activist citizenship because apart from the choice to selectively resist Prevent Duty, these individuals predominantly identify with the neoliberal logic of citizens taking on security responsibilities to keep people safe. They may split their loyalties between the state and their inner groups, but they are at ease when monitoring the conducts of others. This clash of narratives further highlights the overlap between the ideas of compliance/resistance and active/activist citizenship. People do not have uniform ideas and their articulation of their role in their society and where their loyalties belong shift depending on a variety of factors. This does not mean we should do away with the different narratives and discard our analytical frameworks, however, we should learn to not see these concepts as hermetically sealed silos because the lived reality of these ideas is fluid and murky.

Coerced Compliance

This form of compliance also lies closer to resistance but unlike the previous examples, the process of hesitation here is influenced more by the coercive influence of the policy rather than reluctance due to other reasons. This discussion follows on from Indifferent Compliance where we reviewed how Prevent referrals can be coercive for the individuals being referred. By exploring how frontline staff feel coerced into engaging with their Prevent Duty obligations, we look at another dimension of this phenomenon. Owing to Prevent's statutory status, citizens employed in public sector institutions come under a legal duty to enact the policy as part of their professional routines. Due to sectoral dynamics and institutional cultures, the policy is implemented differently across these sectors. This variation can be seen in how Prevent enactment is monitored across different institutions, for example schools are monitored by Ofsted and can be downgraded for failing to meet their Prevent Duty obligations, while universities are monitored by Office for Students through a self-assessment and self-reporting mechanism (Carr, 2021; Office for Students, 2018). Similarly, as we will discuss in Chapter 8: Resistance, an individual's place in the professional hierarchy also makes a difference in how they would engage with Prevent, with some senior staff members taking a strong stance in opposing the policy as opposed to those in junior roles. However, despite these variations, it is interesting that the coercive element of Prevent can be conveyed regardless of how stringently or leniently the policy is enforced and monitored. This section will unpack this tension between the presence of coercive influence across different sectors but the variation in how it manifests depending on the individual's professional sector and their job description.

As the previous chapter explains, the British state has normalised civilian-led surveillance work by using the narratives of civic responsibility and safeguarding and routing the policy through professional practices. This has served to hide Prevent Duty in plain sight and facilitated the engagement of citizens. However, as we have seen, while consent remains a dominant factor in Prevent compliance, there is an underlying coercive element as well. As such, Prevent enjoys a dual control over citizens, while the policy is presented as a welfare-oriented civic duty, its statutory status gives it a coercive character that limits the scope of agency of citizens in this regime.

In my interview data, I did not find any cases of Prevent compliance that were purely due to the coercive nature of the policy. In all my interviews, I could see a few different narratives emerge, some were complementary to each other, whiles others clashed. As such, when we talk about coerced compliance, we are drawing out the insights of those people who were more aware of the statutory nature of the Prevent Duty than others.

The compulsion of Prevent's statutory status was evident in a number of cases, regardless of people's personal views on the policy. A medic who was generally on board with Prevent, displayed a sense of compulsion in following the policy as doing otherwise could have negative consequences for them:

'I could potentially be in a lot of trouble if I said you know what I'm not doing this... I work in the NHS, it's a huge organisation and I think I would potentially lose my job... I would have some sort of warning with disciplinary action potentially, because it would be then considered that I wasn't following government policy which is now NHS policy.' (Psychotherapist, HE05)

This medic occupies different gradations of the spectrum because their otherwise eager compliance is accompanied with coerced compliance. While they are convinced of the normative aims of Prevent and its significance as a safeguarding duty, they are also acutely aware of its statutory status. Hence, even though their engagement with Prevent is rooted in the narrative of active citizenship and they accept their responsibilities as a self-governing citizen, they are also aware of the more coercive tactics of state control. Even though their understanding of negative consequences is based on what their employer would do, so the source of coercion is situated in the NHS, not the British state per se. However, they also know that their sector has to ensure compliance with 'government policy' and non-compliance would warrant punitive actions. This is not the kind of state control we normally

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associate with citizenship practice that leads to deprivation citizenship as discussed in Chapter 5. However, I would argue that through the statutory status of Prevent, the British state is ensuring citizens behave like neoliberal agent/subjects by filtering state control through different professional structures.

Most of the responses in this theme are hypothetical as none of the participants in this research had actually been sanctioned for refusing to comply with their Prevent Duty obligations. However, this lack of actual experience with the process in itself provides valuable insights because it shows the cognitive effect Prevent has on citizens. If people feel the coercive influence of Prevent without having actually suffered any consequences, it shows how successfully Prevent has been diffused into the professional logics of different sectors. Frontline staff operate on a fear of detriment to their career or well-being in case they do not comply with this statutory duty. This also came up in the interview with the trainee teacher (ED03) discussed earlier who reluctantly agreed to make Prevent referrals for far-right extremism. When asked if they could be compelled to follow the Prevent Duty stipulations, they also acknowledged that opposing the policy could impact their professional life:

'I have to, yeah... I am legally responsible. So, if I don't do it and then someone finds out that I didn't do my job, I could have consequences.' (Trainee Primary Schoolteacher, ED03)

In a similar case, a primary schoolteacher (ED02) maintained opposition to the policy throughout our interview and detailed the different interventions they would put in place to tackle risks of extremism amongst their student body. Owing to their two decades of experience in teaching, they appeared to be quite confident about not taking on any Prevent duties, however, they did concede that Prevent as a legal duty has an influence on their sector. When pressed, they accepted that they would have to engage with Prevent in some way if they were forced to as it is a statutory obligation. This resignation about the coercive influence of Prevent within different sectors was also highlighted by a junior university academic who said that they could be vocal about their reservations with these counter-terrorism duties, but it would not have any meaningful impact:

'I think I could certainly raise my concerns and express my opinions but I don't think that would make a difference and I would still say we have to do this online tick-boxes training, I will still probably do it [follow Prevent Duty], more because of my precarious position and wanting to earn an income than for any other reason. So, yeah, I think I could express them, but I really don't think it would make a difference in practice.' (University Lecturer, ED-H04) While the primary schoolteacher (ED02) and this university lecturer (ED-H04) occupy different positions in the professional hierarchy, with former in a secure permanent job and the latter in a temporary one, they both can feel the coercive influence of Prevent's statutory status. This shows that the way Prevent is changing institutional cultures is in itself becoming a source of compulsion for citizens working in these sectors. The coercion inherent in Prevent's statutory status bleeds through regardless of how it is presented to frontline professionals in different sectors or how much the latter agree or disagree with the policy's stipulations.

Conclusion

This discussion of hesitation as a mid-point space between compliance and resistance sits in a different chapter but it is connected to the two ends of the spectrum. Hesitation captures the process of deliberation that precedes a citizen's decision-making process; therefore, the chapter provides further context of how and why people end up complying or resisting with the policy. I have chosen to label this place hesitation because during my interviews I noticed that participants went back and forth between different ideas with their actions sometimes going against their initial instincts. While the previous chapter on Compliance helped us identify how narratives of securitised active citizenship influence people's decision to engage with the Prevent Duty, this discussion shows that Prevent enactment is not always straightforward but a negotiation of different beliefs and concerns. These ideas are not always articulated in the language of citizenship or civic responsibility, but once we scratch below the surface, we can identify how they connect to these broader narratives. One of the most interesting findings of this chapter is how people make sense of their Prevent Duty obligations by deploying contradictory narratives. We see some participants talk about resisting the government and not wanting to live in a spying society while also justifying their role in Prevent as the eyes and ears of the state. By analysing these findings through the framework of securitised citizenship, we can make sense of these contradictory stances by connecting them to the wider narratives of responsibility and self-governance.

Within these insights, we can also find an interplay or clash of different narratives in how people decide to engage with the policy. This process of deliberation also shows us that there is an overlap between acts of compliance and resistance. The spectrum I have put together covers nine different types of civic engagement within the enactment of Prevent Duty. This chapter covers most of these to highlight the fact that the way people normally think about Prevent or interact with it mostly lies at the intersection of compliance and resistance. For a variety of reasons, people are not always in

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favour of or able to fully comply or contest the policy. By splitting these interactions within the gradations of measured compliance, selective compliance, selective resistance, and coerced compliance, I draw out the influence of different narratives and factors that inform how Prevent enactment is articulated by citizens. By looking at the factors that determine citizens' engagement with Prevent, we can also glean insights about how they interpret the idea of civic responsibility and 'good citizenship'. When citizens weigh the salience of different narratives to decide whether to enact the Prevent Duty or contest it, they are telling us where they situate their loyalties, how they see the state and the society, and whether the idea of society is one monolithic entity or a hierarchy of groups.

We start this chapter with a discussion of 'measured compliance' to understand how people manage their unease with some aspects of the Prevent Duty and justify their role in the policy. These findings are different from the ones discussed under 'indifferent compliance' because instead of acknowledging some problems with Prevent and then moving on, the insights shared here are borne out of a sense of discomfort. People are uncomfortable with the Prevent Duty, but they still advocate compliance with it because they either see it as a way of protecting people or participating in the society and helping out the state. They sidestep concerns about the prejudicial nature of Prevent monitoring or the policy encouraging people to spy on each other by deploying the narratives of civic responsibility and safeguarding. We also find people alluding to the narratives of moral and resilient citizenship by encouraging Muslim communities to actively participate in Prevent work. These also come with the acknowledgement that Muslims may feel targeted by the policy, but people manage these concerns by pointing out the security threats that need to be tackled. The views catalogued under 'measured compliance' are predominantly rooted in the idea of active citizenship that facilitates the acquiescence to state control and self-governance but this buy-in is also accompanied with a process of deliberation. As such, we can place these between active and activist citizenship because even though these people are advocating compliance with Prevent Duty, they are at least trying to unpack some of its harms and as the Resistance chapter would show, cognitive resistance can be the starting point of a more concrete push-back.

Through the discussion of 'selective resistance', we see how people who are generally supportive of Prevent talk about contesting it to avoid monitoring their co-workers. While selective compliance helps us understand how people who express a vocal opposition of Prevent Duty obligations would engage with it to tackle the threat of far-right extremism. This not only highlights the fluid nature of boundaries between compliance and resistance but also helps us see the overlap between active and activist citizenship. Active citizens who readily comply with Prevent obligations and interpret them as their civic duty advocate resisting the policy in certain circumstances. On the other hand, under 'selective compliance', we can see activist citizens who oppose the introduction of Prevent Duty in their sectors consider engaging with it with some caveats attached. These contradictory stances make us interrogate the efficacy of applying these labels very strictly because they reveal the messiness inherent in the lived reality of Prevent enactment. The everyday enactment of Prevent does not happen with clear-cut boundaries and we can locate activist citizenship in compliance and active citizenship in resistance to the policy.

Covering a cross-section of different types of engagement also allows us to draw out the coercive elements of the Prevent Duty. So far, through our discussion of active citizenship, we have approached state control and securitisation of civic life by looking at how Prevent is normalised by connecting this legal obligation to narratives of responsibility, safeguarding, and civic duty. This demonstrates an element of policing by consent within Prevent enactment. However, by looking at coerced compliance, we also see how the coercion of Prevent's statutory status impacts the way people approach the policy. In some cases, the fact that Prevent is a legal duty weighs heavily in people's deliberations to comply or resist, in others it's just a consideration along with other motivations. Regardless of how much people get influenced by the policy's legal status, it does play a role in determining engagement. This helps us highlight how the governance regime of securitised active citizenship operates by deploying positive narratives alongside the threat of punitive action.

The next chapter will discuss the different gradations of resistance. While we situate some forms of resistance under the broader category of Hesitation, the following chapter will discuss insights where people are clearer about their intention to resist or not comply. These actions still involve a process of deliberation, but the thoughts and ideas shared under Resistance are more clearly oriented towards contesting control and undertaking acts of citizenship by challenging the state. We will see some of the participants we have already discussed also appear in the next chapter, this will further highlight the fluidity of the borders between these different gradations and the instability of binary framings.

Chapter 8: Resistance

The discussion so far has looked at the different ways in which citizens comply with the Prevent Duty and in some cases move away from this compliance into the grey zone of hesitation. Through this enquiry, we have found that this engagement is not uniform and cannot be fitted into neat categories of absolute compliance or resistance. Therefore, I have analysed how people respond to their Prevent Duty obligations by mapping them on to a spectrum of activity that conveys both the multidimensionality as well as the fluidity of these interactions. The last chapter allowed us to explore the midpoint of this spectrum by taking stock of the deliberations that precede citizens' decisions to comply or resist. In this chapter, we will move further along the spectrum towards those instances of Prevent engagement that sit closer to the endpoint of resistance. While the findings discussed here are more resolutely in favour of challenging one's co-optation within Prevent and contesting state control, we will see insights from some of the same people who were also featured in the previous two chapters. This demonstrates that a single individual can embody different shades of resistance and compliance as these are dictated by a variety of complementing or clashing narratives. As such, we can analyse this fluidity in the spectrum in two different ways. It can be seen as a clash of different narratives; this was evident in our discussion of measured compliance, selective compliance, and selective resistance, where we saw people juggling contradictory narratives to act against their instincts. Alternatively, we can also see this overlap between the different gradations of the spectrum as a linear progression where people start from one point and progress on to the next. While this approach may appear contradictory, it serves to highlight the messy reality of Prevent engagement. This chapter will take the latter approach and analyse the last three points on the spectrum – cognitive resistance, muted resistance, and vocal resistance – as interconnected stages of a single process.

By approaching resistance through this process, this chapter will be able to interrogate the concept and open it up to a more expansive conceptualisation. As the discussion on activist citizenship in Chapter 4 argued, we should approach resistance as an umbrella concept for analysing different types of scattered and irregular acts of contestation. Within Prevent Duty engagement, we find resistance in a variety of micro-processes – practices, rationalities, and thought processes of contestation (Death, 2010, p. 240). Taking a variegated approach shows that the technologies of resistance can be visible and vocal or subtle and muted, our subjects may deploy their power and elect to take risks, or they may submit and opt for pragmatic approaches. We will not find outright revolt or rebellion here, but different modes of contestations that manifest in banal everyday activities. However, every act or declaration of resistance unveils a web of power relations explaining how people articulate their obligations to the state and their fellow citizens. As such, by putting forward a typology of resistance that brings together varied acts of defiance, this chapter will argue that resistance should be seen as a consolidation of divergent technologies and activities that would otherwise go unacknowledged.

The framework of citizenship practice helps us reconceptualise resistance because it tells us that citizenship is not just defined by the state but it is co-constituted by the ideas and actions of ordinary citizens (Huysmans and Guillaume, 2013; Isin, 2009). It draws our attention to mundane activities that are hidden within different pockets of civic life (Staeheli et al., 2012). This helps us capture the irregular and scattered acts of contestation that push back against state control and challenge the disciplining and self-governance of citizens. By focussing on resistance to state control, we also move beyond active citizenship and governmentality as a governance strategy to look at activist citizenship and counter-conducts (Foucault, 2009, pp. 200–210). In our discussion so far, we have analysed the influence of active citizenship narratives and neoliberal ethos of shifting responsibilities to citizens on Prevent engagement. We have also found some instances of activist citizenship in previous categories, but by focussing on how citizens resist their co-optation within Prevent, we can learn more about how they reclaim their civic identity and reinterpret their responsibilities to the society.

