

“Paramount Among All Sublunary Cretures”

Anthropocentrism, Attentiveness, and
Nonhumanity in Early Modern England,
1575-1660

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the dynamics of anthropocentrism in early modern English literature: how it could provoke both a callous disregard for and profound consideration of nonhumanity. Synthesising animal studies, ecocriticism, and cultural theory, it interrogates the “life and death relations” of early modern England and reveals how four writers navigated “the implications of our real similarities with and differences from other creatures”.¹ Using important animal studies scholarship alongside writing on cosmopolitics, I craft a theoretical framework that traces the varied dynamics of early modern attentiveness to the natural world.

Chapter 1 shows how George Gascoigne’s *The Noble Arte of Venerie* (1575) balances the addictive brutality of blood-sports with an alertness to nonhuman subjectivities, building to a discussion of rights and justice in relation to the body. Chapter 2 examines how Shakespeare’s *Coriolanus* stages the dangerous consequences of trying to extricate oneself from an earthly interdependence, especially as it impacts on the political world. Drayton’s biblical poem, “Noahs Floud”, is the topic of Chapter 3, giving furious vent to concerns about Man’s capacity to impact the living world. Chapter 4 examines James Howell’s important prose dialogue *Therologia, The Parly of Beasts; or, Morphandra* (1660) and its interrogation of the relationship between human exceptionalism and humoralism at the centre of a decaying cosmos.

My thesis argues that these authors were alert to the living world’s potential to wreak havoc and its “indifference” to humanity.² At the same time, however, it highlights a genuine, thoughtful investment in nonhuman experiences and the wellbeing of the living world.

¹ Helena Feder, “Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism*, ed. Greg Garrard (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 227-28.

² Isabelle Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism*, trans. Andrew Goffey (Lüneberg: Open Humanities Press/Meson Press, 2015), 46-47.

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author.
This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, university.
All sources are acknowledged as references.

Who Cares?

An Introduction

My thesis is about humans, nonhuman animals, the earth, and the “string-figure connections” that looped between them during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in early modern England.¹ Specifically, it thinks about four early modern English texts which address questions of anthropocentrism, justice, earthliness, and environmental and social responsibility. George Gascoigne’s hunting manual *The Noble Arte of Venerie* (1575); William Shakespeare’s Roman tragedy *Coriolanus* (c.1608); Michael Drayton’s biblical verse epic “Noahs Floud” (1630); and James Howell’s anthropomorphic prose dialogue, *Therologia, The Parly of Beasts; or, Morphandra* (1660) were composed in a profoundly pro-anthropocentric period.² These texts are striking because of their attentiveness to the potential outcomes of this epistemology: if Man is central, does that put certain responsibilities on his shoulders? If yes, does he have the capacity to fulfil those duties? Each text offers different answers to these questions, but all are troubled by the notion that Man does not pay enough attention to worlds outside his own, and that this inattentiveness could have devastating consequences.

It might be considered rude, almost, to introduce a work pertaining to attentiveness and nonhumanity and not acknowledge Jacques Derrida’s naked encounter with his cat. Derrida’s cat is a great cat: she alerts us to the fact that humans are not the only ones who have the capacity to look at other living beings with interest and curiosity.³ She exists within a Francophone tradition inherited from the cat who deigns to play with Michel de Montaigne; how much scholarship has imagined her and Michel monkeying about?⁴ Still, if there was ever a cat to shock us into paying attention, she belongs neither to Derrida nor Montaigne: she is, instead, the 450-year-old Mouse-slayer, star of William Baldwin’s *Beware the Cat* (c.1570).

In one episode, Mouse-slayer – a rough-tough cat with a feline propensity for chaos – brings an entire street to ruin.⁵ The humans involved seem to deserve it. One day, an “ungracious fellow” in

¹ The language of string-figures comes Donna Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 9-29.

² Lorraine Daston explores this pro-anthropocentrism in “How Nature Became the Other: Anthropomorphism and Anthropocentrism in Early Modern Natural Philosophy”, in *Biology as Society, Society as Biology: Metaphors*, ed. Sabine Maasen, Everett Mendelsohn and Peter Weingart (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 37-56.

³ Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, ed. Marie Louise Mallet, trans. David Wills (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2008), 4-9.

⁴ Together they engage in “mutuall apish trickes”. Michel de Montaigne, *Essays VVritten in French by Michael Lord of Montaigne*, trans. John Florio (1613), Y5v.

⁵ William Baldwin, *Beware the Cat by William Baldwin: The First English Novel*, ed. William A. Ringler, Jr. and Michael Flachmann (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1988), 47-49.

Mouse-slayer's household seizes upon her and proceeds to take walnut shells, fill them with pitch and stick them to her paws, plunging them into cold water so that the shoeing is more permanent. These shoes leave Mouse-slayer unable to do her usual climbing, so, rather forlornly, she retreats to the garret space at the top of the house, above her master and mistress's bedroom. Unfortunately, the cat-cobbler fails to inform anyone of his actions. Later, when Mouse-slayer begins her night-time hunt, making a startling clattering with her walnuttied feet, the household assume the devil is on the rampage. Cat-cobbler goes up the stairs to see what's happening only to meet Mouse-slayer coming the other way: she too wants to know what's going on. The noise she's making and the sight of her "glistening eyes" convince him that he's seen "the devil!"; he tumbles backwards down the stairs and "brake[s] his head"; the rest of the household run naked into the street, alerting their neighbours to the assumed demonic presence.⁶

In the street, the chaos continues. Hearing that Lucifer is in the neighbourhood, other residents summon a priest, who promptly collects his Catholic paraphernalia and heads for the house. Seeing the priest approach, Mouse-slayer aims straight for him, thinking she's about to be treated to a Mass. The priest, however, falls down with fright: he bops someone with his chalice and pot of holy water, and sets fire to someone else's trousers with his holy candle. Mouse-slayer continues to run amok: she literally scares the crap out of a boy "which for fear had beshit himself" – and the priest faceplants into the steaming results. Ultimately Mouse-slayer finds her human in the chaos; everyone curses the cat-cobbler, and "this done, they got hot water and dissolved the pitch and plucked off [Mouse-slayer's] shoes".⁷

Baldwin gives Mouse-slayer her own thoughts and feelings about the ways in which she navigates space and interacts with people. I discuss the problems of anthropomorphism below, but for now it is important to note that Baldwin thinks carefully about how a real cat would respond in Mouse-slayer's circumstances: she is upset, not just because of the painful indignity of her treatment but because it results in her being unable to act as she wishes *as a cat*. She wants to climb, to hunt, but the walnut shells prevent this. Injured, she retreats to a quiet, private space, just as a real cat would.

Just before this episode begins, Baldwin throws in a tiny detail, which indicates how closely he was thinking about cats as he anthropomorphised them. Mouse-slayer claims that "my master also made much of me, because I would take meat in my foot and therewith put it in my mouth and feed".⁸ This morsel of information is so small it could easily be missed as the narrative launches into one of its most memorable episodes. However, it marks a sincere attention to the actions of a real animal: some cats do pick up their food and eat directly from their paws. The fact that not every cat does this shows that Baldwin is not writing a general 'cat', but characterising Mouse-slayer specifically.

⁶ Ibid., 48.

⁷ Ibid., 49.

⁸ Ibid., 47.

Moreover, Mouse-slayer's behaviour is more than simply acknowledged: her master finds it endearing and enjoys watching her do it.⁹ It also matters that Mouse-slayer is not abandoned to an ungainly fate: she is taken up and treated, her paws restored. Someone, or some people, care about her.

Baldwin pays attention to the cat he is composing. He considers her response to abuse, her interactions with the humans around her and the power humans have to (mis)treat their companion species. However, paying attention to the nonhuman world by no means equates to saving it from harm: in Baldwin's text cats are physically abused, and two are roasted and eaten.¹⁰ Baldwin is perfectly able to produce an attentive, vivid rendering of a cat who people care about, and simultaneously to place her in a narrative which jokingly subjects her and other felines to cruelty and suffering. It is clear from *Beware the Cat* that Baldwin cares about the details of his portrayal of feline life, but writing *carefully* and writing *caringly* are two very different things.

At its heart, this thesis is about the art of giving-a-damn. I am redeploying the intensity with which this phrase is normally delivered negatively to convey the urgency of what is to be done here. The phrasing is borrowed from Isabelle Stengers' idea of "the *art* of paying attention"; Stengers is an important figure in the critical framework which supports this thesis.¹¹ Giving a damn in this thesis is about care, attentiveness, respect and politeness, engaging in the difficult conversations of "cosmopolitics", and the various other terms used then and now for seeing and constructing worlds with and from perspectives other than your own. My exploration of attentiveness to the worlds outside of Man spans a period of roughly 100 years (1575-1660). It examines how four very different texts think carefully about what Jim Mason calls "the living world" and Man's privilege of being able to choose how much attention to pay to it, and how that process of paying attention may manifest as a form of care.¹² Though I use terms such as *nature*, *the natural world* and *the nonhuman world* interchangeably with "the living world", I find the latter to be the most usefully capacious, as it disrupts any boundary between the human animal and everything else: Man's biological existence, pathogens, parasites, flora and fauna, cellular life, multispecies networks – all of these are made present through Mason's choice of terminology.

The four texts I have chosen have in common a suspicion towards human pre-eminence among earthly beings, while acknowledging that humans have a dominant advantage over other earthlings. Furthermore, they acknowledge that this dominance comes with a sense of responsibility for other beings, and that humans have the power to manifest or abdicate from this responsibility. I

⁹ I remember watching one of my grandmother's cats eat like this. I'll always wonder what she as an individual found objectionable about her dish. A YouTube search immediately reveals that Mouse-slayer's master is not the only one who makes much of cats eating from their paws.

¹⁰ Baldwin, *Beware the Cat*, 16; 27.

¹¹ Isabelle Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism*, trans. Andrew Goffey (Lüneberg: Open Humanities Press/Meson Press, 2015), 62. Emphasis in text. Throughout the thesis, emphasis is in text unless otherwise specified.

¹² Jim Mason, "Misothery: Contempt for Animals and Nature, Its Origins, Purposes, and Repercussions", in *The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies*, ed. Linda Kalof (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 136.

began by thinking about Mouse-slayer because although she pops into existence shortly before this thesis is situated, she typifies an early modern ambivalence to nonhuman life, seen as expendable, enjoyable, worth caring for, and subject to total disregard, sometimes simultaneously.

This ambivalent sense of responsibility reveals itself at other moments of tense confrontation between Man and the living world: as animals are killed for entertainment (*The Noble Arte of Venerie*); as Man negotiates with bare life in political community (*Coriolanus*); as Man addresses the aftermath of historical harms committed against nature (“Noahs Floud”), and as Man confronts how this responsibility places him in service to nonhuman lives (*Therologia*). The idea of nature as living and lively is central to how each of these texts conceptualises the nonhuman. The chronological span of this thesis encompasses a world exploding with knowledge to be gathered and processed as Europeans saw, sailed, and sliced their way into new territories at the level of the astronomical, continental, local, and anatomical.¹³ All of these contexts buzz in the intellectual background of the writing explored here, and so to speak of a static, detached-feeling *nature* saps life from a lively, sometimes threatening, “ticklish assemblage of forces”.¹⁴

My understanding of nature-as-assemblages comes from Isabelle Stengers, the originator of the concept of cosmopolitics. I discuss this in greater detail below, but the essence of cosmopolitics is an ethos of attentiveness and openness. When discussions about potentially life-threatening outcomes – political discussions – are happening, cosmopolitics asks that they include beings affected by the outcome, including those who cannot speak, will not speak, or do not care to speak for themselves.¹⁵ Cosmopolitics works through a process of composition: it is about constructing common worlds together in the process of these discussions.¹⁶ Whilst my literature review (below) places a heavy emphasis on cosmopolitics, my thesis does not take this as its exclusive focus. Rather, I use cosmopolitics to draw in a number of other theoretical fields: across my chapters I touch on biopolitics, biocitizenship, the concerns of speculative fiction, and philosophy regarding rights and

¹³ For a stunning overview of the results of this processing, see Ayesha Ramachandran, *The Worldmakers: Global Imagining in Early Modern Europe* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015). On anatomy, see Jonathan Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and The Human Body in Renaissance Culture* (London: Routledge, 1995); David Hillman, *Shakespeare's Entrails: Belief, Scepticism and the Interior of the Body* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). On categorising, Surekha Davies has contributed a great deal to the field: “The Unlucky, the Bad and the Ugly: Categories of Monstrosity from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment”, in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous*, ed. Asa Mittman with Peter Dendle, (Farnham: Ashgate 2013), 49-75; “Catalogical Encounters: Worldmaking in Early Modern Cabinets of Curiosities”, in *Early Modern Things: Objects and their Histories, 1500-1800*, ed. Paula Findlen (London: Routledge, 2021), 227-54. See also Karl A. E. Enenkel, “The Species and Beyond: Classification and the Place of Hybrids in Early Modern Zoology”, in *Zoology in Early Modern Culture: Interspecies of Science, Theology, Philology, and Political and Religious Education*, ed. Karl A. E. Enenkel and Paul J. Smith (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2014), 55-148. On varied scientific thinking, see John Brooke and Ian Maclean ed., *Heterodoxy in Early Modern Science and Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) and for a case study of its literary impact, see B.J. Sokol, *A Brave New World of Knowledge: Shakespeare's The Tempest and Early Modern Epistemology* (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003). For less Eurocentric approaches, see László Kontler et al. ed., *Negotiating Knowledge in Early-Modern Empires: A Decentred View* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

¹⁴ Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times*, 47. This assemblage is discussed further in Chapter 2.

¹⁵ Stengers, “The Cosmopolitical Proposal”, trans. Liz Carey-Libbrecht, in *Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy*, ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 1003.

¹⁶ Bruno Latour, “Politics of Nature: East and West Perspectives”, *Ethics and Global Politics* 4, no.1 (2011): 73.

justice. I am not exploring early modern cosmopolitanism; I am attempting to *do* cosmopolitics and *think* cosmopolitically with early modern writing.

The problem of human exceptionalism recurs throughout this thesis. The precariousness of this idea in early modernity has already been well-established, in particular by Laurie Shannon.¹⁷ Her work has demonstrated how doubts about the “downside risk inherent in the proposition of an immortal soul”, concerns about Man’s “cosmic underprovisioning” in the world as typified by his potential for nakedness, and his “knowledge deficit” in his ability to care for himself medically, served to destabilise Man’s position at the top of an Aristotelian hierarchy of beings.¹⁸ However, this does not diminish exceptionalism’s powerful hold over the period’s epistemologies: its twin roots in both Christian theology and Classical philosophy extend through the period’s interactions with nonhumanity, and have important ramifications for reading anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism in my chosen texts, as I explore below.¹⁹ I am particularly interested in how anthropocentrism and anthro-exceptionalism both support and undermine each other in the texts at hand.

This thesis seeks to explore what issues are at stake when the wants and needs of bodies which make up the early modern living world are considered as inherently political: that is, they involve “life and death relations”.²⁰ This politics demands a recognition of “the implications of our real similarities with and differences from other creatures”.²¹ By taking a cosmopolitical approach, I highlight how early modern English texts negotiate this act of recognition, highlighting the interdependent worlds and subjectivities which contextualise their writing, and which that writing generates in turn. I aim to demonstrate that these examples of early modern English writing on the living world offer complex responses to the problems of anthropocentrism and its innate exceptionalism. I also suggest that examining these texts in this way offer exciting new paradigms for current critical theory. The theoretical works I cite here are written with twentieth- and twenty-first-century sensibilities in mind, sensibilities which are generally more open to a lively nonhuman world worthy of care and just treatment. Applying them to a world in which care for others is dependent on an anthropocentric model of morality and which takes a utilitarian view of the living world productively tests their limits and potentials.

¹⁷ Laurie Shannon, *The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013), esp. 127-73. This chapter is an extended version of Shannon’s earlier article: “Poor, Bare, Forked: Animal Sovereignty, Human Negative Exceptionalism, and the Natural History of *King Lear*”, *Shakespeare Quarterly* 60, no.2 (2009): 168-96.

¹⁸ Shannon, “Poor, Bare, Forked”, 175-77; 192-93.

¹⁹ In relation to Humanist intellectual culture, see Kenneth Gouwens, “Human Exceptionalism”, in *The Renaissance World*, ed. John Jeffries Martin (Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis, 2015), 415-34; Gouwens, “What Posthumanism Isn’t: On Humanism and Human Exceptionalism in the Renaissance”, in *Renaissance Posthumanism*, ed. Joseph Campana and Scott Maisano (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2016), 37-63.

²⁰ Helena Feder, “Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism*, ed. Greg Garrard (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 227.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 228.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The first major study of early modern humanity and its relationship to nature was Keith Thomas' *Man and the Natural World* (1983).²² Thomas' work established the foundations for a number of sub-fields within early modern animal studies and ecocriticism. These include natural history, natural theology, attitudes to meat-eating, abuse and the question of animal rights in early modernity, botanical knowledge, and agricultural practice in the era. From here, the field has become somewhat bifurcated, and scholarship tends to find itself drawn into either animal studies or ecocriticism. This thesis sits between these two fields, concerning itself with both animals and animality in literary texts, and with human interactions with the earth itself, i.e. agricultural work and ecological impact. Below, I lay out an overview of early modern animal studies and ecocriticism as they pertain to my thesis, and consider what tools I have used to bring these fields together.

Work on animals in early modernity broadly encompasses two methodologies. The first is animal history which, when it comes to work on early modernity, owes its explosive popularity to the work of Erica Fudge, who has led the field for some time.²³ Fudge's work focuses on locating animals in history, examining how animals lived and died in the period. Her work has always aimed to answer the question recently formulated by Philip Howell and Hilda Kean: "what happens to 'history' when we recognise that, then as now, we live in the world with animal others?"²⁴ Howell and Kean argue that scholarship must take account of this question as it is "central not just to animal-human history but to the meaning of history itself".²⁵ Thinking about early modern animals thus offers space to write richer, more fully populated pasts. Edited collections such as *The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies* (2014) and *The Routledge Companion to Animal-Human History* (2019) have demonstrated the ever-increasing breadth of possibilities in the field, though as Harriet Ritvo has rightly noted with regard

²² Keith Thomas, *Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800* (London: Allen Lane, 1983).

²³ Erica Fudge's work on animals began with her doctoral thesis on bear-baiting: "The Context of Bear-baiting in Early Modern England" (doctoral thesis, University of Sussex, 1995). Key monographs for work on the early modern period are *Perceiving Animals: Humans and Beasts in Early Modern English Culture* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000) and *Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). Fudge has also edited the essay collection *Renaissance Beasts: Of Animals, Humans and Other Wonderful Creatures* (Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press, 2004). The volume addresses a wide range of animal lives in the period, as well as their work in literary metaphor and philosophy. Her most recent contribution to the field, *Quick Cattle and Dying Wishes: People and their Animals in Early Modern England* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2018) presents a dedicated study of bovine life in early modern England in rural and urban settings.

²⁴ Philip Howell and Hilda Kean, "Writing Animals in History", in *The Routledge Companion to Animal-Human History*, eds. Hilda Kean and Philip Howell (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), 20.

²⁵ Ibid.

to the dominance of scholarship from and concerned with the Global North, “although its historiography has become very lively and rich, the field is still opening up”.²⁶

The second methodology explores how a zoological vocabulary, literary and visual, operates in fiction, visual art, scientific texts, drama, and other genres and media, and considers how animals helped to shape these cultural fields.²⁷ In work on early modern literature, scholarship takes on the liveliness of human-animal history and applies it to textual sources; Shakespeare is something of an epicentre for this. Karen Raber has put together a phenomenal overview of scholarship on animals in the Shakespearean corpus, work on which dates back to the late 1800s.²⁸ In addition to this, alongside Holly Dugan, she has edited *The Routledge Handbook of Shakespeare and Animals* (2020).²⁹ Studies in this collection offer everything from materialist animal histories of Shakespeare in performance to literary analysis of zoological metaphors and demography.³⁰ These studies follow the line of work begun by Bruce Boehrer: his *Shakespeare Among the Animals* (2002) was the first to take up the theoretical concerns broached in animal studies and apply them to early modern English drama.³¹ Continuing this approach, Andreas Höfele’s *Stage, Stake, and Scaffold* (2011) was the first to combine work on the material, environmental contexts of Shakespearean performance with a focus on the multitude of animals that populate Shakespeare’s texts and were present in early modern London.³²

Beyond the English or, occasionally, four nations context, a landmark work of scholarship on early modern animals appeared in 1933, with the publication of George Boas’ *The Happy Beast in French Thought of the Seventeenth Century*.³³ Here, in an examination of the work of Michel de Montaigne and Pierre Charron, Boas introduces his concept of early modern *theriophily*: the idea that animals are equal or superior to humans for a variety of reasons. Boas’ scholarship generated the groundwork for explorations of the intellectual life of early modern animals.³⁴ These in turn made space for what has

²⁶ Harriet Ritvo, “Epilogue”, in *The Routledge Companion to Animal-Human History*, eds. Hilda Kean and Philip Howell (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), 544; Linda Kalof, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017). Whilst my thesis adds to the preponderance of Global Northern scholarship on the work of white Anglophone men, my hope is that its attention to lesser-studied texts, and the way in which it synthesises scholarship on better-known ones, contributes to a richer understanding of how early modernity formulated and thought about human-animal community.

²⁷ Greg Garrard has noted how both of these methodologies fall on one side of a broader divide in animal studies: “[...] study of the relations between animals and humans in the humanities is split between the analysis of the representation of animals in history and culture, or animal studies, and the philosophical consideration of animal rights”. Greg Garrard, *Ecocriticism*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2011), 146.

²⁸ Karen Raber, “Shakespeare and Animal Studies”, *Literature Compass* 12, no.6 (2015), 286-98.

²⁹ Holly Dugan and Karen Raber, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of Shakespeare and Animals* (New York, NY: Routledge 2020).

³⁰ E.g. Todd A. Borlik, “Performing *The Winter’s Tale* in the ‘Open’: Bear Plays, Skinners’ Pageants, and the Early Modern Fur Trade”, 190-203; Joseph Campana, “Flock, Herd, Swarm: A Shakespearean Lexicon of Creaturely Connectivity”, 116-25, both in *The Routledge Handbook of Shakespeare and Animals*.

³¹ Bruce Boehrer, *Shakespeare Among the Animals: Nature and Society in the Drama of Early Modern England* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2002).

³² Andreas Höfele, *Stage, Stake, and Scaffold: Humans and Animals in Shakespeare’s Theatre* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

³³ George Boas, *The Happy Beast in French Thought of the Seventeenth Century* (New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1966), 18.

³⁴ For two examples, see Peter Harrison, “The Virtues of Animals in Seventeenth-Century Thought”, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 59, no.3 (1998): 463-84; Richard Serjeantson, “The Passions and Animal Language”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 62, no.3 (2001), 425-44.

eventually evolved into Laurie Shannon's concept of human negative exceptionalism, begun in a highly influential article on *King Lear*, and coming to fruition in her 2013 monograph, *The Accommodated Animal*.³⁵ In this work, Shannon explores how early modern animals were gifted a political status, and considers how this politicised living world problematised Man's status in nature. Shannon's ideas of "cosmopolity" are influential in this thesis, and I outline them in greater detail below.³⁶ Further work which falls into this theriophilic category has been done by Helen Smith, who has explored how animals shaped the early modern household with their bodily presence, as food, medicinal sources, and companion species, as well as functioning as behavioural exemplars.³⁷ Important new work is now entering the field from trans studies: a 2019 special issue of the *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* showcased articles from Colby Gordon and Holly Dugan discussing trans-animality, as well as other representatives from the nonhuman world.³⁸

Of course, not all beasts were as happy as those in Montaigne's mind or viewed as ethically superior or worthy of admiration. Early modern animals were also sliced apart on the anatomy table, hunted, and abused for entertainment: there were plenty of people who showed little concern about how animals were used on Man's behalf.³⁹ Even when animals were not being tortured by humans, they were still subject to use: as tools for hunting and husbandry, as meat, and as transport.⁴⁰ The horse has proved especially productive for scholars of early modern animality, given its ubiquity in early modern culture, but work has also turned towards beings which might traditionally be called non-charismatic, or at least, less appealing: sea-creatures and vermin.⁴¹ Animal studies thus offers a

³⁵ Shannon, "Poor, Bare, Forked", 168-96; *Accommodated Animal*, 127-73.

³⁶ "cosmopolity" refers to an early modern "habit of explicitly reckoning animals and people as (sometimes even willing) parties in political relation". Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 34.

³⁷ Helen Smith, "Animal Families", in *Family Politics in Early Modern Literature*, ed. Hannah Cawthorne and Sarah Lewis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 75-95.

³⁸ Dugan, "Early Modern Transimals: 57312*", 178-205 and Colby Gordon, "Abortive Hedgehogs: Prodigies and Trans Animality in *The Duchess of Malfi*", 206-26, both in *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 19, no. 4 (2019).

³⁹ e.g. Fudge, "Screaming Monkeys: The Creatures in the Bear Garden", in *Perceiving Animals*, 11-33; Charles Bergman, "A Spectacle of Beasts: Hunting Rituals and Animal Rights in Early Modern England", in *A Cultural History of Animals in the Renaissance*, ed. Bruce Boehrer (Oxford: Berg, 2011), 53-73; Raber, "Resisting Bodies: Renaissance Animal Anatomies", in *Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 31-74.

⁴⁰ *A Cultural History of Animals in the Renaissance* shows a breadth of possibilities for human uses of animal bodies in art, science, philosophy and literature. It also shows how early modernity negotiated paradoxes which we still have not resolved: animals are subjected to cruel tortures and are sentenced to death, but can also have attention lavished upon them and are deeply cared for. I explore this further in Chapter 1.

⁴¹ Kevin de Ornellas has powerfully articulated the cultural impact of the horse in early modern England: "As the historical horse was tamed and bridled, manipulated and subjugated, the culturally or literally produced quadruped is configured through and haltered by oral and written language. Artificially troped, the manufactured, metaphorically enhanced horse is an entity onto which contemporary men's and women's concerns are projected". *The Horse in Early Modern English Culture: Bridled, Curbed, and Tamed* (Madison: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2013), xi.

See also Karen Raber and Treva Tucker eds., *The Culture of the Horse: Status, Discipline, and Identity in the Early Modern World* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Peter Edwards, *Horse and Man in Early Modern England* (London: Continuum, 2006); Peter Edwards, K.A.E. Enenkel and Elspeth Graham eds., *The Horse as Cultural Icon: The Real and Symbolic Horse in the Early Modern World* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Raber, "Erotic Bodies: Loving Horses", in *Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture*, 75-101.

For fish, see Elspeth Graham, "Ways of Being, Ways of Knowing: Fish, Fishing and Forms of Identity in Seventeenth-Century English Culture", in *Animals and Early Modern Identity*, ed. Pia F. Cuneo (London: Routledge, 2014), 351-73. For vermin, the landmark study is Lucinda Cole, *Imperfect Creatures: Vermin, Literature, and the Science of Life, 1600-1740* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2016).

powerful, invigorating energy for work on the early modern period. My thesis is alert to the theriophilic encounters found in the period's literature as well as the brutal practices visited upon animals.

Paralleling animal studies, Helena Feder's summary of the stakes of ecocriticism speaks to early modernity's challenging juxtaposition of theriophilia and utilitarianism:

ecocriticism's radical challenge lies not only in recognizing other forms of subjectivity and the ecological connectedness of these biologically diverse subjects, but in recognizing that the relations between them are *political* – they are life and death relations. We are one animal among many in this shared world, living in interwoven inter-species communities, a series of polities themselves comprised of differing societies. This is not to say that this politics must take the form of human political relations, or that political or ethical consideration of other animals depends on how “intelligent” or *like us* we think they are, but that we must begin to recognize the implications of our real similarities with and differences from other creatures.⁴²

Although conducting themselves with a hefty anthropocentrism, the texts I consider in this thesis are all concerned with subjectivity in other beings. Each text I study is bothered by the interwoven nature of the world, and they are all pitched at the level of life and death relations.

Alongside her survey of early modern animal studies, Karen Raber has produced an invaluable bibliography of early modern ecocriticism up to 2007.⁴³ From there, Todd Borlik's *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature* (2011) demonstrates just how lively, urgent, and varied ecological thinking had the potential to be in early modernity.⁴⁴ Other important monographs on the ecological environment of early modern England include Ken Hiltner's *What Else is Pastoral?* (2011) and Bruce Boehrer's *Environmental Degradation in Jacobean Drama* (2013) but, as Vin Nardizzi and Tiffany Jo Werth have recently noted, there has, historically, been a heavy skew towards Shakespeare in the field.⁴⁵ Shakespearean ecocriticism has proved extremely rich: studies of his work have explored

⁴² Feder, “Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture”, 227-28.

⁴³ Raber, “Recent Ecocritical Studies of English Renaissance Literature”, *English Literary Renaissance* 37, no.1 (2007): 151-71.

⁴⁴ Borlik, *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature: Green Pastures* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011). Borlik has also recently produced an anthology of early modern source materials: *Literature and Nature in the English Renaissance: An Anthology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), a richly varied collection which will spark further enquiry.

⁴⁵ Vin Nardizzi and Tiffany Jo Werth, “Oecologies: Engaging the World, from Here”, in *Premodern Ecologies in the Modern Literary Imagination*, ed. Vin Nardizzi and Tiffany Jo Werth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019), 7. Their collection of work illustrating this point can be found at n.18, 22. Ken Hiltner, *What Else is Pastoral: Renaissance Literature and the Environment* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Bruce Boehrer, *Environmental Degradation in Jacobean Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

forests, soil, and have even begun to think climatically.⁴⁶ Steve Mentz's marine intervention has introduced the blue humanities into the mix, which has led to further work on water in Shakespeare's writing.⁴⁷ Milton has also proved a dominant force in scholarship on early modern ecology.⁴⁸ Ken Hiltner's study of the importance of ecological place in Milton's writing is a recent touchstone for thinking about earthliness in Miltonic scholarship, and Leah Marcus' recent analysis of vitalist philosophy in *Paradise Lost* is a particularly striking example of how early modern ecocritical work looks to build bridges with modern concerns about human impact on the living world.⁴⁹ Diane Kelsey McColley's analysis of interspecies kinship in *Paradise Lost* anticipates my work on Drayton, though by this same token Drayton's ideas of care and kinship in "Noahs Floud" anticipate Milton's.⁵⁰ Milton's work falls outside the remit of this thesis, but Shakespeare is treated as "one animal among many" in a "shared world" of English writers interested in human communion with nature.⁵¹ The broad shape of early modern ecocriticism was reconsidered by Jennifer Munroe in 2015, who noted that the field needs to get to grips with "an at-times uneasy relationship between its fundamental impulses: the desire to decenter the human and the need to reconcile that desire with the way that we as humans will always be the ones to do this decentering".⁵² Through its invocation of cosmopolitics, attentiveness, and care, my thesis makes a contribution to addressing this uneasiness.

There is an important tension in early modern ecocritical writing: Simon Estok has been particularly critical of the appropriation of ecocriticism by scholars who he feels do not adequately represent, or possibly understand, the field's radical potential.⁵³ Displaying both the playfulness and seriousness which have a place in early modern ecocriticism, the collection of essays contained in

⁴⁶ E.g. Frederick O. Waage, "Shakespeare Unearth'd", *Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and the Environment* 12, no.2 (2005), 139-64; Lisa Hopkins, "Comedies of the Green World: A *Midsummer Night's Dream*, *As You Like It*, and *Twelfth Night*", in *The Oxford Handbook of Shakespearean Comedy*, ed. Heather Hirschfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 520-36; Andoni Cossio and Martin Simonson, "Arboreal Tradition and Subversion: An Ecocritical Reading of Shakespeare's Portrayal of Trees, Woods and Forests", *Multicultural Shakespeare: Translation, Appropriation and Performance* 21, no.36 (2020), 85-97. Sophie Chiari has become a prominent figure in thinking Shakespeare's writing and climate: "Climate as Climax in Shakespeare's Plays" *Shakespeare in South Africa* 29 (2017): 1-15 and *Shakespeare's Representation of Weather, Climate and Environment: The Early Modern 'Fated Sky'* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019); Chiari has also very recently assembled an edited collection concerned with ecological disaster: Sophie Chiari, ed., *The Experience of Disaster in Early Modern English Literature* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2022).

⁴⁷ Steve Mentz, *At the Bottom of Shakespeare's Ocean* (London: Continuum, 2009); Claire Hansen, "Reviving Lavinia: Aquatic Imagery and Ecocritical Complexity in *Titus Andronicus*", *Critical Survey* 31, no.3 (2019): 53-69.

⁴⁸ Some illustrative examples: Diane Kelsey McColley, *Poetry and Ecology in the Age of Milton and Marvell* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); Ken Hiltner, ed., *Renaissance Ecology: Imagining Eden in Milton's England* (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2008); Sarah Smith, "The Ecology of Chaos in *Paradise Lost*", *Milton Studies* 59 (2017): 31-55.

⁴⁹ Ken Hiltner, *Milton and Ecology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Leah S. Marcus, "Ecocriticism and Vitalism in *Paradise Lost*", *Milton Quarterly* 49, no.2 (2015): 96-111.

⁵⁰ Diane Kelsey McColley, "Milton's Environmental Epic: Creature Kinship and the Language of *Paradise Lost*", in *Beyond Nature Writing: Expanding the Boundaries of Ecocriticism*, ed. Karla Armbruster and Kathleen R. Wallace, 57-74 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2001).

⁵¹ Feder, "Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture", 228.

⁵² Jennifer Munroe, "Shakespeare and Ecocriticism Reconsidered", *Literature Compass* 12, no.9 (2015): 468.

⁵³ Simon Estok, "Doing Ecocriticism with Shakespeare", in *Early Modern Ecocriticism: From the Florentine Codex to Shakespeare*, ed. Thomas Hallock, Ivo Kamps, and Karen Raber (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 80-83. Borlik gives more detail on this tension, see *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature*, n.21, 212-13.

Early Modern Ecostudies (2008) demonstrates how the field has collected up the “sandal-wearing”, experiential, activism-oriented scholars (as Greg Garrard, with respect, has characterised them) and the more hands-off literary analysts.⁵⁴ Karen Raber and Thomas Hallock note how these two ways of working could be at odds with each other, and may prove damaging to ecocriticism’s capacity to help rethink our present world.⁵⁵

Ultimately, my thesis leans towards Estok’s ethos. Rather than fretting about tensions between animal studies and ecocriticism, both fields should be more concerned with their inherent politicisation. To continue to write neutral and detached scholarship is a political choice: living in the sixth mass extinction and climate breakdown, is it ethical to write scholarship which *doesn’t* at least intuit some sort of alarm/warning/alert to our present?⁵⁶ This is where I believe critical theory has a vital role to play, and this is where, and why, the fields of ecocriticism and animal studies productively cohere.

COSMOPOLITICS

The concept of cosmopolitics began with Isabelle Stengers in the late 1990s, in her multi-volume interrogation of scientific practices and the stakes of their operations in an interconnected world.⁵⁷ Stengers has also produced an explicitly political version of her “cosmopolitical proposal” in which she argues that “politics is an art, and an art has no ground to demand compliance from what it deals with. It has to create the manners that will enable it to become able to deal with what it has to deal with”.⁵⁸ Developing these manners includes paying attention to and making room for all beings in a discussion, including those who do not want to be involved, those who “prefer to be left alone, to avoid participation in a decision even if that decision directly threatens their world”.⁵⁹ This has obvious applications for work on the living world: cosmopolitics demands a particular etiquette of care and respect for those functioning with other interests and in other worlds than our own.⁶⁰

⁵⁴ The “sturdy, sandal-wearing backpacker/literary critic” features in Greg Garrard, “Introduction”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism*, ed. Greg Garrard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1.

⁵⁵ Raber and Thomas Hallock, “Introduction: Early Modern Ecostudies”, in *Early Modern Ecostudies*, 3.

⁵⁶ Garrard has emphasised that “ecocriticism is an avowedly political mode of analysis [...] Ecocritics generally tie their cultural analyses explicitly to a ‘green’ moral and political agenda”. *Ecocriticism*, 3.

⁵⁷ First translated into English and collected into two volumes in 2010, Stengers’ 7 volume exploration of cosmopolitics has been available in the original French since 1997. These were collected together in *Cosmopolitiques*, Vol. 1-7 (Paris: La Découverte/Les Empêcheurs de Penser en Rond, 2007). In English: *Cosmopolitics I*, trans. Robert Bonnono (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010) and *Cosmopolitics II*, trans. Robert Bonnono (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). Immanuel Kant formulated an idea of cosmopolitanism in the early 1800s, but the idea is very different to Stengers, and she explicitly rules it out as being of use. Immanuel Kant, “Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmopolitical Plan”, *London Magazine* 10, (1824): 385-93. For Stengers’ dismissal of Kant, see “The Cosmopolitical Proposal”, 994 and *Cosmopolitics I*, 79-80.

⁵⁸ Stengers, “The Cosmopolitical Proposal”, 1001.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 1003.

⁶⁰ Gary Steiner has outlined the anthropocentric history and legacy of *cosmopolitanism*: “Toward a Non-Anthropocentric Cosmopolitanism” in *Anthropocentrism: Humans, Animals, Environments*, ed. Rob Boddice (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 81-100.

I have written elsewhere about the relationship between the figure of the early modern cosmopolite and Stengers' cosmopolitics.⁶¹ Though the vocabulary of the cosmopolite and a cosmopolitan worldview existed in early modernity, early modern cosmopolitanism is not some prescient vision of Stengers' proposal. To be an early modern cosmopolite was to embrace earthly existence wholeheartedly. The first use of the word in English appears in the context of advocating for a universal Christian spiritual imperialism.⁶² Some writers interpreted cosmopolitanism as an exciting influence, motivating learning and travel.⁶³ Others saw it as a dangerously secular enthusiasm for worldly things: cosmopolites "find their *heaven* upon earth, sith they looke for no *other heaven*", according to clergyman Sebastian Benefield.⁶⁴

Early modern cosmopolitics is both universal and individual, expressing an enthusiasm for and repulsion towards forms of earthliness. Both schools of thought, however, advocate for an awareness of worlds *out there* – new countries, spiritual spaces, or epistemologies – which operate in different ways to our own, but which should nonetheless be carefully considered because of potential interdependencies. The notion of interdependent worlds lends itself to Stengers' idea that cosmopolitics must "make present" beings and worlds which are vulnerable to being marginalised or are indifferent to the matter at hand.⁶⁵ The texts explored in this thesis all relay a sense of interspecies dependence and make present a variety of beings to communicate worlds which operate with different priorities, which often do not align with Man's.

Bruno Latour has outlined the difficulty of having the conversations which define and constitute cosmopolitics, viewing them as "a conflict for which there is no agreed-upon arbiter, a conflict in which what is at stake is precisely what is *common* in the common world to be build".⁶⁶ Latour elaborates that cosmopolitics is about questioning the very idea of one, single cosmos about which we can all agree; working cosmopolitically means fighting (and Latour does word it this aggressively) for a "a common world" which "is something we will have to build, tooth and nail, together" if it is going to exist at all.⁶⁷ In sum, "to speak of cosmopolitics is to say that the world has

⁶¹ Anjali Vyas-Brannick, "Cosmopolite", *CEMS KCL Blog: Keywords*, March 5, 2021, accessed Aug 24 2022, <https://kingsearlymodern.co.uk/keywords/cosmopolite>.

⁶² A cosmopolite is "A Citizen, and Member, of the whole and only one Mystical City Universall: And so, consequently, to meditate of the Cosmopolitical Government thereof, under the King Almighty". John Dee, *General and Rare Memorials Pertayning to the Perfect Arte of Navigation* (London: 1577), G3v. For a further exploration of early modern cosmopolitanism and its relationship to Christianity and imperialism see Brian C. Lockey, *Early Modern Catholics, Royalists, and Cosmopolitans: English Transnationalism and the Christian Commonwealth* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).

⁶³ Vyas-Brannick, "Cosmopolite".

⁶⁴ Sebastian Benefield, *A Commentary or Exposition vpon the Third Chapter of the Prophecie of Amos* (London: 1628), Rr3v.

⁶⁵ Stengers, "The Cosmopolitical Proposal", 1003.

⁶⁶ Latour, "'Whose Cosmos, Which Cosmopolitics?': Comments on the Peace Terms of Ulrich Beck", *Common Knowledge* 10, no.3 (2004), 455.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

to be *composed*. To be composed and not unveiled, possessed, mastered, or abandoned for some other world”.⁶⁸

The language of composition is recycled by Isabelle Stengers in more recent work as she attacks a toxic ethos of industrialised capitalist growth and issues a passionate call for attention to the recent paroxysms of our planetary home.⁶⁹ An equally passionate demand for co-composition has been issued by Donna Haraway, where she conjugates composition into composting: we are required to “make oddkin; that is, we require each other in unexpected collaborations and combinations, in hot compost piles”.⁷⁰ Haraway is working in dialogue with Stengers and Latour, as well as with Vinciane Despret, whose important philosophical writing on ethics and the mental lives of nonhuman animals sits adjacent to this thesis.⁷¹ Haraway’s vigorous and vital intervention advocates for “learning to be truly present” in our current world. It is the duty of all those who can

to make kin in lines of inventive connection as a practice of learning to live
and die well with each other in a thick present. Our task is to make trouble,
to stir up potent response to devastating events, as well as to settle troubled
waters and rebuild quiet places.⁷²

In addition to the approach for which she advocates, Haraway’s vocabulary is also apt. The idea of the present being “thick” is useful for an early modern world which was invested in humoral physiology: the oozy, fluid nature and “porous boundaries” of Man’s body play a particularly important role in “Noahs Floud” and *Therologia*.⁷³ The “volatility” of “wriggling animal spirits” is of special concern in *Therologia* where Howell indicates that they have brought Creation to the brink:⁷⁴ learning to quell them, to “settle troubled waters” within Man’s physiology, is of critical importance. The thickness of the present also manifests in *The Noble Arte* and *Coriolanus*, in the complex entanglements between Man, his need to make use of nature, and his discomfort with or, conversely, his excessive comfort in, that need.

⁶⁸ Latour, “Politics of Nature”, 73.

⁶⁹ Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times*, 45.

⁷⁰ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 1.

⁷¹ Two pertinent examples: Vinciane Despret, “The Body We Care For: Figures of Anthro-po-zoo-genesis”, *Body & Society* 10, no.2-3 (2004): 111-34 and “Sheep Do Have Opinions”, trans. Liz Carey-Libbrecht in *Making Things Public*, 360-68. In both analyses Despret underscores the importance of allowing animals to be interesting, respectively discussing Clever Hans, who was not a mathematical horse but a highly astute reader of human body language, and the 22 sheep and 23 feeding bowls belonging to scientist Thelma Rowell.

⁷² Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 1.

⁷³ Gail Kern Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 8.

⁷⁴ Paster, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 20.

Haraway's project of attentive connection-weaving and kin-making builds on her earlier explorations of interspecies interactions, in which she attends to the *politeness* in politics.⁷⁵ Haraway's model of politeness involves a sense of respect, from *respecere*, a "looking back", which

takes us to seeing again, to *respecere*, to the act of respect. To hold in regard, to respond, to look back reciprocally, to notice, to pay attention, to have courteous regard for, to esteem: all of that is tied to polite greeting, to constituting the polis, where and when species meet.⁷⁶

Politeness and respect go hand-in-hand with Stengers' sense of "paying attention".⁷⁷ In the same way that Haraway encourages her reader to keep looking back, Stengers urges her readers to understand that "attention requires knowing how to resist the temptation to separate what must be taken into account and what may be neglected".⁷⁸ This is informed by her cosmopolitical proposal: there must be an attempt to bring everything into discussion and what is important to that discussion cannot be decided in advance.⁷⁹ This juggling of potentially crucial and potentially neglectable knowledge speaks to an encyclopaedic tradition of knowing in early modernity, and the busy refiguring of knowledge-making practices in order to accommodate an explosion of new information in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁸⁰ But this responsive regard also works with a juggling of perspectives: animal, earthly, and marine worlds are all made present and encourage the reader to reflect upon their own.

Latour famously theorised that we have never been modern; he also argues that we have never not been doing cosmopolitics:

[...] I take the politics of nature, cosmopolitics, to be simultaneously a new phenomenon that forces every one of us to reinvent politics and science in a new combination so as to absorb controversies about natural issues, and a very old fact of civilization that can be experienced through the many different traditions that have always rejected the idea of a human totally detached from her conditions of existence, from her life support, and from fragile artificial spheres.⁸¹

⁷⁵ Haraway, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 92.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷⁷ Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times*. Repeated throughout, esp. 59-77.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁷⁹ Eva Haifa Giraud looks ahead to how these ideas of entanglement might help or hinder real world activism. *What Comes After Entanglement: Activism, Anthropocentrism, and an Ethics of Exclusion* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019).

⁸⁰ Peter Harrison, *The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 64-92.

⁸¹ Latour, "Politics of Nature", 74, and Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

Both animal studies and ecocriticism have been flirting with, if not explicitly engaging, a cosmopolitical attentiveness and, as such, a cosmopolitical arena provides a useful space to bring them together. Early modernity also “rejected the idea of a human totally detached from her conditions of existence” as I will show. *Coriolanus* frets about what it means to try and detach oneself from one’s earthly context, demonstrating its impossibility. “Noahs Floud” and *Therologia* also present the consequences of not attending to the “life support” systems which allow planetary existence. Anthropomorphism (discussed below) and its relative, zoomorphism, become important tools for working cosmopolitically in all four texts: they offer possibilities for making other perspectives present, however imperfectly. Reading cosmopolitics in early modernity is thus not anachronistic, despite early modernity’s differing cosmopolitical lexicon.

What my thesis takes from the cosmopolitical writings of Stengers, Latour, and Haraway is the importance of *care* in thinking about the worlds around us and their inhabitants. Early modern animal studies and ecocriticism are doing valuable work, and critics have recognised their constitutive significance to one another. However, it seems to me that now is the time to produce more ambitious, holistic approaches. This is not to be mistaken with lumping everything together in one amorphous *NATURE*, in the style of Thomas’ natural world. Rather, it is about sitting with the “life and death relations” of which the earth is composed and acknowledging the “string-figure” connections that loop between them.⁸² If, as John Parham has indicated, “literature is habitually structured to a human scale”, reading with care in knotty loops provides a way to break down and mess around with the literary results of this epistemological custom.⁸³

Thinking cosmopolitically is a productive way forward for those of us wanting to take a holistic approach to animal-human-earth interactions and interdependencies in any historical period. Laurie Shannon has begun the work of thinking cosmopolitically about early modernity, but her work takes a light-touch approach to cosmopolitics: in Shannon’s reading, cosmopolitics is a productive shorthand for an era-specific political-legal reading of the Book of Genesis. However, Shannon does not refer to Stengers’ work, and only briefly engages with Latour and Haraway.⁸⁴ If, as Shannon argues, early modern animals were possessed of political status and entitled to certain rights because of this status, then the cosmopolitical potential of early modernity needs to be pushed further: a more thoroughgoing approach is needed.⁸⁵ Feder’s description of ecocriticism’s political

⁸² Haraway *Staying with the Trouble*, 9-29.

⁸³ John Parham, “Introduction: With or Without Us: Literature and the Anthropocene” in *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the Anthropocene*, ed. John Parham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 5. In Chapter 3 I consider the question of scale in relation to “Noahs Floud”.

⁸⁴ Out of Latour’s cosmopolitical work, Shannon finds his concept of “the modern constitution” helpful, in which science concerns itself with *things* and politics is concerned with *subjects* e.g. *Accommodated Animal*, 25. This is from Latour *We Have Never Been Modern*, 27-29. In *Accommodated Animal*, Shannon also takes up Haraway and her insistence that animals have their own earthly lives to live, 5. Here, Shannon is citing Haraway, *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness* (Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003), 5.

⁸⁵ Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 32; 51-68.

work could just as easily apply to work on animals, and this is where a division of the fields of animal studies and ecocriticism feels artificial. However, there are important differences between the two. Raber highlights how “the mutual colonization of ecostudies and animal studies continues to give rise to some entirely predictable frictions – and some highly productive commonalities”.⁸⁶ Conversely, Karl Steel has laid out an important problem in reconciling animal studies and ecocritical work. He proposes that there is “an irreducible conflict between critical animal theory and ecocriticism, as the former concerns itself with particular subjects and with the history of who gets to count as a subject, and the latter with systems and with unraveling [sic.] pretensions to individuality”.⁸⁷ There is, for sure, an awkwardness in trying to talk about animals and plants and earth without reducing so much varied life to *nature*, and dividing thinking between things that “creepeth and moveth on the earth” (to borrow the biblical terms), and things that stay put, makes some sense.⁸⁸ This is where the terminology of the *living world* opens the door for a more ecologically-rounded approach.

This thesis aims to occupy a productive middle ground. It considers who gets to count as a subject, but it also attempts to unravel pretensions, if not to personal individuality then to a certain human exceptionalism which my chosen authors unite against. Conflict resolution is not the aim of this thesis, but in forcing these systems and individuals together I aim for a dynamic fusion in the mode of Raber’s “predictable frictions” and “productive commonalities”. Whilst my thesis attends to animals both human and nonhuman, it tries to be mindful that these beings are not going about in an intellectual or environmental vacuum: the impact of *Coriolanus* depends on an audience who are ecologically- and somatically-minded; Drayton and Howell understand that bodies, whether animal, human, or even planetary, exist in symbiosis with their environment and with each other; Gascoigne’s text is the product of an epistemology which values animal life only so far as it can be used by Man. Each text is working through its own compositional process, bringing beings into conversation, even if they do not want to be involved, or are indifferent to the discussion being had.⁸⁹ In *Coriolanus* and *Therologia* this is literally the case: characters mutually force each other into dialogues that they could not care less about having, or are desperate not to have.

Feder fully grasps the implications of these conversations, especially in light of current events. She writes

we are part of a common world, but a changed one, and one that is still
changing rapidly for the immediate benefit of some at the expense of a great

⁸⁶ Raber, “Vermin and Parasites: Shakespeare’s Animal Architectures”, in *Ecocritical Shakespeare*, ed. Lynne Bruckner and Dan Brayton (London: Routledge, 2011), 15.

⁸⁷ Karl Steel, “Abyss: Everything is Food”, *Postmedieval: A Journal of Medieval Cultural Studies* 4, no.1 (2013): 101.

⁸⁸ Genesis 1:26, 1599 *Geneva Bible*. All biblical references in this thesis are to GNV in order to allow for consistency when working across a period in which many different versions of the sacred text were read. See Kevin Killeen, *The Political Bible in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 14-15.

⁸⁹ Stengers, “The Cosmopolitical Proposal”, 1003.

many others. In this context, to ask who is qualified for politics, what counts as political, is to ask who *counts* full stop.⁹⁰

As I will show, in my chosen texts the commonality between humans and the living world is clearly understood, a world which generally operated for the immediate benefit of humans at the expense of everything else. In asking whether the early modern living world qualified politically, in asking how early modern literature made it present, it is possible to flesh out a richer picture of what in the living world counted, and why.

Two other publications need flagging here. In 2020, a group of activist-academics assembled *The Care Manifesto*. Their work advocates for a world in which we “put care at the very centre of life”, with care understood as “directly looking after the physical and emotional needs of others” and “a social capacity and activity involving the nurturing of all that is necessary for the welfare and flourishing of life”.⁹¹ My thesis does not engage extensively with this text but working towards a more caring and attentive world is the ethos behind this thesis: it has been produced in a time of malicious carelessness on a global scale, and it would be untrue to say that my work and thinking have not been impacted by the pressures this has created. It is time to think about care in great detail and as capaciously as possible. One step towards this, in literary studies, can be seen in a 2020 special issue of *New Literary History: Animality / Posthumanism / Disability*, in which scholars explicitly and implicitly discuss caring relationships between carers and vulnerable humans, and carers and nonhuman animals. Articles from Rachel Adams and Jack Halberstam provide a particular impetus for Chapter 3 of this thesis.⁹² More obliquely, in the appearance of *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the Anthropocene* (2021), other caring work can be seen; this time in the form of attention paid to the relationship between literature and our present earth.⁹³ This edited collection lays down a gauntlet for scholars of any premodern era. Its collected essays show literary scholars have begun the work of this more holistic, care-full thinking, but the literature studied in this collection is generally from the nineteenth century onwards.

My thesis seeks to contribute to scholarship on the early modern living world. I hope that, by beginning the work of applying theories of care, attentiveness, and cosmopolitics to these works of

⁹⁰ Feder, “Ecocriticism”, 228.

⁹¹ Andreas Chatzidakis et al., *The Care Manifesto: The Politics of Interdependence* (London: Verso, 2020), VLeBooks edition, Introduction, NP.

⁹² Rachel Adams, “The Art of Interspecies Care”, 695-716; Jack Halberstam, “Beyond Caring: Human-Animal Interdependency: A Response”, 717-23, both in *New Literary History* 51, no.4 (2020).

⁹³ The prologue to the collection is especially timely, as the writers examine the nineteenth century’s literary contribution to understandings of the Anthropocene as well as the problems of high-speed data use in the twenty-first century. Laura Dassow Walls and Sean Cubitt, “Prologue – Earth, Anthropocene, Literary Form” in *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the Anthropocene*, edited by John Parham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 35-68. For this thesis, Hannes Bergthaller’s argument that humans have begun to recognise themselves as having geological agency and impact is useful: “Humans”, in *Ibid.*, 211-25. The concerns of current literature with Man’s ecological and zoological agency are also explored in the very recent and timely *Literary Animal Studies and the Climate Crisis*, ed. Sune Borkfelt and Matthias Stephan (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

early modern English literature, my thesis enables future work which addresses the early modern living world in all its proper historicity, attuned to and in sympathy with the experiences and demands of the lives lived at that historical moment, whilst being fully alert to the pressures that the present world exerts on this type of work. Additionally, my hope is that my dedicated studies of “Noahs Floud” and *Therologia* will benefit others studying the work of Drayton and Howell more broadly, both of whom suffer from critical neglect (Howell more seriously so). Their capacious interests mean that they have a great deal to offer scholars approaching their corpus from any number of directions, and will prove rewarding to those who give their idiosyncrasies the time they need.

MAN, ANTHROPOMORPHISM, & ANTHROPOCENTRISM

This section outlines three concepts that appear repeatedly in my thesis. Through this introduction, I have switched between *humanity/human* and *Man/Mankind* for naming *homo sapiens*. Throughout the thesis I will, for the most part, be using *Man/Mankind*. I have chosen to use this masculine noun because my texts are male-authored and hail us from a patriarchal world; I believe in reflecting this as I wish to avoid portraying this writing as a universal phenomenon. I have made the decision to capitalise these nouns as it seems to me that *Man*, as found in and around the texts discussed here, appears as a particular character. I think it is productive to give this character a proper noun, again, to emphasise that what is discussed here is not universal; this *Man* does not represent a majority. *Man*, in this thesis, possesses some combination of the following attributes: white, Anglophone, literate, Christian, educated in the Classics and/or foreign languages, with knowledge of the natural world that he has the privilege to decide whether or not to deploy. It is important to note that *Man* is not necessarily male: early modern women were also operating within interspecies networks of use and abuse.⁹⁴ Where I have used the term *human* and its cognates, this is because I am thinking either of our current world where, though there are obviously still destructive continuities, twenty-first-century *Man* is less easily able to claim dominance, or of a more totalising experience.

