

**IMAM SĀLIM B. RĀSHID AND THE IMAMATE REVIVAL IN OMAN
1331/1913 - 1338/1920**

By

Sa'íd b. Muḥammad b. Sa'íd al-Háshimy

(B.A., M. Phil.,)

Submitted in Accordance with the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Under the supervision of the late Dr. M.J.L. Young and Dr. H. Sirriyeh

The University of Leeds

The Department of Modern Arabic Studies

Leeds: December, 1994

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others

**IMAM SĀLIM B. RĀSHID AND THE IMAMATE REVIVAL IN OMAN
1331/1913 - 1338/1920**

By

Sa'íd b. Muḥammad b. Sa'íd al-Háshimy

(B.A., M. Phil.,)

Submitted in Accordance with the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


Under the supervision of the late Dr. M.J.L. Young and Dr. H. Sirriyeh

The University of Leeds

The Department of Modern Arabic Studies

Leeds: December, 1994

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others



Abstract

The principal aim of this thesis is to assess the performance of Imam Sálím b. Ráshid and the Imamate revival in Oman during the second decade of the 20th century. It presents biographical information about Imam Sálím, with special reference to the military and political policies by which he established and consolidated his Imamate in the Interior Province, and his relations with the Sultan and the latter's British supporters. An attempt is also made to explore the relationship between the Imam and the Omani tribes and to evaluate his administrative success. This thesis comprises eight chapters, and the introduction and conclusion. The introduction reviews the relevant literature on the topic. The first chapter describes the geographical setting and provides a historical background, relating to three principal matters: the rise of the Ibádiyyah and the development of the Imamate in Oman; the events in Oman after Sd. Sa'íd's death up to 1913; and the effects of the First World War. The second chapter seeks to give an account of the career of Imam Sálím's life and the Imamate revival. The third chapter discusses the manner in which the Imam was elected, private and public allegiance (*bay'ah*) and the Imam's aims and policy programme. Chapter Four deals with the Imam's military operations and the spread of his authority over Oman. Chapter Five examines the attempts at negotiation between the Imam and the Sultan, and the role of the British Government and the local figures in this regard. Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion of the role of the tribes in support of Imam Sálím, and the extent of the Imam's influence over these tribes. Chapter Seven assesses the Imam's administrative machinery, including the political system, the bureaucracy, education policy, and financial apparatus. Chapter Eight examines the causes behind the assassination of Imam Sálím and the signing of the Treaty of al-Síb. In the conclusion, we present the findings of the research as they have emerged from the assessment of the course of events in Oman. We have said that the Omanis succeeded in reviving the Imamate and elected Imam Sálím al-Kharúsí who devoted his efforts to establish the foundations of the state, and peace prevailed in the country after the treaty of al-Síb in 1920.

Dedicated

to the

Imams, Sultans, Scholars, Authors, Qádis, Teachers, Soldiers, Shaykhs,

Farmers, Clerks, Weavers

and

all who devote their efforts for Oman

CONTENTS

Abstract.....	ii
Dedication.....	iii
Acknowledgments.....	ix
Abbreviations.....	x
Transliteration.....	xi
Note on Some Special Terms and Personal Names.....	xii

INTRODUCTION.....	1-9
1- Structure of the Thesis.....	1
2- Review of the Sources.....	4
(a) Arabic works.....	4
(b) Non-Arabic works.....	7
(c) Other sources consulted.....	9

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	10-52
1) Geographical Setting and Population Structure.....	10
2) The Rise of the Ibāḍiyyah and the Development of the Imamate in Oman.....	13
3) Oman 1856-1913.....	24
4) Impact of the First World War.....	43

CHAPTER 11

THE EARLY LIFE OF IMAM SĀLIM.....	53-71
1) Events of his Life	53
2) The Imamate Revival.....	57

CHAPTER 111

THE IMAM'S ELECTION AND HIS POLICY PROGRAMME.....	72-102
1) Composition of the Imamate.....	72
2) Imam Sálim's Election.....	76
3) Imam Sálim's Aims and Programme	84

CHAPTER 112

THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER:

THE IMAM'S MILITARY OPERATIONS.....	103-144
1) The Occupation of Territories in the Interior Province.....	105
2) The Occupation of Territories in the Western Hajar Province.....	121

CHAPTER 113

THE IMAM'S REGIONAL RELATIONS AND THE

ROLE OF THE BRITISH.....	145-191
1) The Initiative of Sh. 'Isà al-Ḥáarithí	145
2) The Initiative of Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid.....	153
3) The Initiative of Sh. Sulṭán al-Na'ímí.....	157
4) The Initiative of Colonel Benn, the PAM.....	161
5) The Initiative of Major Haworth and Mr. Wingate.....	177

CHAPTER 114

THE IMAM AND THE OMANI TRIBES.....	192-226
1) The Demographic Structure.....	192
2) Tribal Political Relations with the Imam	201
a) Tribes' allegiance to Imam Sálim.....	202

b) The Imam's dominance over the tribes.....	205
--	-----

CHAPTER ٧١١

THE IMAM'S LOCAL ADMINISTRATION	227-261
1) The Political System.....	227
2) The Administrative System.....	236
3) Education.....	247
4) The Economic and Financial System.....	250

CHAPTER ٧١١١

THE END OF AN ERA: THE IMAM'S DEATH	
AND THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF AL-SIB.....	262-281
1) The Imam's Death.....	262
2) The Treaty of al-Síb.....	271

CONCLUSIONS.....	282-288
-------------------------	----------------

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	289-303
1) Arabic sources.....	289
a) Documents.....	289
b) Manuscripts	289
c) Printed books and articles.....	290
2) Non-Arabic sources.....	294
a) Documents.....	294
b) Printed books and articles.....	297
3) Catalogues.....	302
4) List of Personal Communications (Oral).....	303

MAPS	304-309
1) Sultanate of Oman.....	305
2) The Provinces of Oman.....	306
3) Passing Map.....	307
4) Tribes Map.....	308
5) Territories of the Imamate.....	309
FAMILY TREES	310-315
1) Āl Bú Sa‘íd (Rulers of Oman).....	311
2) Imam Sálím al-Kharúsí.....	312
3) Sh.‘Isà b. Šálih al-Ĥáarithí (leader of the Hináwi faction).....	312
4) Sh. Ĥimyar b. Náşir al-Riyámí (leader of the Gháfirí faction).....	313
5) Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná‘í.....	313
6) Sd. Sayf b. Ĥamad b. Sayf al-Bú Sa‘ídí.....	314
7) Sd. Su‘úd b. Ĥamad b. Hilál b. Muhammad al-Bú Sa‘ídí.....	314
8) Sd. Aĥmad b. Ibráhím b. Qays, the ruler of al-Rustáq.....	314
9) List of the PAMs, PRGs, and the Viceroys of India from 1900 to 1923.....	315
ILLUSTRATIONS	316-324
1) Views from Nazwà and Bahlà.....	317
2) The fort of al-Ĥazim.....	318
3) A view from Tanúf.....	318
4) A view from Samá‘il.....	319
5) The forts of Bayt al-Falaj and Bayt al-Rudaydah.....	320
6) A view from al-Rustáq.....	321
7) The fort of al-Fayqayn in Manah.....	321
8) The forts of al-‘Awábí and ‘Ibrí.....	322
9) The forts of al-Qábil and Badiyyah.....	323
10) The forts of Ja‘lán B. Bú ‘Alí and al-Muḍaybí.....	324

APPENDICES	325-345
1) A letter from Sultan Fayṣal to PRG, dated 2nd Sha‘bán 1331.....	326
2) A letter from Sultan Fayṣal to PAM, dated 4th Sha‘bán 1331.....	327
3) A letter from PAM to Sh. ‘Isà , dated 6th Sha‘bán 1331.....	328
4) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 9th Sha‘bán 1331.....	329
5) A letter from Sultan Fayṣal to PAM, dated 27th Sha‘bán 1331.....	330
6) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 29th Sha‘bán 1331.....	331
7) A letter from PAM to Imam Sálím, dated 1st Ramaḍán 1331.....	332
8) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 30th Shawwál 1331.....	333
9) A letter from PAM to Sh. ‘Isà , dated 24th Jumádà I, 1333.....	334
10) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 4th Jumádà II,1333.....	335
11) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 2nd Dhú al-Qi‘dah 1333.....	335
12) A letter from PAM to Sh. ‘Isà , dated 15th Jumádà II, 1333.....	336
13) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 15th Shawwál 1333.....	337
14) A letter from PAM to Imam Sálím, dated 16th Shawwál,1333	338
15) Demands of Imam Sálím, presented to the PAM at al-Síḅ in 1333.....	339
16) The Treaty of al-Síḅ.....	340
17) Proclamation issued by the Sultan regarding arms and ammunition.....	342
18) A letter from Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Khalílí to his father	343
19) A letter from Sh. Sayf b. ‘Alí b. ‘Ámir al-Maskirí to Sh. Khamís b. ‘Alí al-Ma‘marí and Sh. Sa‘íd b. ‘Alí al-Mughírí in Zanzibar.....	344
20) List of Assistance from Zanzibar to some Notables of al-Qábil in Oman....	345

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to all who helped me in the course of preparing this thesis .They are too many to mention here. But I am indebted, in particular, to my late supervisor, Dr. M.J.L. Young, for his invaluable help in the preparation and organization of this work. Throughout my research, his advice and productive criticism helped me a great deal in questions of emphasis and clarity of detail. I owe a special debt to my supervisor, Dr. H. Sirriyeh, who agreed to complete the supervision of this work after the death of Dr. Young. Without his help, this work could never have been accomplished. Throughout my research period he provided me with a great deal of wise advice which helped to put me right on many points .

I am also indebted to Dr.A.Shivtiel, the previous head of the Department of Modern Arabic Studies. Thanks are also due to Professor D. Rimmington, the head of the Department of Modern Arabic Studies, and to all members of staff of this department, for helping me in one way or another. I wish to express special thanks to the archivists and officials of the Omani Ministry of National Heritage and Culture, the India Office Library, the School of Oriental and African Studies, the Public Record Office and the Zanzibar Archives, who have been of great help in guiding me to the many documents relevant to the present study. I would like to thank the Librarians and staff of the Brotherton Library of Leeds University for their assistance in providing books and documents. I would also like to thank Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Bú Sa'ídí, the Advisor to H.M. the Sultan of Oman for allowing me access to his personal library. My thanks are also due to Sh. Sálím b. Ḥamad al-Ḥáarithí for lending me many valuable manuscripts and documents.

I owe special thanks to my mother, father, my wife and children Zaynab, Ziyád, Zuhayr, Zakariyyá, Zakí and Zayd for their constant encouragement and support.

Finally, I would like to thank all friends and relatives for their valuable assistance and help, such as Dr. F.Şáliḥ, Dr. A. Saad, Dr.K. al-Amin and Mr.A. Ḥammúdah.

Abbreviations

A.D =	Anno Domini.
A. H. =	Anno Hegirae
Adm.R.	Administration Report of Muscat
b.=	Bin or Ibn
B.=	Banú or Baní
B.L. =	British Library.
F.O =	Foreign Office
G.J.=	Geographical Journal.
H.A =	Handbook of Arabia
I.O. =	India Office.
K. =	Kitáb.
J.C.A.S. =	Journal of the Central Asian Society.
J.R.G.S. =	Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
M.E.J. =	Middle East Journal
M.N. H. C.=	Ministry of National Heritage and Culture of Oman.
PAM =	The Political Agent at Muscat
PRG =	Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.
R.O. I-VII =	Records of Oman (12 vols.)
RDS 890 =	Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Asia: 1910-1929, Roll 890a on Oman section.
S.=	for the title " al-Sayyid" .
Sd. =	for the title "al-Shaykh", as used by (a) 'ulamá' (b) heads of tribes
Sh. =	subsection.
SS.=	

Transliteration

The system followed here is that to be found in the Encyclopedia of Islam, with the following differences;

- (a) [Jím (ج)] = .J (instead of dj)
- (b) [Qáf (ق)] = Q (instead of Ḳ)
- (c) [‘Ayn (ع)] = ‘__ (instead of ^c__).
- (d) [long vowel] = á, í, ú (instead of a, i, u)
- (e) [al-Alif al-Maqṣúrah (ؤ)] = à (instead of á), e.g., Nazwà, Jumádà, Julandà, etc.
- (f) Diagrams have not been underlined. Arabic words and phrases in transliteration are in *italics*.
- (g) The anglicized term 'Quranic' is not provided with diacritics.

Note:

- (a) Dates have usually been given according to the Ḥijrah; where Christian dates are given they are divided from the Ḥijrî date by a stroke, eg. 1331/ 1913.
- (b) some well known place names such as Oman, Muscat, and Maṭraḥ, have been given their common English spelling. Also names derived from the above place names have not been transliterated, e.g. Omani, Omanis, etc.

A Note on Some Special Terms and Geographical and Personal Names

'Aláyah and Sifálah: Arabic terms meaning "upper" and "lower" respectively, and used to refer to the two distinct areas frequently found in Omani towns. Generally, one section will be occupied by tribes belonging to 'Adnání or Nizárí (Gháfirí) while the other quarter will be inhabited by Yamaní or Qaḥṭání (Hináwí). In towns where this division occurs the wálí will often occupy a fort that is situated in a neutral position. Most of these forts are well placed, should there be need to separate the different factions. Prominent examples are in the town of Nazwà, where a broad Wádí divides the walled section, Izkí, and Samá'il. In the latter, the 'Aláyah is separated from the *Sifálah* by several miles.

Ãl Bú Sa'íd: A distinction is made here between " Ãl Bú Sa'íd" which is a proper noun referring to the Omani royal family, and" al- Bú Sa'ídí" which is an adjective referring to the al-Bú Sa'ídí tribe.

Muṭáwi'ah : (Sig. Muṭáwi') literally means 'one who submits or obeys'. Among the Ibádiyyah of Oman the term refers to more conspicuously devout believers who regarded it as their God-given duty both to inspire their co-religionists to strict observance of the proscriptive tenets of their faith and to castigate potential backsliders. One suspects, to judge from the record of their activities over the past century and a half, that their zeal was prompted less by theological abstractions than by simple bigotry.

Place-names: The following names which are frequently given incorrectly have been given in correct form throughout: e.g.,

- Bahlah = Bahlà
- Barqa or Barkah = Barká'
- Oman Proper = Oman Interior (al-Dákhiliyyah)
- Nazwah or Nizwa = Nazwà

Sultanate The term "Sultanate" is used here to refer to the entire Ãl Bú Sa'íd dynasty, as a matter of convenience, although the first Ãl Bú Sa'íd rulers were Imams, and the Sultan was first applied as a title by the British in the 1860s and not generally accepted in Oman until the beginning of the present century.

Tamímah: The Arabic term for a paramount Shaykh or a tribal leader who has control over all sections of his tribe and can count on their support in intertribal disputes. Not all tribes have *tamímahs*. The term is often technically defined as one who has the power to impose the death penalty on errant tribesmen. e.g. the *tamímah* of B. Gháfir, the *tamímah* of B. Hiná'ah, etc.

- Zuhúr** (manifestation): this term means the proclamation of the independent Imamate. In this case, the ruler of this Imamate is called Imam *zuhúr*.
- Difá'** (defence) this term denotes the obligatory duty in the absence of Imamate *zuhúr* when under attack or a suspicion of a sudden attack, the Ibádis must elect a leader to lead them in fighting their enemy. Such a leader is called Imam *difá'* "Imam defence".
- Shará'** it means buying and selling. This term is used in Ibádí writings for the actions of sacrificing one's life in the cause of God to attain Paradise.
- Kitmán** (secrecy) means hiding one's beliefs. In this state the Ibádis keep their beliefs in secret to avoid suppression by their enemies.
- Kufr Ni'mah** (infidel ingrate) ingratitude for the blessings of God. This term is used in Ibádí writings for those Muslims who commit hypocritical grave sins, and who acknowledge the faith of Islam but do not practice it.
- Waláyah** is a religious duty which controls human emotions of love and hatred in accordance with Islamic teaching. It is used to convey the meanings; love, fraternity, unity among the Ibádis and the duties related to these.
- Bará'ah** expresses the converse of *waláyah*. It literally means to excommunicate. The two terms *Waláyah* and *Bará'ah* were used by Ibádí scholars to indicate the attitude of the believers towards their fellow Muslims and towards the infidels.
- 'Yál** ('iyál) the term *'Yál* means sons. In fact it must be "'iyál", but the common transliteration found in all sources is "'Yál".
- Kummah** (turban) a man's headdress wound round the head. In the Ibádí tradition, the white *Kummah* is an insignia which the Imam must always wear.

INTRODUCTION

1) Structure of the Thesis

The subject of Omani contemporary history is considered, by many researchers, both Arabs and non-Arabs, to be a very important and fertile area of investigation. This great concern is partly due to the fact that Oman's political and social history was for many past centuries little known outside Oman, or even among its own inhabitants. The lack of adequate knowledge about Oman can be partly attributed to the fact that Oman is characterized by two special phenomena; the first is its endemic tribal conflicts and their effects on the ruling power; the second, the existence of the conservative Ibáđi sect, which has a specific and clear ideology about rule. Another reason for the current interest in Oman's history is the importance of Oman in the domains of navigation and commerce, for which the country gained fame from ancient times.

For these reasons, we have embarked on this study to make a modest contribution to Omani local history in the period between 1913 and 1920. This period has a special importance in the history of Oman because the country witnessed tremendous economic, social and political developments in the early years of this century which led to the revival of the Ibáđi Imamate in the Interior of Oman. This brought significant changes to the Omani political map, such that there came to exist in Oman two governments: an Ibáđi Imamate in the Interior, in which a traditional Islamic system of rule prevailed, until the second half of 1950s, and the rule of Āl Bú Sa'íd dynasty in the coastal regions of the country.

This study focuses on Imam Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúší and the revival of the Ibáđi Imamate. The object of this thesis is to deal with the biography of Imam Sálím, his military and political policies in establishing and consolidating his Imamate in the Interior Province, together with the type of relationship that existed between Imam Sálím, on the one hand and the Sultan supported by the British, on the other. We also discuss the

nature of the Imam's relationship with the Omani tribes, and the extent of his success in administering the affairs of his government.

The reason for focusing on the biography of this Imam lies in the necessity to address the local history of Oman and to show the important roles its Imams, *'ulamá'* and notables played in the events which shaped Oman's political history over the course of time. These roles assumed a special significance in influencing the social and political struggles, which make these prominent personalities an integral part of historical events from which they cannot be divorced.

Our choice of this topic has been influenced by a number of considerations. First, the academic studies which have tackled the history of Oman have too often been characterized by generality and superficiality and are lacking in depth. Moreover, we believe there are conspicuous omissions in the study of the local history of Oman, with the exception of a few scattered articles on some specific subjects, e.g., a tribe or the Ibádí sect. These studies also exhibit a tendency to focus on the general appearance of Oman and its rulers, Āl Bú Sa'íd dynasty, the extent of foreign influence on them and their foreign relations, more than on Oman's local history. It would seem that this may have been due to the fact that the main aim of such studies has been to introduce Oman to the outside world, and study the foreign influences which shaped the politics of the Omani rulers. This, in fact has led to criticism, and indeed discontent, from Omani readers who were dissatisfied with such studies because they give the non-Omani reader a blurred picture of Oman's history. This study aims to address these issues, to rectify some of the erroneous concepts and modestly to fill some of the gaps which have been left unaddressed in previous studies.

The second reason for our choice of the topic is the fact that an important success was achieved by the Omanis in reviving the Imamate in the 20th century, after a series of attempts at revival during the 19th century. The revival of the Imamate came as a response to the foreign influence on Oman's internal affairs, and its impact on restricting the slave trade and on the arms trade.

Finally, we have chosen this topic because we wished to gain knowledge about the legitimacy of the independence of the Imamate in Oman, which led to heated debate and

dispute in the 1950s and 1960s. The debate on the Imamate's independence involved a difference in views in the interpretation of al-Sif Treaty which was signed in 1920, between Sultan Sd. Taymúr b. Fayşal and Imam Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Khalífí. The terms of this treaty were rejected by Sultan Sa'íd b. Taymúr (ruled, 1932-70) on the grounds that the treaty was not binding except for those who signed it.

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter outlines the geographical setting and historical background, including a discourse on the rise of the Ibádiyyah and the development of the Imamate in Oman, the events in Oman after Sd. Sa'íd's death up to 1913; and the effects of the First World War. The second chapter seeks to give an account of the career of Imam Sálím's life and the Imamate revival. The third chapter discusses the manner in which the Imam was elected, whether he in fact met the required qualifications for the Imamate to be able to receive the private and public allegiance (*bay'ah*). It also deals with the Imam's aims and policy programme as reflected in his election speech and exchange of correspondence between him and others, which were aimed at rallying support for the Imamate. The Imam's military operations and the spread of his authority over Oman are the subject of the fourth chapter. Chapter Five discusses the negotiation attempts between the Imam and the Sultans, and the role of the British Government and the local figures in these negotiations. Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion of the role of the tribes in support of Imam Sálím, and the extent of the Imam's influence over these tribes. The main aim of Chapter Seven is to gain an understanding of the Imam's administration, including his political system, the administrative apparatus, education policy, and financial system. Chapter Eight examines the causes of the assassination of Imam Sálím and the signing of the treaty of al-Sif. We conclude by giving a brief summary and highlighting the events covered during the period from 1913 to 1920.

2) Review of the Sources on the Topic

In the course of our investigation, we have looked into the maximum possible number of sources, of both Omani and non-Omani origin, which are relevant to the subject of this study. In addition, we undertook several tours in Oman and the neighbouring Gulf States and Zanzibar, and visited some British libraries, in our efforts to investigate the sources of the study. We also conducted interviews with the '*ulamá*' of Oman and the elderly, as well as with the sons of Imam Sálím and the descendants of some of the '*ulamá*' and leaders who worked with the Imam. For convenience, the sources of the study are divided into two categories: Arabic and non-Arabic sources.

We have to emphasize that the researcher has in no way changed the texts and linguistic errors are left as they are in the original. The present writer has encountered many difficulties, and problematic names and dates, and extensive efforts have been made to trace their sources and to probe their implications. Nonetheless, in many instances it has proved very difficult indeed to know the third name of a person, or the precise date of death, let alone that of birth. Luckily, there are references to various names of the '*ulamá*' in diverse sources, such as poems, biographies, letters, etc., and we were fortunate to find incidentally, complete names and dates, in an elegy, or written on the cover of a book which has nothing to do with the person in question.

a) Arabic works:

1. al- Sálímí, Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh (1314/1896-1406/1985). Nahḍat al-A'yán bi Hurriyyat 'Umán. He is the son of the famous scholar Sh. 'Abdalláh al-Sálímí, who played an important role in the revival of the Imamate in 1913. Sh. Muḥammad regularly accompanied his father wherever he went, writing and reading for him and leading him, since Sh. 'Abdalláh was blind. Therefore, Sh. Muḥammad was close to Imam Sálím and served for the Imam as Wálí of al-Muḍaybí and of Nakhal during the reign of Imam al-Khalílí. He also took part in many of the Imam's wars. He fled to Saudi Arabia after the collapse of the Imamate in 1957, and remained there until he finally returned to his country in 1970. His Nahḍat covers the events of the period from 1913 until 1954. His work is an account of the history of two Imamates, those of Imam al-Kharúsí and of Imam al-Khalílí. His work also includes important

biographies of men who became distinguished for the important roles they played in the fields of learning, literature, politics and leadership during this period. The present writer has drawn preponderantly on this source, in comparison with other sources. The contents of British documents largely conform with the information contained in this work.

2. al-Ḥārithī, Sa‘íd b. Ḥamad (still alive). al-Lu‘lu’ al-Raṭīb. His book is composed of narratives, many political and literary stories on diverse themes which the author narrates in praise of Imam Sálím and Imam Muḥammad, and a group of prominent ‘*ulamá*’ and leaders who became distinguished during the reigns of the two Imams. Sh. Sa‘íd narrates these narratives and stories about three personalities: Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálím al-Ruqayshí (d. 1387/1967) who was Qáḍí to both Imams; his father Ḥamad b. Sulaymán al-Ḥārithí (d. 1389/1969); and his uncle Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Sulaymán al-Ḥārithí (d. 1392/1972). Most of his narratives are about Sh. al-Ruqayshí, whom he accompanied for a considerable period of time when both of them were in prison in Muscat during the reign of Sultan Sd. Sa‘íd b. Taymúr. Sh. Sa‘íd was one of those who served the Imamate, and the last of his posts was as Wálí of al-Rustáq in 1957. The work has a historical and literary value because it includes narratives and accounts not mentioned in the work of Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálímí. However, the book is not divided into chapters and the narratives are scattered throughout the book. The book also lacks chronological sequence.
3. al-Siyábí, Sálím b. Ḥumúd (d. Dec ., 1993). He composed several books on history, genealogy (*ansáb*), *fiqh*, and thought. His important work on which we have drawn is the one entitled Is‘áf al-A‘yán fi Ansáb Ahl ‘Umán, in which he presented an account of the tribes of Oman. This work greatly benefited us in our knowledge of the tribes, their leaders and ‘*ulamá*’. The present writer compares this work with the work of Miles (the Countries and the Tribes) and of Lorimer (Gazetteer) who both devoted a large part of their respective books to the Omani tribes. The present writer benefited a good deal from the knowledge of this author, and personally interviewed him and gained useful insights from him on many problematic questions in the history of Oman.

4. The epistles: the present writer also consulted the short letters and reports which have been written in ^{the} Arabic language relevant to the subject of investigation. Such letters and reports include ones like the report of Sultan Sd. Taymúr about the Imam's attack on Barká' in 1914, which he sent to the Sultan of Zanzibar. They also include some of the accounts written by Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Imam Sálím about the *karámát* of his father. He depended in his account on some trustworthy men, as well as on the account of Sh. Sayf b. Sa'íd al-Ma'walí of the *karámát* of Imam Sálím and many others.
5. al-Khuṣaybí, Muḥammad b. Ráshid (d. 1991). Shaqá'iq al-Nu'mán. He is the son of Sh. Ráshid b. 'Uzayyiz, the Qáḍí of the Sultan. The author held important posts in the judiciary in Muscat for a long period of time, then became teacher in the Law Institute in Muscat until his death. His book gives valuable and important biographies of Omani poets. The present writer depended in many instances on this valuable work, which consists of three volumes and includes biographies of over 133 personalities, including '*ulamá*', leaders and poets. It also includes some translations of works by the person praised.
6. al-Bú Sa'ídí, Ḥamad b. Sayf (still alive) emulated this work and composed a book entitled: Qalá'id al-Jumán fi Asmá' ba'd Shu'ará' 'Umán, in which he included biographies and translations for over 107 personalities.
7. There are also some of the *Díwáns* of poetry by poets who emerged during this period. In these *Díwáns* [*Dawáwín*] there is frequent reference of praise or elegy for Imam Sálím, the commemoration of battles and other subjects. Examples of these *Díwáns* are the *Díwán* of Ibn Shíkhán, by al-Sálimí, Muḥammad b. Shíkhán, the *Díwán* of Sh. Maṣṣúr b. Náṣir al-Fárisí, and the *Díwán* of Sh. Abú Muslim al-Ruwáhí and Others.
8. Personal communication (oral). The present writer was not content with the Omani sources referred to above, but conducted personal interviews and contacts more than once with some of the Omani '*ulamá*', leaders and prominent figures, through a set of questions which he addressed to the persons contacted. These questions and queries inquired about the authenticity of certain facts or events, sought further information about Imam Sálím, or attempted to authenticate certain pieces of information, etc. The

names of these contacts are included in the bibliography, but some of them are omitted from the list deliberately to avoid unnecessary embarrassment.

Contemporary academic studies, on the other hand, which deal with the history of Oman during the period under study, can be listed as follows:

1. Qásim, J. Z. al-Khalíj al-‘Arabí 1914 - 1945. The author of this book tackled, in chapter 2 under the title "Inbi‘áth al-Imámah al-Ibádiyyah 1913-1920" pp. 384-421, the political and military aspects of the Imamate, with a special focus on the impediments in the tumbling efforts to reach a peace agreement, and the role of the British in this process. He based his work mostly on British documentary sources.
2. Shahdád, Ibráhím Muḥammad. al-Sirá‘ al-Dákhilí fí ‘Umán Khilál al-Qarn al-‘Ishrín, 1913-75. Shahdád devoted the first and second chapters to the events of the period under discussion, pp. 25-116. He followed in his account his teacher Dr. Qásim, J. Z. However, he relied even more on British documents than Dr. Qásim did. He is more geared towards a national political history in which he adopted a new independent analytical approach. This new approach, however, makes his analyses and interpretations far removed from the realities of the situation.
3. al-Mashhadání, Khalíl Ibráhím. al-Taṭawwurat al-Siyásiyyah fí ‘Umán wa ‘Aláqátihá al-Khárijyyah, 1913-1932. His work is an M.A. thesis, submitted to the University of Baghdad in 1986. This work basically covers the reign of Sd. Taymúr (1913-32). The first and second chapters are devoted to the events of the period between 1913-20 (pp.55-110), in which he discusses the causes which prompted the revival of the Imamate, and the military expeditions of the Imam. This part also includes a discussion of the failed attempts to reach a peace agreement between the Imam and the Sultan. There finally follows an analysis of the reasons which led to al-Síb treaty.

b) Non-Arabic works:

The present writer has also made use of a number of books and documents of British origin, including:-

1. The Administration Reports by the Gulf Political Residency (PRG) and the Muscat Political Agency (PAM). These works contain year by year annual reports since 1873,

giving summaries of important events that were taking place in different places in the Gulf region, details of trade statistics, shipping activities and volumes of freight, aspects of the regional history, geography, tribes, economic matters etc.

2. R/15/6 Political Agency Muscat (PAM) 1867-1951 (546 vols.). The present writer has benefited greatly from these correspondences, especially the files: R/15/6/42-46, 48, 204 and 264. These reports and correspondences have been collected and published in a single book under the title : Records of Oman 1867-1967, and came in 12 vols.
3. L/P&S/10 Department Papers: Political and Secret Separate file 1902-1931. The most important files we have consulted are: L/P&S/ 10/ 397, 423, 425 and 426.

As for contemporary writings in English which deal with the history of Oman, we list the following:

1. Kelly, J. B. "Prevalence of Furies; Tribes, Politics and Religion in Oman and Trucial Oman" ; "Sultanate and Imamate in Oman"; and Eastern Arabian Frontiers. Most of what Dr. Kelly wrote was based on compilation from wide reading and knowledge. He based himself mainly on British archival documents and provided an enormous amount of factual detail. However, all his works supported the view of the Sultan.
2. Landen, R.G. Oman since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society. The author devoted his effort to study the events of Oman from 1862-1902. Then he followed, in brief summaries, the course of events in Oman until the 1950s, in the chapter entitled: "Epilogue: Oman in the 20th century" (pp. 388-426). This chapter is divided into two sections, under the titles: "Divided Oman- Sultanate and Imamate, 1913-55" (pp. 388-414), and "the Reunification of Oman under Moderate Rule" (pp. 414-426). In the first section, the author addressed general matters such as the military operations, and the failed peace attempts, all somewhat briefly. Then he gave an analysis of al-Sífb treaty from the perspective of its legitimacy for the total independence of the Imam. His analysis is considered of a special value to this study.
3. Peterson, J.E. Oman in the Twentieth Century; and "The Revival of the Ibádí Imamate in Oman and the Threat to Muscat 1913-20". The first work addressed the general history of Oman from two angles: themes in Oman; and challenges to the Sultanate. He discussed several issues dealing with the Sultanate, and the difficulties that the Sultan

faced from the Imamate, as well as the associated administrative and economic problems. The second work is an article which was devoted to a study of the Imamate, the causes which led to its revival, and its military and political success until the Treaty of al-Sīb.

4. Bannerman M. Graeme. Unity and Disunity in Oman 1895-1920. The author devoted this work to a study of the relationships within Omani society and traced the positions of the tribes and their influence on the political system. This work is a Ph.D. thesis, submitted to the University of Wisconsin in 1976.
5. Wilkinson, J. C. Water and Tribal Settlement in South-East Arabia: A study of the Aflāj of Oman; The Imamate tradition of Oman; "The Oman question"; "The Origins of the Omani State"; and "The Ibadī Imama". Dr. Wilkinson has written a number of books and articles on Oman and has spent more than 25 years studying Omani history and politics.

c) Other sources consulted:

A quick glimpse into the bibliography will reveal that there is a considerable number of books and articles which the present writer has consulted from both Arabic and non-Arabic sources, both published and unpublished. Some of these sources have been indispensable for the present study. Among these are the books written by Lorimer, Miles and D. Eickelman all in English, in addition to the works of Ibn Ruzayq, those of ‘Abdallāh al-Sālimī, of Qásim, J.Z. and other sources written in Arabic.

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter deals with three principal matters: the rise of the Ibádiyyah and the development of the Imamate in Oman, the events in Oman after Sd. Sa'íd's death up to the revival of the Imamate in 1913; and the effects of the First World War. As a preliminary to those matters it is important to describe the geographical setting and the population structure.

1) Geographical Setting and Population Structure

Oman occupies the south eastern part of the Arabian peninsula, extending from Sabkhat Maṭṭí in the North (the southern borders of al-Ḥasá) to Ḥaḍramawt in the South. Oman is effectively an island, surrounded on three sides by the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, and on the fourth by the Empty Quarter (al-Rub' al-Khálí). At present time Oman had been divided into two states: the Sultanate of Oman and Sáhil 'Umán (Coast of Oman) which is now known as the United Arab Emirates. The term "Sultanate of Muscat and Oman" which appears in the late 19th century in documents and agreements with foreign countries, is confusing. It appears to name two countries, Muscat and Oman. In fact Oman is the name of the whole country, while Muscat has been its capital since the 1780s. Muscat is merely a city, and not even the largest city in Oman. It was included in the name of the state merely as an indication of the city's fame and importance (1).

Oman has been traditionally divided into several provinces, and the political history of Oman has been to a great degree determined by its geography. Three geographical regions are found in Oman; the mountains, the coastal plain and the inland plains. Dominating Oman is the range of mountains beginning with Ra's Musandam at the entrance to the Arabian Gulf, sweeping south-eastwards to Ra's al-Ḥadd which divides the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The area from Ra's Musandam to Dibá is called Ru'ús al-Jibál (Musandam) and from this to Ra's al-Ḥadd is known as Ḥajar (Rock) of

Oman. Wádí Samá'il (Samá'il Gab) divided the Ḥajar into Western and Eastern Ḥajar.

The coastal plain from Dibá to near Muscat is split into two provinces, al-Shumayliyyah and the Báṭinah. The former extends from Dibá to Khaṭmat Maláḥah (north Shinás) and the latter from Khaṭmat Maláḥah to al-Síb. The major towns of al-Shumayliyyah are, from north to south, Dibá, Khúr Fakkán, al-Fujayrah and Kalbá. The towns of the Báṭinah, from north to south, are Shinás, Liwà, Şuḥár, Şaḥam, al-Khábúrah, al-Suwayq, al-Muşann'ah, Barká' and al-Síb. These towns are the main ports and markets for the corresponding towns on the other side of the mountains. Behind these provinces, and divided by Western Ḥajar, lie three provinces, Sír, Záhírah (Dháhirah) and al-Dákhiliyyah (Interior). The first begins from Sha'im, (north of Ra's al-Khaymah) to Dubai in the south, the second from Dubai in the north to Jabal al-Kúr in the south, and Interior from Jabal al-Kúr to Wádí Ḥilfín in the East. The important towns of Sír are Ra's al-Khaymah, Umm al-Qaywayn, 'Ajmán, Shárqah (Shárijah) and Dubai; of al-Záhírah, Buraymí, al-Qábil, and 'Ibrí; and of Interior, Bahlà, al-Ḥamrá', Nazwà, Manaḥ, Adam, Izkí and Samá'il. The important towns in the western Ḥajar are Yanqil, Rustáq, Nakhal, and al-'Awábí. The towns of Eastern Ḥajar are Muscat, Qurayyát, Wádí Dimá, Wádí al-Ta'iyín, Wádí B. Khálid, Şúr and Ra's al-Ḥadd. Behind the Eastern Ḥajar are the provinces of al-Sharqiyyah and Ja'lán. The former adjoins Interior, while the latter extends towards the sea. The major towns of the former are Ibrá', al-Muḍaybí, Samad, Sináw, al-Muḍayarib, al-Qábil, and Badiyyah. The towns of Ja'lán are al-Kámil, al-Wáfí, Bilád B. Bú Ḥasan, and Bilád B. Bú 'Alí. Other provinces belonging to Oman are Musandam (2) in the Ru'us al-Jibál, Zufár (Dhofar) in the southern Oman, and Gawádir on the coast of Baluchistan. (during the period discussion).

The two sides of the mountain range are linked by passes joining the principal Wádí systems. All passes through the mountains are difficult. Three main passes link Oman's coast with its inner provinces (see map passing below). The most important of these has been the central pass which runs from Muscat via Wádí Samá'il where it branches into two. One heads for Interior Province and the other for al-Sharqiyyah and Ja'lán Provinces via the Wádí al-'Aqq. The second passage runs from Şuḥár via the Wádí

al-Jizzí' to al-Záhirah Province, and the third runs from Şúr via the Wádí al-Fulayj to Ja'lán and al-Sharqiyyah.

The great majority of the inhabitants of Oman are of the Arab race. According to tribal tradition, they descend from the two Arabian stocks, the Qaḥṭání (or Yamaní) and the 'Adnání (or Nizári). Tradition says that the Arabs of Oman arrived in two waves as part of the general movement of Arabs into Oman. The first wave migrated from Yemen while the 'Adnánís came into the area from the north and centre of Arabia. In the first half of the 18th century there arose in the course of a general civil war (1724-1728), two large factions, known as the Hináwí and Gháfirí which still exist. The former supported Sh. Khalaf b. Mubárah al-Hiná'í, and the latter gathered under the banner of Imam Muḥammad b. Náṣir al-Gháfirí. The Hináwí consist of Qaḥṭání tribes, while the Gháfirí are mainly 'Adnání tribes. But some of these tribes are exceptions to the usual Hináwí/Gháfirí division, e.g. al-Ḥabús and B. Ruwáḥah, which are both Hináwí, although they are of 'Adnání and not Qaḥṭání origin, while the B. Riyám, the B. Kharúṣ and the Janabah, all Gháfirí tribes, are of Qaḥṭání, and not 'Adnání stock (see Ch. VI below).

There is a minority of inhabitants of Oman who are non-Arabs: Baluchis, Khojas, Baniáns, Zidjál, Africans and a variety of semi-Arabized Semitic peoples (3). The Khojas (Haidarabádí), known in Oman as Luwátiyyah, were British subjects who came to Oman after their native Indian states had come under British rulers. Baniáns or Hindu merchants came from India. They have been in Oman for hundreds of years. Because of their wealth, they have had considerable influence on the Sultan of Oman. This influence rested on economic power and their performance of many bureaucratic functions for the ruler of Oman (4). The Baluchi tribes are from the area known as Baluchistán- the coastal region on the Gulf of Oman divided between Iran and Pakistan. They have migrated to Oman since their area came under Omani domination (5). The geographical and tribal situation of Oman has been described by writers such as al-'Awtabí, Miles, Lorimer, al-Siyábí, Kelly, and Anthony (6).

2) The Rise of the Ibádiyyah and the Development of the Imamate in Oman

This section will deal briefly with the rise and development of the Ibáđí Imamate. The Ibáđí question has been discussed by many writers, but there is no clear and coherent study on the subject. This may be owing to the political conditions which accompanied the rise of the Ibáđis. This section will illustrate the Ibáđí characteristics which distinguish them from other Islamic sects. The Ibáđí Imamate is here analysed and classified in a way which has not been attempted before. The purpose of this clarification is to understand the aims of the adherents of the Ibáđí Imamate, and their desire for the establishment of a strong religious authority. This provides the basis for a better understanding of the revival of the Imamate in the 20th century.

a) The Rise of the Ibádiyyah

It is difficult to harmonise the accounts of Ibáđí and non-Ibáđí sources regarding the rise of the Ibádiyyah and their relations with their opponents (7). The Ibádiyyah is one of the earliest Islamic sects which was founded in the middle of the first century of the Hġrah. It took its name from ‘Abdalláh b. Ibáđ al-Murrí al-Tamímí who came into prominence in A.H. 60s. This name (Ibádiyyah) is applied to a Muslim group which is considered by some writers as a moderate branch of the Khárijite movement, while non-Ibáđí Muslim scholars always tended to regard the Ibáđis as extreme Khárijites (8).

As a result of the civil war which occurred after the assassination of ‘Uthmán b. ‘Affán (23-35 A.H.), the Muslims as a whole were divided into those who supported ‘Uthmán, those who supported ‘Alí, and those who took up a neutral position (9).

The point of dissension among the differing groups in Islam during the first century of the Hġrah was essentially one: who should be the head of the *ummah*? (10). The difference of opinion was confined purely to this political matter. The Ibádiyyah acknowledged both the Caliphs Abú Bakr and ‘Umar and the first half of the third Caliph's reign, but they would not recognize the legitimacy of the second half of the third Caliph's reign and that of the fourth Caliph after his acceptance of the Arbitration with Mu‘áwiyah b. Abí Sufyán (11). The Ibádiyyah agreed with the position of the leaders of *Ahl al-Nahrawán*. Their view was that they should fight "*al-fi'atu al-Bághiyah*" (the supporters of Mu‘áwiyah) until they accepted the commands of God (12). After ‘Alí's

acceptance of arbitration, the minority of his followers withdrew to Ḥarúrá', and then to al-Nahr, where they elected 'Abdalláh b. Wahhab al-Rásibí as their Imam (13). This group was called al-Muḥakkimah, and their slogan was " *lá Ḥukma 'illá lilláh* " which the Caliph 'Alí condemned as "a word of truth by which falsehood was intended" (14). But the Ibáđí scholar, Abú 'Ubaydah later retorted: "since the Caliph 'Alí knew that their slogan expressed the truth, who informed him that falsehood was their intention?" (15).

After his failure to win over the Muḥakkimah, 'Alí attacked them and killed some 4000 men at the battle of Nahrawán (16). Non-Ibáđí sources report that the Muḥakkimah 'went out' against the legal caliph (17). In fact at this time the Muḥakkimah's aim was to avoid shedding Muslim blood, and not to oppose the Caliph 'Alí. Their view was simply that the powers and duties of the leader of the Muslims had been laid down by the Prophet through the Qur'án and the Sunnah, and if such a leader failed to comply with them, it was the Muslim's duty to disassociate himself from him. 'Alí declared war against those who wanted the killers of the caliph 'Uthmán punished, and who rejected the caliphate of 'Alí. 'Alí defeated them at the Battle of the Camel in 36/656 (18), but some members of this group were in Damascus with the Wálí Mu'áwiyah b. Abí Sufyán. This group were denounced as "*al-fi'atu al-Bághiyah*" by the supporters of 'Alí (19). At Şiffín 'Alí encountered the Wálí Mu'áwiyah and his followers in the A.H.36. Hostilities lasted until Şafar, 37/ July, 657, when it was agreed to submit to arbitration (20).

The group of 'Alí's supporters who rejected the arbitration, was called al-Muḥakkimah (21). The survivors of ^{the} battle of Nahrawán escaped to Basrah, where they found protection from the B. Tamím (22). This group of survivors was under the command of Abú Bilál Mirdás b. 'Udayyah al-Tamímí, and adopted the name al-Ḥarúriyyah. It lived in a state of concealment "*kitmán*" in Basrah (23). In consequence of Ḥuşayn b. 'Alí b. Abí Ṭálib's killing, Abú Bilál and his forty followers claiming to be the true Muslim "*Shárl'*", left Basrah for Asik in Ahwáz, where the Wálí of Iraq, 'Ubayd Alláh b. Ziyád killed them in A.H.61 (24). With martyrdom, Abú Bilál became a model for the Ibáđiyyah. 'Umrán b. Ḥaṭán succeeded Abú Bilál (25). The period of 'Umrán was quiet and his adherents devoted themselves to political and religious studies. This period is somewhat obscure, and reports of secret assassinations which are

attributed to the Ḥarúrah are not necessarily reliable, since there were many other active opponents of the Umayyads (26).

After Madínah was occupied by Yazíd b. Mu‘áwiyah in A.H. 62, most of the Ḥarúriyyah then moved from Basrah to Mecca to help ‘Abdalláh b. al-Zubayr, while a minority of them moved to Yamámah (27). Ibn al-Zubayr, however rejected the Ḥarúriyyah's views, and they returned to Basrah, where ‘Ubayd Alláh b. Ziyád imprisoned them (28).

After the leaders of ^{the} Ḥarúriyyah were released, a dispute arose among them as to whether they should rebel against the Umayyads or continue their *da‘wah* in a state of *kitmán* (29). The majority were in fervour of rebellion, and were supported by Náfi’ b. al-Azraq, who left Basrah for al-Ahwáz, claiming that the Muslim community were all polytheists and their territory was *Dár al-Ḥarb*. His supporters were called al-Azáriqah (30), while those who preferred to continue their *da‘wah* in concealment were called al-Qa‘idah (quietists) (31) and were led by ‘Umrán b. Ḥaṭán, ‘Abdalláh b. Ibáḍ, and ‘Abdalláh b. al-Şaffár. The latter withdrew from al-Qa‘idah and formed al-Şaffáriyyah sect in A.H.75 (32) and al-Qa‘idah later became known as the Ibáḍiyyah. Thus it can be seen, that in its historical development, Ibáḍiyyah had respectively taken different names: (a) First the Muḥakkimah which means those who rejected arbitration with Mu‘áwiyah b. Abí Sufyán. (b) The Ḥarúriyyah, referring to the Ḥarúrá' village to which the Muḥakkimah retired after refusing of arbitration. (c) Al-Qa‘idah, when Náfi’ b. al-Azraq with his extremist ideas was dissociated from the Ḥarúriyyah by 64 A.H., and finally (d) Ibáḍiyyah, which referred to ‘Abdalláh b. Ibáḍ, when Ibn al-Şaffár separated from al-Qa‘idah in 75 A.H.

The Najdát, al-Azáriqah, and the Şaffáriyyah have been generally known by Sunnis and Shi‘ítes under the collective name of "Khawárij", (Khárijites, i.e. these who ‘go out’ or ‘oppose’) and as such they were regarded as having broken away from Islamic principles. However, this fails to take account of the fact that the Ibáḍiyyah pursued a peaceful course, quite distinct from that of the other sects, and for this reason to consider them merely as “moderate”, as is done by non-Ibáḍi scholars, does not accurately reflect their separate status (33). Ibáḍi views are in fact quite distinct from

those of the Khárijites, who consider all other Muslims as infidels and polytheists, while the Ibádis reject this and regard other Muslims as monotheists (*Muwaḥḥidún*) and as *kuffár ni'mah* (34). The Ibádis refused to kill women, and children or the injured, and did not pursue a routed enemy; and they refrained from looting (35).

‘Abdalláh b. Ibáḍ lived in Basrah during the second half of the first century of the Hījah. He joined with his followers in helping Ibn al-Zubayr in the defence of Mecca. ‘Abdalláh openly refuted the views of opposing groups, including the extreme Khárijites (36). He was close to Jábir b. Zayid, and he followed his orders (37).

Jábir b. Zayid was born in Oman and lived in Basrah. He had a wide knowledge of the Qur’án and the Sunnah. This made him a distinguished figure in his field. He was considered by the Ibádiyyah as the first Imam of their school during the first rise of the Ibádis. Ibáḍi jurisprudence was essentially based on Jábir’s legal opinions.

In the 70s and 80s the Ibáḍi leaders were imprisoned by al-Ḥajjáj b. Yúsuf, the Wálí of Iraq, including Jábir and ‘Umrán b. Ḥaṭán (38). The former was later expelled to Oman and the latter after refusing to lead the Ibádiyyah, left Basrah (39).

Some authorities state that the Ibádiyyah had friendly relations with the Umayyad regime during ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwán's reign (40). In fact all the Ibáḍi leaders were in prison at this time, except ‘Abdalláh b. Ibáḍ, who seems to have died shortly after he had explained his views in writing to ‘Abd al-Malik (41).

Abú ‘Ubaydah Muslim b. Abí Karímah, and Abú Mawdúd Ḥájib b. Ḥafṣ al-Ṭá’í succeeded Jábir b. Zayid and ‘Abdalláh b. Ibáḍ (42). Abú ‘Ubaydah was also put in prison by al-Ḥajjáj. After his release in A.H. 95, he played an important part as a successful leader of the Ibáḍi movement. Abú ‘Ubaydah had been a slave of ‘Urwah b. ‘Udayyah, the brother of Abú Bilál Mirdás, and he was blind (43). Consequently his role became that of *Muftí* and teacher to his followers, while Abú Mawdúd Ḥájib b. Ḥafṣ al-Ṭá’í became the political leader of the Ibádiyyah. Abú ‘Ubaydah established three types of council (*Majlis*) as follows (44):

1. A high council which discussed communal plans.
2. A general council for all members of the sect.

3. A special council for regular students intending to study the precepts of the Ibáđi movement or to be trained for the *Da'wah*.

The policy of Abú 'Ubaydah was successful in training a large number of students who were sent out to North Africa, al-Ḥijáz, Yemen and Oman. These students were called a '*ḥamalat al-'ilm*' (45). As a result they established the Imamate in all the above areas except al-Ḥijáz. The first Ibáđi Imamate was in Yemen in 129/746 when Ṭálib al-Ḥaqq was elected as Imam in the Ḥaḍramawt. His Imamate was extended to al-Ḥijáz in 130, but the Umayyad regime suppressed it in A.H.132 (46). In Oman Julandà b. Mas'úd succeeded in establishing a second Imamate in 132, which lasted for two years. The third Imamate, in Táhirt [Tiaret] in North Africa, was established in 160, and lasted until 296 when the Fáṭimid Caliphate suppressed it (47). Although the Ibáđi Imamate in both Yemen and Oman failed to maintain themselves, Abú 'Ubaydah continued his activities until the time of his death during the Caliphate of al-Manṣúr (48). His successor, al-Rabí' b. Ḥabíb persevered with these activities and in A.H.177 the Ibáđiyyah established the second Imamate in Oman.

b) The Development of the Imamate in Oman

The discussion of this period will concentrate on the main stages of the Imamate before the Imamate of Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúṣí in 1913.

i. The first Imamate (132/749-134/751-2)

The Ibađi movement began in Basrah where its missionaries had been trained and then been sent abroad to places far away from the power centres of the Umayyad and 'Abbasid Caliphs. These missionaries were known as the *ḥamalat al-'ilm*. They succeeded in the establishment of the first Imamate in Yemen, Oman, and North Africa.

The conflict between the Umayyad Caliphate and the first Ibáđi Imamate in Yemen ultimately led to the collapse of the latter. But the Ibáđiyyah succeeded in the establishment of their first Imamate in Oman in 132/749. As a result of the Umayyad collapse at the hands of the 'Abbasids, Oman came under the rule of the latter. This in turn led to the dismissal of Ziyád b. al-Muhallab b. Abí Ṣufrah, as the Umayyad Wálí in Oman, who was replaced by Junáḥ b. 'Ubádah b. Qays al-Hiná'í in 132. Shortly Junáḥ was deposed, and his son Muḥammad was appointed in his place. During Muḥammad's

period of office the Ibádiyyah succeeded in the election of Julandà b. Mas'úd b. Jayfar al-Julandí as the first Imam of Oman (49).

Omani accounts state that Muḥammad b. Junáḥ was not against the establishment of the Ibáđí Imamate, in that there was no clash between him and the Ibádiyyah. Instead he secretly countenanced them. This implies that he was impressed by the Imamate type of organisation which was essentially based on the principle of consultation (*shúrah*) and election (50). There are serious doubts about the year 132 (i.e.. the year of the overthrow of the Umayyads) as being the date of Julandà's election. The turbulent events of this year raise the following question: how did Abú al-'Abbás al-Saffáḥ manage to deal with all these events during the second half of the year 132?. We do not know exactly how long Junáḥ held his position and why he was dismissed, and similarly we have no information about how long it took Muḥammad b. Junáḥ to establish friendly relations with the Ibádiyyah. These events needed some time to mature, and cannot have taken place within a few months. In addition Oman in itself was not a very important Wiláyah for the 'Abbasids because it did not constitute any real danger to the Caliphate. The establishment of the first Imamate in Oman in that year is therefore unlikely, and there is a much stronger argument which suggests the year 134 as the date of the foundation of the first Ibáđí Imamate in Oman (51).

Imam Julandà was just, generous and pious. He was the first uncontested Imam of Oman, and greatly promoted the cause of the Ibádiyyah (52). His Imamate continued until 134, when he was killed at the Battle of Julfár (Ra's al-Khaymah) which was fought between himself and Kházim b. Khuzaymah who had been sent by the Caliph, Abú al-'Abbás al-Saffáḥ, in order to suppress the rebellion of the Şaffariyyah in Bahrayn (al-Ḥasá) (53). Kházim defeated Shaybán b. 'Abd al-'Azíz al-Yashkurí, the leader of the Şaffariyyah in Bahrayn. The latter escaped to Oman, but the Imam refused to allow him to enter Oman. The Imam's troops encountered Shaybán in Julfár in 134. The result of this battle was that Shaybán and his followers were killed (54). Shortly after this, Kházim came to Oman searching for Shaybán, not knowing that the latter had already been killed. During his interview with the Imam, he explained his aims as follows: "let their death and what they have suffered at your hands suffice. My only wish now is to be

able to inform the Caliph that you are obedient and loyal” (55). But the Imam vehemently rejected this proposal. Battle then ensued between the Imam and Kházim in Julfár in 134 A.H. The Imam was killed and his Imamate, which had lasted for two years and one month, collapsed (56).

ii. The Second Imamate (177/793-280/893)

After the death of Julandà, Oman came under the ‘Abbasid Caliphs, but their rule extended over the coastal towns of Oman only. Muḥammad b. Zà’idah b. Ja‘far al-Julandí, and Ráshid b. al-Nazar al-Julandí succeeded in ruling inland, in the ‘Abbasid’s name (57). On the other hand, the Ibáđí missionaries were still preaching their doctrines, and became very active after some Ibáđis came to Oman from Basrah. The Ibáđiyyah seized an opportunity when a conflict arose between Ráshid b. al-Nazar and Ghassán b. Abd al-Malik. The latter was supported by the Ibáđí leaders, such as Sh. Músà b. Abí Jábir al-Izkawí, Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh, and Muḥammad b. al-Mu‘allá al-Kindí. These fought with Ráshid in al-Záhirah Province in 177/793. Ráshid and his supporters were killed in this battle which was known as the Battle of al-Majázah (58).

The Ibáđiyyah established a second Ibáđí Imamate in Oman. They gave their allegiance to Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh b. ‘Affán as an Imam *difá’*. After two years, he was deposed, and al-Wáarith b. Ka‘b al-Kharúşí replaced him in 179/795 (59). Henceforth, the Ibáđiyyah continued to elect their Imams until A.H.280. During this period eight Imams were elected one after another. At the end of 273, Imam al-Şalt b. Málík was deposed by Sh. Músà b. Músà b. ‘Alí, and Ráshid b. al-Nazar was elected as Imam. Ibn Ruzayq gives the reason as being that “Imam al-Şalt became very old and feeble, ... and the loyalty of people towards the Imamate was weakened” (60).

In consequence of this, a serious disturbance arose in Oman and the Omanis were divided in their opinions. Warfare broke out between the ex-Imam’s supporters and the Imam Ráshid. Several battles occurred between them. Among these were the battle of al-Rawḍah in Tanúf, and the battle of Rustáq. Eventually Sh. Músà b Músà deserted the Imam Ráshid, and deposed him. Sh. Músà then nominated ‘Azzán b. Tamím al-Kharúşí as Imam in 277. The latter improved his relations with Sh. Músà and Imam al-Şalt’s supporters by dismissing all the adherents of Imam Ráshid. Sh. Músà became chief Qáđí

(61). After one year Imam ‘Azzán removed Sh. Músà from his position. Nevertheless the former suspected what might happen to him from Sh. Músà. He then sent a force against Sh. Músà who was killed and his supporters in Izkí were slain and robbed. This occurred on Sunday, 29th Sha‘bán, 278/5th December, 891 (62). In consequence, conflict arose between Sh. Músà’s supporters (Nizáris) and Imam ‘Azzán who was supported by the Yamanis. The Nizáris tribes nominated al-Ḥawáirí b. ‘Abdalláh al-Ṣalúti (Yamaní origin) as Imam in Ṣuḥár in Shawwál, 278/January, 892 (63). The Imam al-Ḥawáirí clashed with al-Ahyaf b. Ḥimḥám al-Hiná’í, the commander of Imam ‘Azzán's troops in the village of Majíz in the Báṭinah on Monday, 26th Shawwál, 278. The result of this battle was that Nizáris party was defeated and its Imam was killed (64).

Two chiefs of the Nizáris, Muḥammad b. Abí al-Qásim, and Bashír b. al-Mundhir went to Bahrayn, and thence to Iraq, seeking help from Caliph al-Mu‘taḍid (279/892-289/901) against their opponents. The latter ordered his Wálí of Bahrayn, Muḥammad b. Núr, to proceed against Oman (65). Muḥammad b. Núr succeeded in defeating Imam ‘Azzán and restored Oman to the suzerainty of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate in A.H.280 (66). Before his departure Muḥammad b. Núr for al-Bahryan, he appointed Aḥmad b. Hilál as governor of Oman. The latter's residence was Bahlà, and he appointed a governor at Nazwà (Abú Aḥmad Bajayrah or Buḥayrah) (67).

iii. Third Imamate (the "Weak" Imamate) (284/897-c.330s/940s)

Not long after this the people of Oman successfully established the third Imamate in Oman by killing the governor of Nazwà, Abí Aḥmad Bajayrah, in A.H.284. Their first Imam was Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Kharúṣí (284-285) and their last one was Ráshid b. al-Walíd al-Kindí (328-?) (68). Between those there were sixteen Imams. Al-Izkawí states that “ the people set up 16 different Imams, and in each case failed to hold to keep the allegiance, which they had vowed” (69). The underlying reasons for this were the conflict between the Nizáris and Yamaní parties, the interference of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate in the affairs of Oman, and the occupation of the Qarmatians who attacked Oman during the Imamate of ‘Umar b. Muḥammad. The ‘Abbasid Caliphs restored their authority in Oman in about 330s/940s and this lasted until 407/1016 (70).

The outstanding Imam of this Imamate was Imam Sa'íd b. 'Abdalláh b. Muḥammad (320-328). He was praised by several '*ulamá'*', among these being, Abú Muḥammad 'Abdalláh b. Muḥammad b. Abí al-Mundhir; and Abú Ibráhím, Muḥammad b. Sa'íd. The former described him as follows: "we know of no Imam of the Muslims in Oman more excellent than Imam Sa'íd, for he was an upright and learned Imam, and he died the death of a martyr. All these things were combined in him" (71). Abú Ibráhím added that "Imam Sa'íd was superior to Julandà b. Mās'úd [first Imam in Oman] for he was a just and righteous Imam, excelling the people of his times in learning, and he died a martyr withal" (72).

iv. The Fourth Imamate (the dual Imamate) (407/1016-c.560/1164)

After the Imamate of Ráshid b. al-Walíd, the office lapsed during the second half of the fourth century of the Ḥijrah. During this period Oman was dominated by the 'Abbasid "supreme commanders" (the Buwayhids [945-1016]) (73). On the other hand, there was continuing conflict within leadership of the Omani '*ulamá'*' over the issue of *wiláyah*, and *bará'ah* in relation to Sh. Músà b. Músà, Imam al-Şalt, and Imam Ráshid b. al-Niẓar (74). This conflict persisted until the emergence of Khalíl b. Shádhán b. Imam al-Şalt who was elected as Imam in 407/1016 (75). His first task was to get rid of the 'Abbasid governor of the Buwayhids, but he died before he could achieve this. His successor Ráshid b. Sa'íd, however, managed to expel them from Oman. Ibn Ruzayq notes that Imam Ráshid "walked in the good way of his predecessor and imitated him in his praiseworthy life"(76).

After the death of the Imam Ráshid, the Imamate was conferred on his son Ḥafş , who ruled Oman for some twenty years. Ráshid b. 'Alí al-Kharúşí then succeeded him. His Imamate persisted until his death in A.H.513 (77). His conduct was not approved by some Omanis but it was claimed that he declared his repentance in 474/1081(78). The people of Rustáq, however, were not convinced of his repentance. They accordingly elected 'Ámir b. Ráshid b. al-Walíd al-Kharúşí as Imam in Rustáq in 476/1083 (79).

Consequently, there were now two Imamates in Oman; one in Rustáq, and the other in Nazwà. The conflict between the two groups continued until the mid-sixth century of al-Ḥijrah, when the B. Nabhán overthrew the two Imamates, and established a

kingdom which was known as the first state of the B. Nabhán. Their rule was monarchical and dictatorial (80).

v. The Fifth Imamate (rule of an imam and of a king "malik" (809-964)

The first kingdom of the B. Nabhán lasted for more than 250 years. The history of this period is obscure. There are no documents on which one can rely for the analysis of cultural and political affairs during this period. Al-Sálimí ascribes the lack of recorded events in this period to "the dictatorial system of the rulers" (81). The B. Nabhán's policy led ultimately to the revival of the Imamate in 809/1406 (82), when the people of Oman gave their allegiance to al-Ḥawárí b. Málik. But the rule of the B. Nabhán continued for another forty years (83). During this period four Imams were elected. But Sulaymán b. Sulaymán b. Muẓaffar al-Nabhání succeeded in regaining his authority by 850s A.H (84). Not long after this 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭáb al-Khalílí was re-elected as Imam. Subsequently he decided to confiscate the property of the B. Nabhán, and return it to the *Bayt al-Mál*. Henceforth, the practice of confiscation became a rule for the following Imams (85).

The date of the beginning of 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭáb's Imamate is unknown. It may have been in 855 A.H. (86) when Sulaymán b. Sulaymán al-Nabhání overthrew his Imamate, but he was certainly re-elected in 885 A.H., (87) and after two years he issued a decree for the confiscation of the properties of the B. Nabhán, which were to be returned to the *Bayt al-Mál*. After his death in 894 A.H., the people elected six different Imams during just five years. This led to the revival of the B. Nabhán. Sulaymán b. Sulaymán al-Nabhání again seized power in 899 A.H. (88). But Sulaymán was killed by Muḥammad b. Ismá'íl in 906/1500 (89). An allegiance was then given to Muḥammad. Al-Izkawí states that "the Muslims were so pleased at this proof of his strength to do right and oppose wickedness, that they elected him Imam in the year 906 A.H." (90).

During his rule the Portuguese occupied all the coastal towns of Oman, which had been under the domination of the Empire of Hurmuz since the rule of the first B. Nabhán. Henceforth, Muḥammad and his successors ruled only the interior part of Oman. There is no record of the struggle between the Imams and the Portuguese during the 10th/16th century until the Ya'áribah dynasty appeared in 1034/1624. After Muḥammad's death, allegiance was given to his son, Barakát in 936/1529. In 960s conflict broke out again

between the people of Oman. We find three Imams at the same time. This weakened the Imamate, and afterwards the B. Nabhán successfully re-established their rule, which lasted until 1034/1624 (91).

vi. The Sixth Imamate (Ya‘áribah and Āl-Bú Sa‘íd) (1034 - 1207 A.H.)

During the first quarter of the 11th/17th century Oman was divided into several small states ruled by leaders calling themselves Kings. There was a state of conflict between those rulers. This gave the Portuguese an opportunity to strengthen their position and control all the important Omani coastal cities. This situation led forty ‘*ulamá*’ to meet in Rustáq in order to discuss the plight of Oman and they finally decided to elect Náşir b. Murshid al-Ya‘rubí as Imam. His task was to re-unite the country and free Oman from Portuguese occupation. Imam Náşir was regarded as the founder of the Ya‘áribah dynasty which lasted until 1156/1743. The rule of the Ya‘áribah was hereditary and their rulers were nominated as Imams after their election (92).

Although the Ya‘áribah had achieved a great success in the unification of Oman and the expelling of the Portuguese from the country, they had facilitated the Persian occupation in the latter part of their rule. But the Persians were driven out of Oman by Aḥmad b. Sa‘íd al-Bú Sa‘ídí, who transferred the Imamate from the Ya‘áribah dynasty to his own family. After the death of Aḥmad and his son Sa‘íd, the term "Imamate" was no longer used (93).

vii. The Seventh Imamate (1285/1868-1287/1871)

In the third quarter of ^{the} nineteenth century, Sd. ‘Azzán b. Qays b. ‘Azzán al-Bú Sa‘ídí revived the Imamate, which is known as the seventh Imamate (see section 3 c below).

viii. The Eighth Imamate (1331/1913-1377/1957)

This Imamate is the main subject of this study, which we are going to discuss in the following chapters.

3) Oman 1856 -1913

a) Sd. Thuwayní b. Sa'íd b. Sulţán (1273/1856 - 1282/1866)

Āl Bú Sa'íd dynasty replaced the Ya'áribah's rule, when Aḥmad b. Sa'íd al-Bú Sa'ídí was elected as Imam in 1162/1749, as a result of his leadership in first successfully resisting a Persian siege while Wálí of Şuḥár. Imam Aḥmad's rule remained in al-Rustáq until his death in 1783. His son, Sa'íd succeeded him, but his power passed a year later to his son Ḥamad b. Sa'íd, who shifted the capital from al-Rustáq to Muscat. When Ḥamad died in 1792, his uncle Sd. Sulţán b. Imam Aḥmad replaced him. The great ruler in this dynasty was Sd. Sa'íd b. Sulţán (1804-1856), who extended his authority to East Africa in 1832, when he used Zanzibar as a second capital for his throne until his death in 1856. Coupland sums up Sd. Sa'íd b. Sulţán's achievement as follows :

"He had made Oman a greater, wealthier, stronger state than it had been since Dark Ages; he had given it a new place in international relations; and ___ a final achievement which makes him the central figure of the story told in this book ___ he had recovered, unified, and extended the Arab dominion in East Africa and brought it back into close touch with life of the outer world" (94).

Sd. Sa'íd had been a great ruler and Oman was essentially an extension of Sd. Sa'íd's intelligence, energy and personality. After Sd. Sa'íd's death, his empire was divided into two principal possessions, Oman and Zanzibar. The former was ruled by his son Thuwayní, and the latter by another son, Májid b. Sa'íd.

Sd. Sa'íd had usually appointed his sons as his deputies over his provinces during his absences. Since 1833 Sd. Thuwayní had been deputy over Oman while his brother Májid b. Sa'íd had been appointed by his father over Zanzibar after the death of his son Sd. Khálid in 1854. Before his final departure from Oman to Zanzibar, Sd. Sa'íd had appointed his son Turkí as governor of Şuḥár in 1856 (95).

During the latter half of the 19th century Oman suffered conflicts between the descendants of Sd. Sa'íd (d. 19th October 1856), resulting in tribal rebellions, an increasingly inefficient domestic political administration and finally a large increase in British involvement in Omani domestic affairs. In addition to this there were disturbed foreign relations with the Saudi and Iranian authorities. In the same period, Oman was ruled by five rulers. Four rulers held the title of Sultan and one of them was an Imam *difá'* in accordance with the Ibádí terminology.

Before we discuss events in Oman during the second half of the 19th century, the local power structure at that time requires to be analysed. It may be summarized as follows:

1. The governors of Rustáq and those in permanent opposition to the Sultan; Rustáq was ruled by the descendants of Sd. Qays b. Imam Aḥmad (see Family Tree: 8)
2. The continuous rivalry between the descendants of Sd. Sa'íd b. Sulṭán
3. The role of Sh. Şálih b. 'Alí b. Náşir al-Ḥáarithí, the tamímah of ^{the} Ḥináwí faction
4. The role of Sh. Ḥumúd b. Sa'íd al-Jaháfí in opposing the rulers of Āl Bú Sa'íd
5. The role of 'Yál Sa'd in al-Báṭinah Province in opposing the rulers of Āl Bú Sa'íd
6. The unrest of the tribes of Wádí Samá'il (Gháfirí and Ḥináwí factions).

All these local powers threatened the government of Āl-Bú Sa'íd during the period. In November 1856 the news of the death of Sd. Sa'íd b. Sulṭán reached Oman, which spread throughout the country and Sd. Thuwaynı́ succeeded his father over Oman.

During the first four years of his reign, Sd. Thuwaynı́ faced the problem of the opposition of his brothers, Májid in Zanzibar and Turkı́ in Şuḥár. They refused to submit to his control and proclaimed their independence. In 1857, Sd. Muḥammad b. Sálím b. Sulṭán mediated between Sd. Thuwaynı́ and Sd. Májid. The result of this mediation was that the latter agreed to pay \$MT. 40,000 annually to Sd. Thuwaynı́, but in the next year Sd. Májid withheld payment (96), and refused to acknowledge his brother's sovereignty over Zanzibar. Some writers attribute this to the drop in the promised Zanzibar's customs receipt (97), but this would not have been enough for Sd. Májid to sever his relations with his brother and plan to divide his father's empire into two states. Sd. Thuwaynı́ then equipped an expedition of ten ships carrying 2,500 troops to attack and dispossess his brother Sd. Májid. On 11th February 1859, the expedition sailed for Zanzibar, but a steam frigate despatched by the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, succeeded in overtaking Thuwaynı́'s squadron at Ra's al-Ḥadd (98). On reading the letter addressed to him by Lord Elphinstone, Sd. Thuwaynı́ agreed to submit the differences with his brother to the arbitration of the British Government, under the following conditions:

1. "That there shall be one consolidated state without any division, Zanzibar being subordinate to Muscat; and that the interests of the one shall be identified with those of the other, as during the time of our father and forefathers"
2. " his reference to a settlement effected by Muḥammad b. Sálím between us, with the common consent of all parties, that he (Májíd) should pay me annually a sum of forty thousand French Dollars (99). In the event of Oman being involved in any hostilities, Zanzibar shall afford assistance, as it has always been the practice for Zanzibar to assist Oman"
3. "that the property of the orphans shall be given up by him (Májíd) and deposited with a trustworthy person, in whose custody all parties may feel satisfied that it will be safe"
4. "that Sd. Májíd shall indemnify me for all the losses entailed upon me on account of the expense of despatching an army in consequence of his opposition and disobedience" (100).

It appears that Sd. Thuwaynǐ had no confidence in the arbitration of the British Government, because he felt that the British Political Agent at Zanzibar, Captain Rugby, was supporting his brother, and encouraging him to sever his relations with him (i.e. Thuwaynǐ), while Sd. Thuwaynǐ lacked this support and did not have good advisors (101). For this reason in March 1859, he sent his cousin Ḥamad b. Sálím b. Sulṭán to Zanzibar, where Ḥamad spent five months trying to persuade Sd. Májíd to pay \$MT. 40,000 in order to avoid the arbitration of the British, which threatened to divide their empire, but his attempt failed. Meanwhile, Sd. Májíd encouraged his brother, Turkǐ, the ruler of Ṣuḥár, to attack Muscat. On 2nd April 1861, Lord Canning, the Viceroy of India, announced the terms of the arbitration, which were as follows :

1. That Sd. Májíd should rule the Zanzibar and the African dominions.
2. That Sd. Májíd should pay annually to Oman a subsidy of 40,000 Crowns (102)
3. That Sd. Májíd should pay to Sd. Thuwaynǐ the arrears of subsidy for two years (103)

The arbitration of Lord Canning disappointed Sd. Thuwaynǐ's ambitions, but he nevertheless professed his contentment with the arbitration (104), because he found himself in difficult circumstances. His relations with Zanzibar were no more important than his problems in Oman (105) on the one hand, and on the other hand his brother Turkǐ at Ṣuḥár had already collected troops to attack Muscat, and the inhabitants of Nakhal had revolted and killed the Sultan's Wálí, Suwaylim b. Sálímín, while the tribe of 'Yál Sa'd had captured the fort of al-Suwayq after the murder of Sd. Hilál b. Muḥammad b. Imam Aḥmad, the ruler of al-Suwayq. Besides this there was the problem of ever-decreasing trade revenues and loss of most of Sd. Sa'íd's warships and merchant vessels which had been captured by Sd. Májíd (they were anchored at Zanzibar when their father died). These were the circumstances which obliged Sd. Thuwaynǐ to declare his acceptance of the arbitration of the Government of India. Whether in making his

arbitration, Lord Canning had intended to destroy Sd. Sa'íd's empire as a power to be reckoned with, or whether he had no such intention, such was the result. Omani history for the next decades degenerated into a record of dynastic struggles and betrayals (106).

After having settled his dispute with his brother Sd. Májid by arbitration, Sd. Thuwayní turned to his difficulties with his domestic opponents. He prepared an expedition against Nakhal, but this failed. He then mustered an army against Şuḥár, where his brother Turkí refused to consider himself subject to his brother Thuwayní. But before his departure, W.M. Pergelly (the new PAM) volunteered his mediation between the two brothers, who both accepted it (107). But this mediation was a failure, because Sd. Turkí suspected his brother Sd. Thuwayní, who was accompanied by two hundred cavalry and one 12 pr. howitzer (108). Thereupon Sd. Thuwayní arrested and imprisoned Sd. Turkí, and he moved to Şuḥár which he restored and his son Sálím was appointed its Wálí (he was 22 years old) (109).

The problems of Sd. Thuwayní were too numerous for him. Not long after that the 'Yál Sa'd captured the fort of al-Suwayq. The conflict between them began after Sd. Thuwayní had revoked a *zakát* exemption that his father had forgiven the 'Yál Sa'd. The 'Yál Sa'd contacted Sd. Qays b. 'Azzán at al-Rustáq, and they offered to submit to his rule (110). Sd. Qays agreed with the view of the 'Yál Sa'd and travelled to al-Suwayq to discuss the matter with its Wálí, Sd. Hilál b. Muḥammad. But the latter refused to sever his relations with Sd. Thuwayní and to join them. As a result of this argument both Qays and Hilál lost their lives (111). Then the 'Yál Sa'd besieged the fort of al-Suwayq, where Sd. Hilál's sister, Sayyidah Júkhah bint Muḥammad resisted for 18 days (112). She appealed for aid from her cousin, Sd. Thuwayní who was occupied in Şuḥár. But the fort had fallen under the control of the 'Yál Sa'd in December 1861. Therefore, one month later Sd. Thuwayní moved toward al-Suwayq which he restored by negotiation with the 'Yál Sa'd (113) on condition that Sd. Thuwayní issued a new *zakát* exemption to them (114). According to al-Sálímí's account (115) when Sayyidah Júkhah asked aid from her cousin Sd. Thuwayní, he delayed his assistance for her because he preferred the fort of al-Suwayq to be under the control of the 'Yál Sa'd, as it would be easier to take it from them than from Sayyidah Júkhah, in order to bring the fort under his direct control.

In August 1865, hostilities were renewed between the Wahhábis and Sd. Thuwayní. The former declared their support for Sd. 'Azzán b. Qays against Sd. Thuwayní. They send an envoy to Muscat demanding that the annual tribute be increased to four times the customary. Sd. Thuwayní refused their demand, and agreed to pay the ordinary annual tribute. Therefore the Wahhábis captured Şúr. According to the local account the aims of the Wahhábis were to assist Sh. Náşir b. 'Alí al-Wahíbí who differed with Sd. Thuwayní, because the latter had appointed his brother Sh. Khulayfiyyín b. 'Alí al-Wahíbí as leader of the Āl Wahíbah. Sh. Náşir failed to get permission to discuss his position with Sd. Thuwayní, and then decided to make trouble for Sd. Thuwayní. He visited Buraymí for this purpose and accompanied the Wahhábis to Şúr (116).

Sd. Thuwayní then equipped an expedition against the Wahhábis. His brother Turkí sailed to Şúr, while he himself proceeded to Şúr by the inland. In Badiyyah Sh. Náşir met Sd. Thuwayní who forgave him on condition that he persuade the Wahhábis to withdraw from Şúr (117). Sd. Thuwayní succeeded in collecting a large number of troops from the Hináwí tribes of al-Sharqiyyah under the commander of Sh. Şáliḥ b. 'Alí al-Ḥáarithí, who was in Şúr when the Wahhábis attacked it (118). Lorimer gives a different account of the cause of this raid and how it ended. He states that Sd. Thuwayní 'bribed' the Wahhábis with payment of \$MT. 16,000 rupees (119). In fact Sd. Thuwayní at this time had a large number of troops, and it was not necessary to pay any bribe; their moneys were in the nature of an ordinary annual tribute.

After that, Sd. Thuwayní sailed from Şúr to Şuḥár to assemble his troops to attack the Wahhábis who had raided Şaḥam in the Báṭinah and Manaḥ in Interior. But Sd. Thuwayní was killed in the fort of Şuḥár on 27th Ramaḍán 1282/3rd Feb. 1866 (120).

Sd. Thuwayní's external relations were amicable. He obtained British recognition as Oman's Sultan, the Anglo-French declaration to respect the independence of the Sultanate of Oman, and finally the continuance of the Zanzibar subsidy. Besides this, he concluded two agreements with the British government: the first was for a British service of mail steamers and the second was for the carrying out of a British telegraph project. He held firm amidst disorder and was killed just as it appeared that Oman was about to enjoy a period of interior unity (121).

b) Sd. Sálím b. Thuwayní 1282 /1866-1285 /1868)

After his father's assassination in Şuḥár, Sd. Sálím seized the apparatus of state. Although he denied the assassination of his father, all the records affirm it. This is not the place to discuss this accusation. It is sufficient here to note that Sd. Thuwayní was advancing to Şuḥár to attack the Wahhábis at Buraymí, and that Sd. Sálím, when he became ruler, had the reputation of being very sympathetic towards Wahhábí religious teachings (122).

The first task of Sd. Sálím was to gain British recognition. He sent a letter to Colonel Pelly (the PRG) informing him of his father's death, and his taking over Oman, but Pelly ignored his letter and he started to embark the PAM, and other Europeans, and the valuables of British Indian merchants onto the Berenice. Sd. Sálím then commissioned Sd. Náşir b. 'Alí al-Bú Sa'ídí, Wálí of Muscat, and Sh. Ḥumayd b. Sa'íd b. Khalfán to complain to the government of Bombay about the hostile attitude of Pelly. Apparently the envoys succeeded, because Pelly arrived at Muscat on 10th September 1866, to declare British acknowledgment of Sd. Sálím as Sultan of Oman (123). British recognition of a ruler of Oman was very important for the continuance of his rule. Pelly described its effects by stating that "the Arabs understand that recognition does not mean support. But they and our own subjects understand that without recognition restoration of a confidence in a trade which is largely in the hands of our Indians is impossible ... non-recognition implies to the Arab mind a latent wish on our part for change in the government and this impression begets a general doubt as to the future" (124). It is clear that the British would support in Oman only a ruler who would cooperate with them.

The first difficulty that faced Sd. Sálím was to come from his uncle Sd. Turkí, because Sd. Sálím had imprisoned him immediately after his father's death, but Pelly, who arrived in Şuḥár at the end of February secured Sd. Turkí's release. During the year 1866 Sd. Turkí was absorbed in gaining supporters from the coast of Oman and al-Záhirah Province, but he was unsuccessful in enlisting allies, because Pelly cautioned the Shaykhs of these areas against abetting his proceedings, especially by sea (125).

Meanwhile, Sd. Turkí was supported by the B. 'Alí, who was in Yanqil in the Western Ḥajar, and from there he began his attack on his nephew's territories, but his

attacks failed to obtain any position for him (126). He then moved to al-Sharqiyyah and thence to Ja'lán Province to raise troops from the Hináwí tribes. Sh. Şálih unsuccessfully attempted to make a reconciliation between Sd. Turkí and his nephew Sd. Sálím. Eventually, Pelly persuaded Sd. Turkí to retire to India, because the latter found himself without Omani support (127).

These troubles had scarcely ended when Sd. Sálím began a quarrel with Sd. Ḥamad b. Sálím, Wálí of al-Muşann'ah. This quarrel alienated his supporters, who abandoned him. He faced major trouble from Sh. Şálih and the leaders of the Hináwí faction, when he committed a prime blunder by seizing Sh. Şálih in Barká' in late 1867. At the outset of his reign, he enjoyed friendly relations with both Sh. Sa'íd b. Khalfán al-Khalílí and Sh. Şálih b. 'Alí al-Ḥáarithí, who supported him. These relations were severed in late 1867, when Sd. Sálím attempted to arrest Sh. Şálih in Barká'. The reason for this was that the Shaykh had remained aloof from Sd. Turkí, whom Sh. Şálih's tribe supported, during the Shaykh's absence in Muscat with Sd. Sálím (128), even though later the Shaykh supported Sd. Turkí when the latter attacked Muscat. This incident broke the alliance between Sd. Sálím and the Hináwí tribes. Sh. Şálih contacted Sd. 'Azzán b. Qays and Sh. Sa'íd b. Khalfán al-Khalílí, with the aim of defeating Sd. Sálím. Sh. Sa'íd b. Khalfán organized a coalition against Sd. Sálím. At the end of September 1868 Sh. Sa'íd with his allies began their operation against Muscat. Before their attack, they demanded that Sd. Sálím declare his repentance, "i.e. he should return to his allegiance" (129). Sd. Sálím refused, and they then attacked Muscat, which fell into their hands. After three days of abortive negotiations between the two sides, Sd. Sálím left Oman for Bandar 'Abbás on 9th October 1868 (130). In reality the terms of reconciliation between Sd. Sálím and his opponents were that Sd. Sálím should be Sultan, and that Sd. 'Azzán should be his advisor, but Sd. Sálím preferred to give up his powers to them.

c) Imam 'Azzán b. Qays (1285/1868-1287/1871)

In consequence of the general conclave in Muscat the only candidate was Sd. 'Azzán who was supported by three religious dignitaries of Oman: Sh. Sa'íd b. Khalfán, Sh. Şálih b. 'Alí and Sh. Muḥammad b. Sulayyim al-Gháribí, the leading '*ulamá*' of the 'Yál Sa'd tribe. On Friday 22nd Jumádà II, 1285/10th October 1868, Sd. 'Azzán was

elected as Imam of Oman on condition that he should obtain prior approval from the religious leaders before certain actions were taken. This type of allegiance (*bay'ah*) is called *bay'at difá'* (defence) in the traditional Ibádí regime (131).

The four important personages in the Imamate of Sd. 'Azzán were Sh. Sa'íd b. Khalfán, who was appointed Wálí of Muscat and the chief Qádí (unofficially he was the chief religious, financial and political advisor); Sh. Şálih, an official in the government of Imam 'Azzán (somewhat analogous to a secular prime minister); Sh. Muḥammad al-Gháribí who became a Qádí; and fourthly his brother Ibráhím b. Qays. Power was now in the hands of a group of leaders, who modelled the apparatus of government on the pattern of the traditional Imamate to restore the Islamic community to what they considered its pristine state. They attacked prevailing religious practices and accused them of containing innovations and impurities. G. A. Atkinson (the PAM) was convinced that "'Azzán's position at Muscat was secure. Government should consider 'Azzán as her solemnly elected Imam and not merely Sultan" (132).

There were six factors which assisted the accession to power of Imam 'Azzán and his allies: first, the support of many Omanis, especially the Hináwí tribes; secondly, the dispute between the Gháfirí tribes and Sd. Sálím; thirdly the presence of leading personalities of the Ibádiyyah; fourthly the presence of some leaders from the Qays branch and the royal house; fifthly, the adherence of Hináwí faction leaders to the opposition cause after 1867; and finally the growing weakness and inefficiency in the camp of the descendants of Sd Sa'íd b. Sulṭán (133).

At the commencement of 1869 Imam 'Azzán attacked the Siyábiyyín and B. Jábir tribes in Wádí Samá'il. He was successful and they submitted to him. Izkí and some towns in the Interior afterwards declared their submission to the Imam. In the Báṭinah Province, Sd. Ḥamad b. Sálím, the Wálí of al-Muṣann'ah, surrendered, and his properties were confiscated by Imam 'Azzán. In the spring Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Alí al-Na'ímí, the leader of B. Na'ím in Buraymí reached al-Suwayq and met Sh. Muḥammad al-Gháribí, seeking his help to eject the garrison of the Wahhábis from Buraymí. Sh. al-Gháribí took Sh. al-Na'ímí to Imam 'Azzán, who agreed to their plan, because the Wahhábí Amír in Buraymí threatened the Imam unless he paid tribute (134); besides, the

Imam received support from Pelly to attack the Wahhábí outpost of Buraymí (135). Moreover, the Imam had received an invitation from Sh. Záyid b. Khalífah to attack the Wahhábis. Before long, al-Buraymí fell to Imam ‘Azzán on 18th June, 1869. The last victory of the Imam in this year resulted in the submission of the B. Bú ‘Alí in Ja‘lán. The Imam captured and imprisoned their leader, Sh. Ráshid b. Sálím b. ‘Alí, who died in the Imam’s prison in the following year. The Imam appointed Sd. Sayf b. ‘Ámir b. Khalfán al-Bú Sa‘ídí as Wálí of Ja‘lán. In the late autumn of the same year the Imam’s rule over Oman reached its peak. The year 1869 had been very successful for the Imam, but the following year was not (136).

Unfortunately, Imam ‘Azzán distrusted the Gháfirí tribes which supported him, and yet no Imamate in Oman could have endured without them (except when it represented a fusion of some powerful elements of both the Gháfirí and Hináwí tribes) (137). In June 1869 envoys of Sd. Májid, ruler of Zanzibar, reached Bombay to ask the British if they would raise any objection to his sending an expedition against ‘Azzán to reunite Oman under his rule. The British apparently agreed with Sd. Májid’s opinion, but when Imam ‘Azzán learned of it, he declared that he would send an expedition to Zanzibar at the end of 1869 (138).

In the late summer of 1869, Imam ‘Azzán received a warning letter from ‘Abdalláh b. Fayşal, ruler of the Wahhábí government in Riyadh, telling him that he was preparing himself to visit al-Buraymí with 20,000 men (139). In reply to this letter, Imam ‘Azzán raised a large force and marched to al-Buraymí, accompanying the brother of ‘Abdalláh, the Amir Su‘úd b. Fayşal, who was in dispute with his brother, but ‘Abdalláh b. Fayşal in fact never carried out his threat to "visit" al-Buraymí. The result of this expedition was that both the Gháfirí and Hináwí tribes’ relations with the Imam worsened, because of the extreme measures he took to raise revenue quickly. But these were necessary because the *Bayt al-Mál* was virtually empty.

The prime difficulty which faced the Imam’s government was money, and to increase it to the *Bayt al-Mál* was the responsibility of Sh. al-Khalílí, who had practically no business or financial training or experience (140). Sh. al-Khalílí issued a *fatwá* sanctioning the collection of money from the tribes in order to provide a fighting force.

The Imam also issued a *fatwà* in Dhú al-Ḥijjah 1285/May 1869 that all the properties of Āl Bú Sa'íd and their close relations and high ministers and commanders were to be appropriated for the *Bayt al-Mál*. This *fatwà* was supported by Sh. al-Khalílí and his followers, but Sh. Şálih and Sh. Muḥammad al-Gháribí rejected it. Sh. al-Sálimí himself condemned this confiscation. Sh. al-Gháribí felt that many of Sh. al-Khalílí's extremist policies were unrealistic (141). The effect of the confiscation was too vast to be comprehended and acquiesced in by both members of Āl Bú Sa'íd and the Gháfirí tribes, who were alienated from the action of the Imam's council.

The tribes reacted angrily to this and gradually deserted. In September Sd. Turkí appeared in Oman, seeking supporters against Imam 'Azzán. Most of the tribes which were ill-disposed towards the Imam, joined Turkí's forces, and Turkí was successful in Dank on 5th October 1870 against the Imam, who returned, defeated to Şuḥár and thence to Muscat on 10th November 1870. This victory strengthened the relations of Sd. Turkí with his supporters (142).

However, Sd. Turkí felt that his forces were not yet strong enough, because the Hináwí tribes had not yet made clear their position. He marched to al-Sharqiyyah and thence to Ja'lán, where he was successful in collecting a large body of troops. In Şúr his troops were divided into two groups, the first taking the coast route towards Muscat, under the command of Sd. Sayf b. Sulaymán al-Bú Sa'ídí (143) and Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sálim b. 'Alí, the *tamímah* of B. Bú 'Alí. The second went by the inland route to Muscat under the command of Sd. Turkí himself (144). At the end of January, 1871 Sd. Sayf attacked Imam 'Azzán in Maṭraḥ, and in the outcome both the Imam and Sd. Sayf lost their lives. After four days Muscat fell, but Sh. al-Khalílí still resisted in the Jalálí fort in Muscat. Although Sd. Turkí was hindered by Sh. Şálih and Sd. Fayşal b. Ḥumúd b. 'Azzán, he reached Muscat on the fourth or the fifth of February (145). Sh. al-Khalílí tried to get Sd. Ibráhím b. Qays to take 'Azzán's place as Imam and asked the British to guarantee Sd. Ibráhím's rule in return for a yearly tribute of one-fourth of Muscat's revenues, but Sd. Ibráhím immediately went to Şuḥár (146).

Eventually, the Imamate of Sd. 'Azzán which had lasted two years, four months and fifteen days, fell. Imam 'Azzán's revival of the Imamate in the 19th century was a

great achievement, but he was deserted by those who in principle supported his aims (147). More immediate causes for the failure of the Imamate at that time are given by both al-Sálimí and Lorimer (148). Besides this, Imam ‘Azzán’s government failed in its faulty administration of finances and the Imam’s difficulties extended to his relations with his advisors and supporters (149).

d) Sd. Turkí b. Sa‘íd b. Sultán (1287/1871-1305/1888)

Sd. Turkí reached Muscat in the first week of February, 1871. He began to negotiate with Sh. al-Khalílí, who refused to place himself under the protection of Sh. Záhir b. Hilál al-Hiná‘í (150). Pelly and Way (the PAM) succeeded in making peace between Sh. al-Khalílí and Sd. Turkí, and made agreement between them (151).

In spite of this guarantee, the agreement was not kept. Sh. al-Khalílí and his son, Muḥammad, died in the Mirání fort on 17th and 18th February respectively, from the effects of a severe illness (152). However, Sh. al-Sálimí states that Sh. al-Khalílí and his son were killed by Sd. Thuwayní b. Muḥammad, the former minister to Sd. Thuwayní, because he was afraid that Sd. Turkí might be intending to release Sh. al-Khalílí and his son (153). But Sd. Turkí had really imprisoned Sh. al-Khalílí and his son together with his advisor Sh. Náṣir b. Ráshid al-Ḥáarithí, because he had discovered that the Shaykh had sent money to Sd. Ibráhím b. Qays in Şuḥár to raise a force, and Sh. Náṣir was causing disaffection among the tribes in Muscat (154).

Another problem for Sd. Turkí was to come from Sd. Ibráhím b. Qays, who had come to power in Şuḥár and the whole Báṭinah coast between Shináş and Muşann‘ah, and refused to give his loyalty to Sd. Turkí, as did his cousin, Sd. Fayşal b. Ḥumúd b. ‘Azzán who held Rustáq (155). During the year 1871 Sd. Turkí equipped no less than four expeditions against Sd. Ibráhím b. Qays in Şuḥár, but all of them failed to take Şuḥár, and Sd. Ibráhím in the following year restored Mijays and Shináş which he had lost in the previous year. In July 1873, Sd. Ibráhím surrendered Şuḥár to Sd. Turkí who was supported by B. Na‘ím, in return for which Sd. Ibráhím received a gift of \$MT. 5000, and a pension of \$MT. 100 a month. Sd. Turkí then appointed Sd. Badr b. Sayf b. Sulaymán al-Bú Sa‘ídí (whose father had killed Imam ‘Azzán) as Wálí of Şuḥár (156).

By the end of 1873 Sd. Ibráhím had taken possession of the forts of al-Ḥazim and Rustáq from his cousin Fayṣal b. Ḥumúd b. ‘Azzán, and had made an alliance with ‘Yál Sa‘d. In March he resumed his military operations against the Báṭinah towns, captured Muṣann‘ah on 6th March, but was unable to keep it and eventually declared his submission to Sd. Turkí who allowed him to rule Rustáq at the close of 1874. After this Sd. Ibráhím made no trouble for Sd. Turkí except for two raids; one was on 11th March 1882 against Muṣann‘ah, and the second in July 1887 against al-Suwayq (157).

Immediately, after Imam ‘Azzán’s death, Sd. Sálím b. Thuwayní came back to Oman from Qishim island, in order to overthrow his uncle, Sd. Turkí. To this end, he contacted the tribal Shaykhs. The first contact was with Sd. Ibráhím in Ṣuḥár, whose sister he had married in 1871. Having gained supporters, he attacked Ṣúr in February 1872, but failed to achieve his aim. Then he went to Ja‘lán, and thence to Badiyyah, where he raised a force. The second and third attacks against Ṣúr and Qurayyát in September 1872 were unsuccessful. When he had lost hope of obtaining support, he found himself obliged to leave the country for India in December 1872, where he remained until his death in 1876 (158).