Prevent Duty is conveyed to frontline staff through a series of mandatory training programmes that are often delivered alongside safeguarding modules. In this way, from the very first introduction of Prevent into professional practice, it is impressed upon its recipients that it is a safeguarding duty. As the previous discussions show, by deploying Prevent through safeguarding, the state also links to the broader narratives of securitised active citizenship that require citizens to play a proactive role in protecting others. This results in people mostly accepting their role within Prevent Duty enactment either eagerly or managing their hesitation by seeing it as their civic responsibility. However, amidst this dominant consensus in favour of Prevent, there are also instances of resistance and contestation. Given the hegemonic presence of Prevent across different sectors, these responses are scattered, irregular and punctuated with concerns about job security, disciplinary action, and a fear of appearing negligent. As such, the reasons for resisting and the techniques of resistance are not just influenced by one's views on security, safeguarding and civil liberties, but also their own identities, their place in the professional hierarchy, and the social capital they appear to possess. I should add that these factors also influence people's decision to comply or be hesitant as we have discussed previously, however, they occupy a prominent place in the discussion of resistance because contesting this legal duty is a risky endeavour that can impact people in a number of different ways.

Owing to these different factors and power dynamics, resistance to Prevent manifests in a variety of actions and intentions with varying degrees of commitment and vigour. As the discussion on 'selective resistance' in the previous chapter demonstrates, people can be quite comfortable with some aspects of the policy but resist others. Similarly, as the insights discussed under 'selective compliance' show the variation in approach can be seen within the actions of a single individual who can go from vehemently opposing the policy to conceding some form of engagement. This can either be because people view Prevent referrals as an appropriate action for addressing certain issues – such as the schoolteachers who see it as an avenue for tackling right-wing extremism. Alternatively, it could also be a case of Scott's 'symbolic compliance' to avoid sanction (1985, p. 26). By building on the conceptualisation of resistance provided in Chapter 4, this following discussion will unpack all of these dynamics and explore the ways in which people push back against their Prevent obligations and reclaim their identity and responsibilities as citizens.

Cognitive Resistance

In his analysis of quotidian contestations of power, Scott explains that thoughts and acts of resistance are in a constant dialogue, the former may not immediately result in the latter, but they serve as cognitive openings that make defiance possible (1985, p. 38). As such, we can start our discussion of resistance to Prevent by looking at contestation through ideas – a cognitive form of resistance. Through these thought processes, individuals not only negotiate their engagement with Prevent but they also interrogate their place in the society and their responsibilities as a good citizen. The findings discussed here are similar to those catalogued under 'measured compliance', however, these have different orientations. The deliberations discussed under 'measured compliance' start from a place of resistance but move towards compliance. Cognitive resistance is different because it is both the starting point of resistance as well as an act of contestation in its own right. The insights discussed here will show that people start the process of resisting by rejecting the common-sense consensus and questioning Prevent's framing of threat and vulnerability. Through these cognitive openings, people start to articulate a desire to claim some form of agency within the subjection of Prevent. These do not always translate into action and given the coercive nature of Prevent governance, it is difficult to match the intensity of cognitive resistance to actual acts of contestation. However, it is worth starting our conversation with an overview of resistance through ideas because these explain why people choose to or want to resist the Prevent Duty. It also makes sense to take account of these cognitive openings because active citizenship requires citizens to adopt and promote liberal ideas. The self-governance of disciplined subjects starts from cognitive obedience as we can see in the framing of Prevent Duty as a 'battle of ideas' to be waged by the adherence and promotion of British values.

Therefore, even if cognitive resistance does not translate into actions, it should still be seen as an act of activist citizenship as it challenges the common-sense narrative of individuals accepting security responsibilities and monitoring their fellow citizens for the security state.

While we agree that cognitive resistance can be seen as an act of contestation in itself, we can also approach it as a starting point of the process that leads to more active forms of resistance. To explain the linkage between cognitive, muted, and vocal resistance, this chapter will feature inputs from the same participants throughout this chapter to map out the thought processes that manifest in resistance and identify the reasons that influence people to oppose the Prevent Duty. Unlike the previous two chapters, the types of resistance in this discussion should not be seen as separate categories but as steps in a process that starts from an idea and culminates into an action.

For a university Graduate Teaching Assistant (ED-H07), opposition to Prevent Duty was rooted in concerns about structural racism and how Prevent has established a framework for exacerbating and entrenching these practices in different institutions. They highlighted how Prevent changes a citizen's relationship with the state and co-opts them into a system of oppression:

'The government is addressing people to be representatives of the state in a small community... so, everyone becomes responsible for the public security... when you embed all the racial values that is within Prevent, you start to reproduce the same colonial, white supremacist power, and you become the oppressor to a certain degree... I think it's kind of evil to make people become those tools of the institution that is already racist.' (Graduate Teaching Assistant, ED-H07)

Through this insight, this academic is drawing our attention to two different yet connected issues here, they situate Prevent within a wider societal framework that is informed by racist logics of threat and security. They explain how these logics get reproduced and reinforced when Prevent policing enters different institutions, such as the university where they work. Along with this, they also focus on the co-optation of ordinary people in this oppression. Their cognitive resistance is rooted in their concern about being complicit in this coercive system. They talk about not wanting to 'reproduce' the 'racist project' of Prevent not just as a teacher, but also as a person pointing out that Prevent works everywhere whether it's the university or their apartment building. This intervention sits in contrast with the findings discussed under 'measured compliance' where participants subconsciously acted upon securitised active citizenship narrative of wanting a small state and taking on responsibilities

while expressing discomfort with spying for the government under Prevent. This academic, on the contrary, is fully cognisant of the neoliberal logics that govern Prevent enactment and is using this awareness to reclaim their identity as an activist citizen. Interestingly, by not wanting to reproduce the 'racist project of Prevent', they are not rejecting their responsibility as a citizen, they are just reinterpreting how to meet their civic obligations of protecting other people. Here safeguarding is being seen as protection from state oppression rather than seeing it as a way of protecting the state from risky citizens.

A trainee primary schoolteacher (ED03), whom we also discussed in 'selective compliance' and 'coerced compliance', drew on a similar theme of structural racism and policing when they discussed their resistance to Prevent. They talked about their unwillingness to make a Prevent referral because they situate it within the state's law enforcement infrastructure and do not trust the system to safeguard their pupils, especially those belonging to ethnic minorities:

'I would think twice (about making a Prevent referral) because once you do it, you set in process such a strong machine that something could go very far and could have far-reaching consequences for a particular family, and we know how the police behave! There's so much racism we don't really know what could happen.' (Trainee Primary Schoolteacher, ED03)

Here we can see the cognitive resistance is progressing into a form of muted resistance because owing to their fears about the well-being of their pupils, this teacher is unwilling to make a Prevent referral. However, this insight would still be important even if it does not translate into action because it is challenging the narrative of safeguarding that is associated with Prevent Duty. This should also be seen as a way of reclaiming citizenship along the lines of activist citizenship because they are reinterpreting how they should carry out their civic responsibility of protecting others. Even though under the discussion of 'coerced compliance', we saw that they would comply with the policy because it is a legal duty. Their acknowledgement of the coercion of the policy also serves to reject its compliance as an act of citizenship and by doing so, reclaims the meaning of citizenship. As such, these insights should be seen as resistance or at least the starting point of resistance because cognitive interventions challenge the common-sense acceptance of Prevent Duty and open up the possibility of more pronounced acts of contestation. A similar concern was also highlighted by a medic (HE06) who did not make a direct connection to structural racism, however they expressed unease about exposing their patients to an unknown law enforcement process that could have far-reaching consequences:

'If I do a referral for somebody that I think is unwell, somebody who I think needs other help... the service on offer is to help improve their life. Whereas, this (Prevent) referral... I don't really know what they're going to do... it could mean somebody is being put in prison, it could mean someone being monitored, and even if they were proven innocent, they still would be... so there's quite a lot of guilt on someone's conscience if it's wrong.' (Physician's Associate, HE06)

Here, resistance to Prevent is motivated by the possibility of harm to patients and they are taking a personal responsibility for this, speaking about the guilt for exposing an innocent person to this system. For both the medic (HE06) and schoolteacher (ED03), the concerns about their patients' and students' well-being are accompanied by a mistrust in the law enforcement system. This shows that not only do they see Prevent as a security policy rather than a safeguarding measure, but they also do not believe in the security state's capacity to protect vulnerable people. This lack of trust in the state also reflects the difference in how the state is perceived by active and activist citizens. Active citizenship is contingent on citizens' perceiving the state as a positive entity which encourages them to play a proactive role in the society. However, for activist citizens, the state is a coercive presence and therefore they situate their loyalties away from it and within their communities. This perception also came up in the interview of another schoolteacher (ED02), who also appeared in the discussion of 'coerced compliance'. They see the Prevent Duty as a way of compelling people into not only monitoring others but also subjecting those deemed risky to an intrusive deradicalisation programme.

'The tendency for a Prevent referral to then pigeonhole somebody, we know how it works because the child or young adult gets spoken to by the police... If the parents are present then they're encouraged if they deem it necessary to go down the Channel program,⁷ if they don't want to do that then there's more pressure put on to them.' (Primary Schoolteacher, ED02)

⁷ Channel is a bespoke deradicalisation intervention that offers mentoring support to individuals who have been referred under the Prevent Duty. Not all referrals receive Channel support, a case only progresses to this stage if it is deemed to be risky enough by the police or Prevent co-ordinators at the local authority. Once a case is assessed by the Channel Panel, a counselling programme is put together to offer support to the referred individual.

In our discussion, they also talked about the fact that their primary school pupils are at an age where 'lots of hormones are flying around and their mood swings from one thing to another' (ED02). As a classroom teacher, they said they do not have the time to investigate what goes on in their pupils' heads according to the pre-crime indicators of Prevent and then exposing their pupils to a process that they do not trust. Hence, for them the entire Prevent process is untrustworthy whether it is identifying risks, or the steps taken to mitigate them. Not only do these participants see Prevent as part of the state's coercive security infrastructure, they also see it as a means of doing more harm to vulnerable people. If the adoption of safeguarding and civic duty narrative drives compliance with Prevent, then we can say that critically interrogating these framings and seeing the inherent coercion of the policy is the start of resistance.

A slightly different case for resistance was made by the social worker (LA05) who advocated selectively complying with the policy to deal with right-wing extremism. Their opposition to Prevent is not just rooted in the critique of the wider coercive system but also the way Prevent has securitised certain ideas. This is a clearer example of cognitive resistance where an individual is actively dissenting against the ideas that are instrumental to not just Prevent but also wider counter-terrorism narratives. Speaking of their involvement in the anti-war movement, this social worker rejected Prevent's framing of the concepts of extremism and radicalisation:

'My political views around radicalisation are that it's good to be radical because we don't live in a fair world and I want to change society and that means my view of society is critical of it and I would agree with radical change... Similar thing might apply to extremism... what is the extreme... for example, recently all the stuff around Extinction Rebellion, I would wholeheartedly support Extinction Rebellion... they would be considered extreme.' (Social Worker, LA05)

Here the social worker is taking a clear stance against Prevent's 'battle of ideas' and its framing of certain thoughts and actions as extremist. The mention of Extinction Rebellion is with reference to the reports that some Prevent literature identified the group as espousing 'an extremist ideology' (Dodd and Grierson, 2020). The cognitive resistance put up by this social worker (LA05) is in some ways going deeper than that of other participants because they are tackling ideas that are at the core of Prevent philosophy. As discussed in chapter 3, radicalisation is one the foundational concepts upon which the entire Prevent programme rests, by rejecting these narratives, the social worker is making the policy irrelevant. In our discussion, they also highlighted Prevent's attempts to depoliticise counter-terrorism

by taking a narrow approach to what causes radicalisation and to see the whole policy as a process to be unthinkingly enacted rather than a political action that can cause harm. For them, getting involved with Prevent would thus mean compromising their political principles because Prevent reduces the act of conducting surveillance into a depoliticised process that should be followed by 'putting one's politics aside' (LA05). This critique is similar to the one put forward by Rodrigo Jusué (2022) whose research we discussed in the Literature Review chapter. They identify a similar process of depoliticisation at work in the making of 'counter-terrorism citizens' who are supposed to accept the state's definition of radicalisation without any critique or introspection. This shows that if the active citizen is the unthinking, unquestioning subject, then the activist citizen is the one who critically examines the state's rhetoric.

By engaging in these introspections, the participants discussed here turn into what Death has termed 'intellectualised subjects' whose resistance is not necessarily outright or organised but starts from and often manifests in a refusal to accept dominant ideas of threat and security (2016, pp. 216–217). As such, taking stock of these examples of cognitive resistance helps us to situate the foundations of contestation and we can see where and why resistance to Prevent initiates. This also helps us see how activist citizenship can be done by adopting dissenting ideas and questioning the status quo. As Neveu explained, acts of citizenship can be found in a variety of forms and by capturing cognitive resistance we can capture the thoughts and ideas that allow individuals to reclaim the idea of citizenship and their responsibilities to their fellow citizens (2014). To understand how this form of resistance develops and manifests in actions, the following two sections will look at different ways of resisting Prevent. We will start by looking at 'muted resistance' that aligns more closely with counter-conducts whereby citizens do not pose an overt challenge to the policy but take small actions to work around it (Foucault, 2009, p. 201).

Muted Resistance

One of the most common forms of resistance evident in the responses is not so much a refusal to engage with the Prevent Duty, but to deal with individuals considered to be 'at risk' in alternative, less coercive ways. In these instances, frontline staff opt to take welfare-oriented measures instead of making a Prevent referral, hence treating Prevent as the last resort rather than the go-to option. This is in sharp contrast to participants discussed in the Compliance chapter who displayed an overreliance on the Prevent infrastructure and eagerly complied with the policy by making referrals at the slightest hint of doubt. The latter would usually be motivated by a fear of appearing negligent to the threat of extremism and the statutory weight of the policy. However, the participants who opt to contest the

policy are more cognisant of the impact a Prevent referral could have on their student/patient/service user. Therefore, while they do not outrightly refuse to implement the duty, they make efforts to mitigate the risks posed by Prevent to the well-being of citizens in their charge. The form of contestation on display here falls under the category of Foucault's subtle acts of intransigence rather than a 'whole-hearted resistance to governmentalisation' (2007, pp. 72–73, 1994b, p. 456). This is also not far away from active citizenship because the neoliberal logic of civic responsibility is at play here, citizens accept they have a duty to protect other people, but they choose different mitigations.

Within health and social care, Prevent can be resisted by separating it from safeguarding provisions. By doing so, participants demonstrate that the vulnerabilities of patients and service users can be addressed by using existing services that do not rely on the involvement of law enforcement agencies:

'If I suspected that anybody posed a risk to other people or themselves, I absolutely have a responsibility, not to let the government know, but [to let] the relevant healthcare services know that they are at risk or pose a risk... we've got very good and established steps of dealing with that through our training and safeguarding people that already exist, so I would follow things that already exist, I don't see why we need something else.' (Consultant Physician, HE01)

This doctor is not refuting the possibility that there is a risk of radicalisation, however, they do not see Prevent as the avenue through which this risk should be managed. They believe that the healthcare sector has the provisions to support those individuals who could be vulnerable to extremist views. Here, not only are they separating Prevent from the existing safeguarding infrastructure, they are also reorienting the focus on the safety and well-being of the at-risk individual. The possibility of someone posing a threat to other people is being seen as a condition that should be managed by focussing on the person's well-being rather than seeing them as a security risk that needs law enforcement intervention. Similarly, the social worker discussed earlier explained that they would also opt out of going down the Prevent route and turn to other services such as mental health support:

'I feel that it (Prevent) is not a mechanism for accessing support. I think if somebody's mental health, for example, is leading them into exploring things that could be considered to be extremism, I think that mental health professionals and myself, who may have built a rapport with them, might have a better chance of talking to them about that... than a referral that might put them on a list for monitoring.' (Social Worker, LA05) Similar to the consultant physician (HE01), this social worker is also in favour of turning to existing provisions and safeguarding practices to help out someone with 'extremist' ideas. It should be noted that this social worker is making a direct connection between mental health and extremism, which could prove counter-productive because the British state has securitised mental health and made it into an indicator of vulnerability to extremism. This has resulted in mental health support services being co-opted within the wider security network (Aked, 2022). However, for the social worker (LA05), recognising vulnerability to extremism as a mental health problem is a way of offering traditional safeguarding assistance rather than exposing the individual to the Prevent process. This form of resistance is not necessarily overt and is not challenging the presence of Prevent in the health and social work sectors but by drawing the focus back on existing services, the participants discussed here are reasserting the capacity of their sectors to tackle the issues of radicalisation and extremism without exposing the 'at-risk' individuals to more harm. By opting to use existing services, they are also indicating that they see Prevent as being separate from the safeguarding infrastructures of their sectors. As such, they are rejecting the British state's framing of Prevent as a safeguarding policy. This shows the interconnections between cognitive and muted resistance because by choosing to treat these cases of 'risk' differently, the muted resistance of this social worker (LA05) and the medic (HE01) is also reinforcing their cognitive resistance. Therefore, rather than viewing these as two separate categories of resistance, cognitive resistance should be seen as the starting point from which different acts of contestation may emerge.