Anthropomorphism is a feature of the literature explored in this thesis, and of much early modern writing on the living world. There are current discussions about the value of anthropomorphism when it comes to developing greater understanding of the intellectual life of the

⁹⁴ For example, Elizabeth I's passion for hunting is well-attested: Simon Adams, “The Queenes Majestie ... is now become a great huntress”: Elizabeth I and the Chase”, *The Court Historian* 18, no.2 (2013): 143-64. The relationship between milk-maids and their cows represents a more benign attentiveness: Fudge, *Quick Cattle*, 117-23.

nonhuman world.⁹⁵ However, early modernity did not have the same ethical concerns about reading humanity in the nonhuman.⁹⁶ When anthropomorphism is deployed in early modern texts, it is often to undercut human pretensions to exceptionality, to make the nonhuman function didactically, or to offer surprising views of nonhuman lives. Anthropomorphism might well be “philosophically suspect”, but its utility in making engagement with nonhuman species possible cannot be denied.⁹⁷ Haraway has considered the role of anthropomorphism in working with other species, with particular regard to animal training: anthropomorphism is “necessary to keep humans alert to the fact that somebody is at home in the animals they work with”. However, this offers no certainty as to who is there: “the recognition that one cannot *know* the other or the self, but must ask in respect for all of time who and what are emerging in relationship, is the key”.⁹⁸ The capacity to ask who is there is not new (though the question might now be asked more frequently); in the late sixteenth century Montaigne evidently understood the value of asking his cat if she was present and ready to play: who was she and what emerged as they engaged in their “mutuall apish trickes”?⁹⁹

Michael Weemans and Bertrand Prévost have argued that early modern anthropomorphism represents “an increasingly *insistent embedding of man within the cosmos*” (emphasis my own) and their articulation of anthropomorphism as practised in the period is useful for this thesis: cosmopolitical attentiveness and politeness demand an acknowledgement of this embeddedness of Man within the living universe.¹⁰⁰ Weemans and Prévost are particularly attentive to the early modern propensity for analogy and make a concise summary of its impact on anthropomorphic thinking: “it is in the human that the world folds and wraps itself in infinite combinations [...] If humanity is the analogon of the world, it is because the world itself is analogically structured”.¹⁰¹ Whilst my thesis does not attend to any explicitly analogical texts, the idea that the human world can be understood through similarities and correspondences with beings in the living world, and *vice versa*, appears throughout: in

⁹⁵ For an important historic intervention in these debates, see Frans B. M. de Waal, “Anthropomorphism, and Anthropodenial: Consistency in our Thinking about Humans and Other Animals”, *Philosophical Topics* 27 (1999): 225-80. De Waal provides an especially interesting “Anatomy of Anthropomorphism” in this article, turning anthropomorphism into a spectrum of thinking, rather than a binary on/off epistemology, 262. These discussions have been drawn together in Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman, ed. *Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005). Investigations of anthropomorphism now tend towards considerations of artificial intelligence, rather than respiring or photosynthesising beings. For a very recent monograph, see Sven Nyholm, *Humans and Robots: Ethics, Agency, and Anthropomorphism* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020). For two different perspectives on anthropomorphism in AI, see Brian R. Duffy, “Anthropomorphism and the Social Robot”, *Robotics and Autonomous Systems* 42, no.3-4 (2003): 177-90 (anthropomorphism as productive) and David Watson, “The Rhetoric and Reality of Anthropomorphism in Artificial Intelligence”, *Minds and Machines* 29 (2019): 417-40 (anthropomorphism as unhelpful).

⁹⁶ This is not to say that there was *no* premodern concern about what it means to think other minds from a human perspective: medieval angelology provides an example of this. Daston, “Intelligences: Angelic, Animal, Human”, in *Thinking with Animals*, 37-58. See also Daston, “How Nature Became the Other”, 39.

⁹⁷ Haraway, *The Companion Species Manifesto*, 50.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ Montaigne, *Essays*, Y5v.

¹⁰⁰ Michael Weemans and Bertrand Prévost, “Introduction”, in *The Anthropomorphic Lens: Anthropomorphism, Microcosmism and Analogy in Early Modern Thought and Visual Arts*, ed. Walter S. Melion, Bret Rothstein, and Michael Weemans (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 7.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

metaphors, in prosopopoeia, and in speculative world-building. Probably the most compelling example of this explored here is in “Noahs Floud”, in which Drayton marshals an array of correspondences in order to imagine Earth as a living female body in forensic detail. Martius’ rhetoric in *Coriolanus* also tries to work with these anthropomorphic analogies but, as I will show, anthropomorphic language is not as reliable as Martius would like it to be.

Anthropomorphism is the outcome of an anthropocentric worldview.¹⁰² Anthropocentrism is a “human centredness that places humans not only at the center of everything but makes ‘us’ the most important measure of all things”.¹⁰³ Fiona Probyn-Rapsey has noted that anthropocentrism is “everywhere *and* nowhere”, and has highlighted the difficulty of disentangling ourselves from it:

all three interacting levels of life (the personal, the cultural, and the epistemological) inform anthropocentrism, leaving us with a generalized sense of complicity that limits what we can claim to be outside of but also indicates a deep and abiding sense of responsibility to a complex problem that takes a huge toll on nonhuman animals.¹⁰⁴

In his contextual approach, Gary Steiner has outlined why Western philosophy in particular is so liable to lapse into anthropocentrism: “philosophers in the West conceptualize the human condition as a middle station between animality and divinity [...] standing in close proximity to the gods gives human beings license to exercise lordship over animals and other created beings”.¹⁰⁵ Christianity holds that Man is made in the image of God, and the Old Testament twice grants Man dominion over other earthlings; a divine edict for anthropocentrism is well-established.¹⁰⁶ Steiner outlines the impact of this on nonhuman life: “all and only human beings are worthy of moral consideration, because all and only human beings are capable of genuine self-determination and moral responsibility”.¹⁰⁷ This divide is reflected in the writing of Thomas Aquinas: though he argues that it is better for humans not to harm animals, this is only because violence against animals could lead to a

¹⁰² De Waal’s anatomy shows where these two can be separated. De Waal, “Anthropomorphism, and Anthropodenial”, 262.

¹⁰³ Fiona Probyn-Rapsey, “Anthropocentrism”, in *Critical Terms for Animal Studies*, ed. Lori Gruen (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 47.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 47-48.

¹⁰⁵ Steiner, *Anthropocentrism and its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 1.

¹⁰⁶ “Furthermore God said, Let us make man in our image according to our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the heaven, and over the beasts, and over all the earth, and over everything that creepeth and moveth on the earth”, Genesis 1:26; “Also the fear of you, and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the heaven, upon all that moveth and creepeth on the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea: into your hand are they delivered. [3] Everything that moveth and liveth, shall be meat for you: as the green herb, have I given you all things”, Genesis 9:2-3.

¹⁰⁷ Steiner, *Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents*, 2.

human (a moral being) acting more violently towards another human (also a moral being), or because another human might get hurt, not because nonhuman life holds value in itself.¹⁰⁸

Yet, as I discuss in Chapter 4, anthropocentrism is not the same as pro-anthropism. Environmental anthropologist David Kidner stresses this point: just because something prioritises the human does not mean it benefits them, and just because Man makes himself central to discussions of the living world, it does not mean that every discussion finds him to be worthy of this centrality.¹⁰⁹ Anthropocentrism is not inevitable, and the living world is possessed of a stunning indifference towards humanity. From the perspective of animals and other beings, we are certainly not central.¹¹⁰ This thesis bears witness to writers, at times desperately, composing worlds in which Man absolutely *has* to matter. However, these compositions also demonstrate a healthy scepticism towards the physical virtues and intellectual abilities of Man, even where they make him central to their discussions of nonhumanity. As with anthropomorphism, this thesis accepts the anthropocentrism of the writing discussed here: it is how the writers I examine intervene in this Man-centric cosmos that is of interest.

SOURCES

Chapter 1 explores George Gascoigne's (1534/5?-1577) *The Noble Arte of Venerie* (1575), a translation of a French hunting manual by Jacques du Fouilloux, *La Venerie* (1561). Gascoigne may have undertaken this work to attract patronage from Elizabeth I and was certainly writing for a courtly audience.¹¹¹ This is not a straightforward book of instructions, however. Du Fouilloux's manual includes, at the very end, an anthropomorphic poem by Guillaume Bouchet (poet, and likely the text's printer). In this poem, a stag bemoans his fate at the hands of a hunter and wonders why he is being subjected to such cruelty. Translating the manual, Gascoigne moves Bouchet's poem into the main body of the text, right next to the entry on hunting stag, and adds three other poems spoken from the perspective of pursued quarry. These poems have turned Gascoigne's text into a rich source for scholarship on human-animal studies. Work on *The Noble Arte of Venerie* has generally focused on embodiment: how the speaking animals describe their bodies, but also how the text constructs and deconstructs animal bodies as it guides the hunter to their prey. I take up this focus on embodiment alongside Charles

¹⁰⁸ "And if any passages of Holy Writ seem to forbid us to be cruel to dumb animals, for instance to kill a bird with its young: this is either to remove man's thoughts from being cruel to other men, and lest through being cruel to animals one becomes cruel to human beings: or because injury to an animal leads to the temporal hurt of man, either of the doer of the deed, or of another". Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Contra Gentiles of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, trans. the English Dominican Fathers (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd, 1928), Bk. 3b, Chap. 112, 92.

¹⁰⁹ David W. Kidner, "Why 'Anthropocentrism' is not Anthropocentric", *Dialectical Anthropology* 38 (2014): 465-80.

¹¹⁰ June Dwyer, "A Non-Companion Species Manifesto: Humans, Wild Animals, and 'The Pain of Anthropomorphism'", *South Atlantic Review* 72, no.3 (2007), 73-89; Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times*, 46-47; Probyn-Rapsey, "Anthropocentrism", 51. Jack Halberstam touches on this indirectly in his examination of human relationships with emotional support animals. "Beyond Caring: Human-Animal Interdependency: A Response", *New Literary History* 51, no.4 (2020): 717-23.

¹¹¹ G.W. Pigman III, "Gascoigne, George (1534/5?-1577), author and soldier", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

Bergman's contention that the text can be read as a proto-animal-rights treatise.¹¹² Examining *The Noble Arte* in line with new formulations of biological citizenship and philosophical works from Cora Diamond, Roberto Esposito, and Simone Weil on the relations of rights and justice, I argue against Bergman's reading. These thinkers demonstrate that rights do not effectively protect *bodies* from injustice, only legal *personae*, and therefore it becomes difficult to use the language of rights to protect (nonhuman) bodies which some argue do not possess legal personhood. This crucial difference offers the opportunity for a more precise reading of the relationship between the hunter and hunted in early modernity, as Man is forced to cope with a lively nonhuman world asserting itself and the injustices it faces.

William Shakespeare's (1564-1616) *Coriolanus* (c.1608) is also concerned with how the living world asserts its presence to disrupt the "life and death relations" towards which Man has become complacent. One of Shakespeare's latest works set in the Roman world, *Coriolanus* presents a strangely elusive protagonist at war with a neighbouring enemy, his compatriots, and himself. Chapter 2 argues that Martius' death can be traced directly to his refusal to engage with the living world: this world includes bodily needs, ecological awareness, and nonhuman animals. As with Shakespeare's work in general, scholarship has mined this play to a rich variety of ends, but recently there has been a focus on "bare life" and Agambian readings of the play. Critics have drawn attention to animal life, community, and the play's ethics using this methodology.¹¹³ However, no scholarship has so far sought to synthesise these readings, though Andreas Höfele's reading of the play's politics makes an initial foray by combining early modern bear-baiting discourse with Agamben's lycanthropic *homo sacer*. Departing from these biopolitical readings, I view *Coriolanus* as a play which is troubled by the energy and presence of the living world. Using analysis from Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers, I draw these ideas together alongside the idea of the *oikos*: the farmstead and source of life's necessities. From Stengers and Latour I take the ideas of Gaia: a "ticklish assemblage of forces" that make up the earth and its biosphere, and the Earthbound: beings who are "sensitive and responsive" to their earthly environment.¹¹⁴ Thinking about how the living world defies Man's indifference, I consider how care and community in *Coriolanus* are, by necessity, articulated through a civic model which is particularly attuned to the presence of the other-than-human.

¹¹² Charles Bergman, "A Spectacle of Beasts: Hunting Rituals and Animal Rights in Early Modern England", in *A Cultural History of Animals in the Renaissance: Volume 3*, ed. Bruce Boehrer (Oxford: Bloomsbury, 2017), 53-74.

¹¹³ I discuss this critical field in Chapter 2. For important readings, see in particular Nichole E. Miller, "Sacred Life and Sacrificial Economy: Coriolanus in No-Man's Land", *Criticism* 51, no.2 (2009): 263-310; Maurizio Calbi, "States of Exception: Auto-Immunity and the Body Politic in Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*", *ACUME* 2, Vol.4: *Questioning Bodies in Shakespeare's Rome*, ed. Maria del Sapio Garbero, Nancy Isenberg, Maddalena Pennachia (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2010), 77-94 and María Luisa Pascual Garrido, "Re-humanising Coriolanus: Community and the Ethical Self", *Sederi* 26, (2016): 85-107.

¹¹⁴ For "Gaia", see Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times*, 45-47. For "Earthbound", see Latour, *Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime*, trans. Catherine Porter (Oxford: Polity Press, 2017), ProQuest Ebook Central, "The States (of Nature) between War and Peace", NP, accessed Sept 30, 2022, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/york-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4926426>.

Thinking further about how Gaia demands attention, Chapter 3 examines an unusual and fierce biblical verse paraphrase. Michael Drayton's (1563-1631) "Noahs Floud" comes from his final collection of poems, *The Muses Elizium* (1630). The text is part of a triptych of biblical poems, which follows ten "nymphals", and the whole collection is troubled by environmental degradation, and the quest for an Edenic pastoral space.¹¹⁵ Drayton had previously worked on biblical verse paraphrase: earlier in his career he published *The Harmonie of the Church* (1591) in which he versified a wide variety of biblical passages, from Jonah's musings inside the whale, to the aftermath of Judith's killing of Holofernes.¹¹⁶ The important influence of Ovid on Drayton's work can be seen clearly throughout his corpus: *Englands Heroicall Epistles* (1597) are in conversation with the *Heroides*, and *Poly-Olbion* is clearly indebted to Ovid's anthropomorphised nature; this influence continues into "Noahs Floud" which draws on the *Metamorphoses*, especially in Drayton's portrayal of the antediluvian world. There is little scholarship on "Noahs Floud" itself, though Drayton has drawn some attention from scholars of early modern ecocriticism, especially with regard to arboreal life and death.¹¹⁷ Previous scholarship on the poem tends to have been dismissive of Drayton's writing, as I show in my chapter, though Todd Borlik's recent intervention on the ecological, apocalyptic diction of Drayton's late work has demonstrated that this poem has plenty to offer scholarship, especially ecocritical work.¹¹⁸

My reading adds to the body of Draytonian ecocriticism by examining how "Noahs Floud" engages with Pythagorean ideas of an *anima mundi*, as well as contemporary experiences of flooding, to produce a vivid account of the biblical Deluge. Paralleling current concerns about ecological disaster, "Noahs Floud" offers rewarding opportunities for unabashedly presentist readings, but offers these parallels in typically early modern terms: religiosity aside, the poem makes striking use of the natural historical tradition of cataloguing, is heavily invested in its own classical heritage, and is alert to the period's anxieties over human exceptionalism. Like *Coriolanus*, "Noahs Floud" is also concerned with how Man works with the environment but thinks beyond this to his influence on the earth's ecology, for better or worse. I read the text as a work of speculative fiction, using contemporary analysis of the

¹¹⁵ Borlik, "Michael Drayton and the Invention of Disaster: Epic Eco-catastrophe in the Late Poems", in *The Experience of Disaster in Early Modern English Literature*, 127-28.

¹¹⁶ Drayton is engaging in a dynamic and capacious tradition of biblical verse paraphrase in early modern England. Sarah C. E. Ross, "Epic, Meditation, or Sacred History? Women and Biblical Verse Paraphrase in Seventeenth-Century England", in *The Oxford Handbook of the Bible in Early Modern England, c.1530-1700* ed. Kevin Killeen, Helen Smith, and Rachel Willie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 483-97. Ross' analysis focuses on women writers, but touches on the wider tradition.

¹¹⁷ Borlik, *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature*, 96-104; Sukanya Dasgupta, "Drayton's 'Silent Spring': *Poly-Olbion* and the Poetics of Landscape", *Cambridge Quarterly* 39, no.2 (2010): 152-71; Sara Trevisan, "'The Murmuring Woods Euen Shuddred as with Feare': Deforestation in Michael Drayton's *Poly-Olbion*", *The Seventeenth Century* 26, no.2 (2011): 240-63; Andrew McRae, "Tree-felling in Early Modern England: Michael Drayton's Environmentalism", *The Review of English Studies* 63, no.260 (2012): 410-30.

¹¹⁸ Don Cameron Allen is particularly dismissive: *The Legend of Noah: Renaissance Rationalism in Art, Science, and Letters* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1963), 145 and "The Relation of Drayton's 'Noahs Floud' to the Ordinary Learning of the Early Seventeenth Century", *Modern Language Notes* 52, no.2 (1937): 106-11. Borlik, however, offers a far more judicious and generous reading: "The Invention of the Disaster Epic", 122-36.

genre as a way in to thinking about how literature engages with and composes responses to global environmental change.

James Howell's (1594?-1666) *Therologia, the Parly of Beasts; or, Morphandra* (1660) is also concerned with human impact on the nonhuman world. Rather than thinking ecologically, this late work from the political writer presents Howell's understanding of Man's relationship to the cosmos as fundamentally biological. Chapter 4 sets out to explore this rich and labyrinthine text. *Therologia* is an anthropomorphic prose dialogue, but not original to Howell: it is an extended adaptation of an earlier Italian text, *La Circe*, by Giambattista Gelli (first translated into English in 1558), which is itself a much-extended adaptation of Plutarch's dialogue "That Brute Beastes Have Use of Reason".¹¹⁹ These texts feature humans-turned-animals denying the superiority of humans, and choosing to remain in animal form. Unlike in Plutarch's dialogue, at the end of *La Circe* one animal chooses to resume human form; in Howell's text the same happens. However, where Gelli's text sounds something of a human-exceptionalist triumph – a once-philosopher realises he can only have true knowledge as a human – Howell's human victory rings hollow, as I will show, and the text has a sense of resolving with the victory of the human because it *should*, not because it wants to.

There exists no significant scholarship on *Therologia*, and this tracks with a general lack of scholarly interest in Howell and an underappreciation of the enormous breadth of his intellectual interest and influences. As with Drayton in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 contributes to the body of scholarship on a particular author. In terms of the larger concerns of the thesis, my chapter attends to the relatedness of the human body to the living world, showing how Howell's human-animal interlocutors dwell on the somatic nature of humans and the human body's distressing mutability. *Therologia*'s discussions repeatedly touch on Man's unstable humoral physiology, and indicate that this undercuts any pretensions to rational exceptionalism. The animals are not the only ones concerned by this: Howell's paratextual materials are fixated on the idea that the humoral fractiousness of Man bleeds out into the cosmos, and what this means for Man's posthumous legacy in the living world. *Therologia* asks difficult questions about Man and his role in the sublunary community. My chapter attends to the anthropocentrism of Howell's epistemology, arguing that Howell constructs a unique system for interpreting the world around him, a system which is both historically-grounded and cosmically-minded. Like "Noahs Floud" and *Coriolanus*, *Therologia* examines Man's responsibility towards others and the consequences of evading that responsibility. To do this I pair the work of medievalist Karl Steel with the urgent, earthy work of Haraway. Both think about Man's responsibility – or in the case of Haraway, "response-ability" – and how Man's actions have consequences, even after death.¹²⁰ The text accepts an anthropocentric dominion, but questions

¹¹⁹ Plutarch, "That Brute Beastes Have Use of Reason", in *The Philosophie*, trans. Philemon Holland (London, 1603), Aaa5r-Bbb3v.

¹²⁰ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 36.

Man's capacity and fitness for this power. *Therologia* is concerned with what it means to care about the living world, and explores the potential of anthropomorphism to help Man do that caring work.

This thesis does not seek to offer a complete picture of Man's responses to the living world in early modern England. Rather, I have attempted to produce a series of snapshots showing how four different writers responded to pressures produced by the idea that Man had some form of responsibility towards the nonhuman living world as well as towards other humans. By working with scholarship that investigates the tangle of rights, justice, and bodies in Chapter 1, Gaia and the Earthbound in Chapter 2, the stakes of interspecies care as articulated through speculative fiction in Chapter 3, and the sense of "response-ability" offered by Haraway in Chapter 4, my thesis sheds new light on what sort of attention was paid to nonhuman life, and how. Running enthusiastically and messily through theory and text, I follow in the paw-prints of Mouse-slayer (who will return in my conclusion), revealing the troubling potential of the living world to wreak havoc, but also revealing the possibility that Man could "make much of" and appreciate that same living world in an attentive fashion on its own terms. New perspectives and new combinations of ideas are required to cause as much disruption as possible: it's time to give a damn.

“Who Sees A Beast...?”

Bodies, Subjectivity, and Justice in George Gascoigne’s *The Noble Arte of Venerie* (1575)

George Gascoigne’s hunting manual *The Noble Arte of Venerie* (1575) offers detailed information about blood-sport.¹ An aristocratic pursuit across Europe, hunting was especially beloved in England.² John Caius reiterates this in the preamble to *Of Englishe Dogges* (1576): “wée are more inclined and delighted with the noble game of hunting, for we Englishmen are adicted and giuen to that exercise, & painefull pastime of pleasure”.³ More than a pastime, hunting was a socially-constitutive event through which the upper ranks of English society reinforced social hierarchy:

a knowledge and expertise in the art of the hunt informed gentle status, a masculine quality essential to the successful exercise of office and especially the exercise of judicial power. Gentlemen perceived the hunt as a school of honor and gentility, a testing experience that prepared the heart and mind for magistracy [...]⁴

A richly detailed text with woodcut illustrations, *The Noble Arte* is a product of this confluence of power, pleasure, and violence. Presented in quarto and often bound with George Turbeville’s *The Booke of Falconrie or Havvking*, the text appeals to an audience of readers experienced in the “painefull pastime” of the hunt. The text is dedicated to Sir Henry Clinton, “Maister of the Hart Houndes to the Queenes most excellent Maiestie” (A1r): though the term *manual* is useful for characterising the text’s contents, this is less a how-to guide for beginners and more an anthology of established hunting practices.⁵ Gascoigne’s prefatory address offers *The Noble Arte* “to gratifie the Nobilitie and Gentlemen of this land” (A2r) and aims for their “better knowledge in Venerie” (A3r): it operates to confirm and consolidate knowledge readers already have, artfully translated and assembled by an established Elizabethan writer.

¹ Animals included in the manual are hart, bucks (a smaller male deer), reindeer, roe deer, goats, boar, hares, rabbits, foxes, badgers, pine marten, wildcats, otters, wolves, and bears.

² Keith Thomas, *Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800* (London: Allen Lane, 1983), 144-148, esp. 145.

³ Is “painefull” painstaking, or causing pain? Both possibilities are in play and Caius comments knowingly on an activity which is uncomfortable for all. John Caius, *Of Englishe Dogges*, trans. Abraham Fleming (London, 1576), Blv.

⁴ Daniel C. Beaver, *Hunting and the Politics of Violence Before the English Civil War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11.

⁵ George Gascoigne, *The Noble Arte of Venerie* (London, 1575). All references in text to the same.

The Noble Arte is primarily a translation of Jacques du Fouilloux's *La Vénerie* (1561), a popular French hunting manual.⁶ There were multiple editions of the original, and translations proliferated across north-western Europe.⁷ The 1561 edition of *La Vénerie* is a beautiful text, set in a flourish-filled italic type with delicately printed woodcuts; again, this is a text aimed at privileged, knowledgeable individuals – its dedication to the King indicates its aspirations. Appended to this edition is Guillaume Bouchet's poem, "Complainte du cerf a monsieur du Fouilloux".⁸ A hart ("cerf") expresses his distress at being hunted, considers why it might be happening, and hopes that Man will meet an Actaeon-like demise at the teeth of his hounds, if he has not already succumbed to the evils the Hart wishes vengeful gods will hurl down on Man in punishment for blood-sport.⁹ This animal voice is not listed in the book's contents and is placed at the end of the book, completely separated from the hunting instructions. *La Vénerie* also contains other subversive material. Verse-prefaces spoken by a hart and a hare precede the instructions for hunting each animal, there is an anecdote of unusual pet-keeping, and bold illustrations of lively animals undercut the text's project: *La Vénerie* struggles to contain the hunt's lively victims.

Reworking *La Vénerie*, Gascoigne amplifies its subversive vitality. Firstly, he chooses to translate Bouchet's poem: given its original location, he could have omitted it. Gascoigne translates the poem very loosely and with free additions, and he moves it into the main body of the text, where he places it at the end of the section on hunting hart. He adds three more poems spoken by animals –

⁶ *La Vénerie* is a combination of medieval French hunting treatises. Catherine Bates, *Masculinity and the Hunt: Wyatt to Spenser* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 140.

⁷ F. Remigereau, *Jacques du Fouilloux et son traité de La Vénerie* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1952), 88-89. Cited in Suzanne J. Walker, "Making and Breaking the Stag: The Construction of the Animal in the Early Modern Hunting Treatise", in *Early Modern Zoology: The Construction of Animals in Science, Literature and the Visual Arts*, ed. Karl A. E. Enenkel and Paul J. Smith (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 318.

⁸ Guillaume Bouchet, "Complainte du cerf a monsieur du Fouilloux" in Jacques du Fouilloux, *La Vénerie de Jacques du Fouilloux* [...] Plus, *L'Adolescence de l'auteur* (Poitiers: 1561), S6r-S6v.

⁹ With thanks to my colleague Sian Hibbert for checking and confirming my understanding of the French text. Bouchet's verse reads as follows:

Sinon, puisse estre ainsi, que des Dieux la puissance
 Autant que toy a nous te face de nuissance,
 Et plus iustes encor, qu'ilz t'enuoyent souuent
 La guerre, la famine, & la peste suyuant:
 Affin que retenu en ce mal-heur contraire
 Tu ne nous vetuille plus ou nous puisse messaire.
 Mais si tu demourois en tes maux courageux,
 Despitât la puissance, & le courroux des Dieux.
 Puisse-tu rencontrer Diane Cynthiene
 Toute nue baigner dedans quelque fontaine,
 Et ainsi qu'Acteon, comme moy Cerf tourné,
 Bramer devant ton Chien dessus toy attiné [...]

Bouchet, "Complainte du cerf", S6v.

a hare, a fox, and an otter – his own literary creations, at the end of their respective sections.¹⁰ Additionally, he adapts the Hart’s prefatory poem.¹¹

Gascoigne’s restructuring intensifies the problems in *La Vénerie*’s interspecies community, and makes explicit its questions of embodiment and subjectivity. *The Noble Arte* asks what it means to be alive, to exist in bodily form in this world. It asks how particular modes of liveliness relate to a capacity for making claims to just and fair treatment. Who or what can make a claim for justice, and how? How do existing power-structures in the community affect these claims? It also offers different models of interspecies care and attentiveness: there are instances of tender treatment of nonhuman animals juxtaposed with the tense alertness required when stalking prey. That the former is present in a book which validates the violent aims of the latter demands exploration.

Responding to these questions, I draw on a number of theoretical models, all of which cohere around an understanding of the body as the fundamental way of relating to the world and the power-structures governing it.¹² Kelly E. Happe, Jenell Johnson, and Marina Levina argue that “the material body and its health, vitality, and natural and social environments not only create and discipline the citizen-subject but also provide the conditions necessary for its recognition and political agency within biopolitical modes of governance, broadly construed”.¹³ Though this is an understanding born out of the work of scholars studying biocitizenship in the modern state, the framework they offer is suggestive for studying early modern animal-human community, especially in *The Noble Arte*, which is thoroughly somatic in its presentation of power, control, and interactions with nonhuman beings.

Examining the nonhuman bodies of *The Noble Arte* requires unpacking premodern ideas of interspecies attention and care. To do this, I turn to two scholars of human-animal relationships in medieval and early modern cultures: Karl Steel and Laurie Shannon. Steel excavates commonalities between humans and nonhumans across a number of medieval texts, challenging human exceptionalist thinking. Examining the Prioress in *The Canterbury Tales*, Steel focuses on the fact that

¹⁰ Todd Borlik has jokingly referred to this as being “a bit like sticking recipes for vegetarian lasagna in a barbeque cookbook”. *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 172.

¹¹ The Hart’s preface has generally been overlooked by scholars, who have hailed Gascoigne’s complaint poems as the highlights of the translation. See Bates, “Gascoigne’s Prick”, 140-44; Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 76-81; Rob Wakeman, “Shakespeare, Gascoigne, and the Hunter’s Uneasy Conscience”, *Exemplaria* 29, no.2 (2017), 136-56; Charles Bergman, “A Spectacle of Beasts: Hunting Rituals and Animal Rights in Early Modern England”, in *A Cultural History of Animals in the Renaissance: Volume 3*, ed. Bruce Boehrer (Oxford: Bloomsbury, 2017), 53-74. Walker’s chapter (noted n.7) examines the construction of the stag across the whole of *La Vénerie*.

¹² Drawing on the foundational works of Adriana Petryna and Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas, the editors of a 2018 collection on biocitizenship set out the origins of the biocitizen and highlight the concept’s potentials and limits. The biocitizen is tied up with conservative political ideas of individual responsibility and can veer dangerously towards eugenicist aims. However, biocitizenry can also empower activist communities, such as those involved in uncovering the scandal of lead-poisoned water and consequent campaigning in Flint, MI. The collection also offers nonhuman applications of biocitizenship, including cyborgs, incubators and lab animals. Kelly E. Happe, Jenell Johnson, and Marina Levina, ed., *Biocitizenship: The Politics of Bodies, Governance, and Power* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2018).

¹³ Johnson, Happe, and Levina, “Introduction”, in *Biocitizenship*, 1. See also Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas, “Biological Citizenship”, in *Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems*, ed. Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), 439-63; Adriana Petryna, *Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

she feeds her dogs roast meat, but also weeps over trapped mice. In doing so, “she marks which animals matter and which do not, which are truly alive for her and which are relegated to nonlife. Conveniently enough for her conscience, the animals she weeps for are the ones she doesn’t eat”.¹⁴ Steel argues that the Prioress’ “distribution of care” takes place in a “monstrous register”, calling attention to how human-animal “community” works in these moments, which demand we “return to the problem of community, to recognize that any community means making choices”.¹⁵ The Prioress’ attentiveness is analogous to the huntsman: both hunting hounds and prey must be monitored with equal intensity, but one is monitored for living and the other marked for death.

Shannon’s work on the politics of early modern human-animal relationships is also instructive. Through a politicised reading of Genesis, she argues that animals can be viewed as “the laws first subjects, and the first plaintiff-victims of tyrannical oppression”.¹⁶ Animals experienced a critical deterioration in their relationship with Man after the Flood, newly rendered as meat. This exacerbated the “justice problem” of the Fall: blameless animals were punished alongside humanity for sins they are incapable of committing.¹⁷ Summarising interspecies community in early modernity, Shannon draws on a number of key terms which are useful for examining *The Noble Arte*. Premodernity, she writes:

incorporated cross-species relationships, and it named them in the firmly political terms of sovereignty and subjection. The political dimension then attributed to human/animal relations [...] refers not to the obvious fact that these relations involve power [...] but to legal and constitutional concerns such as the legitimacy of authority and the justifiability of its acts, the terms of subjection and obedience, and thus the setting up of parties, membership, and rights.¹⁸

Combining the work of Steel and Shannon along with twentieth- and twenty-first century writing on the body and its place in the “life and death relations” of politics, I explore ideas of subjection and community, nonlife and true life, justice and rights in *The Noble Arte*.¹⁹

The four sections of this chapter each use a different theoretical lens. The first section examines the Hart’s verse-speech, investigating how the body relates to liveliness and establishing

¹⁴ Karl Steel, *How Not to Make a Human: Pets, Feral Children, Worms, Sky Burial, Oysters* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 39.

¹⁵ Ibid. Steel draws on analysis from Susan Crane. See Susan Crane, “Animality”, *A Handbook of Middle English Studies*, ed. Marion Turner (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 123-34.

¹⁶ Laurie Shannon, *The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 52.

¹⁷ Ibid., 51-68. Emphasis in original. Chapter 3 considers a poetic response to this justice problem: “Noahs Floud” fret about the anthropogenic nature of the Deluge.

¹⁸ Ibid., 32.

¹⁹ Helena Feder, “Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism*, ed. Greg Garrard (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 227.

what kinds of beings attempt to claim just treatment in Gascoigne's manual. I work with existing scholarship on the text, especially that by Suzanne Walker, before bringing in Bruno Latour's reading of the body as a site of intra-subjectivity which reconciles problems introduced by the Hart's speech. The second section examines how bodies are represented as lively. I do this by reading the Hare's speech alongside analogous work by Marina Levina. Levina's study of the science magazine *Lab Animal* considers how the publication generates fictional images of animals as active research participants, and juxtaposes these fictions with scientific content which actively harms the animals these images interpellate. Reading the Hare's legal bargaining as complicit in and troubled by the text preceding her speech, I also draw on Cora Diamond's study of Simone Weil and the work of Roberto Esposito, both of whom explore how questions of (in)justice are muddled by a notion of "rights".

The third section uses the work of Martin Luther to consider how the animals' liveliness functioned in a culture which had minimal qualms about its utilitarian approach to animals. I use ideas developed by Sarah Burgess and Stuart Murray regarding social death, exploring how Gascoigne's vocally-resistant animals can make claims for justice and yet also be constituted as killable subjects. The final section draws on Steel's work to think about how genuine care for animals – exhibited explicitly in the manual – colours these dynamics of killability and justice. I pick up on the fact that canines, specifically hunting hounds, form a parenthesis around the manual: hound knowledge dominates almost forty pages of the text before it turns to the victims of the hunt. They also close the text, in a section on "Receipts, to heale sundrie diseases and infirmities in houndes and dogges" (O6r). This section returns to Simone Weil's idea of "loving attention" and explores further its relation to (in)justice in the text.²⁰ *The Noble Arte* invites questions around early modern human-animal relationships, as well as demanding a consideration of the relationship between attentiveness and care.²¹ Responding to this invitation, I interrogate the usefulness of 'rights' for protecting powerless bodies, and generate a nuanced understanding of the discourses of justice and care available to early modern writers thinking about animals.

JUSTIFYING INJUSTICE

Gascoigne's prefatory poem "In Commendation of the Noble Arte of Venerie", explains that hunting is enjoyable and necessary for Man. Gascoigne's commendation covers standard themes: hunting is "a sport for noble peers, a sport for gentle bloods"; a productive way for the nobility to engage in war-like activities (A3v-A4r). Nonhuman animals are only briefly represented, and only to demonstrate

²⁰ This is explored in Cora Diamond, "Injustice and Animals", in *Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers: Essays in Wittgenstein, Medicine, and Bioethics*, ed. Carl Elliot (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 131.

²¹ See Donna Haraway, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 19-27. Attentiveness recurs throughout Haraway's *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016). She develops this from Isabelle Stengers' "art of paying attention". In *Catastrophic Times*, trans. Andrew Goffey (Lüneberg: Open Humanities Press/Meson Press, 2015), 62.

that hunting can be a positive didactic experience: foxes and badgers make intricate dens worthy of war-games; larger prey die with gladiatorial bravery; hares demonstrate the importance of tactics over strength. These references to animals are reflexively anthropocentric, asking what Man will learn and confirm about Man in this engagement with the natural world.²²

Gascoigne closes the poem by reiterating the socially-constitutive nature of hunting:

[...] *Hunting was ordeyned first, for Men of Noble kinde.*
And vnto them therefore, I recommend the same,
As exercise that best becomes, their worthy noble name (A4r).

Gascoigne establishes the idea of hunting as productive exercise shortly before this in his letter to the reader: if idleness leads to sinfulness, “thē is that exercise highly to be commended, which doth maintaine the body in helth, the mynd in honest meditatiōs, & yet the substance not greatly decayed” (A3r).²³ The ending of the commendation confirms the linking of nobility with physical and mental fitness, and affirms hunting as the ultimate way for nobility to maintain their fortitude. This picks up on a refrain running through the poem, portraying hunting as essential to Man’s wellbeing:

It occupyes the mynde, which else might chaunce to muse,
On mischiefe, malice, filth, and fraudes, that mortall men do vse.
And as for exercise, it seemes to beare the bell,
Since by the same, mens bodies be, in health mainteyned well.
It exercyseth strength, it exercyseth wit,
And all the poars and sprites of Man are exercisde by it.
It shaketh off all sloth, it presseth downe all pryde,
It cheres the hart, it glads the eye, & through the ears doth glyde (A3v).

Exercise is good for the health and, as exercise, hunting cannot be surpassed (to “bear the bell” is to be superior).²⁴ Hunting distracts Man from sinfulness and benefits the physical body, raising the spirits.²⁵ It also purges Man of “malice”. Underlying this quasi-humoral thinking is an inverted

²² Early modernity frequently invoked animals as didactic tools. See Annabel Patterson, *Fables of Power: Aesopian Writing and Political History* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991); Helen Smith, “Animal Families”, in *Family Politics in Early Modern Literature*, ed. Hannah Cawforth and Sarah Lewis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 75-95. Emblem books also provided zoomorphic lessons, e.g. George Wither, *A Collection of Emblemes, Ancient and Moderne* (London, 1635). Jonah Stuart Brundage explores how the fashion in English noble hunting practices changed between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries: the nobility “came to reproduce themselves through a strategy – utilization of the law – that discouraged their personal use of, and competence in, violence”. “The Pacification of Elite Lifestyles: State Formation, Elite Reproduction, and the Practice of Hunting in Early Modern England”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 59, no.4 (2017): 810.

²³ C.f. Levinus Lemnius: “nothing is holesomer nor more auayleable for health, than seasonable Exerceyse & conuenient motion. For by it the quicknes and vigeour of the mynde is reuyued, the faint drowsye Spyrites are styred vp and awaked, the soule and mynde cheered and exhilarated, all parts of the body & all the senses both within and w’out madenimble, actiue, perfect and ready to do their proper functions”. *The Touchstone of Complexions*, trans. Thomas Newton (London, 1576), G3v.

²⁴ *OED*, “bell, n.1.”, def. III.7.

²⁵ “sprites” is an elision of “spirites” to ensure the line adheres to the poem’s meter.

Thomist attitude towards animals.²⁶ The commendation argues that rather than avoiding the mistreatment of animals, Man should actively practice it to prevent cruelty to other humans. Hunting is presented as a socio-political good: it keeps the powerful in excellent shape (physically and mentally) and stops them from engaging in sinful activities which harm others.

Though Gascoigne does not reveal the subversion to come, his commendation offers a negative portrayal of Man, even as it explains the benefits and necessities of blood-sport. The manual opens by proclaiming Man's innate cruelty, and the issue at stake is how to manage that predilection for nastiness. Man, specifically the ruling class, hunts animals because he is liable to lapse into sinful ignorance, ill health, and cruelty if he does not, endangering the socio-political order. The powerful need to kill: this book confirms their licence.²⁷

THE HART

In *La Venerie* and *The Noble Arte*, having moved through thirteen chapters on hounds, the reader is greeted by a short poem beneath a large woodcut of a sad-looking hart.²⁸ Gascoigne entitles this "The Preface Pronounced by the Hart" (C3v).²⁹ The first eight lines or so of "The Preface" translate Du Fouilloux's, outlining the Hart's status as the supreme beast of the chase, the "King's delight" (C3v).³⁰ The second half of Du Fouilloux's poem reads:

Si du docte Phebus auez commencement
De Venerie, icy traduite grossement:
Ie me suys uoulu mettre en toute diligence
Vous en pouuoir donner parfaicte intelligence.³¹

There is an allusion to hunting's classical origins, a modesty trope ("icy traduite grossement") and then a couplet which redeems this modesty, suggesting that the author put in every effort ("mettre en toute diligence") to ensure that, though roughly ("grossement") written, the reader should be able to

²⁶ "And if any passages of Holy Writ seem to forbid us to be cruel to dumb animals, for instance to kill a bird with its young: this is either to remove man's thoughts from being cruel to other men, and lest through being cruel to animals one becomes cruel to human beings: or because injury to an animal leads to the temporal hurt of man, either of the doer of the deed, or of another". Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Contra Gentiles of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, trans. The English Dominican Fathers (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd, 1928), Bk. 3b, Chap. 112, 92.

²⁷ Beaver has explored the importance of knowing hunting rituals and practices for members of the nobility and gentlemen, see *Hunting and the Politics of Violence*, 15-31. Others have argued similarly: "the body of the beast becomes a language of civilized order. It is possible that the quasi-religious observance of these ceremonies hints at doubt, on the part of the hunters, as to whether their use of animals for pleasure is fully justified. The ceremony provides the social sanction". Bergman, "A Spectacle of Beasts", 63. Also, "[hunting] manuals provide a precise method for how to (and how not to) properly pursue, kill, and dress a stag, and so temper the ethical uncertainties that surround hunters' bloody work". Wakeman, "Shakespeare, Gascoigne, and the Hunter's Uneasy Conscience", 139.

²⁸ The thirteenth chapters are listed on the contents page: Du Fouilloux, *La Venerie*, *3r.

²⁹ Ibid., C6v. The poem has no title in Du Fouilloux's text, only the accompanying woodcut.

³⁰ "le plaisir des Roys", Ibid.

³¹ Du Fouilloux, *La Venerie*, C6v.

get complete knowledge of hunting from the text. Gascoigne, by contrast, uses the closing stages to turn towards the material to come.

Gascoigne displaces the authorial voice and centres his animal speaker, who tells the reader:

Wherefore who lyst, to learne the perfect trade,
Of Venerie: and therewithal would knowe,
What properties, and vertues nature made,
In one (poor Hart, oh harmless Hart) to grow (C4r).

Before we arrive at the complaint poem, before encountering any instructions on how to hunt a hart properly, an animal voice confronts the reader. There is a striking echo of Sir Thomas Wyatt's "Whoso List to Hunt", which is surprising given that Wyatt's sonnet intentionally contains "multiple scenarios of wrongness [...] at every level".³² No right-minded hunter would pursue an individual *female* deer; the poem's speaker is incapable of meaningful action; as readers we are never certain of the speaker's social status, and the sparkling inscription on the hind's collar suggests possession whilst confirming wildness.³³ Yet Wyatt's sonnet thinks carefully about powerlessness and suffering in a situation which gives little recourse to action, and does so breathlessly – apostrophe and caesura dominate. Gascoigne's poem takes a similar tone: the Hart cries out hopelessly. Though Gascoigne may not be invoking Wyatt intentionally, this possible intertextual reference indicates that there is something strange going on in *The Noble Arte*.

Like Wyatt's speaker, the Hart represents himself as constrained by circumstance. Commenting on his present situation, the Hart delicately questions his position as the most noble of huntable creatures: "For King's delight, it seems I was ordained" (C3v). The wording indicates his lack of choice in this divine designation, and this is emphasised as the Hart comments on what the good huntsman should know. "Nature" has planted "properties" and "vertues" in the Hart's body which can be reaped by Man. The Hart would not have chosen this, but God has ordained things this way: the Hart's self-pitying rhetoric is thoroughly resigned. In the rest of this section, I take my cue from the Hart's speech, and focus on the representation of his body and vitality. In doing so, I flesh out what the Hart tells us about human-animal community and the power dynamics therein.

The "vertues" of the Hart are not moral qualities. Two of the definitions available to Gascoigne focus on virtue as an advantage: "superiority or excellence in a particular sphere", or "an advantageous or desirable quality".³⁴ A more technical definition enriches these: "with reference to a plant, liquid, or other substance: power to affect the body in a beneficial manner, strengthening,

³² Bates, *Masculinity and the Hunt*, 93.

³³ *Ibid.*, 78-93.

³⁴ OED, "virtue, n.", def. 6.a, 6.b.

sustaining, or healing power”.³⁵ This aligns with what the Hart might have as a property: “a distinctive, essential, or special quality. A peculiarity”.³⁶ Shannon’s linking of *property* and *sovereignty* in early modernity is instructive here. Examining botanical medicine treatises, she writes that “sovereign”, as an adjective, “describe[s] the specific properties of particular features of the natural world – their potencies – with an almost performative emphasis on their insuperable efficaciousness or operation”.³⁷ Shannon emphasises that in these contexts we can read “properties” of living creatures as precisely that: “self-owned” qualities.³⁸ Shannon employs these ideas in a wider discussion of “human negative exceptionalism”, arguing that early modern animals were thought to be possessed of a “sovereign self-sufficiency”, as opposed to Man’s “general unreadiness” and “knowledge deficit”.³⁹ The Hart bemoans the medicinal value of his body but he is unable to deny it because, innately, he knows himself inside out.

The section immediately following “The Preface” covers “the vertue and properties of the Harte” (C4r). Mindful of the above definitions, the section outlines what makes the Hart medically sovereign. However, an accident of English turns what is a straightforward fact in *La Vénerie* (“vn os dedans le cueur du Cerf, lequel est grandement profitable contre le tremblement de cueur”⁴⁰) into a difficult knot of bodies as the section opens with an assault of homonyms: “there is a bone founde in the heart of an Harte, the which is very medicinable against the trembling of the heart, and especially for women great with childe” (C4r). The Hart’s heart-bone is listed as a curative ingredient for ailments in a number of sixteenth-century medical texts, but here it is especially troubling. The “trembling” human heart is cured by the bloody extraction of one from a creature who has cried out piteously on the page prior, a “poor” and “harmless” animal, shuddering out its last sigh at the hands of a huntsman.⁴¹ The human heart is so weak that parts must be “borrowed” or salvaged from a h(e)art more sovereign.⁴²

Two h(e)arts are brought together. Medicinally, the Hart’s is more valuable, but when it comes to wellbeing, Man’s heart takes priority: after all, the virtues and properties of a hart’s body cannot be used whilst it is still alive. The heart is the first of many examples: hart’s urine, diced hart’s

³⁵ OED, “virtue, n.”, def. 8.d.

³⁶ OED, “property, n.”, def. 1.b.

³⁷ Shannon, “Poor Bare Forked: Animal Sovereignty, Human Negative Exceptionalism, and the Natural History of ‘King Lear’”, *Shakespeare Quarterly* 60, no.2 (2009): 182.

³⁸ Ibid., 182.

³⁹ Ibid., 192–93.

⁴⁰ Du Fouilloux, *La Vénerie*, Dlr.

⁴¹ To cure the plague, “the bone of a Stagges heart”, mixed with a variety of botanicals can be made into a hot poultice. Leonhart Fuchs, *A Worthy Practise*, trans. anon (London, 1563), [A6r]. To cure “those that be Melancholick, and are in a furie or rage”, the “boane of a Hartes heart” should be combined with sugar and spices, herbs and fruit to make a paste which can be taken “morning and euening two hours before meate”. Girolamo Ruscelli, *A Verry Excellent and Profitable Booke*, trans. Richard Androse (London, 1569), Slv. To cure a faint heart, “Take the fying of Gold, and the poudrer of the bone of a Harts heart, medled with the iuice of Borage, & suger, made in syrrope, for that is very good forswoning [sic.]”. Thomas Moulton, *The Mirroure or Glasse of Health* (London, 1580), Flr.

⁴² Shannon frequently uses the word “borrow” in thinking about Man’s use of natural resources. Shannon, “Poor, Bare, Forked”, 168–96.

head, burned powdered antler, the amniotic sac (“the gatherbagge, or mugwet”), and the “marrow or grease” of the deer all have medicinal properties (C4r-C4v). Walker argues that this moment in *La Vénérice* “establishes that the fundamental nature of the animal is to be a set of utilitarian objects”, and suggests the focus on hart-body as medicine demonstrates that an animal in pieces “functions to confirm the wholeness and vitality of the human subject”.⁴³ This important perspective is, however, troubled by Gascoigne’s reworking.

Delivering “The Preface” from the mouth of the animal himself, and invoking the passive suffering of impossible desire, Gascoigne’s text pushes the reader to consider the living source of these properties. Additionally, the idea of hunting as invigorating exercise suggests the animal does not need to be eviscerated to confirm the hunter’s vitality: if anything, the longer the animal stays alive and whole, the more exercise the hunter gets and the more alive the human predator becomes. *The Noble Arte* begins to work against itself: the Hart’s body will maintain the “wholeness and vitality” of the human hunter – and by extension the reader – but the animal’s voice refuses to confirm it. Instead, he cries out passionately for his own life.

Closing the section on hart hunting, “The Wofull Wordes of the Hart to the Hunter” confirm the Hart’s awareness of this utilitarian discourse.⁴⁴ However, he does not subscribe to it: he resists – or at least ponders – the justification for his death. After all, his body produces renewable resources. He does not have to be killed to provide:

Canst thou in death take suche delight? breedes pleasure so in paynes?
 Oh cruell, be content, to take in worth my teares
 Which growe to gumme and fall from me: content thee with my heares
 Content thee with my hornes, which euery yeare I mew,
 Since all these three make medicines, some sicknesse to eschew (I5r-I5v).

“Mew” refers not just to the shedding of antlers but, primarily, to birds moulting, especially hawks.⁴⁵ This delicate linking of hawking and hunting draws in another group of nonhuman animals hovering around the text, and another animal resource which Man utilises: feathers and down.⁴⁶ The Hart’s antlers and tears (and the hawk feathers) are renewable properties which the Hart seems content to donate for human medicine. Gascoigne is using unusual language here, with “cruel” standing in for a *cruel thing*: a characteristic he bestowed on Man earlier. These words recall the commendatory poem, which praises blood-sport for its capacity to expunge toxic malice from Man’s body. Reading this section of *The Noble Arte*, Shannon argues that the Hart’s verse-speech is enriched when early modern

⁴³ Walker, “Making and Breaking the Stag”, 321.

⁴⁴ As Gascoigne’s poem is a loose translation of Bouchet’s, rather than repeatedly turning between the two, I examine Gascoigne’s text only.

⁴⁵ OED, “mew, v.2”.

⁴⁶ The waning of falconry’s popularity in early modernity has been noted in Richard Grassby, “The Decline of Falconry in Early Modern England”, *Past & Present* 157 (1997): 37-62.

readings of Genesis are considered.⁴⁷ By these lights, “animals signify as political subjects. They are conceived to be capable of meaningful, (i.e. willing) obedience and vulnerable to wrongful dispossession and likely to rise in a legitimate rebellion”.⁴⁸ Here, the Hart “interprets Genesis to require only such sacrifices as are naturally cast from its body”, but the apostrophe of “oh cruel” and the linking of death and delight for Man characterises the tragedy of the Hart’s “wrongful dispossession” of his properties.⁴⁹ Despite advertising all the different ills his antlers can cure, this cannot satiate Man’s appetite.

The poem takes a dynamic twist as the Hart begins to narrate a hunt. As if caught on the hoof, the Hart speculates on his abuse and suffering. The excerpts below make up one continuous passage which I have divided in two, but an important aspect of this verse-speech is the cumulative effect of the Hart’s language:

What should the cruell meane? Perhappes he hopes to finde
As many medicines me within to satisfie his minde.
May be) [sic.] he seekes to have my Sewet for himself,
Whiche sooner heales a merrygald, then Pothecaries pelfe.
(May be) his ioyntes be numme, as Synewes shronke with colde,
And that he knowes my Sewet will, the same fulle soone unfolde (16r).

The poem’s irregular line-length leaves the Hart stumbling through a tangle of thoughts as he is pursued by “the cruell”. Again, malice is Man’s core virtue, and the Hart articulates Shannon’s assertion that “violence appear[s] to be mankind’s most singular property”.⁵⁰ Yet the Hart is still not ready to fully condemn Man. Although he asks what the motivations of “the cruell” are, he knows the answer: the huntsman needs his body for medicines, and non-fatal sheddings are not enough. Perversely, the injuries the Hart describes relate to a huntsman’s life, generating an uncomfortable knowingness: you only need my body because of the injuries you sustain hunting me. A “merrygald” is a wound caused by chafing, while shrunken sinews evoke the discomfort of hunting in all weathers.⁵¹ The Hart’s dismissal of “Pothecaries pelfe” is both self-aggrandising and self-destructive. He advertises his fatty innards as being more useful than anything a human can concoct: “pelfe” signifies someone’s wealth or belongings, but pejoratively – it could be frivolous trash.⁵² Anticipating the negative exceptionalism which Shannon ascribes to Shakespeare and Montaigne, Gascoigne’s Hart opens up a rift between the pure properties of his body, and the Man-*i*pulation of natural resources.⁵³

⁴⁷ Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 52-57.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ OED, “merry-gall, n.”.

⁵² OED, “pelf, n.”, def. 4.b.d.

⁵³ Shannon, “Poor, Bare, Forked”, 168-96.

It is impossible to reconcile the virtues of nature's provisioning and the processes of gathering and applying them to the human body.

Following these hunting injuries, the Hart delves deeper into his body, thinking about the world of the huntsman:

(May be) his wife doth feare to come before hyr time,
And in my mawe he hopes to finde (amongst the slutte and slime)
A Stone to help his wife, that she may bryng to light,
A bloudie babe lyke bloody Syre, to put poor Hartes to flight:
Perchance with sicknesse he hath troubled bene of late,
And with my marow thinketh to restore his former state.
(May be) his hart doth quake, and therefore seekes the bone,
Whiche Huntresmen finde within my heart, when I poore Hart) [sic.] am gone (I6r).⁵⁴

The Hart's abdominal innards present an extractive challenge. The huntsman *hoping* to find a stone "amongst the slutte and slime" makes this invasive search sound particularly messy. Deriving from "sluttish", "slut" refers to "repulsive and disgusting" things; the way in which the line swoops up on "slut" before landing heavily in "slime" makes this an unpleasantly slippery dive into hart anatomy.⁵⁵ Resulting from this gore is a "bloudie babe" which, "lyke bloody Syre" will continue his father's violent domination of the living world – implicitly gendering the child male, Gascoigne gestures to a continuous line of hunters ready to kill. Closing this section, the Hart presents the familiar tangle of homonyms. The Hart emphasises that these resources are only accessible once he is dead. His awareness of his mortality, or more precisely his absence, is unsettling: what is it that has "gone"?

Walker's reading of "Complainte du Cerf" begins to answer this question. The Hart "reiterates the dismantling of his own body by describing the properties of his various parts", generating a complicity in his own positioning as prey:

the representation of his subjectivity thus becomes a way of bolstering the objectified, fragmented utilitarian definition of the animal. The poetic imagination of the animal's individual plea results in a reinforcement of the fundamental construction of the quarry as an object to be disassembled for human use. The organizing principle of the animal as parts overcomes the empathy that might be inspired by a pitiful victim.⁵⁶

Bouchet creates a hart who, though talkative, embodies the perfect nonhuman sovereign-subject. If "the unfolding or enactment of [...] sovereign properties makes that thing the kind or sort of thing

⁵⁴ The original text is missing an opening bracket on the final line of this quotation.

⁵⁵ *OED*, "sluttish, adj."

⁵⁶ Walker, "Making and Breaking the Stag", 332.

that it is”, then it would seem the Hart, by delineating his medical value, is being what a hart should be: a useful thing for Man.⁵⁷ The point is emphasised in *La Vénérerie*: the Hart’s voice is completely disarticulated from Man’s discussion of his medicinal virtues. There is nothing to have “gone” in Bouchet’s poem: the Hart was never more than a resource.

Yet in Gascoigne’s loose translation, the Hart does not view himself solely as a medicine box. The “animal as parts” might work to negate any “empathy” in *La Vénérerie*, but Gascoigne’s decision to relocate the poem and increase the volume of the animal’s passion (anguish and suffering) complicates things. The Hart’s heart-bone can only be found “*when I poor hart) am gone*” (emphasis my own); there is a dualism between the Hart’s body and the Hart’s... what? Soul? When Walker suggests that “the hunting treatise is also a meditation on the nature of the limits and dangers of subjectivity”, it is to moments like this which she refers.⁵⁸ Keen anatomists, Gascoigne and the Hart collaborate, creating a constitutive moment where the animal is granted subjectivity and made whole through speaking his own disintegration. It is only as the Hart points to his own absence that we understand there must have been a coherent animal there to begin with.

