

**Positionalities and belonging amongst migrant youth: The
case of Korean-Chinese communities in Seoul, South Korea**

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on Korean-Chinese migrant youth (KCMY) in South Korea. Migrant youth have rather often been portrayed as passive beings reliant on parental decisions in family migration. In South Korea, youth migration has recently begun to attract social and policy attention as numbers have grown. There is little research on this group's migration processes and experiences in their daily lives; a research gap to which this thesis is oriented. The thesis aims to explore the factors and processes influencing how KCMY negotiate their positionalities and belonging according to spatial contexts in their migration process. It draws on results from empirical research in Seoul, South Korea; interviews with KCMY aged 15 to 19 and with migrant organisation staff and policymakers, and through observations in social settings. I argue that KCMY who are involved in migration across their lifespan shift their positionalities and belonging by negotiating their identities in the situated contexts. Their experiences as left-behind children affect their identities and social positions both in their home and host societies. They try to place themselves in the most appropriate position in the social and spatial context by expressing or hiding certain identities among their multiple identities. This strategic positioning demonstrates that they are not just marginalised and passive in the host society but are flexible in utilising their in-betweenness according to the situated context. Their in-betweenness may play a role as a foundation for them to develop their future plans as transmigrants and in consideration of the social, economic and political conditions of both South Korea and China. Therefore, this thesis argues that the exploration of positionalities and belonging of migrant youth in their daily spaces is essential to understand the impact of migration across their lifespan and the ways they utilise situated social and spatial contexts.

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Name / Phrase
CSP	China Statistics Press
KCMY	Korean-Chinese Migrant Youth
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOEL	Ministry of Employment and Labour
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOGEF	Ministry of Gender Equality and Family
MOHW	Ministry of Health and Welfare
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOLEG	Ministry of Government Legislation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PRC	People's Republic of China
SMG	Seoul Metropolitan Government
SMOE	Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education
SNS	Social Networking Service
SOEC	Seoul On-dream Education Centre

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In this era of globalisation, as migration experiences are diversifying, various migrant groups with diverse migration purposes are emerging. Amongst such diversity, certain groups have, arguably, not received as much attention as more prominent migrant categories such as refugees and labour migrants. This thesis focuses on one such group: migrant youth. Since youth migration has been considered part of family migration, their migration has been thought of as relatively passive, relying primarily on parental decisions. Furthermore, in the case of youth migration, which takes place separately from parental migration, as their ultimate purpose of migration was deemed to be family reunification, other motives for migration are, largely, not covered by relevant studies (Samers and Collyer, 2017). Therefore, there is a gap in understanding their experiences during their migration decision-making. In particular, although migrants' emotions and thoughts felt during the migration have a significant impact on their entire lives, relevant studies have seldom explored psychological aspects in their experiences from the point of view of migrant youth. Therefore, this thesis will provide empirical insights into existing research by considering migrant youth as migrant subjects and exploring their diverse experiences and psychology of this group in depth not only before and during their migration but also as migrants in South Korean society.

This research explores Korean-Chinese migrant youth (KCMY) who have seldom been studied as a migrant group in academia. South Korean scholars have considered Korean-Chinese as a group of ethnic Koreans and have largely focused on topics, such as their identity as ethnic Koreans, transnational migration, ethnic enclaves and the social discourse surrounding them (Choi, 2014; Kim, 2017; Lee, 2015; Lee et al., 2013). This research, however, focuses mainly on Korean-Chinese migrant workers, and their children who were originally left behind in China due to parental migration but who later migrated to South Korea. Indeed, the number of KCMY who have moved to South Korea has been increasing over the past five years (MOJ, 2021). Despite this trend, the experiences of KCMY have seldom been

explored in their own right and research topics have not been much different from studies on Korean-Chinese migrant workers. Since KCMY have different motivations and processes than adult Korean-Chinese migrants, it is necessary to consider them a distinct migrant group. In particular, in terms of identities, there is a limit to exploring this through the lens of the ethnic Korean group when individuals have a strong identity and sense of belonging as Chinese. This is noteworthy because KCMY have multiple identities in relation to their demographic characteristics such as nationality, ethnicity and age. Therefore, while research in this area has hitherto emphasised the primacy of the ethnic Korean identity of Korean-Chinese rather than embodying a diversity of identities, this thesis seeks to address this gap in this consideration of a fuller range of identities amongst KCMY.

The multiple identities of KCMY have an important influence on their positionalities and belonging across their lifespans. In particular, their identities as migrant youth and positions in the family and South Korean society are influenced by their experiences of being left-behind children in China. Despite the connectivity between these places and/or experiences, existing research about their migration has mainly investigated their lives in their places of origin or in South Korea and has not explored the connections between the two (Bae et al., 2018; Chai, 2021; Kim, 2019). However, this thesis looks into how KCMY's emotions and thoughts about their various identities in China affect their social position and sense of belonging in South Korea. This approach then makes it necessary to investigate the lives of migrant youth before and after migration together. Similarly, their plans for the future also need to be examined. In this regard, they plan their prospective migration, citizenship and employment, considering the situation in both Chinese and South Korean society. Therefore, this research argues for the need to pay attention to how KCMY negotiate their positionalities and belonging on their life course while paying particular attention to spatial contexts.

This thesis focuses on how KCMY embody and practice their diversity in daily life, in doing so, this study is critical of existing South Korean research and policy aimed at integrating and assimilating KCMY into South Korean society. South Korean researchers and government encourage KCMY to adhere to existing social norms and to assimilate into South Korean society, rather than acknowledge their multiplicity. Multiculturalism in South Korea comprises

policies aimed at pursuing the coexistence of different groups within society, but the rhetoric implies that non-South Koreans should be assimilated into the South Korean mainstream to coexist (Chae, 2006; Koo, 2015). However, KCMY try to position themselves within a situated relationship with other people and places by adopting the identity most appropriate to the context, whether this is in education, work or leisure activities. In this regard, my study focuses on the subjective negotiation of the social position of KCMY in their daily spaces using geographical and social understanding to provide new insights into ways in which they negotiate their positionalities and belonging depending on the situated context.

This chapter firstly provides a brief introduction to the background of Korean-Chinese migration. It includes an overview of their ancestors' migration from the Korean peninsula to China and their current migration from China to South Korea. In section 1.3, I will describe my research aim and objectives. The last section of this chapter will summarise the structure of this thesis.

1.2 Background of Korean-Chinese migration

This section provides an overview of the migration of Koreans to China prior to the mid-20th century and of their descendants' migration to South Korea over the last 30 years. Korean-Chinese are ethnic Koreans who migrated from the Korean peninsula (including South Korea and North Korea) to China beginning in the 19th century. Today, they mainly live in the three north-eastern provinces of China (Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning provinces) close to the border with North Korea (see figure 1.1). Korean-Chinese are called *Cháoxiǎnzú* in Chinese (one among the 56 ethnic groups in China) and *Joseonjok* in Korean. They were granted Chinese citizenship in the mid-20th century. Since the 1990s, Korean-Chinese have migrated to South Korea and recently, their children who had been left in their places of origin have been reunited with them in South Korea. The first sub-section will provide a brief history of Korean migration to China while Section 1.1.2 will provide the background of current Korean-Chinese migration to South Korea.

1.2.1 Migration of Koreans to China and their life

Koreans, who are ancestors of Korean-Chinese, migrated from the Korean Peninsula to north-eastern China from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century (see figure 1.1). According to Li (2015)'s study, this migration can be divided into three main periods. Firstly, from 1860 to 1910, Korean peasants moved near the border between China and North Korea to cultivate crops because they could not make a living in their places of origin due to flooding and droughts. Qing, the dynasty that ruled China at the time, allowed Koreans to move to north-eastern China which was an uncultivated wasteland at the time. The Koreans were to settle and farm the land and pay the Qing government part of their agricultural production in return for land use.




Figure 1.1 Location of north-eastern area in China and Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture

Secondly, from 1910 to 1931, Koreans moved to the area to avoid economic exploitation associated with the Japanese colonisation of Korea. Most of this migrants were Korean peasants and their numbers were larger than during the earlier migration. The result was that Korean villages began to form throughout north-eastern China (Han and Kwon, 1993). In particular, as Jilin Province was possessed good land for farming, many Koreans settled there.

Lastly, from 1931 to 1945, the largest population movement between Korea and north-eastern China took place. This was a result of Imperial Japan's forced migration policy (Han and Kwon, 1993). During the war between China and Japan, Japan forced a mass migration of hundreds of thousands of Koreans to the area which was transformed into a base to produce food and support for the Japanese military (Lee, 2012). In particular, Japan's establishment of Manchukuo¹ in this area resulted in the forced migration of Koreans (Lee, 2012; Han and Kwon, 1993). Settlement tended to be in existing Korean villages or near the railway lines used by the Japanese military to transport them. Compared to previous migration which usually occurred at the individual or family level, migration during this period tended to involve people, often from the same hometown, moving to China en masse and being settled in the same village (Lim et al., 2013). In other words, as a result of Japan's policy of forced mass migration, such group migration based on a single village location emerged.

After Korea's independence from Japan in 1945, many Korean migrants settled in north-eastern China as Chinese citizens. Before 1945, about 2.3 million Koreans lived in this area (Han and Kwon, 1993). However, after independence, about 35 percent of them returned to the Korean Peninsula while the rest remained in China (Lee, 2012) where they were granted citizenship by the People's Republic of China (PRC), which was founded in 1949. The PRC granted Chinese citizenship to ethnic minority groups within its boundaries, including ethnic Koreans, under the national ideology that all ethnic groups in the country are equal (Kim and Lee, 2007). As a result, Koreans living in China have the legal status of Chinese citizens while also being members of the *Joseonjok*² ethnic group. The Chinese government also guaranteed that each ethnic group could maintain its culture for political stability (Li, 2015). In this context, the government established the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in eastern Jilin Province in 1952 (see figure

¹ Manchukuo was a puppet state that established by Japan in north-eastern China between 1932 and 1945.

² During this period, Korea was known in China by the name of its ruling dynasty, Joseon (1392-1910). Hence the Chinese government called Korean migrants *Joseonjok* (*Cháoxiǎnzú* in Chinese), referring to them as migrants from Joseon.

1.1) and allowed Koreans to maintain their culture and to run their own autonomous institutions. Due to this policy for ethnic minority groups, Korean-Chinese have been able to maintain Korean language and traditional Korean culture in China. As a result, because Korean ethnic schools existed in most Korean villages in this area of China (Kim and Lee, 2007), the community could retain its familiarity with Korean culture and maintain its ethnic identity.

1.2.2 Current migration of Korean-Chinese to South Korea

After the Chinese economic reform in 1978, Korean-Chinese began to move to neighbouring countries such as South Korea, Japan and Russia. The Chinese government aimed to promote economic development by introducing the functions of a market economy while maintaining a socialist political system. As a result, the reform of state-owned enterprises led to an increase in the number of unemployed and an excess of labour in rural areas (Li, 2015). The Chinese government tried to solve the problem of oversupply of labour by encouraging overseas labour migration and using the remittances from foreign countries for national economic development. This policy was also to affect Yanbian, where many Korean-Chinese lived. After 1992 when a memorandum of understanding between South Korea and China was signed, Korean-Chinese began to move to South Korea as migrant workers. This Korean-Chinese labour migration has led to the emergence of children who live apart from at least one of their parents. Migrant parents were unable to move to South Korea with their children because they did not have the job stability or financial means to support their children in South Korea.

In South Korea in the 1990s, there was a shortage of low-wage workers in 3D jobs³ due to a rise in wages in the overall labour market caused by industrialisation, Korean-Chinese migrant workers became an alternative to solve labour gaps (Lee and Park, 2009). In 1993, when the *Training System for Foreign Workers* was implemented to resolve labour shortages in small and medium-sized enterprises in South Korea, Korean-Chinese migrant workers were allowed to move to South Korea, indeed were positively encouraged to do so by the South Korean government (Lee et al., 2013).

³ In South Korea, the 3D jobs refer to difficult, dangerous and dirty jobs in the manufacturing sector.

However, since Korean-Chinese able to apply for this system had to have relatives living in South Korea, many Korean-Chinese entered the country illegally through brokers who made use of forged invitations from relatives and illegally purchased passports (Lee et al., 2014). In addition, because legal Korean-Chinese migrant workers could only stay for two years, a number of them become irregular migrants when they overstayed their visa restriction at the end of two years. In the 1990s, since the monthly wages in South Korea were about the same as their annual wages in China, Korean-Chinese desired to work in South Korea for as long as possible even if to do so meant they become undocumented migrants (Li, 2015). In general, most of their wages were remitted to China for the living expenses of their left behind families (Lee et al., 2013).

In response to the growth in numbers of irregular Korean-Chinese workers in South Korea, the government introduced immigration policies for ethnic migrant workers aimed at making it easier for them to engage in the labour market as legal migrant workers. In this context, the South Korean government implemented the *Visiting Employee System* in 2007 to allow Korean-Chinese migrants aged 25 or older to work in South Korea for five to eight years by issuing a new category of visa, Working visit (H-2). Korean-Chinese who could prove their identity as ethnic Koreans were able to apply for a work visa even if they did not have any relatives in South Korea (Kim, 2009). After the implementation of the *Visiting Employee System*, the number of Korean-Chinese migrants had more than tripled as of 2009 (Lee et al., 2014). The parents of current KCMY in South Korea, usually started to work in the country through this system. As the number of Korean-Chinese moving to South Korea has increased, not only have Korean villages in China become depopulated but also their ethnic schools have begun to disappear (Lee et al., 2014). As a result, Korean-Chinese children in China attend Chinese general schools and live outside ethnic Korean villages, it is therefore more difficult for them to access traditional Korean culture and Korean language than it was in the past.

The number of Korean-Chinese migrant workers has further increased since 2012. Following the classification of Korean-Chinese as ethnic Koreans under the Overseas Koreans Act of 2012, Korean-Chinese migrants with South Korean national technical qualifications have been able to apply for Overseas Koreans (F-4) visas which allow them to live in South Korea for at least five

years (MOJ, 2021). In addition, H-2 visa holders who have worked for a single company in the manufacturing, agricultural or livestock and fisheries industries for more than four years could apply for permanent residency (MOJ, 2021). As visa types and length of stay options for Korean-Chinese increased, Korean-Chinese migrant workers were able to work in South Korea for longer time periods and to accumulate economic capital. This in turn opened up options regarding bringing their children to South Korea (see section 5.2.2). In addition, some Korean-Chinese in their 60s and older decided to migrate to South Korea because, able to prove they were ethnic Koreans, they were able to get F-4 visas. As a result, as the grandparents who took care of their grandchildren at their places of origin were absent, the left-behind children in China stayed in school accommodation, with teachers or with relatives (Lee et al., 2014). Increasingly, the other option was to move to South Korea (see section 5.2).

As will be detailed in section 2.3, the South Korean government's perceptions of the migration of Korean-Chinese has changed from a stable supply for low-wage migrant workers to allowing their family reunification in South Korea. In 2012, the government granted Family visitation (F-1) visas to Korean-Chinese under the age of 19 which allowed them to live with their parents (MOJ, 2021). At that time, however, because Korean-Chinese migrant workers did not have enough social and economic capital to support their children in South Korea, few children were able to come to South Korea. As mentioned above, after working for several years, they became financially able to support their families in South Korea. In 2019, as the range of ethnic Koreans expanded further, Korean-Chinese migrant workers' children were included in the ethnic Korean category and allowed to apply for visas (e.g., F-4 and H-2) open to ethnic Koreans. Furthermore, as the range of applicants for F-4 and H-2 visas has expanded, these children can legally reside in South Korea for a long period even once they become adults (see section 3.3). South Korean immigration policy, which guarantees the economic stability of Korean migrant workers and the long-term residence of their children, has further promoted the migration of KCMY to South Korea. The South Korean government's policy framework for ethnic Koreans clarifies their position as ethnic Koreans through their legal status in South Korea. This allows KCMY to recognise their identity and sense of belonging as ethnic Koreans. This awareness of their ethnic identity can influence the formation of their multiple identities and lead

them to negotiate their positionalities and belonging according to the situated context in South Korean society.

1.3 Aim and objectives

The aim and objectives of this research are as follows:

Aim:

- To explore the factors and processes influencing how KCMY negotiate their positionalities and belonging according to spatial contexts in their migration process.

Objectives:

- 1) To explore the motivations of and family factors linked to migrant youth that influence their positionalities and belonging in the host society in the early stages of migration.
- 2) To investigate the socio-cultural, policy and legal factors which affect the negotiations of positionalities and belonging of migrant youth in a range of relations in their daily lives in the host society.
- 3) To analyse the KCMY prospective life plans, including any migration, citizenship and economic activity as 'in-between' migrants.

1.4 Thesis structure

This thesis provides an in-depth study of KCMY as migrant subjects who negotiate their positionalities and belonging in their daily spaces. Chapter 2 reviews the related literature regarding key concepts in this research, focussing particularly on positionality and belonging. Firstly, the existing literature on positionalities of migrant youth is reviewed, highlighting the encounter and practice of in-betweenness in their everyday lives. Since the concept of positionality is associated with the individual's relational positions in context and relationships (Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2006; Nagar and Geiger,

2007; Rose, 1997), encounters between individuals need to be considered to understand their positionalities. Furthermore, I explain the concept of in-betweenness which forms a fluid and changeable state and dissolves boundaries (Summers and Clarke, 2015; Szakolczai, 2015). I argue that this concept is appropriate to analyse how KCMY strategically represent their identities depending on the situated relationships and spaces, as they are located between multiple identities related to their nationality, ethnicity, age and affiliation. The second section in this chapter discusses the relevant literature on belonging on the national and local scale. Firstly, on the national scale, factors affecting the belonging of KCMY both at and within the national border of South Korea are introduced. Nation states grant legal status to migrants who meet certain established criteria through labelling and categorisation. I emphasise that this labelling and classification of migrants impacts on feelings of inclusivity and/or exclusion in the host society. Secondly, I emphasise the sense of belonging felt by KCMY as transmigrants on a local scale. I maintain that the emotions they feel in their relationships with others may have a significant impact on their sense of belonging to the home and host countries. In particular, I highlight how context-based language proficiency plays a significant role in moulding their social relationships. Lastly, I briefly explain migrant strategies to use their multiple belonging—permanent temporariness, semi-compliance and stepwise migration. I argue that these strategies result from their daily experiences combined with socio-cultural, legal and political factors.

Chapter 3 examines the context of multiculturalism and of ethnic Koreans in South Korea through both legal and policy lenses, which influence the everyday life of KCMY. KCMY are considered a multicultural group as migrant youth and ethnic Koreans as Korean-Chinese in a particular set of laws and policies. Firstly, this chapter explains the aims of South Korea's multiculturalism policy and the public's perception of multiculturalism. I argue that a neo-assimilationist multicultural policy would likely lead to social discrimination and exclusion against certain migrant groups including KCMY. Secondly, regarding the classification of KCMY as ethnic Koreans in Korean law and policy, I maintain that this tends to be contradictory. Because the criteria by which individuals are classified as ethnic Koreans differs in different laws and policies, KCMY may be included in or excluded from the category depending on the policy. In particular, I criticise the government's inconsistent

and contradictory classification of ethnic Koreans, which defines the category differently depending on which side of the Korean border one is on.

The fourth chapter presents my research methods and design. This research uses mixed qualitative methods. I conducted fieldwork for a year in Seoul where the largest number of Korean-Chinese migrants live or work and where the largest Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave in South Korea is located. In this chapter, I provide a rationale for selecting my research area and samples and describe the process of recruiting samples. I interviewed twenty KCMY aged 15 to 19, eleven staff in migrant organisations and six policymakers. I conducted two-phased interviews with KCMY. Furthermore, I observed KCMY at centres and *hagwon*⁴ for migrant youth and participated in Korean-Chinese community meeting to learn about life of Korean-Chinese migrants in various generations. Through interviews and observations, I collected deep and rich primary data. This chapter also describes the data analysis process, ethical issues and my positionalities in this research.

Chapter 5, 6 and 7 present my empirical analysis of how KCMY negotiate their positionalities and belonging according to the situated context in their lives. Chapter 5 considers the migration background and family dynamics of KCMY. In China, as their identities as left-behind children vary according to their relationships with others in their home communities, I argue that parental migration leads to changes of identities and positionalities of KCMY even in their places of origin. In relation to their migration background, by describing the rationalisation of their migration in consideration of family, policy and personal factors, this study extends the existing literature which analyses youth migration from a passive perspective based on parental decisions (Kim, 2018). After moving to South Korea, KCMY reunite with their families as a unit or in part (separation, divorce or step-families). Some KCMY experience a second family separation in South Korea. This produces a diversity of forms of family reunification in the host country. I pay attention to how emotional relationships between KCMY and their family members after family reunification affect their sense of stability and belonging not only within the

⁴ *Hagwon* is a for-profit private institute or academy prevalent in South Korea. Korean students have lessons to improve their academic records. Korean Chinese migrant youth often take supplementary lessons to keep up with school classes and learn Korean at *Hagwon*.

family and but also in South Korean society. While scholars have focused mainly on family reunification, I aim to understand the dynamic of migrant families in South Korea by investigating the background of and changes in family relationships following the separation of reunited families. I maintain that the second family separation in South Korea has a different effect on the feelings of KCMY and on their family relationships than the first one caused by the labour migration of their parent(s).

Chapter 6 explores the relationships between KCMY and South Koreans and the South Korean government's system of classification of KCMY in relevant law and policy. These socio-cultural, policy and legal factors play a role in social position and affecting sense of belonging in South Korean society. Firstly, I explore media portrayals of Korean-Chinese and the reaction of KCMY to them. In the media, Korean-Chinese are depicted as a problematic group. South Koreans become prejudiced against them through repeated exposure to negative portrayals of them in the media (Aizhan et al., 2020; Han and Shin, 2019; Kim, 2018; Kim and Chung, 2015). Focusing on the responses of KCMY to this South Korean prejudice, I examine how they perceive and challenge their marginalised position in society. One typical response is that they change their identities and positionalities in relationships with South Koreans. In particular, I demonstrate how KCMY practice strategies for inclusion—the use of context-based language, peer mimicry and maintaining distance—in peer groups. They also try to maintain relationships with South Koreans by negotiating their identities, adjusting them to reflect how South Koreans perceive their multiple identities.

Secondly, I discuss the impact of centres for migrant youth on position and belonging of KCMY in their local communities and South Korean society. To date researchers have tended to emphasise the need for and the development of programmes provided by centres which support the adaptation and integration of migrant youth into mainstream society (Bae, 2016; Lee et al., 2017; Yoo, 2020). However, this study criticises the centres' assimilationist and purportedly beneficial aims and programmes to transform KCMY into 'good citizens' in South Korean society. Also, I explore how KCMY who use centres form relationships with South Koreans and where they situate themselves in those relationships. In this regard, I point out that although the centres aim to help migrant youth join South Korean mainstream society, those centres would rather KCMY remain at the periphery of society. In order

to address this issue, by emphasising the connectivity between KCMY, centres, local communities and broader South Korean society, I suggest that the centres would serve as places where these groups can encounter each other.

The final section of chapter 6 explores how the South Korean government's system of classification of KCMY influences their identities and the public perception of them. KCMY are categorised as Korean-Chinese and migrant youth in South Korean law and policy. I focus on their feelings and thoughts regarding the government's classification by expanding the critique made in chapter 3. KCMY are allowed to enter South Korea through a simpler visa application procedure requiring fewer supporting documents than is the case for other foreigners due to their privileged position as ethnic Koreans. However, after entering South Korea, their categorisation as ethnic Koreans changes depending on the government agency concerned. In this regard, I point out the contradiction and inconsistency of the government classification of ethnic Koreans after their arrival at South Korea and investigate their thoughts on their identities related to this classification. Also, the South Korean government's classification of them as migrant youth is examined in relation to its own multicultural policies. I criticise the government's aims in managing social diversity and assimilating KCMY into the framework of mainstream society through multicultural policies. I also maintain that the multicultural policies which cause the public to have negative opinions about certain migrant groups may lead to the social marginalisation of KCMY.

Chapter 7 investigates how KCMY strive to challenge their marginalised social position by using their in-betweenness in their current and future lives. Firstly, I examine KCMY's perception and strategic use of in-betweenness in the real and virtual worlds. Previous research has considered Korean-Chinese migrants as transmigrants between China and South Korea on the national scale, and explored changes in their families and communities on the local scale (Lee et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2014; Li, 2015). However, this research focuses on the lives of individual migrants and understands how they use daily spaces while changing their identities depending on the context of spaces. It also demonstrates how they try to escape their marginalised social position by expanding their social networks in both real and virtual spaces, rather than remaining stuck within their ethnic community socially excluded from the mainstream group.

KCMY try to belong to South Korean society by joining the labour market as part-time or casual workers. However, employment is precarious in terms of wages and working conditions due to their age, nationality, language skills and lack of work experience. KCMY under the age of 18 are allowed to stay in South Korea for more than a year. However, because they are banned from working according to the employment restrictions attached to their visas, they work irregularly. I explore this status between legality as legal residents and illegality as irregular workers using the concept of semi-compliance. I also highlight the unstable and vulnerable employment of KCMY over the age of 18, who are allowed to work full-time, the main issues here being those related to flexible employment and casualization. I suggest the need for a deeper investigation into their current employment situation because their precarious status in the South Korean labour market may affect their social and economic status as well as their future position in the job market. In order to escape from the precariousness of their current employment position, KCMY try to acquire more detailed information about the South Korean labour market and gain skills through doing part-time jobs and attending vocational high schools.

In the last section of this chapter, I analyse the impact of the migration of KCMY to South Korea on their outlook for the future, including any plans for migration, citizenship or employment. In terms of prospective migration, KCMY tend to make different plans according to the emotions they underwent during their migration to South Korea. Therefore, I maintain that their feelings regarding their past migration experience and their sense of belonging in South Korean society combine to determine any plans for further movement. Migration plans may also affect decisions surrounding their legal status in South Korea. KCMY who plan to migrate again in the future prefer to extend their temporary stay in South Korea by renewing or applying for visas available to ethnic Koreans which allow them to stay and work in the country or grant them permanent residency. I examine their aspirations using the concept of permanent temporariness. They consider social and political situation in South Korea and China when deciding their legal status in South Korea. In this respect, I argue that KCMY occupy a middle position between South Korea and China and make decisions based on outcomes that appear most favourable to them depending on the context of their situation. KCMY have parallel thoughts about their career path. In South Korea, many KCMY desire to return to China as successful returnees after having received an education

or skills to pursue decent jobs in China. They expect that their in-betweenness and their familiarity with South Korean and Chinese society and culture will increase their value in both labour markets. Overall, I emphasise that KCMY can use their in-between lives in their future plans because they are guaranteed a stable legal stay through visas as ethnic Koreans in South Korea.

My research evidence emphasises that KCMY are a distinct migrant subject that constantly negotiates positionalities and belongings according to the situated contexts experienced in the course of life. Chapter 8 summarises the key insights derived from my analysis with the contribution to Korean-Chinese migration and youth migration research. It also discusses limitations arising from my findings and suggests some topics for further study.

Chapter 2

Literature review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines literature on the themes most relevant to my research on positionalities and belonging of KCMY. Section 2.2 investigates positionalities of migrant youth, emphasising encounters and in-betweenness in their everyday spaces. Section 2.2.1 explores the negotiation of positionalities and identities of migrant youth through encounters in various contexts and relationships in daily life. I highlight that positionalities and identities of migrant youth are not fixed, but are (re)structured through interactions between circumstances and social relations with others in everyday spaces. As daily encounters and interactions on a local scale offer a chance for people to understand differences, encounters are significant for both migrants and host communities. However, intergroup encounters can lead to negative reactions, which may trigger feelings of exclusion from the mainstream group among minorities. Some migrants use a strategy of passing to mask their identities so as to be included as a member of mainstream groups. Section 2.2.2 considers how KCMY deploy their in-between identities and positionalities through recognition of their multiple identities, focusing on their in-betweenness. I demonstrate that their in-between identities and positionalities can help them adapt flexibly in both their home and host societies. This is related to strategic and flexible use of their in-betweenness, by emphasising the most appropriate identities or concealing unfavourable identities depending on the situated context. In this respect, I emphasise the need to analyse the practice of in-between identities and positionalities of migrant youth according to space, highlighting their geographical and spatial experiences in comparison to those of adult migrants.

Section 2.3 examines belonging among migrant youth in relation to borders, bordering and everyday spaces. In section 2.3.1, I investigate the factors affecting belonging among migrant youth on and within the borders on the national scale. I explain that states set criteria to determine which groups are included or excluded, and grant legal status within the host country, such as citizenship, permanent residency, or visas, to individuals who meet those criteria. Regarding legal status, I demonstrate how states conduct labelling

and categorisation of those individuals in related policies, which has a significant impact on their sense of belonging to the host country. Section 2.3.2 examines emotions of belonging in everyday places, which are felt by KCMY as transmigrants who maintain connectivity with multiple localities. I also explain the concept of lived citizenship which can capture experiences of embodied belonging in their social relationships. In addition, by presenting the need for a thoughtful application for flexible citizenship, as suggested by Ong (1999), I highlight that KCMY feel different senses of belonging and change their belonging depending on daily experience. I also argue that language influences how they experience belonging within the host society as members of social and economic activities by emphasising the importance of context-bound language. Lastly, section 2.3.3 examines strategies migrants negotiate their belonging by using their multiple senses of belonging in the host country. These strategies include permanent temporariness, stepwise migration and semi-compliance. I also stress that migrants continuously negotiate and develop their belonging in their situated contexts of their life course through these strategies. Section 2.4 summarises the previous sections and key fields of literature alongside highlighting notable gaps in the literature.

2.2 Positionality

2.2.1 Positionality, identity and encounter

The idea of positionality has been used, particularly in feminist research, to understand how migrants mediate their identities and social positions (Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2006). This concept, which was extensively explored in feminist theory in the 1980s, has been applied in human geography and other fields (Kinkaid, 2021). In migration studies, the concept of positionality refers to ways in which migrants shape their own social situatedness by using their multiple identities in a particular social and spatial context and set of relationships (Nagar and Geiger, 2007; Rose, 1997). Therefore, positionality is not fixed, but negotiated constantly in society. In addition, positionality includes considerations of power relations. As positionality concerns the relative position of individual subjects within social and cultural contexts and relations, uneven power relations are involved (Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2006). Since these power relations shift according to the contexts and relations faced

by individuals, their positionality can also be negotiated. In this regard, it is necessary to consider migrants' encounters in their everyday lives in order to grasp their positionalities.

The concept of encounter is useful in demonstrating how individuals understand distinctions and negotiate their identities in their daily lives (Wilson, 2017; Hubbard, 2013). Encounters can influence how individuals negotiate positionalities in situations and relations by shaping their identities through the recognition of differences in everyday spaces (Goffman, 1990). Zevallos (2008) asserts that identities are shaped in the process by which individuals set their social position. Migrants also shift their positionalities in new contexts and relations through encounters with different cultures, societies and people. The differences, which emerge via encounters (Ahmed, 2000), can cause the negotiation of positionalities in a given context. Therefore, individual positionalities are not fixed, but are formed and reconstructed through interactions between individuals. In this regard, critical geographers recognise the importance of difference, which creates social diversity and can lead to prejudice, and focus on negotiations of identities and positionalities of some groups—minority ethnic groups, children/youth/older people, LGBTQs and disabled people—perceived as differences by the mainstream (Valentine and Waite, 2012). Social perceptions of migrants through specific frameworks may influence their social positions in their everyday lives. In this aspect, everyday encounters are not just banal events, but meaningful contacts which can reflect on how identities and positionalities are refracted.

The everyday spaces where encounters occur play an important role in the formation of various relations between individuals. In particular, cities are considered spaces of connections because different people and cultures create diverse relations through their active mobility and encounters in the city. Since mundane encounters and interactions on a micro scale provide an opportunity for people to perceive differences, encounters in everyday spaces are significant (Valentine, 2008). Some researchers argue that mundane contacts in public or semi-public spaces (e.g., cafes, schools, libraries, markets, parks and public transports) of multicultural cities can compel people to accept different beings with less resistance (Amin, 2002; Valentine and Sadgrove, 2014; Valentine, 2013). However, accounts of encounters in these spaces should be treated with caution. A majority group who feels uncomfortable about encountering individuals belong to a minority group can

also ossify intolerance or prejudicial perspectives for the minority group (Valentine, 2008; Valentine and Waite, 2012). In other words, intergroup contacts can trigger negative feelings about others, which can lead to the exclusion of the minority from the majority. Therefore, we need to keep in mind that encounters which occur in the same space may be read and experienced differently by different individuals (Valentine, 2008).

Migrants are generally recognised as a distinctive group in urban spaces. This recognition is shaped by a variety of factors, such as skin colour, ethnicity, language and cultural practices. However, migrants and established groups may accept each other's differences through continuous mutual interactions in (semi-)public spaces. Semi-public spaces are open to everyone as are public spaces, but people are expected to comply with tacit rules or obligations in these spaces (Wilson, 2011). In semi-public spaces, as migrants initially do not know these tacit rules, their differences are magnified, and they may become marginalised. However, this marginalisation is mitigated by learning implicit codes of conduct through continuous interaction with others, occupying the space. For instance, when KCMY become closer to their classmates, they sometime express their familiarity by acting intensely, such as cursing or using irony, because such behaviours are general in relationships with close friends in their place of origin. However, South Korean youth consider these behaviours very rude in peer relationships. Their difference is marked due to their different behaviours and they are rendered outsiders from South Korean classmates (see section 6.2.2). Therefore, as migrant youth learn and comply with codes of conduct in encounters with peers at school, they can resolve social marginalisation in schools as well as other daily spaces.

Encounters in everyday spaces are considered to be meaningful encounters only if encounters are sustained and individuals interact with each other (Amin, 2002). Therefore, spaces as contact zones (e.g., community centres and centres for migrants) may provide an opportunity for people to interact consistently with each other (Valentine, 2008). Community centres in neighbourhoods serve as comfortable spaces for individuals to gain familiarity with the space and to encounter others through relatively informal and repetitive visits (Conradson, 2003; Valentine, 2008; Valentine, 2013). In this context, migrants often use centres for migrants to build relationships with others and adapt to a new society. Fleeting encounters, which arise in spaces

where contact with others is brief such as streets and public transportations, offer the opportunity for individuals to meet if even for a short time in their daily spaces. These kinds of encounter are worthwhile as they provide individuals with a first step in building relationships with others and offer them the opportunity to reflect on their attitude toward otherness (Askins, 2015). Some scholars criticise the concept of fleeting encounters for not being long enough for individuals to recognise and interact with differences in terms of depth and duration of encounters (Amin, 2002). However, if fleeting encounters happen repeatedly before an in-depth interaction, people can understand differences as individuals build towards more continuous and deeper encounters (Peterson, 2017). This may be the first stage in reducing unfamiliarity and the negative perceptions surrounding migrants because migrants and the host community frequently encounter each other in everyday spaces. Understanding the differences in daily life can also lead to change in the marginalised positionalities of migrants in the host society.

Urban spaces are not only a container for encounters but also shaped by encounters (Leitner, 2012; Massey, 2005). In other words, the characteristics of space influences its occupants, and the occupants' identities simultaneously help to create the identities of the space. As behaviour and events coexist in power relations, individuals shape and reconstruct urban spaces through encounters with others (Merrifield, 2013; Skelton, 2013). The spaces migrants usually use are also a product of encounters. These spaces are not defined as being solely for migrants, but are reconstructed as relational and political spaces formed by social and cultural encounters between migrants and natives (Anderson, 2015; Mitchell, 2003). As migrants enter these spaces, host communities negotiate or compete with migrants for the use of common spaces. In this process, power struggles and conflicts occur over the ownership and control of public spaces not only between different ethnic groups but also between people of different ages (Anderson, 2015; Samers and Collyer, 2017; Vanderbeck, 2007). As host communities who refuse to mix with migrants leave the space, it changes into a place for migrants. In addition, spatial competition occurs between migrant youth, adult migrants and older migrants. As a result, relatively weak groups move to another area (Anderson, 2015). This phenomenon also occurs in Daerim-dong, an ethnic enclave of Korean-Chinese migrants in Seoul. Their enclave was created by the influx of Korean-Chinese migrants who moved there due to the cheap rents (Suh, 2012). In the process, South Korean residents who

felt that their neighbourhood was becoming a space for Korean-Chinese migrants started moving to other areas or experiencing conflicts with Korean-Chinese migrants (see section 6.3.1). In addition, KCMY generally use areas popular with South Korean youth, rather than Daerim-dong, which consists of adult-centred spaces (see section 7.2.1). To summarise, as encounters between individuals involve power relation, encounters not only reconstruct the space but also influence the negotiation of individuals' positionalities.

Migrants sometimes develop strategies to coexist with the host community in urban spaces. Migrants set their positionalities by adopting the most appropriate among their multiple identities according to the situation. In other words, they negotiate their identities depending on a certain consciousness of what the appropriate conduct is and this consciousness resonates from the situated context (Amin, 2008; Wilson, 2011). Migrant adoption of situated identities can be understood using the concept of passing, that is a strategy of performing identities to be regarded as a member of a group. Passing can be understood as an act by which minorities, who are recognised as different in society, adopt a new identity in order not to be subject to discrimination and prejudice from mainstream society (Pile, 2011). The concept of passing has mainly been applied to the history and discourse surrounding racism against African-Americans in the U.S. Not all African-Americans uphold notions of whiteness as the norm by passing as whites such as whitening their skin tone. Although passing as whites has always been highly charged and contested, some African-Americans aspired to be recognised as white by passing of bodily as well as cultural identities in American society where whiteness was considered superior by the 18th century (Pile, 2011). In the context of East Asia, Yeoh and Willis (2005) have investigated how Singaporean and British transmigrants shift their identity in mainland China according to context. According to their research, British migrants express interest in and challenge new cultures and show a friendly attitude toward understanding differences in Chinese society when they first encounter Chinese. Singaporean migrants, on the other hand, initially express PRC Chineseness having an idealised image of the country as their ancestral homeland with subliminal ties. As ethnic roots are significant in East Asian countries due to Confucian culture, Singaporean migrants consider China their ethnic motherland as well. Thus, British and Singaporean migrants shift their identities and positionalities when they encounter Chinese people in Chinese society. As the above research indicates, migrants negotiate their positionalities and identities by hiding

differences or emphasising similarities to the majority in mainstream society through passing.

In South Korean academia, the literature on positionality has engaged with gender and migration issues. Since the late 2000s, researchers have pointed out that women and migrants have been excluded from the main research subjects, and have begun to analyse the inclusion and exclusion of minority groups by examining their positionalities in South Korean society (Lee and Lee, 2018; Lee, 2013; Min, 2010). Human geographers are mainly interested in the backgrounds and characteristics of migrants and the influences of the mainstream group in migrants' positionalities. In particular, most subjects in studies are vulnerable minorities who are discriminated against and excluded from South Korean society, including migrant workers and marriage migrant women (Jung, 2015; Park, 2008). In those studies, these minority groups are portrayed as taking advantage of the welfare system and receiving preferential treatment in terms of benefits as well as financial and political support for their own faiths and wider cultural activities. For this reason, it was assumed that they were merely marginalised groups with weak power, and the ways they negotiate their positionalities and identities did not attract the attention of researchers. Recently, human geographers have become interested in the positionalities of marriage migrant women who are at the intersection of gender and migrant issues (Jung, 2015). However, it is still difficult to find research in South Korea on the positionalities of other migrant groups, including migrant youth. It is toward filling this research gap that the empirical research in this thesis is oriented.

Regarding studies on Korean-Chinese migrants, Lee (2017) has investigated the construction of migrants' identities in South Korean society by referring to the positionalities of Korean-Chinese. He argues that Korean-Chinese have different identities depending on their power, class and gender, and that their identities are reconstructed according to the kind of situation they find themselves in. Korean-Chinese migrants have different perceptions of South Korea depending on their length of stay, family cohabitation and jobs. These perceptions have a significant impact on establishing their positionalities in South Korean society. In other words, Korean-Chinese migrants adjust their positionalities according to the context and relations they encounter. Research on Korean-Chinese migrants has generally understood their positionalities from a macro perspective (e.g., immigration laws and policies). However, the

macro analysis is of limited use in understanding the continuous composition and reconstruction of positionalities of KCMY in diverse contexts. They may become marginalised and mainstream society considers them a passive group whose members do not try to change their positionalities in South Korean society. Nevertheless, they manage to navigate their marginality in strategic ways. Furthermore, their marginalisation is a dynamic and ongoing process rather than one that is fixed or final once laws and politics have been taken into account. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of this group by exploring the flexibility of their positionalities on a micro scale.

In this context, research on KCMY has also provided little multi-layered analysis of how they negotiate their positionalities in their mundane encounters. Therefore, there is a limitation to understanding their flexible and unfixed positionalities on a micro-scale. In particular, in the social sciences, KCMY are considered a marginalised group and there is a suggestion that they should be better adapted to South Korean society. The relevant research focuses on personal, social and policy support for KCMY to integrate them into South Korean society (Nam and Kim, 2018; Song, 2019). Such previous literature has interpreted their lives from the perspective of government or mainstream society rather than from their own perspective, and they are described as a passive and vulnerable group in these publications. Therefore, in the framework of existing research, it is difficult to understand how KCMY adapt themselves to South Korean society while negotiating their identities and positionalities subjectively in everyday spaces. In order to investigate the everyday negotiation of their identities and positionalities, spatial analysis is necessary because the context of the space, where daily encounters occur, is important. The multiple identities—in terms of age, ethnicity and nationality—of KCMY intersect each other within the various relations in a particular space, and their positionalities vary according to the context (Lee, 2017; Valentine, 2008). In this sense, the context and relation in daily encounters may lead to the dynamics of their identities and positionalities. In particular, KCMY may negotiate their positionalities more actively as they have in-between identities—Chinese national identity and Korean ethnic identity—in South Korea. In the next section, I will examine the in-between positionalities of migrants, such as KCMY.

2.2.2 In-between positionalities and identities

South Koreans consider Korean-Chinese migrants a group between South Korea and China, or a group with characteristics of both countries. While their in-between positionalities lead South Koreans to consider them a drifting group without belonging to either country, their in-between status also influences the strategic change of their identities and positionalities between the two countries. The concept of such in-betweenness fosters a fluid and malleable situation and dissolves boundaries or dichotomy, embracing differences (Summers and Clarke, 2015; Szokolczai, 2015). As in-betweenness implies that boundaries are permeable, it challenges the dichotomised discourse of migrants' positionalities and belonging, such as inclusion and exclusion, or inside and outside a set of boundaries, and recognises diversity (Masumi, 2002; Peach, 2002). In this respect, in-betweenness is worthwhile to capture the process within which a multiplicity of identities is negotiated (Valentine, 2007). Therefore, this research uses the concept of in-betweenness to investigate the process by which KCMY shift or strategically deploy their identities and positionalities according to their contexts and relationships.

KCMY adapt to the host society by practicing their in-betweenness in their everyday lives. Rather than revealing a single identity based on their nationality or ethnicity, they place themselves between their home and host countries and change their identities flexibly according to the situation. Among the reasons they practice their in-between identities with in-between positionalities is the wish not to appear awkward in any given situated relation or space (Ahmed, 2010). If migrants are recognised as individuals with different interests or characteristics from the mainstream group, they can become unfavourable and marginalised from mainstream society. Therefore, migrants adapt to the host society in accordance with the social norms, rules, or cultures followed by mainstream society in order not to be excluded (Ahmed, 2010). In particular, as transnational migrants try to maintain the connection between home and host country, they strategically shift their identities in order to adapt to the situated relations or spaces by placing themselves between both countries (Skelton, 2013; Staeheli, 2011).

KCMY also develop their in-between positionalities to maintain their national identity as Chinese and ethnic identity as ethnic Koreans. In South Korean society where a strong homogeneous nationalism is prevalent, they are expected to comply with the South Korean culture and social norms as they are descendants of ethnic Koreans. However, because they were born in and have lived more in China than in South Korea, they still have an identity as Chinese citizens. Therefore, KCMY often face conflicts between their Chinese and ethnic Korean identity in their daily lives (Choi and Lim, 2021) (see section 6.2). Although they feel confused about their identities when they first arrive in South Korea, they try to develop and express whichever identity they find most appropriate in the situated context and relation strategically and flexibly (Summers and Clarke, 2015; Valentine, 2007). Therefore, the in-between positionalities of KCMY allow them to adapt flexibly to both host and home countries, and potentially to use this as an asset in their future economic activities and migration plans (see chapter 7).

KCMYs pre-migration sense of an ancestral link with South Korea and their similar appearance similar to South Koreans influence the awareness of their in-between positionalities in South Korean society. Perceptions and feelings that migrants had about the host country before they migrated can affect their post-migration positionalities and belonging (Cote and Levine, 2002; Samers and Collyer, 2017). In this respect, KCMY feel a sense of closeness toward South Korea through their families, communities and the South Korean media in China (Lee et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2013). This familiarity may help them understand South Korean culture and society even if they cannot grasp the details, and to adapt to South Korean society with less serious difficulties. In addition, their physical appearance, which is almost the same as that of South Koreans, may assist their acceptance into South Korean peer groups (see section 7.2.1). Migrants are often distinguished from host communities by skin colour or other physical differences. As racialized physical differences of migrants are tabooed as a marker of differences in the relations with the native, their different appearances contribute to discrimination and exclusion (Anja, 2016; Jackson, 2014). However, migrants who share a similar appearance with that of the host communities, such as Korean-Chinese migrants, experience few obstacles in the adaptation process that can be caused by physical differences. This similar appearance may result in migrants feeling closer to the host country and this sense of closeness may become a factor in the awareness of their in-between positionalities (see section 7.2.1 and

7.3.1). In this regard, KCMY participants maintain that South Koreans do not distinguish Korean-Chinese as foreigners in appearance, but Korean-Chinese migrants are positioned between foreigners and South Koreans.

KCMY feel a sense of belonging as they change their identities and positionalities in several urban spaces where differences coexist (see section 7.2.1). Recognising a multiplicity of identities allows individuals to have the ability to shift their identities and positionalities according to the situated context (Adey, 2010). Therefore, the in-between identities allow migrant youth to flexibly deploy their positionalities according to the spaces they are in or they belong to, thereby acting appropriately in these spaces (Szokolczai, 2015). As mentioned earlier, the in-betweenness of migrant youth may leave them feeling they exist as drifting subjects in both their home and host countries. However, in cities with active mobility and diversity, migrant youth can also exercise these traits. In this light, migrant youth with in-between identities feel in-place in various urban spaces, and their sense of belonging leads them to feel a sense of belonging to mainstream society.

In addition, migrant youth can alter the identity of spaces in the host country. Migrants decide to be self-segregated with migrants of the same nationality or ethnic group in their enclaves where they live, work or spend their leisure time (Valentine, 2008). Korean-Chinese migrants are also living their daily lives centred on their ethnic enclave in South Korea (Lee and Lee, 2018). However, KCMY are more accustomed to visiting spaces outside their ethnic enclave. In the process of forming relationships with South Koreans as well as with Korean-Chinese in their daily spaces, their in-between positionalities allow them to flexibly shift their identities depending on the relationship concerned and consequently to help them in adaptation. As a result, the ethnic enclave is no longer considered the space in their daily lives where they feel most comfortable and sense of belonging as is the case with their parents' generation (see section 7.2.1). This implies that the identity of space is not fixed, but is reconstructed by the users of that space (Butler, 1999; Urry, 2007). Rather than remaining a self-segregated space, the ethnic enclave is influenced by the in-between identities of KCMY adopting a role as a portal space where new Korean-Chinese migrants access information and networks to adapt to South Korean society and to move to other areas.

Migrant youth experience spatialities differently from adults (Skelton, 2009; Skelton, 2013). Therefore, migrant youths' daily experiences of mobility may also be different from those of their parents. In other words, even if they move to—and through—the same spaces as their parents, they may feel and recognise these spaces differently. The reason why migrant youth use places differently from adults is related to their in-between position on the life course; their placement is between childhood and adulthood. Their in-between stage of life has been suggested to be understood through the concept of liminality. As liminality highlights the status that is “positioned on a boundary or threshold” (Weller, 2006, p.102), it can be one of in-betweenness (Wood, 2012). Young people placed in the liminal position on their life courses have not only the ambiguity and uncertainty, which are caused by their betwixt and between positions assigned by laws and convention, but also the dynamics (Bailey, 2009). This is parallel with KCMY's active negotiation of their positionalities and belonging based on their in-betweenness in this research. Furthermore, understanding the lives of migrant youth on their life courses suggests the need to consider migration as a series of relational practices, which is linking over time and space, rather than a single event (Findlay et al., 2015). In other words, exploring how migrants accumulate experiences in their lifetime allows researchers to analyse how migrants' past experiences affect their current and future life. In line with this argument, KCMY's life as left-behind children (see section 5.2) has a significant influence on their current life as migrants and migration plans and economic activities in the future.

Online spaces, such as Social Networking Service (SNS) and internet communities, play a significant role in expanding the mobility and relations of migrant youth (Ash, 2009; Urry, 2007). In the virtual world, migrant youth can create solidarity by forming various relations with others who share common interests (Butler, 2015). This is possible because in the virtual world, KCMY can form diverse relationships by more actively using their in-between identities as they can conceal certain aspects of their identities (Anderson, 2015; Merrifield, 2013). The cultural capital of KCMY as ethnic Koreans, such as Korean language and Korean traditional culture, has been a catalyst for the awareness of their in-betweenness in South Korean society. Cultural capital also has a significant impact on shifting identities and positionalities in the virtual world as well as in the real world (see chapter 7).

South Korean social scientists have been interested in identities of migrant youth since the 2010s. The positionality of migrant youth is described as marginalised or otherized, and researchers argue that their marginalised positionality causes their identity confusion (Jwa, 2013; Lee, 2015; Song and Yoo, 2020). Earlier research on the identities of migrant youth suggested the need to change their identities from the assimilationist perspective by describing migrant youth as a group which are excluded or discriminated against in South Korean society (Lee et al., 2017; Oh et al., 2013). This is in the same vein as the assimilationist nature of South Korea's multicultural policies discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, migrant youth are implicitly required to change their identities and become what mainstream society expects them to be. Since the mid-2010s, researchers have begun to pay attention to identity confusion among migrant youth, which is caused by difficulties in adapting to South Korean society (Song and Kim, 2017; Song and Yoo, 2020). These studies have focused on the causes of this identity confusion and how to support them (Yoo, 2020). However, they have not examined how migrant youth use their ambiguous identities in a more positive way to strategically help their adaptation. In this regard, this research focuses on the process by which KCMY do not passively accept their identity confusion caused by their ambiguous identities, but try to negotiate their positionalities in the situated relation and context by strategically deploying their in-between identities.

Recent research on the identities of migrant youth has focused on the flexibility and variability of their identities. In particular, researchers have investigated how migrant youth describe their identities after identity confusion in South Korean society. Firstly, Jin (2020) argues that the ambivalent identity that results from the conflict between the national identity of their home country and a sense of belonging to South Korea. This is because migrant youth have both positive and negative feelings about South Korea caused by social discourse and their daily encounters. Their ambivalent identity emphasises that migrant youth constantly deliberate over their identities because they cannot define themselves in terms of only one national identity. However, this ambiguity of identity tends not to include other identities related to age, ethnicity, social position and legal status. Secondly, Choi and Lim (2021) suggest the identities of migrant youth are changed due to the influence of their families and peers during the re-socialisation process in the host society. According to their research, migrant youth tend to change their

identities in the host society, instead of maintaining their existing identities. However, this argument has a limitation in that it ignores individual subjectivity in the process of identity formation. Lastly, Park (2020) describes the nomad identity to highlight that migrant youth do not have full loyalty to their home or host countries and cannot explain themselves in terms of one specific identity. Although the nomad identity is similar to that of the in-between identities utilized in this research, it emphasises the floating nature of the identities of migrant youth like nomads. This viewpoint can explain the flexibility of their identities, but it is difficult to use it to understand their subjectivity in negotiating their identities according to the situated context. In sum, although South Korean research on the identities of migrant youth argues for the variability or flexibility of their identities, there are limitations to delineating their subjectivity to use their in-between identities and positionalities in the host society. In this regard, this research intends to examine the process of how identities and positionalities in South Korean society are strategically negotiated by focusing on the in-betweenness of KCMY.

Research on identities of migrant youth in South Korea has mainly focused on those who are descendants of ethnic Koreans. This is because it is assumed that ethnic Koreans will feel confused as a result of recognising the gap between their national and ethnic identity within South Korean society. Song (2002) argues that the reason for the confusion can be explained through the concept of “marginal person”, which highlights that they are on the border between South Korea and their home country due to their migration to South Korea. The marginal person concept implies an ambiguous state in which ethnic Korean migrant youth cannot completely abandon the ways of thinking and behaviour of their home country and also cannot be fully integrated into their host country (Park, 2017). In other words, they are described as people who do not belong to this or that side (Song, 2002). However, in this research, KCMY are not wandering aimless in the margins between South Korea and China. Indeed they aspire to live as transmigrants by using their in-between identity pro-actively (see chapter 7). In the process of adapting to South Korean society, their multiple identities may not allow them to feel a sense of belonging in a single country, but they can improve their adaptation in both countries and prospective mobility by taking advantage of their cultural and social capital resulting from their in-between positionalities.

2.3 Belonging

2.3.1 Belonging and borders

In human geography, belonging has been explored from an affective perspective in the sense that people long to be connected with other subjects or places (Mee and Wright, 2009). In particular, researchers recently focus on crossing-border groups and their perceptions of belonging, highlighting uncertain and variable aspects of belonging, rather than taken-for-granted belonging such as nationality. As detailed in the next sub-section, migrants' belonging needs a multiscale approach because they feel a sense of belonging in multiple spaces rather than just being emotionally bound to a single country due to transnational migration. In particular, citizenship is a concept and practice that can aid our understanding of the relationships between borders, bordering and belonging. Historically, geographical research on citizenship has focused on the individual commitment to a particular country where migrants have citizenship. This approach considers citizenship as a marker for individual belonging (Desforges et al, 2005). However, recent research treats the relationship between citizenship and belonging as a fluid rather than a fixed one and explores who is within that border and how individual belonging is changed or achieved (Mee and Wright, 2009). Furthermore, migrants stay in a host country by obtaining visas that benefit them in terms of their length and condition of stay instead of adopting citizenship. As detailed below, visas also serve as a device to allow those migrants who have passed certain criteria to enter the host country and provide them with a pragmatic means to stay in a territory.

The concept of citizenship is a political construct because it encompasses the rights and responsibilities to define individual membership in a polity (Isin and Wood, 1999; Samers and Collyer, 2017). States determine who is involved in the states through the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of belonging with the hegemonic political powers (Yuval-Davis, 2006). In other words, states establish boundaries between inclusion and exclusion by determining who deserves to be a member and who does not. Based on this classification, states offer rights to members and expect loyalties or responsibilities from them. For instance, the passport issued to citizens serves as a tool that states control citizens through institutionalisation and codification

(Neumayer, 2006; Torpey, 2000). On the other hand, the passport is an object, that provides tangible and authoritative documentation of an individual's legal status between states (Pogonyi, 2019). In other words, as a passport assumes the existence of relations between states, it expresses more than a single state's power. Thus, through possession of a passport, citizens are controlled by the state, but they also feel a sense of belonging to the state and have their international mobility guaranteed by the country they belong to (Yuval-Davis, 2006). As individual mobility is guaranteed by the power of the passport, migrants desire to acquire citizenship or naturalise in order to obtain a passport from countries that allow them to enter other countries through simple procedures (Baubock, 2019; Pogonyi, 2019). As South Korean passports are less restrictive than Chinese passports when visiting foreign countries, obtaining one is an attractive goal for KCMY who aspire to live as transnational migrants (Biao, 2014; Kim, 2018) (see section 7.4).

As a result of international migration, individuals may acquire legal status in other countries. This means that states grant citizenship to migrants who conduct marriage and labour migration. However, whether to allow migrants to naturalise or become citizens is not just a matter for the host country but for the home country too for it must be willing to allow its citizens to acquire the nationality or citizenship of another country (Samers and Collyer, 2017). In other words, dual nationality or naturalisation are still difficult processes for migrants because permission to change nationality must be granted by the home country as well as authorisation to naturalise by the host country. As South Korea and China basically grant citizenship based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* one's legal citizenship is dependent on that of one's parents. Moreover, since neither state allows dual citizenship, citizens must renounce their existing nationality in order to acquire a new one. For this reason, KCMY weigh up the pros and cons of naturalising in South Korea or of retaining their Chinese citizenship. Naturalisation is not just a way for individuals to acquire new citizenship, it is also a conversion for those whose existing citizenship is no longer appropriate for their situation (Baubock, 2019). Thus, KCMY can also retain or revoke their Chinese citizenship in consideration of their current or forthcoming circumstances. They strategically determine the legal status most favourable to themselves in order to enjoy benefits from both states (Kim, 2019). One way for this is to obtain permanent residency in South Korea while maintaining their Chinese citizenship. Permanent residency in South Korea allows them to get benefits from that country (e.g., entry into South Korea with

simple procedures, savings of visa application time and cost and the right to work) and to maintain their rights in China as Chinese citizens. Permanent residents cannot get a South Korean passport like those who have become naturalised. However, if easy movement between South Korea and China is most valued, permanent residency in South Korea can be an efficient way to enjoy the advantages in movement and stay.

Existing literature argues that it is common for migrants to desire to obtain permanent residency in the host country (Collins, 2012; Gama Gato and Salazar, 2018; Mountz et al., 2002). As mentioned earlier, migrants wish to maintain the benefits of citizenship of their home country as well as wanting to live permanently in the host country where they can access the same benefits of stable settlement, employment and education as citizens of the host country. On the other hand, KCMY desire to acquire permanent residency in South Korea as a way to actively engage in flexible belonging strategies. Focusing on this point, this research explores their desire for permanent residency in terms of strategic decisions to maintain flexible positionalities and belonging (see section 7.4.2).

Most migrants are granted legal status in the host country through visa issuance. Visa policies are migration management techniques that governments use to control the entry of migrants in order to protect citizens within the borders from outsiders (Hoang, 2017). The types of visas issued to migrants determine the extent of their activities in the host country, such as length of stay, employment and family invitation. While governments enforce strict visa screening on certain migrant groups who are considered a threat to social and ethno-cultural stability (Purcell and Nevins, 2005; Samers and Collyer, 2017), they lower entry requirements for other migrants for economic reasons (e.g., tourism, foreign investment, labour shortage) and political reasons (e.g., friendly national relations, historical links) (Neumayer, 2006). In this context, the characteristics of current mobility regimes in Asia, 'hierarchies of regulation', can be understood. Hierarchies of regulation denote the different treatment of migrants depending on their ethnicity, level of education or skills (Lindquist et al., 2012). In South Korea, Korean-Chinese migrants have visa issuance privileges since they share the same ethnicity as South Koreans. The preferential visa policies for ethnic Koreans encourage Korean-Chinese to migrate to South Korea as it is their ethnic home country (Lee,

2019). Regarding their entrance and stay in South Korea, their privileged rights as ethnic Koreans might be a result of selective permeability.

