The Politics of Urban Industrialization:

Integrating the Urban-Industrial Nexus in Ethiopia's Disintegrating Ethno-Federal Party-State

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Declaration

I, Selamawit Wondimu Robi, confirm that this thesis is my own work. I am aware of the University's Guidance on the Use of Unfair Means (www.sheffield.ac.uk/ssid/unfair-means). This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, university.

Abstract

Africa's ongoing radical transformation in the 21st century is characterized by two mega processes of change: its urban and industrial transitions. These interactive processes of change are, however, being steered through highly fragmented state action, which is generating infrastructural, social and economic challenges in a range of African countries. Through an interpretive policy analysis of the ongoing state-driven industrialization program in Ethiopia, and the case of the Hawassa Industrial Park more specifically, the research aims to examine the integration challenge between urban and industrial policy. It does this through a focus on key factors that have impeded holistic policymaking and coordinated action; the limits on the integrative potential of spatial development planning; and the various material consequences of disjointed planning. The thesis argues that in the Ethiopian case, the integration challenge is rooted in the political context of authoritarianism and the inherent tensions between the diametrically opposed socialist institutions of the ethno-federation and the party state.

Ethiopia serves as an extreme case of successful implementation of accelerated industrialization that nevertheless has serious implications for the continent's ongoing urbanization. The research finds the gradual breakdown of the core integrative institutions of the party state, the party bureaucracy and the ethnic federation, to be at the heart of the integration challenge. The internal fracture of the party was mirrored in the breakdown of coordination between sectoral ministries as well as federal-regional and trans-regional planning. Political developments spurred on by these factors limited the integrative potential of spatial planning throughout the period of the development of industrial parks. The infrastructural and housing challenges that emerged as a result of this dissociated planning have been partially resolved, but the emerging Ethiopian urban-industrial nexus as a whole remains undefined and unaccounted for by the plethora of isolated streams of development planning and intervention, indicating continued implications for Ethiopia's industrialization and urbanization in years ahead. Drawing on the in-depth grounded study of the Ethiopian case, the research makes empirical and theoretical contributions to the study of the politics of urban industrialization in a broader range of developmental authoritarian African states.

Dedication

To

The center of all things

The whole and the integrator,

The author and authority,

The liberator, healer, and uniter,

The spring of life and livelihood,

The city of God.

May this work

come under your will for this broken country,

this broken continent and this broken world.

And to

My parents Mestawet Mulualem, and Wondimu Robi

and siblings Blen, Ethiopia and Tewodros,

for your sacrifices, love and encouragement throughout.

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Acronyms

ADLI- Agriculture Development led Industrialization
AGI – The Tony Blair African Governance Initiative
AU – The African Union
CUD- Coalition for Unity and Democracy
DFID – The Department For International Development (UK government)
EEA – The Ethiopian Economists Association
EEPCo- Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation
EPRDF- The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EIABC–The Ethiopian Institute for Architecture, Building Construction and City Development
EIC- The Ethiopian Investment Commission
EIZDC – The Ethiopian Industrial Zones Development Corporation
EU- The European Union Commission
EUPA- The Ethiopian Urban Planners Association
FDRE- Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GT – Grounded Theory
GTP – The Growth and Transformation Plan
HIP- Hawassa Industrial Park.
MoUDH – Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
MoI – Ministry of Industry
MoFECC- Ministry of Forestry, Environment and Climate Change
MSE – Micro and Small Enterprises
MFS- Micro Finance Scheme
NIPSP- National Industrial Parks Spatial Plan
NPDC- National Planning and Development Commission
NICs- Newly Industrializing Countries
IDDA III – The Third Industrial Development Decade for Africa
IDP – Integrated Development Planning
IDS- Industrial Development Strategy
IHDP – Integrated Housing Development Program
ILO – The United Nations International Labour Organization
IPDC – The Ethiopian Industrial Parks Corporation
IP – Industrial Parks
IZ- Industrial Zones

IAIP- Integrated Agro-Industrial Parks

IPA- Interpretive Policy Analysis

IPD – Industrial parks development

INGO- International Non-Governmental Organization

OECD – the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PASDEP – Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty

PDOs – People's Democratic Organizations

PI – Policy Integration

PM- Prime Minister

PMO- Prime Minister's Office

RDP- Rural Development Policy

RTC- Rural Transformation Centres

SEZ- Special Economic Zone

SDF- Spatial Development Frameworks

SDG - The Sustainable Development Goals

SMEDA- Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency

SNNPR- Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region

TPLF – The Tigrayan People's liberation Front

UNCTAD – The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNECA- The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

UNGA- The United National General Assembly

WB – The World Bank

WPE- The Workers Party of Ethiopia

Prologue

We sat in the quiet dim room for an hour, waiting. Cassandre[1] went through the presentation for what felt like the twentieth time as we waited. I could not look at it anymore. Instead, I looked at the room. So, this was what the Prime Minister's Office looks like. Everything looked old and felt heavy, the dim lighting and the grave silence in the waiting room didn't help. The aging carpet and 60's furniture signaled time was both frozen in and taking its toll on this place. It felt like we were the only people in the building but surely there were many toiling behind the heavy wooden closed doors we had gone past as we were being ushered in.

It was August 2015 and Cassandre, my direct supervisor and I had been working on a study on housing for Hawassa industrial park for the past couple of months. It had been an intense period and both of us knew this was important. Most days Cassandre and I sat in the newly established Industrial Parks Development Corporation (IPDC) headquarters. There, we sat in a pool office in the Master Planning Unit in the Design and Development directorate, a room that was the antithesis of this room. The pool office in IPDC was well lit, all the furniture was new, and all surfaces were shiny, no carpets or opaque doors in sight. People hurried around and got in each other's way as they tried to deal with one emergency after another. There, urgency was palpable, and we never sat in silence.

Most days, working in IPDC was exciting and fulfilling. Hawassa Industrial Park was still under development and as it was a design-build project, so the design and development directorate were always in flux dealing with issues as they emerged. As AGI personnel embedded in IPDC, Cassandre and I usually supported the directorate with the day-to-day issues while at the same time developing guidelines on various aspects of park development such as building and master planning standards within the park, land bank protocols, etc., alongside IPDC experts. The housing guideline was one such task that was assigned to us by the then CEO of IPDC. As part of the guideline, we had carried out a quick benchmark study looking at how housing was addressed in various East Asian countries. We had also reviewed the various housing standards developed by numerous multilateral agencies like the ILO. As a conclusion to the document, we had included a rough conceptual proposal for housing 20,000 workers (this was the number of workers that were understood to be coming to HIP at that

[1] Cassandre Pignon, SenionSenior policy advisor at the Tony Blair African Governance Initiative (AGI), was my direct supervisor and colleague at the time. We were both embedded in IPDC supporting the development of Hawassa Industrial Park.

point, which would grow to 60,000 by the time the design-build project was complete). Although the 'proposal' was mostly a cost and spatial analysis, we had been able to confirm that 20,000 workers could theoretically be housed in five storey dormitory blocks within the park's expansion area held by the IPDC land bank with enough space left over for clearances, open spaces, sports facilities etc.

The meeting we were waiting for was with the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Industrial Development, to present our findings and get directives on how to proceed. The advisor was a prominent political figure, and I was excited to meet him and to hear his thoughts on our study and proposal. The secretary finally came around to tell us that he was able to see us now. We walked down the halls and into a large pristine office where he greeted us at the door with a smile. He greeted Cassandre with great warmth and then turned around to see me with surprise.

The meeting quickly started, and Cassandra started going through all the main points and highlighting key findings as he skimmed through the written report. At a certain point, he stopped looking at the report and started listening. We were going through findings about Vietnam when suddenly he asked us to stop. He turned to Cassandre, told her that we may need to do this at another time, thanked her profusely and showed us to the door. I was confused; I didn't really understand what had just happened. Maybe something else had come up or he had read something he wanted to crosscheck; it was unclear. However, Cassandre did not seem to be confused at all. She briskly walked towards the exit after thanking the secretary and didn't bother to set up the next appointment he had suggested. I tried to catch up with her and ask if we needed to talk to the secretary about a follow up meeting and she smiled and said, 'Sure, but you can try that later'.

I did try later but to no avail. I didn't realize then that we had received a response. The unspoken directive was to let it go and Cassandre, being more experienced than I, had gotten the message. She left AGI and the country not too long after that and my responsibilities shifted away from housing. And for the rest of my time in AGI until I left in mid-2016, housing never came back to the table even though the need for housing only seemed to grow with the growing number of estimated workers. The significance of housing and its absence seemed to loom over everything else we were doing. My puzzlement on the matter only grew as the housing situation evolved and deteriorated over the next 2 years. Why didn't all the energy that was going into developing the industrial sheds, with their complicated design programs and seemingly endless investor requirements, ever extend to the housing problem, which in comparison seemed like an easier problem to solve. It was becoming glaringly obvious as the park development was

coming closer to completion Where were all the workers going to go? A backyard micro finance housing scheme came up in 2016 but it was clear to everyone around me, before it was even executed, that it would not scratch the surface of the problem. Nevertheless, it seemed to be the approach that was wholeheartedly pursued in response to the inquiries of the city administration and the investors.

Though my career took me elsewhere, my heart remained fixed on Hawassa, one of my favorite cities, and the impending crisis. I could not shake away the question of why this was happening. Why were urban issues like industrial worker's housing, and by extension transportation, service provision and cost of living issues that were so central to the industrialization agenda, which was being implemented so well, not addressed within industrial parks policy or urban policy? What was holding back extremely effective leaders like the advisor we had spoken to, with his immense experience with urban development issues, from dealing with these issues head-on in their policies? Why were IPDC and MoUDH[2] not dealing with these problems together, and how (if at all) did the planning processes within these organizations interact with each other and other planning processes that affected the emerging urban industrial physical development? Why did all of these issues not seem to change, no matter how bad the housing crisis got[3]?

These questions drove me to do this PhD and to be honest after five years of pursuing the answer to these questions, there is a lot that remains to be uncovered. Partly because of the lack of transparency in Ethiopian policy making but also because of the epistemic limitations of interpretive policy analysis there are limits to what can be known. Nevertheless, following four years of fieldwork and analysis, during which I interviewed over 80 experts and policy makers at all levels of government; attended over 40 sessions of relevant gatherings (conferences, workshops, meetings); and reviewed a wide range of documents – policy documents, studies and reports - as well as the state of the academic literature on this issue, this PhD thesis holds what I have found.

[2] The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MoUDH)

[3] When the primarily (92%) young female workers started to come into the finished parks, the absence of housing provision resulted in most seeking accommodation in newly built informal housing areas that did not have lighting or proper access roads, which led to cases of abductions and rapes of workers in 2019. The housing challenge remains largely unaddressed to date (Addis Insight, 2019).

1. The Research Agenda_ *the landing*

I went to visit Hawassa Industrial Park last week and it was like an alien ship has just landed. It was so disconnected from everything around it and kind of hovering over the city [4]

[4] Conversation with Toni Weis, Ethiopia Scholar and Operations Analyst at the World Bank, in August of 2016, a few weeks after the park's inauguration.

Introduction.

In 2014, Ethiopia embarked on an ambitious Industrial Parks Development Programme that set out to develop 30 industrial parks (IPs) in the country's secondary cities within a period of 10 years (FDRE, 2015). According to some, the program promised to position the country to lead African state-led export-oriented industrialization; to become the largest manufacturing hub in Africa (Oqubay, 2016:3); and to spearhead the continent's industrial revolution (Kellow, 2018). True to the impressive implementation track record of the Ethiopian state, the Industrial Parks Development (IPD) program was successfully established, and eleven IPs were built in record time in secondary cities across the country. However, as soon as the projects began to become operational, it became clear that the rapid planning and development of the parks had not been integrated well into that of their host cities.

Gaps in housing and infrastructure provision in IP host cities quickly led to the formation and densification of peripheral informal settlements; became a bottleneck for labor sourcing, and thus a direct threat to the viability of the industrialization project; and caused serious implications for the safety and wellbeing of their 92% female industrial workers (Addis Insight, 2019). The emergence of these challenges has resulted in a growing number of calls over the past six years for wider integration between urban and industrial policy in national development planning, as well as between federal and local policy and administrative action (PWC et.al., 2017: 22; EDRI, 2017:141; UNDP, 2018a:73; World Bank, 2017a: 41). However, studies on the phenomenon have not gone further than investigating the emerging symptomatic issues to address why and where the disconnect between the spheres of industrial and urban policy arose and why it continues to persist.

This research examines the challenge of integrating industrial and urban policy in Ethiopia by exploring what policy practitioners directly involved in these processes at different levels of government understood to be its root causes and major manifestations. The purpose of Chapter 1 is to set out the research agenda by: outlining the significance of the topic of policy integration in the broader phenomenon of Africa's current urban-industrial development; presenting the empirical problem in the Ethiopian case that prompted the study; giving a brief overview of the wider trajectory of Ethiopian political, economic and social history that framed the country's industrial and urban development; and discussing the initial critical engagement with extant theory that led to the adoption of a grounded theory approach. Finally, the chapter closes by orienting the reader on the thesis structure.

1.1 The significance of the study and research problem.

Africa's ongoing transformation in the 21st century is characterized by two mega trends: its urban, and industrial transitions. The continent will account for 80% of the projected 4 billion increase in global population by 2100 while the urban population is projected to rise to 60% of the total African population by 2050 (UNECA, 2017a; IMF,2014:4). This indicates that cities will become increasingly important in the continent's economic development. As working age populations rise in urban Africa over the next few decades, countries will either leverage the demographic dividend in cities to foster economic growth or face potentially disruptive masses of unemployed youth (BI and OSSA, 2019; IMF,2014).

Cognizant of this fact, numerous African countries[5] are pursuing state-led export-oriented industrialization to address the challenge of youth employment in African cities as part of broader economic development policy. Following the 2008 African Union Summit that endorsed the African Union's Action Plan for the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa (AU, 2011), this effort of accelerating industrialization has been framed as central to the ability of countries to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, specifically SDG 1 and SDG 9, which aim to "eradicate poverty, build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrial development and foster innovation" (UNGA, 2016:3). In line with this, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted a resolution that proclaimed the period of 2016-2025 as the Third Industrial Development Decade for Africa (IDDA III) and called for urgent action to advance rapid and sustainable industrialization. Further propelled by ambitious domestic economic agendas, IDDA III has seen an unprecedented surge in industrialization initiatives across the continent, which is occurring alongside, and partly as a result of, an unprecedented inflow of FDI investment in the African manufacturing sector over the past decade (UNCTAD, 2019: 34; World Bank, 2017; McKinsey &Co. 2010).

Most of these countries that are pursuing accelerated industrialization in Africa are aspiring developmental states[6], who have attempted to steer structural transformation emulating the success of the East Asian developmental state model through the development of Special Economic Zones and Industrial Parks, with varying degrees of success (Fourie, 2011;

[5] Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda are some key examples of this trend (Kweka and Te Velde, 2020; Lopes and Te Velde, 2021).

[6] Defined here as a state that 'establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote sustained development, understanding by development the steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to the international economy' (Castells, 1992:55).

UNCTAD, 2019,149). All attempts have, however, faced challenges owing to the drastically different social and infrastructural environments into which this model is being introduced in Africa.

The very limited infrastructural provision which characterizes many African secondary cities, where these projects are located, is one of the realities that these projects are confronted with. It is widely acknowledged that Africa's experience of urbanization has historically been disconnected from economic growth and industrialization. Instead, an urbanization without growth (Fay and Opal, 2000) spurred on by employment in the informal economy (Bhattacharya, 1993), rural-urban migration and population growth (Fox, 2012: :286) has been the norm. Such urbanization processes have fostered deep-set inequalities and weak institutional systems and capacities that, in turn, have undermined the continent's 'urban potential for structural transformation' through industrialization (UNECA, 2017: xx).

Moreover, there has been increasing concern that national development plans on the continent have overlooked the implications of urbanization for the pursuit of structural transformation (UNECA, 2018: xv). In 2018, the year this PhD commenced, the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) published three reports dealing with this very theme (UNECA, 2017; 2017a; 2018). The reports highlighted the aspatial nature of economic policies and industrial strategies that pursue industrialization processes without providing sufficient attention to anchoring them in the planning and development of national spatial and urban systems; increasing the functionality and productivity in cities; coordinating sectoral urban investments; or adopting sector targeting that responds to urban demands (UNECA, 2018).

The three reports all start out by conceptualizing the problem of the disconnect between urban and industrial development planning on the continent as a *policy integration challenge*. They go on to present strong arguments for why such urban industrial integration is imperative; what positive outcomes integrated policies could deliver; and how these outcomes can be achieved in the urban-industrial nexus. In doing so, they position policy integration as an ideal, owing to its importance to the sustainability of both city and industrial developments, and argue that national development planning is the space where the integration agenda ought to be embedded.

While these are valid and important arguments, this general approach is disconnected from (and so speaks past) the contexts in which industrial and urban policy are formulated and implemented. It misses the myriad of interests, rationalities, and persistent structural factors

that determine whether integration as a goal is adopted or prioritized, let alone considered an ideal, in development policy making spaces. It further fails to address the disjuncture between the assertions of formal national development policies and how and why decisions are actually taken during the steering of complex policy spheres. In response, **this research explores the conditions that inhibit integrated urban-industrial development planning, and the politics, institutions and ideas that generate and perpetuate these conditions.**

Ethiopia is an excellent case of the integration challenge within the African urban-industrial nexus, as a nation that has been positioning itself to become the largest manufacturing hub on the continent (Oqubay, 2016:3) without clearly linking its ambitious industrial policy with rapid urbanization and responses to this. As outlined above, state-led industrial and infrastructural development have taken the form of industrial parks - large industrial estates developed around the edge of cities that employ tens of thousands of young migrant workers.

Within national development policy, there has been some limited recognition of the importance of the urban agenda to that of industrialization. The country's current national development strategy- the second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) – explicitly recognizes that economic growth is tied to urban land-use and spatial policies: "The envisaged expansion of manufacturing and industrial development could not be thought of without sustainable development of urban centers. Hence, utmost emphasis will be given to the urban development process" (NPD, 2016: 157). The preamble of the proclamation for the establishment of the Industrial Parks Development Corporation (IPDC) further recognizes, 'The need to enhance economic land-use and establishing and expanding planned urban centers' (FDRE 2015: 1).

However, outside of these declarations, the formidable task of steering the two interrelated processes of change have been accomplished through separate policy instruments, institutions, and legal arrangements since the onset of IP development in 2008. Furthermore, this has been followed by decades of minimal attention to urban policy agendas in Ethiopian politics. Not only have there been no new integrated policies that position industrial parks within a holistic approach to wider industrial development and urban development policy; the new Industrial Parks Development Policy (2015) was never reconciled with pre-existing urban and industrial policy proclamations and strategies. This has created a situation where, to date, no urban development policies make any mention of industrial parks. Over the course of the inception, planning and development of industrial parks (and especially Hawassa Industrial Park (HIP) as the flagship IP project) integrative instruments at various scales either never emerged, or did

not manage to advance, despite consistent warnings of consequences by various actors working within the nexus.

More generally, the development of the IPs is widely recognized by the Ethiopian government and international observers as being highly successful in terms of the pace of the physical development of parks and infrastructure within them. The projects rapidly materialized through a highly coordinated development process that involved over fifty stakeholders at various levels. Over a period of six years, nine industrial parks expected to employ almost 300,000 workers at full capacity, have become operational. The largest of these, Hawassa Industrial Park (HIP), was developed in a record period of nine months (Nov 2015- July 2016), and is expected to generate $1bn in export revenue (accounting for a third of the country's current annual earnings) and employ 60,000 workers at scale, doubling the formal sector jobs in Hawassa City (EIC, 2017).



Fig. 1. Infrastructural demands generated by the industrial parks from IPDC Industrial Parks Optimization Stakeholder Consultation Workshop (December 2020, Addis Ababa) presentation slides.

However, currently operating at quarter capacity or less, most of the parks are already limited by, and further compound, pre-existing deficits in housing, power, water and transportation provision in host cities. At an Industrial Parks optimization stakeholder consultation workshop held in Addis Ababa in February 2020, stakeholders took stock of what they referred to as 'infrastructural challenges and critical points impeding the performance and efficient operations of industrial parks'. Housing, energy, water and waste management were at the top of the list as critical bottlenecks for the optimal performance of the parks. Conversely, the new structural plan for Hawassa (2020-2030) (UNHABITAT, 2020) highlighted the declining livability of the city due to the rising housing demands and infrastructural challenges brought

on by the development of the park and recommended detailed holistic solutions for addressing challenges that could enhance the productivity of the park while simultaneously improving the ability of the city to address backlogs of infrastructural demand.

Recent international scholarship on Ethiopia's ambitious industrial policy (2001 -2020) (Oqubay and Ohno, 2019; Oqubay and Lin, 2020; Cheru et.al., 2019) has drawn renewed attention to the interactions between urban and industrial development (G/Egziabher & Yemeru, 2020; Cheru and Fikreselassie, 2020). Studies have particularly highlighted the challenges that are emerging at the urban industrial infrastructural nexus, such as the housing crisis and infrastructural deficits (Mitlin, 2020; Goodfellow and Huang, 2021) in cities hosting industrial developments. Further scholarship in urban and development planning studies have also highlighted that these deficits are quickly leading to the formation and densification of peripheral informal settlements (McKinsey & Co., 2017); constraining labor sourcing, and thus directly threatening the viability of the industrialization project; and the wellbeing of the young migrant female worker force (Hassan et. al., 2020, Mains and Mulat, 2021), but have neglected the political drivers of these issues.

However, these studies have failed to look beyond the symptoms and manifestations of the lack of integration in these state-driven accelerated industrialization programs to address the underlying political conditions that are limiting the ability to foster policy integration (PI). At the same time, following the general trend within the politics of development literature, studies that have looked at the politics (Whitfield et. al., 2015) and political economy (Chitonge and Lawrence, 2020) of Africa's recent industrial policy have tended to overlook the urban and spatial dimensions of spatialized industrial policy in their analysis of the conditions of industrialization in Africa more generally.

This research, therefore, aims to address the root causes of the disconnect between the planning and policy making guiding the industrial and urban policy spheres in Ethiopia between 2001-2020. It does this by exploring I) **the key factors that impeded holistic policy making in the Ethiopian urban-industrial nexus during the formulation of industrial parks development policy;** II) **the coordination between industrial park planning and city-driven urban development during implementation; and** III) **the limits on spatial planning and its implications for spatial and infrastructural integration**. These aims and objectives were informed by an initial review of relevant literature conducted prior to fieldwork, which sought to frame the empirical and policy issues outlined above . The next section presents the wider context within which the research is set.

1.2. Wider context of Africa's current Urban Industrialization

1.2.1. Africa and the current moment in global capitalist transformation

The industrialization agenda has a long history in Africa with various attempts and programs linked to the modernization agenda of colonial and post-colonial governments. These attempts span from the immediate post-colonial import substitution industrialization period during the 1960s, through the era of liberalization and privatization that was the 70s and 80s (that stole gains made in the previous decades and resulted in the deindustrialization of many economies), through to the past three decades of export-oriented globalized industrialization (Stiglitz et. al., 2013). This current export-oriented industrialization stage of global capitalist development is one where countries are increasingly beholden to global production networks in their pursuit of integration into the global economic system. Navigating this global economic system increasingly structured around transnational corporations, governments have sought to integrate into the system by facilitating the entry of foreign direct investment in special economic zones.

As geographically defined territories within nation states created to allow for preferential forms of governance and regulations for investors, SEZs have allowed capital to 'reorder working space and time in ways that generate profit more efficiently' by bridging the gap between the slow state bureaucracies and the speed of that global markets demand (Cross, 2014: 13). "*The idea/concept of "The Zone" emerged out of a negotiation between state sovereignty and global capitalism that was needed to facilitate mobility. This negotiation found its resolution in 'the logic of exception"* (Bach, 2011:99). The zone has since captured the imagination of policy makers everywhere as an instrument of economic development and a paradigm of urbanism, fast becoming 'a powerful global form' (Easterling, 2014). The past two decades especially have seen the greatest explosion in the adoption of SEZ programs across the global south, which has led some to argue that IPs, as a specific/prevalent manifestation of SEZs, are fast becoming the 'spatial context of state involvement in the new economics of competition' across the globe (Yeoh et. al., 2017). Indeed, the number of zones around the world has exploded from just 850 in 1998 (Cross, 2014:11) to over 5383 zones in 147 countries, of which three quarters are considered developing, and almost all transition economies, in 2019 (UNCTAD, 2019:137).

It is within this global resurgence of industrial policy and special economic zone development that Africa's current phase of rapid urban industrialization is unfolding. This most recent round of adoption of zone programs in Africa has in most cases sought to emulate successful zone programs in East and South-East Asia (UNCTAD, 2019: 139). However, the export-oriented industrialization-led growth of East Asian economies in the 1960's took place under a particular set of global and internal conditions (Song, 2012:2). These included the structural opportunities in the international political economic system of the post-World War II era; widespread public infrastructure development programs (e.g. in Korea and Singapore); comprehensive state economic and spatial planning; highly authoritarian and hierarchical state structures; and for the most part ethnic homogeneity (Blakley, 2021). Furthermore, in most cases these industrialization programs were embedded in centrally driven national development strategies which were elaborated through comprehensive planning that accounted for urban development demands (Ming & Hin, 2006; Pang, 2017; Wei, 2015). This allowed for highly integrated urban-industrial planning and policy making, which enabled synergetic relationships between urbanization and industrialization processes.

The institutional, political and policy making contexts under which African countries are pursuing rapid export-oriented industrialization are drastically different (Woldeghiorgis, 2014; Whitfield et. al., 2015). These contextual factors have shaped the success and failures of the various attempts at state-led industrialization across the continent. IDDA III, the latest phase of state-led industrialization in Africa (2016-2025) outlined above, has been especially challenging, as the condition of political settlements have been particularly unfavorable for industrial policy, including the predominance of power fragmentation within ruling coalitions and the low technological capacities of domestic capitalists (Whitfield et.al., 2015: 294). Furthermore, colonial legacies of limited capacity building and autonomy at municipal level and anti-urban bias in the 70s and 80s under the influence of donors have also hampered the capacity of urban administrations to support or lead industrialization efforts in Africa.

Through these many phases of industrialization and deindustrialization, very few countries have managed to create internationally competitive manufacturing industries or transform the low productivity of their cities and economies. Nevertheless, during this period, Sub-Saharan Africa's urban population has grown from 33 million in 1950 to 551 million in 2020 (WB, 2019). This rapid pace of urbanization is expected to take the urban population of sub-Saharan Africa to up to upto 2 billion by 2050 (World Bank, 2019). The implications of this rapid urbanization under conditions of low productivity have been the explosion of urban poverty

with very little correlation between urban growth and economic development (Turok, 2014), as discussed above. As a result, current attempts to industrialize in cities are faced with harsh urban realities that undermine the continent's 'urban potential for structural transformation' (UNECA, 2017a: XX). These conditions include, "tepid job creation, huge infrastructure and service gaps, weak linkages with rural areas, increasing inequalities, growing environmental damage and vulnerability to climate change and weak institutional systems and capacities" (UNECA, 2017a: XX).

Based on this review of the literature, I arrived at an understanding of the industrialization of Ethiopia and many other African countries as *urban industrialization* as distinct from earlier experiences of *industrial urbanization* elsewhere. Urban industrialization encapsulates experiences of *late late-industrialization* set in the context of cities experiencing *late urbanization* whereby this industrialization is taking place in cities that have started to rapidly urbanize without substantial industrialization. *Late urbanization* describes the experiences of the least urbanized but fastest urbanizing countries (mostly in Africa) that are undergoing the most recent urban transitions (Fox and Goodfellow, 2021:5). *Late late-industrialization*, which in most cases entails rapid state-led development of large industrial hubs that facilitate technology transfer and foreign direct investment in the context of global production network-based industrial transformation. *Urban industrialization* in Africa therefore, in most cases, entails rapid state-led development of large industrial hubs in cities with significant backlogs of housing and infrastructural deficits.

Despite the inherent challenges of urban industrialization, a growing number of African developmental states push on with ambitious industrial policies, propelled by ruling political elites seeking legitimacy and survival through economic performance (Whitfield et. al., 2019:7). The question is no longer 'Should Africa industrialize?' or 'Can Africa Industrialize?' (Chang, 2013:114) but '***How*** is Africa industrializing?'. There is no instance of contemporary African Industrialization as well suited as the Ethiopian case to delve into this exciting, timely yet nascent and important stream of inquiry as no other country on the continent has pursued an industrial strategy and industry policy at the same scale as Ethiopia. The next sub section briefly contextualizes Ethiopia's current ambitious industrialization program within the wider trajectory of the country's political, economic and social history.

1.2.2. Ethiopia's ongoing radical transformation

In order to better understand the recent developments in Ethiopia's national development planning and in its urban and industrial development in general, it is important to outline the wider trajectory of the country's modern political, economic and social history over the past 50 years, during which it has transformed beyond recognition. Following the end of the Second World War, and the return of Emperor Haileselassie from exile, the imperial government formulated the country's first development agenda which resulted in three five-year development plans between 1957 and 1974 (Imperial Government of Ethiopia, 1957, 1962, 1968). The plans primarily identified agriculture, manufacturing and infrastructure as priority areas of investment and outlined market interventions in the form of monetary, fiscal and trade policies. The plans led to "significant increase in agriculture output in the southern part of the country and a noticeable initiation of export diversification in the second half of the 60s and early 70s" (EEA, 2003:230)

Nevertheless, this period also saw the birth and growing prominence of the Ethiopian Student Movement which called for the end of the centuries-old monarchy and revolutionary changes to the country's political, economic and social structures. Surprisingly the revolution was not initially instigated by a revolutionary party or radical groups (Clapham, 1988:42). News of a small mutiny of rank-and-file soldiers in Negele Borena, that had not been met by punishment from the emperor, spread to other military installations which proceeded to rebel as the emperor gave in to demands. In early 1974, the global oil crisis caused a steep increase in gasoline prices and taxi driver and teachers went on strike. However, the decisive blow came from the reorganization of the army under the Derg - a committee of mid-level representatives of the main military units - that 'shoved off' the old generals and assumed control (Donham, 1992:16).

The 1974 revolution that was born out of those events fundamentally transfigured Ethiopian society. Almost overnight, the deeply hierarchical, feudal, imperial and religious social order headed by the monarchy was replaced by a military regime that sought to transplant Soviet polity and social order towards a communist ideal (AbebeWolde, 2005). In April 1976, Mengistu Haile Mariam, the leader of the newly installed Derg regime, publicly proclaimed himself a Marxist and called for '*the complete elimination of feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism'* in pursuit of a transition towards socialism (AbebeWolde, 2005).

Over the next 17 years, Mengistu went on to alter the country's political, economic and social institutions, creating the foundations of the contemporary Ethiopian modern state (Abebewolde, 2005:1) by establishing the core political and bureaucratic structures that survive to date (though in a somewhat altered form). Three key socialist structures that he introduced were the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) and the urban/ rural neighborhood associations (Kebeles). The core of this new political infrastructure was the creation of the Ethiopian Workers Party in 1984, the first party instituted in Ethiopian history, a Leninist mass party with rules of conduct and operating procedures for party members that was modeled after the communist party of the Soviet Union (CIA, 1986).

Mengistu not only modelled the Soviet party but more widely Soviet polity and its extension, 'the partocratic mono-organizational society' (Rigby, 2007) (discussed further in Chapter 3.1). While Emperor Hailesilassie had taken many serious steps towards modernizing Ethiopia's political system by introducing a parliament and cabinet of ministers and revising the judicial system, Mengistu's introduction of the Leninist mass party and party bureaucratic system reshaped the nature of all these institutions, bringing them under the influence of the party. In an interview in 1990, Mengistu explained how his party was at the center of his Marxist-Leninist modernization project, "This is one of the most ancient counties in the world, and in this long history Ethiopia has never known any kind of party politics. And this party is young, it's still being organized" (Biniamhirut, 2019).

Another key element of the Marxist-Leninist modernization project was the Derg's extensive socialization program. Under this program, land, private medium- and large-scale manufacturing enterprise, buildings and housing were nationalized (Belluci, 2016). The nationalization of major assets and marginalization of the private sector stifled the manufacturing sector as the focus of the country's development strategy shifted to agriculture and to the development of large-scale state-owned farms (Abbink, 2015). In line with socialist development economic planning, agricultural transformation was assumed to automatically induce industrialization. However, this approach failed to bear fruit. The absence of any strategies to improve the productivity of small-holder farmers outside the large state farms led to the intensification of famines across the country (EEA, 2003).

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Derg regime faced coups, uprisings and multiple military engagements throughout its seventeen years in power. These included the Ogaden war with Somalia and the drawn-out civil war with the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation

Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front -- armed insurgencies and successionist movements in Tigray and Eritrea. The 1985 famine and the Soviet Union's retreat from supporting world communism – resulting in the end of its aid to Ethiopia in 1990 – led to their defeat of the Derg regime by the TPLF in 1991.

As urban industrial policy under EPRDF is discussed in depth in the empirical chapters, only a brief highlight of key developments is presented below. Initially, the economic policy of the Marxist-Leninist TPLF-led government did not significantly depart from that of the Derg (Abbink, 2015). Similarly following socialist strategy, agriculture remained at the center of ADLI (Agriculture Development Led Industrialization), the regime's core development strategy was now implemented within a hybrid market economy introduced by the TPLF (Fantini, 2013). For the first ten years, ADLI's rural small-holder farmer-focused strategies failed to materialize or to induce industrialization (Lavers, 2019:83) while the urban population almost doubled from 6.1 million in 1990 to 11.6 million in 2005 (WB, 2019).

At the turn of the century internal political strife within the party resulted in the fracture of the party leadership which culminated in Prime Minister Meles Zenawi taking the lead and introducing a new economic policy modelled after developmental states (discussed in depth in section 3.1). Four years later, a significant challenge to the party's rule emerged during the 2005 national election, when the party experienced significant losses to its opposition in all major cities, where resentment over lack of opportunities had grown. After stifling the opposition, the party's pursuit of developmentalist export-oriented industrialization strategy took center stage as the success of its implementation became the bedrock of the regime's legitimization of its authoritarian rule. At the same time, the regime's recognition of *the urban threat* to its survival resulted in a rapid development of a range of urban policies (Di Nunzio, 2014; Gebremariam, 2017; Oqubay, 2015).

These new industrial and urban policies - including the industrial parks policies – were aggressively implemented over the course of three five-year development plans between 2005 and 2020. Urban policies were geared toward responding to the urban threat while industrial policies sought the economic performance that could legitimize the regime's rule under the political economy of developmentalism. These policies resulted in significant transformations of the country's urban and industrial development. However, as shown above, the two policy spheres have for the most part remained disconnected. This thesis takes as its focus this intense period of transformation between 2001 and 2020 in its exploration of the root causes and

implications of the absence of holistic policymaking across industrial and urban policy spheres during the formulation and implementation of industrial policy (esp. IPD) in chapters 3 and 4.

1.3. Conceptual springboards

Having thus established the global and national context in which the study is set, this section introduces some of the core concepts and debates that were critical in launching the study, preparing me for fieldwork, and by informing my initial lines of inquiry in the field. This initial conceptual framework is made up of three broad concepts which were most relevant to the study's focus, namely: *Policy Integration* deriving from public administration and politics literatures; *Integrative Spatial Planning* deriving from planning literature; and *Urban Developmentalism*, deriving from urban studies literatures. In this section, I highlight key aspects of themes that helped frame the research agenda and the three research questions.

1. What impeded holistic policy making in the Ethiopian urban-industrial nexus (especially during the formulation of Industrial parks development policy)?
2. What impeded policy coherence throughout the implementation of IPD? and why did this problem persist during and after the development of the IPs?
3. What factors limited the integrative potential of spatial planning in the urban industrial Nexus? And what were the spatial and infrastructural outcomes of policy and planning fragmentation in the urban-industrial interface?

1.3.1. Policy Integration and Coherence

The problem of the disconnect between urban and industrial development planning on the continent has been widely theorized as a policy integration challenge (UNECA, 2017; 2017a; 2018; Goodfellow and Huang, 2021; Hassan et. al., 2020; McKinsey & Co., 2017). In keeping with the policy debates outlined above, this conceptualization of the problem positions policy integration as an ideal, owing to its importance to the sustainability of both cities and industrial development in Africa. However, a review of the genealogy, evolution and prominent focus of the policy integration (PI) agenda and theory, reveals its adoption as policy making ideal is still strongly tied to the political context from which it emerged (democratic European states), and the thematic focus of policy problems it was created to solve (environmental and sustainability policy and development cooperation). Its relevance - i.e., status as a policy making ideal-

amongst policy makers - beyond these policy spheres and contexts remains minimal, and in the case of Ethiopian urban-industrial policy making sphere virtually absent.

Nevertheless, key debates from the existing policy integration literature are discussed in the rest of this section as they were key to framing research questions and some early interview questions. The discussion below introduces these key debates by: I) mapping the various interconnected and adjacent concepts (integration, coherence, coordination, collaboration, holistic policy making…); II) outlining dimensions of integration (horizontal, vertical, conceptual, procedural, substantive…); and III) tracing the genealogy, application and relevance of policy integration theory.

The inception of the concept of policy integration and its development into a field of interconnected concepts took place within the context of the emergence of the sustainability agenda in Europe in the 1980s and the immense political pressure that followed to pursue this agenda through cross-cutting policy objectives (OECD, 2009; EU, 2007). The concept of '*policy integration'* was first used by Underdal (1980) in the field of marine policy, where the increasingly diversified use of international ocean space by multiple regimes was resulting in conflict of interests. He defined integrated policy as policy where '*constituent elements are brought together and made subject to a single, unifying conception'* (Underdal 1980:159). Underdal's framing was widely adopted in a new stream of literature - Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) - that emerged following the 1987 Brundtland Report's call for systematically connecting the seemingly incompatible goals of economic competitiveness, social development and environmental protection (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010).

Underdal's conceptualization of integration advanced the argument for coordination between cross cutting policy spheres, that had already been prevalent for decades within the public administration literature, to a higher standard of unification that required policies to be subject to a '*single unifying conception'* or overarching objective. Studies since have predominantly tried to expand on the core element of this definition: *unification*. Geerlings and Stead (2003) later organized various levels of unification into an *integration hierarchy* (see Figure 2) that has been widely applied. In this framework, cooperation was understood to be the lowest form of integration signifying '*the presence of deliberate relations between otherwise autonomous organizations for the joint accomplishment of individual operating goals' (*Meijer and Stead 2004:5). Coordination, on the other hand, was understood to be a higher form of joint policy making which entailed the adjustment of the original sectoral policies to make them mutually enforcing and consistent. Finally, integrated policy making was understood to deal with

objectives at a higher level than those specific to sectors – in other words, formulating cross-cutting objectives that require joint policy for two or more sectors.



Figure 2. The hierarchy of integrated policy making (Meijer and Stead 2004)

Policy coherence is another adjacent concept that was refined in the literature as the PI concept evolved. The concepts of integration and coherence were used interchangeably in the literature until Nilsson et al. (2012: 397) proposed a distinction within policy analysis where policy integration and coherence refer to different stages of the policy making process. 'policy integration analysis' is applied to 'upstream policy making processes' such as policy inputs and goals; and 'policy coherence analysis' is applied to policy outputs and implementation.



Figure 3. Policy coherence in a policy analytical framework (adopted from Nilsson et al. 2012: 397)

Around the same time, Braissoulis (2004:10) sought to expand the purview of integration from the highest standard of unification to include more realistic goals of coordination, signifying separate but aligned policies. She defined PI as "*a process of coordinating* or blending policies into a unified whole, or of incorporating concerns of one policy into another" (2004:10). Where some authors had defined these concepts as distinct from one another, her definition

characterized coordination as part of the process as well as a form of unification. I adopt this more expansive definition of policy integration because it allows for analysis of the degree of alignment in existing urban and industrial policy in the Ethiopian urban industrial field, where joint urban-industrial policies are non-existent.

Braissoulis (2004) also proposed a conceptual framework that expanded the well-established structural dimensions of policy integration – vertical (intra-sectoral) and horizontal (inter-sectoral) – by proposing four dimensions. These four dimensions included: i) substantive/conceptual integration – "policies draw on common or compatible and non-conflicting theories and epistemological frameworks, reflecting common perceptions of the problem and common outlooks of the actors involved, or adopt comprehensive, interdisciplinary problem definitions and theories and define and operationalize concepts similarly" ; ii) Analytical integration – that policies "possess the same or compatible spatial and temporal systems of reference and consider cross-scale integration"; iii) procedural integration - the structural and procedural relationships among policies that constitute the means through which PI materializes including through horizontal and vertical policy coordination; and iv) Practical integration "the plethora of practical issues related to availability, compatibility, consistency and congruence of data and information needed to analyze properly the object of PI" (Braissoulis, 2004:14-21). This expansive categorization of dimensions of policy integration allows for the analysis of the range of complex relationships between policy spheres that considers relationships between policy objects, goals, actors and instruments. Although not extensively applied in this research, this framework informed post-fieldwork analysis of empirical data.

The evolution of PI and its global applicability

In the 1990s, policy integration (PI) received widespread political backing at the international level due to the work of several international governmental organizations like the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Bank (WB) and the United Nations (UN). The concept of *Policy Coherence*, which later developed into a separate stream of PI literature focused on reconciling existing policies during implementation, was first mentioned in an OECD report in 1991. It became popularized in the field of development cooperation, and particularly the goal of creating synergies between aid and non-aid policies through publications by the OECD (2009) and the EU Commission (2007) (Tosun & Lang, 2017:560).

Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) gained prominence and even a legal status in the European Union following the official statement for the integration of environmental concerns in sectoral policies, made in Article 6 of the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty (Braissoulis, 2004:8). More recent literature on EPI has thus looked at the ways and degrees to which EPI has been adopted in the EU and the factors that facilitated or hindered this adoption (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Candel & Biesbroek, 2016:213). The EU has continued to promote various approaches to the design of integrated policies, and the literature on EPI within the European context has dominated the PI literature over the past two decades (Tosun & Lang, 2017:560). Braissoulis (2004:8) notes that as a result of this, most definitions of PI refer to EPI even when 'environmental' is omitted.

What is critical to note about this genealogy and general tendency of conflating PI and EPI is that the adoption of policy integration as a policy objective in democratic European contexts was predicated on the strong political mandate, followed by the significant political commitment (Geerlings & Stead, 2003) to the climate agenda, which continues to be driven by a large base of popular support in Europe. An equivalent political mandate or democratic base to pursue integrated cross-cutting policy objectives is non-existent in the Ethiopian context, in any policy spheres, including around the specific overriding agenda of industrialization. What is instead prevalent is the primacy of economic agendas (like industrialization agendas), where economic performance is tied to the political legitimacy of non-democratic regimes, as shown above.

However, despite the association of democratic contexts with active policy integration, most of the PI literature tends to take the political status of the PI principle (among policy priorities) for granted. That is, while it bases theorizing on integrative processes that have ***already*** been set in motion in democratic contexts where PI is ***already*** an established principle of policy making, it purports PI's universal relevance and therefore "often suggests that policy integration is a political goal that *must* be attained and outlines the design of integrated policies as promoted by the EU, IGOs, or national policymakers" (Tosun & Lang: 2017: 560) for adoption globally. As discussed in section 1.4 and chapter 4, this research does not assume the relevance or political status of the PI principle but instead adopts a grounded theory approach to understand what the status of policy integration is with policy makers directly involved with urban-industrial policy making in Ethiopia.

Nevertheless, despite its lack of sensitivity to political context, three key elements of the European PI literature retain their usefulness for this study on integrated policy making in the

Ethiopian political context. First, the essence of the concept of PI – *unification* – and goal of bringing policies into 'a unified whole' (Underdal, 1980) were critical in framing the first research question as 'what had impeded holistic policy making' instead of 'what had inhibited policy integration'. That is, owing to the presence of claims of coordinating policy spheres towards structural transformation in GTP II (MoFED 2015:17) but the absence of any explicit approach or program of policy integration. The term 'holistic planning' is used instead of policy integration which holds connotations of an active pursuit of an integration agenda, objective or initiative.

Second, Nilsson et al. (2012)'s differentiation of policy integration and policy coherence, as the processes associated with the formulation and implementation stages of policy making respectively, helped me to distinguish these two processes of holistic policy making. As a result, the second research question is framed around coherence to deal with downstream policy making, in other words the integration of policy outputs and implementation at the local level. Finally, Braissoulis (2004)'s definition of PI as processes of coordination /cooperation allowed the application of these concepts in the analysis as parts of the process/forms of holistic policy making. These three elements of the literature, I argue, are critical to the analysis of holistic policy making in non-democratic contexts where PI is generally not a policy ideal.

1.3.2. Integrative Spatial Planning

A second area of literature that I reviewed early on in my study focused on the integrative role of spatial planning, owing to its importance as a vehicle in the pursuit of policy integration at various points in its evolution. I was drawn to review this literature due to my first-hand experience in the spatial planning directorate[7] of the IPDC (Industrial Parks Development Corporation) where I had witnessed how small a role spatial planning had actually played in the IPD program, and what little importance it held for decision makers leading the rapid development of IPs. This led me to review what the integration ideal looked like within spatial planning theory and practice, and what it looked like in Africa in particular.

Spatial planning is one established system by which governments institutionalize policy integration. They articulate and implement spatial policies to achieve "integrated and functional organization of activities and to regulate the type, location and timing of the

[7] In spite of its name, the work of the directorate revolved around planning development within the Industrial Park compounds and carried out no spatial analysis at city, regional or national level during the development of IPs.

activities and territorial strategies across sectoral goals" to ensure sustainable development outcomes (Acheampong, 2019; Rotmans et. al. 2000, Healey et. al. 1997). Spatial and urban planning were born out of efforts to address the negative consequences of early industrial urbanization in European cities and so are at the most fundamental level meant to address the conflicting and synergetic elements of urban and industrial development.

Following World War II, comprehensive or master planning was the dominant form of spatial planning in Western Europe and in many of its colonies where planning had been instituted. Comprehensive planning involves the development of master plans that focus on land uses and their spatial distribution (Todes et. al, 2010:414). Up until the 1970s, this form of comprehensive planning remained central to urban planning practice (Tosun and Lang, 2017:556), primarily driven by the integrative goal of 'coordinating everything'(Altshuler, 1965:186). In the early East Asian Developmental states (that served as benchmarks for the EIPD), that were industrializing during this time when comprehensive planning was prominent, spatial planning played an integral role in integrating the policy spheres and materializing the economic planning ambitions of developmental state planners (Tang, 2006; 2010; Wei, 2015).

In the 1980s, the role of the central planner as the center of coordination and his/her ability to determine and execute the public interest was heavily criticized by postmodernists and movements concerned with popular empowerment, deliberative democracy and participation more generally (Healey et. al. 1997). This criticism was part of a general skepticism toward master planning in the global north that, along with the rise of the neoliberal paradigm, shifted the focus of urban and regional planning to projects for the revival of rundown parts of cities and land-use regulation (Albrechts, 2006:1149).

The birth of the integration agenda across the global north and particularly in Europe in the 1980s was also felt in the sphere of planning practice, precipitating another shift, this time from the land-use focused regulatory activity towards a more holistic approach of integrating policies across sectoral, organizational and territorial boundaries (Vigar, 2009:1572). Albrechts (2006: 1149) summarizes the underlying causes of this shift as

> *"an increasing concern about the rapid and apparently random development, the problems of fragmentation, the dramatic increase in interest (at all scales, from local to global) in environmental issues, the growing strength of the environmental movement, the need for governments to adopt a more entrepreneurial style of planning in order to enhance city competitiveness, a longstanding quest for better coordination (horizontal*

and vertical), a reemphasis on the need for long-term thinking, and the aim to return to a more realistic and effective method".

Although the integrative function of spatial planning has been adopted to varying degrees across the world. The appropriateness and effectiveness of integrative approaches to spatial planning has varied with the particular challenges faced, substantive and institutional contexts and the attitudes of actors in the process (Albrecht, 2006:1150). Acheampong (2019: 142; 2016:1), in his review of multi-level policy integration in Ghana's new three-tier spatial planning system, finds major gaps between integration as conceived in the design of the planning system and integration in practice. He finds the reforms geared toward fostering better integration come into contact with established fragmented notions of the 'spatial' and 'development'- to create two distinct planning systems for socio-economic development planning and spatial planning. Urban planning in most African countries remains the locus of spatial planning initiatives whilst economic development planning at national and regional levels remains, for the most part, aspatial with a few exceptional cases of national spatial development planning (Robi et.al., 2021)

Even in South Africa (SA), where the integration agenda was embraced and devolved to the city level soon after independence in 1994, the extent to which spatial planning has been able to support cross-sectoral and vertical integration has been limited. Harrison (2001) traces the genealogy of Integrated Development Planning (IDP) to the influence of international development organizations, the introduction of New Public Management practices, and conceptual influences of planning and development theory at the time. The introduction of the system of Integrated Development Planning (IDP) at the city level was supported by a number of sectoral plans, most notably the Spatial Development Frameworks (SDF), which were envisioned to promote cross-sectoral integration by giving spatial expression to the integrated developmental vision and priorities of municipalities.

In spite of the adoption of this framework, however, Plessis, (2014: 70) identifies a range of institutional coordination and alignment problems as one of seven key challenges impacting the effectiveness of urban spatial planning in post-Apartheid South Africa. Todes (2004:859) similarly points out that the demands and assumptions of the IDP, particularly in terms of coordinating vertical and horizontal integration at the local level, have proved obstacles to realization in the South African context despite supportive legislation at all levels of the state. Todes (2004:859) concludes her review of the limits and potentials of IDP in South Africa by stressing the need for integrative planning to be considered in context, "with consideration of

prevalent social, economic and political dynamics, and with appropriate support at the level of content, and not only process".

The literature on policy integration in spatial planning in African contexts therefore suggests that examining the usefulness of spatial planning theory and practice requires sensitivity to the prevalent political and economic conditions that contextualize spatial planning and its efficacy in Africa. This was emphasized in relation to my research agenda by the absence of studies dealing with spatial planning in African political contexts that were non-democratic and more centralized than South Africa.

Moreover, while it is clear that spatial planning could be, and in the case of East Asian Developmental states has been, instrumental in integrating urban and industrial development during rapid industrialization, it is important to explore the contextual conditions that did lead to success, in order to better understand what happened in the Ethiopian context. So the final literature I covered in my initial review explored successful urban industrial integration in the East Asian developmental states to try and understand what experiences looked like and what conditions were favorable in cases that Ethiopia emulated in its industrial parks policy making.

1.3.3. Urban Developmentalism and infrastructural integration in East Asia

Ethiopia has represented a great hope for a new round of developmental states in Africa over the past decade (Clapham, 2018; Punier and Ficquet, 2015; Singh and Ovadia, 2018) and has even been described as 'the clearest example of a developmental state in Africa' (Clapham, 2017:1151). This discourse emerged out of the state's own espoused commitment to 'developmental statehood' since 2001, which has equally been the subject of extensive critique from scholars who have carefully deconstructed the state's claim against its governance practices in light of developmental state theory (Hauge and Chang, 2019; Gebresenbet and Kamshi, 2019; Brown and Fisher, 2020). Regardless of these categorical debates, it is clear that the country's industrial strategy and economic policy has been deeply influenced by extensive policy learning and dialogue with, emulation of, and at times direct adoption of successful East Asian economic and industrial policies. The industrial parks development program is a great example of this, as it started with a study of IP development in seven

countries that it called 'Benchmark case studies' four of which were described as 'East Asian developmental states'- Singapore, Vietnam, South Korea and China [8].

The industrial parks 'strategy' was one of eight economic policy instruments of Ethiopia's Industrial policy. The other seven policy instruments are largely non-spatial economic interventions which dealt with industrial financing, export promotion, exchange rate policy, investment promotion, trade protection, SOE investment and sector targeted institutional supports (Oqubay, 2018:20). These seven instruments have been informed by a longer process of engagement in industrial policy dialogue and learning with a series of Asian countries that has taken place over the last two decades. The core focus of this wider industrial policy learning has been on macro-economic and sectoral economic policies, and institutions, with a focus on what made the 'East-Asian model' a success. While there has been a continuous effort to integrate and reorganize all industrial policy tools under the IP strategy (Ohno, 2017:2); these various instruments are fundamentally different from each other in nature, adoption and in terms of their impact on urban development. The 'benchmark case studies' carried out on industrial parks development, a spatial policy with deep implications for urbanization, did not actually directly address the role and place of cities in the economic transformation programs of these developmental states.[9]

This gap in the Ethiopian state's study of the East Asian development experience echoes a wider gap in the literature on developmental states within the development studies field. The examination of 'the role played by urban space in materializing the planning ambitions of developmental state planners', has received very little attention and has only just now started to emerge in the urban studies literature (Doucette and Park 2018:396). In 2018, Doucette and Park proposed the concept of 'urban developmentalism' – a term they coined to "highlight the particular nature of the urban as the site of and for developmentalist interventions" as a remedy to the fact that the influence of developmentalism on East Asian urbanization as well as the influence of East Asian cities on developmentalism has been under-examined in urban research (Doucette and Park 2018:395). The authors further aimed to "situate urban processes within their wider geopolitical economic context to bring in the missing urban story in research on East Asian developmentalism" (ibid).

[8] First scoping pilot study in 2018 Interview with Belachew Mekuria, Former commissioner of Ethiopian Investment Commission

[9] Second scoping pilot study in early 2019 with Fantu Cheru, Advisor to UNHABITAT

This field is critical to the study of Africa's urban industrialization because although there is a large body of literature looking at what can be learnt from the Asian experience of industrialization, this literature has not tended to look at urban developmentalism, and the particular nature of the urban as the site of and for developmentalist interventions. In that regard, it seems only logical that a key aspect of the study of urban developmentalism ought to be the study of infrastructural integration. In other words, this implies a focus on *the ways in which urban infrastructural conditions and development interact with, affect and respond to developmental economic and industrial policies*. While the emerging field of *urban developmentalism* has not yet started to deal with how urban infrastructural integration was a key dimension of the success of spatialized developmental policies in East Asian cases, there is nevertheless a wide yet fragmented body of literature spanning urban studies, urban economics, economic geography and regional studies that has dealt with this (Ming, 2006; Mawson, 2001; Lee, 2014). Similarly, within the developmental states literature, there is some scholarship that deals with the 'local developmental state' which fails to engage specifically with urban questions including urban infrastructural integration.

In order to highlight the importance of particular contextual conditions in cases where urban developmentalism has occurred, the rest of this section brings together elements of this literature to provide snapshots of my initial review of infrastructural integration in two of the benchmark case study countries, Singapore and South Korea. I focus on key spatial strategies (industrial location strategies, spatial policies related to the infrastructure distribution), infrastructural policies (such as those on housing and transport infrastructure) and political and institutional arrangements (including center-region dynamics in infrastructural development) that facilitated infrastructural integration during intensive phases of their urban industrialization. It was clear early on in my review that there was not a homogenous East Asian model for IP development or urban industrial infrastructural integration that could have been emulated. However, both of the benchmark cases involved the use of spatial strategies to facilitate infrastructural integration that could enhance the contribution of cities to rapid industrialization agendas; various means through which wider infrastructural development policies were aligned with the industrial infrastructure development programs; and the institutional and political arrangements that allowed these strategies and policies to guide development.

Singapore's industrialization program (1968 – 2000)

It is critical to understand the political, economic and institutional context within which Singapore was able to successfully integrate its massive industrialization program (1968 -2000) with its development of cities. The first critical factor was the political continuity that allowed for the implementation of its 1965 masterplan framework over 50 years. The one-party parliament that emerged from the 1968 general election stayed in power for 23 years, under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, winning all the seats in every election in 1972, 1976 and 1980 and winning all but two and four seats in the 1984 and 1991 elections. The scarcity of land led to a careful, long-term and comprehensive approach to spatial planning and strong spatial frameworks (fig.4) and planning administration were put in place to ensure optimal use of land. Well-implemented master plans guided IP development along a southwest corridor in proximity to comprehensively planned 'new towns' (Ming, 2006: 510).



Fig. 4. Singapore masterplans, 1965 and 2001. Source: Colliers International Singapore research JTC, URA

Second, the institutional arrangement of IP development was complemented by and later became part of the development of new urban centers. Two key institutions, the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) – tasked with the development of industrial estates- and the Housing Development Board (HDB) – tasked with the development of the new towns, worked in close coordination. Large-scale public transportation had made the commute to the CBD short enough to allow residents to shop and dine there, and the HDB New Towns effectively served as suburban residences and commuter settlements. Later in the 1980's, Jurong Industrial Estate and other industrial estates belonging to the JTC became comprehensively designed to be self-contained urban centers (including golf courses, banks, shopping centers, restaurants, child-care centers, and parks). Eventually JTC took on an urban planning role, sharing the

responsibility for coastal planning and development control with the HDB, Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) and Maritime and Port Authority (Ming, 2006).

South Korea's industrialization program (1989- 2010)

Like Singapore, Korea's IP development was guided by coherent economic and spatial planning for more than four decades, although it happened over successive governments. Seven five-year economic development plans (running between 1962 and 1997) and three ten-year national physical plans (1972- 2001) have been used to guide IP development under evolving location strategies (Mawson, 2001:424).

The peak of rapid development of industrial estates took place under General Park Chung-Hee (1963-79), and within the context of post Korean war reconstruction partially financed by Germany and the US. The first five-year development plan (1962-67) entailed extensive investment in transport infrastructure (Roads, railways, etc.) prior to the major thrust of industrial space development. In the 1960s, the Export Industrialization Estate Promotion Act encouraged labor-intensive industrialization with light manufacturing of textile and wigs that was concentrated in the Seoul Metropolitan area which had benefited greatly from infrastructural expansion. The 1970s saw a shift to heavy, chemical and tech intensive industries and industrial parks intensively developed in coastal areas alongside extensive infrastructural development (Mawson, 2001).

The Industrial Base Development Corporation was set up in 1974, shortly after which state-led housing systems were set in motion to respond to the demands of the industrialization process. The South Korean state had attempted to address the country's acute housing shortage prior to this but a series of housing supply plans had been announced and failed prior to 1962, meaning that "The formation of a formalized housing system only began in the early 1960's as the state focused more seriously on industrialization" (Lee, 2014:181). Alongside the provision of housing, the support for resident firms in public IPs included the installation of welfare facilities including adjacent housing, medical facilities and service provision (MKE, KICOX, 2012:63). Comprehensive planning and the expansion of housing and basic services along with the industrialization effort in the 1960's and 70's allowed for the development of an integrated urban industrial spatial structure that was further developed in the following decades.