Sh. Ṣáliḥ b. ‘Alí decided to attack Muscat in August 1873 but failed to penetrate the Wádí al-‘Aqq which was under the Gháfirí tribes’ suzerainty. There seem to have been three reasons for the Shaykh’s opposition: the agreement for the suppression of the slave trade which Sd. Turkí had signed with the British government in April 1873 (159); the retirement of Sd. Ibráhím from political life in January 1873; and finally, the desire to honour the agreement of 1871 between Sd. Turkí and Sh. al-Khalílí, whose tribe (B. Ruwáḥah) had succeeded in coming to a reconciliation with Sd. Turkí on the following conditions:

1. That B. Ruwáḥah should be forgiven the blood on their hands, particularly that of Sd. Muḥammad b. Sa‘íd, the Wálí of Barká’, whom they had murdered in the previous year;
2. That part of the landed property of the late al-Khalílí, should be restored to his family;
3. That B. Ruwáḥah should receive the customary subsidies every year from Sd. Turkí;

4. That Sh. Sálím b. ‘Udayyín and Sh. Sulaymán b. ‘Umar, should receive a regular stipulated allowance (160).

In February 1873, warfare broke out in Wádí Samá’il over disagreement concerning who controlled the confiscated estates (161). For the following two years the war continued between Sd. Turkí and the Gháfirí tribes, because the former had replaced the Gháfiris with the Hináwí tribes. Towards the end of 1873, Sd. Turkí fell victim to a chyluria which forced him to hobble about on crutches and which depressed his once high spirits. He continually suffered from this disease until 1875. This gave Sh. Şáliḥ an opportunity to exploit the situation, particularly following the news of Sd. Turkí’s death. At the beginning of 1874, Sh. Şáliḥ and his allies, Sh. Ḥumúd b. Sa‘íd al-Jaḥáfí and Sh. Hilál b. Sa‘íd al-Ḥajrí, moved to Muscat and took with them the son of the late Imam, Sd. Ḥumúd b. ‘Azzán, who was 12 years old, in order for him to be elected Imam of Oman. After they had occupied Maṭraḥ, Sd. Turkí sent Sd. Badr b. Sayf to them, seeking peace. An agreement between them was signed on the 22nd January 1874 (162).

In May 1874, Sd. Turkí invited his brother Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz to take over some of the burdens of government. The latter accepted his brother's invitation under the conditions to which Sd. Turkí and the British government agreed (163). The first task of Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz, who was deputizing for his brother, Sd. Turkí, was to be the conciliation between the people of the Wádí Samá’il. He summoned them to visit Muscat, but the Gháfirí tribes gave a hostile reception to his invitation (164).

Sh. Şáliḥ responded to this summons and arrived in Muscat on 1st September 1875, to become a special advisor to Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz, who found himself distracted by about 1200 tribesmen from the Hináwí tribes encamping in Muscat in order to support Sh. Şáliḥ, whose real aim was to elect the son of the late Imam. Eventually the ruler of Abú Dhabí, Sh. Záyid b. Khalífah successfully persuaded Sh. Şáliḥ to leave Muscat to return home (165).

The Gháfirí tribes, however, particularly the B. Riyám, B. Bú ‘Alí, and Janabah tribes, were concerned about the Hináwí tribes' activities in Muscat. They declared war against Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz and his supporters. The Wálí of Şuḥár, Sd. Badr, and the B. Na‘ím supported the Gháfirí rebellion (166), but Sd. Turkí put right this matter by

dismissing his brother, Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz, and by improving his relations with B. Gháfir.

Sd. Turkí long suffered ill-health, including partial paralysis and a weak heart; he died a natural death on 3rd June 1888. He enjoyed a reputation for sound judgment in tribal affairs and for skill in the management of his Arab subjects. He conciliated the people and kept before his eyes the picture of an ideal sovereign (167).

It is clear that the latter part of Sd. Turkí’s rule (1876-1888) was quieter than the earlier period. His relations with the Gháfirí tribes were friendly. There was no comparison between the rule and administration of Imam ‘Azzán and that of Sd. Turkí. The former had announced a *jihád* against his enemies and imposed a tax to finance his troops, whereas the latter relied on winning the tribes’ loyalty and paid salaries to the Shaykhs. Persuasion and weapons could not always bring victory, but the money usually brought at least a temporary solution of problems, because the Omani tribes themselves were more concerned with their own independence. They opposed any attempt on the rulers’ part to impose their direct influence over them. Therefore the winning of the tribes’ loyalty, and persuading them to support the ruler in his decisions or local conflicts were essential elements of policy.

e) Sd. Fayṣal b. Turkí b. Sa‘íd (1305/1888-1331/1913)

Sd. Fayṣal was twenty four-years old when he became Sultan after his father's death in 1305/1888. He was the first ruler of the 19th century to assume power peacefully, and the third ruler of his dynasty. He ruled for more 25 years which were spent in subduing local rebellions and resisting foreign tutelage in Oman. His brothers Muḥammad and Fahd declared their allegiance to him, but his uncle Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz refused to do so and intrigued with the tribesmen to overthrow his nephew. Sd. Fayṣal was born in 1864 and married, in 1881, his cousin Sayyidah ‘Aliyyá, bint Sd. Thuwayní b. Sa‘íd. He reputedly could neither read nor write, although he could sign his own name.

During the first twelve years of Sd. Fayṣal's reign, he unsuccessfully tried to resist British interference. He lacked tribal support, although he courted Sh. Ṣálih b. ‘Alí al-Ḥáarithí and most of the Hináwí and Gháfirí tribes. He went so far as to use the title

Imam on his coins in the 1890s. Sh. al-Sálimí states that at his request, Sd. Fayṣal abolished the customs imposed on returning Omani pilgrims from 1313/1905 (168). The tribes gave their loyalty to their leaders, whose ambition was to obtain positions of power and to revive the Imamate in Oman, but the tribesmen lacked two things; religious and intellectual leaders and unity between the two factions.

After his succession, Sd. Fayṣal was successfully reconciled with Sh. Ṣálih, who had severed relations with Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz, and most of the Shaykhs showed a spirit of loyalty. Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz and Sd. Ibráhím b. Qays hardly troubled Sd. Fayṣal during the period from 1888 to 1890. Three months after Sd. Turkí’s death, Sd. Ibráhím occupied al-‘Awábí, and in September, Sd. Fayṣal unsuccessfully attacked Sd. Ibráhím in Rustáq (169). Between April 1889 and March 1890, Sd. ‘Abd al-‘Azíz was very active in raising his followers against Sd. Fayṣal, but all his attempts failed. Therefore in March 1890, he decided to leave Oman, and sailed for Bombay where he lived until his death in 1907 (170).

During the first half of 1890s, Sd. Fayṣal’s rule was never seriously threatened by his opponents, because although the situation in Oman was very troubled, Sd. Fayṣal’s relations with Sd. Ibráhím and Sh. Ṣálih were friendly, and they were all engrossed in trying to bring about an accommodation between the tribes. In May 1891 Sd. Fayṣal successfully made a truce between the Gháfirí tribes of the Wádí Samá’il and the Hináwí of al-Sharqiyyah, but this truce was broken by the Ḥabús tribe when it attacked the tribes of Wádí Samá’il. Again, Sd. Fayṣal made truce between them in al-Síḅ in January 1893. Sd. Ibráhím and Sh. Ṣálih also made peace between the Hináwí and Gháfirí of Interior, al-Záhirah and Ja‘lán during the years 1892-3 (171).

Sd. Fayṣal had neglected the affairs of Oman and been remiss in arbitrating tribal disputes. In reality, his policy was equally disastrous. This was due to the strength of the position of Sh. Ṣálih, and to the fact that the Hináwí tribes were estranged from him. In 1894 relations between Sd. Fayṣal and Sh. Ṣálih became hostile. The reason for this was that the former cut off the Shaykh’s pension, and in the meantime he strengthened his relations with an other leader of the Ḥáarithí tribe, Sh. Sa‘íd b. Náṣir al-Ḥáarithí, who was seeking to displace Sh. Ṣálih (172). On hearing this, Sh. Ṣálih tried to placate Sd. Fayṣal,

but his attempt was a failure. The Shaykh then decided to overthrow him. He first communicated with his allies and next with the Sultan of Zanzibar, Sd. Ḥamad b. Thuwaynī (173). Before any discussion of the Shaykh's rebellion of 1895, the effect of Sd. Fayṣal's relations with the British government on the history of Oman during the 1890s must be understood. Sd. Fayṣal early indicated his impatience with the British exercise of extensive influence in guiding the actions of the Omani government (174). He tried to limit it by dismissing his father's staff, who supported the policy of the British government in Oman, and appointing a new staff, even while he attempted to court tribal loyalty, as mentioned above. In addition, he strengthened his relations with the French. On the other hand the British government postponed its recognition of Sd. Fayṣal as Sultan until his uncle, Sd. 'Abd al-'Azíz, had left Oman for India in March, 1890, and they were preparing to make a new agreement with him, to be called a "Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation", to replace of the Treaty of Commerce of 1839 (175) which was signed on 19th March, 1891 (176). Sd. Fayṣal was forced to sign this treaty, and in fact he had actually misunderstood its effects, since when he granted the French government a coaling station at Bandar al-Jaṣṣah in 1898, the British government considered this a violation of Sd. Fayṣal's treaty of 1891. The British government sent Major Fagan (the PAM) Colonel Mead (the PRG) and Admiral Dougle (East India Station) to Oman in order to oblige Sd. Fayṣal to cancel the concession to the French in 1899. Sd. Fayṣal eventually agreed to this on 17th February 1899 (177).

As regards the relations of the Sultan of Zanzibar with Oman, Sd. Ḥamad b. Thuwaynī replaced his uncle 'Alí b. Sa'íd b. Sulṭán in Zanzibar in March 1893. Sd. Ḥamad was born in Oman and his early years were spent there. His ambitions were to revive his grandfather's empire by joining Oman to Zanzibar. He therefore welcomed any Omani visiting his country. Thus letters were exchanged between the Shaykhs of Oman and the Sultan of Zanzibar about this question. Sh. al-Mughírí states that the minister of Sd. Ḥamad, Hilál b. 'Āmir al-Ḥáarithí encouraged Sd. Ḥamad to take control of Oman (178). In February, 1894 the Omani mission arrived at Zanzibar, including Sh. 'Abdalláh, the son of Sh. Ṣálih b. 'Alí, Sh. Ḥumúd b. Sa'íd al-Jaḥáfí, Sh. 'Āmir b. Sálím al-Ḥasaní, and Muḥsin b. 'Āmir al-Ḥáarithí, the brother of the minister of Sd.

Ḥamad. Their purpose was to offer the Sultanate of Oman to Sd. Ḥamad. In May they returned to Oman with three field-guns and 300 barrels of powder (179).

There were several reasons for the rebellion of 1895: the British interference in supporting Sd. Fayṣal; the encouragement of the Sultan of Zanzibar for the rebels; the increase of Sh. Ṣálih's influence; Sd. Fayṣal's neglect of affairs in Oman; and the agreements of Sd. Fayṣal and his father with the British. In addition, Sd. Fayṣal had raised the customs rates on goods going to the interior in an attempt to increase his revenues.

As a result in December 1894, Sh. Ṣálih b. 'Alí sent his son, Sh. 'Abdalláh, who was not more than 20 years old, to Nazwà in order to make peace between Sh. Badr b. Hilál al-Hiná'í and Sh. Sulaymán b. Sayf al-Riyámí. He brought about a truce for 6 months and then he wrote to Sd. Fayṣal for permission to visit him in Muscat to discuss the conditions arranged at Nazwà (180). On 11th February 1895, he arrived at Ruwi (5 miles from Maṭraḥ), accompanied by Sh. Ḥumúd b. Sa'íd al-Jaḥáfi and Sh. Muḥsin b. 'Āmir al-Ḥáirithí. They interviewed Sd. Fayṣal and in the evening they were received with hospitality by Sd. Fayṣal, but on the morning of the next day they attacked Muscat and occupied Sd. Fayṣal's palace. Sd. Fayṣal and his family took refuge in the Jalálí fort while his brother, Sd. Muḥammad, barricaded himself in the Mírání fort.

Subsequently, the white banner of the Imamate was raised over Sd. Fayṣal's palace and Sd. Su'úd b. 'Azzán became the titular leader of the attackers. On 17th February, Sh. Muḥsin met Major Hayes Sadler (the PAM), to discuss the deposition of Sd. Fayṣal, and on the same day Sh. Ṣálih and Sd. Su'úd b. 'Azzán reached Maṭraḥ. Sd. Ḥumúd b. 'Azzán also followed them on the 23th (181). Coincidentally, the B. Gháfir of al-Sharqiyyah under the command of Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sálím b. 'Alí came to Muscat to support Sd. Fayṣal (182), who also received support from the B. Jábír. From 24th February the fighting appeared to favour Sd. Fayṣal's position (183).

Consequently, negotiations were opened with Sh. Ṣálih, and on the 9th March the terms of peace were concluded, on condition that Sd. Fayṣal paid \$M.T.12,000, to Sh. Ṣálih, and to continue the allowances of Rustáq family, and on their side Sh. Ṣálih's followers should leave Muscat that night (184). This rebellion was the last attempt to

overthrow Sd. Fayṣal in the 19th century. Sh. Ṣálih b. ‘Alí lost his life in a battle between the B. Ruwáḥah and the B. Jábir in 1314/1896; and two years later Sd. Ibráhím died in Rustáq, and Sh. Ḥumúd b. Sa‘íd al-Jaḥáfí followed them in 1899.

After 1895, Sd. Fayṣal began to strengthen his forts in Muscat and Maṭraḥ by new weapons and garrisons. He dismissed some advisors and appointed new ministers, e.g. Sd. Said b. Muḥammad, Sd. Badr b. Sayf, and Sulaymán b. Suwaylim. In fact, as a result of the events of 1895, Sd. Fayṣal was facing a financial crisis, but support came from the British government which advanced him a sum of \$M.T. 60,000 in the Spring of 1895, and two years later he received the same courtesy again. His liabilities amounted \$MT. 190,000 in 1898 and had jumped to \$MT.200,000 by 1903 (185).

Further results of the ending of tribal opposition after 1895, were difficulties between Sd. Fayṣal and France, on the one hand, and British interference in Oman, on the other. After 1895 the British influence became more evident than in any previous year during Sd. Fayṣal’s reign. This affected the Omani attitude, particularly that of those Omanis who were in Zanzibar (186). They secretly opposed the British policy and encouraged Sd. Fayṣal to pursue a policy of balance between France and Britain. On 8th November 1894 Ottavi, vice consul of France to Oman, arrived at Muscat. His arrival aggravated the situation between Sd. Fayṣal and the British government.

It should be noted that since 1844, Omani commercial ships, particularly those of the B. Bú ‘Alí, and Janabah, were using the French flag. The number of these ships amounted to thirteen in 1891 and rose to twenty-three in 1894, and after another three years they reached thirty eight ships. By this process, the Omanis had managed to avoid the British searching of their dhows (187).

Difficulty arose between the French and British over Oman, which lasted until it was solved by the Hague Permanent Court in 1905, owing to the use by the B. Bú ‘Alí and the Janabah of the French flag during the 1890s and first decade of the present century. This had led them to disregard warnings from Sd. Fayṣal. He summoned them to Muscat, but they refused, and suggested negotiations should be through the vice consul of France. Sd. Fayṣal was opposed to this idea and eventually issued a decree on 25th June 1900, by which the use of foreign flags was prohibited (188).

On 17th February 1899, Sd. Fayṣal cancelled his grant of a coaling station at Bandar al-Jaṣṣah to the French, which he had given them in 1898. He also dismissed his minister Sd. Muḥammad b. ‘Azzán, and his secretary ‘Abd al-‘Azíz b. Muḥammad b. Sa‘íd al-Ruwáḥí who were against British interference in Oman. Sd. Sa‘íd b. Muḥammad was re-appointed to his previous position (189).

Nothing occurred to break the peace between Sd. Fayṣal and the ruler of Rustáq, until the death of Ibráhím b. Qays in 1316/1898. Dissension had occurred between Sd. Su‘úd, who replaced Sd. Ibráhím, and Sd. Sa‘íd b. Ibráhím, the deceased son who was supported by Sd. Fayṣal. Sd. Su‘úd was murdered 1317/1899 and his brother, Ḥumúd b. ‘Azzán replaced him. The conflict continued between Sd. Ḥumúd and Sd. Sa‘íd until the former abdicated in favour of Sd. Sa‘íd, who himself was killed by the sons of Sd. Fayṣal b. Ḥumúd b. Qays in 1912 (190).

During the first decade of the 20th century, Oman faced a growing traffic in the importation of arms, which made Muscat a centre of the arms trade in the Middle East. Nevertheless Sd. Fayṣal improved his position in the interior during 1900-1907. His relations with Sh. ‘Isà who replaced his father in the *tamímah* of the Ḥirth, were friendly, but in 1901 Sh. ‘Isà prevented the explorations of Captain Cox, who was proceeding to Wádí al-Fulayj in order to investigate a mining site for coal at the head of this Wádí. Towards the end of January, 1907 Sd. Fayṣal sent Sulaymán b. Suwaylim to interview Sh. ‘Isà b. Ṣálih in al-Qábil, but when he returned through Wádí al-‘Aqq, he was struck by two shots fired from a cliff on the left bank, and killed on the spot (191). The (Adm.R) comments that "Sulaymán's influence was felt more or less in every part of the country which is to any extent subject to the rule of Sd. Fayṣal" (192). Sh. al-Sálimí states that in 1324/1906, he discussed the affairs of Oman and Imamate with Sd. Fayṣal. The latter promised him his reply should be given to Sulaymán during the latter's visit to Sh. ‘Isà, but Sh. al-Sálimí mentions nothing about the reply of Sd. Fayṣal (193). Nothing further occurred in Oman to break the peace between Sd. Fayṣal and Sh. ‘Isà until May 1913, when Sh. al-Sálimí and others elected Sálim b. Ráshid al-Kharúṣí as Imam of Oman. Not long after that, Sd. Fayṣal died on 4th Dhú al-Qi‘dah, 1331/4th October, 1913 and his son, Sd. Taymúr, succeeded him.

In general, Sd. Fayṣal successfully surmounted his economic and political difficulties with the French and British, although he strongly disagreed with their policy towards Oman. At least he was able to balance the French against the British. For some years he had wanted to abdicate. His policies were opposed by the people: they resented his taxation, his abolition of the slave trade and his efforts to regulate the trade in arms (particularly after his building of a warehouse for this purpose in Muscat). In addition they resented his reliance on foreign support. But in spite of this, his pleasant manners and accessibility won him some popularity (194).

4) Impact of the First World War

At the time of the outbreak of the First World War the Turks had lost al-Ḥasá to Amir ‘Abd al-‘Azíz Ibn Su‘úd in 1913 but they still controlled certain areas of Arabia, including the Yemen and Qatar, and the Amír of Kuwait recognized Ottoman suzerainty over his country. In Oman, the Imamate was revived, and Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúṣí was elected as Imam in May 1913. Germany, France, and Britain all had positions of influence in the Arab countries. In the following we will summarize the effects of the Great War on events in Oman, and will consider the British role in preventing the spread of hostilities to Oman, the vacillating role of the French, and finally the German challenge to the British interests in the Middle East.

a) The British role

At the commencement of the present century, the British government feared that other European states might threaten its position in the Middle East. For this reason, it made certain agreements with these states and with the Arabs in order to limit the effect of their policies. In 1904 there was a general adjustment of political differences between Britain and France (195), and France acknowledged British interests in Oman and the Gulf. Three years later the British government reached an agreement with Russia, which wanted to improve its relations with Britain. This agreement settled their regions of influences in Central Asia and Persia (196). Although this arrangement did not mention British possessions in the Gulf, Russia was aware of the special interest of Britain, and both governments were at pains to avoid offending Germany .

Britain opposed the influence of both Germany and Turkey in the Gulf. It made a secret agreement with Germany in June, 1913, promising to support the building of a railway to Baghdad, in return for a German guarantee not to set up agency in any port of the Gulf (197). In 1913 an agreement was reached between Britain and Turkey regarding the boundaries of the Arabian Gulf states, but this treaty was never signed by the Sultan owing to the outbreak the First World War.

After entering the war, the Sultan declared a *jihád* against Britain, which had tried to prevent the issuing of this declaration, because a large number of Muslims were under British protection. Germany tried to profit from this by circulating the proclamation of the *jihád* throughout the Muslim world. In the meantime, Britain faced German propaganda, which spread through the region. British leaders moved to deal with this situation by trying to court Arab rulers. Lord Hardinge, the viceroy and Governor General of India, travelled to the Gulf in January 1915, in an attempt to counter this propaganda. He called the Arabian rulers to summon a conference in Kuwait to discuss events in the Gulf and declare their support for Britain. Some of the rulers excused themselves from this conference including Sd. Taymúr, the Amír ‘Abd al-‘Azíz, and Sh. Khaz‘al of Muḥammarah. On his way back to India in February, Lord Hardinge landed at Muscat, and discussed with Sd. Taymúr the situation in the interior of Oman. He urged Sd. Taymúr to make peace with his opponents, and excused himself from supporting him at this time because the British navy was distant from Muscat (198).

When Ibn Su‘úd had occupied al-Ḥasá in 1913, he had begun to threaten the Omani coastal rulers, but in December, 1915, the British government reached an agreement with him which was known as the Dárín or the Qaṭíf Treaty, restraining him from this policy. The British government also came to an understanding with ‘Abd al-‘Azíz not to attack the Oman Coast, to improve his relations with Sharíf of the Mecca and to guarantee to subdue Sh. Fahd, the Shaykh of the ‘Anazah tribe which resided on the boundary between Iraq and Arabia, who had caused disturbances in the area by attacking caravans and ships (199).

In the Yemen the British government made a friendly agreement with Imam Muḥammad b. ‘Alí al-Idrísí of ‘Asír on 30th April, 1915 (200). This treaty was called the

Jízán Treaty. Imam Muḥammad afterwards declared war against Turkey, whose garrisons were in San‘á, Ta‘izz and Lahj. The British government had thus succeeded in blocking all routes by which its enemies might affect events in Oman, and the Imamate of Oman remained in the interior, without any external contacts, except East Africa.

b) The French role

The French policy in Oman was ineffective during the war. France had played an important role in Omani affairs before the close of the 19th century and the first five years of the 20th century, but it had failed to make any gains because its policy aims were not clear, and it failed to compete with Britain. Sd. Fayṣal granted France a coaling station in Muscat in 1898, but in the following year he cancelled it. The reason for this was that the position of Britain had eclipsed that of France and the use of the French flag on dhows was no longer a protection. France had effectively abdicated its concerns in Oman and yielded to British influence in 1904. In 1915 it withdrew its consul from Muscat, while local Omani staff administered its consulate affairs (201).

c) The German role

At the beginning of the present century Germany began to rival Britain, France, and Russia in the Middle East. It signed a contract with Turkey to extend the railway from Istanbul to Baghdad. It faced opposition from Britain and France, but succeeded in coming to an agreement with Britain.

During the First World War the PAM reported that the Germans had distributed money in Oman. In fact when the Ottoman sultan declared a *jihád*, the Germans exploited it, and German propaganda stated that Germany and Turkey had won the war, and that the German emperor had become a Muslim, taking the name Ḥajjī Muḥammad Ghulúm (202). When Sd. Khalífah b. Ḥárib b. Thuwayní, the Sultan of Zanzibar, declared war against Germany and Turkey, he justified this by claiming that the Turks had lost their right to call up Muslims for the *jihád*, because the Arabs' own interests were more closely connected with Britain, whether in East Africa or in the Arab Peninsula (203).

The German colony of Tanganyika had friendly relations with the Omani opposition against Britain, and its leaders took refuge there. Sd. Khálid b. Barghash b. Sa‘íd who was deposed from his position as Sultan of Zanzibar by Britain in 1897, took

refuge in the German consulate in Zanzibar, and was under German protection until the British occupied Tanganyika in 1918. Sd. Khálid called upon his followers to support Germany and Turkey against Britain. After Sd. Khálid's defeat in 1897, the British government punished his supporters and confiscated all their property. Most of them returned to Oman (204).

The Omanis supported the Germans in East Africa and some began to return to Oman, joining the Imamate's troops against Sd. Taymúr and his allies. We understand from Sd. Khalífah's words that the calling of the *jihád* by the Ottoman Sultan had effectively reached the ears of Omanis in East Africa, and for this reason Sd. Khalífah felt the need to argue against it.

Before the war, German trade with Oman flourished. The following table gives the value of this trade between 1909 and 1914 in pounds sterling (205):

Years	Exports	Imports	Arms trades	All Exports	All Imports	All Arms
1909-10	00.000	25,000	21,450	277,600	553,700	101,850
1910-11	00.000	22,000	20, 250	271,050	394,500	060,100
1911-12	00.000	31,150	29, 550	290,400	401,300	119,450
1912-13	00.000	07,150	06, 200	301,500	463,55	184,050
1913-14	00.000	01,450	00.000	271,550	407,173	013,550

Germany attempted to spread its propaganda inside Oman by sending out agents who travelled from East Africa to Oman. They landed in Şúr or Ṭaywí and thence proceeded into Oman through al-Sharqiyyah. Part of the tribe of Sh. 'Isà b. Şálih al-Háarithí in East Africa provided them with money and information concerning the movement of British troops in the world. German agents became very active in Oman, stirring up the Omanis against Sd. Taymúr. Many writers stated that Imam Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúşí was affected by German propaganda, and hence refused to complete his negotiations with the Sultan, Sd. Taymúr, after September 1915. Sd. Khálid b. Barghash was active in encouraging the Omanis in East Africa and Oman against Britain.

From its side, Britain observed the movements of Omanis returning from abroad to Oman. In 1915 Britain received three reports from Şúr, Samá'il, and Wádí Ma'áwil

stating that German agents were travelling throughout Oman, encouraging the Imam's followers to attack Muscat, and distributing money (206).

It is obvious that the Germans supported Omani opposition against both the Sultan of Oman and the British government, but it should not be understood from this that the revival of the Imamate had anything to do with the First World War, because it had been launched through a series of attempts made by the Ibadí '*ulamá*' in order to revive the Imamate; but it undoubtedly benefited from the effects of the war.

It was reported that in 1914 Imam Sálím b. Ráshid addressed letters to Imam Yaḥyà of Yemen and to Sa'íd Páshá, the commander of the Turkish garrisons in Yemen, seeking their aid against the Sultan of Oman and the British government, but he received no reply, and he tried again in 1916. Their reply was received in 1917 by the Imam, stating that 10,000 men would be sent by sea to Oman (207). But this promise was never carried out. In March 1918 there were three Turkish agents travelling in Oman, and a further four Turks were arrested in the same month in Muscat by Sd. Nádír b. Fayṣal.

In conclusion, it is clear that both Turkey and Germany had tried to support the Omani Imamate in its conflict with the Sultan of Oman and his alliance with Britain, but they failed to achieve their aims, because they were distant from events in Oman on the one hand, and the British closed all access to Oman on the other hand, even though some members of the Omani opposition managed to contact the Germans and Turks. Oman suffered adverse effects from the war in that there were socio-economic difficulties and civil conflict as a consequence of the blockade of trade between Omani ports and inland towns, and in addition there was an increase of prices and a dearth of hard currency. Furthermore, the spread of cholera during 1918 and 1919, in which Oman lost more than 20,000 people, may have been an indirect result of the war. In the difficult circumstances of the war Omani dhows took the opportunity to carry on trade activities between Oman and the outside world, particularly for the transport of commodities between East Africa and the Gulf in which they made great profits (208).

Endnotes

- (1) Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 12.
- (2) Falcon N.L. "From Musandam to the Iranian Makrán". G.J. vol. 141 (1975) pp. 55-8; "The Musandam Expedition 1971-72" G.J. vol.139, (1973) pp.404-49; Hudson, R.G.S. and Chatton, M. " The Musandam Limestone of Oman Arabia" Notes et Mémoires sur le Moyen-Orient, vol.7 (1959) pp.69-93; Anthony, J.D. Historical and Cultural Dictionary p.64.
- (3) Lorimer, Gazteer vol. 8 pp. 1382- 1412; Bannerman, M.G. Unity and Disunity. p.6.
- (4) Bannerman, op.cit. p. 12; Hudson, op.cit. pp. 63f; Wellsted, Travels in Arabia, vol. I pp. 138.
- (5) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 pp. 1614-17; Anthony, op.cit. pp. 15f.
- (6) Miles, Countries, pp. 422-38; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 pp. 1614-17.; al-'Awtabí, al-Ansáb.; al-Siyábí, Is'áf al-A'yán.; Kelly, Britain, pp. 1-5. ; Anthony, op.cit. pp. 119f.
- (7) Modern European scholars have made useful contributions in the field of Ibádí studies; see: Lewicki, T. Motylinski, P. Wilkinson, S.C. Schacht, and Smogrewski, Z.
- (8) For more detail about the non-Ibádí views see: al-Rází, Abú Ḥátim Aḥmad. al-Zínah; al-Ḥanafí, Abú Muḥammad. al-Firaq al-Muftariqah; Ibn Ḥazim, Abu Muḥammad. al-Faṣil; Shalabí, Aḥmad. Mawsú'at al-Ta'ríkh. vol. II & III; al-Gháribí, 'Alí. Ta'ríkh al-Firaq ; 'Abd al-Ráziq, Muḥammad b. Ismá'íl. al-Khawárij; Abú Zahrah, Muḥammad. al-Madháhib al-Islamiyyah.
- (9) al-Ṭabarí, Abú Ja'far Muḥammad. Ta'ríkh al-Rusul. vol v pp. 161-244; Bakhít, 'Abd al-Ḥamíd. 'Asr al-Khulafá'. pp. 205-51; Cf. with the note (8).
- (10) al-Bashíshí, Aḥmad. al-Firaq al-Islamiyyah; al-Ash'arí, 'Alí b. Ismá'íl. Maqálát al-Islamiyyín; al-Baghdádí, Abú Maṣṣūr 'Abd al-Qádir. al-Farq bayn al-Firaq; al-Shahrastání, Abú al-Faṭḥ. al-Milal wa al-Nihal; al-Izkawí, Sarḥán b. Sa'id. Kashf al-Ghummah; Cf with the note (8).
- (11) al-Qalhátí, Abú 'Abdalláh. al-Kashf wa al-Bayán. Fol. 84; al-Barádí, Abú al-Qásim. al-Jawáhir pp. 52f; al-Izkawí, op.cit. fol. 172; al-Shammákhí, al-Siyar. pp.20f.
- (12) al-Qalhátí, op.cit. fol. 96; al-Shammákhí, op.cit. pp.44f; al-Barádí, op.cit.p. 102; al-Na'ímí, Salím. Zuhúr al-Khawárij. pp. 32.
- (13) al-Baládhurí, Abú Aḥmad b. Yahyá. Ansáb al-Ashráf. vol. II p. 192 & pp. 194ff; al-Ṭabarí, op.cit. vol.v pp. 72-8.
- (14) al-Shahrastání, op.cit. p. 117; Ennami, Studies in Ibádism. p. 9; 'Alí b. Abí Ṭálib. Nahj al-Balághah. p. 145.
- (15) Ennami, op.cit. p. 9.
- (16) al-Baládhurí, op.cit. pp. 196-9; al-Ṭabarí, op.cit. pp. 85f, 88 & 91.
- (17) al-Baládhurí, op.cit. pp. 191f; al-Ṭabarí, op.cit. pp. 55, 57 & 63.
- (18) al-Ṭabarí, op.cit. vol. IV; Bakhít, op.cit. pp. 252-74; Khulayfát, A. Nasha't al-Ibádiyyah. p.60.
- (19) al-Qalhátí, op.cit. fol. 9; al-Shammákhí, op.cit. p. 45.
- (20) Bakhít, op.cit. pp. 274-322; al-Munqarí, Naṣr al-Dín, Waq'at Siffín.
- (21) al-Barádí, op.cit. p. 134; al-Shammákhí, op.cit. p. 45 ; al-Qalhátí, op.cit. p. 106; Khulayfát, op.cit. p. 54.
- (22) al-Barádí, op.cit. p. 167; al-Shammákhí, op.cit. p. 81; al-Darjíní, Ṭabaqát al-Ibádiyyah fol. 92.
- (23) al-Bísyawí, Abú al-Ḥusayn. "al-Ḥujjah 'Alá man Abṭal al-Sawál". vol. II p. 84.
- (24) al-Bísyawí, op.cit. p. 85; al-Ruqayshí, Miṣbáḥ al-Zalám fol. 2a; al-Mubarid, Muḥammad. al-Kamil p. 83; al-Baládhurí, op.cit. vol. iv p. 169.
- (25) al-Darjíní, op.cit. fol. 97; al-Shammákhí, op.cit. p 77; Khulayfát, op.cit. p. 72; al-Baghdádí, op.cit. p. 71; al-Jáḥiz, al-Bayan wa al-Tabyín. vol. I p. 47.
- (26) Khulayfát, op.cit. p. 70.
- (27) al-Ṭabarí, op.cit. p. 566; al-Baládhurí, op.cit. p. 103; Wett, W.M. Khárijite. p. 219.
- (28) al-Ṭabarí, op.cit. p. 563; al-Baládhurí, op.cit. pp. 116f.
- (29) al-Ṭabarí, op.cit. pp. 567f; Khulayfát, op.cit. p. 71; Ennami, op.cit. pp. 7-25; al-Ash'arí, op.cit. p. 86; al-Shahrastání, op.cit. vol. I pp. 179-86.
- (30) al-Barádí, op.cit. p. 117; al-Ṭabarí. op.cit. p. 568; Cf with note (29).
- (31) Khulayfát, op.cit. pp. 64-74.
- (32) Khulayfát, op.cit. p. 74.
- (33) There were some non-Ibádis who regarded Ibádis as extreme Khárijites and heretics, see Ennami, p xvii.
- (34) al-Ṭabarí, op.cit. p. 568; al-Ḥáarithí, Sálím b. Ḥamad. al-'Uqúd al-Fiddiyyah. p. 123.
- (35) al-Baghdádí, op.cit. pp.86f; Ennami, op.cit. p. 133.
- (36) al-Barádí, op.cit. pp. 156-67; al-Izkawí, op.cit. fol. 206; Ibn Ibád, Sírat Ibn Ibád . pp. 325-46.

- (37) al-Qalhátí, op.cit. fol. 224b; al-Shammákhí, op.cit. p. 177.
- (38) al-Darjíní op.cit. fol. 92b; Háshim, al-Ḥarakah al-Ibádiyyah, p. 65.
- (39) al-Shammákhí, op.cit. p. 87; al-Bísyawí, Mukhtaṣar al-Bísyawí, p.8; Háshim, op.cit. p. 65.
- (40) Rubinacci, R. "Ibádis." p. 303; 'Umar, F. "Malámiḥ min Ta'ríkh Ḥarakat al-Ibádiyyah". p. 172; Dixon, 'Abd al-Amír. al-Khiláfah al-Umawiyah, pp. 306f.
- (41) Khulayfát, op.cit. pp. 83f; al-Zarkalí gives the date of 'Abdalláh b. Ibád 's death (83/705), but the reference on which he depended is not known, see his vol. 6 pp. 184-6.
- (42) al-Darjíní, op.cit. fol. 109a; al-Izkawí, op.cit. fol. 838a & b.
- (43) al-Darjíní, fol.9b; Háshim, op.cit. p.78; Abú al-Faraj, al-Aghání, vol. xx p. 78.
- (44) Ennami, op.cit. pp. 612-4; Háshim, op.cit. p.93; 'Umar, Ta'ríkh al-Khalíj pp.117-22; Khulayfát, op.cit. pp. 106-9.
- (45) al-'Awtabí, al-Ansáb, fol 107; al-Izkawí, op.cit. fol 392a; al-Ruqayshí, op.cit. fol. 31b; al-Shammákhí, op.cit. pp. 83f.
- (46) For more detail about Ibádí Imamate in Yemen see al-Shammákhí, al-Siyar; al-Baládhurí, op.cit. vol ii; Abú al-Faraj, op.cit.; al-Ruqayshí, op.cit.; Ibn Khayyát, Ta'ríkh Ibn Khayyát.
- (47) For more detail about Ibádí Imamate in Algeria see: Abú Zakariyyá, al-Siyar; al-Shammákhí op.cit.; Ibn 'Adhárí, al-Bayán al-Maghrib.
- (48) al-Shammákhí, op.cit. p.91; al-Háarithí, op.cit. p. 139; Ennami, op.cit. p. 91; Cf al-Darjíní; Abú Zakariyyá op.cit.; and al-Barádí, op.cit.
- (49) al-Izkawí, Annals, p. 12; Ibn Ruzayq, History, pp.6-8; Háshim, op.cit. pp. 178f.
- (50) al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 12; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 7; Háshim, op.cit. p. 179.
- (51) Badger, History, p. xiii; Phillips, op.cit. p.10.
- (52) al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 12; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 7.
- (53) al-Ṭabarí, op.cit. vol. 7 pp. 462f; Ibn Kathír, op.cit. vol. 4 p. 343; al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 12.
- (54) al-Ruqayshí, op.cit. fol. 24b; al-Shammákhí, op.cit. pp. 113f; al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 12.
- (55) al-Ṭabarí, op.cit. vol. 7 p. 492; al-Ruqayshí, op.cit. fols. 30f; al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 12.
- (56) al-Ṭabarí, op.cit. vol. 7 p. 463; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 8; Cf. Aḥmad Amín. Zuhr al-Islám, pp. 331ff; Ibn al-Athír, al-Kámil, vol.4 p. 343; Ibn Kathír, op.cit. vol. 10 p. 57.
- (57) al-'Awtabí, op.cit. p. 267; al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 13; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 9; Háshim, op.cit. pp. 179f.
- (58) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 9; Háshim, op.cit. p. 201.
- (59) al-Bísyawí, al-Hujjah, p. 100; al-Izkawí, op.cit. p.14; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. pp. 9-11.
- (60) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 19.
- (61) al-Bísyawí, op.cit. pp. 89-115; Abú al-Mu'thir al-Aḥdáth, pp. 23-85; al-Ruqayshí, op.cit. fols. 26-8.
- (62) Abú Qaḥṭán, Sírat Ibn Qaḥṭán, p. 138; al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 20; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. pp. 20f.
- (63) Abú Qaḥṭán, op.cit. vol. 1 p. 139; al-Izkawí, op.cit. pp. 20f; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 21; Háshim, op.cit. pp. 275f.
- (64) Abú Qaḥṭán, op.cit. vol. 1 p. 139; al-'Awtabí op.cit. fol. 194b; al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 21.
- (65) al-'Awtabí, op.cit. fols 195f.; al-Izkawí, op.cit. pp. 21f; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 22.
- (66) Abú Qaḥṭán, op.cit. vol. 1 pp. 139f; al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 22; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 22.
- (67) al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 23; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 25; Háshim, op.cit. p. 284.
- (68) Abú Qaḥṭán, op.cit. vol. 1 pp. 14ff; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 25 & pp. 30f.
- (69) al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 21.
- (70) al-Izkawí, op.cit. pp. 24; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 27; Phillips, op.cit. p. 14.
- (71) al-Izkawí, op.cit. pp. 25.
- (72) al-Izkawí, op.cit. pp. 26.
- (73) al-Sálimí A.H. op.cit. vol. I p. 283.
- (74) For more detail about *al-wiláyah* and *al-bará'ah*, see Abú al-Mu'thir, al-Aḥdáth; al-Bísyawí, al-Hujjah; al-Siyar wa al-Jawábat vol.1 pp. 371-8; al-Siyábí, 'Umán, vol 3. pp. 41-6.
- (75) al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 30; Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 35; al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol.3 pp. 6-15.
- (76) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 35.
- (77) al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 31; al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol. 3 p. 59.
- (78) See al-Siyar wa al-Jawábat vol.1 pp. 396-421; al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 62-77.
- (79) al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 60-1 & pp. 78f.
- (80) al-Izkawí, op.cit. p.32; al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol.3 pp. 101ff
- (81) al-Sálimí, A. H. op.cit. vol. I p. 352; al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 99-110.
- (82) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 48.
- (83) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. pp. 48ff; al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 111-116.
- (84) al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 126-7.

- (85) al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 117-121.
- (86) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 40 note 1.
- (87) al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 32; al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 114f.
- (88) al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 34.
- (89) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. p. 50.
- (90) al-Izkawí, op.cit. p. 34; al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol. 3 pp. 126f.
- (91) Ibn Ruzayq, op.cit. pp. 41ff; al-Siyábí, op.cit. vol.3 pp. 150-187.
- (92) For further information about the Ya'áribah Dynasty see Ibn Ruzayq op.cit.; al-Izkawí op.cit.; al-Sálimí, Tuhfat; al-Sayyár, Dawlat al-Ya'áribah; Bathunst, R.D. The Ya'arubi Dynasty of Oman.
- (93) For further information about the Al Bú Sa'id family see Ibn Ruzayq op.cit.; al-Sálimí, Tuhfat
- (94) Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders. p. 107.
- (95) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 469f.
- (96) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 470.
- (97) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 474.
- (98) (Records of Oman (R.OI)) p.90; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 470; Landen, Oman since 1856. p. 274.
- (99) Sc. 40,000 Maria Theresa Dollars. The erroneous description of thus originally Austrian coin as "French" is still used in Arabia.
- (100) (R.OI) p. 91.
- (101) Sd. Thuwayní had the assistance of four advisors: Sd. Sayf b. Sulaymán, Sd. Ḥamad b. Aḥmad b. Imam Said, Sd. Ya'rub b. Qaḥṭán and Sd. 'Ali b. Šálih. See (R.OI) p. 222.
- (102) This term was sometimes used for Maria Theresa Dollars.
- (103) (R.OI) p. 82 and p. 122.
- (104) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 471.
- (105) Landen, op.cit. p. 279.
- (106) Phillips, Oman: a History. p. 136.
- (107) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 472.
- (108) (R.O.I) p. 216.
- (109) (R.O.I) p. 218; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 472; Landen, op.cit. p. 281.
- (110) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 231; Aitchison, op.cit. vol. xi pp. 304-7.
- (111) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 231f; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 473.
- (112) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 232.
- (113) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 232; Landen, op.cit. p. 282.
- (114) Landen, op.cit. p. 282.
- (115) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 232.
- (116) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 233f.
- (117) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 233.
- (118) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 233.
- (119) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 474; Landen, op.cit. pp. 284f.
- (120) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 476.
- (121) Landen, op.cit. p. 286.
- (122) Landen, op.cit. p. 287; Phillips, op.cit. p. 139.
- (123) (R.OI) p. 231 and p. 235; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 478.
- (124) Landen, op.cit. p. 201.
- (125) (R.OI) p. 232; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 478f.
- (126) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 236.
- (127) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 237f; (R.OI) p. 232; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 479.
- (128) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 238f; Landen, op.cit. pp. 290f.
- (129) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 245f; Landen, op.cit. p. 292.
- (130) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 246 ; Landen, op.cit. p. 293; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 482.
- (131) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 247f ; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 784; Kelly, Britain, p. 665.
- (132) Landen, op.cit. p. 294.
- (133) Landen, op.cit. p. 295.
- (134) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 259; Kelly, Britain, p. 689.
- (135) Kelly, Britain, pp. 687f.
- (136) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 265-7.
- (137) Landen, op.cit. p. 307.
- (138) Kelly, Britain, p. 688.
- (139) Landen, op.cit. p. 304 cited from a letter of 'Abdalláh b. Fayṣal to 'Azzán enclosure in Disbrowe to Gunne 20 August 1869 no. 465 Muscat; Kelly, Britain, p. 688.
- (140) Landen, op.cit. p. 308.

- (141) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 257.; Landen, op.cit. p. 299.
- (142) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 277; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 486; Kelly, Britain, p. 706.
- (143) Lorimer states that the tribe of Sayf b. Sulaymán was al-Riyámí while al-Sálimí states it was al-Bú Sa'ídí
- (144) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 281; (R.OI) p. 473.
- (145) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 260 ; (R.OI) p. 232; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 487.
- (146) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 280f ; (R.OI) p. 473 ; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 487.
- (147) ARAMCO. Umán, p. 55.
- (148) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 491f. Cf. al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. ii pp. 276-9.
- (149) Landen, op.cit. p. 320.
- (150) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 281.
- (151) See the terms of agreement in (R.OI) p. 473 Précis of Muscat affairs 1869-72.
- (152) (R.OI) p. 475; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 492.
- (153) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 281f; Kelly Britain, p. 781 states that the person who killed Sh. al-Khalífí was Rajab al-Baluchí, the Commandant of Fort Mirání.
- (154) (R.OI) p. 475 Telegraph from Major Way to Colonel Pelly on 19th Feb., 1871.
- (155) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 281; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 492.
- (156) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 288; (R.OII) p. 58; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 494.
- (157) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 288f; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 494 & p. 496.
- (158) (R.OII) p. 43-6; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 493f.
- (159) Aitchison, op.cit. vol. XI pp. 308f; Kelly, Britain, pp. 633f.
- (160) (R.OII) p. 60.
- (161) (R.OII) p 86; Landen, op.cit. p. 333.
- (162) See the terms of the agreement in (R.OII) p. 61.
- (163) See Sd. 'Abd al-'Azíz's conditions in (R.OII) pp. 78f.
- (164) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 291; (R.OII) pp. 117-20; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 497.
- (165) (R.OII) p. 103 & pp. 121-3; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 502f; Kelly, Britain, p. 781.
- (166) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 502f; Landen, op.cit. pp. 333f.
- (167) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 518.
- (168) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 313.
- (169) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 294; (R.OII) pp. 117-20; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 497.
- (170) (R.O.II) p. 215; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 527.
- (171) ((R.O.II) pp. 228-31;(Ad. R. 1890-91) p. 18; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 528-31.
- (172) (Adm.R.1894-95) pp.15-18 ; al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 295.
- (173) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 296; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 536.
- (174) Landen, op.cit. p. 365.
- (175) Aitchison, op.cit. vol. XI pp.310-17; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 533.
- (176) Aitchison, op.cit. vol. XI pp.317; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 535; Busch, Britain pp. 18-20.
- (177) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 558-91; Landen, op.cit. p. 382.
- (178) al-Mughírí, Juhaynat al-Akhabár. p. 377 ; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 536f.
- (179) (Adm. R.1894-95) p. 15; al-Mughírí, op.cit. p.377; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 536; Bannerman, op.cit. p.40; Kelly Tribes, Politics. p. 117; Phillips, op.cit. pp. 149f.
- (180) (Adm. R.1894-95) p. 17; (R.OII) p. 665; al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 295.
- (181) (Adm.R. 1894-95) p. 17; (R.OII) pp. 665; al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 295; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 539; Kelly Tribes, Politics. p. 117.
- (182) (Adm.R.1894-95) p. 18; (R.OII) p. 665; (I.O.) R/15/6/37; (I.O) R/15/3/XXVIII/2; Bannerman, op.cit. p. 47; Phillips, op.cit. p. 151.
- (183) (R.OII) p. 669 ; (I.O.) R/15/6/37. The tribes which supported Sd. Fayṣal in the 1895 rebellion were: Janabah, B. Bú 'Alí, B. Ḥasan, B. Hináh, al-Hishm, B. Rásib, B. 'Umar B. Riyám, B. 'Umayr and Ḥajriyyín.
- (184) Landen, op.cit. p. 378; al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 296 & pp. 299-310; Phillips, op.cit. p. 151; Calvin, Oman. p. 59; Kelly Tribes, Politics. pp. 117f.
- (185) Landen , op.cit. p. 156.
- (186) Here one could mention for example; 'Abd al-'Azíz b. Muḥammad b. Sa'íd al-Ruwáḥí, Sh. Hilál b. 'Amir b. Sulṭán al-Ḥáarithí who was ex-minister of Sd. Ḥamad b. Thuwaynín , ruler of Zanzibar.
- (187) Lorimer, op.cit. vol I pp. 548ff and pp. 562-70; Busch, Britain, pp. 154-86; Peterson, Oman p. 47.
- (188) (Adm. R.1900-1) p. 16; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 563.
- (189) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 560.
- (190) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II pp. 299-309; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I pp. 544f.

- (191) (Adm. R.1906-7) p. 58; al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 314; al-Sálimí, M.A. Nahdat, pp. 208f.
- (192) (Adm R.1906-7) p. 59.
- (193) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 313.
- (194) al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. vol. II p. 295 & p. 313; al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 200; al-Sálimí, M. Díwán; Lorimer, op.cit. vol.I p.586f ; Knox laments Sd. Fayṣal in his report by saying that "he could never, at least so far as the writer could observe, find it in his heart to punish anybody.. And moreover "the tribes of Oman had never any justification for their rebellious attitude towards a ruler who never troubled them with taxation nor oppressed them in any way." This, however, contradicts what we have mentioned above about Sd. Fayṣal. One reason for this is that Knox perhaps lacked any knowledge of how the people had felt at that time, or he might have thought that Sd. Fayṣal's actions were justified and that was his divine right as a ruler to impose them. See (Ad. R.1913) p. 103.
- (195) Gooch, G.A. and Temperley, H. British Documents vol. II p. 89; Qásim, J.Z. "Barítányá" p. 88; Qal'ají, op.cit. p. 472; al-Huṣrú, S. al-Bilád al-'Arabiyyah. p. 205.
- (196) al-'Ábíd, F.S. Siyásat Barítányá. vol. II pp. 213-18.
- (197) Qásim, J.Z. "Barítányá" p. 88; Busch, Britain, pp. 353-57; al-'Abíd, F.S. op.cit. pp. 188-94.
- (198) Bell, G. The rebellion. p. 22; (Adm. R.1915) p. 42.
- (199) (I.O.) L/P&S/10/2182; ARAMCO, op.cit. p. 92; Qásim, "al-Mu'aththirát" p. 137; Wahbah, H. Jazírat al-'Arab. pp. 433f.
- (200) Jád, Muḥammad. Siyásat Barítányá. pp. 325-45.
- (201) Qásim, al-Khalíj al-'Arabí 1914-45. Chapter III ; Qásim, "al-Mu'aththirát" pp. 198f.
- (202) (R.OIII) p. 81; (I.O.) R/15/3/45 letter from Bann to Knox no.31, 25th Jan,1915; Phillips, op.cit. p. 161.
- (203) al-Mughírí, op.cit. p. 475. The same opinion was expressed by the Sultan of Lahj, see Jád, op.cit. p. 339.
- (204) al-Mughírí, op.cit. pp. 388f.
- (205) Busch, Britain. Appendices: A, B and D. The report's figures on Muscat are given in \$M.T. which \$ 11.11 = £ 1.
- (206) See the reports in (R.OIII) pp. 79ff.
- (207) (Adm. R.1918) p. 47.
- (208) (I.O.) Muscat Financial Affairs file 1914: no.1,173; Landen, op.cit. p. 400.

CHAPTER 11

THE EARLY LIFE OF IMAM SÁLIM

This chapter deals with the events of Imam Sálim's life and the Imamate revival.

1) Events of his Life

In this section we depend on unwritten material and personal interviews with the sons of Imam Sálim and some of the '*ulamá*', in addition to Nahḍat al- A'yán by Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Sálimí.

Information about the Imam Sálim's life and his family before his election as an Imam is relatively scanty. What is known, is that he came from a family consisting of four boys and one girl, and he was born sometime in 1301/1883-4 in the village of Mashá'iq which is attached to al-Suwayq (1).

His full lineage was Sálim b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán b. 'Ámir b. 'Abdalláh b. Mas'úd b. Sálim b. Muḥammad b. Sa'íd b. Sálim b. Mas'úd b. 'Azzán b. Mas'úd b. Imam 'Azzán b. Tamím al-Kharúṣí (2). According to Sh. Khalfán b. 'Uthmán al-Kharúṣí, however, the name 'Abdalláh should not appear as part of the Imam's pedigree (3) and this is also supported by Sh. Sa'íd b. Ḥamad b. Khamís al-Kharúṣí, the Shaykh of the village of Mashá'iq (4) who was interviewed by the present writer on Thursday 31st December, 1992. There is no evidence to support this claim, however, and we tend to believe that the name 'Abdalláh does form part of the Imam's pedigree because this is stated by his brother Muḥammad b. Ráshid (5) and the Imam's son.

As far as the ancestors of the Imam Sálim, enumerated above, are concerned, we know little of them other than their names, apart from Imam 'Azzán b. Tamím al-Kharúṣí, who was the last Imam of the second Ibáḍí Imamate.

The Imam's tribe (B. Kharúṣ) is one of the most famous tribes in Oman. It descends from Kharúṣ b. Shárí b. Yaḥmud b. 'Abdalláh, and is of Azdí, Yamaní, and Qaḥṭaní origin. It is of a Gháfirí political orientation and belongs to the Ibáḍí sect. It has provided many Imams and famous '*ulamá*' from medieval times to the present (6). It was

described by Major Chauncy, the PAM (Sept. 1949-Oct. 1958), as "a peaceful and comparatively civilized tribe in the centre of Oman" (7).

Imam Sálím had three brothers and one sister: Náşir, Muḥammad, ‘Āmir and Miyá. All of them died after him, while his father, Ráshid, died a few years before his election as Imam in 1331/1913. His mother was Salímah bint Ráshid b. Muḥammad al-Kharúşí, and she died in the 1920s.

Imam Sálím was married to three wives. His first wife, Zayánah, was the daughter of Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálimí. She died in c.1336/1916. She left him two boys: Sh. Yaḥyà (b.1331/1913) and Sh. ‘Abdalláh (b.1336/1916). Then he married ‘Azzah bint Náşir b. Muḥammad al-Ma‘waliyyah. She gave him a boy, Ya‘qúb. His third and last wife was Rayá bint Muḥammad b. Yaḥyà b. Khalfán al-Kharúşí. Thus, when the Imam died, he left three sons, Yaḥyà, ‘Abdalláh and Ya‘qúb. Two of them (Yaḥyà and ‘Abdalláh) are still living and the present writer was able to interview them.

We do not have enough information about how Imam Sálím spent his early life. What is certain, however, is that his early life was not different from that of his contemporaries in his village. When he reached school age he learned the basis of reading and writing at the hands of the village teachers, including his father who was probably a teacher himself (8). When he was in his teens, his father sent him together with his brother Náşir to a school in al-‘Awábí town, which has a high concentration of his tribe. No information has survived concerning how many years he spent in al-‘Awábí, nor the names of his teachers. But he later moved with his brother to continue his studies in Rustáq (9) where he studied under Sh. Ráshid b. Sayf b. Sa‘íd al-Lamkí (1262/1845-1333/1914) (10) who was one of the most famous teachers in Rustáq at that time.

He left Rustáq for al-Sharqiyyah in c.1319/1901 when he was eighteen years old, to complete his studies with Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálimí who himself had studied with Sh. Ráshid at Rustáq in the 1880s. Muḥammad al-Sálimí, however, sheds some doubt on this and argues that Imam Sálím may have moved to al-Sharqiyyah when he was in his early teens, though it was not customary at that time to send children to distant lands, unless there was some indication that they would be able to look after themselves (11). When Imam Sálím and his brother Náşir reached al-Qábil, an important town in al-

Sharqiyyah, and the headquarters of the Ḥirth tribe, they met the blind Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Sálimí, who sat himself between them, and gently pulled their ears and said to his audience " one of these boys will become an ‘*álim* and the other will occupy a notable position"(12) .

Imam Sálim stayed in al-Qábil for more than twelve years until his election as Imam. He spent all this time studying under Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Sálimí and others, and he visited his parents only during the Summer. He refused to take any job or post, even though his tribe wanted him to become a teacher in Nakhal or al-‘Awábí. He preferred to stay with Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Sálimí, who later gave him his daughter in marriage.

On occasional visits to his village, Imam Sálim used to meet the ‘*ulamá*’ and notables, using these opportunities to increase his knowledge and exchange views with them. This should not be taken as meaning that he was the head of his clan, nor *tamímah* of the B. Kharúṣ. There is no indication of his being famous, or having any desire to occupy a senior position before his election. He was clearly an ordinary man who wanted only to study and increase his knowledge. Major Chauncy, the PAM, claimed in 1951 that "Imam Sálim's son Yaḥyà is a *tamímah* of B. Kharúṣ" (13). This unsubstantiated claim has led some writers to state that Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Sálimí was strongly supported by his son-in-law Sh. Sálim b. Ráshid al-Kharúṣí, who was according to them the *tamímah* of B. Kharúṣ (14). However, Imam Sálim was not a leader in any sense and he never claimed the leadership of his folk. Even when he was elected, not a single person from the B. Kharúṣ attended the occasion. He even said to the ‘*ulamá*’, when chosen as Imam, "I did not come here to be elected, but to elect whomever you want to elect" (15).

Imam Sálim was of a medium height, of thin build, fair skinned and with thick eyebrows. He always had a smile on his face and spent most of his time either studying or praying in a group (*Jamá‘ah*). Sh. Sa‘íd b. Ḥamad al-Ḥáarithí said that his father (Ḥamad) went into the Mosque one day and found Imam Sálim crying, and asked his uncle Sh. ‘Isà b. Ṣálih al-Ḥáarithí (who was sitting in the Mosque at the time) why Sálim b. Ráshid was crying. Sh. ‘Isà replied that he had missed the *Jamá‘ah* praying (16). In another story, the man responsible for al-Qábil Mosque was quoted as having said, "I have never been into the Mosque without seeing Imam Sálim in the niche (*miḥráb*)." (17)

Imam Sálím was pious and free from worldly ambitions. He was eloquent, knowledgeable, expert in the *Sharí'ah*, determined and he had no detractors. According to one story he was walking one day near the fort of Nazwà (the old traditional capital of the Ibád) and he heard some soldiers singing and dancing. He shouted at them: behave yourselves in this place!. When the soldiers heard his commanding voice they became full of fear and became quiet (18). Another story told about the Imam was that he saw Sh. Sulţán b. Manşúr al-Ghufaylí, the *tamímah* of the Āl Wahíbah tribe, walking one day with his *izár* touching the ground between his feet, and Imam Sálím shouted at him: pull up your *izár*. Sh. Sulţán pulled up his *izár* without saying a word (19).

It appears from a number of sources (20) that Imam Sálím was financially in strained circumstances and depended entirely on his family during his studies in al-'Awábí and Rustáq. He used to receive a bursary from the school funds generated from *zakát*, *hibát* and *awqáf* during his stay in al-Qábil. These sums, however, were not sufficient to keep him and the Shaykhs and '*ulamá*' used to compete to give him a helping hand by providing him with food. He often refused to accept these gifts, pretending that he had enough food to last him for some time. To overcome this obstacle people used to send to find out whether he really had food or not, and send him ready cooked meals instead of uncooked food. When the Imam discovered this he deceived his well-wishers by boiling water and pretending that he was cooking something for himself (21). In fact Imam Sálím depended on dates and water only as food, and sometimes he even went without food at all for several days, and spent many days fasting (22).

In general, Imam Sálím had attractive personal qualities and in many instances he showed fairness and scrupulosity in dealing with others. He was known for these characteristics among all Omani people, and he had many *karámát* which were believed by all the '*ulamá*'. Addressing his companions, Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ĥumayd al-Sálimí described Imam Sálím b. Ráshid as follows "I do not worry about you becoming ignorant when you have among you 'Āmir b. Khamís, and I do not worry that you should grow weak when you have among you Sálím b. Ráshid" (23).

Imam Sálím died at the age of 37, having spent seven years of his life as Imam. He was elected Imam at thirty and was the first Imam of the Ibádí Imamate in the 20th

century. He was murdered by an individual with an obscure grudge in 1338/1920 in the village of al-Khaḍrā' in al-Sharqiyyah Province and buried there. Many poets composed elegies on him (24).

2) The Imamate Revival: the Eighth Imamate in the 20th Century

By the turn of the 20th century, the pace of events in Oman increased. The British government started to put pressure on Sd. Fayṣal b. Turkí, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman (1888-1913), to honour the agreements he had signed, especially those concerned with the slave trade and arms traffic. In return he was promised financial assistance to help him with his acute financial and debt difficulties. He agreed to the British demands and, as will be seen, this was reflected in the economic, social, and political life of the country. This was met with opposition from the Omani people, and Sd. Fayṣal was accused of abandoning Islamic traditions and falling a prey to foreign demands. This was exacerbated when he imposed heavy taxes on the inhabitants of Muscat and increased the custom duties on goods from the interior to the ports on the coast. More importantly, the Omani tribes looked upon the imposition of customs duties as impious, since it lacked the Prophet's sanction and upon slavery as a lawful buttress of their social and economic system. They objected to any control of the arms traffic and to the treaties with infidel powers which prevented the Government from interfering with the sale of tobacco and alcohol. They were anti-European and especially anti-British, since the British were most hostile to slave-traders and gun-runners; and also because the Hindu traders who were settled in their ports, to the great scandal of the faithful, were under British protection (25). G. Bell, commentating on the Imamate revival, points out that :

" to these foreign influences, to the reliance of the Sultans of Muscat on foreign naval and military power, and to their enforced submission to foreign requirements in the matter of the traffic in slaves and in arms, the modern unrest is due. The late Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal ibn Turki, saw in the suppression of the arms trade by the British government a distinct advantage to himself, since his rebellious subjects became unable to furnish themselves with weapons to use against him; but before his death the discontent which it had caused among the tribes had come to a head" (26).

Of all these problems, the slave trade and arms traffic were the most important factors in the Imamate revival. These two factors will be discussed in the light of four documents which represent correspondence between the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, the

British government and the Omani leaders. From these documents the direct and immediate causes of the Imamate revival can be discerned.

The first document is a letter from Sh. 'Isà to Sd. Fayṣal, dated October, 1900 in which he complains that the Christians are letting free the slaves of the Muslims and that the owners of the slaves are complaining to him about this matter. Sh. 'Isà reminds Sd. Fayṣal that he has written to him more than once but he has not received satisfactory replies from him. In the end, he demands that Sd. Fayṣal put an end to this practice, or else he will not be responsible for the actions of the slaves' owners against him and the British (27).

It appears that the Sultan did not respond to Sh. 'Isà's demand and left the problem as it was. Sh. 'Isà continued in vain to demand action in this matter, despite noticeable improvements in the relationship between Sh. 'Isà and Sd. Fayṣal after 1906.

The second and third documents are two letters from Sd. Fayṣal to the British political authorities. The first is addressed to Sir Percy Cox, the PRG, dated 2nd Sha'bán 1331/7th July 1913 and requesting military assistance to put down the revolt against the Imamate. He goes on to remind the PRG that the reasons behind the revolt are well known to the British government (28). The second letter is addressed to Major S.G. Knox, the PAM dated 27th Sha'bán, 1331/1st August, 1913 and it is set out more clearly than the first letter. The contents of this letter are as follows :

"After compliments,-- Today my son Ḥamad and Wálí Mozaffar [Muḍaffar] arrived and with them some of the Shaikhs of the B. Jábir returning from the Wádí Jayla [Jaylah] (30) and, as for the Shaikhs, your honour has seen them and has realized that there is no reliance to be placed on them; and likewise your honour is aware that my son Nádír is besieged in the fort of Samá'il with a few members of my family and of my dependents and that they are all in great danger from the rebels; and then, if Samá'il and Bidbid fall- for this calamity is considered likely to happen- there remains no protection for the trade of your subjects, any more, Maskat [Muscat] and Matrah will be in danger and never at rest; and all this sedition, as is plain from the notice which you have seen purporting to be from the pretended Imam, Sálím bin Ráshid al-Kharúfí, is owing to the establishment of the warehouse and to the rules which we have made on the advice of the glorious Imperial Government. Now interested persons have falsely represented this arrangement as a device on the part of you and me to forbid to the tribes of Oman modern weapons and ammunition, so that we may press upon them, seeking to reduce them to slavery. Now, in these circumstances, I hope from my old and sincere friends, the British Government, help in this time of need and I ask from you the despatch of troops, according as the glorious Government shall see fit for raising the siege of the fort of Samá'il or its recapture, should necessity call for it, so that the rising may be quelled and peace be restored to my port and my country and to my merchants and yours from the machinations of interested persons and the troubling of the ignorant; and I shall keep the purport of this letter fully secret, until a reply reached [reaches] me from the glorious British government. Usual ending" (29).

Both letters implicitly show that the questions which aroused the Omani tribes and led to the revival of the Imamate were the result of British influence in Oman.

The fourth document is a petition by the Omanis presented by Sh. 'Isà and Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ráshid al-Háshimí, the Imam's Qáđí, to the PAM, who proposed to mediate between the Imam and the Sultan. Their representations were made in al-Síḅ on 4th Dhú al-Qi'dah, 1333/15th September, 1915 (31).

The document identifies fourteen demands which they made of the Sultan; if he agreed to them they would acquiesce in his rule over Muscat and Báṭinah Province according to *Sharí'ah* law. Imam Sálím confirmed these demands to the PAM in a letter dated 8th Dhú al-Qi'dah, 1333/ 19th September 1915 (32). As can be seen from the letters of Sd. Fayṣal quoted above, he clearly sought the revival of the Imamate.

Two factors in particular can be seen as having been instrumental in the revival of the Imamate. The first of these was connected with the progressive abolition of the slave trade by the British government from the end of the first decade of the 19th century, and in this connection they had signed the following treaties with the rulers of Oman (33):

(a) the treaty of 1822; (b) the treaty of commerce, dated the 17th of December, 1839; (c) additional articles inserted into the treaty of commerce (1839), dated 1843; (d) the agreement of 1845 dated the 2nd of October 1845; (e) the treaty of 1873 dated the 1st of July 1873.

In fact these agreements were not carried out in their entirety in Oman until the last two decades of the 19th century, and as a result Britain introduced measures for the searching ships, especially the Omani ones. The Omanis, however, evaded confrontation with the British by flying French flags on the their ships, whether supported by the Sultan or not.

However, although the British had achieved some success in stopping the slave trade during the last decade of the 19th century and the following one, the inland trade had remained largely unaffected. The Sultan had refused British demands to shut down the house of the slave brokers and to issue a decree to this effect. This came in a letter to the PAM, dated 27th Rabí' II, 1308/12th December, 1890 (34). He explained this by saying that such an act would annoy the Omanis and give rise to conflict and trouble

which no one would welcome. This indicates that the Sultan was in close touch with the feelings of the Omani people and their sensitivities.

Nevertheless, although the slave trade during this period was on a small scale, the British demanded that the Sultan free all the slaves, including those classified by Lorimer as domestic slaves (35). The British started to interest themselves in individual cases of persons alleged to be slaves, demanding their manumission. In some cases they required slave owners to write undertakings not to oppress their slaves, and they threatened to free them if this was ignored (36). The following table shows that the total number of slaves handed over to the British Agency in Muscat was 1209, most of whom were freed between 1890-1919 (37):

Years	No. of Slaves	Years	No. of Slaves	Years	No. of Slaves
1890 -1891	32	1900-1901	53	1910	49
1891-1892	71	1901- 1902	54	1911	43
1892-1893	64	1902- 1903	60	1912	46
1893-1894	25	1903- 1904	88	1913	43
1894-1895	50	1904- 1905	105	1914	36
1895-1896	30	1905	93	1915	24
1896-1897	74	1906	46	1916	21
1897-1898	43	1907	43	1917	42
1898-1899	105	1908	44	1918	16
1899-1900	43	1909	34	1919	22

A detailed discussion of the slave trade as an international problem is beyond the scope of this study, but it should be pointed out that the humanitarian considerations which in the first place induced the British government to prohibit the slave trade, later were transformed into a means of acquiring political influence in various parts of the world.

It is in any case not out of place to note that the system of slavery as practiced in Oman at the end of the 19th century was not in general oppressive, as is evidenced by a number of European observers (38). Moreover, as at earlier periods of Islamic history, slaves were able to rise to the highest political position, as for example Sulaymán b.

Suwaylim b. Sálimín who was Wazír to Sd. Fayşal, and whose father and sons were Wális (39).

A second factor in the Imamate revival was the establishment of the warehouse in Muscat in 1912. During the last decade of the 19th century and the first twelve years of the present century, the arms trade in the Gulf had greatly increased, with Muscat as the main centre for the trade. Britain had made extensive efforts to stop the trade in the Gulf, for fear that arms might reach the western borders of India, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. The sources of these arms were Belgium, Germany, France and Britain, whose arms sales in the Gulf increased after the decision at the Brussels conference to stop arms sale in Africa in 1890. To reduce further increases in arms trade in the Gulf, Britain concluded an agreement with the Shaykh of Bahrain in 1898, of Kuwait in 1900, and the Shaykhs of the Omani Coast in 1902. She failed, however, to persuade Sd. Fayşal to sign these agreements, but he did issue a decree in 1898, preventing Omani ships from exporting arms to India and Persia (40). He also agreed to a British demand to inspect these ships and to return any ships breaking this regulation back to Muscat (41).

Consequently, the legalization of the arms trade made Oman the main source and the largest exporter of arms to other countries in Asia and Africa by both sea and land. This gave the Omanis sufficient profits to offset their losses from the abolition of the slave trade. With the growth of trade in Muscat, a conference was held in Brussels to discuss the increase of arms sales in the city between 1908 and 1909 (42), but the conference failed to reach a decision because of France objections (43), and the failure of Britain to persuade France to stop arms exports to Muscat. The British then decided to use force to stop the trade by blockading the Gulf ports during the years between 1910 and 1912. This move proved to be successful, but after incurring heavy expenses (44).

As a next step, Britain tried to persuade Sd. Fayşal to sign an agreement to control this trade in arms. During the winter of 1911/1912 negotiations continued between Major Knox, the PRG, and the Sultan of Oman. The result of these negotiations was the establishment of a warehouse in Muscat where all imported arms and those in circulation internally were to be stored, starting from 1st September 1912. It was agreed also that the Sultan would be compensated for any losses that might arise as a result of

this measure (45). They also agreed on practical arrangements for how the arms were to enter and leave the warehouse. Each piece of equipment entering or leaving the warehouse was to bear the warehouse mark and a serial number. The reason for the arms regulation, according to Sd. Fayṣal's notification was that:

" large quantities of arms and ammunition are at present stored without proper control in private buildings, distributed in this our town of Maskat [Muscat], and thus exposed to the risk of attack, robbery, or fire, we impressed by the serious menace to the safety of our capital arising therefrom, have resolved to remedy this state of affairs in accordance with the needs of the times and the requirement of our municipal administration, by the construction and the establishment of a special customs house, magazine, or arms warehouse for the storage of arms and ammunition under safe precautions" (46).

From the foregoing it is clear that the Sultan faced serious difficulties totally unrelated to his internal domestic policies, but the Sultan's politics in relation to trade were very much influenced by what took place internationally (47). Being unaware of these forces, the tribesmen were dissatisfied with the way in which the Sultan dealt with the arms issue, especially since France at that time encouraged both the slave trade and the arms trade. As a result, the Omani merchants and others, including the French, strongly opposed the new measures, and protested to the Sultan about them. The reaction of the tribes was angry, and they wrote to the Sultan threatening to launch an attack on the capital. They feared that the new measures would prevent modern arms from reaching them in the hinterland. These fears were justified, in that some of the tribes (contrary to what some authorities assert) were poorly armed.

Landen, for example, says that the tribes had been acquiring stocks of new serviceable rifles and ammunition for some 20 years which implies that these tribes were heavily armed (48). This statement represents a considerable overestimate, because not all the Omanis had modern arms, and they were defeated in their first battle with the Sultan and British troops in 1915, despite the fact that the Imamate troops were estimated at about 3000 men (49). This victory was recorded by the British in the military museum at *Bayt al-Falaj* (the place where the battle took place) in a picture in which the Sultan and British troops were shown holding guns and the Imamate troops holding swords and spears.

Two conclusions are clear: the first is that the restriction on arms trade was seen by the tribes as a means of denying them access to modern weapons, and secondly the openness of the Sultan to foreign influence was seen by the tribes as meaning that he was totally under the control of foreign powers, to the neglect of Islamic traditions. The absence of positive influence by the tribes on the Sultan led to irreconcilable differences in opinions between them and a lack of understanding of his policies (50).

Other, economic, factors which led to the Imamate revival were: (a) the increase of import duty from the interior to the coast from 5% to 20%, imposed on the tribes which took part in the rebellion of the 1895; and (b) the imposition of a monthly tax of 20 *Bayzah* (Omani currency) (51) on every household in Muscat to provide medical services for the people (52).

The political factors include: (a) the conclusion of treaties with Britain which increased foreign influence in Oman's affairs and which led to a deterioration in the relationship between the tribes and the Sultan; (b) the failure of the Sultan to encourage reconciliation between the tribes, especially during the three years which preceded the rise of the Imamate. Warfare broke out between the tribes, and between them and the Sultan.

In Bāṭinah Province, in 1910, warfare broke out in Ṣuḥár against the Wálí, Sálím b. Sulaymán b. Suwaylim (d. 5th June, 1911) as a result of heavy taxes and the Wálí's ill-treatment to the inhabitants (53). This revolt was serious and the Sultan had to move by himself to put it down. Afterwards he pacified those who had suffered losses by paying financial compensation to the local notables for distribution to those concerned (54). In the following years, the conflict between the tribe of Ḥawásinah and the B. Khálid in al-Khábúrah was renewed, and left 200 dead. The Sultan sent his leader Sd. Badr b. Sayf b. Sulaymán al-Bú Sa'ídí to make peace between the belligerents, but one year later (1912) the Ḥawásinah attacked the B. 'Umar with heavy losses on both sides. In al-Sharqiyyah, the B. Bú Ḥasan attacked Ṣúr in 1911. The Sultan sent his son Sd. Nádír to Ṣúr, who imposed a fine of \$MT. 2, 000 on the attackers to compensate the inhabitants for their losses (55). In Ja'lán, traditional hostilities between B. Bú 'Alí and the B. Bú Ḥasan erupted (56). In March, 1912 Sd. Sa'íd b. Ibráhím, the ruler of Rustáq was killed by his cousins, Sd. Ibráhím b. Fayṣal b. Ḥumúd and Muḥammad b. Fayṣal

b.Ḥumúd who were killed immediately afterwards. This incident led to clashes between the supporters of the ruler's family and its opponents, until Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím (12 years old at that time), the brother of the former ruler, succeeded in controlling Rustáq with the help of the B. Gháfir.

The Administration Report of 1912 points out that there were rumours that the interior tribes intended to attack Muscat because of the arms traffic regulation by Sd. Fayṣal. The report went on to say that the Sultan had received a number of threatening letters from the heads of the tribes, especially from Sh. 'Isà. These rumours, however, proved to be false (57).

Religious factors came into play with the Sultan's submission to foreign influence and the neglect of Islamic doctrine in allowing the import of alcohol and tobacco into the country, and the Sultan's inability to adopt the *Sharí'ah* as the main source of jurisprudence. A second religious factor was the influence of Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálimí who won the support of the '*ulamá*' and religious leaders for his call for the Imamate revival. Sh. al-Sálimí had many followers and students who were very keen to emulate his life and teachings (58).

The objectives of the Imamate were a return to the *Sharí'ah*, reserve in dealing with foreigners and the provision of justice for Muslims, which was a goal pursued by the Ibádí '*ulamá*' since the establishment of their first Imamate in A.H 132.

The essential elements in the re-establishment of the Imamate were: (a) the continuous and relentless efforts of Sh. al-Sálimí; (b) the support which Sh. al-Sálimí received from the Gháfirí faction and later from Hináwí faction; (c) the loyalty of the '*ulamá*' to their beliefs and their desire to see them implemented; and (d) the weakness of the Sultan's influence in the interior region.

Sh. al-Sálimí (1283/1865-1332/1914) was born in al-Ḥawqayn village, a part of Rustáq domain, and he lost his sight when he was 12 years old. He was educated in Rustáq, and then he moved to al-Qábil in al-Sharqiyyah in 1308/1890 (59), where he studied under Sh. Ṣálih b. 'Alí al-Ḥáarithí (d. 1898). Sh. al-Sálimí became famous and attracted many students to his school from various regions in Oman. His countrywide

reputation and his zeal for Ibádí doctrine made him an outspoken critic and a natural leader in arousing the Omani tribesmen against foreign encroachments.

Sh. al-Sálimí observed that the affairs of Oman were deteriorating with internecine fighting between the tribes, and the Sultan was unable to do anything to stop it, owing to foreign influence, and lack of support on the part of the tribesmen. To combat this state of affairs, Sh. al-Sálimí concentrated on unifying Oman under an Imam, who would return to the basis of Islam.

In 1323/1905 Sh. al-Sálimí met Sd. Fayşal and they discussed Oman's affairs. He demanded that the Sultan should unite Oman under his (the Sultan's) control and should rule it according to Islamic law. The Sultan rejected Sh. al-Sálimí's conditions, suspecting his intentions, and believing that if he conceded his demands, his supporters would nominate his uncle Sd. 'Abd al-'Azíz (d. 1907) as Imam, as they had before with Sd. Sálim b. Thuwayní in 1868. In the following years, after his return from Ḥajj in the company of the Sultan's wife (60), Sh. al-Sálimí repeated his demands to the Sultan, who promised to send his answer with the Wáíl, Sulaymán b. Suwaylim, when he went to al-Qábil, by the end of the year 1324/1906, to see Sh. 'Isà. The Sultan requested Sh. al-Sálimí to act as tutor to his son Sd. Taymúr and to establish a school in Muscat, but he refused the Sultan's offer (61). Sd. Taymúr was of a serious character and strongly inclined towards religious study, and in this he was encouraged by Sh. 'Isà b. Şáliḥ and his brother Sh. 'Alí b. Şáliḥ who influenced Sd. Fayşal in this matter. However, certain persons close to the Sultan persuaded him to give up his plan for the religious education of his son (62).

One Arab writer maintains that the main point of contention between Sd. Fayşal and Sh. al-Sálimí was that Sd. Fayşal claimed to be both Sultan and Imam (63), and this view is supported by the statement of American political Agent in 1912 that Sd. Fayşal had in fact taken the title of Imam as well as that of Sultan (64). There are, however, no Omani sources which have anything to say on this matter, and it is likely that such allegations rested on no more than rumours.

There is no record of whether or not Sh. al-Sálimí ever received an answer from the Sultan during the Wáíl's visit to al-Sharqiyah, but the result of this visit was that the

relationship between Sh. 'Isà and the Sultan improved and this influenced the political activity of Sh. al-Sálimí. Unfortunately, the Wálí Sulaymán was killed in the Wádí al-'Aqq by the B. Gháfir when he returned from al-Qábil, and this diverted the Sultan's attention by making him concentrate his efforts on punishing the killers of Sulaymán.

With the Wálí Sulaymán's death, the Sultan had lost one important figure who had assisted him in controlling many of the towns, especially in the Interior Province. One authority states that the decay in the Sultan's government started with the death of one of its greatest leaders (sc. Sulaymán b. Suwaylim) (65), and he goes on to say that "much of Sultan Fayṣal's relative success in the years immediately preceding 1903 was due not so much to his own actions as to the energetic efforts undertaken on his behalf by Sulayman b. Suwaylim" (66).

Sh. al-Sálimí's efforts to revive the Imamate during the period 1325/1907 to 1329/1911 were not successful. He was let down by the tribal leaders, especially Sh. 'Isà whom he requested to take the leadership in the struggle against the Sultan. Sh. 'Isà, declined on the grounds that the time was not ripe for action (67).

Their efforts having failed Sh. al-Sálimí decided in 1329/1911 to go on the pilgrimage, and then to tour North Africa to seek financial assistance from the Ibáđí communities there (68), but Sh. 'Isà and other notables persuaded him to postpone this visit because they needed his presence. During 1330, Sh. al-Sálimí visited the interior Province and met the heads of tribes of al-'Abriyyín in al-Ḥamrá' and the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná'í in Bilád Sayt who promised to give him their support. Then he visited the village of Tanúf where Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir b. Sayf al-Nabhání (1291/1874-1338/1920), the *tamímah* of B. Gháfir faction, lived. Sh. al-Sálimí discussed his ideas with him and he agreed to support him.

Here lies the importance of the role of the Gháfirí faction in adopting Sh. al-Sálimí's ideas. The main reason for B. Gháfirí support was the deterioration of the relationship between them and the Sultan. Sh. Ḥimyar and his tribe had suffered much from the Wálí, Sulaymán b. Suwaylim, who had interfered in their internal affairs and encouraged their traditional enemies, the B. Ruwáḥah (a Hináwí faction), to encroach upon their lands (69). Sh. Ḥimyar controlled the whole of Jabal al-Akhḍar with its two

most important centres, Tanúf and Barkat al-Mawz. He promised to lend his support to Sh. al-Sálimí, both financially and morally (70). He also agreed to meet him the following year (Jumádà II, 1331/ May, 1913) in Tanúf to elect an Imam (71). According to Landen, the main reasons which caused Sh. Ḥimyar to support the revival of the Imamate were "the fears that this autonomy and the Ibáđí faith were being threatened by increased foreign meddling in Oman (and they) undoubtedly caused Shaykh Ḥimyar to embrace the conservative programme" and moreover "the motives of the B. Riyám Shaykh were more conditioned by family ambitions than were those of the other founders of the 1913 Imamate" (72). This writer has, however, confused the issue of the Imamate revival and the interests of Sh. Ḥimyar's tribe. He maintains that it was not for religious reasons, or because of foreign interference, that Sh. Ḥimyar accepted the call for the revival of the Imamate, but that he acted for the interests of his tribe only. Certain Arab writers have perpetuated this view when discussing the role of Sh. Ḥimyar (73). The truth of the matter was that there was strong competition between the Hináwí and Gháfirí factions to take over the responsibility of the Imamate, and the Gháfirí faction had suffered from the pressure of Sultan Fayṣal who had encouraged the Hináwí faction against the Gháfirí faction. To some extent Sh. Ḥimyar's support for the Imamate was conditioned by the expectation that its establishment would alleviate this pressure. However, while it is true that the establishment of the Imamate would be in the interest of the B. Riyám, there are other indications that Sh. Ḥimyar's primary motive in supporting the Imamate was his religious condition. It must be pointed out that B. Riyám did not take part in the Sd. 'Azzán's Imamate (1868-71), and had had to endure much animosity and loss of property. Thus it must be borne in mind that both political and religious factors influenced Sh. Ḥimyar.

After this, Sh. al-Sálimí wrote to his adherents informing them about what he had discussed with Sh. Ḥimyar, and of his next meeting with him. He stressed in his letters to them that what he had told them should be kept as a secret.

On hearing these news, Sh. 'Isà, the *tamímah* of Hináwí faction, called the heads of his tribe and discussed Sh. al-Sálimí's ideas with them. They decided to try to persuade Sh. al-Sálimí not to continue the meeting with Sh. Ḥimyar (74). They tried to

discuss their views with Sh. al-Sálimí and to warn him against Sh. Ḥimyar, who, they claimed, would hand him over to the Sultan, who had already decided to get rid of Sh. al-Sálimí, but the latter rejected their advice. The relationship between Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Ḥimyar was in general unfriendly and there had been repeated feuding between their tribes (75). Sh. al-Sálimí called his adherents together and discussed these matters with them. The result was unreserved support from these advisers for Sh. al-Sálimí's ideas.

Accordingly he decided to go to Tanúf and proceed with the idea of electing an Imam. He left al-Qábil secretly for al-Muḍaybí on 2nd Jumádà II, 1331 in the company of (76):

- 1- Sh. Sálím b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúší
- 2- Sh. Ḥumúd b. Náşir al-Ma'walí
- 3- Sh. Sálím b. Náşir al-Ḥubayshí
- 4- Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ráshid b. Şáliḥ al-Háshimí
- 5- His son, Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh b. Ḥúmayd al-Sálimí

In al-Muḍaybí, they were joined by:

- 6- Sh. 'Ámir b. Khamís al-Málikí
- 7- Sh. Sa'íd b. 'Abdalláh b. Khádím al-Háshimí
- 8- Sh. 'Ámir b. 'Alí b. Ráshid al-Shaydhání al-Ḥabsí
- 9- Sh. Ḥamad b. Musallam b. 'Ubayd al-Ḥajrí
- 10- Sh. Sayf b. Ḥumayd wald al-Suwaygh al-Háshimí.

The above were accompanied by three attendants only.

Sh. al-Sálimí left the village of al-Khabbah in al-Muḍaybí secretly on the 7th of Jumádà II, and reached Barkat al-Mawz on the following day, where they were welcomed by Sh. Ḥamdán b. Sulaymán b. Sayf al-Nabhání, the cousin of Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náşir. While Sh. al-Sálimí was on his way to Barkat al-Mawz he wrote to his adherents of Izkí, telling them to meet him in Barkat al-Mawz. As a result, some sixty '*ulamá*' led by Sh. Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh b. Muḥammad al-Riyámí and Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálím b. Zahrán al-Ruqayshí met with him as requested.

At dawn on the 9th, Sh. al-Sálimí and his company left Barkat al-Mawz for Tanúf, which they reached on the following day, after receiving prior assurances from B.

Riyám of protection against attacks from Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa'ídí, the Sultan's Wálí of Nazwà. In Tanúf, all the '*ulamá*' had a meeting with Sh Ḥimyar and decided to elect Sálím b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúší as an Imam and depose Sultan Fayşal .

One factor which helped Sh. al-Sálimí and his men to revive the Imamate with such comparative ease was the fact that Sultan's control over his forts had weakened, owing to the undermining of his garrisons in Nazwà, Izkí, and Samá'il. In addition, most of his most loyal commanders, such as Sulaymán b. Suwaylim (d.1907), his son Sálím b. Sulaymán (d. 5th June,1911), and Badr b. Sayf b. Sulaymán al-Bú Sa'ídí (d. 23rd February, 1913) had by this time all died.

Endnotes

- (1) Mashá'iq derives its name from Sh. Muḥammad b. Shá'iq b. Abí al-Qásim al-Kharúṣí, who was one of the '*ulamá*' of Nakhal. It is located in Báṭinah Province about 20 Km from the western coast of the Gulf of Oman.
- (2) The full name of the Imam is written on the inside cover, and repeated on the last page, of a manuscript given to the present writer by the son of the Imam Sálím Sh. Yaḥyà, when he visited him at his house on Wednesday 30th December, 1992, in the village of al-Waljah, attached to al-'Awábí.
- (3) al-Sálimí, M.A. Nahḍat. p. 167.
- (4) Sh. Sa'íd b. Ḥamad al-Kharúṣí is now the Qáḍí of Buraymí.
- (5) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 167.
- (6) Landen, op.cit. p. 393; Anthony, op.cit. pp. 54f.
- (7) (R.O.I) p.cv.
- (8) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p.167.
- (9) al-Lamkí, Náṣir b. Sulaymán. Tahání al-Imám Sálím p. 1; Sh. Sa'íd b. Ḥamad al-Kharúṣí (personal interview).
- (10) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 232f.
- (11) Most of the '*ulamá*' interviewed by the present writer, especially Sh. Ḥumúd b. 'Abdalláh al-Ráshidí, the Qáḍí of Sanáw, and Sh. Sa'íd b. Ḥamad al-Kharúṣí, the Qáḍí of Buraymí, agree that the age of Imam Sálím was not less than 18 years when he left for al-Sharqiyyah.
- (12) al-Ḥáarithí, Sa'íd b. Ḥamad. al-Lu'lu' al-Raṭīb. p. 133
- (13) (R.O.I) p. cv.
- (14) Qásim, al-Khalíj al-'Arabí 1914-45 p. 386; Landen, op.cit. p. 393.
- (15) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 138.
- (16) al-Ḥáarithí, Sa'íd b. Ḥamad. op.cit. p. 40.
- (17) Ibid. p. 43.
- (18) Ibid. p. 42.
- (19) Ibid. p. 42.
- (20) Oral communication to the writer.
- (21) al-Ḥáarithí, Sa'íd b. Ḥamad op.cit. p. 46.
- (22) This point was mentioned by his brother Náṣir in his elegy.
- (23) al-Ḥáarithí, Sa'íd b. Ḥamad op.cit. p.22.
- (24) Among them being Sh. Náṣir b. Ráshid, his brother, Sh. Muḥammad b. Shíkhán al-Sálimí, Sh. Abú Muslim Náṣir b. Sálím al-Ruwáḥí; and Sh. 'Amir b. Khamís al-Málikí.
- (25) Grave, Life of Percy Cox. p. 86.
- (26) Bell, G. op.cit. p. 21.
- (27) (R.O II) pp. 691f for both Arabic and English versions.
- (28) (R.O II) pp. 712f for both Arabic and English versions.
- (29) (R.O II) pp. 740f for both Arabic and English versions.
- (30) Jaylah is a village located in Wádí B. Jábir, the branch of Wádí Samá'il.
- (31) (R.O III) pp. 120f for both Arabic and English versions.
- (32) (R.O III) pp. 123f for both Arabic and English versions.
- (33) For more information see Saldanha, Précis on Slave Trade 1873-1905.
- (34) (R.O III) pp. 652-4.
- (35) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. iv p. 2512.
- (36) Ibid. pp. 2512f.
- (37) (Adm. R. 1890-1919).
- (38) Kelly, Britain. p. 412; Wilson, The Persian Gulf p. 214 ; for further information about the slave trade and their treatment in the West see:
 - Burns, A.S. History of Nigeria. London, 1955.
 - Philip, C. The Atlantic Slave Trade. London. 1969.
 - Davis, D. B. Slavery and Human Progress. Oxford, 1984.
 - Duffly, J. Portugal in. Africa, Harmondsworth, 1962.
 - Fage, J.D. Introduction to the History of Africa. London 1953.
 - Goodell, W. Slavery and Anti slavery.
 - Kirkwood, K. Britain and Africa, London, 1965.
- (39) Kelly, Britain. p. 412.
- (40) Bannerman, Unity p. 231.

- (41) F.O. 54/28; Bannerman, op.cit. pp. 231f.
- (42) For further information about the Brussels conference see F.O. 428/2; al-Mousawi, A History, pp. 252-64.
- (43) Jád, M. "Tijárat al-Asliḥah " p.130f; Busch, op.cit. pp. 280-8; Bannerman, op.cit. pp. 228-38.
- (44) Jád, M. op.cit. p. 171.
- (45) Jád, M. op.cit. pp. 174ff; Bannerman, op.cit. pp. 238-49.
- (46) F.O.428/9
- (47) al-Mousawi, op.cit. pp. 239-86.
- (48) Landen, op.cit. p.392.
- (49) Murphy, Soldiers. p. 136.
- (50) Qásim, J. Z. "al-Uṣúl al-Ta'rikiyyah" p. 174.
- (51) al-Mashhadání, Khalíl Ibráhim, al-Taṭawwurát al-Siyásiyyah fí 'Umán. p. 52.
- (52) Ibid. cited from RDS 890A, letter on 31st May, 1910; and Howarth, The desert King. p. 124.
- (53) (Adm. R. 1910) p. 68; A Handbook of Arabia vol. I p. 250.
- (54) (Adm. R. 1910) p. 68; RDS 890A. letter on 31st May, 1910.
- (55) RDS 890A, letter on 13th July, 1912; al-Mashhadání, op.cit. p. 51.
- (56) (Adm. R. 1911) p. 81.
- (57) (Adm. R. 1912) p. 85.
- (58) Peterson, "The revival of the Ibádí Imamate" pp. 166f.
- (59) For further information about Sh. al-Sálimí, see: his Tuḥfat al-A'yán vol. II; his Jawáhir al-Nizám; al-Sálimí (his son) Nahḍat al-A'yán; Ubaydli, A, "Abdullah al-Sálimi's role in the Ibádí revival (1913-29)". Proceedings BRISMES (10-13 July 1988).
- (60) Bannerman, op.cit. p. 255.
- (61) (I.O.) R15/3/11/1 Muscat political dairy, 16th October 1906; Bannerman, op.cit. p. 255.
- (62) (Adm. R.1906) p. 58.
- (63) Qásim, al-Khalíj 1914-45. p. 385.
- (64) RDS 890A letter of June 1913.
- (65) Landen, op.cit. p. 390.
- (66) Ibid. p.389.
- (67) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 127.
- (68) Ibid. pp. 127f.
- (69) (Adm. R. 1905-6) p. 69.
- (70) For further information about Sh. Ḥimyar see ARAMCO, Oman, pp. 111-15.
- (71) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 129.
- (72) Landen, op.cit. p. 393.
- (73) Qásim, al-Khalíj al-'Arabí 1914-45. p. 387.
- (74) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 129f.
- (75) Thomas, B. "Arab Rule" p. 47.
- (76) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 134-7.

CHAPTER ۱۱۱

THE IMAM'S ELECTION AND HIS POLICY PROGRAMME

The main themes to be discussed in this chapter are the manner in which the Imam was elected, whether he in fact met the required qualifications for the Imamate, the private and public allegiance (*bay'ah*) and the Imam's aims and policy programme as derived from his election speech and exchange of correspondence between him and others with the purpose of rallying support for the Imamate. To begin with, however, it is necessary to understand the composition of the Imamate among the Ibádiyyah, as well as the types and qualifications of the Imam, and the role of the '*ulamá*'.

1) Composition of the Imamate:

"Imamate" means a legitimate Islamic government inspired by the Qur'án and the Ḥadīth. It aims at individual happiness and the creation of an atmosphere in which individuals can live in accord with God's commands (1).

The establishment of an Imamate was a matter of dispute. Al-Shahrastání notes that "the great dissension within the Islamic community (*ummah*) was in regard to the nature of the Imamate. At no time have the Muslims fought each other more regarding the implementation of any Islamic precept than over on the Imamate" (2). In the same way Abú Músà al-'Ash'arí says that "after the death of the Prophet, the Muslims differed in many respects.They divided into several groups with different religious ideas.... after the death of Prophet, the first dispute among Muslims was about the Imamate" (3).

The dissension was focused on two main arguments: the first was that the Imamate is an obligation on the *ummah*. If they do not establish an Imamate, they will be held responsible to God (4). The second argument was that the Imamate is permissible (*mubáh*). In this case, Muslims are not subject to God's punishment (5).

Both arguments have valid reasons in their support. In support of the first it is argued that (a) the Companions agreed on the establishment of an Imamate after the death of the Prophet; (b) the *ummah* needed someone to look after its social, economic and

political affairs. This can only be achieved through the legitimate election of an Imam. The second view was that the Imamate was not obligatory, but depended on peoples' needs in their transactions. Therefore, if people help each other and act according to their religious and political duties, they may not need any ruler (6). In his comment on this argument Ibn Khaldún points out that :

” the reason why they adopted such an opinion was that they (attempted to) escape the royal authority and its overbearing, domineering, and worldly ways. They had seen that the religious law was full of censure and blame for such things and for the people who practised them, and that it encouraged the desire to abolish them“(7).