There is a distorted resonance with twenty-first-century body-talk in this. Bruno Latour thinks of the body as the opposite of being dead; it is “*an interface that becomes more and more describable as it learns to be affected by more and more elements*”.⁵⁹ The Hart’s body is his liveliness; his liveliness is his body. As Donna Haraway formulates it, “the corpse is not the body. Rather, the body is always in-the-making [...] always a vital entanglement [...] always a becoming, always constituted in relating”.⁶⁰ Once that life has been taken, there is no Hart because there is no sensitive relation to the world: there is only antler, blood, skin, heart. As a sovereign-subject, the Hart performs his role as a medical resource; the lively body maintains properties which constitute him as-body, but they are not *for* him. As he attempts to claim his sovereign, identity-affirming properties he reveals two things: one, that he is possessed of an eerily-embodied subjectivity which is only fully realised once it is no longer present and two, that this subjectivity allows him to argue for his self-preservation even as it is denied. This argument only increases in strength in Gascoigne’s original poetic additions to *The Noble Arte*, spoken by the hare, the fox, and the otter.

⁵⁷ Shannon, “Poor, Bare, Forked”, 182.

⁵⁸ Walker, “Making and Breaking the Stag”, 317.

⁵⁹ Bruno Latour, “How to Talk About the Body? The Normative Dimension of Science Studies”, *Body & Society* 10, no. 2-3 (2004): 205-206.

⁶⁰ Haraway, *When Species Meet*, 163.

THE HARE

Writing about twenty-first century laboratory animals, Marina Levina explores how *Lab Animal* – a science magazine – represents mice and rats as collaborators in research. These participatory rodents parallel the self-anatomising stag. Levina writes:

whether anyone or anything can meaningfully consent to experiments – and potential death – has been the subject of many philosophical inquiries. However, anyone or anything can be represented as doing so. Subjectivity is therefore a representational and performative event. In other words, if biopower – the power to make live or make die – is an exercise in governmentality, then subjectivity, be it human or animal, is a production of power.⁶¹

As I have argued, Gascoigne grants the Hart a greater sense of subjectivity than does Bouchet. The Hart, though not represented as consenting to death, is resigned in his rhetorical questioning: “What should the cruell meane”? He cannot know for sure but he must accept it. Rob Wakeman has provided a helpful interpretation of this dynamic, which chimes with Levina’s thinking:

it may be that these hunted animals are only brought into the moral and political imagination in order to authorize honorable venery. Because these hunters have already decided to kill, these scenes of doubt exist to shore up a hunter’s own sense of his or her legitimacy.⁶²

For Wakeman, the anthropomorphic poetry of Gascoigne’s manual supports rather than subverts the text’s project. This is akin to how illustrations of rats as scientists or emotive pictures of vulnerable mice serve to support the aims of *Lab Animal*.⁶³ *Hunting is morally fine, because look*, Gascoigne’s work claims, *we gracious humans consider things from the other side*. The gift of representational power lies in being able to grant subjectivity to animals, only to snatch it away. This section interrogates how *The Noble Arte* navigates animal subjectivity, and examines Charles Bergman’s contention that the text contains a “proto-language of animal rights”.⁶⁴

Wakeman reads *The Noble Arte* alongside a “minor tradition” of nonhuman will and testament poetry, and views the complaint poems as “the last testaments of victims to their killers”.⁶⁵ With the Hart this mostly holds true as his verse speech begins with him at the feet of his soon-to-be-

⁶¹ Marina Levina, “Nonhuman Biocitizens: Lab Animals, Cruel Optimism, and the Politics of Death”, in *Biocitizenship*, 235-36.

⁶² Wakeman, “Shakespeare, Gascoigne, and the Hunter’s Uneasy Conscience”, 137-38.

⁶³ Levina, “Nonhuman Biocitizens”, 237; 243.

⁶⁴ Bergman, “A Spectacle of Beasts”, 56.

⁶⁵ Wakeman, “Shakespeare, Gascoigne, and the Hunter’s Uneasy Conscience”, 148. Referring to a “minor tradition”, Wakeman draws on Edward Wilson, “The Testament of the Buck and the Sociology of the Text”, *The Review of English Studies* 45, no.178 (1994): 157-84.

murderer: “Since I in deepest dread, do yelde my selfe to Man, / And stand full still between his legs, which earst full wildly ran” (I4v). However, Gascoigne’s original contributions do not work like this: the Hare in particular is unrepentantly lively and is no death-bed testator. Following Levina’s contention that the body is “a source of affect, knowledge, and a way of relating to the world”, I start this section by thinking about how the Hare relates to her body and how this, in turn, situates her in relation to the world.⁶⁶

Like harts, Gascoigne introduces hares by describing “the vertues & properties of an Hare, the which be verie great & many” (K8v). Hare blood, bone, and skin can all be used to treat various problems, says the manual (K8v). But, in the penultimate stanza of her poem, the Hare asks:

What meanest thou man, me so for to pursew?
For first my skinne is scarcely worth a placke,
My fleshe is drie, and harde for to endew
My greace, (God knoweth) not great vpon my backe,
My selfe, and all, that is within me founde,
Is neyther, good, great, ritche, fatte, sweete, nor sounde (Mlv).

This is a questionable assertion: within *The Noble Arte*, and more widely, hares were celebrated for their healing virtues. One text puts it all too clearly: “the flesh of Hares, is [...] not praysed in Phisicke for meate, but rather for medicine”.⁶⁷ To give three applications, hares’ hair staunches blood-flow;⁶⁸ the gall of a hare helps with “all evils in the eyen”;⁶⁹ and, applied to the gums, the brains of a hare helps children’s teeth grow.⁷⁰ In *The Noble Arte*, the Hare’s denial of usefulness follows nearly twenty pages which outline how useful hare bodies are and how to acquire them. Is the Hare ignorant, or lying? Whilst the Hart resigned himself to living a utilitarian existence, the Hare rebels against it.

The Hare concurs that her flesh is not praiseworthy as meat, but she disagrees that it has medicinal value. The Hare appears to be lying for self-preservation. By forestalling the “enactment” of her health-giving properties, the Hare refuses to fulfil her obligations.⁷¹ Ending the stanza with a list of adjectives, the Hare discounts any medicinal virtue in her body. In particular, closing the line on “sound”, the Hare is using specific, health-associated vocabulary.⁷² Though self-anatomising like the Hart, the Hare fashions herself as whole and coherent, threading this resistance through her verse-speech. She refuses to play by Man’s rules: not just by fleeing, but by speaking words of misdirection.

⁶⁶ Levina, “Nonhuman Biocitizens”, 236.

⁶⁷ William Bullein, *Bulleins Bulwarke* (London, 1579), N3v.

⁶⁸ John XXI, *The Tresurie of Health*, trans. Humfry Lloyd (London, 1560), N2r; N2v.

⁶⁹ Moulton, *The Mirrour or Glasse of Health*, E5v.

⁷⁰ Bullein, *Bulleins Bulwarke*, N3v.

⁷¹ “[...] the unfolding or enactment of [...] sovereign properties makes that thing the kind or sort of thing that it is”. Shannon, “Poor, Bare, Forked”, 182.

⁷² E.g. “measurable repaste and feeding [...] maketh a sound body”. Lemnius, *The Touchstone of Complexions* [...], A7r. Emphasis my own.

Her subjectivity unites mind and body as a being who exists independent of her potential physical use. This misdirecting speech should not be surprising, however, as *The Noble Arte* also describes hares' intellectual capacities for deception.

Gascoigne writes that "of all chases, the Hare maketh greatest pastime and pleasure, and sheweth most cunning in hunting" and, strikingly, "it is a great pleasure to beholde the subtilties of the little poore beaste, and what shift she can make for hir selfe" (L1v).⁷³ This is translated directly from Du Fouilloux's manual, though there is not a direct source for Gascoigne's "poore", which lends this phrase its discomfort: it feels sadistic to speak of a "great pleasure" derived from the distress of a "poore beaste". At this point, *La Vénérice* speaks insistently in the first person, implicating the authorial voice directly in this nastiness. Du Fouilloux relays his own eyewitness accounts of hare canniness, which Gascoigne faithfully translates. Nine times Du Fouilloux repeats "I'en ay veu" ("I have seen") within two pages, presenting hares with phenomenal tactical abilities which make life extremely difficult for hunters – though Man always prevails.⁷⁴ The Hare's abilities in fleeing – her agile body and mind – lend her coherence as a living being, compared with an animal who resists Man and hounds in a contest of brute strength.⁷⁵

The Hare's protest emphasises the purposelessness of hunting hares. Significantly, she understands why some animals might be killed, but not her kind. She compares herself with deer who "hurt" and "spoilth corn", and with wild swine, who root up meadows (M1r). She, conversely, does none of this:

But I poore Beast, whose feeding is not seene,
Who breake no hedge, who pill no pleasant plant:
Who stroye no fruite, who can turne vp no greene,
Who spoyle no corne, to make the Plowman want:
Am yet pursewed with hounde, horse, might and mayne
By murdring men, until they haue me slayne (M1r).⁷⁶

The Hare distances herself from Man. She has no medicinal benefits to offer, nor does she interfere with anything humans need. Man is stupid to pursue her worthless body:

That bragst of witte, aboue all other beasts,
And yet by me, thou neyther gettest gayne
Nor findest foode, to serve thy gluttons feasts (M1v).

⁷³ Cf. "c'est grand Plaisir de veoir l'espirit de ce petit animal, et des ruzes qu'il fait pour se deffaire des Chiens". Du Fouilloux, *La Vénérice*, N2v.

⁷⁴ Du Fouilloux, *La Vénérice*, N3v-N4r. Hares will swim for their lives, take turns at being chased, hide among flocks of sheep, and find other unique hiding places. Gascoigne's translation: *The Noble Arte*, L2v-L3r.

⁷⁵ See also pp.73-74 for the capabilities of fleeing hares.

⁷⁶ "pill" relates to peel, and suggests plants being destroyed or pillaged by animals. OED, "pill, v.1", def. I.5, I.6, II.7.a.

Though she does not use the word, the “silly, harmless hare” narrates the *injustice* of blood-sport, and she makes her case in the “justice-oriented terms of harmlessness and murder”.⁷⁷

The Hare expresses the injustice of her situation in material terms: her skin being “scarcely worth a plack” typifies this, but more generally she anatomises her body according to its value to humanity.⁷⁸ She also thinks of the material deprivation of others: she does not “make the Plowman want”. Through the Hare’s articulation of imbalanced material exchange, it becomes possible to complicate Bergman’s ideas about the text’s animal rights language. As Cora Diamond notes, “the language of rights comes down to us from the Romans; rights in the original sense were [...] rights to property – and property centrally in slaves”.⁷⁹ Diamond explores the writings of philosopher Simone Weil, drawing attention to the core problems of the language of rights.⁸⁰ As an abstract notion, rights allow us to misread situations: “the *character* of our conflicts is made obscure when two sides of a conflict involving very different elements of human life are expressed in the same terms”, opening the door to fatal injustices.⁸¹

Weil’s work is also invoked by Roberto Esposito, who argues that the language of rights neither adequately relates to nor protects the body.⁸² He explores the irresolvable divide between a person who is capable of making a legitimate, legal claim for rights, and a body, which cannot do this.⁸³ Weil illustrates this with an example:

I see a passer-by in the street [...] If it were the human personality in him that was sacred to me, I could easily put out his eyes. As a blind man he would be exactly as much a human personality as before. I should not have touched the person in him at all. I should have destroyed nothing but his eyes.⁸⁴

Esposito outlines how this example demonstrates “the possible and necessary detachment of rights and person”.⁸⁵ If rights are founded on the idea of “personality”, then bodies can be abused without

⁷⁷ Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 77.

⁷⁸ A “plack” is a low-value copper coin. *OED*, “plack, n.1”.

⁷⁹ Diamond, “Injustice and Animals”, 120.

⁸⁰ Weil herself does not say anything specific about *animals* and injustice/rights; Diamond is developing her thinking. *Ibid.*, 129-30.

⁸¹ “The *character* of our conflicts is made obscure when two sides of a conflict involving very different elements of human life are expressed in the same terms, as in the case in which Irish victims of a profoundly unjust social system were to be allowed to starve because distributing food cheaply would interfere with the rights of traders to make a high profit out of the famine, and would thus supposedly be an injustice to them. Here the understanding of the traders as possible victims of injustice depends on starting from a conception of their property rights, taken to include speculative profits. The framing of thought about the conflict in terms of the rights of the parties is thus likely to lead to a misconception of its character”. Diamond, “Injustice and Animals”, 124-25. From Simone Weil, “Human Personality”, in *Simone Weil: An Anthology*, ed. Siân Miles (London: Virago Press, 1986), 60-61.

⁸² Roberto Esposito, “The Person and Human Life”, trans. Diana Garvin and Thomas Kelso, in *Theory After ‘Theory’* ed. Jane Elliot and Derek Attridge (Oxford: Routledge, 2011), 205-19.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 208-209.

⁸⁴ Weil, “Human Personality”, 71.

⁸⁵ Esposito, “The Person and Human Life”, 215.

evil having been committed.⁸⁶ Alternatively, Esposito suggests, “a right [...] oriented towards justice, not of the person, but of the body, of all bodies and of every body taken individually” would enable a multitude of beings to engage successfully in a discourse of rights in order to claim justice for their bodies.⁸⁷ Esposito also cites Roman law, which drew a distinction between the legal *persona* on one side, and the *homo* or even *res vocalis* on the other: the thing with a voice.⁸⁸ Weil’s work links experiences of (in)justice with attentiveness to the body, which closely aligns with what the Hare does in her verse-speech.

Gascoigne’s Hare is unrepentantly lively, to the extent that she will lie for survival. However, using Esposito’s analysis it is clear that, though highly resistant, the Hare is more of a *res vocalis* than a legal *persona*. The thing can be as vocal as she wants but she cannot change anything. The Hare’s language contains a discussion of rights: she is on the receiving end of an unfair deal, which she expresses in terms of a balance of goods, but she has no power to do anything about it. The conflict between hunter and hare has been mischaracterised as one of equitable trade-offs, but one side is pursuing entertainment, and the other is protesting for her life. Tyrant Man holds all the power and the victim has none. As Weil points out, there is really no such thing as a right unless there is a considerable force to back it up.⁸⁹ If, as Bergman contends, *The Noble Arte* contains a “proto-language of animal rights”, it is not positive or affirming.⁹⁰ It is a cold dialogue of unfair exchange, unmoved by the Hare’s “cry” of injustice, only by the value of her properties.⁹¹ To use the Thomist formula, unlike a human who would have moral status or personality, the Hare’s body can be harmed because there are no adequate structures of rights or justice to protect her. The Hare’s determined liveliness allows her to make an assertive claim for herself, even as that claim is denied. She refuses to “shore up a hunter’s sense of his or her own legitimacy”.⁹² However, her subjectivity is constrained. As Levina put it, subjectivity is a “representational and performative event [...] a production of power”.⁹³ What the Hare’s verse-speech does (as do all the verse-speeches in the manual) is to underscore, with a cruel severity, the power of Man’s words over animal bodies.

⁸⁶ Weil repeatedly uses “evil” to describe cruel injustices in “Human Personality”.

⁸⁷ Esposito, “The Person and Human Life”, 215-16.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 208-209.

⁸⁹ Simone Weil, “Are We Struggling for Justice?” trans. Marina Barabas, *Philosophical Investigations* 10, no.1 (1987): 1-3. Weil uses Thucydides’ Melian dialogue as an illustrative example. During the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians pre-emptively justified the atrocities they committed against the Melians by the fact that they were simply more powerful – the original *might makes right*. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War, Volume III, Books 5-6*, trans. C. F. Smith, Loeb Classical Library 110 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921), 157-77.

⁹⁰ Bergman, “A Spectacle of Beasts”, 56.

⁹¹ Diamond uses the phrase “crying out” throughout her chapter: “Injustice and Animals”, 118-48. This derives from Weil, “Human Personality”, 69-98.

⁹² Wakeman, “Shakespeare, Gascoigne, and the Hunter’s Uneasy Conscience”, 138.

⁹³ Levina, “Nonhuman Biocitizens”, 236.

THE FOX & THE OTTER

The Hare's cry of injustice goes unheard. Understandably: Man has not needed to listen to animals since the Flood. In the aftermath, God granted Man dominion over all things:

Also the fear of you, and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the heaven, upon all that moveth on the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea: into your hand they are delivered, [3]
Everything that moveth and liveth, shall be meat for you: as the green herb, have I given you all things.⁹⁴

Everything fears Man, and everything can be eaten by Man. Martin Luther's lectures on Genesis use this passage to formulate the Christian God in surprisingly "blunt" language:⁹⁵

these words, therefore, establish the butcher shop; attach hares, chickens, and geese to the spit; and fill the tables with all sorts of foods. Necessity also keeps men busy. Not only do they hunt forest animals, but at home they give particular care to tending and fattening cattle for food.

In this passage God sets Himself up as a butcher; for with His Word He slaughters and kills the animals that are suited for food, in order to make up, as it were, for the great sorrow that pious Noah experienced during the Flood. For this reason God thinks Noah ought to be provided for more sumptuously now.⁹⁶

The Word of God is fatal to edible animals, but this is a fair price to pay for the suffering He caused to a few virtuous humans. Luther continues,

it is a great liberty that with impunity man may kill and eat animals of every edible kind [...] the dumb animals are made subject to man for the purpose of serving him even to the extent of dying. They fear and shun man because of this regulation [...] For Adam it would have been an abomination to kill a little bird for food; but now, because the Word is added, we realize that it is an extraordinary blessing that in this way God has provided the kitchen with all kinds of meat.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Genesis 9:2-3.

⁹⁵ As described in Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 63.

⁹⁶ Martin Luther, *Luther's Works: Volume 2, Lectures on Genesis: Chapters 6-14*, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan & Daniel E. Poellot, trans. George V. Schick (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 1960), 133.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 133-34.

Man is granted a carnivorous diet and – with a Word – God absolves him from killing animals for food. Yet the phrasing here indicates that it is not just edibility that calls down a divine death-sentence; Man can “hunt forest animals” to keep busy, and the ambiguity of the animals’ “purpose” of “serving” shows there are further ways Man can kill with impunity.⁹⁸ For animals, this is catastrophic: the butcher shop of the world is open, the kitchen is fired up and He is laying on a feast.

After the Flood, “animals are subjected to man as to a tyrant who has absolute power over life and death”.⁹⁹ The two other animals to speak in *The Noble Arte* – a fox and an otter – seize upon this deeply unjust relationship and press further the Hare’s casting of Man as a tyrannical monster. The Fox’s poem combines the Hart’s consideration of reasons for hunting and cataloguing of medicinal properties with the Hare’s accusation of gratuitous cruelty. The Otter, in turn, becomes the perfect antagonist to the butcher-God, performing her own biblical exegesis against Man’s unquenchable appetite: these “dumb animals” are just the opposite, and refuse to accept the post-Flood covenant. This section takes the figure of the butcher-God along with ideas of sovereign power and “social death” to explore how these fiercely resistant animals can nonetheless be constituted as killable subjects.¹⁰⁰

The Fox’s poem is spoken from a third-person perspective; the animal speaks for an entire species.¹⁰¹ It is prefaced by a short stanza, which introduces the reader to Raynerd himself (Gascoigne’s spelling). Raynerd speaks to the same concerns as the Hart regarding body-as-medicine: fox bodies help with coughs, achy sinews, and splinters (N3v). However, after addressing medicines he acknowledges that, by killing foxes, “a huntsman may, haue profits manyfolde” (N3v). “Profits” here denotes agricultural security, as hens, geese, ducks and pigs will all be left in peace to raise their young: “al the Farmers welth, may thriue and & come to good” (N3v).

Raynerd echoes the Hare’s language of legal rights as exchange: he does not deny that foxes commit disruptive acts, but he enters into a cross-species comparison with Man. Men are far worse, says Raynerd: not only do they kill animals, but they also abuse each other: they hike up rents and deprive one another of food (N3v). They also lie to themselves about why they are hunting: although they claim “they hunt the foxe, / To kepe their neighbors poultry free, & to defende their flockes”, in fact, “they them selues can spoyle, more profit in an houre, / Than Raynard rifles in a yere, when he doth most deuoure” (N4r). Again, there is an uneven exchange: a fox’s right to sustenance is balanced against Man’s right profit from and abuse the world around him. The injustice of the situation is

⁹⁸ See also Gary Steiner’s analysis of Augustine on animal justice: “Toward a Non-Anthropocentric Cosmopolitanism” in *Anthropocentrism: Humans, Animals, Environments*, ed. Rob Boddice (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 86.

⁹⁹ Luther, *Luther’s Works*, Vol. 2, 132.

¹⁰⁰ “Social death” comes from Sarah Burgess and Stuart J. Murray, “Carceral Biocitizenship: The Rhetorics of Sovereignty in Incarceration”, in *Biocitizenship*, 53-54. Burgess and Murray analyse the text of, and responses to, reports from inquests into the death of nineteen-year-old Ashley Smith in 2007. She took her own life whilst in the custody of the CSC. The catalogue of failures, injustice, and her mistreatment at the hands of the CSC is distressing reading.

¹⁰¹ Wakeman has briefly explored Latour’s idea of “speech prostheses” in relation to *The Noble Arte*: Wakeman, “Shakespeare, Gascoigne, and the Hunter’s Uneasy Conscience”, 149.

exacerbated by the veil of pretence that this is fair treatment. The truth, says Raynerd, is that it is all an excuse: “[Men] must haue newfound games, to make thē laugh their fill, / The [sic.] must haue foules, they must haue beasts, to bayt; to hunt, to kyll” (N4r). Within a Lutheran framework, Man must have animals to kill because the butcher-God said so: foxes are killable, and the reasoning behind it does not matter, because of divinely-granted impunity.

Wakeman characterises this section of *The Noble Arte* as “good old-fashioned anthropomorphism”, arguing that Raynerd “issue[s] formal grievances against economic and political systems about which [...he] can have no clear concept”: these “invectives” are “not proper” to a fox’s natural behaviour.¹⁰² But Raynerd, unlike the other three speakers, is not a “proper” fox. Gascoigne purposefully invokes a well-known fictional character.¹⁰³ Enacting the Hare’s portrayal of the power of human words to shape the subjectivity of animals, here Gascoigne uses a vicious shorthand of cultural expectations to shape the subjectivity of his spokes-fox.¹⁰⁴

Like Raynerd, the Otter is forced to negotiate with cultural expectations. As with the Hare’s poem, there is an interplay between the framing, non-fictional text of the manual, and the fictional poetry. Four pages before the “Otter’s Oration” begins, Gascoigne tells the reader that an otter will

destroy all the fishe in your pondes, if she once haue founde the waye to
them [...] A litter of Otters, will destroy you all the fishe in a ryuer (or at
least, the greatest store of them) in two myles length (N4v).

Stacking the case even more firmly against the speaker, the oration is immediately preceded by a woodcut of an otter gnashing down on a fish.¹⁰⁵ The Otter has her work cut out to contest the accusations that have preceded her speech. Targeting Man’s appetite for (ab)using the living world, the Otter’s speech accumulates the concerns of the preceding animals (alr).¹⁰⁶ Like Raynerd, the Otter does not deny any accusations: she admits that “fish I do devour”, and even suggests that her species are capable of eating lambs (alv).¹⁰⁷ She too attacks the double standard enjoyed by Man, who accuses otters of being greedy creatures whilst he devours everything with reckless abandon.

Like the previous verse-speeches, the Otter’s oration shows animals to be useful resources for Man. However, like Raynerd, she is possessed of knowledge about human earthliness, and directs

¹⁰² Wakeman, “Shakespeare, Gascoigne, and the Hunter’s Uneasy Conscience”, 147.

¹⁰³ For further information on Reynard, see Kenneth Varty, “Reynard in England: From Caxton to Present”, in *Reynard the Fox: Social Engagement and Cultural Metamorphoses in the Beast Epic from the Middle Ages to the Present*, ed. Kenneth Varty (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2000), 163–67.

¹⁰⁴ On “spokespersons” see Latour, *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 64–70.

¹⁰⁵ Shannon notes that the same woodcut appears in Topsell’s encyclopaedia, where he describes the Otter as a “very biting beast”. Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 76; Topsell, *Historie of Foure-Footed Beasts*, Fff5r.

¹⁰⁶ At this point, leaf N6 has been replaced by a bifolium signed “a”, but the structure and sense are continuous.

¹⁰⁷ “Most men cry out, that fish I do devour, / Yea some will say that Lambs (with me) be meat”.

this knowledge towards a theological argument. The Otter performs biblical exegesis for the reader, showing that Man's greedily acquisitive attitude will result in punishment:

Well yet mee thinkes, I heare him preache this Texte,
Howe all that is, was made for vse of man:
So was it sure, but therewith followes next,
This heauie place, expounde it who so can:
The very Scourge and Plague of God his Ban,
Will lyght on suche as queyntly can deuise,
To eate more meate, than may their mouthes suffise (alv).

Boldly, the Otter contests Luther's theological understanding. Her use of "deuise" accuses Man of conscious, malicious dishonesty. Man does not slaughter and devour by accident, he actively contrives to do so. Shannon notes the Otter's engagement with contemporary debates surrounding early modern readings of the "justice problem" of Genesis: the Otter accuses Man of reading the Bible's first book selectively, attending only to what it says about using the natural world, and not what happens when it is abused.¹⁰⁸ The hypocrisy is too much, and the Otter bursts out in anger:

Who sees a Beast, for savrie Sawces long?
Who sees a Beast, or chicke or Capon cramme?
Who sees a Beast, once luld on sleepe with song?
Who sees a Beast, make vensone of a Ramme?
Who sees a beast destroy both whelpe and damme?
Who sees a Beast use beastly Gluttonie?
Which man doth vse, for great Ciuilitie (a2r).

The Otter's sixfold repetition of her question hammers home the point that animals do not devour to excess. It is not animals who "sitte-bybbing in [their] seate / With sundry wyne and sundry kindes of meat", but Man (alv). The accumulation produces an image of excessive, drunken feasting: Man's life is an orgy of blood-sports and food-filled revelry, so unreasoned it leaves animals themselves calling it "beastly". The hypocrisy angers the Otter as much as the injustice, but this orgiastic violence is the natural end-point of the butcher-God's slaughtering, killing, stocking of the kitchen, replenishing of spits, and fattening of cattle. Man is sovereign over all other living things and will use them as he pleases.

Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben have both noted the paradoxical nature of what it means to be a subject of sovereign power: for Foucault, the subject is "neither dead nor alive".¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 76. The "justice problem" is from 51.

¹⁰⁹ Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 240.

Agamben extends this, noting in the “sovereign sphere [...] it is permitted to kill without committing homicide”.¹¹⁰ Luther’s butcher-God grants Man this power, and goes further: if these animals have been slaughtered and killed by the Divine Word, they cannot be killed a second time by Man: they are already dead.¹¹¹ This is extremely convenient when, as Raynerd put it, Man “must haue foules, they must haue beasts, to bayt; to hunt, to kyll” (N4r). To borrow from Donna Haraway, God – in drawing up His new pact with Man – “separate[s] the world’s beings into those who may be killed and those who may not”, allows Man to “pretend to live outside killing”, and “make[s] killable” everything nonhuman, so that it might serve Man.¹¹² Quarry are not killed by Man, they are only re-constituted into medicines and material profit.¹¹³ Some animal bodies are rendered as parts even more overtly: *The Noble Arte* outlines the ritualistic gralloching of a hart, and describes the proper way to dismember and flay a hare in front of the hounds (H8r-IIr; L7v-L8v). Gascoigne’s animals do not live under the sovereign power of Man but are trapped, already dead, in an oppressive biopolitical cage.

Here there are analogous questions to those raised by scholars working on oppressive systems in the twenty-first century, though I recognise there is far less at stake when applying these to fictional animals from the 1500s. The work of Sarah Burgess and Stuart J. Murray on the failings of the Correctional Services of Canada (CSC) is especially important for thinking about what it means to be a lively being in a prison system which, horrifically, reduces a person to a “somatic subject”: a body with biological needs, but is “socially dead” and therefore no longer able to claim rights.¹¹⁴ They read prison systems as enacting biopolitical power:

one’s livingness is *not* presumed, one must be *made* to live: power perpetually intervenes on the level of life itself, on a deindividuated and massified body [...] unlike sovereign power, it is not an either/or proposition: being made to live is concomitant with “letting die”.¹¹⁵

Through a similar logic, the animals of *The Noble Arte* can also be read as disempowered “somatic subjects”. Gascoigne intervenes repeatedly in his own text to make his animals live, but these speaking animals are already dead, always killable.

¹¹⁰ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 83. Emphasis in text.

¹¹¹ See James Stanesco’s work on factory farm animals: “The mode of production of the contemporary factory farm is a different ontology, one of deading life instead of the living dead. That is, things that should be alive but for some reason are already dead [...] deading life is [...] the thought of life that is not life, life that is not living. It is a sense of life meant as pure production, pure use-value”. “Beyond Biopolitics: Animal Studies, Factory Farms, and the Advent of Deading Life”, *PhaenEx* 8, no.2 (2013): 151. Industrial meat production and killable life have also been considered by Vinciane Despret: *What Would Animals Say if We Asked the Right Questions?*, trans. Brett Buchanan (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 81-87.

¹¹² Haraway, *When Species Meet*, 79-80.

¹¹³ Cf. Stanesco, “Beyond Biopolitics”, 152-53.

¹¹⁴ Burgess and Murray, “Carceral Biocitizenship”, 53-54.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

Bio-powered spaces, like carceral systems, have “paralyzing effects” on the “somatic subject”.¹¹⁶ They enable those in power (in Burgess and Murray’s analysis, the CSC) to constitute a subject who can act freely but will always be “contained or performed against the background that the CSC provides, but for which it is not (entirely or causally) responsible”.¹¹⁷ In *The Noble Arte*, quarry are paralysed in a world controlled by Man, authorised and sustained by the Lord. Burgess and Murray continue: an incarcerated subject is “given full control over her actions, her body, and her rights within a place that defines and constitutes her, yet as one who is incapable of tendering such a claim in the first place”.¹¹⁸ Thus, a subject’s biocitizenship in a carceral system becomes “empty”: it “mortifies that body, figuring it as already dead, and therefore incapable of issuing a claim to rights”.¹¹⁹ It is not simply that, as discussed in relation to the Hare, that the language of rights does not adequately protect bodies; beyond that, where bodies are subjected to a mortifying biopower they cannot effectively oppose and halt unjust, malicious treatment.

Nothing is stopping the animals from claiming they are owed something by Man, or pointing out that they are on the receiving end of a bad deal. They can cry out against an unjust system, but in no meaningful sense because they are rendered flat, *personae* squeezed out against a background that makes them *res vocalis* only. The “somatic subjects” of *The Noble Arte* are powerless: they are completely free to do what they want, to protest, to physically resist, but they cannot change their mistreatment. Their bodies belong to Man and their bodies are already dead, always-in-the-unmaking.¹²⁰

THE DOG & THE BADGER

All animals are dead, but some are less dead than others. *The Noble Arte* opens with a lengthy section dedicated to the hounds that bracket the book. The table of contents announces that the first section will cover “the Antiquitie of houndes togither vvith the sundry sortes of houndes, and theyr seuerall natures and properties” ([πlv]). The next section also covers hounds: “the best order hovv to breede, enter, and make perfect euery one of the same” ([πlv]). The main body of the text closes with a section on how to care for working dogs: “the cures and medicines for all diseases in Houndes” ([πlv]).¹²¹ The “monstrous register” of Man’s community-making, aptly described by Steel, is evident: the book provides instructions for how to destroy some animals, allows them to rail against the injustice of the situation, yet also provides advice on how to cure and maintain others who are part of

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 65.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Paraphrasing Haraway, *When Species Meet*, 163. “The corpse is not the body. Rather, the body is always-in-the-making; it is always a vital entanglement of heterogeneous scales, times, and kinds of beings webbed into fleshly presence, always a becoming, always constituted in relating”.

¹²¹ I am taking the list of technical hunting vocabulary, the tiny treatise on hunting with greyhounds, and instructions for horn-blowing as a coda.

that destruction.¹²² In this section I explore how genuine care for hounds colours the dynamics of killability outlined above, especially in light of the fact that canines are not the only animals in *The Noble Arte* to receive intimate, loving care. *The Noble Arte* is deeply attentive to its animals: literally in the sense that those who are alive are attended to, but also in the sense that the animals who are to be hunted have been studied, their behaviour analysed and noted.¹²³

The most remarkable thing about the medicinal recipes that close the book is that some demand the use of animal body parts. As the text demonstrates, using animal bodies for medicine was not unusual; but these ingredients demonstrate, in the starkest terms, which animals are “truly alive” (not quite so killable) and which are “relegated to nonlife” (killable).¹²⁴ Predictably, given the Hart’s poem, antlers feature heavily in the canine medicine recipes. “[T]he weight of two crowns of the powder of Harts horne burned” should cure “the sleeping madnesse proceeding of wormes” and “a dramme of Harts horne burnt” is called for to treat worms (O8r; P4v). Other animal pharmacopeia include an ox gall to help with “wormes and cankers”; and red ants and their eggs to cure “lanke madnesse” (P3r-P3v; O8v-Plr). *The Noble Arte* instructs its readers on how to cure hounds and make them usable again; however, it does not contain instructions for helping other wounded animals, who are only useful when lifeless.

As cherished working dogs, hunting hounds occupy a strange space between beloved pet and useful instrument.¹²⁵ Writing on the history of pet-keeping, Steel argues that “denying pets to the periods before us, like denying pets to cultures we think far, far from our own, relegates these periods and these cultures to the purely functional, or it denies that companionship is also a use”.¹²⁶ Framing these hounds as pets is a stretch, but Steel argues for a useful middle ground. He urges “we would do better not to draw too firm a line between utility and pleasure, admiration and love, a practically minded medieval mindset and a frivolous modernity”.¹²⁷ Steel’s reading is helpful as *The Noble Arte* turns its attention to an animal around which issues of utility, companion species and admiration cohere: the badger.

Having outlined badger behaviour pertinent to the hunt, Gascoigne translates what is seemingly a personal anecdote from *La Vénérice*:

¹²² Steel, *How Not to Make a Human*, 39.

¹²³ Walker discusses huntsmen constructing stags from the traces they leave behind. Walker, “Making and Breaking the Stag”, 322-26.

¹²⁴ Steel, *How Not to Make a Human*, 39.

¹²⁵ Though not pets, hunting dogs could be and were considered worthy of individualised attention, as well as being used as tools. David Scott-Macnab has produced a critical edition of a fifteenth-century inventory of named hounds: “*The Names of All Manner of Hounds: A Unique Inventory in a Fifteenth-Century Manuscript*”, *Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 44, no.3 (2013): 339-68.

¹²⁶ Steel, *How Not to Make a Human*, 22.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

I can speake by experience, for I haue brought vp some tame, vntill they were foure yeares olde, and being so brought vp, they are verie gentle, and will playe with yong whelpes, and neuer hurt them, and the rest of the day they neither feede nor playe, they bestow in sleeping. Those which I have brought vp, would come to me at a call, and followe me like whelpes of houndes. They are verie chyll of colde, and if you lette them lye in a chamber where there is any fire, they will creepe so neare it, that they will burne their coates and their feete also many times, and then they are verie harde to be healed. They will be fed with any thing, breade, cheese, fruites, byrdes, or any thing that you will giue them (M5r).¹²⁸

Du Fouilloux displays a clear affection towards badgers. These “verie gentle” creatures contrast sharply with the image he has presented just prior: “I haue seene a Badgerde take a suckyng Pigge in my presence, and caryed him cleane away vnto his earth” (M4v).¹²⁹ Particularly endearing are the text’s comments about badgers feeling the cold. Du Fouilloux’s awareness that burnt badger paws are “very hard to be healed” (“sont fort difficiles a guarir”) glosses a patient concern and innumerable efforts to care for a suffering animal. This phrase conceals an image of the narrator dashing about trying to stop his pets burning their paws and singeing their tails as he sits otherwise distracted near the hearth. Du Fouilloux’s chaotic concern is brought to bear “many times” on the baby badgers, who repeatedly fail to grasp ‘what is fire’. Additionally, describing the badgers not simply as omnivorous but as eating “any thing you will giue them” places a human in direct relationship with the badgers: they must be *given* food in this domestic setting. Ominously, the text does not say what happens to the badgers after the age of four... Bergman notes the “loving care” which was “lavished” on hunting hounds, but misses the care the text lavishes upon baby badgers.¹³⁰ The passage he uses to illustrate his point does, in fact, link the two animals: it is not just badger paws that require tender care to heal.

Early in *The Noble Arte*, Gascoigne describes post-hunt care for dogs. This involves making sure they are clean and dry before they go to their kennels, a process which even includes belly-rubs (C1r).¹³¹ He also describes the attention required by the dogs’ paws after a day’s hunting. Though Bergman quotes only part of the final sentence of this passage (on the use of a linen cloth), I include the context, as it demonstrates the high level of care demanded. Gascoigne writes:

oftentimes also in running through the hard champayne, or stonie groundes,
they [the hounds] surbate and beblister their feete, and to help that, the

¹²⁸ Translated from Du Fouilloux, *La Vénérerie*, Plv.

¹²⁹ The contrast in the French is more striking than the English. Du Fouilloux writes “Ie leur ay veu prendre deuant moy les petis cochons de laict les quelz ilz traynoient tous vifz en leur terrier”, but then describes his tame pets as “ilz sont plaisans et de bonne nature, *sans mordre* ne faire aucun mal”. Literally: they are pleasing and of good nature, *without bite* do no harm (emphasis my own). Ibid.

¹³⁰ Bergman, “A Spectacle of Beasts”, 65.

¹³¹ Du Fouilloux, *La Vénérerie*, C4r.

Hunt [the huntsman] must first washe theyr feete with water and Salt, then take the yolkes of egges & beate them wel with vinegre and the iuyce of an herbe growyng vpon the rockes, and called Mouseare, then take pitch brused to powder and mingle it with twise asmuche [sic.] soote, and after put your sayde powder amongst the egges and iuyce of hearbs aforesayd, making them all hote together and alwayes styrring them, and you must take good heede that you ouerheate it not, bicause the moysture might so be consumed and the substances of the egges woulde ware harde, which woulde marre all, but it shalbe sufficient to heate it untill it be somewhat more than luke warme, and herewithall shall you rubbe euery night the feete and foldes betweene the clawes of your houndes with a linen cloute (C1r-C1v).¹³²

The manual gives us paws/pause. The intimacy of bodies here is striking, as is the number of ingredients required for canine foot care. In the blistered feet of the hounds after running, the manual anticipates the baby badger's burned paws. The hounds need this maintenance nightly because they are constantly working. Baby badgers, conversely, receive this care because Du Fouilloux seems to care. These creatures are in his house only to bring him pleasure in a direct sense: their existence alone is the joy, they are not contingent to another pleasure-seeking exercise like the hounds.

Something about badgers enchants Du Fouilloux, and Gascoigne is faithful in his translations. Away from the household, Du Fouilloux describes watching badgers in the wild as they prepare for winter:

it is a pleasure to beholde them when they gather stuffe for their nest or for their couch, as straw, leaues, mosse, and such other things: and with their forefeete and their heade, they will wrappe vp as much together, as a man would carie vnder one arme, and will make shifte to get it into their holes and couches (M5r).¹³³

Du Fouilloux delights in watching wild badgers: seeing them gather up cosy materials is a feel-good activity. This blending of "utility and pleasure, admiration and love" seems to be precisely what Steel encourages when reading human-animal communities of the past. Four pages after this vivid liveliness, however, Gascoigne reminds us that the same fate awaits badgers as all huntable animals. Just like a fox's, "the bloud and greace of a Badgerd is medicinable" (M7r). Similarly, "the skynne of a Badgerd, is not so good as the Foxes, for it serueth no vse, vnlesse it be to make myttens, or to dresse horscollers withal" (M7v).

¹³² Ibid., C4r-C4v.

¹³³ Ibid., P1v-P2r.

It is difficult to address this weirdness. The care and attention towards badgers is as deep and meaningful as the care and attention directed towards the dogs, if not more so. Helen Smith writes that early moderns were capable of forming emotional attachments to animals as living beings, and they were just as capable of killing those same animals to make use of their bodies.¹³⁴ Conceptualising the world as being full of enjoyable zombie-creatures by way of Divine Providence might be one way to smooth over any apparent inconsistencies in the care extended to different species. If animals are already dead then Man can experience the joys of affection and care, and the exhilarating rush of bloody slaughter or the convenience of using animal bodies. This helps explain how hunting hounds could be highly regarded and carefully attended to, yet still face standard obligations of use. Contemporary medical texts indicate that dogs too could be pulverised into medicinal ingredients, and *The Noble Arte* itself demonstrates their disposability in the chase.¹³⁵ Gascoigne relays an anecdote of a boar hunt:

I thinke it greate pitie to hunte [boar] (with a good kenell of houndes) [... the boar] is the only beast which can dispatch a hounde at one blow [...] if he be runne with a good kenell of houndes [...] he will flee into the strongest thicket that he can finde, to the ende he may kill them at leysure one after another [...] I sawe once a Bore chased and hunted with fiftie good houndes [...] of the fiftie houndes there went not twelue sounde and aliue to their Masters houses (K3r).¹³⁶

The boar turns the tables on the dogs, dispatching them one by one, demonstrating that no animal, not even the most cherished hunting hound, is guaranteed safety from Tyrant-Man.

Diamond notes that justice – specifically as conceived by Weil – depends on attentiveness to others, which consists of two things:

first, that there is an unreasoned expectation that good and not harm will be done to one, and second, that there is an equally unreasoned response to that expectation [...] a response that may also include a desire to protect the being who has that expectation. The awareness of the other being that

¹³⁴ Smith, “Animal Families”, 88.

¹³⁵ Dog bodies appear to have been used only for human medicine. This differs from other animals, which could be used across species. Additionally, where dog resources are required, it is more likely to be their excrement or urine (a renewable resource that does not demand killing). Multiple “dogges torde[s]” and some urine are prescribed in *The Tresurie of Health*, D4r. Wrapping a limb in dog skin eases stiffened sinews, and powdered dog’s head helps with spots on the face: Ruscelli, *A Verie Excellent and Profitable Booke*, IIv; K4v. Roasted liver from a mad dog should help someone who has themselves been bitten by a mad dog, and the “iuce of dogs tong” is suggested as part of a recipe for curing ulcers; the same text offers uses for dog urine. Bullein, *Bulleins Bulwarke*, O4v; Ff5r; O5v.

¹³⁶ “il me semble que c’est grand dommage de faire courir a une bone emeute de Chiens telles sortes de bestes [...] Ce que l’ay veu par experience plusieurs-fois, et entr’ autres d’un Sanglier, qui auoit cinquante Chiens courantz apres luy [...] et des cinquante Chiens courantz, il n’en fut point ramen  dix sains au logis”. Du Fouilloux, *La V nerie*, L6r.

impedes doing injustice, doing harm, is a kind of love, or loving attention
[...]¹³⁷

In their distress, the speaking animals of *The Noble Arte* articulate their “unreasoned expectation” they should not be harmed. There is not, however, an “equally unreasoned response” in Man. Gascoigne’s manual recognises this relationship but does not pursue it. There is a loving attentiveness towards the baby badgers, in that Du Fouilloux attempts to care for creatures who do not comprehend the danger of a hot fire as they attempt to warm themselves. For the hounds, however, there is only attentiveness after the fact: once the dogs have been injured they receive loving and intimate care – if they survive to receive it. Even these most attended-to animals, the ones who occupy the most textual space, have harm visited upon their bodies. Injustice reigns.

As Luther said, there is no impunity in using animal bodies. *The Noble Arte* goes further, suggesting that even the brutality and frivolity of hunting is acceptable, as long as you follow the correct procedures, be that patching dogs up afterward or dissecting animals even more thoroughly, partitioning and parcelling them up. Diamond’s analysis of welfarism in relation to animals is useful here. By thinking about animal welfare rather than animal lives, a problematic line of thought emerges: “we should ease the burdens we impose on animals [...] without ceasing to impose burdens on them, burdens we impose because we *can*, because they are in general helpless”.¹³⁸ *The Noble Arte* imposes innumerable burdens on animal bodies: that they be huntable, medicinal, killable, loveable, entertaining, dead, lively. The text betrays Tyrant-Man at his worst through the badger and dog. Man is capable of meaningful care for animals, and also makes terrible choices about them. Optimistic readings of human-animal relations in *The Noble Arte*, such as Bergman’s, crumble under the paw-pads of a baby badger. There are no rights for animals in this text. There is no justice either.

CONCLUDING THIS “TOLERABLE DISORDER”

In their respective examinations of Philip Sidney’s *Arcadia*, Jenny C. Mann and Jonathan P. Lamb have considered how parenthesis usefully interrupts the text for the reader, guiding them to the multiple voices and compositional structures found within Sidney’s prose.¹³⁹ Both cite George Puttenham’s *The Arte of Englishe Poesie* (1589) to show how parenthesis was a common rhetorical figure in sixteenth-century English texts.¹⁴⁰ Lamb claims that the use of *lunulae* markings to denote parenthesis would have been automatic to Elizabethan writers, and a relatively stable form of punctuation in printed

¹³⁷ Diamond, “Injustice and Animals”, 131.

¹³⁸ Developed through a reading of Leo Tolstoy’s *What Then Must We Do?* Ibid., 141.

¹³⁹ Jenny C. Mann, “The Insertour: Putting the Parenthesis in Sidney’s *Arcadia*”, in *Outlaw Rhetoric: Figuring Vernacular Eloquence in Shakespeare’s England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 87-117; Jonathan P. Lamb, “Parentheses and Privacy in Philip Sidney’s *Arcadia*”, *Studies in Philology* 107, no.3 (2010): 310-35.

¹⁴⁰ Mann, “The Insertour”, 97; Lamb, “Parenthesis and Privacy”, 318.

texts.¹⁴¹ Puttenham classifies parenthesis as a “tolerable disorder”, which occurs when “ye will seems for larger information or some other purpose, to peece or graffe in the midst of your tale an vnnecessary parcell of speach, which neuerthelesse may be thence without any detriment to the rest”.¹⁴² There is something productive in disrupting a text to add extra information. Lamb notes, for instance, that the parentheses of *Arcadia* allow for a “structure of intimate exchange between ourselves and the narrative voice”.¹⁴³

The Noble Arte makes similar use of parentheses. As the Hart speculates about the huntsman’s motives, there are six instances of the phrase “may be” in sixteen lines, five of which occur at the start of a line. Though these words show the Hart questioning the huntsman’s motivations, a closer examination of their presentation suggests something more is happening. Each “may be” is presented within *lunulae*, aside from the first which is missing the opening bracket. Gascoigne’s text features parentheses throughout: sometimes as a result of compositors struggling to fit complete lines of poetry onto a page, at other moments (as in the Hart’s poem) as rhetorical devices.

The Noble Arte follows sixteenth-century convention: its brackets denote there is something worth attending to in these moments of “tolerable disorder”. The repetition in the Hart’s poem establishes a pattern for the animal speeches. The Hare has a repeating “my –” motif, Raynerd’s verse finishes with a flurry of “they must have”s, and the Otter demands six times to know “who sees” the gluttony of Man. Moreover, each of the animal’s addresses is neatly bracketed off from the rest of its respective section, prefaced by an illustration of the animal in question. Though embedded within the text of the manual, the poems are not embedded within sections which analyse and abuse their speakers’ bodies. Though Bergman suggests this structural decision allows the animals the final word, I believe it is less affirming: it separates animal voices from animal bodies and emphasises the fictionality of the poems.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, the manual is itself parenthetical, bracketed by hunting hounds chasing and tearing the prey, and being bandaged up afterwards.

Each verse-speech within *The Noble Arte* is itself a moment of “tolerable disorder”, offering superfluous information. These are tense flashpoints where animal frustration at Man’s power bursts through the page, but the speakers remain fully within Man’s control: we are, after all, reading a hunting manual. These moments of “tolerable disorder” are rhetorically powerful, but they are also safely contained within the text, “without any detriment” to its overall aims, and also safely contained within a bound book, to be held and read by those who enjoy and need to hunt to confirm their dominance of the natural world and of other humans. It is only the glimpse of soothed badger

¹⁴¹ Lamb, “Parenthesis and Privacy”, 318.

¹⁴² George Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie* (London, 1589), T4v-V1r.

¹⁴³ Lamb, “Parenthesis and Privacy”, 311.

¹⁴⁴ Bergman, “A Spectacle of Beasts”, 68. In the case of the Hart and Hare, their poems immediately follow instructions for their orderly dismemberment, emphasising the fictional conceit of a lively, speaking animal.

paws, and wild badgers shuffling in the undergrowth, which offers a brief escape from the *lunulae* of Man's dominance.

Gascoigne and Du Fouilloux carefully observe animals but choose not to see them. *The Noble Arte* does nothing to reconcile the injustices committed against the animals contained within its pages because although it has "the capacity to work out what is fair" – the Hare, for example, makes a compelling case as to the unfairness of her situation – this does not evolve into a "capacity to really see, really to take in, what it is for [an animal] to be harmed".¹⁴⁵ For the sake of human community, for the productive purging of naturally-occurring malice, the writers overlook what happens to animals on the receiving end of Man's violence, even as they present a subjectivity which attempts to articulate it. The "proto-language of animal rights", if it exists at all, is reduced to a materialist exchange which will never work in the animals' favour, because God granted dominion to Man, and his right to wellbeing will always be prioritised. As Diamond puts it, "we mean to have a world in which we treat *each other* with respect, and we mean to make animals bear the burden, the multiform burdens, of *our* living as we think human beings should".¹⁴⁶ This experience is not local to Gascoigne's text and time. In the face of ecological crisis, those in power refuse to acknowledge the cries emanating from the living world. This is a deeper injustice than anything presented in *The Noble Arte*. In a world where we know much more about the internal lives of fellow members of our sublunary community, for how much longer can we repeat this unjust myopia?

¹⁴⁵ I am paraphrasing Diamond, who opens her chapter on animals by thinking about what we have to say about justice when applied to human beings. I hope I am not doing an injustice with my own parenthetical insert replacing "a human being". Diamond, "Injustice and Animals", 120.

¹⁴⁶ Diamond, "Injustice and Animals", 142.

Of Animals & Husbandmen

Earthbound Community in William Shakespeare's *Coriolanus* (c.1608)

Midway through *Coriolanus*, Shakespeare's Roman warrior Caius Martius rails to the senators against the citizens and tribunes who have attempted to arrest him and sentence him to death. The would-be consul spits out a murderous fantasy:

I would they were barbarians, as they are,
Though in Rome littered; not Romans, as they are not,
Though calved i'th porch o'th' Capitol
(3.1.239-241).¹

Janet Adelman identifies a paradox in this moment: though Martius offers an “acknowledgement of kinship” with the citizens, this “must immediately be denied by the assertion that they are not Roman. The very insistence on difference reveals the fear of likeness”.² In Adelman's reading, throughout the play Martius associates the citizens with a dependence on the world, and the likeness he fears is a shared physiological dependency on the earth and its produce. However, the language Martius uses here also indicates another difference, one of species and community: he is human and Roman, the citizens are neither of those things. They are “not Romans” and, rather than barbarians, his description of their birth suggests the citizens are animals. The similarity Martius so fears is also a fear of nonhumanity.³ This chapter examines the “civic world” of *Coriolanus*, arguing that we understand that world differently when we are alert to the presence of the living world in the play's language.⁴

Julia Reinhard Lupton has called *Coriolanus* “a drama of citizenship”, noting that the protagonist “cannot enter the civic world he protects except in death”.⁵ Questions of political

¹ William Shakespeare, *Coriolanus*, ed. Peter Holland (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2013). All further references in text are to this edition.

² Janet Adelman, “‘Anger's My Meat’: Feeding, Dependency, and Aggression in *Coriolanus*”, in *Representing Shakespeare: New Psychological Essays*, ed. Murray M. Schwartz and Coppélia Kahn (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 136.

³ Simon Estok's reading of Martius as a man possessed by “ecophobic fury” who is “a thing of the natural world [...] an object accorded the same moral status of the natural world” depends on understanding Martius as a sexualised, commodified mercenary, and strangely passive. Estok's reading barely mentions the citizens, who he argues represent “a dangerous natural world [which] threatens safety, domesticity, order, and, of course, individuality”. I agree with Estok that the citizens threaten Martius' sensibilities. However, in my reading the citizens do not threaten the above, they *represent* safety, domesticity and order: this is what scares Martius. As such I do not engage more heavily with Estok's work, important though it is. See “Doing Ecocriticism with Shakespeare”, in *Early Modern Ecocriticism: From the Florentine Codex to Shakespeare*, ed. Thomas Hallock, Ivo Kamps, and Karen L. Raber (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 86-87.

⁴ Julia Reinhard Lupton, *Citizen-Saints: Shakespeare and Political Theology* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1; 3.

community are frequently articulated through rhetoric in which the nonhuman world – understood as lively beings and objects – is figured as low status and humiliating, especially by Martius. However, as the drama unfolds it becomes clear that Martius’ revulsion to earthly dependence and nonhumanity make his operating within the political community impossible.

In what follows, I bring the ideas of citizenship and nonhumanity together alongside the concept of the *oikos*. This relates to the Greek *oikonomia*, concerning “the institution of the rural estate” and “the procurement of basic life necessities – food, water, clothing and shelter – from the surrounding environment”.⁶ Driving this analysis are two figures from twenty-first-century cultural theory: Bruno Latour’s *Earthbound* and Isabelle Stengers’ *Gaia*. For Stengers, *Gaia* is not the benevolent mother earth goddess, but an indifferent “assemblage of forces” who demands attention because she is always operating in the *oikos*’ processes of procuring life’s necessities.⁷ The Latourian *Earthbound* are beings who are “sensitive and responsive” to their earthliness, and understand their world as a *territory*, which consists of tangled, complex networks.⁸ This chapter demonstrates how *Coriolanus* explores the consequences of trying to ignore or extricate oneself from these challenging interdependencies, especially as they inform the “life and death relations” of politics.⁹

Imagining the citizens as born “i’th’ porch o’th’ Capitol”, Martius is troubled by their uncomfortable closeness to the heart of Roman power, and elucidates what, for him, ought to be a sharp division between an animal citizenry, and those who are supposed to govern them. The “not Romans” are bestialised, reproducing through littering and calving. This differs sharply from the tribunes’ and citizens’ own visions of Rome, articulated shortly before Martius speaks. Rallying the people, the tribune Sicinius calls to the assembled crowd, “What is the city but the people?”; the citizens reply “Aye, the people are the city” (3.1.199-200). These two statements encapsulate the problem of civic existence at the heart of *Coriolanus*, especially as it presents itself to Martius. On the one hand, he sees the citizens as nonhumans who have no business taking political action. On the other hand, Rome, without its citizens – whether they are people, animals, or something in between – would not exist as a political community.

⁶ Peter Remien, *The Concept of Nature in Early Modern English Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 3. Remien’s study of the mid-seventeenth-century concept of “the oeconomy of nature” explores the relationship between scientific and literary understandings of the interdependence of the natural world and Man.

⁷ Isabelle Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism*, trans. Andrew Goffey (Lüneberg: Open Humanities Press/Meson Press, 2015), 45-47.

⁸ Bruno Latour, *Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), ProQuest Ebook Central, “The States (of Nature) between War and Peace”, NP, accessed Sept 30, 2022, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/york-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4926426>.

⁹ Helena Feder, “Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism*, ed. Greg Garrard (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 227.

There is a wealth of scholarship on *Coriolanus*, including interventions relating to animality, political citizenship, and the physiological demands of hunger.¹⁰ More recently, scholarship has moved towards reading the play through modern political theory, especially through the lens of Giorgio Agamben's *homo sacer* and formulation of bare life.¹¹ Agamben takes "bare life" from the Greek *zōē*: it is "the simple fact of living common to all beings".¹² He differentiates this from *bios*: "the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group".¹³ I suggest that it is possible to draw this theoretical investment in the play's politics together with more recent work in animal studies and ecocriticism, and by doing so I unearth a more complete vision of this play's investment in ideas of political community as entangled in earthliness.