By the 1980's, in response to widening regional disparities, IP development was at the heart of the government's development and decentralization strategy. This imbalance reflects previous selective location policies intended to promote the efficient use of land resources which had

the unintended effect of creating economic stagnation in certain regions and cities. The south-western and central regions developed at much slower rates than the capital and south-eastern regions (Mawson, 2001:426). In the 1990's and 2000s, this gap was addressed in the government's locational regulation policies supported by the Industrial Location and Development Law.

Singapore and South Korea demonstrate how urban infrastructural development anticipated and responded to the developmental aspiration of rapid state-led industrialization. State planners guided the interaction between urban infrastructural development and industrial parks development through long-term comprehensive spatial frameworks that were emblematic of planning practice and theory in the 1950 and 60's, as outlined above. Authoritarian regimes in both countries created political conditions that fostered an *urban* developmentalism – allowing the political continuity, bureaucratic autonomy and institutional coordination that ensured urban space, infrastructures and processes of urban development were aligned with their strategies for economic transformation. The review of these experiences draws attention to the interaction between spatial strategies and infrastructural integration in the urban industrial nexus and the significance of political and institutional environments for both.

In summary, my preliminary review of literature revealed three significant challenges to the analysis of policy integration in the Ethiopian Urban-Industrial policy nexus. First, while there was significant support and advocacy around why PI was needed in this policy space at the continental level, the use and relevance of PI theory is confined to very limited thematic and political contexts. PI has not been adopted as a policy ideal in the Ethiopian political context and had very limited currency on the African continent more generally.

Second, the review indicated the operationalization of integrative spatial planning, like many other planning theories, does not necessarily work where social and political contexts have not been adequately accounted for. The usefulness and relevance of spatial planning, like policy integration theory, was again understood to be highly context specific in the literature. Finally, the review of cases of successful spatial and infrastructural integration in emulated East Asian countries indicated various political conditions were key to policy making as well as implementation. Although PI theory and current conceptualizations of integrated planning were not part of policy discourses that enabled spatial and infrastructural integration in those cases, it was clear that politics was central to the efficacy of comprehensive planning and development. Therefore, while the literature on successful urban-industrial integration suggests that politics was central to these experiences, this does not provide a framework for

understanding what kind of politics was not conducive to urban-industrial policy integration, this would become one of the reasons for the adoption of grounded theory building in this study which is discussed in the next section.

1.4. How to read this thesis

Having completed the literature review in the lead up to confirmation review, it was clear to me that the above literatures, while useful, did not provide an adequate theoretical framework to understand policy fragmentation or holistic policy making in a context such as Ethiopia. There simply wasn't enough known about the nature of integrating policy in the Ethiopian context [as such an agenda or practices was and is non-existent] or the problem of unifying policies across urban and industrial spheres in contexts different from those in which successful integration has been explored. Following the confirmation review process, I conducted a pilot study fieldtrip in June 2019 where I interviewed a senior policy official, who presented a sophisticated interpretation of the policy problem to me. Having analyzed this interview carefully, I decided to change the course of my project and to adopt an inductive, interpretivist grounded theory approach that could frame the analysis around the interpretation of policy actors.

Once adopted, this approach shaped the writing, thinking, and knowledge building process, and consequently the thesis structure which reflects the innovative methodological and conceptual approach pursued in my research. While I will discuss the methodological approach in detail in the next chapter. In this section, I want to orient the reader on the order and content of what comes in later chapters and to highlight unique aspects of the unconventional thesis structure, particularly relating to the use and placement of theoretical and contextual material in this thesis. While the overall thesis content is structured under the orthodox introductory, empirical and concluding sections, the content of these sections differs from a conventional structure in three ways. First, my introductory section consists of this first chapter on the research agenda and a methodology chapter only. The absence of a context chapter and a theoretical framework chapter in the introductory section are deliberate. To capitalize on the interpretivist and constructivist grounded theory approach that I have adopted, I chose to keep my analysis in the empirical chapters grounded in context – providing explanations *by putting my own data in context*. This made my analysis inseparable from context which made having a context chapter before presenting my data in the empirical chapters redundant. I therefore

made the decision to provide context through my explanations of the phenomena and not to separate them, as the meaning I interpret and construct with my research participants about policy action and discourse is embedded in context. The theoretical framework is also therefore not set a priori but instead emerges through this interpretation and construction of meaning during data collection, analysis, the writing of my empirical sections and re-immersion into theoretical literature at the end of the empirical section. I therefore present the theoretical framework that has emerged through this theory building process as part of my concluding section in chapter six.

Second, the empirical chapters deliver most of the emergent analysis, context and initial theorizing simultaneously as I engage with literature on context and existing theorizing on the themes I discuss. In the empirical chapters, I *construct* my analytical framework through the emergent process of writing and examining how policy practitioners understand and interpret the political conditions that foster, and the causes and implications of, the disconnect between policies. The framing of the research evolved as the (new) themes emerged from the data during the analysis and the writing of the empirical chapters. Throughout the empirical chapters, I engage deeply with/draw heavily on the explanations of key policy actors from my interviews, bringing their accounts into conversation with each other in order to synthesize perspectives. Furthermore, each chapter title is followed by a descriptive sub-title in the form of a metaphor coming out of quotes from my interviews that capture interpretations of key concepts (further expanded in section 2.2.2). The quotes are thus used as epigraphs at the beginnings and interpreted in the conclusions of the three empirical chapters and discussed in the next chapter on methodology.

Finally, the concluding chapters, the theory chapter and conclusion chapter, present the (new) integrated substantive theory that emerged from the incorporation of new concepts that came out of a re-immersion in theory after the writing of the empirical chapters. The benefits of following through with this structuring strategy have been that it illustrates for the reader, the emergence of the argument and thus the real outcomes of the grounded theory building process through its reflection in the writing process. Below, a brief synopsis of the remaining chapters illustrates how the grounded theory has been built through the initial review of theory, data collection, analysis, writing and re-immersion in theory.

Chapter 2: The Methodological approach _ Interrogating Tiriguaame

The chapter elaborates on the constructivist, interpretive and grounded theory based methodological approach, its philosophical and practical underpinnings and sets out the relevance of interpretive policy analysis for the research problem and the political context. The chapter presents the methods and procedures adopted for collecting and analyzing relevant data under the methodological approach, including elaboration of ethical considerations and data management.

Chapter 3: Policy Integration in the party-state_ Dogs and Hyenas

The chapter addresses the first research question and centers the role of the party in its examination of the conditions that have limited the extent to which holistic planning could be advanced in the urban industrial nexus. Given that party politics, its history and influence, are central to participants' understanding of holistic policy making in the urban industrial sphere, the chapter begins with a historical account of the emergence of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front's (EPRDF) industrial policy and its relation to urban policy in the party's political economic approach. It then explores the influence of institutions of the party on policy making and deliberation that constituted the policy ratification processes in this area. Finally, conclusions consider the implications of the centralized vanguard polity and policy making during an era of political instability, particularly for the ability to foster holistic and, ultimately, integrated policy in the urban-industrial nexus.

Chapter 4: Policy Coherence in the Ethnic Federation _ The crooked Tree

The chapter looks at the coordination challenges that arose after the ratification of the IPD policy in 2015. Again, policy coherence – the goal of integrating policy during implementation- was understood by policy actors primarily through the prism of center-region relations in Ethiopia's ethno-federal party. The chapter explores the emergence of the IPD project in Hawassa and interprets this period through an analysis of decentralization under EPRDF's Ethnic Federalism and its character in the SNNP region. It explores how capacity gaps at the local level limit the local administration's ability to integrate the development with its own processes, and some of the immediate response of local actors that arose in the face of these capacity gaps. Along with these, the chapter highlights initiatives that attempted to bridge emerging gaps.

Chapter 5: The emerging urban industrial nexus _ All the rivers

This final empirical chapter examines three key dimensions of the integration challenge that were understood by policy actors as key to spatial and infrastructural integration in the

Ethiopian urban-industrial nexus. These are the phenomenon of regions pursuing isolated spatial strategies; the isolated strands of sectoral spatial development planning that separately flow out and cascade down into implementation; and the isolated efforts of different parties to deal with infrastructural challenges that emerge, as disparate spatial policies meet, interact and counteract in physical space at the urban scale.

Chapter 6: Theorizing the politics of the urban-industrial integration in the Ethiopian ethno-federal party-state.

The chapter introduces authoritarianism as the central organizing theory used to foster theoretical integration in the final stage of the grounded theory building process deepened analysis and reflection on the findings, supported by a re-immersion in the relevant literature. I propose the concepts of authoritarian centralization and authoritarian decentralization in order to illuminate the relationship between authoritarianism and policy integration. Based on the analysis in the preceding chapters, I conceptualize the politics of integration as emerging out of the distribution of authority in the party state political system and determining the ability to hold things together- in terms of policy making and implementation, as well as spatially and infrastructurally in the urban industrial nexus.

Chapter 7 Conclusions and Contributions

The chapter summarizes the findings of the study and draws out the theoretical and policy implications of the research for Urban-Industrial Integration in Ethiopia and Africa more widely, before highlighting key areas for future research.

2. Methodology_ interrogating *Tiriguaame*



"This is why I speak to them in parables
Though seeing, they do not see.
Though hearing, they do not hear or understand
For this people's heart has become calloused"[10]

[10] Excerpt from Matthew 13:10-13 where Jesus explains his use of indirect communication, parables in this instance, as a method of engaging an audience in a potentially subversive process of interpretation particularly where people are set in their understandings and are therefore unable to see things differently (Snodgrass, 2008). It is important to note here that in this literary context, the heart signifies the core of a person including reasoning faculties.

Introduction.

The challenges that are emerging in the urban industrial nexus where late, late industrializers like Ethiopia are pursuing export-oriented industrialization in cities experiencing late urbanization, calls for a fresh look at the social processes shaping urban industrialization in Africa and particularly those driving fragmented state action in the nexus. I have adopted *a constructivist and interpretivist grounded theory building approach* for theorizing this emerging phenomenon and consequent policy problems because it offers a novel entry point and a fresh look at the problem- as experienced and interpreted by the actors driving the process. I wanted to foreground the interpretations of actors actually involved, hence choosing to present the Ethiopian context through their narratives (rather than through existing literature). The adoption of this approach was not immediate or a-priori but itself intuitively emerged during pilot studies that I conducted in the first year of the research (see section 1.4). This chapter outlines in detail the rationale, value and implications of applying this approach to the study of this research problem, particularly in the Ethiopian context. In doing so this chapter aims to serve as a bridge between the initial framing of the research and the analysis the reader is directly presented with in the next chapter, the first empirical chapter.

The chapter starts by setting out the knowledge-making rationale and processes that justify the data presented in the empirical chapters to follow. The first section presents the methodological approach in light of the research agenda outlined in Chapter 1, and describes the processes employed in moving from data to the formulation of ideas and concepts that respond to the questions and overall research agenda (Charmaz, 2006). It then goes on to discuss why the interpretive policy analysis is a good fit for the puzzle at hand as well as for the conceptual and empirical context of the study (Wagenaar, 2015; Yanow, 2000). Finally, the section reflects on the ethical challenges posed by the methodological approach and aspects of the researcher's positionality and circumstances during the research. The second section deals with the research design used to define and collect data in line with the research puzzle and illustrates the logic by which the research methods were selected and applied to meet the aims and to answer the research questions (Mason, 2012). The section elaborates further on the research methods and addresses the need for research transparency about how data was collected and co-produced. It elaborates on the criteria and standards used in line with the methodological approach. These issues are significant because they determine the reliability and validity of the analysis and conclusions that are made on their basis (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2011: 127; Bryman, 2012).

2.1. Methodological Approach

2.1.1. The philosophical basis of the study

Ethiopia's emulation of a form of spatialized industrial policy that worked elsewhere has had a significantly different outcome, particularly in terms of urban-industrial integration, upon reproduction. This calls attention to the problem of the translation of policy during processes of policy learning and transfer. In such processes, policy makers are tasked with the problem of interpreting and transferring policies - studying and reconfiguring their constituent parts in ways that *make them meaningful* -to the historical, political, ideological and institutional settings where they are to be implemented (Yanow, 2000:63). This research project adopts a constructivist ontological position, which holds that the social world is constructed, in order to interrogate these processes of reconstruction of meaning in policy making, particularly pertaining to understandings of the relationship between urban and industrial policy.

Interpretivism is adopted as a natural epistemological corollary of the constructivist approach as it holds that those constructions can only be known through the interpretations of the policy actors involved (Schwartz-shea and Yanow, 2014:6). Policy actors, as reflexive beings, actively shape the meanings that policy programs hold at every stage of the policy making process from the definition of policy problems and solutions to implementation processes (Wagenaar: 2015). This translation and interpretation of policy objects occurs at different levels, within different interpretive communities at different stages.

Qualitative research was selected as a natural extension of the constructivist-interpretivist methodology as it is suited to co-generating rich data about how policy actors understand, deconstruct and reconstruct objects of enquiry, including: policies; policy ideals (policy integration, integrative spatial planning and infrastructural integration); and the challenges around these at various levels and as part of different interpretive communities (Mason, 2012: 56). Finally, the confluence of my exposure to the rich analysis of policy actors of their own experiences and the significant gaps in academic literature, which meant that I could not build a strong analytical framework ex ante and to apply to my case, led me to embrace an inductive grounded theory approach elaborated in the next section. This approach allowed me to build an analytical framework and theory from observing patterns and relationship in qualitative data; to think through my research question; and to identify appropriate data sources and methods, summarized in Fig. 6 (section 2.2).

2.1.2. A Grounded Theory Building Approach and Research Process.

The exploratory and inductive style of enquiry that defines grounded theory is well suited when little is known about a topic. Very little is known about the dynamics within policy making contexts that drive the disregard or de-prioritization of policy integration (PI); about holistic policy making within the sphere of the urban industrial nexus; or about the integration challenge within African industrialization projects. As discussed in section 1.4, the limitations of existing analytical tools that could be used to construct a conceptual framework for dealing with the problem at hand have thus been the primary reason for adopting a grounded theory approach.

The general purpose of grounded theory (GT) building approaches is to ground a theory in the context in which a phenomenon arises and in the primary data generated in a study. Constructivist GT approaches further focus on how participants construct meaning in relation to the area of inquiry (Charmez, 2006). The integration ideal does not have a strong institutional or political history in the Ethiopian policy making context. It was therefore important to develop a grounded understanding of PI – of what it means to policy actors and how *what actors understand* determines the ability of the system to plan holistically; to coordinate implementation; and to pursue spatial and infrastructural integration, within this particular policy nexus during this period of intensive institutional change.

Grounded theory involves an approach to theory that is deeply embedded in the research process itself. Through a series of steps outlined in Glasier & Strauss (1967) and later popularized in Charmaz in her work on Constructivist grounded theory, grounded theorists have sought to provide a road map for *systematic inference* (Charmez, 2006:3) in which theory is methodically produced out of empirical materials through a series of iterative steps of abstraction and data collection that allows researchers to construct theories 'grounded in the data' (Charmez, 2006:2). In the rest of this section, I briefly outline the theory building process I undertook and developed through this research.

Preparation Phase: cultivating an open mind

Classical expressions of grounded theory (Glasier & Strauss, 1967) talk about leaving the literature review until after fieldwork so that one is not influenced by existing theory to the extent that it interferes with what the ability to perceive in the field. In line with this concern Henwood and Pigeon (2003) later proposed an approach of *'Theoretical Agnosticism'* which

requires being *"not led blindly by existing research and theoretical literatures [but] instead, dissecting and assessing them with critical skepticism"* (Henwood and Pigeon, 2003 in Charmaz, 2017:5). Giles et. al. (2013), took this a step further, suggesting that the researcher go into the field with *an open mind* (in other words, in spite of the literature review), instead of trying to do so with *an empty mind,* which is impossible in practice.

During the literature review stage, I had not yet adopted the grounded theory approach, so I engaged with the extant literature in depth and drew from it the conceptual springboards discussed in section 1.3. Theorizing on policy integration, urban developmentalism and integrative spatial planning was used to set out the general frame of inquiry at PhD confirmation review stage. During this process, my earlier experience working in IPDC and the first two rounds of preliminary pilot fieldwork I conducted in my first year heavily influenced the selection of these three broad theories themselves, so reference to theoretical literature was from the earliest stages iterative, grounded in experience and data collection. Going into the final rounds of my fieldwork after I made the decision to adopt GT, I made the deliberate effort to go in with an open mind, ready to drop my initial framing if it did not align with what I would find in the field. This was not always easy or possible but there was a deliberate attempt to keep interview questions and analysis open to revision during the data collection phase.

Data collection phase: Early Theoretical Sampling and Memo Writing

I started my analysis during the early stages of data collection. Charmaz (2006:70) calls this process of simultaneous data collection and analysis *'Early Theoretical sampling'*. She argues that it helps the researcher narrow focus early on so as not to make mistakes and thereby misdirect the focus of data collection. She urges the research to '*follow emergent leads'* (2006:70), - i.e., new themes, insights, impressions - that pop up in the field or interviews so that the researcher can take time to explore them in field memos, during the data collection and to test them as they go.

As discussed, insights I drew from my first and second fieldwork trips were important in helping me to identify preliminary theories. During my third fieldwork visit, which took place in June 2019, I interviewed the former CEO of IPDC, Mr Sisay Gemechu[11]. As State Minister of Industry, Agriculture Policy and Plan Execution & Monitoring in the Office of Prime

[11] [11] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry, CEO of IPDC and CEO of Oromia Industrial Parks Development Corporation on 15.06.2019

Minister from 2010 to 2012, Sisay was directly involved, from the very onset of industrial parks development, in efforts made by the state to activate the country's dormant Industrial development policy (2001) under PM Meles. From 2011-2014, he led the development of the Industrial roadmap policy document, and the Ethiopian Special Economic Zones Spatial Strategy document. He was also directly involved in the formulation of the Industrial Parks Proclamation 886/2015 and the Investment proclamation amendment 849/2014; these documents make up the policy framework under which IPs have been developed to date. This made Sisay a key interviewee and so I chose to interview him early on, as he could have potentially been one of the best-informed participants in the study and this interview could produce important leads for subsequent interviews.

The intense and highly provocative interview with Sisay lasted two and half hours and at the end of it I knew I could no longer use the rough conceptual framing I had presented in my confirmation review to drive the analysis because it missed so much of what was critical to the experiences of policy making in the Ethiopian urban-industrial policy nexus that was surfacing in the interview. Sisay gave highly insightful and subversive responses to my somewhat unsophisticated and at times normative questions about policy integration, spatial planning and infrastructure integration. Upon returning to the UK, I spent a month analyzing the interview in depth. I transcribed the interview and used *open, line-by-line coding* in an effort to grasp the numerous threads. I then wrote an extended memo looking at these various strands of analysis. While I identified numerous themes in my analysis, this key interview was instrumental in generating three general impressions that went on to shape my approach.

The first striking impression for me was that Sisay brought almost all questions directly dealing with the integration problem into their political context, especially in relation to the ruling political party, EPRDF. He kept referring to the party's history and various periods of crisis to explain what was happening in the realms of urban and industrial policy. His various highly insightful interpretations of the integration challenges were situated within the ideological, institutional or political history of the party. This continued in later interviews with different respondents at various levels of the bureaucracy, so my analysis of the research agenda and focus of my data collection shifted toward *the politics of policy integration.*

Second, I notice his use of indirect communication wherever key questions, questions with political implications or questions loaded with theoretical assumptions were posed. He used proverbs, metaphors and allegories heavily and in most cases to subvert the assumptions of my questions. This led me to search for and adopt an analytical approach- interpretive policy

analysis - that was sensitive to the use of symbolic language. I discuss this further in the next section on interpretive policy analysis.

Third, I was struck by the levels of open self-critique and reflexive action involved in his explanations of decision making. He would say things like '*What we did was spray the parks like holy water, trying to get to every surface*' or '*It was not that we did not know, it was because we were in a bind, it was a compromise*'. At every step of the policy making and implementation process, that he described in the interview where decisions affecting the urban-industrial interface were made, action was preceded by informed and highly reflexive processes of decision making. This confirmed for me the need for interpretive analysis centered on the meanings of policy action within the historical and political context to get to a coherent explanation for the lack of integration in the urban industrial nexus.

The final and most intensive stage of data analysis took place over a period of eight months between April and December of 2020. During this data collection period, I developed diagrammatic memos after interviews where I tried to map emerging themes, general impressions and key insights and link them with ideologies, institutions and interests. As fieldwork was intensive, it was difficult to do in-depth analysis with every interview. Diagramming was a quick way to map the emerging analysis and the process of writing these early memos and doing diagrams of important interviews and moments of insight really helped me to get a sense of direction for the process of generating the extensive volume of detailed semi structured interviews with participants. It also helped me to focus subsequent interviews and collect data more extensively under the emerging themes. This diagramming was a combination of what Charmaz (2006:87-90) referred to as *Free writing* and *Clustering.*

The Final Analysis: Open coding, Categorizing and Further Theoretical sampling

By the end of my fieldwork in March 2020, I had conducted over 80 interviews and observed 40 events with policy actors at different levels and in different sectors participating. The fact that I was dealing with an unusually large volume of data for grounded theory building made the process of applying rigorous methodical analysis, a very time-consuming, taxing and intensive task within the three-year funded research period. The process was undertaken in three phases over the course of six months (March 2020 – September 2020)

Open coding – defining initial content and form of the analysis.

The first phase consisted of detailed line by line coding where I was categorizing almost literally '*what is happening'* using very descriptive codes and defining them carefully. I

focused on tracing actions and processes within IP development and integration more widely. I did this over the course of the first nine interviews until I got the sense that I had an adequately expansive initial coding set which more or less covered the ***initial content*** of my analysis. Having done this, I started cleaning up the coding hierarchy by thinking through the many codes and how they related with other codes I had created. Where a code seemed to describe a dimension of a larger code, I made the larger code the parent code in NVIVO. In this way I grouped the themes into multiple levels. This created the ***initial form*** of my analysis.

Categorizing – Using memos to move from codes to categories

Having arrived at the initial form and content of the analysis, I started writing memos on some of the key themes. These themes were selected based on the number of references they contained and number of interviews in which they came up. I tried to follow Charmaz's (2006:91-93) approach to categorizing summarized in the quote below.

> *"First, assess which codes best represent what you see happening in your data. In a memo, raise them to conceptual categories for your developing analytic framework-give them conceptual definition and analytical treatment in narrative form in your memo. Thus, you go beyond using a code as a descriptive tool to view and synthesize data… During coding you asked what category does this piece of data indicate? Now ask: what category does this code indicate? …Categories explicate ideas, events, or processes in your data-and do so in telling words. A category may subsume common themes and patterns in several codes…"*

Using the approach suggested by Charmaz, I started using descriptive memos on key codes to consolidate the descriptive coding structure into a group of categories- detailed in narrative form in progressively advanced and analytical memos.

Further Theoretical Sampling: Sharpening categories and building theory

Once categories had been saturated and sharpened through theoretical sampling, they were sorted and diagramed in order to integrate and connect categories into a theoretical narrative (Charmaz, 2006:96). Along with this theoretical narrative I used my set of memos on key themes to outline my empirical chapters and continued the analysis process through the writing of the empirical chapters.

Analysis through the writing process

The writing process itself involved developing the themes and categories I had identified both by gathering further data from my dataset as well as by referring to literature on each theme

and category. The writing process itself, therefore, refined the categories and advanced the emerging theory.

In the outlining stage, I made the choice of using an analytical explanation to structure the presentation of findings that could put the focus on the grounded theory being built around recognizable categories that orient the reader to the argument. This prevents the random sequencing/repetition of concepts that would have characterized a descriptive organization based on the sequence of events in the Industrial Parks Development process. However, to avoid the opposite extreme – i.e., an analytical structure that fragments historical processes to a degree where the reader loses the big picture (Dunleavy, 2003:70) - *a systematic analytical account* is constructed, i.e., the wider policy narrative of formulation, implementation and outcomes is captured in the progression of questions and categories. This is also a critical part of the interpretive policy analysis process that is focused on meaning. Meaning is not only understood to be found in discrete pieces of data; as policy language, policy objects and actions only have meaning in relation to the overarching story within which they emerge. Thus, the writing of the empirical analysis is crafted in storytelling form that allows for theoretical cohesion and situating the interpretive policy analysis.

Post-empirical chapter theory building- Writing the theoretical discussion chapter

The final step of the theory building process proceeded during the writing of theoretical discussion chapter six. The writing of this chapter constituted the final stage of theoretical integration in the grounded theory building process undergone in this research. All the relevant literatures explored through the themes elaborated in the empirical chapters were boiled down to a common theme and underlying phenomenon that was implicit in every interview conducted; in every analytical code and memo; and in every section of the three empirical chapters- the theme of authoritarianism. It took a re-immersion into theory that followed the writing of the empirical chapters to identify the centrality and integrative potential of the theory of authoritarianism (authoritarianism in Africa in particular) to open up numerous avenues of theoretical synthesis and cross fertilization between codes, themes, categories and empirical chapters. This chapter therefore introduces authoritarianism as a central organizing theory in the final analysis and theoretical discussion of the politics of urban industrial integration in African states. Through the steps outlined in this section, I moved from codes to categories to an integrated theory- defined in this research as '*abstract yet interpretive understanding about the phenomena'* (Charmaz, 2006). The next section details the final building block of the

methodological approach- the use and value of applying of interpretive policy analysis in this specific interpretive context.

2.1.3. Interpretive policy Analysis and *Tiriguame*

Having set out the structure and procedural aspects of the grounded theory building process in the previous section, I engage in this section with the substance of the grounded analytical approach - Interpretive Policy Analysis (IPA). I have adopted an IPA approach in this research because my overarching research question of *'Why is there a lack of policy integration in the Ethiopian urban-industrial nexus?'* is a *why* question that is analytically focused on capturing meaning – identifying the frameworks within which this policy outcome makes sense. IPA is concerned with analyzing the ways in which policies (their formulation, implementation, outcomes and reception) are shaped by 'what people find meaningful in a situation' (Yanow, 2000a: 3). The interpretive policy analyst strives to capture this meaning by situating policy artifacts in the context of the "communal background of intelligibility that pre-shapes how the world appears and who we are as agents" (Guignon, 1991:84). These 'communal backgrounds of intelligibility' constitute the various wider systems of meaning within which policies are embedded: historical experiences and narratives; communal values, beliefs and feelings; and ideological, institutional and political context.

In outlining the IPA approach adopted in this research, it is important to first discuss what is considered an object of analysis in this study. I adopted an approach which recognizes policy artifacts, as broadly defined by Yanow (2000:9), as any "concrete symbols representing more abstract policy and organizational meanings". Yanow argues IPA is primarily a study of the symbolic (representational) relationships between ***meanings*** – i.e.- values, beliefs and feelings – and the ***policy artifacts*** – i.e., policy language, policy objects and policy actions – they are embedded in. She defines **symbolic policy language** as written and spoken language, including metaphors, allegories (such as the ones discussed below and categories), through which local knowledge of policy actors is articulated (Yanow, 2000:45). She defines **symbolic policy objects** as physical artifacts, including built spaces and policy programs like the Industrial Parks Development Program, that represent meanings that can be denoted or absent in explicit policy language (Yanow, 2000: 64). Finally, she defines **symbolic policy action** as any action, including agenda-setting, legislating and implementing, that can be interpreted by policy relevant groups to communicate policy meaning (Yanow, 2000: 76). The research design and methods through which these policy artifacts have been collected and co-produced are discussed in section 2.2.

Second, it is also important to discuss what constitutes meaning within the IPA approach adopted in this research. Wagenaar (2015) proposes three broad categories of approaches used by interpretive policy analysts to capture meaning when addressing concrete questions in public policy – hermeneutic meaning, dialogical meaning and discursive meaning - which he defines as follows. ***Hermeneutic meaning*** "focuses on the way individual agents move about in a background of understanding, on how they interpret themselves in light of it". ***Discursive meaning*** "focuses on the large linguistic-practical frameworks, unnoticed by individual agents, that constitute the categories and objects of our everyday world". Finally, ***Dialogical meaning*** are meanings that are "held by individual agents…that become intelligible to themselves and to others by jointly engaging in practices that flow from an inarticulate background understanding. Here, the analyst's focus is on how meaning is constructed in the interaction between agents and between agents and the world in everyday situations" (Wagenaar: 2015:40).

Yanow's and Wagenaar's frameworks for what constitutes the *objects of* and *meanings in* IPA respectively delineate the scope of the IPA approach applied in this research project. In the writing of the empirical chapters, I will be highlighting my application of the above components in my analysis to the extent that I can do this without distracting from the storytelling and elaboration of key themes. Before moving on to the next section, however, I want to highlight two key examples of symbolic language that revealed hermeneutic and discursive systems of meaning that became important to my analysis early. These two examples are presented here to introduce the reader early to systems of meaning - 'backgrounds of intelligibility'- that I found to be key to interpretive analysis in the Ethiopian policy making context but that I could not discuss in detail in the empirical chapters so as not to disrupt the broader analytical exposition.

In the contents page of the thesis, each chapter title is followed by a descriptive tag in the form of a metaphor. These tags came out of quotes from my interviews with Sisay Gemechu and are used as epigraphs at the beginning and interpreted in the conclusions of the three empirical chapters. Sisay used allegories to respond to my direct interview questions. Although I immediately identified the significance of his use of symbolic language at key points in the interview and attempted to interpret their meaning whilst writing (particularly three that were key to my three empirical chapters), I felt the allegories remained vague and open to multiple interpretations. I therefore went back to ask Sisay about his use of allegories in a final interview

in December 2021 where he told me all three were from the book of Ecclesiastes in the Bible (Fig. 5).

To explain why this is significant in the Ethiopian context it is important to elaborate on the social practice of 'Tiriguaame'. Traditional Ethiopian education is carried out through a series of levels ranging from the teaching of the interpretation of biblical texts[12] in Amharic (and its root language Geez) to higher levels of specialization that involves "the practice of interpretation through creative incorporation and critical reflection to produce knowledge from diverse sources" (Woldeyes, 2017:262). Tiriguaame, as a formal tradition of Ethiopian hermeneutics (Girma, 2010; Kebede, 1999; Cowley, 1989; Levine, 1965), is expressed through a range of literary forms that transcend the educational system and formal training. Everyday Amharic speech and writing is structured around words and phrases that carry double meanings and various forms of indirect communication that employ a studied use of ambiguity. Partially arising out of the need for an outlet for criticism of authority in a society that is highly hierarchical, the use of symbolic language and its interpretation is pervasive in the speech, writing and folklore traditions of the Amharic language. To date, training in the Amharic language at all levels of even the modern educational system includes training in the interpretation and construction of various metaphorical literary forms including common proverbs, allegories and critical poetry.

> *The Geez term 'Tirguaamme' translates as the art of giving meaning to reality or text. It is an act of interpreting the world, a process of creating new meaning out of existing meanings (past, present, foreign, local) and practices.. In the traditional education system, students learn tirguaamme especially in Metsehaf Bet (house of books) and Qine Bet (house of critical poetry), as a method of reaching the hidden meaning of a text by interpreting it based on diverse life contexts and the creation of complex and multiple meanings using poetry* (Woldeyes, 2017:262)

It is within this social context that Sisay's repeated use of biblical allegory in response to my direct questions about policy integration was a flag for how I needed to engage with his

[12] It is also important to note that the interpretation of biblical texts was also the original arena of European hermeneutic analysis out of which modern interpretive research developed in the post-enlightenment context[12] (Yanow, 2000). In Europe, hermeneutic analysis emerged as an approach to the study of biblical texts after the reformation (Mcnabb, 2020: 9). The earliest examples of Tiriguaame can be found in the *Andemta* and *Tirguaame Qalamsis* books of biblical commentary, some of which date back to the 14th Century (Cowley 1989).

responses. The construction of meaning in an interview with an Amharic speaker that is skilled at Tiriguaame, involves a conscious, intentional and active engagement. Sisay was in effect engaging in a trained and highly reflexive act of interpretating my questions and the assumptions behind them through the prism of biblical allegory, which represents a system of meaning that extends beyond the religious sphere. The application of IPA within this context therefore required sensitivity to both interpretive/hermeneutic traditions, IPA and Tiriguaaame. The use of allegory in the Amharic language is a call to attention to the listener and gives a cue that the speaker intends to politely challenge the listener's understanding of a subject matter.

The decoding processes entailed situating Sisay's allegorical responses within their meaning in context of the book of Ecclesiastes so as to interpret their meaning in the context of our interview. Although I will discuss each of the three allegories in more detail in my empirical chapters, I briefly summarize the analysis in Figure 5. The book of Ecclesiastes is part of the wisdom literature in the bible, primarily made up of the books of Proverbs, Psalms, Job, Song of songs. Each book in the series is designed to give a different perspective on wisdom - the book of Ecclesiastes provides a skeptical perspective to the meaning of life and human pursuit. The book of Ecclesiastes is about man's search for meaning and the central thesis of the book is captured in its famous first and last lines– "Meaningless, meaningless, utterly meaningless! Everything is meaningless" (i.e., in the absence of God). References to allegories from the book of Ecclesiastes are therefore generally employed to point out the futility of something, especially where it pertains to human plans.

Key interview questions directly linked to Research questions	**Quotes from Sisay's responses to interview question**	**Reference in the book of Ecclesiastes**	**Interpretation of Sisay's response**
What limited your ability to plan holistically and coordinate action?	*The shouting of ministries wasn't going to change the position of government, it was like **the barking of dogs on hyenas***	**Ecclesiastes 13:18** What agreement is there between the hyena and a dog? And what peace between the rich and the poor?	Uneven power relations between the core executive and council of ministers made attempts of negotiating integrated policy making futile.
What was done once the policies were in place to try and bring the sectors together?	***What do you do with a tree once it is crooked**?*	**Ecclesiastes 1:15** What is crooked cannot be straightened; what is lacking cannot be counted.	Structures of center-local power relations make local integrative action meaningless once decisions had been made
How will all these plans interact when they are realized?	***All rivers meet in the sea.***	**Ecclesiastes 1: 7** All rivers flow to the sea but the sea is never full.	Ultimately fragmented programs of action become reconciled upon reaching the unknowable whole, which is never what we expect it to be, making planning for it meaningless.

Fig. 5. Analysis of Hermeneutic meaning in biblical references in core interview questions.

The practice of 'Tiriguaame' which literally means both 'translation' and 'interpretation' can refer to the translation of ideas, both in the sense of two-fold meanings and interpretation of difficult concepts through familiar idioms. In the former sense, translation doesn't necessarily mean interpretation between languages but the translation of language between different meanings. For instance, in the practice of Ethiopian *wax and gold* traditions a verse is constructed to carry two semantic meanings, both in Amharic, where one is hidden and the other apparent. A mastery of language is required to interpret the verse- i.e., put the verse into multiple contexts to reveal its double meanings (Levine, 1972:5). In the latter sense of translation, biblical symbolism can be used as local idiom in regular conversation to put an idea into a different context so as to imbue it with a new meaning.

Social practices of interpretation are critical to the study of African politics because they allow people to express their interpretations of foreign ideas through idioms that they are more familiar with, which is a critical part of the transfer of political ideas. As Toyin Fayola (2022) puts it

> *"There is no aspect of African politics that we can fully capture without interrogating a translation. Politics has to be translated into local idioms because politics is local and grounded in culture and western concepts do not always effectively translate into local idioms".*

Due to traditions of biblical interpretation and political culture, indirect communication is the main way Amharic speakers' express these translations, especially where ideas are complex or foreign. Interrogating instances of every day *Tigiguaame* of foreign, politics-laden concepts - i.e., policy integration, integrated spatial planning and infrastructural integration- in Amharic symbolic literary form, was therefore used to drive the direction of IPA in this study.

The second 'communal background of intelligibility' I identified early was the linguistic-practical framework of socialist thought. I do not discuss this second framework in as much depth here as I did the first on Tiriguaame. Instead, discussions are embedded in the empirical chapters where the use of terms like *Cadre, capitalist roader,* and *polit-bureau* in interview and texts, are analyzed in situ. After tracing the roots of these terms to experiences and aftermath of Ethiopia's socialist past, I adopted it as one of the key systems of meaning that would yield important insights through IPA. Having pointed out these two overarching systems of meaning in my analysis, I reflect on my own positionality in the research field and ethical implications in the next section, before moving on to elaborate on the research design.

2.1.4. Ethics, Positionality and Reflexivity

This section reflects on the implications of the methodological approach and aspects of the researcher's positionality in the research field.

> *"In interpretive research, the researcher is not outside that which is under study. Moreover, in field and archival research focused on meaning-making, the "research instrument" is the researcher in his or her particularity. A methodological starting point for interpretive research design, then, is that both the researcher's prior knowledge and the embodiment of that knowledge may affect the data. Researchers seek to be as transparent as possible about how they generated their evidence and the knowledge claims based on that, including the ways in which their own personal characteristics and background have contributed to that data generation"*
>
> Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2011:80.

In engaging with IPA and grounded theory building, different aspects of my positionality both in the field and in doing archival research have been at times greatly advantageous as well as limiting during data generation, analysis and writing. My background as an Amharic speaker, as a former employee in IPDC, as well as my values and aspirations as a young Ethiopian researcher all had a significant effect in shaping various aspects of the data generation and interpretive analysis in this research.

On the one hand, conducting interpretive policy analysis as an Amharic speaking researcher, I was already embedded in various 'communal backgrounds of intelligibility' and systems of meaning including the ones I outlined in the previous section. This embeddedness was incredibly advantageous during data generation as I could engage with participants in the language that they were usually most expressive in and engage in the construction of meaning in ways that would not have been possible in English. I was also able to engage with important Amharic books, interviews and events where I was able to access and co-create data which would not have been possible had I not been an Amharic speaker.

On the other hand, my embeddedness in and over familiarity with the interpretive context was at the same time partially inhibiting during analysis because I was not always conscious of what the meanings, I apparently understood signified to the speaker. A great illustration of this was the use of term 'Cadre'. I was used to understanding the word to refer to 'a sellout or political pawn' in its common Amharic usage whilst oblivious to its origins as an English word

generally signifying ‘a group of people’ and in the socialist context, ‘a cell of indoctrinated leaders active in promoting the interests of a revolutionary party’. While I had grown up in a house filled with books on the socialist revolutions with parents that were part of the student movement, it was only half-way through my analysis and after reading about socialist political organization that I was able to see the link between these meanings and what the usage of the term signified in Ethiopian politics.

My exposure to the research field as a former analyst embedded in IPDC had a significant effect on my interpretations. On the one hand, my familiarity with the policy agenda and the industrial parks development process heightened my theoretical sensitivity in interviews where I was able to quickly delve into important themes, events and issues which allowed me to more readily connect and pursue leads. At the same time however, I also found I came to the research field with informed opinions and biases on many key issues around housing provision, the status of spatial planning and coordination. I embraced these aspects of my positionality and allowed biases to interact with the new data that I was collecting -i.e., I allowed new insights in the field to challenge my interpretations but at the same time I also allowed my interpretations to add value to and advance the analysis.

Constructivist grounded theory dispels positivist notions of the unbiased and passive observer who is able to collect facts in the field that are untouched by the observers’ values and experience and objective knowledge about a world that is external from them, and instead allows the researcher to incorporate identity and experience as a valuable aspect of their role as research instrument (Charmaz: 2006:5). Therefore, in as far as I was conscious of biased positions, I adopted a stance of ‘critical subjectivity’ (Reason, 1988:12) where I critically evaluated my interpretations in light of what I was learning through the research process whilst using my experiential perspective to enrich my findings.

In the data collection process, I found myself to be both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ (Herod, 1999; Mullings, 1999; Sultana, 2007) during most of my interviews. I was an insider in the sense that I shared cultural, linguistic and social background of most interviewees and was also very familiar with dates, events and central issues around the development of IPs. However, I was also an outsider in the sense that my ethnicity, political views and ‘motives’ remained ambiguous; some interviewees simply did not trust me enough to explain their perspectives on social or political events or make critical remarks about political figures and their administrations which they might have done with non-Ethiopian researcher whom they might

consider neutral. The degree of formality with which I approached interviewees and my ability to establish trust varied widely depending on whether I knew them as former colleagues, friends, acquaintances or strangers.

Generally, it was not difficult to build rapport with interviewees but there were a few interviewees who were especially guarded due to their positions, the policies of the organizations they were working in or the political nature of the aspects with which they were involved. IPDC was especially and unexpectedly problematic. There had been an 'expose' article of some sort (I was never actually able to trace this article) and 'leaks' of important information in the months preceding my research, and personnel had been told that no documents should be shared, meaning some interviewees declined interviews as a result, sympathetic with my situation but none the less unable to take part. I followed protocol and submitted a written request to the CEO and approached deputy directors to request access, following which I was allowed a certain degree of access – i.e., highly formal interviews and restricted access to documents. I was not required to do this in other organizations as the participant information sheet sufficed. Former IPDC employees were much more open and ready to share their concerns.

Another key aspect of my positionality as a researcher dealing with isolated planning meant I was at times the conduit of information from one policy sphere, regional or sectoral organization to another. There were several times during interviews where I would ask about a new planning process or IP regime instigated by a different agency and interviewees would reveal they were unaware of the development. By the mere act of interviewing, I found I was altering information flows and even at times the perceptions and interpretations of actors about the state of integration in the urban-industrial nexus. As I went deeper into the fieldwork, I embraced this element of constructivist interpretivist research and where I sensed there were information gaps and missing links between actors, I filled those gaps where I could without breaching confidentiality and anonymity parameters established in consent forms. This aspect of my positionality in the research field and particularly in relation to the problem of policy integration meant the research process itself contributed to the impact of the research.

It is also important to discuss how my values have shaped this research. This research did not arise merely out of academic curiosity or a detached interest into the workings of industrial policy or urbanization in Ethiopia, it is a deeply personal project that has arisen out of and rests on my experiences and hopes. Part of my motivation for doing this research and for trying to

understand the politics of the urban-industrial interface has been a drive to understand my own story, my agency and where my work fits into this pivotal socio-political moment in Ethiopian history. This in turn comes out of my hopes for the success of ongoing processes of democratization, industrialization and urbanization in my country. In this sense, I generally agree with Wageneer (2015: 5) where he argues that policy analysis is inherently a moral actively where values judgements cannot be avoided throughout the research process, starting from framing the problem to structuring interviews to analyzing the data and presenting findings.

Finally, it is significant that I wrote this thesis about the disintegration of the Ethiopian party-state whilst watching the country experience the worst possible outcome of that process which was set in motion several years earlier. Richardson (2014) highlights the importance of the timing of fieldwork and the political context in which data is collected and analyzed. It would be remiss not to acknowledge that this thesis has been affected by the impact of watching the country's descent into extremely violent civil war, the rise of mass internal displacement and genocidal events driven by intra-elite politics which had become a central theme of my research by this point. The timing and political context of this research has most influenced the theoretical discussions in chapter 6 and 7 where the relationship between authoritarian politics and national integration features as a key part of the explanatory framework. Having discussed the philosophical, analytical and interpretive frameworks for the research and reflected on key aspects of my own positionality, I move in the next section to the research design that was used to define and collect data in line with the research puzzle. The section illustrates the logic by which the research methods were selected and applied to meet the aims and to answer the research questions.

2.2. Research Design and Methods

This section elaborates further on the research methods and data sources to address the need for research transparency about how data was collected and produced. In order to investigate how the policy fragmentation is situated in interpretations and framings of policy problems, solutions and implementation, the study followed a set of qualitative methods for the collection of data over a period of four years through successive stages of fieldwork.

Data generation was carried out through four rounds of fieldwork between 2018 and 2022. The first round of fieldwork was a pilot study, conducted between Dec 2018 and Jan 2019, where I carried out 10 exploratory interviews and identified key documents. The second round of fieldwork was a second pilot, conducted between June and July 2019 where four more interviews were carried out following an important set of workshops organized through a collaboration between Sheffield University, Hawassa University and EiABC, Addis Ababa University. Although the initial aim of these pilot studies was to do some initial scoping and to build contacts, the data and the analysis conducted on this second trip shaped the methodology and became the basis of early theoretical sampling in the grounded analysis.

The third, most extensive and focused fieldwork visit conducted between Oct 2019 and March 2020 involved 71 interviews and 40 sessions of structured observation (of conference presentations, workshops, meetings). I had intended to go back for another round of interviews when COVID 19 lockdown took effect. I went back afterwards for a final period of fieldwork between July 2021 and February 2022 during the writing phase where I shared key chapters with key interviewees and conducted follow up interviews.

In total, over the four phases of fieldwork 85 interviews; 42 sessions of observations; a total of 27 key policy documents (strategies, regulations, proclamations and working guidelines), 52 key studies and 35 reports were collected and constitute the complete body of qualitative data used in this research project. In all, I have been able to observe the phenomenon of study closely over a period of seven years [from 2018 to 2022] during my multiple PhD field work trips between Dec 2018 and Feb 2022, and prior to this during the research I conducted for my masters[13] along with my previous experience of working embedded in IPDC between August 2015 and May 2016 which provided an important foundation for this research.

Following the methodological approach, semi-structured interviews, structured observations and documents were identified as appropriate data sources and methods under each research question for generating data on interpretations of key policy actors. The justification for the selection of each of data sources is summarized in Fig. 6 below and discussed in sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.3.

[13] This masters dissertation entitled ‘Sustainability and Transformation: the case of Hawassa Industrial Park’ was undertaken in 2017/2018 at the University of Exeter before starting this PhD.

Research Questions	Data Sources and Methods	Justification
What impeded holistic policy making in the Ethiopian urban-industrial nexus (especially during the formulation of Industrial parks development policy)?	**Interviews:** Federal gov't officials, Academics	Understandings and interpretations of policy makers about policy integration, spatial planning and various aspects urban and industrial policy making including their own roles and decisions.
	Documents Policy document, studies, reports	Different ways groups are programmed to understand and act on urban and industrial policy and their interface
What impeded policy coherence throughout the implementation of IPD? and why did this problem persist during and after the development of the IPs?	**Interviews:** Regional/City officials, Stakeholders, Experts, Academics	Different experiences and interpretations that constitute understandings of why the problem persists during implementation & how they drive action
	Structured Observations Workshops, Meetings	Interactions between different understandings and institutions via the exchanges between members of groups with d/t positions in different spheres
	Documents Studies, Reports	Different interpretations in form of assessments and detailed analysis of gaps and key issues that need to be remedied and how.
What factors limited the integrative potential of spatial planning in the urban industrial Nexus? And what were the spatial and infrastructural outcomes of policy and planning fragmentation in the urban-industrial interface?	**Interviews:** Federal, regional and city gov't officials and experts, Academics working on spatial planning	Frustrations, interpretations, understandings about the state and limitations of planning across policy spheres in IPD-Urban
	Structured Observations Workshops, Meetings, conferences	Presentations, discussions between and within different planning communities
	Documents Policy documents, studies, reports	Assessments of gaps and intersections in the areas of interaction between planning policy spheres
	Interviews: National, Regional & city officials working on the urban-industrial infrastructural interface	Different understandings about how lack of policy integration has affected spatial and infrastructural fragmentation and what can and should be done.
	Structured Observations: Conferences, Workshops	Discursive positions within presentations and institutions through discussions between and within different agencies
	Documents Studies, Reports	Descriptions and assessments of emerging issues and gaps in the urban-industrial interface.

Fig. 6. The link between research questions and the selection and application of methods and data sources used (by author

2.2.1. Interviews - The people

> *Meanings are held by people, even if they are not always aware of the full import of those meanings, and a common way to access meanings is to simply ask people about them.*
>
> Wagenaar, 2015: 25

Semi-structured interviews were selected as the core method of generating "*rich, detailed material that can be used in qualitative, grounded-theory-type analysis"* (Wagenaar, 2015: 252). The long semi-structured interviews provided the best "*opportunities to excavate the social and political context of decision-making"* and to "*probe contending accounts and evaluate explanations among a range of knowing interlocutors*" (Peck and Theodore, 2015:35 in Silvester, 2016). The semi-structured interview also "*gives the researcher considerable freedom to expand on a given question"* (Huitt and Peabody, 1969: 29) which allows the researcher to explore interpretations of policy language, objects and action. As detailed in Figure 6, the interviews sought to gain insight on the hermeneutic and discursive meanings that constituted the understanding and interpretation of influential policy actors on various aspects of urban industrial policy making including their own roles and decisions.

My early selection of interviewees focused on identifying and establishing access to key policy actors, defined here as influential policy actors that had a direct role in the formulation and implementation of policies. To identify and establish contact with policy elites, I started attending events that were being organized by three key associations of professionals in the two policy spheres. i.e., The Ethiopian Architects Association (EAA), The Ethiopian Urban Planners Association (EUPA) and the Ethiopian Economics Association. The Urban Center in Addis was an especially important space throughout the trip because it held regular weekly events on different themes important to both policy spheres. This allowed me to expand my list of interviewees, to engage in the conversation and open new avenues of inquiry. Discussants and presenters at the association meetings and at The Urban Center were not only central figures in the development of key aspects of the study phenomena, but they were also speaking about points at the heart of the research puzzle. I documented the events and also spoke to discussants, presenters and attendees, introduced/reintroduced myself and asked for interviews where I found clear connection with the research project.

I then snowballed from interviews with these professionals and my list of interviewees grew to 85 through the course of the fieldwork. I prioritized interviewees in order of centrality to policy spheres and ongoing action but also in terms of diversity across the various

interpretive communities that constituted the policy nexus – this included national government officials (32), local government officials (32) and key non-governmental stakeholders (21), as these groups had different perspectives on the policy problem and their roles within it. A total of 85 people were interviewed over the course of the four fieldwork visits (fig. 7), roughly evenly spread out across the three main interpretive communities within government.

INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES		**DESCRIPTION**	**NUMBER**	
Government officials	Federal	Federal Ministries and agencies: EFCCC, EIC, ERC, ISA, IPDC, MoT, MoUDH, NPDC, PMO, SMEA…	32	
	Regional	Regional and sub-regional Administrations: e.g: RIPDC	10	
	Local	City Administrations and local level IPDC: Hawassa city administration and Yirgalem city administration	22	
Other relevant actors	Academics	Ethiopian academics/practitioners working across policy spheres	5	
	Consultancies	UNHABITAT, McKinsey, AGI	5	
	Development Cooperation agencies	DFID, JICA, World Bank	8	
	Investors	PVH	1	
	Workers	HIP	2	
TOTAL			85	

Fig. 7. The distribution and affiliations of interviewees identified as policy elites

The task of reaching out to interviewees and securing interviews was done through phone calls because people generally did not answer emails or did so too late. I generally started my interviews with a brief description of the research after which I presented the participant information sheet and consent sheet before the interview commenced. Only two out of the 85 interviewees asked that they be notified of quotes that might be used from their interview. Generally, people who were willing to be interviewed did not choose to be anonymized when I asked if that was their preference. Nevertheless, I anonymized quotes that were potentially sensitive. Initially I went into interview with interview guides but found I rarely

used the guides, and instead tended to use interviewee experience and responses to initial questions to guide the discussion. After a few interviewees, my interview preparation included identifying the key themes I wanted to cover in the interview (which I determined based on the position of interviewees in the policy process and based on notes on leads from previous interviews). I followed up with some interviewees after the interview via email to follow up on possibly key documents or to ask them to elaborate on emerging themes.

2.2.2. Observations - The People in Meetings

> *"Interpretivism does not have to rely on 'total immersion in a setting' therefore, and can happily support a study with methods, where the aim is to explore people's individual and collective understandings, reasoning processes, social norms, and so on"*
>
> Mason, 2012:56

The observation of events was used in this research as a support to the primary method of in-depth semi-structured interviewing. The main aim here was to access collective understandings and reasoning processes within and between the siloed policy spheres on those rare occasions where policy actors actually met and conversed about key issues. This method was needed to collect data on dialogical meaning – focused on the ways "meaning is constructed in the interaction between agents and between agents and the world in everyday situations" (Yanow: 2000:9). My focus was again on people, but people in a collective process of co-constructing dialogical meaning. I wanted to understand how people communicated their domain-specific understandings and reasonings in settings where their audience was their own interpretive policy community as well as in settings where the audience consisted of actors from a different policy sphere. These conferences, workshops and presentations provided access to many critical insights, but particularly into discourses and reasoning processes that attempted to bridge the divide as well as those that tried to justify it.

Events were selected based on the alignment of their thematic focus with the research agenda and the potential for interactions within and between interpretive communities, or policy communities that hold a common understanding of the policy problem. During the course of the two years of intermittent fieldwork, I collected and documented recordings and reports from international and national conferences and workshops and presentations organized by various actors. In total, I collected data in 42 sessions (38 hrs) of meetings and events. It was

not always possible to take notes at the events, but events were recorded, and the recordings were closely analyzed afterwards. At some of these events, I actively participated by asking questions and making contributions to discussions. Beyond this, the act of observing was involved interpreting the action and language of actors that informed further data collection and analysis. The events were either public/open events where there would be records anyway and when this was not the case, I made sure to make my presence known so that people were aware I was observing for research.

2.2.3. Documents- The people in writing

We collect texts to reconstruct hidden linguistic patterns that determine how a group is programmed to understand a phenomenon

Wagenaar, 2015:242

The analysis of documents is a tertiary method within this research project and is used to support, triangulate and contextualize insights drawn from in-depth semi-structured interviews and the observation of meetings. Written words, texts, documents, records are understood, within this research, to hold hermeneutic and discursive meaning and therefore to be "*meaningful constituents of the social world in themselves*" and thus enable the researcher to "*'read' aspects of the social world through them"* (Mason:2012: 106).

Documents were selected based on their documentation of important policy language, objects and actions. Over the course of the seven years during which I have been following this issue I have collected 114 key documents: 27 policy documents [strategies, regulations, proclamations and working guidelines], 52 studies [feasibility studies, Environmental and social impact studies, both rapid and in-depth assessments of emerging issues, development plans and advisory documents, and learnings and reflections by key institutions] and 35 reports by various international consultancies and multi-lateral agencies on the state of affairs in the development of Industrial infrastructure in the global, African and Ethiopian contexts.

Most of the documents outlined above are book-length documents that provide information in great depth about the nature and development of IPs in Ethiopia and elsewhere. However, despite the rich insights that could have been drawn from extensive documents analysis, text was deprioritized during the analysis phase for two reasons. The first practical reason the breadth of the data I had collected could not be analyzed in any great depth due to the time

constraints of the research project. The second methodological reason for prioritizing interview data over documents was that formalized processes and discourses driving the generation of documents was disconnected from the meanings driving action. Documents were thus used as resources for corroborating interview data i.e., policy documents were reviewed and analyzed in-depth only when references were made to them in the interviews or events. Meanwhile, some further documents were selected for brief analysis based on their importance to research questions, in which case they were skimmed instead of reviewed in detail, and searched for key terms and events that came up in the interviews and events. Documents have also been crucial to checking and cross-checking data during analysis, as well as offering a more elaborate account of discourses and institutions in the context of this study, where necessary.

2.2.4. Data Management

At the end of the third fieldwork visit, all recordings (interviews and events) and documents were organized into a simple Excel data catalog and a corresponding filing system. All data was renamed, checked and saved into the new folder structure. Finally, all the data was backed up onto my university Google Drive storage as well as a personal hard disk. All meta data was also cleaned up, saved and backed up along with the data. Following the organization of data, it was prepared for analysis on NVIVO Pro when the filing structure was imported into it. The software was critical for the methodical, systematic and rigorous preparation and analysis of data involved in the cumbersome indexing process that forms a large part of grounded theory building. What is more, I was working on an unusually large data set (over 150 hrs. of Audio data) which would have been virtually impossible to organize and navigate without a computer assisted approach.

NVIVO is also especially well-suited to a grounded theory approach. It allowed me to simultaneously transcribe, code, annotate and link memos directly onto audio data. This not only allowed me to go through the data in half the time it would have taken otherwise, it also allowed me to navigate my large data set easily, make inquiries and maps of my data (including hierarchical diagrams) that allowed me to see the evolution of my analysis in real time i.e., see *what was happening in my data* and respond to it early. It therefore expediated the categorizing and theoretical sampling processes central to the grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006: 91-93).

Glaser & Strauss (1967), the pioneers of the grounded theory approach, popularized the Latin term 'e*n vivo' - in life* to describe the act of constructing theory out of what is happening in the data constructed through real life experience. The software that has taken on this name seems to have lived up to the aspirations of Glaser and Strauss because a series of studies have shown that *"the software package QSR-NVivo helps the analysis move beyond thick description of the studied phenomena, to an explanatory model grounded in the data. Specifically, it was demonstrated that NVivo can facilitate many aspects of the iterative process associated with grounded theory and can help provide a transparent account of this, which should ultimately enhance study validity"* (Bringer et al., 2004 and Bringer et al., 2006a in Hutchisona et. al, 2010; 3). Hutchisona et. al, (2010; 4) further demonstrated how powerful NVIVO can be in facilitating grounded theory building by mapping all of the analytical phases, processes and tools of grounded theory to the functionalities of the software.

While the use of NVIVO has been criticized for creating a detachment from data during analysis as compared to the use of printed text for coding, I found NVIVO allowed me to code directly on audio data. This not only saved transcription time in later in the analysis but allowed me to access the original wording directly in Amharic. For most of the data, I transcribed while translating and typing directly in to NVIVO which allows transcription with time stamps. Having the audio data directly linked with the coded text allowed me to go back and forth between Amharic audio data and translated English text I was using in my write up. This was especially helpful for analyzing symbolic speech as it allowed for fast access to the original Amharic wording.

Conclusion

The chapter has discussed in detail the *constructivist and interpretivist grounded theory building approach* as well as the research design and methods applied to the research agenda outlined in chapter 1. The chapter set out the philosophical basis of the study and justified its appropriateness for the research problem. It then introduced the phases and procedures involved in grounded theory building approach as well as the object and substance of interpretation in this study, based on interpretative policy analysis. Throughout the elaboration of the different elements of the methodological approach, I narrated the research process I underwent, justified choices and the implications of the methodological

combination applied. Finally, the chapter outlined the qualitative research design used to define and collect data in line with the research puzzle and the methodological approach.