This manifestation of cognitive resistance in muted acts of contestation can also be seen in how frontline staff assess threats and deal with them. We discussed a primary schoolteacher (ED09) under 'measured compliance' who saw Prevent Duty as safeguarding and favoured enacting it and being a vigilant citizen despite having concerns about spying and working for the 'government'. Towards the end of our interview, they talked about how in one situation they chose *not* to make a Prevent referral and instead treated the issue as a juvenile behavioural problem that could be handled internally:

'I've had an incident where a child had used a racist word towards another child... the head teacher came down and based on who the child was, he said "listen, I think it's best if you keep them in and have a chat with them about why that isn't appropriate, why he can't say that", and I completely agreed with the head teacher on it... I'm not going to give details or anything, but you know the child that it was, it's just a classic case of ignorant [sic], using a word that they've clearly heard somewhere and not knowing what it means... I think it's completely wrong to then suddenly be like "right! we need to get people involved here"

... they need to be educated and they need to learn what's wrong.' (Primary Schoolteacher, ED09)

The Prevent training this teacher took presented a case study of a young boy who goes to football matches and gets 'radicalised' by a gang sporting tattoos and carrying British flags. Hence, for this teacher, using racist language is an indicator of radicalisation under Prevent, however, despite being aware of this framing, they opted to take an alternative approach to deal with such behaviour rather making a Prevent referral. As I have mentioned before, this teacher advocates compliance with Prevent because while they have concerns about the policy, they predominantly see it as a safeguarding duty. As such, they come from a place of compliance, but in this instance, they chose to carry out their safeguarding responsibility by not engaging with Prevent. Unlike the examples discussed above, this case of resistance does not have much basis in 'cognitive resistance' but we can still see a muted form of contestation emerge here. This shows that countering the hegemonic influence of Prevent is possible even when people support the policy. This also highlights the fluidity of narratives; in our previous discussion of this teacher, we debated whether they exhibit signs of active or activist citizenship, this insight shows that one's thoughts and actions speak to different narratives depending on circumstances. Therefore, we are not dealing with rigid boundaries, in everyday life, people exhibit behaviours and take actions that cannot be neatly slotted into sealed containers.

This form of muted resistance was also favoured by another schoolteacher (ED02), when asked how they would deal with a hypothetical situation where a child is frequenting anti-Muslim message boards or going on right-wing marches, they put forward the following solution:

'What I would do is talk to that student first of all. Is it the case that they're going there and this has happened more than once or is it just someone seen them and they may have been part of an EDL march or they may have been just walking past, is it something that you know a relative is taking them to once, is it something that they are doing regularly, is it something that they are buying into? I think allowing the whole of the state machine to converge on a student is a big deal, I wouldn't do that unless I made sure that actually I was sure of my facts. If the student was going to EDL marches, if they were part of some sort of hate crime that was going on, then ultimately, it (Prevent referral) may be the way to go but it would have to be the last resort.' (Primary Schoolteacher, ED02) The insights of the two teachers (ED09 and ED02) are different in the sense that one is based on an actual experience and another is a response to a hypothetical situation. However, in both the cases, the teachers are aware of not just how certain behaviours are perceived under Prevent but also the risks these can pose outside of Prevent's guidelines. Their solutions for dealing with these problems do not ignore the risks, they want to address the problems but without involving the coercive framework of the Prevent Duty. This schoolteacher (ED02) even reluctantly concedes they could make a Prevent referral, but this admission should not just be seen as 'selective compliance', it is a form of muted resistance whereby they would try to solve the problem in a non-coercive way before subjecting the student to Prevent procedures. As such, the teachers here are aware of their responsibility to tackle a problem, but they are opting to do so without engaging with the Prevent Duty. These two responses are good examples of a form of resistance that is understated and scattered, these teachers are not posing an active challenge to the policy or putting up a vocal opposition. They are resisting in subtle ways without raising any institutional red flags. Perhaps this form of resistance is more possible in the education sector because a teacher can sit down with their pupils and discuss these issues in detail more easily as opposed to frontline staff in other sectors. This is not to say this form of resistance is only possible in the education sector, but some interactions are more conducive to such interventions than others. This also shows that peoples actions can move them towards activist citizenship even if their ideas are rooted in neoliberal logics of responsibility and self-governance.

It should also be pointed out that these mitigations raise questions about what motivates individuals to opt for resistance instead of compliance. In the case of both the schoolteachers (ED02 and ED09), they are making an active choice to judge their pupils' conduct as something that can be managed internally. They are giving them the benefit of doubt. However, it is worth exploring if this would happen in cases that involve different forms of risks and threats as both teachers did concede they might have to engage with Prevent Duty in some way. As such, the choice to resist Prevent is being made with the knowledge that they may have to make a Prevent referral. Even though we know one of them (ED09) advocated compliance by sidestepping concerns about discrimination and racial profiling, the discussions with both the teachers gave the impression that they would follow similar procedures for all students regardless of their religious or ethnic identities. However, from its inception, the Prevent Duty has predominantly focussed on the threat of religious extremism which is seen as a more pressing security concern. This raises the question whether resistance to Prevent is easier in the cases of unintentional racism as opposed to unintentional expression of 'religious extremism'. In the past few years, there have been a number of instances where Muslim children have been referred to Prevent for talking about video games or making innocuous statements that have

been misconstrued (Quinn, 2016; Townsend and Stein, 2021). This is not to suggest that the teachers discussed here who support muted resistance to Prevent only do so for cases involving right-wing extremism, but it is worth exploring whether the wider discourse makes it easier to take a more nuanced approach in these cases as opposed to those concerning religious extremism.

Furthermore, resistance can also be motivated by an individual's empathy and some common ground with the person in question. The British welfare state, especially the education sector, operates on a racial faultline (Bhambra and Holmwood, 2018; Graham and Robinson, 2004; Schulz, 2021; Swiszczowski, 2022). Certain identities are seen as more suspect than others. In recent years, with the introduction of policies such as the Hostile Environment resulting in the Windrush Scandal, we have seen different arms of the welfare state acting to exclude people based solely on their racial identity (Webber, 2018). With racist narratives embedded in the mainstream discourse and bleeding into the workings of different sectors of the welfare state, the common-sense around threat and security gets shaped by these ideas. Within this context, it is worth asking whether resistance to Prevent is easier when the frontline staff can relate to the experiences of the person considered to be 'at risk'. This is not to dismiss all instances of resistance as being opportunistic but taking stock of the wider dynamics would help us understand why people are motivated to contest Prevent. This also brings us back to the murkiness between active and activist citizenship, is it more difficult to challenge state control and reclaim civic responsibility when it goes against the established narratives on who is considered a threat. Given the recent interventions by prominent politicians and commentators who claim that Prevent disproportionately targets cases of right-wing extremism while ignoring religious extremism, it may become more difficult to challenge the dominant narrative and put even muted forms of resistance to save some people from Prevent referrals (Jenrick, 2022; Malnick, 2022).

Given the variation in dynamics of different institutions, resistance to Prevent can diverge depending on how frontline staff come into contact with the members of public. As discussed above, schoolteachers are uniquely placed to play a more proactive role in their pupils' lives. They spend a considerable amount of time with them during the day so they have many opportunities to address any concerns that may come up. A secondary schoolteacher (ED08) said if their pupils were not behaving well, they would just call them after class to talk to them. Within the university setting, however, the pastoral duties and the nature of relationship between the tutors and students are different, therefore, the kind of resistance that we see in schools is often not conducive. However, this does not mean that resistance within these settings is not possible at all. The university academics I interviewed advocated contesting Prevent through pedagogical tools. This form of resistance is muted and irregular and sometimes it can be done without the intention of necessarily resisting Prevent. A university lecturer I interviewed spoke about challenging intolerant ideas by engaging the students in a dialogue:

'I've had many situations as a lecturer where people would say things that were concerning, that we may challenge in relation to becoming a social worker. So, examples of that might have been where people made sexist or racist comments, perhaps those were comments that they thought weren't sexist or racist, but I might challenge them as being so as an opportunity for learning... We had a dialogue that was always open around challenging people's comments, behaviours that don't align with social work.' (University Lecturer, ED-H02)

As discussed above, having sexist or racist views is not an indication of radicalisation per se but within the loosely defined criteria set by the Prevent Duty, even those academics who are not on board with the policy flag up these issues as 'concerning' within the context of Prevent. While they recognise the 'risks' using Prevent criteria, their approach to dealing with these is different. Rather than exposing their students to a coercive policy, they believe in using pedagogical tools to engage their students in debate and challenge their ideas. This form of muted resistance is not overtly rejecting the Prevent Duty but these interventions are serving to side-line the Prevent process. A graduate teaching assistant (ED-H07) was clearer about how they contest Prevent by creating a safe space for their students. They talked about addressing racism exhibited by a student through providing them opportunities to not just express themselves but also learn from the experiences of their tutor (a woman of colour) and peers. While the participant did express dismay at their inability to tackle this problem, they stayed adamant about not making a Prevent referral:

'One white, male student who always, in the classroom, outside the classroom, in academic activities for QTPOC (Queer, Trans People of Colour), conversations, would make interventions that were clearly sexist and racist and he couldn't grasp the idea of anti-racism, he was curious but he couldn't set himself free from the values of what he'd learn, and yeah it was very difficult, we could see that there was anger there... I don't think Prevent would be good! I wouldn't (make a referral), even after seeing the masculinity he would perform.' (Graduate Teaching Assistant, ED-H07)

While similar to the mitigations put in place by the two teachers discussed above (ED02 and ED09), this example sits in sharp contrast to those because in this case the student is being protected from Prevent even though their actions are becoming a source of distress to the tutor and no doubt other students around them. The tutor here is putting up two fronts of resistance, one against Prevent and one against the racist behaviour of their own student. However, despite the challenges, this tutor is clear that they do not see Prevent as a solution for changing their student's ideas. This response is indicative of an approach that is reverting back to a pre-Prevent notion of prevention that foregrounds the well-being of the 'vulnerable' person rather than exposing them to a system that could cause more harm. This can also be seen in other responses where teachers, social workers, and medics try to draw on different tools from within their professions to manage the 'risk'. These participants do not necessarily reject the responsibility they have but they are reorienting it towards the people around them. In the Compliance chapter we discussed how the very idea of safeguarding is being recalibrated to prioritise the safety of others over the well-being of the 'at-risk' individual. This response shows a different approach where the tutor is looking out for the student by adopting non-coercive measures.

The interventions discussed here are being presented as resistance to Prevent but these are not overt and, in some cases, perhaps also not intentional. The challenges these acts pose to Prevent are scattered and irregular, they do not intend to and neither will upend the system, these are counterconducts where people claim some agency to subvert the system while working within it and reinforcing it. These are not counter-hegemonic acts, but they should still be seen as forms of resistance because despite being irregular and innocuous, they offer some opposition to a coercive policy. As explained earlier, the different gradations of resistance discussed in this chapter should be seen more as different steps in a process rather than different categories or types of resistance. As such, these muted acts of contestation often exist alongside more visible forms of resistance. An individual can offer muted resistance or be more vocal depending on the context because the latter involve a certain element of risk to the professional well-being of frontline staff. To dismiss these acts would mean we ignore a large number of interventions that make up the everyday enactment of Prevent Duty. This also allows us to reinforce the idea of citizenship as a practice co-constituted by both the state and citizens. By highlighting the murky divide between active and activist citizenship, we further show how different acts of citizenship are influenced by both the narratives set by the state and those put forward by citizens to reclaim their identities and responsibilities. As such, this discussion is useful for not just expanding our understanding of the concept of resistance but also for opening up new spaces where we can learn about a citizen's relationship with the state. The following

section will progress to the next stage of resistance to understand how people can put up a more robust challenge to the Prevent Duty despite being restricted by its normative and statutory norms.

Vocal Resistance

These instances of resistance differ in nature and scope from mitigations discussed above, however, there is not a clear split amongst who opts for these in favour of others. The same participants who use muted interventions have also discussed expressing their unease or even opposition to Prevent more or less vocally. While there is a clearer risk associated with openly criticising a legal duty than quietly contesting it, the same people could be doing both, depending on the circumstances around them. This shows that acts of contestation can be varied and multifaceted even within one person's resistance to the policy.

A common theme that emerged in these instances is using the Prevent training as a site of resistance. The training for Prevent Duty is conveyed in a number of different ways. Some professionals have to do a 30-minute online module, while others can be invited to a Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) with a Prevent training lasting between two hours to half a day (Home Office, 2015c). On paper, these sessions are designed to serve as spaces where people can raise questions and concerns. The Prevent co-ordinators and trainers I interviewed would triumphantly share stories about how they allayed people's fears and settled their concerns about Prevent in their training sessions (PC01, PC02, TR-LA01). As such, these sessions serve as both avenues for vocal and visible resistance by the frontline staff and counter-resistance by the state. In some ways, resistance can also start even before the individual attends the training. A social worker discussed above (LA05) used the invitation for the training as an opportunity for resistance by refusing to do the training:

'Four, five years ago, a manager contacted me and said "we are looking for somebody to lead on making sure everyone does the Prevent training" and I said I don't want to do that because I don't agree with the Prevent training, I think that Prevent is racist, so you should find someone else. And they said, "oh right, fair enough" and didn't come back to me.' (Social Worker, LA05)

This was an overt form of resistance whereby this social worker took a vocal stance to make their opposition to Prevent Duty known and explained their reasons to their manager. By refusing to take the training, they also delivered the message that they won't be enacting the duty in their day-to-day routines. Given the coercive influence of Prevent Duty in the public sector, this instance of resistance

can be taken as a rare occurrence where a professional can refuse to do mandatory training and their supervisor accepts it with a certain level of nonchalance. In fact, even in the case of this social worker, they had to eventually take the Prevent Duty training, however, they explained that they attended the training to vocally express their unease with the policy:

'I went to the training wanting to try in some way to resist it, in a small way of just not agreeing with it or criticising it... It was hard to see ways within the context of the training to resist the training, it was difficult, it was designed in such a way to reduce the possibility of that. There was a point where I was arguing a point around not following it and the manager that was sat next to me was very uncomfortable with that.' (Social Worker, LA05)

During the interview, this social worker explained that even though the training session tried to minimise opportunities for negative feedback, they still managed to openly complain about the policy. This demonstrates the variety of interventions that can be made to show one's opposition to the policy. While they initially refused to take the training, when they were forced to do so, this social worker (LA05) changed their approach and tried to put up some form of resistance during the training. This demonstrates the flexibility of counter-conducts because individuals can tailor their responses depending on the context. This makes these scattered acts of resistance easier to take up rather than mounting a more organised challenge. Another schoolteacher (ED02), who is a teacher's union representative, also advocated using the Prevent training session as a way of contesting the policy. When asked how they help new teachers who are worried about Prevent, they said that rather than boycotting, teachers should go to the training session:

'My advice in that situation is that you need to go to it, but that doesn't mean that you just have to sit there and not say anything, challenge them on what's being said, ask questions, if you have concerns, then raise those.' (Primary Schoolteacher, ED02)

Vocal acts of resistance entail challenging one's subjection and given the coercive nature of Prevent Duty, this means that not everyone has the capacity to do so. An individual may have strong opposition to the duty and fear its negative impact on people but depending on their identity and place in the professional hierarchy, they may also have concerns about their own well-being. In their research on the impact of Prevent on NHS workers, Younis and Jadhav have provided a detailed account of the selfcensorship commonly practised by frontline staff, especially those of Muslim faith, out of fear and mistrust in their sectors (2019). Both the social worker and schoolteacher (LA05 and ED02) are white, cis males and have been in their professions for a considerable amount of time. They are confident in their roles and can challenge authority, as such, resisting Prevent comes naturally to them, this may not be the case for everyone, and this is acknowledged by the schoolteacher:

'I think that, as a white, middle-aged guy, I can probably afford to be slightly more gung-ho, I would be perhaps slightly less inclined to worry about what people might think about me and about challenging me afterwards, I think I will be able to say you know what, these are the reasons I did it but if you've got a problem with that, then it's fine, but it may not be the same with other colleagues.' (Primary Schoolteacher, ED02)

This admission explains that resistance to a policy like the Prevent Duty is diverse and scattered because there are a variety of factors that control what an individual can and cannot do. It is not possible for everyone to put up a strong challenge to the policy or make their opposition known. However, it is still useful to take stock of these interventions because it shows the extent to which these boundaries can be pushed. It may not be possible for everyone to refuse to undertake Prevent training or contest it during a training session but there is scope for such activity for some people. Therefore, the example of schoolteacher (EDO2) should not be seen as a limitation of resistance to Prevent but as an indicator of the diversity of actions that are possible. This variation can be seen in another schoolteacher's (EDO3) experience at a Prevent Duty session that shows that while not all forms of vocal resistance can challenge the Prevent Duty strongly, there can also be acts of resistance that are visible yet muted. Discussing their experiences of taking a Prevent module as part of their teacher training course, this schoolteacher complained about the lack of opportunities for critically engaging with issues in both the Prevent Duty training and the wider curriculum. Rather than openly challenging the policy, they tried to express their concern by sarcastically joking about it:

'During the training, there was a mention of British values and I was like "whatever that means", like trying to make a joke of it, but there was no reaction. I don't want to assume anything, but I tend to see the new generation of teachers as quite uncritical... I was critical and I was trying to engage a few friends and things like that but no there's not much... it's just a policy, it's something, it's good for the society I think that would be the main assumption or something like that.' (Trainee Primary Schoolteacher, ED03)

This response also highlights a different form of resistance that is not targeted towards the hierarchy but more aimed at consolidating support within peers. By attempting to critically engage their course

mates, this schoolteacher (ED03) was looking to develop a consensus about the harmful impact of Prevent. Similarly, they also talked about being critical about Prevent with their pupils. When asked how they would deal with a student who expresses concerns about the duty, they said:

'I think I will be quite frank with them. It's not like I have someone you know who's going to be there with a weapon behind me. I would be like that's what it says and that's what I think, and I understand your concerns. And maybe I will explain that I don't really agree with that but I'm a teacher and there's laws in this country and all that, but I'm taking it critically.' (Trainee Primary Schoolteacher, ED03)

Within this form of vocal resistance, this teacher (ED03) appears to claim some agency to speak freely in front of their students. They are attempting to subvert the system from within by doing a form of 'symbolic compliance' that does not pose an overt challenge to the policy but puts up quiet challenges in the background (Scott, 1985, p. 26). They are also trying to challenge the dominant narrative of security and threat by focussing on the concerns of their students rather than seeing them as potential suspects. These are 'low-noise' acts of citizenship that quietly and subtly challenge state control and build support networks (Neveu, 2014). The Graduate Teaching Assistant (ED-H07) discussed above also advocated a similar approach. When they were asked the same question, they explained that regardless of their precarious situation in the higher education sector, what they can offer their students is solidarity against the oppression of Prevent Duty:

'I don't think it's my job to put their minds at ease (about the Prevent Duty) because they should be scared... It is that level of danger that the government is putting on our students' lives... What I could assure is that they have my support, I cannot speak at the institutional level, I cannot speak for my colleagues... I know that my colleagues are not ready to back me up, they're not ready to back up any black students, any Muslim students, so what I could offer to the student is my politics.' (Graduate Teaching Assistant, ED-H07)

This response is close to what they said about mitigating the aggression of a racist student but this form of resistance to Prevent is situated more in their politics of solidarity. This tutor is resisting the negative impacts of Prevent by not necessarily challenging the institutional hierarchy but by providing a safe space to their marginalised students. While vocal, this form of resistance moves away from the individualistic focus of a very visible act of opposition to a more outward looking praxis of solidarity. During the interview, they also talked about undertaking anti-racist trainings organised by social

justice networks to enable them to challenge the Prevent Duty. The interventions of these educators (ED03 and ED-H07) help us add a new form of resistance to our typology that is vocal within small, targeted circles while remaining invisible within the wider perspective. Here citizenship is reclaimed in a way that the state is side-lined and the focus is on interpersonal dynamics informed by loyalty to those around you. This approach is only possible if one stops seeing others as a potential suspect who should be monitored but as a fellow citizen who is facing the same coercion as them.

By attempting to build networks amongst their peers or offering solidarity and safe spaces to their students, these educators are opening up different fronts of resistance that can challenge the hegemony of Prevent Duty without jeopardising their positions within their professional sectors. While these are not always coherent or consistent enough to contribute to an established counterhegemonic movement, this form of resistance is pragmatic and makes it possible for individual actors to take some form of action. In some ways, they are more important than organised movements because by highlighting these small acts, we can make it possible for others to follow suit. Furthermore, these interventions also show that vocal resistance can be put up in a number of different ways that do not directly impact an individual's well-being. This discussion on 'vocal resistance' has focussed more on institutional and sectoral dynamics because while we situate Prevent engagement within the citizenship framework, it is simpler to understand resistance and the potential consequences of this through institutional practices. As things stand, the immediate cost of this contestation can be harm to one's professional well-being. The securitised citizenship framing is still relevant because it helps us highlight the fluid nature of different binaries and the interplay of narratives that inform the nature of one's resistance. The focus on sectoral dynamics help us take stock of the consequences they would face as well as the conditions they manage to put these big and small fronts of resistance.

Conclusion

To understand how citizens can resist the state control exercised through the Prevent Duty, we started with interrogating the very concept of resistance. Moving away from the understanding that resistance should be vocal, anarchic, and organised in well-formed units, this research situates resistance within a Foucauldian framework to deconstruct it into a varied typology of actions and interactions. This approach is necessary because Prevent operates a regime of neoliberal governance that deploys the narrative of active citizenship and co-opts existing professional infrastructure to normalise and diffuse surveillance logics within different parts of the civil society. Given the extensive web of power relations embedded in these sectors, the instances of resistance that emerge at

grassroots level cannot be explained by a framework of anarchic, well-organised resistance. The policy exercises firm control on social processes and professional norms. While the degree and nature of compliance with Prevent varies from one sector to another, the fact that it is a statutory duty precludes any overt resistance. Therefore, this discussion is rooted in a recalibrated understanding of citizenship that is co-constituted by the actions of both the state and citizens. By including citizens in the equation and privileging their everyday ideas and acts as citizenship interventions, we can also develop a different understanding of resistance that is captured at micro-sites in scattered, irregular, and sometimes contradictory acts. Using counter-conducts to articulate the different ways acts of contestation manifest, we can also see what strategies can be deployed to challenge the governmentality that shapes Prevent Duty enactment through active citizenship. We bring in the discussion of activist citizenship to find the possibility of challenging active citizenship narratives of responsibility and self-governance and finding ideas and acts that reclaim the notions of civic duty and identity.

To highlight the different ways acts of contestation manifest, this chapter put forward a typology of resistance that foregrounds the actions and interventions made within the banal, everyday lived reality of the Prevent Duty. We started this discussion with cognitive resistance to identify the thought processes that initiate contestation. Putting this gradation in our spectrum of civic agency is important because cognitive resistance serves a dual purpose of explaining how and why people get motivated to resist and it is also an act of resistance in itself. By rejecting the common-sense narrative on Prevent, individuals engaging in cognitive resistance approach Prevent as a coercive counter-terrorism policy rather than a safeguarding approach. This then helps to inform how they would interact with Prevent. Cognitive resistance does not always manifest in more active forms of resistance, but it is important to capture this stage nonetheless because it signals the possibility of dissent. It also helps us situate the crux between subjectivity and agency where we can see people starting to claim some form of agency within a hegemonic policy programme.

Muted resistance can be seen as the next stage in the spectrum of resistance, building on cognitive resistance, this gradation looks at the different ways in which frontline staff sidestep Prevent compliance through minor interventions. Within this gradation, we can see schoolteachers, social workers, and medics quietly put up fronts of resistance by using professional tools to help their 'vulnerable' students, service users, and patients rather than relying on the Prevent Duty. Whether it's a teacher talking to a pupil about racist language or a social worker arranging mental health support for a troubled individual, these frontline staff demonstrate the 'will not be governed thusly'

by Prevent Duty by opting for alternative safeguarding practices (Foucault, 2007, pp. 72–73). These instances of resistance make us interrogate the fluidity between our binary categories of active and activist citizenship. While people opt for non-coercive ways to deal with concerns and attempt to side-line Prevent infrastructures, the sense of civic responsibility is still quite dominant. As such, people do take on the duty to protect those considered vulnerable, but they reorient the focus away from the state and toward the well-being of the individual of concern.

As we move further along the spectrum, we also find other instances of resistance that are relatively more vocal and visible. Here again, people deploy different technologies of defiance using the everyday reality of their professional life. The face-to-face Prevent Duty training becomes a site of resistance where people can voice their concerns. This discussion also shows that acts of citizenship can be situated in a multiplicity of sites that may appear to be removed from high politics (Staeheli et al., 2012). As such, we find places such as a classroom or a lecture theatre turn into avenues where bonds of solidarity are formed by teachers and lecturers extending vocal support to their pupils worried about the Prevent Duty. The acts that take place in these 'hidden places' are irregular and do not have an umbrella movement to consolidate them in formal structures but despite the absence of a centralising force, they exist and continue to function against the coercive force of an ever-expanding regime of control.

Foregrounding these practices of resistance also helps us put forward a model of resistance that reverts back to the prevention logics of welfare state before they became securitised. As discussions across the different sectors have demonstrated, people do not oppose the principle of prevention, be that against substance abuse or extremism. However, the acts of resistance against Prevent are rooted in the understanding that prevention through securitisation is not necessary and often counter-productive. The civic sectors that have been turned into the frontlines of counter-terrorism work already possess the tools and ethos to protect vulnerable people. Hence, the resistance here is directed towards the imposition of surveillance responsibilities, not the duty of safeguarding those at risk.

While it is useful and important to highlight these interactions and thought processes that would otherwise go unnoticed, it should be acknowledged that this approach also has some limitations. This form resistance is not a well-articulated movement, akin to counter-hegemonic projects, what we have are pockets of contestation that emerge to counter the everyday oppression of Prevent Duty. They may not be working towards a wider goal of abolition per se, but their contribution should not be discounted in the quest to achieve emancipatory security. In their current form, these acts may not be feeding into a well-established movement, but they should be seen as promoting a more normative approach to understanding threat, vulnerability, and security.

The findings discussed in this empirical framework show a rich tapestry of interactions that explain the different ways in which citizens articulate their roles and responsibilities within the Prevent Duty. While we can roughly slot these in different categories, we can see that people respond in a variety of ways because they are influenced by a combination of narratives. We can see this in overlaps between the different gradations of the spectrum where sometimes people negotiate between clashing ideas that result in their actions going against their own instincts. Some people display thought processes made up of contradictory ideas and as such, their actions vary depending on a combination of factors. We have situated these findings within the conceptual parameters of resistance and compliance and the analytical framework of securitised citizenship. While these have helped us understand how people engage with the Prevent Duty, the application of these tools on to the lived reality of Prevent enactment has shown us that our binary understanding of these concepts is unstable. The ideas of compliance/resistance and active/activist citizenship co-exist within a fluid state where citizens move between different narratives as they negotiate their place in society. In this way, while I have used the theoretical framework to approach the empirics of this project, the empirical framework, in turn, has helped me develop a different understanding of these conceptual tools. The next chapter will further draw out the connections between the two frameworks and discuss what insights we can learn from these about civic engagement, citizenship, counter-terrorism governance, and agency/subjectivity.

Chapter 9: Discussion

The Prevent Duty puts a legal obligation on frontline staff working in health, education, social work etc. sectors to 'prevent people from being drawn into terrorism' (Home Office, 2015a, p. 18). This is done by asking citizens to monitor people for 'extremist' speech and behaviour and making a Prevent referral if they are deemed to be 'vulnerable' or 'at risk'. Most people are introduced to Prevent Duty obligations in their professional roles; this has certainly been the case with the research participants of this project. The educators, medical professionals, and social workers I interviewed had received Prevent training or had learnt about the duty as part of their work within these public sector institutions. This also explains why significant amount of research investigating the impact of Prevent has focussed on its enactment within these sectors (Abbas et al., 2021; Busher and Jerome, 2020; Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018; McKendrick and Finch, 2019; Qurashi, 2017; Revell, 2019; Stanley et al., 2017; Whiting et al., 2020; Younis and Jadhav, 2020, 2019). While acknowledging the important contribution of this approach and relying on the knowledge produced through it, I have decided to understand the enactment and resultant impact of the Prevent Duty through a broader framework of citizenship practice. This does not mean that microlevel analyses of Prevent focussing on professional dynamics are not relevant; through this research, I have demonstrated that they co-exist alongside and sometimes get superseded by narratives of civic responsibility and self-governance. While people receive Prevent Duty obligations as part of their professional roles, when they speak about their involvement with the policy, they connect it to a wider sense of responsibility they have as a concerned citizen. This not only explains why people positively respond to this policy that adds surveillance duties to their professional roles, it also shows us that the scope of counter-radicalisation policing under Prevent does not remain limited to these sectors but expands further out in the community. Once people start seeing Prevent as a way of protecting people, they carry this duty from their professional to personal spheres. As such, by situating this analysis of Prevent Duty within citizenship practice, we can understand how people articulate their roles and responsibilities within this policy and also take account of the policy's expansive trajectory.

Prevent Duty as Securitised Citizenship

As the theoretical framework has demonstrated, citizenship is a multidimensional concept. It can be understood as a technology of control through which the state can dictate who is part of the 'in-group' and has access to rights and who is relegated as being an outsider. This control can be exercised through the legal tool of citizenship status as well as through technologies that manage citizens' conducts and turn them into compliant subjects. We can, however, move beyond this narrow approach and see citizenship as a co-constituted practice that is also shaped by the ideas and actions of citizens. These can be in the service of accepting state control or they could be found in techniques to resist the state. The term 'active citizenship' helps us capture the acts of citizenship that turn citizens into responsibilised subjects, while 'activist citizenship' allows us to take stock of the different ways in which citizens resist the state control and reclaim their civic identity. In this way, citizenship practice as an analytical framework gives us a broad canvas to situate the different technologies of control and resistance that define a citizen's relationship with the state.