Aristotle famously summarised the importance of Man existing in political community: "a man who is incapable of entering into partnership [with others in the political state], or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god".¹⁴ Setting aside Aristotle's foreclosure of nonhuman community, what is key is the idea that politics demands people interact with one another, and if they do not then community is impossible.¹⁵ Exploring these socio-political relationships, Gerard Delanty has drawn attention to how existing in a community can generate "contractual ties" between people, encompassing "political, civic and social relations"; crucially, he notes that "what is important here is the immediate and experiential aspect of community as embodying direct relationships in contrast to the alien

¹⁰ Some indicative examples that explore animality in the play include: Liza Blake and Kathryn Vomero Santos, "What Does the Wolf Say?: Animal Language and Political Noise in *Coriolanus*", in *The Routledge Handbook of Shakespeare and Animals*, ed. Karen Raber and Holly Dugan (New York, NY: Routledge, 2020), 150-62; Andreas Höfele, *Stage, Stake and Scaffold: Humans and Animals in Shakespeare's Theatre* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 92-114; Manfred Pfister, "Animal Images in *Coriolanus* and the Early Modern Crisis of Distinction between Man and Beast", *Shakespeare Jahrbuch* 145 (2009): 141-57. On politics and citizenship in the play, see Nate Eastman, "The Rumbling Belly Politic: Metaphorical Location and Metaphorical Government in *Coriolanus*", *Early Modern Literary Studies* 13.1 (2007): paras. 2.1-39, accessed Aug 30, 2022, <http://purl.oclc.org/emls/13-1/eastcori.htm>; Tetsuya Motohashi, "Body Politic and Political Body in *Coriolanus*", *Forum for Modern Language Studies* 30, no.2 (1994): 97-112; Markku Peltonen, "Political Rhetoric and Citizenship in *Coriolanus*", in *Shakespeare and Early Modern Political Thought*, ed. David Armitage, Conal Condren and Andrew Fitzmaurice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 234-52; Cathy Shrank, "Civility and the City in *Coriolanus*", *Shakespeare Quarterly* 54, no.4 (2003): 406-23. On grain and hunger, see Pascale Drouet, "I Speak This in Hunger for Bread: Representing and Staging Hunger in Shakespeare's *King Lear* and *Coriolanus*", in *Hunger on the Stage*, ed. Elisabeth Angel-Perez and Alexandra Poulain (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008), 2-16; Elyssa Y. Cheng, "Moral Economy and the Politics of Food Riots in *Coriolanus*", *Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies* 36, no.2 (2010): 17-31.

¹¹ For Agambian readings of the play see Maurizio Calbi, "States of Exception: Auto-Immunity and the Body Politic in Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*", in *ACUME 2, Vol. 4: Questioning Bodies in Shakespeare's Rome*, ed. M. Del Sapio Garbero, N. Isenberg, and M. Pennacchia (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2010): 77-94; James Kuzner, "Unbuilding the City: *Coriolanus* and the Birth of Republican Rome", *Shakespeare Quarterly* 58, no.2 (2007): 174-99; Nichole E. Miller, "Sacred Life and Sacrificial Economy: *Coriolanus* in No-Man's Land", *Criticism* 51, no.2 (2009): 263-310; Ineke Murakami, "The 'Bond and Privilege of Nature' in *Coriolanus*", *Religion and Literature* 38, no.3 (2006): 121-36; María Luisa Pascual Garrido, "Re-humanising *Coriolanus*: Community and the Ethical Self", *Sederi* 26 (2016): 85-107.

¹² Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 264 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), 1235a, 11-13.

¹⁵ Andreas Höfele has used this formulation to argue for Martius as a rage-fuelled animal or mythic deity lacking human reason, "empowered and disabled by a primordial violence". I think this is too forgiving, as it excuses the character's appalling lack of care. *Stage, Stake and Scaffold*, 104-109.

world of the state”.¹⁶ Delanty’s point is useful: political community places us in some form of reciprocal relationship with other people, and these relationships happen with immediacy and urgency. This notion of community as happening in the moment chimes with the thinking of Roberto Esposito who, through an analysis of Kant and Heidegger, argues that “care, rather than interest, lies at the basis of community. Community is determined by care, and care by community. One may not exist without the other”.¹⁷ Beginning with the citizens rioting for humanitarian relief from starvation, *Coriolanus* presents an immediate and urgent example of community care gone wrong.

Luisa María Pascual Garrido has used Esposito’s work in her analysis of *Coriolanus*, specifically to argue that Martius’ capitulation to the Romans occurs through a revelation of a “sense of ethical responsibility” to his political community.¹⁸ As I argue below, I think Pascual Garrido is too generous in her assessment of Martius’ ethics, but her use of Esposito’s community demonstrates its pertinence to reading the play. Esposito’s analysis continues:

the duty of community (providing, yet not conceding, that there is one) is not to liberate us from care but instead to protect it as the sole thing that renders community possible [...] the figure of the Other ultimately coincides with that of community. At the same time this is so not in the obvious sense in which every one of us has something to do with the other but rather in the sense that the other constitutes us from deep within. It’s not that we communicate with the other but that we *are* the other.¹⁹

Care, according to Esposito, is key to political community. Without appropriate awareness of our vulnerability to being other in our community, we cannot operate with care, and thus cannot make community. Martius desperately wants politics to liberate him from having to care about the citizens, to keep them as other in Rome. The citizens, on the other hand, know that they are the city and cannot be otherwise.

Through its exploration of the presence of the living world in the politics and *Coriolanus*, this chapter considers how care and community manifest in the play, and how these manifestations operate in a “civic world” which reveals itself to be a world constituted of living nonhuman beings and made up of the stuff that living beings need in order to survive. The first section explores the possibilities available for articulating the *oikos* in *Coriolanus*. I lay out my theoretical framework in more detail and begin to unpack the conflict at the heart of the play’s political community. This conflict unfolds in the problematic relationship between Martius’ desire to extricate himself from

¹⁶ Gerard Delanty, *Community*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2010), 1: 3.

¹⁷ Roberto Esposito, *Terms of the Political: Community, Immunity, Biopolitics*, trans. Rhiannon Noel Welch (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2013), 25-26.

¹⁸ Pascual Garrido, “Re-humanising *Coriolanus*”, 103.

¹⁹ Esposito, *Terms of the Political*, 25-26.

said community, and the reality of existing in a world which demands interaction and attention. The second section examines how Martius' rhetoric of dehumanisation towards the citizens appears as a symptom of this conflict. I discuss how this rhetoric is almost always faulty in its aim: in trying to use dehumanisation to distance the citizens from political community, Martius only demonstrates more decisively their contribution to it. His carelessness in his metaphorical choices is indicative of a carelessness about the world around him. The next section explores how the praxis of husbandry is central to the play's civics, as well as to Shakespeare's contemporary world. I consider how characters navigate this need to attend to the earth and its produce, and how this tangible earthiness lends husbandry a particular strength when used as a political metaphor. I conclude by thinking about two moments from the end of the play: Martius' capitulation to his mother, and his death. The Roman is brought to a fatal reckoning with the "contractual ties" of his political community and the assemblages of the play's living world.²⁰

"THE COMMON MUCK OF THE WORLD"

Martius never misses an opportunity to deride the citizens. During the opening scenes of the play, he mocks their starvation and dismisses their demands. He is also critical of the citizens' desire for worldly goods. Relating events after the battle at Corioles, Cominius tells the senators that Martius rejected any loot:

Our spoils he kicked at,
And looked upon things precious as they were
The common muck of the world. He covets less
Than misery itself would give, rewards
His deeds with doing them, and is content
To spend the time to end it.
(2.2.121-127)

In a Marxist reading of labour and exchange in *Coriolanus*, Zvi Jagendorf argues that this moment exemplifies Martius' political ethos, in which honour and material reward are mutually exclusive: "disdaining any reward outside the deed itself, [Martius] is the hero of a one-man economy that boldly distinguishes itself from the market and the getting, spending and exchanging of ordinary men".²¹ Jagendorf's articulation of a dichotomy between Martius and the market-place trading of "ordinary men" hits upon the same divide Adelman argues for in her analysis of orality and worldly dependence in *Coriolanus*. There is something about mundanity which Martius finds repulsive: *mundanity* specifically in its original sense of belonging to the world, *mundane* in its sense of earthly.²²

²⁰ Delanty, *Community*, 1.

²¹ Zvi Jagendorf, "Coriolanus: Body Politic and Private Parts", *Shakespeare Quarterly* 41, no.4 (1990): 464.

²² OED, "mundanity, n.", def. 1 and "mundane, adj. and n.", def. A.1.a.

In this section I set out a framework for discussing the play's political community, attending to the mundane "common muck" by which Martius is repulsed.

Martius prizes abstract notions of honour and nobility over material reward. Cominius' description of Martius' actions comes after Martius' own disparaging of spoils in 1.5, specifically the spoils chosen by the citizen-soldiers.²³ Watching the soldiers carry off their loot, he sneers to his second-in-command:

See here these movers that do prize their hours
At a cracked drachma! Cushions, leaden spoons,
Irons of a doit, doublets that hangmen would
Bury with those who wore them, these base slaves,
Ere yet the fight be done, pack up. Down with them!
(1.5.4-8)

Martius is repulsed by the choices of these citizens and confounded by their disregard for martial honour. He has no respect for those who seek material rewards: the citizens, he feels, "prize their hours" at a disgracefully low value, and his inventory of domestic spoils indicates this.²⁴ Textiles and utensils are irrelevant to patrician warrior Martius: they are fundamentally mundane. Though cushions and doublets might read as luxury items, Martius' language indicates that the ones the Romans have taken are extremely poor quality: the doublets would be better off buried than worn, and the "irons" – which, intriguingly, could be swords or domestic items – are only worth a "doit".²⁵ The cheapness heightens his repulsion: the "common muck of the world" sticks to this military action and, for Martius, degrades what should be a noble act of war by relating it to quotidian items which speak to a homey earthliness. In turn, this earthliness speaks to the Greek concept of the *oikos*.

The Greek *oikos* was a realm of objects and labour: "the primary unit of production, storage and consumption" in the wider political state.²⁶ Above the *oikos* was the "ideal superstructure" of the *polis*: a realm of "self-rule by adult male property owners, equal among themselves" who were "sustained by an economy of noncitizens", i.e. those who laboured and lived in the *oikos*.²⁷ In this

²³ Michael Ignatieff notes that "the civic model opposed the creation of a separate army and a separate bureaucratic cadre on the grounds that specialization bred interests at variance with the general interest of citizens. In the folklore of Roman republicanism, the civic hero was Cincinnatus, the farmer who left his plough to lead the republic out of danger and then returned to the humble soil as soon as the job was done". "The Myth of Citizenship", in *Theorizing Citizenship*, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1995), 58. I consider the figure of Cincinnatus below.

²⁴ Reading this moment, Emily Griffiths Jones argues that "the plebeian foot soldiers' greed for material goods and their extension of the wage labor system to the battlefield are entirely consistent with the notion he already holds that they are, by rank and occupation, uniformly weak, cowardly, unfit for combat, and generally base and dishonest". "Beloved of All the Trades in Rome: Oeconomics, Occupation, and the Gendered Body in *Coriolanus*", *Shakespeare Studies* 43, (2015): 168.

²⁵ Holland notes the ambiguity of "irons" and explains that a "doit" is a low value Dutch coin. Shakespeare, *Coriolanus*, 194, n.6.

²⁶ J. K. Davies, "Society and Economy", in *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume V: The Fifth Century B.C.*, ed. David M. Lewis, John Boardman, J.K. Davies and M. Ostwald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 289.

²⁷ Ignatieff, "The Myth of Citizenship", 56; 59.

Aristotelian model, citizen-rulers in the *polis* are able to access their “fully-developed humanity”, whereas *oikos*-dwellers are less than human.²⁸ J.G.A. Pocock summarises that, in this Aristotelian model, “it did not seem that the human – being cognitive, active and purposive – could be fully human unless he also ruled himself”.²⁹ Aristotelian citizenship cleaves human from nonhuman, dividing beings into those who have power and those who do not, those who are regarded as having a capacity for politics, and those who do not.³⁰

It is this inflexible and violent model to which Martius openly subscribes, intensifying the precarious status of the not-quite-citizens of Rome as he dehumanises and ridicules his social inferiors, referring to them as scabs, rats, hares, geese, fragments, curs, a herd, slaves, and a many-headed monster. In Martius’ eyes, the Roman citizens are citizens in name only, functionally useless as political operators because they belong firmly in the *oikos*, consuming and producing, littering and calving. The citizens are thoroughly mundane, and therefore ought to be thoroughly apolitical, existing only to sustain the *polis*.

Theodore Kaouk has noted how *Coriolanus* engages with an Aristotelian model through the words of 1 Citizen: “we are accounted poor citizens, the patricians good” (1.1.13-14). The text “acknowledges the classical perception of craftsmen as pseudo-citizens and the prevailing belief that full citizenship requires political action and military service”.³¹ Building from Kaouk’s reading, Rome’s citizens are “poor” in multiple senses: “lacking the means to procure the comforts or necessities of life”; “deficient in the proper or desired quality” in their not-quite-humanity; “of little excellence or worth” to Martius; “to be pitied” in their starvation, and even “thin or feeble from inadequate feeding”.³² Verging on becoming skinny “rakes” and speaking “in hunger for bread, not in thirst for revenge” (1.1.21-22), everything about these “poor citizens” attests to their vulnerable dependence on and comfort in the *oikos*, whether that is their joy in the “common muck” of cheap war spoils or their impoverished, starved existence. Under Aristotelian civics, the citizens’ looting binds them within the *oikos* and indicates their lack of the properly human political community found in the *polis*.³³ However, in their hunger, and later with “leaden spoons” and “irons of a doit”, the citizens

²⁸ J.G.A. Pocock, “The Ideal of Citizenship since Classical Times”, in *Theorizing Citizenship*, 32-33.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

³⁰ This is a simplified view of the *polis/oikos* relationship. See D. Brendan Nagle, *The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Polis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). More recent scholarship has suggested that Aristotle does not divide humans in this way, e.g. James Gordon Finlayson, “‘Bare Life’ and Politics in Agamben’s Reading of Aristotle”, *The Review of Politics* 72 (2010): 97-126.

³¹ Theodore F. Kaouk, “Homo Faber, Action Hero Manqué: Crafting the State in *Coriolanus*”, *Shakespeare Quarterly* 66, no.4 (2015), 422. Kaouk examines the play’s politics in relation to the status of craftsmen in early modern England.

³² OED, “poor, adj. and n.1”, defs. A.1.a, A.2.a, A5, 7.b. This last definition is particularly appropriate for dehumanised citizens, given its application to animals.

³³ Derek Heater emphasises how being a good member of the Aristotelian *polis* did mean attending, however abstractly, to the *oikos*: “[...] Greek citizenship depended not so much on rights which could be claimed as on responsibilities which had with pride to be shouldered”. *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education*, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 5.

break down the division between *polis* and *oikos*, as they remind the patricians that the *oikos*, site of making and of using, necessitates political attention.

Giorgio Agamben's work helps to articulate the incursion of this vulnerable dependence into Rome's political arena. Formulating his model of the "modern State", Agamben proposes that

the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, *bios* and *zoē*, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction.³⁴

As Ineke Murakami concisely summarises: "Shakespeare moves the individual-stripped-to-creatureliness to the heart of high politics, and elevates bare life [...] to the primary concern of the state".³⁵ This "irreducible indistinction" is troubling for Martius. He is appalled when confronted by the citizens' "creatureliness" and "their drive for self-preservation".³⁶ Above all else, he despises the "animal life of their hungry mouths".³⁷ The citizens' need for warmth and sustenance, as well as their desire for stuff to furnish their households, indicates a shameful dependency.

A dependent humanity embedded in the physical world is a "very old fact of civilization", writes Bruno Latour: "many different traditions [have] always rejected the idea of a human totally detached from the conditions of her existence, from her life support".³⁸ Pushing these ideas of "life support" further in more recent work, Latour develops more precise terminology, differentiating between what he calls Humans and the Earthbound. Thinking with the term Earthbound, Latour argues, alerts us to our location "on Earth and not in Nature. And, even more precisely, on land shared with other often bizarre beings whose requirements are multiform".³⁹ The main difference between Humans and the Earthbound is their relationship to the Earth: "whereas Humans are defined as those who take the Earth, the Earthbound are *taken by it*".⁴⁰ Moreover, Humans "are defined only by the fact that, thanks to their spiritual or moral qualities, they have been capable of freeing themselves from the harsh 'necessities of Nature'", and "remain indifferent to the consequences of their actions, postponing the payment of their debts, indifferent to the feedback loops that might make them aware of what they are doing and responsible for what they have done".⁴¹ There is an insular anthropocentrism in Latour's Humanity, which is reflected in Martius' desire to extricate himself from the citizens' needs. Martius sees the citizens' participation in politics as wholly inappropriate: all they do is "sit by the fire and presume to know / What's done i'th Capitol" (1.1.186-187). However,

³⁴ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 6; 9.

³⁵ Murakami, "The 'Bond and Privilege of Nature'", 127.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 126.

³⁷ Kaouk, "Homo Faber, Action Hero Manqué", 426.

³⁸ Latour, "Politics of Nature: East and West Perspectives", *Ethics and Global Politics* 4, no.1 (2011): 74.

³⁹ Latour, *Facing Gaia*, "On the Instability of the (Notion of) Nature", NP.

⁴⁰ Latour, *Facing Gaia*, "The States (of Nature) between War and Peace", NP.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Martius fails to comprehend that “what’s done i’t’h Capitol” impacts the citizens and is, in fact, triggering the participatory attempts he so reviles. The “feedback loops” which would make him aware of and responsible for his actions seem unfathomable. The Earthbound, meanwhile, are “sensitive and responsive”; “they belong to a *territory* [...] the territory [...consists of] networks that intermingle, oppose one another, become mutually entangled, contradict one another, and that no harmony, no system, no “third party,” no supreme Providence can unify in advance”.⁴² In Latour’s thinking, the Earthbound operate with a mundane humility, responding to and in the living world, in contrast to Human ignorance and arrogance.

Latour’s writing stages an opposition between Humans who aim (in vain) to transcend the living world, and the Earthbound who are embedded in it. This parallels the Aristotelian tension between *polis* and *oikos*: here there is an opposition between a transcendent political government, and the mundane households where securing “basic life necessities” depends on an attentiveness to “the surrounding environment”.⁴³ Attending to the mundane, earthly life of *Coriolanus* demands a yoking together of these congruent frictions. The figure of Gaia, as articulated by philosopher Isabelle Stengers, usefully draws these ideas together. With a similar alertness to the problems of Man’s impact on the living world, Stengers departs from James Lovelock’s famous notion of the biosphere, what she names is not a deity, not “an arbitrator, guarantor or resource”.⁴⁴ Gaia transcends all, and is everything that makes up this world; importantly, she is “indifferent to our reasons and our projects”.⁴⁵ The “intrusion of Gaia” is Stengers’ articulation of the indifference of the natural world, a cosmos which will inevitably affect, disrupt, or possibly harm us. This intrusion, Stengers writes, is thoroughly one-sided: it “imposes a question without being interested in the response”.⁴⁶ Gaia-as-assemblage is not threatened by Man, and

it is precisely because she is not threatened that she makes the epic versions of human history, in which Man, standing up on his hind legs and learning to decipher the laws of nature, understands that he is the master of his own fate, free of any transcendence, look rather old.⁴⁷

Stengers alerts readers to the liveliness of the more-than-human world and, like Latour and his understanding of the Earthbound, her idea of Gaia is at once cosmological and earthly. Gaia demands that we attend to our *earthbound* experiences, and to how our actions may offend and provoke

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Remien, *The Concept of Nature*, 3.

⁴⁴ Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times*, 47. Lovelock (1919-2022) focused on the idea of the biosphere throughout his career. The term was first formulated in collaboration with Lynn Margulis. See James E. Lovelock and Lynn Margulis, “Atmospheric Homeostasis by and for the Biosphere: The Gaia Hypothesis”, *Tellus* 26, no.1-2 (1974): 2-10. Lovelock continued this work up to his last publication *We Belong to Gaia* (London: Penguin Books, 2021).

⁴⁵ Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times*, 47.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 46.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 47.

intrusions which affect how we “compose with” the world and each other.⁴⁸ These intrusions require no response, but they do demand attention.

Gaia does not permit Humans to “remain indifferent”, to be ignorant of their actions or evade responsibility; rather, she compels a “sensitive and responsive” attention from the Earthbound.⁴⁹ Gaia intrudes through a relentless presence in the play’s language and will not be ignored: in her ticklishness she stirs and shifts throughout the play, her indifference foils Martius’ attempts to exist in total singularity.⁵⁰ Combining classical ideas about citizenship with modern (eco)political writing offers new possibilities for thinking political community in *Coriolanus*. Earthbound civics on a living planet show that using an Aristotelian model of citizenship to draw hard divisions between the ruled and ruled over are not possible when Gaia and the *oikos* repeatedly intrude on the *polis*. *Coriolanus* grapples with the problematic relationships between the *oikos* and the Earthbound, *polis* and Human as they play out under the intrusion of Gaia.⁵¹ Martius is disgusted by the citizens’ displays of physical vulnerability and their interactions with the “common muck of the world”; their earthboundness is repulsive. In Martius’ worldview, to be Earthbound, aware of the “conditions of existence” and the need for “life support” is enfeebling and dehumanising.⁵² This is particularly obvious in Martius’ repeated use of animal language to describe the citizens, as I show in the next section of this chapter.

POLITICAL ANIMALS

Roberto Esposito argues that “care, rather than interest, lies at the basis of community”.⁵³ In stark contrast to this, Martius exhibits a remarkable carelessness in his interactions with the community of Rome. Here, I argue that Martius’ animal language is an especially revealing indicator of this carelessness. He regularly deploys dehumanising rhetoric in order to castigate the citizens and foreclose the possibilities of what (from his perspective) is improper, nonhuman political activity, and to disentangle himself from the “contractual ties” that oblige him to care about the citizens.⁵⁴ The tension between care as a bond for political community versus the reluctance of the patricians to

⁴⁸ “Composing with” is used throughout Stengers’ text, but especially in this section. See *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴⁹ Latour, *Facing Gaia*, “The States (of Nature) between War and Peace”, NP.

⁵⁰ On Martius’ impossible singularity, see Catherine Lisak, “O, Me Alone!: *Coriolanus* in the Face of Collective Otherness”, *Société Française Shakespeare* 28 (2011), 225-55.

⁵¹ Pocock, “The Ideal of Citizenship”, 34.

⁵² Todd Borlik has discussed how Lovelock’s Gaia is applicable to literature on the living world in early modernity, comparing it with ideas of the World Picture and Dame Nature. *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature: Green Pastures* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 29-64

⁵³ “[...] thrust prematurely from dependence on his mother, forced to feed himself on his own anger, Coriolanus refuses to acknowledge any neediness or dependency: for his entire sense of himself depends on him being able to see himself as a self-sufficient creature”. Adelman, “‘Anger’s my Meat’”, 132. Mareile Pfannebecker’s also highlights Martius’ apparent lack of bodily needs: “Throughout, Coriolanus seems to know no fear, hunger, tiredness or greed”. “Cyborg *Coriolanus* / Monster Body Politic”, in *Posthumanist Shakespeares*, ed. Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 115.

⁵⁴ Esposito, *Terms of the Political*, 25.

⁵⁵ Delanty, *Community*, 1.

offer this care is exposed in *Coriolanus* through creaturely metaphor. Martius attempts to invoke certain emblematic qualities in animals for rhetorical purposes, only for these to disintegrate when compared with contemporary knowledge of animal behaviour. His carelessness is thus twofold: firstly, the content of his rhetoric demonstrates his lack of care for his community but secondly, and just as importantly, his metaphors demonstrate a lack of awareness as to the lived experiences of nonhuman animals and the humans who live alongside them.

A particularly telling example of this faultiness occurs at the end of the play. At the height of *Coriolanus*' drama, negotiating with his mother in front of his wife, son, Roman women, and the assembled Volscian leaders, Martius produces a striking image:

[...] I melt, and am not
Of stronger earth than others. My mother bows
As if Olympus to a molehill should
In supplication nod [...]
(5.3.28-31)

Martius conjures the soaring home of the gods begging benevolence from the earthworks of the humble mole. The juxtaposition is ridiculous: a mountain could never need stoop so low. But moles and their industrious burrowings do disrupt the status quo and command notice, if not from Olympus itself.

According to early modern horticultural and agricultural writers, moles cause “great griefe and paine” to “carefull Gardeners”, demanding urgent attention as they tunnel their way through the ground.⁵⁵ The animals “annoyeth the grounds of husbandmen very much”, and will rapidly “deface and spoyle any faire meadow or other ground”, including corn fields, gardens, orchards, even land surrounded by water.⁵⁶ These “pestiferous annoyance[s]” contest the earthly space over which Man attempts to exercise control.⁵⁷ They cannot be ignored and, if Man is to regain supremacy, elaborate interventions are required: sending in cats, taming weasels for hunting, burning brimstone, stuffing tunnels with onions and garlic, setting traps, and more.⁵⁸ Martius attempts to figure himself as an ineffectual pile of earth, no “stronger” than any other. But the nature of the molehill and the industrious mole demand acknowledgement: destroy me, work around me, or give up and leave me – go sow your crops elsewhere.

⁵⁵ Thomas Hill, *The Gardeners Labyrinth* (London, 1577), IIr.

⁵⁶ Leonard Mascall, *The First Booke of Cattell* (London, 1587), Ff4v.

⁵⁷ *The Orchard, and The Garden* (London, 1594), H4r.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, H3r-H4r. Many of these methods are from classical sources and can be found in other texts from the period. See Conrad Heresbach, *Four Bookes of Husbandry*, trans. Barnaby Googe (London, 1577), I5v-I6r; Hill, *The Gardeners Labyrinth*, IIr-IIv; Mascall, *First Booke of Cattell*, Ff4v-Ff8v; *The Country-mans Recreation, or The Art of Planting, Graffing, and Gardening* (London, 1640), D4v-E1v.

The language of *Coriolanus* is populated with nonhumans who disrupt the play and demand that we pay attention to them. Martius' rhetorical engagements with the animal world invite us to imagine a dehumanised citizen-species that can easily be dismissed from the political community.⁵⁹ Manfred Pfister has suggested that Martius is determined to "exorcise the bestial other in himself," and that this is why he is so disparaging of any hint of it in others.⁶⁰ This exorcism is unsuccessful: as Murakami has noted, "instead of exposing the putative gulf between patrician and plebeian classes, beast language [in *Coriolanus*] reveals an underlying totality, a common humanity".⁶¹ Liza Blake and Kathryn Vomero Santos have also reconfigured the play's politics by thinking through animal language in terms of speech, as opposed to animal imagery, arguing that, in *Coriolanus*, "the great factions [are] not the patricians and the plebeians, but inarticulate animal force and sovereign power": can the former ever have a place in politics?⁶² These scholars recognise the rich possibilities the play's animals offer for exploring its political community.

In her incisive reading of animal language in *Coriolanus*, Murakami offers a useful summary of Agamben's biopolitical state, which "carefully monitors the creaturely life of its citizenry, because its sovereignty and legitimacy are most clearly demonstrated in its authority to judge the value or non-value of this life, to extend or withdraw its protection of it".⁶³ I argue, counterintuitively, that it is through a reader's or audience's monitoring of the citizens' decidedly creaturely lives that Martius' attempts at dehumanisation can be resisted. In paying attention to the lives of the animals invoked by Martius and the citizens it is possible to see that Martius' attempts to withdraw protection, and therefore care and attention, only serve to underscore their necessity. Having begun with the mole and its agricultural havoc-wreaking, I follow this line of thinking through the text, showing how contemporary zoological and agricultural writing provides a useful counter to Martius' dismissive efforts. Taking the animals of *Coriolanus* seriously as animals – rather than as metaphors for acts of dehumanisation – I explore the manifestations of Gaia's intrusion on Martius' rhetoric, and how this asserts the presence of the Earthbound in the play's politics.

Addressing the citizens, Martius' first monologue is full of confused species and classification errors. As he gropes his way towards coherence, his rhetoric is filled with animals:

[...] What would you have, you curs,
That like nor peace nor war? The one affrights you,
The other makes you proud. He that trusts to you,

⁵⁹ Peltonen contextualises rhetorical education and political citizenship in early modern England and argues that *Coriolanus* "demonstrates in dramatic fashion how many [civic] themes centred around the different interpretations of the relationship between citizenship and rhetoric". "Political Rhetoric and Citizenship in *Coriolanus*", 252.

⁶⁰ Pfister, "Animal Images in *Coriolanus*", 157.

⁶¹ Murakami, "The 'Bond and Privilege of Nature'", 126.

⁶² Blake and Vomero Santos, "What Does the Wolf Say?", 159.

⁶³ Murakami, "The 'Bond and Privilege of Nature'", 127.

Where he should find you lions finds you hares,
Where foxes, geese you are –
(1.1.163-167)

Here, Martius mostly refers to the citizens as prey animals: hares and geese. In the battle outside Corioles a similar pattern appears: the Romans are an unidentifiable “herd” with “souls of geese” (1.4.32-35). Martius rhetorical intent is clear: his labels of geese and hares are meant to dismiss his social inferiors as dim-witted and easily-panicked. However, early modern agricultural literature indicates that geese played an important role in a successful homestead. Conrad Heresbach describes how geese could prove low-maintenance, profitable investments for their owners:

the keeping of Geese requires no great labour, it is a thing not vnmeete for the husbandman, for that (yf he haue a place commodious for it) it is doone without any charges, and yeeldeth good aduantage hath with their broode, and feathers, for beside the profite of theyr Egges, you may twyse in the yeere, at the spring, and the fall of the leafe pull them. Moreouer, they are a very good dishe for the table, yea being more watchfull then the Dogges, they geue warning when they sleepe. And therefore they were with the Romanes had in great honor, because they with their gagling bewrayed the enimie, that otherwise in the night time had taken the Towne.⁶⁴

Far from being a bad thing, anserine citizens are ideal: they are profitable, productive members of their micro-societies and help keep them safe with their cackling honks. Even in death, geese serve as meat to nourish those around them. Martius is furious to find geese instead of foxes among the citizenry and soldiers, but perhaps he should be grateful: they will contribute to the *oikos* where he will not.

In the same way Martius uses geese to suggest flappy panic, he uses hares to exemplify cowardice: a hare is, according to Edward Topsell, “a simple creature, hauing no defence but to run away”.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, the hare is more than her speed. Topsell’s entry in his *Foure-Footed Beastes* contradicts itself, as he writes that a hare “is subtile, as may appear by changing of her forme, and by scraping out her footsteps when shee leepeth into her forme, that so she may deceiue her hunters [... thus maintaining] a dissembling peace with her adversaries”.⁶⁶ The subtlety of the hare lies in her capacity to regularly change burrows, as well as covering her tracks as she enters her home (“forme”). Not only do hares engage in trickery, they are so confident in their ability to escape that they are even

⁶⁴ Heresbach, *The Fourre Bookes of Husbandry*, X3r.

⁶⁵ Edward Topsell, *The Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes* (London, 1607), Aa2v.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

able to taunt their hunters.⁶⁷ Having detailed how the hare's anatomy makes her perfectly suited to high-speed escape, Topsell describes the hare watching the hunt continue from a distance:

when she hath left both hunters and Dogs a great way behind her, she
getteth to some little hill or rising of earth, there she raiseth herself vpon her
hinder legges [...] and perceuing that shee is deliuered from pursuit of all
daunger, seemeth to deride the imbecilitie of their forces.⁶⁸

Topsell's anthropomorphic reading of the hare's posture as taunting, cheeky, and intelligent acknowledges a wiliness in the hare, reminding readers that hares are unruly animals who will not consent to easy predation: for the hare, peace comes from "dissembling", tricks and rule-bending, not physical dominance. In Martius' zoological confusion, Shakespeare juxtaposes a symbolic heritage in which prey animals are ignoble and useless with the observed behaviour of those animals. Gaia intrudes upon Martius' politics through the behaviour of these real animals: an assemblage of disobedient creatures is indifferent to the Roman's rhetorical intentions.

In opposition to the hares, Martius wishes the citizens were lions. This makes sense in a military context, and under the traditional civic model which "stood against the creation of a standing army of paid professionals".⁶⁹ Martius' desire for fearsome fighters is understandable, but the idea of a leonine citizenry is absurd. Topsell's collection of epithets for lions does not suggest a creature easily ruled: "ful of stomacke, sharp, bold, greedy, blanket, flesh-eater, [...] the lord and King of beastes, and woodes, fierce, wild, hairy, yellowe, strong, fretting, teeth-gnashing, [...] thundering, raging, [...] rough, lowring, or wry-faced, Impacient, quicke, vntamed, free, and mad [...]"⁷⁰ In principle, the Roman citizens should be ready to defend their territory as fiercely as any pride: they have a clear interest in protecting what should be theirs.⁷¹ But should Martius be surprised that he finds no lions in Rome? The first epithet in Topsell's list – "ful of stomacke" – denotes "pride, haughtiness, obstinacy, stubbornness": the citizens can hardly be expected to be "ful of stomacke" and ready for war when they are literally empty of stomach as they starve.⁷² Far from allowing the patrician class to dismiss the citizens, animal language only serves to reinforce their duty towards those they govern. Martius' careless dismissal of nonhuman life is indicative of a malfunctioning state. Care is "the sole thing that renders community possible", but there is no community for the citizens to fight for because no care is offered to them.⁷³

⁶⁷ See p.45 of this thesis for more dissembling hares. George Gascoigne, *The Noble Arte of Venerie or Hunting* (London, 1575), L2r-L2v.

⁶⁸ Topsell, *Four-Footed Beastes*, Aa3r.

⁶⁹ Ignatieff, "The Myth of Citizenship", 58.

⁷⁰ Topsell, *Four-Footed Beastes*, Rr3r.

⁷¹ For an overview of how Rome transformed its citizens into successful soldiers, see Steele Brand, *Killing for the Republic: Citizen-Soldiers and the Roman Way of War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019), esp. 17-66.

⁷² OED, "stomach n.", def. 8.b.

⁷³ Esposito, *Terms of the Political*, 26.

Classifying the citizens as “curs” is the closest Martius gets to a functional dehumanising pejorative. Andreas Höfele has delineated the play’s attention to dogs as animals for use in hunting, suggesting that through these images Martius is framed as the tragic, majestic, baited bear.⁷⁴ However, this does not accurately reflect the perceived uselessness of curs. “Curs” were canines who were neither good for “seruing the game” nor “apt for sundry necessary vses”, only “méete for many toyes”, that is, frivolous usage.⁷⁵ John Caius, the supreme early modern dog-documenter, is vehement in his opinion that the cur, a “mungrell and rascall” canine, should not be afforded the same respect as a “gentle” or “homely kind” of dog.⁷⁶ These animals defy classification in Caius’ *Of English Dogges* (1576) because they “are mingled out of sundry sortes” and do not “exercise any worthy property of the gentle kind”.⁷⁷ Following this logic, Caius goes on to “banish” curs “out of the bounds of [his] Boke” as they are “vnprofitable implements [...] vnprofitable I say for any vse that is commendable.”⁷⁸

In line with Caius’ initial description, the citizen-curs lack any redeeming characteristics or features, and Martius attempts to claw back authority over the citizens by invoking their non-value. In Chapter 1, I showed that in *The Noble Arte of Venerie* (1575), care was lavished upon useful, propertied dogs who worked for Man. Here, by contrast, Martius draws on the perceived ignobility and unprofitability of the animals in order to withdraw any protection, responsibility, or care owed to the citizens: he attempts to break the “contractual ties” of political community by creating two parties (himself and the citizens) who are either unwilling or incapable of extending the care that makes community possible. However, Caius’ book demonstrates that even curs have their uses.

Having argued for banishing curs, Caius immediately lists uses for them, including serving as watchdogs or turning cooking spits. Indeed, Caius finds “Turnespete” dogs surprisingly praiseworthy: “there is [...] a certaine dogge in kytchen seruice excellent”, he writes, and these dogs “so diligently looke to their businesse, that no drudge nor skullion can doe the feate more cunningly”.⁷⁹ This may well be more of a comment on the capacity of menial servants than the canines, but the point is that even the dogs who are allegedly the most “vnprofitable” still work within the *oikos*, helping to nourish and protect those within.

Martius is not alone in his unwillingness to care for the needy citizens and his desire to break political bonds. If Martius sucked his “valiantness” from his mother (3.2.130), then he also imbibed Volumnia’s disdain for the citizens, and her dehumanising rhetoric. I am thinking specifically of her reported characterisation of the citizens as “woollen vassals, things created” (3.2.10), which Martius reminds her of as he rails privately against the citizens. The OED offers this line as an example of

⁷⁴ Höfele, *Stage, Stake and Scaffold*, 92-114.

⁷⁵ John Caius, *Of English Dogges*, trans. Abraham Fleming (London, 1576), Blv.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.,.

⁷⁸ Ibid., Flv.

⁷⁹ Ibid., Flv-F2r.

“woollen” being used to describe someone “wearing woollen clothing”, denoting “poor or lowly status”.⁸⁰ The citizens are homogenized as a mass of poor-quality material, but given the animal imagery that precedes this moment in the play there is also an ovine quality to this description, as if the citizens are made of wool.⁸¹ This sense of animality is heightened by the following “things created”, evoking the fifth day of creation, on which the Lord brought forth “every creeping *thing* that hath life”, and “*everything* living and moving” (emphasis my own).⁸²

The citizens are further subordinated in this sheepy image: they are “[...] things created / To buy and sell with groats” (3.2.10-11). Holland’s note on this line indicates that it is the citizens who are trading with groats, but the structure also suggests that it could be the citizens being bought and sold.⁸³ That Volumnia so easily finds the commodifying potential of sheepiness betrays a character who sees in sheep only the value of their flesh or wool and has no notion of their day-to-day needs. In reality, these woollen “things” – like the geese before – contribute much to their *oikos*. Leonard Mascall’s treatise on livestock management informs the reader that

there is no man that loueth sheepe but will haue a chiefe care of them, to vse
and order them as they ought to be, considering all the commodities y^e
comes by them, and to kéepe their houses cleane & warme in winter, with
their foldes also wel set and ordered in somer.⁸⁴

This “chiefe care” involves careful, intimate interaction with the sheep: attending to them in the morning in their fold, waiting so that they can “donge and pysse” before going out to pasture; checking them for mange and scabs “thre or foure tymes on the oone syde, and as ofte on the other syde”; concocting and applying any number of salves or ointments for solving their illnesses;⁸⁵ making sure they are eating well, and providing them with wooden troughs of salt “as a sauce to their foode”.⁸⁶ Sheep demand an enormous amount of attention from those who govern their existence. In the context of the husbandry manual, it becomes clear that sheep require patience, tenderness, and specialist knowledge if they are to fulfil their potential as members of the *oikos*. They cannot simply be abandoned and expected to function.

The animals lurking in the language of *Coriolanus* remind us of our place “on Earth [...] on land shared with other often bizarre beings whose requirements are multiform”.⁸⁷ They demonstrate that successful political community requires a “sensitive and responsive” approach by an Earthbound

⁸⁰ OED, “woollen, adj. and n.”, def. A.2.

⁸¹ OED, “woollen, adj. and n.”, def. A.1.a.

⁸² Genesis 1:20-21.

⁸³ Shakespeare, *Coriolanus*, 296, n.11.

⁸⁴ Mascall, *The First Booke of Cattell*, Aa2v.

⁸⁵ Fitzherbert, *The Boke of Husbandry*, C7v; E5r-E8r.

⁸⁶ Heresbach, *Foure Bookes of Husbandry*, S4r.

⁸⁷ Latour, *Facing Gaia*, “On the Instability of the (Notion of) Nature”, NP.

populace, but this is not forthcoming. Rather, animality is articulated by Human patricians who feel “capable of freeing themselves from the harsh ‘necessities of Nature’” and therefore have no need to care about or attend to the living world.⁸⁸ This carelessness initiates a failure of political community in Rome, re-emphasising Martius’ acute discomfort with the Earthbound and with his own earthliness. Esposito argues that caring community rests on an unstable foundation because “the figure of the Other ultimately coincides with that of community [...] in the sense that the other constitutes us from deep within. It’s not that we communicate with the other but that we *are* the other”.⁸⁹ In the case of *Coriolanus*, the animals who scurry through the play’s language become Earthbound representatives of Gaia’s intrusion, demonstrating that Rome as a political community is constituted by its own nonhumanness.

Martius and the patricians’ animal imagery is deployed from a position of privileged distance from the animal world. The patricians rely on superficial animal knowledge to communicate, betraying a lack of attentiveness to how the citizens experience life as Earthbound. Martius consistently labels the citizens with what he takes to be pejoratives, appropriate to their homeliness and grounded earthly reality. However, by paying attention to this reality – by welcoming Gaia’s intrusion into the play – it becomes clear that though dehumanised, the citizens are demonstrably contributing to Rome, though Martius does not care to pay attention to them. This anthropocentric politics is “a *symptom* rather than a *cause* of an epistemology which privileges a particular form of human experience over any other”: the abstract politics of the *polis* over the mundane *oikos*.⁹⁰ In their zoo-political existence, the Earthbound of Rome open the gates to Gaia, provoking a confrontation between their needs and capacities to operate as members of the *oikos*, and the patricians’ desire to keep the *polis* Human, liberated from and “indifferent to the consequences of their actions”.⁹¹

Coriolanus’ earliest audiences would have understood the stakes of this confrontation. Years of poor harvests, bad weather, and plague, all of which conspired to drive up grain prices in early modern England, ensured an audience who would, as Liam E. Semler has put it, identify “viscerally” with the citizens on stage, fighting for their bare, animal lives.⁹² In addition, Shakespeare’s audiences were also possessed of an agricultural literacy which today’s audiences lack: references to herbs, weeds, soil, and agricultural processes had tangible referents for those watching the play.⁹³ This agricultural literacy contributed to an understanding of the vulnerability of the state with regard to

⁸⁸ Ibid., “The States (of Nature) between War and Peace”, NP.

⁸⁹ Esposito, *Terms of the Political*, 26.

⁹⁰ David W. Kidner, “Why ‘Anthropocentrism’ is not Anthropocentric”, *Dialectical Anthropology* 38, no. 4 (2014): 477. Emphasis in text.

⁹¹ Latour, *Facing Gaia*, “The States (of Nature) between War and Peace”, NP.

⁹² Liam E. Semler, “Introduction”, in *Coriolanus: A Critical Reader* (London: Bloomsbury, 2021), 7.

⁹³ See the important work of Jayne Elisabeth Archer, Richard Marggraf Turley and Howard Thomas in their analysis of *King Lear*, with particular reference to his botanical crown of 4.4. “The Autumn King: Remembering the Land in *King Lear*”, *Shakespeare Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (2012): 518–43.

food security and an awareness of the importance of good land management to socio-political stability.⁹⁴ Though Martius does not pay attention to these ideas, his first audiences certainly did. It is with this in mind that I turn to the play's husbandry, which demonstrates further the inevitability of Gaia's intrusion and the importance of nourishing the Earthbound in the "life and death relations" of political community.⁹⁵

"[HE] SHOWS GOOD HUSBANDRY"

From the earliest moments in *Coriolanus* we are confronted by Martius' intransigence and poor politics. He does not wish to feed the citizens, only to use them for battle-field fertiliser; he will not engage in the customary political rites for his election to the consulship; and when he finds people opposing his newfound power he simply walks out – of the senate, the city, his homeland. Arriving at the home of Tullus Aufidius (Volscian leader and Martius' sworn enemy), Martius offers him two choices: he will fight for Aufidius against Rome, allowing them both to wreak bloody vengeance on the city, or Aufidius can kill him in that instant (4.5.86-103). As Martius offers his throat to Aufidius, the stakes of the Volscians' decision could not be higher. Yet, in an outpouring of intense admiration, or even sexual longing, Aufidius welcomes Martius into the heart of the Volscian command.⁹⁶

Between 4.5 and the next time Aufidius appears on stage in 4.7, Martius has managed to draw the Volscian forces under his spell. In conversation with his second-in-command, Aufidius asks if his troops are still flocking to Martius. The lieutenant replies:

I do not know what witchcraft's in him, but
Your soldiers use him as the grace fore meat,
Their talk at table and their thanks at end
And you are darkened in this action, sir,
Even by your own.
(4.7.2-6)

Seemingly through sheer force of character, Martius has bent the Volscians to a cultish worship. For the lieutenant, this overshadowing of Aufidius in his own homeland is awkward and dangerous. Aufidius, however, attempts to reassure the lieutenant that everything is under control:

I understand thee well and be thou sure,
When he shall come to his account, he knows not
What I can urge against him. Although it seems –

⁹⁴ Archer, Marggraf Turley and Thomas, "The Autumn King", 529-32.

⁹⁵ Feder, "Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture", 227.

⁹⁶ The homoeroticism of *Coriolanus* is well-studied. For a brief introduction, see Huw Griffiths, "When Coriolanus was Hot: Reading for Homoeroticism Across Time", *Shakespeare / Sex: Contemporary Readings in Gender and Sexuality*, ed. Jennifer Drouin (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), 195-211.

And so he thinks, and is no less apparent
 To th'vulgar eye – that he bears all things fairly
 And shows good husbandry for the Volscian state,
 Fights dragon-like and does achieve as soon
 As draw his sword, yet he hath left undone
 That which shall break his neck or hazard mine
 Whene'er we come to our account.
 (4.7.16-26)

Aufidius is aware that appearances can be deceptive, but notes that Martius has not yet done anything hurtful to the Volscian state and so their plan for joint vengeance will continue, until they come to settle their “account”. Against the lieutenant’s diction of witchcraft, Aufidius’ language is coolly pragmatic. To account is to answer for one’s conduct, but it is also the preparation of financial records and business transactions.⁹⁷ In his military “account[ing]”, Aufidius tots up the value of Martius, balancing his strategic books and anticipating Martius’ fatal reckoning which he will “urge against him”.⁹⁸ In twenty-first century terms, Aufidius understands that his approach is not a sustainable business model. This managerial attitude is further reflected in his description of Martius’ work: he “shows good husbandry” for his new home.

Aufidius’ account-keeping is just one facet of husbandry, which encompassed a wide range of practices from domestic administration and management to agriculture, financial governance, and the handling of resources.⁹⁹ Gervase Markham articulates this most clearly in his comprehensive agricultural manual, *The English Husbandman* (1613), printed shortly after *Coriolanus* was first staged. In his proem to the text, Markham outlines the “vtilitie and necessitie” of husbandry to the state:

a Husbandman is the Maister of the earth, turning sterilitie and
 barrainenesse, into fruitfulnessse and increase, whereby all common wealths
 are maintained and vpheld, it is his labour which giueth bread to all men
 and maketh vs forsake the societie of beasts drinking vpon water springs,
 féeding vs with a much more nourishing liquor. The labour of the
 Husbandman giueth liberty to all vocations, Arts, misteries and trades, to
 follow their seuerall functions, with peace and industry, for the filling and
 emptying of his barnes is the increase and prosperitie of all their labours. To
 conclude, what can we say in this world is profitable where Husbandry is

⁹⁷ OED, “account, v.”.

⁹⁸ “Reckoning” in its sense of settling scores and its numerical, financial sense.

⁹⁹ OED, “husbandry, n.”.

wanting, it being the great Nerue and Sinew which houldeth together all
the ioynts of a Monarchie?¹⁰⁰

Taking Markham's detailed portrait into account, Aufidius' commendation of Martius' husbandry, given his rhetoric and actions, is surprising. Martius expressed nothing but disdain for the Roman citizens and their starvation, to say he has a proclivity for violence is an understatement, and he rejects any hint of domesticity. Martius' incompetent political husbandry is in marked contrast to the qualities Markham outlines. Excavating images of husbandry from the text demonstrates the earthiness at the heart of the play's civics, and the importance of acknowledging complex entanglements between Gaia, the Earthbound, *oikos* and *polis*.

Markham writes that the husbandman's first responsibility is making the land productive, providing "fruitfulnesse and increase", and "giu[ing] bread to all men". In 1.1, the citizens of Rome allege that the patricians, and Martius in particular, are hoarding grain: they "suffer [the citizens] to famish, and their store-houses [are] crammed with grain" (1.1.75-76).¹⁰¹ Starving, the citizens in the opening scenes are "resolved to die than famish" (1.1.3-4) and agree to march on the Capitol. Enter Menenius Agrippa and his famous belly-politic parable. There is a solid body of work (no pun intended) on this insensitive piece of rhetoric and I do not intend to linger on it here, other than to note that it outlines a reasonable system of resource management, whereby the belly is responsible for distributing food to the rest of the body.¹⁰² The citizens are dissatisfied by Menenius' response – the "cormorant belly" cannot be trusted (1.1.116) – but are distracted for just long enough for Martius to enter and dismiss their concerns with a heaping up of pejoratives and a "hang 'em!" (1.1.185).

Set against 2 Citizen's accusations of grain hoarding and Menenius' model of orderly distribution, Martius' mocking response is painful to behold.¹⁰³ This would have been especially true for seventeenth-century audiences, in whose memory the violence of the Midlands Rising of 1607 and the grain shortages of the previous century would have loomed large.¹⁰⁴ Gaia's intrusion on early modern England is transported to ancient Rome, the plight of the audience reflected back to them through the lens of a republic which teeters on the edge of violent unrest. Though Menenius' body-

¹⁰⁰ Gervase Markham, *The English Husbandman* (London, 1613), A2r; A3r. Wendy Wall has explored the relationship between Markham's agricultural writing and burgeoning early modern English nationalism in "Renaissance National Husbandry: Gervase Markham and the Publication of England", *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 27, no.3 (1996): 767-85.

¹⁰¹ The citizens label Martius "chief enemy of the people" and declare "Let us kill him, and we'll have corn at our own price". (1.1.6; 9-10).

¹⁰² See 1.1.91-141. On the political abdomen see Sean Benson, "'Even to the Gates of Rome': Grotesque Bodies and Fragmented Stories in *Coriolanus*", *Comitatus* 30, no.1 (1999): 95-113; A. Crunelle, "*Coriolanus*: The Smiling Belly and the Parliament Fart", *ANQ* 22, no.3 (2009): 11-16; Delphine Lemonnier-Textier, "The Analogy of the Body Politic in Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*: From the Organic Metaphor of Society to the Monstrous Body of the Multitude", *Moreana* 43, no. 168 (2006): 107-31; Michael Schoenfeldt, "Fables of the Belly in Early Modern England", in *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe*, ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997), 243-61.

¹⁰³ Shakespeare's own problematic response to dearth, grain hoarding, is well-documented. A detailed, ecocritical examination of this is offered by Jayne Elisabeth Archer, Howard Thomas, and Richard Marggraf Turley in "Reading Shakespeare with the Grain: Sustainability and the Hunger Business", *Green Letters: Studies in Ecocriticism* 19, no.1 (2015): 8-20.

¹⁰⁴ Steven Hindle, "Imagining Insurrection in Seventeenth-Century England: Representations of the Midland Rising of 1607", *History Workshop Journal* 66 (2008): 21-61.

politic metaphor centres the belly as a distributor for an orderly society, it is Markham's metaphor that proves more apt: husbandry – the producing of food in the first place – is “the great Nerue and Sinew which houldeth together all the ioynts of a Monarchie”. The civil order of Rome is falling apart in the absence of good husbandry. Nothing in Rome will be “profitable” until the patricians recognise this; bread for all is the only way to satisfy the people. The urgency of “contractual ties” which, as Delanty suggests, hold a community together, is evident here: community is made “immediate and experiential” through the hungry stomachs of the Roman citizenry, but foreclosed by Martius and the patricians.¹⁰⁵

Martius does not recognise the importance of husbandry to stabilising Rome, but seventeenth-century audiences had seen this political “Nerue and Sinew” in action. Early modern England had a number of mechanisms in place to help cope with grain shortages and “relief against harvest failure was but one of the reciprocities expected of richer members of the community”.¹⁰⁶ Just as the citizens of Rome request, authorities were encouraged to monitor grain prices and set affordable rates at times of dearth. The Roman citizens attempt to activate this mechanism through their rioting (1.1.84). Beyond this, landowners bought grain to sell directly to their tenants at a loss, or took it to market to sell at low prices; employers would pay workers with food and drink; and sometimes grain would be held to give away to those most in need.¹⁰⁷ When these needs were not met, rather than protesting market prices, rioters attacked and seized supplies of grain, risking brutal physical punishment.¹⁰⁸ Their action in rioting or petitioning when aid was not forthcoming indicates a relationship of expectation and obligation between rich and poor, though the effectiveness of these measures is questionable.¹⁰⁹

This sense of obligation is also found in relationships on a more local level. As one popular sixteenth-century writer reminded his readers:

Ill husbandrye eatith
him selfe out a doore,
Good husbandrye meatith

¹⁰⁵ Delanty, *Community*, 1; 3.

¹⁰⁶ John Walter, “The Social Economy of Dearth in Early Modern England”, in *Famine, Disease and the Social Order in Early Modern Society*, ed. John Walter and Roger Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 106.

¹⁰⁷ Walter, “The Social Economy of Dearth”, 96–116. Steven Hindle has written further about early modern English systems for coping with famine: “Dearth, Fasting and Alms: The Campaign for General Hospitality in Late Elizabethan England”, *Past & Present* 172 (2001): 44–86 and *The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, 1550–1640* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), esp. 149–53.

¹⁰⁸ John Bohstedt, *The Politics of Provisions: Food Riots, Moral Economy, and Market Transition in England, c.1550–1850* (London: Routledge, 2010). Specifically, “The Genesis of Provision Politics, 1580–1650”, 28–85.

¹⁰⁹ Walter characterises the problems caused by this deeply-embedded reciprocal structure as a “crisis of dependence”. “The Social Economy of Dearth”, 128.

him selfe & the poore.¹¹⁰

Thomas Tusser's trite encapsulation of what makes a good husbandman is at odds with Martius' attitude to government. Where a good husbandman would provide for himself and those less fortunate, Martius rejects the idea of provisioning and then some. Responding to the citizens' requests for reasonably priced corn, he wishes that the patricians would let him "make a quarry / With thousands of these quartered slaves as high / As I could pitch my lance" (1.1.193-195). Again, Martius dehumanises the citizens, wishing he could pile up their corpses as if they were deer killed in a hunt: he reads nonhumans and humans as similarly killable lives, unworthy of his attention and care. Indeed, when the citizens are cared for, and the patricians act to relieve the hungry, Martius is incensed:

Whoever gave that counsel to give forth
The corn o'th' storehouse gratis, [...]
I say they nourished disobedience, fed
The ruin of the state.
(3.1.114-119)

This begins a short sequence of speeches by Martius to the senators, in which he explains that capitulating to the citizens has granted them an unreasonable amount of power and undermines the patricians' capacity to control them and coerce them to the battlefield. Martius uses the language of husbandry to produce a perverse account of what has happened. While the patricians have finally attempted "good husbandry" for Rome, "meat[ing]" themselves and the poor, Martius cannot square this with his own repulsion from bare life. As Adelman has argued, for Martius "nobility consists precisely in *not* eating", and Martius, having been "deprived of food [...] find[s] it outrageous that others should not be".¹¹¹ He therefore aligns astute husbandry and the nourishment of people with ruinous politics.

In contrast, Markham argues that husbandry and peaceful community are symbiotic: "the labour of the Husbandman giueth liberty to all vocations, Arts, misteries and trades, to follow their seuerall functions, with peace and industry, *for the filling and emptying of his barnes is the increase and prosperitie of all their labours*".¹¹² The corn of the filled-and-emptied storehouse sustains a peaceful and industrious state, allowing those who work in "all vocations" to flourish in "prosperitie". As Kaouk has noted, Martius feels particular distress at the idea of nourishing those who work in "misteries and trades": for this *polis*-minded patrician "labor still bears its classical connotations, marking the

¹¹⁰ Tusser, *Five Hundreth Points of Good Husbandry* (London, 1573), P3v. Tusser's text was a bestseller, going through 23 editions between 1557 and 1638, see Andrew McRae, "Tusser, Thomas (c.1524-1580), writer on agriculture and poet", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

¹¹¹ Adelman, "Anger's My Meat", 132; 136.