Besides elaborating on the methodological approach of the research, this chapter has also served as a bridge between the initial framing of the research agenda and the analysis that will be presented in the next chapter, the first empirical chapter. The discussion of the emergence of the grounded and interpretive analysis were included in this chapter to prepare the reader for the next chapter where they are directly presented with the analysis. This following chapter has a three-fold objective of i) presenting the findings under the first research question, ii) presenting these findings as part of a narrative that highlights "communal background of intelligibility" within which they have meaning and explanatory power and iii) supporting this interpretive analysis through engaging with the extant literature on the various themes that emerged under the analysis, in keeping with the grounded theory approach.

3. Policy Integration in the Party State _

Dogs and Hyenas

All were shouting from all of these ministries, we disturbed it, the proclamation was disturbed [he laughs]. **The shouting of ministries wasn't going to change the position of government, it was like the barking of dogs on hyenas**.[14]

[14] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry, CEO of IPDC and CEO of Oromia Industrial Parks Development Corporation on 15.01.2020

Introduction.

The chapter deals with the first objective of the research: to fill the gap in knowledge about the various conditions that have impeded holistic policy making in the Ethiopian urban-industrial nexus. The chapter adopts an analytical perspective that views the integration challenge as anchored in the nature of the political system and the history of its political, ideological and institutional structures. As a post-communist state that has been governed for the past thirty years by a party that has itself grown out of a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement, Ethiopia's political system is very much defined by the legacy of its communist past. As part of this legacy, the dominance of the vanguard party, through its fusion of party and state and party-led economic development; its monopoly over state society relations; and its programs, structures and disciplines are at the heart of the emergence and workings of industrial and urban policy making. The analytical focus on the political system and the party were not part of the initial framing of the research but gradually emerged during fieldwork and analysis (as discussed in section 2.1.2) as it became apparent that it was the central framework through which policy actors interpreted the evolution of the urban industrial policy nexus.

This chapter therefore centers the role of the Ethiopian revolutionary party, EPRDF, in its examination of the conditions that have limited the extent to which holistic[15] planning could be advanced in the urban-industrial nexus. The chapter begins with a historical account of the emergence of EPRDF's industrial policy and its relations to urban policy in the early consolidation of the party's political economic approach in the 2000s. This is followed by an account of the evolution of these policies (2005-2012) and the framing of industrial parks development (IPD) (2012-2014) following the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. The chapter then explores the policy making institutions and deliberation that constituted the policy ratification process. Sisay's analogy of dogs and hyenas captures the power dynamics that determined the outcomes of these deliberation processes and set the trajectory of siloed IPD development. This is followed by an account of the planning of industrial parks (IPs), project governance and the onset of implementation (2014-2015). Finally, conclusions consider the implications of the centralized vanguard polity and policy making during an era of political instability for the ability to foster holistic policy in the urban-industrial nexus.

[15] The term 'holistic planning' is used instead of integrated or policy integration which holds connotations of an active pursuit of an integration agenda which is absent in the Ethiopian context.

3.1. The political history of EPRDF's urban industrial policy

When thinking about integration or taking spatial aspects into account, a country's political organization and structures determine what is possible

Senior Official, NPDC[16]

3.1.1. Centralization under PM Meles

The beginning of the millennium[17] in Ethiopia started with a shift in the political leadership and economic agenda of the country's governing party, The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). These developments ultimately became the springboard for the country's current industrial policy and created the environments in which these policies were conceived and initially put into practice. The sub-section sets the scene by presenting the historic context of the evolution of TPLF, outlining the major political economy developments that took place between 2000 and 2005 including the reconfiguration of power within the party and the party's role within government (briefly highlighted in section 1.2.2),. This restructuring of power led to the political ascendency of PM Meles who would go on to change the direction of economic policy under a new discourse of developmentalism that is discussed in the next section.

The Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the founding and dominant party of the EPRDF coalition, began as an ideologically oriented armed insurgency movement that was born out of the Ethiopian Student movement of the 1960's. Largely made up of avid readers of Leninist and eventually Stalinist thought (Berhe, 2008:212, Berhe, 2019), the movement eventually became organized as a centralized revolutionary military vanguard - The Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT)[18]- in 1985. TPLF was one of a wave of national liberation movements across Africa that embraced vanguardism in the 1960s – 80s. The central motivation of the establishment of the MLLT was "a wish to have full control of the

[16] Interview with Seid Nuru, Senior Macro Economy advisor to the National Planning and Development Commission on 02.01.2020

[17] European calendar

[18] The MLLT was a sub movement within the front (TPLF) led by Abaye Tsehaye and Meles Zenawi that eventually took over the Maoist peasant based Tigrean movement. As the head of the cadre school, Zenawi eventually emerged as the movements leader and advocated for 'the Stalinist revolutionary line and the Albanian version of Marxist Leninist thought' (Berhe, 2008:216). Aregawi Berhe (2008) provides an extensive discussion of the integration of MLLT into the leadership of TPLF and later into the structures of EPRDF.

front[19] through abandoning the idea of being a front with various ideological and political orientations and replacing it with a strict single party logic" (GebreEgziabher, 2019: 471).

Lenin's theory of vanguardism, set out in one of his earlier works *What is to be done? (1920),* outlined his strategy for how the working class would take over the state towards the creation of a communist society through the mechanism of the vanguard party that would drive the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. In this system of thought, the vanguard were the guards/ guardians of the communist revolution who would pull the working class into revolutionary politics. The ideological dimension of vanguardism was concerned with raising class consciousness in the masses. The organizational dimension, on the other hand, involved the embedding of a disciplined, hierarchically organized, and swiftly responsive structure of control that would dictate state-society relations. Lenin described this practice as the 'democratization of control' that would allow mass participation in systems of 'control and accounting' within the state (Wright, 1974:75).

During the Second World War and throughout the Cold War, as the ideological map of the world changed, vanguardism evolved in its ideological and organizational form across the world (Gray, 2019). Post-colonial African and Asian socialist movements, that emerged and persisted after the demise of their Soviet and European counterparts, were "confronted with the two key challenges of positioning themselves in a world order not of their own making and that of forging nations after colonial divide and rule" (Verhoeven, 2020: 449). These two unavoidable projects have defined the ways in which African socialist movements evolved after the Cold War- grafting in new ideologies and narratives and recrafting the organization of political control. TPLF addressed the two challenges of global positioning and nation forging through the adoption of 'Developmental Statehood' and 'Ethnic Federalism' respectively. Although Ethiopia's history deviates from the colonial experience most nation building projects on the continent were shaped by, the reexamination of nationhood had been a key part of the student movement that spawned the revolution, the Derg regime and the TPLF regime. The two regimes pursued opposing nationalisms (Ethiopian Nationalism and Tigrayan ethno-nationalism) that were at the heart of their revolutionary ideologies. TPLF's raison d'etre as an insurgency movement was the liberation of the Tigrayan People from the Ethiopian nationalist and centrist Derg regime.

[19] The TPLF – The Tigrean People's Liberation Front, is sometimes referred to as just the Front.

A discussion of TPLF's developmentalism discourse is critical because the discourse was behind the emergence of the country's industrial policy and has shaped the wider context of the relationship of industrial policy to other policy spheres including urban policy. The discourse emerged out of the of ideological uncertainty and consequent tensions within the leadership that characterized the TPLF/EPRDF's first decade in office following its advent into power in 1991. The ideological uncertainty had to do with the party's need to reconcile its foundations as a revolutionary leftist movement with international pressure to undergo democratization and liberal reforms in the era of liberal orthodoxy that was the 1990s (Gebremariam, 2019)

The internal friction within the TPLF was expressed in the form of ideological debates on the direction of economic policy. The growing tensions between these factions[20] in the party culminated into a schism after the Ethio-Eritrean war [1998-2000] aligned along two poles of power that emerged between the federal cabinet led by PM Meles Zenawi and the TPLF leadership leading the war. Meles felt the leadership of the party was degenerating into one obsessed with conquest and rent-seeking at the expense of strategic national interests. His critics felt he was being lenient on Eritrea (Milkias, 2008: 5).

The debating factions couched their criticisms in socialist discursive terms. Whilst the TPLF challengers accused PM Meles of becoming a '*capitalist roader*'[21] within the socialist movement, Meles structured his responses around the Marxist epithet of '*Bonapartism*'[22]. The use of this socialist lexicon to interpret the party's experiences demonstrates the adherence by both factions to socialist systems of thought and revolutionary histories as key interpretive frameworks. Between 1999 and 2001, Meles had produced several doctrinaire white papers[23], including a 700-page document on *Bonapartism*, outlining his critique of his opponents. By 2001, the debate had broadened to include the fate of the revolutionary vanguard and the direction of the country's economy.

[20] Meles felt constrained by the fact that he had to abide by the decision of the TPLF politburo and central committee in Tigray. He tried to get out of the influence of the party by first attempting to dismantle it in 1997 claiming it had outgrown its purpose. The influence of the party leadership in Mekelle grew as it led the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea and became increasing opposed to Meles and his view on the war (Milkias, 2008:2)

[21] Mao Zedong coined the term 'unrepentant capitalist roader' during the Chinese cultural revolution to refer to people in the Chinese Communist party that he feared were trying to restore capitalism in China.

[22] Referring to the revolution that led to the rise of a corrupt military bureaucratic apparatus under Louis Napoléon in 19th century France.

[23] Meles was well respected within the party as an ideologue, having come into the leadership of the TPLF in 1983 with 'the responsibility of training and propaganda' in the MLLT (Berhe, 2008).

In his papers, Meles focused his criticism on the corruption of party leaders and their failure to live up to the party's revolutionary goals of transforming the life of the rural peasant (Bereket Simeon, 2017:197). He reasoned Ethiopia did not have any competitive advantage to build on to integrate into the world economy, which drove the private sector toward rent-seeking because conditions were not conducive to value-creating activities. He argued that what was needed to overcome rent-seeking based economy was 'revolutionary democracy'. *'Democracy'* because (unlike East Asian precedents) "The diversity of Ethiopia's society implied that a coordinated developmental effort could only succeed on a voluntary basis" (Weis, 2015: 230), and *'revolutionary'* because a partisan form of governance was needed, one that was "based on the fundamental belief that the political rights of a disenfranchised majority were more important than those of a profiteering elite" (2015: 230).

In 2001, at the end of the war, a very close vote on the debate on economic policy went in favor of the prime minister and resulted in the expulsion of parts of the TPLF leadership that had opposed him from the central committee. Following their expulsion from the party, supporters of this faction of the TPLF were removed from EPRDF, and later imprisoned along with their supporters on allegations of corruption (Milkias, 2008:12) under newly enacted anti-corruption laws[24]. The centralization of political power under Meles was thus secured and the deployment of law to legitimize his elimination of challengers from the party (Abebe, 2012:4). This development narrowed the already limited space for open deliberation and collective leadership within the party.

PM Meles further curtailed the influence of the party by moving power from the party advisors to federal government structures. To prevent the development of future factions within the party that could operate 'outside (and over and above) the purview of the council of ministers' (De Waal, 2015,156) and thus the PM, Meles decided that control of the bureaucracy would be exercised through ministers who would be exclusively political appointees. This decision allowed the merger of the executive power of both party (central committee/ politburo) and state (council of ministers), which had previously functioned as alternate structures of power, into the PM's cabinet. This shifted power from the former collective leadership and party apparatus to a 'one man show where Meles ran both party and government' (De Waal, 2015,156)

[24] The laws were adopted in 2001. Siye Abraha, for example was arrested just one working day after the laws were adopted (Abebe, 2012:4).

This merger was carried out alongside ambitious civil service reform programs was geared toward the depoliticization of the civil service[25] in that although Meles maintained tight political control over the bureaucracy and appointed people who were politically loyal to him personally, this was very different from the party-based politicization that had preceded it. Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003: xi) have highlighted two major aspects of the depoliticization process – "the party is no longer involved in the evaluation (Gimgema[26]) of government activities; and government policy is debated and evolved by government bodies, not separately as previously throughout the party". These centralized bureaucratic reforms allowed Meles to eliminate direct party influence and to strengthen the hierarchy of command within the bureaucracy. It also meant the PM and his cabinet became the major mechanisms for coordination across policies.

> *"The rise of Meles to a dominant and undisputed position in the Ethiopian state had far reaching political implications. It weakened the rest of the political forces within and outside the ruling party, decimated other centers of power and influence and immobilized the TPLF, the most organized political force in the post-1991 Ethiopian landscape… The progressive political ascendancy of Meles was paralleled by growing political strength at the Center. He created a centralized government and a party leader unified with the state making the party, the government of the day and the state one and the same. He promoted loyal bureaucrats rather than party loyalists which served to reinforce a clearly identifiable power pyramid. In doing this he created a power base independent of all the members of the ruling party"* Medhane Taddesse, 2012 in Gedamu 2017:228)

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[25] The concepts of 'political control of bureaucracies' and 'politicization' are related but distinct theories within the public administration literature. The theory of political control of bureaucracies deals with matters of compliance or responsiveness and "assumes distinction between political and administrative phenomenon in democratic governance." (Friedricson et.al., 2012) Democratic mechanisms to ensure bureaucracies are responsive to elected officials include the political appointments to agency leads who are held to account through parliamentary oversight.
The later concept of politicization refers to a breach of bounds of acceptability of political involvement in bureaucracies through "The substitution of Political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service" (Peters and Pierre,2004). Politicization is often viewed as a threat to democratic governance.
The Era of liberal reforms (1991-2005) saw a series of waves of civil service reforms, some of which took on depoliticization while at the same time putting in place democratic mechanisms for the control of bureaucracy through the political appointment of ministers. The democratization gains made would however be lost in the post-2005 era.

[26] This practice would return in the post 2005 era and is discussed in detail in section 3.2.

To summarize, the 2001 crisis resulted in the centralization of both party and state power under the office of the prime minister, and the rise of Meles as the sole ideologue and central node of the leadership and its coordination. The increased centrality in leadership was key to the adoption and prioritization of 'developmentalism' as the top ideological and political agenda of the vanguard after 2001. The policy discourse of developmentalism was behind the emergence of the country's current industrial policy and defined the scope for holistic thinking in the urban-industrial nexus over the following twenty years. The next section deals with the 2001-2005 period, when EPRDF's current industrial policy emerged.

3.1.2. A shift in industrial policy: ADLI, IDS and anti-urban bias

Beyond paving the way for his political ascendency, the debates leading up to the 2001 political restructuring allowed Meles to push his ideas for economic policy forward and ultimately led to the charting of a new approach to economic governance. In these debates Meles had argued "*Marxist Leninism is not about building a socialist society now. The question is not communism versus capitalism but rent seeking versus revolutionary democracy*" (De waal, 2015: 153). Couched within this discourse of Marxist Leninism, which still strictly defined the discursive boundaries of policy debates in the party, was an argument for a shift toward capitalism.

Following the political restructuring of 2001, the emerging discourse of developmentalism centered on the emulation of East Asian developmental states. The EPRDF's claims of pursuing developmentalism have been the subject of extensive debate and critique in the Ethiopian politics literature that has interrogated its governance practices in light of developmental state theory (Hauge and Chang,2019; Gebresenbet and Kamshi, 2019; Brown and Fisher, 2020). However, for the purposes of the analysis in this section, I engage with EPRDF's developmentalism only to the extent of its relevance to industrial policy and urban policy.

The white papers that Meles had produced over the course of the 2001 economic policy debates articulated the developmental state model paradigm and became the basis for the new policy language of the party. These documents were immediately used to start the work of 'indoctrination and training in the party and the civil service' (Oqubay, 2015:23). Over the next two years, this strategy was developed into two key strategic policy documents that continue to dominate economic policy to date: the Rural Development Policy (RDP) and the Industrial Development Strategy (IDS).

RDP and IDS were essentially extensions of the party's earlier policy of Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) which had focused on stimulating agricultural production by facilitating the growth of demand, supply of foreign exchange for machinery imports and inputs for factories (Oqubay:2015:23). On paper, ADLI presented a highly integrated theory of change that addressed urbanization as part of the wider industrialization agenda which never materialized. the IDS on the other hand , remained focused on enhancing agricultural production. It was structured around six additional pillars that were directly adopted/ "copy pasted" [27] from the industrial policies of South Korea and Taiwan: export oriented, labor intensive, FDI oriented, government led; and based on 'cooperation between people, state and private sector' (MoC, 2001).

Two major shortcomings of the RDP and the IDS were the lack of evidence-based policy making capacity and, partly as a result of this, the absence of urbanization from the conceptualization of structural transformation and the party's theory of change. The rest of this section deals with these two themes. The first problem of the limited capacity for evidence-based policy making resulted in the white papers, declarations of Meles's position on how the party should move forward, being translated directly into the state's economic policy unsupported by research or sectoral strategies developed from analysis of situations on the ground (Oqubay, 2015:23). Furthermore, alternative views on economic policy such as those routinely presented by the Ethiopian Economists Association in its its Annual Report on the Ethiopian Economy (2000-2019), the Ethiopian Journal of Economics (1993-2000), and the Association's magazine Economic Focus (1998-2019), were marginalized. A member of the association recounted the experience as follows:

> *It was the party's view (referring to the economic policy documents), it was not really a government document. Of course, the government and the party were the same so it's really difficult, but it came from the party, so you already know where it's going. We don't have independent or government affiliated think tanks, they still don't exist, so we're not informed by research* [28]

The series of five-year development plans that the IDS led to, had no ways of setting realistic achievable outcomes and gauging results but instead produced ambitious goals that were

[27] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC 03.07.2019

[28] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist and Advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19

meant to "*force the pace of change*" (Oqubay, 2015:25). Oqubay describes the difficulties that arose in these national development plans - the SDPPRP, PASDEP and the GTP[29]:

> *"There can be no effective industrial policy without state capacity to gather reliable data across economic sectors and to deploy the requisite analytical capacity to translate evidence into concrete policies and to closely monitor outcomes" (2015:26).*

The *manifesto as policy* approach to policy making – the use of PM Meles's white papers about how the party should evolve to define industrial policy- has been justified by some as unavoidable considering the limitations under which PM Meles had to address '*development and democracy in a country with limited latitude for policy*' (De waal,2015: 164). However, as Weis (2015: 336) insightfully suggests, seen in light of the vanguard ethos, '*presenting a particular course as the only viable one or the most rational solution to a given problem, chosen by an enlightened leadership*' is quite commonplace. Towards the end of his life, Meles himself would acknowledge the problem in EPRDF's policy making under his leadership while paradoxically arguing it was both the cause of 'an effective process' during his time and would be its major weakness in the future:

> *"Policy research, design and implementation together have been the mission of the top political leadership of the party. This contributed to an effective policy process. There is no time wasted to lobby for a decision to be taken on a policy as the roles of policy researcher, decision-maker and implementer are given to the political leadership of the party… Policy research and study is a full-time job and also requires special knowledge. For this reason, it cannot be given to the political leadership of the party as its full-time job is different and it does not have the expertise required. Because we had elaborate policies, and elites outside the party were indifferent to these policy ideas, policymaking up to now remained the task of the political leadership of the party. We cannot continue this way".* [30]

The second problem that was detrimental to holistic policy making, was that of anti-urban bias. All three policy documents hinged on Agriculture and rural areas as the sole focus of

[29] The Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP, 2002– 05), a Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP, 2005-10) and The Growth and Transformation Plans (GTPI, 2010-2015)

[30] Drawn from an interview with Meles in 2012 referenced in Alex de Waal, 2015:163

developmental intervention, leaving no room for more comprehensive or cross sectoral issues to be identified or considered, let alone prioritized in national development planning. Throughout the 90s and the early 2000s this lopsided economic policy environment was politically entrenched as interventions aimed at addressing it were met with hostility.

> *There was very strong anti-urban bias, throughout every aspect of the government and every institution, the problem is urban, this anti-urban bias has always been embedded in economic policy in this country.*[31]

> *The political environment was hostile for us. Why? because the political policy was focusing on the rural areas and agriculture as an economy, so urbanization was not the agenda. So,* ***when you talk about cities and towns, small and big, you are going against the political agenda****, no matter how colorfully you speak. The political and cultural landscape was not fertile for urban policy. It was simply rejection*[32]

Anti-urban bias is known to have been prominent in African regimes in the 80s and 90s that have tended to adopt development plans that are solely or predominantly focused on rural poverty. This was largely due to perceptions amongst African policy makers in post-colonial states that cities were sites of privilege and extraction and detracted from efforts to improve more immediate challenges of rural poverty, following the work of Lipton (1977) and Bates (1981) (cited in Cheru, 2008:15). What Bates saw as urban bias in Africa turned into a de facto rural bias through the processes of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the 80's, influenced by Bates and the notorious Berg Report.

In the case of Ethiopia, however, some have characterized the anti-urban bias as arising from the perception of urban areas not only as sites of privilege but also as sites of domination in a longer history of political struggle between urban and rural elite. Bekele et.al, (2016:8) propose this urban-rural cleavage in Ethiopian politics is historically created by the emergence of most urban centers as roving capitals in the 16th century- military garrisons of the mobile aristocracy that moved in search of resources (Horvath, 1969:206). They argue urban elites were thus viewed as 'settlers' by rural masses, and as consisting of ethnic groups that dominated the political scene, as the most educated class, since the formation of the

[31] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist and Advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19
[32] Interview with Zegeye Cherinet, Architect and Planner at EiABC 23.06.20

modern state. Bekele et. al. (2016) posit that the EPRDF's focus on the rural peasant as well as its mobilization of rural masses under ethnicity-based political organization- the people's democratic organizations (PDOs) – was partially an effort to diminish the influence of the urban elite, which contested EPRDF's ethnicity-based political settlement. Rural communities, which are relatively ethnically homogenous as compared to cities, were more easily mobilized through the PDOs and made for a more secure social base.

Furthermore, while the rivalry between the revolutionary socialist regimes of the Derg and the EPRDF was set primarily along the ideological differences of nationalisms- Ethiopian nationalism and ethno-nationalism- these differences were marked also along the urban-rural divide. The Derg was a nationalist revolution that was rooted in cities and endeavored to organize the countryside while the EPRDF was, at least nominally, an ethno-nationalist movement organized in the countryside that sought to '*surround and capture the cities'* (Clapham, 1990:5). The rural smallholder farmer was the political base that the TPLF/EPRDF vanguard claimed from its early days of practicing Maoist garrison socialism (de Waal, 2015:153), where it had formed an allegiance with farmers amongst whom fighters lived. This strategy was inspired by Mao's ideals of the peasant revolution which pitted cities, i.e., urban workers, and rural peasants as class enemies as part of his political-military strategy of "Surrounding the cities from the countryside" (Brown, 2012: 4).

However, the Chinese case was a revolutionary peasant movement - i.e., a peasantry that self-organized in a class struggle. The TPLF leadership, on the other hand, organized the Tigrean peasantry[33] not as a class struggle[34] -i.e., towards a revolution against an urban economic class- but along the lines of identity politics -i.e., as an ethno-nationalist struggle against a nationalist Derg regime that dominated cities. Farmers accounted for 85% of the Ethiopian population in 1991 so PM Meles's 'stable developmental coalition' had to center the smallholder farmer (Weis, 2015:246).

In summary, the limited space for evidence-based policy making, the party's political dependence on rural mobilization and the prevailing anti-urban bias within EPRDF's

[33] Though TPLF's Marxist stance held that "workers and the peasantry were the social forces that should take the lead, in practice it was the few TPLF elites who assumed the leadership that used the ideology and party machinery to control the peasantry down to the village level". (GebreEgziabher, 2019)
[34] DERG already dominated the 'class struggle revolution' imagination of the population which made it less effective as a discursive tool to mobilize peasantry for the TPLF regime.

peasant-based polity (which in the first decade and a half of its rule, all contributed to the absence of an urban agenda within the party's early program of developmentalism.

3.1.3. A shift in urban policy: The 2005 crisis, rebuilding the vanguard party state

> *"Ethiopia finds itself once again at the crossroads. The May 2005 national elections have presented the country with a clear-cut choice between a functional multiparty democratic system or a patrimonial state-party system"*
>
> Berhanu Abegaz, 2005

Described as possibly the only genuine election ever held in the country (Harbeson, 2005), the run-up to the 2005 national election saw opposition parties able to publicly campaign and mobilize voters against the party. The main opposition party, The Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), campaigned against EPRDF's ethnic federalism, the disregard of urban constituencies and the focus on ADLI, instead arguing for a greater focus addressing equitable regional development, and urban issues - urban unemployment, urban poverty and the housing crisis. Much to the surprise of the party, opposition parties won all the seats in the capital and most seats in many other cities (Aalen, 2009:197).

While the unrest that followed the elections was quickly silenced and did not result in a shift in the political settlement, it ushered in two major shifts: the rebirth of the party-state (see section 3.2), and a significant shift in its outlook toward cities. The election cemented the party's outlook towards cities and their place in relation to the 'stable developmental coalition' (Weis, 2015:246). Cities moved from being marginal in the political imaginary to being a major threat that needed to be appeased through the consistent delivery and anticipation of massive infrastructural development. Oqubay (2015:17) notes:

> *Increasing political pressure in urban centers has been an important factor for the government's focus on urban economic and governance issues, especially after the 2005 national election. This election and its aftermath were* ***an important wake-up call, perhaps even an internal threat,*** *to the ruling party. The focus on large housing and infrastructure developments and employment programs in urban centers commenced after, or partly because of, these events.*

Meles attributed the crisis to the weakened status of the party- "he explained the EPRDF had been slow in establishing a social base in the cities, and (especially) had not drawn up

policies that brought tangible benefits to urban areas" (De waal, 2005: 159). EPRDF's response to the urban threat in 2005 thus combined the goals of resuscitating the vanguard with that of bringing disenfranchised urban youth, considered as the central threat, into the fold. The 2006 party statutes pronounced the need to strengthen the vanguard: "EPRDF should play the role of a vanguard by bracing up its organizational capacity to lead the people in their efforts to raise consciousness and organize themselves" (EPRDF, 2006 in Weis:2015). Meanwhile, a promotional brochure released in 2006 captures for the first time the new urban constituencies targeted in the resurgence of the party: "the Vanguard of the Ethiopian farmers, lower and middle urban dwellers and developmental actors" (EPRDF, 2006 in Weis:2015).

As part of the political strategy of bringing youth into the fold of the party's influence, a series of new urban development strategies focused on youth employment emerged in 2005 (Gebremariam, 2017). Prime amongst these was the National Urban Development policy (NUDP), consisting of the Urban Development Package and the Urban Good Governance Package. The Urban Development Package was overseen by the Ministry of Works and Urban Development (MoUDH) and sought to reduce urban unemployment by 20% through the development of Micro and Small Enterprises (MSE); to reduce slum areas by 50% through its Integrated Housing Development Programme (IHDP)[35] and the provision of land, infrastructure, services and facilities; and finally, to link larger towns to small towns (Kassahun & Tiwari, 2012:72).

In 2006, the Industry and Urban Development package (MoWUD, 2006) further outlined the industrial component of the NUDP and the modalities of the development of MSEs. The targeted sectors included textiles, metal and woodwork, food preparation, municipal services and construction. Under the construction sector, MSEs were set up to produce building materials for the IHDP and for cobblestone paving of secondary roads. The development of MSEs played the dual roles of small-scale manufacturing development program and youth mobilization structure that could 'contain dissent by linking the ruling party to a significant number of urban youths who were dependent on the government for their survival' (Di Nunzio, 2014:420).

[35] Housing became the ministry's biggest mandate and the name of the ministry eventually changed to the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MoUDH) in 2008

In a demonstration of the continuity of communist vanguard institutional structures, EPRDF revived the Derg's mass organizations including the kebeles[36], youth women's leagues to support the effort of expanding the party's local cadre constituency (Gebremariam, 2017; 2020). Kebeles were provided with the resources and were brought into the task "assisting small-scale enterprises in their search for funding and in the provision of training and business facilities" (Di Nunzio, 2014: 417) Similarly, youth and women's leagues that had been formally disbanded by the EPRDF in the 1990s were brought back to address the 'socio-economic and political problems of the youth' (Di Nunzio, 2014:419). Overseen by the new Ministry of Works and Urban development, these programs introduced through the kebeles also doubled as a recruitment channel for local party cells (Weis: 2015: 275).

In this way the organizational capacity of the vanguard was to be built along the lines of Stalin's ideal of the mono-organizational society- a social order in which society would become an extension of the party, increasingly dependent on it for its survival. Stalin put this ideal for state society relations into practice through the implementation of Cadre Policy, which involved the organization of members of the communist party into political cells which would be established at the level of neighborhoods, workplaces and social organizations (Rigby, 2017). This practice is visible in EPRDF's strategy of extending its structure of control in cities as well as its mechanism for the control of bureaucracy (discussed in 3.2) in the post-2005 period. The employment of infrastructure to facilitate encadrement extended the party's reach as a mechanism of control.

The PASDEP's[37] 'urban agenda' remained for the most part disconnected from the agro-industrial focus of the party's core economic policies, the RDP and the IDS. In principle the MSE strategy, the industrial component of the 'urban agenda', was "seen to play an important part in the national economy… the vision is based on the country's overall development strategy of ADLI and the adoption of the market economic system, where the private sector will take the lead" (MoTI, 2005:12). In practice the MSE strategy was focused

[36] The DERG had had a better stronghold in cities through its youth and community organizing focused grassroots associations. Kebeles were local urban dwellers associations that were first established by the DERG between 1975 and 78 after the nationalization of urban and rural land, as part of the restructuring of urban government to allow for a Leninist-Stalinist form of political control of cities alongside the bureaucratic administration of state resources (Clapham 1990:51).

[37] The 5-year national development policy – PASDEP -Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (2005-2010). The NUDP was one of the implementation strategies of the PASDEP under MoUDH.

on employing urban youth which departed from the logic of absorbing surplus agricultural labor in the RDP and ADLI.

The 2005 MSE strategy thus dissociated the project of *'urban development'* from that of national economic development as envisioned in ADLI. Urban-industrial development, as defined by the Industry and Urban Development Package, became a strategy of containing urban dissent and urban poverty through the creation of livelihoods in MSEs and service provision. The MoUDH followed up its 2006 Industry and Urban Development package with the 2011 Micro and Small Enterprise development Policy and Strategy (MoUDH, 2011). In its conceptual overview (the very first page), the document discusses the political drive behind the strategy, again failing to directly link the MSE strategy with the national Industrial Development Strategy.

> *There is also a political justification for providing policy and strategy related support to MSEs. Just as farmers are the basis for a developmental state in rural areas that will fulfil the interests of rural residents, achieving this [providing support to MSEs] would give impetus (for the governing party) to achieve progress in terms of democracy and development and muster the support of the urban population.*
>
> *MSE operators in urban centers, which normally constitute a significant segment of the urban population, also share similar characteristics with rural farmers. The MSE operators in urban centers not only strive to create wealth by providing their labor and mobilizing other resources but are also susceptible to rent seeking behavior. Hence, they are expected to benefit from the MSE Development Policy and Strategy and* ***become the basis for political support.***

While it had, at this point, become clear that MSEs were not transitioning into large scale enterprises or absorbing surplus agricultural labor, as postulated in ADLI, and remained a means of survival for a growing urban population; MSEs continued to be a prominent objective in the subsequent five-year plans GTP I and GTPII, while disconnected from the agenda of structural transformation through the large-scale industrialization envisioned in the 2002 Industrial Development Strategy.

Despite the urban agenda being subsumed in the party's political agenda, the post 2005 fervor for infrastructural development brought about an intense rapid physical transformation of cities. However, infrastructure was not only a tool for gaining legitimacy

in cities but with all the party's regional and local constituencies in general during this period. The post 2005 authoritarian turn in EPRDF increased its reliance on the legitimizing narrative of developmentalism and its dependence on its ability to deliver on development to ensure its political survival. Infrastructure thus became the primary medium of gaining legitimacy for the party state. Its core offerings of mega projects, be it energy, rail, road, sugar plants, hospitals, or universities, were at the center of federal regional bargaining that consistently revolved around calls for regional equity (discussed in 4.1). These projects dominated both the PASDEP and GTP periods. Local constituencies and thus regional elites came to increasingly demand the development of mega projects as a form of claiming redistribution in the short term. EPRDF especially after 2005, and even more so after the death of Meles, used the distribution of mega projects across regions as the main mechanism of illustrating its ability to deliver on regional equity. Shiferaw et. al., (2012:43) point out that the economic rationale or real contribution to regional development were secondary to the appearance of coverage:

> *Coverage and equity between regions have received more emphasis than the usefulness and the net value of the projects. Several projects have been implemented due to coverage and equity reasons of the government. Some of these projects could not provide sustainable services, and they do not have a reasonable economic return rate compared to the investment.*

Centralization under PM Meles was again key to this infrastructural redistribution regime that prioritized 'equity' over efficiency. In a process that one interviewee described as the production of 'a camel by committee'[38], the formulation of Growth and Transformation plan (GTP1) was led by a macro economic committee set up in the Prime Minister's office and put forward as series of overambitious projects. The drafting of key documents proceeded at great speed and in the absence of inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder involvement (JICA,2011:46, 72). High level consultations with the Japanese National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) and JICA marginally fed into the process but very few of their proposals were adopted and advisors later noted they had 'expressed

[38] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist and Advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19. He makes a reference to the proverb 'a camel is a horse designed by a committee' to denote the ineffectiveness of incorporating to many conflicting opinions via compromise.

concern over the speed of drafting key documents which seemed too fast to ensure feasibility' (JICA, 2011:72).

GTP1 (2010-2015) outlined four areas of focus for industrial development: I) MSE development II) Medium and large Industries development (including agro-processing) III) Industrial Zones Development for (MLIs) and IV) public enterprise Management and privatization (MoFED,2010). The objective of 'Industrial Zone Development' emerged out of an internal review conducted on the IDS in the lead up to the development of GTP I. Sisay Gemechu, advisor to the PM at the time, recounted the period as follows

> *This 2002 Industrial Development Strategy had been on the ground for a while, but it did not bring about results. The document was being used in training and promoted on various platforms but on the ground, there were no results. We all knew the seven pillars of the country's industrial development strategy but '**the how' was missing**. The challenges that are faced by investors was not recognized because it had been copy pasted from Asia. So, there was an inquiry into what the problems were. We were asked what the problem was? and what we found was that the bottlenecks had not been recognized.*

He went on to explain the main bottlenecks were found to be the arduous processes of land acquisition within the federal system, the infrastructural burden left to the investors and the financial losses incurred in the lengthy periods it would take to secure land and basic infrastructure. The worst of these, the process of securing land, involved the investor being referred by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ethiopian Investment Commission to go to regional investment commission which would then write to the Zone administration who would write to the district or city administration, the land would be viewed and the woreda (district) would write back with confirmation and the decision would finally be made by the regional investment board. This could take up to 3 years and at the fastest within a year.

Once these bottlenecks had been recognized by the Prime Minister's office, a process of policy learning, exchange and development cooperation was set in motion. PM Meles made a visit to South Korea and had discussions with the then PM Han Seung-Soo on the Korean export-oriented manufacturing model and the state-led development of export processing zones. The trip culminated in Meles making a commitment to develop an export processing zone in Addis Ababa with the understanding that PM Han would channel Korean investors to the development. Upon his return, the decision was made to get started with the

development of the export processing zones. Under GTPI, the directorate for Industrial Zone Development (which was under the Ministry of industry) had the mandate of developing industrial zones. The four projects that were commissioned in this period were Bole Lemi and Kilinto in Addis Ababa, Kombolcha in Amhara regions and one in Dire Dawa.

> *Bole Lemi was decided in the palace, it was a political decision. When it started, it was all chaotic. … When we said we would develop industrial zones in GTP I, we did this before we fully understood Industrial zone development. Hawassa, Kombolcha, Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa (Kilinto).* [40]

While GTP1 was still under development, a task force was established under PM Meles and instructions were given to find a location for the park that would accommodate the Korean Investors. Both the Addis Ababa City administration and the MoWUD were part of the task force which went on to identify the Bole Lemi site. Development commenced in 2011 with a time frame of six months at the end of which Korean firms were expected to arrive. Interviewees saw this stage of the IP development as having been well coordinated.

> *When we started during the time of PM Meles, **we started off the right way**. The ministry of industry and the Ministry of Works and Urban development (MoWUD) were both assigned to propose a site for the park in Addis Ababa and to also check it together. The logistics institutions were also involved. So when Bole Lemi was being developed, the MoWUD was very involved. The six months ended before the agreements were concluded and before the foundation was started when the PM passed away*[39]

The sudden death of PM Meles in August 2012 plunged the project into disarray. The Korean prime minister had also been removed and as a result most of the Korean Investors had pulled out. The project was moved out of the prime minister's office and moved under the Ethiopian Industrial Zone Development Corporation (EIZDC) (Reg.no. 297/2013) under the Ministry of industry. Problems with financing and the limited capacity of both the directorate and the local construction firms led to repeated delays (20 construction firms were simultaneously tasked with the development of the mega project) and the construction of

[39] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020

Bole Lemi dragged on while the development of Hawassa, Kombolcha, DireDawa and Kilinto were completely stalled.

In summary, the period between 2005 and 2012 saw the widening of the rift between the urban and industrial transformation agendas of the vanguard, despite the emergence of a significant attention to cities. The Industrial component of the 'urban agenda' that emerged in the wake of the 2005 elections was entangled with the wider project of resurrecting the party's political control in cities and remained for the most part disconnected from the party's core economic policies, the Rural Development Policy and the Industrial Development Strategy. The early stages of Industrial Zone Development on the other hand progressed as a separate agenda under the prime minister's office until it was interrupted by the death of Meles. The next section delves into the major shifts that occurred over the following two years that would redirect the nature of industrial parks development and shape how it would unfold for the rest of the decade.

3.2. Political organization and the Framing of urban industrial policy

> *Development is a political process first and an economic and social process after. It is the creation of a political set-up that is conducive to accelerated development that sets the ball of development rolling*
>
> Meles Zenawi, 2011:170

The two years following PM Meles's death saw significant changes in the direction of the framing and institutionalization of state led industrial development. These changes were crafted and implemented through the bureaucratic control that PM Meles nurtured as part of the 'political set up' for accelerated implementation of developmental state policies following the 2005 crisis. Interviewees highlighted the importance of what they called '*the party channel'* and the power relations between different tiers of the party which they characterized allegorically as one between *'dogs and hyenas'* to be at the heart of policy coordination and its challenges in the urban industrial nexus. These two descriptions and interpretations of coordinative institutions refer to the Stalinist institution of *the party bureaucracy*.

The party bureaucracy is the embodiment of Vanguardism (discussed in section 3.1.1) and Cadre Policy (discussed in 3.1.3) in the civil service. Where control of bureaucracy is

achieved in Weberian bureaucracies[40] through politicians at top administrative positions that are held accountable by a strong parliament, in Leninist/Stalinist bureaucracies it is achieved by the 'democratization of control' i.e., mass participation in control and accounting through democratic proletarian centralism[41] (Wright 1974). As this involves the appointment of cadres to all decision-making positions, political and administrative structures are combined to create a party-state apparatus which 'ex-definition precludes any kind of dualism in power between party and state" (Theen, 1984:138). This section discusses the different ways in which this fusion of party and state bureaucracy affected coordination in urban industrial policy making in the post-Meles era.

3.2.1. Coordination through *the party channel*

The bureaucracy had always been a battleground for the EPRDF. Early on after coming to power, EPRDF officials expressed that the civil service was "the next enemy we have to fight now we have overcome the Derg" (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003:25). The work of bending it to the influence of the party involved the purging of the previous regime's loyalists followed by "massive expansion, the creation of a civil service college and the training a new cadre of officials, many of them former EPRDF fighters" (2003:25).

> *"The bureaucracy of the newly established federal state had to be rebuilt. This implied massive bureaucratic transformation in terms of political indoctrination (with the philosophy of the new government) and instilling professional capabilities."*
>
> Oqubay, 2015:19

The post 2005 period saw the re-politicization of the bureaucracy as part of the work of rebuilding the party. This 'politicization'[42] ((Asefa, 2018a, 2018b; Abebe Wolde, 2005;

[40] Weber set the ideal for liberal bureaucracies and their relationship with politics in his foundational text, Parliament *and Government (1917),* where he proposes that the accountability of appointed agency heads to the parliament become the main mechanism of control of bureaucracies

[41] In the same year 1917, Lenin's *State and Revolution* set the ideal for revolutionary socialist bureaucracies where the proletariat would be directly involved in the processes of control within bureaucracies through the mechanism of Democratic centralism – which funnels decisions to the highest leadership of the party whilst allowing for 'democratic' discussion amongst the massive membership of the party.

[42] The concept of Politicization, although dominant in the Ethiopian Public Administration literature (Asefa, 2018a, 2018b; Abebe Wolde, 2005; Kebede, G, 2013; Miruts et.al,2014; Workagegnehu, 2019) is not appropriate as it assumes the existence of a Weberian merit-based bureaucracy and thus a separation between politics and administration (Peter and Pierre, 2004). Unlike Weberian bureaucracies where politicization

Kebede, G, 2013; Miruts et.al,2014; Workagegnehu, 2019) was carried out through the widespread practice of cadre deployment - "policy of filling all higher and middle level posts with appointees on the bases of political and ethnic consideration" (Meheret and Paulos in Kebede,2013:267). As Meles bluntly pointed out first in a parliamentary address in 2005 and on many occasions afterwards, "in appointing civil servants, we are more interested in political loyalty than competence". Appointees had dual roles within the civil service- as party members and bureaucrats. The difference between these cadres and other bureaucrats was their accountability first to the party and then to the public. This duality not only blurs the distinction between politics and administration but also creates a parallel partocratic power structure through which administrative functions are evaluated and key decisions are made.

Post 2005 EPRDF saw the fusion of political, administrative and economic structures taking back the gains achieved during the era of civil service reforms between 2001 and 2005. Alongside the encadrement of youth to extend political control in urban neighborhoods, control of the state bureaucracy was pursued through the encadrement of civil servants and the appointment of cadres to all points of control within public institutions in spite of the fact that the 1994 Ethiopian constitution had supposedly instituted a merit-based bureaucracy [art. 39-federal agencies, art. 39(3) federal character, Civil Service Proclamation No. 515/2007]. The overall effect of the party bureaucracy is the undermining of the separation of powers and the merging of state and party. Interviewees interpreted the fused structure as being represented by what they referred to as the '*party channel'*- a parallel political evaluation structure consisting of the core party organizations and their extensive structures of *Gimgemma*[43].

Within the context of EPRDF's federal system, Gimgemma denotes the institution and extensive structures of peer evaluation and intraparty accountability. The scope and influence of the structures of Gimgemma run parallel to and overlay all levels of the state bureaucracy, serving as "one of the most important mechanisms used by TPLF/EPRDF to control federal and regional state apparatus and overshadow democratic mechanisms of

beyond a certain degree becomes problematic, within the framework of a Leninist bureaucracy, politicization is not only acceptable but the organizing principle behind cadre deployment. The purpose of the democratization of control is the complete politicization of the bourgeoise bureaucracy so as to bend it to the will of the masses.

[43] The literal translation of Gimgemma in Amharic is *evaluation.*

accountability" (Abebe, 2014 :4). This dual/fused structure was described in great detail by the former head of the spatial planning directorate of Hawassa city administration[44]. His extended description of the structure of the party bureaucracy was particularly illuminating so it is presented here in full length.

> *"When you enter the civil service, you by default become a party member unless you have special reservations against it. You participate in party gatherings and there are no clear distinctions as the meetings are convened as the party's as well as the administration's gatherings. It's easier to describe where the structures merge and separate if I describe it from the top down. If we take the case of the Hawassa City Administration, there are two wings at the top- there is the party wing and then there is the state (Mengist[45]) wing…The party's one to five structure[46] evaluates the party's work and is political evaluation while the state one to five evaluates the progress of projects free from politics. The same people evaluate projects under the party's Hiwase or Meseretawi Dirigit[47] and the state's one to five…Coordination failures would be identified through the party channel and very effectively resolved. They say the party wing is a small motor that gets things moving, it catalyzes the work. Because everyone that has any power is appointed by the party, they listen to them more and this makes things easy. If someone at the lowest rung, say in a kebele, is found to be ineffective, if the work is not going well, he is summoned and evaluated. If he has not been able to convince the public or whatever the problem is, he is held accountable by the party.*

The institution of *Gimgemma* plugs the civil service into the party's political organization and subjects it to the party's principle of democratic centralism. The fused structure is highly hierarchical and serves to centralize decision making to party headquarters at the regional and city levels and ultimately to the central committees of the four member parties of the

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[44] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 06.12.20.

[45] In Ethiopian tradition and in the Amharic language (which remains the language of state at the federal and some regional levels) no distinction is made between 'state' and 'government', both being referred to as *mengist*.

[46] A political cell is made up of 5 people with one leader who is also part of a group of 5 creating a hierarchy of 1 to 5 people.

[47] *Hiwase* is the term used to describe the political cell or network of five party members in SNNPR. *Meseretawi Dirigit* directly translates into basic organization. Both these terms and a wider description of the various post-2005 mechanisms of political control and mobilization in cities is found in Bekele et.al, 2016:9-10

coalition at the federal level. Back, 2011:647 (in Gedamu, 2017:217) describes Gimgema as follows

> *"Democratic centralism reveals above all the rigid and hierarchical structure of the EPRDF coalition and is, among others, illustrated by the Gimgema. These ''politico-administrative evaluations (. . .) allow the appointment and discharge of civil servants and government officials to be manipulated and subverted''. ''Criticism'' and ''self-criticism'' procedure is thus presented as ''an instrument used to reprimand defects and mistakes in members''. This practice inherited from the TPLF internal organization during the struggle is now at the center of the administrative system in which the ruling party finds a powerful way of controlling the affiliated party members"*

Members of the EPRDF politburo[48] and the four central committees served as 'Central Political Bureaucracy'[49]; and the various agencies of the civil service made up of at various levels of the territorial-administrative structure, as the 'Petty Bureaucracy'. Post 2005 EPRDF was highly dependent on the responsiveness of the petty bureaucracy, using the 'Party Channel' to ensure its increasingly ambitious developmental project were effectively implemented. The party channel was the core integrative mechanism for the implementation of industrial parks development, as discussed in section 4.1.3.

3.2.2. The post-Meles party fracture and a *hodina jerba* urban-industrial nexus

Upon the death of Meles, the established structures of the party channel allowed for the continuity of the effectiveness of policy implementation and the responsiveness of state agencies. However, within the innermost circles of the party (which constituted the central bureaucracy), and mostly hidden from the wider EPRDF general council, a general state of intense competition for power, corruption and conflict ensued.[50] As Lefort (2014:1) put it "The colossal body of the pyramid is intact and still performs its main functions, its single

[48] Note the TPLF and more recently PP continue to use the term 'politburo' instead of 'executive committee.' The politburo is the principal policymaking committee of a communist party; one of the terms within the socialist lexicon that persists in Ethiopian polity

[49] The soviet party-bureaucracy under Stalin was made up of two stratums: the 'Upper Stratum' or 'Central Political Bureaucracy'; and the 'lower stratum', the 'Petty Bureaucracy' made up of bureaucrats that serve in government positions at various levels of the territorial-administrative structure, be it national, regional, city level, sub city levels of administration. (Theen, 1984)

[50] Birhane Tsigab, in his 2019 book entitled 'The Downward Spiral of the EPRDF' (Amharic) documented in great detail and length the conflicts and infighting that dominated the central committee meetings 2012-2017.

apex has exploded into multiple centers of power, of unequal weight, none of which has achieved critical mass. While it would be an overstatement to speak of paralysis, the party's pinnacle is at least "in a disarray"".

In spite of quick succession to PM Hailemariam, PM Meles's death became the beginning of the end for the central party's fragile cohesion and consequently the coherence of its policies. The death of Meles was thus key in the disintegration[51] of policy spheres that he had up to that point held together as the strong central node. Recognizing all the centrifugal forces that had been at play during Meles's time, Tom Gardner (2020) captures the nature of his role as integrator: "Meles's death simply removed the last line of defense against eventual fragmentation, ultimately precipitating in a violent rush for control of both the party and state".

Nine members of the old guard[52] emerged as advisors to PM Hailemariam with the rank of ministers and enjoyed the greatest influence over the sectors they overlooked. The group included Bereket Simeon, Abay Tsehaye, Kassu Ilala and Kuma Demeksa for policy, Newaye Christos Gebreab (economy), Fassil Nahom (legal adviser), Tsegaye Berhe (security), Andras Eshete (diaspora) and Arkebe Okubay (investment and industrialization).

The in-fighting between these key party leaders was again couched in socialist ideological and discursive terms. In the urban-industrial policy sphere, disagreements between Bereket Simeon and Arkebe Oqubay were significant. Newly returned with a PhD from SOAS in 2012, Arkebe Oqubay wielded a great deal of influence quickly becoming the main ideologue[53] on matters of industrialization within the party. Arkebe's record of delivering infrastructural projects, also contributed to his highly influential position in the post-Meles era when pressure on the party to legitimize its rule through its delivery of infrastructure had significantly increased.

This influence was not well received by Bereket Simeon who in his 2017 book *The crossroads of Ethiopia's resurrection* criticizes him as deviating from Meles's legacy on

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[51] Candel and Biesbroek (2016:217) introduce the concept of 'disintegration' to capture such instances where less holistic policy making emerges when "regime configurations with relatively high degrees of policy integration are weakened".

[52] In the lead-up to the 2010 election, Meles had spoken of a transition of key leadership positions from the old guard, (i.e. the original TPLF fighters involved in the armed struggle against DERG) to a new generation of young EPRDF cadres. The transition indefinitely dragged on and never transpired after his death.

[53] Please note a series of Arkebe's academic articles and books are cited in this thesis under his surname Oqubay while I use his first name to refer to him in the text which is standard practice in Amharic.

industrial policy. Simeon cites a general disregard for rural industrialization, a shift from local fabrication based to FDI heavy manufacturing, an unhealthy support of foreign investment, a preference for low value-added textile industries. He argues that the departure from the 2002 industrial development strategy is a danger to the vanguard's revolutionary aspirations and closes the section with "*Therefore there is a need to get our country's Rasputins*[54] *in line, those who have undue influence as sources of contraband policy ideas in our investment and industrial sectors*". This interpretation of deviation from Meles's legacy was corroborated by an interviewee who pointed out that this '*sparked a great deal of debate within the party*'[55].

Beyond debates and ideological differences, however, some interviewees interpreted other disagreements with Arkebe's approach as contributing to the elimination of coordination of industrial parks policy with MoUDH in the period following Meles's death. Here the party bureaucratic leadership of state agencies by polit bureau members was interpreted to be at the heart of urban-industrial policy fragmentation.

> *How are industrial developments developed outside of planning? How do you proceed without talking to us about housing? I understand Arkebe led on the industrial park's development, urban development used to be led by Mekuria Haile and the two did not like each other and it was a fight. So, one does not talk to the other and there is always blame.* ***Conflicts between leaders at the top became the reason for why urban planning and industrial development never became aligned (saynibebu qere).*** *… and the system isn't strong. If the system had been strong, these individual problems could have been overcome.* ***Institutions (state organizations) are hanging on individuals****. If I lead a sector and I hate someone who is leading a different sector,* ***the sector that I lead and the sector that he leads are hodina jerba,*** [56] *no matter how much their work may be related. So, there is a failure from the outset.*[57]
>
> *When Bole Lemi was being developed, the MoWUD was very involved. When Meles died the leadership structure changed, the position of different individuals changed*

[54] A reference to Rasputin's undue influence on Imperial Russia's Tsarina Alexandra.
[55] Interview with Hallelujah Lulie, Former Director of Foreign Policy Strategic Studies Institute on 04.06.2018
[56] An allegory that literally translates into 'belly and back' denoting the diametrically opposed nature of the relationship and the inability of the two points to meet or interact.
[57] Interview with a former Division Director, National Urban Planning Institute on 04.03.2019

within the party and ***MoWUD was left out. Automatically, its involvement in the work of the Office of the Prime Minister concerning Industrial parks was ceased****. I do not know the reason, but it was left out and the MoI (where I was at the time), the PMO and the investment commission went into the race that led to where we are today.*[58]

The values of individuals or differences between them may not be detrimental to organization coordination within a Weberian bureaucracy, however, the concentration of power that the hierarchical party bureaucracy creates, and the absence of democratic checks makes the institutionalization of personal rivalries unavoidable in Stalinist party bureaucracies. Wider fractures within the party were creating similar coordination failure across other sectors. "Both the intra-TPLF and the cross-factional fissures undermined the EPRDF, which was not designed for collective management." (Crisis Group, 2019). In a 2019 interview, Birhane Tsigab [59] describes the effect of the infighting in the party and its eventual fracture as follows:

None of the five democratic institutions had been built, if we look at the federal structure, federal agencies had not been built up, the horizontal and vertical relations had not been built. There were only two institutions holding everything together. The primary institution was the party. The executive committee, the central committees and the council decides, and this goes down to the kebele and the basic organization (meseretawi dirigit)[60] *and holds/controls the public.* ***When there was a fracture at the top, it created a fracture all the way down because there was nothing else that could hold things together****. The other institution was of course the defense force.*

The state minister of Urban Development echoed the same reasoning when asked about why coordination failed in the urban-industrial nexus during the framing of IPD. Multiple interviewees spoke of the beginning of IPD program under Meles as a window of opportunity for coordinated planning. Here *the right way to coordinate* is understood as coordination through a strong central node. The elimination of collective leadership by PM Meles in post 2001 EPRDF that had allowed him to consolidate his own personal rule, had

[58] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020
[59] Interview of Birhane Tsigab, a former member of the TPLF's central committee (2012-2017) on Arts TV on 11. 08.2019
[60] Reference to the one to five networks including those in the civil service.

left the distribution of authority outside of the prime minister's office unclear. Many interviewees interpreted the crisis of authority that his death then created to be the root cause of the factionalism and consequently the disruption of coordination with the central bureaucracy and by extension the state bureaucracy. The conflict between these individuals was interpreted to be the root cause of policy disintegration and fragmentation in the urban industrial nexus.

> *No one questions whether a developmental state is needed or not. but there was competition,* ***when Meles died,*** *he was influential when he was taken out there was immense competition (fukikir) and an inability to listen to each other within the party. "Who are you to order me", "I am such and such". this is what you see, the differences between political figures is reflected in the differences between ministries and their inability to listen or talk to each other.* ***because that was where coordination had previously taken place*** [61]

Furthermore, within the political administrative institution of the party bureaucracy, entire policy programs, administrative agencies and policies themselves were interpreted to be extensions of party leaders and their own political agendas.

> ***All this chaos came out of the collision of individuals.*** *After Meles died, what people say about the country has spiraling into chaos, this is one of the symptoms of that. You might look at a plan of one of these sectoral agencies and think it was consulted on.* ***If it were during the time of Meles, it certainly would have been but documents that come out now, these are papers of individuals. Everything was dispersed and resources were wasted****.* [62]

This post-2012 disintegration of the party, and by extension coordination is the party bureaucracy, is highly significant to the problem of urban industrial integration because it happened in a period that also saw the most concerted effort to understand, define and implement the Ethiopian Industrial Parks Development Program. The next section looks how the fracture of the party bureaucracy affected the framing of industrial parks policy.

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[61] Interview with Tazer G/Egziabher, State Minister of Urban Development on 18.12.2019
[62] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020

3.2.3. Framing Industrial Parks Development without urban agencies 2012- 2015

Whilst GTP 1 had laid out a very thin framework for the development of industrial parks in 2010, it was in the period between 2012 and 2014 that the conceptualization and institutionalization of industrial parks development project took its present form. This period involved intensive policy learning, development cooperation and the drafting of a series of key policy documents and reports[63] including the 2013 Ethiopian Industrial Development Strategic Plan (2013-2025) (MoI, 2013), the 2014 Industrial Development Roadmap (MoI, 2014), the 2014 CADZ study reports[64], the 2014 World Bank reports[65]. It all started with a recognition of the need for defining and framing what IPD would be in Ethiopia.

> ***We realized we needed to look at how we understand Industrial Parks?*** *when it is built and after it has been built, how do companies come in?* ***what are the legal frameworks?*** *The Chinese, the World Bank, KOICA and JICA said they would support us in this. From the Chinese side, so we hired the CADZ, the Chinese Association of Development Zones, a large association made up of professionals who played a role in the growth of China, both retired and still practicing, and young practitioners. The study had a huge capacity building input for us and our working team repeatedly visited the Chinese cities that the CADZ team mentioned in the study. While the CADZ was implementing the study, the World Bank said they would support us with Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. In Addis Ababa, they would support us with Bole Lemi and on the other hand to help us with the legislative framework and the institutional arrangement*[66]

[63] Oqubay points out that the consultancy studies were only inputs and policy learning was primarily based on "a comprehensive and thorough study on industrial hubs and industrialization, which covered international experiences from six Asian and two African countries (South Korea, Singapore, China, Vietnam, Mauritius, and Nigeria). The research included country and site visits, observations, document reviews, in-depth interviews, and expert discussions. Consultancy studies were used as inputs to the research and policy documents.7 In September 2014, a White Paper was produced and discussed by about 100 policymakers and regional and federal government officials" (Oqubay & Kefale, 2020:878). However, no material on any of these studies or the white paper that carried forward their impact on industrial parks policy, have ever been made public (my requests for these documents were denied). On the other hand, the official 2014 Industrial development road map policy document conducted by the Ministry of Industry in collaboration with Adama University was led under Sisay Gemechu, then state minister of Industry who is cited extensively in this chapter. Sisay claims the exposure visits that Oqubay refers to are those he personally conducted.