I advocate analysing Prevent Duty enactment through this framework because it helps us understand why and how citizens engage with this policy in a number of different ways. At a very basic level, we can say compliance with Prevent Duty is a securitised act of citizenship because it is counter-terrorism work being done by ordinary citizens. These citizens may be public sector employees, but they are not part of the state's coercive sphere, they are not part of the law enforcement infrastructure, therefore, when they take on security duties, their civilian status stands out. However, this still gives us a limited understanding of the phenomenon. We can put the citizenship framework to better use to understand *how* this shifting of security responsibilities has been facilitated and normalised within British civic life. What are the narratives that convince people to adopt this duty and take it with them from their professional to their personal lives? How do people not question the coerciveness of their surveillance responsibilities? These questions can be answered by connecting Prevent Duty to the established norms of citizenship practice in the British society.

As the discussion on radicalisation explained, Prevent Duty relies on shifting responsibilities to citizens, in addition to this, it also requires them to adopt these willingly as a normative duty. We can find these governing techniques in active citizenship, through which the British state has historically encouraged citizens to manage their conducts and become self-governing subjects (Bee and Pachi, 2014). With Prevent Duty, the state has simply injected security logics into the myriad civic responsibilities people have to take on to be identified as 'good citizens'. As such, Prevent should be seen as securitised citizenship because it has diffused norms of civic responsibility and self-governance with security priorities making counter-radicalisation monitoring a normative duty to be actively taken on by (good) citizens.

My conceptualisation of securitised citizenship is not just limited to the co-optation of citizens in security governance through active citizenship. Given the broad remit of citizenship practice, we can also accommodate resistance to Prevent Duty within the framework of securitised citizenship

(Guillaume and Huysmans, 2013, p. 35). Since citizenship comprises interventions made by both the state and citizens, we should also take account of those actions that contest state control. Citizenship framework also widens our scope of enquiry by opening up a whole new range of actions and ideas that would otherwise be ignored by a conceptualisation of resistance looking for organised, counter-hegemonic actions. Within this we can find acts of contestations in ideas, shared views, small acts of defiance, while also including more vocal examples of resistance. In this way, we move forward with an understanding of Prevent as securitised citizenship encompassing both active and activist citizenship. This framework gives us the tools to understand how people comply or resist with the policy and identify the narratives that shape these decisions. It also gives us a set of binaries – compliance/resistance, active/activist citizenship, and agency/subjection – we can use to determine the parameters of our enquiry.

The Lived Reality of Securitised Citizenship

To systematise the different ways in which citizens interact with the Prevent Duty and situate these findings within our theoretical framework of securitised citizenship, the empirical framework of the thesis puts forward a spectrum of civic engagement. This enabled me to map a multiplicity of interactions into three crudely broad categories of Compliance, Hesitation, and Resistance, which were then further broken down into different gradations to show the diversity and the overlap between these points.

By bringing in the perspectives of ordinary citizens who have to enact Prevent Duty and applying them to the theoretical framework, we find that the binary categories of compliance/resistance, active/activist citizenship, and agency/subjection are unstable. Within their everyday engagement, citizens' actions fluctuate between compliance and resistance as they move between different narratives and take decisions that sometimes go against their initial instincts. They also appear to adopt certain narratives that contradict their other ideas resulting in a variety of actions that straddle the compliance/resistance divide. As such, through the application of empirical findings to our theoretical framework, we find that agency and subjection are also in constant circulation. Before we explore the oscillating nature of agency and subjection within Prevent enactment, I want to explain how the different gradations of our spectrum correspond to the narratives of active and activist citizenship.

We started the discussion with the chapter on Compliance to showcase the gradations of 'eager compliance' and 'indifferent compliance'. I grouped these two together because even though they

appear to be opposite in nature, we can find a strong influence of active citizenship narratives in these categories. Under 'eager compliance' we see how people have readily adopted the neoliberal rhetoric of responsibility and self-governance as they speak of Prevent Duty as a moral and civic duty. For these citizens, Prevent Duty obligations are not just a professional responsibility, but a way of protecting the wider community. These insights not only indicate citizens' willingness for a wider remit of counterradicalisation policing, they also show that Prevent compliance is not just limited to monitoring people but also comprises adoption of liberal values. By situating these within the framework of securitised citizenship, we can understand why people see their role within Prevent Duty beyond the narrow confines of their professional roles. This discussion also helps us see how the underlying narrative of active citizenship is changing professional norms and practices. By shifting citizens' loyalties away from the individuals in their care to the state, Prevent Duty is changing the orientation of safeguarding practices. As a result, when people talk about their responsibility to safeguard, they prioritise the safety of the wider community over the well-being of the 'vulnerable' individual. Overall, the different responses show that whether or not people speak the language of (active) citizenship and civic duty, their engagement with Prevent is informed by the narratives of responsibility and self-governance. They see it as something they have to do, not just as frontline professionals but also as (good) citizens.

The discussion of 'indifferent compliance' sits in contrast with 'eager compliance' because while in the case of the latter, we can see why people comply, the former indicates a detachment between people's thoughts and actions. The insights featured here show that for some people enacting Prevent Duty is just one of the many things they have to do in their role. It's considered to be just another step in the wider safeguarding process and all they have to do is raise the concern and move on. While this may seem to contradict my earlier assertion that we can find a link between compliance and active citizenship, I argue that this detached engagement with Prevent is also an example of securitised active citizenship. By virtue of their unthinking compliance with their Prevent Duty obligations, they are accepting the state's rhetoric of Prevent as a moral/civic duty. This shows that the techniques of governmentality are not reliant on people reproducing active citizenship narratives, this form of governance can still succeed if people uncritically engage with the responsibilities shifted to them by the state.

The next four points in the spectrum – 'measured compliance, selective compliance, selective resistance, and coerced compliance' – are covered under the chapter on Hesitation. By bringing together different versions of compliance and resistance, this chapter highlights the overlap and fluidity across the spectrum. As such, 'Hesitation' serves as a grey area between the two endpoints

and brings them together. Even though these different categories are situated on a spectrum, I recommend this chapter should not be seen as a linear progression of actions but rather as the starting point for the acts of compliance and resistance. The categories covered in this discussion of hesitation show us the circuitous process of deliberation that leads people to either comply or resist against their initial instincts. In this way, this chapter shows us the interplay of competing narratives through which citizens negotiate their roles and responsibilities within Prevent Duty enactment.

Under 'measured compliance' we analyse different findings that show a variety of concerns and doubts citizens deliberate over before they agree to comply with their Prevent Duty obligations. Unlike 'eager compliance', this form of engagement takes account of the harmful impacts of Prevent and the creation of a surveillance state, however, they manage these concerns by seeing the policy as a way of protecting others. This process of deliberation also provides very interesting insights about citizens' contradictory stances on their relationship with the state. While some participants would say they do not want to help the government and want to challenge the state's coercion, they would also talk about wanting a smaller state, taking on responsibilities to protect other people, and being the eyes and ears of the state. These insights show a clashing influence between the narratives of active and activist citizenship in these individuals' thought processes. While they want to resist state control, they have also internalised the neoliberal logics of being the self-securitising, enterprising citizen who can assist the state in security monitoring. This shows us that citizens, perhaps unknowingly, espouse contradictory values that cause them to move around these different conceptual divides as they make sense of who they are and what they are supposed to do.

The following discussions of selective compliance and resistance further highlight the murky nature of separation between our binary divides of active/activist citizenship. These two categories cover those stark cases where people who would otherwise comply or resist with the policy decide to do the opposite in certain situations. In the case of 'selective compliance', we see people agreeing to enact the Prevent Duty even though they express vocal opposition to the policy and its goals. These participants are also featured in the Resistance chapter so for most part their actions are seen as activist citizenship. However, they also reluctantly concede they would engage with Prevent to tackle the threat of right-wing extremism. Their insights reflect a resignation that there are no alternative ways to deal with this kind of threat. These interventions raise interesting questions about whether they turn into active citizens by this admission of complying with Prevent or do their views on the different ways to resist compliance make them activist citizens. While I believe they are better placed in the latter category, it is interesting that they are also influenced by a narrative of responsibility and

the need to safeguard the people around them. As such, we again see an overlap of different narratives where under certain circumstances people can act against their instincts.

The case of 'selective resistance', on the hand other, sees people who would otherwise be placed under the category of 'eager compliance' for their adoption of the active citizenship discourse of helping the state and taking on responsibilities. However, they take exception to the idea of monitoring their colleagues and express unease about it. They agree to selectively not comply with their Prevent Duty obligations because the idea of 'spying' on their colleagues eclipses their wider sense of responsibility. This shows a hierarchy of social relations where they are comfortable with subjecting their students/patients/service users to surveillance measures but do not want to do the same for people with whom they work. This contradictory stance also tells us how people articulate the ideas of risk and threat. The participants discussed here felt uneasy about subjecting their colleagues to Prevent Duty monitoring because they cannot even entertain the possibility that one of them could be a threat. This also highlights how Prevent etches a security border within these spaces that allows not just the state but also the citizens to identify their co-workers as fellow agents of the state, while the remaining people turn into suspects. This divide is superficial and sometimes agents can find themselves being seen as suspects, however, this dichotomy was not acknowledged by any of the research participants. One reason for this could be that people often reproduce narratives without knowing it, this does not mean they are ignorant, it just shows how we go about life unthinkingly adopting ideas and acting on them.

The category of 'coerced compliance' sits close to the endpoint of resistance but it also features insights from people who are comfortable with enacting the Prevent Duty. These findings show that whether one's initial instinct is to comply or resist, for some people the statutory status of the policy weighs heavily in their deliberations. It is not the only reason why they comply with the policy but in some cases, it gives them the final push towards compliance. Prevent is a legal duty for people employed in different frontline sectors, hence, the punitive measures one can face would come from their sectors of employment. As a result, when people discuss the coercive influence of Prevent, they situate it within professional cultures and dynamics. In these discussions, we do not see the narrative of citizenship come through very clearly, but the fear of punitive action if they fail to comply reveals that they are responding to a form of state control that turns them into neoliberal agent/subjects. This shows us that the statutory status of Prevent sits next to the other narratives deployed by the state to ensure compliance.

The final chapter of Resistance in this framework looks at those cases of contestation where the intention to resist is more resolute. This does not mean the categories of 'cognitive resistance', 'muted resistance', and 'vocal resistance' are completely separate from the other forms of engagement, we see insights from some of the same people discussed in the previous two chapters. However, the discussion in this chapter shows how people reject the narrative of active citizenship and governmentality, and present thoughts and actions that correspond more with activist citizenship and counter-conducts (Foucault, 2009, p. 201). This chapter takes forward an alternative conceptualisation of resistance as a collection of actions and ideas that do not manifest as organised, counter-hegemonic movements, but as irregular and scattered acts of contestation. Using activist citizenship as our guide, we find resistance in small, low-noise acts of citizenship that would otherwise go unacknowledged.

This chapter differs from the previous two because the three gradations discussed here can be seen as standalone modes of resistance or they can be approached as steps in a single process. As such, our discussion starts with 'cognitive resistance' to show that people start challenging the state control by rejecting the common-sense framing of Prevent as a safeguarding responsibility or a civic duty. This is different from 'measured compliance' where we saw people question some aspects of Prevent Duty, 'cognitive resistance' does not sidestep concerns about the policy and people are clear about its impact on the society. This type of resistance sits in direct contrast to the neoliberal logic of moulding disciplined subjects through the promotion of liberal values, what we get are Death's 'intellectualised subjects' who actively refuse to accept the common-sense narrative on security and responsibility (2016, pp. 216–217). Within cognitive resistance we see people challenging Prevent's rhetoric of British values and its interpretation of safeguarding and radicalisation by refusing to see it as such and highlighting the racism and coercion inherent in the policy. These findings reflect a mistrust in both the Prevent Duty and the wider state that influences people to resist the policy, either with their thoughts or actions, or in some cases both.

The following discussion on 'muted resistance' sits close to 'selective' and 'coerced compliance' because people find different ways to avoid engaging with Prevent procedures unless it is the only option left. These people know they may have to go down the Prevent route, but it is used as the last resort. People turn to different strategies like getting welfare support for 'vulnerable' people or at school intervening and talking to students before making a Prevent referral. For university staff, acts of resistance manifest in using seminars as a place for exchanging progressive ideas and challenging views that Prevent would consider 'extremist'. Some of these actions are not carried out with the

intention of resisting Prevent per se, but I argue these should be grouped under resistance because they open possibilities of broader, more organised forms of contestation. Furthermore, these exist alongside more vocal acts of resistance, so a person can go between different modes of resistance depending on their circumstances or other factors. The insights drawn from 'vocal resistance' prove this point as we see the same people discuss how they, along with doing muted resistance, have also challenged Prevent Duty stipulations more actively. Here again we see a variety of interventions in how people push back against the imposition of this responsibility. Some owing to their job status and social capital are able to openly refuse to comply, while others cloak critique in sarcasm or offer vocal but private support to the people around them. In the case of the latter, we see a similar dynamic of interpersonal loyalty emerge that we find in 'selective resistance' where people refuse to monitor their colleagues. However, I would argue this approach is an example of activist citizenship because these participants are not reserving their solidarity for a chosen group around them, they are actively prioritising the well-being of those whom the state is asking them to target. They are reclaiming the meaning of citizenship by choosing to identify their civic obligations as being owed to their fellow citizens, rather than the state.

By applying our empirical findings to the framework of securitised citizenship, we have been able to situate the multiplicity of interactions that make up Prevent Duty enactment in everyday life. For analytical ease, we started by bookending these across the binaries of compliance/resistance and active/active citizenship. However, as this discussion demonstrates, the lived reality of Prevent engagement is in a state of constant flux and therefore, not many interactions can be neatly slotted into these binary categories. While there are instances of compliance and resistance, our empirical analysis shows that these come about with an interplay of different narratives. As such, at any given time, people are juggling different considerations before they make their decisions.

This instability also shows that within Prevent Duty, state control co-exists with civic contestation. Alongside the governmentality of active citizenship, we also have counter-conducts and a variety of acts that push back against the state in whatever capacity different factors allow the citizens. As such, our notion of securitised citizenship captures both the acts of compliance and resistance that emerge out of the narratives of active and activist citizenship. I have debated whether the existence of contestation in Prevent engagement means that we should place resistance and activist citizenship outside of this framework and situate it within desecuritised citizenship (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2013, pp. 348–349). However, given the diffused boundaries of different narratives, I have decided against placing these interventions under a framework of de-securitisation. Within our discussion of resistance, we have seen some very clear examples of cognitive pushback and rejection of the neoliberal rhetoric, however, I would say that people are still not far from the realm of compliance. Similarly, even when people discussed muted or vocal forms of resistance, the possibility of compliance is always there in the background. This shows that while we may have started to travel in the direction of desecuritised citizenship, I do not believe that is where we arrive within this project's empirical findings. Our discussion of active and activist citizenship, of compliance and resistance to Prevent shows us that we are very much rooted in a narrative of security politics. Whether people want to be part of the Prevent framework or push back against it, they are still talking about threats, vulnerabilities, and (in)security. As such, even when people move between the different gradations of the spectrum of civic engagement with Prevent, they are articulating their roles with reference to managing threats and keeping people safe. They differ on how this can be done, but we exist within a common-sense that is diffused with a security logic. As such, I believe securitised citizenship is the appropriate framing for understanding the lived reality of Prevent enactment.

So far, we have talked about the binaries that influence people's engagement with Prevent. By looking at compliance and resistance, we study the practical actions that are taken by citizens, while looking at activist and activist citizenship provides us conceptual insights on how these actions come about. I now want to move on to another binary of agency and subjection. These have not been touched upon save for some passing references to the creation of agents/subjects throughout our different discussions. However, now with the combined analysis of our theoretical and empirical frameworks, we can draw some lessons about civic agency and subjection within Prevent Duty.