The Ibádiyyah adopted the first viewpoint, which is the view of all Muslims, except some in the Mu‘tazilíte school and the Khárijites. According to al-Şá’ighí, the Imamate is an obligation (*fard*)” (8). In the same sense, Abú al-Mú’thir says: “the Imamate is a part of God’s religion and it is a right which he exacts from his people” (9).

a) Types of Imamate

Owing to the adverse conditions under which the Ibádiyyah developed, two kinds of Imamate arose: those of *kitmán* (concealment), and *zuhúr* (appearance). There were also two other types of Imamate which might occur within this attenuating scheme: Imamate ^{of} *difá’* and Imamate ^{of} *shirá’*. In the following we shall discuss each of them.

i. Imamate of Kitmán

We have already discussed (ch. I. 2.a), the reasons which led to the emergence of the Ibádiyyah in Basrah. This stage was called the Imamate of *kitmán*, because the Ibádiyyah was in a weak position. There are two preconditions for this type of Imamate: first, when the Ibádiyyah is in a weak position, and second, when it is under the control of tyrants or non-Ibádí rule (10). In this case Ibádí activities have to be limited to teaching and learning. Religious punishments cease, and *taqiyyah* may be practised (11).

More specifically, the role of the Imams would be concentrated on teaching, guidance, orientation, organisation of the *da‘wah*, collection of *zakát*, and issuing *fatwas*. In this stage there is no election of an Imam. But the Imam’s scholarly and leadership qualities allow him to act as head of the movement by his example. In case of suffering actual physical attack by an enemy, the Ibádiyyah must elect an Imam *difá’*, but this Imamate ends with the end of the danger (12).

ii. The Imamate of *Ḥuhūr* (The full realization of an Ibádí state)

The Imamate of the *ḥuhūr* is the Ibádí goal. This means the establishment of an Islamic government according to the Qur'án and the Sunnah. According to Ibádí teaching “the Imamate of *ḥuhūr* is essential to Islamic government” (13). The Ibádiyyah managed to establish *ḥuhūr* in Yemen (129/747), in Oman (132/749) and in Algeria (160/776). Subsequently the Imamate continued to exist in Oman as we have already seen (14). The Imam of this Imamate has been considered as an Imam *ḥuhūr* (15).

iii. Imam *difá'* and Imam *shirá'*

When the Ibádiyyah faces an enemy, Ibádis are supposed to elect an Imam *difá'* to defend the Imamate. He must be a learned man of high military capability. During the war period, he enjoys all the authority of an Imam *ḥuhūr* (16).

This kind of Imamate continues to exist until the end of the emergency. In case of success, the Imamate takes the name of Imamate of *ḥuhūr*, and an Imam *difá'* can be re-elected as an Imam *ḥuhūr*. In the case of failure, the Imam *difá'* reverts to the *kitmán* situation (17). The *shirá'* Imamate has been explained by Abú al-'Abbás Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Bakr in the following terms :

“The *shirá'* agree that they sell themselves desiring God's pleasure, and show no claim for ruling, but to end tyranny and revive righteousness. They must not revolt with less than forty men, they can complete the number with a woman. If their intention was not to return before ending falsity, they, therefore, must not return to their homes unless they ended falsehood or died. If they went out with the intention to return if they wanted they can return at any time. Their homes are their swords, so if they return to their original homes for any purpose, they must pray short prayers (*qasr*) and pray complete prayers during their revolt, even through they were far away from their original homes” (18).

The first person who was imam *shirá'* was Abú Bilál Mirdás as a reaction to the injustice of 'Ubayd Alláh b. Ziyád (19).

b) Election of Imam

i. Qualifications of the Imam

An Imam *kitmán* does not need to be elected. His scientific and leadership capabilities qualify him to be Imam. His duties will focus on orientation, education, and giving *fatwas* . In other types of Imamate, the Imam must be elected according to conditions accepted by all Muslims. However, they rejected membership of Quraysh as

an essential condition (20). For the Ibádiyyah, any Muslim can be Imam if he fulfills the following conditions, as explained by al-Şá'ighí:

“ The Imam must be a mature male of outstanding intelligence, not blind, deaf, senile, nor lacking limbs which would prevent him from taking part in the obligation of Jihád, nor should he be a eunuch or emasculated. He must not be mad, nor feeble-minded, nor should he be envious, cowardly, mean, a liar, nor a man who fails to keep promises and agreements, nor possess any other characteristic that causes concern. He must be a man of great learning for without learning and perception how can he carry out his duties and interpret the laws aright and ensure that his subordinates do so?” (21).

The Ibádiyyah agree with other Islamic sects in allowing the Imamate of a candidate preferred by the community over one who may have a superior theoretical claim. For the Ibáđi, there ought to be no more than one Imam in the one country at a time (22).

The process of election should be organized as expressed by al-Şá'ighí:

“Upon the election to the Imamate of an Imam, at which ceremony are present the leading *'ulamá'*, the most esteemed takes the Imam's right hand and says: 'We set you forward as Imam over ourselves and the Muslims provided you judge by Qur'án and the Sunnah of His Prophet. peace be upon Him, and provided you order by what is universally recognized, prohibiting the disallowed and making evident the religion of God whom you worship, demanding what you find necessary for that purpose. If the Imam assents, the oath of allegiance is then required whereupon the election is confirmed. This declaration is for a *difá'í* Imam; if he is to be a *shirá'* Imam the clause, 'provided you Jihád for the cause of God' is added. Then all present, one by one, swear allegiance and they place the *kummah* on his head and the seal in his hand. The Khatíb then pronounces the validity of the oath of allegiance and after the prescribed prayers, the *Takbír* and *Tahmíd* says 'No judgment/ government except God's and no judgment by him who judges other than by what God has revealed; no obedience to him who revolts against God; there is no judgment except God's without reserve and no disobedience to God' (23).

If the election occurs in this way Muslims have the right to depose their Imam (24), but before doing so they must demand from him an explanation (*'udhr*) and then ask him to formally repent (*tawbah*). If he does not, then it is the duty of Muslims to abandon him, and if necessary fight against him. For the Ibádiyyah, there are three general conditions under which an Imam can be removed from his Imamate: mental and physical reasons; committing of sins; and the omission of his responsibility towards his followers. The *ummah* should respect and obey their Imam and support him (25).

The *wiláyah* and *bará'ah* define the relationship between the ruler and ruled. In this context Muḥammad b. Músà al-Kindí says that “the *wiláyah* and *bará'ah* are obligations in the Qur'án. There is no excuse for a Muslim to ignore them” (26). The *wiláyah* appears in Ibáđí literature in several meanings, among which are the following:

(a) obligation to carry out God's command,(b) to love all Muslims who believe in God with heart and tongue (27).

The concept of *bará'ah* means the converse of *wiláyah*. More specifically the terms *wiláyah* and *bará'ah* were used by Ibádí scholars to express the attitude of believers towards their Muslim supporters and towards the unbelievers.

Between those two concepts is the concept of *wuqúf*, which means that when a person is not qualified for *wiláyah* or *bará'ah*, his situation may be considered as neutral. *wiláyah* and *bará'ah* created a split not only between them and their opponents, but also among themselves. This conflict was inherited by following generations and led them to establish more than one Imamate at same time.

ii. The role of the 'ulamá'

There are two means by which the Imam can be installed: (a) by a recommendation from the previous Imam; (b) by "those who can loose and bind" (*Ahl al-hall wa al-'Aqd*) (28). There is another argument that "the installation of the Imam can be by the resident 'ulamá', and there is no quorum for such a decision" (29), but al-Mawardí insists that it is not possible to take a decision with less than five 'ulamá' (30). Some, however, have argued that the number of 'ulamá' should be no less than forty (31). The Ibádiyyah agrees as regards the *Ahl al-Hall wa al-'Aqd*, but insisted that the decision should be taken by at least six 'ulamá' (32).

The important prerogatives which the 'ulamá' have enjoyed in Oman consist in their considerable legitimate power, through which they have controlled both politicians and people, to the extent that they have been able to depose Imams (33).

2) Imam Sálim's Election

This section depends not only on written accounts but also on verbal accounts of the election given to the present writer by persons close to the participants, and as such they express a wide variety of opinions connected with the Imam's election, and his personal qualities.

The 'ulamá' and leaders discussed for three days in Jumádà II, 3131, the establishment of the Imamate in Tanúf (34). Among those who attended this meeting

were Sh. Ḥimyar and the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhír b. Sa'íd al-Hiná'í, Muḥammad, 'Abdalláh, 'Alí and Khálid, and his grandsons, Záhír b. Ghuṣn b. Hilál b. Záhír and Sálím and Su'úd b. Badr b. Hilál b. Záhír. Sh. Hilál was a descendant of Sh. Khalaf b. Mubárák al-Hiná'í, after whom the Hináwí faction was named following his death in 1140/1728. Sh. Hilál became the leader of his tribe following the death of his cousin Sh. Sa'íd b. Muḥammad b. Sa'íd, and a commander of ^{the} Wálí of Nazwá, Sd. Ḥamad b. Sayf b. 'Ámir b. Khalfán al-Bú Sa'ídí. In the 1880s he became the ruler of Nazwá and succeeded in expelling its Wálí who moved to Muscat where he stayed until his death in the early years of 1890s (35). In 1312/1894 Sh. Hilál was killed by the son of the former Wálí of Nazwá, Sayf b. Ḥamad b. Sayf ^{who} took control of Nazwá, and the sons of Hilál went back to their village, Bilád Sayt (36).

During their three-days meeting the '*ulamá*' and leaders did not reach any agreement and were divided into those who supported the re-establishment of the Imamate and those who opposed it. The latter group argued that the political situation was not favourable because the Sultan's forces were surrounding them and they lacked the support of most of the Hináwí tribes, except the sons of Sh. Hilál and their adherents. They were more weakened by the fact Sh. Májíd b. Khamís b. Ráshid al-'Abrí (1252/1836-1346/1927) and Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad b. Muḥsin al-'Abrí, (1289/1872-1342/1923) the leader of the tribe of 'Abriyyín, went back on their promise to attend the meeting. They put forward as excuses the prevailing conditions and the fear of failure (37).

The re-establishment of the Imamate needed more than just the support of the '*ulamá*'. It needed in addition the total support and commitment of the tribes to make it viable and give it effect (38). In addition, Sh. Ḥimyar's adherents advised that this was not an easy matter and pointed out that he did not have the support of any of the other leaders; moreover, Sh. al-Sálímí was a poor man with no following (39). However, Sh. al-Sálímí was able to set the fears of Sh. Ḥimyar at rest and to persuade him to rejoin the meeting after a long discussion (40).

In the afternoon of 12th Jumádà II, 1331, Sh. al-Sálimí asked those attending the meeting to choose one of the company as Imam, and he expressed his opinion that the choice of Imam should be confined to one of four men, who were:

(a) Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh b. Sa‘íd b. Khalfán al-Khalílí (1299/1881-1374/1954)

(b) Sd. Hilál b. ‘Alí b. Badr b. Ḥámid b. Aḥmad b. Imam Sa‘íd b. Imam Aḥmad al-Bú Sa‘ídí (c.1281/1864-1361/1942)

(c) Sh. Abú Zayd ‘Abdalláh b. Muḥammad al-Riyámí (1301/1883-4-1364/1944)

(d) Sh. Sálim b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúşí (1301/1883-4-1338/1920)

Sh. Muḥammad and Sd. Hilál did not, however, attend the meeting. The former was a grandson of a notable leader of the *‘ulamá’*, Sh. Sa‘íd b. Khalfán al-Khalílí, who had played a prominent role in the election of Sd. ‘Azzán in 1868. His father, ‘Abdalláh b. Sa‘íd (1278/1861-1332/1914), was the leader of the B. Ruwáḥah, and he enjoyed great respect in Wádí Samá’il over the Hináwí faction in their region. He was strongly opposed to the Imamate revival on the one hand because he would lose his position, and on the other, because the Imamate was supported by Sh. Ḥimyar, who was an enemy to Sh. ‘Abdalláh. He was attacked by the poet of his tribe (Abú Muslim Náşir b. Sálim al-Ruwáḥí), and he decided to live with the Sultan, but he met his death in an accident in Wádí al-Ḥawásinah in Jumádà II, 1332. For this reason it was decided not to nominate his son Sh. Muḥammad.

Sd. Hilál b. ‘Alí was a descendant of the Imam Sa‘íd b. Imam Aḥmad, the founder of the Āl Bú Sa‘ídí dynasty. He lived in Rustáq and was well-known for his generosity, fairness and humility (41). The status of Sh. Hilál was one of the factors which favoured his nomination for the position of Imam, but his absence from the meeting reduced his chances of being elected.

The third person, Abú Zayd ‘Abdalláh al-Riyámí, was known for being a thrifty and harsh ruler and this united some of the *‘ulamá’* against him later when he was acting as a Wálí and Qádí for Imam Sálim b. Ráshid and the Imam's successor in Bahlà. Moreover, he was from the tribe of Sh. Ḥimyar, and these were all reasons for his not being elected Imam. Some *‘ulamá’*, indeed, thought that he was not a serious candidate at all and that the third candidate should be Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málikí. The present writer

discussed this question with some of the *'ulamá'*, some of whom maintained that Sh. 'Ámir was in fact the third contender in the election. The meeting, however, elected Sh. Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúṣí for a number of reasons which will be discussed below.

Unlike his predecessor's case, the election of the Imam Sálím of 1331/1913 took place peacefully and without staging a revolt against the Sultan. This Imamate was distinguished by the following features: only once before in the history of the Imamate in Oman had a *bay'ah* taken in this way, viz. the *bay'ah* of Náṣir b. Murshid 1034/1624. Secondly, the *'ulamá'* had not elected a member of the family of the ruler as their Imam in order to give them more unity, so as not to repeat what they had done in the case of the Imamate of 1868 (when they had elected Sd. 'Azzán b. Qays from the ruling family, whose rule had lasted only three years). Thirdly, this new Imamate relied heavily on the support of the Gháfirí faction under the leadership of Sh. Ḥimyar. Fourthly, it constituted a revival of the role of the B. Kharúṣ (which had declined in importance from the first half of the 16th century) in the Imamate. It may also be noted that election was unusual in that it gave the *'ulamá'* an opportunity to deliberate and exchange views freely before electing an Imam.

a) The reasons for election

The *'ulamá'* and the leading men regarded as *Ahl al-Ḥallwa al-'Aqd* having failed to agree on whether to re-establish the Imamate or not, were asked directly by Sh. al-Sálímí to elect one of their number, and they accordingly chose Sh. Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúṣí. The movement for the revival of the Imamate had started, as seen above, as a reaction to the policies of the Sultan, which were in general perceived as being contrary to the traditional interpretation of the *Sharí'ah*. It is therefore not surprising that the meeting of the *'ulamá'* who assembled to elect the Imam should have settled their choice on a figure who was prominently qualified to represent the values of the *Sharí'ah* and the attitudes of the *'ulamá'*, and who moreover came from a family historically associated with the office of Imam.

In spite of some disagreement in the accounts of the election gathering, it is clear that narrow motives of tribal politics and personal interests were not reasons for the

election of Sh. Sálím, nor indeed was the desire for effective military leader among the motives of his electors.

Imam Sálím was seen as possessing all the *Shurúṭ al-Imam*, or "conditions for the Imam" as these were traditionally understood (42). He was learned in religion and had spent his life in study, but he lacked experience in religious office which in this case was very important, because later this was used as an argument by his opponents that his learning was limited. This accusation is incorrect and irrelevant because he appointed competent advisers to help him in different fields (43), since the Imam was involved in the administrative business of the country economically, administratively, and financially, and he delegated the office of *Muḫtí* and religious laws to the judges. Moreover, he depended on consultation, and never took a decision without the approval of the '*ulamá*', which had been one of the conditions of the election contract (44).

The second qualification of Imam Sálím was his probity. He had been known for his uprightness and moral integrity since he was a child. There are a number of accounts which are evidence of this (45), and these qualities were conspicuous throughout his rule.

The third requirement, that the Imam should have the ability "to carry out the punishments fixed by law and to go to war... and be able to assume responsibility for getting people to go to war" (46), was not in question, despite the fact that Imam Sálím lacked leadership experience. His knowledge of religion, the lives of the Companions of the Prophet and the history of Oman, gave him moral authority to shoulder the responsibilities of the leadership.

The fourth and last qualification, that of complete physical soundness and health, was not in question. Beside these formal qualifications he enjoyed the advantage of being a student and son - in - law of Sh. al-Sálímí, and he was a member of the B. Kharúṣ, who had provided many Imams during earlier times.

In addition, it should be noted that there was a popular feeling in Imam Sálím's favour, which seems to have been encouraged by a story related by his brother Náṣir. This concerned a dream of Imam Sálím in which he had been greeted with the words "*al-Salám 'alayka yá Imám al-Muslimín !* ", and which was repeated in a similar form in a

day time vision. Násir had said to his brother that if this were true it should be made public, and it was in fact being widely circulated among people shortly afterwards (47).

b) The bay'ah al-kháṣṣah and the bay'ah al-'ámmah

This section depends on the detailed account given by Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí, who was one of the persons who attended the swearing of allegiance to Imam Sálim, together with his father Sh. al-Sálimí, who was the moving spirit behind the meeting in Jumádà II, 1331 and which is included in his book Nahḍat al-A'yán (48).

As described above, the '*ulamá*' had chosen Sálim b. Ráshid as an Imam, but the eyewitness Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí, makes it clear that Imam Sálim did not immediately accept this nomination, and that he refused it on the grounds that he was not fit to bear the responsibilities of the office, and that ordinary people were not ready for the full application of the provisions of the *Sharí'ah* and the *jihád*. A heated debate and discussions then followed between the '*ulamá*' and Imam Sálim on the subject of his Imamate, but Sálim refused to accept their nomination. He told them "I did not come here to be elected, but to elect whoever you want to elect as an Imam". The '*ulamá*' on their part insisted on their demand and they refused to accept Sálim's excuses. Sh. al-Sálimí asked the '*ulamá*' to bring Sálim to the front, but he refused and he was then carried by force to the Shaykh (who was blind) and he tried to persuade him to accept the nomination on the grounds that all the *ummah* had agreed that he should be elected Imam, and he warned him that a refusal on his part would split the unity of the *ummah*, and that his punishment according to Islamic law would be death. Under this pressure, it appears that Imam Sálim finally agreed to their demand, but on certain conditions, which Sh. al-Sálimí refused to accept (49). In the tense circumstances of the meeting, Sh. al-Sálimí issued a *fatwà* that Imam Sálim should be put to death (50), and even appointed one of his students, Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh al-Riyámí, to carry out the execution. At this point, Imam Sálim appealed to the gathering, who, however, unanimously supported the Shaykh, and with tears in his eyes he submitted to the general will (51). Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí comments on Imam Sálim's refusal by saying that he was probably afraid of not being able to carry out the responsibilities of the Imamate in a proper way and of being accused of being a failure. He states that the Imam Sálim now put forward two

other conditions for his accepting election: first that he should be allowed to perform the Pilgrimage, and secondly that he should be allowed to visit his mother in his own village, and these were accepted.

Thus, before sunset on 12th Jumádà II, Imam Sálím was elected, and the first to give his allegiance after Sh. al-Sálímí was Sh. ‘Ámir b. Khamís al-Málikí, who placed the *kummaḥ* on his head and the signet-ring on his finger, according to Ibáđí tradition. The terms of the contract of the *bay‘ah* according to Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálímí were as following:

"We have given you our allegiance on condition that you obey God and His Prophet and that you work for the good of the people and against evil, and undertake the *jihád*, and that you pursue no course of action without consulting the ‘*ulamá*’. We have given you our allegiance to carry out God's teaching, to establish the *Ḥudúd*, to collect taxes, to oversee the Friday prayer, to assist the week and to aid the needy" (52).

Sh. ‘Ámir al-Málikí was followed by Abú Zayd ‘Abdalláh al-Riyámí in pledging allegiance and hoistingth white flag of the Imamate. Then the following people pledge^{of} their allegiance:

- (1) Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálímí
- (2) Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ráshid b. Šáliḥ al-Háshimí
- (3) Sh. Nášir b. ‘Ámir b. Sulaymán al-Riyámí.
- (4) ‘Abd al-Raḥmán b. Nášir b. ‘Ámir b. Sulaymán al-Riyámí
- (5) Sh. ‘Ámir b. ‘Alí al- al-Ḥabsí
- (6) Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálím b. Záhir al-Ruḡayshí
- (7) Sh. Ḥamad b. Musallam b. ‘Ubayd al-Ḥajrí
- (8) Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nášir b. Sayf al-Nabhání
- (9) Sh. Khálid b. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná’í
- (10) Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná’í
- (11) Sh. ‘Alí b. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná’í
- (12) Sh. Muḥammad b. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná’í
- (13) Sh. Hilál b. Ghuṣn b. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná’í
- (14) Sh. Sálím b. Badr b. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná’í

The form of allegiance (*bay‘ah*) which was given was called *al-bay‘ah al-kháṣṣah* which is that form which is carried out by a group of leading personalities. Sh.

Muḥammad al-Sálimí did not mention whether his father Sh. al-Sálimí had pledged his allegiance to the Imam or not. He may simply have forgotten, or more probably his father was exempted because he was blind. Sh. al-Sálimí had in fact given his allegiance to the Imam wholeheartedly, since he had spent most of his life struggling to revive the Imamate.

Sh. al-Sálimí then approached Sh. Ḥimyar to ask him not to betray him and to swear to support the Imamate. He also did the same thing with the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhír, and then Sh. ‘Āmir b. Khamís al-Málikí gave a speech followed by the Imam. They were followed by Sh. Abú Zayd ‘Abdalláh al-Riyámí. Then the flags of the Imamate were hoisted and guns were fired announcing the revival of the Imamate. In the following day ordinary people gave their allegiance (*bay’at al-‘ámmah*) to the Imam.

According to some authorities the *bay’ah* did not take place in the way just described (53). They describe the *bay’ah* as having been agreed between Sh. al-Sálimí, Imam Sálim al-Kharúsí, and Sh. Ḥimyar, because they believe erroneously that Imam Sálim al-Kharúsí represented a wholly independent party. However, the account given here is more likely to be correct, since it is supported by the local sources (54).

As mentioned above, an Ibáđí Imamate may take only one of four forms. The question was put to Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málikí as to which category was the Imamate of Sálim, and their answer was that this Imamate was like that of the two Caliphates[†] Abú Bakr and ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭáb, i.e. Imamate *ḡuhúr*.

One of the terms of the *bay’ah* contract was the requirement that the Imam should be a *shirá’* Imam because of the presence of the word "*jihád*" in the election contract. Discussing this point al-Sá’ighí explains that "if he (Imam) is to be a *shirá’* Imam, the stipulation that he (wages) *jihád* for the cause of God" (55) should be stated in the contract.

We have already referred to the statement of Sh. al-Sálimí that such a condition implies a weak Imamate. In the contract of the *bay’ah* of Imam Sálim it is laid down that "...you pursue no course of action without consulting the ‘*ulamá’*", and Sh. al-Sálimí claims that this means that the Imamate of Sd. ‘Azzán was a weak one, the point being that such a stipulation limits the freedom of action of the Imam owing to the various

demands and pressures of the *'ulamá'*. Al-Darjíní states that the Ibáđí *'ulamá'* in North Africa had sought the opinion of the Ibáđí *'ulamá'* in Oman about the stipulation imposed by Yazíd b. Fandín (56) on Imam 'Abd al-Wahháb b. 'Abd al-Raḥmán b. Rustum (171-190 A.H.), that he should do nothing without consulting the *Shúrá* council. The reply of the *'ulamá'* in Oman to this question was that "this was not part of the Muslim tradition and that the Imamate is valid but the stipulation is invalid" (57). Imam Sálím's contract states that, "I give you allegiance on the condition prescribed in the Qur'án and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muḥammad", but it imposes no other check upon the Imam other than obedience to the *Sharí'ah* (*lá Shurúṭ 'alá al-Imam*). Does this mean that the Imamate of Imam Sálím was a weak one?. The answer is definitely in the negative, if it is measured by its achievements. The present writer put this question to the *'ulamá'* and others in Oman and from their answers and taking into account the efforts of Imam Sálím in establishing the Imamate during his rule of seven years, it is evident that this Imamate was not a weak one. On the contrary, the stability which his successor enjoyed was the result of the efforts of Imam Sálím.

It should be stressed that Imam Sálím's decisions were taken in consultation with the *'ulamá'*. This collective decision-making was one of the main reasons which helped the Imamate to survive for over forty years. In this, it contrasted with the Imamate of Sd. 'Azzán, which lasted for nearly three years, largely because it was based on the authority of one person, Sh. Sa'íd b. Khalfán al-Khalílí. This is one of the reasons why Sh. al-Sálimí described it as a 'weak Imamate' because of the stipulation that the Imam should not take any action without consulting the *'ulamá'*. Another factor was that in 1913 the Imamate had ceased to exist in Oman for over forty years and the people were not used to the rule of the *sharí'ah*, which made it difficult for the Imam to rule according to this law.

3) Imam Sálím's Aims and Programme

We have shown that the reasons which called for a revival of the Imamate, included the state of internal instability in Oman and the intensification of conflicts between the tribes, in addition to the Sultan's complete submission to external pressures, and foreign interventions in Omani affairs such as the abolition of the slave trade, the

restrictions on arms' sales and the supervision of Omani ships. All of these factors combined to spur the call for a re-establishment of the Imamate.

The '*ulamá*' in reaction, called for a return of the Imamate in order to deal with these problems. The final aims which the Imamate was expected to achieve were to work for the unity of the Omanis, to stop the fighting and internal conflicts between the tribes and to alleviate the oppression which they suffered at the hands of the Sultan's Wális. All of these objectives would have been difficult to achieve unless the Sultan had been removed from power in the first place and replaced by a new leadership, free from tribal, political and religious fanaticism, so that it could then unite all the Omanis.

In this section, we will discuss the Imam's future plan as expressed in his electoral speech and through the speeches of his assistants, some of whom held the real reins of power among the people. We also come to know of his future plans through his correspondence with the chiefs of the tribes and others. It is noted that in fact the Imam lacked the necessary experience in matters of rule and political administration and in political and religious knowledge. This is because he had not held political or administrative roles, or official, or jurisdictional posts before. It is understandable, therefore, that he entrusted the administration of such matters as the preparation of his speeches, correspondence and other matters to those of his assistants who had knowledge about them. This, it is evident that there was a true democratic system of governance, which guarded against ruling single-handedly, which often leads to authoritarian and dictatorial rule.

a) The Imam's election speech

After having received the allegiance of the people, Imam Sálím rose to deliver a speech for the people who came to congratulate him on his ascendancy to the Imamate. He delivered a short religious extempore speech in front of the audience, the tenor of which was that he demanded people's loyalty to God, the Prophet and the Imam (58). He said nothing about his future plans or his attitude towards his opponents, or of his intentions regarding a *jihád*. His address was in fact a sermon of a time-honoured kind.

The Imam stressed a number of important issues in his speech. He emphasized the importance of unity among all the Omanis, and exhorted them against the bad effects

of fragmentation and social strife. He also urged them to reject factionalism and tribalism, and advised them to adhere to the principles of Islam. He called on them to perform good deeds of charity and compassion, and to uphold the values of social equity through giving alms and *zakát* out of their wealth. He also stressed the importance of referring their disputes to religious courts, and not to take the law in their hands.

It is clear from the Imam's speech that his aim was to prepare the people psychologically to accept the principles of the Imamate. He laid emphasis on the issue of unity for the sake of cooperation, and the rejection of tribal factionalism which he saw as the real factor which devastated the Omani society. This is an undeniable truth, so much so that the hot issues in Oman and their far-reaching negative consequences can be rightly attributed to the rise of tribal politics and factionalism. Therefore, in order for the Omani society to rid itself of these ills, the Imam urged them to care for the poor and the needy, and to work for beneficence and social equity. And in a bid to foster this ideal, we see that the Imam subsequently apportioned a share of the *zakát* to be given out to the poor and needy in the country.

It is possible that because the Imam did not clearly set out the lines of his future policy in his first speech in front of the people, he seemed content to adopt what was contained in the speech of Sh. 'Āmir al-Málikí before him, and the speech of Sh. Abú Zayd after him. By this, it seems, he wanted to give the opportunity for *Ahl al-Hall wa al-'Aqd* to share in his future plans.

b) Speeches of other important 'Ālims

The importance of the '*ulamá*' and chiefs of tribes was second only to that of the Imam. These were called *Ahl al-Hall wa al-'Aqd* who had elected Imam Sálím. Due to the power and influence of *Ahl al-Hall wa al-'Aqd*, the Imam gave the opportunity for two of the most influential figures who stood at the top of the hierarchy among the religious '*ulamá*' in Oman, after Sh. 'Abdalláh al-Sálimí. These two figures were Sh. 'Āmir b. Khamís b. Mas'úd al-Málikí, and Sh. Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh b. Muhammad b. Ruzayq al-Riyámí, to whom reference has already been made, regarding their candidature for the Imamate leadership and the reasons which led to their unelectability.

Sh. 'Āmir al-Málikí (1280/1863-1346/1927), was born in Wádí B. Khálid in al-Sharqiyyah Province, and died in Nazwà, the capital of the Imamate. He was an important and influential figure among the '*ulamá*'. He had written several books in Islamic law. He was considered the second man after Sh. 'Abdalláh al-Sálimí, and when the latter died, Sh. al-Málikí became president of the judiciary in the rein of Imam Sálím as well as in the rein of Imam Muhammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí. He used to be deputy to both Imam Sálím and Imam Muhammad in Nazwà during their absence (59).

Shortly after the declaring of allegiance, Sh. 'Āmir al-Málikí delivered a rousing speech in which he congratulated those assembled to revive the Imamate which had lapsed for forty years, and urged them henceforth to obey the orders of the Imam. The main points of the speech were as follows (60): God had given the Muslims two gifts: the message of Prophet and a just Imam. Next, they now had a chance to achieve unity. They should support the Imam's call to *jihád*. Finally he emphasized the benefits unity would bring.

Thus, Sh. 'Āmir laid down a general foundation for the new regime, which would undoubtedly require the support and sacrifice of the people. He did not neglect to warn the people of the consequences of laziness, deceit, going back on the *bay'ah* or rebelling against the Imam.

The second notable personality was Sh. Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh b. Muhammad al-Riyámí (1300/1883-1364/1944), who was born in Izkí and died in Bahlà. He belonged to the B. Ráshid, the part of the B. Riyám. Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí, like Sh. al-Málikí was also one of the influential figures among the '*ulamá*'. He lived in Izkí, where he taught and held the post of a Qáđí on religious jurisdiction. He spent part of his life as a student to Sh. al-Sálimí. He was considered one of the prominent '*ulamá*' during this period. He had written a number of books on Islamic jurisdiction. He assumed the office of Imam's Qáđí in Izkí, from where he was transferred in 1335/1917, to be the Wálí and Qáđí to the Bahlà. He continued in office for thirty years (61).

Sh. Abú Zayd gave a speech in which he indicated the main features of the future policy of the Imamate and called for a *jihád* against Sd. Fayṣal b. Turkí, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman (62). He urged the audience to take part in this *jihád*, enumerating its

benefits to their society and its rewards in the next life. He warned his audience against disunity and conflict, citing the disagreement between the Gháfirí and Hináwí factions in Oman and emphasizing that this was an act of Satan.

These speeches all emphasized the importance of the Imamate and the main aim of its revival, viz., the unity of Oman under one leadership and the putting aside of disagreements between the tribes, something which the Sultan had failed to bring about. Above all, the foremost objective of the Imamate was the establishment of Islamic law and the revival of Islamic traditions and values.

After the speeches were finished came the turn of the poets, who congratulated Imam Sálím in their poems; others who had not had the chance to recite their poems in person had sent them to him in written form. These poems were later published in a book called Tahání al-Imám Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúşí by Sh. Náşir b. Sulaymán al-Lamkí in Zanzibar in 1332/1914 (63).

One scribe had described the Imamate as "a pure religious revolution to re-establish the Ibáđí tradition but there was a nationalist current embodied in it" (62). He does not explain the nature of the nationalist movement nor against whom it was directed. It is well known that this revolution was against an Arab Muslim ruler of Omani descent. Oman was not under the occupation of a foreign power and there were no foreign troops on Omani soil at that time. One may conclude from a letter by Imam Sálím to the PAM dated 9th Sha‘bán, 1331/ 14th July, 1913 that the animosity was between the Omanis and their Sultan. In his letter Imam Sálím states:

" As far as, Sd. Fayşal, [is concerned] the ‘ulamá’ have risen against, [him] often times after his deprivation and deposition [from the Imamate]. And he refused to resign and has kept his seat this long time past by the road of violence and wrath and the Muslims were displeased with his Sultanate and his acts and you are a company of this Government (Britain). It is incumbent on you to refrain from the affairs of the Muslims, and it is necessary for you that you should not do us injury" (65).

This shows without any shadow of doubt that the animosity was not directed against a foreigner, but was against Sd. Fayşal, demanding his removal as their Sultan; they had offered to make him Imam, but he refused. This clearly shows that this Imamate was not in any way a nationalist movement.

Qásim goes on to say that Imam Sálím and the *'ulamá'* primarily wanted to establish an Ibádí Imamate on lines similar to those of the Imamate of 'Azzán, that would have included greater Oman with its coastal and interior regions (66). A cursory look at this view reveals that Qásim contradicts himself in saying at one moment that the movement was not religious, and then that the main objective was to establish an Ibádí Imamate.

Another writer claims that the revival of the Imamate did not mean the establishment of another state inland, but it was no more than a tribal coalition, because the main tribal leaders were personal allies of Imam Sálím rather than of his followers (67). It must be remembered, however, that the main purpose of the Imamate revival was the establishment of justice according to Islamic laws and the revival of Islamic traditions. The Imamate was established on an ambiguous basis with the intention of forming a fully fledged state, especially since Qásim clearly states that Imam Sálím and the *'ulamá'* wanted to establish an Imamate that would include greater Oman. Moreover, the correspondence between the Imam and others clearly point to this and not to a tribal coalition.

The presence of strong tribal leaders as allies of the Imam had prevented the imposition of central authority upon the tribes and had helped to preserve the Omani identity from foreign influence. These leaders would be a valuable support to the Imamate as long as they remained loyal to the Imam, obeyed his orders and paid their *zakát* and that of their followers. The Imamate needs group feeling, at least in the early stage of its establishment, when it is in need of financial and military assistance.

It is important, therefore, to understand the attitude of these leaders towards the Imam, whether they were allies (*ḥulafá'*) or merely followers (*atbá'*). The following are the names of the main leaders during the Imamate of Imam Sálím (1913-1920):

- (1) Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir al-Nabhání (d.1338/1920)
- (2) The sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná'í
- (3) Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad al-'Abrí (d.1342/1924)
- (4) Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfirí (d. 1348/1928-9)
- (5) Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih al-Ḥáarithí (d. 1365/1942)

(6) Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím al-Bú Sa‘ídí (d. 1392/1972)

All these persons gave their allegiance to Imam Sálím and declared their support for him, except Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfirí and Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím al-Bú Sa‘ídí, who only gave their allegiance and did not join his military operations. In return, the Imam allowed them to rule their territories in the customary way under his leadership and when Sh. Náṣir al-Gháfirí and Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím behaved unreasonably and without consultation, he ordered his troops to depose them from their position.

If those leaders had been allies of the Imam, they could have imposed on him their opinions and their demands, but they were not, as the following stories indicate:

(1) Sh. Sa‘íd b. Ḥamad al-Ḥárithí states that when Sh. Náṣir al-Gháfirí was ousted from his post as a ruler of Bahlà, Imam Sálím ordered that the properties of his minister, Sulaymán b. ‘Abdalláh al-Maḥrúqí, who was guilty of the illegal imposition of taxes, should be confiscated and that he should be put to death. Sulaymán fled Bahlà and remained in hiding for some time. He then decided to go to Sh. Ḥimyar and seek his help, but he refused to mediate between him and the Imam. Instead he told Sulaymán that he should talk to Sh. ‘Isà, who might have the courage to speak and mediate between Sulaymán and the Imam. Sh. ‘Isà on his part also refused to be involved and suggested that they should go together and see Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málikí. When they met Sh. ‘Āmir, however, he told them that "you are Amirs and more equipped to talk to the Imam". The Imam, however, accepted Sh. ‘Āmir's mediation and forgave Sulaymán (68).

(2) When the Imam conquered Nazwá, he met with its notables, among whom was Sh. Záhir b. Ghuṣn b. Hilál al-Hiná‘í, who had committed a *ḥadd* offence. Sh. al-Sálímí at the time commented that "this is a test for us from God. Shall we carry out the *ḥadd* or punishment ourselves and our indispensable supporters, or forego what God has demanded?". He then told Sh. Záhir that his offence was a *ḥadd* crime, and that he should not object to being punished. Sh. Záhir replied that he accepted the *Sharí‘ah* punishment, and was given eighty lashes (69).

(3) The steady refusal of Imam Sálím to accept the genuine efforts of Sh. ‘Isà to make peace between him and the Sultan of Muscat did not change the attitude of Sh. ‘Isà towards the Imam, nor towards the Imamate.

These positions clearly demonstrate that these leaders were followers of the Imam, and they were not allies, at least during the rule of Imam Sálím.

c) **The exchange of correspondence between the Imam and others**

We have valuable primary evidence for the period in the form of the correspondence between Imam Sálím and the ‘*ulamá*’, Shaykhs, Sultan Sd. Fayṣal and his sons and the PAM, including letters sent or received by the Imam himself or his adherents on his behalf. The analysis here is confined to the letters sent or received during the period Jumádà II/ May-Dhú al-Ḥijjah 1331/November 1913. Some of these letters are recorded in full, while others are merely mentioned as having provoked the Imam's reply, which is then given .

On the election of a new Imam it was customary for him to send letters to all the tribal leaders informing them of the event, and asking them to be loyal to him and give him their support. Many tribal leaders, however, who are known to have responded to the Imam's call, received no mention in the correspondence.

It can be seen from table below that the first letter sent by Imam Sálím was to Sh. Májid b. Khamís b. Ráshid al-‘Abrí (70) and Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad b. Muḥsin al-‘Abrí, the Shaykh of al-‘Abriyyín (71). The date of this letter was 13th Jumádà II, 1331, and it was written by Sh. ‘Ámir al-Málikí on the orders of the Imam. These two leaders had promised Sh. al-Sálimí to give him their support, but went back on their promise.

Sh. Májid was a well-known ‘*álim*’ who enjoyed a high position among Omanis. Most of the Wális of the Sultan used to seek his advice and listen to his opinion. He had a strong influence on his tribe and those in its neighbourhood. He was a Qádí in Bahlà during the Imamate of Sd. ‘Azzán (1868-71). He responded to the Imam’s letter, and immediately went to Tanúf and paid homage to the Imam. He was then about 79 years old. Next he wrote to the Wálí of Nazwà, Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad, and to the Shaykhs of the ‘Aláyat of Nazwà, informing them of the Imamate revival and that he had given his allegiance to the Imam, and advised them that they should do the same thing (72).

Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad, however, did not come to the Imam at this time because he was not then in his home town. It was said that he was visiting Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfirí (73). When he returned home, the Imam was on the verge of attacking Nazwà, and when the news came in that the Imam had entered it, he wrote to him asking permission to go to meet him there. The latter, however, replied that Sh. Muhanná should stay where he was (74). It appears that the Imam was displeased with him for not giving his *bay'ah* to him earlier on, and he thought that he had betrayed the Muslims by not fulfilling his promise to give him his full support (75).

One of the most important letters written by the Imam was one sent to the Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal, in which he defined the relationship between the two of them. Unfortunately, this letter is missing, but Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí has stated that it informed the Sultan what had been agreed between the '*ulamá*' and leaders in Tanúf, and that he had been elected as the Imam of the Muslims. The letter called upon the Sultan to support the Muslims in rallying to the Imam and assuring him that he would have the same rights and obligations (76). This is contrary to Landen's assertion that the Imam declared that the Sultan was deposed, and that he was dissociated from the affairs of the Ibádis and deprived of any role in their realm, his decrees becoming null and void (77).

Landen bases his argument on the Imam's letter to Major Knox, the PAM, dated 9th Sha'bán, 1331/ 14th July, 1913, and does not refer to the Imam's letter under consideration. This other second letter states: "You know that the governance of Oman pertains to the '*ulamá*' thereof from old time, and that every king opposed to the '*ulamá*', is deprived of the government, separated from the affair of the Muslims, has no enjoyment (share) in their government and his orders has no validity" (78). Other writers have also quoted this opinion to characterize the behaviour of the Imam's adherents towards the Sultan.

Three further important missing letters are those from Sh. al-Sálimí to Sh. 'Isà (79). In the first letter dating 13th Jumáda II, 1331, Sh. al-Sálimí demanded from Sh. 'Isà to give his *bay'ah* and support the Imam. The second letter was dated on the 19th of the same month, in which he encouraged Sh. 'Isà to hurry up to come and meet the Imam, and in the last letter dated the 2nd of Rajab, he blamed him for not replying to his

call to come and see the Imam, and reminded him that his neighbours, the tribe of al-Ḥajriyyín, had done so before him.

It must be pointed out that Sh. 'Isà's political inclination was in favour of the Sultan and he was not a supporter of the Imamate revival. We have already seen that he had failed to reply to the calls made to him by Sh. al-Sálimí in this regard. Sh. 'Isà was late to give his homage to the Imam, long after the conquering of Nazwà and Izkí at the hands of the Imam and did not do so until 18th Rajab 1331, one month after the establishment of the Imamate, and after he had been subjected to considerable pressure from Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. 'Āmir al-Máلكí (80). The purpose of Sh. 'Isà in going to Izkí was to make peace between the Imam and the Sultan, but he was pressured into giving his *bay'ah* to the former (81). He remained, however, a good friend of the Sultan until the beginning of the 1915, when Imam Sálim decided to attack Muscat (82). This is in contrast to the views of some writers (83) who claim that Sh. 'Isà had a big role in the Imamate revival and that he was the head of one of the groups calling for the overthrow of the Sultan .

Other letters sent by the Imam were addressed to the Wáλί of the Sultan, and the tribes which remained loyal to the Sultan. One of these letters was sent to the Wáλί of Nazwà, Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa'ídí, in which he asked him to stay loyal to him and hand over the town to his authority. Sd. Sayf replied by saying that the town was under the rule of the Sultan and that he could not give it away without seeking the opinion of the Sultan, and he refused in his reply to give his allegiance to the Imam (84).

The Imam also sent a warning letter to Sd. Ḥumúd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál al-Bú Sa'ídí, the Wáλί of Şúr, asking him to withdraw his forces from Izkí. Sd. Ḥumúd was despatched by the Sultan to help his brother Sd. Su'úd b. Ḥamad, the Wáλί of Izkí, against the forces of the Imam. Sd. Su'úd b. Ḥamad had secretly declared his loyalty to the Imam, but he did not announce this publicly because he feared the action of the Sultan's forces (85).

The Imam also sent a letter to Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd b. Khalfán al-Khalílí, and his son, Muḥammad, accusing them of cowardice for not allowing him and his forces to enter Samá'il by their village al-'Aláyah (86).

When Sultan Sd. Fayṣal sent his son, Sd. Ḥamad, to help his besieged brother Sd. Nádír in the fort of Samá'il, he sought the help of B. Jábír. This angered the Imam and he sent a letter to the leaders of the B. Jábír asking them either to drop their support for the Sultan and get rid of his son, or else he would send his army to attack them (87).

There are four letters by Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. 'Isà which were written to the Shaykhs of the Janabah and the B. Bú 'Alí in reply to their letters. In their letters to Ḥimyar and Sh. 'Isà these Shaykhs had demanded that Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. 'Isà should withdraw their support from the Imam, but they replied that it was impossible for them to do that, and they even asked the Shaykhs of the Janabah and the B. Bú 'Alí either to remain neutral or give their support to the Imam (88). The following sums up the letter of Sh. Ḥimyar to Sh. Muḥammad b. Nášir, the *tamímah* of the B. Bú 'Alí: "I warn you and earnestly urge you not to fight the Muslims; if you accept my advice, this is all what I have" (89).

On having given his allegiance to Imam Sálím, Sh. 'Isà wrote letters to the Sultan and his sons in which he said: "we arrived at the town of Izkí on 17th Rajab to salute the Imam and in obedience to the commands of God" and that "we spoke to him about peace between him and the King [Sultan]. In everything good, we pray God for help" (90). This clearly demonstrates that Sh. 'Isà was intent on making peace between the Imam and the Sultan to avoid bloodshed, on the one hand, and to shut the door in the face of foreign intervention in favour of the Sultan, on the other.

During his stay in Samá'il, Imam Sálím exchanged correspondence with Major Knox, the PAM. The latter became increasingly worried by the successes of the Imam, and as a result he sent a letter to him, Sh. 'Isà, Sh. al-Sálímí and Sh. Ḥimyar reminding them of the warning issued by Sd. Fayṣal to the Shaykhs of the tribes on 5th Jumádà II, 1313, that the British government would not allow in future the tribes to attack Muscat and Maṭraḥ, and "that in case the important interests of the subjects of the British government in these two towns [were threatened] ... the aforesaid government will not let anyone of them [tribes] to attack these towns" (91).

The Imam replied to Major Knox's letter after three days, on 9th Sha'bán, 1331 / 14th July, 1913, explaining to him the purpose of the Imamate and its relationship with

Sd. Fayṣal. He emphasized to him that "the ordering of Oman belongs to the *'ulamá'* thereof from old times and that every King [ruler] opposed to the *'ulamá'*, is deprived of the government, separated from the affairs of the Muslims, has no enjoyment (share) in their government and his orders have no validity". He then warned the British government to stop interfering in the Muslims' affairs: "It is incumbent on you (the British) to refrain from the affairs of the Muslims, and it is necessary for you that you should not do us injury" (92). This correspondence continued between the Imam and his leaders on the one hand, and the PAM, on the other. They all demanded from the British that they should withhold their support from the Sultan.

After the death of Sd. Fayṣal, and the coming to power of his son Sd. Taymúr, as his successor, there were moves to improve relations between the Sultan and the tribal leaders including Sh. 'Isà. As a first step in this direction Sd. Taymúr had accepted the offer of Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid (1912-1922) the ruler of Abú Dhabi, who arrived at Muscat at the beginning of November, 1913 to mediate between the Imam and him. Sh. Ḥamdán started immediately by sending letters inviting Sh. 'Isà and Sh. al-Sálimí to come for a meeting in al-Síb town for this purpose, later in Dhú al-Ḥijjáh, 1331. But the mediation of Sh. Ḥamdán was unsuccessful.

The following are the most important letters to have been exchanged between the Imam and others during 1331/1913:-

No.	Date	Letter from	Letter to
1	Jumádà II	Imam Sálim	Májid b. Khamís al-'Abrí and Muhanná b. Ḥamad al-'Abrí
2	do	do*	The Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal b. Turkí
3	do	do	Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad, Wálí Nazwá
4	do	do	'Abdalláh b. Aḥmad, the commander of the fort of Nazwá
5	do	do *	Náṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfrí
6	do	al-Sálimí	Sd. 'Isà b. Ṣálih al-Ḥáarithí
7	16th	Sh. Májid	Sayf b. Ḥamad, Wálí of Nazwá

* This letter is merely mentioned.

8	17th	do	the people of Nazwá : Sh. 'Alí b. Náṣir al-Kindí Sh. Sulaymán b. 'Abdalláh Sh. Muḥammad b. Sulaymán
9	c.13th -18th	Wálí of Nazwá *	Imam Sálím
10	19th	Sh. al-Sálimí *	Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih al-Háarithí
11	22nd-29th	Sh. Muḥanná b. Ḥamad al-'Abrí	Imam Sálím
12	1st Rajab	Imam Sálím	Muḥanná b. Ḥamad al-'Abrí
13	2nd Rajab	Sh. al-Sálimí*	Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih al-Háarithí
14	4th-7th	Sh. 'Ámir al-Málikí *	Imam Sálím
15	10th	Sh. al-Sálimí	Sd. Nádir b. Fayṣal
16	10th	Imam Sálím	Sd. Ḥumúd b. Ḥamad
17	19th	Sh. 'Isà al-Háarithí	Sd. Fayṣal
18	23th	do	Sd Fayṣal
19	do	do	Sd. Taymúr b. Fayṣal
20	do	do	Sd. Nádir b. Fayṣal
21	N.D.	Sh. Muḥammad of B. Bú 'Alí *	Sh. Ḥimyar
22	25th	Sh. Ḥimyar	Sh. Muḥammad of B. Bú 'Alí
23	N.D.	Sh. Muḥammad, of B. Bú 'Alí *	Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih al-Háarithí
24	25th	Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih	Sh. Muḥammad of B. Bú 'Alí
25	N.D.	Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd al-Khalílí *	Imam Sálím
26	1st Rajab	Imam Sálím and Sh. al-Sálimí	Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd al-Khalílí and his son, Muḥammad
27	27th	Imam	Shaykhs of village of Híl
28	28th	Sh.al-Sálimí	Sd. Nádir b. Fayṣal
29	Sha'bán	do *	Shaykh of B. Jábir
30	2nd	Imam *	all Omanis in East Africa
31	N.D.	Shaykhs of Janabah *	Sh. Ḥimyar
32	5th Sha'bán	Sh. Ḥimyar	all Shaykhs of Janabah
33	N.D.	Shaykhs of Janabah*	Sh. 'Isà
34	Sha'bán	Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih	all Shaykhs of the Janabah
35	6th	The PAM	Imam Sálím

36	9th	Imam Sálím	The PAM
37	16th	Sh. 'Isà b. Şálih	Humayyid b. 'Umayr al-Hiná'í
38	16th	Do	Sd. Hilál b. Muḥammad
39	16th	Do	Muzaffar b. Sulaymán
40	N.D.	The PAM	Imam Sálím
41	19th	Sh. 'Isà b. Şálih	Sd. Taymúr
42	22nd	Do	Sd. Taymúr
43	29th	Imam Sálím	The PAM
44	1st Ramaḍán	The PAM	Imam Sálím
45	Shawwál	Imam Sálím	The PAM
46	do	do	The PAM
47	5th Dhú al-Qi'dah	Sh. al-Sálimí	The PAM
48	7th	The PAM	Imam Sálím
49	N.D.	Sd. Taymúr	all the Chiefs of Oman
50	N. D.	Sh. 'Isà b. Şálih*	Sd. Taymúr
51	N.D.	Do*	the PAM
52	N. D.	Imam and al-Sálimí*	Sd. Taymúr
53	N.D	do*	the PAM
54	Dhú al-Hijjah	Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid*	Sh. 'Isà b. Şálih and Sh. al-Sálimí
55	do	Sh. Hilál al-Ḥajrí	Sh. 'Isà b. Şálih
56	do	Sh.Sálim al-Ḥasaní*	Sh. 'Isà b. Şálih

Some conclusion about the Imam's policy programme can be drawn from his speeches and correspondence.

The first objective of the Imam was to unite the Omanis under his leadership, and to make Nazwà the capital of his Imamate. In order to achieve this aim, he called upon the Sultan and the chiefs of the tribes to submit to his authority. He also called upon the Sultan's Wális, especially in the Interior Province, to surrender the forts to him. This is on the official level. As for the popular level, the Imam called upon the people to join him for the achievement of the set aims. The speed with which people responded to the Imam's call was impressive, as was evident in Nazwà which on its fall was crowded with

* This letter is merely mentioned.

people coming from all towns and villages from those who responded to the *jihád* call, to those seeking justice and others who were motivated by a desire for material gains.

The second objective in the Imam's plans was to check foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Oman, especially that of the British. This is why we saw the flow of correspondence between him and the PAM, especially focusing on this issue.

This is not to imply that the Imam was inimical to the British. Indeed, he was conscious of the power of the British, especially of the British maritime power through the control of their navy over the seas; he therefore sought their collaboration and friendship. As the bulk of the Omani trade was with India, and it passed through the Indian Ocean, which was under the effective control of the British navy, the Imam was very conscious of the significance of the British power, and in a bid to win their friendship, he undertook to guarantee the safety of British subjects resident in Oman. This is evident in the Imam's friendly attitude towards the PAM, whom he described as a capable man, when the PAM presented to the Imam his initiative for reconciliation between him and the Sultan. The Imam's response was: "I see no objection to peace being arranged between myself and Sd. Taymúr, and you are a suitable and capable person to undertake the same" (93).

It is clear that the Imam's objection was not so much to the presence of foreigners in Oman, but to their interference in the internal affairs of the country. As a result, we see that the Imam did not ask the British, French or the Americans to leave the country, but that in many cases, he often consulted the French and the Americans on the principles of Christianity governing the declaration of war and the like.

The third objective in the Imam's agenda was to abate the internal conflicts between the Hináwí and the Gháfirí tribes. The Imam, therefore, stressed in his speeches this aim, either directly or indirectly. To be sure, the effects of these conflicts have been the cause of all problems in Oman, throughout its history. The Imam, conscious of the roots of the problem, directed many of his letters to the chiefs of the tribes urging them to observe the goal of unity and cohesion. The Imam thus sought the support of the two important leaders, Sh. Ĥimyar b. Náṣir al-Riyámí, the *tamímah* of the Gháfirí faction, and Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣáliḥ al-Ĥárithí, the *tamímah* of the Hináwí faction. The former demanded

that as a condition, the Imam should not interfere in the affairs of the region under his control, in return for supplying the Imam with a thousand warriors, if asked to do so. The same also applied to Sh. 'Isà. However, the difference between the two leaders was that Sh. Ḥimyar was a strong opponent of the Sultan and an invincible enemy, while Sh. 'Isà was a supporter of the Sultan. For that matter, the Imam preferred to leave his troops into several groups under their personal leader, so as to minimize friction and conflict between the tribes.

The fourth policy objective of the Imam was the application of Islamic *Shari'ah* in civil matters, such as social equity, education, the upgrading and revival of interest in the observance of Islamic duties, mosques, and propagation of Islamic culture and books, the application of *Shari'ah* principles, the attendance of the *Jum'ah* prayer, and others. All of these principles were relaxed previously, and now that the Imam sought a revival of the general Islamic principles, which was essentially the cause for the call for the Imamate. The Imam, therefore, emphasized these roles in his speech, and was corroborated in that by both Sh. al-Málikí and Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí in their respective speeches. And in order to reinforce his position, the first thing that the Imam did was to perform the *Jum'ah* prayer in Nazwà on its fall. Sh. al-Sálimí remarked, commenting on that: "Thanks to God who gave us back our *Jum'ah* prayer " (94).

It is not our concern here to document all that had been achieved with regard to the revival of the spirit of Islam in the society. However, it is no exaggeration to state that the Imamate truly became a typical version of the Islamic state during the era of the first four caliphs in early Islam, in its idealism and adherence to the principles of the faith. For these reasons, the Imamate was enthusiastically welcomed by the '*ulamá*' and the general public, who were under the control of the Imam. Those groups who opposed the Imamate included those who had lost their positions of political power or those who were hostile to the application of the Islamic laws and fearful of the possible extremism accompanying their application, such as the Imam's Wális in Rustáq and in Bahlà.

These, in sum, were the Imam's main objectives of the Imam's programme. In the following chapters we will see to what extent these four main objectives were implemented, and with what effects and consequences.

Endnotes

- (1) al-Rayyis, al-Nazariyyát, p. 116.
- (2) al-Shahrastání, al-Milal, vol. I p. 20; al-Rayyis, op.cit. p. 74.
- (3) al-Ash‘arí, op.cit. vol. I p. 2; al-Rayyis, op.cit. p. 24.
- (4) al-Mawardí, al-Aḥkám al-Sultániyyah, pp. 5f.
- (5) al-Rayyis, op.cit. pp.131-34.
- (6) al-Shahrastání, Niháyat al-Aqdám p.481; al-Ash‘arí, op.cit.vol. II p. 460; al-Mawardí, op.cit. p.5.
- (7) Ibn Khaldún, al-Muqaddimah, p.391.
- (8) al-Šá‘ighí, Kanz al-Adíb, fol. 83r; ‘Umar, al-Ta’ríkh al-Islámí, p. 18.
- (9) Háshim, op.cit. p. 298.
- (10) Háshim, op.cit. pp.291-95; al-Shammákhí, Sharḥ Muqaddimat al-Tawḥíd, fols. 16v-17r.
- (11) al-Šá‘ighí, op.cit. fol. 99v; Cf al-Shammákhí, op.cit. fols. 16v-17r; al-Darjíní, op.cit. p. 82.
- (12) For more detail about Kitmán Imamate see: Háshim, op.cit. pp. 291-95; ‘Umar, Ta’ríkh al-Khalíj pp. 108ff.
- (13) Háshim, op.cit. pp. 298f.
- (14) Háshim, op.cit. p. 298; al-Bísyawí, al-Hujjah p. 22.
- (15) al-Šá‘ighí, op.cit. fol. 82r.
- (16) Ibid.
- (17) al-Darjíní, op.cit. ; al-Shammákhí, Siyar, p. 92; al-Bísyawí, op.cit. p. 22; Háshim, op.cit. pp.295-7.
- (18) Ennami, op.cit. p. 233.
- (19) al-Shammákhí, Sharḥ, fol 26; Háshim, op.cit. pp. 287f.
- (20) al-Ḥárithí, op.cit. p.26; al-Baghdádí, Uṣúl al-Dín, p. 275; Ibn Ḥazim, al-Maḥallá, vol. I p. 26; al-Ghazálí, Faḍá’ih al-Báṭiniyyah, p.208; al-Baqlání, al-Tamhíd, p. 181; Ibn Khaldún op.cit. p. 162; al-Bayyátí, al-Dawlah, pp. 314-16; al-Rayyis op.cit. pp. 228-34.
- (21) al-Šá‘ighí, op.cit. fol. 82; ‘Umar, al-Ta’ríkh al-Islámí, p. 16; Wilkinson, “The Ibádí Imama” p. 538
- (22) al-Mawardí op.cit. p. 8; Ibn Ḥazim, al-Maḥallá, vol. 9 p. 363; al-Rayyis op.cit. pp. 228-34.
- (23) al-Šá‘ighí, op.cit. fol. 82r; ‘Umar, al-Ta’ríkh al-Islámí, p. 16f.
- (24) al-Mawardí, op.cit. pp. 19f; al-Shahrastání, Niháyat, p. 296; Ibn Ḥazim, al-Milal, vol.iv. pp. 175f; al-Ghazálí, Iḥyá ‘Ulúm al-Dín, vol. ii p. 111.
- (25) al-Šá‘ighí, op.cit. fols. 85r & 98v; al-Bísyawí, op.cit. fol. 13.
- (26) ‘Umar, op.cit. p. 18.
- (27) Ennamí, op.cit. pp. 193f.
- (28) al-Nawawí, al-Minháj, vol. vii p. 120.
- (29) al-Baghdádí, op.cit. p. 281; al-Rayyis, op.cit. p. 172.
- (30) al-Mawardí, op.cit. pp. 17f.
- (31) al-Nawawí, op.cit. vol. vii p. 120.
- (32) al-Ḥaḍramí, Abú Isháq, Mukhtaṣar al-Khiṣál fol.70r; al-Ruqayshí, op.cit. fol. 21v.
- (33) The following are examples of some of the ‘*ulamá*’ who took part in electing Imams;
 - a) Among the ‘*ulamá*’ who elected al-Julandá (132/749-134/751-2) were Sh. Abu al-Maw‘dúd Ḥájib al-Ṭá‘í, Sh. al-Rabí‘ b. Ḥabíb, Sh. Shabíb b. ‘Uṭayyah, and Sh.Khalaf b. Ziyád al-Baḥrí.
 - b) Among the ‘*ulamá*’ who elected Muḥammad b. Abí ‘Affán (177/793-179/795) were Sh.Músá b. Abí Jábir al-Izkawí, Sh. Muḥammad b. al-Mu‘allà al-Kindí, Sh.Bashír b. al-Mundhir, and al-Wáarith b. Ka‘b al-Kharúṣí.
 - c) Among the ‘*ulamá*’ who elected Sa‘íd b. ‘Abdalláh (320/930-327/939) were Abú Muḥammad al-Ḥawári b.‘Uthmán, Sh. Abú Muḥammad Ibn Abí al-Mu‘thir, Sh. Muḥammad b. Zá‘idah al-Samá‘ilí, and Sh. Abú Sa‘íd al-Kudamí.
 - d) Among the ‘*ulamá*’ who elected al-Khalíl b. Shádhán (407/1016-425/1033) were Sh. Muḥammad b. al-Muḥḍilí al-Kindí, and Sh. al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad al-Kindí al-Bahlawí.
 - e) Among the ‘*ulamá*’ who elected Muḥammad b. Ismá‘íl (906/1500-936/1529) were Sh.‘Abd al-Báqí b.‘Umar b. Muḥammad b. Sulaymán, and Sh.Madád b. ‘Abdalláh b. Madád.
 - f) Among the ‘*ulamá*’ who elected Náṣir b. Murshid al-Ya‘rubí (1034/1624-1059/1649) was Sh. Khamís b. Sa‘íd al-Shaqṣí.
 - g) Among the ‘*ulamá*’ who elected ‘Azzán b. Qays al-Bú Sa‘ídí (1285/1868-1287/1871) were Sh. Sa‘íd b. Khalfán al-Khalílí, Sh. Šáliḥ b. ‘Alí al-Ḥárithí, and Sh. Muḥammad b. Sulayyim al-Gháribí.

- h) Among the '*ulamá*' who elected Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúsí (1331/1913-1339/1920) were Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Humayd al-Sálimí and Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí.
- (34) Anthony, op.cit. pp. 111f.
- (35) This family had inherited power in Nazwá (see family tree 5).
- (36) For further information See al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 96-99; Miles, "On the border of the Great Desert" In GJ vol. 36, no.2 pp. 175-8; Peterson, Oman, pp. 125f.
- (37) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p.137.
- (38) It is interesting to note that this fact of Islamic political life is emphasized by Ibn Khaldún in his Muqaddimah. See Ibn Khaldún, op.cit. p. 391 and p. 414.
- (39) al-Háarithí, Sa'íd, op.cit. p. 19.
- (40) al-Háarithí, Sa'íd. op.cit. p. 20; al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 138.
- (41) He was eulogized by al-Sálimí, Muḥammad b. Shíkhán. (Díwán of Ibn Shíkhán, p.182) in a poem in which he described his various good qualities. He was also mentioned by al-Bú Sa'ídí, Ḥamad b. Sayf in his al-Mujaz. p. 57 : " Hilál and his brother Su'úd are like two betting horses (meaning in generosity)" .
- (42) See al-Mawardí al-'Aḥkám al-Sultániyyah for the qualifications of an Imam.
- (43) The present writer investigated this question by interviewing some of the '*ulamá*', and it became evident to him from these interviews that Imam Sálím is considered one of the '*ulamá*'. This was confirmed by Sh. Sa'íd b. Khalaf b. Muḥammad al-Kharúsí (the deputy general Muftí of the Sultanate of Oman), who had previously asked his teacher, Sh. Khalfán b. Jumayyil al-Siyábí (d. 1972), about this matter and his answer was that Imam Sálím was an '*álim*'.
- (44) Imam Sálím never issued a religious farwà, and apparently he used to depend for this on Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. 'Amir b. Khamís al-Málikí, who succeeded Sh. al-Sálimí as the judge of the Imam for fatwas and religious judgments. See al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 398.
- (45) For example when he was young he used to go and collect dates from nearby date-groves and one day he found a part of a bough of a palm tree which had fallen on the ground. He took it to the owner of the date palm, who told him that was unnecessary. Imam Sálím replied, "we collect those dates which have fallen naturally, but this one may have been due to some act of willful damage, and must be returned to the owner". Another example: Imam Sálím was in al-Qábil, one day when he saw Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí washing his clothes and wringing them outside the Falaj, he shook his head in disapproval. Sh. Muḥammad looked at Imam Sálím and asked " what is wrong?" Imam Sálím replied " I am surprised at what you are doing". Sh. Muḥammad returned: "What have I done to make you surprised?" Imam Sálím retorted: " because you have washed your garment in the Falaj but wrung it outside it. You should have wrung it inside the Falaj to return the excess water back into the Falaj, because this is a property of someone else and we only have the right to wash inside it." Sh. Muḥammad replied: " I will not do that again". See al-Háarithí, Sa'íd, op.cit. p.48.
- (46) Ibn Khaldún, op.cit. p. 395.
- (47) al-Háarithí, Sa'íd. op.cit. p. 45.
- (48) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 137-139 and pp. 150-52.
- (49) Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí does not specify these in his book.
- (50) In his fatwà, Sh. al-Sálimí depended on 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭáb's command that his chosen successor from the six nominees he had recommended should be put to death if he refused to accept the Imamate. According to Abú Ya'qúb al-Warjalání and Tíghúrín b. 'Isà " If all Muslims and those who loose and bind have agreed to elect a man as an Amir of the believers, and there was no one else among them better than he, he should be killed, if he refuses to accept their nomination". See Jahlán 'Idán, al-Fikr al-Siyásí 'ind al-Ibádiyyah. p. 193.
- (51) For further detail about this discussion see al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit., pp. 137f; al-Háarithí, Sa'íd. op.cit. p. 18.
- (52) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 152.
- (53) Qásim, al-Khalíj al-'Arabí 1914-45. p.386; Shahdád, al-Širá', pp.29-31; Landen, op.cit. pp.392f
- (54) al-Sálimí M.A. op.cit. pp. 137f. and pp. 150-2.
- (55) al-Sá'ighí, op.cit. fol. 82r; 'Umar, al-Ta'ríkḥ al-Islámí, p.17; Wilkinson, Ibádí Tradition. p.539
- (56) Yazíd b. Fandín was one of the '*ulamá*' of Táhirt and one of its notables. He was appointed by Imam 'Abd al-Raḥmán b. Rustum to the Shúra council, because of his leadership and academic qualities. He got angry with Imam 'Abd al-Wahháb because the latter did not appoint him to a high position, and revolted against him in A.H.171 and his followers were later named the Nukkáriyya. See al-Darjíní, op.cit. pp.47-56; al-Shammákhí, al-Siyar pp.146-54.
- (57) al-Darjíní, op.cit. vol. I p.49; cf al-Bárúní, Sulaymán. al-Azhár al-Riyádiyyah. vol. ii pp. 152ff.
- (58) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 155f.
- (59) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. pp. 400f.
- (60) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 153-5.

- (61) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. pp. 420f.
- (62) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 156-62.
- (63) The poets on this occasion included:
 1- Sh. 'Ámir b. Khamís al-Málikí (d.1346/1927)
 2- Sh. al-Murr b. Sálím al-Ḥaḍramí
 3- Sh. 'Abd al-Raḥmán b. Násir al-Riyámí
 4- Sh. Muḥammad b. Shíkhán al-Sálimí.
 5- Sh. 'Abdalláh b. 'Ámir b.-'Azrí'
 6- Sh. 'Ámir b. Sulaymán al-'Abbádí
 7- Sh. Jum'ah b. Salím b. Háshil al-Khanjarí
 8- Sh. Abú Muslim Násir b. Sálím al-Ruwáḥí (d. 1338/1920 in Zanzibar)
- (64) Qásim, al-Khalíj- 1914-45. p. 385.
- (65) (R.O II) pp.730f for both Arabic and English versions.
- (66) Qásim, al-Khalíj- 1914-45, p. 387.
- (67) Shahdád, M. Ibráhím. op.cit. p. 31; cf al-'Aqqád, , op.cit. p. 10.
- (68) al-Ḥárithí, Sa'íd. op.cit. pp. 34f.
- (69) Ibid. p.180.
- (70) For further information about Sh. Májid see al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 385ff; al-'Abrí, Ibráhím, op.cit. pp. 142-71.
- (71) See letter in al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 169.
- (72) See letter in al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 169-71.
- (73) al-'Abrí, Ibráhím, op.cit. p.130.
- (74) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 176.
- (75) We will discuss the role of Sh. Muḥanná in conquering al-'Awábí when we discuss the military operations of the Imam (see ch. IV below).
- (76) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 168.
- (77) Landen, op.cit. p. 394.
- (78) (R.O. II) p. 731.
- (79) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 180.
- (80) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 184.
- (81) For further information about Sh. 'Isà see: al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 74-90 ; ARAMCO, Oman, pp. 116-9; Peterson, Oman, pp. 119-22; Murphy "A sketch of the careers of Saleh b. Ali and his son Isa b. Saleh, the stormy petrels of Oman politics" in (I.O) R/15/3/242.
- (82) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 227.
- (83) Qásim, op.cit. p. 386; al-'Aqqád, op.cit. p. 310; Landen, op.cit. p. 393; Shahdád, op.cit. p. 31.
- (84) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 171.
- (85) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 182.
- (86) (R.O II) p. 722.
- (87) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 192.
- (88) See letters in (R.O II) pp. 721-2 & pp. 727-8.
- (89) The full text of the badly translated letter is given in (R.O II) p.721.
- (90) (R.O II) pp. 723f.
- (91) (R.O II). pp. 718f.
- (92) (R.O II). pp. 730f from where the poor translation in taken.
- (93) See Imam's letters in (R.O II) pp. 721-2.
- (94) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 112.

CHAPTER 10

THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER: THE IMAM'S MILITARY OPERATIONS

In this chapter it is proposed to discuss the military operations of the Imam and how he spread his authority over Oman. Traditionally, Oman is divided into a number of provinces whose boundaries cannot be defined with any exactness, but the mountainous range which stretches in the shape of a great crescent extending south eastwards from Ru'ús al-Jibál almost to Ra's al-Hadd, forms an arbitrary divide between provinces. As the Imamate was established in the Interior Province, this area soon came under the complete control of the Imam. In addition to this region the Imam was also able to extend his dominion over al-Sharqiyyah, and some parts of the Eastern and Western Hajar Provinces. The main aim of the Imamate was to control all parts of Oman but the prevailing economic, political, social, and military factors stood against achieving this aim. During the first year of his Imamate, Imam Sálím was able to establish his authority over all the Interior Province and in the following year he achieved some successes on the Western Hajar. This sweeping victory was mainly due to the religious enthusiasm and commitment of the Imam's followers rather than to military factors. All the Imam's direct military operations against the Sultan had ceased after his defeat in the Waṭayyah battle in January, 1915.

It must be mentioned here that the Imam and his followers were in the eyes of the Sultan and the British no more than hard revolutionaries. This is based on the view that anyone who revolts against an established regime is a revolutionary. By contrast the opposition considered itself a reformist group whose main aim was to establish justice in the country and in their view the Sultan was a ruler presiding over a defective non-Islamic government. Despite this view, however, we find that the tribesmen who supported the Imamate had great respect for the Sultan, both at the official and public levels.

After his election as an Imam, Imam Sálím announced his Imamate throughout Oman. He wrote to the principal Shaykhs of Oman, calling upon them to rise in defence of truth and to join all Muslims in the sacred duty of assisting the cause of the Imamate even if only through their prayers (1). The Imam's main aim was the overthrow of the Sultan, and his government, and the spread of justice among people. For this reason he wrote to the Sultan and his Wális asking them to declare their allegiance to him and to step down from government and when he received no response from them he declared war against them to ensure their obedience.

The territories which were annexed during the Imam's military operations (2) can be divided into two main groups: the first group included those towns which were annexed without the need to resort to war, and the second included those towns which were annexed by force. Examples of the first group include: Manah, al-Ḥamrá', Bahlà and Adam in the Interior Province, 'Ibrí, in al-Záhirah, Rustáq in the Western Ḥajar, and some towns in al-Sharqiyyah Province like 'Ibrá', Samad, al-Muḍayrab, al-Qábil and Badiyyah. These towns declared their allegiance either because they failed to stand as an opposing force to the Imam's army or because they accepted the Imam's call to join the Imamate without the need to go to war. This *bay'ah* was completed either by sending one of the Imam's assistants to these towns, or the tribal leaders from these towns came to the Imam of their own accord and declared their *bay'ah* to him. In this case the Imam usually allowed these leaders to rule their towns. Examples of the second group of towns were Nazwà, Izkí, Samá'il, Bidbid in the Interior Province and al-'Awábí, Nakhal, and Wádí al-Ma'áwil in the Western Ḥajar Province.

1) The Occupation of Territories in the Interior Province

The first military action of the Imam was against Nazwà, because of its historical and religious importance to the Imamate. The Imam first wrote to its Wálí, Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad and its notables asking them to declare their allegiance to him. The same thing was also done by Sh. Májid b. Khamís al-‘Abrí who tried to persuade these people to give their *bay‘ah* to the Imam (3). The reply of the Wálí to these calls, however, was negative, and he explained his position in that he was the Sultan's representative in the town and for this reason he could not give it up. This was, of course, understandable, since Sd. Sayf had been the Sultan's Wálí in Nazwà for almost sixteen years (4), and his family had inherited their position generation after generation since the 1830s. It was customary for the Sultan to station a garrison in each fort independent of the authority of the Wálí to ensure that no Wálí was capable of rebelling against him. These garrisons used to be formed from the Ḥaḍramis of Yemen, Najdis from the central Arabia, and the Baluchis, to ensure their neutrality.

Sd. Sayf sent to the Sultan informing him about the content of the Imam's letter and asked for reinforcements. Most of his letters, however, did not reach the Sultan because the B. Riyám of Barakat al-Mawz cut the line of communication between him and the Sultan (5), and channelled all the letters to the Imam, who made use of the information contained in them. Despite the intercepting of the Wálí's letters the Sultan sent his slave, ‘Anbar, with 21 bags of rice, 3,000 rounds of ammunition, and \$MT. 100 in cash to his Wálí Sd. Sayf, but these were confiscated by the B. Riyám, and ‘Anbar was killed and two of his party were wounded (6).

One week after his election, Imam Sálím launched an attack on Nazwà (see chart 1 below). Most of his troops were from the B. Riyám and some parts of the B. Hiná‘h, loyal to the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná‘í. The troops were divided into two battalions, one being under the joint leadership of himself and Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir al-Nabhání, and the other being under the command of the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir. The first battalion was given the task of attacking the ‘Aláyat of Nazwà, which was known by the name Samad al-Kindí, and contained the famous Bayt Ṣulayṭ and the fort of *Jámi‘* (Mosque) of Nazwà (7), leaving the second battalion to concentrate on its Safálah, which also

contained the famous castle and which was under the protection of the Sultan's garrison. The two parts of the town were separated by the Wádí of Kalbúh.

At the break of dawn on 20th Jumádà II/25th May, the Imam attacked al-Maddah (a suburb of 'Aláyah) where the Wálí was resident. He was injured in the first attack on al-Maddah. He then retreated to his Mosque leaving his minister, Sh. Náşir b. Khamís al-Sayfí, to fight the Imam's army. The fighting continued between the two sides until the Wálí committed suicide in the Mosque on 24th Jumádà II/ 31st May (9). It was later revealed in his will that he had preferred death to the humiliation of defeat (10). This was followed by the surrender of his followers, and the inhabitants of Nazwà, including the commander of the castle of Nazwà, 'Abdalláh b. Aḥmad al-Ḥaḍramí who left for Muscat (11). Then, all the inhabitants gave their allegiance to the Imam (12), except Sd. Ḥárib b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa'ídí, the brother of the Wálí, and five of his assistants who were jailed by the Imam for ten days and later released to leave for Muscat. The total number of those killed in the battle was fifty (13), five of whom were from the Imam's side (14), and the total number captured by the Imam exceeded one thousand men (15). Among those killed was the Wálí, Sd. Sayf, who, fearing to fall into the hands of his enemies, committed suicide as already mentioned (16). One day before his suicide, the Wálí sent to the Imam asking him to pardon him and promised to surrender under the protection of Sh. 'Ámir b. Khamís al-Málikí. The Imam responded to this request by sending Sh. 'Ámir to him. Sd. Sayf, however, put forward three stipulations before giving himself up. He first demanded that the ownership of al-Ruwayashah orchard, which belonged to the *Bayt al-Mál* of Nazwà, be transferred to him; secondly, that the Mosque of Nazwà be his place of residence (17), and thirdly that all the munitions and financial resources of the Mosque should be put in his own name (18). After recording all munitions and armaments, Sh. 'Ámir asked Sd. Sayf to give him until the following day to discuss these stipulations with the Imam, but Sd. Sayf did not wait for the Imam's reply, and killed himself before Sh. 'Ámir informed him of the Imam's reaction (19). No evidence, however, is available on whether the Imam had accepted Sd. Sayf's stipulations or not; what is certain is that he forgave him (20).

According to Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí the total cost of the war was paid by Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir al-Nabání and the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná'í. The Imam and his close '*ulamá*' on the other hand lost 3000 rounds of ammunition. Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí does not give the total financial losses, but he states that his father, Sh. al-Sálimí had \$MT. 300 (three hundred) when he left al-Sharqiyyah and he had \$MT. 20 (twenty) remaining when the Imam attacked Nazwà (21). It is almost certain that the '*ulamá*' had some money for personal expenses. The soldiers' expenses were usually met by the heads of the tribes, as customary at that time, but sometimes individuals took care of themselves from their own resources.

The fall of Nazwà had a number of consequences: first, Nazwà was declared the capital of the Imamate as it had been in the past; secondly, the victory increased the confidence of the Imam's adherents which in turn created in them a spirit of self-denial and sacrifice, and thirdly, it influenced the Omani tribes and the Sultan. Immediately after the fall of Nazwà the tribes came to the town and declared their allegiance to the Imam. Among them were the following (22):

- 1- The Durú' tribe whose Shaykh was Sh. Ḥumayd b. Khulayfín al-Dur'í
- 2- Al-Ya'áqíb tribe whose Shaykh was Sh. Sulṭán b. Ráshid b. 'Abdalláh al-Ya'qúbí
- 3- Al-Ḥajriyyín tribe of al-Sharqiyyah
- 4- A section of the Janabah tribes, inhabiting Adam, whose Shaykh was Sa'd b. Sa'íd b. Náṣir al-Jaháfí.
- 5- Al-Maháriq tribe of Adam.

It is clear that the number of the Imam's supporters had greatly increased and Nazwà became crowded with tribesmen willing to take part in the *jihád*. For this reason the Imam turned his intention to annexing Izkí next, following the announcement by the Wálí of Manaḥ (23), Sd. Sayf b. Sulṭán al-Bú Sa'ídí, and his brother, Sd. Ḥumúd b. Sulṭán, the Shaykh of Manaḥ of their loyalty to him. The latter handed over their town to the Imam, who appointed Sh. Sálim b. Badr b. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná'í as its Wálí, after the Sultan's garrison had withdrawn from its fort.

On his part, Sd. Fayṣal confiscated the weapons and money of the sympathisers and supporters of the Imam, especially those who had recently arrived from abroad or had

property deposited with French merchants. It was estimated that the total amount confiscated in this manner was one lac of dollars (one lac or lakh =100, 000) (24). He also increased the taxes on imports and exports to and from inland. On the military side, he sent a force under the leadership of his two sons, Sd. Ḥamad and Sd. Nádír, to Nakhal and Samá'il respectively in early June, 1913. The former was to assist the Wálí of al-'Awábí while the latter was to help the Wálí of Izkí (25). This was followed by sending a second force under the command of Sd. Ḥumúd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál al-Bú Sa'ídí, the Wálí of Şúr, to support his brother, the Wálí of Izkí, Sd. Su'úd b. Ḥamad. The Sultan also sent messages to the tribes loyal to him, asking them to come to his aid and support him against the Imam (26). In addition, he wrote to the British government asking for military assistance to defend the capital, and to honour the undertaking of 1895, which has been mentioned earlier. He started preparing for the war by moving his valuables to the forts of Muscat (27), and he warned by drumbeat all the inhabitants of the suburbs that it was unsafe to stay outside the walls at night (28); any men without weapons and ammunition were supplied with them (29).

During the Imam's stay at Nazwà the financial resources of the Imamate greatly increased, mainly as a result of confiscating the properties of the Wálí of Nazwà, together with what was already in the *Bayt al-Mál* plus the supplies sent by the Sultan to his Wálí in Nazwà.

According to the British records, Sd. Fayşal tried to send reinforcements of arms and provisions to Nazwà, but communications had fallen into the hands of the Imam's followers, and as a result these reinforcements never reached their destination (30). All these factors, in addition to the invitation of the Wálí of Izkí, Sd. Su'úd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál al-Bú Sa'ídí to surrender the town to him, helped the Imam make the decision to proceed to Izkí.

First, the Imam sent a force composed mainly from al-Ḥajriyyín tribe under the command of Sh. 'Āmir b. Khamís al-Málikí to Izkí to arrange its takeover. On reaching Izkí, Sh. 'Āmir used the Mosque of Izkí in the Yaman section as his headquarters (31). The Wálí, Sd. Su'úd and Sh. 'Āmir soon proceeded to hand over the town peacefully to the Imam without the need to fight with the Sultan's garrison which was occupying the

fort. They agreed to concert a plan to get rid of this garrison which was reinforced by a new force under the command of the Wálí's brother, Sd. Ḥumúd b. Ḥamad who left the town on the same day as Sh. 'Āmir's arrival. On the other side Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd b. Khalfán al-Khalílí, the *tamímah* of B. Ruwáḥah, played a role in reinforcing Izkí by suggesting the transfer of the gunners stationed in the fort of Samá'il to it, but his attempts were turned down by Sd. Nádír b. Fayṣal on the grounds that Samá'il was strategically more important than Izkí, and that the Imam might attack Samá'il before Izkí.

The plan put forward by Sh. 'Āmir and the Wálí to get rid of the Sultan's garrison involved the invitation of the B. Ráshid (the inhabitants of the village of al-Qaryatayn) (32) to come and join him in the fort and its surrounding places to pretend that they wanted to defend the town against a possible attack by the Imam (33), and when Sd. Su'úd b. Ḥamad left of the fort to meet the Imam, the B. Ráshid would then attack the garrison, and force them to come out of the fort.

On receiving the details of the plan, the Imam marched to Izkí on 9th Rajab, 1331/13th June, 1913, accompanied by a large number of tribesmen. This illustrates the resentment of the tribes of the Interior Province towards the Sultan and his actions, and particularly his neglect of tribal affairs. On the following day the Imam arrived to Izkí (34), and on the same day Sd. Ḥumúd b. Ḥamad returned to Izkí, accompanied by Sh. 'Alí b. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd al-Khalílí, and Sh. Sulṭán b. Manṣúr b. Náṣir al-Ghufaylí al-Wahíbí. On hearing of the Imam's arrival in the town, Sd. Ḥumúd stationed his forces in the village of Saddí (35). In the meantime, Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd b. Khalfán tried to persuade Sd. Nádír in Samá'il to march with his force to Izkí, but this attempt had failed, because Sd. Nádír had received orders from his father not to do anything outside Samá'il (36). The Imam sent a warning to Sd. Ḥumúd telling him to leave Saddí or else prepare for war, and since the latter had little force with which to fight the Imam, he preferred to retreat to Samá'il. Sh. 'Alí b. 'Abdalláh, and Sh. Sulṭán b. Manṣúr, on the other hand, waited in Saddí for Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih al-Ḥáarithí to arrive.

On 12th Rajab/17 June, the Wálí of Izkí, Sd. Su'úd, came out of the fort to meet the Imam, and at the same time the B. Ráshid, the supporters of the Wálí, asked the

commander of the garrison, ‘Awaḍ al-Ḥaḍramí (37) to withdraw his forces from the fort. He agreed to their demand and retreated to Samá’il.

Not all the people of Izkí, however, gave their *bay‘ah* to the Imam, especially the B. Ruwáḥah (Hináwí faction), who demanded from the Imam a delay until the arrival of Sh. ‘Isà, and Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Sa‘íd b. Khalfán al-Khalílí, because they could take any decision without consulting them. The Imam had previously sent Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málikí to their Shaykh, Sh. Ḥámid b. Sayf b. Aḥmad al-Ruwáḥí who was controlling Bayt Qárút, a well fortified position belonging to the B. Riyám (Gháfirí faction), which had been confiscated from them by Sulaymán b. Suwaylim (d. 1907) (38).

During this period the Imam awaited the arrival of Sh. ‘Isà who left his place on 15th Rajab, 1331, and Sh. al-Sálimí prepared a big reception party for him. According to Sh. ‘Abd al-Raḥmán b. Náṣir al-Riyámí, he was asked by Sh. al-Sálimí to compose a poem to welcome Sh. ‘Isà. This he did and the poem was recited during the *bay‘ah* of Sh. ‘Isà (39). This implies that Sh. al-Sálimí was very anxious for Sh. ‘Isà to join the Imamate to give it coherence and unity by bringing together the Hináwí and Gháfirí factions particularly, ^{since} up to that moment the Hináwí had been reluctant to join the Imamate.

On 17th Rajab/ 22nd June, Sh. ‘Isà arrived at Izkí. In his company were his brother, ‘Alí b. Ṣálih, Ḥamdún and Ḥamad b. Ḥumayd b. ‘Abdalláh al-Ḥáarithí, Sálim b. ‘Umayr b. Ḥanḍal al-Ḥáarithí and Sh. Muḥsin b. ‘Āmir b. Sulṭán al-Ḥáarithí (40). The Imam sent Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. ‘Āmir al-Málikí to Sh. ‘Isà at his residence in the Yaman quarter of the town to persuade him to give his *bay‘ah* to him. He finally gave him *bay‘ah*, and he then went to meet him at the Ḥabíb Mosque where he and the notables of his tribe also gave their allegiance to the Imam. Sh. al-Sálimí then gave a welcoming speech to Sh. ‘Isà in which he called upon Muslims to adhere to the teaching of the Qur’án and the Sunnah (41).

The adherence of Sh. ‘Isà to the Imamate had given it power and coherence and he became one of its symbols. This in turn made other tribes join. Two days later Sh. Ḥámid b. Sayf al-Ruwáḥí declared his *bay‘ah* and handed over all the important military positions to the Imam, including Bayt Qárút (42). Soon after this Sh. ‘Isà started a move to make peace between the Imam and the Sultan, on condition that the former should not go further

than Izkí, and leave Wádí Samá'il to the Sultan. A long discussion between the Imam and Sh. 'Isà then followed, with the former refusing to accept this proposal. Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí states that hostility was on the point of erupting between the two sides, had it not been for the interference of the Shaykhs of the Ḥajriyyín tribe who persuaded Sh. 'Isà to drop his proposal at least for the time being (43). In fact Sh. 'Isà was under considerable pressure from the *tamímah* of the B. Ruwáḥah and Sh. 'Alí b. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí, who encouraged him to use his influence on the Imam to stop him from proceeding to Wádí Samá'il, but Sh. 'Alí's attempts were unsuccessful. He wrote a letter to Sd. Nádír in which he mentioned that "I met Sh. 'Isà b. Şáliḥ at Izkí with thirty men, and the latter was ready to mediate, but the Imam and Sh. al-Sálimí refused to listen to any talk of peace and told him to desist from such effort" (44). The persistence of the Imam and his followers in attempting the overthrow of the Sultan, and their refusal to accept any mediation, had forced Sh. 'Isà to accept unwillingly the status quo, making use of any opportunity to ask the Imam to make peace with the Sultan.

After taking control of Izkí, the Imam turned his attention to the strategic Wádí Samá'il which is the only passage connecting the coastal and inland towns (45). Before leaving Izkí, he appointed Sh. Ḥamdán b. Sulaymán b. Sayf al-Riyámí as Wálí of Izkí, and Sh. Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh al-Riyámí as its Qáđí. He marched to Samá'il, 56 Km. east of Izkí, on 26th Rajab/1st July, passing through Qárút, and Híl village (46) on Wádí the B. Jábír (47). Before reaching Híl, the Imam wrote to its Shaykhs informing them of his arrival and that he would like to meet them (48). During his stay at Híl, the Imam wrote a second letter to Sd. Nádír: "we have informed you that all who are around you are against you, and perhaps the truth of my saying has become clear to you, and also the disinterestedness of my advice. Then, if your desire is safety in both worlds, enter into what the Muslims have entered, and, if your desire is for this world's goods only, then look out for yourself a way of escape before you are surrounded" (49).

It appears that the Imam had chosen to go through Wádí B. Jábír for two reasons: the presence of the B. Jábír (who were of the Gháfírí faction), and the fact that the Imam had received a letter from Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd al-Khalílí requesting him not to enter Samá'il from 'Aláyah. In addition, there was a rumour that the B. Ruwáḥah who were

accompanying the Imam had refused to allow the B. Riyám to enter Wádí Samá'il, because of the fear that they might take their revenge on the B. Ruwáḥah, the inhabitants of the Wádí (50). This was the opinion of both the Imam and the B. Riyám, who believed that if the B. Ruwáḥah entered the Wádí they would encounter no difficulties from the people of their own tribe inhabiting the Wádí, especially since their leaders were in the company of the Imam and Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Ḥámid b. Sayf al-Ruwáḥí.

Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd al-Khalílí had played a significant role in this plan. He held a meeting with Sh. Sulṭán b. Maṣṣúr, the Shaykh of Āl Wahíbah to discuss the possible reaction of the Imam before he started marching towards Samá'il. It was decided during this meeting that Sh. 'Abdalláh should send his son Sh. 'Alí, and Sh. Sulṭán b. Maṣṣúr to Izkí to meet Sh. 'Isà to persuade the Imam not to proceed further and not to attack Samá'il. Sh. 'Isà had, however, failed to do this, and this forced Sh. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí to write directly to the Imam asking him to go through Wádí B. Jábir. The Imam's response to Sh. 'Abdalláh's request was as follows: "your letter has reached us, barring access to your town. Perhaps you desire to find favour with your Sultan or with the Bedouins of Āl Wahíbah. We could never believe that of you.... We are obliged to come into the town with truth, not with violence" (51).

It must be emphasized that the Āl Wahíbah were at that time supporters of the Sultan, and they were brought to Samá'il by Sd. Nádír to defend the town against the Imam. However, after Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih al-Ḥáarithí gave his *bay'ah* to the Imam, they withdrew from Samá'il and retreated back to their homeland (52). Naturally this withdrawal affected the position in Samá'il of Sd. Nádír who wrote to his father Sd. Fayṣal explaining the situation to him. He went on to say in one of his letters that "all these people including the inhabitants of Samá'il are traitors" (53). Sd. Nádír was, however, no more than expressing a fact, and this was why the Imam reminded him that all the inhabitant of the Wádí were against him. However, the B. Jábir and the Siyábiyyín tribe did not give their *bay'ah* to the Imam, nor did they show any support for the Sultan and preferred to remain neutral. Bannerman observes that no tribal leader at that time was able to resist the wishes of his own tribesmen (54).

Sd. Nádír had arrived to Samá'il early in June (see above) with a force consisting of 2,000 men (55), all of them from Āl Wahíbah. Because of the strategic and economic importance of the passage, the Sultan sent further reinforcement to Samá'il by the end of the same month, consisting of 500 men from Shuhúh of Khaṣab, and 600 men from Şúr and Ja'lán, among whom were Janabah, al-Hishm, B. Rásib, and the B. Bú 'Alí. They arrived at Bidbid on 24th Rajab/29th June under the command of Sh. Muḥammad b. Náşir b. 'Abdallál Āl Ḥumúdah, a nephew of the Amir of Ja'lán, Sh. 'Alí b. 'Abdalláh b. Sálím Āl Ḥumúdah (56), and accompanied by Sd. Muḥammad b. Badr b. Sayf al-Bú Sa'idí, the Wálí of Khaṣab. Sd. Nádír was planning to put a force from Şúr and Ja'lán at the entrance of the Wádí al-'Aqq, and the remaining force from Shuhúh in the fort of Bidbid, but after the withdrawal of the latter to Nakhal to help the Sultan's garrison at al-'Awábí, he was forced to change his plan, especially after he received orders from his father "that he should not allow the B. Bú 'Alí to advance beyond that place (Bidbid). This was because if they went on to Samá'il, there would be a danger of them being cut off by a force advancing down the Wádí al-'Aqq" (57).

The Shaykhs of the Janabah and the B. Bú 'Alí wrote to Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. 'Isà informing them that they would be coming to Bidbid as subjects of the Sultan, and asked them to desist from helping the Imam. They warned them that the consequence of this involved their personal safety and that of their followers. But Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. 'Isà not only rejected these demands, but also warned them against shedding Muslim blood; they also informed them that a delegation from the tribes of the Sharqiyyah Province had met the Imam, requesting the appointment of a leader over them to attack Ja'lán (58).