The concept of selective permeability describes a situation where certain specific groups of individuals are allowed to enter the host country through less rigorous criteria and with simpler documentation, than other groups who must struggle with strict criteria and complex procedures for entry (Popescu, 2012). States implement visa policies as a firewall which allows certain groups to pass through while others are blocked at the border (Walters, 2006). Therefore, through a selective permeability of migrants, states implement hierarchies of regulation on different migrant groups. Likewise, the South Korean government designates ethnic Koreans, including Korean-Chinese, a favoured group and issues visas which allow them to stay in South Korea for at least a year through simple procedures. In particular, the South Korean government has established new types of visas (F-4 and H-2) that offer employment rights as well as rights to long-term stay for Korean-Chinese and ethnic Koreans from CIS countries (MOJ, 2021). As these types of visas permit employment work in industries with labour shortages, the South Korean government can solve that problem (Lee, 2021). Therefore, ethnic-Korean migrants became a favoured group and were offered more advantageous visa rights than other migrants. Considering these preferential visa policies, KCMY can stay and work in South Korea with the aforementioned visas without becoming naturalised or obtaining permanent residency after the age of 18. They have several options in pursuing a stable and long-term stay in South Korea while maintaining Chinese citizenship. Therefore, KCMY can use the selective characteristics of South Korea's visa policy regulations to develop strategies to diversify their belonging and their future legal status. An empirical analysis of strategies of KCMY for using South Korea's visa policies will be carried out in sections 6.4 and 7.4.

States grant and manage the legal status of migrants within the host country through bureaucratic and policy processes including visa policies. Regarding bureaucracy, human geographers, especially economic and urban geographers, are interested in how bureaucracies interact with other political actors outside the state (Jessop, 2007; Peck, 2011). However, due to increases in transmigrants, some argue the need for human geographers to investigate how migrants interact with the bureaucratic and policy processes of their home and host countries and how they negotiate their legal status in

their lives (Kuus, 2015; Robertson, 2011). States seek to conduct simplification and quantification of migrant populations in the process of the establishment and implementation of policies to govern them (Humphris and Sigona, 2019; Ruszczyk, 2021; Yea, 2015). They count populations within their borders to facilitate smooth governance and simplify the diversity of population by classifying and counting them (Humphris and Sigona, 2019). Through classification of populations, bureaucracies provide a basis for policies by labelling and counting them. In the process, those who are labelled and counted become visible and included in the policy, but those who the process ignores may face exclusion as invisible beings (Humphris and Sigona, 2019). Furthermore, the way in which governments organise the labelling and categorisation of populations can influence public perceptions of groups belonging to a particular category (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018). Therefore, how migrants are classified in policies may have an impact on their sense of belonging in the host society.

In terms of categorisation, KCMY are labelled as ethnic Koreans and migrant youth, respectively, by the South Korean government. As Korean-Chinese, they fall under the rubric of ethnic Koreans and are subject to policies targeting ethnic Koreans (see section 2.3 and 6.4.1), and as migrant youth, they are subject to relevant multicultural policies (see section 2.2 and 6.4.2). As mentioned in section 2.2, multicultural policies were introduced to implement welfare policies in support of socially and economically vulnerable families of migrants married to South Koreans (Park and Park, 2014). As the number of migrants living in South Korea increased, the South Korean government tried to solve the majority of issues relating to migrant families through multicultural policies. KCMY have also been included as subjects of multicultural policies. As a result, South Koreans' negative feelings towards existing multicultural policy recipients (i.e. poor and vulnerable welfare beneficiaries) has been applied to KCMY (Koo, 2015). Negative public perceptions of multicultural policies have resulted in KCMY being considered a marginalised group, which may hinder their development of a sense of belonging in South Korean society.

Although the South Korean government includes migrant youth as a target of its multicultural policies, each government ministry adopts different criteria as to who is or is not eligible for inclusion in its policy programmes. As a result, South Korean government ministries have not yet decided on a common standard for defining migrant youth. Therefore, the exact population of migrant

youth in South Korea is not known as they are labelled and counted according to different definitions and standards by each government ministry (Lee et al., 2017). For example, the Ministry of Education (MOE) defines migrant youth as children of marriage migrants or naturalised citizens, who are attending schools in South Korea. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) includes not only children of marriage migrants and the naturalised but also the children of other migrant families who are having difficulty in adapting to South Korean society. These different definitions and standards sometimes exclude KCMY from counting or labelling of government ministries because their parents are not marriage migrants or naturalised citizens or because they are not attending school in South Korea. This may be criticised as categorical fetishism which criticises the mismatch between policy categories related to KCMY and their actual lives. Categorical fetishism indicates the need to be careful when determining categories and developing policies based on them because existing categories are unable to clearly capture complex social realities (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018). For instance, many KCMY are not included in the current MOE classification of migrant youth because their parents are neither married migrants nor naturalised citizens, but they are included in the MOGEF's one. In other words, KCMY are visible or invisible depending on their status (e.g., student status, parent's nationality, naturalisation status) (see section 2.2). Therefore, since policy categories are the product of a simplistic dichotomy that tries to fit individuals into a framework already established by policymakers rather than taking into account the complexity of reality, KCMY experience a change in the categories used to define them, depending on the government ministry. As migrant youth, they experience belonging or non-belonging depending on the policy target criteria set by each ministry. The inclusion and exclusion of KCMY from South Korean policies will be analysed along with empirical examples in section 6.4.

As government ministries, which lack accurate information about migrant youth, attempt to solve problems related to them, they establish and implement short-sighted solutions and associated policies (Kuus, 2015). Due to the ambiguity of such day-to-day policies, KCMY keep anxiously up to date with relevant policy changes (Robertson, 2011). In particular, changes in visa policies related to their legal status in South Korea are assiduously followed by KCMY who need to change their visa types before they turn 19 (see section 7.4.2). Because policymakers tend to change the eligibility criteria of different

visa types and their conditions of stay for political and social reasons (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018), lack of information on the actual life of migrants and the frequent shift in visa policies make KCMY particularly vulnerable to these changes. Therefore, as a result of these inconsistent policies KCMY often feel an unstable sense of belonging. The next section will look into KCMY's sense of belonging and the factors which influence this in their daily spaces.

2.3.2 A sense of belonging as transmigrants in everyday spaces

Transnationalism is a term often associated with contemporary migration. The concept of transnationalism has been used to describe not only social relations across national boundaries but also phenomena which create and maintain the linkage and interaction of products, culture and information by individuals who transcend national borders (Vertovec, 2009). Transnational migrants maintain connectivity in that they form social fields or relations which simultaneously span two or more countries including their home and host countries (Schiller et al., 1992). Their connectivity can influence their sense of belonging to multiple countries (Morley, 2001). Therefore, studies on transnationalism are attentive to the practice of individual social relationships and interactions on the ground. Korean-Chinese migrants also maintain social relations between South Korea and China. As Lee et al. (2013) demonstrate, Korean-Chinese migrants who participate in transnational migration maintain economic, cultural, and social relations with their country of origin, and these relations affect the material and socio-cultural landscapes of their country of origin. Even though they live in South Korea, they seek to sustain transnational connectivity with their parents, siblings or children who still live in China. Their left-behind family members participate in transnational connections as a node in these migrants' social network, although they do not physically migrate to other countries (Lee et al., 2014) (see section 5.2).

The emergence of transnational migrants has led some to argue that state-based belonging is no longer a sufficient framework to describe the sense of belonging of transnational migrants even though states still play an important role in identifying their legal status (Castles et al., 2014; Staeheli et al., 2012; Waite, 2012). As has been mentioned above, since transnational migrants form social relations across states, their belonging is not limited to a single state. This then is the background to migrants developing strategies to shift or

diversify their existing belonging in ways such as naturalisation, dual citizenship and permanent residency rather than maintaining a single citizenship for their entire life (see section 2.3.1). As these multiple connections evoke various feelings of being and belonging depending on contexts and relations, migrants feel multiple senses of belonging (Jackson, 2014; Wood and Waite, 2011). Sense of belonging embraces migrants' experiences which are rooted in their daily places (Jackson, 2014; Yuval-Davis, 2006). When migrants form mutual relations with others in their daily lives, they feel a sense of belonging not only in the relationships but also in the local places. Their sense of belonging based on their localised contexts is related to the concept of translocality. Translocality is considered a form of 'grounded transnationalism' which means that local-local relationships of migrants exist within the debates on transnationalism (Brickell and Datta, 2011). Since the spaces and places experienced in the everyday lives of transmigrants are connected across different localities, this concept emphasises exploration of their daily experiences on a local rather than a national scale. Conradson and McKay (2007) suggest the concept of translocal subjectivities, focusing on migrants' subjectivities and feelings at the level of everyday experience. This term highlights "the multiply-located sense of self amongst those who inhabit transnational social fields" (Conradson and McKay, 2007, p.168). Because transnational migrants try to maintain emotional connections with their families, friends and communities in certain locations, their sense of belonging is more closely related to localities within states than to the nation-states. In this respect, it is evident that transmigrants have multiple senses of belonging across various localities.

Emotional feelings about the home and host countries can change. As the intensity of ties to the home and host countries shift, migrants' feelings toward these countries also change (Boccagni and Baldassar, 2015). Feelings for the host country shift from out-of-place to in-place as migrants are integrated into the host society (Burman and Chantler, 2004). On the other hand, as ties to their home country grow weaker, feelings of connectivity to the home country correspondingly decrease (Howes and Hammett, 2016). However, some KCMY desire to maintain their Chinese identities and their ties with friends and family in their hometowns in order to live as transmigrants between South Korea and China in the future (see section 7.4). Their multiple sense of belonging is also strategic, enabling them to capitalise on the benefits that both societies are perceived to offer.

Belonging as felt by migrants in their everyday lives provides understanding about how they interact with their socio-cultural backgrounds and material circumstances. Staeheli et al. (2012) argue that migrants' ordinary and everyday experiences play a significant role in the construction and practice of belonging, emphasising the importance of everyday places and communities. Through interactions with diverse people and places, migrants can attain belonging as dynamic emotional attachments (Wood and Waite, 2011). As emotional attachments shift depending on relations with others and with material circumstances, migrants may develop flexible and multiple belonging. Although such localised belonging rooted in daily life is more complex and ambiguous than state-based belonging, it may represent more accurately how migrants negotiate their own belonging in real-life.

Kallio et al. (2020) use the concept of lived citizenship to analyse such belonging in everyday life. Over the last twenty years, human geographers have endeavoured to focus on the life of ordinary people in their daily spaces. The aim is to expose the ordinary and the everyday, especially of marginalised groups, including women, migrants, youth and children (Kallio et al., 2020; Lister, 2007). Fundamental to this aim are arguments surrounding the significance of context to the embodied and everyday characteristics of experiences of belonging (Dyck, 2005). From this perspective, analysis of embodied belonging in daily life raises the need to investigate individual agency. Kallio et al. (2020) highlight the subjectivity of individuals in the realm of their social relationships through the concept of lived citizenship. While the concept of translocality has been applied to studies on the sense of belonging of migrants across multiple localities, lived citizenship focuses on migrants' subjectivities which allow them to flexibly change their belonging according to situated relationships within the host society. Migrants negotiate their belonging in various relations rather than determining their belonging through citizenship in a national framework. In this context, transmigrants subjectively constitute their belonging with lived citizenship, positioning themselves in the relationships and places they encounter (Kallio et al., 2020). Migrant youth also build their lived belonging, but academic interest in this area remains limited. Research on KCMY also focuses more on the belonging and identities of the entire community of Korean-Chinese migrants rather than on KCMY (Fang, 2020; Kim and Chung, 2017). However, KCMY are distinct from older migrants to South Korea. KCMY endeavour to adapt to South Korean society

in order to feel being in place by using their in-between positionalities and identities (see section 7.2). This is different from the belonging of the earlier generation of Korean-Chinese migrants who pursue self-segregation and internal consolidation within their ethnic enclave. Therefore, KCMY can change their belonging flexibly according to the social and spatial contexts in their everyday spaces, recognising their in-between belonging and positionalities.

In addition, scholars use the concept of flexible citizenship to investigate changes in the flexible belonging of transmigrants. Flexible citizenship which is said by Ong (1999) to refers to “the cultural logics of capital accumulation, travel and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions” (1999, p.6). Ong’s concept of flexible citizenship argues that transmigrants are constantly in transit in order to accumulate capital from their migration (Ong, 1999). She focuses on wealthy and powerful rather than ordinary migrants, and investigates their strategic use of flexible citizenship to live as flexible subjects in the modern capitalist system.

Although migrants change their belonging in the process of adaptation to the host society, not all migrants shift their belonging strategically in transit primarily for economic benefits. It is advisable then to use the concept of flexible citizenship thoughtfully. Waters (2006) argues that migrants negotiate their belonging flexibly to pursue not only economic capital but also the accumulation of different forms of capital, raising the need for a strategic and flexible viewpoint of citizenship. In addition, migrants have openness to further migration in the life, but they are not always in transit. According to Waters (2009), migrants desire to move to another country, to stay in the current host country, or to return to their home country, depending on the length of their stay and their daily experiences. As their sense of belonging varies depending on how they feel about their daily experiences, their aspiration for mobility is likely to be different. Likewise, KCMY also consider their sense of belonging in South Korean society as a significant factor in deciding their mobility. They conduct strategies to flexibly change their belonging according to their relationships and the context of their daily experiences. Therefore, as the flexibility of their current belonging can also influence their future mobility and belonging, their flexible belonging needs to be investigated on their life courses (see section 7.4).

Language significantly influences the emotional attachments of KCMY in their daily places. Language barriers that migrants encounter in their host countries are a result not only of a lack of knowledge of the language itself, but also of a lack of understanding of the context in which the language is used. In particular, as language is composed and employed by its users, understanding the context-bound characteristics of a language is important. In this light, KCMY endeavour to understand a new language, Korean, in their daily lives through the contextualising and socialising process (Bailey et al., 2016) (see section 7.2.1). As language, space and sense of belonging are interconnected and constructed by each other (Valentine et al., 2009), KCMY aspire to acquire contextual Korean language to adapt to the new society.

Since proficiency in language is considered cultural, economic and social capital, ability to use the language of the host country has a positive impact on migrants' socio-cultural adaptation as well as on their employment (Kallis and Yarwood, 2021). In particular, for migrant youth, language is an intellectual and social skills acquired through communication with one's peers (Yosso, 2005). Therefore, proficiency in the host country's language acts as a catalyst for socialisation and significantly influences the formation of emotional attachments and belonging in relationships in the host society (Karin and Shirley, 2015; Valentine et al., 2009). In addition, language skills are an important factor when trying to find a job. It is obvious that proficiency in the host country's language makes the job seeker more employable in the host country. Migrant youth as transmigrants can also use their proficiency in their native and the host country's language as valuable economic capital within the labour markets of their home and host countries. KCMY are eager to find work that use their dual language skills and to live as transmigrants after acquiring familiarity with Korean language, culture and society (see section 7.4). They gain a sense of belonging to local spaces while learning contextual Korean language through encounters with their peers and neighbours at school, centres or communities (see section 6.2.2). They also maintain connectivity with China through their continued relationships with family and friends in their hometowns (see section 2.3.1). Therefore, their multiple senses of belonging and connectivity based on language and relationships with acquaintances provide the basis for their desire to connect South Korea and China (see section 7.4). The next section will explore the ways in which KCMY negotiate their belonging strategically in South Korean society.

2.3.3 Strategic practices of belonging

Migrant transnational practices tend to result in repeated temporary sojourns rather than permanent settlement (Bailey et al., 2002; Dahinden, 2010; Salazar, 2017; Schiller and Çağlar, 2009). These days, some migrants tend to extend their stay temporarily in current host country or to migrate to other countries depending on their circumstances (Collins, 2012). Migrants adapt to host societies by altering their existing habits and adjusting to new circumstances in their daily lives (Cojocaru, 2021; Valentine, 2008). As mentioned in section 2.3.2, they feel multiple senses of belonging that span diverse countries or places. In other words, those who pursue temporary sojourns, experience these as dynamic and flexible rather than as fixed processes (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Under these multiple senses of belonging, migrants develop diverse migration-and-stay strategies for their temporary settlement in the host country. As detailed below, they also engage in temporary employment by using in-between legal positionalities. This section briefly presents these strategies—permanent temporariness, stepwise migration and semi-compliance—in order to underpin an understanding of the lives of KCMY. These will be investigated further in Chapter 7, which demonstrates how KCMY practice their in-between positionalities and belonging in their everyday spaces.

The concept of permanent temporariness provides a useful descriptive marker to analyse the temporary mobility of transmigrants. Due to advanced telecommunications and transportation, migrants engage in cross-border activities including labour, family life, education and business. These migrants are issued temporary visas to enter host countries at the outset. Although they enter the host society with temporary visas with specific limitations on their stay and activities in the host country, they endeavour to find ways to remain long-term before expiration of their visa (Collins, 2012). In other words, they tend to continue their stay by holding temporary legal status in the host country, instead of changing their nationality through naturalisation. Therefore, the distinction between temporary and permanent migrants becomes unclear (Samers and Collyer, 2017). In this light, the term ‘permanent temporariness’ is useful to describe their positionalities and belonging between temporariness and permanency of migrants.

Bailey et al. (2002) argue that the concept of permanent temporariness describes the combination of the static experience of being temporary and the knowledge that this temporariness is permanent. Their research focuses on migrants who live and work under TPS (Temporary Protective Status) in the U.S. TPS grants selected foreign-born populations temporary residence status and employment rights, nevertheless, TPS holders pursue permanent settlement through their children's education, marriage and even by refusing to leave the U.S. Permanent temporariness is a ubiquitous feature of the daily life of migrants through their mundane encounters with state power. Such encounters are not limited to just one scale, but span multiple scales (e.g., bodies, families, social fields and states) (Bailey et al., 2002). In this regard, if migrants are unable to obtain citizenship in the host country and are reluctant to return to their home country, they seek ways to extend their stay and to maintain their current life in the host country. KCMY are guaranteed to stay in South Korea until the age of 18 depending on visas of their parents. However, they have to change their visas in order to stay in South Korea beyond that age. Like the participants in Bailey et al. (2002)'s research, KCMY prefer not to return to China immediately even if they assume they will return someday. Keeping open the possibility of returning to China, they prefer to extend their stay in South Korea through legal means such as by changing their visa type or obtaining permanent residency, rather than naturalising in South Korea. While participants in Bailey et al. (2002) consider deemed 'illegal' ways to extend their stay, KCMY try to maintain legal temporariness as they have relatively easy access to methods of legally extending their stay. Therefore, KCMY can continue in their daily lives, having permanent temporariness due to South Korean laws and policies in favour of ethnic Koreans (see section 2.3). In Section 7.4, I will thoroughly examine the permanent temporariness that KCMY desire.

Some transmigrants engage in 'stepwise migration' in that they stay a while in one or more steppingstone countries during their migration. The goal of stepwise migration is an improved socio-economic status at the final destination (Harpaz and Mateos, 2019; Kim, 2019; Paul, 2011). In the migration process, stepping stone countries vary depending on the differing circumstances and intentions of migrants. According to Kim (2019)'s research on the stepwise migration of Korean-Chinese migrants to the U.S., South Korea is considered a steppingstone country for Korean-Chinese migrants.

They determine to migrate to the U.S. in anticipation of greater economic gain and an improved social status than they had in China. For Korean-Chinese migrants, South Korea is a space where they can use their ethnicity to acquire economic capital and form social networks for their migration to the U.S. They prepare forthcoming migration in South Korea where they can earn higher wages than in China and have easy access to information about migration to the U.S. For these reasons, South Korea plays a significant role as a steppingstone country in the process of migration from China to the U.S. KCMY also aspire to learn knowledge and skills in South Korea to achieve more economic gain and an improved social status in China. In contrast to the participants in Kim (2019)'s research, some KCMY consider South Korea as a place to prepare for a return to China as a successful returnee, not for further migration to another country (see section 7.4.3). The assumption that they will return to China someday affects their preference for obtaining long-term visas or permanent residency rather than naturalisation in South Korea. In this study, the stepwise migration process for the return of KCMY to China can extend the scope of the existing concept of stepwise migration, which assumes migration to a third country. In this regard, this research also suggests the need to consider migrants' sense of belonging and negotiation of their legal status as factors in their stepwise migration. Section 7.3 and 7.4 will investigate the role of South Korea as a steppingstone country for KCMY.

In terms of employment, migrants, who locate themselves between legality and illegality in the host country, participate in the labour market as semi-compliant migrants. The notion of semi-compliance refers to "the employment of migrants who are legally resident but working in violation of the employment restrictions attached to their immigration status" (Ruhs and Anderson 2010, p.195). Ruhs and Anderson (2010) introduce the term semi-compliance to examine this vague (il)legitimacy by classifying the levels of compliance of migrants in the host country. Firstly, compliant migrants are legally resident and work in compliance of the employment restrictions attached to their visa status. Secondly, non-compliant migrants refer to irregular residents who are not allowed to dwell or work in the host country. Lastly, semi-compliant migrants are those who can legally reside but working in contravention of some or all of the employment restrictions stipulated on their visas. Therefore, semi-compliant migrants have in-between belonging as legal residents and irregular workers.

Although semi-compliant migrants try to comply with immigration laws to maximise the security of their status, they work by bending the immigration rules in the host country. Although they recognise that their immigration status prohibits employment, they believe that their economic benefits and irregular working do not have a significant impact on the economy and society of the host country (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). They seem themselves as bending the rules rather than breaking them. Some employers abuse migrants' semi-compliance to maximise their benefits, which influence migrants' precarious positionalities in employment relationships (Peng, 2020; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). As migrant youth obtain visas that do not allow them to work, they violate immigration laws to work part-time or full-time (Mosneaga and Winther, 2013; Peng, 2020). Employers often exploit the illegal working practice of migrant youth by putting downward pressure on low wages or short-term contracts (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). In this regard, since migrant youth are often employed as part-time or short-term casual workers, their economic and social positionalities are more precarious than those of the host community. Although it is the role of government to deter the dodgy practices of unscrupulous employers, not only is it difficult to crack down on the employment of semi-compliant migrants, but the government is also uninterested in intervening as it determines that this form of employment has a relatively low impact on the state (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). By analysing the actions and intentions of agents related to the employment of semi-compliant migrants, the notion of semi-compliance points to a grey ambiguous zone of legal residents who are working in contravention of employment regulations. KCMY usually work as semi-compliant migrants employed in part-time and short-term casual work. The short-term and temporary nature of this employment offers little in the way of training or acquisition of skills which would help them to find a stable job on becoming adults. Furthermore, it is pointed out that KCMY sometimes get involved in criminal activity as a way to make money quickly and also that they may participate in the underground economy (Song and Kim, 2017). In section 7.3, I will examine their economic activities through this lens of semi-compliance.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a literature review of the themes which emerge through my research. In section 2.2, I explored migrant positionalities and

identities, focusing on mundane encounters and in-betweenness in their daily spaces. I found that migrants negotiate their identities and positionalities flexibly in encounters in diverse contexts and relations in daily spaces. Because such encounters are experienced in different ways by different individuals, even if they occur in the same space, migrants can be included or excluded from the space or mainstream group depending on the relations between migrants and the host community. I also discussed how some migrants desire to be included in the mainstream group and do so by passing as members of the host community. They do this by concealing or emphasising certain aspects of their identities. In addition, I examined how the in-between positionalities of migrants allow them to negotiate their multiple identities. In this regard, this research raises the need for consideration of spatiality and encounters in the discussion of migrant youth in-betweenness. This is because the negotiation of their in-between positionalities and identities may present itself differently depending on situated spaces and relations. Existing research has more infrequently explored the negotiation processes of positionalities and identities of KCMY, considering them as passive. It is my opinion, however, that these processes can be refined to explain their active agency in that they can strategically negotiate their identities and positionalities in their everyday lives.

Section 2.3 explicated migrants' belonging related to borders and localities in their daily lives. Existing literature on migrant belonging on the national scale has been interested in how states manage migrants through categorisation via labelling and counting. However, I felt the need to investigate how states influence the belonging of KCMY in their daily life from a micro-perspective, emphasising that categorisation influences experiences of belonging and non-belonging depending on the policy. On the local scale, I found the need to analyse the belonging of KCMY in their daily lives through the concepts of lived belonging and refined flexible citizenship because their sense of belonging is flexibly changed by local spaces and relationships. I also explained the importance of context-bound language which can influence migrants' social and economic belonging in the host society. Finally, I highlighted that migrant youth's belonging cannot be described as fixed because temporary stays are often preferred and these open up the possibility of onward migration, while maintaining connectivity with multiple localities. In this regard, I realised that it is necessary to go beyond a single-layered analysis of migrants' belonging. Throughout this chapter, I have focused on

the themes which I will investigate in subsequent chapters, emphasising how I plan to develop on current theoretical framings.

Chapter 3

Context of multiculturalism and ethnic Koreans in South Korea

3.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates multiculturalism and ethnic Koreans in South Korea through both legal and policy lenses. These framings have had, and continue to have, a significant influence on positionalities and belonging of KCMY in South Korean society. KCMY are understood to belong to a 'multicultural group' or to a group of 'ethnic Koreans' who come from China according to South Korean laws and policies. As will be detailed in the following empirical chapters, their legal categories—Chinese and ethnic Korean—have influenced the negotiation of their positionalities and belonging depending on the context that they encounter. Throughout this chapter, I focus on the legal and policy frameworks and emerging experiences that lead to Korean-Chinese being viewed through the lens of 'multiculturalism' and the legal category of 'ethnic Koreans'.

Section 3.2 looks at the ambivalent role that multiculturalism, as practice and policy, plays in South Korean society. It explores how South Korean multiculturalism is practiced through government-led multicultural policies, which have spread via the media and become the basis for discrimination and exclusion of certain migrant groups including KCMY. I highlight the role of the media which reproduces and spreads negative discourses on certain migrant groups that are subject to multicultural policies, including KCMY. Furthermore, South Korea's multicultural policies aim to integrate migrant youth into the mainstream framework through the perspective of neo-assimilationism. The government emphasises the need to support migrant youth through multicultural policies because they are perceived to potentially cause social problems. However, I stress that this rationalisation of government can cause social discrimination and prejudice against migrant youth who are targets of multicultural policies. In order to investigate these points, I analyse the basic multicultural policy plans and detailed projects of the South Korean central government and the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG).

Section 3.3 investigates the South Korean visa policies related to KCMY as ethnic Koreans and the contradictory classification of them depending on the government agencies. I aim to demonstrate that South Korean immigration laws and policies for KCMY as ethnic Koreans are oriented towards encouraging their stable and long-term residence in South Korea. I suggest that this change can be the basis of KCMY strategically using their status as ethnic Koreans in South Korean society. I also highlight the inclusion and exclusion of KCMY in accordance with the policies or Acts targeted at ethnic Koreans. KCMY are not subject to coherent policies due to the Acts or policies related to overseas Koreans playing out differently due to different visions of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). KCMY as ethnic Koreans shift their positionalities depending on legal and political factors in South Korean society, and hence their 'ambiguous belongings' emerges. I close this chapter by emphasising the relevance between my findings and legal and policy factors related to South Korean multiculturalism and ethnic Korean policies.

3.2 Government practices constituting multiculturalism

South Korea has been considered a country with a largely homogeneous population and South Koreans pride themselves on adhering to a culture and way of life handed down from their ancestors. However, as diversity in population and culture emerge, this homogeneous nationalism is being replaced by multiculturalism (Oh, 2007). Contrary to accepting of these demographic and social changes, many South Koreans believe that the invasion of diverse cultures undermines their own culture, which arouse antipathy toward heterogeneous cultures. The South Korean government has begun to use the term "multiculturalism" as a means of dealing with this newly emerging diversity which is perceived as a challenge to the homogeneous nationalism prevalent in society (Koo, 2015). Multiculturalism has become the keynote of the government's immigration policy. The term "multiculturalism" was announced in April 2006 then circulated over a short period of time without gaining sufficient public agreement for the governments' plan to support the social integration of migrant families by focusing on married migrant families (Koo, 2015). Popular misunderstandings meant it became associated with discrimination against certain migrant groups and the formation of a negative discourse around them in South Korean society. In

this context, because KCMY, who have Chinese nationality and at least one parent with Chinese nationality, are classified as a multicultural group in certain policy areas, they also share the same negative public perception as other migrant groups. In this respect, this section elucidates how the set of the South Korean government's practices (or policies) that constitute multiculturalism entail social consequences.

Multiculturalism in South Korean policy has the stated aim of supporting the adaptation of migrant families. In other words, South Korea's version of multiculturalism tends to be characterised by the neo-assimilationist approach that diverse people and cultures exist in society, but that the government (and society) desire their identities to mirror those of mainstream society. This is closely related to the South Korean government's implementation of multicultural policies to support the adaptation and integration of married migrant women and their children into South Korean society, as will be explained further below. Therefore, multiculturalism in South Korean policies does not aim for the coexistence of various cultures and people, but is a strategy to pursue social stability by managing heterogeneous groups who are believed to hinder social unity (Koo, 2015). In other words, although multiculturalism appears to be a slogan that encourages social diversity and coexistence, it ultimately implies the government's intention to manage them to follow the framework of mainstream society. Furthermore, government intentions are to implement multicultural policies in parallel with its immigration policies, such as visa policies. Since these multicultural policies mainly target migrants, South Koreans remain unaffected by them. Thus, multicultural policies have played a role in rationalising the boundaries between migrants and the native through accentuating the distinction between those two groups (Yuval-Davis, 2006). In particular, because South Korean multiculturalism began with a government-led top-down approach, South Koreans had to accept it without enough preparation for accepting the diversity (Jirn, 2014). Even though South Koreans understand that the need to pursue coexistence with different cultures and people, they psychologically 'other' them. As such othering could lead to social conflict between migrants and South Koreans, the government expects migrants to join the mainstream social framework through multicultural policies which pursue the assimilation of migrants.

As mentioned earlier, South Korean multiculturalism was created as the South Korean government announced establishing multicultural society as the vision

of immigration policies. In 2006, the government, under the Presidency of Roh Moo-Hyun, declared a transition to a multicultural society and said, “We should strive to integrate migrants through multicultural policies” (Chae, 2006). In particular, the MOE announced policies to support the adaptation and integration of marriage migrant women and their children into South Korean society, which had become a social issue. In 2008, the Multicultural Family Support Act was enacted and the term “a multicultural family” was defined as a family consisting of a marriage between a South Korean and a marriage-migrant. As this definition of a multicultural family implies, multiculturalism in South Korea’s policies refers to situations where people of different nationalities become mixed up rather than to the coexistence of diverse cultures. Migrant youth of foreign nationality were categorised as multicultural students in schools according to the MOE’s definition, which included children who were born to those multicultural families. As the number of diverse migrants has increased, the government has expanded the scope of its definition of multicultural families to include any migrants and their children (MOGEF, 2018). Despite this, because the definition and range of children of multicultural families can vary according to different government ministries, migrant youth become a target of multicultural policies, although this may vary depending on the policy (see section 6.4.2). For example, KCMY were defined as multicultural students at school but they may not be so by the various ministries that implement multicultural policies outside of school.




Figure 3.1 The number and ratio of registered migrant youth (2010-2019)

Source: Statistics Korea, Korean statistical information service
(<http://kosis.kr>, 10 Mar 2020)

Table 3.1 Plans for multicultural policies in South Korea

Plan	The Third Basic Plan for Multicultural Family Policy	Multicultural Education Support Plan	The Second Basic Plan for Foreign Residents and Multicultural Families of Seoul
Agency	MOGEF	MOE, SMOE	SMG
Target	Marriage migrants, children and local communities	Migrant students, teachers, parents and local communities	Foreign residents and local communities
Vision	Multicultural society with equal participation and coexistence	Students who learn and grow together, and schools with diversity and harmony	Seoul where migrants' participation is guaranteed
Key themes of major policy tasks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support for long-term stay of multicultural families ▪ Enhancement of capabilities of children of multicultural families ▪ Improvement in multicultural acceptability ▪ Cooperative multicultural family policy management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Guarantee of educational opportunities ▪ Support for school adaptation and stable growth support ▪ Establishment of a school environment with diversity ▪ Enhancement of the multicultural education support system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The cultural diversity city ▪ The human rights-centred safe city where citizens can mutually respect and communicate ▪ The city where all citizens share duties and rights ▪ The tolerance city realised by governance

Source: MOE, 2021; MOGEF, 2018; SMG, 2019; SMOE, 2021

As the proportion of migrant youth⁵ relative to the total number of registered foreigners and the total number of them in South Korea has increased in recent years (see figure 3.1), the South Korean government has begun to pay attention to migrant youth in multicultural policies. South Korea's multicultural policies are based on the *Basic Plan for Multicultural Family Policy* which is announced every five years under the Multicultural Family Support Act. While previous multicultural policies have concentrated on immigration and the initial period of adaptation of migrant youth, the *Third Basic Plan for Multicultural Family Policy* focuses on the prolonged stay in various forms of migrant families (MOGEF, 2018). Migrant youth became an object of focus as they were also staying in South Korea for more than a year and belonged to various forms of family due to family reunification or parental divorce or remarriage (see section 5.3 and 5.4). Furthermore, although existing policies did not take into account the difference between migrant youth and children of multicultural families born in South Korea, the government has recently announced plans to implement support policies which consider the characteristics of this group (MOGEF, 2018). The government has assumed that the identities of migrant youth differ from those of mainstream society because they grew up mainly in foreign countries, and that their sense of belonging to South Korean society is

⁵ According to the Multicultural Family Support Act, the upper age limit for migrants to be considered as youth is 24. Therefore, South Korea's multicultural policies implemented under this Act determine the target age group of migrant youth under the age of 24 according to their policy goals.

weak. Therefore, the government set up the promotion of their integration into Korean society through their stable growth as one of the main policy issues in the new multicultural policy plan (see table 3.1).

As table 3.1 demonstrates, the current multicultural policies aim to develop a society which respects diversity so that migrants and South Koreans can coexist equally in the society. If previous policies had unilaterally forced migrants to assimilate and integrate into South Korean society, the current policies appear to aim at helping migrants coexist with South Koreans without discrimination. In particular, migrant youth have become recognised as members of multicultural families, including migrant families, under the multicultural family policies of the central government. The central government's multicultural policies, which are established mainly by the MOGEF, suggest a broad framework for domestic multicultural policies by setting the stance and direction of overall multicultural policies at the national level (Choi, 2021). Other government ministries, such as the MOE, have established multicultural policies respectively based on the plan for multicultural policy announced by the MOGEF. Local governments are responsible for implementing detailed tasks based on the major policy directives of the central government and for carrying out their own relevant policies that take into account local characteristics (e.g., demographic characteristics of migrants, employment, industry, etc.). The multicultural policies of the SMG, Seoul having the largest number of migrant in the country, offer sufficient support for them to live as members of local communities. Through the announcement of the *Second Basic Plan for Foreign Residents and Multicultural Families of Seoul (2019-2023)*, the SMG has set out a vision for its multicultural policies to ensure the social and economic participation of migrants in Seoul. Regarding migrant youth, one of the major policy tasks is to support them in their adaptation so that they can enjoy the right to be educated and work like South Korean citizens. Multicultural education policies which directly influence migrant youth are also helping to increase diversity in schools. The MOE has announced the *Multicultural Education Support Plan (2021)*, and local education offices, such as the SMOE (Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education), implement the multicultural education policies in practice. The goal of multicultural education policies is to help migrant youth adapt smoothly to South Korean schools and to have a positive impact not only on their learning but also on their social adaptation. In these three policies,

migrant youth are judged to be able to adapt without difficulty to South Korean society and to be able to coexist with South Koreans.

In the policies and projects of these plans, migrant youth are considered to be assimilated and adapted to the mainstream framework in South Korean society, even if these policies seem to acknowledge their diversity (see table 3.2 and 3.3). Multicultural policies of the South Korean central government and the SMG targeted at migrant youth are divided into the following categories: bilingual education, career and vocational education and guidance, Korean language education, school life support and social adaptation. These categories imply that those in government wish to encourage migrant youth to adapt to society and school life through Korean language education and, to use the advantages of bilingual abilities to decide their career (Bae, 2016; Lee et al., 2017). The emphasis in these policies is on the adaptation of migrant youth rather than on a recognition of their diversity. In other words, multicultural policies encourage migrant youth to learn about South Korean culture and society thus assimilating into the South Korean social system where they will not cause any problem. Centres for migrant youth (e.g., Rainbow school, Seoul On-dream Education Centre and Da plus On Centre) and vocational high schools for migrant youth (e.g., Korean Polytechnic Dasom High School and Seoul Dasom Tourism High School) serve as hubs to implement policies for migrant youth. Programmes run by these organisations firstly aim at a smooth and efficient harmonisation of migrant youth with mainstream society by alleviating their difficulties through helping them learn Korean language, culture and society. In this light, South Korean multicultural policies are intended to train migrant youth to be good citizens (see section 6.3.1). Through multicultural policies, government encourages migrant youth to abide by the mainstream framework, not to maintain their own identities. The standard of 'goodness' refers to the desirable standard that mainstream society has adhered to so far, and the government encourages migrant youth to become good citizens who conform to this standard. Policies aimed at maintaining their identities, such as bilingual education, are intended not to encourage diversity, but to turn them into valuable human resources for South Korea (Kim and Chung, 2016). These policies also demonstrate the South Korean government's intention to manage the diversity of migrant youth within the mainstream framework. Therefore, the goal of multiculturalism in South Korea as reflected in its government's multicultural policies is not the realisation of a nation united in

diversity but rather a framework of integration which is recognised as neo-assimilationist.

Table 3.2 Policies or projects of the South Korean government targeting migrant youth

Category	Policy / project	Responsible agency
Bilingual education	Enrichment of bilingual human resource development projects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bilingual human resources database - Bilingual speaking contest - Making bilingual teaching materials 	MOGEF, MOE
Career and vocational education	Activation of career programmes for migrant youth <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Catch the Rainbow programme: career education - Catch my work programme: vocational education 	MOGEF, MOE
	Support for the vocational education and training institute : Korean Polytechnic Dasom High school	MOEL
Korean language education	Enhancement of Korean language education management and quality improvement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Teaching materials and teacher training in accordance with the KSL (Korean as a Second Language) curriculum - Preparatory courses for the TOPIK (Test of Proficiency in Korean) in the migrant youth support project 	MOGEF, MOE
Social adjustment	Expansion and diversification of Rainbow School to help migrant youth adapt early <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Korean language education, extracurricular education, and Korean culture for migrant youth to help adaptation in the early stage - Consideration of collaboration of Rainbow School curriculum with Social Integration Programmes 	MOGEF, MOJ
	Operation of programmes to support the psychological and emotional stability of migrant youth <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Specialised counselling and case management considering the characteristics of migrant youth - Group counselling programmes for improving interpersonal relations, and youth camp - Customised services to vulnerable migrant youth through the integrated support system 	MOGEF
	Expansion of ' School of Achieving my work ' management and vocational training courses for migrant youth who are vulnerable to blind spots in educational opportunities such as out-of-school migrant youth	MOGEF
Support for school life	Activating the Academic Ability Review Committee to support the entry of migrant youth into public education	MOE
	Support for the basic academic skills improvement	MOE
	Expansion and enhancement of Multicultural Preparatory Schools for migrant youth' early adaptation to school life <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Korean language and cultural education programmes - Multicultural Preparatory Schools with special classes that run KSL curriculum - 'Visiting Preparatory Schools' to eliminate blind spots and monitor the adaptation of migrant youth to schools 	MOE

Source: MOGEF, 2018

Table 3.3 Policies or projects of the SMG and SMOE targeting migrant youth

Category	Policy / project	Responsible agency
Career education and school admission	Providing comprehensive career and school admission services for migrant youth	SMG
	Provision of information tailored to migrant youth and parents who are having difficulty deciding their careers due to the complex university entrance examination system	
	Customised career mentoring programme , 'Multicultural Dream Mentoring School', for migrant youth	SMOE
Social adjustment	Operation and promotion of centres (NGOs) and projects to support stable settlement of migrant youth <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Operating the 'Seoul On-dream Education Centre' <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Korean language education • Specialised support programmes: the preparation classes for the qualification exam and the naturalisation test • Korean culture experience • Supporting psychological and emotional stability - Support for the emotional aspect of migrant youth 	SMG
	Running a winter camp for migrant youth from low-income families	SMG
Support for school life	Support for entry into public education and school adaptation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support for the transfer, admission or creation of school register of migrant youth - Management of steppingstone courses as preparatory courses 	SMOE
	Strengthening prevention and support of school violence	SMOE
	Invigoration of the multicultural education support centre, "Da plus On Centre" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Construction of a multicultural education model which reflects the characteristics of migrant youth in Seoul and support for active on-site support to eliminate blind spots in education - One-stop service for entrance into public education - Korean language education and teacher training in accordance with the KSL curriculum - Operation of parental capacity enhancement programmes - Establishment of multicultural education support networks and collaboration with related organisations - Counselling programmes for migrant youth and parents - Support for multicultural education in schools 	SMOE

Source: SMG, 2019; SMOE, 2021

In order to justify this level of support for migrant youth, the South Korean government argues that the absence of such support has the potential to cause social problems. As South Korea's transition into a multicultural society has occurred in a short period of time and has been very much government led, South Koreans' perceptions of 'others' have failed to keep pace with social change (Melody and Shin, 2013). For many South Koreans who have not encountered any migrant youth in person their impression of them is formed through discourse in the media or in multicultural policies (see chapter 6). The

media portrays migrant youth as vulnerable beneficiaries of welfare programmes funded by tax paid by South Koreans. This is often accompanied by the suggestion that the government's multicultural policies support migrants in their daily needs. Therefore, as this portrayal of migrant youth has been amplified in the media and has spread, prejudice against migrant youth among South Koreans has grown.

In South Korean society, the experience of KCMY is influenced by the negative discourse not only regarding migrant youth but also the broader Korean-Chinese migrant category. They tend to be regarded as pitiful beneficiaries of welfare like other migrant youth from multicultural families. Furthermore, they are considered a dangerous group which threatens the security and social stability of the mainstream because they are Korean-Chinese migrants from China. This negative discourse on KCMY is related to mainstream society's habit of dividing migrants into categories of good and bad and maintaining the existing social order (Anderson, 2012; Kipling, 2015). Migrants who threaten the moral standards and social values of mainstream society tend to be categorised as bad migrants and excluded from society. On the other hand, mainstream society also advocates tolerance towards migrants as a step towards the ideal democratic goal of respecting individual freedom and rights, and this is reflected through the implementation of multicultural policies (Anderson, 2012). Therefore, popular discourse on KCMY results from a combination of their image as a poor and vulnerable target group of multicultural policies and their media portrayal as violent and immoral Korean-Chinese (see section 6.2.1). As prejudices against Korean-Chinese migrants have spread through the media, South Koreans have come to believe these negative portrayals to be true. The following newspaper articles illustrate how KCMY are portrayed in the media. The first excerpt is from an article in a politically progressive newspaper, the second from an article in a conservative newspaper:

There is a stereotype in South Korean society that children from multicultural families are always poor and feel timid. Some South Koreans think that it is natural for children from multicultural families to receive help and benefits from the South Korean government because they are vulnerable group. The government is also implementing multicultural policies based on the viewpoint that they should be helped because they are vulnerable.
(Jung, 2018)

The SMOE announced at the opening ceremony of the Daerim-dong Multicultural Education Support Centre that schools will actively educate students in Chinese and Korean languages in three districts in southern Seoul. This raised criticism from South Korean parents because more Korean-Chinese students will gather in these districts due to the Chinese classes and students' academic results will decline. KCMY have become a socially unfavourable group due to the portrayals of violent Korean-Chinese migrants in the movies and the news about their crimes. [...] Residents of these districts also protested to the SMOE, arguing, "The real estate prices in the neighbourhood have plummeted since the bilingual special zone was announced."
(Segyellbo, 2020)

From the perspective of South Korean multiculturalism, KCMY are stigmatised as welfare beneficiaries or as a problematic group capable of disrupting the social order. The first article, which is from a progressive newspaper, describes children from multicultural families as being socially vulnerable and mentions the need for multicultural policies to support them. However, such a beneficial perspective can also create a discourse of discrimination and exclusion against them in South Korean society. In other words, multicultural policies implemented to support their integration into South Korean society can cause claims of reverse discrimination among the native population, which can lead to social discrimination and exclusion of objects of multicultural policies (Jun, 2015, Koo, 2015). Newspaper articles about KCMY from politically right leaning outlets focus on conflicts between Korean-Chinese migrants and South Koreans caused by the influx of Korean-Chinese migrants. As illustrated in the second excerpt, claims are made that the multicultural education policies which support both Korean-Chinese and South Korean students have caused conflicts with the economic or educational interests of South Korean residents. The tone of the newspaper article emphasises that multicultural policies result in social conflicts while leaving the burden of the responsibility for this on Korean-Chinese migrants who have entered the local community. The media's negative portrayal of multicultural policies and Korean-Chinese migrants has also played a role in pushing KCMY towards the margins of society. In other words, KCMY may end up in the position of marginalised others in South Korean society through the way the media covers multicultural policies. Although the media mainly describes KCMY as being passive members of a marginalised group, this research will explore how KCMY challenge such negative depictions by negotiating their positionalities and belonging (see section 6.2).

3.3 Position of ethnic Koreans in South Korean law and policy

This section examines changes in visa policies affecting ethnic Koreans and how these have influenced the migration and residence of KCMY. It also investigates the multiple and contradictory designations used by different government agencies, and how this impacts KCMY in their migration process. Contrary to Chinese migrant youth who have the same nationality as Korean-Chinese but are not ethnic Koreans, KCMY benefit under South Korea's immigration laws and policies. They can enter South Korea through simple procedures by obtaining a visa for ethnic Koreans. However, they experience being categorised as belonging to different groups (sometimes as ethnic Koreans, sometimes not) depending on the government ministry concerned. Although they are legally qualified to stay in South Korea because of their background as ethnic Koreans, as detailed below, some ministries such as MOFA do not recognise them as members of this category (ethnic Korean) since they are not living abroad. Therefore, KCMY undergo a certain change in their belonging as ethnic Koreans depending on which side of the South Korean border they are living, and experience shifts in their positionalities depending on South Korean policy.

The Act on the Immigration and Legal status of Overseas Koreans (hereafter, the Overseas Koreans Act) is closely linked to the granting of visas as it stipulates not only the immigration but also the legal status of overseas Koreans in South Korea. Many South Koreans attribute great importance to the homogeneity of the ethnic group, strongly believing that Korea is a nation made up of the descendants of a single bloodline (Hong, 2013, Li, 2015). In this regard, South Koreans tend to feel that ethnic Koreans, who share the same ethnic roots as themselves, are closer to the majority population than are other foreigners. Furthermore, South Korean law and policy also give preference to ethnic Koreans (Hong, 2013). In 1999, the government of President Kim Dae-jung (1998~2003) enacted the Overseas Koreans Act to overcome a domestic economic crisis by utilising the global network of ethnic Koreans living abroad (Li, 2015). The government recognised them as "partners" and "living assets of ethnic Koreans" (Kim, 2009). In return for their support, the government offered them preferential immigration and residence

benefits such as simplification of the visa issuing procedure and allowing them long-term residence and employment rights when visiting South Korea. According to the Overseas Koreans Act and policies their visits to South Korea were to be considered ethnic return migration which refers to the migration of second or later generations of descendants back to their ancestral homelands (Hong, 2013). The government's preferential treatment of ethnic Koreans, however, was clearly differentiated from its treatment of other migrant workers, especially those from the Global South.

As of 2019, Korean-Chinese migrants accounted for the highest percentage (74.66 percent) of ethnic Koreans entering South Korea on F-4 visas (MOJ, 2020). When the first version of the Overseas Koreans Act was passed, Korean-Chinese were not subject to it. This is because the first version did not include South Koreans (or their descendants), who had migrated abroad before the establishment of the South Korean state in 1948. In this regard, Korean-Chinese who had moved to China before 1948 were not recognised in the Act as ethnic Koreans. However, when the Act was revised in 2012, Korean-Chinese were included. Since 2012, Korean-Chinese have entered South Korea due to geographical proximity and higher wages than in China. In addition, as Korean-Chinese migrants in their 50s and older, who account for the highest proportion (47.23 percent) of Korean-Chinese migrants, were familiar with Korean language and culture while having lived in the Korean Autonomous Prefecture in China, the transition to life in South Korea was not too difficult a one (Lee, 2015).

As the number of Korean-Chinese migrants living in South Korea has increased, the number of their children migrating to South Korea has also been increasing. In particular, the number of Korean-Chinese aged 15 to 19, ages where children would usually be attending secondary school, increased dramatically in 2018 and has continued to increase (see figure 3.2). This is a countrywide trend but is at its most pronounced in Seoul. More than half of the Korean-Chinese migrants in South Korea live in the metropolitan area which comprises Seoul and Gyeonggi-province (MOJ, 2020) (see section 4.2.2). Since their parents are concentrated in this area for work, most KCMY, who live with at least one parents, live there too. The increase in the number of Korean-Chinese aged 15 to 19 is linked to the legal long-term residence and economic activities of their parents in South Korea. In this regard, Temporary visit for Overseas Koreans (C-3-8) visas are issued for ethnic Koreans to stay

in South Korea for up to 90 days. Those holding C-3-8 visas can change their visa to an H-2 visa which allows the holder to work in specific industries on completion of a government approved course in technical education for six weeks. This visa initiative was implemented for the purpose of reducing the number of undocumented Korean-Chinese migrants who accounted for the highest proportion of undocumented migrants in South Korea. Under the new visa policies, undocumented Korean-Chinese migrants need first to return to China. Then once they have obtained C-3-8 visa they can re-enter South Korea and after completing six weeks of technical education can then apply to change their visa to an H-2 which allows them to stay in South Korea for three years. In addition, H-2 visa holders who have worked in specific industries (babysitter, agricultural and livestock industries, fisheries, root industries⁶ and local manufacturing industries) for more than two years can change their visas into F-4 visas which allow ethnic Korean migrants to enter South Korea and to renew their visas by a simple procedure. Therefore, their stay can be extended further. The prolonged legal stay of these Korean-Chinese migrants has led to a rise in the number of their children entering South Korea. Korean-Chinese students (34.56 percent) account for the highest proportion of overseas secondary students in Seoul and this situation is expected to continue for some time.




Figure 3.2 The number of registered Korean-Chinese aged 15 to 19 in South Korea and Seoul (2014-2019)

Source: Statistics Korea, Korean statistical information service (<http://kosis.kr>, 10 Mar 2020)

⁶ Root industries are industries that form the foundation of manufacturing competitiveness. These industries comprise these technical fields; casting, moulding, welding, plastic processing, surface and heat treatment.

The regulations for migrants on living with their children are attached to the parental visas, and have a significant influence on the migration of KCMY under the age of 19 (see table 3.4). Since 2012, those KCMY have been allowed to stay in South Korea with their parents for the duration of the parental stay (Kim, 2018). However, Korean-Chinese migrants who have moved to South Korea had to leave their children behind in China because they did not have the economic and social stability to live with them in South Korea (Kim, 2018). Instead, their children were able to visit their parents in South Korea during holidays. As Korean-Chinese down to the fourth generation have been recognised as ethnic Koreans since 2019, KCMY can be granted visas limited to ethnic Koreans (e.g. F-4 or H-2). This means that they have become more independent in terms of their immigration choices than in the past when they were only allowed to come to South Korea as children of ethnic Koreans. However, even if KCMY are legally recognised as ethnic Koreans, they have difficulty obtaining F-4 visas. In contrast to their parents, most of them have limited proficiency in Korean language or can only speak a few words. It becomes difficult then for them to take the technical qualification examination necessary for applying for an F-4 visa.

However, from September 2019, KCMY who have a high school education background or who have completed the fourth or higher levels of a social integration programme in South Korea are allowed to change to or be issued with F-4 visas. The social integration programme can be completed by passing a test after following a course of lectures related to Korean language and culture at certified centres. However, KCMY do not prefer this method because it involves 100 hours of lessons at each level. Instead, they plan to change their visas to F-4 visas by graduating from high school. South Korean high school education options includes general high schools, passing the qualification for high school graduation and graduation of alternative schools which are recognised as being equivalent to graduation from a general high school. This qualification is not only a requirement to apply for F-4 visas, but is also useful to have in South Korean society. In 2020, the minimum age of application for H-2 visas was revised to any ethnic Koreans over the age of 18. This should benefit KCMY who wish to work from the outset of their arrival in South Korea. In sum, South Korean immigration policies and related Acts recognising KCMY as ethnic Koreans have been amended in the direction of promoting their stable and long-term stay in South Korea.

Table 3.4 Change in Acts of Law, immigration policy and legal status of KCMY

Date	Changes in the Act and policy
Apr. 2012	Permission to stay with parents of ethnic Korean youth via the Family visit visa (F-1) until they become 19 years old
Apr. 2014	Beginning issue of the Temporary visit for overseas Koreans visa (C-3-8)
Jul. 2019	Expansion of the scope of ethnic Koreans down to the fourth generation
Sep. 2019	Permission to issue Overseas Korean visa (F-4) for ethnic Koreans , <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - who have Korean high school education background - who have completed fourth or higher level of a social integration programme
2020	Lowering of the age of application age for Working Visit visa (H-2) from 24 to 18

Source: MOJ, 2021

Since the Overseas Koreans Act has been revised to allow minors to live with their parents, KCMY can live long-term in South Korea as children of Korean-Chinese migrants or ethnic Koreans (see table 2.4 and 2.5). Most KCMY are issued F-1 visas if their parents are F-4 or H-2 visa holders (Kwak, 2021). In addition, if their parents have permanent residency in South Korea or become naturalised, they can get Residency (F-2) visas which allow them to stay for up to 5 years. As F-1 and F-2 visas require fewer documents and have simpler application procedures than other visas, KCMY prefer to obtain these visas as their first visa for long-term residence in South Korea. KCMY, who cannot obtain one of these visas in China, first enter South Korea with a C-3-8 visa which permits them to stay for 90 days. Since C-3-8 visas are issued to overseas Koreans without any complex procedure, KCMY who plan to visit South Korea for a short time or who have not applied for another type of visas, usually apply for this type. After arrival at South Korea on a C-3-8 visa, it is possible to change to another type of visa which will allow them to extend their stay. Some KCMY, who attend primary or secondary schools, hold General training (D-4) visas which are issued to international students under the age of 19. D-4 visas guarantee their stay in South Korea until they have graduated from school.

KCMY must change their current visa before they turn 19. They prefer F-4 visas which allow them to remain stable and get a job with fewer restrictions. With the relaxation of requirements for the issue of F-4 visas in 2019 (see table 2.4), it has become easier to switch to this type of visa. Because changes in visa policy have a significant impact on their legal stay in South Korea with

Chinese citizenship, KCMY pay careful attention to these changes (Kwak, 2021). Rather than naturalising in South Korea, they desire to use both their Chinese citizenship and their ethnic belonging as ethnic Koreans (see section 7.4.2). South Korea's visa policies for ethnic Koreans appear to reflect government expectations that they will play a role connecting South Korea and China in the future. These personal and political factors can influence the flexibility of KCMY in negotiating their positionalities and belonging in South Korean society (see section 7.4).

Table 3.5 Visas that KCMY are usually issued

Visa type		Length of Stay	Requirement for visa issuance
C-3-8	Temporary visit for overseas Koreans	90 days in 5 years	Overseas Koreans under the age of 60 who meet the criteria of overseas Koreans with foreign nationality
D-4	General training	2 years (renewal available)	Primary and secondary school students in South Korea
F-1	Family visit	2 years (renewal available)	A person who meets one of the following conditions: - Minor children of overseas Koreans who have been issued Overseas Korean visa (F-4) visa or Working Visit visa (H-2) - Those are not engaged in economic activities and are allowed to stay for a long period due to unavoidable reasons
F-2	Residency	5 years (renewal available)	Minors of foreign nationality with a South Korean parent or a person who has permanent residence status (F-5)
F-4	Overseas Korean	3 years (renewal available)	Ethnic Koreans who meet one of the following conditions: - Who has Korean high school background (including high school qualification examination or alternative schools which are recognised as a high school education background) - Who has a certified national technical qualification in South Korea - Who has completed fourth or higher levels of social integration programme

Source: MOJ, 2021

KCMY have experienced exclusion from the policies for ethnic Koreans. There are two relevant Acts, which define ethnic Koreans—the Overseas Koreans Act and the Overseas Koreans Foundation Act. Firstly, in the Overseas Koreans Act, the term 'ethnic Korean' is defined as a national of South Korea having the right of permanent residence in a foreign country, or a person who

has held South Korean nationality or their lineal descendants who are nationals of a foreign country. As the Act is a basis for the MOJ's immigration and sojourn policies for ethnic Koreans, it is relevant to the legal status of ethnic Koreans on and within the South Korean border (see section 6.4.1 and 7.4.2). On the other hand, the Overseas Koreans Foundation Act defines an ethnic Korean as a person who is a national of South Korea and stays in a foreign country for a long time or obtains permanent residency in a foreign country, or a person of ethnic Korean descent regardless of their nationality residing in a foreign country. The purpose of this Act is to establish the Overseas Koreans Foundation under the MOFA, which helps ethnic Koreans to maintain ethnic ties with South Korea while living in foreign countries. Therefore, the MOFA's policies for ethnic Koreans do not include those ethnic Koreans living in South Korea who have foreign citizenship. According to the MOFA's definition, although KCMY were categorised as ethnic Koreans when they were in China, they are no longer ethnic Koreans in South Korea because they no longer live overseas (see section 6.4.1). Therefore, Korean-Chinese migrant youth may be included or not included as the targets of policies depending on the government agency concerned because the range and definition of ethnic Koreans used by each ministry are different. In particular, whether or not they are included in these policies can vary depending on the decisions of the relevant ministries based on whether they are inside or outside the country. In this regard, KCMY practice strategies that can help them adapt socially and economically to South Korean society by using these policies for ethnic Koreans. I will investigate this point in chapter 7.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the policies and Acts related to Korean multiculturalism and ethnic Koreans which consequentially affect positionalities and belonging of KCMY. KCMY who are not naturalised in South Korea have different social positions and sense of belonging depending on how multicultural policies are interpreted in different government ministries. In particular, as KCMY are ethnic Koreans with Chinese nationality who are living in South Korea, they may benefit from or be excluded from policies for ethnic Koreans. In this regard, this concluding section encapsulates analysis which can be a basis of my findings and contributions.

Section 3.2 investigated South Korean multiculturalism which is not only a basis for discrimination and exclusion but also has the aim of assimilation. I proposed that South Korean multiculturalism assumes the unproblematic integration of migrants into South Korean society to preserve social unity rather than the coexistence of diversity. In South Korean society, multiculturalism as a political ideal has been furthered through governmental multicultural policies which favour migrants' adaptation and assimilation. In this context, even though the government aims to encourage citizens to have a tolerance for diversity, most multicultural policies focus on encouraging migrants to adapt and assimilate into society. In other words, although the government has included local communities as a target group for its multicultural policies, those policies still require migrants to shift their identities and assimilate into the national framework. I also highlighted that South Korean multiculturalism influences the formation and spread of discourses on discrimination and exclusion of certain migrant groups. The government considers certain migrant groups vulnerable or problematic and so emphasises the need to provide policies to support them, KCMY being included in this category. The negative image of KCMY, which is produced by the government, has spread through the media, fuelling prejudice against them. I emphasised that this results in the marginalisation of KCMY. Regarding their marginalisation in South Korean society, I will explore in the empirical chapters how KCMY negotiate their positionalities and belonging according to the situated context to move away from their marginalised social positions.