[64] These CADZ studies included four major reports- i) Development strategy of Special Economic zones in Ethiopia, ii) research report on Dire Dawa Special Economic Zone, iii) The master development plan of Ethiopia Dire Dawa Special Economic Zone, iv) the Dire Dawa Economic Zone Spatial Plan

[65] Confidential reports developed on institutional and legal framework for industrial parks development

[66] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020

During this period and during the drafting the key proclamations that followed, the Ministry of Urban Development was not included in the learning processes that informed the legal and institutional framework for the development of Industrial parks after 2014. This framework consisted of the 2014 Proclamation for the Establishment of IPDC (Proc.no 326/2014), the 2014 amendment of the Investment Proclamation (849/2014) and the 2015 industrial Industrial Parks Proclamation (886/2015). With the background of party fracture discussed in the previous section, some interpreted this exclusion to be deliberate and led by party leadership in the PM office. Commenting on the degree to which the MoUDH was absent during the framing and early development of the parks, interviewees were nevertheless reluctant to go into why the MoUDH was not invited to these processes, they would say, they did not know

> *The IPD Proclamation states in the preamble mentions integrated urban development, this came out of the studies that were done but these people (MoUDH) were not involved in the studies. The studies included the world bank study, the CADZ study and the MoI's studies. And the reason why they were not involved in the studies was because of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). Why? I don't know but it was a problem, and it was a mistake.* [67]

> *'We would find Mekuria Haile[68] at the opening ceremony of the parks. He would say to me 'I heard on TV that you have such and such a park'. There was no involvement of the urban development ministry when we were doing all of these CADZ studies. [why is that?] that. I don't know.*[69]

There were three strategic issues that took form in the policy learning and contextualizing process, during which MoUDH was absent, that would go on to detrimentally affect Policy integration in the urban-industrial nexus: Institutional arrangements, the designation of industrial estates and the location strategies of parks. The first issue was determining the legal and institutional arrangements under which the industrial estates included the establishment of the Industrial Parks Development Corporation (IPDC) and the Ethiopian Investment Board. The IPDC was set up as a state-owned development enterprise "chaired

[67] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020
[68] The former Minister of Urban Development
[69] Interview with Amare Asgedom, Deputy CEO (park design and development) on 09.12.2019

by a minister in the Prime Minister's Office"- Arkebe Oqubay. (Gebre-Egziabher & Abera, 2018:794).

The corporation would only be answerable to the newly set up Ethiopian Investment Board which would be chaired by the Prime Minister and relevant ministries. As discussed in 3.2.2., the exclusion of MoUDH due to animosities between actors, prevented it from making a case for its potential role within the Investment Board. Furthermore, The Ethiopian Investment commission[70] was also brought in as the regulator of IPDC, responsible for investment promotion and attraction. Together these three institutions were meant to jumpstart a steady flow of investment into rapidly produced industrial estates without any obstacles, therefore accelerating development. This institutional arrangement was "designed to shorten the length of time required to start up production and export to world markets" (Gebre-Egziabher & Abera, 2018:794). In practice, this would mean that the corporation was backed up by the highest leadership in the party and operated on terms that were different from the wider bureaucracy in what one interviewee referred to as 'parallel government'.

> *(In the Asian cases that were part of the CADZ studies) there was a central coordinating body, either MITI or MoTI. These were lead institutions. In different countries, they employed different arrangements but all of the institutions that deal with the value chain processes are all under one authority. The second or third senior political person in government led this institution. There is no need to search for the blessing of the prime minister at every turn to implement. He has the political authority to make decisions.*
>
> *So, we took everything and looking at our own pre-existing situation and existing institutions and we considered what would be appropriate…We considered what kind of an institution in our system can have the big muscles that the Chinese were able to*

[70] Proclamation No. 849/2014 amended the investment proclamation and defined the functions of the Ethiopian Investment Board (EIB), its secretariat the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) and gave legal definition for Industrial Development Zones (which included industrial parks). The Board was given the power of 'authorizing the granting of new and additional incentives and investment areas for foreign investors' and 'deciding on the reduction or expansion of the boundaries of industrial development zones'. The council of ministers regulation 313/2014 regulation "describes the board members to be first the Prime Minister as a chairperson, second a government official designated by the Prime Minister as a vice chairperson, followed by members are assigned by the prime minister"." EIC was set to regulate the work of Industrial Parks Development Corporation.

wield to implement these projects? The Ethiopian Investment Board was created as a result, that can be led by the Prime Minister and comprise of senior ministers. In the proclamation article 29:1, such an institution ***'the board' has ultimate control and say in the development as the prime minister has the highest authority****. Other regulatory agencies are under it, MoI, MoE and others but the Ethiopian Investment board has the ultimate say on industrial development. In terms of industrial parks and investment, the Ethiopian investment board and the house of ministers are parallel. It is very powerful.*[71]

They became a ***parallel government****, it's unbelievable. Everything is thrown at them now. Everything that you cannot throw to the bureaucracy, you throw to them. but they have* ***different incentives structures, they have different access to the centers of power,*** *so we have two governments. They were better resourced* [than relevant ministries and other government agencies] *and had direct access to the Prime Minister's Office*[72]

The second strategic issue that was shaped during this period was the ambiguous designation and spatial definition of the industrial estates. This included policy language that had clear conceptual and legal overlaps and inconsistencies with urbanization policy. These were dealt with through maneuvering exercises that obscured potentially conflicting mandates and superficially addressed the conceptual and legal problems that arose. One of the key maneuvers was around the use of the term SEZ. Although the original policy learning had focused on SEZs as industrial townships, there was a political decision to abandon the term because legally this would mean SEZ development in cities like Hawassa with existing urban administration would fall under the purview of the city administration or MoUDH which are legally mandated to lead large scale urban development and planning. Sisay Gemechu, who led the process as the state minister of industrial parks development in the Ministry of Industry, describes the period as follows:

We started our studies with SEZs in mind, everywhere we would work, and we intended to develop entire industrial townships. We studied this in Dire Dawa (New Dire Dawa) CADZ developed a national special economic zone strategy, Dire Dawa

[71] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020
[72] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist and Advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19

*SEZ feasibility, SEZ master plan and SEZ spatial plan… But when we went to Hawassa or Addis if we were to call them SEZs, it would encompass the whole existing city so we could not apply the term as per the legislature. So, we temporarily suspended the use of the term in the titles, and we had to carefully insert the term in the legislature…**So, when we as IPDC say SEZ, we mean urban development, one entire city.** When urban development people say industrial zone, they are using the designation that was set in the 1995 urban reform (zoning designation). Now if you have noticed, although we are now calling them industrial parks, in the proclamation the term 'SEZ' is inserted as a premise…We had decided that we would implement the SEZ models while we had to use the IP term in the legislature, when really, it's a township, we had the agreements.*

When we formulated the proclamation, we used the term 'Industrial Park'. Industrial Park was needed so that it wasn't to be confused with the old 'Industrial Zone' urban planning designation. Because we couldn't apply the higher-level term of SEZs everywhere, we decided on the term Industrial Park. For companies coming out Asia, Industrial Park was a common term and for us Industrial Park steered us clear of the higher 'SEZ' and the lower 'Industrial zone' designation and we chose the intermediate term of 'Industrial Park'. Not SEZ and not industrial zone but within the definition both are included. It is difficult to say IP on top and follow on to talk about SEZs instead, it should be the other way around. If someone that understands these terms were to read the proclamation, it is clearly visible. ***For us, it was not that we did not know, it was because we were in a bind. It was a compromise****….*[73]

The legal maneuvering that Sisay describes is captured in the shift that happens between the conceptualization in the 2014 Industrial development roadmap policy document and the final phrasing in the 2015 Industrial parks development corporation establishment proclamation (Proc no. 886/2015). One of the strategic objectives of the 2014 policy document was initially stated as "to develop and operationalize industrial zones and cities" (MoI, 2014:37). The document further describes the relationship between industrial zone development and urbanization as a continuum and captures some of the initial holistic

[73] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020

thinking that would disappear in the drafting of the 2015 industrial parks development corporation.

> *"**The development of the industrial zones, ultimately into industrial city development**, is a continuous process which requires a longtime and sustained commitment from the part of the government. It demands not only the preparation of industrial development plan but also a comprehensive plan to establish regional business centers, social services (schools, hospitals, residences…etc.), environmental standards and other dimensions which are crucial to develop industrial cities – commonly known as development zones. This entails the fact that the government in one way or another couldn't be out of the zone development issues rather it will chair governance of the industrial cities' development program. This is a crucial step towards urbanization and industrial transformation that ensure structural change of the country's economy." (MoI, 2014:37).*

The only mention of cities in the Industrial Parks Proclamation 886/2015 is found in the preamble which defines 'Industrial parks' in the Ethiopian context as

> *An area with distinct boundary designated by the appropriate organ to develop comprehensive, integrated, multiple or selected functions of industries, based on a planned fulfilment of infrastructure and various services such as road, electric power and water, one stop shop and have special incentive schemes, with a broad view to achieving planned and systematic, development of industries, mitigation of impacts of pollution on environment and human being and **development of urban centers,** and includes **special economic zones, technology parks, export processing zones, agro-processing zone, free trade zones and the like designated by the Investment Board***

The '*compromise*' of using the term 'industrial parks' and eliminating other references to cities in the 2015 IP proclamation in spite of the implications of the policy language for developing large-scale industrial settlements that are integrated with urbanization processes arose out of the need to limit the scope of IPDC's legal mandates and to obscure the role of urban administration and the MoUDH's legal jurisdiction in large scale industrial settlements. Involving MoUDH was possibly risking slowing down the development process which was set to highly ambitious timelines.

"In terms of mandates, I don't believe the preamble of a proclamation is an implementation directive. when you go to the lower paragraphs where roles and responsibilities are outlined, I don't think you will find the MoUDH. Like I said, as a corporation our responsibility is developing the sheds, so that they are fully utilized and access services. we don't really know who is supposed to coordinate urban-industrial development"[74]

Still others held that the problem lies in the fact that the studies conducted during the framing of the IPD policies were selective and did not deal with the urban dimension of state-led rapid industrialization at all.

There is not a full understanding of urban dimensions to this whole debate on industrialization or structural transformation… the learning process did not happen, I still don't think we understand where this thing is, particularly ***for a government obsessed with industrialization,*** *what are you supposed to do to make Ethiopian cities more competitive and productive. What are the nuts and bolts required to do this? I don't think we fully understand it.*

There are many people who are well versed on East Asia or more on the ingredients. Whether it be macro-economic or sectoral policy. But not all of the societal processes that were underway, key of them being urban. The urban-rural dynamic, ***what the role of urban has been****. So, they seem to be very well versed on the technical / academic part of what makes the east Asian model a success rather than the processes that took place or the role of different social forces taking place in shaping urban growth and development or the role of cities in Economic development, very superficial. I think it is a misreading of the Asian experience, I call it, selectively understanding that Asian experience but not fully comprehending the Asian experience.*[75]

In summary, the scope and selectivity of the studies, the inclusiveness of the policy learning and drafting which allowed the legal maneuverings during the drafting stage all contributed to the creation of legislation that obscured the role and legal standing of urban administrations and the Ministry of Urban Development in the IP policy. This can be seen

[74] Interview with Amare Asgedom, Deputy CEO of IPDC (park design and development) on 09.12.2019
[75] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist and Advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19

in the policy language shifts between the 2014 Industrial development roadmap and the 2015 IPDC establishment proclamation where the latter did not define the relationship between IPD planning and urban development planning or define the legal mandate boundaries around infrastructure development. This led to a series of institutional voids and overlaps that are discussed in more detail in the following two chapters which focus on local administrations and sectoral agencies. 3.3. The ratification and roll out of IPD policy in the party state.

The framing and drafting of industrial parks policy under the MoI's industrial zones development corporation and the Prime minister's office unfolded in the absence of both the Ministry of Urban Development and urban development agencies at regional and local levels. The previous section looked at how the structure of power within the vanguard polity and the weakness of federal institutions created the conditions in which the exclusion of urban agencies was made possible. This section looks at the next stage in the policy ratification process and the key party bureaucratic policy making institutions involved in the planning and roll out of implementation.

3.3. Deliberation under Democratic Centralism: *Barking Dogs and Hyenas.*

Following the completion of the MoI and PMO studies that framed strategic issues in 2013, deliberations were made on a 'white paper' and the draft proclamations. The deliberations took place in two closed party platforms.

> *So, based on these we developed a white policy paper that was discussed with 100 representatives for a full day**: regional representatives and ministers were present** and there was a hot debate over whether it should be export versus import oriented. Following this we had to improve the investment proclamation to create IPDC, EIC and the investment board. Industrial parks had to be a national level development because there was no local capacity. There was another hot debate when we presented the 2015 proc. **to the minister's cabinet**.*[76]

[76] Interview with Arkebe Oqubay, Advisor to the prime ministers on Industrial Development on 07.02.2020

Deliberations in the party gatherings follow strict party discipline of democratic centralism, the core institution of Lenin's vanguard organization that's meant to allow for "a democracy under central guidance" (Tung, 2012: 285), where "the decision of higher organs is unconditionally binding on lower ones" (Theen, 1984:142). The EPRDF party program further states "party members have the right and obligation to discuss the agendas presented freely, to oppose, support and provide critical comments. However, members have no right to mobilize others against decisions passed by the central political leadership. Attempts would be considered a major disciplinary breach and expulsion from party membership" (Chanie, 2007: 368). The practice of democratic centralism not only forces the majority to accept the decisions of the minority leadership, it limits open discussion as members know objections would not only be ineffective but would have significant political costs. One interviewee reflected on the deliberation platforms where the proclamation drafts were discussed as follows:

> *I'm quite sure there were reservations raised in those discussions. But you cannot fully really openly raise them because there are consequences. You can disagree but at the end of the day you toe the collective decisions. So, there are people who raise the flag but that doesn't mean their points are taken into account in the final decision. That is the problem…* ***The system requires compliance. You're rewarded for compliance and loyalty.*** *Every word is scrutinized, if it has a double meaning or whatever so in that situation, there's* ***no culture of open policy discussions****. But even then, it is kept a secret from the public. You don't really hear what is going on except in the final communique. Even when there are very strong heated positions, it never comes out. People who are not in a position to make decisions and don't wish to articulate their positions.* ***Because they know, Fait accompli. Nobody is going to listen to them****. So, you've got* ***a very disabled bureaucracy****.*[77]

Party protocol eliminated any channel of dissent, with censorship scrutinizing even indirect speech which is usually an acceptable form of dissent in this cultural context (discussed in 2.1.3). However, in spite of all of these restricting norms and codes of appropriateness, there were very serious objections made. These were especially prominent during the second round of deliberations in the council of ministers on the amendment of the investment

[77] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist and Advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19

proclamation that would establish IPDC, EIC and the investment board. The issues of mandate overlaps were identified and raised by ministers but did not change outcomes. Dissonance with urban development agendas was raised by the minister of urban development at the time, but the objection was set aside as a difference in development visions. The former CEO of IPDC elaborated:

> *When the proclamation (demb) was ratified,* ***one minister from the house of ministers left the room in defiance. For the first time in the history of EPRDF cabinet!*** *Ahmed Abetew was his name, he was the minister of industry and he said "the mandates given to the corporation in its establishment are not appropriate. This is someone else's mandate." I call him brave… Mekuria Haile*[78] *kept saying "What you are envisioning and what you are saying and the city that my ministry envisions are different. The developments you are implementing require infrastructure, housing, water, power, drainage, wastewater. All of these things are known by the city." They kept saying, "you are headed towards error!". We were looking to how such strategies had been realized all over the world. And they* [urban development ministry] *were looking at it from the constraints of the city. If a city is to be a city, they were thinking about urban poverty and infrastructure. We were thinking about in terms of the IDS strategy and exports.* ***The township they were thinking about and the townships we had in mind just could not come together…***
>
> *All were shouting from all of these ministries, we disturbed it, the proclamation was disturbed (he laughs). The shouting of ministries wasn't going to change the position of government, it was like the barking of dogs on hyenas.* [79]

This expression which is partially discussed section 2.1.3, makes biblical allegory in the book of Ecclesiastes which deal with unequal power relations. Sisay uses the expression here to imply, that the ministers were objecting even though they knew all decisions had already been made, and that objections were futile because they were powerless within the party bureaucratic institution of democratic centralism. Sisay interprets the idea of integrating policy making through deliberation within the political context of the Ethiopian party state as meaningless.

[78] The Minister of Urban Development at the time.
[79] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020

3.3.2. Rule by Law: '*getting the consensus and bulldozing through'*

Following the 'hot debates', the proclamations were quickly ratified by the parliament and directly came into effect. It is important to here to examine the failure of parliamentary scrutiny, the next procedural step that was constitutionally set up to allow for a check on the executive, in the policy making process. This failure is not a single event but part of an established tradition of the supremacy of the governing over the rule of law that extends beyond the EPRDF period. Embedded within both imperial and vanguard party policy making in Ethiopia, is a 'Rule by Law' political culture. Adem Abebe, in his 2012 paper by the same title, conceptualizes the ways in which laws are used to advance the interests of the governing, often 'rendering the constitutional limits on government power nonsensical' (2012:1). Within this wider framework, Abebe (2012: 12) links the failures of parliament directly with the party dominance in vanguard policy making.

> *The Ethiopian federal parliament has been disproportionately controlled by the EPRDF throughout its rule – 82.9% (1995), 87.9% (2000), 66% (2005), 99.6% (2010). Due to the parliamentary form of government the constitution establishes, the winning party in the parliament also controls the executive. As a result, the parliament merely serves as a stand-by rubber-stamping institution to* ***the initiatives of the Central Committee of the party****. Indeed, the parliament has never initiated any major legislative proposal. Nor has it rejected or even substantively modified any executive initiative. This absolute dominance of the legislative and executive organs of government enables the ruling party to effectively enact into law its own ideologies regardless of their constitutional implications*

The effect of deliberations under the institution of democratic centralism in a dominant vanguard party which controls both the parliament and the executive (especially after 2005), is that the consensus of the central committee is, by default, law. Interviewees interpreted this as being one of the root causes of the integration challenge.

> *During the framing and early discussions there needs to be someone who asks, 'what about urbanization' and* ***that can only happen if you have democratic institutions but there simply weren't****. In a very closed so called 'democratic centralism', you can't question things, what you do is get a consensus within the central committee*

and go to implementation, that was what was happening. ***Bulldozing everything front and right***[80]

The proclamations directly came into effect following the 'deliberations. The establishment of IPDC as an asymmetrically resourced, differentially incentivized agency with direct access to *the* center of power created the perfect formulae for a great deal of autonomy to move forward with its mandate and override other agencies in the process. This created a series of problems, the most immediate of which was its effect on cross-ministerial coordination.

Once it (the proclamation) was approved, the corporation had to implement accordingly. It was clear that it wouldn't work... Because after that it just becomes a matter of pulling each other. 'You have taken my job' 'you're not doing your job, so I've taken it'... So, we were not working with Urban Development authorities. Later on, we were not really working with the MoI either. We were also not working with MoFEC and the cultural ministry. ***We formulated it and gave it to them, and we were not letting them participate appropriately****...* [81]

The speed with which the proclamation came into effect and IPDC was created also made the transition between the thinking phase, the two prior years of research at the MoI, and the move into action immediate and abrupt. This jump into action did not allow for a planning phase in which even the most basic of planning decisions, location strategies, could be made.

We left the Ministry of industry before decisions were made *and the other thing was not being in sync. What I mean here is the lack of synergy (alemenabeb) within the system. It was only later on when many decisions were made (while we were in the MOI, it was mostly studies), before the major decisions were made, the corporation went out. People (We) with experience were all swept out of MoI into the corporation.*[76]

It was unofficially understood within IPDC that the first site would be Hawassa [discussed below]*and that they would really need to push for Mekelle afterwards, and it seemed obvious to everyone why. when I first put up the map in the office,* ***no***

[80] Interview with Belachew Mekuria, commissioner of EIC on 21.05. 2019
[81] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020

> ***one knew where the parks were going to be****, people were coming into my office and saying is this a park? it was clear that there was no plan at the time. The map that I had was the only map around.*[82]

Cassandre, policy advisor at IPDC, referred to a cartographic map of Ethiopia she put up in the IPDC park development directorate where she pinned suggested locations as information trickled in. The industrial parks development projects commenced earnestly with its first project Hawassa Industrial Park (HIP) without a comprehensive location strategy or national spatial plan in place. The selection of Hawassa as the site of the first park was determined by the preference of PVH, one of the earliest investors in the IPD program which policy makers had courted as a potential anchor investor.

3.3.3. Location Strategies: '*Spraying parks like holy water'*

Unsurprisingly, the onset of the development of IPs without a comprehensive location strategy was one of the biggest controversies that would later emerge around the Ethiopian Industrial Parks Development Program. In his annual address to the house of parliament in July 2019, PM Abiy Ahmed brought up the problem highlighting the costs of locating parks in every region regardless of the implications on infrastructural investment, logistical inefficiencies in terms of proximity to the port and functional specialization of regions. Distributed across all 10 regions outside of any legal and planning guidelines or economic efficiency justifications, the political basis on which locations were decided continues to be a cause of concern. Ermias Azmach (2019:53) captures this sentiment over the inadequacy of legal frameworks and the absence of 'a commercial case' as follows:

> *"In Ethiopia, the crucial location selection and demand identification and overall dimensioning are predominantly, if not exclusively, taken as "public issue" and a mandate of public entity. The location of the industrial parks is inserted into the GTP I and II without prior sufficient and independent consultation and demand driven market-based feasibility study.* ***The laws are silent on providing guiding principles and rules of location choice in developing industrial parks****. …. Although strong commitment from the government is needed, projects must be designed carefully on*

[82] Interview with Cassandre Pignon, AGI Advisor to IPDC and my former colleague on IPDC

the basis of clear policy, strategic plans, feasibility study, environmental baseline study and sufficient consultation with stakeholders"

While the case for economic efficiency-based location strategies is clear, Azmach underestimates the role of political economic factors in shaping all aspects of industrial policy especially spatial distribution which has a direct relationship with regional equity concerns. In the Ethiopian IPD case, the distribution of parks became a political bargaining chip in the struggle to rein in demands for regional equity and win favor with regional elites.

Considering the widespread and profound poverty in Ethiopia and the country's long history of political fragility and ethnic diversity, the issue of equitable growth has been especially pressing. ***Regional equity has become the foundation of the polity****, institutionalized through a commitment to federalism…the management of diversity and* ***the difficulty of reconciling 'autonomous systems of power and authority within a common political structure' remain a central challenge for the government.*** *Arguably, this commitment to 'horizontal' equality may have offered at least a rhetorical counterweight to the clearly accelerating vertical inequality accompanying and encouraged by growth"* (Oqubay, 2015:17)

"It was clear that regional clustering and agglomeration were in conflict with equitable spatial growth. Location of industrial parks has been a major political factor as equitable distribution was not necessarily the best in terms of productivity gains, development of production capabilities, or attracting investment. Interests and preferences at federal, regional state, and local government levels were not always in harmony with interest groups influencing the process. This political pressure gradually subsided as more industrial hubs were built and expanded to cover most regional states. " (Oqubay & Kefale, 2019: 888)

Farole, (2014:7) in his review of the political economy of African SEZs, identifies this tendency of distortions being created by political incentives. He highlights "politicians often have the incentive to use SEZs as an instrument to confer privileges on various domestic constituencies, in order to quell potential internal political dissent.". As Sisay argues below, in the Ethiopian case, the political incentives were also linked to the party's own internal power struggles and the cause of maintaining influence and favor with the increasingly powerful regional coalitions.

In the beginning, it was lack of knowledge. Then it was not daring to make the decision. And then a 'let me be loved' attitude/ ***seeking popularity*** *["lewoded bayinet"]. Those that knew wanted popularity. He knows the challenges. PM Haile Mariam, during whose term these decisions were made, was not seeking popularity but people below him were. First, we did not know but then there were too many 'popularity seekers'. The others including regional investment bureaus were all saying, 'it was done there, how about in my region'. They were convinced so there was no way of persuading them. You know how we spray holy water in the house, trying to make sure we get to every surface.* ***What we did was spray the industrial parks like holy water****. We discussed the fact that this was not right, but no one would listen, no one dared say no, people on top were all yea-sayers, all the regional actors were looking out for their own regions and asking for their own parks.*[83]

3.3.4. Selective hyper-coordination

This final sub section on the roll out of IPD deals the nature of selective coordination that characterize the deployment of IPD policy. In September of 2014, IPDC was officially established as a state-owned Enterprise under the Council of Ministers Regulation No.326/2014 with an authorized capital of ten billion birr. One of its mandates was framed as "In collaboration with the concerned bodies, ensure that necessary infrastructure is accessible to Industrial Park developers" (FDRE, 2013:7753). Beyond this mandate, IPDC became the center of the party's discourse of light manufacturing-based industrialization. IPDC took ownership of coordination with state agencies, that were considered critical to the development process, in an ad-hoc 'as we encounter them' manner but with considerable influence all the same. As MoUDH was not seen as instrumental to the actual development process, it never featured as one of IPDC's stakeholders. Instead IPDC selectively owned coordination processes with actors directly relevant to the physical development process which actors referred to as '**our** stakeholders'. This selectivity of ***our*** against ***other*** stakeholders characterized the scope of coordination in IPD.

When parks are built there are stakeholders that are concerned, in total they are over 50 stakeholders that are concerned with this. we inform these stakeholders when we plan every year. we send them our plans and we sit down to discuss our plans and try

[83] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020

*to evaluate our plans. we do this at our level because **they were OUR stakeholders**. Every three to six months we have discussions with all our stakeholders. on our plans and on our implementation. and then when it comes to the stakeholders **in the construction phase, we have meetings every week or bi-weekly**. Similarly, those in operation, we have weekly or bi-weekly meetings. So, this is how we do the work of jointly planning and implementing our tasks.* [84]

The development of Hawassa Industrial Park, which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, was completed within nine months. The development process was a colossal undertaking that required a great deal of coordinated action across federal agencies and between federal and local actors. The developmental state discourse around light manufacturing was particularly key as a coordinate discourse between federal agencies that created a state of hyper coordination- with actors working in Maoist synergy. At the same time, coordination with sub regional actors was seamlessly executed through the federal-local party networks and by extension the party bureaucracy.

It was like a mantra! You go to customs they tell you about light manufacturing; you go to immigration, they tell you about light manufacturing, you go to ministry of industry, they tell you about light manufacturing, Everybody, it's like a mantra. So, you're working within that vibration. *And this is needed, this is how Mao, and all the others did it, with commitment you do it.*[85]

Because you're ruling the regions through agents. If you're in the south its Shiferaw who was the party head, they controlled the local politics, from village level up.. So, it was impossible. Shiferaw[86] *was a strong arm of the EPRDF's. Even though he represented a particular regional party. So, **you've got a very centralized top- down system where you have local enforcers, whatever they say, it becomes the rule**.*[87]

Impressive levels of party bureaucratic coordination drove the fast-paced development process. A high degree of coordination was selectively exercised in areas deemed

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[84] Interview with Amare Asgedom, Deputy CEO of IPDC (park design and development) on 09.12.2019

[85] Interview with Belachew Mekuria, former commissioner of EIC on 21.05. 2019

[86] Shiferaw Shigute was the regional president of SNNPR between 2006 and 2013. In 2013, He was replaced by Hailemariam Desalegn who was also PM at the time. Fantu is suggesting Shiferaw was a proxy ruler for EPRDF.

[87] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist and Advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19

detrimental to the development process. This suggests that the lack of coordination with MoUDH was not a failure of coordination as a function of state capacity to coordinate but as a result of the incentives in place for IPDC. Its raison d'être being limited to the rapid physical development of the parks easily translated into the corporation's selective efforts at coordination focused on *just in time* ad hoc coordination, with only agencies directly relevant to physical development. MoUDH did not fall into this category because, IPDC did not 'encounter' them.

> *From land preparation to export, we have made great efforts to keep all our stakeholder informed because* ***our work would fail if we did not do this. so, we communicated with them as we encountered them [bemitedershibet].*** *If MoUDH is the owner, we would have encounter them in the process. Even now we have only found MoUDH in Housing and in the national framework for cities. They have developed a national framework for cities, and we are preparing a national framework for cities and that's where we have encountered them*[88]

In summary, the prevalence of highly effective top-down coordination was confined to the physical development process which was the only mandate IPDC recognized. This selective process of coordination shows that lack of coordination was not driven by a problem of capacity but one of selectivity.

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the first research question of what impeded holistic policy making in the Ethiopian urban-industrial nexus (especially during the formulation of Industrial parks development policy) by examining the conditions that created the disconnect between the two policy spheres. Various conditions that policy actors understood to have limited holistic thinking, planning and policymaking in the urban-industrial nexus have been interpreted through the historic, ideological, institutional structures of EPRDF's Vanguard polity and rule.

This included the political history of the evolution of urban industrial policy under EPRDF. Actors identified how the hostile environment created for urban policy under the lop-sided distributive regimes (ADLI) deterred urban productivity in the early stages of EPRDFs rule

[88] Interview with Amare Asgedom, Deputy CEO (park design and development) on 09.12.2019

but was maintained because it was the bedrock on which the new authoritarian political order was established. After 2005, the repressive and co-optive tactics employed to address the urban threat, the first major challenge to the political order, only served to dissociate the urban agenda further from core economic policy agenda. The adoption of developmentalism discourse to legitimate EPRDF's authoritarian rule through economic performance during this period created an industrialization agenda which had different political incentives than the co-optive urban agendaActors also highlighted the implications of the party's political-bureaucratic organization for the framing of urban industrial policy as well as for the ratification and implementation processes.

The chapter also reviewed the history of centralization in the party and its implications for policy coordination. PM Meles played a key role as dictator integrator that promoted coordination at the initial stage of IPD development, but his death was detrimental for holistic policy making as it unleashed factional politics and inter-elite hostility amidst the crisis of authority that was the aftermath of his personalist rule. Finally, participants identified elements of the authoritarian policy making environment that narrowed the scope of holistic planning and implementation at the federal level, including deliberations under democratic centralism; the use of rule by law tactics during ratification; the use of IP distribution to build political leverage; and the application of selective coordination through party bureaucratic committees. These conditions constituted the constraints that interviewees understood to be the political drivers setting the trajectory of disintegration in industrial parks development that would go on to materialize in both organizational and physical form at the local level during the implementation and operationalization of the parks.

The next chapter deals with this next phase in IPD development by examining the case of the implementation of the development of IPDC's first and largest park, Hawassa Industrial Park.

4. Policy Coherence in the Ethnic Federation

_ The crooked tree

So, what was done once the policies were in place to try and bring the sectors together?

***What do you do with a tree once it is crooked**?!*[89]

[89] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry, CEO of IPDC and CEO of Oromia Industrial Parks Development Corporation on 15.01.2020

Introduction

This chapter deals with the second objective of the research, to fill the gap in knowledge about the various conditions that have impeded realignment of sectoral policies in the urban-industrial nexus at the local level during and after the implementation of the Ethiopian industrial parks policy [2015-2021]. Focused on policy formulation, the previous chapter adopted an analytical perspective that viewed policy fragmentation as anchored in the nature of the political system. This chapter extends this analysis in looking at the role of intergovernmental relations and their impact on capacities for promoting coherence at different levels during and after implementation. However, it also expands beyond the sphere of government to look at the roles played by to NGOs and donor communities.

Sisay's use of the metaphor of the crooked tree speaks to a general fatalistic attitude, amongst policy actors I interviewed, towards efforts to integrate the work of the two policy spheres that had emerged, once implementation had commenced. The chapter interrogates the conditions that inform this perception by shadowing the story of the development of Hawassa Industrial Park, the first and largest industrial park built by IPDC, from inception through operationalization to optimization through the eyes of local actors. Through this process, the chapter highlights key political, institutional and ideological structures that limited the scope and outcomes of coherence building.

The chapter begins with a look at the nature of the onset of the IPD project in Hawassa which local policy actors interpreted as emblematic of nominal decentralization under EPRDF's Ethnic Federalism and its particular character in the Southern Nations Nationalities and People's Region (SNNPR). In explaining the limited scope for coordination during the early stages of IP development, interviewees focused on the political fault lines along which federal-regional and sub-regional bargaining was struck and implementation processes pursued. The second section looks at the ways in which capacity gaps at the local level limited the local administration's ability to integrate the development with its own processes. It also looks at some of the immediate responses of local actors. The final section delves into initiatives that attempted to bridge some of the emerging gaps, primarily taken on by multilateral development cooperation agencies, that arose at various levels during and after the development of the park.

4.1. Nominal Decentralization

The previous chapter has extensively dealt with the various forms and processes of centralization, undergone by the Ethiopian party state, emanating from and facilitated by the ideological, institutional and political structures of vanguard party organization. This chapter deals with the other side of the coin, the formal structures of decentralization that are nevertheless in practice undermined by those centralizing forces. The tension between these forces is a central character in the Ethiopian political setting and is introduced in this section to frame a different side of the policy narrative, that at the local level. This section sets the scene by first discussing the birth and evolution of the decentralized federation, its various tiers and its manifestations in the Southern Region. This is important to understand the degrees of autonomy, authority or accountability of regional and city administrations and thus their scope for intervention and capacity to integrate from below during the rapid and sudden onset of the development of IPs.

4.1.1. The 'put-together' Federation and the threat of disintegration

The Ethiopian state has functioned as a centralized multiethnic unitary state through most of its modern history. The 1974 revolution saw the advent of a socialism under the Derg that sought to maintain this unitary structure by stressing "the illegitimacy of ethnicity as a political organizing principle" (Keller, 2005:267), instead choosing to organize on an economic basis with an administrative territorial structure consisting of 24 regions. It was in opposition to this unitary stance that the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) defined itself as an ethno-nationalist regional insurgency, calling for regional autonomy and Stalinist approaches to ethnic self-determination. Upon coming into power in 1991, one of TPLF's first tasks was assembling the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) as a coalition of ethnic parties most of which it had created itself (Mehretu, 2012). It further institutionalized Ethnic Federalism through the drafting of a transitional charter, implementation proclamations and a constitution based on this principle. Lashitew (2021) notes the irony of the adoption of ethnic nationality-based federation in Ethiopia, during the very year "the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—two federations that had enshrined ethnic self-determination in their respective constitutions—were going through violent episodes of disintegration." (2021:2)

At the core of the implementation of the ethnic federalist organization was the reterritorialization of regions based on ethno-linguistic characteristics (Fig .8). Since 1994, Ethiopia's decentralization has followed this ethnic territorialization instead of the more

common basis of historical, geographical or resource-based boundaries. This has had a significant effect on the planning and development of functional regions – economically and socially defined regions (Mehretu, 2012:119) – including regional and national urban systems and national industrial landscapes that do not align with the ethno-administrative boundaries created by the 1994 constitution's Ethnic Federal structures (discussed further in section 5.1). The constitution outlined five levels of government: Federal, Regional (Ethnic nations), Zones, Woredas (district) and Kebele (local neighborhood level).



Fig. 8. The reterritorialization of regions (from 24 to 9) based on the 1994 constitution (Mehretu, 2012).

The 1994 constitution facilitated a federalism from above that was to a large extent *put-together* – "imposed from the center without a broad elite consensus"[90] (Keller & Smith, 2005:269), some have even characterized it as closest to Bermeo's category of a 'forced together' federation (Hartman, 2013). The constitution further endowed the newly formed ethnic nations and nationalities with sovereignty and the unqualified right to self-determination "up to secession" (Lashitew, 2021). This institution of this endowment on a forced federation inherently created the impetus for disintegration and served as core justification for the federal government's securitization of development[91] (Gebresenbet, 2014) in its later adoption of the 'developmental state' discussed in 3.1.2 (Bayu, 2019). However, this was an empty promise as the constitutional promise of high levels of self-determination, was in practice heavily restrained by the centrality of the party (Aalen, 2000;

[90] Keller and Smith define the *putting together* federation in relation to two other common types of federalisms-the *coming together* and *holding together* federations. They define the *coming together* federation as one in which sovereign states decide voluntarily to form a federal system for the purposes of efficiency while the *holding together* federations are ones created to avoid or manage divisive ethnic, religious, regional conflicts within the polity and arise out of a consensual parliamentary decision to preserve a united country.
[91] The developmental agenda was presented as the solution to the existential threat of national disintegration.

2002; 2011). The policy coherence building challenges that are discussed in the following sections have arisen out of the limits on capacity, authority, autonomy and accountability of local administrations born out of this tension.

4.1.2. Local Authority: '*Who owns the urban Agenda?'*

Decentralization under EPRDF took place in two waves. The first wave that came along with the reterritorialization described above, saw the prioritization of regions in the establishment of what Mehretu (2012:113) refers to as EPRDF's *divisive architecture of hegemonic governance*[92]. This *regional decentralization* "went hand-in-hand with large-scale initiatives to stabilize the polity, create order, reconstruct the state, and reform the economy" (Dickovick & G/Egziabher: 2012, 84). EPRDF's justification for the reterritorialization along ethnic lines was that economic inequality across ethnic groups could be addressed by redistributing political power- "raising the level of economic equality was the primary issue and part and parcel of the group rights agenda that gave extended emphasis on ethnicity" (Gedamu, 2017:255). This justification created a legitimizing façade as political power within EPRDF remained firmly within the hands of TPLF which had established and mobilized the other parties of the coalition, the Amhara People's Democratic Movement (APDM), Southern Ethiopian Peoples's Democratic Movement (SEPDM) and the Oromo People's Democratic Movement, (OPDM[93]) during its transition from an insurgent group into national government (Bayu, 2019: 20594)

Very little decentralization occurred below the regional level and the regions became the prime implementers of development policies whilst remaining reliant on federal government's budget allocations (Bayu, 2019: 20598). However, as only thirty of the country's 580 woredas (districts) at the time were monolingual ethnic islands, mutually exclusive ethnic territorial homelands were simply unattainable. Instead as Lashitew (2021) points out the "top-down manufacturing of ethnic nations" created overlapping and

[92] Mehretu elaborates on this interpretation as follows: 'an architecture of hegemonic governance is defined as a system of hegemony that uses a concatenation or juxtaposition of enabling structures and processes that are artfully syncretized to yield desired political and territorial outcomes. The term 'architecture' in this context means the construction of a coordinated and integrated design of political superstructure to facilitate a centralized control. Hegemony is the use of power of command exercised by a ruling party dictatorship (nativist or benevolent) with or without the use of coercive force for compliance".

[93] The Amhara People's Democratic Movement, Southern Ethiopian Peoples's Democratic Movement and the Oromo People's Democratic Movement

contested territories in all regions across the country, and the dominance by majority ethnic groups in the redistribution of federal resources at regional level.

This was especially problematic in SNNPR where ethnic federalism failed to deliver on the right of self-rule to a majority of the country's ethnic groups in the south. To deal with the immense diversity of the south, over 50 of the country's 80 ethnic groups were 'put together' into one region which came to be called the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's region (SNNPR). To accommodate this diversity, SNNPR is the only region where zones, the second-tier administrative units after regions, were ethnically defined[94]. In spite of this accommodation, however, most of the ethnic groups including the largest ethnic group in the region, the Sidama, resisted their sub-regional designation[95]. While the Sidama zone was successful in attaining statehood in the 2019 referendum, the next populous zone Wolayita and 10 other ethnic zones in the region continue to demand statehood to secure a place at the center and shift from the status of 'administration' to 'government'[96].

Another key shortcoming of decentralization under the ethnic federal arrangement was that the status of cities which was not defined under the 1994 constitution. The decentralization scheme "did not recognize municipalities as an independent entity to which power and resources can be devolved" (G/Egziabher & Kassahun, 2007:30). This meant cities were governed in and within the legal constitutional framework of the regional states, often lumped together with zonal or woreda administrations and rarely recognized within regional constitutions.

As ethnically diverse territories, cities were in many ways rendered unable to administer themselves or claim statehood as this did not fall within the institutional mechanisms geared toward facilitating ethnic autonomy. Instead, the governance of cities became dominated by ethnic representatives primarily coming from rural areas, most city mayors being recruited from rural administrations within the regions to which the cities belong. This has had a

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[94] Although there are a few zones and special woredas in most of the regions which are defined by ethnicity, SNNPR is special because this applies to all the zones

[95] Sidama was a separate region before the reterritorialization process. It was lumped into the new SNNPR along with over forty other smaller ethnic groups. The Sidama people resisted this because in theory this diluted their power in the center; however in practice the Sidama dominated SNNPR politics both at the regional and federal level due to their being the biggest ethnic group within the SNNPR amalgamation.

[96] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.

significant effect of limiting the political power of urban centers in federal-regional negotiations around megaprojects, leaving them vulnerable to being "staging grounds of political influence among competing ethnic parties" (Lashitew, 2021) as illustrated in the Hawassa master plan revision process. As the capital of Sidama Zone for instance, the status of Hawassa upon Sidama's statehood – that is, whether it would continue to be the SNNPR capital, become the Sidama region capital or a federal charter city – remained unanswered for a long period, threatening the master planning process into becoming a covert process and bringing its outcomes into question (discussed further in 4. 3).

The second round of *woreda level decentralization* took place in the early 2000s following the shift in EPRDF's concerns from "questions of basic stability with regional decentralization to questions of political and economic reach" (Dickovick & G/Egziabher: 2012, 84). Some have argued that the 2001 political crisis and the emergence of developmentalism shifted the attention of the party from facilitating ethno-national self-rule to the effective implementation of centrally designed development, and that the second wave of decentralization was aligned with this latter agenda at the cost of the former (Assefa, 2019: 166).

Following the 2005 crisis, the promise of the delivery of regional equity used to justify the ethnic federalist arrangement, began to be framed as the only protection against the floodgates of national disintegration. Oqubay (2015:4) reiterates this as he frames the developmental project as a project of ensuring national integrity through addressing the call for regional equity. Partially as a consequence of the 2005 election, in which the agenda of regional equity featured as a central issue, the post 2005 polity sought to redress grievances and regional visits by dignitaries revolved around communities bargaining for infrastructural projects.

> *The ruling party and government have exhibited a long-term commitment to sustained, rapid, and equitable growth. Threats of endemic famine and poverty and* ***the risk of Ethiopia's disintegration under internal and external pressure have all contributed to the commitment to this [developmental] vision****. Considering the widespread and profound poverty in Ethiopia and* ***the country's long history of political fragility and ethnic diversity****, the issue of equitable growth has been especially pressing.* ***Regional equity has become the foundation of the polity, institutionalized through a commitment to federalism****. (Oqubay, 2015)*

The 2002 wave of woreda decentralization, aimed at expanding the reach of government, had a significant impact on the revival of municipalities as it led to the enactment of regional proclamations - municipal legislation that clarified the status of municipalities within decentralized government (G/Egziabher & Kassahun, 2007:30). Under these proclamations, urban administrations were given State and Municipal functions. The state functions would be financed through regional transfers and include education, health and trade and industry while municipal functions are self- financed from the cities revenues and include solid waste management, sewage, etc.

However, political bargaining about development projects by various ministries and development corporations remained the purview of federal and to some extent regional government, giving little room for urban administrations. This is primarily due to the concurrent power over nationalized land given to the federal and regional governments, where the former has legislative powers and the latter has administrative powers and where cities have neither, which continues to have significant implications for planning at the city level. The industrial park proclamation illustrates this as it allows for the federal administration of land through the establishment of a federal land bank administered by IPDC. Assefa, 2019:165 argues this arrangement, along with a set of other federal laws, "*have blurred where the legislative power of the federal government ends, and the administrative power of the states* [regional governments] *begins with respect to land and natural resources*".

Federal authorities on the other hand claim that land transferred into the federal land bank is obtained through federal regional bargaining and thus does not infringe on regional self-rule. This claim of course overlooks the inordinate influence of the federal party bureaucracy on regional party leaders (discussed in the next section) and the skewed resource base and political vulnerabilities that set the stage of these processes of 'bargaining'/coercion. In some cases, land for IPs was selected outside urban boundaries so as to sidestep urban administrations all together. Finally, the fact that regions ultimately decide over the allocation of urban land for mega projects limits the ability of city administrations to negotiate for compensation for the land or adhere to the urban plans they produce. Regions handed over the land to the IPDC federal land bank free of charge, depriving municipalities of potential revenue, in order to compete for the allocation of parks from federal government. Along with the land, regional governments handed over ownership of the IP development process, because they interpreted the policy objects (IPs) to be pet projects of the PMO and

the center of the party that were out of their jurisdiction and sphere of influence. From the center, this was interpreted as regions disowning the IPD agenda.

> *The constitution states that land is administered by regions and the regulations state that the regions would transfer land to the federal government under the corporation's land bank and this was approved by the council of ministers, and I only implemented this. When you think about this at face value, you might ask why regions would hand over land, but the assumption was that they would compete to do so because the corporation would invest in the development. The regions raced to give us land and the development was implemented. So now there are two issues: should they have sold the land to the federal government? Legally, sure.* ***They should have asked for the value of the land. But if they did, the corporation would not have developed the parks*** *so the city would sit idle with the land.*
>
> *No city was forced to transfer land. We told them 'We have 750 million dollars; we are planning to build parks in these locations.* ***We have regulations and require the land to be in the land banks, if you are interested, bring the land'. And they came****.*
>
> *We said this to the regions and not the MoUDH because we weren't talking (to MoUDH). So, in the process of cascading this top down, they would say "****we don't know about this project, it is the PMO's****" and they are right, we did not make this their role. There was a gap at high levels. When you go to the bottom they appear. There were good intentions in the planning but in the execution, stakeholders [regional government] needed to own it and* ***they did not own it.*** [97]

At that point in IP development (most IP land was secured between 2012 and 2014), the dependence of regions on federal fiscal allocations has restricted the degree to which they can plan large infrastructural developments despite the authority vested in them in the constitution. It has also weakened their bargaining power, making them more open to accepting centrally designed development programs. Moreover, regional governments interpreted their absence in the initial thinking and policy making at the center and their lack of ownership of the project during the stages of rapid development as signifying the federal ownership of the project that would remain outside their purview.

[97] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020

As illustrated by their absence from all of these initial processes, cities had not broken away from the provisions of the 1994 constitutions as they remained beholden to regional administrations in all arenas of political bargaining. At the same time, however, the devolution of the mandates of most federal agencies to regional, and woreda levels in the second wave of decentralization, had had implications for how projects are implemented in cities after decisions are made. It had created a situation where sectoral projects are cascaded down through regional approvals which city administrations did not have the authority to select or coordinate these projects with reference the overall development of the city. Instead, megaprojects are individually accommodated through land use changes and ultimately masterplan revisions.

The head of the plan implementation bureau at the MoUDH pointed out this uncoordinated cascading of projects from disjointed sectoral federal agencies leaves cities unable to bring projects together despite the authority vested in them to do so. The state minister of urban development similarly framed this problem as a loss of 'the integrator body' within processes of nominal decentralization where ownership and authority at the city leadership level was nonexistent.

> *All sectors come down to cities, including agriculture. But all these sectors go on their own and instead we should all go together.* ***All are trying to cascade down their own programs and are not really thinking about how to work together and according to the plans.*** *Cities find it hard to coordinate all the developments that come in, so they go for the sector which invests more, whichever sector assigns a budget. They connect it with investment, health invests the most, so they get the land they want because no one objects.* ***Everyone orders cities and they are the ones that suffer in the midst of all of this****.*[98]
>
> ***Our government structure is neither centralized -because we have a weak center now***[99]***- nor decentralized in a proper way****. There are things we have lost in the middle. So, everything was decentralized, but the body that looks at the big picture disappeared. This is the ambiguous structure that has been created in cities. So, what you actually see people doing is running around putting out fires. No one can give*

[98] Interview with Genet G/Egziabher, Head of plan preparation and Implementation Bureau, MoUDH on 16.12.2019

[99] Referring to the perceived strength of the party center under PM Hailemariam versus PM Meles.

you answer of what they want the city to be in 10 years, nor do they have the capacity to do this…. We need to know who owns the city's agenda, if it ought to be the region, let it be; if a number of cities need to be overseen by the national government, that's fine, let it be. All of the issues that are arising, housing, jobs, these are all problems are partly arising because they [cities] don't have leadership able to think independently or in the long term about these issues. [100]

The state minister further stressed the direct relationship between the loss of integrative mechanisms at federal level and capacity at the local level with the decentralization of sectoral agencies. The paradox found in the claim that decentralization has in a sense incapacitated local governance was not lost on him. He interpreted this to be a product of the ambiguous nature of decentralization- '**neither centralized not decentralized'**- which had created a void in leadership that could push forward a holistic urban agenda at the local level or foster coordination.

On the part of IPDC, the deputy CEO described cities as the corporation's main and direct counterpart in the industrial infrastructure development process. He reassured me that MoUDH had a much smaller role to play as cities were now vested with the authority to administer land and develop master plans. Contrary to this claim, however, in the development of HIP, the Hawassa city administration had no part in the initial studies or negotiations over locations and was first brought in once the city had been selected to host the development and potential sites were under review. Both city administration leadership and external advisors maintained the opposite position that the lack of joint planning at the early stages severely limited anticipatory foresight at the city level, further eliminating any ability to mobilize to integrate these developments into city level planning and development activities. Below are the conflicting accounts of the agency and authority of cities in IP planning and development process.

***Our connection is first with cities and mostly cities**. Why? Because we take land from them and they hand over the land, compensation is paid by them and alternative land is provided by them. They provide the master plans, and allocate land based on their own master plans; and when they allocate land and when land is allocated, they deal with procedures around this like the land use change, we communicate about all*

[100] Interview with Tazer G/Egziabher, State Minister of Urban Development on 18.12.2019

of these with the city. ***This doesn't have any relations to the regional government and the ministry of urban development. Cities are self-sufficient that are plan led.***[101]

The onset of the park was very sudden and there wasn't much planning associated with it. It was all done very fast, and the city was mostly only involved with preparing the land. ***We weren't involved in any of the studies or planning***[102]

They drew the city in at the very last moment*, I kept telling Ato Sisay and Ato Arkebe. you're building the park next to the city does the city have the schools, hospitals, etc…, and none of this resonated. We did a trip at some point when we talked to the municipality, but it was so late in the process, and it seemed that they were discovering these things at the same time that we were talking. I don't think they were prepared for the indirect labor that would be created in the city.* ***The fact that IPDC wasn't working with the city administration did not stop them in any way.*** *If there was a vision that Hawassa projected, it was that it wanted to be this high end clean touristic city and the industrial park was the opposite of this and I never saw a document that looked at the value that the park would bring vs what it would destroy.*[103]

The fact that the late incorporation of the city did not hinder IPDC's ability to execute the development of the park also brings to the fore questions about the actual relative authority of the two in practice and the impact of this skewed relationship on their ability to negotiate competing visions for the city or bargain over the terms of execution. Ultimately this draws us back to the competing institutions from which they derive their authority: the decentralized federation and the centralized party-state. Local level coherence building was undermined by the prevalence of the latter, demonstrated by the lack of autonomy, upward accountability and limited capacity of city administrations in the face of the centralizing party and its extra-state development corporations, which are discussed in the next sections.

4.1.3. Autonomy and Accountability: '*The noose around our necks'*

The previous section discussed how regional authority over land and dominance in political negotiations affects the ability of city administrations to integrate projects into their own

[101] Interview with Amare Asgedom, Deputy CEO of IPDC (park design and development) on 09.12.2019
[102] Interview with Melaku Worku, Deputy Mayor of Hawassa on 14.11.2019
[103] Interview with Cassandre Pignon, TBAGI Advisor to IPDC11.06.20

plans, planning processes and overall development work. This is also affected by the limitations on the autonomy of both regional and city administrations from party bureaucratic structures of federal bureaucracies and their upward accountability mechanisms. City administrations are extensions of regional government bureaucracies which are in turn beholden to the federal party bureaucracy and its disciplinary action.

Numerous authors have highlighted the ways in which party centrality has come at the cost of regional and sub-regional autonomy and self-rule (Gedamu, 2017; Afesha, 2015; Ayele, 2011; Chanie, 2007b; Vaughan, 2003b). This problem arises from the fact that the political party channel is the primary channel of intergovernmental relations (Afesha, 2015:363). As elaborated at length in section 3.2, the extensive structures of peer evaluation and intraparty accountability run parallel to and overlay all levels of the state bureaucracy.

> ***They say the party wing is a small motor that gets things moving, it catalyzes the work. everyone that has any power is appointed by the party, they listen to them more and this makes things easy****. If someone at the lowest rung, say in a kebele, is found to be ineffective, if the work is not going well, he is summoned and evaluated. If he has not been able to convince the public or whatever the problem is, he is held accountable by the party.* [104]

As discussed in section 3.2, Gimgemma[105] structures serve the function of constant upward feedback that ensures the responsiveness and effectiveness of the vast party structure. These structures also serve as a top down partocratic power channel that undermines the formal state power structures, including those of the decentralized federation, thus working against the constitutional integrity of regional states. One mechanism by which this is carried out are the obligatory periodic reports required from regional government officials on their performance. These are evaluated by federal party officials and could result in "reporting of the inefficiency of the regional representatives to the regional government president's office which may result in the removal of the person in charge of the office. This undoubtedly amounts to eroding the autonomy of the regions and systematic reshuffling of the regional state officials" (Afesha, 2015:367).

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[104] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.

[105] Gimgemma denotes the institution and extensive structures of peer evaluation and intraparty accountability discussed in depth in section 3.2

Similarly, at the sub regional level, the party's control over local urban governance structures is carried out through mayoral reshuffling by the regional government. The governance structure of most cities follows the council- mayor system which provides executive leadership in the mayor who serves as chair and political heavy weight. Under this arrangement, the mayor is a political appointee while the city manager is elected by the council based on merit. The vulnerability of the positional power of the mayoral post and its effect on both the capabilities of mayors and their ability to take ownership of cities' long-term development needs was identified as a major void of urban leadership at the city level by multiple interviews and came up in multiple meetings I observed. In Hawassa, the replacement of mayors was an annual occurrence.

> *There is such high turnover in city administration. I have been involved in IPD for over six years now including the studies. Implementation is all about its things flowing down in a coordinated manner. The leadership at city level has changed so many times. We inform them, take them outside. this instability at regional and city level has had major implications for implementation.* [106]

> *Mayors are fighting fires, when he's told there's a security issue, that becomes his priority; when he's told jobs need to be created, he works on temporary structure to relieve that pressure;* ***there is no long-term vision that guides or excludes developments****. Mayors are constantly changing, and it is a political assignment, it's not competency based. Decisions made in cities are political decisions. There is no one with wider understanding of urbanization. Politicians, the elite who understand urban issues and the technocrats are not in-sync.* ***There's no difference in understanding between mayors of small towns, rural districts or secondary cities. They are reshuffled. The power is positional***[107]

The concentration of power in this one positional role is compounded by the fact that it is the intersection between the party and state structures at the local level and so wields the power of both to effectively channel and cascade federal and regional development initiatives in the form of what interviewees often referred to as '*government direction'*:.

[106] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020.
[107] Interview with Tazer G/Egziabher, State Minister of Urban Development on 18.12.2019

As a political appointee, the mayor is the head of both wings and he leads and coordinates the two wings. They refer to it as the common command post of the organization[108] and the government[109]. The organization's meetings are convened by the organization's office lead (Yedirigit Tsehifetbet Alafi) and the state command post is convened by the deputy mayor of the city. And ***they are both accountable to the common command post, the mayor****.*

As you know, in our country, ***it is because you are told that it is the government's direction that things are done****. But ultimately it is very rare that it is about following the law and proper procedure… it is difficult when an issue is a* ***government direction/*** *priority.* ***The body at the bottom is part of the government and the one at the top is also part of the government.*** *When it is told that 'this is the government's direction', it feels that it has the responsibility to implement.* [110]

The chain of command within the party bureaucracy goes from federal party structures to regional state bureaucracy to zonal, City and district level administrations. Throughout this chain, effectiveness of the party channel is used to compensate for capacity gaps and time pressures within petty bureaucracies through the pressure exerted on any one cadre government official to deliver results (Lyons et.al., 2016; Gedamu, 2017:195; Bayu, 2019:).

All of these points of control at regional and city level came into play during the onset of development of Hawassa Industrial Park. In a rushed process that did not follow any formal protocol, the project was taken onboard by the city administration in 2015 quickly becoming the top priority for the city manager and other higher officials of the regional and city administrations who were under a great deal of pressure.

There was such a rush. we were on a crash plan and not really a long-term project but something that had to be finished in a matter of days, days! Time was not taken to look at the impact on the city properly. ***The regional president was leading this then. He gave directions to the city Mayor and the Mayor gave directions to us. I***

[108] The term 'the organization' or *DIRIJITU* is used to refer to the party wing of the bureaucracy
[109] Cherinet used the term 'Mengist' (government in English) to refer to both party and state.
[110] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.

was the city manager, I was told this area has been decided and to prepare a guide map, sign it and hand it over. and I did this. There was no discussion.[111]

The city mayor would call a meeting with all of the sectoral directorate leads and work would be assigned. There was the attitude from city leadership that there was pressure from federal government. There was the sentiment that things were being done against our will and that the federal government was over pressuring them. They were distancing themselves from the federal government and there was an attitude that the parks were their business. There were tense conversations and harsh words during meetings to the extent that some were thrown out of meetings. [112]

The transfer of land and the onset of construction and resettlement followed a similar pattern. the project quickly went into implementation in a haphazard, rushed manner with overlapping stages. Once the site plan had been handed over to IPDC, it secured a contractor and started clearing the site before the city administration could manage to resettle people that were residing there. Considering the density of settlements in the region, the planning head for the city administration reflected that the number of people that were evicted was relatively small because the land was largely under a government agricultural research centre. This resulted in the city administration temporarily housing people in rental housing until the planned resettlement site could be completed. IPDC leadership, on the other hand, held that the rushed and at times uncoordinated implementation was unavoidable due to the time constraints set in the GTP.