On receiving no reply from Sd. Nádír, the Imam finally decided to attack Samá'il. He divided his troops into two groups: the first group was under the joint command of the Imam himself and Sh. 'Isà, and was to attack Samá'il through 'Aláyah, while the other group was under the command of Sh. Ḥimyar who was to attack Samá'il through the Safálah. The Imam chose the Ibráhímiyyah village (about one mile above the fort of Samá'il) as his camp while the Jibílát was chosen as a camp for Sh. Ḥimyar. No fighting took place between the Imam's troops and the inhabitants of the Wádí Samá'il, except around the fort (the area of the Bazaar and around the house of Sh. Ráshid b. 'Uzayyiz al-

Khuṣaybī, the Sultan's secretary), before finally besieging the fort of Samá'il. Sixteen men were killed in the first day (four of them being from the Imam's side) with an unspecified number of injured on both sides (59). During the first three days the B. Bú 'Alí and Janabah, were at Bidbid trying to help Sd. Nádír, but their attempt was unsuccessful, because they were opposed by Sh. Ḥimyar and his force, and they then decided to leave for Muscat on 1st Sha'bán/6th July thus leaving all the roads leading to the coast and the capital without any protection. The Imam seized this opportunity to send part of his troops to besiege Bidbid, which was without proper defences. There are several reasons for the retreat of the B. Bú 'Alí from Bidbid: they had probably been influenced by what was said in the letters of Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. 'Isà to them; the B. Bú 'Alí probably believed that their traditional enemies, the B. Bú Ḥasan, had attacked their territories in their absence as mentioned by Sh. Ḥimyar in his letter to the Janabah, especially since Sh. Sa'íd b. Ṣáliḥ al-Sunaydí, the leader of Sinadah section of the B. Bú 'Alí was a friend of the B. Bú Ḥasan (60); moreover they were expecting some of their followers to come to them. The Sultan exploited this situation by sending to Sh. Ḥamad b. 'Abdalláh al-Sharqí, the leader of the Sharqiyyín tribe in Fujayrah, to seek his help. Sh. Ḥamad responded to this request by coming to Ṣuḥár with 500 men of his men (61), to replace the B. Bú 'Alí, but after his meeting with Shuḥúḥ on their way to their home territory, he changed his mind and returned home.

The siege of the fort of Samá'il continued for about a month, despite the fact that the number of defending soldiers did not exceed ninety men (62). During this period the Imam exchanged correspondence with the PAM, who warned him in his first letter not to allow the tribes to attack Maṭraḥ and Muscat, because of the British interest in these two towns. The Imam's reply to the PAM was that his conflict was only with the Sultan; he had no quarrel with the British, and he asked him not to support the Sultan. The PAM, however, was determined to defend the two towns and on 9th July/4th Sha'bán, a wing of 250 men from the 2nd Rajput, under the command of Lt. Colonel Smith landed at Maṭraḥ, justifying this measure as a response to a request from the Sultan (63).

On hearing of the landing of British troops, the Imam wrote to the PAM demanding an explanation of the purpose of this force, giving his personal assurances to the PAM that their interests would not be violated. The PAM replied as follows:

" your letter dated 29th Sa'bán, 1331 A.H., has reached me and you mention therein that a part of our soldiers had landed in vicinity of Maskat(Muscat), and you ask the reason thereof. Now we answer you about this that British soldiers have landed for the protection of Maskat and Maṭraḥ, according to the warning contained in the notice of his Highness, the Sultan dated the 5th of Jumáda II, 1313, which I repeated to you in my letter dated the 6th of Sha'bán, 1331 A.H., and in my letter to your companions" (64).

After the B. Bú 'Alí, Janabah, Shuḥúḥ, and al-Sharqiyyín had withdrawn their support for the Sultan, it seems that he had faced some serious crisis which had led him to seek the support of the British to defend his capital. In the meantime daily reports from Samá'il to the Sultan were indicating the desire of the tribes loyal to him to attack the Imam's troops which did not exceed 2,000 men. In response to these calls the Sultan collected a force from the various tribes loyal to him and moved with this force from Muscat to al-Síḅ on 15th July, in order to be nearer to the battlefield in Wádí Samá'il. A prominent figure in these efforts was Sh. Su'úd b. 'Alí b. Jabr al-Jabrí, the most important Gháfirí leader in Samá'il (65). He was a staunch supporter of the Sultan, and provided him with detailed information about the Imam's force and tribes supporting him. He wrote in one of his letters to the Sultan urging him to be quick in sending help to Sd. Nádír: " Oh, Master! if you have help for Sd. Nádír (your son), be speedy with it. Beware of delay! This is no time for delay" (66). This close and intimate relation between Sh. Su'úd and the Sultan aroused the suspicions of the Imam and also annoyed Sh. Su'úd who wrote to the Sultan complaining:

"... letters constantly come to me, sometimes they ask for cartridges and sometimes they demand that I should go with them, and sometimes they demand my allegiance (to the Imam) and sometimes your messenger goes through me to Sd. Nádír. They (the Imam's supporters) do not leave a single arrow untouched from their quiver, but by God's grace nothing of all this penetrates my ears" (67).

On reaching al-Síḅ, the Sultan dispatched his son Ḥamad, Hilál b. Muḥammad b. Náṣir al-Sammár, the Wálí of Barká', Muḏaffar b. Sulaymán, the Wálí of al-Khábúrah, and Sh. Khamís b. Sa'íd b. Ṣáliḥ al-Sunaydí (the leader of the Sunadah, section of the B. Bú 'Alí tribe) with 200 men to Samá'il to see whether it was possible to send the force which he had collected to the town and to test the willingness of the tribes which had remained neutral to join this force (68). Sd. Ḥamad and his company could reach as far as

the Wádí of the B. Jábir, where they stayed for about two weeks and discussed the Sultan's plan with the B. Jábir. Failing to enter Samá'il, Ḥamad launched an unsuccessful attack on Bidbid to the great annoyance of the Imam who wrote to the B. Jábir warning them that they should expel Sd. Ḥamad from their territory. As a result Sd. Ḥamad left the Wádí of the B. Jábir and went back to Muscat (69). In the mean time the Sultan returned from al-Síb to Muscat on 22nd July, leaving his force under the command of his other son, Sd. Taymúr, who left al-Síb for al-Khawḍ (15 Km. south of al-Síb), to persuade its inhabitants to join him in the attack against the Imam. The people of al-Khawḍ, however, refused, and asked the Imam to come to their help, who sent a force under the command of Sh. 'Isà. The latter wrote to his former friend Sd. Taymúr asking him to leave al-Khawḍ, because he did not want to fight him. Sd. Taymúr responded to Sh. 'Isà's request by withdrawing his force, and returning to al-Síb.

Despite the fall of Bidbid into the hands of the Imam (discussed below) the destruction of the fort of Samá'il, and the unsuccessful attempts by Sd. Ḥamad and Sd. Taymúr in getting aid through to Samá'il, the Imam failed to capture the fort. This failure led Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd al-Khalílí to offer his mediation between the Imam and the besieged Sd. Nádír. Both Sd. Nádír and the Imam agreed to this mediation. Sd. 'Abdalláh then entered the fort, and tried to persuade Sd. Nádír to leave the fort. After lengthy discussions Sd. Nádír and Sh. 'Abdalláh agreed that the control of the fort should be put into the hands of Sh. 'Abdalláh for 15 days, after which the fort would be handed over to the Imam, assuming Sd. Nádír had failed to come back with military assistance. Knowing the difficulty of meeting this condition, the Imam was quick to accept Sd. Nádír's demand. He also agreed to allow Sd. Nádír to carry out all his military equipment with him out of the fort (70).

Accordingly, on the night of 28th Sha'bán, 1331/1st-2nd August, 1913 Sd. Nádír left the fort with 12 men of the royal family in his company. Among them were Sd. Ḥumúd b. Ḥamad, Wálí of Şúr, and Sd. Ḥumúd b. Imam 'Azzán. This was in addition to the remnants of his army. To stop any skirmishes between Sd. Nádír's men and the Imam's army, Sh. 'Abdalláh and his son 'Alí b. 'Abdalláh provided an escort for Sd. Nádír and his men up to al-Khawḍ, while 'Abdalláh's other son, Sh. Muḥammad (who

was elected an Imam after the murder of the Imam Sálím in 1920), replaced Sd. Nádír at the fort of Samá'il as agreed.

As soon as Sh. 'Abdalláh and Sd. Nádír reached al-Khawḍ, they heard the news that the Imam had taken control of the fort, and that Sh. Muḥammad had withdrawn from it. This manoeuvring on the part of the Imam was pointless because even if Sd. Nádír had been able to bring up support, he would not have been allowed back in the fort. The acceptance of the above condition by the Imam was simply to convince Sh. 'Abdalláh and Sd. Nádír that he was sincere during the negotiation of the terms of the deal. Nonetheless, it appears that the Imam's decision to take over the fort was somewhat hasty. He should have fulfilled the terms of the agreement, because in either case he would have been able to overrun the fort.

The Imam's actions, however, angered Sh. 'Abdalláh, who considered the Imam's move as evidence of a personal disappointment in him. To correct his mistake and to please Sh. 'Abdalláh, the Imam decided to leave the fort until the 15 days were over and to allow the force of Sh. 'Abdalláh to re-occupy it during this period (71). This period finished on 13th Ramaḍán, and Sh. 'Abdalláh handed the fort over to the Imam (72), because Sd. Nádír did not return to Samá'il according to the terms of agreement.

At the commencement of the year 1334, the Imam returned from al-Sharqiyyah to Nazwà where he stayed for a short time and then left to the Wádí al-Ma'áwil. Soon after leaving Nazwà, his deputy, Sh. 'Ámir al-Málikí, discovered that some notables of Nazwà had written to Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd b. Ráshid al-Gháfirí, the ruler of Bahlà, asking him to capture Nazwà. Sh. 'Ámir immediately arrested three of these conspirators (73). These men tried to exploit (a) the dispute between the Imam and Sh. 'Isà who was of the opinion of making peace with the Sultan in order to allow the Omani people to improve their deteriorating living conditions and (b) the frequent absence of the Imam from Nazwà.

For many reasons Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd wanted to relinquish his relations with the Imam. He even paid a secret visit to the Sultan in Jumádà II, 1334/ April, 1916 to discuss with him his plan to occupy Nazwà. The Sultan probably accepted his ideas and gave him military assistance for that purpose (74). On returning to his home, Sh. Náṣir came up with a plan to occupy the Manaḥ first and then Nazwà, but before doing so he paid a visit

to the Imam (75) who knew about the intentions of Sh. Násir. The Imam decided to dismiss the Shaykh from his position as a ruler of Bahlà (76), and as a precautionary measure he sent first a military force to the Manaḥ and then he wrote to his followers asking them to come to Nazwà to support his decision of expelling Sh. Násir (77).

When Sh Násir knew about the determination of the Imam to oust him from his post, he wrote to his followers in al-Záhirah Province to come to his aid. He also sent to the Sultan for help, who responded by dispatching a force under the command of Muẓaffar b. Sulaymán, the Wálí of the Khábúrah, to support him. In a tactical manoeuvre, the Imam allowed some men of his force to return back to their homes, which made Sh. Násir think that he had dropped the idea of dismissing him and consequently he too relieved some of his men and reduced his force. Soon after knowing about this move, the Imam marched to Bahlà on 13th Rajab, 1334/ 15th May 1916, which he reached in the evening of the same day, accompanied by Sh. Ḥimyar (see chart 2 below). He took advantage of the bad weather that night and entered the town very easily, but failed to capture the fort which he besieged for about forty days. The besiege ended after mediation from Sh. ‘Isà (78) who succeeded in persuading Sh. Násir to withdraw with his troops from Bahlà to Jabrín (Yabrín) on 23th Sha‘bán, 1334/24th June 1916 (79).




Chart (1) Imam Sálím's military operations during the 1331/1913




Chart (2) Imam Sálím's military operations during the 1334/1916 and 1335/1917

2) The Occupation of Territories in the Western Hajar Province

During the Imam's stay at Izkí (June 1913), al-‘Awábí was occupied by Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad al-‘Abrí (80) (see chart 3 below). As mentioned above, Sh. Muhanná had asked the Imam to let him join his army in the attack on Nazwà, but the Imam refused his request because of Sh. Muhanná's delay in giving his *bay‘ah* to him. The relationship between Sh. Muhanná and the Wálí of Nazwà, Sd. Sayf, was friendly, and he did not want to disturb his relations with the Wálí. He supported the Wálí in 1324/1906 in his dispute with Sh. Ḥamdán b. Sulaymán al-Nabhání, who was controlling the ‘Aláyat of Nazwà. That is why he was careful not to give his *bay‘ah* immediately to the Imam until he was sure of the strength of support for the Imam. Sh. Ibráhím al-‘Abrí states that Sh. Muhanná later recognized his mistake and tried to think of some way of getting himself out of this situation and improving his standing with the Imam (81). He found the opportunity to do this when Sh. Májid al-‘Abrí, the deputy of the Imam in Nazwà, proposed to him that he should capture al-‘Awábí (82). Accordingly, he proceeded with his army to al-‘Awábí, but it seems that the revolt had already started in the town under the leadership of the Imam's brother, Sh. Náşir al-Kharúşí, before he reached it. This is because the Sultan had sent his son Sd. Ḥamad to Nakhal to help the Sultan's force in the fort of al-‘Awábí early in June of that year. However, Sd. Ḥamad did not go directly to the ‘Awábí, but stayed at Nakhal and asked its inhabitants to join his troops, who refused to fight their fellow brothers and sons of their tribe in the ‘Awábí (83).

Most of the inhabitants of al-‘Awábí were from B. Kharúş and al-‘Abriyyín, with the political affairs of the town under the control of the latter tribe. Sh. Muhanná had previously captured al-‘Awábí when it was under the control of Sd. Sa‘íd b. Ibráhím b. Qays the ruler of Rustáq (1903-1912) (84), and handed it over to the Sultan who appointed a Wálí over it and stationed there a garrison of 30 men under the command of al-Sharíf ‘Abdalláh b. Sálím al-Ḥaḍramí, in 1901 (85). When Sh. Muhanná attacked al-‘Awábí, the inhabitants surrendered immediately (except the fort under the control of al-Sharíf ‘Abdalláh, who resisted for several days and later declared his surrender in the third week of Rajab, 1331/ June, 1913) (86).




Chart (3) Sh. Muhanná al-'Abrí's campaign against al-'Awábi in Rajab, 1331/June, 1913

It must be pointed out that Sh. Nāṣir b. Rāshid al-Kharúṣí, who was a teacher in the town, had played an important role in preparing the inhabitants of the town for the Imam's rule. After the surrender of al-Sharíf and the withdrawal of his forces to Muscat (87), the inhabitants declared their loyalty to the Imam. Sh. Muhanná and the notables went to Samá'il where the Imam was and gave their *bay'ah*.

Al-Mushhadání claims that after the fall of Izkí Imam Sálím proceeded to al-'Awábí, whose inhabitants gave their allegiance to him (88). This contradicts those historians mentioned above who believe that the Imam did not go to al-'Awábí, nor had any knowledge about Sh. Muhanná's activities there. The Imam could only have gone there by one of two routes: either through Wádí Samá'il or through Wádí Tanúf across the Jabal al-Akhḍar. Neither of these two routes were usable because the first was under the control of the Sultan, while the second route was far away and required that he should return to Tanúf first, which he did not do. It seems that al-Mushhadání lacked any knowledge of the geographical position of al-'Awábí, and probably thought that it was situated near Izkí.

Before the attack on Samá'il by the Imam, Bidbid was occupied by the B. Bú 'Alí and the Janabah, who replaced the Shuḥúḥ tribe which was withdrawn by Sd. Ḥamad b. Fayṣal to assist the commander of al-'Awábí garrison. The B. Bú 'Alí and the Janabah, however, later retreated to Muscat three days (2nd Sha'bán/7th July) after the attack on Samá'il. The fort thus became defenceless except for a small defence force consisting of 12 men under the command of the sons of Sh. Sálím b. Sa'íd al-Aghbarí (89). For this reason the Imam sent Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih with 200 men to besiege the fort of Bidbid. This force was joined by 90 other men from Izkí and Āl Wahíbah under the leadership of Sh. Ḥamad b. Sulṭán b. Sa'íd al-Wahíbí (90).

Sh. 'Isà besieged the fort until the arrival of Sd. Ḥamad b. Fayṣal at the Wádí of B. Jábir on 21st July. He was then sent to al-Khawḍ to stop the advancing force of Sd. Taymúr b. Fayṣal and was replaced by Sh. 'Alí b. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná'í. Soon after that the latter was attacked by Sd. Ḥamad, but the attempt was unsuccessful and Sd. Ḥamad was forced to retreat to the Wádí of the B. Jábir (91). This action made Sh. 'Alí increase his pressure on the fort until the commander of the Sultan's garrison there finally

surrendered it on 25th Sha‘bán/ 30th July. By this time Bidbid had fallen in to the hands of the Imam, and three days later Sd. Nádir left the fort of Samá’il.

By winning the forts of Bidbid and Samá’il, the Imam had achieved a great victory over the Sultan. These two forts represent two of the strategic and politically significant cities which have great importance in linking the interior of Oman with its coast. Had it not been for the lack of awareness of the tribes of this area of the importance of this pass, it would not have been possible for the tribes of the interior to attack Muscat at all. Cox, the Political Resident at the Gulf (PRG), claimed that the Sultan without Samá’il would have been reduced to a mere Shaykh of Muscat (92).

After the fall of Samá’il Sh. ‘Isà and Sh. Ĥimyar left the town for Rustáq and Bahlà respectively. The mission of the former was to ask Sd. Aĥmad b. Ibráhim, the ruler of Rustáq, to declare his allegiance to the Imam. Sh. ‘Isà succeeded in doing this and he accompanied him to Samá’il to meet the Imam on 19th Ramaḍán/22nd August. He gave his *bay‘ah* to the Imam who agreed to let him continue as ruler of Rustáq. Sh. Ĥimyar on the other hand had also succeeded in his mission by winning the support of Sh. Náṣir b. Ĥumayd b. Ráshid al-Gháfirí, the ruler of Bahlà, to the Imam's side. The latter pledged his loyalty to the Imam in Samá’il on 26th Ramaḍán/ 29th August.

Both Sh. ‘Isà and Sh. Ĥimyar were influential figures among their respective tribes and by choosing them as his messengers, the Imam was able to muster the support of the Hináwí and Gháfirí tribes as well as the support of Sd. Aĥmad, the ruler of Rustáq and Sh Náṣir , the ruler of Bahlà. Thus, he was able to spread his influence directly or indirectly, over a wider area of Oman.

Between August, 1913 and March of the following year, the Imam conducted no military operations whatsoever. This was mainly due to the death of the Sultan Fayṣal, who died on 4th Dhú al-Qi‘dah, 1331/ 4th October, 1913, and the coming to power of his elder son, Sd. Taymúr (1305/1887-1385/1965) (93), who showed some signs of reconciliation by inviting his former friend Sh. ‘Isà calling on him to make peace between him and the Imam (94). As a result military operations on all sides had ceased and the Imam took this opportunity to call upon the tribes of al-Sharqiyyah to give him their allegiance. He dispatched for this purpose Sh. al-Sálimí, Sh. Ĥimyar, and Sd. Su‘úd b.

Ḥamad b. Hilál, who succeeded in winning over the subjects of al-Sharúj, and al-Rawáshid in the Wádí 'Indám, and the people of Samad al-Shán. The three leaders were also able to win the loyalty of al-Masákirah and al-Hishim (96).

Sh. Ḥimyar and Sd. Su'úd continued their tour and visited Sh. 'Alí b. 'Abdalláh b. Sálím Āl Ḥumúdah, the leader of the B. Bú 'Alí, for the same purpose. It appears, however, that Sh. Ḥimyar failed to win the support of Sh. 'Alí, but succeeded in persuading him to remain neutral in the struggle between the Imam and the Sultan (89). The Janabah refused to meet him.

In Dhú al-Ḥijjah, 1331/ November, 1913, Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid the ruler of Abú Dhabi (1912-1922) arrived at Muscat and wrote to Sh. 'Isà and Sh. al-Sálimí, telling them that he came to make peace between the Sultan and the Imam, and that he would like to discuss the matter with them. Sh. 'Isà and Sh. al-Sálimí were in al-Sharqiyyah at that time while the Imam was still in Samá'il. They responded to Sh. Ḥamdán's request (97).

The Imam, however, refused the mediation of Sh. Ḥamdán by immediately sending Sh. 'Āmir al-Málikí to meet Sh. 'Isà in al-Síḅ and informing him of his disapproval of the proposed reconciliation. It must be pointed out that the meeting between Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Ḥamdán at al-Síḅ was convened without obtaining the consent of the Imam. The talks between Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Ḥamdán continued, and the latter proposed to Sh. 'Isà that he should meet the Sultan. Despite strong opposition from his adherents, Sh. 'Isà met the Sultan in Muscat on 10th Muḥarram, 1332/9th December, 1913 and discussed with him the terms of reconciliation even though the Sultan was fully aware of the Imam's opposition to such moves. The two men had agreed that Sh. 'Isà should discuss these terms with the Imam in the hope that he might change his mind and agree to them (98). Sh. 'Isà returned and discussed the terms with the Imam as agreed but the Imam refused to give him an immediate answer before consulting his *Shúrá* Council, scheduled to meet at Nazwà later in the year. However, it refused all the terms reached by Sh. 'Isà and the Sultan to achieve reconciliation (99).

The Imam remained in Samá'il until 30th Muḥarram, 1332/ 29th December, 1913 after which he left for Nazwà, after appointing Sd. Su'úd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál as Wálí of Samá'il. During this month he received a delegation from al Má'áwil tribe led by Sh. Sayf

b. Sálím al-Ma'walí and other notables of that tribe, among them being: Sh. Sayf b. Sa'íd b. Sayf, Ḥamad b. Sa'íd, Sa'íd b. Khalfán and Sa'íd b. Ḥamad b. Sayf. The purpose of this delegation was to meet the Imam and give allegiance to him and to urge him to expel the Wálí of the Sultan from their region. The Imam agreed to this demand and promised to see to it at a later date.

One month after the Imam's arrival at Nazwà, Sh. al-Sálímí died in Tanúf (100). Following his death the Imam called a meeting of '*ulamá*' towards the end of Rabí' I, 1332/February, 1914 to choose a successor to Sh. al-Sálímí. It was agreed on two things: (a) to appoint Sh. 'Āmir al-Málikí as a successor to Sh. al-Sálímí to run the religious and administrative affairs of the Imamate (101), and (b) to extend the Imam's authority over Nakhal and Wádí al-Ma'áwil. The latter decision was taken to (i) fulfill the promise made by the Imam to the notables of al-Ma'áwil tribe in his meeting with them, and more importantly (ii) to counter any damage that the death of Sh. al-Sálímí might have done to the morale of his forces, especially by the Sultan and his supporters (102).

To achieve the second objective the Imam moved with his troops at the beginning of Rabí' II, to occupy Nakhal and Wádí al-Ma'áwil (see chart 4 below). He divided them into two groups: one was put under the command of Sh. 'Isà, its task being to use the Wádí Samá'il and settle in Fanjá for counter any possible attack by the Sultan, and one under the command of the Imam, with the aim of crossing the Jabal al-Akhdar via Tanúf. The Imam left Nazwà to al-'Awábí where he was welcomed by its people. Then he moved to Wádí al-Ma'áwil which he entered via Muslimát (103). Its people pledged their allegiance, except for its Shaykh and Wálí Sh. Sulaymán b. Náşir b. Muḥammad al-Ma'walí (104). Later he was persuaded by his people to surrender the fort to the Imam. By doing so the Wádí al-Ma'áwil fell in the hands of the Imam at the second half of Rabí' II without the need to resort to war (105).

The people of Nakhal then declared their loyalty to the Imam who sought the help of Sh. Ḥimyar to address the inhabitants. They were mostly of Gháfirí political orientation. He persuaded them to give their allegiance. The only person who refused was the town's Wálí, Sh. Aḥmad b. Thunayyán b. Sálím al-Ḥarrásí, who asked Sh. Ḥimyar to give him sometime to consult the Sultan about this matter (106). The Wálí's demand was

granted and he wrote to the Sultan who replied: "if you don't have the power to fight, do whatever you like" (107). Accordingly Sh. Aḥmad asked Sh. Ḥimyar to allow him and his forces a safe passage out of the town and thus Nakhal fell at the end of Rabí' II/ March, 1914 . The Imam then issued a decree confiscating the property of Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Náṣir al-Bú Sa'ídí, the Wálí of Maṭraḥ, and that of Sh. Ráshid b. 'Uzayyiz al-Khuṣaybí, the secretary of the Sultan in Nakhal (108).

As a response to the fall of Nakhal, the Sultan collected an ill-trained, heterogeneous force in order to counter act any possible attack by the Imam in Barká'. The Imam expected that the Sultan would attack the Wádí al-Ma'áwil or Nakhal and accordingly he divided his troops into three groups: the first group was under the leadership of Sh. 'Isà who was stationed at Fanjá, the second was in Ḥibrá village (109) and the third group was under the Imam's personal command stationed in Nakhal. This confrontation continued until 13th Jumádà II, when false news (110) reached the Imam that the Sultan's soldiers had attacked the Wádí al-Ma'áwil (112). On hearing this the Imam ordered his army to advance towards Barká' (113), where it met strong resistance from the Sultan's army and was stopped from entering the fort (see chart 4 below). However, the Imam was able to occupy the fort of Nu'mán, a few miles west of Barká', and his followers occupied the house of Sulaymán b. Suwaylim. The fighting lasted for three days (13th, 14th, and 15th) and it ended in the Sultan's favour and the retreat of the Imam to Nakhal. This victory was brought about after the British ship H.M.S. Fox, at the request of the Sultan, bombarded the Imam's troops (113). The Imam lost in this campaign Sh. Sayf b. Sa'íd b. Sálím al-Ma'walí, and Sh. Sulaymán b. Ḥamad al-Ma'walí and an unspecified number of his people.

During the Imam's attack on Barká', the B. Baṭṭásh, who had previously declared their loyalty to the Imam in 1331/1913, succeeded in attacking and occupying Qurayyát. This forced the Sultan to send H.M.S. Dartmouth to repossess the town, which succeeded in expelling the attackers (114).




Chart (4) Imam Sálím's military operations during the 1332/1914

Following his defeat at Barká' the Imam retreated to Nazwà, where he stayed until the end of the year 1914. It appears that he became convinced that his only hope for securing victory against the Sultan and his British allies was to get military assistance from abroad. Relying on the local human resources was not enough to achieve this goal because his men lacked the necessary modern weapons. He wrote to Imam Yaḥyà of Yaman and to the Turkish Wálí there Sa'íd Páshá, asking for their assistance (115), but he received no reply. In the meantime he also wrote to the PAM asking him for an explanation of the involvement of British warships in his conflict with the Sultan, and of their bombardment of his troops without any prior warning something which constituted according to him a violation of the friendly spirit and previous correspondence between them (116).

Having received no response from the Imam Yaḥyà, Sa'íd Páshá, and the British Representative at Muscat, the Imam called his *Shúrá* council for a meeting to discuss the final bid to attack Muscat. The direct reason for this move was the success achieved by the B. Baṭṭásh, who had successfully attacked the British garrison at Ruwi, seizing some of their rifles while some of them attacked Qurayyát (117). Another reason for attacking Muscat at this particular time was to exploit British involvement in the First World War and the consequent withdrawal of British troops and ships from Muscat during the summer months of 1914 (118). During the meeting the Imam proposed that they attack Muscat and expel the Sultan and his British allies, but the council rejected this. Two main views were expressed:

- (1) The occupation of Muscat and the expulsion of the Sultan represented one of the priorities of the Imamate. This was the view of the Imam.
- (2) Other people, including Sh. 'Isà, thought that it was inadvisable to enter into a fight with the Sultan or annex any part of his domain for two reasons: (a) the Sultan was supported by the British forces, and (b) the economic situation of the interior of Oman was weak and would not allow a sustained campaign.

The meeting broke up without reaching agreement, and it was left to the Imam to do what he thought was best. After the meeting messengers he travelled throughout Oman trying to gather the views of the tribes. It seems that most of the tribes backed Sh. 'Isà's view of the inadvisability of attacking Muscat. This would have made the Imam drop the

idea of attacking Muscat, had it not been for the British landing of additional forces at Maṭraḥ. British sources state that " on 16th November, 1914, 6 companies of 95 Russell's Infantry arrived at Maṭraḥ, which had the immediate effect of breaking up the concentration of the Imam's followers " (119). For this reason the Imam decided to attack Muscat, and in his letters to his followers he fixed mid- Ṣafar, 1333/ beginning of January, 1915 as the starting date for the mustering of his army at Fanjá. It was said that Sh. 'Isà had disagreed with the Imam over the expenses of the planned attack and refused to co-operate with him over this issue unless the question of funds was resolved (120). The Imam solved this difficulty when he received some assistance from the Omanis resident in the East Africa. In addition the German agent in Tanganyika actively encouraged the Omanis to revolt against the Sultan and the British. We can not exclude the possibility that they may also have helped the Imam financially for this purpose. The opposition of Sh. 'Isà and his followers to war against the Sultan also suffered a set-back following Turkey's decision to enter the Great War on the side of the Germans against Britain and the *jihád* propaganda of the Ottoman Sultan which was supported also by the Germans. These factors forced Sh. 'Isà to drop his opposition to the Imam and reinstate his position (121).

After 'Id al-Aḍḥá, 1332, the Imam left Nazwà for the Wádí al-Ma'áwil to recruit men to attack Muscat (122). He succeeded in enlisting 400 men and marched with them to Bidbid, which they reached on 15th Ṣafar, 1333/ 2nd January, 1915 (123). The following day he was joined by Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Ḥimyar, and the total number of his troops according to British sources reached 3,000 men (124). On 19th Ṣafar/6th January the Imam left Bidbid for Fanjá and two days later reached Bawshar (see chart 5 below).

The Sultan seemed not to be moved by these threats of attack on his seat of government. His military position was well secured by the presence of a British contingent of 950 men and comprising the 102nd K.E.O. Grenadiers were under the command of Colonel S.M. Edwards and the 95th Russell's Infantry was commanded by Major F.F. Major. The headquarters of the former was at Bayt al-Falaj and that of the latter was at Ruwi (125). In addition there were 500 men of al-'Awámir tribe especially reported by the Sultan for the defence of Muscat against any possible attack by the Imam

or the B. Baṭṭāsh. Moreover, there were two small pickets to protect Maṭraḥ in the event of the Imam's army overrunning the town and holding hostage the British infantry there. One of these pickets was stationed on the hills west of Dār Sayt and the other was on Murtafāāt al-‘Aynāt behind the Eastern hills of Dār Sayt on the West of Maṭraḥ (126). The Sultan also decided to put a sea force under his command opposite Dār Sayt and Waṭayyah to bombard any attacking force from this coastal position.

Two days after his arrival at Bawshar, the Imam ordered his troops to march to Waṭayyah and before the sun set on 10th January some of his army under the command of Sh. ‘Alí b. Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥārithí, the brother of Sh. ‘Isà, reached the village. The remaining part of the army had reached the village at night, while some could not reach their destination until the following morning.

On reaching Waṭayyah, Sh. ‘Alí immediately decided to attack the British garrison stationed at the Eastern Heights of the village and he succeeded in expelling the 95th Russell's Infantry from its position and occupied the surrounding mountains overlooking the Bayt al-Falaj and Ruwi. At midnight, and with the full moon of the 24 of Ṣafar/11th January he continued his march forward and occupied Dār Sayt. On the following morning the Imam's army rushed from Waṭayyah and climbed the heights overlooking the Bayt al-Falaj. The British, however, were able to regroup and they succeeded in recapturing their former position and in cutting the line of communication between Sh. ‘Alí and the Imam. A fierce battle then commenced between the two sides which lasted until midday. Before daybreak the whole line from Ruwi on the left flank of Jabal to Dār Sayt was engaged in this battle. According to Bannerman by the morning of 11th of January several positions had been lost by the 102nd K.E.O. and the British situation became critical, with many skirmishes and hand to hand fighting (127). The ensuing pressure forced the Imam's army to retreat in disorder to Waṭayyah with some considerable loss of life and many injuries (128). Sh. ‘Alí and his force, on the other hand, retreated to the hills surrounding the Dār Sayt and stayed there until nightfall before they finally retreated to Waṭayyah owing to shortages in ammunition, food and water (129).




Chart (5) The Imam's campaign against Muscat in Ṣafar 1333/January 1915

During all this time the Imam lacked any knowledge of the whereabouts of the divisions of his army and had no plan how to salvage the situation. This lack of coordination together with the haste of his army leaders in conducting this campaign, were the main reasons for his defeat (130). The total losses among his army were 186 killed and 141 injured. The British on the other hand lost 7 rank and file and 15 wounded. Among the latter was Captain Coat from the 102nd K.E.O., who died later (131). Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí blamed Sh. 'Alí b. Ṣálih for occupying the hills surrounding the Waṭayyah before the army preparations were completed and for being deceived by the big size of the army (132). Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí gives 52 men killed, and he ignores the total number of the wounded, but he further puts forward the point that the Sultan's authorities looked after their wounded better, and after they had recuperated, they were returned to their homes(133).

The following table shows the names of the tribes and approximate numbers of

those killed or wounded on the night of 10th-11th of January, 1915 according to British sources (134):

Tribes	Leaders	Killed	Wounded	Remark
B. Riyám	1-Imam Sálím 2- Sh. Ĥimyar 3- 'Alí b. Ĥumayd 4- Zuhayr b. Sa'íd	5	15	No. 3 killed No. 4 wounded
Ĥirth	1- Sh. 'Isà b. Šálíĥ 2- Sh. 'Alí b. Šálíĥ 3- Sh. Muĥammad b. 'Isà 4- Ĥamdán b. Sulaymán 5- Muĥammad b. Sulaymán	50	17	No. 2 wounded No. 4 killed No. 5 wounded and later died
Ĥajriyyín	1-Sa'íd b Sayf b. Muĥammad 2-'Āmir b. Muĥammad	32	22	
Raĥbiyyín	Sh. Sultán b. Sálím			
Nadábiyyín	Muĥsin b. Zahrán			
Ĥubús	1-'Alí b. Ĥamad 2-'Abdalláh b. Sálím 3- Málik b. Sayf	10	16	
'Awámir*	1-Ĥumúd b. Háshim 2- sons of Muĥammad b. Sayf	5	10	
B. Baṭṭásh	Sh. Sultán b. Muĥammad			
B. Ruwáĥah	1- Sh. Muĥammad al-Khalílí 2-sons of Su'úd b. Muĥammad	12	2	
al-Ma'áwil	no leaders	7	7	
al-Ĥadábí	1- Sa'íd b. Ráshid 2- Nášir b. Muĥammad			
al-Masákirah	Sh. Sayf b. 'Alí			
al-Siyábiyyín	Sh. Muĥsin b. Zahrán	2	8	
al-Maĥáríq	Sh. Hilál b. Ĥamad	3	2	
B. Jábir	Sh. Zahrán b. Sa'íd			
al-Ĥadárim	(1) Muĥammad b. Sálím	3	2	No. 1 wounded and later died
Miscellaneous		57	43	
	Total	186	141	

* This part of 'Awámir lives in the Interior, and supported the Imam.

On hearing of the Imam's attack on the British at Bayt al-Falaj, the B. Baṭṭásh came to his help, but on reaching Waṭayyah, they found that he and his troops had already left. They then decided to attack Ruwi and al-Qurm, and they returned to their land after taking sheep and goats belonging to the British garrison (135).

The Imam's defeated army returned to Samá'il with mutual recriminations. In this elation, the Sultan thought of recapturing the Wádí Samá'il by trying to persuade the British to press on the Imam's retreating army. He was encouraged in this by the actions of the Gháfirí tribes at this Wádí, who did not want to be under the Imam's domination (136). The British, however, turned down the Sultan's request because they did not want to go too far into the Interior of Oman where they had no interests. This was expressed in a letter by the PAM to the Sultan in which he indicated that :

" with the knowledge that our accepted policy is one of non-intervention in the hinterland and that His Highness's proposal was fraught with dangers greater than any advantages that might be expected to follow, I informed His Highness that I could give him no assurance whatever in this matter which also demanded a reference to my government" (137).

These views of the PAM were in total agreement with the British government's view of non-intervention in Oman's hinterland.

On reaching Samá'il, the Imam held an urgent meeting with his followers to discuss the reasons behind his military defeat by the Sultan and what should be done in future. It was agreed to suspend all military activities against the Sultan.

In the meantime, Sh. Sulṭán b. Muḥammad b. 'Alí al-Na'ímí, the ruler of the Buraymí, offered to mediate between the Sultan and the Imam. He arrived in Muscat for this purpose and asked the Sultan for a ten days truce in hostilities between him and the Imam. The Sultan granted Sh. al-Na'ímí this. Sh. al-Na'ímí then wrote to the Imam explaining to him his initiative, and insisted in his letter to him that if he did not receive any response within ten days from sending his letter to him, the Sultan would try to recapture Samá'il. The Imam was desperate, and needed this mediation for the fear that the victorious British army might advance and occupy the Wádí of Samá'il. This was in addition to the low morale among his men following their defeat. For this reason, the Imam immediately agreed to Sh. al-Na'ímí's offer, delegating Sh. 'Isà to represent him in these talks. Sh. 'Isà arrived at al-Síḅ where he met Sh. al-Na'ímí, accompanied by Sd.

Nádir b. Fayṣal during the second half of January, 1915 (138). However, nothing was accomplished in these talks and as a result, Sh. al-Na‘ímí was forced to write to the Shaykhs of the B. Gháfir of the Wádí Samá’il, asking them to come and meet him at al-Síḅ to discuss the situation and to assess their willingness to cooperate with the Sultan (139). Some of these Shaykhs responded positively to Sh. al-Na‘ímí’s call and met him at al-Síḅ on 9th Rabí‘ I, 1333/26 January, 1915. Among them were: Sh. Sa‘íd b. Ráshid al-Hadábí, Sh. Sa‘íd b. Ráshid b. Muḥammad al-Jábirí, Sh. Muḥammad b. Sa‘íd b. ‘Umar al-Jábirí, and Sh. Ḥumayd b. Málík al-Jábirí. Others responded by sending their apologies for not being able to meet Sh. al-Na‘ímí at al-Síḅ because of the pressures exerted upon them by the Imam (140). Sh. al-Na‘ímí was not put off by the failure of his talks with Sh. ‘Isà. He tried once again to put life into his initiative by writing a number of letters to Sh. Ḥimyar asking him to meet him in al-Síḅ. Sh. Ḥimyar, however, apologised for Sh. al-Na‘ímí for not being able to come and see him at al-Síḅ. Instead he suggested that they should meet at Samá’il. Failing to achieve any success in his effort to end the dispute, Sh. al-Na‘ímí finally left al-Síḅ (141).

The Imam returned to Nazwà where he stayed for a few months, and then left it for Nakhal to suppress the revolt of the people of Ṭaww (142) against him who were supported by Sd. Muḥammad b. Hilál b. Sa‘íd al-Bú Sa‘ídí, the Wálí of al-Síḅ (143). The fighting between the Imam's force and this group finally ended with the people of Ṭaww declaring their loyalty to the Imam after the mediation of Sh. Ḥimyar (144).

Following the defeat of the Imam's forces in the Bayt al-Falaj, and his pressure on them, the B. Gháfir of the Wádí Samá’il asked the Sultan to hasten to recapture their Wádí. They encouraged him to take the opportunity of the disarray of the Imam's forces to do so.

The Sultan wanted to reclaim the Wádí Samá’il (see above), but he lacked the necessary force and his British allies refused to help him. The British position was made clear during the visit of the viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge, to Muscat on 11th February 1915. He tried to convince the Sultan that even if normal conditions were restored, troubles would break out anew and that the best solution to the problem would be through negotiation and reconciliation. The Sultan, however, took no notice of this and prepared a

campaign against the B. Baṭṭāsh. He formed an army consisting of four divisions, under the command of his brother Sd. Nádír b. Fayṣal, Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Náṣír, the Wálí of Maṭraḥ, Sd. Ḥumúd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál, the Wálí of Ṣúr, and his minister Sh. Ráshid b. ‘Uzayyiz. Using this force the Sultan was able to reclaim the area of the B. Baṭṭāsh, and to dismiss the Wálí of the Imam, Sh. Aḥmad b. Salím b. al-Murr al-‘Arímí, from his post. The Sultan's forces then moved to al-Síḅ in an effort to restore Samá’il.

Those gains by the Sultan's forces forced the Imam to revise his plans. He reacted by sending a force under the command of Sh. ‘Alí b. Ṣálih to Fanjá to counter any attack from the Sultan's army which was expected to reach the Wádí Samá’il at the beginning of Sha‘bán, 1333/June 1915. He also sent messages to Sd. Su‘úd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál, the Wálí Samá’il, and Sh. Sulṭán b. Sálím b. Ḥasan al-Raḥabí, asking them to cooperate and help Sh. ‘Alí b. Ṣálih in his mission. In the meantime he sent to Sh. ‘Isà and Sh. Ḥimyar informing them about the situation and asking them to come to his aid. He recruited some men by himself from the Wádí al-Ma‘áwil and moved with them to Samá’il on 14th Ramaḍán /27July (145).

On reaching al-Síḅ the Sultan despatched a force under the command of Sh. Ráshid b. ‘Uzayyiz to test the resolve of the Imam's force. They were able to report that the Imam had collected a formidable force; they returned to their base after one of its leaders, Sh. Sa‘íd b. Aḥmad al-Jábirí, was captured by the Imam and later executed for espionage (146).

The Imam stayed for a whole month in Samá’il expecting the Sultan to attack him, but nothing took place. He then wrote to the B. Gháfír (B. Jábír and al-Siyábiyyín) asking them to declare their loyalty to him under threat of his declaring war against them. The response of these two tribes was negative and the Imam immediately started to put his threat of a campaign against them into action. The Shaykhs of the Masákirah tribe (147) offered to mediate between the Imam and those tribes. The offer of mediation was accepted and the two tribes later agreed to give their loyalty to the Imam who imprisoned their Shaykhs except the Shaykh of al-Siyábiyyín, Sh. Muḥsin b. Zahrán b. Muḥsin who fled the area to Muscat (148).

In Dhú al-Qi'dah, 1333 the Imam visited al-Sharqiyyah Province in an effort to persuade some of the tribes there to declared their loyalty to him. He visited Samad al-Shán, Sanáw, and Badiyyah. In Samad he received the loyalty of the leaders of Āl Wahíbah, among them were (149):

1. Sh. Sulṭán b. Maṣṣúr b. Náṣir al-Ghufaylí
2. Sh. 'Alí b. Sulṭán al-Ghufaylí
3. Sh. Su'úd b. Muḥammad al-Ghufaylí
4. Sh. Sa'íd b. Ráshid al-Jaḥáfí
5. Sh. Wanay b. Sulṭán al-Jaḥáfí
6. Sh. Sálím b. Ḥumúd al-Jaḥáfí (150)

It was rumoured that the main purpose of the Imam's visit to al-Sharqiyyah was to attack Şúr, and all local tribes joined him except the B. Bú Ḥasan (Hináwí) and the Janabah (Gháfirí) who opposed him (151). In fact that the Imam was very willing to bring the town of Şúr under his control, but his plan may have been put off by the offer of the PAM to mediate between him and the Sultan (152).

After that the Imam returned to the Wádí al-Ma'áwil from Bahlà, and Sh. 'Isà visited Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím at Rustáq at the beginning of Shawwál. The purpose of this visit was to tell him that the Imam was not happy about his administration of the town, and that the people of Rustáq had complained to the Imam about him many times before. Sd. Aḥmad explained his position and accepted the criticisms against him on the basis that the human being is prone to make good and bad things, and correcting one's position is in itself a good practice (153). Sh. 'Isà then suggested to Sd. Aḥmad to meet the Imam to improve his image in his eyes and clear any misunderstanding between them. This meeting took place in Dhú al-Qi'dah, 1334/ September, 1916, the result of which was the improvement of the relations between the two men (154). But these friendly relations were broken by renewed complaints against Sd. Aḥmad from the people of Rustáq. For these reasons the Imam decided to dismiss Sd. Aḥmad from his post as ruler of Rustáq and when he consulted his Shúrá council, they all agreed to his decision, except Sh. 'Isà, who remained unconvinced that these complaints were good enough to warrant the dismissal of Sd. Aḥmad from his post (156).

On 22nd Jumádà I, 1335/ 25th March, 1917 the Imam left Nazwà to Rustáq to depose its ruler Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím, but before reaching it he sent a letter to him asking him to leave the town peacefully (see chart 2 above). According to Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí, Sd. Aḥmad rejected the Imam's request to leave the town because he found it hard to give up his rule and to leave the place where he was born and brought up. For this reason he decided to resist the decision to sack him by barricading himself and a few of his followers inside the fort after he had been betrayed by his allies (157). As we mentioned earlier in chapter I, Sd. Aḥmad had inherited the rule of Rustáq from his ancestors, who had held power since the 1830s. Throughout this period the central authority had failed to confiscate power from his family which remained an influential force in the area for decades.

Faced with Sd. Aḥmad's refusal to leave Rustáq, the Imam finally declared war against him by besieging the town for a period of five months, despite the effort of al-Sayyidah Aṣīlah bint Ibráhím, the sister of Sd. Aḥmad, to break the siege against her brother by asking the assistance of the Sultan. The latter responded to the situation by sending a force under the command of his brother, Sd. Ḥamad b. Fayṣal, and accompanied by Sd. Muḥammad b. Ḥamad b. Hilál, the Wálí of Ṣuḥár, Muẓaffar b. Sulaymán, the Wálí of Khábúrah, Sh. Sulṭán b. Muḥammad al-Na'ímí, the ruler of Buraymí, and Sh. Khalaf b. Sanán b. Ghuṣn al-'Alawí, the Shaykh of Yanqil, to help the besieged ruler (158). It must be pointed out that al-Sayyidah Aṣīlah was in control of the fort of al-Ḥazim which she captured from her brother Sd. Aḥmad in Shawwál 1334/August, 1916 after she felt that her brother was inclined to support the Imam. She also feared that she might lose the rule of her ancestors and their authority over the region (159). The siege of Rustáq ended after Sh. Ḥimyar had mediated between the belligerents. It was agreed that Sd. Aḥmad should leave the fort with all his force and in return to leave al-Ḥazim (160) on 23rd Shawwál 1335/13th August, 1917 (161).

This brought the rule of the family of Aḥmad in Rustáq to an end after more than eighty five years of power. Two years later Sd. Aḥmad tried to restore Rustáq from his exile, but failed in his attempt and as a result the Imam decided to expel him from the Ḥazim in Sha'bán, 1338 (162). This problem was solved only after mediation by Sh. 'Alí

b. Hilál b. Záhír, on condition that Sd. Aḥmad should leave for Báṭinah and the fort of al-Ḥazim should be controlled by the sons of his brother, Sd. Sa‘id b. Ibráhím, who were in the custody of their aunt, al-Sayyidah Aşlah bint Ibráhím. But two months later the Imam was assassinated in his sleep and Sd Aḥmad took the opportunity to regain Rustáq once more, though he did not stay for long, because the Imam's successor, Imam Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh, succeeded in forcing him out.

Endnotes

- (1) (R.O. II) p. 734.
- (2) By the term town is meant the largest and most important settlement which represents a centre for a group of villages surrounding it. In Oman it is called Wiláyah, and its governor is called Wálí. Towns vary in the number of villages in their domain. For example, Nazwà has 43 villages, Izkí 30 villages, Samá'il 46, and Bidbid 41 villages, with the total number of villages in the Interior Province reaching 256, centred in 8 Wiláyah. see Murshid pp. 113-136.
- (3) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 168.
- (4) (R.O. II) p.734.
- (5) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. pp. 171f.
- (6) (R.O. II) p. 734.
- (7) For further information about Nazwà see Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 pp. 1364f.
- (8) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 177; (R.O. II) p. 711.
- (9) Bannerman, op.cit. p. 259, claims that the main reason for the fall the town was the treachery of its inhabitants.
- (10) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 177; Lughat al-'Arab, vol. III part.2 (Aug. 1913) p. 111.
- (11) Bannerman, op.cit. p. 253 states that the Sultan's garrison in Nazwà was under the command of the Wálí. This is incorrect, because this garrison was usually out of the control of the Wálí. See al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 178.
- (12) al-Mashhadání, op.cit. p. 61 states that the inhabitants of Nazwà had responded to the call of the Imam to give their *bay'ah* to him. The present writer disagrees with this view, because people of Nazwà, specially the inhabitants of al-Safálah, had defended the town when the Imam attacked. Moreover, the war had raged on for seven days and finally, the total number of these captures exceeded one thousand persons. This view is not supported by any sources.
- (13) Bannerman, op.cit. p.259 states that the number of those killed was 12 men. This number in fact represents the number of those killed in the first attack. See (R.O II) p. 711.
- (14) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 179.
- (15) al-Mashhadán, op.cit. p.61 states that the total number of those killed was only 25 persons. This total, however, is too low and probably it represents the number of those killed in the first attack.
- (16) (R.O II) p. 734.
- (17) The fort of Mosque was built by Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná'í during his control over Nazwà.
- (18) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 177.
- (19) Lughat al-'Arab, vol. III part. 4 (Oct. 1913) p. 223, states that the Imam gave the Wálí of Nazwà safe passage if he surrendered himself. The Wálí asked the Imam to give him one hour to think. When the Imam accepted his request, he committed suicide.
- (20) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 177.
- (21) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 172.
- (22) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. pp. 179f.
- (23) Manaḥ is situated twelve miles South-East of Nazwà, and most of its inhabitants were from al-Bú Sa'ídí tribe. The power centre of the Wiláyah was in the village of al-Fayqayn. See Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 115; Murshid al-Wiláyát. p. 123.
- (24) (R.O II) p. 734.
- (25) (R.O. II) p. 734.
- (26) For further information about the tribes which supported the Sultan at this stage, see Bannerman op.cit. pp 272f.f
- (27) al-Mushhadání, op.cit. p. 33.
- (28) (R.O. II) p.720.
- (29) (I.O) R15/1/35/42; Bannerman, op.cit. p. 267.
- (30) (R.O. II) p. 734.
- (31) Izkí is an important town in the interior, situated on Wádí Hıĺfín and it is divided into two sections: the Yaman section and Nızár section. The former is inhabited by the Hináwí faction (B. Ruwáḥah, al-Darámkah and al-Manádhirah), and the latter by the Gháfırí faction (B. Riyám). See Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 p. 882; Wilkinson, water pp. 208-38; Anthony, op.cit. pp. 48f; Murshid al-Wiláyát pp. 131f.
- (32) The Qaryatayn lies south of Izkí. Its inhabitants, beside the B. Ráshid were al-'Awámir tribe. See: Lorimer op.cit. vol.8. p. 1374; Murshid al-Wiláyát, p. 122.
- (33) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 187.
- (34) Izkí is situated 36 miles Eastern of Nazwà.

- (35) Saddí is only one mile away from Izkí, it is located on Wádí Qant, a tributary of Wádí 'Indám, and most of its inhabitants were from B. Ruwáḥah. See Lorimer, op.cit. vol.8 p. 1374; Murshid p. 121.
- (36) (R.O. II) p. 734.
- (37) al-Mughírí states on p. 401 that 'Awaḍ al-Ḥaḍramí was a supporter of Sd. Khálid b. Barghash the Sultan of Zanzibar, but after the overthrow of Sd. Khálid by the British government in 1314/1897, all the supporters of Sd. Khálid including 'Awaḍ were purged.
- (38) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 183.
- (39) Díwán Sh. 'Abd al-Raḥmán b. Násir b. 'Ámir al-Riyámí, pp. 172f.
- (40) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 183.
- (41) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 184.
- (42) Qárút is a village situated on the left bank of Wádí Ḥilfín about four miles above Izkí and had date palm groves estimated by Lorimer in 1906 at 30,000 trees. See Lorimer op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1374; Murshid al-Wiláyát p. 121.
- (43) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 184.
- (44) (R.O. II) p. 719.
- (45) Handbook of Arabia (H. A.) pp. 259f.
- (46) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 p. 889.
- (47) Wádí B. Jábir is situated in Western Hajar and it is the only tributary of Wádí Samá'il on the West. The two Wádis meet at al-Multaqà village, see Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 pp. 889f.
- (48) See a letter in (R.O. II) p. 722.
- (49) See a letter in (R.O. II) p. 722.
- (50) (R.O. II) p. 719.
- (51) See a letter in (R.O. II) p. 722.
- (52) Sh. Ḥimyar pointed out in his letter to Sh. Muḥammad b. Násir Āl Ḥumúdah that the reason why Āl Wahíbah left Samá'il was that they were convinced of the manifestation of Islamic rule. See a letter in (R.O. II) p. 722.
- (53) See a letter in (R.O. II) p. 719.
- (54) Bannerman, op.cit. p. 266.
- (55) Murphy op.cit. p.130; Bannerman, op.cit. p.263.
- (56) Sh. 'Alí b. 'Abdalláh Āl Ḥumúdah succeeded his father Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sálím in early of 1913 as *tamímah* of the B. Bú 'Alí. For further information see al-Sálimí M. A. op.cit. pp. 49-54.
- (57) Murphy, op.cit. p. 130.
- (58) See the letters of Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. 'Isà in (R.O. II) pp. 721-3.
- (59) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p.190; (R.O. II) p. 721.
- (60) (R.O. II) p. 720.
- (61) (R.O. II) p. 720.
- (62) Lughat al-'Arab, vol. III No.4 (Oct. 1913) p. 223.
- (63) (Adm. R. 1913) p. 104; (R.O. II) pp. 712-14.
- (64) See the Imam's letters (both in Arabic and English) in (R.O. II) pp. 740f and the PAM's letters (both in Arabic and English) in (R.O. II) pp. 744f.
- (65) Further information about Sh. Su'úd's family can be obtained from al-Háshimy, S.M. The Relations pp. 120-5.
- (66) See Sh. Su'úd's letter in (R.O. II) p. 728.
- (67) See Sh. Su'úd's letter in (R.O. II) p. 726.
- (68) For further information about the Gháfirí tribes loyal to the Sultan in Wádí Samá'il see: Bannerman, op.cit. p. 267.
- (69) See the letters from Sh. Muḥsin b. Su'úd al-Jábrí to the Sd. Ḥamad and Muzaffar in which he requests from them to leave the Wádí B. Jábir in (I.O.) R/15/6/42.
- (70) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 190.
- (71) See a letter of Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí to his father dated 3rd of Ramaḍán, 1331. The present writer was able to obtain a copy of this document and it is contained in Appendix 18.
- (72) Sh. 'Abdalláh on leaving the fort left public life and stayed at his home. He later wrote to the Sultan expressing his wish to live in Muscat. His request was granted and he left Samá'il early in Muḥarram 1332, but he was killed by a stray bullet on Jumáda II, 1332/ May 1913, when he was visiting Sh. Sayf b. Muḥammad al-Ḥawsaní at the Wádí al-Ḥawásinah.
- (73) These men are Sh. Násir b. Khamís al-Sayfí, Ḥumúd b. Sálím al-' Afífí, and Muḥsin b. Sálím Āl Ṣabáhiyyah.
- (74) (Adm. R. 1916) p. 65 in this report the PAM mentions that Sh. Násir had received presents of money, rice and arms from the Sultan.
- (75) (Adm. R. 1916) p. 65.

- (76) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 231 points out that Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd was urged by his people to occupy Nazwà. In addition he states that he had done many things which angered the Imam, but Sh. al-Sálimí does not mention the nature of these things.
- (77) Sh. Náṣir descends from Imam Muḥammad b. Náṣir al-Gháfirí (1724-1728), and his family was a *tamímah* of the B. Gháfirí faction. In 1860s his family, however, lost its position with the death of his father and grandfather. As a result Sh. Náṣir and his brothers were put under the custody of their slave 'Ubayd b. Surúr, and Sh. Muḥsin b. Zahrán al-'Abrí. Accordingly they were deposed from the ruler of Bahlà by Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Alí al-Shukaylí, but they regained their position in Bahlà after the death of the Imam 'Azzán in 1871. But they lost their leadership of the B. Gháfir which fell to the hands of Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir al-Nabhání. For more information about this family see al-Sálimí, A.H. op.cit. pp. 261f; al-'Abrí, op.cit. pp. 147ff.
- (78) For more information about the mediation of Sh. 'Isà see al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 241f.
- (79) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 238; (R.O. III) p. 133.
- (80) Sh. Muhanná succeeded his father Ḥamad b. Muḥsin b. Zahrán al-'Abrí as Shaykh of his tribe in 1317/1998. his tribe was of a Nizárí origin and a Gháfirí political orientation, living in different regions of the Western Hajar Province and the Záhrah province. Miles estimated the total number of this tribe in 1880 at 8,000 persons while Lorimer in 1906 put the figure at 6,500. Miles described al-'Abriyyín by saying that " they are generally well-behaved and peaceful tribe". For further information about this tribe See al-'Abrí, Ibráhim. Tabṣirat al-Mu'tabirín.; Miles's account in (Adm. R.1880); Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 6 p. 16.
- (81) al-'Abrí, Ibráhim. op.cit. p. 128.
- (82) al-'Abrí, Ibráhim. op.cit. p. 128; al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 376.
- (83) al-'Awábí is situated in the Western Hajar on the left bank of Wádí B. Kharúṣ and it lies about 37 Km. west of Nakhal and 15Kms. East of Rustáq. See Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 6. p.186.
- (84) Sd. Sa'íd b. Ibráhim was at that time a ruler of al-Ḥazim and al-'Awábí.
- (85) There is no agreement about the exact date of the transfer of al-'Awábí to the Sultan. Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 6 p. 186 gives the date as 1900. This was also confirmed by the (Adm. R. 1900-1) p. 15.
- (86) The fort was also known by Bayt al-'Awábí and it was formerly known by the name of Bayt Suwní after the 'Awábí itself, the old name of the town. See al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 376.
- (87) There is disagreement as to when the 'Awábí fell to Sh. Muhanná, al-'Abrí, Ibráhim op.cit. p.125 mentions that the town had fallen at the end of the Rajab, while al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p.185 gives the date as 17th Rajab/22nd June, which is the same date of the arrival of Sh. 'Isà b. Šáliḥ al-Ḥarithí to Izkí. The Records of Oman ((RO II) p. 735) states that on 26th June/21st Rajab al-'Awábí fell under the Imam's hand. Murphy, op.cit. p. 130, states that the attack of Sh. Muhanná was on 20th June/15th Rajab and after four days al-'Awábí fell and with its Bayt al-'Awábí, a fort of great natural strength.
- (88) al-Mashahdání op.cit. p. 62.
- (89) (R.O. II) p. 721.
- (90) See Sh. Su'úd's letter in (R.O. II) p. 721. Sh. Ḥamad later escaped to the Sultan, because he has murdered one of the Ḥarásí tribe living in Farq.
- (91) See the description of this attack in Muzaḥfar b. Sulaymán's letter to Sd. Fayṣal dated on 20th Sha'bán, 1333/ 25th July, 1913 in (I.O) L/P&S/10/425.
- (92) ARAMCO, op.cit. p. 82.
- (93) Sd. Taymúr studied at Mayo Collage in Ajmer in India and had participated in political life and represented his father at the coronation of king Edward in 1903 in India . He also took part in the military operations against the opponents of his father's regime. For more information about him see Lorimer, op.cit. vol. I p. 570; Peterson. op.cit. pp. 50ff.
- (94) Bell, op.cit. p. 21.
- (95) Further information about al-Masákirah and al-Hishm, see Lorimer op.cit. vol. 7 p. 743 & vol. 8 p. 1170.
- (96) al-Sálimí, M.A. (op.cit. p. 216) states that Sh. 'Alí kept his promise of neutrality for 12 years despite the efforts of the Sultan to entice him to his side. See also (I.O) L/P&S/10/425, Muscat news for the week ending 8th Nov. 1913.
- (97) Sh. Hilál b. Sa'íd al-Ḥajrí, and Sh. Sálim b. 'Ámir al-Ḥasaní supported Sh. Ḥamdán by writing to Sh. 'Isà asking him to refrain from further trouble and to use his influence with Sh. al-Sálimí with a view to the cessation of hostilities. See (I.O) L/P&S/10/425, Muscat news for the week ending the 8th Nov. 1913.
- (98) al-Ḥarithí, Sa'íd. op.cit. p. 122, states that the Sultan knew of the Imam's position from reconciliation. He opened the meeting by trying to ascertain Sh. 'Isà's opinion about reconciliation by asking him, if the Omaní broke the conditions of reconciliation what Sh. 'Isà's position would be. Sh. Ḥamdán replied on behalf of Sh. 'Isà that " he would be on the right

- side". It was reported later that Sh. 'Isà had said this reply was in total agreement to what I (Sh. 'Isà) had in mind.
- (99) Al-Mashhadání (op.cit. p. 78) states that Sh. 'Isà met the Imam at Nazwà and after the Imam's refusal to accept reconciliation, he sent Sh. Ḥámid b. Sayf al-Ruwáḥí to Sh. Ḥamdán of Abú Dhabi who was in al-Záhirah Province, informing him of the Imam's refusal. This narration, however, is incorrect because Sh. 'Isà did not go to Nazwà but instead he went from Samá'il to his land at al-Sharqiyyah and that Sh. Ḥámid b. Sayf al-Ruwáḥí was sent to Sh. 'Isà and not to Ḥamdán b. Záyid, see al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 219.
- (100) Sh. al-Sálimí died on 5th Rabí' I, 1332/ 1st February, 1914.
- (101) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 222.
- (102) al-Ḥáarithí, Sa'íd. op.cit. p. 32.
- (103) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1114.
- (104) Sh. Sulaymán used to rule three villages in the Wádí al-Ma'áwil including, al-Wásit, Iffí and Muslimát, See (R.O IV) p. 641.
- (105) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 222 states that Sh. Ḥamad b. Sa'íd b. Aḥmad al-Ma'walí had paid all the expenses of the Imam's troops during this campaign.
- (106) Sh. Aḥmad b. Thunayyán was supported in his action by Sd. Ḥárib b. Ḥamad b. Sayf, the brother of previous Wálí of Nazwà See (RO II), p. 30.
- (107) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 123.
- (108) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 219.
- (109) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1114.
- (110) What happened was that Sh. Ḥamad b. Hilál al-Sa'dí, the Shaykh of 'Yál Sa'd, wanted to mediate between the Imam and the Sultan. He went to Nakhal in the company of his men to see the Imam, and offer his mediation. On seeing Sh. Ḥamad and his men, the Imam's followers thought that those were the Sultan's troops.
- (111) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 226.
- (112) This narration is based on al-Sálimí's account (op.cit. p. 226) of events, but it seems that the reasons for the Imam's desire to occupy Barká' were totally different, as pointed out by al-Ḥáarithí, Sa'íd. op.cit. pp. 22f, who states that the Imam's reason for this move was the encouragement of the Shaykhs of al-Ḥajriyyín tribe to the Imam to capture Barká'. This account of events is supported by the Sultan's letter to the PAM, dated 12th Jumádà I, (the night of 13th Jumádà I) in which he demanded him to send H.M.S. Fox to his aid. He also mentioned in this letter that the enemy was near Barká'. In another letter to the Sultan, he mentioned, that the attack on Barká' took place on the morning of 13th Jumádà I. This proves that the Imam was well prepared to attack Barká', but he did not give the final order for the army to march and the news of his attack was no more than rumour. He was in a position to halt this operation when he knew of the news, because he had ample time to do so.
- (113) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 227; al-Ḥáarithí, Sa'íd. op.cit. p. 23; (R.O.II) p. 30.
- (114) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 234f; (R.O. II) p. 30.
- (115) (Adm. R. 1918) p. 47.
- (116) See the Imam's letter to PAM, dated on 16th Jumádà I, in (I.O.) R/15/6/43.
- (117) (R.O. II) p. 46.
- (118) (I.O.) R/15/3/29/2; Bannerman, op.cit. p. 303.
- (119) (R.O. II) p. 47.
- (120) (R.O. II) p. 47.
- (121) See reports from Šúr, Samá'il, and the Wádí al-Ma'áwil about the role of the German Agents in Oman during this period in (R.O. III) pp. 79-81.
- (122) He appointed the Qádí Sh. Sulaymán b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Kindí (d. 1337/1019) as a Wálí of Nazwà.
- (123) See the letter of Sh. Sa'íd b. Ráshid al-Hadábí of Fanjá, to the Sultan, dated 15th Šafar, 1333 in (I.O.)R15/3/29/4.
- (124) (R.O. III) p. 49; Murphy, op.cit. p. 136.
- (125) (R.O. III) p. 49.
- (126) Murphy. op.cit. p. 135; al-Mousawi, op.cit. p. 296.
- (127) Bannerman, op.cit. p. 3307.
- (128) For further information about this battle, see Murphy, op.cit. pp. 135f; (R.O. III) pp. 36-56.
- (129) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 129.
- (130) al-Ḥáarithí, Sa'íd. (op.cit. p. 227) states that the British army dug ditches which they covered with grass, a factor which caused many of the Imam's soldiers fall in these ditches; among them were his uncle, Sh. Muḥammad b. Sulaymán b. Ḥumayd.
- (131) The 102nd K.E.O. Grenadiers relieved the 2nd Rujputá in November, 1914.
- (132) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 228.

- (133) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 229.
- (134) (R.O. III) p. 56.
- (135) (Adm. R. 1915) p. 41.
- (136) Bannerman, op.cit. p. 308.
- (137) (R.O. III) p. 56.
- (138) (R.O. III) p. 56.
- (139) (I.O.) R/15/6/45.
- (140) (I.O.) R/15/6/45.
- (141) See the correspondence between Sh. Sultán b. Muḥammad and Sh. Ḥimyar in (I.O.) R/15/6/45
- (142) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1873.
- (143) The Imam ordered the arrest of Sh. Aḥmad b. Thunayyán al-Ḥarrásí. See about this the letter from Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím to Sd. Ḥumúd b. 'Azzán dated 2nd Jumádà II, 1333/17th April 1914 in (I.O.) R/15/6/45.
- (144) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 229.
- (145) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 230 states that the Imam left the Wádí al-Ma'áwil to Samá'il at the beginning of Shawwál, but Sh. Ḥumayd b. Sa'íd al-Fulaytí gives a correct date for the departure of the Imam in his margin of his letter to the PAM. See his letter in R.O. III, pp.108f.
- (146) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 231.
- (147) See the letters of Sh. Sa'íd b. 'Alí, Sh. Muḥsin b. Ḥamad, Sh. Muḥsin b. Záhir and Sh. Thání b. Ḥáarith, dated on 4th Rabí' II, 1333/ 14th Feb., 1915 in (I.O.) R/15/6/45.
- (148) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 231; al-Siyábí, Is'áf al-Áyán. p. 160.
- (149) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 231.
- (150) Sh. Sálím is the son of Sh Ḥumúd b. Sa'íd b. Ráshid al-Jaháfí who played a great role in the political events during the second half of the 19th century.
- (151) (R.O. III) p. 133.
- (152) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 231.
- (153) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 243.
- (154) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 243; (R.O. III) p. 134.
- (155) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 245.
- (156) (R.O.III) p. 134.
- (157) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 245.
- (158) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 246.
- (159) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 246.
- (160) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 246.
- (161) al-Mashhadání states that Sd. Aḥmad left Rustáq for Muscat, but this is not true.
- (162) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 255f; (R.O.III) pp. 169-172.

CHAPTER ۛ

THE IMAM'S REGIONAL RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

In this chapter it is proposed to discuss the political relationship of the Imam with Sd. Fayṣal and his son, Sd. Taymūr. We will also shed light on the British role. At the same time, there were some influential local figures who played an important role in bridging the divergent views between the Imam and the Sultan and consequently in ending the hostilities by peaceful means. These efforts, which were exerted by such local figures, were by no means less than those worked out by official personalities. It is customary to ascribe to official efforts all possible achievements. However, if we accept the argument that local figures had laid the actual foundation for the success achieved by the official bodies, we cannot ignore the role of these local figures. This chapter will discuss the five attempts made to conclude a peace agreement between the Imam and the Sultan.

1) The Initiative of Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥārithí.

After having been elected for the Imamate, Imam Sālim sent to the Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal, telling him of this, and invited the Sultan to pay homage to him. However, the Sultan ignored the calls of the Imam, and instead, sought to reinforce his position by reinforcing his garrisons with further provisions, in anticipation of a possible attack by the Imam. But the latter did not wait to hear the Sultan's reply. He, on his part, declared war against Nazwà, which surrendered immediately. Following the fall of Nazwà, other towns fell, one after the other, under his hands, as described above.

On the other hand there had been exchange of correspondence between the Sultan and the tribal leaders about their attitude toward the Imam, among them, Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥārithí who waited a whole month before finally giving his support to the Imam, who was eager to have Sh. 'Isà join him. This hesitation on the part of Sh. 'Isà was partly because some of his tribe declared their support for the Imam, in contrast to Sh. 'Isà and

his hesitant stance (1). Sh. 'Isà's hesitation has been described by some writers to have "prompted him to wait and see how the new born authority was received" (2).

However, the truth is that Sh. 'Isà's political inclinations were disposed towards the Sultan, while those of the tribes were inclined towards the Imam. Sh. 'Isà, though, was finally forced to compromise his position by giving his support to the Imam for fear of losing his political influence among his tribes. He wrote to the Sultan informing him about his intention and his position regarding the Imam. He says:

"There is nothing in this your country [i.e.. news] that would necessitate communications except the arrival of a messenger from the Imam, and before this, another messenger came insisting on our going to him. Last night I read his letter and therein he pressed me, and God says 'listen to the inviter of God'! So we have determined to obey him, like Muslims, so that we may be of those who are saved ... And what has happened, O King [Sultan], is a matter which is supernatural: the tribes from the east to the west of the country are drawn (to him) while the Imam is in Nizwah [Nazwà]. There was nothing except his real piety and the exhibition of miracles which, we do not think, will lead to what you hear and see. God knows best where he sends his message"(3)

He also wrote to the secretary of the Sultan, Sh. Ráshid b. 'Uzayyiz, explaining to him the circumstances which prompted him to support the Imam:

"We had arranged the 15th of the present month (Rajab) as a fortunate day for proceeding to the presence of the Imam, after letters and messengers had constantly come inviting us to go to him. We did not see any escape from answering to one who calls in God's name and have made preparation to go to him with the blessing of God and to help him....And see! Oh Abú Ráshid this wonderful strange affair, how the Shaykhs of al-Dahirah [al-Záhirah] and the Shaykhs of Oman are serving this Imam without hope of gain and the grace is to God and the forts are calling out "come! come" (4).

However, Sh. 'Isà met with the Imam in Izkí on 17th Rajab 1331 and gave his allegiance to the Imam after a long discussion with a view to mediating between the Imam and the Sultan. He immediately began his mediatory mission. His view was that the Imam should be content with the territories and towns he had captured and abandon his plans of attacking the Wádí of Samá'il; also, that he should work for a permanent peace settlement between him and the Sultan. Sh. 'Isà was supported in this stance by the B. Ruwáḥah, who controlled the upper part of the Wádí of Samá'il.

We do not know for certain whether this initiative was Sh. 'Isà's own accord or was entrusted to him by the Sultan. However, his proposal was rejected by both the Imam and Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálimí. They also prevented him from spreading the news about this proposal in public, lest it stir confusion among their subjects. In spite of all that, according to Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí, the Imam's rejection of Sh. 'Isà's proposal caused some tension in the relationship between the two men, as well as between

their followers. This state of tension was somewhat eased by the intervention of the Shaykhs of the tribe of Ḥajriyyín in an effort to mediate between the Imam and the Shaykh. The mediators proposed to Sh. 'Isà that he postpone the discussion of a possible reconciliation for a later date.

Unfortunately, this proposal came at an untimely period, when the militancy of the Imam's followers was at its height, and the spirit for war and fighting was prevailing among them. Moreover, Sh. 'Isà lost part of his support of the Hináwí tribes, especially the B. Hiná'ah. In addition, it is to be noted that the Imamate is largely an issue to be decided by the *'ulamá'* whose primary concern was to depose the Sultan. Also, his reluctant support for the Imam lost him a good deal of the respect and esteem among the *'ulamá'* which he had commanded previously as the son of a renowned religious leader. Furthermore, the Imam was unhappy with the attitude of Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd b. Khalfán al-Khalílí, the Shaykh of the B. Ruwáḥah, who was loyal to the Sultan and strongly opposed to the Imam (5).

But as his letters to the Sultan indicate, Sh. 'Isà was evidently forced into an ambivalent position whereby on the one hand he acquiesced to support the Imam, while on the other hand, he kept in correspondence with the Sultan. His regular correspondence with the Sultan was meant as a reassurance that he wanted to maintain his relationship with the Sultan. Sh. 'Isà was lucky to find an indirect support from a prominent notable in the lower part of Samá'il, Sh. Su'úd b. 'Alí b. Jabr al-Jabrí, who played an instrumental role in strengthening Sh. 'Isà's position by rallying support for him from different quarters, from the Janabah and B. Bú 'Alí as well as from the Sultan.

Under the circumstances of the siege of the fort, there emerged two views. There were those who saw that the Imam should go for peace and reconciliation, while others upheld a continuation of the war. In this environment, the Imam issued a memorandum stating his stipulations for a peace deal as follows:

"In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate"

"Let anyone who meets with this letter know that many people have constantly been asking the Imam of the Muslims to abstain from fighting the Sultan Fayṣal b. Turkí, in Maskat (Muscat) and Maṭraḥ and they are flattering him (Fayṣal) in the hope that he will obtain what he demands, but he will not obtain abstention from the Imam except he grants conditions and among them are:

- 1- The agreement in the matter of arms between the Sultan and the Christians must be broken.
- 2- That the Wádí of Samá'il, Nakhal and Sur should belong to the Imam exclusively.

3-The reduction of Customs duties in all the ports to the rates that were in force in the time of the Imam 'Azzán, may God pity him.

4-And that the Sultan and his sons should promote good and prohibit evil to the best of their ability.

Now, if the Sultan grants these conditions in full, we hope from the Imam that he will desist from fighting. And his brother, Náşir b. Ráshid wrote it with his own hand" (6).

Although this memorandum was undated, the British records report that it was brought by Sh. Ráshid b. 'Uzayyiz, the Sultan's secretary to the PAM on 26th July, 1913. It is generally believed that this memorandum was the one referred to by Sd. Ḥamad b. Fayşal in the letter which he sent to his father the Sultan on 20th Sha'bán 1331/25th July 1913, and which was sent with his messenger, Sulaymán b. 'Alí al-'Āmirí to al-Síb, and then to Muscat (7).

The Imam held complete control over the fort of Samá'il. After that the call for peace was at its strongest among the local tribal chiefs, especially among the tribes of the Wádí of Samá'il. The chiefs wrote to the Sultan urging him either to go for peace or for war. One of them was Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd al-Khalílí who wrote to the Sultan and his sons asking them to empower Sh. 'Isà to monitor the peace process. In one of his letters which he wrote to Sd. Nádir b. Fayşal on 30th Sha'bán 1331 after he had discussed this matter with Sh. 'Isà, he says, "We went to your town of Khod (al-Khawḍ) and conferred with your servant, the young 'Isà, about an understanding between our master and his subject, and asked him to help us in that, and we found him well-disposed" (8).

He concluded his letter stating that he was awaiting a reply from the Sultan. However, it is evident that he did not receive any response, either from Sd. Nádir, nor from the Sultan. The latter, though, commented on Sh. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí's letter, "This letter has reached me and I have not replied to it; and what conciliation can be expected from this poor weak man, when the territories of Muscat have been snatched away?" (9).

The Sultan, it seemed, was sceptical about local chiefs' loyalty to him, and that he thought they lacked the necessary power leverage to press on the Imam and his followers. These ineffective pressures on the Imam came at a time when he was actually planning a military attack on Muscat.

On 11th July 1913/6th Sha'bán 1331 Major Knox (the PAM) wrote warning letters to the four chiefs of the Imamate reminding them of the notice issued by the Sultan, Fayşal on 5th Jumádà II, 1313 which warned that: "the British Government would not tolerate the

tribes launching attacks on Muscat and Maṭraḥ under any circumstances" (10). This was in view of the British Government interests therein.

The PAM sent an ultimatum two days after the disembarkation of the 2nd Rajputs in Maṭraḥ under the command of Lt Colonel Smith who camped at Bayt al-Falaj. He also made a plan to send troops to al-Sīb and then to Samá'il in the event the Sultan asked for reinforcements. But the Sultan rejected the PAM's plan when it was presented to him in al-Sīb on 15th July 1913. The PAM, though, was not put off by the Sultan's rejection of his plan. He attempted to persuade the Sultan to accept his plan on two more occasions, but his persistence somewhat angered the Sultan. The event prompted the Sultan to ask the PAM not to interfere with these affairs henceforth. The PAM confessed that: "the Sultan asked the political (PAM) to return that evening (15th July 1913) to Muscat, as the signs of open sympathy and friendship that existed between the Sultan and the British representative were misunderstood and objected to by his troops and the Omanis up country and militated against the Sultan's channels of quelling the rising himself" (11).

It was clear that the Sultan did not want to see the British influence extend beyond Muscat. He preferred the British protection to be confined mainly to the cities of Muscat and Maṭraḥ. This was because the Sultan did not want to be seen by his subjects as nursing a friendly relationship with the British, lest this would alienate the Omani tribes. His ultimate goal was to win the tribes' support without having to resort to the help of foreign force. Foreign interference was, in his view, the primary cause that instigated the Imamate in the first place.

The Imam replied to the PAM's letter of 11th July, explaining the purpose of the re-establishment of the Imamate, and at the same time asking him not to give support to the Sultan (12) on the ground that it was an exclusively internal affair between the Sultan and his subjects. The PAM welcomed the Imam's letter and described it as extremely polite in tone. He not only welcomed this letter, but also wrote to the Imam asking him not to harass British subjects. The Imam was taken in by the friendly and positive attitude of the PAM, and in response wrote a letter in which he undertook not to molest British subjects: "Your letter reached us and you mention that your subjects should not be molested in their persons or property. There is no intention of interfering with you or your subjects. But the

intention is the establishment of justice" (13). At the end of his letter, the Imam expressed his concern over British troops being sent to Bayt al-Falaj, in spite of his firm promise not to interfere with British subjects in the area. He also asked the PAM for an explanation of the British move of sending troops to Bayt al-Falaj. The PAM in his reply to the Imam repeated what he had already said about the British intention in sending troops, which was to protect Muscat and its vicinity (14).

In the period between August and September 1913 a succession of secret delegated talks were going on between the Sultan and the Imam. These were meant as a conduit to elicit a response to the Imam's terms of conciliation.

Available sources give us no clues on the Sultan's and the British reaction to the Imam's terms of conciliation. However, a report by the British naval Commander in Chief on 9th September 1913/ 7th Shawwál 1331 states that: "yesterday [8th] the Imam sent to the Sultan requesting the presence in Samá'il of an ambassador to discuss terms of peace. The Sultan's delegate left yesterday for Samá'il, and some sort of peace agreement is expected to be signed in the course of this week" (15).

Unfortunately, these efforts did not materialize, and we have no good knowledge about these talks and the people who conducted them. As a result of the failure of these talks, the Imam wrote to the PAM explaining to him the purpose of the re-establishment of the Imamate, and also "... therefore requested and hoped of your government that her troops will be moved from the Bayt al-Falaj and entirely removed early. If these were brought for the protection of your subjects, then we undertake the responsibility of protecting their lives and property" (16).

From the Imam's letter, it was obvious that the Imam and his assistants had no prejudice against the British. This was because they deeply recognized the importance of maintaining a friendly relationship with Britain for their mutual interests. This stance was reaffirmed by the Imam's letter to the PAM, mentioned above, in which he states:

"We do not think that your Government, which is well-known for her diplomacy and considerate treatment, will prefer one individual to two millions of Arabs and will dash their friendship and love which is greater for her than for any other Government against the wall as useless. The Arab community thinks her above that and that she is far too noble to suffer such a thing from which your Government will reap nothing, but loss of lives and flowing of gutters of blood on the surface of the earth"(17)

But the PAM ignored the Imam's request to withdrawing the British troops and pointed out that his Government was based on justice and peace and would want to see these prevail in Oman between the Sultan and his subjects. It is noteworthy to mention that Sd. Fayṣal, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman died on 4th October, 1913.

Following the death of the Sultan, the Imam, Sh. al-Sálimí, and Sh. 'Isà each wrote a letter to Sd. Taymúr b. Fayṣal, successor to the deceased Sultan, in which they urged him to adopt the *Shari'ah* laws, to abide by the teachings of Islam and to work for the prevalence of peace and justice. They also wrote to the PAM requesting that they be left alone to administer their own affairs and to settle their disputes with their Sultan (18).

The PAM, as it appears, interpreted the views of the Imamate's leaders as a sign of weakness among the Imam and his leaders, and that they were now looking for peace and conciliation (19). In fact, the Imam and his followers did not wish to anger either the Sultan or the British, but he requested the establishment of justice in Sultan's administration, and the withdrawal of the British troops from Oman. This was by no means a sign of weakness, as the PAM understood it. This leads us to another interpretation, that the Imam did not wish to oppose the Sultan, insofar as the latter adhered to the *Shari'ah* in his administration of rule.

This explains to us the preparedness of Sd. Fayṣal not to resort to the use of force against his opponents. He also rejected the British assistance (except in protection of Muscat and Maṭraḥ), and their advice and plans to attack the Imam's followers. We believe that had it not been for the treaties between him and the British Government on arms trafficking and slave trading, he would have yielded to the pressures from the Imam. But for fear of Oman going under British rule, he refused to agree with the Imam. This fear of a British occupation of Oman was precisely what Sh. 'Isà had cautioned about and had prompted him to persuade the Imam to seek a conciliation with the Sultan.

Immediately on his ascendancy to the throne, Sd. Taymúr initiated a number of policy reforms, which included the reorganization of customs duties, and the permission of public smoking and drinking. Prohibitive orders included the prohibition of prostitution and bribery. Local authorities in Muscat and Maṭraḥ received warning against taking bribes, and generally, a high level of justice was promised. All of these policy reforms

were intended principally to give the Omanis the impression that the Sultan was in favour of justice and public order and against corruption (20).

It was said that the Sultan in fact was inspired in these reforms by a deference to the wishes of Sh. al-Sálimí (21). Not only that, but the Sultan wrote letters to all the principal chiefs of Oman including Sh. 'Isà, informing them of his assumption of Oman, giving assurances of a just and equitable rule and his desire to reform the administration of the country at large (22).

Not long afterwards, the Sultan received many friendly reply letters from the chiefs, expressing their loyalty to him. Among those who wrote in reply and expressed loyalty were (23):

- 1- Sh. Ḥamad b. Hilál b. Ḥamad al-Sa'dí
- 2- Sh. Ḥamad b. Sa'íd b. Ḥammád al-Ruwáḥí
- 3- Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd b. Khalfán al-Khalífí
- 4- Sh. Ḥumayd b. 'Umayr al-Hiná'í
- 5- Sh. Sa'íd b. 'Abdalláh b. Muḥammad b. Mubáarak al-Junaybí.
- 6- Sh. Muḥsin b. Zahrán b. Muḥsin al-Siyábí.
- 7- Sh. Su'úd b. 'Alí b. Jabr al-Jabrí.
- 8- Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih al-Ḥáarithí.

The PAM mentions that Sh. 'Isà's letter had been extremely friendly to the Sultan, who pinned his hope in Sh. 'Isà to conduct the mediation process (24). But the process of mediation and conciliation was halted by Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir's call for the tribes of Ṣúr to support the Imam or to remain neutral.

In conclusion it should be said that Sh. 'Isà's efforts for conciliation between the Imam and the Sultan were not successful for several reasons. First, the Imam's followers' optimism for a quick and easy victory made them militant and hard-line enough to try to overthrow the Sultan. Secondly, many of the tribes headsmen's acquiescence to the Imam's leadership was rather ambivalent, because they feared loss of their political influence among their tribes. Thirdly, the Sultan was supported by the British; and finally, it had been difficult to negotiate the terms and conditions of a conciliation between the Sultan and the Imam, because these were irreconcilable as each of the two parties stuck to

their position. To these we should add the untimely death of the Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal, who saw only about four months and a half of the Imamate period.

2) The Initiative of Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid of Abú Zabí

At the beginning of November 1913 Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid b. Khalífah, the ruler of Abú Zabí (1912-1922) arrived at Muscat, accompanied by forty of his men. The purpose of his visit was to achieve two aims; first, to pay his condolences to Sultan Sd. Taymúr on the death of his father; and second, to offer his help for mediation between the Sultan and the Imam.

Following his talks with the Sultan, Sd. Taymúr, Sh. Ḥamdán obtained the Sultan's approval to go ahead with his plan for mediation with a view of eventual conciliation. On the basis of the Sultan's approval, Sh. Ḥamdán wrote to the leaders of the Imamate informing them of the purpose of his visit and the efforts he was undertaking to bring about peace and reconciliation between the Sultan and the Imam. He designated the town of al-Síb to be the meeting place for the leaders after the 'Id al-Aḍḥà (25).

Sh. Ḥamdán's efforts received a further impetus from two letters written by two prominent tribal leaders: Sh. Hilál b. Sa'íd al-Ḥajrî, one of the leaders of the Ḥajriyyín tribe, and Sálím b. 'Āmir al-Ḥasaní, a leader of B. Bú Ḥasan. Both exhorted Sh. 'Isà to accept Sh. Ḥamdán's call, and asked him to use his influence to press on the Imam to go for conciliation with the Sultan. They also warned him of the grave risks that might arise from the reluctance to accept peace, such as the outbreak of a civil war and social, strife (26). Their two letters went on to warn that "if matters are not straightened soon all the Hináwí tribes will march out to fight against the Imam and his Gháfirí partisans" (27).

After having received Sh. Ḥamdán's letter, Sh. 'Isà convened a meeting at al-Qábil, attended by Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. 'Āmir b. Khamís al-Málikí and others, in which they discussed Sh. Ḥamdán's call for peace. The result of this meeting was that they agreed to meet Sh. Ḥamdán in order to bridge the gap of conflict between the Imam and the Sultan, and also to get to know about the latter's point of view.

After the 'Id al-Aḍḥà, the three leaders, Sh. 'Isà, Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. al-Málikí left al-Sharqiyyah to meet Sh. Ḥamdán at al-Síb. On their way, they agreed among

themselves that Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. al-Máلكí should head for Samá'il to convey to the Imam what plans they had for peace. The Imam speedily refused their call for peace, and instead, called for a meeting to discuss this call. The result of the meeting was that they supported the Imam's stance in his refusal to meet Sh. Ḥamdán. Accordingly, the Imam sent Sh. al-Máلكí to al-Síḅ to inform Sh. 'Isà of what the Imam had decided, while at the same time giving Sh. 'Isà the freedom of choice to negotiate with Sh. Ḥamdán on his personal accord, without the Imam having to be responsible if talks failed (28).

We have no clear evidence on the reasons which led the Imam to reject this initiative before it was discussed. However, as it appears, Sh. Ḥamdán did not send a letter directly to the Imam probably because he did not recognize the Imam. Another reason was that Sh. 'Isà did not get prior permission from the Imam for negotiation of peace.

Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid reached al-Síḅ on 18th November accompanied by certain Shaykhs of al-Ḥawásinah and those of the B. Bú Ḥasan and Sh. Ráshid b. 'Uzayyiz. A few days later, Sh. 'Isà arrived, accompanied by his brother and some of the dignitaries of his men (29). Sh. Ḥamdán was hopeful that a good number of the Omani chiefs would respond to his call, but only a few responded, among them Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Hilál al-Yaḥyá'í, one of the Shaykhs of al-Záhirah, while the remaining leaders (e.g. Sh. Ḥimyar, the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir, Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd b. Ráshid al-Gháfirí, and Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad al-'Abri) (30) all accepted Sh. Ḥamdán's call, but when they arrived at Samá'il proceeding on their way to meet Sh. Ḥamdán in al-Síḅ, were intercepted by the Imam, who prevented them from proceeding.

Immediately afterwards, negotiations started, which actually marked the first serious attempt of negotiations for peace between the Sultan and the Omanis on this matter. These talks and discussions lasted until 9th December 1913. The talks centred around the Imam's terms for conciliation which he presented in July 1913. They agreed on the following terms:

1. That the Imam would maintain control over the Interior towns of Oman.
2. That the Imam should surrender the fort of Bidbid and Samá'il to the Sultan.
3. That both sides should respect each other's interests.

4. That both sides should ensure freedom of movement for all Omanis in all territories.
5. That the Sultan should refrain from surrendering any of Omani land to Britain.
6. That the Sultan should not harbour any elements dissident to the Imam.
7. That the Sultan should endeavour not to take any action that may harm the Omanis.
8. That the Sultan should abide by the *Sharí'ah*, promote the Islamic principles of righteousness and maintain justice.
9. That the Sultan should reduce the import tax to 5% along all Sultan's ports.
10. That the Sultan should cancel taxes on domestic produce going to his territories, such as pomegranates and dates.
11. That there should be an exemption from examination of personal baggage passing the *on* check-point at Şúr (31).

The terms of this treaty included some religious, economic, security and political issues. Some of these issues were dealt with by the Imam at times, the Sultan at others, and jointly by both of them at yet other times.

It is obvious from the treaty that it reinforced the existing status quo and that Sh. Ḥamdán was striving to strike a balance between the stipulations of the Imam and the demands of the Sultan. He suggested that the Imam should return the forts of Bidbid and Samá'il to the Sultan (term 2), which was the only main demand of the Sultan. In return the Sultan should approve the Imam's control in the Interior (term 1). Sh. Ḥamdán also avoided committing the Sultan to abdicate his agreements with the British Government about the trade of arms and slaves. The abdication of the Sultan from his agreements with the British was the principal demand of the Imam. Sh. Ḥamdán, therefore, sought to commit the Sultan to a solemn undertaking that he would not surrender any part of the land to the British (term 5), and to exempt passenger bags passing through the port of Şúr from examination.

Sh. 'Isà, on his part, agreed on all points except the one stipulating that the Imam return the forts of the Bidbid and the Samá'il to the Sultan (32), on which point he expressed reservations, based on his firm conviction that the Imam would not accept this condition.

This treaty, as it were, was presented to the Sultan first for approval. Sh. Ḥamdán and Sh. 'Isà, both went to see the Sultan, Sd. Taymúr, in Muscat on 10th Muḥarram 1332/ 9th December 1913 and to present him with its terms. The Sultan agreed, unconditionally to the terms included in the treaty. However, the Sultan's approval of the treaty, we believe, did not come from a firm conviction in the terms, but from his firm belief that the Imam would reject them. He also tried to know Sh. 'Isà's point of view when he asked about the latter's position in case the Omanis rejected the terms of the treaty. Sh. 'Isà replied that he would stand with justice and rightness (33). There prevailed a degree of peace during a two-months truce which was intended as an interim period to enable the parties concerned to discuss the terms of the treaty (34).

Sh. 'Isà then returned to Samá'il, where the Imam was (35) to present to him the results of his negotiations. The Imam postponed the discussion of the terms of the treaty until he had convened a meeting with his aides in Nazwà in Şafar 1332/January 1914. Sh. 'Isà felt that the Imam was unappreciative of his efforts, felt somewhat disappointed and returned home with an uneasy feeling.

In less than a month, the Imam sent an envoy, Sh. Ḥámid b. Sayf al-Ruwáḥí to Sh. 'Isà, informing him that the meeting had unanimously rejected the terms of the treaty. Not only that, but Sh. 'Isà was accused of weakening the Imam and of supporting the Sultan and standing against the Omani people (36). Sh. 'Isà was in fact, clear of such accusations, and had worked hard for peace, motivated by a strong desire to see peace and justice prevail among the Omanis and to see an end to the hostilities.

As a result of the Imam's refusal, Sh. 'Isà wrote to Sh. Ḥamdán informing him of his disappointment with the refusal of the Imam of the terms of the treaty, and of the failure of his efforts. On the Imam's refusal, there ensued a state of confusion and apprehension among the adherents of Sh. 'Isà. The Sultan wisely seized on this opportunity of confusion by sending to the Hináwí tribes inviting them to abandon the Imam and come and join him (37). According to British sources, Sultan Sd. Taymúr succeeded in diverting some of the Interior Hináwí tribes to his support (38), but these sources did not mention specific tribes by name. The fact is that none of the Interior Hináwí tribes withdrew their support from the Imam. It is more likely that the Hináwí of

the Báṭīnah Province may be the ones referred to by these sources. These latter tribes were holding a middle position between the Imam and the Sultan. However, when it became clear to them that the Imam and his followers were not serious about conciliation, they opted to support the Sultan, who had agreed on some of the Imam's claims and made some changes to ameliorate his rule, as mentioned above.

Hence, Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid's initiative failed mainly because the Imam was wary of Sh. Ḥamdán's mediation; secondly, the Imam was of the belief that the seizures of the forts of Bidbid and Samá'il should not, as a matter of religious principle, be returned to the Sultan.

3) The Initiative of Sh. Sultán al-Na'ímí, the Shaykh of al-Buraymí

The attempts *at* mediation for a political conciliation came to a halt pending the 1914 because the Imamate lost one of its prominent religious leaders, Sh. al-Sálimí (5th Rabí' I, 1332/1st February 1914), who was directing all its affairs. As a result, the Imam was able to achieve some successes by annexing both the Nakhal and Wádí al-Ma'áwil. It also widened the gap of conflict as a result of the British intervention to protect Barká' and Qurayyát in April 1914.

The Imam denounced the British intervention and their support to the Sultan in Barká'. He wrote to the PAM denouncing the British entering war without prior warring, as he also asked for explanations which led the British Government to retract their promise between the PAM and the Imam the preceding year as mentioned earlier. The Imam also wrote to the American Consul in Muscat asking for information on the general Christian rules on the issue of war (39). Although Sh. 'Isà did not actively participate in the early successes which the Imamate achieved in 1914, he nevertheless wrote to the Sultan expressing his alarm, as well as that of the Omanis, over the British interference in Omani internal affairs (40).

The PAM ignored the Imam's letter, which led the latter to seek international support, from Imam Yahyà of Yemen and Sa'íd Páshà, the Turkish commander in Yemen. The Sultan, on his part, imposed taxes on domestic produce during the summer of 1914 (41).

Following the defeat of the Imam at al-Waṭayyah in January 1915, letters poured from some of the tribes' headsmen expressing loyalty and support to the Sultan. Also some of the tribes of al-Siyábiyyín and the B. Jábir (42) sent two corps to al-Síb, intended to support the Sultan (43).