Section 3.3 discussed the changes and contradictions of government laws and policies which affect ethnic Koreans' migration and residence in South Korea. Previous studies have focused on the legal status and policies targeted at adult Korean-Chinese migrants. However, I have gone further and found that the Acts and policies related to ethnic Koreans have been revised to allow Korean-Chinese migrants to reunite with their families, which has had a significant impact on the migration and length of stay of KCMY in South Korea. In particular, the Overseas Korean Act determines their legal status in South Korea as well as the rules around their immigration. I argued that the Acts and policies aimed at ethnic Koreans can support them to become transmigrants because KCMY can move between South Korea and China relatively freely using their status as ethnic Koreans. I also revealed how KCMY experience inclusion and exclusion according to which government agency they are

dealing with as the definition and range of the term 'ethnic Korean' is different from agency to agency. In particular, agencies may or may not include KCMY in policies aimed at ethnic Koreans depending on whether they are inside or outside the country. I will explore how KCMY use policies that target ethnic Koreans strategically for their current and future lives mainly in chapters 6 and 7.

Chapter 4

Methodology and research design

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and specifies the methodology and methods employed in this research. I will explain why my chosen methodology is the most appropriate in order to achieve my research aims. I will also describe how I conducted the chosen methods—interviewing and observation—to obtain my primary data. The explanation of the methodology and methods can be a basis for increasing the rationality and validity of my research.

My research adopts an epistemological approach of a type which has been highlighted in feminist geography. Feminist epistemology critiques ways of knowing and emphasises awareness of contexts in research (Sharp, 2005). My research critically investigates how KCMY negotiate their positionalities and belonging depending on their situated contexts. In this light, I decided that it would be appropriate to apply a feminist epistemological approach which is attentive to positionalities that change flexibly according to the situated context of an individual. The feminist epistemology approach was applied to this research through mixed qualitative methods.

I conducted my fieldwork in Seoul, South Korea between October 2019 and September 2020. I undertook in-depth interviews with forty-one participants, including twenty KCMY aged between 15 and 19, eleven migrant organisation staff and six policymakers. In particular, I conducted two-phased interviews with the migrant youth to build a good rapport with them and to collect a rich set of data. In addition, I observed KCMY at a centre and *hagwon* for migrant youth and attended a community meeting for Korean-Chinese migrants. Through these methods, I was able to collect an in-depth and rich set of primary data.

This chapter details how I designed and conducted my research. Section 4.2 provides an explanation of my research design by outlining mixed methods, research site and ways for sampling and recruitment of participants. In section 4.3, I focus on the research process, including interviews and observation.

Revised research strategies due to Covid-19 will also be presented. In addition, I describe in detail the data analysis process. Finally, section 4.4 discusses the ethical issues I had to take into consideration and my positionalities in the research process.

4.2 Research design

4.2.1 Mixed qualitative methods

I decided to use mixed qualitative methods in my research. Using multiple methods provides an opportunity to understand a research topic in breadth and depth through abundant data sources, and validates one source of data by others (Hammond and Wellington, 2013; Johnson et al., 2007; Rose, 2001). In other words, the mixing of methods provides opportunities for researchers to represent multi-layered and dynamic aspects of research thus overcoming partiality, caused by using one source of data only (Finney, 2021; Thien and Gilliam, 2020). Scholars who use mixed methods in research combine both qualitative and quantitative data to underpin their arguments and insights with further evidence (Cresswell and Plano Clark, 2018). However, analysing both qualitative and quantitative data may not always be the best approach in the case of every piece of research. In my case, I adopted two qualitative methods—in-depth interviews and observations—as my main methods. Qualitatively driven mixed research is conducted when researchers seek to achieve research aims associated with qualitative aspects and use quantitative data to support primary qualitative data as supplementary materials (Johnson et al., 2014). In such research, qualitative methods are privileged in the analytical and collecting process. In this regard, my research is qualitatively driven mixed research because one of its underlying premises is that it is significant to understand that participants' emotions, thoughts or attitudes appear through their words or behaviour in everyday spaces than to analyse statistical figures.

In human geography, qualitative research is concerned with exploring and understanding individual accounts of situations and events by describing thoughts and feelings which are rooted in diverse factors (e.g., psychological,

political and social factors) (Cook et al., 2012). Individual identities and positionalities are linked to the relationship with others in the social structure (Sayer, 2000). Therefore, qualitative methods can be used to grasp the nuanced relationships between individuals and situated contexts, which can be difficult to recognise through quantitative data. For migration research in particular, qualitative data is useful when exploring migrants' lived experience by considering a range of factors that numerical analysis cannot capture (Finney, 2021). In addition, qualitative methods can provide an opportunity to express voice for minorities in society such as women, youth and migrants (McDowell, 1992). However, qualitative methods have been criticised because it is difficult to guarantee that participants' responses are not influenced by the researcher or by other external factors rather than being an honest reflection of their own opinion (Valentine, 2005). Therefore, qualitative methods must be treated with caution in fully delivering the voices of minorities (McDowell, 1992). Nevertheless, after development of sufficient levels of rapport with participants, researchers may be able to observe directly the daily lives, thoughts and emotions of minorities by means of qualitative methods. In this regard, qualitative methods are suitable for this research which examines the negotiation of positionalities and belonging of KCMY who are considered a marginalised group in South Korean society. In this research, KCMY express their individual voices through interviews and observations with me. Furthermore, I sought to deliver these voice by emphasising multiple meanings and interpretations of their experiences.

My research adopts a type of epistemology approach that has been highlighted in feminist geography. Feminist researchers have critiqued ways of knowing by challenging objectivity, recognising the situated and non-universal nature of knowledge and demanding awareness of context in any research situation (Sharp, 2005). A more traditional research approaches in social science might apply dominant disciplines to their fields, without considering context (Kitchin and Tate, 2000; McHugh, 2014). However, feminist epistemology produces new understandings of what is regarded as knowledge by exploring what constitutes knowledge and how we know it (McHugh, 2014). My research aim is to critically investigate how KCMY negotiate their positionalities and belonging according to the situated context. To achieve this, I criticise the adult migrant-centred or elite-migrant-centred dominant concepts and reinterpret the identities and sense of belonging of migrant youth in terms of the diverse contexts where KCMY are situated. In

this light, this research challenges dominant perspective on migrants in South Korean society and through qualitative methods, my research analyses participants' experiences in multifaceted and fluid contexts. For these reasons, I chose mainly to use two qualitative methods—in-depth interviews and observations—in this research.

4.2.2 Research site

My fieldwork was conducted in Seoul, South Korea between October 2019 and September 2020. Seoul is the capital as well as the largest city in South Korea. During my fieldwork, I was able to investigate positionalities and belonging of KCMY in a range of places and contexts. Research on migration tends to focus on migrant life in cities because cities provide opportunities to meet a large number of migrants who have undergone diverse experiences. Cultural diversity, a product of different ethnic and social groups, creates heterogeneous urban spaces which impact migrant experience in many different contexts and relations. Therefore, through encounters with different migrant groups in urban spaces, researchers can achieve valuable insights into research participants from multifaceted perspectives. In this regard, as migrants negotiate their positionalities and belonging according to situated contexts and relations, the diversity of urban spaces where they are located allows me to capture more vividly the dynamics of the negotiation between the two. Therefore, Seoul, the largest city in South Korea, was chosen as my field site and here I would investigate the diverse influences of situated contexts and relations on positionalities and belonging of migrants.

In Seoul, a large number of foreigners as well as South Koreans live and work. Seoul, including Gyeonggi Province (*Gyeonggi-do*), is the largest metropolitan area in South Korea. About half of the Korean population (44.30 percent) and more than half of all registered foreigners (54.74 percent) live in this metropolitan area. As people tend to live in Gyeonggi Province where housing prices are relatively low, and work in Seoul due to the excellent transportation links between the two regions, Seoul and Gyeonggi Province have come to form a large urban zone. In addition, as there are many jobs in Seoul and Gyeonggi Province in the service and manufacturing sectors, migrant workers prefer to live in this metropolitan area.




Figure 4.1 Map of Korean-Chinese migrants in South Korea and Seoul

Source: MOJ, Korea immigration service statistics

(<https://www.immigration.go.kr/immigration/>, 10 Mar 2020)

Korean-Chinese migrants, who form the largest proportion (28.1 percent) of registered foreigners in South Korea, also predominantly live in this metropolitan area (see figure 4.1). In particular, the largest and most representative Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave in the country was created in Daerim-dong, Seoul in the early 2000s (see figure 4.2 and section 5.4.2). As shown in the map of Seoul in figure 4.1, Korean-Chinese migrants are concentrated in the southwest part of Seoul, where Daerim-dong is located.

Although their concentration is lower than that of other migrants, Korean-Chinese migrants still live, work and spend leisure time in their ethnic enclave (Lee, 2015). KCMY also live in or around the enclave with their families (SOEC, 2020). While their parents generation chose to move to South Korea as migrant workers for economic reasons, KCMY migrate mainly for family reunification and educational reasons (see section 5.2.2). Understandably then, they desire to live in or attend educational institutions (e.g., schools or centres for migrant youth) in Seoul, where most Korean-Chinese migrants believe their children will receive a good education in a comfortable environment. Some Korean-Chinese families live apart because of their children's education (see section 5.4.2). While the children stay in Seoul for their education and their parents live in other parts of South Korea where they work. In particular, many of the participants of this research (KCMY aged 15 to 19) aspire to go to university in South Korea and so want to live in Seoul where many schools and centres provide adaptation support and guidance for those wishing to enter university. It is generally the case then that KCMY and their families prefer living in Seoul as they think it is the best place for them to achieve the key goals of their migration to South Korea.




Figure 4.2 Location of Daerim-dong in Seoul

The choice of Seoul allows me to multifacetedly investigate the negotiation process of the positionalities and belonging of KCMY in their everyday spaces

because the residential districts of migrants are not clearly separated from those of South Koreans in the city. In Daerim-dong, South Koreans and Korean-Chinese migrants live side by side in the same district. In addition, Korean-Chinese migrants are less concentrated in one area and more scattered in Seoul than other migrant groups (Lee et al., 2014). Considering the characteristics of their living spaces, Seoul is a good place to explore how KCMY negotiate their identities, positionalities and belonging by interacting with others in local communities. In addition, the SMG began to establish and implement policies for migrants earlier than local governments in other regions (Lee et al., 2017). The policies that the SMG have undertaken focus on supporting migrants in their daily lives, including in the areas of education, labour, welfare and human rights. The wide scope of such policies allows me to investigate how KCMY are influenced by policy and social factors, thereby changing their positionalities and belonging in their daily spaces. Thus, I determined that Seoul would be an appropriate research site not only for enabling me to meet many KCMY but also for understanding the dynamic of negotiation of their positionalities and belonging in terms of personal, social and policy aspects in their everyday spaces.

4.2.3 Sampling and recruitment

I selected participants through purposeful sampling combined with snowball sampling. Purposeful sampling allows the researcher to choose samples related to the research aims and questions based on certain key criteria (Ritchie et al., 2014; Sanchez-Ayala, 2012). In this research, the key criteria were that participants have to be Korean-Chinese migrants aged 15 to 19 who have lived separately from at least one of their parents in China and who were now living in Seoul. Their current nationality must be Chinese or South Korean. Before beginning my fieldwork, I did not include KCMY who had become naturalised in South Korea in samples as I assumed that few Korean-Chinese migrants aged 15 to 19 would have done so. However, through interviews with participants, I realised that there were a few KCMY in this age group who had become naturalised in South Korea. In addition, I decided that I could explore their feelings about belonging, which were likely to be different from those of Korean-Chinese who choose to maintain their Chinese nationality. This was done by analysing the reasons why they decided to become naturalised. Thus, I decided to include naturalised KCMY in the early stages of my fieldwork and two naturalised KCMY participated in this research.

I also used snowball sampling, which asks people, who have already participated in the research, to introduce other people who fit in the criteria of samples (Ritchie et al., 2014; Valentine, 2005). This approach would help me overcome the obstacle of recruiting participants who are difficult to contact. In addition, this types of sampling is useful in that it makes it easier for new participants to trust me as existing participants have introduced me to them (Valentine, 2005). I was able to contact sixteen potential participants who were cousins or friends of existing participants through snowball sampling. When I designed my research, I had planned to use snowball sampling as a supplemental approach. I had intended rather to ask KCMY in centres to participate in the interview by talking to them in person. However, as the centres or schools for migrant youth were closed due to the spread of COVID-19, I was unable to access these places where it would have been easy to meet them. For this reason, I ended up using snowball sampling as my main approach. Snowball sampling is sometimes criticised for being too narrow a method to recruit diverse participants because new participants are generated only through the limiting lens of existing ones (Ritchie et al., 2014). In order to overcome this disadvantage, I was introduced to up to two new participants per existing participant. In other words, I used multiple people for initial contact when I started snowballing so that I did not recruit all participants from a narrow circle. Another potential disadvantage is that it can be difficult to maintain the confidentiality of each interview (Valentine, 2005). Any mention of previous interviews to build up rapport with, or explain the object of the research to, new participants would not protect the confidentiality of each interviewee. Therefore, I endeavoured to maintain the confidentiality of each interview by neither mentioning the content of previous interviews and nor revealing any information about either existing or potential participants.

In the process of recruiting participants, I was forced to change my recruitment plan. As mentioned above, I planned to recruit participants, who were interested in my research through meeting KCMY in person while doing voluntary work at a migrant-youth centre. However, following the spread of Covid-19 in South Korea at the end of January 2020, all these centres were closed, making it impossible for me to use them for meeting potential participants. Although I had already started volunteering at the centre before it was closed, I did not have enough time to build a sufficient rapport to explain this research to them. As I will outline in section 4.3.2, I provided them with

English classes six times as a teacher at the centre. However, this was not enough time to build a sufficient rapport with them and ask them whether they would agree to participate in the interviews. As an alternative, I decided to interview the head of a *hagwon* located in Daerim-dong. Since most of the pupils at this *hagwon* were KCMY, I hoped to have the opportunity to recruit potential participants through her. She organised a seminar where I could share my experiences as an international student in the UK to the attendees and advise them on their difficulties in South Korea from the perspective of an international student. At the end of the seminar, I briefly introduced my research and informed them that I was recruiting participants. I handed out my business card and asked them to contact me if they would be interested in participating in my research. After the event, two individuals messaged me to say that they were willing to be interviewed. I was able to interview KCMY starting with them.

My second method of recruitment involved forming a rapport with existing participants during interview. This method became a prerequisite for me to recruit new participants through snowball sampling. In order to recruit new participants through existing participants, it was important that the existing participants trusted me first. Trust was founded on the rapport build up through interaction between participants and me. Establishment of a good rapport between researcher and participants helps the latter respond in a full and open way during interview, a result of the trust felt in the researcher (Ritchie et al., 2014). Trust encourages participants to suggest to acquaintances and friends that they too might participate in the research thus offering opportunities to the researcher to meet new participants. In order to build the kind of good rapport that leads to trust, I listened and responded sincerely to participants during interview. In addition, I tried to empathise with them by chatting about our daily lives before and after the interview. Participants with who I formed a good rapport introduced me to any friends or cousins who satisfied the criteria of my sampling. As potential new participants heard of my positive reputation from existing participants, they might decide to participate in this research and I could smoothly form a rapport with them. Therefore, trust through building a positive rapport played a significant role not only in recruitment but also in the research process.

I also used another recruiting method which was to ask centres for migrant youth to provide opportunities for me to recruit participants. KCMY was a hard-

to-reach group for me as a South Korean researcher (see section 4.4.2). In order to overcome this obstacle to access and recruitment, I searched for centres that they usually use. I contacted those centres, whose names I had seen mentioned in research reports, academic papers and newspaper articles, via e-mail or telephone. One centre which is known as being the one most frequently used by migrant youth in Seoul replied that they could introduce me to some participants. In this way, recruiting participants through organisations, that provide services for a particular population, is a recruiting method that relies on gatekeepers (Ritchie et al., 2014). As gatekeepers possess information about the users of their organisation and have built up a trust relationship with them, they can recommend suitable participants for the study.

However, relying on gatekeepers to recruit participants can have certain disadvantages. Firstly, when recruiting participants, gatekeepers' judgements may intervene thus negatively influencing the diversity of participants. There is a likelihood of narrow sampling if gatekeepers recommend only those who they themselves view favourably. In order to prevent this problem, I emailed the gatekeeper with the guidance for my research outline and process and my criteria for participant recruitment before recruiting participants, I then explained these documents again over the phone. In addition, I asked them to contact me without forming their own opinion about whether there were any unclear points in the recruitment process. This was a device to prevent the intervention of gatekeepers in the process of selecting participants. Another shortcoming of relying on gatekeepers is the implicit influence they may have over potential participants (Valentine, 2005). People's participation must be determined by their own decision. However, if gatekeepers implicitly force them into participating in the research, users may be steered into participation. In order to avoid this problem, I asked the gatekeeper to provide me with a list and contact details of potential participants, and I contacted those on the list myself to explain the research process, and to confirm whether they would be willing to participate. I received information about three potential participants from the centre. However, one of these was not informed by the gatekeeper that the interview would take place over two occasions, and refused to participate in the research. In the end, I was able to recruit two participants through the gatekeeper.

I recruited twenty KCMY participants through the above three methods (see table 4.1). In this research, only KCMY aged 15 to 19 were included.

According to South Korea's Framework Act on Youth, youth refer to anyone between the ages of 9 and 24, though it is more usually limited to those aged 13 to 18 thus comprising middle and high school students in South Korean society. Since migrant statistics by age are provided in units of five years, I needed to take the age unit within these statistics into account to grasp the number of potential research subjects in my research. Considering the social scope of youth and the migrant statistics of the five-yearly units, I decided on KCMY aged 15 to 19 as a suitable category of research participants. My participants consisted of 14 females and 6 males. As a female researcher, it was difficult to recruit male participants because of the tendency of adolescents not to feel comfortable talking to an adult of the opposite gender. However, I could gather enough data for analysis from the recruited male participants and supplement data from staff working in the centres and schools they use. Although years of entry vary, 75 percent of participants had entered South Korea within the previous five years. This suggests that the number of KCMY arriving in South Korea has been increasing since 2016. Regarding their current visa types, I tried to include as diverse a range as possible, even though most KCMY hold F-1 visas. Their educational background included middle school students, high school students (both graduates and dropouts) and university students. This variety allowed me to analyse experiences of positionalities and belonging depending on their background. Their last places of residences in China, these threw into question claims made in previous studies that most Korean-Chinese migrants came from three northeast provinces (Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang), including Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. My research included KCMY from the eastern coastal area⁷(6 participants) and the northeast area(14 participants) of China.

I also recruited staff of organisations used by KCMY and policymakers involved in the establishment or enforcement of policies related to them (see tables 4.2 and 4.3). One of my research objects is to investigate the socio-cultural, political and legal factors which influence the negotiation of positionalities and belonging of KCMY. To achieve this objective, I tried to understand their experiences and opinions regarding socio-cultural, political and legal factors through interviews with staff in centres, NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) and schools and relevant policymakers. Firstly,

⁷ This area includes Qingdao, Weihai and Yantai.

I sought to contact various organisations for KCMY. Since the services—education, social adaptation, career path and legal support—provided by each organisation are different, I tried to interview staff from as diverse organisations as diverse as possible. Secondly, I wished to explore policy and legal factors on both the local and national scales through interviews with relevant policymakers. For this reason, I recruited research fellows⁸ of think tanks, policy consultants, an educational supervisor and a civil servant, who were involved in the policies of the SMG or the South Korean central government. The recruitment of these two groups was conducted by selecting people in positions of authority regarding migrant youth or Korean-Chinese migrants based on information gained from the organisation charts posted on the websites of organisations. I called the office numbers of the selected people and emailed them to explain the research and ask whether they would be willing to participate. Some of them agreed to be interviewed after the organisations they work for had given their approval. As a result, eleven staff and six policymakers participated in this research.

⁸ In South Korea, research fellows of think tanks under the government play a role in investigation and analysis for and development of policies. In this context, these research fellows were included in the policymaker group in this research.

Table 4.1 Participants: KCMY

ID	Gender	Age	Year of entry	Current visa type	Educational background	Last residence in China
M1	Male	19	2017	D-4	High school student	Qingdao
M2	Female	17	2018	F-1	High school student	Qingdao
M3	Female	18	2019	F-4	High school dropout	Harbin
M4	Female	18	2019	F-1	High school student	Harbin
M5	Female	18	2015	F-2	Freshman	Qingdao
M6	Male	19	2012	Naturalised	Freshman	Qingdao
M7	Female	16	2017	Naturalised	High school student	Dalian
M8	Female	15	2014	F-1	Middle school student	Yantai
M9	Male	16	2017	F-1	High school student	Jilin
M10	Female	15	2017	F-1	High school student	Dalian
M11	Male	17	2013	F-1	High school student	Changchun
M12	Female	18	2016	F-1	High school student	Dalian
M13	Female	17	2017	F-1	High school student	Weihai
M14	Female	15	2016	F-1	Middle school student	Yanji
M15	Female	19	2015	F-1	High school graduate	Harbin
M16	Female	19	2016	F-1	High school student	Qingdao
M17	Female	19	2018	F-4	High school dropout	Mudanjiang
M18	Female	18	2018	F-1	High school dropout	Liaoning
M19	Male	16	2016	F-1	Middle school student	Heilongjiang
M20	Male	19	2017	C-3-8	Middle school dropout	Yanji

Table 4.2 Participants: Staff

ID	Role
S1	Head of the centre for migrant youth
S2	Head of a <i>hagwon</i> for migrant youth
S3	Elementary school teacher in the Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave
S4	Head of an alternative school for migrant youth
S5	Pastor who runs programmes for Chinese migrant youth
S6	Lawyer in an NGO for migrants in the Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave
S7	Lawyer in an NGO for migrants in the Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave
S8	Activist in an NGO for migrants in the Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave
S9	Head of the cultural and research centre for ethnic Koreans
S10	Teacher in the centre for migrant youth
S11	Teacher in a high school for migrant youth

Table 4.3 Participants: Policymakers

ID	Role
P1	Policy consultant for migrant students policies
P2	Research fellow in a SMG think tank
P3	Policy consultant for Korean-Chinese migrant policies in Seoul
P4	Civil servant in a department for foreign residents in the SMG
P5	Educational supervisor in the SMOE
P6	Research Fellow in a South Korean central Government think tank

4.3 Research process

4.3.1 Interviewing

My principal research method was interviewing. Interviewing has been the predominant method in qualitative research which attempts to investigate the context and people's social, cultural, political or economic aspects in their daily lives (Crang and Cook, 2007). In the social and cultural geography, qualitative interviews are used to explore the experiences and spatialities of social life (Dowling et al., 2016). In particular, feminist geographers have emphasised critical reflection in their work by using qualitative methods. McDowell (2014) argues that qualitative methods, including interviews, enable a rich and context-aware explanation in research related to migration, gender and class. Migration research has employed interviewing as a main method because it allows researchers to understand migrants' daily lives and experiences through their own voices (Sanchez-Ayala, 2012). For these reasons, I decided on interviewing as the most suitable method for this research as my aim was explore the ways that, and factors influencing how, KCMY negotiate their positionalities and belonging in their migration process by listening to their experiences in person.

I used in-depth interviews to achieve my research aim. In-depth interviews are "sensitive and people-oriented, allowing interviewees to form their own description of their experiences by describing and explaining their lives in their own words" (Valentine, 2005, p.111). This method provides a window which reveals interviewees' thoughts and reflections on their lived experience. Therefore, in-depth interviews aim to explore how individuals experience and

think their lives (Ko and Hong, 2020; Valentine, 2005). This kind of conversation allows participants to raise issues that the researcher may not have been prepared for. In addition, Rubin and Rubin (2012) emphasise that through in-depth interviewing, researchers can investigate in detail the experiences, emotions and thought of others, not from the researcher's own perspective, but from that of the interviewees' one. As researchers explore participants' life through the participants' own language, it is important to focus on their language which holds and elucidates meaning (Ritchie et al., 2014). Therefore, in-depth interviews can provide an opportunity for researcher and participant to hold a wide-ranging, detailed and multi-layered discussion. These advantages encouraged me to understand the positionalities and belonging of KCMY in their situated social and spatial contexts through in-depth and multifaceted means.

My in-depth interviews followed a semi-structured format. As semi-structured interviews are between the structured and the unstructured forms, they have some degree of predetermined direction to the conversation while still ensuring flexibility in the way in which participants express their opinions (Dunn, 2021; Sanchez-Ayala, 2012). In other words, this sort of format offers the knowledge-producing potential of conversation by allowing participants the latitude to narrate their stories on issues related to the researcher's questions (Brinkmann, 2013). In semi-structured interviews, the researcher formulates questions relevant to the research aims and directs the conversation towards the areas he/she wishes to explore (Brinkmann, 2013; Longhurst, 2010). The researcher does not judge the rights and wrongs of the participant's position and allows them to respond in an open and free manner (Longhurst, 2010; Valentine, 2005). In order to be open to the responses of my participants, I used open-ended questions in the interview. As interviewing is a process through which the researcher and the participants co-construct meanings (McHugh, 2014), open-ended questions can help participants actively participate in the interview and the researcher acquire rich data from conversations. In addition, I used funnelling questions, starting with general and closed questions and then drilling down to a more specific content (Kipling, 2015; Rubin and Rubin, 2012). During interviews, I started with casual conversation using simple and easy to answer questions and then asked questions that need more sensitive, personal and detailed answers. This technique allows participants to discuss their feelings and thoughts in a flowing and spontaneous manner.

I conducted individual face-to-face interviews with fifteen participants. Individual interviews are frequently used in studies related to the lives of individual participants. When participants are reluctant to share their experiences with others, one-on-one interviews allow them not only to feel more comfortable but also to maintain more confidentiality than would group interviews (Brinkmann, 2013). Thus, participants are offered an atmosphere of trust and discretion. As I have sought to understand participants' nuanced emotions and thoughts based on their personal experiences, I chose to carry out individual interview. Also, I tried to conduct face-to-face interviews. During face-to-face interviews, participants provide additional information through non-verbal language such as gestures, body language or facial expressions (Brinkmann, 2013). In addition, this type of interview provides a solid foundation for forming a good rapport with participants. When researcher and participant encounter each other face-to-face, it is easier to create an environment where the participant responds in a comfortable and open way and the researcher has the opportunity to register both the verbal and non-verbal language of the participant (Ritchie et al., 2014). I will explain my methods of establishing a good rapport with participants in detail below. In my research, participants were able to communicate effectively in Korean though there were some moments when it was difficult for them to explain themselves properly. After realising their difficulties, I allowed them to search for difficult words on their smartphones then show the result to me. Sometimes I also offered several Korean words related to my understanding of what they were trying to say and let them choose the most appropriate one. Throughout the interview, participants could participate more actively due to my empathy and favourable attitude toward what they were trying to tell me.

Although I interviewed most of the participants face-to-face, I conducted online interview with five participants. Due to the spread of COVID-19, some participants preferred to communicate through Voice Talk of Kakao Talk⁹, the real-time chat platform, rather than through a face-to-face meeting. As the Voice Talk function allows participants to talk to me if they save my phone number on their smartphone without giving me their phone number, they were satisfied with protecting their privacy. Also, since we did not see each other in

⁹ Kakao Talk is the most popular chat app in South Korea. It is similar to WhatsApp.

person, they were able to avoid an awkward atmosphere that can arise when first meeting with a stranger. They were able to feel more comfortable in conversation which shared sensitive personal experiences because speaking via an online chat platform felt less personal than would a face-to-face interview (Brinkmann, 2013). They responded to my questions as if they were talking to themselves about their thought and emotions. Although this method has the disadvantage of there being an absence of non-verbal expressions, I endeavoured to focus more on and respond appropriately to variations in their speech, elements such as tone and speed, as well as emotional markers like laughter and sobbing.

I also interviewed participants in cafes. Researchers should carefully consider the locations for interviews because these have a significant influence on the interaction with participants. Ideally, the best setting is one that is neutral to participants. It is less than ideal if participants feel uncomfortable or disturbed during the interview. However, it is not always possible to conduct an interview in the perfect setting. Alternatively, researchers should aim to find neutral, informal and easily accessible places (Longhurst, 2010). Cafes may not be considered appropriate for discussing personal and sensitive matters as they are open to the public. However, in my research, the open nature of cafes tended to allow my participants to feel more comfortable. In cafes, people focus on whatever activities they are involved in, such as conversation, work, study and reading, while the music that fills the space reduces the chance of overhearing others' conversations. As these advantages of cafes made participants feel anonymous among a crowd of other people, they tend to feel more comfortable and open in cafes than in other public spaces. Beforehand, I would ask participants to decide a place where they want to be interviewed and they had suggested a cafe they usually visited. As with a favourite cafe, places and atmospheres that are familiar to participants facilitated a more relaxed conversation (Valentine, 2005). In order to record and concentrate on the discussion, I usually chose a corner space of the cafe where there were few other people around.

I conducted two-phased interviews with all KCMY participants. The advantages of this approach is, firstly, that I could achieve a more in-depth exploration and explanation than a single interview would provide. The two-phased approach consists of a first interview during which broad and easy-to-answer questions are asked, then a second interview which includes more

detailed, sensitive and in-depth discussion. As participants' initial responses tend to be at the surface level, the researcher can listen, explore and use the second interview to obtain a deeper and fuller understanding of participants' experiences (Ritchie et al., 2014). Considering these advantages, I asked participants informal and broad questions in the first phase, and then I conducted the second interview by asking questions that aimed to elicit deeper and more emotional responses from participants based on what they had told me in their first interviews. I will outline the contents of each phase interview in the following subsections.

The second reason that I employed two-phased interview is the establishment of a good rapport with participants. Building up a good rapport was the most difficult as well as important in my fieldwork. As developing a good rapport or meaningful connection with participants may lead to more honest and richer data (Phillips, 2014), I endeavoured to develop and maintain a good relationship with mine. In addition, having a good rapport helps participants to engage with guided conversation prepared by the researcher (Phillips, 2014; Rubin and Rubin, 2012). Since my participants were migrant youth, forming a good rapport with them was also an important way to eliminate or at least reduce the power hierarchy resulting from differences in our age and nationality. In order to develop a high level of rapport with participants, I endeavoured to be respectful by maintaining eye contact and to give the odd nod to express my attention. Being a good listener, I was able to conduct responsive interviewing that highlights the importance of the establishment of a good rapport between the researcher and participants during interactive conversation (Rubin and Rubin, 2012). The second way to build up a good rapport with participants is to share similar personal experiences with them. Sharing personal information such as leisure time, school life and friends allows participants to feel closer to the researcher (Madge, 2010). If participants share similar life experiences with the researcher, this can reduce the distance between the two of them because the participant can empathise with the researcher's experience. For this reason, I started the first interview by talking about my life as an Asian minority in the UK. Participants empathised with my story and told me that I could understand their life better than other researchers. Also, as participants and I had already had daily conversations before each interview began, it was possible for them to relax and participate in the interview as if they were having another one of these daily conversations. Finally, my background knowledge of Korean-Chinese

migrants acquired through research for my master's thesis offered them the confidence that I could fully understand their lives. Participants' trust in me become an important element in the formation and maintenance of a good relationship.

4.3.1.1 First phase interview

First phase interviews took place within two weeks of receiving confirmation of the participants' participation by message or phone. In this phase, I aimed to offer participants a rough introduction to my research and to try to build a good rapport with them. They had already been informed of the research topic and that they would be interviewed twice at the time they had agreed to participate. As I had provided them with an information sheet which included the background and purpose of this research and how to conduct interviews, they could fully understand this research and interview process. At first, I had planned to follow a narrative approach in listening to participants' experiences, as this allows the researcher to grasp the overall life story of participants with limited intervention (Brinkmann, 2013; Laoire, 2020). However, my participants had no experience of being interviewed and had never previously spoken to adults, especially South Korean adults, about their experiences, emotions or thoughts. Thus, it was difficult for them to answer questions about their lives without any guidance. In order to overcome the difficulty, I gave more direction to participants. I used open-ended questions, which do not constrain participants' answers and minimised my intentions in asking questions.

Since another aim of the first interview was to build up a good rapport with participants, I asked them general descriptive or factual questions which suggested that I wanted to have a free and open conversation. The aim of this research is to capture not only the participants' experiences but also their deeper feelings and thoughts. Therefore, participants were asked to respond with more descriptive and elaborate answers than a simple yes or no. I conducted the first interview as a warm-up, as preparation to bring out more sensitive and personal responses in the second interview. This is because by forming a good rapport with participants through a sufficient warm-up, one can ask more abstract, sensitive or difficult questions later (Valentine, 2005). With all this in mind, I structured the interviews around mundane and factual

matters, including questions about migration process, experience of Korean culture in China, family members living with and day-to-day routine in South Korea and China (see appendix C.1). The interview lasted from an hour to an hour and a half.

4.3.1.2 Second phase interview

The second interview was on average conducted two weeks after the first. I left a period of time between the two interviews to prepare the second interview based on the transcription of the first interview. As participants and I discussed a deeper and wider range of topics, the second interview generally lasted two to three and a half hours. I gave participants a break of about 10 minutes during the interview. Despite the extensive length of the interview, participants usually enjoyed the conversation, saying “Time goes so fast with you.” This was possible because a good rapport with participants had been formed in the first interview. This good rapport was a significant foundation for conducting successful second phase interviews with all participants.

The second interview aimed to understand in detail participants’ experiences, emotions and strategies in the negotiation of their positionalities and belonging. While I was able to learn the background of their experiences in the first interview, this time I endeavoured to elicit answers about why they went through these experiences and how they responded to them. With these aims in mind, I endeavoured to capture the dynamics of the negotiation process of their positionalities and belonging in everyday life. This would include experiences they may have had as left-behind children, identity change, family relationships, emotions about South Korea and China, their relationships with others in the local community and possibility of further migration (see appendix C.1). As the questions I asked were based on their responses, they could explain the complexity of their experiences and describe them in mundane detail. Through this process, I was able not only to explore their lives but also to understand their position and sense of belonging as an agent. In particular, I focused on the entirety of their lives to demonstrate that the process of negotiating their positionalities and belonging according to the situated context and relationships is an ongoing one.

4.3.1.3 Interview with staff and policymakers

The aim of the Interviews with staff and policymakers was to explore the legal, policy and social factors which influence the positionalities and belonging of KCMY. As their organisations and departments are subject to the range of laws and policies touching on the life of KCMY in South Korea, interviews with them provided an opportunity to better understand the impact of relevant laws and policies in practice. I was also able to learn the issues that arise in the field when policies are implemented. Interviews with staff working in centres, NGOs or schools for migrant youth focused on the nature of their work where it involves interaction in person with KCMY in the workplace. In detail, there were questions about the characteristics of KCMY users, the role of organisations for migrant youth, relationships with local communities and legal and policy aspects which influence the operation of organisations and the life of KCMY (see appendix C.2). Talking with policymakers was helpful to understand the process of establishing and implementing relevant laws and policies and the different opinions of the various parties affected by the process. I could obtain information in diverse policy fields because the group of policymakers interviewed were involved in diverse policy making and practice at both the local and national scales. During these interviews, I asked questions on South Korean opinion about policies targeting migrants or Korean-Chinese migrants, key points or limitations in the process of establishing and implementing policies and the desirable direction of relevant laws and policies (see appendix C.3).

Interviews with staff and policymakers were conducted in a more formal manner. While I interviewed KCMY in a relaxed atmosphere, interviews with staff and policymakers were more structured. Most of them asked me to send an information sheet and rough list of interview questions in advance. This was their method of answering my questions efficiently within a fixed time frame. However, this also resulted in responses that could be abstract and formal, particularly among those who had participated in interviews on similar topics before. In order to get more detailed and practical answers, I tried to rephrase my questions in different ways, focusing on details such as the cases they had experienced (Valentine, 2005). These interviews were mainly conducted in their offices. However, when visitor access was restricted or they could not meet me in person, we had conversations in a cafe or via Zoom.

Interviews with staff and policymakers were conducted in a single phase and lasted between one and two hours.

4.3.2 Observation

Another method I used was observation of KCMY in a centre for migrant youth and *hagwon* which they attend. I was also able to observe Korean-Chinese migrants at one of their community meetings. Observation is a central and formative method in qualitative research. It allows researchers “to understand the world-views and ways of life of real people from the ‘inside’, in the contexts of their everyday lived experiences” (Cook, 2005, p.167). By watching what happens and listening to what people have to say about their mundane lives, researchers can collect data relevant to the research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). As observation is often combined with other methods such as interviewing, data can be rich through interwoven interpretation. Observation can be used to understand the contexts surrounding participants by capturing their behaviour and social interactions in a space, and also to demonstrate how material discussed in interviews is represented in practice (Nicholls et al., 2014). Thus, observation has allowed me to understand in practice how KCMY interact and position themselves in their relationships with others, and to underpin the interviews.

In human geography, especially cultural and social geography, observation is used to gain insights into interactions, processes and behaviour in people’s daily lives beyond the information delivered in interviews (Nicholls et al., 2014). In particular, observation plays a significant role in research which aims to investigate interactions or processes, which are so mundane habitual that participants may not be aware of or describe them fully. It is also a useful technique to gather information which arises in the context of the space used by the participants (Nicholls et al., 2014). Researchers can follow those interactions or processes by watching events unfold in front of their eyes, and keep a record of their thoughts or feelings in various ways diverse forms (e.g., field notes) (Cook, 2005; Laurier, 2010). I was able to understand the life of KCMY somewhat by observing their behaviour and interactions in the spaces they used. After any observation, I would complete my field notes at a nearby cafe or at home as soon as possible. Although I was able to note down important points while observing participants, I tried to write up my field notes

outside the space where I had been with them, because I worried that they would act unnaturally if they recognised that I was observing them, writing things down and making judgement about them (see section 4.4.1). These activities which would distinguish me from them could be a barrier to the achievement of my goal of investigating KCMY in the space. Therefore, I wrote up field notes elsewhere.

I carried out observations of KCMY and Korean-Chinese migrants by participating in their activities. In this research, I conducted covert observation, which does not ask for participants' consent. I did not ask them for their permission because if they had been aware of what I was doing, I would not have been able to observe them going about their ordinary lives (Nicholls et al., 2014). At the centre for migrant youth, I was an English teacher. At the *hagwon*, I gave a presentation during which I talked about my life as an international student in the UK and acted as moderator of the discussion that followed. As staff of the centre and *hagwon* introduced me to the KCMY in advance, no one felt strange or uncomfortable about my sudden appearance in these spaces.

I was a participant-as-observer at the centre for migrant youth and the *hagwon*. I was able to observe people through participation in activities in a specific space. My position as a participant-as-observer allowed me to maintain my status as observer but also to engage in close relationships with the participants (Nicholls et al., 2014). Adopting such a position was a decision that took into account the power relationship between researcher and participants that is highlighted in the feminist framework (Kitchin and Tate, 2013). My presence as a participant-as-observer reduced the power inequality between participants and me and helped me understand their behaviour, emotions or thoughts that were natural in a relatively close and equal relationship with participants. Similarly, I did not offer information about my observation or ask KCMY directly for their permission to observe them as it would make them, who had no experience in participating in research, have resistance or burden. In other words, if I had asked for consent to observe them, the relationship between participants and I would have become fixed as one between objects for observation and researcher. As this type of relationship tends to increase the power inequality between participants and researcher, I obtained consent from the heads of these organisation instead. At the centre for migrant youth, I volunteered to teach English to eight KCMY

for two hours every Tuesday, for six weeks. I originally planned to do this voluntary work for six months, but it ended prematurely in the last week of January because all face-to-face activities were banned due to the COVID-19 pandemic. When I observed KCMY in the centre, it was usually in class. In addition, I endeavoured to understand how KCMY interact and form relationships with South Korean volunteers, staff and other migrant youth through their conversation and attitude in the classroom, the staff room or the corridors before and after class. I could simultaneously fulfil my roles as a volunteer teacher and as a researcher to investigate changes in their identities which might express themselves in both their verbal and non-verbal language in the centre. Moreover, as mentioned in section 4.2.3, I gave a seminar on my experience in the UK at the *hagwon* for KCMY. In this seminar, I talked about racism, people's perception of foreigners and my identity as an Asian minority in British society. As this seminar was an event where participants' questions and opinions could be shared, we were able to discuss their experiences as migrant youth in South Korean society. Although playing the role of participant and moderator in this discussion, I was also able to observe the other participants at the same time.

In addition, I attended a community meeting of Korean-Chinese migrants as an observer-as-participant who observes as unobtrusively as possible and engages in proceedings for short periods of time (Nicholls et al., 2014). This sort of researcher does not try to form close relationships with people and participate deeply in activities. The observed community group was one where Korean-Chinese migrants regularly meet in their ethnic enclave and discuss their lives in South Korea. It takes place in cooperation with Seoul Southwest Global Centre. The topic of the meeting I attended was the identities of Korean-Chinese living in South Korean society. At this meeting, Korean-Chinese migrants ranging in age from their 20s to over 50s participated in a discussion how they live in South Korean society. In addition, several South Korean researchers and staff from the Seoul Southwest Global centre attended to share their views on the identities of Korean-Chinese migrants from the perspective of NGOs, central and local governments and academia. I briefly introduced my research and raised the need for the younger generation of Korean-Chinese to be included in such a discussion. As this seminar focused on discussions among Korean-Chinese migrants, I concentrated on observing the discussion rather than the participants and on taking notes on the relationship between the perception of identity as Korean-

Chinese and the actual nature of adaptation in South Korean society, which is subtly different from generation to generation. In this seminar, although I could not hear the voices of KCMY directly, I was able to understand the thoughts and emotions of another generation of Korean-Chinese migrants. This meeting was a significant source for understanding how identities and belonging of KCMY differ from those of previous generations.

4.3.3 Data analysis

Data analysis was an ongoing and iterative process. I transcribed all interviews shortly after carrying them out to describe them vividly. I listened to recordings of interviews and typed them up verbatim, including sighs, laughter, crying and even silence which I marked with an ellipsis. These non-verbal expressions represent participants' emotions which can be difficult to describe in words. As in this research it is important to capture participants' emotions, I endeavoured to extract any emotional content from the recordings. Since interviews with all the KCMY participants took place in two phases, I typed up the first interview shortly after it was over. By conducting a brief analysis based on these transcripts, I was able to ascertain questions I had missed and points I needed to develop in more detail. In addition, I always kept a field diary in which I recorded the interview contents and the atmosphere during the interview, my own thoughts and feelings and the points that I felt I had to supplement. I also tried to record the observation spaces in detail through my field notes brought up to date after each observation, when they were still fresh in my mind. These records provided a significant and useful resource for the data analysis and the writing processes.

After I had gathered all of my raw data together, I conducted thematic coding. In the initial analysis, while reading the text of my material slowly and thoroughly, I engaged in open coding process which allows researchers to simply note down any ideas which emerge about the topics in the material in the margin alongside the text (Crang and Cook, 2007). Even though there was a large quantity of text material, this technique helped me become familiar with my material. After jotting down notes, I wrote theoretical memos which were based on my thoughts about what were the meaning and intent of each of participant's accounts, as these related to my research aim and objectives. At the end of this work, I determined themes or concepts which were based

on my research objectives. As these selected themes or concepts were salient and recurring in the data, they were used to label and sort the data and to organise an initial structure which linked them correlatively (Crang, 2005). Thus, this process allowed me an overview of my data and to identify key points.

I elected to use NVivo (Version 12 Plus) to conduct intensive and efficient coding for thematic analysis. The software for qualitative data analysis, including NVivo, allows researchers to code or annotate the data produced by qualitative methods and easily retrieve information (Spencer et al., 2014). In other words, they are helpful to speed up sorting according to codes and to search for information assigned to different sections of the data (Crang, 2005). Considering the large amount of text to analyse, NVivo, which can label different parts with a certain code and retrieve specific section quickly for analysis, was a more efficient means than sorting and labelling with pen and post-it. Through labelling and sorting process, I created three master codes based on the time and space of participants' migration process—past life in China, current life in South Korea and Future life—and sub-codes were assigned to the text by emerging subdivision during the analysis (see appendix D). The process of coding, sifting and sorting was iterative until coherent and supportable categories were generated (Crang, 2005; Crang and Cook, 2007). In addition, as NVivo allowed me to label parts of the text with multiple codes, I was able to analyse the text from multiple perspectives by connecting diverse related themes or concepts in the same statement of the participants. However, I did not use advanced analytical tools in NVivo as I was trying to form the structure of this research by linking qualitative data to related themes or concepts rather than trying to draw statistical results from advanced analysis through the software.

In order to analyse handwritten materials and electronic documents together, I typed the handwritten material into Word files. My field notes, which were recorded after interviewing and observation, were handwritten material. In order to analyse them via the software, it was necessary to convert them into electronic documents. Although this was a time-consuming task, it was necessary to sift and sort them with same codes that were being used to analyse the interview transcripts. As material from the interviews and observations complemented each other, data produced through these two methods had to be analysed together (Sanchez-Ayala, 2012). The field notes,

saved in Word file format, were analysed through iterative thematic analysis. Through this process, I was able to connect interview data and observation records and explore them within a single analysis framework. This work was worthwhile because it not only put the data produced from different sources in one analytical framework, but also allowed them to be linked together.

4.4 Ethical considerations

4.4.1 Principles of ethical research

This research abides by the standards for ethical research of the University of Leeds and was approved by the University Faculty Research Ethics Committee. When I was recruiting participants, I verbally informed them about the research purpose and the interview process. Before the first interview, participants were provided with an information sheet which included details of the research aim and subject as well as information about data storage, use, distribution and elimination. Participants, who were interviewed via Voice Talk, received the information sheet file via Kakao Talk before the interview so that they could read the information on interview procedures and data management in advance. After reading the information sheet carefully, they were asked to sign the consent form. Although participants can have daily conversations in Korean without difficulty, some of them had difficulty in understanding the information sheet and the consent form written in Korean (see appendix A and B in English). In order to facilitate matters, I also prepared the information sheet in Chinese so that participants could choose the one they could read more easily. Also, the consent form was written in simple Korean, avoiding difficult words, and I gave additional explanations to help them understand while we were reading it together. In addition, before starting the second interview, I briefly explained the content of the consent form to the participants and asked for their permission to participate in the interview again.

Regarding data management, I stored all data securely. All interview recording files and transcripts were saved anonymously by giving pseudonyms to all participants. Pseudonyms were created by designating a letter of the alphabet to each group and then adding an Arabic number which were given in the

order of interviews. I assigned 'M' to KCMY, 'S' to migrant organisation staff and 'P' to policymakers (see table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). Participants agreed to this method of maintaining anonymity and suggested that anonymity was helpful for them to participate more actively in the interview. In particular, guaranteeing anonymity was even more important for policymakers who belong to the SMG or the South Korean central government. They asked me to maintain their anonymity as their opinions do not represent all of the governments' official positions. In this regard, I made it clear in the information sheet and the consent form and explained it to them verbally.

Although this research did not involve any risk of physical harm coming to the participants, it involved sensitive questions that might cause discomfort. I allowed the participants to decide the space for the interview to provide a comfortable atmosphere for them. Considering that they were sharing their personal experiences and feelings with me as a new acquaintance, interviews were conducted in spaces comfortable for them. Nevertheless, questions related to certain experiences in their migration process—e.g. separation from parents, conflict with family members, discrimination and bullying—were sensitive to the participants. Although these sensitive were asked only after forming a good rapport with participants, they could still be painful to recall. Therefore, I asked them about the broad topic first. Then I followed up with questions derived from their answers with an explanation that they do not have to talk if they do not want to share their experiences. During the interviews, I altered my manner of asking sensitive questions depending on the participant concerned. Nevertheless, on occasion some participants cried because they were filled with emotion while talking about the difficulty of adapting to life in South Korea and the conflicts they had had with their family. I gave them time to calm down, and proceeded with the interview once they felt able to continue. In addition, I clearly stated in the information sheet, that there is no need to answer questions that the participants do not want to answer, so allowing them to decide whether or not to respond. While observing participants, I worried that they might be uncomfortable about my writing things down in front of them. In order for them to act comfortably and normally in the spaces, I took no notes while I was with them and wrote down my observations in my fieldnote once I was outside.

4.4.2 Positionality

Feminist scholars argued that power, reflexivity and positionality are representative key features in feminist research methodology (Doucet and Mauthner, 2007). They have sought to recognise their situated perspective which influences their research topics and questions. Throughout the research, researchers must recognise and consider their own position, as well as that of the participants (McDowell, 1992). Firstly, as research is created by the actions and values of the researcher (Limb and Dwyer, 2001), researchers should consider their position self-consciously in their situated society. It is almost impossible to detach researchers from their life environment or from their identities related to their nationality, gender, age, class and social position (Madge, 1993). The position of the researcher, which influences their interpretation of the data not only in the data collection process but also in the stages of analysis and conclusion, results in situated knowledge (Rose, 1997). Since it is almost impossible to proceed with research neutrally without considering the researchers' position in the research, researchers endeavour to conduct research by assigning a greater value to their participants' knowledge than their own (Skelton, 2001). In consideration of this point, I tried to respect and accept my participants' knowledge without bias as much as possible during the data collection process. Although it might have been feasible to include participants in the data analysis process, time constraints and concerns about the security of primary data meant I had to impose my own interpretation on the data.

Secondly, the positionality of researchers with regard to their participants also has a significant impact on knowledge production as well as on research process. As identities of researchers shape the interaction between participants and themselves, it is important to reflect on positionalities of researchers within their relationship with the participants. Researchers as insiders who share backgrounds and identities similar to participants can form a good rapport relatively easily through detailed conversation based on empathy and mutual understanding (Valentine, 2005). The researchers' similar positionality allows them to understand the participants' life experience more clearly having an advantageous position through a shared common language or similar cultural background (Vargas-Silva, 2012). Nevertheless, when participants feel too close to researchers, they might be wary of sharing their life (Mohammad, 2001). Hong (2013) argues that in her research project

on Korean-Chinese migrants in South Korea, it was easy to access the Korean-Chinese community as she is Korean-Chinese, however some participants avoided answering sensitive questions because she belonged to the same community as them. Although she guaranteed her participants confidentiality, they were worried that their responses would spread to other member of the community because their community was a small one, and avoided answering questions that might have caused conflict or trouble. On the other hand, researchers as outsiders have difficulty building a bond with their participants (Valentine, 2005). However, as the distance between researchers and participants is a better guarantee of anonymity, participants have confidence that their answers will not leak to their acquaintances, and the researchers' neutral position helps participants trust them (Vargas-Silva, 2012). Such anonymity and neutrality allow participants to share their thoughts and emotions more freely.

The researchers' positionalities are not clear and fixed and can change flexibly through interaction with participants during the research project (Mohammad, 2001). Although I share the same ethnic roots as KCMY, this common denominator had no advantages other than allowing me to communicate in the same language as them. Instead, my experience of living abroad as a migrant helped me form a strong bond between them and me. I am an Asian and South Korean international student in the UK, and they are Korean-Chinese who are sometimes discriminated against by South Koreans (see section 6.2). Our shared experience of being members of a minority as well as foreigners living in a foreign country helped us build a good rapport by enabling us to interact with each other with mutual understanding, especially on an emotional register. This shared experience allowed me to be placed in somewhat of an insider position, even if I have different identities and background from my participants.

However, I remained an outsider in some regards. I felt a subtle distance between participants and me because of our differences in age, nationality, educational background and social status. However, I used my experience and knowledge to overcome the difference in our backgrounds and identities. During my master's degree, I carried out a study in Daerim-dong, a Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave, for a year, and conducted fieldwork in north-eastern China, where most Korean-Chinese migrants come from. These experiences provided background knowledge which helped me understand the lives of

Korean-Chinese migrants before and after migration. In addition, I have participated in research on migrant youth in Seoul while working as a researcher at a think tank belonging to the SMG. The information and knowledge I acquired about migrant youth through the research project became a significant foundation for interviewing and observing my participants. These experiences demonstrated to my participants that I had a good understanding and knowledge relevant to their lives, and this helped build their trust in me. Indeed, I was viewed as a counsellor as well as a researcher by some KCMY participants. After the interview, one participant said, "Thank you for listening to me from beginning to end, even though no one has listened to me before." Some participants, who lacked information about their school life and university entrance in South Korea, asked me to explain instructions of guidance written in Korean and how to find further information. They found it easier to discuss with me what they were reluctant to talk to their teachers about. This might be because of my personality and inter-personal skills, as I always listen to other people's stories and respond appropriately. As a result, I learned that sharing structural and cultural similarities with participants is not the only way to come to a better understanding of their lives and feelings. Rather, my differences as an outsider provided an important basis for gaining a richer understanding of their lives.

In interviews with migrant organisation staff and policymakers, the fact that I am as interested in migrant youth as they are made me much more of an insider. My insider positionality allowed me to benefit from rich discussions based on mutual respect and understanding. As all of them were South Korean, we shared similar a culture and background. Therefore, even if it was difficult for them to express their opinions directly because of considerations about the position of the organisations to which they belong, I could catch the nuance of what was said even if this was expressed metaphorically or indirectly. This was possible because as a South Korean, I have a good understanding of South Korean culture and society. In particular, in the interviews with policymakers, my positionality as a researcher, who has encountered and listened to KCMY in person, encouraged them to participate in the interview more actively. This is because they wished to hear my ideas about the life of KCMY. I briefly discussed the life of my KCMY participants, which stimulated in turn additional explanations about relevant policies from them.

Feminist researchers suggest that the power of the researcher is stronger than that of participants within the research. Researchers and participants are in a different and unequal relation when it comes to knowledge, age, class, nationality and gender, and researchers usually set the final direction of the research within most research projects (Crang and Cook, 2007; Johnson and Medge, 2010). Therefore, power imbalance is an inevitable feature of research projects. Feminist researchers maintain that power differentials in research could be minimised by creating non-hierarchical and friendly relationships with participants (Doucet and Mauthner, 2007). In my research, as my KCMY participants are younger than me, it has been more difficult to minimise the power inequality between researcher and participants. Hemming (2008) suggests that it is necessary to consider the fluid nature of power relations between the adult researcher and child or youth participants by using appropriate strategies. Although the power imbalance between adult researchers and youth participants cannot be fully eliminated, I endeavoured to treat my participants as equal human beings by using honorific language and involving them to teach me because I did not know as much about their life as they did themselves. As a result, they felt that they were being respected because South Koreans generally express their respect for other by using honorific forms. I also asked them to tell me about the lives of Korean-Chinese migrants using their experiences as examples because they know more than I did. Although they already knew that I was well informed about KCMY, they realised that I did not know about details and explain to me as if they teach me about Korean-Chinese with their lives. The knowledge that an older researcher would prefer to be taught by young participants rather than teach them reduced the power imbalance between them and me if only by a little bit.

In my relationship with the staff and policymakers I interviewed, I was in a position of relatively less power compared to them. As they had been working longer than I had either in supporting migrant youth or in the process for establishing policies targeted at them, I was sometimes considered to be an inexperienced researcher. Some of them made it clear that they disagreed with my position and tried to impose their own opinion on me. They also emphasised that when objective factual information such as statistics and phenomena that they knew was different from the information I mentioned, they were correct. On these occasions, I searched for accurate information after the interview was over and checked my facts again. In this way, some

staff and policymakers assumed that they were higher than me, a PhD researcher, in career and social status, and tried to guide me in the direction of the interview while sticking to their own arguments. However, most staff and policymakers respected my research direction and had a discussion while maintaining equal relationships between us.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter described my research design, methods, fieldwork and analysis process. Discussions on the research design and data collection process are important as they not only enhance the validity of a selected methodology and methods, but also demonstrate robustness within subsequent findings and arguments. I utilised a feminist epistemological approach, which produces knowledge by recognising the situated context rather than by applying dominant disciplines to the field. This approach provided the basis for analysing the negotiation process of positionalities and belonging of KCMY from various lenses depending on diverse contexts and factors in their migration process. In addition, by using mixed qualitative methods, I could gain an understanding of how participants' emotions and thoughts appear in their own words and through their own behaviour in their daily spaces, through abundant data sources.

In the fieldwork, I used interviewing and observation. Firstly, in-depth interviews with participants allowed me to examine the positionalities and belonging in their situated social and spatial contexts through their own words. In particular, I was able to collect in-depth and rich data because two-phased interviews with KCMY helped the establishment of a good rapport between my participants and me. For research, such as this research, where researchers and participants have different backgrounds or identities and researchers need to ask questions about participants' thoughts or feelings based on their experiences, two-phased interviews may provide researchers with rich primary data. In addition, I observed KCMY while participating in voluntary activities and during a seminar at a centre and *hagwon* for migrant youth. By attending a community meeting of Korean-Chinese migrants, I could grasp how the identities and sense of belonging of KCMY were different from those of older generations of Korean-Chinese. I derived my findings and

arguments through empirical analysis based on this collected data. These findings and arguments are discussed described in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In the next chapter, I will analyse the motives for migration and the family dynamics of KCMY to understand the influences of their life and family in China on their positionalities and belonging in South Korea.

Chapter 5

Migration of left-behind children and their families

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the migration background and family dynamics of KCMY. In order to analyse the positionalities and sense of belonging of this group in their places of origin, I highlight the context in which they have had to change their identities and sense of belonging as well as the different communities to which they articulate belonging. Whereas existing literature tends to simplify their migration motivation as being predominantly a result of parental decisions, my research looks into agentic decision making in regard to migration as made by KCMY themselves. After migration to South Korea, KCMY often reunify with their family members as a whole unit or at least partially. By examining the gap between their expectations and the reality of family reunification, I investigate their family relationships and their emotional responses to these relationships. Some reunified Korean-Chinese families experience renewed separation in South Korea. Previous research has not focused on family dynamics after the reunification of transnational families in the host country. However, transnational families often experience several family reunifications and separations in both their home and host countries. In this regard, my research analyses family separation after the reunification of Korean-Chinese families in South Korea. This chapter focuses on their emotional responses during several family reunifications and separations both before and after migration in order to unpack the positionalities of KCMY and their sense of belonging.

In order to explore both family and the motives behind KCMY choosing to migrate, in so much as these influence their positionalities and belongings in South Korea, this chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, the motives for migrating of young Korean-Chinese, who have been left-behind by their families in China, will be examined. Secondly, the family reunification of KCMY and their subsequent relationship between with their family members will be analysed. Lastly, the process of family separation of KCMY in South Korea and their emotional responses to this renewed separation will be investigated.

5.2 Life left behind: KCMY origins and the migration decision-making

This section investigates how Korean-Chinese young people define their identities and belongings in China and the reasons why they choose to migrate to South Korea. In China, although Korean-Chinese young people belong to the ethnic minority group, Korean-Chinese, they have lived all their lives as citizens of China. Their sense of belonging and positionalities as Korean-Chinese and as left-behind children has been influenced by the community where they lived. After they have lived apart from their parents for some time, most children of Korean-Chinese migrants who have migrated to South Korea eventually follow their parents. Although their parents' decision is the most decisive factor behind their choice to migrate, they may consider several other factors as part of their decision-making process. While previous studies have sought to reduce their motivation for migration to parental decisions alone, this section will examine their motivation from the perspective of those children who have emigrated from China.

5.2.1 Korean-Chinese left-behind children in China

This section examines how KCMY formed their identities and sense of belonging as left-behind children in China. Previous studies have reduced the identities of KCMY to their ethnic identity as Korean-Chinese, and have not been interested in their identity as Chinese (Park, 2020). Also, their positionalities as children left-behind in the community has not been focused on. As Korean-Chinese young people are more integrated into Chinese society than was the case with their parents' generation, their identity in China should not solely be reduced to their Korean-Chinese ethnic identity. Also, their positionalities as left-behind children need to be understood as something that can vary depending on situated spatial context. Therefore, I analyse positionalities and sense of belonging of Korean-Chinese left-behind children in China in this section, which not only enlarges on their identities before migration, but also serves as a starting point for negotiating their positionalities and belongings within South Korean society.