¹¹² Markham, *The English Husbandman*, A3r. Emphasis my own.

bodies of those who engage in it as apolitical animals”.¹¹³ Pressed by “the concerns of biological life (*zoē*)”, since they are rioting in response to their hunger, yet “sharply distinguished from political life (*bios*) and public, virtuous action” by their status as labourers in the *oikos*, craftsman and husbandman alike force Martius to recognise their contribution to the civic life of Rome.¹¹⁴ Murakami productively summarises how Martius’ confrontation of the citizens’ hunger “moves the individual-stripped-to-creatureliness to the heart of high politics, and elevates bare life [...] to the primary concern of the state”.¹¹⁵ It is this bare life, the “the simple fact of living common to all beings”, that Markham’s husbandman devotedly nourishes, and it is this bare life that Martius finds inappropriate and repulsive in Rome’s politics, not only because it undermines and offends his own sense of self but also because it reminds him of the presence of the Earthbound and Gaia. Martius’ dismissiveness towards appropriate responses to famine betrays his political ineptitude and carelessness.¹¹⁶ By these lights, Aufidius’ later assessment is not just surprising but baffling.

Though Martius sees war with the Volsces as an exciting chance to face Aufidius in combat again, he also sees it as a chance to make the Roman citizens work for their famine relief: “The Volsces have much corn. Take these rats thither / To gnaw their garners” (1.1.244-245). For Martius, the warrior who “links food with courage and work”, this pillaging of enemy territory is the only proper way to earn food.¹¹⁷ However, the fact that the citizens have to earn food in the first place shows them to be lacking in the self-sufficiency that Martius so values: there is a dignity in “not eating”.¹¹⁸ Figuring the citizens as rats, Martius balances his need to dehumanise them with an acknowledgement that even these citizen-scavengers, undiscerning in their raiding, might be usefully deployed. Rather than granting “liberty to all vocations” through good husbandry, Martius plays upon the necessity of effective resource management to coerce the citizens of Rome to fight. In order to feed themselves, they must empty the barns of the Volsces, as their own stand crammed but out of bounds. It stands to reason that, when the opportunity for vengeance arises later in the play, Aufidius views an incursion into Roman territory similarly: an opportunity to gain resources in an acquisitive mode of husbanding his state. To Aufidius, Martius’s need for revenge is a useful catalyst.

In the closing stages of the play, Martius articulates the end goal of the Volscian invasion: his army will “plough Rome and harrow Italy” (5.3.34). Though Martius is invoking the plough and harrow as metaphors of violent destruction, there is a definite sense in which this is Aufidius’ intention: to “reduce [Rome] to a colony or *territorium*”.¹¹⁹ Stuart Elden has noted how the plough was

¹¹³ Kaouk, “Homo Faber, Action Hero Manqué”, 415.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 414-15.

¹¹⁵ Murakami, “The ‘Bond and Privilege of Nature’”, 127.

¹¹⁶ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, I.

¹¹⁷ Drouet, “‘I Speak This in Hunger for Bread’”, 13.

¹¹⁸ Adelman, “‘Anger’s My Meat’”, 132.

¹¹⁹ Stuart Elden, “Bellies, Wounds, Infections, Animals, Territories: The Political Bodies of Shakespeare’s *Coriolanus*”, in *International Politics and Performance: Critical Aesthetics and Creative Practice*, ed. Jenny Edkins and Adrian Kear (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 197.

a crucial tool in the marking of new imperial territory. He argues that “an important moment in the founding of a new colony was the ploughing of the sacred boundary of the city walls”, adding that Isidore of Seville even relates the etymology of *territory* to the oxen (*taurus*) who would pull the plough itself.¹²⁰ Thus the ploughing and harrowing of Rome would have the material benefit of new territory for the Volsces, and the image in this rhetorical flourish is more complex than Martius would have his audience believe.¹²¹

The territorial gains implicit in Martius’ rhetoric reflect a recognition and knowledge of the importance of ploughing and harrowing to agricultural success. Conrad Heresbach’s *Four Bookes of Husbandry* is explicit in its affirmation of ploughing: “in plowyng and orderly preparing grounde for seede, consistes the cheefest point of husbandry”.¹²² John Fitzherbert’s *Boke of Husbandry* agrees that the plough is critical to a successful harvest: advice on ploughing is found at the very start of the text and the subject occupies a vast amount of space. The text stresses that the plough is “the moste necessaryest instrumente that an husbände can occupy”.¹²³ Heresbach elaborates that ploughing requires a great deal of skill: a good husbandman has to understand the soil, the contours of the field and the weather and seasons.¹²⁴ In order to sustain the *oikos*, which powers the *polis*, it is critical to “pay attention” to Gaia in a holistic manner: it is not only the earth that matters but everything happening in the biosphere.

The act of ploughing the soil is destructive: it is a breaking of the earth designed to bring forth something new. It also eliminates pest plants where necessary to ensure the desired crops grow successfully. Yet this is not an uncaring or mindless act of annihilation. Heresbach urges the ploughman to measure the success of his work:

the good husbandman must trie whether [the field] be wel plowed or no,
and not onely trust your eyes, which (the Balkes being couered with mould)
may easely be deceyed, but trie it with your hand (which is a certainer
prooffe) by thrusting downe a rode into the Furrowe, which yf it pearce a
like in euery place, it sheweth that the ground is wel plowed.¹²⁵

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ The working of uncultivated ground in order to claim ownership of it is a key facet of early modern colonial thinking, especially in the context of Ireland: “An uncultivated land is an uncivilized land, and an uncivilized land is a practically unoccupied land as it is not occupied for any purpose or progress. It thus became very useful for proponents of Irish colonization to emphasize the frowardness of Irish agriculture”. Benjamin P. Myers, “The Green and Golden World: Spenser’s Rewriting of the Munster Plantation”, *ELH* 76, no.2 (2009): 476.

¹²² Heresbach, *The Four Bookes of Husbandry*, C4v-C5r.

¹²³ Fitzherbert, *The Boke of Husbandry*, B1r. The 1598 edition of this text offers a much more violent image in the same section: “the Plough is the first good instrument, by which the Husbandman rips from the Earths wombe a well-pleasing liuing”. Perhaps this sadistic agriculture would be more Martius’ speed. *Fitzherberts Booke of Husbandrie* (London, 1598), B2r.

¹²⁴ Heresbach, *The Four Bookes of Husbandry*, C4v-C8r. See also Markham, *The English Husbandman*, B1v-C3r. Markham provides forensic information about ploughing, as well as specific instructions depending on what type of earth the husbandman is working.

¹²⁵ Heresbach, *The Four Bookes of Husbandry*, C5v-C6r. “Baulkes” here are the ridges produced by ploughing.

Heresbach's instructions show that ploughing, beyond the physical demands of the task, was an action that required painstaking attention. Harrowing follows after ploughing and sowing, "to breake the Clodes withal, and to couer the seedes".¹²⁶ It was not enough to plough the ground, slicing it to pieces, it was vital to ensure a thorough job had been done to ensure a fruitful harvest, testing by hand. A husbandman truly must be "the maister of the earth", knowing his territory down to the dirt of its foundations, the soil through which "all common wealths are maintained and upheld". The husbandman is truly an Earthbound, "sensitive and responsive" to a "territory" made up of "networks that intermingle, oppose one another [and] become mutually entangled": soils, weather, fertilisers, shapes and contours of the land, climate, and more.¹²⁷ Though Markham's language has echoes of anthropocentric, Christian dominion – viewing Man as "maister of the earth" – the relationship between Man and his farmland is humbling. It is the job of the husbandman to turn land perceived to be barren into land which provides but, in order to do that, careful, painstaking attention must be paid to the earth which is to be managed.

Emily Griffiths Jones has examined the influence of Xenophon's agri-political treatise, the *Oeconomicus*, on *Coriolanus*, arguing that Martius "does seem to identify himself, perhaps entirely fancifully, with an idealized agrarian-warrior class".¹²⁸ Though I agree that Martius evidently has knowledge of husbandry practices and deploys this in various moments through the play, to say he identifies with agrarian statesmen – such as the historical figure of Cincinnatus – goes too far. Given the carelessness with which Martius ineffectually labels the citizens as animals, as outlined above, and given how he sees the citizens' starvation as a troublesome inconvenience to ignore rather than an indication of a malfunctioning political body in need of urgent care (following Markham's metaphor), it is evident that Martius sees agrarian knowledge as something abstract: for rhetoric, not action. Indeed, the closest Martius gets to this ideal is when Volumnia describes him moving through the battlefields like a mower: "Forth he goes / Like to a harvestman that's tasked to mow / Or all or lose his hire." (1.3.37-39). Unlike the husbandman, however, the mower hews the crops down rather than nourishing them.

In the *Oeconomicus*, the labour of husbandry is a noble and edifying pursuit, producing a body of citizen-soldiers.¹²⁹ In stark contrast to Martius, Cincinnatus embodies the agrarian-citizen-soldier, and his deeds were well-known in early modern England. Born roughly a century after the historical Caius Martius Coriolanus, Cincinnatus has proved a mythic figure in the conceptualisation of citizenship through history.¹³⁰ The story goes that Rome was on the point of being overwhelmed by

¹²⁶ Ibid., C7v.

¹²⁷ Latour, *Facing Gaia*, "The States (of Nature) between War and Peace", NP.

¹²⁸ Griffiths Jones, "Beloved of All the Trades in Rome", 162.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 159-60.

¹³⁰ The myth features strongly in the political history of the United States. Michael J. Hillyard, *Cincinnatus and the Citizen-Servant Ideal: The Roman Legend's Life, Times, and Legacy*, (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris Corporation, 2010), 111-62. Though at times an idealised account of Rome and its influences, it provides a useful overview.

her enemies when the senators hurriedly sought out Cincinnatus to save the city as dictator. They found him labouring in his farmstead: “whether bending over his spade as he dug a ditch, or ploughing, he was, at all events, as everybody agrees, intent upon some rustic task”.¹³¹ He was sped away to war, where his bravery and cleverness in tactics brought victory to the Romans. After only fifteen days, Cincinnatus relinquished the dictatorship and returned to his farm.¹³² This agrarian citizen-soldier exemplifies remarkable qualities for a state leader: he was an expert military tactician, displayed a lack of appetite for power, and was skilled in the art of husbandry. This “triumphant husbandman” appears not only in classical sources but in various early modern rewrites, where Cincinnatus serves as an exemplary good citizen and soldier.¹³³ In one particularly telling instance he even appears in a husbandry manual, with his homestead serving as an example of a reasonably-sized farming estate.¹³⁴ The history of Cincinnatus appears as an antithesis to everything Martius stands for. Understanding the nature of the *oikos*, Cincinnatus returns to his homestead secure in the knowledge that whether fighting or farming, he is working for his Roman community: his attention to the earth is in symbiosis with his care for his people.

In this reading, Aufidius serves as a model for competent political husbandry. Though Martius abuses his inferiors, we do not see Aufidius do likewise.¹³⁵ Aufidius makes strategic use of Martius in the Volscian-Roman conflict, mindfully watching Martius destroy himself in pursuit of a Volscian “design” (4.7.8). This manipulation of Martius’ ineptitude allows both for vengeance for the Roman victory at Corioles and territorial gains for the Volscies. Though he portrays himself as a victim of Martius’ sudden surge to fame in Antium, he is able to wield the strength, reputation, and familial bonds of his enemy productively. As the two men come to their account, Aufidius calculates the profit from his astute management: the death of his most powerful enemy, an impoverished rival state and, critically, new territory for provisioning his people. In Tullus Aufidius the audience is offered a leader who truly understands the roots of his state.¹³⁶ Despite Aufidius having lost every physical fight that he and Martius have engaged in, he runs a state in which the citizens are well-fed,

¹³¹ Livy, *History of Rome, Volume II: Books 3-4*, trans. B. O. Foster, Loeb Classical Library 133 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1922), 91.

¹³² Livy, *History of Rome, Volume II*, 91-101; Pliny, *Natural History, Volume V: Books 17-19*, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 371 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 201-203; Augustine, *City of God, Volume II: Books 4-7* trans. William M. Green. Loeb Classical Library 412 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 235.

¹³³ William Fulbecke, *An Historicall Collection of the Continuall Factions, Tumults, and Massacres of the Romans and Italians* (London, 1601), C1r. Cincinnatus makes multiple appearances in Innocent Gentillet, *A Discourse Vpon the Means of VVell Governing*, trans. Simon Patericke (London, 1602). See also Robert Greene, *A Quip for an Upstart Courtier* (London, 1592), B4v; Richard Niccols, *Londons Artillery* (London, 1616), D2r.

¹³⁴ M. Prudent Le Choysselat, *A Discourse of Housebandrie*, trans. R.E. (London, 1580), A4r.

¹³⁵ Holland highlights a cinematic adaptation which shows Aufidius to be “a back-slapping, easy-going companion” amongst ordinary Volscies. “Introduction”, 137-38. Holland is discussing *Coriolanus*, directed by Ralph Fiennes (Icon Entertainment International and BBC Films, 2011).

¹³⁶ Cf. Richard Raspa, who argues for the Volscian state as autocratic, and sees in Aufidius a “singular ambition to extend his autocratic power” as his motivation for invading Roman territory. However, as an audience we do not see the state’s political processes, and the Volscies mirror Rome with their senators and citizens. “Place in Shakespeare’s *Coriolanus*: The Intersection of Geography, Culture, and Identity”, *Mediterranean Studies* 26, no.2 (2018): 217.

possessed of “much corn”, and in which he is fully in command of the governing classes. As Markham could have predicted, the skilled husbandman always wins.¹³⁷

The figure of the husbandman provides a useful comparison for Martius and his actions. The good husbandman is familiar with his territory: this is literally the earth and its capacity for production, but the good husbandman is also familiar with the needs of the people in that territory and understands how managing their interdependence is critical to political stability. Following Markham’s metaphor, a good husbandman is foundational to a healthy body politic, and his maintenance of the political community enables it to function. The husbandman’s care for the earth and his cohabitants strengthens this political community. Cincinnatus offers a familiar, classical model of this praxis. Martius has no understanding of this in Rome but transplanted into strange new ground with the Volscies he has something of this realisation, and begins to serve his new state productively. However, having staked so much of his politics on being a careless anti-husbandman, Martius cannot survive these efforts coming to fruition. I turn now to the close of the play, examining Martius’ resignation to the Earthbound political community.

“NO OTHER KIN”?

The Roman citizens demand attention. Despite Martius’ attempts to dehumanise the citizens, and thereby justify his inattentiveness towards them, his metaphors serve only to underscore just how much care nonhumans command. The citizens also need feeding to sustain the city. Murakami has read the drive for attention in *Coriolanus* as a manifestation of “natural law”: whether wolf, lamb, or human, “all are driven by the need to preserve their lives; all desire to reproduce themselves; and all must attempt some balance between their needs as individuals and the needs of their pack, or herd”.¹³⁸ Living in political community “demands the literal or figurative relinquishing of one’s surplus” to that community.¹³⁹ In Murakami’s argument, Martius’ surplus is his exceptionality, which is surrendered through his “personal sacrifice”.¹⁴⁰ Pascual Garrido also sees self-sacrifice in Martius’ actions, arguing that “it is a sense of ethical responsibility that makes Coriolanus abandon an ethics of war for an ethics of non-violence [...] even if that entails self-annihilation”.¹⁴¹ Through differing methodologies, both scholars argue that Martius has developed some understanding of political community by the time the Volscians slaughter him; or rather, it is *because* he has developed this understanding that he is killed. I believe these readings are too charitable, and I conclude this chapter

¹³⁷ The number of encounters Aufidius gives at 1.10.7-8 (“five”) and 4.5.123-124 (“twelve several”) do not match, but he is certain he has never bested the Roman.

¹³⁸ Murakami, “Bond and Privilege of Nature”, 125.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 131.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ Pascual Garrido, “Re-humanising *Coriolanus*”, 103.

by thinking about where we are left at the end of the play. Martius' death reveals the stakes of managing the Earthbound and attending to Gaia in political community.

Martius' death is precipitated by his capitulation to the demands of Rome, as issued by Volumnia, head of the embassy of Roman women. Their arrival unsettles Martius, and this has to do with the women's kinship with him: as a family unit they represent another aspect of the *oikos* from which he has consistently tried to extricate himself. As they enter, he finds himself losing any sense of stability as he meets his wife's gaze. Dissolving into tears, he utters "I melt, and am not / Of stronger earth than others" (5.3.28-29). Martius finally begins to understand his status as an Earthbound and presence in a Gaian cosmos. He is forced to reckon with his physical constitution: a death knell sounds in his language of bodily earth, as hints of the Anglican burial prayer echo in his speech. As he becomes aware of his "vile body", Martius begins to disintegrate just as Christian burial demands: "earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust".¹⁴² Martius also recognises an equivalence between his own body and those around him: though he might have proven himself to be physically stronger, the constitution of his physical being is no different from others. His newfound humility makes Volumnia's bowing to him even more distressing: it is as if she bows not just to Martius but to all the Earthbound, becoming less Human in the process and abasing herself.

Martius steels himself momentarily, however, as his mother bows, and he resolves to never

[...] be such a gosling as to obey instinct, but stand
As if a man were author of himself
And knew no other kin.
(5.3.34-37)

Martius' faulty rhetoric strikes again. By inviting baby birds into his speech at this critical moment, he infantilises and dehumanises himself, making himself vulnerable in saying precisely what he is not going to be: in order to imagine not-gosling Martius, you have to first imagine Martius-as-gosling. This sense of infantilization is heightened by the presence of his mother, the "kin" Martius tries not to know. However, this kin is more than familial.

Donna Haraway offers a useful articulation of kinship for exploring Martius' stance. Her sense of kin is that "kin making is making persons, not necessarily as individuals or humans," and that "all earthlings are kin in the deepest sense, and it is past time to practice better care of kinds-as-assemblages".¹⁴³ When Martius claims that he would know "no other kin" I suggest that it is in this Harawayan sense: to recognise the women as his kin means to recognise the rest of Rome and himself

¹⁴² "The Order for the Buriall of the Dead" in *The Book of Common Prayer; The Texts of 1549, 1559, and 1662*, ed. Brian Cummings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 82-83.

¹⁴³ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 103. Haraway also discusses being moved by Shakespeare's playfulness with the words "kin" and "kind" here.

as part of an Earthbound *oikos*, tangled in responsibilities with and for other beings. This is too monumental a turn-around given his consistent rejection of the political personhood of those unlike him. To recognise the women as kin means to recognise the Romans as people. It means recognising the “kinds as assemblages” that constitute the city he tried to abandon: the animals and crops that co-constitute the city alongside the people. Martius struggles with confronting the kin he wishes he did not have: mother, son, and wife. Metonymically representing the entire city at this moment of tense negotiation, the women force Martius to confront the fact that he has not successfully severed the connection between himself and the citizens he tried to leave behind.

As Martius offers to stand kin-less, “author of himself”, we know that he is attempting to defy reality, not least because his family stands right in front of him. In entering the camp, the women and boy force Martius into his final confrontation with Gaia and the *oikos*. They kneel, presenting a humility and a possibility of composing with, finding a way forward that does not involve total destruction. Martius' response conjures a world without connection:

[...] let the pebbles on the hungry beach
 Fillip the stars; then let the mutinous winds
 Strike the proud cedars 'gainst the fiery sun,
 Murdering impossibility to make
 What cannot be slight work.
 (5.3.58-62)

Confronted by his kin and the *oikos*, Martius' world comes apart. Beach stones rise rapidly into the stratosphere, trees are uprooted and hurled towards the sun. Martius, sustained by his denial of Gaia, suddenly feels her full force shortly before he seals his own fate. The bonds which keep earthly community in coherence are let loose as Martius finally understands their significance.

Awaiting Martius' return from treaty negotiations, Aufidius claims that Martius sold the “blood and labour” of the Volscies at the price of “a few drops of women's rheum” (5.6.45-46). However, when Martius returns it seems that blood and labour have fetched a higher value:

Our spoils we have brought home
 Doth more than counterpoise a full third part
 The charges of the action.
 (5.6.77-79)

This moment encapsulates the triumph of the Earthbound over Martius. Where Pascual Garrido and Murakami have read Martius' capitulation to Volumnia as the moment which indicates Martius' noble sacrifice on behalf of the political community, I contend that in the result of these negotiations the play shows not sacrifice, but resignation to the political community. I agree with Pascual Garrido

that *Coriolanus* demonstrates that “being in the community is what makes beings more human, and that human care and recognition of the other are the ethical bases of such community”.¹⁴⁴ However, this is not through some ethical epiphany. In his last moments, Martius generates no abstract, honour-driven peace treaty. Instead, he shows tangible, *oikos*-minded diplomacy. Where Martius “kicked at” spoils, and valued material looting from war at nothing more than a “cracked drachma”, here he tries to justify his actions through material gains which will benefit the Volscian community.

Aufidius stage-manages Martius’ Human, anthropocentric attitude in order to affect an Earthbound resolution to the conflict. Martius’ indifference to the “feedback loops” that implicate him in earthly community and his misplaced belief that he was “capable of freeing [himself] from the harsh ‘necessities of Nature’” enable him to threaten a brutal and indiscriminate assault on Rome.¹⁴⁵ However, he cannot escape that that he “belong[s] to a *territory*” which consists of intermingled, tangled networks.¹⁴⁶ He is brought down by Gaia’s inevitable intrusion and the centrality of bare life to politics, a bare life which must be attended to and cared for. This is emphasised by the fact that Martius is killed not in some grand senatorial assassination *à la* Caesar, but in a Volscian marketplace: a space for the trading objects, food, and animals. This is done as the citizens scream the names of their kin who Martius has slaughtered: they assault Martius with the ridiculousness of his aim to recognise no kin, and the impossibility of breaking the “bond and privilege of nature” (5.3.25). Where once Martius hoped to take the Romans as “rats” to war, to “gnaw” the corn of the Volscians, now he has become the rat himself, boasting of his successful gorging on Roman spoils.

In *Coriolanus*, it becomes clear that the earthly *oikos* is where wholesome statecraft should be found. Rather than seeking to “compose with” the assemblage of political, natural, and domestic processes that engender the Roman state, Martius the Latourian Human tries to untangle himself from it all, attempting a doomed, anthropocentric insularity. The Earthbound community, on the other hand, is fully aware of the necessity of composing with multiple assemblages, and generates political community by doing so. This is what ordinary Roman citizens do as they subvert dehumanisation, protest for their bare life and what the Volscians do as they cry out the names of their lost kin. By paying attention to the intrusion of Gaia, and the “sensitive and responsive” Earthbound, it is possible to find a creaturely, earthly politics in *Coriolanus*, one which cares about the play’s wider community, and resists being swallowed up by the charismatic force of Martius, the “lonely dragon” (4.1.30). Getting amongst the “ticklish assemblages” spiralling through the play, it is clear that *Coriolanus* offers more than “a drama of citizenship”: it is an exploration of Human pretentiousness and its arrogant naivety in the face of Earthbound kinship and interdependence.

¹⁴⁴ Pascual Garrido, “Re-humanising *Coriolanus*”, 105-106.

¹⁴⁵ Latour, *Facing Gaia*, “The States (of Nature) between War and Peace”, NP.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

“To Make A New World...”

Speculation, Care, and Attentiveness in Michael Drayton’s “Noahs Floud” (1630)

Writing the planetary changes wrought by a twenty-first-century Anthropocene is hard: their ramifications for earthly life exist on a scale beyond the capacity of most of our literary imaginings.¹ Scholars have discussed the problems presented by the scope of these changes in literary fiction and outside the humanities: scientists struggle to convey the enormity of our global impact to those outside their disciplines.² Julia Adeney Thomas and Dipesh Chakrabarty have noted a disintegration of the traditional boundaries between the sciences and humanities as both grasp at the multifaceted threats to planetary life.³ Additionally, ties to the “local” in environmentalism are being put under pressure by the enormity of the problem. Ursula K. Heise has argued that our newly global networks necessitate that “advocacy on behalf of the nonhuman world” and “greater environmental justice” are founded on “ties to territories and systems that are understood to encompass the planet as a whole”.⁴

Though acutely pressing now, literary constructions of environmental disaster are not new. Images of local anthropogenic environmental destruction in literature exist as early as Homer, and evidence from classical Greece to the eighteenth century attests to a history of real-world ecological awareness, albeit limited.⁵ In the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries in the West, however, imagining *global* disaster took on a particular significance as writers of natural philosophy began to grapple with one specific cataclysmic event: the biblical Deluge.⁶ This anthropocentric apocalypse – caused by Man, exterminating Mankind, with a multispecies salvation through one man – took on a special significance in an expanding world, filling out with people, places, and things: the

¹ This has been discussed in relation to the novel by Amitav Ghosh in *The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 66 and John Parham, “Introduction: With or Without Us: Literature and the Anthropocene”, in *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the Anthropocene*, ed. John Parham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 5-6.

² Julia Adeney Thomas, “History and Biology in the Anthropocene: Problems of Scale, Problems of Value”, *The American Historical Review* 119, no. 5 (2014): 1587-1607; Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate Crisis of History: Four Theses”, *Critical Inquiry* 35, no.2 (2009): 197-222; “The Human Condition in the Anthropocene”, Lectures, Yale University, New Haven, 18 and 19 February 2015, <https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/resources/documents/a-to-z/c/Chakrabarty%20manuscript.pdf>; Ursula K. Heise, “Science Fiction and the Time Scales of the Anthropocene”, *ELH* 86, no.2 (2019): 275-304. For another perspective on the problems faced by scientists, see Naomi Oreskes, “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change”, *Science* 306, no.5702 (2004): 1686.

³ Adeney Thomas, “History and Biology in the Anthropocene”, 1587-90; Chakrabarty, “The Climate Crisis of History”, 201-207.

⁴ Ursula K. Heise, *Sense of Place, Sense of Planet: The Environmental Imagination of the Global* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 10. See pp. 4-10 of Heise’s monograph for a thorough exploration: localism in environmental thought is not universal.

⁵ Teresa Kwiatkowska and Alan Holland, “Dark is the World to Thee: A Historical Perspective on Environmental Forewarnings”, *Environment and History* 16 (2010): 458-72.

⁶ Lydia Barnett, *After the Flood: Imagining the Environment in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019). I capitalise “Flood” and “Deluge” in my work as Barnett does in hers.

Flood became a “crucial vector through which early modern Europeans imagined the globe”.⁷ This chapter examines a literary fiction printed shortly before the Deluge became a pressing matter for European writers: Michael Drayton’s “Noahs Flood” (1630). The poem describes the Deluge as a multispecies apocalypse and imagines the world as a biospheric system powerful enough to endure the cataclysm whilst sustaining near-fatal damage, morphing into a sinful, weakened present. The text is powered by an anthropocentric concern about the state of the world but builds from this to advocate for a greater attentiveness towards the living world.

“Noahs Flood” does this work whilst attending to the multidisciplinary demands of early modern writing on the Flood. As Lydia Barnett explains: “the Flood appealed as a means of crossing the disciplinary and professional boundaries that kept human history and natural history, natural philosophy and theology, distinct from one another”.⁸ This pre-disciplinary thinking anticipates Chakrabarty and Adeney Thomas’ ideas of disciplinary collapse in the Anthropocene. Gaps in the biblical narrative invited speculation on all aspects of the Flood through every investigative technique available, though the Deluge became primarily “a means of exploring how humanity’s spiritual failings were made physically manifest in the natural world and how nature in turn became a medium through which humanity was punished for their sins”.⁹ These explorations were rooted in “a deeply pessimistic belief in the pervasiveness of human sin and in its uncontrollable power to wreck the world”.¹⁰ Barnett thus tracks humanity’s understanding of its own “geological agency” – deeply impacting the planet – further back than does most recent work on the Anthropocene.¹¹ Importantly, she also suggests that these explorations of the Flood were closer to current speculative fiction than modern science: “acknowledging the speculative, imaginative, and fabulist dimensions of this early modern research agenda” is critical to fully appreciating these global conceptualisations.¹²

Speculative fiction offers unique opportunities for working through complex and distressing ideas about the world around us. Heise, and more recently Rachel Adams, have pointed to speculative fiction (SF) as a productive space for processing Man’s potential for dangerous planetary impact. Heise argues that narrative techniques in SF support a “scaling up [of] imagination in narrative”, concluding that “it is not surprising that [SF] has now emerged as one of the major genres for narratives about the Anthropocene”.¹³ For Adams, SF enables “powerful and dramatic acts of imagination that rearrange who and what we see as deserving of our care [...]”.¹⁴ Donna Haraway has

⁷ Ibid., 11. Colonial enterprise, Christian evangelism, and their attendant racism were important motivating factors for these imaginings, see pp. 50-88.

⁸ Ibid., 16.

⁹ Ibid., 3.

¹⁰ Ibid., 4.

¹¹ Ibid., 8. The idea of “geological agency” comes from Chakrabarty, “The Climate Crisis of History”, 207.

¹² Barnett, *After the Flood*, 11.

¹³ Heise, “Science Fiction”, 301; 300-301. The language of “scaling up” comes from Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History”, 206.

¹⁴ Rachel Adams, “The Art of Interspecies Care”, *New Literary History* 51, no.4 (2020): 714. The texts Adams refers to are Richard Powers’ *The Overstory* (2018) and Sue Burke’s *Semiosis* (2018).

also considered how SF can build a fairer world: it is “a method of tracing, of following a thread in the dark, in a dangerous true tale of adventure, where who lives and who dies and how might become clearer for the cultivating of multispecies justice”.¹⁵ In SF, “imaginings of the world, the globe, or the planet as a whole” are “ways of reimagining the multiculture and multispecies communities of which we form part”.¹⁶ Similarly, SF gives authors “affordances” to imagine “vast systems [that] endure far beyond the minute historical blip that is an individual human life or even the human species”; authors also use the genre to imagine the mental and physical worlds of nonhuman lifeforms.¹⁷ The literary imaginings which build speculative worlds are powerful tools for questioning assumptions about the status and place of Man in the universe, something understood by both modern SF writers and Drayton.

“Noahs Floud” presents a familiar urgency: early modern England’s demand for natural resources increased dramatically during Drayton’s lifetime and his work, especially that written towards the end of his life, is uniquely “eco-minded”.¹⁸ “Noahs Floud” comes from Drayton’s final collection of poems, *The Muses Elizium* (1630), which “revels in calamity”.¹⁹ It contains a sequence of ten pastoral poems bound alongside three biblical poems, “Noahs Floud”, “Moses His Birth and Miracles”, and “David and Goliah”. Todd Borlik explains Drayton’s extremity of feeling:

irked that the public had turned a deaf ear to the warnings about deforestation sounded in his *Poly-Olbion*, he became convinced England was over-depleting its natural resources, and destined to suffer a self-inflicted catastrophe [...] Drayton stands among the first authors in English literature to foresee an anthropogenic environmental disaster, and to lament its dire consequences for other species.²⁰

Following Borlik’s suggestion that readers must take Drayton’s ecologies seriously, I examine “Noahs Floud” via three ecological themes which flow through the poem.

I begin by taking up the idea of the Fall of an earthly body alongside the trope of the Pythagorean *anima mundi*; this lively earth intensifies the reader’s experience of postdiluvian loss. I then investigate how Drayton frames the Flood through the experiences of nonhuman animals. I read

¹⁵ Donna Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 3. Haraway uses the idea of “SF” throughout this work.

¹⁶ Heise, “Afterword: Environmentalism, Eco-Cosmopolitanism, and Premodern Thought”, in *Premodern Ecologies in the Modern Literary Imagination*, ed. Vin Nardizzi and Tiffany Jo Werth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019), 287.

¹⁷ Adams, “Interspecies Care”, 708.

¹⁸ These changes are briefly outlined in Bruce Boehrer, *Environmental Degradation in Jacobean Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1-27. “Eco-minded” is from Todd Borlik, “Michael Drayton and the Invention of the Disaster Epic: Ecocatastrophe in the Late Poems”, in *The Experience of Disaster in Early Modern English Literature* ed. Sophie Chiari (New York, NY: Routledge, 2022), 123. Borlik presents a precise reading of disastrous events in Drayton’s contemporary world and their manifestation in his biblical apocalypticism.

¹⁹ Borlik, “Invention of the Disaster Epic”, 123.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 123-24.

this framing with contemporary flooding reports and biblical exegesis, examining how Drayton's eco-mindedness attends to a particular human responsibility for nonhuman life. Finally, I consider the impact of human activity on the environment, exploring how Drayton's text expresses human responsibility for the Flood: sin physically changes the earth. Throughout, I attend to Drayton's literary borrowings: his writing wallows in the fertile possibilities offered by the tensions between biblical, classical, ecological, and scientific knowledge. These knottings serve as a reminder of the complex master-steward-cohabitor position of Man, a position troubled in this poem which foregrounds the nonhuman experience of the Flood over the human, and the antediluvian earth over antediluvian people.²¹ Overall, I argue that reading "Noahs Floud" as a work of SF, taking into account its multivalent interests, shows how a narrative as anthropocentric as the biblical Flood can, with the appropriate attention and imagination, be transformed into an ecological parable: a manifesto for a caring, responsible relationship with the natural world. In "Noahs Floud", human health and happiness depend on how this relationship unfolds.

ANIMATING THE EARTHLY BODY

When humanity falls after Eve's sinful snack, the earth too is punished: a prickling infertility plagues the ground.²² In "Noahs Floud", however, it seems this curse never happened. Until the Deluge, the antediluvian earth thrives with a generous, maternal energy. The trope of feminine Nature has been widely studied, and rather than speculating as to why Drayton invokes this, I focus on how he presents this feminised world.²³ Drayton renders the Fall of Earth in especially bodied terms and this generates a sense of postdiluvian loss even before the aftermath of the Flood is revealed. Drayton frames the Flood through the experience of its primary victim: the earthly body. "Noahs Floud" considers the "vast system" of the earth as a living force, enduring through disaster.²⁴

Drayton's vital, feminised world differs from the Gaia of Chapter 2 of this thesis. Rather than an indifferent "assemblage of forces", in "Noahs Floud" the human body and an earthly body are mutually at stake in each other's wellbeing.²⁵ To make the difference clear, I refer to Nature in this chapter: this early modern vision of the living world is "organic, sentient, and ensouled": she is a being

²¹ I borrow the language of knottiness from Borlik, *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature: Green Pastures* (New York, NY: 2011), 14-23. I also sense Haraway's "string figure connections" in this knottiness. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 9-29.

²² "[...] cursed is the earth for thy sake [...] Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee". Genesis, 3:17-18.

²³ Carolyn Merchant offers an overview of the idea of a feminine natural force and the changes this idea was undergoing during Drayton's lifetime: "Nature as Female", in *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution* (London: Wildwood, 1982), 1-41. Lynne Dickson Bruckner has produced an insightful exploration of how early modern literature and ecofeminism intersect, see "N/nature, and the Difference 'She' Makes", in *Ecofeminist Approaches to Early Modern Literature*, ed. Jennifer Munroe and Rebecca Laroche (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 15-35. Kate Soper presents a brief outline of the tensions present in the mother/virgin dichotomy so often found in writing on the natural world: "Naturalized Woman and Feminized Nature", in *The Green Studies Reader: From Romanticism to Ecocriticism*, ed. Laurence Coupe (London: Routledge, 2000), 139-43. The chapter is an extract from Soper's *What Is Nature?: Culture, Politics and the Non-Human* (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 1995).

²⁴ Adams, "Interspecies Care", 706.

²⁵ Isabelle Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism*, trans. Andrew Goffey (Lüneberg: Open Humanities Press/Meson Press, 2015), 45-47.

who creates and nurtures but, as the poem shows, can also be made to suffer and sicken.²⁶ Through familiar medical concepts, Drayton parallels the living world with the human body: they are subject to the same biological systems. He couples this physiological paralleling with the trope of the *anima mundi*, which understood “nature [...] as a quasi-deific force” and saw “the organic world as spontaneously designing rather than passively designed”.²⁷ This Pythagorean formulation of a living world proved influential in early modernity, even as it tested Christian theology.²⁸ In rediscovering this classical material, Renaissance writers inherited a holistic view of the natural world: “Pythagoreanism had an interdisciplinary outlook that regarded the arts and sciences as symbiotic”.²⁹ In “Noahs Floud”, Drayton expresses a particular interest in thinking through the micro/macrocasm relationship between Man and Nature, colliding the *anima mundi* with early modern science: the text imagines the world as a giant human, specifically, as a giant woman. Drayton’s text works through this metaphor in real terms.

Drayton’s prodigiously fertile antediluvian earth produces healthy humans and wholesome plants. Life centres on the potency and health of feminised Nature: “the fruitful earth being lusty then and strong” (327.23).³⁰ “Lusty” is multivalent, meaning healthy, sexually-amorous, good-humoured, and arrogant, as well as referring to healthy plant growth.³¹ Drayton’s choice of vocabulary creates a holistic vision of environmental health, be it sexual, mental, physical, botanical: antediluvian earth is thriving in all senses. Yet the audacity lurking in “lusty” hints at an uneasiness about this bounteous health: it is unsustainably good.

This earthly body defies scriptural precedent and her lustiness flows outwards in a “continuall spring” of generative energy: each woman

[...] had that power to nourish
Her Procreation, that her children then
Were at the instant of their birth, halfe men.
(327.26-30)

The earth effortlessly sustains life, and antediluvian women mirror her reproductive fortitude. They

[...] very hardly went
Out their nine months, abundant nature lent
Their fruit such thriving, as that once waxt quicke,

²⁶ Borlik, *Ecocriticism*, 74.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 67.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 24-74.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 37.

³⁰ Michael Drayton, “Noahs Floud”, in *The Works of Michael Drayton: Volume III*, ed. J. William Hebel (Oxford: Shakespeare Head Press, 1961). All references to the same.

³¹ *OED*, “lusty, adj.”. Two texts from the year before *The Muses Elizium* was printed attest to the botanical sense: John Parkinson, *Paradisi in Sole Paradisus Terrestris* (London, 1629), D4v; H.C., *A Discourse Concerning the Drayning of Fennes and the Surrounded Grounds* (London, 1629), A4r.

The large limb'd mother, neither faint nor sicke,
Hasted her houre by her abundant health,
Nature so plaid the unthrift with her wealth [...]
(327.35-40)

Extrapolating from the begetting catalogues of Genesis, Drayton creates a super-abundant nature where babies are born near full-grown. There is a nod to the biblical giants through these “large limb'd” women: life thrives in a big way.³² Eve’s cursed conception and birth are absent.³³ Mothers “hardly” get through the pregnancy: they barely carry a foetus to term because they are so powerfully strong, and they do this with great energy, even audacity.³⁴ The specificity of the gestation process heightens the sense that Nature supercharges human reproduction: once the mother feels the baby quicken she is able to “haste[n]”, press on with, the birth.³⁵ Yet warnings rumble around Nature playing the “unthrift”: she “prodigally lavish[es] her store / Upon the teeming earth, then wasting more / Then it had need of” (328.41-43). Drayton’s speculative “vast system” intertwines the human female and earthly bodies in mutual fertility and fate: in her “lusty” disregard for biblical punishment, Nature’s expenditure is dangerous.

Antediluvian Nature also provides humans with botanicals to maintain the health with which she infuses them. Her lavish spending allows gargantuan shrubs to produce wholesome herbs:

In Med'cen, simples had that power,
That none need then the Planetary houre
To helpe their working, they so juycefull were.
(328.47-49)

Simples were popular botanical cures, usually consisting of a single herb as an active ingredient.³⁶ The idea that celestial bodies influenced all living things, plants included, and therefore botanical medicines were more effective when accounting for certain astrological conjunctions was relatively uncontentious.³⁷ In this enormous system, reading stars gave early moderns greater control over their bodies and agricultural practices.³⁸ Drayton thus invokes a reader’s knowledge of everyday practices and an interconnected cosmos to enrich his distinction between a post-Flood present, when it was

³² Drayton does not seem to differentiate between giants and sinful antediluvian Man in the way Genesis 6:4 does.

³³ Genesis 3:16.

³⁴ OED, “hardly, adv.”, defs. 8.a, 1, 2.

³⁵ OED, “quicken, v.1”, def. 4; “haste, v”, def. 2.

³⁶ OED, “simple, adj., n., adv., and int.”, def. II.4.a. For sources see Louise Hill Curth, *English Almanacs, Astrology and Popular Medicine: 1550-1700* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 166-67. As an example of their popularity, see the contents list of William Langham, *The Garden of Health* (London, 1633), 93r-94v.

³⁷ Hill Curth, *English Almanacs*, 125. Nicholas Culpeper’s work makes this explicit, see *The English Physitian, or An Astrologo-Physical Discourse of the Vulgar Herbs of this Nation* (London, 1652), D1r.

³⁸ Bonnie Lander Johnson, “Visions of Soil and Body Management: The Almanac in *Richard II*” in *Ground-Work: English Renaissance Literature and Soil Science*, ed. Hillary Eklund (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2017), 70.

accepted that “the healing efficacy of plants was on the wane”, and an antediluvian wonder-world.³⁹ The “spontaneously designing” earthly body nurtures by default.⁴⁰

Drayton brings this nurturing relationship to fruition as the poem turns from the qualities of plants and women to the land: sacred cedars graze the clouds (328.56), and these arboreal giants

[...] dropt honey, & the Springs gusht milke:
The Flower-fleec't Meadow, & the gorgeous grove,
Which should smell sweetest in their bravery, strove;
No little shrub, but it some Gum let fall,
To make the cleere Ayre aromaticall [...]
(328.59-64)

Drayton is borrowing directly from Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. The corresponding passage reads

Forth-with the Earth corne, vnmanured, beares;
And every yeere renewes her golden Eares:
With Milke and Nectar were the Riuers fill'd;
And yellow Hony from greene Elms distill'd [...]⁴¹

Both texts emphasise the gustatory pleasures of these antediluvian worlds (I return to the agricultural reference later in the chapter). Using Ovidian material for “Noahs Flood”, Drayton picks up on the “*ecological uncanny*” which early modern writers found so appealing in the *Metamorphoses*: “by detecting a subtle congruence in their physiognomy, poets convey an intimation of the interdependence of the plant and animal kingdoms”.⁴² The physiognomies of woman and earth are made congruent as Drayton translates Ovid into his Christian theology. However, the phenomenal Ovidian fertility turns gloopy, almost rancid in its fecundity. The Promised Land of the Old Testament flows with wholesome milk and honey, but this lactating land is uncomfortably corporeal given Drayton's explicitly maternal Nature. Honey-dripping trees are unsettling; delicate flowers take on a weighty fleeciness. The sensation of gluey wool is exacerbated by the oozing of “gum”, sticky-sweet incense or medicine, restating the medical bounty of maternal Nature: the creation and

³⁹ Peter Harrison, *The Bible, Protestantism and the Rise of Natural Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 85. Harrison cites George Hakewill, who suggested “the *foode* wherewith [antediluvians] were nourished [...] may well be thought to have been more *wholesome* and nutritive, and the Plants more *medicinnall*”. *An Apologie* (Oxford, 1635), D3v.

⁴⁰ Borlik, *Ecocriticism*, 67

⁴¹ Ovid, *Ovid's Metamorphosis Englished*, trans. George Sandys (London, 1628), B3r.

⁴² Borlik, *Ecocriticism*, 90-91.

administration of medicinal syrups were most frequently practiced by women in early modernity.⁴³ However, the “bravery” of these plants indicates a dangerous pride, as does their striving for the sweetest scent.⁴⁴ These divergent possibilities emerge in heady excess: whether nutritive or suffocating, there is too much power in this earthly body. As Drayton begins to describe the Flood itself, however, the language around the earthly body changes. Nature’s productivity is manipulated by the Divine Hand into something pathogenic.

The first symptoms appear as Drayton moves from describing the chaos of a ferocious thunderstorm into examining another source of the floodwaters. Rain thunders down, but groundwaters also spew up. Eschewing the brevity of the biblical account (“all the fountains of the great deep [were] broken up [...]”⁴⁵), Drayton creates a bio-meteorological process of water-production:

The Card’nall Windes [God] makes at once to blow,
Whose blasts to buffets with such fury goe,
That they themselues into the Center shot
Into the bowels of the earth and got,
Being condens’d and strongly stifned there,
In such strange manner multiply’d the ayre,
Which turn’d to water, and increast the springs
To that abundance, that the earth forth brings
Water to drowne her selfe [...]
(344.645-53).

The “card’nall winds” crash in from all compass points; a “buffet” is anything resembling a punch.⁴⁶ This airy assault plunges itself into the bowels of the earth. An embowelled earth is a common trope, however Drayton’s negotiation of this metaphor demonstrates his interaction with contemporary debates about the nature of the Flood. In his *History of the World* (1614), Walter Raleigh describes this moment as “the waters forsook the very bowels of the earth; and all whatsoever was disperst therein pierced and broke through the face thereof”.⁴⁷ He also uses condensation to describe the generation of

⁴³ Wendy Wall, “Just a Spoonful of Sugar: Syrup and Domesticity in Early Modern England”, *Modern Philology* 104, no.2 (2006): 156-60. Drayton anticipates Milton’s heavily-scented Eden and a sensory overload which indicates an oncoming disaster. For Edenic scent, see Sophie Read, “Ambergris and Early Modern Languages of Scent”, *The Seventeenth Century* 28, no.2 (2013): 223-24; David Hopkins, *Reading Paradise Lost* (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 46-48; Michael Gillum, “Milton’s Roses and Amaranth”, *ANQ* 20, no.1 (2007): 28-34. Contingent to this, the relationship between gender, sugar, and colonialism has been explored by Kim F. Hall in “Culinary Spaces, Colonial Spaces: The Gendering of Sugar in the Seventeenth Century”, in *Feminist Readings of Early Modern Culture: Emerging Subjects*, ed. Valerie Traub, M. Lindsay Kaplan, and Dymphna Callaghan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 168-90.

⁴⁴ OED, “bravery, n.”, defs. 1, 3.a.

⁴⁵ Genesis 7:11.

⁴⁶ OED, “buffet, n.1”. A pun lurks in these winds coming to blows.

⁴⁷ Walter Raleigh, *The History of the World* (London, 1614), K5v.

the floodwaters, condensation being “a conuersion of ayre into water”.⁴⁸ Drayton matches Raleigh’s language and highlights this engagement: a marginal note at this point in “Noahs Floud” agrees with Raleigh that “water is but ayre condens’d” (344.650).⁴⁹ Drayton’s presentation of the Flood process is not only physical, however: condensation is a medical term.

A contemporary translation of French physician Ambroise Paré’s work abounds with condensation, and Helkiah Crooke’s *Mikrokosmographia* is similarly concerned with watery thickenings. Most bodily fluids can become condensed, writes Paré, with potentially life-threatening consequences; Crooke covers similar ideas.⁵⁰ Another physician puts Drayton’s imagery into its physiological context: “we see in the bowels of the earth of the little world, man, no lesse then in the great world’s belly”.⁵¹ This macro/microcosmic thinking shows how Drayton’s condensed air gestures beyond the water cycle and understands the processes of the human and earthly body as governed by the same principles. The generativity of the earthly body returns here, the winds “being condens’d [...] multiply’d the ayre”.⁵² The earthly body cannot help but reproduce, even as her fertility – evidenced previously by her progeny and wholesome botanicals – leads to her destruction. Of those about to be affected by the Deluge, it is the earth who is characterised as most threatened: she is about to “drowne her selfe”, as if a terran suicide is the only way to fully eradicate sin from the world.

Medical anthropomorphism and Paré and Crooke’s thinking on condensation matter here because they suggest that the disease suffered by the earthly body is potentially curable: this is not an unknown pathogen, but something that can readily be found in medical treatises. “Noahs Floud” suggests that the suicidal drive of the earthly body is a biological response to suffering which could have been avoided, or cured, if appropriate action had been taken. Indeed, the next section of the poem describes the earth’s efforts to purge her body. However, the disease of human sinfulness is terminal, and the cure becomes self-destructive.

This self-destruction begins with the condensed liquid releasing from the bowels of the earth. Drayton describes this in forensic detail, developing his *anima mundi* further here through the most explicit collision of Pythagoreanism and physiology in the whole poem. Moving more speculatively, Drayton considers how the maternal energy described earlier is transfigured by disease. The earthly body perspires:

⁴⁸ Ibid., K5v-K6r.

⁴⁹ C.f. Borlik, “Invention of the Disaster Epic”, 130.

⁵⁰ e.g. Ambroise Paré, *The Workes of that Famous Chirurgeon Ambrose Parey*, trans. Thomas Johnson (London, 1634), D4r; P6r; Y6v; Bb6v; Helkiah Crooke, *Mikrokosmographia: A Description of the Body of Man* (London, 1615), G6v-H1r.

⁵¹ Joseph Du Chesne, *The Practice of Chymicall, and Hermeticall Physicke*, trans. Thomas Timme (London, 1605), X4v. Du Chesne’s microcosmic man is as watery and windy as Drayton’s earthly body. The text continues “[...] the Tympanie, the swelling of the Coddies, windinesse of the stomach and bellie: al which doe represent the windes, raynes, and Earth-quakes of the earth: and the waters within the body, and betwene the skin and the flesh, doe represent the Sea, the Riuers and Springs of the earth”.

⁵² This contradicts Raleigh, who states no extra floodwater was created. *History of the World*, K5v.

[...] through her pores, the soft and spungy earth,
 As in a dropsie, or unkindely birth,
 A Woman, swolne, sends from her fluxive wombe
 Her woosie springs, that there was scarcely roome
 For the waste waters which came in so fast,
 As though the earth her entrailes up would cast.
 But these seem'd yet, but easily let goe,
 (344.655-61).

The pronouns in these lines seem especially ambiguous: do the fluxive womb and its springs belong to the woman or the earth? This anthropomorphic melting of boundaries solidifies the relationship between the human body and the earthly one: they are subject to the same infirmities, and the earth feels these changes as much as a human. Though the primary cause of the Flood is God's wrath, the Deluge presents as a disease, or rather as a process of purging disease from the sickened body. This is expressed in particularly feminine terms, namely leaky fluids and birth.⁵³ "Unkindely birth" summons a distressing image, as does the idea of guts being thrown up, but the language also points to the period's popular miracle texts. In a revealing turn of phrase, an account of the disastrous 1607 storm surge in England and Wales labels these real-world inundations "the very diseases and monstrous byrthes of nature, sent into the world to terrifie it".⁵⁴ Drayton echoes providentialist language, balancing religious ominousness with a visceral understanding of what this means for an embodied world. In addition to labouring, the earthly body is diagnosed with dropsy, which presents with watery swellings, exacerbating the bloated bowels mentioned moments earlier.⁵⁵ Early modern medical discourse around the various fluids mentioned in this metaphor reveals Drayton's precise physiological thinking.

For physician Christoph Wirsung, the best dropsy cure "is to expel vrine", and he notes that "sweating is very good for all Dropsies".⁵⁶ This cure is put to work as the earth sweats "through her pores". However, both Crooke and Paré note a more dangerous remedy: paracentesis. This involves cutting the patient to release excess fluid, sometimes with the aid of a metal pipe inserted into the incision.⁵⁷ Both physicians emphasise the perilousness of this cutting: the volume of "waters" that surge from the wound can prove fatal.⁵⁸ Invoking this medical discourse, Drayton adds a new dynamic to the danger that has been building through the poem. His text anticipates the new biblical

⁵³ i.e. Gail Kern Paster, "Leaky Vessels: The Incontinent Women of City Comedy", *Renaissance Drama* 18 (1987): 43-65. C.f. Borlik, "Invention of the Disaster Epic", 124-25; 127: using birth to think apocalyptically is both biblical and Draytonian.

⁵⁴ 1607. *A True Report of Certaine Wonderfull Ouerflowings of Waters* [...] (London, 1607), A3r. I explore these analogues in the following section.

⁵⁵ OED, "dropsy, n. and adj.", def. A.1.a.

⁵⁶ Christoph Wirsung, *The General Practise of Physicke*, trans. Iacob Mosan (London, 1605), Cc2v; Cc3r.

⁵⁷ Crooke, *Mikrokosmographia*, I4r-I5r; Paré, *The Workes*, Dd1r-Dd2r.

⁵⁸ Both authors use "water" to describe these bodily effluvia.

covenant: the earthly body may be forever damaged by the Flood, just as a human body may be irreparably harmed by a potentially fatal cure.

The earth's watery sickness corrupts her reproductive power as the Flood intensifies. A womb (which is "flowing or apt to flow"⁵⁹), part of a "swolne" body, sends forth "woosie springs", followed by the image of entrails being vomited up.⁶⁰ Uterine "flux" could refer to the process of menstruation: "a monethly flux [...which is] an excrement in quantity, in quality being pure and incorrupt".⁶¹ However, other fluids could also be termed "flux": "false cources or whites" [i.e. non-menstrual discharge] were symptomatic of various problems and could present in "divers colours, as reddish, blacke, greene, yellow, white".⁶² The sticky gumminess of the antediluvian world now seeps back out ("easily let goe") in slimy, unproductive destruction. Drayton emphasises the earth's embodied, visceral experience of the Flood: the floodwater is everything that she can produce, a squeamishly juicy consummation of her unbounded fertility.

The earth undergoes diuretic treatment for her maladies, purging the sinful sickness of Man. However, the Lord grows impatient with this attempted cure, and the tension between the earthly body and the deity explodes into violence. The Flood loses any potential to cure, becoming instead a brutal assault. The natural world splits across gendered lines: "Gods great hand so squeues'd the boysterous clouds" that the violence unleashed mutilates the earthly body:

[...] the wilde raine, with such a pondrous weight
As that the fiercenese of the hurrying floud,
Remov'd huge Rockes, and ram'd them into mud:
Pressing the ground, with that impetuous power,
As that the first shooke of this drowning shower,
Furrow'd the earths late plumpe and cheerefull face
Like an old Woman, that in little space
With ryveld cheekes, and with bleard blubberd eyes,
She wistly look'd upon the troubled skyes.
(344.666-74)

⁵⁹ OED "fluxive, adj.".

⁶⁰ Drayton is the only writer who uses "woosie" in the period, see also *Poly-Olbion*, containing a "foul woosie marsh". *The Second Part, or a Continuance of Poly-Olbion* (London, 1622), P3r. Additionally, he seems to be first to use "fluxive" in the context of bodily fluids: "In fluxiue humor, which is euer found / As I do wane or wax vnto my round [...]". "The Man in the Moone", in *Poems Lyrick and Pastorall* (London, 1606), H5v.

⁶¹ John Sadler, *The Sicke VVomans Private Looking-Glasse* (London, 1636), B4v-B5r.

⁶² Ibid., D1r-D3r. Though in this extract Sadler does not refer to flux, he uses "flux" regularly for describing vaginal discharge, e.g. "if the flux be white, the cause is either in the stomacke or the reynes", D2r.

This is the final, transformative blow to the antediluvian earth. Nature's "plumpe and cheerfull face" is permanently disfigured. The rain carves up the ground, ageing the earth from a healthy and generous young woman into a craggy old hag: the loss of fertility is implicit.⁶³

"Beard blubberd" evokes ugly grief: earth's eyes are "dimmed with tears, morbid matter, or inflammation".⁶⁴ More than tears, "bleare" eyes could indicate a "cold and plainly waterish" humour, or a "hote biting" humour, with "pain, fretting, burning, and rednesse in the eye liddes", potentially causing itching, scabs, even "the perishinge of the flesh in the great corners of the eyes".⁶⁵ The damaged earth becomes repulsive: gunky-eyed, mucus streaming across her wrinkly, mutilated face. The Fall of Earth, her sickening and ageing, is a tragedy, and this hideousness is the last glimpse of the poem's earthly body. As I will discuss, "Noahs Floud" is clear about the causes of the Flood: human sinfulness. However, what it does not resolve is why the *earth* had to be so violently mutilated. She stares "wistly" at the source of her grief, "with close attention; intently".⁶⁶ Terran eyes search for answers in the face of divine wrath. As with the hunted animals of *The Noble Arte of Venerie*, however, there are no answers given for the violent treatment of nonhumanity. There is the same implicit injustice in both texts: just as *The Noble Arte* validated the killing of animals for simply existing as themselves, the earthly body's suffering is exacerbated because she works consistently to produce. Even as she sickens under celestial pressure her generative energy continues to flourish, though turning self-destructive.