Civic Agency and Subjection within Securitised Citizenship

The Prevent Duty is designed to bifurcate the society into agents and subjects, as explained earlier it creates security borders within civic spaces whereby one set of citizens gets tasked with policing conducts, while the other gets rendered as suspects. Admittedly, this line can move and even the agents can find themselves being seen as suspects as they move across different spaces. For ethnic and religious minorities, this shift from agent to suspect can take place even within the spaces and contexts where they technically have the role to be an agent of the state (Younis and Jadhav, 2019). This divide gets further blurred when we take account of the fact that even as agents, these citizens are subjects of the state as they come under a legal obligation to enact the Prevent Duty. In this way, Prevent is coercive for citizens on both sides of the security divide – the referrer and the referee. By looking at the experiences of these agent/subjects, we can draw some insights about the diffused nature of agency and subjection within the securitised citizenship regime of Prevent Duty.

If we look at the narratives of securitised citizenship, we can find Prevent compliance is interpreted as empowerment of agent/subjects. The shifting of security responsibilities to citizens is seen as an act of giving them control and democratising counter-terrorism. As our empirical analysis demonstrates, Prevent as securitised citizenship is co-constituted by the actions of both the state and citizens. By adopting the narratives of responsibility and safeguarding, people are not only accepting their duties but also expanding them outside of their professional spheres. Similarly, the different ways in which people engage with the policy and shape it is also interpreted as citizens exercising agency. While analysing Prevent enactment within Muslim communities, Pearson identifies the policy as giving an 'agential role' to Muslim women and opening up sites where they can have agency not just by resisting the policy but by participating in it and exercising leadership (2020). This approach reinforces the state narrative that highlights the agency of citizens undertaking Prevent responsibilities while sidestepping the inherent subjection. As such, while we can recognise that Prevent exists in its current form because of the actions and participations of citizens, I am hesitant to code this as agency. Assigning agency to citizens in this context would be akin to what Stern et al. describe as 'reinscribing the governed as agents in their own subordination' (2015, p. 10). Rose explains this as equipping individuals with a 'moral agency that would shape their conduct' (1999, p. 72). This form of freedom is characteristic of neoliberal governance as it relies on citizens acting as free subjects. Therefore, we cannot discuss agency here without taking stock of the fact that it is a technology of governance and its purpose is not to set people free but to make them more efficient, self-disciplining subjects. In this way, Rose reaffirms the diffusion of agency within subjection (and vice versa) by declaring that 'modern forms of subjectivity (and) contemporary conceptions of agency and will... are not antithetical to power... but the resultants of specific configurations of power' (*ibid*, pp. 54-55). This also aligns with critique of neoliberalism we find in International Political Economy literature that explain the need to turn human beings into 'neoliberal subjects' who must be 'compelled to embrace their "entrepreneurial" selves' and turn their lives into 'self-maximising quest' (Seymour, 2014, pp. 9-10).

However, this scepticism towards agency does not mean that there is no scope of it existing within Prevent compliance. By approaching Prevent through the clashing narratives of compliance/resistance and active/activist citizenship, I have arrived at an understanding of restricted agency. This allows citizens to move between different narratives and pick different positions albeit within limited parameters. While citizens may not have the choice to put up very vocal, counter-hegemonic fronts of resistance, they seem to find some room to manoeuvre around the policy within their workplaces. A teacher can choose to deal with racist comments by talking to their pupils or a social worker can reach out to mental health services instead of making a Prevent referral. While citizens may not have the agency to put up an organised front of resistance, they can carry out minor forms of activist citizenship. We can see a similar approach to agency in Lakhani's study of Prevent enactment in schools and colleges, where they look at staff using professional networks and institutional knowledge to assert some form of agency (2020). Similarly, Elwick and Jerome have conducted a thoughtful analysis of the limits and potentials of frontline staff using agency within Prevent enactment while internalising securitisation narratives (2019). As such, while we can reject the active citizenship narrative that interprets compliance with Prevent Duty as empowered citizens exercising agency, we can recognise that the unstable boundary between compliance and resistance creates conditions for a restricted form of agency.

This brings me to the question of situating agency in resistance. If we do not see compliance with Prevent as citizens exercising agency, could we look at resistance and draw a different conclusion? When people resist the imposition of Prevent Duty, are they also challenging their subjection? I would say the answer to these questions is the same as above, in the absence of a firm divide between compliance and resistance, what emerges is a limited scope of agency where citizens can choose not to be 'governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price' (Foucault, 2007, pp. 72–73). We can see this in cognitive resistance through which people try to reclaim their identity as a citizen and recalibrate their responsibilities towards protecting vulnerable people rather than targeting them. We can also find agency in the acts of muted and vocal resistance that allow frontline staff to use that limited amount of autonomy the state has given them in deciding which actions or ideas should be flagged for a Prevent referral. As such, the state control is not absolute, and the subjection carries within it the possibility of agency. However, it is restricted in scope not just because of the way Prevent Duty operates and its statutory status. Allen situates the possibility of agency in subjection because one cannot be a subject without the capacity to think i.e. a thinking subject can also exercise agency (Allen, 2002, p. 135). However, as our empirical findings show, civic agency is curtailed by the influence of the very narratives that create subjection. In most cases, we can see an influence of securitised citizenship narratives of responsibility and self-governance. When the process of deliberation is already influenced by the ideas of threat, vulnerability, and insecurity, then the scope of agency weakens in favour of subjection.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

"It's long been a mantra in counter-terrorism policing that we want every good police officer to be a counter-terrorism officer. This is an opportunity for every good citizen to be a counter-terrorism citizen."

Neil Basu, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, 20 March 2018

In 2018, Neil Basu invited all good citizens to become 'counter-terrorism citizens' (BBC News, 2018). Even though he did not say this with reference to the Prevent Duty, this brief quote has played an important role in guiding this research project. I made an instant connection with this quote, because with just seven words Basu articulated the logic and purpose of the Prevent Duty. Through this project I have argued that Prevent should be seen as a regime of securitised citizenship because the imposition of counter-terrorism duties on public sector institutions is not contained within those sectors. If the state is telling people they have a duty to safeguard 'vulnerable' people from the threat of extremism, they will accept it as more than just a professional duty and take it into their personal lives. We can study the impact of this securitisation in a number of different ways, I have chosen to focus on the question of whether citizens want to be 'counter-terrorism citizens' and what narratives shape their answer to this question. What you have read in the previous chapters has been an attempt to unpack this puzzle.

Following a feminist epistemological approach, I have studied the experiences of those citizens who, by virtue of their professional roles, have been given the statutory duty to 'keep people from being drawn into terrorism' (Home Office, 2015a, p. 18). This allowed me to approach the securitisation of citizenship from a bottom-up perspective and see how citizens engage with this policy and how they articulate their roles and responsibilities within it. By charting the different ways in which citizens respond to their Prevent Duty obligations, I have been able to explain why citizens comply with or resist the policy, what are the narratives that influence this decision-making process, and how do these actions manifest in everyday citizenship practice.

To understand what social control under Prevent looks like, I have studied Prevent through citizenship and focussed on the norms and practices that the British state has deployed to convince people to take on these counter-terrorism duties. Through this analysis, I demonstrate that the security infrastructure and practices of Prevent are well-entrenched in different parts of the civil society. Whether one is a teacher or a student, a medical professional or a patient, at some point they would

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come into contact with Prevent. This could be in the shape of a mandatory training, a government directive asking civilians to do more, or a Prevent referral. While the policy reaches citizens through professional sectors and infrastructures, the coercive edges of Prevent are made blunt by presenting the policy as a way of safeguarding vulnerable individuals. It is conveyed as a duty of care that should be taken up by all good citizens. This dual narrative helps these security obligations to bleed from professional into personal spaces. As this thesis shows, citizens explain their compliance of Prevent obligations by speaking of it as a 'moral/civic duty'. Furthermore, by seeing it as a civic responsibility, people not only justify their own compliance but urge others to engage as well. As a result, Prevent and the logic of surveillance and vigilance are a continuous presence in the mundane routines of everyday. One of the findings this research can thus contribute is that Prevent is changing how we conceptualise what good citizenship entails. It is creating compliant, moderate subjects who subscribe to a prescriptive understanding of civic duty and citizenship rooted in the idea of 'Britishness'. Prevent has also created a common-sense that normalises citizen-led surveillance to the point that the state is allocating such monitoring duties to a much wider section of the populace through programmes like Actions Counter Terrorism (ACT) training that one can take at home. However, leaving our analysis here would only give us a surface-level understanding of Prevent Duty as a regime of securitised citizenship.

This research also shows that where there is compliance, there is resistance. Prevent is a statutory duty and given the fact that it is diffused in the norms of safeguarding and civic duty, resisting the policy and contesting the state control exerted through it has its challenges, but this does not mean the control is absolute. To understand how resistance within this strict regime of governance manifests, this research puts forward a framework that captures irregular and scattered thoughts, acts, and practices through which citizens put up different fronts of contestation. These instances of resistance fly under the radar but this makes their existence possible. Given the coercive and discursive control exercised by the state through the Prevent Duty, an organised form of counterhegemonic resistance is difficult for people who are embedded within these welfare state institutions. Therefore, deploying small acts of resistance and refusing to be 'governed thusly' helps these citizens to resist Prevent. Just because these acts are not making a big change, does not mean they are not important. We still need to recognise these acts because they help us develop an understanding of the scope of state control. These small acts of resistance help us see that while the control is pervasive, it is not absolute. There are moments of resistance here and there, the power is decentralised and if we ignore these mundane acts, we continue with a surface-level understanding of what is control and what Prevent does to citizens.

These acts of resistance also help us reclaim and redefine the idea of good citizenship. Within the discourse created by Prevent, a good citizen is someone who fulfils their Prevent Duty obligations and acquiesces to state control. The discussion on resistance helps us see that 'good citizenship' could also be defined by actions that contest this state control. People justify resisting Prevent on grounds of safeguarding their fellow citizens from the violence of the state. By placing their loyalties within their communities and with their fellow citizens, we can see them present resistance as a more worthy act of citizenship than compliance. In this way, when we talk about resistance to Prevent, we are alluding to something bigger. If the state is telling us that enacting Prevent or doing counter-terrorism is something good citizens do, then resisting these coercive measures becomes an effort to reclaim this title and our civic identity.

By mapping civic engagement with Prevent on a spectrum bookended by compliance and resistance, we can see that control co-exists with contestation and this is the beauty of citizenship practice as an analytical framework because it allows us to uncover this constant negotiation, this back and forth between the state and the citizen, between subjection and agency. I confess I have presented a rather pessimistic view on the scope of agency within securitised citizenship in the last chapter. However, recognising that civic agency is limited does not mean we remove the possibility of agency altogether. In the messy, lived reality of civic engagement with Prevent, we have muddled spaces and therefore, we have to find imperfect opportunities of resistance within them. As such, within securitised citizenship, we see that while the resistance of citizens is not necessarily leading to the removal of Prevent Duty from their work, neither is the control of the state completely removing citizens' agency. There is a tug of war of sorts between the state and the citizen, and by focussing on these scattered interactions we can excavate these mini battles that go on in daily life and will continue to happen because wherever there is social control, there will be resistance to it.

The aim of this project is not to make absolute declarations about who prevails in these interactions because if we conclude that the state control renders any contestation impossible, we miss out on these scattered acts of resistance, the counter-conducts that are important part of Prevent enactment. Conversely, we cannot overestimate the strength of citizens' agency or the impact of these irregular forms of resistance because in some ways they are successful because they are muted and manage to go undetected. What we can do is acknowledge that Prevent as a regime of securitised citizenship sees power regulate, albeit unevenly, between the citizen and the state. Therefore, this research will not declare who gets dominance in this tug of war of social control. Power is in a state of constant circulation and, thus, so is control. The state will continue to expand the Prevent

programme, it will try to curb future dissent and contestation, and it will demonise its critics as extremist sympathisers (Malnick, 2022). However, at the same time, resistance will crop up, it will be scattered and irregular, it will be messy and contradictory, but it will manage to find its way to challenge the power. Hence, rather than making a definitive statement about the absolute control of the state or its removal altogether, I would conclude this project by highlighting the circular nature of power in these processes. The state will enforce its power and the citizens will push back, and this cycle will keep going on because this back and forth is what defines a citizen's relationship with the state.

Recommendations for Future Research

This research has engaged with existing scholarship on securitised citizenship and contributed a broad conceptualisation of this term. I believe this can be used to conduct further enquiries into the expansive nature of citizen-led counter-terrorism initiatives being embedded within the British civil society. Within the development of Prevent Duty, we can trace this expansion starting from Muslim communities, to community groups, to public sector employees, and now any citizen who can spare 20-30 minutes can take an online *Actions Counter Terrorism* training and become a 'counter-terrorism citizen' (Counter Terrorism Policing, 2020). When we analyse this expansion through the lens of securitised citizenship, we can grasp how deep and wide is this control. It is not only expansive, but it also securitises banal, everyday activities in a way that people cannot see the coercion of these policies. Future work can take a number of different approaches to capture this phenomenon and study its impact.

Using my spectrum of civic engagement, we can study how ordinary citizens are responding to these calls to become 'counter-terrorism citizens'. My research has conducted a limited study of citizens working in public sector institutions. As I explained, these citizens receive Prevent Duty as a professional obligation and then take it forward as a personal responsibility. While useful, this still leaves a whole section of the community open for further study. It would be insightful to explore how ordinary citizens, who do not have any obligation to take this on, engage with an initiative like *Actions Counter Terrorism* training. What motivates compliance or resistance, are the responses neatly split along a binary or do we see similar results as the Prevent engagement spectrum. A study along these lines would yield very interesting and useful insights on civic identity, duty, responsibility, and also the presence or absence of a wider sense of vigilance.

Connected to this, research can also focus on the impact of such initiatives on community cohesion and relations between different majority and minority demographics. When we turn a wide section of the society into counter-terrorism citizens in a structurally racist society, what could this mean for cohesion between different groups. Terrorism is an emotive issue that evokes people's worse fears as well as appeals to their sense of responsibility. When people are told to stay vigilant to threats, we can see them acting according to their biases. This can be seen in Prevent referrals made for innocuous comments and activities like a child talking about video games or a retired doctor talking about going to an Extinction Rebellion protest (Evans, 2019; Townsend and Stein, 2021). When this kind of vigilance is requested from the wider public, it could lead to situations where people perceive anything as a security threat and try to deal with it as counter-terrorism citizens. The recent attack on a migrant centre in Dover holding asylum seekers by a right-wing extremist shows how narratives of 'invasion' and threat lead to racist attacks against minorities. It is worth investigating the impact such initiatives can have on minority and vulnerable communities that are normally presented as being outsiders and posing a threat to the majority.

Another way of studying this phenomenon of citizen-led counter-terrorism is to investigate how ethnic and religious minorities respond to these calls for action and how much agency they have in resisting this. In the literature review discussion, we discussed scholarship exploring Muslim citizens' responses to terrorism and how some of them equate good/active citizenship with participation in security policies. It would be interesting to explore how minority communities approach something like *Actions Counter Terrorism* training. Do they think this will be a way to boost their citizenship credentials or can they exercise agency to resist this? A study like this can also use the civic engagement spectrum and chart the responses to draw out the influence of different narratives.

Another research question that has intrigued me and that I hope to explore in future is to investigate if there is a possibility of emancipatory counter-extremism work. I understand this term is rife with contradictions but the discussion on resistance in this thesis demonstrates that frontline professionals do try to put non-coercive mitigations in place to deal with issues that Prevent would recognise as risk of radicalisation. This shows that there are practices and resources within the welfare state sector to manage issues that could lead to extremism without using coercive measures. Therefore, one can make a case for funding a stronger welfare state and emancipatory practices, rather than having an expansive counter-terrorism infrastructure to deal with threats and vulnerabilities.