The life changes experienced by left-behind children in their country of origins as a result of parental migration have largely been ignored in the adult-centric literature related to migration (Lam and Yeoh, 2019). Studies on Korean-Chinese left-behind children who live together with their grandparents tend to focus on the negative effects of parental migration such as problematic behaviour and psychological instability (Park and Xuan, 2018; Song and Yoon, 2017). Although their identities and positionalities have a significant impact on their individual emotions, their relationships with others and their ways of life in their country of origin, investigations into their identities and positionalities in their local communities has been limited. In this regard, participants of this research narrate how they used to live as Chinese like other Chinese friends, with the community giving them their identity as Korean-Chinese:

*I lived with my grandmother until primary school. However, my grandmother was sick, so she moved to the countryside and I lived with my dad and step-mother. However, after living with them for a few months, my aunt came to my house and lived with me. My dad and step-mother lived in another house. When I went to a nursing high school in Harbin, I lived in a school accommodation. However, I wanted to dance so much that I dropped out of school and lived alone. [...] As I lived in a Korean-Chinese village and went to Korean-Chinese ethnic school until middle school, I knew that I was Korean-Chinese as well as Chinese. It was not unusual that I was Korean-Chinese. However, most of the students in the nursing high school was Han Chinese and I was the only Korean-Chinese student. When some Han Chinese students listened to my Korean words on the phone with my mum, they bullied me. In fact, there was no other reason for it than because I am a Korean-Chinese. Even though we are all Chinese, my language and lifestyle were a little different, so it was noticeable that I was different from them. That difference was not good for me in China.
(M4, Female, High school student, Entry in 2019)*

I originally lived in the north-eastern region of China then moved to Guangdong Province. In that region, it became clear that I was not from Guangdong when I spoke because I could not speak Cantonese. So, when I said, "I am a Korean-Chinese from the north-eastern region in China", other students thought I was just South Korean. Teachers also asked me, "Are you South Korean or North Korean?" I am Chinese, neither South Korean nor North Korean! So, I said, "I am Chinese, just from one of the ethnic groups in China!" No matter how many times I told them, I was not the same Chinese as them, but someone else. Ah, South Korean culture like K-pop or Korean TV programmes is very popular in China. So, when I told them I was a Korean-Chinese, they envied me, saying "I envy you as you are South Korean! Can you speak

Korean well?" So, I also enjoyed the jealous look in their eyes because they envy me even though I am not South Korean. (Laughs)
(M12, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

M4 and M12, who moved home due to parental migration, argue that their identity as Korean-Chinese was emphasised by others in the community. These participants lived away from their parents for a year to thirteen years either in their grandparents, relatives or teachers' houses or in school accommodation, and changed these several times like M4. In the process, they were placed in a new spatial contexts. Adolescence is a period when young people undergo considerable changes and challenges, and through these changes, they form their own identity in relationships with families, peers and others (Gough, 2008; Punch, 2002; Skelton, 2002). Participants were also able to discover their identities and positionalities in society by expanding the scope of their social encounters resulting in a complex cultural and social matrix of identity formation through migration (Skelton, 2013). Furthermore, they came to realise their identity as Korean-Chinese, especially when Han Chinese made the distinction at school. As M4 and M12 mention, participants insisted that they had lived their lives as Chinese, but that they were not recognised as real Chinese by Han Chinese who account for over 90 percent of the total population of China. Their identity as Korean-Chinese could influence participants' daily lives in both negative (as in the case of M4) or positive (as with M12) ways, depending on how their peers or neighbours viewed their identity. It has often been noted that through everyday encounters, people distinguish the figure of the outsider who have a lack of commonality with the broader group and become aware of the differences between themselves and the outsider (Askins and Pains, 2011; Valentine, 2008). However, as this difference is accepted differently by person, his or her identities and sense of belonging may begin to change flexibly under the influence of the societal attitude, discourses and categorisations of the community (Brown, 2008; Skelton, 2013; Wilson, 2017). In this context, Han Chinese categorise Korean-Chinese as other and exclude Korean-Chinese (see M4's quotation), or make Korean-Chinese the object of envy by identifying them with South Koreans (see M12's quotation). Korean-Chinese young people's reflections on their Korean-Chinese identity change therefore depending on how they are perceived in any given social context. Interestingly, M12 inwardly agreed that Korean-Chinese belong to the same group as South Koreans, although she disagrees that Korean-Chinese are South Koreans. This reflects her experience of the community being viewed favourably in

comparison to Han Chinese due to a positive perception of South Koreans being projected onto Korean-Chinese.

Korean-Chinese young people also experience confusion about their identities when others deny their identity as Chinese. As M4 and M12 mention, they have lived their lives thinking of themselves as ordinary Chinese. Twelve participants, who attended public schools in China, argue that as they were educated that they were all Chinese in class, they took it for granted that this was the case. Ironically, however, they were often considered as non-Chinese (even as South Koreans) by their teachers and peers though they had never thought as such. Because individual identities are flexible and multiple, individuals actively emerge or change their identities through encounters in everyday localised contexts (Skelton, 2013). However, rather than experiencing identities as something flexible and self-guided, Korean-Chinese youth have 'flexibility' imposed on them from the outside. Such imposed flexibility results in confusion about one's identities and sense of belonging, furthermore this new identities and positionalities are defined by others rather than by oneself.

Participants experienced their positionalities as children of separated families who had been left behind within the community. As previously mentioned, the children of Korean-Chinese families are left in their places of origin to live with their grandparents or relatives (Faist et al., 2013) while maintaining a transnational relationship with their parents who have migrated to South Korea. As separated families caused by parental transnational migration are common in Korean-Chinese villages (Lee et al., 2014), children's separation from their parents is accepted as a common phenomenon. However, in villages where there are few Korean-Chinese or where parental migration is uncommon, these children are often considered unusual. M4 and M20 illustrate the contrasting positionalities of children who have been left behind in the community through their experiences:

I was lonely when I left high school and lived alone. I always came home late as the dance class ended late. I was a teenager, lived alone and came home late, so other people did not like me. At that time, I lived in a town where many Han Chinese lived. All my friends lived with their parents, but their mums told them not to go out with me. I was not doing anything wrong to them. So, I was alone. I did not talk much with my neighbours.

(M4, Female, High school student, Entry in 2019)

Before I came to Yanji, I lived in a Korean-Chinese village in the countryside. In my generation, many children lived apart from their parents. We lived in China, and our parents were working in South Korea and came to China several times to visit. Our teachers did not consider us unfortunate. It is because it is difficult to find Korean-Chinese children who live with their parents. Our neighbours were in a similar situation, so we cared about each other. We would eat together and hold village event together.
(M20, Male, Middle school dropout, Entry in 2017)

In transnational migration, a family form consisting of working migrant parents and left-behind children is common (Butt, 2018). In China, peasants leaving the Chinese countryside to work in cities have been leaving their children behind in their home communities since the 1980's (Ge et al., 2019). In the early twenty-first century, it is common for residents of rural areas to move to cities for better-paid work. However, they are not able to bring their children with them due to *hukou*¹⁰, the long-standing household registration system in use in China. *Hukou* prevents migrant workers and their families from accessing social benefits, including public education and national health service (Ge et al., 2019). Therefore, there are large numbers of split families living in the rural communities of China. Of course Korean-Chinese migrants do not move within China but migrate to South Korea instead while leaving their children in the original locale. Korean-Chinese who live in both urban and rural areas decide to migrate to South Korea as wages there are higher than those in Chinese cities (see section 1.2.2). As a result, their children are left in Chinese cities and suburbs as well as rural areas. In the Korean-Chinese village in the countryside, where M20 lived, the form of transnational family due to parental migration was a common family type. As most Korean-Chinese parents had migrated to South Korea to work, people did not feel pity for their children or consider their families abnormal. In other words, in communities where transnational migration is prevalent, the separated family

¹⁰ At birth, all Chinese citizens must register their personal basic demographic information, such as name, other family members, date of birth, permanent address and so on. The system was designed to control internal migration from rural areas to cities. The current Chinese government has relaxed the *hukou* to reflect changes in social and economic structure, but people must meet high standards of finance to be issued with new *hukou* allowing residence in cities. For this reason, it is difficult for rural migrants to bring their children to live in the city with them.

is an accepted social phenomenon (Butt, 2018). This type of internally cohesive community is highly accepting of left-behind children and there is little social exclusion and the children feel as if they belong to the community.

On the other hand, M4 experienced isolation and marginalisation in her community as a left-behind child who lives alone. Her experiences can be related to community-based narratives of norm which creates and rationalises normative values and standards as they are recognised in the local community (Valentine, 2008; Valentine, 2010). She lived in a suburban area which consisted largely of Han Chinese. In the community, as the migration of parents who had left their children behind was not a common phenomenon, the normative family type was defined as a family in which parents and children live together. Left-behind children who live alone in this type of community were considered by their neighbours to be children of unusual family. In addition, left-behind children who as adolescents behave in ways that are considered undesirable such as M4 coming home late or being a dropout, are often considered as a group that does not conform to moral norms of the community. Moral norms establish desirable standards of behaviours in the community and implicitly require members to adhere to them (Atkinson, 2005). Some communities develop prejudice against group who violates such moral norms by becoming antagonistic towards them (Valentine, 2008). M4 was considered undesirable because she was a dropout living alone and came home late, and was marginalised without feelings of attachment to the community. As she was not considered someone from an ordinary family in the community, the neighbours were wary of her and applied strict moral standards to her behaviour (Valentine, 2008). Therefore, Korean-Chinese left-behind children can experience social exclusion and marginalisation because they are considered to be an atypical group in communities where separated families are not ubiquitous. The next section will examine the factors which influence the decision of Korean-Chinese left-behind children to migrate to South Korea where their parents are living.

5.2.2 Factors involved in the decision to migrate to South Korea

This section investigates factors that influenced KCMY' decision-making process regarding migration to South Korea. The existing literature on youth migration focuses largely on their migration process and difficulties in

adaptation to the host country (King, 2018; Smith et al., 2014; Tucker et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2012). These studies assume that migrant youth moves primarily as part of a process of family migration and that left-behind children migrate to the host country for the purpose of their family reunification. In other words, migrant youth' voices on migration have not been included in previous studies, almost as if they have no opinion in the decision-making process. In the same vein, it is widely held that Korean-Chinese left-behind children migrate to South Korea in order to reunite with their families (Kim, 2018). Although parental invitation and family reunification might be the main reasons for migration, there are also other motives for migration from China to South Korea. Factors involved in the decision-making about whether to migrate to South Korea can be categorised as family, policy and personal motives. Family and policy motives influence their parental decision-making process about whether to bring the children to South Korea to reunite the family. Personal motives includes factors that make migration to South Korea attractive from the individual perspective. The migration of KCMY is determined by considering familial, policy and personal factors altogether.

Firstly, at the familial level, Korean-Chinese migrants decide to bring their children to South Korea when they have achieved sufficient financial security to allow them to support their children (Park, 2020). In South Korea, most Korean-Chinese migrant workers have temporary jobs in the manufacturing or service industries. Even though their work is neither stable nor of high status, if they think they can at least earn a living for their family, they make the decision to reunite their families in South Korea. Until the mid-2010s, Korean-Chinese migrants remitted cost of living money to their families in China or bought a house in their place of origin to live in after they had returned (Lee, 2015). Now, however, it is more common to reunite with their left-behind children in South Korea as there are visas for ethnic Koreans which are renewable thus allowing for long-time stay (Bae et al., 2018; Song and Kim, 2017). In this case, the intention is to bring their left-behind children to stay in South Korea long term. In particular, the migration of children has been further accelerating due to the absence of caregivers in China, such as grandparents. In addition, community bias and prejudice against split families can trigger the migration of left-behind children to South Korea:

If parents become financially stable in South Korea, they take their children with them. My mum did not ask me if I want to go to South

Korea. As I did not have any caregiver to take care of me, I was alone in China. After I left school, my grandmother passed away. My mum was worried because I did not have a caregiver in China. My neighbours though badly of me because I was living alone. So, my mum told me to come to South Korea.

(M4, Female, High school student, Entry in 2019)

My grandmother came to South Korea for surgery. So, I was alone in China for a while. My parents asked me to come to South Korea, but I did not want to go. (Laughs) I have never thought of leaving China at that time. I was forced to come to South Korea after fighting with my parents.

(M16, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

When I talk with my students, they tell me that their classmates hit them, saying "If you do not live with your parents, leave China right now!" Then, they did not want to go to school. Some of them were expelled from school as they fought with their classmates. After that, their parents brought them to South Korea.

(S4, Male, Head of an alternative school for migrant youth)

In China, more than 60 million left-behind children have been brought up by their grandparents due to their parents' migration to urban areas or foreign countries (Ge et al., 2019; Hu, 2017). In the Korean-Chinese community, migration to South Korea began in the 1990s, with the number of Korean-Chinese moving to South Korea increasing rapidly in the 2000s. According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2021, the number of Korean-Chinese in China has decreased by about 130,000 compared to 2010 figure (CSP, 2022). Korean-Chinese adults chose to migrate to South Korea, leaving most their left-behind children in the care of their grandparents. However, if their grandparents, the main caregiver in China, pass away or also migrate to South Korea or to another areas in China, as was the case with M4 and M16, there is no one left to take care of them. As M4 mentions in section 5.2.1, left-behind children who do not belong to a normative family in the community and who live without a caregiver may be excluded from the community or face prejudice against them. In addition, some students of S4 were bullied by their peers as they belonged to a split family. Such bullying denied their sense of belonging as well as their identity as being Chinese, and they were excluded from school and community as well as from the friendship of their peers. In other words, the fact of belonging both to an ethnic minority and a split family has influenced their identities and positionalities of left-behind Korean-Chinese children. So, parents decide to reunite their families through the migration of their children to South Korea as they are not able to return to their home community to look

after their children themselves unless they gave up their jobs. Korean-Chinese migrant families consider reuniting the family in South Korea a solution to the above problems.

Secondly, in terms of South Korean immigration policy, although the motives for the migration of KCMY are diverse at both the family and individual levels, immigration policy as it affects ethnic Koreans has a substantial influence on migration in practice (Park, 2020) (see section 3.3). Most KCMY enter South Korea with a type of visa which is issued to children of Korean-Chinese migrants. Therefore, in order to grasp the policy influences on KCMY' decisions to migrate, it is necessary to understand the characteristics related to family reunification of visas issued to their parents. P3 and S7 narrate how visas for Korean-Chinese migrants have been revised so as to enable families to reunite with their children:

The South Korean government did not want to establish policies for ethnic Koreans, including Korean-Chinese, due to the possibility of diplomatic disputes with China and of potential confusion in the South Korean labour market. The government was forced just to make a working visa, such as H-2 and F-4, depending on the situation that it faced at the time. [...] Therefore, as KCMY were not considered in the government policies regarding ethnic Koreans, their family reunification was also not included in these policies. Therefore, Korean-Chinese migrants had no choice but to leave their children in China.
(P3, Male, Professor)

In the past, the fourth generation of Korean-Chinese could not easily obtain a visa to stay in South Korea for more than 90 days. They were not included in the Overseas Korean Act. Only when the government expanded visas for Korean-Chinese, were they included. The South Korean government now issues visas to their children and spouses so that left-behind family members in their origins can live with Korean-Chinese migrants.
(S7, Female, Lawyer in an NGO)

P3 and S7 insist that policy towards ethnic Koreans had been formulated with a focus on labour migration, and that consideration of family reunification has been excluded from related policies or laws. The South Korean government first issued H-2 visa and F-4 visa to help solve labour shortages in 3D or 3C

jobs¹¹, considering Korean-Chinese migrants as foreign workers rather than ethnic Koreans (see Section 2.3). As South Koreans and Chinese are not legally allowed to have dual citizenship, Korean-Chinese migrants stay in South Korea with renewable visas which allowed them to stay for more than three years. If they then became naturalised as South Koreans, they were able to live in South Korea as Koreans. However, most did not feel the need to become naturalised as they have visas that could be easily renewed. Thus, Korean-Chinese migrants preferred to obtain visas for ethnic Koreans, which could be renewed to allow them to stay longer legally in South Korea. In 2012, immigration policy was revised to allow families of H-2 or F-4 visa holders to come and live with them in South Korea. Korean-Chinese left-behind children could then move to live with their parents in South Korea (Kim, 2014). KCMY generally stay in South Korea on F-1 visa which are dependent on their parents' visa for the duration of stay. Korean-Chinese parents eager to reunite with their families, were able to do this when immigration policies were eased. This has resulted in a rapid increase in the number of KCMY since 2016 when the new rules took effect. This relaxation of immigration policy served as a catalyst for the migration of KCMY in response to the desire to reunite with their families.

Lastly, on an individual level, KCMY try to rationalise their migration as a significant event in their lives after their parents suggest the move to South Korea. As participants had never expected that they would live in South Korea, they would often feel embarrassed and reluctant to move when their parents suddenly told them that they had to relocate to South Korea. Although their parental decision had the most impact on migration, many KCMY were able to adjust to this sudden change by considering relocation to South Korea as an opportunity for self-development. In particular, KCMY of school age often mention the fact that they could better prepare for their future in the Korean education system as a major motivation for coming to South Korea:

Education in China is too strict. From primary school, teachers make students memorise the contents of textbooks and write them out. If the test results are not good, it is natural for teachers to

¹¹ The term “3D (see section 1.2.2) or 3C jobs” are used to describe low paid jobs in South Korea. The 3C jobs refer to catering, cleaning and caring jobs, particularly in the service sector.

punish students. However, it is not like this in South Korea. Korean teachers do not discriminate against students based on students' exam results or their parents' jobs. At first, when my mum asked me to come to South Korea, I did not want to go as I could not prepare anything. However, I heard from my parents that South Korean schools are less strict, and I saw how South Korean school life was in Korean dramas. So, I wanted to go to South Korean school.

(M8, Female, Middle school student, Entry in 2014)

I came to South Korea in order to enter a good university. (laughs) In China, if I enter a vocational high school due to a low grade in the high school entrance exam, I cannot go to a good university and I cannot succeed in my life. However, in South Korea, I can enter a good university with good academic results from a vocational or technical high school.

(M13, Female, High school student, Entry in 2017)

As M8 and M13 mention, participants made the decision to move because they aspired to studying in the South Korean education system where the atmosphere is more liberal atmosphere and they can have a better opportunity to go to a prestigious university. KCMY usually learn about South Korean school life through their parents or the South Korean media. They expect the atmosphere in South Korean schools to be more liberal and that they will better respect students' human rights than is the case in Chinese schools. In addition, the possibility of entering a relatively prestigious university through getting good grades in any type of high school (including academic high school and technical/vocational high school) influenced their decision to migrate if they were of middle or high school age. In China, students, who get high grades in the high school entrance exam, can gain entry to academic high schools, which provide a better educational environment to go on to a prestigious university (Hu, 2017). However, students with lower scores have to enrol in vocational/technical high schools and get a job after graduating from the high school. Therefore, the high school entrance exam puts enormous pressure on Chinese students as the result can determine their life's path. In Chinese and South Korean society, there is a perception that going to a prestigious university is a shortcut to getting a decent job, the essential indicator of successful life. For KCMY, the fact that those who get good grades in high school can go to a prestigious university through early admission¹² was an attractive factor in their migration decision-making

¹² Early admission is a type of Korean university admission in which universities can recruit students through their high school record, essay

process. Those migrant youth who had the ambition to belong to a high social and economic class through admission to a prestigious university decided that migration to South Korea would provide an opportunity to achieve their goals more easily.

As with KCMY, in East Asia, educational migration has been taking place since the late 1990s, the goal being to improve migrant youth' social and economic prospects (Waters, 2015). So called 'parachute-kids' or 'satellite-kids' participate in educational migration from South Korea, Hong Kong or mainland China to North America or Oceania. Their middle class and well-off parents accompany them to the destination following which one or both parents return home, leaving the young person alone (Alipio et al., 2015). Migration goals include not only improving their English skills but also entering a prestigious university in their new country. On the other hand, for KCMY the primary motivation has been to receive a more diverse and liberal education in South Korea, where their parents have settled, and their secondary goal has been to enter a good university. Although the educational motivation of KCMY has been slightly different from that of 'parachute-kids' or 'satellite-kids', both groups aim ultimately to use their mobility as a means for the strategic accumulation of cultural and social capital (Waters, 2015). There is also expectation of economic capital accumulation based on gaining a familiarity with foreign cultures and the formation of social networks through education in foreign countries. Therefore, as M13 mentioned, for Koran Chinese migrant youth migration was regarded as an opportunity to increase opportunities for success in future lives.

Regarding migration motivation as an opportunity for self-development, participants aged 18 or over moved to South Korea in search of job opportunities. Those, who had dropped out of school in China, wished to find work in South Korea. M3, M17 and M20 elaborate on this:

I dropped out of high school in China. My mother tried to persuaded me that I had to go on to university, but I did not want to study any more. I wanted to work in beauty and makeup. I thought it is better to learn makeup in South Korea as the South Korean beauty

writing or special talent screening without taking the College Scholastic Ability Test.

industry is famous. [...] If I get a beauty certificate there and have a career as a stylist, I could earn a lot of money. If I do not have enough experience as a stylist, my wage would be low and my work is hard. However, if I returned to China later, I would earn a lot of money.

(M3, Female, High school dropout, Entry in 2019)

I cannot go to a famous university in China since my high school record is not good. So, my parents told me to leave school and come to South Korea to get a job there. I thought that I could work for Chinese customers in South Korea as I can speak Chinese.

(M17, Female, High school dropout, Entry in 2018)

Many KCMY over 17 come to South Korea to earn money. Those who have dropped out of school and worked in Yanbian do not want to study any more, but need to learn skills to earn money here. They think it is the most important to earn a lot of money. So, they come to South Korea to work part-time or full-time.

(M20, Male, Middle school dropout, Entry in 2017)

Some participants decided to migrate in order to get a job in South Korea. M3 decided to migration as it was more useful to her to learn skills and pursue a career in South Korea so as to be able to achieve her goals for the future. In South Korea, as there are private academies and centres that teach job skills such as beauty, cooking, computer skills and industrial technology KCMY can learn relevant skills without going to a technical/vocational high school. The industrial sectors where these skills can be learned are the manufacturing and service sectors, mostly low-paid sector work (Bae et al., 2018). However, considering that they can earn a good salary both in South Korea and in China after they have acquired these skills and build a career, they can afford to accept low wages at the beginning. Thus, expectations of obtaining a higher social and economic status in the future can offset an initially precarious positionality. M17 and M20 moved to South Korea just to earn money. They had no clear goals of a career path and did not want to go to high school or university. While still in China they decided to move in the hope of easily finding a job where they could make use of their linguistic capital, such as Chinese and Korean. Contrary to their expectations, most of the jobs they could find in South Korea being part-time or casual, their economic status was precarious. This mismatch between expectation and the reality of low-paid sector work is a common experience among low-skilled labour migrants. However, as the same job pays more in South Korea than in China, many KCMY would still rather work in South Korea. As with M3, they are eager to be employed in South Korea because they believe that their future financial

situation will be better there than in China. KCMY' economic activity in South Korea will be further analysed in section 7.3.

In summary, KCMY make the decision to migrate after taking into account a combination of family, policy and individual factors. Of these motivations, family reunification is considered the most important. However, post-migration, not all Korean-Chinese migrants return to the same family as before. In the next section, issues relating to family reunification of Korean-Chinese migrant families will be explored.

5.3 Family reunification

Many KCMY who have been left behind in their place of origin migrate to the host country to reunite with their families. Transnational families may have lived separately for a long time. Transnational migrants reunite family members in the host society after having attained sufficient socio-economic and legal status to support their families (Eremenko and González-Ferrer, 2018; Yeoh et al., 2020). As a result of family reunification, migrant youth start to re-build a new relationship with their families. In this context, this section examines KCMY' experiences of family reunification and the revised relationship between family members by focusing on their sense of belonging and positionality within the family in South Korea.

5.3.1 Family reunification of the whole family unit

This section investigates reunification of KCMY with their parents and their emotions about family members that arise during this process. Before the South Korean government amended its policies and laws to support family reunification of ethnic Koreans, many Korean-Chinese migrants' children had to live apart from their parents in their country of origin. According to surveys of migrant youth, a considerable number of KCMY lived in China for more than five years apart from one or both parents (Bae et al., 2018). Their parents had initially moved to South Korea as temporary migrants, then later had tried to bring over their children as they now had sufficient means to support them and

immigration policies for reunification of Korean-Chinese families had become more relaxed.

Participants who had been left behind in their places of origin expected that all their family members would live together in due course as they had done before their parents migrated. However, as the period of their separation from their parents grew longer, they became less hopeful that family reunification would happen, and their sense of distance from their parents became wider. Many grew sceptical about the likelihood of the reunification of the whole family. Parents who were feeling a sense of distance from their children decided to bring their children to South Korea when they were in position where they were able to support them. M5 recalls:

*When I was in China, my impression of my dad was ambiguous. It seemed that he was a person who was a very far away from me and that he did not consider me an important person. I think I spent less than one year with my dad up until the time I was in the first grade of middle school. So, I did not especially want to live with my dad. [...] At first, I was really sad when my mum and dad went back to South Korea. Also, I was upset as they left me alone. However, as time went by, I felt no emotion toward my parents. No love, no resentment... My parents were people who were called mother and father and had nothing to do with me. So, I did not really want to live with my parents. After my mum came to know about my thought, she decided to live with me as she thought my relationship with my parents, especially my dad, would otherwise be distant. Therefore, my parents brought me over as soon as my dad got permanent residency and opened a Chinese restaurant in South Korea.
(M5, Female, Freshman, Entry in 2015)*

Participants spent at least one to fourteen years away from one or both parents. Even though they were in regular contact with their parents, the psychological distance between parents and children became significant (Elspeth and Lucy, 2011; Faist et al., 2013). Such temporary contact with their parents limited feelings of closeness and solidarity between family members. As M5 mentions, most participants experienced psychological as well as physical separation from their parents while living apart from them. Some participants, who spent a relatively short time away from their parents, felt mainly sad about parental absence. Others, who lived apart from them for more than three years recalled that, more than sadness at their absence, they felt resentment toward their parents and eventually gave up any thought of

living with them again by accepting the reality of separation. Furthermore, M5 felt no closeness or even sadness toward her parents, and was isolated within the framework of a family without bonds. In this situation, because her parents' economic and legal status had become stable as a result of her father's permanent residency and his opening a Chinese restaurant, her mother brought her to South Korea as she was worried about the psychological dissolution of the family. As was the case with M5, parents of participants who were separated from their children in China, tried to reunite their families in South Korea out of fear for their children's isolation due to the continued physical and psychological distance between them. Families of KCMY expected to be able to rebuild their previous family relationships by means of their children's migration to South Korea.

Participants moved to South Korea expecting a harmonious family life, though their long separation from their parents still made them feel distant. However, they were rejoining families, where all of a sudden they had to spend large amounts of time in the same space with parents who were no longer close to them. M3 and M15 allude to this:

I was not confident when I was in China. However, I am confident now as I have parents who tell me, "I have got your back!" I missed those words so much. [...] The thing I really appreciate about my parents is that they always talk about family issues with me. As I am able to talk to them and participate in the decision-making process, I feel, 'Oh, I am a member of this family.' Also, my parents always support me by saying, "We fully believe in your choice." I could not think of receiving care and love from my parents in China, but I am really happy now in South Korea. I can feel that I am in this family, and I am mentally as well as psychologically stable. I am very satisfied with my life.
(M5, Female, Freshman, Entry in 2015)

After I arrived in South Korea, my parents told me everything about why they had to spend time away from me and what kind of work they did. My parents worked harder than I thought. It was heartbreaking and I could understand them even a little bit. [...] When I lived with my grandparents, it was hard for me to talk with them even if I had a hard time. Even if I told them my problems, they could not understand it well. I usually talked about my problems with my friends or tried to solve them on my own. When I started living with my parents, my parents wanted me to talk to them about my problems. However, I never shared them with my parents, so it was very difficult to talk with them. My mum explained why I had to talk to my parents, and I tried to communicate with

them continuously. Although I was not familiar with this kind of relationship with parents at first, now I feel I'm loved. Thanks to my parents' love and support, I have been able to adapt to South Korea more easily.

(M15, Female, High school graduate, Entry in 2015)

M5 and M15 describe how they were lonely and unconfident as they did not have a family to share their worries with in China. M15 lived in her place of origin with her grandparents like other children in transnational families (Faist et al., 2013). In transnational families, grandparents usually focus on providing material support for left-behind children. Rather than having emotional interaction with their grandparents, left-behind children usually try to share their worries with their peers or solve them on their own. Wei (2018) argues that grandparents of left-behind children have difficulty providing them with in-depth guidance about the emotional and practical aspect of their lives. Therefore, it is difficult for left-behind children to develop psychological and emotional assets, such as identity, as their grandparents do not actively engage in emotional interactions with their grandchildren (Piao and Zhen, 2009; Yoon and Chung, 2007). These types of relationships is very typical of those described by participants who had lived with their grandparents in China. As for their parents, they would talk to their parents regularly, either every day or once a week over the phone, sometimes their parents would come to see them once a year or every few years. However, the time and frequency of phone calls and visits were easily influenced by their parents' schedules. Some participants talked to their parents on the phone once every few months and in some cases their parents never visited them. Consequently, there was often a limit both to the level of interaction with their parents about their daily lives and to the ability to maintain emotional connections between parents and children. In other words, while phone calls and short-term visits could be a means for light daily conversations, these were often not sufficient to maintain in-depth interactions such as the sharing of worries.

These two participants claim they felt affection and care from their parents after they re-joined them in South Korea. Shortly after M15 came to South Korea, she and her parents needed time to adapt to each other, and they were able to return to the type of family relationship they had had before parental migration through plentiful conversation. Although M5 was also worried about the family reunification while she was still in China (see p.115), she was able to restore her happiness and psychological stability through her family

reunification in South Korea. These two participants had experienced psychological rupture caused by parental migration while still in China, and emotional problems between family members were present in the early stages of family reunification in South Korea (Flot, 2015; Yeoh et al, 2020). It has often been noted that this kind of psychological distance between family members can be gradually eliminated through sustained interaction between parents and children (Flot, 2015). In particular, as M15 mentions, even though participants often understood very little about the background of their parent's migration while still in China, they came to better understand their parents' life in South Korea by talking with them and observing their daily lives directly. Also, the support of their parents made them feel more stable and increase their sense of belong not only within the family but in the host country as well. M5 argues that her parents' supportive words had a significant positive impact on her stability and confidence, and that such psychological stability had helped her adapt to the new society. Therefore, the sense of family belonging following family reunification of KCMY can be understood as a positive factor in their adaptation to the host society (Morrison and James, 2009).

However, not all Korean-Chinese migrants who reunite with their parents feel happy and stable. Sometimes the psychological distance experienced by family members in the early stages of the family reunification still remains unresolved, which can lead to serious conflicts (Fresnoza-Flot, 2015). Five of the eleven participants who reunited with their parents are still at odds with them. This figure is in line with previous studies and suggests that significant numbers of migrant families continue to suffer from emotional difficulties caused by family conflicts during the process of family reunification (Choi and Song, 2020; Elisa Barbiano Di and Laura, 2018; Fresnoza-Flot, 2015). In particular, KCMY who have suffered psychological scars following parental separation at an early age tend to continue to maintain psychological distance from their parents unless their parents make an effort to heal the scars. M1 and S9 describe the situation like this:

I really do not want to talk to my dad. Whenever I talk to him, he keeps sighing. He seems to think that I always do nothing even while he is toiling hard for me. Even if I tell my parents about something tough I am going through, they just tell me to endure it. [...] Usually, KCMY have bad relationships with their parents. They tend to rebel against their parents. They think that they were not loved by their parents as they did not live with them when they were young. I was never loved by my parents when I was a child, so I do

not think I need love from them now. My parents and I do not seem to understand each other.

(M1, Male, High school student, Entry in 2017)

KCMY are often given nasty nicknames, such as subnormal student, youth without goal or maladjusted adolescents, just because they are not good at Korean. They need to talk to their parents to discuss such problems and the parents have to take these on board. However, it is hard for their parents to discuss these worries because they do not have enough time to talk due to their long time work hours. Furthermore, as parents do not know much about South Korean schools and society, they cannot advise their children about what to do. Therefore, the proximity between parents and children grows more and more distant.

(S9, Female, Head of cultural and research centre for ethnic Korean)

KCMY and their parents undergo conflict as they have different approaches about how to resolve the psychological distance that has grown between them. KCMY seek emotional support from their parents as a compensation for their loneliness caused by their long-standing family separation. However, their parents often consider that they have fully compensated for their earlier separation thanks to their lifetime of financial support. M1 explains that his parents would try to compensate for their absence through their continued material support, while recalling his childhood in China when his parents were away and he really needed their love and care. However, his parents expect that he should acknowledge their commitment to providing him financial and material support. Even though he claims that he is disappointed by his parents' expectations and has given up on their love and care, he still appears to yearn for their love and emotional support. Like M1's parents, the parents of many KCMY believe that once the family has been reunited, both physical distance and the emotional gap between parents and children will inevitably decrease. However this is not always the case. The emotional gap between parents and children which had grown over the course of a long separation can continue or even grow larger as a result of unsatisfied mutual expectations (Flot, 2015). Therefore, there is a limit to how successfully close-knit relationships between parents and children can recover simply through family reunification.

The psychological distance between KCMY and their parents is difficult to reduce merely to their parents' long working hours. As explained in section 5.2.2, their parents usually work in 3D or 3C jobs. Migrant workers in these industrial sectors usually work from early in the morning to late at night, or

work night shifts and rest during the day. With this kind of work pattern, there is little time to build emotional bonds with one's children. Such an inadequate level of interaction often leads to a lack of sense of belonging felt by KCMY within the family. Although they have moved to South Korea to reunite with their families, they still alienated from their parents and emotionally are not at all reunited. The emotional isolation of migrant youth within their families makes them not only lonely but also yearn for their former life back in their country of origin (Flot, 2015; Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco, 2001). However, the lack of time spent with parents does not mean that all KCMY remain emotionally disconnected from their families. As mentioned earlier, although the parents of M5 and M15 (both of whom experienced feelings of stability and belonging following family reunification) also spent less time with their children due to long hours of work, they nevertheless tried to understand their children by having conversations, even if short, with them on a regular basis. Through this accumulation of interactions, these families were able to reconnect emotionally. On the other hand, parents-child relationships where mutual expectations remain unsatisfied due to limited opportunities for mutual understanding, as is the case with M1's family, are rarely restored.

As mentioned above, the sense of stability and belonging felt by KCMY within their families has a significant impact on their adaptation to the new society (Morrison and James, 2009). On this point, as S9 mentions, the isolation and loneliness of KCMY within the family can make it difficult for them to adapt to South Korean society. Although KCMY face many obstacles in adapting to a new society and culture, they are reluctant to share their difficulties and concerns with their parents. Furthermore, their parents do not have enough information to help them properly adapt to South Korean society, especially where it concerns school life. Although some information is shared within the Korean-Chinese community, not only is the available information insufficient, it may not have been confirmed by schools or other relevant organisations. Due to this lack of information and its uncertain nature, it is difficult for Korean-Chinese parents to provide proper support even if their children share their problems with them. KCMY, who do not have adequate parental support, become dependent then on their peers and may become involved in violence or other crimes. As a result, as S9 fears, they may be stigmatised as a problematic group and marginalised in South Korean society. In other words, the lack of opportunities for interaction between parents and children as well as absence of proper support from their parents exacerbate social exclusion

and the marginalisation of KCMY from both their families and society. In the next section, I will investigate the process by which KCMY may sometimes partially reconnect with their families as a result of separation, divorce and remarriage of their parents.

5.3.2 Partial family reunification: separation, divorce or step-families

This section looks into the process of reconnection between KCMY and a biological parent who has separated or remarried thus forming a step-family and also the relationship between migrant youth and these family members. I define this type of family reunification as partial-reunification. Previous research has limited study of the partial family reunification of KCMY to the step-family, and have focused mainly on the kinds of conflict migrant youth encounter with the members of their step-family. However, partial family reunification that happens after a migrant youth's arrival in South Korea may take various forms (separation, divorce or remarriage of the biological parents) and his or her relationships and emotional feelings for other family members may also be diverse. Therefore, it is necessary to look at cases of family reunification and the relationships between family members from various perspectives. Given this need, this section seeks to explore KCMY's positionalities and sense of belonging in the context of their interaction with family members as part of the partial family reunification process.

KCMY whose parents are separated or divorced usually live with one or other of their parents in South Korea. Participants from families with separated or divorced parents explain that one of their parents had been working in South Korea first (often for a long time) and that the other only moved there later or, in another scenario, they had been working in different areas in South Korea and this long-standing spatial separation had led ultimately to the parents separating. Before their migration, the relevant participants already knew about their parents' separation or divorce and, after arrival in South Korea, they lived with whichever parent had custody over them. M12 and M16 allude to this below:

My dad has been in South Korea for 10 years and my mother has been working in South Korea for just a few years. [...] Whenever

he came to China, he often hit my mum and sister. This had been going on since I was young. So, they were traumatised by him. Even if dad beat them or screamed at them, they could not say a word. After my sister and I came to South Korea, we lived alone with our mum. My parents have not divorced yet, but they live separately. My dad does not know where we live. I hope they will get divorced as soon as possible. However, my dad refuses to divorce my mum, so she cannot divorce him. [...] My dad found the school I used to go to and confirmed with my homeroom teacher that I was attending that school. Once he waited for me outside the school. He kept asking me where I was living, but I did not answer. He tried to contact my mother through me. I did not want to be involved with him anymore.

(M12, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

My parents got divorced when I was young. Even though they were in South Korea, it seems that they did not live together perhaps because their work places were far away from each other. I think that is why my parents eventually got divorced. Now, I live with my dad on weekdays and spend weekends with my mum as he has custody over me. My mum's house is also in Seoul. She wants to spend a long time with me every weekend. The interesting thing is that my mum and dad do not contact each other, but they ask me about each other. (Laughs) [...] At first, I was not happy because I wanted to hang out with my friends on weekends but I had to go see my mum. However, even if my mum and dad are divorced, she is still my mum. So, I try to spend a lot of time with her on weekends.

(M16, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

The parents of many KCMY living separately from each other in South Korea have not yet had their marriages legally dissolved, but they have already become physically and psychologically separated. The parents of M12 separated in South Korea, the mother bringing the children over to South Korea. M12 and her mother live apart from the father to avoid his domestic violence. M12 is the only participant whose parents are separated without being divorced. Some parents of KCMY begin to live apart from each other if they work in different areas before their children move, but they tend to move back together again after the arrival of their children (interview with M20). As families of KCMY who live apart due to family discord are not easily distinguished without in-depth conversation, previous researchers have tended to ignore them. However, as this type of family reunification is in legal terms still a reunification of an existing family, it is also necessary to understand their consequences. The relationship between M12's parents was marred by domestic violence even before the migration of their children. This was due to the father's refusal to divorce. The separated family status makes

her feel insecure as she worries about her family being eventually destroyed by her father's violence rather than being able to live in comfort. This insecurity has led to feelings of anxiety that she has to live in hiding from her father in South Korean society. This kind of anxiety also interferes with her adaptation to the host society and makes her life there more inconspicuous and marginalised.

After her parents divorced, M16 moved to South Korea after being invited by her father who had custody of her. Although she already knew that her parents, who had been living separately for a long time in South Korea due to their workplaces, had got divorced, she still thinks of her parents and herself as comprising a single family. She stays in her father's house during the week but she spends weekends with her mother. Although her parents have legally separated, they both maintain a relationship with their children. Previous research on KCMY of divorced families has not paid attention to the relationship between migrant youth and their separated parents (Choi and Song, 2020; Song and Kim, 2017). In this research, however, as participants belonging to divorced families continue to maintain relationships with both parents through phone calls and face-to-face encounters, they consider themselves to belong to the old family framework consisting of their parents and themselves. Although their parents are not directly connected with each other, they are indirectly connected through their children. Contrary to social perceptions that a divorced family is no longer considered a single family, participants still try to maintain the sense of the original family by keeping up relationships with both parents.

Partial family reunification can be also found within step-families. Many Korean-Chinese left-behind children feel anxious, angry and lost when they learn their parents have got divorced (Choi and Song, 2020). After migration to South Korea, they unexpectedly encounter new family members caused by the remarriage of their biological parents. This type of situation can make them feel obliged to find acceptance in a new family. In other words, on reuniting with their biological parent(s) they are forced into a relationship with the family of a step-parent. In the process, they often feel uncomfortable and embarrassed at first, but over time they may gain a sense of belonging with the new family thanks to the hospitality of their biological parent and the step-parent. M7 elaborates on this:

In China, I felt I was abandoned by my dad due to his new family. When I come to South Korea, my mum was living with a South Korean man. I did not know that my mother had remarried. So, when I first met my step-dad, I thought that my mum had also abandoned me to live with a new man. So, I felt uncomfortable at first. However, as he takes care of me and my mum better than my dad did, I think I'm really a member of this family now. [...] I feel my step-dad loves me because he loves my mum. He always asks me to do what I want without placing any burden on me. I was so moved by him.

(M7, Female, High school student, Entry in 2017)

M7 moved to South Korea without knowing that her mother had remarried and unexpectedly found herself living with her step-father. Having felt abandoned following her father's remarriage in China, she once again felt excluded from her parents' lives after meeting her mother's new family. She had expected to be living only with her mother, but instead was forced into an inconvenient partial family reunification. It was necessary that she joins a new family group as a result of her mother's remarriage, and this regardless of her own opinion. However, after being treated with love and care by both her mother and step-father, she came to feel she had become part of the new family. As with M7, migrant youth living in remarried families learn to adapt to a new society as well as to a new family environment, even if they usually experience emotional difficulties in the early stages of settlement (Song and Kim, 2017). In this situation, the hospitality of the step-parent as well as of their biological parent promotes their a sense of belonging within the new family and they begin to feel themselves a family member. In particular, the hospitality of M7's step-father allowed her to feel like a child of both her mother and step-father, not just a child of her mother. Her identity in the new family was no longer that of an outsider or a housemate, but one of an insider and a beloved child. A stable sense of belonging within a step-family, which is based on family attachment, also helps to relieve anxiety about the new society particularly during the early stage of settlement (To, 2020). Therefore, hospitality from the step-parent provides a significant foundation for adaptation to the new society as well as providing a sense of belonging within it. KCMY who belong to step-families go through a legal adoption procedure not only to establish a relationship with new family members, but also to make such a relationship legal. be involved in a legal family. By means of adoption by the new family, migrant youth legally become a part of the new family. As this offers reassurance that they will not

be excluded from mainstream South Korean society, a decision is made to go through adoption procedures. M7 and S1 elaborate further:

My mum told me that I can become a family member like her if I am legally adopted by my step-dad. She told me that if I first become naturalised in South Korea, I will easily be adopted by my step-dad. When we prepared my application for naturalisation, we were very worried that my application would be rejected. Fortunately, it has taken about two years but my naturalisation has recently been granted. Now, my step-dad is starting the process of adopting me. As it took a long time to get naturalise, I am worried to because the adoption process is also complicated.
(M7, Female, High school student, Entry in 2017)

Nowadays, many KCMY are adopted into the step-families. The adoption is referred to as inbound adoption process. They have to go through different procedures for naturalisation and adoption. If his/her mother and step-father are involved in one family through a marriage, her children are not legally members of his family. The mother and the children legally belong to one family. However, the children must be adopted by the step-father in order to become legal members of the step-family. Until they are adopted, they are not legally children of the step-father, but rather housemate. It takes a lot of time, effort, and money to adopt and naturalise migrant youth. So, some step-families give up on the procedure.
(S1, Female, Head of centre for migrant youth)

In the remarried families of KCMY, which usually consist of a biological mother, a South Korean step-father and themselves, they are legally named as housemates, not children. As S1 mentions, in order for migrant youth to be legally accepted as the children of their mother and step-father's family, they must be adopted by their South Korean step-fathers. In the case where there is no adoption two families coexist: one consisting of the mother and the step-father, the other of the migrant child(ren) and their mother. The South Korean step-father adopts the migrant children so as to integrate the two families. A South Korean parent who wishes to become an adopter must meet the conditions stipulated in South Korean adoption law. In addition, since children of Korean-Chinese migrants are Chinese nationals, additional requirements such as Chinese adoption law, parental rights and custody rights must be taken into account (Song and An, 2016). As adoption procedures require considerable documentation and scrutiny and South Korean adoption laws do not clearly establish legal and practical regulations for adoption of children of foreign nationality, the procedures are both time consuming and expensive.

During the adoption procedure, some families give up because of the financial or psychological difficulties involved (Song, 2012). However, most families are willing to endure the long adoption process. Some migrant youth like M7, who have already experienced their biological parents' divorce, also hope to be legally adopted by their new family.

Many KCMY decide to become South Korean citizens through naturalisation. Naturalisation is the only way to legally become a South Korean citizen as neither South Korea nor China allow dual citizenship. Children of Korean-Chinese migrants under the age 19 who have a South Korean step-parent can acquire South Korean citizenship through a special category of naturalisation. In particular, if they apply for naturalisation before reaching 19, they are not required to undergo the comprehensive naturalisation test; those applying before they are 15 are additionally exempted from interviews (MOLEG, 2022). M7 is taking steps to have her step-father adopt her following her successful naturalisation. In her case, she will be subject to a shorter and simpler set of procedures than would be the case for a migrant youth who was still a Chinese national. According to Article 7 of the Korean Nationality Act, as adoption and naturalisation of foreign children are separate procedures, there is a special naturalisation procedure for them to acquire South Korean nationality. As of June 2022, it will take more than nineteen months to acquire South Korean citizenship through the special naturalisation of foreign children (MOJ, 2022). It took about two years for M7 to become naturalised, and her family and her were even worried that she might be denied naturalisation. Her anxiety about being refused naturalisation then probably hindered her ability to settle comfortably both in South Korean society and in her new family. In addition, she mentions that she came to South Korea because her biological father abandoned her due to his having a new family (see p.124). Considering her migration background, her desire to become the South Korean child of a South Korean step-father after having become legally South Korean suggests the desire to be considered the child of an ordinary South Korean family. For her, naturalisation was not just a legal process to change her nationality, but an opportunity to be recognised legally as a native by the host society. Therefore, children of Korean-Chinese migrants who belong to step-families consider the adoption and naturalisation processes as a means to become ordinary members of South Korean society as well as of their new families.

However, some KCMY who live with step-families suffer difficulties due to serious conflict with their new family members. Family interactions form the basis for new relationships with others in adolescent development, and these have a lasting impact on the whole of one's life (Damon and Lerner, 2006; Lee and Kim, 2016). The relationships between KCMY and their step-families have a significant impact on their ability to adapt to South Korean society. In particular, migrant youth may find themselves in marginal positions within their new families due to conflicts with their step-parent. M4 recounts:

*I came to South Korea without knowing that my mum had remarried. When I arrived at her house, I was confused to find my mum living with a strange man, but I endeavoured to adapt to this new family. However, now, I wish my mum would divorce my step-father as he has been having an affair with someone who works at my mother's karaoke for a year. And he always considers me a bad person even though I have not done anything. He often curses me while jerking my hair and throws clothes and stuff at me. I am separated from my step-family now, but I would go crazy if I had to live with them again. The other day, my mum and step-father had a quarrel and my mum and I left home. However, when she said we were going to live together again, I got really angry. So, I told her that he hit me sometimes, but that she did not care. She did not say anything to him or worry about me. As my room does not have a door, all I can do is draw the curtains. So, when my mum and step-father quarrel outside, I can hear everything. I lost more than 10 kilograms due to that stress. Even so, my mum is not interested in why I lost weight. Looking at my mum's life, I cannot get married.
(M4, Female, High school student, Entry in 2019)*

As KCMY and their step-parents live together without knowing much about each other, they maintain a sense of distance. Three of the four participants whose mothers had remarried South Koreans or Korean-Chinese moved to South Korea without being aware of their mothers' remarriage or ever having met their step-fathers. They along with their step-fathers suddenly faced a situation in which they had to live together without knowing almost anything about each other. If their mother failed to act as an effective mediator between their step-father and themselves, it could prove difficult to reduce the sense of distance between the two of them. However, their mothers also had limited understanding concerning their children as they had lived apart from them for many years. As a result, the mothers found it difficult to act as effective mediators between their children and their new husbands, which often led to distance and conflict between the participants and step-parents. Regarding the biological parent in the step-family, all the staff who participated in this

research argued that this role is critically important for migrant youth especially when they first meet their step-father without prior warning. As KCMY and their step-fathers use different languages, both of them have difficulty communicating with the other and adapting to the new family environment. Therefore, if a mother does not help mediate the interaction between her children and the new husband, the children, for whom their mother is the only person they can rely on in South Korea, will not feel a sense of belonging to their new family or society. Therefore, the role of biological parent as a mediator in the early stage of living together is important to reduce conflicts between KCMY and their step-parents and to encourage adaptation to the new society (Ganong et al., 2020).

M4 is in serious conflict with his step-father due to physical as well as emotional violence she has received from him. Even before her migration, the relationship between her mother and step-father was not good, but marital relations worsened considerably due to the conflict between her step-father and her. In situations where conflict intensifies, step-parents tend to acknowledge migrant youth only as their wives' children, whereas migrant youth often consider their step-parents as no more than the current spouse of their biological parent. This leads to the result that they do not consider each other as belonging to the same family (Choi and Song, 2020). As Jung (2018) notes, some husbands blame their wives for conflicts with their step-children and assault the step-children, consequently the step-family may be in danger of falling apart. In such cases of family crisis, although migrant youth report step-fathers' violence to their mothers, the mothers sometimes overlook this in order to maintain the relationship with their husband rather than protect their children. If they get divorced, there is the prospect of economic insecurity as a result of the loss of financial support from their husband and they may be deprived of their legal status as spouses of South Koreans (Song and An, 2016). Although NGOs and government departments—MOGEF, MOJ and SMG—provide temporary legal support and protection for divorced migrants, Korean-Chinese spouses generally try to maintain their current marital status as it is difficult to maintain a stable economic and legal status in South Korea without their husband's support. Therefore, fear of losing their current economic and legal status is a major deterrent to divorce for Korean-Chinese migrant wives. In this context, mothers of KCMY consider their children a potential catalyst for marital conflict, and go so far even as to demand that their children remain silent about domestic violence committed by their step-

father (To, 2020). Considering that the emotional support of step-parents has a significant impact on migrant youth' adaptation to South Korean society (Go and Oh, 2016; Um, 2013), the silence of their mothers about conflict and violence between their children and their new husbands can trigger feelings of marginalisation in the new society as well as in the step-family.

KCMY also experience conflicts with their biological parent in regard to the relationships they form with their step-siblings. Participants who meet their new family following their mothers' remarriage feel lonely and sad at the reality that they have to share mothers' love and care with step-siblings. M4 and M20 highlight this issue:

I have three step-sisters and one step-brother. The step-sisters are older than me and the step-brother is younger. My mum calls the youngest in a lovely sweet voice, "My son." Whenever I hear her say that, I get really jealous. My mum speaks to me in an unfriendly way using my full name. I wish my mother would be nice to me. She treats me brusquely, so I act rebellious. When my step-father and step-siblings are around, I do not leave my room. I just eat quietly and return my room. I do not talk to them at all. I do not think I can be happy here.

(M4, Female, High school student, Entry in 2019)

Honestly, I thought that my mother lived alone in South Korea. So, when I came to South Korea, I felt resentment towards my mum. She was living with a man and his daughter who is older than me. My mum is always nice to the daughter, but she gives me the cold shoulder. She originally wanted to have a daughter, instead she gave birth to a son, me. So, she seems to have good relationship with the daughter. I cannot be affectionate to her like my step-sister is. If I look at my step-family without me, they are all very close. However, when I am added to the mix, we seem to become a dysfunctional family.

(M20, Male, Middle school dropout, Entry in 2017)

When KCMY find themselves in step-families in South Korea, the children of the Korea-born parent are more likely to feel a sense of belonging within the family whereas the newcomers are more likely to experience feelings of exclusion. M4 and M20 have both lived with their step-siblings in South Korea. Right after they arrived, it was difficult for them to form an intimate relationship with their stepsiblings since they could not speak Korean well. Moreover, feelings of discrimination and prejudice towards Korean-Chinese in South Korean society may have caused their step-siblings to be reluctant to accept

them as family members (To, 2020). If there is little interaction between migrant youth and their step-siblings even though they lived in one space, there tends to be little conflict between them. Alternatively, participants may feel jealous of their step-siblings as their mother shows more love to them than she does to themselves. This jealousy towards their step-siblings is related to a perceived lack of love in their own childhood, and is often expressed in the form of disobedience to their mothers. This is similar to the context in which participants, who have reunited with their parents, then go on to defy them because they desire extra emotional support to compensate for the lack of love and care they received in the past (see section 5.3.1). As their disobedience can lead to conflict with the mother, they often become isolated in the family. From their perspective, although their step-siblings enjoy a harmonious relationship with their mother, they can feel excluded from the family as they are unable to maintain a good relationship with other family members, even their mothers. Their feelings of being excluded may then intensify as they are considered to be obstructing family bonds within the family (To, 2020). The more they become marginalised within the family, the more they tend to rely on their peers, on staff of migrant centres or on others from outside the family for emotional and practical support. This sense of exclusion within the family also acts as a stimulus for them to leave the family home. In the next section, I will investigate the background, feelings and reflections of KCMY who have quit their family home in South Korea.

5.4 Renewed separation of the family

This section explores how KCMY separate once again from their families in South Korea. Furthermore, it examines their emotional responses to this second separation and how it affects their sense of belonging. Previous studies on family reunification of migrant youth have focused on the impact of government policies on the process as well as the relations among different members of the new family (Eremenko and González-Ferrer, 2018; Fresnoza-Flot, 2015). Furthermore, separation and reunification of migrant youth with their families may happen several times depending on the situation. The five participants in this research were separated twice from family members in South Korea due to parental economic activities, family relationships or their adaptation to South Korean society. The following subsections will analyse the factors affecting the family separation of KCMY from both the family and

individual levels, their emotional responses to the renewed separation process will also be explored.

5.4.1 Family-level: parental economic activities and conflicts with the step-family

This section investigates how KCMY become separated from their families in South Korea at the family level and how this separation affects them emotionally. Family factors may play a significant role in the separation of KCMY from their families in South Korea. Previous studies have largely focused on conflicts between family members which resulted from problems associated with the family reunification. They have not however paid attention to renewed break-up of the family as a result of conflict in the host country. In addition, although parents' economic activities are often major factors in the break-up of Korean-Chinese migrant families within South Korea, there has been little academic or political discussion in this field. Therefore, in this section, I focus on family separation as a result of conflicts with members of the new family as well as on parents' economic activities and the feelings produced in the process.

Firstly, participants who find themselves part of a step-family feel isolated within their new families as conflicts within the family are frequent. Although one of the biological parents still belongs to the new family, participants experience themselves as existing psychologically and spatially outside the family space. M20 and S11 elaborate:

I really wanted to live with my mum in South Korea. Then, after I had lived with her for a while, I found that sometimes we did not understand each other, and I had a lot of trouble living with my step-family. As it was very difficult for me to live with the family, my mum rented a studio where the rent was low in the same neighbourhood. At first, I was angry at the thought that it was only my fault that I could not adapt to the new family. It was not my fault, though everyone thought it was. I was very lonely and angry with my mum as she did not stand by me either. I feel comfortable living alone, but I also miss my mum. However, when my mum encounters me in neighbourhood, she does not look happy to see me, and sometimes she even pretends she does not know me. On those occasions, I wonder if I am really my mum's biological child. [...]
There are some KCMY who live alone. They sometimes get

involved in criminal activity. As they are living alone in a foreign country, they do not have parents to tell them what is right or wrong. (M20, Male, Middle school dropout, Entry in 2017)

In the Korean-Chinese remarried families, the biological parent is usually the mother. Some mothers bring over their children without discussing the matter with their husband, thinking that their children will have better opportunities for education and employment if they live in South Korea. So, while persuading their husbands to take them in, they send their children to our high school. This is because all the students in our school have to live in the school accommodation. Moreover, there are some step-fathers who send their wives' children to our school because they do not want to live with them. In this school, students can eat, sleep and study for free. Students have to get permission from their parents to go home on weekends, but there are some step-fathers do not even allow this. During a vacation, some mothers take their children to studio apartments when they can rent for about 300,000 won so as to keep them separate from the step-family. This might be possible because the children are high school students. (S11, Female, Teacher in a high school for migrant youth)

M20 and some of S11's students were spatially separated from their mothers due to conflicts with new family members. As M20 has neither a good relationship with his mother nor with his new family members, he lives alone in a studio. He came to South Korea expecting to live with his mother, but found it difficult to adjust to a different reality from that he had imagined. He could not adapt to the new family, feeling particularly disappointed in his mother due to her cold-hearted attitude towards him (see section 5.3.2). Family reunification for him entailed a second spatial separation from his mother. KCMY, who undergo difficulties in the process of partial family reunification due to the remarriage of a parent have anyway suffered from a shortfall of emotional attachment due to the nature of the transnational relationship they endured in their childhood (Anschütz and Mazzucato, 2022). This lack of emotional attachment to their original family members results in a sense of belonging which is underdeveloped and places them emotionally outside the new family. This emotional separation may also end up leading to spatial separation, in other words, a further physical separation from their family. M20 felt that the emotional separation from his mother became more serious after he began to live apart from the step-family, and his self-identity as being her child also grew weakened. Therefore, renewed separation in the host country is often influenced by past emotional attachment to parents and

this can affect the current emotional attachment to, and sense of belonging within, the new family (Anschütz and Mazzucato, 2022).

Some KCMY live away from their step-families while attending schools for migrant youth that offer on-campus accommodation. However, many migrant youth and their new families end up living together without prior explanation or even acknowledgement of the other's existence (see section 5.3.2). Such absence of information about, and prior interaction with, each other is liable to escalate tensions between the child and their new step-parent. This kind of aggravated conflict may then trigger the step-parent, who has more power within the family, to push the child out of the family space. In other words, migrant youth, who are in a vulnerable position in terms of power relation within the new family, are often forced out of their families regardless of their own wished. S11's high school provides skills and vocational education to migrant youth, and the South Korean government covers most of the expenses, including tuition and accommodation fees. The advantage of being able to live for free as a student has led some step-fathers to entrust their migrant youth stepchildren to the school before breaking off relations with them entirely. Step-father, then, may form a boundary between themselves and their stepchildren as they consider them to be their wives' children and not their own. This kind of boundary-making causes some step-fathers to cut off financial support to their migrant stepchildren and often to stop their mothers from providing financial support to them as well.

Moreover, while mothers of KCMY are discussing moving in with their new husbands and her children, they often prefer to have their children stay at school for a while. As soon as they arrive in South Korea, KCMY start adapting to the new society at school rather than at home. Although family support provides an important foundation to help adapt to the host society, the main support in terms of adaptation comes from school. In other words, when it comes to social adaptation schools perform a role which might be expected to be offered by the family. As KCMY often experience exclusion from the new family, mothers often entrust their children to the schools for migrant youth so as to avoid conflicts and maintain stability within the new family rather than attempting to resolve conflicts between their children and step-parents. S11 argues that if social and policy discussions on the separation of migrant youth from their step-families are not conducted, the burden on schools and centres will only increase. As M20 mentions, if migrant youth who have been excluded

from new families are not included within the framework of schools and centres and are not able to receive appropriate support, they are likely to experience difficulties in adaptation and may get involved in crimes. Therefore, the role of schools and centres, which work to prevent migrant youth from becoming marginalised by both the family and society, is important. The role of these schools and centres will be discussed in detail in section 6.3.