Drayton's multidisciplinary, Pythagorean writing generates a twofold sense of postdiluvian loss. The first is that of a deeply-connected, bodily relationship to Nature. No longer in sync, Man is now forced to protect himself, and cannot depend on this powerful nurturing force. Women are no longer enveloped in an organic protection through pregnancy and childbirth; medicine becomes more complex and less effective. The second loss is that of the earthly body's beauty and lust for existence: the Flood leaves her diseased and haggard. The opening of "Noahs Floud" intertwines the human and terran demonstrating that Man's relationship with Nature is not only interdependent, but inter-embodied. The health of the earth is crucial to human health, and the earth's health can be understood and interpreted via human medical knowledge: both bodies are subject to the same sicknesses. Drayton builds out speculatively from the early modern analogy of micro/macrocasm, "scaling up" his imagination and medical knowledge in order to think through not just global changes, but the most catastrophic global change in human history.⁶⁷ Drayton's feminised earthly body matters to any reading of this poem, as it exceeds a basic reworking of his source materials to

⁶³ For healthy, see *OED*, "plump, adj.1", def. 3. For generosity, see "cheerful, adj." as "unbegrudging", def.3.

⁶⁴ *OED*, "bleared, adj.", def. 1.

⁶⁵ Johann Jacob Wecker, *A Compendious Chyrurgerie*, trans. Ihon Banester (London, 1585), F7r-F7v. Regarding "bleare-eyes", Paré comments on "a certain white filth flowing from the eyes, which oft times agglutinates or joynes together the eye-lids". Paré, *The Workes*, Hhh4v.

⁶⁶ *OED*, "wistly, adv.".

⁶⁷ Heise, "Science Fiction", 301.

build a provocative model of the world, a powerful earthly body which is subject to *curable* maladies. The fact that there *are* cures available suggests that the disease of Man's sinfulness need not have been terminal, despite the outcome, if only the appropriate *care* had been taken. The earthly body has endured beyond the "minute historical blip" that is the Flood, but this is endurance in the sense of suffering: at what cost has she survived? Writing in a fallen world, the enormity of the loss hits hard in Drayton's text: the "vast system" no longer cares, the *anima mundi* is no more.

CARE & THE NONHUMAN EXPERIENCE

250 lines into "Noahs Floud", the text announces "the Arke is finisht, and the Lord is wrath" (333.249). The syncretism announces the salvation of the righteous and the annihilation of the sinners. Yet Drayton centres nonhuman experiences of the Flood, defying religious tradition and departing from his predecessors in Diluvian writing, and he does this whilst thinking about how far human responsibility for nonhuman life extends.⁶⁸ It is clear that in reality, and in "Noahs Floud", the lives of animals mattered deeply to their owners. However, this caring responsibility comes with caveats: it extends only to domestic animals, and the animals which are subject to caring attention are intended as producers of profit, or of edible goods, a perspective which has solid theological backing.

Clergyman Andrew Willet offers a profoundly anthropocentric reading of the position of animals in the Deluge, explaining

not onely man shall be destroyed, but the other creatures with him, and yet man onely had sinned. The reason is, 1. As *Chrysostome* sheweth, because all things were made for mans vse [...] and therefore when man is taken away, there should be no use of them.⁶⁹

The care that is extended to animals, whether that is grief at their death, attempts to save them, or placing a lucky few aboard the ark, is dependent on their capacity to be used by Man. To think this more precisely, I am interested in how Jack Halberstam responds to Rachel Adams' writings on interspecies care, where he does not find affirmation, but instead an anthropocentric neediness. In a strongly-worded formulation, Halberstam writes

⁶⁸ Three contemporary retellings of the narrative focus on human experiences of the Flood, but barely touch on the nonhuman lives lost: William Hunnis, *A Hyue Full of Hunnye* (London, 1578), C3v-D1r; Francis Sabie, "The Olde VVorlde Tragedie" in *Adams Complaint. The Olde VVorlde Tragedie. Dauid and Bathsheba* (London, 1596), D2r-E4v; Guillaume de Salluste Du Bartas, *Bartas his Deuine Weekes & Workes*, trans. Josuah Sylvester (London, 1605), Cc5r-Ee1v. Twentieth-century critic Don Cameron Allen is no fan of "Noahs Floud", branding it "far more learned and somewhat duller than Sabie's poem". *The Legend of Noah: Renaissance Rationalism in Art, Science, and Letters* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1963), 145. Ad Putter demonstrates that many Flood narratives seem to have been produced in isolation, but argues for a common ancestor, Avitus of Vienne's sixth-century *De Diluvio Mundi*. "Sources and Backgrounds for Descriptions of the Flood in Medieval and Renaissance Literature", *Studies in Philology* 94, no.2 (1997): esp. 145-59.

⁶⁹ Andrew Willet, *Hexapla in Genesin* (London, 1608), G3v.

it is hard to say whether human care directed at animals is born of a selfless desire to help or of a deeply narcissistic desire to be central to the animal. Care, at its worst, after all, is manipulative and self-serving; and all too often human caregiving can establish a sense of indebtedness at one end and entitlement at the other that can form noxious relations between humans who think of themselves as good and virtuous and the nonhuman entities that they seek to help, rescue, or care for.⁷⁰

Halberstam's "nonredemptive model" is productive for thinking about human-animal relationships in the early modern period, especially regarding the Flood.⁷¹ If, according to Chrysostom, the animals aboard the ark are only saved because they need to be used by future Man, then what indication is there that nonhuman lives hold value in their own right? Did most of those animals need to be saved – there are not many that Man would eat – or are they there purely to be postdiluvian subjects of human dominion? Willet responds baldly: "So then as the cattell perished in the Flood together with the wicked, so they are preserved for the righteous sake".⁷²

However, "Noahs Floud" also gestures to a more redemptive form of caring, thinking of care as an "activity involving the nurturing of all that is necessary for the welfare and flourishing of life".⁷³ Adams' exploration of twenty-first-century literature and art which attends to nonhuman animals argues that the creators use their work "to imagine the intelligence of other species, invite human audiences to feel kinship with those species, and explore the ethical tradeoffs [sic.] when the care of one species results in suffering for another".⁷⁴ As chaos engulfs the globe, Drayton imagines an underwater world which defies human use and control. Here, I use seventeenth-century English accounts of disastrous flooding to demonstrate that Drayton is not writing in a vacuum regarding animal experiences of flooding. What is unique to Drayton, however, is how he yokes an attentiveness to nonhuman worlds to theological and ecological problems, inviting readers to question whether this care for nonhumans comes from a narcissistic anthropocentrism, or an imaginative, speculative understanding of the world and its inhabitants: what type of responsibilities does, or can, Man hold for nonhuman life?

The poem's first example of care extended to nonhuman animals is during and after the animals' arrival on the ark. Drayton dedicates three lengthy catalogues to the animals embarking. Cumulatively, these run to hundreds of lines: a catalogue of beasts, one of birds, and one of reptiles. The important thing to note here is the length, the sheer number of different animals Drayton chooses

⁷⁰ Jack Halberstam, "Beyond Caring: Human-Animal Interdependency: A Response", *New Literary History* 51, no.4 (2020): 720.
⁷¹ Ibid., 719.

⁷² Willet, *Hexapla*, H6v.

⁷³ Andreas Chatzidakis et al., *The Care Manifesto: The Politics of Interdependence* (London: Verso, 2020), VLeBooks edition, "Introduction", NP.

⁷⁴ Adams, "Interspecies Care", 708.

to include: the antediluvian community is diverse.⁷⁵ However, whilst the beasts and birds parade into the ark at leisure, the reptiles arrive in a hurry. Drayton imagines a moment in which they are almost abandoned to the Flood, saved only at the last moment:

The Beasts and Birds thus by the Angels brought,
Noë found his Arke not fully yet was fraught,
To shut it up for as he did begin,
He still saw Serpents and their like come in
(338-39.453-56)

Once Noah has all the birds and beasts aboard, he feels that he has collected all nonhuman life worth saving. However, he is shown immediately to be incorrect. Noah is literally battening down the hatches when the reptiles come slithering over the horizon. This episode gestures to a number of problems surrounding nonhuman care in the poem: who receives it, why, and what does this say about the carer?

Noah's forgetfulness aligns with that of the Old Testament: reptiles have no special creation day; Adam's dominion is over fish, fowl, beasts, and "everything that creepeth and moveth on the earth".⁷⁶ Noah himself is told to safeguard "fowls", "cattle" and "every creeping thing of the earth": reptiles are among many generic creepers.⁷⁷ Aside from the indignity of being nearly forgotten, the narrative's lack of attention is further reflected in how the reptiles arrive at the ark: the beasts and birds are guided by angels, whereas reptiles have to seek their own safety. Drayton extrapolates from a biblical absence to create a moment which spotlights the extent of Man's power of the living world: for Noah this is either an embarrassing level of forgetfulness, or a tacit, malicious attempt at extinction. Reptiles are nearly annihilated either way because of Man's carelessness.

Following the wiliness of the Edenic serpent, perhaps these creatures should be thought of as sneaking in at the last moment, surviving through no help but their own cleverness, as if their salvation was unintentional.⁷⁸ However, Drayton guides the reader's response in a slightly different direction. Closing the catalogue, he writes

These viler Creatures on the earth that creepe,
And with their bellies the cold dewes doe sweepe,

⁷⁵ Allen is ungenerous to Drayton's text, arguing these catalogues characterise a poem unworthy of study: "in the main the animals are listed; occasionally a little lore is added. In every case where the comment is at all extended it is something that everyone seems to know". He then provides a comprehensive list of sources for this "lore", dismissing them with "one can safely assume that this knowledge was common to most men of this time and that Drayton gave them what they expected". Allen's desire to see original material as the hallmark of an interesting writer prohibits consideration of *why* Drayton uses recycled information. "The Relation of Drayton's 'Noah's Flood' to the Ordinary Learning of the Early Seventeenth Century", *Modern Language Notes* 52, no.2 (1937): 110; 111.

⁷⁶ Genesis 1:26.

⁷⁷ Genesis 6:20.

⁷⁸ Edward Topsell praises the wisdom of serpents but places it in contrast with "the innocencie of the Doue". Topsell, *The Historie of Serpents* (London, 1608), A4v.

All these base groveling, and ground-licking sute,
 From the large Boas, to the little Neute;
 As well as Birds, or the foure-footed beasts,
 Came to the Arke their Hostry as *Noes* guests.
 (339.485-490)

This feels like standard language for talking about the descendants of the unfortunate Edenic serpent: vile, grovelling, ground-licking. Yet the close of this section complicates this traditional dynamic. In just a few lines, the reptiles are moved from the brink of extinction to boarding the ark, elevated to the same status as the other two zoological classes: they come “to the Arke their Hostry as *Noes* guests”, making Noah’s initial carelessness even more humiliating.

Eliding “hostelry”, Drayton’s ark becomes “a house where lodging and entertainment are provided”.⁷⁹ Here, animals are suitably and comfortably hosted, and this hospitality is emphasised as Drayton offers further detail on Noah’s guests’ dietary requirements:

Thus fully furnish *Noe* need not to carke,
 For stowidge, for provision for the Arke:
 For that wise God [...]
 [...] did the food for euery thing puruaye,
 Taught [Noah] on lofts it orderly to laye:
 On flesh some feed, as others fish doe eate,
 Various the kinde, so various was the meate:
 Some on fine grasse, as some on grosser weeds,
 As some on fruits, so other some on seeds,
 (339-40.491-502)

“Carke” indicates an act of caring, but an anxious, burdensome care.⁸⁰ The text specifies that Noah “need *not* to carke” (emphasis my own): he is not responsible for worrying over how the ark will function, or how food will be provided, God will sort it all out. Man is not represented as a righteous or knowing being, but simply the only one with enough physical and mental attributes to put it together and stock it with cargo. This is not just the cargo of the animals themselves, but everything they require to survive for the length of the Flood.

The dietary specificity Drayton offers differs from exegetes such as Willet, who is more interested in calculating quantities of provisions than speculating on their qualities.⁸¹ Additionally, Willet does not resolve the question of what the animals ate on the ark, and leaves it with Augustine:

⁷⁹ OED, “hostelry, n.”.

⁸⁰ OED, “cark, v.1.”, defs. 2, 3.

⁸¹ Willet, *Hexapla*, H3r.

“what could not God make pleasant, who could haue giuen [carnivores] power to haue liued without meate, much more then could God by his power dispose them to liue for that time of other food then flesh”.⁸² Drayton has no such vegetarian concord. Ironically, by maintaining interspecies violence, he manages to create a “hostry” which cares more attentively for nonhuman needs. On Drayton’s ark, Man is obliged to care for his “guests”, meeting a standard of hospitality which suits the needs of those for whom he is responsible.

This hosting anticipates a model of care which Diane Kelsey McColley has identified in Milton’s *Paradise Lost*: Man is in servitude to nonhuman life “in an order where the higher serves the lower”.⁸³ In “Noahs Floud” this registers with a persistently anthropocentric but misanthropic dynamic. Drayton’s text does not debate *why* the reptiles must be cared for. It simply suggests that Noah, perhaps even God himself, is not quite sure. On the ark, the postlapsarian enmity between Man and serpent is forgotten: Man will, and must, provide an optimum space of care for the reptiles.⁸⁴ Drayton’s explanation for the presence of reptiles on the ark is simple: although they are “hurtfull to man, yet will th’Almighty have / That Noe their seed upon the earth should save” (339.463-464).

Theologians such as Chrysostom would have it that the reptiles must have some form of use in the post-Flood world, and that is why they are saved: the majority must die in the Flood “because all things were made for mans vse” but some must survive “for the righteous sake”.⁸⁵ As Halberstam might put it, reptiles become indebted to humanity: in this “noxious” power relation, they owe Man their lives because Noah admitted them to the ark. Though unlikely to be consumed and used like animals such as domestic cattle, perhaps they are saved as potential, postdiluvian subjects of human dominion; to bruise Man’s newly tyrannical heel, or be broken by it. The necessity of caring for reptiles, though divinely-ordained, both props up and destabilises an already wobbly human status. It appears that the needs of noisome species, at least temporarily, supersede Man’s, and these needs require no explanation in order to be demanded. Here, “Noahs Floud” forces the reader into a moment of recognition: Man is indeed a host, a host to all, but in an almost parasitical sense. This is not to denigrate the nonhuman but to underscore the fact that at this moment Man is a quasi-unwitting life-support system for all living things, even those which present a danger to him.

All guests accounted for, Noah addresses his family. In a puzzling moment, he acknowledges the threat they face, not from the Flood, but from their fellow passengers:

The mighty hand of God doe you not see,

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ McColley, “Milton’s Environmental Epic: Creature Kinship and the Language of *Paradise Lost*”, in *Beyond Nature Writing: Expanding the Boundaries of Ecocriticism* ed. Karla Ambruster and Kathleen R. Wallace (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 2001), 61-65. McColley’s analysis of Milton shows that Drayton anticipates many of the same concerns about human-nonhuman interdependence and care.

⁸⁴ “I will also put enmity between thee [the serpent] and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed”. Genesis 3:15.

⁸⁵ Willet, *Hexapla*, H6v.

*In these his creatures, that so well agree:
Which were they not, thus mastred by his power,
Vs silly eight would greedily deuoure:
And with their hoofes and pawes, to splinters rend
This onely Arke [...]
(342.569-74).*

Man's dominion hangs in the balance during this catastrophe: Noah admits the fact that the eight humans have not been eaten alive is miraculous. Drayton emphasises the physical strength of the animals: they are capable of rending the ark to "splinters". Man has no power in this turbulent box-space, all he can do is hope that God remains favourable. In the dark belly of the ark, there is a two-way pressure upon Man's status, threatened from above and below on the Great Chain of Being.⁸⁶ Man is compelled to care for animals out of fear: fear of divine threat, and fear of animal violence. Nonhuman animals exist to keep Man occupied, provided for, and challenged, mindful of his precarious position at the top of an earthly hierarchy. This is anthropocentric, controlling, narcissistic caring.

Though anthropocentrism and a speciesist narcissism are important factors in these early modern human-animal care relations, they are not the whole story. Reading contemporary writing on real-world flooding in England, a more capacious model appears. A 1607 report of disastrous flooding in the Bristol Channel includes moving anecdotes about the suffering of animals as waters surged up the Severn estuary. The anonymous author grieves for the "lamentable spectacle" of

whole heards of Cattle, struggling for life with the flouds, Oxen in great numbers were caryed away with the streame, and looked like so many whales in y^e Sea: their bellowing made a noise in the water as if it had bin a tempest, and that y^e Sea had roared. The flocks of Sheep that are vtterly destroyed by this Land-wracke are innumerable, none knowes the losse for the present but the owner of them: But the whole land wil I feare feele the smart.⁸⁷

When the author refers to the loss which "none knowes [...]" but the owner", there is a sense that this is more than economic; it suggests an emotional connection between the owner and their animals. Other animals also struggled to survive: there were "conies in great numbers being driuen out of their boroughes by the tyde, [who] were seene to sit for safety on the backs of sheepe, as they swom up &

⁸⁶ The "Great Chain of Being" is shorthand for the Platonic theory of a natural hierarchy, which informed thinking from antiquity to beyond the early modern period. Harrison's *The Bible, Protestantism and The Rise of Natural Science* shows how this idea repeatedly appeared in writing on nature through the centuries: 39; 54; 163; 180; 230.

⁸⁷ 1607. *A True Report*, B1r.

down and at last were drowned with them”.⁸⁸ The report also tells of people desperately trying to save their animals, and mourning their loss.⁸⁹ One anecdote mentions a shepherd who, witnessing the flooding, ran to save his flock. Unfortunately, he was not quick enough and was forced “to climb vp into a tree: there hee saw the confusion of hys whole flock: they swom to and fro bleating for helpe, he satte tearing his hayre and beating his breasts; crying mainly out but could not save thē”.⁹⁰ Though these accounts constitute less of the historical text than is dedicated to human suffering, they provide important evidence for how the suffering of animals communicates the surge as a more-than-human tragedy.

Drayton constructs a similarly dramatic fate for the animals who do not make it to the ark. He begins with livestock: animals with whom humans would have the most intimate relationship in a way that calls to mind the flooding reports which feature domestic animals, and do not attend to the loss of non-domestic animal life:

Up to some Mountaine as the people make,
Driving their Cattell till the shower should slake;
The Floud oretakes them, and away doth sweepe
Great heards of Neate, and mighty flockes of Sheepe.
(344.675-78)

The “Great heards of Neate” – cattle – echo those found in the 1607 report, bellowing in distress as they drown; likewise the “mighty flockes of Sheepe” can be visualised swimming “to and fro” like their real counterparts. Drayton’s description of people “driving their Cattell” up mountains to keep them safe parallels the stories of shepherds attempting to save their sheep, and rescue attempts to save stranded cattle (see Appendix). Whether or not Drayton is recalling this specific disaster, narrating the loss of animal life is an important tool for conveying the magnitude of flooding.

Outside the ark, contemporary flooding reports show kinship in the suffering of humans and nonhumans. These providential accounts show distress and death across species: rabbits leap onto the backs of sheep to save themselves, humans flee to trees and rooftops; flooding affects humans and their fellow land-dwellers.⁹¹ The reports also demonstrate an understanding that humans, particularly livestock owners, have a clear responsibility towards particular groups of nonhumans, “nurturing [...] all that is necessary for the welfare and flourishing of life”.⁹² Reading “Noahs Floud”

⁸⁸ Ibid., Blv.

⁸⁹ As an illustrative example I have included an appendix containing a transcription of an account of the fate of a herd of cows in Norfolk.

⁹⁰ 1607. *A True Report*, B2r.

⁹¹ Disaster narratives, especially floods, were popular throughout the seventeenth century. These “formulaic” providentialist pamphlets were often embellished with generic woodcuts and recycled linguistic tropes and presented “remarkable coherence as a genre”. John Emrys Morgan, “Understanding Flooding in Early Modern England”, *Journal of Historical Geography* 50 (2015): 37-50, esp. 40-41.

⁹² Chatzidakis et al., *The Care Manifesto*, NP.

alongside these narratives, it is evident the poem draws urgent, contemporary concerns about catastrophic weather events, combining this with biblical material to think about Man's ability to control and care for other species.⁹³

Drayton imagines "the intelligence of other species" and invites "human audiences to feel kinship with those species".⁹⁴ This is unsurprising, considering that Drayton had consistently expressed ecological concerns in earlier work.⁹⁵ However, as with its figuring of the earthly body, "Noahs Flood" pushes its imaginative reach beyond its source material. There is one group of animals that benefit from the Flood: sea creatures. Drayton had hermeneutic precedent here, with Willet explaining that fish "are not herewith threatened also to be destroyed" (i.e. in Genesis 6:7), partly "because they lived in that element wherewith God purposed to overflow the earth" and also because "neither had man so much abused them, as the other kinds".⁹⁶ Raleigh quotes Augustine, explaining that "it was the earth, and not the waters, which God cursed".⁹⁷ Keeping the sea creatures alive is practical, but these animals have also been preserved from the worst of Man's cruelty: "abuse" seems to refer to bestiality, as when discussing the destruction of the land animals Willet claims that "beastly men had abused the creatures to their filthy pleasure and riotous excesse", and so "it standeth with Gods iustice to punish the instrument with the principall".⁹⁸ Sea creatures are not punished alongside Man, and all the other nonhuman animals, because they were less likely to be used as instruments of bestiality, and because they dwell in a different element. Taking these ideas into account, the Deluge precipitates a moment of freedom for sea-creatures, unlike the indiscriminate destruction of those who live above the water.

Rather than thinking only about the devastation of the Flood, Drayton embraces the possibilities this opens up for those who live in an alternate world. He writes

[...] those scaly creatures us'd to keepe,
The mighty wastes of the immeasured deepe:
Finding the generall and their naturall bracke,
The taste and colour every were to lacke;

⁹³ There is extensive evidence from the late medieval period onwards of English concerns with flooding and how to manage it. Morgan's "Understanding Flooding" shows how minutes from the commissions of sewers and local parish records provide important sources for exploring how flooding was thought about in the early modern period, 44-49. Tim Soens' article discusses how the late medieval period saw an increase in disastrous flooding on North Sea coasts, and the social concerns and fears this awoke in those affected: "Flood Security in the Medieval and Early Modern North Sea Area: A Question of Entitlement", *Environment and History* 19, no.2 (2013), 209-32.

⁹⁴ Adams, "Interspecies Care", 708.

⁹⁵ Analysis of this has focused on *Poly-Olbion*: Borlik, *Ecocriticism*, 96-104; Sukanya Dasgupta, "Drayton's 'Silent Spring': *Poly-Olbion* and the Politics of Landscape", *The Cambridge Quarterly* 39, no.2 (2010): 152-71; Andrew McRae, "Tree-Felling in Early Modern England: Michael Drayton's Environmentalism", *The Review of English Studies* 63, no. 260 (2012): 410-30; Sara Trevisan, "'The murmuring woods euen shuddred as with feare': Deforestation in Michael Drayton's *Poly-Olbion*", *The Seventeenth Century* 26, no.2 (2011): 240-63.

⁹⁶ Willet, *Hexapla*, G3v. Genesis 6:7: "Therefore the Lord said, I will destroy from the earth the man, whom I have created, from man to beast, to the creeping thing, and to the fowl of the heaven; for I repent that I have made them."

⁹⁷ Raleigh, *History of the World*, L2r.

⁹⁸ Willet, *Hexapla*, G3v

Forsake those Seas wherein the swamme before,
Strangely oppressed with their watry store.
(345-46.717-22)

Drayton's interpretation of the sea-creatures as "strangely oppressed" is anthropo- and terra-centric, but underscores how these animals are breaking out of their allotted space.⁹⁹ It is as if the sea creatures are trying to find salt-water ("bracke") but cannot, and so adapt. They seem to enjoy it:

The crooked Dolphin on those Mountaines playes,
Whereas before that time, not many daies
The Goate was grazing; and the mighty Whale,
Upon a Rocke out of his way doth fall:
From whence before one eas'ly might have seene,
The wandring clouds farre under to haue beene.
The Grampus, and the Whirlpoole, as they rove,
Lighting by chance upon the lofty Grove
Under this world of waters, are so much
Pleas'd with their wombes each tender branch to touch,
That they leave slyme upon the curled Sprayes,
On which the Birds sung their harmonious Layes.
(346.723-34)

As in his description of the antediluvian world, Drayton borrows directly from Deucalion's flood in the *Metamorphoses*. However, the tone is quite different. Ovid (in Sandys' translation) reports:

Where Mountayne-louing goats did lately graze,
The Sea-calf now his vgly body layes.
Groues, Cities, Temples, couer'd by the Deep,
The Nymphs admire, in woods the Delphins keep,
And chace about the boughs [...]¹⁰⁰

Though the ugly sea-calf is a direct translation, Sandys' dolphins show restraint compared with the original Latin. The verb Sandys translates as "keep" is "teneo", but this holds senses of possessive control and dominance: it is invasive.¹⁰¹ Sandys omits two other verbs as well, "incursant" and "pulsant": the dolphins are rushing towards or through the trees in an aggressive fashion, beating against them.¹⁰² Conversely, Drayton's dolphin is playful, and he introduces three more animals to

⁹⁹ For animals having rights to certain spaces, see Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 29-81.

¹⁰⁰ Ovid, *Ovid's Metamorphosis*, B6r.

¹⁰¹ *An Elementary Latin Dictionary*, s.v. "teneo".

¹⁰² Ovid, *Metamorphoses, Volume I*, trans. Frank Justus Miller, Loeb Classical Library 42, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916), 22, l.302-303.

populate this watery wood. The “grampus” and the “whirlpoole” – both types of whale – enjoy this new “world of waters”, as does the whale surprised by a boulder. The scene evolves from aquatic invasion in Ovid, to something gently piscatorial in Sandys’ translation, to Drayton’s delightful playtime.

Primarily, this passage serves to emphasise the height of the Flood, yet it is also invested in the animals’ happiness. The grampus and whirlpoole are particularly intriguing, who are “so much / Pleas’d with their wombes each tender branch to touch”. Following the definition of womb as belly, these creatures might simply enjoy the sensation of having their tummies tickled by the branches.¹⁰³ Extending the imagination, this tummy-tickling is likely a new sensation for the sea-creatures: how many trees are there in the ocean? It is a moment of pure joy after the earthly destruction.¹⁰⁴ Unlike the annihilation of life above the waves, underwater life is thriving. Drayton’s choice of the word “womb” to describe the animals’ abdomens is telling, recalling the fertility of the earthly body.

The text challenges readers to interpret whether the slime from the whales has been produced internally and expressed, or whether Drayton is thinking of the whales as coated with something mucus-like. With the increasing commodification of whale oil during this period, these creatures were known for their internal sliminess.¹⁰⁵ I have found only a single further reference to specifically *slimy* cetaceans, and this is in a translation of some Spanish sermons printed in 1629. The author saves particular ire for Jonah who is vomited up by the whale covered with “filthie slime and oyle” and “froathie slime, and unctuous stuff”.¹⁰⁶ Still, in linking the slime with the whales’ wombs, whether that means their external bellies or their internal organs, Drayton draws again on medical terminology for the human body: slime is also a “viscous substance or fluid of animal or vegetable origin: mucus, semen, etc”.¹⁰⁷ Wirsung’s *The General Practise of Physicke* contains over 100 references to “slime”, for the most part describing mucus of varying consistencies, or a type of medicinal syrup (“musilage”).¹⁰⁸ Thinking slime in a fertile sense, French physician Jacques Guillemeau suggests

[husbands] should not embrace their wiues all the time of their being with child, but onely toward the time of their lying in, thereby to shake the child, and make him come the more readily forth; for comming into the world

¹⁰³ OED, “womb, n.”, def. 1.a.

¹⁰⁴ Drayton’s poetic delight in marine life parallels Adam and Eve’s enjoyment of Edenic nonhumanity: “what animals supply them is delight in otherness”. McColley, “Milton’s Environmental Epic”, 61.

¹⁰⁵ The financial importance of these unctuous productions is emphasised in a royal proclamation issued by Charles I in 1636: England and Wales, Sovereign (1625-1649 : Charles I), *By the King. A Proclamation Inhibiting the Importation of VVhale Finnes, Or VVhale Oile [...]* (London, 1636).

¹⁰⁶ Cristobál de Fonseca, *Deuout Contemplations expressed in two and fortie sermons* (London, 1629), K4r; M3v.

¹⁰⁷ OED “slime, n.”, def. 2.a.

¹⁰⁸ Data found using the “Text Creation Partnership” text available on *Early Modern Books Online*, and counting results returned for “slime”, <https://www.proquest.com/books/general-practise-physicke-conteyning-all-inward/docview/2240919634/se-2?accountid=15181> (accessed September 14, 2021).

after this acte, he is commonly enwrapped and compassed with slime,
which helpeth his coming forth.¹⁰⁹

Guillemeau is reporting Aristotle's and Hippocrates' suggestion that sex near labour coats the baby with a combination of vaginal discharge and semen. Reading this understanding of slime into the whales' experience of pleasure in the trees opens up a possibility of a marine *jouissance*. The slime exists precisely because the creatures are "so much pleas'd [...] *that they leave slyme upon the curled Sprayes*" (emphasis my own): the mucus, whatever it is, is a direct result of the animals' pleasure.

At the close of his article, "Beyond Caring", Halberstam poses a question: "What if, I want to ask, the animal needs not to care about us in order to attend to its own survival?"¹¹⁰ Drayton's marine mammals answer this provocation. Drayton's imaginative turn at this moment is striking as he tunes into the idea of animal emotion: these animals delight in novelty. The poem tells us not just that the Flood was so high there were whales in the trees, but that *there were whales in the trees who were enjoying the new freedoms and physical sensations of this massive environmental change*. It is a genuinely marvellous moment: Drayton finds nonhuman marine joy in the anthropogenic destruction of terran life. Playing with the ambiguity of biblical precedence, Drayton reconciles this with an Ovidian water-world in order to build something totally a-human.

In "Noahs Floud", Drayton uses nonhuman animals to think about the consequences of natural disasters for nonhuman life, and their responses to it. Like Haraway's vision of SF, Drayton is "following a thread in the dark" thinking carefully about "who lives and who dies [...] for the cultivating of multispecies justice".¹¹¹ He makes clear the unjust treatment of the earthly body; he shows how Man, through seconds of carelessness, nearly eradicates an entire taxonomic class; gestures to humans and animals taking their dying breaths together, but shows how nonhumans are able to claim space and redress the balance of power. His text expresses the anthropocentric narcissism behind human care of nonhuman animals but subtly undercuts it with hints of servility. "Noahs Floud" also relays broader cultural concerns about the relationships between humans and domestic nonhuman lives, and indulges in speculative, imaginative play, seeking out joy in environments alien and hostile to the human. Ovid again appears as a useful source for thinking about nonhuman spaces and experiences, but Drayton also works with contemporary discourse around flooding to explore further the nonhuman experience. As Borlik words it, Drayton's poem "insist[s] on the animacy of other species" throughout, and "Noahs Floud" defies traditional understandings of nonhumans in the scriptural narrative and in biblical exegesis.¹¹² The poem follows interests that Drayton explored in many of his other texts; in drawing on a biblical narrative to do so, it lends these

¹⁰⁹ Jacques Guillemeau, *Child-birth or, The Happy Deliuerie of VVomen*, trans. anon (London, 1612), C4v.

¹¹⁰ Halberstam, "Beyond Caring", 723.

¹¹¹ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 3.

¹¹² Borlik, "Invention of the Disaster Epic", 129.

ideas particular ecological urgency, especially in light of contemporary flooding disasters. Examining these ideas through the lens of care gives readers a space to consider the specific role of Man in flood narratives, and his relationship to the living world more broadly. As the next section argues, the way in which Man cares and how much he does so has global ramifications.

THE ROLE OF MAN(URE)

Appreciating the aftermath of the Deluge in “Noahs Floud” means attending to the anthropogenic nature of its origin. The biblical text blames Man, but does not explain the punishment of nonhuman animals and the earthly body alongside humanity:

[5] When the Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and all the imaginations of the thoughts of his heart *were* only evil continually, [6] Then it repented the Lord, that he had made man in the earth, and he was sorry in his heart. [7] Therefore the Lord said, I will destroy from the earth the man, whom I have created, from man to beast, to the creeping thing, and to the fowl of the heaven: for I repent that I have made them.¹¹³

The text offers no precise description of this “wickedness”, only that “the earth was filled with cruelty”.¹¹⁴ Before commissioning the ark, God tells Noah that “an end of all flesh is come before me: for the earth is filled with cruelty through them: and behold, I will destroy them with the earth”.¹¹⁵ There are two things I want to pick up on here: the vagueness of the biblical description of Man’s sin, and the way in which the text collects up humanity and nonhumanity in “them” and “all flesh”. This section considers how Drayton’s text expresses human responsibility for the Flood and how the nonhuman world, both animal and earthly, suffers as an innocent victim. I focus on how Drayton thinks about the fertility of the post-Flood world, and how it differs from the antediluvian one. This comparative thinking is illustrative of broader anxieties around Man’s understanding of nature and his ability to damage the face of the earth, however unwittingly.

God’s punishment of “all flesh” indicates a slipperiness of species and activities; this slipperiness invited lurid speculation on antediluvian behaviour. Willet collates accounts from different authors: men “by violence took vnto them, not to their wives, but women [...] from all men whatsoever [...] both virgins, and wiues, they cared not whom [...] Some Hebrewes here vnderstood also the filthie sinne of buggerie: that they tooke all they liked, even from among the bruit beasts [...]”.¹¹⁶ Willet is also concerned by the activities of the giants, who “did tyrannize ouer their

¹¹³ Genesis 6:5-7.

¹¹⁴ Genesis 6:11.

¹¹⁵ Genesis 6:13.

¹¹⁶ Willet, *Hexapla*, Glv.

neighbours, and brought them in subiection: of whome *Berosius* writeth [...] they did eate mans flesh, and had vnlawfull companie with their mothers, daughters, with mules, and bruit beasts”.¹¹⁷ Though during the sixteenth century the writing of “Berosius” who Willet cites here was demonstrated to be a fifteenth-century fraud, authors like Willet and Raleigh found ‘his’ work to be a fruitful source of information.¹¹⁸ Drayton, too, appears to embrace these accounts in his retelling.¹¹⁹

Antediluvian men tear wild animals apart in order to dress themselves, following their “sensuall will” and “lust” (329.91). Drayton works cannibalism, rape, incest, and bestiality into a horrific explosion of sinfulness:

With one anothers flesh themselves they fil’d,
And drunke the bloud of those whom they had kil’d.
They dar’d doe, what none should dare to name,
They never heard of such a thing as shame.
Man mixt with man, and Daughter, Sister, Mother,
Were to these wicked men as any other.
To rip their wombes, they would not stick,
When they perceiv’d once they were waxed quicke.
Feeding on that, from their own loynes that sprong,
Such wickednesse these Monsters were among:
That they us’d Beasts, digressing from all kinde [...]
(329.95-105)¹²⁰

Echoing the myth of Kronos devouring his own children, and using material from religious thinkers and literary forgers, Drayton’s antediluvian cannibal-rapists foreshadow their own demise, killing off their progeny or, in the case of bestiality, simply failing to reproduce. The early productivity of the earthly body begets a frenzied violence.

It is just after this list that God begins to “repent himself that he created man” (329.108). If the list presents sins in an ascending order of depravity, it suggests that the way Man “us’d” animals is what offends the Lord the most, and this is what triggers the flooding; if Man had only gone as far as anthropophagy, things might not have been so bad. This tracks with providentialist reports of the 1607 floods, which suggest that there might be a level of sinfulness that God will tolerate before launching apocalyptic waters. The account of the Bristol surge claims God “fils out the measures of

¹¹⁷ Ibid., G2v.

¹¹⁸ Walter Stephens, “Complex Pseudonymity: Annius of Viterbo’s Multiple Persona Disorder”, *Modern Language Notes* 126, no.4 (2011): 689-708. Raleigh cites “Berosus” in his *History of the World* e.g. “Berosus writeth in this manner; *That they exceeded in all sorts of inhumane and vnaturall wickednesse [...]*”, Klv.

¹¹⁹ A marginal note at line 98 indicates “Berosus cited by Piriarius”. “Noahs Flood”, 329.

¹²⁰ For the relationship between “kin”, “kinde”, and early modern animals, see Erica Fudge, *Quick Cattle and Dying Wishes: People and their Animals in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 162-205.

his chasticement according to the quality and proportion of our offences” and that this flood has occurred “to afright vs the more to make vs look about”, and so the Lord only “menaceth” in this disaster.¹²¹ The account of the same flooding in Monmouthshire echoes this language: the Lord “doth threaten greiuous calamities evē against our vice”.¹²² Yet animals and the earth are included as victims of these threats: in order to make His point, the Lord “doth strike our Cattle with diseases; he takes away the liues of our beasts fit for labor: he destroys Corne-fields, threatens vs with famine”.¹²³ Human sin impacts the natural world which then has a direct, negative impact on humanity: there is an imbalanced interdependence in the stakes of sin.

Willet’s account of why all land animals were killed in the Deluge makes this interdependence clear, with an aggressively anthropocentric understanding of Man’s position and power in the world:

Not onely man shall be destroyed, but the other creatures with him, and yet man onely had sinned. The reason is, 1. As *Chrysostome* sheweth, because all things were made for mans vse [...] and therefore when man is taken away, there should be no use of them. 2. Like as when the head is cut off, all the members die, so together with man the creatures, ouer which he had power, are punished: not onely he, but his. Hereby the severitie of Gods punishment appeareth, as also the greatnes of mans sinne, that brought destruction vpon many [...] Because beastly men had abused the creatures to their filthy pleasure and riotous excesse, it standeth with Gods iustice to punish the instrument with the principall.¹²⁴

Drayton’s choice of the verb “us’d” to describe bestiality picks up on this more general idea of animals existing for humanity only, not in their own right. For John Chrysostom, nonhuman animals are purely instrumental; as instruments of sin they must be destroyed in this purge, according to “Gods iustice”. Drayton offers his reader no such easy get-out, providing no explanation for the death of nonhumans. His ire seems reserved for the humans who have allowed their “sensuall will” to overcome all reason.

This disdain for sinners is clearest towards the end of the poem. In a spectacular panorama, Drayton considers the consequences of an apocalyptic flood: mass extermination. With the ark roof opened, everyone delights in the daylight, but then looks out to see

[...] a Plaine,

¹²¹ 1607. *A True Report*, A3r; A3v-A4r.

¹²² 1607. *Lamenetable Newes*, B4v.

¹²³ 1607. *A True Report*, A4r.

¹²⁴ Willet, *Hexapla*, G3v.

A Mountaines top which seemed to containe,
 On which they might discern within their ken,
 The carkasses of Birds, of Beasts, and men,
 Choak'd by the Deluge [...]
 (352.961-65)

This is a distressing foundation for rebuilding Creation. Surveying the open space, Noah and his family discern their dead “ken”. This ken relates Noah and his family to beasts and birds, as well as humans. The survivors seem to view all the corpses as equal, rather than looking at the humans and not really *seeing* the rest. This heaping up of ken amplifies the Flood’s destructive power, but also emphasises that the anthropogenic crisis of the Flood resulted in more than human lives being lost. Man becomes “one animal among many” in a now extinct sublunary community.¹²⁵

It is horrifying that Drayton describes these corpses as having been “chaok’d” by the Flood, not drowned. The word is distressingly immediate, and harks back to the slimy thickness of the antediluvian world. The bodies strewn across the landscape recall the 1607 storm surge, where near Bristol “men, women, and children perished: theyr deade bodies floate hourelly aboue-water, and are continually taken vppe”. The adverbs reinforce the huge loss of life, before the author remarks “it cannot yet be knowne, how manye haue fell in this Tempest of God’s fearful iudgement”.¹²⁶ Though the author does not mention dead animals among the humans, the account lends a shocking realism to Drayton’s description. Rather than dwelling on this loss of life, however, “Noahs Floud” looks forward to the new world.

The appearance of this new world is anticipated earlier by Noah as he speaks to his family during the Flood. He tells them to

[...] *bid the goodly fruitfull earth adue,*
For the next time it shall be scene of you,
It with an ill complexion shall appeare,
The weight of waters shall have chang’d her cheere.
 (342.597-600).

Recalling the craggy-faced, mucus-strewn hag with which Drayton left the reader, this is something of an understatement: Noah cannot imagine the destruction which awaits, though the “ill complexion” captures the sickness which has befallen the antediluvian world. However, Drayton’s use of the word “cheere” is revealing: it can refer to the face, specifically to the expression on it (with an adjectival qualifier), an emotional state, or even a “kind or benevolent disposition [...] esp. kindly

¹²⁵ Helena Feder, “Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism*, ed. Greg Garrard (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 227.

¹²⁶ 1607. *A True Report*, B2v.

welcome shown to a visitor; hospitality”.¹²⁷ Drayton has already described how the physical face of the earth has changed, with an emotional expression of her grief at this transformation. Beyond this, the idea that she will *behave* differently towards Man is especially discomfiting: no longer welcoming, the earth is a woman scorned. Drayton’s language captures the hostility of God’s curse.

The earth is covered in human and nonhuman corpses, presenting a newly-hostile force to be reckoned with, and there is only one group to blame: the sinners. Having taken in the scene, Noah reassures his family, praising God for having engineered the ark’s safe landing. This omniscient pragmatism extends to the corpses:

*But see except these heere [i.e. the survivors on the ark], each living thing
That crept, or went, or kept the Aire with wing,
Lye heere before us to manure the Land,
Such is the power of Gods all workeing hand.
(352.977-80)*

Calling all Man’s ken “manure” is both practical and callous. Drayton encourages readers to infer Genesis 9:20: “Noah also began *to be* an husbandman, and planted a vineyard”.¹²⁸ To talk of manure is to talk of fertility, new life and recovery, but it is also to talk of smelly waste.

In this language there are echoes of the providentialist report on the 1607 storm surge and its effects in south Wales. The writer meditates on the biblical Deluge, arguing that antediluvian Man:

grew shameless in all euill courses, wee see that Almightye God being
mooued vnto wrath by their enormous vices, sent a floud vpon them, and
swept them away from the face of the earth, like dung and excrements [...]¹²⁹

The imagery is straightforward: for this author, the antediluvian sinners are literal shit to be hurriedly washed away. Drayton, however, operates differently: though these bodies are “manure”, they are not the “excrement” of the Monmouthshire flood reporter. “Manure” in contemporary husbandry manuals almost always refers to dung, and such texts emphasise the importance of this stuff to the fertility of the land. A 1616 translation of Charles Estienne’s *Maison Rustique*, for example, contains over 150 references to manure.¹³⁰ More intriguingly, and horribly, shortly before “Noahs Floud” was printed, a couple of late sixteenth-century texts use “manure” relating to corpse-covered

¹²⁷ OED, ‘cheer, n.1’, defs. I.1.a, I.2.a, I.3.

¹²⁸ Genesis 9:20.

¹²⁹ 1607. *Lamentable Newes*, B3v.

¹³⁰ Charles Estienne, *Maison Rustique* [...], trans. Richard Surlet (1616). Data found using the “Text Creation Partnership” text available on *Early Modern Books Online*, and counting results returned for “manure”, “manured”, and “manuring”. <https://www.proquest.com/books/maison-rustique-countrey-farme-compyled-french/docview/2269047361/se-2?accountid=15181> (accessed September 14, 2021).

battlefields.¹³¹ Evoking this gory image, Drayton renders the Flood's destruction as interspecies carnage. Ultimately it does not matter whether a being has the capacity to operate as an interspecies steward, or is to be stewarded: all end up as waste matter, good only for producing something else. By calling the sinners "manure", Drayton co-opts the rhetoric of disgust alongside a more ambivalent discourse around the necessary use of manure in agricultural work, in order to provide a foundation for the postdiluvian vineyard.

This awareness of and desire to work the land contrasts sharply with the antediluvian world. Before the Flood, there was no agricultural labour: the earthly body was so fertile that she demanded no input from Man: the earth "all plenty did afford, / And without tilling (of her owne accord)" (328.69-70). Drayton is drawing on the Ovidian golden world again here, in which "Forth-with the Earth come, vnmanured, beares; / And euery yeere renewes her golden Eares".¹³² In the Ovidian text, the golden world simply decays into the silver, and life gets more difficult for Man. However, for Drayton, it is precisely the lack of labour that generates Man's sinfulness: the following couplet explains "that living idly without taking pain / (Like to the first) made every man a *Caine*" (328.71-72). When the earthly body is generous of her own accord, this leads to idleness, which leads to sin. A lack of agricultural labour made man murderous and violent, says Drayton, and he follows biblical precedent. The Old Testament extols the joy of agriculture, Ecclesiastes in particular: "there is no profit to man, but that he eat and drink, and delight his soul with the profit of his labour".¹³³ Similarly, "every man [should] eateth and drinketh, and seeth the commodity of all his labour. This is the gift of God".¹³⁴ Psalm 128 reiterates the point: "When thou eatest the labours of thine hands, thou shalt be blessed, and it shall be well with thee".¹³⁵

Willet and Raleigh apply these ideas to Genesis. Willet describes Noah as a "man of the earth" who "delighted in husbandrie", and argues that, though there were antediluvian vines, "Noah brought the grape to more perfection".¹³⁶ Raleigh emphasises the stability agriculture brings: it is the "businesse" of a husbandman "to dresse and manure the earth; and not to range ouer so many parts of the world".¹³⁷ "Dress" is a beautifully capacious verb: it has agricultural applications, but a wealth of definitions are available, including senses of setting in order, styling and treating, as well as clothing and decoration, and these are all important when thinking about the milieu of Drayton's manure.¹³⁸ The manifold modes of attentiveness which "dress" contains speak to the variety of care work Man must undertake in this postdiluvian world. Willet and Raleigh's accounts work with scriptural

¹³¹ OED, "manure, v.", def. 5.c.

¹³² Ovid, *Metamorphosis*, B3r.

¹³³ Ecclesiastes 2:24.

¹³⁴ Ecclesiastes 3:13.

¹³⁵ Psalms 128:2.

¹³⁶ Willet, *Hexapla*, I5v.

¹³⁷ Raleigh, *History of the World*, L5r.

¹³⁸ OED, "dress, v.".

precedent, presenting a pastoral joy in agricultural labour and commending the capacity of the husbandman for earthly improvement. Working with the earth provides spiritual and physical satisfaction, and is necessary for salvation. Noah is the perfect example of this, and the newly-manured world is rich in spiritual promise. The biblical source advocates for a thoroughgoing attention. But in “Noahs Floud”, postdiluvian Man does not labour innocently: he is building on antediluvian remains.

The imperfection sprouting from this sinful compost results in difficulties. Though, as Willet acknowledges, Man’s privileges of reproduction, dominion and ready food are renewed after the Flood, the dynamic is different. They are “not in that integritie and perfection” which they were before: now, “the generation of man is with much difficultie and perill: his dominion over creatures much impaired: his food more grosse, *and with greater care provided*”.¹³⁹ Willet’s reading of God’s new covenant in Genesis 8 and 9 is helpful for reading the closing dynamics of “Noahs Floud”. The idea that every interaction with the newly hostile earthly body will now need to be managed with “greater care”, whether painstaking, tender, or a mixture of the two, and Raleigh’s formulation of husbandry dressing the earth, shade Noah’s vision of productive manure with uncertainty. Nothing is guaranteed, and the new divine covenant demands Man *address* the earthly body and his nonhuman counterparts with a greater delicacy of touch.¹⁴⁰

This delicacy is extended to the nonhuman animals, who Noah attends to before dismissing, saying

Now take you all free liberty to goe,
And every way doe you yourselves disperse,
Till you have fild this globy universe
With your increase, let every soyle be yours.
He that hath sav’d thee faithfully assures
Your propagation.
(354.1040-45)

Borlik’s reading of these closing lines recognises an affirmative possibility in this new level of care for the world; the poem advocates for caring work to be done. In this statement, “post-catastrophe humanity” is forced to rethink their position in the world; “rather than teach the resignation of tragic apocalypticism, Noah’s ordeal on the ark inculcates resilience and a sacred commitment to the ‘propagation’ (and hence protection) of non-humans”.¹⁴¹ A new level of care is already in practice:

¹³⁹ Willet, *Hexapla*, I5v. Emphasis my own.

¹⁴⁰ There was an acute urgency to understanding this delicacy of touch. See Ayesha Mukherjee, “Manured with the Starres”: Recovering an Early Modern Discourse of Sustainability”, *Literature Compass* 11, no.9 (2014): 602-14.

¹⁴¹ Borlik, “Invention of Disaster Epic”, 130-31. Again, Drayton anticipates Milton’s model of Man’s relationship to animal life: postlapsarian “human government of [animals] must now be concerned with preserving their seed”. McColley, “Milton’s Environmental Epic”, 72.

Noah's speech figures animals as "co-owners" of the earth, with "every soyle" now promised them.¹⁴² The poem's end feels almost utopian and unites all species to rebuild. Noah closes by announcing "To make a new world, thus works every one, / The Deluge ceaseth, and the old is gone" (354.1051-52). Yet the poem ends on a lie. Noah would have it that "the old is gone", but he has also identified the bodies around the ark as nourishment for the new world all beings are working to create. There is a transformation of substance in place, but it is not a clean one: the future looks uncertain.

Taking up Chrysostom's image of Man as the head of an earthly body containing multitudes, Drayton's Man becomes a head cannibalising the lifeless members of its body, shaping and reforming them into potentially toxic produce in a self-destructive mutilation. The wine produced by the grapes of Noah's husbandry leads to his drunken nudity, which results in the cursing of Ham, and initiates another downward spiral for at least one branch of Man. Drayton's text anticipates this in its nod to scriptural husbandry. The post-Flood world is fertile like the first, but it is weakened, needs deep care and attention from all species, and does not bear fruit without potential spiritual cost. Reading in the present, be that the seventeenth century or the twenty-first century, readers are yet to see this care and attentiveness appear, and this is tragic. Man was offered an opportunity to take responsibility on a species-wide level, and did not. Though the text promotes care as "necessary for the welfare and flourishing of life", it does so in the knowledge that life is not flourishing as it once was.¹⁴³ The sinfulness of antediluvian humanity physically changes the earth and Man's relationship to it.¹⁴⁴ This uncertain future speaks to Drayton's contemporary world of climactic volatility, political instability, and environmental destruction. Cultivation and dressing cannot disguise the fact that for Drayton, the "old" world is never quite gone. The new earthly body is nourished by the residue of sinfulness and will be forever dirtied by it.

CONCLUSION

Lydia Barnett emphasises how seventeenth-century Flood writing often collapses chronology. The providential significance of the Deluge necessitated relating the biblical past to the instability of the present and exploring possible futures. She writes that understanding the Flood:

could yield insight into how the world would end and who would be saved.
If European scholars felt insecure about their lack of knowledge of the globe
in their present moment, conjuring a lost world and a past disaster – as well
as a future disaster and a future world yet to be born – gave their

¹⁴² Borlik, "Invention of Disaster Epic", 131.

¹⁴³ Chatzidakis et al., *The Care Manifesto*, NP.

¹⁴⁴ Drayton seems to be 60 years ahead of works such as Thomas Burnet's *Telluris Theoria Sacra* (London, 1681-1689). See Barnett, *After the Flood*, 89-128, especially 90: "[...] by cataloging [sic.] the Flood's devastating effects on the physical earth and climate, Burnet sought to demonstrate that sin was a powerful, world-historical force capable of ruining the global environment. He also wanted to argue that these catastrophic changes in nature the world over, the unanticipated yet richly deserved result of human action, afterward placed limits on humans' capacity to better themselves and their world".

imaginations free reign, largely unconstrained by empirical reality [...] The empirical unavailability of their object of study left them free to imagine the world they had lost and the terrifying process by which it was destroyed, to ruminate on the sins of their forefathers, and to speculate about how they might redeem themselves and their ruined planet in the future.¹⁴⁵

I quote Barnett's summary at length because it is wholly apt for thinking about Drayton's work. John Emrys Morgan also touches on this blurry chronology in early modern English flood writing: "providential literature set tragedy in a cosmological and national context, appealing to long-held beliefs in God's intervention in human and natural affairs".¹⁴⁶ Man's ability to affect the natural world has ramifications forwards into a cosmological future, and that ability to affect the natural world stems from a cosmologically-understood past.¹⁴⁷ In this strange horizontal and vertical understanding of biblical time and the living world, though Drayton writes about the past, the way in which chronology folds in on itself in early modern natural philosophy and flood reporting lends this poem a tense urgency.

Considering ecologies of the past, Heise turns to the work of Frederic Jameson, who notes that "science fiction" offers "multiple mock futures" which transform "our own present into the determinate past of something yet to come [...] SF thus enacts and enables a structurally unique 'method' for apprehending the present as history".¹⁴⁸ "Noahs Floud", with its scientific interests, ecological urgency, and chronological collapse, offers history as the present and broods ominously over what may come. The text advocates for greater care to be taken over human activities in an interdependent world. Drayton does this through acquisitive, speculative world-making, which for the most part foregrounds the nonhuman experience over the human. Through this speculative writing, "Noahs Floud" opens the door for readers to consider "the ethical tradeoffs [sic.] when the care of one species results in suffering for another".¹⁴⁹

Drayton's advocacy for the nonhuman world takes a threefold approach. By imagining a physiologically-governed earthly body, Drayton connects the management of the earth and management of the human: both demand care to flourish, and are interdependent. Attending to terran and aquatic animals, and contemporary environmental concerns, he transforms a biblical origin story into a contemporary parable of ecological disaster. Finally, by circling back to issues of fertility at the end of "Noahs Floud", Drayton underlines the legacy of historic, careless sinfulness. The poem offers

¹⁴⁵ Barnett, *After the Flood*, 15.

¹⁴⁶ Emrys Morgan, "Understanding Flooding", 50.

¹⁴⁷ Catastrophe narratives extricated themselves from this chronological collapse over the seventeenth century, according to Françoise Lavocat: "Narratives of Catastrophe in the Early Modern Period: Awareness of Historicity and Emergence of Interpretative Viewpoints", *Poetics Today* 33, no.3-4 (2012): 288.

¹⁴⁸ Frederic Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions* (New York: Verso, 2005), 288, quoted in Heise, "Afterword", 287.

¹⁴⁹ Adams, "Interspecies Care", 708.

hope for interspecies cohabitation at its close, but this is drowned out by what comes before, and by readers' earthly experiences. Drayton understands Man as having the capacity to ruin the world through sin, and he constructs a nonhuman world which responds to these catastrophic changes with no regard for Man. Turning away from humanity, Drayton scales up his imaginative work in order to "reimagine [...] multispecies communities of which we form part".¹⁵⁰ He manipulates a disciplinary collapse (or disciplinary absence, to be less anachronistic) brought about by thinking ecological disaster to retell the Flood narrative in light of his own ecological concerns.¹⁵¹ Like Adams' modern writers, Drayton uses "affordances of speculative fiction", creating a "vast system" which conceives of terrestrial physiology, diversity, and chronology as something beyond the "minute historical blip" that is an average human existence. The end of the poem recalls the biblical imperative for man to hold dominion over the earth, but Drayton creates his own vision of how that dominion ought to be managed: care and attentiveness are paramount.

Drayton's speculative fiction attempts to comprehend the capacity of a single species to permanently impact the planet through immoral acts. "Noahs Floud" also invites readers to engage imaginatively with nonhuman responses to anthropogenic disaster. The text rethinks the standard early modern model of Man's relationship to the cosmos: Man is not microcosmic, but microscopic, dwarfed by the enormity of the nonhuman. More than a paraphrased narration of events, "Noahs Floud" is a singular act of speculative world-making which presents an attentive mode of inhabiting the non-fictional world, one which demands Man cares for and about every living thing. As disciplines, scales, and species collapse into one another, "Noahs Floud" advocates for a reimagined present: a world founded on an understanding of the interdependent, interconnected nature of the human, nonhuman, and the terran through time.

¹⁵⁰ Heise, "Science Fiction", 301; "Afterword", 287.

¹⁵¹ See footnotes 1 and 2.