The resettlement was left to the city and the region. *There were people in the area, almost half of the area was occupied by government farms, and we took advantage of this fact that it wasn't occupied. In total there was 300 Ha, 67 was government farms, 100 ha private farms, 55 ha government agricultural research center. About 80% of the space was occupied by the government. Approximately 20% was the private horticulture farms. From these we excluded the productive farms, about half was taken from the 100ha. So, there was a focus on free areas.* ***We were able to limit***

[111] Interview with Birru Wolde, Former City Manager for Hawassa City Administration on 06.11.19
[112] Interview with Tinsae Yimam, Operations Manager IPDC, on 16.12.2019

evictions, it was a small group that were evicted. But as you know SNNPR is very dense and there were a lot of people in a small area.[113]

I remember I fought with Amare [IPDC Deputy CEO] over this, there were even insults, there was a settlement in the area. Without our knowledge the project had gone into tender and the contractor had been identified. Before we were even able to move the settlers, they started construction. So, where and how do you move the people. and ***we were simply not ready,*** *so we paid rent for people. this had never ever happened in the history of the administration.*

Until the construction of their accommodation could be completed, we paid 1000 birr/ person for rent for 200 people with the city's expenses. This was extremely difficult for us. First, to ask people to move without any fore warning. ***There was resistance and people were throwing stones at us. this is what I meant by one-dimensional thinking****.* ***there wasn't long-term thinking there. It was haphazard plan that came in***.[114]

It says in the GTP that a certain number of parks will be built and even names them but in the first GTP it took over five years to build one park [bole Lemi] so at the end of the GTP1, although 5 were planned, only one was delivered. so, when you come to GTPII, 15 were planned so ***we either had to change the plans or at least push all the parks to a certain level. so that was one decision point, a government direction.***

But how to do this? Design takes one year, the tendering process takes six months, construction takes one or two years. and this why the design construction process was merged. but what kind problems arise when you attempt a Design-build process, the question of do we save time and do we find qualified people to help do this. So that was part of the process. Finally, when we are implementing, ***if the contractor has to wait for our own government system and bureaucracy, it would still be sluggish***.[115]

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[113] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.
[114] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.
[115] Interview with Amare Asgedom, Deputy CEO of IPDC (park design and development) on 09.12.2019

It is difficult to deal with the city administration as an independent body with any degree of autonomy when looking at the ways in which key city officials became subsumed within IPDC's 'crash plan' of getting the project up and running. City officials employed full time and paid by the city administration took on the work of clearing the way for the development on a full-time basis, putting aside their roles in the city administration. Furthermore, throughout this period, city officials were directly accountable to federal party and IPDC officials who would hold weekly evaluation of their performance. This left them no room for their city administration role of actively addressing the implication of the project for the city's planning and development processes. The former head of Planning Directorate of the administration told me '*It was difficult to think of such things'* whilst '*working with a noose around our necks*'.

> *When we are resettling people, we had to stop our regular work to be there full time, till 10pm, there were weekly evaluations. Because there were right of way issues on our end and issues with workers, this was our full-time work. It was only when the park was inaugurated that we went back to our regular work. There were constant complaints and issues with security and so we made it our regular job. And there were around 20 new housing being built for the resettled and they were substandard. Tenants were complaining that the people who were resettled were not getting supported. There were lots of problems and it was very difficult* [116]
>
> *I was not happy with the resettlement, but when we were told that it is the government's direction and you have to implement… 'next month at this time, this has to be cleared',* ***we were all working with a noose around our necks, including the mayor and the regional president. This was the direction coming from the PM office. So, to think that people will think of these things when they are under such pressure is difficult****.*
>
> *It was a matter of political direction from the top so there was pressure on higher officials from city and regional government wanted to get things done. It's obvious that there are some that might be harmed by the rushed execution of the evictions, but people were cleared. They weren't happy. You would feel the same if you were in*

[116] Interview with Birru Wolde, Former City Manager for Hawassa City Administration on 06.11.19

the same position. You think about what if this happened to me. People were leaving lives they had grown accustomed to. [117]

Once the development of the park was underway and the abrupt resettlement turmoil was abated, the urgency shifted to the development of a runway for the opening of a new airport terminal in a new location. Throughout this process as well, city administration staff were beholden to the IPDC/PM project management team that held weekly evaluations. In a rapid, plan-as-you-go protocol, the new airport which had not been in any of the plans of Ethiopian Airlines or the city, materialized and became functional within a year while the road connecting it to the city would take another two years to complete.

The local airport in front to the park was changed because an Indian investor brought his own plane and after landing couldn't get off the runway. So, ***we were given 45 days to get the new runway ready****. The investors complained that they don't want to drive for four hours with all the insecurity and risks of the roads.* ***A meeting was called in the PM office and the airport authority, Ethiopian Airlines, Civil aviation was there. a discussion was made, and we were given the assignment to clear the runway, do the fencing and the terminal shed in 45 days. and we were able to do it. It was all so serious. There was no tender done, we took contractors that were working on asphalt in the city and started the work****. then they started coming in on flights.*

A political decision was made that the Haiq mado airport should be built within one year and by chance a company, geotech that had already a cement plant won, and the runway was finished in a year. We did the work of clearing and resettlement, we worked day and night. one year before service started. The HIP was the reason the airport was finished so quickly. it is the only reason it is there at all because the airlines was saying it was not profitable for them. but they were pushed to start the line.[118]

The opening of the airport within an extremely short period and outside of any prior planning and foresight by the Ethiopian Airlines Corporation highlights not only the extent of the

[117] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.
[118] Interview with Birru Wolde, Former City Manager for Hawassa City Administration on 06.11.19

influence of top-down party project implementation but its absolute effectiveness of overriding any resistance from any part of the government within the concerted effort of the party-led industrialization. This would later also play a role in securing energy for some of the industrial parks outside of the plans of the Ethiopian Electric corporation, discussed in section 5.2. The laser focus on removing all obstacles to the rapid roll out of the industrial parks required '*bulldozing everything front and right'* and would not have been possible without the partocratic institutions that facilitated this.

> *In a very closed so called 'democratic centralism', you can't question things, what you do is get a consensus within the central committee and go to implementation, that was what was happening.* ***Bulldozing everything front and right***[119]

The nature and speed of the resettlement process and the construction of related infrastructure set the tone for the skewed power relations that would remain between IPDC and the city administration throughout the development of the park, operationalization and governance of the parks as discussed in the next section.

4.2. Local capacity and Industrial Infrastructure Development

The final dimension of ethno-federal and party bureaucratic decentralization that has been the most significant barrier on coherence building at the local level has been the most obvious - the limited capacity of local governments. This dimension of decentralization is dealt with separately in this section to allow for a more extended discussion of the myriad of ways capacity limitations accounts for the inability of city administrations to bring together urban and industrial policy instruments. This section explores some of the ways limited local capacity has inhibited holistic planning, development and governance of industrial infrastructure in the Ethiopian urban-industrial nexus before, during and after the onset of rapid IPD.

[119] Interview with Belachew Mekuria, commissioner of EIC on 21.05. 2019

4.2.1 From localized to centralized industrialization: Industrial Zones to Federal IPs

Prior to the GTPI focus on Industrial Parks, the 2002 revival of municipalities that came along with the second wave of woreda decentralization had included the issuing of municipal proclamations by some regions, including SNNPR. These proclamations gave cities the legal framework under which they could institute land use planning which included zoning as a key dimension of the production of urban plans. As part and parcel of these land use plans, Industrial zones were instituted in most secondary cities as an urban component of the ADLI and IDS and were implemented under city administrations with varying degrees of success.

Cities were generally left to their own devices when it came to industrial zones, an approach which would be reversed under GTP I. The implementation of the development of industrial zones was thus limited to varying degrees by their capacity to provide the basic infrastructure required. Furthermore, because these city level industrial zones were not planned within a national framework for an industrial infrastructural ecosystem, problems of logistics, access to markets were predominant and limited the productivity of industrial zones. In many cases, Industrial Zones were either sites of speculation or uninhabited and did not always deliver on the goal of job creation.

> *The former way of working [aserar] was the Industrial Zone model. Setting out industrial zones in cities and then inviting investors. Developing basic infrastructure, water, power, roads and then inviting investors.* ***This way of working of providing infrastructure and providing the land at really cheap prices was meant to create jobs. This did not always happen*** *however, as developers took on the most profitable route which for example could be building warehouses and renting it out. At one point it was very fashionable when Mekuria Haile was in the ministry and small industrial zones were created in all cities (appropriate or not). But the areas selected, and the level of infrastructural provision was not attractive to investors. Because these required infrastructures, not the kind cities could provide either, but connections with the national grid so that its products could access central markets and it wasn't clear that it was connected or not.*
>
> *There were laws regulating the function within the zones but because the intention was to expand industries government wanted to do what it could but didn't want to push investors too far as long as investment was being made. While the outcomes*

need to be reviewed more generally, to some extent I personally don't believe the government has met its goals with the industrial zones, although it had its own contribution. It could have been more If it had been regulated more closely and had its own structure in place. [120]

In many ways the Industrial parks model sought to redress these capacity gaps and streamline end to end manufacturing and export processing bringing into focus all production, national and international logistics, customs and transportation into what one interviewer described as an '*integrated process of export processing'*. I have discussed the politics behind the framing of policy language around Industrial Zones and Industrial parks in section 3.2.3., here I discuss the differences between the policy objects themselves. Where Industrial zones had focused on domestic investors and did not intervene beyond availing space and infrastructure, Industrial parks sought to eliminate hurdles to export processing in targeted sectors and to FDI-led light manufacturing.

The organization of Industrial zones was part of the Master Plans of cities and were usually found on the edge of cities and the task was fencing [mekelel] in industrial areas based on certain parameters. ***But Industrial parks were mainly about ensuring physical infrastructural integration****; environmental concepts; bringing governmental services into one space and the tool for implementing government policies; as bonded areas these areas would be different from other industrial developments in the city - even in the clearance process a product that is destined for a certain location is under surveillance from its starting point all the way to its destination. unless a product goes through that process it doesn't get cleared.*

So, an industrial park is a development that has these systems; has customs regulations; that exercises new policy and incentive mechanisms; and where new environmental policies are implemented - like shared treatment plants and the reuse of resources where the waste of one factory goes can serve as input for another firm. ***This integrated process is seen in the parks.*** [121]

[120] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.
[121] Interview with Amare Asgedom, Deputy CEO of IPDC (park design and development) on 09.12.2019

In this sense, Industrial parks development addressing some of the biggest shortcomings of the industrial zones model. Most local government interviewees understood and interpreted these advantages brought on by industrial parks as positive changes that addressed important capacity gaps that had been prevalent in city level industrial parks. However, they stressed that it was the rapid transition/ jump from highly localized and disconnected industrial estates to highly centralized and streamlined national manufacturing ecosystems that they saw to be most problematic. Various issues of governance, planning and gaps in infrastructural provision arose amidst the rapid, on the go, 'learning by doing' process that could have been ironed out through a more strategic transition and synergetic approach to implementation.

In asking why such synergetic approaches were not sought after by the PM office or IPDC, responses always went back to discussions of capacity. Some of the exposure visits especially to China as well as the recommendations of the CADZ report had suggested local involvement and locally driven industrial infrastructure development. These were however, passed over as part of interpretive process of contextualizing the input from these learning experiences. Decentralization in China had created different capacities at the local level. The absence of local capacity to lead the IPD program or keep up with its effects in the context of Ethiopia's decentralization was used by interviewees on the IPD side as the main justification both for why the project needed to be led nationally and for why early joint planning wouldn't have made a difference.

> *We did not take any input from the CADZ study. Because it did not align with contextual factors.* ***China had strong local government*** *and big governmental institutions.* ***Industrial parks*** **[in Ethiopia]** ***had to be a national level development because there was no local capacity***.[122]
>
> *CADZ looked at other countries experiences and highlighted potential issues, but it doesn't mean it will be realized because it is written there. Even now,* ***it doesn't mean that just because the problems are known, that they will be addressed****. I'm just telling you about what we have experienced. For instance,* ***it doesn't mean that because it may be clear to me, it can be clear or resolved at a national level.*** *These problems may not have become clear to me just today, this may have been clear to me five years*

[122] Interview with Arkebe Oqubay, Advisor to the Prime Minister on Industrial Development on 07.02.2020

ago. and we may have communicated these things five years ago. ***It is known that workers will be employed and that we may have written to cities about getting housing ready but where would cities find the resources to be able to do that?***[123]

The deputy CEO of IPDC alluded to the fact that they had known the challenges that would emerge and that it was clear that the cities' capacity gaps would prevent them from addressing them. This foresight in some ways contributed to the late onboarding of the city due to the understanding that cities wouldn't have done anything even if they were informed or involved early. City officials on the other hand, interpreted their exclusion in the initial planning as the very reason responsibilities shifted from city government to IPDC including those of addressing the impacts and filling the capacity gaps that IPDC presumably was aware of.

The practice/ experience came from IPDC, the understanding of where the failures are was with IPDC, the city did not have this opportunity, none of us had the awareness. Because it was said the industries create jobs, that was what the city was preparing for. IPDC should have thought beyond this, on both sides. ***This was IPDC's task. They did not do this****. They did everything they had planned. They asked for free land, it was provided. So, they were able to execute what they wanted to do autonomously.* ***It shouldn't have just brought and dropping the industry on the city. Industry is coming, it has looked at all the experience, it has gone and collected the success stories and all the failures. Cities did not do that. After doing that, it*** **[IPDC]** ***just brought, dropped the industry and walk away saying here, I'm done. But also think about how it is linked with the city, what kind of pressures does it bring to the city.***

It should have studied this and shown how the city can cope up with this. *It should have owned the pressures that this has brought on cities. On behalf of the city administration, it should have allowed the city to take part and done this as a joint effort. There were a lot of tasks that it could've done and this shouldn't be repeated in other cities.* ***IPDC has better capacity than the cities,*** *be it in terms of human capacity, or exposure.* ***Cities do not have this capacity****. So, it did not carry out its*

[123] Interview with Amare Asgedom, Deputy CEO of IPDC (Park Design and Development) on 09.12.2019

*responsibility of filling the gaps for cities and working with them**. IPDC concentrated within the park only, there was no IPDC outside.***

…It requires a great deal with investment outside of the park, although I don't know who will be able to do that. It can't just be conversations; The government needs to invest in the infrastructure as much as it has invested in the parks. It needs to invest in the city because the implication of the park on the city have been identified. ***IPDC was created out of nothing, you could similarly create the capacity here.*** *So this much needs to be invested in the infrastructure and housing. It is repeatedly discussed that investment is needed but there hasn't been any concrete action or a budget.*[124]

City administration officials perceived what IPDC understands to be capacity gaps at the local level, to be an investment deficit on the part of the federal government that should have been part and parcel of the industrial infrastructure investment. As the former head of master planning at Hawassa City Administration pointed out, the capacity that was built at the national level with the establishment and financing of IPDC could have been created at the city level. Although it is clear that it would have taken a lot more investment to build and retain capacity across city administrations, these perceptions of investment deficits at the city level explain why city administration ascribe responsibility to IPDC which had received all for the financing infrastructural development related to IPs.

4.2.2. SOEs and Local government: The governance of IPs and their externalities

The other problem born out of capacity limitations was that of the governance of the industrial parks once they had been built that extended the disconnect with city administration to the operational phase of the park's development. While interviewees recognized the importance of the creation of a governing body dealing with the operations of IPs, they stressed the importance of the integration of city administration bodies into the governing body of the IPs to allow for park administrators to consider issues that extended beyond the park's perimeter.

Cities led the industrial zones in a joint effort between city municipality and investment bureau ***so there was no body that was given a defined role to handle***

[124] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.

these industrial parks. *Which has been corrected with the new structure. The way that it has been set up now as industrial parks, it has its own structure and regulating organization so this is good.*

We were criticizing the fact that that it seemed to be two governments: the connection between governance 'within the park' and 'outside the park' was very loose. Because the park was operating on its own from the onset; starting from the planning and construction

I think the biggest gap is that IPDC is administrating the park as a federal institution. I think this needs to be localized because why would this need to be run so remotely. It would be easier to think about the park with the city. The IPDC within the park needs to be in tune with the administration of the city out of the park. It should be one body.[125]

A series of interviewees with city officials dealt with the narrow focus of IPDC's concerns in overall thinking and planning concerning the externalities of the development of industrial infrastructure at this scale. This perception was shared by IPDC personnel who defended the narrow focus of the corporation and made no apologies for it. When asked for their understanding of who should deal with issues beyond this narrow purview, their response would circle back to city government and their limited capacity. In this way, the investment deficit is understood to extend from an institutional void that both parties' distance themselves from. The two conflicting interpretations of what IPDC's role should be are captured in the quotes from senior city administration and IPDC officials.

The problem with IPDC is that they see only one dimensionally, only park, first park and then they don't think about anything else, about the tenants that come in about the workers that come in, they only think about the parks. Their minds are fenced in on that. Other than the main targets for which it was created exports, job creation and they are not concerned about the city's growth.[126]

Like I said, as a corporation our responsibility is developing the sheds, *we developed 50 sheds and worked so that they could be fully utilized and access*

[125] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.
[126] Interview with Birru Wolde, Former City Manager for Hawassa City Administration on 06.11.19.

services. This is where our focus is. If we have developed housing for those with the capacity; it is our responsibility that they are fully occupied and fully functional. We don't even bring in Electricity; we request electricity provision; there is an application for it. So, ***if it is an urban issue, we send it to the city in a letter. beyond that, we can't look at the impacts or whatever else****.*[127]

This stalemate between interpretations of where responsibilities lie, and what IPDCs role should be, has in many ways put the physical integration problems of the park in institutional limbo. In interviews I conducted, city administrators interpret these policy objects, IPs, to be infrastructural islands that are outside of their purview and that employ an isolated planning approach that is creating challenges for the city. This understanding of IPs as planning islands and the planning approaches that feed this perception are discussed in the next section.

4.2.3. IPs as isolated infrastructural and planning islands

When you look at the industrial park itself, it's very attractive and looks like a different country, when you look at its physicality. The same image could have been created in the city. ***Now, when you look at the park, it looks like a city in another country***[128]

Very much like the opening quote in Chapter 1 where Toni Weis described the striking visual effect of IPs in their immediate surroundings as alien ships landing, local interviewees highlighted how the IPs stand out as islands of infrastructural excellence that draw attention to comparisons with their immediate environments. City administration officials explained the infrastructural differentiation as partially arising because local level planning guidelines and standards have not been modified to respond to the onset of large IPs. The land use planning of most cities continues to apply zoning separate from the zoning undertaken within the IPs themselves. IPs often appear as dark patches in urban plans that incorporate them through blanket land use changes [which suggests a single land use] but do not account for the implications of these new forms of densely populated internally functionally

[127] Interview with Amare Asgedom, Deputy CEO of IPDC (Park Design and Development) on 09.12.2019.
[128] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.

differentiated enclaves. The former Hawassa city master planning department director described the problem of development through distinct and unreconciled planning industry:

> *If you have seen the new industrial parks strategy, it encourages housing and even schools inside the parks. It encourages a lot of functions. So, in terms of approach, there was no resistance from the city because this is a good idea. But the problem is that there needs to be a connection with the wider city planning approach.* ***Our planning manuals all predate the industrial parks so there is a need to link it with industrial parks. It is a good approach on its own but if it is to work with the rest of the city, it needs to be reconciled with these planning approaches.*** *The planning guidelines and manuals need to incorporate it… this is being developed in cities, it should be a part of and go well with the urban structural planning approach.*[129]

On the side of IPDC, the 'master planning' principles of the industrial parks confirm this perception as they focus on *'the creation of a place*' and fail to consider implications that extend beyond the perimeters of the park. The 'master plan' section of the Mekelle Industrial Park feasibility study elaborates on this inward-looking approach as follows

> *The master plan's purpose is to* ***guide the creation of the place.*** *It is an environment where state-of-the- art facilities engage in a reciprocal relationship with dynamic form. Together* ***they create a special place that caters to every requirement of the proposed Industrial Park together with infrastructure and amenities***. ***The Master Plan Concept is the reflection of the vision of the project proponent*** *[IPDC] and his ultimate development goal. It ensures the environmental and economic sustainability of the proposed development. The Master Plan must strive to achieve a minimum quality of living and working spaces for the users and in the process attain long term viability for the proposed project. Greenfield projects such as the Industrial Park have to be effective in apposite physical planning to harness the complete potential of the site. The vision towards the development and* ***the framework guiding the development shall form the basis for efficiency, adequacy and functionality within the park.***

[129] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.

While it is obvious that ensuring the environmental and economic sustainability of the proposed development is impossible where the framework does not look outside the boundaries of the park, externalities remain outside the scope of planning considerations of IPDC master plans. Harnessing *the complete potential of the site* and *maximum efficiency within the park* has translated in to developing what planners in IPDC referred to as 'Maximum leasable area' which in some cases designates 60 percent of the large sites to industrial sheds. Sites as large as 2000 ha in Adama and 4000ha in Dire Dawa have been set apart for planning on these terms. Personnel at IPDC recognize that this approach implies a significant land use influence on cities and the challenges this may pose but maintain a hands-off approach to the urgency of ensuring that the development of dense industrial space is reconciled with the planning and zoning of cities who are expected to meet these needs.

> ***The industrial parks have their own internal land use designations***. *When industrial zones are set up; you start out with the premise that you get housing and services as neighboring functions. But 30% of the land use of industrial parks goes back into integrated use. So, within the confines of the industrial park, you can have housing or businesses or other systems.* ***The other thing is that there are profitable Sizes of IPs – 100 Ha or 75 Ha so the idea is to have a large tract of land and when you are at that scale to have the integrated services, the governmental services, the infrastructural provision, it doesn't make sense to do this in small tracts of land like 20 Ha so it starts with the understanding that there are optimal sizes are required.***
>
> *Because our cities are small, the land use influence is high. The park influences the existing masterplan and changes the land uses of the city's master plan because it becomes an attraction point. At the same time, the creation of jobs is double in cities from what is in the park, and this creates challenges for the development of the cities because this itself has an effect on the land use for all services in the city. When you create 30,000 jobs in the park, you create 60,000 in the city. So, if you create 100,000 jobs in a city (directly and indirectly) with 500,000; a population of 20% of the city, directly or indirectly affected by the park, will be injected into the city and this has challenges of its own.*[130]

[130] Interview with Amare Asgedom, Deputy CEO of IPDC (Park Design and Development) on 09.12.2019

The former commissioner of the Ethiopian Investment Commission summarized the federal government's outlook to the problem as an almost deliberate approach to push ahead with the production of industrial space in spite of the lack of preparation with the understanding that it would catalyze urbanization even if that would come at the cost of '*pressuring cities'* (quote below). For the Hawassa city administration, on the other hand, the pressure coming from the infrastructural investment deficit and institutional voids created by HIP and the sudden influx of population has not inspired the creation of new capacities. Instead, it led the city to revert back to the PMO with 'demands' for support. These opposing interpretations of the way out the capacity barrier are captured in the quotes from the two sides below.

> *"**You cannot really pause your development because a condition is not there.** It's about bringing in jobs to the poor, to the jobless essentially. and that is something that you need to do yesterday. It would have been very difficult to do what has happened if you were to wait for the city to put in place the housing, the waste management systems and everything, the park wouldn't have happened. **What you do is, do the industrial park in a place where it is suited for potential improvement of the services and put pressure on the city as well in a way because there is no sequencing here between urbanization and industrialization. The industrial park will shape the future of the cities and not the other way around.** you cannot have a planned city suited for a park rather the park will shape the future of the city"* [131]

> *So, the city made clear demands, CLEAR DEMANDS. we presented CLEAR DEMANDS to the PMO. We made the case to the Prime Minister's Office that we should obviously be supported around this issue. **We made clear demands, listed them out. There were two, three meetings at the PM's office where the city's mayor was present.** We raised these issues, all these pressures that are coming to the city. So, to **the federal government should share this burden**. **So, it was discussed what could be done and Dr. Arkebe said, let DFID handle this and look at where who should be involved. The EIC was also present when Fitsum was commissioner. So, DFID started working with us.*** [132]

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[131] Interview with Belachew Mekuria, Commissioner of the Ethiopian Investment Commission on 06. 2017
[132] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 31.10.19.

The series of meetings and continued persistence of the city did not however bring about the intended investment or changes in the governance of IPs. The process did, however, open up a new chapter of policy coherence building that relied heavily on non- governmental actors. The series of interventions by donors and development cooperation agencies that followed and attempted to build coherence between the policy spheres by filling gaps in local capacity are explored in the next section.

4.3. Unsustainable Bridges: Donors filling local capacity gaps

This section explores some of the initiatives taken on by donors and development corporations that sought to bridge the gap between the two policy spheres (urban/industrial) and interpretive communities (PMO-IPDC / local administrations) by building local capacity. It also looks at the inherent limitations of this modality of addressing local capacity gaps. Towards the completion of the construction of the parks in late 2016, the Hawassa city Administration, under direction from the PMO, organized a workshop that brought together various donors, INGO and multilateral agencies to get the non-governmental sector involved in addressing some of the challenges they had identified as urgent. The focus for the city administration was identifying stakeholders who would support capacity building efforts especially around the master plan. DFID's work with the GoE on industrialization started much earlier as part of its economic development program and easily led them coming on board and organizing the workshop alongside the city administration.

> *The city administration who are responsible for taking things forward, don't have the strength of relationship with donors, INGOs and the academic world that the federal government has so it was kind of our role to start to broker those relationships* [133]

> *DFID was supporting the government on these issues. We organized a donor's workshop with DFID. We wanted to clearly outline the challenges and areas where the city ought to be supported. This was when the park was about to be operational, towards the end of the construction. We invited a lot of donors, JICA, UNHABITAT, GTZ. UNHABITAT had already showed interest and DFID continued to support us*[134]

[133] Interview with Matt Butler, Former Senior Economic Advisor at DFID ON 18. 05.2018
[134] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 06.12.20.

DFID's involvement quickly expanded beyond the workshop to the financing of a diagnostic on the situation around housing, which featured as the central issue in the workshop. McKinsey and Co. took on the assignment and delivered the results in mid-2017. The findings of the report were quite damning and paved the way for a series of interventions around housing from various donors (discussed in section 5.2). Alongside the commissioning of the diagnostic study of housing, DFID came on board to support the city administration to start work on the revision of the city's master plan, another key issue identified in the workshop.

4.3.1. The Hawassa Master Plan Revision

Hawassa is the fastest growing city in Ethiopia with a growth rate of 4% (McKinsey & Co. 2017a:2). Currently at 387,087, the population of the city is projected to grow to 800,000 by 2025 and 1.8 million by 2035. For Hawassa Industrial Park (HIP), 85% of the workers are coming from a 40km radius and the rest from 150km radius (McKinsey & Co, 2017b:5), which has meant that all HIP workers not only required housing but that the influx of population would render the expired master plan of the city obsolete as it would transform basic service and infrastructural demands in most sectors.

Following a long period of consultations between UNHABITAT and MoUDH, DFID pledged a million pounds that would go through UNHABITAT that would go to the development, implementation and monitoring of 'structural urban development plans' at regional, cluster and city levels in 2017. The city had already started collecting data using various surveys but had not commenced with data analysis. In August 2017 a series of workshops with the city administration were facilitated by UNHABITAT and resulted in the consensus of starting with the city level plan with a strong focus on developing strategies for housing, transportation and solid waste management.[135] The regional planning process that had originally been proposed was set aside temporarily and the scope of the plan was tightly set to the city boundaries.

After the workshop in August 2017, the planning process was stalled by the sudden eruption of protests around the Sidama statehood claim which started in late 2018. The regional president asked the city administration and UNHABITAT to temporarily stop the planning process until there was more clarity around Sidama's autonomyand the result of the

[135] Interview with Alberto, Hawassa structural plan development lead at UNHABITAT Ethiopia on 03.01.19

referendum. Planning and the development of master plans had become a politically sensitive issue which often spurred on protests since the 2015 protests around the Addis Ababa Master plan. And so, although the master planning process would not directly affect the statehood claim, the regional and city administration wanted to take precautions.

> *The direction has changed but we don't know to what direction they are heading either. In the meantime, there is the reality, so I don't know. There is something happening. They're very secretive. So,* ***I don't know where we are heading, what their plans are but at the moment all the plans have been stalled.*** *I don't even know how much production is going on there. Plus, there was problem with transport because the youth were trying to burn the buses so there's a lot of uncertainty in Hawassa right now. To the point that we evacuated everybody, they were here for two months.* ***They're going back now and then wait for what will happen after the referendum. There's a lot of question on the status of Hawassa City that is controversial. A lot could happen there****. We're not going to engage them until there's clear government policy on a number of Issues besides the local political issues*[136]

Later UNHABITAT proposed the continuation of the work on the assessments on housing, transportation and solid waste management, of course staying within the confines of the planning boundary[137], while the autonomy issue could be decided as this would not be affected by the uncertainty around the status of the city or its boundaries. The mayor and regional president agreed, and the housing assessment continued. The work on the master plan was officially stalled for almost a year September 2018 to December 2019 when the referendum decided that Sidama would be granted statehood. However due to the funding deadlines and UNHABITAT's own deliverables, the planning process continued covertly starting mid 2019 with the planning team conducting analysis and developing preliminary proposals without public engagement. This of course created major challenges for public facing participatory engagement and limited feedback and ongoing reviews to the city administrations oversight.

[136] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist and Advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19
[137] The area within which the city administration is legally allowed to plan development. The area outside the planning boundaries are technically urban woreda's that accounts for 35% of Hawassa's built up area planning ordinances do not apply.



Fig. 9. Planning and administrative boundaries. source- UNHABITAT (2021) The Hawassa Structural Plan

"Normally it is important to get the community involved, you need to ask people what their problems are and what their wants and needs are. And you have to be able to listen. When I come to the city and assess it, I might be able to gather some information, but I will not be able to get all the details. Because it is the people who know the details. For instance, I might come in on a season when there is no flooding, and it is hard to really identify areas which are most vulnerable to flooding beyond some basic contour analysis. We would have like to do participatory mapping and it aids your analysis when you can confirm it. ***But during this process when we have been supporting the city administration, because of the political situation, we have not been able to do any public consultations, almost zero. We don't know what they are saying, and this is a major weakness of the planning process.*** [138]

"When we did the IDP in 2006, we did a lot of work to ensure that it was participative. But now we don't really know how the planning process is being managed, whether

[138] Interview with Abayachew Ayele, Urban planner and GIS expert Hawassa project, UNHABITAT on 07.11.19

it is being periodically reviewed, discussed getting feedback. Now it is being done silently, we have no idea what is going on. I was very involved in the development of the IDP but this would suggest that I would have a lot to say about how its implementation went and where the gaps are now, but I have no idea what is going on now, Let alone coordination between planners at various levels, this leaves a lot to desire in terms of coordination more generally across governmental sectors and with the general public. So beautiful papers may be produced but it will not create solutions or fit with what is going on on the ground. And there is still time to fix this [139]

The revision of the Hawassa Structural Plan was undertaken between 2018 and 2021 and included detailed on housing, transportation and waste management issues for the city. By the admission of the team itself the extent to which the plan has and will foster coherence building has been limited by issues at the federal level and the political climate in SNNPR during the planning period.

4.3.2. The UNHABITAT Urban Stakeholders Platforms

From September 2018 to mid-2019, the team focused on the housing, transportation assessment and solid waste assessments. In May 2019, once the first drafts of the assessments were complete, UNHABITAT called a stakeholder's coordination meeting entitled "supporting to the sustainable development of Hawassa city". Here the discussions revolved around encouraging PVH, the largest investor in the park, and IPDC to set up and take up leadership of an HIP planning coordination committee which could take ownership of the projects strategies and help drive them forward. PVH made it clear that it could not play a leadership role within this while IPDC limited their contribution to presenting their most recent plans of the newly created housing development directorate[140], to develop dormitory housing, which had been developed in the absence of discussions with the city administration (discussed in depth in 5.3.2).

The meetings, whilst informative of the status of the work of the different actors did not really generate any action steps to move the discussion forward or manage to get

[139] Interview with Messay Matusala, Sidama Zone Spatial Planner on 09.11.19

[140] The IPDC Housing Directorate was created in IPDC in late 2017 in reaction to a study conducted by McKinsey and Co. Both the study and the establishment of the housing directorate in IPDC were funded by DFID

commitment from any of the actors on aligning instruments or collaborating in future efforts. Interpretations of why this was the case was again relegated to the reluctance of IPDC to engage with collaborative governance modalities with the city administration that were suggested.

> *The IPDC was not working with the city administration with these problems.* ***We had to drag them into doing all that.*** *Because of the expose that we did on Hawassa. The series of studies that we did. so damned if you do, damned if you don't...* ***They were basically caught in a situation, and we became the peace makers or the in-go between. we brought them in kicking and screaming. They still don't want to be involved. There were zero relations between the city administration, the Sidama regional government and the IPDC, nothing, none****.*
>
> ***So, within this process, housing was a trigger point that's how we came in****. we did a big study on housing so some of the industrialist seek UNHABITAT, because they know they can't do it on their own.* ***The government wasn't offering anything. So, I'm not even sure where we are heading because of the crisis but somehow, they were beginning to do something but not full heartedly, it was the housing crisis and then there were a series of bad articles written about wage issues that got international attention****. So, it was not because they want to learn or they want to embrace but because they were caught red handed, they were dragged into the situation, they actually wanted to hide it. With the McKinsey Study and all that, they could not put the fire down. There was really a great deal of resistance from IPDC, they came in kicking and screaming, talking about this and that. IPDC was forced but they wanted to deny that there was even a problem.*
>
> ***Again, if you have problems at the federal level, then it's not possible to integrate sectors at the local level****. even in the regional planning institutions, there's a huge gap. Those were the ones that were supposed to advise at the regional level. That's why we ended up doing this report with UNHABITAT because the capacity at that level, we knew they could not do it so that's why we had to support.*[141]

[141] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist and Advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19

Interviewees stressed that local level efforts of fostering coherence between the plans of various actors were limited in the degree to which they could correct or reverse integration problems at the federal level or serious gaps in intergovernmental relations. The ability of the new structural plan to integrate Hawassa IP into the development planning of the city was limited by these extra-local factors that UNHABITAT was not well placed to resolve. Creating the mechanisms for intergovernmental coordination between various sectoral ministries to overcome local capacity gaps, or and facilitating funding for the various projects it identifies (beyond the limited allocations from the municipal budget), were higher structural and long-term problems that could not be addressed through or during the planning process. At best, the plan could identify the conflicting, redundant, or missing administrative actions that had taken shape during the 3-year delay in renewing the masterplan and additional 3 years of its development.

UNHABITAT's next effort was bringing the issue to its newly established National Urban Stakeholders Platform with a much wider group of what it refers to as Urban Agenda Partners. The platform consisting of 15 donor agencies, 16 development agencies, 11 professional associations and academic institutions and 12 governmental partners. This platform was established on Nov 30th, 2019, with the expressed agenda of "enhancing coordination through political and technical meetings; sharing best practices; reinforcing common strategies"[142]. Although all the actors in the Hawassa stakeholder coordination meeting are also a part of this wider platform, the new platform had not enabled any new sustained coherence building at the time of writing.

4.3.3. IPDC's Industrial Park Optimization workshops

On Jan 31st, 2020, IPDC in collaboration with its implementing partners[143] organized a stakeholder's consultative workshop that brought together all major governmental and donor organizations[144] to discuss the 'optimization' of industrial parks. The framing of the workshops as focused on the Industrial parks themselves however did not do justice to the actual themes that were discussed in great detail. In this section, I provide a highly

[142] Notes from the National Urban Stakeholders Platform establishment workshop on Nov 30th 2019
[143] The four implementing partners of IPDC featured in the workshop included The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, McKinsey and Co., Enterprise Partners and Precise Consult International.
[144] Donors included DFID, USAID, European Union, GIZ, UNIDO, WBG, IFC, JETRO, JICA and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

descriptive and detailed account of each presentation and the summary response to the presentations by the PMO-IPDC because the exchange demonstrates a dialogical process of defining and redefining the meaning of policy problems in the urban industrial nexus within the context of skewed power relations between key policy actors. The morning session consisted entirely of infrastructural challenges that were limiting the performance of the IPs. Housing, energy and water and waste management were the core themes of the workshop.

The first presentation by implementing partners on housing highlighted the housing deficit of over 200,000 across parks created by the fact that 90% of the workers would be recruited from rural areas. The presenter interpreted the major challenges as being IPDC's inability to make financial commitment and its lack of technical capacity to provide housing for IP workers; lack of cooperation from federal, regional and local government regarding financing and constructing units for workers; the increase of rent despite absence of services and amenities; and the absence of private housing developers that were ready to take the risk of developing cheap workers' housing.



Fig. 10. Indicative status of operational and under construction parks, Optimization workshop presentation master deck

The presentation further identified the root causes as the lack of clear direction and institutional arrangements from the government regarding the planning and provision of workers' housing; the absence of coordination between government actors regarding

housing initiatives and financing; the poor management of developers interested in housing development; the limited availability of land in cities to be allocated by regional governments; the limited financing options to private housing developers; the cost and time it takes to develop the power, waste, water and transportation infrastructure (fig.10.) ; and IPDC's limited technical and financial capacity to take on all of these root causes.

Similarly, the second presentation by an implementing partner concerning water and energy provision highlighted the growing demands on water and energy provision in all parks. This was especially critical in four parks Bahir Dar IP, Mekelle IP, Dire Dawa IP and Adama IP which do not have access to potable water for workers. They again identified financial and technical capacity gaps in relevant institutions to address the issues.

Finally, the third presentation on wastewater treatment and solid waste management gave an overview of the status of the installed, under construction and planning waste management systems in the various parks. The presenters highlighted the major problems as being the inadequate sludge and salt management in IPs; the lack of monitoring systems and safe disposal sites in the cities; in many instances the absence of national guidelines and standards for industrial solid and hazardous waste and of course the lack of financing to implement waste management technologies.

Although each of the presenters ended their presentations with recommendation the came out of the identified problems, the discussions that followed and took up most of the afternoon did not really explore the policy problems identified or suggested solutions at length. Instead, Dr. Arkebe Oqubay, speaking on behalf of the PMO and IPDC leadership, gave a reinterpretation of the root problems identified as being dead end structural problems. The first structural problem he identified was the weakness of local government. He stressed it did not make sense to expect local government or regional government to resolve all the issues that had been identified. This statement of course begs the question of why it was left to local government during the development of the park if it was already clear that they would not be able to deliver on it. In a similar vein, he went on to clarify that housing was the responsibility of local government and regional government and not federal government but that it was not useful to expect them to carry out this responsibility because they do not have the financing or land to be able to do so. Finally, he stressed that many government agencies including IPDC, EEP and EEU had a serious shortage of finance and that political

differences were making coordination between government offices difficult as well as between regional and federal government.

Dr. Arkebe concluded the session with the message that what was needed was to 'create new capabilities' where gaps had been identified and he made a plea to donors and development cooperation agencies to step in where they could. Although it was not explicit, the new capabilities pertained to IPDC taking charge on all of the issues outlined above where responsible administrations and agencies did not have capacity. The workshop ended after these responses were made with a commitment to follow up meetings between relevant participants.

In summary, this workshop on the optimization of IPs was as an effort to reorient the narrative around IPDC and challenges arising in the urban-industrial nexus and most importantly to engage the donor community in filling institutional voids and capacity gaps. However, much like the UNHABITAT led master plan revision and stakeholder coordination platforms, initiatives primarily dependent on the funding and leadership of the donor community or development cooperation agencies would be constrained by their own uncertain financing and time constraints (similar to the initiatives discussed in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Even where such initiatives take off and perform well, they do not offer sustainable solutions to the inherently structural problems they address.

Conclusion

The chapter has addressed the second objective of the research which was to better understand the various conditions that have impeded alignment/realignment of sectoral policies in the urban-industrial nexus at the local level during and after the implementation of the Ethiopian industrial parks policy. Sisay's use of straightening the crooked tree, as a metaphor for the futility of working against rigid structures that are not easily reshaped to foster better outcomes, was found to be fitting. Some of these structures were interpreted to be present in the political history of decentralization of the EPRDF that have shaped the limits of local authority, autonomy and capacity and set modes of accountability that inhibit the possibility and success of local government initiatives geared toward building coherence in the urban-industrial nexus. The chapter started with a brief review of intergovernmental relations and decentralization under EPRDF's Ethnic Federalism and its particular character in SNNPR. The themes of authority, autonomy and accountability within the party bureaucracy, as it extends from federal bureaucracies to regional to city administrations, was

seen to counter self-rule or independent action on the part of city administrations by creating a leadership void and having a countering effect on any possibility of a bottom-up coherence building effort.

The second section looked at the ways in which capacity gaps at the local level, partially born out of the nature of decentralization but also the nature of the implementation process, limited the local administration's ability to integrate the development with its own processes during and after the construction of the park. Local officials in city administration reported feeling powerless in many ways throughout the development of the park and in trying to deal with later outcomes due to capacity limitations. Their absence from initial planning, research and exposure left many placing the responsibility for building coherence and addressing impacts on federal agents like the PMO and IPDC. Similarly, on the other side, the infrastructure burden was seen to be squarely the responsibility of city administrations and pressures on the city were expected to spur catalyze urbanization.

The final section explored the initiatives that have attempted to bridge some of emerging gaps and to foster policy coherence, primarily taken on by the donor community. All in all, whilst there has been some effort to bring actors and planning instruments together, results so far indicate initiatives primarily dependent on the funding and leadership of the donor community will be constrained by their own uncertain financing and time constraints in addition to their inability to address the root political, and capacity issues brought on by the state of intergovernmental relations. Donors and development cooperation agencies have facilitated discussions and financed both federal government agencies (Housing development directorate in IPDC) and local government (Hawassa city administration) to work on solutions for housing and other infrastructural gaps. While the involvement of these agencies has also drawn attention to the emerging issues, allowed for some research and documentation of issues and discussions, they have not resulted in the bridging of major gaps in infrastructural provision. The next chapter steps back to look at the larger picture of the state of spatial and infrastructural fragmentation in the urban industrial nexus and the limitations on spatial planning that have contributed to this.

5. The Emerging Urban-Industrial Nexus

All the rivers

…All these agencies are separately working on different layers of what ought to be one spatial framework, and you've just told me about the Oromia region's own plans of developing a massive SEZ the size of a city, separate from all of these processes. How will all of these interact when they are realized?

Ultimately, all rivers meet in the sea.[145]

[145] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry, CEO of IPDC and CEO of Oromia Industrial Parks Development Corporation on 15.01.2020

Introduction

This final empirical chapter deals with the final objectives of the research: understanding the limits on the integrative potential of spatial planning within the urban-industrial nexus and the spatial and infrastructural implications of the urban industrial policy disconnect. Previous chapters presented an analytical perspective that primarily interrogated the nature of the political system in its explorations of the conditions that account for the lack of integration in the nexus. This chapter turns the focus onto the nexus itself and examines various dimensions of the integration challenge by grafting in a socio-spatial perspective into the analysis at the national and urban scales.

The term *urbanization-industrialization nexus* is drawn from an analytical framework proposed by the ECA's 2017 Economic report on Africa, to conceptualize and highlight areas of interdependence between the two mega processes of change and the specific challenges currently emerging at their interface in contemporary Africa (UNECA, 2017:94). The concept of a nexus between these processes is conceived as not only co-occurance but on of impact and interdependence. The ECA framework is organized around enablers and barriers to capitalizing on inherent interdependencies; and is constructed out of a set of normative concepts and principles emanating from economic geography that deal with this interface. The principles highlighted in the framework included strengthening urban-rural linkages; addressing housing and infrastructure deficits; sharpening industrial location strategies; and guiding urban form and infrastructure through the rollout of industry. The report mainly uses the framework to frame its review of country cases and as the basis for its recommendations of key interventions for national development policy and planning.

This chapter expands on the use of this concept beyond identifying interdependencies to understanding what actors interpret by the concept of urban industrial nexus. Most generally interpreted the nexus to include all the spatial and infrastructural relationships that exist between urban systems and ecosystems of industrial infrastructure at various scales. Therefore, in adopting ECA's term and general framing, this chapter seeks to foreground and elaborate on this grounded understanding of the emerging Ethiopian urban-industrial interface in its many spatial and infrastructural forms. Sisay's analogy of numerous tributary rivers ultimately becoming one in the sea, is employed to this end as it carries layers of meaning and insights that bring into focus ECA's somewhat abstract notion of an *urban-*

industrial nexus and anchoring it in located discussions and attitudes prevalent with policy actors on the ground.

The three subsections of this chapter interpret Sisay's analogy across three important dimensions of integration in the urban-industrial nexus: vertical-spatial, horizontal-spatial and infrastructural. The first section deals with the phenomenon of regions pursuing isolated spatial strategies - creating territorially bounded urban-industrial systems and restricting processes of regional integration- within the context of looming national disintegration[146]. The second section deals with the isolated strands of sectoral spatial development planning – that separately flow out and cascade down into implementation, creating inconsistencies and redundancies and restricting the development of synergies in the nexus- within the context of the disintegrating central party bureaucracy. The last section looks at the case of Hawassa Industrial Park (HIP) and Hawassa city, by exploring the isolated efforts to deal with infrastructural and housing challenges that emerge, as disparate spatial policies meet, interact and counteract in physical space at the urban scale where products of disjointed planning processes materialize. Finally, the conclusions consider the ways in which complex socio-political processes set limits on the integrative potential of spatial planning within the urban-industrial nexus and underlie the various manifestations of infrastructural fragmentation.

5.1. Economic disintegration: "*Give me a portion of everything now"*

The urban-industrial nexus is broadly understood amongst policy actors in this research, to be the cumulative productive ecosystem created by the spatial structures and infrastructural configurations of urban and industrial systems. Across the board, interventions in the development of urban- industrial ecosystems, are understood to have the potential to foster economic integration by facilitating the flow of goods, capital, labor and resources and promoting the development of internally integrated labor markets, settlement patterns and infrastructural connections. Nevertheless, Ethiopia's experience of attempting to steer structural transformation, through its pursuit of industrial development and substantial

[146] The threat of national disintegration (discussed in chapter 4) is strongly perceived by most interviewees following a series of ethnic conflicts and the establishment and strengthening of regional special forces over the past decade.

investment in infrastructure over the past two decades, is widely understood to have been accompanied by declining functional integration. Indeed, the general understanding amongst interviewees for this research was that economic investment and growth over the past decade had taken place against the backdrop of the country's gradual descent into national disintegration (Ahmed, 2021).

This first subsection of this chapter deals with these broader themes and the challenges they have posed to national economic integration and regional development in Ethiopia. It does this by interrogating the rise of the regional self-sufficiency agenda, the failure of different high-level attempts to foster economic and spatial integration and the resulting territorially fragmented and isolated regional planning practices. The implication of these challenges of nation-building for how urban systems and industrial ecosystems have developed and interacted throughout the period of the development of industrial parks, is brought to the fore.

5.1.1. Regional 'Self-sufficiency' and functional integration in the enclosure federation

As briefly discussed in Section 4.1., the reterritorialization of the Ethiopian state along ethno-linguistic lines in the 1994 constitution involved the construction of ***political regions*** called '*Kilil*s'. The term denotes both the ethno-regional state governments that were formed and the "***enclosures***" [147] that were created around ethno-linguistic population groups following the new basis for political organization[148]. The shaping of these exclusive territories and boundaries did not follow ecological, environmental, or resource distribution logics. The conception of the *Kilil* as 'exclusive and legally bounded administrative territories established to achieve communal objectives' thus inadvertently resulted in the creation of 'major disparities in the distribution of land-based resources" (Mehretu 2012:120).

At the same time, the new territorial and political order inextricably linked these new political constructs - i.e., ethnic territorial regions and their boundaries– with the

[147] The Amharic term used to denote administrative regions was changed in the 1994 constitution from '***Kifle-Hager'*** which translates into '*Segment of the country'* to '***Kilils***' which translates directly into 'enclosures'. This change captures the shift in the conceptualization of Ethiopia's regions from being defined by their characteristic of being part of a whole; to being defined by an inward focus of centering and 'enclosing' ethnic groups.

[148] The 1994 constitution set ethnicity as the sole basis for organizing and entering the country's political arena with the premise that the 'nationalities question' superseded other demands of the general public

organization of economic development. Under the new EPRDF constitution, the Kilils had to serve as ***economic regions,*** as the institutionalization of and commitment to federalism was justified on the grounds that it would facilitate the pursuit of inter-ethnic/ regional equity. However, this presented obvious problems as "*economic functional areas rarely coincide with political boundaries, and are rather path dependent, and formed through the interaction of humans and local resources. Ethiopia's federal states are considered regions but are not necessarily characterized by internally integrated labor markets organized around economic nodes*." (Kebede & Gauntner, 2019:9)

As regional equity was '*the foundation of the polity'* (Oqubay, 2015:17), it became the overriding principle in the EPRDF's approach to 'balanced regional development'[149] and measures to promote regional distribution included decentralization.. The efficiency-equity tradeoff balance, a common problem for many developing states pursuing balanced regional development, was presaged by the party's declared commitment to inter-ethnic equity, legislated in the 1994 constitution (discussed in section 4.1.1). By 2005, the failures of the first 10 years of pursuing inter-ethnic equity through the federal arrangement and the prevalence of investment in the Tigray region featured as core issues that opposition leaders stressed in the run up to national elections. Post-2005, the EPRDF sought to demonstrate its commitment to its foundational principle of regional equity by evening out the distribution of state investment across ethnic regions, an agenda which was made more immediate by the political crisis as regions increasingly demanded their share of whatever developmental projects the federal government initiated. Because economic growth is by nature geographically unbalanced, 'trying to spread out economic activity is tantamount to discouraging it.' Which is why 'identifying spatial efficiency- equity tradeoffs is at the core of designing territorial development strategies.' (Lall, Schroeder & Schmidt, 2015:1-2). In the absence of an official national spatial development framework or territorial development strategy where this key tradeoff could be worked out and negotiated, the general approach to balancing regional development fell to the distribution of state investment in drivers of

[149] EPRDF's policies of regional equity sought to distribute investment in drivers of economic growth, i.e. mega infrastructural projects including economic nodes like Industrial parks, at the cost of economic efficiency. "*'Balanced regional development' may refer to spatially distributed drivers of economic growth, or spatially equitable human development, or both. While the geography of economic drivers and the geography of human development are related, they are not equivalent, and neither are the policies that impact them*." (Kebede and Gauntner, 2019:1),

economic growth across the national territory. Most notable early examples of the distributive effort were the state universities and road development projects.

Following the death of Meles in 2012, the growing ethno-nationalist drive for regional economic self-sufficiency intensified intra-ethnic competition for investment in all sectors. Needless to say, this inward-looking ethnocentric focus had a serious impact on prospects of regional functional integration and trans-regional planning, and thus indirectly on the very development regions sought to secure within their enclosures (Alem, 2021:2). A senior advisor at the National Planning and Development Commission described the effects of this on economic specialization and integration.

> ***There was an inherent problem in the regions where there is a political economy perspective where they want to be self-sufficient in everything and there is a give me a portion of everything approach***. *Wherever the PM went for a visit if people asked for a university, a university would be provided.* ***This was especially common when it was based on ethnicity and when you start treating regions like countries****, when regions started thinking instead of 'how can I benefit from the wealth of the country' to 'How can I benefit from my nation', regions stop thinking about what they can trade with other regions as a country and start to instead focus on self-sufficiency.* ***So, when they plan for their region, instead of specializing they distribute their resources on all sectors****. You see regions that don't have a lot of land trying to focus on agriculture or regions that don't have tourism potential stressing about developing tourist destinations****. If a university is built for a specific ethnic group within a 30 km reach, you would hear complaints about why a university hasn't been built here****. Where this is the case, the federal government would try to work on comparative advantages and regions may reject this in pursuit of their own development corridors*[150]

This regional self-sufficiency agenda superseded logics of territorially based strategic investment, economic efficiency, regional specialization based on comparative advantages, or cross regional interdependence, and thus negatively affected overall functional integration within and between regions. In the years following Meles's death, centralized developmental

[150] Interview with Seid Nuru, Senior Macro Economy advisor to the National Planning and Development Commission on 02.01.202

strategies had to be negotiated with the increasingly assertive and autonomous planning of regional governments as development of economic nodes, primarily industrial infrastructure, advanced in the three major constituent regions of the EPRDF coalition, Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR. Hailemariam Desalegn commissioned the establishment of the National Planning Council in 2015, as the need for an extra-party platform for reconciling regional plans and promoting national planning became increasingly apparent in the post-Meles political environment (discussed in 3.2). Interviewees directly attributed the isolated regional planning to the loss of the strength of federal government that had held it at bay under Meles.

> *We've seen government institutions in Ethiopia lose a lot of coordination. We may have had the image, maybe in the days of Meles, but since then we have seen increasingly, with the change of political leadership at the top, many many many challenges. Not just in the industrial parks but across the board... We've also seen the federal regional coordination change.* ***In the old days the federal government would issue commands and regions would follow them, we've seen regions pushing for autonomy and making autonomous decisions so industrial parks have not been well coordinated with the regions. We saw a lot of the politics of post Meles EPRDF has affected government harmony and coordination,*** *so we are now in a weaker state of coordination.*[151]

> ***Under Ethiopia's federalism it is not as easy as it used to be for federal government to set spatial directives****. The ability to foster a common political and economic system is possible only to the extent to which the regions grant this. Regions are very autonomous now and want to set their own economic corridors.* ***We know that regions are planning on their own.*** [National] ***Planning got currency in the second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) where they identified gaps and recognized there were challenges under planning****. The National Planning Council was set up under PM Hailemariam. Before that it was just one directorate under the Ministry of Economic Development which means there really wasn't a lot of attention given to planning. The National Planning and Development Commission (NPDC) was set up as a secretariat under the National Planning Council headed by the prime minister*

[151] Interview with Nebil Kellow_ CEO of Enterprise Partners (key development partner of IPDC) on 04.02.2020

and where regional government presidents are members. Instead of making the plans and then telling them they need to realize them, macro issues would cascade down and detailed sectoral models and issues with spatial implications needed to be dealt with on the ground. The national council was supposed to be the arena to do just that and the NPC was the secretariat in this process. ***There are regions that have gone ahead and are developing their own growth corridors It was disarrayed because planning was set aside and that was why NPDC needed to be established****. Unfortunately,* ***the execution of this role was disrupted by the political crisis [the 2016-2018 nationwide protests]*** *where even private developments were being burnt so it was a difficult time to think through spatial issues.* [152]

Despite the establishment of the NPDC during the GTP II period (2015-2020), it remained ineffective in aligning regional and national planning or allowing for trans-regional planning throughout this period. Regional assertiveness around economic planning was, on the other hand bolstered by the 2014 protests in Oromia against government development interventions, which grew out of protests against a planning intervention aimed at improving integration between Addis Ababa and its hinterlands in the Oromia region. The protests rose out of a perceived federal government infringement on Oromia state territory and became the rallying cry of ethno-nationalist resistance. Alem (2021:1) shows how socio-spatial development and trans-regional boundary issues such as urbanization became serious challenges in the context of rising ethno-nationalism and inter-regional conflicts during this period. A senior official in the ministry of Urban Development described how the 2014 crisis surrounding the Addis Ababa Master Plan created the political sensitivity around planning exercises that would go on to restrict the space for inter-regional and integrative planning for the rest of the decade. This partly influenced the Hawassa Master Plan Revision as well with the delay of the planning process before the Sidama statehood referendum could be finalized (discussed in section 4.3.1)

Now the level of awareness and the political situation has made talking about integrated planning taboo and dangerous*. There's an attitude and paranoia of* ***'don't get into my space'.*** *Let alone nationally,* ***the planning exercise that we did on Addis Ababa created such havoc. There was never any intention or***

[152] Interview with Seid Nuru, Senior Macro Economy advisor to the NPDC on 02.01.2020

> ***content in the plan to take or give away land, but it was spun in that way. The Addis Ababa plan was about integration!*** *instead of harming each other, how do we support each other's growth.* [153]

Looking at the longer-term perspective, the drive for regional self-sufficiency in the face of federal government driven developmental infrastructural projects and the general disregard for declining functional integration between regions on both sides, has dominated the regional development planning space following the death of PM Meles and the 2014 protests. The space for integrated inter-regional planning narrowed against the backdrop of looming national disintegration. The next section delves into how this affected integration in the urban-industrial nexus at the national scale.

5.1.2. National disintegration and isolated regional planning of the urban-industrial nexus

The 2014-2018 protests and the political shift that they brought on only served to further bolster regional assertiveness and accelerate the race for the development of large-scale industrial spaces – factory complexes, industrial parks, special economic zones by regional industrial development agencies. In 2016, The Ministry of Industry, established regional IPDCs in all regional capitals and in the charter cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (discussed further in 5.2). While the development of new Federal IPDC parks (discussed in chapters 3 and 4) was officially halted in 2019, regional IPDCs pushed forward with new initiatives for industrial estates either expanding on national initiatives or developing new ones in defiance of federal government directives. The director of the SNNPR IPDC (quoted below) at once spoke about the regional corporation's own isolated industrial development planning whilst condemning the practice in all regions. He repeatedly brought attention to the spatially bounded thinking especially around urban-industrial systems and connected this back to regions each "running their own course" and acting like, if not "becoming small countries". In many ways this isolated spatial planning of Regional IPDCs contradicts all the effort to bring together all the relevant economic sectors under IPDC through the highly centralized approach.

[153] Interview with Abebe Zeleul, Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and construction on 17.12.19

There is no spatial or regional plan for the Southern region. But there is a regional manufacturing roadmap that the region has had studied where we looked at what resources are available and what we should be focusing on. There is no national [spatial] roadmap for industrial infrastructure development. Regions, on their own time are having studies carried out. This is something that needs extensive attention. How do you manage the competition for resources that this creates let alone the infrastructure integration problems? There is no holistic vision at the regional or national level.

***There are massive developments being studied in Oromia, Amhara and Tigray**. In SNNPR alone, we are conducting feasibility studies to develop four agro-industrial parks through the Industry Project Service (IPS). Everyone is running their own course. And I personally believe that this will create all kinds of problems. It's a time when a lot of things are being allowed to abate political issues. The Ministry of Industry is telling all of the regions to stop but no one is listening.*

As the head of a regional IPDC, I am only thinking about the demarcated area that is my region**. In many Ethiopian cities, cross regional integration is very difficult. For instance, when Hawassa Structural plan was developed, Shashemene will obviously have an impact on what I am doing, Dilla will have an impact, Bishan Guracha will have an impact. If we don't have transport linkages, there will be problems, **but we are all working within our boundaries**, I'm not trying to align or even think about the linkages with Dilla or Shashemene when I am developing parks. **There is nothing. There is no region-to-region integration.