Secondly, for the three of my participants who have experienced family separation—either living alone or with other members of the family due to their parents' workplaces being located in other regions—the planned separation period was less than three months. However, in each case that this period was longer than envisioned their parents came to see them frequently. Through frequent meetings and phone calls with parents, the participants were able to keep a close relationship with them even though they were physically distant from each other. M12 elaborates:

Actually... I am at home on my own from Monday to Friday because my mum works at an automobile component factory in Hwaseong, Gyeonggi-do. She spends weekdays in an accommodation near the factory. On weekends, she comes home and spends time with me. [...] At first, I lived with my sister apart from my mum, and then she also went to work in another area. So, now I am alone in this house. At first, I was a little scared to live alone, but now it is getting better. My mum had no choice but to live apart from me in order to make money. So, I understand my mum. As I call her every day and she comes home every weekend, I feel like I am always with her. (Laughs)
(M12, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

Even if M12, who is separated from her family due to her mother's work, is physically distant from her mother, she feels a sense of belonging to her family because she has sufficient interaction with her mother to retain emotional attachment. Participants, who live apart from their families in South Korea due to their parents' economic activities were also left behind for the same reason in China. There, it had been difficult for them to feel a sense of belonging to the family as there was a limit to the level of emotional attachment they could develop for their parents due to the irregular phone calls and short-term visits (see section 5.3.1). Meanwhile, after the family reunification in South Korea, and even though participants experience renewed physical separation from their parents due to parental economic activities, they feel a strong sense of

belonging to their family. Nevertheless, such separation in the host country can cause emotional anxiety (Lee and Kim, 2016). However, levels of anxiety are generally lower if the parent-child relation has had a chance to heal following reunification of the family in South Korea (Choi and Song, 2020). In other words, emotional attachment as a result of restoration of the relationship between parent and child may limit the pain of psychological separation and/or the difficulty of adapting to the new society if families are once again separated (Anschütz and Mazzucato, 2022). M12 was able to adapt to living alone in South Korea while accepting the absence of her mother through frequent phone calls and meetings. After the renewed separation, she and her mother lived relatively close to each other so they could meet regularly, and even though they were living apart, they were able to maintain a close relationship. Although she is physically separated from her family in the same way as when she was living in China, she now feels psychologically connected and with a sense of belonging within the family. In addition to these reasons for living apart at the family-level, some KCMY live apart from their families, generally in Seoul, in order to help them better adapt to South Korean society. The next section will analyse the family separation of KCMY who have chosen to live apart for individual reasons.

5.4.2 Individual-level: adaptation in a new society

Some KCMY choose to live in Seoul separately from their parents in order to better adapt to South Korean society. This choice is often one made by their parents rather than by themselves alone. Their parents may choose to move them to Seoul because there are a range of support facilities including special for migrant youth there. S1 elaborates on this point:

One KCMY came to our centre in Seoul from Ulsan. His parents work in Ulsan. However, in Ulsan, there are no centres or facilities to support migrant youth. At that time, as one of his relatives was taking a class here, his parents came to know about our centre. He learned that we teach Korean language and offer classes for the school qualification exam. So, his parents rented a studio for him in Daerim-dong and he began to attend our centre. Because he is not good at Korean and is more accustomed to Chinese culture, it is good for him to live in Daerim-dong, which is the biggest Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave in Seoul. Also, as many KCMY live in Daerim-dong, his parents thought it would be a good place for him to live in. At first, he was unfamiliar with the centre and did not know

anyone so felt lonely. However, he gradually adapted to the new environment while making some Korean-Chinese friends. He moved to South Korean high school a few months later. And he said he was happy that his parents come to Seoul every weekend and took good care of him.

(S1, Female, Head of centre for migrant youth)

This KCMY who attended S1's centre stayed on his own in Seoul to gain support in his adaptation to the new society. During fieldwork, I was not able to meet any migrant youth who were living away from their parents in order to learn to adapt better to South Korean society. Most of my conversations with participants also included accounts of family conflict and parental economic activity as reasons for the separation of the family. The six of my participants who moved from other parts of the country to Seoul for the purpose of adaptation and education moved together with their families. As such, it is rare for KCMY to live separately from their family reasons of adaptation or education alone. In this context, there have been a small number of studies on family separation of KCMY in South Korea which also focus on short-term family separation due to parental economic activities (Lee and Kim, 2016). However, considering that one of the key reasons for migration has been to get a better education (see section 5.2.2), individual migration for purpose of adaptation and education does not seem an abnormal phenomenon. As mentioned by S1, Seoul not only has more centres and schools for migrant youth than other regions, but also offers a wider variety of education and services (see sections 2.2 and 6.3). Therefore, Seoul is an area where migrant youth can easily find social or governmental support to help them adapt to South Korean society in the early days of settlement. In addition, the Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave in Seoul is not only a place where KCMY can feel culturally at home, but also a starting point for building a social network in South Korea. Living in an enclave, a place where migrants can gain psychological stability and use ethnic capital to form networks in the host society (Samers and Collyer, 2017), may help KCMY adapt more smoothly to the new society. These advantages then provide good reason for KCMY to move to Seoul on their own.

Although KCMY may be separated from their families, often against their will, by their parents' decision, they are still financially and emotionally dependent on them. Due to lack of information on education of Seoul mentioned above, they relied on their parental decision on their move. Parents, who cannot quit

their jobs in other regions or find a suitable job in Seoul, allow their children to live alone in Seoul while supporting them financially. Although I was unable to hear in person the thoughts and feelings of KCMY who were living apart from their families for purposes of adaptation and education, the interview with S1 revealed that while they experience emotional difficulties due to family separation at first, they were later able to adapt gradually to South Korean society thanks to the support, both practical and psychological, they received from Korean-Chinese peer groups and from centres for migrant youth. In addition, they may feel a sense of belonging and gain psychological support from within the family, and also learn to accept the reality of physical separation, because of the close relationship between their parents and themselves. Therefore, support from family members is the most significant factor in helping KCMY who have experienced several family separations, whether at the family or personal level, adapt to life in the new society.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter investigated changes of positionalities and sense of social and familial belonging as experienced by KCMY in the process of repeated family unification and separation in both the home and host countries. Section 5.2 explored ways in which KCMY feel about their identities and their sense of belonging in China as well as the factors which have influenced their decision to migrate. While the existing literature has not been much concerned with the diverse identities of Korean-Chinese left-behind children in their origin locations, I argued that their identities may change depending on the types of relationship that they encountered in their home communities. Contrary to the claim that identities emerge or that individuals can change them flexibly and subjectively, for Korean-Chinese left-behind children the flexibility of their identities is imposed on them by their native communities, their identities and positionalities are formed in relationship with others.

I discussed how Korean-Chinese left-behind children migrate to South Korea under the influence of factors such as family, immigration policy and personal choice. Although factors depending on family and immigration policy are mainly the domain of parents, left-behind children also tried to rationalise their migration for life development and education. Contrary to existing research

that tends to reduce migration motivation to parental decision alone, I highlighted the degree of subjectivity inherent in this process through an analysis of the different rationalisation involved in coming to a decision.

Section 5.3 and 5.4 investigated migrant youth' sense of belonging and positionalities within the family. These sections focused on their emotions during the process of family reunification and separation. The existing literature focuses on the reunification of Korean-Chinese transnational families in their destination countries, specifically South Korea. However, I make the point that Korean-Chinese transnational families may experience several rounds of family reunification and separation both in the home and host country.

After the family as a unit has been reunited, KCMY were often able to narrow the psychological distance between themselves and their parents through sufficient levels of interaction. On this point, I argued that the sense of stability and belonging felt by KCMY within the family is significant for their ability to adapt to and gain a sense of belonging within both the family and the new society. On the other hand, some KCMY have only undergone a partial reunification with their family. I argued that although divorced families have legally been dissolved, the KCMY still feel like they belong to the original family and need to maintain relationships with both biological parents. This argument presents a different perspective on family than many existing studies (or social perceptions) of divorced families. Within the step-family, KCMY may feel a sense of belonging in the new family if there is sufficient affection and support from both the biological and the step-parent. However, many KCMY living in step-families struggle with conflicts with members of the new family. I express the opinion that the role of the biological parent as mediator is critical in maintaining positive relationships within step-families.

KCMY experience family separation in South Korea due to conflicts within the new family or because of their parent's workplace. Those, who do not form an emotional attachment to their biological parents within the step-family, find themselves emotionally outside the new family. KCMY who undergo separation due to their parents' workplace live apart from their parents for the same reason as they did in China. However, compared to the emotions they may have felt about their parents while still in their origin, they are more likely

to feel a sense of belonging within the family in South Korea through regular contacts with their parents. Some KCMY live alone in Seoul for the purposes of helping them adapt to the new society and gain an education. However, they maintain strong emotional connections with parents. Therefore, I emphasised that for KCMY in the separated family the psychological support of their family members has a significant impact on how well they adapt to their new family and society. In the next chapter, I will investigate the ways in which social and governmental factors influence positionalities and belongings of KCMY in South Korea.

Chapter 6

Relations with South Koreans and government methods of categorisation

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines both the relationship between KCMY and South Koreans and the South Korean government's system of classification of KCMY. In order to analyse the social, policy and legal factors influencing their positionalities and belonging of KCMY in South Korea, I highlight the formation of relations between themselves and South Koreans in everyday spaces as well as the government's perception of KCMY in its attempts to classify them. Existing research has focused mainly on the negative representation of Korean-Chinese migrants in the media. The purpose of this has been to disentangle the varying factors affecting South Koreans' perceptions of Korean-Chinese migrants. However, in the first section of this chapter I examine how not only negative reproduction in the media but also how other socio-cultural factors change South Koreans' perception of KCMY. In addition, centres for migrant youth, which KCMY typically use to receive support in the early stages of migration, also influences their adaptation to South Korean society. In this respect, the second section critically examines the impact of these centres' aims and programmes on the development of positionalities and sense of belonging in both the local community and broader South Korean society. In the last section, I criticise the South Korean government's system of classification of KCMY. KCMY are classified as Korean-Chinese migrants and migrant youth in South Korean law and in government policy. I suggest that such a system of government classification also influences the public's perception of KCMY, and as such leads to changes in their social positions and senses of belonging within their daily spaces.

6.2 Relations, perceptions of and encounters between Korean-Chinese and South Koreans

This section examines how socio-cultural factors form South Koreans' perception of KCMY and how KCMY react to this perception. After moving to South Korea KCMY often experience some confusion about their identities as a result of encountering pre-conceived ideas about who they are from South Korean society. In particular, South Koreans' negative perceptions of Korean-Chinese migrants as shaped by the media are an obstacle to the formation of positive relationships with South Koreans. In their daily lives, the lack of Korean language proficiency, the psychological distance from their friends and the South Koreans' negative perceptions of Korean-Chinese migrants, which are caused by an intersectionality of age, ethnicity and nationality, lead to changes in identities and positionalities of KCMY. In this regard, the first sub-section will analyse how KCMY react to their stereotyped portrayal in the South Korean media. In the second sub-section, I will explore the factors which influence the formation of relationships between KCMY and South Koreans as they occur in everyday life.

6.2.1 Reaction to the representations of Korean-Chinese in the media

South Koreans tend to identify the representation of Korean-Chinese as they appear in the media with how they are in real life. They also tend to project images of Korean-Chinese as they are reproduced in the media on KCMY. Therefore, there is a cyclical relationship between media representations and the public's interpretations of the media and its perceptions of Korean-Chinese people in real life. The media presents a reproduction of the world to the public, and the public interprets the world through the images reproduced in the media. As the reproduction of reality in the text reflects the influence of power and of stakeholders, it is difficult to present reality without exaggeration or minimisation in the media (Bleich et al., 2015; Kirsten, 2016). The existing literature on South Korean's perception of Korean-Chinese focuses particularly on how these are represented in the media and the resulting public opinion in response to this portrayal (Han and Shin, 2019; Kim and Chung, 2015; Kim, 2018). Korean-Chinese are often portrayed as belonging to negative social categories such as criminals, or immoral or poor migrant

workers, especially in films or in news articles (Aizhan et al., 2020; Zhou, 2020). As South Koreans are exposed to negative portrayals of Korean-Chinese through the media, they develop negative attitudes to, and perceptions of, Korean-Chinese in real life (Aizhan et al., 2020; Kim, 2018). However, to date there have been few studies on Korean-Chinese's feelings or thoughts about this representation. Therefore, this section investigates how KCMY react to these media portrayals of themselves as well as looking at how South Koreans' perceptions of Korean-Chinese are formed by the media.

As detailed below, South Koreans have few opportunities to encounter and form relationships with Korean-Chinese in their everyday spaces. Therefore, their perception of Korean-Chinese is largely formed indirectly through the media. While Korean-Chinese migrants account for the largest percentage (28.1 percent) of registered foreigners in South Korea, they only comprise approximately 0.6 percent of the overall population (MOJ, 2020). Because they constitute such a small percentage of the overall population, it is difficult for South Koreans to meet Korean-Chinese migrants in their daily spaces. However, Korean-Chinese migrants live not only in ethnic enclaves, but also all over the country (Lee and Lee, 2012). Nevertheless, although South Koreans and Korean-Chinese migrants may live together spatially in the same community, there is generally little interaction between the two groups (Lee and Lee, 2018). Therefore, they are in 'parallel lives' state. M5 criticises the fact that when South Koreans encounter Korean-Chinese they are prejudice against them because of the media:

South Korean students and young South Koreans have no knowledge of Korean-Chinese. After the release of the movie "Midnight Runners," South Koreans who do not know me well tell me that they are very scared of Korean-Chinese. I want South Koreans to see the real Korean-Chinese first, not the media version. I want the public to know that the Korean-Chinese in the news, movies or soap operas are different from ordinary Korean-Chinese. South Koreans do not meet and talk to us in person. It is heartbreaking because they look at us with a jaundiced eye. (M5, Female, Freshman, Entry in 2015)

M5 points out that South Koreans form stereotypes about Korean-Chinese migrants based on portrayals reproduced in the media. For South Koreans the media has a significant influence on the formation of stereotypes about migrants in their daily spaces (Jackson, 2014). Media representations of

ethnic stereotypes have an impact on migrant identities as well as on the public opinion about migrants (Bleich et al., 2015; Chavez et al., 2019). In particular, if the public continues to be exposed to unfavourable media messages regarding a particular migrant group, they will interpret that group in a similarly negative way in the real world. In the context of the UK, Amin (2002) shows how the media's categorisation of migrants as 'other' leads to otherization of migrants in everyday life as prevalent social perceptions influence individual acceptance of encounters with people who are different from them. Likewise, South Koreans may show prejudice against Korean-Chinese migrants because their perceptions of Korean-Chinese in the real world are influenced by description of Korean-Chinese reproduced in the media. The negative media stereotypes of Korean-Chinese were highlighted in 2010 when the movie *The Yellow Sea* was released and widely viewed in South Korea (Aizhan et al., 2020; Song, 2017). The plot revolves around a Korean-Chinese man who is hired to commit a murder in order to pay off his gambling debts. He is smuggled into South Korea to attempt the murder. As there is a tendency for South Koreans to associate such fictional media depictions of Korean-Chinese with reality, negative perceptions of Korean-Chinese migrants in real life may become more commonplace. Moreover, after three major murders committed by Korean-Chinese migrants in the 2010s, the South Korean news media began to treat Korean-Chinese migrants as a criminal group (Kang, 2022). In 2017 the movie *Midnight Runners*, which is about trainee police officers arresting undocumented Korean-Chinese migrants who have committed crimes such as kidnapping South Korean girls and illegally removing eggs from the girls, further went to heighten negative public opinion toward Korean-Chinese migrants. Due to these murder cases and movies, Korean-Chinese migrants began to become folk devils in South Korean society. Contrary to the discourse on other migrants, which merely considers them poor or belong to an inferior social group, discourse on Korean-Chinese migrants emphasises their social threat including murder, assault and other crimes (Aizhan et al., 2020). Public prejudice against Korean-Chinese is also spreading through social media as demonstrated by comments on online news articles or other online posts (Park and Kim, 2017). Readers' opinions on news articles or posts are reflected in their comments or further posts. And these comments further encourage people to strengthen and spread their opinion thus forming a social common notion (Merrifield, 2013). It does not matter to those who make the comments whether their opinions are true or not (Park and Kim, 2017). As a result, portrayals of Korean-Chinese in the virtual world manifest perception of how

they are thought to be in the real world (Merrifield, 2013). The negative perceptions of Korean-Chinese migrants in the media may then influence South Koreans making them unwilling to form relationships with Korean-Chinese migrants.

Negative perceptions of Korean-Chinese migrants in the media have led to discrimination in South Korean society. When Korean-Chinese migrants first appeared in the South Korean media in the early 2000s, they were mainly depicted as poor migrant workers. However, Korean-Chinese migrants later become portrayed as groups that commit crimes or immoral acts in order to earn money as mentioned above. M8 and M9 point out the portrayal of Korean-Chinese migrants in news, movies and soap opera and the perceptions South Koreans have about them:

In the news, there are a lot of stories about Korean-Chinese murdering, beating or perpetrating phishing scams. In the news the subtitles are written so as to emphasise 'Korean-Chinese'. That is why South Koreans regard Korean-Chinese as a harmful or negative group. Not all Korean-Chinese kill people, but South Koreans look at us with eyes anxious for their own safety. Do they think I am able to kill them? (Laughs) Korean-Chinese seem to be considered a very dangerous group by South Koreans. However, Chinese who are not Korean-Chinese are considered wealthier and more helpful people than us by South Koreans. Thus, it is better for me to just introduce myself as Chinese.

(M8, Female, Middle school student, Entry in 2014)

South Koreans think that all Korean-Chinese are gangsters because they are usually portrayed as killers or gangsters in movies. I think that is why South Koreans think like that. And... regarding Korean-Chinese... South Koreans think that they all come from Yanbian in China. This is because in the movies, all Korean-Chinese are from Yanbian, and they return to Yanbian after killing people in South Korea. Thus, South Koreans think that Yanbian is the home of criminals and that all Korean-Chinese are criminals as they came from Yanbian.

(M9, Male, High school student, Entry in 2017)

As M8 and M9 mention, the South Korean media is inclined to report on crimes committed by the Korean-Chinese community by emphasising the fact that the perpetrations are 'Korean-Chinese' rather than the nature of the crimes themselves. The incidents are subject to selection and distortion by the media. In other words, coverage does not convey cases as they are, but rather

emphasises or deletes certain elements (Entman, 1993). Readers then come to accept these dominant media representations which serve to frame Korean-Chinese migrants. The media continuously produce frames for certain migrant groups by representing them as groups which are problematic to society as a whole (Bleich et al., 2015). This is a common trope and one that has been repeated for different migrant group in other setting, for instance, the media's identification of Islam with terrorism and the portrayal of Latino as synonymous with criminal groups in the U.S. (Chavez, 2001; Chavez et al., 2019). The prevalence of reports on racialized or ethnic crimes can generate not only negative perceptions of a particular migrant group but also anti-migrant attitudes. Therefore, the particular migrant group targeted by the framing remains stuck as a perpetual out-group, unable to assimilate into the host society (Chavez et al., 2019). In this context, South Koreans may identify Korean-Chinese migrants as being involved with criminal groups if the media emphasises the crime as being 'committed by Korean-Chinese' rather than the nature of the crimes themselves.

This prejudice against Korean-Chinese migrants is being generated not only by the news but also by movies and TV programmes. In particular, the movie *The Yellow Sea* triggered public perceptions of Korean-Chinese migrants as dangerous individuals from Yanbian. As the public came to stigmatise Korean-Chinese migrants as criminals, Yanbian, where most of them originated from, also began to be considered a dangerous area, and the Korean-Chinese from the area held to be members of a threatening group. This stereotypical way of judging all Korean-Chinese migrants by characteristics exhibited only by certain members of the community may lead to prejudice against the whole group (Schiller and Çağlar, 2009; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002). This can be understood as an example of fallacy of composition, which consists in the attribution of the characteristics of certain members of a group, generally held to be true, to everyone within the community (Chernoff and Russell, 2012). Such mainstream stereotypes against Korean-Chinese migrants reduce opportunities for adaptation and assimilation by positioning them as perpetual outsiders (Chavez et al., 2019).

Prejudice against Korean-Chinese migrants also influences the sense of social distance that South Koreans feel toward them. In comparison to the perceived social distance felt toward North Koreans, the social distance between South Koreans and Korean-Chinese migrants is substantially wider

(Kim, 2015). Moreover, South Koreans accept North Koreans as being 'us' more easily than they do for Korean-Chinese migrants. This reflects the prejudice that even though Korean-Chinese migrants belong to the same ethnic group as South Koreans, they cannot be accepted as members of the same country due to their Chinese nationality (Cho and Kim, 2017; Chung et al., 2016). In other words, Korean-Chinese migrants cannot belong to mainstream South Korean society due to their foreign nationality and social stigma within the country. KCMY find it difficult to form relationships with South Koreans due to their marginalised position in South Korean society.

In order to escape this position of marginality, Korean-Chinese migrants sometimes emphasise their identity as Chinese rather than as Korean-Chinese. This change in identity is based on the belief that South Korean young people think that Chinese are richer than Korean-Chinese migrants (Kim et al., 2011). KCMY, like M8, make a decision to assert their identity as Chinese in relationships with their South Korean peers as they believe that these will hold negative perceptions and attitudes toward Korean-Chinese migrants, whereas they are more likely to view Chinese people positively thanks to their impressions of wealthy Chinese via movies and TV programmes. Therefore, KCMY have started to align themselves with certain socially constructed and widely and unquestioningly accepted images of their community. In effect, they are accentuating a constrained choice being made by mainstream society.

Daerim-dong, a Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave in Seoul, has been stigmatised as a dangerous neighbourhood because Korean-Chinese migrants who occupy the area are considered a threatening group in South Korean society. While Daerim-dong was already known as an ethnic Korean-Chinese enclave, since the release of the movie *Midnight Runners* in 2017, it also gained a reputation as a den of Korean-Chinese criminals. M8 and M15 claim that this movie further encouraged South Koreans to consider Korean-Chinese migrants as dangerous criminals:

South Koreans think Daerim-dong is a scary place. Daerim-dong is mentioned in the movie, Midnight Runners, and is in the news a lot. There are a lot of stories about South Koreans being knifed in Daerim-dong. So since then, Daerim-dong has become a hot topic. In the area, signs are lit up throughout the night and Korean-

Chinese people speak loudly and with a heavy accent. Moreover, they drink and smoke on the street. It must be very scary for South Koreans as it is so different from other areas. South Koreans say that Daerim-dong is a scary place because that is how it is portrayed in the movie. I understand them, but honestly, I hope that South Koreans understand that not all Korean-Chinese are dangerous people.

(M8, Female, Middle school student, Entry in 2014)

In the movie, Midnight Runners, Korean-Chinese are not portrayed as good people. As the Korean-Chinese in the movie were not like ordinary Korean-Chinese, I did not feel good. In the past, Daerim-dong was just an area where Korean-Chinese lived, but now people think that Korean-Chinese are also dangerous because Daerim-dong is represented as being a dangerous place in the news and movies. So, South Koreans are afraid to come to Daerim-dong, and they do not want to get along well with us.

(M15, Female, High school graduate, Entry in 2015)

After the release of *Midnight Runners* negative attitudes toward Korean-Chinese and Daerim-dong grew more pronounced. The movie depicts policemen catching Korean-Chinese criminals in Daerim-dong. As the name Daerim-dong was left unchanged in the movie and the real-life neighbourhood used as a backdrop to the film prejudice against Korean-Chinese migrants living there grew even larger. Such prejudice against Korean-Chinese is evidenced in news articles about Daerim-dong which tend to focus on crimes committed by Korean-Chinese migrants. I searched for media articles related to Daerim-dong for the three years subsequent to 2017 when the movie *Midnight Runners* was released in order to investigate the media's influence on public perceptions of Daerim-dong and Korean-Chinese migrants. For the three years, 71.1 percent of media articles related to Daerim-dong covered either crimes or exhibited prejudice or discrimination against Korean-Chinese migrants. Two-thirds of the articles were published in the conservative press and these focused mainly on crimes committed by Korean-Chinese migrants. The remainder were covered by more progressive media outlets and these tended to discuss prejudice and discrimination against a victimised minority, however these articles mainly referred to South Korean perceptions of the links between Korean-Chinese migrants and criminality while insisting in no more than a few sentences that South Koreans should not be prejudiced or discriminate against Korean-Chinese migrants. While Daerim-dong was already known as a Korean-Chinese cluster before the release of the movie, today, the sense of the place as a crime hotspot inhabited by Korean-Chinese migrants has taken hold in South Korean society (Kim, 2019). As a result,

discrimination against Korean-Chinese migrants has grown even stronger (Aizhan et al., 2020). M11 and M14 suggest that the Covid-19 pandemic has further fuelled anti-Chinese sentiment and discrimination against Korean-Chinese migrants:

I went to an internet café but I was not able to use the internet cafe because I am Chinese. I had always use it before, but now it was not available because of the coronavirus. I have not been to China recently. Why do South Koreans suddenly discriminate against me because I am Chinese? South Koreans hate Korean-Chinese since we are dangerous and discriminate against Chinese due to the coronavirus.

(M11, Male, High school student, Entry in 2013)

Before the coronavirus, South Koreans did not like China because of the fine and yellow dust clouds coming from China. After the spread of the coronavirus, South Koreans do not even want to meet Chinese. The news and social media mention there are many Korean-Chinese migrants living in Daerim-dong, so the area is a place where there is a high risk of getting the coronavirus. However, Korean-Chinese migrants living in Daerim-dong have not been to China for a long time. We are the same as South Koreans. However, it makes me upset when all Korean-Chinese migrants are considered as coronavirus carriers due to our Chinese nationality.

(M14, Female, Middle school student, Entry in 2016)

This street where many Korean-Chinese restaurants are located was crowded with Korean-Chinese migrants and South Korean customers from Friday evening to Sunday. However, due to the rapid spread of Covid-19, the street is very quiet today. Some Korean-Chinese restaurants and stores seem to be temporally closed. A Korean-Chinese owner who runs a bakery said, "Business in Daerim-dong is worsening due to negative news reports about Korean-Chinese." Today, few South Koreans can be seen except for residents living the neighbourhood even though this is the main street in Daerim-dong.

(Field notes, 14/3/2020)

Participants assert that anti-Chinese sentiment and discrimination against Korean-Chinese due to Covid-19 (because they are Chinese as well as Korean-Chinese) has been even greater than usual. As mentioned earlier, 14 of 20 participants have started to emphasise their identity as Chinese when forming relationships with South Koreans as Korean-Chinese migrants are considered both a criminal and threatening group. However, their Chinese nationality has now proved a basis for their exclusion from the daily spaces of South Koreans who wish to protect themselves from the spread Covid-19

which is reported to have originated in China. This exclusion of Chinese has led to discrimination against them within South Korean society. M6, who are naturalised in South Korea, mentioned that he emphasised his identity as Chinese while enjoying the attention that his South Korean friends consider him a rich Chinese, but now he desires to be considered a South Korean due to the spread of anti-Chinese sentiment. There is a long history of discrimination against minority ethnic and migrant groups in Western society (Castles et al., 2014; Samers and Collyer, 2017; Tyler, 2006). China and Chinese individuals have also been subject to discrimination in recent times. The spread of Covid-19 has resulted in a contemporary example of such types of discrimination. In South Korean society, negative discourse on China and Chinese people has been intensifying. At the end of January 2020, when the first confirmed Covid-19 case was announced in South Korea, negative media articles linking Covid-19 with Korean-Chinese migrants began to circulate. Interestingly, regarding Covid-19, more negative feelings towards Korean-Chinese migrants than towards Han Chinese were noted (Park, 2022). This can be understood as the addition of anti-Chinese sentiment to the existing negative social perception of Korean-Chinese migrants acting to further strengthen negative attitudes toward Korean-Chinese migrants. In other words, a combination of ethnicity and nationality have intensified anti-Korean-Chinese sentiment. Due to the negative social perception of Korean-Chinese migrants, KCMY have been excluded from their usual social spaces or have experienced discrimination therein. Negative views regarding their ethnicity and nationality have influenced their marginalisation within South Korean society. Nevertheless, some Korean-Chinese migrants are campaigning alongside NGOs in order to fight against discrimination and social exclusion. However, KCMY tend to try to eliminate prejudice among South Koreans through everyday interactions in their daily lives rather than participating in these campaigns. M12 and M20 narrate their experiences:

When I said, "I am Korean-Chinese." to my friends, they would tell me, "All Korean-Chinese are gangsters like in the movies!" or "You are the coronavirus!" At those times, I just wanted to live as a foreigner who is neither Korean-Chinese nor Chinese. At first, when they teased me like that, I got angry but I just put up with it. However, I recently told them that not all Korean-Chinese are violent and that I have never been back to China since I arrived in South Korea. So, they apologised to me and did not discriminate against me anymore. (M12, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

There are some South Koreans who discriminate against Korean-Chinese silently, saying that they are not prejudiced against Korean-Chinese. Whenever I am discriminated against, I felt bad. So, I explain everything there is about Korean-Chinese. If I do not explain clearly about Korean-Chinese, South Koreans will continuously have a prejudice against us.
(M20, Male, Middle school dropout, Entry in 2017)

Both M12 and M20 have endeavoured to break down prejudice against Korean-Chinese migrants by making an expression of their emotions or thoughts. Previous research has tended to portray migrant youth as passive beings who suffer from or put up with prejudice and discrimination against them in South Korean society (Bae, 2016; Song and Kim, 2017). However, M12 and M20 have both tried to convey accurate information about themselves and the Korean-Chinese population in South Korea by explaining how South Koreans' perceptions of Korean-Chinese are very different from the fact. Of course, in order to do this it is necessary to have a certain proficiency in Korean language. However, even by means of simple explanation and levels of conversation, M12 believes that she can shift her friends' perceptions. Following her explanation about Korean-Chinese migrants, her friends apologised for their teasing and no longer discriminated against her in the relationship. As young South Koreans generally get information about Korean-Chinese migrants from the media, they may be prejudiced against them if the dominant media narrative is negative (Kirsten, 2016). This prejudice then can only be undermined when the individual has a positive experience with a Korean-Chinese or they come to realise that the prejudice itself is mistaken. Even when South Koreans encounter Korean-Chinese migrants in their everyday spaces, if there is no opportunity to interact, there is a limit for any positive experience of the other to occur (Valentine, 2008). In particular, as South Koreans and Korean-Chinese migrants exist in a state of power inequality, the experience of migrant youth in resolving prejudice against Korean-Chinese may help in reducing discrimination and exclusion from mainstream society (Valentine, 2008; Wilson, 2017). Prejudice often hinders migrants from entering mainstream society as they are categorised as a 'different' class of beings from the natives due to negative perception about migrants (Anja, 2016; Jackson, 2014). Therefore, by resisting the prejudice held against them, KCMY may be able both to escape the trap of becoming an 'other' as well as their marginalisation from mainstream society.

The media has reproduced negative portrayals of Korean-Chinese migrants, and South Koreans have come to define the identity of Korean-Chinese based on these negative descriptions. If negative depictions of a particular migrant group are continually repeated in the media, the public may form wider derogatory stereotypes and assumptions about that group; in turn, this may result in it becoming an obstacle for the migrant group to feel a sense of belonging within the host society (Jackson, 2014; Tyler, 2006). In this context, KCMY may often desire to feel a sense of belonging within the host society by aligning their identities with an imaginary form that is positively received in the society. Meanwhile, they sometimes choose to emphasise their ethnic identity so as to counteract the negative perception of them presented in the media. Therefore, they have learned to negotiate their identities according to the context. The next section will examine changes in the identities and positionalities adopted by Korean-Chinese migrant youth in their daily relationship with South Koreans.

6.2.2 Dynamics of identities and positionalities in relationships with South Koreans

The identities of KCMY are also formed through their encounters with South Koreans in South Korean society. KCMY experience feelings of both belonging and exclusion in their daily encounters with South Korean neighbours (Leitner, 2012; Wood and Waite, 2011). They negotiate their identities and positionalities based on the people they encounter or form relationship with in their daily spaces. In this context, the current section investigates how KCMY develop their identities and positionalities at the beginning of their stay in South Korea, the ethnic home country. Previous research in human geography has been mainly concerned with the confusion and negotiation of identities experienced by migrants who are different in race, nationality or ethnicity from the natives of their host countries. In South Korean academia, as the migration of KCMY is regarded as a return migration to the home country of their ancestors, researchers have primarily focused on migrants' ethnic identity. In other words, there has been little interest in the confusion or negotiation of identities and feelings of belonging experienced by Korean-Chinese migrants. In this respect, this section proposes the need to investigate how KCMY feel and behave within their relationships with South Koreans, and what factors influence their response.

Korean language proficiency plays a pivotal role for KCMY, not only in the formation of relationships with South Koreans but also in the development of their positionalities. Language is a means of expression containing the feelings and opinions of the speaker, and people form relationships by interacting with each other by means of conversation. Therefore, language is an important parameter of individuals' emotional attachment and sense of belonging within a relationship (Karin and Shirly, 2015). The Korean language proficiency of KCMY also has a significant influence on their ability to maintain close relationships with South Koreans. M5 and M14 argue that contextual Korean language skills rather than grammatical ones are more important in their relationships with South Koreans:

I belong to a band together with South Koreans. One day, one of them wore a suit that was different from usual. I wanted to tell him that his image was a bit different from normal. So, I said to him, "Oh, your clothes are weird." He had a puzzled expression on his face at that time. I realised then that I had said it wrong. A few minutes later, I apologised to him because I wanted to say, "Your clothes are unusual in a good way." Like this, I often make mistakes when I talk to South Koreans as the usage of words is different depending on the context.

(M5, Female, Freshman, Entry in 2015)

When I first came to South Korea, it was very difficult for me to use the right words to fit the situation. I used some words with my friends, but they came out wrong. They felt bad because I had used words that were wrong for the situation. In China, I learned North Korean language. So, I sometimes used words and intonations as they are used in North Korea. As I am ashamed of using North Korean language to my South Korean friends, I tried to correct myself. Whenever I spoke in North Korean language, my friends looked at me in a weird way.

(M14, Female, Middle school student, Entry in 2016)

For KCMY, the contextual usage of Korean words has a critical impact on their relationship with South Koreans. Spatial norms are included in the language used by an individual, and the language affects his/her sense of belonging or identities in that context (Valentine et al., 2009). Therefore, KCMY understand that in order to belong in a relationship they need to use appropriate language depending on the situation and the relationship between speakers. In order to use the appropriate language, they should understand the society and culture of the host country. Considering this, KCMY generally try not to use the

Korean language they learned in China in their conversations with South Koreans. This is because in China they learned Korean as it is used in North Korea, similarly, Korean-Chinese who frequently interacted with North Koreans learned to speak like North Koreans. Even though South Koreans can largely understand the language of North Korea, KCMY feel ashamed of using the North Korean language and try to correct it in order to form closer relationships with their South Korean peers. This can be understood in terms of a “difference” from their South Korean peers which is reflected in the use of North Korean words or intonation. Their South Korean peers may then consider them as ‘others’ who use a different language from ‘us’. In other words, KCMY become ‘others’ in terms of their peer relationships through speaking a different language.

This otherization may create a psychological boundary between KCMY and their South Korean peers and lead to their exclusion from the group (Kirsten, 2016). In order to prevent exclusion from the peer group, KCMY make efforts to speak like young South Koreans by copying their language and intonation. As mentioned in section 6.2.1, South Koreans tend to consider North Koreans as being more like themselves than Korean-Chinese migrants. Ironically, however, Korean language as used in North Korea turns out to be a barrier for KCMY in their interactions with their peers in South Korean society. This suggests that there is a certain fluidity regarding which identities are considered closer to that of South Koreans depending on the facet of culture being discussed. Therefore, when they communicate with South Koreans, participants generally try to hide their identity as Korean-Chinese by avoiding linguistic terms originating from North Korea and by emphasising their identity as South Korean through the mimicking of language and accent typical of South rather than North Korea. Although they endeavour to speak like South Koreans, KCMY sometimes change their positionalities in a relationship in response to the reactions of their South Korean peers. M15 describes her experience of communicating with her South Korean peers in this regard:

When I talk to my friends in Korean, they sometimes do not understand me. When they ask me, “Uh?” or “What?” I get confused and embarrassed. Their reaction might be caused by curiosity about what I was saying and they are asking me to explain because they cannot really understand what I was saying. At those times I think it is my fault that they cannot understand me because I am not good at South Korean. So, I become so embarrassed that I do not say anything after that. [...] When I say,

"I am Korean-Chinese," some South Koreans say, "Ah..." Of course, as they are surprised to learn that I am Korean-Chinese, they can speak like that. However, it feels to me like they are ignoring me. I feel that they are distancing themselves from me. So, I have become timid and now avoid talking to South Koreans.
(M15, Female, High school graduate, Entry in 2015)

KCMY sometimes change positionalities in their relationship with South Koreans depending on the reaction they receive. In Korean, 'Ah', 'Uh' and 'What' are expressions both of exclamation and questioning, and their meanings can vary depending on the speaker's intonation and the context of the conversation. As M15 felt that her friends' responses were uttered with the intention of pointing out her mistakes or ignoring her, she became tense, timid and uncomfortable in the relationship. She inferred certain perceptions and feelings about her from her friends' reactions then acted on those inferences. Regarding this point, affect theorists argue that individuals decide their reaction depending on the emotion in the relationship by encountering others (Ahmed, 2010; Anderson, 2018; Thrift, 2004). According to their argument, individuals feel emotions in relationships and express these either through actions or words. Therefore, if members of a mainstream group do not verbally discriminate against migrants, but instead use non-verbal expressions such as gesture or intonation to express their discomfort towards them (Gervais et al., 1999), migrants may feel marginalised within the group. In this context, when KCMY pick up on the negative reactions of South Koreans during a conversation, the discovery causes friction in the relationship. As a result, they may avoid dialogue with South Koreans in future and more generally become marginalised in terms of their relationships with South Koreans.

KCMY usually form relationships with South Koreans at school and negotiate their identities and positionalities in order to establish themselves within peer groups. It is a well established fact that adolescence is a period when it is important to form relationships with one's peers, and young people may change their identities through interacting with each other within a peer group (Lesko, 2001). M5 and M9 both altered their identities as a strategy to avoid being excluded from the peer group:

Putting on makeup is not a natural thing to do but rather a personal choice. However, while I was in middle school, I put on makeup due to my friends. I was afraid that I would be bullied if I do not put on makeup. I really did not like makeup. I had no choice but to put on

makeup to keep in with my friends. I also felt like I was forced to wear clothes that did not suit me. It was like I was not me, but I felt I had no choice. I had to be what my friends wanted me to be in order to belong to the group.

(M5, Female, Freshman, Entry in 2015)

I walked around the basketball court alone. Some Korean students were playing basketball and they suggested we play basketball together. I became friends with them through playing basketball. It was a bit burdensome. If I played basketball well, I would be able to get along well with them more easily. I worked hard at basketball due to my friends. (Laughs)

(M9, Male, High school student, Entry in 2017)

Participants often wished to become someone with the characteristics and abilities held in high esteem by the peer group, in order to maintain a sense of belonging within the group. They chose to follow the types of identities valued within the peer group instead of their own as they were anxious about being excluded from the group (Anderson, 2015). M5 tried to establish herself within her peer group through getting into South Korean youth culture in the same way as her friends. The Korean-Chinese girls among my participants usually maintain their relationship with their South Korean friends through makeup and clothes. Korean-Chinese boys in my sample tend to increase their sense of belonging within the peer group through sport and playing online games together. In these ways, participants align themselves with the typical behaviour of their peers. Although M5 realised that she was not happy doing this, she felt she had no choice but to acquiesce. This is because any behaviour or appearance which deviates from the group norm is perceived as a 'difference' from the majority, which can lead to segregation and exclusion from the group (Anja, 2016; Massey and Denton, 1993; Michèle and Virág, 2002). KCMY, who are trying to adapt to a new society, tend to believe that by mimicking the cultural identities of their peers they can gain acceptance within the host society. Indeed some participants have argued that after making friends with South Koreans, the door into South Korean society began to open for them. However, participants sometimes find the boundaries between themselves and the South Koreans in the peer group unclear:

Some of my friends sometimes talk behind other people's backs. I always just listen to their talk. Honestly, that other person could take it out on me if I also took part in the gossip. So, I keep my mouth shut. That person has not bothered me. I just want to get along with everyone.

(M4, Female, High school student, Entry in 2019)

I am a high school student, so all my friends are very busy. So, my friends cannot always help me. If I keep asking things of my friends, I will feel really sorry. I think it is good to keep a proper distance from South Korean friends and to preserve proper social etiquette. If I get too close, I may get into conflict with them. So, I will keep my distance in order to get along with them.
(M15, Female, High school graduate, Entry in 2015)

In general participants keep a certain distance from their South Korean friends in order not to be excluded from the peer group. They still belong to a different culture and have a different set of identities from their South Korean peers as they have not yet completely assimilated to South Korean society and culture. Differences within a group can cause conflicts with the majority and result in the exclusion of KCMY from the group. Therefore, as they do not want their friends to notice these differences, they voluntarily maintain a certain distance between themselves and their friends (Anderson, 2015). Participants, who maintain some psychological distance from their friends, generally prefer to be located at the margins rather than the centre of the peer group and try to maintain a harmonious relationship with all members of the group.

When KCMY first encounter South Koreans at the beginning of their migration experience, they try to look like South Koreans by mimicking how they talk and act. However, they often find that they are judged differently depending on the generation of South Koreans they are interacting with. M12 describes her experience:

When I say, "I am Korean-Chinese", the older generation of South Koreans say, "If you are Korean-Chinese, you are South Korean just like us because you are of Korean descent." (Laughs) I feel weird and confused when this happens. I was born in China and my nationality is Chinese. I do not know why they have decided I am South Korean. South Koreans categorise Korean-Chinese differently according to their age. Young South Koreans think of Korean-Chinese as Chinese. Young people do not consider their ethnic group as being important. Young South Koreans think that Korean-Chinese are dangerous when they discuss crimes committed by Korean-Chinese. However, South Koreans over the age of fifty have learned the history of Korean-Chinese in school. That is why they think that Korean-Chinese are also South Koreans.
(M12, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

M12 experienced different definitions of her identities depending on the generation of South Koreans she was interacting with. The positionalities and sense of belonging of KCMY, are relevant to the intersectionality of their age, ethnicity and nationality. Depending on how these are perceived by South Koreans, positionalities and sense of belonging may differ. In other words, when identities intersect simultaneously and mutually with others in a particular relationship, these identities and positionalities can shift flexibly (Hopkins, 2019; Valentine, 2007). South Koreans over the age of 50 tend to think that Korean-Chinese are South Koreans because they are descended from Koreans who migrated from the Korean Peninsula in the past (Chung et al., 2011). They consider the ethnic group to be as important as the nation state as they were educated and grow up in a society which emphasises belonging and community. However, KCMY who have grown up as citizens of China are confused as their national identity seems to be denied by older South Koreans. On the other hand, KCMY are categorised as Chinese by their South Korean friends. The younger generation generally believes that the ethnic group is no longer a useful category by which to measure belonging in their daily lives (Christou and King, 2006). They consider nationality to be more related to their identities as a culture and society, and this may from country to country (Chung et al., 2011). Therefore, as far as they are concerned KCMY are just Chinese. Based on the opinion of their South Korean friends, all participants believed that no matter how assimilated to Korean culture and society they become, they will not be able to become 100 percent South Korean. Their emotions parallel the sentiments felt by many migrants, that they are marginalised or floating within their host societies, even if they have lived there for many years (Lems, 2020). In this way, as Korean-Chinese migrants experience different perceptions of their identity according to the generation of South Koreans they interact with, they also suffer confusion about their identities and belonging within South Korean society. Overall, the level of relationship with South Koreans is an important parameter for gauging the negotiation of identities and positionalities as experienced by KCMY. This may happen through encounters with native Koreans at centres for migrant youth as well as at standard state schools, which will be explored in the next section.

6.3 Centres for KCMY

This section investigates how the social position of KCMY changes in the establishment and operation of the centres for migrant youth. The existing Korean literature on centres for migrant youth has focused on the types of support they provide (Bae, 2016; Lee et al., 2017; Yoo, 2020). However, this research considers their aims and programmes while providing critical perspectives on the influences of centres in developing positionalities and a sense of belonging of KCMY both in the local community and within South Korean society more broadly. The South Korean government's immigration policies focus largely on migrant workers, married migrant women and foreign students (MOE, 2021; MOEL, 2021; MOGEF, 2021; MOJ, 2021). Since these migrant groups account for 62 percent of the foreigners living in South Korea, there are centres dedicated to help them located in each region or city (MOJ, 2020). However, a small number of centres specifically targeted at migrant youth have been provided by the government or NGOs since the late 2000s. The number of these is small as the population of migrant youth is proportionally small compared to the three groups mentioned above. Since the mid-2010s, South Korean academia and the media have begun to highlight the various social difficulties resulting from the problems migrant youth have in adapting to South Korean society. However, at first the South Korean government did not consider it necessary to provide centres to help migrant youth as it judged that they would be fully able to adapt to society through the school system. Only in the late 2010s, when the number of migrant youth began to increase rapidly, especially in Seoul, did the government and a number of NGOs establish centres to provide services to support their adaptation to society. The centres and other services for migrant youth that were established at the time included multicultural education policy schools, Korean language classes, multicultural special classes and alternative schools for migrant youth. As of 2022, there are 5 dedicated centres for migrant youth, 30 multicultural education policy schools and 22 Korean language classes in Seoul. In this research, these facilities are called centres for migrant youth. Regarding these centres for migrant youth, the first sub-section will analyse South Korean society's attitudes toward KCMY and the establishment of such centres in their communities. In the second sub-section, I will investigate how KCMY, who attend these centres, position themselves in their local communities.

6.3.1 Establishment of centres for migrant youth

In this section, I will examine perceptions of South Korean society both toward KCMY and toward centres for migrant youth by analysing the process of establishment of these facilities. The centres for migrant youth were established by both the government and certain NGOs with the aim of instructing migrant youth in how to become good citizens in South Korean society. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, a good citizen is someone who complies with social rules or laws, who receives a formal school education during childhood and who participates in productive economic activities during adulthood. It is held that passive citizens, those who conform to social norms and laws, approach closer to good citizens than active citizens who make their voices heard or express their subjective view on social issues. Thus, the government's perception of what is a good citizen tends to be based on a desire to deter the public from protest or resistance. In this regard, centres for migrant youth aim to help migrant youth adapt to South Korean society by turning them into good citizens who will comply with South Korean social norms and laws (see section 2.2). This imperative was arose in response to the social needs caused not only by the increasing numbers of migrant youth but also by the social problems that resulted from their difficulties in adapting to the new society.

Currently, there is an influx of migrant youth of various nationalities and with different reasons for migrating to South Korea. According to Korea Immigration Service Statistics for 2019, young people aged between 15 and 19 made up the largest proportion (about 33.9 percent) of migrants under the age of 20. The largest number of this group (10,607 people) were living in Seoul, that is 1.6 times the number of those living in Gyeonggi Province (6,555 people), the second largest population by area listed (see figure 6.1). In Seoul, the number of KCMY aged between 15 and 19 has risen sharply since 2017 (see figure 6.2). This increase in numbers has been linked to the easing of visa rules in 2011 which were aimed facilitating the family reunification of Korean-Chinese migrants (see section 5.2.2).




Figure 6.1 Map of registered foreigners aged 15 to 19

Source: MOJ, Korea immigration service statistics
(<https://www.immigration.go.kr/immigration/>, 10 Mar 2020)




Figure 6.2 The number of registered Korean-Chinese migrants aged 15 to 19 in Seoul (2014-2019)

Source: MOJ, Korea immigration service statistics
(<https://www.immigration.go.kr/immigration/>, 10 Mar 2020)

KCMY live largely in the areas of Seoul where Korean-Chinese migrants are concentrated. Korean-Chinese form the largest ethnic enclave in Daerim-dong, Seoul, and Korean-Chinese migrants tend to encourage their children to remain in/around the enclave to make their social adjustment easier. M5 describes this phenomenon:

I lived in Gyeonggi Province right after I came to South Korea. There were no Korean-Chinese there. So, my family moved to Daerim-dong because many Korean-Chinese live there. My parents wanted me to make Korean-Chinese friends at school and adapt to South Korea quickly. At that time, I could hardly speak Korean. All my Korean-Chinese friends live in Daerim-dong or nearby.

(M5, Female, Freshman, Entry in 2015)

All participants who are KCMY reside either in or near Daerim-dong. As the ethnic enclave provides information and social capital for early migrants while allowing them to live among people of similar ethnic background to themselves, it is a convenient point to ease into the acculturation process (Castles et al., 2014; Mitchell, 2003). After moving to South Korea, M5 endeavoured to adapt to South Korean society through exposure both to South Korean and Korean-Chinese ethnic culture in the enclave. As spaces where South Koreans live also exist within the area, the influx of KCMY has meant a change in communal spaces for South Koreans as well. In particular, some conflicts have occurred at schools where KCMY attend. P5, an educational supervisor, describes some of the problems resulting from the influx of KCMY into the area:

Schools now demand that Korean-Chinese students understand Korean language and the working of the South Korean school system before enrolling in the school. KCMY who come to South Korea in middle or high school have some problems at school. In particular, there are many Korean-Chinese migrants in the southwestern part of Seoul since there are areas there where the community is concentrated. [...] As Korean-Chinese students are not good at Korean, it is hard for them to make South Korean friends. So, they tend only to communicate within their group, using Chinese. Teachers say that it is difficult to teach and guide Korean-Chinese students because they do not participate in the class and they communicate only among themselves using Chinese. So, some teachers find them problematic or difficult to teach and sometimes give up trying to help them adapt to school life. There are also conflicts between South Korean parents and Korean-

Chinese parents. South Korean parents think that Korean-Chinese students cause problems in class because their parents are indifferent to them. So, South Korean parents and Korean-Chinese parents do not want to meet each other either. The MOE then sent instructions to local education offices to prepare centres and schools for the adaptation of migrant youth to reduce such social conflicts.

(P5, Male, Educational supervisor)

KCMY have difficulty in communicating with South Koreans at school due to a lack of understanding of the Korean language on the one hand (see section 6.2.2) and of South Korean school culture on the other hand. They tend to form groups among themselves where they can speak in Chinese. A school is a space where students can not only learn subjects but also practice socialisation to enable them to grow up to be good citizens (Chee, 2020; Moskal, 2014). Especially for migrant youth, schools are a place where they can socialise while experiencing the host culture and forming in-depth relationships with natives (Adams and Kirova, 2006). However, KCMY create a boundary between themselves and their South Korean classmates and teachers, even if unintentionally, due to the language barrier that limits the development of relationships with South Koreans (see section 6.2.2). As P5 mentions, both teachers and their South Korean classmates consider this boundary-making to be a problem (Anderson, 2015), and deem Korean-Chinese pupils as being 'tough to get along with' or 'troublemakers'. At schools in or around Daerim-dong, where the number of Korean-Chinese students is large, boundaries between South Koreans—South Korean teachers, South Korean students and their parents—and Korean-Chinese migrants—Korean-Chinese students and their parents—becomes pronounced. The government ministries—MOE and MOGEF—regards difficulties in adapting to South Korean society as the main cause of conflict between KCMY and South Koreans. Therefore, the government has focused on establishing centres to help KCMY adapt to South Korean society as a means of resolving social conflict.

Both central and local governments have enacted laws and ordinances to establish centres for migrant youth. There are also some NGOs which plan to operate centres for them in a few local areas. However, as detailed below, local residents often oppose the establishment of these centres by bringing civil complaints to borough offices or refusing to rent spaces for the centres. As a result, both governments and NGOs have found it difficult to obtain sites

to house the centres. S4 describe their experiences with South Korean residents who were opposed to the establishment of centres:

Many KCMY live in Guro-dong and Daerim-dong. So, the MOE designated one middle school for each Dong (the smallest administrative district in South Korea) as a school focused on multicultural education. However, after a school is designated as a school focused on multicultural education, South Korean students tend to leave because they do not want to attend school with Korean-Chinese students. [...] At first, we tried to rent a floor in a building. When I went to sign the contract, I was told that the owner could not rent it to us because we are a multicultural school. He said multicultural schools are unpleasant places. So, we found a new space in another building that is directly connected to the subway station. However, the owner told me that he could not rent it to us since migrant youth might make trouble. This school is now located at some distance from the subway station, so it can be difficult for students to find the building.
(S4, Male, Head of alternative school for migrant youth)

S4 maintains that South Koreans do not welcome centres for migrant youth and are reluctant to rent their spaces to them. According to Anderson (2015), mainstream society is creating a border with 'the other' group which has physical or cultural differences from it. The arrival of 'the other' into its space is perceived as being like an invasion. In this context, the establishment of centres for migrant youth is viewed as an attempt by migrant youth, that is people of different nationality and culture, to occupy a space considered as belonging to South Koreans. Also, South Korean prejudice against Korean-Chinese migrants is expressed in terms of concerns that if KCMY flock to an area to use the centre, there will be a negative impact on the safety of the local community. Such concerns often result in nimbyism. This kind of nimbyism is often expressed as discrimination against centres for migrant youth through refusal to rent property to them, which is not illegal and does not involve breaking any laws. Such nimbyism is becoming ever more of a problem around the Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave (Lee, 2015).

KCMY, who do not use the centres run by the governments or NGOs, often attend a category of state school known as 'Multicultural education policy schools' or they may attend Korean language classes in a non-multicultural education policy school. These schools and classes provide migrant youth with education designated to help with their adaptation to South Korean

society. Services on offer include Korean language classes, psychological counselling and fieldtrip, and may take into account the characteristics of the local community as well as the migrant youth who attend (MOE, 2021). South Korean students and their parents usually complain that these schools are run mainly for the benefit of foreign students. Some South Korean students then leave their schools. Thus, schools are in general reluctant to be designated as a Multicultural education policy school or even to run Korean language classes due to fears both of an outflow of South Korean students and an influx of foreign students. However, this negative attitude can make it difficult for migrant youth to adapt to the public education system and to the new society. The reason for establishing these facilities was government expectations that migrant youth would be able to adapt to the South Korean public education system without any serious difficulties as education for migrant youth is provided at general schools (MOE, 2021). Also, the government predicted that once migrant youth began to enter the public education system, they would adapt to South Korean society through social interaction with South Koreans. As schools are reluctant to introduce these facilities, even though they are shown to have a positive impact on the school and help with the social adaptation of their pupils, migrant youth often find themselves struggling to adapt school life. Seven participants who attended schools that did not offer special provisions for migrants claimed that such facilities would have been helpful if they had been provided by their schools.

As S4 mentions, centres for migrant youth run by the government or by NGOs are often located in places which are not easily accessible by public transportation due to South Koreans opposition to the establishment of these centres. Six participants, who have attended centres for migrant youth which are run by the government or NGOs, were only able to find those centres through the introduction of acquaintances or families or other migrant families. Centres for migrant youth ought really to be located in places where migrant youth and their parents who lack local information can easily find them. In that case migrant youth who are newly arrived in the country would easily be able to access support. However, as places which are easily accessible to migrant youth (e.g., near a bus stop or subway station) are equally accessible to South Koreans they will tend to be occupied by them. If it is the case that the owners of buildings in these places (or the local shopkeepers) have a negative perception of migrant youth they will probably oppose the establishment of centres in the nearby area. The result then is that centres for

migrant youth tend to be located in less accessible places and migrant youth who need help from the centres do not even know of their existence or role. In other words, the practical results are very different from those set out by the government.

The key aims of centres for migrant youth are to help with social adaptation and offer vocational education. Firstly, centres aim to support newly arrived migrant youth in adapting to South Korean society through providing Korean language education and activities to help them better understand Korean culture and society. This goal runs in parallel with the aims of other centres for foreigners—Multicultural family support centres and Migrant worker centres—in South Korea. However, the centres for migrant youth provide recreational and artistic activities as well as academic education; in this way they recognise the particular characteristics of adolescence (see section 6.3.2). Furthermore, they provide education and advice on Korean culture and society in order to assist migrant youth in their adaptation to everyday life in South Korea. S3, S4 and S10 refer to the goals of their centres, while recalling their establishment:

The homeroom teachers of the Korean-Chinese students have difficulties in communicating with them. However, the students learn Korean language, Korean culture and school life in this multicultural special class, teachers have recognised the need for this special class. On the other hand, they worry that Korean-Chinese students will be transferred to this school because we offer this special class.

(S3, Female, Teacher in charge of a multicultural special class)

The children of migrants were attending school, but schools had no idea how to educate these students. At that time I thought that foreign students would become alienated not only from school but also from society. So, I set up an alternative school for them. If they fail to receive adequate education about Korean language, culture and society, they not have experienced socialisation in school. Thus, they might make social issues. This school was established not only to provide a standard education but also to prevent such social problems in advance. Therefore, we ultimately desire to enable migrant youth to grow up as upright members of South Korean society.

(S4, Male, Head of alternative school for migrant youth)

In 2018, the superintendent of SMOE and the heads of three boroughs in the southern part of Seoul announced that Seoul was to be a global city. As a result this centre was able to be established.

As Korean-Chinese students have begun to live in this area and South Korean students have been leaving for other areas, teachers in the southern part of Seoul were growing worried about how to educate their foreign students. So, this centre was opened in southwest Seoul to enable them to learn Korean language, school culture and South Korean society before they started regular state school. We expected this centre to act as a preparatory school. (S10, Female, Teacher in a centre for migrant youth)

All participants working at centres insist that the priority of their centres is the social integration of migrant youth. The priority of these centres reflects governmental and social discourse about migrant youth. According to a National Multicultural Family survey carried out in 2019, 33.2 percent of migrant youth who mainly grew up abroad do not currently attend school, and 25.9 percent of them have never attended school in South Korea. Also, the percentage of migrant youth who go to high school is about half that of those who attend primary school (Choi et al., 2019). Crimes involving migrant youth have recently received much media coverage (see section 6.2.1). In news articles about migrant youth, it is sometimes claimed that they are involved in mass violence or in phishing scam. While it is true that some migrant youth have been involved in criminal activity, this media coverage also reflect a moral panic amongst South Koreans, and there is much exaggeration in the reporting. In particular, media coverage of crimes involving KCMY emphasise the fact that they are Korean-Chinese thus fulfilling South Koreans' negative perception of Korean-Chinese migrants as a problematic group (Cho, 2019). Such coverage goes to strengthen negative public opinion about migrant youth, especially KCMY. As a result, the public demands that migrant youth adapt better to society in order to prevent further problems because they are considered a problematic social group. Thus, the primary goal of the centres has become that of guiding migrant youth who are believed to be disengaged and at risk (Mansouri and Mikola, 2014; Vromen and Collin, 2010).