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Appendix A: Interview Questions – Category 1 Participants (Prevent Co-ordinators)

Date	
Category	
Serial Number/Initials	
Age Band	
Job Description	
Self-identified ethnic group	
Self-identified religious identity	
Political Affiliation	
Verbal Consent	
Written Consent	
Anonymity	
Audio Recording	
Answered all the questions	
Avoided questions	

There are no right or wrong answers. Please talk freely, do not worry about what I would think or like or dislike.

Trigger Warning: I am going to ask you questions about the Prevent Duty and your role in implementing it. If you feel uncomfortable with any question, please let me know. You do not have to answer any questions you don't want to.

ICEBREAKERS

- 1. How long have you worked in local government?
- 2. Have you worked in any other local authorities?
- 3. How long have you worked on Prevent? Can you give me some details of your role?
- 4. What got you interested in Prevent?

PREVENT IMPLEMENTATION

- 5. When was the Prevent team set up at your local authority?
- 6. Is the team funded and monitored by the Home Office?
- 7. What is the purpose of implementing Prevent Duty through your council?
- 8. What role do the councillors play in implementing the Prevent Duty?
- 9. Can you give me some details about how the council is implementing the Prevent Duty?
- 10. How many agencies/social workers are involved in implementing Prevent?
- 11. Which agency takes the lead?
- 12. How does Prevent Duty interact with existing procedures?
- 13. How closely is the Prevent Duty related to other safeguarding duties the council carries out?

- 14. What has been the biggest change that Prevent has brought about in the work of your local authority?
- 15. Does Prevent cover people who are employed by the council i.e. do you have to monitor your colleagues?
- 16. Does your council have a counter-extremism co-ordinator?

PREVENT AND CHANNEL

- 17. What happens when a Prevent referral is made?
- 18. So, if a Prevent referral is made, would it be a social worker who would inform the person in question that there is a concern about them?
- 19. What happens when a citizen wants to refer someone under Prevent?
- 20. What is the procedure of conducting a Channel intervention?
- 21. What are some of the challenges of putting a Channel intervention in place?
- 22. What happens if someone refuses Channel intervention?
- 23. Do you think Channel programme should be voluntary?
- 24. Do you agree with the allegations made in the Sunday Times story about intervention providers?

TRAINING

- 25. What kind of Prevent training have you received? Could you provide brief details of the training session/s you have attended for Prevent Duty?
- 26. What kind of background information did you receive about Prevent during your training?
- 27. What did you learn about radicalisation from the training?
- 28. What did you learn about extremism from the training?
- 29. Did the training mention anything on civic duty or responsibilities of citizens?

TRAINING FOR SOCIAL WORKERS

- 30. What kind of Prevent training is provided to your team?
- 31. What kind of Prevent training is provided to the social workers? Are there different trainings for different social workers/agencies?
- 32. Do you feel the Prevent training provides social workers with the skillset to make a judgement about people?
- 33. Who provides the training?
- 34. Does the council do any training sessions?

35. When you go to a group to do Prevent training, depending on the make-up of the team, how do you make sure that they don't act on their biases, whether they are pro-Prevent or anti-Prevent?

PERSONAL VIEWS

Trigger Warning: Should I turn the recorder off?

- 36. What do you think is the strongest aspect of the Prevent Duty?
- 37. Are there any weak aspects of the Prevent Duty?
- 38. Does it make you a bit concerned that something that is passed on as a safeguarding concern could then sort of fall into Prevent based on someone's background?
- 39. Do you feel the need to continue monitoring people outside of your professional roles? Does your Prevent training make you look at people in a different way, even when you're not at work?
- 40. Is there any aspect of the Prevent Duty which makes you feel uncomfortable?

COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS

- 41. Do you work with any community organisations in the region and what kind of work is it?
- 42. How closely do you work with community organisations?
- 43. What kind of organisations do you work with?
- 44. What kind of training do they receive?
- 45. Is there ever a concern that these community organisations are doing Prevent work, do you ever hear any concerns from the community or from these organisations?

CITIZENSHIP

- 46. What should be a citizen's responsibilities to the state and their society?
- 47. What should be the state's responsibilities towards its citizens?
- 48. Do you think citizens have a role to play in implementing the government's security policy?
- 49. Do you feel obligated to conduct Prevent policing outside of your professional duties as a citizen?

OPPOSITION/RESISTANCE

- 50. Have there been any instances where people employed by the council have expressed unease or opposition to implementing the Prevent Duty?
- 51. How did you deal with that?
- 52. If I am a teacher or a social worker or a doctor, and I feel very uneasy about Prevent because I have read that my patients might not feel comfortable talking to me or my students might feel like they can't discuss issues with me, what should I do?

- 53. Prevent receives criticism from different quarters, how do you deal with that?
- 54. Has there been any criticism of Prevent which you think has reasonable concerns behind it?
- 55. Do you feel concerned that people referred under Prevent might feel targeted? How do you think that should be tackled?
- 56. How do you think people (receiving support from the council) who interact with your team or other council colleagues feel about the Prevent Duty?
- 57. Has anyone expressed concerns about the Prevent Duty?
- 58. If clients express concern about Prevent Duty, will you feel obligated to investigate this further?
- 59. If someone resists or opposes Prevent Duty, are they acting as bad citizens?

Would it be possible to observe a training session? Would it be possible to speak with other members of your team? Can I send an email to the social workers?

Appendix B: Interview Questions – Category 2 Participants (Frontline Staff)

Date	
Category	
Serial Number	
Age Band	
Job Description	
Self-identified ethnic group	
Self-identified religious identity	
Political Affiliation	
Verbal Consent	
Written Consent	
Anonymity	
Audio Recording	
Answered all the questions	
Avoided questions	

* There are no right or wrong answers. Please talk freely, do not worry about what I would think or like or dislike.

* Trigger Warning: I am going to ask you questions about the Prevent Duty and your role in implementing it. If you feel uncomfortable with any question, please let me know. You do not have to answer any questions you don't want to.

- 1. How long have you worked in your current role?
- 2. Where did you work prior to this?

TRAINING

- 3. How did you first come into contact with the Prevent Duty?
- 4. What do you know about the Prevent Duty?
- 5. Have you received any training to implement the Prevent Duty?
- 6. Could you provide brief details of the training session/s you attended for Prevent Duty?
- 7. Was the training helpful?
- 8. Did the scenarios cover one type of extremism?
- 9. Can you remember any keywords from your training?
- 10. What did you learn about radicalisation from the training?
- 11. What did you learn about extremism from the training?

- 12. And did the training provide any background on what the Prevent Duty was and the purpose of doing it?
- 13. Did the training mention anything on civic duty or responsibilities of citizens?
- 14. Did they explain why you were required to do the training?
- 15. Did they explain what you were required to do after you received the training?
- 16. Did they explain the whole process? Do you know what happens when a referral has been made?
- 17. Can you give a brief overview of the Prevent compliance procedures at your place of work?
- 18. Do you now feel confident to make a judgement about people/ spot if someone is at the risk of radicalisation or being radicalised based on the training you have received?
- 19. Do you feel the need to continue monitoring people outside of your professional roles? Does your Prevent training make you look at people in a different way, even when you're not at work?
- 20. How closely is Prevent Duty related to the safeguarding duties you have to carry out?
- 21. Do you feel opposition to Prevent Duty could hamper the safeguarding work you do?
- 22. Does it make you a bit concerned that Prevent is seen in a similar way as other safeguarding duties?
- 23. Why do you think the Prevent Duty has been introduced in your sector? Do you think your sector has a role to play in counter-terrorism or counter-extremism?
- 24. Is there any aspect of the Prevent Duty which makes you feel uncomfortable?

IMPLEMENTATION/COMPLIANCE

- 25. Do you think the Prevent Duty has an impact on your relationship with your pupils/clients/patients, which is predominantly based on trust and confidence?
- 26. Do you feel Prevent makes you choose whether your loyalty lies with your students/patients/clients or with the state?
- 27. How do you think your patients/students/clients feel about the Prevent Duty? Has anyone expressed concerns about the Prevent Duty?
- 28. If your patients/students/clients express concern about Prevent Duty, will you feel obligated to investigate this further?
- 29. What would you do if your student/patient/client said something which Prevent would recognise as threatening behaviour?

- 30. Would you be concerned about their welfare if you referred them under Prevent?
- 31. Have you made any referrals? Can you give me some details?
- 32. Do you ever feel you should refer people under Prevent just to be on the safe side and cover your back?
- 33. Would you say Prevent implementation varies from school to school and the set-up of the school could determine how effective Prevent could be not just for the student but also for the staff especially the frontline staff members who are marginally trained and involved, but they play a key role?
- 34. Have you ever been asked to monitor or report on your colleagues under Prevent? Whether during the trainings or afterwards?
- 35. Would you agree to monitor a colleague because they could pose a threat to the pupils/patients/clients?

BRITISH VALUES

- 36. What do you understand by British values as someone who has taken the Prevent training and has worked as a teacher/medical practitioner/social worker?
- 37. How different are the prescribed British values from what you would normally teach at schools?
- 38. How do you think British values help schools fulfil their Prevent Duty obligations?
- 39. What kind of materials and resources were you provided for teaching British values? Did the school have any presentations or booklets?

CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIC IDENTITY

- 40. What should be the state's responsibilities towards its citizens?
- 41. What should be a good citizen's responsibilities to the state and their society?
- 42. Do you think citizens have a role to play in implementing the government's security policy?
- 43. Do you agree with the statement that every good citizen should be a counter-terror citizen?
- 44. If someone resists or opposes Prevent Duty, are they acting as bad citizens?

OPPOSITION/RESISTANCE

- 45. Do you feel you can express opposition to the Prevent Duty?
- 46. Have there been any instances where you have not followed the Prevent Duty guidance?
- 47. How can Prevent be improved?

Appendix C: Participant Information Sheet – Category 1 Participants

Participant Information Sheet - Category 1 Participants Date: 21/12/2018

Research Project Title: The impact of Prevent Strategy on citizenship governance.

You are being invited to take part in a research project which looks at how the Prevent Strategy is impacting citizenship practice and civic duty. Before you decide whether or not to participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

1. What is the project's purpose?

This research is being conducted as part of a PhD qualification and the research will last three years.

2. Why have I been chosen?

You have been chosen because you work in the local authority/health/education sector or you work for a law enforcement agency and have a duty to implement the Prevent Strategy under Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) 2015.

3. Do I have to take part?

Taking part in the research is entirely voluntary and if you do not wish to take part, there will be no negative consequences. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to participate, you will be given this information sheet to keep and will be asked to sign or initial the consent form. If you do not want to provide written consent, you can give verbal consent in the form of yes/no answers to statements read out by the researcher. Your verbal consent will be audio recorded if you agree to being recorded.

If you change your mind after signing the consent form, you can still withdraw at any time without any negative consequences. You do not have to give a reason. If you wish to withdraw from the research, please contact the researcher Amna Kaleem (a.kaleem@sheffield.ac.uk) or the research supervisors: Dr Ross Bellaby (r.bellaby@sheffield.ac.uk) and Dr Anastasia Shesterinina (a.shesterinina@sheffield.ac.uk).

While you can discontinue your participation at any time, if the data from your interview has been anonymised and included within a large dataset, it may not be possible to remove your data from the study. However, you will be removed from any on-going or future data collection and your original interview transcript will also be removed from the records.

4. What will happen to me if I take part? What do I have to do?

You will be invited to take part in an interview with the researcher or you will be observed during participant observation. In case of an interview, it will be semi-structured i.e. the researcher will ask you a few broad questions and then you will be invited to answer these questions and provide additional feedback. The interview will last for 40-60 minutes and will be conducted like a conversation. The interview will take place either at your workplace or at a public venue agreed by

both you and the researcher. You might be invited for a second follow-up interview at a later date but will be given enough notice before it is scheduled. The interviews might take place at a university building which could involve a commute to the venue. Unfortunately, the researcher will not be able to pay travel expenses.

The researcher will ask you about your involvement in implementing the Prevent Strategy at your workplace or in the community. Your participation in the project will provide valuable insights about the impact of the Prevent Strategy on the daily conduct of your professional duties. You will be asked about your knowledge of the Prevent Strategy, details of any training sessions you have attended or conducted etc. You will be invited to share your opinions and feelings about this policy and how it influences your job.

5. What are the possible benefits of taking part?

Whilst there are no immediate benefits for you for participating in the project, it is hoped that the information you provide by sharing your experiences and views would prove useful in analysing the government's policy and highlighting any positive or negative impact this policy may have.

6. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?

Your personal details such as phone number, address, and email address etc. will not be revealed to anyone. However, your name and some of your details such as the sector of employment, job designation, and region will be mentioned in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs, if you give explicit consent for this. If you do not want to be identified at all, you can request the researcher to keep you anonymous. If you request anonymity, the researcher will ensure that any discussion of your input protects your identity and is not attributable to you.

In exceptional circumstances, the researcher could be under a moral obligation to break confidentiality. These relate to child protection offences such as the physical or sexual abuse of minors, the physical abuse of vulnerable adults, money laundering and other crimes covered by prevention of terrorism legislation.

7. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

This research will discuss your views on the implementation of the Prevent Strategy in your workplace. Talking about the Prevent Strategy and its impact could prove uncomfortable for you if you feel that this policy targets people of your religious, ethnic, economic, or/and other demographic background. You may also feel uncomfortable sharing your political views about the government and the orders to implement the Prevent Strategy at your workplace. The researcher will provide you trigger warnings for questions which could make you feel uncomfortable, when this happens you can refuse to answer the questions. You can also discontinue the interview and your involvement with the project at any point.

While your personal information will be kept confidential and your name and job designation will only be used *if you have given consent*, if you are identified through your interview data by your colleagues or your superiors, your views may create difficulties for you at work. This could happen if you have views which differ from the opinions of your colleagues or the Prevent Officer/s at your organisation or you have views which are critical of the work being done by your colleagues or superiors. If these views are published in the research, your colleagues may read the findings and disagree with what you have said.

Furthermore, if you are employed in the public sector and have views against a governmental policy, your superiors may not approve of this. If you fear your opinions may have negative consequences for your personal or professional well-being, you can request the researcher to provide you complete

anonymity. If you are unable to decide this at the moment, you can request the researcher to provide you with your interview transcripts which might help you decide if there is anything you do not want included in the findings.

Your well-being is the researcher's top priority, therefore, if there is anything that makes you uncomfortable, please share it and every effort will be made to address your concerns.

8. What is the legal basis for processing my personal data?

According to data protection legislation, we are required to inform you that the legal basis we are applying in order to process your personal data is that 'processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest' (Article 6(1)(e)).

As we will be collecting some data that is defined in the legislation as more sensitive i.e. information about racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, we also need to let you know that we are applying the following condition in law: that the use of your data is 'necessary for scientific or historical research purposes'.

9. What will happen to the data collected, and the results of the research project?

Only the researcher will have access to the raw data. There are no collaborators in this project and no external services are being used, therefore, no one else will have sight of the raw data.

The hard copies of the consent form you have signed will be scanned and the digital copies will be stored in a password protected folder. The hard copies will be destroyed. If you do not want to provide written consent, you can give verbal consent in the form of yes/no answers to statements read out by the researcher. Your verbal consent will be audio recorded if you agree to being recorded. However, if you do not feel comfortable with that, the researcher will take down the details in a record of verbal consent document. If you agree to your verbal consent being recorded, the recording will be uploaded to a password protected folder on an encrypted laptop and the original recording will be deleted from the recording device.

All the interview transcripts will be stored in a separate password protected folder. If you consent to your interview being audio recorded, the recording will be moved immediately to an encrypted laptop and the original recording will be destroyed from the recorder. These folders will be stored separately from the Master folder containing your personal data.