Only the federal government could integrate regional plans to national plans. Right now, with all our differences, regions are becoming autonomous, unlike in the past, power is shifting. There should be a national spatial plan that connects the regional and federal plans or there will be no reins, you'll have developments in every neighborhood. Regions are becoming small countries. [154]

State disintegration along ethnic lines was perceived to drive dissociated planning at various levels. The Director of the SNNPR IPDC connected what was happening at national level

[154] Interview with Birru Wolde, CEO of SNNPR IPDC on 06.11.19.

with sub regional disintegration in SNNPR [the only region where zones were also ethnically defined] where zonal competition for industrial investment has followed statehood claims. In this sense the SNNPR is unique due to its ethnic zones which have brought in an added layer of intra-regional competition for infrastructural projects

> ***And beyond that you have conflicts within the region itself.*** *The four agro-industrial parks that SNNPR has had studied, it has asked us not to make it public where these parks will be because this would spark a fire,* ***'why in that zone and not in this zone'****. In SNNPR, it used to be that cities used to seek the consent of regional government to allow industrial investment in their jurisdiction, but this is no longer the case,* ***cities are granting land autonomously****.* ***Since the political shift [2018 regime reform],*** *it has come down to city level.* ***Especially where you have statehood questions coming out****. This was what I was telling you earlier about Werabela in Silte zone. The zone approved a 300-hectare development. There were protests in Durame Zone about why a park was being built in Silte and not there. The PM is going there tomorrow, he will be asked for an IP, everywhere he goes, he is asked the same thing.* ***Even zones are becoming autonomous in the current situation****. And it has reached a point where it is becoming unmanageable.* [155]

In contrast, the Director of the Oromia IPDC noted that integrated planning within the Oromia region was easier than at national level due to the relative political cohesion within the more ethnically homogenous regional state. His comparison of coordination at the regional level to the difficulties of intra-party communication and coordination within the federal party bureaucracy points to another reason why regional planning has becoming isolated and disjointed from federal planning. However, while better intra-regional relations in relatively ethnically homogenous states like Oromia make planning at regional level easier than at federal level, sectoral fragmentation nevertheless limits spatial coordination within the state (as discussed in section 5.2.1.)

> *The coordination at regional level on the other hand is really great [In contrast to coordination at the federal level where Sisay was previously engaged]. I'm really happy here. When you speak your mind, it's not interpreted through an ethnic lens. It is the country's political situation that is shaking institutions, and this has been the*

[155] Interview with Birru Wolde, CEO of SNNPR IPDC on 06.11.19.

case for a while. And this is signaling the disintegration of the country. I see a disintegrating Ethiopia. [156]

Themes of isolated regional industrial planning and spatially bounded thinking in the urban-industrial nexus, on the other hand, run across regions. The themes were echoed in an interview with the current Director of the Oromia Industrial Development agency as he described Geda Special Economic Zone (GSEZ), a special economic zone at the scale of a city, to be developed on 23,656 hectares between Modjo and Adama with 5300 hectares of industrial space. GSEZ lies at a critical intersection of three major transport and economic corridors that connect Addis to Djibouti, Somalia and Kenyan borders. It merges Adama, the biggest city in Oromia, with Modjo, home to the biggest dry port in the country. GSEZ therefore has all the makings of a major urban, economic and logistical centre for the country with the sheer scale of the zone marking its significance to urban and industrial systems beyond the region. However, provisions for its integration to federal level planning processes were not only absent but considered futile within the context of 'weak federal government' and a 'disintegrating state'. Instead, a 'self-contained' urban unit is envisaged that the director of the developing agency described as a 'planned city development' where spatial planning was restricted to the boundaries of the zone (fig. 12)

Fig. 11. Location and size of Geda SEZ in relation to major urban centres Addis Ababa, Adama and Mojo

[156] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC and current director of the Oromia Industrial Development Agency on 15.01.2020



Fig. 12. Geda Special Economic Zone Master Plan.

Right now, since I've moved to the Oromia Industrial Development Agency, ***we are working on one SEZ project****, it isn't public yet, but we are conducting a study in one place where the site is thousands of hectares.* ***The study is for city development but with the concept of industrial parks and its almost done. Everything that is contained in a city will be developed, the CBD, infrastructure, logistics. This was what we studied in Dire Dawa - planned city development****.*

[Q: A series of agencies are separately working on different layers of what ought to be one spatial framework, and you've just told me the Oromia region's own plans of developing a massive SEZ the size of a city, separate from all of these processes. How will all of these interact when they are realized? Can you really plan holistically as a separate entity?]

Ultimately, all rivers meet in the sea. *Like I've said before, this was something that was coordinated up until the death of Meles.* ***I consider the time since as an era of loss****. The reason for the losses is that no one will coordinate. There was an attempt to create collective leadership, but it only created dispersion.* ***There is a tendency to see regions are confederal states instead of federal states****. We have a single system; one country and national planning is very important but for that to work, we need a strong federal government.* ***We are disintegrating as a society and also disintegrating as a state.*** *You will only coordinate when the law requires you to. We simply don't have strong coordination between federal and regional agencies but*

what has happened to us because we are not coordinating, nothing. We all submit our separate and joint reports and are evaluated on this and that's it. [157]

A political economy of disintegration with enclosed regions preparing for an eventuality of succession, i.e. 'becoming small countries' or becoming 'confederal states' has increasingly narrowed prospects for functional (economic) and regional integration throughout the period of the development of industrial parks. The metaphor of the rivers (i.e., regions, sectoral agencies) 'running their own course' captures a state of resignation to this eventuality of national disintegration and to the vast unknowable whole the urban industrial nexus is understood to be under these conditions. Within the context of the verse in Ecclesiastes that this quote makes reference to, the *tirguaame* that Sisay makes here about the problem of planning the national urban industrial nexus -i.e, the unknowable whole (which is symbolized by the sea) - is that it is futile. And that since it is futile to pre-determine what the whole can be in uncertain times, it is important to instead focus on the contribution of the component parts (the regional plans symbolized as rivers) that will somehow come together without changing the nature of the nexus, should the Ethiopian state survive.

This interpretation of the problem removes the impetus for actors to conceive of or take responsibility for cross-regional issues within their planning in general, deterring possibilities for steering towards an integrated national urban-industrial systems. The next section reviews the same state of resignation at the federal level fostered by the disintegrating party-state (here primarily of the party bureaucracy instead of the ethnic federation) which has aggravated isolated and bounded sectoral thinking (here by domain instead of territory) allowing disparate spatial planning processes to proceed, in the absence of an overriding spatial development framework.

In summary this section has dealt with the broader process of economic disintegration that has emerged due to political and territorial barriers to spatial integration. The locations of constituting elements of urban and industrial systems (SEZs, transportation, industry, urban and rural settlements etc.…) determines their interactions, synergies or conflicts. However, the location, type and number of these elements are planned and governed by a range of sectoral and regional agencies and parastatals that are not working from a holistic picture of the spatial structure of the national space economy within which the urban-industrial system

[157] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC and current director of the Oromia Industrial Development Agency on 15.01.2020

is embedded. The next section looks at the nature of isolated sectoral spatial planning within this.

5.2. The emerging urban industrial spatial nexus

> *Where do we locate developments? where will the cities be? What will they specialize in? will the regional corridors align with federal corridors? There was a great gap in spatial thinking in GTP1 and GTPII* [158]

Having looked at the problem of isolated regional planning, this section situates the spatial integration challenges of the urban-industrial sphere within the wider context of lack of spatial integration across federal agencies that are shaping the structure of the Ethiopian space economy. By tracing the spatial thinking (or lack thereof) that lies behind the planning and location of various elements of the nexus following the disintegration at the center, the section brings to the fore the complex web of interactions between incongruent spatial frameworks that is shaping urban and industrial spatial development and thus their interface. Finally, it deals with the disparate spatial frameworks under development within the industrial sector itself and considers the impact of these on the urban systems that host proliferating industrial infrastructure projects.

5.2.1. Reconciling spatial policies

While the isolated regional planning discussed in the previous section has been increasingly prominent over the last decade, it is in many ways a new phenomenon in the Ethiopian context. Isolated sectoral spatial planning, on the other hand, has a much longer history within the modern Ethiopian state. Top-down, macroeconomic and sectorally driven national development planning have tended to overlook the importance of territorially based strategies, regional development planning and the coordination of the spatial dimension of sectoral policies, instead propagating the use of ad-hoc measures and unreconciled wide-ranging development policies with disparate spatial instruments (Robi et. al., 2021). Today, Ethiopia's spatial planning system remains highly fragmented by the decline in cross sectoral coordination brought on by the internal fracture of the central party bureaucracy (discussed in section 3.2). Serious coordination and integration challenges have become

[158] Interview with Seid Nuru, Senior Macro Economy advisor to the NPDC on 02.01.2020

increasing apparent in the various crises that have emerged across land use inconsistencies between urban, industrial and agricultural development (Alem, 2021); rail and road connectivity; infrastructural interfaces in cities (Rode et. al., 2020) and competition for resources more generally.

Since the 2014 nation-wide protests were sparked by the Addis Ababa Master Plan, spatial planning, especially integrative regional and trans-regional planning processes, have become increasingly interpreted as politically dangerous within the divided political system. As a result, spatial planning continues to play an insignificant role in the integration of economic development interventions. The State Minister of Urban Development described how attempts at improving the legal frameworks around spatial planning to allow for integrative national spatial planning have been met with cautious disregard from parliament which has to date not approved proposed legislations. At the same time, senior personnel in the National Planning Commission (NPDC) described how national and sectoral economic planning dominated the thinking of decision makers while integrative spatial frameworks were absent.

> ***There is a very strong phobia of planning in this country.*** *We tried to improve the legal frameworks around spatial planning and propose it to the government but there is this phobia. They said the federation council should look at this and the council just sat on it.* ***So, when you talk about planning now what comes to the mind of the leadership is the problem of the Addis Ababa Master Plan. When you talk about planning, people immediately go to borders*** **[boundaries between regions]**. *No one listens to the possibility of planning being borderless.*[159]
>
> *The spatial element is not in the mind of decision makers. Instead, there is a strong national or sectoral focus. The main spatial frames, i.e., urban centers; rural development; lands; transportation; and industry are not understood, and this needs a lot of work. If you were to be seriously looking at the development of the space economy, you would need to look at these. That kind of integration is simply non-existent because it is sectoral agencies* [e.g. land use, transport, urban, agricultural

[159] Interview with Tazer G/Egziabher, State Minister of Urban Development on 18.12.2019

and industrial development] *that are developing these spatial frames on their own.* [160]

In the absence of overarching national and regional spatial strategies or plans; a range of sectors have been separately developing plans what they claim to be 'integrative' sectoral spatial plans. The most significant of these spatial planning processes include **the Integrated Land Use Master Plan (MoFECC), the Integrated National Transport Planning (MoI), the National Urban Development Spatial Plan (MoUDH) and the National Industrial Spatial Plan** (IPDC). At the same time planners involved in each of these planning processes stressed the history of economically inefficient infrastructure planning driven by the political context and the distributive agenda of the party. The rest of this section looks at the ways in which this infrastructural planning and the practice of isolated planning across these sectoral spatial frames[161] - land use, transport, urban, agricultural and industrial development – are interpreted as political by various policy actors in sectoral agencies. The state of the integration of the urban-industrial nexus is revealed in their description of the state of development integration across the frames. Their direct quotes are presented in at length to highlight the language they use in describing the politics behind the fragmented spatial planning.

The land use spatial frame - The planning and integration of land use across sectors was recognized by the majority of interviewees as the most contentious, and problematic of the spatial frames and potentially the root challenge that underlies the lack of integration across the other frames. Following the 2016 national crisis, the importance of integrated land use management got a lot of attention, and a steering committee and project office were set up in 2017 under the prime minister's office to develop a national integrated land use policy that would legislate the development of a National Integrated Land Use Plan. The policy was still under development when the 2018 political reshuffle resulted in the project office being moved into the Ministry of Forestry, Environment and Climate Change (MoFECC).

[160] Interview with Prof. Tegegne G/Egziabher, Spatial policy Advisor to National Plan and Development Commission on 08.11.2019.

[161] The understanding that these spatial plans are all frameworks of an overarching spatial development framework is widely recognized across the planning professionals I interviewed in the various sectoral agencies. A couple of interviewees (Abebe Zeluel- MoUDH and Bulcha Berecha- MoFECC) even described their plans as spatial frames. I adopt their usage of the term spatial frame, despite the fact that a national spatial development framework, which would warrant the use of term, was non-existent during the period of my fieldwork.

Interviewees felt this diminished the ability of the project office to convene or coordinate other sectoral agencies.

Up to this very moment, the determination of land use is all random (zim bilo). Sectors quietly simply do their own plans. Cities produce their expansion plans following roads or settlement patters through their LDPs and Structural plans; and conflicts arise. Ministry of Agriculture cultivates what should be urban land, cities encroach on what should be agricultural land; Land set apart for roads is used for something else and so on. Same with industries, and all sorts of infrastructural development. We simply do not have any integrative processes when it comes to land use.

There is a long history of land use planning, but it has only been sectoral land use planning, i.e. the ministry of agriculture or the Ministry of Urban development would develop land use plans. As you know, ***when land has been allocated for projects in the past, it hasn't been based on any technical assessment. Prime agricultural land is given for industrial park development****.* ***There are a lot of conflicting interests in land****. In recent years, this has brought about a serious national crisis. So, since 2017, there is an effort to integrate the use of rural and urban land. A steering committee for the development of the integrated land use policy had been set up and it was made up ministers of the various sectors but when Abiy Ahmed came into office and all the ministers were reshuffled, the steering committee fell apart. So currently we are developing the policy which will give way to a plan but there is no federal platform for cross sectoral deliberation.*

The process has been moved into the Ministry of Forestry, Environment and Climate change (MOFECC). It is not only the spatial plan that will need to be reconciled but all of the sectoral legislature concerning land. This whole process will not work without the good will of all the sectors to work in an integrated manner because we cannot order anyone. This was why the steering committee was set up under the Prime Minister's office because ***if MoFECC was to try to convene all of these ministries, they simply would not comply. So, the biggest fear right now is if this organization is going to remain under one commission, it will not be productive and that is why we are struggling. You simply cannot do this at the ministerial level, it would have to be the Prime Minister who would convene and negotiations between the political people would have to happen there****.* *All sectors would present*

their agendas and it is there that conversations would need to happen. That is the only way you can solve this; the PM would have to preside over the negotiations. [162]

These challenges of integrated land use policy making speak to a larger dependence for intersectoral coordination on the PM office that is one of the legacies of the post 2001 restructuring that centralized coordination under PM Meles. The distribution of authority, i.e.- the elimination of alternative loci of power or decision under PM Meles's personalist regime in many ways institutionalized the elimination of horizontal coordination mechanisms.

The urban spatial frame was similarly understood, across the board, to be poorly integrated with rural/agricultural economy, transport infrastructural planning and industrial planning more generally. The National Urban Development Spatial Plan, an extensive national urban spatial development plan developed by MoUDH in 2015, was not approved by parliament again due to the political climate after the 2014 Addis Ababa Master Plan. The problem of reducing conflict and facilitating linkages between urban and agricultural/ rural and industrial development, in the absence of such a national urban spatial plan was identified as the most pressing integration challenge. In this context, urban planning was perceived by most as yet another isolated sectoral planning exercise that could not contribute to the integration of the national economy or facilitate inter-regional planning. The Spatial policy Advisor to NPDC stressed how at the very least the urban plan had gotten attention whereas regional spatial plans, which ought to have informed urban spatial plans, were virtually non-existent (section 4.2).

There is very little spatial thinking. ***The only things that come closer to considering space are cities and roads, but most urban plans are conceived in isolation of the surrounding areas so there's very little that brings together / links cities and rural areas****. The agricultural sector is similarly concerned with its own objectives of raising productivity and doesn't really have the orientation of thinking about how they can develop agriculture through urban centers.* ***Regions cascade national plans and do sectoral plans; they don't develop integrated spatial plans at the regional level. But cities and rural areas need to be linked and value chains need to be developed.***

[162] Interview with Bulcha Berecha, Land Use Planning Policy Framework Directorate Lead, MoFECC.

When MoUDH produced the NUDSP and even now when UNHABITAT talks about regional spatial plans, they are referring to urban plans and its immediate environment. but they will not deal with regional resource potentials or regional levels of socio-economic development or ask, 'How can we bring a balanced integrated regional spatial development plan?'. Because their mandate is cities, …. ***But regional planning and regional urban planning are different things****.* ***At national level you are looking at inter-regional development, integrating the country and enhancing productivity****.* ***But the urban spatial plan is mostly focused on the urban system, how it will evolve, which cities should grow and become connected to other cities.*** [163]

The transportation spatial frame is another core spatial frame that determines the structure of the urban-industrial nexus as transport infrastructure determines the structure of both urban systems and industrial ecosystems. However, both urban spatial planning and industrial spatial planning show critical inconsistencies with transport infrastructure planning. In the case of urban plans, although transport authorities claim they consult city administrations and ensure their plans are broadly integrated in urban plans, the fact that these two planning processes are approved by city administration and federal authorities respectively in the absence of an overarching national spatial plan leaves room for significant inconsistencies. This can be seen for instance in the planning of Northern Route 5 rail line (Woldiya- Asmera line) which bypasses Mekelle, the capital of the Tigray region, which hosts the Mekelle Industrial Park (MIP). The head of the transport logistics coordination bureau of the ministry of Transport stressed how the sectoral focus of the planning exercises and the fact that planning bodies answer to authorities within their own sectors only creates major gaps.

The transport authority plans its routes on its own. We were working on Mekelle's master plan when the transport authority was developing its rail route. They said they would not touch Mekelle because they were only concerned about slopes. They were planning to go through Kombolcha then Adigrat and pass through without going through the capital of the region. So, we asked 'Do you intend to kill the city? You're

[163] Interview with Prof. Tegegne G/Egziabher, Spatial policy Advisor to National Plan and Development Commission on 08.11.2019.

not just trying to open a line, you're determining where economic phenomena takes place'.

Who will listen to whom in this situation? They are doing the rail plan and we are doing Mekelle's master plan. We demarcated a different site, and they demarcated a different site and got it approved at the federal level. *if you were to look at the legality, it is our plan that will be implemented. It is the city plan that the city has approved that has precedence, not the federal government.* ***The rail station we have provided for and the rail station they have set are different. We provided our logic and they argued based on cost, essentially saying they fate of the city is none of our business.*** *This is a basic problem that you see everywhere. The roads authority plans its own network and transport nodes. All of this has an effect on the city. Integration is key, if you can't integrate these projects, you will not have the desired outcomes.* [164]

There is very little coordination between responsible agencies for road and urban development. Land use and transportation planning is not well integrated, and you see how this has become a problem in cities. [165]

Upward accountability and the focus on sectoral performance overshadows inter-sectoral problem solving within the party-bureaucratic system more generally but in the post Meles era, this has become heightened as discussed in section 3.2.2. This was also the case in the various processes of industrial development which also proceeded without consultation with the authorities planning the transportation system. Whilst transport planning authorities held that this has created significant challenges for industrial productivity, they nevertheless were engaging in a new planning project for an 'Integrated National Transportation Master Plan' where they were to going to '*do the land use-transport integration planning*' whether or not input from relevant agencies would be available**.**

Industrial planning is not coordinated well with the transportation system. ***They*** **[IPs]** ***were built in places where transport infrastructure was not well developed, if they were developed, they were not developed to the standard that is required for***

[164] Interview with Abebe Zeleul, Land Management and Housing Directorate MoUDH, on 17.12.2019
[165] Interview with Atnafseged Kifle, Transport logistics coordination Bureau Head at Ministry of Transport on 14. 01.2020

industrial centers. *The requirements and needs of the industrial sector should be looked into with respect to transportation infrastructure facility development. What we are doing now, because the industrial parks were not established on the transport lines (railways, roads and air transport), we are trying to meet the industrial parks where they are because there wasn't any initial coordination at the planning stage with the transport system.* ***We were not consulted and the way they started locating the parks****.* ***Any development at that scale needs to look at transport and land use planning and should try to fit into the spatial structure and networks already established.*** *The location of some of the industrial parks is not in line with the master plan of the individual cities or the masterplan of overall land use transport plans.*

The industrial parks were developed irrespective of the transport needs, i.e., the way they would move commodities or workers in and out of the industrial parks. They've shifted the urban planning norm where workers would live close to the industrial parks so that transportation times would be minimized. That has not thought of because we now see that people who work in the industrial parks are travelling long distances which has financial and time costs.

*We are now working on an Integrated National Transportation Master Plan that will look into the urban movement, commodity movement and the demand analysis will be there, and that master plan and it will be an enabler to industries, agriculture and movement of people as well. We have prepared National Transport Policy which will guide the planning process. The transportation master plan will look into land use because transportation has to serve different land uses****, if at that point the national land use planning problem has been addressed by other bodies then it will be an input for us but whether they supply it or not we will be doing the land use-transport integration planning.*** [166]

Transport authorities ascribed a large share of their past inability to coordinate or promote efficiency both in urban and industrial development, to the nature of decision making that prioritized the distorted distribution of infrastructure over economic efficiency. The

[166] Interview with Atnafseged Kifle, Transport logistics coordination Bureau Head at Ministry of Transport on 14. 01.2020

distortions were viewed as either favoring TPLF's home region of Tigray or pacifying some ethnic group or other (as discussed in 5.1).

> *The way road and rail networks have been executed over the past 20 years is difficult to explain because it did not follow any economic evaluation of road or railway network development.* ***It was political decisions that were leading the development of transport infrastructure. There is ample evidence of this,*** *if you go to the southwest where we produce a huge amount of coffee, they don't have sufficient, standardized roads to take out their products to the international market. When you go to Tigray the road network is complete now, so this is a very big disparity that has been created by the political decisions, so we have to stop that.* ***Lots of roads have been constructed but key developments remain disconnected from roads and rail lines. The new Integrated transport plan will look at economic viability and social integration*** [167]

> *When you look at the industry parks, they were developed long after the establishment of the rail line masterplans. One of two things should have happened, either the rail master plan should have been revised when the potential industrial sites were known, or* ***the industrial parks should have been established along the rail corridors that had been set in the rail master plan****.* ***But what happened when one park was built in Adama, one had to be built in Semera and Jimma in a sort of quota system due to the nationality focus of our politics. It shouldn't have been the case. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti Corridor was already under construction, it is obvious that being close to the bulk transport system that the rail provides could have been instrumental for the parks because they are export parks****.*

> ***The corporation was set up with the eight rail projects already defined****. Full financing couldn't be secured, it was only possible to build some of the lines planned under GTP 1 so the projects had to be prioritized.* ***The corporation did not have any say in prioritizing key rail projects. I feel the decision making in the Industrial Parks Development Program is the same as decision making in the Rail Development Program. Neither are based on the big picture of tapping into***

[167] Interview with Atnafseged Kifle, Transport logistics coordination Bureau Head at Ministry of Transport on 14. 01.2020

economic potential or improving economic efficiency by focusing on the comparative advantages of regions. Instead, it is all based on our ethnic politics of making sure X, Y, and Z also get this or tha*t. As an implementing agency, it [rail corporation] builds what it is told to build in the sequence that it is given. All strategic decisions, as we all know, are made politically.* [168]

The legal frameworks that force you to coordinate spatially are simply not there *and people don't even really perceive or criticize the state of development coordination at that level, the most people notice is infrastructure coordination (power, roads, water) so a proclamation came out and an agency was set up*[169] *but even that is not operational. The National Planning Commission is leading on National Economic Development but where that could happen, it's not looking at the spatial dimension. So, it is not bringing about spatial coordination.*[170]

The recognition of the need for overarching National Spatial Development legislation, strategies and frameworks was shared by all of the sectoral agencies that were interviewed in the session. As the body responsible for the coordination of economic development planning, many attributed the role of spatial coordination of economic activities to the National Planning and development commission. However NPDC did not manage to take on spatial development coordination within the political environment that GTPII was being implemented in.

5.2.2. Isolated planning of Industrial Infrastructure within the Industrial Sector

The final spatial frame, **the industrial spatial frame**, is examined separately in this sub section to allow for a more in-depth discussion. While the lack of integration of the industrial planning with the other spatial frames has been indirectly discussed in the previous section, this section briefly reviews inconsistencies within the sector itself. The review of the sector is not exhaustive but only looks at the Industrial Parks development program (IPD), the most significant industrial spatial instrument instigated in GTP I and implemented until the end of the GTP II period. Within this, the section looks at the disconnect between

[168] Interview with Abiy Getachew, Deputy CEO of the Ethiopian Rail Corporation on 23.01.2020
[169] Abebe is referring to the Federal Infrastructural Development Coordination Agency (FIDCA)
[170] Interview with Abebe Zeleul, Land Management and Housing Directorate MoUDH, on 17.12.2019

three overlapping regimes of industrial parks development that have had a significant impact in shaping the emerging national industrial landscape: the federal IPDC-led IP development regime; the Federal Ministry of Trade and Industry led AIP and SME cluster center development regimes implemented by regional IPDCs and city administrations respectively; and private industrial parks development facilitated by EIC. These IPD regimes have been carried out simultaneously during the GTP1 / GTP II periods (2010-2020) with varying degrees of success and very little spatial coordination.



Fig. 13. The different regimes of Industrial Park Development (by author)

The federal IPDC-led industrial parks development regime, which this study has predominantly focused on, was set in motion by the 2014 Industrial parks development proclamation. As discussed in section 3.3, prior to this point IPD had been under the Ministry of Industry (MoI). Following the heated discussion in the council of ministers in 2014 [171], the 2014 amendment to the investment proclamation and 2015 IPDC establishment proclamation moved IPD into a new institutional arrangement (fig.13) where an investment

[171] The discussions were part of the deliberations around the IPDC establishment proclamation (discussed in 3.3), where Ahmed Abetew (the Minister of Industry at the time) had famously walked out when his point, that the mandates of IPDC would overlap with mandates of other ministries, was not taken up.

board chaired by the PMO would coordinate IPD directly through the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) which was vested with new powers and IPDC, which was newly established. The coordination between these three authorities, EIC, MoI and IPDC, over the following six years during which a majority of IPs were built was infamously poor.

> *Federal organizations are not coordinated (aynabebum) for example the MOI is planning industries, EIC does industrial parks and the two* [MoI and EIC] *do not communicate across. In the past, the people who had power were people around the PM office like Dr. Arkebe had a better say and influence on where parks should be placed, the advisors to the PMO. The fact that there are these three authorities* [EIC ,IPDC, MoI] *requires coordination and do they really coordinate? Do they understand each other or are they in conflict over mandates?*[172]

One of the mandates given to IPDC in its foundational proclamation was the development of a national spatial plan for industrial development. While the locations and sites of all of the industrial parks had been decided by late 2015, IPDC would not embark on the development of the national spatial plan until 2020. While some interviewees gave the justification that the spatial planning exercise was delayed due to budget constraints, the highly political site selection decision making process would suggest decision makers did not want to be constrained by a formal planning process.

During this time the Ministry of Industry had shifted its focus to the development of IPs for domestic manufacturers under two programs. For the first program, the SME cluster centers program, MOI established the Small and Medium Enterprises Development agency (SMEDA) in 2016, which would be responsible for the cluster-based SME centers in 700 woredas[173] across the country. The cluster centers were to be built on **50, 100 and 250 hectares** of land depending on the business potential and the stage of development of the location. SMEDA commissioned Mahindra Consulting engineers which developed Small and Medium Enterprises Cluster Development Plan (SMECDP)[174] which included prototypical designs for the 50, 100- and 250-hectares typologies that would be adopted by

[172] Interview with Seid Nuru, Senior Macro Economy advisor to the NPDC on 02.01.2020
[173] There are 800 woredas in total, meaning SME clusters would be established in over 85% of the woredas in the country.
[174] The plan remains unavailable to the public, the only documentation I could elicit from SMEDA are the two pictures of the 50- and 100-hectare typology protypes shown here.

the different woredas across the country. The cluster center projects are being implemented in collaboration with city administrations and regional IPDCs (as applicable) in all regions.



Fig.14. 50- and 100-hectare typologies prototype designs from the SMECDP by Mahindra consult

The second national wide IP development program that has been launched by Ministry of Industry is the Integrated Agro-Industrial Parks (IAIP) Development Program. Conceived as part of an international initiative under UNIDO's ESID [175]mandate to assist countries to attain SDG objectives, the Ethiopian IAIP development program was launched in 2009 in a collaboration between UNIDO, FAO, the Ministry of Industry and Ministry of Agriculture. The Ethiopian IAIP program envisioned the development of 17 agro industrial parks across the country, each linked to a network of Rural Transformation Centers which provide linkages to producers (farmers, farmers associations and collection centers fig.15). Four of the 17 IAIPs- Baeker in Tigray, Yirgalam IAIP in SNNPR, Bure IAIP in Amhara and Bulbula IAIP in Oromia region - were selected as pilot projects to be developed in the first phase by regional IPDCs.

[175] UNIDO mandate to promote Ecologically Sustainable Industrial Development (ESID)



Fig. 15. Conceptual diagram of IAIP-RTC- Producer networks (SNNPR IPDC, 2018)



Fig. 16. National IAIP pilot projects infrastructure connectivity map (UNIDO, 2016:9)



Fig. 17. Yirgalem IAIP in SNNPR. (UNIDO, 2016)

Fig. 18. Dilla Rural Transformation Center in SNNPR (SNNPR IPDC, 2018)

The Ministry of Industry, not only set up SMEDA in 2016, but also regional IPDCs in all regional capitals and in the charter cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The regional IPDCs are responsible for the construction and administration of IAIPs, RTCs and Cluster

centers; the development and maintenance of infrastructure in and around the parks; and the facilitation of governmental service provision in one stop shops (SNNPR IPDC, 2018). They are however only accountable to regional governments and do not have any mandates to work with the Federal IPDC which sits under a different institutional structure under the PMO's office. As a result, some regional IPDCs have been engaged in the development of Regional Manufacturing Roadmaps that include additional IAIPs.

> *There is no spatial or regional plan for the Southern region. But there is a regional manufacturing roadmap that the region has had studied where we looked at what resources are available and what we should be focusing on. There is no national roadmap for industrial infrastructure development. Regions, on their own time are having studies carried out. This is something that needs extensive attention. Regions are studying and planning to develop additional agro-Industrial parks on their own initiation… In SNNPR, we are considering four IAIPs and we are conducting the studies for this… The agro-industrial park development is supposed to be at pilot stage and so we should be developing one park for the whole country. The reason four pilot industrial parks are being built all at once was political experience. If you start it in SNNPR only, you would have problems with the other regions. But it is not just stopping at four at pilot stage, regions will build more. The Ministry of Industry has been asking regions to stop what they are doing on their own initiation, but no one is listening to the MOI.* [176]

While the development of additional IAIPs is not in itself problematic, the scale of the projects and their impact on urban or industrial systems call for careful spatial planning and coordination which at present is lacking. The SNNPR pilot IAIP, the Yirgalem IAIP, was developed in a town with a population of 43, 185[177] and is envisioned to employ 400,000 at full capacity. The rural transformation centers that will be feeding into the Yirgalem IAIP are to be built on 10 hectares of land each and located within a 10 km radius in Dilla , Bensa-daye and Yigra-Chefe.

[176] Interview with Birru Wolde, Director of SNNP regional IPDC on 25.02.20

[177] This figure is from the last national census in 2005 by the Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency. Although the population is expected to have grown, the town did not appear in the >50,000 category of the 2017 projected population. They mayor suggested a population of around 80,000.

The implications of the inflow of a population this size on the small town of Yirgalem are not lost on the town's mayor or the director of the SNNP Regional IPDC, who were both engaged in efforts within their capacity to try and imagine, plan and prepare for these implications. But their foresight does not extend beyond the infrastructure development demands that are already arising in the immediate vicinity of the IAIPs and does not extend beyond this to consider implications on land use planning, transportation planning, broader infrastructural demands or urban-industrial planning at the regional and national level discussed in section 5.1. This case also illustrates how regional urban planning in the absence of regional economic planning holds very limited integrative potential for urban industrial systems.

> **Yirgalem IAIP will host over 400 companies and is expected to employ 395,000** workers. This will both strain and build the capacity of the town administration. [178]
>
> *In Yirgalem,* ***we are trying to connect the park with the city because it is unavoidable. we are constructing an access road around it, we are building smaller roads outside the park, we are working so that the area gets electricity and builds homes because the housing you might build inside the park won't be sufficient so workers can live in the surroundings****. the AIPs the value chain starts from the farmers' fields. so, this is closer to the farmers, and it shouldn't be too far from the cities, so the park is not in Yirgalem city, it is outside the city. But it completely shifted the growth direction of the city*.[179]

The IPDC led IP development Program

The cluster centers and IAIPs discussed above are programs that have no direct linkages with the Industrial Parks development Program discussed in previous chapters. The IPDC has led the development of IPs geared toward the attraction of FDI. GTP I envisioned the establishment of five IPs but only the development of Bole Lemi had commenced by the end of the plan period. By the end of GTPII (2020), IPDC had developed 11 IPs and commenced with the planning of 4 additional parks (see fig.19).

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[178] Interview with Yitna Belay, Yirgalem City Mayor on 10.10.2019

[179] Interview with Birru Wolde, Director of SNNP regional IPDC on 25.02.20

However, this acceleration in the development of IPs allowed for very little room for coordination or planning as discussed in chapter 3. The development of new IPs suddenly came to a halt in 2019 following the shift of the political reform processes that were commenced in 2018. The new administration took a more cautious spending policy took over in light of the national debt crisis. The focus shifted towards optimization of existing IPs and along with this the development of Satellite parks[180] within 100km Radius of existing IPs. The optimization focus was what prompted the National IP Spatial Plan (NIPSP) (2020).

By late 2020, the NIPSP planning process had reached the diagnostic phase, where it presented a strong overview of the urban and social development context which included a brief urban systems analysis of IP hosting urban centers as well as a strong overview of the state of physical infrastructural development pertaining to the infrastructural needs of the Industrial Parks developed by IPDC. Although the study presented a thorough diagnosis of the state of IPs, it came much too late to affect spatial coordination between the IP regimes.

	IP Name	Area	Region	Status
1	Bole Lemi I	187	Addis Ababa	Operational
2	Bole Lemi II	181	Addis Ababa	Semi Operational
3	Kilinto	279	Addis Ababa	Under Construction
4	Hawassa	300	SNNPR	Operational
5	Mekelle	1000	Tigray	Operational
6	Kombolcha	800	Amhara	Operational
7	Adama	2000	Oromia	Operational
8	Bahir Dar	1000	Amhara	Operational

[180] There has been almost no elaboration of the form of these parks beyond the announcement of their development during the 2019 IP optimization Workshop led by IPDC and a proposal map in late 2020

9	Debre Birhan	1000	Amhara	Operational
10	Jimma	150	Oromia	Operational
11	Dire Dawa	4068	Dire Dawa	Semi Operational
12	Airlines and Logitics Park	200	Addis Ababa	Planning Stage
13	Arrerti	-	Amhara	Planning Stage
14	Alage	-	Oromia	Planning Stage
15	Semera	-	Afar	Planning Stage
16	Assosa	-	Benshangul-Gumz	

Fig. 19. Overview of Federal IPDC led IP development

At this stage, however, the Diagnostic Report did not delve into the spatial coordination of the various IP regimes beyond identifying the pilot IAIPs and 3 privately developed IPs. The report remains incognizant of the IPs, IAIPs and SEZs being developed by regional IPDCs, or the Cluster Centers being developed by city administrations. At the same time, regional IPDCs were not only unaware of IPDCs NIPSP spatial planning process but also did not for the most part recognize its authority to plan or implement such a plan. Furthermore, the interpretation of IPDC as a party-led parastatal so closely linked with the center of the party, both grants it a great deal of political power but also some arena discredits it due to perceptions of association with ethnic preference.

> ***I am hearing that IPDC is developing a National Spatial Plan from you. I am the CEO of the regional IPDC and I don't know anything about what the federal IPDC is doing,*** *I am hearing about these satellite industrial parks from you. There is no integration or coordination. IPDC ought to make the planning participatory but now it is moving on its own. At federal level, two studies are being conducted, the first one is the one that is being carried out by IPDC and then there is the SMEDA study. These two are not coordinating.* ***If it is carried out IPDC, it will be viewed as having come from Tigray, Oromia or what not and it will not acceptable.*** *But if the two ministries study it and it is passed on as a national document and IPDC could take part in the*

study as well, but it doesn't have the mandate. It may have the mandate to do a spatial plan for the developments that it would itself undertake but how could it ensure the implementation of spatial policies beyond the parks that it would build, who would guide the developments that the regions undertake? This is a major gap. And this can be stopped. IPDC cannot stop me from building a park in SNNPR.[181]

In late 2020, an IP spatial plan proposal map (fig. 20), one of the final phases and products of the National IP spatial Planning Process, was unveiled to the public. The plan proposes the development of five logistics parks (Adigrat, Semera, Metemma, Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Moyale), five special economic zones, over 25 development IPs and over 50 Satellite Industrial parks. All of these designations, other than logistics parks, are new to the Ethiopian legislative context. As such their distinctions and potential interactions with the other IP regimes remains unclear. (Addis Fortune, 2021; Endale, 2021)



Fig. 20. National IP Spatial Plan proposal Map (Endale, 2021)

There are 31 cities in SNNPR. While the IPDC parks focus on FDI, these parks [IAIPs and Cluster centers] are focused on local firms. Cluster centers will be studied in all cities, and they will reserve land in all cities but the centers will only be developed where there is capacity. At the same time, we wanted the Rural Transformation centers to be in cities so it's closer to markets and it is good for cities. It is in the SNNPR manufacturing roadmap. And then we have the Cluster Centers which are aimed at small and medium manufacturing. The big ones go into the parks and the smaller ones go into Cluster Centers. There are also a lot of private parks that are coming along. I don't know if you've heard about this but just recently this Chinese

[181] Interview with Birru Wolde, Director of SNNP regional IPDC on 25.02.20

manufacturer has started a private park on 300 hectares of land in Worabella. …There are more coming and how do you handle this because this creates competition for resources and could create infrastructure integration problems. there is no holistic vision at the regional or national level. [182]

Currently there are no linkages between the planning of the IPDC-led IPs, the IAIPs, the Cluster Center Development and Private Industrial parks development across the country. The absence of strategic spatial planning of the industrial landscape has significant repercussions not only for the economic integration of these various regimes of IP development but for regional and urban development plans more generally.

The federal government is driving projects in various regions but there is a gap when you look at all how well these projects are being integrated to projects that are being developed by the regions themselves or more generally with the regional development needs or agenda*s. Every region wants to have a university but when it comes, they are not thinking about how it can be integrated into their own plans to promote the regions. The industrial park should have been integrated at regional level and the question of why Hawassa, or Yirgalem or Dilla should have been asked and discussed.* ***How do you reconcile federal projects to regional needs and industrial development agendas?*** *All the regions want federal universities or railway lines, but it is not just that these projects are developed but how these projects are integrated into regional development agendas and planning efforts.* ***The question of how can these projects be used to leverage development at the regional level is something that we still need to ask****.* [183]

Whilst some interviewees recognized the potential consequences of the isolated nature of the planning and development of IPs; others echoed the resignation to the state of affairs and determination to focus on their piece of the undefined whole with a strong sense that this represented progress in the planning sphere. An attitude reminiscent of Sisay's analogy of the rivers (here, isolated IP regimes) meeting in the sea (here, urban space).

[182] Interview with Birru Wolde, Director of SNNP regional IPDC on 25.02.20
[183] Interview with Prof. Tegegne G/Egziabher, Spatial policy Advisor to National Plan and Development Commission on 08.11.2019.

> ***There are integration and awareness gaps. We have a steering committee but the past few years…because there were some problems… The ministry of Industry is in one place, IPDC is in another and EIC is also in another place***[184]***, they is a dispersion****. If it had been possible that they were led by the same steering committee whether that be a ministry, commission or whatever it would have had to be, whatever the case what we do as a country should feed into each other, the output of one should be the input of the other. There should be the kind of information gap there has been of late.* ***But I believe this will get better. There were instances of pushing each other around (Yemegefafat Negeroch Neberu) and everyone was taking their own course but, in a way, while we ought to coordinate, our work and IPDC's work, for example in a city like Sodo***[185]***, taking into consideration the population of that size, our collective results will not even suffice. Even if SMEDA were to build two 250-hectare Cluster Centers and IPDC was to build one of its satellite parks, it would not absorb the existing population and resources.*** *If we don't establish the cluster centers now, the cities will haphazardly produce substandard sheds for SMEs all over the place and occupy the land anyway'. The production of manufacturing space is inevitable because the city administration can't afford not to provide jobs.* ***This way at least we structure the development to some degree unlike in the past when people just kept going without knowing where they were going***[186]

The three overlapping regimes of industrial parks development share the objective of creating employment and enhancing productivity in cities and towns and to some policy actors this suggests that as long as they are contributing to this shared sectoral objective, their isolated efforts can be justified and in fact more industrial development is needed. From a cross sectoral perspective (i.e.- an urban-industrial systems perspective) however, the cumulative effect of the three regimes present consequences that extend beyond the sum of their parts and beyond the implication for industrialization alone, including a range of unintended consequences for the physical integration of these industrial developments in host cities. The next section deals with these challenges of infrastructural integration through

[184] This is a direct translation. When Asfaw is referring to as place here is not physical space but an indirect reference to the absence of common or shared spaces where these agencies meet or coordinate.
[185] Sodo is the second most populous city in the SNNP region after Hawassa with a population of 161, 450
[186] Interview with Asfaw Abebe, Director of Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency on 03.03.2020

a closer look at the case of Hawassa Industrial Park and the isolated planning of IPDC and the city administration.

5.3. The emerging urban industrial infrastructural nexus

The final section of this chapter deals with the shared infrastructural systems that tie together the fate of urban livability with that of industrial parks productivity. I look at the outcomes around drainage, power, housing and water provision arising out of the disconnected processes of planning and development carried out by IPDC and the Hawassa city administration. The first sub section discusses some of these outcomes of the various infrastructural integration challenges arising out of the disjointed development focusing on the initial period when Hawassa Industrial Park (HIP) became operational, which is when defects in the infrastructural interface first became apparent. The second section provides a detailed account of one of the challenges, that on housing, looking at how the problem has persisted in spite of the various housing provision schemes attempted in by IPDC. The case of HIP gives a glimpse of the status of the housing provision challenges in industrial infrastructure host cities across the board.

5.3.1. Infrastructural Integration

> *There were major integration challenges with the city. Starting from the development and going into operations there were many gaps. It goes back to the fact that the planning for the park was not integrated into the city's urban planning. So, we had to initially rely on the city for water, power and there was also a major problem with drainage.*[187]

The lack of coordinated planning between park development and urban infrastructural systems resulted in a series of infrastructural integration challenges when the park went into operations. While most of these challenges have been addressed over time, they presented significant challenges during the first couple of years of park operations, shaping public perceptions of the parks and relations with city administrations. In an assessment that McKinsey and Co. conducted in the first year of HIPs operations (discussed in section 4.3.1), some of the most basic infrastructural provision arrangements between IPDC and Hawassa

[187] Interview with Wondwossen Reta, After care and IP management Director IPDC, on 10.12.2019

city administrations remained unclear. Within this gap, challenges emerged and were given attention in an ad hoc fashion some finding immediate resolutions, others remaining unresolved for longer periods. Amongst these, challenges that arose around housing, drainage, water and power provision were understood to be the most significant.

The first major infrastructural challenge, that drew attention to the disconnect between HIP and its immediate surrounding was the failure of the city's drainage system to handle the runoff from the park. A few months after the park opened, a flooding incident in 2017 sparked a great deal of public controversy. Groups of residents approached sub-city administrations demanding the park be closed or held responsible for damages. The city administration temporarily created a retention pond along the abandoned landing strip of the old airport site across the street from the park. IPDC was put under public scrutiny with a series of public discussions held on the matter. Eventually IPDC took on the problem and allocated funds for the construction of a canal that would direct the run-of into the lake.

> ***In Hawassa industrial park as soon as the construction was complete, the city flooded****. Because 140 hectares of land we developed used to be farmland that would absorb rainwater, suddenly it was all asphalt and roofing, and every drop of water became runoff. So, the effort to try and reassess the drainage system started. A great expense went into constructing the canal that would collect the water coming from the park and take it to an appropriate destination. The canal was 8m deep.* ***This*** **[initial failure]** ***signals the lack of integration with the city administration and its masterplan****.* [188]

While the city was responsible for all of the city's drainage system, IPDC took on the development of special drainage solution, a closed canal system, for the park to make sure that the parks drainage could be regulated separately from the city's drainage to ensure that HIP wasn't releasing contaminants into the city's drainage system. Even so, stakeholders from the university held that the size of the canal and the speed and the volume of water that it was directly dumping into the lake meant it would cause significant damage to the lake floor and the biodiversity of the lake. Although there was a concerted call for the creation of wetlands that would prevent this damage, this proposal never developed into concrete plans by the city or IPDC. The flooding problem and the rushed canal solution could have

[188] Interview with Wondwossen Reta, After care and IP management Director IPDC, on 10. 12. 2019

been avoided had there been early coordination between IPDC and the city administration concerning drainage but as discussed in chapter 4 IPDC-City coordination was weak and key personnel were subsumed into the park development effort.

A less public and controversial issue, but a critical issue that arose was the problem of meeting the power demands of the park during the construction and initial stages of operation of the park. During the two years it took to develop the permanent substation for the park, the city was confronted with the problem of reduced supply of power.

> *Power was a big issue. It was a very difficult problem. When the park came to the city, the city was not prepared for that, so the power issue was a major issue. A dedicated power station was set up for the park, and what this resolved was so that it wouldn't burden (indayishama) the city's power supply. But until the permanent substation was put in place, there was a big problem for the city. The city's power grid has five main lines. Line 1 was dedicated to the industrial park. And this was a big burden because during this time there was a national shortage of power. The power for line 1 never went off because the power to the park couldn't be interrupted so the reduced supply to the city affected all the other lines which would alternate throughout the week.* ***It was not a major public issue because only people on the inside were aware that the industrial park that was burdening the city during times of shortage. people generally assumed the overall national power shortage problem was the only cause.*** [189]

More generally the development of the 11 industrial parks involved the transformation of the national network of power. Each dedicated sub-substation set up for the parks required the extensive upgrading of the power distribution system all along the lines coming from the power generation plants and dams. In the long term, this has built the potential to allow more surplus power to be accessible to cities as it has indirectly drawn investment to the upgrading of the country's power distribution system. While this has indirect benefits for increasing the cities' overall power supply where power stations are functioning at full capacity and there is surplus power, it has also had the disadvantage of compromising the cities' power supply during power shortage.

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[189] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 06.12.20.

When it comes to power, you have to request it from the city. When we first started Hawassa Industrial Park, we asked the city to give us 10MW to start with, and to prepare for the 30 to 40MW that we would need once the construction was done and the 280MW when operations would start. They initially provided us with 8MW and then brought us a mobile substation which provided around 40MW and now the permanent substation is in place...to provide power at this scale, ***the power distribution system has to be upgraded starting from where the dam is, new substations have to be built all along the line. So, when power was needed, the system was upgraded in Debre Ziet and Assela. Related to the industrial parks, EEPCo is setting up 10 major substations and upgrading existing substations to allow these substations to function, this is a complete transformation of the national network of power.*** *The upgrading of the distribution system increases the amount of power and potentially surplus power that is coming to these cities.* ***In spite of this however, the presence of the park can still be a burden on the city at times when there is power shortage due to insufficient rain or siltation in the dams. Because the power to the parks can't be interrupted and the total power coming to the city decreases, power to the city is compromised.*** [190]

However, the investment in the power system came at the cost of the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo). The corporation was pressured to push ahead with the development of distribution line and substation for Hawassa in the absence of clear financial arrangements and planning around this. The demand for energy had grown in a series of other sectors as well in this period and the financing of some of the IP related power projects contributed to serious financial distress that the EEPCo would later face due to unsettled debts.[191]

Yet another, more immediate, challenge that arose as HIP started operating was around transportation for workers. A series of ideas and proposal were developed by the city, but these did not materialize. Amongst these were the use of bicycles; connecting investors with the city's transport providers; and importing new buses to take on the additional transport needs of the city. The transport void was filled by busses that had been serving the city. Busses were rented by the investors to transport their workers, and this has taken the buses

[190] Interview with Tinsae Yimam, Operations Manager IPDC, on 16.12.2019
[191] The corporation had accumulated a debt 191.8 billion birr between 2004 and 2016

out of circulation in the city which has resulted in fewer buses for commute in the city resulting in higher fares for trips.

> *There were plans around transportation, to give workers cycles on loan, that wasn't done. On public transport, we did studies with the city and the tenants association on how private transport providers could take part and in fact I undertook that study. Modes of transport and bringing in duty* [tarrif] *free buses but this was also never implemented because there was no commitment from IPDC. The task was to organize private transport providers to get organized and bring in buses, but this never happened. There are 200 buses currently providing service to workers and this is being shared with the city. it's great for job creation and generating revenue but it also has a side effect on the city dwellers because these buses used to give service in the city now, they don't so the demand of the park creates inflation in the city. something could have been done by working with the tenant's association and encouraging private sector, because it ends up having an effect on workers productivity*[192]

The fact that 200 buses were put out of their circulation in the city to cater to industrial workers reduced the supply in cities leading to a hike in public transportation cost for the population. While workers could get to the factories on time, they would be subject to these same transportation costs where they go into the city, opting instead to walk to most of their destinations to save money. This would include trips to get water into the new settlements they were in which did not have water lines.

Water was yet another area where the park became dependent on the city's supply. Although here, IPDC had put in some forethought and dug a borehole inside the park, the water from the borehole was found to be high in fluoride and thus not potable. Attempts to treat the water were found to be too expensive and eventually the park turned to the city for its supply of water.

> *Except for Addis, contractors were digging bore holes in most of the parks. But* ***because the water from the borehole in HIP didn't meet the standard, we are taking water from the city.*** *It was assumed that there would be sufficient water and it was only when the park was becoming operational that we realized the water was too high*

[192] Interview with Birru Wolde, Former City Manager for Hawassa City Administration on 06.11.19

in Fluoride and doesn't meet WHO standards. There were attempts to treat it but it took time and by this time the investors had come in so we started taking water from the city[193]

Beyond the infrastructural integration challenges however IPDC has had to step in to fill a series of additional gaps in urban service provision ranging from security services to fire protection, not just in the IPs but in the cities more widely. In fire protection IPDC's efforts have been beneficial to the city as the park's fire station has also been used by the city on numerous occasions. However, having to set up these services has created significant financial burdens for IPDC which it maintains ought to be taken over by the MoUDH. This has however not found a resolution to date and continues to be covered by IPDC's Aftercare and IP Management Directorate. Some IPDC personnel interpreted these as having overextended the scope of IPDC's mandate and as being the mandate of MoUDH.

Industries are prone to fire, but the cities don't have the capacity to prevent fires, they don't have fire brigades. Security, where you have 20,000 people sitting in one place and coming in and out, the cities are just not prepared at that level. There are strikes and managing them, worker's attitude is problem [security services were provided by the city's police force]. *the other thing is health. we have tried to provide a clinic there but one clinic for 20,000 workers is not necessarily sufficient. so these are all problems besides housing.*[194]

There are a lot of extra expenses that IPDC has been forced to take on because cities are not able to provide fire protection, manage industrial waste, and so many other things. If cities were ready to take on these demands, IPDC would never have gone into those kinds of commitments… At the moment, IPDC has taken on the burden of integrating so many things and I don't think this is right. ***I think the MoUDH has to take on this role of integrating park development and city development.*** [195]

To summarize, the development and operationalization of IPDC came along with a range of infrastructural integration problems that could have been averted through closer planning coordination between IPDC and the Hawassa City Administration. The fact that these

[193] Interview with Tinsae Yimam, Operations Manager IPDC, on 16.12.2019
[194] Interview with Amare Asgedom, Deputy CEO of IPDC (Park Design and Development) on 09.12.2019
[195] Interview with Wondwossen Reta, After care and IP management Director IPDC, on 10. 12. 2019

challenges arose in one of the biggest and comparatively well-resourced cities indicates that the development of the different and overlapping industrial regimes in smaller cities could entail similar challenges. The following section delves into housing, the most immediate and critical of the infrastructural integration challenges facing all cities hosting IPs. HIP has been the largest IP developed so far and solutions for workers housing for all IPs have all been tested on this park. The discussion of the Hawassa's housing crisis and the various interventions around it therefore give a picture of the state of worker's housing problem across Industrial Park host cities.

5.3.2. The isolated planning of Housing initiatives

This last section of this chapter provides a detailed account of all the housing schemes attempted in HIP so far and their outcomes. The construction of Hawassa Industrial Park (HIP) commenced prior to the completion of the overall design of the park including the determination of the design program, i.e., the number of workers, sheds and housing units was not a fixed figure that informed a comprehensive design of the park. IPDC had conducted a preliminary assessment before the onset of construction where it had identified workers' housing as a critical area of concern. According to the IPDC operations manager for HIP, this had been communicated with the city administration at the time and the city had committed to developing condominium[196] housing for HIP within a year of the park being built. While this communication was not confirmed by the city administration (possibly due to the turnover in city administration higher officials), the Integrated Housing Development Program for Hawassa was halted around this time along with other secondary cities due to federal government budget constraints.

> *The condominium solution that they had suggested didn't work out, they did get the money they needed but there was the assumption that rental housing will be sufficient in the city, and it was left at that. It was only when we got into operations that the pressure came full force and the rush to do the Sidama Micro Finance housing took*

[196] Public Housing developed and subsidized by the federal governments under the grand housing program (2004- 2021) also known as the Integrated Housing Development Program (IHDP). The program was initiative led by Arkebe Oqubay while he was mayor of Addis Ababa and adopted in secondary cities across the country under the funding of the federal government (UNHABITAT, 2011:28). The IHDP program was halted in a number of cities due to budgetary constraints after 2015.

over. But in the beginning, it was assumed that the city would meet the demands for housing. [197]

The number of workers expected in HIP changed and evolved during the actual construction of sheds. Initially it was estimated that there would be fifteen to twenty thousand workers in HIP at full capacity. The number gradually grew to sixty thousand during the construction of additional sheds. By the time the design of the housing units was completed it was clear that the small number of housing units that was being built in the park would not be able to accommodate all the workers. The eight-month HIP project development period together with the iterative design build process did not allow for comprehensive planning of alternatives for workers housing within and beyond the park.

Over the following five years, IPDC put forward a series of schemes to address the gap of housing provision for IP workers; however, for the most part these schemes were devised in isolation. In the meantime, workers, recruited from a 100 km radius, started to reside in newly emerging informal housing units built on farmland on the periphery of the city. The tension between IPDC's urgent need to eliminate a labor sourcing bottleneck and the city administration's wider housing provision challenge can be read through each of the schemes. When the housing crisis finally caught public attention after a series of negative articles both in international and national media (Davison, 2017; Addis Insight, 2019), IPDC got engaged in a series of consultative platforms that ran alongside their own core schemes around housing

There were separate movements. The park people [IPDC] thought they could resolve the issue alone and they had McKinsey and others do studies. They thought this is possible, but it is not. land supply, housing finance, basic services… you need to coordinate to deliver Industrial workers housing[198]*The IPDC is not working with the city administration with these problems.* ***We had to drag them*** **[IPDC]** ***to do all that.*** *Because of the expose that we did on Hawassa. The series of studies that we did. so damned if you do, damned if you don't...*

So, within this process, housing was a trigger point that's how we came in*. we did a big study on housing so some of the industrialists sought UNHABITAT, because*

[197] Interview with Tinsae Yimam, Operations Manager IPDC, on 16.12.2019
[198] Interview with Abebe Zeleul, Land Management and Housing Directorate MoUDH, on 17.12.2019

they know they can't do it on their own. ***The government wasn't offering anything. So, I'm not even sure where we are heading because of the crisis but somehow, they were beginning to do something but not full heartedly, it was the housing crisis and then there were a series of bad articles written about wage issues that got international attention****. So, it really not been because they want to learn or they want to embrace but because they were caught red handed, they were dragged into the situation, they actually wanted to hide it. With the McKinsey Study and all that, they could not put the fire down.*[199]

The Micro finance schemes: Phase 1 and 2

Towards the completion of the construction of HIP, inquiries as to the solutions for housing were met with vague references to a scheme of housing workers rooms in city resident homes within a 5km radius. In late 2016, this emerged as the Micro-finance Housing scheme (MFS). The scheme was proposed by IPDC and implemented in partnership with Sidama Microfinance and the city administration[200]. IPDC provided a loan guarantee in the amount of 28 million ETB for the provision of loans to homeowners to build rooms within their compounds with the loan condition to rent the rooms exclusively to HIP workers for the first three years. Within six months, 536 rooms were built with a capacity to house 2000 workers (IPDC, 2018a).

[199] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist and Advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19
[200] The Scheme was designed and fully funded by IPDC and the city administration was engaged in its implementation

Fig. 21. The location of MFS Housing (McKinsey & Co, 2017)

The first phase of the scheme proved to be a failure on all counts as only 56 rooms were occupied at peak occupation by HIP worker (IPDC, 2018a:151). Some of the shortcomings recognized too late, were the appalling living conditions in the units, their slow uptake, loan default, and the fact that the setting did not allow workers to acclimatize to urban living (Mckinsey & Co,2017b:14) as workers could not afford the subsidized 1200 birr/month rent and couldn't adjust to the imposed 4ppl/ room arrangement. [201] Manufacturers did not want to be associated with the scheme as a solution because the rooms did not comply with ILO standards (45% of the landowners did not have enough space to put up toilets and showers) (Mckinsey & Co,2017b:15). Landowners struggled to pay off their debt due to non-occupancy and IPDC had to make the multiple million-birr payments in compensation. (IPDC, 2018a:151)

[201] Interview with Netsanet Abebe, IP worker on 01.2019



Fig. 22. Micro finance Housing layout and living conditions in McKinsey & Co. 2017b:12

In 2017, EIC commissioned McKinsey and Co. to do the diagnostic of the housing situation and propose solutions.They proposed upgrading the initial batch of housing built and recommended a second phase for the scheme where the rooms would be built to minimum acceptable standards and identified 175 additional sites in four other sub-cities within a 3km radius. The scheme was to be implemented with the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) with a lower interest rate, but CBE backed out of the negotiations in early January of 2019.

Hawassa city Administration was opposed to the scheme in view of two major adverse effects on the city: the formalizing the overcrowding of some of the formal, adequate housing available in the city and by constraining the ability of the city to manage urban expansion. It could be argued that the former impact was not significant as the construction of extra rooms within households preceded the microfinance housing scheme in Hawassa, with a majority of private and kebele housing building rooms within compounds so as to raise household income. This had, however, been an informal practice that had been condemned by the city administration due to its propensity to congest existing plots, compromise natural ventilation and illumination and burden already inadequate service provision. The MFS in a way formalized this practice as the adoption of the typology by farmers as a model for informal workers housing in the city became widespread.