“The Preservation of the Whole”

“Response-ability” and Anthropocentrism in James Howell’s *Therologia* (1660)

This chapter examines how writer, political theorist and linguist James Howell engaged with the themes of anthropocentrism and Man’s impact on the living world in his late work, *Therologia, The Parly of Beasts; or, Morphandra* (1660), which responded to the national and global uncertainty of Howell’s political moment. In this idiosyncratic and capacious prose dialogue, eleven humans-turned-animals from different European states are trapped on an island, having been transfigured by Queen Morphandra. Prince Pererius arrives and assumes the humans need rescuing from their “groveling and quadrupedal shape[s]” (C1v).¹ Pererius and Morphandra make a deal: if he can “induce and fairly perswade any of them to reassume the shapes of Human creatures and to be invested again in their former condition” in their homeland, Morphandra will transform them back and send them home with the prince (B2r). The animals discuss the pros and cons of being human with Pererius, comparing their new experiences as animals with their human lives, and reflecting on the turmoil of their home countries. All but one declare that they prefer their animal form, and wish to remain on the island.

As I explore below, *Therologia* exists in an early modern tradition of Aesopian politics. In early modern England, anthropomorphic fiction became an “increasingly complex medium of political analysis”, and these narratives were consistent in their “appearance and reappearance at moments of crisis, or at least visible strain on the ligaments of the social body”.² These political projections generated reflexive nonhuman figures; this reflexivity was so useful for socio-political analysis that writers doing anthropomorphic politics “consulted earlier ones as carefully as if they were historians or political philosophers”.³ During the mid-seventeenth century, the English social body was at a moment of intense strain when, as Christopher Hill has famously put it, the world turned upside down, and radical ideas, as well as bloody violence, exploded across Britain and Ireland in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms and the Interregnum.⁴

¹ James Howell, *Therologia, the Parly of Beasts; or, Morphandra* (London, 1660). All references to the same. The animals and their previous lives are: an otter (Dutch mariner), an ass (French peasant), an ape (English preacher), a hind (Venetian courtesan), a mule (Spanish doctor), a fox (Italian merchant), a boar (German count), a wolf (Swedish privateer), a goat (Welshman), a gannet – “soland goose” – (Scotsman), and a hive of bees (a nationality-less convent of nuns). Morphandra is “descended of the High-born Circe”, alv.

² Annabel Patterson, *Fables of Power: Aesopian Writing and Political History* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 75.

³ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁴ Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution* (London: Temple Smith, 1972).

Therologia responds to this turbulent context, presenting the world as Howell sees it: a thing in chaos undergoing an all-encompassing process of deterioration. This sense of decay is rooted in a well-established but contentious seventeenth-century discourse surrounding the world's decline.⁵ In *Therologia*, this global deterioration centres on Man: though "Mankind is *one of the prime parts of the Universe and Paramount of the Sublunary World*", something has come unstuck. Because Man "*doth decay in his Species, 'tis a shrewd symptom that the Whole is en decadence, in a declining state*" (b1r).⁶ *Therologia* broods over the repercussions of its own anthropocentric worldview. In a cosmos where "every part [must] perform its peculiar function towards the preservation of the Whole", what happens as Man, the "prime part" and "Paramount" of the "sublunary world", malfunctions (b1r)? This question gives *Therologia* a special urgency, and its answer is pessimistic and uncertain, especially as the text's speakers pick away at Man's weaknesses. In the first dialogue, the Otter is scathing in his reproach of Man, who "doth vaunt, and cry up himself, to be the Epitome and Lord Paramount among all sublunary Cretures, [...] he vainly entitle himself, the *Microcosm*, yet I hold him to be the most miserable of all others" (C2r). This anthropocentric world is built on a joyless and empty bravado. At the centre of a decaying cosmos, Man's life is a miserable struggle which impacts all beings.

This sense of difficulty was familiar to early modern readers through Christian theology. As punishment for eating the forbidden fruit, Man must eke out a living in sorrow and sweat until he returns to the soil: "thou art dust, and to dust shalt thou return" proclaims God to Adam and Eve as they fall from grace.⁷ Medievalist Karl Steel argues that this moment should be understood

not as a humiliation of worldly pretensions but rather as a failure to take responsibility for what we have done in our lives, and even a failure to recognize that what we do can have mattered. There can be some comfort in thinking that we can just disappear, regardless of what we have done.⁸

To this theological backdrop, Howell adds his own vision: the pessimism of Man's struggles in *Therologia* has to do with Howell's sense of humanity as somatically embedded in the earthly realm. It is through this physiological epistemology that Howell intensifies his criticism of Man's vaunting self-importance. The hollowness of this vanity is also expressed through Man's inability to live up to his role of "*Paramount of the Sublunary World*": Man holds supreme power but also has responsibility for acting appropriately in that supremacy, "*that Dominion which was given to him over all his fellow-*

⁵ Victor Harris, *All Coherence Gone: A Study of the Seventeenth Century Controversy over Disorder and Decay in the Universe* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1966), 148-72.

⁶ I follow the text's italicisations throughout unless otherwise specified.

⁷ Genesis 3:16-19.

⁸ Karl Steel, *How Not to Make a Human: Pets, Feral Children, Worms, Sky Burial, Oysters* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 128-29.

Cretures” (blr).⁹ As the text develops, it becomes clear that Man has shirked this responsibility, with terrible consequences.

Howell fixates on “the implications of our real similarities with and differences from other creatures”, exploring how Man’s somatic turbulence impacts the welfare of all other living beings.¹⁰ As I will show, he is also concerned by what happens when Man returns to the soil: “a failure to take responsibility for what we have done in our lives” bleeds into a posthumous legacy. *Therologia* undercuts the “worldly pretensions” of Man, and argues that what Man does *matters* to the “Sublunary World”, and that he will not “just disappear” after his death: he needs to take responsibility. In my reading of *Therologia*, the urgent, earthy work of Donna Haraway works usefully beyond Steel’s. This chapter argues that Howell’s speakers attempt to force Man to “cultivate response-ability”, to “make present to itself what it is doing” in the world, and to “live in consequence or with consequence” of his uncontrolled physiology and its impact on Creation.¹¹ In the twenty-first century, stumbling through contingent socio-political and ecological crises, says Haraway, we must “learn to live and die well with each other in a thick present. Our task is to make trouble, to stir up potent response to devastating events, as well as to settle troubled waters and rebuild quiet places”.¹² *Therologia*’s hybrid speakers represent a “potent response” to the devastation of years of violent chaos, aiming to settle the troubled waters of the human body and the seventeenth-century political landscape, enabling Man to fulfil his role as sublunary paramount.

Howell’s attempt to “cultivate response-ability” is an anthropomorphic fiction. The value of anthropomorphism for thinking about nonhumans is questionable. As Erica Fudge has noted, there are no real animals to be found in this sort of writing.¹³ Moreover, anthropomorphic thinking at large could well be a “sign not of mastery but of incomprehension” of all things nonhuman: “what might at first seem to be a sign of anthropocentric dominion proves instead to be a mark of humanity’s tenuous command over the external world”.¹⁴ At its worst, anthropomorphic thinking is a lazy approach that uses only our own subjectivity to interpret that of others.¹⁵ Modern criticism thus finds anthropomorphism to be another symptom of Man’s desire to undeservedly “vaunt, and cry up himself” (blr): it is a self-centred use of the nonhuman world to reflect on Man. Yet this antipathy to anthropomorphism does not reflect early modern English attitudes, especially when it comes to the

⁹ OED, “paramount, adj., n., and adv.”, defs. A.1.a, A.1.b.

¹⁰ Helena Feder, “Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism*, ed. Greg Garrard (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 227–28.

¹¹ Donna Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 36.

¹² Ibid., 1.

¹³ Erica Fudge, *Perceiving Animals: Humans and Beasts in Early Modern Culture* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 3.

¹⁴ Lynn Festa, *Fiction Without Humanity: Person, Animal, Thing in Early Enlightenment Literature and Culture* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 132.

¹⁵ Lorraine Daston, “Intelligences: Angelic, Animal, Human”, in *Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism*, ed. Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), 54.

“life and death relations” of political existence.¹⁶ When attempting to “stir up potent response to devastating events” through a strong sense of the “tenuous command” one has over “the external world”, ventriloquising nonhuman bodies turned out to be highly effective.

Therologia follows in a tradition of texts which use animals to think about politics but are not interested in the particular experiences of living animals. In early modern England, fabulist writing was a useful mode of political theorising, as Annabel Patterson has shown: “the *inversion* of the old fables [was] connected to the inversion of conventional power structures in England [...]”.¹⁷ Well-known tales were reworked to support political causes (the same fable could be made to speak to Royalist or Parliamentary aims), and this anthropomorphic politics crops up beyond literary fiction in varied formats, including parliamentary speeches, broadsides and, as is the focus here, prose dialogue.¹⁸ *Therologia* takes a unique path, however, and offers more than a simple allegory of British and Irish politics (though there is plenty of that). It also covers anatomy, medicine, metaphysics, gender politics, socioeconomic concerns, theology and more, and this chapter is more concerned with the text’s non-political content than with its explicit geopolitical engagements. My focus is on Howell’s use of anthropomorphic fiction to interrogate a chaotic Mankind broadly understood, rather than offering a detailed account of his response to the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. Still, the violent chaos the wars unleashed is overtly present in *Therologia* and therefore briefly outlining Howell’s own politics, so far as he articulated them, is useful as they have important ramifications for the text at hand.

Though Howell had Royalist sympathies, his personal politics were moderate, to the extent that he was accused of “time-serving and lukewarmness”.¹⁹ In a poignant summary, he wrote

difference in *opinion*, no more than a differing *complexion*, can be cause enough for me to *hate* any. A differing *fancy* is no more to one than a differing *face* [...] if I have a *fair* opinion, though another have a *hard favourd* one, yet it shall not break that common league of humanity which should be betwixt rational creatures, provided he corresponds with me in the generall offices of morality and civill uprightnes [...].²⁰

¹⁶ Feder, “Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture”, 227.

¹⁷ Patterson, *Fables of Power*, 85. Emphasis in text.

¹⁸ For a fabulous parliamentary speech and comment on John Ogilby’s politicised *Fables of Aesop*, see Patterson, *Fables of Power*, 83–94. The *Dragons Forces Totally Routed by the Royal Shepherd* (London, 1660) and *The Tryall of Traytors, or The Rump in the Pound* (London, 1660) are Royalist broadsides featuring the same woodcut of animals on their hindlegs, dressed in human clothes and doing politics. The latter labels its hybrid figures with names of major players in the English Civil Wars. For the Parliamentary cause, John Milton offers comment on the fable of *The Frogs and the Stork*: “Brief Notes Upon a Late Sermon”, in *Complete Prose Works of John Milton: Volume 7*, ed. Robert W. Ayers (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), 478.

¹⁹ D.R. Woolf, “Howell James (1594?–1666), historian and political writer”, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. This paragraph draws extensively on Woolf’s account.

²⁰ Howell, “XXVI. To R.K. Esquire at St Giles”, in *Epistolæ Ho-eliae: Familiar Letters Domestic and Forren* (London, 1650), C6v. Emphasis in text. Quoted in Woolf, “Howell, James”, ODNB.

Howell spent much of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms imprisoned in The Fleet (1643-1651), where he began writing in earnest, as violence reverberated through England and beyond. He viewed the bloodshed as “a fundamentally religious struggle [... which] made it all the worse for England since, in Howell’s view, strife over religion was at once the most foolish and the most terrible form of human conflict”.²¹ This concern over religious conflict comes through most strongly in the Ape’s dialogue, which I explore below. Though D. R. Woolf has suggested that Howell presents himself as “capable of a dispassionate observation of events”, *Therologia* in fact offers a profoundly emotional response.²²

This political baggage weighs on *Therologia*, which is distinctly misanthropic. Through its interests in politics, physiology, and cosmological decay, *Therologia* produces an unusual form of what Laurie Shannon has called “human negative exceptionalism”, that is, “an abject sense of humanity’s underprovisioning in the face of the environment [...a] privative sense of man [which] results from both comparative references across species and a zoographic notion of animal integrity”.²³ Shannon’s negative exceptionalism has to do with humanity lacking material qualities or skills in comparison to animals, and *Therologia*’s animal-human speakers pick up on this.²⁴ However, Man’s negative exceptionalism here centres on a lack of corporeal integrity: an internal, fluid instability in the human body.²⁵ Man’s humoral body is too turbulent to sustain the pressures of being “so considerable a part of the world” (b1r) and *Therologia*’s animal-human speakers dwell on Man’s physiological instability. The paratextual materials of *Therologia* also fixate on the concerning implications of Man’s humoral fractiousness bleeding out into the cosmos. Howell centres Man, but Man’s anthropocentrism does not isolate him from the living world: it only serves to implicate him further.

I begin by exploring *Therologia*’s literary heritage. Anthropomorphic dialogues are not original to Howell; acknowledging this ancestry is crucial for fully appreciating his project and the urgent motivations powering it. It is this urgency that Howell communicates in his introductory paratexts, which I explore in my second section. Howell’s elaborate lead-up to the dialogues guides a reader’s interpretation of the text. In this introductory material Howell offers unequivocal articulations of Man’s dismal state and his responsibility towards the wider world, and makes clear the text’s historical situatedness. The third and fourth sections explore material from the dialogues themselves. *Therologia* is so diverse a text that I have had to be extremely selective with the material I examine. My third section is almost exclusively concerned with the Ape’s dialogue, whilst the fourth takes

²¹ Woolf, “Howell, James”, ODNB.

²² Woolf, “Conscience, Constancy and Ambition in the Career and Writings of James Howell”, in *Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England*, ed. John Morrill, Paul Slack, and Daniel Woolf (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 247.

²³ Laurie Shannon, “Poor, Bare, Forked: Animal Sovereignty, Human Negative Exceptionalism, and the Natural history of ‘King Lear’”, *Shakespeare Quarterly* 60, no.2 (2009): 196.

²⁴ Shannon takes “coatedness” as her main point of difference. Ibid., 185-95.

²⁵ Shannon also examines the idea of integrity in human negative exceptionalism, but focuses on how animal integrity relates to a sense of immunity to the trials of the world or self-sufficiency in maintaining the body. Shannon, *The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 127-73.

snapshots from the dialogues with the Otter, Ass, Hind, and Fox. The third section explores Howell's understanding of Man's humoral body, examining how this undercuts any pretensions to rational exceptionalism: Man's unstable mental condition destabilises everything else. Section four takes up these concerns and considers Man's legacy to the world compared with his nonhuman counterparts. If Man's death "will always leave something out of balance, something always left over", what will his legacy be in the sublunary community?²⁶ Working through these ideas, this chapter demonstrates that didactic anthropomorphism, as a manifestation of anthropocentrism, does not inevitably result in pro-anthropic interpretations of the world, and argues that *Therologia* alerts readers to the necessity of "learn[ing] to live and die well with each other in a thick present".²⁷

The animal-human speakers of *Therologia* are given voices to "mone, chide and complain", "arraign", "preach" and generally harangue Man for his irresponsibility, and Man, as represented by Pererius, is forced to listen (b1v-b2r). As Haraway has noted,

the risk of listening to a story is that it can obligate us in ramifying webs
that cannot be known in advance of venturing among their myriad threads
[...] the figural is more likely than not to grow teeth and bite us in the
bum.²⁸

Advocating for greater human "response-ability", Haraway's insistence that humanity needs to listen speaks to Howell's concerns about understanding Man as exceptional. As the "prime part" of the cosmos, in which every part must support the whole, Man is responsible for the welfare of the entire living world.²⁹ Howell's figural interlocutors sink their teeth into unsuspecting Man, ensnaring the reader in their cosmic obligations. As in my discussion of *Coriolanus*, Gerard Delanty's idea of "contractual ties" in "political, civic and social relations" are at play in this sublunary community.³⁰ *Therologia* knots Man into a string-figure game, where players are obliged to play with "response and respect [...] learning to pay attention", because the consequences of carelessness are too horrifying.³¹

LITERARY CONTEXT

The critical anthropomorphic dialogue has a prestigious history, though George Boas wryly observed that theriophilic thinking – the idea that animals enjoy a superior existence compared to humans – "is probably as old as human misery".³² Long before Howell's beasts piped up, Plutarch produced

²⁶ Steel, *How Not to Make a Human*, 129.

²⁷ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 1.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 132.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 36. "Response-ability" also appears in Haraway, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 88-89.

³⁰ Gerard Delanty, *Community. Second Edition* (London: Routledge, 2010), 1.

³¹ Haraway, *When Species Meet*, 42. "String-figure" is from Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, esp. 9-14.

³² George Boas, *The Happy Beast in French Thought of the Seventeenth Century* (New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1966), 18.

Gryllus, a talking pig. Gryllus appears in Plutarch's *Moralia* in the dialogue "That Brute Beastes Have Use of Reason".³³ The discussion ostensibly takes place on Circe's island, and is between Ulysses and Gryllus, a man-turned-pig by Circe. Gryllus is offered the opportunity to reassume human form and return to Greece. Ulysses is shocked to discover the pig has no desire to re-join humanity. Gryllus is adamant that his new life is superior. The happy hog lives "in abundance, and enjoy[s] the affluence of all things".³⁴ He berates Man: animals perform feats of bravery "without any craftinesse or sleight, onely by plaine hardinesse and cleane strength", and are content without the trappings of wealth. Furthermore, "every beast hath in it selfe not onely the art and skill to cure and heale it selfe when it is sicke, but also is sufficiently instructed how to feed and nourish it selfe".³⁵ Ulysses cannot counter Gryllus' observations and the dialogue appears to end in victory for the pig.³⁶

Fudge summarises Gryllus' attacks: animals are morally and biologically self-sufficient in all aspects of life, lacking no knowledge about their bodies or minds. She writes, "education [...] is a necessary addition to a fragile [human] being. Animals, in contrast, are taught by nature, or rather need no teaching because what they know, they know naturally".³⁷ Moreover, Gryllus argues that though education inducts Man into civil society, this is not noble but servile: "it is humans who are slaves, slaves of their customs, of their civilization. Free will [which Ulysses argues only humans can have...] is a myth of the discourse of reason, is a legend used by humans to bolster their own status".³⁸ Plutarch thus assaults Man's prizing of intellect over an existence more attuned to the physical demands of earthly life.

Centuries later, Plutarch's pig proved provocative.³⁹ In the mid-sixteenth-century, Italian writer Giambattista Gelli (1498-1563) produced a much-extended homage to the Plutarchian dialogue, *La Circe* (1549). The text enjoyed pan-European popularity, translated into English by Henry Iden as *Circes of Iohn Baptista Gello* (henceforth *Circes*).⁴⁰ The discussion takes place under the same conditions as before: if an animal wishes to turn human and return home, they may do so. However, Ulysses is subject to a much greater challenge, facing eleven animal-human speakers! The Greek is compelled to work his way through the "great chain of being", from an oyster to an elephant.⁴¹ Instead of Plutarch's nonhuman victory, this time an animal, the elephant, decides to

³³ Plutarch, "That Brute Beastes Have Use of Reason", in *The Philosophie*, trans. Philemon Holland (London, 1603), Aaa5r-Bbb3v. For Gryllus' early modern life, see Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 87-96.

³⁴ Plutarch, "Brute Beastes", Aaa6v.

³⁵ Ibid., Bbb1r.

³⁶ On the possible ambiguity of the ending, see Plutarch, *Essays*, trans. Robin Waterfield, introduced and annotated by Ian Kidd (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 381.

³⁷ Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning*, 91.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ In *The Happy Beast*, Boas offers further detail on the history of European theriophilic writing, pp.10-36, and shows how theriophilily infiltrated early modern zoology, pp.37-51.

⁴⁰ Steel, *How Not to Make a Human*, 155.

⁴¹ Karen Raber, *Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 1. Boas also offers a commentary on Gelli's text: *The Happy Beast*, 28-36.

become human again. The animals discuss their advantageous bodies, but their arguments focus on Man's psychological life (painful) and the intellectual capacities of animals (not so bad as Man would believe).

Ulysses spends the final dialogue arguing with Aglafemos, a philosopher-turned-elephant. Aglafemos eventually accepts that Man's "intellectiue knowledge, is far more noble, for the certeyntie thereof" than animals' sense-based interpretations of the world.⁴² As a self-professed "louer of truthe", certain knowledge proves irresistible to Aglafemos, he chooses to resume human form, and Ulysses wins the elephant over for Mankind.⁴³ However, this is not to say that the animals do not win numerous battles through the text: they are

convinced that they are happier, are more secure, and have more pleasurable lives than do any and all humans precisely because they *don't* have the type of reason Ulysses keeps trying to establish as exclusively human, since it is attended by imbalanced appetites, dissatisfaction, oppression by their fellows, and so on.⁴⁴

Gelli's text expresses similar concerns to Plutarch's over a more varied and sustained series of engagements. Both texts are concerned with Man's capacity for reason and how this plays out against animal experience which, allegedly, is unsatisfactory because it lacks an intellectual aspect. Though the extent of Man's victory in both texts is debateable, what is important is that both are more concerned with intellectual than physical differences.

Gelli's Plutarchian "revival" triggered a proliferation of "Gryllus-like" manifestations in early modern English writing, in works ranging from Spenser's *Faerie Queene* to Milton's *Comus*, yet Howell's late intervention has been overlooked.⁴⁵ This speaks to a general dearth of scholarship on Howell's writing. Critical accounts, where they do exist, have focused on his politics or linguistic interests.⁴⁶ Scholarship on *Therologia* is scant. The text's vast scope has led to it being mischaracterised and/or

⁴² Giovanni Battista Gelli, *Circes of Iohn Baptista Gello, Florentine*, trans. Henry Iden (1558), S3r.

⁴³ Ibid., R1r.

⁴⁴ Raber, *Animal Bodies*, 4.

⁴⁵ Laura Brown and Bryan Alkemeyer, "Rational Elephants or Hominoid Apes: Which is Early Modern?", *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 13, no.4 (2013): 63. Alkemeyer's doctoral thesis focuses specifically on metamorphic fiction in early modernity: Bryan Alkemeyer, "Circe Stories: Transformation, Animals, and Natural History, 1550-1750" (doctoral thesis, Cornell University, 2013).

⁴⁶ On Howell's politics, see Dawn Goldstone, "Royalism and Social Change: The Case of James Howell", *Literature Compass* 10, no.3 (2013): 249-259; Michael Nutkiewicz, "A Rapporteur of the English Civil War: The Courtly Politics of James Howell (1594?-1666)", *Canadian Journal of History* 25, no.1 (1990): 21-40; Paul Seaward, "A Restoration Publicist: James Howell and the Earl of Clarendon, 1661-6", *Historical Research: The Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 61, no.144 (1988): 123-31. Older criticism dealt with Howell's linguistic ideas, see E.H. Mensel, "James Howell as a Practical Linguist", *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 25, no.4 (1926): 531-39; John W Hales "James Howell as a Spelling Reformer", *The Academy*, 1869-1902 0269-333X, no. 456 (1881): 82. Howell was a skilled polyglot, and there is Spanish scholarship on his engagement with non-English languages. See Francisco Javier Sánchez Escribano "La Lexicografía Plurilingüe en los siglos XVI y XVII: Los Diccionarios de James Howell", *Philologia Hispalensis* 22, no.12 (2008): 299-318 and M. A. Angeles García Aranda, "Las Fuentes Lexicográficas de la Nomenclatura de James Howell (1659)", *Revista de Filología* 26 (2008): 47-60. Howell has been branded an "unoriginal thinker" by his primary biographer. Daniel Woolf, "Conscience, Constancy and Ambition", 247.

used to support analyses of other texts. Elizabeth Hedrick, for example, is misled by the pan-European flavour of *Therologia*, characterising it as “a series of satires on people of different nations and professions”, citing the fact that “they loathe the failings of their countrymen” as the reason the animals do not wish to return to human form.⁴⁷ Though Hedrick’s comments highlight some of the text’s key facets, she ignores the remarkable (and, as I show, consciously highlighted) influence of *La Circe*. In an analysis of animal medicine in *Volpone*, Elizabeth Harvey claims Howell rewrote *La Circe* only to add medicinal interests to its contents: a serious underestimation of *Therologia*’s original elements.⁴⁸ In 1922, Bartholow Cawford suggested that the text is “smooth and graceful”, disregarding the variety of Howell’s subject matter and tone.⁴⁹ Though *La Circe* is increasingly familiar to early modern animal studies, *Therologia* has not received the same treatment.⁵⁰

Pre-*Therologia*, Howell had written dialogues: a philosophical debate between the body and soul, *The Vision* (1651) and a political dialogue, *Casuall Discourses* (1661, though composed in the 1640s).⁵¹ He had also used prosopopoeia for political ends. In *Englands Teares for the Present VVarres* (1644), Howell gives voice to what he perceived to be a nation in grief, “mak[ing] England her selfe to breath out his [Howell’s] disordered passions”: there is something cathartic about using a nonhuman figure to speak deep feelings.⁵² *Dendrologia* (1640) and *Parables Reflecting Upon the Times* (appended to the 1644 edition of *Dendrologia*) offered Howell space to experiment with natural allegories to express political conflict. In particular, *Dendrologia* is an overwrought, arboreal rendering of the Thirty Years War, which becomes increasingly warped as the weight of the subject matter overwhelms what Howell’s trees can sustain.⁵³ Adapting and extending *La Circe* to process political events thus feels like a natural step for Howell, who had clearly read *La Circe* in some form. *Therologia* borrows its plot, and

⁴⁷ Elizabeth Hedrick, “Romancing the Salve: Sir Kenelm Digby and the Powder of Sympathy”, *The British Journal for the History of Science* 41, no.2 (2008): 180-82.

⁴⁸ Elizabeth D. Harvey, “Beastly Physic”, *Shakespeare Studies* 41 (2013): 119.

⁴⁹ Bartholow Cawford, “Formal Dialogue in Narrative”, *Philological Quarterly* 1 (1922): 184. Cawford also claims that Pererius does not persuade any animal to turn human, 183-84. This is incorrect, and Pererius’ success with a hive of bees at the end of the dialogue is a crucial detail in the text’s philosophy.

⁵⁰ Steel, *How Not to Make a Human*, 155-58; Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 136-64; Raber, *Animal Bodies*, 1-6; Alkemeyer, “Circe Stories”, 34-116 and “Remembering the Elephant: Animal Reason Before the Eighteenth Century”, *PMLA* 132, no.5 (2017): 1149-65; Gary Steiner, *Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in Western Philosophy* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 135-37.

⁵¹ Woolf, “Howell, James”, ODNB.

⁵² Howell, *Dendrologia: Dodona’s Grove, or, The Vocall Forrest. The Second Edition* (London, 1644), Z1v.

⁵³ A French translation attests to *Dendrologia*’s international reach: Howell, *Dendrologie, ou la forest Dodonne* (Paris, 1641).

sections of prose are repeated almost verbatim.⁵⁴ The material offers ample opportunity for beasts to preach, and for rangy explorations of any number of subjects: perfect for a reader as “voracious and indiscriminating” as Howell looking to deploy his lifetime of learning.⁵⁵

Although *La Circe* and *Therologia* follow the same plot, have two animals in common (the hind and the goat), have similar concerns (human life is hard), and reach the same eventual outcome (one animal agrees to turn human), their journeys differ. Whereas the animals of *La Circe* make their case in timeless universals (nature’s provision for animals, human health, Man’s ability to reason), *Therologia* ties its rehearsal of these debates to its historical moment and Howell’s understanding of Man’s place in the cosmos. A humanist text in which reason conquers all (albeit with some caveats) is transformed into a text in which the universe itself is at stake.⁵⁶ *Therologia* is also far more embodied than *Circes*. Whilst there are only 44 uses of “body” or “bodies” in Iden’s translation, Howell more than doubles that in *Therologia* with 104. Similarly, the humours crop up only 6 times in *Circes* compared with 43 appearances in Howell’s dialogue.⁵⁷ This development is indicative of Howell’s understanding of the troubling symbiosis between the body and politics.

From its dialogic predecessors, *Therologia* adopts the possibilities anthropomorphism offers for generating different perspectives on human lives. It also takes up their concerns about Man’s intellectual and physical capacity to deal with the world around him. Yet Howell uses the material for strikingly different ends, and in focus and tone the text feels very different to *Circes*. This development makes greater sense when contextualised in Howell’s body of work: his use of natural allegory to think politically is foregrounded in *Therologia*. Acknowledging the text’s literary ancestry is crucial to an informed reading, especially when, as I outline below, Howell so self-consciously highlights it. Moving into *Therologia*’s paratextual materials, Howell builds upon this heritage but also places his text explicitly in an early modern English tradition of anthropomorphic politics. This combination of political analysis, anthropomorphism and humoralism is built up by Howell to lend *Therologia* an urgent, emotional impetus which powers the dialogues.

⁵⁴ This happens most overtly in the Hind’s dialogue: both hinds snap at the men at the opening of the dialogue. When asked if they wish to become women again, Gelli’s hind replies “No: loe there is a quick aunswere.” *Circes*, IIr. Howell’s hind responds: “No; ther’s a short and sudden Laconicall answer for you”, *Therologia*, Plv. Also, c.f. “Alas the being a reasonable creature is not the cause that I will not return into my former state: but y^t I must become a woman againe, as I haue told thee, for that women by so much despysed by you [...]”, Gelli, *Circes*, IIv; and “To be a *Rational* creture is not the thing I am so averse unto as much as to be a *Woman*, which sex is so much undervalued and vilified by you [...]”, Howell, *Therologia*, Plv. Howell may not be using Iden’s translation and could have read *La Circe* in the original Italian. In 1644, Howell had published a translation of an Italian text, Ferrante Pallavicino’s *Il Divortio celeste* (Villafranca, 1643) as *St Paul’s Late Progres Upon Earth* (London: 1644). For further detail on *Il Divortio celeste* and Pallavicino’s life and work, see Edward Muir, *The Culture Wars of the Late Renaissance: Skeptics, Libertines, and Opera* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 63–98.

⁵⁵ Woolf, “Howell, James”, ODNB.

⁵⁶ Steel elaborates on these caveats: *How Not to Make a Human*, 155–56.

⁵⁷ This difference is not proportional: excluding the paratexts, *Therologia* is only 10% longer than *Circes*. With the paratexts, the difference is still only 20%.

PARATEXTS

Therologia's paratexts are surprisingly elaborate: there are a considerable number of pages to wade through before the dialogues themselves. It is here that Howell lays out the physiological framework that undergirds the rest of the text. This section explores Howell's deployment of *Therologia*'s literary ancestry and how he contextualises the urgency of his text. In his prefatory materials, Howell sets the stage for what he hopes will be a cosmos-saving work, which seeks to alert Man to his obligations and kick-start some "response-ability".

The paratextual framing of *Circes* and *Therologia* are very different. Iden's translation of *La Circe* contains two brief dedicatory letters: Iden's to "the right honorable y^e Lord Herbert of Cardiffe, Maister Edwarde Herbert, and Master Henry Compton, his brethren", and a translation of Gelli's address to Prince Cosimo de Medici.⁵⁸ Iden's letter notes that *Circes* demonstrates "howe lyke the brute beast, and farre from his perfection man is, without the vnderstanding and folowinge of dyuynethynges".⁵⁹ He focuses on the edifying potential of the text, referring to the "tender" age of Edward Herbert, and hoping *Circes* will aid in his "most nyghe comminge to very true perfection".⁶⁰ Gelli's letter, in Iden's translation, also focuses on the edifying nature of anthropomorphic dialogue. The proper aim of humans is

lifting them selues from things base and earthly, to things high and diuine,
[being] broughte to their owne trewe perfection, like vnto those happie
spirites, who out of this corruptible world, liue in contemplation of diuine
thynges, their life is most happy and blessed.⁶¹

In this letter, Gelli also indicates his source material, telling Prince Cosimo that the dialogue "folow[s] in the steppes of the most learned Plutarche".⁶² Overall, then, *Circes* is framed as a text which is focused on intellectual self-improvement with a spiritual goal in sight.

Therologia operates rather differently. Like Gelli and Iden, Howell outlines his reasons for writing *Therologia*, but also makes clear his particular aims. Preceding the discussions, the reader finds

— A lengthy title page

⁵⁸ Gelli, *Circes*, A2r-A4v. The original Italian text is even more brief, with a portrait of Gelli and then the letter to Prince Cosimo: Gelli, *La Circe di Giouanbatista Gelli accademico fiorentino* (Florence, 1549), A1v-A4r.

⁵⁹ Gelli, *Circes*, A2r.

⁶⁰ Ibid., A2v.

⁶¹ Ibid., A4r.

⁶² Ibid. This seems to be a reference to the *Moralia* as a morally edifying text, rather than Gryllus specifically: "And contrary when [men] wythdrawe them the most they may from [earthly things], and retourne to their owne true and proper operation, and lifting them selues from things base and earthly, to things high and diuine, are broughte to their owne trewe perfection, like vnto those happie spirites, who out of this corruptible world, liue in contemplation of diuine things, their life is most happy and blessed. This is the thing most mighty and excellēt prince, to helpe others the most that in me lieth, as the proper and true duetie of man is, folowing the steppes of the most learned Plutarche, that in these my present dialogues, I haue sought as I haue bene best able."

- A synopsis: “The Scope and Substance of the Ensuing Section”
- A dedicatory letter to the Lady Marie de la Fontaine ⁶³
- A prefatory letter: “To the Severer Sorts of Reders”
- A poem: “Poema Tempestivum”
- Another synopsis: “The Contents of the Severall Sections”
- A key to the animal speakers: “to more easily enter into the sense of Morphandra, or, the Parly of Beasts”
- “An etymologicall derivation of som words and anagrams in the Parly of Beasts”. ([A2v])

Howell uses this material to frame his view of the state of humanity whilst prescriptively directing readerly engagement with *Therologia*: the urgency of the text’s goals becomes clear as the reader makes their way through the paratexts.

A century after Gelli followed in Plutarch’s footsteps, Howell acknowledges that he is following Gelli, alongside a number of other sources. In his letter “To the Severer Sorts of Reders”, Howell declares that his text is not the first in which beasts have spoken:

we read of one in the Sacred Code who spoke; and besides, Solomon sends in to som of Them for Instruction: The Phrygian Fabler was one of the first who taught them their Abcee, then Anian, Barlandus, and another taught Them Their Primer, and the two ingenious Florentines, Poggius and Gelli may be said to have taught Them Their Grammer: But these transmuted Beasts speak in a louder Dialect, who having tryed both Natures, they tell the Human Creture his own [...] (b1v).

Immediately following this letter, the “Poema Tempestivum” begins by acknowledging Howell’s anthropomorphism, recalling *Dendrologia*: “Trees spake before, now the same strength of Art / Makes Beasts to cunn the Alphabet by heart” (b2r). Citing precedent for Howell’s anthropomorphism, the “Sacred Code” and Solomon gesture to scripture, and the singular “one” may be the serpent of Genesis. Howell continues by invoking Aesop and Avianus, Adriaan Van Baarland (an early-sixteenth-century Dutch writer who adapted their fables), and *Facetiae* author Poggio Bracciolini,

⁶³ This could be minor aristocrat Marie de la Fontaine (b.1638), who was 22 years old at the time of *Therologia*’s printing. See P. Anselme de Sainte-Marie et al., *Histoire Généalogique et Chronologique de la Maison Royale de France [...] Troisième Edition* (1733), 855. Another candidate is the young wife of Jean de la Fontaine (1621-1695), a French fabulist. She would have been 27 in 1660: Susan Halstead, “The Feckless Fabulist who took on the Sun King”, *European Studies Blog, The British Library*, April 22, 2015, accessed Sept 20, 2022, <https://blogs.bl.uk/european/2015/04/the-feckless-fabulist.html>.

along with his direct source, Gelli.⁶⁴ Outlining this literary heritage, Howell presents *Therologia* as an instructive text with a rich ancestry.

The other genre to acknowledge here is the dialogue itself: an important method of early modern political analysis. *Therologia* consciously invokes the “iconic status given to oral communication in early modern political thought and culture”, and Howell’s list of sources highlights the literary, humanist education which prepared boys for this discursive mode.⁶⁵ Howell structures his source catalogue around a pedagogical metaphor: moving from the “Abcee” to the “Primer” to “Grammer” completes a formal education for the text’s speakers, graduating from basic literacy to advanced rhetorical skills. Eloquence was a prerequisite for early modern politics and yet, when translated onto the page, things do not run smoothly: written dialogues, Cathy Shrank notes, have a habit of hitting a “deadlock, or stutter[ing] into silence. They self-consciously stage failed communication”.⁶⁶ *Therologia* thus draws on a well-established yet flawed model to support its anthropomorphic analysis of the world.

Howell places great importance on his text having literary momentum behind it, in a way that *La Circe* and *Circes* do not. The rest of the second prefatory letter and “Poema Tempestivum” indicates why. Opening his epistle “To the Severer Sorts of Reders”, Howell invokes a Pythagorean cosmos: “*Som of the Antient Sages [...] had a Speculation, That the World was but one huge Animal or Living Creture, compos’d of innumerable members and parts*”. His model depends on co-operation: “*every part [must] perform its peculiar function towards the preservation of the Whole*”, and “*if the parts begin to impair, the Whole must be in a declining condition*” (b1r). Howell continues his letter by rounding out the consequences of this: the stakes are raised in a world which views Man as exceptional. He writes:

Mankind is one of the prime parts of the Universe and Paramount of the
Sublunary World, which is demonstrable by that Dominion which was given him over
all his fellow-Cretures in Aire, Water, or Earth [...] Now, if Man, who is so
considerable a part of the world doth decay in his Species, ‘tis a shrewd symptom that
the Whole is en decadence, in a declining state (b1r).

Howell bemoans the state of the world: “*Man doth impair as well in his Intellectuals and the Faculties of his Soul, as in the motions and affections of his heart*”, and “*this present Age can afford more pregnant proofs than most of*

⁶⁴ For “Anian” see Avianus (fl. 400 CE), who adapted 42 Aesopic fables into verse. His writing is referred to throughout the medieval period and beyond. See Florus et al., *Minor Latin Poets, Volume II*, trans. J. Wight Duff and Arnold M. Duff (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 671-75. Van Baarland is credited with adaptations of Aesop and Avianus in Goudanus et al., *Aesopi Fabvlæ Lectori non Minorem Fructum [...]* (1568), C3r-D2r. The text of the fables credited to “Anianus” in this text corresponds directly with those found in *Minor Latin Poets*.

⁶⁵ Cathy Shrank, “All Talk and No Action? Early Modern Political Dialogue”, *The Oxford Handbook of English Prose 1500-1640*, ed. Andrew Hadfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 31.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

the Ages before” that this is true (blr). Echoing the dynamics of Drayton’s Pythagoreanism, discussed in the previous chapter, Howell adopts the concept of the *anima mundi* to powerful effect: the “quasi-deific force” of the natural world is in peril, and Man is central to this precariousness.⁶⁷ Victor Harris has noted how Howell, invoking the early modern trope of a decaying cosmos, is “particularly interested in the corruption of man”, but he does not address how Howell uses this motif to think about politics.⁶⁸ In *Therologia*, this decaying corruption develops from the “fond futilous new Opinions [which] have bin hatch’d of late times” and “*the horrid Sacriledges, the new-fangled Opinions, and gingling Extravagances that Human brains are subject unto, specially this last dotting and vertiginous Age of the World*” (alr). I return to the term “vertiginous” in the next section, but crucially this is tied to *Therologia*’s political context, broadly understood.⁶⁹

Howell’s prefatory letter offers a textbook example of Patterson’s Aesopian political writing in early modernity. When it came to the important work of applying fables to reality, “later fabulists consulted earlier ones as if they were historians or political philosophers”.⁷⁰ Howell deliberately situates himself in conversation with his literary predecessors and applies their learning to current events. He is not content with producing another fable, however, and his creatures will “*speak in a louder dialect*” (blv).

Patterson has shown how anthropomorphic didacticism in the seventeenth century demanded that writers speak to

the new historical circumstances that motivated [them] to return to Aesop.
For the fable to do its work in the world, a contemporary vocabulary and
issues cannot merely be grafted upon a traditional matrix, but past and
present must be seen to be *structurally* related.⁷¹

Howell’s understanding of a world in decline links the past, present, and future, and calls upon an Aesopian tradition to speak to “vast social and cultural changes”, undertaking “advanced work in the arena of political definition”.⁷² His anthropomorphised speakers are here to draw attention to this: “*these transmuted Beasts [...] tell the Human Creture his own, and how he growes daily from bad to worse*” (blv). However, *Therologia* offers no easily-shirked scolding: the “*transmuted Beasts*” aim to provoke Man into

⁶⁷ Todd Borlik, *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature: Green Pastures* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 67.

⁶⁸ Harris, *All Coherence Gone*, 155.

⁶⁹ Howell was possessed of a big-picture awareness of the world around him. He was well-travelled, had some involvement with the Spanish Match, and discussed the Thirty Years War in *Dendrologia*. Woolf, “Howell, James”, ODNB. Other texts such as *A Trance* discuss the Wars of the Three Kingdoms pre-*Therologia*. (see n.89)

⁷⁰ Patterson, *Fables of Power*, 52.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁷² *Ibid.*

“response-ability” and “make present to [him] what [he] is doing”.⁷³ The “Poema Tempestivum” indicates that this provocation will reflect poorly on Man:

But here *Beasts* speak, they mone, chide, and complain,
And at the Barr of Justice *Men* arraign;
Such are our crying sins, that *Beasts* resent
Our miseries, and wretched case lament (b2r).⁷⁴

This is strong, legal language which calls upon the “*justice problem*” Shannon identifies in early modern readings of Genesis.⁷⁵ *Therologia*’s speakers are going to “arraign” Man: “call upon [him] to answer for himself on a *criminal charge*”.⁷⁶ Men have been committing sins not only against each other but against the living world, allowing it to enter into a “*declining condition*” (b1r). Just as the Fall and the Flood punished animals for sins they never committed, Man continues to allow creatures to suffer for his freedom to act as he pleases.

Having listed the wealth of sins Man has committed, Howell closes his prefatory poem with a fire-and-brimstone finale:

In summ, *We* may for these and thousands more
Vye *Villanies* with any Age before;
Which shews the World is *Hecticall*, and near
Its Gran and Fatal *Climacteric* year;
The whole Creation mourns, and doth deplore
The ruthfull state of *Human* kind; Therefore
If *Men* can not be warn’d when *Men* do *Teach*,
Then let them hearken here what *Beasts* do *Preach* (b2v).

This Millenarian thinking sets the tone for the reader’s processing of *Therologia*: it is a didactic text which sets itself the grand task of saving Man and the cosmos. Creatures who have “tried both natures” will force Man to answer for his criminal behaviour and are following the demands of these “climacteric” times to “preach” for Man’s benefit. “Climacteric” lends the text a particular urgency. It can indicate a “critical period or moment in history” but also has specific application to the human body. The climacteric refers to a year in a life when a human is “particularly liable to change in health or fortune”.⁷⁷ That the “world is *Hecticall*” in this critical period heightens the sense of the somatic

⁷³ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 1.

⁷⁴ *tempestivus* means “timely” or “opportune”, but Howell is almost certainly toying with its stormy cognate, *tempestas*. *An Elementary Latin Dictionary*, ed. Charlton T. Lewis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), s.v. “tempestivus”.

⁷⁵ Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 51.

⁷⁶ OED, “arraign, v.1”, def. 2. Emphasis my own.

⁷⁷ OED, “climacteric, adj. and n.”, defs. B.1.a, B.2.a.

roots of the world's deterioration: it is on the brink of precipitous possibilities whilst wasting away in a consumptive feverishness.⁷⁸ Howell's timely poem shudders under the pressures of its self-generating urgency. A glance back to the pre-civil-war *Dendrologia* underscores the poem's force. In 1640 Howell was optimistic and could not "*subscribe to their speculation, that thinke the World hath beene long since in a Hectique Feaver, and so drawing on to a Consumption*".⁷⁹ Howell's dramatic *volte-face* in *Therologia* encapsulates how the Wars of the Three Kingdoms destabilised his worldview, and indicates that a personal shock at the events of the past two decades powers the writing. The reader enters the dialogues primed to read them under the weight of real-world events. More than that, Howell frames these events as an existential emergency: a reader's capacity to "cultivate response-ability" could make or break the cosmos.

"DISORDER AND HURLIBURLY"

Addressing the Lady Marie de la Fontaine, Howell reflects that Man will never be at peace. The reasons for this are physiological:

it is denied to *Man* to be always at Home within himself, and it will be so to the world's end as long as he is compos'd of the four Elements, and as long as the Naturall *humors* within *Him* sympathize with the said Elements, who are in restles mutation and motion among themselves for mastery, which made one break out into this excesse of speech, that if the four *Humors* were ballanc'd aright in the *human* body, he wold live easily many thousands of years upon earth (a2v).

Howell foregrounds his humoralism: a constant war boils inside Man. This follows typical early modern thinking: "the language of the humoral body constructs a bodily self-experience that is often tumultuous and dramatic even when function is normal", as Gail Kern Paster remarks.⁸⁰ Howell is clear that Man's mutable existence makes life miserable at every turn. This section explores how Man's internal turbulence manifests in *Therologia*, focusing on the Ape's dialogue, which connects Man's "natural propensity to 'dis-ease'" to the violence of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms.⁸¹ I show that Howell's understanding of humoralism works with a productive antagonism against the text's anthropocentrism, producing a politicised twist on Shannon's "human negative exceptionalism".⁸²

⁷⁸ OED, "hectic, adj. and n.", def. A.1.a.

⁷⁹ Howell, *Dendrologia* (London, 1640), Nlv.

⁸⁰ Gail Kern Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 10. Paster notes the supremacy of humoral theory: "in early modern Europe, despite the challenges to Galenism posed in the sixteenth century by Paracelsus and his followers, the dominant physiological paradigm was the classical theory of the four humors", 2.

⁸¹ As worded by Harvey, "Beastly Physic", 118.

⁸² Shannon, "Poor, Bare, Forked", 196.

The substance of the human body matters enormously to Howell, and his previous writing provides important context. In *Dendrologia* and *Englands Teares* Howell grappled with the turbulence of Man's humoral volatility. In the former, he states "*there is an incessant warfare amongst the humours for predominancy, and while this naturall war lasteth, the earth cannot be without civill and political preliations, the mind following most commonly the temper of the body*".⁸³ In *Englands Teares*, he suggests that the bloodshed of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms was inevitable, insisting that "the frayle bodies of men [...] must have an evacuation for their corrupt humours, they must be phlebotomiz'd".⁸⁴ Returning to the passage at hand, Howell draws this disorder to its natural conclusion. The power of the elements is so great that their battles shorten the life of the average human: mutability kills.

In the first of *Therologia's* two synopses, Howell elaborates on the "Declinings of the World, and the late Depravation of *Human Nature*" (title page). He explains that *Therologia's* animals refuse human form because of:

the rebellious Humors, the horrid Sacriledges, the new-fangled Opinions, and gingling Extravagances that Human brains are subject unto, specially this last doting and vertiginous Age of the World, with the numberles Indispositions whereunto the Bodies of Men as well as their Brains are expos'd (alr-alv).

Howell restates his understanding of the human body as a vulnerable, unstable space: a vessel "characterized not only by its physical openness but also by its emotional instability and volatility, by an internal microclimate knowable, like climates in the outer world, more for changeability than for stasis".⁸⁵ In the dialogues that follow, the animals seize on this weakness, interpreting it as an emotional and intellectual infirmity. The first and fourth dialogues are especially concerned with Man's "*rebellious Humors*" and "*Indispositions*": an otter and a mule both seize on Man's psychological vulnerabilities. The Otter, previously a Dutch mariner, tells Pererius that human brains are full of "phrensies" and "vexations", and that Man's "cruciatory passions do operat somtimes with such a violence, that they drive him to despair, and oftentimes to murder and destroy himself" (C2r). The Otter corroborates the paratextual materials which expose the disorder of Man's soul. However, in this reference to suicide Howell pushes traditional humoralism to its limit: although this understanding of the body "ascribes to the workings of the internal organs an aspect of agency, purposiveness, and plenitude to which the subject's own will is often decidedly irrelevant", to read Man's emotional forces as actively working to sabotage him takes this epistemology to an extreme.⁸⁶

⁸³ Howell, *Dendrologia* (1640), Y3v.

⁸⁴ Howell, *Dendrologia* (1644), X3v.

⁸⁵ Paster, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 19.

⁸⁶ Paster, *The Body Embarrassed*, 10.

The Mule, once a doctor hailing from Spain, also reaches for self-annihilation in discussing Man's problems. Following an enormous catalogue covering not "the twentieth part" of "outward diseases" suffered by Man, the Mule turns to Man's "Rationall Soul" (X2r). The Mule attacks the "anxieties, "agonies", "racking torments", and "frenzies" suffered by Man, and then states "incertitudes of holy things, and fits of despair work sometimes so powerfully, that he becomes *Felo de se*, making him to destroy himself" (X2r).⁸⁷ Howell's linking of religious uncertainty and despair gestures to a mid-seventeenth-century context of religious conflict, suggestive of a societal self-killing in such crises.⁸⁸ The battles between the elements and humours are dangerous on an individual level, but also have ramifications for human society. This is expressed unequivocally in the third dialogue, where Man's infirmities have, according to the Ape, destroyed England or, in *Therologia's* pseudonym-governed geography, "Gheronia".

In this episode, Howell's misanthropic criticisms become an explicit skewering of the English, more pointed than any of the other episodes in *Therologia* where the animals attack their native lands. The second synopsis informs the reader that in his previous life, the Ape was a clergyman, "carried away with every wind of Doctrin and folloing [sic.] any fanatic new-fangled Opinion" (Clv). In his dialogue proper, the Ape echoes this phrasing in reference to the English population at large, arguing that they too are "carried away with every wind of Doctrine, and fanaticall newfangled opinions" (Ilv). The Ape delivers a damning account of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms and their fallout. His explanation is that literal agents of Hell infiltrated and corrupted socio-political structures across England. He explains this by narrating an elaborately detailed dream, from his pre-Ape life, which involves Pluto (as a Satanic stand-in) discussing his plans for an epidemic of brutal violence across England "till that the whole Nation be at last extinguished that one may not be left to pisse against a wall" (L2r). The dreamer undertakes a Dantean journey through Hell with a "guiding spirit", marvelling at the punishments inflicted upon dead English men and women, particularly the anti-Royalists (L2v-Nlr). Tortured by fire, ice, Sisyphean labours, and brutal mutilations, the Gheronians pay the price of their "mimicall apish humor" (Ilv).⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Howell's Goat also claims that "discursive *Reson*" leaves Man "subject to a thousand vexations of spirit" and "makes him a tyrant to himself", Iilr.

⁸⁸ Destabilised English politics is covered by Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). The violence and geographical reach of the Thirty Years War was deeply distressing. See John Theibault, "The Rhetoric of Death and Destruction in the Thirty Years War", *Journal of Social History* 27, no.2 (1993): 271-90. However, there is some discussion as to how the conflict was interpreted by those living through it i.e. as one conflict or many smaller ones. See G. Mortimer, "Did Contemporaries Recognize a 'Thirty Years War'?", *English Historical Review* 116, (2001): 124-36.

⁸⁹ For apes as natural mimics, see "apes are much giuen to imitation and derision" Edward Topsell, *Historie of Foure Footed Beastes* (London, 1607), Blv; "[...] as they see hunters doe before them, they will imitate them in euery point" Pliny the Elder, *The Historie of the VVorld* [...] *The First [-second] Tome*, trans. Philemon Holland (London, 1634), X2r; "the common Apes [...] be very nimble and active creatures; and for their greatest delight, it is to imitate man in his actions", John Swan, *Speculum Mundi: Or a Glasse Representing the Face of the World* (London, 1635), Nnn4v. Simian anthropomorphism presented special problems to the status of early modern man, see Fudge, *Perceiving Animals*, 11-33.

The Ape rejects a return to his Gheronian life: a mutable population has become so violent that it faces a permanent metamorphosis. His fellow Gheronians, already disadvantaged by their simian dispositions, are “are turned from Men to Wolves”:

if you go to their humours, ther’s a tru Lycanthropy among them, else they
wold never worry and devour one another in so savage a manner; All which
proceeds from a sad disease which hath seiz’d upon many thousands of
them, it is a pure Scotomia, an odd kind of Vertigo that reigns among them,
which turns the head round, and fills it with new chimeras ever and anon
(IIr-IIv).

The image of a violent werewolf is combined with diseases which rage through the body corporeal and politic. This lupine savagery is more than an anthropomorphic pejorative: the relationship between lycanthropy, insanity, and moral responsibility in early modernity was deeply troubling.⁹⁰ As Brett Hirsch has shown, for Christian thinkers “if a man is transformed into a beast (and thereby divorced of his rational nature) he is not responsible for any sinful act he commits, since the rational consent of the sinner is lacking”.⁹¹ Howell draws on this idea to underscore Man’s worrying volatility: the diseased transformation of the Gheronians allows for an abdication of responsibility. This is a moral responsibility, but also Harawayan “response-ability”, in that the Gheronians, “divorced of [their] rational nature” cannot “make present to [themselves] what [they are] doing” to themselves or to each other, and how this impacts the cosmos.⁹²

This volatility is also characterised through more standard infirmities: the references to “Scotomia” and “Vertigo” demand attention given Howell’s account of the world as “doting and vertiginous” in the prefatory material and that all but one other use of “vertigo” or “vertiginous” in the text appear in the Ape’s dialogue in reference to Gheronia/England. The world suffers from a consumptive illness, but England suffers from a special sort of malady. Scotomia, or *scotoma*, is an ocular disease causing the sufferer temporary blindness.⁹³ The effects of vertigo are documented in early modern medical treatises, which refer to the well-known symptom of spinning hallucinations. However, they also describe an internal conflict as the cause, with one invoking “inordinate moving of Vapours that are windy, contained in certain parts of the Brain”;⁹⁴ another “the circumvolution of the spirits [...] coming to the Ventricls [sic.] of the brain disturbs the spirits”: an apt metaphor for a

Howell is being “mimicall” himself here: in an earlier work he describes a vision of Hell and he recycles this material for the Ape’s nightmare. The narrative plot is exactly the same, and entire sections are used verbatim. See Howell, *A Trance: or, Newes From Hell* (London, 1649).

⁹⁰ Brett D. Hirsch, “An Italian Werewolf in London: Lycanthropy and *The Duchess of Malfi*”, *Early Modern Literary Studies* 11, no.2 (2005): paras. 2.1-43, accessed Nov 27, 2022, <http://purl.oclc.org/emls/11-2/hirswere.htm>.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

⁹² *Ibid.*; Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 36.

⁹³ John Smith, *A Compleat Practice of Physick* (London, 1656), P12v.

⁹⁴ Nicholas Culpeper, *Culpepers Last Legacy* (London, 1655), D2v.

political scene in constant flux.⁹⁵ A further text describes *both* scotoma and vertigo as “a giddiness in the head”.⁹⁶ Howell was not the only writer to use the language of giddiness to describe the chaos of mid-seventeenth century England; others drew on dizzy cognates through the civil wars and Interregnum, especially giddiness. To give just two examples, one writer attacks the regicides as “giddy-headed Traytours”, whilst another accuses the whole nation of being “a giddy-headed multitude in the Land, who are onely Time-servers, and (like weather-cocks) will turn at any time to serve their own turn”.⁹⁷ As such, Howell draws on a political discourse specific to his historical moment, but develops this into a more complex model which works within an interconnected cosmos.

The Ape concludes by drawing these discourses together. He tells Pererius he holds “a detestation of those mimicall giddy opinions” and is convinced those in power are “tumbling all things into a horrid disorder and hurliburly”: compelling reasons to stay on the island with Morphandra (N1v-N2r). The humoral body’s chaotic reeling whirls outwards and sets society spinning. Easing this chaotic turmoil seems to be impossible. As his parting shot to Pererius, the Ape claims “I so far detest *human kind*, that, in the mind I am in, I had rather undergo an *Annihilation*, or to be reduced to a *non-Entity*, which is so horrid a thing to all created natures that the very devills themselves abhor it, then be as I was” (O1v).⁹⁸ This is a damning verdict on “one of the Prime parts” of the cosmos. Man has been granted an exceptional status, but he has also been cursed with an exceptional psychological life which stems from his exclusive claim to rational thought. This is Howell’s articulation of human negative exceptionalism at its most intense: ultimately it would be better to be *nothing*, than to be human, exposed to this constant potential for unstable degeneration and brutality. This quality is as unique as it is toxic.