Another goal of the centres is to help migrant youth gain skills that will enable them to make a livelihood through vocational education. There are ten participants aged 16 to 18 who are preparing for future employment through vocational training provided by specialised high schools or centres. Four of these participants are attending specialised high school along with South Koreans, whereas the other six are attending ones solely for migrant youth. S11 and P6 discuss the implications of the vocational education provided by the specialised schools or centres:

This school belongs to the Ministry of Employment and Labour (MOEL), not to the MOE like other regular schools. I think the goal of this school is to integrate foreign students into South Korean society quickly by turning them into making them labourers. The MOEL assumes that migrant youth can adapt well to society if their lives are stabilised through employment, and that they will then be able to live well in South Korea without any problems. So, the Ministry manages this school in order to offer them a vocational education. As this school is an alternative high school for migrant youth, it is not a general, technical or specialised high school. However, students go through all the official curricula in order to receive a certification of high school graduation. [...] Students do not want to get a job as soon as they graduate from this school because they do not want to work in a factory, getting paid much less than college graduates.

(S11, Female, Teacher in a high school for migrant youth)

Vocational education for migrant youth is very limited. Most of centres for migrant youth probably runs baking and barista courses. However, experts say, "The market is already saturated when it comes to opportunities for bakers and baristas, so migrant youth have fewer possibilities to find work than South Koreans in these fields." Centres do not investigate market demand for vocational education and only provide programmes with simple equipment that are easy to teach. Migrant youth need to experience various jobs in order to judge their aptitude in order to adapt properly to South Korean society. Government and society are only worried about migrant youth joining criminal gangs like in the movies when they become adults. They are not interested in finding ways to allow migrant youth to enter the mainstream and interact with South Koreans.

(P6, Male, Researcher)

Vocational education for migrant youth can lead to marginalisation within South Korean society. This vocational education is provided at alternative or specialised schools or centres run by NGOs who have been entrusted to do this by the government. With professional instructors providing vocational education in locations equipped with specialised tools, equipment or machines there are a number of places where migrant youth can receive vocational training. The alternative high school for migrant youth where S11 works belongs to the MOEL. As this government ministry oversees employment prospects for migrant workers, migrant youth who attend the school are also considered a pool of potential labour. The school aims to prepare students for factory work immediately after graduation by offering the kind of technical education currently in demand in the manufacturing sector (see Appendix E).

However, as social perceptions about, and treatment of, factory workers are poor in South Korean society, students prefer to enter university instead. This can cause issues with migrants youth who are over-qualified not wanting to work in the sectors for which they have received training—i.e., the low-paid sectors of the economy such as factory labour. While the government provides technical education to support migrant youth in their adaptation to a new society and way of life, this support can also be a factor which contributes to their social marginalisation. Centres operated by NGOs generally provide vocational education which is easy to teach (see Appendix E). It tends to be conducted superficially with little consideration for the aptitude or interests of the students or of which industries might be suitable for them. This kind of superficial vocational education reflects government education policies which aim to prevent migrant youth from becoming a social burden when they become adults. Thus, South Korean government and society, which consider KCMY as a potentially problematic group, end up marginalising them rather than encouraging them to join the mainstream. In the next section, I will examine the role of centres for migrant youth in terms of the relationships between KCMY and local communities.

6.3.2 Influences of centres on the relationship between KCMY and local communities

This section analyses the influences of centres for migrant youth have on the relationship between KCMY and the local community. Previously published studies on centres for migrants in South Korea limited themselves to examination of the relationship between the centres, migrant youth and the local community. However, in order to grasp the dynamics of social adaptation and positionalities of migrant youth, it is necessary to look into the relationship between these three groups at the local scale. KCMY often go to multicultural schools for migrant youth, to centres or to preparatory schools before moving on regular state schools. Even if they go to a regular school, there is often a preparatory class, such as a Korean language class, for foreign students, and it is through this class that they start adapting to school life. Such facilities have been established to support migrant youth in their adjustment not only to Korean language but also to school life more generally before they join a regular class. According to the precepts of these facilities, migrant youth must move on a regular state school or class after completing an essential adaption

programme. However, some KCMY choose to remain at these facilities, as M12, M18 and S11 mention:

As they speak very fast, I cannot understand them well. I thought I would not be able to get along with my South Korean peers, so I went to a multicultural middle school. The school is an alternative school to which my original middle school entrusted me. If I was good at Korean at the alternative school, I am supposed to go back to my original school. However, if I went back to my original school, I do not think I would be able to make South Korean friends there. So, I kept going to the alternative school. Now, I am attending a multicultural specialised high school that only migrant youth can attend. I do not think I could keep up with the class if I went to a regular state high school.

(M12, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

When I came to South Korea, I wanted to go to a regular state school. One day, my mum told me that there are many Korean-Chinese who are bullied at school. I thought my South Korean classmates would snub me as I cannot speak Korean well. So, I decided not to go to school. However, because I wanted to go to university, I started preparing for the high school certification examination at the centre. [...] As there are many Korean-Chinese in the centre, I usually speak in Chinese. I only speak Korean to the teachers. So, even though I am learning Korean, my Korean is not improving. However, I am glad I have been able to make Korean-Chinese friends at the centre.

(M18, Female, High school dropout, Entry in 2018)

Since this school is an alternative school for migrant youth, the teachers speak slowly in class and other students help to interpret into their native languages. So, students can participate in classes. However, this kind of teaching method is not available in regular schools. [...] Students in this school have come from multicultural alternative schools or centres. However, there are many establishments which do not provide students with any guidance about how to live in South Korean society. So, it is difficult for us to teach them how to live in society because otherwise they do not know why they should follow the rules. [...] There is a dilemma about the role of multicultural school. The school must be kind to the students and take care of them. However, who cares about them when they are outside the school?

(S11, Female, Teacher in a high school for migrant youth)

While centres or schools for migrant youth were established to help them enter the mainstream, these establishments can sometimes end up influencing them to remain on the fringes of society. As the above three participants

mention, KCMY worry about their weakness in Korean language, their relationship with South Korean peers and the difficulties of school adaptation. As a result they make up their mind to attend the centres or schools for migrant youth instead. This decision is made because they believe they will not face discrimination as 'the other' group in these facilities. In other words, KCMY are generally reluctant to leave these facilities where they feel that they are 'in place' (Cresswell, 1996). The end result is that KCMY often prefer to remain in a place that feels comfortable to them, even if this is one that occupies a marginal area of society, rather than endeavour to integrate into the mainstream.

KCMY can become marginalised from mainstream South Korean society due to the parallel hospitality and tolerance they are shown in the centres for migrant youth. It is well known that hospitality can encourage integration and interaction between different groups (Bell, 2007). Therefore, as facilities for migrant youth provide them with hospitality and tolerance, this can help to reduce psychological boundary between themselves and mainstream South Korean society. It can help them to adapt easily to the new society. However, if they face South Korean society outside the centres, they are forced to follow an unfamiliar set of customs and morals which makes them feel uncomfortable. They realise that while it seemed natural for them to receive help in their special schools or centres, this was not something to which the public gave priority. They experience discrimination and exclusion from the mainstream when they do not follow the social order (Anderson, 2015). These experiences of discrimination and marginalisation may then reduce their desire to form a relationship with the majority culture and influence them to maintain their own group identity outside the mainstream (Valentine, 2008). This is a similar impulse to that which encourages ethnic enclave organisations for migrants to seek support from their co-ethnic group (Samers and Collyers, 2017).

Some centres for KCMY are forced to relocate due to conflicts with South Koreans. At the local scale, the indistinct boundary between the two groups leads to otherness (Cresswell, 2015; Popescu, 2012). If 'the other' group continues culturally or geographically to invade 'our' space or does not fit 'our' norms, the mainstream group may wish to expel 'the other' group from 'our' space (Anderson, 2015; Popescu, 2012). In this context, having South

Koreans bordering onto a centre for migrant youth may result in its displacement. S5 and S9 describe the displacement of their centres:

Only Chinese including Korean-Chinese can attend our church and we just rent a space in a Korean church building. This particular Korean church encourages missionary activity, so many of its members have been abroad to do missionary work. So, I thought they would show some understanding towards Chinese migrant youth, and treat them kindly. However, even though we have shared the church building for a long time, they are not keen on Chinese migrant youth. Therefore, we have decided to build a separate church for the Chinese congregation.
(S5, Female, Pastor)

I visited a church by chance. When I said I wanted to establish a centre for migrant youth, the pastor of the church lent us part of the church space for free. As the number of migrant youth increased, the pastor even lent us a place of worship. So, we mainly occupied the church, and Korean members of the church used it in the morning and on weekends. One day, the pastor said, "You need to find another space for the centre." As the number of migrant youth had been increasing, the Korean church decided that they wanted to use this space only for themselves. So, I had to find a new space.
(S9, Female, Head of a cultural and research centre for ethnic Koreans)

Centres for migrant youth can be displaced as a result of South Koreans who shared with whom they share space asking them to move. Some churches share their space with small centres for migrant youth like those of S5 and S9. At first, these churches considered migrant youth a precarious group treating them with courtesy and tolerance, and the South Korean congregation and the migrant youth interact with each other. However, as the number of the migrant youth users of the centres increase, the South Korean members, begin to feel that 'our' place is turning into a place for migrant youth. They then ask the centre to leave. These are examples of power conflicts over the ownership of space between different ethnic, national or age groups (Anderson, 2015; Valentine, 2008; Vanderbeck, 2007). As a result, migrant youth run up against boundaries between themselves and mainstream society as a result of being excluded from the community.

Regarding their educational programme, centres for migrant youth mainly offer courses that encourage students to adapt to society by respecting the prevailing social order (See Appendix E). In other words, centres run

programmes which focus on how to make migrant youth good citizens. However, they do not provide any programmes aimed at helping the local community better understand the situation of migrant youth. S8, S10 and P5 are sceptical about whether migrant youth can ever become good citizens without local community attitudes towards them changing as well:

Since our orchestra practice room is located in Daerim-dong, many KCMY participate in our orchestra. We want migrant youth and South Korean youth to interact and get to know each other, so South Korean youth also participate in the orchestra. At first there were some difficulties because it was the first time that we had ever managed such an orchestra. Since we are a migrant centre, we had to pay more attention and offer more opportunities to our migrant youth members. So, the South Korean members then felt alienated. South Korean youth and migrant youth only concentrated on their respective parts. As they did not interact much with each other, they were unable to get close to each other. So, I think they need to have more of an opportunity to talk to each other like through planning their performance together.
(S8, Male, Activist in an NGO)

When this centre becomes like a reception room for the wider community, migrant youth will be welcome here. In order not to hurt them, South Korean students, teachers and residents also need to be educated at this centre.
(S10, Female, Teacher in a centre for migrant youth)

The SMOE and three boroughs in southern Seoul have announced the introduction of the 'Middle and Long term Plan for Supporting Growth of Students in Seoul'. Education works effectively when students, parents, teachers, faculty and communities change together. The SMOE can have a policy impact on students, teachers and faculty in school. However, in order to shift the opinion of the local community, borough offices have to act too. If NGOs and other relevant organisations in the local community participate in our plan, local community opinion can be changed more easily. Overall, this plan aims to harmonise migrant youth and local communities, focusing on the three boroughs in southern Seoul where KCMY predominantly live. If local community opinion changes together, KCMY may feel a sense of belonging to the local community and settle down successfully.
(P5, Male, Educational supervisor)

As S10 and P5 suggest, better local community understanding of KCMY can promote their social adaptation. They may then come to feel a sense of belonging in the community through interactions with their neighbours in daily

spaces. Participation in the community increases migrants' sense of belonging via direct personal contact and experiences that are mediated both socially and culturally (Gustafson, 2009). In this regard, KCMY and South Koreans need the provision of an environment where they can learn to understand each other; opportunities such as organising local events together or having a shared place like a community centre where they can encounter and talk in a relaxed manner could help. As S8 mentions, even where South Koreans and migrant youth do share the same space, if there are no opportunities to interact directly with each other, the two groups will remain separate. In other words, the spatial proximity does not translate into a newfound closeness. Emotional attitudes to neighbours affect not only one's sense of belonging to the community, but also have an impact on social change (Anderson and Smith, 2001). Thus, it is necessary to create opportunities that KCMY and South Koreans to build emotional relationships with each other (den Besten, 2010). The result hopefully is that prejudice against 'the other' group can be reduced through the creation of a sense of familiarity nurtured by shared physical contact and opportunities to share emotions and opinions.

The centres for migrant youth could play a role as "sites of connection" (Valentine, 2008) for daily contacts between KCMY and South Koreans. Allport (1979) suggests that meaningful contact is an effective way to reduce prejudice and promote social integration of migrants as it decreases feelings of uncertainty and anxiety about different groups. Therefore, centres for migrant youth would seem ideal spaces where KCMY and South Koreans could interact comfortably with each other. As there are staff there who have knowledge and experience of those who use the centres, migrant youth, their families and South Koreans could with the staff's help interact with each other there. If encounters within the centres take place in an informal and friendly manner, prejudice against KCMY may disappear of its own accord. M20 mentions that it is difficult for KCMY to form relationships with their South Korean neighbours due to prevalent negative perceptions about Korean-Chinese. These difficulties might possibly be resolved were the centres for migrant youth, which have already been established at a number of locations around the Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave, opened up to South Korean residents with the organisation of events or activities where KCMY and South Koreans would have the chance to interact. Currently, no such opportunities exist with the centres closed in practice to South Koreans. However, if as suggested by S10, the centres could be open to the local community then

Korean-Chinese migrants and South Korean residents could easily access them and participate together in the same activities. KCMY might then be able to build relationships with South Koreans and these in their turn would receive a more positive impression of them. In this vein, P5 argues that it is necessary to establish a micro-scale encounter system, in which the office of education, borough offices and the local community are all closely linked to each other. Although this system is still in the planning stage, its implementation will provide opportunities for local community members to better understand and build relationships with migrants in a comfortable and natural setting. The hoped for result is that KCMY will begin to develop a sense of belonging in the local community.

6.4 Governmental categorisation of migrants in law and policy

This section examines how the South Korean government classifies KCMY in associated policies and laws and how this categorisation affects the public's perception of KCMY. Positionalities and belongings of migrants in the host country may shift as their behaviour is influenced by changes in government policy which can have an impact on their everyday lives. The governmental power of the host country effects not only the establishment or implementation of laws or policies relating to migrants, but influences also the formation of discourse on migrants as expressed in the media and in social norms (Conlon, 2010; Hoang, 2017). In particular, the discourse on migrants, which can result in negative public opinion within the host country, has a significant impact on migrant adaptation. Therefore, positionalities and belongings of migrants within the host society will likely vary depending on how the host government defines and categorises them. Likewise, KCMY are influenced by the government's efforts to adapt them to South Korean society. The government provides various centres and programmes with the aim of supporting their adaptation (see Section 6.3). Indirectly, it also influences the perception of Korean-Chinese or migrant youth via the media and through its manipulation of the discourse on social norms (see Section 6.2). As mentioned in the previous sections, KCMY as a group possess two distinct characteristics—on the one hand they are Korean-Chinese, on the other they are migrant youth. In this respect, the first sub-section will investigate how the government's classification of KCMY as Korean-Chinese migrants in policies for *Dongpo* has an effect on their experiences in daily life. In the second sub-section, I will

examine how the government's perceptions of them as migrant youth are projected on multicultural policies.

6.4.1 Korean-Chinese migrants in South Korean law and policy

The classification of migrants is relevant to ways in which the host government defines and manages them as well as how it promotes a social perception of them. The government's definition and perception of the migrant group may also play a part in determining their positionality within the host society. In other words, the native population can influence the positionality of the migrant group by either embracing or excluding them. This takes place via a discourse on the migrants in which the government is involved (Mehan, 1997; Nevins, 2002). KCMY are subject to the South Korean governments' authority in the field of migration and this affects them in their daily life. The South Korean government classifies Korean-Chinese living in China as ethnic Koreans, called as *Dongpo*. This category includes people who live abroad with South Korean nationality as well as those who have a foreign nationality but the same blood lineage as South Koreans. In other words, the term, *Dongpo*, emphasises their ethnicity which is the same as South Koreans and makes the difference from foreigners who are not co-ethnic groups with South Koreans. As will be explained in detail below, however, the government classifies Korean-Chinese, who reside in South Korea, as either Chinese, *Dongpo*, or as members of some ambiguous group that lies halfway between Chinese and *Dongpo*. This section then investigates how the South Korean government classifies the position of KCMY as Korean-Chinese in laws and in policy and how this classification impacts on their daily lives.

First of all, as KCMY are legally categorised as foreigners of Chinese nationality, the social perception identifying them as Chinese has become prevalent in South Korean society. KCMY who have migrated to South Korea, are no longer considered ethnic Koreans, but Chinese. Government's classification of Korean-Chinese migrants as Chinese is relevant not only to immigration policy, but also to other policy areas touching on daily life, including those of education, labour and welfare. M18 and S7 discuss their experiences:

I am a foreigner because I am a Chinese. I am a Chinese in the immigration office and in my school. As I am a Korean-Chinese in South Korea, I have never been an ethnic Korean. When I came to South Korea, I was able to enter the country easily because I can be issued a visa for ethnic Koreans. However, after I had entered South Korea, the South Korean government considered us as Chinese. (Laughs) My nationality is Chinese, so I think it is presumed that I am a foreigner.

(M18, Female, High school dropout, Entry in 2018)

The government seems to treat Korean-Chinese who come to South Korea as foreigners rather than as Dongpo or people whose ancestors have lived in South Korea. The government judges them by their nationality rather than by their ethnicity.

(S7, Female, Lawyer in an NGO)

S7 suggests that the South Korean government classified KCMY living in South Korea, based on their Chinese nationality rather than on their ethnicity. In related policies and laws, although KCMY are classified as ethnic Koreans or *Dongpo*, before entering the country, they are classified as Chinese after they have crossed the border. In other words, they are categorised in a different way depending on which side of the border they are on. This ambiguous system of classification has its origins in 1997 when the South Korean government came up with the categorisation, *Dongpo*, for its own political purpose. In 1997, the South Korean government tried to utilise networks of Korean nationals living abroad and descendants of Korean ancestors to help overcome the economic crisis (Kim, 2009; Li, 2015). The government named them *Dongpo* and established a visa type to provide them with preferential treatment such as simplifying the immigration procedure and allowing them to stay for a longer period of time; this was in return for making use of their networks and their human capital (Larner, 2007) (see section 2.3). At that time, the government did not consider including ethnic Koreans living in South Korea in this category. This was because there were not many foreign Koreans moving in and out of the country (Kwak, 2021).

However, since the 2000s, the number of foreign Koreans crossing the South Korean border has greatly increased, and many ethnic Koreans have migrated to South Korea either for work or for leisure. Korean-Chinese migrants, who accounted for a significant number of undocumented migrants, were also able to continue their stay in South Korea as the South Korean government regularised their status in 2002 (Kim, 2014). This decision also had a political context. As Korean-Chinese migrants were largely employed in manufacturing

or service industries which South Koreans tended to avoid, repatriating all those irregular migrant workers would have caused considerable damage to the South Korean economy. Government then changed the status of irregular Korean-Chinese migrant workers to that of legal migrant workers to protect the domestic economy (Kim, 2014). As a result, Korean-Chinese migrants living in South Korea came to be classified as foreign workers rather than as ethnic Koreans, and KCMY, being their children, were also categorised in this way. Reflecting national interests and priorities which change over time (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018), Korean-Chinese migrants living in South Korea came to be labelled as foreigners in relevant policy and law. As a result of this political background, M18 is categorised as a Chinese living in South Korea although she was issued a long-term visa as an ethnic Koreans when she was entering South Korea. This situation reflects the simplistic dichotomy of the South Korean government, which ignores the category of *Dongpo* when differentiating between foreigners and ethnic Koreans.

Other migrant groups in South Korea tend to consider Korean-Chinese migrants to be relatively privileged. The types of visas that are issued only to ethnic Koreans or which they can obtain through simpler procedures than other groups—mainly, F-1, F-2, F-4, F-5 (Permanent residency) and H-2—allow them to stay for longer periods of time with fewer restrictions and to work in a more diverse range sectors than other migrants. In this respect, some other migrants think that Korean-Chinese migrants receive preferential treatment not only regarding the entry process but also during their stay in South Korea (Lee, 2015). This privileged status of Korean-Chinese migrants as ethnic Koreans is also recognised by participants. M4 and S2 elaborate on this point:

I think I was able to get a visa to live in South Korea for a long time more easily and more quickly because I am a Korean-Chinese. In my case, as my mum had remarried a South Korean man and my mum recognised me as a her child, I was issued an F-1 visa. My friends whose parents are all Korean-Chinese usually get an F-1 or F-2 visa. The parents usually have visas available only for ethnic Koreans, so their children can easily get those visas too. However, Han Chinese friends say it is difficult for them to get a visa to stay in South Korea for long.

(M4, Female, High school student, Entry in 2019)

The number of KCMY coming to South Korea with long-term visas has increased in recent years. In the past, as the government

issued only short-term visas to the children of migrants, they only stayed in South Korea for a few months, and then returned to China. I think because the government thinks that Korean-Chinese migrant workers will stay in South Korea for a long time, it has changed its immigration policy to allow them to stay with their families. Korean-Chinese are given preferential treatment as they are a co-ethnic group of South Koreans.
(S2, Female, Head of a private educational institute for migrant youth)

M4 and S2 state that KCMY are privileged when it comes to getting visas as they are a co-ethnic group of South Koreans. This preferential policy toward the co-ethnic group then influences the migration process, encouraging migration to the ethnic home country (Lee, 2019). Immigration legislation and the legal status of overseas Korean comes into force within the border of South Korea. From the perspective of immigration and residence rights, the offer of privileged status to co-ethnic groups can be understood as an example of selective permeability on the borderzone. According to the concept of selective permeability, while some applicants may cross a border with little difficulty if they can satisfy certain selected criteria, whereas others are faced with a far more complicated set of entry requirements making it difficult for them to enter a territory even if they have undergone many complicated immigration procedures (Popescu, 2012; Walters, 2006). In this respect, the South Korean government designates co-ethnic groups as selected people and issues them visas that facilitate their transnational migration. In addition, privileges granted to the co-ethnic group by their ethnic home country can be understood as an extension of the concept of ethnizenship (Baubock, 2007). Ethnizenship is a status used to describe external quasi-citizens who neither have citizenship nor are residents of a country but who generally share the same ethnic descent (Baubock, 2007; Lee, 2010). Based on this ethnizenship, governments tends to grant more privileges to co-ethnic groups than to other foreigners in terms of their immigration policies. Although the South Korean government does not grant South Korean citizenship to ethnic Koreans, it does aim to make them feel some sense of belonging to the country through preferential treatment in immigration policies (see section 3.3). However, P3 and S1 point out that their co-ethnic status does not always work in favour of KCMY:

There is an Act dealing with educational support for overseas Koreans. [...] The Act stipulates that the National Institute for International Education under the Ministry of Education has to

support overseas Koreans' education in South Korea. The government is involved in recruiting those from overseas who are suitable to receive such educational support. This kind of support is targeted at ethnic Korean youth living abroad. However, policymakers or the government have not considered ethnic Korean youth living in South Korea as a target group. KCMY, who already live in South Korea, are not a target of this policy. In order to receive this support, descendants of ethnic Koreans have to study Korean or go to a Korean university in South Korea.
(P3, Male, Professor)

The Overseas Korean Foundation under the MOFA supports overseas Koreans but KCMY who already live in South Korea are not supported by this organisation. According to the government, overseas Koreans must live abroad. From the government's perspective, ethnic Koreans who have foreign nationality and live in South Korea are not overseas Koreans anymore. Therefore, KCMY who have Chinese nationality and already live in South Korea are no longer overseas Koreans. I do not understand why Korean-Chinese migrants are not included in the category of overseas Koreans even though there are many of them living in South Korea.
(S1, Female, Head of centre for migrant youth)

In terms of immigration and length of stay in South Korea, KCMY are privileged because they are subject to a more streamlined visa process than other migrants due to being ethnic Koreans. However, they are no longer classified as ethnic Koreans in terms of South Korean policy and law. If as ethnic Koreans they are eligible to stay in the country according to the Overseas Korean Act, adult Korean-Chinese migrants can easily find employment in those industrial sectors that the government allows them to work in and these sectors are more diverse than those open to other migrant workers. However, even though they are ethnic Koreans it is difficult for KCMY to obtain government support for adaptation or education. The National Institute for International Education, mentioned above by P3, provides descendants of ethnic Koreans living abroad with opportunities to obtain an education in Korean language or from Korean universities. In addition, the Overseas Koreans Foundation is in charge of policy covering ethnic Koreans, but the organisation concentrates on ethnic Koreans living abroad. Its perspective can be understood from the stated objective of the Overseas Koreans Foundation Act, which aims to help overseas Koreans maintain ethnic ties with the mother country and to live as exemplary members of their country of residence. Considering the policy aims of both organisations, the focus is on ethnic Koreans 'living abroad'; ethnic Korean migrant youth living

in South Korea are by definition excluded from these policies. The contradiction is that though ethnically Korean they are not recognised as such under South Korean law because they live in South Korea rather than abroad. It is enough to make one wonder if the South Korean government might have intentionally chosen to exclude KCMY already living in South Korea as the principal purpose of the policy appears to be to support descendants of ethnic Koreans living abroad so as to take advantage of their local networks. If policies and laws dealing with ethnic Koreans were also to recognise those living in South Korea, KCMY would not only be subject to those policies and laws, they would also gain a sense of belonging as a group of fully fledged ethnic Koreans living in South Korea. In addition, this would oblige South Koreans to recognise Korean-Chinese migrants as members of the same co-ethnic group as themselves, thus providing them with greater opportunities to access mainstream society in South Korea. How the government categorises migrants and which group gets included in which category can also influence public perception of each group and their positionalities within the host society (Collyer and de Haas, 2012; Crawley and Skleparis, 2018).

KCMY are neither recognised as foreigners nor as ethnic Koreans due to government policy and discourse surrounding Korean-Chinese. While Korean-Chinese migrants might expect their backgrounds ethnic Koreans to entitle them to the status of quasi-citizens, their ethnic home country deems them as other by emphasising their nationality rather than their bloodline as has been mentioned earlier (Choi et al., 2016). In addition, South Koreans' negative perceptions of China (Korean-Chinese's home country) only heightens the tendency to consider them not as a co-ethnic group but as others. As the government implicitly influences the discourse on Korean-Chinese, they become further marginalised within South Korean society (Choi et al., 2016). P3 argues that policy and discourse as it affects Korean-Chinese have an impact on the ambiguous positionality of KCMY in South Korean society:

There is a prejudice against other races and nationalities in South Korean society. The attractiveness of a foreigner is determined by the economic level of the foreigner's home country. South Korea developed economically in 1980s and 1990s. In the process, the public tend to believe that the national economic level is representative of themselves. The government has also influenced such public perceptions through its campaigns and policies. The South Korean government deems KCMY as Chinese, and some

South Koreans still view them based on past assumptions about China being a poor country.
(P3, Male, Professor)

Participants who work in the field of foreign policy such as P3 affirm that Korean-Chinese migrants are considered to be neither foreigners nor ethnic Koreans, but that they occupy a position as an ambiguous third group in the legal framework and discourse that surrounds them. They also note that KCMY experience confusion about their belonging in the early stages of their settlement in South Korea. Among the criteria for encouraging the migration of co-ethnic groups are those related to skills and/or economic needs (Joppke, 2005). In the case of Korean-Chinese migrants it is the need to find workers in the service and manufacturing sectors which suffer from labour shortages. As South Korean immigration policy tends to regard Korean-Chinese migrants as just a means of solving domestic labour market problems, Korean-Chinese migrants have found it difficult to gain acceptance in mainstream South Korean society. As mentioned earlier, South Koreans have different attitudes toward foreigners depending on their nationality. In particular, some South Koreans have more negative attitudes toward Chinese migrants than towards other foreigners (Chung et al., 2016). China's low GDP before the economic boom and the different public etiquette from those of South Korea have had an impact on these attitudes (Kwon, 2020). The South Korean government takes pride in publicising the fact that South Korea has become a developed country in a short space of time. Moreover, in the early 1990s, national campaigns were conducted to introduce new social norms regarding public behaviour (Kwon, 2020). High levels of pride in the economy and in good standards of public behaviour as promoted by the government led to public disdain towards China which was felt to be poor and dirty. As a result, Korean-Chinese migrants have tended to be perceived as an inferior category of ethnic Koreans due to their Chinese nationality, a situation exacerbated by the crimes supposedly committed by Korean-Chinese migrants, which are felt to disturb the social order (Cho, 2017). Therefore, taking into account the ambiguity of the government's position which regards Korean-Chinese both as Chinese migrant workers and ethnic Koreans, KCMY do seem to belong to an ambiguous category, neither completely foreigners nor true ethnic Koreans.

6.4.2 Migrant youth in South Korean law and policy

Government regulates migration at the border (Rodriguez, 2019). Regulation of migration at the border is governed by immigration policy which in its turn is a reflection of government policies on migration management (de Jong, 2016; Neumayer, 2006). Migration management represents a certain approach for dealing with migration (Ghosh, 2007). Visa policies are an example of migration management as put in place by government (Hoang, 2017). On the other hand, diversity management policies may be more relevant to migrant youth in their identity formation within the host society (de Jong, 2016). Diversity management refers to the management of diversity of population within a territory (de Jong, 2016; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). Regarding diversity management, government fosters policies or programmes which both encourage migrant youth to integrate into society as good citizens, and which serve to create a social atmosphere which promotes their naturalisation within the host country (Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000). The South Korean government used to regard KCMY as temporary residents belonging to an unfavourable group, whereas more recently is seeing them strategically as a remedy to the declining fertility rates through their naturalisation. This section examines ways in which the South Korean government classifies KCMY as migrant youth and how such classifications influence their social positions within South Korean society.

In general the South Korean government regards KCMY as a problematic migrant group, one which is responsible for significant extra expenditure, including in welfare and crime prevention. This negative perspective is based on the assumption that they will leave South Korea at some point in the future yet will have a harmful impact on South Korean society during their stay. In general, governments determine whether migrants are favourable groups based on certain characteristics entailed in their bodies—age, nationality, ethnicity or race—and implement different immigration policies accordingly (Aradau and Tazzioli, 2020; Bailey, 2013). In the case of South Korea, policies targeted at KCMY are often short-sighted and focus only on short-term social integration and adaptation. P2 and P6 elaborate on this:

Policies of the SMG and the central government toward migrant youth aim to prevent them from becoming criminals. It is difficult to implement policies for people who are expected to leave the

country soon. All policy projects add to the tax burden of residents, and most of these have South Korean nationality. So, it is hard for the majority of people to be sympathetic to the implementation of policies for migrant youth. In order for these policies to gain the public acceptance, we have to explain to people that migrant youth will one day become citizens and live with us as law-abiding members of society, even though government knows that they will leave someday. And then, we should persuade the public that policies aimed at migrant youth are necessary to prevent them from disrupting the lives of ordinary South Koreans.
(P2, Female, Researcher)

The out-of-school youth support division in the MOGEF is in charge of issues related to migrant youth. Usually, the division establishes and implements policies on migrant youth. Does the government think that as migrant youth are not in school (i.e. they are dropouts), the team is responsible for their problems? In fact, projects aimed at migrant youth do not seem to be an important part of the MOGEF's field of responsibility. Since the president is interested in issues pertaining to migrant youth, the MOGEF seems to be preparing policies aimed at dealing with them. Regarding these policies, the government's main concern appears to be that migrant youth do not cause social problems, at least for the duration of their stay.
(P6, Male, Researcher)

Participants, who research or implement policies on migrant youth, maintain that the government regards migrant youth as temporary migrants who are prone to committing social problems due to their difficulty in adapting to South Korean society. Yet government has recently become interested in migrant youth as P6 mentions. Previously, they were an invisible group as far as the government was concerned because they were small in size and no problems relating to them had surfaced. As the number of KCMY has increased over the past five years and problems relating to their adaptation have surfaced, policies aimed at promoting their social adaptation or assimilation have begun to be implemented. As Korean-Chinese migrants generally prefer to stay in South Korea long term, they wish to reunite their families there too (see section 5.2.2). Since 2012, the government has issued visas to children of Korean-Chinese migrants which allow them to stay in South Korea with their parents. The children are also entitled to be registered as legitimate migrants in the Foreign Registration System (Lee, 2021). Considering that statistics become a tool by which governments can practice political power over the people at a distance (de Jong, 2016; Legg, 2005), KCMY are registered in the national statistical system which is managed by the government.

In addition, the South Korean government regards KCMY as a potentially troublesome group and has implemented certain policies to prevent them from disturbing the social order. The out-of-school youth support division of the MOGEF, mentioned by P6, is one of the departments which support migrant youth. The policies implemented by this division to support out-of-school migrant youth differ from those targeted at South Korean dropouts. While the policies for South Korean dropouts are aimed at returning them to school, those for migrant youth focus on facilitating their integration into South Korean society through the centres for migrant youth (see section 2.2). Policies for migrant youth presume that they are not attending school due to difficulties in adapting to South Korean society, and that they are liable to get involved in crime or have other social problems (MOGEF, 2021). Therefore, the government considers them a problematic or potentially problematic group and feels the necessity to support them in order to maintain the existing social order. The government's opinion of migrant youth is also reflected policy and law. Under the Juvenile Welfare Support Act (2021), migrant youth are classified as 'youth at risk' without providing any explanation about this classification. As explained in Section 6.2, the image of KCMY as a potentially troublesome group has solidified due to the unfavourable discourse on Korean-Chinese prevalent in South Korea (Kwon, 2020). Therefore, the government has established laws or policies designed to prevent disturbance to the social order, whether by KCMY or any other migrant group. Some participants, who understand what the government expects of them, try to comply with South Korean social norms in school or in society more generally. This implies that at least some KCMY endeavour to change their attitudes and behaviour so as to become good citizens in the eyes of the government. In other words, laws or policies reflecting the government's perception of KCMY do have some success in encouraging KCMY to comply with normative social rules and established codes of behaviour (Conlon, 2010; Hoang, 2017).

Contrary to the government's previously mentioned negative perception of KCMY, it does on the other hand encourage them to become naturalised citizens of South Korea. While migrant youth of foreign nationality are regarded as undesirable, migrant youth who are naturalised in South Korea are actively welcomed. The government considers them as future human capital or as a labour resource and naturalisation is encouraged. Evidence for this can be found in the experience and opinions of M8 and P6:

When we have to submit personal documents for administrative purposes at school, South Korean students only have to submit a few documents. However, I do not know what kind of documents I should submit. I am a little different from my South Korean peers. So, I will take along all the documents I have related to myself. I once asked my homeroom teacher, "What kind of documents should I submit because I am a Chinese?" I once thought it would be better to be naturalised as a South Korean. (Laughs) This is because I do not want it to be revealed that my friends and I are different.

(M8, Female, Middle school student, Entry in 2014)

Migrant youth come to live here, but the government's perception is that they are different from us. The government's objective to naturalise migrants is hidden inside its policies, like 'If you become a South Korean citizen, we will support you like any ordinary South Korean.' I can understand the government's perspective because it has to pay attention to public opinion as well. Of course, the government considers migrant youth as a future human resource and hopes that they will become naturalised. Moreover, the government has decided to turn them into South Korean citizens because the public is opposed to there being special policies for migrants who do not have South Korean nationality.

(P6, Male, Researcher)

M8 is required to submit a number of documents to verify her identity in her daily space as she is not a South Korean. Through this process, she is made to feel continuously different from the South Koreans around her. This otherization in one's everyday space hints at the government's intention to control migrants according to their nationality (Foucault et al., 2007; Hoang and Yeoh, 2012). The governmental practices related to this process of otherization set migrants apart from the native population (Conlon, 2010). Such repetitive cases of otherization and discrimination in everyday life may also influence decisions about whether or not to get naturalised, as in the case of M8. Since the South Korean government does not allow dual citizenship, KCMY can acquire Korean citizenship only after they have renounced their Chinese citizenship. By relinquishing their existing nationality, they may then be more eager to be included in mainstream South Korean society.

The South Korean government's encouragement for migrant youth to become naturalised is also aimed at placating the general public. This is because there are some South Koreans who complain that it is not desirable to spend tax

revenue on migrants who are staying in the country only temporarily (Ryu, 2020). For this reason, the government emphasises the significance of policies aimed at transforming migrant youth into human capital or a labour resource in the future (Kim and Jung., 2016). In other words, the government hopes to persuade the public that the existing expenditure invested in migrant youth is a good investment for the future. Centres for migrant youth are responsible for implementing the government's policies regarding naturalisation. S11, a teacher at a school for migrant youth, mentions that the school principal implicitly pressures teachers to encourage students to become naturalised. Furthermore, most centres for migrant youth provide assistance with tests and other administrative procedures necessary for naturalisation through the government may also provide some subsidies to implement such naturalisation programmes. While centres for adult migrants—migrant workers and married migrant women—tend to provide one-off programmes related to naturalisation, centres for migrant youth offer regular programmes, including classes for helping pass the naturalisation test and in Test of Proficiency in Korean (TOPIK) (see Appendix E). They also offer support with the administrative procedures required for naturalisation. Thus, the government is on the whole inclined to welcome naturalisation of migrant youth who are prepared to learn South Korean social norms and become future human capital. Certainly, the government's encouragement of naturalisation may contradict its stated position that migrant youth are a temporary group. However, it also believes that all migrant youth who plan to stay temporarily or longer should be integrated into South Korean society as good citizens who adhere to the social order of mainstream society.

In South Korean society multicultural policies run in parallel with policies for migrant youth. This is because the term multiculturalism is prevalently recognised as referring to foreigners or their families (see section 2.2). Western multicultural policies acknowledge that social integration of migrants takes a long time, and examine whether the rules and norms of mainstream society put migrants at a disadvantage (Kymlicka, 2002). They identify migrants as active members of society and promote participation of the government and native population as well as migrants (Kymlicka, 2013). However, South Korea's multicultural policies are characterised by a strong impetus towards assimilation because they intend to integrate migrants into South Korean society in a short period of time (Kim, 2014). This short-term multicultural policy may be beneficial to migrants, as it can have a positive

influence on public discourse which currently holds that they are an inferior group within South Korean society, which can affect the formation of discourse that they are inferior groups in South Korean society. P2, P3 and S2 emphasise this point:

From the first South Korea's multicultural policy did not include South Koreans. Therefore, the term "multiculturalism" itself is used as a discriminatory term in society as well as in policy. Multicultural policies should also include South Koreans. South Koreans think that South Korea has become a multicultural society because foreigners have invaded it. However, just because we occasionally meet each other in the street, does that mean we have become a multicultural society? Neither government nor society understands real multicultural society or policy.
(P2, Female, Researcher)

School provides a multicultural education for children from multicultural families. From a policy perspective, a multicultural family means a family formed by the marriage of a South Korean and a foreigner. Migrant youth were neither given a multicultural education nor were subject to multicultural policies at first. As the number of them in school increased, the government tried to include them in the existing multicultural policy. Therefore, blind spots in the policy exist because the government has tried to fix problems with them with short-sighted solutions.
(P3, Male, Professor)

South Korea's multicultural policy is too generous to migrants. Migrants are passive players in the multicultural process. The government implements multicultural policies, but I think migrants only get help rather than playing a voluntary part in the process. When KCMY go to school, some teachers rebuke them, saying, "Why cannot you adapt quickly to South Korean culture when we invest so much in you and help you so much because you are subject to the multicultural policy?" Therefore, KCMY come to hate the term, multiculturalism.
(S2, Female, Head of a private educational institute for migrant youth)

South Korean multicultural policies have been used as one of the techniques of governmental management that the government employs to manage targeted migrants who are considered as subjects of welfare. These policies were established in response to rapidly growing numbers of marriage migrants, and concerns about cultural hybridity and poverty in the family. The government labelled these families as multicultural families and policies to support them were called multicultural policies (Kim, 2014). As

multiculturalism has often been used as a counter-concept, one in opposition to anti-migrant sentiment and discrimination in South Korean society, it is sometimes difficult to remember that the principal idea behind the concept is one of mutual recognition among different members of society (Kim, 2008). In relation to this, since South Korean society contains a powerful strain of homogeneous nationalism, it is highly discriminatory against migrants who are citizens of other countries and who have migrated to South Korea. Therefore, government emphasises assimilation rather than a dialogue of equals of between South Koreans and migrant groups who retain a foreign culture and customs. Marriage migrants and their families, who have settled in South Korea, have also become subject to these multicultural policies. However, other migrants who are considered not to have permanently settled in South Korea, they are not subject to these policies. Thus, South Korea's multicultural policies were planned by mainstream society, and migrants were selected as the target.

Furthermore, with their generous levels of support for low-income families, these multicultural policies mean that migrants who fall into the wrong category become inferior beneficiaries of welfare. Migrants who are subject to support for low-income multicultural families have been regarded as passive beneficiaries of welfare. Therefore, although the government emphasises that its multicultural policies intend to help migrants adapt to South Korean society, those migrants are still in a vulnerable position in society. Furthermore, as they are often the beneficiaries of politicians' charity events and of corporate social responsibility activities, they are stigmatised as a vulnerable group. As a result, the term 'multiculturalism' has for some become an easy excuse to discriminate against those migrants who are supposed to benefit from these policies. M4, who attends a general high school, mentions that she felt uncomfortable when her homeroom teacher publicly categorised her as belonging to a multicultural family and asked her to distribute supplies intended for multicultural families, in front of her classmates. She was teased by her friends who knew that the government provides supplies to low-income multicultural families. Therefore, classification as belonging to a multicultural family can result in discrimination from non-migrant groups and increase levels of social marginalisation. In addition, previous studies on South Korea's multicultural policies have been limited to discussion about social integration and welfare support for migrants while excluding South Koreans from the discussion. South Korea's multicultural policies do not accept diversity as a

positive value. Their implicit intention is that migrants should abide by the norms and framework of mainstream society. Overall, they largely demonstrate that in South Korea both government and society regard migrants as an inferior, vulnerable and marginalised group.

As the number and diversity of migrants increases, the range of South Korea's multicultural policies is also expanding. However, blind spots have been created by applying the initial multicultural policies to new migrants. In other words, the government conducted a piecemeal approach by making use of existing multicultural policies in order to integrate migrants into society in as short a timeframe as possible. At first, KCMY experienced that they were sometimes included in or not included in these initial multicultural policies. As both their numbers and the social problems associated with their adaptation increased, the government expanded the scope of those covered by multicultural policies to include at least some of them as well. However, some KCMY still remain outside the reach of these policies because the relevant ministries (e.g. MOE, MOGEF and MOHW) define and implement their multicultural policies according to the key aims of each ministry (Lee, 2010). As mentioned above, the South Korean government influences positionalities and sense of belonging as these are experienced by KCMY via various techniques of power including its multicultural policies. Individual experiences are important in forming or shifting the identities, positionalities and sense of belonging of migrants (Lee, 2021). Their experiences are stem from their treatment by the governments related to their migration (e.g. governments of home and host country) (Larner, 2007). Therefore, positionalities and sense of belonging of KCMY may vary depending on how the South Korean government has decided to categorise them and how this categorisation goes on to influence their daily lives.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored both the social and political factors which influence the positionalities and sense of belonging of KCMY in their relationships with South Koreans and the differing ways in which the government administration classifies them. Section 6.2 investigated how KCMY feel and behave in response to the media's portrayals of KCMY and interaction with South

Koreans in daily life. I argue that participants try to change their positionalities to overcome their social marginalisation by anti-Korean-Chinese migrant sentiments caused by mainly produced in the media. Moreover, KCMY practice strategies to position themselves in their peer groups by reducing or maintaining the distance between their Korean peers and themselves. Furthermore, I emphasise that the positionalities and sense of belonging of KCMY in South Korean society may change depending on how South Koreans perceive the intersectionality of their diverse identities in their relationships with them.

In section 6.3, I explored the relationships between KCMY and the local community in the process of establishing and operating the centres for migrant youth. Existing research on centres for migrant youth has focused on the support they provide to migrant youth. However, I make a case for the need for critical analysis of the centres' aims and programmes where they touch on relationship-building between KCMY, the centres, local communities and South Korean society. Regarding the ultimate aim of the centres, this is to separate KCMY from mainstream South Korean society by making them use the centres then training them to work in specific industrial sectors and hopefully turning them into good citizens. The end result of this appears to be even greater marginalisation within South Korean society. As for the programmes provided by the centres, I criticise those which focus on social adaptation only for migrant youth and stress the need for centres to function as sites of connection with the broader community and two-way integration processes.

Lastly, section 6.4 carried out a critical analysis of the South Korean government's system of classification of KCMY based on the policies for *Dongpo* and multiculturalism. As Korean-Chinese migrants, KCMY were considered to be ethnic Koreans before they entered South Korea; however after their migration, South Korean immigration law and public policy regards them as Chinese. In other words, the South Korean government's classification of Korean-Chinese migrants is different depending on which side of the border they are living. I maintain that such paradoxical system of classification may cause KCMY to feel confused about their identities and belonging and may encourage them to feel that they belong to a marginal group. As migrant youth, KCMY are considered by the South Korean government to belong to an undesirable social group. I criticise the

government perceptions of them, and suggest they are the result of short-sighted policies focusing on social integration. I go on to criticise multiculturalism, as the term is used in South Korea where it refers only to certain particular migrant groups. I also suggest that the government's multicultural policies may position some migrants including KCMY as belonging to inferior and marginalised groups in South Korean society where they are often portrayed as passive beneficiaries of welfare. Therefore, the South Korean government's system of classification of KCMY is a significant factor in influencing their positionalities and belonging. The next chapter will investigate how KCMY negotiate their positionalities and belonging by using their in-betweenness strategically.

Chapter 7

Strategic use of migrant youth 'in-betweenness' to challenge their marginalised positions in South Korean society

7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines how KCMY actively challenge their marginalised positions in South Korean society by using their in-betweenness. In order to understand this, I focus on how their in-betweenness and subjectivities play out in their real and virtual spaces, in their work experiences and in their future life plans. Previous studies on Korean-Chinese migrants have considered them transmigrants and focused on their movement between South Korea and China. They have however paid less attention to how they actively use their daily spaces while negotiating their positionalities and belonging. In this regard, in section 7.2, I analyse how they attempt to enter mainstream society by using their in-betweenness in real and virtual spaces. Section 7.3 explores the difficulties they experience in the South Korean labour market as semi-compliant migrants who are legal residents but on occasion deemed 'illegal workers', and the methods they seek to overcome such difficulties. In section 7.4, I investigate how KCMY use their experiences of having moved to South Korea and their in-between positionalities to plan for their subsequent life including their future migration, legal status and career path. They tend to make plans for future migration based on the emotions they felt when they moved to South Korea. Their migration prospects can affect their plans for changing their legal status in South Korea. Furthermore, their experience of migration can influence the strategic use of their in-betweenness in their career plans. In conclusion, KCMY try to make strategic decisions as active agents who inhabit a space between South Korea and China by utilising their in-between positionalities.

7.2 Perception and strategic use of in-betweenness in their real and virtual spaces

In this section, I explore how KCMY use their in-betweenness to negotiate their positionalities and belonging in both the real and virtual worlds. The concept of in-betweenness focuses on a flexible and changeable state, it is critical of binary and fixed thinking with regard to differences (see section 2.2.2). The in-between being exists not just as a combination of two separate existences (home and host country), but as an independent existence with flexibility and diversity in relationships (Masumi, 2002; Peach, 2002; Summers and Clarke, 2015). The first sub-section will investigate how KCMY as transmigrants negotiate their identities by using their in-betweenness in their daily spaces. In the second sub-section, I will explore how KCMY use their in-between positionalities to challenge their marginalised positions in South Korean society.

7.2.1 Perception of in-betweenness and the use of urban spaces

This section examines how KCMY perceive their in-betweenness and how they deploy this when making use of their daily spaces. Transmigrants usually feel a sense of belonging to multiple countries as a result of being spanned emotionally across these countries (Castles et al., 2014; Closs Stephens, 2016; Lyons, 2018; Valentine et al., 2009). While their in-between positionalities can cause identity confusion, it can also influence the negotiation of their identities according to the situated context with their multiple identities (Skelton, 2013; Staeheli, 2011; Wood and Waite, 2011). In other words, the in-between positionalities of migrants affect and are also affected by relationships with other people or things in the host society, migrants can change their identities and belonging appropriately in different relationships (Anderson, 2014; Masumi, 2002; Wilson, 2017). In short, in-between positionalities are adaptive strategies.

In South Korean society, as KCMY are of similar appearance to South Koreans, it is difficult to tell them apart by their appearance (Chung, 2009). In addition, since they are relatively familiar with South Korean culture compared to other groups of migrant youth, they are generally able to adapt more easily

to South Korean society. KCMY with these demographic and cultural characteristics can adapt to the host society by flexibly shifting their identity. As I mentioned in Chapter 6, because participants felt they did not belong to either South Korea or China due to their in-betweenness and their policy or legal affiliations, they felt ambiguous in South Korean society. However, participants argued that their in-between identities help them adapt to South Korean society rather than make them feel confused. M6 and M13 refer to their in-between identities as an important asset:

I cannot clearly say whether I am Chinese or South Korean. I was naturalised, so my nationality is definitely South Korean. However, I think KCMY like me have the ability to think and act flexibly switching between our South Korean and Chinese identities depending on the situation. We are no different from South Koreans in appearance, so if we do not mention that we are Korean-Chinese or Chinese first, South Koreans may naturally think that we are South Koreans because of our appearance. It would be same in China. So, I think this kind of similar appearance allows us to act flexibly in both countries. Also, we can understand the South Korean mind and the Chinese mind. If I have this ability, I should use it in my daily life. (Laughs) I think we are more flexible than South Koreans and Chinese who grew up in only one country. (M6, Male, Freshman, Entry in 2012)

I think people who inhabit a boundary zone are valuable. I think their background makes them more competitive than those who grew up in one country. The KCMY live in the margin between China and South Korea. I do not think their position at the boundary is always bad. Because we can understand to some extent the society and culture of both the countries whose borders meet. So, my view of the world has expanded since I came to South Korea. (M13, Female, High school student, Entry in 2017)

M6 and M13 describe how they are located between South Korea and China, and how their identities help them adapt to both counties. In particular, M6 stresses that the similarity of appearance between Korean-Chinese and South Koreans, prevents South Koreans from noticing the difference between Korean-Chinese migrants and themselves. Skin tone and physical appearance may be subject to discrimination and prejudice from mainstream society. However, because KCMY are physically similar to South Koreans, they can pass as South Koreans in their daily lives without enormous efforts. Furthermore, being familiar with South Korean culture, they often consciously aspire to be recognised as South Koreans while participating in South Korean

society. Therefore, through passing of body and cultural identities, KCMY try to join mainstream society by primarily emphasising their identity as South Korean among their multiple identities.

The above two participants also highlight the fact that their in-between positionalities have helped to expand their outlook. Since KCMY are members of an ethnic minority in China and ethnic Koreans or foreigners in South Korea, they are marginalised in both societies. However, they regard their state of being in-between in both societies as an asset to help them to enter the mainstream society of their host country. In this regard, Adey (2010) insists that the recognition of multiple identities can be used as the capacity for individuals to shift their positionalities flexibly depending on the context. KCMY recognise that they have diverse identities corresponding to their nationality and ethnicity and use them to find the best position for themselves in the situated context. Therefore, their in-between identities lead them to act in the appropriate manner according to the time and place in the host society (Szokolczai, 2009; Turner, 1995). As M13 mentions, most participants evaluate their in-between positionalities as an asset which enhances their competitiveness not only in the labour market but also in their relationships with others in their daily lives. In the labour market the advantage of their familiarity with the society and culture of both countries allows them to play a role in connecting those countries (see section 7.4.3). Due to the close political and economic relations between South Korea and China, their in-between positionalities can make them more competitive in finding jobs which traverse both economies. In addition, since in-between positionalities help individuals change their identities flexibly according to their relationships, those of KCMY can have a significant impact on their being able to form and expand their social relationships in their daily lives. As a result, KCMY form various relationships and experience multiple situations which lead to an expansion of their outlook from a diversity of perspectives.

Participants sometimes feel negative about the in-betweenness of North Korean youth who share the same ethnic roots as South Koreans. They argue that Korean-Chinese rather than North Koreans have in-between positionalities because they are the only ones who inhabit the margins between South Korea and China (and even North Korea as well). M7 and S1 explain that although North Korean youth belong to the same ethnic group, they have different identities and positionalities within South Korean society:

When I was in China, I had a friend from North Korea. And I met her again in South Korea. We flew to here directly, but North Koreans have a hard time coming to South Korea. She said, "North Koreans can get South Korean passports and receive government assistance as soon as they arrive in South Korea." To be honest, I thought Korean-Chinese and North Koreans are the same ethnic group in China because I could not find the difference between them. However, after coming to South Korea, I now see that Korean-Chinese and North Koreans are different even though they share the same ethnic roots. We need a lot of documents to prove our identity. However, North Koreans do not need them because they have become South Koreans. (Sighs) I do not think North Koreans are in the middle, but we occupy the boundary between countries, such as South Korea, China and North Korea. North Koreans can become South Koreans by receiving education after entry to South Korea, so they belong to South Korea 100 percent. (M7, Female, High school student, Entry in 2017)

A Korean-Chinese boy and a North Korean boy fought at this centre. The Korean-Chinese boy really wanted to get South Korean citizenship. The North Korean boy has lived in China and is obviously Chinese. However, the North Korean boy has obtained South Korean nationality. That is why the Korean-Chinese boy could not understand the situation. He felt that Korean-Chinese try very hard to get South Korean citizenship, but North Koreans even though they seem to be Chinese are granted South Korean citizenship easily as soon as they come to South Korea. Korean-Chinese and North Koreans do not get along well in South Korea. Korean-Chinese ignore North Koreans because they pretend to be South Koreans even though they come from poor North Korea, and North Koreans think they are superior to Korean-Chinese since they have South Korean nationality. The conflict between the two groups has worsened since they came to South Korea. This conflict is becoming more widespread among youth of both groups. (S1, Female, Head of centre for migrant youth)

In South Korean society, participants recognise the difference between themselves and North Koreans, and suggest that these differences can lead to conflicts. The South Korean literature on KCMY and North Korean youth has tended to highlight the separate identities of each group and the social distancing that South Koreans feel toward both groups (Cho, 2014; Chung et al., 2016; Park, 2015; Park, 2020). However, these studies have not examined in any detail the perceptions each group has of the other. This is because both groups are identified as belong to the same ethnic Korean group. However, as the two groups have different countries of origin and different histories of immigration and settlement, their feelings of in-betweenness within South

Korean society cannot be expressed in the same way. As with M7, participants mention that there is little difference between Korean-Chinese and North Koreans in China, but that they started to feel different from North Koreans after moving to South Korea. In China, while Korean-Chinese are native, most North Koreans are undocumented migrants who have illegally entered the country and now live there illegally (Kuk, 2017). However, in South Korean society, the former are considered foreigners and the latter have become South Koreans. According to South Korea's constitution, which defines all South and North Koreans living on the Korean Peninsula as South Koreans, North Koreans are granted South Korean citizenship after they have entered South Korea. Their positionalities and legal status change as a result of their migration to South Korea. Consequently, participants acknowledge the differences between themselves and North Koreans in South Korean law (Ahmed, 2000; Wilson, 2017). Therefore, participants tend to define North Korean migrants as South Koreans, emphasising only Korean-Chinese as having an in-between identities. Consciousness of these differences may then cause conflict between the two groups.

The in-between positionalities of migrants are expressed through encounters and relationships with different groups sharing the same urban spaces. As cities are areas where a multiplicity of encounters derives from the active mobility of subjects (Skelton, 2013; Stevens, 2007), individuals can form relationships with others from different social and ethnic backgrounds in their daily lives (Amin and Thrift, 2002; Askins and Pain, 2011; Massey, 2005; Valentine, 2008). Individuals' identities based on the emotions derived from relationships with others are influenced by diverse encounters in urban spaces (Pile 2010; Stewart, 2011). Migrants make use of their in-between positionalities by flexibly changing their identities through various encounters in urban spaces (Harker, 2009; Skelton, 2013). Participants with in-between positionalities flexibly negotiate their identities and belonging through their various encounters in Seoul.

Participants mention that Seoul is a space where they have greater access to diverse people and cultures than other parts of South Korea. Skelton (2013) insists that in multicultural cities, young people can encounter a variety of spaces, people and cultures on the local scale. Because Seoul is a multicultural city with a high proportion of registered foreigners (2.9 percent of the population are registered foreigners) (MOJ, 2019) and a high mobility, a

diverse range of encounters are possible within the city. While South Korean multiculturalism is beneficial to certain migrant groups and assimilationist (see section 3.2), the government plays an important role to ensure that Seoul is an ideal multicultural city through preservation and promotion of multicultural urban landscapes. In other words, the South Korean multicultural city can only maintain its cultural diversity by creating and promoting urban spaces where populations of different cultures tend to congregate. In Seoul, the area around Hong-ik University is one area where various cultures coexist so migrants as well as South Koreans can enjoy the diversity there. M3 and M14 explain how the atmosphere of diversity and freedom in this area makes them feel comfortable:

There are many foreigners in Hongdae (abbreviation of Hong-ik University in Korean). Some have come on trips and others live in South Korea. When I go to Hongdae, I feel like I am a foreigner or not a foreigner. Well... I do not know how to explain it, but... I think I am South Korean when I talk to my Korean-Chinese friends in Korean. However, if I speak in Chinese, I become a foreigner. I do not know who I am. However, I like this ambiguity. It is interesting that I might be South Korean or Chinese when I am there. (Laughs)
(M3, Female, High school dropout, Entry in 2019)

At Hongdae, I usually eat delicious food, go shopping and enjoy busking performances. I often visit there with my South Korean friends, but there are really more foreigners than South Koreans there. And there are many people who dress in different ways and do different things there. I think it is a place where many different people gather. So, when I go to Hongdae, I think I am one of these many different people. Especially, I like to watch busking (street performance) as I feel that I am one of the many groups in the audience when I watch busking. I do not care what other people think. The people there seem to be free to express themselves. So, I feel comfortable being one amongst that diverse group of people.
(M14, Female, Middle school student, Entry in 2016)

M3 and M14 feel a sense of belonging in Hongdae due to the atmosphere there where various different people and cultures can coexist. M3 describes herself as having an identity of being in-between. She sees herself as a floating person who does not belong to any group in South Korean society. However, in Hongdae, she is not confused about her ambiguous identities rather she is interested in it. She plays with her multiple identities passing as either Korean or Chinese in different spaces of Hongdae. In other words, her in-between positionality frees her to express whichever identity makes her feel

most comfortable in the situated context and relationship. M14 also feels comfortable in a local environment which embraces individuals' diverse identities, likening herself to a constituent part of this diversity. Hongdae is also a space that participants can occupy with South Korean youth. They enjoy South Korean youth culture by shopping, eating food and watching performances on the street (see figure 7.1). Through participating in these activities, they can feel attached to the peer group, not marginalised due to their in-between position in South Korean society. In such an atmosphere of diversity, affects and emotions of bodies promote the performance and expression of multiple identities of KCMY (Faria, 2014). In terms of age, KCMY are located between children and adults. Therefore, they are considered as a marginalised group due to their in-between position in terms of age (Anderson, 2015). However, in Hongdae, where individual characteristics such as nationality or age are not a cause for discrimination and exclusion, participants feel able to occupy the mainstream space regardless of the fact that they are migrant youth. They feel comfortable in this space where they are freely able to negotiate and express their in-between identities.



Figure 7.1 Busking (street performance) on Hongdae Festival Street
Source: Park (2022).



Figure 7.2 The main street in Daerim-dong

Source: The author, photograph taken in October 2019.