As for the leaders of the Imamate, they all dispersed and each returned to their homelands. Meanwhile, Sh. Sulṭán b. Muḥammad b. 'Alí al-Na'ímí emerged on the scene of events. The latter presented himself to the Sultan, offering his assistance to mediate for conciliation. The Sultan blessed Sh. al-Na'ímí's initiative for conciliation. He then wrote to the Imam proposing the terms of peace and stating that he had been able to persuade the Sultan not to advance into the Interior for ten days. He also asked for a reply from the Imam within ten days, and warned him that if a reply was not received within that period, he would be sure of the Sultan's advance into the Interior, to Wádí Samá'il (44). It is evident that the Imam was anxious to consider Sh. al-Na'ímí's initiative for peace, and he accepted to meet Sh. al-Na'ímí accordingly. Not only that, but he also suggested that a meeting should be held at al-Síb for this purpose (45).

Unfortunately, however, we do not know precisely the details about this meeting or even whether it was actually convened. Al-Sálimí for example, mentioned that Sh. 'Isà met Sh. al-Na'ímí at al-Síb (46), but he did not specify a definite time for this meeting. Some of the Arab writers mentioned that it was held at the end of 1914 (47), whereas British sources state that some delegates were sent to a meeting between 17th and 25th January 1915, but these British sources did not mention whether this meeting was actually convened or not. However, these sources mention that Sd. Nádír b. Fayṣal, the brother of the Sultan, accompanied Sh. al-Na'ímí when the latter went for the meeting at al-Síb, and the Sultan followed them there, to be at close quarters of the meeting, though he did not disembark from his yacht on the sea (48).

In spite of all these apparent statements about the meeting between the representatives of both the Sultan and the Imam, we believe that no such meeting ever took place on January 1915. Our belief is based on the following premises: first Sh. 'Isà left Samá'il on 28th Şafar 1333/ 15th January 1915 for home, immediately after a meeting was held between the Imam and his leaders in Samá'il, after their defeat at al-Waṭayyah, and

he did not return to al-Síḅ during this period; secondly, there had been a number of deaths among his close kin; thirdly, the PAM confirmed that Sh. 'Isà collected some weaponry with the intention of launching an attack on Muscat, the Sultan's seat.

Following the failure of this expected meeting, Sh. al-Na'ímí made a fresh attempt and wrote to the chiefs of the B. Gháfir, in Wádí Samá'il area, asking them to come for a meeting at al-Síḅ on 9th Rabí' I, 1333/26th January 1915 (49). The tribes' headsmen accepted his call (50). However, they were checked short by a strong warning issued from the Imam and Sh. Ḥimyar not to go on to meet Sh. al-Na'ímí. In spite of the Imam's warning, the chiefs formed a delegation (51), comprising the following four Shaykhs to meet Sh. al-Na'ímí at al-Síḅ:

1. Sh. Sa'íd b. Ráshid b. Muḥammad al-Jábrí.
2. Sh. Muḥammad b. Sa'íd b. 'Umar al-Jábrí.
3. Sh. Ḥumayd b. Málík al-Jábrí.
4. Sh. Sa'íd b. Ráshid al-Hadábí (Hináwí tribes in Fanjá)

This delegation convened a meeting at al-Síḅ in the period between 1st and 6th February 1915. In this meeting, a strong commitment of support of the Sultan was reaffirmed if and when the Sultan would come with a force to attack the fort of Samá'il. The delegation also proposed to Sh. al-Na'ímí to contact Sh. Ḥimyar to discuss with him the possibility of peace. Sh. al-Na'ímí favoured this proposal and sent to Sh. Ḥimyar for a meeting. The latter immediately agreed to meet Sh. al-Na'ímí. The PAM commented on Sh. Ḥimyar's acceptance: "on 7th February 1915, Sh. Ḥimyar wrote a friendly letter to the emissary [Sh. al-Na'ímí], accepting his invitation to meet him for an exchange of views" (52). In another letter from Sh. Ḥimyar to Sh. al-Na'ímí in which he apologised that he would not be able to meet Sh. al-Na'ímí in al-Síḅ (53), and he proposed Samá'il to be the meeting place instead of al-Síḅ, and telling him that "when you [Sh. al-Na'ímí] hear about our arrival there [Samá'il] we wish you may come there or send a messenger on your behalf who should suffice". Sh. al-Na'ímí welcomed the above mentioned letter, but apologised that he would not be able to go to Samá'il, and instead would send a representative to the meeting.

On 14th February Sh. Ḥimyar arrived at Samá'il, while Sh. al-Na'ímí moved out from Muscat to al-Síb on the 17th of that same month. He then immediately sent his representative, Sh. 'Abdalláh b. 'Alí, accompanied by Sh. Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd. However, on the arrival of Sh. al-Na'ímí's representative, Sh. Ḥimyar blankly refused to meet them. And even worse, he completely rejected Sh. al-Na'ímí's mediation. It is more likely that the abrupt change in Sh. Ḥimyar's attitude was in line with the Imam's refusal of Sh. al-Na'ímí's mediation. Besides, the Shaykhs of the B. Gháfir ignored the Imam's warning not to meet Sh. al-Na'ímí at al-Síb. In spite of this tension, the chiefs of the B. Gháfir succeeded in convincing Sh. Ḥimyar to respond to Sh. al-Na'ímí's call. Sh. Ḥimyar was thus being persuaded, and eventually agreed to his people's pressures. He wrote a reply letter to Sh. al-Na'ímí, in which he incorporated a number of demands as necessary conditions for his acceptance of conciliation. These demands can be summarized as follows:-

1. All grievances and wrongs existing with regard to the coast towns to be redressed.
2. Removal of additional taxes, customs and dues. They were to remain the same as in the time of Imam 'Azzán., and Sd. Turkí b. Sa'íd.
3. The Imam to appoint his own Qádis in all the coastal towns.
4. Half of the customs revenue to go to the Imam and half to the Sultan.
5. The Christians to be removed from the trade routes, and free intercourse to be allowed to the inhabitants of Oman for the purpose of trade or for earning their livelihood.
6. The sons of the Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal, to interview the Imam.
7. The wounded Omanis who were undergoing treatment in the hospital to be immediately released and sent under escort to Bidbid.
8. Amnesty for the people of Bawshar who were suffering most from the closing of trade routes to Muscat and Maṭraḥ (54).

Sh. Ḥimyar concluded his letter by referring to the conditions on which he would accept the peace deal. He insisted that the Sultan should have full knowledge of these conditions and give his complete consent to them. The Sultan's consent then had to be fully entrusted to and enacted by Sh. al-Na'ímí.

It is clear from these conditions of Sh. Himyar that they were in fact worded with the full knowledge of the Imam. He categorically refused to enter into any peace negotiation without a prior approval of these conditions. Sh. al-Na'ímí sent these demands to the Sultan, who accepted them and approved of their discussion, except terms 4, 5 and 6, which the Imam would not accept. As a result, the peace talks failed, as did the previous ones.

4) The Initiative of Colonel Benn in 1915/1333

Following the visit of Lord Hardinge (1858-1944), Viceroy and Governor-General of India to Muscat on 11th February 1915, on his way back to India from the Gulf, Benn, the PAM, (55) was active pressing forward his mediation between the Imam and the Sultan. Before embarking on Benn's role, it is worthwhile first, to shed some light on the view of the Viceroy, concerning the internal affairs of Oman.

In chapter I, we have already referred to the purpose of the Viceroy's visit to the Gulf, which was to obtain get a first hand knowledge of the position of the Shaykhs of the Gulf states with regard to the politics of the First World War. Sultan Taymúr apologised for not being able to attend the meeting that was convened in Kuwait on this issue. Accordingly, the Viceroy decided to visit Muscat so that he could appreciate more closely the situation inside Oman. Before having met the Sultan, the Viceroy called Benn, the PAM, for a meeting. The latter briefed the Viceroy of the general state inside Oman, and especially about the on-going conflict, the defeat of the Imam and the ensuing events (56). The Viceroy made the following remarks:

1. That the time had now come when the Sultan must be given clearly to understand that a British garrison, which involved considerable expenses to the British Government, could not be maintained indefinitely in Muscat;
2. That the Sultan must see to it that an understanding with his opponents was arrived at and normal conditions restored as soon as possible;
3. That the Political Agent might act as intermediary between the Sultan and the rebel leaders and an understanding be arrived at on the basis of fixed tribal allowances for the chiefs (57).

It was evident that the Viceroy was anxious that the Sultan should reach a reasonable agreement with his subjects. That was especially so when the Viceroy emphasized the role of the British military support, which he described as being not intended to remain permanently in Muscat to protect the Sultan. It was certain that the Viceroy also assessed the letters of the Imamate leaders written to the PAM in October 1913, in which they expressed their belief that the British Government would not sacrifice its credibility for the sake of one person. Besides, the Imam had undertaken to ensure the safety of the British subjects and their property in the area under his control. In addition, the Viceroy was afraid of the Imam's call for the *jihád*, which would inevitably coincide with the Ottoman call. Ironically, the British were negotiating with the Sharíf Ḥusayn of the Ḥijáz to call for the *jihád* against the Ottoman Turks. All of these circumstances led the Viceroy to realize the necessity of the Sultan coming to terms with his opponents.

The Viceroy then asked the PAM about his view with regard to the point he had made earlier, and inquired whether it was possible to reduce the British garrison in Muscat to its former smaller size. The PAM (58) welcomed the Viceroy's suggestion. It was evident that the PAM was in favour of conciliation, which would also be welcomed by the Sultan and the French. This latest development was not in accord with the British earlier policy, which was essentially to avoid any direct contact with the rebel leaders for fear of arousing suspicions from both the Sultan and the French. The PAM, however, was of the view that it was impossible to effect a conciliation with the Imamate leaders for two obvious reasons:

1. The rebels held the key to the situation through the possession of the Samá'il fort, and valley and while thus holding the trump card, they would probably see no advantage in coming to terms. They were at present defiant.
2. The bestowal of tribal allowances might not prove attractive to the Arab leaders. Religious scruples might preclude the Imam from accepting such an allowance while the other two chiefs (Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Ḥimyar) enjoyed good income from their present positions (59).

Moreover, the PAM was reserved about the reduction of the British forces in Muscat, explaining that the ships of the British Navy used to lie in the sea close by such that they

could be called at short notice. This was no longer possible under the circumstances of the War which summoned the navy away from the region (60).

The Viceroy strongly saw the necessity of conciliation between the Sultan and his opponents, and therefore insisted on a solution that would be acceptable to both parties. He met the Sultan and addressed him in the following terms: "we wish to see these disturbances at an end , and Muscat restored to its normal position of peace." He added that " the time has now arrived when a serious effort must be made to bring about an understanding with the rebel leaders as the location of the British garrison in Muscat could not be indefinitely continued and you (Sultan) must clearly understand this" (61).

The Sultan himself tried to convince the Viceroy that conciliation with the Imam was impossible and that the Imam would declare the *jihád* (62). In the end, the Viceroy succeeded in persuading the Sultan to accept the proposed mediation of the PAM (63).

On 9th April 1915, the PAM sent letters to the Imam, Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Ḥimyar. His intention behind this dispatch was to ascertain their views and the terms on which they would be prepared to accept a reconciliation (64). Ten days later, the PAM received the Imam's reply, in which (65) he expressed his approval provided that he needed to consult with other '*ulamá*' and leaders. Sh. Ḥimyar also replied that he suggested sending a representative to the Interior to discuss matters with them (66). Sh. 'Isà, however, was slow in replying, though he apologised for the delay of his reply (67).

Thus, it appeared that the Imam and his leaders accepted the principle of negotiation under British supervision. This was indicative of positive signs of moderation in their attitudes, contrary to the generally held view which saw the Imam's acceptance of peace as a sign of weakness in the position of the Sultan and the British. This view also saw the proposal as coming as a surprise to the Imam and his followers, such that it aroused some suspicions and apprehensions among the Imam's ranks (68).

Before the Imam came to a final decision on whether to resume negotiations or not, the other chiefs of the Imamate sent a messenger to the PAM to ascertain his view and also to explain the general Omani view about the reconciliation process, especially that they had failed on a previous occasion to make such a deal (69). The messenger was Sh. Ḥumayd

b. Sa'íd b. Shunayyin al-Fulaytí, who lived in the village of Wásit in Wádí Ma'áwil, and who played an instrumental role in the success of the proposed meeting.

Sh. al-Fulaytí interviewed the PAM on 29th May 1915. Bell reported that their conversation elicited as follows:

1. The people as a whole welcomed British intervention, but were anxious to know what they expected to gain.
2. The Sultan was not really anxious for a reconciliation, but was moved by a wish to please the British.
3. The Sultan did not conform to Muslim faith and was regarded as a heretic.
4. Peace could only be agreed to be on the following terms:
 - i. Full recognition of the *Sharí'ah* law, as practised by the Imam in substitution for the present unjust system of dealing with civil and criminal cases. There was to be no favouritism towards people connected with ^{the} palace.
 - ii. Removal of British troops and of the land blockade of imports into the Interior.
 - iii. Full settlement of the financial claims of the tribes of the Interior.
 - iv. Importation of wine, spirits and tobacco to be prohibited.
 - v. The Sultan to be regarded as ruler of Oman, but the Imam to administer the country according to the *Sharí'ah*, either personally or through a representative at Muscat.
 - vi. Free purchase of arms and ammunition to be allowed (70).

On examination of these terms, which were apparently concordant with the Imam's earlier demands, it becomes clear that they could not have come from somebody who had no connection with the Imamate, as the PAM was content to claim. The PAM claimed that the messenger, Sh. al-Fulaytí, denied having any authorization to speak on behalf of the Imam's side (71). Sh. al-Fulaytí, as it appeared, denied that he was delegated by or speaking on behalf of the Imam's party, but was sent by the Imam's Qádí, Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ráshid b. Şáliḥ al-Háshimí.

The PAM refused to discuss this matter except with the Imam or his representative. But eventually, Sh. al-Fulaytí (72) was informed in general terms what demands could not be considered:

1. Any demand that implied the non-recognition of the Sultan's legitimate rights in Muscat and the Interior of Oman;
2. Any demand that implied the contravention of Treaty rights between Great Britain and Oman, in which connection we [the PAM] recognized no one but the Sultan;
3. Any demand that might injure or hamper British interests or their trade with Oman;
4. Any demand for the discontinuance of the existing arms and warehouse arrangements (73).

On 21 Rajab 1333/4th June 1915 Sh. al-Fulaytí left Muscat for al-‘Awábí where the Imam was, in order to present the PAM's condition to the Imam and Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-Háshimí, the Qáđí of Imam. The former refused to listen to whatever he had to say. The latter, although accepted in principle these conditions, nevertheless denounced the PAM's insistence on retaining them. Sh. al-Háshimí wrote to the PAM in order to ascertain the PAM's view directly from him. He wrote on 5th Sha‘bán 1333/18th June 1915, saying: "Sh. Ḥumayd b. Sa‘íd brought a message to us from you to the effect that you desire to negotiate for peace and prevent bloodshed and do good for all men, and in reply I inform you that a Muslim will never agree to be led astray from the path of the Prophet. If the message which Sh. Ḥumayd has brought is correct, then it behoves us to ask you for certain conditions both of a religious and of a worldly nature" (74). Sh. al-Háshimí then complained about the PAM's letter with regard to the following :

1. The stopping of the trade in slaves and other commodities, which was inconsonant with Islamic law.
2. The British claim to command the sea which is common to all.
3. That the British were interfering in the affairs of the Sultans of Oman and supporting them in matters contrary to their religion.
4. That the people of Oman were suffering from the fall in the value of Dollar and the increase in the price of food and cloth. the
↑
5. The general complaint against the British from the stand-point of Islam, for permitting the forbidden, such as the sale of wine and tobacco, and forbidding the permitted, such as the trade in arms and slaves (75).

Sh. al-Háshimí concluded his letter by stating that if the PAM agreed to the conditions set out in his letter, and which were demanded by their religious beliefs, then he would agree and would do everything in his capacity to get the approval of his party and to bring about final peace. But Sh. al-Háshimí warned that if the PAM worked only for his government's interests and to force a peace deal, then they would reject that and "shall ask God's help"; implying war. Sh. al-Háshimí then explained that he wrote that letter to the PAM only to clear himself of the blame of not replying on the proposals.

Before going into the British view on Sh. al-Háshimí's letter, it is worth while trying to understand the Omanis' public view on the conciliation process. The following letter, sent by the son of Sh. al-Háshimí to his father written on 15th Jumádà I, 1333/31st March 1915, shows us the Omanis' desperation and desire for peace and stability:

"I beg of our leaders who are wise and who are capable of being of one mind and one opinion, with the help of one another according to Islamic law and religion, to stop the bloodshed of Muslims without delay. You are able to negotiate for peace and God will unite all hearts together. I cannot offer advice to the heads of the people, but you have influence with them and with the Imam. They will listen to you and accept what you propose. I hope that all of you will try to induce Shaykh 'Isà b. Šálih to propose terms of peace and not harm the people on the coast of Oman. You know that the coast of Oman is under the protection of the British. Can Omani people fight with the British?

The guns fire shells like rain. Can we hope for success in such circumstances? Perhaps these words will arouse you and induce you to think about saving yourselves and others. This is my humble advice to my religious brethren and to my people" (76).

This letter clearly shows the extent to which the Omanis had grown weary of the continuing strife, and were desperate for peace and stability.

After having received Sh. al-Háshimí's letter, Benn (the PAM) dispatched a short message to the Imam reminding him of his promise to give his view and also informed him of his receipt of some letters from Sh. al-Fulaytí and al-Háshimí containing his views. But the message indicated that it was impossible for the PAM to accept any peace or place confidence in these letters if the Imam did not endorse them in the first place (77). Benn also replied to Sh. al-Háshimí and Sh. al-Fulaytí, telling them it was impossible to take action upon a letter not coming from the Imam himself. This was because, firstly their letter was not undersigned by the Imam nor sealed; secondly, that the PAM had been promised by the Imam that he would reply to his letter (78). It appeared that the PAM declined to go into negotiations until the Imam personally informed him of his view.

Sh. al-Háshimí and Sh. al-Fulaytí both received the PAM's reply with some condemnation and surprise. They wrote three letters to him in response, on 14th and 15th

Ramaḍán/27th and 28th July, 1915. For the importance of Sh. al-Háshimí's letter dated 14th Ramaḍán, of the contents of which he briefed the Imam and because of the importance of this letter for the prospects of peace, here are some extracts of this letter:

"When I received your letter of 16th July, 1915/ 2nd Ramaḍán, 1333, which was a reply to mine, I took it to the Imam and those who were with him and then we sent the letter to Sh. 'Isà b. Şáliḥ on the advice of the Imam and his friends. and we have sent a copy of that letter to Sh. Himyar b. Náşir and to Sh. 'Ámir b. Khamís and their friends. The reply will come to you from the Imam, (and it will be written) in the presence of above mentioned Shaykhs. You should be prepared to receive it; and (you will be able) to distinguish those conditions which are capable of acceptance by us and those which are not. And you should not consider our demands as extraordinary or be surprised at the terms we ask" (79).

Sh. al-Háshimí asked a number of questions, which were in fact not intended for information but as exclamations and complaints. He complained of the British Government's actions, expressing himself as one asking who has the right to:

1. Stop us from taking back our escaped slaves ?
2. Prevent us from prohibiting the things which are forbidden by God such as wine and tobacco?, and stop us passing orders prescribed by our religion?
3. Stop us from dealing in rifles, ammunition, gunpowder, and weapons?
4. Stop us from sending our rifles by sea? and stop our trade abroad?
5. Stop us from setting the right path of our religion and made demands of our leaders?
6. Stop us passing orders according to our *Sharí'ah* against the Sultan when he acts contrary, and oppose us whenever we come to punish him who trespasses our faith?

And Sh. al-Háshimí continued :

"I write to you to be a wise man and of good understanding and the representative of the British Government. I ask you is it fair to call upon the Imam to agree to conditions which are of no interest or profit to him? Or to ask him to accept only such terms as you want while at the same time unlawful things are permitted to continue in Muscat? if you wish Oman to remain under the rule of Sd. Taymúr, then he must follow and obey Islam and conduct all his affairs according to Islamic law by his close relations and friends and by the public equally both high and low. The Sultan must accept and permit the Deputy of the Imam to live with him in Muscat to see that the orders of Islamic law are carried out. The Deputy will give or withhold permission according to that law and protect the rights of the subjects. If Sd. Taymúr agree to all this then the Imam and his followers will be bound not to oppose him in any way either in his Court or his buildings or any defence works belonging to him.

Sh. al-Háshimí then put forward the following conditions:-

1. Every slave should be given back to his master.
2. The dealing in arms should be permitted.
3. Everything pertaining to arms should be allowed.
4. No rules except Islamic rules should be permitted.

He concluded by giving the PAM choice between two options, saying that:

"If you intend to exercise your authority over both sides viz., over the Imam's people and Sd. Taymur's as well, then (I say) this will never be permitted by our religious; for we do not ask for worldly thing; was ask only for the recognition of Islamic law and of the right to 'bid and forbid' according to the Shari'ah of Islam. If you agree with us then all will be well. We await your reply to appoint a day on which the leaders of Oman will be summoned".

Sh. al-Fulaytí's second letter to the PAM following Sh. al-Háshimí's letter in one days' time confirmed that the latter was written by order from the Imam (80). The letter asked for a prompt reply:

" Now if you consider the reply will be acceptable to the British Government please let me know by the bearer of this as we, Imam, Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Ḥimyar have agreed to meet in Samá'il. I and Sh. al-Háshimí await your reply and on its receipt. We shall go to Samá'il in order to consult the above mentioned persons" (81)

A month later, the PAM received a letter from the Imam, signed by him and by the rest of his leaders; Sh. 'Isà, Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. al-Háshimí, conveying their approval of his mediation. This letter reads as follows:

"Your former letters have reached me and I have learnt their contents. I see no objection to peace being arranged between myself and Sd. Taymúr and you are a suitable and capable person to undertake the same. But negotiation by correspondence at this distance is impossible.

A meeting to discuss what you have mentioned in your letter and what your messenger Sh. Humayd b. Sa'íd has also mentioned might if you wish be arranged, and if you agree to this suggestion we should of course send a trustworthy man to represent us. The date may be fixed by you. We expect a reply by this messenger Sh. Ḥumayd b. Sa'íd al-Fulaytí" (82).

The PAM, Benn welcomed the Imam's letter, and sent, on 5th September/25th Shawwál, a letter to the Imam and each of his leaders, including Sh. al-Háshimí and al-Fulaytí, in which he decided that the meeting would be convened on Friday, 8th September/28th Shawwál at al-Síḅ (83). He also undertook to guarantee their safety on their way to al-Síḅ and during negotiations (84).

The exchange of correspondence between the PAM and the Imamate continued for a long period, about five months. Needless to say, the process of peace would naturally require a great deal of consultation and contact between the various factions. Eventually, though, the PAM succeeded in eliciting the Imam's approval for a meeting. The latter, in the end, welcomed the PAM's mediation, but needed time to get his leaders' final consent. The reasons that led to this delay in the peace process were numerous. First, the Imam needed time to consult his followers; second. it coincided with the harvest time for the Omanis who were busy harvesting their crops. Besides, Sultan Sd. Taymúr, instead of handling his problem with the B. Baṭṭásh diplomatically, used force against them in July

1915. This complicated the situation even further. He was also preparing for a campaign against the Wádí Samá'il. As a result of all these complications, it is possible to find justification for the Imamate's long delay in accepting the peace mediation, contrary to the view that they were suspicious of the British PAM's mediation initiative (85). It was even possible to assume that it was in the Imamate's interest and in their favour to back up the PAM's initiative, in view of the British strong influence over the Sultan, such that they could force him to accept the conditions of peace.

It was decided by the PAM, that the meeting should take place on 8th September, 1915. However, the PAM was receiving Sir Mark Sykes who was visiting Muscat, and therefore wrote to the Imam informing him of a change of date of the meeting, to take place on 10th September (86). It appears that neither letter was received by the Imam, because the letters were sent to Wádí al-Ma'áwil, while the Imam was in Wádí 'Indám in al-Sharqiyyah at the time.

When the PAM arrived at al-Síb on 10th September, he was received by Sh. al-Fulaytí, who informed him that the Imam had no prior knowledge of the date of the meeting and therefore was unlikely to attend. On the evening of the same day, the PAM received a letter from the Imam confirming that he had not received his previous letters concerning the date of the meeting, and suggested 5th or 6th Dhú al-Qi'dah/ 14th or 15th September (87).

It was said that the Imam's postponement of the day of the meeting was due to a murder incident which took place in al-Khábúrah. The murder was that of Sh. Khalaf b. Sinán al-'Alawí, the Shaykh of the important Hináwí tribe, by his cousin (88). The present writer refutes this story. First, Sh. Khalaf had no relationship with the Imamate, but he was a supporter of the Sultan and fought with the Sultan against the B. Baṭṭásh in July 1915, just a month before negotiations, and also against the Imam in al-Rustáq in 1917. Secondly, Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí states that Sh. Khalaf's murder took place on the night of 10th Ramaḍán 1344/ night of 23/24 March 1926 (89). Accordingly, the story that Sh. Khalaf's murder was a cause of the Imam's delay in attending the proposed meeting with the PAM, on the fixed day of 10th September, was incorrect. The truth about the matter is that the Imam did not receive the PAM's letters in time (90).

On the changed date of the meeting proposed by the Imam on Wednesday, 15th September 1915 Sh. 'Isà arrived at al-Síḅ, accompanied by an armed following of about 200 men and the following Shaykhs (91):

1. Sh. 'Alí b. Ṣálih al-Ḥáarithí, the brother of Sh. 'Isà.
2. Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ráshid b. Ṣálih al-Háshimí, the Qáḍí of the Imam.
3. Sh. Ḥumayd b. Sa'íd al-Fulaytí, the messenger between the two conflicting parties.
4. Sh. Sulṭán b. Sálím b. Ḥasan al-Raḥbí, the Shaykh of the Raḥbiyyín.
5. Sh. Ḥamad b. Musallam al-Nadábí, the Shaykh of the Nadábiyyín.

The PAM, Benn arrived on the same day accompanied by Captain E. Palmer, R.N. commander of H.M.S. "Dalhousie", Lt Grey, R.I.M., and Lt Johnson, commander of the 126th Baluchistan Infantry, and a personal guard of 10 men of the latter regiment (92).

At the negotiation table, the PAM opened the discussions, welcomed those present and explained that the purpose of the meeting was to be a channel through which they could achieve the British Government's desire to see peace and stability prevail in Oman between the Sultan and his subjects. After that, Sh. 'Isà showed a letter from the Imam authorizing him to speak on behalf of the Imam (93), and presented a written petition which requested the British Government to take careful consideration of the conflict between them and the Sultan, and to force the Sultan to maintain justice in Oman (94).

The following table shows the demands contained in the petition, the discussions that followed, the Sultan's remarks and the PAM's modification thereon (95):

(a) In their written petition	(b) Verbally with modifications	The Sultan's rejoinder and remarks thereon
<p>We pray that the British Government will make careful inquiry into the matters (under dispute) between us and the Sultan in accordance with justice and that (they will also see that) justice is maintained in the Sultan's kingdom for the future, viz., in Muscat and all the coast towns belonging to Muscat.</p>	<p>The cause of all this misunderstanding and unrest in Oman is the misgovernment prevailing in Muscat and the misconduct of its Ruler. In consequence, blood has been shed in Oman, murders have been committed and the murderers and other offenders are given asylum by the Sultan in Muscat. No rules or laws are observed in Muscat. The authorities make their own rules and decide cases according to their own fancy. Partiality and favouritism are rife. This is contrary to all religious laws.</p> <p>The Sultan may hold himself bound by his own religious views, but we demand that justice should be done according to Shari'ah.</p> <p>Owing to all this bloodshed and misgovernment in Muscat and our inability to obtain justice from the Sultan we were compelled to appoint the present Imam.</p>	<p>These are mere excuses put forward by the Imam to try and justify his own irregular conduct and his usurpation of the rights and privileges of the Sultan of Oman, myself. Blood has only been shed in fighting with him-my enemy. The methods of administering justice are the same today as they were in the time of my forefathers and a Shari'ah Court exists.</p>
<p>1) That the Sultan's subjects may be compelled to observe all religious duties and be prohibited from committing all unlawful acts.</p>	<p>Sultan to guarantee the enforcement of Shari'ah forthwith in Muscat and Oman and to apply it to all Arab and other subject of the Sultan in settlement of their cases. Sultan to appoint a Qāḍī in Muscat and we suggest one of the following men whose duty it will be to see that the Shari'ah law is properly administered there. viz.:-</p> <p>(a) Sh. Sa'īd b. Nāṣir al-Kindī.</p> <p>(b) Sh. Sulaymān b. Ḥamad al-Kindī.</p> <p>(c) Sh. 'Āmir b. Khamīs al-Mālikī.</p> <p>(d) Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh al-Khalīfī.</p>	<p>Justice is administered not only in Muscat and the coast towns but throughout Oman according to Shari'ah and Islamic law is invariably observed. A Qāḍī for this purpose already exists in Muscat namely Sh. Sa'īd b. Nāṣir al-Kindī, the man who the Imam now wishes to appoint.</p> <p>I refuse to allow Sh. 'Āmir al-Mālikī, Wālī of Nazwā, or Muḥammad al-Khalīfī to be appointed as Qāḍī in Muscat; but have no objection to either of the other two.</p>

<p>2) That the enhanced export and import dues (knowledge) in the Interior may be withdrawn.</p>	<p>In addition to an extra 10% on account of <i>zakát</i> now levied by the Sultan charges \$1 on every bag of rice which leaves al-Síb and other coast towns for the interior. This should be removed.</p>	<p>When the Imam and rebels make peace with me all enhanced taxes and <i>zakát</i> will be withdrawn. I have recently received the submission of the B. Baṭṭásh tribe who also paid the enhanced <i>zakát</i>, but since their surrender I have exempted them from this payment.</p>
<p>3) That all murderers and offenders, who are now given an asylum by the Sultan in Muscat, may be returned to us (for punishment) according to the law of God.</p>	<p>An impartial and proper inquiry should be held according to Sharí'ah, into the murders committed in Oman and justice done. The following are the murders and offences complained of:-</p> <p>(a) Ḥamad b. Sultan, Shaykh of the Wahíbah, murdered one of the Ḥarásí tribe living in Farq (Nazwá district). This man is now living in al-Síb under the Sultan's protection. The murder was committed last Ramadán (July-August).</p> <p>(b) Sayf b. Náṣir al-Ruwáḥí with some 12 companions murdered 2 men of the B. Riyám about one year ago. Sayf is now in al-Síb.</p> <p>(c) Sa'dalláh al-'Aqrab, a slave of the B. Kharúṣ, killed one Kharúṣí man and fled to the Sultan who gave him a reward and rifles to return and commit another murder. But the Imam intercepted him and killed him.</p> <p>(d) Sulaymán b. Ḥamad al-Ḥarásí and Sulaymán b. Zubayr al-Kharúṣí, killed one Kharúṣí in Surúr by name Yaḥyá b. Sulaymán. The above murderers also killed two more men in Ruḍah, viz., Khalfán b. Sulaymán al-Hadábí, and Latyaf b. Ḥamad al-Qásmi. Both murders committed about 3 or 4 months ago. Murderers are in either Muscat or in al-Síb under the Sultan's protection.</p>	<p>I admit that all the men mentioned were killed. It was not murder. The men who killed them were my "Askaris" and were deputed by me to kill anyone who sided with the Imam, who is my enemy and who has raised the country in rebellion against me and usurped my rights as ruler of Oman. I decline to deliver the "murderers" to the Imam for punishment even if and after peace is made between us.</p> <p>The Imam's men have killed my men also.</p> <p>(a) Admitted Sh. Ḥamad b. Sulṭán "Askri" of mine.</p> <p>(b) Admitted, Sayf b. Náṣir</p> <p>(c) This man was one of the Imam's people. He killed a Kharúṣí and fled here to me hoping for a reward, but I expelled him.</p> <p>(d) These two men were the Imam's men.</p> <p>They came and tried to enlist in my "Nizám" I suspected them as being spied and told them that as a proof of their sincerity they should go back and kill one of the Imam's men and return. They did this and I enlisted them. Admitted, but justified for the reasons given above.</p>

4) That we may be allowed to purchase arms and ammunition so that our arms may not (through want of ammunition) remain as useless things.	The sale to us of arms and ammunition according to the Rules and Regulations of the Arms Warehouse should be permitted. We admit that only men of good character should be permitted to purchase arms and ammunition.	Agreed
5) That we may be granted allowances (lit. help) to enable us to enforce our orders and punish those people of Oman who commit offences. (We would explain that) we cannot enforce our orders without such assistance.	Allowances should be paid to the Imam, Sh. 'Isà, and Sh. Ḥimyar and should equal in amount the sum paid annually to the Sultan as subsidy as compensation for losses suffered by him owing to the stoppage of the arms traffic (Rs. 8,333-5-5 per mensem)	I cannot agree to this
6) That the Chiefs of tribes may also be granted allowances according to the usual custom.	Same view as above	No fixed allowances have ever been paid to tribal Chiefs. It has been the custom to make periodical payments--more or less regularly-- to certain Chiefs of tribes in the interior--but nothing fixed. I am prepared to continue this practice when peace is made--but I absolutely decline to pay any allowance to the Imam. A bullet is what he deserves. Sh. 'Isà would be perhaps among the favoured Chiefs and perhaps Sh. Ḥimyar, but the latter has never received such payments hitherto.

<p>7) That the Sultan may do away with his "Nizám"(the new troops recently raised by the Sultan) together with the Band. Although such things are the custom of the Turkish Government(according to our views) they are unlawful. None of the Sultan's ancestors had a "Nizám" and a Band; and the Sultan is forbidden by his religion to allow such things.</p>	<p>The "Nizám" and Band are quite contrary to the Sharí'ah law, and we insist on the latter being absolutely done away; but as regards the "Nizám" in no case should men be forcibly enlisted in it.</p>	<p>This is a childish request and I absolutely decline to agree to it. Enlistment in my Band is purely voluntary.</p>
<p>8) That the Sultan may be called upon to remove all the unjust and corrupt Wális and Qádis whom he has appointed and sent to the towns.</p>	<p>The Qádis and Wális appointed by the Sultan should administer justice according to Sharí'ah only.</p>	<p>I am quite willing to agree to this. I will appoint and pay any Qádí the Imam suggests except the 2 men mentioned at (1) (c) and (d) above.</p>
<p>9) That the Sultan will not give protection to Omani slaves who escape from their masters when the latter want them back.</p>	<p>Slaves who come for manumission certificate to be returned to their masters, provided it can be proved to the satisfaction of the British Consul that they have not been ill-treated and that there is no intention to sell them. The Sultan to give assurance that they will not be ill-treated in future or sold.</p>	<p>I leave this to the British Government to decide. The practice already exists. I cannot agree to take any responsibility in respect of the slaves of men not known to me or in a general way.</p>

<p>10) That the Sultan may be called upon to release the following persons who have ^{been} imprisoned by him viz.:</p> <p>(a) the son of Sh. Sa'íd b. Náşir al-Kindí</p> <p>(b) the son of Sh. al-Ṭaywání</p> <p>(c) Khalfán b. Sarḥán al-Muḥrazí and his son.</p> <p>(d) A slave of Sh. 'Isà b. Şáliḥ</p> <p>(e) the people of the village of al-Khawḍ.</p> <p>(f) the people of Raḥbiyyín.</p> <p>(g) the camels of the slave of Shuhúl</p>	<p>Nil.....</p>	<p>These men all arrested by my orders in pursuance of my campaign of coercion against the Imam. I decline to release any of them-- even after peace is concluded; but I agree that in future after peace is concluded such cases and also those of murder should be referred to the Sharí'ah Court for decision, or handed over to the Imam to deal with.</p>
<p>11) That the Sultan may be called upon to refer every kind of dispute to Sharí'ah.</p>	<p>Our request refers only to disputes among Arab and other subjects of the Sultan.</p>	<p>The practice already exists in Muscat.</p>
<p>12) That the Sultan will issue orders prohibiting the dealing in wines and tobacco and smoking in the public Islamic bazaars. And the dealers in the above commodities should be forbidden to do so.</p>	<p>This applies to Arab and other subjects of the Sultan only. Those who are permitted by their religion to drink and smoke may do so.</p>	<p>My subjects do not trade in wines and tobacco. The subjects of foreign nations do. This question should be deferred until after peace is concluded when I will give a more definite reply.</p>
<p>13) That the Sultan will exempt the 'Ayál ['Yál] Sa'd from payment of duty and <i>zakát</i> as they have never paid the same hitherto.</p>	<p>The 'Ayál ['Yál] Sa'd, should be exempt from payment of <i>zakát</i> and 'Ashúr as in the days of Sd. Sa'íd. Sd. Fayşal was the first to try and levy this duty on them.</p>	<p>Agreed to</p>
<p>14) That the personal baggage of travellers from India and Zanzibar arriving at Şúr may be exempted from examination according to old custom.</p>	<p>The examination of the personal baggage of arrivals from India and Zanzibar at Şúr is made the excuse for looting such people of their private property. We do not object to having merchandise examined for customs duty. Sd. Taymúr promised to have the practice complained of discontinued, but he has forgotten about it.</p>	<p>Smuggling is very prevalent at Şúr and this examination of baggage is necessary and justified by the circumstances. I deny the charge that it is made the opportunity for looting private property of travellers.</p>

The Sultan put forward two conditions as necessary prerequisites for his final approval of reconciliation which are follows :

1. Absolute subordination of the Imam to the Sultan as Ruler of Oman. If and when he was assured of his loyalty and allegiance to him, he would be prepared to consider his appointment as his Deputy in the Hinterland, exclusive of the Samá'il district
2. Immediate and unconditional surrender to the Sultan of the district of Samá'il within the boundaries defined by him and including the forts of Bidbid and Samá'il reserve to himself the exclusive right as Ruler of Oman to collect all taxes and dues within the said boundaries .

The responses of the Imam's representative were as follows:

1. As regards (1), the Imam and his followers refused to recognize his authority or they saw that they were called upon by the *Sharí'ah* principles to depose him. Therefore, had it not been for the British support, the Sultan would have since long been deposed.
2. As regards (2) it was incumbent upon them not to hand back any place that the Imam had captured by the imperative of the *Sharí'ah*, and hold firm to its teachings. Accordingly, the Sultan must carry out the reforms in his administration and implement their earlier demands (96).

Sh. 'Isà suggested that the Sultan be called upon to introduce those reforms at once and that he be placed on probation for 6 months. If after the expire of that period there were no grounds for complaint, then the question of allowing him to occupy the Wádí Samá'il as the Imam's deputy might be considered.

In the end, the PAM claimed that Sh. 'Isà offered to surrender the forts of Bidbid and Samá'il to the British government to be taken over by the Sultan on condition that the Sultan be persuaded to carry out the necessary reforms. But that if that condition was not met, then the British Government would have to consider the desirability of taking them away from the Sultan, and handing them over to the Imam (97). This offer from Sh. 'Isà was, however, overruled by Sh. al-Háshimí and all the other Shaykhs present, who maintained that such a measure would be contrary to the principles of the *Sharí'ah*. Sh. 'Isà eventually sided with their view.

The PAM also claimed that Sh. 'Isà afterwards confided to him, during the absence of his other associates, that there was only one way out of this situation, and that was not to raise the issue of the forts "as long as the Imam is alive" by which he meant to imply that it was not difficult to defer this issue of surrendering the forts (98).

Eventually, the meeting failed, in view of each party's insistence on its stance. The Imam stuck to his condition of the illegitimacy of surrendering the forts (99), while the Sultan on his part also insisted on his condition of surrendering the forts to his authority (100). The PAM held the Imam responsible for the failure of the negotiations, as also partly attributed the failure of talks to Sh. al-Háshimí and the brother of Sh. 'Isà, both of whom "maintained a most sullen and contentious demeanour throughout the proceedings" (101). The PAM, Benn, wrote to his higher authorities suggesting, as a solution to these difficulties, that one of three courses of action be taken (102):

1. Either the Sultan must agree to set his house in order in accordance with the Imam's religious views and by the introduction of such reforms as may be deemed reasonable, endeavour to give some proof of his desire to conform to the doctrines of the Qur'án as interpreted by the Imam, in return for which the latter would acknowledge the Sultan's supremacy and surrender the forts; or
2. The Sultan must, when negotiations were abandoned, carry out his determination to reduce the Imam to submission and obtain possession of the forts by force of arms; or
3. Allowances, sufficiently large to be attractive and guaranteed by the British Government, must be offered to the Imam, Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Himyar to induce them to surrender the forts to them for disposal as they wished.

5) The Initiative of Haworth and Wingate (1918-1920)

The peace talks stagnated following the failure of the PAM efforts, as a result of Benn's departure from Muscat after a month of the end of the negotiation. Benn was succeeded by no less than six British Political Agents over Muscat within the span of the year following his transfer. The very frequent and ad hoc nature of the succession to the agency of so many representatives within the short period of only one year placed them in

a position wherein they were unable to understand properly the general situation in Oman, and therefore was not conducive to peace negotiations. These agents were (103):

1. Major H. Stawart, C. I. E., I. A.
2. Lit Colonel C. Ducat, I.A.
3. Major A. R. Purton, I.A., 94th Russell's Infantry, officiating.
4. Major E.B. Howell, C.I.E., I.C.S.
5. Major A. King-Mason, 108 Infantry, officiating.
6. Major L. B. H. Haworth, I.A.

Major Haworth, (the PAM) held charge of the agency on 8th November, 1916. Between the years 1916 and 1919, he did not hold any communications with the Imamate leaders. However, Haworth was anxious to offer his intervention to mediate between the Sultan and the Imam.

During the whole of 1917, the PAM, Haworth embarked on a dedicated effort of correspondence with his government, trying to persuade his higher authority to intervene for a permanent settlement of the Omani conflict. In this dedicated effort, he employed all means possible, and was coincidentally helped by two events in the internal development of affairs. The first was that of the Imam's siege of al-Rustáq, its eventual fall at the hands of the Imam and the escape of its ruler, Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím. The second was a letter from the Sultan to the British Government asking for military support. As a result of these developments, and helped by them, Haworth compiled a lengthy report and sent it to the PRG on 9th May 1917. From this report, here is a summary of some of its points:

1. He compared the regime of government of the Sultan with that of the Imam, describing the Imam's regime of government as good, whereas that of the Sultan otherwise. He added that he had never heard a good word from any one regarding the Sultan's government and his Wális, and added "it is not then surprising that the Imam's government is preferred by those who live under it" (104).
2. He gave a historical background of the Imamate and the Sultanate in Oman, in which he concluded with final conviction stating that "my object in giving the above history is to show that it will not be possible to suppress an ideal which has existed for so many years by a simple effort of force, any more than it has proved possible in Ireland" (105).

Apparently, the PAM implicitly favoured the Imamate regime of government, and felt that it was incumbent on the British Government not to ignore this system which had had a long standing tradition in this region. Accordingly, his view was that an ideal solution to the conflict would be to work for a compromise between the Sultanate and the Imamate, which was the essential necessity of reconciliation between the two. His view was that "conciliation is the more necessary since, from the point of view of their history and their religion, right is on their side: while it would be difficult today to deny the right of a people to depose its ruler badly " (106).

The PAM was not content with that, but even admitted that British policy which depended on supporting the Sultan alone, and ignoring the other party, was bound to engender popular animosity towards the British. The general public might well rise against British policy in the country (107). The PAM was of the opinion that the Omani question should be postponed until after the Great War, but also admitted that the course of events was rapidly deteriorating.

3. The PAM was convinced that if the tribes were to be persuaded to an agreement, and the Sultan to effect reforms, it was necessary to bring some British influence to bear. Therefore, the PAM's report went to great length in criticising the financial and administration system of the Sultan's Government, maintaining that had it not been for British aid and support, the Sultan's government would have collapsed long before. For these reasons, he suggested the improvement of the system of government by direct British intervention (108).

The PAM then went on to explain the details of such a project in many of his letters to his higher authorities. As a result of these efforts, a certain measure of the reforms were implemented, not along the lines of his proposals, but by means of a loan directed to reform the financial administration. The Sultan entrusted the implementation of such a reform to Egyptian experts, who started work in October, 1918. The other part of the reforms concerning administration was delayed until October 1920, the time when a council of ministers was appointed.

4. In the end, the PAM presented his suggestions for mediation in the Omani conflict on the bases of the terms of conciliation set out in the meeting that was convened in al-Sīb on

15th September 1915. However, before embarking on this task, the PAM asked his higher authorities' permission to go ahead with his mediation efforts (109).

The PAM's comprehensive report also incorporated the draft letter which he was intended to send to the leaders of the Imamate (110). It went to great length to explain the details and procedures on which the coming negotiations could be conducted.

A week after writing his report, the PAM sent a letter to the PRG, in which he mentioned that he had received a messenger from Sh. 'Isà, asking for a meeting. He commented on Sh. 'Isà's letter of request for a meeting that there must have occurred a split between Sh. 'Isà and the Imam (111). The PAM went on to claim that Sh. Isà's emissary was one of Zanzibari origin, who had possessions of gardens in the Interior of Oman which it was difficult for him to reach and claimed that it was this man who had persuaded Sh. 'Isà to meet the PAM at Qurayyát (112). The PAM concluded his letter by stating: "I do not think that there can be peace in Oman except through British mediation. The Sultan's star seems to be in the ascendant, but the fact does not in any way alter the situation, there can be no permanency of peace except through us" (113). It was evident that the PAM had a strong desire to mediate between the Sultan and the Imam, and his secret reports were replete of this concern. The PRG, on the other hand, supported the PAM's view in a message cabled to Government of India (114).

In order to understand the Sultan's point of view and his inclination to resolve the conflict with his opponents by force, the following is a letter sent from him to the PRG, seeking assistance from the British:

"I beg to address the high government [British] through you about the present situation which has been brought about again between me and my rebellious subjects of Oman, and of which you are aware. Their acts are producing evil results in the interior of my country and I fear that an unsatisfactory state of affairs will be produced if this situation continues between me and my subjects. Undoubtedly the High Government knows that what I state in my letter is a brief account because I report verbally what happens to your Political Agent here; and "a man who is present sees what an absent person cannot see". We have always enjoyed the good offices and assistance of the High Government and they have been "more widely known than a fire on the hill". But I trust that they will afford me such an assistance that I can put an end to this trouble to the relief of both parties.

Now, in truth, the hopes of the rebels have no limit. Since the last month up to now they have attacked my cousin, the Chief of Rustaq, who always helped them whenever they rose in rebellion, and was counted as one of them. They were not satisfied with this, however, but intend to turn him out of his place and capital and he found himself besieged one morning in the fort of Rustaq. He sent to me for help and I took action to prevent the rebels gaining possession of the place. They made misrepresentation to the other clans who were favourable to me and struck terror into their hearts in different ways.

I now write to request the Government to afford me help so that I may be able to adopt a different policy with the rebels, contrary to the past. The Government and I should act together to

put an end to the disturbances created by the rebels. I promise to the Government that if the rebels are crushed by me with the assistance of the Government troops or some war material to disperse their men and destroy their fortifications, ^{the} power will break down and there will be eternal peace in Oman.

I know the Government is very busy in these days, but I cannot help fearing the evil consequences of the growth of this trouble, and the losses which will be incurred by the Government and me and which will continue without any result. Therefore I say that what I have stated is an easy work if the Government helps me.

I have forgiven them more than once and granted (money) to them, but they have become more and more rebellious. They believe that what they are doing is connected with the religion and that they are fighting me and the Government for religion, and have impressed this belief on the minds of the peoples. In brief, it is in the interest of the Government, myself, the merchants and the people to bring this situation to an end" (115).

The PRG's reply to the Sultan indicated that he regretted the adverse developments in Oman, that the Sultan's letter would be closely considered and sent to the Government of India for action, and finally, that the British policy was not to take any action in the inland of Oman (116). The PAM commented on the Sultan's letter saying:

"I have allowed the above letter to go as he wrote it thinking it would be better to let him express what was in his mind only censoring one passage, the meaning of which did not seem clear. I am becoming doubtful if it is necessary to give the Sultan control over the whole of Oman and I have already shown in previous letters that he has never had such control with a view to our own policy than with reference to the Sultan" (117).

As it appears, the PAM was intent to distort the image of the Sultan to the British view, and his view was that Britain should assume complete control over Muscat, convinced that the Omanis would welcome the British. This was conveyed to him by the messenger of Sh. 'Isà, already mentioned above, "pointing out that the British are a just race who interfere with no man's religion and that the Omanis cannot fight the British who could destroy them with a few aeroplanes if they wished to do so even as they have driven the Germans out of East Africa" (118).

It was too optimistic to expect the Omanis to accept British control. However, the truth is that the Omanis welcomed British presence not as dominant overlords, but as partners in trade, because the Omanis were aware of the British fleet control over the Indian Ocean, through which passed all of their trade with the far East, Africa and the Gulf. In order to strengthen his position, the PAM tried to persuade his higher authorities of the futility of assisting the Sultan and in fact interfered with those efforts that had already begun in this direction (119).

In spite of all his persistence, the PAM was not given permission to meet Sh. 'Isà. Having failed in his efforts to get a go-ahead through correspondence, he decided to go to India personally to explain his point of view more closely. He hoped that after his

visit to India, he would be in a better position to meet Sh. 'Isà, and with a more clear view about the situation.

At the commencement of 1918, there was some correspondence between Sh. 'Isà and the Sultan. The former sent a number of friendly letters to the Sultan requesting him to release four men prisoners and asking him to resume the negotiations and a change of his terms (120). However, it is not clear what changes in the conditions and terms of peace were being suggested. Qásim claims that the Sultan agreed to the release of the prisoners, in exchange for the handing over of the gardens which the Imam had confiscated from his subjects inland (121).

There was clearly a narrowing of the divide between the Sultan and the Imamate leader, but the narrowing was unfortunately disturbed by Sd. Ḥumúd b. Hilál, the Wálí of Şúr, who killed one of the Imam's Wális, Sh. Aḥmad b. Sálím al-'Uraymí, during his visit to Şúr on 21st Jumádà 11, 1336/13th April 1918 (122). As a result, disturbances ensued in Şúr, and rumours circulated that the Imam was preparing an attack on Şúr or Yanqil or al-Buraymí which were under the Sultan. Therefore, this incident impeded the on-going efforts exerted by Sh. 'Isà and the PAM and checked short the Sultan's positive response to these efforts.

By the end of the Great War, the British Government sought to resolve the Omani conflict. Therefore it instructed its agent at Muscat to contact the Imamate leaders for resumption of the peace talks. Consequently, the PAM wrote letters on 5th March 1919, carried by Sh. Ḥumayd b. Sa'íd al-Fulaytí to the Imamate leaders, Sh. 'Isà, Sh. Ḥimyar, and Sh. Náşir al-Kharúşí, the Imam's brother, the Wálí of al-Rustáq. Because the PAM's letter contained exhortations and attempts at persuasion, we cite some of its contents:

"It is some time since I have written to you, now that the war is over I had intended to address to you and inform you with reference to it and our general intention in these parts of the world. As you will know, thanks be to God, Great Britain and her Allies have defeated their enemies who have all surrendered and we are now in occupation of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Germany has surrendered her fleet, the most of which is interned in England and Germany itself is in a condition of revolution and famine. In Turkey we have occupied Constantinople and as you know Baghdad has been for a long time in our hands. We are now establishing an Arab Government in that place and will place the whole of Iraq in the hands of an Arab Government and we will not allow the Turkish Government to have any connection with it.

In the Hijáz our friend and ally Sheriff Ḥusayn is all powerful and has taken the title of King of Hijáz. Under the terms of armistice which we allowed the Turks, Madinah has been surrendered by them and is now in the hands of the King of Hijáz. In Yemen Sa'íd Pasha has surrendered and is now a prisoner in our hands. And the truth of all this will undoubtedly reach you from other sources very soon and the time of the Hajj will show it to those who may doubt.

I am especially writing to tell you that it is our intention to assist in the establishment of the Arab Government in all Arab places to govern according to their own customs. Now they are freed from the tyranny of the Turk there is every hope that they will be able to develop on good Arab lines. Now that we have the time and opportunity to attend to Oman it is necessary that I should attempt to explain to you our position towards Oman so that you will be able to understand our point of view. Muscat is one of the ports used by our ships on the way to Bushier and Basrah. It is essential for the purposes of the trade of the world that ports should be in a condition of safety and peace. If the government of the country is upset and fighting, then the port becomes unsafe and there is no harbour for ships which are passing and no safety and the cargo from them if it is landed, is in danger.

In Oman there was always fighting and trouble, especially when one Imam there or a Sultan died and another was elected. We used to make an alliance with one ruler and immediately we had done so we found he was being attacked by some other claimant to the throne. In these circumstances, as you are aware, we were forced in 1895 to make a declaration to all the Shaykhs of Oman that we would support in the ports the Sultan who was in power and with whom we had made alliance and in this way we have supported Sultans Turkí, Fayşal and Taymúr. It is for this reason that I have wished to meet you to discuss with you what can be done to improve matters, for in such a matter it is only by discussion that either side can understand the other and see if it is possible to meet each others' views.

It has never been known that we should injure any one unjustly but how can we act other than we have acted if you do not come to a discussion with us or show any desire for friendly intercourse. We have no wish to force upon people a government which is bad or which is against their customs. And it is at this time that I hear of some talk of a desire to attack Sur. I do not know if this is true but God forbid that it should be, for this would bring the Omanis into conflict with us once more and for two years I have been endeavouring to make this impossible and I write to you to say: do not do this thing if it has arisen in the minds of any of you that it should be done, for this will cause loss to you and we do not wish to harm you. On the contrary, for if we wished we could send aeroplanes which would destroy your towns and your forts and you surely do not think you could fight against us. We have 500,000 men in Iraq whom we no longer require there and a few thousand of these would be sufficient to take the whole of Oman if we wished to do it.

Sd. Taymúr, unlike you has always attempted to be on friendly terms with us and you will see that the ruler who has sea ports will always have the power to put taxes upon the goods coming from the Interior and you will be unable to do anything and we have control of the sea, if you desire to be at enmity with us, why should we allow rice and wheat to be sold to you or clothing and why should we allow you to sell your dates as all your trade is with our countries? But if you are friendly with us and discuss matters, that we can assist you as we are now assisting Sd. Taymúr. But if you go against us then the consequences are on your head and not on ours as I have said before and how can we be friends with those who will not be friends with us.

I would ask that you would explain this to your brother (123) the Imam and let him see that the present condition cannot go on for ever and that communication with us cannot do you any harm, but good, while refusal to communicate with us makes it impossible for us to help you and therefore must result in harm to you and I have written to Sh. Himyar also like this" (124).

It is said that the PAM was threatening the Omani chiefs as a signal to show British power and its victory in the Great War, and to emphasize that they would not be able to withstand British military strength if they refused to cooperate with the British (125). The Omani chiefs, in fact, were well aware of the British power and influence in the world politics, as they also had had a long contact with the British for over a century. For these reasons, the Omanis could not underestimate British power.

However, in spite of the signs of the PAM's brandishing of British military strength, the Imamate leaders paid little attention to his warning, as usual. They continued their preparations for peace. The Imam, for his part, called for a meeting to be convened in Samá'il on April 1919 to discuss the PAM's proposals. Sh. 'Isà also wrote to the PAM,

welcoming his view, but also expressed his desire to meet the PAM at al-Sífb before the Imam's meeting at Samá'il (126).

After having discussed the PAM's proposal at Samá'il, Sh. 'Isà wrote to the PAM, telling him of their final acceptance of negotiations. The latter arranged for a meeting at al-Sífb in May 1919, but this meeting did not take place because of the death of the brother of Sh. 'Isà, Sh. 'Alí b. Şálih on 5th Shawwál 1337/ 6th May 1919, and another date was fixed for the meeting to be held on 14th September 1919 (127).

On 14th September 1919, Sh. 'Isà and Haworth, the PAM, arrived at al-Sífb. The former was accompanied by 14 of the Shaykhs, most of them from his people of the Hináwí tribes and an additional 280 armed men as guards. The meeting was delayed to the 15th in order to await the arrival of Sh. Sa'íd b. Náşir b. 'Abdalláh al-Kindí (1268/1851-1355/1936) to whom an envoy had been sent to ask him to attend the meeting (128). Sh. al-Kindí was an *'álim* and who lived at al-Mutahadamát village (now al-'Ámirát) which is under the Sultan's control.

Haworth and Sh. 'Isà met in the afternoon on 15th September, in the house of Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Bú Sa'ídí, the Wálí of Maṭraḥ. The meeting was also attended by both Sh. al-Kindí, and a translator of the British Agency. Both parties discussed the situation most comprehensively.

At first, the meeting discussed the PAM's proposal that there should be a division of power between the Sultan and the Imam for a united Oman, in which the Sultan assumed temporal power and the Imam spiritual leadership. Therefore, the Sultan should appoint Sh. 'Isà as his representative in the territories under the Imam's control, viz., Samá'il, Nakhal, and Bidbid, and also the coastal towns under the Sultan's control. On the other side, the Imam should appoint Sh. al-Kindí to be his representative. The Imam or his representative should be consulted on the posts of Qádis, and get their approval before the Qádis could be appointed. Also a council for Oman notables should be appointed to assist in decisions regarding the appointments of Wális, and in the running of the country's financial affairs (129).

The meeting was called off for a short interval during which Sh. 'Isà and Sh. al-Kindí discussed the PAM's proposal with the 14 Shaykhs of his followers waiting outside

the hall of the meeting. During these discussions, the Shaykhs rejected this proposal on the grounds that such a dualism of a temporal and spiritual authority had no precedent in Islamic tradition (130).

Evidently, these Shaykhs could not comprehend the possibilities of peace offered by these proposals, and see that formula was more conducive to the peace efforts and could form a basis on which all Omanis could agree. In fact, these could be seen as a form of democratic participation, as there could be formed a council to supervise the financial and administrative matters in the Sultan's government. In addition, there was ample chance for appointing the best cadres to the posts of Wális and Qádis.

After the rejection of the PAM's proposal by the Shaykhs, the PAM presented another proposal, based this time on the prevailing state of affairs. We do not need to go into the details of what these new proposals were or how they were discussed. However, they finally agreed on the new proposals, which include the following terms, some of which were to be carried out by the Sultan and others by the Imam (131):-

1. On the Sultan's part to guarantee:

- a. Freedom of entry for Omanis into Muscat and Maṭraḥ.
- b. Reduction of the coastal tax on all goods to 5%.
- c. Return of Omani fugitives from justice.
- d. Release of prisoners.

2. On the Omani part to guarantee:

- a. Non-interference with the Sultan's government and cessation of hostilities with him in the future.
- b. Freedom to trade and travel in Oman and the safety of travellers.
- c. Return of fugitives from the Sultan's justice.
- d. Settlement of the claims of traders and others against Omanis.
- e. Return of two valuable gardens of the Sultan's subjects seized by the Imam.

It is clear from the terms of this agreement that it was inclined towards the Imam's side and weakened the Sultan's position as regards his demands for the handing over of the forts of Bidbid and Samá'il, and recognition of his sway as Sultan over Oman. As we have seen earlier, these two conditions were responsible for the failure of the peace talks

in September 1915. Another observation about this agreement is the problematic demand for the return to the Sultan of the gardens which had been confiscated by the Imam .

If we compare the terms of this latter agreement with the first proposal which called for a measure of participation in government, we can see that the first proposal offered a better chance of rule, as there could be participation and implementation of financial and administrative reforms. The latter agreement offered no such concessions, and indeed made no provisions against external intervention, in case it happened.

Sh. 'Isà left al-Síb on 17th September, for Nazwà, in order to inform the Imam of the terms of the new agreement. He then left for his home town, giving the Imam ample time to consider the agreement.

The Imam rejected the term which demanded that he return the gardens to the Sultan. It is important to note here that there was a split in the Imam's ranks concerning the issue of the handover of the gardens. The majority of the prominent leadership within the Imam's party were in favour of the return of gardens, if the Imam himself agreed to it. However, another group of his following, mainly from among *Muṭáwi'ah*, were opposed to any handover of the gardens, on the assumption that this would be anti-religious.

However, the new PAM, Wingate, who succeeded Haworth on 15th October 1919, authorized Sh. al-Kindí to follow up the implementation of the terms of the agreement with the Imam (132). Wingate considered that Sh. al-Kindí was the only personality capable of over-coming religious prejudices and could convince the Imam of the necessity of giving back the gardens to the Sultan. Wingate's view was that there could be no peace without the handing back of the confiscated property of the gardens (133). In November 1919, Sh. al-Kindí went to Nazwà to get back the gardens from the Imam, but was not able to do so as a result of the Imam's refusal to hand them over. After that, Sh. al-Kindí tried to persuade the influential elements with the '*ulamá*' in the Imam's party to see the potential benefits of coming to terms with the Sultan for the purposes of peace. His efforts, however, were also unsuccessful in this direction. Consequently he left Nazwà for al-Qábil in January 1920 to discuss the matter with Sh. 'Isà so that the latter could use his influence to press on the Imam to accept peace.

Sh. 'Isà called for a general meeting of the Shaykhs in Nazwà to discuss with the Imam the possibilities of peace. This meeting was held on 28th Jumádà II, 1338/18th February 1920. The results of the meeting were, however, disappointing for these who were in favour of a final peace settlement (134).

According to the PAM's view the main causes of the refusal of the Imam were as follows:

1. Intense ignorance and the paramount influence for the timebeing of *Mutáwi'ah*.
2. Over - confidence and bad management on the part of Sh. 'Isà.
3. Belief on the part of the more powerful and intelligent Omanis that the British were only supporting the Sultan in a half-hearted manner as the British had continually stopped him from imposing restrictions on them and had openly admitted his bad government (135).

The PAM was of the opinion that the rule of religion (that of the Imam) is short-lived, personal and pays no consideration to the issues of public policy and interests and is more inclined to extremism and intolerance (136). These views of the PAM could not be justified and indeed conflicted with the view of one of his predecessors, who described the rule of the Imam as being better than that of the Sultan in many respects.

It appears that the PAM was not happy with the attitude of the Imamate leadership. therefore describing them in such strong terms. Not only that, but he even went further to suggest to the Sultan that he suppress the Omanis in the following ways:

1. increase the tax on dates from 5% to 25%, as a temporary and punitive measure openly directed against the Omanis;
2. increase the tax on pomegranates from 35% to 50%, especially directed against Sh. Hımyar b. Náşir;
3. forbid the export of coffee to the Omanis (137).

The last measure, the banning of coffee exports to the Omanis, according to the PAM's would be the most effective one. The PAM went on to explain the details of how to carry out these measures, and in order to convince his government of his plan, stated that these new measures would be implemented with no extra expenses to be assumed by the British Government (138).

The PAM emphasized the importance of supporting the Sultan in order to reinforce his position, to reaffirm his power and authority among the Omanis, so that they could feel that the Sultan had enough power and authority to press on them. He reassured his government of the possible Omani reaction to such measures, and stated that " the Omanis have no offensive power, for the very simple reason that they have no cartridges for their rifles" (139).

These measures were to be implemented in May 1920 and the Sultan even warned that they would be implemented by force, if need be. In consequence, a torrent of letters poured on the PAM, inquiring about the PAM's position with regard to these measures. His response to these questioning letters was that the British Government supported its efforts of mediation for peace. Moreover, as the Omanis had refused the terms, the British Government decided to support the Sultan and had no further interest in the matter (140).

Britain, in an effort to display its powers and to salvage its image, invited the Sultan for a visit to India to be accompanied by the PAM, on March 1920. At the same time, the British and the Sultan's fleets increased their presence in the coastal ports of Oman, and the fleets put down the rebellion of Sh. Mas'úd b. Zumayt al-Sa'dí, who refused to comply with the declared measures.

The Imam on his part lost one of his important assistants, Sh. Ĥimyar b. Náşir on 7th Jumádà II 1338/27th February 1920. He also launched an attack on al-Ĥazim, but failed to capture it. A few months later, the Imam himself was murdered in July 1920. With his death, the course of events took a different shape, which will be discussed later.

Endnotes

- (1) Qásim, J.Z. al-Khalíj 1914-45. p. 388; Shahdád, op.cit. p. 32.
- (2) Landen, op.cit. p. 394.
- (3) See his letters in (I.O) L/P&S/10/397.
- (4) See his letters in (I.O) L/P&S/10/397.
- (5) See Ch. III.
- (6) See this memorandum in (R.O. II) p. 738.
- (7) See Sd. Ḥamad's letter in L/P&S/ 10/397.
- (8) See his letter of 5th Aug. 1913 in the Muscat Affairs in L/P&S/10/397.
- (9) See his letter of 5th Aug. 1913 in the Muscat Affairs in L/P&S/10/397.
- (10) See the PAM's letter in (R.O.II) p.716-17 for both Arabic and English versions.
- (11) (R.O.II) p. 730.
- (12) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.II) pp. 730f for both Arabic and English versions.
- (13) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.II) pp. 742f for both Arabic and English versions.
- (14) See the PAM's letter in (R.O.II) pp. 744f for both Arabic and English versions.
- (15) L/P&S/10/425, Muscat Affairs (9th Sep. 1913).
- (16) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.II) p. 746 & p. 750, for both Arabic and English versions.
- (17) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.II) p. 746 & p. 750, for both Arabic and English versions.
- (18) (R.O.III) p. 27.
- (19) (R.O.III) p. 27.
- (20) (R.O.III) p. 28.
- (21) (R.O.III) p. 28.
- (22) (I.O.) L/P&S/10/397, Muscat news for the week ending 18th October, 1913.
- (23) (I.O.) L/P&S/10/397, Muscat news for the week ending 18th October, 1913.
- (24) (I.O.) L/P&S/10/397, Muscat news for the week ending 18th October, 1913.
- (25) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 217.
- (26) (I.O.) L/P&S/10/377, Muscat news for the week ending 8th November, 1913.
- (27) See their letters in (I.O.) L/P&S/10/377, Muscat news for the week ending 8th November, 1913.
- (28) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 217.
- (29) (Adm.R.1913) p. 105.
- (30) (R.O.111) p.29 Muscat news for the week ending 29th November 1913.
- (31) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 218.
- (32) Lughat al-'Arab, vol. iii no. ix (1914) p. 504.
- (33) This reply was voiced by Sh. Ḥamdán on behalf of Sh. 'Isà, to which the latter heartily consented.
- (34) (Adm.R.1913) p. 105.
- (35) al-Mashahdání, (op.cit. p. 80) states that Sh. 'Isà met the Imam in Nazwà. This contradicts Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí's account, see al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 218.
- (36) (I.O.) R15/3/29/2 Muscat news for the week ending 3rd December 1913.
- (37) Shahdád, op.cit. p. 42.
- (38) (I.O.) R15/3/25/1 Letter from the PAM to PRG, January 1914.
- (39) See the Imam's letter in (R.D.S.890A) and also see it in al-Mashahdání, op.cit. p.163.
- (40) Shahdád, op.cit. p. 43.
- (41) Qásim, J. Z. al-Khalíj 1914-45. p. 391; al-Mashahdání, op.cit. p. 82.
- (42) See Wálí of al-Síb's letter of 25th Ṣafar 1333/13th Jan.1915 in L/P&S/10/397.
- (43) The commanders of the corps were the son of Sh. Muḥsin b. Zahrán al-Siyábí, and the son of Sh. Ráshid b. Muḥammad al-Jábrí, see Wálí of al-Síb's letter, see note 42 above.
- (44) (R.O.III) p. 53.
- (45) (R.O.III) p. 53.
- (46) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 219.
- (47) Qásim, J. Z. op.cit. p. 394; al-Mashahdání, op.cit. p. 83 ; Shahdád, op.cit. p. 49.
- (48) (R.O.III) p. 53.
- (49) (I.O.) R15/6/46.
- (50) The Shaykhs of the Gháfirí tribes in the Wádí Samá'il were:
 1. Sh. Thání b. Ḥáarith al-Jábrí
 2. Sh. Muḥsin b. Ḥamad al-Jábrí
 3. Sh. Sa'íd b. Ráshid b. Muḥammad al-Jábrí
 4. Sh. Muḥsin b. Zahrán al-Siyábí.

5. Sh. Sálím b. Muḥammad al-Siyábí
 6. Sh. Zahrán b. Muḥsin al-Siyábí.
 7. Sh. Zahrán b. Su'úd b. Sarḥán al-Jábrí
 8. Muḥammad b. Sa'íd b. 'Umar al-Jábrí
 9. The sons of Sh. 'Azíz b. Ráshid al-Jábrí
 10. Sh. Sa'íd b. Ráshid al-Hadábí (Hináwí)
 11. Sh. Su'úd b. 'Alí b. Jabr al-Jabrí
 12. Sh. Ḥumayd b. Málík al-Jábrí.
- (51) For further details about exchange of correspondence between the B. Jábr, the Imam, Sh. al-Na'ímí, and the Sultan see (I.O.) R 15/6/45.
 - (52) See the PAM's report to PRG on 1st March 1915 in (I.O.)L/P&S/10/397.
 - (53) See Sh. Ḥimyar's letter in the PAM's report to PRG on 1st March 1915 in (I.O.)L/P&S/10/397.
 - (54) See Sh. Ḥimyar's letter in (I.O.) R15/1/435 p. 278
 - (55) Colonel Benn, R.A.E. held the post of PAM from 3rd March 1914 to 15th October 1915, see (Adm. R. 1914 & 1915).
 - (56) See the PAM's interview in (R.O.III) p. 59.
 - (57) See the Viceroy's remarks in (R.O.III) p. 59.
 - (58) Ibid. p. 60.
 - (59) Ibid. p. 60.
 - (60) Ibid. p. 60.
 - (61) Ibid. p. 61.
 - (62) Concurrently, with these talks, Sh. al-Na'ímí was also engaged in similar talks.
 - (63) Bell, op.cit. p. 22.
 - (64) (Adm. R.1914) p. 41.
 - (65) See the Imam's letter to the PAM in (R.O.III) pp. 65f for both Arabic and English versions.
 - (66) See Sh. Ḥimyar's letter to the PAM in (R.O.III) pp. 67f for both Arabic and English versions.
 - (67) See Sh. 'Isà's letter to the PAM in (R.O.III) pp. 79 & 84 for both Arabic and English versions.
 - (68) Landen, op.cit. p. 397; Qásim, J. Z. op.cit. p. 399; Shahdád, op.cit. p. 67.
 - (69) The PAM stated that Sh. al-Fulaytí was sent by them to make known their views regarding terms of peace and to ascertain how far these were likely to be accepted by the British, see (R.O.III) p. 87.
 - (70) Bell, op.cit. pp. 23f.
 - (71) (R.O.III) p. 87.
 - (72) Shahdád, (op. cit. p. 68) states that the PAM's conditions were included in his letters to the Imam and his leaders, dated 9th April 1915. This is incorrect, because they had not been sent in a message, but were verbally communicated by the PAM to Sh. al-Fulaytí during his interview with him on 20th May 1915, see the PAM's letter in (R.O.III) pp. 62f for both Arabic and English versions.
 - (73) (R.O.III) p. 83; Bell, op.cit. p. 24.
 - (74) See Sh. al-Háshimí's letter in (R.O.III) pp. 89-91 & pp. 95f, for both Arabic and English versions.
 - (75) (R.O.III) p. 89; Bell, op. cit. p. 25.
 - (76) (R.O.III) p. 91, Sh. al-Háshimí enclosed this letter in his letter to the PAM, on 5th Sha'bán.
 - (77) (R.O.III) p. 88.
 - (78) See the PAM's reply to Sh. al-Háshimí and al-Fulaytí in (R.O.III) pp. 100f.
 - (79) See Sh. al-Háshimí's letter in (R.O.III) pp. 104-7 for Arabic and English versions.
 - (80) See Sh. al-Fulaytí's letter in (R.O.III) pp. 108f for Arabic and English versions.
 - (81) See Sh. al-Fulaytí's letter in (R.O.III) pp. 108f for Arabic and English versions.
 - (82) See the Imam's letter in (R.O.III) pp. 111f for Arabic and English versions.
 - (83) See the PAM's letter in (R.O.III) pp. 112f for Arabic and English versions.
 - (84) The Sultan sent to his Wálí in al-Sib and the notables instructing them to see to the safe passage of the Imam's representative and his escort during the period of negotiation. See the Sultan's safety letters dated on 25th Shawwál 1333/5th September 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46 p. 30.
 - (85) Landen, op. cit. p. 397; Shahdád, op.cit. p. 67.
 - (86) See the PAM's letter to the Imam of 5th Sep. 1915 in (R.O.III) pp. 114f; to Sh. al-Háshimí and Sh. al-Fulaytí of 6th Sep. 1915 in (R.O.III) pp. 117f. See also his letter regarding his change of the date in (I.O.) R15/6/46 pp. 39f, for Arabic and English versions.
 - (87) See the Imam's letter of 28th Shawwál in (I.O.) R15/6/46 pp. 36f for Arabic and English versions.
 - (88) See the PAM's Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46, p. 63.
 - (89) al-Sálímí, M.A. op.cit. p. 385.

- (90) See the Imam's letter of 28th Shawwál in (I.O.) R15/6/46 pp. 36f for Arabic and English versions.
- (91) See the PAM's Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46 p. 63.
- (92) See the PAM's Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46 p. 63.
- (93) See the Imam's letter of 2nd Dhú al-Qi'dah, 1333 to the PAM in (R.O.III) p. 119.
- (94) See this petition in (R.O.III) pp. 120f, for Arabic and English versions.
- (95) See the PAM's Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46, Appendix B & C.
- (96) See the PAM's Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46, Appendix D.
- (97) See the PAM's Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46 p. 65.
- (98) See the PAM's Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46 p. 66
- (99) See the Imam's letter of 8th Dhú al-Qi'dah 1333 in (R.O.III) p. 123
- (100) See the PAM's Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46 p. 68
- (101) See the PAM's Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46 p. 65
- (102) See the PAM's Report of 28th Sep. 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46 p. 67
- (103) (Ad. R 1916) p. 63.
- (104) See The PAM's Report of 9th May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 17.
- (105) See The PAM's Report of 9th May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 16.
- (106) See The PAM's Report of 9th May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 16.
- (107) See The PAM's Report of 9th May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 17.
- (108) See The PAM's Report of 9th May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 pp. 19f.
- (109) See The PAM's Report of 9th May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 pp. 20ff.
- (110) See The PAM's Report of 9th May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 pp. 22f.
- (111) See The PAM's letter to the PRG of 17th May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 29.
- (112) See The PAM's letter to the PRG of 15th May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 29.
- (113) See The PAM's letter to the PRG of 15th May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 29.
- (114) See the PRG's telegram to Government of India no. 993 of 23rd May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 29.
- (115) See the Sultan's letter of 18th Sha'bán,1335 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 pp. 6f.
- (116) See the PRG's letter to the Sultan of 17th June 1917, in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 7.
- (117) See the PAM's letter no 115-C to PRG of 13th June 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 2.
- (118) See the PAM's letter no 91-C to PRG of 15th May 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 29.
- (119) See the PAM's letter no 115-C to PRG of 13th June 1917 in (I.O.) L/P&S/ 10/426 p. 2.
- (120) (Ad. R.1918) pp. 47f.
- (121) Qásim, J. Z. op.cit. p. 406.
- (122) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 252; (Ad. R.1917) p. 48.
- (123) This paragraph was included only in the letter sent to Sh. Násir b. Ráshid, the brother of the Imam.
- (124) See the PAM's letter of 5th March 1919 in (R. O. III) pp. 138f
- (125) Qásim, J. Z. op.cit. p. 407; al-Mashahdání, op.cit. p. 96; Shahdád, op.cit. p. 87.
- (126) (Ad. R.1919) p. 54.
- (127) (Ad. R.1919) p. 54 ; al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 74.
- (128) (R. O. III) p. 144.
- (129) (R. O. III) p. 144.
- (130) (R. O. III) p. 144.
- (131) (Ad. R.1919) p. 55.
- (132) (Ad. R.1919) p. 55.
- (133) (Ad. R.1919) p. 55.
- (134) (I.O.) R15/1/416 p. 215.
- (135) (I.O.) R15/1/416 pp. 215f.
- (136) (I.O.) R15/1/416 p. 216.
- (137) (I.O.) R15/1/416 p. 217.
- (138) (I.O.) R15/1/416 pp. 217-19.
- (139) (I.O.) R15/1/416 p. 220.
- (140) (R. O. III) p. 166.

CHAPTER ٧٦

THE IMAM AND THE OMANI TRIBES

This chapter will discuss the role of the tribes in support of Imam Sálím, and the extent of the Imam's influence over these tribes. It will also discuss the degree of cohesion between these tribes. To understand this situation, and the character of these tribes and their political role, it is important, first, to shed light on the general demographic structure of the Omani population.

1) The Demographic Structure

The exact figures of the Omani population are difficult to obtain, or are not existent, especially for the period that we are now documenting. Some attempts, however, have been made by three authors, covering widely different periods. These attempts tried to give us various estimates of the numbers of tribesmen, varying from one tribe to another. The following table shows examples of these variations, according to the estimates given by the three different authors (1):

Nos	Names of the Tribes	Estimates of Miles (1881)	Estimates of Lorimer (1908)	Estimates of Chauncy (1951)
1	al-'Awámir	12, 000	10, 000	3, 000
2	al-Habús	20, 000	7, 000	6, 000
3	al-Hajriyyín	13, 000	5, 500	2, 000
4	Jábir (Banú)	30, 000	25. 000	5, 000
5	al-Janabah	28, 000	12, 000	10, 000
6	Kharúş (Banú)	14, 000	4, 000	2, 000
7	al-Ma'áwil	13, 000	8, 000	3, 000
8	Na'ím (Banú)	16, 000	5, 400	2, 000
9	Sa'd ('Yál)	60, 000	13, 000	10, 000
10	Sa'íd (Āl Bú)	20, 000	6, 000	2, 000
11	'Umar (Banú)	13, 000	11, 000	1, 500
12	Wahǐbah (Āl)	30, 000	13, 000	5, 000

It is clear from the table that there are great variations in the estimates of tribe population numbers. It is possible to attribute these variations to the inaccuracy of estimates, and to the fact that these estimates were based on guesses rather than on a proper census, especially those of Miles' estimate. The fact that these were no more than guess estimates can be seen from the great discrepancies between them. For example there are great discrepancies in the estimation of the 'Yál Sa'd tribe between that of Miles, which about was 60, 000, and those of Lorimer and Chauncy which were 13, 000 and 10, 000 respectively.

The population of the Omani tribes can be studied according to the following criteria:

a) **Origin of tribes:**

The Omani population comprises diverse ethnic groups, of Arabic and non-Arabic origin. The majority, though, are descended from Arabic origins: Southern Arabs and Northern Arabs. These origins have in historical time divided into two groups, and are known under various names (2), those of the Southern origin being called Qaḥṭání or Yamaní, and those of Northern, 'Adnání or Ma'addí or Nazárí. The Qaḥṭání were the earliest to settle in Oman. These are divided into several divisions, such as Quḍá'ah, Azd and Tayyi. The second wave of settlers were the 'Adnání group. The 'Adnání were also divided into many subgroups, such as B. Tamím, 'Abs, Dhubyán, B. Sámah, 'Abd al-Qays, ...etc. There were about 170 of these tribes, and another 15 tribes whose origins can be traced to India, Persia or Africa. Those of African origin were predominantly descendants of former slaves and vassals (*Mawáli*) who got their freedom at various times. Some of the *Mawáli* are also known as at Bayásirah. These were affiliated to the major Omani tribes under various denominations. e.g. the Khuṣaybí, the 'Ubaydán, the Jadídí, and the Jámi'í (3).

b) **Tribal political affiliations**

It is to be noted that animosity is a deep-rooted ancient phenomenon that has characterized the relationship between the Qaḥṭání and 'Adnání throughout history. This historical animosity somewhat eased during the era of the Prophet Muḥammad and the four caliphs after him but re-emerged again during the Umayyad Caliphate and continued

until the present century. The animosity also extended to the Arabs of Oman. It began in 280 A.H. when the 'Adnániyyah sought the support of the 'Abbasid Caliph, al-Mu'tadid against their Qaḥṭānī rivals (4).

The Omanis entered into three bloody inter-tribal wars, the last of which took place during the 1720s, and acquired the name of the Hináwī-Gháfirī tribal conflict. This term commonly used among the Omani people during the last three centuries, and accordingly, the tribes were divided according to their interests and politics (5).

The majority of the Hináwī tribes are descended from the Qaḥṭānī, and, on the other hand, the Gháfirī are descended from the 'Adnání. The number of the tribes which belong to the Hináwī faction is about 88, while those under the Gháfirī faction number 82. In fact the number of Qaḥṭānī tribes is 91, and that of the 'Adnání, 79. This is because some of the Qaḥṭānī tribes supported the Gháfirī faction, and vice-versa. The reason for this anomaly can be attributed to internal rivalries within each ethnic or tribal group of the same origin, which led some of the competing rivals to seek support and join the other different faction (6). The following table illustrates some of these instances:

No	Hináwī tribes of 'Adnání origin	Gháfirī tribes of Qaḥṭānī origin
1	Sa'd ('Yál)	Kharúṣ (Banú)
2	Ruwáḥah (Banú)	al-'Abriyyín
3	al-Habús	al-Nabáhinah
4	Wahíbah (Āl)	al-Ya'áqíb
5	'Adí (Banú)	al-Ya'áribah
6	al-Masháfirah	Rásib (Banú)
7	al-'Awámir	al-Raḥbiyyín
8	al-Harásís	al-Masákirah
9	al-Zawáhir	'Alí (Banú Bú)
10	al-Hadádibah	al-Janabah
11	Wahíb (Banú)	Riyám (Banú)
12	Khálid (Banú)	'Arábah (Banú)
13	al-Mashárifah	al-Fawáris
14		al-Na'ím (Banú)
15		al-Sawálim
16		al-Nadábiyyín
17		al-Hadárim

Tribes and tribal politics have played a powerful role in Oman's history. The table below shows the major tribes which have influenced events in Oman during the period with which we are dealing (7):-

Provinces	Gháfirí Faction	Hináwí Faction
al-Báṭinah	B. 'Umar, al-Mazárí'	al-Ḥawásinah, Āl Khamís, al-Bú Ráshid, 'Yál Sa'd, al-Mawálik
Eastern Ḥajar	B. Jábir, al-Siyábiyyín	B. Battásh, al-Mashárifah
Ja'lán	B. Bú 'Alí, B. Rásib, al-Hishm	B. Bú Ḥasan
al-Dákhiliyyah	al-'Abriyyín, al-Kunúd, al-Nadábiyyín, al-Raḥbiyyín, al-Nizáriyyín, B. Riyám, B. Shukayl, al-Maḥáriq	al--Yamaniyyín, B. Hiná'ah, B. Ruwáḥah, al- Bú Sa'id , al-'Awámir
al-Sharqiyyah	al-Ḥasrít, al-Ḥikmán, al-Janabah, al-Maḥáriq, al-Masákirah	al-Ḥabús, al-Ḥarth, al-Ḥajriyyín, Āl Wahíbah
western Ḥajar	B. Ḥarrásh, B. Jábir, B. Qatab, B. Kharúsh, B. Kulayb, B. Riyám, al-Maḥábil al-Mazárí'	B. 'Alí, B. Ḥassán, al-Ma'áwil, al-Mawálik, al-Mayáyiḥah
Záhirah (Dháhirah)	B. Gháfir, B. Qatab, B. Na'im, al-Ya'áqib, al-Durú'	al-Manádhirah, B. Šárikh, al-Zawáhir

c) Size of tribes

Comparison between the sizes of the Omani tribes are based on the estimates given by Miles, Lorimer, and Chauncy. We have seen that the tribes vary in size considerably from one to the other, and from author to author. This is only naturally understandable in a context of such diverse ethno-tribal groups. The following table shows the size of different tribes (8):

Description	Size	Hináwí tribes	Gháfirí tribes	Other tribes	Total
Over..... 7, 000	Very large	12	8	4	24
5, 000 to 7, 000	Large	6	12	1	19
1, 000 to 5, 000	Medium	19	13	3	35
Less..... 1, 000	Small	51	50	7	107
Total		88	82	15	185

It is clear from the table that the Hináwí and the Gháfirí tribes were approximately equal in size and the balance of power between them. It is for this reason that the length of a particular ruler in power depends on the ability of the ruler to maintain the balance between these two main factions. If, for any reason, this balance is upset, the length that a regime (or ruler) stays in power is usually very short. An example of the shortness of a ruler's regime of power, was the short Imamate of 'Azzán b. Qays (1868-1871), which did not last more than two years^{and a half.} Conversely, an example of a longer regimes depending on maintaining the balance, was the Imamate of Sálím b. Ráshid (1913-1920) and his successor Imam Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí (1920-1954). Here are some examples of the five major tribes in Oman whose members numbered over 7, 000, and which effected influence on Omani politics:

No	Hináwí tribes	Gháfirí tribes	Other tribes
1	Hawásinah	al-Hishm	al-'Ajam
2	Ruwáḥah	Jábir (Banú)	Bayásirah
3	Sa'd ('Yál)	al-Janabah	al-Fawáris
4	Shuḥúḥ	Riyám (Banú)	al-Zidjál
5	Wahábah (Ál)	'Umar (Banú)	

These tribes left an impact on the course of events in the country. This impact varied from one tribe to the other in accordance with the nature of the event itself. For example, al-Shuḥúḥ and al-Hishm were two big tribes, but had no influence on the internal course of events or in the conflict which was going on during the period under study, except to a very limited extent. In addition, they had had no political influence, as other tribes did, such as the Nabáhinah, and the Ḥirth tribes (9).

d) Spatial distribution of tribes

The distribution of the tribes is given here on a spatial basis, according to the habitat of the tribe or its territories, social and cultural institutions. It is not based on the level of development or degree of modernization of the tribal system of settlement. In spatial geographic terms, the distribution of the tribes can be based on two broad categories: the desert inhabitants (Badú) and the urban dwellers (Ḥaḍar).

It is easy in Oman to distinguish between two different modes of life according to the type of settlement of each tribe. There are those Bedouin tribes who live in the desert and employ herding and animal husbandry. Some sections of these tribes also practise fishing. Examples of this are the tribes of Janabah, al-Ḥikmán, and Ḥarásis. These are essentially Bedouin tribes, but many of their members also practise fishing. Another example is the tribe of al-‘Awámir, which is also a Bedouin tribe, some of whose branches also live in the towns, and the tribe members practise farming and trade (10).

i. Settled (Ḥaḍar)

The majority of the Omani tribes live in the towns and villages, whether these are coastal or mountainous, or settlements near oases. The tribes usually base their settlement on the availability of water, either in a Wádí (valley) or from underground water. Underground water is exploited through the technique called a Falaj (pl. Afláj) or Jázirah (11). And in order to preserve their territorial economic resources, each tribe has its own region or Dár, which usually is named after the tribe’s name, as are the resources therein, such as the names of Wádí B. Ruwáḥah after B. Ruwáḥah. The same appears to Wádí al-Ḥawásinah, Wádí B. Kharúṣ, Wádí B. Gháfir, or Jadat al-Ḥarásís, Buldán al-Ḥabús, Barr al-Ḥikmán, Ramlit^a Āl Wahíbah ... etc (12).

This tradition of extending the name of the tribe to designate other resources in the tribe’s Dár, includes not only names of Wádis, but also other aspects of the community resources such as water resources (wells or oases), products, even mountains ...etc. It is important to note that each tribe recognizes other tribes’ rights of property over their resources and the frontier between the different tribes’ Dárs. When and if two groups of settlers belonging to two different tribes come to co-exist in a town or city, conflict usually develops between them, and the town settlement will usually have to be divided into two settlement divisions: ‘Aláyah and Safálah. Conflict and rivalry therefore, can be transferred to town settlement, as for example in the case of the town of Samá’il whose Safálah division is occupied by the Gháfirí tribe and whose ‘Aláyah is occupied by the Hináwí tribes. This is so also in Ibrá’ whose Safálah division is occupied by Hináwí (al-Ḥirḥ) while its ‘Aláyah is occupied by the Gháfirí (al-Masákirah) (13).

Rarely, in fact, do we find a town in the interior of Oman which does not have this division, especially in areas of water availability as in the lower valley areas, such as Nazwà, Bahlà, Samá'il, Izkí, etc. (14).

It is also important to note the existence of boundaries demarcating the frontiers of each tribal region or Dár from its neighbours. And for security purposes, each tribe would have its own fort or tower to secure the safety of its towns. Sometimes the towns are secured against possible incursions by enemies by walls such as those of Bahlà and Muscat. The important forts to be found are those in Nazwà, Bahlà, Rustáq, Şuḥár, etc. (see illustrations below).

ii. Badú (Bedouin)

The Badú (singular: Badawī) are nomadic groups who inhabit the desert. Their life is characterized by constant movements with their herds of animals in search of pasture and water. Therefore, they are not settled in one particular place, but have some areas, where they camp in their seasonal movements, and therefore have two seasonal settlement places, those in Winter and others in Summer. This is not to say that the desert is an open-access land, free for everybody or every tribe. There are certain rules and conventions agreed upon by the desert nomadic communities which regulate ownership of resources and right of access to these resources. These rules are subject to the general codes of practice and community values. They recognize that each tribe has its own territorial land area in which the tribe members move freely with their animals (15). The region would usually be named after the name of the tribe, as for example, Ramlāt Wahībah, Barr al-Ḥikmán, Ḥamrá' al-Durú'. The main Badú tribes are as follows (16):

- 1) 'Awámir are a Badú tribe, though some of its sections live in towns.
- 2) al-Durú' are a large Badú tribe, except for the few who had settled in the Tan'im.
- 3) Āl Wahībah are a large Badú tribe, who inhabit the Southern part of al-Sharqiyyah.
- 4) al-Janabah are a big Badú tribe. Some of them are Ḥaḍr, who live in Şúr.
- 5) al-Ḥikmán are a small Badú tribe, and inhabit al-Sharqiyyah and also Maşírah island.
- 6) al-Ḥarásís are another Badú tribe. Their main centre is Marbát in Southern Oman.
- 7) al-'Afár are a small Badú tribe, who are allied with Āl Wahībah
- 8) Āl Khumays are also a small Badú tribe, who are allied with al-Durú'.

- 9) Āl ‘Amr are a Badú tribe, forming an alliance with Āl Wahǧbah.
- 10) Āl Fazárí are a small Badú tribe, allied with Āl Wahǧbah and also with al-Durú‘.
- 11) The B. Na‘ím are predominantly a Ḥaḍar tribe, but some of them are Badú.
- 12) The B. Ka‘ab are mainly a Ḥaḍar tribe, but some of them are Badú.
- 13) The B. Qatab are mainly a Ḥaḍar tribe, but some of them are Badú.

These are the major Badú tribes inhabiting the desert. However, after the discoveries and expansion of the oil industry, many of the members of these tribes have been tempted to settle down as they have taken up jobs in the new opportunities open to them. As a result, many have abandoned the traditional tents made of woollen mats, and instead live in settlements made up of permanent houses and buildings, although essentially they have maintained the traditional values and customs that they inherited from the desert culture.

e) Religion of tribes

The entire population of Oman are Muslims, except a very small minority groups called Banián, who follow the Hindu religion. This group came and settled in Oman a few centuries ago, under the protection of the British. The rest of the population follow three main Islamic religious sects: Ibáḍí, Sunni, and Shí‘ite. The main tribes which adhere to the Ibáḍí sect are Āl Bú Sa‘íd, al-Ḥirḥ, B. Jábir, B. Riyám, al-Ḥabús, B. Ruwáḥah, ‘Yál Sa‘d, and al-Ḥajriyyín, ... etc, all of which inhabit the centre of Oman, while the peripheries are inhabited mainly by tribes adhering to the Sunni sect. The following table shows the tribes adherent to the Sunni sect (17):

The Tribe	Political affiliation	Origin	Area
Shuḥúḥ	Hináwí	Qaḥṭání	Musandam
Ka‘ab (Banú)	Gháfirí	‘Adnání	Dháhirah
Qatab (Banú)	Gháfirí	Qaḥṭání	Dháhirah
al-Janabah	Gháfirí	Qaḥṭání	al-Sharqiyyah
al-Durú‘	Gháfirí	‘Adnání	Dháhirah
Rásib (Banú)	Gháfirí	Qaḥṭání	Ja‘lán
al-Ḥarásís	Hináwí	Qaḥṭání	al-Sharqiyyah
‘Alí (Banú Bú)	Gháfirí	Qaḥṭání	Ja‘lán
Shayádí	Hináwí		Báṭinah

al-Sawálim	Gháfirí	‘Adnání	Eastern Hajar
Sanán (Banú)	Gháfirí	Qaḥṭání	Şúr
Zarráf (Banú)	Gháfirí		Eastern Hajar
Bawáriḥ	Hináwí		Eastern Hajar
Baduwát	Hináwí		Western Hajar
Ḥammád	Hináwí	‘Adnání	Báṭinah
Khálid (Banú)	Hináwí	‘Adnání	Báṭinah
Marázíq	Hináwí	Qaḥṭání	Báṭinah
Qatayṭ	Hináwí		Báṭinah
Radaynát	Hináwí		Báṭinah
Rayáyah	Hináwí	Qaḥṭání	Báṭinah
al-Baluch	-----	-----	Báṭinah/Dháhirah

The following table shows the tribes adherent to the Ibáḍí sect, though they also have some Sunnis among their members (18):

The Tribe	Political affiliation	Origin	Area
Āl ‘Azíz	Gháfirí	‘Adnání	Dháhirah
Burayk (‘Yál)	Hináwí	‘Adnání	Báṭinah
al-Hishm	Gháfirí	‘Adnání	Ja‘lán
al-Mazári‘	Gháfirí	‘Adnání	Báṭinah / Dháhirah
Sa‘íd (Banú)	Hináwí	Qaḥṭání	Báṭinah
Washáḥát	Hináwí	‘Adnání	Dháhirah
al-‘Abriyyín	Gháfirí	Qaḥṭání	Western Hajar
al-Ya‘áqib	Gháfirí	Qaḥṭání	Dháhirah

It is clear from the table that the concentration of the majority of the Sunni tribes is in the provinces of the Dháhirah, Báṭinah, Ja‘lán, and Şúr. In addition, the area of Dhofar is predominantly inhabited by Sunni tribes, which do not appear in this study, because these tribes were not directly involved in the events taking place in Oman at the time.