To Howell, the behaviour of everyone involved in the religious conflicts in England and elsewhere is eminently human. Of all living beings, only Man has the capacity to generate “*the horrid Sacriledges, the new-fangled Opinions, and gingling Extravagances that Human brains are subject unto*”, creating “incertitudes of holy things, and fits of despair” which lead to horrendous acts of violence against others and the self (a1r-a1v; X2r). This lack of self-control is wholly unbecoming for “*one of the prime parts of the Universe and Paramount of the Sublunary World*”, especially considering “*that Dominion which was given [Man] over all his fellow-Cretures*” (b1r). Articulating the causes and effects of The Wars of

⁹⁵ A *Short Method of Physick* (London, 1659), A3v.

⁹⁶ A *Physical Dictionary* (London, 1657), M4v; O2r.

⁹⁷ Peter English, *The Survey of Policy* (Leith, 1654), Ll1r; *The Lively Character of the Malignant Partie* (London, 1642), A4v.

⁹⁸ Howell may be invoking Augustine on the human body: “a body’s immortality and immunity from corruption derives from health of mind, and health of mind means resolutely holding fast to something better, namely the unchangeable God [...] Some say they would prefer not to have a body at all, but they are mistaken. For what they hate is not their body, but its imperfections and its dead weight. What they want is not to have no body at all, but to have one free from corruption and totally responsive; they think that if the body were such a thing it would not be a body, because they consider such a thing to be a soul”. Saint Augustine, *On Christian Teaching*, trans. R.P.H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 18-19. Emphasis my own. The link between stability and godliness, opposing corrupting mutability and sickness is very tempting.

the Three Kingdoms through humoralism and its impact on Man's mental state, Howell demonstrates human negative exceptionalism's potential political impact: political not just in the sense of the "life and death relations" of Tyrant Man's interspecies violence exhibited in Chapter 1, but also in respect of the socio-political community relations of Chapter 2.⁹⁹ To make political "response-ability" effectively, Man must admit to and then master his vulnerabilities. The health of the cosmos rests on this negative anthropocentrism.

It is useful to draw here on the work of environmental anthropologist David Kidner, who reflects on the tension between twenty-first-century humanity's account of itself and its needs, and its responsibilities. Kidner understands anthropocentrism as a system which has no interest in the welfare of the human: a valuable perspective for reading *Therologia*. Kidner argues that "while the behavior of people in the industrialized world appears superficially to be anthropocentric, this behavior is actually driven by forces and influences that have no concern for human well being [sic.], and are in fact highly damaging to human welfare".¹⁰⁰ Anthropocentrism is not pro-anthropism: if they were identical, the ongoing crises of our modern age, especially climate change, might be far easier to resolve. Anthropocentrism, writes Kidner, "is a *symptom* rather than a *cause* of an epistemology which privileges a particular form of human experience over any other".¹⁰¹

In the world of *Therologia*, "a particular form of human experience" – the capacity to engage in religious debate via a rational mind – has been "privilege[d]" over paying a much-needed attention to how the complexities of humoral physiology interact with that experience. An anthropocentrism which unquestioningly lauds human reason has "no concern for human well being [sic.]" and is, as Howell shows, "highly damaging to human welfare". Howell's elaboration on the main problem of anthropocentrism stands thus: humans are as much grounded in the world as nonhumans, however, they have been granted a unique responsibility for the state of the cosmos. Man has "contractual ties" as a member of the sublunary community, after all, he is "*so considerable a part of the world*", so dominant that if he "*decay[s] in his Species*" it puts the whole universe in danger (blv).¹⁰² Man's responsibility must be navigated whilst hindered by a humoral "self-experience that is often tumultuous and dramatic".¹⁰³ For the Ape, this tumultuousness is characterised by dizziness and blindness: Man has, literally, lost sight of his place in the cosmos.

This infirmity does not stop Pererius accusing the animal speakers of a similar myopia. After unsuccessfully speaking with three animals, Pererius is reminded by Morphandra that they "had the same reach and full light of *Reson*" as they had when they were human. Unable to believe the evidence

⁹⁹ Feder, "Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture", 227.

¹⁰⁰ David W. Kidner, "Why 'Anthropocentrism' is not Anthropocentric", *Dialectical Anthropology* 38, no.4 (2014): 474.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 477. Emphasis in text.

¹⁰² Delanty, *Community*, 1.

¹⁰³ Paster, *The Body Embarrassed*, 10.

before him, Pererius vents, “Oh, how is it possible then that the eyes of their understanding shold not be opend, to discern their own error?” (O2v). Morphandra’s response is remarkably casual: “it may well be that they find and feel more contentment, and sweetnes in that life they now lead, whereof men have no sense or knowledg, therefore ‘tis no thing of wonder that they desire to continue so [i.e. remain in their current form]” (O2v). In her work on anthropocentrism, Fiona Probyn-Rapsey writes that we should be mindful of “the possibility of nonhuman animal (in)difference to us. [... Animals] probably have more important things to think about than merely being our negative foils”.¹⁰⁴ Working with Agamben’s vision of the “anthropophorous” animal who bears the burden of human meaning Probyn-Rapsey articulates what is implied in Morphandra’s statement: Man refuses to acknowledge that *animals have other things going on*, “whereof men have no sense or knowledge”.¹⁰⁵ Throughout *Therologia*, Pererius repeatedly demonstrates an inability to fathom the animals’ contented existences.

Therologia treats its anthropomorphoses with a healthy suspicion: rather than reproducing traditional power dynamics, it gives its animal-speakers space to object and contest rhetorical space, enacting a type of zoo-centrism to counter the dominance of the anthropos. This extends into the animals’ attitudes to the dialogues. They are reluctant to speak and some make excuses to exit quickly, with palpable hostility.¹⁰⁶ Three of the dialogues in *Therologia* end because the animal-speakers want to do something else, whether that is because they have become uncomfortably warm in the sun, or because they are peckish: they have “more important things to think about”.¹⁰⁷ The Hind’s dialogue nearly does not happen at all. Responding to Pererius’ question about whether she would like to turn human, she offers a tart “No; ther’s a short and sudden Laconicall answer for you” (Plv). Though she is drawn into conversation, her initial indifference to Pererius’ questioning shows a disregard for the “*declining condition*” of the world and its consequences. The animals do not comply with Pererius’ expectations or demands (Stay still! Talk to me!), and in the “disorder and hurliburly” of this rebelliousness *Therologia* demonstrates a cosmopolitical attentiveness to its speakers: gathering together those who are set aside, forgotten about, unable to participate or utterly indifferent to discussions which affect their wellbeing.¹⁰⁸

Analysing this politically-inflected negative anthropocentrism, Isabelle Stengers’ idea of cosmopolitical politeness is useful. She writes that “politics is an art, and an art has no ground to

¹⁰⁴ Fiona Probyn-Rapsey, “Anthropocentrism”, in *Critical Terms for Animal Studies*, ed. Lori Gruen (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 51.

¹⁰⁵ Giorgio Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal*, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 12.

¹⁰⁶ Howell adapts the excuses from *Circes*, but adds the hostility, c.f. the Hare in *Circes*: “And therefore syns I haue sene the grasse yonder on the fayre hyll agaynste vs, and am hungry, I am inforced to leue thee”, Glv-G2r.

¹⁰⁷ The Otter: “I feel the Sun dart his rays somewhat quick”; The Boar: “I am going to *herb* among that tuft of Trees”. Howell, *Therologia*, E2r; Gglr.

¹⁰⁸ Isabelle Stengers, “The Cosmopolitical Proposal”, trans. Liz Carey-Libbrecht, in *Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy*, ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 1002-1003.

demand compliance from what it deals with. It has to create the manners that will enable it to become able to deal with what it has to deal with.”¹⁰⁹ These manners include accounting for those who will be affected by the outcomes of any discussions. In an anthropocentric world, this means paying attention to other witnesses to a cosmological decay in which Man’s humoral instability is implicated, and which only Man can rectify. Representing Man, Pererius is still learning these manners: he sees the animals’ perspectives as errors rather than valid, important worldviews. In *Therologia*, the “life and death relations” to cosmopolitics are informed by a physiologically disordered anthropocentrism which works to sabotage the wellbeing of all beings.¹¹⁰

The chaos which characterises seventeenth-century England and Europe is just one aspect of a wider problem of cosmological decay and corruption caused by Man’s sinfulness. The slow decomposition of the world beginning at the Fall was believed, by Howell and a significant swathe of his contemporaries, to be accelerating towards its final stages in this historical moment, intensifying a sense of immanent destruction.¹¹¹ Man’s anthropocentric sinfulness and his self-obsessed, chaotic emotional torment prevents a cultivation of appropriate “response-ability” in order to react to this cosmological downfall. *Therologia* demands that Man attend to the living world, that he must “live in consequence or with consequence” and “make present to [himself] what [he] is doing”.¹¹² However, it does so with the caveat that the entire cosmos is alert to Man’s consequential actions: “*the whole Creation mourns, and doth deplore / The ruthfull state of Human kind*” (b2v).

However, these animal-human speakers clearly have “more important things to think about” than mourning as Man continues to fail.¹¹³ Negative anthropocentrism and negative human exceptionalism means privileging an experience that makes Man the centre of attention; it means that everything is watching, waiting, and invested in every move he makes. However, Man’s welfare is not the concern, only that he must be watched and judged – and that judgement will find him wanting.

“A LEGACY TO MY FRIENDS”

Responding to crises at a global level, whether climate change or a Millenarian concern about the end of the world, means “learning to live and die well with each other in a thick present”.¹¹⁴ Howell’s present is oozy, saturated with humours and “thick” with conflict, elemental and political. But the idea of “d[y]ing well with each other” also plays an important role in reflecting on Man’s “response-ability” in the sublunary community. As Steel has argued, death “will always leave something out of

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 1001. Haraway also considers politeness an important part of politics: *When Species Meet*, 92 and throughout.

¹¹⁰ Feder, “Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture”, 227.

¹¹¹ Harris, *All Coherence Gone*, 194–97.

¹¹² Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 36.

¹¹³ Probyn-Rapsey, “Anthropocentrism”, 51.

¹¹⁴ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 1.

balance, something always left over”; in *Therologia* Howell explores how Man’s unstable volatility continues to affect the world from beyond the grave.¹¹⁵ If every part of the cosmos must “*perform its peculiar function towards the preservation of the Whole*”, *Therologia* demonstrates that Man fails this role in death, as well as life (b1r).

To think through the legacy of Man’s body, Haraway’s characterisation of earth as a “terran compost pile” is useful.¹¹⁶ *Therologia* alerts the reader to the vitality of this compost pile, the home of all sublunary beings, and the reader is forced to recognise that “critters are at stake in each other in every mixing and turning” of it, the “mixing and turning” here caused by the “restles mutation and motion” of Man’s humours (a2v). In this section, I discuss what *Therologia* says about the legacy of Man’s deficient body, what leeches out into the compost pile, and how it compares with the leavings of his sublunary fellows. I explore how Howell’s animals characterise their own bodies in comparison with Man’s and then discuss what these animals have to say about their bodies in death. I turn to what the animals say about Man’s corpse, arguing that even in death, Man’s responsibility to the cosmos does not end: the text denies the reader the “comfort in thinking that we can just disappear, regardless of what we have done”.¹¹⁷ Animal corpses are characterised as healthy and health-giving, Man’s is the opposite. Exploring the stakes of dying well in the world and Man’s problematic legacy, I reveal another facet of *Therologia*’s withering attack on the superficial vanity of Man’s exceptional status.

Opening the dialogues, the Otter gives an overview of the exterior parts of his body. As in *La Circe*, one of the primary reasons the animals give for maintaining their form is that they are fully resourced to contend with the world. For the Otter, his fur is the perfect example. Once a sailor suffering in all conditions at sea, he is much more comfortable in his amphibious coat, telling Pererius:

I am now in a condition that I need not fear hunger or cold, I have a good warm Coat about me, that will last me all my life long, without patching or mending; [...] indulgent *Nature* provides for us sensitive Creatures, [...] Beasts have skins, Fish have scales, Birds have feathers, but Man comes naked and wawling into the World, and cloaths himself afterwards with our spoils (Elr).¹¹⁸

Shannon’s writing on human negative exceptionalism and the vulnerability of human bodies combines comments on Man’s nakedness with early modern understandings of the infirmity of the senses. Man faces a “cosmic underprovisioning” in this world: “we see that the ‘coveredness’ of

¹¹⁵ Steel, *How Not to Make a Human*, 129.

¹¹⁶ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 97.

¹¹⁷ Steel, *How Not to Make a Human*, 129.

¹¹⁸ C.f. the Oyster on nakedness in Gelli, *Circes*, B2r.

animals – their not being really ‘naked’ – figures their self-completeness or natural sufficiency: the integral animal comes equipped with a good-enough coat already on its back”.¹¹⁹ This refers not just to the physical coat of animals but also to the integrity of their senses. For the Goat, Man’s lack of resources is clear: “thers many of us [animals] that surpasse you in strength and quicknesse of sense”, he tells Pererius, listing examples including the dog’s sense of smell or the eagle’s ability to look into the sun (Hh2v). Pererius is unable to deny that animals have it better, and can only suggest that “Hands, Speech and Reson make amends for all” (Hh2v). This Aristotelian line of reasoning is weak because firstly, *Therologia* follows a tradition of destabilising the supremacy of human language and reason, and secondly no animal in *Therologia* even hints at regretting their lack of hands: they are not necessary unless you are inhabiting a particular type of body. While these three qualities might be enough to persuade a human reader of their own exceptionalism, they have negligible impact in a space where animality is an option.

Beyond a lack of external integrity, Man is more infirm internally than his sublunary fellows. I have explored how the animal-speakers articulate this with regard to Man’s psychological life, but this infirmity is also very much physical. Howell’s paratexts foreground this, and three of Howell’s animals seize on this vulnerability to disease and discomfort. The Hind makes compelling points for rejecting not just humanity but human life lived specifically in the body of a woman: she expresses her joy at being free from “carnall copulation”, “that monthly purgation so improperly called Flowers”, as well as “abortions, and that curse which the Creator inflicted upon *Woman-kind* that they shold bring forth their children with sorrow and pain” (R2r-R2v).¹²⁰ Though animality might place a being on the worse side of the Genesis “*justice problem*”, when it comes to the dangers of pregnancy and birth, there are real advantages.¹²¹

More generally, the Ass and Mule give lengthy and detailed descriptions of common human diseases to which they are no longer subject. In particular, the Mule’s description of potential illnesses runs to over a page of the text, describing a “world of distempers and maladies” (X1r-X2r). The Ass (once a French peasant), rather than focusing on the human, elaborates upon the sole disease to which his kind are subject, which is “onely in the head, when som unusuall defluxion of rheume falls thence into the nostrils, which being stopp’d turns to the improvement of health, but if once it falls upon the lungs we are gone” (H1v). Whilst a sickly existence as a snotty donkey is not appealing, the Ass’ description of its swift, clean dispatch from life hits on a theme which runs through the animals’ arguments. Having described his body as “more healthfull far and neat” than Man’s, the Ass

¹¹⁹ Shannon, “Poor, Bare, Forked,” 192; 186.

¹²⁰ Gelli’s hind refers to childbirth – she no longer has “so many sorowes in delyuerance of [her] younge” – but the references to sexuality and menstruation seem to be Howell’s additions. Gelli, *Circes*, K2r.

¹²¹ An analysis of gender in *Therologia* is beyond the scope of this chapter, but taking the Hind and the Bees together as ventriloquised female voices would be productive, given how Howell’s writing seems to lurch between misogyny and sympathy.

suggests that as well as living more healthily, he has the capacity to die more efficiently: one day there is rheum on the lungs, the next, no more Ass (H1v).

By comparison, Man's body could not be more unhealthful or messy, and the Goat confronts Man with this fact. In the ninth dialogue, he berates Pererius' exceptionalist view of Man, combining emotional and physical weakness to form a depressing vision of hominoid life:

let the threed of a man's life be never so well spun, yet it cannot be without
bracks and thrumbs: Ther is no creture so troublesome to himself as man,
[...] Moreover, *you*, like us, are but raggs of mortality, yet you are so vain in
magnifying your own species, that you make Man the epitome and
complement of all created natures [...] What numberles diseases is his frail
body, which is the socket of his soul, subject unto? how short are his
plesures, and what black sudds commonly they leave behind them?
Insomuch that they may be said to have wings and stings, for sadnes
succeeds his joys as punctually as night follows the day (I11r).

The textile imperfections that are "bracks and thrumbs" flow into the Goat's reading of *all* corporeal life as "raggs of mortality" and his disdainful, fatalistic view of existence. The Goat's rag-bodied Man is also subject to the instability which other animals have previously outlined, but he adds an emotional aspect: even if Man experiences happiness, it is depressingly short-lived and leaves behind a dirty froth.¹²² This scummy aftermath is indicative of a wider problem with Man, in that his body is porous and oozy, perpetually leaving a wake of filth behind him.

Upon closer examination, it becomes evident that a corpse's productions are just as important as the deeds performed by that body in life. Without exception, the animals of *Therologia* refer to the medicinal value of their bodies. This is a surprising line to take, referring neither to the animals' current lives, nor their previous humanity, but to something that can only happen once they die. Unlike the animals of *The Noble Arte* in Chapter 1, whose medicinal catalogues serve to justify their deaths, the animals of *Therologia* outline their medicinal virtues as a point of pride, emphasising their bodies' superiority. The Otter lists a number of benefits from his corpse, the Ass mentions milk, in addition to pulverised bones and keratin, as a curative; the Hind is confident "ther's nothing within and without our dead bodies but is usefull for Mankind", giving examples such as a deer's "*marrow* against the *Gowt* and *Consumptions*" and the "exquisit vertues" of antlers (C2v; H1r; R2v-S1r). The

¹²² "Black sudds" is a specifically Howelian phrase, used to describe negative emotional excess. In *A Trance*, Howell describes the aftermath of a nightmarish vision: "So did this *Extasis*, with that deluge of objects wherewith it overwhelm'd my braine, leave behind it blacke sudds, and gastly thoughts within me", C2r.

Mule, Boar, and Goat also provide ample evidence of the usefulness of their corpses, specifically for human medicine: their “cleaner carcasses” are excellent pharmacopeia (Z1r; Ff2v; li2r).

The most heavy-handed example of this cataloguing is from the sixth dialogue, featuring a fox (previously an Italian merchant):

when Nature hath finished her course in me, I will leave it [his corpse] for a Legacy to my friends, for ‘tis good and medicinall for many uses, my *Brain* is good against the *Falling-sickness*; my *Blood* against the *Stone*, and the *Cramp*, my *Gall* instill’d with Oyle takes away the *pain in the ears*; my *Tounge* worn in a chain is good for all diseases in the *Eyes*, my *Fatt*, healeth the *Alopecia*, or falling off of the hair (Cc2v-Dd1r).

The catalogue continues, with the Fox elaborating on his eyes, liver, genitals, dung, spleen, and fur “which is so much valued by the fairest Beauties, I will bequeath it to the admired Queen *Morphandra* to make her a Muff, as a small Heriot for her protection of me under her Dominion” (Dd1r). As Harvey notes, Howell’s listing of particular properties calls on structures found in natural history texts.¹²³ To some extent Howell follows this convention: the animals talk about themselves in an abstract fashion, considering, for instance, otter bodies rather than that specific Otter’s corpse. It is a male ass who mentions female ass’s milk as a remedy. The Fox, however, talks about himself: he envisages his body being consumed by others, specifically his friends, and is not at all troubled by it. The Fox also understands his body as possessing economic value. In referring to his fur as appropriate for a “heriot” he invokes a system of payments to a landlord taken on the death of a tenant.¹²⁴ The Fox emphasises that animals and their bodies are productive members of the sublunary community and their superiority to human bodies is two-fold. They are sufficiently adapted for life on Earth and in death they continue to make contributions to Man’s wellbeing. They continue to offer support to the “prime part” of the cosmos and each animal is well-suited “to perform its peculiar function towards the preservation of the Whole” (b1r). The same cannot be said for human bodies.

The Otter makes it clear that human bodies are unstable producers of stinking excreta, but he also remarks upon the fact that human corpses leech horrible lifeforms into the cosmos: “after Man’s death, ther’s no carcasse so gastly and noisome as his, so that Toads and Serpents engender often in his scull; nor is his cadaver good for anything when life is gone” (C2v). The Ass follows in a similar fashion: “we [animals] have cleaner carcasses than *Men* [...] Nor do any crawling nasty worms

¹²³ Harvey, “Beastly Physic,” 120.

At the back of *Therologia* there is another paratext, a ten-page index which shows readers where they can find particular scientific, medicinal, and philosophical ideas in the text (Rr2r-Tt2v). Though the functionality leaves much to be desired – the alphabetisation of sources appears arbitrary – that *Therologia* contains a device more commonly found in natural history texts indicates Howell’s interests in science and medicine, as discussed in Hedrick, “Romancing the Salve”, 180–84.

¹²⁴ OED, “heriot, n.”, def. 2.a.

grow out of our Cadavers, but Beetles, and other airy insects, which are not so noisome" (Hlv). The Hind also attacks the bodies of human women: "ther is nothing in the most noisome carcasses of *Women* that's good for any thing, except their *hair*, which is either but an excrecence, or excrement rather, usefull only to make fantastic foolish *Periwigs*" (Slr). Having stated her anger at the numerous injustices that she faced as a human woman, these closing remarks are the nail in the Hind's existential coffin. The excreta of the dead serve to decorate the living. Invoking excreted hair, explosive viscera, and stench-ridden corpses, Howell refuses to "thrust aside" the defilement "that life withstands, hardly and with difficulty".¹²⁵ Both the Hind and the Otter indulge in a "theology of human abjection" to powerful effect.¹²⁶ Not only is human death disgusting and abject, it is useless, and "*preservation of the Whole*" vanishes from the agenda. Howell does, though, give us pause: useless is not the same as unproductive. The human corpse encourages unsettling generativity with reptiles and amphibians procreating in lifeless hollows and maggots sprouting from the leftovers.¹²⁷

Haraway offers a fruitful reading of entangled interspecies legacies: "trying to make a living, critters eat critters but can only partly digest one another. Quite a lot of indigestion, not to mention excretion, is the natural result [...] some of that indigestion and voiding are just acidic reminders of mortality".¹²⁸ Confronting vibrant decay produces a nasty reflux. Steel's work draws together these contrasting corpse-legacies and articulates a troubling conception of the lively dead-matter which is the lifeless body.¹²⁹ Steel notes that death inevitably results in life: "vibrancy will always swarm forth from the putrefaction, exhaustion, failure, or, for that matter, the ineluctable instability of matter, to try to sustain its own new, temporary order".¹³⁰ He also points to the "irresponsibility" of understanding death as a finite end-point which "erase[s] what we have donated to or inflicted on others as we have lived".¹³¹ *Therologia's* contrasting of animal pharmacopeia with human remains offers "acidic reminders" not just of mortality but of the troubling fact that Man's posthumous impact on the world is inevitable and outside of his control.¹³²

The animals of *Therologia* understand that death is not the "finite end-point" of their existence, and that what they "donate" to Man from their medicinal bodies will continue to affect their "friends" in the world. There is a strong sense of the "vibrancy" that their death will support, the idea that they will sustain a "new, temporary order", however chaotically governed and regurgitated by Man. In *Therologia*, animal bodies work to maintain Man's body and they do not object to this

¹²⁵ Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1982), 3.

¹²⁶ Shannon, "Poor, Bare, Forked," 175.

¹²⁷ For early modern anxieties over parasitic consumption, see Raber, *Animal Bodies*, 103-25.

¹²⁸ Haraway, *When Species Meet*, 31.

¹²⁹ Steel, *How Not to Make A Human*, 101.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 108.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 129.

¹³² Steel notes the work of artist Jae Rhim Lee, who has designed a burial suit for the twenty-first-century human. The fabric contains fungal spores, which "capture the environmental toxins that we take in during our lives", thus saving the earth from our poisonous legacy. *Ibid.*

labour because their donations are a point of pride, or exceptionality: their biology is their legacy. By contrast, the productions of the human body place it in the same category as the things it produces: at best, an annoying inconvenience of existence, at worst, a time-bomb of noxious substances oozing “excrecences” and “black sudds” which corrupt and contaminate anything with which they come into contact. The problem, of course, is that Man is so embedded in the cosmos, “vainly entitl[ing] himself, the *Microcosm*”, that nothing escapes his toxic touch (C2r).¹³³

CONCLUSION

Therologia frets over the legacy of the human. In the eleventh and final dialogue, Pererius succeeds in persuading a hive of bees to turn human (they have no specified nationality). Previously nuns, the bees agree to resume their monastic isolation because of the promise of the afterlife.¹³⁴ Pererius’ rhetoric flees the earthly plain as he fails to answer any of the questions of mundane existence which the animals have presented throughout the text, and tells the bees that in Heaven, the joys they will experience are “beyond *expression*, [...] beyond all *imagination*; That vast *Ocean* of Felicity which the *Separat Soul* is capable to receive cannot flow into her, until those *banks* of earth, viz. the *corporeall* walls of flesh be removed” (Qqlr). It is in this upward reach to the celestial world that, in contrast to Gelli’s Aglafemos, Howell reinforces the negative exceptionality of Man, despite the bees’ choice of humanity.¹³⁵ It is undeniable: just as the paratexts spoke of “*the numberles Indispositions whereunto the Bodies of Men as well as their Brains are expos’d*” and declared that “it is denied to *Man* to be always at Home within himself”, the end of the text demonstrates unequivocally that Man’s body prevents him from achieving stability in this world (alr-alv; a2v). The bees having agreed to turn human, *Therologia* closes with a hymn. The animals are given the last word: we do not witness any transformation, unlike in *La Circe*, where Aglafemos momentarily reflects on his new status.¹³⁶ The hymn glorifies the Creator, referring to “*glorious Angels*”, “*Scrapphick Powers, cherubs*”, and ending with “*the glorious Beatific Vision*” (Qq2r).

The concluding lines of *Therologia* reinforce a sense of the vast, overwhelming distance between embodied life, and Man’s spiritual aspirations: earthly life, including the reality in which the

¹³³ Microcosmic analogy and its inherent anthropomorphism represent “an increasingly insistent embedding of man within the cosmos”. Michael Weemans and Bertrand Prévost, “Introduction”, in *The Anthropomorphic Lens: Anthropomorphism, Microcosmism and Analogy in Early Modern Thought and Visual Arts*, ed. Walter S. Melion, Bret Rothstein, and Michael Weemans (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 7.

¹³⁴ Howell’s portrayal of convent life, as spoken by the bees, is determinedly negative. As with the Hind, though, the extent to which this is powered by misogyny is debatable. The text appears to attack female sexuality, possibly suggesting a male entitlement to female bodies, but it also appears to be sympathetic in its imagination of the impact of closing oneself off from human society (Mmlv-Mm2r).

¹³⁵ It is interesting that Howell chooses a religious group to resume their humanity, given the Ape’s railing against religious conflict. This seems to turn on Howell’s ability to separate a general idea of Christian belief (based on the content of the bees’ dialogue, it does not seem to be specifically Catholic) from exegetical discussions about what, to Howell, appear to be less significant matters.

¹³⁶ Gelli, *Circes*, Tlr-T2r.

reader experiences the text, is conspicuously absent from the end of the dialogues. *Therologia* walks a precarious tightrope. On the one hand, its conclusion offers comfort to the reader: spiritual joys await and Man can simply vanish into the ethereal realms. However, everything that has gone before demonstrates that Man has a responsibility to the “Whole”, and that the physiology of his body and his mismanagement of it matters. Man’s legacy is toxic, contributing nothing of value to the cosmos.

Howell uses anthropocentrism as a tool to interrogate the worthiness of Man for his divinely-ordained and self-perpetuated exceptional role. The Aesopian politics of seventeenth-century English literature is deployed to ambitious ends: not only to do political analysis but to do so with the aim of attacking Man so viciously that the world changes course. The animal speakers follow precedent, speaking from a rich heritage, and they use their training in political eloquence to deliver a powerful message, drawing attention to and undermine the damaging vanity of Man’s self-allotted exceptionality. To return to Haraway, Howell’s speakers attempt to force Man to “cultivate response-ability”, to “make present to itself what it is doing”, to “live in consequence or with consequence” of his uncontrolled physiology and its impact on Creation.¹³⁷ With Man stripped of any exceptional features, Pererius’ justifications of superiority are found to be hollow. Howell brandishes the resulting hideousness for us, and the lesson to be learned is unequivocal: Man has no pre-eminence over beasts – indeed, he has been arraigned as criminal – and what marks him as different also marks him as repulsive and miserable, unfit for the cosmological duties demanded of him.

This intensely emotional interrogation speaks to *Therologia*’s historical moment: the text is an absorbing, unsettling response to a desperately unstable period of history. How could a writer argue for exceptional human status, for Man being central to the universe, when for decades Man had proved to be so recklessly chaotic and changeable? Howell’s political moderation seems to have left him distressed by events around him. *Therologia* surprises the reader with far more than its aggressively chatty animal interlocutors and its swoops of subject matter. Howell’s emotionally and anatomically-inflected anthropocentrism is as destabilising to the reader as the elements and humours that compose that reader’s body.

Anthropomorphism creates a unique space to process difficult truths. *Therologia* demands its readers acknowledge the weight of the world pressing on it, and the high stakes of existing in human form in the world. Humanity is knotted into a string-figure game in which the players are obliged to play with “response and respect [...] learning to pay attention”.¹³⁸ Attending to Man’s embodied legacy and his socio-political status in an anthropocentric cosmos should lead towards a “nurturing of all that is necessary for the welfare and flourishing of life”.¹³⁹ Pulling at the threads of obligation in

¹³⁷ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 36.

¹³⁸ Haraway, *When Species Meet*, 42.

¹³⁹ Andreas Chatzidakis et al., *The Care Manifesto: The Politics of Interdependence* (London: Verso, 2020), VLeBooks edition, Introduction, NP.

which Man finds himself caught, *Therologia* “make[s] trouble” in a “thick present”.¹⁴⁰ Man has the odds stacked against him: his body is naturally unfit for his role as Paramount, perpetually destabilising him. Attempting to “settle troubled waters and rebuild quiet places”, the text challenges Man to do the impossible: to conquer the “restles mutation and motion” of elements and humours of which he is composed and to take “response-ability”: for the world, and for himself.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 1.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

How Do They Care?

A Conclusion

William Baldwin's *Beware the Cat*, the text with which I opened this thesis, centres on Master Streamer's eavesdropping on a feline court, and Mouse-slayer's memorable testimony is well worth a listen – or rather, a read. However, though Streamer has gone to great lengths to concoct the devices which give him the supernaturally sensitive hearing needed to understand animals, he does not interact with the cats outside his lodging. In fact, the only animal he interacts with directly once he has gained the ability to hear what it has to say is a crow.¹ Reeling from the sudden shock of being able to hear all animals, as well as the conversations of humans from miles and miles away, and being aurally bludgeoned by a church bell striking nearby, Streamer cowers in the hearth in his room:

[...] because the noise was so terrible that I could not abide it, I thought best to stop mine ears, thinking thereby I should be the less afraid. And as I was thereabout, a crow, which belike was nodding asleep on the chimney top, fell down the chimney over my head, whose flittering in the fall made such a noise that, when I felt his feet upon my head, I thought that the Devil had been indeed and seized upon me, and therewith touched him, he called me “knave” in his language, after such a sort that I swooned for fear.²

Scholarship on *Beware the Cat* has commented on its religious satire and its interest in textual frames and typography, and has investigated the identity of Streamer and John Young, the text's dedicatee.³ However, for my purposes, its most valuable quality is its utter irreverence, both in its content and towards the broader philosophical concerns with which it collides: specifically those related to the treatment of animals, either as literary figures or as objects for human use.⁴ The text's speed and directness leave no room for meditative musings about the possibilities of nonhuman language,

¹ However, Streamer sources, dismembers and flays other animals in order to make his hearing devices. William Baldwin, *Beware the Cat by William Baldwin: The First English Novel*, ed. William A. Ringler, Jr. and Michael Flachmann (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1988), 25-27.

² *Ibid.*, 33.

³ On religion, see Andrew Hadfield, “William Baldwin's *Beware the Cat* and the Question of Anglo-Irish Literature”, *Irish Studies Review* 6, no.3 (1998): 237-43; Robert Maslen, “‘The Cat Got Your Tongue’: Pseudo-Translation, Conversion, and Control in William Baldwin's ‘Beware the Cat’”, *Translation and Literature* 8, no.1 (1999): 3-27. For questions of identity, see Marie Hause, “Identifying John Young and Gregory Streamer in William Baldwin's *Beware the Cat*”, *Notes and Queries* 68, no.4 (2021): 393-96; Ben Parsons, “William Baldwin's *Beware the Cat*: Some Further Light on Gregory Streamer”, *Notes and Queries* 69, no.2 (2022): 85-86. On *Beware the Cat*'s textual complexities, see Terence N. Bowers, “The Production and Communication of Knowledge in William Baldwin's ‘Beware the Cat’: Towards a Typographic Culture”, *Criticism* 33, no.1 (1991): 1-29; Edward Bonahue Jr., “‘I Know the Place and Persons’: The Play of Textual Frames in Baldwin's ‘Beware the Cat’”, *Studies in Philology* 91, no.3 (1994): 283-300; Rachel Stenner, “The Act of Penning in William Baldwin's *Beware the Cat*”, *Renaissance Studies* 30, no.3 (2016): 334-49.

⁴ Catherine I. Cox has explored the seriousness with which the text treats the plague as divine punishment: “Plague Like Cats: Soft Instruments of Sharp Justice in William Baldwin's *Beware the Cat*”, *Explorations in Renaissance Culture* 41, no.1 (2015): 1-29.

subjectivity, politics, or human-animal relations. The reader has to pick up what they can as the text runs along: cats have a functioning society and judicial system, Streamer wants in. Take it or leave it, says the text. *Beware the Cat* does not overthink its anthropomorphism, its animal cruelty, its companion species interactions: these things just happen.

The unfortunate crow typifies Baldwin's approach, and in this interaction he offers a remarkable gloss on anthropocentrism. Streamer is entitled, desperate to understand what is happening amongst the cats, but is totally unprepared for what he might hear. He has not thought through the consequences of inserting himself where he is neither required nor wanted. Before Streamer's chaotic intrusion into the nonhuman world, the crow was "nodding asleep on the chimney top".⁵ Rather than landing in the hearth, the crow falls on a head and receives an unexpected touch; irked by this unsolicited contact he hurls out an insult. This crow had "more important things to think about", to borrow Probyn-Rapsey's formulation, than getting caught up in Streamer's cross-species nosiness.⁶ He neither knew nor cared about what was happening in the room below his chimney roost. Streamer was not relevant to the crow's bedtime, and the bird has no patience for Streamer's clumsy nonsense.

This is the problem. Anthropocentrism is a speciesist selfishness which favours Man's curiosities and desires over the freedom of others to be left alone. Baldwin's displeased crow is a relatively minor manifestation of this selfishness in comparison with many of the other nonhuman beings who appear in this thesis. As I explored in relation to Cora Diamond's work in Chapter 1, anthropocentrism brings about conditions "in which we treat *each other* with respect, and we mean to make animals bear the burden, the multiform burdens, of *our* living as we think human beings should".⁷ In *The Noble Arte of Venerie* (henceforth *The Noble Arte*), these burdens prove fatal to animals: Man is supposed to hunt, it is necessary for his sociability. The harming of animals is an unfortunate side-effect, but in any case, Man has been granted impunity by God against almost all instances of cross-species violence. Even where animals are an object of human care they are burdened by potential, unnatural injury. Humans ought to be allowed to keep baby badgers in rooms with fire should they so wish, says Du Fouilloux, and the pets will pay the price. However, as my reading of *Coriolanus* shows, in Chapter 2, the idea that anthropocentrism leads us to "treat *each other* with respect" is too optimistic. David Kidner's reading of anthropocentrism has demonstrated how it "privileges a particular form of human experience over any other".⁸ *Coriolanus* shows how this privileging can have fatal consequences for humans as well as animals. The play's zoo- and agri-

⁵ Baldwin, *Beware the Cat*, 33.

⁶ Fiona Probyn-Rapsey, "Anthropocentrism", in *Critical Terms for Animal Studies*, ed. Lori Gruen (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 51.

⁷ Cora Diamond, "Injustice and Animals", in *Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers: Essays in Wittgenstein, Medicine, and Bioethics*, ed. Carl Elliot (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 142. Emphasis in original.

⁸ David W. Kidner, "Why 'Anthropocentrism' is not Anthropocentric", *Dialectical Anthropology* 38 (2014): 477.

political rhetoric allows Martius to dehumanise the citizens and bring them to the brink of starvation; Martius is killed because he has so keenly privileged his own model of citizenship until it is too late.

Through the mistreatment of the disempowered, *The Noble Arte* and *Coriolanus* offer worlds in which some beings are “truly alive” whilst others are “relegated to nonlife”.⁹ Whether starved citizens or hunted animals, the beings subjected to Human power demonstrate that creating “any community means making choices”: choices about who will live, who will die, and who will be attended to in their life and death.¹⁰ Yet this is not entirely one-sided: the sublunary communities of this thesis are filled with beings whose responses to their mistreatment make visible the “monstrous register” through which any political “distribution of care” operates.¹¹ In their determinedly somatic discourses, these sublunary communities are strikingly “immediate and experiential”, and it is these embodied calls for attentiveness which highlight the “contractual ties” that bind Man to his fellow beings.¹²

“Noahs Floud” and *Therologia* show the consequences of anthropocentric community choices writ large: the entire cosmos suffers from Man’s self-obsessed insularity. In both “Noahs Floud” and *Therologia*, Man’s ignorant sinfulness, whether in the past or present, oozes out into the world and corrupts or proves fatal to other beings. Drayton’s biblical paraphrase uses classical models and contemporary experiences of the indiscriminate harms caused by flooding to interrogate Man’s divinely-ordained, anthropocentric dominion over the living world. The sins of the past are visited upon the present as Drayton suggests that the current world is built upon, even nourished by, the decayed corpses of antediluvian sinners and their innocent victims. *Therologia* also gestures to a divinely-ordained anthropocentrism and dominion, but engages with it through an attack on human exceptionalism. Reflecting on decades of bloody violence caused by “incertitudes of holy things”, Howell shows that unquestioningly celebrating Man’s capacity to reason has led to a neglect of his physiological life.¹³ Man’s “*rebellious Humors*” render him unable to “*perform [his] peculiar function towards the preservation of the Whole*”, and instead leave him with a posthumous legacy through which his toxic fractiousness contaminates the cosmos.¹⁴

⁹ Karl Steel, *How Not to Make a Human: Pets, Feral Children, Sky Burial, Oysters* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 39.

¹⁰ Ibid. “Human” in the Latourian sense: Bruno Latour, *Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), ProQuest Ebook Central, “The States (of Nature) between War and Peace”, NP, accessed Sept 30, 2022, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/york-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4926426>.

¹¹ Steel, *How Not to Make a Human*, 39.

¹² Gerard Delanty, *Community*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2010), 1; 3.

¹³ James Howell, *The Parly of Beasts; or, Morphandra* (London: 1660), X2r.

¹⁴ Ibid., alr; blr.

A grotesque injustice results from Man's inability to take up his role as "Epitome and Lord Paramount among all sublunary Cretures".¹⁵ Through these texts, the "*justice problem*" of Genesis reveals itself to be not just a historic covenant, but something ongoing.¹⁶ Through quotidian acts of injustice Man makes animals "bear the burden" of his living a meaningful existence. Genesis 9 "establish[es] the butcher shop" of the world in which "all things [are] made for mans vse".¹⁷ In *The Noble Arte*, this injustice is centred on the use of bodies: the chasm between being able to speak a language of rights and use those rights to claim just treatment for one's body is unbridgeable. For instance, though the Hare attempts to plead for her life through a language of material exchange centred on the human world, this cannot protect her body because Man's right to hunt will always be prioritised. This is inevitable in a text which functions on the premise that animals are not really alive in the first place. With a similar carelessness, the antediluvian sinners of "Noahs Floud" do not appreciate that the earth is a living force, something not to be "offended", and the result is the killing of all things because "when man is taken away, there should be no use of them".¹⁸ *Therologia* explores the outcome of accepted human exceptionalism: Man can disregard the living world if he chooses, but what are the consequences of doing so, and does he deserve this extraordinary privilege? The answer is no: the animal speakers take Man to "the Barr of Justice" precisely because his unstable physiology is driving a socio-political incompetence which is cosmically destructive.¹⁹ In his paratexts, Howell further undercuts Man's pretensions to this privilege and elevates the moral status of the living world: "*the whole Creation mourns, and doth deplore / The ruthful state of Human kind*".²⁰ The cosmos is magnanimous enough to not only see Man's dire circumstance for what it is, but to feel pity for him.

Anthropocentrism powers the injustice faced by early modern animals, but it also causes justice problems for people. Chapter 2 touched on this problem obliquely. Kidner's assertion that anthropocentrism, as it is traditionally understood, has no interest in human welfare plays out in dramatic fashion in *Coriolanus* through the unjust treatment of the citizens. To use Weil and Diamond's terms, the Roman citizens expect that "good and not harm will come to them", but the patricians, Martius in particular, lack an "awareness of the other being that impedes doing injustice, doing harm": the "loving attention" that would foster a just political society is absent from the play, and so the citizens starve until the patricians relent.²¹ Martius himself also suffers through his

¹⁵ Ibid., C2r.

¹⁶ Laurie Shannon, *The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 51.

¹⁷ Martin Luther, *Luther's Works: Volume 2, Lectures on Genesis: Chapters 6-14*, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan & Daniel E. Poellot, trans. George V. Schick (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 1960), 133; Andrew Willet, *Hexapla in Genesin* (London, 1608), G3v.

¹⁸ Isabelle Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism*, trans. Andrew Goffey (Lüneberg: Open Humanities Press/Meson Press, 2015), 45; Willet, *Hexapla*, G3v.

¹⁹ Howell, *Therologia*, b2r.

²⁰ OED, "ruthful, adj. (and n.)", def. 2.a.

²¹ Diamond, "Injustice and Animals", 131.

privileging of his military and honour-bound experience over one more “Earthbound”, more attuned to the demands of living on the earth.²² Ignoring the necessity of political husbandry, he refuses to “cultivate response-ability” to the world, and is “unable to make present [...] the world in its sheer not-one-selfness” until moments before his death.²³ Attempting to demonstrate that his peace treaty is not a shameful capitulation, Martius is forced into paying attention to the mundanities of earthly life because his life depends upon it: the materiality of war, previously so shameful to him, suddenly becomes “our spoils”, he has won back “a full third part” of the cost of the military action.²⁴ Diplomacy forces Martius to rapidly “cultivate response-ability” and alerts him to his Earthbound existence and his duty towards “land shared with other often bizarre beings whose requirements are multiform”.²⁵ These “bizarre beings” are not just nonhuman animals, but other people, whose “requirements” are those demanded by the work of attending to Gaia and sustaining political community through the *oikos*.

In the texts I have explored in this thesis, injustice is marked by inattentiveness, in the sense that Man moves through the world comfortably unaware of the backwash and “black suds” he leaves behind.²⁶ And yet there are moments where a great deal of care is shown towards nonhuman lives throughout the texts and traditions I trace – such as that shown to the dogs and badgers of *The Noble Arte* – and moments where care towards nonhumans has the potential to impact intra-human interactions. For instance, Martius’ faulty agri-political rhetoric belies entire worlds of interspecies care and attentiveness: the sheep who need checking for mange, the soil which needs breaking by the plough, or the geese whose honking protects the homestead. Martius is able to shirk responsibility for the citizens’ wellbeing, turning “life and death relations” into biopolitical control, because he does not care about interspecies entanglements.²⁷

Drayton offers a very different, two-sided model of care in “Noahs Floud”. The poem exhibits the model of narcissistic care outlined by Jack Halberstam, in which care is offered because the object of care is needed in order to make the carer feel good about themselves.²⁸ At the same time, it acknowledges the devastation felt by those who lost their animals in contemporary flooding disasters. Though this devastation remains tied to an anthropocentric understanding of the lost animals as productive livestock, the emotive language found in Drayton’s text and contemporary

²² Latour, *Facing Gaia*, “The States (of Nature) between War and Peace”, NP.

²³ Donna Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 36.

²⁴ William Shakespeare, *Coriolanus*, ed. Peter Holland, (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2013), 5.6.77-78. Emphasis my own.

²⁵ Latour, *Facing Gaia*, “On the Instability of the (Notion of) Nature”, NP.

²⁶ Howell, *Therologia*, lllr.

²⁷ Helena Feder, “Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism*, ed. Greg Garrard (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 227.

²⁸ Jack Halberstam, “Beyond Caring: Human-Animal Interdependency: A Response”, *New Literary History* 51, no.4 (2020): 720.

accounts of flooding invite “human audiences to feel kinship with other species”.²⁹ Rachel Adams’ more redemptive model of care, which I argued can be found in “Noahs Floud”, can also be felt in *Therologia*: the text registers as a “powerful and dramatic [act] of imagination that [rearranges] who and what we see as deserving of our care”.³⁰ This is care not in the sense of safeguarding, but in the sense of alertness to circumstance.

Calling attention to the artfulness and heritage of his anthropomorphism, Howell draws on a long tradition of speaking animals to “*tell the Human Creture his own*” and these reflexive projections hold up a mirror to Man: *behold your imperfection, nosce te ipsum*.³¹ *Therologia* attacks the consequences of Man’s carelessness in the world whilst simultaneously aiming to provoke a feeling of interspecies kinship in the reader: the text’s fixation on shared bodily decomposition after death, and the contrasting ends to which body parts are put, is a humbling *memento mori*. The text is alert to the possibility that “all earthlings are kin in the deepest sense, and it is past time to practice better care of kinds-as-assemblages”.³² Howell’s earthlings petition for a form of care which is centred on the human out of necessity – he is Creation’s “paramount” – but that act of centring also embeds Man into an assemblage of earthliness.³³ *Therologia*’s fluid humoralism produces beings interacting “in unexpected collaborations and combinations, in hot compost piles”.³⁴ This productive but noxious composting is expressed through Howell’s engagement with the early modern discourse of worldly decay, as well as the animals’ remarks on Man’s viscera. The Otter asserts “ther’s no carcase so gastly and noisome as [Man’s]” and refers to the “Toads and Serpents [that] engender often in his scull”, and the Ass cites the “crawling nasty worms” which spring from Man’s corpse.³⁵

There is an energetic, mucky fecundity to this assembling, as Drayton’s manure can testify. The assemblages and collaborations brought into being across these texts offer cosmopolitical possibilities. Encompassing all is the “ticklish assemblage of forces” that is Gaia.³⁶ She gets to work in *Coriolanus*, but a presence akin to this is felt in “Noahs Floud” through its invocation of the *anima mundi*, and a lively cosmos hums through *Therologia*’s nod to the “*Antient Sages*” who understood the universe as “*one huge Animal or Living Creture*”.³⁷ Whilst *The Noble Arte* does not invoke the same universal force, it brings together an assemblage of forces to act upon the nonhuman beings it makes speak: divine edicts, social hierarchy, a desire for companion species, medical necessity, even the art of literary composition.

²⁹ Rachel Adams, “The Art of Interspecies Care”, *New Literary History* 51, no.4 (2020): 708.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 714.

³¹ Howell, *Therologia*, blv.

³² Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 103.

³³ Howell, *Therologia*, blr.

³⁴ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 4.

³⁵ Howell, *Therologia*, C2v; Hlv.

³⁶ Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times*, 47.

³⁷ Howell, *Therologia*, blr.

To greater and lesser degrees, the works studied here have allowed me to engage with Donna Haraway's vision of cosmopolitics, in which the aim is to "make trouble, to stir up potent response to devastating events, as well as to settle troubled waters and rebuild quiet places".³⁸ These devastating events are as unfathomably huge as the biblical inundation and as small as the death of a hare. Gascoigne's poems trouble the reader, if only temporarily; Shakespeare stages a "potent response" to contemporary problems; Drayton and Howell "stir up" troubling anthropomorphic worlds. In his underwater playfulness Drayton finds a "quiet place" to consider the fact that there really is, as Martius might put it, "a world elsewhere": outside Man's jurisdiction, nonhuman life thrives as Man confronts the consequences of his careless sinfulness.³⁹ Howell's powerful human-animal speakers exhort Man to "learn to live and die well" in the cosmos, hoping to calm Man's physiology and politics.⁴⁰

The texts I study in this thesis all pay attention to the possibilities of worlds beyond Man's ken, especially to the prospect of their indifference or even hostility towards humanity. Literary attentiveness is important, especially when it is working politically, to "create the manners that will enable it to become able to deal with what it has to deal with."⁴¹ What these texts deal with is often surprising and provocative, and as such the writing considered here exemplifies Stengers' idea that "attention requires knowing how to resist the temptation to separate what must be taken into account and what may be neglected."⁴² Very little is left off the table. Why discuss the stench of excrement? Why devote stage time to a discussion of the minutiae of mundane war spoils? Why show marine mammals loving life under the sea? Why watch badgers gather nesting materials? These texts follow Stengers' cosmopolitical proposal in their unruly contents. *Therologia* in particular, other than its paratextual framing, offers its readers little guidance as to what they should and should not attend to in the text. Its indiscriminateness speaks to a cosmopolitics which understand that "the world has to be *composed*. To be composed and not unveiled, possessed, mastered, or abandoned for some other world".⁴³ The text's compositional processes present numerous obligations to the reader and show that a world which cannot be "unveiled, possessed, mastered, or abandoned" demands a species of Man which "make[s] present to itself what it is doing" and lives "in consequence or with consequence" of those actions.⁴⁴ *Therologia* does offer thorough paratextual guidance, but also an index of scientific information so the reader can select content of their choosing. "Noahs Floud" takes a biblical narrative and combines it with natural philosophical and ecological thinking in order to compose a speculative fiction provoked by gaps left in scripture. Gascoigne's text offers neither a

³⁸ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 1.

³⁹ Shakespeare, *Coriolanus*, 3.3.134.

⁴⁰ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 1.

⁴¹ Stengers, "The Cosmopolitical Proposal", trans. Liz Carey-Libbrecht, in *Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy*, ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 1001.

⁴² Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times*, 62.

⁴³ Latour, "Politics of Nature: East and West Perspectives", *Ethics and Global Politics* 4, no.1 (2011): 73.

⁴⁴ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 36.

straightforward celebration nor condemnation of the “noble arte” of hunting: fictional poetry and attested fact are collided to force a reader’s own “potent response”. *Coriolanus* demonstrates the consequences of avoiding this compositional work.

My thesis prompts questions about the relationship between power and subjectivity. As Marina Levina writes, “subjectivity is [...] a representational and performative event [...] subjectivity, be it human or animal, is a production of power”.⁴⁵ The power of literary representations to impact the world is made clear in these texts. In *The Noble Arte*, what for Gascoigne is a literary diversion, feeling like an exercise *in utrumque partes*, makes room for Man to commit brutal violence against nonhuman animals. In *Coriolanus*, a neglectful, self-obsessed leader makes no answer to contemporary concerns about grain shortages and in doing so draws attention to Man’s dependence on his earthly habitat and the vulnerability inherent in it. Imagining an earth who lives and suffers as humans do, or conjuring animals who watch and judge Man from a safe distance, the writers I study force readers to reckon with historical and present wrongs and feel the pressure of anthropocentrism at work. Man should feel these things: lives are at stake.

These early modern literary representations of humans and nonhumans in “life and death relations” are inherently political, and they are about power: not just the power to do things like decide if a body is killable or not, but the power to decide whether to grant voices to, make present, and listen to those who cannot speak; the power to do the imaginative work that might allow cosmopolitical composing to take place.⁴⁶ Of course, thinking cosmopolitically about subjectivity and power in 1575 (or even 1549, backdating to *La Circe*) feels very different to considering these same ideas in 1660, and even more different to thinking about these ideas now. In the roughly 100-year span of this thesis, changes and developments in society, politics, religion, and science meant that later writers like Howell, and even Drayton, were forced to contend with new problems: the intensifying depletion of ecological resources and violent wars lent an urgency to their imaginative acts and intensified the demands placed upon literature which explored the potential of power to act upon beings which are unable to respond. These texts wrestle with the question of whether Man has the “response-ability” to face what he has wrought on the world, and insist that, ultimately, he must, because he is the only one who can. Though “one animal among many” he is uniquely invested with something – call it reason, language, intellect, politics – and he has to use it.⁴⁷ The texts powerfully demonstrate what has happened and happens when this is done for questionable purposes: animals die, people die, worlds are destroyed. If all this death “will always leave something out of balance,

⁴⁵ Marina Levina, “Nonhuman Biocitizens: Lab Animals, Cruel Optimism, and the Politics of Death”, in *Biocitizenship: The Politics of Bodies, Governance, and Power* ed. Kelly E. Happe, Jenell Johnson, and Marina Levina (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2018), 235-36.

⁴⁶ Feder, “Ecocriticism, Posthumanism, and the Biological Idea of Culture”, 227.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 228.

something always left over”, what remains is a question: *what happens if these purposes were turned to good?*⁴⁸

In the end, these four explorations of political interactions, broadly understood, offer a legacy to the world which invites the reader to respond to their injustices and expressions of care and kinship, and do compositional work of their own around three fundamental demands:

- Those in positions of power must listen to cries of injustice and right those wrongs.
- Those in positions of power must respond to the bodies of those they govern *and* their own, because each is implicated in the other.
- Those in positions of power must take care because they can, and should.

Writing from a fundamentally anthropocentric age, early modern writers who attend to the nonhuman or the not-fully human are never going to mark the triumph over anthropomorphism that modernity might hope for: these texts are always going to do reflexive work. On some level, however, this work of imaginative composition is always going to be an act of resistance against the comfortable complacency which anthropocentrism can offer. Perch-wobbling and cage-rattling, these works awaken Man to the facts of his animality and offer him a choice which, troublingly, is still to be resolved: give a damn, or be damned. Reading these texts in the twenty-first-century, there is only one answer.

⁴⁸ Steel, *How Not to Make a Human*, 129.

APPENDIX

During flooding in Norfolk, cattle in the affected area fled to higher ground:

The Cattell fed in those Marshes so sodainely taken, that had they not fled to an Hill, some halfe mile in compasse called Thruhill, few or none of them could haue escaped with life: yet being there, their safety is very daungerous: for this hill being very high and narrowe in the top, is like a Rocke in the Sea, girdled about with water, so deepe, that on foote neither Man nor Beast canne passe it, and yet not deepe enough to beare a Boat, by reason of muddy and old shrubs y^t grow in it: by reason whereof the poore beasts haue fedde the Hill so bare, as it affordes neither grasse nor wood, and so do their hunger encrease, and sustenance decrease, as they do eate the tops of Molehils, and the uery earth it selfe, and with lamentable bellowing complaine, and as it were make moane to their owners, who being willing canne by no meanes releuee them. Hee that should see this pitiful famine of Beasts, coulde not (except hee were too leastall himself) but pittie it.

At last they made shift by cutting away through the Shrubs & Bushes, to bring abroad a ferry Boat to the hill, to which the cattell would swim so thick, y^t they had much ado to keepe it from sinking, others seeing their fellowes in the Boate, would throw themselues into the water, and like people at a shipwracke, swarme so thicke about them, and offer such mournefull noyses, that pittied y^e fellowes to heare, the Boat being full, other striuing to swim after them, being weak, for want of sustenance, were drowned at the Boats side.

In pittie whereof, they concluded to fetch noe more of, but in those Boats conuay Hay, and such like fodder, to the Hill, and there feed them: such as are not too farre spent and gone, by this means they hope to recouer, (notwithstanding the best helpe they can apply) they die in great numbers: the sight is to be pittied, the losse greeued at, and the Judgement to be trembled at. For with it, it brings this fearefull expect of a hard and sharpe dearth. For Corne and Cattell, the two cheefe hopes of bounty taken away, what else can we expect, but a fearfull Ruine, and an ineuitable desolation, which God for his mercies sake auert.

From 1607. *A True Report of Certaine Wonderfull Ouerflowings of Waters, now lately in Summerset-shire, Norfolke, and Other Places of England* (London, 1607), C3v-C4v.

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