KCMY do not remain stuck in their ethnic enclave, like their parents' generation. Certainly It is well known that Korean-Chinese migrants tend to live, work and spend their leisure time in the Korean-Chinese enclave of Daerim-dong (Lee, 2015) (see section 5.4.2). For participants, however, Daerim-dong is largely regarded as a place where they sometimes go to reminisce about China, though not always. Participants living in Daerim-dong and its surrounding areas mention the enclave merely as just a residential space. In this regard, M15 and M20 elaborate:

Our generation does not work or meet friends in Daerim-dong like our parents' generation. But for us, South Korea is a foreign country, so I think it is better to adapt to South Korean society in Daerim-dong before moving to another place where South Koreans live. If someone has adapted well to South Korean society, there is no reason why he/she should come to Daerim-dong. Therefore, as time goes by, Korean-Chinese migrants will not congregate around Daerim-dong, but at the moment it still plays a role in supporting their adaptation.

(M15, Female, High school graduate, Entry in 2015)

Daerim-dong satisfies my longing for my hometown when I cannot go back there. I can buy Chinese food or ingredients that I used to eat in China only there. However, Daerim-dong is only the place where I live. [...] There is nothing to do there. There are no internet

cafes or coin karaoke that we use there. Usually, my mother eats and drinks with her friends there. However, we cannot drink or smoke like adults. Also, the price of food is too expensive for us to eat with our friends in Daerim-dong. There is no space for us here. So, we usually go to Hongdae. Hongdae is a place where we can do the things we want. It seems that each generation thinks of Daerim-dong differently.
(M20, Male, Middle school dropout, Entry in 2017)

In the interview extracts above M15 and M20 demonstrate how KCMY perceive and make use of their ethnic enclave. Daerim-dong serves as a portal through which Korean-Chinese migrants may relocate to other parts of South Korea after having adapted to the new society with the support of their ethnic network in the enclave (Koh, 2019; Suh, 2012). In addition, Korean-Chinese migrants, even if they now live in other regions, maintain their networks around Daerim-dong through encounters with family members and acquaintances who still live there. Therefore, it is easy to find comfortable spaces for Korean-Chinese adults—restaurants, bars and adult arcades—in Daerim-dong (Lee, 2015). The store signs shown in figure 7.2 demonstrate this: Chinese restaurants, bars, karaoke clubs and travel agencies located on the main street in Daerim-dong are all spaces for adults. In particular, participants are reluctant to eat at Chinese restaurants as the prices are too expensive for them and the spaces largely occupied by adults. Due to such an adult-centred spatial structure, KCMY do not consider Daerim-dong the centre of their daily lives in the same way as their parents do. Since they are in-between beings, they can occupy other spaces than their ethnic enclave. Their parents' generation have tended to consider themselves a marginalised minority in South Korean society and consequently have largely chosen to be self-segregated in their ethnic enclaves (Valentine, 2008). However, KCMY consider their location to be somewhere between South Korea and China and decide that they can use spaces flexibly. The lack of comfortable space for KCMY in Daerim-dong has forced them to use other areas, but their in-between identities have also played an important role in how they use space. They are using their in-between position to expand the scope of their mundane activities and to help them better adapt to South Korean society. M7 suggests that if she makes enough South Korean friends and learns to speak Korean well, she will rarely go to Daerim-dong. However, as M15 mentions, Daerim-dong still plays a role in helping KCMY adapt to South Korean society since it is a familiar environment and is where the centres for migrant youth are located. However, M6 argues that the atmosphere of Daerim-dong, which

used to be very familiar to Korean-Chinese migrants, is now becoming less so:

*When I first came to Daerim-dong, the atmosphere was very similar to that of my hometown. At that time, I felt like I was living in a familiar place. However, if I live here for a long time, I feel unfamiliar with the place. The landscape is similar to my hometown, but the people in it are Chinese and South Koreans. The culture is mixed as well. For example, traditional Korean-Chinese food sold in restaurants becomes Koreanised. So, I feel distant with Daerim-dong like a French or American town. [...] As I know South Korean, Chinese and Korean-Chinese culture, it was not very difficult for me to adapt to Seoul. However, it is unfamiliar that Daerim-dong is changing into a place where these cultures are blended.
(M6, Male, Freshman, Entry in 2012)*

M6, who has lived in South Korea for a decade, is confident that he has adapted well to South Korean society. He stresses that as he understands South Korean society and culture well, he has not had any difficulties in living his daily life. He has adapted to South Korean society by negotiating his identities and positionalities according to the space and context. Participants, who have stayed in South Korea for more than five years like M6, often believe that Daerim-dong no longer provides a unique cultural space for Korean-Chinese, but has become a space located somewhere between South Korea and China. In such an in-between space as this, since various relationships coexist, diverse identities encounter each other (Szakolczai, 2009; Valentine, 2008). In addition, considering Korean-Chinese in-between positionalities, Daerim-dong is naturally a place where South Korean, Korean-Chinese and Chinese cultures coexist. However, KCMY feel weird and uncomfortable about the fact that traditional Korean-Chinese culture is disappearing from their ethnic enclave. M3 explains that this unfamiliarity is related to the loss of authentic Korean-Chinese culture and its replacement by a Koreanized Korean-Chinese culture. Therefore, although participants still use their ethnic enclave their in-between identity means they now feel a subtle distance from the ethnic enclave which is becoming more of an in-between space.

As mentioned above, KCMY share most of their daily space with South Koreans. Although their ethnic enclave, which came into being as a result of self-segregation, remains an important space for adult Korean-Chinese migrants, KCMY mainly use spaces—schools, cafes, restaurants, cinemas

and karaoke—outside their enclave. Even if they have been living in South Korea for a shorter period than their parents, they can more easily adapt to South Korean urban spaces through support of schools, centres for migrant youth or friends. However, when they go to a place where most people are South Koreans, they pretend to be South Koreans themselves by complying with South Korean social norms and moral standards:

When I am with Korean-Chinese friends, my behaviour is very natural. So, I feel comfortable. However, when I am with South Korean friends, I always have to think about whether my actions and words fit, like 'If I act like this, will they think I am weird?' When I go to place where there are a lot of South Koreans, I usually speak in Korean even with my Korean-Chinese friends. Everyone else is speaking in Korean and if we speak in Chinese, other people will look at us strangely. Then I will always be conscious about what they are thinking. So, I make sure not to appear as a Korean-Chinese or Chinese, and I pretend to be South Korean. I adjust myself to the situation.

(M3, Female, High school dropout, Entry in 2019)

While attending school in South Korea, I went out a lot with my South Korean friends, and my Korean skills improved. So, I visited various places in Seoul. Before going to school, I only went to the centre for migrant youth. When I met my South Korean friends, I would go to karaoke and a café with them after school. I also went to those places with my Korean-Chinese friends. My range of daily activities expanded while I was attending high school. Even though I am good at Korean and have visited many different places, I am still conscious about what South Koreans think about me when I am in a place filled with South Koreans. Although I do not do anything wrong, I still think like that. (Sighs)

(M15, Female, High school graduate, Entry in 2015)

M3 and M15 explain how they emphasise the South Korean side of their identities by passing as natives in order not to reveal that they are different when they are in spaces dominated by South Koreans. This negotiation of their identities can be the result of contact with South Koreans in a certain shared space. In section 6.2, it was noted that South Koreans create boundaries with KCMY due to differences in language and standards of morality. Social exclusion by South Koreans spurs KCMY to conceal their ethnic or national identities and reveal the identity as South Koreans. They continuously negotiate their identities in their everyday spaces due both to their desire to belong to, as well as their experience of exclusion from, the mainstream society. When emphasising their South Korean identity, they aim

closely to follow South Korean customs and moral standards by making correct use of Korean etiquette. Encounters in public space entail that individuals comply with normative codes of behaviour which maintain commonality within the space (Cresswell, 1996). Therefore, individuals attempt correctly to follow ordinary and ritualised ways of etiquette so as to be accepted as a member of the local community (Valentine, 2008). In this respect, migrants with in-between identity express, according to the context, the most appropriate among their multiple identities by the correct use of language and behaviour in order to belong to the space or community concerned. Likewise, KCMY emphasise the South Korean part of their identities as a strategy to belong in a space or community dominated by South Koreans.

As M15 points out, Korean language proficiency and South Korean friendship groups play a significant role in the mobility of KCMY in Seoul. These factors run in parallel with the factors which affect their adaptation. In particular, language is an important marker of identity because what an individual says and how he/she speaks indicates his/her positionalities within society (Valentine et al., 2008). Individuals feel a sense of belonging to a space as a result of how they negotiate their identities by using verbal and/or non-verbal expressions appropriately depending on the space (Valentine et al., 2009). In this regard, an in-between identity can be expressed through the malleable use of language, adjusting it to fit the space and situation. Furthermore, close relationships between KCMY and their South Korean peers can help expand access to daily spaces in South Korean society because South Korean peers tend to help KCMY understand South Korean society and culture from a youth perspective. Because the in-between positionalities of KCMY allow them to change their identities flexibly, their South Korean peers do not feel they are any different from themselves and as such maintain close relationships with them (Anderson, 2014; Skelton, 2013; Wilson, 2017). In the next sub-section, I will investigate how KCMY challenge their marginalised positionalities in order to enter mainstream society.

7.2.2 Challenging the marginalised positionalities of KCMY

This section examines the ways in which KCMY make use of their in-betweenness to challenge their marginalised positionalities in South Korean

society. The motives for this is a desire to participate in South Korean society and the means an expansion of their social networks. Youth is an in-between age between childhood and adulthood. Anderson (2015) likens the in-between positionalities of youth to that of a grey area between childhood and adulthood. As KCMY are located not only between childhood and adulthood, but also between nationality (Chinese) and ethnicity (ethnic Korean), these factors intersect in their in-between identities. As in-between individuals may be viewed as unstable and uncertain due to their positionalities on the boundary, they remain in the margins of society (Turner, 1995). However, they may also aspire to be subjective members of society, or to form networks with others in order to expand their ability to occupy social space.

In most cases KCMY endeavour to actively participate in South Korean society, having their in-between identity. However, even if they experience unfair discrimination in South Korean society, they have little choice but to accept the reality at the personal level rather than resisting it collectively (Chung, 2009). As will be explained below, KCMY tend to be sceptical about personal or collective resistance since they believe that South Korean society may ignore their resistance due to their status as teenagers, foreigners and Korean-Chinese. For this reason, they largely share their experiences of injustice with their families and Korean-Chinese peers. On this question, four participants suggest that their voices would be ignored by the South Korean government and society; the rest however argue that they need greater opportunities to express their opinions. M2 and M5 show the two sides of the question:

*Even if we express our opinions collectively and send them to the government, the government and South Koreans will not care about what we think. To be honest, the South Korean government prioritises the needs of South Koreans. No matter what problems we have or what help we ask for, civil servants and South Korean society will not listen to our voices as they are. Even if Korean-Chinese adults went on the demo, there would not be any change. Are South Koreans going to listen to the voices of us then, of KCMY? Civil servants see things from the perspective of South Koreans, as if they were saying 'This will be a difficulty faced by KCMY, so we will help them by establishing programmes to help them with that.' However, their ideas are not the same as ours. So, I do not feel the need to express our opinions to the South Korean government or society because we will be ignored anyway.
(M2, Female, High school student, Entry in 2018)*

I am opposed to meeting only KCMY to make our voice heard. Migrant youth from other countries also have difficulties living in South Korea, so it would be nice to share them together. It would be easier for all of us to live in South Korean society if we gave each other advice. And... if only KCMY suggest their opinions, will South Koreans accept them? Maybe not. South Koreans do not like Korean-Chinese. Therefore, if we make our demands together with other migrant youth, maybe South Koreans will listen to our voices better.

(M5, Female, Freshman, Entry in 2015)

M2 does not feel the need to express her opinion to South Korean society because she supposes that she will not be listened to because she is a foreigner and an adolescent. This reasoning is based on her everyday experience of South Korean society's reaction to KCMY, that it is a group that can be ignored. Butler (2015) uses the concept of vulnerable bodies to explain how governments explicitly or implicitly encourage a ban on the expression of a certain group's voice or on the legal and institutional protection of the group. Although there is no specific group in South Korea whose collective expression is explicitly subject to government ban, the South Korean government implicitly tends to ignore the voices and experiences of some groups (e.g., refugees, migrant workers, Korean-Chinese), which are considered inferior in South Korean society. Considering the opinion of M2 from the perspective of the concept of vulnerability, the South Korean government has ignored KCMY rather than listening to their voices for social stability because they are not Koreans. However, she also remarks that the government considers KCMY a vulnerable group and implements policies for them. The problem she poses is that these policies are based on the government's interpretation of the situation, not on the voices of KCMY themselves. The mainstream group believes that they can interpret other groups' voices and respect them in doing so (Spivak, 2010). In this context, KCMY are a subaltern group with a positionality that means they cannot express their true selves (Sharp, 2009). It is possible then that KCMY as a subaltern group believe that the government has accepted their opinions and is drawing up policies to help them, even if the reality is not quite the same. Thus, KCMY who have experienced not being listened to by officialdom prefer not to express their opinions directly to the government or to broader society. Instead of speaking directly, they prefer to express their opinions in indirect ways, such as through questionnaires about life at school or at the centre. Such a method may be expressed as one of majority opinion without the direct

expression of individual opinions. In this respect, KCMY express their voices in other less visible spheres.

On the other hand, M5 prefers to join her voice to that of other foreign migrant youth groups. KCMY tend to express their identity as Chinese or foreign rather than as Korean-Chinese because of the negative discourse surrounding them in South Korean society (see section 6.2.1). In order to convey their voice more effectively and accurately, they sometimes choose to find solidarity with other migrant youth groups from different backgrounds. Through solidarity, individuals can not only share opinions with each other but also publicise their concerns collectively (Butler, 2015; Halvorsen, 2015; Merrifield, 2013). In this respect, some KCMY desire to express themselves in solidarity with others through online petitions or through SNS. This type of solidarity may be related to the characteristics of youth culture, which develops their culture and networks in the online world.

In South Korea, young people enjoy playing online games, watching YouTube videos and reading webtoons. Through these activities too, participants are developing their own networks. Through online youth culture, they can create and expand their individual networks into offline relationships. Extensive online solidarity also helps KCMY who have weak social networks in South Korea form new relationships. In particular, SNS is used as a means of creating and maintaining relationships with others:

I like to draw characters in animations. Now, I am contacting people through an app called Discord. I had been in contact with some other people through the app for about a year. I met them in person recently. They are all older than me, and they are all South Koreans. They do not care what age I am or what nationality. However, as I wanted them to think I am South Korean, I acted like a South Korean student. Frankly speaking, it is not important to me that I am Korean-Chinese when I meet Korean-Chinese friends after getting to know them online, but I do think it is important when I meet negative South Koreans in person. When we met we watched movies together, went shopping, played at the video arcade, and went to a café. That was the first time we had met in person, but maybe because we had a lot in common I did not feel that it was the first time. I still keep in touch with them.
(M14, Female, Middle school student, Entry in 2016)

*I usually meet South Koreans using Open chatting in the Kakao Talk app. Currently I am participating in a chat room where we are all big fans of BTS, who are my favourite boy band. Everyone talks about BTS there. [...] As I do not go to school, it has been hard to make South Korean friends. However, I have a lot of South Korean friends there. I feel like I am South Korean there. No one there would know that I am a Korean-Chinese. (Laughs)
(M17, Female, High school dropout, Entry in 2018)*

*All teenagers these days send messages and communicate with each other on Facebook. When we use it, we can contact other people without knowing their phone numbers, and we can easily make friends. When I access to Facebook, some recommended friends are displayed. If I look at a recommended friend's post and click 'Like', the friend will send me a friend request. Then, if I accept that request, we will be friends on Facebook. I have often met South Korean friends with whom I have become close that way. I am so happy that they treat me without prejudice or discrimination. Like me, other KCMY make South Korean friends through Facebook or Instagram.
(M20, Male, Middle school dropout, Entry in 2017)*

M14, M17 and M20 were easily able to build relationships with South Koreans through SNS. In particular, M17 and M20 have difficulty in meeting South Korean peers because they do not go to school, they have however been able to form relationships with other people in the virtual world by using smartphones. Therefore, new technology affects the construction of the virtual world which may then become integral to our mundane encounters (Ash, 2009). In virtual spaces, people share their opinions and personal information with others whom they share a commonality and are able to form bonds of solidarity. The solidarity in the virtual world may appear weak (Butler, 2015), but it may sometimes have a stronger influence than expected because it is formed through the participation of a number of people over a wide area. Moreover, non-face-to-face and anonymity of the online can help young people expand their relationships online (Anderson, 2015). On SNS, KCMY are free to negotiate their identities without caring about what other people think as their nationality and age are not visible in the virtual space. As a result, as they can employ their in-between identity to establish relationships with others, KCMY find it easier to join groups online than offline where they often experience discrimination and exclusion because of their background. In other words, they remain membership of groups online more by hiding their identities as KCMY rather than by actively trying to pass as South Koreans. For instance, M14 and M17 have felt a sense of belonging to networks which support them through common interests (Butler, 2015).

The virtual relationship of KCMY can be extended to the real world. Like the three participants above, participants usually form relationships with others through SNS, such as Facebook, Instagram, KakaoTalk Open chat and Discord, or through online games. As mentioned earlier, these virtual spaces provide a platform to chat about or enjoy common interests rather than one for political debate. A sense of solidarity among those in the group, which is based on commonality, can develop into relationships in the real world (Butler, 2015). In this respect, participants mention that after maintaining relationships with others online for several months, if people they felt close to suggested offline encounters, they would meet each other in person. As they were already close enough online because of their shared common interests, they are able to have a closer relationship to each other face-to-face than with those whom they had had no previous interaction. Although M14 says she did not worry about her identities during face-to-face encounters with other Korean-Chinese migrants, she also mentions that she tried to pass as a South Korean in real-life encounters with South Koreans. In other words, she was emphasising her identity as a South Koreans rather than that of a Korean-Chinese migrant in navigating the expansion of her virtual relationships into the real world. Therefore, as virtual relationships with South Koreans can lead to real relationships, participants tended to negotiate their identities according to the context. In most cases, they aspire to escape their marginalised position in South Korean society by expanding their relationships with South Koreans. In the next section, I will investigate how KCMY use their in-between positionalities for their employment in the South Korean labour market.

7.3 Work experience and development of career paths

This section investigates the precarious positionalities of KCMY as semi-compliant migrants in the South Korean labour market, who are legally resident but working in violation of some or all of the employment restrictions attached to their immigration status (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). As adolescence is considered the period during which one prepares to become an independent individual, it is presumed in South Korean society that most young people are in education. In neoliberal society, however, young people often undergo a transition process that is more diverse or even uncertain than

is typical or standardised transition process (Frändberg, 2015; Koo, 2021; Lulle et al., 2018; Peng, 2020; Punch, 2015). Work experience is often part of this dynamic process. In general, adolescents work part-time on weekends or vacations in the service sector where labour markets are flexible. Even though migrant youth participate in, or desire to be involved in, economic activities in the host country, both structural factors—e.g. strict immigration policies, limited economic opportunities for migrant youth and discourse on specific migrants—and individual factors—e.g. language barriers, a lack of prior work experiences and limited exposure to local individual networks—can become obstacles to enter the job market in the host country (Kim, 2016; Koo, 2021; Moskal, 2017; Peng, 2020). In other words, it is more difficult for migrant youth to find work experience than native youth because of the difficulty of finding work opportunities in the host society which take advantage of knowledge and experience gained in their places of origin. If these difficulties continue, migrant youth can be excluded and marginalised in the host society (Khan, 2021).

In general most KCMY also desire to gain work experience in South Korea. In South Korean academia, very few previous studies have investigated the economic activities of migrant youth, including KCMY. The reason for this shortfall may be related to the assumption, typical among the educated elite, that migrant youth need help to adapt and assimilate through receiving support in schools or centres rather than through work experiences as it is presumed that most migrant youth are in fulltime education (Lee et al., 2020). However, since migrant youth are not only studying at school but are also in work, research on employment should be included in studies of migrant youth. Such research if it were to focus on their current work experiences could help illuminate the social and economic position of KCMY in South Korean society beyond becoming adults.

KCMY are more active in part-time work than other groups of migrant youth as they look the same as South Koreans and generally held visas allowing for a long term stay (Lee et al., 2020). Participants held mainly F-1 visas (15 people) or F-2 visas (1 person), which are dependent on visa types of their parents, or D-4 visas (1 person) or F-4 visas (2 people) which are issued to ethnic Koreans who hold authorised technical qualifications. As detailed in 7.3.1, Korean-Chinese migrants who hold F-1 or F-4 visas are not allowed to work in the service sector, however they have informally worked in restaurants,

warehouses and wholesale markets. KCMY work part-time in such places doing jobs like washing dishes, delivery work or distributing parcels in warehouses (see table 7.1). Although underage migrant youth who hold D-4 visas are prohibited from all economic activity, they also do part-time jobs in those kinds of workplace. Even though one participant who holds a Temporary visit (C-3) visa is not allowed to work during his stay (for 90 days) (MOJ, 2021), he also makes a living through doing part-time jobs. Flexible working arrangements are typical the kinds of sector where KCMY find part-time work and employers can hire part-time workers and use their labour flexibly under this work arrangement (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). Even though some employers know that KCMY have visas that do not allow them to work, they hire them because they can pay them lower wages (see section 7.3.1). As a result, KCMY can live in South Korea both as legal residents and irregular workers. This position between legality and illegality can make their working environment precarious and they often face difficulties at work because of it. In this respect, the first sub-section will examine the difficulties experienced by KCMY as semi-compliant migrants in the South Korean labour market. The second sub-section will investigate how they overcome such difficulties in their career paths.

Table 7.1 Participants who have worked in South Korea

ID	Age	Current visa type	Part-time		Full-time
			Day labour	Regular	
M1	19	D-4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restaurant staff Delivery man (in wholesale markets) 		
M5	18	F-2	Restaurant staff		
M6	19	Naturalised	Restaurant staff		
M7	16	Naturalised	Restaurant staff		
M11	17	F-1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reseller of limited editions Distribution of parcels at warehouses 	Part-time worker at a convenience store	
M14	15	F-1	Drawing animation characters		
M15	19	F-1	Restaurant staff	Chinese grocery staff	
M16	19	F-1	Restaurant staff		
M17	19	F-4			Duty-free shop staff
M19	16	F-1	Handing out fliers		
M20	19	C-3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restaurant staff Mask packing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restaurant staff Pub staff 	

7.3.1 Precarious positionalities as semi-compliant migrants in the labour market

This section explores experiences of marginalisation of KCMY in the South Korean labour market as a result of both individual and structural factors. As migrant youth have to adapt to a new society and culture as part of the process of transition to adulthood, this transition becomes more complex and more challenging (Peng, 2020). Previously published studies on the work experience of migrant youth mainly focus on the strategies and capital used in finding work; they do not however examine the complex process of their transition into the labour market (Naafs and Skelton, 2018; Waters, 2015; Zampoukos et al., 2018). Research on the work experience of KCMY has been conducted as part of the data collected used to establish support plan, and this research maintains that migrant youth work part-time due to their economic difficulties (Bae et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2020). This previously published literature does not however deal with the difficulties KCMY face in preparing for and participating in work nor does it offer in depth analysis of the factors affecting their work experiences. In this regard, there is a need to discuss the reasons why KCMY look for work and the difficulties they face in the South Korean labour market.

KCMY face various obstacles that they would not have had to deal with in China when they start to look for a job in South Korea. Participants desire to find work in order to experience the local culture and to better adapt to South Korean society as well as for broader economic motives, such as earning some pocket money. However, they face many difficulties in finding work opportunities due to their age, immigration status and the pervading negative public discourse surrounding China. M3 and M4 describe the difficulty of finding a job due to these factors:

In theory, I can get a job as soon as I have got my makeup qualification. The principal of my makeup academy usually introduces students who pass the qualification to various makeup studios and beauty salons, so successful students are easily able to get a job. I probably will not be able to get a job without an introduction somewhere. (Laughs) Now, the principal says that because I am Chinese, I will not be able to get a job due to the coronavirus. Even though I hold an F-4 visa that allows me to work, I cannot get a job because South Koreans are currently avoiding

Chinese. If conflicts arise between China and South Korea due to issues like THAAD¹³, and fine atmospheric dust, it will be difficult for us to find jobs or we would be forced to quit them. If I find a job, I will be discriminated against not because I am Korean-Chinese, but because I am Chinese.

(M3, Female, High school dropout, Entry in 2019)

Next year, I will be an adult and will have to find work. So, while still an adolescent, I want to experience South Korean society through having a part-time job before working in a real workplace. Through working part-time, I think I will be able to understand how to work in South Korea and how to have a proper relationship with South Koreans. Of course, it will be good that I can earn my allowance through doing a part-time job, but honestly, I definitely want to do it because it is an opportunity to understand South Korean society better. (Laughs) Even though migrant youth holding F-1 visas are not supposed to work, they often do part-time secretly. (Laughs) Honestly, it is not easy to find a part-time job because I am under age and Chinese. So, I feel sorry for my mum, but I am still getting pocket money from her.

(M4, Female, High school student, Entry in 2019)

Participants hope to experience real South Korean society through employment and wish to find work not only for economic independence but for social independence as well. According to table 7.1, participants mainly found low-skilled jobs in the service sector where work as day labours or short-term part-time jobs which do not require specialist training are commonplace. It is easier for migrant youth to find jobs in this sector than in others (Naafs and Skelton, 2018; Smith, 2018). M3 and M4 are struggling to find jobs due to their age, employment restrictions attached to their immigration status, and the negative perceptions of Chinese people typically held by South Koreans. In particular, participants under the age of 18 stress that it is difficult to find part-time work because they are 'foreign teenagers'. M14 (fifteen years old) and M19 (sixteen years old) explained that as they are legally too young to work part-time, they cannot find part-time jobs in spaces such as cafes or convenience stores even with their parents' permission. For this reason, they

¹³ THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) is an American anti-ballistic missile defence system. It has been deployed in South Korea to counter missile threats from North Korea. The Chinese government has expressed concerns that its deployment could jeopardise China's legitimate national security interests. As a result of the deployment of THAAD in South Korea, the Chinese government has banned South Korean companies from operating in China and prohibited the import of products from South Korea.

had to take jobs where there is little face-to-face interaction with South Koreans and the tasks involved are simple. These non-face-to-face jobs do not meet their desired objective of gaining insight into South Korean society.

Table 7.2 Allowed length of stay and employment restrictions according to visa type

Visa Type	Length of Stay	Employment	
		Under the age of 18	From the age of 18
C-3	90 days	Not allowed	Not allowed
D-4	2 years (renewal available)	Not allowed	Part-time jobs that students generally do in South Korea
F-1	2 years (renewal available)	Not allowed	Allowed (except unskilled labour jobs)
F-2	5 years (renewal available)	Not allowed	Allowed (except unskilled labour jobs)
F-4	3 years (renewal available)	Not allowed	Allowed (except unskilled labour jobs)

Source: MOJ, 2021

Employment restrictions attached to their immigration status constrain KCMY from searching for legal employment (Mosneaga and Winther, 2013; Peng, 2020; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). As mentioned earlier, KCMY often work part-time as semi-compliant migrants. The industrial sectors in which adult Korean-Chinese migrants are allowed to work are restricted by their visa types. In the case of KCMY under the age of 18, any economic activity is prohibited (see table 7.2). However, part-time jobs are often sought for in violation of employment rules. The existence of a workforce of semi-compliant migrants is a result then of the economic benefits for both KCMY who can earn pocket money and for employers who gain access to an easy source of cheap labour (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). As detailed below, this semi-compliance has negative consequences for working conditions (e.g., low wages and unfair treatment). Furthermore, some employers are reluctant to hire KCMY for fear of the fines or penalties involved if they are caught. For instance, M16 tried to find a part-time job through an employment agency website, but some employers refused to employ her because she held an F-1 visa and was underage. Thus, even though underage KCMY hold long-term visas, they still find it difficult to enter the South Korean labour market legally due to the employment restrictions attached to their visa types.

M3 notes that KCMY encounter prejudice due to negative perceptions of China and that this is an obstacle in finding work. As mentioned in Chapter 6, negative attitudes towards both Chinese and by implication Korean-Chinese migrants as well affect the marginalisation of KCMY in everyday life. It is noteworthy that, as M3 mentions, difficulties in finding a job, are not because KCMY are Korean-Chinese, but rather because they are from China. Mainstream discourse on China in South Korea can have a significant impact on whether or not employers decide to employ KCMY (Coe and Kelly, 2000; Yea, 2015). As a result, it may be difficult for KCMY to enter the South Korean labour market.

Despite these difficulties, some KCMY succeed in finding jobs. However, they encounter other difficulties in the workplaces. As with all groups of migrant youth, working in unfamiliar societies and cultures, they must confront cultural or structural obstacles and are in a more precarious position in the labour market than the natives (Lewis et al., 2015; Marcu, 2019; Peng, 2020; Waite, 2009). In particular, M1 and M16 explain how inadequate language skills and a lack of work experience influences the type of work obtained by KCMY and their marginalisation in the workplace:

I used to work part-time at a BBQ restaurant. As I am not good at Korean, I just washed the dishes in the kitchen. My colleagues looked down on me and never talked to me. For them, I was an invisible person. I have worked cleaning up in another restaurant. At that time, I cleared the table in the wrong way. Because I had never done such work before, I was confused. The owner of the restaurant got angry while cursing at me. He did not treat other South Korean part-time workers like that. I think that because I am a foreigner and a teenager, he felt he could do that. Although I was really angry, I put up with it.

(M1, Male, High school student, Entry in 2017)

The types of work we can do are different depending on our Korean language skills. Korean-Chinese friends who are not good at Korean do not look for part-time jobs working with South Koreans. They want to work in restaurants or shops run by Korean-Chinese or Han-Chinese. So, when they look for a part-time job, they do not use the job-hunting website or apps that South Koreans use. They mainly use apps that Chinese people use for finding work in South Korea. If they have no choice but to work part-time, they will wash dishes or clean up in a restaurant.

(M16, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

M1 and M16 stress that Korean language proficiency and amount of work experience in South Korea affect the types of job they can get and their positionalities within the workplace. Korean language proficiency of KCMY influences not only their relationships with South Koreans (see Section 6.2) but also the sense of belonging they feel as an in-between individual in South Korean society (see Section 7.2). Their Korean language proficiency is also a significant factor affecting their sense of belonging and positionalities in the workplace. The language barrier hinders them from finding jobs working with South Koreans and makes forming relationships with their colleagues difficult (Bae et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2020; Moskal, 2017). As a result, M1 describes how he felt an 'invisible person' at work. He experienced isolation in his workplace and was constantly ignored as it was difficult for him to communicate with his colleagues due to the language barrier. As M16 mentions, KCMY who have difficulty in finding a job due to a lack of Korean language skills tend to have little work experience in South Korea. As a result, they do not know the correct rules and etiquette of the South Korean workplace. In this regard, they often make mistakes and so lose the trust of their employers. S11, a teacher at a vocational high school for migrant youth, mentions that when students go to factories for field training, they sometimes have conflicts with the owners because they do not understand the rules and etiquette of the South Korean workplace. Repeated exposure to this kind of experience may result in KCMY who have a lack of Korean language skills continuing to work in Korean-Chinese communities where they can find jobs and work more easily and comfortably (Lee, 2015; Lee, 2014; Samers and Collyer, 2017). Three of my participants often work part-time on weekends and during holidays at restaurants run by their parents or relatives located in the Korean-Chinese ethnic enclave. The main motive for these part-time jobs is to give the family a helping hand rather than a personal economic one. When KCMY enter adulthood, if they fail to get a job outside their community, they will have to look for a job in their enclave economy. In this regard, although participants desire to join the mainstream economy (see section 7.4.3), if they do not have adequate Korean language proficiency and a proper understanding of the South Korean workplace, they can only hope to find work within the Korean-Chinese community. This implies that they are vulnerable to marginalisation in South Korean society.

In terms of their wages, KCMY are also in a precarious situation. Most employment is in the service sector, where most work is low-paid and part-

time (Lee et al., 2020; Marcu, 2019; Naafs and Skelton, 2018; Smith, 2018). As mentioned earlier, KCMY are paid less than South Korean workers. This is a result of employers exploiting their illegal employment status to pay them lower wages. Some KCMY complain to their employers about low wages. However, most KCMY are forced to accept the situation. M1, M15 and M20 discuss their responses to the problem of low wages:

I used to wash dishes as a part-time job in a restaurant. At that time, the minimum hourly wage was about 8,500 won (about £6). I worked for 12 hours as a day labourer, so I should have earned at least 90,000 won (about £60). However, the owner gave me only 85,000 won (about £57). In the case of daily part-time jobs, I got paid cash in hand and came home to check the money, but the money was not enough. So, when I told my parents about it, they just told me to put up with it, saying it was not that great. So I did put up with it because I had nowhere to ask for help even if I was frustrated.

(M1, Male, High school student, Entry in 2017)

Employers seem to be trying to reduce our daily wages because we are migrant youth. When I was looking for a part-time job, if I said I am a Chinese student, many business owners were reluctant to employ me. However, some of them, told me, "It would be possible if you receive a smaller than usual daily wage." Employers knew that I was a foreign teenager and not allowed to work part-time so they tried to take advantage of this and pay me a lower wage. When I worked part-time at a restaurant, the owner gave me a lower wage than he had promised at first. I believed that he would pay me according to the legal minimum hourly wage. However, I did not protest. To be honest, I knew that I could not work with my current visa so I gave up asking for reasonable wage. I thought I should not cause any problems until I change my visa type to one which allows me to work.

(M15, Female, High school graduate, Entry in 2015)

I used to work part-time at a restaurant for twelve hours. It was a day labour. However, the owner paid me a lower wage than the minimum hourly wage since I was working illegally as a foreigner. When, I asked for the money I should have received, he got angry and told me he would report me for working illegally. So, I told that I would report him to the centres for migrant workers and other organisations. If he was caught employing me illegally, he would have to pay a fine. So, he gave me the proper wage that I should have received. Honestly, if I had not known where I could get help, I would have given up like my friends. [...] The teachers at the centre for migrant youth always worry about me. There are migrant youth like me who come here to find work with C-3 visa. Even if the

teachers tell me not to work, they know I will do it. So, they always tell me to be careful.
(M20, Male, Middle school dropout, Entry in 2017)

The participants above who have all been employed in South Korea describe how they usually work daily part-time at restaurants on weekends or during vacations and that they get paid cash in hand (see table 7.1). Some researchers suggest that KCMY have an advantage in finding their employment because they are similar in appearance to South Koreans (Chung, 2009; Khan, 2021). Despite this advantage, KCMY earn less than South Koreans because of their in-between positionalities—semi-compliance—in the South Korean labour market. As mentioned earlier, semi-compliant migrants in the workforce infringe some or all of the employment regulations depending on their visa types. Even though employment status is a result of the host country's immigration laws (Mountz, 2003; Ruszczyk, 2021), in practical terms employers ignore or exploit the rules to employ migrants illegally. Employers know the immigration status of migrants including their residential status and the employment restrictions for different categories of visa, and migrants understand the employment rules attached to their visa type (Anderson, 2008; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). Thus, semi-compliance allows both migrants and employers to bend the rules rather than breaking them while minimising potential punishments for infringing the immigration laws (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). In practice, only a few cases of employers being punished for hiring KCMY under the age of 18 as part-time workers have been reported. In other words, government is not active in cracking down on these employment violations both because KCMY legally reside in South Korea and because the impact of their employment on the South Korean labour market is minimal. This position is in stark contrast to the government crackdown on employment and residence violations of fully undocumented migrant workers.

KCMY who work part-time are reluctant to report any difficulties that arise in the workplace as a result of them breaking the conditions of their visa type. Like M15, they tend not to report the problem because they do not want their state of semi-compliance to be revealed to the government in order to smoothly switch their visa type to another one that allows them to get paid employment legally (Lee, 2015; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). This fear of being reported to the authorities encourages unscrupulous employers to exploit them by paying a lower wage than is normal or legal. On the one hand, some

KCMY accept the lower wage forced on them by their employers. On the other hand, others, such as M20, challenge their employers and end up receiving the correct wage. They claim their rights by threatening employers with reporting them to organisations for migrants or to the government for employing them illegally. M20 learned how to deal with this kind of situation from the centre for migrant youth and also has excellent Korean language skills and good knowledge of the South Korean labour market. Based on his language proficiency and knowledge, he was able to agitate for his rights and get his wages raised to the correct level. Therefore, KCMY can be successful as semi-compliant migrant workers by overcoming difficulties as a result of having good language skills and knowledge of the types of problem they are likely to experience in the workplace (Anderson, 2008; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010).

KCMY who are working full-time are usually over 18 years old and are often employed as casual workers. Their employment status however may be vulnerable and uncertain. With the emergence of flexible labour contracts in a neoliberal economy, flexible employment and casualization have become common features of the labour market (Naafs and Skelton, 2018; Smith, 2018). In particular, precarious employment patterns have had a significant impact on young people, women, labour migrants and contract workers (Lukacs, 2015; Naafs and Skelton, 2018). In South Korea, young Korean-Chinese workers are also in a precarious position in the labour market. M17 recounts how difficult the precarious nature of casual employment can be:

*I used to have a job as a casual worker in a duty-free shop in Myeong-dong. As I can speak both Korean and Chinese, I sold cosmetics to Chinese tourists. So, there were only Chinese employees in the shop where I worked. By the way, I quit this job recently. Due to the coronavirus, Chinese people could not come to South Korea, so duty-free shops did not do any business. The manager of the shop told me that my contract was likely to be terminated even though there was still some time left. So, when I was fired, I tried to find another job. However, there was no job I could do. Since I am Chinese, it is difficult to get a full-time job unless it is in a duty-free shop or a cosmetics shop for Chinese. Frankly speaking, it has been very difficult financially because I was suddenly fired. My father is not working either, so I have to pay all the bills and taxes. I am really confused and tired.
(M17, Female, High school dropout, Entry in 2018)*

M17 is the only one of my participants with experience of full-time work in South Korea. In South Korean society, 72.5 percent of high school graduates go to university or college, and there is only a limited industrial sector where high school dropouts and graduates can find a full-time work (MOE, 2020; Yeung and Alipio, 2013). KCMY over 18 years old often work in the service or manufacturing sectors as contract workers (Lee et al., 2020). Their occupations vary according to their gender. According to a study by Lee et al. (2020), about 88.9 percent of female KCMY are employed in jobs that provide services for Chinese tourists. These are generally located in places used by Chinese tourists, such as duty-free shops, department stores and hotels. On the other hand, 46.5 percent of male KCMY work as factory workers. In particular, as female KCMY are largely employed in the service industry, it is difficult for them to find jobs in other sectors. This may be related to the high demand for them in this particular sector, but it may also mean that they lack information about employment in other sectors of the economy (Lee et al., 2020). As a result, if one of them suddenly quits her job like M17, they will have a hard time finding a new one. The subsequent unemployment can result in rapid economic and social marginalisation.

In particular, as the jobs which are done by female KCMY are easily influenced by the numbers of Chinese tourists, their employment is precarious. If the number of Chinese tourists visiting South Korea decreases, some employers fire them due to their companies falling into financial difficulty. Even though they have a contract for a fixed period of employment, whether or not they keep their job depends on the health of the company where they are employed. Thus, having a flexible and casual employment contract affects both levels of pay and security (Naafs and Skelton, 2018; Smith, 2018). Female KCMY are paid less than permanent employees, and their employment depends on the financial situation of the company. Although their predicament is shared by other casual workers, KCMY, who find it more difficult to get proper information or support, are in a more precarious position than South Korean workers. Personal experience of precarious employment may result in them giving up their search for full-time work and restricting their chance to earn a living to helping occasionally with the family business, or to looking for illegal part-time jobs. Alternatively, for those who are able to retain work by tolerating a difficult work environment and standard of life, their current precarious position may have a negative impact on their social and economic hierarchies or positionalities both in the present and future. I will look into future economic

activities in depth in section 7.4.3. In the next subsection, I will investigate how KCMY consider their precarious positionalities in the labour market and prepare for jobs they may aspire to in South Korea.

7.3.2 Experiences of being a proactive agent in one's career path

Through work experience, migrant youth cannot only earn pocket money, but also learn about the social structures or relationships in the host society. Therefore, work experience is considered an opportunity to adapt to the host society economically, socially and culturally (Williams, 2007). In South Korea, KCMY are also encouraged to adapt to the host society through participation in economic activities. Even though they often experience discrimination and social exclusion not only in their daily lives but also in the workplace, these negative experiences may be considered steppingstones for future life. To date academic research has focused on understanding the difficulties experienced by KCMY in the South Korean labour market (Bae et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2020). In this section, however, taking matters a step further, I investigate how they respond to such difficulties and prepare for future employment in mainstream society.

Most participants maintain that their desire to work part-time is primarily to give them experience of the South Korean labour market rather than simply for economic reasons. Unlike ordinary part-time workers who work for economic reasons, they have decided to find part-time work in order to gain greater understanding about South Korean society. This implies that as KCMY have difficulty learning about South Korean society, especially the labour market. This lack of knowledge about the South Korean labour market may be a result of factors such as the short duration of their stay in the country, the language barrier and their lack of effective local networks (Lee et al., 2020). M11 and M14 assert that trial and error as well as advice gained from others during previous work experience have been factors that have helped them in their career development:

I have had a number of part-time jobs in restaurants. I like working in them. When I was working in the restaurants, the owners would explain how much money one needs to open a restaurant and what one needs to learn because I would tell them, "I want to run a restaurant in the future." Some owners told me to contact them if I

ever needed their help. While working part-time in restaurants, I learned a lot about how to talk to colleagues and how to behave. I learned a lot by being scolded and cursed. (Laughs) If I were to run a restaurant, I would make less money than working part-time as a reseller of limited-edition shoes. Nevertheless, these days, it is good to know not only how to work in South Korea but also how to get along with people through doing a part-time job.
(M11, Male, High school student, Entry in 2013)

I work part-time drawing animation characters through a website. If someone asks me to draw a character, I will draw it and sell it to him/her. Before I had this part-time job, I did not think I was good at drawing. However, I am considered a good illustrator here, so I can earn more than 100,000 won (£67) per picture. I think I was able to recognise I had talent here. After graduating from university, I want to work for a film animation company like Disney.
(M14, Female, Middle school student, Entry in 2016)

M11 and M14 were able to develop their career path as a result of their part-time work experiences. Participants communicate little with their parents due to the parents' long work hours, and also their parents themselves possess limited information about the South Korean labour market (see section 5.3.1). Therefore, it is difficult to get much information or support from their parents. However, through working part-time, they can get information about jobs from their employers or South Korean colleagues and start their career development in South Korean society. In addition, through interacting with colleagues and customers, they can better understand not only the South Korean workplace culture but also more practical ways to form social relationships in South Korean society—e.g. greetings, ways of speaking to colleagues and clients and social etiquette. Thus, they can better understand the culture and structure of mainstream society. Although there may be times when they experience discrimination or social exclusion in their encounters with others, these negative experiences when approached with the right attitude may also be opportunities for self-improvement (Koo, 2021; Peng, 2020; Wilson, 2017). In addition, KCMY, who tend to have small social networks within the host society, gain an opportunity to expand their networks through relationships with employers and colleagues. In other words, part-time jobs can become a vital channel providing them with useful social networks for their future career and life (King, 2018; Koo, 2021). The more KCMY expand their social network, the more they tend to feel a sense of belonging to various groups within South Korean society.

Moreover, KCMY have the opportunity to learn what their strengths are through doing part-time jobs and to set their own career paths. As they face a new society and culture and are not able to draw on previous knowledge and experience from the home country, they often have a low opinion of their abilities in the host society (Peng, 2020). However, through working in a job they find interesting, participants have been able to learn what their abilities are in the South Korean labour market. For them, flexible and temporary employment is the first route into the South Korean labour market. Once they have gained some experience of the industrial sector through having a short-term part-time job, they are able to learn new skills as well as recognise their own abilities and develop their careers. In this regard, M11 stresses that the information he obtained while working part-time will reduce the amount of trial and error he would otherwise make when working as an adult. However, whereas some KCMY may give up their hopes of a career through repeated experiences of precarious employment, others are eager to find available jobs like M11 and M14. Thus, they hope to be able to enter mainstream society without the stigma of social and economic marginalisation even after they have become adults.

Similarly, some participants prepare for a future career by entering a vocational high school. In East Asia, public perception of students who attend vocational schools is negative, and the school curriculum has been much criticised (Ling, 2015). In Section 6.3, I concluded that the curriculum of the vocational high schools for migrant youth in South Korea do not take into account students' areas of interest or the social perceptions of their graduates and as such have a negative impact on their social marginalisation. Despite this negative judgement, vocational high schools are also responsible for providing KCMY with information and teaching them skills in several fields:

The tourism vocational high school I went to had several majors related to the service sector, particularly the hotel and aviation industries. My major was in the cooking department. At first, I wanted to get a job right after graduation, but high school graduates can only get lower level jobs. That is why I went to college. I wanted to be a chef. Some of my friends did not want to do anything in the future before they entered the vocational high school. However, after taking classes and practising, they now have a dream. If migrant youth who do not have any plans for the future enter vocational high schools and get technical qualifications related to their majors, they will make money by using their skills and knowledge. I got a cook's license in Korean cuisine and will also try

to get a Chinese cooking license soon. I was able to get a certificate and also learn a lot about the South Korean labour market through classes. I would not have been able to learn so much without the experts in my field. If migrants do not know about the world of work in South Korea, I think it will be helpful for them to go to a vocational high school.

(M6, Male, Freshman, Entry in 2012)

I go to a beauty academy on weekends and am studying for a certificate in makeup. At first, I wanted to go to a beauty high school to learn to be a makeup designer. However, the teachers in the academy recommended that it would be better to go to an academic high school because beauty high schools are not good as good as I think. They also said it would be good to attend make up classes on weekends and prepare for getting a qualification from a beauty academy. While attending the academy, I learned not only about makeup techniques but also obtained information about where I can get a job with makeup skills. So, my dream seems to becoming clearer.

(M8, Female, Middle school student, Entry in 2014)

The twelve participants, who attended or are attending high schools in South Korea, all went to or go to vocational high schools. They enter a vocational high schools not only because they want to get a job after graduation but because they worry that they would struggle to adapt to an academic high school. In South Korean society, there is a great deal of social stigma surrounding vocational high schools. It is believed that students who attend them are academically poor and often have behavioural problems (Ling, 2015). As a result, young people who get a job right after graduating from vocational high school tend to be somewhat stigmatised by their new colleagues and this can have a negative impact on their level of economic and social marginalisation. Despite this negative public perception of a vocational high schools, KCMY more generally attend vocational than regular high schools. As mentioned above, all 12 participants, who have attended high schools in South Korea, were or are vocational high school students. Furthermore, S4, the principal of an alternative middle school for migrant youth, mentioned that most of the Korean-Chinese students in his school go on to vocational high schools. In vocational high schools, KCMY can acquire the knowledge and skills needed for particular jobs, and also get experience of the job in advance via practical training in the workplace. In particular, they can receive training in for jobs where they will utilise their in-between positionalities. For example, M6 obtained a Korean cuisine license and will try to get a similar license in Chinese cuisine through classes at his school. He was able to discover his

competitiveness as a Korean-Chinese chef in the labour market by learning not only cooking skills but also gaining information about career-related prospects from school. Furthermore, KCMY, who have lived in South Korea for only a short term or who lack information about the South Korean labour market, have the opportunity to develop their career paths through gaining a vocational and technical qualification. Private vocational training institutions such as beauty academies may also play the same role. In this way, vocational high schools and private vocational training institutions can help KCMY both become more self-sufficient and develop their career path by gaining knowledge, skills and information related to jobs. They can also be an important resource for those preparing for the socioeconomic activities of adulthood in an unfamiliar society and who wish to join the mainstream without being isolated or socially marginalised. In the next section, I will explore how KCMY plan for their future by hoping to make use of their in-betweenness.

7.4 Plans for the future: migration, legal status and employment

This section explores how the migration of KCMY to South Korea affects their plans for the future, including making changes to their legal status and employment goals. It is well known that the individual migration experience has an influence on one's current and future life. As migrants confront a new environment, they must necessarily adapt to the host society by adjusting the habits and rhythms of their daily lives (Cojocaru, 2021; Lefebvre, 2004; Valentine, 2008). As part of this adaptation process, they generally feel multiple emotional connections between their place of origin and destination. These connections result in multiple senses of belonging typified by in-between positionalities, which leads not to a permanent disconnection from their place of origin but to continued feelings of connection. Therefore, an in-between positionalities and multiple senses of belonging offer play significant roles in the way migrants plan their lives. This may be done in such ways that they can flexibly negotiate their identities and belonging depending on the situation.

As discussed in the previous chapters, KCMY try to adapt to South Korean society by using situated knowledge between South Korea and China. Their

in-between positionalities facilitate strategies which help them be more flexible in dealing with situated contexts and relationships. In South Korea, KCMY usually emphasise their identity as Chinese more than their identity as Korean-Chinese. In other words, they tend to frame their identities more through national citizenship than through ethnic belonging. However, when they plan for their future in South Korea, they often make strategic use of their identity as Korean-Chinese. They obtain long-term residence visas based on the fact that they share the same ethnicity as South Koreans and make use of their ethnic capital in the workplace. Previous Korean studies on the life plans of migrant youth have tended to focus on their career plans (Hong, 2017; Seo and Cho, 2017). However, these offer only limited reflection on migrant youth's positionalities and belonging in their daily lives, which also affect how they plan for the future. In addition, the prevalent perspective among researchers that KCMY are permanent settlers rather than migrants hinders a proper understanding of those KCMY who desire to live as transnational migrants. Based on these limitations in the existing literature, the first sub-section will investigate the relationship between emotions felt by KCMY during their migration to South Korea and their thoughts of further migration. In the second sub-section, I will explore how KCMY seek to change their legal status in South Korea based on prospects open to them through immigration law. The last sub-section will examine how their migration experiences influence their plans for a career.

7.4.1 Influence of the migration experience on prospective plans for further migration

This section examines how the emotions felt by KCMY during the process of migration to South Korea affect their migration plans for the future. Migrant youth form new relationships through their encounters with others in new spatial and social contexts as a result of migration (Skelton, 2013). In these new relationships, they may feel diverse emotions, which may have a significant impact on how they negotiate their positionalities and sense of belonging (Adey, 2010; Skelton, 2013). Influenced by their positionalities and sense of belonging in the host society, they may in some cases make plans for further migration. Therefore, the emotions felt by migrant youth during their migration to the host country are important factors which affect their decision to move on again or settle down once they have reached adulthood.

The emotions felt by KCMY during the migration process influence not only their adaptation to South Korean society but also their prospective migration decisions or strategies. Some participants who have experienced tolerance and hospitality in South Korea have little difficulty in adapting to South Korean society. This acceptance not only gives them confidence that they have successfully adapted to the new environment, but may also have a positive impact on any decision to migrate to another country in the future. These positive feelings about the current migration experience imply that they feel South Korea has become their new home country. M4 and M6 argue that the experience of their successful, and relatively painless, adaptation to South Korean society will have a positive impact on any further decision making about migration they may make as adults:

If I still lived in China, I would not be able to go to another country even after I had grown up. I have a Korean-Chinese friend in China, who does better in her studies than I do and could enter a good university in South Korea. However, she does not want to enter a Korean university. She is afraid to live in an unfamiliar country. (Laughs) Although I had a hard time right after arriving in South Korea, I was able to get through it thanks to the support of my friends. So, I think I can overcome any difficulty even if I go to live in another country. I think people, like me, who have adapted well will not have much fear of moving to other countries. Since we have experienced it once, we know what we have to do to prepare. (M4, Female, High school student, Entry in 2019)

As I have a lot of friends in South Korea and have become naturalised here, I feel I have become 100 percent South Korean. I have had the experience of migrating from China to South Korea already. So, I am not afraid or worried about living in another country. However, I do not want to leave South Korea. As I already have friends here and my life has become comfortable, I would not decide to give up this comfort and relocate to another country even if I had not been naturalised. (M6, Male, Freshman, Entry in 2012)

Flexibility of identities and positionalities can influence future migration decisions. Thirteen out of twenty participants argue that their migration experience will both provide them with useful skills to prepare them for or help them come to a decision about migration in the future and be useful to develop adaptation strategies in new spaces. Eleven of them are living in South Korea for more than a year, and two participants who are living in South Korea for

less than a year have visited the country for a short time before their migration. These 13 participants believe that they are well adapted to South Korean society. They have achieved this by learning to understand South Korean culture and society and by forming favourable relationships with their peers or acquaintances as in the cases of M4 and M6. Although they have encountered much change and many challenges, their successful adaptation demonstrates an ability to respond to those difficulties with subjectivity and self-confidence (Oswin and Yeoh, 2010; Punch, 2002; Skelton, 2002). In this light, M4 maintains that her experience of moving to South Korea is an important asset when it comes to making future decisions about further migration. From what M4 says above it is clear that she feels able to develop psychological and practical strategies to prepare for any future migration based on past experience and heuristic knowledge gained from her migration to South Korea. In particular, KCMY who have been successful in flexibly shifting their identities and positionalities believe that this flexibility would help them easily adapt if they chose to migrate to another destination. They appear to have a perennial openness to further movement even if their mobility may change depending on their economic and social position (Cojocaru, 2021; Eade et al., 2007). Therefore, some KCMY aspire to move to a third country or even to return to China after making a success of themselves in South Korea (see section 7.4.3).

Two of participants remark that they would rather stay in South Korea in the future because they are satisfied with their lives here and feel a sense of belonging. As we have seen, M6 states that it would not be easy for him to migrate to another country due more to the comfort of his everyday life in South Korea rather than to any fear of a new environment. Similarly, most participants feel that South Korea has become their new home and this makes them reluctant to decide their migration to a new country. They have gradually come to feel a sense of belonging in South Korean society as they feel they have successfully adapted to it (Ho and Hatfield, 2011; Lam and Yeoh, 2004). They have formed an attachment to South Korean society because they feel they emotionally belong there. It is not that they have lost their feeling of connection to China but rather that they have created a new one with South Korea. As a result, they feel at home in South Korean society and would be hesitant to relocate somewhere else, just as they had been reluctant to leave China beforehand. However, some KCMY may not be able to leave South Korea due to the trauma they have had to undergo in adapting to South

Korean society. S1 shares the experience of some KCMY who have attended her centre:

KCMY have already experienced migration once, and some of them suffer from conflicts and shocks in the migration process. They seem to choose to stay in South Korea rather than go back to China because all their family and relatives live in South Korea, not China. Although they have difficulty getting along with South Koreans, they live with their family members at home. If they go back to China, they would have to live alone again. That is the reason why they do not want to return to China or move to any other countries. They just want to live with their family in South Korea. It is comfortable for them to spend time with Chinese or Korean-Chinese friends here.

(S1, Female, Head of centre for migrant youth)

If they cannot even adapt to life in South Korea, how can they adapt to life in another country? It would be difficult for them. There are some KCMY who cannot adapt to life here and who go back to China. One of my friends came to South Korea as her parents live here. However, she could not get along well with her classmates or keep up with classes. So, she told her parents that she wanted to go back to China. Now, she is living with her grandmother in China again. I think that those who have not adapted well when they stay here for a short time will go back to China. I also wanted to go back to China when I had a hard time right after arriving in Seoul.

(M19, Male, Middle school student, Entry in 2016)

KCMY who end up living in South Korea include some who have less difficulty in adapting to South Korean society (as in the case of M6) and others who experienced difficulties in the adaptation process. Although each group has had very different feelings and experiences during the migration process, the outcome for both has been the same, remaining in South Korea. S1 argues that most KCMY who have difficulty adapting to South Korean society have little choice but to remain in the country because they have nowhere else to go. All participants live with at least one of their parents in South Korea. Moreover, as most of their relatives live there too, it is difficult to find family or relatives who still live in China. As in the case of M19's friend, if KCMY have family members still living in China, they can go back. However, if they do not, it is not easy for them to decide to return to China. In other words, they choose to stay in South Korea because that is now where they feel their home is. Furthermore, their emotional connection to China, their home country, tends to loosen as time goes on (Howes and Hammett, 2016). Therefore, they may

choose to stay in South Korea because they do not want to experience the harsh process of adaptation again.

Some KCMY who have just moved to South Korea decide to return to China due to the difficulties they encounter in their new environment as was the case with the friend of M19. All participants confirm that they longed to return to their hometown shortly after arriving in South Korea. M5 for example told me, "I was living with my parents, but I felt like I had been left alone in an unfamiliar environment." However, as KCMY generally learn to adapt to South Korean society by forming new relationships and gaining an understanding South Korean culture and society, their desire to return to China diminishes. That said, some KCMY who have yet to adapt to South Korean society do choose to return to China due to difficulties in integrating.

KCMY tend to form onward migration plans influenced by their experiences in adapting to South Korean society. This, their first experience of international migration, may provide them with confidence, or instil them with fear, regarding further migration. Their perception of further migration is different from Ong's (1999) description of flexible migrants. She argues that transnational migrants, who are described as flexible subjects, tend to flexibly shift their attitudes towards the acquisition of new citizenships to accumulate benefits while strategically negotiating positionalities or cultural acceptance in different geographical spaces (Ong, 1999). Of course, some participants desired to migrate to other countries like the flexible migrants Ong describes. However, other participants, while remaining open to further migration, are firmly tied to South Korea, as they have adapted to South Korean society with the passing of time. Also, several KCMY who have had difficulty in adapting to life in South Korea will end up staying there because they are terrified of the prospect of any further migration. In general feelings KCMY have regarding their future mobility is deeply linked to their legal status in South Korea and how they can change this. The next sub-section then will examine how KCMY seek to change their legal status in South Korea.

7.4.2 Change of legal status in South Korea

In this section, I explore how KCMY seek to change their legal status in South Korea so as to improve their situation by making use of their ethnicity. Neither the Chinese nor South Korean government allows just anyone to enter into their territories. There is a strict screening process for being issued a visa and not everyone will meet the required criteria (see section 6.4). Thus, the influence of the border is both complex and differentiated (Popescu, 2012). Citizenship of migrants is important when traveling between countries. Citizenship not only guarantees the rights of a citizen within the home country, it also decides whether the individual will be privileged or disadvantaged when travelling abroad. In other words, the migration prospects of people may be either facilitated or hampered depending on their country of origin or their socioeconomic status (Popescu, 2012). Therefore, migrants tend to either maintain their original citizenship or to become naturalised in their host countries (Kim, 2018).

Contemporary migrants tend to pursue temporary or circular migration rather than to permanently settle in the host country (Collins, 2012). This migration pattern has not only increased with physical mobility due to the development of modern forms of transportation, but has also made participation in transnational practices more accessible via the internet (Dahinden, 2010; Schiller and Çağlar, 2009). Temporary migrants who get more social or economic benefits from a longer stay in the host country often decide to remain there longer than initially planned (Bailey et al., 2002; Collins, 2012; Loong, 2018). As their purpose is to relocate according to the situation rather than permanently settle in any one country, they prefer to find ways to stay longer in the host country maintaining their original citizenship rather than to become naturalised (Eade et al., 2007). From this perspective, it is difficult to distinguish temporary from permanent migrants as intentions and circumstances of migrants are continuously shifting (Samers and Collyer, 2017). To help clarify matters, Bailey et al. (2002) have come up with the concept of permanent temporariness which describes both the static experience of being temporary and the development of strategies of resistance based on the knowledge that such temporariness is permanent. In this context, if migrants do not have the legal right to become naturalised citizens of their host country and are hesitant to return to their home countries

due to an uncertain future, they will seek ways to remain in the host country by using temporary legal status for an extended period of time.