However, there are some smaller groups belonging to the Shí‘ite sect. These include the tribes of the Zidjál, al-Baḥárinah, al-‘Ajmán, al-ḷuwátiyyah, some of the Za‘áb tribe, and some of the Baluchis. Some factions of the latter, which live in al-Dháhirah province, adhere to the Ibáḍí.

In broad general terms, it is possible to say that the complex events and conflicts throughout Omani political history cannot be attributed to ethnic origins or religious

affiliations. One is inclined to think that the accommodating flexibility of the Ibádí sect has largely saved the country from much religious controversy and the potential conflicts therein.

2) Tribal Political Relations with the Imam

The Omani tribes continued to play an influential role in Omani politics throughout its history, motivated by religious or national considerations or both. Therefore, the foundation of the Ibádí Imamate drew much of its support from these tribes. Peterson, for example, observes the close relationship between the Imamate and the tribes: “the formalisation of a supra-tribe system under the institution of the Imamate, with all its inherent tendencies towards anarchy and instability, has provided the philosophical basis for the background of much of Omani history” (19).

It is therefore evident that the tribal system has given continuity to the general balance of power, as they entered into alliances with one another against other tribal alliances. This balance of power has also greatly influenced state power as well as the Imamate authority. As a result, the rivalries and conflicts between the Arabs of the North and those of South was reflected in the tribal alliances throughout the 18th century, which *were* led to the emergence of what has come to be known as the Hináwí and Gháfirí division or conflict. This division has created the two main political formations which continued to maintain the general balance of power or status-quo in the country (20).

Consequently, it would not be possible for an elected Imam to continue in power without the support of these two tribal confederations, as indicated above. This is clear from the attempts in the 19th and 20th centuries to elect an Imam, such as the election of Sd. Ĥumúd b. ‘Azzán in 1846, and that of Sh. Şáliḥ b. ‘Alí in 1895. The Gháfirí tribes were opposed to all these attempts for reviving the Imamate. The Imamate of Sd. ‘Azzán did not last for long because he antagonized the Gháfirí tribes. This was in contrast with 1913 when there was a close balance between the Hináwis and Gháfiris and both gave support to a joint candidate who was elected as an Imam and remained in his position for 40 years.

a) Tribes' allegiance to Imam Sálim

The meeting, which was held at Tanúf in May 1913, between the B. Gháfir, under the leadership of Sh. Ĥimyar b. Náṣir al-Nabhání, the *tamímah* of the B. Riyám and the Shaykhs of the B. Hiná'ah, agreed to the revival of the Imamate. Among those who attended the meeting were seventy-five '*ulamá*' under the leadership of Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ĥumayd al-Sálimí. They then elected Sh. Sálim b. Ráshid al-Kharúṣí as Imam. Sh. Ĥimyar and the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir of the B. Hiná'ah supported the Imam materially and morally. It was in the terms of this agreement that the two parties paid the expenses of the military operation which captured Nazwà, Izkí, and Samá'il, because, typically, each Shaykh would pay the expenses of his men.

Following the fall of Nazwà, the Kunúd gave their *bay'ah* to the Imam, followed by the residents of Nazwà, and Manaḥ. The Wálí and Shaykh of the latter town, one of Āl Bú Sa'íd, proclaimed the town's allegiance to the Imam, including the Ĥaḍárim tribe. These proclamations of allegiance to the Imam had in fact been preceded by similar moves on the part of Sh. Májid b. Khamís al-'Abrí and his party of his tribe. Sh. Májid was a respected figure among his people for his religious standing (21), as he also commanded the respect of the other tribes inhabiting the Interior. Although, Sh. Májid's *bay'ah* came a little later, the delay was due to factors related to the military operations of Imam Sálim mentioned earlier (see Ch. IV).

After having been captured by the Imam, Nazwà was crowded with people who congregated from all regions to support the Imam. As a result of the Imam's flow of correspondence with the chiefs of Oman, a number of those chiefs came to Nazwà. Among them was Sh. Ĥumayd b. Khulayfín al-Dur'í, who paid homage to the Imam (22). In the same week (on 2nd Rajab, 1331/7th June, 1913) the Shaykh of al-Ĥajriyyín came and declared his allegiance to the Imam, and two days later Sh. Sultan b. Ráshid al-Ya'qúbí, the ruler of 'Ibrí in Dháhirah province, followed suit. He was followed by Sh. Sa'd b. Sa'íd b. Sultan al-Junaybí, one of the Shaykhs of the Janabah tribe, the Majá'ilah *fakhdh*, who inhabit the area around Adam, whose centre is 'Izz. Sh. Sa'd's arrival coincided with the arrival Shaykh of al-Maḥáriq. Both of them declared their *bay'ah* to the Imam (23).

It is important to note that after the fall of Nazwà, the numbers of the Imam's supporters increased significantly. This is clear from a further influx of supporters, such as Sd. Su'úd b. Hamad b. Hilál al-Bú Sa'ídí, the Wálí of Izkí, who declared his *bay'ah* to the Imam. During his stay in Izkí, the Imam received the allegiance of al-Hirth, B. Ráshid, and B. Ruwáḥah. This tribe was an important Hináwí tribe, which was under the power of Sh. 'Isà b. Şálih al-Háarithí, the *tamímah* of Hináwí faction (24).

In Samá'il, the Imam first received the homage of Sh. Muhanná al-'Abrí, the chief of al-'Abriyyín, and the chiefs of the B. Kharúş. Both Sh. 'Isà and Sh. Ḥimyar succeeded in persuading Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhim, the ruler of Rustáq, and Sh. Náşir b. Ḥumayd b. Ráshid al-Gháfirí, the ruler of Bahlà to declare their allegiance to the Imam in Ramaḍán, 1331 (25). This support enabled the Imam to reinforce his powers over the tribes and gave him more motive to obtain his aims.

It is noticeable that the Imam adopted the policy of appointing his assistants as Wális over the towns which fell in his hands, or those which declared allegiance to him, with the exception of Rustáq and Bahlà, the affairs of which were left to their former Wális. The reason for this move was that these Wális had been responsible for the affairs and general welfare of their subjects, and nobody had complained against them. The Imam also saw that in view of the commanding power and leadership of Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhim and Sh. Náşir al-Gháfirí among the tribes, it was necessary to seek their support, despite his general control over their towns. However, the Imam sought control over the two towns when signs of independence and secession became evident on the part of these two leaders. Therefore, in Dhú al-Qi'dah 1331, the Imam delegated Sh. al-Sálimí, Sh. Ḥimyar and Sd. Hilál b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa'ídí to go to the tribes of al-Sharqiyyah to rally their support for the Imamate. The Imam's delegation succeeded in rallying the loyalty of the following tribes (26):

1. al-Sharúj and al-Ruwáshid in Wádí 'Indám
2. al-Ḥabús in Samad al-Shán
3. Masákirah and al-Hirth in 'Ibrá'.
4. al-Hishm in al-Kámil.

Sh. Ḥimyar, also succeeded in neutralizing the B. Bú 'Alí in the struggle between the Imam and the Sultan. At the commencement of the 1332, the Imam received a mission from Wádí al-Ma'áwil, under the leadership of Sh. Sayf b. Sálím b. Sayf al-Ma'walí (who was later killed in the attack by the Imam's forces on Barká' in Rabí' II, 1332), accompanied by Sh. Ḥamad b. Sa'íd al-Ma'walí, Sa'íd b. Khalfán al-Ma'walí, Su'úd b. Ḥamad b. Sayf al-Ma'walí and Sh. Ráshid b. Nabhán al-Ma'walí. The aim of this mission was to declare their support for the Imam. It is necessary, however, to point out here that this mission was composed of factions of the tribes while the Shaykh of al-Ma'áwil tribe, Sh. Sulaymán b. Náşir al-Ma'walí, opposed the Imam, and maintained his loyalty to the Sultan. But Sh. Sulaymán later feigned to give his loyalty to the Imam. After the Imam's abortive attack on Barká', he reneged on his promise of loyalty to the Imam. This, in turn, prompted the Imam to kill him, which consequently led to many secret killings (27). As a result of these secret killings, a number of important notables lost their lives, including a number of '*ulamá*' (28).

As for the B. Ḥarrás, who submitted to Sh. Ḥimyar, they had actually paid allegiance to the Imam. Their allegiance, however, was no more than a temporary truce on their part. The fact is that they were discontented with the Imam, especially after he had killed their Shaykh, Aḥmad b. Thunayyán b. Khalfán b. Sálím al-Ḥarrásí. They created difficulties for the Imam and his successor.

The B. Jábir and al-Siyábiyyín refused to declare their allegiance to the Imam before 1915, but following the Imam's defeat at al-Waṭayyah, the Imam warned them to declare their allegiance, because they made forceful claims on the Sultan demanding the capture of Samá'il. They did not respond to the Imam's warning, but when he again threatened to use force against them, they declared their allegiance to the Imam through the mediation of the Shaykhs of al-Masákirah tribes (29). Thus the B. Jábir and al-Siyábiyyín submitted to the Imam's authority completely, although unwillingly, as had to al-Ma'áwil and the B. Ḥarrás before them.

At the end of 1915, the Imam decided to secure the loyalty of the tribes of al-Sharqiyyah. He went there with his forces for this purpose. In Samad al-Shán, he

received the allegiance of the Āl Wahībī Shaykhs. Prominent among these Shaykhs were Sh. Sulṭān b. Maṣūr b. Nāṣir and Sh. Sālim b. Ḥumūd b. Sa'īd al-Jahāfī.

To sum up, Imam Sālim had called upon all the tribes of Oman to pay allegiance to him. Some of these responded positively and supported him, some openly opposed him, while others such as those of 'Yāl Sa'd, the B. Na'īm, and the B. Bū 'Alī, remained neutral. As for those tribes which declared their allegiance to him, they were not all equal in their commitment and loyalty. This is clear from the stance of such tribes as al-Ya'āqīb, the B. Ghāfir and the Badū tribes of al-Durū' and Āl Wahībāh. In addition, the followers of Sh. Nāṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Ghāfirī and Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm did not join in the Imam's military operations. It is also clear that some of the tribes submitted to the Imam out of fear and not conviction, such as a part of al-Ma'āwil, the B. Ḥarrāṣ, the B. Jābir and al-Siyābiyyīn, who were forced to pay allegiance to the Imam under coercion. Therefore, many of the subsequent difficulties and rebellions that the Imam had to face came from these discontented tribes.

b) Imam's dominance over the tribes

It is clear from the previous discussion that the loyalty of the various tribes to the Imam varied from tribe to tribe. This in turn had its effects on the Imam's authority over these tribes. Therefore, it is not possible to describe the Imam's authority over the tribes as being complete. The Imam's authority can best be described as being incomplete, in that only some of the tribes submitted to the Imam's authority completely. This made it possible for the Imam's government to interfere in all tribal affairs, both trivial and important and the members of the loyal tribes dedicated every effort to protect the Imam, and helped him implement his political, economic and administrative programmes. There were other tribes who gave their support to the Imam without actively taking part in his programme. The support of the latter group of tribes was only a matter of convenience they offered only lip service and a pretence under which to protect and maintain their independent authority.

i. The Imam's complete control over tribes

As it has been pointed out, the Imam's authority over the tribes varied from complete loyalty to only a tacit form of acceptance. In this section, we shall try to give an account of the tribes which gave the Imam their complete and unambiguous loyalty, which allowed the Imam to enforce his economic and administrative programmes. These can be divided into two main groups; the Gháfirí tribes and the Hináwí tribes. This will help us understand the effect of these two tribes on the programmes of the Imam during his rule, and the reasons which induced them to support the Imam.

1. The tribes of the Gháfirí

a) The B. Riyám

The B. Riyám (sing. Riyámí) are one of the most important tribes, They are of Qaḥṭání origin and belong to the Gháfirí political faction. In religious affiliation, they adhere to the Ibáḍí sect. Their *tamímah* was Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir al-Nabhání (1281/1861-1338/1920). The tribe is divided into several *fakhds*. These include: B. Nabhán. B. Tawbah, B. Ruqaydh, al-'Uzúr, al-Ṣaqúr, al-Sarjí, al-Jawámíd and al-Fahd (30).

In this tribe we find that there have been three '*ulamá*', who have been of influence in the recent history of the Imamate of Imam Sálím, beside also three leaders. The '*ulamá*' were Sh. Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh al-Riyámí, Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálím al-Ruqayshí and Sh. Náṣir b. 'Ámir b. Mas'úd al-Riyámí. These prominent personalities were active supporters of the Imam, and served with him in the judiciary and as Wális. They also played an important role in rallying their tribe's support for the Imam. They also formed an important part of the consultative council. Among the most prominent political leaders of this tribe, in addition to their *tamímah*, Sh. Ḥimyar, were Sh Ḥamdán b. Sulaymán b. Sayf al-Nabhání, 'Alí b. Ḥamad al-Tuwbí and Sayf b. Zahrán al-Fahdí.

The tribe under Sh. Ḥimyar supported the Imam. It was one of the important pillars on which the Imamate depended, both materially and morally. The reason behind this unparalleled support was the long-standing hostility between the tribe and the Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal, because the latter had declared war against them for a long period of time, and imposed an embargo on their import and export trade, as well as supporting their

enemies, the B. Ruwáḥah. For all these reasons, the B. Riyám had suffered a great deal under the Sultan's bad treatment, which led them to harass their neighbours. In the face of these pressures from the Sultan, they were quick to support Sh. al-Sálimí's call for the revival of the Imamate. It is understandable, then, that the seat of the tribe, the town of Tanúf, witnessed the first elected Imamate in the present century. The tribe actively joined in the Imam's political, economic and military programmes. It was also important to stress the role of Sh. Ḥimyar in rallying the support of many of the leaderships of the Gháfirí tribes for the Imam such as that of Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfirí. He also succeeded in neutralizing B. Bú 'Alí's support for the Sultan against the Imam. On the other hand, the B. Ḥarráṣ gave allegiance to the Imam through Sh. Ḥimyar. His valuable support included the extension of aid for the Imam in facing the many difficulties which the B. Gháfir caused to the Imam. Sh. Ḥimyar strongly denounced the B. Gháfir's position of hostility to the Imam. This tribe continued as a dangerous foe and enemy to the Sultan for a long time. Even now, the son of Sh. Ḥimyar, Sh. Sulaymán, is in asylum in Saudi Arabia.

The strong support of the tribe to the Imamate under the leadership of Sh. Ḥimyar, and the strength and power of the tribe, both in human and material resources, had significant positive effects in consolidating the Imam's power and authority, thus enabling him to achieve great successes. No wonder, then, that both the Sultan, Sd. Fayṣal, and his son, Sd. Taymúr, imposed, as punishment, excessive taxes on the produce of this tribe.

b) al-'Abriyyín

al-'Abriyyín (sing. 'Abrí) are the second most important tribe. They are of Qaḥṭání origin, and like the B. Riyám, belong to the Gháfirí political faction, and in religious affiliation, adhere to the Ibáḍí, although a small minority of them are Sunni. Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad b. Muḥsin was the leader of the tribe whose headquarters was at al-Ḥamrá' on the Southern slopes of Jabal al-Akhḍar (31).

Among al-'Abriyyín there appeared very famous personalities who played a significant role in the events in Oman in the course of its history. Most prominent among these famous men were Sh. Májid b. Khamís b. Ráshid al-'Abrí (1836-8-1927) and Sh.

Ibráhim b. Sa‘íd b. Muḥsin al-‘Abrí (d. 1975). Sh. Májid, as mentioned above, played a very influential role. He was the son of a distinguished ‘*alim*, known by the name Dhú al-Ghabrá’, Khamís b. Ráshid.

Sh. Májid’s proclamation of allegiance to the Imam had a very significant effect on the tribes of the Interior, and especially on the ‘*ulamá*’ and religious men among these tribes. This immediate effect was felt among the people of al-Ḥamrá’, Bahlà and Nazwà, and of course among his own tribesmen. Sh. Májid’s *bay‘ah* to the Imam had wide positive effects on the tribes, due to his high religious and social standing. He was the reference point in Islamic jurisdiction and law. He also advised on religious and legal matters, assumed the office of the Qáḍí and taught in a school which he had established in his locality; many of his students later became Qáḍis. Immediately after his allegiance, he wrote to the Wálí of Nazwà, Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad b. ‘Ámir al-Bú Sa‘ídí, and the Shaykhs of al-Kunúd tribes in Nazwà also, urging them to declare their *bay‘ah* and support for the Imam. Many of the Qáḍis emulated his position and came to support the Imam, including those Qáḍis who served with the Sultan. As a result of his important role, Sh. Májid became the first deputy for the Imam in Nazwà for a brief period, after which he was relieved from his position because he lost his sight at this stage (32). After that he returned to his place (al-Ḥamrá’) where he resumed teaching. But this did not mean that he had given up participation in the political affairs of the country. In this respect he still participated in many of the events, such as his opposition to Sh. al-Sálimí in his *fatwá* concerning the abrogation of *awqáf* allotted to the service of graveyards.

Al-‘Abriyyín continued to play a very important role in support of the Imam all throughout his rule, under the leadership of Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad. This support was unconditional for most of his programme. This is in spite of the fact that the Imam imposed his complete control over the tribe, and only conceded to Sh. Muhanná to continue running the affairs of the tribe from his headquarters in al-Ḥamrá’. This was in tribute to the Shaykh for his bright record in supporting the Imamate.

c) The B. Kharúṣ

The third important tribe standing behind the Imamate was the B. Kharúṣ (sing. Kharúṣí). They are of Qaḥṭání descent. Politically, they belong to the Gháfirí faction, and in religious affiliation, they were of the Ibáḍí sect. This tribe was very close to the B. Riyám. From amongst the members of this tribe came about twenty three Imams. The first of their Imams was Imam Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh b. ‘Affán (177/763-180/769), and the last one was Imam Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Khalílí (1338/1920- 1374/1954). The B. Kharúṣ had al-‘Awábí as their headquarters although some of them lived in Nakhal, Wádí al-Ma‘áwil and al-Rustáq (33).

It has been suggested that the B. Kharúṣ lacked the strong political leadership that was capable of uniting their different *fakhds* under one strong central tribal political authority (34). The reason for the apparent fragmentation of the tribe was due to the fact that many of its clans and *fakhds* had, at one stage or another, some member of their kin who actually was elected Imam. Therefore, many of the big families of the tribe would have claims to the Imamate leadership. For that reason, the tribe's record was clean on the level of inter-tribal conflicts and wars, for the tribe had no animosities and hostilities with their neighbours, and therefore it has been described as a peaceful tribe (35).

Naturally, nobody from this tribe came to give *bay‘ah* to Imam Sálím. However, when they came to know of him, they hurried to give their homage and support to him, especially, when the Imam's brother was teaching in al-‘Awábí, where he rallied support for the Imam. Following these developments, the B. Kharúṣ even contemplated driving the Wálí of the Sultan and his garrison out of the fort. For all that, when they got support from al-‘Abriyyín, as mentioned earlier, they increased their support for their Imam and reinforced his position. In this regard, Sh. Náṣir b. Ráshid al-Kharúṣí, the brother of Imam Sálím, played a significant role in the success of his brother the Imam. As a result of that, many of the ‘*ulamá*’ and leaders did not agree with his ideas and his hastiness in tackling many important matters. An example of the criticisms levelled against him was that by Sh. Májid b. Khamís al-‘Abrí, who criticized him for extremism in implementing the Islamic laws and his harshness against transgressors. He was also described as being ill-tempered and impatient, personal traits which negatively affected many of his attitudes

and thinking. Due to these shortcomings in his personality, which ill-qualified him for leadership, Imam Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh al-Khalīfī soon dismissed him in the same year that his brother, Imam Sālim died, but gave him some unimportant responsibilities in some minor provinces, which he accepted reluctantly. Twenty years later, the rift between him and the Imam grew wider, which finally led him to seek refuge with the Sultan, who appointed him as Qādī to al-Suwayq.

The importance of this tribe derived not only from the fact that it provided the majority of the Ibādī Imams, or from its dedication to the general cause of the Islamic religion, but, more importantly, from the fact that the tribe had no difficulties with their neighbouring tribes. Moreover, the tribe cannot be placed on parity with those tribes who were experienced in the politics of tribal warfare and had many rivalries and conflicts with their neighbours, such as al-‘Abriyyīn and al-Siyābiyyīn.

The three tribes just mentioned were the major Ghāfirī tribes which supported the Imam truly and unambiguously and continued their support for the Imam in every respect and everywhere. It follows that the Imam depended greatly on their support, together with that of the Hināwī tribes, to which subject we turn hereafter.

The following Ghāfirī tribes, on the other hand, came in the second place to the former in their support for the Imam, and the Imam did not accord them much importance. The most important among these tribes were:

d) al-Maḥārīq

Al-Maḥārīq (sing. Maḥrūqī) are of ‘Adnānī descent. Politically, they belong to the Ghāfirī, and they adhere to the Ibādī sect. Their region is around Adam, which is their headquarters. The importance of the tribe is that it participated in most of the Imam's military operations after it paid its allegiance to him in Nazwà as we have seen earlier. However, its military participation was in a small force of men, compared with other tribes. The reason for that, we assume, is that it was under threat from Āl Wahībah and al-Janabah, who did not support the Imam. Therefore, these latter tribes were opposed to the former's support to and participation in the Imam's military operations. However, the Imam, in the end, brought al-Maḥārīq's land under his control and entrusted the administration of their affairs to his appointed Wālis (36).

e) al-Masákirah

Al-Masákirah (sing. Maskirí) are of Qaḥṭání origin; in politics, they are Gháfirí, and in religion, they are Ibádí. Their headquarters was 'Aláyat of 'Ibrá' in al-Sharqiyyah Province (37). The heads of the tribe were Sh. Náṣir b. Sulaymán and Sh. Sayf b. 'Alí b. 'Ámir al-Maskirí (d. 1355/1936), who played an important role in the politics of Zanzibar towards the turn of the century which led to his release from prison and his consequent expulsion from Zanzibar to Oman. Sh. Sayf then continued to support Imam Sálím and his successors, as he also assumed high office responsibilities in the Imamate (38). In this stance, he was followed in similar manner by his sons and his grandsons. Now, one of his grandsons is a close ally of Imam Ghálib b. 'Alí b. Záhir al-Hiná'í and Sh. Sulaymán b. Ḥimyar al-Nabhání in Saudi Arabia.

Al-Masákirah actively joined in the Imam's military operations, as they also played an important role in persuading the Shaykhs of the B. Jábir and al-Siyábiyyín to pay allegiance to the Imam.

f) al-Kunúd

Al-Kunúd (sing. Kindí) are of Qaḥṭání descent; in politics they are Gháfirí and their faith is the Ibádí sect. Their main stronghold is 'Aláyat Nazwà, but some of them can also be found in several towns in Oman (39).

The tribe had at the beginning rejected the call of the Imam and that of Sh. Májid b. Khamís al-'Abrí. However, following the fall of Nazwà to the Imam, they paid their *bay'ah* to the Imam. The tribe is famed for the big number of '*ulamá*' and Qáḍis from among its members, much more than for its military power. Therefore, the role that their '*ulamá*' played was more important and conspicuous than its military role. Among the tribe's prominent '*ulamá*' was Sh. Sulaymán b. Aḥmad b. 'Abdalláh al-Kindí (1293/1880-1337/1919), who assumed the office of Qáḍí of Nazwà until his death (40). There was also Sh. Sa'íd b. Náṣir b. 'Abdalláh al-Kindí (1268/1851-1355/1936), who played an important role in the negotiations which we have mentioned earlier (41). There were also among them the Qáḍis Sulaymán b. Sálím and Ḥumúd b. Záhir, who taught in Nazwà and other learned men who served the Imamate by their knowledge and learning much more than others. This is not to suggest that they did not support the Imam actively in

more practical matters, but they played a more important role in matters of administration than in other domains.

g) The B. Shukayl

The B. Shukayl (sing. Shukaylí) are of Qaḥṭání origin. Politically, they belong to the Gháfirí faction, and in religious affiliation, they are Ibáđí. Sayfam is their central town; besides they also have other towns like Bahlà and ‘Ibrí in al-Záhirah Province (41).

The B. Shukayl were previously under the rule of the Wálí of Bahlà, Sh. Náşir b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfirí. When he was removed from his office in 1916, they quickly turned to the ranks of the Imam, and supported his Wálí in Bahlà, and helped in the implementation of his policies. Their active participation was made clear during the reign of Imam al-Khalílí (1920-1954). This is not to suggest that they did not support Imam Sálím, but that they did not take part in his military operations because there were no major military activities after that date, with the exception of the attack of the Imam on al-Rustáq and al-Ḥazim. In addition, the Imam himself did not in fact want their participation in this attack, in view of their relationship with the B. Gháfir, who supported Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím.

The Imam’s policy was to choose for his military activities those tribes whose territories were secure from the raids of rival tribes. This was to guard against counter-attacks or incursions from rival tribes, and therefore, he took care in selecting the type of tribes who met this criterion.

h) al-Nadábiyyín and al-Raḥbíyyn

Al-Nadábiyyín (sing. Nadábí) and al-Raḥbíyyín (sing. Raḥbí) are both of Qaḥṭání descent (43). They are Gháfirí in political orientation, and Ibáđí in religious affiliation (44). Their ranges are in the Wádí Samá’il and Wádí al-‘Aqq. They are very close allies of al-Siyábiyyín and the B. Jábir . They declared their *bay’ah* to the Imam immediately when the Imam arrived at Samá’il. Their *tamímah* was Sh. Su‘úd b. ‘Alí b. Jabr al-Jabrí, but they abandoned him when he refused to support the Imam. Sh. Su‘úd, the head of all the Gháfirí tribes in Wádí Samá’il, was initially reluctant to show either support or opposition to the Imam, preferring instead to abstain and confine himself to his homestead. This is in spite of the fact that he exchanged letters with the Sultan and others

on the situation, although without results. On the other hand, the head of al-Raḥbiyyín, Sh. Sulṭán b. Sálím b. Ḥasan, and Sh. Ḥumayd b. Musallam, the Shaykh of al-Nadábiyyín, all supported the Imam, while the other Gháfirí tribes in this area were unwilling to support the Imam or otherwise.

From the above one can readily see the inconsistency in the position of the Gháfiris, between those who supported the Imam and those who opposed him. As a consequence, suspicion became rampant among them, which made it easy for the Imam to gain time to tackle each tribe separately, or to brandish the threat of the use of force, as we will see later.

It should be noted that the B. Ruwáḥah had played a crucial role in convincing these two tribes to join the Imam. As a result, there followed no objection on their part to the Imam's plan.

i) The B. Jábir, al-Siyábiyyín and the B. Ḥarráş

The B. Jábir (sing. Jábrî), al-Siyábiyyín (sing. Siyábî), and the B. Ḥarráş (sing. Ḥarráşî), are all of 'Adnání origin (45). Politically, they belong to the Gháfirí faction (46), and in religious affiliation they adhere to the Ibáđí sect. Both the B. Jábir and al-Siyábiyyín inhabit Wádí Samá'il, while the B. Ḥarráş inhabit the region of Nakhal in Wádí the B. Kharúş (47).

It is important to note that the Imam had control and authority over these tribes, although they then did not take part in the Imam's military operations nor in the administration; with the exception of some few individuals who participated in view of their policy, like Sh. Khalfán b. Jumayyil al-Siyábí (d. 1972), who made his opposition clear. As a result, secret assassinations were rife among the B. Ḥarráş, as we have explained earlier. As for the B. Jábir, although they did not support the Imam, they succumbed to the reality of the situation despite being the biggest of the Omani tribes in number.

Before concluding this part, it is necessary to point out that there were some of the Gháfirí tribes which did actually join the Imam, but these were very small in size and numbers. These were al-Ya'áribah (48) and al-Ḥaḍárim (49). It is also noteworthy that these latter two tribes had no specific land or territory, but were divided in many of the

towns and villages in Oman in various places. For this reason we only occasionally encounter a famous name of an *'álim*, a leader, or a *Wálí* from amongst their members. The tribes also seem to have been very small in size. Lorimer, for example, estimated the number of population of al-Ya'áribah about 800 souls (50), scattered in various places. Nonetheless, al-Ya'áribah had once played a very significant role in the history of Oman as the dynasty that ruled over the country, between 1624 and 1744.

It becomes clear from the above presentation that the Gháfirí tribes differed in their support and contribution to the Imamate from one tribe to the other, corresponding to each tribe's own convictions about the revival of the Imamate, and the conditions specific to each one of them. As a result of these variations, we see that the support of the B. Riyám, al-'Abriyyín and the B. Kharúş to the Imamate was greater compared to the relatively smaller role of the tribes of al-Maḥáriq, al-Masákirah, al-Nadábiyyín and al-Raḥbiyyín. This was due either to their remoteness from the scene of conflict, as for example in the case of the first two, i.e. al-Maḥáriq and al-Masákirah; or to the smallness of the size of the tribe, as in the case of the latter two, al-Nadábiyyín and al-Raḥbiyyín. It was necessary, therefore, for the Imam to exercise his control over them, and for that purpose, he entrusted many of their leaders with responsibilities of administration and participation in the running of the affairs of their respective tribes.

Other Gháfirí tribes openly opposed the Imam, which left the Imam with no choice but to subject them by force, and in the end they succumbed to the reality of the situation and submitted, without actually taking an active role in the Imam's activities. On the contrary, they in fact caused him many problems. These tribes included the B. Jábir, al-Siyábiyyín and the B. Ḥarráş.

i. The tribes of the Hináwí

As explained above, the Gháfirí tribes played an active role in support of the Imamate. The role of the Hináwí tribes, on the other hand, was no less significant in supporting the Imamate. The contribution of the Hináwí tribes was influenced by their proximity or remoteness from the scene of events, and the manner in which they influenced the course of events and their developments. In this part, we will discuss in

brief terms the identity of these tribes, and the extent of their contribution in support of the Imam.

a) The B. Hiná'ah

The B. Hiná'ah (sing. Hiná'í) are of Qaḥṭání origin. As regards political and religious inclinations, they belong to the Hináwí faction and Ibádí sect respectively. Their main homestead was Bilád Sayt. The Hináwis as a distinct political grouping^{were} formed in Oman in the 1720s, and derived^{their} name from this tribe (51). The present-day *tamímah* of the B. Hiná'ah isⁱⁿ a line of succession which began with the assumption of the *tamímah* by Sh. Hilál b. Záhír al-Hiná'í in the late 19th century, who successfully won the *tamímah* away from his cousin, Sh. Sa'íd b. Muḥammad al-Hiná'í (52).

Sh. Hilál, thus, formed his own independent state and made Nazwà his capital. Many of the tribes submitted to his authority for fear of his aggression. He erected in Nazwà some fortifications to secure himself from incursions. Apparently, he was doing all that in the name of the Sultan. However, his motivations for independence led the Sultan to dismiss him. The Sultan sent out a force, under the command of Sulaymán b. Suwaylim and Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd al-Khalílí, to support Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa'ídí. This force succeeded in smashing Sh. Hilál, who was killed in the fight and Nazwà fell once again to the Sultan's forces 1312/1894. Sh. Badr succeeded his father, but two years later, Badr was also killed by the B. Shukayl.

The position of the tribe was weakened after the death of Sh. Badr, and no successor to Badr was found among the Sh. Hilál's sons, who were all young at the time. As a result of this general weakness, the tribe suffered a great deal from their enemies, especially from the Sultan's Wálí of Nazwà, Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad. Consequently, when the Imamate came, the sons of Sh. Hilál found in it the opportunity that would relieve them from the oppression which they had long suffered and to avenge the death of their father and brother. It followed that Sh. al-Sálimí invited them to support the revival of the Imamate, which they readily did. From then onwards, we see that the four remaining sons of Sh. Hilál, together with their three nephews, Záhír b. Ghuṣn b. Hilál, and Sálim and Su'úd b. Badr b. Hilál, all hurried to support the position of Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣír al-Nabhání to convene the *bay'ah* for Imam Sálim. Then the tribe

exerted great efforts in support of the Imamate. As a result of its strong support, the tribe lost many of its members in the course of defending the Imamate. The sons of Sh. Hilál also occupied many of the high ranking positions in the Imam's government, until today. One of his grandsons, Sh. Ghálib b. 'Alí b. Hilál, was indeed chosen by Imam al-Khalílí to stand for the Imamate after the latter's death in 1954. Imam Ghálib is still alive, and lives in asylum in Saudi Arabia.

b) al-Ḥajriyyín

Al-Ḥajriyyín (sing. Ḥajrī) are of Qaḥṭānī origin, Hináwí in political inclination and Ibádí in religious affiliation. The tribe inhabit Badiyyah, in al-Sharqiyyah Province (53). They took part in the Imam's activities. The prominent Shaykhs of the tribe, namely, Sh. Musallam b. 'Ubayd al-Ḥajrī and Sh. 'Āmir b. Khamís al-Málikí (54) played an important role in support of the Imam, in spite of the fact that some of the other Shaykhs of the tribes did not give the *bay'ah* to the Imam. As we have seen earlier, Sh. Hilál b. Sa'íd al-Ḥajrī had supported Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid in his efforts with Sh. 'Isà to strike a reconciliation between the Imam and the Sultan. It seemed likely that Sh. Hilál had been forsaken by his supporters, as both Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'íd al-Khalílí and Sh. Muḥsin b. Zahrán al-Siyábí, had eventually forsake the tribe and fled to join the Sultan. The Imam on his part had come to learn about this internal conflict, as a result of which he appointed a Wálí over the area of the Ḥajriyyín, a man from Āl Bú Sa'íd called Sd. Hilál b. 'Alí b. Badr al-Bú Sa'ídí, who commanded great respect in the Omani political circles. He carefully managed to secure his position by neutralizing and appeasing the discontent of those opposed to him, thereby avoiding any further problems.

In fact, Ḥajriyyín had supported the Imam, in spite of the fact that they remained aloof from the issue of conflict and rivalries between the two parties. However, this is not to underestimate their role in support of the Imamate. They can be more safely placed at the level of the B. Hiná'ah and the B. Ruwáḥah in that, first, the number of those who participated were small and second, they lacked a strong independent unifying leadership. This made them a subordinated group, usually allying themselves with Sh. 'Isà, even though they did not see eye to eye with him on many issues, especially, what they

thought were his inclinations towards the Sultan, and that he was more inclined towards peace than wars. These inclinations put him in a position of doubt and suspicion.

c) The B. Ruwáḥah

The B. Ruwáḥah (sing. Ruwáḥī) are of 'Adnání descent. They are Hináwí in their political inclinations and Ibáđí in religious affiliation. They occupy a Wáđí which is named after the name of the tribe, viz. Wáđí B. Ruwáḥah, which extends from Izkí to the Samá'il and contains about thirty villages. They are also found in Samá'il, Wáđí Muḥram and Wáđí 'Indám. They are divided into several *fakhdhs*, each of which has its own Shaykh (55). Their *tamímah* is a descendant of Sh. Sa'íd b. Khalfán b. Aḥmad al-Khalílí (d. 1871).

When the Imam captured Izkí, Sh. Ḥámid b. Sayf b. Aḥmad al-Ruwáḥí refused to declare his allegiance to him without he first consulting and obtaining the approval of Sh. 'Isà b. Şáliḥ al-Ḥáarithí, and their *tamímah*, Sh. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí. Consequently, after Sh. 'Isà's proclamation of allegiance to the Imam in Rajab, 1331, Sh. Ḥámid then followed suit and agreed to the *bay'ah* without the need of consulting Sh. al-Khalílí.

Sh. Ḥámid and his men then accompanied the Imam to Samá'il which was the headquarters of their *tamímah*, Sh. al-Khalílí, who denounced the attack, but eventually had to reconcile himself to the reality of the situation and submit to the Imam. However, he did not stay for long, but fled to Muscat, leaving the leadership of the tribe to his son Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh, who was fully content with the Imamate and succeeded Imam Sálím after the latter's death in 1920.

The B. Ruwáḥah participated actively in the Imamate because they were in the very centre of events (in Wáđí Samá'il). They then continued to support the successor of Imam Sálím, and their Shaykh, Imam al-Khalílí, for about 34 years.

d) al-Hadádibah

Al-Hadádibah (sing. Hadábí), are of the Qaḥṭání origin. They are Hináwí in politics and Ibáđí in religion (56). They joined the Imam, but that section of the tribe under the leadership of Sh. Sa'íd b. Ráshid al-Hadábí opposed the Imam in many situations. Therefore, he was the only one among the Hináwí tribes who met with Sh. Sulṭán b. Muḥammad al-Na'ímí, who called the people of Wáđí Samá'il for a meeting

with him at al-Sīb in February, 1915. The aim of this call was to support the Sultan, if he succeeded in reaching Wádí Samá'il. However, the tribe was small in size compared to those of the B. Jábir, al-Siyábiyyín and the B. Ruwáḥah. The region's strategic position was in fact the cause of the whole conflict between the Sultan and the Imam. The tribe occupied the strategic middle centre of Oman. This was the cause of the conflict, as both the Sultan and the Imam wanted to extend their control over this strategically important area.

c) al-Ma'áwil

Al-Ma'áwil (sing. Ma'walí) are a Qaḥṭání tribe whose members are Hináwí in politics and Ibáḍí in religion. They inhabit the Wádí that derives its name from that of the tribe, viz., Wádí al-Ma'áwil (57). Their leader, Sh. Sulaymán b. Náṣir b. Muḥammad, first refused to declare his allegiance, but his followers persuaded him to give the Imam his homage. A few months later, he reneged on his allegiance. This cost him his life. As a result, secret assassinations became rife in the ranks of the 'ulamá' who supported the Imam, as we have mentioned earlier. Their participation, therefore, was mainly confined to individual initiatives, motivated either by religious zeal or by material self-interest. In other words, they did not join collectively under the leadership of their Shaykh, but under the protection of the Imam and with his instructions. For all these reasons, the tribe's contribution was small, due mainly to its lack of conviction in the Imamate, an attitude which was similar to that of their neighbours, the B. Ḥarrás and the B. Jábir

f) al-Ḥirṭh

Al-Ḥirṭh (sing. Ḥáriṭhí) are of Qaḥṭání origin. In politics, they belong to the Hináwí, and they are Ibáḍí in their faith. Their headquarters was al-Qábil (58). Their *tamímah* was Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih, who was also the *tamímah* of the Hináwí factions. Sh. 'Isà was a very well respected figure in Oman from all the Hináwí, inheriting this high social standing from his father, who played a very prominent role in the second half of 19th century.

We have seen that the tribe did not give the *bay'ah* to the Imam at the beginning. Not only that, but Sh. 'Isà even tried to dissuade Sh. al-Sálimí from reviving the issue of the Imamate. As a result of this, Sh. al-Sálimí went out of al-Qábil under cover until he

reached Tanúf, as mentioned earlier. He then refused to give his *bay'ah* until the fall of Izkí in to the hands of the Imam, after which he realised that he would lose his political position and influence among the tribes if he continued to refuse to support the Imam.

It is possible that the B. Ruwáḥah had played a role in consulting Sh. 'Isà in order to save the tribe from coming into conflict with the B. Riyám, their traditional enemies. For this reason, Sh. 'Isà decided to support the Imam and joined in all his military operations. Sh. 'Isà's role in support of the Imamate was crucial, although he always hoped that peace and conciliation would prevail between the Imam and the Sultan. His role in persuading the Hináwí tribes to support the Imam was also great, as for example, in the cases of Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím and Āl Wahíbah, who retracted their support of the Sultan, when they knew of Sh. 'Isà's support for the Imam.

g) al-Ḥabús

Al-Ḥabús (sing. Ḥabsí) are of 'Adnání origin. Politically, they belong to the Hináwí, and they are Ibádí in their sect. They inhabit al-Sharqiyyah in a region named after the tribal name, as Buldán al-Ḥabús; their mainstay was al-Muḍaybí. They are divided into several *fakhds*, about fifteen in all. They supported the Imam and joined in many of his military operations. The Imam had complete control over the tribe (59).

h) al Bú Sa'íd

Āl Bú Sa'íd (sing. al-Bú Sa'ídí) are of Qaḥṭání origin, Hináwí in politics and Ibádí in religion. To this tribe belongs the Omani ruling family. The tribe is widely scattered all over Oman, to such an extent that members of them can be found every where in the country. Their main concentration is in al-Sharqiyyah. Some of them supported the Imam and many of their members joined the Imam and his successor. Among those who supported the Imam were Sd. Su'úd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál, and Hilál b. 'Alí b. Badr, who assumed the office of Wálí of the Imam. The first among them to become Wálí of Samad al-Shán was Sd. Sálím b. Sa'íd (60).

i) al-'Awámir

Al-'Awámir (sing. 'Āmirí) are of 'Adnání origin. Politically, they belong to the Hináwí faction, and religiously, they are divided between the Ibádí and Sunni (61).

The tribe is big and extends from Dhofar in the South to al-Buraymí in the North. Some sections of the tribe are Ḥaḍar, who live in the interior province, also in Muscat and al-Báṭinah in al-Síḅ. They are divided into several *fakhdhs*. However, that section of them who supported the Imam lived around Izkí. These joined the Imam very actively and submitted completely to him and implemented his political and administrative programmes during his reign and that of his successor.

In conclusion, it has to be stressed that the Imam had laid his complete control and authority over the above tribes in that he appointed his Wális, Qáḍis and *zakát* collectors over these tribes. It has to be noted also that all of these tribes are settled Ḥaḍar tribes and practised agriculture. The submission of these tribes to the Imam was complete, with the exception of al Ma'áwil whose submission to the Imam and involvement with his activities was weak and only by individual initiative. This was in contrast to the other tribes like the B. Ruwáḥah and al-Ḥirth whose involvement was whole-hearted and unanimous. This also applies to some of the *fakhdhs* from al-Hadádibah, the inhabitants of Fanjá, who submitted to the Imam, but opposed him on many issues and therefore were inclined more towards the Sultan than the Imam.

ii. The Imam's incomplete control over tribes

This section deals with the relationship between the Imam and those tribes over which he had only partial control. These are the tribes which, on the one hand, accepted the Imamate, but on the other hand, the Imam exercised no direct authority over them. They supported the Imam and sent some of their men when asked to do so in order to participate in the Imam's military operations. They also referred their disputes and legal problems to the Imam's courts. Some of these tribes were not settled, but were Badú who were in constant movement.

1. The tribes of the Gháfirí

a) al-Janabah

Al-Janabah (sing. Junaybí) are Qaḥṭání. They belong to the Gháfirí political faction, and they adhere to the Sunni sect. They are mainly Badú, but some of them are Ḥaḍar. Their range was in three main areas (i) around Adam, (ii) Şúr, and (iii) Maşírah. They are divided into five main *fakhdhs*: al-‘Arámá, al-Fawáris, al-Ghayáliyyín, al-Makhánah, and al-Majá‘ilah. The first four *fakhdhs* live in Şúr and extend Westwards along the shores. Al- Majá‘ilah, on the other hand, inhabit the area around Adam and Masírah. Their *tamímah* was in the Majá‘ilah *fakhdh*, who was Sh. Yásir b. Ḥumúd b. Sulṭán al-Majay‘alí, whose headquarters is ‘Izz. In Şúr, it was Sh. Muḥammad b. Mubáarak al-Mukhayní. We have seen that it was Sh. Sa‘d b. Sa‘íd b. Sulṭán al-Majay‘alí, who gave the *bay‘ah* to the Imam. Sh. Sa‘d was cousin to Yásir who took over the leadership of the tribe after Sa‘d. Al-Majá‘ilah is the only *fakhdh* of the tribe who gave the *bay‘ah* to the Imam, while the other *fakhdhs* of the tribe rejected the Imamate (62).

We also indicated that Sh. Ḥimyar had called upon the people of Şúr to come to a meeting, or to send their representative to him during his tour in al-Sharqiyyah between October and November 1913, to discuss their loyalties, but they rejected his call, and instead sent to the Sultan informing him of the event. The Sultan, on his part, sent a force to protect them against any possible attacks that Sh. Ḥimyar might launch against them. Initially, they had allied themselves with the B. Bú ‘Alí in support of the Sultan and sent a force of men which reached Bidbid. However, after three days of the Imam’s attack on Samá’il, they were forced to withdraw. Not only that, but they even went to threaten al-Maḥáriq in Adam.

The Majá‘ilah, on the other hand, supported the Imam and were committed to his programme, obeying his instructions and rule, and also paid the *zakát* to him. However, they lacked organisation in view of the fact that they were Badú and they did not get involved in the administration and rule, except during the reign of Imam al-Khalílí, who greatly depended on them. As a result, we find the name of Sh. Yásir repeatedly mentioned in respect of many of the responsibilities and events that occurred during the time of Imam al-Khalílí,

b) al-Durú‘

Al-Durú‘ (sing. Dur‘î) are ‘Adnání Badú tribes. They belong to the Gháfirí faction. Religiously, they are divided between Ibádí and Sunni. They inhabit the area of Southern al-Záhirah, and their headquarters is Tan‘im. They are divided into twenty four *fakhdhs* (63). Al-Durú‘ gave their *bay‘ah* to the Imam in Nazwà, under the leadership of Sh. Ḥumayd b. Khulayfín b. Sayf b. Náṣir. However, their involvement in the events in Oman was very little at this period. In fact, we did not find any sources which would indicate their participation in the Imamate, which suggests that the Imam was not able to exert complete control over them.

It seems that the Imam’s call on them for support was intended to win more followers, or at least to neutralise them, for fear that they might join his enemies, as did Āl Wahíbah, who joined the Sultan. From all these developments, it becomes clear that the Imam did not interfere in the tribe’s affairs and was not able to enforce his programme on them. Therefore, he left the situation of the tribe as it was before. However, they were able to refer their legal problems to the Imam’s law courts, if they so wished.

c) al-Ya‘áqíb

Al-Ya‘áqíb (sing. Ya‘qúbí) are of Qaḥṭání, and in politics, they belong to the Gháfirí faction. They adhere to ^{the} Sunni and some of them ^{the} Ibádí sect. Their centre is ‘Ibrí in al-Záhirah Province (64). Their *tamímah* was Sh. Sulṭán b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Ya‘qúbí (d. 1342/1924). Sh. Sulṭán responded to the Imam’s call and gave the *bay‘ah* to the Imam, who then appointed him ruler over his people as he used to be. From our investigation, we have come to realise that neither the Shaykh nor his tribe actually took part in the Imam’s wars. The Imam issued instructions to them demanding that they participate in the wars, but they did not. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Shaykh and the Imam continued unimpaired throughout the latter’s reign.

It is possible to assume that the Imam’s friendly attitude towards them was due to his strategy of securing the Imamate from the Western borders, ^{as} a friendly al-Ya‘áqíb would provide that security. This is particularly important because the ruler of Abú Dhabi was a supporter of the Sultan, especially when the latter became active with the ruler of Dubai in raising an army from al-Buraymí to support the Sultan. Al-Ya‘áqíb, therefore,

would be an important ally to the Imam in securing his Western flank. Nevertheless, the Imam was not able to exert complete control over them until the end of 1940.

This, in general, was the position of the three Gháfirí tribes over which the Imam failed to exercise complete control, partly because they were remote from the centre of the Imamate, and partly because these were primarily Badú tribes, used to a style of life characterized by constant movement and unamenable to discipline and organized living. Therefore, their contribution was very little in the events of the Imamate, with the exception of some members from the Janabah. There is no evidence to suggest that the Imam collected the *zakát* from these tribes.

2. The tribes of the Hináwí

a) Āl Wahíbah

Āl Wahíbah (sing. Wahíbí) are of ‘Adnání origin. They belong to the Hináwí faction, and adhere to the Ibáđí sect. They live, together with al-Ḥabús, in Buldán al-Ḥabús, particularly in Sanáw and Sudayrah. They are divided into eight *fakhdhs* (65). Āl Wahíbah were first supporters of the Sultan, but when Sh. ‘Isà proclaimed his support for the Imam, they abandoned their support for the Sultan and returned to their homeland. They then continued monitoring the situation until the end of 1333/1915, when the Imam visited Samad al-Shán and there met with the dignitaries of the tribe and they gave their allegiance. No doubt Sh. ‘Isà influenced them to give the *bay‘ah* to the Imam. This was also due to the pressure that they faced from their neighbours. As a result of these pressures, they finally agreed to declare their allegiance to the Imam. Here are some of their prominent Shaykhs, who met the Imam to give their support:

1. Sh. Sulṭán b. Maṣṣúr b. Náṣir al-Ghufaylí (d. 1372/1953) at an age of 115 years. Sh. Sulṭán’s grandfather, Sh. Náṣir b. ‘Alí (d. 1866) supported al-Wahhábis against Sd. Thuwayní b. Sa‘íd b. Sulṭán.
2. Sh. Su‘úd b. Ḥamad b. Ḥimyar b. Khulayfín b. ‘Alí al-Ghufaylí
3. Sh. Sa‘íd b. Ráshid b. Sulṭán b. Wany al-Jaháfí
4. Sh. Wany b. Sulṭán b. Wany al-Jaháfí

5. Sh. Sálím b. Ḥumúd b, Sa'íd b. Ráshid al-Jaḥáfí, son of Sh. Ḥumúd b. Sa'íd (d. 1898), who played a significant part in the events which occurred in the second half of 19th century. The *tamímah* of Āl Wahíbah was Sh. Sulṭán, who relinquished the leadership of the tribe as a result of old age and was replaced by his son, Sh. Ḥumúd b. Sulṭán, aided by Sh. Ḥumúd b. Sálím b. Ḥumúd al-Jaḥáfí. Āl Wahíbah were not particularly favoured by the Imam, and although they obeyed his rules, they rejected them on many occasions. Therefore, when the Imam went to meet them in 1920, he was killed on the way to them. We will discuss this incident in some detail later in (Ch. VIII).

b) al-Ḥarásís

Al-Ḥarásís (sing. Ḥarsúsí) are of Qaḥṭání origin. They belong to the Hináwí political faction, and adhere to the Sunni sect (66). They live in Jaddat al-Ḥarásí, which extends to the lands of al-Durú' and Āl Wahíbah. Their language belongs to the branch of the modern non-Arabic dialects of Southern Arabia. They declared their *bay'ah* to the Imam, but there is no idea exactly when this happened. They also did not take part in the Imam's wars, nor did he impose any forms of payments or tributes on them.

All of these tribes are Badú, and although in principle they gave the *bay'ah* to the Imam, he was not able to exert complete control over them. As we have tried to explain, this lack of complete control, was partly due to the Bedouin nomadic life of these tribes, who were unsettled and unamenable to discipline and organization and lacked religious zeal. Many of them were also Sunnis, like al-Durú', al-Janabah and al-Ḥarásís. For all these reasons, the position of the Imam among these tribes was generally weak. However, they were also careful enough not to antagonize the Imam or challenge his power, as did the rulers of Bahlà and Rustáq, whom, as a result, the Imam dismissed from their position. The same could be said about Āl Wahíbah, who posed a challenge which the Imam had to face when a conflict arose between them and al-'Abriyyín. The Imam sent his instructions to Āl Wahíbah regarding this conflict, which Āl Wahíbah refused to obey. As a result, the Imam advanced towards them to make them obey his orders, but met with his death on his way to them before completing what he had intended to do, as we will see later.

Endnotes

- (1) Miles, "Note on the Tribes of Oman"; Lorimer, op.cit. vols. 6, 7 & 8 pp. q.v.; Chauncy, "Notes the Tribes of Sultanate of Muscat and Oman".
- (2) Miles, The Countries and Tribes. p. 418.
- (3) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 6 p. 2965; Wilkinson, "Bayásirah " pp. 75-85; Carter, Tribes. pp. 118f.
- (4) al-Izkawí, Annals of Oman. p. 27.
- (5) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1389ff.
- (6) al-Siyábí, Is'áf. p. passim; Miles, op.cit. pp. 418-38; Lorimer, op.cit. vols. 6, 7 & 8 p. q.v.
- (7) Rentz, "al-Djanaba" EI-2 vol. i pp. 1313f; Lorimer, op.cit. vols. 6, 7 & 8 pp. q.v.; Anthony, Historical and Cultural Dictionary, p. q.v.
- (8) Miles, "Note "; Lorimer, op.cit. vols. 8 pp. 1391-1412.; Chauncy, "Notes".
- (9) Peterson, Oman. pp. 110-35.
- (10) Gabriel, T. 'Rural Change in Oman'; Thesiger, "The Badú of Southern Arabia".
- (11) The Jázirah system consists of a pair of yoked bullocks or donkeys which draw water from inside the well by a bucket to the surface, repeatedly, See Wilkinson, Water and Tribal Settlement. p. 78
- (12) Lorimer, op.cit. vols. 6, 7 & 8 pp. q.v.; Anthony, op.cit. p. q.v.
- (13) Arabia Handbook, p. q.v; Anthony, op.cit. p. q.v.
- (14) Muḥammad, Su'ád Máhir. "al-Isiḥkámát al-Ḥarbiyyah bi-Salṭanat 'Umán".
- (15) Dostal, W. "The evolution of Bedouin life" In F. Gabrielle (ed.), L'Antica società. Beduina Centro di studi semitice, Roma, p. 11-34.; Carter, Tribes. pp. 17ff.
- (16) al-Siyábí, Is'áf. p. passim; Miles, The Countries, pp. 418-38; Lorimer, op.cit. vols 6, 7 & 8 pp. q.v.; ARAMCO, 'Umán, pp. 121-70.
- (17) Ibid.
- (18) Ibid.
- (19) Peterson, Oman. p. 110.
- (20) Peterson, Oman. p. 112.
- (21) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 375.
- (22) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 180.
- (23) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 180.
- (24) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 182ff.
- (25) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 196f.
- (26) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 215f.
- (27) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 224.
- (28) Among the 'ulamá', who were killed in this secret killing were: Sh. 'Abd al-Raḥmán b. Khamís b. Já'id al-Kharúší and his son, Sh. Sayf b. Aḥmad al-Kindí, the Qádí of Nakhal and his wife, Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Salámí, and Sh. Sa'íd b. Sálim al-'Arafátí and his son.
- (29) Sh. Muḥsin b. Zahrán al-Siyábí, the Shaykh of al-Siyábiyyín, refused to declare his allegiance. Therefore, he escaped to Muscat, where he lived until Imam Sálim's death.
- (30) For further detail about the B. Riyám see Miles, The Countries. p.434; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 pp. 1593f; Peterson, Oman pp. 123-5.
- (31) For further detail about al-Abriyyín see Miles, op.cit. p. 428; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 6 p. 16; Wilkinson, Arab settlement. pp. 156ff.
- (32) al-'Abrí, Ibráhím. Tabṣirat. pp. 141ff; Wilkinson, Arab settlement. pp. 167; al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 385f.
- (33) For further detail about the B. Kharúš see Miles, op.cit. p. 430; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 7 p. 1027; al-Siyábí, Is'áf. pp. 111ff; ARAMCO, 'Umán. p. 144f.
- (34) Interview with Sh. Sa'íd b. Ḥamad al-Kharúší
- (35) Chauncy, "Notes the Tribes of Sultanate of Muscat and Oman" p. q v (B. Kharús).
- (36) For further detail about al-Maḥáriq see Miles, op.cit. p. 431; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1396; al-Siyábí, Is'áf. pp. 63f; ARAMCO, 'Umán. p. 161f.
- (37) For further detail about al-Masákirah see Miles, op.cit. p. 432; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1178; al-Siyábí, Is'áf. pp. 122f.
- (38) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 404f.
- (39) For further detail about al-Kunúd see Miles, op.cit. p. 430; Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1041.
- (40) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 254.
- (41) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 403.

- (43) For further detail about al-Nadábiiyyín see Miles, *op.cit.* pp. 432f; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 8 p. 1364.
- (44) For further detail about al-Raḥbiyyín, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 434; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 8 p. 1572f; al-Siyábí, *Is'áf.* p. 145.
- (45) For further detail about the B. Jábir, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 428; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 7 pp. 885-9; al-Siyábí, *Is'áf.* p. 48.
- (46) For further detail about al-Siyábiiyyín, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 436; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 8 p. 1834; al-Siyábí, *Is'áf.* p. 40.
- (47) For further detail about the B. Ḥarrāṣ, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 426; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 7 p. 642; al-Siyábí, *Is'áf.* p. 46.
- (48) For further detail about al-Ya'áribah, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 437; Bathunst, *The Ya'rubi Dynasty of Oman*; al-Siyábí, *Is'áf.* pp. 119f; Anthony, *op.cit.* p. 123.
- (49) For further detail about al-Ḥaḍárim, see Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 8 p. 1393; al-Siyábí, *op.cit.* p. 161.
- (50) Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. viii. p. 1931.
- (51) For further detail about the B. Hiná'ah, see Miles, *op.cit.* pp. 425f; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 7 p. 715; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* pp. 163f; Anthony, *op.cit.* pp. 41f; Mandaville, "The B. Hiná" *EI-2* vol. iii p. 403.
- (52) al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* p. 96.
- (53) For further detail about al-Ḥajriyyín, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 427; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 7 p. 615; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* pp. 137f.
- (54) Sh. 'Ámir b. Khamís al-Málikí did not belong to al-Ḥajriyyín, but he lived in their location
- (55) For further detail about the B. Ruwáḥah, see Miles, *op.cit.* pp. 434f; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 7 p. 1614; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* pp. 150f; Anthony, *op.cit.* p. 91; Peterson, *op.cit.* pp. 128f.
- (56) For further detail about al-Ḥadádibah, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 427; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 8 p. 1402; al-Siyábí, *Is'áf.* p. 158.
- (57) For further detail about al-Ma'áwil, see Miles, *op.cit.* pp. 430f; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 8 p. 1113; al-Siyábí, *Is'áf.* p. 106.
- (58) For further detail about al-Ḥirṭh, see Miles, *op.cit.* pp. 426f; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 7 pp. 740-3; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* pp. 140f; Anthony, *op.cit.* pp. 142f; Peterson, *op.cit.* pp. 119f.
- (59) For further detail about al-Ḥabús, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 426; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 7 pp. 494-6; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* p. 130; Mandaville, "al-Ḥubús" *EI-2* vol. iii p. 537.
- (60) For further detail about Āl Bú Sa'íd, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 435; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 8 pp. 1647f; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* pp. 154f; Anthony, *op.cit.* pp. 92f.
- (61) For further detail about al-'Awámir, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 422; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 6 pp. 186ff; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* pp. 159f; Headly, "'Awámir" *EI-2* vol. i p. 759.
- (62) For further detail about al-Janabah, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 429; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 6 pp. 903ff; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* pp. 131f; Rentz, "al-Djanabah" *EI-2* vol. ii p. 40.
- (63) For further detail about al-Durú', see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 424; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 6 p. 360; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* pp. 140f; Matthews, "al-Durú'" *EI-2* vol. ii pp. 630f; Peterson, *op.cit.* pp. 129f.
- (64) For further detail about al-Ya'áqīb, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 437; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* p. 170; Anthony, *op.cit.* p. 123.
- (65) For further detail about Āl Wahíbah, see Miles, *op.cit.* p. 437; Lorimer, *op.cit.* vol. 8 pp. 1921-5; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* pp. 165-8; Anthony, *op.cit.* p. 120.
- (66) Matthews, "al-Harásís" *EI-2* vol. iii pp. 176f; Dostal, "Two South Arabia Tribes: al-Qurá and al-Harásís" *Arabia Studies*, II (1975), pp. 38ff; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* p. 139; Carter, *Tribes* pp. 93ff.

CHAPTER ۱۱۱

THE IMAM'S LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

The main aim of this chapter is to gain an understanding of the Imamate of Imam Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúşí and the extent of his success or otherwise in administering the affairs of his government in its various branches. It deals with the state institutions and the functioning of such institutions. These are the political system, the administrative system, education, and the economic and financial system.

1) The Political System

The main themes to be dealt with in this section are the power of Imam Sálím's government and the role of the Consultative Council which assisted the Imam in important matters and decision making. On top of the political hierarchy sat the Imam.

a) Imam

One of the basic principles of the Ibáđí faith is that the Imamate is not a necessity, but that when circumstances arise which demand its revival, the post is elective and not hereditary. For most of its existence, Oman has been ruled by Imams as mentioned above (Ch. I. S. 1), but during the 19th century, few of the rulers have had the necessary religious qualifications to fill the post. For that reason, the Imamate system is considered the most suitable system of rule in Oman because of the nature of the demographic composition of the country, which makes unity difficult in the absence of the Imamate system. In addition, this rather heterogeneous demographic composition is further complicated by the fact that each ethnic or religious group held fast to its inherited traditions which are saturated with Islam. As such, in political conventions, tribal conviction confers on the Imam the people's undivided loyalty and allegiance much more than any ruler can exercise over them.

Ex-officio, the Imam is both head of the state and government. His duties are to organize the administration, to command the army, to appoint officials, to implement Islamic laws and to lead the Friday prayer.

The election of Imam Sálím came as a result of the need of the Omani society for the Imam. The factors which engendered such a need were tackled in Ch. II. S. 2. This convergence of factors include a religious resurgence among tribesmen and notables of the Interior, inspired in part by a weakened Āl Bú Sa'íd, perceived as compromised by British domination.

Therefore, the Imam set out a programme designed to achieve the aims for which the Imamate had been revived. For that reason, the Imam immediately after his election embarked on a reorganization of his administration, and he wrote to all the chiefs of tribes calling upon them for his support in order to complete his mission.

As for the provinces, the Imam delegated the responsibility of administration to his Wális, Qádis and Army Generals. However, he decreed that all important cases and issues be referred to him. He closely supervised the behaviour of his Wális and Qádis, and used to hold them accountable for all matters, big or small. We have seen that he used to attend seminars held to resolve controversial and difficult matters, whether among the general public or between the '*ulamá*', or the officials. As an example, he held a meeting in Nazwà, aimed to resolve a case of religious controversy between Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. Májid b. Khamís al-'Abrí in 1332/1914. The Imam was generally blamed for his rigidity such that he never retracted from a decision passed by the '*ulamá*', such as the issue of the confiscation of the property of Sh. Ráshid b. 'Uzayyiz al-Khuşaybí (d.1347/1928) and the property of Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Sulaymán al-Maḥrúqí.

Considering these things mentioned above, an important question arises: was Imam Sálím able to achieve all that he aspired for in the organization of his Imamate?. To be sure, the answer is in the negative. The reason for this failure can be traced to a multiplicity of causes, the most important of which was the continuation of war with the Sultan who was supported by the British, and the diminution of economic resources. Did he, however, achieve social justice, the stability of law and order, and the prevalence of security? The answer to this question is in the affirmative ; and the PAM's (Haworth) report of 9th May 1917 attests to the fact. The Report says of the government of the Imam that "justice is obtainable, and the only complaints heard are due to the fact that it is strict... The Hindu (British Subjects) community inform me [PAM] that the government

of the Imam is good and that if the rule of the Wális in the districts was not good, it was at any rate very much better than the conditions of affairs at Masqat [Muscat], and at Matrah [Maṭraḥ] under the Sultan himself” (1).

The testimony of the PAM and Hindus who were working in trade and who were not Muslims as a matter of course, all testify that the Imam system of government was better. Imam Sálím himself had surrounded himself by a great number of consultants and ‘*ulamá*’ and entrusted many of them with the responsibilities of running the affairs of his government. However, the Imam was a firm and tough leader, who led his armies personally, and carried out such punishments for big offences as the death penalty, the *rajm* (stoning to death), and the amputation of arms of those who committed theft offences. On 29th Shawwál 1331, the Imam personally carried out the execution of the penalty of *rajm* on Su‘dah bint Sálím al-‘Āmiriyah, who admitted committing *ziná* (adultery) in Samá’il (2). He also ordered in person the execution of the death penalty on Sa‘íd b. Aḥmad al-Jábirí who was accused of spying for the Sultan (3). He also ordered the death of Muḥammad b. Bakhít al-Salámí who was a high-way vagabond, as well as the order of death of both Sh. Sulaymán b. Náṣir al-Ma‘walí and Sh. Aḥmad b. Thunayyán al-Ḥarrásí. Thus, the Imam was a stern character, which made many of the leaders fear him. Mention has already been made (Ch. II. S. 1) of some aspects of his personality. It was said that Sh. Sulṭán b. Manṣúr al-Ghufaylí did not dare to meet the Imam alone for fear of him (4). It is also said that Sh. Ḥimyar and Sh. ‘Isà refused a request from Sulaymán b. ‘Abdalláh al-Maḥrúqí asking them to intervene with the Imam to pardon him (5).

As a result of the Imam’s strictness and sternness, he was obeyed by the subjects, and some of the tribes submitted to his authority, as we have mentioned earlier. This does not mean, however, that Imam Sálím ruled over the people entirely single-handedly as an authoritarian dictator, but that he was governed in all his actions by what was decided by his ‘*ulamá*’ around him, not necessarily taking decisions by way of general meetings.

In actual fact, the government of the Imam lacked the necessary institutional set-up of the modern state, and the system of governance which he followed was a traditional rudimentary one that goes back to the system of political organisation found in the early

days of the Islamic State. It is also probable that his system of government owed its origins to what the Omanis had conventionally agreed upon. The pre-occupation of the Imam with his wars and his concentration on how to requisition supplies for his armies, together with his responsibility for dealing with people's judicial and security problems, all combined to diminish the development of a fully-fledged institutional political system for state organisation.

b) The Consultative Council

When Imam Sálím was elected as Imam, a condition of the *bay'ah* as Imam was that the Imam should not pass an important decision without the prior consultation of the '*ulamá*' who were in the position of *Ahl al-Ḥallwa al'Aqd* (Ch. III. S.2). According to this condition, Imam Sálím was bound to consult the '*ulamá*' and the chiefs of the tribes. Therefore, we may consider this body as a consultative council for the Imam, or a body of close advisors to the Imam. The council had as its members the prominent '*ulamá*' and notables, and the chiefs of the tribes. The '*ulamá*' were entrusted with carrying out matters relating to religious and judiciary law, whereas the focus of responsibility of the remainder of the council were those relating to military and administrative matters.

i. '*Ulamá*'

The '*ulamá*' played an important role in reviving the Imamate in 1913, and the government of the Imam witnessed a big number of them, the majority of whom were former students of Sh. al-Sálímí, and Sh. Şáliḥ b. 'Alí al-Ḥáarithí (d.1314/1896) and Sh. Ráshid b. Sayf b. Ráshid al-Lamkí (d.1333/1915). These '*ulamá*' concentrated their efforts on the service of the Imamate and many of them assumed important offices in it. The Imam used to rely on them in the resolution of his administrative and political problems. He also used to consult them in all matters, small or big, either on a collective group basis or on individual personal level. This implied that he either called for a general meeting of the '*ulamá*' and their counterparts of the chiefs of the tribes to discuss a specific issue, or that he counselled with a few of them, without the need of calling for a general meeting. In the following, it is noteworthy to give a listing of the '*ulamá*' on whose shoulders, the Imamate of Imam Sálím could be said to have primarily rested:-

1. Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálimí (d. 1332/1914). He was the driving force behind the revival of the Imamate in 1913, as mentioned in some detail earlier. He was blind, nonetheless, he was given the office of president of Qádis of Imam Sálim, and was the main dynamic force for the Imamate. He wrote twenty-six books, in addition to his *fatwas* and letters in correspondence with the men of his time (6).
2. Sh. ‘Amir b. Khamís b. Mas‘úd al-Málikí (d. 1346/1927). He was the second personality in the government of Imam Sálim. Sh. al-Málikí was one of the key figures on whom the Imamate had rested. An indication of the importance of his standing is that in 1332/1914 he replaced his tutor, Sh. al-Sálimí as head of the Qádis, and sometimes he assumed the role of deputy of Imam Sálim in Nazwà. He also gave lessons and lectures, and under him were graduated many of the ‘*ulamá*’ and Qádis who contributed significantly to the services of the government of al-Khalílí and the government of the Sultan (7).
3. Sh. Abú Zayd ‘Abdalláh b. Muḥammad b. Ruzayq al-Riyámí (d. 1364/1945). He was the third in rank after Sh. al-Sálimí and al-Málikí. He gave his famous speech on the occasion when Imam Sálim was elected, in which he detailed the programme of the Imam (see Ch. III). He assumed the office of the Imam’s Qádí in Izkí, and then was transferred as Wálí and Qádí of Bahlà in 1334/1916 (8).
4. Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálim b. Záhir al-Ruqayshí (d. 1386/1967). He assumed the office of the Imam’s Wálí and Qádí to Izkí, and Imam al-Khalílí transferred him to Nakhal and then to ‘Ibrí in 1360/1941 (9).
5. Sh. Náṣir b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúsí (d.1363/1943). He was the brother of Imam Sálim. He greatly supported the Imam, and was one of the closes and most influential figures to the Imam, such that the Imam rarely decided on an important issue without his prior consultation. He assumed the responsibilities of administration in the Western Ḥajar Province (al-Rustáq, al-‘Awábí, Nakhal and Wádí al-Ma‘áwil) (10).
6. Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Khalílí (d.1373/1954). He was one of the most prominent ‘*ulamá*’ who combined the mastery of learning and the art of politics. He was the *tamímah* of the B. Ruwáḥah. He became Imam after Imam Sálim’s death (11).

7. Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. Ráshid b. Şáliḥ al-Háshimí. He was one of the figures who were most dedicated to the support of Imam Sálím. He played an important role in the mediation efforts for a conciliation between the Imam and the Sultan.
8. Sh. Náşir b. ‘Ámir b. Sulaymán al-Riyámí (d.1336/1918). He was one of the notables of the B. Riyám. He supported the Imam, who appointed him as Qáđí for Izkí (12).

In addition to that, there was also another group of the ‘*ulamá*’ who permanently accompanied the Imam in all his moves, and in turn the Imam continuously sought their advice. These close advisers and consultants to the Imam included:

1. Sh. Sulaymán b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Kindí (d.1337/1918). He lived in Muscat exiled from Nazwà, and thence he returned at the time of the appearance of Imam Sálím, who appointed him as Qáđí in Nazwà (13).
2. Sd. Su‘úd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál al-Bú Sa‘ídí (d. 1337/1918). He was one of the descendants of the founders of the State of Ál Bú Sa‘íd. He was the Sultan’s Wálí to Izkí, yet he preferred to give his support to the Imam. He was a pious and ascetic man, who assumed the office as Wálí of Samá’il, then of Nazwà. The Imam entrusted him with the responsibilities of the Imamate when the Imam went out for war (14).
3. Sh. ‘Abdalláh b. ‘Ámir al-‘Azrí (d.1358/1939). He was one of the prominent ‘*ulamá*’, whom the Imam appointed Qáđí to Ibrá’, then transferred to Nazwà in 1337/1919. He was deputy to the Imam in Nazwà and the head Qáđí therein after Sh. ‘Ámir al-Málikí resigned his post (15).
4. Sh. Muḥammad b. Ḥumúd b. Şáliḥ al-Şawwáfí (d. 1364/1944). He was one of ‘*ulamá*’ known for his asceticism, who remained closely by the side of the Imam for a long period of time.
5. Sh. Sálím b. Ḥamad b. Sa‘íd al-Baráshidí (d. 1371/1951) was one of the ascetic ‘*ulamá*’, and Qáđí who accompanied the Imam for a long period of time and received his learning at the hands of the Imam.

ii. *Shaykhs*

The other members of the Consultative Council were the important chiefs of the tribes who emerged under Imam Sálím’s Imamate and who became important allies and supporters to the Imam. These were :

1. Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nāṣir b. Sayf al-Nabhānī (d. 1338/1920), the *tamīmah* of the B. Ghāfir faction. He supported the Imamate materially and morally, as we have mentioned above (16).
2. Sh. ‘Isà b. Ṣāliḥ b. ‘Alī al-Ḥārithī (1365/1946), the *tamīmah* of Hināwī faction. He was considered the second important pillar of the Imamate. He was not only a political and military leader, but was also one of the ‘*ulamā*’ as he contributed to writing, and had written some books in matters of *fiqh*. In his religious views he differed from the two Imams, Imam Sālim and Imam Muḥammad al-Khalīlī (17).
3. The sons of Sh. Hilāl b. Zāhir al-Hinā’ī, viz.: Sh. ‘Abdallāh, Sh. Khālid, Sh. ‘Alī and Sh. Muḥammad b. Hilāl, and their nephews, Sh. Zāhir b. Ghuṣn b. Hilāl and Sh. Sālim and Sh. Su‘ūd b. Badr b. Hilāl. Sh. ‘Abdallāh and his brother Sh. ‘Alī were in the forefront of the Shaykhs who accepted the Imamate and supported the Imam materially and morally, and for that reason the Imam continued to give them deep and special respect (18).
4. Sh. Muhannā b. Ḥamad al-‘Abrī (d.1342/1924). He was the chief of his tribe. He greatly supported the Imamate and devoted his efforts to this purpose (19).
5. Sh. Sayf b. ‘Alī b. ‘Āmir al-Maskirī (d. 1355/1936) was one of the dignitaries of the Masākirah tribe, who lived in Zanzibar in the service of Sultan, Barghash b. Sa‘īd (1870-88). However, the British expelled him from there after having confiscated his property because he was a supporter of Sd. Khālid b. Barghash b. Sa‘īd in 1314/1896. He then returned to Oman and remained by the side of the Imam and became one of the Imam’s companions (20).
6. Sh. Ḥāmid b. Sayf b. Aḥmad al-Ruwāḥī, was one of the chiefs of his tribe. His headquarters were in Izkī. He was very close to the Imam.
7. Sh. Ḥumayd b. Musallam al-Nadābī. He was one of chiefs of his tribe. His habitation was in Surūr in Wādī Samā’il.
8. Sh. Ḥamdān b. Sulaymān b. Sayf al-Nabhānī, the cousin of Sh. Ḥimyar b. Nāṣir. Sh. Ḥamdān’s headquarters was Barkat al-Mawz. He supported the Imam, who appointed him as Wālī of Izkī.

These were the members of the Consultative Council whose mission it was to give advice and guidance to the Imam and to help him implement the programme of the Imamate; not only that, but also to exert a supervisory role over the Imam lest he get derailed from the right track, as they also had the right to sack the Imam if he acted contrary to the principles of the *Sharī'ah*. However, an important question arises: did this Council have a formal constitutional character ? i.e. did it have a real existence actually affecting the decision-making process, or was it merely a formal nominal institution without real actual powers ?.

In answering this question, one can say that the council was no doubt a nominal institution, lacking in constitutional powers, holding meetings only when it was asked to do so, and not necessarily all of its members attended when it did. In fact the name given to the council was not the Imam's coinage or choice. He preferred to call it *anṣār* (helpers or followers), such that when he needed advice, he would say "I will consult the *anṣār*", and for that matter, the Imam used to convene his meetings according to this conception. Accordingly, the Imam did not call for general meetings of the council, but he called for meetings according to the dictates and the expediency of the situation at hand. Following are some examples of such meetings:

1. The Imam called for a meeting in Nazwà in Şafar 1332 to discuss the conditions laid down by Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid for the conciliation between the Sultan and the Imam through the mediation of Sh. 'Isà.
2. The Imam called for a meeting in Nazwà in Dhú al-Qi'dah 1332 to discuss the war against the Sultan. As a result, the Imam attacked Muscat in Şafar 1333.
3. When the Imam received the PAM's letter in which he proposed his mediation for reconciliation, the Imam's answer to the PAM was that the issue required consultation with the *anṣār* (21).
4. The Imam called for a council meeting to elect a successor to Sh. al-Sálimí to the post of head of Qádis.
5. The Imam called for a meeting to settle the *fiqh* controversy that arose between Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. Májid al-'Abrí (22).

There were other calls for similar meetings, either from the Imam himself or from other leaders, to decide on issues requiring a collective decision.

It is noticeable that the Imam rarely took decisions unilaterally, without the prior consultation of the '*ulamá*' and leaders, and he, therefore, remained for the most part bound by the decisions of the Council. However, this general role did not hold uniformly, and the Imam did sometimes act otherwise, as for example when he opposed some '*ulamá*' whose collective decisions on certain matters conflicted with that generally upheld by the '*ulamá*'. Examples of such opposition were those in which the Imam's views conflicted with that of Sh. 'Isà on many political and military matters. He also opposed some of his Qádis on the issue of applying the *Sharí'ah* punishment of flogging on a woman who bore a child outside marriage. The Imam was generally held to be inclined to take the view generally held by the majority of the public opinion. An example of this was that incident when the leaders and '*ulamá*' wanted to postpone the attack on Muscat, which was decided upon to take place in January 1915. However, the opinion of the majority of the people, who desired immediate attack, was adopted.

It is noteworthy to add that one characteristic of the members of Council was that they generally respected the views of the Imam, even if his views were different from theirs or contrary to their desires, in spite of the fact that there existed no clear-cut system of organisation governing the process of decision-making, either through a majority or minority rule, nor in the way deliberations and discussions were conducted. Nonetheless, the Council adopted a system of presenting the issues which needed to be discussed by the Imam or one of the members, then the Council decided from among such issues the ones which most urgently called for discussion, according to their importance.

2) The Administrative System

a) Wális and Qádis

Oman is naturally divided into several provinces, each of which is in turn divided into a number of *Wiláyát* (sin. *Wiláyah*), each *Wiláyah* administered by a Wálí who runs the affairs of his *Wiláyah*, as far as the maintenance of security and the enforcement of *Sharí'ah* are concerned. The Wálí acts on behalf of the Imam or the Sultan. Moreover, each *Wiláyah* is also headed by a Qádí who is responsible for judicial matters, *Sharí'ah* and *fatwas*, and all that concern religious law, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and guardianship of orphans. This is a system accepted and generally agreed upon since the early days of Islam. Imam Sálím, as may be expected, followed this system virtually unchanged, save that he very often combined the two posts of Wálí and Qádí in one and the same person. Examples of such combination were the appointments of Sh. Sulţán b. Muḥammad al-Ḥabsí, Wálí and Qádí of al-Muḍaybí; Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí at Bahlà; Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ghábish al-Nawfalí at Ibrá'; Sh. Sayf b. Ḥamad al-Aghbarí at Wádí Dimá wa al-Ṭa'yyín and Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálím al-Ruqayshí at Izkí.

It is noteworthy to observe that Imam Sálím did not resort to such combination unless he was very sure that the person chosen was a capable and trustworthy man who could administer the *Wiláyah*, both politically and religiously. There was yet another important determining factor, which was the cutting down of expenditures.

The Imam used to consult his advisors when he wanted to appoint a person, asking their opinions concerning the candidate for posts before issuing the decree of appointment. The decrees which the Imam used to issue for the appointment of Wális fell into two types: either authorizing him with unlimited powers, or giving him restricted powers. Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálímí has preserved for us in his Nahḍat al-'Áyán two documents as examples of appointment decrees; the first was for the appointment of Sh. Muḥammad al-Ruqayshí on 25th Sha'bán 1335 (23), and the second was that of the appointment of the author himself, Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálímí as Wálí on al-Muḍaybí, dated 28th Rajab 1337 (24). The appointment decree of Sh. Muḥammad al-Ruqayshí reads as follows:

“ This is the authorization of the Imam al-Muslimín, Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúsf to his ‘Ámil (Wálf) Muhammad b. Sálím b. Záhír al-Ruqayshí on Izkí and its surroundings (25), thereon acting on our [Imam] behalf in the observance of the right (Amr bi al-Ma‘rúf) and forbidding sinfulness (Nahí ‘An al-Munkar); on the observance and maintenance of justice, siding with the aggrieved against the aggressor in fairness and justice, maintaining justice for the weak against the powerful by force of law, and to advise in his Wiláyah such as did Muhammad (prayer and peace be upon him) to advise his Ummah, to punish the criminal, as did the ‘Ámil of the early Imams before him punish the transgressor without leniency in the matter, to collect *zakát* from those of the rich able to pay it, and to levy it according as to the Imam may see to, and apportioning the part due for *Bayt al-Mál*, according to the ideal set by the predecessors, the implementation and execution of the Imam’s instructions, setting such rules as the Imam sees as general codes adapted to the basic principles of the Qur’án and the Sunnah, and Ijmá’. He should seek, and refer all problematic difficult matters to the ‘ulamá’. This as a decree, affirmed, and authorized. Written under his instruction by his ‘ámil Abú Zayd ‘Abdallah b. Muhammad b. Ruzayq al-Riyámí, by his hand on the day of 25th Sha‘bán 1335” (26).

It is evident that the Imam specified many powers for his Wálf, and clearly laid down for him the programme of policy and action according to the *Sharí‘ah*, though restricting his powers in matters relating to the ways of expending the *zakát*, and expending moneys from the *Bayt al-Mál*, in which he forbade him to act independently without the Imam’s approval.

From this decree, it is evident that the *Sharí‘ah* had to be carried out according to three sources: the Qur’án, the Sunnah and *ijmá‘* (consensus of opinion); and the Imam forbade using the *ra’f* (interpretation) and *qiyás* (analogy) as means of legislation, but that he used to ask the Qádf to refer important matters to the ‘ulamá’ in order to take a collective opinion on such matters. This was also clear in the letter which the Imam sent to Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí, the Qádf of Bahlà exhorting him against the use of *ra’f*.

Other appointment decrees used essentially the same language. However, this did not mean that the Imam gave his Qádis or Wálfis unlimited absolute powers without referring to him, but that the Imam constantly supervised the conduct and performance of his administration, and received all too open-heatedly, complaints raised against his officials and penalised them, such as he did with Sh. Abú Zayd (27).

The responsibilities of the Wálf were to act on behalf of the Imam in the Wiláyah, implement the Imam’s instructions in carrying the people into the right track of Islam,

capture criminals and bringing them to justice, and maintain law, order and general security. Sometimes, the Wálí also undertook the levying of the *zakát* and the *waqf* of the *Bayt al-Mál*, and other the administrative, political and economic responsibilities.

The Qáđí, on the other hand, was responsible for religious and social matters, such as the settlement of disputes, supervision of *waqfs*, appointment of guardians to orphans, performance of *fatwas*, and concluding marriage contracts. He also undertook teaching, as did Sh. Májid al-‘Abrí, Sh. ‘Āmir al-Máلكí, Sh. Abú Zayd, Sh. Abú ‘Ubayd Ḥamad al-Sulaymí, and Sh. Náşir al-Kharúşí, and many others. A Qáđí candidate had to have certain qualities to qualify for the post. These included justice and commanding complete knowledge of the Qur’án and Sunnah, knowledge of the interpretation of the *Salaf* as premise for consensus, and ability to exercise his own judgement in controversial matters.

Routine work was performed in *barzah* or public reception, attended by both the Wálí and Qáđí in the same place and with a big congregation of other people. The *barzah*, was usually conducted in two sessions. The first session ended at the *zuhr* prayer time; the other covered the time between the *‘aşr* and *maghrib* prayers.

In the preceding chapters, we have seen how the Imam came to extend his control and authority over certain regions in Oman which numbered about 17 Wiláyahs, distributed as follows:-

- 1) The Interior Province: Bahlà, al-Ḥamrá’, Nazwà, Manaḥ, Adm, Izkí, and Samá’il.
- 2) The Western ^{and} Eastern Ḥajar Provinces: al-Rustáq, al-‘Awábí, Nakhal, Wádí al-Ma‘áwil, Bidbid and Dimá wa Wádí al-Ṭa’iyyín.
- 3) The Sharqiyyah Province: Ibrá’, al-Qábil, Badiyyah, and al-Muḍaybí.

The Imam appointed Wális and Qáđis over those Wiláyát, since these came under his effective authority. The following table gives the names of the Wiláyát and their respective Wális:-

Wiláyát	Wálí
Adm	Sd. Zahrán b. Mubáarak b. Aḥmad al-Bú Sa'ídí (d. 1354/1935)
al-'Awábí	Sh. Náşir b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúşí (d. 1362/1943) Sh. Sa'íd b. Ḥamad al-Kharúşí
Badiyyah	Sd. Hilál b. 'Alí b. Badr al-Bú Sa'ídí (d.1361/1942) Sd. Muḥammad b. Sulaymán b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa'ídí (d. 1353/1934)
Bahlà	Sh. Náşir b. Ḥumayd b. Ráshid al-Gháfirí (d. 1348/1929) Sh. Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh b. Muḥammad al-Riyámí (d.1364/1944)
Bidbid
Dimá Wa Wádí al-Ta'íyyín	Sh. Sayf b. Ḥamad b. Shíkhán al-Aghbarí (d. 1380/1960)
al-Ḥamrá'	Sh. Muhanná b. Ḥamad b. Muḥsin al-'Abrí (d. 1342/1923)
'Ibrá'	Sh. Sulaymán b. Sanán b. Ghuşn al-'Alawí (d. 1356/1937) Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ghábish al-Nawfalí (d.1339/1921)
Izkí	Sh. Ḥamdán b. Sulaymán b. Sayf al-Nabhání Sh. Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálím al-Ruqayshí (d.1387/1967)
Manah	Sh. Sálím b. Badr b. Hilál al-Hiná'í (d. 1372/1953) Sh. Khálid b. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná'í (d.1372/1954)
al-Muḍaybí	Sd. Sálím b. Sayf b. Sa'íd al-Bú Sa'ídí Sh. Aḥmad b. Sulayym b. al-Murr al-'Uraymí (d. 1336/1918) Sh. Sulṭán b. Muḥammad b. Rashíd al-Ḥabsí Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Sálímí (d. 1406/1986) Sh. Sulaymán b. Sanán b. Ghuşn al-'Alawí (d. 1356/1937) Sh. Su'úd b. Ḥumayd b. Khulayfín (d. 1373/1953)
Nakhal	Sh. Náşir b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúşí Sh. Sayf b. Háshim al-Riyámí
Nazwà	Sh. Májid b. Khamís al-'Abrí (deputy of the Imam in 1913-14) Sh. 'Āmir b. Khamís al-Málikí, (deputy of the Imam) Sd. Su'úd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál al-Bú Sa'ídí (deputy of the Imam) Sh. 'Abdalláh b. 'Āmir al-'Azrí (deputy of the Imam in 1920)
al-Qábil	Sh. 'Isà b. Şáliḥ b. 'Alí al-Ḥáarithí (d. 1365/1946)
al-Rustáq	Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhim al-Bú Sa'ídí (d. 1401/1981) Sh. Náşir b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúşí
Samá'il	Sd. Su'úd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál al-Bú Sa'ídí (d. 1337/1918) Sh. Muḥammad b. Ráshid al-Kharúşí
Wádí al-Ma'áwil	Sh. Náşir b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúşí

As for the Qādis of the Imam, the following table gives their names against their respective Wiláyah:-

Wiláyát	Qādis
Adm	Sh. Zahrán b. Mubáarak b. Aḥmad al-Bú Sa'ídí (d. 1354/1935)
al-'Awábí	Sh. Náşir b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúşí (d. 1362/1943)
Badiyyah	Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ghábish al-Nawfalí (d. 1339/1920)
Bahlà	Sh. Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh b. Muḥammad al-Riyámí (d.1364/1944)
Bidbid	Sh. Sálím b. Furaysh b. Sa'íd al-Shámisí
Dimá Wa Wádí al-Ta'íyyín	Sh. Sayf b.Ḥamad b. Shíkhán al-Aghbarí (d. 1380/1960)
al-Ḥamrá'	Sh. Májid b. Khamís b. Ráshid al-'Abrí (d. 1346/1927)
'Ibrá'	Sh. Sulaymán b. Sanán b. Ghuşn al-'Alawí (d. 1356/1937) Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ghábish al-Nawfalí (d. 1339/1920) Sh. 'Abdalláh b. 'Āmir al-'Azrí (1358/1939) Sh. Sulaymán b. Ḥámid b. Jamí' al-Baráshidí
Izkí	Sh. Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh al-Riyámí Sh. Náşir b. 'Āmir b. Sulaymán al-Riyámí (d. 1336/1917) Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálím al-Ruqayshí (d. 1387/1967)
Manah	Sh. Zahrán b. Mubáarak b. Aḥmad al-Bú Sa'ídí (d. 1354/1935) Sh. Qaswar b. Ḥumúd b. Háshil al-Ráshidí (d.1360/1941)
al-Muḍaybí	Sd. Sálím b. Sayf b. Sa'íd al-Bú Sa'ídí (d.1345/1926) Sh. Sultán b. Muḥammad b. Rashíd al-Ḥabsí Sh. Su'úd b. Ḥumayd b. Khulayfín (d. 1373/1953)
Nakhal	Sh. Sayf b. Aḥmad b. Sulaymán al-Kindí (d. 1337/1919)
Nazwà	Sh. Májid b. Khamís al-'Abrí Sh. 'Āmir b. Khamís al-Málikí Sh. Sálím b. Ḥamad b. Sa'íd al-Baráshidí (d. 1371/1951) Sh. Sulaymán b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Kindí (d. 1337/1919) Sh. 'Abdalláh b. 'Āmir al-'Azrí
al-Qábil	Sh. 'Isà b. Şálih al-Ḥáarithí (d. 1365/1946) Sh. Sálím b. Muḥammad al-Ḥáarithí
al-Rustáq	Sh. Ráshid b. Sayf b. Ráshid al-Lamkí (d. 1333/1915) Sh. Sa'íd b. Şálih b. Ráshid al-'Abrí (d. 1340/1921)
Samá'il	Sh. Abú 'Ubayd Ḥamad b. 'Ubayd al-Sulaymí (d. 1390/1970)
Wádí al-Ma'áwil	Sh. 'Alí b. Náşir al-Yahmadí

The name of the same Wálí may appear in more than one Wiláyah, the reason being that these Wális may have been transferred from one Wiláyah to the other.

However, this explanation does not apply to Nazwà and al-Muḍaybí. In the former case, the Wálí was in the position of the Imam's deputy and the head of Qádis at the same time, such as Sh. 'Amir al-Málikí and Sh. 'Abdalláh al-'Azrí. The latter Wiláyah was the largest of all in Oman, and had three centres, al-Muḍaybí, Samad and Sanáw; the Imam appointed a Wálí for each district, and they conjointly administered the Wiláyah (28).

We also see that the names of more than one Qádí appear in more than one Wiláyah. This does not mean that the Imam appointed two Qádis in the same Wiláyah, but that one Qádí worked in the Wiláyah and then transferred to another with the exception of Nazwà where there was more than one Qádí. This is why we see the repetition of names, as for example the name of Sd. Zahrán al-Bú Sa'ídí, Qádí of Adam, who had also worked in Manaḥ, as he was also one of the Wálís who assumed office of Wálí of Adm.

However, there are some Qádis whose Wiláyát we do not know. It is likely that this group of Qádis were closely attached to the Imam and were responsible for reviewing big and important cases and acting as Qádis of Appeal. These Qádis were as follows:-

1. Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí (who became Imam after Imam Sálím's death).
2. Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ráshid b. Şálih al-Háshimí.
3. Sh. Muḥammad b. Humúd b. Şálih al-Şawwáfí (d.1364/1944).
4. Sh. Muḥammad b. Shámis b. 'Adaí al-Ruwáhí.
5. Sh. Muḥammad b. Sulaymán b. Májid al-Kharúsfí (d. 1351/1932).
6. Sh. Thábit b. Surúr b. Aḥmad al-Ghálíbí

It is important to note that Sh. al-Sálimí was first Qádí to the Imam, and when he died on 5th Rabí' I, 1332, the Imam called for a general meeting to appoint a general Qádí as successor to Sh. al-Sálimí, and Sh. 'Amir b. Khamís al-Málikí was elected to become the chief of Qádis to the Imamate, and acted as Imam's deputy in Nazwà, as may be seen from the tables above. When Sh. al-Málikí fell from the Imam's favour, towards the latter days of ^{the} Imam's reign, Sh. al-Málikí's position was held by Sh. 'Abdalláh b. 'Ámir al-'Azrí. Moreover, towards the latter days of the Imam there were many men who were qualified to assume the office of Qádis as a result of the Imam's concern for education and learning, as we will show below. At this time, the Imam surrounded himself with a

big number of the '*ulamá*' who declined to assume the office of Qádis, and preferred to work in education instead, like the scholar Khalfán b. Jumayyil al-Siyábí, Sh. Muḥammad b. Shíkhán al-Sálimí and Sh. Ḥámid b. Náṣir al-Nazawí.

b) Clerks and Officialdom

One of the requirements of state administration was an efficient clerical pool to help the Wálí or Qádí or the Imam himself in the operation of record writing and keeping. As mentioned above, the Imam adopted a simple system of administration, and accordingly, there were no offices to keep records and documents, except on a very limited scale, especially pertaining to financial matters. The clerical pool comprised different types of clerks, i.e. clerks of letters, clerks of the judiciary, clerks of the *zakát*, clerks of the market, clerks of the *awqáf*, clerks of *Bayt al-Mál*, and clerks of the Afláj. These clerks were either permanent employees who received regular salaries, or worked on a temporary basis, as clerks of the *zakát* who receive their fixed assigned share from the *zakát* they collected. These usually formed a large group, largely composed from the village people who had a thorough knowledge of the people and their properties and how to collect the *zakát*. In addition to these, the Imam had special clerks who collected the *zakát* after it had been levied from the rich, and then deposited it in *Bayt al-Mál*.