The case for the latter impact on the city' expansion can be found in the fact that MFS housing trial created a delay in the provision of a viable affordable housing alternative. This created a window for the rapid development of informal and substandard rental housing in the peripheries of the city within the rural jurisdiction of the city administration. Farmers started to build replicas of the 'IP worker housing typology' brought in by the MFS in mud and thatch. This has now become the most favored solution by IP workers, as they are cheaper than the MFS rooms, which has further accelerated their proliferation[202]. The rapid expansion and densification of these settlements which are under rural administration signify the creation of massive infrastructural demands for the city which it will have to meet on its own municipal budget.

Fig. 23. Location and typology of emerging informal settlements (photo by author in Jan 2019)

[202] Fieldwork visit to Dato settlement in January of 2019

Fig. 24. Worker's housing built on farmland in Dato sub-city (by author in Jan 2019)

More importantly, the ad-hoc MFS housing solutions never had the potential to meet the total demand of housing for HIP. The MFS housing potential was limited by the number of willing landowners with available space. While the projected demand for workers alone is 40,000 – 60,000 by 2021 (McKinsey & Co., 2017a:13) and 84,000 by 2025 (EDRI, 2017) at full capacity the micro-finance schemes would house 3500 workers. This is assuming workers choose to rent the rooms which has not been the case thus far as workers have chosen to rent similar rooms developed informally in the peripheries of Dato Sub-city (Fig 24). While it is true that the schemes increased the housing stock for the city when the loan conditions were lifted and the landowners were allowed to rent the rooms to Hawassa residents, most MFI scheme houses did not meet basic needs and so can only be said to have raised the stock of substandard back-yard rental housing which the city had already been struggling with.

Finally, the decision to build MFS housing did not ultimately deliver the desired outcomes for IPDC or enhance the housing situation in Hawassa. By mid-2017, The failure of the MF schemes and lack of affordable alternative housing started to pose a direct threat to the attraction and retention of foreign direct investment: high turnover, low productivity, limitations on extending to two-shifts or three-shifts and security risks for female workers who made up 92% of the workforce (IPDC, 2018b: 149). In response, IPDC went on to devise another immediate housing provision approach, this time in the form of mass dormitory housing. Under the approach mass dormitory housing is to be developed by private developers in partnership with manufacturers or directly by manufacturer.

Mass Dormitory Housing

In late 2017, a group of manufacturers volunteered to provide a 10-year rental guarantee to any private developers that would be interested in developing affordable, ILO compliant dormitory housing near or inside HIP.[203] The dormitory housing was to cater to young female workers to ensure they acclimate well to urban living.



Fig. 25. Mass dormitory housing locations (by author)

A housing unit was set up in IPDC to coordinate this work. Consisting of three full time staff and two advisors from McKinsey & Co. and AGI, the unit has been working on conducting housing assessment and proposals for Hawassa. There are no coordination mechanisms for the IPDC Housing Unit and Hawassa City Administration to date as discussed extensively in chapter 4, a series of efforts to build bridges have not been fruitful. The IPDC housing unit recognizes the need for coordination and admit to the lack of a common guiding directives that has exacerbated the lack of communication.

A consultative workshop organized by UNHABITAT as part of The Hawassa Sustainable Urban Development Partners' Platform (discussed in 4.3) was a rare opportunity where the housing unit could present the dormitory housing scheme to the city administration. The unit presented their proposal for the construction of dormitory buildings that could accommodate 40,000 workers. The city administration and UNHABITAT were opposed to the development of mass dormitory housing segregated from the city and suggested instead rental housing dispersed in the city (on 18 hectares that had been identified by the city administration) and integrated with the city's housing provision plans. The strategy for the shared apartment units suggested by UNHABITAT included a financial plan with an

[203] Interview with Matt Butler, Outreach Director on 29.05.2018

invitation for the City Administration and other stakeholders to invest in housing and generate a financial return. The Housing unit on the other hand felt this was not a viable solution as it would create a transport gap (which would work against the multi-shift working hours of the factories), would most likely not be affordable for workers and would not be developed in time due to the limited capacity of city administration. [204]

The IPDC housing unit staff acknowledged the conflicting interests of the city and IPDC, the narrow focus on both counts. There is a pressing need for clarity on the roles and responsibilities of both in the housing policy and the exploration of potential synergies and conflicts especially in terms of infrastructure provision. They further noted it would be impossible to simply follow the direction of city government despite their valid objections due to the absence of viable alternatives proposed. The team stressed the fact that the workers would not indefinitely be employed in the parks but would ultimately move on to other livelihoods within the city and so worker's housing is by its nature temporary, they did not however follow the point to its natural conclusion- the creation of demand for housing by ex-factory workers (with the park's high turnover rates) within the city. The unit repeatedly stressed the need for integrating the action of IPDC and city administrations while denouncing the dispersed housing scheme as unacceptable (interview with IPDC housing unit).

While the city administration and IPDC continued to disagree on the appropriate solution for the worker's housing and how it should be integrated to the city. The IPDC Housing Unit moved forward with its plans for constructing dormitory housing in two phases. The design of the first phase of dormitory housing which targets 4000 workers, is already underway. The four G+4 blocks, which were expected to be built inside the industrial park, were to accommodate 804 workers each. The design for the second phase targeting 26,000 is similarly underway. It is expected to be developed on 26 Hectares along with soft infrastructure including hospitals, hotel apartments and fire station by foreign developers in partnership with manufacturers. The development was expected to take place adjacent to the park in the area reserved for expansion.[205]. But the developments had not been built up to the writing of this thesis because IPDC was not able to secure investor buy-in as initially hoped.

[204] Interview with IPDC Housing Unit on 10.12.19
[205] Interview with IPDC Housing Unit on 10.12.19

At the same time, there was a concerted effort to encourage manufacturers to develop housing themselves. Within the IPDC housing unit, dedicated staff from Mckinsey and Co. and AGI worked to persuade park tenants with limited success. IPDC offered to provide land for interested manufacturers upon request and approval by EIC and the PMO. Through this scheme Shintz, a manufacturer at Bole Lemi and early adopter of the scheme, voluntarily developed residential rooms for 9000 employees. There had also been some initial interest from three of the firms in HIP: Arvind, EPIC and Isabella. But for the most park tenants did not wish to engage in housing development. (IPDC, 2018:143).

Private Developer led Housing

The final housing provision scheme that has had some success recently has been the development by private developer. Under this initiative, IPDC was to provide a 10 year rental guarantee for workers. In July 2021 IPDC signed a contract with Corner Stone Housing Group, a domestic private housing developer, to develop 13 dormitory buildings that would house 6500 workers over 18 months. While this is a small start, it may potentially encourage more private developers to get into this space. While this scheme has again been led by IPDC, the corporation has also been creating more consultative platforms around the provision of affordable housing for industrial park workforce although these discussions have not resulted in concrete solutions to date.

To summarize, the infrastructural integration challenges and the industrial workers housing crisis could have avoided, and later mitigated if the development of Hawassa Industrial Park, the flagship project of Ethiopian IPD, had been conceived, planned and implemented in close collaboration with the city administration. But as discussed at length in chapter 4, the top-down implementation mechanism of the Leninist bureaucracy allowed for the early development and decision making to be restricted to the inner circles of the party and its implementing corporation IPDC (chapter 3). The fracture of the central bureaucracy further created siloed planning and the exclusion of some key actors. Later on, party bureaucracy structures of project implementation and accountability hijacked the limited capacity of city government, injecting it into the rushed development process (discussed in chapter 4). These factors along with the capacity gaps at the local level prevented the city administration from playing their role in leading and integrating the development. The housing crisis is the most prominent manifestation of the integration challenge and remains for, the most part, unresolved to date in spite of the various attempts discussed in this section.

Conclusion

This chapter addressed the third and fourth objectives of the research by taking on the broad task of discussing barriers to spatial integration in the national urban-industrial system and space economy; the limits on the integrative potential of spatial planning within this; and the various manifestations of disintegration at national and urban scales relating to this. Sisay's analogy of rivers meeting in the sea was interpreted in the attitudes and actions driving isolated regional and sub-regional planning; isolated sectoral and sub-sectoral (i.e., industrial) spatial planning; and isolated attempts to deal with the material consequences of disjointed planning. In all these instances the absence of a holistic vision of national spatial development (and within this, holistic visions of urban and industrial spatial development) underlies the state of spatial disintegration of the urban-industrial nexus along with all other spatial structures of the national space economy. The inability to arrive at a common vision of national spatial development is in turn understood to be one of the many manifestations of the political economy of the disintegrating party state (both party bureaucracy and ethnic federation).

The inherent dangers in the 1994 conceptualization of Kilil's and the enclosure-based federation it created, the ethno-nationalist turn in Ethiopian politics and its effect on thinking around regional economic integration, and the political developments spurred on by these factors, limited the integrative potential of spatial planning throughout the period of the development of industrial parks. At the same time, loose coordination between sectors during the post-Meles era allowed the proliferation of unreconciled spatial policies. The industrial sphere, which had been the focus of much attention and investment during this period. dissociated into a series of unreconciled regimes of industrial space production.

The infrastructural and housing challenges emerging as these industrial infrastructure projects land in urban space are only starting to materialize. While some of these challenges have found resolution through the reactive and isolated efforts of various actors, other persistent challenges like the housing crisis signal increasing severity of implications for Ethiopia's industrialization and urbanization in years ahead. In spite of this, however, the emerging Ethiopian urban-industrial nexus as a whole remains undefined and unaccounted for by the plethora of isolated streams/rivers of development planning and intervention. In the next chapter, this thesis contributes to improving the understanding of the nexus by theorizing the socio-spatial dynamics driving its transformation and many of its challenges.

6. Theorizing the politics of urban-industrial integration in a disintegrating Party-state



"Turning and turning in the widening gyre

The falcon cannot hear the falconer;

Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;

Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world." [206]

[206] In his poem The Second Coming, W.B.Yeat's captures, in apocalyptic imagery, the sense of chaos and disintegration he experiences amidst the crisis of authority in Post-World War I Europe and the Irish war of independence.

Introduction

The urban challenges that pre-date and impede attempts of contemporary industrialization in African cities today create the necessity for holistic and synergistic approaches to steering urban and industrial development. However, as the empirical analytical chapters 3, 4 and 5 have shown, in the Ethiopian case, the nature of policy making and implementation and ethnic and factional politics within this have made this kind of integrated policy making impossible in the urban-industrial sphere.

The writing of this chapter constituted the final stage of theoretical integration in the grounded theory building process undertaken in this research. In trying to integrate the expansive analysis and seeing how all the different codes and categories fit together, I became aware of an implicit theme that made relationships between several codes intelligible. I found this underlying phenomenon that was implicit in every interview conducted; in every analytical code and memo; and in every section of the three empirical chapters- the theme was Authoritarianism. It took a period of deeper reflection on my analysis, extensive diagramming, and a (re)immersion into theory (that followed the writing of the empirical chapters) to identify the centrality and integrative potential of the theory of authoritarianism (and authoritarian durability in particular) to open up numerous avenues of theoretical synthesis and cross fertilization between codes, themes, categories and empirical chapters. This chapter therefore introduces the concept of authoritarianism as a central organizing theory in the final analysis and theoretical discussion of the politics of urban industrial integration in African states under dominant parties and/or personalist rule.

This chapter puts the empirical analysis of the policy integration challenge in the Ethiopian party state into conversation with the authoritarian durability literature and considers the implications of the interplay between authoritarianism and integration for debates in policy integration; spatial and infrastructural development planning; and decentralization. Drawing from and integrating numerous themes emerging from the preceding analytical chapters, it explains the ways in which authoritarian politics shapes urban policy, planning, development and its integration into industrial and economic development strategies in Ethiopia - thereby proposing a new theoretical framework for explaining the phenomena under study. The use of this particular literature is key to the scholarship on PI because although politics is central to the understanding of policy integration, authoritarian politics is often overlooked in much of the literature.

Although recent scholarship has demonstrated that autocratic regimes are more likely to pursue state led industrialization agendas (Gerring et.al.,2022) and that urban policy is instrumentalized by these regimes to establish and maintain authoritarian rule (Wallace, 2014; Hinfelaar et.al., 2020; Jackman and Goodfellow; 2019), there is no analysis to date on how authoritarianism affects the interaction of industrial and urban policies and their integration or how this plays out in the African continent, two thirds of which is authoritarian (Basedau, 2019), and where the highest rates of industrialization and urbanization are being experienced. The political context of authoritarianism that frames industrialization and urbanization in most of the Asian NICs and now in two thirds ofAfrica today seems to be taken for granted in the literature on both these processes of structural transformation.

In exploring these issues, the first section addresses how, contrary to the understanding that centralization is beneficial for policy integration (Rode, 2018: 81), strategies of *authoritarian centralization* can adversely influence policy integration by hampering conceptual integration, weakening alternative mechanisms of coordination, and eliminating checks and balances. By zooming out of and abstracting away from the Ethiopian case to the level of theory, it discusses how the death of dictators in highly centralized personalist regimes trigger and intensify development pressures and factionalism that can deter integration by disrupting inter-elite relations, inter-sectoral coordination, and heightening the threat of national disintegration.

The second section examines how power sharing, resource distribution and control mechanisms, built into authoritarian party systems, determine the presence, scope and efficacy of spatial development planning in the urban industrial nexus. It looks at the tensions between center-region ethnic clientelist relations and the ability to promote functional integration through integrated spatial planning at national and regional scales. It then looks at the implications of the fragmentation of the party as a regime-state fusing structures, both between party and the formal bureaucracy and between the party and parastatals, on inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral coordination through spatial planning.

The final section examines the implications of the structure and degree of *authoritarian decentralization* for infrastructural integration at the city level. It considers the bargaining power of cities within ethnicity-based power and resource distribution structures and the implications this has for the integrative capacity of urban plans and the coordinative capacity of city administrations in urban-industrial development. This theoretical framing draws on

and further explains the infrastructure and housing challenges discussed in section 5.3. The conclusion offers an integrated theory of the politics of urban industrial integration in Ethiopia.

6.1. Policy integration and Authoritarian Centralization

As highlighted in the introduction, this section uses the literature on the role of centralization in policy integration as an entry point into a discussion of the implications of, what I call, *Authoritarian Centralization* for urban industrial integration. The central argument of this section is that specific forms and strategies of authoritarian centralization shape the different integration outcomes that can be observed across autocratic states- for example, between China and Ethiopia. Here, I explain the theoretical underpinnings for this concept, and its application in this study as well as its wider theoretical potential.

In organizational theory and political science, the concept of centralization of power deals with the distribution of control or effective decision-making authority within an organization or the state (Anderson, 1968:392, Pugh et.al, 1968:78). The term is used to describe both the process by which political power becomes concentrated in a central decision-making body as well as the outcome of such a process (Vasher, 2011). The assumption that a critical level of centralization serves policy integration and coordination has been widely debated across political science, public administration, organizational science and planning literatures (Jaques 1990; Powell 1990; Thompson 1991; Healey 1997). Rode (2018: 89) summaries the central question in these debates as being "to what extent planning and policy integration ultimately requires centralization, and whether hierarchy equates to centralization".

Generally, centralization is understood to be key to policy integration in bureaucracies (Mansfield, 1973) because bureaucratic hierarchies rely on super-ordination and subordination of actors and functions – i.e., the oversight of each level by the next level up- for the effective implementation of policy (Thompson, 1991; Coyle 1997; Peter, 1998). Centralized decision-making is therefore critical for the effectiveness of hierarchical integration, which is the main mechanism of coordination in bureaucracies and other political organizations (Coyle 1997).

Beyond the logic of hierarchical integration in bureaucracies, it is also true that holistic policymaking requires and promotes the concentration of power where other forms of coordination prevail - i.e., networks and markets (Thompson, 1990). Studies have in fact

suggested that integration and holistic governance may have centralizing tendencies (Rode, 2018:70). Trein and Ansel, (2020: 1144) have argued that policy integration reforms have been used as a political strategy to recentralize control under central governments in reaction to NPM reforms that have resulted in "the relocation of political power beyond the boundaries of nation-states' central governments upward, downward, and sideward, ultimately resulting in the "denationalization" and "decentering" of policy making".

The nature and limits of the centralization of power varies greatly across and between democratic and autocratic political systems and limits their integrative capacity in different ways. Whilst there are a series of political institutions built into democratic rule that limit the excessive concentration of power, authoritarianism is defined by the active elimination of these very limits – i.e., "**Authoritarianism is the enforcement of obedience to a central authority** at the expense of personal freedoms, rule of law and other constitutional values and principles [this includes the separation of powers]. Authoritarianism can be characterized by chronic shortcomings: narrowed political pluralism, absent or inadequate democratic institutions, denied or unenforceable fundamental rights, lack or shortfall of constitutional checks and balances, and oppression of non-governmental-organizations" (Toth, 2017:1). Centralization in authoritarian states is also achieved through "the removal of power from civil society and peripheral institutions of the state" (Martin and Thomson, (2001:100).

The limits to the monopoly of power in democratic states limits the extent to which policy integration and coordination can be achieved. For instance, if we consider pluralism - the distribution of power among groups with competing agendas like political parties and civil society (professional associations, trade unions and business organizations) - this feature of democracies inhibits the monopoly of power or decision making and requires flexibility in policy making that can accommodate different policy agendas. As OECD (1996:8) points out "governing in democratic political systems necessarily involves a degree of incoherence…as excessive efforts to enhance coherence can result in a high degree of central control and a consequent loss of flexibility in the policy making system".

This does not mean that there are no limits to the monopoly of power in authoritarian states or that there are therefore no limits to the degree of policy integration that can be achieved in such states. On the contrary, there are harsh limits to the monopoly of power in authoritarian states. However, these limits are only set by credible threats of use of force

against the monopoly of power. Authoritarian regimes face such threats both from the masses as well as the elites they forcibly exclude from power in their bid to centralize and monopolize power (Svolik, 2006:6). Such regimes are forced to accommodate such threats through complex mechanisms of authoritarian power sharing, redistribution, or control (Geddes et. al., 2018; Boix & Svolik, 2013; Paine, 2022; Svolik, 2009; Bremen, 2019; Meng, 2022; Adem: 2012). These accommodations are reflected in decision and policy making that have implications for PI. Centralization in such authoritarian governments (Boix & Svolik,2013), what I call ***authoritarian centralization***, has to be enforced through, and is therefore, I argue, inextricably linked to, authoritarian power sharing, redistribution and control and determines both the durability and breakdown of autocratic regimes (Geddes et. al., 2018:190). As a concept, *authoritarian centralization* serves as a link between the drivers of authoritarian politics and the politics of policy integration. I argue strategies of authoritarian centralization directly shape PI outcomes because they determine how and where authority can be exercised in the framing and implementation of policies. At the same time, I argue, the real limits of authoritarian centralization, i.e credible threats against the monopoly of power, define the limits of integrative capacity in authoritarian states.

Authoritarian centralization can be both beneficial and damaging for prospects of policy integration. Positive effects of authoritarian centralization include the fact that authoritarian states have greater capacity to integrate because centralization is less limited than in democratic states. Although this will in most cases (except possibly in completely totalitarian regimes), have limits set by the real constraints of power sharing and redistributive arrangements. Negative effects of authoritarian centralization can be seen in the ways in which power is centralized- i.e through the elimination of plurality (policy alternatives, competing policy agendas) and stifling of dissent (through repression or patronage)- and how that compromises the state's ability to be comprehensive – i.e., consider and consolidate various aspects of a problem.

Ethiopia has been widely classified as an authoritarian state by numerous studies (Kilson, 1963; Fisher et.al. 2015; Nur, 2013). Some have further attempted to subcategorize Ethiopia as an electoral authoritarian state (Abbink, 2017) or as a developmental authoritarian state (Matfess, 2015). While these categorical debates have given us limited insight into the authoritarian politics of the EPRDF government or the impact of this on its urban and industrial policies, these limitations of such debates could be said about studies of most authoritarian states more generally. As Geddes (1999:121) points out,

> *"Different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy. They draw on different groups to staff government offices and different segments of society for support. They have different procedures for making decisions, different ways of handling the choice of leaders and succession, and different ways of responding to society and opponents. Because comparativists have not studied these differences systematically, what theorizing exists about authoritarian regimes is posed at a highly abstract level."*

This is another reason why grounded theory studies such as this one, are important to unpacking the specificities of the politics of policy integration in authoritarian states. I propose the concept of 'Authoritarian Centralization' to capture the difference in the nature of centralization within democratic and authoritarian regimes as this difference is critical to thinking about policy integration outcomes. In so doing, however, much like the concept of authoritarianism, the term does cover up the variation between authoritarian regimes and thus the range of implications (positive and negative) that centralization can have for policy integration across these regimes. It is important to note however, that as the work of systematically examining variation amongst authoritarian states more generally, remains stunted, capturing the implications of this variation for policy integration conceptually, is challenging. However, the term is needed nevertheless in the policy integration literature, which is based almost exclusively on the study of democratic contexts, to draw attention to the unique implications of authoritarianism for policy integration outcomes.

Within the authoritarianism literature, the literature on authoritarian durability presents some insights in the way of thinking about varied implications because it highlights core decision making constraints in authoritarian regimes and explains variation through how regimes respond to these constraints. I therefore try to synthesize various concepts from this body of authoritarianism literature to address the specificities of the Ethiopian case. This literature posits that what sets regimes apart are the terms on which political order is established - i.e., the strategies by which they respond to society and elites to secure the stability and longevity of their centrism and rule. These different types of strategies feed into each other in different ways to define the nature of authoritarianism within a regime and by extension create the basis and limits of authoritarian centralization and integration capacity in such regimes.

In the case of EPRDF, I argue its three decades of relatively stable and highly centralized rule were maintained through a combination of the three types of strategies: their power

sharing mechanisms (Meng et. al., 2022; Svolik, 2009, 2012; Paine, 2022; Magaloni, 2008; Mcgregor, 2013; Boix and Svolik, 2013); distributional policies (Boix, 2003; Lavers 2019; Wallace 2014; Blaydes & Kayser, 2011; Albertus, 2016); and control mechanisms which could include legitimation (patronage, cooption) or repression (coersion, surveillance and use of force) (Mcgregor, 2013; Martin, 2001; Gebremariam,2020). . The first strategy was the creation of the "divisive architecture of hegemonic governance" (Mehretu; 2012) that was the *ethno-federal party state* which served as the narrow power sharing mechanism (Gedamu, 2017; Legide, 2019; Fisseha 2012). The second was the agrarian distributional regime that served as the central distributional strategy (Lavers, 2019: 75). The third type of strategy were the control mechanisms which included the party bureaucracy, the use of various targeted clientelist packages (Gebremariam, 2020:20), repressive laws (Adem, 2012:4) and forms of coercion and violence as the means of legitimation and repression respectively.

In the rest of this chapter, I use the findings coming out of my empirical chapters to discuss how these three types of strategies, and their application at different times and at different levels has shaped policy integration in the urban industrial policy and spatial nexus- i.e., how it shaped approaches to and processes of both industrialization and urbanization and their interface-during the reign of EPRDF.

6.1.1. Conceptual integration and the political geography of redistribution policy in Authoritarian regimes

Following the structure of the empirical chapters, I start by discussing how the conceptual integration challenge that emerged during EPRDF's reign was shaped by its strategies for authoritarian centralization. I adopt the concept of 'conceptual integration' from the PI literature of the early 2000s (discussed in section 1.3). Braissoullis (2004:15) argued that the state of integration between policies is primarily determined by understandings of ***what*** should be integrated. She points out

> *The congruence of the theoretical and conceptual framings of two or more policies is perhaps the necessary precondition for their substantive, and not only instrumental, but sustainable integration…two policies have chances of being integrated, if they have common scope, treat common or complementary facets of a problem situation in congruent or unified manner*.

The conceptual integration challenge inherent to EPRDF's economic policymaking lies in its framing of the complementary facets of the problem of structural transformation in highly agrarian societies: rural/agricultural productivity and urban productivity in its development strategy ADLI[207]. Stemming from the valid concern that rapid population growth would result in rural land shortages, food insecurity and that this would drive 'the persistent onslaught of rural to urban migration' (PMO, 1993 in Lavers 2019:78); the framing of the problem did not adopt a holistic approach of simultaneously addressing the need of raising both agricultural productivity and investment on the rapid creation of urban employment.

On paper, ADLI presented a highly integrated theory of change that addressed urbanization as part of the wider industrialization agenda. It held that rural agriculturally based industrialization would lead to the emergence of small towns which would develop into cities through a process rapid growth that would include and center on the small holder farmer(Simeon, 2017). In practice, this theory of change did not materialize, instead the first 10 years of ADLI saw the least investment in existing cities and the emergence serious urban challenges which remained unchecked in the context of a regime that was not merely negligent but highly hostile to the development of any active urban agenda[208]

In real terms, the structural transformation problem was addressed in ADLI as an agricultural productivity problem alone with the understanding that urbanization could and should be prevented, or at least delayed indefinitely. This was true of many countries across Africa in the late 20th century. On the one hand, while this framing was partly coming out of the influence of the socialist approach of the party, it was also driven by perceptions that the urban population did not pose an immediate threat to the survival of the regime. On the other hand any redistributive agenda for cities, it was feared, would promote urban growth that would threaten the ethnic federal political order. In 1994, only 13.7 % of the Ethiopian population (FDRE1994) was urban which was low as compared to the Sub-Saharan African average of 29% in the same year (WB, 2018) and the regime sought to keep it that way. It succeeded to a large extent because it remains, today, at a low level of 21% (in 2020) as compared to the Sub-Saharan African average of 41% (in 2020). Urban migration had to be prevented not only because it presented the threat of collective action (Wallace, 2013)

[207] the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization strategy
[208] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist and Advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19

but because it threatened *multi-ethnic collective action* which couldn't have been addressed through the ethno-federal power sharing arrangement (discussed in section 4.1).

On the other hand, TPLF had realized early that its ethno-nationalist mobilization of the peasantry in Tigray could only be sustained through a redistributive strategy that catered to this constituency (Lavers, 2019:73). Land reform, the control and allocation of land and agricultural extension services, was used as a means of securing support of TPLF's core political base- the peasantry. In 1994, this redistributive strategy was scaled up with the understanding that this would 'limit urban migration in the interest of political stability' (MoFED, 2003).

Following older debates on urban bias from the 1970s from proponents such as Bates and Lipton, Wallace (2013) has more recently shown, through a cross-national analysis of nondemocratic regime survival in the post-WWII period, how "self-serving regimes have tended to adopt redistributive policies that are biased in favor of cities as urbanites pose a more immediate threat to stability". However, his analysis did not factor in how the size and composition of urban populations determines perceptions of this threat. He does note that urban bias has not been the universal response to the urban threat and uses China as an illustration of a 'rare case' – "the promotion of rural subsidies, migration restrictions and the delay of land privatization to keep farmers in the country side were responses to the regime's fear of ''Latin Americanization'' that is, the emergence of highly unequal megacities with their attendant slums, crime, and social Instability (Wen, 2006 in Wallace, 2013). However, in China, these policies of deterring urban growth under Mao were later coupled with policies that favored cities and promoted urban productivity. In that sense, China had a balanced approach that balanced agrarian led development with the raising of urban productivity and industrialization.

On the contrary, EPRDF's political strategies for the two facets of the problem, i.e., ADLI's *agriculture first* and *agriculture only* development approach, virtually **omitted a short-term development or redistributive strategy for cities and urban dwellers**. While both of these strategies could be and have been interpreted as strategies of political survival (Lavers, 2019), they are also emblematic of authoritarian centralization because the implementation of the political strategy, of keeping the ADLI redistributive strategy in place, necessitated mechanisms of authoritarian control that ensured the marginalization and exclusion of

alternative policy solutions and lobbies coming from civil society throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

Authoritarian centralization, in this case was enforced through "the removal of power from civil society and peripheral institutions of the state" (Martin and Thomson, (2001:100). As discussed in section 3.1, throughout the 1990s, the Association of Ethiopian Economists (EEA) lobbied for an urban development agenda to be integrated into the economic policy in its Annual Reports on the Ethiopian Economy (2000-2019), the Ethiopian Journal of Economics (1993-2000), and the association's magazine Economic Focus (1998-2019) but these voices were marginalized. The economist president of the EEA at the time, Prof. Berhanu Nega, would go on to lead the main opposition party that would win all the seats in Addis Ababa and in many other urban centers in 2005. The urban crisis was one of the key policy agendas of the opposition party during the campaign. Following the violent repression of the urban dissent that followed EPRDF's declaration of victory in 2005, Prof. Berhanu went into exile and the advocacy of the EEA would decline as the repressive 2006 Civil Society Organizations law created serious funding restrictions for civils society organizations. Similarly, architects and urban planners who, at the time, attempted to lobby party officials and make the case for urban policy faced a 'hostile political environment'[209]. Had these civil society organizations and agents had any access to democratic means of promoting the interests of the urban populace, there would have been a greater chance of coming to a more holistic conceptualization of the problem that responded to its complementary facets.

As discussed in section 3.1, the next phase of economic policy revision – The emergence of developmentalism- occurred alongside the centralization of power under Meles during the 2001 political crisis[210]. This centralization under Meles saw the rejection of socialism and the adoption of vanguard state capitalism which entailed a shift in ADLI from promoting a 'pro poor strategy' that centered the poor smallholder farmer to a focus on capital- and labor-intensive investment promotion that was centered on foreign capital based and export oriented agricultural development (Lavers, 2019:83). Lavers also points out another key

[209] Interview with Zegeye Cherinet, Architect and Planner at EiABC 23.06.20

[210] Whilst authoritarian centralization under the TPLF executive had started much earlier, further centralization under Meles happened following the 2001 political crisis which is discussed in chapter 3. During this period, the regime changed from being a single-party regime to a personalist regime, which are two different forms and degrees of centralization (Geddes, 1999)

development that took place with the shift to vanguard capitalism, the shift from the *agriculture first* approach that had dominated ADLI up to this point to the promotion of *simultaneous agricultural and industrial development* approach through the new Industrial Development Strategy (IDS) policy that promoted the meat, leather, textiles and garments, horticulture and floriculture (Lavers, 2019:84). The IDS also brought into the picture a great focus on massive infrastructural development in the transportation and energy sectors.

Although it had become clear, after 2005, that ADLI had failed to deliver on preventing or even delaying urban dissent; neither ADLI nor the new IDS incorporated an active urban strategy towards meeting their economic development goals. At this point, the urban threat, which had caught the party by surprise, was too immediate to be addressed as part of the party's long-term economic policy. Although the need for a political strategy for the 'urban problem' was clear, it would have to be dissociated from long term economic planning for the response to the urban problem to be effective in the short term. The linking of urban policy to the industrial drive that was just getting off the ground with the IDS did not seem a viable or useful response to the urban threat.

Initially, repressive authoritarian interventions that involved the use of force were used on unemployed urban youth who started to be referred to, in the government speeches, as 'Adegegna Bozene'- dangerous idlers. During this period, the coercion and displacement of unemployed urban youth involved rapid inner city redevelopment projects that dispersed areas of concentration. This was followed by the application of targeted clientelist policies aimed at *centralization through co-optation*. As discussed in section 3.1, unemployed urban youth were enveloped into the mono-organizational centralizing structure of the vanguard party through *clientelist policies* (Eraydin & Tasn-kok, 2013:112) such as the Urban Development Package (UDP 2006), the Revised Micro and Small-scale Enterprises Development Strategy (2011 MSEs Strategy) and the Revolving Youth Fund (RYF 2016) (Gebremariam, 2020: 20). The political institution of hierarchical vanguard party membership effectively eliminated the urban threat and secured the acquiescence of dissident urban youth under the party's decision-making structures.

On paper, the party argued the MSE strategy fed into the overall strategy of economic transformation (MoFED, 2006:151). However, while MSEs where supposedly aimed at absorbing surplus labor, the majority of MSEs were formed in major cites. Through this process of centralization, the party's political strategy for survival created a **de-facto**

dissociation of its urban policy from the economic policies of ADLI and IDS. The UDP (2006) created urban employment and to some extent addressed urban poverty. However, the strategy, by default, targeted urban youth and not the surplus agricultural labor that had been postulated in the MSE strategies under ADLI and the IDS. The second MSE strategy in 2011 extended the use of MSE's as *the only* urban employment strategy while it was clear that MSEs under the UDP were not transitioning into large-scale enterprises and had instead become a means of survival and subsistence that created a dependence of the growing urban population on the patronage of the party. In summary, authoritarian centralization was the mechanism that allowed for the initial omission and later dissociation of urban policy from economic policy that would secure the regime's survival in the short term while irreparably fragmenting the conceptual integrity of the country's economic policy across an urban- rural divide.

6.1.2. Personalist regimes and the death of dictators.

Authoritarian regimes are not all the same. Barbra Geddes (1999) revolutionized the study of authoritarian variation with a landmark study that systematically categorized regimes. In her study of the rise and fall of 163 regimes in 94 countries over 20 years, Geddes demonstrated how different structures of authoritarian regimes, which she identified as personalist regimes, single party regimes[211], military and monarchic regimes, explain how dictatorships arise, how they function, where their vulnerabilities lie and the different ways, they make decisions and ultimately break down. In this section, I discuss how the structure of authoritarian regimes also determines integrative capacity as it comes along with different modes of authoritarian centralization. Amongst the type of regime structures highlighted above, the personalist regime gives us unique insight into the EPRDF under Meles, and so is described in some detail here.

Personal rule represents absolute authoritarian centralization of power - where power is centralized not just in the party executive but in the very person of the leader at the cost of eliminating all other loci of power within the state. The leader of a personalist regime uses political organizations (usually single parties) as a launching pad to personal power (Svolik,

[211] The single party regime, of which China is a good example, is different from the personalist regime because "access to office and the fruits of office depends much more on the discretion of an individual leader" (Geddes, 1999:121) and single party regimes, "the party organization exercises some power over the leader at least part of the time, controls the career paths of officials, organizes the distribution of benefits to supporters (IBID,1999:124)

2012: 56). To protect this power, he (and it is usually a he) proceeds to eliminate potential rivals and weaken the political party (Geddes et. al., 2018:190); to create division and competition between elites to deter the formation of groups (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011: 223); to create patronage networks (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011: 222); to weaken the legislature and judicial branches; and finally to weaken the bureaucracy in a variety of ways (Geddes, 1999:133, Ezrow, 2015). He does this to ensure that there are no groups that have the ability to challenge the leader. In short, the regime is de-institutionalized in order to personalize it. This makes personalist regimes more susceptible to kleptocracy and most vulnerable to the death of leaders and their violent overthrow (Geddes, 1999: 122; Ezrow, 2015).

In this section, I argue that personalist regimes create unique political conditions, that weaken integrative capacity outside of the executive during the reign, and that deter policy integration across the board, following the death of the leaders. I further argue personalist authoritarian regimes demonstrate an extreme case of how authoritarian centralization can create disastrous integration outcomes. Through an examination of PI under Meles, I illustrate how the centralization of authority, not only in the executive but in the leader/dictator alone, in such regimes, *can* promote development coordination (where leaders find this aligned with their political interests) but comes at the cost of weakening all other mechanisms of coordination by eliminating other loci of power and authority. These weaknesses become starkly revealed when the dictator dies.

As discussed in section 3.1, following his successful reversal of the 2001 political crisis, Meles was able to expel rival factions from the party by enacting new anti-terrorism laws to arrest and then, creating new legal provisions, to deny bail to his opponents (Abebe, 2012: 5). These repressive 'rule by law' tactics, along with civil service reform programs, allowed him to "*weaken political forces within as well as outside the ruling party, decimating other centers of power and influence, and immobilizing the TPLF"* (Gedamu, 2017:228) which allowed him to bring both the EPRDF party and state bureaucracy under his personal control.

Within the Ethiopian politics literature, a great deal of attention is paid to Meles's strategy of centralizing power under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) ensured his dominance over both party and state– i.e., by weakening the party, eliminating opposition and centralizing government through loyal cabinet appointee bureaucrats. What is given less attention in both the politics and public administration literature is how this weakened alternative (horizontal) forms of coordination and created the legacy of dependency on PMO-based sectoral

coordination. As discussed in section 5.2, this legacy would remain through to 2018 where interviewees insisted that only the PMO could convene ministries for inter-sectoral coordination and that ministries would not comply otherwise[212]. The creation of Investment board under the PMO as the sole coordinator of IPD development separate from the rest of the ministerial bureaucracy is another instance of the dependence on the PMO as sole inter-sectoral coordinating body. This is also demonstrated in the direct control of parastatals and their coordination with the formal bureaucracy, which should have technically driven the control of parastatals, through the PMO office alone (Discussed in section 6.2).

Another key implication of the centralization of power under Meles, after the 2001 critical juncture, was his emergence as the sole ideologue and architect of the new developmentalist policy agenda. In the absence of evidence-based policy making or ministerial deliberation, Meles's white papers on how the party should move forward, were translated into the state's economic policy. The adoption of his *manifesto as policy*[213] was followed by efforts to *force the pace of change*. As discussed in 3.1, this approach carried into the development of GTP I in 2009 under a macro-economic committee set up in the PMO. GTP I policy documents were drafted at great speed, in the absence of sectoral input or inter-ministerial coordination and put forward a series of overambitious projects that were meant to force the pace of change (JICA, 2011:46, 72).

In terms of shaping industrial and urban policy, the Ethiopian IPD program itself was initiated by the PM himself following his visit to South Korea in 2008. It was later adopted as one of the key spatial instruments of industrial policy under GTP I (drafted in the PMO). Furthermore, the coordination of industrial policy with other policy sectors was personally undertaken by the PM. As discussed in section 3.1, Meles personally summoned the leadership of the Ministry of industry (MOI), the Ministry of Works and Urban Development (MoWUD) and the Addis Ababa City Administration to discuss the selection of a site for Bole Lemi I[214]. The coordination between the urban and industrial development agencies under Meles's PMO was considered highly effective by most, which was to be expected seeing as how IPD was not only his own personal initiative but was also one of the core instruments of his own foreign capital based and export oriented industrial strategy. Meles's

[212] Interview with Bulcha Berecha, Land Use Planning Policy Framework Directorate Lead, MoFECC.
[213] According to interviews discussed in depth in section 3.1, Meles personally drafted the Industrial Development Strategy policy document
[214] Interview with Sisay Gemechu, Former Minister of Industry and CEO of IPDC on 15.01.2020

role as the core coordinator of mega infrastructural development through party led parastatals, can also be observed in his role in the Addis Ababa's LRT project where he was personally involved in creating and in coordinating the ERC and the city administration (Kassahun and Bishu, 2019)

Meles's industrial strategy illustrates how highly centralized policy making can promote effective coordination and coherent policy making and implementation through the mechanism of *Autocrat/dictator as integrator* both at the substantive level (as ideologue), procedural (as convener) and practical (as coordinator during implementation) dimensions of policy integration (Braisoullis, 2004:19). As Meles would later put it in an interview with De Waal in 2012, "the roles of policy researcher, decision maker and implementer were given to the top political leadership [which in fact referred to his sole leadership] of the party". **The multifaceted, coordinative role of the dictator in personalist regimes thus simultaneously creates unparalleled integrative capacity at the center while weakening it elsewhere**.

The role of the dictator, in personalist regimes, of almost single handedly holding everything together, is nowhere better illustrated then by the death of leaders. 20% of personalist dictators manage to hold on to power long enough to die whilst in office and when they do, their regimes tend to breakdown within a decade of their passing (Ezrow, 2015). The literature on personalist regimes has already highlighted the fact that the death of dictators brings about a crisis of legitimacy, factionalism and the threat of national disintegration (Geddes, 1999, Taylor and Franz, 2016; Svolik, 2012). In their article, '*When dictators die'*, Taylor and Franz (2016: 163) highlight the case of how the death of the Yugoslavian president Josip Broz Tito served as a catalyst for the country's break up and how this kind of national disintegration is a particular threat in ethnically divided countries. Studies have also shown how in well-established and institutionalized single party dictatorships, like China for instance, transitions of leadership are smoother as there are more checks on the power of leaders (Davis, 2015) and clearer provisions for succession. However, no studies thus far have shown how outcomes of the death of dictators can in turn affect policymaking and impact policy integration.

It is clear that the death of Meles created a crisis of authority and regime legitimacy that intensified development pressure and the urgency of the need for performance legitimacy through infrastructural development and distribution (Terrefe, 2022). The urgency ("crash

plan") and brutality ("noose around our necks")[215] of the implementation of GTP II that this crisis of legitimacy prompted had a direct effect on what was coordinated and how. IPDC selectively coordinated with parties that had a direct impact on the physical development process through ad-hoc coordination committees that had limited scopes of action and agendas (section 6.2).

At the center of the polity, the death of Meles after decades of personalist rule, created a power vacuum that triggered and intensified factional politics that resulted in the breakdown of communication between party leaders that were also leading sectoral ministries. As discussed at length in section 3.2, this had a direct effect on inter-sectoral coordination during both policy formulation and implementation. In terms of center-region relations, the death of Meles dissolved the personal patron client dynamic that he had maintained at the helm. At the same time, his death unleashed strong ethno-nationalist sentiments that opportunistic regional party leaders fueled to advance their political agendas that had up to this point been contained by his tight grip on regional parties. As discussed in section 5.1, this heightened the threat of national disintegration and made inter-regional planning impossible after this point and gave rise to the onset of isolated regional planning (discussed in 6.2).

In summary, personalist rule under Meles created political conditions that weakened integrative capacity outside of the executive during his reign and that deterred policy integration across the board, upon his death. This case illustrates how understanding the structure (e.g., personalist or single party) of authoritarian rule is critical to understanding how authoritarian centralization affects policy integration. The next section moves on from our discussion on authoritarian centralization to examine the role of mechanisms of authoritarian survival in policy integration and in limiting the integrative capacity of spatial development planning. In the following section, I deal with authoritarian power sharing which may appear antithetical to personal rule (which would suggest that power is not shared). As the literature on authoritarian durability has shown, authoritarian power sharing structures are the foundations on which paths to personal dictatorships are paved (Svolic, 2012:54). The personalist dictator rises to power by compromising the institutions of power sharing within a party system and utilizing institutions of party control to consolidate

[215] Interview with Cherinet Filate, Former head of Master Plan Directorate in Hawassa City Administration on 06.12.20.

absolute power under himself. This remains a key concern of personalist dictators after they consolidate power. Personalist dictators therefore maintain these institutions, which include constitutions and party structures (the ethnic party system and party bureaucratic structures in the case of EPRDF) and calibrate how much power and resources are actually shared and withheld through them.

I proposed concept of Authoritarian centralization to synthesize two bodies of literature that on authoritarianism and policy integration. As I discussed earlier in the chapter one of the main difficulties in trying to do this is that addressing authoritarian variation and how the specificities of regime types and their strategies affect policy integration i.e., what different types of authoritarianisms mean for the capacity to integrate. Through the discussion about EPRDF in this section, I have dealt with two of Barbra Geddes's authoritarian regime types- single party regimes (in the Ethiopian case the Leninist party state) and personalist regimes (by looking at personalist rule under Meles) and the ways in which these types that were prevalent at different periods of EPRDF/TPLFs history affected the capacity to integration in different ways.

Svolik (2012) in his article – 'And then there was one! Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to dictatorship' deals with an important aspect of authoritarian variation- that Barbra Geddes's regime types are not necessarily mutually exclusive but can occur at once i.e. Personalist regimes are created on the back of single party regimes and even after dictatorships are established the dominant party remains a central institution of authoritarian rule and power sharing. I characterize EPRDF as one such regime where the single party TPLF/ EPRDF formed the power structure that enabled the ascendence of PM Meles to dictator. TPLF/EPRDF is a single party regime that evolved into a personalist regime and as both types, the regime created challenges for urban industrial policy integration that were directly linked to the drive to centralize.

The concept of authoritarian centralization in the context of policy integration literature therefore brings Barbra Geddes's concepts of regime types to bear on a novel problem of integrative capacity, i.e., what do these different types of regimes (which imply different degrees of centralization) mean for the capacity to integrate. The fact that TPLF/EPRDF is both a Leninist party and a personalist regime and that its drive to centralize, expressed through very different strategies, is behind urban industrial integration challenges illustrates that the concept of 'authoritarian centralization' has explanatory power in these two types

of regimes. It is therefore plausible to conjecture that authoritarian centralization may be linked to policy fragmentation challenges in personalist and dominant party states in Africa.

In the next section, I discuss the theoretical implications of the ways in which these mechanisms are used to curtail spatial development planning and its role in policy integration in the urban- industrial nexus.

6.2. Authoritarian survival, African party systems and Integration through Spatial Development Planning.

As briefly discussed in section 1.3.2., spatial planning deals with the politics of space in territorial development (Albrecht, 2003; Auerbach, 2012). It can be a strategic process of policy integration because it translates policies into 'specific investment programs and regulatory practices' (Rode, 2018:69) that can reconcile different policy objectives. As part of this process, Spatial development planning (SDP), identifies, manages and resolves planning conflicts and conflicting agendas around the distribution of investment at national, regional and city levels (Stead et. al., 2009; Vigar, 2009; Albrechts, 2006; Counsell et. al., 2006). SDP is meant to allow for informed, strategic and holistic spatial decision making within the highly political processes of developing territorially based strategies; reconciling development planning carried out at different levels and coordinating the spatial dimension of sectoral policies (Todes, 2001; Dewar and Kiepel, 2012; Drewes and Van Aswegen, 2013; Orange, 2010).

At the same time however, "spatial planning discourses of integration, collaboration and partnership speak directly to the invocation of a perceived post-political era" (Fearn and Daoudi, 2021:5). Fearn and Daoudi discuss how these discourses are part of the claim that wealthy liberal states have reached an era of 'reflexive modernity' and 'third way politics' where expert-led, evidence-based and integrated policy making is possible because antagonisms can be resolved by rational calculation (aggregative view) and moral deliberation (deliberative view) (2021:5).

These underlying assumptions of aggregative and deliberative politics that inform theorizing about the integrative capacity of spatial planning are challenged in practice by the actual messiness of politics in a divided and uncollaborative world (Brand and Gaffikan, 2007). These assumptions barely hold in democratic contexts where the communicative turn in planning has taken root (Healey, 1997,2006; Tewdwr-jones and Allmendinger, 2006) but

become meaningless within the authoritarian politics of deeply divided, poor, developing states where top-down executive planning tends to be the norm (Yiftachel, 2006:213; Watson, 2006, 2009, 2013; Kaso et. al; 2018).

The very meaning and precedence of social institutions, like planning, are constituted within the political contexts in which they exist. Within the context of authoritarian politics, any prospects of rational and deliberative planning exercises are superseded by the imposition of punitive central, executive restraints and interventions. Policymaking in general is, to a large degree, made by executive decree and, within this, planning decisions do not arise out of bottom-up consensus building but are instead a part of the centralized decision making (Kaso et. al; 2018) that is then enforced through disciplining, controlling and at times explicit exclusion of planners and formal planning processes (Robi, forthcoming).

Authoritarian politics is thus one of the 'stubborn realities' (Watson, 2013) that planning theory needs to confront if it is to be 'useful' (Watson, 2002) in the global southeast. Spatial planning, while formally institutionalized, is made at times ineffective and irrelevant (Watson, 2002), is at times viewed as dangerous and threatening to political order, or becomes instrumentalized as means of control (Yiftachel, 1996,1997,1998, 2006) in such contexts. Where conflictual factional politics and upward accountability are dominant, fragmented planning easily overrides any principles of integration that spatial planning institutions may promote.

What instead always takes precedence within authoritarian political systems is the goals of ensuring survival, stability and durability in the face of the tenuous monopolies of power that restrain and hold together deeply divided societies. And it is through carefully calibrated power sharing and control institutions that that these goals are met (Meng et. al., 2022: Svolik, 2009; Boix &Svolik, 2013; Paine, 2022). Party systems have been *the* political institution most commonly used by authoritarian regimes to undertake this balancing act (Slater, 2003; Slater, 2010; Geddes, 1999, 2005; B. Smith 2005; Brownlee 2007, Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012). In Africa, party systems, more specifically the one/dominant party state system, have not only been central to the emergence, maintenance and solidification[216] of indigenous authoritarianism on the

[216] More than half of African party systems remain one party or dominant party states today (Basedau, 2019:2)

continent (Basedau, 2019), they have also been the sole mechanism for national integration in the face of the main social cleavage of post-colonial African society, ethnicity.

The emergence of the one-party dominance tendency in African party systems has been widely studied as a response to the challenge of national integration that faced post-colonial African states immediately upon independence in the 1960s[217] (Kilson, 1963; Coleman and Rosenberg, 1964; Emerson, 1966; Nijzink, 2013). Coleman and Rosenberg (1964:2) aptly described this problem of national integration as being constituted of two challenges. The first challenge was that of '*Territorial Integration'* -i.e., the emerging body politic had to hold together 'hundreds of heterogeneous ethnic communities that had been arbitrarily bunched together within artificial boundaries imposed during the colonial period'.

The second was that of '*political Integration'*- i.e., the political challenge of 'bridging the elite-mass gap' ensuring mass participation in societies that had not undergone a gradual evolution toward universal suffrage as seen in the west (Emerson, 1966:267); and the organizational challenge of ensuring stable conformance, effective control and political loyalty to the center, (which are all critical to enforcing territorial integration but also authoritarian rule), in the absence of established institutions (Ronen, 1976: 577).

Broad multiethnic, nationalist, mass party systems became adopted by virtually all newly independent Sub-Saharan African countries as part of their fight for independence[218]; and as part of the process of consolidating the new nation-states and addressing the challenges of territorial and political integration. While the multiethnic nationalist stance promoted territorial integration by eliminating the ethno-regional threats, the mass type party[219] form ensured political integration by mobilizing its wide membership to perform political, social and economic roles with its ability to influence all aspects of the members' daily life (Kilson, 1963:265). Ethiopia does not share the same independence struggles but is analogous for reasons discussed in Chapter 7.

Both of these functions of the emancipatory African nationalist mass party of the 1960s allowed regimes to solidify into authoritarian states in the 70's and 80's as it helped them eliminate internal challengers (Basedau, 2019) and gave them the legitimacy that facilitated

[217] How colonialism affects the generalizability of Ethiopia's party history will be dealt with in chapter 7.
[218] Diverse nationalist groups united, if only in fragile coalitions, with the main objective of discrediting the colonial system (Tunteng, 1973: 652)
[219] A mass type party is a party organized around direct links to the masses through large scale party membership mobilized through thousands of party branches, e.g- socialist parties. a caucus type party is organized around its influential figures.

external backing of global superpowers during the cold war (Martin and Thomson, 2001: 157). These parties weathered the storm of 'democratization' in the 90's by morphing into competitive Authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and way, 2010) and are currently thriving in the context of the resurgence of authoritarianism around the world (Arsel et al., 2021; Brown et. al., 2018; Bloom, 2015) While Ethiopia's history in the colonial period diverges from the experiences of the rest of the continent, the introduction of the socialist mass party under the Derg served these same purposes as other nationalist mass parties of the 1960s and 70s.

Africa's single dominant parties, have thus, from their very onset served a much bigger role than the conventional function of political representation; they have served as integrative mechanisms for national integration and development (Omodia, 2018:69) as well as instrumental institutions of authoritarian rule. Comparing the role of Africa's mass parties to Sigmund Neumann's (1956) description of similar parties in socialist and communist parties in Europe, (Kilson, 1963:265) describes Africa's mass parties as '***Parties of Integration'***. Ethnic based party systems, especially, embody this function of the African party system as the sole arbiters of territorial and political integration (Zerai, 2018; Dowd and Driessen, 2008; Ujo, 2001).

This history of African party systems is important to our discussion of spatial development planning in authoritarian Africa because their role as ' parties of integration' -mechanisms of territorial and political integration – is key to understanding the failure of integrative spatial planning. The African authoritarian party takes precedence over any other social or political institutions, **including spatial planning institutions,** as the core mechanism for the identification, management and resolution of conflicting agendas both due to the role of parties as institutions of authoritarian rule and their role as primary integrative mechanism. These two roles converge when dealing with conflicting agendas around the distribution of investment, especially amongst ethnic groups which authoritarian regimes can't afford to ignore or stifle. The existing scholarship on spatial planning and politics in one-party regimes has not sufficiently studied this **role of party systems in determining spatial outcomes** and substituting/overriding spatial planning institutions in spatial decision making.

TPLF's instrumental construction of the Ethiopian party system as ethnicity based and party bureaucratic, i.e the ethno-federal party-state described at length in chapters 3, 4 and 5, has ensured regime durability by allowing for clientelist center-region relations (Fiseha, 2012;

Chanie, 2007) alongside political control of the federal bureaucracy (Gedamu, 2017). Within this political structure, the party had positioned itself and its 'democratic centralism' as the only mechanism of cohesion and 'deliberative' platform in an increasingly fragmenting divided society. Wherever spatial planning discourses and processes have threatened to interfere with this role of the party or its ability to carry out the clientelist exchanges that ensure the regime's survival, they have been set aside or disabled. The party, as a very narrow power sharing structure able to enforce high degrees of control, has thus had very serious implications for any attempts to promote policy or spatial integration through spatial development planning. In the following two sections, I briefly discuss the effects of the sole power sharing mechanism (the ethnic basis) and the core control mechanism (the party bureaucratic structures) of the party on spatial development planning.

6.2.1. Authoritarian power sharing, the ethnicity based party and spatial development planning

Power sharing mechanisms- i.e., institutions through which spoils are shared amongst ruling coalitions in authoritarian regimes (Meng et. al., 2022:1) are the primary political institutions that ensure stability and durability in authoritarian states (Svolik, 2009; Boix &Svolik, 2013; Paine, 2022). In Ethiopia, ethnic federalism, and the ethnicity-based party system through which it is primarily expressed, is the sole *power-sharing mechanism* –instituted by TPLF in the 1994 constitution (Fisseha, 2012; Gedamu, 2017) - which prohibited political organizing on any other basis than ethnicity. This decision to institutionalize the first ethno-federal territorial power sharing system on the continent has received a lot of attention in the African federalism and politics literature. While formally institutionalized exclusively ethnic political organization is unusual on the continent, ethnic power-sharing has been of central importance in many countries. Assessments of the performance of this unique party system have shown its latitude for power sharing to be very narrow under a 'highly integrated bureaucratic party structure' (Hartman, 2013: 124) and highlighted its resemblance to 'a centralized unitary state with most powers residing at the center' (Keller, 2002) similar to other Stalinist socialist federations around the world.

In this section, I briefly highlight two ways in which the territoriality of this narrow authoritarian power-sharing mechanism has inhibited the integrative capacity of SDP of the Ethiopia's urban industrial nexus. These are: the omission of integrative national and regional spatial development planning that could address declining functional integration, and the emergence of isolated regional infrastructural development.

The omission and suspension of integrative spatial development plans and planning processes.

The need for flexibility in order to facilitate on-going negotiation over distribution of infrastructural projects and investments, through intra-party 'deliberation' alone, has resulted in the omission of key integrative national and regional spatial development frameworks during the period of study (1991-2017) discussed in section 5.2.1. This has been exacerbated by political developments over this period such as the nation-wide protests (2014-2018) by ethnically organized groups that were instigated by the 2014 Addis Ababa and the Surrounding Oromia Integrated Development Plan (AAOSIDP) (Alem, 2021:3).

The absent or suspended spatial plans and planning processes include, but are not limited to: the absence of a national spatial development framework (or any regional integrated spatial development frameworks) during a period of declining functional integration; the absence of a national industrial development spatial framework (and within this the suspension of the development of National Industrial Parks Development Spatial Plan (IPDC) until after all industrial park locations had been determined and all the parks had been built); the suspension of the Integrated Land Use Planning Framework (MoFECC); the suspension of the ratification of the completed National Urban Development Spatial Plan (MoUDH); the suspension of the Integrated National Transportation Plan (MoI) during the period of the nation's most aggressive development of transportation infrastructure.

As discussed at length in chapter 5 the omission and suspension of these spatial development planning instruments were understood by the majority of my interviewees as the reason for the lack of integration in the spatial urban-industrial nexus. The numerous problems of inconsistencies and redundancies across sectoral and regional spatial development agendas are all traced back to the absence of integrative spatial frameworks at the national and regional levels. Most interviewees further linked the absence of these frameworks to the party's prioritization of meeting demands of mobilized (mostly rural) ethnic groups over considerations of economic efficiency and spatial integration that integrative spatial development frameworks would entail.

It is not a coincidence that integrative spatial development frameworks and integrated governance modalities on the African continent have tended to be developed in more democratic African states such as South Africa, Ghana, and Kenya (Robi et. al., 2021). In Ghana, for instance, the 2015 National Spatial Development Framework (NSDF) proposed an integrative rather than a distributive response to the efficiency equity problem of regional development by seeking to connect leading and lagging areas economically rather than distributing economic activity across space. The spatial strategy of the Ghanaian NSDF is primarily based on a hierarchical system of settlements (rural settlements, towns and cities), defining the functions they are expected to perform and the linkages between them (MoLNR et. al., 2015). The fragmented Ghanaian spatial planning system has presented challenges for multi-level policy integration and implementation (Acheampong, 2019, 2016), and the development of the NSDF was consultative and de-politicized (COWI MAPLE and CERSGIS, 2012). However, once developed, the highly spatially integrative Ghanaian NSDF has had political support across the country's issue based political parties (Ibrahim and Siiba, 2020).

Kenya's 2015 National Spatial Plan development process proposed spatial integration through a set of national sectoral frameworks brought together in a national spatial structure (KDOPP, 2015) was similarly depoliticized in spite of the dominance of ethnicity based parties within Kenya's relatively more democratic politics suggesting the absence of the use of ethnicity as a medium of authoritarian power sharing, may decouple integrative spatial planning from ethnic politics in more democratic African settings.

In South Africa, potentially the most democratic African state, the 2018 National Spatial Development Framework was the most recent of consecutive national spatial plans that has sought to redress the uneven space economy shaped by apartheid, by balancing investment based on economic potential with investment targeting disadvantaged regions. The framework was developed through, what is potentially, the most extensively consultative formulation process attempted on the continent involving provincial governments and sectoral agencies over a period of four years. It is also potentially the most integrative framework attempted being 'informed by, built on and supportive of' a comprehensive set of national, sectoral, provincial, regional and local development strategies, SDFs and plans (NSDP, 2018). These three cases illustrate how democratic political environments have allowed for the pursuit of integrative spatial planning in the African context, in contrast to the Ethiopian case.