Korean-Chinese migrant youth usually plan to change their visa type to remain longer in South Korea before they turn 19. 15 out of 20 participants expect to go back to China someday, but want to stay in South Korea until they feel it is the right time to return. The other 5 participants state that they have already become naturalised in South Korea or that they will remain there because they have few family members or acquaintances in China. It is necessary to change one's visa type or become naturalised if one wants to remain in South Korea beyond becoming an adult and this must be done before turning 19 (MOJ, 2021). There are various different ways to change one's visa type: by entering university, by gaining a qualification or by passing the high school certification exams. The types of visas that KCMY wish to get vary depending on the country they wish ultimately to settle in and their future mobility. First of all, two participants, who wish to return permanently to China, hope to get jobs in China after graduating from Korean universities. They wish then to replace their current visa with another type that will allow them to remain in South Korea until they have graduated from university. M15 for example discusses her plans for changing her visa:

I plan go to university in South Korea. Then, I can stay here for as long as I am a student attending university. Moreover, there are more activities, that students can be involved in, at Korean universities than at those in China. So, I want to enjoy the activities here. (Laughs) When I become a university student, I will change my visa to a Study abroad (D-2) visa by submitting documents from the university that prove my status as a student. [...] Even if I return to China, I think I will be able to get a temporary visa to visit South Korea to see my mom and relatives for holiday. So, I am going to change my visa which will allow me to stay here until I have graduated from university. I do not think I will live in South Korea for a long time after that. However, depending on the situation after graduation, the possibility of staying longer in South Korea by changing to another visa is open. (Laughs)
(M15, Female, High school graduate, Entry in 2015)

M15 seeks to get a D-2 visa which will permit her to live in South Korea as a Chinese student attending a Korean university. Similarly, three participants, who hope to work in China plan to apply for visas that allow them to legally reside in South Korea until they have graduated from university. They are

pragmatic in considering South Korea a steppingstone to gain a Korean higher education or high-quality training before going on to find decent jobs in China. Therefore, for them, South Korea is not a place to settle down permanently in the future. If they replace their current visas with D-2 visas and extend their stay until they have graduated university, they will have extended their status as temporary migrants to fit the limited period of their intended stay. In M15's case, however, as she wishes to retain the option of extending her stay post-graduation, she will have to look for other ways to pursue permanent temporariness in the future. In addition, if these participants return to China after graduating from university but still have family in South Korea, they will retain their transnational relationship between the two countries. Therefore, although they may only have extended their residence for a specified period of time, they will continue to maintain links with South Korea even after they have returned to China.

The 12 participants, who have yet to decide when they want to return to China plan to stay in South Korea after becoming adults by applying for F-4 visas which are only available to ethnic Koreans. Although they maintain they wish to return to China someday, they are reluctant to do so in the near future due to their uncertain social and economic status in China. Therefore, they will use their ethnicity as ethnic Koreans to try to get new visas to allow them to stay longer in South Korea. In their daily lives, these participants tend to emphasise their national identity as Chinese rather than their ethnic identity as Korean-Chinese (see section 6.2.1). When they change their visas, they are eager to get F-4 visas or permanent residency which will allow them to travel back and forth between South Korea and China with minimal requirements. Of course, these types of legal status may be preferable because the procedures involved and documents required are more straightforward than for other types of visa. Nevertheless, for those who expect to return to China someday, the advantage of such a legal status not only allows them to stay in South Korea legally, but also to maintain their positionality between South Korea and China. Therefore, they plan to secure visas which allow them to maintain a flexible status. In particular, they wish to obtain F-4 visas rather than permanent residency visas because the application process is much simpler and the criteria are easier to meet. M4 and M16 explain why they want to obtain F-4 visas:

I would like to change my visa to an F-4 visa because I plan to settle down in China in the distant future. To be honest, I want to get permanent residency, but I cannot as I do not have a lot of money and a stable job. (Laughs) I have heard that national technical qualifications can be helpful when applying for an F-4 visa. With that visa, I can go back and forth between China and South Korea more freely. So, I am thinking of studying for a makeup qualification like my friend. If I cannot go to a good university, I think I can get a job with that qualification. I think the technical qualification would be useful because it would help both with my visa application and with finding a job in the future.

(M4, Female, High school student, Entry in 2019)

I will go back to China someday. However, as I still do not know what kind of work I can do in China, I cannot go back right after graduation. So, when I graduate from high school, I will apply to change my visa to an F-4 visa. Now, if I graduate from high school in South Korea, I can get an F-4 visa without having any national technical qualifications. I am not supposed to part-time job with the F-1 visa that I have now. However, if I change my visa type to F-4, I can work either part-time or full-time legally. Moreover, F-4 visas require fewer documents for the application process than other types of visa and allow me to stay longer in South Korea and also they are easily renewed. Also, it is useful to be able to move back and forth between South Korea and China.

(M16, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

Participants, who plan to return to China someday, are reluctant to make definite decisions about when to do so because they are uncertain about what kind of life they will be returning to. Therefore, they become instead permanent sojourners who opt for the middle way between sojourners (temporary migrants) and settlers (permanent migrants) (Uriely, 1994). Participants who end up as permanent sojourners are not permanently settled in one country, but continue to move back-and-forth between South Korea and China while maintaining connections with both countries. Therefore, they remain in South Korea in a state of permanent temporariness there being no clear distinction between their country of arrival and that of departure (Gama Gato and Salazar, 2018; Salazar, 2017). They attempt to alter their legal status by using their identity as Korean-Chinese (Mountz et al., 2002). Amongst participants getting an F-4 visa (10 people) was the most popular option to change their legal status by making use of their ethnicity. As the F-4 visa was established with the purpose of facilitating entry and extended stay of ethnic Koreans, it allows holders of the visa to stay in the country for three years and is easily renewable. KCMY can replace their visas with F-4 visas if they have graduated from a South Korean high school, has passed the South Korean high school

certification examination or have been awarded a national technical qualification (MOJ, 2021). As an F-4 visa allows holders to enter and stay in South Korea for an extended period of time and as it is relatively easy to obtain, most participants hope to extend their stay by this means even though they are only temporary sojourners.

Participants prefer F-4 visas because they legally allow them to work. At the time of interview, M16 was illegally working part-time because her F-1 visa did not allow her to do so legally. Therefore, she wishes to get an F-4 visa so she can work legally either part-time or full-time particularly once she has become an adult. Furthermore, M4 claims that having a national technical qualification is not only handy for obtaining an F-4 visa but is also useful capital for finding employment in South Korea. The second half of this claim though is not universally accepted for S1 asserts that there is little connection between getting a technical qualification and employment because in most cases this is just a means for getting the visa. However, for those who lack knowledge of the South Korean labour market, it may be true that these technical qualifications can be a useful means to improve their skills and abilities. Therefore, gaining a technical qualification will not only help M16 get her visa, but may also be means for her to get a foothold in the South Korean labour market. In other words, I may help her achieve her aim both to extend her stay in South Korea and to find employment in the country. Getting a job as a route into mainstream society may then influence her sense of belonging within South Korean society. Overall, F-4 visas allow KCMY not only to be legally recognised as foreign residents beyond reaching adulthood, but also to feel a sense of belonging as members of South Korean society by providing them the opportunity to find employment legally.

Some KCMY who want to stay in South Korea longer-term but do not plan to change their nationality hope to get permanent residency. As M4 mentioned above, even though one is an ethnic Korean, there are many requirements such as having an above-average income, stable employment and a stay of more than two years in South Korea, before one can apply for permanent residency (MOJ, 2021). Therefore, it is difficult for KCMY to obtain permanent residency. Nevertheless, it is still the preferred option ahead of naturalisation. M5 and M17 discuss their thoughts about permanent residency:

Frankly, I would like to get permanent residency. However, before I apply, I need to check the eligibility conditions whether anyone with permanent residency in a foreign country can become a member of the Chinese Communist Party. I know that people with foreign citizenship cannot become members of the Chinese Communist Party. If membership of the Chinese Communist Party is open to those who have permanent residency in South Korea, I would like to obtain permanent residency. However, I hesitate to apply because I am worried that I will be excluded from Chinese society because of this. As my parents are going to live in South Korea forever, I guess I will visit South Korea often after I have returned to China. Because I have to maintain my link with South Korea, I will apply for an F-4 visa if the Chinese government does not allow those with foreign permanent residency to become Communist Party members.

(M5, Female, Freshman, Entry in 2015)

I would prefer to get permanent residency than be naturalised here. I feel like to get naturalised would be to abandon China. No one has said anything to me, but I feel like I would be a betrayer if I got naturalised. Moreover, I think I would be at a disadvantage when I go back to China. If Chinese people were to exclude me, finding a job in China would be more difficult. As I will go back to China someday, I do not want to be naturalised in South Korea due to the possibility of such disadvantages. If possible, I hope I can live in South Korea as a permanent resident and move back and forth between China and South Korea easily.

(M17, Female, High school dropout, Entry in 2018)

M5 and M17 find permanent residency preferable to naturalisation as a means of extending their stay in South Korea while also being able to maintain a link with both South Korea and China. China prohibits all Chinese citizens from holding dual citizenship. The same is true for South Korea except in certain cases, which do not include Korean-Chinese (Kim, 2019). Therefore, KCMY have to choose between maintaining their Chinese citizenship and becoming naturalised in South Korea. Both M5 and M17 wish to maintain their Chinese nationality while also extending their stay in South Korea by applying for permanent residency. In contrast to F-4 visa, once permanent residency has been granted, migrants can stay in South Korea without renewing or changing their visas. In addition, compared to the situation for other foreigners, the criteria for permanent residency (e.g., minimum length of stay and financial level of family or individuals) is less complicated or strict for ethnic Koreans (MOJ, 2021). Therefore, permanent residency is an attractive legal status which allows KCMY who plan to return to China someday to travel frequently between South Korea and China without having to worry about their visas.

Permanent residency is preferable to naturalisation when taking into account life as an ordinary Chinese after returning to China. Furthermore, M17 remarks that naturalisation as a South Korean citizen would be considered an act of betrayal against her home country in the eyes of Chinese society. In other words, some KCMY prefer permanent residency over naturalisation because they fear that otherwise they could be displaced from their home society due to their new citizenship when they return to China (Jackson, 2014; Mountz et al., 2002).

Some KCMY are reluctant to apply for permanent residency because they are concerned about their future ability to participate in Chinese political life. As China is a socialist republic governed by a single party, voting and political decision making are conducted by selected members of the Communist Party. Furthermore, Party members can be promoted to higher positions in business and society than non-members. In the case of M5, he hopes to become a Communist Party member so as to be involved in politics and ensure stable employment in the future. The Chinese Communist Party does not grant membership either to Chinese people with foreign citizenship or who have permanent residency in another country. Thus, M5 is worried that South Korean permanent residency would hamper her political as well as her economic ambitions once she is returned to China. Although gaining permanent residency is considered an ideal way for KCMY to stay for an extended time in South Korea while maintaining their legal citizenship, consideration must be given to their life after returning to China. Therefore, the choice whether to apply for permanent residency in South Korea is determined by considerations both of their life as Chinese citizens in China and their long-term links with South Korea, because they have in-between positionalities that involve both countries.

Unlike the participants mentioned above, there are others who do not plan to return to China and prefer to remain in South Korea instead. Among these some choose to become naturalised as South Korean citizens. Two participants have already naturalised in South Korea, while three more are actively deliberating on their legal status before coming to a decision. Due to the presence of their family and the advantages of South Korean citizenship which would allow them to move more freely to other countries, they may be attracted to becoming naturalised in South Korea. If they conclude that remaining in South Korea offer better prospects than re-settling in China, they

may plan to change their nationality. M11 describes his thoughts about naturalisation:

*My father, grandmother and relatives all live in South Korea. I would like to open a Chinese restaurant here or work at a fancy Chinese restaurant. So, I have no intention of going back to China. (Laughs) I heard that South Koreans can go to most countries without a visa with their passport. There are only a few countries which Chinese people can go to without a visa. When I grow up, I want to travel to and work in other countries, so I envy the power of the South Korean passport. (Laughs) Considering my life plan, I want to become a South Korean citizen. However, since I am male, I used to be a little worried that I would be forced to serve in the army if I naturalised. However, naturalised migrant youth only have to undergo training for four weeks and do not have to serve in the army. Therefore, these days, I am seriously thinking about becoming naturalised as a South Korean citizen.
(M11, Male, High school student, Entry in 2013)*

M11 has decided to stay in South Korea as his family and relatives live in there and he plans to pursue his career in the country. M6 and M7 both of who have already been naturalised also said that they had changed their nationality in order to permanently stay with their families in South Korea. As I mentioned in section 7.4.1, South Korea rather than China has become the new home country for many participants. In other words, they have developed a sense of emotional belonging in South Korea and this has come at the expense of their sense of belonging to China (Burman and Chantler, 2004; Hammett and Howes, 2016; Waters, 2009). When this emotional belonging to South Korea triggers a their desire to change citizenship, KCMY may begin seriously considering becoming naturalised. In deciding whether or not to naturalise, one's legal obligations as a citizen of South Korea need also to be considered. In South Korea, all male citizens are obliged to serve in the military for 18 months and male KCMY are reluctant to be naturalised in South Korea due to this obligation. However, the law has recently been revised to allow migrant youth who have naturalised to have to undergo only four weeks of basic military training rather than competing the full military service. This revision of the military service law is expected to result in higher numbers of KCMY choosing to naturalise. M11 also mentions that holding South Korean citizenship, which allows greater freedom of movement internationally than Chinese citizenship, will help him realise his life goals. Naturalised KCMY enjoy the same rights as any other South Korean citizens after acquiring South Korean citizenship and one of these rights is a high level of freedom of cross-

border mobility. As South Korean passports make it easier to visit China and other countries, there is an important benefit for those whose goals are further transnational migration (Biao, 2014; Kim, 2019). Therefore, this benefit of South Korean citizenship is an attractive lure to any KCMY who are considering becoming naturalised in South Korea. Regardless of whether KCMY choose to become naturalised in South Korea, most of them wish to maintain their relationship with China. They hope to play a role as a useful link between South Korea and China. In the next section, I will examine how the migration of Korean Chinese migrant youth to South Korea influences their career plans.

7.4.3 Migration experiences as a steppingstone to a better career

This section explores the influences of migration to South Korea on the career paths of KCMY. Migrant youth have the opportunity to discover what they want to do in the future through participating in activities such as studying, part-time work or social activities while in the host country. In this way, although they often undergo social marginalisation and uncertainty about their future as a result of social discrimination and the problems associated with cultural differences in the host society, they also have the chance to challenge these difficulties and prepare goals for their future life (Côté, 2014; Peng, 2020). Current difficulties may be an opportunity to prepare for multiple simulating employment possibilities in the future (Worth, 2009) (see section 7.3.2). Skills and abilities are sometimes uncovered through coming to understand one's identities and positionalities in the host society.

KCMY also come to learn of jobs they would like to do. As a result of migrating to South Korea they encounter a variety of people in many different contexts. Although they may feel unfamiliar with their environment and uneasy, these new experiences may serve as steppingstones toward the achievement of future goals and prove to be useful for their self-development (see section 7.3.2). KCMY often also experience emotional turmoil through having to face the complexity and ambiguity of their identities and feelings of belonging in South Korean society, but they are often able to make use of their in-between positionalities to find jobs that they wish to do.

Participants anticipate that they will be able to return to China or migrate to other countries because they have matured intellectually and emotionally as a result of their varied experiences in South Korea. They argue that if they had stayed in China, they would probably have been satisfied with leading monotonous and repetitive daily lives. However, migration to South Korea has expanded their horizons, giving them opportunities to encounter a diverse range of socio-cultural differences. Through familiarising themselves with these differences, they have been able to take a step forward on their life's path (Peng, 2020; Williams, 2007). M8 and M16 look forward to going back to China, and hope to realise their self-improvement and achievements there in terms of life and career:

I want to go back to China after developing my career as a makeup artist in South Korea because South Korean beauty skills are very popular in China. So, I decided that it would be better to build up some experience here. If I go back to China with lots of work experience, I can get a better salary and work in a better environment. I want to return home as a successful person. [...] In South Korea, I am learning not only makeup skills but also how to maintain a good relationships with others because I meet so many different people.

(M8, Female, Middle school student, Entry in 2014)

I made a lot of trouble at school in China. However, after coming to South Korea, I became introverted due to the new environment. Then I started to make friends and to participate in various activities provided by my school and the centre. Thanks to these activities, I was able to find out what I can do and what I really want to do, regarding my career path. If I were still in China, I would have been a student who bullied her classmates. However, after I came to South Korea, I felt like I had improved myself through encountering various events and people. I will be able to adapt well to other countries based on my experiences in South Korea.

(M16, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

M8 and M16 maintain that they now have more developed life plans as a result of their experiences in South Korea. Their opportunities have expanded because of diverse people and cultures they have encountered in South Korea. They regard their daily life in South Korea as a steppingstone to a richer and more fulfilling life. They have learned how to adapt themselves by challenging the various difficulties they have encountered during the adaptation process. Thus, they consider their migration to South Korea to have been an opportunity to acquire professional knowledge, skills (including social skills)

and confidence (Williams, 2007). This knowledge and these skills are likely to be useful for their future career paths as well as if they have further plans for onward migration (Frändberg, 2015). In addition, the ability to utilise their multiple identities flexibly is likely to have a significant influence on their plans for the future.

KCMY anticipate that their social mobility will have been boosted by their sojourn in South Korea. Although participants are uncertain about their prospects of being upwardly mobile if they were to migrate to other countries, they are confident that this will be the case when they return to China. This type of migration where socioeconomic hierarchy—economic gain or higher social status—is elevated in the country of destination, is referred to as stepwise migration (Harpaz and Mateos, 2019; Kim, 2019; Paul, 2011). Although the current destination of KCMY is South Korea, the final point of destination for some of them may be China. Thus, it can be argued that their case is one of extended stepwise migration. As with M8 who hopes to return to China as a successful returnee, KCMY who plan to return to China try to develop their career by acquiring knowledge and skills in South Korea. They believe that these will improve their social and economic stability and social mobility on their return to China. For this reason, they prefer to maintain a status of permanent temporariness, changing or renewing their visas in South Korea until they feel the time is right to achieve their goals in China (see section 7.4.2). In other words, they are engaging in a stepwise migration to China, making use of South Korea as a kind of steppingstone and turning point toward more promising career goals.

In-between positionalities can be an important asset when KCMY are considering their future careers. A common realisation is that they may be able to play a role in connecting South Korea and China by way of their in-between positionalities between the two countries. In addition, based on their migration experience, they often hope to play a role in helping other migrant youth adapt to South Korean society. M12, M15 and S11 elaborate on these points below:

I want to be a teacher at a school in South Korea where there are many migrant youth. I have migrated from China to South Korea. At first, there were a lot of difficulties due to discrimination but now I think I have adapted well to South Korea. So, as a Chinese and

Korean-Chinese, I know what difficulties KCMY face. As someone who has experienced and overcome these difficulties in advance, I want to be a person who can help other KCMY. When I first come to South Korea, I wished to meet someone like that.
(M12, Female, High school student, Entry in 2016)

I want to be a Korean language teacher in China. That is why I want to major in Korean language and literature at university. I want to teach Korean to Chinese people while learning how foreigners can learn Korean more easily. My friends in China have advised me that if I want to come back to China and get a good job, I should major in a subject that I can learn better in South Korea than I could in China. Therefore, I have decided to major in Korean language and literature and learn Korean properly. Then, this can be my strength in China. I think this will be an excellent strength not only for a Korean teacher but also in other professions as well. As I know Korean culture and society well, I want to work to better connect South Korea and China.
(M15, Female, High school graduate, entry in 2015)

After comparing wages in South Korea with wages in China, KCMY will decide to work for companies that offer better conditions for them. Especially, if they have to toil as irregular workers in South Korea, I think they will go back to their home country. [...] They will keep the option of returning to China open even if they get a job in South Korea, and they will be strategic when finding employment, comparing working conditions in both countries before making up their minds.
(S11, Female, Teacher in a high school for migrant youth)

M12 and M15 hope to employ their in-between positionalities—a result of their experiences in overcoming difficulties in adaption to South Korean society—in the jobs they wish to do. Other participants also desire to get a job by taking advantage of their understanding of both South Korean and Chinese societies. They hope to use their ethnic capital and in-between positionalities to find a job. The kinds of jobs that they wish to do are different from those of their parent. Their parents, who can speak Korean, usually work in low-wage jobs within South Korea such as construction site workers, factory workers or restaurant workers (see section 5.2.2). However, most participants aspire to white collar jobs, especially those which can play a role in connecting South Korea and China. Although they and their parents both have ethnic capital and in-between positionalities as Korean-Chinese, the difference in occupation between generations reflects how the capital and positionalities are used. Whereas the elder generation has simply uses their ethnic capital and in-between positionalities to find work in South Korea, the younger generation plans to employ them with the aim of increasing their value in the labour

market of South Korea and China. As a result, participants wish to work in a variety of different fields including as teachers, chefs, designers and architects. In particular, they aspire to jobs which link South Korea and China whether culturally, socially or economically. M15's goal is to use her language skills to connect South Korean and Chinese culture and society. Furthermore, she believes that her in-between positionalities can enhance her value in the Chinese labour market. In other words, she desires to utilise her in-between positionalities as a capital for her prospective life in her home country. Moreover, participants' challenging experiences in learning to adapt to South Korean society sparks a desire to support future generations of migrant youth in South Korea. For example, M12 has a plan to support newly arrived migrant youth in South Korea by becoming a tutor because she hopes to help them integrate into the new society without having to experience the social marginalisation that she did.

As S11 notes, even if KCMY do get a job in South Korea, they can always move to China later and compare the benefits and working conditions such as wages, employment status and working hours in the two countries. This kind of employee power is a common phenomenon in the neoliberal labour market. However, migrants who work in 3D and 3C industries tend to prefer to work in South Korea than their home countries as the work is better paid. However, the wage gap between white-collar jobs in South Korea and China, the type of jobs that KCMY aspire to is not so large. Therefore, a strategic choice can be made between jobs in the South Korean and Chinese labour markets, taking into account not only wages but also other working conditions. In addition, KCMY can obtain information about the Chinese labour market through family networks or through the internet while living long-term in South Korea due to the easy availability of extended-stay visas for ethnic Koreans (see section 6.4.1). In other words, they are guaranteed a stable stay in South Korea by securing visas with their ethnicity and at the same time, are able to practice flexible employment strategies due to their in-between positionalities. Therefore, KCMY can make strategic decisions about their future career path in either South Korea or China by simultaneously using their ethnicity and positionalities.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed how KCMY strategically negotiate their identities and feelings of belonging by using their in-between positionalities in their current and future lives. Section 7.2 explored how KCMY recognise their in-between positionalities and use them in a continuum of real and virtual spaces. I highlighted how the recognition of their multiple identities influences the ability to flexibly change their positionalities and belonging depending on the context and that this has a significant impact on the formation and expansion of their social relationships once in South Korea. Regarding the spaces occupied by migrant youth, previous research has focused primarily on their activities within their enclaves and schools. However, I have explored how KCMY use spaces while changing their identities depending on characteristics of the space—dominant groups, activities and atmosphere. I also emphasised that KCMY actively participate in South Korean society and challenge their marginalised positionality by connecting virtual relationships to real relationships and thus expanding their social networks. This marks a different perspective from existing research which has tended to consider them as a passive group.

In section 7.3, I explored the precarious positions of KCMY in the South Korean labour market and the tactics they use to overcome these. As KCMY under the age of 19 are legally allowed to stay in South Korea, but not to work, they participate in the workforce as semi-compliant migrants. Although many KCMY work part-time both because they wish to experience mainstream society and because they wish to earn money, they cannot fulfil the objective of gaining insight into South Korean society because few of the jobs they can find involve face-to-face interaction with South Koreans. Furthermore, they experience discrimination and exclusion in the workplace due to their low levels of proficiency in Korean language and limited workplace experience. Typically, they work in low-paid part-time jobs as semi-compliant migrants in the service sector. Some employers abuse their semi-compliant status and treat them unfairly, such as by paying them lower wages than other workers, though KCMY may sometimes challenge this. Although KCMY over the age 18 are legally allowed to work full-time, their employment status is still vulnerable because they are generally employed on casual contracts in flexible labour markets where employment is precarious. I further argued that

the insecurity of their current employment may have a negative influence on their positionalities in the present and future. Some KCMY consider the insecurity of their current position in the labour market as a steppingstone to more secure employment in the future. KCMY who do not have any work experience prepare to enter the South Korean labour market through taking courses in vocational high schools, this despite the generally negative reputation of these schools. In this regard, I highlighted that KCMY do not passively accept their precarious position in the South Korean labour market, rather they try to use it to become better adapted to mainstream society.

Lastly, section 7.4 investigated how KCMY use their experiences of migration to plan their future life. Existing literature has tended to focus on the lives of KCMY before and after their migration. However, this research is largely interested in the motivations for their migration, their legal status in South Korea and their career paths. It goes on to suggest that migrants' past and current experiences will have an impact on their future plans. I elaborated on this by adding that KCMY tend to have different opinions about further migration depending on the emotional experiences they underwent during their migration to South Korea. Any plans for future migration affect decisions about changing one's legal status in South Korea. I maintain that, even if their plans for their future stay in South Korea were different, they would still seek ways to be able to move freely between South Korea and China while considering the possibility of living in either country. Lastly, experience of migration plays an important role in setting the future direction of KCMY's career paths. Some participants plan to engage in stepwise migration to China, considering South Korea as a steppingstone to a better career and quality of life. I emphasised that because their long-term stay in South Korea is guaranteed by easily obtainable visas and because they have opportunities to use their in-between positionalities in a flexible labour market, they are in an excellent position to find jobs in either South Korea or China, while maintaining permanent temporary status in South Korea.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

This thesis has explored the ways in which KCMY negotiate their positionalities and belonging as migrant subjects in the migration process, based on interviews with KCMY, staff in migrant organisations and policymakers as well as observations of daily spaces where KCMY frequent. In conclusion, I argue that KCMY who engage in migration throughout their lives shift their social positions and belonging by negotiating their identities according to situated contexts. Family affects them not only in terms of their imposed identities as Korean-Chinese left-behind children in their local communities of origin, but also because families play a role in their adaption and belonging to South Korea in the early stages of their settlement. Furthermore, in South Korean society, KCMY try to place themselves in the most appropriate position according to the social contexts by expressing or concealing certain constituent identities among their multiple identities. This strategic positioning also affects how they are perceived or classified in the relationships, policy and law, which they encounter in their daily spaces. In other words, I argue that the socio-cultural, policy and legal factors are inextricably intertwined, which lead to changes in their positionalities and belonging in the local community and the labour market. In addition, I demonstrate that they plan to live as transmigrants while maintaining flexible belonging between South Korea and China by considering the social, economic and political situation of both countries. This final chapter pulls together the main threads of my empirical analysis and considers the main findings. Furthermore, I underline my contributions to academic and policy fields and suggest domains for future study.

The first section discusses how I explored practices of multiple-identity and in-betweenness among KCMY in their daily lives. The second section presents the need to investigate the impact of the migration experience of KCMY throughout their lives, showing how they participate in transnational migration. The last section considers limitations of this research and possibilities for future studies.

8.2 Migrant youth with multiple identities and in-betweenness

This research has focused on how migrant youth define and position themselves in the context of their daily lives as a migrant subject. In previous research, they have been considered dependent participants in family migration rather than as individual migrant subjects (see section 1.1). Therefore, their migration has been explored in terms of family migration, and their subjectivity during the migration process tends to be ignored. However, this research focuses on the life of migrant youth who have sought to find the optimal social location for themselves while actively shifting their identities during the migration process. Based on this research, I argued that KCMY can negotiate their positionalities and belonging according to different contexts while strategically selecting particular identities within diverse everyday spaces. Because positionalities and belonging shift in relation to the relative social positions, KCMY 'feel' in the situated context, there is a need to explore on a local scale how KCMY change these and based on what factors. In this respect, I have tried to focus on their behaviour, emotions and thoughts on the ground and to consider these together with spatial and social contexts that have influenced those responses.

The research evidence shows that KCMY can choose, emphasise or hide a particular identity from their multiple identities depending on the emotions they feel in different social contexts and relationships. Previous studies on Korean-Chinese migrants have simplified their identities solely to that of ethnic Koreans (see section 3.3). As a result, other identities, which reflect their lives in China, have been ignored. However, this study recognises their multiple identities and explores how KCMY use them in their daily lives by focusing not only on their ethnic identity but also on their other identities related to demographic and socio-cultural factors. In this regard, I believe that my findings can contribute to studies of Korean-Chinese and migrant youth in that it examines in depth how KCMY's exercise their multiple identities in various contexts.

Expansion of the academic discussion surrounding identities of Korean-Chinese migrants is an important contribution of this research. Researchers have not considered how KCMY define themselves and the social positions they occupy in the local community from the KCMY's perspectives. In

particular, few studies have analysed their positionalities and belonging as Korean-Chinese left-behind children in their places of origin. In this respect, chapter 5 filled a gap in the literature by focusing on changes in their identities and sense of belonging in their local communities in China. In China, their ethnic identities tend to be imposed by others in the community rather than being ones they recognise themselves. As a result of a strong sense of Chinese identity in the community, some of them experience identity confusion when they come to realise their identity as ethnic Koreans. Their identity confusion in China can expand the existing research that argues the identity confusion of migrants takes predominantly place in host societies. I also argued for the importance of considering the community's perceptions regarding Korean-Chinese left-behind children and the children's responses to these (see section 5.2). Experiences of social marginalisation or internal coherence occur among left-behind children, though this depends on whether split families are a common feature in their communities. In this respect, I suggested that the demographic and social backgrounds of the communities where they lived in China have had an effect on their identities and social positions.

In South Korea, South Koreans' perceptions of KCMY has a significant impact on the formation of KCMY's identities. The media largely influences public perception of them in South Korean. Previous studies have analysed how the media reproduces images of a particular migrant population and how such descriptions influence public perception of them (Han and Shin, 2019; Kim and Chung, 2015; Kim, 2018). However, it is difficult to find material on how migrant groups respond to such public perceptions. In this respect, based on understanding KCMY's thoughts and feelings regarding both how they are portrayed in the media and South Korean's reactions to them, I drew attention to the changes in their identities in South Korean society. Participants are aware that they belong to a group that is portrayed negatively in the media, and as a result prefer to be recognised by their South Korean peers as Han-Chinese who are considered a wealthy group by Korean youth. However, the spread of Covid-19 and the deterioration of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China have fostered anti-Chinese sentiments in South Korean society. This has led KCMY to hide their Chinese identity as a result of experiencing prejudice and discrimination. Therefore, they desired to project an identity which will be more easily accepted to South Koreans. In this regard, this study used empirical evidence to show how KCMY flexibly

alter themselves based on multiple identities to maintain positive relationships with South Koreans.

One of the strategies used by KCMY to negotiate their identities is to pass as South Koreans. Passing is an attempt by migrants to close the distance from mainstream groups in host societies. In China, KCMY were categorised as South Koreans by their peers. Feelings of superiority over Han-Chinese made them want to express their identity as South Koreans rather than changing their identities to belong to the mainstream group. However, in South Korea, using their similarity of appearance and cultural identity to pass as South Koreans, they desire to be recognised as such and hence to be included in mainstream society. To date, South Korean human geographers have paid limited attention to passing as practised by KCMY. This is partially a result of the common assumption that Korean-Chinese can be taken for granted as ethnic Koreans. However, I highlighted the need to explore their passing as South Koreans because their ethnic identity is not all encompassing, rather they are comprised of various identities.

As their passing strategies tend to become more active in relation to South Korean peers, KCMY sometimes hide their other identities and emphasise their identity as young Koreans to fit more easily into the peer group. Interestingly, KCMY sometimes choose to keep a certain distance from their South Korean friends. This is a result of the fear that in an over close relationship with South Koreans their identity as KCMY might be revealed through some error in language or behaviour on their part. In other words, they place themselves at the margins rather than at the centre of the peer group, but not to the degree where they might risk losing their belonging in relationships within the group. This strategy of maintaining distance may appear different from the opinions of existing research which suggest that KCMY are eager to develop close-knit relationships with South Koreans. However, paradoxically, it can be argued that this is another strategy to maintain belonging in the peer group.

This research demonstrated that KCMY can express their identities appropriately in whatever situation they encounter because they know how to position themselves 'between' multiple identities. If they are to use their in-between positionalities flexibly, Korean language proficiency is an important

prerequisite. Language is an important factor in enabling the individual to maintain relationships that provide feelings of emotional belonging (Valentine et al., 2009). Nevertheless, in human geography, there has been little in-depth analysis of the role played by language within individuals' social relationships. I suggested the need for further investigation into how KCMY use language to retain belonging in their relationships. With regard to language use, participants believed that their ability to use contextual Korean language in everyday conversation was more valuable than their grammatical skills. Because by using appropriate expressions and words in context, they can feel involved in their relationships with South Koreans (see chapter 6). Korean language proficiency also plays a significant role in their employment. As explained in chapter 7, Korean language skills are a requirement for KCMY who want to find jobs now in South Korea and to work with optimal wages and working conditions between the South Korean labour market and Chinese labour market in the future. Therefore, this study preposes the need to consider contextual language in analysis of KCMY's in-betweenness and the sense of belonging in their daily lives.

Regarding the daily spaces used by KCMY, existing research has largely focused on activities in their ethnic enclaves and schools. My findings, however, expand the scope of these spaces and reveal changes in their behaviour and emotions depending on the characteristics of different spaces. KCMY try to belong in a space by changing their identities and positionalities according to the demographic factors and socio-cultural atmosphere that comprise it. In addition, this study is the first geographical study to investigate how KCMY relate to others in the virtual world and how these virtual relationships are extended to the real relationship. Although social scientists assert that KCMY maintain transnational relationships with their friends in China (Bae, 2016), they have not focused on the process of expanding social relations within South Korean society through online activities. However, I demonstrate how they form relationships through feelings of solidarity with others by flexibly changing their identities in virtual space where their anonymity is guaranteed. When these virtual relationships expand into real world ones, KCMY try to adopt an identity appropriate to the altered characteristics of the relationship. Therefore, I highlight that virtual spaces can be a starting point for KCMY to develop relationships with others in South Korean society.

The South Korean government's policy regarding KCMY is established and implemented through multicultural policies that encourage integration and assimilation into South Korean society rather than the practice of multiple identities (see section 3.2). The aim of multicultural policy is to turn KCMY into good citizens to maintain an integrated society. On this point, we need to examine what is meant by the term 'good citizen'. In the UK, good citizens are usually considered active citizens who permeate through various policy spheres and participate in communities (Kipling, 2015). However, in South Korea, good citizens are integral to the society by conforming to social rules and laws. In this respect, I highlighted the government's intention of classifying only those who conform to the established social framework as good citizens without considering individuals' subjectivity.

The government's assimilationist stance is also evident in the operational goals and programmes of centres for migrant youth, as explained in chapter 6. Previous studies of these centres have focused primarily on the development and operation of their programmes in order to provide evidence and rationale to improve methods of supporting migrant youth (Bae, 2016; Lee et al., 2017). However, my analysis does not focus only on the activities within centres. I have also attempted a geographical analysis of the role played by centres through exploring their influence on the social positions of KCMY in the local community and South Korean society. In particular, I maintain that the local community of which they are a part also needs to have the opportunity to accept them as they are, instead of forcing them to adapt to the mainstream. In this regard, I suggested that centres can serve as sites of connection (Valentine, 2008) where the South Korean community and KCMY can interact together. This could contribute to the demand for projects linking migrant youth and local communities which are being planned by SMOE to spread to other regions. In the next section, I will discuss the contribution of this study, which maintains that the migration of KCMY to South Korea is an important factor that affects their lifespan.

8.3 Exploring the effects of migration across the lifespan

This research has examined how the daily lives of KCMY involved in transnational migration across their lifespan change according to their situated

spatial contexts. I argued that because KCMY are placed between childhood and adulthood on the life course, their life should be investigated as a series of relational experiences. Their in-between positionalities can be understood through the idea of liminality which refers to the status of being in the middle of longitudinal processes, such as a life course (Findlay et al., 2015; Wood, 2012). However, this research focused not only on KCMY's position at the threshold of the life course, but also on their in-between positionalities in their everyday life in relation to their demographic characteristics using the idea of in-betweenness which encompasses the liminality. In other words, I demonstrated how they use their-in-betweenness in daily spaces by describing that KCMY is located in an in-between space where diverse characteristics intersect, not following the static binary (e.g., children/adults, native/foreigners, inclusion/exclusion). Therefore, it is worthwhile that this research not only presented the need to consider the liminality on the life course of migrant youth along with the family, social structure and spatial scale where they belong, but also conducted empirical analysis on it through KCMY's case.

Regarding their transnational migration, in their places of origin, their lives were changed by the migration of their parents (see chapter 5). Existing studies on transnational families have focused on the relationship between left-behind children and their migrant parents (Graham and Jordan, 2011; Salazar Parrenas, 2008; Yeoh et al., 2020). However, my research went a step further in examining not only the lives of left-behind children in their places of origin, but also the decision-making process behind their migration to the host country where their parents were by then living. Although the argument of parents had a decisive impact on their decision to migrate, I highlighted KCMY's subjectivity in the migration decision process, showing that they also had motives to rationalise their migration. Therefore, my analysis suggests the need to explore KCMY's migration experiences over the entire life course, as their lives as left-behind children in China are closely related to their migration to South Korea.

Family is the factor that has a significant impact on KCMY's sense of belonging in local communities whether before or after their migration to South Korea. As mentioned above, studies on the transnational families of KCMY have focused primarily on their family relationships in China (Kim and Lee, 2007; Song and Jang, 2015). However, I suggest the need to pay attention to

their family dynamics in South Korea, emphasising that families are the first groups that they belong to in South Korean society and they play a role as a base camp in adapting to a new society. Unlike previous studies, which have focused on family reunification as a unit, this study presents diverse family forms which KCMY belong to in South Korea. These include partial family reunification and second family separation. Furthermore, regarding step-families of KCMY, I argued that as their biological parents restore psychological connection with them and intervene in interactions between them and their new family members, they can smoothly adapt to a new society as well as to a new family. Conflicts often occur where families reunite as a unit. In this respect, this study offers empirical evidence to demonstrate how weakened family relationships caused by parental absence in China can affect the adaptation of KCMY and their family relations in South Korea.

In terms of their family, I also clarified that generational differences between KCMY and their parents in relation to their identities and migration pathways. Their parents attended Korean-Chinese ethnic schools while living in Korean villages in China. Within their ethnic communities, they could form and maintain their ethnic identity strongly through easy access to their ethnicity (see section 1.2.1). On the other hand, as KCMY lived in local communities consisting of various ethnic groups in their places of origin and attended general schools rather than ethnic schools, they often encountered other ethnic groups in their daily spaces (see section 5.2). This influenced them to retain their national identity as Chinese rather than ethnic identity. The generational differences of ethnic/national identities of Korean-Chinese affect not only their positionalities and sense of belonging in South Korea, but also their future migration pathways. The parents generation, who moved to South Korea for economic goals and consider South Korea their ethnic home country, plan to live in South Korea if they have a stable social and economic status. However, many participants migrated to South Korea with various motivations such as education and family reunification, and aspired to move back and forth between South Korea and China or migrate to a third country (see section 7.4). This may be influenced not only by their experiences as migrant youth, but also by their belief that they can flexibly change their identity based on their diverse identities according to the situated context.

The South Korean government's immigration policy toward Korean-Chinese migrants is the factor affecting the legal migration of KCMY. Researchers and

policymakers argued that the immigration policy covering ethnic Koreans has been revised to promote the reunification of their families in South Korea. To further the discussion, I analysed the South Korean visa policy, which allows ethnic Koreans to stay for a long time through streamlined procedures, by applying to it the concept of selective permeability. This approach to visa policy demonstrates the South Korean government's intention to create categories for migrants and manage them according to these categories. In addition, this research focused on the policies that influence the decision of KCMY to stay in South Korea and to live as transnational migrants after becoming adults. Because they have the possibility of returning to China, they prefer to maintain permanent temporary status in South Korea through visa renewal rather than becoming naturalised. In this regard, I argued that their visas based on their ethnicity, which guarantee their legal stay, have a significant impact on their positionalities as transmigrants even after becoming adults. As such my analysis underpins the claim that visas for ethnic Koreans enable them to stay securely in South Korea and to live as transmigrants in the present and the future.

This research argued that further investigation into the current employment practice of KCMY is needed because current work experience could affect further employment. Previous studies and legislation have focused more on their adaptation through education than on their employment (Lee et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2020). Contrary to these research and policy directions, KCMY already engage in the Korean labour market (see section 7.3). In this study, their status in the labour market is described as one of semi-compliance. I suggest that KCMY who are legally resident but work without permission can also be referred to as semi-compliant migrants. Because of this semi-compliant position, they are generally in a precarious status in the South Korean labour market. I emphasised that their vulnerable positionalities may have a significant impact not only on their employment but also on their social and economic status in the future. Regarding the precariousness of their position, participants endeavour to overcome it through taking part-time jobs and vocational education, thus hoping to gain more decent and stable jobs in the future. Similarly, I demonstrated that their work experience can be part of a strategy for a better future life socially and economically, showing that they desire to work part-time to gain a better understanding of South Korean society and the South Korean labour market as well as for the more obvious economic reasons.

Overall, my analysis of KCMY as transmigrants focused on how they flexibly shift their positionalities and belonging between South Korea and China. Because they do not have many family members or friends left in China, their connectivity to their home country may seem weaker than that of past generations. However, they are open to the possibility of returning to China and aspire to live as transnational migrants traveling between both countries (see section 7.4). Regarding this aspiration, I suggest the concept of flexible citizenship, a term coined by Ong (1999) to describe the strategic movement of wealthy people for economic capital, should be used carefully. KCMY with flexible belonging change their identities and sense of belonging according to the context in which they find themselves. They are eager to maintain flexible belonging and position themselves between South Korea and China throughout their entire lives, rather than pursuing a strategic change of citizenship to accumulate economic capital. Therefore, while considering the social, political and economic situations in South Korea and China, KCMY plan regarding not only their current lives in South Korea, but also their future objectives. In relation to transnationality of KCMY, I argue that even if they are not involved in physical movement or active interactions between South Korea and China at present, they nevertheless live as transmigrants because they retain psychological connections with both countries.

8.4 Limitations and further research

In this research, I have stressed the importance of examining KCMYs identities and social positions as felt in their everyday lives because it offers valuable means to explore their negotiation of positionalities and belonging as migrant subjects throughout their lives. While my research contributes to an expansion of studies on this topic, there remain some issues that have not been researched due to the limitation of the range of participants and the change of research method affected by the coronavirus pandemic.

Firstly, it was difficult to recruit KCMY from various backgrounds. In the early stages of fieldwork, I tried to recruit diverse participants regardless of their Korean language abilities even if I would have had to interview them with the aid of an interpreter. However, KCMY, who are not good at communicating in

Korean, rejected my proposal because they felt burdened at the prospect of undergoing two-phased long interviews with a South Korean researcher. As discussed in chapters 6 and 7, language is a major factor affecting KCMYs senses of belonging in the spaces and groups where they are located. In this regard, it would be useful to hear from KCMY who are not familiar with the use of Korean language and who inhabit the margins of South Korean society. It would be desirable to understand the issues they are currently facing in their own words and through their own vivid emotions. However, because most of my participants had experienced the difficulties that result from poor language abilities, I was able to understand the various identities, positionalities and belongings of this subsection of KCMY society through in-depth interviews with them.

In future, it would be worthwhile to conduct research comparing their ways to negotiate their positionalities and belongings based on their socioeconomic background by recruiting KCMY from various social and economic backgrounds. Were these studies to be undertaken, my research could provide a basis for understanding the complex influence of sociocultural, policy and legal factors affecting their daily lives. In addition, a comparison daily lives of Korean-Chinese youth still living in China and those who have moved to South Korea could help better our understanding of the impact of migration on their current lives and future goals. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of KCMY and other ethnic Korean migrant youth living in South Korea might inform our understanding of differences in social position and sense of belonging between these groups even though they are all ethnic Koreans. In this study, I briefly investigated the differences in positionalities due to different legal status in South Korea between North Korean migrant youth and KCMY, through interviews with participants. Based on my findings, further research might be able to demonstrate that each group feels differently about its position in South Korean society, through in-depth interviews with ethnic Korean migrant youth from other national background.

Secondly, the Covid-19 pandemic limited the observation of KCMY in their daily spaces. When I designed the fieldwork, I intended to observe their behaviour while regularly volunteering at a centre for them. However, as mentioned in chapter 4, because all the facilities for young people were closed due to the spread of the Covid-19 in 2020, I was unable to continue to access the centre. Furthermore, as KCMY were reluctant to meet others, it was also

difficult to observe how they interact with others in spaces they frequent. However, during two-phased in-depth interviews with participants, I tried to overcome the limitation of observations through understanding of their experiences. Also, through interviews with staff working at centres and schools, I tried to redeem it by grasping their daily activities and relationships with others from staff perspectives.

Further research on the daily spaces of KCMY might explore their interactions with diverse people more deeply through in-depth interviews and regular observations in their everyday spaces. This study has demonstrated KCMY can change their identities flexibly and their sense of belonging also differs depending on the demographic features and atmosphere of spaces. Based on my analysis, if researchers regularly observe KCMY in spaces where they spend many hours like centres or schools, they may be able to better understand how they adapt to those spaces and to South Korean society by conducting more specific studies.

Lastly, this thesis, based on a case of KCMY, suggests the need to reflect the voices and daily experiences of other groups of migrant youth in other countries so as to explore their interactions with their host societies. Future research into the lives of migrant youth could include grounded and in-depth analysis by focusing further on their thoughts and feelings. Furthermore, policymakers can prepare more effective policies by understanding the policy demands that migrant youth really need through investigation of their daily lives and opinions on specific issues. In line with these suggestions, I argue that studying the positionalities and belonging of migrant youth in their daily lives is vital to understand how migration affects them across their lifespan and how they subjectively utilise the situated context.

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Appendix A

Information sheet

[School of Geography]



UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

Positionalities and belongings amongst migrant youths : A case of Korean-Chinese communities in Seoul, South Korea

You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

Purpose

This study began with the need to investigate the Korean Chinese migrant youth's migration experiences and various characteristics under the current situation where the number of Korean Chinese migrant youth staying in South Korea is increasing. In this regard, the project seeks to explore how the migration experience of Korean Chinese migrant youth and their thoughts about their own characteristics in China and South Korea and the groups in which they belong affect and/or are affected. This study is conducted as the fieldwork of my doctoral research at the University of Leeds (UK) and will last from 1st October, 2019 to 30th September, 2020.

Participation

You have been invited to take part in this research because you are [a Korean Chinese migrant youth aged 15 to 19 / a staff in an organisation for migrant youths or ethnic Koreans / a policy maker who has experienced to participate in making or implementing the policy for migrant youths] and I am interested to know about your experiences/opinions related to migrant youth's migration and thought about their specific characteristics and groups where they belong. Korean Chinese migrant youth aged 15 to 19 will be recruited through introductions by staff working in supporting facilities and existing interviewees.

This interview will last about one to two hours, and can be conducted at a time and place that are convenient for you. If you feel fatigue during the interview, we can have a break. During the interview, we will talk over diverse topics freely about your experience/opinions in terms of your migration experience, daily life in South Korea and future movement. Audio recordings of these interviews will be taken. If I need additional interview with you to understand your stories in more detail, I may contact you again to ask for your consent for the second interview.

During the interview, if you mind answering any question that might be sensitive, embarrassing or upset, you do not have to answer it. Just let me know that you do not want to answer that question.

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part in the research, you will be given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you can still withdraw at any time without it affecting any benefits that you are entitled to in any way. You do not have to give a reason.

[School of Geography]



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Withdrawing

After having taken part in the research, you will have the right to withdraw your information within two months after the interview, when I will start to analyse and use it for publications. If you withdraw, your data will be completely deleted and will not be used in any publications.

Use, dissemination and storage of research data

The data including audio recordings collected through the interview will be used only for analysis and for illustration in conference presentations and journals. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original data.

The researcher will transcribe and store all of the interviews securely with a false name in order to be unable for others to identify an individual subject. All the contact information that we collect about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential and will be stored separately from the research data. When reports and publications are created that make use of the information which you provided in an interview, you will not be identifiable.

After this project has been completed, anonymous records of the information you have provided, along with audio data, will be retained until the end of relevant publication. The fieldwork will end on 30th September, 2020 but you may be asked to provide contact details. You can be contacted in the future for subsequent research but you will not be obliged to take part in this.

Contact for further information

[Researcher]

Name	Hoayong Lee
Affiliation and address	School of Geography University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK
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Telephone number	South Korea: 010 8228 7492 UK: +44 792 271 2538

[Main Supervisor]

Name	Professor Louise Waite
Affiliation and address	School of Geography University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK
Telephone number	+44 113 343 3367

Thank you for taking the time to read through the information.

NB. You will be given a copy of this information and, if appropriate, a signed consent form to keep.

Appendix B

Consent form

[School of Geography]



UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

Consent to take part in the research on “Positionalities and belongings amongst migrant youths: A case of Korean-Chinese communities in Seoul, South Korea”

Add your initials next to the statement if you agree

I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated dd/mm/yyyy explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.	
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline. I understand that I need to inform Hoayong Lee if I decide to withdraw from the research (email: gyhl@leeds.ac.uk; Phone number: 010 8228 7492 (South Korea), +44 792 271 2538 (UK)). I understand that if I withdraw, my data will be disposed and will not be used in any way as part of this or other research.	
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential.	
I agree for the data collected from me to be stored and used in relevant future research in an anonymised form.	
I understand that other genuine researchers will have access to this data only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this form.	
I understand that other researchers may use my words in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs, only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this form.	
I understand that relevant sections of the data collected during the study, may be looked at by auditors from the University of Leeds where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission for these individuals to have access to my records.	
I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the lead researcher should my contact details change during the project and, if necessary, afterwards.	

Name of participant	
Participant's signature	
Date	
Name of lead researcher	
Signature	
Date*	

*To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant.

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form, the letter/ pre-written script/ information sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent form should be kept with the project's main documents which must be kept in a secure location.

Appendix C

Interview guide

C.1 KCMY

[First phase interview]

Ice breaking

- Impression of this interview proposal, hometown in China, day-to-day activities
- Age, nationality, year of entry, visa type

Life in China

Experiences as left-behind children

- When did your parents move to South Korea? Why they did? Do you know where and what kind of work they did? Who did you live with?
- What kind of school did you attend in China (Korean-Chinese ethnic school or general school)? Did you have any friends who live apart from their parents?
- Have you ever used Korean in China? When? With whom?

Process of migration to South Korea

- Why did you come to South Korea? What was your impression of South Korea?
- Who have you lived with since you came to South Korea?

Encounter in your everyday spaces

People who you spend time with

- Who do you met the most these days? How do you contact them and how often do you meet them? Where do you usually go with your friends? Why?
- Do you have any friends, family or relatives left in China? Have you been in touch? Have you ever been to China after you come to South Korea?
- Did you visit anywhere without your parents right after your arrival? Where?
- How is your school life? / How are you preparing for the (elementary/middle/high) school qualification exam? Are there any difficulties? (roughly) Have you ever used a centre for migrant youth? What kind of programme is it?

[Second phase interview]

Ice breaking

- Feeling about the first interview, day-to-day activities

Life in China

Experiences as left-behind children in a transnational family

- How did you feel when your parents went to South Korea?
- Have you ever heard of life in South Korea from your parents or relatives? What did you feel about it?
- What did your neighbours and friends seem to think about you and your family living separately? Why?
- Have you ever thought that there is a difference between Korean-Chinese and Han-Chinese in China? Why? (with their experiences)

Arrival at South Korea

Home life

- How did you feel when you came to South Korea?
- Have you ever thought about your life within your family in South Korea before you came to South Korea? Do you often talk to your parents? How often? How is your relationship with your family, especially with your parents (in comparison to the relationship when you were in China)? How do you feel when you think of your parents?
- Have you ever lived apart from your family in South Korea? Why? How did you feel when you had to live alone?

Encounter in your everyday spaces

- Have you ever spent long hours alone at home without going outside? How did you feel then?
- Have you ever met a friend from North Korea? If so, do you think there is a difference between a North Korean and you? If so, what is the point?
- Have you ever felt your South Korean friends or other South Koreans don't want to do anything with you? When and where? How did you feel then? Why do you think they acted like that?
- Have you ever changed your behaviour or thoughts due to the reaction South Koreans do to you? How and why? When you acted like that, what did they say and how did you react to their saying? Have you experienced that South Koreans consider you someone who was not South Korean or Chinese? How did you feel?

Perception of South Korea

- Is the image of South Korea that you imagined in China the same as the perception that you feel living in South Korea? Do you think your perception of South Korea affects our life in South Korean society? How?

Employment

- Have you ever worked part-time or full-time in South Korea? When? What kind of job? Did you have any fun or difficulties while working? Why did/do you want to work?
- What kind of job do you want to get in the future? Why?

South Korean Law and policy

- Have you experienced administrative difficulties while preparing to attend school in South Korea? Who do you talk to when you have administrative problems (e.g., immigration, visa) in South Korea?
- Have you ever heard of the term, "multiculturalism"? Where? How do you feel about this term?

Migration in the future

Stay in South Korea

- How did you feel when you came to South Korea?
- Do you want to live in South Korea after becoming an adult? Do you have any plans to change your visa or naturalise to do so? Why? How?

Future migration

- Do you want to live in another country? Where? Why?
- Do you think your feelings about South Korea or your migration experience will affect your future migration decision-making? Why?

C.2 Staff

Personal information

- Responsibility (task in the organisation), length of engagement, background of one's position

Roles of the organisation

Basic information about the organisation

- When did this centre open? What is its background and ultimate goal? Why was this centre located in this area/space?
- Who usually uses this centre? (Nationality, age and length of stay in South Korea)
- Are there organisations you cooperate with?

Roles

- What are the different characteristics of this centre compared to other centres?
- What programmes does this centre offer? What would you like to focus on? What do you think about those programmes? Is there anything that needs to be improved?
- What do you think of the claim that schools are not yet ready to accept migrant youth? What roles should centres for migrant youth and general schools play, respectively?
- What are the difficulties of running the centre (related to society and the government)? What role can the centre play in the local community?

Characteristics of KCMY

- Since when do you think the number of KCMY has increased? Did they change the local communities as they live in particular areas in Seoul?
- What is the relationship between other migrant youth and KCMY?

Influence factors of South Korean society and government

- What are the factors that affect the identities and belonging of KCMY in South Korean society?
- What do you think are the goals and intentions of South Korean law and policies related to KCMY? What do you think of multiculturalism in Korean society? How do you think multicultural policies affect the relationship between migrant youth and South Koreans?

C.3 Policymakers

Personal information

- Responsibility (task in the organisation), length of engagement, background of one's position

Public discourse

Discourse on foreigners

- Do you think South Koreans' perceptions of foreigners are different depending on the demographic factors of foreigners? Then, how is it different?

Discourse on KCMY

- What do South Koreans usually think about Korean-Chinese? (compared to other foreigners or North Koreans)
- Compared to the perception of adult migrants, do South Koreans have a different perception of migrant youth?

Establishment and implementation of policies targeting KCMY

- What is the most fundamental or important policies or projects concerning KCMY? What issues have had the greatest impact on the establishment and implementation of those policies or projects? How do you grasp the actual situation/status of KCMY? Were there any issues that had a significant impact the establishment of related policies and projects? What was the government's perspective on KCMY? What do you think are the limitations of its position?
- What do you think about the purpose of the government's position on the programmes of activities of the centres for KCMY? What do you think of the argument that KCMY should be subject to both the overseas Koreans policy and the multicultural education policy?
- What do you think of multiculturalism as the keynote of the government's policy targeting migrant youth? How have Korean-Chinese, especially KCMY, been defined and described in South Korean multicultural policy or law concerned?

Future life of KCMY in South Korean society

- Do you expect KCMY will stay in South Korea even beyond becoming adults? Then, where will they be located in South Korean society?

Appendix D

Coding tree

Master code	Sub-code
Past life in China	Relationship with the local community
	Education in China
	Family relationship in China
	Motives for migration
	Perceptions of South Korea
	Visa preparation
Current life in South Korea	Comparison between KCMY and other ethnic Korean migrant youth
	Contact with acquaintances left in China
	Employment
	Ethnic enclave
	Facilities for migrant youth
	Family relationship in South Korea
	Feeling about China
	In-betweenness
	Language issue
	Relationships with Korean-Chinese in South Korea
	Relationships with other migrants
	Relationships with South Koreans
	School life in South Korea
	South Korean government's policies
	South Korean perceptions
	Spaces they frequently use
	Visa issues
Future life	Migration plan
	Legal status in South Korea
	Future jobs

Appendix E

List of programmes provided by centres or schools for migrant youth

Name	Category	Activity	Regular / One-off	
Seoul OnDream Education Centre	Korean Language Education	Phased Korean Class	Regular	
		TOPIK Class (Test of Proficiency in Korean)	Regular	
		Consonant & vowel Class	Regular	
	Education Support	School for All	Regular	
		Arts, music and physical education	One-off	
			Regular/ One-off	
			Regular	
	Support for Naturalisation	Class for naturalisation test		
	Specialized Services	Counselling	Regular / One-off	
		Other specialized services	One-off	
	Support for Adaptation	Introduction to South Korean society	Regular	
		Cultural experience	Regular	
		Volunteer work	Regular	
Da plus On Centre	Preparatory school	Korean Language Class	Regular	
		Supporting a transfer admission	Regular	
	Korean Language Education	Korean Language Class	Regular	
		Support of Adaptation	Counselling	Regular / One-off
			Empowerment of parents	Regular
	Interpretation and translation service		One-off	
	Teacher Training	Support for teacher studying community	One-off	
	Global Citizenship	Class about multiculturalism and global citizenship	Regular	
Association	Association with relevant organisations	One-off		
Rainbow Youth Centre	Initial Support	Rainbow school	Regular	
		Catch the rainbow!	Regular	
		Catch my work!	Regular	
	Integrated Support	Integrative counselling and case management	Regular / One-off	
		Group counselling	One-off	
		Family camp	Regular	
Providing specialized information one-to-one		One-off		
Korea Polytechnics Dasom High School	Education	Korean language education	Regular	
		Multicultural special class	Regular	

Name	Category	Activity	Regular / One-off
Korea Polytechnics Dasom High School	Specialized Education	Specialized class (Major)	Regular
		Education for certification	Regular
		UNESCO associated schools project network	Regular
All Love School	Alternative education	Korean language class	Regular
		Career and vocational education	Regular
		After-school class	Regular
		Mentoring	One-off
	Global citizenship education	Global Village Week	Regular
Church		Social and Mentoring	Regular
Seoul International Hagwon	Academic Education	Bilingual classes	Regular
		Subject education	Regular
		Supporting the test for naturalization	Regular
	Non-academic activities	Korean Culture experience	One-off
Migrants Centre Friend	Non-academic activities	Migrant Youth Orchestra (Yeongdeungpo Miracle Wind Orchestra)	Regular
Culture and Research Centre for Ethnic Korean	Education	Korean language class	Regular
	Counselling	Counselling in their native language	Regular
	Supporting a community	Volunteer work	Regular
	Academic work	Conducting research on ethnic Korean	Regular