The interview data will primarily be analysed and published in the researcher's PhD thesis but can also be used in journal articles, blog posts, books etc. All of these will be in the public domain and you will be able to access sources containing data or analysis of data gleaned from your interview transcript.

The interview transcripts, audio recordings, and associated material will be stored for three years and will be destroyed if no further use for these has been identified. Identifiable personal data (such as the key which links an individual to the data they provided) will be destroyed as soon as it is clear that this will not affect the research purpose.

10. Who is organising and funding the research?

This research is being funded by the Economic and Social Research Council which is part of the UK Research and Innovation, a non-departmental public body funded by a grant-in-aid from the UK government

11. Who is the Data Controller?

The University of Sheffield will act as the Data Controller for this study. This means that the University is responsible for looking after your information and using it properly.

12. Who has ethically reviewed the project?

This project has been ethically approved via the University of Sheffield's Ethics Review Procedure, as administered by the Department of Politics and the Economic and Social Research Council.

13. What if something goes wrong and I wish to complain about the research?

If you have a complaint regarding your treatment by the researcher, you can raise it with the members of the supervisory team which include Dr Ross Bellaby (r.bellaby@sheffield.ac.uk) and Dr Anastasia Shesterinina (a.shesterinina@sheffield.ac.uk). If you feel your complaint has not been handled to your satisfaction, you can contact Prof. Andy Hindmoor (a.hindmoor@sheffield.ac.uk), the Head of Politics Department, who will escalate the complaint through the appropriate channels. If the complaint relates to how your personal data has been handled, information about how to raise a complaint can be found in the University's Privacy Notice: <u>https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/govern/data-protection/privacy/general</u>.

14. Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used?

If you provide consent, the interview will be audio recorded. The recording will be immediately transferred to an encrypted device and the recording from the digital recorder will be deleted. The audio recordings will be transcribed and will only be used for analysis and for understanding the context of your answers. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original recordings. The original recordings will be stored on an encrypted device for three years and will be destroyed if no further use for these has been identified.

While you can discontinue your participation at any time, if the input from your audio data has been anonymised and included within a large dataset, it may not be possible to remove this data from the study. However, you will be removed from any on-going or future data collection and your original audio recording will also be removed from the records.

15. Contact for further information

If you wish to obtain further information about the project, you can contact members of the supervisory team:

Dr Ross Bellaby	Dr Anastasia Shesterinina	
Lecturer, Department of Politics	Lecturer, Department of Politics	
University of Sheffield	University of Sheffield	
Elmfield, Northumberland Road	Elmfield, Northumberland Road	
Sheffield S10 2TU	Sheffield S10 2TU	
r.bellaby@sheffield.ac.uk	a.shesterinina@sheffield.ac.uk	
0114 222 1700	0114 222 1700	

At the interview, you will be given a hard copy of this information sheet and a signed copy of the consent form for your records.

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for considering participation in the project.

Appendix D: Participant Information Sheet – Category 2 Participants

Participant Information Sheet – Category 2 Participants Date: 21/02/2019

Research Project Title: The impact of Prevent Strategy on citizenship governance.

You are being invited to take part in a research project which looks at how the Prevent Strategy is impacting citizenship practice and civic duty. Before you decide whether or not to participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

1. What is the project's purpose?

This research is being conducted as part of a PhD qualification and the research will last three years.

2. Why have I been chosen?

You have been chosen because you work in the local authority/health/education sector or you work for a law enforcement agency and have a duty to implement the Prevent Strategy under Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) 2015.

3. Do I have to take part?

Taking part in the research is entirely voluntary and if you do not wish to take part, there will be no negative consequences. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to participate, you will be given this information sheet to keep and will be asked to sign or initial the consent form. If you do not want to provide written consent, you can give verbal consent in the form of yes/no answers to statements read out by the researcher. Your verbal consent will be audio recorded if you agree to being recorded.

If you change your mind after signing the consent form, you can still withdraw at any time without any negative consequences. You do not have to give a reason. If you wish to withdraw from the research, please contact the researcher Amna Kaleem (a.kaleem@sheffield.ac.uk) or the research supervisors: Dr Ross Bellaby (r.bellaby@sheffield.ac.uk) and Dr Anastasia Shesterinina (a.shesterinina@sheffield.ac.uk).

While you can discontinue your participation at any time, if the data from your interview has been anonymised and included within a large dataset, it may not be possible to remove your data from the study. However, you will be removed from any on-going or future data collection and your original interview transcript will also be removed from the records.

4. What will happen to me if I take part? What do I have to do?

You will be invited to take part in an interview with the researcher or you will be observed during participant observation. In case of an interview, it will be semi-structured i.e. the researcher will ask you a few broad questions and then you will be invited to answer these questions and provide additional feedback. The interview will last for 40-60 minutes and will be conducted like a conversation. The interview will take place either at your workplace or at a public venue agreed by both you and the researcher. You might be invited for a second follow-up interview at a later date but will be given enough notice before it is scheduled. The interviews might take place at a university building which could involve a commute to the venue. Unfortunately, the researcher will not be able to pay travel expenses.

The researcher will ask you about your involvement in implementing the Prevent Strategy at your workplace or in the community. Your participation in the project will provide valuable insights about the impact of the Prevent Strategy on the daily conduct of your professional duties. You will be asked about your knowledge of the Prevent Strategy, details of any training sessions you have attended or conducted etc. You will be invited to share your opinions and feelings about this policy and how it influences your job.

5. What are the possible benefits of taking part?

Whilst there are no immediate benefits for you for participating in the project, it is hoped that the information you provide by sharing your experiences and views would prove useful in analysing the government's policy and highlighting any positive or negative impact this policy may have.

6. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?

Your personal details such as your name, phone number, address, and email address etc. will not be revealed anyone. All the information that we collect about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential and will only be accessible to the researcher. You will <u>not</u> be identified by name or any other identifiable information in any reports or publications unless you have given your explicit consent for this.

In exceptional circumstances, the researcher could be under a moral obligation to break confidentiality. These relate to child protection offences such as the physical or sexual abuse of minors, the physical abuse of vulnerable adults, money laundering and other crimes covered by prevention of terrorism legislation.

7. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

This research will discuss your views on the implementation of the Prevent Strategy in your workplace. Talking about the Prevent Strategy and its impact could prove uncomfortable for you if you feel that this policy targets people of your religious, ethnic, economic, and/or other demographic background. You may also feel uncomfortable sharing your political views about the government and the orders to implement the Prevent Strategy at your workplace. The researcher will provide you trigger warnings for questions which could make you feel uncomfortable, when this happens you can refuse to answer the questions. You can also discontinue the interview and your involvement with the project at any point.

While your personal information will be kept confidential and your name or other identifying information <u>will not</u> be used in the research findings, if your views are published in the research and your colleagues read the findings and attribute these quotes to you, your opinions may create difficulties for you at work. This could happen if you have views which differ from the opinions of your colleagues or the Prevent Officer/s at your organisation or you may have views which are critical of the work being done by your colleagues or superiors. Furthermore, if you are employed in the public sector and have views against a governmental policy, your superiors may not approve of this. The researcher is aware of these risks, therefore, special care will be taken to anonymise your data and protect your identity.

Your well-being is the researcher's top priority, if there is anything that makes you uncomfortable, please share it and every effort will be made to address your concerns.

8. What is the legal basis for processing my personal data?

According to data protection legislation, we are required to inform you that the legal basis we are applying in order to process your personal data is that 'processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest' (Article 6(1)(e)).

As we will be collecting some data that is defined in the legislation as more sensitive i.e. information about racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, we also need to let you know that we are applying the following condition in law: that the use of your data is 'necessary for scientific or historical research purposes'.

9. What will happen to the data collected, and the results of the research project?

Only the researcher will have access to the raw data. There are no collaborators in this project and no external services are being used, therefore, no one else will have sight of the raw data. If at some stage, the data or research findings are shared with the supervisory team, your data will be anonymised i.e. your name, place of work will be removed.

You will be assigned a serial number, these will be recorded with your full details in a password protected file on the University of Sheffield secure drive and on an encrypted laptop.

The hard copies of the consent forms will be scanned, and the digital copies will be stored in a password protected folder. The hard copies will be destroyed. All the interview transcripts will be stored in a separate password protected folder bearing your serial number. If you do not want to provide written consent, you can give verbal consent in the form of yes/no answers to statements read out by the researcher. Your verbal consent will be audio recorded if you agree to being recorded. However, if you do not feel comfortable with that, the researcher will take down the details in a record of verbal consent document. If you agree to your verbal consent being recorded, the recording will be uploaded to a password protected folder on an encrypted laptop and the original recording will be deleted from the recording device.

If you consent to your interview being audio recorded, the recording will be moved immediately to an encrypted device and the recording will be destroyed from the recorder. These folders will be stored separately from the Master folder containing your personal data.

The interview data will primarily be analysed and published in the researcher's PhD thesis but can also be used in journal articles, blog posts, books etc. All of these will be in public domain and you will be able to access sources containing data or analysis of data gleaned from your interview transcript.

The interview transcripts, audio recordings, and associated material will be stored for three years and will be destroyed if no further use for these has been identified. Identifiable personal data (such as the key which links an individual to the data they provided) will be destroyed as soon as it is clear that this will not affect the research purpose.

10. Who is organising and funding the research?

This research is being funded by the Economic and Social Research Council which is part of the UK Research and Innovation, a non-departmental public body funded by a grant-in-aid from the UK government

11. Who is the Data Controller?

The University of Sheffield will act as the Data Controller for this study. This means that the University is responsible for looking after your information and using it properly.

12. Who has ethically reviewed the project?

This project has been ethically approved via the University of Sheffield's Ethics Review Procedure, as administered by the Department of Politics and the Economic and Social Research Council.

13. What if something goes wrong and I wish to complain about the research?

If you have a complaint regarding your treatment by the researcher, you can raise it with the members of the supervisory team which include Dr Ross Bellaby (r.bellaby@sheffield.ac.uk) and Dr Anastasia Shesterinina (a.shesterinina@sheffield.ac.uk). If you feel your complaint has not been handled to your satisfaction, you can contact Prof. Andy Hindmoor (a.hindmoor@sheffield.ac.uk), the Head of Politics Department, who will escalate the complaint through the appropriate channels. If the complaint relates to how your personal data has been handled, information about how to raise a complaint can be found in the University's Privacy Notice: <u>https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/govern/data-protection/privacy/general</u>.

14. Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used?

If you provide consent, the interview will be audio recorded. The recording will be immediately transferred to an encrypted device and the recording from the digital recorder will be deleted. The audio recordings will be transcribed and will only be used for analysis and for understanding the context of your answers. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original recordings. The original recordings will be stored on an encrypted device for three years and will be destroyed if no further use for these has been identified.

While you can discontinue your participation at any time, if the input from your audio data has been anonymised and included within a large dataset, it may not be possible to remove this data from the study. However, you will be removed from any on-going or future data collection and your original audio recording will also be removed from the records.

15. Contact for further information

If you wish to obtain further information about the project, you can contact members of the supervisory team:

Dr Ross Bellaby	Dr Anastasia Shesterinina
Lecturer, Department of Politics	Lecturer, Department of Politics
University of Sheffield	University of Sheffield
Elmfield, Northumberland Road	Elmfield, Northumberland Road
Sheffield S10 2TU	Sheffield S10 2TU
r.bellaby@sheffield.ac.uk	a.shesterinina@sheffield.ac.uk
0114 222 1700	0114 222 1700

At the interview, you will be given a hard copy of this information sheet and a signed copy of the consent form for your records.

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for considering participation in the project.

Appendix E: Consent Form – Category 1 Participants



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The impact of Prevent Strategy on Citizenship Governance

Consent Form – Category 1 Participants

Please tick the appropriate boxes		No
Taking Part in the Project		
I have read and understood the project information sheet dated DD/MM/YYYY or the project has been fully explained to me. (If you will answer No to this question please do not proceed with this consent form until you are fully aware of what your participation in the project will mean).		
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project.		
I agree to take part in the project. I understand that taking part in the project will include being interviewed and/or observed.		
I agree to being audio recorded and understand that the audio file will be transferred to a password protected folder on a secure drive and will not be stored on the audio recorder.		
I understand that my taking part is voluntary and that I can withdraw from the study at any time and before [DATE], when this research is planned to be completed; I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take part and there will be no adverse consequences if I choose to withdraw.		
How my information will be used during and after the project		
I understand my personal details such as phone number, address and email address etc. will not be revealed to anyone.		
I agree to my name, sector of employment, job designation, and region to be revealed in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs.		
I understand and agree that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs.		
So that the information you provide can be used legally by the researchers		
I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials generated as part of this project to The University of Sheffield.		
I do not want to sign this consent form but I agree to provide verbal consent to my participation in the project.		
Name of participant: Signature: Date:		

Project contact details for further information:

Name of Researcher: Amna Kaleem

Dr Ross Bellaby	Dr Anastasia Shesterinina	Prof Andy Hindmoor
Lecturer, Department of Politics	Lecturer, Department of Politics	Head of Department
University of Sheffield	University of Sheffield	Department of Politics
Elmfield, Northumberland Road	Elmfield, Northumberland Road	University of Sheffield
Sheffield S10 2TU	Sheffield S10 2TU	Elmfield, Northumberland Road
r.bellaby@sheffield.ac.uk	a.shesterinina@sheffield.ac.uk	Sheffield S10 2TU
0114 222 1700	0114 222 1700	a.hindmoor@sheffield.ac.uk

Date:

Signature:

The template of this consent form has been approved by the University of Sheffield Research Ethics Committee and is available to view here: https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/rs/ethicsandintegrity/ethicspolicy/further-guidance/homepage

Appendix F: Consent Form – Category 2 Participants



The impact of Prevent Strategy on Citizenship Governance

Consent Form – Category 2 Participants

Please tick the appropriate boxes		
Taking Part in the Project		
I have read and understood the project information sheet dated DD/MM/YYYY or the project has been fully explained to me. (If you will answer No to this question please do not proceed with this consent form until you are fully aware of what your participation in the project will mean).		
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project.		
I agree to take part in the project. I understand that taking part in the project will include being interviewe and/or observed.		
I agree to being audio recorded and understand that the audio file will be transferred to a password protecte folder on a secure drive and will not be stored on the audio recorder.		
I understand that my taking part is voluntary and that I can withdraw from the study at any time and before [DATE], when this research is planned to be completed; I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take part and there will be no adverse consequences if I choose to withdraw.		
How my information will be used during and after the project		
I understand my personal details such as my name, phone number, address and email address etc. will no be revealed to anyone.		
I understand and agree that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs.		
So that the information you provide can be used legally by the researchers		
I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials generated as part of this project to The University of Sheffield.		
I do not want to sign this consent form but I agree to provide verbal consent to my participation in the project.		
Name of participant: Signature: Date:		

Name of Researcher: Amna Kaleem	Signature:	Date:
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Project contact details for further information:

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The template of this consent form has been approved by the University of Sheffield Research Ethics Committee and is available to view here: https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/rs/ethicsandintegrity/ethicspolicy/further-guidance/homepage

Appendix G: Data Access Statement

Given the sensitive nature of the subject matter, all the participants in this project were assured complete anonymity. Therefore, in order to keep the involvement of all research participants confidential, supporting data associated with this project cannot be made available.

As part of the data gathering process, I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with frontline professionals who come under a legal obligation to enact the Prevent Duty. During the interviews, all the participants spoke freely and shared many details that could lead to their identification. Although every effort has been made to anonymise the transcripts, it cannot be guaranteed that participant anonymity would be maintained if a third party access this data. Therefore, to honour the commitment made to the research participants, I have taken the difficult decision of not depositing the interview transcripts in any online depository accessed by third parties.

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