Government letters clerks, on the other hand, were found in all government Wiláyát, helping the Wálí in issuing government letters. As for the Imam's letters and his decrees of appointment of Wális and Qádis, all those letters which came to us were written under his direct instructions, bearing the following names:

1. Sh. al-Málikí.
2. Sh. Naṣir al-Kharúṣí.
3. Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí.
4. Sh. Muḥammad al-Khalílí
5. Sh. Muḥammad al-Ṣawwáfí.
6. Sh. Manṣúr al-Fárisí
7. Sh. 'Isà b. Ṣálih al-Ḥáarithí
8. Sh. Sa'íd b. Sayf.

Such letters, issued under the instruction of the Imam, usually ended with the phrase: “written by (the hand of.....). The Imam of Muslims certified it to be true with his own hand”.

It remains to be explained why the Imam used to ask his advisors to write such letters. There can be two reasons for this. The first is that the Imam wanted indirectly to let them know of the contents of such letters, of course after their consultation. The second reason is that these advisers were learned people who were versed in the art of writing. However, over and above these considerations, the present researcher observes that the Imam’s letters can generally be arranged under two subjects: the first are the letters dealing with important matters such as the political letters which were usually written by Sh. al-Sálimí, Sh. al-Málikí, Sh. al-Khalílí and the Imam’s brother, Sh. Náşir for their wording. The other type of the letters was written by anyone present from among those whose names are mentioned above, though a certain hierarchy can be discerned, as for example, Sh. Abú Zayd came first before Sh. Muḥammad al-Khalílí, and Sh. al-Khalílí was before the rest.

As for the clerks of Wális and Qádis, they specialised in writing contracts, applications and complaints between people, *nafaqát*, and inheritance wills, etc., to the extent that each Wálí and Qádí had at least one clerk or more as needs demanded.

In fact, we lack knowledge of the names of those who formed the clerical pool, due to the fact that there existed no offices set especially for them, through in our close investigation into this matter, we met an old man of over 90 years of age named Ghuşn b. Shámis al-Sayfí, who told us that his father, then his brother, had been responsible for the collection of the *zakát* during Imam Sálim’s reign and his successor (29). This man narrated that he had always accompanied his father. We also asked him some further questions concerning the tradition of inheriting the post of clerks, upon which we came to the conclusion that there apparently existed no school which instructed young men in the arts of administration and economics, and that fathers instructed and initiated their sons in the field of his specialisation from early childhood, consequently they gained practical knowledge without the need for theoretical instruction. This process largely explains the

phenomenon of inheriting posts in the field of Afláj, *zakát* collection, or other fields of administration and practical life.

The Imam used to issue decrees when appointing his officials, in which he clearly specified the duties and responsibilities for the Wálí deputies and other officials. And it is useful that Sh Muḥammad al-Sálimí has preserved us in his Nahḍah, the Imam's decree on the author's appointment as Wálí in conjunction with Sh. Sulaymán b. Sanán al-'Alawí in which he mentioned:

1. The author's appointment as Wálí on al-Muḍaybí
2. Sh. Su'úd b. Ḥumayd b. Khulayfín as clerk of contracts.
3. Sh. Faḍil b. Su'úd al-Sálimí
4. Háshim b. Ráshid, responsible for the police.
5. Muḥammad b. Sa'íd al-Jábirí, collector of the *zakát*.
6. The salaries of his above staff.

The Imam also used to appoint some knowledgeable men to supervise the *awqáf*, either private or public, i.e. mosques, *Bayt al-Mál*, the guest houses, the grave-yards, etc. For instance, he assigned to Sh. Khalfán b. Jumayyil al-Siyábí, in his early days the responsibility of supervising the *awqáf* of the village of Síma', one of the villages of Izkí and Sh. Náşir b. Mus'úd al-Ma'marí as the *awqáf* of 'Ibrá'. Similarly, he appointed Ibráhím b. Muḥammad al-Sayfí to be responsible for the *Bayt al-Mál* in Nazwà.

It was a necessary pre-requisite for those who assumed these offices to command a good knowledge of religious matters, as well as the knowledge of reading and writing, as a matter of course. Moreover, the clerks of the Wálí and Qáđí in addition to the aforementioned knowledge, needed a further qualification, namely good "penmanship".

c) Regular Defence Forces

i. The Army

At the beginning, the Ibáđiyyah created and organized an army, but from the second Imamate, they refused to establish a professional army. Their argument was based on two considerations: (a) the Imam should not be able to use the army against the people; (b) it was the responsibility of the Ummah to defend the community and its religion (30).

These ideas had led to the defeat of Ibáđí Imamates by their opponents. In the modern age the Ibáđiyyah realized the necessity of organizing the army in order to defend the country. This was clear in the policy of the Ya'áribah Imamate who faced Portuguese colonialism.

Imam Sálím, it should be emphasized, did not build a regular army, but he relied on tribesmen loyal to him, on consideration that everybody is responsible for defending his country and the principles of the Imamate. Therefore the Imam was keen to mobilise his followers, appealing to their religious sentiment and zeal. It might have been more appropriate for the Imam to have built a regular army, especially since he was facing the strong regular army of the Sultan supported and equipped by the British. For his lack of such a regular army, the Imam sought military help from the Imam of Yemen and the Turkish leader there. It is difficult to find a convincing explanation why the Imam did not build his own regular army. The only possible explanation that could be found is that the Imam relied on the tribes who were not used to military discipline and order and did not take the army as a professional career, but fought wars in their traditional way of military organisation. When war was over, every one returned to his homeland and resumed his usual work. But this is not to suggest that the Imam did not have a permanent stand-by force. There are, in fact, some stories which relate that there were some people who spent longer periods of time closely attached to the Imam and called themselves *Shurá'*, and considered themselves as *Murábīṭūn* in the cause of God (31).

It should be also said that the Imam relied greatly on the followers of Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náṣir al-Nabhání, the *tamímah* of the B. Gháfir, who at some stage undertook to provide some thousand men, should circumstances demand. Similarly, the Imam received help from Sh. 'Isà al-Ḥáarithí and the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná'í. As such, the largest army ever which was thus being built for the Imam was the one deployed at al-Waṭayyah battle in January, 1915, numbering about three thousand men. In comparison, the Imam's army at the fall of Nazwà, is not precisely known in number, but all indicators suggest that it was large enough, on evidence that the captives from the army of Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad, the Wálí of Nazwà, numbered a thousand captives (32). This large number of captives from the rival army testifies implicitly that the Imam's army was much

larger in numbers. On the other hand, his troops at the time when he seized Samá'il numbered two thousand men (33).

From what has been said above, it can be inferred that the Imam did not have a regular standing army, but he relied on the tribes to provide him with men to defend the country and religion, and they were socially obliged to do so, and were motivated by religious and national considerations. At the same time, there had always been a small force who voluntarily remained around the Imam and called themselves "*al-Shuráh*" or "*al-Murábítín*", who surrounded the Imam, taking turns in duty for a specific time. This was a voluntary action and not an official duty. The Imam took the advantage of using this stand-by force in emergency situations in patrolling the inlets and outlets leading in and out of the main towns. It helped the Imam until the time came when he was able to raise a sufficiently large army. However, this small force which was attached to the Imam varied in numbers, such that at times it reached about 400 men, but never fell below 100 men at any one time.

ii. Police and Body-guards (*'Askar*)

Both the police and bodyguard personnel are called "*'Askar*". However, the duties of each of the two differed in significant respects. The police were responsible for guarding public places, such as the forts, the markets, and the strategic sites, as well as the resolution and settlement of disputes which occurred among the people. The police also helped the Wálís and Qádis in implementing the laws, capture of thieves and criminals, execution of punitive penalties, enforcement of reward and punishment, management of prisons, etc. On the other hand, the duties of the body-guard was confined to the Imam's personal safety, and it was the responsibility of the Wálís to see to their rest and comfort, night and day.

There were some other differences between the two institutions. The *'Askar*, on the one hand, was found in every Wiláyah, and the headman of the *'Askar* was known as "*Aqíd al-'Askar*". We have seen that the Imam appointed Háshim b. Ráshid as head of *'Askar* in al-Muḍaybí. The *'Askar*, as a regular force, had fixed salaries, as mentioned in the decree of appointment of Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí, which clearly specified the

salaries of the *'Askar*. There were \$MT. five per month for the *'Askarí* and \$MT. 12 for the *'Aqíd*.

The Imam's body-guards were 'Abdalláh b. Muḥammad al-Ma'walí and his brother, Málík b. Muḥammad and Sálím b. Bashayr, the servant of the Imam himself. This latter was the Imam's bodyguard when he was killed in the village of al-Khadrá'. The other body-guard, besides Sálím b. Bashayr, was a man from al-Khadrá'.

From this account, we conclude that there was a police or *'Askar* institution besides the Imam's personal body-guard, and that they received fixed monthly salaries, and that they were responsible for maintaining the general law and order in public places, patrolling over government buildings and managing the prisons. The size of the *'Askar* force in the towns was usually decided according to the importance of the town and the size of its population, in addition to the extent of loyalty of the inhabitants to the Imam.

3) Education

Imam Sálím showed special concern for education. The evidence attesting to such a big concern for education was that the Imam built schools and encouraged fathers to send their children to schools. Every village or town had at ^{at} least one school in which students learnt the basic principles of reading and writing, and in which the learning of the Qur'án formed the basis of the whole learning process

Quranic schools were a necessary step toward becoming educated. These schools were located in specially built places, through at some times of the year were held simply in an open space under a tree. A typical class contained anything from twenty to fifty students, varying in age from six to fourteen. The teacher (*Mu'allim*) usually gave each student a verse or set of verses to read for the day and recite in front of the students. There were no formal levels of education in Quranic schools (34).

The education at the village-school level ended when the student had completed learning the Qur'án, and had knowledge of the principles of performing the prayers, and the fasting of Ramaḍán, besides commanding reading and writing skills. Then, those of the students who still had the desire for further learning, for higher education, went to schools in big towns in their respective Wiláyah, such as Nazwà, al-Rustáq, Samá'il, al-Qábil, al-Muḍaybí, etc., where a student received adequate academic education which

qualified him to become a Qáđí or a teacher in these schools. Teaching was considered the most important profession at that time, in view of the state's need for such qualifications.

Imam Sálím also had great concern for higher education, to the extent that he facilitated the means for such education for both students and teachers alike, in terms of food, drink and housing. For these purposes, he brought teachers from the villages to the towns, and gave them fixed salaries, while the students were given free accommodation in students' hostels, in which the basic needs were provided. It needs to be recognized that higher education would naturally require a learned professional class of '*ulamá*' and Qáđis who were well versed in learning, usually in one specialist subject or more, such as *nahw* (grammar), *şarf* (conjugation), *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), etc.

In general, possession of a culturally valued cognitive style (35), "a set of basic, deeply interiorized master-putters" of language and thought on the basis of which other learning was subsequently acquired, distinguished men of learning as a social category from other persons (36).

In general, possession of a culturally valued cognitive style (35), according to Eickelman, "a set of basic, jurisprudence, biographies, interpretation (*tafsír*) of the Qur'án and the Ḥadíth. In addition to these basic subjects, the students were also instructed in arithmetic, astronomy, geography, history and poetry (37).

In sum, it could be said that the Imam laid strong foundations of education in his state, and encouraged students to acquire learning. In his enthusiasm and great efforts to promote education, Imam Sálím was no doubt influenced by the letter of Sh. Abú Muslim Náşir b. Sálím al-Ruwáhí (d. 1920 in Zanzibar), which he sent to the Imam on 13 Rabí' II, 1333, in seventeen pages in which he proposed to Imam Sálím to encourage education, even if this meant forcing those in charge of government to do so (pp. 9-10). Sh. Abú Muslim went on to explain why he so strongly encouraged education, as he also asked him to set up a publishing house to publish books about Oman, in order to facilitate and propagate knowledge (38).

It seems that this letter found its way to the Imam's heart and therefore he did encourage education, and brought cartographers to copy books when it was not possible

to print them at that time, as he lacked the necessary financial means, as we have mentioned above.

Because of the Imam's strong commitment to and encouragement of education, we see in the decade following his death a good number of learned '*ulamá*' who formed the necessary cadres on whom the education and training of the government personnel of Imam al-Khalílí ultimately depended. Also the Sultan, Sd. Sa'íd b. Taymúr (r. 1932-1970) came to depend on these cadres in the judiciary and the administration. It was obvious that each one of the '*ulamá*' undertook to educate, guide and instruct a number of students and prepare them for the future assumption of such posts (39).

It would be difficult to say with any certainty, how many Qádis got their education and learning under the Qádis of the Imam and in his schools. The following table gives the names of some of the teachers who assumed education posts in the main centres:-

Wiláyah	Mu'allim (Teacher)
al-'Awábí	Sh. Náşir b. Ráshid b. Sulaymán al-Kharúşí
Bahlà	Sh. Abú Zayd 'Abdalláh b. Muḥammad al-Riyámí
Bidbid	Sh. Sálim b. Furaysh b. Sálim al-Shámisí
al-Ḥamrá'	Sh. Májid b. Khamís al-'Abrí Sh. al-Murr b. Sálim b. Sa'íd al-Ḥaḍramí (d.1336/1917-8)
Izkí	Sh. Náşir b. 'Ámir b. Sulaymán al-Riyámí (d. 1336/1917-8) Sh. Muḥammad b. Sálim b. Záhir al-Ruqayshí Sh. Sa'íd b. 'Abdalláh b. Náşir al-Maḥrúqí(d. 1336/1917-8)
Manah	Sh. Nuşír b. Náşir b. 'Isà al-Bú Sa'ídí (d. 1375/1955)
al-Muḍaybí	Sh. Su'úd b. Ḥumayd b. Khulayfín (d. 1373/1953)
Nakhal	Sh. Khalfán b. Jumayyl al-Siyábí (d. 1392/1972)
Nazwà	Sh. Ḥámid b. Náşir al-Nazawí Sh. 'Ámir b. Khamís al-Málikí Sh. Sálim b. Sayf b. Sulaymán al- Bú Sa'ídí (d.1395?1975) Sh. Sulaymán b. Sálim al-Kindí Sh. 'Abdalláh b. 'Ámir al-'Azrí
al-Rustáq	Sh. Ráshid b. Sayf b. Ráshid al-Lamkí (d.1333/1915) Sh. Muḥammad b. Shíkhán al-Sálimí (d.1346/1928)
Samá'il	Sh. Abú 'Ubayd Ḥamad b. 'Ubayd al-Salímí (d.1390/1971) Sh. Muḥsin b. Musallam al-Ramaḍání

In general, it is evident that Imam Sálim laid the foundations for education in Oman during his reign. We see that old schools were rehabilitated by means of financial allocations from *the awqáf* money earmarked for education, and books were made available for them by means of copying and printing them, as also sometimes students themselves were asked to copy them in return for of a small sum of money. The students themselves became active and motivated to copy books. Consequently, we see that places like Nazwà, Bahlà, Samá'il, al-Rustáq became important centres of education in Oman.

4) The Economic and Financial System

The main themes in this section are to understand the Imam's sources of revenue, and the manner in which the government financial resources accruing from the revenue were expended on the government expenditure and as salaries to the government's personnel. It needs to be noted that at this time, the financial situation in Oman had deteriorated precipitously since the death of Sd. Sa'íd b. Sulṭán (d. 1856). This was in spite of the fact that Oman had become at the time "a first-rate Asiatic maritime power" (40). In addition, Imam Sálim's government had no access to the Omani ports, since these were under the Sultan's control.

The situation had been compounded by the fact that the Indian Ocean and its surroundings came under the control of the British navy, who extended their Maritime military power and exercised such power over all navigation and vessels passing through it. The British thus became the self-appointed sea masters, patrolling the Indian Ocean waters, policing and investigating all navigation activities, sometimes under the banner of stamping out the slave trade, at others under the pretence of checking arms trafficking. This British subversive role in the Indian Ocean waters naturally weakened the flow of the Omani trade. Moreover, the relative state of stability in Oman which had not been witnessed in the second half of the 19th century due to the many revolts, most importantly those of 1878, 1884 and 1895, was an additional factor which further contributed to the general state of decline.

Another important factor was that trade was mostly held in the hands of non-Omanis (Banián and luwátiyyah) (41) who exercised complete control over trade activities

and channels and were very sensitive to international prices, especially when Oman was in a currency crisis in the late 19th century (42) which deeply affected them.

From the above account we want to try to answer the questions: were the Imam's territories affected by this general weakness of the Omani economic crisis, and were they affected by the fluctuations in the international economic environment and prices?

In answering these questions, Landen has confirmed, and it was corroborated by Speece, that Oman was much affected generally, but that adverse effects were much less felt in the regions of the Interior (43). Speece observes that "to be sure, the Interior was relatively immune from the situation on the coast. Its economy was still based upon subsistence agriculture, which was affected very little by the international economic system" (44).

This statement by Speece contains some truth, if we recognize that as a rule agriculture was the backbone of the Interior Omani economy. However, it is not the whole truth, since Oman in its long history has thrived in wealth and prosperity through its trade across the seas. But, during the period under discussion, outside trade had been hit by recession, if not total collapse. On the other hand, the main source of income for the people of the Interior was agricultural products, which in turn were affected by the imposition of high taxes levied by the Sultan. This last resort represented the card which the Sultan used to pressurise the Imam and his followers.

a) Revenues

Before discussing the sources of income for *Bayt al-Mál*, for Imam Sálím, it is necessary first to state that Imam Sálím and his followers, at the time of their first meeting in Tanúf, the centre of Sh. Ĥimyar al-Nabhání, had only a sum of \$M.T. 300, in the possession of Sh. al-Sálímí, who borrowed it from Maṭar b. Ĥumúdah al-Ĥajrí, a man from Badiyyah (45).

As we have seen earlier, Sh. Ĥimyar al-Nabhání undertook to provide the Imam's army with some thousand armed men at his own expense. By the fall of Nazwà and Manaḥ, the Imam took hold of the *Bayt al-Mál* in both towns, in addition to the properties confiscated, that is those of the Wálí of Nazwà, Sd. Sayf b. Ĥamad, and the properties of the Sultan found in Manaḥ and Nazwà. Among the properties of *Bayt al-Mál* were the

gardens of Ruwayshah and the properties of *Bayt Sulayṭ* (46). Thus, once a town or village was surrendered to the Imam, the properties of *Bayt al-Mál* were surrendered, too (47). The properties of *Bayt al-Mál* came from the following sources:-

i. *Waqf* (pl. *Wuqúfat* or *Awqáf*)

These included lands, estates and gardens, which were the properties of *Bayt al-Mál* (48), and were registered to it either through direct personal bequests from charitable individuals, or through purchase for *Bayt al-Mál*, under which came *awqáf* like mosques, schools, grave-yards. There were also *awqáf* concerning road maintenance, Ramaḍán breakfast, and the copy of books. Besides these forms, Eickelman also mentions, "... for one village near Hamra [al-Ḥamrá'], the provision of coffee to every male villager in the guest house at mid-morning" (49).

The *Sharí'ah* regulations and laws about how to expend the revenues coming from these *awqáf* had always been clear. Nonetheless, there were some breaches by Imam Sálím, in that he earmarked some of these resources to be expended on the preparations of the army. Mention has already been made in this context of the conflict that arose between Sh. Májid al-'Abrí and Sh. al-Sálímí concerning the *awqáf* of the grave-yards. The conflict arose when Sh. al-Sálímí proposed the sale of these *awqáf* in order to cover the government expenditures, a proposal rejected and opposed by Sh. Májid on grounds that it was not permissible to reallocate the revenues of *awqáf* to projects other than what they had been set to serve.

ii. *Zakát*

Zakát is the basis of Islamic fiscal policy. It is one of the five Pillars of Islam, the others being belief in one God and that Muḥammad is the prophet of God, prayer, the fast of Ramaḍán, and pilgrimage to Mecca. In each category of wealth, *zakát* is paid by the people whose holdings exceed a certain minimum called *niṣáb* (50).

The types of property and wealth on which *zakát* is payable when reaching the *Niṣáb* (certain level) are:-

1. *Zakát* on animals (camels, cattle, sheep, goats)
2. *Zakát* on money (paper notes, coin money)
3. *Zakát* on precious metals (gold, silver, etc.)

4. *Zakát* on trade

5. *Zakát* on fruits (dates, peaches, fruits, etc.)

6. *Zakát* on grains (rice, wheat, barley, etc.)

iii. Taxes

Taxes are different from the *zakát* with respect to the religious status of the former and also in quantity. Taxes are impositions from the state in return for providing services to the people and the maintenance of public utilities. The quantities of taxes depend on the types and quality of services provided.

Taxes were collected from commercial and estate enterprises, and on trading activities in the markets, on factories, sometimes on roads and also on cafés and restaurants etc. Taxes were estimated between 5% and 10%. However, during the reign of Imam Sálím, taxes were restricted to commercial enterprises, to commodities traded in the markets, whether these be food products, or fabrics or other.

iv. *Ṣadaqát* (alms) and *Hibát* (gifts)

In addition to the aforementioned sources of revenue for *Bayt al-Mál*, there were also the *ṣadaqát* and *hibát* which were donated by charitable individuals at will and of their own accord, with the intention of helping the State meet its obligations. These individual contributions were usually sums of liquid money or in kind. This form of revenue was conspicuous during the reign of Imam Sálím, as *Bayt al-Mál* was in chronic deficit in its resources.

It is informative that Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálímí provided us with two examples of donations; the first was that of Sh. Ḥamad b. Sa'íd b. Aḥmad al-Ma'walí who undertook from his own resources the entire expenses of preparations of the army which attacked Wádí al-Ma'áwil in 1332/1914 (51). The other example of donation was that of Sh. Muḥammad b. Ṭálib b. Muḥammad al-Ḥarráṣí (d. 1335/1917), who in his own capacity undertook the expense of preparing the army which attacked al-Rustáq in 1335/1917 (52). There was, however, another type, exemplified by some charitable individuals who donated sums of money to the Imam. This is understood from Sh. Sa'íd b. Ḥamad al-Ḥáarithí's account that his father Ḥamad b. Sulaymán and his uncle, Muḥammad b. Sulaymán (53) both met Imam Sálím who offered them grapes, and asked them to eat

them, and he told them that, “it was not from *Bayt al-Mál*, but from the bounty of some brothers who gave us some *Daráhim* (54) with which we brought these grapes”(55).

These were the sources of the *Bayt al-Mál* during the reign of Imam Sálím. It should be noted that each Wiláyah had its *Bayt al-Mál*, and that the revenues levied from all centres, were collected in Nazwà, the capital of the Imamate, from which cumulative total funds were allocated and expended on the various state departments according to need. However, sometimes the Imam might find it more appropriate to leave the revenue of individual Wiláyah under the discretionary dispensation of their respective Wálí, who also exercised supervision and control over the *awqáf*. We should also mention that the financial director in Nazwà, during Imam Sálím’s reign was Sh. Ibráhím b. Muḥammad al-Sayfí, while Sh. Maṣṣúr b. Náṣir al-Fárisí was director during Imam Muḥammad’s Imamate.

As for the situation in the Wiláyát, we find that Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí was given extraordinary powers in the dispensation of *Bayt al-Mál* moneys; Sh. Muḥammad al-Ruqayshí, on the other hand, was entrusted with supervising the *Bayt al-Mál* in Izkí on grounds of his being the Wálí, though he was not given permission to dispense with the *Bayt al-Mál* resources and money without the Imam’s prior approval. In al-Muḍaybí, it was Sh. Muḥammad b. Sa’íd al-Jábrí who was in charge of the *zakát* collection, but the *awqáf* remained in the hands of the Wálí himself, who in his capacity paid the salaries of his staff from this revenue. With regard to the rest of the Wiláyát, the Imam used to appoint one of his staff for collection of the *zakát* and supervision over the *awqáf* personnel in the village and towns. This did not apply to the Wiláyát which were controlled by their leader, i.e. al-Ḥamrá’, al-Qábil, al-Rustáq, Jabal al-Akhḍar and Bahlà (56).

It has to be acknowledged that, circumscribed by our present state of knowledge, there are a number of questions about the revenues of the *Bayt al-Mál* which still cannot be fully answered. Nothing is known, for example, about how much was the *Bayt al-Mál* share from the *zakát* or from the *awqáf*, or what was the share of each Wiláyah from this revenue, or whether the expenditures actually exceeded revenues, etc. We address the answers to these and similar questions in the following sections.

b) Expenditures

Routinely, the *Bayt al-Mál* resources were gathered in the capital of the Imamate, or in the main centres of the Wiláyah, in order to enable the Imam or his deputy to supervise these revenues. These revenues were set in accordance with the needs of the state. Generally, the money of the *Bayt al-Mál* was spent by the Imam or his representative on public purposes, i.e. defence, *jihád*, and promoting educational and religious institutions. This was in addition to other social services, such as those for orphans, the poor, the elderly, students, and the staff of the state.

However, we lack knowledge about the actual revenue available to *Bayt al-Mál*, which is necessary for an understanding of the nature and composition of the expenditures, in spite of the fact that Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí mentions that military expenditures spent on the preparations of the army which captured Samá'il, amounted to \$MT. 50,000 and 50.000 rounds of ammunition (57). This, of course, did not include the amounts of money paid by Sh. Ḥimyar al-Nabhání and Sh. 'Isà al-Ḥáarithí to their own recruits. It should be pointed out that this sum of money appears too large for the Imamate's financial position at the time, and is obviously indicative that there had been open to the Imamate wider options and alternative means of financial resources, especially of *Bayt al-Mál* in Nazwà where ammunition was also collected. All these resources were collected within the span of only two months from the time of the Imam was elected.

It is possible here to include in *Bayt al-Mál* resources the properties which were been confiscated by the Imam, which included the properties of each of:-

1. Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa'íd (d. 1331/191913) Wálí of Nazwà.
2. Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Náṣir al-Bú Sa'ídí (d. 1347/1928), Wálí of Maṭraḥ.
3. Sd. Muḥammad b. Hilál b. Sa'íd al-Bú Sa'ídí, Wálí of al-Síb.
4. Sh. Ráshid b. Uzayyiz al-Khuṣaybí (d. 1347/1928), the Sultan's Qáḍí
5. Sh. Sulaymán b. 'Abdalláh al-Maḥrúqí, Minister to Sh. Náṣir b. Ḥumayd al-Gháfirí

In fact, we lack knowledge about the exact amount of the Imam's revenue from the *zakát* and *awqáf*, due to the absence of records about this revenue. However, if we shed light on the Sultan's revenue from some of the Wiláyát in the year 1906-1907, now

under the Imam, we find that the revenue of these Wiláyát from the *zakát* and *awqáf* was small. The following table illustrates this according to Lorimer's accounts (58):-

Distract	<i>Zakát</i>	Annual value from date-groves and cultivated land	Total
Bidbid	Nil	2, 500	2, 500
Izkí	1, 600	Nil	1, 600
Manah	0, 400	Nil	0, 400
Nakhhal	1, 200	1, 000	2, 200
Nazwà	3, 000	2, 000	5, 000
Samá'il	2, 400	2, 000	4, 400
Total	8, 600	7, 500	16, 100

The table shows that Samá'il and Nazwà were the leading towns which had the capacity to feed *Bayt al-Mál* with a stable revenue.

It is by no means coincidental that the expenditures of the Imamate greatly exceeded its revenue, and the Imam frequently was forced to borrow in order to cover the costs of his administration. In one instance he delegated Sh. Muḥammad b. Naṣír al-Kharúṣí to seek a loan from one of the wealthy men, in order to balance his financial deficit (59).

Traditionally, the Imam used to have employees who aided him in the administration of the various government departments. These naturally needed fixed salaries to be paid to them, in addition to the expenditures on the preparations of the army, the salaries paid to the police and the guards and the expenditures on development reforms and rehabilitation programmes. However, the Imam and some of his prominent advisors like Sh. al-Málikí, Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí and Sh. al-Ruqayshí did not have fixed salaries, but were given from *Bayt al-Mál* amounts sufficient to meet their essential needs and their families for one day only. This also applied to the Imam's visitors and students, as well as to each of the following Shaykhs who also did not have fixed salaries: Sh. Ḥimyar, Sh. 'Isà, Sh. Muhanná al-'Abrí, Sh. Náṣir al-Gháfirí and Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím. These did not have salaries because the Imam did not interfere with the affairs of

Bayt al-Mál under their supervision, and for that matter they were responsible for the spending on their followers in time of war.

We have already mentioned that the Imam charged Sh. Abú Zayd to supervise the *Bayt al-Mál* in Bahlà. Sh. Abú Zayd lived frugally most of his life, and the cost of half a *Raṭl* [Pound] of meat from *Bayt al-Mál* sufficed for the needs of his household (60). As for the rest of the personnel of the Imamate, i.e. the Wális, Qáḍis, ‘Askarí and clerks were given fixed salaries, which did not exceed \$MT. 50 a month. The following table shows the salaries given to some of the employees:-

No	position	Salary
1	Wáli	Between \$MT. 30 to 50
2	Qáḍí	Between \$MT. 30 to 50
3	Clerk	\$MT. 15
4	Mu‘allim (teacher)	\$MT. 30
5	‘Aqíd al-‘Askar	\$MT. 12
6	‘Askarí	Between \$MT. 5 to 6

There were also the *zakát* collectors, the supervisory staff over the *awqáf*, the markets and the Afláj, who received their pay as a percentage, which ranged between 2.5% and 10%, of the amounts they collected from their respective missions.

In hindsight, it should be mentioned that at that time, the cost of living was generally low, and that the salaries given, in spite of the fact that they were relatively low, were nonetheless sufficient to meet the living expenses of an employee and his family. And as for the currency, the dollar (\$MT) was extremely scarce, and rarely found in circulation; possibly, a person may have possessed only one dollar. Sh. Sa‘íd al-Ḥáarithí cited as an example that Sa‘íd b. Jum‘ah al-Masrúrí was appointed guard of one of the towers in al-Muḍayrib (61) in return for a payment of only \$MT. one per month, and this amount was sufficient to support him and his brothers (62). Another example, mentioned by Sh. Sayf b. Sa‘íd al-Ma‘walí was that Imam Sálím earmarked to Sd. Su‘úd b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa‘ídí a monthly salary of \$MT.50. Sd. Su‘úd was Wáli of Samá’il, and one day he went to meet the Imam in al-‘Awábí and asked him to reduce his salary to \$MT. 30, on grounds that \$MT. 30 was sufficient to support him and his family, and therefore, the excess was unnecessary. The Imam refused at first to curtail the salary, but when

convinced of the actual needs of the Wálí and his family, approved of the cut in the Wálí's salary (63). The tenor of this story is that Sd. Su'úd no doubt felt that he received a salary much bigger than what he actually spent, and as a result preferred to cut down on his salary to come in step with the rest. Moreover, he was well aware of the difficulties of *Bayt al-Mál* and its chronic deficits. Similar actions can also be found elsewhere, for example, as when Imam Muḥammad al-Khalílí sold all his properties in Samá'il for the sake of *Bayt al-Mál* and in order to meet part of the government expenditures.

Thus, in spite of the apparent deficit in *Bayt al-Mál* which the Imam faced, he was able to go ahead with his reform programme and could find the resources to expend on the development projects, the maintenance of fortresses and towers, the rehabilitation of al-Afláj and the properties of *Bayt al-Mál*.

In fact, very little is known about the Imam's efforts in the areas of development and reconstruction and what we know, comes to us from the account of Sh. Muhammad al-Sálimí, who provides us with a list of the projects which were implemented by Sh. Abú Zayd, who for thirty years was Wálí of Bahlà, on behalf of both Imam Sálim and his successor. Among his deeds, were his efforts to build defensive bulwarks to defend Bahlà, as he rebuilt the wall of Bahlà and fortress of Jabrín, spending some \$MT. 70,000 on the rebuilding of the wall. He also spent some \$MT. 140,000 on the renovation of al-Maḥyúl branch of the Falaj al-Juz'ayn, and about thirty wells were dug as a security measure to provide for time of drought. Not only that, but he also paid considerable attention to making sure that *Bayt al-Mál* and *awqáf* property were well invested. Furthermore, he organized the plantation of some 7000 date-palms to add to *Bayt al-Mál* property, of which 500 were of the valuable Khalás variety (64).

From the above account, it is evident that the resources of *Bayt al-Mál* under Imam Sálim were meagre in relation to the large government expenditures. This state of stringency forced the Imam frequently to adopt austerity measures for himself personally, as well as for his prominent advisors. In addition to such measures, he also from time to time resorted to borrowing from merchants and wealthier individuals. It needs to be emphasized that the army and military spending took the major portion of the government

budget, in view of the many wars which the Imam launched and which continued throughout the seven years of his reign.

From what we have said in this chapter, it can be seen that the Imam's institutional set-up consisted of a political system composed of the Imam himself, a consultative council and the Wális of the Wiláyah. A civil system existed for education, military affairs and finance, in addition to a judicial system. Imam Sálím followed, in his political system, the traditional model based on the early Islamic State dictated by the society's needs and the circumstantial constraints of the period. He did not attempt to invent a new system for his administration. In the first six years of his rule, he concentrated his efforts on promoting a rule based on the Islamic *Shúrá* systems, whereas the last year of his reign was characterized by increasing authoritarianism and concentration of powers in his hands. He gave a great deal of his concern and efforts to the promotion of education and economic affairs, as he encouraged education and restored many of *Bayt al-Mál* properties and appointed supervisors for them. However, he was faced by many difficult problems, notably the general weakness of the economy as a consequence of his continued wars with the Sultan and the tribes throughout his reign, which lasted for seven years.

Endnotes

- (1) (I. O) L/P&S/10/426 p. 12.
- (2) al-Sálimí, M. A. *op.cit.* p.199.
- (3) al-Sálimí, M. A. *op.cit.* p. 231.
- (4) Interview with Sh. Ḥumúd b. ‘Abdalláh al-Ráshidí; and in Sa‘íd al-Ḥáarithí, *al-Lu‘lu’*. p. 42.
- (5) Sa‘íd al-Ḥáarithí, *al-Lu‘lu’*. p. 34.
- (6) For further information about Sh. al-Sálimí, his books and his students, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 99ff.
- (7) For further information about Sh. al-Málikí, his books and his students, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 398ff.
- (8) For further information about Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí, his books and his students, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 420ff.
- (9) For further information about Sh. Muḥammad al-Ruqayshí, his books and his students, see al-Khuṣaybí, Muḥammad b. Ráshid. *Shaqá‘iq al-Nu‘mán*. vol. iii pp. 254ff.
- (10) For further information about Sh. Náṣir b. Ráshid al-Kharúṣí and his students, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* p. 414.
- (11) For further information about Imam Muḥammad al-Khalílí, and his students, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 323ff; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* pp. 105-110.
- (12) For further information about Sh. Náṣir al-Riyámí, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 252f.
- (13) For further information about Sh. Sulaymán b. Muḥammad al-Kindí and his books, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 254f.
- (14) For further information about Sd. Su‘úd al-Bú Sa‘ídí, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* p. 254.
- (15) For further information about Sh. ‘Abdalláh al-‘Azrí, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 411ff
- (16) For further information about Sh. Ḥimyar al-Riyámí, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 92ff.
- (17) For further information about Sh. ‘Isá b. Ṣáliḥ al-Ḥáarithí, and his books, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 78ff; ARAMCO, *op.cit.* pp. 116ff.
- (18) For further information about the sons of Sh. Hilál, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 96ff.
- (19) For further information about Sh. Muhanná al-‘Abrí, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 375ff.
- (20) For further information about Sh. Sayf al-Maskirí, see al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* p. 404.
- (21) See the Imam’s letter to the PAM dated on 4th Jumádà II, 1333/20th April, 1915 in (I.O) R15/6/45
- (22) al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* p. 219, p. 222 and p. 290.
- (23) al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* p. 267.
- (24) al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 267f.
- (25) There are about 30 villages belonging to Izkí, i.e. Sadní, Qaryatayn, Qárút, Saymá’, Sháfí’ ...etc.
- (26) See Sh. al-Ruqayshí’ s appointment decree in al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* p. 267.
- (27) See the Imam’s letter to Sh. Abú Zayd in al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 263-7.
- (28) See the Imam’s letter to Sh. Abú Zayd in al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* pp. 263-7.
- (29) Interview with Sh. Ghuṣn b. Shámis al-Sayfí, May 1994.
- (30) Hášhim, *op.cit.* pp.191f; Wilkinson, “the Imamate” pp. 183-5.
- (31) Sh. Sayf b. Sa‘íd al-Ma‘walí states in his papers that Sh. Ḥamad b. Sa‘íd b. Ḥamad al-Ma‘walí was from the *Murabi‘ūn* of Nazwà.
- (32) al-Sálimí, M.A. *op.cit.* p. 179.
- (33) See Sh. Su‘úd b. ‘Alí b. Jabr al-Jabrí’s letter to the Sultan dated 8th Sha‘bán, 1331/13th July, 1913 in (R. O.11) p. 728.
- (34) Eickelman, “Religious Knowledge in Inner Oman” p.164.
- (35) For a discussion of the term “Cognitive Style” see Bourdieu, P. “System of Education”. ; Eickelman, “ the Art of Memory” pp. 485f.
- (36) Eickelman, “Religious Knowledge in Inner Oman” p. 167.
- (37) For further information about Education in Oman, see Ministry of Omani Education. *Lamḥáḥ ‘An Mádí al-Ta‘lím fí ‘Umán.*; Pridham, “Oman: change or continuity”. pp. 135ff; Yousuf, A.M. *Education in Oman*, (UNESCO, Beirut, 1971).
- (38) Sh. Abú Muslim was one of the Omani ‘*ulamá*’ who lived in Zanzibar, and wrote many books, and he was the founder of “al-Najah” weekly in Zanzibar.
- (39) For examples of these students include:
 1. Students instructed and graduated at the hands of Sh. al-Málikí:
 - a) Sh. al-Qádí Sa‘íd b. Aḥmad b. Sulaymán al-Kindí (d.1383/1963).
 - b) Sh. al-Qádí Manṣúr b. Náṣir b. Muḥammad al-Fárisí (d. 1397/1979).

- c) Sh. al-Qáđí Sa'íd b. Náşir b. Khamís al-Sayfí (d. 1374/1954).
d) Sh. al-Qáđí Su'úd b. 'Ámir b. Khamís al-Málikí (d. 1403/1983).
2. Students instructed and graduated at the hands of Sh. Májid al-'Abrí
a) Sh. al-Muftí Ibráhím b. Sa'íd b. Muḥsin al-'Abrí (d. 1395/1975)
b) Sh. al-Qáđí Sa'íd b. Şálih b. Ráshid al-'Abrí (d. 1340/1922)
c) Sh. al-Qáđí Muḥammad b. Sálím b. Badr al-'Abrí
d) Sh. al-Qáđí Thábit b. Surúr b. Aḥmad al-Ghallábí
3. Students instructed and graduated at the hands of Sh. Náşir al-Kharúşí:
a) Sh. al-Qáđí Khalfán b. 'Uthmán b. Khamís al-Kharúşí
b) Sh. al-Qáđí 'Abdalláh b. Muḥammad b. 'Alí al-Kharúşí
c) Sh. al-Qáđí Sayf b. Ḥammád al-Kharúşí
d) Sh. al-Qáđí Sulaymán b. Náşir al-Dhuhlí
- (40) Landen, Oman. p. 114.
(41) For further information about Banián and their activity in Muscat, see Calvin, Sayyid, pp. 99-139; Wellsted, Travels in Oman, vol. i pp. 18-21.
(42) Landen, op.cit. pp. 123-31.
(43) Landen, op.cit. p. 130.
(44) Speece, "Aspect of the economic" p. 502.
(45) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 172.
(46) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 177f.
(47) For detail of *Bayt al-Mál* see EI-2 vol. i pp. 1141-9.
(48) For detail of Land property and land tenure in Islam see the Islamic Quarterly vol. V no. 3 (1959) pp. 3-11.
(49) Eickelman, "From Theocracy to Monarchy". p. 8.
(50) For further detail of *zakát* see al-Qarađawí, Muḥammad. Fiqh al-Zakát. 2 vols. Beirut, 1981.
(51) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 222.
(52) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 247.
(53) Sh. Muḥammad b. Sulaymán al-Ḥáarithí was killed in the Battle of al-Waṭayyah in 1333/1915, while his brother Ḥamad b. Sulaymán died in 1389/1969.
(54) Dirham(pl. Daráhim) is a traditional unit of currency in Arabia, the Arabic word being derived from the ancient Greek coin, drachma. See Anthony, op.cit. p. 30.
(55) al-Ḥáarithí, Sa'íd. al-Lu'lu' p. 164.
(56) During an interview with Sh. Ghuşn b. Shámis al-Sayfí (over 90 years of age), in Nazwà, on 26th May, 1994, he told the present writer that both his father Shámis and his brother were among the staff responsible for the collection of the *zakát* from the Wiláyát during the reigns of both Imam Sálím and his successor Imam Muḥammad.
(57) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 195.
(58) Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8. pp. 1422-4.
(59) The papers of Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Imam Sálím al-Kharúşí p. 2.
(60) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 422.
(61) For further detail about al-Muḍayrib, see Lorimer, op.cit. vol. 8 p. 1764; H.A. p. 276.
(62) al-Ḥáarithí, Sa'íd. al-Lu'lu' p. 218.
(63) The papers of Sh. Sayf b. Sa'íd al-Ma'walí, pp. 7f.
(64) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 422.

CHAPTER VIII

THE END OF AN ERA: THE IMAM'S DEATH AND THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF AL-SIB

The aim of this chapter is to explore the mysterious cause which led to the assassination of Imam Sálím, and the turbulent political situation which followed and which eventually led to a permanent conciliation between the sultanate and Imamate. This peace settlement lasted for thirty four years. The chapter also discusses the effects of the conciliation on the Omanis in terms of peace, security, and economic and social stability.

1) The Death of the Imam

Before going through the events of the Imam's death, it is necessary first to take a look at the political situation inside Oman on the eve of his death.

Since the beginning of 1338/1920, signs of weakness on the Imam's political authority were already apparent. His grip of power over the tribes was weakening, and those tribes further away from the centre of the Imam's political power, became increasingly vocal in voicing their discontent, their individual independence and indifference to the Imam's authority. This was partly due to the fact that the Imam at this time was under the influence and tainted advice of the hard-line Islamic clergy (*mutáwi'ah*) after having lost the best of his former politically shrewd advisors who had had a remarkable influence on his political and administrative successes. Among these invaluable advisors was Sd. Su'úd b. Ḥamad al-Bú Sa'idí whom the Imam lost early in 1337. He also lost Sh. al-Qáđí Sulaymán b. Muḥammad al-Kindí, the Qáđí of Nazwà who died on the night of 14th Şafar 1337/16th November 1918, as a result of a cholera outbreak which swept through Oman in that year (1), claimed over 20,000 Omanis, hit the inland Provinces particularly hard, and prompted Imam Sálím to designate a special day of prayer (2). In the same year, the Imam also lost yet another very important personality with the death of Sh. 'Alí b. Şáliḥ al-Ḥárití, brother of Sh. 'Isà, on Sha'bán,

1337/May 1919. Sh. 'Alí was indeed the tough military and militant hand of Sh. 'Isà and a strong supporter of the Imam, as we have seen his role in the battle of al-Waṭayyah (3).

The most important personality whom Imam Sálím lost was Sh. 'Āmir b. Khamís al-Málikí, who resigned his position as Qáđí of the Imam and general managing director for the Imamate. The reasons for his resignation were the accusations directed against him by some of the *Muṭáwi'ah* close to the Imam and by some students. These accusations alleged corruption in the use of money from *Bayt al-Mál* directed by Sh. al-Málikí (4). It was apparent that the Imam's power weakened greatly after the resignation of Sh. al-Málikí. The major trouble for the Imam was the loss of his staunchest supporter, Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náşir al-Nabhání, the *tamímah* of the B. Gháfir and the most powerful chieftain of the B. Riyám, who died on Friday 7th Jumádà II, 1338/ 27th February 1920 (5). Wingate, the PAM, described him by saying: "Hamyar [Ḥimyar] had been the sword arm while Sh. 'Isà had been the brains of the Omani rule" (6).

Yet another important factor behind the weakening of the Imam's position was the general decline of the economy as a result of the imposition by Sultan Sd. Taymúr, of exorbitant taxes on the agricultural produce of the Interior Provinces, especially after the Imam did not permit Sh Sa'íd b. Náşir al-Kindí and Sh. 'Isà to ratify, in February 1920, the terms which had been put for negotiation on 15th September, 1919.

Another factor was the Imam's insistence on retaining the confiscated gardens and estates and his refusal to hand these properties back to their owners, contrary to the opinion of most of the tribal leaders, who saw that the return of these properties to their owners would gain support for the Imamate. The Imam's refusal, therefore, caused a feeling of discontent among the important leaders of the tribes. Also the conduct of the Imam's brother created problems with the enemies of the Imamate. Therefore, by the middle of 1338/1920, the Imam's policy became a confidential affair between him, his brother, Sh. Náşir and a few of the *Muṭáwi'ah*. This attitude on the part of the Imam prejudiced the leaders of the tribes, whose sentiments varied between spite, denunciation and silence. Wingate says, commenting on these affairs: "He [the Imam] and his brother in whose hands all power was, began to lose grounds and a definite reaction against the puritanical fanaticism of the Imam and exactions of his brother set in" (7).

The position of the tribes in relation to the Imamate became apparent when the Imam called them for a meeting to discuss the issue of punishment of Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhīm, the ruler of al-Ḥazim. This incident came as a result of the Imam's acquiescence to his brother's request. The story was that the Imam's brother, Sh. Náṣir, who was Wálí of al-Rustáq, instigated a conflict with Sd. Aḥmad and with the Shaykhs of the B. Gháfir, who supported Sd. Aḥmad. The tribes declined the Imam's call (8), which impelled the Imam to force their compliance (9). This brought the Imam strong criticism from Sh. Májid b. Khamís al-'Abrí. However, the tribes which agreed to go to war, either due to consent or coercion, were not free from treason. This explains why those in siege of Sd. Aḥmad and his followers let the besieged out of the fort more than once, to obtain provisions of food and water from the neighbouring towns (10). Also the B. Ḥarráṣ returned home after having counselled with Sd. Aḥmad and adopted his point of view.

It is more likely that the B. Ḥarráṣ were convinced of the credibility of Sd. Aḥmad, and that Sh. Náṣir was creating conditions of tension in order to get rid of Sd. Aḥmad and control over al-Ḥazim. There is also further evidence concerning Sh. Náṣir, such that the Imam al-Khalílí immediately dismissed him from al-Rustáq as Wálí because the tribes were discontented and dissatisfied with his attitude.

In the summer of 1338/1920, the Sultan decided to impose taxes on the produce of the provinces under the control of the Imam. The Sultan raised the new taxes to 25% on all dates and 50% on pomegranates, instead of the customary 5% (11). These new taxes were imposed by force, and a strong feeling of rage and discontent was thus created, especially since the Sultan explained that the reason for his decision to impose and increase these taxes was the Imam's refusal to give back the confiscated gardens to their owners. This annoyed Sh. 'Isà, which led him to write his letter to the PAM on 29th July, 1920 inquiring about the British government's position with regard to this issue. It was a surprise to Sh. 'Isà when he received the answer of the PAM informing him of his government's support of the Sultan, and that this position will not be altered unless the confiscated properties are handed back to their owners (12).

This clear message deeply affected Sh. 'Isà. The general feeling of anger and discontent towards the Imam increased with his insistence on retaining the confiscated gardens in order to appease those of his followers who were economically deprived. The PAM commented on this situation when he said that "this letter dispelled any remaining doubts the Omanis may have had, realising the attitude of the Imam and of his brother" (13).

Our objective in giving the above introduction is to understand the situation surrounding the internal affairs inside Oman which immediately preceded the Imam's assassination. This state of affairs can best be described as a rise in the influence of the Sultan and a decline in the power of the Imam. The Imam, during this stage, spent the two months of Sha'bán and Ramaḍán, 1338, in al-Rustáq in siege of al-Ḥazim, as already mentioned. The siege of al-Ḥazim ended in a conciliation between the Imam and Sd. Aḥmad and between the Imam and the Gháfirí tribe. The supporters of Sd. Aḥmad were under the leadership of Sh. Náṣir b. Ráshid al-Gháfirí. After that, the Imam returned to his capital, Nazwà, where he spent the month of Shawwál.

At the beginning of Dhú al-Qi'dah, 1338, the Imam decided to go to al-Muḍaybí in order to hold talks with the Āl Wahíbah who refused to abide by a judgement he had made against them in a case won for al-'Abriyyín (14). Therefore, after having appointed Sh. 'Abdalláh b. 'Āmir al-'Azrí as his deputy, the Imam departed towards al-Muḍaybí to discuss the matter with the Āl Wahíbah. On his way, the Imam passed through Izkí, then spent the night in the wilderness, near the village of al-Khaḍrá' Banú Difá' (15), on the night of Wednesday 5th Dhú al-Qi'dah, 1338/ 21st July 1920. At their camp site, the Imam's party was joined by a bedouin man called Abú Bisrah Sulṭayn Wald al-Tawbalí al-Fazárí al-Wahíbí. The Bedui claimed that he was looking for a stray camel he had lost. Then, after five hours, and just before midnight on the that night, Abú Bisrah secretly crept, unnoticed by the guards, towards the Imam, who was then asleep on his back and covered with a white garb, shot him with a gun and fled under cover of the night. The shot hit the Imam on the mouth. He was covered in blood and his cohorts bewailed the calamity, they could not then believe that the aim of the man who had joined them on the eve of that night was to kill the Imam (16). The Imam was dead. His party stayed in the

place until the morning, and decided to bury him in the spot where he was killed. To this day, his grave can still be seen at the foot of a mountain to the east of Khadrá' Banú Difá'.

This is the story of the death of Imam Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúsí (17). However, an important question remains to be asked about the reasons and motives which led Abú Bisrah to murder the Imam: whether he had a personal grievance against the Imam, or he was merely an agent pushed to commit the assassination on behalf of another party. It would be instructive to shed light on these reasons and motives from the diverse stories about this subject, bearing in mind that Abú Bisrah himself was killed secretly without a trial, or knowing the reasons which led him to kill the Imam.

In the conflicting stories about the assassination of the Imam, the reasons behind the killing are generally shrouded with obscurity and mystery. One of the stories, given by Sh. Muhanná b. Khalfán al-Kharúsí, maintains that Abú Bisrah was accused of theft of a camel, and that he was wanted to appear before court for justice (18). Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí, on his part, mentions this story, but does not give the accusation against Abú Bisrah (19). Both Sh. Muhanná al-Kharúsí and Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí confirmed that Abú Bisrah was pushed by his people to kill the Imam (20). Another story is given in the British sources, which claim that the tribes were involved in the killing of the Imam. These British sources depend on many accounts and state that:

“the real reason of his [Imam's] death, which was confirmed from many sources, was that the tribes were practically in open revolt against his rule and that of his brother, which was a combination of utter religious ^{bigotry} combined with shameless selfishness and oppression and a complete disregard of politics or government, all of which in addition to their inherent disadvantages were resulting in all sorts of trying restrictions from the Sultan's government, which they were powerless to resist, culminating in the penal *zakát*” (21).

There is some suspicion attached to the Omani sources which reported that this man was wanted for justice, in that case, it would have been well known to all people that he disobeyed the Imam. The immediate question which could be raised is: did not the Imam's guards and his companions know about the man and his animosity to the Imam, especially since one of the Imam's guards was a man from the village of Khadrá' Banú

Difá', the village in which the Imam was murdered? Second, the murderer was not a stranger to this area, and he was obviously well acquainted with the Imam's movements, and even his camp. This is because the village people knew about the coming of the Imam through their area, such that when the Imam's companions heard the shot, they thought it was a shot fired by the village people as a welcome signal to the Imam, as was the common custom in receiving high-ranking guests (22). All this leads to the conclusion that the Imam's guards could have connived with Abú Bisrah. A British source refers to such a possible connivance in that "the immediate cause of his murder was stated to have been an insult to one of his guards" (23). Another account was given by Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Su'úd al-Bú Sa'ídí . It states that the two guards on duty suspected Abú Bisrah's story and motive and therefore needed to be more cautious of him, but that in fact they fell asleep (24). However conflicting the accounts about the Imam's murder may be, both those which maintained that the murderer was personally motivated and those who suggest he acted out of incitement from his tribe, exploit the state of generalised discontent which was prevalent among the tribes against the attitude of the Imam and his close circle.

The implication of the other tribes in the murder of the Imam is arbitrary and not supported by evidence. The tribe to which Abú Bisrah belonged refused to accept the rules issued by the Imam against them, so it was reasonable to suspect that they influenced the man and encouraged him to kill the Imam. The main purpose of the Imam's visit to their area was indeed to put an end to their disobedience, either by persuasion or coercion. As for the claim that all the tribes were implicated in the murder on the grounds that they were discontented with the Imam's attitude, it is unlikely that they would have influenced the murderer. This is not simply because he was of another tribe, but, more significantly, because they were seen to adopt a quite different strategy of protest. These tribes expressed their anger and discontent by silence and by civil disobedience, if we can so describe it. For example, Sh. 'Isà refused very firmly to accept anything from the confiscated properties, and stood firm, even to the extent of disputing the whole issue of confiscations (25). However, he was careful not to put himself at risk. For that reason, Sh. 'Āmir al-Málikí answered him in a reply essay entitled "*Gháyat al-*

Tahqíq fí Ahkám al-Intiṣár wa al-Taghríq'. And in more than one instance, we find that he did not participate in the Imam's wars against Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím, since he saw it as being better and more helpful for the Imam to leave Sd. Aḥmad as ruler of al-Rustáq, and therefore he did not take part in the war.

As for the tribe of the murderer, Āl Wahíbah, we cannot rule out its involvement in the murder act, through in an indirect way, for a number of reasons mentioned earlier. Another reason which can be added these already mentioned, is that one of the Shaykhs of this tribe, named Sh. Ḥamad b. Sulṭán b. Sa'íd al-Wahíbí (26), had been wanted by the Imam for justice, because he was accused of having killed a man from B. Ḥarrás tribe in the village of Farq, one of the villages of Nazwà, and had fled to Muscat where he was given refuge and protection. That was in Ramaḍán 1333/ July-August 1915. Sh. Ḥamad afterwards took al-Síḅ as his permanent abode for fear of punishment, which according to the *Sharí'ah*, is the death penalty (27). It is therefore likely that Sh. Ḥamad played a covert role in the Imam's murder in order to get rid of him, and hence incited one of his tribesmen to carry out the murder act.

These, therefore, were the causes which led to the loss of the Imam's life. It is more probable that the murder of the Imam was an exclusively Omani affair (involving the Imam's supporters) either because of personal prejudices and jealousies, or as a consequence of the general suffering and hardship which the Omanis were experiencing as a result of the Imam's rigidity and his refusal to accept peace and conciliation (28). Qásim attributes the causes to the Imam himself and his brother, Sh. Náṣir, both of whom represented, in Qásim's view "the extreme in authoritarianism and indifference to the welfare and interests of the general public" (29).

It is important to note here that the supporters of the Imamate did not direct any accusation either ^{against} the Sultan or to the British, with regard to the murder of the Imam. From this it can be understood that the leaders of Oman and its '*ulamá*' were of the view that the reasons and motivation behind the Imam's murder did not come from outside. For them, the murder act was an exclusively Omani affair. On the other hand, the murder act conspicuously raised the status of the Sultan in the eyes of the Omanis. With this new

momentum, they pressed the new Imam to speed up the negotiation process and to reach a reconciliation with the Sultan.

The measure which the new Imam Sh. Muḥammad al-Khalílí took in order to bring the murderer to justice was the passing of the death penalty on him. In order to ensure that the offender was brought to justice, the new Imam also imprisoned the Shaykhs of Āl Wahíbah, the tribe to which the murderer belonged, in order to force them to hand over the offender for execution. However, the imprisonment of the Shaykhs did not lead to a positive result. As a result, the Imam took another decision, this time in terms of reward, and declared a huge bounty for whoever brought the murderer to justice, dead or alive.

At any rate, a year from the death of Imam Sálím, a man from al-Janabah tribe called Maktúm b. Hamúsh al-Junaybí, was able to kill the murderer, Abú Bisrah (30) in the neighbourhood of ‘Ibrí in the Province of al-Dháhírah (31). Thus, Abú Bisrah al-Fazárí was dead and with him too died the secrets surrounding his true motivations for the murder of the Imam. This does not imply that we have doubts about the murderer. Our doubts focus on the true causes and motivation which underlay the decision for the murder action.

The situation after the Imam’s assassination was indeed very confused, in that the supporters of the Imam received the news of the murder with strong detestation and sadness. Others, however, were happy with the news, and soon declared their allegiance to the Sultan. Sh. ‘Isà b. Şálih captured this confused state of affairs and general mood in his letter which he dispatched to the PAM on 16th Dhú al-Qi‘dah 1338 in which he said, after having informed him of the general situation in Oman, and the new Imam, that “then the affairs were tired and thanks God that the tribes returned to their former conditions after they were about to make bloodshed and rob properties, and the grace and glory is for God” ((32).

British sources reported that a great number of the Shaykhs of the tribes and of the main towns declared their allegiance to the Sultan, and that the government of the Sultan welcomed this support, and issued a general amnesty for these Shaykhs and others who wished to submit to the Sultan’s authority. Not only that, but the Sultan also sent

delegations headed by the Qáđí of Muscat, Sh. Ráshid b. ‘Uzayyiz al-Khuṣaybí, to Samá’il to hold talks with the Shaykhs of the Wádí Samá’il on the issue (33).

It can also be understood from Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí’s account that the Sultan himself was personally involved in these communications with the tribes, asking for their support and submission, and warning against the consequences if they refused to support him and opted for a new Imam (34).

Unfortunately, however, we have not a single piece of evidence available to us about the names of these Shaykhs, either those who wrote to the Sultan, or those whom the Sultan approached or wrote to. However, it can be understood from the context of the account, that the Shaykhs denoted by the text were those of Wádí Samá’il. The British sources, nonetheless, mentioned that the Wálí of al-‘Awábí fled from his position, and also Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím prepared an expedition on al-Rustáq, which soon fell into his hands (35).

A week later after the Imam’s assassination, the *‘ulamá’* and the leaders of tribes gathered to elect a new Imam. They elected the learned man, Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Khalílí, the *tamímah* of the B. Ruwáḥah, as Imam. The difficult mission entrusted to him at these critical times included the re-capture of al-Rustáq and the reaching of a conciliation agreement for peace with the Sultan on grounds that the Imam was actively rallying the tribal Shaykhs to his support and declaring a general amnesty.

Two days after his election as Imam, Muḥammad al-Khalílí travelled to Samá’il which was the object of both parties, the Sultan and the Imam. But the Imam succeeded in reaching it 24 hours before the Sultan’s marching force, and the tribes naturally followed the Imam (36).

Imam Sálim’s death, in fact, paved the way for a reconciliation between the Imamate and the Sultanate. The immediate outcome was the signing of the Treaty of al-Síb in September, 1920 between Imam Muḥammad al-Khalílí and Sultan Sd. Taymúr. The future implication of the Treaty is that it laid the foundation for the future co-existence between the Imamate and the Sultanate based on peace, which brought general peace and stability to Oman for over 34 years, until the death of Imam al-Khalílí in May, 1954. Then in December, 1954, the Sultan, Sd. Sa’íd b. Taymúr decided to get rid of the

Imamate and its political influence, due to several factors, important among which was the Imamate's aspiration and attempts to forge foreign relations, the concessions for the oil industry, and the general support which the Sultan, Sd. Sa'íd, received from many of the Omani tribes.

2) The Treaty of al-Síb

At this time, voices were becoming louder among the tribes calling for conciliation with the Sultan. Thus they asked the new Imam, Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí, to put an end to the suffering of the Omanis, for example by lifting economic pressures and hardships associated with the oppressive taxation system, and putting an end to the high prices which adversely affected the standards of living. Under these pressures, the Omanis were gripped with feelings of disappointment and disillusion after having spent seven solid years in continuous warfare with the Sultan, and they had not achieved the aims for which the Imamate had been revived in the first place, especially since the British strongly supported the Sultan, while the Imamate lacked the necessary trained regular army, not to mention their lack of modern weapons.

At any rate, Imam Muḥammad al-Khalílí was persuaded of the necessity of putting an end to this long enmity with the Sultan and the associated suffering and hardships of the population. In this, he entrusted Sh. 'Isà al-Ḥáarithí to resume his communications and efforts for the resumption of peace talks, which had been suspended since the previous year by Wingate, the PAM. The Imam, however, postponed the resumption of the peace efforts until he had settled his problems with Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím who took control of al-Rustáq. Thus, two days after Imam Muḥammad was elected, Sh. 'Isà wrote a letter to the PAM, in which he told him of the general situation inside Oman, and the general desire to resume talks. He sent his letter to the PAM with the famous scholar Sh. Sa'íd b. Náşir al-Kindí (37).

The PAM approved the resumption of the talks, but put foreword some conditions, first insisting on the handing back of the confiscated gardens to their owners. He also said that he would go to India for a period of a month (38).¹ During the first half of August, 1920 Sh. 'Isà was busy with the question of al-Rustáq, for Sd. Aḥmad b.

Ibráhím agreed to leave al-Rustáq and returned to al-Ḥazim. At the same time, communications were continued between him and the PAM through Sh. Sa‘íd al-Kindí, especially concerning the issue of the return of the confiscated gardens, which the Imam agreed to return to their owners. Sh. ‘Isà’s letter on these issues came as follows: “that the Imam, after having counselled with his leaders, is willing to return the gardens to their owners out of respect for the great British government” (39).

Sh. ‘Isà proposed in the above letter that the talks should be resumed after the ‘íd al-Adḥá and that the talks should be held either in al-Síb or Samá’il. Wingate, the PAM agreed to the proposed time and place, while he was in India during this time. The PAM asked his deputy at Muscat to confirm to Sh. ‘Isà that the talks would be held after 15th September 1920.

Finally, the meeting was convened at al-Síb between 11-13 Muḥarram, 1339/ 24-26 September, 1920. Wingate arrived at al-Síb on the afternoon of 23rd September accompanied by Captain Pearson, commander of the 117th detachment at Maṭrah; Captain Memor, M.O.; and the consul Frugoman, while Sh. ‘Isà awaited the PAM at al-Khawḍ for 20 days, arriving at the place of the meeting on the morning of 24th September, accompanied by over twenty Omani Shaykhs and three hundred camelmen (40).

An hour later the meeting started between Sh. ‘Isà and Wingate. During the meeting, which lasted for two hours, the discussion was centred on introductions and the working out of the meeting agenda. Wingate stressed his main question which was about the authorization and legal status and role of Sh. ‘Isà. The PAM expressed his main concern about Sh. ‘Isà’s legal or authorized status in these words: “it will be remembered in this connection that at our last meeting [referring to the meeting of 15 Sep., 1919] he [Sh. ‘Isà] was not fully authorized” (41).

However, no sooner did the PAM expressed his concern, th^en Sh. ‘Isà and his companions clarified the matter and confusion, and confirmed that he had the full authorization of the Imam. The PAM, after having been assured of the legally authorized status of Sh. ‘Isà, put forward another condition which was: “it was agreed that the terms, if agreed, would be signed by him [Sh. ‘Isà] and the other Shaykhs present in my

(PAM's] presence, and that they would then take the document away and obtain the signature of the Imam and of any other Shaykhs whom I [the PAM] may name" (42).

Sh. 'Isà and the rest of the Shaykhs then present agreed to these conditions of the PAM. It should be noted that these conditions had several implications. The PAM, for example, stressed the conditionality of obtaining the Imam's approval and the seriousness of the conciliations, being well aware that Sh. 'Isà and the Shaykhs then present would not endorse any thing without the approval of the Imam. Secondly, the PAM wanted to have a proof in his hands to use against them in case the Imam refused to accept the peace deal. Thirdly, he also insisted on obtaining the signature on the document of some influential leaders who did not attend the meeting, like Sh. Sulaymán b. Ḥimyar and the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir.

In the afternoon, another meeting was convened and was restricted to Sh. 'Isà, Sh. Sa'íd al-Kindí and Wingate and his translator. In this meeting, Sh. 'Isà presented twelve points for discussion, which were as follows:

1. That the independence of Oman should be recognized.
2. That the *zakát* should be reduced to 5 per cent.
3. That the Omanis should be free and safe in the Sultan's territory.
4. That the British Government should not help the Sultan.
5. That nothing should be done against the Imamate's religion.
6. That passports should not be needed for Omanis.
7. That the Omanis should be allowed to purchase cartridges.
8. That the Sultan should subsidize the Omanis.
9. That all documents such as passports, etc., from the Imam should be countersigned by the Political Agent and not by the Sultan.
10. That Sh. Ráshid b. 'Uzayyiz al-Khuṣaybí should not be allowed in Oman.
11. That Sh. Sa'íd b. Náṣir al-Kindí should be guaranteed safety in the Sultan's territory.
12. That the Sultan should return fugitives from Imam's justice (43).

In return for that, Sh. 'Isà promised to abide by the following two points:

1. Not to attack the Sultan's territory or to interfere in his Government.
2. To allow freedom of trade and travel in Oman (44).

The PAM refused to accept Sh. 'Isà's offer, although he agreed to three of the conditions, Nos.: 2, 3 and 12 and firmly refused to agree to the rest of the conditions, on the grounds that they were unreasonable and contrary to reason (45). The PAM, in the end, succeeded in persuading Sh. 'Isà to withdraw the rest of the conditions. For example regarding the first condition he said: " they [the Omanis] had got practical independence, what else did they want?" (46). And regarding point No. 4 he said: "if we were mediating in an agreement, they could rely on our not backing the other side unless they flagrantly broke it" (47).

It is clear that the PAM was an evasive, deft diplomat who wanted to see this agreement as a binding contract between the ruler and his subjects, without at the sometime forcing the Sultan to acknowledge the Imam or his independence. At the same time, it was meant to be understood that the PAM was implicitly working towards legitimising and consolidating the Sultan's authority over the whole of Oman. Surprisingly enough, Sh. Isà did not take notice of this trend of events in his dealings with the PAM, who tried to cover his inclinations throughout the talks. At the end of the talks, they both agreed on a number of conditions, which came in the following order:

The Sultan's Government would:-

1. Reduce the *zakât* on all goods coming into the coastal towns to 5 per cent.
2. Guarantee safety and freedom for Omanis in the coastal towns.
3. Remove all restrictions on the entry of Omanis into Muscat and Maṭraḥ .
4. Return fugitives from Omani justice and not interfere in their internal affairs.

The Omanis would:-

1. Remain in peace with the Sultan, not attack the coast and not interfere with his Government.
2. Permit freedom of trade and travel in Oman and guarantee the safety of travellers.
3. Would return and not protect fugitives from the Sultan's justice.
4. Would hear the claims of traders and others against Omanis according to *Shari'ah*.(48)

The following day all the Shaykhs accompanying Sh. 'Isà came and signed the document. However, a problem arose regarding the signing of Sh. 'Isà, due to his insistence that the agreement should be between the Sultan and the Imam. The PAM,

however, rejected this formula, and tried to persuade the present Shaykhs to his view. The problem was resolved by regarding the agreement as being between Sultan Sd. Taymúr's government and Sh. 'Isà on behalf of the Omani people. The document was issued in two copies in Arabic; each party took a copy to sign it and returned it, signed, to the other party, through the PAM.

On 8th October, the agreement was officially ratified and declared to have been set in force. Imam Muḥammad al-Khalílí had ratified it on 28th September 1920, together with a number of Shaykhs. As a result, taxes were lowered and returned to their former levels of 5% on all produce from the inland. All prisoners were released, restrictions on travelling removed and free movements between the interior and coastal areas were restored to their former status, as before May 1913. Each of the two parties retained a copy of the document. Following is the wording of the copy found with the Sultan:

"In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful"

"This is what has been agreed upon in the settlement between the Government of Sultan, Saiyid Taimur bin Faisal and Shaikh Isa bin Salah bin Ali al-Harhi on behalf of the Omanis who sign their name here through the mediation of Mr. Wingate, I.C.S., Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's consul, Muscat, who is authorised by his Government in this respect to be a mediator between them. The conditions are stated as follows. Four of them concern the Government of the Sultan and four of them concern the Omanis. What concern the Omanis are those:-

First: On all commodities brought from Oman of all kinds to Muscat, Matrah, Sur and all the coast towns nothing more should be taken than 5 per cent.

Secondly: For all the Omanis there should be safety and freedom in all the coast towns.

Thirdly: All restrictions on entry to and exit from Muscat, Matrah and all the coast towns should be removed.

Fourthly: The Sultan's Government should not protect criminals who flee from the justice of the Omanis and they may be returned to them if asked for and that the Sultan's Government should not interfere in their internal affairs.

The four which concern the Government of the Sultan are stated as follows:-

Firstly: All the tribes and Shaikhs should remain in peace and amity with the government of the Sultan and that they should not attack the coast towns and should not interfere in his government.

Secondly: All travellers to Oman on their lawful business should be free and there should be no restrictions on trade and travellers should be safe.

Thirdly: All criminals and evil men who flee to them should be turned out and should not be protected.

Fourthly: The claims of merchants and others against the Omanis should be heard and decided as is just according to the Sharah (*Shari'ah*).

Written at Sib on the eleventh day of Moharram, one thousand three hundred and thirty nine Hijrah, corresponding to twenty fifth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and twenty.

I have completed what was completed by Shaikh Isa bin Salah on my behalf in these conditions. Written by Imam al-Muslamin Mohammad bin Abdullah with his own hand.

I on behalf of the Imam al-Muslamin Mohammad bin Abdullah al-Khalili and on my own behalf agree to the conditions written here with the authorisation of Imam al-Muslamin. Written by Isa bin Salah with his own hand.

(Signed) Sulaiman bin Hamyar an-Nabhani (with his own hand).

(Signed) Zahair bin Ghusn al-Hinawi (with his own hand).

(Signed) Mohsin bin Zahran as-Siyabi (with his own hand).

(Signed) Hamaid bin Mussullam an-Nidabi (with his own hand).

(Signed) Sayf bin Salim b. Amir al-Habasi (with his own hand).

(Signed) Khalaf bin Nasir bin Mohammad al-Maawali (with his own hand).

Thumb impression of Mohammad bin Sultan bin Mansur al-Wahaibi (with his own hand).

(Signed) Mohammad bin Saif bin Said al-Jabri (with his own hand).

(Signed) Sultan bin Salim ar-Rahbi (with his own hand).

(Signed) Khalfan bin Mohammad bin Sulaiman al-Hidabi (with his own hand).

(Signed) Thani bin Harith al Jabri (with his own hand).

(Signed) Hamdan bin Sulaiman bin Saif an-Nabhani (with his own hand).

(Signed) Muhanna bin Hamad bin Mohsin al-Ibri (with his own hand).

(Signed) Nasir bin Hamaid bin Rashid al-Ghafiri (with his own hand), and his son Mohammad bin Nasir (with his own hand).

(Signed) Abdullah bin Hilal bin Zaher al-Hánai (with his own hand).

This official document of agreement was brought to me which is the best sort of settlement between Shaikh Isa bin Salah on our behalf as written above and the government of Sultan Saiyid Taimur through the mediation of Mr. Wingate, I.C.S., His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Muscat, as is written also with special authorisation. I write these lines with my own hand and thank God for it. Written by Sayf bin Ali bin Amir Al-Maskari with his own hand" (49).

As for the document found with the Imam, it read as follows:

"In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful"

"This is what has been agreed upon in the settlement between the Government of Sultan, Saiyid Taimur bin Faisal and Shaikh Isa bin Salah bin Ali al-Harthi on behalf of the Omanis who sign their name here through the mediation of Mr. Wingate, I.C.S., Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's consul, Muscat, who is authorised by his Government in this respect to be a mediator between them. The conditions are stated as follows. Four of them concern the Government of the Sultan and four of them concern the Omanis. What concern the Omanis are those:-

First: On all commodities brought from Oman of all kinds to Muscat, Matrah, Sur and all the coast towns nothing more should be taken than 5 per cent,

Secondly: For all the Omanis there should be safety and freedom in all the coast towns.

Thirdly: All restrictions on entry to and exit from Muscat, Matrah and all the coast towns should be removed.

Fourthly: The Sultan's Government should not protect criminals who flee from the justice of the Omanis and that may be returned to them if asked for and that the Sultan's Government should not interfere in their internal affairs.

The four which concern the Government of the Sultan are stated as follows:-

Firstly: All the tribes and Shaikhs should remain in peace and amity with the government of the Sultan and that they should not attack the coast towns and should not interfere in his government.

Secondly: All travellers to Oman on their lawful business should be free and there should be no restrictions on trade and travellers should be safe.

Thirdly: All criminals and evil men who flee to them should be turned out and should not be protected.

Fourthly: The claims of merchants and others against the Omanis should be heard and decided as is just according to the *Sharah* [*Shari'ah*].

Written at Sib on the eleventh day of Moharram, one thousand three hundred and thirty nine Hijrah, corresponding to twenty fifth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and twenty.

Seals signature of Taimur (H. H. the Sultan Muscat and Oman)

(signed) Mohammad bin Ahmad, with his hand, on behalf of the Sultan" (50).

Evidently, the importance of this document has been its focus on addressing the deterioration in the economic situation, and the restoration of peace and stability between the interior and coastal areas. In fact, it restored the political situation of Oman to the state which had prevailed during the 13th-17th centuries, when the coastal areas of Oman were under the authority of the Kingdom of Hurmuz (51) (in 13th, 14th and 15th centuries) and then came under Portuguese authority (1507-1650), while the interior of Oman continued to be ruled by an elected Imam or a King (52).

The agreement itself was covered in mystery and confusion, but it meant the two governments were totally independent of one another. The supporters of the Imamate interpreted it in this way when they used the al-Sib agreement as evidence of Oman's independence, involving various foreign powers in long debates in the United Nations Assembly in New York throughout the 1950s and 1960s (53).

The agreement did not specify the sovereignty rights of the Sultan, nor did it contain a statement on the independence of the Interior of Oman from the Sultanate. It also did not explain the right of the Sultan or the Omanis to establish foreign diplomatic relations (54). We have already seen how the PAM evaded any mention of these points, in spite of the fact that it was Sh. 'Isà who presented them for discussion, and the PAM refused to accept the agreement to be between the Sultan and the Imam, as we have already mentioned. Therefore, the agreement came to be between the Sultan's government and Sh. 'Isà on behalf of the Omanis. As a result, a long dispute ensued in interpreting the agreement. Some have understood it to have provided for an Interior independent from the Coast (55), while others interpreted it to be an expression of an entirely domestic matter similar to the agreements which the Turkish Sultan signed with his subjects (56).

Here, we do not intend to discuss the legal implications of the agreement (57), because the legal considerations lie outside the scope of our present study. However, we need to make clear that the reasons for divergence of views in interpretation of the Treaty of al-Sīb can be subsumed in two points. The first is that the terms of the treaty itself ignored the political and legitimate status of the Imamate, and only emphasized the peaceful co-existence, freedom of movement and trade, and the handing of criminals between the two parties. The second point is the Sultan's open disapproval of the Imamate itself. This is evident in the fact that the Treaty did not include the name of the Imam or Imamate, and that the agreement in fact was between the government of the Sultan (not the Sultan himself), and Sh. 'Isà b. Şálih al-Ĥáirithí, on behalf of the Omanis (not on behalf of the Imam). For these reasons, each party interpreted the treaty in its text, its implementation and in its implications, in its own way, according to its interests.

We also want here to point out the basis on which the agreement was founded. A fundamental fact was that the two states were independent from one another, and they did not form a large state, as was made clear in many statements, including the following letter from Rea, the PAM to Sh. 'Isà dated 8th March 1922, which says:

"The Government of His Highness, the Sultan Taimur [Taymúr] ibn Faysal has notified me about events happening in Sur to the effect that a man from Oman has killed a soldier of the Sultan in Sur. This is to inform your Excellency that this act is aggression on the part of Oman along the

borders of the state of Muscat and an abrogation of treaty obligations... It is the duty of Omani authorities to seize the murderer and punish him so that no similar acts may happen in the future" (58).

Captain G.J. Eccles, the commander of the Muscat Levy Corps (1924-26) described the authority of the Sultan as follows: "The Sultan in reality has authority only of Muscat and a stretch of coast to the north and south, which can be intimidated by a British gun-boat" and he admitted that the Treaty of al-Sīb is "virtual acknowledgment of the Independence of the Imamate" (59). Another writer, Thesiger, says:

"we were now entering territory which is effectively administered by the Imam. Mohammed Ibn Abdullah, who is recognized as ruler of inner Oman by all the settled tribes His representatives are to be found in every group of villages, where they administer justice and collect taxes... the Bedouin do... recognize the Imam as their over-lord and the expression 'God lengthen the life of the Imam' is frequently heard amongst them and sincerely meant, since by affording them a tribunal and by composing their differences he has brought to them security and justice. Here a man can walk unarmed and leave his camels unattended without fear that he will be robbed" (60).

Consequently, it is clear that the Sultanate and Imamate were independent from each other since this treaty, and the British government herself fully recognized the Imamate of Oman. This division continued until 1954, when Imam Mohammed died. On the death of the Imam, the Omanis elected Sh. Ghálib b. 'Alí b. Hilál al-Hiná'í as Imam of Oman, while Sd. Taymúr bequeathed the rule to his son Sd. Sa'íd in 1932.

Here in this context, we are concerned with the aspects of peace and stability which the terms of al-Sīb treaty helped to create over a period of 35 years since it came into force. During this period, the living conditions of all the Omanis improved remarkably, in addition to the freedom of movement for the populations across all areas and regions, such that there were no restrictions or boundaries separating the regions, one from the other. As for the role of the Sultan, he was able to effect many significant reforms in his administration. He reorganized the duties department and set up a ministerial Council to administer the country's affairs. He also laid the foundations for a national military institution with a standing army, composed of Arab and non-Arab elements .

Endnotes

- (1) al-Sálimí, M. A. Nahdat. p. 254.
- (2) Landen, op.cit. p. 399; Cf (Adm. R. 1918), p. 48.
- (3) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 74.
- (4) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 399.
- (5) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 94.
- (6) (Adm. R. 1920), p. 54.
- (7) (Adm. R. 1920), p. 54.
- (8) (Adm. R. 1920), p. 54.
- (9) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 261.
- (10) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 94; (I.O. R15/6/204): Report from the PAM to civil commissioner, Baghdad dated 4th June 1920.
- (11) Landen, op.cit. p. 403.
- (12) (Adm. R. 1920), p. 54.
- (13) (Adm. R. 1920), p. 54.
- (14) Interview with Sh. al-Qáđí Ĥumúd b. ‘Abdalláh al-Ráshidí.
- (15) For the location of village of al-Khadrá’ Banú Difá’, see Lorimer, Gazetteer, vol. 8 p. 1373.
- (16) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 363; Sh. Muhanná al-Kharúşí’s account.
- (17) There was a poem composed by Sh. Abú Muslim al-Ruwáhí, and sent to the Imam who received it in the month of Shawwál, 1338. In the poem, Sh. al-Ruwáhí mentioned how the Imam was murdered and gave a description of his murderer. The poem was found in his saddle-bag when he was killed. See the poem in al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. pp. 261f.
- (18) Sh. Muhanná al-Kharúşí’s account.
- (19) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 262.
- (20) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 262; Sh. Muhanná al-Kharúşí’s account.
- (21) (I.O. R 15/6/264): confidential report no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920 from PAM to PRG.
- (22) Sh. Muhanná al-Kharúşí’s account.
- (23) (I.O. R 15/6/264): confidential report no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920 from PAM to PRG.
- (24) Sd. Muĥammad b. Aĥmad al-Bú Sa’ídí’s comments on the account of Sh. Muhanná al-Kharúşí.
- (25) al-Sálimí, M. A. op.cit. p. 75.
- (26) See Sh. Ĥamad b. Sulţan’s family tree in Carter, Tribes in Oman. p. 55.
- (27) See the PAM’s report of 28th Sep., 1915 in (I.O.) R15/6/46: Appendix “c”.
- (28) Shadád, op.cit. p. 97.
- (29) Qásim, al-Khalíj 1914-45. p. 413.
- (30) Sd. Muĥammad b. Aĥmad al-Bú Sa’ídí states that Imam Muĥammad al-Khalílí assigned an annual cash prize for Maktúm which he continued to receive until his death.
- (31) Sh. Muhanná al-Kharúşí was of the opinion that the man who killed Abu Bisrah was Sulayţín b. Sálím b. Musallam al-Junaybí, a man from the village of ‘Izz.
- (32) See Sh. ‘Isà’s letter to the PAM in (I.O.) R15/6/204.
- (33) (I.O.) R15/6/204: Telgram from the PAM to PRG no. 1636 dated on 26th July 1920.
- (34) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 343.
- (35) I.O. R15/6/204: Telegram from the PAM to PRG no. 1636 dated on 26th July 1920.
- (36) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. p. 343; (I.O.) R15/6/264: The PAM’s report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920.
- (37) See Sh. ‘Isà’s letter to Wingate in (Adm. R. 1920)
- (38) (I.O.) R15/6/264: The PAM’s report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920.
- (39) Telegram no. 1817 dated 2nd Sep., 1920 from PAM to PRG in I.O. R115/6/204.
- (40) (I.O.) R15/6/264: The PAM’s report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920.
- (41) (I.O.) R15/6/264: The PAM’s report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920.
- (42) (I.O.) R15/6/264: The PAM’s report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920.
- (43) (I.O.) R15/6/264: The PAM’s report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920.
- (44) (I.O.) R15/6/264: The PAM’s report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920.
- (45) Shadád, op.cit. p. 152.
- (46) (I.O.) R15/6/264: The PAM’s report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920.
- (47) (I.O.) R15/6/264: The PAM’s report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920.
- (48) al-Sálimí, M.A. op.cit. pp. 346f; (I.O.) R15/6/266: The PAM’s report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920; United Nations Document A/5562, 8th Oct., 1963 Annex ix.

- (49) The Treaty of al-Sīb was written and signed in Arabic. The copies in English were translated by Wingate, the PAM, for information. The English copies are found in (I.O.) R15/6/264: The PAM's report to PRG, no. 2052, dated 14th Oct., 1920. Other English texts are to be found in R/15/3/204 and R/15/3/337; (Adm. R. 1920). p. 54f; Landen, op.cit. pp. 403-404n; al-Baharna, H. The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States. pp. 315f; Arab Information Centre, The Question of Oman: An Analysis of the British Oman Dispute; Peterson, Oman, pp. 174f; New York Times, August 12, 1957. et al. al-Sálimí M.A. op.cit. pp. 345-9; al-Mashhadáni, op.cit. pp. 164-6.
- (50) Ibid.; Sh. Muḥammad al-Sálimí does not mention the signature of the Sultan, Sd. Taymúr, nor of Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, but mentions the signature of Wingate, the PAM, see his Nahḍat p. 345.
- (51) The Portuguese conquered the Kingdom of Hurmuz in 1508, and the capital of Kingdom was in Hurmuz Island, located in the Strait of the Arabian Gulf. The Kingdom of Hurmuz occupied vast areas on both two shores of the Gulf, including the coastal area of Oman.
- (52) al-Mousawí, A History of Omani-British Relations. p. 302.
- (53) United Nations. Year Book of the U.N. Office of Public Information, UN., New York (the Question of Oman for years, 1971-71); al-Tabatabai, The Conflict between the Sultanate of Muscat and the Imam of Oman. pp. 87-110.
- (54) Landen. op.cit. p. 404.
- (55) Ibn Fayṣal, Fayṣal b. Alí. al-Qaḍiyyah al-'Umániyyah; Thesiger, Arabian Sands. p. 255; Eccles, "Sultanate of Muscat and Oman". pp. 23f; Thomas, "Arab Rule". p. 26; Qásim, al-Khalíj al-'Arabí 1914-45. pp. 419f; Shahdád, al-Širá'. pp. 115f.
- (56) Phillips, Oman. p. 162; Kelly, "Tribes" p. 121; Landen, Oman. p. 404; Peterson, Oman. pp. 175f.
- (57) For further information on the legal status of the Treaty of al-Sīb see: "The Treaty of al-Sīb between Sultan of Muscat and Oman and Imam of Oman" in Revue Egyptienne de Droit Internationale, vol. 13, (1956), pp. 120-2; al-Baharna, H. The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States. pp. 241f
- (58) al-Tabatabai, op.cit. p. 76, citing from The Status of Oman and the British Omanite Dispute, by the Arab Information Centre, New York, 1957.
- (59) Eccles, "the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman". p. 25.
- (60) Thesiger, "Desert Borderland of Oman". G.J. vol. 116 (1950) pp. 151f.

CONCLUSIONS

Although this study has focused on the biography of Imam Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúsí, it is in reality a study of Omani local history during the period 1913-1920. This period has been characterized by the significant revival of the Imamate in the Interior of Oman after a long series of past revival attempts by Omani leaders and '*ulamá*' during the 19th century. This revival was caused by a variety of factors; first and most important was the internal tribal conflict between the Hináwí and Gháfirí tribes and its grave impact on the security, social and economic situation. The Sultan, Sd. Fayşal, had neither the ability nor the interest to put an end to these conflicts, which did not negatively affect his power position. Furthermore, the Sultan was under strong British influence. In line with British demands, the Sultan banned the slave trade and imposed limitations on trade in weapons, despite strong opposition from Omani tribes. He became particularly apathetic to these tribes' reaction to his policies after the death of strong leaders, like Sh. Şáliḥ b. 'Alí al-Ḥárithí and Ḥumúd b. Sa'íd al-Jaḥáfí. In return, the British extended loans to the Sultan on easy terms, which helped him maintain his rule. Moreover, and related to the above, the Sultan refused to agree to the demands of Omanis ('*ulamá*' and leaders) which including a ban on the sale of tobacco and alcohol in Omani markets, continuation of the slave trade and putting an end to corruption and heavy taxation. The Omanis also demanded a general improvement of the Sultan's administration and the modification of his rule to conform with the *Sharí'ah* law. Finally, under these conditions a very strong personality called Sh. 'Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd al-Sálimí emerged and succeeded in rallying '*ulamá*' and tribal leaders around him to revive the concept of Imamate and its application in Oman: Sh. al-Sálimí convinced his supporters that through the institution of Imamate many of their demands would be met, i.e. independence from external influence, an end to tribal conflict, maintenance of internal security and stability, improvement of living conditions and a return to Islamic teaching.

In the context of highlighting Omani history, we have investigated the roles of many important Omani figures, including '*ulamá*' and leaders, because of their important

position in the Omani society. Many of these *'ulamá'* and tribal leaders had great impact on the course of political events and subsequent political developments. Also these important figures played influential roles in the Imamate of Imam Sálím al-Kharúṣí, in various respects. This undertaking has not been an easy one. Many difficulties were encountered, and it has been necessary to examine problematic names and dates, and to make extensive and lengthy efforts to trace their sources and to probe their implications.

We have also sought to shed light on the origins of the Ibáḍiyyah sect, how it was established, its main principles and its relationship with al-Khawárij. The study has arrived at the conclusion that the Ibáḍi movement emerged first in Basrah then extended to Yemen, Oman, and North Africa. During its historical development it took different names: al-Muḥakkimah (A.H.37-38), al-Ḥarúriyyah (A. H. 38-65), al-Qa'idah (A.H. 65-75), and Ibáḍiyyah (after, A.H.75). Since its emergence, Ibáḍiyyah remained faithful to its Islamic opinions relating to creed and political order. The outcome of the Ibáḍi idea was the establishment of first Imamates in Yemen and Oman, both of which lasted two years. In 160/776 another Imamate was established in Algeria, and in 177/792, the Imamate was successfully re-established in Oman. During the following centuries the Imamate in Oman alternated between emergence and disappearance. The historical development of the Ibáḍi Imamate was classified under the following names: first Imamate, second Imamate, third Imamate, etc.

In the modern age, the Imamate took another form of organisation essentially based on heritage, with a formal election of Imam. This clearly appeared during the rule of the Ya'áribah and Āl Bú Sa'id. The instability and discontinuity of the Imamate in Oman resulted from religious and tribal divisions and foreign intervention. These factors contributed to the emergence of weak Imams, and the existence of more than one Imamate at the same time. In spite of the difficult religious and political problems which faced the Ibáḍiyyah throughout its history, the movement managed to protect itself and defend its Islamic doctrine. This means that the Ibáḍiyyah adhered strictly to its own religious and political ideas regarding non-Ibáḍi Muslims in Oman and elsewhere.

An important conclusion to be drawn is that the Ibáḍiyyah sect is a different group altogether from al-Khawárij. Each group is ideologically and politically different from the

other. However, what had bound both groups together -- and this has been a source of much confusion for many writers -- is that both the Ibádiyyah and al-Khawárij were traditional enemies of the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids.

This naturally leads us to another conclusion; throughout Omani history, there has never been a conflict between the Omani people on sectarian grounds, for such conflicts have always been on a political and tribal basis. That is mainly because the majority of Omani tribes were Ibádí, while a few others were Sunni. Most Sunni tribes became Sunni peacefully, without compulsion, responding to Wahhábí preaching during the early 19th century. Because of the peaceful manner in which different sects were introduced into Oman, we find that some members of the same tribes were Ibádí and others Sunni, e.g., al-Ya'áqíb, al-'Abriyyín, al-Hishm. Tribal members were united against enemies and were not disunited by different sectarian loyalties. Moreover, in many cases Omani rulers, who were Ibádí, received strong support from Sunnis in their struggle against their enemies.

Some examples were given and discussed which show that the source of conflicts in Oman was not ethnicity. The two large factions in Oman were the Hináwí (88 tribes) and Gháfirí (82 tribes). Both parties had supporters among the 'Adnání and Qaḥṭání. This study has shown that that a substantial number of tribes of 'Adnání origin supported the Hináwí faction (13 tribes) which relies on the Qaḥṭání tribes as a major base of political support, while on the other hand a substantial number of Qaḥṭání tribes (17 tribes) supported the Gháfirí faction which is mainly supported by 'Adnání tribes. Tribal conflict in Oman, one can infer, was not caused by sectarian or ethnic loyalties.

However, the bulk of the thesis has been concerned with the biography of Imam Sálím al-Kharúfí. We have traced the course of Imam's life, concentrating, in particular, on the period of his Imamate. In short, the Imam was born in 1301/1883-4 in ^{the} village of Mashá'q, one of the villages of the Wiláyat of al-Suwayq in the Báṭinah Province. He was one of four children in his father's family. He received his basic education in his village and completed his learning at al-'Awábí, al-Rustáq, and al-Qábil, and devoted ten solid years before he was elected Imam, as student to Sh. al-Sálimí who gave him his

daughter, Zayánah, in marriage. Imam Sálím was one of Sh. al-Sálímí's close circle. In 1331/1913 he was elected as Imam in Tanúf.

We have discussed the manner in which the bay'ah was established for Imam Sálím, the qualifications which he commanded, and the speeches delivered on the occasion, which specified the Imam's future programmes. Mention has been made that there had been four characters who were eligible candidates for the Imam's post. These were Sh. Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí, Sh. Abú Zayd al-Riyámí, Sd. Hilál b. 'Alí al-Bú Sa'ídí, and Imam Sálím al-Kharúşí. The study has explained the causes which prevented the election of the other three candidates and brought about the unanimous election of Imam Sálím for the post of Imam.

Imam Sálím assumed the responsibilities of his office immediately from the day of his election when he proclaimed the Imamate and wrote several letters to the leaders of Oman and its '*ulamá*', as well as to Sultan Fayşal and his Wális, in which he called on all of them to rally for his bay'ah and to submit to his authority. We have examined this correspondence, as well as the speeches made by the Imam and other prominent personalities, in order to shed light on the main features of Imam Sálím's policy programme.

We have discussed the political and military relations between the Imam and the Sultan. It has become apparent from this relationship that the Imam was able to achieve remarkable military successes during the summer months of the 1913. We have seen that the Interior had fell into the hands of the Imam and other Wiláyát of al-Sharqiyyah and al-Dháhirah, such as al-Muḍaybí, Badiyyah, Ibrá', 'Abrí, and al-Rustáq, declared their allegiance to him. In the first few months of the following year, the Imam succeeded in bringing under his authority both Nakhal and Wádí al-Ma'áwil. After these successes, the Imam directed his attention to the control of the coastal towns. However, his attempts to seize and annex Barká' in April 1914, and Muscat in January 1915 both failed, which compelled him to amend his plans, and remain distanced from these coastal towns throughout the period of his reign.

On the political side, the study has highlighted the attempts to bring about a reconciliation between the Imam and the Sultan. These efforts were initiated by Sh. 'Isà

b. Ṣálih al-Ḥáarithí soon after the proclamation of the Imamate. He was either tacitly encouraged by the Sultan to pursue his efforts at conciliation, or made them on his own initiative, encouraged by the support of the Shaykhs of the Wádí Samá'il. Another peace initiative was conducted by Sh. Ḥamdán b. Záyid, the ruler of Abú Dhabi in November 1913, and another initiative by Sh. Sulṭán b. Muhammad al-Na'ímí, the ruler of al-Buraymí in January- February 1915. We have seen that both attempts failed as a result of the Imam's rejection of their terms. Then came the two peace initiatives by the British PAM in September, 1915 and September, 1919, both of which also failed. The terms of the 1915 peace effort postulated that the Imam should hand back the region of Wádí Samá'il to the Sultan. In the 1919 peace initiative, the Sultan's primary condition for peace was that the Imam should return the gardens he had confiscated to their owners, but conceded this point, in exchange for the return of Wádí Samá'il. However, as has been pointed out, the Imam rejected all these terms, apparently because he was hopeful of much greater concessions from the Sultan. Thus, the Sultan on his part, imposed heavy taxes on the produce of the Interior, which finally led to widespread confusion and discontent among the Omanis, who under the pressure and hardships, became openly critical of the Imam's policies and attitude, especially in the last year of his reign.