The emergence of isolated ethno-nationalist regional infrastructure development.

As discussed at length in chapter 5, ethno-nationalist agendas of economic self-sufficiency have been increasingly pursued through isolated regional infrastructural development in the post-Meles era. Under a general perception of national disintegration, regional governments have sought to pursue the development of industrial infrastructure, such as SEZs and IPs, in isolation, in the absence of regional or national integrative spatial frameworks and in pursuit of ethno-national self-sufficiency and performance legitimacy at the regional level.

The regressive impacts of spatial policies in deeply divided societies, especially societies structured around ethnically dominated authoritarian 'homeland states', has received some attention in the planning literature. Arasaratnam (1987) and Yiftachel (1992, 1996) have shown how territories in such states become "key group resources for asserting ethnic control, collective identity and economic superiority" (Yiftachel, 1998:5). The same tendencies can be observed internally in spatial relations between regional states in

ethnically divided countries like Ethiopia where ethnic identity has become territorialized and aligned with power sharing arrangements.

As seen in chapter 5, the ethno-regional constituting parties of the EPRDF have sought to demonstrate their autonomy and independence to their increasingly mobilized and demanding constituencies, in the face of nation-wide ethno-regional popular resistance to the contested dictatorship of post-Meles EPRDF. Within this, regional infrastructural development has been seen not only as a means of protecting ethnic group interests within a multi-ethnic state but as a way of asserting the autonomy, sovereignty, self-sufficiency and independence of ethno-regional states and ethnic parties of the EPRDF coalition from the center. As such, the planning goals of maximizing economic growth, facilitating capital accumulation and coordinating development at the national level and regional levels (Chapin, 1965; Hall, 1975) have been challenged by the pursuit of political goals of regional parties and their governments.

6.2.2. Authoritarian control, party state fusion and spatial development planning

Mechanisms of authoritarian control - i.e., institutions through which power and decision making is centralized in authoritarian regimes (Svolik, 2012: 121-202) - are the primary political institutions that ensure political order in authoritarian states (Blaydes, 2018; Davenport, 2007; Edin, 2003; Way and Levitsky, 2006). While control mechanisms are wide ranging and can include repression, surveillance, limited access to political space, legitimation, cooptation and bureaucratic control, all of these mechanisms are made possible through the fusion of the government's autocratic institutions with the bureaucratic institutions and capacities of the state.

In Ethiopia, the party bureaucracy – i.e., the institutions of democratic centralism, Gemgema,[220] and the mono-organizational society (Rigby, 2017) (discussed in section 3.2) - is the central control mechanism through which bureaucratic control is expressed. The party bureaucracy, as instituted by TPLF in its very early days as a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party and as inherited in the institutional legacies of the country's socialist past, is particular to Ethiopia's somewhat peculiar socialist history. However, features of this

[220] Gimgemma denotes the institution and extensive structures of peer evaluation and intraparty accountability. The scope and influence of the structures of Gimgemma run parallel to and overlay all levels of the state bureaucracy, serving as "one of the most important mechanisms used by TPLF/EPRDF to control federal and regional state apparatus and overshadow democratic mechanisms of accountability

control mechanism such as "hierarchical assignment of service and benefits, political control over appointments, and selective recruitment and repression" (Svolik, 2012:163; Edin, 2003) apply to bureaucracies in most successfully authoritarian regimes on the continent. Party state fusion and bureaucratic control is therefore relevant to understanding the relation between party systems and spatial development planning in Authoritarian regimes on the continent more widely.

In this section, I briefly highlight two ways in which authoritarian control mechanisms have inhibited the integrative capacity of SDP in Ethiopia's urban industrial nexus. These are: ad-hoc and wide-ranging executive interventions in strategic infrastructural development; and isolated infrastructural development through the parallel (party led parastatal) bureaucracy.

Ad-hoc and wide-ranging executive interventions in strategic infrastructural development

As shown in the discussion of the unreconciled isolated sectoral planning across spatial frames (section 5.2), ad-hoc executive interventions in the location, prioritization and creation of strategic infrastructural projects in all sectors were pervasive during the implementation of, and at times went against, formally ratified sectoral spatial plans. Decisions on the selection and sequencing of rail, energy and road projects; the location and sequencing of IP projects; the AALRT; the IHDP housing development and a range of other strategic infrastructure projects were made within the central bureaucracy or by the PM himself and would suddenly be imposed on municipalities or city administrations regardless of their own spatial planning and infrastructural development plans. A great case of this was the AALRT, a project that was personally initiated by PM Meles and suddenly replaced the city administrations plans to develop a BRT on the same route (Kassahun and Bishu, 2019; Goodfellow and Huang, 2021)

These projects, which constituted executive interventions in strategic infrastructural development, would then be implemented by party-led parastatals (discussed in next subsection) with minimal ad-hoc coordination with city administrations. The main platform of coordination would usually be the temporary ad-hoc committees that would be set up by the parastatals to ensure the cooperation of city administration wherever needed. Party leadership would convene these committees as the upward accountability of the party bureaucracy ensured all parties at any administrative level or in any sectoral agency would have to cooperate in project implementation whether or not it was reconciled with their own spatial plan or infrastructural development. Key officials would be called in to these

committees as needed and the committees would be dissolved as soon as the project was complete.

These flexible coordinative committees through which ad-hoc and wide-ranging executive interventions in strategic infrastructural development were implemented, allowed for very selective intense project-based coordination that was delinked from wider cross-sectoral or urban spatial planning or integrated infrastructural development. This mechanism of control was therefore critical to allow the party leadership to distribute infrastructural projects and investments amongst the ethnic regions through intra-party 'deliberation'. Similarly at the regional level, regional government would initiate and distribute strategic infrastructure projects in response to their sub regional constituencies - zonal ethnic administrations and rural groups in the case of SNNPR.

Isolated infrastructural development through the parallel (party led parastatal) bureaucracy

The post 2005 authoritarian turn[221] in EPRDF increased its reliance on the legitimizing narrative of developmentalism and its dependence on its ability to deliver on visible development to ensure its political survival. Infrastructure thus became the primary medium of gaining legitimacy for the party state. Its core offerings of mega projects (be it energy, rail, road, sugar plants, hospitals, universities) were at the center of federal-regional as well as federal-local (rural) authoritarian bargaining (discussed in section 6.3). These projects dominated both the PASDEP and GTP periods.

The development of the massive mega projects was undertaken through a series of new State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) created and expanded for this very purpose. Between 2007 and 2014, newly established SOEs included but were not limited to: the *Ethiopian Railway Corporation* (2007), The ICT Park corporation (2010*), Ethiopian Roads Construction Corporation* (2011), the Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprises (2011), Ethiopian Petroleum Supplier Enterprise (2012), *The Ethiopian Sugar Corporation*, *The Ethiopian Industrial Parks Development corporation* (2014- discussed in detail in section 3.3.) and Metals and Engineering Corporation (METEC). The Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO) and Telecom were also both significantly expanded. One interviewee

[221] While EPRDF was authoritarian since its inception, the post 2005 crackdown intensified the autocratic features of the party.

characterized these set of institutions as *the parallel bureaucracy*, differentiating them from *the formal disabled bureaucracy*[222].

In terms of infrastructural integration, these parastatals presented the most significant challenge for policy and urban infrastructural integration across the country both at national and local levels, especially during the PASDEP and GTP I and II periods. There has been a growing body of literature that has looked at the infrastructural integration challenges that were created by this isolated/uncoordinated parastatal led infrastructural development. Kassahun and Bishu (2018) identified the AALRT [223] as one of two key infrastructural development programs that fundamentally restructured Addis Ababa through the same PMO/parastatal led development that was not coordinated with the city administration. Rode et.al. (2020a, 2020b) zoomed in on the material infrastructural interfaces of AALRT and the Dire Dawa rail stations as entry points into understanding the governance of transport-city infrastructural interface. Gebresenbet and Kamski (2019) looked at how the sugar corporation disabled the formal sugar industry bureaucracy in its bid for the rapid development of sugar industrial plantations. And finally, Goodfellow and Huang (2021) again showed how the governance of the development of the AALRT led to 'dislocated infrastructure development'.

However, none of these studies traced the roots of the governance problem back to the party bureaucratic structures that gave the autonomous and powerful party/PMO-led parastatals direct access to the central executive power core. The governance focused studies did not recognize the design of the parastatals as instruments of autonomous party policy implementation with even less restraint and accountability than the formal disabled bureaucracy. This was needed to allow the parastatals to function under different incentives to deliver on unidimensional mandates within short-term horizons (as discussed in section 4.2.2). While most of the studies explored the outcomes of poorly integrated governance and planning systems, they did not analyse the root causes or identify the broader governance structure driving this problem or zoom out to see how this was happening across all the sectoral infrastructural development spearheaded by these parastatals.

In theory, the purpose of parastatals is partly to address the coordination problems generated by regional and sectoral competition/silos to try and approach policy in a more integrative

[222] Interview with Professor Fantu Cheru, Economist, scholar and advisor to UNHABITAT Ethiopia 28.11.19
[223] Addis Ababa light rail transit system

way. However, poor *corporate governance of parastatals*[224] has limited accountability and transparency, proper monitoring and performance and adherence to good governance standards that would have ensured they work well with the *public governance of the state bureaucracy* (Apreda, 2008).

In the Ethiopian context, the fusion of the party with parastatals (Weis, 2015; Sheiferaw, 2012) was used to eliminate all checks and balance mechanisms within the state bureaucracy that was meant to control them. This is a paradigmatic example of authoritarian centralization. The rationale may have been to remove obstacles that could prevent the parastatals from 'bulldozing through', 'forcing the pace of development' and delivering on their over-ambitious programs. However, the undefined authority and autonomy from the state bureaucracy that this autonomy created, along with the fact that they were better resourced than the rest of the formal bureaucracy, including urban administrations, resulted in making them the prime agents of fragmented urban infrastructural development in the post 2005 period.

Each of the new parastatal SOEs were established with capital endowments of several billion birrs and became **the strong arm of party-led infrastructural development** across the country. Weis (2015:297) describes the direct party control of the corporations outside of state structures:

> *"To shorten the managerial chain of command, they were also established outside the purview of the Privatization and Public Enterprises Supervision Agency and made directly accountable to the prime minister. Their boards, on the other hand, were dominated by senior party leaders without an industry background. An additional level of supervision was created with the establishment of advisory positions for 'plan execution and monitoring' (at the level of state minister) within the PMO".*

A majority of the SOEs would eventually fail to deliver the megaprojects, incur a cumulative debt of over 570 billion birr (Tadesse, 2021) and see many senior officials implicated in serious corruption scandals (Wilson, 2018). The failure of the SOEs has been linked, amongst other things, to the poor governance of public investment projects more generally.

[224] In other words, "the set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are allocated" (Blair, 2008 in Muzapu, 2016).)

Shiferaw et. al. (2012:60) argue this boiled down to the overambitious nature of project proposals and the failure of gatekeeping by the ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). This failure emerges out of the party bureaucratic structure of relations between the party and the formal bureaucracy, in defiance of constitutional provisions put in place to prevent the very problems that arose.

> *The ministry project appraisal system lacks mandatory control gateways for project concept selection, public needs assessment, evaluation of project alternatives, uncertainty analysis, and for other important decisions. The input of MoFED at the front-end, project preparation, and decision-making stages are not significant. However, according to the proclamation No. 642/2009, MoFED had to play a gatekeeper role in the project preparation and implementation process (Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic [EFDR], 2009) … The national government decides and MoFED implements*. (Shiferaw et. al., 2012:60)

IPDC would emerge as one of the rare more successful cases of party-parastatal led infrastructural development because it delivered on most of its mandates and managed to develop the infrastructure it was created to develop. However, procedural problems were prevalent. Project budgets would be released following initial project concept proposals before feasibility studies were completed, causing, for instance, the commencement of construction before residents on the HIP site had been resettled (discussed in section 4.1). Instead, feasibility studies would often be carried out alongside the construction of projects; because this was necessary to meet the overambitious timelines set in both GTP plans, it was pursued in spite of significant implications for the profitability of some projects, for their integration into existing spatial plans and planning processes, and therefore the economic efficiency of the overall productive landscape.

However, IPDC's successful implementation of most of its projects in the absence of spatial planning[225] and in defiance of urban plans that were in place subsequently resulted in the serious spatial and infrastructural development implications for host cities discussed in chapter 5. This is yet another illustration of how the party system, here in its party

[225] The National Industrial Parks Development Spatial Plan (NIPDSP) was developed after all the parks sites had been selected and the parks had been built.

bureaucratic control capacity, easily overrides spatial development planning institutions and frameworks.

6.3. Authoritarian Decentralization and Infrastructural Integration

This final section of the chapter examines the implications of decentralization in African authoritarian states for infrastructural integration at the city level. Through a discussion of the case of Hawassa IP, it considers the implications of the minimal bargaining power of cities on local integrative and coordinative capacity within ethnicity based and party bureaucratic power and resource sharing systems. It then looks at the ways in which the state uses the incapacitation that ensues as its main justification for top-down fragmented infrastructural development in cities.

It is appropriate to start this section with a brief summary of the definitions of the different *forms* and *dimensions* of decentralization that are well established in the literature before attempting to tackle a definition of authoritarian decentralization (which will be theorized later), its variation between regimes or its relevance to infrastructural integration. The three commonly conceptualized forms of decentralization include: *De-concentration*, the 'redistribution of decision-making authority from the central to the field offices of national ministries'; *Delegation*, the 'transfer of responsibility for certain public functions to sub-national governments' and finally *Devolution*, the 'transferring of responsibility along with authority over decision-making and accountability to autonomous and legally constituted sub-national governments' (Resnick, 2014:56, Rondinelli, 1981). The three dimensions of decentralization, on the other hand, include: *administrative* decentralization, the 'transfer of responsibilities for the delivery of certain services to sub-national governments'; *fiscal* decentralization, the 'increase of local government discretion over the formulation and allocation of budgets'; and *Political* decentralization, the 'regular election of local leaders in secret and free and fair ballots'. (Resnick, 2014:56)

From the early days of Tocqueville's (1839) observations of participatory elements of local governance to the 1990s heyday of decentralization and democratization prioritization in the development field, studies have shown that decentralization is strongly associated with democracy (Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005; Dethier, 2000; Gibson, 2004; Faguet, 2014). On the other hand, almost counterintuitively, studies focused on African and (post) socialist contexts have also shown authoritarian regimes can sometimes decentralize further than democratic regimes (Riedl and Dickovick, 2013; Emmenegger, 2016, Busygina et. al., 2018:62). What is clear across explanations that have been offered for why regimes

decentralize, and why they do so to different degrees in these different contexts, is that democratic decentralization and autocratic decentralization are driven by very different incentives. It is important to consider these different incentives because they have a direct effect on the governance of service delivery, infrastructure development and its integration in cities.

Democratic governments are more likely to pursue decentralization to 'maximize their electoral possibilities' (O'Neill, 2003, 2005:18). This electoral incentive of political parties promotes downward accountability as it influences intergovernmental relations with political parties seeking to build coalitions between national and local politicians (Busygina et.al. 2018:61). Electoral incentives also promote downward accountability by driving efforts to make public service delivery more efficient and allocatively more responsive to local voter preferences (Resnick, 2013: S6). Both of these effects of the electoral incentives of democratic decentralization promote city level governance of infrastructure development and incentivizes city governments to steer and integrate spatial development through 'place-based interventions that require horizontal integration instead of functionally organized sectors and silos that prevail at higher levels of governance' (Rode, 2018:69).

Authoritarian states, on the other hand, tend to want to 'handle' decentralization in response to external pressures; as a way of offering limited concessions to hold on to power during state crisis (Busygina et.al., 2018); or to further reinforce their power by expanding subnational footholds, patronage networks and incumbent advantages (Riedl and Dickovick: 2014:327; Chemouni, 2014). Authoritarian regimes do not otherwise opt to decentralize because decentralization is risky for autocratic regimes (Treisman, 1999) as it "corrodes authoritarianism by creating loci of power that can gradually develop into a source of political opposition" (Landry, 2008: 10). Regimes tend to choose to take on the risk of short-term benefits of decentralization rather than the risk of civil war in the long term[226].

In spite of this, however, some African and post-socialist authoritarian contexts exhibit extreme decentralization (Triesman, 2006: 312) where the risk of the creation of alternative loci of power is eliminated by the presence of a hegemonic, dominant or (post) socialist party structure (Riedl and Dickovick: 2014; Busygina et.al. 2018; Landry, 2008; Chemouni).

[226] Ethiopia, of course, did not manage to avoid civil war when TPLF got displaced from the center of the power-sharing arrangement. However while TPLF was at the center, it managed to neutralize regional and sub-regional threats through decentralization.

Riedl and Dickovick: (2014) have illustrated how the degree and structure of decentralization in African authoritarian states is partially determined by the type of party system. Amongst federalized African states, they identify Ethiopia as a case of robust decentralization under a hegemonic party, and South Africa and Nigeria as cases of robust decentralization under dominant[227] parties.

In the policy integration and integrated urban governance literatures,

> *"a key debate, around the question of to what extent planning and policy integration ultimately requires (de)centralization, focuses on a requirement for either more centrism at the national level or greater support for devolved governments. This may ultimately depend on the policy sectors in question. In the case of integrating urban form and transport, it seems to necessitate greater autonomy for the metropolitan level in order to most effectively address the spatial scale of the relevant system boundaries."* (Rode, 2018: 89)

Central to these debates is the fact that centralization undermines integrative and administrative capacities and coordinative authority at the local level (Stoker, 2002; Rode, 2018). For urban administrations, integrative capacities include the ability to initiate and drive place based infrastructural development and the ability to coordinate infrastructural development with sectoral and federal agencies. Although a large body of work has demonstrated how autocracy fundamentally alters the nature of urban governance (Ergenc and Yuksekkaya, 2022; Bayraktar, 2007; Di Giovani, 2017) and infrastructural development in cities (Beall et. al., 2019), there is relatively little analysis on how authoritarian decentralization influences the governance of infrastructural integration- i.e integrative capacities and coordinating authority- of cities, especially in Africa.

China's experience of advancing integrated infrastructural development in cities through the entrepreneurial urban governance of the local developmental state is often cited as the greatest success story of decentralized urban governance in Authoritarian regimes (Landry, 2008:6). However, the Chinese case is a historical outlier[228] (Bateman, 2018:25) in how

[227] Dominant parties are defined as semi-authoritarian parties that have held office for more than two consecutive terms.

[228] "China's major decentralization moves in the early 1980s under Deng Xiao Ping gave significant - at times, complete - strategic and operational freedom to provinces, counties, cities, townships and village administrations to introduce and manage their own industrial, innovation, labor market, financial and

successfully the CCP was able to combine limited political decentralization (due to political control through CCP party structures) alongside incomparable fiscal and administrative decentralization (Landry, 2008:6) and therefore does not help us understand African authoritarian decentralization (with its minimal fiscal and administrative decentralization) and its implications for local infrastructural integration capabilities in cities. Another reason why the Chinese experience doesn't illuminate the African authoritarian decentralization is the fact that African decentralization programmes were often designed very much with rural governance in mind, while municipal power were significant in decentralized governance in China.

Ethiopia, on the other hand, has been an attractive case for the study of decentralization in African authoritarian regimes over the last decade (Emmenegger, 2016; Kosec and Mogues, 2020; Riedl and Dickovick, 2014; Kuliposa, 2004:772; Hartman, 2013). Most studies of Ethiopia's authoritarian decentralization have highlighted the fact that decentralization has been used "as a means of expanding state power into the rural hinterlands rather than as a genuine attempt to devolve power" (Emmeneggar, 2016: 265). As discussed in chapter 4, the 1994 Ethno-regional decentralization reform sought to institute the territorial power-sharing system that established the TPLF-centered autocracy. The second round of decentralization, the 2002 *woreda level decentralization* reflected the shift in EPRDF's concerns from "questions of basic stability with regional decentralization to questions of political and economic reach" (Dickovick & G/Egziabher: 2012, 84). The attention of the party had shifted from establishing authoritarian political order to the effective implementation of centrally driven rural development that would ensure authoritarian durability (Assefa, 2019: 166). As discussed in section 6.1, cities were not viewed as a credible threat due to the low urban population, so minimal provisions for administrative decentralization in the 2001 urban reform program was considered sufficient, while political and fiscal decentralization remained very limited.

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technology development policies" (bateman,2018:25). However, Deng simultaneously strengthened and institutionalized the centralized mechanisms of administrative and organizational controls that had been deficient under Mao. This balancing of decentralization reforms alongside the tightening of central control allow china to succeed in decentralizing further than any other authoritarian state at the time. To date, china ranks as one of the most decentralized countries in the world, if not the most- with local governments accounting for 70% of all government spending. This figure is surpassed amongst authoritarian regimes only by Yugoslavia immediately before its breakup. (Landry, 2008:3,12)

This resulted in a structure of robust decentralization (see fig 27) that jumped from regional level to the woreda (district) level **bypassing cities and municipalities and focusing on extending and resourcing the party's reach to the rural households** (Emmenegger, 2016:270). Even in rural areas, Kosec and Mogues, (2020: 166) have highlighted how the expanded reach of the state achieved by this authoritarian decentralization was used to improve delivery of productive services (like agricultural inputs that could maximize rural citizen's production- on which rents depended-) but not social services, like drinking water provision, in rural areas.



Fig. 26. structure of decentralization in the Oromia region (Emmenegger, 2016:270)

In order to understand the state of the integrative capacity or coordinative authority of Ethiopian cities, or their failure to advance infrastructural integration under the centralized urban decision-making of authoritarian urbanism, we must look at how highly limited urban decentralization (alongside robust ethnic and rural decentralization) puts cities in a very weak position for authoritarian bargaining around infrastructural development. The fact that political, fiscal and administrative decentralization to the level of city governments is limited created the capacity gaps that the central government used to justify fragmented infrastructural development in cities. The following two subsection examine these predicaments in the Ethiopian case.

6.3.1. Authoritarian Bargaining and Infrastructural integration in cities

Authoritarian bargaining is one type of redistributive mechanism in authoritarian states where citizens and groups relinquish political influence to the autocratic ruling elite in exchange for either public spending (economic transfers) or the ability to influence policy making (Desai et. al., 2009:93). Ruling elites may allow political bargaining to groups or citizens that pose legible threat to the regime and whose demands are not being sufficiently met through the formally instituted power and resource sharing mechanisms in an autocracy. Infrastructure is deployed as a key bargaining chip in these state-society negotiations in developmental authoritarian states, because it serves as both a developmental public spending instrument, as well as an effective tool for appeasing demands of threatening groups.

The bargaining power of social groups depends on their position in the power and resource sharing system. If they are in any position to threaten the power sharing arrangements that allow for stability in these regimes, they are in a better bargaining position than other groups. As discussed previously in the chapter, power sharing in the early period of EPRDF regime has been geared toward accommodating ethnic groups and rural citizens, as is evidenced by the robust ethnic (regional) and rural decentralization that left out multi-ethnic cities by default. This puts cities in an awkward position between ethnic regional governments and rural groups that are both attempting to bargain with the federal state when it comes to infrastructural development.

A clear case of the disadvantaged position of urban administrations in EPRDF's bargaining is seen in how the regional governments gave land for free to IPDC in order to quell the threat of rural challengers, eliminating compensations that city administrations could have had. The former CEO of IPDC pointed how the development of IPs was conditional on the ability of regions to provide land for free as well as cover the compensations to former residents. Not only did this deprive municipalities of potential revenue, it illustrates how IP projects were distributed, with cities excluded from initial negotiations over the planning or implementation of centralized infrastructural development projects, including IPs. Hawassa city administration was first called into the project to transfer land into the IPDC land bank once all decisions had been made. This eliminated the possibility of early coordinative action.

Limited administrative decentralization around land administration forces cities to accommodate regional decisions on land through land use changes or plan revisions. The regions decide which national sectoral projects are selected and given land and how much land. Cities are not able to define spatial interventions or initiate the development of place-based developments that could integrate sectoral plans as they are not in a position to bargain with federal or regional governments over the type, location or timing of centrally designed infrastructural development projects. This is compounded by the fact that city administrations have severe planning capacity deficits which means urban plans, the cities' only instruments for coordinating spatial development, hold very little real integrative capacity (although the plans may be integrative on paper- e.g., the 2006 Hawassa *Integrated* development plan (discussed in section 4.3.1).

The disadvantaged position of city administrations within EPRDF's authoritarian bargaining can be seen in the fact that cities are unable to draw investment or economic transfers through the ethnic balancing logics that rural groups and ethno-regional governments deploy to demand infrastructural investment. One instance of how this played out in the integration of HIP is seen in how the Hawassa city administration's direct demands for resources to the PMO to meet infrastructural gaps created by IPs were not met or even addressed (discussed in section 4.2.3).

Another aspect of bargaining from a position of limited urban decentralization is the complete absence of political decentralization to cities. The appointment and reshuffling of mayors by the regional party bureaucracy creates a void in qualified leadership that can champion long-term and strategic interests of the city through integrated planning or development. Due to the appointment of mayors and local party bureaucratic structures, city administrations have very little autonomy and downward accountability, critical for integrative and accountable planning, service provision or infrastructural development at the local level.

On top of this, the limited administrative decentralization is quickly and easily reversed through the party bureaucracy, which can enlist local bureaucracies into the federal bureaucracy and its infrastructural development implementation wing. This eliminates bargaining agents below the mayoral level in city administration. A great example of this was the way in which city administration officials were subsumed into IPDC's IP development program through development committees - during the clearing and

resettlement of residents and the rapid development of the airport - whilst abandoning their local roles which included coordinating infrastructural development. Not only were these city administration officials directly accountable to these committees, but this upward accountability also came at the cost of downward accountability to their residents. This is most clearly illustrated in the rushed resettlement process where city officials came into direct conflict with city residents, sometimes being attacked by residents on site, to allow for IPDC's expedited process.

In summary, the structure of decentralization and power sharing in EPRDF had a direct impact on the bargaining power of city administrations as it directly affected their coordinating authority and integrative spatial planning and development capacities. However, the link between authoritarian bargaining (authoritarian decentralization and authoritarianism more generally) and infrastructural integration seems to be absent in the literature on infrastructural integration in Ethiopia (Rode et.al, 2020a; Rode et.al, 2020b; Beall. et. al., 2019).

6.3.2. Capacity as justification for centralized and fragmented infrastructural development.

The adverse relationship between authoritarian urban decentralization and infrastructural integration is complex. While the previous subsection discussed how the compromised bargaining power of cities limits their infrastructural integration capacity, this subsection looks at the converse problem of how the central government is able to drive and perpetuate fragmented infrastructural development by using the limited capacity of city administrations as its main justification. This tendency appeared in my data in three ways.

Firstly, the low capacity of city administration was used to justify the centralized development of IPS. Following the initial CADZ studies and Asia visits, the decision to centralize the development of IPs was considered a part of 'contextualizing' the Chinese approach of local IP development. In response, city administrations argue the capacity gap is an investment deficit on the part of the federal government that should have been part and parcel of the industrial infrastructure investment, and that localized IP development could have been more highly integrated with the city administrations spatial planning and development.

Second, the governance of the industrial parks at the federal level instead of the local level, again justified by the low capacity of city administrations, has meant that park administrators do not consider issues brought on by the park that extended beyond its perimeter. On the other hand, city administrations argue that a localized or joint governance of the IPs would better align the governance of the park with the administration of the city, solving joint problems of physical integration- i.e drainage, fire protection, service provision and housing challenges in more integrated ways. City officials challenged the justification of central control based on local capacity gaps stressing that the new capacity created in new federal agencies like IPDC could be created at the local level.

Finally, planning capacity differentials between the rapid design-build processes of Chinese infrastructure development firms and the slow-moving planning bodies of cities in Ethiopia have deterred the reconciliation of the planning principles of the IPs with that of the cities. IPDC plans its compounds under the principle of harnessing *the complete potential of the site* and *maximum efficiency within the park,* which creates demands on cities that are not considered with the city's zoning and planning approaches. The IPDC justification for pushing ahead with the disproportionate production of industrial space (in relation to other landuses) in spite of the lack of preparation as a strategy of '*pressuring cities*' to increase capacity to meet those demands has, however, failed so far. Instead, demands are adding on to pre-existing demands unmatched by the capacity of city administrations

> *"**You cannot really pause your development because a condition is not there.** It's about bringing in jobs to the poor, to the jobless essentially. and that is something that you need to do yesterday. It would have been very difficult to do what has happened if you were to wait for the city to put in place the housing, the waste management systems and everything, the park wouldn't have happened. **What you do is, do the industrial park in a place where it is suited for potential improvement of the services and put pressure on the city as well in a way because there is no sequencing here between urbanization and industrialization. The industrial park will shape the future of the cities and not the other way around.**" [229]*

The justification of fragmented infrastructural development as a way of forcing cities to increase their capacity is highly problematic in the face of pre-existing infrastructural

[229] Interview with Belachew Mekuria, Commissioner of the Ethiopian Investment Commission on 06. 2017

deficits. More importantly, however, this justification itself confirms top-down fragmentation of infrastructural development can be deliberate, where the political objective of delivering industrial infrastructure to enhance performance legitimacy in developmental authoritarian states overrides objectives of integrating spatial and infrastructural development to promote economic efficiency at any scale. The role and impact of NGOs and the donor community, which act as unsustainable bridges between local government and federal infrastructural development agencies, is one of unwitting complicit support in ensuring regime durability by at best addressing symptoms of dysfunction and at the very least covering institutional voids created by rapid and highly centralized infrastructural development in cities. Again, this link between developmental authoritarianism and infrastructural integration seems to be absent in the literature on infrastructural integration in Ethiopia (Rode et.al, 2020a; 2020b; Beal. et. al., 2019) and Africa.

Conclusion

The politics of integration (be it conceptual, policy, political, spatial, infrastructural or national integration) is about how the distribution of authority in a political system affects the ability to hold things together. Where a/any 'center cannot hold, things fall apart'[230]. The politics of integration in authoritarian states is dramatic because centripetal forces are stronger as the monopoly of power is more absolute. Centrifugal forces, where they exist, have to match the strength of centralized power and vice versa. In a system built on such a taut balance between these power struggles, if and where the center breaks, disintegration becomes imminent in the crisis of authority that ensues.

To recap, the first section of the chapter proposed the concept of authoritarian centralization as a bridge between authoritarian durability theory and policy integration theory. This concept was used to identify the roots and explain the persistence of conceptual fragmentation in the urban industrial nexus through three decades of EPRDF's rule. The concept was then used to examine the role of the most important agent of integration in personalist authoritarian states, the integrator dictator, and the many ways in which the crisis of authority that his death creates shapes policy integration outcomes. Understanding the

[230] Reference to the famous line from W.B.Yeat's, 'The Second Coming'

ways in which authoritarian centralization shapes urban industrial policy integration is critical in African industrialization regimes because of the peculiar concentration of personalist regimes with ageing dictators and prevalence of conceptual fragmentation in their economic policies.

The second section dealt with the meaning, relevance and precedence of integrative spatial development planning theory and its assumptions within the context of authoritarian party system-based decision making, power sharing and control. The taut, diametrically opposed power strategies of center and region were identified as driving the omission and suspension of integrative spatial development planning to allow central and regional parties to distribute resources in ways that maintain their grip on power through ad-hoc and wide-ranging executive interventions in strategic infrastructural development. They also manifest in the prevalence of isolated regional infrastructural development driven by regional opportunist party claims to regional power through ethno-nationalist self-sufficiency agendas. Furthermore, parastatals were identified as instrumental to implementing these strategies at both levels through their own isolated spatial planning instruments.

The final section linked theorizing on the governance of urban infrastructural integration with that on authoritarian decentralization. While both of these literatures' present significant insights to the other, they have, to date, not been explicitly linked or jointly theorized. The implications of the minimal bargaining power of cities within structures of authoritarian decentralization for local integrative and coordinative capacity clearly defines the scope of integrated urban development. On the other hand, central government discourses of 'pressuring cities to increase their capacity' through deliberately fragmented top-down infrastructural development, shed new light into the ways in which limited urban decentralization and constraints on integrative urban governance are sustained.

Throughout the chapter, I have highlighted several apparent paradoxes in my argument that underline the sophistication of the analysis and interpretations presented. Some of these included the importance of structures of power sharing that allowed for highly personalist rule; mechanisms of *authoritarian centralization* built on 'democratic centralism' and *authoritarian decentralization*; central domination alongside growing regional assertiveness; and integrative parties setting the scene for dis-integrative planning. These apparent contradictions and paradoxes make up the complexity of Ethiopian politics and are at the heart of the policy fragmentation challenge in the Ethiopian urban-industrial Nexus.

7. Conclusion and broader contributions

Introduction

This chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing answers to the research questions posed in the introductory chapter; by widening out to academic and policy contributions; by reflecting on the strengths and limitations of the study; and by outlining implications for future research.

The research questions and the overarching research aim of this study has been addressed extensively through the analysis presented in the three empirical chapters (Chapters 3-5) and the theory building chapter (Chapter 6) preceding this one. As demonstrated in those discussions the answers to the research questions are complex as they dealt with the political conditions created by a myriad of historical, ideological and institutional factors that deterred holistic policy making in the urban industrial sphere. So, in the first subsection where I summarize my findings, I identify and highlight key points that are important for thinking about the broader research agenda – **the politics of urban industrial integration in Africa**- beyond the Ethiopia case and for reflecting on the theoretical and policy contributions of this research and its wider contribution to knowledge.

In that regard, the conclusion also addresses a critical theoretical challenge - how and why Ethiopia serves as an instructive case for the study of the politics of urban-industrial integration in Africa - by confronting the obvious barrier to generalizability, Ethiopia's lack of a colonial past. I argue Ethiopian politics nevertheless converged with post-colonial African politics since the 1960s independence era and its experimentation with an ethno-federal political structure position it as a highly valuable extreme case of an authoritarian politics of integration that is at the heart of the urban industrial fragmentation problem in Africa. The Ethiopian case may therefore be useful to think about African states with dominant parties and personalist regime that are pursuing rapid industrialization in cities.

Having thus outlined ways in which the findings are usefully generalizable to the wider continental empirical problem, I discuss the theoretical and policy implications of my findings in relation to the various theoretical gaps and empirical challenges outlined not only in the introductory chapter but in the empirical and discussion chapters as well. Finally, the

chapter reflects on the strengths and limitations of the study before concluding with the identification of key priority areas for a future research agenda.

7.1. Summary of findings

I started this study with the aim of exploring the conditions that inhibit integrated urban-industrial development planning in Africa, and the contextual factors that generate and perpetuate these conditions. As discussed in depth in chapters 1 and 2, my research methodology, analytical framing and research questions co-evolved during the process of the research, especially following my adoption of a grounded theory and interpretive policy analysis approach after the confirmation review stage. This approach determined the analytical focus to be the historical, ideological and institutional structures of the Ethiopian political system and its dominant party as these proved to be the central frameworks through which policy actors interpreted the evolution of the urban industrial policy nexus and policy integration (or lack thereof) in this nexus. The interpretive policy analysis approach also led me to refine my research question, which were formulated as follows:

1. What impeded holistic policy making in the Ethiopian urban-industrial nexus (especially during the formulation of Industrial parks development policy)?
2. What impeded policy coherence throughout the implementation of IPD? and why did this problem persist during and after the development of the IPs?
3. What factors limited the integrative potential of spatial planning in the urban industrial Nexus? And what were the spatial and infrastructural outcomes of policy and planning fragmentation in the urban-industrial interface?

Overall, fragmentation of the Ethiopian urban-industrial policy, spatial and infrastructural nexus is interpreted to be a function of a crisis of authority in an authoritarian state. The politics of integration (be it conceptual, policy, political, spatial, infrastructural or national integration), as analyzed by key policy actors and I, is about how the distribution of authority in a political system affects the ability to hold things together. Authoritarianism emerged as a central organizing theory in the analysis as it was the wider political phenomenon actors attributed to shaping the distribution of authority and all of the political institutions relevant

to holistic policy making. This general understanding of the political dynamic behind urban industrial fragmentation informed my findings under the three research questions.

This relationship between the distribution of authority and both policy integration during national (central) policy making (Q1) and policy coherence during implementation at the local level (Q2) was understood to be structured by the socialist institutions of authoritarian vanguard rule - the party bureaucracy and the ethnic federation respectively. The shifts within to these two political institutions brought on by the political developments including the death of Meles, the fracture of the party core and the growing assertiveness of regional parties were key to understandings of drivers of fragmentation during these two stages of the policy process.

In terms of policy integration (Q1), actors identified how the hostile environment created for urban policy under the lop-sided distributive regimes (ADLI) deterred urban productivity in the early stages of EPRDFs rule but was maintained because it was the bedrock on which the new authoritarian political order was established. After 2005, the repressive and co-optive tactics employed to address the urban threat, the first major challenge to the political order, only served to dissociate the urban agenda from core economic policy agenda. The adoption of developmentalism discourse to legitimate EPRDF's authoritarian rule through economic performance during this period created an industrialization agenda which had different political incentives than the co-optive urban agenda. The nature of personalist rule under these incentives meant Meles played a key role as dictator integrator that promoted coordination at the initial stage of IPD development but that weakened alternative mechanisms of coordination in the party. Upon his death, Actors highlighted how detrimental factional politics and inter-elite hostility became for holistic policy making amidst the crisis of authority that was the aftermath of his personalist rule. Finally, actors identified the authoritarian policy making environment including deliberations under democratic centralism; the use of rule by law tactics during ratification; the use of IP distribution to build political leverage; and the application of selective coordination through party bureaucratic committees narrowed the scope of holistic planning and implementation at the federal level.

In terms of policy coherence (Q2), local actors highlighted how the position of city administrations within structures of authoritarian decentralization severely curtailed city level integrative and coordinative capacity. They discussed the various ways nominal

decentralization to cities erodes the effectiveness of urban plans and the ability of cities to lead, coordinate or even take part in the state intergovernmental negotiations on infrastructural development. They stressed the various ways in which de-facto center-local relations under ethnic federalism undermined local authority, accountability and autonomy and eliminated the possibility of active coordination from below. At higher levels of local administration, the void in leadership created by the accountability mechanisms of the party – Gemgemma and mayoral reshuffles- eliminated local ownership of the development and governance of IPs and their externalities. At the same time, the intense pressure of the highly centralized development process itself carried out again through the party channel and its coordination committees meant lower-level city officials were subsumed under the IPDC led development of IPs at the cost of their relegation of their duties to city administration. While local policy actors recognized the advantages of the centralized development of IPs in the context of limited local capacity, they highlighted how these capacities could be localized to allow for more integrated governance of the IPs with the city's development. They saw localization of IP governance as critical due to the uni-dimensional mandate of IPDC that has created a proclivity to pursue isolated planning that creates infrastructural islands.

The limitations on the integrative potential of spatial planning (Q3) were understood to be directly driven by the need to maintain the dominance of the party, as the sole integrative institution of sectoral (through the party bureaucracy) and regional agendas, over any other social institutions including spatial planning. There is a particularly strong drive to disabling integrative spatial planning where this pertains to the distribution of investments as this constitutes the spoils sharing platform of the power sharing arrangements that is the foundation of authoritarian rule. Actors understood the centralizing party bureaucracy as the institutions that obstructed spatial development planning by serving as the control mechanism of the formal bureaucracy and state-owned enterprises and allowing for ad hoc wide ranging executive interventions in strategic infrastructural development that was executed through non-collaborative party-led parastatals that carried out isolated spatial planning. Actors also understood the territoriality of ethnic federalism and its role as the sole power sharing mechanism resulted in the omission of integrative spatial development frameworks. Finally, policy actors understood the spatial and infrastructural implications of the fragmented planning and development in the urban industrial nexus to be significant. They recognized and clearly identified the various inconsistencies, redundancies and even

serious challenges arising, and that could arise, out of fragmented planning, including the isolated regional and sectoral planning some recognized they themselves were engaged in. Actors highlighted the futility of attempting to plan the Ethiopian urban industrial nexus as an integrated whole within the political context of perceived looming national and social disintegration and the importance of focusing on the fragments that were within their control and planning within the boundaries and to the extent that the political context would allow.

7.3. Broader Contributions

Having outlined key findings of the study on urban industrial integration in the Ethiopian political context, in this section, I reflect on the implications of these findings beyond the Ethiopian case. Ethiopia serves as a case of successful implementation of industrial policy during the global resurgence of industrial policy in the 21st century (Chang and Andreoni, 2020; Mazzucato, 2013; Felipe, 2015; Noman and Stiglitz, 2016). In this sense, this research on the Ethiopian case is particularly instructive for the study of the political and urban dimensions of accelerated and spatialized industrial policy in Africa, where this has moved to the top policy agenda (Chang et al., 2016; Kanbur et al., 2019; Noman and Stiglitz, 2015) at a time when most of the continent is experiencing rapid urban transitions - Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda are some key examples of this trend (Kweka and Te Velde, 2020; Lopes and Te Velde, 2021). This section elaborates on the various wider theoretical and policy implications of the findings of this study on Ethiopia's urban industrialization.

In order to discuss some of the implications of this study, it is important to first delineate the wider phenomenon it serves to explicate. I introduced the concept, *Urban industrialization* to differentiate Africa's current experience of accelerated industrialization in cities from earlier experience of *industrial urbanization* in 18th century Europe and *urban- industrial expansion* in East Asian developmental states. This distinction is important because conceptualizations of urban-industrial development have not sufficiently evolved to accommodate the vastly different global economic, political and social conditions in which African countries are urbanizing and industrializing in the 21st century. Most of our understanding of urban-industrial transformation come from the industrial revolution where Early Industrialization - gradual agglomeration of individual domestic firms in European cities in the 18th century - catalyzed Early Urbanization – gradual urban transitions brought on by urban growth that took place over periods of decades.

Africa's current experiences of *urban industrialization* involve processes of *late, late industrialization* set in the context of cities experiencing *late urbanization.* Late *urbanization* describes the experiences of the least urbanized but fastest urbanizing countries in the 21st century (mostly in Africa) that are undergoing the latest urban transitions in context of 'unprecedented demographic intensity, hyper-globalization, centripetal state politics and climate change' (Fox and Goodfellow, 2021:5). In some of these countries, these conditions are fostering and being influenced by *late-industrialization*, which currently entails rapid state-led and centralized development of large industrial hubs. This specific spatial form is preferred as it facilitates technology transfer and foreign direct investment in the context of global production network-based industrial transformation. *Urban Industrialization* in Africa therefore entails rapid state-led and centralized development of large industrial hubs in cities that have already urbanized without industrializing and are therefore prone to deep-set inequalities, serious infrastructural deficits, weak institutional systems and capacities that in turn undermine the continent's 'urban potential for structural transformation' (UNECA, 2017: xx).

As a result, countries like Ethiopia that are undergoing *urban industrialization* are faced with a new host of spatial and infrastructural challenges in host cities that call for synergetic and integrated approaches to development planning. An understanding of the conditions that influence integrated policy making, planning and development is therefore crucial to ensuring Africa's urban industrial transitions are sustainable. Arguably the first in-depth study on the politics of Africa's urban industrialization, this research on the Ethiopian case contributes to a range of related debates that span across political science, public administration, development studies, urban studies and African studies fields. Within these fields, this research makes contributions to the literatures on policy integration, urban planning, politics of development/industrialization, integrative spatial planning, infrastructural integration, decentralization, authoritarianism, African urbanization and African politics

The research therefore contributes to the emerging field of the study of Africa's urban industrialization by introducing an analysis of the politics of policy integration. In spite of the fact that integrated development planning and the integration of policies are inherently highly political processes under state-led projects of structural transformation, there has been a virtual absence of urban industrialization analysis that deals with the politics of policy integration in rapidly industrializing African states. Similarly, the policy literature coming

out of international and continental organizations that have shaped the African industrialization agenda (AU, 2011; UNGA, 2016) and the emerging challenges around integrated urban industrial development (UNECA, 2017; 2018) have generally avoided addressing and analyzing the causes, particularly the political drivers, of the rift between the policy spheres. This may be partly influenced by the political positioning of these agencies in relation to the leadership of member states with which they need to maintain working relationships. Similarly Academic studies of spatial and infrastructural challenges arising in host cities (Mitlin, 2020; Hassan et. al., 2020; Goodfellow and Huang, 2021) have failed to look beyond the symptoms and manifestations of the lack of integration in state-driven accelerated industrialization programs.

In the politics of development literature, this study makes a contribution by introducing an analysis of the urban dimension of structural transformation through the lens of policy integration theory. The politics of industrialization/ development literature does not give sufficient account of the urban dimension of development politics in its explanations of success and failures in structural transformation and economic trajectories. Following this general trend, studies that have looked at the politics (Whitfield et. al., 2015) and political economy (Chitonge and Lawrence, 2020) of Africa's recent industrial policy, have tended to overlook the urban and spatial dimensions of spatialized industrial policy in their analysis of the political conditions of industrialization. On the other side, the recent literature that engages with the urban dimensions of IPs in Africa doesn't engage with the political drivers of policy fragmentation (Lawanson and Agunbiade, 2018; G/Egziabher & Yemeru, 2020; Cheru and Fikreselassie, 2020).

At the same time the literatures on effective states, developmental states and political settlements have argued certain forms of politics (centralization of power, levels of state capacity and coherent long-term development visions) underpin periods of successful economic growth, industrialization and structural transformation (Hickey et.al. 2021; Kelsall et. Al., 2010; Pritchett et. al., 2017; Khan,2010). Absent from these interrogations of political systems, however, has been their implications for urban policy and processes of urbanization that define structural transformation. My research highlights the negative effects of authoritarian centralization for conceptual integration, policy coordination and infrastructural integration in the urban-industrial policy sphere, providing a counter argument to theorizing that has stressed the benefits of tight control for steering economic development. As illustrated in the Ethiopian case, strategies for authoritarian centralization

that involve lop-sided distributive regimes can for instance create hostile environments for urban policy or co-optive urban policy regimes which dissociate urban and industrial policy making.

The study links theorizing on authoritarianism with that on the politics of policy integration to grapple with processes of authoritarian centralization and authoritarian decentralization that are critical to the politics of urban industrial integration in Africa. Although recent scholarship has demonstrated that authoritarian regimes are more likely to pursue state led industrialization agendas (Gerring et.al.,2022), and that urban policy is instrumentalized by these regimes to establish and maintain authoritarian rule (Wallace, 2014; Hinfelaar et.al., 2020; Goodfellow and Jackman; 2020), authoritarianism has been taken for granted in the literature on both these processes of structural transformation. This gap creates challenges for the analysis of the politics of urban industrialization in Africa not only because two thirds of the continent remain authoritarian (Basedau, 2019), but also because authoritarianism almost exclusively makes up the political context of rapidly industrializing African states.

This study therefore makes an important contribution to understanding the implications of authoritarianism for urban industrial policy integration in some African states by analyzing the historical foundations of African authoritarianism which has resulted in the prevalence of dominant parties and personalist regimes on the continent. through the prism of the Ethiopian case. As discussed in section 6.2.1, the historical development of authoritarianism in post-colonial personalist and dominant party African states is rooted in challenges of political and territorial integration that remain in different forms to date and that continue to shape the implementation and outcomes of industrial policy and urban policy. It is widely recognized the trajectory of Africa's post-colonial political development has created political systems that challenge the successful development and execution of development policy. While Ethiopia has a unique political history on the continent, its political development has converged with the development of African authoritarianism elsewhere since the emergence of the party as the core institution of both authoritarian rule and political/territorial integration. The mass party became the central mechanism for political integration following the introduction of the socialist party system and the party-state political structure under the Derg. The party became the central mechanism for territorial integration following its evolution into an ethno-federal party state under EPRDF. Together these integrative mechanisms define the scope for policy, spatial and infrastructural integration.

This research makes a significant contribution to the spatial planning literature by highlighting the fact that these integrative mechanisms and party politics substitute, override and control spatial development planning in African authoritarian states. These mechanisms accommodate non-democratic party based spatial decision making which has serious implications on spatial and infrastructural integration. This influence of authoritarian parties on integrative spatial planning, urban industrial policy integration and on the spatial dimensions of industrialization has not received enough attention in the relevant literatures. Studies of the spatial politics of authoritarian regimes have tended to focus on the use of architecture to project power and shape public spaces (Barykina: 2008, Therborn, 2017). The literature on the politics of spatial planning in both democratic (Healey, 1997, 2006; Albrechts, 2003, 2006; Jones, 2006) and authoritarian contexts (Yiftachel, 1997, 1998, 1996, 2006) or dealing with difference within this (Watson, 2009) does not deal with the influence of party systems. The politics literature that deals with African cities, urban governance and party systems tends to focus on service provision and therefore tends to miss the link between party systems and the wider spatial development and infrastructural integration challenges that reinforce service provision challenges (Resnick, 2014; Lambright, 2014; Cameroon, 2014).More generally, the burgeoning literature on African cities that looks at the implications of party politics and elite bargaining for authoritarian survival tends to focus on the scale of the urban and on service provision (Mains, 2016: Asante, 2021:129; Hinfelaar et. al, 2020; Scroese, 2017; Goodfellow and Titeca, 2012; Goodfellow and Jackman, 2020; Mwanga et. al., 2020; Gebremariam, 2020). Economic geography literature that deal with SEZs fail to consider the role of party based spatial decision making for the structure and efficiency of national space economies (Farole and Moberg, 2014; Farole, 2020; Oqubay & Lin, 2020).

In response to all these gaps in these relevant literatures, this research has drawn out and brought to the fore the ways in which authoritarian party-system-based decision-making, power sharing and control shape integrative spatial development planning in the urban – industrial nexus. More generally this research makes a contribution to the African spatial planning literature by illustrating how understanding the influence of nominally democratic institutions like party systems and legislatures on spatial planning institutions in autocracies is critical if spatial planning is to be of any use in projects of structural transformation in Africa. In a similar vein, this research makes a contribution to the literature on Infrastructural integration in Ethiopia and African states with dominant parties and/or personalist regimes

where the governance of infrastructural interfaces is delinked from how political institutions, at play at higher levels, affect these interfaces on the ground (Rode et.al., 2020).

Last but not least, in the policy integration literature, this study contributes to theorizing on urban industrial PI and the politics of PI in African authoritarian states. The study analyses various dimensions of urban industrial PI that are critical to understanding processes of structural transformation that have implications for multiple domains of development. Part of this analysis has been the interrogation of ECA's somewhat abstract concept of the 'African urban industrial Nexus'. This research has anchored the concept in grounded discussions and attitudes prevalent with policy actors where the integration of the urban industrial nexus was interpreted primarily in political terms- as a function of national political and territorial integration. Outside of these wider frameworks, technical efforts of addressing policy, spatial or infrastructural integration were interpreted as futile. Within existing political constraints, the concept of integration was understood to only be meaningful within the territorial fragments and policy domains over which actors at various scales had direct control or authority.

Through the analysis of these limits, the study makes a significant contribution to the general literature on policy integration in non-democratic political systems, which is currently underexplored. Authoritarianism has been overlooked in studies of policy integration because they have overwhelmingly been focused on cases in democratic contexts in the global north and on the themes of environmental policy integration and coherent development cooperation (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Tosun & Lang:2017). This highly technical literature on policy integration (PI) reforms, in these democratic political contexts where PI is established as a policy ideal, provides limited insights for the study of the politics of policy fragmentation in Africa's state-led urban industrialization. The in-depth analysis of PI in the urban industrial nexus in Ethiopia contributes the analysis of PI under African Party Systems and other non-democratic political systems.

Finally, this analysis also speaks back to the literature on policy mobilities, policy learning and Authoritarian developmental states in Africa that have attempted to link East Asian and African industrial policy experiences (Mankandwire, 2001; Routley, 2014; Fourie, 2011, 2012). In these literatures authoritarianism seems to be taken for granted in the study of processes of structural transformation while authoritarianism has framed industrialization

and urbanization in most of the East Asian late industrialiser states (now idealized as developmental states) which African states have sought to emulate in IDDA III. This is particularly important because the emulation of East Asian late industrializers has arguably shaped Africa's current industrialization agendas more than any other. This research contributes to the understanding of the transferability and successful emulation of urban industrial policy by highlighting the ways in which authoritarian variation between these political contexts creates significantly different political and economic conditions for urban-industrial development. The prevalence of personalist regimes in Africa as compared with single party regimes in East Asia affects is just one example of the variations that affects differences in coordinative institutions and the role of the party within this significantly (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011; Ezrow, 2015). Findings show there is a need for more systematic comparative research that confronts the central role of authoritarian variation in shaping policy outcomes, especially around urban-industrial policy.

7.4. Limitations and Strengths

The study used Ethiopia as an extreme case of Africa's urban industrialization in order to explore the ubiquitous problem of fragmentation in urban-industrial policy, planning and development using constructivist grounded theory and interpretive policy analysis approaches. This chapter has summarized the study's findings on political conditions that inhibited integrated urban-industrial policy, planning and development in Ethiopia's ongoing industrial parks development program. The study was conducted between 2018 and 2022 during one of the most turbulent political periods in recent Ethiopian history with rapid changes under intensive political reform and state restructuring, violent civil war, massive internal displacement, economic downturn, numerous natural disasters and the covid pandemic. The methodological approach adopted, the single case research design, the political environment under which the research took place as well the time constraints of the PhD have contributed to the strengths and limitation of this research and its findings, which I reflect on in this section.

In terms of strengths, I was able to generate a large body of rich qualitative data through in-depth interviews with a range of research participants at the heart of urban industrial policy and development. I was also able to carry out rigorous and methodical analysis on this data

and to construct a coherent and grounded explanation of a complex set of conditions that have inhibited integrated urban-industrial development. In the final stages of the PhD, I managed to share the empirical and discussion chapters with key interviewees from the different interpretive communities that took part in my research and to incorporate their feedback in order to enhance the credibility of my findings. As a result of all of these processes, this study constitutes one of the most extensive studies of urban industrial integration in Africa to date.

Furthermore, my positionality as a former participant in the research field allowed me to bring invaluable experiential knowledge into this research project which served as a great strength in applying an interpretivist approach where the researcher is the core research instrument. It also helped with access to high level policy actors who were key protagonists in these processes. My positionality as an informed researcher dealing with the problem of policy silos made the research process itself impactful to a certain degree. Furthermore, my involvement in policy work[231] during my writing up period further contributed to the impact of the research as it allowed me to apply my research findings to addressing the empirical problem that the research is dealing with. Finally, the interpretive policy analysis was carried out in a way that was sensitive to the Amharic interpretive context.

In terms of limitations, through the constructivist interpretivist methodology employed, I sought to develop a sensitive, nuanced, coherent and valid interpretation of the political conditions driving policy fragmentation in the urban industrial nexus that was grounded in the understandings of policy actors involved in policy making and implementation. However, as the analysis of the causes is an interpretive one, with particular epistemological foundations, others might reach different conclusions.

Furthermore, the use of a single case study research design limits the generalizability of the findings on the Ethiopian industrialization projects to other cases on the continent as much as a multiple case comparative project could have. However, the fact that Ethiopia has attempted a spatialized industrial policy at a scale that is unprecedented on the continent and is widely perceived to be a successful case of rapid industrial infrastructural development in cities on the continent makes it an instructive *extreme or pivotal* case *'which can be extreme*

[231] I worked as a consultant on a background paper for the ECA's Ethiopian National Spatial Development Framework Development Project that reviewed African and international experiences in Integrative Spatial Development planning.

and unusual in other ways but central to a developing body of theory' (Yin, 2003: 12) which is in this case theorizing on the African urban-industrial Nexus.

The onset of the Covid pandemic also limited the extent to which I could carry out the iterative processes of data collection and theoretical samplings at the core of the grounded theory approach adopted in the research. While I had initially intended to do multiple trips after I had analyzed the data coming out of the longest period of fieldwork, the Covid lockdowns prevented me from travelling in my third year to collect further data. I was able to carry out online interviews where it was critical to have additional data but had to otherwise work within my dataset, which was significant.

Finally, the political environment in which this policy analysis was conducted created some limitations on the project. As in most studies of authoritarian politics, detailed information on policy discussions, meeting and deliberations were extremely difficult to obtain. Beyond interview data, it was also challenging to secure project reports and policy documents which were at times vital to the analysis. Furthermore, the various political developments that were underway during my field work affected my ability to access important politicians to take part in the research. Key examples of this were the mayor of Hawassa whom I could not reach during my six-month fieldwork period due to processes around the Sidama referendum and Dr. Arkebe Oqubay, whom I reached out to on numerous occasions but was not able to interview in any depth.

7.4. Implications for future research

This focus of this study the politics of urban industrial integration in Ethiopia is a novel research field that opens up various important lines of inquiry, amongst which four are particularly timely. First, as discussed in chapter one, a series of reports by the UNECA have identified lack of integration in the urban-industrial nexus as the most serious challenges to desirable structural transformations on the continent. Building on the findings of the research, future studies might use comparative research to examine the politics of urban industrial integration in other rapidly industrializing and urbanizing African states, including Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (Kweka and Te Velde, 2020; Lopes and Te Velde, 2021).

Second, this study looked at the relation between politicized bureaucracies and spatial development planning, a topic that has received very little attention in the research on both themes. Future research might examine the ways in which politicized bureaucracies in Authoritarian regimes shape spatial planning and development processes. Future studies might also look at the role of party systems as integrative political structures and how this shapes urban industrial integration and policy integration in other spheres given the authoritarian turn in many parts of the world and parties/bureaucracies with similar origins.

Third, in research on Ethiopia, this research could serve as a starting point for the examination of the politics of nexus between urban policies and various economic policies that are come about as part of the reform process that has been underway since 2018. Within this, the emergence of personalist rule under PM Abiy has had serious implications for various economic policies including industrial policy. He has embraced urban regeneration as a top economic policy agenda and as one of the legitimating foundations of his increasingly illiberal regime. Future research can explore the continuities and shifts in the authoritarian politics at the nexus of urban and economic policies.

Finally, future research might also examine the ongoing implications of the country's political structure for its urban policy, its industrial policy and for the nexus. Most recently the growing tensions over the boundaries of Addis Ababa city and Oromia region have become a point of contention, extending the boundary demarcation and expansion challenges affecting the planning and growth of most secondary cities. Perceptions of national disintegration and consequent isolated planning has only been aggravated by the civil war and rise of inter-ethnic conflict since 2018. Future research can examine the implications this has for urban-industrial planning and policy making in an increasingly divided society.

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