The study has paid particular attention to the relationship between the Imam and the Omani tribes; it explored the dimensions of this relationship, in terms of profiles of the tribes involved and the extent to which they influenced the Imam's policies. The tribes have been classified on political and geographical bases. We have tried to explain that some of these tribes completely submitted to the Imam's unrivalled authority, while other tribes, such as Ya'áqíb, al-Durú', al-Hishm and Āl Wahíbah, only declared their loyalty, which the Imam accepted. The study has tried to give short profiles of each tribe, its importance for the Imamate, as well as a brief account of some of the most prominent of its members who gained fame during the period under discussion.

In discussing the Imam's local administration we have shown that he had adopted a traditional Islamic system of government. At the top of the hierarchy in this system, stood the Imam as the head of state, who was responsible for duties such as the *Ṣalát al-Jum'ah* (the Friday prayer), the organisation and leadership of the army and the

appointment of government employees. The Imam was aided in such duties by a nominal council composed of a number of '*ulamá*' and leaders, which met when important issues arose. This council was called the Consultative Council.

The study has also pointed out that the Imam, for a long period, suffered from the general weakness of the economy as a result of the meagreness of the sources of government revenue coming into *Bayt al-Mál*, compounded by large increases of expenditure in many different fields, such as on the Imam's many military operations.

The study has also brought to light fresh information about many important figures who played significant roles in the Imamate of Imam Sálím, and who assumed posts such as Qádis, Wális, teachers and clerks, together with a mention of the places where they worked and the offices they had assumed.

However, for every epoch, there is an end, and the end of the Imam's era came on his assassination in 1338/1920 at the hands of a Bedouin Arab called Abú Bisrah Wald al-Tawbalí from *Ál Wahíbah* tribe, a Bedouin tribe with many branches. It is apparent from our assessment of the causes and motivations which led Abú Bisrah to carry out the act of assassination, that he fell prey to the instigations and insinuations of malefactors from his own tribe. However, the true causes and the authentic motivation for the assassination remained a mystery and were buried with the assassin himself, who was killed after a year, as was evident from his disappearance in the al-Dháhirah Province. As a result of the death of Imam Sálím, a peace agreement became possible in 1920 between his successor, Imam Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh al-Khalílí and Sultan Sd. Taymúr b. Fayṣal (1913-1932). This peace agreement came to be known as the Treaty of al-Síb. According to the terms of the treaty, Oman was divided into two political divisions, independent of one another. This situation continued to be effective and characterized the Omani internal political situation until the death of Imam Muḥammad al-Khalílí. After that Sultan Sd. Sa'íd b. Taymúr (1932-1970) refused to abide by the terms of the treaty, since, in his view, it made no claims regarding its continuity, and therefore, it was valid and binding only for those who signed it. The Sultan, moreover, did not approve of the new Imam. For these reasons, there ensued a lengthy debate on the interpretation of the terms of the Treaty of al-Síb in the 1950s and 1960s, in the corridors of the United

Nations. This long debate ended with the inauguration of a new era in 1970, under the leadership of Sultan Qábús b. Sa'íd.

In this thesis, we have attempted to correct some of the misconceptions regarding Omani history during the period under discussion. Most writers have wrongly cited names of places, personalities and events. This has been demonstrated in the thesis by consulting original Omani sources. Some examples of these errors are Nizwah mistakenly taken for Nazwà, Bahlah as Bahlà, Mashá'if as Mashá'iq, etc. Also Imam Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúsí has been cited as Ráshid al-Kharúsí and Sh. Ĥimyar b. Náşir al-Nabhání as Ĥumayd b. Náşir al-Nabhání. Moreover, some Arab studies suggest that the Imam was a leader of a political party before he was chosen as Imam, which we have shown to be untrue. Another example of misconception is that some considered the revival of the Imamate as a result of a coalition between tribal parties, but the thesis, on the basis of documentary evidence, has established that the revival of the Imamate was based on religious law.

In sum, we have presented a basic and documented account of this important period in the modern history of the Ibáđí Imamate and thus made a modest contribution towards filling the gap in the literature on this period.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1) Arabic Sources

(a) Documents (found with author)

- (1) A letter from Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh al-Khalífí to his father, dated 5th Ramaḍán 1331.
- (2) A letter from Sh. Násir b. Sálím al-Ruwáḥí to Imam Sálím, dated 13th Rabí’ II, 1333.
- (3) Report written by Sd. Taymúr to Sd. Khalífah b. Ḥárib, Sultan of Zanzibar, about the Imam's attack on Barká’ in April, 1914.
- (4) Some papers written by Sh ‘Abdallāh b. Imam Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúsí (still alive) about the *Karámát* of his father, Imam Sálím b. Ráshid.
- (5) Some papers written by Sh. Sayf b. Sa‘íd b. Muḥammad al-Ma‘walí (still alive) about the *Karámát* of Imam Sálím b. Ráshid and others.
- (6) A list of money given as assistance from Zanzibar to some notables of al-Qábil in Oman

(b) Manuscripts

- (1) al-‘Abrí, Ibráhím b. Sa‘íd. Tabṣirat al-Mu‘tabirín fi Ta’rīkh al-‘Abriyyín. A copy is in the writer's possession.
- (2) Abú al-‘Abbás, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Bakr. Masá’il al-Tawḥíd
- (3) Abú Zakariyyá, Yaḥyá b. Abú Bakr. al-Siyar wa Akhbár al-Ummah. MSS 9030C. Dár al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, Cairo.
- (4) al-‘Awtabí, Salamah b. Musallam. al-Ansáb. MSS 2461 History. Dár al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, Cairo.
- (5) al-Darjíní, Abú al-‘Abbás Aḥmad. Ṭabaqát al-Ibáḍiyyah. MSS 12561C. Dár al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, Cairo.
- (6) al-Ḥaḍramí, Abú Isháq. Mukhtaṣar al-Khiṣál. MSS B21591. Dár al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, Cairo.
- (7) al- Izkawi, Sarḥán b. Sa‘íd Kashf al Ghummah al-Jámi‘ li Akhbár al-Ummah. MSS Or 8076 B. L.
- (8) al-Kharúsí, Muhanná b. Khalfán. Lamḥah min Ta’rīkh Ḥayát al-Imám Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúsí wa Asbáb Wafátihi. 5pp. written in 21st October, 1982 for Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Bú Sa‘ídí. The latter made some comments on it.
- (9) al-Kindí, Aḥmad b. ‘Abdallāh. Kitáb al-Takhaṣiṣ
- (10) al-Kudmí, Abú Sa‘íd. Kitáb al-Istiqámah. MSS in Library of M.H.N.C. Oman.
- (11) al-Qalhátí, Abú ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad. al-Kashf wa al-Bayán. MSS Or 2606, B. L.
- (12) al-Riyámí, ‘Abd al-Raḥmán b. Násir. Díwán ‘Abd al-Raḥmán al-Riyámí. MSS in the library of Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Bú Sa‘ídí, Oman.
- (13) al-Ruqayshí, Aḥmad b. ‘Abdallāh b. Aḥmad. Miṣbáh al-Zalám. MSS B20549. Dár al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, Cairo.
- (14) al-Šá’ighí, Sálím b. Sa‘íd. Kanz al-Adíb wa Suláfat al-Labíb. MSS Add. 2896. Cambridge Library.
- (15) al-Shammákhí, Aḥmad S. Sharḥ Muqaddimat al-Tawḥíd. MSS B22572. Dár al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, Cairo.

(c) Printed books and articles

- (1) 'Abdalláh, 'Abd al-Ráziq Ibráhím. "al-Juhúd al-Dawliyyah li 'ilghá al-Raqíq fí Ifríqyá" al-Majallah al-Misriyyah li al-Dirását al-Ta'ríkhiyyah. vol.xxxii (1985), pp. 181-219.
- (2) 'Abdalláh, Muḥammad Mursi. Imárát al-Sáḥil wa 'Umán wa al-Dawlah al-Su'údiyyah al-úlá. Cairo, 1978.
- (3) 'Abd al-Amír, Muḥammad Amín. al-Ouwá al-Baḥriyyah fí al-Khalíj al-'Arabí fí al-Qarn al-Tási' 'Ashar. Baghdad, 1966.
- (4) 'Abd al-'Azíz, 'Abd al-Ghaní b. Ibráhím. al-Salám al-Baritání fí al-Khalíj al-'Arabí. Riyadh, 1981.
- (5) 'Abd al-Ráziq, Muḥammad b. Ismá'íl. al-Khawárij fí Bilád al-Maghrib. Casablanca, 1976.
- (6) 'Abd al-Wahháb, Aḥmad. "Baritányá wa Tijárat al-Raqíq fí Mintaqat al-Khalíj al-'Arabí wa Sharq Ifríqyá". Majallat Kuliyyat al-'Adáb, University of the Emirates. vol. i (1985), pp. 9-32.
- (7) al-'Ábid, Fú'ád S. Siyásat Baritányá fí al-Khalíj al-'Arabí. 2 vols. Kuwait, 1984.
- (8) Abú 'Alá, Maḥmúd Táhá. "'Umán fí al-Qarn al-'Ishrín", (review of J.E. Peterson/s Oman in Twentieth century). Majallat Dirását al-Khalíj wa al-Jazírah al-'Arabiyyah. vol. vii, no.21 (1980), pp. 143-159.
- (9) Abú 'Aliyyah, 'Abd al-Fattáh. al-Dawlah al-Su'údiyyah al-Thánayah. 4th ed. Riyadh, 1983.
- (10) Abú al-Faraj al-Iṣfáhání. al-Aghání. Beirut, 1961.
- (11) Abú Ḥakimah, Aḥmad Muṣṭafá. Ta'ríkh al-Kuwayt. Kuwait, 1984.
- (12) Abú al-Ḥawárf, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥawárf. "'Sírat Abú al-Ḥawárf". al-Siyar wa al-Jawábát, vol. i. Muscat, 1986.
- (13) Abú al-Mú'thir, al-Ṣalt b. Khamís "al-Aḥdáth". al-Siyar wa al-Jawábát, vol. i. Muscat, 1986.
- (14) _____. "Siyar wa Jawábát". al-Siyar wa al-Jawábát, vol. ii. Muscat, 1986.
- (15) _____. "fí Qitál Ahl al-Baghí". al-Siyar wa al-Jawábát, vol. ii. Muscat, 1986.
- (16) Abú Qaḥṭán, Khálid b. Qaḥṭán. Sírat Ibn Qaḥṭán. al-Siyar wa al-Jawábát, vol. i. Muscat, 1986.
- (17) Abú Tálíb, 'Alí b. Nahj al-Balághah. Edited by Sh. Muḥammad 'Abduh. 4th ed. Beirut, 1989.
- (18) Abú Yásín, Samír Muḥammad 'Alí. al-'Aláqát al-'Umániyyah al-Baritániyyah. Basrah, 1981.
- (19) Abú Zahrah, Muḥammad. al-Madháhib al-Islámiyyah. Cairo, 1959.
- (20) Aḥmad, Amín. Fajr al-Islam. Cairo, 1928.
- (21) _____. Zuhr al-Islám. Cairo, N.D.
- (22) Anon. "'Sírat al-Sawál fí al-Wiláyah". al-Siyar wa al-Jawábát, vol. i. Muscat, 1986.
- (23) al-'Aqíl, Muḥammad Arshíd. "al-Ḥurúbát al-Ibáḍiyyah fí 'Umán wa 'Aláqatihá al-Siyásiyyah ma' al-Dawlah al-'Abbásiyyah ḥatá Ṣuqūt al-Imámah al-Thánayah". Majallat Kuliyyat al-'Adáb, University of the Emirates. vol. i (1985), pp. 203- 226.
- (24) al-'Aqqád, Ṣaláh . al-Tayyárat al-Siyásiyyah fí al-Khalíj al-'Arabí. Cairo, 1975.
- (25) _____. "Taqrír al-Umam al-Muttaḥidah 'an Qaḍiyyat 'Umán". al-Siyásah al-Dawliyyah. vol. i 1965.
- (26) al-Ash'arí, 'Alí b. Ismá'íl. Maqálat al-Islámiyyín. Cairo, 1363 A.H.
- (27) al-'Awtabí, Salamah b. Musallam. al-Ansáb, vol.i (1981) and vol. ii (1984). Muscat.
- (28) al-'Aydarús, Muḥammad. al-Taṭawwurát al-Siyásiyyah fí Dawlat al-Imárát al-'Arabiyyah al-Muttaḥidah. Kuwait, 1983.
- (29) al-Baghdádí, Abú Maṣṣūr 'Abd al-Qádir. al-Farq bayn al-Firaq. Cairo, 1915.

- (30) _____. Uṣūl al-Dīn. 1st ed. Istanbul, 1928.
- (31) Bakhīt, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd. ‘Aṣr al-Khulafá’ al-Ráshídín. 2nd ed. Cairo, 1965.
- (32) al-Baládhurí, Abú Aḥmad b. Yaḥyá. ‘Ansáb al-‘Ashráf. vol. ii. al-Qúds, 1938
- (33) al-Baqlání, Abú Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib. al-Tamhíd. Cairo, 1947.
- (34) al-Baradí, Abú al-Qásim b. Ibráhím. al-Jawáhir al-Muntaqáh. Cairo, 1884.
- (35) al-Bárúní, Sulaymán Páshá. al-Azhár al-Riyádiyyah fí A’immat wa Mulúk al-Ibádiyyah. Muscat, 1987.
- (36) al-Bashíshí, Aḥmad. al-Firaq al-Islámiyyah. N. P. & N.D.
- (37) al-Bayyátí, Munír Ḥumayd. al-Dawlah al-Qánúniyyah wa al-Nizám al-Siyásí al-Islámí. Baghdád, 1979.
- (38) al-Bísyawí, Abu al-Ḥusayn. "al-Ḥujjah ‘Alá man Abṭal al-Sawál". al-Siyar wa al-Jawábat. vol. ii. Muscat, 1986.
- (39) _____. Mukhtaṣar al-Bísyawí. Zanzibár, 1886.
- (40) al-Búríní, Aḥmad Qásim. al-Imárát al-Sab’ álá al-Sáhil al-Akḥḍar. N.P. Dár al-Ḥikmah, N.D.
- (41) al-Bú Sa’ídí, Ḥamad b. Sayf. al-Mujaz al-Mufíd: Nabadhat min Ta’ríkh al-Bú Sa’íd. Muscat, 1988.
- (42) _____. Qalá’id al-Jumán fí Asmá’ ba’ḍ Shu‘ará’ ‘Umán. Muscat 1993.
- (43) Darwísh, Madíḥah Aḥmad. Salṭanat ‘Umán fí al-Qarnayn al-Thámin ‘Ashar wa-al-Tási’ ‘Ashar. Jiddah, 1982.
- (44) Dixon, ‘Abd al-Amír. al-Khiláfah al-Umawiyyah. London, 1971.
- (45) al-Dujaylí, Muḥammad. R. H. Firqat al-Azáriqah. Baghdád, 1973.
- (46) Fálíḥ, Ḥanḍal. al-Mufaṣṣal fí Ta’ríkh al-Imárát al-‘Arabiyyah. Abú Dhabi, 1983.
- (47) _____. al-Shuhúḥ wa Ta’ríkh Mintaqat Ru’ús al-Jibál. 1st ed. N.P. 1987.
- (48) al-Fará’, Abú Ya’lí Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn. al-Aḥkám al-Sultániyyah. Cairo, 1966.
- (49) Fayyáḍ, ‘Alí. Ḥarb al-Sha‘b fí ‘Umán: wa Yantaṣir al-Ḥufáḥ. Beirut, 1975.
- (50) al-Gháribí, ‘Alí. Ta’ríkh al-Firaq al-Islámiyyah. N.P & N.D.
- (51) al-Ghazálí, Abú Ḥámīd. Iḥyá ‘Ulúm al-Dín. 2nd ed. Cairo, 1316 A.H.
- (52) _____. Faḍá’ih al-Báṭiniyyah. Leiden, 1916.
- (53) al-Ḥanafí, Abú Muḥammad ‘Uthmán b. ‘Abdalláh. al-Firaq al-Muftariqah Bayn Ahl al-Ziyagh wa al-Zandaqah. Ankara, 1961.
- (54) al-Ḥáarithí, Sa’íd b. Ḥamad. al-Lu’lu’ al-Raṭīb. Muscat, 1985
- (55) al-Ḥáarithí, Sálím b. Ḥamad. al-‘Uqúd al-Fiddiyyah. Muscat, 1983.
- (56) Háshim, Mahdí Ṭálib. al-Ḥarakah al-Ibádiyyah fí al-Mashriq al-‘Arabí. 1st ed. Baghdad, 1981.
- (57) al-Ḥuṣrú, S. al-Bilád al-‘Arabiyyah wa al-Dawlah al-‘Uthmániyyah. Beirut, 1960.
- (58) Ibn ‘Adhárí, Abú ‘Abdalláh Muḥammad. al-Bayán al-Maghrib fí Akhbár al-Andalus wa al-Maghrib. Beirut, 1950.
- (59) Ibn al-Athír, Abú al-Ḥasan ‘Izz al-Dín. al-Kámil fí al-Ta’ríkh. vol. iv. Beirut, 1915.
- (60) Ibn Fayṣál, Fayṣál b. ‘Alí. al-Qadiyyah al-‘Umániyyah. Cairo, N.D.
- (61) Ibn Ḥaz m, Abu Muḥammad ‘Alí. al-Faṣil fí al-Milal wa al-Ahwá’ wa al-Niḥal. N.P. & N.D.
- (62) _____. al-Mahallá. Cairo, 1351 A.H.
- (63) Ibn Ibád, ‘Abdalláh. "Sírat Ibn Ibád". al-Siyar wa al-Jawábat. vol. ii. Muscat, 1986.

- (64) Ibn Kathír, al-Bidáyah wa al-Niháyah. vol. viii, Beirut, 1966.
- (65) Ibn Khaldún, al-Muqaddimah. Cario: Dár al-Sha‘ab, N.D.
- (66) Ibn Khayyát, Abú ‘Umar Khalífah. Ta’ríkh Ibn Khayyát Baghdad, 1967.
- (67) Ibn Ruzayq, Ḥumayd b. Muḥammad. Badr al-Tamám. Muscat, 1977.
- (68) _____. al-Fath al-Mubín. Muscat, 1977 .
- (69) _____. Diwán Ibn Ruzayq. Muscat, 1983.
- (70) _____. al-Shu‘á‘ al-Shái‘. Muscat, 1984.
- (71) _____. History of Imams and Seyyids of Oman Trans. by Badger, G.P. London, 1871.
- (72) al- Izkawi, Sarḥán b. Sa‘íd. Kashf al Ghummah al-Jámi‘ li Akhbár al-Ummah. Muscat, 1992.
- (73) _____. Annals of Oman , Trans. by Ross, E.C. Calcutta, 1874.
- (74) Jád, Muḥammad Táhá. "Tijárat al-Asliḥah fí Gharb Asyá." al-Majalah al-Ta’ríkhiyyah al-Miṣriyyah. vol. xvii (1970), pp.129-192.
- (75) _____. Siyásat Baríṭanyá fi Janúb al-Jazírah al-‘Arabiyyah 1798-1963. Cairo, N.D.
- (76) al-Jáḥiz, Abú ‘Uthmán ‘Amr b. Baḥr. . al-Bayan wa al-Tabyín. vol. i. Cairo, 1948.
- (77) Jahlán, ‘Idán. al-Fikr al-Siyásí ‘ind al-Ibádiyyah. 2nd ed. Muscat, 1991.
- (78) Jihád, Majíd Muḥyí al-Dín. "Tijárit al-Raqíq fi Ifríqiyá" al-Mu‘arrikh al-‘Arabí vol. xxx (1987) pp. 81-98.
- (79) Kaḥḥálah, ‘Umar Riḍá. Mu‘jam al-Qabá’il al-‘Arabiyyah al-Qadímah wa al-Ḥadíthah. 5th ed. Beirut, 1975.
- (80) Khulayfát, ‘Awaḍ Muḥammad. Nash’at al-Ḥarakah al-Ibádiyyah. Amman, 1978.
- (81) al-Khuṣaybí, Muḥammad b. Ráshid. Shaqá‘iq al-Nu‘mán ‘alá Sumút al-Jumán fí Shu‘ará’ ‘Umán. 3 vols. 2nd ed. Muscat. 1989.
- (82) al-Khuṣúṣí, Badr al-Dín ‘Abbás. Dirását fí Ta’ríkh al-Khalíj al-‘Arabí al-Ḥadíth wa al- Mu‘ásir. Kuwait, 1984.
- (83) _____. "al-Nashát al-Rúsí fí al-Khalíj al-‘Arabí 1887-1907". Majallat Dirását al-Khalíj wa al-Jazírah al-‘Arabiyyah. vol. vii, no. 18 (1979), pp. 113-139.
- (84) al-Lamkí, Náṣir b. Sulaymán. Tahání al-Imám Sálím b. Ráshid. Zanzibar, 1914.
- (85) Lughat al-‘Arab. vol. iii, part 1-4 (1913), Baghdad.
- (86) al-Mashhadání, Khalíl Ibráḥím. al-Taṭawwurat al-Siyásiyyah fi ‘Umán wa ‘Aláqatihá al-Khárijyyah, 1913-1932. (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Baghdad,1986).
- (87) al-Mawardí, Abú al-Ḥasan. al-Aḥkám al-Sultániyyah wa al-Wiláyát al-Díniyyah. Beirut, N.D.
- (88) Ministry of Omani Education. Lamahát ‘An Mádí al-Ta‘lím fí ‘Umán. Muscat, 1985.
- (89) Ministry of Omani Interior. al-Murshid al-‘Ámm li al-Wiláyát wa al-Qabá’il fí Salṭanat ‘Umán. Muscat, 1982.
- (90) al-Mubarrid, Muhammad b. Yazíd. al-Kámil fí al-Adab. Cairo, N.D.
- (91) al-Mughírí, Sa‘íd b. ‘Alí. Juhaynat al-Akhbár fí Ta’ríkh Zanjibar. Muscat, 1979.
- (92) Muḥammad, Su‘ád Máhir. "al-Istihkám al- Ḥarbiyyah bi-Salṭanat ‘Uman", al-Dárah vol. vii, no.3 (1982), pp. 202-6.
- (93) al-Mukhtár, Ṣaláḥ al-Dín. Ta’ríkh al-Mamlakah al-‘Arabiyyah al-Su‘údiyyah. Beirut, 1390/1970.
- (94) al-Munqarí, Naṣr b. Záḥim. Waq‘at Ṣiffín. Cairo,1382 A.H.

- (95) al-Na'ímí, Sálím. "Zuhúr al-Khawárij". Majallat al-Majma' al-'ilmí al-'Iráqí, vol. xv (1967), p.10-35.
- (96) al-Nawawí, Yaḥyà b. Sharaf. al-Minháj fí Sharḥ Ṣaḥíḥ Muslim. vol. vii, N.P. & N.D.
- (97) Qal'aji, Qadari. al-Khalíj al-'Arabí. Beirut, 1992.
- (98) al-Qaraḏáwí, Muhammad. Fiqh al-Zakáh. Beirut, 1981.
- (99) Qásim, Jamál Zakariyyá. Dawlat Bú Sa'íd fí 'Umán wa Sharq Ifriqyá: 1741-1861. Cairo, 1968.
- (100) _____. al-Khalíj al-'Arabí 1914 - 1945. 1st ed. Cairo, 1973.
- (101) _____. al-Khalíj al-'Arabí 1840 - 1914. Kuwait, 1974.
- (102) _____. al-Khalíj al-'Arabí: 1507- 1840. Cairo, 1985.
- (103) _____. "al-Usus al-Ta'ríkhiyyah liwaḥdat al-Imárát wa Dawr al-Ist'imár fí tajzír'atihá" al-Majallah al-Ta'ríkhiyyah al-Miṣriyyah. vol. xii (1969), pp. 167-89.
- (104) _____. "al-Mu'aththirát al-Siyásiyyah li al-Ḥarb al-'Ālamiyyah al-úlá 'Alá al-Khalíj al-'Arabí" al-Majallah al-Ta'ríkhiyyah al-Miṣriyyah. vol. xvi (1969), pp.115-78.
- (105) _____. "Baríṭanyá wa al-Khalíj al-'Arabí fí al-Ḥarb al-'Ālamiyyah al-úlá". Majallat Dirását al-khalíj wa al-Jazírah al-'Arabiyyah. vol. i, no.3 (Jul.1975), pp. 87-110.
- (106) _____. "al-Uṣúl al-Ta'ríkhiyyah li Qaḏiyyat 'Umán" al-Majallah al-Ta'ríkhiyyah al-Miṣriyyah vol. xii (1965), pp. 168-189.
- (107) al-Rayyis, Muḥammad Diyá' al-Dín. al-Nazariyyát al-Siyásiyyah al-Islámiyyah. Cairo, 1957.
- (108) al-Rází, Abú Ḥátim Aḥmad b. Ḥamdán. al-Zínah fí al-Kalimát al-Islámiyyah. Cairo, 1970.
- (109) Sa'id, Amín. al-Khalíj al-'Arabi fí Ta'ríkhihi al-Siyásí wa Nahḏatihi al-Ḥadíthah. Beirut, 1962.
- (110) al- Sálímí, 'Abdalláh b. Ḥumayd. Tuḥfat al- A'yán bi Sírat Ahl 'Umán. Muscat, 1978.
- (111) al- Sálímí, Muḥammad b. 'Abdalláh. Nahḏat al-A'yán bi Hurriyyat 'Umán. Cairo. N.D.
- (112) al-Sálímí. Muḥammad b. Shíkhán. Díwán Ibn Shíkhán. N.P & N. D.
- (113) al-Sayyár, 'Āishah. Dawlat al-Ya'áribah. Beirut, 1974.
- (114) Shahdád, Ibráhim Muḥammad. al-Sirá' al-Dákhilí fí 'Umán Khilál al-Qarn al-'Ishrín,1913-75. al-Dawḥah, 1981.
- (115) al-Shahrastání, Abú al-Faṭḥ Muḥammad. al-Milal wa al-Niḥal. Cairo, 1961.
- (116) _____. Niháyat al-Aqdám fí 'ilm al-Kalám. Baghdad, N.D.
- (117) Shalabí, Aḥmad. Mawsú'at al-Ta'ríkḥ al-Islámí wa al-Ḥadárah al-Islámiyyah. Cairo, 1978.
- (118) al-Shammákhí, Aḥmad b.Sa'íd. al-Siyar. Cairo, 1884.
- (119) al-Sharíf, Walíd. "al- Ittihád al-Súfyatí wa Mintaqat al-Khalíj". Majallat Dirását al-Khalíj wa al-Jazírah al-'Arabiyyah, vol. ii, no.5 (1976), pp. 87-104.
- (120) al-Siyábí, Sálím b. Ḥumúd. al-'Unwán fí Ta'ríkḥ 'Umán. Beirut, 1965.
- (121) _____. Is'áf al-A'yán fí Ansáb Ahl 'Umán. Beirut, 1965.
- (122) _____. 'Ídāḥ al-Ma'álim fí Ta'ríkḥ al-Qawásim. Damascus, 1976.
- (123) _____. 'Umán 'Abr al-Ta'ríkḥ. 4 vols. Muscat, 1982.
- (124) Sultanate of Oman. Masírat al-Khayr. 6 vols. Muscat, 1986.
- (125) al-Ṭabarí, Abú Ja'far Muḥammad b. Jarír. Ta'ríkḥ al-Rusul wa al-Mulúk. vol. v, N.P & N.D.
- (126) Tajribat Dawlat al-Imárát al-'Arabiyyah al-Muttaḥidah, 3rd ed. Beirut, 1986.
- (127) al-Takrítí, S.T. al-Sirá' 'Alá al-Khalíj al-'Arabí. Baghdád, N.D.

- (128) al-Tamímí, 'Abd al-Málik Khalaf. "Barítányá wa Tijárat al-Raqíq fí Mıntıqat al-Khalíj al-'Arabí 1820-1928". al-Majallah al-Ta'rikhiyyah li al-Dirásat al-'Uthmáníyyah, vol. i-ii (1990), pp.73-91.
- (129) Umar, Fárúq. "Malámiḥ min Ta'ríkh al-Khawárij al-Ibáḍiyyah". al-Mu'rrikh al-'Arabí, vol. ii (1975), Baghdad.
- (130) _____. Ta'ríkh al-Khalíj al-'Arabí. 2nd ed. Baghdad, 1985.
- (131) _____. al-Ta'ríkh al-Islámí wa fikr al-Qarn al-'Ishrín. 2nd ed. Baghdad, 1985.
- (132) Wahbah, Háfiz. Jazírat al-'Arab fí al-Qarn al-'Ishrín. 5th ed. Cairo, 1967.
- (133) _____. Khamsún 'Ām fí Jazírat al-'Arab. Cairo, 1960.
- (134) Yághí, Ismá'íl Aḥmad. "al-'Aláqát al-Barítániyyah - al-'Umániyyah fí al-Qarn al-Tási' 'Ashar". al-Dárah, vol. xiii (1981), pp. 117-40.
- (135) Zallúm, 'Abd al-Qádir. 'Umán wa al-Imárat al-Sab'. Beirut, 1963.
- (136) al-Ziriklí, Khayr al-Dín. al-A'lám. 3rd ed. Beirut, 1969.
- (137) Zuhdí, Samúr 'Abd al-Majíd. Ta'ríkh Sáhil 'Umán al-Siyásí. 2 vols. Kuwait, 1986.

(2) Non- Arabic Sources

(a) Documents

(i) Great Britain

(1) India office:

a) Board's collections, 1796-1856.

b) Bombay secret letters received:

(1) first runs from 1798-1833: 37 vols.

(2) second runs from 1781-1851: 20 vols.

c) Home Miscellaneous (Home series 1600-c1900) [vols.471 and 472]

(1) Broughton Papers (833-62)

(2) Malcolm Paper (733-7)

(3) Wellesley Papers (452-79)

d) Muscat Financial Affairs, file 1914, No. 1,173.

e) European Manuscripts Collections (IOR Accession of Private Collections 1937-77)

MSS EUR f 111&112 Curzon Collection (1899-1905)

MSS EUR c 144 Northbrook Collection 1872-1890)

MSS EUR f 126 Sir Lewis Pelly Collection (1858-1978)

MSS EUR f 125 Linlithgow collection (1936-1943)

MSS EUR C 49 Aitchison Papers

MSS EUR D 510 Hamiltom Collection (1895-1903)

MSS EUR D 558 Lansdowne Papers (1889-1894)

MSS EUR D 660 Hamiltom Grant Collection (1903-1930)

f) L/P&S/ Political and Secret Department Records, 1756-1950;

1-L/P&S/3 Home Correspondence 1807-1911.

2-L/P&S/6 Political and Secret Correspondence with India 1875-1911

3-L/P&S/10 Department Papers: Political and Secret Separate file 1902-1931 : (1315 vols).

L/P&S/10/25	L/P&S/10/27	L/P&S/10/110
L/P&S/10/211	L/P&S/10/216	L/P&S/10/235
L/P&S/10/308	L/P&S/10/397	L/P&S/10/398
L/P&S/10/423	L/P&S/10/425	L/P&S/10/426
L/P&S/10/427	L/P&S/10/449	L/P&S/10/647
L/P&S/10/800	L/P&S/10/928	L/P&S/10/944
L/P&S/10/974	L/P&S/10/994	L/P&S/10/1194

4-L/P&S/12 Department Papers (Political) External file & Collections c1931-1950
Muscat L/P&S/12/ 2951-3003.

g) R/15/1 Political Residency in the Gulf (Bushore) 1763-1948 (759 vols/files).

R/15/1/35/42

R/15/1/535

R/15/1/416

R/15/1/434

h) R/15/3 Political Agency, Bahrayn.

R/15/3/xxviii/2

R/15/3/11/1

R/15/3/337

i) R/15/6 Political Agency Muscat (PAM) 1867-1951 (546 vols).

R/15/6/ 24, Anglo-Persian Oil Company; Oil in Muscat and Oman: 9th Sep. 1921-23rd Jun 1928.

R/15/6/37, Major Sadler's diary during the rebellion of 1895 in Oman.

R/15/6/ 42, Oman affairs and the Imamate from July, 1913 to Dec., 1913

R/15/6/43, Oman affairs and the Imamate from Dec., 1913 to Dec., 1914

R/15/6/44, attack on garrison at Bait al-Falaj from 16 Aug, 1914 to 26 Oct, 1914

R/15/6/45, attack on Bait al-Falaj from 26 Dec. 1914 to 31 Oct, 1916

R/15/6/46, Peace negotiation between the Imam and the Sultan

R/15/6/47, Sidab detachment from 12 Jan to 4 Mar. 1915

R/15/6/48, Narrative of events from 17 Apr, 1917 to 20 Jul 1918

R/15/6/52, Sultan's abdication plans from 29th Oct, 1919 to 15 Nov, 1929.

R/15/6/204, Dependencies: Situation in Oman from 9th May 1917 to 9th Oct 1920

R/15/6/224, Relations of Muscat with other Arab rulers from 16 Jan. 1917- to 1st May 1933.

R/15/6/233, Biographical sketches of Sh. Salih b. 'Ali and 'Isa b. Salih, 1930

R/15/6/234, Sh. 'Isa b. Salih's activities, copy of biographical sketches 1937-40.

R/15/6/242, List of tribes and Shaykh of Oman.

R/15/6/243, Shaykh Sulayman b. Himyar of Jabal al-Akhdhar 5 Jan 1949.

R/15/6/244, Notes on tribes and Shaykhs of Oman 8th Mar. 1950-20th Dec 1950.

R/15/6/264, Relations of the Sultan with the tribes of Oman; Treaty of al-Sib 1920 (1920-34)

2) Public Record Office (Foreign Office) (F.O):

(a) F.O. 27 France F.O.27/3530

- (b) F.O 52/28
- (c) F.O. 54 Muscat (1834-1905, 36 vols);
F.O.54/4 F.O 54/5 F.O. 54/6 F.O. 54/7 F.O. 54/38
- (d) F.O. 60 Arms Trade
- (e) F.O. 60/591 F.O. 60/ 604 F.O. 60/642
- (f) F.O.84/61. Slave Trade
- (g) F.O. 248/1660
- (h) F.O. 364 Ottoman Empire
- (i) F.O.371/1695 (1913) F.O.371/1785 (1913) F.O.371/2416(1913-1916)
F.O.371/5264 (1920) F.O.371/15955 (1932) F.O 371/1820:22076; 37510
- (j) F.O.428 /2. F.O.428 /9.

3) Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons)

- (a) House of Commons Sessional Paper No. Cd 2281
- (b) House of Commons 4th series LXVII 295-

(ii) France

L' Oman et la France: Quelques éléments d'histoire. This book is translated to Arabic Under the title: 'Umán wa Faransá: Şafhát min al-Ta'ríkh. Paris, N.D.

(iii) United Nations

- (1) Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957-1971.
- (2) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Chapter XIII: Oman, A/6700/Add. 12. Dated on 15th November, 1967.
- (3) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Oman, A/5562/Add. 8. Dated on 8th October, 1963.
- (4) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Chapter XVII: Oman, A/7200/Add. 8. Dated on 8th November, 1968.

(iv) United States

National Archive Microfilm Publications Microcopy 722 Roll 7, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Asia 1910-1929 890a Oman.

(v) Zanzibar

Archives of Zanzibar :

ZA 3/1 & 8	AB 10/10, 89&109
AB 21/6	AB27/9
AN1/ 1-3	AO18/1
AM12/1	HC11

(b) Printed books and articles

- (1) 'Abdul-Kader, Ali. "Land property and land tenury in Islam" The Islamic Quarterly. vol. v, no. 3 (1959), pp. 3-11.
- (2) 'Abú Ḥakimah, Aḥmad Muṣṭafá. The Modern History of Kuwait 1750-1965. London, 1983.
- (3) Aitchison, G.V. (ed) A collection of Treaties Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries. vol. xi, 5th ed. New Delhi, 1933.
- (4) Anthony, J. D. Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Sultanate of Oman and the Emirates of Eastern Arabia. New York, 1976.
- (5) Arab Information Center. The Question of Oman: an Analysis of the British-Oman Dispute. (Information paper no. 13, New York, November, 1960).
- (6) ARAMCO, (Arabian American Oil Company Relations Department, Research Division) Oman and the Southern Shore of the Persian Gulf. Cairo, 1976.
- (7) Badeair, Abdulwahab Salah. "The Role of the 'Ulamá' in Modern Islamic Society: A Historical Perspective". The Islamic Quarterly. vol. xxxv, no. 2 (1993), pp. 233-67.
- (8) Badger, G.P. (Trans) History of Imams and Seyyids of Oman by Salil Ibn Ruzik (Ibn Ruzayq). London, 1871.
- (9) al-Baharna, H. M. The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States: A Study of their Treaty Relations and their International Problems. Manchester, 1968.
- (10) Bannerman, M. Graeme. Unity and disunity in Oman 1895-1920. (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1976).
- (11) Bathurst, R.D. The Ya'rubí Dynasty of Oman. (Unpublished, Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford, 1967).
- (12) Bell, G. "The Rebellion Against the Sultan of Muscat and Oman May 1913 to July 1916". The Arab War; Confidential Information for General Headquarters from Gertude Bell; being Despatches Reprinted from the secret "Arab Bulletin." London, 1940, pp. 20-28.
- (13) Bent, J. Theodore. "Exploration of the Frankincense Country Southern Arabia". G.J. vol. vi, no.2 (1895), pp. 110-34.
- (14) Bourdieu, P. "Systems of Education and System of Thought" International Social Sciences Journal. vol. xix (1967), pp. 338-58.
- (15) Burton, R. Zanzibar. vol. i, London, 1872.
- (16) Busch, B.C. Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914. Berkeley, 1967.
- (17) _____ Britain, India and the Arabs 1914-1921. Berkeley, 1971.
- (18) Calvin, H. Alllen. Oman: the Modernisation of the Sultanate. London, 1987.
- (19) _____ Sayyids, Shets and Sultans: Politics and Trade in Musqat under Āl Bú Sa'íd, 1785-1914. (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Washington, 1978).
- (20) Carter, J.R.L. Tribes in Oman. London, 1982.
- (21) Chauncy, F. C. "Notes on the Tribes of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman" in (I.O.) R15/6/244.
- (22) Coupland, Reginald. East Africa and its Invaders. New York, 1965.
- (23) Curzon, George. Persia and the Persian Question. 2 vols. London, 1892.

- (24) al-Dhahab, M. H. The Historical Development of Education in Oman: from the First Modern School in 1883 to the First Modern University in 1986. (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Boston College, 1987).
- (25) Dickson, H. R. The Arab of the Desert, London, 1949.
- (26) Dostal, W. "The Evolution of Bedouin Life". F. Gabrieli (ed.). L'Antica società Beduina Centro di studi semitice. Roma, p. 11-34.
- (27) _____. "Two South Arabian Tribes: al-Qurá and al-Harásís" *Arabian Studies* II (1973), pp. 33-42.
- (28) Eceles, Capt. G.J. "The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman". *J.C.A.S.*, vol. xi (1927), pp.19-42.
- (29) Eickelman, D. F. "From Theocracy to Monarchy: Authority and Legitimacy in Inner Oman 1935 - 57". *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. vol. xvii (1985), pp. 3-24.
- (30) _____. "Ibadism and the Sectarian Perspective". Oman: Economic, Social and Strategic Development, edited by B. R. Pridham, London, 1987.
- (31) _____. "Religious Tradition Economic, Domination and Political Legitimacy: Morocco and Oman". *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et Méditerranée*, vol. xxix (1980), pp. 17-30.
- (32) _____. "Religious Knowledge in Inner Oman". *Journal of Oman Studies*, vol. vi, no.3 (1980), pp. 163-72.
- (33) _____. "The Art of Memory: Islamic Education and Its Social Reproduction". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. xx (1978), pp. 485-516.
- (34) Ennami, A. K. Studies in Ibádiyyah (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1971).
- (35) Falcon, N.L. "From Musandam to the Iranian Mukran" *G.J.*, vol. cxli (1975), pp. 55-58.
- (36) al-Fárisí, 'Abdalláh b. Šálih . Sayyid Sa'íd b. Sultán: 1804 - 56. New Delhi, 1986.
- (37) Fraser, L. "Gun Running in the Persian Gulf" *Proceeding of the R.C.A.S.* vol. xxx (1908).
- (38) Freeth, Zahra and H.V.F. Winstone, Explorers of Arabia from the Renaissance to the End of the Victorian Era. New York, 1978.
- (39) Gabriel, T. "Rural Change in the Sultanate of Oman: Social Organisation in the Wahiba Sands Region". *Asian Affairs*, vol. xix (1988), pp. 154-63.
- (40) Gooch, G.& H. Temperley (eds). British Documents on the Origins of the War. London, 1926.
- (41) Graves, P. The Life of Sir Percy Cox. London, 1914.
- (42) Great Britain. "A Handbook of Arabia". vol. i, London, 1916.
- (43) Grohmann, Adol. "Maskat". *EI-1*, vol. iii, pp. 391-3.
- (44) _____. "Muṭrah". *EI-1*, vol. iii, p. 414.
- (45) _____. "Oman". *EI-1*, vol. iii, pp. 975-7.
- (46) Halliday, F. Arabia without Sultans. London, 1974.
- (47) Harrison, P.W. "The Arabs of Oman" *The Moslim World*, vol. xxiv (1934), pp. 262-70.
- (48) al-Háshimy, Sa'íd M. Relations between Oman and the States of Eastern Arabia 1804-1956 as Shown in the Kitáb Badr al-Tamám fí Sírat Sa'íd b. Sultán of Ibn Ruzayq. (Unpublished M.Phil. Thesis, University of Leeds, October, 1990).
- (49) Hawley, D. Oman and its Renaissance. London, 1977.

- (50) Hay, R. "Great Britain's Relations with Y^emen, and Oman". Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. xi, no. 5 (1960), pp. 142-9.
- (51) _____ The Persian Gulf States. Washington, 1959.
- (52) _____ "The Persian Gulf States and their Boundary Problems" G. J. vol. cxx, no. 4 (1954), pp. 433-45.
- (53) Headley, R.L. "'Awámir". EI-2, vol. i p. 759.
- (54) _____ "al-Bátina". EI-2, vol. i p. 1098.
- (55) _____ "Some Surprising Aspects of Oman History". Asian Affairs, vol. xiii (1982), pp. 28-39.
- (56) Heard-Bey, F. "The Gulf States and Oman in Transition". Asian Affairs vol. lix (1972), pp. 14-22.
- (57) _____ From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. London, 1982.
- (58) _____ "Social Changes in the Gulf States and Oman". Asian Affairs, vol. lix (1972), pp.309-16.
- (59) Howarth, David. The Desert King Ibn Saud and his Arabia. New York, 1964.
- (60) Hudson R.G.S. and Chatton, M. "The Musandam Limestone of Oman Arabia" Notes et Mémoires Sur le Moyen-Orient. vol. vii (1959), pp. 69-93.
- (61) Hurewitz, J.C. (Ed). The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record. vol. 2. 2nd ed. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press 1979.
- (62) Kelly, J. B. Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880. London, 1979.
- (63) _____ "Buraimi Oasis Dispute" International Affairs, vol. xxxii, no 3 (1956), pp. 318-26.
- (64) _____ Eastern Arabian Frontiers. London, 1964.
- (65) _____ Arabia, the Gulf and the West. London, 1980.
- (66) _____ "prevalence of Furies; Tribes, Politics and Religion in Oman and Trucial Oman" In Derek Hopwood (Ed). The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics. London, 1972, pp. 107-41.
- (67) _____ "Sultanate and Imamate in Oman". Chatham House Memoranda. London, Oxford Univ. Press, For Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, 1959.
- (68) _____ "Hādrāmaut, Oman and Dhufar; the Experience of Revolution". Middle Eastern Studies vol. xii, no. 2 (1976), pp. 213-30.
- (69) _____ "The British Position in the Persian Gulf ". The World Today, vol. xx (1964), pp. 238-49.
- (70) _____ "Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in Eastern Arabia". International Affairs, vol. xxxiv, no.1 (1968), pp. 16-24.
- (71) el-Khatāb, M. Fathalla and Kabbani, Issam. "British Aggression Against the Imamate of Oman". British Imperialism in Southern Arabia. Part ii, Arab Information Center (Information paper no. 6) New York, November, 1958, pp. 43-57.
- (72) Kumar, R. "The Jissah Lease: An Episode in Anglo-French Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf". Journal of Indian History, vol. xlii (1964), pp. 301-13.
- (73) _____ "Note and Memoranda: British Attitude Towards the Ibādiyya Revivalist Movement in East Arabia". International Studies, vol. iii, no. 4 (1962), pp. 443-50.
- (74) Landen, R.G. Oman since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society. New Jersey, 1967.
- (75) Lewicki, T. "Ibādiyya". EI-2, vol. iii pp. 648-60.

- (76) Liebesny, H. J. "International Relations of Arabia , the Dependent Area". The Middle East Journal, vol. i (1947), pp. 148-68.
- (77) Lorimer, J. G. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf; Oman and Central Arabia. 8 vols. London, 1986. (Arabic trans. by Office of the Ruler of Qatar , 14 vols. al-Dawhah, 1967).
- (78) al-Ma'marí, Aḥmad b. Ḥ. Oman and East Africa. 1st ed. New Delhi, 1979.
- (79) Mandaville, J. " Banú Hiná' ". EI-2, vol. iii p.403.
- (80) _____ " al-Ḥubús". EI-2, vol. iii p. 537.
- (81) Marlow, J. The Persian Gulf in The Twentieth Century. London, 1962.
- (82) Matthews, C.D. "al-Báṭāhira". EI-2, vol. i p. 1091.
- (83) _____ " al-Durú' ". EI-2, vol. ii p. 630-1.
- (84) _____ " al-Ḥarásís ". EI-2, vol. iii p.176-7.
- (85) Melamind, Alexander. "The Buraimi Oasis Dispute". Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. vii, no. 2 (1956), pp. 56-63.
- (86) Mertz, R. A. Education and Manpower in Arabia Gulf. Beirut, 1972.
- (87) Miles, S. B. The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf. London, 1919.
- (88) _____. "Journal of an Excursion in Oman in South-East Arabia". G.J. vol. vii (1896), pp. 522-37.
- (89) _____. "Note on the tribes of Oman". (Adm. R. 1880-1) pp. 29-44).
- (90) _____. "Across the Green Mountains of Oman" G.J. vol. xviii (1901), pp. 465-98.
- (91) _____. " On the Border of the Great Desert: a Journey in Oman" G.J. vol. xxxvi, no. 2 (Aug. 1910) pp. 159-78; and no.4 (Oct. 1910), pp.405-25.
- (92) Morsi, M.M. Education in the Arab Gulf States. al-Dawhah, 1990.
- (93) al-Mousawi, H.B.A.S. A history of Omani-British relations with special reference to the period 1888-1920. (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Glasgow University, 1990).
- (94) Muḥammad, Khalíl. The Arab States and the Arab League. vol. ii Beirut.1962-4.
- (95) Murphy, Lit. Col. C.C.R. Soldiers of the Prophet. London, 1921.
- (96) Muscat and Oman. " Muscat and Oman". The Middle East Journal, vol. xi, no. 3 (1957), pp. 282-4.
- (97) Netton, I.R. (ed). Arabia and the Gulf: from Traditional Society to Modern States. London, 1986.
- (98) Omar, Haliq. "The Buraimi Dispute" in British Imperialism in Southern Arabia, Part iii, Arab Information Center (Information paper no. 6) New York, November, 1958, pp. 59-86.
- (99) Palgrave, W. G. Central and East Arabia. vol. ii. London, 1862.
- (100) Peterson, J.E. Oman in the Twentieth Century. London, 1978.
- (101) _____. " The Revival of the Ibádí Imamate in Oman and the Threat to Muscat 1913-20". Arabian Studies III, pp. 165-88.
- (102) _____ "Britain and 'the Oman War: an Arabian Entanglement". Asian Affairs, vol. lxiii (1976), pp. 285-98.
- (103) _____ "Oman's Odyssey: From Imamate to Sultanate". Oman: Economic, Social and Strategic Development, edited by B. R. Pridham, London, 1987.
- (104) _____. "Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia". The Middle East Journal, vol. xxxi (1977), pp. 297-312.

- (105) Philby, H. St. B. Arabia. London, 1930.
- (106) Phillips, W. Oman: A History London, 1971.
- (107) Porter, J.D. (ed). Oman and the Persian Gulf, 1835-1949. Salisbury, 1982.
- (108) Preece, R.M. "The Traditional State of 'Uman-A sketch." SAIS Review, vol. x (1965), pp. 26-32.
- (109) Pridham, B. R. (ed). Oman: Economic, Social and Strategic Development. London, 1987.
- (110) _____ "Oman: Change or Continuity?". Arabia and the Gulf: from Traditional Society to Modern States, edited by Ian. R. Netton. London, 1986, pp. 132-55.
- (111) Records of Oman 1867-1947 (R.O.). Archive Editions, 12 vols. London, 1988 & 1993.
- (112) Rentz, G. "al-Buraymí". EI-2, vol. i pp. 1313-4.
- (113) _____ "al-Djanaba". EI-2, vol. ii p.40.
- (114) Rubinacci, R. "the Ibádís". Religion in the Middle East. vol. ii (1969), pp.302-317.
- (115) _____ "Djabir b. Zayd" EI-2, vol. i pp. 358f.
- (116) Ruete, Said. "The Al Bu Said Dynasty in Arabia and East Africa". J.C.A.S. vol. xvi, no. 4 (1929), pp. 417-32.
- (117) _____ "Dates and References of the History of the Al-Bu Said Dynasty". J.C.A.S. vol. xviii, no. 2 (1931), pp. 233-59.
- (118) Russell, C.E.B. General Rigby, Zanzibar and the Slave Trade. London, 1935.
- (119) Saldanha, J. A. Précis on the Slave Trade in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, 1873-1905. Simla, 1906.
- (120) _____. Précis on Masqat Affairs, 1869-1872. Simla, 1906.
- (121) _____. Précis on Masqat Affairs, 1872-1892. Simla, 1906.
- (122) Sanger, R.H. The Arabian Peninsular. New york, 1954.
- (123) Saudi Arabia. Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia. Arbitration for the Settlement of the Territories Dispute between Muscat and Abu Dhabi on one side and Saudi Arabia on the other. Cairo. 1955.
- (124) Speece, M. "Aspects of the Economic Dualism in Omam 1830-1930". International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. xxi (1989), pp. 495-515.
- (125) _____ Sultan and Imam: an Analysis of Economic Dualism in Oman. (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Arizona, 1981).
- (126) Strothmann, R. "Barbar und Ibaditen" Dar Islam, vol. xvii (1928), pp. 258-79.
- (127) Sultanate of Oman. Geographical Introduction. vol. i. Stuttgart, 1980.
- (128) al-Tabatabai, Talib Abbas. The Conflict Between the Sultanate of Muscat and the Imamate of Oman: History, Politics and Legal Aspect. (Unpublished M. A. Theses, Long Island univ., 1964).
- (129) Thesiger, W. "Desert Borderland of Oman". G.J. vol. cxvi, nos. 4-6 (1950), pp. 137-71 .
- (130) _____ Arabian Sands. London, 1959.
- (131) _____ "the Badú of Southern Arabia" JRCAS, vol. xxxvii, no. 1 (1950), pp. 53-61.
- (132) Thomas, Bertram. "A Journey Into the Rubá al-Khali". G.J. vol. lxxvii, no.1 (1931), pp.1-37.
- (133) _____ "Arab Rule under the Al Bu Said Dynasty of Oman ". Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. xxiv (1938), pp.27-53.
- (134) Tourneau, R. LE. " Bayt al-Mál". EI-2, vol. i pp. 1141-9.

- (135) Ubaydlí, A. "'Abdullah al-Sálimí's role in the Ibádí revival (1913-20)" Proceedings BRISMES, 1988, pp. 431-40.
- (136) Wahbah, Ḥáfiẓ. "Wahhábism in Arabia: Past and present". J.C.A.S. vol. xvi, no. 4 (1929), pp.458-67.
- (137) Watt, D.C. "Britain and the Future of the Persian Gulf States". The World Today, vol. xx (1964), pp. 488-13.
- (138) Wellsted, J. R. Travels in Arabia. London, 1838.
- (139) Wett, W.M. "Khárijite Thought in the Umayyad Period". Dar Islam, vol. 36 (1961), pp. 215-32.
- (140) Wilkinson, J. C. Water and Tribal Settlement in South-East Arabia: A study of the Afláj of Oman. Oxford, 1977.
- (141) _____ The Imamate Tradition of Oman. London, 1987.
- (142) _____ "The Oman question". G.J. vol. cxxxviii, no .3 (1971), pp. 361-37.
- (143) _____ " The Origins of the Omani State". Derek Hopwood (ed). The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972, pp.107-41.
- (144) _____ "Bayásirah and Bayádír". Arabian Studies I, 1974, pp.75-85.
- (145) _____ " The Ibadi Imama" B.S.O.A.S. vol. xxxix (1978), pp. 535-51.
- (146) _____ "Kalhát". EI-2, vol. iv pp. 500-1.
- (147) Wilson, A. T. The Persian Gulf. Oxford, 1954.
- (148) Yousuf, A.M. Education in Oman. UNESCO. Beirut, 1971.
- (149) Zwemer, S.M. Arabia, the Cradle of Islam. London, 1900.
- (150) _____ "Three Journeys in Northern Oman". G.J. vol. xix, no. 1 (Jan.1902), pp. 54-64.

(3) Catalogues:


- (1) Abá Ḥusayn, 'Alí. Fihris Makhḥūṭat al-Baḥrayn, 3 vols., Baḥrain vol. i, 2nd ed. (1983). vol. ii 1st ed.(1981); vol. iii (1986) (in English).
- (2) Abú 'Aliya, 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ḥasan. Masádir al-Dirásat fi Ta'ríkḥ al-Jaziriah al-'Arabiyyah al-Ḥadīth wa al-Mu'ásir, 1st ed. Riyadh, 1979.
- (3) Adam, Gacek. Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts in the Library of the Institute of Ismaili Studies, vol. i London, 1984.
- (4) Blochet, E. Bibliothèque Nationale. Paris. Catalogue des Manuscrits Arabes des Nouvelles Acquisitions (1884-1925)
- (5) Bruno and Colette le Cour Grandmaison. Contribution to a General Bibliography of Oman. Muscat, 1980.
- (6) Ellis, A.G. and Edwards, E. A Descriptive List of the Arabic Manuscripts Acquired by the Trustees of the British Museum Since 1894. London, 1912.
- (7) Ernest, Wickersheimer. Catalogue Général des Manuscrits des Bibliothèques Publiques de France-Strasbourg - B.U. Regionale, Paris, 1923.
- (8) Frank, A. Clements. Oman. (World Bibliographical series), vol. 29 London, 1981.
- (9) Korkees, Awad. Catalogue of the Arabic manuscripts in the World, 2 vols. 1st ed. Kuwait, 1948.


- (10) Kussaibi, Nazih. Catalogue Critique des Manuscrits Arabes de la Bibliothèque Nationale el Universitaire de Strasbourg. Kuwait, 1985.
- (11) Qá'imah Mukhtárah bi-Ba'd al-Makhtútát, bi Dár al-Makhtútát, at the M. N. H. C. Oman, 1983.
- (12) al-Shantí, Muḥammad. Arabic Manuscripts Microfilmed by the Institute from the manuscripts housed in San'á. 1st ed. Kuwait, 1988.
- (13) al-Shibání, Muḥammad. al-Makhtútát al-'Arabiyyah fi al-'Álam. 1st ed. Kuwait, 1953.
- (14) Tuson, P. The Records of the British Residency and Agencies in the Persian Gulf. London, 1984.
- (15) _____ Sources for Middle East Studies. The British Library Reference Division, London, 1984.


4) List of Personal Communications (oral)

- (1) Sd. al-Qáđí, Ḥamad b. Sayf b. Muḥammad al-Bu Sa'ídí, Adviser Judge at the Ministry of Justice, Awqáf and Islamic Affairs.
- (2) Sd. Ḥumúd b. 'Alí b. Náşir al-Bú Sa'íd, Adviser Judge at the Ministry of Justice, Awqáf and Islamic Affairs.
- (3) Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Bu Sa'ídí, adviser to His Majesty Sulṭán Qábús b. Sa'íd
- (4) Sh. al-Qáđí 'Abdalláh b. Imam Sálím al-Kharúşí (formerly, Qáđí of al-Rustáq)
- (5) Sh. al-Qáđí Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Sálím b. Záhir al-Ruqayshí (formerly, Qáđí of 'Ibrí)
- (6) Sh. 'Alí b. Jabr b. Su'úd b. 'Alí al-Jabrí
- (7) Sh. Ghusn b. Shámis al-Sayfí (d. November, 1994).
- (8) Sh. al-Qáđí Muḥammad b. Shámis al-Baṭṭáshí , Appellate Judge at the Ministry of Justice, Awqáf and Islamic Affairs.
- (9) Sh. al-Qáđí Náşir b. Ráshid al-Mundhirí, Appellate Judge at the Ministry of Justice, Awqáf and Islamic Affairs.
- (10) Sh. al- Qáđí Sa'íd b. Ḥamad b. Khamís al-Kharúşí (formerly, Qáđí of Buraymí)
- (11) Sh. Sa'íd b. Ḥamad b. Sulaymán al-Ḥáarith, (formerly Administrator of the Institution of Judges)
- (12) Sh. al-Qáđí, Sálím b. Ḥamad b. Sulaymán al-Ḥáarithí, Appellate Judge at the Ministry of Justice, Awqáf and Islamic Affairs.
- (13) Sh. Sálím b. Ḥumúd al-Siyábí (died on 28th Dece. 1993)
- (14) Sh. Sulaymán b. Khalaf al-Kharúşí, at the office of the adviser to H. M. Qábús b. Sa'íd
- (15) Sh. Sulṭán b. Sulaymán b. Ḥimyar b. Náşir al-Nabhání
- (16) Sh. al-Qáđí Su'úd b. Sulaymán al-Kindí (formerly, Qáđí of Nazwà)
- (17) Sh. Yaḥyá b. 'Abdalláh b. Sulaymán b. 'Abdalláh b. Sa'dalláh al-Nabhání
- (18) Sh. Yaḥyà b. Imam Sálím b. Ráshid al-Kharúşí

MAPS	304-309
1) Sultanate of Oman.....	305
2) The Provinces of Oman.....	306
3) Passing Map.....	307
4) Tribes Map.....	308
5) Territories of Imamate.....	309









Passing Map

The territories of the Imamate during Imam Sálím's reign (1331/1913-1338/1920)




FAMILY TREES	310-315
1) Āl Bú Sa‘íd (Rulers of Oman).....	311
2) Imam Sálím al-Kharúší.....	312
3) Sh.‘Isà b. Şáliḥ al-Ḥáarithí (leader of the Hináwi faction).....	312
4) Sh. Ḥimyar b. Náşir al-Riyámí (leader of the Gháfirí faction).....	313
5) Sh. Hilál b. Záhir al-Hiná‘í.....	313
6) Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad b. Sayf al-Bú Sa‘ídí.....	314
7) Sd. Su‘úd b. Ḥamad b. Hilál b. Muhammad al-Bú Sa‘ídí.....	314
8) Sd. Aḥmad b. Ibráhím b. Qays, the ruler of al-Rustáq.....	314
9) List of the PAMs, PRGs, and the Viceroys of India from 1900 to 1923.....	315

(1) Abbreviated descendants of Āl Bū Sa'íd Dynasty




(2) Abbreviated descendants of Imam Sálím b. Ráshid




(3) Abbreviated descenc

ḥ al-Háarithí


Šálih b. ‘Alí b. Násir b. Īsà b. Šálih al-Háarithí (1250/1834-1314/1896)




(4) Abbreviated descendants of Sh. Ḥimyar b. Násir




(5) Abbreviated descendants of the sons of Sh. Hilál b. Záhir




(6) Abbreviated descendants of Sd. Sayf b. Ḥamad Wálí of Nazwà
Ḥamad b. Sayf b. ʿĀmir b. Khalfán al-Bú Saʿídí



(7) Abbreviated descendants of Sd. Su'úd b. Ḥamad al-Bú Saʿídí




(8) Abbreviated descendants of ruler of al-Rustáq



(9) The table shows the list of Viceroys, PRG and PAM's names since, 1900 until 1923

The Year	Viceroy of India	Political Residents in Persian Gulf	Political Agent at Muscat
1900	- Lord Curzon	- Maj. M.J. Meade - Lt.Col. C.A.Kemball	- Capt. P.Z. Cox
1901	- Lord Curzon	- Lt.Col. C.A.Kemball	- Capt. P.Z. Cox
1902	- Lord Curzon	- Lt.Col. C.A.Kemball	- Capt. P.Z. Cox
1903	- Lord Curzon	- Lt.Col. C.A.Kemball	- Capt. P.Z. Cox
1904	- Lord Curzon - Lord Amptill	- Lt.Col. C.A.Kemball - Capt. P.Z. Cox	- Capt. P.Z. Cox - Cap.Lethbridge - Capt. W.G. Gray
1905	- Lord Curzon	- Capt. P.Z. Cox	- Capt. W.G. Gray
1906	- Lord Minto	- Capt. P.Z. Cox	- Capt. W.G. Gray - Lt W.H.L. Shakespear - Maj. W.G. Gray
1907	- Lord Minto	- Capt. P.Z. Cox	- Maj. W.G. Gray - Capt. N.Scott - Capt. F. McConaghey - Mr.R.E. Holland
1908	- Lord Minto	- Capt. P.Z. Cox	- Mr.R.E. Holland
1909	- Lord Minto	- Capt. P.Z. Cox	- Mr.R.E. Holland
1910	- Sir C. Hardinge	- Capt. P.Z. Cox	- Mr.R.E. Holland - Maj. A.P. Trevor
1911	- Sir C. Hardinge	- Capt. P.Z. Cox	- Maj. A.P. Trevor - Maj. S.G. Knox
1912	- Sir C. Hardinge	- Capt. P.Z. Cox - Mr.J.G. Lorimer	- Maj. S.G. Knox
1913	- Sir C. Hardinge	- Mr.J.G. Lorimer	- Maj. S.G. Knox
1914	- Sir C. Hardinge	- Mr.J.G. Lorimer - Maj. S.G. Knox - Sir Percy Cox - Maj. S.G. Knox	- Maj. S.G. Knox - Lt. Col. R.A. Benn
1915	- Sir C. Hardinge	- Maj. S.G. Knox - Maj. A.P. Trevor	- Maj. S.G. Knox - Maj. H. Stewart
1916	- Lord Chelmsford	- Sir Percy Cox - Maj. A.P.Trevor	- Lt .Col .Ducat - Maj.H.Stewart - Lt.Col. Ducat - Maj. A.R. Purton - Maj.E.B.Howell - Maj. King-Mason - Maj.L.B.H.Haworth
1917	- Lord Chelmsford	- Sir Percy Cox - Maj.A.P.Trevor - Mr. J.H. Bill	- Maj.L.B.H.Haworth
1918	- Lord Chelmsford	- Mr. J.H. Bill	- Maj.L.B.H.Haworth
1919	- Lord Chelmsford	- Mr. J.H. Bill - Maj. C.H. Gabriel - Lt.Col. A.P.Trevor	- Maj.L.B.H.Haworth - Mr. R.E.L. Wingate
1920	- Lord Chelmsford	- His Excel.Sir P. Cox - Lt Col. Sir A. Wilson - Lt. Col. A.P.Trevor	- Mr. R.E.L. Wingate - Mr.J. Gazder - Mr. R.E.L. Wingate
1921	- Lord Reading	- Lt. Col. A.P.Trevor	- Mr. R.E.L. Wingate - Maj. M.E. Rea
1922	- Lord Reading	- Lt. Col. A.P.Trevor	- Maj. M.E. Rea
1923	- Lord Reading	- Lt. Col. A.P.Trevor - Lt.Con. S.G. Knox - Lt. Col. A.P.Trevor	- Maj. M.E. Rea - Mr. R.E.L. Wingate - Mr.J. Gazder - Maj. R.G. Hinde

ILLUSTRATIONS	316-324
1) Views from Nazwà and Bahlà.....	317
2) The fort of al-Ḥazim.....	318
3) A view from Tanúf.....	318
4) A view from Samá'il.....	319
5) The forts of Bayt al-Falaj and Bayt al-Rudaydah.....	320
6) A view from al-Rustáq.....	321
7) The fort of al-Fayqayn in Manah.....	321
8) The forts of al-'Awábí and 'Ibrí.....	322
9) The forts of al-Qábil and Badiyyah.....	323
10) The forts of Ja'lán B. Bú 'Alí and al-Muḍaybí.....	324




A view from Nazwà






The fort of al-Hazim



A view from Tanūt



A view from Samá'il




The fort of Bayt al-Falaj



The Bayt al-Rudaydah in Barakat al-Mawz



A view from al-Rustáq




The fort of al-Fayqayn in Manah




The fort of al-'Awábí




The fort of 'Ibrí




The fort of al-Qábil



The fort of Badiyyah



The fort. of Ja'lán B. Bú 'Alí



The fort of al-Muḍaybí

APPENDICES	325-345
1) A letter from Sultan Fayṣal to PRG, dated 2nd Sha‘bán 1331.....	326
2) A letter from Sultan Fayṣal to PAM, dated 4th Sha‘bán 1331.....	327
3) A letter from PAM to Sh. ‘Isà , dated 6th Sha‘bán 1331.....	328
4) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 9th Sha‘bán 1331.....	329
5) A letter from Sultan Fayṣal to PAM, dated 27th Sha‘bán 1331.....	330
6) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 29th Sha‘bán 1331.....	331
7) A letter from PAM to Imam Sálím, dated 1st Ramaḍán 1331.....	332
8) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated the 30th Shawwál 1331.....	333
9) A letter from PAM to Sh. ‘Isà , dated 24th Jumádà I, 1333.....	334
10) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 4th Jumádà II, 1333.....	335
11) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 2nd Dhú al-Qi‘dah 1333.....	335
12) A letter from PAM to Sh. ‘Isà , dated 15th Jumádà II, 1333.....	336
13) A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 15th Shawwál 1333.....	337
14) A letter from PAM to Imam Sálím, dated 16th Shawwál, 1333	338
15) Demands of Imam Sálím, presented to the PAM at al-Síb on 6th Dhú al-Qi‘dah 1333/15th Sep. 1915.....	339
16) The Treaty of al-Síb.....	340
17) Proclamation issued by the Sultan regarding arm and ammunition.....	342
18) A letter from Sh. Muḥammad b. ‘Abdalláh al-Khalílí to his father	343
19) A letter from Sh. Sayf b. ‘Alí b. ‘Ámir al-Maskirí to Sh. Khamís b. ‘Alí al-Ma‘marí and Sh. Sa‘íd b. ‘Alí al-Mughírí in Zanzibar.....	344
20) List of Assistance from Zanzibar to some Notables of al-Qábil in Oman....	345

R/15/6/42

1913

25 ص

١٣٣١

تفضلنا بشرفك الكريم ونسألك عن حسن سيرتك
 ما تقرر له المهيبة القصدية الا لا تكلمت به في صلح فارس
 المخلص
 المخلص على القدر والشا ساني الرتبة والمكان صدقنا
 بعد هراء اسلام الوافر والشاء الفاخر ارجاء الباء والاضار عن
 العيون التي اذنت محرومة من جميع الافاق فاستبشروا المسترات غير
 على جنابك الفاضل انما كان في عيسى بن علي وادام الله وليتباعهم فاطنا وشارت
 وسقوط نزول وازكي في ابد يومنا القوي في قلوبنا صلحنا عن حتى خذنا اربابا
 ولا يخفى على جنابك السبب وكنا في ذلك طغنا زيادة وقد سمعنا على اسمايل
 دحروا الولد نادر في احسن والان هو في احضروا ما اتنا الان صرح بخبر
 وقد اطلعنا جناب صدقنا المكرم الميجرناكس على جميع الحقائق
 لاسيما ما نطلبه في حضرة المذموم الذي نرى العظمى من ايساعه
 وجناب الميجرناكس في المثل واليه لا بدنا خبر جنابك العالي ليذكرك
 هذا لما نرى ان افترض به جنابك السامي لحيث يقينا اننا الصدوق
 الصادق والخليل المخلص وكفى خلقا وثقتي بالدولة العلية الامكارات
 هذا طبعها مع سليم عبد الوج محمد وال ولد ربيع واطول

بعد سلم على حضرة صدوقنا الميجرناكس
 ههنا نقول الكتاب كما تطوع عليه راكنا سوف نرسله في الجبل
 بالم

1 A letter from Sultan Faysal to PRG, dated 2nd Sha'ban 1331/7th July 1913

نسخة

فتمت
والله اعلم
بما كنا
على
القول
الهدية

مفتي كنجي
المختار الشيخ الامام محمد باقر الخليلي

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
تذليل العساكر الفريضة
على بر سقط او صلح من خدونا
هذين المكامين عن العامين
وكانت تزيدهم وجلبهم
هذا والسالم
١٣٣١
مُصَنَّفَان

2 A letter from Sultan Fayçal to PAM, dated 4th Sha'bán 1331/9th July 1913

من ٢٦٥ - ٢٦٧ هـ ويستقطب في سنة ١٣٣١
٦ شعبان ١٣٣١

من امير ناكس نايب كورنلة الجيش اليتصر في الاستقطب

الاجناب كشيخ علي بن صالح الكارني بعد السلام عليك
لا بد انت خير قديماً بالفتنة الواضحة بينكم وبين حضرة سلفكم
المعظم في جبل بن توكي وفي ربيع الثاني ١٣١٣ هـ
لقد انتم تشرككم اعداء ناكس ياتي
الاكافه من يراه ويبدت فرقانك تروصلنا كتاب من بغداد في
الخليج بهذا المضمون انه تقرأ الى المصالح المصونة لرعايا الدولة
البريطانية في بلدتي مقط والمطرح قد عزمت الدولة البريطانية
اصدار اذار الى اكابر مشايخ اهل عمان ان فيما بعد ما يقع
من الخصومات منهم في حق حضرة اميرك فنصير لادترك دولة
المذكورة احداً منهم على ما تبين ابلرتين فنتذركم
بهذا الايت تامل فائام والتدري على مقط والمطرح و
كفى اخباكم بذلك

ومن حيث يبين بعض منكم تسواخذة التصيتم والندار
اكثر لكم ذلك يصير عندكم معلوماً ولكم السلام

3 A letter from PAM to Sh. 'Isà , dated 6th Sha'bán 1331/11th July 1913

(The same letter was also sent to the Imam, Sh. al-Sálimí and Sh. Himyar)

R/15/6/42

1913

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



وقل جاء الحق وزهق الباطل ان الباطل كان زهوقا فإمام
 العالمين المسلمين ووجه رب العالمين سلام من الله هذا اخو من
 الحضرة الميرزا قاسم ثابث الدرر واللائكيزية السلام على
 من اتبع الهدى ورضي عواقب الردى اما بعد فقد وصلني كتابكم
 المارح سادس تحياتك عن هذا العام فكرم فيهم ما ذكرتم وانتم تعلمون
 ان امر عمان الى انما من قديم الزمان وان كل من خالف العلماء
 فهو ضليك من الدرر من غير انتم المسلمين لا تصرف له في دولتهم
 ولا نفاذ حكمه وان فيه لا قد قام عليه العلم وارا بعد ظلمه
 وعزله فالى ان يعتزلوا وانه فقد هذه المدة الماضية بسبيل الغلبة
 والفقر والمسلمون لم يروىوا سلطنة ولا افعالهم وانتم معصية هدف
 الدولة يجب عليكم ان تكفوا عن امر المسلمين وليزومكم ان لا
 تتعدوا علينا وقرتنا فإله عينا عليه وكفى بالله وليا
 وكفى بالله نصيرا وصيونا انهم ونعم وكيلهم وقران مواسم كان
 انهم معهم وقرتنا كل على انهم فهو حسب ان الله بالغ امره
 قد جعل الله لكل شيء قدرا وكنته عن او امامه اخوة ناصر الله
 اخو من بيده قديم وثمان سنة اسم ١٣
 صحيح كتبه امام المسلمين بيده

Received through post office with post-
 mark d. 21.7.13 on the 21st July.
 [Signature]

4 A letter from Imam Sálím to PAM, dated 9th Sha'bán 1331/14th July 1913

R/15/6/42

في فصل بركي
 الاحباب صديقتنا المود الغزيرة اكرم حضرتكم ليجعل
 نايب دولة الفخيمة الدكتور تيم دام باجلال واکرام بعد تسليم الوافو عليكم
 لان يخفى على جنابك انك اليوم وصل هنا الولد حمد والى مظفر ومعهم بعض
 مشايخ بني جابر اربعين من وادي الجميل واما المشايخ شافتم جنابك
 وتحققتم ان لا يهت عليهم عمدة وكذلك جنابك خبير على ان الولد انا
 محصور في حصن ممايل مع قليلين من ربينا وحمس وبيتنا واهلهم في خطر عظيم
 من العصاة وتم اذا سقط يد يد و ممايل لانه ما بعد كظن وقوع تلك الحصة
 فما بقى التحفظ لتجلا رعاياكم بل ان سيدي خطر على سقوط المطرح ولا
 تبقى لهما الراحة ابدًا وهذه كفتنم كلها كما تبين من الاعلان الذي ارفق
 عليكم كانه من سالم بن راشد الخروصي وهو الامام فقه من تأسيس المحزن و
 القوانين عقداها بمشورة دولكم الفخيمة القيصريه فاما هذا الترتيب فقلنا
 اهل الغرض كزبانا انها حيلة من طرفكم وانا بالتحريم شائرم عن اسلمة
 الجديدة والرى كى نعرض عليهم استبعادا ففى هذه الاحوال اجوا ووقاهن
 اصداقنا المخلصين القديمين الدولة البريطانية العظمى العون في هذا وقت
 الحاجة واطلب منكم ارسال الجنود بما يقتضى نظر الدولة الفخيمة لرفع
 الحصار عن حصن ممايل او استرداده ان لزم ذلك حتى تسكت الكثرة
 وترجع الراحة لعاصمتنا وبلادنا وتجلنا وتجلكم جميعا من حيل اهل الغرض
 وتعدى الجهاد والى اسحق مضمون هذا الكتاب محققا جدا الى ان
 يصلنى الجواب من الدولة الفخيمة البريطانية فذا ما لزم ولكم حمد
 ٢٧ شعبان ١٣٣١ هـ

5 A letter from Sultan Fayṣal to PAM, dated 27th Sha‘bān 1331/1st August 1913

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

من إمام المسلمين سيدينا راشد الخروصي الحقة
 الميجرنا كسن نائب الدولة الانكليزية اما بعد ^{فالمسلم}
 على من اتبع الهدى كتابك وانا وذكرت عدم المعاصرة
 لرعيته في الحال والمال وليس القصد الاعتراض لكم
 ولا الرعيته انما القصد القيام بالعدل لما اثر الفساد
 وسفك الدماء حتى في موضع السلطنة ولم يكن من القائم
 انصاف وطول به فلم يفعل بل اثار القتل بين
 العشائر واخر اهوى على الشر وهذا الارضاه اذني
 ملك ولم تبحه مشروعة من الشرائع قال فظرو رؤساء
 القبائل اهل الجبل والعقد على القيام بالعدل دفعا
 للظلم وقد بلغنا ان طائفة من عسكركم نزلت بحريم
 مسكد فاعرفنا وجه هذا الاعتراض بيننا وبين
 من نصب لنا الخصومة فربح الجواب حر في يوم ٢٩ من
 شهر شعبان سنة ١٣٣١

بسم الله
 29/8/1331

٧٩١ هـ مسقط

٥ أغسطس ١٩١٣ م

١٢٣١ رمضان

من الميجر تالكس ص.د. نايب الدولة البعثية البريطانية
بني مسقط

الاجناب الشيخ سالم بن راشد الخروصي محترم
السلم عليكم ويهد فقد وصلنا كتابكم المحرر في شعبان ١٣٣١ هـ
وذكرت فيه ان طائفة من عسكرنا نزلت بحرية مسقط
وانك تفهم سبب ذلك فنجواو بك عن هذا ان عسكر
البريطانية قد نزل لصيانة مسقط والمطرح على وفق التحذير
المضمن باعلان حضرة سعادة السلطان تاريخه ٥ جمادى الآخرة
١٣١٣ هـ الذي قد ذكرت لك في كتابي مؤرخ ٦ شعبان ١٣٣١ هـ
اليك وفي كتب الخ اصحابك وبهذا سيدتبلن لكم ان
اي هجوم منكم على مسقط او المطرح باي قصد كان يستلزم
المصلاحة بينكم وبين دولتنا الكريمة البريطانية هذا هو الحكم
ص.د. الميجر تالكس ص.د. نايب الدولة البعثية البريطانية ومقطعه

SUB-ENCLOSURE No. 1

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
 يا امام المسلمين سلام من راشد الخوصص ومن معه من الروساء
 اليحضرة الاخيرة الميمون كس قضاة الدولة البريطانية تمسقط اما بعد فانا نحمد الله
 الذي جعلنا بك اربابا لهم ان احلوا بمان قد اطبقت كلمةهم على خلع سلطانهم واجتمعوا
 في القيا م عليه انكارا لما احدث على الاسلام من مخالفة الاوامر الشرعية
 وان تكاب المناهي واعزوا الناس بعضهم ببعض وفتشوا بك التفتاني البلاد
 واخذل به نظام العام وانتهت اليهم ات وسفكت الدماء ونهت الاموال
 وعطلت الحدود وضمرت حقوقهم فندد بك يا المسلمين له يترهم وعضبوا
 لما اراوا من الفتا واجتمعوا على هلك النهضة المباركة برجون بها صلاح
 البلاد والعباد وحيث ان احركت فقد انتهت الي واذاي سمايل بلغنا ان جنابكم
 قد انزلتم طائفة من عساكركم بدمشق والحمص ونواحيه فنظرنا في ذلك وخشينا
 ان تقع بيننا وبينكم مصادمة فتر بصناك في امرنا ومنعنا الفتايل عن
 البطش وامرناهم بالتحاشي عن عباياكم فامتنفوا ولا بد لهم من الامتناع كل ذلك
 تامر في امر دولتك وحرص على بقاء الصداقة بيننا فانا اقيم الحق ما تفرنا
 الا لذكركم بلغنا ان خطا بطا قد سرت علينا فقتضى التنقيب والشهجة
 ومثل جنابكم لا يخفي عليه كذب مثل ذلك والمقول من جنابكم رفع العساكر الحربية
 من مسقط ونواحيها ولكن ان شاء الله استعانا الوفاء بحضرة قبا واحفظ لرعاياكم
 وحماية انفسهم واموالهم وسنرون ان شاء الله استعانا الوفاء النمام واحول
 مطلق احوالهم ما يكون، وكتب هذا عن امرهم محمد بن عبد الله بن
 في يوم الاثنين ثنتون اكتوبر سنة 1331 صحیح من امام المسلمين سالم
 بن راشد الخوصص بيد



8 A letter from Imam Sálim and his the Chiefs to PAM, dated 30th Shawwál 1331/

2nd Octobar 1913

١٣٣٣
 Batein 4 Jumada II 1333
 20 April 1915



بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
 المقصم
 من امام المسلمين الميرزا محمد الخوصي كخنة البالوز قنصل الدولة
 الانكليزية اما بعد فلنا بك قد وصل وقرئنا جميع ما ذكرت
 والامر الذي تشير اليه عرفناه غير انه يحتاج لمناظرة ومساودة
 وامر الامة الى علماءها وهم متفرقون بالسقية وبنزوى والغزبية
 وما نحن نرسل اليهم حالا وما يؤول اليه نظرهم ويرجع اليه امرهم
 فيسكنه هذه واللام على من ابنته الذي هو ربيع عم جادي الاخرى
 سنة وكتبه باسم اخواننا من الميرزا محمد الخوصي بيده
 ١٣٣٣

From
 Salim Muhammad Salim
 Dec. 20/4/15

For translation see next page.

(23)

10 A letter from Imam Sálim to PAM, dated 4th Jumádà II, 1333/ 20th April 1915

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
 من امام المسلمين الميرزا محمد الخوصي الانبا قنصل الدولة البريطانيّة الانكليزية
 اللام على فضل شيخ الهدى ووجد كتابك وصلته وقد عمدنا الشيخ عيسى
 وفوضناه فيما يخصه علينا ولنا فخرنا وعظيم هذا وحرر ربيع عم جادي
 سنة وكتبه على محمد بن عبد الله بيده
 ١٣٣٣



11 A letter from Imam Sálim to PAM, dated 2nd Dhú al-Qi'dah 1333/ 13th Sep. 1915 15

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم



من امام المسلمين سالم بن شهاب الخروصي الاحضرة
 الكرنل قنصل الدولة الانجليزية البريطانية
 النائب بمكة سلم الله تعالى وهذا هـ
 ا ما بعد فلكنته السابقة قد وصلت وما كرت
 لنا من الاعتراض بالصلح بيننا والسيد تيمور
 صار معلوما فله تأس انت كقولك ولكن نرى
 المناطات من بعيد غير ممكنة فان كنت تحب
 الملاقاة على ما ذكرت ولكم حميد بن سعيد فله بد
 ان فوجت اليكم احدا من مختصه من ارباب الدولة
 والوعد من كبرهك والكتاب على ان سوتك
 الوصل هذا ما لنم وكنته من امر عيسى صلح
 بيدي في يوم النصف من شهر شوال سنة 1333
 صحح من امام المسلمين سالم بن شهاب الخروصي

صح هذا كتبه عيسى صلح

صح هذا كتبه عيسى صلح

صح عبدالله بن شهاب الخروصي



Received 23/3/15.

R/15/6/46

1915

Letter from P.A. Mascot to Imam ,Salim bin Rashid al Kharusi
in reply to his of 15th Shawal.

No. 51 Dated 28th August 1915

Transl. of the original.

١١٤٩

عنه وكرمه

مخبره سنة حرمه بمقط ٢٨ الست سنة ١٩١٥ مطابقه اسوال ١٣٣٣

الى جناب الاجل الاكرم حضرة الامام سالم بن رشيد الخراساني وبعدهم والسلام وصلواتي كما

الشيخ الشريف فلقتم مسرورا وكان مصححا يدك وقاتلك ويد الشيخ عيسى صالح ويد الشيخ حمير وخاتمة ويد جناب القاضي الشيخ عبد الله بن رشيد الهاشمي وقد علمت ما فيه وقد سرتنا بوجهكم الصلح والامن فيكم وبين ايديكم وقد عرفتم انباء بان الدولة البريطانية تارغب ان ترى ان الصلح قد وقع بينكما وان اتفقا معكم في قولكم المخاطبة بهذا البعد في غاية الصعوبة وقد اشرتم بان المجلس ينبغي ان يتفقد وانكم ينبغي ان اليه المنتكم للايمان هناك وهذا حسن جدا وبهذا اجبركم باي ارفع هذا الامر الى من هو فوق من امراء الدولة البريطانية على لسان البرق وعلى وصول البرق للجواب ما خاطبكم من غير جهال ان شاء الله وسعينا اليوم ولكن للاهتمام اذ ذلك هذا والسبع عليكم جميعا.

من محكم لفتنت كوزل اري اي بن سي اي اي

فضل الدولة العلية البريطانية لمقط

تظن من جناب الدولة الانكليزية العظمى ان تقفوا بيننا وبين الملك
 بالعدل والانصاف وان يكون جاريا في مملكته مسقط وما اشتمل عليه
 عليها من بلدان الساحل على حسب قواعد الشرع المحمدي رافعا عن اهل
 عمان وزيادة المعشرات الزائدة في الداخل والخارج نأيا من اتاه من سفنة
 الدم ونهبه الاموال وردة اينا انفا ذكركم الله فيه وان يظلم لنا السلاح
 والرمي لتلا تفضل السلاح الذي عندنا وان يجعلنا مدد النقوم به على من خالف
 الحق من اهل عمان لان القيام لا يمكن الا به ولان اهلها من امراء القبائل عوائد
 وان يترك النظام والمزيقيا التي هي من افعال تركيا ولم يجر عليها اياؤه وجرها
 دينه وان يعزل عنا الولاة والقضاة الظالمين المرشدين وان لا يايوي اليها
 الهاربين من عمان متى ظلمهم ساداتهم وان يظلم المملاتهم ولان
 الكندي واولاد الطيويين واولاد الخلفاء واولاد الخواري واولاد
 وكل من تزوه من اهل الخوص والحميد واطلاق كالمعتاد
 خافق الشهور ومرح كل شئ وقع فيه كالتشاجر
 عمارة الدين هذا صحيح كتبه عبد صالح
 صحيح عبد الله بن رشيد بن صالح الخواري في مقامه في الايام - الامام الخواري

وان يكون جاريا في مملكته مسقط وما اشتمل عليه عليها من بلدان الساحل على حسب قواعد الشرع المحمدي رافعا عن اهل عمان وزيادة المعشرات الزائدة في الداخل والخارج نأيا من اتاه من سفنة الدم ونهبه الاموال وردة اينا انفا ذكركم الله فيه وان يظلم لنا السلاح والرمي لتلا تفضل السلاح الذي عندنا وان يجعلنا مدد النقوم به على من خالف الحق من اهل عمان لان القيام لا يمكن الا به ولان اهلها من امراء القبائل عوائد وان يترك النظام والمزيقيا التي هي من افعال تركيا ولم يجر عليها اياؤه وجرها دينه وان يعزل عنا الولاة والقضاة الظالمين المرشدين وان لا يايوي اليها الهاربين من عمان متى ظلمهم ساداتهم وان يظلم المملاتهم ولان الكندي واولاد الطيويين واولاد الخلفاء واولاد الخواري واولاد وكل من تزوه من اهل الخوص والحميد واطلاق كالمعتاد خافق الشهور ومرح كل شئ وقع فيه كالتشاجر عمارة الدين هذا صحيح كتبه عبد صالح صحيح عبد الله بن رشيد بن صالح الخواري في مقامه في الايام - الامام الخواري


عبد صالح
 15-9-15

PETITION presented by Sheikh Isa bin Saleh, representative of Imam, Salim bin Rashid al Kharussi, to the Political Agent Mascat at SIB, on 15th September 1915.

Photostat copy of the version of the Agreement
of Sib signed by Muhammad bin Ahmed on behalf
of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.

CONFIDENTIAL

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



هذا ما اتفق عليه الصلح ما بين حكومة السلطان السيد محمد بن فيصل
والعمانيين على يد نائب الوزير السيد محمد بن احمد ومفوضات المعظم
السلطان بواسطة المستر ونيت آي سي إس باليون
وقضل للدولة البريطانية العظمى مسقط الذي هو مفوض
مزدولته في هذا الحضور وان يكون وسيطاً بينهم والشروط
الآتية بيانها اربعة منها تخص حكومة السلطان واربعتها
تخص العمانيين اما التي تخص العمانيين
الاول ان يكون كل وارث من عمان جميع الاجناس الى معطوط مطرح
وصور وسائر بلدان الساحل لا يؤخذ منه زيادة عن في المائة
الثاني ان يكون لجميع العمانيين الامن والحريه في جميع بلدان الساحل
الثالث جميع التجديدات على جميع الداخلين والخارجين في معط

16 The Treaty of al-Sib, signed by Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Nāṣir al-Bū Sa'ídí,
behalf of the Sultan, Sd. Taymūr b. Fayṣal

ومطرح وجميع بلدان الساحل تُرفع
 ٤ الرابع ان لا تاتي حكومة السلطان مندبا يهرب ^{من} النصارى
 العمانيين وان ترجعه اليهم اذا طلبوه منها وان لا يتدخل في
 دخليتهم
 واما الامة التي تخص حكومة السلطان فهذا بيانها
 الماؤل كلالتياندا والمشايخ يكونوا بالامن والصلح مع حكومة
 السلطان وان لا يهاجموا بلاد الساحل ولا يتدخلوا في حكومته
 الثاني كل المسافرين الى عمان في مساعدهم الجائزة والامن
 التجار يه يكونوا احرار ولا تكون تجارات على التجار ولهم الامن
 الثالث كل مذهب ومذنب يه يطردوا ولا ياتوه
 الرابع ان تكون دعاوى التجار وغيرهم على العمانيين تسمع وتفصل ايجاب
 ما هو الاضاف بالحكم الشرعي وذلك بقطعة من العشرة من شهر
 عام الفس ولا تاتاه وتسعه وثلاثين هجرية موافق ثمانية من شهر

صحيح الناب

The Treaty of al-Sīb, signed by Sd. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Nāṣir al-Bū Sa'ídí, behalf
 of the Sultan, Sd. Taymúr b. Fayṣal

17) Proclamation Issued by the Sultan regarding arms and ammunition 1898 and 1912

I

Proclamation by the Sultan of Muscat forbidding the export of arms and ammunition to India and Persia,
13th January, 1898

Be it known to such of our subjects as see this that, whereas the British and Persian Governments have represented to us that are desirous of preventing introduction of arms and ammunition into India and Persia, and that there is reason to think that many are exported from Muscat and taken to those two above-named countries, we have resolved to join them and to assist them as far as it lies in our power in suppressing this trade in arms and ammunition between Muscat and India and Persia. We therefore warn (our subjects) that all the arms and ammunition sent to those two countries will be confiscated and those engaged in this trade will be punished, as the introduction of arms and ammunition into India and Persia is prohibited by the Governments of those two countries and therefore illegal.

In future our Muscat flag will be no protection to vessels carrying the said arms and ammunition from our dominions to India and Persia.

II

Proclamation by the Sultan of Muscat granting British and Persian vessels of war the right to search Muscat vessels for arms, dated 13th January, 1898

Be it Known to all who see it this we have given permission to British and Persian vessels of war to search vessels carrying their and our flags in our territorial waters, and to confiscate all arms and ammunition in them, if those arms and ammunition are intended for Indian and Persian ports, and if they are the property of British, Persian or Muscat subjects.

We have also given permission to those vessels of war to search Muscat vessels in Indian and Persian waters suspected to contain arms and ammunition for Indian and Persian ports, and to confiscated the said arms and ammunition.

III

Notification issued by the Sultan of Muscat establishing a bonded warehouse for arms and ammunition,
dated 4th June, 1912

Whereas large quantities of arms and ammunition are at present stored without proper control in private buildings, distributed in this our town of Mascot, and thus exposed to the risk of attack, robbery or fire, we, impressed by the serious menace to the safety of our capital arising therefrom, have resolved to remedy this state of affairs, in accordance with the needs of the times and the requirements of our municipal administration, by the construction and establishment of a special customs house magazine or arms warehouse for the storage of arms and ammunition under safe precautions. It is proposed to introduce this warehouse arrangement from on or about 1st September next. It will be conducted on the following general lines:-

Firstly, On or after 1st September all arms and ammunition or parts thereof imported into my territories will be taken direct from the steamer to the special arms warehouse, to the control of which a special Superintendent will be appointed by us.

Secondly, Similarly all arms-dealers in my territories will be required to deposit stocks remaining in their hands on 1st September in the said warehouse. Any trader offending against this regulation will, in addition to other penalties, render all future consignments of arms and ammunition arriving in his name liable to confiscation, unless and until he complies with this regulation in full.

Thirdly, No arms will be allowed to issue from the warehouse until duty has been fully paid thereon to the Customs Superintendent in the usual way.

Fourthly, The withdrawal of arms from the warehouse will be regulated by the issue of special licenses prepared by the Superintendent and countersigned by myself.

Fifthly, Such licenses will not be granted to traders but only to approved individual purchasers or their duty authorised agents on the production of satisfactory proof that the number, quantity and destination of arms, ammunition, etc., to be withdrawn from the warehouse are free from justifiable objection.

Sixthly, All arms issuing from the warehouse will be marked with a special warehouse mark and serial number.

Seventhly, Special rules will be drawn up providing for and regulating the issue to approved traders of sample stock for exhibition in their shops.

Eighthly, Rules providing for the collection of arms warehouse charges, on stocks therein deposited, will be drawn up on the analogy of the present Customs House Regulations for the levy of such fees on general merchandise.

Ninthly, Special rules will be drawn up governing the transfer between traders' stocks deposited in the arms warehouse.

Tenthly, Special relaxations will be arranged for in favour of flint-locks, muzzle-loading gun powder and caps in reasonable quantities

Lastly, Detailed rules embodying the above principles are under preparation and will be published in due course for the further information of all concerned.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
 اخي محمد
 والحمد لله الذي هدانا لهذا الذي كنا لنهتدي لولا ان هدانا الله
 انعم الله عليك ورحمة الله وبركاته نحن وسيدنا محمد خير لارثنا
 وما هنا علم الا اننا وكما بلغنا ما صار في امرنا احسن من ان
 لنا منه ان تلك الشروطين لا تتبعه علمها وكما اننا اولافقنا اننا
 ادركنا بنظر القوم ومرادهم ان كل الامتيازات العارضة
 حاملها كيف والمالكي ووصلنا معه قفا لا يسر ما اردنا
 اننا ان نزعنا ولا نزيد الا ان نزعنا ونستزير وهو عده
 الليلة نزلنا وصعودنا والاضاريد ان احدكم يعلم هذه
 والحمد لله رب العالمين
 حيدرآباد ١٣٣١ هـ

- 18) A letter from Sh. Muhammad b. 'Abdallāh al-Khalīlī to his father, dated 3rd
 Ramaḍān, 1331/7th August, 1913

